Self-interest vs Group-interest: Rich and Poor group members exchange behaviour of experimental dollars under Individual Mobility and Group Mobility experimental conditions.

Abstract

Background: Social Identity Theory (SIT) defines the factors that create social groups and the impact these social groups have on our behaviour in different social dilemmas. Therefore, depending on the situation and the position of an individual’s social group, it can result in an individual engaging in either self-interested behaviour – which is highly detrimental to other individuals but highly beneficial to oneself; or group-interested behaviour – which is highly detrimental to other groups but will privilege their own group. Aim: The aim of this research dissertation was therefore to explore the conditions which result in individuals being self-interested or group-interested in an economic social dilemma. Methodology: Virtual Interaction Application (VIAPPL) was used to create a social environment which had a High Status and Low Status group and the presence or absence of Social Mobility/Change. A total of 60 experiments were conducted over 10 rounds across four experimental conditions. In each Get Rich Game, there was a group of 8 participants which resulted in the entire sample of 479 participants. The allocation behaviour of experimental dollars was imported into a statistical processing software (R) and analysed with multilevel modelling (MLM). Results: Descriptive statistics and modelling produced results for Ingroup Bank, Outgroup Bank, and Outgroup Individual exchange behaviour. The findings suggest that Individual Mobility and Status are the factors which affect self-interested exchange behaviour or group-interested exchange behaviour. The effect of Individual Mobility results in less investing in the Ingroup Bank but more donating and trading with the Outgroup Bank and Outgroup Individual respectively. This seems to suggest that the condition of Individual Mobility results in the perception of Social Mobility which makes participants take part in self-interested exchange behaviour. The effect of Status is that the High Status results in less investing to the Ingroup Bank but more trading with the Outgroup Individual. Therefore, High Status results in greater self-interested exchange behaviour. A Low Status results in more investing to the Ingroup Bank but less trading with the Outgroup Individual. Therefore, Low Status results in greater group-interested exchange behaviour. Discussion/Conclusion: Social identity processes of positive distinctiveness and categorisation are what motivated participants to take part in group-interested exchange behaviour. Whereas, intergroup compensatory helping and social encounters being on the interpersonal end of the interpersonal-intergroup continuum are what motivated participants to take part in self-interested exchange behaviour. Therefore, this evolutionary approach to study exchange behaviour showed that Status and Individual Mobility produce either self-interested exchange behaviour or group-interested exchange behaviour in asymmetrical groups.