



**Exploring the political and economic effects of Xenophobia on South Africa's  
Foreign Policy toward other countries: 2008 – 2019**

**By**

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**A Dissertation submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of  
Philosophy (International Relations) in the School of Social Sciences at the University of  
KwaZulu-Natal.**

**Supervisor**

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**2024**

## DECLARATION

I, Precious Owoha (219080916) declare that

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
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
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Signature: 

## **DEDICATION**

This work is dedicated to all residents of South Africa (citizens and foreigners alike), to all those who understand the relevance of living in peace and have continuously made effort in one way or another to see the achievement of an era of peaceful co- existence, to all who have been affected by Xenophobia and to the families of victims of such act of violence.

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

It has been a very interesting journey for me as I have come to the end of this significant chapter in my life. I would not have made it to this point if not for the encouragement, prayers, support and love of some wonderful individuals and I would not fail to use this opportunity to express my deep gratitude to them. First and most importantly, I would like to thank my Maker, the Almighty God for the life, grace, health, strength and enablement he bestowed on me from the beginning of this journey to the end. He alone is my source and the lifter of my head; without Him, this would have remained only a dream. You deserve all the praise, glory, and adoration of Lord Jesus.

Secondly, I am grateful for my Supervisor Dr. Dorcas Ettang. I appreciate your guidance, encouragement, understanding, and support throughout this phase. You observed my struggle and pointed me rightly. Your words of encouragement are second to none. Thank you for being there at every point. It was also a pleasure working with you and tapping from your knowledge. Thank you for being a source of motivation to me. You are amazing.

I want to thank my dearly beloved Husband, Faith Owoha. Thank you for your support, encouragement, prayers, and patience throughout the journey. This journey lasted longer than anticipated but you were my backbone every step of the way. I love and appreciate you deeply. To my two precious children, Marvel and Ephraim Owoha, thank you for giving me a new perspective to life and being a source of motivation to ensure this journey ends. I cannot thank God enough for blessing me with you. The Lord orders your lives and knows that you can accomplish anything you want with God by your side.

My parents, Joshua and Cordilia Okungbowa (JOSCORD) you are amazing. Thank you for constantly checking up on my progress, praying for and with me, encouraging me during challenging times and giving me space when needed. The success of this journey would not have been complete without you. Words cannot express how much you mean to me. I pray for long life to reap the good fruits of your labour. I love you so much. I would also like to thank my second family, Bishop and Pst. Mrs Owoha, may God bless you for your unending support and prayers. To all my siblings and siblings in-love, Praise Okungbowa, Rejoice Okungbowa, Precious Owoha-Bolanta, Confidence Owoha, Ese Owoha. Thank you for believing in me. You all kept me going, gave me reasons not to give up and saw the glorious end even before I did. I pray that you will always finish strong in all your endeavours.

I would also like to thank Pst. Honour and Pst. Mrs Grace Joseph for your concern and show of love. Words fail me to express my gratitude, but I appreciate you from the bottom of my heart. Mr. Stevie and Dr. Feyi Wayas, thank you for all you did. For all the assistance, acceptance and motivation, God bless you tremendously. My gratitude goes to Mrs. Bunmi Okelola, who always checked up and asked for updates. They propelled me always to do something, no matter how little. Thank you. Tableview Library, South Africa, thank you for opening your doors.

Thank you to Ms Nancy Mudau for helping me through the administrative process from the onset in getting to this point. I want to acknowledge the Vice Chancellor, for the funding which brought a relief especially at the concluding stage of this personal journey. Finally, I want to thank everyone who assisted sincerely, encouraged, prayed and supported me in one way or another through this project's completion. God bless you all. You all are amazing.

## ABSTRACT

The economic and political landscape, both globally and domestically, profoundly influences a nation's well-being, a reality keenly felt in South Africa. Persistent tensions between citizens and foreign nationals have erupted into violent conflicts, demanding a comprehensive and strategic response. Xenophobia remains a critical and life-threatening challenge for foreign nationals within contemporary South Africa. Despite not being a donor country, South Africa's engagement in development cooperation across Africa is central to its foreign policy. However, the scourge of xenophobic violence has tarnished its international reputation and strained diplomatic ties even within the African continent, thus, affecting the potency of its foreign policy.

Drawing from Realism, Constructivism and Securitization theory, this dissertation investigates how security issues are framed through political elites' speech acts, shaping perceptions of existential threats requiring protection. By delving into the root causes of Xenophobia and its economic and political implications for foreign policy, this study contributes to understanding the underlying motivations behind anti-foreign sentiments, particularly towards black foreign nationals. Realism provides insights into the state's role and national interests amidst Xenophobia and foreign policy challenges.

Through structured questionnaires and interviews with diverse stakeholders across South Africa, this research identifies policy gaps and institutional avenues for the state to address underlying conflict drivers and mitigate violent outbreaks. Additionally, it fills a literature gap by exploring the significance and applicability of constructivism and securitization theory within the South African context.

In conclusion, this study confirms the presence of Xenophobia within South Africa and emphasizes the need for tailored frameworks to foster peace both nationally and internationally. Effective peace initiatives must prioritize comprehensive economic and political strategies aimed at resolving conflicts and promoting coexistence among culturally diverse populations. With the aim of bridging the divide of 'us versus them' this study further recommends and encourages the deliberate practice of the spirit of Ubuntu, increasing empathy, with the aim of arriving at a more cohesive community. Thereby, enhancing South Africa's reputation internationally.

## ACRONYMS

ACDEG	-	African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance
ACHPR	-	African Court Of Human And People’s Rights
ACIRC	-	African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises
ACMS	-	African Centre for Migration and Society
AfCFTA	-	African Continental Free Trade Area
AIMS	-	African Institute for Mathematical Science
AISA	-	Africa Institute of South Africa
ANC	-	African National Congress
APRM	-	African Peer Review Mechanism
AU	-	African Union
BMA	-	Border Management Authority
BNC	-	Binational Commission
BRICS	-	Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa
CIA	-	Central Intelligence Agency
CNN	-	Cable News Network
COSAFA	-	Council of Southern Africa Football Associations
COMESA	-	Common Market of East Africa
DA	-	Democratic Alliance
DDG	-	Deputy Director-General
DIRCO	-	Department of International Relations and Cooperation
DFA	-	Department of Foreign Affairs
DHA	-	Department of Home Affairs
DRC	-	Democratic Republic of the Congo
EAC	-	East African Community
ECA	-	Economic Commission for Africa
ECOSOC	-	Economic and Social Council
EFF	-	Economic Freedom Fighters
EU	-	European Union
FCT	-	Federal Capital Territory
FDI	-	Foreign Direct Investments
FNL	-	Forces National de Liberation
FPA	-	Foreign Policy Analysis

GDP	-	Gross Domestic Product
GCRO	-	Gauteng City-Region Observatory
HC	-	High Commission
HRD	-	Human Rights Defender
HRW	-	Human Rights Watch
ICC	-	International Criminal Court
ICT	-	Information and Communication Technology
IDASA	-	Institute for Democracy in South Africa
IFP	-	Inkatha Freedom Party
IGD	-	Institute for Global Dialogue
IMF	-	International Monetary Fund
IOM	-	International Organisation for Migration
IR	-	International Relations
IRJET	-	International Research Journal of Engineering and Technology
IRO	-	International Relations Organization
ISS	-	Institute for Security Studies
JBC	-	Joint Bilateral Commission
JCC	-	Joint Commission of Cooperation
JPCC	-	Joint Permanent Commission for Cooperation
LPA	-	Lagos Plan of Action
MFA	-	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MISTRA	-	Mapungubwe Institute for Strategic Reflection
MoU	-	Memorandum of Understanding
MTN	-	Mobile Telephone Network
NAM	-	Non- Aligned Movement
NACFP	-	National Advisory Committee on Foreign Affairs or Policy
NANS	-	National Association of Nigerian Students
NAP	-	National Action Plan
NEPAD	-	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NGAs	-	Non- Government Actors
NGOs	-	Non- Governmental Organizations
NIIA	-	Nigeria Institute of International Affairs
NPC	-	National Planning Commission
NSAs	-	Non-State Actors

OAU	-	Organization of African Unity
OD	-	Operation Dudula
OEC	-	Observatory of Economic Complexity
PAP	-	Pan- African Parliament
PPP	-	Public Private Partnerships
RDP	-	Reconstruction and Development Programme
RECs	-	Regional Economic Communities
S&T	-	Science and Technology
SA	-	South Africa
SACU	-	Southern African Customs Union
SADC	-	Southern African Development Community
SADCC	-	Southern African Development Coordination Conference
SAHRC	-	South African Human Rights Commission
SAI	-	South African Institute
SAIIA	-	South African Institute of International Affairs
SAPS	-	South African Police Service
SAMP	-	Southern African Migration Programme
SANDF	-	South African National Defence Force
SASSA	-	South African Social Security Agency
SGBV	-	Sexual and Gender-Based Violence
SOES	-	State- Owned Enterprise
SRD	-	Social Relief of Distress Grant
SSR	-	Security Sector Reform
TFTA	-	Tripartite Free Trade Area Agreement
UN	-	United Nations
UNHCR	-	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNSC	-	United Nations Security Council
WB	-	World Bank
WTO	-	World Trade Organisation
ZANU PF	-	Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front
ZEP	-	Zimbabwean Exemption Permit
ZIFA	-	The Zimbabwe Football Association

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# CHAPTER ONE

## INTRODUCTION

### 1.1 Background to the Study

The global and domestic economic and political environment is highly significant to a country's wellbeing, and South Africa is not exempt. The basis of South Africa's foreign policy is supportive of its domestic policy objectives. On a more extensive scale, the policy aims to promote development within Africa via regional integration. Against this, Makokera (2015:3) in (Isike and Ogunnubi, 2017:4) stated that in South Africa's National Development Plan (Chapter 7), 'favourably positioning South Africa globally' is the focus of South Africa's foreign policy. This is reinforced by the campaign for democracy, human rights, and pursuit of the African Agenda (DIRCO, 2016: 2). The development of foreign policy is influenced by domestic considerations (Encyclopaedia Britannica: 2009) such as enhancing the economy which in turn, serves as a source of power in the international scene. The Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO, 2016), regarding the area of international relations, states that South Africa, as attributed by other countries, needs to develop and employ strategies to achieve these goals. These bring up questions about how feasible the agenda is, with Xenophobia lurking and eating deep into the system. It is of note that its effects are never commendable but tragic and, as a result, affects relationships and peaceful co-existence between states.

With that in mind, Izueke *et al.* (2014: 367) postulated that humanity consistently makes an effort to promote people's wellbeing within their local, national, and international community because of the longing for a peaceful existence. Within foreign policy, the assumption is that it is created and developed to improve certain goals and objectives, with the people in mind. Considering South Africa's foreign policy, the Department of Foreign Affairs (2006) noted that "well into its second decade in power, the African National Congress (ANC)- led South African government perceives its foreign policy as based on democratic principles and practices, which are attuned to the interests of 'the people' or 'the masses'. These ideals, Chikane (2001) argues, seem to be in line with Thabo Mbeki's presidency (1999 – 2008) and the Special Report back to the Nation document 'Integrated Democratic Governance: A Restructured Presidency at Work'. This idea of a people-centred and citizen inclusive foreign policy seems to consider that foreign policy goals are meant to improve

the lot and experiences of South Africans, which involves improving relations with states that could benefit and improve its economy. On this basis, van Wyk, (2012: 79) declared that:

*In the latter, the Mbeki Presidency declared, explained and justified the various attempts it had taken to 'put people first' – also in the South African foreign policy decision- making process and conduct. This was not a novel claim to make. Before 1994, the ANC (1993) released its future foreign policy for South Africa, namely Foreign Policy in a New Democratic South Africa. Notwithstanding these declaratory statements, the citizens of South Africa remain largely excluded from decision-making on public policy issues beyond their state's borders. This contributes to South Africans' disempowerment and alienation from and apathy towards especially foreign policy. This was, for example, poignantly illustrated in May 2008 when widespread xenophobic violence erupted in South Africa.*

Xenophobia is termed as violence and hatred towards foreigners. In South Africa, Xenophobia is prevalent in townships where immigrants are tagged “kwerekwere”, a disapproving word for African immigrants (Khosa & Kalitani 2014). The phenomenon is much more intricate as only black ‘foreigners’ from Africa are often targeted by xenophobic actions, notwithstanding South Africa hosting foreigners from all parts of the world. Furthermore, it was established by the South African Migration Project (SAMP) that South Africa has one of the highest levels of Xenophobia in the world and this is habitually directed towards black and African immigrants (Laher, 2009: 1). Despite its ill repute, Xenophobia in South Africa seems only to attract more attention when there are violent outbreaks.


It has become a reoccurrence in South Africa. Its impacts over the years have resulted in certain negative outcomes in the nation’s local and international political and economic status, hence the need for this research. Therefore, this study primarily focuses on the effects of Xenophobia and xenophobic attacks on the republic’s foreign policy to other African countries. It examines the effects on its foreign policy's political and economic areas, focusing on 2008-2019. The choice of this period is because 2008 saw the emergence of stronger xenophobic attacks and significant physical damage with the most recent xenophobic attacks occurring in 2019. In 2008, for instance, xenophobic attacks “began in Johannesburg and spread to other cities such as Pretoria and Cape Town” (Tella, 2016). As a result, loss of lives and valuable properties were experienced by both migrants and South African citizens.

To shed further light on these attacks, (Crush, 2008) notes that:

*in terms of its spontaneity and rate of spread, its extent and mode of implementation, and its ferocity and viciousness, the spurt of sporadic xenophobic attacks on predominantly foreign African residents in South Africa that started in and around the Alexandra township in Johannesburg on the night of 11th May 2008 and escalated a week later, spreading to other parts of the country, was a watershed in the history of migrant-host relationships in Africa. Also, the novelty of the xenophobic attacks of May 2008 prompted analysts to raise questions about the identification, analysis and management of the determinants of attitudes toward migrants in South Africa.*

This analysis by Crush (2008) raises two key points for consideration. The first is that Xenophobia in South Africa has increasingly become a common occurrence such that xenophobic violence occurs annually (Figure 1.1). Secondly, it reflects the intense violence that has come to characterise anti-migrant sentiments and responses in South Africa and the cost of this foreign nationals, South Africans and the South African government itself.

**Figure 1.1: Threats, attacks and killings against foreigners in South Africa**



Source: Xenowatch and African Centre for Migration and Education (2019)

While the previous table ends in 2018, xenophobic violence continue to occur. For example, xenophobic attacks occurred in 2019 very intensely leading to colossal loss of property and livelihoods. Figure 1.2 shows how Xenophobia has become destructive as violent incidents and victimisation has led to death, physical assaults, displacement of large populations, the looting of shops and constant threats to safety and property. More recently, the rise of Operation Dudula (OD) has led to targeted attacks on migrants using a vigilante like approach. They have been involved in attacks on foreign nationals who are informal traders by searching and seizing their goods and belongings. Operation Dudula which means to ‘push back’ or ‘fight back’ continues to intimidate, attack and victimize foreigners, these activities going unabated. (Xenowatch: 2019, Dratwa, B: 2024)

**Figure 1.2: Xenophobic violent incidents and types of victimisation (1994 – 2018)**

	1994-2018	2018 alone
Total number of incidents	529	42
Deaths	309	12
Physical assaults	901	29
Displaced	100,000+	1,145
Shops looted	2,139	139
Threats to safety/property	257	23

**Source: Xenowatch and African Centre for Migration and Education (2019)**

The increase in xenophobic violence and the attacks will have implications beyond South Africa’s borders, thus the need to particularly reflect on what this will mean for South Africa’s foreign policy and foreign relations. Violence in one country can spill over into all aspects of that society including the economy, trade, security. It does not remain there, however, as its effects can be felt in other states and impact their relations. It could further worsen relationships between states and lead to further escalation of relationships. This study will explore these dynamics further.

## **1.2 Definition of concepts**

### **1.2.1 Foreign national**

The term foreign national refers to an individual who is not a naturalised citizen of a country. According to the Collins Dictionary, “it is “a person residing in a country without the right to permanent residence in that country”. Using this definition, they temporarily reside in

their host country for work, education, or other short-term stays. Other terms of foreign nationals include foreigners, migrants, non-nationals and immigrants. Many governments use the term distinguishes foreigners from naturally both citizens and what rights and opportunities the former can access. In South Africa, the word *Amakwerekwere* is used to refer to foreigners. Kwerekwere (singular) is an “onomatopoeic (imitative of an incomprehensible sound), derogatory term used by black South Africans in many parts of the country to refer to foreigners, especially African immigrants, and also to people of particular ethnicities from South Africa” (Jacobs, 2022:227).

### **1.2.2 Foreign Policy**

Foreign policy is critical in international relations and global politics. Heywood (2011:129) defines foreign policy as “attempts by governments to influence or manage events outside the state’s borders, usually, but not exclusively, through their relations with foreign governments.” This requires identifying the state’s goals and objectives concerning its relations with other countries and determining the best ways and methods to achieve them. Usually referred to as external relations, states use various instruments to meet their foreign policy goals. These instruments include diplomacy, sanctions, negotiation, embargoes, or foreign aid among many others.

### **1.2.3 Foreign Policy in South Africa**

We have established how critical foreign policy is in international relations as it involves governments’ strategies and attempts at managing external relations. As stipulated in the Discussion document on foreign policy for South Africa (1996), South Africa develops foreign policy principles and practical foreign policy objectives and priorities that align with the country’s needs and resources. Its foreign policy development is done by responsible but flexible reactions from the government departments and others involved in the sphere. South Africa’s foreign relations in this regard are guided by a commitment and dedication to global peace, adherence to internationally accepted conflict resolution mechanisms, prioritizing Africa’s interests in world affairs and commitment to economic development through regional and international cooperation in an interdependent and interconnected world (UN, 2023). This involves not forgetting its dedication to promoting human rights and democracy and a commitment to uphold justice and international law in the conduct of international relations.

### **1.2.4 Xenophobia**

Grouped in the same category as racism, Xenophobia has become a popular form of intolerance and discrimination globally. Its main idea is simply the hate for others, in this case foreigners. The term “phobia” brings the idea that there is a fear of the ‘other’ as they pose a threat to one’s safety, security and prosperity. This perhaps explains the level at which foreign nationals are attacked and why they are treated poorly. Jones (2011) while conducting a study on Toxic Xenophobia and Pedagogy of resistance, identifies three interrelated forms of Xenophobia, namely: exclusive, possessive and toxic. While exclusive means the ‘other’ is different from those in the host community and has to leave outside of their ‘imagined community’, possessive Xenophobia goes further than noting the difference between the group and the community to include the idea that the other group is trying to take the jobs and services (healthcare, social assistance among others) of the host community. Toxic Xenophobia sees the other ‘group’ as different but also coming to destroy what the host community holds dear. In line with this, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) defines Xenophobia as “attitudes, prejudices and behaviour that reject, exclude and often vilify persons, based on the perception that they are outsiders or foreigners to the community, society or national identity.” (IOM UN Migration, 2023:14)

### **1.2.5 State**

The key actors in politics and international relations are states. States are defined as “a political association that establishes sovereign jurisdiction within defined territorial borders, and exercises authority through a set of permanent institutions” (Heywood, 2013:57). Within their borders, the state plays a wide range of roles from providing security, organising society, collecting and disbursing taxes for the development of society. In the context of foreign policy, the state represents its people outside its borders. It develops relationships with external entities and implements foreign policy with the interest of its public in mind.

### **1.2.6 Non-state actors**

International politics has seen an increasing influx of non-state actors all playing different roles and promoting various goals and agendas in the world. These actors have a growing influence in global and local politics. These non-state actors (also referred to as non-government actors) range from civil society, multinational corporations, terrorist groups and nongovernmental organisations. Some of these non-state actors have larger incomes than some governments. For example, “based on the (rather crude) comparison between corporate sales and countries’ GDP, 51 of the world’s 100 largest economies are corporations; only 49 are countries” (Heywood,

2013:24). Other non-state actors boast of a growing network and influence across the world (Greenpeace, Human Rights Watch). While one can argue that states remain the most dominant actors globally, they are not the only one.

### **1.2.7 Political factors**

It has been established that among other factors, political and economic considerations are vital in forming and establishing foreign policy objectives in the international scene. For this study however, the political and economic factors (though sometimes influence each other and can be categorised as domestic determinants) (Mamchii, O.: 2023), are identified.

Political factors are simply elements of features related to government policies and political decisions that shape the economic environment within which international political economy operates. These political factors can moreover, consist of laws, regulations, government stability, interaction between politicians, and foreign policies that impact global economic trends and relations.

### **1.2.8 Economic factors**

The rate of a country's economic growth largely determines the power potential of such country as well as how soon the country can become a major economic power in the global arena. This consequently determines and affects the viability of the country's political system over a period of time (Bandopadhyaya, J: 1969).

An economic factor according to Mahr, N. (2022), is defined as "anything that has a bearing on the economy". These factors can stem from several sources such as politics, society, technology, laws, or the environment. It is worthy of note that while many factors influence the economy, some have a more significant impact than others. Although focusing on the domestic level (within a state), Mahr, N. (2022) gave instances of how various factors can impact the economy when it was mention thus:

*"For example, a change in the interest rate is likely to have a greater effect on the economy than a change in the price of gasoline. Some businesses will be more or less affected by certain economic factors than others. For example, a change in the interest rate is likely to have a greater effect on businesses that borrow money than businesses that do not."*

This is also significant in the international system and draws attention to the importance of understanding various economic factors which can help states mitigate risks as well as take advantage of opportunities.

### 1.3 Statement of the Problem

In South Africa, Xenophobia is observed as being different and unique. Its uniqueness has resulted to it being labelled as ‘targeted Xenophobia as it is, mainly directed at African foreign nationals, hence the term ‘Afrophobia’ (Tirivangasi, 2017). Since South Africa attained democracy, there has been an inflow of migrants from various parts of the world, especially from its neighbouring countries. As of 2020, there was almost 3 million migrants in South Africa from within and outside the continent (Figure 1.1). Most of them from its neighbouring countries like Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Lesotho, Eswatini, Angola and Botswana.

**Figure 1.3: Immigrants in South Africa, 2020**

Country of Origin	Number	Percent of Total
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>2,860,500</b>	<b>100%</b>
Zimbabwe*	690,200	24%
Mozambique*	350,500	12%
Lesotho*	192,000	7%
Malawi*	94,100	3%
United Kingdom	67,400	2%
Democratic Republic of the Congo*	63,900	2%
Somalia	58,500	2%
Botswana*	50,500	2%
Angola*	47,900	2%
Eswatini*	45,400	2%

Source: United Nations Population Division, “International Migrant Stock 2020: Destination and Origin,” (2020).

Various factors propelled the inflow of migrants from the African continent, including political refugees, economic crisis, and others seeking greener pastures. Refugees and asylum seekers make up a component of migrants in South Africa (Figure 1.2) as they leave their countries due to war, violence and other forms of persecution. It is quite likely that the total of 250,200 is not a significant reflection of the country’s true number of refugees and asylum seekers, due to poor reporting, and the failure of individuals to make their statuses known. Refugees and asylum seekers can apply for grants from the South African Social Security Agency (SASSA) such as the Social

Relief of Distress (SRD) Grant. This perhaps explains resentment towards foreigners as they compete with locals for limited resources.

**Figure 1.4: Asylum Seekers and Refugees in South Africa, 2020**

Country of Origin	Number of Refugees and Asylum Seekers	Percent of Total
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>250,200</b>	<b>100%</b>
Ethiopia	63,700	25%
Democratic Republic of the Congo	57,600	23%
Somalia	27,800	11%
Bangladesh	25,700	10%
Zimbabwe	14,900	6%
Congo	12,300	5%
Burundi	9,600	4%
Pakistan	8,900	4%
Nigeria	5,500	2%
Uganda	4,500	2%

**Source:** UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR); “Refugee Data Finder,” (2020)

In many instances, African migrants who fall in this group are victims of xenophobic attacks because they settle in the lower class of the South African community, resulting in constant struggle for houses, jobs, services, business opportunities and other means of livelihood. This is what Wutawunashe (2011) refers to as ‘Afrophobia’, Africans loathing Africans. The attacks of 2008 were characterized as criminal and were, according to President Mbeki, not xenophobically motivated (The Presidency, 2008). Bekker S. (2015: 243) also supported this notion when he opined that the Police Minister Nhleko in April 2015, said he struggled hard to assess the attacks on foreigners as just Xenophobia simply. On that note, He was said to have suggested that “In a sense, what we are witnessing are Afrophobic kinds of activities and attacks, resembling elements of self-hate among Africans. The evidence shows the attacks are mainly against the Congolese, Zimbabweans, Malawians, Somalis and some South African nationals as well” (Gqirana 2015 in Bekker S., 2015: 243).

Other xenophobic attacks such as those in 2015 brought about various reactions from different African countries. As Kinge (2016:47) highlighted, “there were urgent calls from home countries, particularly Malawi, Kenya and Nigeria, to evacuate their own from amongst South Africans in South Africa”. Quoting Angen (2016; 19), Crush & Ramachandran (2009) recorded that despite the evidence of the growing Xenophobia in South Africa, the government has mainly ignored the problem. Economically, the outbreak of xenophobic attacks on Nigerians living in South Africa and the looting of their shops and stores led to a retaliatory attack on a South African owned

company in Nigeria. On February 23, 2017, protesters looted and vandalized office equipment of the head office of telecommunications giant MTN in the Federal Capital Territory (FCT), Abuja.

Stakeholders in Nigeria were also reported as charging the AU and ECOWAS to ensure that the rules for protection of migrants are prominently featured in national laws of countries in the continent. In the same vein, it is also reported that the Nigerian government ‘appealed for caution from Nigerians and other arms of government’ in an attempt to ‘douse the anger.’ Gadzikwa and Asakitikpi (2015: 228).

Regional bodies in Africa also reacted to the attacks. According to Gadzikwa and Asakitikpi (2015: 227), these regional bodies were mainly from the Southern African region and such bodies include the SADC, AU, ZIFA, AIMS, and ambassadors. The newspaper reports they analysed revealed that these bodies condemn the acts of violence using words such as ‘unacceptable,’ with the African Union (AU) further calling ‘for an immediate halting of violence.’ The Kenyan Ambassador also, called for ‘tolerance in South Africa,’ while the Ambassador to the United Nations High Commission for Refugees also called for being ‘calm.’ Gadzikwa and Asakitikpi (2015) also note that the SADC advised foreigners who are affected “not to retaliate, but they must engage in dialogue to end the problem”. In contrast, the African Institute for Mathematical Science (AIMS) spoke to South Africans stating that “Xenophobia had caused irreparable damage to the country.”

Neighbour Zimbabwe included its voice in speaking against the xenophobic attacks. Consequently, the ruling party, ZANU PF in Zimbabwe: “called for the immediate cessation of xenophobic attacks because the continued violence makes a mockery of the persistent calls for unity in the SADC region.”(Gadzikwa and Asakitikpi, 2015: 227). In addition, Zimbabwean President, who was in the position of SADC Chairperson, called on “SADC member states to put mechanisms in place to ensure their citizens flocking South Africa return to take up opportunities at home.” (Gadzikwa and Asakitipi, 2015:227). There were many expressions of shock and disdain at the violent attacks experienced by migrants in South Africa. This was particularly gruesome as bodies were burnt and migrants were injured and lost their valued belonging. It was also noted that the football fans, through the ZIFA in Zimbabwe, advocated for the country in protest, to withdraw from the 2015 Council of Southern Africa Football Associations (COSAFA) Cup.

Diplomatically, since the 2008 edition of anti-foreigner violence, Nigeria and South Africa have been making efforts towards patching their diplomatic relations. To this end, Ige (2018:101)

opined that “once there is a severe row between countries the next option is recalling ambassadors and whenever there exists a breakdown of a relationship between countries, it usually takes time for such to be restored taking into cognizance the position of Nigeria and South Africa in the African continent”. Furthermore, one of the social impacts of xenophobic attacks is African disunity. According to Ige (2018: 101-102), when Africans see and treat their fellow brothers and sisters with such violence, despite regarding each other with common history and descent, it breeds disunity within the continent. The consequence of such actions and disunity is the dread Africans will inhabit when visiting other countries in the continent.

As a result of the intensity of the outbreak in 2019, an airline was sent from Nigeria for easy evacuation. Reports show that following the outbreak of the xenophobic attacks, the Malawian government similarly threatened to withdraw its citizens from South Africa. In addition, Mozambican President Filipe Nyusi, according to Shaban and Mumbere (2019), expressed displeasure on, and sternly condemned the acts of xenophobic incidents in neighbouring South Africa. He also stated that the government had activated processes to repatriate affected nationals. This action made Mozambique the second African nation to do so. In the wake of the xenophobic attacks, several African states expressed displeasure with the violence perpetrated against their citizens. For example, Ogunnoiki and Adefisayo (2019: 13) noted that Nigeria had borne the impact of a great number of the xenophobic attacks and extra-judicial killings in South Africa. The Senior Special Assistant to the President Buhari on Foreign Affairs and Diaspora, Mrs Abike Dabiri-Erewa, furthermore states that between year 2016 and 2018, not less than 117 Nigerian citizens were extra-judicially killed in South Africa for one flimsy reason or another (Vanguard, 2018). These egregious killings of Nigerians in South Africa have in several ways impacted on Nigeria-South Africa relations economically, diplomatically and socially (Ogunnoiki and Adefisayo, 2019).

In the heat of the 2019 attacks, a video message was posted on Twitter by President Cyril Ramaphosa, he used the social media avenue to condemn the violence strongly and requested an immediate cessation on all xenophobic actions but reports from Human Rights Watch (2019) noted that the violence continued and did not stop. BBC has reported that the President expressed his shame from the recent violence. “We are very concerned and of course as a nation we are ashamed because this goes against the ethos of what South Africa stands for,” (BBC News, 2019). The President apologised to Nigeria as South Africa's international relations minister Naledi Pandor commented. This she said because “Nigeria was notably outspoken” BBC (2019). The South African President declared that he would send high-ranking representatives to reassure different

African countries following the xenophobic attacks which had their nationals targeted. By way of acknowledgement, the former president of Nigeria, Muhammadu Buhari thanked his South African counterpart for sending a special envoy to apologize over the recent xenophobic attacks. The special envoy, Jeff Radebe, told President Buhari that the attacks on foreign nationals do not reflect South Africa's "value system, nor those of the larger number of South Africans" (Shaban and Mumbere, 2019).

On this premise, this study explores how these xenophobic attacks have influenced or shaped South Africa's foreign policy, given that the presence of Xenophobia in South Africa during the period of 2008-2019 has significantly influenced the country's foreign policy decisions towards some African countries. Foreign policy in post-1994 South Africa, is aimed to be utilized to the latter's advantage but the achievement of this goal has been threatened by Xenophobia which intensified with the opening of international borders.

Considering the above discussions and peculiar interests about South Africa's political economy, this research sets to examine the effects and implications of Xenophobia on its foreign policy throughout 2008-2019 by comprehensively analyzing how xenophobic incidents, both domestically and internationally perceived, shaped South Africa's economic engagement, political strategies, and diplomatic relations with its African neighbours. By examining the interplay between xenophobic sentiment and foreign policy actions, this study seeks to uncover the underlying motivations, constraints, as well as implications for South Africa's regional leadership, economic interests, and international reputation within the African continent."

While there is extensive academic research on the causes, nature and effects of Xenophobia domestically (Chinomona and Maziriri, 2015; Tella, 2016; Ige 2018; Morris, 2008; Biekpe, 2008; and Crush & Ramachandran, 2016), it has been observed that there is not enough academic engagement with regards to the effects of Xenophobia on South Africa's foreign policy to other African countries. In addressing this gap and for a more authentic data acquisition, contact was established with some African embassies of victims of the reoccurring xenophobic attacks in South Africa. Similarly, the increase in attacks against African foreign nationals in South Africa has triggered growing resentment between South Africa and the affected countries (Krippahl C. (2019). South Africa is used as a case study because of the nature of its racial past as well as the recent xenophobic attacks. That is why Minnar (2005: 292), recognizes that these anti-foreigner approaches have been practised zealously and frequently in the last years, thus deserving serious

attention in the context of human rights and the general South African approach to migration and foreign policies and the role of government.

#### **1.4 Research Objectives**

Based on the discussions above, the primary objective of this study is to determine whether and the extent to which Xenophobia affect South Africa's relation with other African countries.

Specifically, the following objectives underpin this study:

- a. Examine the effects of Xenophobia on South Africa's foreign policy between 2008 - 2019.
- b. Explore the effects of Xenophobia on South Africa's political relationships with other African countries.
- c. Establish the effects of Xenophobia on South Africa's economic status and relations with other African countries
- d. Explore the future of South Africa's foreign policy within the context of Xenophobia.

#### **1.5 Research Questions**

This study seeks to provide answers to the following key research questions:

- a. How has Xenophobia affected South Africa's foreign policy?
- b. What are the effects of Xenophobia on South Africa's political relationship with other African countries?
- c. What are the effects of Xenophobia on South Africa's economic status and relations with other African countries?
- d. How will Xenophobia influence the future of South Africa's foreign policy?

## 1.6 Significance of the Study

Conceptually, 'international' involves more than one country and is concerned with relations between different countries. By implication, no country survives independently and therefore must relate with others to exist, hence, the need for foreign policies. The term foreign policy has been defined in various ways by scholars; however, a recurring line of thought is its concern with the behaviour of a state towards other states. Hermann (1978:34), for instance (in Bojang, 2018), defined foreign policy as "the discrete purposeful action that results from the political level decision of an individual or group of individuals". Also, Modelski (1962) defines foreign policy as "the system of activities evolved by communities for changing the behaviour of other states and adjusting their activities to the international environment".

Furthermore, the Britannica encyclopaedia defines foreign policy as "general objectives that guide the activities and relationships of one state in its interactions with other states". Foreign policy development is influenced by domestic considerations, the policies or behaviour of other states, or plans to advance specific geopolitical designs. It can be carried out via various means, otherwise called 'tools'. The major foreign policy tools are alliances, international trade, diplomacy, and war.

Considering the foreign policy of South Africa in this context, the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO, 2016: 2) referred to it as that which is "based on principles, values and national interest. The promotion of human rights, democracy, and the pursuit of the African Agenda underpins it". To this end, South Africa's former Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, Lindiwe Sisulu, mentioned that the foreign policy of the country has progressed over many years, fashioned by Oliver Tambo as he made the struggle of South Africa known to the world; and crystalized and given expression by Nelson Mandela as he ensured South Africa was firmly put on the international stage. All this, she added, is appropriately summarised in the African National Congress' (ANC) 54<sup>th</sup> National Conference Declaration: "We remain committed to the founding values of the struggle for a humane, just, equitable, democratic and free world". She further stated that the country has over time been consolidating it, and this boils down to: "a better life for all, a better life for all of us equally as South Africans, a better life for our continent, and a better life for the world, embedded in a desire to create and preserve peace" (Foreign Policy Journal, 2018: 9).

It should be considered that South Africa's approach to and execution of its foreign policy must be based on an understanding of the domestic, regional, and global political and economic realities.

The political and economic environment consist of all laws, government agencies, and lobbying groups that influence or restrict individuals or organisations in the society. An input by Charles (2013: 4) reveals that “South Africa focuses and makes input on matters of governance at various multinational platforms for the improvement of governance structures across the globe.” He further stated that South Africa has played a crucial role in mediation and peacekeeping on the continent, adding that it has answered many calls for help on the continent with disasters of one kind or the other, including public health emergencies and humanitarian assistance. These can be categorised as some of South Africa’s foreign interests and objectives, leading to the formation of policies and ways to execute them.

South Africa makes deliberate effort to address its domestic necessities as articulated in the NDP and national interest while also considering other countries' needs. Also, over the past two decades South Africa’s diplomatic efforts have included conflict resolution, peacekeeping, conflict prevention and mediation. Even with these notions, Xenophobia and xenophobic violence has affected its international reputation and, by extension, foreign relations even with other African countries. Xenophobia is known to be an act against foreigners; these foreigners, in turn, are citizens of their home country whose governments (through their embassies) protect them. With violence against their citizens, the relations between states are negatively affected if matters concerning their citizens in the host country are not handled logically. In the case of South Africa, failure to adequately handle the conflict between its citizens and foreigners has affected its reputation in the international environment thus, influencing the foreign policies of states.

A historical background of South Africa sheds light on the evolution of Xenophobia in the country. According to Harris (2001: 70), South Africa’s apartheid, prompted the xenophobic mind-sets observed in today’s South Africa, such that the oppression of black nationals during the apartheid regime propelled some to be close-minded, to remain suspicious of and to mistrust foreigners. The case of South Africa started in the 1980s, but more recently in the early 1990s. As Solomon (2008:3) and Matzopoulos, Corrigan and Bowman (2009: 11) pointed out, some examples include the March 1990 Xenophobic assault ‘Hlaphekani’ in which natives burned 300 huts belonging to Mozambicans. Likewise, in 1993 as Choane, M., Shulika L.S and Mthombeni M. (2011: 132) mentioned, locals in Cape Town expressed grievances that Namibians and Angolans were gaining access to land and services, while many South Africans remained homeless. Another example includes the 1994 clash between indigenous Xhosa and Namibian fishermen. The locals alleged that Namibians were stealing their jobs on the fishing boats, and not engaging in collective bargaining with the employers over the rewards system and work conditions, working for less than

the standard rate. In addition to these was the 1995 movement ‘Operation Buyelekhaya’ (go back home) incident which sprung up in the Alexandra township. (Solomon, 2008: 3; Matzopoulos, et. al., 2009: 11)

This discrimination and violence against migrants according to Matzopoulos, et. al., 2009: 1), needs to be looked at in the context of broader structural or institutional discrimination. This form of discrimination is deemed to manifest in discriminatory government policies and abuse of migrants by civil servants, such as the police, border control or repatriation centre staff. Governments in Africa, Latin America and Asia for example, have been criticized for disrespecting and violating the rights of migrants and for using migrants as scapegoats to explain unemployment and crime. This is evident in mass repatriation programmes at short- notice and abuse of migrants in repatriation facilities (Ratha & Shaw, 2007; Zoomers & van Naerssen, 2006). Without a doubt, migrants who travel to other developing countries are more likely in positions to be expelled than are those who migrate to industrial countries (Ratha & Shaw, 2007 in Matzopoulos, et. al., 2009: 1). “The current situation in the Ivory Coast where many Ivorians must show documentation of local ancestry to enjoy full citizen rights is a prime example of institutional discrimination. It is important to recognize that discriminatory policies both result from and contribute to broader societal Xenophobia and discrimination.” (Matzopoulos, et. al., 2009: 1)

Just as in other parts of Africa and the world at large, Xenophobia in South Africa is not a new phenomenon. Crush (2014) in this regard noted that “violent Xenophobia has become a regular feature of South African life. Everyday animosity frequently spills over into violence against individual migrants and refugees and their economic enterprises.” For this reason, Long, Chiliza and Stein (2015: 510) observed and referred to South Africa as one of the “more violent places on earth”. They further ascertain that South Africa has been and continues to be a country with high levels of criminal violence, political violence, and domestic violence. And even now, violence against fellow Africans is being witnessed. While many have termed this ‘Xenophobia’, a more accurate term may be ‘Afrophobia’. In a bid to address the question of what the cause or trigger of Afrophobia is, as well as the relationship between the institutional, interpersonal and structural violence that persists in SA, Long et al., (2015) highlight some perceived factors, ranging from the “macrostructural and socioeconomic (e.g. the colonial-apartheid legacy, persistent socioeconomic)” inequalities through to the micro-political and psychological effects (e.g. the effects of ‘foreign’ entrepreneurship on township economies and the likelihood that some of those involved in the killings have a history of antisocial behaviour). In addition, they opine that the country is suffering from an “epidemic of displaced anger” upheld by a macro-politics of exclusion

and a micro-politics of daily insults. This experience has led to misplaced priority in the sense that the citizens rather tilt towards scapegoating those with little or no connection to the source of anger instead of dealing with the source of their anger which they indicate as a prevailing public emotion among South Africans today.

Crush (2014) stated, "some of these incidents reach the scrutiny of the media and officialdom but remain invincible and unremarked." In the 1970s, as highlighted by Biepke (2008: 4), Ghanaians under the 'Aliens' Compliance Order' chased Nigerians out of their country and in the 1980s, the Nigerians retaliated by chasing hundreds of thousands of Ghanaians out of their country (Zondi, 2008: 30). This vicious anti-foreigner practice is very much an international issue, credited mostly to the rapid globalisation of the social order, which stimulates the migration of people, from developing and less developed countries to greener pastures. The South African expression of intolerance towards their fellow Africans has attracted analysis due to its somewhat hypocritical nature (Masenya (2017: 86 and Kalitanyi & Visser, 2010). This can however, be understood on the notion that "the crisis of Xenophobia is a contradiction to that which is ubiquitously referred to as the theology or philosophy of Ubuntu (translating as "human kindness" and "the belief in a universal bond of sharing that connects all humanity" (Couper, 2015). Migration to South Africa indicates her emergence as Africa's preeminent economic, educational, and cultural centre, and from an international standpoint, it is seen as something of a duty to share this prosperity with its African counterparts (Kalitanyi and Visser, 2010; Zouandé, 2011; Hussein and Hitomi, 2013; Gumede, 2015). Biekpe (2008:4) further opined that "to allow citizens of one member state to think and act in xenophobic ways about citizens of another, is ultimately extremely destructive of regional cooperation and harmony".

Against this and judging from the xenophobic attacks in South Africa, it is safe to say that there have been some laxities with regards to upholding some of its policies, among others, and this has a huge implication on the various sectors of the country, directly and indirectly. For instance, that concerns promoting human rights, including the right to life and others.

Mainly, the contribution of this study to existing literature is placed in its comprehensive analysis of the relationship between Xenophobia and South Africa's foreign policy towards other African countries during the period of 2008-2019. Specifically, the study adds to the erudite discourse in several key ways:

- i. **In-depth Examination:** The study deeply delves into the phenomenon of Xenophobia in South Africa and its impact on foreign policy, thereby providing a nuanced understanding of how domestic issues influence international relations.
- ii. **Temporal Scope:** The study, by focusing on the period from 2008 to 2019, captures a critical time frame marked by significant xenophobic incidents and changes in South Africa's foreign policy landscape, offering awareness into the evolution of the country's approach to African diplomacy.
- iii. **Multi-dimensional Analysis:** The research not only explores the economic implications of Xenophobia on foreign policy but also investigates its political and diplomatic ramifications. This approach enriches existing literature by providing a comprehensive examination of the subject matter.
- iv. **Identification of Motivations and Constraints:** Through its analysis, the study identifies the underlying motivations driving South Africa's foreign policy responses to Xenophobia, as well as the constraints that shape its decision-making process. This contributes to a deeper understanding of the factors influencing state behaviour in the face of domestic and international challenges.

To this effect, this paper is drafted to address how the act of Xenophobia affects South Africa's political and economic position regarding its foreign policy objectives. However, this research's importance lies in enhancing knowledge and thus revealing the relevance of obtaining and maintaining a conducive environment for co-existence void of conflict. Therefore, establishing new grounds in studying foreign policy and Xenophobia as well as stimulate further academic research that will aid in expanding knowledge, is a goal this study attempts to achieve. Its significance also is geared towards the orientation of the policy-making body in South Africa. The government of the day will establish strategies to manage conflict in the country while upholding its international status.

### **1.7 Gaps in the literature and originality**

These authors have written on Xenophobia in South Africa, addressed historical events like apartheid which is seen to have influenced xenophobic attitudes, and mentioned some governmental responses to Xenophobia as well as other significant effects of Xenophobia on a country's general position in the global arena, particularly its foreign policy. However, this study is looking deeper further at the foreign policy dimension, on how Xenophobia impacts South Africa's regional and global diplomatic relations, trade, and security cooperation. Furthermore, perspectives from organizations who deal with issues relating to Xenophobia as well as communities with experiences of Xenophobia are sought in order to provide a more inclusive and nuanced understanding and interpretation of the phenomenon.

### **1.8 Xenophobia and the African Continental Free Trade Area**

By definition, regional integration depicts a situation or process where two or more countries agree to work together to address common challenges, and propose ways to achieve peace, stability and wealth (World Bank: 2023, Centre for European Studies: 2023). It is worthy of note that integration usually involves one or more written agreements describing the areas of cooperation in detail, as well as some coordinating bodies representing the countries involved.

In a quest to explore the challenge of regional integration with the presence of xenophobic activities in Africa, Adu-Gyamfi and Arthur (2022) were of the opinion that Africa's anti-colonial movements, the early independence era, as well as the resistance against the Apartheid regime in South Africa were majorly characterized by the spirit of unity and solidarity and this has paved way to a swirling atmosphere of Xenophobia which has been a key obstruction and impediment to the viewpoint of regional integration. In support, Hartzenberg (2011: 2) indicated that since independence, African governments have incorporated regional integration as a significant component of their development strategies. In addition, the drive of African leaders towards integrating Africa, and developing the continent through import substitution industrialisation, was a key feature of the immediate post-colonial period, and also provided the rationale for the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA). According to Hartzenberg (2011: 5), the LPA was an initiative of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) now African Union (AU), adopted by Heads of State in April 1980, and strongly supported by the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA). A decade later in 1991 the Abuja Treaty supported the African integration agenda.

With the importance of peaceful coexistence and the reality that no state can operate independently, the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) Agreement was set up. As Dankyi and Boateng (2019) posit, the AfCFTA is an agreement among fifty- four 54 African nations to create a single continental market for goods and services. It is therefore on course to becoming the largest free trade area in the world, in addition to the free movement of persons, labour, and investment geared towards a customs union. The purpose of this agreement is to expand and increase intra- African trade through a harmonized and well- coordinated trade facilitation systems. In addition, it also aims to harmonize trade instruments across the Regional Economic Communities (RECs).

AfCFTA is not simply a Free Trade Agreement as it were, it is a very potent tool for peacebuilding on the continent. It is about allowing people to move and work and holding secured investments on the continent (Dankyi and Boateng, 2019). The benefits of the AfCFTA has been re-echoed by the leadership of the African Union, African governments, and academia to yield very high results. For example,

*The agreement will double intra-African trade, which is very low, between 13 percent to 16 percent of total trade flows. Similarly, it can potentially advance the free movement of persons and labor across the continent to support the implementation of the AfCFTA. Despite its enumerated strengths above, it will also impact most African countries' GDPs by 1 percent to 3 percent and total African employment could rise by 1.2%. Furthermore, it has the characteristics to build on rather than replace existing free trade agreements signed between the RECs, translating to a less disruptive approach to the status quo.” (Dankyi and Boateng (2019).*

But, the recent rise in xenophobic attacks in Africa has the power to derail an agreement that strengthens Africa in even more ways than one. And that is why Govender (2023) indicated the traces of xenophobic sentiment and violence have long existed in Africa, which at times has resulted in the inflammation of inter-state relations and large-scale displacements, thereby, working contrary to the intention of the Free Trade Agreement. To this end Xenophobia is spoken of to operate in direct contradiction to what the African Union hopes to achieve with AfCFTA. According to Dankyi, and Boateng (2019), Xenophobia casts a slur on the fore bearers of African unification, and the efforts of the African Union towards Agenda 2063 (which is Tagged: “The Africa we want” and referred to as “Africa’s blueprint and master plan for transforming Africa into the global powerhouse of the future.” (African Union, 2023). Paolo, Adu-Gyamfi and Arthur

(2022) lend their voices to the potential effects of Xenophobia on the Free Trade Area and Afrophobia regional integration by noting that:

*the phenomenon of Xenophobia, [which is exacerbated and reinforced by discourses and practices surrounding deep-rooted issues such as colonial political and economic structures, poor political leadership, and overlapping sub-regional membership] and Afrophobia, [expressed in many forms across the continent] reduces the possibilities of regional integration beyond policy propositions.*

Xenophobia as Govender (2023) puts it, is destructive to the African peace, security and development agenda, and it obstructs the integration and achievement of the Pan-African project. Furthermore, if Africa's citizens are to benefit from initiatives such as the African Free Trade Agreement (AFCTA) then countries need to take collective responsibility for the problems or concerns that drive xenophobic sentiments on the continent. Any effort in this regard must result from a common effort and vision for peaceful co-existence and cooperation in Africa. On this note, it is quite obvious that rising Xenophobia in Africa is a blockage to trade, investment, and integration on the continent.

### **1.9 Scope and Delimitations of the Study**

This study focuses mainly on exploring Xenophobia's political and economic effects on South Africa's Foreign Policy with relation to other African countries between 2008 and 2019. The selected period provides significant insight into the far-reaching effects of Xenophobia and the increasing violent turn it has taken. This period has also seen more strong and vocal responses from the governments where these migrants originate from. The concept of Xenophobia is viewed in the course of the study, possible triggers of such actions and probable solutions are also discussed. In the same way, it looks at the importance of peaceful co-existence and positive relations in a country's domestic and international affairs.

### **1.10 Research Methodology**

The research methodology for this study, will use a wide range of techniques and approaches to explore and answer the research questions posed in the study. This study adopts and uses a qualitative approach. Qualitative research is a type of social science research that collects and works with non-numerical data and seeks to interpret meaning from these data to understand social

life by studying targeted populations or places (Ashley, 2020). The necessity of a qualitative study is shown in its ability to create a profound understanding of the behaviours, attitudes, events, interactions, and social practices that comprise everyday life. Doing so fosters a better understanding by social scientists on how society-wide factors like social order, social structure, and all kinds of social forces influence everyday life. In addition, this set of methods has the benefit of being flexible and easily adaptable to changes in the research environment. It can be carried out with minimal cost in many cases. This mode of research ensures the collection of authentic data. Therefore, this study is adopting it as first-hand information will be retrieved.

### **1.10.1 Data Collection**

Both primary and secondary data are the most appropriate to gather data for this research work. In addition to primary data being obtained through key informant interviews, secondary data were also collected from relevant journals, documents, textbooks, review articles, critical analysis essays, the internet, periodicals, abstracts, research reports, magazines, and newspaper articles. The semi-structured in-depth interviews were conducted among a cross section of experts in the field of foreign policy. This was to source for actual and specific information based on participants' first-hand and expert knowledge on the subject matter. Interviews are appropriate when collecting in-depth information on people's opinions, thoughts, experiences, and feelings is necessary. Hence, the researcher's intention in employing that method.

### **1.10.2 Sampling**

Sampling is seen as a precise principle used to select members of the population to be included in the study. It has been rightly noted that "because many populations of interest are too large to work with directly, statistical sampling techniques have been devised to obtain samples taken from larger populations." (Proctor, 2003 in Dudovskiy, 2018). In other words, due to the large size of the target population, researchers have resorted to studying several elements within the population to represent the population and reach conclusions about the population. Consequently, for this study, the purposive sampling method will be considered. This is that purposive sampling, also known as judgment, selective or subjective sampling, allows the researcher to rely on their judgment when choosing a population to participate in the study. In addition, purposive sampling poses one of the most cost-effective and time-effective sampling methods available (Dudovskiy, 2018). The reason is that purposive sampling allows one to identify people with expertise and knowledge on the subject matter, which is foreign policy, migration and Xenophobia.

The researcher also identified respondents from relevant embassies and government departments concerned with foreign policies of South Africa, including the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO), the primary foreign policy planner. For this study, a total of twenty (20) respondents were contacted which were comprised of one (1) from the government (DIRCO) and four (4) from research institutes and five (5) African foreign representatives whose nationals have been the most affected by xenophobic attacks. The research institutes and embassies therefore comprised of the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), Africa Institute of South Africa (AISA), South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), and Institute for Global Dialogue (IGD), and (10) officials from the foreign embassies and consulates of Democratic Republic of Zambia, Zimbabwe, Nigeria, Somalia and Mozambique.

**COVID-19:** Qualitative research typically relies on face-to-face interaction for data collection through interviews, focus groups, and fieldwork. With the outbreak of Covid-19 and consequently social distancing, it is only necessary to adapt to new qualitative research methods. To this end, the researcher collected data via video calling (e.g. Skype/ Zoom) or text-based instant messaging (e.g. WhatsApp) to virtually imitate the face-to-face interview. In addition to video calling electronic mails can also be used to collect qualitative data by asking respondents to type their responses to open ended questions.

### **1.10.3 Data Analysis**

Qualitative data are expressed in words. Consequently, the researcher needs to give meaning to the data and, to achieve this, content and thematic analysis was used. According to Bengtsson (2016:8), the analysis process eases the volume of text collected, identifies and groups categories, and seeks to understand it. In the same vein, as Luo (2019) stated, content analysis is a research method used to identify patterns in recorded communication. Researchers use content analysis to discover the purposes, messages, and effects of communication content. To conduct content analysis, the researcher collected data from written, oral or visual texts mainly from secondary sources like press releases, presidential speeches and key government reports. Thematic analysis, on the other hand, according to Braun and Clarke (2006), provides core skills for conducting many other forms of qualitative analysis. Thematic analysis was used to examine different research participants' perceptions, identify similarities and differences, and generate unanticipated insights.

Thematic analysis is also suitable for summarising key features of a large data set. It forces the researcher to take a well-structured approach to handle data, helping to produce a clear and organised final report (King, 2004).

### **1.11 Ethical Considerations**

Very important to the success of this work are objectivity and ethical consideration. Therefore, concerns such as voluntary or willing participation, informed consent, confidentiality, and discretion were all considered. Also, due to the requirement of some high-profile confidential information from government departments, the need for privacy is key. Consent to carry out the study was obtained from the University of Kwa-Zulu Natal Humanities and Social Sciences Ethics Committee. Participants were also properly informed that their participation in the study is completely voluntary and were therefore not pressured to participate. The researcher ensured that the research was conducted by following standard ethical principles and in conformity with the requirements of the University of KwaZulu-Natal. All humanly and academically possible efforts were made to ensure the confidentiality, wellbeing, dignity, and safety of participants in this study. Extreme caution was also exercised regarding seeking, storing, and transmitting information.

### **1.12 Profile of South Africa's political and demographic make-up**

South Africa is deemed a home to a population rich in cultural and ethnic diversity. From the streets of its metropolitan cities to the rural villages of its hinterlands, South Africa's predominantly young population is characterized by a wide range of languages, religious beliefs and customs (Statistics South Africa, 2023). Figure 1 shows a map of South Africa and surrounding countries, noting the international borders, major geographic features, and the location of the national capitals: Cape Town, Pretoria, and Bloemfontein as well as province capitals, major cities, main roads, railroads, as well as major airports.

**Figure 1.5: Political Map of South Africa showing its 9 provinces**



**Source: Nations Online Project**


Also, South Africa’s wealth is seen in the multicultural nature of the society, characterised by its rich linguistic diversity. As stated in the South African Government website, Language is an indispensable tool that can be used to deepen democracy and contribute to South African society's social, cultural, intellectual, economic and political life. Therefore, the country is multilingual with eleven (11) official languages such as; Zulu, Xhosa, Afrikaans, English, Sepedi, Swazi, Sesotho, Setswana, Xitsonga, Tshivenda, Ndebele (BBC News, 2023), each of which is guaranteed equal status. Interestingly, most South Africans are multilingual and can speak at least two or more official languages. So, as part of promoting social cohesion and nation- building, it is expected for every government department, public entity and enterprise to establish a language unit and adopt a language policy. This also concerns the Use of Official Languages Act in 2012 (Government of South Africa, 2023).

In addition to the 11 official languages, it has three Capitals – Pretoria (Administrative centre), Cape Town (Legislative centre) and Bloemfontein (Judicial centre). It is a constitutional democracy with a three-tier system of Government and an independent judiciary. The national,

provincial and local levels of Government all possess legislative and executive authority in their domains, and are also regarded in the Constitution as distinctive, interdependent and interrelated. In addition, to being democratic, South Africa is a one- party dominant state with the African National Congress (ANC) as the governing party currently. Other parties such as the Democratic Alliance (DA), the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), and the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) govern provinces and municipalities, with some in coalitions with smaller parties. Also, advisory bodies drawn from and made up of South Africa’s traditional leaders, operate at both national and provincial levels. It is an indicated intention in the Constitution that the country be run on a cooperative governance system. The South African Government is committed to building a free, non-racial, non-sexist, democratic, united and successful South Africa (South Africa Yearbook 2017/18: 2).

The population of South Africa increased as of 2022, South Africa's and counted approximately 60.6 million inhabitants, of which the majority (roughly 49.1 million) were Black Africans. Individuals with an Indian or Asian background comprised the smallest population group, counting approximately 1.56 million overall (Cowling, N. 2023). The graph below is an illustration of South Africa’s population in 2022.

**Figure 1.6: Total population of South Africa in 2022, by ethnic groups (in 1,000s)**



**Source: Statista (2022)**

### **1.13 Structure of dissertation**

This study comprises eight chapters of which:

Chapter One introduces the topic, which includes a brief background on Xenophobia, the problem statement, the objectives which this study is geared towards achieving, the intended research questions, the scope and delimitations, and the definition of terms to provide a better understanding of the variables under examination. This section will also include a comprehensive discussion on the significance of the study and present the research methodology. The Chapter concludes with an overview of South Africa's profile and demographic makeup.

Chapter Two provides a literature review of Xenophobia and foreign policy amongst other vital components. The aim is to clearly understand the concept of Xenophobia and its origins, forms and causes. It also includes various examples of Xenophobia across the world as this is not only specific to South Africa or Africa. The chapter also covers some of the perceptions and views of South Africans on Xenophobia and how these have evolved. The chapter goes on to unpack the concept of foreign policy, the different principles and actors that shape it and how goals and objectives of foreign policy are determined. It concludes with an examination of South Africa's foreign policy goals.

Chapter Three further discusses the concept of foreign policy, detailing its actors, objectives, instruments and determinants among others. In this chapter, it was stated that foreign policy is influenced by the domestic status of a country, while laying emphasis on the process of foreign policy formulation which ranges from framing, agenda setting, to implementation and evaluation.

Chapter Four considers the theoretical framework for this study, these are realism, securitization theory and constructivism. The proponents, assumptions and criticisms of the theories will be highlighted. In addition, the justification and application of the theories to the study were also bolstered. Here it was revealed that although, Xenophobia may manifest itself violently through rioting and attacks on foreigners amongst the poorer, black population, it is surely an issue for all sectors of South African society and beyond. All these theories attest to the role of the state as a critical actor in protecting its national interest, in inciting or preventing xenophobic sentiments and violence and in addressing the longstanding needs of its citizens. Therefore, for this study, these theories are considered fitting.

Chapter Five comprises an introduction, background and history of foreign policy with South Africa in focus. It reflects on its place as a leader both within Africa and globally. This Chapter explores the various goals and instruments of foreign policy in South Africa while reflecting on what South Africa's national interest means. Here, South Africa's national interest and composition are also highlighted to bring a deeper and clearer understanding of the motive behind the country's foreign policy objectives and strategies explored in this chapter. It looks at key actors in its foreign policies including President Cyril Ramaphosa and other state and non-state stakeholders that contribute to its foreign policy decision-making process. By identifying the various presidents from the year 2008, their foreign policy goals and strategies were identified and looked into for a better insight into the system's modus operandi. The chapter also explores the historical development and trends of South Africa's foreign policy between 2008 and 2019.

Chapter Six is the data presentation and analysis component of the dissertation. The chosen research methods and data collection tools are discussed and applied to the study. Having highlighted the research method, the area to be studied, the study population, the instruments and method of collecting data, this chapter then focuses on the data presentation, analysis, and interpretation of the result of the study.

Chapter Seven of this work further discusses the findings obtained. It discusses three key themes in response to the research questions, with the objectives in mind. The section presents findings based on perceptions and views from a wide range of stakeholders while supporting this with secondary sources to bring forward some narratives and views on foreign policy and migration from the South African experience. The chapter also presents the limitations of the study.

Chapter Eight concludes the research work. Based on the discussions and analysis, it concludes the study with relevant recommendations for policymakers. The recommendations target key role players like the South African government, other migrant-sending countries, and the African Union. These recommendations also take into account the causes of Xenophobia as well as the actors involved and its effects on South Africa and the continent of Africa.

## CHAPTER TWO

### LITERATURE REVIEW

#### 2.1 Introduction

Randolph (2019:2) defines a literature review as “a means of demonstrating an author’s knowledge about a particular field of study, including vocabulary, theories, key variables and phenomena, and its methods and history”. Furthermore, he writes that a literature review is a process through which the researcher is informed of the key researchers and research groups in their chosen field (Randolph, 2019). Literature review is essential to synthesize an available body of knowledge on a research area to provide a foundation for new research (Creswell, 2013; Rowe, 2014). A literature review therefore allows the acquaintance with previous research to consolidate and integrate ones findings with the existing knowledge base. It enables the establishment of the theoretical roots of the study, provides the context, and shows the gap in the existing literature that the research intends to address (Creswell, 2013; Machi and McEvoy, 2016).

Gall, Borg, and Gall (1996) present some of the benefits of literature reviews as critical in “delimiting the research problem, seeking new lines of inquiry, avoiding fruitless approaches, gaining methodological insights, identifying recommendations for further research, and seeking support for grounded theory”. In addition, Hart (1998) identifies some key benefits of literature reviews including its role in: “distinguishing what has been done from what needs to be done, discovering important variables relevant to the topic, synthesizing and gaining a new perspective, identifying relationships between ideas and practices, establishing the context of the topic or problem, rationalizing the significance of the problem, enhancing and acquiring the subject vocabulary, understanding the structure of the subject, and relating ideas and theory to applications”.

Based on the above, this chapter and the next, will explore various sources on Xenophobia, foreign policy and other related concepts and terms. This review exercise will identify existing and available information on these themes, shed more light on these concepts and themes, and to understand the significance of the subject matter while contributing to knowledge on an existing and evolving area. Having considered scholarly views and positions on the subject matter, this study delves deeper at the foreign policy dimensions in how Xenophobia influences South Africa's regional and global diplomatic relations, trade, and security cooperation. With specific focus on

its political and economic angles, the study further assesses perspectives of representatives from organizations who focus on issues and experiences relating to Xenophobia in order to provide a more comprehensive and nuanced understanding and interpretation of the phenomenon. This section however, reviews relevant literature on the subject matter under several headings. It looks at the conceptual issues bordering on the political and economic effects of Xenophobia on South Africa. The review stems from the perspectives of experts, along with published works on Xenophobia and foreign policy.

## **2.2 The Concept of Xenophobia**

Xenophobia is a complex phenomenon, and this complexity has resulted in various views by different scholars. Xenophobia, as highlighted by Merriam-Webster, was “formed from a brace of words found in ancient Greek, *xenos* (which can mean either “stranger” or “guest”) and *phobos* (which can mean either “flight” or “fear”). Citing Moge kwu (2005), Solomon and Kosaka (n.d.) define Xenophobia as “the fear or hatred of foreigners or strangers; it is embodied in discriminatory attitudes and behavior, and often culminates in violence, abuses of all types, and exhibitions of hatred.” They also present the views of Kaysen (1996) that Xenophobia “basically derives from the sense that non-citizens pose some sort of a threat to the recipients’ identity or their rights, and is also closely connected with the concept of nationalism: the sense in each individual of membership in the political nation as an essential ingredient in his or her sense of identity”. Raypole (2021) defines it as “an extreme, intense fear and dislike of customs, cultures, and people considered strange, unusual, or unknown”. The foreigner is then deemed strange, unusual and unknown thereby facing the brunt of the citizens’ frustrations towards their government. The foreigner is as a consequence blamed for their various challenges and problems. The idea that citizens are more superior to the foreigners, and that foreigners are a potential threat to the citizens’ safety and security all further drive the xenophobic agenda.

## **2.3 Perceptions and Opinions on Xenophobia**

Respondents who participated in this study had their views on Xenophobia and how it affects the people in South Africa (See Table 5.1 for code allocation of respondents). Majority of these respondents were of the opinion that Xenophobia connotes negativity and should not be tolerated. They collectively were of the opinion that Xenophobia depicts fear of foreigners. This notion is in agreement and corresponds with the various views of scholars as highlighted in the previous chapters, for example, Neocosmos M. (2006: 1) who stated that this Xenophobia is

overwhelmingly directed at Africans from across the continent although some are singled out such as Nigerians and Mozambicans as being involved in illegal activities like illicit drugs and illegal immigration. He further noted that this hostility towards people deemed to be non-citizens is evident as it amounts to denial of the latter's rights, privileges and equally expressed through certain stereotypes which has a tint of racism embedded into it.

For respondent SAI5- P1, xenophobic discrimination or Xenophobia is a complex phenomenon and it manifests in different ways. Xenophobia in itself, is not unique to South Africa. Respondent SAI5- P1, originally from Botswana, opined that "Xenophobia is everywhere. We see it in our countries... in our policies, how migrants are treated". In Europe, however, this respondent notes Xenophobia being manifested with "how Black Arab migrants are treated", but believes that the spotlight and attention has been drawn to the republic of South Africa because Xenophobia manifests in the form of violence, and this places a general thought and perception about the country as one that hates migrants. This view of xenophobic activities not attributed to South Africa alone is moreover, in line with Misago's (2016: 10 - 11) view where it was highlighted that a few other countries have had cases of xenophobic occurrences. According to him, countries like India has a record of "increasing xenophobic antagonism" that has been directed at "irregular migrants from neighbouring Bangladesh and other minority groups including Indian Muslims and Indian Bengalis who are increasingly viewed as a threat to national or ethnic cultural well-being and security" (Misago 2016: 10). Furthermore on Muslim migrants, Misago (2016: 11) highlighted that areas like northern Assam recorded more than fifty (50) deaths and displacement of more than ten thousand (10,000) Muslim migrants in September, 2008.

*In Libya, unprecedented anti-immigrant violence was witnessed in September 2000. It erupted in Zawiyah west of Tripoli and quickly spread to other areas like Zarah and Benghazi. "On September 25, a mob of around 1,000 Libyans reportedly attacked and set ablaze a locality occupied by Ghanaian migrants" (Takeyh, 2000). According to the World Refugee Survey (2001), several hundred migrants (including 50 Sudanese and Chad workers) were killed and some 20,000 African migrants fled Libya (USCRI, 2001).*

This act however, has resulted in series of losses, displacements and trauma associated with victimization. In addition, respondent SAI5- P1, who has been with an institution that researches and collates reports on Xenophobia and xenophobic incidences in South Africa, mentioned that in the republic, there seem to be "peak seasons" where Xenophobia manifests. These seasons, most

times are linked to election periods where, in order to advance their political agenda, politicians make statements that places foreigners in a position to be perceived as problems in the country. This further buttresses the assumption of the securitization theory and should be noted that the above statement was made based on researches conducted over time by the respondent. In addition, this respondent mentioned another avenue which intensified xenophobic incursions. This is the Covid-19 period which propelled another phase entirely and intensified the use of social media where statement “were made online, twitter accounts popping up and nationalistic talks about putting South Africa first” were the order of the day. Party migration policy by the ANC party focused on governing issues around migration, now they are adopting anti-party migration policies. “False videos were also shared, causing people to panic” even more, There was also decision by the minister without consultation not to renew the Zimbabwean Exemption Permits (ZEP) and Vigilante groups (Operation Dudula) became more active (“demanding permits from foreigners even in hospitals”). Respondent SAI5- P1 further expressed that despite these activities, the government remained quiet about it, therefore “contributing to the complexities that government is in support of it”. In addition, “Over the years there was denial to the issue of xenophobia, always termed or considered as criminality especially when South Africa was called out. But I think we saw a shift in 2019 when President Cyril Ramaphosa came into power.

According to respondent SAI1-P1, Xenophobia is scape-goating and it dates back to the apartheid era where there was segregation, exceptionalism and the expectations after that of the post-apartheid era in South Africa by the masses. In addition, it revolves around the notion that “foreigners are stealing our jobs” which is a wrong and dangerous narrative to run along with because it is just ignoring other deep issues affecting the state like corruption, governance, management of migration and so on. This was most likely what propelled respondent HC1-P1 to tag it as “Witch hunt” on Africans because even those who are legally and honestly working, paying taxes, and contributing positively to the country are being targeted and violently attacked too. According to Samuel and Ekaete (2016), the given reasons for the 2001, 2002, 2008 and 2015 attacks in South Africa are the same:

- a. *foreigners are “stealing” our jobs – either since employers prefer them from a productivity point of view or because they accept lower wages;*
- b. *they are impeding our access to services;*
- c. *they are responsible for crimes in the area, including selling drugs and running prostitution rings;*

d. *they are “stealing our women”; etc. (Cox, 2009; Kellett, 2002).*

Respondent SAI3- P1 in addition, identified Xenophobia as a problem in South Africa that should be taken seriously because some dwindling effects can be resorted to, if ignored. And respondent SAI3-P2 identified Xenophobia (while also referring to it as Afrophobia for a better context), as an issue that has a lot of nuances to be considered. Interestingly however, respondent HC3- P1 specifically opined that Xenophobia is derived from two words ‘Xeno’ and ‘Phobos’ which are combined to form a word. By definition, the respondent referred to Xenophobia as fear towards an “entity”. This entity could be a group of people categorized by status, nationality, and social class.

Furthermore, respondent SAI2- P2 does not see Xenophobia as an act solely done by one national to another but see it also as an internal affair. As a result, this respondent feels that Xenophobia found even within and among South Africans, “amongst our ethnic groups, we also have that thing”. In addition, respondent HC2- P1 mentioned that Xenophobia is not a policy of the republic of South Africa as the government has clearly stated that it is against Xenophobia. In addition, the respondent states that these xenophobic activities are an offshoot of some misguided group and individuals which has tainted the reputation of the country.

Xenophobia, according to respondent HC3- P1 does not exist as most people claim it to be, that is, targeted towards immigrants or foreigners. This respondent maintained that there must be a clear distinction between Xenophobia-based actions and criminal activities where they emphasized the fact that crime takes place everywhere and everyone interprets the crime by the victim at the time. That way,

*“if you park your car and two boys break the windows and take your phone and laptop, that is a crime and not Xenophobia but you can say ‘hey! Those are from country X and I am from country Y’, giving an interpretation of Xenophobia from the view of the victim. However, it is worthy of note that the weakest of the link is what those criminals see. For example the women, the foreigners, the kids and those criminals are only damaging Pan-Africanism (Africans working together) and creating a fear and the idea of they versus we. But “I believe what I see is more of criminality than Xenophobia” (HC3-P1).*

Respondent IRO1 - P1 shared the same view with respondent HC3- P1 as he maintains that these are criminal activities in most instances. An instance could be that a South African robs another

person and in the process someone gets killed. In a situation where that person is a foreigner, for example a Nigerian, the media outlets carry such news and tag it as Xenophobia meanwhile, it was just a criminal activity and nothing more. In addition, there are cases of foreigners not given permits to study in a South African university despite being admitted, for reasons that may be administrative and beyond the control of staff, (for example recently, the COVID-19 situation exacerbated this strain in issuing out visas because of the need to clear out the backlog which takes a long to time to process). This has been referred to as a part of xenophobic agenda.

While emphasizing the detrimental effect of Xenophobia, respondent NA- P1 stated that such act or series of occurrence frightens other Africans in the country. In his words, “Generally for me, Xenophobia is not right thing to be happening here and there in South Africa because it is not good for the economy as a whole”. On the notion of Xenophobia being a source of fright, the respondent stated that these other Africans in South Africa are frightened and cannot bring in investment for fear of “having these investments taken away without any security or protection from the government”.

Respondent SAI5 – P1 however, maintained that Xenophobia is a complex phenomenon and will require deliberate act by the government to handle. In their words,

“the long and short to it is that it is a very complex issue and will require a lot of political will that we haven’t seen from the government, even though civil society authorities have done a lot to advocate for migrants, putting together a lot of programs, social equitation programs, those have failed, maybe due to the conditions of living for a lot of South Africans in poverty, with legitimate concerns of being oppressed to work and depend on foreigners”.

In respondent SAI2 - P2’s opinion, politicians have their agenda, and not all of them have the public interests at heart. For example, if Xenophobia occurs, the political parties will shift their main focus by using these attacks to their advantage by influencing their manifesto and agenda. So, instead of the greater good, they use these occurrences to try and get people on their side. Some elements or otherwise referred to as indexes perceived as factors triggering or driving xenophobic activities were also highlighted by some respondents. Some of these elements will be consequently considered.

### **2.3.1 Poverty and unemployment**

Respondent SAI3-P2 stated categorically, that, Xenophobia is mostly situated in communities where there are lots of poverty. On the other hand, xenophobic violence robs foreigners of their employment status thereby increasing the unemployment rate and putting a strain on the economic standing of the country. However, by condemning any form of justification or excuse for attacks targeted at foreign nationals based on unemployment, the South African Police Minister, Nathi Nhleko, said: “poverty and unemployment are not justification for attacking foreign nationals. We all are human beings and as a result we only have one heritage that we share, and that’s humanity. That is the starting point” eNCA (2015) in Kinge G.T.W (2016: 33).

### **2.3.2 Anti-immigration strain**

Poor management of how people get in and out of the country is perceived by respondent SAI1-P1 as the major problem surrounding Xenophobia. In addition, the respondent noted that Africa is inherently weak and the burden of accommodating other nationals is quite high. However, adequate management of the migration cannot be over emphasized, bearing in mind that although migration is a human phenomenon, migrants also consist of the good and bad. So, suppose the systems are in place to sieve rightly, and monitor migration into the country, void of stringent rules, allowing participation and inclusion. In that case, it is going to be for the best, a different ball game altogether. On how in-migration contributed to Xenophobia however, Mensah and Ekaete (2016: 75) write that South Africa, upon attainment of political independence in 1994, boasted the largest economy in Sub-Saharan Africa, making it appealing and attractive to other Africans. As a result, a diverse array of individuals from all works of life migrated there, ranging from academics and professionals to skilled artisans, shop owners, and street vendors. Among them were teachers, cobblers, and salon operators, some of whom operated makeshift businesses in roadside tents, along with unskilled individuals looking for menial employment opportunities. This influx of migrants brought with it a variety of skills and work attitudes that the apartheid regime had previously denied black South Africans the opportunity to acquire and develop.

*Some filled yawning gaps – created by both the apartheid Bantu education policy for black people and the exodus of professional and skilled white South African – in the skill profile of several establishments. Some were self-employed and established themselves as entrepreneurs who created jobs for locals, but others also competed with locals for places in the unskilled labour category. (Mensah and Ekaete, 2016: 75)*

In addition, the new arrivals unlike those who had taken part in the earlier mine migrant labour system and were confined to hostels, had the liberty of mingling in the local communities. Therefore, posing as opportunities for many new migrants to set up and run businesses that increased both their income levels and their income distribution position in their communities. And according to Mensah and Ekaete (2016: 75), these improvements in their economic circumstances did not go unnoticed by their South African neighbours.

Respondent H1-P1 however, maintained that it is impossible for a country to survive without migration and the South African government is playing it safe when the issue of Xenophobia is brought to the table in order to escape any repercussion. Migration, in the words of respondent HC1- P2, is a fundamental thing as no country is an island and there is need for crossbreeding of ideas for the sake of development.

### **2.3.3 Inequality and competition for scarce resources**

Respondent SAI1-P2 mentioned that in addition to other factors deemed responsible for Xenophobic activities in South Africa, inequality and competition for scarce resources and opportunities are contributing factors. This is also in line with what respondent SAI1- P1 meant with the notion of “foreigners are stealing our jobs” which is an incorrect narrative according to some other respondent accounts. Consequently, Mensah and Benedict (2016: 76), both have this to say:

*Another boost to the xenophobic sentiments in South Africa may have been statements attributed to important public figures. For example, Mr. Mangosutho Buthelezi, Minister for Home Affairs in 1994 was reported to have informed parliament that it was not in the spirit of the Reconstruction and Development Programme, the country’s blueprint for development at the time, to let South Africans “compete for scarce resources with millions of aliens [from other African countries] who are pouring into South Africa” (Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, 2008).”*

Respondent HC1- P2 majorly disagreed on the belief that foreigners are taking South Africans’ jobs. According to him, “It is very unfortunate because, if you ask your fellow Africans to leave your country because you feel they are taking something away from you, I don’t think they are being fair and sincere to even themselves because these foreigners are contributing to the GDP of this country... when you hear they say foreigners are taking their jobs, it is actually not true because foreigners are the ones generating jobs”. To this respondent, foreigners do not take over

government jobs in South Africa. They would rather create jobs for themselves and even employ many South Africans. Thus, there is no logical reason to the claim that foreigners are taking their jobs. Respondent NA- P1, who also share the same opinion, highlighted that “having the notion of saying ‘foreigners are here to get our jobs’ is neither here nor there because I don’t think jobs are up for grabs because you are a foreigner. But I think those who are employed in different organizations... they get it on merit because they have got the qualifications”. But this does not mean that those foreigners who are involved in illicit forms of businesses should be condoned.

To further affirm the view of foreigners creating jobs for themselves, Respondent NA- P1 used himself as an example, where he stated that for the number of years being resident in South Africa, he has never worked for any South African company, firm and/or individual. Rather, he had contributed to the GDP of the country over the years by creating jobs. On that note, this respondent mentioned that, “most of the foreigners doing business ... they bring in resources that are required”. Therefore, maintaining the view that “not everyone is employed by the government”.

Interestingly, during the reign of former President Thabo Mbeki, Kinge (2016: 34) recorded that:

*Efforts to transform the South African economy through black empowerment, equal access to health care and educational facilities did not succeed. Rather, it created a wider unequal gap between and amongst black South Africans. As a result, the unequal distribution of resources between and amongst black South Africans has created a hostile environment not conducive for cohabitation for both the black locals and foreign immigrants living in the country. Local black South Africans from the economically disadvantaged communities had it that foreign nationals compete with them for employment opportunities and to make matters worse accept cheaper pay packages far more than what a local black South African would take (Warner and Finchelescu, 2003: 36- 44). Xenophobic attacks on foreign nationals became the only way to vent frustrations emerging from this issue.*

## **2.4 Origins and Cases of Xenophobia**

It is worthy of note that although, Xenophobia has existed for a long time, the word is quite new with all its manifestations suggesting that it originated near the end of the 19th century. To this end, Fritscher (2022) noted that Xenophobia has played a role for thousands of years in shaping human history. This is evident from the ancient Greeks and Romans, whose beliefs and opinions that their cultures were superior, were used to defend the enslavement of others. Citing Makari

(2021), Newcombe (2021) writes that Xenophobia as a “social construct is a recent idea and a product of the modern era, arising under the conditions of intercultural mixing that have marked globalization”. Makari (2021) argues that major global developments have resulted in Xenophobia such as the Soviet Union’s demise, the 2008 economic crash, and the mammoth increase in refugees due to war and armed violence.

Also, according to Fritscher (2022), many nations of the world have an account of xenophobic approaches toward foreigners and immigrants. For example, in America, Italian immigrants were seen as “racially inferior and prone to criminality” (Newcombe, 2021). According to Shindondola, 2003, the European Union (EU) in 1997 embarked on a study on the presence of Xenophobia in all its member states and found out that nearly thirty- three (33) percent of those who were interviewed showed signs of being xenophobic. From majority of responses gotten, it was revealed that the reasons for being xenophobic are attribute to being dissatisfied with the condition of their life, fear of being unemployed, low or lack of confidence in the public authorities and services and being uncertain about the future (in Lesetedi G. N and Modie-Moroka T. 2007: 4). In Botswana also, there has been a high rate of dislike of black foreigners and these all point towards Xenophobia. The attitude has overtime been expressed in ways that Lesetedi and Modie-Moroka (2007: 9) termed ‘extensive’. In situations when certain crimes like house breaking and theft are reported, the most instantaneous response by many Botswana indigenes is that “e a bo ele ma-Zimbabwe” (translated as “it must be Zimbabweans”), (Morapedi, 2003).

In addition, it has been reported by Newspapers that immigrants are not having it easy with citizens as they are being assaulted severely by some natives of the country, who also lay accusations on them for taking their jobs, spreading HIV/AIDS and for stealing their wives (Daily News in Lesetedi and Modie-Moroka 2007: 7). The year 1972 also saw the expulsion of Asians from Uganda. The BBC reported the height of resentment expressed against Asians despite being the support of the country’s economy, within Uganda’s black majority. These Asians have been residing in Uganda for over a century and have built a life there. Yet, the country’s leader at the time; General Idi Amin, having referred to the Asians as “Blood suckers” and accusing them of “milking the economy of its wealth”, set a deadline for most of them to be expelled from the country by giving them three months (amounting to 90 days) to leave. The State took their businesses (BBC: n.d).

Aremu, (2013: 340) moreover, recorded in the African Research Review that a level of Xenophobia was seen in Nigeria in the year 1983 where over two (2) million foreigners were

expelled from the country. Just like the Ugandan case, this was done as a response to a weakening in economic prosperities in the country. This is in addition to the perceived involvement of migrants in criminal activities. Another record in 1985 saw a wave where a large number of Ghanaians expelled from the country. As Aremu (2013: 341) noted, some reasons were given by the Nigerian government to back up their decision to expel illegal aliens. To this effect, he stated thus;

*Some of the major reasons cited by the Nigerian government for the expulsion of illegal aliens by Nigeria in January, 1983 included: ensuring the integrity of Nigerian immigration laws; the general economic recession which resulted in the reduction of foreign exchange earnings to Nigeria since 1981; the involvement of some foreign nationals from neighbouring countries in violent religious disturbances in Nigeria and; involvement of some Ghanaians in some crimes, including armed robbery in Nigeria. Aremu (2013: 341)*

However, to help manage the stress and trauma deportees might be faced with while leaving the country, Fafowora (1983:392 in Aremu 2013: 340-341), stated that the federal government of Nigeria, in collaboration with all relief agencies in the country fully cooperated with the United Nations Secretariat in facilitating U.N. to offer relief assistance to those being evacuated.

According to the Human Rights First's reports of 2017, a drastic increase in Xenophobia- driven hate crimes have been recorded in Germany and the numbers went from 5,858 in 2014 to 10,373 cases in 2015. This was seen from the increase in violent attacks and crimes against asylum refugee shelters from 2014 to 2015 and in the first quarter of the year 2016, reports gathered from the Police showed three hundred crimes committed against the asylum shelters which is considered to have exceeded the total number in 2014 and on same level with that of 2015 (Human Rights First Reports, 2017).

#### **2.4.1 The Case of Xenophobia and South Africa**

Niyitunga (2024: 1 - 2) noted South Africa's ambition, which focused on becoming a democratic developmental state. This goal was first declared at the Africa National Congress (ANC) conference in 2007 when the notion of a "democratic developmental state" was endorsed in Polokwane. However, since the endorsement in 2007, Niyitunga (2024) noted that "this ambition has neither been materialized nor achieved". As to the probable reason behind the failure of

achieving the goal, Niyitunga (2024) further identified one of the many factors, which according to her, *“has been the regular recurrence of xenophobic violence against foreigners which has effects on the economic growth and service delivery framework in the country”*.

Meanwhile Schwikowski (2023) strongly opined that South Africa is facing growing xenophobia problem. This is based on warnings by experts on the high possibility of increase in attacks on foreigners. The warning mostly sprang as a result of the self-proclaimed civilian army making the rounds on the streets of South Africa's Soweto Township with the sole aim of driving foreigners out. Supporters of this group claim that relevant ministries are acting below expectation to stop foreigners from owning businesses, therefore, the operation is taking matters into their own hands by storming into shops owned by foreigners and raining threats on them. According to Schwikowski (2023), Thabo Ngayo, Dudula's national coordinator said that the businesses are solely set aside for South Africans, and threatened further that even foreign owners who have registered their businesses must vacate the premises. A representative of the current South Africa's third strongest party, Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) party, Mzwanele Manyi, supports the national coordinator. He, too, according to Schwikowski (2023) is calling for the shutdown of all spaza shops in South Africa, owned by foreigners.

The table below, presents a survey carried out by Tawodzera and Crush (2023) to expose some Challenges faced by migrants in South Africa, specifically in Limpopo and Cape Town.

Findings from the survey suggest that not only is Xenophobia an element of life in large South African cities, it presents very real challenges to migrants seeking to put together their enterprises in secondary centres as well.

**Table 2.1: Challenges faced by migrants in Limpopo and Cape Town**

	Limpopo % Yes	Cape Town % Yes
Levels of Conflict		
Conflict with foreign-owned businesses	25.6	28.3
Conflict with South African-owned businesses	30.2	34.9
Incidence of Theft		
Theft of goods/stock	38.3	56.7
Theft of money/income	31.3	44.2
Levels of Xenophobic Prejudice		
Verbal insults against my business	35.3	32.6
Prejudice against my nationality	47.6	48.0
Xenophobic Violence		
Physical attacks/assaults by South Africans	19.0	23.5
Police Misconduct		
Harassment/demands for bribes by police	26.2	10.7
Confiscation of goods by police	18.8	10.2
Arrest/detention	9.1	7.6
Physical attacks/assaults by police	8.7	6.8
N	504	500

**Source: Urban Transformations (2023)**

However, The South African government has been accused of failing to admit that xenophobia remains a serious issue in many townships. In fact, report from Deutsche Welle (DW: 2018) has it that the Director of the Consortium for Refugees and Migrants in South Africa, Thifulifeli Sinthumule, strongly blamed the government for its failure to admit that xenophobia remains a serious issue. To this end, DW (2018) noted that;

“The government has been accused of side-lining the issue of xenophobic violence in South Africa. After the 2008 riots it joined civil society and international organizations in committing to prevent future attacks. However, the government insists the latest attacks are not xenophobic in nature, but a contestation over living resources and opportunities.”

This shows that there is denial on the part of the government as to the presence of Xenophobia in the country. Rather, they find solace in blaming foreigners for the problems of the country. No doubt, there are challenges faced in South Africa but putting blames of non-nationals is misguided and not legitimate.

#### **2.4.2 Xenophobia and Pan-Africanism**

Never-ending xenophobic attacks in different African countries against Africans inevitably carry substantial implications for the ideals of pan-Africanism. Pan-Africanism has as its main drive,

“the centralization of race effort and the recognition of a racial fount” (Legum 1965: 14 in Yahaya, 2020: 20). It addresses Africa’s sense of common hospitality and communalism and advocates for opposition against Western and non-Western domination. In other words, Pan-Africanism is a movement that strives for the promotion of unity, solidarity, and cooperation among people of African descent worldwide. This movement emerged in response to experiences like colonialism, racism, and the struggle for independence by African states. (Khoapa, 2016).

Although Pan-Africanism is a belief system and movement that promotes the solidarity of Africans worldwide, for the purpose of this study, it will be briefly considered from the angle of the SADC. According to Khoapa (2016), The Southern African Development Community (SADC) was launched in the year 1992, preceded by the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC). It is a Regional Economic Community (REC) consisting of fifteen (15) member states who are keen on establishing and maintaining diplomatic relationships through conflict resolution, promote economic growth, and making collaborative efforts to alleviate poverty within the Southern Africa region.

Specifically, as seen on its website, the objectives of the SADC as stipulated in Article 5 of the SADC Treaty (1992) include;

- Evolve common political values, systems and institutions.
- Promote and defend peace and security.
- Promote self-sustaining development on the basis of collective self-reliance, and the inter-dependence of Member States.
- Achieve complementarity between national and regional strategies and programmes.
- Promote and maximise productive employment and utilisation of resources of the region.
- Achieve sustainable utilisation of natural resources and effective protection of the environment.
- Strengthen and consolidate the long-standing historical, social and cultural affinities and links among the people of the Region. (SADC: nd).

Clearly, this movement is aimed at the collective good and benefit for all African states. But, activities like Xenophobia and its various manifestations have not made this movement a complete success. This prompted Yahaya (2020: 20) to say that:

These “documented xenophobic attacks across the continent do not underscore a united African people and government, rather a more fragmented, self-centred and self-

serving people supported by state actions and regulations encapsulated in national interests.”

Therefore, If South Africans are unable to identify and relate on a similar basis, Khoapa (2016) posits that achieving national cohesion in the direction of eradicating poverty and inequality becomes more difficult.

## **2.5 Forms of Xenophobia**

Xenophobia has taken various forms, ranging from obvious violence to the subtle and seemingly often overlooked form like comments to unconcealed acts of prejudice or discrimination. Raypole (2021) identifies two forms of Xenophobia, namely: stranger/immigrant Xenophobia and cultural Xenophobia. According to Raypole (2021), Xenophobia plays out in the following ways:

- a. *“avoid and reject anyone they consider outsiders — people who come from other countries, who have a different skin colour, who practice other religions, or who speak a different language*
- b. *consider the people who belong to their social or cultural group superior to everyone else*
- c. *avoid stores and businesses where “foreigners” or “other outsiders” shop*
- d. *avoid neighbourhoods mostly populated by immigrants or people of different skin colours, or describe those neighbourhoods as “dangerous” or “going downhill”*
- e. *make negative or derogatory remarks about people of other cultures or countries*
- f. *make an effort to keep “outsiders” out of their neighbourhood and social circle”*

While cultural Xenophobia (Raypole, 2021) is expressed when individuals:

- a. *“make rude or negative remarks about someone’s traditional clothing*
- b. *refuse to listen to music from other cultures or watch TV shows and movies in other languages*
- c. *reject food from other cultures without trying it*
- d. *believe products or materials manufactured in other countries are inferior*

- e. *make derogatory or negative remarks when people speak a different language”*

Fritscher (2022) highlights some examples of Xenophobia:

- a. ***Immigration policies:*** *Xenophobia can stimulate how nation-states handle or deal with immigration. This may include hostility and outright discrimination against immigrants. Also, specific groups of people may be the target of bans intended to keep them from moving to certain locations.*
- b. ***Displacement:*** *In the U.S., the forcible removal of Indigenous people from their land is an example of Xenophobia. The use of residential schools in the U.S. and Canada was also rooted in xenophobic attitudes and was designed to force the cultural assimilation of Native American people.*
- c. ***Violence:*** *For example, attacks on people of Asian descent have increased in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic.*

Xenophobia is likewise present at all societal levels, from individual beliefs, including cultural attitudes, economics, politics, educational sector and history to laws as well as government policy.

Villines (2022) further highlights other examples of Xenophobia to be;

- a. ***Micro aggressions:*** *Xenophobic micro aggressions are subtle comments that suggest someone is a stranger. For example, a person might hear that someone has a different accent, and immediately ask where they are from or compliment their English. These comments might seem harmless, but they emphasise a person’s “otherness.”*
- b. ***Exclusion and discrimination:*** *Xenophobic discrimination can occur anywhere, (with emphasis on ‘anywhere’) from relationships to workplaces. For example, an employer might not hire or promote people they view as “foreign” due to hidden or open beliefs about their eligible, capable, deserving or trustworthy. This can also pass for a subtle manifestation of Xenophobia.*
- c. ***Medical Xenophobia:*** *This occurs when medical professionals treat perceived outsiders differently. They might spend less time with patients, view them as untrustworthy, fail to get a translator if they need one, or report them to immigration authorities. This means most of the time that people perceived as outsiders get lower quality medical care, delayed access to medical care, or have a higher risk of stress-*

*related health conditions. For example, the case in South Africa, according to Tebogo Monama (2022), of a Limpopo Health MEC Phophi Ramathuba, who was caught telling a perceived Zimbabwean patient that “the province did not have a budget for foreigners” as foreigners were putting a “huge strain” on its health system, is a typical reference of this form of Xenophobia.*

- d. **Journalistic Xenophobia:** This is when implicit or explicit Xenophobia affects how journalists portray religious or cultural groups. For example, they can present religious minorities as part of a multicultural society or as outsiders, or refugees as either “deserving” of help or as a threat. Publications can also focus on negative stories about certain groups to sow fear, attract more readers, or sway public opinion.*
- e. **Violence:** Xenophobic violence can come from individuals or institutions. For example, in South Africa, xenophobic attacks against Congolese migrants are a serious problem. Still, the Human Rights Watch reports that some witnesses say local authorities are complicit in this too.*
- f. **Hostile immigration policies:** Harsh immigration policies, such as forcibly taking children from their parents at the Mexican border, are the result of Xenophobia and racism. These policies aim to deter a specific ethnic group from moving to the U.S. and punish those who try. Other examples of these policies include the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 and the Muslim travel ban of 2017.*
- g. **Displacement:** This is when a more powerful group or institution forces a less powerful group out of their home. An extreme example is the Trail of Tears, in which the U.S. government forced approximately 100,000 Native American people off of their land.*
- h. **Genocide:** Genocide is an attempt to destroy or kill a religious, racial, or ethnic group. An example of genocide is the Holocaust, in which the Nazis imprisoned and executed millions of Jews based on a racist and xenophobic ideology.*

Furthermore, Xenophobia has steered some ugly occurrences like acts of violence, discrimination and genocide throughout the world, like “The World War II Holocaust; The internment of Japanese Americans during World War II; The Rwandan genocide; The Holodomor genocide in Ukraine; The Cambodian genocide” (Fritscher, 2022). From the information above, it can be deduced that Xenophobia comes in different forms ranging from institutional, individual, structural, to

interpersonal, and systemic. Common features of Xenophobia is where an individual or group strongly believes that they are better than the other, they discriminate against the 'other'. They can treat them violently and aggressively, and in some instances policies and institutional cultures can exclude or discriminate against the other. In other ways, Xenophobia rears its ugly head when systems (whether new or existing) are made to exclude and discriminate people of a different nationality deliberately and what is most alarming is when these behaviours and responses to others of a different nationality have become an accepted and normalised culture.

## **2.6 Causes of Xenophobia**

Many factors have been identified as reasons for the rise in Xenophobia. Neocosmos (2006) identifies post-coloniality as a reason for this whereby the dominant groups in a post-colonial environment shape and define the politics which in many ways excludes other groups as they deem themselves more superior. What is clear is that Xenophobia divides societies creating us versus them with the dominant group shaping behaviour and attitudes towards foreigners. According to Raypole (2021) a major cause of Xenophobia emerges "from perceived threats to the "in-group". From studies as well as history of South Africa, one thing has stood out as the most possible cause of Xenophobia in the Republic is the background of apartheid. The apartheid regime in South Africa was characterized by discrimination against blacks by the whites and this created a negative impact on the minds of the discriminated.

This, as a result, according to Patel (2013) and Madue (2015) became a learned attitude that has unfortunately stuck and expressed in every means possible. This could be likened to the scenario of 'transfer of aggression'. Due to the Master- Servant relationship and order in the apartheid regime, the 'servant' in this case, being blacks were in a position of being unable to fight back because of fear to do so and as a result, used the slightest opportunity to express their anger and frustration to immigrants who perhaps left their home country for unfortunate reasons. Therefore, the new dispensation of "democratic equality" (Choane, Shulika, and Mthombeni, 2011) has little effect on the state of mind of the segregated blacks. In addition, Xenophobia can also be learned and transferred from one generation to another, can emerge as a response to a traumatic event like theft or terrorism, or even through political agendas that try to incite Xenophobia and create divisions and tensions in communities. (Raypole, 2021).

The state in this case can create xenophobic policies and have institutions that fuel Xenophobia. These could be because they have failed to meet the needs of their citizens as seen through poor

service delivery, increasing poverty and unemployment and poor infrastructure. Storey (2017:120 - 121) states “through ideas of the nation they also play a key role in identity formation and in encouraging a sense of communal belonging, with potentially positive or negative implications”. Therefore, if this role is not played adequately, the right sense of communal belonging and livelihood, void of conflict and hostility will only be a matter of idea and not translate into reality. As such, studies based on Xenophobia highlights that there are several factors attributed to such hatred of foreigners, such as: “the fear of loss of social status and identity; threats – perceived or real; a citizen’s economic success; a feeling of superiority unemployment, poverty, income inequality, access to property and high crime rates amongst others” (Mogekwu, 2005 in Sempijja and Mongale 2022: 02) and these grievances were mostly blamed on immigrants.

There has been a history of inequality in South Africa and this has formed a basis for the development of hatred and consequently, violence in the country. According to Makgetha (2018: 76), South Africa’s profound inequality was largely created by state action before 1994. This action enriched a minority in ways evident in holding down economic opportunities and incomes from the majority. The height of discrimination was elevated, and this can be seen in the economic sector. As Makgetha (2018: 76- 77) puts it:

economic discrimination under apartheid centred on limiting the access of the majority to education, urban residence and infrastructure as well as ownership of businesses and land... in terms of ownership, apartheid laws limited black people’s rights to own their homes and land in areas designed for ‘whites’... apartheid legislation also stopped most black- owned businesses from operating in urban centres, and reduced access to credit, especially for African women...

The area of education was also highlighted when Makgetha (2018: 77) mention that the apartheid rules in the area of education effectively limited access to quality education to create shortage, and this increased the premium for skills, making it easier for whites, who had privileged access to training and education, to claim ‘European’ pay and benefits. This strategy cut across other areas like residential rights which were also restricted, municipal services which were restricted to non-Africans, workplace organizations that were set up to provide for relatively high skilled workers and so on.

From the time of the installation of the post-apartheid South Africa in 1994, barely did any year go by without a record of an occurrence of xenophobic attacks by South Africans on fellow blacks

from other African countries. Without a doubt, this resulted in destruction of human and material resources, which can hardly be quantified. Therefore, it has been noted that certain displays as well as the frequency of Xenophobia are well-known and recognized. It is also well known that, Xenophobia consequently, results to violence and may lead to war, owing to the weakening of mechanisms for mutual accommodation and inhibitions against killing.

## 2.7 South Africans' perceptions of foreigners

Xenophobia and xenophobic character runs deep in the Republic of South Africa and goes past the fears and hatred of foreigners (Kinge, 2016: 15-16). Research findings, since the 1990s have consistently presented strong negative feelings and malicious behaviours towards foreigners within the general public and government agencies (Dodson 2010, Crush 2008, HSRC 2008, Joubert 2008 and Nyamnjoh 2006). Even though there are situations of hospitality, tolerance, and with the eligibility of foreigners being defended by South Africans, there is material evidence that South Africans are particularly displeased with the presence of Blacks as well as Asian non-nationals in their country (Misago et al. 2015: 18). According to the World Values Survey (2010-2014), a wide range of countries in the Global South were surveyed on if their governments should allow migrants in. Four key options were provided as potential responses: "prohibit entry, strict limits, as long as jobs are available, and letting anyone come". The findings below (Table 2.2) show South Africans had the most negative responses.

**Table 2.2 Comparative citizen attitudes toward immigration**

Country	Prohibit Entry (%)	Strict Limits (%)	As Long as Jobs Available (%)	Let Anyone Come (%)
South Africa	30	48	16	6
India	30	25	22	23
Egypt	26	43	25	5
Jordan	25	46	28	2
Malaysia	18	72	8	2
Mexico	17	25	45	12
Zambia	15	44	30	11
Thailand	14	65	16	5
Morocco	11	20	41	28
Brazil	11	33	47	9

Trinidad & Tobago	10	55	32	4
Chile	9	35	50	6
China	8	21	51	20
Indonesia	8	72	15	6
Guatemala	7	21	55	17
Ghana	6	36	39	18
Peru	6	21	50	23
Argentina	6	34	45	15
Ethiopia	5	27	28	40
Mali	4	16	46	34

**Source: Inglehart et al. (2014).**

These negative attitudes are revealed in other statistics, produced at both local and national levels. In 1998, a survey was conducted where it was unveiled by the South African Migration Project (SAMP) that 87% of South Africans felt strongly that the country was allowing too many foreigners into the country. The Southern African Migration Programme (SAMP) has been monitoring and keeping records of the perceptions and behaviours of South Africans towards migrants and refugees since the late 1990s. A survey by Wits University 2004 in Johannesburg showed that 64.8% of South Africans perceived the departure of immigrants and refugees from South Africa would be a positive development (Landau et al., (2004).

In another survey by the Institute for Democracy in Southern Africa (IDASA) in 2011, bitterness towards foreign nationals and specifically migrants from neighbouring and other African nations were unchanged and persistent. The findings also concluded that “South Africans who have negative attitudes to immigrants display various forms of Xenophobia arguing that immigrants threaten society and weaken the health of the nation” (IDASA 2011: 6). Other results from the survey showed that a significant percentage of the population would be willing to take action against foreign nationals in the country, 32% would be willing to take action to hinder non-nationals from moving into their neighbourhood, 36% from operating a business in their area, 32% from sitting in class with their children and 31% from becoming co-workers (IDASA 2011: 6); Crush (2000) propounds that 25% of indigenous South Africans would desire a complete halt on all forms of migration and immigration while about 20% are of the view that illegal or legal migrants from neighbouring countries residing in South Africa should be repatriated.

A survey in 2014 by the Gauteng City-Region Observatory (GCRO) exposed “levels of Xenophobia and intolerance of foreigners are increasing in Gauteng”, as “thirty-five percent (35%) of all respondents said we should send all foreigners home now” (IOL news). Crush’s finding in (2008:1) concludes that “South Africans are the least open to outsiders and want the greatest restrictions on immigration.” He further noted that amongst South African citizens, a third would be willing to act against foreign nationals, typically to protect ‘local’ jobs or fight crime.

## 2.8 Xenophobic Violence

Xenophobic violence has become a regular and increasingly unremarkable feature in democratic South Africa. Foreign nationals are routinely attacked in their residences, workplaces, business premises, when using private and public transport, or simply when walking the streets. Incidents of xenophobic violence have been recorded across the country every year since 1994. Indeed, Xenowatch has recorded at least 873 incidents of xenophobic violence in South Africa between 1994 and November 2021 (details in Table 2.3 below).

**Table 2.3: Incidents of xenophobic violence in South Africa by province: 1994 – 2021**

Province	Total number of incidents
Gauteng	347
Western Cape	147
KwaZulu-Natal	124
Eastern Cape	91
Limpopo	44
Mpumalanga	38
Free State	30
North West	28

Northern Cape	15
Unallocated	9
<b>Total</b>	<b>873</b>

**Source: Xenowatch Quinquennial Report (2021: 15)**

Xenophobic violence according to Magwaza S. (2018: 36), poses as a social and political phenomenon that contributes continuously to the marginalization as well as exclusion of non-nationals from national and social factors. Various forms of violence, aggression and brutality towards migrant groups represent extreme and escalated forms of Xenophobia, as in the case of South Africa. The reactions to foreigners are no longer silent and xenophobic individuals are no longer not doing anything about it. In the past, accounts of xenophobic statements were the most that migrants would experience, however these has changed significantly. Blaming foreigners for the challengers faced in the country is not enough, it has become important to inflict harm and attack them even if it means they lose their lives.

This violent behaviour towards foreigners speaks to a larger culture of violence in South Africa. The UN experts however, alleged that discrimination against foreign nationals in South Africa has been established in both government policy and the South African society at large. This had resulted in violations of basic rights like the right to life and physical integrity as well as rights to an adequate standard of living, among others (United Nations: 2022). This culture of violence is seen in the continued increase of crime, murder, Sexual and Gender-Based Violence (SGBV) and intimate partner violence in the country. This view is put forward by the Citizen’s Rights of Africans Initiative (CRAI, 2009: 28), where they state that “South Africa’s only true culture is one of violence, which has been part of the country’s long history of apartheid where in the liberation struggle, violence was used as tool of repression”. In their 2008 publication, the Centre for the Study of Violence and reconciliation (CSRV) (2008) noted that violence since South Africa’s history has been the most used and most common of response to address opponents, threats and challenges of any nature. They term this as the ‘systematic’ use of violence.

As presented in previous sections, what has become clear is that in South Africa, Xenophobia is expressed and manifests itself in many different ways from systemic to institutional and at the interpersonal level. Systemic Xenophobia means it has become the norm to attack foreigners, loot their shops, and arrest and imprison them without any legal reason. The culture of attacking

migrants has become the norm and the idea is that ‘nothing can be done about it’. It has been accepted as a daily or normal occurrence. Institutional Xenophobia is, visible for example, in cases when various institutions and their representatives deny immigrants or South Africans married to immigrants access to government services (health, home affairs, social welfare grants) and even opportunities (jobs, promotion, housing, educational opportunities) which they are eligible for by law.

Other forms of interpersonal Xenophobia is the comments, abuse and accusations blatantly made in public to foreigners, instances where they are harassed and intimidated in public and private spaces. Other examples are seen through “slanderous and belittling pronouncements made by government officials; selective enforcement of laws; unlawful detentions, harassment, intimidation and extortion by law enforcement agencies. Public manifestations on the other hand include everyday street-level abuse; dehumanising remarks, extortion by local gangs; threats; evictions from residences and business premises; and collective violence, commonly known as xenophobic violence” (Misago, 2021 in Xenowatch Quinquennial report 2021: 29).

It is important here to reflect on how xenophobic sentiments have led to more aggression and violence. A disregard for the dignity and rights of migrants characterises it. It is no longer just statements and narratives that are Xenophobic in nature, but the destruction of human lives both physically and emotionally. For better understanding, Allport’s (1954: 14-15) scale of intensity is viewed below from the mildest to the strongest, as highlighted by Angen (2016: 6-7):

- a. *Antilocution is the mildest degree of prejudice and involves discussing hostile attitudes with others.*
- b. *Avoidance is when the prejudice is more intense, and individuals avoid group members they dislike. An important notion here is that the burden of withdrawal rests on the bearer of the prejudice, and they do not directly inflict harm upon the disliked group.*
- c. *Discrimination is when the bearer of prejudice takes a detrimental action. They actively exclude all the members of the disliked groups from certain spheres in the society. Segregation is an example of discrimination that has been institutionalized.*
- d. *Physical attacks occur when prejudicial emotions are heightened to a degree that might result in acts of violence, or semi-violence. This form of intensification can lead to acts of violence or semi-violence. The xenophobic attacks in South Africa would be in this category, with the instances of chasing, violence, house burning and killing*

- e. Extermination is the strongest degree of expression of prejudice, and consists of pogroms, lynching and massacres. One of the most well-known examples of this is Hitler's genocide program directed towards the Jews.*

Xenophobia in South Africa takes all these forms. Taking the above into consideration, Xenophobia overtime has been attributed to biased attitudes and behaviours that most likely will escalate further into violence, physical and verbal abuse and visible actions that show the level of hatred towards foreigners.

According to Ige (2018: 100), this ugly development inevitably pitted South Africa against other African countries, especially Nigeria. Although, his emphasis was on Nigeria-South Africa relations, the impacts of such attacks can be said also to affect other Africa nations as it concerns their relations with South Africa. Xenophobic attacks, in the words of Lelope (2019: 37) are detrimental to South Africa's economic development. This is because the country relies heavily on co-operation and good political standing with other countries (Ilevbare & Adedanya, 2008: 204). Ige (2018: 100) however, noted that the impacts of the attacks can be viewed from political/diplomatic, socio-cultural, and economic angles. But for this study, focus is on the political and economic angles.

## **2.9 Perceptions on the treatment of Foreigners**

While considering xenophobic treatment of foreigners in South Africa especially, the question of 'who is at fault', is triggered. To further understand respondents' position on who is to blame, a question was asked to get their responses on whether foreigners deserve to be treated in such an ugly manner. Majority of them maintained that foreigners should and must not be blamed. According to SAI3- P1, blaming them is tantamount to blaming the victims. Talking about victims, respondent HC1- P1 mentioned being a victim of such attacks and explained that it was a traumatic experience. Point to note is that the respondent was in South Africa for study reasons and was embarking on a journey to attaining a Master's degree in order to make his parents proud. The experience was quite ugly and according to the respondent, "the trauma is still there" years after the incident.

Respondent HC1- P1 noted further: "According to ICC and the Human rights Code of Conduct, there are better ways of handling such issues. For instance, there is a xenophobic attack and you

go to someone's shop - who has nothing to do with drugs or whatever – and collapse and loot all their life's savings, how is that justifiable?... It is more of an internal crisis and has nothing to do with foreigners.” Respondent HC2- P1 established the fact that migration is a natural phenomenon, people move for various reasons and as much as it is the best practice to respect legal laws and sovereignty of states especially with regards to migration, it is only fair that people should be treated as humans with all sense of dignity and foreigners do not deserve such inhumane treatment.

Even if there is something wrong, respondent SAI2- P1 explained that violence should not be the way to handle any challenge. This statement was made in addition to revealing certain attributes or behaviours seen amongst mostly illegal immigrants such as issue of drugs, human trafficking and scamming amongst others which according to the respondent, “irritates South Africans” and those spearheading such dealings are to be blamed. Therefore, other methods void of violence can be employed to check that some unaccepted behaviours are reduced to the minimum. Opting for violence (such as xenophobic violence) against those involved in illicit activity is something that should not be happening.

Respondent SAI2- P2 opines that from the human perspective, no one deserves – foreigner or not – to be discriminated or attacked just because of their nationality but in a way, “They (foreigners) call it upon themselves”. This was followed by an illustration based on a personal experience in an area in Johannesburg where even as a South African citizen, they cannot walk freely in because it is dominated by foreigners and regarded as their territory and so citizens are revolting in the sense that they cannot have foreigners take over their land despite being accommodated and even allowed to enjoy some privileges like medical aid and healthcare for example. On the other hand, rather than fault foreigners, respondent SAI2-P1 and respondent SAI1- P2 opined respectively, that South Africa should be partly blamed as well for not putting proactive measures in place to prevent some ill situations from happening and that the structures of inequality and systemic poverty in South Africa are to blame and must be addressed to curtail these unfair xenophobic activities.

The above notion was also supported by respondent NA1- P1, who mentioned that the blaming game is two-fold and that foreigners cannot and should not be hundred percent (100%) blamed for any form of xenophobic activity against them because the South African Government has a part to play also. While indicating that foreigners (whenever they arrive) come in to South Africa legally, it is not right to be xenophobic towards them whether or not their stay is abrogated

thereafter. The Onus, according to this respondent, is however, on the government to ensure to normalize these foreigners' stay in the country, thereby aiding their legal status in the republic.

Respondent SAI5 – P2, while maintaining the belief that foreigners should not be blamed and that xenophobia is targeted on the wrong people, noted that some people (among foreigners) are “terrible people”. And so, the fact that “you are an immigrant does not make you a saint” neither does it make it right to be treated in a xenophobic manner. However, “violence or any form of discrimination is not justifiable at all and laws must not be taken into the hands of the people” (Respondent SAI5 – P2).

## **2.10 Economic and Political effects of Xenophobia on South Africa's Foreign Policy**

Generally, Xenophobia is a present and ever growing threat to the lives and livelihoods of foreign nationals in the country. Individuals and groups who are targeted based on Xenophobia are repeatedly murdered, injured, physically attacked, and displaced, and their properties and sources of revenue plundered, destroyed, or stolen. The continuing xenophobic violence has posed and continues to pose a magnitude of challenges that have far-reaching impact beyond the targeted groups. By damaging the country's socio-economic structures, social cohesion efforts, fragile security and preventing the rule of law, xenophobic violence will have mammoth socio-economic, political and security implications for all residents in the country, whether they are of a foreign nationality or South African (Xenowatch Quinquennial Report 2021: 5).

Most of the respondents collectively held a notion that indeed the economic and political strength of a country is an important element in the development and sustainability of the said country. The frequent occurrence of Xenophobia or any form of conflict surely affects the economic and political sectors, as well as the general performance of the affected country or state. Although, few respondents hold the view that there are more political effects and there has not been extensively, any economic effect on South Africa, some respondents believe otherwise. In the case of South Africa however, the following has been identified as possible economic and political effects of Xenophobia on her foreign policy:

- a. Increased South African government's expenditure on correctional services and rehabilitation by way of taking care of Xenophobia victims and drug addicts. Matunhu, (nd: 101), while referring to the May 2008 xenophobic episode revealed the extent of the destruction and the effects on government income and expenditure:

*The xenophobic attacks led to the destruction of property that belonged to foreigners. For instance, stores and tuck shops that belong to migrants were looted and destroyed causing psychological trauma to the survivors. Some of the survivors had stayed in the country for many years. According to Nyawo-Shava (2008), some migrants had married South African women and some had established properties which they could not turn their backs on. It was difficult for the migrants to jettison and return to their home countries. Trauma is associated with long term stress and depression, which robs persons of the zeal to work. The net effect of the xenophobic attacks was that the number of displaced persons in the country increased and this might have put pressure on the tax payers who finance the Department of Social welfare. The government of South Africa incurred expenses as it committed resources to quell the disturbances. The government had established a Distress Grant to assist the displaced immigrants. This was a direct cost to the South African tax payers. The government also spent time and money looking after the survivors in compliance with Section 27 (1) (b) of the Bill of Rights, which states that everyone has the right to have access to sufficient food and water and (c) to social security if they are unable to support themselves and their dependency (Matunhu J, n.d: 101)*

- b. It is declining or dwindling the level of economic development in South Africa. This conclusion was made after considering the variables that make up a nation's development, including overall standard of living, inflation, etc. This decline is evident in areas like load shedding, water shortage and overall infrastructure ageing and may get worse if nothing is done.
- c. There is good diplomatic relationship between governments, but this does not translate to people – to - people diplomacy, the most important and intricate aspect of diplomacy with a higher potential of achieving more. According to respondent HC1- P2 this is not good because the “brotherliness that should exist between the people of other countries in Africa and South Africans is not there...”
- d. The country’s image as a preferred destination for investment will be damaged. Hesitation by other countries to establish any business relations with South Africa is heightened and the investment flow in the country will be affected due to investors being scared away. Therefore, the economic sector will be the greatest casualty.

- e. Politically, South Africa has an entire pillar of its foreign policy directed to Africa, called the 'African Agenda'. But the general notion of hatred of South Africa towards other Africans pose a major challenge in regional politics and of course, internationally by way of creating a tense relationship between South Africa and other countries.
- f. Undoubtedly, foreigners hold and occupy critical positions in the country's economy. So if these foreigners are displaced, there will be an adverse effect on the country's economy because there will be an outflow of the much needed skills, some of which cannot be found there.
- g. The Pan- African outlook of South Africa is painted in a negative light due to xenophobic activities and other countries who look up to South Africa are made to withdraw their relationship intentions with the South African government. This is because the political status has been tainted by Xenophobia. As a result, South Africa stands a high chance to be side-lined politically,
- h. There have been records of strikes because of the belief that foreigners are taking over the jobs. For example, the recent occurrences of truck drivers causing eventual road blocks thereby obstructing the free flow of transportation of food and other resources, has led to increased food prices, which invariably leads to increased cost of living and unemployment. So, the economy is affected as those behind the xenophobic attacks are not looking at the bigger picture, they are only concerned with eliminating these foreigners and when this happens, what then happens to the economy? These perpetrators, according to respondent SAI2- P2 are the same ones who will complain about the increase in prices of things and forget they have a hand in it as a result of their xenophobic attitude. The economic foreign policy will be affected because unemployment affects the economic growth of a country, policies will have to be adjusted to accommodate the increase of unemployment in the country.

## **CHAPTER THREE**

### **UNDERSTANDING THE CONCEPT OF FOREIGN POLICY**

#### **3.1 INTRODUCTION**

Chapter three delves into diverse sources focusing on foreign policy and related concepts, building upon the groundwork laid in the previous chapter. The aim is to thoroughly examine existing information pertaining to foreign policy themes, enhancing comprehension and highlighting its importance. This section will also address conceptual aspects surrounding the subject matter of foreign policy, drawing insights from expert views, perspectives and published literature, particularly on topics like Xenophobia and foreign policy.

#### **3.2 Foreign Policy**

Despite various views, comments and descriptions of foreign policy from practitioners and scholars, there is yet to be a universally acceptable conceptualization of foreign policy. This made Toyin (1999) refer to the concept of Foreign Policy as a “fluid concept”. To him, this implies that there are as many definitions of Foreign Policy as many interested scholars in this sphere of international relations. In this regard, scholars have defined what Foreign Policy implies to them in their fields of study based on their understanding. For example, Ayah (1998), views foreign policy as a “plan for action by government of a state regarding its relations with other sovereign states and non-state actors”. The implementation of the Foreign Policy of a government is put in the hands of the state’s Foreign Affairs Ministry. He further asserts that the Foreign Policy of one state differs from the other and this is because the background of a State’s Foreign Policy is not the same as in another State on account of differences in national power, national interests, leadership, geopolitics and other factors such as the impacts of domestic politics. Their history and experiences differ significantly all of which shape and define the creation and evolution of their foreign policy.

In addition, Palmer and Morgan (2011: 1), postulated several approaches to understanding the concept of foreign policy. To them, the first approach regards individual policies that states choose. This can be seen on the choice of states to for example, start wars that may lead to loss of lives, impose sanctions that may even be detrimental on innocent citizens of another state, and make alliances. These issues among others most affect our lives directly. Furthermore, the second

approach considers “the relationship between a state’s policies in a specific situation or at a specific time” (Palmer and Morgan, 2011). As generally acknowledged, policies are tools used by states to get what they want, therefore, the reason behind a state’s decision to execute certain policies like impose sanctions on another state as opposed to attacking it, breaking alliance with another country and so on, is best known and influenced by the leaders of states (Non- state organizations). The third approach however, is relevant to choices made by leaders between similar sets of policies in different situations. For example, Palmer and Morgan (2021) noted that the United States is both friendly with Denmark and Israel but has a formal military alliance with Denmark and not with Israel, but gives annual foreign aid to Israel but not Denmark.

Based on the above view, one can deduce that foreign policies are basically decisions made by a group or groups of people and thus, they are to be held responsible for outcomes of such decisions made. Frankel (1968) in Bojang (2018: 2) affirms by defining Foreign Policy as consisting of decisions and actions which largely involve relations between one state and others in the international scene. This means that foreign policy involves actions made within a state’s borders and intended or directed towards forces existing outside the state’s borders. Therefore, foreign policy encapsulates the formulation and execution of a set of ideas that govern the behaviour of states while interacting with other states to enhance and defend their national interest. This further implies that foreign policy intends to influence the international arena in line with the goals of its political activities geared towards interests. In the same vein, Rosenau (1968: 222) supports with the motion that the intention is to maintain or modify the state of affairs in the international scene in line with a goal or goals their superiors have chosen. Therefore, he defines foreign policy as a systematic decision making by officials, authorized by states' constitution.

Furthermore, Calvert (1986: 1) explains foreign policy as decisions and activities, largely concerned with interstate relations. A more elaborate definition of the concept of foreign policy is seen in the Brockhaus encyclopaedia (2006) where it referred to foreign policy as the institution saddled with managing a state’s relation with other states in the international system, to preserve its independence as well as promote the economic, social, and cultural interests of its citizens. To this end, the Marxist definition of the subject matter will not be omitted. The definition explains foreign policy as the policy of the ruling class of a state, directed towards the outside. The “Outside” depicts the external relations of the state. In this regard, foreign policy comprises principles, responsibilities and aims of the state as it concerns relations with other states, group of states and international organizations and movements.


Having considered such a variety of definitions as to what is meant by ‘foreign policy’, Bojang (2018: 2) settled on a definition of foreign policy as “consisting of three parts: the ‘end’, the ‘ways’ and the ‘means’”. According to him, the end involves an idea of a desired result or set of interests in relating with another state/actor; the ways on the other hand, entails the strategies ( which could include diplomatic schemes or coercion), to pursue these desired interests; while the means, comprises of the available means at a state’s disposal (for example economic, military). Thus, a foreign policy, according to Bojang, is “a vision of a desired outcome or set of interests in interacting with another state/actor, the strategies and ideas used in achieving these goals, and the available resources at a state’s disposable, in guiding her interaction with other states”.

These definitions have in common the elements of decisions: the making, execution and national interests or goals. Therefore, foreign policy comprises the means and methods for achievement of set goals made by a constitutionally authorized body. This is interspersed with the continued interaction between the state and the environment in which it exists.

### **3.3 Determinants of Foreign Policy**

Determinants of foreign policy refers to various factors that define and influence the foreign policy decisions of a state. These determinants are many as international relations and global politics is a complex myriad of actions, actors and activities. These determinants could range from internal factors, external considerations as well as developments in the global system. There are a wide range of determinants in foreign policy and from Figure 2.1, the ten most important are: crisis and immediate events, international law and institutions, technological advancements, quality of diplomacy, political leadership, ideology, economic resources, history, population and geographical location.

**Figure 2.1: Ten most important determinants of Foreign Policy**



**Source: School of Political Science, 2023**


Morin and Paquin (2018) identify other independent and intermediate variables that determine a foreign policy: institutional infrastructure, interest groups, media influence and the bureaucracy of its politics. The media influence for instance speaks to how technological advancements in Figure 2.1 have significantly transformed how they relay the news (see section 2.13 on the media and foreign policy).

Taking the above into consideration, Morin and Paquin (2018) note that the balance of power between countries can partially determine foreign policy. The power of a country can reflect in its economic resources, its geographical location which determines what resources it owns, as well as its population which make up its capacity and resources. Another determinant of foreign policy is the influence of transnational stakeholders and intergovernmental organisations (Morin and Paquin (2018), and drawing from Figure 2.1, these could include the influence of international law and institutions. Another determinant of foreign policy are the internal dynamics of the state in question, thus the political leadership, ideology and its quality of diplomacy. Sprout and Sprout, 1965) write that the interplay of domestic factors and the decision-making processes of a state are important in shaping their foreign policy.

### 3.4 Foreign Policy Formulation

Developing a country's foreign policy requires some critical steps and actions that captures the interests, goals and needs of a country. According to Morin and Paquin (2018) there are 6 critical steps in the cycle of formulating foreign policies, namely: framing, agenda setting, options, decision, implementation and evaluation (Figure 2.2). They argue that these critical steps discussed below help to define and explain the foreign policy of a state.

**Figure 2.2: The cycle of formulating foreign policy**



**Source: Morin and Paquin (2018).**

#### 3.4.1 Framing

As a first stage in the foreign policy cycle, framing involves giving the issue a framework and this involves shaping a problem from one of “objectivity to intersubjectivity (Morin and Paquin, 2018: 42). It is a process that “defines the problem, identifies the protagonists, qualifies their interactions and puts the episode into context” (Morin and Paquin, 2018:182). It is important that the information used to frame the problem is credible and based on real evidence as it will shape other steps in the cycle such as implementation. This could lead to the state making poor foreign policy decisions and mistakes on the global stage and affect its reputation, status and influence. Morin and Paquin (2018:225) raise an important point that foreign policy actors “cannot identify and assess all the possible options because only partial information is available regarding their enemies’ determination, their capacities, constraints and motivation”. There are therefore misled by incomplete and incorrect information which could have strategic and security implications.

### **3.4.2 Agenda setting**

Agenda setting involves identifying the key actors of the foreign policy problem and convincing them of the importance of prioritising it. Morin and Paquin (2018) mention the important role non-state actors play here in mobilizing and influencing civil servants and political advisors who have access to political leaders and can inform them to include this foreign policy issue on the agenda. The setting of an agenda can be determined by a new development or crisis domestically or internationally which requires its inclusion on the agenda. For example, the increase in xenophobic violence and the effects this has had on South Africa's relations with other countries on the continent, requires that it is put on its foreign policy agenda. Morin and Paquin (2018) note that the different cycles can overlap such that agenda setting can take place even during the implementation stage. This holds true as the foreign policy arena is every changing and evolving.

### **3.4.3 Options**

As the third stage, the 'options' involves identifying the different policy alternatives in relation to the foreign policy problem. It explores what sectors or issues the foreign policy problem will affect and the 'political authority' needed to examine those different options. Morin (2011) notes that at this stage, the experts which include advisors, scientists and the civil service, replace those who framed the issue (activists, reporters, and lobbyists). The various options are then explored to determine their benefits, disadvantages and the implications of each choice on resources, capacity and other factors. Through a review process, some options are disregarded because they are not politically acceptable or feasible, they are not supported by the public, and those that will not lead to the desired result.

### **3.4.4 Decision**

The decision-making process occurs once the various policy options have been largely reduced. The fourth stage involves decision makers who are provided with the different options identified by experts to decide on the most suitable options. These will determine the most appropriate response by the state in this case. These decision-makers vary depending on the country and the issues, and they can include heads of states, ministers, a policymaking committee or parliamentary procedures (Morin and Paquin, 2018). Foreign policy decisions involve an interplay of these various decision-makers as they try to finalise and agree on the preferred option. Morin and Paquin (2018:26) note then that "Foreign policies are often the result of a trade-off between the different actors involved in the domestic decision-making process. The actors are encouraged to find a way

to combine their respective goals so that a common policy can be reached”. These multiple levels and processes of negotiations and trade-offs could lengthen the decision-making process considerably.

### **3.4.5 Implementation**

At the fifth stage, the process of implementation requires determining the necessary operations to execute the chosen foreign policy option. In some instances, previously used foreign policy instruments can be applied based on previous experience and broader foreign policy principles and pillars. The public administration, which is made up of professionals with skills to implement various government policy and manage the process of implementation are involved. Morin and Paquin (2018:43), note that the public administration is responsible for how the decision is “interpreted, implemented and continually adjusted to external circumstances”. In the case of South Africa, the department tasked with implementation would be the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO), its various desk officers and its diplomatic missions around the world. At this stage Morin and Paquin (2018:44) argue is when some of the modalities of implementation play out and they posit that the administration does not have the “material capacity, the information, the legitimacy or even the will to ensure that the authorities decision is perfectly translated into concrete results”.

### **3.4.6 Evaluation**

The evaluation of the chosen policy option is an essential step in the policy formulation life cycle. This sixth and final step examines the results and those involved in the framing of the issue at the initial stage participate in the evaluation process by campaigning “in favour of maintaining, adjusting or entirely reformulating the policy” (Morin and Paquin (2018:44)). Thus the cycle is implemented again, and the argument for a cyclical as opposed to a linear process is the fact that foreign policy is ever changing and never ‘permanently settled’. The evaluation process can take any length of time depending on the issue and the chosen foreign policy option. Goldsmith et al (2005) note that issues like public development aid and public diplomacy focus on long term goals thus making it difficult to determine their full impact. Benchmarking is another tool to evaluate the impact of a foreign policy decision. Some examples of ‘quantifiable and observable benchmarks’ that are used to determine success and responses in the area of military engagement include the number of deaths in combat or the destruction of a target (Morin and Paquin, 2018:112).

### 3.5 Objectives of Foreign Policy

Domestic considerations stir the development of foreign policy, the policies or behaviour of other states, or plans to advance specific geopolitical designs (Britannica: 2023). It is regularly developed and carried out by the country's government. However, other actors, such as civil society organizations, businesses, and individuals, may also shape foreign policy. The foreign policies of nations are not just set to fulfil all righteousness but are set to achieve some aims and objectives. Agreeing to this, Toyin (1999) posits that nations generally pursue various objectives in their foreign policy. He further noted that the objectives behind nations' interaction with other nations "are as numerous as there are many interests within the international system itself..." For this reason, summarized as well as classified the foreign policy objectives of a nation into the following; core value, the middle range objectives and the long range value of which the core values are usually attached to immediate realization and achievement, the middle range objectives are the foreign objectives which are vital but they do not attract the same importance as the core value while the long range value deals with the foreign objectives which is meant to achieve long range goal or ultimate vision.

In addition, foreign policy objectives differ, depending on the country and its specific state of affairs. But some common goals of foreign policy as highlighted by The Kootneeti Team (2022) include the following:

- a. **National security:** *Ensuring the security and safety levels of the country and its citizens, home or abroad is a vital objective of foreign policy. To attain a relatively commendable security level, actions such as developing military capabilities, forming associations with other countries, or engaging in diplomatic efforts to prevent conflicts are ventured into.*
- b. **Economic development:** *Many countries strive to promote their economic growth, progress, and improvement through the function of their foreign policy. In this case, this may involve practices revolving around negotiating trade agreements, promoting investment, and looking for access to resources.*
- c. **Political stability:** *this is another goal of foreign policy. Through a State's foreign policy, political stability can be promoted domestically and outside of the country. To realize this goal, countries do things like supporting other democratic governments, making attempts to help to mediate conflicts where possible, and promoting fundamental human rights.*


- d. **Protecting national interests:** Recall that the National interest of a country is a propelling force to the country's foreign policy formulation. Therefore, it is safe to say that countries regularly seek to ensure their interests are protected through their foreign policy. As every State is different, so are their national interest which amongst others, may include defending their territory, being protective over access to the countries well of natural resources, or promoting the country's values and belief system.
- e. **Influencing international relations:** The potency of foreign policy is so strong even to the extent that international relations can be shaped by it. It can also be used to form and influence the global order. This may be achieved through promoting and maintaining certain standards or principles, such as democracy, respecting human rights, or seeking to inspire the behaviour of other countries.

As just outlined, the most general foreign policy objectives constitute various elements observed as common to countries. This does not mean there are no additions or modification to it. The state and dynamics of the country influence such modifications to their foreign policy objectives. This study will discuss South Africa's foreign policy history, principles, pillars and actors in more detail.

### **3.6 Foreign Policy Instruments**

Foreign policy instruments are the approaches used by foreign policy actors to carry out and implement their foreign policy objectives. It sheds light on the decision-making process and the chosen policy options that states have agreed to implement. States therefore choose to interact and engage with other states using these tools. Nye (2004) categorises these instruments as soft power (diplomacy) and hard power (military force). Soft power uses institutions, values, policies and culture to co-opt and attract other states, while hard power relies on sanctions and the use of force to coerce and induce others to change. Morin and Paquin (2018) identify three categories: socialisation, coercion and intervention (Figure 2.3). These are discussed in more detail below.

**Figure 2.3: Foreign Policy Instruments**



**Source: Morin and Paquin (2018)**

### **3.6.1 Socialization**

Alderson (2001) promotes socialisation as transferring ideas, values and beliefs from one actor to another. This process involves three methods: rational communication, rhetorical action and bargaining (Morin and Paquin, 2018). With rational communication, the validity of Actor A's arguments can lead to a change in Actor B's ideals, while rhetorical action by Actor A involves the use of arguments to achieve their goals. Bargaining involves a process of convincing others to modify their policies or approaches. Instruments of socialisation can involve public diplomacy with the population as the focus, inter-country exchange through conferences, training and capacity development programmes.

### **3.6.2 Coercion**

Coercion involves measures "designed to influence how a target state behaves by modifying the way its interests are calculated, without directly intervening in foreign territory". (Morin and Paquin, 2018:35). There are two types of coercion: dissuasion and compellence, the former aims to keep the status quo as is while compellence focuses on changing it. Instruments of dissuasion include nuclear weapons while instruments of compellence include naming and shaming countries with wrong or irregular practices, for example violations of human rights or unfair trade practices with the goal of pressuring them to change. Coercion includes the following other instruments: positive and negative sanctions and coercive diplomacy. For example, economic sanctions were placed on the Apartheid regimes of South Africa and Rhodesia which led to its political isolation globally.

### **3.6.3 Interventions**

Interventions are the third category of instruments which refer to active involvement in the domestic affairs and internal politics of a country. These are either political (subversion) or military in nature according to Morin and Paquin (2018) and are used to change and influence the status quo. Political interventions include supporting the opposition, supporting a weak ruler, providing budgetary support and resources to the state, and electoral interventions while military interventions can include border clashes, ‘manoeuvres on foreign territory’, assassination, bombing of key facilities, regime change and democratisation, and intervening in ethnic conflicts (Morin and Paquin, 2018). It is possible that these military responses could trigger further destabilisation and retaliation of a destructive nature thus Russett and Oneal (2001) argue that resorting to war is an extreme and rarely used instrument in foreign policy.

In conclusion, the three categories are not mutually exclusive meaning that they can be used interchangeably and simultaneously. On that basis, foreign policy instruments can be combined in various contexts, for example negotiation can be used with military intervention (Fearon, 1995 and Wagner, 2000). These will require different resource and capacity levels of the influencing state.

### **3.7 Foreign Policy Actors**

Foreign policy decision-making as earlier noted, entails processes and involves different actors. The international affairs of a state is run by it because without an accurately framed foreign policy, a state could lose its position and reputation in world affairs and consequently, will result in possible failure in achieving its national interest, meanwhile with countries possessing well formulated foreign policies, the opposite is the case. Therefore, it is essential for policy makers, students and researchers to fully understand the meaning and concept of the term foreign policy. Actors of foreign policy, otherwise known as determinants and influencers of foreign policy are also referred to as actors in the international arena and can be categorized mainly into two types which are; state actors and non-state actors. The key difference between state actors and non-state actors is that, the state actors are the ruling governments of a state or a country (Aron: 2011) while those in the category of non-state actors are the organisations or even individuals who are not necessarily allied to a state but possess the potential to influence the actions of state actors.

Actors of foreign policy refers to those elements that propel, affect or serve as determinants of foreign policy, whether directly or indirectly. In an attempt to answer the question of “who makes foreign policy”, (US History, 2022) noted that in the United States, many people and organizations have a hand in setting her foreign policy, as with all policy making. This is not far from what is applicable in other states. It further emphasized the main objective of foreign policy as geared towards using diplomacy (or talking, meeting, and making agreements) to solve international problems.

### 3.7.1 State Actors

State actors are the leading actors globally. A state is an entity overseeing the affairs and the people within its territory. In other words, state actors are the governments of the states/countries in the world. According to Upendra (2018) and Robert Longley (2022), state actors, are key players on the global stage as they shape both domestic and foreign policy, and are the key decision-makers and policy implementers. According to Britannica Encyclopaedia (2023), the state in some countries like the United States of America, Australia, Nigeria, Mexico, and Brazil, also denotes political entities or units that are not sovereign in themselves but act under the authority of the larger state, or federal union. But for this study, the state means an entity with sovereignty and is responsible for supervising and managing the affairs of people within its territory.

The state holds various responsibilities from carrying out various administrative roles and that of security and defence of its borders. States have the right to manage and control resources and protect their borders. Globally they sit at the top in relation to other non-state entities. In addition, they have the power to set and collect taxes and decide how these and other public funds are dispersed and used. Non-state actors do not have these same powers and responsibilities. The main features of a state are: government, territory, population and sovereignty.

- a. **Territory:** Storey (2017:116) defines territory as “a portion of geographic space (containing land, air and water) over which it exercises power”. He adds that “territory is a clear necessity for a state to exist, and provides that state with a seat of power and a functional space to operate” (Storey, 2017:116). This is an important element of the state and speaks to the idea of foreign policy as it interacts with countries bordering it and beyond.
- b. **Government:** For a system to work, there has to be a source of power or an entity responsible to ensure orderliness and smooth running of that system. This is where the

government comes in. government can be referred to as the power house of a state. According to Wangare and Sinmwa (2022), it is a machinery made up of a group of people with appointed or elected positions who work hand in hand to meet the citizens' needs and enforces rules, regulations and orderliness through laws of the land. It is important to note that various types or forms of government exist (Enders, 2023). Still, according to Wangare and Sinmwa (2022), major are identified as: Authoritarian, Oligarchic and Democratic forms of government.

- Authoritarian form of government, or authoritarianism, denotes an oppressive type of government. This type of government operates by centralizing power and giving power to an individual (Nhamirre, 2022) who operates by controlling and given orders. In addition, Wangare and Sinmwa (2022) noted that it is possible for some democratically elected leaders to turn authoritarian during their tenure in power.
- Oligarchic form of government can be referred to as a government by a few. According to the Collins COBUILD Advanced Learner's Dictionary (2023), it is a system run by a small group of people, also called 'Elites' who run and control a particular country or an organization. However, rulers in an oligarchic system may develop or obtain their power via social background or standing, religion, nobility, economic status, or other notable factors (Reiff, 2023). An example of this form of government is South Africa, ruled only by the whites.
- Democratic government system operates in ways such that the people are empowered and have the right to participate in decision-making (Parliamentary Education Office, 2023). According to Wangare and Sinmwa (2022), this system of government is deemed the most commonly practiced in the world. Here, the majority (the people) rules by influencing decisions as it concerns them hence, the common saying that 'the majority have their way and the minority have their say.' Wangare and Sinmwa (2022). In addition, this system of government has shown some benefits, including the fact that; everyone is equal before the law. Therefore the rule of law is upheld. Also, people have a voice and can as a result, influence societal decisions. Furthermore, People are free to act, speak and think as they choose so long as it does not prevent or hinder others from doing the same (Parliamentary Education Office, 2023).

- c. **Population:** Population make up a State. This implies that a State cannot exist without a population of human beings (Wangare and Simwa, 2022) otherwise, it will not be recognized as one. A population comprises people and groups of citizens and foreigners (Morton, 2016), who most of the time may not share the same belief system or way of life.
- d. **Sovereignty:** Another important feature of the state linked to how it exerts and implements its foreign policy is the idea of sovereignty. Citing Elden (2013), Storey (2017:118) posits that “Sovereignty implies the existence of geographic space over which control is exerted, thus ideas of sovereignty are intimately bound up with ways of conceiving territory”.

The modern state system has existed since the treaty of Westphalia in 1648. States vary in their size, resources and their population. Thus, the global foreign affairs landscape includes small powers and middle and great powers. The global stage is where all these stakeholders engage and interact on multiple issues including economic, political, security, climate and other priorities. States therefore engage with others in bilateral and multilateral settings where they influence and shape the foreign policies of others like them.

Bojang (2018) also noted the aim of a sound and healthy foreign policy. According to him, a sound and healthy foreign policy is formed to establish friendly and cooperative relations between states in the international system. In essence, the state has the relative power in shaping its foreign policy within the international system. With the constant change in the world, full of new activities, events and personalities, new foreign policy concerns and problems are being created. An instance is seen in cases of “the effect of the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, the rise of Communist Power in China in 1949, the rise of De Gaulle to power in France and Hitler in Germany, and the emergence of new states in Asia and Africa” which all came with peculiar undeniable changes in the power structure and as a result, has impacted the foreign policy of many states (Bojang 2018: 3). For further insight on the role of state actors in foreign policy, the United States and Nigeria are considered below.

#### **a. Foreign Policy Actors: Case of the United States**

In the case of the United States of America, the President is primarily responsible for shaping foreign policy. Presidents of a country, or their representatives go ahead to meet with leaders of other nations to achieve a goal in oneness. This goal mostly is to try to resolve international problems among them peacefully. According to its Constitution, the Presidents sign treaties with

other nations with the "advice and consent" of the Senate. This means that the Senate, and to a lesser extent, the House of Representatives, also play their part in shaping foreign policy. In addition, other agents that participate in foreign policy making include the Secretary of State as well as other officials of the State Department. In this system, The Secretary of State is usually the President's primary foreign policy adviser, and they are labelled and acts as the chief coordinator of all governmental actions that affect America's relations with other countries.

According to the Britannica Encyclopaedia (2022), there is what is referred to as the Foreign Service. This body consists mainly of ambassadors and other official representatives of more than 160 countries. Embassies are set up by Ambassadors and their staff in countries recognized by the United States, serving as an American territory of presence abroad. It is important to note that embassies are needed to serve as an extension of the sending country in the receiving country and are therefore, part of the State Department as in the case of the United States. These embassies protect Americans overseas thereby, serving as a haven for them, and are vested with the responsibility of maintaining harmonious relationships in various forms with other countries.

Another arm is the National Security Council, which is part of the President's Executive Office. It comprises the President, the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defence, and others designated by the President. This council helps the President deal with national security policies that have foreign, military, and economic policies under-tone. Depending on their relationship with the President, the National Security Adviser, who manages and coordinates the Council, sometimes has as much influence as the Secretary of State. In addition, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), regarded as one of the best known agencies in the business of setting foreign policy also, gathers, analyses, and passes on any form of information from other countries that might be of importance to the security of the nation. Although the CIA is notoriously known for participating in "spy" work and "top secret" investigations, much of its work is public and routine. On the other hand, the CIA Director is selected and appointed by the President and then confirmed by the Senate. "Leopold von Ranke emphatically spoke about the prevalence of geography and external threats in shaping a state's foreign policy, but later, writers emphasized domestic factors" (Britannica Encyclopaedia, 2022).

Foreign policy aims to keep problems from developing and escalating into conflicts or violence that may eventually lead to military interventions and settlements. In order words, it strives to handle conflicts that are void of military interference.

## **b. Foreign Policy Actors: Case of Nigeria**

From the time of the Nigerian independence to date, Landmark University (n.d: 22) revealed that foreign policy making has remained the exclusive preserve of the President or the Head of State as the case may be, and their small accompanying political group. Although it is primarily the affair of a foreign ministry, Okpokpo (2000: 34) stated that it is worth mentioning that internal or domestic actors play their part, individually and collectively, in Nigeria's foreign policy formulation process. These actors involve the President, the foreign minister, the National Assembly (consisting of the Senate and the House of Representatives) and states' Houses of Assembly, ambassadors, embassies abroad, administrators and judges, the media as well as the business community (Okpokpo, 2000 and Popoola, 2016). These are regarded as the primary actors in the Nigerian system and, consequently, need not depend on other governmental organizations, agencies, units or structures to play their policy making roles.

In addition to the above mentioned, organizations also play a role in the foreign policy formulation process. these organization according to Landmark University (n.d: 6) are the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), the Nigeria Institute of International Affairs (NIIA), the National Advisory Committee on Foreign Affairs or Policy (NACFP). According to Landmark University (n.d: 7) a political system that upholds fundamental human rights as well as freedom of expression, is such that understands that these rights form part of the country's national life. In such a system, the role of public opinion is highly remarkable in the foreign policy formulation process. For this reason, Landmark University (n.d: 7) indicated that;


*“In Nigeria, the Tafawa Balewa government abrogated, in 1962, the Anglo-Nigeria Defence pact entered into in 1958, due to the anti-pact demonstration led by the university students at Ibadan. But, it is important to say that the rate at which domestic pressure group influence decision-making highly depends on the type of government, such as democratic or authoritarian, informed public opinion about the external environment, and political institutions that enjoy popular political support.”*

### **3.7.2 Non-State Actors**

Non-state actors are critical players in foreign policy according to authors Stengel, et al., (2017). Although, they might sit as independent players and participants in global affairs, they are increasingly involved in “traditional” national foreign policymaking processes within various state establishments like foreign offices or defence ministries (Stengel, Frank and Baumann, Rainer,

2017). Their important role in foreign policy reflects how integral they have become to international relations and the work of organisations like the United Nations, World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Taking the United Nations as an example, non-state actors (nongovernmental organisations) have increasingly become part of the engagements and deliberations within its various structures (Figure 2.1). In their advisory role, nongovernmental organisations can participate and contribute to the activities of these international organisations. They are also invited on many occasions to report to the UN agencies and its various arms on various political, security, economic and climate related issues.

**Figure 2.4: Number of NGOS enjoying advisory status with the UN Economic and Social Council**



**Source: ECOSOC (2008)**

According to Longley (2022), non-state actors consist of organizations and individuals that hold significant influence politically although they are not backed by government and remain independent of them. Typically, these non-state actors (NSAs) or non-government actors (NGAs) include multinational corporations, private financial institutions, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), as well as paramilitary groups, armed resistance groups, and even insurgent groups, some of which use violence in achieving their goals.

In a bid to understand the role(s) of non-state actors, Peter Wijninga, Willem Theo Oosterveld, Jan Hendrik Galdiga and Philipp Marten (2014) opined that; “the more the notion of the state as a

coherent actor is differentiated, the more the roles of Non-State Actors and the impact they have on societal issues, including security matters, stand out”. According to them, they put forward a wide range of entities that can be classified as Non-State Actors, these include: “Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), political parties, lobby groups, charities, multinational companies and the media, they also include super-empowered individuals such as ‘oligarchs’, but also terrorist groups and international crime syndicates, as well as diasporas and organized ethnic minorities”. Furthermore, there are many definitions for Non-State Actors, many as broad or ambiguous as to be of little operational merit. A realistic and efficient way of defining them is to distinguish them from the characteristics of a state (See Table 2.3). Thus, Wijninga et al., (2014) make some critical distinctions between the state and non-state actors and the areas where their roles overlap. From the table, it is clear that non-state actors' influence is increasingly reaching into what was traditionally state roles.

**Table 2.4: Critical distinctions and overlaps between states and nonstate actors**

<p><i>To begin with, a Non-State Actor does not exercise formal power over, or on behalf of, a given population. However, this does not mean that it has no constituency of its own. Many Non-State Actors have formal membership bases, employees (in the case of large corporations and NGOs) and sympathizers. Sometimes Non-State Actors act as official representatives of designated groups in a country (e.g. an ethnically defined political party). As a result, a Non-State Actor can sometimes be very influential, in some respects even more powerful than a state itself.</i></p>
<p><i>Secondly, a Non-State Actor does not formally control territory. This is true as a rule, but separatist movements, large companies, or the Catholic Church can effectively control territory. Conversely, the state may not always be in control of all territory under its jurisdiction, as in the tribal areas of Pakistan.</i></p>
<p><i>Finally, the cornerstone rule that international relations are built on formalized state-to-state relations is also becoming questionable. Many NGOs now have standing in certain interstate bodies, and can conclude agreements with state authorities. Also, states are entering more often in officially sanctioned contracts such as Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) with commercial enterprises. As a result, Non-State Actors are assuming more responsibility under international law. The UN’s Global Compact (2000), which brings together governments and multinationals to promote good business practices is one well-known example amongst many.</i></p>

**Source: Wijninga et al., (2014)**

Interestingly, non-state actors are considered heroes or villains based on different narratives on international politics. Longley (2022) indicates that realists for example, see non-government actors as either “front organizations thinly disguising the interests of particular states, or as

potential revolutionaries, seeking to undermine national solidarity and the stability of the state system.” On the other hand, optimists “consider them to be the leading edge of an evolving global civil society, challenging the authoritarian tendencies of governments and the power of international capital. Supporters of the globalization drive or movement, see non-state actors as a key to building networks across borders, encouraging shared understandings, and even international solidarity” (Longley, 2022).

### **3.7.3 Public opinion as influence on foreign policy**

Public opinion is a strong influence on foreign policy. It refers to the views and perspectives of citizens on a specific topic or issue, in this case foreign policy. Public opinion requires getting the population’s perspective on the issues that affect them, both domestic and foreign. Interest groups fall under this category as they bring together individuals with a common interest or issue and they voice those using a common platform. Interest groups can be largely influential in policy formulation in the decision-making stages according to Morin and Paquin (2018) as they frame how foreign policy-decision makers will understand and include an issue on the policy agenda.

Mutheu (2017: 11-12) suggests that one of the longest running debates in the study of Foreign Policy in Africa (FPA) before its theoretical conceptualisation in the 1950s has been over the appropriate role of public opinion on foreign policy making. This debate, according to her was by no means settled then as Foyle (1997: 141) notes, “Public opinion's complex influence on foreign policy continues to attract scholarly attention. While many researchers acknowledge that public opinion influences foreign policy, a full understanding of the conditions determining the public's influence remains elusive” (Foyle, 1997:141 in Mutheu, 2017: 12).

Much has changed since then and the public has become important in foreign policy formulation. The importance of public opinion comes in ways that give policy practitioners the ability to view the world and themselves from a different perspective, whether in the global arena or domestic setting. According to Rom, Hidaka and Walker (2022: n.p), “when public opinion changes, demanding for example more or less government, government responds in the demanded direction. And it does so quickly.” Furthermore, they postulated that there is a simple relationship between public opinion and policy outcomes. This was seen when President Barack Obama was elected by a public that tremendously agreed that the economy, jobs, and health care were top priorities to them. And as such, Obama’s policy agenda reflected these concerns.

*At the top of his list was an economic stimulus package and the Affordable Care Act. In a way, we can understand public opinion and its influence on policy as a chicken-and-egg relationship: the public alerts elected officials of their preferences, and these officials then try to sell their solutions to the public as the best course of action. This relationship further underscores the importance of public opinion in our democratic process.” (Rom, Hidaka and Walker, 2022)*

Public opinion also plays a fundamental role in our globalized world. In an interview with the Council on Foreign Relations, political psychologist Steven Kull of WorldPublicOpinion.org explained, “If policy practitioners want to promote international cooperation, they can pretty much see public opinion as a kind of ally in this process — not in every case, of course, but this is a tendency on that side.” (Rom, Hidaka and Walker, 2022). Also, as Hobley (2012) opines, Public opinion may help set the pace of reform. To overcome frustrations around the lengthy timetable required to implement reform, Hobley (2012) advises that policy needs to be timetabled to align with public opinion. This is because, therein lies the momentum and impetus to accelerate the speed at which the suitably labelled dead hand of the state implements policy.

Citizens can engage in foreign policy through various tools and instruments. The term e-democracy captures these various modes of citizen engagement. Table 2.4 presents various examples of e-democracy that allow citizens to interact with government more regularly and easily and provide their opinions and inputs on domestic and foreign issues. For example, online surveys and polls are a good tool to reflect on citizen input and perspectives on a wide range of issues, particularly foreign policy.

**Table 2.5: Examples of e-democracy**

online voting (e-voting) in elections or referendums	accessing political information, news and comments via websites, blogs, web-blogs
online petitions (e-petitions) organized by governments or other bodies	the use of interactive television or social networking sites, or social media, to allow citizens to engage in political debate and, possibly, policy-making
the use of ICT to publicize, organize, lobby or fundraise (e-campaigning)	the use of mobile phones and social media to organize popular protests and demonstrations

**Source: Heywood (2013)**

The internet is important in ensuring citizens can actively participate in the democratic process. The challenge for many developing societies is that the internet is a very expensive exercise for those who have access to it, and for others these are not readily available as they are far removed from urban areas and where internet access is available. The value of the internet as a foreign policy tool is that it allows citizens to access real-time information and use various social media platforms to interact and dialogue with each other and various government stakeholders, while monitoring foreign policy developments and gaps and essentially contributing to decision-making processes. Chapter Four examines how citizens have been included in South Africa's foreign policy process.

### **3.7.4 The Media and Foreign Policy**

The media has a powerful influence on a country's foreign policy. Their role in foreign policy ranges from articulating diverse opinions and creating the space for dialogue and analysis from both sides. Jordan and Page (1992) write that the way in which news is reported can influence the view of the public on foreign policy. Thus, the nature of the news and the information in it can shift their views in a specific direction and shape their opinions on how the government should respond in its foreign policy. The media can also influence the Head of state and foreign ministers through three channels:

*First, the media can put pressure on leaders to adopt a position on problems that they had previously overlooked. Journalists' questions or even anticipating their question can help put a foreign policy issue on the government's agenda. Second, foreign reports and editorials in major newspapers can influence leaders' ideas because they are considered to be a source of information and analyses, which complements the reports produced by the administration. Third, leaders may believe that specific media coverage influences their electorate and due to this indirect bias, they may adjust their policies for electoral purposes.*

Forms of media have transformed significantly from more traditional sources like print media and television to other forms due to technological advancements such as YouTube, podcasts, and a wide range of social media sources. The power of the media stems from the fact that the world is now more globalised than before such that "national borders have become increasingly permeable (if not irrelevant) as far as communications are concerned" (Heywood, 2014:140). With this has come the easy access to information. Technological advancements have also made it easier for the

media to bring live news and developments from anywhere in the world speedily. Heywood thus states that:

*While the industrial age created new mechanisms for communicating at a national rather than a local level (via national newspapers, telephone systems, radio and television services and so on), the technologies of the information age are by their nature transnational – mobile phones, satellite television and the Internet (usually) operate regardless of borders.*

There are various key considerations when it comes to media's role in foreign affairs and in influencing foreign affairs. Hoge (1994:143) states that when it comes to foreign news for example, there is a tendency to reduce its coverage based on the level of response and interest from the public. In the same vein however, some media are increasing their coverage of international and foreign affairs. Regardless of how much content is being covered, what is evident is that most of it focuses on 'unusual and violent' news. Media also provides new developments in evolving relations between states in a rapid and accelerated manner. The state is therefore kept up-to-date and informed on issues of conflict, trade agreements, or various bilateral and multilateral issues thus giving them the information to make key decisions. The media is also key in helping to set the foreign policy agenda, as they cover key issues to the agenda through their ability to provide evidence from the ground (Pena, 2003).

Heywood (2013:188) presents two ways in which media has transformed itself:

*In the first, the rise of the blog has greatly expanded the contours of political commentary, as the growing 'blogosphere' allows writers, academics, politicians and others to share their observations and opinions about political matter with whoever may be interested in accessing them. In the second, there has been a growth of 'user-generated content', stemming from the increased willingness of private citizens, often in newsworthy or politically-charged situations, to share their thoughts, experiences and, frequently, pictures with other via social media.*

From the above, it can be deduced that citizens increasingly have power to voice their opinions and engage in political processes. It seems to a large extent that the power has shifted from the state to citizens. Foreign policy is no longer a secretive process left to very few as it was in the past. It has evolved to include a wide range of stakeholders and the media has helped to facilitate

and foster this transformation. Chapter Four discusses the role of media in South Africa's foreign policy experience.

### **3.8 Conclusion**

The most important reasons behind the prevalence of Xenophobia in South Africa are economic and the tendency to criminalise foreigners. Xenophobia may manifest itself violently through rioting and attacks on foreigners amongst the poorer, black population. Still, it is an issue for all sectors of South African society that is becoming increasingly urgent for the government to address. This chapter has shed some light on the origins and forms of Xenophobia more generally and more specifically as it concerns South Africa. It has also examined the perceptions of South Africans on migrants. The chapter discusses and explores foreign policy, its determinants and the foreign policy formulation process. It also explores the role of state and non-state actors in foreign policy as these policies act as a guide, to shape and guide relationship in the global arena. It also reflects on the role of the public and the media in shaping and contributing to foreign policy. These policies are also guided by the country's national interest, which varies, depending on the country's peculiarity. This is why, it is quite crucial for the government of the day to understand a country's internal situation and position to be properly guided in formulating policies because they form the principles upon which relations will be conducted and sustained with other nations in the international arena.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK


#### 4.1 Introduction

The previous chapter demonstrated that a wide range of factors causes Xenophobia and its effects are experienced through insecurity such as looting and attacks on foreigners. Responses to Xenophobia and the incidents of violent attacks requires a stronger response by the government, especially in instances when they have incited the violence by their words and actions. This Chapter discusses key theoretical frameworks that underpin this study.

Theoretical frameworks can be defined as structures that are useful for supporting research. They allow for contemplative and rational thinking often associated with such processes as observational learning or research. A theory on the other hand, can be considered as a template or frame work relevant for organizing ideas, opinions, and experiences given well defined assumptions. Most theories are however based on hypothetical and intellectual facts formulated to proffer solutions, guided by given principles as the context may apply. “Theories guide the enterprise of finding facts rather than reaching goals, and are neutral concerning alternatives among values.” (McMurray, 1955). In addition, theoretical frameworks are useful in providing meaning to a problem, an incident or event and providing perspectives and critical views of the world and how it functions. Citing Harris (1997), Yahaya, Oyediran and John (2019: 848) point to the contribution of theories which according to them, are geared towards someone thinking in a positive direction and assesses such thinking independently.

Theories have overtime, turned out to be beneficial concerning the guiding principles they present. They also add value to the chosen research methodology, whether qualitative, quantitative or mixed methods approach. For this study, the importance and centrality of a theory in qualitative research is discussed in Figure 3.1.

**Figure 3.1: The role of theories in the qualitative process**



**Source: Collins and Stockton (2018)**

Collins and Stockton (2018) note that for qualitative processes theories can influence multiple processes and levels of the research from choosing the methods and defining and setting the research questions to analysing the findings. They also state that at the initial stages of research as one conducts their literature review process and works to understand the research problem better, theoretical frameworks “can be a fulcrum and pinnacle portion of a qualitative study (Collins and Stockton (2018). They further point out that qualitative research grows and is enriched when clear links and relationships are defined between theoretical frameworks and various aspects of the research design.

Theoretical frameworks are also useful in provide meaning to a problem, incident or event and provide perspectives and critical views of the world and how it functions. Below are some other benefits of a theory according to Yahaya, Oyediran and John (2019): Theories are useful for

- a. Analogy
- b. Reorganizing experiences
- c. Recognizing complexity
- d. Averting the frivolity of empiricism

Finally, theories are also relevant for comparing opinions about a phenomenon or unit of analysis and help clarify aims and intentions. Three theoretical frameworks have been identified in further unpacking this study's research objectives and research questions. These are realism, securitization and relative deprivation. The research objectives and questions are presented here again for context.

### **Research Objectives**

- a. Examine the effects of Xenophobia on South Africa's foreign policy between 2008 - 2019.
- b. Explore the effects of Xenophobia on South Africa's political relationships with other African countries.
- c. Establish the effects of Xenophobia on South Africa's economic status and relations with other African countries
- d. Explore the future of South Africa's foreign policy within the context of Xenophobia.

### **Research Questions**

- a. How has Xenophobia affected South Africa's foreign policy?
- b. What are the effects of Xenophobia on South Africa's political relationship with other African countries?
- c. What are the effects of Xenophobia on South Africa's economic status and relations with other African countries?
- d. How will Xenophobia influence the future of South Africa's foreign policy?

Returning to a broader discussion, Realism is important in understanding the basis and goals of why states engage in international affairs and what shapes or drives their foreign policy. It will help to understand how internal developments shape external relations and foreign policy goals and outcomes. Thus, in the case of South Africa, it helps to understand how Xenophobia affects its foreign policy. The securitization theory is relevant in understanding the nature of Xenophobia and how it is used to shape the rhetoric and actions of politicians including those involved in foreign policy formulation and implementation. The Securitization theory will be discussed in light of its evolution and its relationship to human rights and peace building, as it relates to government responsibility.

The relative deprivation theory is significant in unpacking the nature and effects of Xenophobia on interpersonal relationships. The Relative deprivation theory is considered suitable in addressing the mind-set leading to xenophobic behaviours. This is because the concept of relative deprivation draws its basis from persons who may feel disadvantaged or deprived of some desired things concerning their past, other persons or groups of persons, or some other social category. Relative deprivation theory contributes to understanding the underlying causes of conflict as it relates to xenophobic actions towards foreigners. Both of these theories will be utilized to understand how the root causes of the subject matter can be addressed. But, before discussing these theories and their responses to xenophobic conflict, it is important to discuss the nature and rationale of conflict, as it is considered to describe xenophobic actions.

According to Coyne and Pellillo (2011: 3) in Ettang (2015: 65), conflict often involves parties resorting to violence as a means of dispute resolution, although it is important to note that conflict can occur without necessarily involving violence. They posit that the reasons for these disputes revolve around clashes over economic resources or opportunities, ideological factors, ethnic or religious tensions, or disagreements over politics and borders (Coyne and Pellillo, 2011). Carpenter and Kennedy (1981: 65) also, noted that conflict can easily and quickly shift from disagreements over issues to “bitterness between parties, hardening of positions, development of more extreme positions, and a desire to win regardless of the consequences”. They are of the opinion that the worsening of such disagreements make the conflict situation much more complex as differences become even harder to resolve (Carpenter and Kennedy, 1981: 65) in Ettang (2015: 65).

The nature of clashes between various groups has been categorized as Social conflict (Ettang; 2015: 65). To this end, Coser (1967: 232) explains social conflict as a “struggle over values or claims to status, power, and scarce resources, in which the aims of the conflict groups are not only to gain the desired values but also to neutralize, injure, or eliminate rivals”. Additionally, social conflict emerges when “particular structures of domination make struggles over values and scarce resources likely” (Oberschall, 1978: 292). As Burton (1997) affirms, conflict arises because of unmet needs. According to Upreti (2004), it emerges from feelings of injustice, mistrust, unfairness, and suspicion and is expressed increasingly through violence. Therefore, Conflict as Ettang (2015) asserts, occurs between individuals, groups, organisations, and communities and could divide groups by race, class, religion or ethnicity.

Although conflict mostly has negative outcomes, it can also be “creatively transformed to ensure equity, progress and harmony” (ECPF, 2008: 7). For this reason, Homer-Dixon (1994: 6) stresses that “social conflict is not always a bad thing: mass mobilization and civil strife can produce opportunities for beneficial change in the distribution of land and wealth and processes of governance”. Therefore, conflict as a “driver of social change can be considered constructive if the conflicting parties acknowledge the legitimacy of different interests and the needs of all actors involved” (Berghof Foundation, 2012: 11).

## 4.2. Realism

Analyzing the economic and political effects of Xenophobia on South Africa's foreign policy towards other African countries calls for an approach, multidimensional in nature. One theoretical framework as earlier stated that can be useful in this analysis is the Realist perspective in International Relations.

Realism posits that states act primarily to pursue their own self-interests in an anarchic international system where power is deemed the primary currency. This theory further emphasizes the state's role, national interest, and military power in world politics. According to Bell (2018), realism focuses on “long-lasting patterns of interaction in an international system with no centralised political authority. That state of anarchy differs from domestic politics where there is a sovereign authority. In the same vein, Antunes and Camisão (2018: 2) opined that realism is often utilised in policymaking more than any other International Relations theory.

The assumptions of realism, as highlighted by Antunes and Camisao (2018), are as follows:

- a. *The state is the major actor in international relations. Other bodies exist, such as individuals and organizations, but their power has some degree of restriction.*
- b. *The state is a unitary actor. Especially in war, national interests lead the state to speak and act with one voice.*
- c. *Decision makers are rational actors because rational decision-making leads to the pursuit of the national interest. On this basis, taking actions that would make a state weak or vulnerable would not be rational. Realism, however, submits that all leaders, no matter their political influence, recognize this as they attempt to manage their state's affairs to survive in a competitive environment.*
- d. *States live in a context of anarchy, that is, they exist in the absence of anyone being in*

*charge internationally.*

Realism is fundamental to this study because of its emphasis on analysing relations amongst states within the global system. This aligns with the study's focus on South Africa's foreign policy and political and economic relations with other states. The study highlights how states and their foreign policy interests and objectives are shaped by domestic occurrences and vice versa. The likes of Hans Morgenthau and Niccollo Machiavelli, amongst others, are some realist scholars who believe that states act only out of self-interest to enhance their power and position over others. Also, realists emphasize the use of power to achieve what ordinarily would not be achieved, which makes states power-driven entities.

Under the lens of realism, it can be argued that power, interests and motives feature in South Africa's response to Xenophobia and its engagement and relationships with other African countries. The relevance of realism to this study stems from the fact that perhaps South Africa is in a position of solely making decisions for its good and the good of all its citizens and migrants. Realism's critics argue that realists can help perpetuate the violent and aggressive world they describe in the name of self-interest. Realists assume the position of humankind's uncooperative and self-centred nature and the absence of hierarchy in the state system. And realists encourage those at the helm of affairs to act based on suspicion which could further hamper positive relations with other states.

However, in the context of South Africa's foreign policy towards other African countries affected by Xenophobia, the analysis can be broken down into economic and political dimensions:

**1. Economic Effects:** Realists would argue that South Africa's economic interests are paramount (Mearsheimer: 2014) and Xenophobia can have both positive and negative economic effects. On one hand, xenophobic sentiments may lead to formulation of policies that restrict the influx of foreign labour, in a bid to potentially protect job opportunities for South African citizens. It can however, also result in strained economic relations with other African countries, particularly those whose citizens are victimized by xenophobic violence. This can consequently, lead to reduced trade relations, investment, and economic cooperation between South Africa and its African neighbours. On the other hand, South Africa may adopt a more assertive foreign policy to maintain its perceived power and security in the face of domestic challenges like Xenophobia, potentially leading to a more aggressive stance towards perceived threats or rivals. As Baldwin-Edwards

(2013: 221-237) discusses, xenophobic sentiments can lead to the enactment and presentation of policies restricting foreign labour, supposedly protecting domestic job opportunities.

2. **Political Effects:** the theory of Realism emphasizes the role of power and security in international relations. Xenophobia is capable of undermining a country's political influence in the region. Instances of violence against foreign nationals can as well damage South Africa's reputation as a regional leader and a champion of African unity. As a result, this can weaken its diplomatic relationships with other African countries and reduce its ability to pull political influence within regional organizations such as the African Union.

#### **4.2.1 Neorealism**

Neorealism is an extensive term that can be implemented in several fields of study. In politics however, it is referred to as a theory of international relations relating to power politics being applied due to the inconstancy of other governments' intentions. Neo-realism (also known as neorealismo) is an Italian cultural movement which spanned literature, art and film (Britannica Encyclopaedia, 2016). It was influenced by Modernism in the 1920s and emerged more strongly after World War Two in Italy. Neo-realism is an artistic movement focusing on depicting the War, its causes and aftereffects, as realistically as possible, along with depictions of ordinary human life.

The absolute dominance knows the neorealist perspective of international relations of security interests, states' drive self-preservation and the refusal to cooperate. As there is no authority outside of states (such as a world government) that lays down rules and norms mandatory for all states and that can, if necessary, ensure compliance by force, states must live in a condition of permanent insecurity regarding their neighbours' intentions. They must always be prepared for the worst, namely, war. As Schörnig (2014: 37) indicates, these assumptions place neorealism within the tradition of realist authors such as Hans J. Morgenthau, Edward H. Carr and Henry Kissinger, but it goes beyond them when it comes to theory building (hence neo realism). Also, this theory of neorealism "attempts to explain why more wars occur during certain periods of history, while others are more peaceful despite great tensions.

The theory concentrates solely on "high politics" (in other words the "classical" politics of security) while leaving "low politics" (social and economic issues) out of the account". Schörnig

(2014: 39). It is important to note the leading and most prominent proponent of neorealism - Kenneth N. Waltz. In his book; Theory of International Politics, Waltz aims to formulate a far-reaching international relations theory.

Neo realism is centred on two central concerns. According to Schörnig (2014: 38),

*First, it sought to explain the reason for conflict in the East–West bipolar world, a world standing up with arms. This world had proved astonishingly stable and opposed to war despite successive phases of mis-understanding and confrontation. Second, in light of the decline of American hegemony in the 1970s, the economic resurgence of Europe and Japan, and the global economic crisis, it tried to explain why the US had begun to lose its pre-eminent status. Waltz was looking for a general International Relations theory that systematically explains both war and periods of peace in international politics.*

Neorealism thus sheds light on how a state should act regarding foreign relations; as mentioned above, this could result in war, aggression or more peaceful methods like negotiation and diplomacy. In doing so self-interest or national interest is paramount, a state relies on its capacities and resources, and protects its economic and military interests. It is important to note that while neorealism highlights that states must take into account the various role-players external to them and the dynamics of the anarchic global system, foreign policy puts forward the need to include and engage domestic role-players in shaping a country's foreign relations foreign relations.

#### **4.2.2 Realism and Foreign Policy**

Realism is important in understanding how foreign policy is shaped and driven. National interest is at the foundation of foreign policy, which is important for realists. National interest according to Heywood (2011: 58) is “foreign policy goals, objectives or policy preferences that supposedly benefit a society as a whole (the foreign policy equivalent of the ‘public interest’)”. With this definition, the state's actions and behaviour regarding foreign policy is largely driven by its benefits to the public. Sometimes the state or politicians have to put aside self-interest, which is inherent in human nature, in favour of the public good. According to its proponents, it helps explain the state's role and why it behaves the way it does. Smith et al., (2016) note that realism provides three core assumptions on how things work globally. They identify these as groupism, egoism and power-centrism (See Table 3.1).

**Table 3.1: Three main assumptions of behaviour in global politics**

<i>Groupism</i>	<i>Egoism</i>	<i>Power-Centrism</i>
<p><i>Humans face one another mainly as members of groups. To survive above subsistence level, people need the cohesion provided by group solidarity, yet that same in-group cohesion generates the potential for conflict with other groups. Today the most important human groups are nation states, and the most important source of in-group cohesion is nationalism. However, it is important to stress that realism does not assume the nature of the polity. It may apply to any social setting where groups interact.</i></p>	<p><i>Self-interest ultimately drives political behaviour. Although certain conditions can facilitate altruistic behaviour, egoism is rooted in human nature. When push comes to shove and ultimate trade-offs between collective and self-interest must be confronted, egoism tends to trump altruism. As the classic realist adage has it, 'Inhumanity is just humanity under pressure'.</i></p>	<p><i>Power is the fundamental feature of politics. Once past the hunter-gatherer stage, human affairs are always marked by great inequalities of power in both senses of that term: social influence or control (some groups and individuals always have an outsized influence on politics) and resources (some groups and individuals are always disproportionately endowed with the material wherewithal to get what they want). The interaction between social and material power is key to politics in any area, which unfolds in the shadow of the potential use of material power to coerce.</i></p>

**Source: Smith et al., 2016).**

States may use non-violent measures and aggression to further their national interest or foreign policy. Therefore, diplomacy can be a chosen instrument of foreign policy in efforts to avoid war and tensions between countries. Diplomacy as an instrument of foreign policy can be defined as “process of negotiation and communication between states that seeks to resolve conflict without recourse to war; an instrument of foreign policy (Heywood, 2011: 7). Governments therefore can choose conciliation, compromise and non-violent conflict resolution as modes of engagement

when interacting with other countries (Heywood, 2011). This in some instances serves their interests best. What is very clear is that foreign policy is no longer secretive left only to high level political stakeholders, the space has since opened up to a wide range of domestic role-players as the issues of foreign policy impact the domestic arena and vice versa.

### **4.3 Levels of Analysis Framework**

In foreign policy, Waltz (1959) levels of analysis in understanding the causes of war have been used to shed light on how decisions are made in foreign policy and what factors influence foreign policy decisions. These are:

- a. The level of the individual decision-maker (for example personal priorities, psychological and cognitive dispositions)*
- b. The nation-state level (for example the nature of the state, type of government, bureaucratic structure)*
- c. The systemic level (for example power balances within the international system, the web of state interdependence, dynamics of global capitalism)*

In their work, Mark C.R., Masaki H., and Rachel B.W. (2022) emphasized the significance and importance of the levels of analysis framework as a tool for understanding international relations as well as the decision-making processes of actors. This framework allows for a focused examination of specific aspects of interactions, thereby contributing to a deeper comprehension of the dynamics at play. They further reiterated a well-recognized aspect and characteristic of the international system, highlighting the primary responsibility of states in policy creation. However, within international relations, levels of analysis can be discerned by scrutinizing the individual (comprising leaders within a nation), concentrating on their actions; the state, focusing on the actions of nations; and the global system, examining how states engage with other actors such as international organizations, non-governmental entities, and multinational corporations among others.

These various levels of analysis are critical as they show how integral the state is to foreign policy goals, targets and drivers. The individuals that sit in key political positions like Heads of States and Ministers, the type of state be it authoritarian or democratic will determine the level of inclusion of non-state actors in foreign policy. The balance of power on the international stage and the influence of one state to another, will shape how states develop and decide on their foreign policy. The role of allies and the nature of a country's bilateral and multilateral engagements also

shape its foreign policy decision-making and implementation process. The next chapter sheds light on how these different levels of analysis are featured in South Africa's foreign policy process.

#### **4.4 Constructivism**

In international relations theory, social constructivism (also referred to as constructivism), emphasizes the role of human awareness (Jackson, R. and Sorensen, G., 2007: 162) and how ideas, norms, and distinctiveness shape state behaviour and consequently foreign policy decisions and strategies. By this, constructivism is regarded as a valuable tool not only for the purpose of understanding foreign policy, but as also a guide for prescribing foreign policy (Flockhart, T., 2017). This theory maintains that the world of international relations, including its political and social angles, is nothing out of human consciousness. This means that the international system is not just something that exist on its own, but rather exists as an "intersubjective awareness among people" (Jackson, R. and Sorensen, G., 2007: 162), thereby making it to be an ideologically and intellectually-based system, and not just materialistic or physical element. This however, means that constructivists do not believe international politics is 'ideas all the way down', but is characterized by both by material factors and ideational factors. Consequently, constructivists see these varying identities and interests of actors as socially constructed and changeable, owing to the fact that identities are not constant (Wendt, A., 1992) and are formed by rolling processes of social practice and interaction.

##### **4.4.1 Constructivism and Xenophobia**

In the context of xenophobia and foreign policy, constructivism can be applied to understand how perceptions of "self" and "other" influence a state's attitudes towards foreigners. An instance of constructivist analysis can be seen in ways that might suggest that a state's historical narratives, cultural beliefs, and social identities play a significant role in shaping its xenophobic tendencies and foreign policy approaches. These factors can influence how a state views foreign individuals or groups, leading to discriminatory policies or hostile attitudes based on constructed notions of identity, difference, or threat (Jackson, R. and Sorensen, G., 2007: 163- 165). To provide a specific example, however, consider how the rise of right-wing nationalism in some European countries has been fuelled by constructivist ideas of national identity and cultural superiority. This has, in turn, influenced foreign policy decisions related to immigration, border control, and international relations with countries perceived as culturally or ethnically different.

In summary, constructivism is able to offer valuable insights into how xenophobia manifests in foreign policy by bringing to light the role of socially constructed identities, norms, and perceptions in shaping states' attitudes towards foreigners.

#### **4.4.2 Constructivism through the lens of foreign policy**

According to Behraves, M. (2011: 1), foreign policy analysis can be made while putting into cognisance three (3) chief ways. These consist of; the role of actors and bureaucracies in shaping foreign policy, the process of decision-making, and the effect international system or society has on the conduct of foreign policy by states.

##### **National Bureaucratic Actors**

These bureaucratic actors, as highlighted by Behraves, M. (2011: 2), play a crucial role in shaping foreign policy decisions due to the fact that they possess specialized knowledge, expertise, and resources necessary for conducting and guiding international relations. They also have their own agendas, priorities, and constraints which also influence their decision-making process. This can be seen in cases where ministries of defence, for instance, may prioritize military strategies and security concerns in foreign policy decisions, while departments of trade and development may focus on economic interests and trade relations. Furthermore, National security councils may prioritize intelligence gathering and threat assessments, while foreign offices may pay attention on diplomacy and international relations. The interactions and conflicts between these bureaucratic actors can shape the final outcome of foreign policy decisions. Using the case of the Cuban missile crisis as an example, Behraves (2011) suggests that the bureaucratic politics within the U.S. government played a noteworthy role in shaping the response to the crisis.

In general, national bureaucracies play a crucial role in shaping state foreign policies by balancing national interests with their own organizational interests. It is however important that understanding the dynamics and motivations of these bureaucratic actors is vital for understanding the complexities of foreign policy decision-making.

##### **The Decision-Making Process**

In the words of Behraves (2011: 3), the decision-making process is an important and strategic part of making decisions at both the state and international levels. Another importance was drawn to the fact that having logical arguments is important making decisions, and this is because it helps a better negotiation process and fosters learning of new things. Cottone, R (2001:29) wrote:

*A social constructivism approach redefines the ethical decision-making process as an interactive rather than an individual or intrapsychic process. The process involves negotiating, consensualizing, and, when necessary, arbitrating.*

This connotes that in the international system, State actors and elites involved in decision-making are thought and expected by many to be “instrumentally rational” Behraves (2011: 3), seeking to maximize effectiveness through such means and mechanisms as “bargaining” as well as concluding deals at different strategic and tactical levels.

### **International Society**

Although globalization is making it harder to separate domestic and international politics, scholars in the field of international relations and foreign policy analysis (FPA) still see the divide between them as an important theoretical and conceptual issue Behraves (2011: 3). In addition, Constructivist theory as indicated by Finnemore (in Hobson, 2003), submits that international organizations not only regulate state behaviour, they also influence states' identities and interests, thereby shaping and directing their actions (Johnston, 2001). This however, implies that states combine international norms of acceptable state behaviour through international organizations, influencing their policies and domestic frameworks accordingly.

### **4.5 Securitization Theory**

Securitization theory brings attention to how various issues like migration and health have become ‘securitised’ thus warranting security responses. In reflecting on the securitization theory, Eroukhmanoff (2018:1) notes that political actors and policymakers shape and design national security policy. Clara proceeded to clarify the notion of Securitization theory as follows:

*According to securitisation theory, political issues are constituted as extreme security issues to be dealt with urgently when they have been labelled as ‘dangerous’, ‘menacing’, ‘threatening’, ‘alarming’ and so on by a ‘securitising actor’ who has the social and institutional power to move the issue ‘beyond politics’. So, security issues are not simply ‘out there’ but must be articulated as problems by securitising actors”.*

Therefore, in a bid to understand the securitisation of issues and foreign policy then, the role of the state and politicians in deciding what is an issue of national security is critical. Securitization

Theory focuses on the speech acts of political elites. In doing so, they decide what requires a security approach or response and can convince the public that it is a security response and why they have taken it (Baysal, 2020:4).

According to Eroukhmanoff (2018: 2), the speech acts of these political elites (otherwise referred to as decision makers) depict that ‘by saying the words, something is done, like betting, giving a promise, naming a ship’ (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde 1998: 26). In an attempt to explain how the whole idea of speech acts plays out, Clara (2018: 2) revealed categorically that:

*To convince an audience to take extraordinary measures, the securitising actor must draw attention and often exaggerate the urgency and level of the threat, communicate a point of no return, i.e. ‘if we do not tackle this problem, everything else will be irrelevant’, and offer a possible way out (lifting the issue above politics) – which is often framed in military terms. In so doing, the securitising actor makes some actions more intelligible. They enable a regime of truth about the nature of the threat and the referent object’s nature.*

An instance of this was experienced right before the 2015 episode of xenophobic violence when Zulu monarch King Goodwill Zwelithini at a public event in KwaZulu-Natal in March 2015, stated that foreigners should take their bags and go back to their countries. During the public event, he also blamed the South African government for not protecting its citizens from the huge numbers of migrants coming into the country. In his speech, he stated, "Most government leaders do not want to speak out on this matter because they are scared of losing votes. As the king of the Zulu nation, I cannot tolerate a situation where leaders are leading us with no views whatsoever" (Bekker, 2015: 234).

The notion of the securitization theory shows how different political actors play a role in constructions of what a security is or not. These can go beyond political stakeholders or actors to non-state entities like communities and non-governmental organisations. And so in the foreign policy context, states determine what an issue of high politics is which requires significant attention. These high politics issues are of “primary importance, usually taken to refer to defence and foreign policy generally, and particularly to matters of state self-preservation” (Heywood, 2011:63). One can therefore argue that Xenophobia is perhaps perceived as an issue that is vital to South Africa’s self-interest and self-preservation thus warranting a security approach. It is also an issue that significantly affects its domestic and foreign policy.

#### 4.5.1 Securitization Theory and Xenophobia

Xenophobia has been framed very much by the state through political office holders, through public xenophobic statements (one of which has incited violence) and by the inaction or limited response to xenophobic violence. Sempijja and Mongale (2022) strongly opined that “Post-apartheid South Africa has experienced continuous xenophobic attacks on Africans since 2008 and has resulted in a total of at least 612 deaths (Xenowatch 2021: 22).

**Table 3.2: Incidents of xenophobic violence and type of victimisation: 1994-30 Nov 2021**

<b>TYPE OF VICTIMIZATION</b>	<b>TOTAL NUMBER</b>
<b>TOTAL NUMBER OF INCIDENTS</b>	<b>873</b>
<b>PERSONS KILLED</b>	<b>612</b>
<b>PHYSICAL ASSAULTS</b>	<b>1,184</b>
<b>PERSONS DISPLACED</b>	<b>122,298</b>
<b>SHOPS/PROPERTY LOOTED/DAMAGED</b>	<b>6,306</b>

Source: Xenowatch 2021.

In most cases, the attacks were not framed as xenophobic by the state. Rather, they were framed within a socio-economic context, where the general population criminalised and securitised the targeted groups.” With securitisation, Haggmann J (2016: 201) acknowledges that when the knowledge of problems is brought into the political and societal space and this knowledge is received as truth and real, it will result in some form of action. He adds that while securitisation “provides points of reference for agency and simultaneously asks for agency, “how that agency is used depends on the nature and understanding of insecurity. Therefore, by naming a threat, securitising actors haul topics into security logic, setting out problem situations and the imperative to act — but they also usually associate these topics with broader understandings of who (or what) threatens whom and how... (Haggmann, 2016:201).

Xenophobic violence in South Africa as stated in the Xenowatch Quinquennial Report (2021: 4), is “generally a collective action (i.e., a type of collective violence) mostly carried out by groups (large or small) of ordinary members of the public, often mobilised by local leaders (formal and informal) and influential groups or individuals to further their own political and economic

interests”. These role players are very influential and their words and actions hold significant weight. According to the Xenowatch Quinquennial Report (2021:6):

*Instigators of xenophobic violence in South Africa use various mobilisation techniques and processes including ‘haranguing’ and inciting crowds during mass community meetings; social media messages, spreading purposely engineered rumours, appealing to a community’s sense of solidarity and right to self-defence; setting examples and asking community members to join; and hiring unemployed youths to carry out attacks.*

This connotes the idea behind securitization as a phenomenon that comes with identifying sources and targets of threats, and a description of the nature of relations between them. Securitization therefore has its basics on the power that the few elite or decision makers have to declare an element or a thing as posing a threat. Securitization moves actors or ideas like foreign governments, cultural practices or non-state actors into powerful and unique roles (Hagmann, 2018: 201). In conclusion, while more focused on how issues are framed as security threats by political elites, Securitization Theory, can provide perceptions into the rhetoric and narratives surrounding immigration and Xenophobia in South Africa. The data highlights that political statements and securitization narratives portray immigrants as threats to national security, which influences public perceptions and potentially contributes to xenophobic sentiments.

#### **4.5.2 Securitization Theory and Foreign Policy**

In his publication on the production of international order(s), Hagmann (2016: 194- 195) emphasized that securitization as a major influence can be seen in the light of a powerful means of ‘antagonistic international subjectification and subject-positioning’. The securitization of ‘themes’, or things (for instance terrorism, migration, climate change among others.), has become a “world-controlling practice’ that jeopardises and limits international relations.” (Hagmann, 2016). As an outcome, the securitization of migration, for instance, implies that immigrants are considered a threat to the society's identity or the integrity of the state and society (Angelescu, 2008: 4).

As earlier stated by Hagmann, securitization of any concept or element as it relates to a state is deemed a practice which endangers, orders and consequently, conditions international relations. To this end, he explained in summary, that the securitization practices endanger or threaten international stability by identifying problem situations, which generates a need for defence and

sets out a powerful motivation for policy activism or action. As a function of ordering international relations, securitization achieves this by defining who (or what) threatens whom and how (that is, by positioning enemies, adversaries, associates and other actors within international politics). And, if accepted, securitisation moves to the third function by “conditioning foreign policy making employing authoritative, albeit socially produced and thus also contestable, frameworks of reality” (Hagmann, 2016: 195).

Recall however, that securitization has its basics on the power that the few elite or decision makers have to declare an element or a thing as posing a threat. To this end, Waever, posits securitization to be a choice consciously and deliberately exercised by state elites and actors who are attempting to manipulate or influence society (Williams, 2003: 511–531 in Göktürk Tüysüzoglu, 2015: 194). That is to say, securitisation is employed by elites to achieve certain intentions, to legitimize certain values or ideologies, and to obtain acceptance of the policies those elites intend to impose. This invariably means that issues that turn out to be securitized do not automatically or necessarily represent issues that are essential to the objective survival of a state, but rather represent issues where someone has successfully constructed an issue into an existential problem. These same people are most likely responsible for making policies to back up their position or claim. If an element is securitized successfully, it is possible to legitimize unusual and extraordinary strategies to solve the perceived problem. This could include but not limited to declaring a state of emergency or martial law, mobilizing the military or attacking another country by any means possible. Furthermore, if a subject is successfully categorized as a security problem, then the subject can be considered to be a prohibited subject for political or even academic debate. It is worthy to note however, that:

*Politically, successful securitisation creates complex local truths about the presence and organisation of international danger, identifying numerous actors and relations. When issues are securitised, these topics are brought to local attention. Necessities for action are created, and knowledge of international security politics is produced and organised in distinct ways. This means that after endangerment, securitisation connects to foreign policy making by its epistemological ordering of the international. Securitisation moves identify who (or what) is a source of insecurity, who is affected by insecurity, and they define the nature of the relation between these threatening and threatened actors.*

#### 4.6 Realism, Securitization theory and Xenophobia

It can be deduced from realism and securitization theory within the context of Xenophobia that humans are shaped by their nature – the nature being egoistic and desirous of power. Realists for example, believe that as humans, selfishness, a desire for power and the mistrust of others leads to specific outcomes. Central to Xenophobia, foreigners are generally referred to as threats and the ‘fear and hatred’ of them revolves around xenophobic actions against them. What triggered foreigners to be perceived as such, is however, explained by Eroukhmanoff (2018: 1), where she stated while further explaining the Securitization theory that:

*Calling immigration a ‘threat to national security’, for instance, shifts immigration from a low priority political concern to a high priority issue that requires action, such as securing borders. Securitisation theory challenges traditional approaches to security in IR and asserts that issues are not essentially threatening in themselves; rather, it is by referring to them as ‘security’ issues that they become security problems.”*

Crush (2020: 4) further notes that “the nation-building projects of most post-colonial states focus more on the perceived threats to national sovereignty and citizen livelihoods posed by migrants, refugees and immigrants. Opportunities for permanent residence and citizenship in other countries are also extremely constrained.” Several authors have highlighted that racism plays a role in the securitization of migration (Huysmans 2000; Ibrahim 2005; Togral 2011).

According to Ibrahim (2005:163-164), the securitization of migration can be looked at as “discourse through which relations of power are exercised” and is “racism’s most modern form”. Undoubtedly, the antagonism directed in the direction of migrants is based on the belief that the host country views itself as more superior, and as a result see the need to exclude migrants from all aspects of their society. This is carried out through discriminatory and prejudicial laws (Elisabeth, 2016: 5). It is therefore possible to see that various sectors from law enforcement, judiciary, education and health all target migrants and fail to accord them the services they require and disregard their rights.

While on the point of humans naturally craving for power and being selfish, Neocosmos (2010) asserts that Xenophobia is also in other parts of the world and not just domicile to South Africa only. What is most glaring is the nature of xenophobic violence experienced in various settings

like South Africa. But the more disturbing thing about South African Xenophobia is its nature of violence. This is why Vilji (2003) presents the idea of a ‘culture of violence’ in the country.

According to Tirivangasi, (2017: 25) violence has become typical and has been often used in the expression of individual grievances, despising the fact that it comes with adverse repercussions. Bond et al. (2011) outline the dissatisfaction by most South African citizens about limited available employment opportunities and the rapid decrease in service delivery. Moreso, various forms of crimes, theft, frauds committed by foreign nationals, have provoked around thirty-one per (31%) of xenophobic attacks. The use of violence to discourage and scare away foreign nationals became a more allowable strategy of dealing with the situation. This, however as stated by Tirivangasi (2017: 25) can be traced back to the colonial era where people turned to mass violent demonstrations against the apartheid government. In the post-colonial era, South Africans have continued to practice these mass demonstrations to express their disgruntlement or grievances.

Although the South African government, in recent years, has begun to recognise the extent and effects of the problem of Xenophobia and the need to address and manage it to protect its ‘young democracy’, politicians have frequently expressed xenophobic views. These views and narratives are evident in various government departments and the government figureheads themselves. For example, former Minister of Home Affairs, Dr Mangosuthu Buthelezi described illegal migrants as his “biggest headache” in his maiden speech to Parliament, noting that they would hinder South Africa’s economic growth as they came in large numbers (BBC News 2003). Solomon and Kosaka (2016) noted that political party spokespersons for the African National Congress have insinuated that human rights does not apply to foreign nationals. For example, ANC MP, Desmond Lockey stated that “there are very few countries in the world which would extend human rights to non-citizens” (Neocosmos 2006). Xenophobic sentiments are not confined to the ruling party, and criticisms against immigrants have spanned the political spectrum. For example, in the run-up to many of its elections, a range of political parties used anti-immigration discourse to attract votes.

A research carried out by Xenowatch Quinquennial report (Misago et al., 2021: 28), revealed how violence against foreigners are incited and triggered by politicians who utilise sentiments geared towards the perception of foreigners as a threat to citizens’ livelihood and national security. According to the report, A South African respondent in Diepsloot, when asked for opinion about the causes or reasons behind negative attitudes and violence against foreign nationals stated thus:

*I think the main drivers are politicians. Because they want to rule, they look for different ways of gaining public attention and support and one of the reasons would be blaming outsiders for the problems faced in this community. It is all about power. Politicians will always tell you what you want to hear even if it is false. We also have to remember that not all of us tolerate foreigners. Some people do not. So, it's most likely that once they hear negative messages from some of these politicians about foreign nationals, they are quick to support them and start violence. The community members will start supporting them when they say foreigners must go. These are the kind of statements that are likely to breed hate and incite violence Xenowatch Quinquennial report (2021: 28).*

The state and its various agencies in protecting their interests embrace and imbibe the views presented by the securitisation theory where ideas and narratives about foreigners as a significant threat, now shape domestic policy and actions. It seems that sometimes state actors (those who shape and influence foreign policy) also fail to realise that their actions and the consequences of their actions will have implications beyond their borders. The next section now reflects on the relative deprivation theory.

#### **4.7 Conclusion**

This chapter is relevant because of its emphasis on theories, their uses and general understanding of their aims. Theory forms a framework upon which ideas are structured for better clarity of a concept. They also clarify qualitative research and its research methods, questions, and analysis process. This chapter covered theories like realism, securitization and constructivism, and discusses their relevance to the understanding of Xenophobia as it applies to the Republic of South Africa. South Africa's political history and culture of violence, the use of speeches and statements to incite xenophobic violence have all played a role and become a catalyst for xenophobic attacks. Beyond the domestic implications, this chapter has shown how foreign policy relates to securitization, realism and constructivism. The next chapter examines South Africa's foreign policy experience and its foreign policy, principles, objectives and actors.

## **CHAPTER FIVE**


### **SOUTH AFRICA'S FOREIGN POLICY**

#### **5.1 Introduction**

It has been established in previous sections that foreign policy covers a number of decisions and actions by various actors to manage a state's relations with other states on the global arena. While acknowledging its sovereignty and independence, the state is also mandated to engage with other states in enhancing and promoting their citizens' social, economic, cultural and security interests. This chapter examines the foreign affairs and foreign policy landscape of South Africa by looking into the various actors and institutions, a historical overview of its foreign policy journey as well as its engagement with other African countries. To institute this, South Africa's national interest will be looked into. Recall that a State's national interest is the propelling force or the bed rock on which its foreign policy is built. It serves as a guide to influence policy formations and process.

Returning to a broader discussion, South Africa remains one of Africa's largest economies thus giving it a role of a leader on the continent. In comparing the economies of the continent (Figure 4.1), South Africa's GDP stands higher than the other growing economies on the continent. As of 2022, it sits as the second highest economy in Africa with a GDP of 407.5 billion dollars after Nigeria (Statista, 2022) depicting its high per capital income and high-income levels. As one of the most powerful economies in SADC, it drives trade in the region significantly.


**Figure 4.1: African Countries by GDP (1994-2018)**



**Source: Elcano Global Presence Index (2018)**

In addition to its visibility and economic strength on the continent, it has significant visibility globally as it is a member of the BRICS coalition. Until recently, it was the only African member of the G20 (the African Union became a member in 2023). This visibility is presented in Figure 4.1 by the Elcano Global Presence Index, where South Africa has had the strongest presence globally out of all African countries. Furthermore, it has been ranked among the world’s top 30 regarding global visibility between 2015 and 2018 (Elcano Global Presence Index).

**Figure 4.2: South Africa’s global visibility as compared to other African countries**



**Source: Elcano Global Presence Index 2018 – Africa**

While South Africa enjoys this international visibility and status, certain incessant challenges hinder its potential for sustained economic growth. High unemployment rates, stagnant poverty levels, the enduring energy crisis, and persistent levels of criminality and corruption collectively slow down economic prosperity. It is however, important to recognize that these issues are not only obstacles to growth but are also influenced by the state of the economy. For instance, a high unemployment rate and persistent poverty can be both a cause and a consequence of low economic growth. In the same way, crime rates may rise in response to economic hardship and lack of opportunities, further intensifying economic challenges. Moreover, the ongoing xenophobic crisis, while sometimes scapegoated for these systemic problems, is a reflection underlying social and economic tensions that impact the country's infrastructure and economy. Understanding the bidirectional relationship between these factors is essential for devising comprehensive strategies to promote sustainable economic development and address social issues in South Africa.

## **5.2 South Africa’s National Interest**

As indicated above, sovereign states utilise foreign policy to showcase, promote, and protect their interests, which can be summed up as its ‘national interest. However, South Africa’s National Interest serves as a guide to the country’s domestic goals and priorities. Generally, some of these interests as stipulated by DIRCOS’s Framework Document on South Africa’s National Interest and its Advancement in a Global Environment (2023: 2) result from the state’s domestic political and economic responsibilities, obligations, policies and historical experience. As also highlighted, states pursue their interests internationally via foreign policy and, more so, employ different

methods or tools to achieve it such as diplomacy, negotiation, building alliances, sanctions and coercion when needed.

As highlighted in the Framework Document (DIRCO, 2023: 3), South Africa's National Interest emerged from its Constitution as adopted in 1996. While establishing National Interest as the phenomenon that guided its domestic objectives and priorities, the framework document elaborated further on the fact that:

*Identifying and operationalising the country's National Interest is integrated in government planning and policy-making, including through the National Development Plan: Vision for 2030, the Medium-Term Strategic Framework, the National Security Strategy and the Foreign Service Act, 2019 (Act 26 of 2019). South Africa's National Interest is influenced by other national, regional and global policy instruments such as the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Constitutive Act of the African Union (AU) and its Agenda 2063 and the Charter of the United Nations (UN) and its 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. The National Interest is also shaped through solidarity and mutual interests with the region, continent and the South, including the Bandung Principles, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), the Group of 77 and China and the UN. The National Interest shapes the key principles of South Africa's foreign policy". (Framework Document on South Africa's national interest and advancement in a Global Environment (2023: 3).*

In essence, a state's foreign policy is birthed from the state's national interest. This bolsters the already stated notion and definition of foreign policy generally, as actions largely concerned with handling a state's relations and engagements with other states in the international system with her national interest as the driving force.

The Framework Document on South Africa's National Interest and its Advancement in a Global Environment (2023: 5) also highlighted that strategic moments in a state's development prompts it to identify and review the key foundations and components of its national interest when the structural conditions that drives the national interest change fundamentally. These core elements, however, are not redefined often, because the motivations and principles that propel it are mostly consistent over long periods. As a result:

*A review of the National Interest is mostly usually linked to the ending of a particular historical era and the beginning of another; or critical intervals in the life of a state or people when profound events give birth to a fundamentally new political, social and economic order. However, precise definitions and details of National Interest should be flexible and responsive to the inevitable change and unforeseen developments in a fast-changing and dynamic world. (Framework Document on South Africa's national interest and advancement in a Global Environment (2023: 5).*

On the above basis, it is not out of place to say that South Africa's National Interest has been influenced and defined as a result of some developments over time. For instance, before 1994 (the year which marked its independence from the shackles of apartheid), it would have been a challenging venture trying to define and settle on a common understanding of its National Interest because the dissimilarities were too severe and the society was separated with clear divisions and divisiveness. With the domination by one apartheid regime after another, the country's National Interest at the time was only defined within the context of, and revolving around the white minority rule (regime security) and the Cold War (ideology) (DIRCO 2023: 7). In the society also, no agreement could be made with regards to the nature, purpose or legality of the State due to the inability of the majority of the people (blacks) to shape their lives and experiences reflected thereof.

Nonetheless, after 1994, DIRCO (2023: 7) revealed that South Africa faced different situational obligations. These obligations comprised a comprehensive, all-inclusive and fundamental remaking and restructuring of its political and economic dispensation. A democratic society had to be created, the country's constitutional rules and imperatives developed, the economic inefficiencies and state of underdevelopment looked into, and turned the focus from an inward-looking to an outward-looking one. South Africa had to ensure effectiveness and competitiveness of its economy and be re-joined into the global economy by using its economic resources and liquidity. Another strategic obligation was restructuring of the private sector. As a country, there was the need to reintegrate into the political economy of the region and the continent so that it can reintegrate into the family of nations.

The other document that sets out South Africa's national interest is the National Development Plan (NDP). The document's long-term vision is that, "in 2030, South Africa, informed by its national interests, is a globally competitive economy, and an influential and leading member of the

international community. South Africa promotes and contributes to democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and peace and security, within a safe, peaceful and prosperous Southern African Region and Africa, as well as a fair and just world” (NPC, 2015).

The National Development Plan (NDP) offers a long-term socio-economic development road map addressing the country’s challenges. Therefore, The NDP: Vision for 2030 focuses on the following strategic areas of development:

- a. creating jobs;
- b. expanding infrastructure;
- c. sustainable use of resources;
- d. transforming urban and rural spaces;
- e. improving education and training;
- f. providing quality healthcare;
- g. building a capable state;
- h. fighting crime and corruption; and
- i. uniting the nation

As the name implies, the National Development plan (NDP) is a plan or intention geared towards national development. According to National Planning Commission (NPC) (2023), the NDP serves as a working plan to aid the achievement of the greater goal of securing the future of South Africans as projected in the Republic’s Constitution. The Constitution requires that “we build a united and democratic South Africa, able to take its rightful place as a sovereign state in the family of nations”. (NPC, 2023). In addition, the South African NDP is focused on ensuring that by 2030, poverty should have been eliminated and inequality reduced. This is relevant because the South African policy, as discussed earlier, revolves around a people-centred agenda that sees equality, human rights, and reduced poverty in the system. According to the NDP 2030 plan, these goals can be realized by collaborating the energies of its people, developing individual and collective capabilities, enhancing the capacity of the State, growing a wide-ranging economy, and promoting leadership and connections throughout the society. (South African Government, 2023).

It has acknowledged the need to work with and engage with the broader international community in pursuing its national interest. Therefore South Africa’s return to the global stage as an active player saw an increase in its engagement globally and contributed to developing its foreign policy stance and approach post-independence. Since the return of South Africa to the international

community from 1994, there has been record of its significant contribution to the definition of the general direction of the country's foreign policy through its membership of various organisations. Table 4.1 identifies the list of organisations in which South Africa joined or was readmitted into after its first democratic government took over. Since then its membership in international organisations has grown considerably. It is also home to many consulates and foreign embassies, totalling a hundred and ninety six (196).

**Table 4.1: List of Organisations South Africa joined post-independence from the Apartheid government**

▪ gained re-admission to the Commonwealth;
▪ resumed its seat in the United Nations;
▪ joined the G77
▪ joined the Organisation for Africa Unity (OAU);
▪ joined the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC);
▪ joined the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM);
▪ re-joined United Nations Specialised Agencies such as ILO, WHO, FAO, etc; and
▪ initiated negotiations with the European Union (EU).

**Source: Discussion document by Government of South Africa (1996)**

These efforts were geared towards having a firm footing in the international realm while also focusing on fulfilling the demanding responsibilities in the domestic arena. This is portrayed in an address by the then Deputy President Thabo Mbeki, in his address to South African ambassadors during the September 1995 conference, where South Africa's position was formulated in terms that portray South Africa as a country with a unique attribute that is centred on the sustained interest of the rest of the world in the future of the country (South Africa). According to the Deputy President;

*The depth of this interest is not only confined to government, but includes ordinary people, especially those involved in the anti-apartheid movement abroad. They have not disengaged themselves from South Africa since the elections. However, the strength and persistence of the international focus on South Africa puts the South African Government of National Unity under pressure to contribute positively and*

*constructively to the global community...* (Discussion document, Government of South Africa, 1996).

Furthermore, the Deputy President noted that there are expectations from Africa that revolves around South Africa playing a significant role in promoting peace and development across the continent. While South Africa is faced with its own challenges, it recognizes that other African countries also struggle with respective difficulties and problems. In spite of these limitations, the Deputy President maintained that South Africa remains committed to fostering peace, democracy, human rights, and sustainable development. According to him, “These principles are fundamental to our foreign policy...”. On the domestic front however, this situation gives emphasis to the importance of collaboration among government, industry, and labour—the “tripartite partners”—to address international complexities that impact South Africa’s national interest. (Discussion document, Government of South Africa, 1996).

South Africa’s National Interest as a result, is wrapped around a people-centred standpoint and perspective that places priority on the protection and promotion of their human dignity, and increasingly realising the human security of its citizens which involves; assisting them in ways possible to freely live a life which is void of fear and want; where poverty is eradicated; and structuring a society in which every citizen enjoys access to adequate shelter, healthcare services, educations, security of their lives and properties, and the space to work as well as opportunities to generate an income. Hence, the Constitution of South Africa places at the core of its focus, the interests of its citizens, thereby leading to the formulation of policies and programmes by the State such that they revolve around a people-centred approach. It furthermore emphasizes human development and human security within and beyond its borders.

By way of defining South Africa’s National interest however, the Framework Document on South Africa’s National Interest identified “The protection and promotion of its national sovereignty and constitutional order, the well-being, safety and prosperity of its citizens, and a better Africa and world” as the basic definition of South Africa’s national interest. The document furthermore explained South Africa’s national interest as derived from the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, also regarded as the country's supreme law (See Table 4.2). The Preamble sets the context of a country that recognises its past and desires to move forward from it creating a more democratic and free society, also shifting away from the deprivation and exclusion of the past to build a united country.

**Table 4.2: Preamble, South African Constitution**

The Preamble of the South African Constitution
<p>The vision as a republic is to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• heal the divisions of the past and establish a society based on democratic values, social justice and fundamental human rights</li><li>• lay the foundations for a democratic and open society in which government is based on the will of the people and every citizen is equally protected by law</li><li>• improve the quality of life of all citizens and free the potential of each person</li><li>• build a united and democratic South Africa able to take its rightful place as a sovereign state in the family of nations.</li></ul>

Following the Preamble are the Constitution's founding provisions (Table 4.3), which lay out key principles fundamental to how the state is run. These founding provisions promote and foreground the ideals of sovereignty, democracy, and other key values. In many instances, these values are also espoused in its foreign policy and shape its engagements on the global stage.

**Table 4.3: The Founding Principles of the South African Constitution**

The Founding Principles of the South African Constitution
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• human dignity, the achievement of equality and the advancement of human rights and freedoms</li><li>• non-racialism and non-sexism</li><li>• supremacy of the Constitution and the rule of law</li><li>• universal adult suffrage, a national common voters' roll, regular elections and a multi-party system of democratic government, to ensure accountability, responsiveness and openness.</li></ul>

The Bill of Rights, found in Chapter II of its Constitution, acknowledge and cover the roles and duties of the various state institutions to the citizens and their needs. Values like equality, freedom, and human dignity are critical components of this document which were set to be applied in the

democratic dispensation. South Africa's foreign policy has its basis in the Bill of rights, and its key elements such as freedom and security of the person, political rights, among others are meant to drive its engagement in all sectors including political, security and economic engagement domestically and globally.

### 5.3 South Africa's Foreign Policy Principles and Pillars

With the end of Apartheid, the new democratic government had to rethink its foreign policy while working on the new political transition internally. This created the opportunity to redefine and rethink its identity in its foreign policy. This identity of a rainbow nation that celebrated its diverse landscape, multiculturalism and reconciliation were evident in its foreign policy principles and pillars. These would later shape its foreign relations and engagement internationally. This new identity is also featured in its cornerstones of foreign policy (Table 4.4).

**Table 4.4: Cornerstones of South Africa's foreign policy**

- Foreign policy is an integrated part of government policy aimed at promoting the security and welfare of South Africa's citizens.
- The present policy and execution of policy represent a break with the past.
- Exercising regular choices between available options in the international arena based on South Africa's interests and means is a part of the foreign policy process.
- South Africa is a democratic country and formulating foreign policy should be open and transparent. However, South African actions must be in keeping with international practice, including the need for appropriate confidentiality. Diplomacy is by its very nature "quiet diplomacy" and not diplomacy through the media.
- Officials from the Department of Foreign Affairs and other officials representing South Africa abroad must be fully acquainted with the policies and strategies of domestic departments to pursue the national interest in all spheres.
- South Africa must strive to be a responsible global citizen.
- South Africa supports the global free trade system.
- North-South and South-South cooperation will be promoted.
- South Africa must cooperate with international efforts to develop and implement environmentally friendly policies.
- South Africa adheres to the philosophy of non-alignment and friendly, constructive relations with all nations, that is, universality of relations.
- Multilateral cooperation at all required levels is essential and is supported by South Africa. A holistic approach should be pursued wherever possible.
- The United Nations should be reformed and strengthened to enable it to deal with global economic and environmental challenges and achieve sustainable development.
- Foreign policy objective should seek to promote mutual benefits and mutual respect in bilateral relations.
- South Africa should treat African partners as equals and avoid all hegemonic ambitions. A narrow, short term approach aimed at promoting self-interest must be avoided.
- Confidence-building and cooperation should be prominent trends of South Africa's African policy. Peace-making and conflict-prevention should receive priority consideration.
- South Africa will cooperate with other countries to shape and define the new world order and promote multilateral

- cooperation in the international community.
- Scientific and technical development and cooperation in Antarctica and globally, will be promoted and environmental protection will be supported.
- As far as South Africa's means allow, all efforts to alleviate the plight of refugees and children in Africa and elsewhere, particularly the work of the UNHCR must be supported.
- South Africa should remain actively engaged in efforts to secure world-wide peace, promote disarmament, prevent genocide, and restrict proliferation of nuclear and other arms of mass destruction and achieve a new world security regime.

**Source: from the Discussion Document of South Africa's Foreign Policy, 1996).**

Foreign policy principles or pillars shape and form the foundation of a state's foreign policy as well as help to guide its relations with other countries. South Africa's Presidents, Deputy Presidents and Ministers have been integral in shaping South Africa's foreign policy over the years. For example, speeches by President Nelson Mandela and subsequent Presidents and Deputy Presidents, Ministers and Deputy Ministers have clarified South Africa's foreign policy in theory and practice. In many ways they have contributed to the evolution of its foreign policy. Referring to the principles of South Africa's foreign policy, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs of South Africa, Minister Alfred Nzo mentioned that the principles:

*Constitute the broad aspirational tenets of our approach to foreign policy, and, if consistently adhered to will render our foreign policy predictable and in line with our perception of the kind of nation we seek to be, and the kind of world we wish to live in. They also serve as a yardstick by which the quality of our practical foreign policy decisions may be measured, and are consequently a very useful policy tool.* (Foreign policy for South Africa: Discussion document)

At the Heads of Mission Conference in Pretoria in September 1995, Pretoria, Minister Nzo spelt out South Africa's foreign policy principles "which serve as guidelines in the conduct of our foreign relations" (Foreign Policy for South Africa: Discussion document). These principles include:

- a. *a commitment to the promotion of human rights;*
- b. *a commitment to the promotion of democracy;*
- c. *a commitment to justice and international law in the conduct of relations between nations;*
- d. *a commitment to international peace and to internationally agreed-upon mechanisms for the resolution of conflicts;*

- e. *a commitment to the interests of Africa in World Affairs; and*
- f. *a commitment to economic development through regional and international cooperation in an interdependent world.*

As noted by (Nathan, 2005: 362), the department's priorities in terms of foreign policy included:

*the realization of the 'African Renaissance' by promoting the objectives of the African Union (AU) and its economic and social development programme, the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD); regional integration in southern Africa; the promotion of international peace and security; and the promotion of sustainable development and an equitable global system. Given the political distance between 1994 and 2004, it is striking that the current principles are virtually identical to those formulated by the African National Congress (ANC) when it came to power.*

As noted by Chris and le Pere (2004: 284), Nelson Mandela's declaration that 'human rights will be the light that guides our foreign policy' on the eve of its first democratic elections, establishes a platform for the nature and conduct of South African diplomacy (Mandela, 1993 in Alden and Le Pere. 2004: 284). The ANC leader's vision was to infuse the practice of international affairs with a clear direction towards promoting civil liberties and democratisation by incorporating the experiences of the anti-apartheid struggle into the conduct of foreign policy. Furthermore, the new government remained open towards the concerns of non-state actors and maintained willingness to engage them. Also, the priority of the incoming government had been putting Africa at the centre of post-apartheid foreign policy. This was different from the Apartheid government which had limited political influence across the continent.

President Cyril Ramaphosa recently reiterated the principles and pillars that shape South Africa's foreign policy in his speech on August 20, 2023 as it prepared to host the 15<sup>th</sup> BRICS Summit. He noted that South Africa's foreign policy is based on the key pillars like "the promotion of human rights, peace and stability and the strengthening of trade and investment ties with other countries" (Ramaphosa, 2023). Table 4.4 as shown above provides an overview of the cornerstones of South Africa's foreign policy which sets as its main interest the promotion of its peoples' welfare and security. The cornerstones of its foreign policy were a key component of its Discussion Document of South Africa's Foreign Policy, published in 1996 with the new democratic government led by President Nelson Mandela.


## **5.4 South Africa's Foreign Policy Actors**

International relations involve multiple levels of engagement and links between states and non-state actors as they interact over various issues including trade, development, security and other sectors and priorities. The effectiveness of these relations is influenced by the foreign policies in place to ensure a relatively successful international relations agenda. Foreign policy authorities are generally faced with tasks that concern their country and South Africa is no different. It is important to delve into the role of these actors particularly because they are responsible in shaping the implementation of South Africa's foreign policy, ensuring that the principles embedded within it are met and upheld and that the country itself is delivering on all its commitments and role regionally, continentally, and globally. These regional and global spaces, where South Africa's foreign policy actors engage and work in include the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), the African Union (AU) and the United Nations (UN). In addition to its presence in all these spaces, it is also involved in initiatives like New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) and the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) at the continental level and with a host of other international organisations at the global level.

It has been stated that a state's foreign policy is derived and determined by various principles and is shaped by different entities all within the state. These actors will be considered in the following sections. But, before going further, an understanding should be brought to the fact that, although the role players or actors of South Africa's foreign policy are mainly governmental institutions and individuals, others like non-governmental institutions and individuals continue to contribute to foreign policy formulation in various ways. In many instances they contribute in an advisory, monitoring or lobbying capacity, possibly influencing the direction and character of such policies. This aligns with discussions in Chapter two that foreign policy actors are majorly categorized into state and non-state actors.

It goes beyond saying that including non-state actors shows the inclusivity and public engagement required in choosing the right foreign policy instruments and developing the right foreign policy goals. While authoritarian governments do not engage their citizens in foreign policy, the idea is that in democracies other non-state entities including the public, civil society, private sector and the media are involved in various ways and multiple levels. Figure 4.3 gives an overview of South Africa's foreign policy environment.

**Figure 4.3: South Africa's Foreign Policy Environment**



**Source: Pfister, 2004.**

Concerning individuals, the main foreign policy making individuals of South Africa would include the President, Deputy President, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and other Cabinet Ministers. Meanwhile, others most likely to contribute to decisions as influencers and implementers of foreign policy consist of deputy ministers, directors-generals and advisors. In addition, foreign policy influencers may also include individuals and institutions drawn from outside the public policy environment, which goes beyond the political party in power and the government of the day. This means, the public opinion, news media, pressure groups, academic institutions and business sector are all equipped with the capacity to influence public policies, including foreign policy. These various state and non-state actors are examined below.

## **5.5 Exploring the levels of Analysis Framework and foreign policy in South Africa**

In the last chapter, the levels of analysis framework was indicated to be significant in that each level presents a different perspective on the causes and consequences of international relations and foreign policy (the kootneeti team, 2022). These levels are simply: The individual, nation-state (or state) and the international (systemic) levels. For the purpose of this study, these levels will be evaluated in South Africa's context.

### **5.5.1 The Individual Level**

This level of analysis looks at how individual actors, like politicians, government officials, and regular citizens, impact international relations. For instance, it might study how personal beliefs of a leader affect the decisions they make about foreign policy.

#### **5.5.1.1 Presidency**

This consists of the President and the Deputy President. The President is South Africa's Head of State and Head of Government (South Africa's 1996 Constitution). Being the Head of State and the National Executive, the President must "uphold, defend and respect the Constitution as the supreme and absolute law of the Republic. This is done both at home and abroad". (Framework Document: 17).

The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996, which was approved by the Constitutional Court on 4 December 1996 and took effect from 4 February 1997 (South Africa yearbook 2009/10: 260), declares that, the President is ultimately responsible for the foreign policy and international relations of South Africa. The President is entitled to appoint heads of mission, receive foreign heads of mission, conduct state-to-state relations, negotiate, and sign all international agreements. International agreements not of a technical, administrative or executive nature bind the country only after being approved by Parliament, which also approves the country's ratification of or accession to multilateral agreements. All international agreements must be tabled in Parliament for information purposes (Government of South Africa, n.d.).

On the other hand, the Deputy President is an important component of the Presidency. As stated in the South African Constitution, the Deputy President is intended to support the President (See Table 4.5). It is worthy of note however, that the once separated Offices of the President and Deputy President have now been merged into a single Office of the President (or Presidency) with

some role players attached. Following this, the South Africa Year book 2021/22 states that the Presidency comprises eight political principals:

- a. The President, who is the Head of State and Government
- b. The Deputy President, who is the Leader of Government Business (in Parliament)
- c. The Minister in The Presidency
- d. The Minister in The Presidency for Women, Youth and Persons with Disabilities
- e. The Deputy Minister in The Presidency for Women, Youth and Persons with Disabilities
- f. Two Deputy Ministers in The Presidency
- g. The Deputy Minister in the Presidency for State Security.

The Presidency in addition, has three structures that support governance operations directly. They are:

- a. The Cabinet Office provides administrative support to Cabinet. It implements administrative systems and processes to ensure the Cabinet's and its committees' overall optimal functioning. It also facilitates the management of decision-making processes of the Cabinet and its committees.
- b. Policy Coordination Advisory Services comprises a Deputy Director-General and five chief directorates, which support policy processes developed by respective clusters of directors-general.
- c. Legal and Executive Services provides legal advice to the President, Deputy President, the Minister, and The Presidency, and is responsible for all litigation involving the political principals.

Apart from serving as the executive manager of the government, the Presidency, as stated in South Africa's Yearbook of 2020/21, is located in the Union Buildings, Pretoria. Additionally, it maintains a secondary office in Tuynhuys, Cape Town.

#### **5.5.1.2 Cabinet**

The cabinet plays a highly significant role in government wherever legislative powers are held by a parliament. Although, it is worthy of note that its structure varies considerably across different countries. In South Africa, the Cabinet is made up of the President, as Head, the Deputy President and Ministers. The President appoints the Deputy President, Ministers and Deputy Ministers, and the portfolios assigned to them, and may dismiss them as well. The President

presides over a cabinet of ministers whose portfolios extend occasionally into International relations. Therefore, depending on the nature of the decision, the president consults with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, other members of the Cabinet and senior civil servants in the Department of Foreign Affairs, as well as other departments and advisors deemed relevant to such decision making. However, some high profile or sensitive issues relating to human rights or arms sale might not necessarily be decided upon directly by the President. Still, he is expected to be consulted or informed in details about such developments as they unfold. He also should be well aware of all key policy issues; domestic or foreign, through the weekly Cabinet meetings.

The President may identify some ministers from the members of the National Assembly, while choosing no more than two ministers from outside the assembly as members of his cabinet. The President is also responsible for the appointment of a member of the Cabinet to lead government affairs in the National Assembly. Currently, the President of the Republic of South Africa is President Cyril Matamela Ramaphosa, appointed since June, 2018 whose members of Cabinet are placed in five (5) clusters to bring “together overlapping functions...” (Pretoria News. 25 January, 2001: 19). The Cabinet members are also responsible for ensuring that government-wide priorities are aligned and cohesive, that urgent priorities are implemented and facilitated and that broad-based consultations are the norm on cross-cutting priorities and matters on the Cabinet’s agenda. As identified by the Government of South Africa (2023), these clusters they consist of;

- i. International Cooperation, Trade and Security cluster
- ii. Economic, Employment and Infrastructure Development cluster
- iii. Social Protection, Community and Human Development cluster
- iv. Justice, Crime Prevention and Security cluster
- v. Governance and Administration cluster

A Cabinet Secretariat is established in the Office of the Presidency with a policy co-ordination arm to oversee and review ministerial proposals to ensure they (are) in line with policy. This means that the Presidency is involved on all policy matters, including foreign policy through the cabinet secretariat.

## **5.5.2 Nation-State level**

This level of analysis (also referred to as state level) examines how states and governments influence international relations. Being the primary actor, Tella (2016:148) hinted on the nature of the political system as a notable feature in influencing a state's position in the world stage. In this regard, a state marked by instability might initiate a conflict with another state with the main aim of restoring internal peace. The likelihood of a state engaging in warfare against others is influenced by various factors, including the nature of its governance (as a poorly functioning government might seek foreign conflicts to divert attention from domestic tensions) or geographical and economic disparities (such as irredentism, justified as a means to enhance the state's security). Consequently, if the goal is to eradicate war, there must be reforms within states. (Waltz, 1959 in Tella, 2016:148).

This level also considers elements and collectives within the state which range from a state's military strength, economic influence, and interest groups to political associations and government agencies (Goldstein & Pevehouse, 2008). It is however, for this reason that this level is also referred to as domestic or societal level.

### **5.5.2.1 Department of International Relations and Cooperation**

The Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) is one, vested with the responsibility of “formulation, coordination, implementation and management of South Africa's foreign policy as well as international relations programmes and in so doing, promoting South Africa's National Interest in the international environment, inclusive of its national values, principles, aspirations, objectives and priorities, including the African Renaissance, to create a better world for all”. According to the Framework Document (2023: 16) on South Africa's national interest and its advancement in a Global Environment, DIRCO is ultimately responsible under the Foreign Service Act, for the “pursuit and promotion of National Interest through the application of foreign policy outside the borders of the Republic”.

In DIRCO, there are seventeen (17) branches responsible for various aspects of South Africa's international affairs and foreign policy. There are three branches focusing on the key regions of the world; Asia and the Middle east; and America and Europe. Its Global Governance and Continental Agenda branch is tasked with the continent of Africa and the broader global landscape; as well as a State Protocol and Consular Services Branch. It also has a Diplomatic Training and

Research Branch; and another on Public diplomacy. The Department is supported by its Financial and Assets Management Branch and a corporate management Branch (DIRCO, 2023).

Under DIRCO are South Africa's diplomatic corps. South Africa Year Book 2021/22 on International relations declares that the international diplomatic footprint of South Africa comprises of diplomatic missions present in 108 countries wherein the country is represented, and also through the approval of over one hundred and sixty (160) countries and international organizations dwelling in South Africa. Furthermore, South Africa's diplomatic and consular missions are saddled with implementing the country's foreign policy to intensify and boost its international profile and serve as strategic structures for the achievement of the country's national interest. In addition, "training and policy analysis remain of strategic importance for the execution of the DIRCO's mandate." (South Africa Year Book 2021/22: 2).

Morin and Paquin (2018) note that foreign policy is no longer under the jurisdiction of just Foreign Affairs alone as other government departments play a role such as defence and trade. In South Africa, the Departments of Trade, Industry and Competition and Defence also engage in foreign policy matters when it comes to cooperation agreements or South Africa's peacekeeping operations respectively. Morin and Paquin (2018) go on to add that in many countries, ministries of health, finance, education and culture have developed their own structures for foreign affairs.

#### **5.5.2.2 South African Public**

It is important to reflect whether the South African public are informed and aware of the principles of its foreign policy, the place and importance of South Africa to African Affairs and vice versa and the notion that Xenophobia goes against its foreign policy principles and pillars. The findings of a survey conducted by Afrobarometer (2022) on how South Africans see the international community and its role in the development of South Africa showed "considerable resistance among South Africans to free movement and trade, reflecting a preference for protecting domestic industries from foreign competition". Furthermore, the results supported the United States and China's development models and welcomed the economic and political influence they wield in their country (Afrobarometer, 2022).

The Afrobarometer report concludes, "South Africans express considerable resistance to opening their borders to foreigners and their products, although questions of free cross-border movement and free trade have strong support on both sides of the debate". The question is, how much do their views and positions influence the actions and decisions of the South African government regarding

foreign policy? As a democratic nation and a people-centred foreign policy, public opinion should be an integral part of South Africa's foreign policy. Although, according to Van Wyk (2012) this has not been the case.

South Africa's democratization as well as its consolidation, as Van Wyk, J. A. (2012: 80) also pointed out, has been accompanied effectively by the side lining of public participatory institutions, including even the Parliament. This implies that the South African public has not been carried along and is particularly excluded from airing their opinions through discussions and deliberations about matters and policies beyond the country's borders. This, as Van Wyk (2012) noted, forms a part of the criticism that has been raised and regarded as a hindrance against consecutive major foreign policy projects conducted by the ANC- led government, such as "the African Union (AU), the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), and Zimbabwe. This is even more critical as Mbeki, for example, was regarded as a 'foreign policy president' of note." (Van Wyk (2012: 80).

#### **5.5.2.3 Private sector, state-owned enterprises [SOEs] and civil society and the media**

South Africa's national interest cuts across multiple sectors and priorities and covers many issues. Critical to ensuring a cohesive and coherent approach in its foreign policy and in defining South Africa's National Interest is the involvement of the private sector, State-owned Enterprises (SOEs), and civil society. As the Framework Document on South Africa's national interest and its advancement in a Global Environment (nd: 18- 19) asserts, the private sector, labour, and civil society possess extensive international connections and function within a global environment. Among these, the private sector stands out in ways that revolve around spearheading job creation, driving trade advancement, and industrial growth, while also contributing to regional integration, all facilitated by the conducive environment established by governments.

*The private sector is also important partners and critical sources of investment, while SOEs include a developmental mandate to their activities. The presence of civil-society organisations in international affairs has become increasingly relevant. They have played a role in agenda-setting, international law-making and diplomacy and can be important voices supporting South Africa's development agenda. Civil society, particularly its large grassroots coverage, plays an important role in implementing and monitoring several crucial global issues.*

Including multiple actors in foreign policy results in higher levels and constant critique of foreign policy priorities and interventions. Alden and le Pere (2004) exposed this main problem for post-

apartheid South African foreign relations. According to them, this problem is wrapped around the multiple actors participating in shaping and driving policy. With the relevance associated with worldwide financial markets, regional economic partnerships and associations, international trade connections, information technology and the recent practices of multilateral governance, this presence of multiple actors should not come as a surprise because they are needed to touch on all the developments in the international system. The South Africa's Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) found itself at odds with various other actors with claims upon the foreign policy process.

This diversity or multiplicity of actors was precisely responsible for springing up forms of accusations relating to disorganization, inconsistency, and opacity in policy formulation process (Muller, 1997: 69). The key players at the time however, included "the President, Nelson Mandela, the Deputy President Thabo Mbeki, the Cabinet, Parliament, parliamentary committees dealing with foreign affairs and trade, other state departments for instance Trade and Industry, Defence and Finance. The critical voices of civil society components added to this cacophony." (Alden and Le Pere, 2004: 285). Despite this it does not downplay the value of having a wide range of voices and entities acting as checks and balances in reviewing and deciding foreign policy.

### **5.5.3 International Level**

Also, referred as systemic level, the international level of analysis examines the impact of international bodies like the United Nations or the World Trade Organization among others on shaping global politics. It probes into the influence exerted by global economic and cultural dynamics, along with exploring how states interact within the international system. South Africa's foreign policy is as well influenced by interactions with major powers such as the United States, China, the European Union, and multinational corporations operating in the country. Functions like economic ties, security partnerships, as well as diplomatic relations with these actors impact South Africa's positioning in the international system and its ability to pursue its national interests on the global stage.

#### **5.5.3.1 The International Criminal Court (ICC)**

South Africa's decision to withdraw from the International Criminal Court (ICC) after it faced significant backlash for failing to detain former Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir was a critical development in its foreign affairs. President al-Bashir's efforts to evade the ICC indictment charging him for crimes against humanity and genocide and war crimes was further supported by

the failure of South Africa to arrest him when he attended the 2015 AU-Summit. For many, South Africa's honouring of human rights and equality was questioned by President Zuma's failure to honour international law and treaties the country had ratified and signed. Zuma no longer pretended to honour international law and the treaties South Africa is signatory. Instead, the President announced South Africa's intention to withdraw from the ICC and while working to review and change the domestic legislation that guided its obligations to the international frameworks. (James and Mills 2016: 8 and Mpungose, 2018). The attempt to withdraw has tainted international perceptions of South Africa as a protector of human rights. For this reason, Mpungose (2018) opined that:

*Institutions like the African Union (AU) have demonstrated limitations in holding leaders who have committed crimes against humanity to account. While the African Court of Human and People's Rights (ACHPR) already exists, it is unlikely to be an effective alternative to the ICC considering that member states have not ratified the 2014 Malabo Declaration statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights.*

### **5.5.3.2 Human Rights**

This looks at how human rights issues, violations, and protections shape state behaviour, interactions between states, and the broader dynamics of the international system. It is worthy of note that the promotion and protection of human rights by states, international organizations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and other actors, impact considerations on diplomatic relations, conflict resolution, and global governance structures. For instance, an important aspect of Zuma's foreign policy emphasized upholding equal rights, opportunities and status of all peoples while ensuring the enhancement of peace and friendship amongst all. Well, with regards to human rights, Mpungose (2018), expressed dissatisfaction with events like the Marikana Massacre in August 2012, which showcased a major gap in South Africa's commitment to the said human rights where the police opened fire on mineworkers on strike in the country's platinum mining belt. She further noted that since 2010, a ninety-six percent (96%) increase in protests have been seen and recorded in South Africa which according to the Institute of Race Relations, even includes service delivery protests. Protests were also recorded in Universities with regards to fee increments.

For example, in October 2015, the largest student protests since the apartheid era occurred. The protest is said to have been triggered by the news of fee increment by universities for the upcoming

academic year. As a result, poorer students (mostly Black students), expressed their inability and struggle to afford the increase, which would carry on the state of inequality and disparity that dated back to the apartheid era concerning which South Africans were unable to gain access to higher education. After about a week of protests, which saw the shutdown of many universities, President Zuma announced that there would not be a fee increase for 2016. That did not have so much effect because demonstrations and protests continued at some schools. Still, this time, there was demands by students over free education as well as other additional demands, which later included a decolonized education. By fall 2016, the demonstrations had picked up steam and sparked up again as an increase in university fees for 2017 was anticipated (Encyclopedia Britannica: 2023). Consequently, with the history of police brutality during the apartheid era, the August 2012 killing of thirty-four (34) Marikana mineworkers by police remains a long-lasting stain on the country's human rights record.

### **5.5.3.3 Foreign Affairs to International Relations and Co-operation**

Zuma's administration also recorded the change of nomenclature of the department vested with the responsibility of managing and overseeing South Africa's foreign policy agenda and diplomatic approach. This was announced by Minister Nkoana-Mashabane, based off of the ANC resolution in Polokwane to change the department's name from the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) to the Department of International Relations and Co-operation (DIRCO). According to Landsberg C. (2012: 77):

*The idea behind this change was to indicate the Zuma government's intention to introduce a new and different style and approach to the conduct of foreign affairs. "The emphasis was now upon collaboration, and a non-hegemonic attitude that eschewed so-called 'soft balancing', wherein the bullying tactics of successive apartheid governments had supposedly been replaced by deals with foreign powers aimed at mutual recognition of each other's self-interest.*

In her first public speech, the new Minister, Nkoana-Mashabane, clarified the justification behind name change, stating it had been intended to "reflect the new focus that our government wishes to place on partnerships and co-operation for development" (DIRCO, 2009). Expanding on the motivation behind this change, she asserted that it "was largely motivated by international trends which require states to emphasize cooperation over competition, and collaboration over confrontation" and that "the globalised nature of the world necessitates that states continue to forge

ways of co-operating better with each other” (Nkoana Mashabane, 2009a in Landsberg, 2012: 77).

Other rationales behind the change of name are deduced as follows;

1. *To help bridge the gap between domestic and foreign affairs and to help demystify the latter by bringing them closer to the public.*
2. *Recognising that there is a need for the government to become better in devising strategies that would help to close the domestic-foreign policy divide.*
3. *Expectations that the government would communicate the underlying principle underscoring foreign policy to domestic audiences more effectively. (Landsberg, 2012:77)*

### **5.6 The Development and Evolution of South Africa’s Foreign Policy (2008 – 2019)**

*“No matter who you are or your credentials, leading South Africa is no easy task. With its diversity of people and problems, there are many challenges and pitfalls.”*

– Mathekga Ralph (2018)

We have indicated the role of individuals in the formulation of a country’s foreign policy. To further look this in South Africa’s context, the analysis, examination and assessment of South Africa’s Foreign Policy behaviour is examined starting from the period of Kgalema Petrus Motlanthe’s time heading the country to Matamela Cyril Ramaphosa’s administration. The historical descriptive method is thus adopted for this purpose. According to Terlumun (2009), a historical descriptive method is a narrative sequence of historical events as they occur.

In 1910, precisely on the 31st day of May, the colonies of Cape, Natal, Transvaal and Orange River were unified, leading to the Union of South Africa, known and regarded today as the Republic of South Africa. The Union of South Africa was established as a self-governing state within the British Empire. It created restrictions on political and property rights safeguarding it to whites legally at the detriment of blacks. From studies carried out by Kinge G.T. (2016: 31), findings suggests thus that since the removal of the apartheid regime in South Africa, the country has portrayed its image on the international stage as a “Rainbow Nation” because of its diverse cultures.

According to Worger and Byrnes (n.d), laws were enacted which ensured that Africans are placed in a position to seek jobs from white employers who would only give the lowest paid jobs available, excluding them from the political process by depriving them of the right to vote amongst others, thereby placing them at the bottom of the economy. William and Rita further

noted that in this era, "...South Africa was proclaimed to be a white man's country in which members of other racial groups would never receive full political rights." As Davenport states, "the constitution of 1910 united South Africa under a single government but did not make it in all respects a sovereign independent state: 'Above all this was the case concerning external affairs, for South Africa was bound by the decisions of the King ...on questions of war and peace'" (1977: 174 in Anthoni van Nieuwkerk 2006: 2). Afrikaner politicians took control of the state in 1948 and by 1961 declared it a Republic. Under colonial rule, the aim was to exploit the southern African region for economic and political gain; under apartheid, both economic and security interests weighed prominently.

This was the case until the 1950s when blacks in protest, rose against apartheid. This movement was led by Nelson Mandela and Oliver Tambo whose drive was to impede the implementation of apartheid. The apartheid regime as a result of the division, created a state where the whites were deemed superior and the blacks as inferior. The Apartheid era was that of an authoritarian government and was characterized by fear while the post-apartheid era sought to be void of such segregations and negativity. The table below, adopted from Naidoo Varusha (2010: 9) summarizes what was obtainable in the Apartheid foreign policy era compared to the post-apartheid era.

**Table 4.5: Apartheid foreign policy era versus the post-apartheid era.**

OLD (Pre-1994)	NEW (Post-1994)
<p><b>Locus of decision making</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• State Security Council</li> <li>• President</li> <li>• Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence</li> </ul>	<p><b>Locus of decision-making</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Cabinet</li> <li>• The Office of the Presidency</li> <li>• Department of Foreign Affairs,</li> <li>• Department of Trade and Industry</li> <li>• Department of Defence</li> </ul>
<p><b>Marginalized Sectors</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Parliament</li> <li>• Public opinion and the media</li> <li>• Political Parties</li> <li>• Most external actors except fellow pariah states</li> </ul>	<p><b>Involved Sectors</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Parliament and the portfolio committee system</li> <li>• Public opinion and the media</li> <li>• The ruling party and alliance partners (ANC, SACP, COSATU)</li> <li>• Extensive interaction with states, multilateral institutions, and the global economy</li> </ul>
<p><b>Ideological Orientation</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Apartheid mentality, racism</li> <li>• Anti-communist – defence against the ‘total onslaught’</li> </ul>	<p><b>Ideological Orientation</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Ongoing contest between idealist and ‘neoliberal schools’</li> </ul>
<p><b>Decision-Making</b></p>	<p><b>Decision-Making</b></p>

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Authoritative</li> <li>• Secretive</li> <li>• Reactive</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• More democratic, open and transparent</li> <li>• More inclusive and consultative</li> <li>• However, still plagued by intrastate competition and conflict</li> </ul>
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In the previous chapter, foreign policy, a channel through which a country’s national interests are projected, was emphasized. Generally, as Tshaba Tjemolane indicated, foreign policy is regarded as a double-sided element of international relations. This double-sidedness is the case because the State’s interaction and its internal and external spheres of influence are considered. According to Carlsnaes (2008: 86), foreign policy contains domestic issues and institutions of a particular State that are involved directly or indirectly in foreign policy, as well as foreign concerns or issues on which decisions are made. For instance, South Africa’s post-apartheid foreign policy, although formulated at the national level, emphasises the government’s ambition and commitment to the region and, by extension, the continent. (Tjemolane .T. 2011: 61- 62).

On that note, Naidoo (2010: 7) portrayed that the weight of negotiating this two-faced path of promoting national interests in a highly competitive global arena was acutely felt by South Africa’s newly constituted democratic leadership whose active foreign policy engagement was necessitated by the country’s emancipation from longstanding international isolation. According to Naidoo, foreign policy in the Mandela era was driven by a “heady mix of idealist principles and grandiose objectives” which threw into glaring relief the serious limitations a middle-level country such as South Africa faces in pressing forward an ambitious foreign policy agenda (Le Pere and van Nieuwkerk, 2004: 132). During this period, the post-revolutionary zeal associated with liberation policies resulted in normative and theoretical confusion about proper foreign policy goals and objectives. In the same vein, Burgess Stephen F. (2020: 104) highlighted that the advent of a democratic South Africa in 1994, characterized by a relatively robust state with influence over African nations, coincided with the global democratic wave, setting the stage for innovative foreign policy approaches. Nelson Mandela and the African National Congress (ANC) ascended to power as key partners in a power-sharing agreement with the National Party, forming a transitional government. This "new South Africa" adopted a cautious attitude in its foreign policy during the 1990s.

South Africa’s democratic transition as the Helen Suzman Foundation (nd) puts it, was facilitated, by a greater part of an active international commitment to democracy and human rights. And DIRCO has declared same commitment since then. The transitional government prioritized internal initiatives, focusing on implementing the Reconstruction and Development Programme

(RDP) and addressing the educational, employment, and housing needs of millions of black individuals who suffered under apartheid. This domestic focus constrained South Africa's leadership role in African regional bodies like the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC). In addition, mindful of the negative legacy of apartheid, particularly in the Southern Africa region, the Mandela administration aimed to avoid replicating the domineering behaviour of the apartheid regime and proceeded with diplomatic sensitivity. In spite of this cautious approach, Mandela spearheaded foreign policy innovations, notably in the promotion of democracy and human rights. His moral leadership, rooted in his steadfast opposition to apartheid and his remarkable reconciliation efforts with the National Party, resonated with global public opinion and garnered admiration from world leaders. Mandela articulated a vision for a world characterized by democracy, human rights, and the eradication of poverty, hunger, and conflict, reflecting his commitment to peace and justice.

*Therefore, with Mandela at the helm, South Africa possessed “soft power” and diplomatic capacity and at times effectively used the diplomatic, information, military, and economic (DIME) instruments of power to play an important role as regional leader in Southern Africa and Africa as a whole, especially with the prestige and talents of Mandela. When the ANC assumed power, it had cultivated good relations with SADC and the rest of Africa and had no real enemies. Antimilitarist voices dominated government thinking in the mid-1990s in a backlash to the brutality of the apartheid military... (Burgess Stephen F. 2020: 104)*

Furthermore, The Mbeki era focused on creating a new set of focus areas and principles that increasingly shifted South Africa's foreign affairs and priorities towards the global stage (Le Pere and van Nieuwkerk, 2004: 132). As a result,

*Mbeki dramatically expanded South Africa's diplomatic role, playing a major role in ending wars in Burundi, the DRC, and Sudan; promoting movements toward democracy and human rights; and engaging in difficult negotiations in the Côte d'Ivoire peace process. From 2003 to 2005, South Africa supported the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) and human rights in southern Sudan, as the civil war came to an end and as the Darfur genocide accelerated. (Burgess S.F, 2020: 111).*

In the same vein, Mbeki's leadership, in conjunction with the global surge in democracy and South Africa's considerable influence, gave rise to notable foreign policy advancements. These included

the establishment and reform of African institutions prioritizing democracy, good governance, and human rights, along with the authorization to get involved in cases of widespread human rights violations and crimes against humanity. South Africa also made significant steps in peace mediation and peacekeeping efforts during Mbeki's tenure. However, Mbeki and South Africa opted in contrast to leveraging Pretoria's economic and military might to enforce democratic and human rights standards on countries like Zimbabwe and eSwatini. This hesitancy stemmed first and foremost from a sense of deference to nations that supported the ANC during the struggle against apartheid. (Burgess, 2020: 113).

In summary, South Africa in the 1990s demonstrated a deliberate line of focus managing both tapestries of the domestic and foreign spaces, while being resolute in acknowledging the external dynamics and the lingering issues post-independence. It also used resources, knowledge, leadership and foreign policy innovation to tackle this new space. “The democratic wave, South Africa’s size (reflected in its established instruments of power), and the leadership of Mandela and Mbeki, as well as the ANC’s relations with Africa, were responsible. However ... the new South Africa had much to learn about African foreign policies.” (Burgess, 2020: 107).

### **5.6.1 Foreign Policy under Kgalema Petrus Motlanthe**

Kgalema Petrus Motlanthe is a South African politician who served as the third president of South Africa from 25 September 2008 to 9 May 2009, following the resignation of Thabo Mbeki. The National Assembly selected him as interim president until elections could be held in 2009. It is worth noting that President Kgalema Petrus Motlanthe was the interim president and did not introduce any significant foreign policy direction.

### **5.6.2 Jacob Zuma’s Foreign Policy (2009 – 2018)**

The relevance and goal of a country’s foreign policy regarding being able to respond to both domestic and continental needs is critical and central to their foreign affairs. By this, the needs of such state should be at the fore of any foreign policy formulation and execution. In his words, Zuma, confirmed this notion in an address at the University of Pretoria on ‘aspects of South African Foreign Policy’ when he said that “It is important to state from the onset, that our foreign policy is an extension of our domestic policy and our value system.” (The Presidency, 2011). In his address, he further mentioned that the origin of South Africa’s foreign policy was shaped by ‘ordinary people of the Republic of South Africa, and is embodied in the Freedom Charter of 1955’, which proclaims that “there shall be peace and friendship”, and further outlines the following aspects of foreign policy (The Presidency, 2011):

*“South Africa shall be a fully independent state which respects the rights and sovereignty of all nations;*

*South Africa shall strive to maintain world peace and the settlement of all international disputes by negotiation – not war;*

*Peace and friendship amongst all our people shall be secured by upholding the equal rights, opportunities and status of all;*

*The right of all peoples of Africa to independence and self-government shall be recognised, and shall be the basis of close co-operation”.*

Jacob Gedleyihlekisa Zuma became South Africa’s third president in 2009 and remained president until February 2018. Although Mngomezulu, (2019: 37), notes that his time in office ended after the Party’s 54<sup>th</sup> Elective Conference at Naturena on 20 December, 2017 in Johannesburg, Luanda Mpungose (2018), hinted that historically, the Mandela administration reintegrated post-apartheid South Africa into the global community successfully. This feat restored a positive image of South Africa in institutions like the United Nations (UN) and the South African Development Community (SADC). Nelson Mandela’s successor, Thabo Mbeki, focused primarily on Africa’s development with his philosophy of ‘African Renaissance’ which emphasised ‘African Solutions to African Problems’ and encouraged African Unity. He was regarded as the founding father of key African institutions and frameworks like the African Union, the Pan-African Parliament (PAP), New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM).

With Jacob Zuma campaigning under the theme "Continuity and Change", he won the April 22 national election, with almost sixty-six (66) percent of the vote. Zuma was confident to assume the position as the country’s next president. Afterwards, he was officially elected to the presidency in a National Assembly vote on May 6 and inaugurated on May 9. Mpungose (2018) opined further, that most prominent of Jacob Zuma’s achievements perhaps were; “South Africa joining the Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) grouping in 2011, as well as strengthening South Africa’s relationship with China and further continued the call for a more representative and equitable governance structure in global multilateral institutions like the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and United Nations Security Council (UNSC).” (Mpungose, 2018).

The Medium-term Strategic Framework to Guide Government’s Programme for the Electoral mandate Period 2009-2014 was announced in August 2019. This public announcement established that the Zuma government would drive and promote its foreign policy under the broad rulebook

of “Pursuing African Advancement and Enhanced Co-operation” (Landsberg Chris. 2012: 76). The government further established several pillars, remarkably related and similar to those of Mbeki, namely;

1. *closing the gap between domestic and foreign policy, or the national interests;*
2. *Promoting Southern African Development Community (SADC) integration;*
3. *prioritization of the African continent through “African advancement”;*
4. *strengthening of South-South relations;*
5. *improving strategic relations with the North;*
6. *strengthening political and economic relations; and*
7. *Participating in the global system of governance.*

As much as ‘national interest’ was frequently voiced as the cement projected to hold the foreign policy pillars together, it became quite obvious soon that the weight was too heavy for the foundations themselves to carry. As a result, critical observers soon became concerned majorly in respect of whether these foreign policy goals represented a marked shift in, or whether it was merely a reinforcement of, those goals pursued by Mbeki, as well as why there had been so many variations and divergences in their implementation. It got these observers wondering because If Zuma wished to deviate from Mbeki’s agenda, why did he in the first place adopt it? Or was it that he perhaps was “caught between the enthusiastic reformers who put him into power and the actual powers responsible for putting policy into practice?” (Landsberg C. 2012: 76). These contradictory occurrences perhaps were the reason behind Mpungose’s conclusion that the Zuma administration, on the domestic front, has in her words “flagrantly contradicted SA’s commitment to human rights and Ubuntu, enshrined in the Constitution and embodied in Mandela’s leadership’ (Mpungose: 2018). Those pillars introduced from the inception of the democratic government (see 4.3) and espoused in the foundational foreign policy documents, the Bill of Rights and founding principles were missing. As president, Jacob Zuma had to put up and deal with economic problems and social discontent. Amongst these problems are, occurrences of numerous extended strikes, with some escalating to violence, notably the 2012 tragedy at a platinum mine in Marikana. During this incident, police discharged firearms at striking miners, resulting in the deaths of over thirty four (34) individuals and leaving many others wounded. Additionally, the unemployment rate persisted at approximately 25 percent. And as noted earlier, many South Africans expressed dissatisfaction with how slowly the ANC-led government was making progress and voiced out concerns about inadequate service delivery and poor living conditions. President Zuma and the ANC were also accused of corruption, notably surrounding the expensive and extensive upgrades to Zuma’s

private home in Nkandla, KwaZulu-Natal. These upgrades were paid for with public funds and included things like a swimming pool and an amphitheatre, which didn't seem necessary for security. Furthermore, South Africa's public protector, Thuli Madonsela, conducted an investigation into the upgrades for two years and recommended that Zuma repay some of the costs which he refused to. All these extravagant spending of public funds bothered people, especially when so many South Africans were still living in poverty. A clear sign of Zuma's weakening popularity emerged during a memorial service for Nelson Mandela, the beloved former president and ANC icon who passed away on December 5, 2013. When Zuma attempted to deliver his speech at the December 10 memorial, the audience repeatedly booed him. (Encyclopedia Britannica: 2023).

The changes in foreign policy and domestic discontent did not pose well for Zuma and his administration. His tenure, according to Helen Suzman Foundation (nd), "saw a more contentious approach", consisting of alignment with certain global "left-leaning" states and controversial decisions. Some key foreign policy issues are discussed below.

#### **5.6.2.1 Engagement in Africa**

The focus of South Africa's engagement on the African continent as stated in the South Africa Year book (2010/11: 306), is to promote and encourage development, make an impact on resolving conflict and build a conducive environment to stimulate socio-economic development. South Africa's role has been significant on many points, including peacekeeping operations and trade. It is also recorded as one of the continent's leading economies with a gross domestic product (GDP) valued at \$301 billion in 2016, with progressive infrastructure. In addition, Post-apartheid South Africa has been a defender and promoter of peace and development on the continent, with proof of facilitating and mediating political negotiations in SADC (Burundi, Lesotho, Madagascar and Zimbabwe). The country has also been active in Francophone Africa after President Mbeki made possible, discussions in Côte d'Ivoire in ethnic-motivated conflicts in 2006. (Mpungose: 2018). South Africa's efforts to resolve conflict within southern Africa highlight the challenges and difficulties Pretoria experiences in realising its ambitious foreign policy agenda for Africa (Chris Alden and Garth le Pere 2004: 289). Consequently, the crucible upon which South Africa's post-apartheid foreign policy will be judged is in the regional and continental context, and in terms of its ability to manage conflict ('security') and promote development ('wealth creation'). In this sense, South African foreign policy is experiencing its greatest challenge in its wish to manage conflict in its region. The post-war reconstruction of Angola, the problematic and tentative peace

agreements in the Congo and Burundi and the mounting economic and political crisis in Zimbabwe threaten the integrity of these states, regional stability, and the prospects for development.

*With an explicit commitment to 'play a catalytic role in ending Africa's wars', the South African government has embarked on a set of initiatives that aim to tackle the immediate causes of these crises as well as efforts to address its more enduring sources. Complicating South Africa's engagement with the region, however, is its history of intervention in regional affairs, much of which centred upon destabilising regional co-operation, and a contemporary desire to undo that legacy through active consultation with member states. Moreover, the continuing ambivalence towards democracy and human rights amongst key SADC leaders has made South Africa's promotion of these values all the more problematic (Malan, 1998 in Chris Alden and Garth le Pere 2004: 289).*

Now, although South Africa has been playing a role in United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations under the Zuma administration, there has been records of less involvement in strengthening certain key institutions and instruments like the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG) which was not the case in Mbeki's administration. This treaty created in the African Union (AU) to enhance and encourage better governance in Africa, is in line to a large extent with South Africa's developmental desires and aspirations for the continent. Mbeki's engagement in the region was more all-inclusive, including governance and peacekeeping.

South Africa's relationship with a few African countries, as recorded in the South Africa Yearbook 2010/11, highlighting areas like economic and political rapport, is considered below for reference. These include relations with countries from Southern Africa, North Africa, West Africa, Central Africa and the Horn of Africa.


## **Southern African Countries**

### **a. Democratic Republic of Congo**

President Zuma of South Africa and President Joseph Kabila of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in October 2009, met as part of the Binational Commission (BNC) established between the DRC and South Africa in 2004. The BNC was created to solidify trade, peace and security, economic development, and defence relations between the two countries. Furthermore, the DRC, had over time become one of the Republic's leading trade partners in the region (South Africa Year book 2010: 309). Data from the Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC) show that trade

between South Africa and the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2022 recorded South African exports of \$1.47B to the Democratic Republic of Congo. The main products exported to the Democratic Republic of the Congo were Refined Petroleum (\$111M), Liquid Pumps (\$89.7M), and Excavation Machinery (\$69.8M). Furthermore, the exports of South Africa to the Democratic Republic of the Congo over the past five (5) years have increased at an annualized rate of 9.31%, from \$940M in 2017 to \$1.47B in 2022 (OEC, 2022). Figure 4.4 below shows the data. The two countries also cooperate on several projects, including security sector reform, capacity development and institution building, and infrastructural development support.

**Figure 4.4: Comparative Advantage; South Africa-Democratic Republic of Congo**



**Source: OEC (2022)**

### **b. Malawi**

The first diplomatic relations were established between South Africa and Malawi in 1967. Malawi was an independent country at the time. Some of the engagements between South Africa and Malawi include the inaugural Joint Commission of Cooperation (JCC) meeting between the two countries in Blantyre, Malawi in 2008. The South African High Commission has led multiple engagements between both countries in Malawi. In 2012, the South African Government News

Agency (2012) reported that a meeting between President Jacob Zuma and then Malawian President Joyce Banda was held to reassess bilateral relations between the two countries. The two Heads of State expressed contentment with the existing bilateral cooperation between the two countries conducted within the Joint Permanent Commission for Cooperation (JCC) structure. In the same vein,

"Both Zuma and Banda reiterated their commitment to improving and strengthening the political and economic relations by enhancing cooperation between the two countries' business communities as well as increasing trade and investment... Both countries agreed to encourage people-to-people contacts through cultural, scientific and educational exchange programmes and tourism"...

To this effect, the Presidents directed their Ministers of International Relations and Foreign Affairs to ensure regular meetings of this important Commission to maintain the required momentum in implementing the existing bilateral agreements and memoranda of understanding.

## **Zambia**

President Zuma conducted a state visit to his Zambian counterpart to consolidate relations between the two countries, specifically in trade and investment. According to the South Africa Yearbook 2010/11, Zambia is one of the Republic's largest trading partner in the continent, with a total trade volume of \$2 billion. In addition, "the countries signed MoUs to enhance their ties in sectors such as agriculture, health, mining and energy. Zambia bestowed the South African President with the Order of the Eagle. He is the second South African to have received this honour after former ANC president, Oliver Tambo." (South Africa Year Book 2010/11: 311).

### **c. Uganda**

Among his many state visits, President Jacob Zuma visited Uganda in response to an invite by President Yoweri Kaguta Museveni in March 2010. The visit initiated cooperation in many sectors including trade, agriculture, customs and science and technology. The signing of multiple agreements was pivotal in solidifying South Africa's foreign affairs with the government of Uganda. In addition, the two countries have combined forces to support peace-building efforts on the African continent, with a significant focus in the Great Lakes Region since 1994. In 2023, South Africa's President Ramaphosa hosted President Museveni on a state visit that was said to enhance bilateral relations between the two countries. Vital areas like political, economic, regional,

continental and international issues were said to have been discussed by the Presidents. President Ramaphosa stated, therefore, that the State Visit has

“Reinforced the firm political and economic relations between our two countries. By deepening these relations, we aim to better the lives of our people and continue the struggle to overcome poverty, unemployment and inequality... witnessed the signing of Memoranda of Understanding in diverse areas of cooperation.” (SA News: 2023).

## **Mozambique**

As revealed in the South Africa Year Book (2010/11), good historic and neighbourly relations have existed between South Africa and Mozambique. Fortunately, over the years these relations have been cemented through the South Africa – Mozambique Heads of State Economic Bilateral Commission, the Joint Permanent Commission for Cooperation (JPCC), supporting the SADC and AU policies as well as the effective implementation of NEPAD programmes. Evidently in January 2010, President Zuma, in the company of the Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, Ms. Maite Nkoana-Mashabane, was present at the inauguration of President-elect Armando Guebuza with a festival to promote relations between the two countries was held in Maputo in May 2010. The programme included discussions about road infrastructure, information and communications technology (ICT), an avenue for trade exhibition of South African companies and an inspection of agricultural projects. In addition, a travel book pointing out the N4 route between Gauteng and Maputo was also published. President Guebuza undertook a working visit to South Africa in October 2010.

## **Central African countries**

South Africa did not relent in strengthening its bilateral relations with the countries in the Central African Region during 2010/11. A few of those countries are noted below.

### **a. Gabon**

Diplomatic relations between South Africa and Gabon were established in 1992, and a legal framework was generated by signing a cooperation agreement, and further agreements have since been signed. Minister Elizabeth Thabethe, Deputy Minister of Trade and Industry, spoke at a business seminar arranged by the Department of Trade and Industry, during the Gabonese leg of the Trade and Investment Mission mentioned one of these agreements between the two countries.

According to her, the countries agreed to increase trade relations between them. (South African Government, 2012). In the same event, it was also hinted that both countries had experienced a cordial political partnership since President Nelson Mandela first visited Gabon.

#### **b. Equatorial Guinea**

Diplomatic relations between Equatorial Guinea and South Africa were established in May 1993 with President Zuma paying a working visit there in November 2009. Since then, both countries have signed bilateral agreements in defence and general cooperation. There continues to be regular diplomatic engagement between both countries and their embassies.

#### **c. Burundi**

Since 2008, South Africa has been an integral part and a driving force in steering Burundi's peace process forward. These key developments include the disarmament and reintegration of the Forces National de Liberation (FNL) and registering itself as a political party. The FNL committed itself to participate in the 2010 elections. South Africa also contributed SANDF peacekeepers to Burundi's peace process; its last contingent returned to the Republic in December 2009.

#### **d. Rwanda**

In May 1995, full diplomatic relations were established between South Africa and Rwanda. The two countries have maintained good political relations. Their collaboration however, focuses on the reconstruction of Rwanda post-conflict and has also extended to the management of NEPAD on the continent. In a bid to further strengthen this bilateral structure, an establishment of the Implementation Monitoring Committee came to be realized at director-general level to provide the necessary coordinating, planning and monitoring framework needed to manage effective implementation of approved programmes, and also to ensure the delivery of cross-cutting training and human resource (HR) capacity-building programmes.

### **North and West Africa and the Horn of Africa**

#### **a. Mauritania**

Relations between South Africa and Mauritania were normalised in late 2009 due to the return to constitutional order, the lifting of suspension and re- admission of Mauritania by the AU. South Africa and Mauritania started normalising relations with the latter appointing a resident ambassador during 2010, while South Africa was in the process of doing the same. It was recorded

that during the period 2010/11, trade involving the two countries doubled in volume, leading to an increase of over 50% to reach its highest of R440 million. In 2015, however, South Africa and Mauritania committed to further enhance the Bilateral Economic Relations by signing a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Economic Cooperation that will “enable the two countries to explore trade and investment opportunities in the energy, mining, transport and communication infrastructure, agro-processing and tourism sector.” (South African Government: 2015).

#### **b. Tunisia**

The South Africa Year book indicates that the political relations between South Africa and Tunisia remain strong. In April 2010, Deputy President Motlanthe undertook a working visit to Tunisia where he co-chaired a meeting with Prime Minister Mohamed Ghannouchi to assess progress achieved in various areas of cooperation. The two countries also cooperate in health, social development, defence, S&T, culture and sport. Moreover, South Africa has over 80 Tunisian medical doctors working in rural areas.

#### **c. Sudan**

Its strategic foreign policy priority informs South Africa’s involvement in Sudan that peace, security and stability are prerequisites for Africa’s socio-economic development. In October 2010, President Zuma appointed his political adviser, Mr Charles Nqakula, his special envoy to the Sudan. This is a strong reflection of South Africa’s commitment to assist Sudan to overcome the country's challenges. South Africa chairs the AU Ministerial Committee on the Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development of the Sudan. The committee comprises Algeria, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal and the Sudan.

#### **d. Nigeria**

The country Nigeria is considered one of South Africa’s most important partners on the African continent in pursuing the vision of an African renewal. In November 2009, Deputy President Motlanthe undertook a working visit to Nigeria to attend the 10th anniversary celebrations of the South Africa-Nigeria BNC in Abuja. South Africa committed to supporting close cooperation with Nigeria by structuring bilateral relations by establishing a BNC. Minister Nkoana-Mashabane visited Nigeria to meet with her counterpart, Mr Henry Ajumogobia in May 2010. It was further emphasised in June 2024 by President Ramaphosa that understanding and partnership between South Africa and Nigeria is critical for the success of the African continent. According to him, “It

is the two countries that are among the pillars of our continent, and I'm particularly pleased that we support each other internationally... and we want to engender good economic and trade relations between our two countries to address the challenges that our two countries face" (SA News: 2024). This statement was made following a bilateral meeting with his Nigerian colleague, President Bola Tinubu, in Tshwane.

## **Senegal**

Bilateral relations between South Africa and Senegal are mainly based on the Senegalese Government's strong support for the African Renaissance initiative and NEPAD, and its strong commitment to promoting democracy and good governance. Full diplomatic relations between South Africa and Senegal were established in May 1994 and the two countries' representative offices were upgraded to embassy level. In addition, various cooperation agreements exist between the two countries. In 2013, President Zuma concluded his visit to the Republic of Senegal and declared it a great success, having honoured the invitation of the President of the Republic of Senegal, His Excellency Mr Macky Sall. The visit aimed at strengthening social, economic and political relations between the two countries and was regarded as a first by a South African head of state.

The two Presidents, however, expressed their satisfaction over the signing of Cooperation Agreements in the areas of Agriculture and Arts and Culture and encouraged both parties to finalize promptly the draft agreements currently negotiated. According to the South African Government's report (2013), the agreements were on the following:

- Economic and Technical Cooperation;
- For Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion;
- Energy Cooperation;
- Environmental Cooperation;
- Cooperation in the Field of Livestock;
- Waiver of Visa Requirements for holders of official and diplomatic passports.

**Figure 4.5: Senegal’s intra-Africa export and import products (2017)**

Intra-Africa export products				Intra-Africa import products			
HS codes	Product description	2017 (US\$m)	% total intra-Africa exports	HS codes	Product description	2017 (US\$m)	% total intra-Africa imports
2710	Petroleum oils (not Crude)	232.76	16.8%	2709	Crude petroleum oils	513.32	45.6%
2523	Cement	199.87	14.4%	1511	Palm oil	72.66	6.5%
0303	Frozen fish	139.20	10.1%	2710	Petroleum oils (not Crude)	52.08	4.6%
2104	Soups and broths and preparations therefor	121.06	8.8%	2701	Coal	44.41	3.9%
1901	Malt extract	47.36	3.4%	8704	Goods vehicles	27.24	2.4%
2402	Cigars and cigarettes	46.58	3.4%	4407	Wood sawn or chipped lengthwise	25.72	2.3%
3304	Beauty and skin care preparations	32.74	2.4%	2711	Petroleum gas	24.40	2.2%
2403	Manufactured tobacco	32.10	2.3%	4819	Paper packaging	16.68	1.5%
1006	Rice	31.17	2.3%	8703	Passenger vehicles	10.79	1.0%
2401	Unmanufactured tobacco; tobacco refuse	26.21	1.9%	2101	Coffee and tea extracts, essences and concentrates	10.69	0.9%

Source: ITC TradeMap (2018)

### 5.6.2.2 Xenophobia

As a result of increasing hostility and resentment towards foreign nationals by locals, the South African APRM Country Review Report in 2007 put on the alert the rise of Xenophobia. “In 2008, violent attacks broke out resulting in the deaths of more than sixty (60) foreign nationals. There was more violence in 2015 which President Zuma condemned and appealed to South Africans not to blame criminal acts on foreign nationals.” (Mpungose, 2018).

Zuma, in a closed-door meeting at the start of the African Union (AU) assembly of heads of state in Sandton on Sunday morning, said that South Africans took a stand against Xenophobia, which “shattered the stereotype that South Africans are intolerant, specifically against fellow Africans or that South Africans are xenophobic” (Carien du Plessis: 2015). In His words, “South Africans are not xenophobic. We do not believe that the actions of a few out of more than 50 million citizens justify the label of Xenophobia.” (Carien du Plessis: 2015,). Regardless of this justification, Mpungose added that there have been several other incidents since then, such as an anti-foreigners march in Pretoria in February 2017. Addressing the march in a televised speech, Zuma stated:

*“The march in Pretoria today, which was also attended by foreign nationals, was anti-crime not anti-foreigners and we appeal to all the marchers to protest within the confines of the law.” Both Presidents Mbeki and Zuma have denied that such acts can be labelled as*

*xenophobic on the basis that South Africa hosts more immigrants than Europe, and African countries were so hospitable to exiles from South Africa historically. This flagrant denial of a concerning phenomenon further strains South Africa's relationship with the rest of the continent, particularly with countries like Nigeria which recalled its ambassador after the 2015 attacks. Although South Africa's relationship with Nigeria has often been rocky, xenophobic incidents have further diminished South Africa's position as a continental leader. (Mpungose 2018).*

### **5.6.2.3 Admission into BRICS**

With democracy, South Africa's experience under the Zuma's tenure indicates clearly that majority decisions are not always the most beneficial or rational. Mathekga (2018: 90) expressed that under the Zuma administration, Parliament made decisions that could be seen as legitimate from the point of view that the majority approved them but some of those decisions that passed through majority processes, have also proved to be irrational, indefensible and some even unconstitutional. An instance is how parliament handled the Public Protector's report on the upgrades to Zuma's private residence at Nkandla. According to Mathekga, the ANC used its majority in the Parliament to excuse Zuma from taking responsibility and paying back a certain portion of the public money spent on his private residence. He further concluded that the manner in which the parties (including opposition parties) engage with each other on matters like the Public Protector's report demonstrates the lack of commitment to the principle of multiparty system, or the spirit of multiparty democracy at least. Mathekga (2018: 91).

As expressed by Mpungose (2018), the ultimate achievement for the Zuma administration in 2011 was the admission of South Africa into the BRICS grouping of emerging markets thus, giving room to the nation to potentially advance its national interests, to develop and improve structure and promote regional integration, as well as give substance to its interests in South-South cooperation. According to Fabricius (nd: 9), it was also during the "Zuma's presidency that South Africa was invited to join the G20 group of "systemically important" economies. Both invitations reflected South Africa as a critical player and an emerging global trade and politics economy. To this end, "South Africa immediately gave BRICS an African mandate, inviting several African leaders to meet the BRICS leaders at the first summit Pretoria hosted, in 2013, with a view to their possibly tapping into the huge development-financing resources of China in particular".

This membership, however, attracted series of criticism and scepticism by the media and economists due to South Africa's relatively small economy and slow economic growth compared to its 'new friends'. Furthermore, it is worth noting that South Africa's relationship with China elevated under Zuma. According to Mpungose (2008), this elevation demonstrated to be "advantageous and valuable considering that Nigeria – Africa's largest economy, also had an interest in joining and being part of the group as remarked by the outgoing chairman of the Manufactures Association of Nigeria, Mr. John Aluya".

#### **5.6.2.4 ACIRC and SADPA**

In addition, Zuma's other notable diplomatic initiative resulted in the creation of the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC) comprising countries like Algeria, Chad, Tanzania and Uganda. This initiative aimed to develop a short-term rapid-response force comprising troop contributions from the five-member countries to improve their rapid response potential to instability and insecurity in the continent. This was why Ontavio (2021: 92 – 94) opined that Zuma's time in government saw deepening and consolidating relations across the continent and strengthening the African agenda. In addition, Fabricius (nd: 9) further noted that:

*The Zuma administration also announced the imminent establishment of the South African Development Partnership Agency (SADPA) which would channel South African development assistance mainly into Africa, sometimes in conjunction with traditional donor countries. Zuma also formally articulated the widely-held notion that South Africa was an economic "gateway to Africa," a base for foreign investors and traders to do business with the continent.*

In conclusion, Ontavio, (2021: 93) identified some challenges faced from the time of Nelson Mandela which trickled down to the Zuma administration where he pointed out that the strategies of international and regional insertion based on the role of multilateralism and the universality of foreign policy, to a certain extent, generated two consequences for the Mbeki administration that differed from those found during the Mandela administration". Titus (2009) noted that the Western powers were unhappy about the choice of South Africa to engage countries it disapproved and this resulted in an image that the country had lost its moral fibre. Also, the intensification of the regional integration process was exemplified by the collaboration with numerous African nations and the proactive efforts to establish initiatives deemed significant for the African Renaissance. To this end,

*The consequences previously indicated influenced the foreign policy adopted during the Zuma administration. The valorization of democracy, economic development and conflict resolution continued to be linked to the role of multilateralism and universality in foreign policy, symbolized by the greater interest in strengthening ties with emerging powers (Titus: 2009).*

Therefore, the yearning and desire to greatly intensify the economic relations with several African countries can be outlined as one of the two characteristics of the Zuma administration that revealed the continuity in the South African strategy of regional insertion, meanwhile the other refers to resolving conflicts through dialogue.

### **5.6.3 Foreign Policy under Cyril Ramaphosa**

In the words of Hendricks and Majози (2021), questioning of South Africa's international stature was stronger principally during the Jacob Zuma era (May 2009 to February 2018), when there were concerns and fear regarding the country's domestic politics as well as an increasing distrust of the motives for, and a decline in, its engagement in peace and security on the continent. They (Hendricks and Majози, 2021) write that the need for the Republic to reclaim its space internationally and improve its reputation and credibility was a key theme in Ramaphosa's administration as stated in a speech by the former Minister of International Relations and Cooperation Lindiwe Sisulu (2018) that: "we once were a giant in the world and our reputation was well known, because of what we represented. [. . .] We want South Africa to be once again a moral compass and a voice of reason in a world increasingly overcome with selfish, narrow interests".

According to Ontavio (2021: 95), in correspondence with Zuma's resignation in the early 2018, one of the demands that gained dominance in the country and can be understood and referred to as one of the main objectives of the Ramaphosa's administration is the one that concerns "the search for solving socio-economic challenges — especially poverty and unemployment." To a certain extent, the previous governments sought to create initiatives aimed at the same purpose, and even managed to improve some indexes.

*Examples of this can be found in access to drinking water, which went from 58% in 1994 to 91% in 2009, and in the scope of public policies, since in 2015 around 17 million South Africans were supported, while in 1994, there were 4 million (Cilliers and Aucoin 2016). However, some challenges remained, such as the high*

*unemployment rate, is reflected in the relationship between young people entering the labour market (annually, around 1.2 million) and those who manage to be employed (about a third of the total) (Ramaphosa 2020). Ontavio A. (2021: 95).*

However, Mathekga (2018: 17 – 18), opined that after all the experiences from the Zuma era, it will be wrong to think that the Ramaphosa presidency is an isolated incident or a “new dawn”. Instead he posited that this presidency should be seen as another episode of political leadership in post-apartheid South Africa. Furthermore, the Ramaphosa presidency according to Mathekga (2018), has been widely crafted as an alternative to Zuma’s decade of “all things gone wrong” and this has put Ramaphosa in a position where he has to thread carefully to avoid making enemies especially with the fact that he cannot let go of all Zuma’s supporters in the administrative arm like the Cabinet for example. In addition, Ontavio (2021) revealed that Ramaphosa has regularly noted the importance of universality and multilateralism as responses to various socioeconomic challenges in the country including unemployment, while also noting that both ideas are integral to expanding its economic diplomacy. In a speech addressed to the German President, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, who was on an official visit to South Africa in 2018, Ramaphosa spoke about the “strategic importance of Berlin at the international level, as both defend multilateralism and the promotion of peace, as well as domestically, as Germany is the country's third largest trading partner, and one of the main investors, with more than 600 companies operating in South African territory” (Ontavio, 2021: 96)

President Cyril Ramaphosa’s administration is well cognisant of the limitations associated with implementing South Africa’s foreign policy to date and the understanding of the need to bring South Africa back to plan. This is often expressed by emphasizing the need to reposition South Africa. Also, the administration is devoted to augment its leadership role, with the integrity to back it up, and on providing a new vision in an increasingly unilateralist, uneven and anarchic world, which sees a return to geopolitics, and where military power has once again become a legitimated and dominant form of resolving conflicts (Alexandroff, 2015 in (Hendricks and Majazi, 2021).

Speaking of diplomacy, Mathekga (2018: 18) noted Ramaphosa’s strong feat in diplomacy. According to him, Ramaphosa speaks eloquently and crafts his messages and speeches in a way that speaks to and carries everybody along. Yet, Fabricius (nd: 10) noted a decline on the enthusiasm to follow through with making peace in the continent, stating that:

*The momentum behind South Africa’s peace-making efforts on the continent, epitomized by former president Thabo Mbeki’s African Renaissance, seems to have*

*been lost. The political will to mobilize resources to this end is no longer as strong as before... Even within South Africa's foreign policy establishment there has been sharp criticism of South Africa's recent foreign policy performance. After President Cyril Ramaphosa ousted Zuma to become national president in 2018, his new International Relations and Cooperation Minister Lindiwe Sisulu commissioned a review of foreign policy lead by former deputy foreign minister Aziz Pahad. It concluded that, during the Zuma administration, "Because both South Africa and other countries that used to play leading roles on the African continent, such as Nigeria, had, for various reasons, vacated the political leadership on the continent, there emerged other countries that occupied that vacuum, and thus being able to lead on many issues on the African continent as well as with relations with outside regions and countries.*

Along with economic diplomacy, as Ontavio (2021: 97) opined, the political- diplomatic domain is a forum for the universality in foreign policy and the appreciation of multilateralism. Unlike the Mbeki and Zuma governments however, the mission to utilize such tools to rescue the status of a country with a strong moral dimension, is the observation. This way, it points towards approaching the foreign policy implemented by the Mandela administration. In other words, there is a maintenance of the interest in ensuring strategic partnerships and increasing and strengthening the value of multilateral spaces. Ontavio A. (2021: 97- 100) identified some characteristics in the Ramaphosa administration so far. One of them revolves around the fact that the "current administration has shown an interest in acting on various topics, with emphasis on conflict resolution, such as those in Syria, Somalia and Yemen; and in the defence of the independence of Western Sahara (Ramaphosa 2018). Activism about Western Sahara and the resolution of the conflict in Somalia serve as examples that symbolize the continent's continued importance to South Africa". As quoted by the current DIRCO Minister, Naledi Pandor, "Our foreign policy as South Africa is, and has always been based on our vision of championing an African continent which is prosperous, peaceful and democratic" (Pandor 2019, n.p).

Another is centred on Africa's centrality in South African foreign policy as not simply rhetorical. Since the beginning of his administration, President Ramaphosa has been establishing continuity in this objective. "A first example that demonstrates interest in continental integration can be found in the African Union (AU), with South Africa not only assuming its presidency in the 2020 and 2021 biennium, but also demonstrating that in this period it will act in favour of one of the main initiatives linked to the Organization, Agenda 2063, created in 2015 and marked by several

aspirations that symbolize the continent's quest to solve challenges in the fields of economics, politics and security” (AU 2015).

In addition, participation in the pacification processes is considered one of the characteristics. In this case, such an objective can be exemplified by Pretoria's interest in directing the AU presidency to resolve crises in Libya and South Sudan (Africa News 2020). Ontavio A. (2021: 99) stated that in addition to conflict resolution efforts, the Ramaphosa administration's commitment to silencing weapons reflects another characteristic: multilateralism. Since the Mandela administration faced criticism for its handling of conflict situations, Pretoria has prioritized collaboration with other African nations to bolster its presence and engagement across the continent. Under the current administration, multilateralism serves not only as a tool for promoting stability and peace in Africa but also remains crucial in the economic sphere. Similar to the approach taken during the Zuma administration, this commitment is evident in the goal of operationalizing the Free Trade Area resulting from the Tripartite Agreement (TFTA) among the Common Market of East Africa (COMESA), the East African Community (EAC), and SADC. To achieve this objective, Pretoria seeks to encourage other countries to sign and ratify the agreement, as it requires fourteen (14) ratifications for the TFTA to take effect (Pandor, 2019). Overall, the emphasis on multilateralism in conflict resolution and economic integration aligns with the continuity of the African Agenda, an initiative initiated during the Mbeki administration and upheld throughout the Zuma administration.

*In this case, in addition to acting on the main multilateral initiatives developed on the continent, the Ramaphosa administration has sought to maintain South Africa as a defender of African interests on the international stage. This is confirmed in his 2019 speech in Biarritz, France, when he highlighted the importance of G7 member countries investing in the African continent (Ramaphosa 2019). This highlight reflects one of the main objectives set by the country in the post-apartheid period, the search not only to strengthen its regional insertion, but also to remain relevant in solving existing challenges in Africa. Ontavio A. (2021: 99)*

Although an importance in prioritizing the African continent is present, both the advancement and development in multilateral and bilateral relations can be obstructed by a challenge that has been present since the Mandela administration in South Africa which in this case, is the never-ending xenophobic violence. In the current administration, the fight against Xenophobia unites with the development of the National Action Plan to fight Racism, Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerances (NAP). Created in 2019, the NAP has laid its goals as the “protection of human rights,

the adoption of anti-racist and anti-discrimination initiatives, especially in the field of education” Ontavio (2021). However, an unfortunate event presented in the same year that the Plan was formed. This event saw the murder or expulsion of several Nigerians from areas close to Johannesburg and, in response to that, what was seen were some Nigerians attacking South African traders resident in Abuja. More so, this type of violence to a certain extent, ends up exposing one of the challenges that the Ramaphosa administration will face, since the defence of regional integration and Xenophobia tend not to go in the same direction and one can attest to the fact that this challenge is still very much present.

## **5.7 Conclusion**

This chapter has examined South Africa’s evolution and growth in foreign policy and the role of key players like former President Zuma and current President Ramaphosa. This chapter has established the nature and extent of foreign policy and the wide range of state and non-state actors involved in defining and shaping foreign policy. It can be deduced that foreign policy for South Africa is an important priority based on the experiences and engagements it has had across the continent. It is clear that the policy decision-making entails processes and involves different actors. Furthermore, a sound foreign policy must be well framed and developed as these will solidify a state’s position in the world and positively add to its influence and reputation. Therefore, all policy-making bodies (state and non-state) are critical in fully understanding, framing, applying, and implementing foreign policy's meaning, concept, and relevance. This chapter also acknowledges that as a sovereign state, South Africa has a clear national interest that drives and shapes its foreign policy and engagement beyond its borders.

To maintain this notion, a review of key documents on South Africa's foreign policy shows the country's different international relations, priorities and objectives. And the discussions above show the different relationships and stakeholders the country must balance to meet its foreign policy principles. In general, maintaining the state’s reputation and standing in the global arena, poses a priority for the country going forward. It will have to contend with balancing its reputation internationally and continentally, while addressing the issues internally that could taint this image.

## CHAPTER SIX

### DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS

#### 6.1 Introduction

As the subject expresses, this chapter and the one that follows present and analyse the data from the fieldwork conducted for this study. Chapter six presents and analyses the data gathered from interviews, while Chapter six gives more insight on the data garnered. It is important to note that data presented here were obtained from semi-structured interviews where views on the subject matter were expressed and highlighted. A total of fourteen (14) interviews were held, with six (6) respondents from South African Institutes, four (4) from High Commissions, one (1) from an African National association and three (3) from an international relations organisation. Before presenting and analysing the data, the codes and translations used to identify respondents are once again presented.

**Table 5.1: Code Allocations of Respondents**

Code	Translation
SAI1	South African Institute one
SAI2	South African Institute two
SAI3	South African Institute three
SAI4	South African Institute four
SAI5	South African Institute five
HC1	High commission one
HC2	High commission two
HC3	High commission three
HC4	High commission four
IRO1	International Relations Organization one
P1	Participant one
P2	Participant two
SAI1-P1	South African Institute one – Participant one
HC1-P1	High commission one – Participant one
IRO1-P1	International Relations Organization one – Participant one
NA1	National Association one
NA1-P1	National Association one – Participant one

A few key issues and observations from the South African Institute (SAI), International Relations Organization (IRO), High Commission (HC) and National Association (NA) should be noted. While most respondents agreed on specific issues and gave examples to support their views, there

were instances where there were differing views. Some personal experiences were shared as well by respondents to bolster their views and opinions. Dissatisfactions on the occurrence of Xenophobia were also expressed for example, a few respondents indicated that these attacks are targeted towards the wrong set of people. The level of honesty was good by majority of the respondents although a little hesitation for instance, on the part of one HC respondent was perceived during the interview session.

## **6.2 Thematic Presentation and Discussion of Data**

For qualitative research, researchers use thematic analysis to systematically collate, categorise and scrutinize complex data sets. It involves the sorting through and identifying relevant themes through careful understanding and repeated reviews of the transcribed data (King, 2004; Rice & Ezzy, 1999). Braun and Clarke (2006) argue that thematic analysis is very useful in “identifying, describing, and interpreting patterns (themes) within a data set in great detail”. Due to the qualitative nature of this study, thematic presentation fits well. It also attempts to explore issues related to Xenophobia in South Africa towards other African countries, understanding foreign policy better and the links between Xenophobia and foreign policy.

### **6.2.1 Impacts of Xenophobia on Foreign Nationals**

Xenophobic attacks are generally detrimental to the safety and well-being of foreign nationals. This afore statement summarizes the views of respondents on the subject matter. When asked about the effects of xenophobia on foreign nationals, respondent SAI5 – P2 made an interesting statement in this regards, and it goes; “it depends on who the foreigner is”. On a general note, this respondent identified as being a victim xenophobia (being a white American person in another country). So, to respondent SAI – P2, if you are a poor immigrant living in a township, the effect could be deadly. This connote that the degree and magnitude of xenophobia’s effect can be based on the factor of location. However, this respondent further noted that “I see more criminal activities than actual xenophobia”.

In an attempt to be more precise, statements by some respondents will be highlighted. According to respondent HC1- P2, the effects of Xenophobia on foreigners include emotional and mental changes. The thought process of some people are affected and are evident in how they think and do things. This is so because “when you are in a hostile environment, you do not know what will come up next so foreigners are beginning to be afraid and fear for their lives... because you don’t know if you are going to be the next target...” therefore, the psyche of foreigners is affected. A

statement by respondent SAI1- P2 supported this view by saying Xenophobia affects foreigners by way of increasing the perception of feeling unsafe and unwanted which in turn creates a state of being hesitant to invest in any capacity that should supposedly be beneficial to the development of their respective immediate communities thereby putting a strain on the country at large.

Respondent HC1-P2 noted that “more so, a lot of foreigners are thinking of leaving South Africa... which is going to spell doom for the economy of this country” Other respondents’ views on the impacts of Xenophobia on foreign nationals could be summarized as follows:

- a. creating a sense of panic and fear
- b. uneasiness and vulnerability
- c. hostility, animosity and division between foreigners and South Africans, thereby defeating the goal of Ubuntu and Pan-Africanism and creating a scenario of “Us versus them”
- d. destruction of lives and property
- e. fear of being exploited by security by paying ‘protection money’
- f. depression and mental health issues among foreigners
- g. affects economic wellbeing of foreigners, especially on the family in the home country of the victim or deceased
- h. lead to foreigners organizing their resistance like a form of vigilante action to strike back
- i. possible decrease in migrants going to South Africa because of the possible chance of themselves and their families being in danger
- j. deprivation of certain rights or privileges
- k. negative effects on their livelihood in general

The points raised above are in line with the views by Kinge (2016: 33) that the fear of foreign nationals by local black South Africans has created an environment that is unsafe for foreigners living in South Africa. The author points out the gravity of the situation stating that the situation worsened to the point where these foreign nationals are often underpaid for the type and hours of work they perform. Local employers exploit black foreign immigrants, taking advantage of their vulnerable status and creating an insecure environment. This insecurity prevents some foreign immigrants from pursuing asylum procedures without fear of arrest and detention by police. Due to their undocumented status, local employers exploit foreign workers by withholding wages, knowing that reporting to the police could result in arrest. This targeted exploitation has rendered seeking assistance from law enforcement impractical for foreign nationals.

*Employers now work in cahoots with the police in identifying foreign nationals. A community organization known as “Community Policing” was formed to monitor the activities of these foreign immigrants living in the country. This ‘Community Policing’ expect South Africans to spy on foreign nationals and report suspicions to the authorities.’*

All these add up to the widespread feeling of insecurity experienced by foreigners in South Africa, and speaks to the point made by respondent NA1- P1, who also maintained that foreign nationals, as a result of xenophobic activities against them, are mostly frightened and live in such a state thereafter.

### **6.2.2 Impact of Xenophobia on South Africans**

One vital information in the context of the impact of Xenophobia is the fact that not only foreign nationals are engulfed with fear as a result of the xenophobic attacks. Some citizens also are living in a state of fear. Respondent NA1- P1 highlighted how locals are put in a state of fear as a result of xenophobic activities. For examples, there are instances (as indicated by respondent SAI – P1) where some South African citizens who share the same language with surrounding African countries are attacked. According to this respondent, some South Africans who are found in the midst of non-nationals are also victims of xenophobic violence. It then seems, even as citizens, they have to always look over their shoulders for fear of being attacked.

Respondent SAI5 - P1 however, noted that foreigners attack themselves and cover it up with Xenophobia. This connotes that not all ‘xenophobic attacks’ are actually citizen-foreigner based, therefore tarnishing the reputation of South Africa and its citizens further.

### **6.2.3 Views and understanding of Foreign Policy**

Based on their knowledge of the subject matter, the respondents gave their views and understanding of what foreign policy is. Before revealing their opinions, it is of essence that the idea of states relating in the global system is of huge importance. As stated by a respondent earlier, no country is an island thus, they need each other to make things work. This also means that its national interest must also focus on propelling and executing such relationships.

On the above basis, respondent SAI1-P1 defined foreign policy as “a way that a state acts towards other actors in the international community. You have domestic foreign policy which deals with citizens and residents in the country and you have how the country projects, behaves, interacts on the global scale. This can be with other governments as frequently as with other states, it can be with international organizations... it can be with non-state actors maybe counter terrorism or dealing with international NGOs”. So it is how states interact with other countries, governments, and non-state actors.

Respondent HC1- P1 noted that foreign policy can be defined differently. “Some will say it is a government strategy in dealing with counterparts in the international arena and some will even say that foreign policy is second to none”. Using an African country as an example, the respondent noted that if a country says her foreign policy is to repair her image in the international world, no one or country will ever compromise such decision. Therefore, “it is a government strategy in dealing with colleagues or other nations in the international arena.”

Respondent HC1 – P2 explains foreign policy as “a combination of aspirations and procedures through which a country desires to pursue its needs”. Furthermore, amidst the many definitions of foreign policy, whatever definitions are given to it must be in tandem with the country's aspiration. “On the other hand, “it is also worth noting that foreign policy in Africa for example, are not usually defined in terms of processes”. To this respondent, this is because most African countries lack a clear-cut review of what the foreign policy consists of hence, the leader or incumbent president determines the face of the foreign policy of the nation. According to the respondent, this mostly occurs in developing nations.

Respondent SAI3 – P2 identifies foreign policy as “a set of frameworks that a country creates to respond to the foreign environment outside domestic issues. So it is how it engages with other countries and in the region and internationally. But it is a set of policies that guide our interaction politically, economically and socially outside South Africa's borders”.

According to respondent HC2 – P1 who happens to be a diplomat cum foreign policy practitioner, foreign policy in general is “a set of goals which outline how a country relates with other countries. It could be relations with other countries in the region, in the continent and beyond. It is also goals that direct a country on its relations with non-state actors.” The respondent highlighted further, that all these are done in pursuit of the country's' national interest. These interests could be political, economic, social or cultural. In addition, “the formulation and implementation of a country's foreign policy is primarily based on a country's desire to foster and protect its national

interests...” an example was given of Zimbabwe where issues like national security, independence or sovereignty and economic prosperity in general form their national interest. On that note the respondent maintained “that foreign policy is therefore an extension of a country’s domestic policy because it is the domestic policy that shapes a country’s foreign policy.”

Respondent SAI2 – P1 understands foreign policy generally as any rules or laws guiding how the foreigners should be treated or how they should behave when they are entering a foreign country. This definition cannot be entirely faulted because it was given on the basis of the respondent’s understanding and to an extent, it revolves around foreign relations.

Respondent HC3 – P1 opines that foreign policy are goals created by country X which contains their interests as well as how to achieve the interests based on the international level of analysis. It is simply the interests of the country translated into goals. Every country has domestic goals which is the bedrock and foundation of every foreign policy. Secondly, the regional or continental context and the international level of analysis are considered in those goals. Therefore, foreign policy always represents the country's interest by figuring out how to minimize threats from outside and maximize the profit that the country can get. In essence however, foreign policy, is arrived at by three major stages of analysis: Domestic goals → Regional (or continental) goals → International goals. In other words, as respondent SAI5 – P2 puts it, foreign policy is a function of domestic policy translated to regional (within Africa) level and then to international level. The respondent also believes that based on a country’s national interest, foreign policy is geared toward minimizing threats and maximizing profit.

In the words of respondent IRO1 – P1, foreign policy is “about the promotion and the protection of South Africa’s national interest in the world. Therefore, anything that is in our national interest, we will promote it and anything that is against our national interest, we will defend our national interest against it”. This respondent further highlighted some interests of South Africa. “For example we believe it is in our national interest to have peace and stability on the African continent. We will promote peace and stability in Africa by putting our resources and even manpower” to achieve that goal. According to the respondent, the South African government will not hesitate to interfere in areas or countries where their companies are challenged. This will interfere while respecting the domestic laws and policies of the host countries to create channels that will foster an amicable resolution of any dispute.

Respondent NAI – P1 understands foreign policy as “something that countries, within a continent and in the global scene, enter among themselves” that determines how they interact generally.

According to this respondent, foreign policy also involves agreements like Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), which serves as a guide in general for interactions among concerned countries. This could be for example, protocols surrounding entries of migrants into the republic, amongst others.

#### **6.2.4 Evaluation of South Africa's Foreign Policy Objectives**

A few respondents commended South Africa for upholding its foreign policy while some others did not. In no particular order, however, they had the following to say:

Respondent IRO1 – P1 maintained his belief that South Africa's foreign policy objectives indeed puts the interest of Africa first. The respondent noted that:

*“Everything is done in our power within bilateral corporation to promote this idea of Africa first, Africa's renaissance first, Africa's peace and security first. We do this because we believe that peace and security and economic development are intrinsically linked. We believe that there can be no sustainable development without peace and security. We also believe that there can be no sustainable peace and security without development... that is why we promote South African companies to go and invest in Africa so that they can contribute towards the development of the continent; through bringing investment, sharing of knowledge and skills and technologies, fast tracking the modernization of African economies, creating employment opportunities for Africans, particularly young people and women...”*

According to respondent SAI3 – P1, South Africa has been praised many years for her constitution, the simplicity of the constitution, the understandability of the constitution and the far reaching rights that the constitution enshrines and so, “on paper I am sure there are lots of laws that say that we need to treat foreign nationals fairly, equitably, responsibly but does that happen in practice? I don't know” This respondent is aware of and recognizes the laws in the constitution as it relates with foreign nationals and relations but cannot say how effective these laws are.

With examples of Zimbabweans who have special permits, when those permits lapse (which is certain), what then becomes of them? As a result, respondent SAI3 – P1 believes that at this juncture, between the law as is written and the practice of it, the policies are reasonably good and the execution of it as well. An instance was made of the steps taken by the President, just after the most recent outbreak of Xenophobia, by sending some special envoys to the major capitals of countries that “supply immigrants to South Africa like Nigeria and Mozambique to smooth the

diplomatic feathers and demonstrate that the South African government is a very committed African country and that this is not a normal practice”. To this respondent, this has affected foreign policy as South Africa’s standing, internationally and in Africa has gone down. Citing that in the Zuma administration, corruption laid bare, leading to the diminished influence of South Africa and in the post Zuma era, “Ramaphosa has been a very disappointing president and indecisive”. Referring to Zambia, this respondent SAI3 – P1 stands on the notion that South Africa’s standing in Africa has been damaged by not only the Jacob Zuma administration but also by Xenophobia. Therefore, the moral voice that South Africa portrays, holds less importance and the high profile “xenophobic attacks has left a very bitter taste in the diplomatic mouth” of South Africa as well as making other African countries weary of South Africa.

The view of respondent HC1- P1 is not so far from the above in that, on the scale of 1-10, the three (3) score was given to evaluate South Africa’s ability to uphold her foreign policy objectives. According to this respondent, since 2012, nothing has changed positively, the situation remains the same. Respondent HC1-P2 also opined that Africans in South Africa are not finding it easy and that should not be happening if the country truly upholds her foreign policy objectives. This respondent experienced one of the episodes of xenophobic violence and observed that the government was slow to intervene as it took about two to three weeks before the police was deployed to the affected area. Therefore, the South African government cannot be commended for this respondent because they have not lived up to their foreign policies in terms of principle.

Respondent HC2- P1 noted, the stance of the South African government on Xenophobia, where they stated that it is against Xenophobia, but these activities are carried out by some misguided individuals or group of individuals which has unfortunately created a bad image of the country. Against this, the respondent maintained that at this stage, a distinct evaluation is not feasible because the government has made it known that it is against Xenophobia. Although respondent HC3- P1, who had the same opinion added that South Africa can be commended because based on experience as a diplomat, there is good communication and relations between South Africa and other countries. In addition, the country’s doors are open to everyone. According to the respondent HC3- P1, Pretoria for example has the second largest diplomatic community after the Washington District of Columbia in the United States of America, and that is proof that South Africa has a good connection with the international community and good foreign policy that attracts every country into opening an embassy. On that basis, this respondent feels South Africa can be commended on her foreign policy.

For respondent SAI1- P1, you cannot set up laws and policies and not abide by them for example in the Department of Home Affairs (DHA), where procedures are set for people to be properly integrated and documented into the system, staff are the ones giving people illegal documents because only those that have access to the facility can produce fake documents for anyone. On that point, South African cannot be commended because set rules are broken eventually by the people who set them.

Respondent NA1 – P1 maintains that there should be no form of commendation because the South African government has barely lived up to expectation with upholding some of its policies, especially those concerning migration and proper placement of citizens in the Country. According to the respondent, the government, through the department of home affairs, puts migrants under pressure as it relates with their visas. The respondent believes that if the government pays more attention to normalizing their (foreigners) stay, rather than revoking certain visas that have been issued, there will be easier among migrants. This position was further supported by respondent SAI5 – P1. The responded opined that some of the issues that foreigners face that cause the irregularities is that the home affairs system has failed them in the sense of not providing documents in time, making them (foreigners) find themselves in situations where they are arrested for being illegal in the country. Therefore, in this respondent’s words; “I think domestically South Africa’s policies are good on paper, but the reality is different”.

Respondent SAI5 – P2 however, opined that based on their experience, South Africa can be commended for upholding its foreign policy principles. This, according to the respondent, is due to the fact that South Africa has an “open and welcoming good foreign policy”. As a result, it has attracted various categories of people and organizations. On this premise, this respondent believes South Africa’s foreign policy is quite symbolic and can therefore be commended.

#### **6.2.5 Consequences of Xenophobia on South Africa’s Economic and Political relationship with other African Countries**

Some of the effects of Xenophobia on South Africa’s relationship with other African countries are discussed below:

- a. The linking bridge between South Africa and other countries gradually faces collapse because people who intend to invest in and with South Africa are now engulfed with fear and South Africans on the other hand, who intend to conduct any form of business with

countries whose citizens are victims in South Africa are reluctant to do so. Bonga (2021:17) shares the same view by terming it ‘repetitive xenophobic attacks’ which, in his words, “clearly shows unrest and instability in a nation.” Furthermore, the economic development of countries depends largely on the prospect of making a profitable investment, which becomes problematic in an unstable environment, lowering the nation’s chance of attracting adequate and useful capital, thereby leading potential investors away and making them divert their attention to other stable investment climates (Bonga, 2021: 17). This is only logical because the chance for retaliation in other countries with South Africa’s businesses cannot be ruled out. In summary, “there is a strong link between repetitive xenophobic attacks and declining future FDI inflows in a country.” (Bonga, 2021:19).

- b. The same notion concerning hatred towards other countries may most likely affect immigration in the future. Respondent SA13 – P2 narrated a personal experience where on getting to another country, remarks such as “Oh you South Africans are killing other Africans” were directed, and that, can in the long run be a major issue. It may manifest for example in South Africans not obtaining visas on arrival in some countries because of that perception. It could also happen in situations or in an instance where South Africa might be pushing a particular position in the African Union (AU). Still, it may be undermined by the implications of Xenophobia.
- c. It must be understood that migration is a natural phenomenon and has been established that no country is an island and South Africa is no different. It needs a market for its goods and services in Africa. So, according to Respondent HC2 – P1, it is best to avoid a situation where other countries resort to retaliatory measures as a result of Xenophobia.
- d. Also, South Africa is a member of some regional organizations such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the African Union (AU) among others and have been playing a very positive role in these organizations especially in maintaining peace and security. Therefore, if this act of Xenophobia leads to isolation of South Africa from these regional organizations, the economic impact will be great because, who will South Africa trade with? So, Xenophobia does not help the situation.
- e. When asked about the consequences of xenophobia, respondent SAI1 – P2 responded thus; “I don’t think there is a significant impact” as it concerns the Southern African region and even in Africa generally. But noted that there will be more of concern should migrants not

be regularized. According to this respondent, if migrants are not regularized, there will be a problem as it leads to exploitation and comes to unemployment so, if people are regularized, they are paid properly on employment and the issue of some foreigners not running their shops and products legally will be rectified. This is because when People and their businesses are regularized, one benefit is that tax payments will improve and counterfeit goods and wrong business transactions are avoided.

- f. Another consequence of Xenophobia on South Africa's relationship with other countries revolves around a decline in trading potential. This was indicated by respondent SA15 – P2 while noting that Xenophobia and xenophobic activities will render the country a less attractive place for foreign investment based on the hostility associated with xenophobia.
- g. Globally, as respondent SAI5 – P2 indicated, “South Africa has been hurt” as a result of xenophobic activities in the country. In addition, “its brand deluded across the internet” and this has made South Africa “much weaker” - a position that is detrimental and of no good to a state.

#### **6.2.6 Possible domestic and international risks of prolonged Xenophobia**

Some respondents do not think or believe Xenophobia in South Africa has the tendency of coming to an end anytime soon. Just like respondent SAI5 – P2 whose reason is stated to be “as far as we still have parties that will scape goat on migrants and blame migrants... Even if foreign nationals are to be sent away, there may still be other forms of ethnic violence within the country. And with the kind of leadership that we have that does not take these pressing matters seriously, or at least for the most part acknowledge it, I don't see it happening anytime soon” (SAI5 – P2).

Majority of respondents however, opined that there are risks associated with prolonged Xenophobia in South Africa. These risks vary and cut across various angles in the country.

For example, domestically, Respondent SAI2- P1 noted that South Africans cannot function in all capacities and according to the respondent, “we do need these people's skills...” Lecturers for example are majorly foreigners because the truth is “South Africans do not like to teach. That one is a fact, we cannot run away from it” (it must be stated here that this claim cannot be generalised to all South Africans), noting that this forms a negative impact on not foreigners alone but also in the country as most of these foreigners will be forced to go elsewhere, thereby creating a gap in the educational sector of the country. On the foreigners, when they leave maybe back to their home

country of somewhere else, it will take a while to build themselves again because their stability has been disrupted. For some of them, this is a very difficult and stressful condition.

Another possible risk is the potential for the total breakdown of relationships between South Africa and other countries which is already affected as a result of the xenophobic crisis. And respondent HC1- P2 strongly believes that this connection will eventually collapse completely if care is not taken, which will generally spell doom to South Africa.

It is no news that a principle pushed by South Africa's foreign policy is human rights. Therefore if these attacks linger, the values-based stance of South Africa and its foreign policy will be questionable internationally. According to Respondent IRO- P1

*“Because it undermines how we exert influence in structures such as the Human rights council... it means that we will have double standards in some of the positions we take internationally. Suppose I can liken it to the position of the United States right now on the issue of Ukraine, when the United States is trying to push a position in a particular way. In that case, countries say ‘hmm we are not sure you are pushing that because you have your issues that you have not addressed’” (IRO – P1).*

That said, this respondent stated that South Africa is at risk of becoming like that internationally, which is, not being influential regarding human rights issues. It may also result in losing the trade South Africa already has because its biggest trade partner is Africa therefore, there are a lot of issues that can happen over a long period if Xenophobia lingers.

While Respondent HC2- P1 hopes that Xenophobia comes to an end, they referred to Xenophobia as an activity that “poisons the atmosphere” and it affects South African relations with other countries. It does not only do that, it also affects people to people relations. For example, foreigners are getting married to South Africans and so on, so when Xenophobia raises its ugly head, families are invariably affected as marriages will be broken because certain individuals may be forced to return to their countries. The world being a global village creates a situation where any disturbance in one country impacts the entire system. In addition, if Xenophobia continues to linger, the foreign policy of the country, political relations with other countries and the economic status will all suffer.

Respondent SAI2- P1 supported the notion that the South African economy will collapse if Xenophobia lingers any further because if the relationship with other countries is truncated, investments rate from those countries will also suffer a setback and import and export relationships. Also, “South Africans will end up like Nigerians where it becomes very hard for

us to enter other countries like it will become very hard for us to obtain visas”. This respondent also highlighted that there have been warnings by Zimbabweans to South Africans on these xenophobic attributes and how South Africa will end up becoming like Zimbabwe if care is not taken and if they do not stop these ugly activities so, “we might end up like them where we have no home, no we will have to go everywhere to find our homes which is not a good thing”.

Furthermore, if Xenophobia lingers, the positive impacts of high profile South African leaders like Oliver Tambo, Thabo Mbeki, and Nelson Mandela, whose lives have had a positive impact and a profound development in Africa in general will be affected. Respondent HC2 - P1 on this note, terms “Xenophobia as a destructive force to all those positive development”, so if it continues to linger, we can only expect its destructive effect to manifest. Meanwhile, Respondent NAI- P1 indicated that if the issue and occurrence of Xenophobia continues, a time will come where South Africa will be locked up in their own space with no economic relations.

Respondent SAI2- P2, however, hinted on another area where Xenophobia can affect the country: the academic sector. According to the respondent, when there is an intention of South Africans in the field to collaborate with colleagues in other countries for research purpose, they don’t want to welcome that fellow because of this mind-set that South Africans are not good and not loving to their brothers who are residing in the country so there is no point collaborating with them. A practical experience was shared of an academic conference by South Africa which was to be hosted in Kenya but was not approved because of the same perception. Still on the academic angle, if Xenophobia lingers, as posited by Respondent SAI2 - P2 “we will suffer in every way”. If no one, especially Africans, is willing to welcome or work with South Africa, “South Africa will work alone” and consequently, lose funders or sponsors and this will affect the growth rate of academics and or researchers.

In addition to migrants leaving the Country, respondent SA1- P5 highlighted some perceived dangers of xenophobic activities, and it was noted that domestically, there will be more records of loss of lives and properties, protests by refugees and generally, frustration underground will be felt.

### **6.3 Additional Themes**

According to respondent SAI2-P1, the economy of South Africa is affected significantly by xenophobic practices particularly in the aspect of the claims that foreigners take over jobs. It was noted by the respondent that “foreigners when it comes to jobs and businesses are not choosy. They take what they think will make them to survive and that is what we are lacking as South

Africans so when we now see them making money or making a living from that thing we did not see as a livelihood option, we tend to opt for violence and I don't think that is a good thing... and while we are chasing them (foreigners) away, that also affects our economy as well". The effect materializes in ways that can be avoided because for instance, after chasing these foreigners who play certain roles or do certain jobs away, South Africans do not take over those jobs. So the gap remains and broadens because no one fills it up. And this will place them at the losing end as respondent HC1- P2 puts it. Because not only will it affect their economy, it will equally ruin their diplomatic relationships with other countries, particularly other African countries.

Respondents SAI2-P1 and NAI- P1 partially attributes the decline of foreigners' permits and visas to Xenophobia. This simply means that not all xenophobic activities are violent in nature. They can be subtle as well, eating deep into the system. The shackles of Apartheid are still very much present amongst citizens of South Africa, as respondent HC1- P2 stated. For this respondent, South Africans are Africans by name but not Africans by nature. While speaking with some of them, the respondent highlighted the meaning of not being "Africans by nature". An illustration was given thus "when you see other Africans, like Congolese, Nigerian, Gabonese in one area, you may not even be able to differentiate them but immediately you see a South African, a Nigerian and a Ghanaian, you will immediately be able to know that this is South African". This is because there are some attributes peculiar to Africans that South Africans do not possess in that they behave differently and act accordingly. In addition to these views, respondent SAI3- P2 stated that "We are seen to be abusive to other African countries" and are seen as "selfish with no intention of relating well with their brothers and sisters" (Respondent SAI2- P2).

It is important that practicing the spirit of Ubuntu must be a deliberate act if the goal is to create and sustain a cohesive community.

## **6.4 Conclusion**

This section presents the views and responses of participants obtained during the semi-structured interviews. Thematic analysis was the chosen data analysis approach in trying to make sense of the data. Through this process of reading the data, key patterns were identified on issues ranging from perspectives and views of Xenophobia, the impact of Xenophobia on foreigners and South Africa nationals, as well as some of the potential economic and political effects of Xenophobia on South Africa's foreign policy and relations with other African countries.

Some of the key points emerging from the data was that inequality and the competition for resources contributed to Xenophobia, that foreign policy is an extension of a country's domestic policies as these policies shape a country's foreign policy. Furthermore, it can be deduced from the data that South Africa's standing on the continent has been negatively affected and the potential that it could be affected further remains. Worth noting was that while there seemed to be good diplomatic relations among South Africa and other African countries, there has been very poor people to people diplomacy, which is an integral component of diplomacy in theory and practice. The next section reflects on the data and its implications.

## CHAPTER SEVEN

### DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS

#### 7.1 Introduction

This chapter begins with a brief discussion and review of the research objectives. It then focuses on four crucial themes in response to the research questions. Data from primary and secondary sources support these themes. The findings obtained in the field are further discussed to emphasize how adequately the research questions have been addressed. After an elaborate discussion of the central themes, the chapter further examines the political and economic effects of Xenophobia on South Africa's foreign policies on intra and international levels, it presents limitations of the study, and recognizes areas for further research. The results of this research hold advantage because it is evidence-based and individuals who provided the data consist of those who have seen and felt the impact of the violence, as well as those in position of influencing and shaping foreign policy. On a general note, respondents emphasised the importance of development in several ways and the need to make efforts in prioritizing it in order to achieve positive relations between South Africans and foreign nationals. What emerged strongly from the data was that development must be achieved through processes that focus on sensitization of the youth residing in South Africa, skills development, improving literacy rates, building government infrastructure and equipping the locals amongst others. These will be further explained in the chapter following.

According to El-Fouly and Moursi (1975: 90) in Ettang (2015: 190), economic development will meet needs for nourishment, good health, and housing as well as establish “social and cultural development, justice and integration.” Based on these views, development will bring about a sense of stability for individuals, result in just systems, ensure self-improvement, and meet basic desires for economic and human security in addition to producing unified and secure societies. Development must therefore be included and prioritized in peace-building as it incorporates elements like economic opportunities, individual well-being, capacity development and inclusion (Krause and Jutersonke, 2005: 454) in Ettang (2015: 190). Mensah and Benedict (2016: 79) already identified an already existing system that can effectively reduce Xenophobia and stop the attacks – the social welfare grants' cash transfer system, noting that significant training infrastructure has already been put in place in South Africa. This, they argue, could be better operated to facilitate its implementation. They also argue that:

*There is need to whip up the desire among the unskilled and unemployed to access training and improve their human capital. Part of the cash transfer system could be linked to acquisition of skills and training in entrepreneurship. This will make it possible for many South Africans to either move from the secondary to the primary labour market or start viable businesses of their own, and thus reduce the numbers that see some groups of foreign Africans as competition. (Mensah and Benedict (2016:79).*

This means that it is one thing to set up these institutions or infrastructure, and it is another thing to steer up the minds of the youths to participate in such trainings and skill acquisition programs willingly. If this is achieved, those who believe that foreigners are taking over their opportunities will rather have something tangible to focus on thereby reducing the number of people with ideas that see foreigners as competition.

## **7.2. Discussion of Themes**

The objective of this study is to examine thoroughly, the effects of Xenophobia on South Africa's foreign policy as it affects its economic and political sectors as well as proffer solutions and recommendations on how direct xenophobic violence can be reduced in addition to addressing the underlying causes of such violence. Ensuing from the data collected and the discussions in the next sections, the study has accomplished the following objectives as set out in the introductory chapter:

- a. Examined the intra and interpersonal implications of Xenophobia in South Africa
- b. Examined the effects of Xenophobia on South Africa's foreign policy between 2008 - 2019
- c. Explored the effects of Xenophobia on South Africa's political relationships with other African countries
- d. Established the effects of Xenophobia on South Africa's economic status and relations with other African countries
- e. Explored the future of South Africa's foreign policy within the context of Xenophobia

### **7.2.1 On-going Xenophobia and xenophobic violence in South Africa has negatively affected relations between foreign nationals and South Africans and between South Africa and other African countries.**

The persistent state of Xenophobia in South Africa has had significant effects on the relationships between foreign nationals and South Africans and between South Africans as well. What emerged from the data is that this has and will continue to have implications for South Africans visiting

other countries, those who live in other African countries and South Africans that might want to conduct or set up businesses in other parts of the continent. This view is presented in Kinge's (2016:50) stand point, which highlights that:

*South Africa is the only African country with eleven (11) official languages. Because of its vast cultural diversity, it has served as a home for many foreign nationals from Africa and the world in general. South Africa, with a leading economy in the continent, has directed more of her attention in the fight for intra Africa's economic integration. Regrettably, the recent spate of xenophobic violence against foreign nationals living in South Africa has negatively affected the country's economy and also halted the country's effort to expand its tentacles in other African countries.*

This claim by Kinge is nothing short of views by scholars in the field and is supported by evidences that have reflected in one or more sections of this study. A few, however, include documented incidences of xenophobic violence in South Africa by the Human Rights Watch (HRW) (2020), which revealed some disturbing experiences. For example Jean, an interviewee and a Congolese shop owner, faced rioters who broke into his shop in Johannesburg. He was chased away, stoned, and forced to run off. Reports by the Human Rights Watch (2020) have it that Jean has approached the police and civil society organizations with a list of damaged properties, requesting compensation so that he can make a start to rebuild his life, but to no avail.

**Compensation of the damages of my property**

The following are items looted and damaged and the estimation per Rand value of my mini-shop from the [REDACTED]

No	DESCRIPTION	Amount / ZAR
01	Cigarettes	130,000
02	Hardware	120,000
03	Airtime and machines	30,000
04	Food stuff	100,000
05	Commercial fridges	40,000
06	Shelves, security gates, roller door	30,000
	<b>Total</b>	<b>450,000</b>

[REDACTED]

Cell. No: +27 [REDACTED] or +27 [REDACTED]

Source: Human Rights watch, 2020

In addition, Syed, a Bangladeshi shop owner, also witnessed mobs looting over 1,000 Bangladeshi shops. The police response was delayed, leaving shop owners vulnerable. Nathalie, on the other hand, a grade-10 student from the Democratic Republic of Congo, was beaten severely by fellow students due to Xenophobia, students who believed a non-national was undeserving of being elected to a position of class captain. Despite the unruly behaviour which led to her admission into a hospital where she spent nine (9) days, the Education authorities took no action and the perpetrators faced no penalties for attacking her (Human Rights Watch: 2020). Also, impact on Immigrant youth traders has been recorded by Makanishe, B.T. and Umubyeyi, B. (2023), where they revealed that up to 30% of Zimbabwean immigrants in South Africa were involved in informal trade, with 75% being youth aged under 35. Many of these traders were noted to have experienced xenophobic violence, looting, abuse and robbery.

With these kind of occurrences making the round, it is only natural that no one will want to be identified with any country with such reports. It is however, safe to say that violence is repellent of positive associations.

It is of general knowledge furthermore, that conflict, especially the violent ones never result in anything good. It often, results in high rate of uncertainty, extreme level of insecurity, stress, and grief in general. Rensburg, S.K (2024) for example, highlighted an important consequence of Xenophobia such that its magnitude in South Africa is preventing people from integrating properly and benefiting society. Thus, damaging both South Africa and those who migrate there. Concerning high rate of uncertainty and insecurity caused by Xenophobia, the data shows that xenophobic violence has caused significant emotional, mental, and psychosocial distress, along with profound impacts such as loss of lives, destruction of livelihoods, properties, and disruption of communities and the economy. It's essential to recognize that this violence has also adversely affected South Africans, their businesses, and the nation's economy. Violent conflict denotes the disruption of law and order; as a result, unhealthy rivalry and division and disunity ensue from it. This is why Justino (2010: 2) referred to violent conflict as considered one of the most important development challenges facing the world today. This is because when conflict prevails, everything is put on hold and when (or if) it ends, the ability to return to the pre-conflict stage slows down due to the havoc caused by such ugly occurrence. Xenophobia has been found to feature both in the form of interpersonal and structural violence, with the latter consisting of both social and economic marginalisation and exclusion. War, a type of conflict was referred to by Justino (2010: 2) where it was stated that the economic, political and social consequences of civil wars are

colossal. In addition, “war displaces population, destroys capital and infrastructure, disrupts schooling, damages the social fabric, endangers civil liberties, and creates health and famine crises” (Justino 2010: 2).

In line with this, Sempijja and Mongale (2022: 1-2) stated that xenophobic attacks have long existed in post-independence Africa, as presented for example, through the

- e. “expulsion of Ugandans of Asian origin from Uganda in 1972 by the Ugandan government under the presidency of Idi Amin which carried out xenophobic attacks against the Ugandan Asians.
- f. In the 1960s for instance, in November 1969, Ghana’s Prime Minister, Kofi Busia, presented the Aliens Compliance Order (known as the Aliens Order), through which Kofi Busia sought to expel undocumented aliens from Ghana (Adeola, 2015, p. 256 in Sempijja and Mongale (2022: 4).

In addition, identity conflicts have permeated most of Africa’s post-independence post-liberation experiences. Thus many African states have for the longest time remained prone to intra state violence, which has usually been on racial, ethnic, religious, language fault lines. In these instances, interpersonal relations are characterised as hatred, detest, mistrust and destruction of the other. Xenophobia, falls in this form of identity conflict, resulting in dire consequences for all parties, regardless of whether they are foreign nationals or South Africans.

Respondents in various categories have viewed the implications of Xenophobia. Some see it from the view of the intrapersonal, where it affects one’s emotional and mental health as well as the way they views themselves when they experience discrimination or attacked based on their nationality, whether real or perceived. Saleh (2015:299) states that intrapersonal conflict “may arise from the experienced stress of being in a new cultural environment and potential social stigmas levied upon the acculturating individual. Saleh (2015:299) further brings into context these intrapersonal contestations as the term foreigner ‘expresses cultural non-belonging and the idea of foreigners as foreign bodies’”. This already sets the tone of how foreigners perceive themselves and in times where they are attacked because of their identity, it can be argued that those feelings of self-inadequacy emerge more strongly. This could create feelings of shame about one’s identity and belonging and in the context of foreign policy, impacts an idea of an African Agenda and a united Africa.

The intrapersonal implications are evident in these two examples drawn from another study by Chigeza et al (2014) on African Migrants' Experiences of Xenophobic Violence in South Africa.

A Zimbabwean migrant said: I felt left out and lost. The interactions took place in the context of a team dinner; I went to a team dinner; the whites were speaking Afrikaans. When I moved to the blacks, they were also speaking in their language which I could not understand. All of them expected me to be able to speak in their language.

Another migrant from Zimbabwe expressed her emotional experience as follows; It was terrible. I was shocked. The inter-personal context in which the interactions with South African citizens took place was a shopping trip with her friends and her mother; One day we were shopping with my mother. We went into a shop and spoke our language (Shona). And you know what, the woman who is the owner threw us out of her shop, because we were Zimbabweans.

These accounts reflect the experiences of foreigners where the environment they exist has significant intrapersonal implications. These domestic events occurring in South Africa also show the lack of people diplomacy.

The implications on the interpersonal are also glaring and evident. This is why (Neocosmos, 2006: 1) noted that Xenophobia does not only manifest itself through the provocation of anti-foreigner language but actions that are highly hostile, exclusionary and violent against people perceived as 'foreign'. This also has significant impacts on South African citizens simply because "foreign status" is declared based on racist stereotypes, therefore suggesting that the issue is not only applicable to foreigners as it were but presents as a form of discrimination closely related to racism and liable to affect anyone or any group considered non-indigenous or non-autochthonous for whatever reason" (Mail and Guardian. 2000:309 in Neocosmos 2006: 1). The data also notes the fact that interpersonal relationships in South Africa are now composed of foreign nationals marrying South Africans and vice versa. This could significantly affect how they are treated because of their relationship choices. A study by Ettang and Tella (2022) on personal migrant relationships between Nigerians and their South African spouses presented the following findings:

The respondents cited some challenges that accompany being married to a Nigerian man. These include name-calling (such as paper wives and gold diggers). According to Respondent 1, South Africans often regard women in relationships with Nigerians as prostitutes, HIV positive women, and gold diggers that run after drug dealers.

Respondent 6 noted that women married to Nigerians suffered discrimination at the workplace. She said they are often overlooked for promotion and must endure comments like, 'So you are married

to a Nigerian, you want to bring corruption to work?’ Respondent 2 noted discrimination in social welfare such as Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) houses. Access to funeral and medical policies is also limited. She poignantly stated that they have become aliens in their own country. When Respondent 5’s father discovered that she was involved with a Nigerian, he remarked: “‘Why did you choose to be with this nation? Why did you choose a Nigerian man?’” and he was like, “do you know that this is the worst nation on earth?’”.

These sentiments are in line with the findings in the study by Chigeza et al (2014) that at the interpersonal level, migrants are ignored, they are excluded from interactions are seen as threats and are treated differently. These sentiments have also spread to South African spouses and children (Ettang and Tella, 2022). Both the interpersonal and intrapersonal implications are evident in the views by respondents on the impact of Xenophobia, including:

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|--|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. creating a sense of panic and fear</li> <li>b. uneasiness and vulnerability</li> <li>c. hostility, animosity and division between foreigners and South Africans, thereby defeating the goal of Ubuntu and Pan-Africanism and creating a scenario of “Us versus them”.</li> <li>d. destruction of lives and property</li> <li>e. fear of being exploited by security by paying ‘protection money’.</li> <li>f. depression and mental health issues among foreigners</li> <li>g. affects economic wellbeing of foreigners, especially on the family in the home country of the victim or deceased</li> <li>h. lead to foreigners organizing their resistance like a form of vigilante action to strike back</li> <li>i. possible decrease in migrants going to South Africa because of the possible</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>chance of themselves and their families being in danger.</li> <li>j. deprivation of certain rights or privileges</li> <li>k. negative effects on their livelihood in general</li> </ul> |
|--|--|

The real-life examples above support the finding that xenophobic violence and xenophobic sentiments have significant effects on both intrapersonal and interpersonal relationships. Drawing from the various views and opinions, one important fact is clear, that the presence and practice of Xenophobia is highly detrimental to every sector of the country. As a respondent puts it, it will spell doom to the country. The key identity groups here are foreign nationals and South African citizens thus it will have some implications for the foreign policy space. The spill-over effects in the foreign policy and relations sphere will be reflected in consequent sections.

### **7.2.2 South Africa's foreign policy and relations have experienced notable and significant challenges as a result of the effects of Xenophobia for 2008-2019**

Based on the data, South Africa's foreign policy covers its behaviour to other actors in the international community, and in the context of this study its fellow African countries. It also refers to its strategy in engaging other countries, a set of frameworks that shapes its response to its external environment, and a set of goals and outcomes that drive it. More importantly it has to do with foreign relations and the promotion and protection of its national interest. For example, one respondent noted that one of South Africa's interest is to create a peaceful and stable African continent, thus making it a priority. The views and ideas of foreign policy align with the definition by DIRCO (2019:13) that foreign policy is a "multidimensional set of policies, principles, strategies, objectives, and plans".

One thing this study has established is the fact that Xenophobia and everything about it brings about a negative connotation and has nothing good to offer. Rather, the negative effects of Xenophobia poses great loss to the economy of South Africa due to the destruction of human lives, property, tax-paying businesses and the loss of trust and social cohesion. Therefore, it is safe to say that a lot of challenges accompany Xenophobia in its various ways of manifestation.

From the data, respondent SAI3-P2 noted that in addition to the fact that Xenophobia is mostly situated in areas where poverty is prevalent, xenophobic violence robs foreigners of their employment status thereby increasing the unemployment rate and putting a strain on the economic structure of the country. According to the Mapungubwe Institute for Strategic

Reflection (MISTRA, 2014: 107), the constant attacks and never-ending tension between locals and foreign nationals greatly challenge social cohesion. As domestic developments are linked to foreign policy, thus the effects of Xenophobia are felt beyond the shores of South Africa and in its relations with other African countries. Invariably, this brings to light the fact that with the presence of Xenophobia, the ability to co-exist domestically and internationally faces a great challenge, leading to lack of trust and increasing levels of suspicion in the community.

For instance, internationally, the presence of Xenophobia has already tainted the values-based stance of South Africa and questioned its foreign policy focus on the respect of human rights. While its White Paper on Foreign Policy, “Building a Better World: the Diplomacy of Ubuntu”, relays the Republic’s interest in promoting and developing others positively and the idea of Ubuntu is pronounced and prioritised as a key principle in its foreign policy, this has not relayed in practice especially in the areas of human rights, human dignity and such.

Furthermore, one can argue that it is quite interesting that a country that promotes an African Agenda, a country which continues to engage with other African countries diplomatically through the signing of multiple cooperation agreements, has failed to protect and prevent Xenophobia on its shores. As noted by one of the respondents, South Africa’s presence and its influence in the United Nations Human Rights Council and other similar international entities presents a double-standard as it fails in the promotion and protection of the human rights of those within its borders, even including vulnerable groups like refugees and asylum seekers. Its reputation internationally therefore has faced some backlash because of this inaction. Hengari (2016:1), writes that “Xenophobia, which has become a near-permanent feature of its domestic political economy, is undermining the country’s leadership role. Notionally, Ubuntu as a central feature of the country’s foreign policy is ringing hollow”.

While focusing on the impacts of Xenophobia on South Africa and Nigeria relations, Ige (2018: 100) hinted that politically, the continuous wave of xenophobic attacks on Nigerians in South Africa:

“has a lot of impactful implications if the two governments fail to muster enough political will to deal with this unbecoming situation. It can mar the ties between both countries. In

diplomatic circles, once there is a severe row between countries the next option is recalling ambassadors and whenever there exist any breakdown of relationship between countries, it usually take time for such to be restored and taking into cognizance the position of Nigeria and South Africa in the African continent, it will be also to the detriment of the progress of other African countries. Xenophobic attacks in South Africa has received staunch criticism within and outside Africa, following the April 2015 xenophobic attack in South Africa, the United Nations Security Council was quick to condemn the attacks, as did her neighbours, Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Malawi, followed suite in denouncing and criticizing these acts (Claaassen, 2015 in Ige, K. M (2018: 101) ... The xenophobic attacks thus increased tensions between the two countries, as the Nigerian government felt the South African government was not doing enough to protect her citizens in South Africa, who she felt were the primary target of the attacks”.

On the implication of losing trust, Ige (2018) further highlighted in this regard, that another dimension to this is its prospect to arouse loss of African solidarity. According to him, it is a general attribute for Africans to regard each other as brothers and in so many circumstances speak with one voice in the international arena. Therefore, it is only logical to reason in the direction that a break in relationship between Nigeria and South Africa will lead to a divided Africa thereby limiting their chances in making wave in international politics (Ige, 2018: 101). One of the common threads amongst some of the respondents is that South Africa’s foreign policy and foreign relations could take a progressive hit in the future if there is no concerted effort to address Xenophobia. The responses, retaliation and fight back from other African countries might seem subtle or non-existent. Still, these exist through refusal of visas, attacks on South African businesses and xenophobic sentiments as well. These are explored in the next section.

Integral to foreign policy are the foreign policy actors who represent South Africa in one way or another. These include Presidents, Ministers, Deputy Ministers, and others who develop and implement foreign policy. Statements by key political actors have also shaped South Africa’s perception abroad and their actions can enhance South Africa’s foreign policy image abroad. For example, after the deadly xenophobic events of 2019 that resulted in the loss of lives and property of foreign nationals, President Cyril Ramaphosa sent an envoy led by former energy

Minister Jeff Radebe, Ambassador Kingsley Mamabolo, and Dr Khulu Mbatha to deliver solidarity messages to Heads of States. Their visits to Nigeria, Ghana, Senegal, Tanzania, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Zambia involved delivering messages on behalf of President Ramaphosa and to reassure them of South Africa's commitment to Pan African solidarity and unity. Also worth noting is that South Africa after the Washington District of Columbia in the United States has the world's largest diplomatic community, thus perhaps showing that it takes its foreign image and engagement with other countries very seriously.

### **7.2.3 The economic status and political relations of South Africa with other African countries record mostly negative effects as a result of re-occurring xenophobic violence.**

It is clear that domestic developments have significant implications on foreign relations and will impact every aspect of a state's engagement with state and non-state actors outside its borders. For this study, Xenophobia and xenophobic violence has affected South Africa's economic status and its economic and political relations with other African countries. This study systematically investigates the occurrence of anti-migrant xenophobia in African continent, with reference to its effects on foreign policy.

#### **Economic relations and economic status**

Firstly, reflections on South Africa's economic status and place as a favourable destination for foreign economic activity have been affected. An economy that is unfavourable to foreigners is one where their goods and businesses are looted and destroyed and where the policies and institutions frustrate and cripple because they are foreign-owned. This will hinder their desire to invest in the South African economy or set up a shop in the Republic. Moreover, Le Cordeur (2015) argues that the economy of South Africa has for many years benefited from foreign investments. Therefore, the outbreak of xenophobic violence seems to work against the economy of South Africa, which has attracted many foreign investors and has been a home away for many foreign nationals from Africa in particular and the world in general (Kinge, 2016: 51). The data also suggests that the idea of South Africa as a destination for investment

has been affected by the xenophobic attacks and an increased hesitation and fear to establish business relations with South Africa.

It was clear also from the data that South Africa's image as a favourite tourist destination and a space for Africans and others outside the continent to come and rest and relax has been hard-hit. These views are in line with the views below that:

*As indicated by the South African Trade and Industry Deputy Minister, Mzwandile Masina, South Africa has lost billions of Rands following an embargo on South African products as a result of the last wave of xenophobic attacks that ravaged the country. Nigeria recalled its envoys to South Africa. The tourism industry was negatively affected following the outbreak of the last wave of xenophobic attacks targeted at foreign nationals as many tourist visitors' trips to the country were cancelled and many foreign representatives on their part updated their travel advisories regarding the xenophobic attacks in South Africa. All these therefore worked against the economy of South Africa (Iruobe, 2015 in Kinge, 2016: 52).*

Other economic effects noted by respondents include the outflow of skilled Africans from South Africa, especially those who hold critical roles and positions in the economy. In addition, it has contributed to restricting South African businesses and citizens who want to conduct trade and commercial activity in other African countries. There was a personal account from one of the respondents who experienced retaliatory remarks as a citizen of South Africa in another African country in response to the xenophobic attacks in the Republic. Once again, Ige, (2018: 101), while considering the South Africa and Nigeria relations has this to say:

*"The economic impact of the recurring xenophobic attacks in South Africa on Nigerians is very enormous. Fundamentally, one of the principal reasons for xenophobic attacks in South Africa is tied to the economy i.e. foreigners and locals competing for scarce resources... While this argument appears correct, it is relatively weak as these people are doing genuine and legal businesses in South Africa. Equally, taking cognizance of the fact that South Africans are also doing businesses in other*

*African countries, it will be better imagined of there exist reprisal attacks on South Africans in residing and doing businesses in other African countries.*

Consequently, Ige (2018: 101) expressed that the Nigerian-South African Chamber of Commerce illustrated the potential impact on Africa's overall economy should this situation unfold. The chamber expressed concern that xenophobic violence in South Africa and reciprocal incidents in Nigeria, including direct assaults on foreign-owned businesses in both countries, threaten Africa's already fragile economic recovery and development. It is important to note that these attacks could lead to job losses, leaving victims vulnerable to exploitation by terrorist organizations and making worse existing security challenges in both nations and across Africa. Currently, high rates of unemployment among youths in Nigeria and South Africa contribute significantly to crime rates in these countries.

Regarding investment, Oyelana (2015 in Ige, 2018: 102) also reveals that more foreign investors have lost confidence in the police and the judiciary that fail to protect them. In this regard, the majority of foreign investors lack community security. As a result, foreign investors were faced with increased vulnerability to abuse, crime, and extortion by individuals and community leaders, as Charman et al. (2012) have shown. This situation compels foreign investors to rely almost entirely on authorized judicial institutions, hindered by a lack of trust in the police and courts exacerbated by cultural and language barriers. Charman et al. (2012) also found that police and prosecutor statements often focus on foreign investors. Regarding the lengthy judicial process and the victimization of foreign investors by crime, it is observed that prosecutors and police encounter difficulties in communicating with and keeping them engaged during court proceedings. Therefore, according to Charman and Piper (2012), the study revealed that foreign investors feared various forms of violence during xenophobic attacks, categorized by the South African Police Service (SAPS) as murder, attempted murder, robbery, theft, and assault (Ige, 2018: 103).

The economic strength of a country contributes as a source of power and places of relevance of such country in the international scene. Also, the economic development and stability of the country depends on the unity and harmony of all people, including foreigners and refugees

(Oyelana, 2016: 284). According to Ige (2018: 103), every country is fully aware of how powerful and potent investments are to their economies. Any country that fails to consider foreign investments as one or part of her economic growth and development priority is heading towards her economic collapse. On that basis, it has been observed that;

*“Some African countries such as Nigeria, Ghana and Zimbabwe have previously implemented xenophobic attacks and this reflected on their economies after sending foreign investors back to their countries. They regretted their actions and undiplomatic decisions taken against foreign nationals residing in their countries. In addition, the execution of impromptu xenophobic attacks by Nigerians, Ghanaians and Zimbabweans against foreign investors residing in their countries have, however, largely dissuaded many who may wish to invest in their economies (Atsenuwa and Adepoju, 2010; Posen and Ross, 2012). This incontrovertibly implies that xenophobic attacks negatively affect the countries” direct foreign investments.”* (Ige, 2018: 103).

In terms of the effects on business, quoting Tshishonga (2015: 165) (in Lekopo A.L (2019: 35), reports that previous outbreaks of xenophobic attacks on foreign nationals forced these foreigners to either go into hiding or leave their businesses completely unattended. In some cases, those who were incapable of going into hiding were reduced to spectators as they painfully watched their hard-earned properties being looted and burned down (Adeleke et al., 2008: 143). Their years of entrepreneurial or business endeavour were thus wrecked in a matter of hours or days (Mensah & Benedict, 2016: 76). In most cases, they are left to fend for themselves with no form of assistance from the government, even to the extent that re-establishing their businesses became a huge task leaving some with no option but to return to their countries of origin (Oyelana, 2016: 286). As noted by Lekopo A. L (2019: 37), There is a fear that xenophobic attacks might have adverse consequences on the country and may result in isolation from the African business sector and consequently, the rest of the world (Mudzanani, 2016:339). This might have tremendous effects on the South African community and the country.

As a result of Xenophobia, Joseph O. N. (2019: 25) stated that South Africa has lost its glory as the strongest economy in the continent. South Africa has its drawbacks especially in becoming the economic and political haven for non-South Africans faced by socio-economic and political hardships and oppression. Furthermore, another economic implication of xenophobic violence is South Africa is that available surplus finance by foreign borrowing which shows a cordial relationship among different citizens and governments of African countries and the world as a whole are lost and denied in the face of 'xenophobia'.

In essence, Xenophobia in South Africa has given rise to significant repercussions on its economic relations with other African countries. Among others, these repercussions are evidenced by ways of; Disruptions of Trade and Investment as countries reconsider doing business with a nations where the safety of their citizens are not guaranteed. Also, due to perceived risk of violence and uncertainty, foreign investors become even more cautious with dealings in South Africa; Reduced Tourism is seen as another evidence. As a vital economic sector, tourism suffers from xenophobic activities because tourists and potential tourists alike naturally become sceptical about visiting any country associated with violence against foreigners. In the same vein, Niyitunga, (2024: 7) argues that xenophobic attacks against foreigners and their businesses have affected immensely, the country's national economic growth in both short and longer term, and as a result, hindered the country's ambition of becoming a developmental state. And South Africa's failure to address issues relating to Xenophobia has a long-term impact on investment in the country. That means the persistence of xenophobia has affected the singular focus on economic growth as the prime directive of the economy and society (Bonga 2019: 14 in Niyitunga, 2024: 7).

### **Political relations**

Politically, South Africa's influence and position on the continent has some significant effects. The effects of Xenophobia can be seen in South Africa's political focus of an African Agenda in its foreign policy. Its efforts to focus on a Pan African unity and solidarity is under attack as this is contradictory to its efforts to managing and preventing Xenophobia. Some respondents

noted that this political status is also hampered by this idea of “hatred” of South Africa to those from other African countries. This has created tense relationships between South Africa and its fellow African governments. Furthermore, respondents noted that this could halt any future intentions of engaging with South Africa on various political matters. Xenophobia also, has a huge tendency of creating a loss of trust in the government of the day thereby, leading to political unrest as the people of South Africa may question the legitimacy of the government administration.

South Africa’s membership in organisations like the African Union, Southern African Development Community (SADC) has historically given it much weight politically. Its role in initiatives like the APRM and NEPAD and peacekeeping efforts on the continent are noteworthy. But is likely that continued xenophobic violence which continues to worsen with the rise of groups like Operation Dudula, will lead to its isolation in these spaces.

Politically, the never-ending wave of xenophobic attacks on black foreigners in South Africa has a lot of impactful implications if the governments fail to muster enough political will to deal with the situation. According to Ige (2018: 101), ties between the countries can be damaged. In diplomatic circles, the minute there is a severe row between countries the next option is recalling ambassadors. Whenever any relationship breakdown between countries exists, such usually takes time for such to be restored. To this end, Masiko-Mpaka, (2023) opined that when Xenophobia rears its ugly head, the aspiration for unity and progress (The African project) is tarnished.

This could be seen in 2015 when there was a form of tension on the diplomatic relations between South Africa and Nigeria which led the latter taking an action to recall its diplomat from Pretoria in 2015 (Adebisi, 2017: 89). Note however, that this was after the Femi Gbajabiamila-led Nigerian House of Representative’s Ad-Hoc Committee reprovved the South African leaders for the violent attacks on Nigerian citizens (Adebisi, 2017: 89). In addition to the just stated actions, there was a radical student movement known as the National Association of Nigerian Students (NANS). Members of this movement marched to and attacked the Mobile Telephone Network (MTN) offices in Abuja, Nigeria in 2015 (Afrika, 2017: 4). MTN is a

confirmed South African telecommunications enterprise that has been present and trading in Nigeria for some years. “South Africa is considered one of the most unequal countries in the world” (Heleta, S. 2019). It has been observed that a lot of South African citizens, live a life of poverty and lack. The level inequality and hardships the majority of South Africans go through bears its root in the country’s colonial and apartheid racist past, legacy, as well as the post-1994 failures to transform the economy and the society in general. Yet, by listening to many politicians, one gets the impression that all the immigrants are to blame.

This could be seen in 2015 when South African diplomatic relations with Nigeria came under strain while Nigeria recalled its diplomats from Pretoria in 2015 (Adebisi, 2017: 89). This was after the Nigerian House of Representative’s Ad-Hoc Committee led by Femi Gbajabamila reprimanded South African leaders for the attacks on their nationals (Adebisi, 2017: 89). In a society, however, where there is prevalence of violence against foreign nationals and xenophobic attitudes and feelings are common, Heleta, S. (2019), expressed that, irresponsible leaders continue to fabricate an atmosphere of crisis. Politicians stand on the claim that foreigners are swamping South Africa (Madia, 2018) and causing a decline in the country’s security, stability and prosperity. Yet, reports from the 2011 census, shows that South Africa isn’t overwhelmed with immigrants, with some 2.2-million international migrants (about 4% of the population) in the country in 2011. Statistics South Africa Community Survey 2016 also, puts the number of foreign born people at 1.6 million, out of the population of 55 million at the time. While there are several methodological issues with the Statistics South Africa Community Survey, Savo (2019) hinted that it would not be surprising if this figure is correct, especially as the Department of Home Affairs has deported close to 400 000 foreign nationals since 2012.

The people-to-people diplomacy has been significantly affected which from the data is an important element of diplomatic relations as a whole. So while one can argue that diplomatic relations between African countries and South Africa remain diplomatic, this is not the case amongst citizens of these countries as they face the brunt of the xenophobic attacks (not their embassies). South Africans in other countries have experienced xenophobic behaviour. It is clear that no country is an island and the actions in one country will impact other countries,

thus countries must be aware of their actions and domestic responses as these will shape how they are perceived and welcomed externally.

#### **7.2.4 Xenophobia can have significant implications on the future of South Africa's foreign policy and a successful foreign policy requires effective development and implementation by the state through adequate consultations and partnership with other stakeholders**

According to Madue (2015: 60), migration to South Africa has experienced significant change and greatly increased since 1994. There are perceptions among South Africans population that there are many illegal immigrants residing in the country. These perceptions and other unfounded myths, as well as the socioeconomic challenges faced by South Africans has however, been a major factor for xenophobic attacks on foreigners. Xenophobic attitudes have over time escalated into full on violence against foreigners with impunity. The idea of institutional Xenophobia is evident as various sectors like the police and Home Affairs have failed to protect or support foreigners. Instead, they have victimised and discriminated against them. According to Patel (2013), foreigners, especially black foreigners, have come to be perceived as “a direct threat to the future economic health of the country”.

Since independence and the new democratic dispensation, South Africa has rapidly become an important player globally and on the continent of Africa. It has grown to engage in global trade, and it holds much influence in various security, economic and political circles. While foreign engagement is beneficial to a state as it provides access to other markets, allows for the movement of ideas and people from one country to another and opens the space for the maximisation of trade and capital, it can be affected by internal insecurity, human rights abuses especially as it pertains to citizens of other countries. With the opening of borders in Africa and efforts toward a free trade area, the movement of skilled and unskilled people will continue. As intrastate armed conflicts break out, the movement of refugees and asylum seekers will continue to shape the landscape of the continent. Thus, foreign policy principles and goals need to factor these into account. In the same vein:

South Africa's foreign policy, hence, considers the ever-evolving global environment in which the country operates to respond effectively to domestic imperatives. Effective policy development is essential for the survival and prosperity of any country in the global system (South Africa, 2011: 7)

For the future, South Africa's foreign policy considerations and reflections should uphold its key principles and ideals which do not promote Xenophobia. Very importantly, South Africa's unique global-issue viewpoint is grounded in Ubuntu's ideas. Ubuntu, integral to South Africa's diplomatic approach and engagement, speaks of a better world for everyone. It is a principle that feeds into the idea of respect and value for all nations, human beings and cultures. It recognises that it is in "South Africa's national interest to promote and support the positive development of others". DIRCO, (2015: 148) reports that:

After 1994, inspired by the notion of Ubuntu, South Africa's foreign policy approach was characterised by cooperation, collaboration and the building of partnerships rather than conflict and competition. All departments representing South Africa internationally were transformed within the first decade of democracy. In the modern world of globalisation, a constant element must be our common humanity. South Africa therefore accords central importance to our immediate African neighbourhood and continent, working with countries of the South to address shared challenges of underdevelopment, promoting global equity and social justice. (DIRCO, 2015: 148).

As earlier discussed within the context of this study, most respondents agreed that the economic and political strength of any national economy is a paramount element in the development and sustainability of that country. The frequent occurrence of Xenophobia or any form of conflict surely leaves an effect on the economic and political sectors, as well as the general performance of the state. On the other hand, the domestic occurrences and over all situation of a country greatly affects and determines the international status as well as foreign policy and relations of the country with others in the international scene. To this effect, it is important that at the domestic level, states must ensure to work with non-state actors such as non-state organizations, academic institutions, political groups and even individuals to have a relatively solid ground upon which the foreign policy will be influenced and formulated.

In South Africa, this should be obtainable. Some non-state actors in Chapter Four of this study are noted that they are very relevant in foreign policy formulations of the country. Therefore, a few actors equipped with the capacity to influence public policies, including foreign policy and necessary for achieving such goals are briefly highlighted below:

**a. Public opinion**

Page & Shapiro (1983), postulated that “the responsiveness of government policies to citizens' preferences is a central concern... public opinion is often a proximate cause of policy, affecting policy more than policy influences opinion.” For better understanding, Giuliani, A. (2022) puts it this way;

When it comes to policy making, there is one crucial issue that must be tackled: responsiveness to public opinion. If governments and international forums like the G7 and G20 fail to acknowledge the preferences of the citizens they represent, policy solutions to pressing issues fall short of effectiveness and efficiency. This is because the positive outcomes of policy solutions are maximized only when these are in line with what citizens deem to be priorities. For example, policies aimed at protecting the environment became increasingly effective with the rise in environmental awareness of the last decades and the consequent change in the general public's perspective. Therefore, increasing the responsiveness of global governance forums to public opinion would lead to better policy alternatives and more effective and efficient solutions to tackle critical issues...

To this end, a vital thing to do by policymakers is that they should invest deliberately in education to ensure that South African citizens (as in this case) can participate and influence policy decisions more actively. When it comes to Xenophobia, it is important to note that South Africa's demographic landscape is evolving as South Africans marry foreigners and vice versa, and children with parents from both nationalities are born. They have become part of the public that should inform policy. There must be engagement with these groups to address xenophobic tensions and prevent its occurrences. There should be efforts to educate South Africans about the contribution of other African countries to the liberation struggle against apartheid and contemporary relations between South Africa and other African nations.

## **b. The media**

The media is a strong influence, whether positive or negative, especially as a core provider of information, awareness, and education. The media in its various forms (print, traditional, social, new media) are available 24/7 to all citizens and are important sources of information regarding domestic developments and Xenophobia.

New media sources have now moved into the realm of foreign policy, and they directly influence global relations now and in the future. In a bid to explore the relations between the Media and a state's foreign policy, Adan (2017: 9) noted that the "integrity of the American government suffered its biggest loss when the Pentagon Papers information was leaked to the public. The Pentagon Papers were published in the New York Times, the Washington Post, and other newspapers". The media therefore become a tool through which the state is informed on foreign affairs developments and can identify how to curb Xenophobia and xenophobic violence using the media. Seib (2008) writes that "satellite media and the Internet foster some sort of "virtual sovereignty" by cultivating a shared identity among disperse members of ethnic or religious communities". This is therefore relevant for foreign policy because "virtual states' (the media) can affect the stability of traditional states and regions. In addition, the media can also alleviate tensions and conflict by providing new perspectives to an unprecedentedly large audience" (Seib, 2008). The author therefore "recommends that, if policymakers want to take advantage of the media's power to create communities, cooperation is a better approach than competition. International media become relevant tools of foreign politics" (Seib, 2008 in Adan (2017: 10- 11).

## **c. Academic institutions**

As noted by a respondent, the academic environment is indispensable in foreign policy formulation. Also, diplomacy and international relations (IR) academics have contributed over the years to foreign policymaking. Peya Mushelenga (2018: 215) asserts that the contribution of Academics has been made through research and publications and by providing advisory services to policymakers. Moreover, other existing platforms for academics are platforms for debates on foreign policy and providing training to foreign policymakers alike. Academics are

also able to build a gap existing between themselves and foreign policy practitioners using writing positively about policies or adopt criticism towards policy and policymakers. In the same vein,

Coady (2012, p. 35) propounds that academics have contributed to foreign policy formulation on conflict prevention by developing perspectives, identifying causes of conflicts and measures to be adopted in conflict prevention and resolutions. Accordingly, policymakers have adopted policies based on these epistemic contributions. For example, the United Nations Office for Research and the Collection of Information have sought the inputs of academics, when it was developing the database of conflict resolution and putting in place the early warning system. The information provided serves as a valuable source of information for use and planning by UN structures, especially the UN High Commission for Refugees (Coady, 2012, p. 35 in Mushelenga P., 2018: 217)

In addition, De Spiegeleire and Joenniemi (2011: 7) in their analysis of foreign policy, state that academics focus on four areas, namely, speculating the results of a specific foreign policy; analysing and seeking a better understanding of current trends in foreign policy; providing advice on the best foreign policy options; and appraising past developments in a foreign policy. Hence, their importance in the society and a country generally.

### **7.3. Limitations of the Study**

A major limitation of this study was the unavailability of some intended respondents to participate even though they were informed in advance and had agreed to the interview. Appointments with some respondents were rescheduled several times and eventually did not occur. In some cases, appointments had to be rescheduled numerous times due to unexpected developments. While some were sceptical about being part of it, others bluntly and without hesitation, declined while others completely ignored my request. There was a high record of resistance because, as a foreigner, interviewing a citizen about a behaviour that's not palatable in its own is challenging hence, not everyone contacted was interested in availing themselves for the interview session. Also, some organizations only availed one person for the interview

as against two hence, the intended number of respondents was affected. The researcher, therefore, could only engage with personnel that made themselves available for the interview.

In addition, due to the interview carried out online via the use of Zoom and WhatsApp, some challenges were faced with regards to irregular internet network thereby making it difficult to carry out a smooth interview session and in some cases the frequent load shedding led to multiple rescheduling of some others.

#### **7.4 Conclusion**

The study has shown that conflict in its entirety never leads to a happy ending. Xenophobia also is not an event to be made light of because not only are there effects for the foreign national (which is originally the expectation), it also affects South Africa, the sending states, as well as the families of the victims. In addition, the economy of South Africa is affected significantly by xenophobic practices, and it is believed that South Africans are Africans by name but not Africans by nature. Hence, the absence of oneness is prevalent and the notion of ‘them versus us’ seems to be the order of the day. In a video on YouTube, the youtuber who is South African mentioned that having experienced the way of life in another African country, she has now confirmed that South Africans are not their ‘brothers’ keeper’. According to her, South Africans rather accept other foreigners as brothers and see African foreigners as strangers. The reverse according to her, is the case in the African country she now lives in because, they treat fellow Africans despite the country they are from, as brothers compared to their treatment of those from non-African nations.

Therefore, this study raises the importance of adequate education of people and creating awareness to South Africans and non-South Africans alike on the relevance of treating fellow humans as they are as well as awareness on the setback it brings when hatred and fear rule their minds and consequently, their behaviour.

## **CHAPTER EIGHT**

### **SUMMARY, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION**

#### **8.1 Introduction**

Before concluding this study, a summary and recommendations are provided below. This provides notable and significant points for action by the South African government and institutions as it continues to adequately implement her foreign policy efforts in the short, medium and long term. These will contribute to the success of its foreign policy and improve its economic and political status with other African countries while improving their relationships.

#### **8.2 Summary**

This study has explored the political and economic effects of Xenophobia on South Africa's Foreign Policy toward other African countries from 2008 to 2019 where it found out that Xenophobia in South Africa is not limited to just dislike or fear of foreigners but includes and translates into violence by South Africans towards immigrants. This shows that Xenophobia goes beyond simply putting up xenophobic attitude or mindedness but includes mostly gruesome behaviour. Various factors account for the rise in Xenophobia and the dislike of foreigners, all of which are caused by foreign nationals. These include: lack of access to resources provided by the state, unemployment, high rates of crime, poverty and inequality. All these factors align with most respondents' views on the triggers of such hatred towards foreigners. Some respondents further stated these real or perceived threats as unfair because no human deserves such treatment no matter the circumstance.

To further understand the rationale behind such feelings toward foreign nationals in South Africa, realism, the securitization theory and relative deprivation theory were portrayed as relevant theories to aid such understanding. Securitization emerged in understanding how key political stakeholders shape how their public view certain issues, in this case foreign nationals. In this instance, they have used their positions to propagate and fuel these anti-foreigner

sentiments such that they become the truth for some. Foreigners are treated through the lens of security and not human rights and dignity. Realism sheds light on the state's role in protecting its interests, which feeds into domestic priorities and vice versa. Relative deprivation theory is important in explaining why structural challenges and the failure of the state to meet various needs over time, leads to an attack and blame on other identity groups. Considering all these events and their practices in South Africa, realism, securitization and relative deprivation theories were deemed most adequate. Furthermore, findings suggest that the influence of Xenophobia on South Africa's foreign policy is seen in areas revolving around political decisions, public sentiments, and international relations, which are evident, for instance, in visa policies, trade agreements and diplomatic relations.

South Africa's visa policies over time have been influenced by concerns in relation to immigration and Xenophobia. Evidently, decisions regarding visa requirements, visa extensions, and refugee status influence the country's relations with other nations in general and African nations in particular. In the area of trade agreements, countries, when negotiating trade deals and economic partnerships, may consider the treatment of their citizens in South Africa. Therefore, the way South Africa addresses Xenophobia plays a significant role in inter-trade relations and, consequently, diplomatic relations. Worthy of note, however, is that adequately addressing Xenophobia and promoting inclusivity are vital steps in shaping a more practical foreign policy.

### **8.3 Recommendations**

*“Dealing with xenophobic attacks entails dealing with the causes of the problem.” (Matunhu nd: 102).*

The findings from this study constitutes a basis for several recommendations. The need for recommendations in this study is solely to give clear, realistic suggestions or guidance to governments, state and non-state actors, stakeholders, policy makers, reviewers and practitioners as well as academic researchers for future actions based on the findings of this study. In addition, recommendations such as these aid decision making and serve as call to

action for further research in the subject area. Therefore, based on findings, this study proposes the following recommendations. It is often believed that labelling a problem thoroughly, is a crucial step in finding effective solutions (Murphy M.D: 2016). It may not be easy to eradicate Xenophobia because human nature drives some of these reactions and that some benefit from insecurity and xenophobic violence (looters, bribery). As discussed in previous sections, identity dynamics in a context of an “us-versus-them” society and a government that is failing will cause various reactions like nationalism, racism, Xenophobia among others. Also, it must be acknowledged that anti-immigrant policies and violence will not resolve any of the various problems South Africa is currently facing. However, the measures put forward in this paper could be useful in transforming mind-sets and building more positive relations between foreign Africans from Xenophobia to comradeship or partnership, which will make the attacks eventually progress to a halt.

### **8.3.1 Government**

Being the major stake holder and decision making body, it is crucial that bulk of responsibilities towards curtailing any act that has the tendency of tarnishing the country’s image is channelled and expected from the government of the day. On this premise however, a few actions, based on the study have been identified and therefore, recommended.

#### **8.3.1.1 Prompt and adequate response**

The importance of prompt response to conflict situations cannot be offer emphasized ad it brings to mind the saying that ‘a stitch in time saves nine’. Meaning, a timely response or intervention when the issue is little, saves you from doing nine times the work if you let it linger. This study finds that there was an acknowledgement by government officials on failure to prevent the xenophobic violence outbreak in September 2019. Most respondents also hold this belief and expressed that government officials are barely held accountable for such failure. This prompted a respondent's recommendation on having a prompt response from the government and its institutions on matters like this. Based on the respondent’s personal experience, if prompt actions are taken in crisis events, especially those with xenophobic connotations, these institutions will earn more confidence and the feeling of safety will increase

also. In addition, emphasis must be placed on the need for the Minister of Police and the South African Police Service (SAPS) to reinforce front-line supervision and officer accountability mechanisms to improve public ordering policing. By so doing, excessive and disproportionate use of force by law enforcement officials especially in the context of public protests in the country is monitored and if done effectively, halted.

Furthermore, the study uncovered that culprits who participate in these acts of xenophobic attacks and violence have without a doubt contributed either directly or indirectly to the downfall of the economic development of South Africa. This further shows the importance of the government to take matters more seriously and nip the issue of xenophobic violence in the bud because the repercussion of such acts are not pleasant but mostly gruesome and generally detrimental.

In addition, South Africa, beyond its national economic interests, should take a more active part in the continental economic integration project and contribute to transforming global power relations. In this regard, there is a necessity to rethink the approaches to peace and security in addition to the limitations of the tools developed to manage conflicts, as well as how to amplify these, so that it is possible to achieve sustainable peace.

### **8.3.1.2 Acknowledge the presence of Xenophobia and xenophobic activities**

There have been findings that the government of South Africa is operating in denial on the presence and practice of Xenophobia in the country. Also, the government's official response to Xenophobia and other related violence has been characterized over time by a lack of sustained political will, denialism, and impunity for all actors involved. It is often said that admitting a problem is the first step to finding solutions to it. So, there is no need to run away from the truth and reality of the presence of Xenophobia in the country.

On this note, it is recommended that the government avoids moving in circles when it comes to matters of xenophobia and xenophobic activities in the country. Acknowledging the presence of Xenophobia is a major step in working out possible means to curtail it.

### **8.3.1.3 Identification and assessment of risks**

South Africa's National Interest is directed at achieving its national vision, but its local, regional and global context, both historical and current, points to its interests in certain risks and constraints associated with implementation of the National Interest that need mitigation.

These indices include:

- poverty, inequality and unemployment (especially youth)
- lawlessness, disregard for authority of the State and lack of accountability
- high levels of corruption and transnational organised crime
- poor service delivery (collapse of local government structures)
- uncontrolled migration and urbanisation
- poor economic growth and high debt levels
- climate change, natural disasters, environmental challenges and infectious diseases
- loss of natural heritage (poaching, unregulated trade)
- unreliable and insufficient energy and water security
- non-alignment of education, training and skills
- continued disinvestment in research and development
- lack of universal access to digital infrastructure and services
- increased narrow nationalism, protectionism and unilateralism
- delays in resolving land reform and redistribution
- regional instability, terrorism and extremism.

In addition, there needs to be continued focus by the government on domestic human rights challenges, particularly with violence, crime, and Xenophobia. It must also continue to consider its regional, continental and global commitments with Southern African Development Community (SADC), the African Union (AU), the United Nations (UN), and other international frameworks to more promote human security nationally and externally.

#### **8.3.1.4 Find African solutions to African problem**

Every problem is peculiar to the environment and/or situation where it sprang from, and so is the solution to the said problem. Based on this notion, and as a result of the interviews, this recommendation of finding African solutions to African problems was identified. This recommendation is considered to resonate equally among the South African government and civil society on the continent. This recommendation is as a result of this study, deemed important across all sectors especially in achieving the goal of building African resilience and Africa's capacity to respond to its internal challenges like migration-induced insecurity, developmental challenges and infrastructural gaps. Once again, a popular saying goes, 'only the person who wears the shoes know where it pinches'. Therefore, external or foreign solutions are not necessarily considered sustainable in Africa because, finding African solution(s) to African problem(s) simply ensures that you naturally would want to see it through and ensure its success when a solution is formed by yourself (Africa in this case). In essence, Africans would not own those solutions.

Some respondents emphasized the importance of introspection in addressing issues like xenophobia, highlighting Africa's unique circumstances. Therefore, it is suggested that the government takes into account these unique characteristics when identifying strategies to effectively address these issues, particularly in South Africa. In a nutshell, the notion of "African solutions to African problems" indicates that this is the time for Africans to take things into their own hands and use their resources to solve Africa's troubles.

#### **8.3.1.5 Sensitize the South African public**

The point of public sensitization cannot be over emphasized because adequate education and information is of great importance. The focus here is both on South African citizens as well as on migrants. Findings on this study present that civil society organizations have played a part and have responded in various ways to xenophobic violence since 2008. They have played a number of roles including offering humanitarian assistance to victims and putting in place preventative programmes through building social cohesion but social and institutional Xenophobia and its different manifestations persist regardless.

Therefore, it is important that prompt and adequate responses by the government should be prioritized because where there is peace, improvements and development can be achieved. Majority of respondents were of the view that history is gradually fading away in the sense that roles played by other African nations especially towards South Africa's gaining independence is not being spoken of anymore, and that is meant to be a strong point in teaching the oneness and brotherhood of Africans. This means that xenophobes are not well knowledgeable about the people they hate, and because they lack the know-how to deal with such people, they have a tendency to perceive them as threats.

In this regard, respondents made suggestions regarding bringing back history, educating the people and disseminating key information that will change or reform violent attitudes towards foreigners. Also, political education among locals on pan Africanism should not be taken lightly and must be taught at early age. The government can be prompt in handling this through channels they can understand for example through the media, in schools, through social initiatives and policies. In addition, spaces of dialogue and interaction should be provided to aid integration. The civil society however, should further enhance education of the masses and prompt their awareness that no country is an island and the need to accept others because according to a respondent, we need each other and no one can make it on their own.

Furthermore, there is need for the citizens of South Africa to be properly exposed. A respondent noted that lack of exposure contributes to the xenophobic violence in the country. This recommendation is geared toward the government to create avenues and encourage their citizens to travel out of the country and learn the way of life of other countries. Still on sensitizing the public, this study considers another lesson to be taught. This lesson however, revolves around the importance of respect on both sides – citizens and foreigners. On one hand, the locals should be taught the importance of respecting individual and human rights and Foreigners or migrants on the other hand must be aware that there are rules and laws guiding any host country and it is expected of them to respect and abide by those laws so as not to be caught up wrongly.

## **Academia**

Another way people can be informed rightly is by publications, thereby harnessing the power of academics where such information are embedded in books, articles, journals, research papers, and so on. So, the education system in both South Africa and the sending nations should be shaped such that people's value system are reshaped and tolerance of human dignity, cultural diversity and empathy for each other regardless of origin, colour, etc. are taught. Schools and institutions alike have proven to be great avenues for proper education on the need and relevance of peaceful co-existence and development at large.

### **8.3.1.6 Availing Sufficient opportunities**

When the environment is right and conducive without limit or constraint, there is a higher tendency for the full capacity of resources to be harnessed and utilized for the collective advantage of such environment and people in it. For this reason, some respondents advocated that the South African government gives people opportunity and the enabling environment to make money for the country's economy to gain stability and sustainability. Therefore, having "the rights of all citizens gallantly and courteously well established in the country..." should not only be on paper (as a respondent suggested) but should be implemented without compromise.

In addition, it is recommended that the South African government create a favourable environment for foreign businesses across the continent, to build continental economic resilience and intra-continental trade. This will further improve economic relations with its fellow African governments and enhance its economic status significantly.

## **Address Unemployment**

It is important that citizens are granted access to jobs. Poverty, based on findings, generates a state of instability and uncertainty in a person's state of mind. It is this instability and persistent lack with no view of permanent relief that propels individuals to take part in xenophobic attacks

and the looting of shops. The lack and absence of income is the major cause of poverty among young people.

Another major point of reference as to what triggers xenophobic violence is the perception that foreigners are taking over available jobs, leading to high levels of unemployment and consequently, a form of competition between them and the locals. On this basis, it is recommended that the government safeguards its economic progress and growth targeted towards reducing unemployment. Although, priorities are given to locals in the areas of employment, funding, and so on, the fact that there are areas or skills foreign nationals possess that citizens do not, should not be ignored. This also boils back to civil society's sensitisation and education on accepting foreign nationals, especially because they are there to also contribute to the wellbeing and development of the country at large by putting their skills to use where given the opportunity.

#### **8.3.1.7 Improvement on service delivery**

Some respondents believe that enhancing access to utilities and improving service delivery in general is crucial. They attribute poor service delivery, among other factors, as contributing to xenophobic violence in South Africa. Therefore, to mitigate and prevent future occurrences, it is a necessity to address and enhance these areas.

#### **8.3.1.8 Create quotas for foreigners**

There has been concerns and claims about strain on resources generally due to the presence of foreigners in the Republic. To address this issue and based on findings, this paper posits that due and adequate budget systems and preparedness should be set up to give room for as well as accommodate several migrants so as not to be overwhelmed and strained by their presence as it relates to the need for some of the resources and services offered by those foreign nationals. On the other hand, according to a respondent, the financial budget is always declining while immigrants keep increasing. And as a result, the pressure on all resources and sectors becomes

increasingly higher, putting a strain on the overall livelihood of the country. Therefore, everything should be balanced as “our government is also failing us”.

That way, it is important that the government official who will oversee setting up quotas in specific sectors, however, will consider the skills availability among locals when deciding these specific quotas to ensure that jobs are not taken away from South Africans. With the help of these institutes, it is important to know that peaceful coexistence is paramount. Therefore, in a bid to promote national unity, equality, establish and protect human rights in South Africa, adequate delegation of resources are recommended to serve the people at large.

#### **8.3.1.9 Inclusive Society**

A respondent declared that the African Centre for Migration and Society (ACMS) is currently trying to push civil society organizations and political organizations to not just look into foreigner issues (although it is originally their mandate). But, if they want to resolve the matter of Xenophobia, they must consider an inclusive society for women, migrants, children, etc. It is believed that this strategy may help in resolving the issues for both South African citizens and foreign nationals while bringing all into the plan. From interviews conducted, this study gathers that the fact remains that South Africans also have real pressing issue and these foreigners are living with and among them. On this note, it is suggested that the strategy of making South Africa inclusive for everyone might be the key to mitigating such conflict both by the government and civil society.

#### **8.3.2 Law enforcement**

The Law enforcement agencies in any given country is vested with the power to ensure law and order are kept. As a result, people (citizens and foreigners alike) are to feel safe around law enforcement agencies and personnel. To this end, the study recommends the law enforcement should;

### **8.3.2.1 Strengthen border controls**

From the responses, a common perception is that the borders and points of entry into the country have become porous overtime. This is hung on the rope of corruption and lack of diligence by the officials responsible for the legal admission of foreigners. To this end, it is recommended that the issue of border control must be handled with utmost priority. The borders must be decent and in good state and entries must be adequately monitored. At the launch of the Border Management Authority (BMA) in Limpopo, South African President Cyril Ramaphosa identified some challenges faced at the borders which included the increase of undocumented foreign national entering the country among others, making it crucial to address securing the border because a more secure border is important for lessening illegal migration, human smuggling and trafficking and will help in fighting cross-border crimes.

It's worth highlighting that while border control and security receive more investment and resources, it's equally crucial to ensure that officials receive proper training. They need to understand the importance of avoiding statements that could incite violence or create resentment by and among foreigners

### **8.3.2.2 Take necessary action(s)**

Law enforcement agencies like the SAPS must enforce laws that will not tolerate crimes relating to Xenophobia and xenophobic attitude of any sort from any channel and at various levels of securities. And leaders also, who indulge this behaviour of instigating xenophobic sentiments must be called to order (in reality and not just on paper) and held (even more) responsible. This way, the rule of law is applied strictly and culture of impunity is nipped in the bud. As a respondent clearly stated, "We need to see more action around protecting other nationals". This gives an impression that when people are made to face the consequences of their actions, it builds confidence towards the law enforcement agencies and parastatals. In addition, relevance should be placed on tightening up the justice system of South Africa and making clear, the position regarding violence and xenophobia.

### **8.3.3 The Department of Home Affairs**

Based on the study, it was found out that the law enforcement agencies have overtime, pressured foreigners by questioning the authenticity of their documents and permits. It should be noted that the Department of Home affairs is responsible for issuing permits to foreign nationals. Being a key enabler of republic's national security, citizen empowerment, efficient administration and socioeconomic development, it is therefore, recommended that officials be held accountable and if the need arises, punished for crimes relating to issuing illegal documents. It is also important that migrants are ensured to be regularized on time in order to alleviate some pressure on concerned migrants.

Another important thing is that the department must ensure adequate and effective communication channels between it and the Police. Some respondents view this as lacking due to experiences of being help up for not having proper documentation, despite proof of application for a renewal. Therefore, it is crucial that these departments work closely in this regard.

### **8.3.4 Foreign Embassies and Consulates**

Embassies also have a role to play in this regard. The purpose of embassies is to serve as a safe haven for their citizens in diaspora. Therefore, these Embassies must strive to gain the confidence of their citizens. So that in situations like conflict or the like, these citizens are consoled by the fact that they will not bear the grunt alone and will be supported. Furthermore, the concept of citizen diplomacy comes into play when the protection of citizens is held in high esteem, with citizens placed at the centre of the governmental policies of the sending state, which in turn guides treaties and bilateral agreements. In addition, this (South Africa's) system must show that other countries that treat their citizens well should be rewarded in areas of strengthening relations among them.

In contrast, countries that do not value their citizens or treat them unfairly must face the consequences, which could be by ways of cutting ties with them. Embassies must be citizen-oriented, and relations between States should be guided by how each sending State's citizens are treated in and by the receiving States. In addition, Embassies must encourage right and

legal processes and conduct by their foreign nationals in any country, particularly South Africa (as per this study), as this will greatly influence the impact on xenophobic activities. It is important to be on the right side of the law to avoid such claims that foreigners are responsible for spearheading criminal activities and being corrupt. In this regards, foreign embassies must ensure that their citizens are aware of the laws of the land (receiving country), so as not to be caught in the web of ignorance of the law.

### **8.3.5 Responsibility of Migrants**

On the part of migrants however, there is already a notion as a respondent indicated that they see South Africa as a 'cash cow'. This means they only come in to the country with the intention and mind of just working and making a living without acknowledging the need to integrate. Therefore, it is recommended that foreigners or migrants should make deliberate efforts to learn the local languages. In addition, migrants generally, must be aware of the rules and laws guiding the country and act accordingly. It is worth noting however, that the government of South Africa has a major role to play in encouraging the integration of foreign nationals into activities of black communities so that locals are exposed to the worth of these black African nationals in their communities.

### **8.4 Areas for future research**

A few key areas for future research emerge from this study. The first is to explore the misconceptions and instigating factors of Xenophobia. This is linked to an assumption that the attacks on foreigners are incidents of criminality and not Xenophobia. This practice of denialism and ignoring the existence of Xenophobia is problematic as it will hamper any efforts at addressing Xenophobia in all its forms be it systemic, interpersonal or institutional. Secondly, future research can examine how xenophobic incidences can be better considered and reflected in South Africa's foreign policy pillars and principles. Third, is the need to view Xenophobia within Global and Regional Context in that, a deeper analysis of how xenophobia impacts South Africa's regional and global diplomatic relations, trade, and security cooperation

could provide a broader view to the subject matter. Currently these are distinct areas and Xenophobia does not feature in South Africa's foreign policy principles and foreign relations. In many instances, it is mentioned when there are violent incidents and in an ad-hoc manner. Developing a foreign policy that is Xenophobia-sensitive is important for South Africa because without doing so will continue to put its reputation at risk and it could have serious ramifications for its influence and acceptance on the continent. This cannot happen if denialism continues to occur.

## **8.5 Conclusion**

All human societies, both at the local community level and other subnational and national levels, require shared values, norms, visions and goals to secure co-operation and foster bonds of belonging. The foundation of social solidarity is the interconnectedness based on valuing and respecting all human beings despite their origin, race, and culture and so on. This idea guides this study because of the general knowledge of the need to co-exist peacefully in an environment – local and international.

Xenophobia in South Africa, is not limited to just fear or dislike of foreigners but translates into violence which indicates that this issue goes beyond just a mind-set to actions. Moreover, as it is with small scale conflict (for instance in the family setting), so is it in the large-scale setting (like a state) – they both are left with repercussions, consequences and effects which are felt by all parties involved. The uniqueness of Xenophobia in South Africa has however, resulted to it being labelled as 'targeted Xenophobia' and this is owing to its nature of presenting not less than three characteristics which most likely differentiates it from other forms of Xenophobia in other countries and continents.

On the other hand, foreign policy is a vital component of a country's ability to relate in the international system as it is seen as a tool of diplomacy. It involves general strategies put in place to aid, guide and enhance a sustainable relationship between various countries in the international system and are primarily set to achieve some aims and objectives, also referred to as the country's 'National Interest'. therefore, It should be considered that a country's approach to and execution of its foreign policy must be based on an understanding of the domestic,

regional and global political and economic realities and South Africa is not exempt. The political and economic environment consist of all laws, government agencies, and lobbying groups that possess the power to impact or restrict individuals or organisations in the society.

While focusing mainly on exploring the political and economic effects of Xenophobia on South Africa's Foreign Policy in relation to other African countries between the years of 2008 – 2019, questions were asked revolving around how Xenophobia has affected the country's foreign policy, political and economic relationships with its African counterparts and what the future possibly holds for South Africa's foreign policy should xenophobic occurrences linger.

And this study made some findings and among them is the fact that Xenophobia is not a phenomenon to be taken lightly because its effects are mostly gruesome as every sector in the country gets hit by it, as the Xenowatch Quinquennial Report (2021) and Kinge (2016) noted. Even though, it was observed that the South African government operates in denial of the practice of Xenophobia (Crush & Ramachandran: 2009) and that sometimes, the leaders incite xenophobic behaviour by making statements and gestures in that line, this study noted that putting an end to Xenophobia is a collective effort and must not be left to the South African government alone. This way, even sending countries must work on their internal policies and welfare to reduce the rate people leave in search of 'greener pastures'. As a result, this study looks at and emphasises the importance of peaceful co-existence in a country's domestic and international affairs. But in all, Africa cannot keep doing the same things it has done for the last twenty (20) years and hope to get a different result. Do see something new, something new needs to be done therefore, new thinking is necessary.

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# Appendices

## Appendix A: Ethical Clearance



06 December 2022

Precious Ekhobhanye Owoha (219080916)  
School of Social Sciences  
Pietermaritzburg Campus

Dear PE Owoha,

**Protocol reference number:** HSSREC/00004674/2022

**Project title:** Exploring the political and economic effects of xenophobia on South Africa's foreign policy toward other African countries: 2008 – 2019

**Degree:** PhD

### Approval Notification – Expedited Application

This letter serves to notify you that your application received on 04 August 2022 in connection with the above, was reviewed by the Humanities and Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee (HSSREC) and the protocol has been granted **FULL APPROVAL** on the following condition:

**Condition:** Data collection can only take place at research sites where gatekeeper permissions were granted.

**Any alteration/s to the approved research protocol i.e. Questionnaire/Interview Schedule, Informed Consent Form, Title of the Project, Location of the Study, Research Approach and Methods must be reviewed and approved through the amendment/modification prior to its implementation. In case you have further queries, please quote the above reference number. PLEASE NOTE: Research data should be securely stored in the discipline/department for a period of 5 years.**

This approval is valid until 06 December 2023.

To ensure uninterrupted approval of this study beyond the approval expiry date, a progress report must be submitted to the Research Office on the appropriate form 2 - 3 months before the expiry date. A close-out report to be submitted when study is finished.

HSSREC is registered with the South African National Research Ethics Council (REC-040414-040).

Yours sincerely,



Professor Dipane Hlalele (Chair)

/ms

### Humanities and Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee

Postal Address: Private Bag X54001, Durban, 4000, South Africa

Telephone: +27 (0)31 260 8350/4557/3587 Email: hssrec@ukzn.ac.za Website: <http://research.ukzn.ac.za/Research-Ethics>

Founding Campuses: Edgewood Howard College Medical School Pietermaritzburg Westville

INSPIRING GREATNESS

## Appendix B: Interview Guide

It has been observed the economic and political status of a country is highly significant to her wellbeing but can be affected in a situation where conflict is present, especially when it takes a form of hatred towards a particular sect. In the same way, economic and political development among countries has affected relationships and that has steered a new era in which others nations feel that they are better off than others. This mind-set of betterment has resulted in hatred among nations in the same country and from different nations. This is the case in South Africa as it has resulted in violent confrontations of African foreigners amongst others, leading to destructions of lives and properties. Based on this;

1. What is your take on Xenophobia as it relates to foreign nationals in South Africa?  
.....  
.....  
.....
2. From your point of view, do you think foreigners have a hand or deserve to be treated in such manner? .....
3. If yes, give reasons.....  
.....  
.....
4. What are the possible effects of Xenophobia on foreign nationals in South Africa?  
.....  
.....  
.....
5. What do you understand about foreign policy?  
.....  
.....

.....  
.....  
6. Do you think South Africa should be commended with upholding its foreign policy objectives as it relates to foreign nationals?

.....  
.....  
.....

7. How has Xenophobia affected South Africa's foreign policy economically?

.....  
.....  
.....

8. How has Xenophobia affected South Africa's foreign policy politically?

.....  
.....  
.....

9. What will you posit as the effects of Xenophobia on South Africa's political relationship with other African countries?

.....  
.....  
.....

10. What are the consequences of Xenophobia on South Africa's economical relationship with other African countries?

.....  
.....  
.....

11. What would be at stake if Xenophobia lingers; both domestically and internationally?

.....  
.....  
.....

12. In your opinion, how will South African policy be shaped with the presence of Xenophobia?

.....  
.....  
.....

13. In your opinion, how can there be peaceful coexistence among citizens and foreigners in South Africa?

.....  
.....  
.....

14. What other strategies do you recommend to prevent and/or curtail crisis-ridden and xenophobic mindedness towards foreign nationals?

.....  
.....  
.....

## Appendix C: Informed Consent and Declaration from Participants

Dear Participant,

My name is Precious Owoha (219080916). I am a PhD candidate studying at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, Howard College / Pietermaritzburg Campus. The title of my research is: Exploring the political and economic effects of Xenophobia on South Africa's Foreign Policy toward other African countries: 2008 – 2019.

The aim of the study is to (explore the political and economic implications of Xenophobia on South Africa's foreign policy toward other African countries while making reference to attacks between the period of 2008 and 2019). I am interested in interviewing you so as to share your experiences and observations on the subject matter.

Please note that:

- The information that you provide will be used for scholarly research only.
- Your participation is entirely voluntary. You have a choice to participate, not to participate or stop participating in the research. You will not be penalized for taking such an action.
- Your views in this interview will be presented anonymously. Neither your name nor identity will be disclosed in any form in the study.
- The interview will take about (*45 minutes*).
- The record as well as other items associated with the interview will be held in a password-protected file accessible only to myself and my supervisors. After a period of 5 years, in line with the rules of the university, it will be disposed by shredding and burning.
- If you agree to participate please sign the declaration attached to this statement (a separate sheet will be provided for signatures)

I can be contacted at: School of Social Sciences, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg Campus, Scottsville, Pietermaritzburg, Durban.

Email: [REDACTED]

My supervisor is Dr. Dorcas Ettang who is located at the School of Social Sciences, Pietermaritzburg Campus / Howard College Campus, Durban of the University of KwaZulu-Natal. **Contact details:** email: [Ettang@ukzn.ac.za](mailto:Ettang@ukzn.ac.za). Phone number: +27312605283

The Humanities and Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee contact details are as follows:  
Email: [HSSREC@ukzn.ac.za](mailto:HSSREC@ukzn.ac.za), Phone number (+27) 031 260 3587/4557/8350

Thank you for your contribution to this research.

## DECLARATION

I..... *(full names of participant)* hereby confirm that I understand the contents of this document and the nature of the research project, and I consent to participating in the research project.

I understand that I am at liberty to withdraw from the project at any time, should I so desire. I understand the intention of the research. I hereby agree to participate.

I consent / do not consent to have this interview recorded (if applicable)

SIGNATURE OF PARTICIPANT

DATE

.....

.....

## Appendix D: Gatekeeper's Letter

Dear \_\_\_\_\_

My name is Precious Owoha (219080916). I am a PhD candidate studying at the University of KwaZulu, Pietermaritzburg Campus. I would like to kindly seek permission to interview staff \_\_\_\_\_ with expert knowledge of foreign policy and Xenophobia in as my PhD research topic focuses on 'Exploring the political and economic implications of Xenophobia on South Africa's Foreign Policy: 2008 - 2019'. This is drafted to address the question of how the act of Xenophobia affects the position of South Africa politically and economically with regards to its foreign policy objectives.


Xenophobia in South Africa, as in other parts of Africa and the world at large, is not a new phenomenon. This violent anti-foreigner practice is to a great extent a worldwide issue, mostly attributed to the fast globalization of society, which prompts the migration of people, especially from developing and less developed countries to go in search of greener pastures. Xenophobia negatively affects the social, economic and political functioning of the country. At the broadest level, though, South Africa's foreign policy as a whole is premised on support for its domestic policy objectives and for the overarching aim of promoting African development, including through regional integration.

This study was borne to primarily focus on the problems, challenges, effects of xenophobic attacks on the political and economic areas of the republic's foreign policy. This is because a Country's foreign policy is driven by some principles and in South Africa, "fundamentally transform and achieve sustainable growth of the economy to empower the people and create a better life for all" is one of the principles which is not believed to be the case due to xenophobic attacks.

This study attempts to capture as well as analyse the understanding of the interviewees on the subject matter. It is also intended to guide policy formulation that will bring about real world solution to practical problems of Xenophobia as it concerns South Africa and its foreign nationals. The importance of this research, however, lies on the platform of enhancing knowledge and thus, revealing the relevance of obtaining and maintaining conducive environment for co-existence void of conflict.

For any further queries, please contact my supervisor; Dr Dorcas Ettang who is located at the School of Social Sciences, Pietermaritzburg Campus of the University of KwaZulu-Natal. Her [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

## Appendix E: Structure and Functions of the South African government



## **Appendix F: Form IP2:**

### **UKZN Intellectual Property Agreement**

## **Explanatory Notes**

### **CONTACT US**

If you have any concerns about the Form IP2 please feel free to contact the IP & Technology Transfer Office ("IPTTO") for clarification. The Director's telephone number is (031) 260 3326 and you can also try (031) 260 8172 for an IP Consultant.

The Form IP2 should be signed in duplicate and all pages should be initialed. One of the *signed originals*(not a copy or scan) should be returned to:

The Director

UKZN Intellectual Property & Technology Transfer Office  
("IPTTO") 8<sup>th</sup> Floor, Library Building, Westville Campus

University of KwaZulu-  
Natal Private Bag  
X54001, Durban, 4000  
Republic of South  
Africa

If you will be submitting a thesis please retain the duplicate signed original and attach it (or a certified copy) to the master copy of your thesis when you submit it to the UKZN Libraries.

### **PURPOSE OF FORM IP2**

The purpose of the UKZN IP Agreement (Form IP2) is to ensure that in cases where intellectual property is properly meant to belong to the University, documentation is put in place to reflect this position. The agreement also deals with related matters such as the need for research

documentation to be kept and not discarded, the need for researchers to sign formal paperwork when patent applications are filed, the need to send copies of theses to the library, etc.

In many cases, the intellectual property in question will already belong to the University by operation of law, and in such cases the Form IP2 is really more of a *confirmation* of the existing position rather than an assignment of rights. For example, the IPR Act of 2008 automatically makes the University the owner of any intellectual property resulting from publicly financed R&D. By signing the Form IP2 in relation to such IP you are really just confirming the existing position and regularising it.

In other cases, such as where you are involved in a research contract, the University is obliged to get formal assignment of the IP from the researchers because, in many cases, it has contracted with the funding partner to assign all or part of the IP from the project to the funding partner. The University can only legally assign IP which it owns hence the need to get assignment first from the individual researchers and students working on the project.

One of the functions of the Form IP2 is therefore to ensure that the University can meet its obligations under the research contracts it signs. If a researcher or student is involved in research which is sponsored under a contract it is critical that any IP passes to the University first so that it can thereafter be transferred to the relevant company or other private funding partner. The "chain of title" must be established and should look like this: RESEARCHERS/STUDENTS to UKZN to PRIVATE FUNDING PARTNER.

## **CLAUSES IN THE AGREEMENT - EXPLANATORY NOTES**

(NB: The following notes do NOT form part of the agreement.)

### **CLAUSE 1:**

There is some latitude over when IP can be said to have been "identified." The IPR Act, No. 51 of 2008 does not define "identification." Researchers should exercise their judgment, keeping in mind that an element of novelty or originality is usually required to define something

as intellectual property. For example, something is patentable only if it is new, non-obvious and useful. Researchers are asked to err on the side of caution and get a second opinion from their School or the IPTTO.

Regarding the benefit share, as of November 2010 this was set in a 40:40:20 ratio as follows: 40% to the

Researcher(s): 40% to the University: 20% to UKZN Innovation (Pty) Ltd. However, if there is co-ownership of IP between the University and a private entity or enterprise, the benefit sharing ratio will be amended accordingly.

Please check the IP Policy for any amendments and/or updates.

#### CLAUSE 2:

There is a need for researchers to sign a small number of formal documents when applications for legal protection of intellectual property are filed, e.g. when applications are filed for patents, registered designs, trademarks, domain names, plant breeders' rights, etc. The administrative burden on researchers is minimal (and takes a matter of minutes). In most cases the only "paper" which a researcher will be asked to sign is a Deed of Assignment, which is a formal requirement of any Patent Office when a patent or design application is filed; in some cases a Power of Attorney authorizing a firm of patent attorneys to work on the case will also be needed.

#### CLAUSE 3:

The necessity to maintain written records will not usually add to the documentary burden that already exists for projects. The notes on routes for exploitation, commercial or otherwise, will only become necessary in the event that IP protection is being sought, which can only happen after IP has already been identified and a project is being handled by the IPTTO or by NIPMO, the government agency. This clause is primarily aimed at ensuring that Researchers do not throw away existing written records for projects; Researchers are not being asked to generate extensive new and burdensome records.

#### CLAUSE 4:

This clause sounds more onerous than it actually is. The documents and Tangible Research Property mentioned do not have to be submitted frequently and the administrative burden will not be great. This clause only obliges Researchers to deliver documents when leaving the University or upon receiving a request from the University. Documents do not have to be submitted for every research project, and there is no need to submit them on an ongoing basis.

#### CLAUSE 5:

You should avoid using your own personal Intellectual Property (or that of previous employers) in your work at UKZN unless you first get agreement from UKZN in writing. The purpose of this clause is to avoid later disputes arising over the ownership of such IP, i.e. to avoid uncertainty over whether such IP is owned privately by the Researcher or by UKZN.

#### CLAUSE 6:

Sub-clause 6(a).The Fundamental Ownership Rules come into play in the following circumstances: where there has

been significant use of UKZN resources, where the research was funded by UKZN, where the research was externally sponsored (including by public finances), where there was a written agreement with UKZN, and/or where the work was produced as a work for hire (i.e. during the course of the Researcher's employment with UKZN). Please refer to the UKZN Intellectual Property Policy for more information.

Sub-clause 6(b).The Researcher gives UKZN this limited pre-publication licence in recognition of the fact that UKZN has conferred the degree giving rise to the treatise, dissertation or thesis. In the event that a publisher (e.g. a journal) wishes to have this licence varied or cancelled, arrangements can be made with UKZN via the IPTTO.

Sub-clause 6(c).This provides for situations where the Researcher is the author of a thesis, etc. and is still the copyright holder but has left UKZN and can't be traced. The IP Steering Committee can only authorize use of the thesis in another publication if certain conditions are met. For example, the Committee must have been shown evidence that attempts were made to trace the Researcher.

Sub-clause 6(d).By signing up to this sub-clause the Researcher undertakes to forward the correct number of copies of their thesis, etc. to UKZN's Libraries.

Sub-clause 6(e).This sub-clause relates to *underlying* IP as opposed to copyright. There may be several different types of intellectual property associated with a thesis. Firstly there will be the copyright in the text of the document. Copyright relates to the copying or publishing of the text. However, there may be other types of intellectual property, such as inventions, described in the thesis or referred to from it. These are separate from the copyright in the thesis. What sub-clause 6(e) says is that such *underlying* IP will belong to UKZN if it was created in circumstances falling within the scope of the Fundamental Ownership Rules of UKZN's IP

Policy. As mentioned previously, these Rules apply where there has been significant use of UKZN resources, where the research was funded by UKZN, where the research was externally sponsored (including by public finances), where there was a written agreement with UKZN, and/or where the work was produced as a work for hire (i.e. during the course of the Researcher's employment with UKZN). The term "significant use" is prescribed by the University's Full Cost model. Information on the Full Cost model can be obtained from UKZN's Finance department.

#### CLAUSES 7& 8:

These refer to the relationship between the Researcher and UKZN. The Form IP2 replaces any previous IP agreements signed between the Researcher and UKZN. Regarding other contractual relationships (with companies, etc), researchers and students signing the Form are unlikely to create conflicts by signing. Past rights which have already been signed over to external parties are unaffected. The Form IP2 will only have an effect on IP to which the Researcher is entitled; he or she can't transfer IP which does not belong to him or her. In the future the Form IP2 will, in fact, serve to facilitate external contracts with private funders. This is because such contracts are usually entered into between the University and the relevant companies, rather than between the individual researchers and the companies. The Form IP2 will ensure that IP rights move from individual researchers and get vested in the University so that they can then be transferred to the companies concerned.

However, if there are any other agreements to which you are party and which arguably conflict with the Form IP2, Clause 8 requires you to attach additional pages, identifying them, to the Form IP2.

### **WHO MUST SIGN FORM IP2?**

Persons who fall into the following categories are expected to sign this Agreement:

1. Those in continuing or anticipated employment at the University of KwaZulu-Natal (UKZN).
2. Anyone performing research at UKZN.
3. Anyone with an opportunity to make significant use of UKZN administered funds and/or UKZN facilities.
4. Anyone with an opportunity to share in royalties as outlined in UKZN's Intellectual Property Policy.
5. Those who receive support from sponsored research (i.e. research contracts) or UKZN Council-funded projects.

6. Those who may be in a position to create inventions or technology in connection with sponsored research or UKZN Council-funded projects.
7. Those who may be in a position to create inventions or technology through the use of significant UKZN funds and/or facilities.
8. Anyone (including students) embarking on a research programme which will culminate in a treatise, dissertation or thesis must sign Form IP2 before commencing their research.
9. A *visiting Academic* must sign Form IP2, prior to the commencement of any work, if it is anticipated that IP may arise during the course of his or her research. The Form must be signed by the Academic and by any other persons involved in the Academic's research. The Academic may be excused from signing if the relevant School is satisfied that there is no prospect of IP resulting from the research.
10. An *Academic on sabbatical* must sign Form IP2, prior to the commencement of any work, if it is anticipated that IP may arise during the course of his or her research. The Form must be executed by the Academic and by any other persons involved in the Academic's research.

# IP

THE UNIVERSITY OF KWAZULU-NATAL

# TTO



## FormIP2

### Intellectual Property Agreement

Entered into by and between

**THE UNIVERSITY OF KWAZULU-NATAL**

("UKZN")

a higher education institution and a juristic person in terms of the Higher Education Act 101 of 1997, as amended

represented herein by **PROFESSOR NELSON MUTATINA IJUMBA** in his capacity as **DEPUTY VICE-CHANCELLOR: RESEARCH**, duly authorized,

--

and

**THE RESEARCHER**

**Details of "the Researcher": Precious Ekhobhanye Okungbowa**

**Legal Name: First, Middle & Last (please print or type)**

**\*Title (Prof./Dr/Mr, etc.) Miss**

**\*UKZN Staff/Student No.:** [REDACTED]

**\*E-mail address** [REDACTED] **\*UKZN Tel. Ext.** \_\_\_\_\_ **Cellphone** [REDACTED]

**\*Faculty, School and Department**

**College of Humanities, School of Social Sciences**

**\*Please complete all items above in full before returning to the IP & Technology Transfer Office.**

## INTRODUCTION

This Agreement clarifies rights, obligations and relationships relating to Intellectual Property. These arise from law and policy set out in the *Intellectual Property Rights from Publicly Financed Research and Development Act*, No. 51 of 2008 and UKZN's *Policy on Intellectual Property*.

## DEFINITIONS

**Intellectual Property** means any creation of the mind that is capable of being protected by law from use by any other person, whether in terms of South African law or foreign Intellectual Property law, including any *rights* in such creation. The term shall include the following (whether registrable or non-registrable): inventions, copyright works (i.e. works qualifying for copyright), computer software, drawings, designs, semiconductor mask works and topographies, expertise, trade secrets, trade & service marks, domain names, business names, goodwill and the style and presentation of goods or services, plant breeds & varieties and tangible research property (i.e. research results which are in a tangible form as distinct from an intangible form). Material distributed under a Materials Transfer Agreement is an example of tangible research property.

**IP** means Intellectual Property.

**IPR Act** means the *Intellectual Property Rights from Publicly Financed Research and Development Act*, No. 51 of 2008.

**IPTTO** means the Intellectual Property and Technology Transfer Office of the University of KwaZulu-Natal.

**UKZN** means the University of KwaZulu-Natal.

**Invention** includes any discovery, invention or other development of a technical nature, whether or not patentable.

**Inventor** is a creator of Intellectual Property, whether or not patentable. An inventor may be referred to as an "author" where the Intellectual Property in question is a copyrightable work.

**Significant Use** The University's Full Cost Model prescribes what constitutes "significant use" and covers both direct and indirect costs.

## **AGREEMENT**

The Parties agree as follows:

1. The Researcher undertakes to disclose to UKZN any intellectual property created by him or her which falls into one or more of the following categories:
  - a. IP developed pursuant to a sponsored research or other agreement in which the Researcher participates;
  - b. IP which results from the significant use of UKZN administered funds or facilities the finance department of UKZN has the requisite skills to advise on whether significant use

of UKZN's funds and/or facilities have been made;

- c. IP developed in the course of the Researcher's employment with UKZN; and/or
- d. IP which emanates from publicly financed research and development (excluding publications associated with conventional academic work).

The Researcher undertakes to make such disclosures within 90 days of having identified the IP, and before the IP is made public. The Researcher agrees to make the disclosure either to the IP & Technology Transfer Office or to an appropriate School at UKZN.

**UKZN Sole Owner of the Intellectual Property:**

The Parties agree that all rights and title in such intellectual property vests in UKZN, provided that the Researcher shall share in the benefits of commercialization of such property. The Researcher shall receive a benefit share no less than that prescribed in the IPR Act, 2008, or that set out in UKZN's Intellectual Property Policy, whichever is higher. The applicable version of UKZN's Intellectual Property Policy shall be that which was in existence at the date of signature of this Agreement.

**UKZN and Private Entity/Enterprise Co-Owners of the Intellectual Property:**

A funding entity or enterprise may become a co-owner or holder of the intellectual property subject to the following conditions:

- a. provided that such private entity or enterprise is best placed to manage and commercialise the intellectual property in the national interest, or
- b. there has been a significant contribution of resources, including background intellectual property by the private entity or enterprise.

The ratio of ownership of the IP rights will be negotiated between the University and the private entity or enterprise concerned.

If the invention arose from a sponsored research programme, the IPTTO may file for a patent and negotiate an appropriate Commercialisation model consistent with the contract with the sponsor. The IPTTO may be contacted for information about the specific terms of individual research contracts.

### **Benefit Sharing:**

When the sole ownership of the IP vests in UKZN, the benefit sharing ratio remains fixed at 40:40:20: 40% to the Researcher(s): 40% to the University: 20% to UKZN Innovation (Pty) Ltd.

However, when the IP ownership is shared between UKZN and a funding entity or enterprise, the ratio of ownership will be negotiated between the University and the private entity or enterprise concerned.

2. The Researcher undertakes to execute all necessary papers and provide proper assistance to enable UKZN to obtain, maintain, and/or enforce legal protection for the Intellectual Property referred to in Clause 1 above. The Researcher agrees to perform these undertakings promptly upon UKZN's request, at UKZN's expense, and regardless of whether such request is made during or subsequent to the period of his or her UKZN affiliation.

3. The Researcher undertakes to prepare and maintain for UKZN adequate and current written records of the Intellectual Property referred to in Clause 1 above, together with proposed routes for exploitation thereof and frameworks for compensation of UKZN and the relevant Researchers.
  
4. The Researcher undertakes to deliver promptly to UKZN when leaving UKZN for whatever reason, and at any other time as UKZN may request:
  - a. copies of all written records referred to in Clause 3 above;
  - b. any related notes and other written materials; and
  - c. all related Tangible Research Property delivered to, made by or investigated by UKZN, which will at all times be the property of UKZN.
  
5. Unless otherwise agreed in writing with UKZN, the Researcher undertakes to avoid disclosing the following to UKZN or using any of it in his or her work at UKZN:
  - a. any proprietary information belonging to any of his or her prior employers or of any third party, including any trade secrets or confidential information related to the business of such prior employer or third party; and
  - b. any ideas, writings, or Intellectual Property of his or her own which cannot be considered to fall within the scope of Clause 1 above.
  
6. Treatises, Dissertations and Theses.
  - a. The ownership of the full copyright in any treatise, dissertation and/or thesis created by the Researcher relating to any degree conferred by UKZN (whether undergraduate or postgraduate), shall vest in UKZN if any of the Fundamental Ownership Rules of Paragraph 2.1.1 of UKZN's Intellectual Property Policy is satisfied.
  
  - b. In respect of treatises, dissertations and/or theses which do not fall within the scope of

the preceding sub-clause (6.a.), the Researcher hereby grants to UKZN a perpetual, non-exclusive, royalty-free licence to digitize, reproduce, share, disseminate and/or publicly distribute copies of his or her treatise, dissertation or thesis for research and study purposes only. Such licence shall be termed a pre-publication licence and shall be understood to take effect immediately and automatically upon creation of the treatise, dissertation and/or thesis concerned. If UKZN requests a written agreement recording the licence, the Researcher undertakes to do all things necessary to give effect to such agreement and UKZN shall bear the costs of such agreement.

- c. In the event that the Researcher's whereabouts cannot be traced and any person requests authorization to include the whole or part of a treatise, dissertation or thesis created by said Researcher in a publication, and/or subsequently to reproduce it, the Researcher hereby agrees that the IP Steering Committee of UKZN may assess the matter and make a recommendation regarding such authorization; provided that said Committee shall not do so unless it has:
- received evidence of reasonable attempts to trace the Researcher and to make provision for remuneration of him or her;
  - considered all relevant factors, including the Researcher's moral rights; and
  - consulted the UKZN Copyright Office;

and the Researcher hereby agrees to abide by any such recommendation of the IP Steering Committee.

- d. The Researcher undertakes to forward master copies and electronic copies of all treatises, dissertations and/or theses created by him or her to UKZN Libraries by the date, in the numbers and in the format stipulated in the relevant policies of the UKZN

Libraries that were in effect at the time of creation of the treatise, dissertation and/or thesis concerned.

e. The Researcher agrees that any software code, patentable subject matter and/or other underlying intellectual property contained in or referenced by any treatise, dissertation or thesis created by him or her is owned by UKZN subject to the Fundamental Ownership Rules set out in Paragraph 2.1.1 of UKZN's Intellectual Property Policy.

7. This Agreement replaces all previous agreements that the Researcher may have entered into with UKZN relating in whole or in part to the same or similar matters. It may not be modified or terminated, in whole or in part, except by agreement in writing signed by an authorised representative of UKZN. Discharge of the Researcher's undertakings in this Agreement will be an obligation of his or her executors, administrators or other legal representatives or assignees.

8. The Researcher represents that, except as identified on the pages attached hereto, he/she has no agreements with or obligations to others in conflict with the foregoing.

Precious

**Signature of Researcher (Please include full first name)**

Precious E. Okungbowa

**Print name**

SIGNED AT (Place).....Capetown... on this.....21.....day of.....January..2022.....

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**FOR THE UNIVERSITY OF KWAZULU-NATAL**

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**PROFESSOR NELSON MUTATINA IJUMBA** in his capacity as DEPUTY VICE-CHANCELLOR: RESEARCH

SIGNED **AT**.....**on** this.....day of.....**20**..

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**INSTRUCTIONS FOR SIGNING**

To the Researcher: Please sign this Form IP2 in duplicate and initial each page. The signing for UKZN will be arranged by the IPTTO.

Please return one *signed original* (not a copy or scan) to: The Director

UKZN Intellectual Property & Technology Transfer Office ("IPTTO") 8<sup>th</sup> Floor,  
Library Building, Westville Campus

University of KwaZulu-Natal Private Bag  
X54001, Durban, 4000 Republic of South Africa

If you will be submitting a thesis please retain the duplicate signed original and attach it (or a certified copy)

to the master copy of your thesis when you submit it to the UKZN Libraries.

For further information please refer to the UKZN Intellectual Property Policy or visit the IPTTO website (<http://iptto.ukzn.ac.za>). Contact the Director of the IPTTO on Tel. +27 (0) 31 2603326.

