Truth as correspondence reconsidered.

Abstract

Contemporary philosophical investigations of truth (especially in the analytical philosophical tradition) treat the concept as a “thin concept”, and so reduce truth discourses to conceptual analysis of intentional signs (concepts, propositions) or analysis of the truth predicate by considering its logical, semantic and anaphoric function in sentences (or propositions). This reductive conception of truth neglects the importance of the conscious and intentional act of the subject and thus results in an explosion of deflationary theories, and even the quest for the elimination of truth. Contrary to the views that consider truth as a “thin” concept, I argue that a robust substantive conception of truth as correspondence is essential if we are to account for the importance of truth in philosophy and daily human existence. To account for such an understanding of truth, a philosophical investigation of truth must be explored within a wider context of the human quest for knowledge and self-transcendence. Such examination requires an explicit articulation of the cognitional theory on which a conception of truth is founded. This is because a philosopher’s conception of truth is influenced by the cognitional theory that he or she subscribes to. In other words, a philosophical investigation of truth that aims at adequate exposition must account for the conscious and intentional acts of the human subject, since the importance of the role of the knowing subject in the quest for knowledge and truth cannot be underestimated. To account for the role of the subject and the importance of foundational cognitional theory, the conception of truth as correspondence that is defended in this thesis is based on a comprehensive tripartite (experiencing, understanding and judging) cognitional structure. Moreover, an explicit examination of the cognitional theory on which a theory of truth is based is vital to establish the relation between knowledge, truth, objectivity and being (reality).