An analysis of export support measures with special reference to South Africa, and the impact of the general export incentive scheme.

Abstract

South Africa, in common with many other developing countries, embarked on an import substitution policy to promote development and industrialisation. Although initially successful, it was recognised in the late 1960s that the scope for further import substitution was limited and that alternative development strategies should be embarked upon. Unfortunately, the years of import substitution resulted in high levels of protection and consequently an anti-export bias. In 1972, under the leadership of Dr Reynders, a commission found that South Africa should embark upon a policy of export promotion. In 1980 a new form of export incentive was introduced, viz. Category A and B. Category A incentives were aimed at neutralising the effects of import substitution and compensated exporters fifty per cent of the duty payable on inputs, regardless of whether the inputs were imported or not. Category B incentives compensated exporters for the consequences of cost increasing on non-intermediate inputs because of the import substitution policy and was calculated on the value added. Exporters also enjoyed various grants and tax breaks to enable them to undertake export marketing. The schemes were unsuccessful and were replace by a General Export Incentive Scheme (GElS) in 1990. The main aim of the GElS was to encourage the export of manufactured products. With the means of an econometric model, the success of GElS is evaluated on a sectoral basis. GElS brought with it rent seeking, corruption, lobbying, and threats of countervailing duties. In addition to the enormous costs, exceeding R6 billion, there were other bureaucratic costs. In general, the GElS was not successful. The sectors that did benefit from receiving GElS benefits were the tobacco industry, footwear, furniture, metal products, and electrical machinery. In most cases, exporters would have exported with or without GElS. GElS was simply a windfall. Policy-makers failed to recognise the dynamics of exporting. GElS contributed neither to additional exports, export capacity nor to a sustained competitive advantage. import substitution policy to promote development and industrialisation. Although initially successful, it was recognised in the late 1960s that the scope for further import substitution was limited and that alternative development strategies should be embarked upon. Unfortunately, the years of import substitution resulted in high levels of protection and consequently an anti-export bias. In 1972, under the leadership of Dr Reynders, a commission found that South Africa should embark upon a policy of export promotion. In 1980 a new form of export incentive was introduced, viz. Category A and B. Category A incentives were aim.ed at neutralising the effects of import substitution and compensated exporters fifty per cent of the duty payable on inputs, regardless of whether the inputs were imported or not. Category B incentives compensated exporters for the consequences of cost increasing on non-intermediate inputs because of the import substitution policy and was calculated on the value added. Exporters also enjoyed various grants and tax breaks to enable them to undertake export marketing. The schemes were unsuccessful and were replace by a General Export Incentive Scheme (GElS) in 1990. The main aim of the GElS was to encourage the export of manufactured products. With the means of an econometric model, the success of GElS is evaluated on a sectoral basis. GElS brought with it rent seeking, corruption, lobbying, and threats of countervailing duties. In addition to the enormous costs, exceeding R6 billion, there were other bureaucratic costs. In general, the GElS was not successful. The sectors that did benefit from receiving GElS benefits were the tobacco industry, footwear, furniture, metal products, and electrical machinery. In most cases, exporters would have exported with or without GElS. GElS was simply a windfall. Policy-makers failed to recognise the dynamics of exporting. GElS contributed neither to additional exports, export capacity nor to a sustained competitive advantage.