History

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From "conscience politics" to the battlefields of political activism : the Liberal Party in Natal, 1953 to 1968.
(1999) Moffatt, Debra Anne Fyvie.; Benyon, John Allen.; Nuttall, Timothy Andrew.
This thesis examines the ways in which the Liberal Party - the Natal Division in particularattempted to become an effective political force in South Africa. The Party was fanned in May 1953 as a non-racial political party. Initially, it concentrated on working among the white electorate, and on achieving political change through parliamentary means. The Party gradually shifted its attention to the voteless black majority, and took its active opposition beyond the boundaries of parliamentary politics. Members of the Natal Division played a leading role in this shift. The party gave expression to a distinctive strand of radica1liberalism, within a broader spectrum of South African liberalism. The Party was unsuccessful in preventing the entrenchment of the apartheid policies it so vehemently opposed. However, the Natal LP succeeded in developing a good working relationship with Congress Alliance, especially the African National Congress, in the region, in attracting a large number of black members through its grass-roots involvement, and in keeping liberal principles and priorities in the public eye in inauspicious circumstances. From 1960, Party leaders attracted increasing government persecution for their anti-apartheid activism. The Party deserves more attention than is commonly given to it in the South African historiography of resistance politics. The Liberal Party's continued existence as a non-racial political party was rendered impossible by government legislation in 1968. The Party disbanded, rather than compromise its non-racial principles.
The incorporation of Alfred County: aspects of colonial Natal's annexation strategy and subsequent consolidation on the South-Western Frontier 1850s-18180s.
(1995) Mbhodiya, Sipho Henry.; Benyon, John Allen.
The official and permanent British occupation of the Cape was finalised by the convention concluded in London on 13 August 1814, when Britain decided to retain the strategic Cape from the United Province!:» of the Netherlands. Britain had previously twice taken over the Cape during the twenty years of mortal struggle with France. Natal, on the other hand, became British territory in 1843, and it received its Representative Government in 1856. The point is, by 1860, one would have expected Natal and the Cape Colony to have established a tradition of friendship or mutual trust, not for its own sake, but for a combined effort to overcome the common problems in the sub-continent that faced these two coastal British colonies head on. Both colonies were confronted with the preferred British home policy of non expansion. Both colonies experienced the temptation to violate this non interventionist policy, as turbulence beyond the borders continued to threaten stability, law and order within their territories. Thus they were keenly concerned , about preserving piece among the African Chiefdoms within and beyond their borders. They also had a similar task of devising a measure of ruling the indigenous people within their territories. Both colonies relied upon the High Commissioner, who spent most of his time in the Cape Colo.n y, to handle their affairs beyond their borders. Thus one would have expected that the Cape Colony and Natal would have cemented a complementary relationship for the mutual benefit of both colonies. The envisaged mutual relationship foundered on the rocks of colonial rivalry. There were accusations and counter-accusations. Natal did not accord the High Commissioner full trust, because, at times, he appeared to represent the interests of the Cape Colony alo_ne. The situation was delicate, because the High Commissioner was the Cape Governor, the Commander-in-Chief and then the High Commissioner for the territories adjacent to both Natal and the Cape Colony. Thus the expected collaboration between Natal and the Cape Colony could give way to apathy and jealousy, and, to make the situation worse, their spheres of influence overlapped. The Treaty of Amity of 1844, signed between Faku, the Mpondo Chief and Sir Peregrine Maitland, the Cape Governor, recognized the former as paramount chief of the whole territory abutting on Natal's southern boundary, the Mzimkhulu river, down as far as the Mthatha river. It, therefore, followed that, if Faku failed to stabilize the territory and if the resulting in stability affected Natal, the latter would read the riot act to Faku. Faku would eventually opt to cede the Mzimkhulu Mtamvuma territory to Natal in 1850. But the Cape Colony cried foul, because the High Commissioner was not consulted; and this Faku-Harding Treaty of 1850 then clashed head on with Sir George Grey's plan for the Transkeian territories. Neither side was prepared to back down. The scene was set for Shepstonism versus confederation, with Sir George Grey being both a "player" on the Cape side as Governor and an "umpire" as High Commissioner. Thus Shepstonism (in "Nomansland") was to be contained. Natal and the Cape Colony, it appeared then, were operating on one dogmatic principle: whatever Natal could do, the Cape Colony could do better! This trend of antipathy and rivalry transcended the term of office of Sir George Grey. Sir Philip Wodehouse inherited the rivalry and, on the side of Natal, Lieutenant-Governor Scott was more than willing to take up the challenge of Cape domination. This rivalry thus placed the Duke of Newcastle on the horns of dilemma: it would be awkward for him to overrule the High Commissioner, Sir George Grey, and.later Sir Philip Wodehouse; nor could he completely ignore the views of John Scott. Both parties wanted to reverse imperial non-expansion and annex "Nomansland" in order to stem the tide of turbulence in that territory. Ultimately, Newcastle was brave enough to take the decision. He offered the division of "Nomansland" in the hope it would accommodate both sides - that is, Sir George Grey's Cape plan of settling the Griquas of Adam Kok could be carried out south of the Drakensberg Mountains; while Natal could annex the smaller northern part of "Nomansland". At the time of annexation, the question of who obtained land and closed the frontier was, thus, essentially a competition between the larger southern (Cape) colony and the smaller northern (Natal) colony. For Natal, it was a question of "half-a-loaf of bread is better than none", as the most valuable land, which was suitable for farming, was given to the Griquas of Adam Kok. On 1 January 1866 Natal annexed her small pickings and named them the "Country of Alfred". Natal's plans for "Nomansland" were disrupted, as the most fertile lands were lost to Adam Kok. But the colony did need a committee to report on the three essential elements in any situation where a frontier has to be "closed". These are: details of the terrain and its geography, the characteristics of the basic cultures to be accommodated, and plans for the process by which relations between the indigenous societies and the colonizing authority would be maintained. Such a committee was set up under the chairmanship of J. Bergtheil. On the strength of the findings and recommendations of the Bergtheil Committee, it was resolved to appoint a magistrate whose administrative task was to dominate, and give the law to, the entire territory annexed to Natal along the European or colonial lines of administration. The first magistrate was Lieutenant H.K. Wilson. His administration experienced major problems, as there was lack of capital, markets, towns and the necessary infrastructure. This meant that the "closure" of the frontier in Alfred County, 1866- 1880, was a long, slow and uneven process which cannot be easily subjected to any strictly cumulative chronological order.
The interaction between the missionaries of the Cape eastern frontier and the colonial authorities in the era of Sir George Grey, 1854-1861.
(1984) Weldon, Constance Gail.; Benyon, John Allen.
In the work of radical historians and in Xhosa tradition the Cattle Killing has become the supreme example of the deliberately destructive impact of a colonial governor, helped by missionaries, on the Black peoples of the eastern frontier of the Cape. This figure of controversy, Sir George Grey, was Governor of the Cape and High Commissioner from 1854-1861. As a civilian, he sought to pacify the Xhosa through 'civilization1 and education. To do this he enlisted the help of the frontier missionaries, who themselves desired a stable Xhosa society to aid their work. The result, it has been alleged, was the final demise of effective Xhosa resistance to the encroachment of imperial forces and white settler society. By the early 1850s the work of the missionaries on the frontier was at an all-time low. And so they certainly did hope that Grey's plans, of which the extension of education was part, would provide a long-sought breakthrough for them. But this, in turn, has led to the accusation that the missionaries acted merely as mercenary imperial agents and as a 'collaborating group' for the extension of colonial authority over the Xhosa, rather than for the benefit of their would- be converts. Because of the nature of the allegations, it seemed a significant historical exercise to investigate more closely the nature and extent of the links which the missionaries did in fact forge with Sir George Grey. It must be admitted that Grey's frontier plans, together with the steady erosion of traditional society over the years, economic distress in the mid-1850s, and the Cattle Killing dealt a deathblow to effective Xhosa resistance to colonial encroachment. Radical historians have blamed Grey and the missionaries of deliberately engineering the Cattle Killing for their own Machiavellian purposes. There is not enough evidence to convict Grey on this charge, but certainly his actions, or lack of them, during the crisis suggest that once the Cattle Killing had started he deliberately allowed it to develop to the point where the Xhosa could be more easily subordinated. It can not, with any justification, be said that the missionaries had a part either in instigating or maintaining the crisis, though they were not slow to hope for some advantage from it in the shape of a more receptive Xhosa nation driven by adversity to 'humble themselves before God1 and accept conversion. The Xhosa were deeply divided over Nongqawuse's prophecy - which was a fact that tended to work very much to Grey's advantage. He also used the crisis to break the chiefs who survived the disaster and to evict Sarhili from his ancestral land in Kaffraria Proper. On what seems to have been fabricated evidence, Grey accused Sarhili, together with Moshoe- shoe, of plotting the Cattle Killing to force the Xhosa into war with the Colony. Far from this being the case, the Cattle Killing should rather be regarded both as a millenarian movement and as a feature of a so-called 'closing' frontier. Grey had hoped to use the crisis to extend his 'civilizing' plans to Kaffraria Proper; but though his expulsion of Sarhili to beyond the Mbashe River prepared the way, he did not receive official sanction to go ahead with his plans. This, together with other setbacks to his plans, may well have led Grey to accept a transfer to New Zealand in 1861, sooner than had been expected. It has been suggested that the Cattle Killing resulted in an unprecedented advance by the missionaries, but detailed investigation of their records has shown this to be untrue. The influence attributed to the missionaries has, thus, been somewhat overrated and their links with Grey, who was essentially a man of independent and arbitrary action, exaggerated. Although their converts were few, missionaries did, however, foster far-reaching changes in traditional society. One of the most notable was the growth of peasant communities around the stations, which supplied a viable alternative to wage labour in the pre-capitalist colonial society. They also contributed to the stratification of Xhosa society and to the creation of an educated elite which would become leaders in a new industrial situation of contracting options. Grey was Governor at a time when the frontier was in the process of closing. A study of his era is, thus, relevant not only in terms of the relationship between the missionaries and the personality embodying the authority of the colonial state - and their consequent combined impact on Xhosa history but also in terms of more general frontier studies.

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Browsing History by Author "Benyon, John Allen."