THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF URBAN AND REGIONAL
PLANNING IN SOUTH AFRICA: 1900 TO 1988
TOWARDS THEORY TO GUIDE PROGRESSIVE PRACTICE.

by

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ABSTRACT

The dissertation has three major objectives. The first is to examine the relation between the nature and trajectory of urban and regional planning in South Africa, and developments within the South African political economy of which it is an integral part. The second is to contribute to the sparse literature on the history of urban and regional planning in South Africa. The third is to consider the historical record on and the prospects for facilitating progressive social change through planning in South Africa. An empirical analysis of the history of urban and regional planning for the period 1900 to 1988 provides the basis for the achievement of all three objectives. In attempting to fulfil the first objective some emphasis is placed on examining the relationship between territorial apartheid and planning. The experiential basis of the distinction often made between planning and apartheid by South African planners is explored. The conclusion reached is that whilst a distinction between the trajectory of professional town planning and territorial apartheid is sustainable, there has also been a very substantial measure of articulation. Special emphasis is also given to examining the relationship between planning and the specific nature and history of the accumulation process in South Africa. In this regard it is concluded that the accumulation process has borne both an indirect and direct relation to planning at different junctures. At times the trajectory of accumulation has simply provided a context which has affected the definition of social priorities and placed limits on what could be pursued through planning. At other times the momentum of accumulation has quite directly affected planning, providing opportunities for or requiring responses from planners.
As far as the record on the social role played by planners is concerned, it is concluded that planning has not cut a particularly progressive profile. The emergence of a progressive planning movement in South Africa is however noted. Possibilities for pursuing progressive practices are identified against the background of a detailed analysis of the contemporary period.
The origins of this thesis date back to the early 1980's when I first became aware that very little work had been done on the political economy of urban and regional planning in South Africa. My interest in the political economy of planning had been stimulated firstly by post-graduate study in the U.S.A. and secondly by a search for theory to guide my practices as a planner in a conflict-ridden society. When political tumult escalated in South Africa in the first half of the 1980's, my initial interest in conflict on the urban terrain was academic. I was particularly fascinated by the emergence of urban social movements. As a consequence I began to work with these movements. Slowly my academic interest began to translate into a real political commitment. For much of the four-year period between 1982 and 1986 I was intimately involved in the practices of the primary urban social movement in the Durban metropolitan area. So intoxicating was this involvement, and so needed were my urban planning inputs, that I thoroughly immersed myself in the roles of political activist and planning advocate. My academic work suffered but I learned a great deal about progressive human practices. When the repression of 1986 took the steam out of political revolt, I found that I had more time to reflect on my experience. Once again I was struck by the paucity of theoretical and empirical work on the political economy of urban and regional planning against which I could place my deliberations. More convinced than ever of the need for a study which contextualized urban and regional planning in South Africa and which gave a sense of its momentum through time, I set about writing this dissertation with renewed vigour.
Many people have contributed to whatever insights the dissertation may contain. Primary among these people is my close friend and colleague, Jeff McCarthy. Jeff has been a sympathetic, helpful and incisive supervisor. Moreover in a decade of collaboration on a variety of projects Jeff has contributed substantially to my intellectual growth, elements of which are reflected in the dissertation. Special thanks are also due to another close friend, supervisor and colleague - Mike Kahn. Mike and I have, over the years, spent many hours talking about planning in South Africa. These formal and informal discussions have contributed substantially to the content of the dissertation.

Two other friends have also been particularly influential. Alison Todes, with her critical and often original approach to issues has, perhaps more than anyone else, shifted often entrenched views that I have held. So too has my advocacy planning colleague, Clive Foster.

Apart from those who have influenced my thoughts about planning, there have been many people who have developed my ability as a politician, political economist and activist.

My mentor in this regard has, without question, been Pravin Gordhan. In many respects this giant of a man has stood at the centre of progressive political mobilisation in Natal. It has been a privilege to work with and learn from him. Pravin has also been a very supportive friend. Also very important to my political growth, are Vish and Vidhu with whom I have spent many hours in urban social movement work. Ironically when I first began to work with urban social movements I believed that I was contributing to their intellectual growth by introducing them to authors
such as Manuel Castells. Instead it was I who received a thorough education even if it is only recently that this has begun to dawn on me.

A particular word of thanks is due to my wife Jenni who has assisted in many ways. Jenni proof-read the manuscript and has facilitated the production of the document - a most tedious task. Jenni has also taken more than a fair share of domestic responsibilities in order to allow me to complete this work.

Finally thanks must go to Eileen Oelofse who typed the document under duress, and to Gerry and Michael Oelofse who assisted in production.

While many people in a variety of ways have contributed to the conceptualisation and production of this dissertation, responsibility for the arguments made is entirely mine. Moreover the dissertation is my own original work and has not been submitted in whole or in part, to any other university.
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CHAPTER ONE : GENERAL INTRODUCTION

The twelve years since the Soweto uprising of 1976 have been among the most turbulent in the country's history. Virtually every aspect of everyday life in South Africa has become politicized. For Black people it has been a period of mobilization, of optimism about change, of heroism and of struggle. It has also been a period of violence, of fear, of strikes and of massive disruption. For Whites, whose everyday lives have been less directly disrupted, it has been a decade of uncertainty, insecurity, fear and, of change. It is easy to sensationalize crisis and conflict, but few would regard the comments made above as overly melodramatic. It is not surprising that in this context of upheaval, urban planning related issues such as the improvement of living conditions in South Africa's townships and shacklands, have been brought sharply into focus. In fact, urban and regional planning has been thrust on the centre stage of crisis resolution. Given this increasing centrality, and given the increasing polarization of South African society, urban and regional planning has itself become much more politicized. What had previously been a rather sedate, unexceptional, technicist and consensual profession, has suddenly become high profile and conflict-ridden. Such conflict is, of course, inevitable when planners begin to ask questions, somewhat belatedly, about the social role that they are actually playing. Indeed planning has begun to exhibit what Muller (1982) has called its "Janus face".

Janus was a Roman deity with two faces, one looking "inward on the sanctuary of the home and another outward to the unpredictable world beyond" (Muller, 1982, p 4). After a long period of focusing on its inner sanctuary, planning in South Africa is beginning to consider its relationship to society at large. In doing so, however, planners have found the literary cupboard on planning in South Africa quite bare. Very little has been written about interrelations between urban and regional planning and "the ensemble of socio-political and economic relations constituting the society in which it is theorized and practiced" (Meuleman, 1987). The present dissertation is primarily concerned with making a contribution towards the filling of this gap. More specifically, the major objective of the thesis is to examine the relation between urban and regional planning in South Africa and the political economy within which it is embedded. Of course, the
respective trajectories of politics and economics in South Africa are not independent processes and are related in complex ways. As will be elaborated shortly, due cognisance will be taken of these interrelations, but it is also recognized that the realms of politics and economics develop relatively autonomously. Crude economic determinism (or political determinism for that matter) is avoided wherever possible.

It should be noted at the outset that greater emphasis will be placed on exploring the political economy of urban planning as opposed to regional planning for two reasons. The first is that whilst very little has been written on urban planning in South Africa, good historical analyses of the political economy of regional policy in South Africa have been produced by, amongst others, Bell (1973, 1987); Glaser (1987); Tomlinson and Addelson (1984); and Dewar et al (1984). Of the urban terrain, however, Haines and Buijs (1985, p vii) have recently been prompted to comment as follows:

"With the partial exception of McCarthy and Smit’s work and Ron Davies’ writings on the colonial and post-colonial city, there has been no serious attempt to develop or generate a broad conceptual understanding of urbanization and urbanism in South Africa."

The work of Western (1981), and Bloch and Wilkinson (1982) and Padayachee and Haines (1985) must be added to the list. It should be noted, however, that most of these works have addressed urbanism in South Africa at a general level, without focusing specifically on urban planning. McCarthy and Smit (1981 and 1984) do explicitly address the political economy of planning, but they do so with the intention of illustrating the application of general theoretical models in the South African context. They do not address the political economy of urban planning in South Africa in any empirical detail. Patricios (1975) and Muller (1982) have, in the process of addressing other topics, made some reference to the political economy of urban planning, but their analyses and empirical accounts are cursory.

The second reason for lending relatively greater emphasis to urban as opposed to regional and rural planning, is that this is the terrain with which the author is more familiar and upon which he has practiced (as an
urban planner, political activist, and political economist). While greater emphasis will be given to urban planning, regional planning will also be addressed, largely because no single text exists in which the two processes are considered together. Separate treatment of the urban and regional components of planning runs the danger of losing a sense of the dialectic between the two processes. Moreover, it is hoped that one of the contributions of this dissertation is that it will provide initiates into the field with an overview and sense of momentum of the entire field of urban and regional planning in South Africa. Comprehensive texts of this kind are available to planning students and scholars in other countries, but not in South Africa. Finally, since the literature on regional planning in South Africa is quite well developed, there will be a greater tendency to engage in debate with authors who have contributed, than is true for the coverage of urban planning.

A second major objective of this dissertation is to make a contribution to the literature on the history of urban and regional planning in South Africa. The author had hoped, in embarking on this project, that a descriptive history of the evolution of planning would be already available. The specific contribution of the dissertation would then be to make the connections between an already available planning history, and historical developments in the South African political economy. On investigation, the author discovered that the historical literature on urban planning in South Africa was very sparse. Floyd (1960) has written a book called Town Planning in South Africa. Apart from one or two papers, also by Floyd (1959), this book remains the only substantial piece on town planning in South Africa. Price (1982) and has also conducted some preliminary investigations into the history of town planning in South Africa. All of these works are, however, rather cursory, and as a consequence the historical material on town planning contained in this thesis is relatively original, especially for the earlier periods.

This is not to suggest that the historical work presented in this thesis is the product of a major exercise in primary research. Certainly, some primary research was undertaken in the form of archival research and lengthy interviews with pioneers in the planning field such as T.B. Floyd and Nola Green. Much of the historical material was, however, drawn
from the work of prominent political and economic historians who have produced a rich tapestry of case studies of South Africa's towns and cities. Of course, most of these authors were not concerned with town planning directly, but their work includes many allusions to such planning. Most urban and regional planners in South Africa are not aware of this literature and one purpose of this dissertation is to bring aspects of it to their attention. It should be noted that while the historical work in this dissertation is considered a contribution, the dissertation certainly does not pretend to be a comprehensive history of urban and regional planning. It is rather concerned with the historical articulation of urban and regional planning with developments in the political economy. It pays very little attention to Janus's inward-looking face, i.e. to the theoretical and methodological developments internal to the profession such as Mallows's pioneering methodological work and Muller's advances in procedural theory (Muller, 1987). Furthermore, there has been substantial regional variation in the evolution of, particularly urban planning. Doing justice to this variation is, however, beyond the scope of this dissertation.

The third major objective of the thesis is to consider the historical record on, and the prospects for, the promotion of progressive social change through planning. The conflagration in South Africa in the post-Soweto period has brought the dilemma of planning practice in South Africa sharply into focus. On the one hand, the crisis has drawn attention to the desperate need for interventions aimed at improving the material conditions of the urban and rural masses. Housing shortages have reached crisis proportions, overcrowding is everywhere apparent, and literally millions have no access to basic physical and social services. In such circumstances it seems eminently reasonable that socially concerned individuals would enter a profession such as urban and regional planning with a view to addressing these problems. In fact, many of the students the author has encountered in eight years of teaching in the Department of Town and Regional planning at the University of Natal, have had precisely such intentions in mind.

On the other hand, working as an urban and regional planner in South Africa means working either within apartheid state apparatuses or, at the very least, working within an apartheid framework. Moreover, many
progressive planners have been influenced by the structuralist neo-marxist work of authors such as Castells (1977, 1978), Harvey (1978) and Mingione (1981). These authors have argued that, under capitalism, urban and regional planning is simply an extension of the capitalist state whose structurally determined role is to ensure the growth and reproduction of the system of accumulation. Thus, for authors such as Castells (1977), urban planning is not a means of social change but only part of a process of domination, integration and the control of contradictions. The position that will be taken in this dissertation is that extreme structuralism of this kind takes insufficient account of human agency in determining the role that planning plays in society. Thus, whilst emphasis will fall on the influence of social structure on urban planning, a conscious attempt will also be made to investigate the extent to which human agency either has made a difference or could have made a difference.

The relevance of such an analysis to those wishing to pursue social improvement through urban planning is obvious. Moreover, in tracing the historical relations between planning and the trajectory of broader social context within which it is embedded, emphasis will be placed on deriving lessons that can inform the debate on progressive planning practice in South Africa. Furthermore, the prospects for, and constraints on, progressive planning practices, will be evaluated with specific reference to a detailed analysis of the structural circumstances of the contemporary period, and the attempts at instituting more progressive practices in the past decade. Throughout the dissertation, the author's own predilection for making urban and regional planning more relevant to social change is evident and produces, perhaps, an element of bias into the selection of the historical evidence chosen for analysis. The dissertation is therefore a politically committed piece of work, and hopes to inform progressive praxis.

In sum then, the major objectives of the dissertation are threefold:

1. To examine the relation between the nature and trajectory of urban and regional planning in South Africa and developments within the political economy within which it is embedded;
2. To contribute to the literature on the history of urban and regional planning in South Africa; and

3. To consider the historical record on, and the future prospects for, the promotion of progressive social change through planning in South Africa.

These objectives will be pursued primarily through an historical analysis of the evolution of urban planning practices in this country. The dissertation itself is organized as follows. The Chapter which follows this introduction provides a brief outline of the conceptual framework in terms of which the analysis is pursued. It will be noted that whilst there is a measure of theoretical eclecticism, the analysis is strongly influenced by the growth in recent years of new approaches towards analyzing urban and regional issues, which derive their inspiration from the political economic work of Max Weber and more particularly Karl Marx. This Chapter also addresses methodological issues, and particularly the question of distinguishing urban and regional planning interventions from other kinds of state intervention on the one hand, and specifying an appropriate periodization for analysis on the other. Chapter Three focusses on the period prior to the adoption of the first formal town planning ordinances. It is argued that while the origins of town planning in South Africa bear a relation to the emergence of crises in the sphere of reproduction (e.g. health crises and slum development), they are more directly traceable to problems of social co-ordination of land use in order to promote efficient production, circulation and exchange of commodities. Early town planning is also seen as having idealist origins and being strongly influenced by individual agency.

Chapter Four examines developments in urban and regional planning for the period 1930 to 1950. The tendency for town planning to become a rather pragmatic, administratively-oriented and technocratic activity is noted and explained. More specifically, it is argued that this minimalist arises out of the contradiction between the need for urban planning on the one hand, and the simultaneous rejection of it on the other. The minimalist of urban planning in the "White" towns is contrasted with the dramatic interventions which characterize early rural development planning in the reserves. The rapid growth of South African cities, and
the crises this spawned, are also examined and related to the growth of manufacturing industry and the increasing decline of the reserve economies. The opportunities for grandiose town planning and urban design occasioned by rapid and state assisted accumulation, are also discussed.

Chapter Five focuses on the draconian period of apartheid spatial engineering which spans the period 1950 to 1975. Both the reconstruction of the South African city to provide coherent "Group Areas", and the way in which the pursuit of "grand apartheid" provided the impetus for large-scale regional planning, are discussed. The articulation of territorial apartheid with other more conventional forms of planning is also examined. Some emphasis is placed on explaining the apparent contradiction between the tightening of influx controls in this period and the simultaneous initiation of the largest mass housing programme in the country’s history. Moreover the close relation between the actual spatial design of the mass housing estates and the imperatives of the political economy is explored. The emergence in this period of finance capital as a distinct social phenomenon is noted. The effects of the growth of finance capital and the corresponding increase in the concentration and centralization of capital, on the reconstruction of the built environment are outlined. Likewise the increasing incidence and centralization of planning intervention and its widening spatial scope (metropolitan planning, national planning) is investigated.

The period 1975 to 1988 is dealt with in some detail in Chapters Six through to Eleven. There are three reasons for the special emphasis given to the analysis of the contemporary period. The first is that it is a period in which a great deal of change has taken place, both in the political economy and in planning. The second is that a careful analysis of the contemporary period is particularly useful for assessing prospects for progressive practices in both the short and medium term. The third is that it is in this period that the most significant progressive planning praxis has occurred. The major reason for the last mentioned developments was the onset of a deep politico-economic crisis beginning in the early 1970’s. Given the significance of this crisis in both explaining changes in planning and in assessing prospects for progressive practice, the economic and political dimensions of the crisis
are explored separately and in some detail. It is recognized that such a separation is artificial (given a theoretical assumption of dialectical unity between politics and economics) but it is considered necessary for purposes of exposition. Thus Chapter Six outlines the basic dimensions of the economic crisis, the responses of capital and the state to the crisis, and the implications of such responses for urban and regional planning. More specifically, the implications of macro-economic growth strategies in response to crisis (such as export-industrialization and inward-industrialization) for aspects of regional and urban policy are investigated. Also examined are the effects of deregulation and privatization on urban and regional planning theory and practice.

Chapter Seven develops an analysis of the political crisis in South Africa which serves as a preface for the chapters which follow. Whereas Chapter Six considered the relationship between economic crisis and positive urbanization and changes in regional policy, Chapter Eight examines the relationship of changing urbanization and regional policy to political crisis. Chapter Nine focuses on the politics of housing policy changes. Special emphasis is given to the introduction of a large-scale programme of urban renewal or upgrading in Black townships. Chapter Ten examines the relationship between aspects of state reform strategy and the practice of planning. More specifically, the chapter focuses on the restructuring of state apparatuses and its effects on planning outcomes, the jurisdictions over which planners preside and the spaces for progressive practices. Also considered in this chapter is the relationship of political crisis to the development of new town planning devices such as structure plans and development plans. The possible use of town planning schemes to effect racial zoning is discussed. Chapter Eleven focuses on the emergence of a progressive planning movement for the first time in South Africa. The importation and local production of progressive planning theory are also discussed.

Finally, Chapter Twelve summarises the arguments, draws out major conclusions and considers the prospects for planners assisting in progressive social change.
There are, of course, a variety of theoretical frameworks in terms of which an analysis of the political economy of urban and regional planning in South Africa could be undertaken. A discussion of the range of options and their applicability in South Africa was the subject of a book co-authored by the writer in 1984 (McCarthy and Smit, 1984). A prolonged discourse on the merits or otherwise of these various theoretical perspectives is therefore considered unnecessary here. Suffice it to say that in our book (McCarthy and Smit, 1984), we concluded that the relatively new approach to urban and regional studies generally referred to at that time as the "new urban sociology" or "urban political economy", was the framework which seemed to have the greatest explanatory potential. This tradition, which is perhaps no longer new or even so fashionable, draws its inspiration from the classical sociological writings of Max Weber and more significantly, from Karl Marx. While a degree of theoretical eclecticism will be evident in this dissertation, the work must nonetheless be located within a neo-Marxist framework. In methodological terms this implies that urban and regional planning is investigated within a largely historical-materialist framework, but one in which the political and ideological levels of the social formation are accorded some autonomy from the economic level.

In examining the evolution of urban and regional planning in South Africa, the author has been influenced, at a conceptual level, by the works of several theoreticians and researchers. With regard to the conceptualization of the process of urban and regional development in capitalist societies, the works of Harvey (1973, 1978a, 1981), Castells (1977, 1978, 1983) and Mingione (1981), have been particularly influential. As far as the conceptualization of urban and regional planning in relation to capital accumulation, class struggle and the state is concerned, the author is particularly indebted to the work of Shoukry Roweis and most notably his earlier (1981) theorization of urban planning in early and late capitalist societies. The last-mentioned work shaped the dissertation’s "pre-conceptualization" of the urban planning process in South Africa. This is not to say, however, that the present dissertation is an application of Roweisian theory in South Africa of the hypothesis testing sort. One of the tenets of historical
materialist analysis is that the evolution of a set of social relations such as urban and regional planning should be theorized in relation to the concrete practices and thought that develop within a specific set of (historically and geographically contingent) social circumstances. An attempt is certainly made to honour this tradition in theorizing urban and regional planning in South Africa. But in scanning the historical evidence, and in selecting from and interpreting it, there can be no question of the a priori theoretical influence of Roweis' (1981) work. While Roweis' later (1983) theorization of urban planning has had less impact on the conceptual framework carried to the analysis, it has been particularly useful at a methodological level.

Given the centrality of Roweis' (1981) theory to the entire project, this chapter begins with an outline and critical evaluation of his work. The thrust of Roweis' (1981) theory is that planning is largely a state response to the crisis and contradictions of capitalist accumulation and class struggle. However, he does not specify the particular types of crises and contradictions which give rise to specifically urban and regional planning interventions. Thus, a summary of the variety of different types of crisis and contradiction which have featured in the writings of significant urban theorists such as Castells (1977) and Harvey (1978b) is provided in section two. These latter theorists, it will be recalled, have influenced the author's conception of the processes that underlie transformations in patterns of urban and regional development.

In the third section the work of Borja (1977) on the emergence of urban and regional planning in Spain, is reviewed and its possible application in South Africa is assessed. Borja's (1977) work is considered important since it provides a model of the unfolding of crisis and contradiction through time in a semi-peripheral capitalist social formation (i.e. a social formation similar to that in South Africa). Moreover, in a rather superficial prior analysis of the evolution of state interventions on the urban terrain, McCarthy and Smit (1984) attempted to apply the Borja model to South Africa. The periodization developed in their analysis provides the basis for the periodization of planning activity in this dissertation. Thus the third section reviews the McCarthy and Smit (1984) application of Borja (1977), and modifies
The periodization. The fourth section focuses on the specificity of urban and regional planning, as a form of state intervention distinct from other forms of state intervention. Roweis' (1983) theory of planning as the mediation of territorial politics has proved particularly useful in deciding whether to treat territorial apartheid as distinct from urban and regional planning or as an integral part of it. The final sections of the chapter focus on theories of progressive planning. As far as the international literature is concerned, special attention is paid to the works of Fainstein and Fainstein (1982), Cooke (1983) and Kraushaar (1988). Locally, contributions by McCarthy and Smit (1984) and Coleman (1986) are reviewed.

THEORY OF PLANNING IN CAPITALIST SOCIETIES

Roweis (1981) begins his analysis of planning by rejecting even the possibility of a viable theory of planning produced in isolation of the social context within which it occurs. Moreover, he argues that planning is essentially a social activity and therefore an attempt must be made to understand the social relations it changes, creates or perpetuates. He assumes also that urban planning relates to some form of collective action and to a constant struggle to institutionalize such collective action. Thus, urban planning is seen as a subset of state intervention and he argues that a plausible theory of planning must focus on the interface between "civil society" and the state. This relationship, it is argued, evolves and changes through time.

"We can no longer proceed along general, abstract and formalistic lines to discuss urban planning as if it existed in a stable, immutable or universal context" (Roweis, 1981, pp 161-162).

Thus, he distinguishes between planning in early and late capitalist societies. He describes early capitalism (mid-seventeenth to late nineteenth century) as characterized by the basic socio-economic institutions of laissez-faire capitalism: private ownership of capital, land and labour; competitive factor and goods markets; and incomes being derived primarily from the sale of individually owned factors of
production. State intervention in this period was limited, and confined to enforcing the rules of the game (e.g. protecting the institution of private property), ensuring social stability, the provision of a minimum level of public goods, and national defence. This is not to suggest that the state acted as neutral arbitrator. It fully reflected differential political power.

As laissez-faire capitalism transformed into monopoly capitalism, state intervention expanded and intensified. Such extended intervention was necessary, according to Roweis (1982) to:

1. Redress inequalities and grievances which arise as a matter of course as laissez-faire capitalism plays itself out. These interventions are necessary to prevent explosive social confrontation.

2. Contain crises deriving from the irrationalities contained in the logic of capitalist accumulation such as: over accumulation resulting from production for exchange rather than social needs; uneven economic growth characterized by boom and bust; unemployment and the extermination of small businesses arising from the tendency towards concentration and centralization of capital.

3. Provide public goods such as collective consumption, and infrastructure for accumulation which, given the logic of commodity production for exchange, would otherwise not be provided, but which are essential to ensure continued accumulation.

Whilst state interventions have expanded, Roweis points out that there are in capitalist societies, forces which simultaneously resist such expansion. These include:

1. The institution of private property.

2. The freedom or autonomy accorded to producers under capitalism in investment decisions, the setting of production priorities and so on.
3. The unwillingness of all social classes to grant power to ambiguous and relatively impenetrable and technocratic bureaucracies.

Roweis goes on to argue that in late capitalism the distinction between civil society and the state becomes blurred. Civil society itself becomes much more politicized (what Castells (1977) would call the politicization of "everyday life"). Thus, private property is now subjected to a number of politically decided constraints (e.g. zoning regulations in the case of land); labour markets are mediated through political struggles between trade unions and management; the market in goods and services is increasingly regulated through a political process; and incomes are no longer derived primarily from the sale of owned factors of production, but rather through a political process (the award of contracts, welfare programmes, regional equalization policies etc). This increasing politicization notwithstanding, Roweis (1981, p 167) points out that:

"In the final analysis, the dictates of capitalist commodity production and exchange are still at the core of the civil society and, as such, continue to be the ultimate regulators of state activities and decision processes."

However, given the increasing politicization of civil society, the state has come to rely increasingly on what Roweis (1981, p 168) calls the "pre-politics processing of political information". This refers to work undertaken by state apparatuses to produce information aimed primarily at pre-empting political confrontation or disputes. This includes information such as: the relevant classes or fractions of classes who might be affected by an emerging issue; the respective power of each; the potential alliances which may emerge; the degree of disruption that may occur if a particular fraction is ignored; the variety of ways in which contenders can be neutralized or bought off, and so on. The effect of this increasing reliance on the pre-political processing of information has, according to Roweis, enabled the state to act as a buffer between contending parties. The "direct politics" of early capitalism has been replaced by the mediation of a fairly technocratic state. This, in turn, has mitigated the bias of state interventions in favour of the ruling classes. Instead, the role of the state has become that of system stabilization. Thus, rather than being an instrument of the
ruling classes in a very direct sense, the state in late capitalism will respond to politics in such a way that:

"The greatest share of political attention, i.e. the highest priorities of political/administrative intervention, will be given to those classes, factions, groups, or organizations who are most able to contribute effectively towards easing fundamental crises or reducing the risks of aggravating such crises" (Roweis, 1981, p 168).

He goes on to qualify, however, as follows:

"Since 'overdoses' of state intervention generally tend to give rise to problems in other areas, a minimum of regulation necessary for stability will tend not to be exceeded" (Roweis, 1981, p 168).

In turning specifically to the question of urban planning in capitalist societies, he begins by arguing that urban planning grapples with the problem of making collective actions affecting the social utilization of land possible in a society whose basic social institutions resist such actions.

"The history and development of urban planning under capitalism can thus be seen as the history and development of modes of operation allowing for some measure of collective action (that affects decisions concerning the social utilization of urban land); modes of operation which must be feasible in a society whose basic social and property relations (or institutions) resist such action" (Roweis, 1981, pp 170-171).

Given the weakness of the state under early capitalism, urban planning did not emerge as a particularly distinctive social relation. However, the crises and contradictions of capitalist accumulation necessitated intervention, particularly in the provision of essential public goods.

The continued development of these crises led, under late capitalism, to an increasing incidence of planning. However, under the increasingly politicized conditions of late capitalism, urban planning has never been fully integrated into its institutions. Instead planning is an activity which gains or loses prominence depending on the role it can play in resolving crises:
"Urban planning remains an instrumentality picked up or neglected depending on whether, under the circumstances, it can be effectively used to stabilize the economy and/or to maintain a reasonable threshold of required mass loyalty" (Roweis, 1981, p 172).

The necessity for and the simultaneous rejection of planning under capitalism, Roweis argues, finds expression in the contradiction between theory and practice experienced by planners. On the one hand, planners constantly attempt to show how in theory, the marriage of planning and capitalism is possible and highly desirable. In practice, however, they are forced to "recognize the near impossibility of such a reconciliation" (Roweis, 1981, p 172). Thus, they are forced to become skilled at the "art of the possible" but in doing so, Roweis suggests, their theory diverges from their practice.

As the gap widens so they are forced to either reject planning outright (or advocate "ideal" forms of planning in a more rational future society) and give up hope of making any practical impact, or they have to opt for a more pragmatic, less theoretically integral approach and, in so doing, forego any possibility of bringing about structural change.

Roweis (1981) goes on to argue that the gap between theory and practice and the evolution of both, is fundamentally affected by the tendency towards crisis in capitalist societies. In times of crisis it is possible that planners are able to close the gap between theory and practice, and in the process, learn from praxis. The extent to which this is possible depends on the extent to which planning is relevant in resolving crisis and restoring stability. However, in line with this general theory of state intervention, Roweis points out that only the minimal level intervention necessary to restore stability, will be tolerated. Thus, planners are not able to follow through and test the promise of their theory in practice. In times of stability, or in periods in which planning appears to have little relevance to crisis resolution, planning is relegated into the background. During such periods, theory once again diverges from practice. Theorists may, in such periods, indulge in fanciful and idealistic theorization, whilst
practitioners get on with "grubby" and relatively insignificant administrative practices.

"...it can now be seen that it is not what happens in the minds of urban planners (i.e. ideas, advocacies, self-images, professional ethos, theories, etc) that primarily shapes the nature and development of urban planning practice (although it may have a negative influence), but rather the exact opposite. It is the strains put on urban planning in practice (i.e. the concrete manifestations of the irreconcilability of capitalism and collective action) that constantly shape and reshape the theoretical superstructure of the field..." (Roweis, 1981, p 172).

In sum then, for Roweis (1981), urban planning has to do with the pre-political processing of information relevant to decisions concerning social stability. Moreover, its prominence, scope and nature depends critically on the extent to which it is relevant to the resolution of crisis. By implication its theoretical and practical progress is also dependent on crisis, since it is in crisis periods that opportunities exist for closing the gap between theory and practice.

Whilst impressed and influenced by Roweis' theoretical work, the author should, however, also point to a number of weaknesses, some of which will be elaborated in the course of the dissertation itself. To begin with, the overly structuralist emphasis of his theory is problematic. The extent of this structuralism is revealed in the following quote:

"Hence, a critical analysis of urban planning must reject the inane notion that the successes or failures of urban planning practice are due to 'good' or 'bad' urban planning theory. It should rather seek to understand these successes and failures by analyzing the concrete socio-economic political conditions under which urban planning is practiced and by looking specifically, in every case, for the objective circumstances allowing (or demanding) the undertaking of more (or less) collective action in the domain of urban development" (Roweis, 1981, p 173).

While not disagreeing with Roweis that structure affects the possibilities for practices of various kinds and also the outcomes of such practices, it is hypothesised here that Roweis's conception underemphasizes the importance of agency and of ideas. Thus, this dissertation attempts to show how at particular conjunctures, ideas on
the one hand and the agency of planners on the other, have been quite decisive in affecting the trajectory of planning. In fact, it is suggested that in South Africa, the emergence of town planning legislation in the 1930s was as much a function of the importation of ideas from abroad as it was a response to local structural circumstances.

Roweis’ structuralism also leads to a theorization of planning as an essentially reactive (as opposed to proactive) activity. Whilst the evidence that will be produced in this dissertation largely supports this view, it will be shown that in some respects planning has been a very stable activity, and at times manifestly proactive. Another problem with Roweis’ framework is his rather fuzzy and, ultimately, structuralist theory of the state and by implication, of urban and regional planning. Whilst in early capitalism he sees the capitalist state in largely instrumentalist terms, he then argues that the state’s increasing role in pre-political processing of information affecting collective action buffers it from the influence of particular classes. Instead, its role becomes that of systems stabilization, acting against the interests of some factions of the dominant classes if necessary. Moreover Roweis (1981) is clearly influenced by the structuralist work of Poulantzas (1973) in which the role of the state is seen as structurally determined and thus independent of the will of individual capitalists (or workers for that matter). This structurally or objectively determined role is to maintain social cohesion so as to promote the reproduction of the process of capital accumulation.

Saunders (1981) has criticized structuralist conceptions of the state as tautological:

"...as long as capitalism continues, the theory contains no counterfactual at all; the only thing that the state could do that would be against the long term interests of monopoly capital is to abolish monopoly capitalism!"

Moreover, he criticizes the tendency of structuralist theorists to anthropomorphize the state:

"Where apart from human agency, is the cause of ... aims and intentions ... without human subjects the state cannot have
aims, and without aims there is no mechanism to explain its necessary function" (Saunders, 1981, p 207).

Cooke, (1983, p 264) also criticizes the assumption that the role of the state is system stabilization, and therefore axiomatically in the long run interest of capital, and makes the following observations:

"The implication here is not that the state or, more pertinently, the state planning apparatus is 'functional' for capital ... but that the planning system is itself fraught with the contradictory lines of force found in civil and political society. This means that planning does not simply serve capital, it helps to provide conditions for accumulation or valorization to continue. This is carried out in a context set by resistance to those activities from labour and a variety of ethnic, regional, local, gender, religious and other interest groups. The outcomes of this process are uncertain" (emphasis added).

As Cooke (1983) points out, Roweis' (1981) structural-functionalism leads him to conceptualize the state and urban planning as an ever-growing and necessary response to the escalating crises and contradictions of capitalism. It is this conceptualization which allows him to distinguish between planning under early and late capitalism. However, the functionalism and determinism of his perspective does not allow him to sufficiently recognize that urban planning is not a necessary response to crisis and contradiction but a contingent response. Thus, while Scott and Roweis (1977, p 111) predict that:

"... urban planning is likely to grow into an ever more insistent element of the capitalist urbanization process"

the evidence for the late 1970's and 1980's in the USA and Europe is to the contrary. Thatcherism and Reaganism have been accompanied by a systematic dismantling of the state apparatuses including those dealing with environmental control. As Cooke (1983, p 264) comments:

"These events seem to indicate not that planning is an essential part of advanced capitalism, but rather that it is one kind of solution to class struggles, and that its form may change, or disappear, to be replaced by new kinds of solutions structured by new legal arrangements"
These criticisms of Roweis' (1981) work notwithstanding, a number of aspects of his theory have proved particularly useful in guiding the historical and theoretical work conducted in the thesis. These are as follows:

1. The emphasis on the relation between the nature and evolution of urban planning and social structure. Thus, in many respects this is a structuralist dissertation, but an effort is made to pay due attention to idealism and agency.

2. The emphasis on crisis and contradiction as the basis for emergence of urban planning practices and their transformation.

3. The observation that there is an ongoing tension in capitalist societies between the need for institutionalized urban planning on the one hand, and its simultaneous rejection on the other.

4. The argument that this tension is often experienced as a tension between theory and practice.

5. The proposition that planning is an instrumentality which may achieve prominence or be discarded depending on the extent to which it can contribute to crisis resolution.

6. The argument that in times of crisis, opportunities exist for the advancing of planning theory and practice, but that the potential of such advances is usually stunted by the tendency for only minimalist intervention to be allowed, since more thorough interventions might create problems elsewhere in the social structure.

Crisis, Contradiction and Urban and Regional Planning

While Roweis' (1981) work is very useful in providing a broad conceptual overview of planning in capitalist societies, he does not specify, at a conceptual level, the kinds of crises and contradictions that give rise to the need for urban planning. Of course, the precise nature of these contradictions and crises will vary with time and place. The author has been influenced in his identification and theorization of these crises
in South Africa by a wide range of theoreticians, the full richness of which cannot be repeated here. A range of contradictions which various authors have related to crisis and conflict and the emergence of urban and regional planning, however, may be briefly listed here:

1. Crises and conflicts arising from the appropriation of a portion of the social product in the living place through rents. For workers, rent is paid out of wages and reduces living standards. This, in turn, leads to demands for high wages in the workplace. Thus, the possibility of tri-partite conflicts between capital, land and labour may emerge. This conflict will give rise to the call for urban planning (public housing, slum clearances, etc) (Harvey, 1978a; Roweis and Scott, 1981).

2. Many of the goods and services necessary for the reproduction of labour (health care, schooling, housing and so on) will not be produced in the commodity form because of high risk, low profits, and slow rotation time of capital. In the housing sphere, for example, this may lead to the emergence of squatting, of slums and of demands for public housing. It may also lead to the emergence of what Castells (1977) calls urban social movements and struggles over the social wage. Urban planning may be called upon to intervene in, or mediate struggle in some way (Castells, 1977; Harvey, 1978b).

3. In capitalist societies, the logic of commodity production and the reproduction of labour power requires functionally efficient patterns of land use. Private land use decision-making in pursuit of profit leads to a tendency away from such efficiency. This, in turn, may lead to calls for the social co-ordination of land use decision-making at both the urban and regional scale (Roweis and Scott, 1981).

4. To the extent that urban land is produced in the commodity form, so it has a use-value and an exchange-value. Conflicts may develop between owners of land who wish to convert the use of land to realize exchange value (absentee landlords, speculators, property capital) while others (tenants, working-class resident owners) fight
to preserve the existing use values (Harvey, 1978a). Planners may be called upon to mediate.

5. The uneven nature of capitalist development may create opportunities for, or place constraints on bringing about changes in planning practice. The tendency towards over-accumulation in the primary circuit of capital, may lead to bursts of built environment production, as capital is channeled into the secondary circuit (Harvey, 1981). Planners may be asked to preside over this rapid flow of capital into the built environment, either facilitating the process or responding to its effects (freeway construction, bulk controls, etc). Realization crises on the other hand, may lead to pressures on planners to promote particular forms or styles of consumption (e.g. suburbanization and private ownership of housing, rather than collective forms (Walker, 1981). Long term crises or "organic" crises emanating from amongst other things the tendency of rate of profit to fall, may also bring major changes in planning. To the extent that monetarist responses are adopted, deregulation and privatization may not only affect planning practices, but even constitute a challenge to planning itself (Rees and Lambert, 1985).

6. The tendency in capitalist societies towards the concentration and centralization of capital has reduced the reliance of large firms on agglomeration economies and thereby reduced the extent to which they are locality-bound. This, in turn, has facilitated capital flight from cities and regions where class struggles are well developed, to regions or countries where labour is less organized (Massey, 1984; Rees and Lambert, 1985). This has led some authors to suggest the regional planning policies such as deconcentration and decentralization are functional to monopoly capital (Rees and Lambert, 1985). Moreover, urban planners are often called upon to help resolve the crises precipitated by capital flight.

7. The tendency towards the concentration and centralization of capital and the emergence of finance capital as a distinct social relation, has increased the capacity of firms to undertake massive built-environment related projects (skyscrapers, regional shopping centres, private new towns). In some instances, this may lead to
conflicts over the conversion of the built environment or to major
design opportunities for planners (Walker, 1981).

8. The tendency under capitalism towards increases in the organic
composition of capital has as its corollary, increasing
unemployment. Planners may be called upon to help address such
problems through a variety of mechanisms (basic needs programmes;
public works programmes; spatial design to promote small business;
public/private co-operative schemes, etc) (Cooke, 1983).

Of course, the general types of contradiction, crisis and conflict
referred to above, will develop quite differently in different contexts.
As I have already pointed out, they are part of the conceptual armory
that I have brought to bear in my analysis of the specificity of urban
and regional planning in South Africa. It should be noted, however,
that the mere identification of planning-related crises and
contradictions gives no sense of the way in which these crises or
contradictions unfold and the kinds of state interventions they give rise
to. The work of Borja (1977) on urban planning practices in Spain has
proved very useful in providing such a sense of momentum. Given that
Spain, like South Africa, is a semi-peripheral capitalist society,
Borja’s (1977) propositions seem particularly appropriate. Thus, in the
model of state interventions on the urban terrain in response to the
unfolding of a variety of crises and contradictions was developed which
was based on Borja’s (1977) work. Since this model has provided the
conceptual basis for the periodization of the analysis in this
dissertation, a brief summary of the basic model is warranted.

The Borja Model

Borja (1977), in fact does not explicitly identify an historical model of
planning intervention, but the first few pages of his analysis of Spanish
urban issues implicitly suggest such a model. In terms of McCarthy and
Smit’s (1984) version of the Borja Model, the role of the state in
responding to the crises of accumulation process under capitalism can be
related to the urbanization process in three overlapping historical
stages. These are described by McCarthy and Smit (1984, p 87) as follows:

"t1 - an **urbanization of raw accumulation** where the state relies upon extreme coercion of labour and concentrates its urban land use activity upon facilitating the appropriation of surplus in the spheres of production and circulation by supplying infrastructure to those spheres.

**t2** - a subsequent **urbanization of social control** where the state's interest is forced to switch to problems of reproduction in a 'saturated and under-equipped' reproductive sphere that is seen 'merely as an object of public order'; and

**t3** - an **urbanization of ideological and physical intervention** where the sphere of reproduction is once again paramount to the priorities of the state, but where that sphere increasingly becomes 'an object of plunder and of ideology'."

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**Figure 2.1**: Levels of state concern with different aspects of urbanization (After McCarthy and Smit, 1984)

According to Borja (1977) the urbanization that is generated by the first phase of capitalist accumulation (**t1**) is one characterized by appropriation of labour power from the pre-capitalist hinterland and the overall neglect of the sphere of reproduction. State intervention
focuses on the provision of infrastructure (bridges, roads, railways) to promote rapid accumulation, and on repression. Contradictions of types 1 and 2 (Described in the preceding section) combined with the overall neglect of the sphere of reproduction give rise to crisis and political activism (e.g. urban social movements). Contradictions of type 3 may also begin to affect the viability of accumulation, and give rise to demands for collective intervention. The state response in this period to political revolt and crisis in the sphere of reproduction is to quell it with brute force. It is also fairly common in this period for the state to adopt an "anti-urban" posture and attempt to control influx to the cities (Borja, 1977).

In the t2 period the state is forced to switch attention to the sphere of reproduction (usually a consequence of some fairly major revolt). The character of intervention however, shifts from "neglect by oversight to that of neglect through regulation and control" (McCarthy and Smit, 1984, p 91). Land use planning often arises in this period, usually to deal with the efficiency problems that "emerge out of an urbanism that on the one hand requires interdependence in production and consumption, but which on the other hand is based upon the relations of anarchical 'private' decision-making" (McCarthy and Smit, 1984, p 91).

Attacks might also be made on slum conditions through the introduction of controlling regulation (slum acts and the like), slum clearance and perhaps the limited provision of public housing (responses to contradictions of type 1 and 2). In making these interventions, however, the city is seen "merely as an object of public order" (Borja, 1977). The limited nature of the interventions, and the growing importance of the appropriation of surplus in the living place (type 1), leads to a resurgence of activism at both the point of production and in the community. This provides the conditions for the shift to the t3 phase.

The t3 phase is perhaps the least satisfactorily theorized by Borja (1977) or by McCarthy and Smit (1984). The period is characterized as one in which substantial and direct physical and ideological intervention in the sphere of reproduction occurs in response to the failure of the interventions in the t2 phase. Mass housing estates are often built or
new subsidized housing programmes introduced. The focus on built-environment production may also be underpinned by a crisis of accumulation in the primary circuit which leads to a diversion of capital into the secondary circuit (type 5). It may also be underpinned by the concentration of capital and the emergence of finance and property capital as distinct social relations (type 6). During the t3 phase attempts to re-introduce the popular masses to the principles of possessive individualism are common (through the promotion of home-ownership or self-help strategies). Strategies for dealing with the perennial contradictions (1 and 2) in the reproductive sphere vary depending on the momentum of the accumulation process.

In their application of the model to the history of urbanization-related state intervention in South Africa, McCarthy and Smit (1984) specify the period up to 1925 as the t1 phase. The t2 phase spans the period 1925 to 1950. The t3 phase refers to the period after 1950. It should be noted that the time periods referred to above are generally approximations of times in which particular policy directions were dominant. Overlap from one period into the other also occurred. The empirical evidence upon which the periodization is based was by the own admission of the authors, thin. This consideration notwithstanding, the periodization does, however, provide a useful basis around which to structure future research. However, whereas the McCarthy and Smit (1984) periodization is useful, the actual periodization chosen for the present study was also based on other considerations. Thus, the first period examined - 1900 to 1930 - roughly corresponds with the t1 phase identified earlier by McCarthy and Smit (1984), but is also the period just prior to adoption of formal town planning legislation in the early 1930s. Moreover, while the 1930 to 1950 period corresponds with the t2 phase, it is also the period in which the first town planning schemes were implemented, the first major new towns designed, and the period in which regional planning gained momentum. The specification by McCarthy and Smit (1984) of the entire period since 1950 as one period (t3) is perhaps insufficiently fine-grained. After all, the period 1950 to 1974 is very distinctive as the period of "apartheid" planning. Moreover, the post-1974 period is equally distinctive as the period of "organic crisis" which has had major impacts on urban and regional planning.
Before proceeding it should be noted that while the Borja (1977) model and the McCarthy and Smit (1984) application has been useful in conceptualizing and organizing the study at hand, the author is fully aware of the difficulties associated with the almost Rostovian evolutionism implicit in the model. The deterministic and agency-less conception of history implicit in the model is a source of concern, and in the analysis that follows, the opportunity is taken to reflect critically on it.

On the Specificity of Urban and Regional Planning

One of the methodological/theoretical difficulties that is encountered in embarking on a political-economic analysis of planning in South Africa, is the question of whether or not "territorial" apartheid should be considered part and parcel of urban and regional planning or simply an influence at a distance upon it. On the other hand, there is a strong feeling within the planning profession in South Africa that politics and urban and regional planning are quite separate. In a survey of urban and regional planners conducted by the author in 1985, 95% of Afrikaans-speaking planners felt that planning was either entirely "science" or mostly "science", influenced occasionally by politics. Only 5% felt that it had mainly to do with politics. For English-speaking respondents, the response was a little different. Sixty percent felt that planning was largely science whilst a more sizeable 38% felt it was mainly "politics". In any event many urban and regional planners argue that apartheid sets a framework within which they, and other professionals, are forced to work. However, in pursuing their planning activities they say they proceed strictly in terms of the science of the public interest. The opposing view is that to argue that territorial apartheid falls outside of urban and regional planning, is to argue that the state interventions which have most fundamentally shaped the settlement patterns and territorial social relations of South Africa's cities and regions have nothing to do with urban and regional planning. In attempting to resolve this question the author found an article on the specificity of urban and regional planning by Roweis (1983) to be especially useful.
Roweis (1983) begins by attempting to situate urban and regional planning practice in a broader conceptual framework. He does this by first discussing the relationship between politics and society and then by examining the role of what he calls "public policy professionals" in the political realm. He then attempts to delineate the specific terrain of urban and regional planning. Turning firstly to his conception of politics, Roweis (1983, p 149) argues that politics can be defined in the following way:

"... events, encounters, issues, and processes are political if they involve attempts to modify, amend, or change some social institution and/or to make public decisions which cannot be routinely or legitimately made on the basis of existing social institutions alone."

The essence of the argument is that in any society numerous social interactions occur on a decentralized basis and are mediated through a set of institutions which allow the routinization of such interactions. By the term institution Roweis (1983) means "social norms" as opposed to organizational units. When these social norms or institutions no longer adequately regulate everyday life, or if they are no longer socially accepted by some individuals or groups, and if attempts are made to modify or change existing institutions or introduce new ones, politics occurs. Moreover, he argues that some social relations cannot be routinized, and as a consequence require ongoing political decision-making. Roweis (1983, p 150) then goes on to develop the notion of "public policy professionals" who are defined as follows:

"I define public policy professionals as those whose substantive fields of competence qualify them to, and whose particular work situations requires them to, participate in politics in the capacity of practical advisors."

By acting as practical advisors, Roweis (1983) means that they provide credible and systematic interpretations of political issues which ease the task of political actors in accommodating or resolving differences. In this sense public policy professionals act as mediators.

Roweis (1983) then moves from the general specification of politics and public policy professionals to define the specificity of urban and
regional planning. He argues that planners are involved in politics and that they are public policy professionals, but with respect to a particular domain of social life - the domain of territorial social relations. Territorial relations are defined as:

"Those human interactions which involve actual or potential impacts (positive or negative) on the access pattern of an occupant or group of occupants by the plans, decisions, and/or actions of other occupants or groups of occupants in the relevant territory" (Roweis, 1983, p 153).

More specifically, an action may have an impact on territorial relations if it changes:

1. The physical characteristics and/or the territorial configuration of channels of access or some relevant elements thereof;
2. The type and/or intensity of the use of the network of channels of access or of some relevant elements thereof; or,
3. The types of inhabitants or users, activities, or objects available (or absent) in various nodes of assembly within the relevant territory" (Roweis, 1983, pp 153-154).

Of course, a number of territorial social relations are governed by routinized and standardized behaviour patterns (e.g. land markets). However, Roweis (1983) argues that because of interdependencies and externalities associated with territorial relations, there are enormous difficulties in standardizing such relations. As a consequence territorial politics is a very important part of politics in general. Urban planners, Roweis (1983) argues, are the public policy professionals of the politics of territorial social relations. More specifically, and with particular reference to the USA, the role of urban and regional planning:

"is to mediate ongoing territorial politics, mainly, but not exclusively, by providing professional interpretations of relevant territorial realities" (Roweis, 1983, p 539).

Viewed in the light of Roweis' definition, there can be no doubt that territorial apartheid interventions would constitute urban and regional
planning interventions. Such interventions have been critical in the
domain of territorial social relations in South Africa. Territorial
apartheid has, for example, certainly affected the types of users, the
activities and the access of people to nodes of assembly (e.g. influx
controls) and to what Roweis (1983) calls material public goods.
Whether or not planners in South Africa have acted as "mediators" in this
process is another matter altogether. Certainly urban and regional
planners in South Africa are, for the most part, public policy
professionals as posited by Roweis, and it seems reasonable to argue that
they are involved in the provision of practical advice to decision-makers
by interpreting territorial realities. However, it is quite obvious
that in the case of South Africa many territorial interventions are
clearly partisan in the sense that they have been quite specifically
designed to serve the interests of power bloc groupings. Thus, this
dissertation will not proceed on the basis of any 'abstract' assumption
regarding the actual social role played by planners, but will attempt to
establish this role through empirical analysis. At a definitional
level, however, urban and regional planning will be regarded as the
professional interpretation of territorial realities, with a view to
influencing collective interventions in territorial social relations.
It should be noted, however, that in many instances what is observable
empirically are actual territorial interventions, rather than the
"pre-politics" processing of information relevant to the interventions.
As a consequence, the historical account that follows focuses mainly on
concrete territorial interventions, and only where feasible are attempts
made to address the planning "advice" given.

While territorial apartheid is included in the analysis (by definition),
it should be noted that it has been analysed in some depth by
non-planners (e.g. Wolpe, 1972; Legassick and Wolpe, 1976; Western,
1981; Hindson, 1987). As a consequence, territorial apartheid will not
be the central focus of the study, but an important one nonetheless. A
particular attempt will be made to explore the way in which apartheid has
historically articulated with other apparently more technicist forms of
urban and regional planning. An attempt will also be made to explore
the distinction (so often made by South African planners) between
"apartheid politics" and "technicist public interest planning", with a
view to determining whether such a distinction is sustainable.
Moreover, the material circumstances of planning practice in South Africa which have given this distinction resonance in the eyes of South African planners, will be explored.

Finally, it should be noted that while the definition of urban and regional planning adopted here is useful in focusing the analysis, no attempt is made to stick to it rigidly. At times, issues will be discussed which, strictly speaking, contravene definitional boundaries, but which nonetheless would be regarded by planners as part and parcel of their professional concerns. For example changes in housing policy, with marginal territorial content, are discussed in the dissertation largely because housing and housing policy have traditionally been accepted as an integral component of planning activity. Moreover, at certain conjunctures, professional planners have strayed outside the boundaries of territorial social relations and have become involved in other social relations (e.g. local economic development planning).

Thus, in this dissertation, what is considered the content of urban and regional planning is informed by inter alia: abstract definition; an examination of the concrete practices of professional urban and regional planners; and by an intuitive grasp (hopefully shared with other planners) of the scope and dimensions of the field.

**PLANNING AND PROGRESSIVE SOCIAL CHANGE**

As specified in the previous chapter, one of the goals of this dissertation is to examine the record on and prospects for a progressive social role for urban and regional planning in South Africa. It was also noted that very little has been written locally on either of these issues. This section briefly reviews the international literature on progressive planning as well as providing an overview of recent local contributions to the debate.

One of the unintended consequences of the rise of the "new urban sociology" in the late 1970s was the challenge it posed to planning theory and practice. It was not that radical theorists from within planning's own bastions had not already dealt harshly with planning. Kravitz (1970), for example, had styled planners as the "handmaidens of
conservative politics”, while Goodman (1971) went even further, suggesting that they were nothing but society’s “soft cops”. It was rather that the rise of the “new urban sociology” to an almost hegemonic position within the realm of urban and regional theory, meant that the critique of planning that it implied, could no longer be ignored. Certainly, many of the “new urban sociology”’s most prominent theorists were highly critical of planning and the social role they considered it to play. Castells (1977, p 44), for example, argued that “town planning cannot be a means of social change but only of domination, integration and control of contradictions”. In the same vein, David Harvey (1978b, p 213) argued that the role of planning could be described as the:

"... maintenance and management of the built environment .... in order to stabilize, to create the conditions for "balanced growth", to contain civil strife and factional struggles by repression, co-option or integration."

Mingione (1981) focused his critique on the inability of planning to manage the territorial contradictions of capitalist development and on its autocratic and controlling nature:

"In fact by definition, planning has in any case been an authoritarian undemocratic mechanism which has tried to limit the anarchist multi-directional tendencies of economic and social movements into a single direction guided by a political elite" (Mingione, 1981, p 171).

As Kraushaar (1988, p 93) puts it, in the context of these critiques "progressive planning is truly an oxymoron". While in some quarters the critique elicited a hostile and reactionary response, more serious-minded and progressive planners began to embrace the challenges the critique posed, and began to respond.

It soon became apparent that critiques of planning of the sort presented by Harvey (1978b) and Castells (1977), were based upon overly abstract, a historical and excessively structuralist or instrumentalist views of the state under capitalism. Earlier in this Chapter the problems associated with overly structuralist theories of the state were outlined with reference to the work of Roweis (1981). The same criticisms apply equally to Castells (1977) and Harvey (1978b). In the critique of Roweis
(1981) referred to above, the determinism and functionalism of structuralist thought was noted and criticized. An alternative conceptual approach is proposed by Cooke (1983):

"... it is of key importance that urban and regional development planning under capitalism is conceptualized as a somewhat limited and indeterminate part of an equally indeterminate framework of uneven social relations" (Cooke, 1983, p 264).

Viewed from this perspective, the state and, more importantly urban planning, cannot simply be assumed, in the abstract, to be functional to capital in either the short or long run. Whether or not it serves the interests of the dominant classes is contingent and uncertain. Essential in such an approach is a move away from the abstractionism so typical of Harvey (1978b) and Castells (1977), to a focus on historical specificity and the contingency of social actions and their outcomes, not only on conjunctural circumstances (structure), but also on subjective factors (human agency). The elements of such an approach are evident in Fainstein and Fainstein's (1982) assessment of the possibilities for progressive practice in the USA in the 1980s. While their analysis is not based on a particularly careful analysis of the conjuncture, they do at least recognize that in the USA there is neither a well-developed proletarian party nor a distinct working-class consciousness. Thus, they assume that the chances for revolutionary transformation are remote and given this assessment, they offer the following propositions to guide progressive planning practice:

1. Planners should attempt to improve the material conditions of the working classes.

2. Because the working classes are more vulnerable under "laissez-faire" conditions, the more planning the better.

3. The expansion of planning and the welfare state should be encouraged.

In addition to their assessment of the broad social context, Fainstein and Fainstein (1982) reach these conclusions on the basis of an analysis
of the options open to progressive-minded planners in the USA. They identify three such options: "working within the state to make its character more humane, working outside the state to affect governmental policy, and developing autonomous centres of production and distribution" (Fainstein and Fainstein, 1982, p. 155). It is clear that they do not believe that the latter strategies have much potential in the USA given the fragmented and often marginal nature of urban movements. This is not to say that gains cannot be won by planners working outside the state structures, but rather to assert the primacy of the formal structures, as the terrain upon which progressive planners are most likely to be effective. Their faith in the formal planning structures lies in the belief that the state is not monolithic and can at least potentially respond to what they call "non-elite" interests. Moreover, they argue that planners can exploit the relative autonomy that derives from their mastery over technical issues and their role in the management and communication of information. The Fainsteins' (1982) avoidance of structural determinism is evident in their recognition that agency can make a difference, arguing that:

"The character of the governmental response depends on the factual analysis and value orientation of those within it. The ideology of planners within government can be a crucial determinant of policy at critical moments" (Fainstein and Fainstein, 1982, p 153).

Moreover, their less functionalist approach is evident in their observation that improving the material conditions of the working classes "is at least as likely to result in further contradictions of capitalism as to eliminate a revolutionary potential" (Fainstein and Fainstein, 1982, p 155).

While Fainstein and Fainstein's (1982) paper is a useful response to the dilemmas raised by Marxist theories of planning, it is also deficient in a number of respects. As has already been suggested, Fainstein and Fainstein (1982) do not pay sufficient attention to the economic crisis of advanced capitalism of the late 1970's and 1980's and its implications for welfarism and statism. Thus, like Roweis (1981) they tend to assume that the continuance and growth of urban planning is not only possible, but desirable. Furthermore, the superficial nature of their conjunctural
analysis does not allow them to concretely identify major opportunities for, or constraints on, progressive practice, either inside or outside the bureaucracies. Thus, their assessment that formal planning offers the best opportunities for progressive planners is not satisfactorily substantiated. Finally, Coleman (1986) argues that the Fainstein's (1982) proposals hardly go beyond the prescriptions of liberal redistributionists and are reformist in the extreme. While Coleman (1986) fails to grasp the strategic and contingent nature of Fainstein and Fainstein's (1982) guidelines for progressive practice, there can be little doubt that they do not deal with the reformist implications of their propositions adequately.

Many of the shortcomings specified above are largely avoided in the work of Robert Kraushaar (see Kraushaar 1979, 1982, 1984, 1988; Kraushaar and Gardels, 1982; Kraushaar and Forester, 1987). To begin with most of his work is informed by a careful analysis of politico-economic crisis in the 1980s and its implications for planning. Thus, in his paper with Gardels (1982) he attempts to understand the crisis and then goes on to address the possibilities of planning in an era of limits. In his most recent paper (Kraushaar, 1988), he argues that many of the strategies that have served progressive planners in the past are no longer relevant and calls for strategies more in tune with the economic realities of the 1980's.

"Strategies such as community action (Alinsky, 1971), advocacy planning (Davidoff, 1964) and administrative insurgency (Needleman and Needleman, 1974) have lost significance in the 1980s. As Harvey (1978, p 219) notes, the real task has become the evolution of actions and ideologies that fit the economic realities in the 1980s 'rather than the social unrest and civil strife of the 1960s'" (Kraushaar, 1988, p 92).

Moreover, Kraushaar (1988) is much more aware of the problems associated with reformism. Thus, he distinguishes between what he calls "social reform" on the one hand and "radical reform" on the other. He defines social reform as attempts to rectify inequities and inequalities "within the existing sets of institutional and economic mechanisms" (Kraushaar, 1988, p 91). He defines radical reform as an activity that attempts to transform society, insofar that it brings about changes that add substantially to the rights, democracy and power of average citizens.
However, radical reform implies the introduction of such changes without calamity or revolution:

"Radical reform takes as its objectives fundamental political and economic changes, which it seeks to attain without crises or revolution. But radical reform sees the existing economic and institutional mechanisms of society as a primary cause of inequity and inequality. Therefore, I use the term "radical reform" deliberately, to reflect the contradictions inherent in its objectives and activities" (Kraushaar, 1988, p 91).

Thus like Fainstein and Fainstein (1982), Kraushaar (1988) implicitly recognizes that socialist transformation is a long way off in Britain and the USA, but is unwilling to accept the "social welfarist" model that the Fainsteins (1982) propose. Furthermore, he argues that given changed economic circumstances, progressive planners cannot and should not direct their attentions at resolving the symptoms arising from contradictions, but should attack the contradictions directly:

"Instead of developing programs that integrate and socialize urban communities into the existing economic system, they (progressive planners) need to develop planning strategies through which they can examine the political and economic structure of those same urban areas and can demonstrate how private capital operates against the interests of ordinary people (e.g. that a community and its residents do not control basic decisions about jobs and investment)" (Kraushaar, 1988, p 95).

Kraushaar (1988) then goes on to identify four directions for progressive practice, namely: a focus on the ravages of unfettered capital mobility in the context of crisis; the avoidance of artificial divisions in addressing urban issues; the building of coalitions; and the sustenance of routine.

As far as a focus on unconstrained capital mobility is concerned, Kraushaar (1988) points out that while economic growth is without question an important part of public consciousness, few reformists have managed to translate this consciousness into a progressive political movement. However, he notes with approval the way in which several progressive cities in both the USA and the UK have played an active role in either protecting neighbourhoods or communities from the effects of
large-scale private investment or preventing the flight of capital from the local environment. He refers, for example, to instances in which there has been direct government involvement in the local economy. Reference is made to the emphasis on the co-ownership of city real estate in Hartford and also to the way in which some local governments in England have become involved "in the ownership or directorship of private firms" (Kraushaar, 1988, p 96). Such ventures have been aimed primarily at introducing some public control over investment decisions. Moreover, Kraushaar (1988) also cites examples of the production of progressive economic development plans at the local level. More specifically, he mentions the Chicago Development Plan in which all city investments are evaluated in terms of the number of jobs they can potentially create. Given a context of crisis it is through the expansion of interventions which focus on economic issues, that Kraushaar (1988) sees important spaces for building a progressive consciousness.

In addition to a focus on the economy, Kraushaar (1988, p 97) suggests that progressive planners also have a role to play in promoting an alternative consciousness of everyday life, one which fosters, "rather than divides, the various aspects of everyday life, and defines community, not as a commodity, but as a place to experience life". He argues that in its pure form, capitalism tends to break down existing social relations of community and to replace them with financial links. Like Castells (1983), he sees many aspects of urban politics as struggles by communities of workers, women, ethnic groups, environmentalists and so on, over the "meaning of urban living". By promoting a holistic urban perspective around the notion of community, Kraushaar (1988, p 97) posits that planners can "nurture the ethos and institutions that will serve as alternatives to those of corporate capitalism".

In a similar vein, Kraushaar (1988) argues that planners can also contribute to the restructuring of urban consciousness by linking often disparate and fragmented urban social movements. More specifically, he argues that planners are often in a position to act as "linkage points" between groupings such as the aged, environmentalists, women, housing associations and many others:
"Because of the fragmentation of urban life, those individuals and organizations seldom interact, and frequently they do not trust one another ... As a result, even when they do recognize the need to unite over a common issue, they hesitate - or fail - to act" (Kraushaar, 1988, p 98).

Finally, Kraushaar (1988) suggests that the sustenance of certain kinds of routine can be turned to progressive ends by planners. He points out that the weight of institutional tradition (which is what he refers to when he uses the term "routine"), has often been regarded by radicals as fundamentally conservative and that change necessitated its elimination. However, he makes the point that such tradition can be turned to progressive ends, insofar as it is often particularism of the sort associated with inter alia kinship, religion, ethnicity, Black nationalism, that is most resistant to the homogenization and modernization that capital forces on society.

While Kraushaar's (1988) perspective represents an advance over the Fainstein and Fainstein (1982) formulations, it nonetheless suffers from a number of shortcomings. To begin with, Kraushaar (1988) gives us no sense of just how feasible his proposals are. There is no indication of why it is that we should expect that the strategies he proposes can be successfully pursued (or pursued at all). This omission stems from his highly generalized treatment of the momentum and direction of change within the political economies to which he refers. In fact, so generalized is his treatment that it is not at all clear precisely which political economies he is actually referring to. Certainly, as has already been mentioned, Kraushaar (1988) pays more attention to conjunctural circumstances and particularly the context of economic decline than do the Fainsteins (1982). Not surprisingly, the economic focus he proposed for planners has a rationale. However, some of his other proposals appear to have been plucked from the air. In fact, most of his proposals appear to have idealist rather than materialist origins. Furthermore, Kraushaar (1988) gives us no idea of why it is that planners are particularly well-located to pursue some of the strategies he suggests. Apart from his brief reference to the fact that planners often find themselves in "linkage" positions, he provides no assessment of whether such a "linkage" role is likely to become more or less important in the future. Moreover, since he lends so little
content to the concept "linkage points", it is difficult to assess just how effectively planners could use the space that he asserts these points provide. Finally, it should be noted that while Kraushaar (1988) recognizes the limits of welfarism, he is apparently not averse to a statist model of planning per se. For example, he sees no problem with an expanded role for planners in local investment decision-making through local state apparatuses.

The critique of statism does, however, lie at the centre of some authors' theories of progressive planning. Particularly influential in this regard is the work of Philip Cooke (1980, 1982, 1983). Cooke's (1983) prescriptions for progressive planning emerge from an exhaustive overview of theories relevant to planning in Britain. He is far more explicit in his recognition of the contextual specificity of his work than is Kraushaar (1988):

"... it is important that another, more substantial point is understood about the status of the framework to be discussed. This is that it does not seek to represent any general theory of planning ... What has been discussed is an attempt at explanation of certain important characteristics of the planning process under conditions of advanced capitalism (largely, though not exclusively, in the UK)" (Cooke, 1983, p 250).

Cooke (1983) argues that in the late 1970s in Britain, there was a shift from reproduction expenditure, to an emphasis on assisting capital through interventions in the sphere of circulation. This shift, Cooke (1983) argues, has been accompanied by the granting of considerable amounts of discretion to the local state. This discretion is allowed to enable the local state to spend resources on firms which have a chance of achieving above-average profit rates. However, Cooke (1983, p 272) suggests that this "local discretion" can also be used to "establish islands of socially-useful production in local space". It is in assisting workers in the production of worker plans for such socially useful production that Cooke (1983) sees a role for planners. Lying behind Cooke's (1983) proposals is a central concern with statism. He argues that progressive planners cannot hope to address the primary contradiction of advanced capitalism, i.e. the contradiction between capital and labour, because to attempt to do so through planning
represents what in his view is an absurdity. Cooke (1983, p 256) explains as follows:

"... while we have argued that development planning has its uses for capital and labour, it cannot be pretended that its institutions preside over commanding power vis-a-vis either the institutions of capital or those of labour, in the final analysis."

Instead he suggests that progressive planners should focus on what he calls the "people" versus "officialdom" contradiction. This contradiction, he argues, arises from the fact that even in instances where progressive forces win gains through the state, these gains are often delivered in a form which "apes the undemocratic command structures of the capitalist business enterprise" (Cooke, 1983, p 254). This is what Cooke (1983, p 254) refers to as the problem of statism and he elaborates as follows:

"... however good the intentions of political parties, pressure groups and the like, in seeking to establish state apparatuses aimed at correcting distributional imbalances, their legalistic, and hence, coercive, basis turns them into instruments which appear to further oppress rather than assist the proposed beneficiaries."

Cooke (1983) goes on to point out that despite all of its flaws, advocacy planning did attempt to overcome standard bureaucratic planning by rooting progressive planning activity in popular organization in the sphere of reproduction. He then notes, with approval, the emergence in the UK of popular planning not in the community, but in the sphere of production. By way of example he draws attention to the Lucas Aerospace Combine Committee’s Corporate Plan and a similar plan produced by the workers at Vickers. While the content of these plans cannot be elaborated here, suffice it to say that they focussed on utilizing industrial plant and technology for "socially useful" production whenever the "normal" use of this fixed capital was in danger as a consequence of downturns in the economy. While such plans relied on assistance from local state, they took planning outside of its usual statist form.

While Cooke’s (1983) direction is interesting and perhaps of some relevance in South Africa, it is difficult to understand why urban and
regional planners should become involved in assisting in the production of the worker's plans he refers to. Short of seeing planning in generic terms or in the procedural theoretical terms associated with authors such as Faludi (1973), it is doubtful that urban and regional planners have anything to offer workers in an exercise such as this. It is quite apparent therefore that in developing his theory of progressive planning, Cooke (1983) fails to take sufficient account of the specificity of urban and regional planning as a distinct domain of state intervention. Earlier in this chapter we drew on Roweis' (1983) work to suggest that this domain is the politics of territorial social relations. Cooke (1983), however, ignores the expertise and traditions of many years of urban and regional planning practice. This is not to suggest that the specificity of planning is immutable. Nor is it to make a fetish out of territorial social relations. It is simply to suggest that Cooke's (1983) proposals are not likely to have much resonance for practicing planners. This problem is further compounded by his apparent discarding of formal state structures as terrains for serious progressive planning programmes. In doing so he offers no guidance to the vast majority of practicing planners who have little alternative but to work within state structures. Certainly, Cooke's (1983) proposals would be less problematic if they were posed as a relatively minor part of a fuller range of strategies which took the location, traditions and expertise of planners into account. Moreover, Cooke's (1983) rooting of progressive planning within the sphere of production may reveal a narrow workerism, and one that is problematic in the light of changing processes of class structuration. This much is evident from the conclusions reached by Rees and Lambert (1985) based on an extremely detailed analysis of post-war planning in Britain. They note that as far as the inner city areas are concerned, the regional restructuring of accumulation and the flight of manufacturing capital have weakened the more traditional forms of labour organization and particularly of the unions. Thus, they argue that the creation of new "left" alliances will have to be forged on new terrains :

"What this implies, then, is that if the emergent new alliances are to grow stronger, then alternative focuses of organization to the historically rooted trade union ones (overwhelmingly, of course, wages and working conditions) need to be developed. We wish to suggest that the local state may have an especially
important role to play in this context" (Rees and Lambert, 1985, p 173).

What is interesting about Rees and Lambert’s (1985) propositions, is that they point to the possibility that in particular conjunctural circumstances, the state may not only be the appropriate terrain for embarking on progressive programmes, but may in fact be the only terrain. This is not to suggest that the problems of statism that Cooke (1983) refers to are not real enough. It is simply to suggest that Cooke’s (1983) response to the problems of statism are too one-dimensional. Rees and Lambert (1985), on the other hand, propose a much more layered and balanced range of strategies for progressive planners working within the inner cities. These include proposals for overcoming statism (such as the deconcentration of housing services and participation in worker plan-making), as well as a series of tactical proposals for those working within local state structures. As far as the latter is concerned, emphasis falls on the role of the local state in controlling disinvestment, and of the role of planners in ensuring that such opposition is rooted in strong locality-level alliances (community groups, ethnic groups, tenants associations, unions, etc). The details of these proposals need not be elaborated here, but it is worth noting that in many respects Rees and Lambert’s (1985) book provides a methodological model for this dissertation. Like this dissertation, Rees and Lambert’s (1985) book has the twin aims of understanding the political economy of urban and regional planning (with special reference to the inner cities) on the one hand, and developing theory to guide progressive interventions on the other. The book traces the historical evolution of planning and provides a very detailed analysis of the momentum and trajectory of change in the contemporary period. It is this detailed analysis of the conjuncture which together with lessons learned from the past, provides the basis for developing meaningful and balanced progressive strategy. It is precisely such an approach that has been adopted in this dissertation. The soundness of such an approach is quite evident when the weaknesses of previous attempts (mainly the author’s) to theorize progressive planning in South Africa are explored.
Serious attempts at theorizing progressive planning in South Africa have been confined mainly to McCarthy and Smit (1984), Smit (1984, 1986) and Coleman (1986). McCarthy and Smit’s (1984) work is heavily influenced by Castell’s (1977) classic work *The Urban Question*. This is not entirely surprising since it was in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s that urban social movements blossomed in South Africa in response to political and economic crisis. Following Castells (1977), McCarthy and Smit (1984) argued that the transformation of the built environment was far more likely to be achieved through the agency of urban social movements than through the state. Thus, they argued that a new progressive planning praxis would be largely forged outside of formal structures and in relation to the emerging urban social movements. Furthermore, they argued that while the possibilities for achieving progressive gains through state structures are extremely circumscribed in South Africa, they concede that progressive planners both can and should pursue progressive practices within these structures. They reach this conclusion on the basis of a review of theories of the state in which they criticize overly structuralist or instrumentalist views of state. They then draw on the theoretical work of Wolpe (1980) who argues that the state has to be understood as an arena of class struggle. To take any other position, Wolpe (1980, p 416) suggests, is to "set up the entire state as an instrument of the dominant classes, wielded on their behalf, by their party political representatives". Before proceeding, to an analysis of the spaces that may exist for progressive practices within formal structures, McCarthy and Smit (1984) specify three criteria for assessing the progressive content of any policy or practice, namely:

1. Does the policy advance the material well-being of the working classes?

2. Does the policy enhance the state of "class awareness" among the working classes?

3. Does the policy contribute to the mobilization of the working classes?
According to McCarthy and Smit (1984), the satisfaction of any of these criteria would constitute a progressive gain, but the first criterion cannot be pursued at the expense of the second and third criteria. They then go on to argue that there are four directions in which planners working within formal structures could advance progressive causes. The first concerns the utilization of the power that derives from control over technical expertise for progressive ends. They make the point that "public interest" ideology and technocracy is not the sole preserve of the ruling bloc. Secondly, they suggest that if change is most likely to come from urban social movements, then progressives should pursue strategies and policies which could potentially promote the growth of these movements (by, for example, supporting notions of citizen participation in planning). The third direction refers again to the relation between planning and urban social movements. To the extent that the growth of urban social movements depends on the politicization of contradictions and to the extent that the state is itself a prime politicizer by its interventions in everyday life, McCarthy and Smit (1984) argue that planners should actively attempt to promote statist as opposed to privatized responses to contradictions. Finally, McCarthy and Smit (1984) point to the role that planners can play at an ideological level in revealing the contradictions between the technical possibilities of rational planning and the frustration of any chance of achieving such possibilities by existing social relations.

Smit (1984) builds on McCarthy and Smit's (1984) analysis, but shifts away from a narrow emphasis on urban social movements. Smit (1984) continues to argue that the major engine of social change lies outside of formal planning, but now extends his conception of the major agents of change in territorial social relations to trade unions and the major popular political organizations. Whilst acknowledging the limits of progressive planning from within state structures, Smit (1984) now argues that progressives should contest the terrain of "policy" (usually anathema for progressives). Failure to do so, it is argued, will result in missed opportunities and existential problems for urban and regional planners. Drawing on Roweis (1981), Smit (1984) stresses the importance of the spaces that sometimes emerge for progressive practices in times of crisis. Smit (1984) also draws attention to the importance of
contradictions within the power bloc and the way in which, in particular circumstances, allies for progressive policy can be found within the power bloc. Some emphasis is given to the notion that in order to achieve progressive gains from within or outside of state structures, planners need to build alliances within a range of groupings (some within the power bloc and some outside) who may, for a variety of conjunctural reasons, have interests in supporting progressive policy. Smit (1984) then attempts to illustrate the importance of exploiting "crisis opportunities" and of building alliances with reference to concrete examples in the Durban context (the details of which need not be repeated here).

Coleman (1986) takes an entirely different direction. He criticizes McCarthy and Smit (1984) and Smit (1984) for trying "to make planning political by addressing political issues through the planning problematic" (Coleman, 1986, p 59). Moreover, he argues that while McCarthy and Smit (1984) are aware that the space for progressive planning intervention depends critically on the balance of class forces, they do not show how planners may assist in tipping this balance one way or another. The thrust of his argument is that planners need to see themselves as part of social struggle, not as presiding over it. Coleman (1986) also introduces a concern with the reconstitution of the social relations that comprise the labour process of planning practice itself. More specifically, he argues that progressive planners should attempt to transform the hierarchical and autocratic social relations that characterize the way in which their own activities are organized. As far as tipping the balance of class forces in the direction of labour is concerned, Coleman (1986) argues that planners need to align themselves with the emerging trade union movements in South Africa. More concretely, he suggests that planners should develop relations with worker's unions in the municipalities. Coleman (1986, p 178) specifies the advantages of such a strategy as follows:

"The establishment of these relations would give planners the opportunity to in some way articulate their practice with the struggles of workers within the municipality - against a common employer - so as to collectively establish the rudiments of an alternative state from within the local state itself. It would also have the potential to link the activities of
Thus, Coleman (1986) shifts the emphasis of progressive planning praxis within formal structures away from attempting to win gains for working class and popular constituencies through allocative and policy devices, to an emphasis on transforming the social structure of the state itself.

While there can be little doubt that the South African Literature referred to above has advanced the debate on 'progressive planning in South Africa, the greatest weakness of this work is, however, its high level of abstraction. In some respects the theory may as well have been hatched in Europe or in the USA. In part this reflects the fact that the authors were drawing on the insights of the international community of planners. But insufficient attention is given to the specifics of the planning terrain and its context in South Africa. Nor is the literature sufficiently sensitive to the momentum of change and the trajectory of social forces in South Africa. Certainly McCarthy and Smit (1984) place a lot of faith in urban social movements because urban social movements had become a highly visible component of the political terrain in South Africa in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s. But they show no awareness of the possibility that urban social movements may themselves be ephemeral social phenomena as the state attempts to extract itself from the sphere of collective consumption. Like-wise, while Coleman’s (1986) work is prefaced by a rather shallow historical analysis of planning, he too rather uncritically embraces the trade union movement without considering the specificity of its trajectory. Thus, it is quite possible, for example, that in the context of economic crisis in South Africa, the trade unions could become part of a reactionary labour aristocracy pitted against the growing army of the unemployed and those working in the informal sector. Hopefully, the historical and conjunctural analysis conducted in this dissertation will provide a more substantial base for the building of praxis-relevant planning theory.

CONCLUSIONS

This chapter has attempted to provide a review of the major theoretical works which have formed an important part of the conceptual framework for
the dissertation. This framework is one which is rooted firmly in the school of thought which has become known as the "new urban sociology". As a consequence the interpretation of planning history in South Africa that follows tends to stress the significance of social structure. More specifically, planning is viewed as a collective response to contradictions which are ultimately traceable to the social organization of production. However, recognition is given to the need to avoid overly structuralist, functionalist and deterministic understandings of the planning process. As a consequence a special effort will be made to consider the role of agency and idealism in affecting the trajectory of planning.

Moreover, a similar effort will be made to acknowledge the non-determinacy of social struggles and social activity. Thus, outcomes are treated as contingent and uncertain and not as the inevitable product of social structure. It should be noted that in addressing a topic as broad as the political economy of South Africa, reference will constantly be made to theoretical concepts which have not been elaborated in this overview. The assumption in such instances is that these concepts have become part and parcel of the everyday conceptual vocabulary of planning theorists and practitioners alike. As far as the building of theory to guide progressive planning practice is concerned, a great deal of emphasis has been placed on the need for historical analysis, in order to understand the momentum of change and the need for detailed conjunctural analysis. Thus, the very detailed analysis of the contemporary period in this dissertation is justified insofar as it, together with lessons learnt from history, provides the basis for building a praxis-relevant theory of planning.

In the Chapters which follow the focus shifts from pure theory to the historical unfolding of urban and regional planning in South Africa. As noted earlier in this chapter, the historical analysis is undertaken within the framework of a modified version of the model produced by McCarthy and Smit (1984).
CHAPTER THREE: THE EARLY YEARS OF URBANIZATION AND THE ROOTS OF MODERN PLANNING

INTRODUCTION

The period approximating the t1 phase of the McCarthy and Smit (1984, p 87) model had been shown, in preliminary research, to be characterised by:

1. High levels of state expenditure on productive infrastructure, and a parallel neglect of reproductive infrastructure, in the cities.

2. Ruling class ideology that emphasized the cities as centres of production, but which neglected the sphere of reproduction.

3. Rising labour militancy which reached a crescendo towards the end of the period, and parallel popular militancy over urban living conditions reaching a similarly-timed crescendo.

It was hypothesised that the period was one in which urbanization "operated principally in terms of the rapid appropriation of labour power from the precapitalist rural hinterland in order to install the roads, railways, factories and other physical requirements of production and circulation" (McCarthy and Smit, 1984, p 88). Because of the neglect of conditions of labour reproduction, the cities were turned into "... chaotic encampments, saturated and underequipped ..." in the phrasing of Borja (1977). A political crisis, brought about by popular resistance to poor conditions of reproduction, heralded the formation of a new power bloc which forged new urbanization strategies and urban policies in the t2 period, to follow.

This Chapter elaborates some of the key features of the t1 period in more detail as they emerged at the national scale. In particular, the main urbanization and planning issues of the period are examined through interviews, archival sources and secondary references. What emerges is a scenario not markedly different from that originally postulated in the McCarthy and Smit (1984) t1/t2/t3 periodization model, but one that is nevertheless more developed in empirical detail. Furthermore, by
comparison with McCarthy and Smit's preliminary impressions of the t1
period, it becomes evident that the period was not one in which problems
of productive infrastructure dominated state strategy, to the exclusion
of all other issues. There are clear precedents, for example, with
'planning issues' that incorporated the concerns of restrictive controls
on labour reproduction and segregation that were to dominate subsequent
periods. The discussion that follows seeks to bring these precedents to
the fore, so as to qualify the more crudely economic and almost
Rostovian perspective offered in McCarthy and Smit's (1984) initial
theoretical framework.

THE EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY CITY AND ITS PLANNING ISSUES

The discovery of gold and the construction of the railway lines rapidly
transformed the Witwatersrand’s peripheral status and moved it to the
centre stage of the South African political economy. Because the
Witwatersrand was the accumulation heartland, urban growth was most
rapid here and it is not surprising that the early calls for town
planning were most clearly articulated in this area. It is for this
reason that the account that follows focuses primarily on developments
in the Witwatersrand. It should be noted that given the export-oriented
nature of the gold mining industry, areas like Durban and Cape Town grew
rapidly into very busy ports and many of the problems of urban
development described for the Witwatersrand can be generalized to these
areas as well. However, urban planning issues developed unevenly in
response to regional specificities and it is not possible to do justice
to such variation in this Chapter. The focus, therefore, is on the
metropolitan centre. It should be noted too that the particular nature
of the gold mining industry had important implications for the emergence
of crisis in the reproductive sphere in the early years. To begin with,
gold was sold almost entirely on foreign markets. This meant that
mining capital was not concerned with the establishment of a local market
for its products. Furthermore, since the mining industry was unable to
control the price of gold, it was a very cost-sensitive industry
(Yudelman, 1984; Lipton, 1986). The net result was the establishment of
a low-wage economy which was to have implications for the emergence of
urban crises.
Urban Growth, Crisis in the Sphere of Reproduction, and the Emergence of Restrictive Controls

By 1896, when the first census was held, Johannesburg had a population of 102,000 (Morris, 1981). Half of this population was Black, and Lewis (1966) reports that the ratio of males to females was 12:1. The bulk of the mainly Black, male population was housed in compounds, in order to facilitate labour control (cf. Mabin, 1985). After the Anglo-Boer War (1899 to 1902), the rate of migration to urban centres increased as a consequence of the devastation of the countryside and the expulsion of White labour tenants from farms (Lipton, 1986). The decade after the Anglo-Boer War was, moreover, one of rapid economic growth centred upon the mines, and this fuelled pull-factor-led migration to the cities. The new Black arrivals in the cities were accommodated either in the compounds or informal settlements, and the new White arrivals usually sought out cheap, rented accommodation wherever it was available (Bozzoli, 1979).

In Johannesburg itself, the increased demand for residential space gave rise to a spate of speculative activity in urban land (Floyd, 1960). Sprawling development occurred as developers "leapfrogged" over more expensive land adjacent to the city and established suburban extensions on cheaper land further out (Floyd, 1986).

The layout and arrangement of these new townships/suburbs was not co-ordinated in any way and no provision was made for their interlinking or the provision of through routes. This lack of co-ordination and foresight subsequently caused the city of Johannesburg problems for many years. In 1930, for example, the City Engineer of Johannesburg described the problems caused by unco-ordinated township development of the past as follows:

"The planning of Killarney and Houghton in relation to Parktown reveals such a grave disability. Between Louis Botha and Riviera Road there is a distance of not less than 2,000 yards without public cross access of any kind east-west so that anyone living in the centre of Eastern Parktown wishing to visit a friend in lower Houghton has to travel back southwards, probably to Twist Street Terminus, in order to go east, and then has to travel north before he reaches his goal - an..."
increase of travel of at least one mile, besides the unnecessary congesting of a trunk highway ... with what is purely local traffic ..." (Waugh, 1930, p 36).

Unco-ordinated growth of this kind led to the first attempt in South Africa to regulate the laying out of future townships (Porter, 1922). Ordinance No 57 was passed in the Transvaal in 1903 and gave the Lt. Governor power to regulate the establishment of new townships. This power was not used and it was only with the promulgation of the Townships Ordinance No 19 of 1905 that more effective control was made possible in the Transvaal. This ordinance created the first Townships Board which established criteria for approving new developments. In terms of the ordinance, developers were required to provide particulars on the size and extent of proposed townships, the water supply, the layout of plots and the spaces to be set aside for public use (Porter, 1922). The principle of the Townships Board was extended to other provinces through the parliamentary Townships Act No 33 of 1907. The Act specified that ultimate authority for approval of townships resided with the Minister who was empowered to establish townships boards to advise him. Thus, some form of control over township development at a metropolitan and regional scale was achieved at a relatively early stage of the urbanization process. This control was however, not executed in relation to regional plans which would follow only much later.

There were also early attempts to control the use of land within urban settlements. These attempts represented a tentative response to conflicts and crises in the reproductive sphere which, in turn, were rooted in the contradictions of the predominantly "laissez-faire" social relations governing urban land use at the time. Primary among these was the contradiction between the need for patterns of land use which facilitated the reproduction of a very poorly paid workforce, and the tendency away from such patterns resulting from anarchic-land-use-decision-making in the pursuit of private profit. More specifically, there was a tendency towards the "sweating" of land by absentee landlords. Porter (1931) reports that in Johannesburg there were many instances in which as many as five shacks or cottages were built on sites of 450 square meters. General sanitation provisions in such crowded conditions were inadequate and unable to deal with the
overcrowding. This, in turn, led to the outbreak of various epidemics. In 1904, plague broke out in the so-called "Coolie Town" located close to the Johannesburg central business district (Morris, 1981). The area had been described by a local government commission as having "twisted and narrow streets, with water being drawn from a polluted well and with holes in the ground as lavatories" (Morris, 1981, p. 9). The residents were removed, and the settlement was razed to the ground. A year later the first municipally established township, Klipspruit, was founded at some distance from Johannesburg. Kagan (1978) reports that Blacks living within the city were required to move there. However, because of the long distances and poor public transport, many simply stayed or returned later (Maud, 1938). Interestingly, the Klipspruit solution to the "health problem" prefigured the national solution that was to be adopted with the promulgation of the Native Urban Areas Act of 1923. Moreover, the contradictory and costly nature of this solution was immediately evident in the transport problems which followed. This contradiction between the need to banish very low income workers to the periphery and the need to reproduce their labour at very low cost, has remained a central contradiction of the spatial form of South African cities.

It should be noted that fear of the plague led the Cape Town municipality to remove approximately 7,000 Blacks from slum conditions to a far-flung peripheral site which was later to become Ndabeni (Morris, 1981). Likewise, fear of the plague also led the Port Elizabeth city council to establish New Brighton and Korsten in 1902. These efforts notwithstanding, large numbers of Blacks remained in the cities. In Johannesburg areas such as Vrededorp, Burghersdorp, Brickfields, Ferreirastown, Marshalltown, Fordsburg, Jeppestown and Ophirton, White landlords continued to rent out squalid and crowded accommodation to Blacks. These areas also accommodated the poorer sections of the White working class who, in many instances, augmented their own wages by "shack farming" their backyards. This situation led, in 1912, to the insertion of a clause in the Transvaal Local Government Ordinance which attempted to regulate dwelling density (Pearse, 1931). There were practical difficulties with such a clause, however, arising mainly from the difficulty of dealing with varying house sizes on standard lots (it was, for example, possible in theory to cover an entire
lot with a single very large house and it was thus possible to turn these houses into rental tenements). Drawing from the British experience, coverage regulations were introduced in Johannesburg (Pearse, 1931). For any dwelling, hospital or school, a coverage of 60% was accepted. In cases where buildings of these types had frontages on two or more streets the amount of required open space around the building was reduced to 25% (Pearse, 1931). Moreover, in the case of tenements, which had to be sewered, coverage was fixed at 80% with further allowances in the case of double frontages or corner-stands. Clearly, these regulations with their very generous coverage allowances did not really curtail the growth of high density slum tenements. In part the generous allowances must be seen as a function of the interests of White landlords who were fairly influential in local politics (van Onselen, 1982b). However, the regulations foreshadowed the introduction of more comprehensive town planning regulations in the late 1920's and early 1930's.

Segregation, Sanitation, Social Reform and Planning

It should be noted that from the very beginning a relatively high level of racial segregation existed in South African cities. By 1910 most Blacks lived in underprovided locations at the urban periphery. In most towns, Blacks were prohibited from owning property by way of restrictive conditions written into title deeds. Moreover, a great diversity of local authority measures had already been taken by this time to keep Blacks out of the towns and to establish Black "locations" (Morris, 1981). As has already been mentioned, many Blacks nonetheless found their way into the cities and towns as tenants in slum areas usually owned by Whites. In most of the locations, however, land was controlled by the municipality and tenure was on the basis of a monthly rental. In some areas such as Sophiatown, Maitland and the Fingo Village in Grahamstown, land was made available to Blacks on a freehold basis. While conditions of tenure varied from one "location" to another, appalling conditions and massive underprovision of services was common to most. Indeed, these peripheral "locations", which had originally been conceived of as part of the solution to the health threat posed by the

1 "Locations" refers to the term colloquially used in South Africa to describe Black townships.
influx of Blacks into the White towns, soon became regarded as problems in their own-right. Throughout South Africa tuberculosis flourished in the locations, and this gave rise to the Tuberculosis Commission Report of 1914. This report highlighted the abject living conditions in townships throughout the country.

In 1918, an influenza epidemic struck South Africa killing some 500 000 Blacks (Morris, 1981). This, together with the deteriorating tuberculosis problem, led to the promulgation of the Public Health Act of 1919. This Act provided the machinery for bringing "conditions" in the locations under central government control. More specifically, it enabled the Minister to "make regulations, confer powers and impose duties on local authorities as to the subdivision and general layout of land intended to be used as building sites, the width and number of streets, the limitation of the number of dwellings or other buildings to be erected on such land, the proportion of any site which may be built upon and the establishment of zones within which offensive trades or occupations are prohibited" (Porter, 1931, p 14). However, the Act gave no powers for the altering of layouts of existing towns. Porter, writing in 1931, considered this legislation to be the definitive town planning charter of the time. What is significant about these regulations is the fact that South Africa's first relatively comprehensive town planning regulations grew out of the health crises precipitated by unco-ordinated and rapid urban development, in the context of a very low wage economy, and at a time when the state paid little attention to the sphere of reproduction. In this respect the origins of town planning regulations in South Africa bear some resemblance to the origins of similar regulations elsewhere (e.g. Britain). Moreover, it is clear that for some enthusiasts, town planning offered substantial possibilities with regard to social reform.

The Cape Times carried an article on town planning in 1927 in which the potential social impacts of town planning are eulogized as follows:

"... think of the lessened costs of our hospitals and charitable institutions, our goals and mental asylums! Think again of the prospect of ennobled, contented and loyal citizens, proud in the possession of their suburban homes and gardens; think still again of the effect this would have upon the current unrest."
Where is the connection? Well just picture yourself after a hard day's work coming to your "home" in District Six where your children must perforce play upon the street: the "pocket handkerchief" backyard being insufficient for even the family washing. Come with me to some of the hovels of Cape Town and elsewhere, and express no surprise again at discontent and disloyalty under such conditions" (Enthusiast, Cape Times, 1927).

While extreme physical determinist views of this kind were relatively rare, there can be no question that the relation between planning and social reform was evident to the major power bloc actors of the time. Thus Stallard, in the report of the Local Government Commission in 1922, pointed out that "housing problems and overcrowding with their concomitant evils (are) intimately connected with neglected town-planning" (Stallard, 1922, para 224). In part this concern was followed through into the Native Urban Areas Act of 1923. While the Native Urban Areas Act is usually associated with the exclusion of Blacks from the White towns and with the introduction of the notion of Blacks as temporary sojourners, Davenport (1971) points out that much of the Act, in intention at least, had more to do with limited welfare provision rather than racial ideology. Municipalities, for example, were required to keep separate "native revenue accounts" for the locations and to plough any profits back into the townships (some municipalities had in fact been making profits out of the administration of the townships and had been transferring income away from Black areas to White areas).

While some municipalities used the powers provided by the Act immediately, others opted to use them only much later. Port Elizabeth, for example, used the powers for the first time as late as 1935 (Morris, 1981). In effect, it was the Native Urban Areas Act which more than any other piece of legislation most effectively 'resolved' the health problem as it was then perceived by the authorities -- i.e. a problem of 'contagion' to be contained through segregation. The fact that the problem was addressed through the Native Urban Areas Act and only indirectly through the town planning legislation which was to follow a few years later, is instructive. Patricios (1975), for example, argues that:
"... it is a pity that the Transvaal Town Planning Commission of 1929 did not grasp the wider concept of town-planning given in the report of the Local Government Commission (Stallard, 1922) eight years earlier, ... the separation then of the concerns of the social reformers from those of the civil engineers, land surveyors and architects involved in embryonic town planning was an unfortunate repetition of what happened in Britain and the USA."

The effect of this separation of the social reformists from the more technicist administrators of land was to have fairly major implications for the way in which town planning evolved and developed in the five decades that followed. The major impact of the separation was that from the very beginning town planning took the physicalist and technicist philosophical orientation of the "city practical" movement which was also gaining ground in Britain. This technicist orientation is evident in the discussion and debates about town planning just prior to the passing of the first Provincial Town Planning Ordinances. Thus, the Transvaal Town-planning Commission considered town planning to be involved primarily with the laying out of private townships. Moreover, the lectures presented by various members of the Transvaal Town Planning Association just prior to the passing of the first specifically town planning legislation in the Transvaal in 1931 (Transvaal Ordinance No 11 of 1931) confirms this technicist orientation. The Association had been founded in 1918 and acted as a significant lobby for the introduction of town planning legislation. In 1930 A.S. Furner presented a lecture on the need for town planning under the auspices of the Association in which he described the functions of town planning as follows:

"Town plans ... would provide for new streets and the improvement of existing ones; prescription of new building lines; open spaces; the siting of civic centres where such do not already exist; restrictions as to heights of the space about buildings; zoning and other matters which may be necessary to bring any particular part or parts of the towns into proper relationship and general convenience, or into architectural setting and harmony, and for the improvement of towns generally. I must again emphasize the fact that a city plan is not a grandiose scheme for immediate and costly civic improvements ... . Town-planning means a saving of money. It is far cheaper to build a road or a square in the right place than to reconstruct it when land has become valuable and expensive buildings have been destroyed" (Furner, 1930, p 28).
In illustrating the need for town planning in South Africa, Furner (1930) presented an account of the major town planning problems of Johannesburg (as he saw them). He bemoaned the awkward positioning of the railway and the railway station, the difficulties of achieving lateral communication between the various suburbs (or townships), the congestion at the centre, the tendency of the industrial activity to encroach on residential areas and so reduce property values, the poor circulation and so on. No mention is made of social reform in any form. Likewise E.H. Waugh (1930) stresses the expensive expropriation and building costs that are often incurred because of a lack of foresight:

"Louis Botha Avenue presents, from Fife Avenue to Tudhope Avenue, a somewhat similar piece of work where a high wall is now being built at a total cost of 10,000 pounds, to carry the main trunk road to Pretoria. Of course, this road should have been planned before Yeoville, Berea and Hillbrow were laid out so that a route shorter and more diagonal to the present line should have been taken. In fact the main trunk routes should have been laid out from the centre city, preplanned before townships entangled the layout" (Waugh, 1930, p 35).

Thus most of the instances cited as evidence of the need for town planning, can be theorized as efficiency problems resulting from a lack of social co-ordination and vision (planning) in the physical development process. These concerns with efficiency were to dominate the city planning practice in South Africa for many years to come.

It could be argued, however, that all this concern with physical layout and efficiency would have been consistent with the strong ruling class emphasis, at the time, on cities as centres of efficient production, as elaborated in previous Chapters. Moreover, while Patricios (1975) fails to make the point, his comparison of town planning concerns with those of the Natives Urban Areas Act (inadvertently) raises a crucial point of tangency between the basic principles of Native Administration and town planning during the period: namely, the need for the physical separation of 'social incompatibles'. It is this principle, after all, that underlies the ideas of both enforced racial segregation and land use zoning, and what is common to both is the idea of constraining urban problems (disease, pollution, poverty, etc by removing them from the sight of elite groups).
The Segregated and Planned Urban Environment and Housing Sector as an Object for the Formation of Class Alliances.

Prior to the Anglo-Boer War, South Africa, and particularly the Transvaal, was largely under the political control of a rural bourgeoisie (van Onselen, 1982b). The war itself had a great deal to do with the deposing of this bourgeoisie by an aggressive urban bourgeoisie which in turn was dominated by mining capitalists (both local and foreign). Backed by the military muscle of the foremost imperialist power of the time, the urban bourgeoisie seized control and moved quickly to establish the conditions necessary to promote the growth of the mining industry. One of the immediate concerns of the new rulers was to consolidate the new order by incorporating elements which potentially posed a threat. One such element was the militant immigrant miners who brought with them the experience of the labour movements in Europe. Another was the swelling group of Afrikaaners in the towns, many of whom were unemployed. Interestingly, the earliest efforts at incorporation included a strong emphasis on social reformist urban planning on the Witwatersrand, and van Onselens’s (1982a) account of these efforts is worth recording here:

"Under the new dispensation the British government, in alliance with the Rand mining capitalists, came to exercise authority over the city and its inhabitants, and nowhere was the impact of the emerging industrial state more clearly visible than in the fields of urban planning and public transport" (van Onselen, 1982a, p 180).

Johannesburg’s Acting Town Clerk in the period immediately after the war, Curtis, was very sensitive to what van Onselen (1982a, p 180) calls the "geography of class". In the 1890’s, he had served on a number of committees in London which had investigated working-class housing problems and social control through intervention in the sphere of reproduction. The new regime was very anxious to douse incipient and already manifest class conflict. Moreover, there "was a clearly expressed need to avoid the emergence of a sharply demarcated central working-class area with its associated problems of markedly different rating values, high rentals and the development of an aggressive class
consciousness" (van Onselen, 1982a, p 181). Thus Curtis believed that the White working-class on the Witwatersrand should be suburbanized and stabilized as soon as possible. To deal with the transport problem that might arise from such suburbanization, Curtis proposed the establishment of a public tram way system.

"The town council will thus accept the duty of providing for the welfare of workers with moderate incomes, to whom a cheap, efficient and well-regulated tramway-system is particularly a necessity, tending as it does to reduce the disadvantages of residing at a distance from their work." (Mayor of Johannesburg 1901, cited in van Onselen, 1982a, p 163).

In order to promote suburbanization and ensure equitable distribution of the rate burden, the city of Johannesburg's boundary was increased from 9 square miles in 1901 to fully 82 square miles in 1903, and the first electric tram was seen on the streets by 1906. Shortly thereafter, the service was extended to several new suburbs. Curtis' programme was relatively successful so that by 1912, 42% of the Witwatersrand's White miners were married and had their wives and families living with them by comparison with 12% in 1897 and 20% in 1902 (van Onselen, 1982a). However, sharply demarcated working class areas developed nonetheless, so that in 1911 W.C Scully (cited in van Onselen, 1982a) commented that he was struck by the "sudden transition from splendour to squalor" of the western side of the city. He also mentioned several "slum warrens" which were inhabited by "Europeans of various nationalities, Indians, Chinese, Arabs, Japanese, Kaffirs, and miscellaneous coloured people of every hue" (Quoted in van Onselen, 1982b, p 39).

While Curtis' suburbanization programme was relatively successful, it should be noted that it was not supplemented with a vigorous public housing programme for Whites. Apart from a few modest attempts at the provision of company housing (van Onselen, 1982b) the supply of White housing was left to the market. This did not, however, lead to a massive housing shortage, largely because Whites were able to enter these markets fairly successfully as a consequence of preferential treatment in the workplace. The "job colour bar" was introduced onto the mines as early as 1893 in response to pressure from the emerging White unions and was a major bone of contention between mining capital
and White workers for thirty years hereafter (Lipton, 1986). The effect of the bar, however, was to ensure that most White workers were able to acquire reasonable accommodation. However, there were many unemployed Whites in the cities and by the early 1920s White housing had become a political issue.

Parnell (1986, p 3) reports that in Johannesburg, the 1919 municipal election "focused unambiguously on the pressing accommodation requirements of White labour ...". This focus led to the 1920 Housing Act (which gave Johannesburg and other councils the authority to act on their housing problems) and the establishment of a Central Housing Board. The council response was slow, however, and it was not until 1923 that it made an application for a loan from the Central Housing Board for a White housing scheme (Parnell, 1986). The timing of the application is not entirely insignificant. In 1921 a sharp fall in the gold price precipitated a crisis (Lipton, 1986). Given the cost-sensitivity of the gold mining industry, the drop in price meant that costs had to be cut somehow and the Chamber of Mines, against Smut’s advice, announced that it would infringe the Status Quo Agreement of 1918 and increase the ratio of Africans to Whites in the mines. This in turn led to the famous general strike by White workers, and the rebellion of 1922. The rebellion was militarily suppressed with 250 people killed and many others wounded or imprisoned (Lipton, 1986). Thus, the city of Johannesburg’s 1923 White housing scheme proposals were made at a time when political tension was running high and should be seen, at least in part, as a response to political crisis. This proposition gains weight when it is recognized that the scheme never materialized, because the Central Housing Board demanded that the extent of the housing crisis be quantified before funds could be made available (Parnell, 1986). The enumeration of the White housing crisis was undertaken by the city’s Medical officer of Health, who reported a year later that there was in fact a sufficient supply of housing for Whites and in some instances there were housing units standing empty (Parnell, 1986).

Instead, he argued that the White housing problem was largely one of Black infiltration into White areas and the concomitant lowering of living standards that this involved. He suggested (in line with the
thinking of Stallard and others) that the living conditions of Whites could be greatly improved by the removal of Blacks to townships at the periphery of the city. Thus, in discussing the Johannesburg City Council's response to the housing question by the end of the 1920's, Parnell (1986, p 6) summarizes as follows:

"By 1927 both public and civic opinion was such that despite the fact that more than a quarter of all Whites in Johannesburg lived with more than two people to a room, the Council did not consider it necessary to apply for a housing loan for Whites. Instead the energy and finances of the local authority were centred on ridding the slums of all Blacks, and attention focused on the re-housing schemes of Western Native township, various hostel facilities, and Orlando. Even if Whites were present in the slum areas, the city's housing problem was understood to be about re-housing 'natives'."

It is worth noting that the overriding concern with getting Blacks out of the White cities found its way into the propaganda being used to promote town and regional planning at the time. In his lecture on the historic and public health aspects of town planning, Charles Porter, Johannesburg's Medical Officer of Health at the time, (1922, p 17) made the following suggestions as to the application of town planning principles to Johannesburg:

"1. That in order that the Malay location and the minor slums may be vigorously tackled, the Council continue its genuine efforts to provide accommodation for natives herding there........

2. That slums generally should not be dealt with by betterment schemes at great cost to ratepayer's generally, but by closure and demolition orders against the owners who have profited from them........

4. That efforts be made to obtain legal powers :-

(a) To secure some measure of effective control of the influx of natives other than those coming to mining or other definite employments or to approved employment agencies........"
but rather the mere removal of Blacks and the control of their 'influx'. There was little concern, as in Britain, for the creation of reformist-oriented environments for the working class generally. Rather, planners, "Native" Administrators, and other state officials conceptualized urban problems as something to be socially and spatially redistributed and segregated. The reason for this particular trajectory of events appears to be that the urban environment had, by the 1920's, become part of the material basis for the formation of class alliances - in particular, alliances between White labour and particular fractions of capital.

These alliances became hegemonic at the level of the national state after the elections of 1924, which heralded what many regard as a turning point in South African political history (Davies et al., 1976; Lipton, 1986).

**The Incorporation of White Labour and its Effects on the Direction of Early Town Planning**

The 1924 election saw mining capital, with its foreign or imperialist connections, ousted from its hegemonic position within the power bloc, and replaced by an alliance of agricultural and industrial capital and the White working classes (the so-called Pact Alliance). Whilst the formation of this alliance may have been assisted by the segregationist ingenuities of state officials in respect of questions of labour reproduction, it would be an oversimplification to reduce it to this status. It should be recalled, for example, that the political crisis that hastened its ascendency to power originated at the point of production - in particular, conflicts between mining capital and White labour, over wages.

It is important to understand, therefore, that while the Pact Alliance emphasized a segregationist 'solution' to problems of labour reproduction as a tactic of its alliance building, the Alliance was forged primarily around issues in the sphere of production. What the White working class got out of Pact Alliance, for example, was the partial restoration of the job colour bar in certain positions through the 1925 Mines and Works Act (Davies et al., 1976). While the wages of
White mine workers did not rise during the Pact period, the "civilized labour" policy of the Pact government did a great deal to solve the White unemployment problem (Davies et al, 1976). The awards of government contracts were, for example, made contingent upon contractors employing a "fair" proportion of White workers. Other measures included the imposition of statutory minimum wages and employment of poor Whites in the state sector. As a consequence of these measures the proportion of Whites employed in the industrial and commercial labour force increased from 30.7% in 1923/4 to 45.2% in 1932/3 (Davies et al, 1976). Moreover, it is estimated that by 1931 some 24,989 poor Whites had been absorbed into the state sector since the election of 1924 (Davies et al, 1976). One effect of this soaking-up of the White unemployed was to improve the living conditions for Whites, thereby reducing the need for direct physical intervention in the sphere of reproduction.

The ability of the White working class to protect its interest through the state was, in fact, contingent upon another contradiction within the power bloc - the contradiction between mining capital on the one hand and agricultural and manufacturing capital on the other. As has already been noted, mining was a very cost-sensitive industry and this was particularly the case in the period following the First World War. Since prices were fixed on international markets, mining capital was concerned to keep the prices of labour and capital inputs into the industry as low as possible. Agricultural and manufacturing industries on the other hand, were not very cost-efficient at this time and their products were more expensive than those of foreign producers (Davies et al, 1976). As a consequence, their interests lay with the restriction of foreign competition and the establishment of local markets for their products. Protectionism, however meant higher input costs for mining and an intense struggle developed over this issue.

Agricultural and manufacturing capital were not strong enough in their own right to depose mining capital politically. However, they found supporters in the White working class and this led to the contradiction and tension-filled alliance that materialized in the Pact government of 1924. Apart from the protection of White workers and the absorption of the White unemployed that the Pact government brought, the victory of agricultural and manufacturing capital had other major implications for
town planning. Particularly important was the growth of manufacturing industry based on import-substitution that followed. Tariff protection was introduced and the state further promoted the growth of manufacturing by establishing the state run Iron and Steel Corporation (ISCOR). The latter was a massive venture and only became profitable by the late 1930's. Nonetheless, manufacturing was given a significant boost and was later to become the most significant growth sector of the South African economy. The link between the growth of manufacturing and the need for town planning controls over land use was not lost on T.B. Floyd (Price, 1982) in his explanation of the emergence of zoning in South Africa. In an interview with Price (1982), the town planner Floyd, explicitly discusses the importance of the Pact Alliance in providing the impetus for manufacturing growth and the subsequent need for land use controls.

"Industry did not come to South Africa without opposition. Import merchants were against the idea because it meant competition for their trade, and the mines were against it because they thought local products would cost more than imported ones ... After the war the Nationalist Party and the Labour Party both supported the creation of an industrial sector, ..., so as to create jobs on the one hand for Afrikaans-speakers who were leaving the platteland and ... for English speaking townspeople who were also facing unemployment. These two parties formed an alliance and came to power in 1924" (Floyd, recorded in Price, 1982.)

In any event it should be clear that the specific struggles of the period, namely those between capital and White labour on the one hand and between mining capital and agricultural/manufacturing capital on the other, had a major influence both on the need for town planning and the direction it took. Black labour had not as yet flexed its muscle or become a political threat to the reproduction of the system except insofar as the slum conditions within which Blacks lived posed a health hazard. The greater militancy of the White working class can be ascribed in part to the importation of working class culture from Europe and to the colonial social relations out of which the social formation had been forged.
STRUCTURE, AGENCY, IDEALISM, COLONIALISM AND URBAN PLANNING

The emergence of town planning in South Africa has, up to this point, been presented as a response to urban contradictions, which are ultimately traceable to the structural relations of racial capitalism. Such a view of planning accords insufficient importance to the role of human agency and "will" in the making of history. Instead planning is seen as being "determined" by these structural contradictions. However, it is by no means clear that urban planning was a necessary response to the structural contradictions of the early 1900's. It is probable that none of the urban crises of the time were so deep as to necessitate a specifically urban planning response. Furthermore, manufacturing industry was very much in its infancy and the planning response could be argued to be "anticipatory" rather than reactive in South Africa. Floyd (in Price, 1982) argues that zoning was included in the Public Health act of 1919 because of existing industrial blight, but because of the fear that blight would, in fact, accompany the growth of industry.

Many of the early proponents of town planning in South Africa came from Europe, and were as a consequence very sensitive to the environmental squalor that could potentially accompany industrial growth. Moreover, town planning was highly fashionable in Europe and the USA at this time, and there can be little doubt that the emergence of planning legislation in South Africa is partly explained by the importation of ideas from the imperial core to the colonial periphery, in much the same way that Victorian architecture was introduced into South Africa. Thus, Floyd (in Price, 1982) argues that South African planning legislation was influenced primarily by British town planning thought but also by French, German and American thinking. He also stressed the importance of individuals in influencing the direction of planning thought. He refers, for example, to the possibility that the link between planning thinking in the USA and South Africa may have been provided by Johannesburg's City Engineer (M. Waugh), whose son was an architect in the USA at the time when zoning ordinances were becoming fashionable. The emphasis on the importance of "agency" is a feature of Floyd's (1960) historical account of town planning in South Africa. The Transvaal
Planning Association is also for example considered by Floyd (1960) as being an important agent in selling town planning propaganda, and as an important importer of European planning ideology. With regard to the latter, a quantitative analysis of five articles by Transvaal Planning Association members (Pearse, 1931; Porter, 1922; Furner, 1930; Waugh, 1930, and Porter, 1931) reveals that nearly 40% of the text in these articles refer directly to the European and American planning experience. Moreover, the imperial imposition of town planning on colonial South Africa is evident in the following comment by Pearse (1931, p 2):

"With the exception of South Africa, the British dominions have forged ahead in Town Planning and the British Colonial office is now insisting on the appointment of town planning experts in all the Crown Colonies to control the development of existing towns and to advise on the layout of new towns."

It is also significant that the 1931 Transvaal Town Planning Ordinance, which served as a model for the Cape, Natal and Orange Free State Ordinances, was in its turn closely modelled on the British Town Planning Act of 1925. There can be little doubt, then, that town planning in South Africa was not borne solely out of purely local contradictions and struggles, but also has a partially "idealist" origin arising from the importation of European "ideas". But, substantial evidence has been presented in this Chapter to show that local urban contradictions/crises were real enough. Johannesburg's early and unsuccessful attempts to deal with overcrowding and slumming, for example, led to the Medical Officer of Health (Dr Porter) being sent to the Summer School of Town Planning, at University College, London. Here he learned about the principle of "coverage" control, and returned a town planning enthusiast. Shortly hereafter coverage regulations were included in South Africa's Public health Act. Thus, while the coverage concept was derived from abroad it was the very pressing nature of local problems that led to its "discovery" and application in South Africa. Similarly, the interaction between the manifestations of real structural problems, agency and idealism is quite evident in the introduction of
the "Garden City Movement" into South Africa. The agency was provided by an individual called Richard Stuttaford, a member of the Union Cabinet. The ideas were those of Ebenezer Howard whose works Stuttaford had read (Myers, 1953). On visiting Britain in 1917, he took the opportunity of seeing one of Howard's projects, Letchworth, and met Howard in person. He returned to South Africa determined to launch a Garden City Movement. He was disturbed by the housing shortage and "rack-renting" that was all too evident in South Africa. Likewise he was clearly aware of the social and efficiency problems associated with the "laissez-faire" provision of housing. In motivating garden city principles Stuttaford (quoted in Myers, 1953, pp 25-26) argued as follows:

"My policy differs fundamentally from the ordinary policy pursued in the development of land for building purposes. The old method is that the land is cut up and developed with the single aim of bringing the most return to the original owner within the shortest time; the results, as seen all over the world, are crowded dwellings, the narrow streets allowed by the Local Authority, want of air space and recreation space, and sometimes no provision even is made for the proper making of roads. I maintain that from the public point of view that is economically unsound. In the future it costs vast sums in widening streets and in sanitary and other control, but, what is more important, it all tends to fill our hospitals with sickly children and physically unfit adults, and creates breeding spaces for infectious diseases..."

While Stuttaford provided the agency, it was the influenza epidemic of 1918 that gave his pro-Garden City propaganda resonance in South Africa. It also provided the impetus for the introduction of the first Garden City scheme in South Africa (Myers, 1953). Stuttaford made representation to the Prime Minister F.S. Malan and in 1919, 400 morgen of the Uitflught Forest Reserve near Cape Town was donated to the Garden City Trust (Myers, 1953). It was on this land that Pinelands, South Africa's first garden city suburb was established. In sum, it appears that town planning was ushered onto the centre stage in South Africa by a degree of structural necessity on the one hand, and by individual agency and a fairly high level of fashionable, colonial idealism on the other.

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1 The Garden City idea is associated with the work and practices of Ebenezer Howard and rests on the notion of the integration of country and city in the environments of the working-classes.
The determinants of the form, nature and direction of early town planning are, however, manifold.

THEORIZING THE EARLY YEARS: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

To the extent that urban planning is defined at the highest level of abstraction, as collective intervention in the social processes of land occupancy and territorial organization in urban areas, then a number of urban planning interventions occurred in the period 1900 to 1930 in South Africa. The most dramatic interventions of the period were those that attempted to deal with slum conditions. Here, intervention took two forms, namely intervention in the sphere of circulation by the imposition of density controls and layout regulations, and secondly by the demolishing of slums, the banishing of Blacks to the periphery, and the building of a very limited amount of public housing for rental. It should be noted that welfare economists would see the emergence of planning in such circumstances as a response to the "externalities" of the land market. While this is true at the epiphenomenal level, welfare economics is unable to explain why it is that such externalities are so severe in some parts of the land market and not in others. The answer to this question has to be sought at a deeper structural level.

The urban planning interventions to deal with slum problems are ultimately traceable to the primary contradiction of the racial capitalist social formation, i.e. the contradiction between capital and labour within a specific regime of accumulation. Of fundamental importance in South Africa in the early years was the contradiction between the logic of accumulation based on mining and the logic of reproducing a labour force. Gold mining was a cost sensitive export industry, and this produced a low-wage domestic economy, which in turn inhibited growth in other sectors of the economy. Given low wages and high unemployment, and given the social relations governing the land and housing markets, slums were an unsurprising result. The specific forms that the interventions took have to be explained with reference to the particular form that class struggles took in this period. Of particular significance here, is the articulation of racist social relations (forged in the colonial era) with capitalist social relations of production. Thus, the harsh treatment meted out to Blacks in slum clearance was, in
part, dependent on the colonial view held by both White capitalists and White workers, that Blacks were inferior. Moreover, the state's concern in meeting the demands of the White working class also reflects the balance of class forces at the time. White labour was far more militant and organized than Black labour.

The non-social reformist direction taken by planning at the end of this period is explicable only with reference to the specific articulation of two primary contradictions of the period, i.e. the contradiction between capital and White labour, and the contradiction within the power bloc between mining capital and agricultural/manufacturing capital. These contradictions gave rise to an alliance between White labour and agricultural/manufacturing capital, which in turn reduced the need for direct physical intervention in the sphere of reproduction, in order to incorporate Whites. Instead, relatively full levels of White employment ensured that reproductive needs were met. Thus, by the end of the period, the call for town planning was being made on largely efficiency grounds. It was the contradiction between the need for functionally efficient patterns of land use to facilitate accumulation on the one hand, and the tendency away from such efficiency resulting from myopic private land-use decision making, that led to this call.

While class alliances in this period were forged mainly around non-territorial issues relating to the sphere of production, and while the resultant alliances reduced the perceived need for social reformist interventions in the sphere of reproduction, reference has also been made to the way in which certain issues, in the sphere of reproduction, themselves became a focus around which class alliances were built. Particularly important in this regard were the alliances struck around the expulsion of Blacks from the central city. Reference was also made to conscious attempts by the agents of imperial capital to co-opt the White working classes through an ambitious suburbanization programme linked to the provision of public transport. In later chapters, the importance of alliance-building around issues in the sphere of reproduction, to the emergence of coalitions at a national level will be stressed. It is worth noting, however, that the importance of alliances in both the spheres of production and reproduction should not be overemphasized in understanding state policy at least prior to the Pact
election of 1924. In the period after the Anglo-Boer War there can be little doubt that the South African state was essentially capitalist in an almost instrumentalist sense (Yudelman, 1984). After the Pact, however, the nature of the state changed to more closely reflect the interests of the White working classes.

Finally, a theme that has been developed in this Chapter concerns the importance of understanding the emergence of urban planning not only with reference to structural contradictions, but also with due regard to individual agency and idealism. There were, for example, a number of proponents of town planning who were enthused by the possibility of turning South African cities into grandiose monuments to aesthetics, comparable with those in Europe. Their support for planning grew out of the contradiction between their conception of what was possible in terms of beautifying South Africa's cities in purely technical/ artistic terms, and the pre-emption of such possibilities by myopic individual-land-use-decision-making. As a consequence, their support and lobbying (which had much to do with planning actually materializing), had its origins in the mismatch between their idealist conceptions of the beautiful city and the impossibility of achieving such conceptions given the existing social relations governing land use. Others were more concerned with the possibility that urban planning ideas imported from abroad could address the serious health crises and blight in the sphere of reproduction. In any event, a major conclusion of this Chapter is that planning activity and outcomes have to be understood in terms of the interaction between structure, agency and ideas. This interaction is further explored in the Chapter that follows, particularly in the section dealing with attempts to implement the first town planning schemes.

INTRODUCTION

McCarthy and Smit's (1984) initial conceptual framework and preliminary research on urbanization and planning in South Africa indicated that the period approximating 1925-1945 could be described as one of "an urbanization of social control" (McCarthy and Smit, 1984, p 87). In particular, they noted the emergence, during this period, of the first town planning ordinances, slums legislation and associated restrictive measures and concluded that:

"... The concern for regulation and control over the sphere of urban reproduction is a partial response to community agitation and militancy during the tl phase. It is also assumed to be a response to the state's difficulties in meeting rapidly rising demands for housing and urban services during periods of increased rural-urban migration ... and the concern for restrictive legislation is ... (also) ... heightened by:

(i) the growing importance of petty landlordism in the sphere of reproduction and a concomitant rise in the costs of the reproduction of labour power; and

(ii) the co-ordination or efficiency problems in the realization of surplus value that emerge out of an urbanism that on the one hand requires interdependence in production and consumption, but which on the other hand is based upon the relation of anarchical private decision-making. Consequently, attacks are made on 'slum' conditions (and therefore, indirectly, the petty landlord classes); urban planning emerges to rationalize, as far as possible, the internal contradictions of capitalist land use patterns through limiting legislation (building codes, zoning, etc); and land-use and urban development in general become a highly policed enterprise" (McCarthy and Smit, 1984, p 91).

They pointed to empirical evidence of rising house rentals during the 1920's and 1930's to corroborate their hypothesis on the penetration of the sphere of reproduction by petty landlords; and they noted that "approximately eighty per cent of all articles on the urban reproductive sphere published in the Johannesburg Star during the 1930's were concerned with so-called unplanned settlement issues" (McCarthy and
Smit, 1984 p 91). They also referred to a scholarly literature on 'squattting problems' around Johannesburg during the 1930's and 1940's, and generally concluded that the period was, indeed, one of state and ruling class attempts to restrict, control and administer, what was seen as 'alarming' spontaneous development.

In short, as in the previous Chapter, the purpose of the present Chapter is both to elaborate the complexity of a period of urbanization identified in earlier models, and to show how this complexity reveals the preconditions for the emergence of the period that follows. The Chapter begins with an account of the implementation of the first town planning schemes in South Africa. The resonance of Roweis's (1981) proposition that planning interventions in the land market are simultaneously needed and rejected, is noted. This contradiction, it is argued, accounts for the rather minimalist nature of urban planning interventions in the early years. The second section provides a discussion of developments in the political economy which allowed planners to partially transcend the bounds of the minimalism referred to above and become involved in "grand design". This is followed by an account of limited but direct state interventions in the sphere of reproduction. More specifically the building of public housing for Whites and state interventions to deal with unplanned or informal settlements are discussed. The rapid urbanization which gave rise to the mushrooming informal settlement in the cities, also provided the impetus for the emergence of a concern with conditions in the rural areas. Thus, rural betterment planning and tentative attempts to promote more spatially-even growth, are discussed in a fourth section. Finally, an emerging philosophy of the need for fully planned cities is discussed. The growing popularity of this notion with particular fractions within the power bloc, it is argued, provided the basis for the dramatic ethnic spatial engineering that followed in the 1950's.

PLANNING AS MINIMALIST INTERVENTION IN A PRIVATE LAND MARKET

As noted in the previous chapter, provision was made for the preparation of town planning schemes for the first time with the promulgation of Transvaal Ordinance No 11 of 1931. The Cape Province had made similar provisions in 1927. But, the Ordinance was poorly drafted and a revised
version, which was modelled on the Transvaal Ordinance, was introduced in 1934. Natal also promulgated a similar ordinance in 1932 (amended in 1949) and the Orange Free State followed suit in 1947. In general terms all of the ordinances prescribed procedures for the establishment of townships on the one hand, and town planning schemes on the other. With regard to the former, the arbitration powers of township boards was confirmed. Approval of a new township was made contingent on the establishment of "need and desirability" by the township developer and this situation pertains today. Town planning schemes on the other hand were generally left to the initiative of local authorities, but it was possible for provincial administrators to compel local authorities to produce such schemes. The tools which the ordinances made available to planners for implementing schemes were, for the most part, restrictive measures. These measures included use zoning, land reservation rights, density zoning with respect to population numbers, and density zoning with respect to building size and bulk (bulk, coverage and height restrictions). Provision was also made for compensation and betterment. It must also be pointed out here that provision for ethnic engineering was explicitly built into the early, restrictive town planning ordinances. As Floyd (1960, p 134), for example, notes, the tool of land reservation is usually used in town planning for "recreation grounds, parks, playgrounds, open squares, proposed road routes, parking places, aerodromes, non-White group-areas,...." (emphasis added). The fact of the matter is that town planning and ethnic spatial engineering have been very closely related from the very beginning, irrespective of whether one chooses to work with a narrow or broad definition of planning.

It was during the 1930's that the tools provided for in the ordinance, were used to produce the first town planning schemes. Schemes were prepared for a number of rapidly growing towns on the Witwatersrand such as Johannesburg, Pretoria, Randfontein, Krugersdorp, Roodepoort, Germiston, Boksburg, Benoni, and Brakpan. In the other provinces, the preparation of schemes took a little longer to get off the ground (with the exception of Cape Town). The schemes prepared for the Witwatersrand were very pragmatic and minimalist interventions, in the sense that they proposed no grand reconstruction of the built environments to which they
were applied. Instead, they tended to build on and simply reinforce existing patterns of growth.

Floyd (1986), who was personally involved in the preparation of many of the schemes, admits that in some cases, the best schemes from a town planning point of view, i.e. from the point of view of some over-arching social rationality, were subverted by vested interests. The implementation of the schemes was not a smooth and unproblematic process, and there was some resistance:

"Generally there was an atmosphere of suspicion" (Floyd, 1960, p 48).

The actual implementation of schemes meant that planners came face to face with social institutions which on the one hand were responsible for the need for planning intervention in the first place, but which on the other hand, resisted such intervention. What is being referred to, of course, are dominant social institutions which governed the use of land at the time, private property and the utilization of land in the pursuit of private profits. Floyd (1960) pays a great deal of homage to the wisdom and diplomacy of a Col. Bowling who co-ordinated many of the early schemes. Floyd (1960) claims that it was largely through Bowling's sagacity that planning was accepted at all:

"If wrongly handled town planning would have raised such opposition that it would have been set back for a generation" (Floyd, 1960, p 48).

More specifically, Floyd (1960), p 50) argues that the acceptance of planning depended critically on the "soundness and regard for other person's property displayed in town planning schemes ..." It should be clear then, that the rather pragmatic direction taken by city planning was not just a function of Col. Bowling's planning philosophy or the specific struggles and contradictions that led to its emergence in the first place. It was also a function of the resistance that planning intervention received from vested interests. While in a technical sense rational comprehensive planning was possible, the only kind of planning that was compatible with existing social relations of land occupancy and use, was incremental control of what had already developed. Thus, after
the first thirty years of town planning practice (i.e. by 1960), Floyd argues:

"There is no place in town planning for the naively imaginative or unrealistic person" (Floyd, 1960, p 63).

"There is nothing magic in town planning, it is but an instrument of administrative control and its value depends on the quality of the instrument" (Floyd, 1960, p 62).

It is significant that at a "Congress on Town Planning" held under the auspices of the Architectural Students Society in Johannesburg in 1938, the possibility of town planning under capitalist social relations emerged as the central issue. In a remarkably perceptive paper for the time, Farrel (1938) makes the following comments:

"Towns grow up where they do because, very crudely put it pays the owners of capital to invest their capital there. The town we are in at the moment is a very obvious example of that process ... Since, for example, it pays the ground landlords to extract as high a ground rent as they can, they tend to chop it up into such lots as they think will achieve this object, largely irrespective of other considerations. ... In short, ..., the forces that determine the social and economic distribution of population and institutions are of the same sort as those determining the development of the town itself. They are the normal consequences of a capitalist society predominantly competitive in character ... If this is so, it follows that the location and ecology of new towns can hardly be controlled within the framework of this sort of society. Town planning appears to be incompatible with it. And should the town planners start an agitation under Professor Pearse's aegis, they are quite likely to find themselves opposed by that powerful section in the community that owns the capital goods. The members of this section are likely to see in the town planning movements a threat to their own individual freedom of action and a menace to their future expectations of gain, which freedoms and which expectations they identify with the ultimate welfare of society as a whole" (Farrel, 1938, p 278).

In elaborating on the incompatibility of planning and capitalist social relations, Farrel (1938, p 279) stresses the importance of the fact that capitalism leaves investment decisions and the organization of production in private hands.

"For one thing, the location of future industry and factories is still left to the decisions of private individuals. The
freedom is sufficient to thwart the best laid of schemes. For it means, among other things, that the future diminution of growth of population is largely unpredictable and uncontrollable. Clearly, it is hardly worthwhile to plan elaborately if in a few years time a large percentage of the population has migrated elsewhere ..."

The constraints imposed on planning by private property was a theme taken up by other authors at the same congress. Thus Mauthner (1938) eulogized the frontiers which socialism opened for planners in the USSR as follows:

"The system of town planning in the USSR is a direct result of the social and economic order. The main obstacle preventing systematic town planning in other countries is the private ownership of ground. In the USSR this has been abolished. Therefore, there can be no speculation, estate agents, etc - planning on broad lines becomes possible" (p 249).

"From all I have said in the course of this lecture it can be concluded without exaggeration that no earlier period, when new towns or parts of them were founded, or when towns or parts of them were rebuilt, gave such enormous possibilities to town planners, architects and their collaborators as they do now for these men in the USSR. I think their boldest dreams are now being realized in Russia, dreams which former generations would have waved aside as Utopian, and which may still seem so, if we think of the legal, technical and economic limitations within which the town planner has to grope his way in other countries" (p 264).

In a paper on the business centre of Cape Town, Hanson (1938, p 357) bemoaned the tendency to abandon planning in the central areas of South Africa's cities because it "is too often said, even of the relatively minor problems we are faced with in South Africa, that nothing really effective can be done - the best that is possible is to create a further problem elsewhere". Moreover, in discussing the much-vaunted (at the time) plans for a piece of reclaimed land on the foreshore in Cape Town, Hanson (1938, p 372) drew attention to the unusual planning opportunities such reclamation offered:

"The town planner ... looks primarily on reclaimed land as a liberated space ..."
While there can be little doubt that a major emphasis in the debates of the congress revolved around the constraints imposed on planning by capitalist social relations, there was also a sensitivity to the simultaneous need for such planning. The following comment by Thornton-White (1938, p 380) demonstrates this awareness well:

"Just as, in the 19th century, legislation to protect the health and safety of workmen was necessary in the interests of industry, in the interests of capitalism, but no individual capitalist could be found to support it, so today town planning is necessary in the interests of the capitalist community. It is very difficult to find capitalists themselves who are prepared to support it - to provide funds for it; to push it through parliament. One has to force it upon the capitalist for his own good."

Not all the speakers at the conference argued that planning was impossible under capitalism. Many expressed the opposite viewpoint. What is significant, however, is that it was this topic that dominated the proceedings, as is made clear by Thornton-White's (1938) summary of the proceedings. Such debates, it might be argued, followed logically from the first attempts to actually implement planning in South Africa - a process that immediately threw up a number of contradictions, not least the power of private property in relation to other powers or objectives. It is, perhaps, these powers then, that restricted planning to minimalist controls only in the late 1920's and 1930's.

On the other hand, as will become apparent in a later section of this Chapter, not all private property rights were treated with equal respect or awe by planners during this period. The property rights of a Black homeowner, for example, were viewed as less problematic obstacles to 'planning' than those, say, of an industrialist. This, in turn, reflected the relative balance of political powers that, of necessity guarantee rights to private property. Moreover, it is possible that the debates on property rights at the time reflected the ideological tensions implicit within the then dominant power bloc alliance. Somewhat socialist White government officials, oriented towards the Labour Party, were rubbing shoulders with the more free enterprise oriented exponents of the interests of capital. In this context, the discourse on the constraints of planning in a capitalist environment, the eulogization of
the USSR, etc, become understandable as an ideological reflection of material differences within the power bloc alliance. Such tensions were also evident in the first major attempts at proactive interventions into the built environment during the latter stages of the t2 period.

DIRECT INTERVENTION AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW TOWNS

While the preparation, implementation and administration of town planning schemes in existing areas was low-key and minimalist, opportunities did arise in this period for grand design. These opportunities arose as a consequence of the rapid growth of manufacturing and the establishment of South Africa's first planned industrial new town - Vanderbijlpark.

In 1943, the South African Iron and Steel Corporation (ISCOR) decided to establish a new steelworks which was to supplement iron and steel produced by the existing steelworks in Pretoria (Anderson, 1959). They chose a site near Vereeniging for the establishment of an entirely new steelworks town - Vanderbijlpark. The reasons for the establishment of the new town complex, can largely be ascribed to developments in the political economy. While the manufacturing sector of the economy had grown steadily since the early 1930's, it was the Second World War which gave the sector a major boost. Between 1939 manufacturing's contribution to national income grew by over 90%, by comparison with 17.6% for mining and 61% for agriculture (Davies et al 1976). Moreover, manufacturing became the most important sector of the economy during the war. Small engineering stimulated by the production of armaments flourished, as did the production of capital goods as substitutes for goods which were now quite difficult to get from abroad. This, in turn, necessitated expanded production of local steel. Apart from the accumulation imperative, there were also other reasons for the establishment of a new steelworks. The decision to enter the war in the first place led to a significant rupture in the power bloc. Afrikaner nationalists and agricultural capitalists were opposed to South African participation in what they saw as an "imperialist war".

The memory of the Anglo-Boer War was still relatively fresh among Afrikaners, and they were not easily going to go to war for Britain. Agriculturalists were also uneasy about South Africa's participation in
the war as they feared disruption of markets. As it turns out, the war was good for agriculture, but agriculturalists were nonetheless against participation in the beginning. The result was that 37 United Party parliamentarians (including the Prime Minister, General Hertzog) resigned to form the Re-United Nationalist Party. White workers were also increasingly uneasy about the rapid growth of the African population in the cities as a consequence of industrial growth and the collapse of the reserve economies (Lipton, 1986). They were concerned that the increasing militancy and unionization of Black workers, and the existence of a large reserve army of Blacks in the cities, would weaken their bargaining position relative to capital as well as threaten their jobs. The ruling United Party, which by this time was dominated by manufacturing and mining capital, was concerned about losing the support of White labour to Hertzog’s Nationalists, and as a consequence a number of interventions were made to ensure full levels of White employment and to protect the position of Whites in the division of labour (Davies et al, 1976). One such intervention was the planning of Vanderbijlpark which was projected as a model project which would promote not only the growth of manufacturing, but also provide employment and pleasant living conditions for White workers.

The form of planning intervention in the case of Vanderbijlpark is of some interest from a planning theoretical point of view. To begin with, the project represented direct state intervention into the sphere of production. The intervention went beyond the mere provision of infrastructure to facilitate accumulation, but actually involved participation in production on a large scale. Secondly, there was simultaneous and direct state intervention in the sphere of reproduction, insofar as public housing was produced for Black employees and company housing for certain categories of the White working classes. Thirdly, the design, layout and town planning scheme components of the new town, represented proactive rather than reactive interventions in the sphere of circulation. While all town planning schemes imply a level of future control, there can be no doubt that real forward planning was possible in the case of Vanderbijlpark and other new towns because of the absence of spatially entrenched vested interests. Finally, a great deal of ethnic spatial engineering is evident in the early spatial plans for Vanderbijlpark, even though this planning occurred long before the
promulgation of the Group Areas Act. The land reservation tool was used to set aside land for separate Black townships. And while this was in accordance with the Native Urban Areas Act of 1923, the principles used in locating the Black townships prefigured some of the measures that were used to engineer the "apartheid city". Anderson (1959), for example, reports that an area for light industry was located to the east of the town centre to act as a buffer between White and Black residential areas.

The fact that in "new town" planning, planners really were free to plan the "socially rational" town without resistance from vested interests and safe in the knowledge that capital would, in fact be invested in the new town, meant that planners were able to close the gap between their theory and practice. Real praxis was possible. New planning ideas could be tested. Thus, Anderson (1959) comments on the performance of Vanderbijlpark some 10 years after its establishment as follows:

"... one principle of design which has been tested and which has proved successful is that of concentrating traffic on main boulevards and also planning suburban residential streets to discourage fast and heavy traffic. This principle has shown not only that traffic moves more easily, but that there are considerable savings in road construction costs when the traffic on roads is predictable and the roads built accordingly" (Anderson, 1959, pp 170-171).

The importance of the opportunities for theory generation and creativity is not lost on Anderson (1959, p 171).

"For the town planner the value of the solving of the planning and development of a "new town" is much more than the solving of this isolated problem. Much of the work of town planning is the guidance of movements already afoot, the retention of a position already established or the prohibition of conditions which is feared might come about. The creation and motive force is with others and too often the town planner must feel like the driver of a ponderous coach which is barely under control. Seldom comes the opportunity of creative design ..."

Interestingly, the plans for the Vanderbiltpark new town, and for a number of others which followed, allowed for a substantial degree of idealistic input. This idealism took two forms. On the one hand, "ideas" were borrowed freely from the British and American experience and adapted locally. In Vanderbiltpark, for example, Floyd and McManus used
the then fashionable idea of determining the size of neighbourhood units based on the threshold requirements of a primary school (Anderson, 1959). Likewise, in his design of Sasolburg (in 1951) Kirchofer used a number of principles from the Radburn scheme in the USA (Kirchofer, 1959). The second sense in which idealist input occurred was with respect to the exercise of personal creativity and imagination in a way that had not been possible before in South Africa. Kirchofer's plan for Sasolburg is a very good example of the expression of individual creativity and there can be no doubt that planning in these contexts was visionary, proactive and individual. Small wonder then that there was some debate at the time as to whether or not planning was an art or a science.

It should be noted that most new towns in South Africa had their roots in the imperatives of the accumulation process rather than in social reform as was the case in the United Kingdom. In the late 1940’s, the discovery of the OFS goldfields led to the comprehensive preconceptualization and development of a number of new towns such as Welkom, Harmony and Virginia. Unlike Vanderbijlpark, the goldfields' towns were largely private ventures, although the state was responsible for a great deal of the infrastructure necessary to promote accumulation. Sasolburg, which was planned in 1951, was, however, another example of massive state intervention in the sphere of production. The early new towns were not, however, tied directly to a broad regional development and planning programme as was the case with later "state" new towns such as Richard's Bay, Shishen and Saldahnah. The precise reasons for the establishment of new towns is a subject worthy of further enquiry. So too, is an examination of the extent to which planners have been able to maintain control over the subsequent development of new towns. Unfortunately, such investigations fall outside of the scope of this particular study.

UNPLANNED SETTLEMENT AND THE REPRODUCTION OF LABOUR POWER

In the South African context during the 1930’s and 1940’s, debates on the urban reproduction of labour centred on the perceived problems of unplanned settlements and/or 'slums'. It has already been noted for example, that during the 1930’s, most of the attention of the national media was focused on such issues, insofar as reporting on the urban
reproductive conditions of Blacks is concerned. Figure 4.1 illustrates the proportional distribution of different categories of the Johannesburg Star's reporting on urban reproductive conditions applicable to Blacks, as is recorded for the period 1925-1979.

State intervention into the sphere of reproduction generally was quite limited during the 1930's and 1940's, although it is true that expenditure on Hospitals and Public Health rose proportionately, in comparison with expenditure on productive infrastructure (South Africa, 1960). For the most part, however, interventions into the sphere of reproduction during the period did not take the form of state expenditure on the sphere of reproduction, but rather state attacks on 'slums' and informal settlements. There was, moreover, a racial selectivity to these attacks, most of which were aimed at low-income housing occupied by Blacks. Often the clearance of Black "slums" paved the way for the establishment of public housing schemes for Whites. A limited amount of Black public housing was also built on the urban edges, as in the case of Lamontville in Durban (Torr, 1987).

In general terms, the 'great depression' between 1929 and 1933 had a severe impact on the housing conditions of the working classes. In 1933, for example, a survey in Johannesburg showed that 1,121 White families were in need of accommodation, compared to 1923 when 322 houses available to the White working classes stood empty (Parnell 1986). Moreover, despite the 'civilized labour' policy of the Pact government, White unemployment levels remained high during the depression years (Davies et al, 1976). Parnell (1986) cites a 1933 Medical Officer of Health report (Johannesburg), that showed how community health conditions amongst Whites had declined dramatically between 1927 and 1933, and she notes how these poor conditions were often associated with 'slum' housing and rental exploitation by landlords. In Durban a similar situation applied, with local authority officials often blaming poor housing and health conditions upon the exploitative practices of 'slumlords'.

Certainly national statistics on average house rentals corroborate the image of rising exploitation in the rental sector during this period. As Figure 4.2 shows, house rentals rose at a particularly rapid rate between 1920 and 1932.
Figure 4.1: Proportional distribution of three categories of Star reporting on the urban reproductive sphere of Black South Africans, 1925-1979 (Source: McCarthy and Smit, 1984).
Figure 4.2: House rentals in relation to the consumer price index in South Africa (Source: South Africa, 1960)

It was in this context that the Slums Act was passed in 1934 which gave local authorities the powers of large-scale expropriation. Parnell (1986), moreover, reports that a number of local authorities began to build public housing for Whites. In Johannesburg, for example, the Council constructed the Jan Hofmeyer, Pioneer and Glenesk schemes in response to the crisis (Parnell, 1986).

Often such interventions were bought at the expense of Black housing. In several instances throughout the country, the Slums Act was used to destroy densely-populated central city areas occupied mainly by Blacks, and it was not exceptional for these sites to become areas for construction of public housing for Whites. Parnell (1986) cites the clearance of Prospect Township, in Johannesburg, and its replacement by the Maurice Freeman public housing scheme for Whites, as an example. On the other hand, it is also true that limited public housing efforts were
made in respect of Blacks. Orlando East near Johannesburg, for example, was established in 1935, with the local authority providing 3000 dwelling units (Morris, 1981). And in Durban, the first local authority sponsored housing schemes for Blacks - Lamontville and Baumanville - were completed in 1934 (Maasdorp and Humphries, 1975; Torr, 1987).

In general, though, such housing interventions were relatively modest in comparison to the scale of the housing problem faced by the working classes as a whole. In 1936, for example, there were approximately 10,000 dwellings available for Blacks in Johannesburg while the Black population had swelled to an estimated 236,000 (implying an occupancy ratio of 23.6 people per household). Morris (1981) also reports that in 1935, 20,000 of East London’s 25,368 Blacks were living in unsanitary conditions. Port Elizabeth’s one “location”, New Brighton, had a population of 7327, while the estimated size of the Black population in 1936 was given as 25,800. In Cape Town only one formal Black township (Langa) had been built by the mid-1920’s, and it was estimated that approximately 8,000 to 9,000 were either “illegally accommodated in the slum quarters of the city, in semi-developed townships (e.g. Windermere) or in the bush of the Cape Flats” (Morris, 1981 p 29).

The relatively tentative response by the state to the Black housing problem up to the late 1930’s, can be ascribed to a number of factors. First, Black militancy in places of both work and living was incipient, but not developed to any extent. Second, the so-called health crises associated with “unplanned” Black settlement and had been partially ‘solved’ by removing Blacks to the urban periphery. Finally, Morris (1981) suggests that the tentative response also grew out of contradictions in the 1923 Native Urban Areas Act. More specifically, this Act required that local authorities accept more responsibility for their Black populations on the one hand, but on the other hand, relegated Black settlement to the status of a “temporary” phenomenon.

By the mid 1940’s, however, the housing crisis had become critical. The exacerbation of the crisis was largely due to the acceleration of the influx of Blacks to cities as a consequence of the collapse of the reserve economies on the one hand, and the rapid growth of manufacturing during the Second World War years on the other. The population of
Johannesburg grew from 229,122 in 1936 to 370,972 in 1946 (Morris, 1981). This rate of growth led to the burgeoning of "squatter" camps (Stadler, 1979).

While house building for Blacks had been very slow prior to the war, it slowed dramatically during the war years (Lodge, 1983). Instead the City Council in Johannesburg allowed tenants of housing schemes to take on sub-tenants which, in turn led to high levels of overcrowding. This measure did not meet the need for shelter. Unskilled workers were earning an average of five pounds a week, of which approximately 20% was required to meet rent payments. Moreover, food prices rose dramatically during the war making it very difficult for people to survive (Lodge, 1983). Between 1930 and 1940, for example, the price of mealie-meat rose by 20% (a rate well above the general rate of inflation) and that of firewood by 50% (Lodge, 1981). Squatting, therefore, provided a rational (if desperate) survival response and numerous squatter camps burgeoned around Johannesburg (ultimately housing some 90,000 people).

The immediate response of the local state, upon whose land most squatter camps had emerged, was to destroy and clear the camps. Considerable resistance was, however, forthcoming from the squatters themselves. Like "birds in a cornfield", to use Stadler's (1979) analogy, they would simply re-build themselves elsewhere in the same "cornfield" if forced to leave a particular locale. The local authority in Johannesburg was alarmed by these developments. Firstly, the squatting constituted a major challenge to its authority and secondly, there was a philanthropic sentiment about health conditions in "unplanned" settlements (Stadler, 1979). As a result the local authority, with assistance from the central government, instituted a major planned site-and-service scheme (Morris, 1981).

Some 11,200 tiny sites (40sq meters) were laid out and batteries of pit latrines were made available (Morris, 1981). Squatters were then moved to the camp (often forcibly) and eventually 8611 families were accommodated here.

It is important to note that the site-and-service scheme was enacted only after the unsuccessful first response of the local state to squatting -
that of clearance. This first response was unsuccessful because of the resistance of the squatters, and it follows therefore, that the emergence of the first major site-and-service scheme can be ascribed to the structural conditions of the time on the one hand (urbanization, poverty, etc), and the specificities of the struggles between squatters and the local state on the other. While earlier (1920’s) state responses to slum conditions were ultimately shaped by struggles on the factory floor and in the political sphere, this shaping occurred at a distance (i.e. the struggles set a context for state interventions in the sphere of reproduction rather than directly determining such interventions). By the 1940’s, however popular struggles in the sphere of reproduction began to shape urban planning policy in a much more direct way. An overly deterministic interpretation of the effects of struggle should, however, probably be avoided, as shall be clarified shortly.

In the 1940’s, many of the conditions in the squatter camps were strikingly similar to those which prevail today. A similarity of particular importance was the emergence of autocratic forms of social control within the squatter settlements themselves. ‘Warlords’, very much in the mould of those common in informal settlements around cities such as Durban today, ran the squatter settlements with fists of iron. A widely publicised warlord of the Johannesburg squatter camps was James Mpanza (Stadler, 1979). The extent of Mpanza’s control is described by Morris (1981, p 37) as follows:

"James Mpanza set up his own party, the Sofasonke Party, and assumed control of the settlements. Squatters had to join the party and make payments for membership fees and running costs. He provided hessian for the shanties, employed guards to prevent looting, sold trading rights to shopkeepers and levied tolls on traders entering the camp."

This description could easily apply to the warlords of Crossroads or Lindelani today. However, unlike the authorities today, the state did not see the potential for using these autocratic structures as a means for maintaining overall social control. Whereas today, site-and-service schemes under the control of state-supported warlords are apparently seen

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1 Crossroads and Lindelani, are squatter settlements in Cape Town and Durban respectively.
as the route to social control of the masses and the cheap reproduction of the labour force, in the 1940's the site-and-service schemes were seen as a temporary phenomenon, and the activities of those such as Mpanza as threatening. While Mpanza and his cadres entered into considerable conflict with the Johannesburg City Council, there is no doubt that they were potentially co-optable. As Lodge (1983) points out, neither the African National Congress (ANC) nor the South African Communist Party (SACP) had shown much interest in the spontaneous struggles emerging in the "shanty towns", and where they did, they were clearly at odds with the likes of Mpanza. Instead of co-opting Mpanza, the authorities chose to deport him, and ultimately to destroy the squatter and site-and-service schemes and absorb them into the massive public housing estates created during the 1950's.

The state response might be explained in terms of a more general paranoia in ruling circles at that time linked to the growth of Black resistance. The response to Mpanza, for example, came at the same time that ruling groups were being shaken by the first strike to parallel the severity of that of 1922 (fig 4.3).

In contrast to the 1922 precedent, the 1946 militancy drew upon a very considerable constituency of African workers, and the ruling classes may have felt generally threatened by Africans 'acting outside the law' at this time. Possibly this could account for the scapegoating of Mpanza, but it could be retorted that, during the mid 1980's, a state strategy of actually accommodating squatter settlements and their leaders, has followed shortly after a period of intense African labour militancy.

The anomaly that is raised here requires explanation. Two possibilities are considered here. Firstly, debates on the 'problem of squatters' in the 1930's and 1940's were also debates about desirable urban forms on the part of ruling groups. It was not so much squatting that was regarded as a problem, but where it occurred, and which interests it frustrated in the process. As will be elaborated in Chapter Five, local bureaucracies during the 1940's, were increasingly conceptualizing 'the ideal city', as planning and planners became more confident of moving beyond the bounds of minimalism. Not only did these bureaucratic visions articulate the interests of the White labour-capital alliance
insofar as future urban form was concerned; they identified areas which had to be 'renewed' if such visions were to be realized. Many such areas happened to be those occupied by squatters, and possibly Mpanza fell afoul of such plans.

Figure 4.3: Strike activity in South Africa, 1910 - 1960 (Source: South Africa, 1960)

A second possible reason why squatters were dealt with differently in the 1940's concerns the differences in economic policy environments. Keynesian economic solutions were gaining increasing currency in South Africa during the 1940's, and the idea that state-assisted housing and the construction sector could be used as a 'lead sector', to stimulate accumulation generally, was common. Reflecting this viewpoint, the state set about promoting housing and the construction sector, via the building societies, subsidized housing loans and so on. In consequence, in the decade 1943 to 1952, the construction sector of the economy grew
from 70 million Pounds in 1943 to 450 million Pounds (1952), whilst, by comparison, the industrial sector grew from 125 million Pounds (1943) to 395 million Pounds (1952) (South Africa, 1960). The rate of growth of the construction sector was, therefore, twice that of the industrial sector in the decade in question, and the interests associated with such growth were considerable. In such a context, where the prospects of turning 'city building' into a major project for corporate capital were ripening, inconveniently placed squatter settlements were bound to be seen as areas worthy of 'renewal', with their inhabitants earmarked for future occupation of housing estates to be developed by the emerging construction sector.

THE EMERGING PHILOSOPHY OF A "PLANNED CITY" AND ITS CONTRADICTIONS

By the mid-1940's, the groundwork had been laid for an emerging philosophy of the 'planned city' amongst ruling groups -- a philosophy that was to have major implications for the decades that followed. A classic instance of this was the Barnes (1943) Report on a Programme for the Post War Development of the City of Durban. As suggested in the previous section, the concept of the planned city was gaining increased currency with the general drift away from minimalist planning in South Africa during the 1930's, as manifest for example, in the new town planning schemes discussed earlier in this Chapter. The hallmarks of this outlook were those of: an emphasis upon pro-active state intervention; 'blue-prints' for shaping future urban growth; antagonism towards spontaneous settlement patterns; and support for the principle of rigid separation of (apparently) non-complimentary land use. These ideas were to receive their fullest expression in the apartheid period of the 1950's and 1960's, and I shall therefore leave detailed discussion of them to Chapter Five. In the interim it is necessary only to record that the early 1940's was the period that saw the introduction of the first 'blue-print' plans for South Africa's larger cities, including Johannesburg, Durban and Cape Town (Durban Housing Survey, 1952).

The emerging consciousness of city-wide, blue-print planning was encouraged by the increasing spatial extent of urbanization during the 1930's and 1940's - a period that witnessed the emergence of functional urban systems of 10 miles radius and more, made possible by the increased
usage of motorised and rail commuter transport. Transport, in turn, began to assume increased significance as a priority amongst power bloc and popular political actors alike, with the early 1940's seeing the beginnings of politicized public transport systems.

As discussed earlier in this Chapter, the state response to central city 'slums' was to 'remove' the problem by banishing Blacks to the metropolitan periphery and this, in turn, set the stage for the emergence of urban social movements around the transport issue. Of particular significance in this regard were the bus boycotts that developed in Alexandra, a formal Black township some twelve miles from central Johannesburg. By the early 1940's, the transport industry was dominated by a few White owned transport companies. The Motor Carrier Transportation Act of 1930 had already had the effect of squeezing many African bus companies and taxis out of the industry (McCarthy and Swilling, 1985). Oligopolistic practices had become the norm and in the 1940's the bus companies attempted a concerted increase in fares. Numerous bus boycotts followed. In 1943, 20,000 boycotters from Alexandra walked to work (Stadler, 1979). Later in the same year, 10,000 Alexandra residents marched through central Johannesburg. The dispute was temporarily resolved by the institution of a coupon scheme in which coupons could be bought by workers at the old fare, while the bus companies were able to claim the difference between the new and old fares from the city council (Stadler, 1979). This was a temporary arrangement and later the private carriers were amalgamated into a single state-subsidized transport monopoly - The Public Utility Company (PUTCO) - which, it was hoped, would ultimately dispense with the need for subsidy by realizing economies of scale in service provision.

The contradictions of a transport system, based upon a state sponsored monopoly serving a forcibly peripheralised Black population, will be explained in Chapter 5. In the interim, however, we can note the relevance of the early 1940's transport issue for the subsequent development of urban social movements in South Africa. Lodge (1983, p 15) describes the significance of the 1940's bus boycotts as follows:

"Apart from their influence on the politics of opposition the boycotts were also important in demonstrating the
effectiveness of a new tactic which was to be used again and again in the succeeding decade. They also served to promote a trend towards increasing state intervention in issues bearing upon the subsistence of workers; the form this took in the case of Alexandra’s transport was modest - the subsidization (from a levy exerted on employers) of the monopolistic Public Utility Transport Corporation which still to this day carries a major proportion of the Rand’s labour force to and from work.”

This trend towards monopolistic and central state-supervised provision of peripheralised systems of urban reproduction for Blacks became a hallmark of state strategy, and a condition for popular response, during the 1950’s and 1960’s, and it is important to notice its origins in the emerging pattern of spatial relationships which were increasingly dominating South African cities during the 1930’s and 1940’s. It was not only urban social movements around the transport issue that served as an early index of the internal contradictions of the emerging system of planning, since inhabitants of inner-city ‘slum’ neighbourhoods were simultaneously beginning to resist planning threats to their neighbourhoods. Overall levels of Black protest over urban living conditions were low during the 1930’s and early 1940’s, by comparison with later years. For example, of all the reports on such protest that derived from McCarthy and Friedman’s (1983) survey of the Star newspaper for the period 1925-1979, just 13% occurred in the period 1930-1944. By contrast, the proportion of reports applicable to the period 1945-1959 was three times as high, at 39%. The point should be made, then, that we are dealing, in this period, simply with precedents for a much more tumultuous period, to follow during the apartheid era.

THE EMERGENCE OF RURAL AND REGIONAL PLANNING

The period 1930-1950 heralded the introduction of rural and regional planning, albeit at a very tentative level. Rural planning took the form of so-called “betterment” planning in the reserve areas. In the early 1930’s, a government Commission of Enquiry (The Native Economic Commission of 1932) argued that it was in the public interest that something be done about the declining productivity and economic collapse of the rural areas. The Commission placed some emphasis on the evil of overstocking in the reserves (Seneque, 1982). Betterment planning, however, was not introduced until 1936, and was a clear response to the
continued economic collapse of the reserves and the related acceleration of the flow of Blacks to the cities.

As noted in a previous section, the influx of Blacks was a source of major concern to both the White working class and the ruling classes (Lipton, 1986). Seneque (1982) also suggests that in addition to the fears referred to above, betterment schemes were also introduced as a consequence of the fears of the mining sector that the collapse of the reserves (upon which the mines were increasingly dependent for labour), would lead to demands for higher wages.

The reasons for the collapse of the reserves are complex, and cannot be explored in detail here (for more detailed coverage see Lipton, 1986; Seneque, 1982; and Fox, 1983). The major reasons can, however, be summarized as follows. The 1913 Land Act had the effect of destroying the class of Black farmers in the "White" agricultural areas and contributed to the rapid increase of the reserve population (Lipton, 1986). The conscious attempt by the state to co-opt and retain traditional authority structures in the reserves for purposes of social control, had a limiting effect on the development of collective responses on the part of Black farmers to growing land scarcity (Lipton, 1986). Moreover, the migrant labour system was responsible for disturbing traditional forms of economic organization, and the re-organization that was necessary to ensure successful adaptation was likewise stunted by the maintenance of traditional authority structures. Even if they were able to produce successfully, Black peasant farmers found it increasingly difficult to compete in markets for agricultural goods, given state aid to White farmers and given conscious state interventions to limit Black competition (Lipton, 1986; Seneque, 1982). Other reasons for the decline of the reserves included, inter alia, rapid natural population growth; the use of archaic farming methods which became increasingly inappropriate; certain cultural factors and so on. There can, however, be little doubt that the development of capitalist agriculture, mining and manufacturing went hand in hand with the destruction of peasant agriculture.

Betterment planning involved an attempt to substantially re-organize the spatial organisation of peasant agriculture. More specifically,
peasants were moved off so-called productive land and resettled in nucleated villages which, it was argued, could be more easily serviced. Unlike the "minimalist" interventions of urban planners in the sphere of circulation at this time, interventions in the reserve areas were both dramatic and wide-sweeping. The objective was the total transformation of rural settlement patterns. Not surprisingly, betterment planning interventions were vigorously opposed, albeit by a politically impotent and militarily weak rural peasantry. This relative weakness notwithstanding, the betterment measures were so disruptive that significant levels of political mobilization ensued (Senneque, 1982). As a consequence, the resistance was relatively effective and by 1952, only 23% of "released" areas 1 and 3.8% of "scheduled" 2 areas had been "replanned" (Glaser, 1983). While the specific form that betterment intervention took, involved the comprehensive reorganization of settlement patterns, the state stopped short of interventions which could really arrest rural decline, e.g. tenurial reforms, the provision of infrastructure and the introduction of marketing strategies.

Senneque (1982) argues that comprehensive intervention of this sort was constrained by the concern of mining capitalists that successful rural development would constrain the supply of migrant labour. Thus, what was required was intervention which stabilized rural decline, but which did not stimulate the rural economy to the point where labour supply would be endangered (Senneque, 1982). While this explanation appears to be rather functionalist, the reports of the Native Affairs Commission during the 1930's stated quite explicitly that "no developments would be contemplated which might reduce the supply of labour from them" (Lipton, 1986, p 105). Furthermore, there was real fear of the competition that Black farmers could pose to the White agricultural capitalists. Thus, in 1936, J.G. Strijdom opposed the provision of tractors and ploughs to rural peasants arguing that:

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1 "Released" areas refer to land additional to that set aside in the Native Land Act of 1913 for occupation and ownership by Africans. This additional land is provided in terms of the Native Trust and Land Act of 1936.

2 "Scheduled" land refers to land set aside in terms of the Native Land Act of 1913 for occupation and ownership by Africans.
"If the government went on this way, natives would soon cease to be labourers and become farmers, with disastrous effects on White farming, where the problem of markets was already serious" (quoted in Lipton, 1986, p 106)

Of some interest from a planning point of view, is the fact that betterment planning represents direct intervention in the spatial organization of precapitalist spheres of production and reproduction. However, to the extent that the reserves were by this time essentially locales within which labour was reproduced (i.e. they were more like residential suburbs than areas within which the production of value occurred) so it follows that betterment was essentially an intervention in the sphere of reproduction. Thus, while it is true that value was being produced through peasant agriculture, the state's intervention was not an effort to promote accumulation in the subordinate precapitalist mode, but rather an attempt to reduce the costs of reproduction in the dominant capitalist mode. Another point of general interest is that whereas planning intervention in the sphere of production is very rare under capitalist social relations (where the spatial organization of production is indirectly controlled by planning interventions in the sphere of circulation) in instances where a dominant capitalist mode is articulated with subordinate precapitalist modes, planning interventions in the productive sphere of precapitalist modes might be quite common (e.g. rural-service centres, state farms, rural co-operatives and so on).

In addition to the betterment schemes, the 1940's also saw the first tentative attempts by the state to promote industrial decentralization. The Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) was founded in 1940 and among its varied projects was the promotion of capital accumulation in more peripheral areas.

The IDC established a number of important productive concerns in these peripheral areas such as the Good Hope Textile corporation in King Williams Town (1945), a masonite plant in Estcourt (1945); the SAPPI Mills at Tugela Mouth (1948); the Sasol plant at Sasolburg (1950); the Foskor Phosphate plant at Phalaborwa (1951); and the SAICCOR pulp mill at
Unkomaas (1951) (Glaser, 1983). In one sense these interventions can be understood as technocratic attempts to facilitate accumulation by bringing capital, raw materials and labour together in locales and sectors of the economy which private capital had either neglected or been unable to develop. Thus, a long-term chairman argued that the IDC:

"... paid particular attention to the fields in which it has appeared possible to develop the use of types of labour and materials hitherto more or less neglected by reason of their nature or location" (van Eck, quoted in Glaser, 1983, p 11).

The failure of private capital to utilize these resources can be explained with respect to inter alia: the slow rotation time of capital (a number of IDC projects were in fact only profitable after the passage of a considerable period of time); the risky nature of the ventures (in the absence of state backing); the disjuncture between the private and collective interests of capitalists; and the lack of appropriate information.

The rapid growth of the economy during and immediately after the war years, led to an increasing realization of the need for state intervention to co-ordinate resource exploitation on the one hand, and stimulate resource utilization on the other. With the expansion of capitalist accumulation, greater levels of regional interdependence developed. A contradiction developed between the increasing spatial unity of capitalist production on the one hand, and its fragmented spatial administration on the other. Such an awareness is evident in the fifth report of the Social and Economic Planning Commission (SEPC) in 1944. This report represented, in the words of Glaser (1983, p 12):

"... the first attempt to outline a program of well-informed and integrated state intervention in reorganizing the topography of capitalist accumulation in South Africa."

It was, however, the discovery and decision to develop the Orange Free State goldfields in the late 1940's, that gave regional planning its first real impetus. A Natural Resources Development Council (NRDC) was established in 1947 to co-ordinate the development of the goldfields and other resources on a relatively ad hoc basis (Glaser, 1987). Fair (1959)
clearly regarded the planning of the goldfields as the first major attempt at regional planning.

"The finest example of planned regional development in the Union - and possibly in Africa South of the Sahara - is to be found in the recent growth of the Orange Free State goldfields. It was essentially a combined operation by private and governmental agencies. On the one hand, there was the development of the region and the drive displayed by the gold mining industry; on the other hand, there was the control of the use of land and the establishment of Townships, as well as the provision of major services such as power and water supply, roads and railways by the governmental authorities. However modest were the powers given the Natural Resources Development Council in terms of the Act of 1947, the establishment of "controlled" areas for the gold-mining regions of the North West OFS, the Western Transvaal (Klerksdorp), and the Eastern Transvaal (Bethal) marks the first attempt in South Africa to achieve co-ordination of public policy and action on physical planning matters according to major development regions" (Fair. 1959, p 50)

The close and almost instrumental relation between the state and capital is quite evident from this statement and there can be little doubt that early regional planning interventions were closely tied to the promotion of capital accumulation. While such interventions were clearly in the interests of capital they can also be argued to have been in the interests of both White and Black labour (to the extent that growth meant job provision and finances for increasing the social wage during the 1950's).

While the utilization of the resources of the OFS goldfields was predicated on the exploitation of essentially Black labour, the regional planning of the time cannot be construed as an attempt to refine or defend the social relations of racial capitalism. The interventions were, in fact, of a more technocratic "public interest" nature, within the constraints set by dominant social relations. This assessment notwithstanding, there can also be little doubt that the regional and town planning of the time was quite accommodating of racial capitalism and reproduced elements of it in spatial form (e.g. the planning of segregated and peripheral townships for Blacks, in addition to making provision for compounds on the mines).
The period 1930-1950 saw the first attempts in South Africa to prepare and implement town planning schemes. These attempts immediately highlighted the contradiction between the need (on the part of both capital and labour) for collective intervention on the one hand, and a set of social relations and social institutions which resisted such intervention. In addition to the factors discussed in the previous chapter, the highly pragmatic and tentative direction of early town planning interventions in South Africa was also due to the resistance to planning interventions associated with the institution of private property. Given that planning in the USA and in Britain very quickly assumed a similarly "practical" orientation, notwithstanding the early utopian rhetoric and somewhat different social conditions, it is tempting to suggest that the resistance to planning arising out of the institution of private property, is perhaps the most important variable accounting for its minimalist and pragmatic character. The tension between the need for planning on the one hand, and the simultaneous resistance to it on the other, is one which has remained with planning to the present day. Instances in which this tension surfaces and becomes particularly prominent will be discussed in later chapters.

The town planning schemes implemented in this period took the form of interventions into the sphere of circulation and more specifically the land market. The role of planners in the preparation of these schemes appears to have been largely normative at the outset, and more functionalist and administrative as time passed. The early schemes also took the form of blueprints which were only proactive and forward-looking to the extent that they attempted to ensure that potential land use conflicts were controlled or avoided. There were, however, opportunities for grander and more proactive interventions. These opportunities arose as a consequence of historically contingent developments in the accumulation process. The first was the rapid development of the manufacturing industry (which itself was subject to complex determination) during the Second World War and the second the discovery of the OFS goldfields. These developments provided South African planners with their first opportunities to produce grand designs for "new towns".
Since new towns were designed for implementation on "virgin" land, the institution of private property proved less obstructive and allowed planners to close the gap between theory and practice to an extent. The emergence of opportunities for grand design coincided with the growth of the ideology of the "planned" city within certain sectors of the power bloc alliance. While the urban planning that was taking root in White areas was of an essentially minimalist nature, the rapid growth of informal or unplanned settlement led to a growing consensus within power bloc circles for the need for ethnic spatial engineering on a grand scale. Thus, the seeds for the period in which the "segregation" city was transformed into the planned "apartheid" city were sown in the late 1940's. This process of reconstruction is investigated in the next Chapter.

In addition to interventions in the sphere of circulation (use and density zoning, land reservation etc) the period also saw limited interventions in the sphere of reproduction in the form of public housing estates for both Blacks and Whites, and the destruction of so-called slums. The provision of public housing in both the case of Whites and Blacks can be theorized as a response to the non-producability (in the social not technical sense) of certain commodities, necessary for the reproduction of labour under capitalist social relations of production. The differences in quality, quantity and design of these public housing estates can only be understood in terms of the specificity of the class struggles of the time and the imperative to reproduce the White working class. The relatively limited supply of housing for Whites can be explained with reference to the contradictions between the need to provide relatively high quality houses (because of the balance of class forces and colonial mentalities with respect to what was appropriate for Whites) and the expense of doing so, which in turn, was a function of the imperative to employ a large proportion of Whites in their construction (in line with "civilized" labour practices extracted through struggle by White workers in the 1920's). The limited supply of Black housing can be attributed to the meanness of local authorities on the one hand, and more importantly the relative weakness of the Black popular movements and working class at this time. This weakness notwithstanding, popular struggles began, for the first time, to have a direct influence.
on the direction and nature of planning policy. Thus, the adoption of the first site-and-service housing schemes in South Africa is attributable in part to the specificities of popular struggles in relation to the squatting "issue". Likewise, emergent state transport policies were directly shaped by struggles in the sphere of reproduction.

It is also during the period 1930 to 1950 that regional planning emerged. The betterment planning responses to the collapse of the rural economy were born out of the contradictory articulation of a rapidly growing and dominant capitalist mode of production with a subordinate pre-capitalist mode. More specifically, betterment planning can be understood as an attempt to straddle the contradiction between the need to maintain the pre-capitalist mode on the one hand (to augment the reproduction of labour and maintain social control), and the need to destroy it on the other (to create a labour supply and to limit competition from the peasantry). Moreover, aspects of betterment planning can also be understood with respect to the balance of class forces and more particularly, the historically contingent structure of the power bloc. With respect to the former, the fact that the form that betterment took was so comprehensive - insofar as it involved the reconstruction of the spatial organization of both production and reproduction in the reserves - is a reflection of the relative weakness of the peasantry and the working classes in the reserves. The fact that betterment was not more widely implemented, on the other hand, was a reflection of the bitter struggles and resistance that flared in response to its implementation. With respect to the latter, the introduction of an attempt to stem the flow of Blacks to the cities was partly a response to the fear of White labour (whose representatives had gained influence in the power bloc in the 1920's) that their jobs would be endangered by the growth of a large reserve army of Black workers. Finally, the state's tentative attempts to promote production in remote and more backward areas can be understood as a response to the contradiction between the individual and collective rationality of capital. In this respect, early attempts to direct regional growth were of a technicist rather than overtly political nature.
CHAPTER FIVE: URBAN AND REGIONAL PLANNING AND APARTHEID SPATIAL ENGINEERING: 1950 TO 1975

INTRODUCTION

McCarthy and Smit (1984, p 87) styled the 1950’s and 1960’s as a period of "ideological and physical intervention" where, to use Borja’s (1977) words for a parallel period in Spain, the city becomes "an object of plunder and of ideology". Accompanying the expansion of the construction sector of capital, McCarthy and Smit (1984, p 95) hypothesized that "the urban reproductive sphere ... becomes one outlet for the commodity production activities of monopoly capital".

In retrospect, whilst it was true that the major construction companies did benefit from the Black housing programmes of the 1950’s and 1960’s (see, for example, Hendler, 1987), McCarthy and Smit (1984) probably overemphasized the significance of these developments from the point of view of construction capital. The per unit costs of construction, and per unit profits, were quite modest by comparison, for example, with White housing constructed during the same period (see, for example, Maasdorp and Humphries, 1975). Moreover, the housing sector was only part of a broader thrust during the 1950’s and 1960s’, towards the building of a ‘formalized city’ that absorbed the attention of the construction sector: freeways, office blocks, factories and commercial centres were probably more profitable ventures than Black housing estates.

The 1950’s and 1960’s, however, were not simply characterized by a commodification of the built environment that served the interests of the construction/real estate nexus. They were, perhaps more than anything else, years in which experiments in ethnic spatial engineering were conducted, probably on a scale without precedent elsewhere in the world. The election of the Nationalist Party to power in 1948 led to the Group Areas Act of 1950 and this Act, together with the trend towards the formalized city as already discussed, led to a massive reconstruction of South African cities. The result, in Davies’ (1976) terms, was a city "more structured and quartered than anything that had preceded it".
Apart from the dramatic reconstruction of the South African city, apartheid spatial engineering also gave impetus to regional planning and particularly to decentralization policy. As noted in Chapter Four, the seeds of regional planning were sown in the 1930's and 1940's, but it was only with the adoption of "grand apartheid" 1 in the late 1950's and the 1960's, that significant resources were diverted into regional planning. Moreover, regional planning did not emerge as an activity distinct from the concerns of urban planning. It was instead part of an overall strategy to deal with contradictions posed by rapid urbanization and unplanned growth discussed in the previous chapter.

Given that apartheid spatial engineering was such a dominant feature in the 1950's and 1960's, the emphasis in this chapter falls quite squarely on the relation between apartheid and planning. Thus, the first section deals with the forging of the apartheid city. This is followed by a discussion of regional planning and its relation to apartheid. The third section attempts to explain the major shift in state policy regarding the urban sphere of reproduction from minimalist regulation to substantial and direct intervention in the form of a very substantial public housing programme for Blacks. The way in which apartheid thinking was built into the physical design of these housing schemes is stressed. Section four briefly describes the state's attempt to shift urbanization to locales behind bantustan boundaries as part of the Verwoerdian vision of separate development. The inefficient and inequitable urban forms that this process has created are stressed, since they later become an important part of the organic crisis that afflicts the state in the post-1975 period. The articulation of apartheid with activities such as urban renewal and the emergence of metropolitan planning is also discussed. Finally, it is argued that the dominance of apartheid social relations notwithstanding, the rapid growth of built-environment production within the White areas, created the material conditions for entrenching the dogma that planning is an essentially

1 "Grand apartheid" refers to the shift from initial concern with the ethnic spatial engineering of the South African city, to the formulation of a broad vision in terms of which Blacks would exercise political rights within the reserves, which were to be turned into separate "national states". Grand apartheid is synonymous with "Verwoerdian separate development".
technical activity. On the other hand, it is also noted that the very same growth of built environment creation, may well have provided an important impetus for apartheid spatial engineering.

THE FORGING OF THE APARTEID CITY AND THE RISE OF AFRICAN AND AFRIKAANER NATIONALISM

In previous Chapters reference has been made to early attempts at the ethnic engineering of South African cities. Mention has been made of the use of restrictive covenants to keep Blacks out of White residential areas in the first quarter of the century, and also of the expulsion of Blacks from central city neighbourhoods to the urban periphery, in terms of such legislation as the Slums Act and the Native (Urban Areas) Act of 1923. There were also numerous attempts at the local and regional level to introduce and implement racist legislation governing settlement, but there was a great deal of regional variation in this regard. In East London, for example, the municipality enacted legislation which empowered it to segregate Indians and Whites. Likewise in the Transvaal and Natal, the 1943 Trading and Occupation Land Restriction Act (the "Pegging Act") allowed for the control of future land transactions involving Indians, and effectively froze or pegged the existing distribution of Indian Land. However, the segregation powers implied in the 1923 Native Urban Areas Act were not applied with much vigour and it was only with the ascension of the Nationalist Party to power in 1948, and the enactment of the Group Areas Act of 1950, that spatial engineering occurred on a grand scale. Before turning to the "apartheid city" it should be noted that while significant racial mixing existed in South African cities, Western (1981) reports that in 1936, thirty-seven percent of residential Cape Town was mixed. Levels of segregation were nonetheless high. This pattern of segregation is quite apparent in the segregation indices computed by Davies (1976) for the City of Durban in 1951 and 1971, where he shows that only marginal increases in levels of segregation per se were achieved by the Group Areas Act.

The Group Areas Act, nevertheless, implied major changes to the fabric of SA cities. This Act, Number 41 of 1950, imposed uniform controls upon all sales of land between races and on interracial changes in occupation. A Group Areas Board was established to preside over these matters and to
set in motion what must rank as one of the most dramatic exercises in social spatial engineering anywhere in the world. While the "fixedness" of the existing built environment posed something of a problem for the creation of an ideal apartheid city, this did not deter the social engineers. It is estimated that more than half of the people in the City of Durban were forced to move to accommodate the provisions of the Act (Maasdorp and Humphries, 1975). While the Group Areas Act did not specify any particular spatial model, it required complete separation of the races and specified a set of criteria that should be met in Group Areas design. These criteria have been summarized in the Durban Housing Survey (1952) as follows:

1. Each race group should have its own consolidated residential areas.

2. Each consolidated area should be located in such a way as to allow continuous and incremental expansion.

3. Each residential group area should be separated by a strong physical "buffer" such as a river or ridge or by a use buffer such as an industrial or commercial area. Should buffers of this kind not be available, then an open space or "buffer zone" was to be left between group areas.

4. Each group area was to have good access to and from work. Attention should be given to trying to locate Black areas as close to work opportunities as possible.

5. Racial mixing within work areas was regarded as permissible (and, in fact, obligatory).

6. In moving to and from work, however, no ethnic group should have to traverse the residential areas of other groups.

7. Each area should become self-governing as soon as possible and move toward equality in as many aspects as possible.
As Davies (1976) points out, there is only one spatial model which satisfies these criteria. This is a sectoral model in which group areas are arranged in sectors radiating from a central core area, with African sectors located adjacent to an industrial sector. Such a model is depicted in Figure 5.1.

![Diagram](image)

Figure 5.1: The ideal apartheid city

It should be noted that relocations and removals in terms of the Group Areas Act affected mainly Indians and Coloureds. According to Platsky and Walker (1985) a total of 111580 families had been "disqualified" in terms of the Act by 1970 and of these 59% were Coloured, 39% were Indian and only 2% were White. However, Platsky and Walker (1985) point out that the Group Areas Act has been used to destroy many African settlements in the urban areas as well. In many instances these Africans were tenants living on Indian-owned land. When this land was wrested from the Indian owners, the African tenants also had to go. It
is not known how many African people were forced to move in this way, but
Platsky and Walker (1985) have estimated that in Durban alone, the figure
was as high as 80000. Some African freehold townships, such as
Sophiatown, were also destroyed by the Act.

In order to explain why it was that such massive spatial engineering
occurred in the 1950's and 1960's it is necessary to understand major
developments in the political economy in the late 1940's. The growth of
Afrikaaner nationalism had been given a boost by South Africa's entry
into World War II. Given the resignation of Hertzog and a number of
members of Parliament referred to in the previous chapter, the political
gap between the largely English mining and manufacturing fractions of
capital (which had gained dominance within the power bloc) on the one
hand, and their mainly Afrikaaner allies constituted by agricultural
capital, the emerging White petty bourgeoisie, emergent Afrikaaner
finance capital and the White working class on the other, widened
substantially. While Afrikaaner nationalism had an autonomy of its own
and could not be reduced to an alliance of economic interests, the
movement was nonetheless reinforced by a coincidence of the economic
interests of its major constituents during this period. Particularly
important, in this regard, were the conflicts which developed between
agricultural capital and manufacturing capital on the one hand, and
between White labour and manufacturing capital on the other.

The rapid flow of Blacks to the cities during the war endangered
agriculture's supply of labour. As Lipton (1986) points out, the demand
for labour increased dramatically in the 1930's and 1940's, because of
the massive increase in agricultural output and the expansion of the area
under cultivation. The South African Agricultural Union complained
bitterly about the loss of Black workers to the cities and urged the
government to tighten influx controls and institute a system of labour
bureaux to ensure effective implementation (Lipton, 1986). Manufacturing capital, on the other hand, benefited from the existence of
a large reserve army of labour in the urban areas. More important,
however, from the point of view of manufacturing capital was the need for
Black semi-skilled workers, notwithstanding the fairly stringent job
colour bar in this sector. The very rapid growth of manufacturing and
the departure of many White workers to take part in the war effort, led
to the infiltration of many Blacks into semi-skilled and skilled positions. As a consequence of these developments, manufacturing capital was keen to establish a stable labour force and was therefore opposed to influx control. Thus the Minister of Native Affairs in 1947 argued as follows:

"Can we develop our industries when we have the position that the Native only works for a few months and then returns to the reserves for a couple of years? No, the Native must be trained for his work in industry, and to become an efficient industrial worker, he must be a permanent industrial worker. On that account, he must live near his place of employment" (Quoted in Davies et al, 1974, p 26).

Davies et al (1976) report that in 1943 the Department of Native Affairs refused to enforce the 1936 Native Lands and Trusts Act which gave them the power to remove squatters and redirect them to the agricultural areas. Instead, the Government suggested that farmers should attempt to attract labour by improving conditions on the farms. This proposal, in turn, did not find a warm reception amongst farmers.

As has already been noted White labour was also not particularly enamoured of the infiltration of Blacks into semi-skilled jobs. During the war, the African labour force in manufacturing grew by some 115 000 (Davies et al, 1976). Whereas Whites comprised only 10% to 15% of the labour force in mining, they accounted for fully 46% of manufacturing employment up to World War II (Lipton, 1986). Clearly, infiltration worried Whites and their unions often complained of widespread evasion of the colour bar by employers. Moreover, manufacturing capital, however, was placing a great deal of pressure on the state to relax the bar. Manufacturers complained bitterly about the high costs and inefficiency that the job colour bar imposed on them.

Also of significance was the conflict that emerged after the war between foreign capital (which had predominantly English links) and emergent Afrikaner manufacturing capital which utilized investment from the agricultural sector (Davies et al, 1976). Immediately after the war foreign capital flowed into the country and by 1948, accounted for one third of all investment in manufacturing (Davies et al, 1976). As such, foreign investments posed a threat to the emergent local manufacturers.
Apart from conflicts within the power bloc, the other development in the political economy of substantial significance in explaining the emergence of apartheid and the apartheid city, was the growth of Black political opposition into a coherent mass movement in the late 1940’s and early 1950’s. As Lodge (1983) points out, the 1946 mineworkers’ strike and the brutality of its repression had the effect of radicalizing previously moderate (and petty bourgeois-dominated) movements like the African National Congress. The partial radicalization of popular movements also coincided with a growing tolerance of nationalist movements by the Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA). In 1950, a CPSA report argued a case for working through the national movement:

"From the analysis here presented, the conclusion must be drawn that the national organizations can develop into powerful mass movements only to the extent that their content and aims are determined by the interests of workers and peasants. The national organizations, to be effective must be transformed into a revolutionary party of workers, peasants, intellectuals and petty bourgeoisie, linked together in a firm organization, subject to strict discipline, and guided by a definite programme of struggle against all forms of racial discrimination in alliance with class conscious European workers and intellectuals. Such a party would be distinguished from the Communist Party in that its objective is national liberation, that is the abolition of racial discrimination, but it would cooperate closely with the Communist Party" (Quoted in Lodge, 1983, pp 29-31).

The tactical convergence of ideologically disparate groupings was to lead to major conflicts within the ANC later. In the short-run, however, it served to consolidate the Black oppositional forces. As Saul and Gelb (1981) point out, the power bloc was shaken to the core by the political opposition mounted by Blacks in the late 1940’s. This affected all constituents of the power bloc amongst whom arguably the more vulnerable were the White workers and White petty bourgeoisie.

The response of the ruling United Party to the variety of pressures exerted on it was ambiguous. In many respects it sought to be "all things to all people" and nowhere is this more clearly evident than in the Fagan Commission Report of 1948. On the one hand, this report stressed the need to "stabilize" workers by affording them permanence in
the urban areas. On the other hand, it also endorsed the migrant labour system and the tightening of influx controls (Davies et al, 1976).

Significantly, the Fagan Commission also argued that total spatial and economic segregation of races was "utterly impracticable" (Morris, 1981, p 40). The ambitious and apparently soft line taken by the United Party lost it a great deal of support, particularly among threatened White workers and labour-starved agriculturalists. The Nationalist Party, on the other hand, offered a clear and "hard" solution. It promised agricultural capital that it would clamp down on urban influx and ensure a substantial rural labour supply. It promised White workers and the White petty bourgeoisie that the job colour bar would be reinforced, that Black political opposition would be crushed, and that their safety and interests would be ensured. It promised Afrikaaner manufacturing capital that it would secure its interests and liberate the South African economy from the stranglehold of Imperial capital (Davies et al, 1976). In this regard, it even went so far as to threaten the nationalization of the mines.

In 1948, the Nationalist Party came to power. In this context the passing of the Group Areas Act in 1950 could be interpreted as one of the steps necessary to meet the political demands of the White petty bourgeoisie and the White working classes. Western (1981), for example, argues that the initial Group Areas interventions were a response to the almost hysterical fear of the urban "swart gevaar" 1. The general success of the Defiance Campaign led by the ANC in the period 1950-1952, had the effect of even further exacerbating this fear. The ANC had become a national force to be reckoned with. Western (1981, p 74) points out that the military control motive for establishment of the apartheid city is "not searching for ideological-conspiratorial or Machiavellian motives where none exist in fact". To support his argument he cites, amongst others, van den Berghe (1966) and a report on a statement by the Minister in charge of security, Jimmy Kruger. These quotes are worth repeating here:

1 "Swart gevaar" is a term used by Afrikaaners to describe the notion of "Black threat".
"The older shanty towns with their maze of narrow tortuous alleys were often located close to White residential or business districts; they are now systematically being razed as a major military hazard ... The new ghettos are typically situated several miles from the White towns, with a buffer zone between" (van den Berghe, 1966, p 411).

"... (Minister Kruger) said that he did not think an organized campaign would get off the ground. One of the big advantages of South Africa was that the residential areas were segregated. Overseas, urban terrorism was largely sparked off by a mixture of mutually antagonistic groups within a limited geographical area, and this was often accentuated by overcrowding. We have fortunately managed to avoid this here" (South African Digest, 2, September, 1977).

More compelling evidence of the centrality of political control in explaining apartheid spatial engineering, is presented by Lodge (1983, p 93) in his detailed analysis of the destruction of Sophiatown. Lodge argues the "political quiescence of the 1960s was at least in part the result of the social disorientation which accompanied the transition from city location to state-administered township during the 1950's. Many of these central city locations had through the years developed rich social and political cultures.

Moreover, the lack of direct state control was in direct contrast with the state administered townships.

"Unlike locations, these townships were not fenced off, there was no superintendent, nobody had to ask permission to live here, and compared to the geometrically planned municipal location, these densely packed suburbs were very difficult to police" (Lodge, 1983, p 95).

Sophiatown was also considered a hotbed of political resistance and had been described by the Native Affairs Commission as: "for many years a source of difficulty" (quoted in Lodge, 1983, p 99). Sophiatown had also been central in the political insurrection of the late 1940's and 1950's. In 1944, for example, an Anti-Tram Fare Action Committee organized a boycott to protest increases in fares. The boycott lasted a number of months and ended in a pitched battle between boycotters and police. Later in the same year, the ANC, the Communist Party and the Transvaal Indian Congress called for a stayaway. In Sophiatown strikers gathered in the streets and were only dispersed after the police had
opened fire on them (Lodge, 1983). There were many other instances of resistance and the ANC and other oppositional organizations were very strong here: "one of the largest and certainly best-organized ANC branches existed in Sophiatown" (Lodge, 1983, p 105).

"But in the final analysis, the decisive factor was the massive force the state was prepared to deploy to destroy Sophiatown. This was no slum clearance scheme" (Lodge, 1983, p 110).

The fact that the site of the razed Sophiatown became a White working class suburb called 'Triomf', for Lodge (1983), is a symbolic demonstration of the significance of the area in terms of the direct confrontation between Afrikaaner and Afrikaaner Nationalisms.

It is important to note, however, that in the views of many government officials, the destruction of Sophiatown and many areas similar to it (Cato Monor in Durban, District Six in Cape Town, etc) were simply exercises in 'urban renewal'. Western (1981) heaps scorn on this proposition, often offered by government officials, but the frequency with which it has been made is in itself instructive. The town planner Floyd (1960), for example, in his book on town planning in South Africa saw the Sophiatown clearance as a technicist exercise in "urban renewal". The significance of such perceptions, I would argue, is that "expert knowledge" of cities and "city modernization" was not easily separable from the major dimensions of political conflict in South Africa during the 1950's. The fact of the matter was that there were precedents, for example in Britain and the USA, for the pattern of planning events developing in South Africa. Gans's (1962) critique of urban renewal practices in American cities, and Young and Wilmott's (1962) critique of similar practices in Britain, for example, exposed how planners in those countries were responsible for the destruction of well established communities within inner-city (often 'ethnic') neighbourhoods in the name of modern, 'rational' planning. Moreover, the communities so destroyed often vigorously resisted the planning measures that were ostensibly in their own interests. In consequence, during the 1960's in the United States in particular, some of the most developed debates on the nature of political power generally centres upon the empirical

The implications of these observations were twofold. First, the 'urban renewal' of inner-city ethnic subcommunities is not something that was unique to South Africa and, in many respects, South African planners were simply duplicating their already well-established traditions of idealism and dependence upon British and American planning concepts, as they had done before. Second, as was the case in Britain and the USA, the planning 'rationality' that informed such interventions was anything but technical and politically neutral. Rather it reflected the relative balance of class powers expressed through state apparatuses (cf; Mollenkopf, 1983). In the United States, for example, it has been demonstrated that city bureaucracies were under the influence of local property developers and, more generally, local capitalist 'growth coalitions' when they pressed for urban renewal programmes in their cities (Mollenkopf, 1983). Castells (1977), Lojkine (1976) and Olives (1976) have made similar points in respect of the politics of urban renewal in Paris, France. Their point is that urban renewal programmes in Paris brought class contradictions between monopoly capital on the one hand, and labour and the petty bourgeoisie on the other, sharply into focus. The political expressions of this conflict were the state practices of 'urban planning' versus the popular resistances of 'urban social movements'.

In this context it seems that a false dichotomy underlies the objections of Western (1981), Lodge (1981) and others when they protest that the destruction of Sophiatown, and similar measures, was not motivated by 'planning' concerns, but rather by 'politics'. It should be recalled that the typical planning bureaucrat in South Africa was, at the time, in many respects the personification of prevailing power bloc forces. In the phraseology of Wright (1976), such officials would occupy 'contradictory class locations' between the hegemonic fraction of capital (controlling the bureaucracy) and (White) labour (their own class origins). That their concepts of 'planning rationality' should reflect some combination of the interests of such class positions is hardly surprising.
On the other hand, a class analysis alone would be an insufficient basis upon which to explain the specific use of the Group Areas Act to restructure South African cities. The establishment of Group Areas was not the only way in which an alliance of White labour and construction and allied capital could have realized their mutual interests. That Group Areas was chosen over other, less dramatic, options possibly reflects the dependence of the power bloc, during the 1950's, upon ethnicity as a basis upon which to ideologically cement a ruling alliance. As Adam and Giliomee (1979) would put it, there was a need for 'ethnic power' to be 'mobilized'. Afrikaner Nationalism, in other words, played a relatively autonomous role in the choice of strategy of urbanization during the 1950's and 1960's. After all, the concept of separate residential areas follows logically from an emphasis upon the values of ethnic identity.

There were also other, more directly material reasons for ethnic spatial engineering. Especially important in this regard, were the growing manifestations of the contradictions of racial capitalism on the urban terrain. The rapid and unplanned growth of informal and squatter settlements on the peri-urban peripheries of most South African cities in the 1940's were a result of contradictions which have already been described in earlier chapters. These unplanned squatter settlements, however, created spatial contradictions in their own right. More specifically, they tended to pre-empt certain possibilities for horizontal expansion of White residential areas and White-owned industry. Moreover, there was a fear that they would reduce the property values of White areas close by. As Davies (1976) points out, this led to a great deal of agitation on the part of realtors and White property owners.

The tendency to pre-empt future possibilities later led to a recommendation by the Department of Native Affairs that "one large location per town should be established to avoid the creation of a series of small locations around every town which would lead to the merging of White and Black residential areas" (Morris, 1981, p 50). The state’s concern with squatting led to the passing of the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act of 1951. As Platsky and Walker (1985, p 104) observe, this Act "meshed in with the Group Areas Act" and allowed the clearance of many squatter camps.
In an intriguing paper, McCarthy (1986) argues that the removals of the 1950's and the shaping of the "apartheid city", may well have had much more to do with the tendency of uncontrolled squatter settlements to pre-empt the expansion possibilities of local landed and industrial capital, than with the imposition of "apartheid" ideology. He questions the widely accepted view that the apartheid city was imposed from above on sometimes reluctant local authorities. To support his case he discusses the pressures that developed at the local state level for ethnic spatial engineering and squatter removal in the city of Durban prior to the 1950's. This pressure came mainly from land-based capital and industrial capital who had achieved hegemony within the local state. The issue of the pre-emption of future options by uncontrolled settlement surfaced in the 1930's and 1940's in the debates about the need for the expansion of the municipal boundary to incorporate and control such unplanned settlement. In 1930, the Durban Boundaries Commission reported that the logical (from a technicist point of view) direction of industrial expansion was to the south, beyond the borough boundary and into an area then occupied by low income Indians and Africans. The reason given for the necessity of expansion in this particular direction, was the shortage of flat land for industrial purposes given Durban's very broken topography.

By the mid 1930's, the Borough Council had urged the "slum clearance" of unplanned settlement in areas "which were simultaneously being earmarked by the City Engineers and City Evaluators and Estates Departments as suitable for industrial development" (McCarthy, 1986, p 8). Moreover, there was a growing awareness on the part of city officers (and particularly those concerned with land acquisition) of the need for planning the city's spatial development so as to ensure that pre-emption of capital's future options did not occur again. The City Evaluator and Estates Manager produced a report in 1943, in which a pattern of future land use was proposed, which bears a remarkable similarity to the ideal apartheid city model. Moreover, McCarthy (1986) notes the remarkable similarity between the plan proposed and the actual patterns of land use achieved by the 1970's.
The important point raised by McCarthy’s (1986) contribution, however, is that apartheid spatial engineering in the urban areas certainly cannot be explained purely in terms of the "impress of central authority". Local capital in alliance with White residents from all classes played an important part. In Durban it is quite clear that Afrikaaner Nationalism played a relatively minor role in accounting for the ethnic spatial engineering proposed by the City Evaluator in 1943 and the Technical Sub-Committee in 1950. Whether or not the Durban experience is generalizable to other parts of the country, is a moot point and will require further investigation. It is, however, relatively clear from McCarthy's contribution, and those of other authors, that apartheid spatial engineering in the cities, was certainly not out of line with the interests of White capital.

It is intriguing that the apartheid city era also coincides with the growth of the construction sector. McCarthy and Friedman, (1983) point out that the net output of the construction sector grew from 70 million in 1943 to 450 million in 1952 - a growth factor of 1:6.4. The corresponding growth rate for manufacturing industry over the same period was 1:3.2. McCarthy and Friedman (1983) argue that by the 1950's the built environment had become a major outlet for the commodity production activities of increasingly centralized and concentrated capital. As noted earlier in the Chapter, this growth in the construction sector was related primarily to a spurt of built environment creation in "White" areas and the consequent geographic expansion of industrial and residential land owned by Whites. At the same time, apartheid removals in the 1950's and 1960's were linked to the building of new dormitory suburbs for Blacks. McCarthy and Smit (1984) describe the relation between the Group Areas Act and the growth of the construction fraction of capital as follows:

"It is notable, for example, that it was during the (t3) phase (beginning in the 1950s in South Africa) that major construction companies, subsidized by the state, began creating row upon row of look-alike houses in places such as KwaMashu in Durban, Guguletu in Cape Town and Soweto in Johannesburg. At the same time, the state engaged in wholesale removal of the

1 Most Whites in Durban are English-speaking and have English descendants.
population and the physical demolition of compact, inner city, low-income residential districts such as Cato Manor in Durban and Sophiatown in Johannesburg. There was an essential complementarily between these two processes since the populations removed from the inner city complexes were subsequently forced to seek accommodation in the new corporately created suburbs." (p 95)

Kuper et al (1958) place some emphasis on the extent to which the Group Areas Act served the interests of White business and trading interests. This was achieved largely through the appropriation of large portions of prime land (in a locational sense) and through the banishing of particularly Indian traders to remote "Oriental Plazas". Kuper et al (1958) provided the following estimates for Durban:

"In general ... the plan involves the redistribution of resources in favour of Europeans ... The value of European investment in the city (thereby) would rise by 6,000,000 pounds to 120,000,000 pounds, while Indian investment would fall to about 18,500,000 pounds" (p 192).

Western (1981) also describes the way in which White property developers and realtors benefited through the "gentrification" of certain previously mixed areas. However, he argues that this reflected opportunism on the part of property interests rather than a determinant of the apartheid city per se. The timing and extent of apartheid spatial manipulation across South Africa, was however, uneven. What this suggests is that the process was, in fact, highly sensitive to local interests and local conditions which themselves displayed a great deal of regional variation. Thus, on the Witwatersrand and in the Eastern Cape where political opposition was particularly strong, it is quite likely that the most compelling determinant of the apartheid city, was social control. In other, less politicized, environs the logic of capital accumulation as understood by local landed and industrial capital, may have been decisive in determining the particular form that apartheid city engineering took.

Whereas the relocations of Black people, in the 1950's, can be explained largely in terms of an almost militaristic short term concern to restore social control and the accumulation concerns of local capital the massive relocations of the 1960's and 1970's are much more closely associated
with a maturing grand scheme to reproduce racial capitalism at the political level. In order to create consolidated Bantustan areas in the late 1960's, the state adopted a policy of relocating whole Black townships across Bantustan boundaries as long as these Bantustan areas were within "reasonable" commuting distance of the White towns (distances of up to 70kms were considered reasonable.) An estimated 670,000 people were relocated in this way during the period 1960 to 1980 into townships like KwaMashu, Mdantsane and Garankuwa (Platsky and Walker, 1985). In order to more fully understand this shift in emphasis, it will be useful to first review developments in state regional policy, and the centrality of these developments to the power bloc's ambitious plan for creating the political conditions necessary to reproduce racial capitalism.

**REGIONAL PLANNING AND APARTHEID**

After its tentative beginnings in the 1940's, regional planning developed slowly in the 1950's. In 1955 a "Commission for the Socio-Economic Development of the Bantu within the Union of SA" presented what Fair (1959) considered to be only the second example of planned regional development in South Africa.

"This report represents the first major analysis of the Union's most seriously backward areas. The very nature of the problems of rehabilitation and development demand ... an approach to planning and development according to distinctive cultural and historical regions, such as the South-Eastern Nguni core (Transkei), the Zulu core, ..., and the Tswana core of Western Transvaal and Northern Cape" (Fair, 1959, p 50).

It is interesting that in the early attempts to deal with "backward" areas, regionalization was predicated on ethnicity rather than any other criterion. [The real impetus for linking of regional planning to apartheid was, however, provided by the growth of Black political opposition in the 1950's. Group Areas removal in the cities did as much to provoke political opposition and mobilization as they did to repress such organization. Moreover, the tightening of influx controls in the early 1950's was only partially successful in reducing the flow of people to the cities. In the reserves, economic collapse continued notwithstanding betterment planning interventions, and Blacks continued to move to cities in large numbers. It was the escalating political unrest.
and the failure of betterment planning which led to the Tomlinson Commission Report in 1956. This report explicitly argued that the economic development of the reserves was necessary to ensure that politically dangerous concentrations of Blacks did not develop in the cities. Glaser (1983, p 14) describes the Tomlinson Report as follows:

"Tomlinson’s report, though, was a much more explicitly political document, clearly spelling out the relationship between macro-segregation, Bantustan development and the survival of the existing order."

Tomlinson proposed a radical revision of land tenure arrangements, one implication of which was the displacement from the land of fully 50% of the reserve inhabitants. Tomlinson also proposed the decentralization of manufacturing to the reserves to absorb those displaced from the land. The government rejected not only Tomlinson’s land tenure proposals but also his suggestion that "White capital" should be allowed into the reserves (for reasons which cannot detain us here). However, the Tomlinson Commission Report was an important forerunner to the regional development policies that were to follow. By the late 1950’s it had become apparent to the architects of apartheid that Black political aspirations would have to be accommodated in some way. Political instability reached its zenith with the Sharpeville shootings in 1960 in which 70 demonstrators against pass laws were killed. The shootings provoked further resistance in the country. It also precipitated a short-run flight of capital and immense panic amongst Whites. A massive clampdown followed in which thousands of political activists and trade unionists were arrested and the major Black oppositional movements were banned. Furthermore, a substantial policy shift occurred insofar as the Nationalists conceded that unending White domination was untenable and started instead to promote the policy of "separate development" (Lipton, 1986). South Africa was now conceived of, not as a multi-racial society, but one which was composed of a number of separate nations, each of which would get independence in its own homeland. While the economic interdependence of the various "nations" was acknowledged, the nationalists stated their commitment to the creation of economically viable "homelands" and reaffirmed their intention to stem the flow of Blacks into "White" South Africa. In order to achieve this, the capital
intensity of White metropolitan industry was to be increased and labour intensive industries were to be encouraged to move to the Bantustans.

In 1960, Verwoerd announced a number of incentives to encourage industrial dispersal to border areas which were defined as industrial centres within thirty miles of the "Bantu" reserves (Dewar et al, 1984). The Bantu Investment Corporation (BIC) had already been formed in 1959 and in 1960 a Permanent Committee for the Location of Industry took on the task of promoting and implementing the border industry programme. Thus, by the early 1960's a major regional development programme of national scale was under way and was closely tied to the separate development programme of the Nationalist Party. Glaser (1983, p 17-18) sums up as follows:

"Thus, while regional planning first emerged during the war as an adjunct to the technocratic visions of the ascendant competitive industrial capitals, it was after 1948, firmly wedded to the racial and spatial segregationist discoveries of the NP. The 'border' industry policy cannot therefore be viewed as a simple functional corollary of secondary industrial development under conditions of rural breakdown. It was, rather, the contingent historical product of a particular balance of political and class forces within the capitalist state, played out within the limits determined by the capitalist accumulation process but not necessitated by it."

The border industry incentives were comprised of tax concessions, subsidies to social overhead capital, low interest loans, direct financial assistance (e.g. building of worker housing), labour concessions (exemptions from levies), transport subsidies and tariff protection (Glaser, 1987). They included, therefore, interventions in both the sphere of circulation and reproduction. The package was not particularly successful, however, and Bell (1973) estimates that despite a state expenditure of nearly R80 million on industrial dispersal policy only 11,579 jobs were created in the period 1960 to 1968. The government was, however, determined to push ahead and in 1964 they made it clear that dispersal was essential for political reasons even if it was very costly (Lipton, 1986). Capital's slow response to incentives led to the enactment of the 1967 Physical Planning and Utilization of Resources Act (henceforth Physical Planning Act). This Act marks a
shift from attempts to lure capital to border industries, to attempts to coerce its emigration from the metropolitan areas (Dewar et al, 1984).

The Physical Planning Act was essentially an intervention in the sphere of circulation and more specifically the land and labour markets. In terms of the Act no new land could be zoned or rezoned for industrial use without the approval of the Minister of Planning and the Environment (Dewar et al, 1984). Extensions to existing factories required similar approval. Finally, the size and racial composition of the labour force in metropolitan areas was subjected to central government control. In the years immediately following the Act, hundreds of applications to set up or extend plants were refused (Glaser, 1983). Bitter conflict developed between manufacturing capital and the government over the impacts of the Act. The Federated Chamber of Industry and ASSOCOM strongly voiced their disapproval. In 1970, the conservative and pro-government Afrikaaner Handelsinstituut (AHI) also came out against the Act (Lipton, 1986). Capital threatened to withhold investment from the economy. The threat of an investment strike led to changes in 1971 when so-called locality-bound industries were exempted from the provisions of the Act. All new firms, however, would have to maintain a ratio of Black to White employment of 2.5:1 (Lipton, 1986). Glaser (1983) estimates that by 1977 as many as 2002 applications for factory extensions had been refused at the cost of 101,000 jobs for Blacks in the metropolitan areas. Job growth declined in the major metropolitan areas (and particularly the Witwatersrand) and given the slow rate of job creation in the reserves, Glaser (1983, p 26) concludes that capital simply "staged an investment boycott or violated the Act". By the mid 1970's industrial developments in the border industry areas had shown little sign of accelerating. Within the Bantustans, growth was negligible. New incentive packages in 1968, 1971, 1972 and 1975 seemed to have little effect. It was only in the late 1970's and the 1980's that industrial dispersal began to increase significantly. The reasons for this shift, however, will be pursued in the next Chapter. The more immediate issue is to explain why it was that capital resisted decentralization.

One of the more important variables in explaining the failure of capital to respond to either the carrot or the stick, is the very rapid growth of
manufacturing in the 1960's. Between 1960 and 1965 manufacturing output grew by nearly 10% per annum compared with a rate of 4.5% between 1955 and 1960 (Black and Stanwix, 1986). This rapid growth in the 1960's, the second fastest in the world after Japan, was partly attributable to the state's ability to suppress trade unions and political organizations in the period following Sharpeville.

"... The 1960s was characterized by relatively low levels of industrial conflict and political resistance as trade unions and political organizations were relentlessly suppressed" (Black and Stanwix, 1985, p 15).

Perhaps more important was the fact that there was a great deal of scope for an industrialization based on import substitution supported by tariff protection. Investor confidence was restored quickly after the uprisings of the 1950's and the period 1960 to 1970 was the most prosperous in South Africa's economic history. Given the political and industrial quiescence of the metropolitan areas there was no real need for capital to decentralize. Another significant factor was the low productivity of labour in the reserves at a time when the escalating monopolization of the SA manufacturing and corresponding capital-intensification, was leading to a demand for a smaller but more skilled and stable working class (see Innes, 1983, p 188-229). Moreover, White managerial staff and skilled White workers were very reluctant to move out of these areas. Finally, capital was also concerned about the political uncertainty of the reserves and feared instability. In the final analysis, however, it was the fact that capital saw no immediate need to move, that more than anything else accounted for the investment strike. There were significant agglomeration economies to be exploited in the metropolitan areas and repression seemed perfectly capable of ensuring political stability and reasonably low wage levels. In short, capital could see neither the political nor economic rationale for decentralization. It should be noted, however, that capital was not entirely united in this stance. In the 1950's and 1960's, for example, Afrikaaner capital indicated its ideological support of the programme. They did not, however, follow through to any significant extent with investment.
In any event, capital's reluctance to move to or near Bantustans, suggests that the state's decentralization programme had very little to do with the promotion of capital accumulation, except insofar as it was designed to promote macro-level political conditions favourable to accumulation. It should be noted, however, that decentralization and regional planning did not have their origins solely in the machinations of apartheid spatial engineering. In the 1940's and 1950's, an awareness was developing, in the advanced capitalist world, of the negative effects of uneven capitalist development in both time and space. As a consequence a regional planning literature was beginning to emerge which focused on the promotion of a more even spatial spread of development for both efficiency and equity reasons. The influence of this literature on certain individuals and their subsequent agitation for the introduction of regional planning, is quite evident on examination of South Africa's oldest institution, established specifically to conduct regional planning - the Natal Town and Regional Planning Commission.

The establishment of the Natal Town and Regional Planning Commission in 1940, was largely the result of the agency of two individuals, Douglas Mitchell and E. Thorrington-Smith. Mitchell was a member of the Post War Works, Planning and Reconstruction Committee, and had become convinced of the need for a planning body to ensure efficient resource utilization. Thorrington-Smith, on the other hand, had been inspired by an account of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) scheme which he had read while in military service in Britain.

"This book made a tremendous impact on me which I like to think had influence on the course of planning in Natal. This was a book about an impoverished region where the average income was far below the national average ... and this was the story of how this region and the millions of people who lived in it had been raised up, because they lived in a region with great natural resources and it was the harnessing of these resources that gave these people a bright future" (Thorrington-Smith, 1977, p 5).

Thorrington-Smith felt that there were many parts of Natal that were likewise impoverished, but resource rich, and that one of the primary functions of some sort of town and regional planning body, would be to harness and mobilize these resources. Thus one of the first tasks
undertaken by the Commission was a regional survey of the Tugela River Basin (Thorrington-Smith, 1977). In any event it was largely through the efforts of these two individuals that the Town and Regional Planning Commission was created through the Town Planning Ordinance (Natal) No 27 of 1949.

The particular form taken by the Commission was also largely due to Thorrington-Smith’s attachment to the TVA Scheme. One of the distinctive features of the Commission is that it was comprised of a number of lay people appointed by the Provincial Administrator. This, Thorrington-Smith argues, was directly attributable to a central innovation message of the TVA Scheme - that people should participate in the planning process:

"...The...message was that people must participate in this sort of development and this...was the reason why the Commission was created as a channel or a medium by which the people should have some part and communication with the planning process" (Thorrington-Smith, 1977, p 6).

However limited this degree of participation may appear today, the Commission represents possibly the first formal concern for public participation in the planning process in South Africa.

The regional work conducted by the Commission was of a largely technicist nature. The Tugela Basin studies of the 1950’s and 1960’s were, for example, essentially attempts to improve resource utilization. The same can be said of their studies of the Umgeni Catchment (1961), the Natal North Coast (1962), the Illovo River Basin (1965) and so on. It is also worth noting that very little by way of regional planning per se occurred during this period. Most of the work was regional survey work. The only regional plan produced was the plan for the Tugela Basin which was published in 1960. Not surprisingly, this plan demonstrated a high level of articulation with the state’s maturing decentralization policy. While Thorrington-Smith (1977) argues that Iscor is at Newcastle today largely because of the promotion of the Tugela River Basin by the Commission, it is perhaps more correct to argue, that its presence is much more a function of the state’s attempts to reproduce racial capitalism politically through its border industrial programme.
That the central state was embarking on an ambitious decentralization programme at the same time as the Commission was developing a programme for the effective resource utilization of the basin, was fortuitous as far as both parties were concerned. Thus, despite the very technicist appearance of the work conducted by the Commission in this period, the regional planning conducted was in the end, not particularly different from the very political regional planning elsewhere.


The bulk of the formal housing currently available to Blacks in South African cities, was built in the 1950’s and early 1960’s. The production in this period, of vast, sprawling, monotonous, and highly controlled Black townships on the urban peripheries, marks a major shift in state policy away from an emphasis on dealing with reproduction either through neglect or indirect and minimalist interventions in the sphere of circulation, and towards direct intervention in the sphere of reproduction through a massive state house building programme. Between 1950 and 1960, three times as many houses were provided for Blacks in Johannesburg than had been provided in the entire period since its inception (i.e. the period 1876 to 1950). Using data provided by Morris (1981), it is estimated that the rate of housing provision increased from an average of 800 houses per year for the period 1900 to 1950 to 4000 houses per annum in the 1950’s. At its peak in 1957/8 the rate reached 11,074 houses per year (Morris, 1981). In Pretoria 12,500 units were built between 1955 and 1958 and large housing schemes were also underway in other Witwatersrand towns. In Port Elizabeth 3006 dwellings were built between 1956 and 1959. Durban’s largest Black townships, KwaMashu and Umlazi were built in the late 1950’s and early 1960’s.

In short, the 1950’s heralded a new, dramatic and ultimately short-lived episode in the shaping of South Africa’s cities. Interestingly, this shift appears to be in contradiction with the strong "anti-urban" stance taken by the newly elected Nationalist government in response to its rural constituency’s call for strong influx measures. How then is this apparently contradictory house-building programme of the 1950’s and 1960’s to be explained?
The first point to be made is that the Nationalist government did, in fact, respond immediately to the labour demands of agricultural capital by tightening influx controls. The Native Laws Amendment Act of 1952 brought the Labour Bureau system into being (in terms of which Africans could not leave a rural district unless it had been established that local labour needs had been met). In the urban areas, Africans were required to carry reference books affirming their right to be there. It has also been argued that the Group Areas removals of the 1950's can be understood as a response to the demands of White Labour and the White petty bourgeoisie for social control. While many people were repatriated to the bantustans, the extensive demolitions that removals entailed, meant that housing stock had to be provided elsewhere for those who were "legitimately" resident in the urban areas. However, this explanation is insufficient since the house building programme of the 1950's went far beyond the mere replacement of stock. It appears that the programme cannot easily be understood as a response to the demands of Afrikaaner Nationalist constituencies except insofar as it can be argued that the provision of mass housing was necessary to ensure social control. Certainly the conditions in Black "locations" in municipal areas dominated by Afrikaaner Nationalist constituencies, were, prior to 1950, notorious for their appalling living conditions (Lodge, 1983).

"Given their constituency, Labour and Nationalist town councils of the 1930s and the 1940s were reluctant to embark on ambitious programmes of public works, and conditions in the African locations on the East Rand were notoriously bad ... These places were always the object of public indignation. As one wartime sanitation official pointed out in Benoni: 'The conditions under which the natives are living are vile' (Lodge, 1983, p 130).

However, as Lodge (1983) notes, neglected and underprovided townships were also the townships in which control was least developed. Many were also highly politicized and it is significant that the first major housing schemes of the apartheid era were established on the East Rand (e.g. Katlehong near Germiston in 1949 and Daveyton near Benoni in 1950). It should be noted, however, that the post 1948 provision of mass housing in local authorities dominated by Nationalist Party
constituencies correlated quite strongly with spatial variations in politicization.

Another plausible possibility is that the Afrikaaner Nationalist government felt a paternalistic necessity to improve the living conditions of urban Blacks, as part and parcel of their legitimization of apartheid spatial engineering, and their desire to show their moral superiority over the preceding "British Imperialist" government. Certainly Verwoerd and other Nationalists made many references to the right of all people to decent accommodation and often expressed confidence that the state would soon wipe out the housing backlog. There is evidence, however, that the rhetoric of government officials notwithstanding, paternalism was not a priority. While the Nationalist government stepped up the provision of housing in the 1950's, they simultaneously introduced more regressive policies regarding the financing of housing. To begin with, the Nationalists reduced the availability of sub-economic loans for Blacks who were now required to pay fully for their houses by way of rental or purchase (Morris, 1981). Sub-economic loans were made available only to those who earned less than fifteen pounds a year (Morris, 1981). In those areas in which sub-economic schemes had not been built, tenants were still required to pay economic rentals irrespective of income.

There is also little evidence that the housing programme was initiated to provide employment for White workers. While the Nationalist government entrenched the job colour bar in many sectors of the economy, Black housing was not one of these. In fact, the Native Building Workers Act of 1951 firmly reinforced the rights of Blacks to take up semi-skilled positions in the building industry which had been won during the war when many White artisans were away. This was, however, only permitted in building operations within Black areas (Morris, 1981). As a consequence of these and other measures, the cost of building houses was reduced in the period from R1.22 to 67c per square foot (Lewis, 1981).

It should be reasonably clear that it is difficult to explain the massive growth of housing provision in the 1950's in terms of the interests of the coalition of interests that comprised the Nationalist government.
Instead, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the housing schemes of the 1950's were largely a response to manufacturing capital's need for a stable labour force which, in turn, implied relatively decent housing in the urban areas. The need for a stable and relatively skilled labour force for manufacturing had emerged as one of the primary issues of the 1940's. Not surprisingly this need did not disappear in the 1950's. How manufacturing capital was able to persuade a relatively hostile central state to embark on an ambitious programme of this kind, however, requires explanation. The key it seems lies in the local initiation and administration of public housing schemes. Only on very rare occasions did the central state become directly involved in housing provision. For the most part, it was local authorities who implemented schemes using financing provided by the central state. Manufacturing capital and its allies were far more influential in local authorities such as Johannesburg, Durban, Cape Town and Port Elizabeth (in which major schemes were implemented) than at central state level. In fact, there is evidence of substantial tension over the house building programme between various local authorities and the central state. In the 1950's, the Central state blocked applications for loan finance from the Johannesburg City Council, and it was only after they indicated a preparedness to comply with state policy that the application was granted (Morris, 1981). Furthermore, the Minister of Native Affairs appointed a "watchdog" committee for Johannesburg, to ensure that state policy was implemented. That the Johannesburg City Council was serious about the creation of a stable labour force in the city is quite clear. When the council's wrangling with central government reached an impasse of one sort or another, they sought alternate sources of funding. Thus, in 1956, the Anglo-American Corporation were approached to provide the city with a loan of R6 million to build houses for people living in appalling conditions in the Moroka Emergency Camp (Mandy, 1984). The loan, repayable over thirty years and at an interest of 5% was granted and construction began the same year (Mandy, 1984).

There are also three additional hypotheses that are worth exploring. The first is that the housing programme of the 1950's should be understood as a victory for labour and popular oppositional forces. Substantial reference has been made in preceding sections to the escalation of opposition in both the political and economic realms.
Whether or not the housing of the 1950’s can be interpreted as an attempt to pacify labour is, however, less certain. The entire emphasis of state intervention in the 1950’s was on subjugation rather than incorporation and it seems unlikely that the housing provision of the 1950’s was a concession to labour. The second hypothesis has to do with economic conditions in the country in the early 1950’s. It has already been noted that the South African economy experienced rapid growth in both the agricultural and manufacturing sectors in the 1940’s. The emergence of the construction industry in the 1940’s and finance capital in the 1950’s has also been mentioned. Furthermore, the discovery of and subsequent exploitation of the OFS goldfields in the late 1940’s provided a tremendous boost for the South African economy. Finally, the flow of foreign capital into the country immediately after the war, also provided a further boost. At the very least, these relatively favourable economic developments provided the South African state with the confidence and financial means with which to embark on an ambitious housing programme. There may, however, be merit in exploring the hypothesis that the programme represented a state assisted flow of capital into the secondary circuit of capital as a consequence of overaccumulation in the primary circuit.

This hypothesis gains plausibility when one considers, on the one hand, the vast amount of finance capital in search of valorization that was around, and, on the other, the relatively limited size of the local market for goods produced in the primary circuit. Clearly, a great deal of empirical research is necessary to establish or refute this or any other of the hypotheses mentioned here.

The third hypothesis is proposed by Hindson (1987a). He argues that the apparent contradictions between the anti-urban stance of the Nationalist Party and the simultaneous introduction of the housing programme is no contradiction at all and can be explained as an attempt to create differentiated labour markets. Hindson (1987a) suggests that pass controls served to segment mining and agricultural labour markets from manufacturing (and primarily urban) labour markets.

"From the late 1940s to the early 1960s the pass system was restructured to secure new aims and to perform new functions."

Passes were used to provide preferential access to jobs, housing and services for permanent residents, and to restrict temporary migrants to lower paid and hard manual work in towns. The outcome of this policy was the creation of segmented labour markets and differing conditions of reproduction in the urban areas for migrants and permanent residents. Apartheid should be understood as a system which secured the reproduction of differentiated forms of African labour power, an occupationally and residentially stabilised urban proletariat, and a temporary migrant workforce" (Hindson, 1987a, pp 98-99).

Thus, in terms of Hindson's (1987a) framework, the mass housing programmes of the 1950's were simply part of the creation of a stable urban proletariat. While Hindson's (1987a) propositions have a great deal of resonance, his highly economic understanding of apartheid tends to obscure the importance of contradiction and conflict within the power bloc in accounting for the housing programme. Thus, in Hindson's (1987a) view the housing programme and apartheid are part of a highly logical strategy on the part of a capitalist state to segment labour markets and thus promote accumulation. It has already been noted that none of the elements of the hegemonic alliance that constituted the Nationalist Party, stood to gain from the housing programmes. Likewise, it has been argued that housing programmes in some areas had to be fought for by local manufacturing capital. On the other hand, Hindson (1987a) produces compelling evidence that the recognition of a stable urban labour force was quite evident in the form that pass laws took in the 1950's. Whether this was simply a concession to manufacturing capital, or a conscious attempt to segment labour markets has yet to be adequately investigated.

In a previous chapter, it was noted that the authorities paid little attention to the layout and design of Black townships in the period prior to 1950. This lack of attention was ascribed to the contradiction between the so-called "official" impermanence of urban Blacks and the need for a stable Black labour force; to the colonial mind-sets of planners in the period; and finally, to the balance of class forces at the time. With the massive housing programme of the 1950's, however, this situation changed dramatically. The Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) and the National Building Research Institute (NBRI) began to produce a substantial literature on the provision of
Black housing. In fact, the NBRI devoted seven years solely to the study of low cost housing. Surveys of Black attitudes on housing were conducted, minimum standards of house provision were ascertained, and experiments with different layouts were tried. Books which dealt with the layout, design and establishment of Black housing were published by, amongst others, Floyd (1951), Calderwood (1955 - a seminal work) and Mathewson (1957). These studies provide a useful insight into the thinking of the time.

One of the features of the mass housing programme of the 1950’s, was the predominant provision of single family units on small but separate lots. Experiments were conducted with three story walkups and with a variety of attached and semi-detached options. For the most part, however, the 51/9 house on a separate lot predominated. Lionel Abrahams captures the essence of the physical appearance of the 51/9 township in his poem Soweto Funeral:

"Yet still this dormitory world of low huts In ranked battalions, uniform by blocks, Quilts the tilting hugeness of the veld. House patterns A, B, C, D, E In turn insist their order to our eyes."

This world of box-like "new huts" can be explained in terms of a number of factors among which cost, gender, paternalism and popular struggle appear to be the most important. Perhaps the most important reason for the avoidance of flats and three storey walkups concerns the necessity of providing water-borne sewerage (Mathewson, 1957; Reineke, 1958). Detached houses allowed for the provision of much lower-order sewerage facilities. Economy was also clearly a priority in house design and layout. The layouts of the 1940’s had not been particularly efficient and prompted Jennings (1954, p 8) to call for more effective design:

"It is difficult to comprehend that in some of our urban Bantu townships the cost of developing the land has been nearly equal to the cost of building the actual houses."

By the end of the 1950’s, however, South African Planners had become experts in the field of low cost layouts and housing. Site development

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1 The 51/9 house was a standard "Box-like" house.
had, in some instances, been reduced to a mere 20% of dwelling unit cost (Calderwood, 1955). Housing experts from other parts of the world visited South Africa regularly to learn about the technical breakthroughs that had been achieved in the field of low-cost housing. Interestingly then, the state's response to the political crisis of the late 1940's allowed planners to bring planning theory and practice closer together and hence the rapid progress in the field of low-income housing. Of course, the very contradictions that gave rise to the need for the massive housing intervention of the 1950's and early 1960's, also served to constrain the full realization of planning's potential to enhance social welfare. Some of these constraints will be discussed later in this section.

In addition to economy, the predominance of single family units on separate lots is also partially attributable to the paternalism and particular value systems of Whites as is evident in the following comment by Jennings (1954, p 2):

"It is important, however, to understand certain other basic facts which further complicate the picture, amongst which is the genuine desire on the part of the White population of South Africa to impart a decent Christian standard of living to the Bantu, as amply demonstrated by the policy of our pioneers which was to advance with a gun in one hand and a bible in the other ..."

"...satisfactory housing is essential for the good physical health of a people and for the proper functioning of good family life, which is the keystone of our Western civilization."

Likewise the preamble to the Committee on Minimum Standards of Accommodation (1949) report, stresses the importance of family life and its relation to Christianity and civilization. Thus, one of the specific recommendations of the report is that:

"Planning should be based on each family occupying a separate dwelling unit..."

In addition to paternalism, some authors reveal a great deal of bigotry in their analysis of the need for single family houses on separate lots. In his book on township layout, Floyd (1951, p 27) argues that:
"Too small a stand size cannot be used for Natives because piccanins do not use the closets but make use of the ground around the houses. This habit makes a garden essential ... "

In any event, there is much evidence which suggests that the mind-sets of planners and other professionals involved in Black housing, affected the kind of environments that ultimately materialized.

The form that Black housing environments took in the 1950’s was also affected, both directly and indirectly, by popular struggles. As far as direct influence is concerned there were instances in which local authority attempts to provide housing in a more "traditional" form were vigorously opposed. In the late 1940’s the Pretoria City Council proposed the establishment of a scheme which was modelled on rural settlement patterns (e.g. huts surrounding a courtyard). Hellmann (1944) reports that the proposals were vigorously opposed by virtually all Black communities in the city on the grounds that they were "primitive" and not in touch with the growing "urbanity" of Blacks. The CSIR conducted a number of attitude surveys amongst Blacks in the late 1940’s and early 1950’s and the results confirmed the antipathy of urban Blacks to "traditional" housing as well as "high rise" housing solutions.

The broader popular struggles of the time also affected the form housing took. The state’s preoccupation with control was certainly translated into spatial design. To begin with, the "divide and rule" tactics of the state were concretised in Black township design by separating the township population into distinct groups based on ethnicity (Xhosa, Zulu, Swazi, Ndebele, etc).

"A more recent innovation in the planning of native townships is the requirement by the Minister of Native Affairs that the area must be divided into ethnic groups and that the inhabitants must be settled in the main groups to which they belong..." (Mathewson, 1957, p 30).

The extent to which such division required and spawned spatial design creativity is evident in the following passage on ethnic division in the townships taken from Mathewson’s (1957) book.
"Radial planning will simplify division, that is, different sectors which develop radially away from the axis in such a manner that each sector has its hinterland. Each sector must be looked upon as an entity of its own and be provided pro rata with school, church and trading sites ... The speedy development of a Bantu town on ethnic lines can be very complicated if the area is not specifically laid out for the purpose. Such basic essentials as water reticulation, construction of access roads, sanitation facilities and building of houses have to be provided concurrently in different directions. However, it has been proved in the case of Daveyton ... this ideal can be achieved. Daveyton is divided into seven distinctly ethnic groups ..." (Mathewson, 1957, p 32).

There were also other less subtle manifestations of the importance of control in township design. There was, for example, a concern that townships should have only one entrance so that in the event of political unrest the township could be easily sealed off.

"From the point of view of control there should be only one main access road to a native township ..." (Mathewson, 1957, p 29).

Moreover, as Platsky and Walker (1985) point out, streets were designed in such a way that vehicular police patrolling was possible.

Another variable affecting the form of Black housing provision was the dominance of patriarchal social relations in both Black and White communities. The assumption of the nuclear family with male heads of household which provided the basis for design and planning in Black townships is, of course, partially attributable to the "Christian" patriarchal social relations of the White community. Furthermore, in developing design criteria for beer hall provision in Black townships, Mathewson (1957) noted that Black men did not like to have "their women" drinking with them and consequently the halls should be designed for males only. He suggested instead that "off sales" facilities be made available for women. The relation between patriarchal social relations and the design of Black townships is, however, an under-researched area.

In the final analysis, however, the urban Black townships of the 1950's and 1960's were born out of the contradiction between what was
considered necessary for a stable Black urban labour force on the one
hand, and what was considered necessary for the political reproduction of
racial capitalism. Thus, on the one hand, a plethora of physical
planners and housing experts attempted to find ways of housing urban
Blacks cheaply, but at the same time, preserving amenity.

On the other hand, there was also a concern, amongst the architects of
grand apartheid, that urban townships did not become too attractive.
This was especially the case in the 1960's when "separate development"
policy had matured substantially. In 1968, Deputy Minister "Blaar"
Coetzee said "quite brutally and frankly, that Johannesburg should not
make it attractive for Black people to live there because then they would
have no incentive to move to the homelands" (Mandy, 1984, p 188). Thus,
the Nationalist government actively opposed the provision of facilities
such as child-care centres, orphanages and old age homes. A callous
departmental circular in 1967 made it quite clear that "non-productive"
Blacks such as the handicapped, aged, and widowed would have to move to
the bantustans (Mandy, 1984). The net result was a peculiar mix of
superb design and layout (path-breaking in many respects) on the one
hand, and massive underprovision of facilities and services on the other.
Thus, the very crises which provided physical planners with the
opportunity to experiment and learn, also prevented the realization of
the potential that arose as a consequence of such learning. The fact of
the matter is that we know a great deal about low income housing in South
Africa and have the wealth to put this knowledge to use. The social
relations which constrain the realization of this latent potential will,
however, have to be transformed.

FRONTIER TOWNS, HOUSING AND THE EMERGING TRANSPORT CRISIS

The political system now known as "Verwoerdian apartheid" (Cobbett et al,
1985) was grounded not only in the concept of Group Areas, but also that
of bantustan development. The bantustans were conceptualized by
Verwoerd as providing a territorial basis for realization of African
political aspirations and considerable emphasis was placed, during the
1960's, on making such areas geographically coherent and economically
independent. At the same time, in 1967, the further construction of
African housing in 'White' South Africa was terminated. Many Black
Urban townships were incorporated into bantustan boundaries (e.g., KwaMashu) and yet other townships were constructed in areas where they could be incorporated into bantustans (e.g., Mdantsane) (Cooke, 1980). All of this went hand-in-glove with forced removals in both urban and rural areas. Moreover, by the end of the 1960's the state started to reduce the rate of housing supply in "non-frontier" areas and to increase supply within bantustans. Housing became a form of influx control in its own right. It should be noted that it was only after the 1960's that the South African state started to provide large amounts of capital for housing within the bantustans. Morris (1981) reports that between 1960 and 1975 a total of R292.6 million was spent on the creation of townships in the bantustans. Whereas only R50,000 was spent on bantustan townships in 1960, this had escalated to R4 million in 1965 and R18 million in 1969.

Another reason for the growth of frontier towns was the expulsion of labour from White agricultural areas as a consequence of increasing mechanization and monopolization of the agricultural sector (Lipton, 1986). High levels of unemployment were also exacerbated by the increasing concentration of manufacturing capital and attendant capital intensification. Thus, Black and Stanwix (1986) point out that new employment lagged far behind rapidly increasing manufacturing output in the 1960's. In the period 1965 to 1970, for instance, manufacturing output increased by 7.4% per annum while employment only grew at 3.2%. There were also a number of serious droughts in the 1960's which forced many people off the land. In any event, the net effect of these tendencies and their articulation with separate development policy, was the rapid growth of the frontier towns. The acceleration of this process in the 1970's was to precipitate a major transport crisis, which together with other factors, was to contribute to a growing fiscal crisis of state. This crisis will be examined in greater detail in the next chapter.

The "urbanization" of the reserves by the conscious creation of Black residential suburbs within the boundaries of the bantustans, represents a major intervention by the state in the sphere of reproduction. The urban population of the bantustans grew from 33,486 in 1960 to 594,420 in 1970 (Morris, 1981). Sixty-six towns were established in this period.
Most were located close to the borders of White urban areas (Morris, 1981). One result of the process was the further attenuation of already attenuated South African cities. Apart from the inefficiencies of attenuated urbanism and particularly the burden that has been placed on the fiscus, attenuated urbanism has also served to isolate the poor and reduce their life opportunities. This is a theme which will be taken up in Chapter Six in a discussion of David Dewar’s (1985) proposals for the reconstruction of South African cities. In any event, the highly dispersed urban form that characterizes South African cities today unquestionably has its roots in apartheid spatial engineering. In fact, as with regional planning, apartheid spatial engineering seems to have tainted many aspects of more technicist urban planning. A good example in this regard are the urban renewal schemes in Johannesburg and other parts of the country which were set in motion in the 1950’s.

**URBAN RENEWAL AND APARTHEID**

The urban renewal schemes in Johannesburg arose initially because of concern about the blighted living conditions that many poor Whites were still enduring. The return of many servicemen from the war exacerbated the housing shortage and led to additional overcrowding in blighted areas. While the absorption of many poor Whites into the civil service and the introduction of generous housing subsidies did much to alleviate the problem, many Whites were in very low-paying jobs or unemployed and receiving no housing assistance. Not surprisingly, in the early 1950’s, the Nationalist government was particularly sensitive about "symbols" of White deprivation. The White working class was, after all, one of their major political constituencies. As a consequence of concern shown by Members of Parliament and the Provincial Council, the City Council began investigating the blight problem in 1956 (Johannesburg City Engineer’s Department, 1968). In 1962, the Medical Officer of Health submitted a report entitled "Review of European Low Cost Housing and the Need for Urban Renewal". In the same year, the National Housing Commission requested local authorities throughout the country to investigate the living conditions of sections of the White population (Johannesburg City Engineer’s Department, 1968). A citywide survey was instituted and the results indicated that blight was most evident in the eastern suburbs (14.6% of the 7 100 units in these suburbs were classified as slum
dwellings). As a consequence, the city addressed its first renewal schemes to this area.

It should be noted that at that time "urban renewal" was very fashionable in the planning practice and the international planning literature. Moreover, some of the planners within the City Council had been exposed to urban renewal practices abroad. Nola Green had, for example, worked on renewal projects in Britain in the early 1960's. Thus, the particular form that the renewal projects took in Johannesburg was influenced by the importation of ideas from abroad and by the agency of particular individuals who had been exposed to the urban renewal process elsewhere. The major effect of these influences was to give the renewal programmes a more "scientific" veneer and to depoliticize the process. The city planners proposed a pilot scheme in which a number of renewal "techniques" were to be tried. This scheme became known as the JFT (Jeppe, Fairview, Troyeville) Pilot Scheme and was comprised of four phases. Phase 1 involved the razing of slum housing in a portion of Jeppe and the building of public housing for Whites on the site (Kahn, 1986). In Phase 2, attempts were made to rehabilitate the existing housing stock in parts of Jeppe and Fairview. Infrastructural improvements were made and the city also pursued a policy of "infilling" vacant or "cleared" land with public housing. In Phases 3 and 4, attempts were made to achieve upgrading by providing low interest loans to homeowners and by improving infrastructure. In some instances, a conscious attempt was made to attract private sector capital by "up zoning" certain areas, thereby making higher density development possible (Kahn, 1986; Green, 1986).

While the removal of Blacks from the central city areas was never the primary intention of the JFT Pilot Schemes, even this relatively technicist scheme became articulated with apartheid thinking. In order to effect the JFT Pilot Scheme, the City Council had to approach the Department of Community Development who were empowered by the Community Development Act of 1966 to acquire and expropriate property and land and freeze development for purposes of urban renewal. The primary purpose of the Community Development Act was to effect Group Areas removals and to improve the living conditions of poor Whites. It was also this act which cemented the relationship between urban renewal and apartheid. In
the years to follow, the Department of Community Development was to acquire and "freeze" large portions of "decaying" urban real estate all over South Africa, which almost always, and not coincidentally, was occupied by racially integrated populations (e.g. District Six in Cape Town, Block AK and Umgeni Heights in Durban, and so on).

In the case of the JFT Scheme, the Department of Community Development appointed a State Committee to co-ordinate the process. In effect, this meant that while the Johannesburg City Council was responsible for implementation, the central state exercised control over the project. This, in itself, was an important development, insofar as it signified increasing centralization of planning in South Africa, a process which was to become more pronounced in the 1970’s. Whether or not the central government or the Johannesburg City Council was responsible for the removals based on race that accompanied the JFT Scheme is not clear. The removal of Blacks was however a clearly stated goal in the City Engineer’s recommendations for the scheme.

"It is recommended:

(a) That the State Committee be asked to accept the following principles as a basis for renewal of the Jeppe/Fairview/Troyeville Pilot Scheme:

(i) the area be retained for predominantly residential purposes
(ii) the removal of slum, outdated and sub-standard properties
(iii) the removal and relocation of non-conforming uses
(iv) the removal and relocation of non-white race groups"

(City Engineers Department 1968, pp 1 and 2, emphasis added).

The City Engineer’s Department (1968) estimated that there were 225 Coloured persons, 77 Asiatic persons, 168 Chinese persons and 113 "Bantu" women resident in the area. With regard to the removal of these people, the following quote illustrates the local authority view rather well:

"The types of persons discussed above who have gravitated to the area ... are in themselves a degenerating influence. Their relocation is as equally important as the removal of slum properties and illegal uses ..." (City Engineer, 1968, p 14).
While apartheid thinking affected the JET Scheme, the primary purpose of the scheme was not to effect group removals. It was understood by planners involved as an exercise in urban renewal comparable with and drawing on advanced renewal exercises in the UK and the USA (Green, 1986; Kahn, 1986). The same cannot, however, be said for the Fordsburg and Vrededorp renewal schemes which also got underway in the late 1960’s (Green, 1986). These schemes were also undertaken by the local authority in liaison with the "State Committee" appointed by the Department of Community Development. Large scale removal of predominantly Indian and Coloured people occurred here and it seems fairly clear that ethnic removals constituted the primary motivation for the schemes.

The extent to which apartheid ideology began to permeate virtually every aspect of urban and regional planning is quite apparent in the Johannesburg City Council’s attempts to upgrade the Coloured township of Westbury-Newclare. This township had originally formed part of the Western Native Townships which had been razed as part of the Group Areas removals of the 1950’s. It had since become occupied by Coloured people and when the city attempted to upgrade the township in the late 1960’s and early 1970’s, the central state demanded that it be redeveloped in such a way as to promote "ethnic autonomy". The area was to have its own civic facilities, its own town centre and so on (Green, 1986). This process was, however, effectively opposed by residents who insisted that they were part of the City of Johannesburg (Green, 1986). As a consequence, a number of ethnically motivated design proposals were dropped, illustrating again the importance of political struggle in affecting urban and regional planning outcomes.

Many of the "urban renewal" schemes undertaken by the Department of Community Development in the end, amounted to little more than slum clearance programmes with ethnic overtones. The scale of the intervention was enormous. Most central city slum areas were, in fact, cleared and this certainly had the effect of "tidying up" the central city environment. On the other hand, in many instances the Department of Community Development actively "slummed" areas so as to effect Group Areas removals. This was achieved by "freezing" development and creating an environment of uncertainty. According to Green (1986) the Department of Community Development acquired vast housing stock which
could easily have been rehabilitated. They chose instead, to demolish most of this stock and to create vast tracts of vacant land in South Africa's central city areas. Why they chose this strategy is not entirely clear, although Green (1986) argues that it had to do with their fear that slums would appear again if ongoing maintenance programmes were not introduced.

THE GROWTH OF FINANCE AND MONOPOLY CAPITAL AND THE RECONSTRUCTION OF SOUTH AFRICAN CITIES

So far this chapter has reflected upon the 1950's and 1960's in relation to problems of racial segregation, urban formalization and Black housing. Whilst these were key urban issues of the period in question, it would be wrong to imagine that they were the only ones. Indeed, it should be noted that, in many respects, they were secondary consequences of more powerful forces operating within the cities at the same time: the rapid accumulation of capital reflected via the expansion of the secondary circuit; and the geographical manifestation of this through the redevelopment and intensification of use within the 'urban cores' together with the horizontal expansion of upgraded White housing. It should be recognized that just a few blocks of high-rise office area in downtown Johannesburg would, for example, equal the value of all the Black township housing constructed during the 1950's and 1960's. Likewise, the value of White housing constructed during the 1960's would, for example, have been many times higher than the value of housing constructed for Blacks. Such value, of course, carried with it considerable political interest.

This section focuses on the urban reconstruction and consequent urban planning issues which were associated with the process of value-creation through the built environment which really gained impetus in the 1960's and 1970's. The section begins with a discussion of the effects of the concentration of capital on the one hand, and the emergence of finance capital on the other, on built environment formation and urban planning. While monopolies have always been an important presence in the South African economy since 1901, prior to the Second World War, the economy was dominated by small scale competitive capitalism (Innes, 1983). The mining sector was the most clearly concentrated sector, but links between
mining monopolies and financial monopolies were poorly developed. Innes (1983, p 171) argues that prior to the war "finance capital was not apparent as a capitalist form". After and during the war, there were a number of developments which quite substantially altered the structure of the South African economy. As noted in an earlier section, the development of new mines on the OFS goldfields; the mechanization of manufacturing industry; the mechanization and expansion of agricultural output; and the inflow of foreign capital were particularly important. The net effects of these developments were to increase the amount of capital in search of valorization. Mining monopolies began to seek other outlets for their rapidly accumulating capital. In 1949, for example, the Anglo-American Group were involved in the establishment of the National Finance Corporation which functioned to direct capital into manufacturing. In 1955, Anglo launched its own merchant bank in a joint venture with a London based finance company (Lazard Brothers) and Barclay's Bank. This venture is described by Innes (1983, p 174) as the "first organized manifestation of finance capital (in the strict sense of the term) in South Africa".

The increased availability of capital and its increasing concentration had important effects on the built environment and urban planning. To begin with, the increasing concentration of capital made it possible for individual firms to undertake massive urban redevelopment projects without state assistance. The significance of concentration in property development is evident in Mandy's (1984, p 76) account of the role played by Rapp and Maister in the construction of South Africa's first suburban regional shopping centre (floor area greater than 30,000 square metres):

"When Rapp and Maister's shares were listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange in 1968, the company was managing almost 100 property investments which it had created. The flotation made it possible for Rapp to undertake large projects without having to resort to syndicated financing."

Moreover, the mining houses began to get involved in property development. The pioneers in this regard were the Anglo-American Corporation, who, in the early 1960's, built Endura House and Amcor in Johannesburg on entire city blocks (Mandy, 1984). The rapid growth of the tertiary sector of the economy had created a demand for office space and
capital poured into the creation of the country's first skyscrapers. Moreover, distinct finance districts began to emerge. In cities where height and bulk controls already existed (such as Johannesburg) pressures developed to have these relaxed. In cities (such as Durban) where very loose regulations existed, an awareness began to develop that congestion and traffic problems in the downtown areas were related to the ineffectiveness of such controls. In addition to the intensification of use in the CBDs, decentralization of commerce and industry, the rampant growth of sprawling suburbs for Whites, and the construction of freeways, are all related to the growth of finance capital and the boom years of the 1960's.

In Johannesburg, a large portion of low income residential Doornfontein was bought up by a private company in the late 1960's and was developed as an office park later. Likewise, pressures for the conversion of high income residential Parktown began to develop. In the Doornfontein case, the developers encountered substantial difficulties in acquiring the last properties they needed to effect the necessary consolidation of land (Kahn, 1986). Individual landowners held on to properties and were able, in the end, to extort massive payments. Interestingly, the events in Doornfontein led to a change to the Transvaal Planning Ordinance, which in effect allowed the expropriation at "fair market price" in instances where a few owners were holding up a large redevelopment. This instance signified the increasing influence that finance capital was playing in planning practice and policy. In the Doornfontein and Parktown instances, redevelopment was initially opposed by the city planners (Kahn, 1986). Their concern was with the partially "idealistic" protection of the Central Business District, especially in the light of the decline of American CBDs. In the case of Parktown, there was also an almost romantic concern with the retention of a characterful inner city high income residential area. Kahn (1986) suggests that urban planners had grossly underprojected the growth of tertiary activity and the consequent demand for office space. Whatever the relative merits or demerits of the position taken by the city planners, what is clear is that big business got its way. The tendency for local finance and landed capital to exert a disproportionately large influence (in relation to their numbers) on planning outcomes, led Green (1986) to comment that in the twenty-five years she spent in the
Johannesburg Local Authority, planners seldom won a dispute with the private sector. She pointed out that big business almost always appeared to be able to influence the arbitration of disputes at the provincial level. Green's (1986) opinion notwithstanding, it appears that capital's influence on the land use process is dependent on a variety of contingencies. The "bulk control" controversy in Durban in the late 1960's illustrates this point well.

One effect of the growth and concentration of finance capital was the emergence of the first real skyscrapers in South African cities. The rapid vertical growth of the city started to create visible congestion and traffic problems within the CBD. In 1964, the Natal Town and Regional Planning Commission conducted a study of the Durban CBD which led them to propose the introduction of bulk controls in the city (Purcell, 1974). The idea was taken up by the City Engineer and led to a proposal in 1967 of a new formula for calculating height and bulk permissible (Purcell, 1974).

The move was almost immediately opposed by the local business community and particularly landowners within the CBD who were in favour of less restrictive controls. The Natal Chamber of Industries and the Natal Chamber of Commerce worked in unison in opposing the bulk controls and started to lobby and pressurize city councilors. The outcome of the struggle between the City Engineer's Department and organized capital was something of compromise. A revised formula was eventually accepted, but it was certainly not as stringent as initially proposed. The resolution was, however, generally seen as a victory for the bureaucracy (Purcell, 1974). The key factor accounting for the relative success of the City Engineer, was not so much the exercise of the power that derives from control over technical and scientific knowledge, but rather articulation of scientism with a particular set of conjunctural circumstances. To be more specific, the Durban City Council had been subjected to a Commission of Inquiry into municipal corruption in 1964 (the James Commission).

The outcome of the inquiry was damning and criminal proceedings were brought against a number of councilors. One former mayor was actually jailed (Purcell, 1974). A major impact of the inquiry was a tendency towards a "more technocratically-oriented decision-making process"
Councilors became very sensitive to accusations of political corruption and relied heavily on the city's technical staff in decision making. The effect was, of course, to substantially increase the City Engineer's power. In time, as the spectre of the James Commission receded into the background, the influence of local capital and powerful interest groups began to be felt once again. It seems likely therefore that the City Engineer's victory in the bulk control saga, was largely a function of the specific circumstances that pertained at the time.

The 1960's and early 1970's also saw the emergence of the debate on the decentralization of retailing activities. The demand for such decentralization was a response to (a) the phenomenal growth of finance capital and the attendant need to valorize such capital; (b) the increasing affluence of Whites given the economic boom of the 1960's and their protected position in the job market and (c) the increasing suburbanization of White settlement which was itself a function of the trends mentioned in (a) and (b) above. Increasing affluence also led to a major increase in individual car ownership amongst Whites which, in turn, made both residential suburbanization and retailing decentralization possible. It should be noted that notwithstanding the even more dramatic suburbanization of Blacks associated with Group Areas removals, retail decentralization pressures only existed in White areas, where high-threshold-buying-power existed. Such decentralization pressure led to a variety of conflicts namely: conflict between fractions of capital (e.g. CBD landowners versus finance capital); between finance capital and city planners; and between finance capital and residential land users in the suburbs in which decentralized centres were proposed. Once again, city planners were concerned about the survival of the central business district, which they regarded as being in everyone's interests. The planning rationale for preserving the CBD was often weak and based on romantic notions like the need of every city for a "heart" of some kind. Not surprisingly, planners found themselves on the losing side of many rezoning applications. Conflicts between finance capital and residents on proposed decentralization sites were classic instances of use value/exchange value conflicts over the built environment. However, to the extent that most decentralization occurred to White middle and upper income suburbs these conflicts represented squabbles
within the ruling classes over who should bear the costs and benefits of the rapid accumulation of the time.

The rapid vertical growth of South African CBDs and consequent congestion, on the one hand, and the rapid horizontal spread of White suburban areas, on the other, led to a growing need for more efficient transportation systems. Thus, by the late 1960's, urban freeways and downtown parking garages were placed firmly on the agendas of urban planners. In Durban, for example, traffic in the Central Business District had become a much debated issue. In the mid 1960's the City Engineer's Department proposed a ban on parking garages, and the development of a park-and-ride system from the CBD edge to compensate (Purcell, 1974). The proposal stirred some controversy and in the end the city got both. The important point, however, is that the spurt of built environment creation in the 1950's and 1960's sharpened the need for planning regulation, but also brought greater resistance to its imposition because of the high stakes involved. This tension between the growing need for urban planning and its simultaneous rejection was noted in Chapter Four. Interestingly, the tension was still evident in the implementation of town planning schemes. In Natal, for example, a large city like Durban did not implement a town planning scheme until the 1950's and then only on the insistence of the newly formed Natal Town and Regional Planning Commission. Thorrington-Smith (1977, p 6) attributes this sluggishness to resistance to the regulation of private property:

"Public opinion ... was not favourably disposed to interference with the free play of market forces ..."

However, with the rapid growth of cities and investment in the built environment, it seems that the need for regulation was increasingly accepted. Whereas no planning schemes had been implemented in Natal prior to 1950, by the mid 1970's, seventy-seven local authorities had established such schemes (Little, 1987). Moreover, authors such as Floyd (1960) boasted that by the late 1950's the town planning scheme had become a firmly entrenched regulation tool in the Transvaal.

In his view, not only were town planning schemes accepted, but that they were successful and durable. As evidence, he notes (with apparent approval) that the Pretoria Town Planning Scheme required only marginal
revision when re-examined some twenty years after its original formulation. Whilst the discussion in this section and in previous chapters suggests that Floyd's (1960) salutation of the success of the town planning scheme is overstated, there can be little doubt that by the late 1960's and mid 1970's town planning was far more readily accepted than had hitherto been the case. Ironically the economic crisis of the post-1975 period was to once again bring town planning regulation into doubt, but for entirely different reasons. The 1950's and 1960's were, however, periods of growth and large conurbations emerged. This, in turn, gave rise to the need for the co-ordination of planning across the myriad of local authorities that had emerged.

THE TENTATIVE EMERGENCE OF METROPOLITAN PLANNING

The emergence of metropolitan planning in the 1950's and 1960's can be explained with reference to two interrelated, but analytically separate processes. The first concerns the control, reproduction and circulation of Black labour in the context of the dominant people/power bloc contradiction, and the second the spatial co-ordination of processes of production, consumption and circulation in the context of rapid urbanization and economic growth. The major line of argument in this section is that the need to control and efficiently reproduce Black labour power has always been a more important impetus for metropolitan planning than any call for co-ordination to promote accumulation or the consumption interests of the ruling classes. It is for this reason that metropolitan planning of land use, transport and Black housing provision has preceded the introduction of metropolitan government per se.

As has already been described, the dominant contradiction of the South African social formation of the 1920's and 1930's, i.e. the contradiction between mining capital and White labour, had, by the late 1940's, been replaced by a people/power bloc contradiction. Apartheid spatial engineering was a response to the development of a political crisis which had its roots in this new contradiction. Interestingly, one of the first concrete instances of metropolitan planning in South Africa was part and parcel of apartheid spatial engineering. The rationalization of the urban fabric in apartheid terms involved the construction of far-flung Black residential suburbs and their linking to major
production areas by means of public transport. In the case of the Witwatersrand, such engineering had to occur across numerous local authority boundaries. Moreover, a substantial degree of antipathy had developed between the Johannesburg local authority and the central government over the destruction of existing housing stock (on both humanitarian and efficiency grounds) and over the increased levies on capital that would be necessary to foot the transport bill. The central state responded to these matters by appointing the Mentz Committee, whose watchdog role in relation to the Johannesburg City Council was described in an earlier section. Mallow and Fair (1959, p 137) regard the efforts of the Mentz Committee as one of the first metropolitan planning interventions in South Africa.

"To meet this great problem (of towns and the housing shortage) the government appointed the Witwatersrand and Vereeniging Native Areas Zoning Committee (the "Mentz" Committee) in 1953. The action taken in the light of this committee’s report has led to the redevelopment and siting of African townships on a regional instead of a municipal basis ...

Further, a railway line construction programme, costing more than 15,000,000 pounds has commenced to link these new townships by fast electric service with the chief working centres all along the Reef and in Pretoria.

All these facts, illustrate well that, in effect, we are dealing with a metropolitan region at one of its most critical moments of transformation when an older, immature pattern has to be redesigned to meet new economic trends."

There were also more technicist calls for the establishment of metropolitan government. These calls were based on a growing perception of the need for co-operation and co-ordination across local authority boundaries. The economic boom of the 1950’s and 1960’s led to increasing car ownership amongst Whites which together with increasing investment in White housing promoted rapid suburbanization and the growth of a spate of new local authorities (such as Sandton and Randburg, near Johannesburg). While no detailed analysis of the growth of new local authorities in this period has been undertaken to date, it appears that the increase in the rate of local authority formation was not related to central city class struggles, high local taxes, or the desire to escape regulatory or redistributive central city policies as is often the case in the USA (see for example Cox, 1973). Residential suburbanization
fuelled by the aggressive marketing of increasingly large property companies, appears to have been the major determinant of local authority growth. Suburbanization of industry and commerce did occur, of course, largely because the truck freed a number of previously locationally-tied activities. Thus, in an article written in 1959, Mallows and Fair noted the loose and sprawling nature of metropolitan development on the Witwatersrand. It should be noted, however, that at no stage did the rate of local government formation approach anything like the rate that pertained in the USA. Moreover, problems associated with the fragmentation of city government were far less severe. Nonetheless, the growth of new, but functionally linked local authorities, did lead to a growing perception of the need for some form of co-ordination.

Mallows (1961, p 46) noted the functional unity of the Witwatersrand and made a call for metropolitan planning as follows:

"Patterns of administrative machinery, like law itself, always lag behind reality and the pattern of local authority control now existing on the Witwatersrand represents a pattern of independent, self-contained towns that is becoming more and more out of touch with reality. The Witwatersrand is virtually one unit ... The regional approach is the only valid approach and in a real sense it can be said the Reef towns will have to hang together or they will all hang separately. Their problems will certainly never be solved in isolation."

In addition to academic perceptions of the need for metropolitan planning, some concrete steps were taken to improve co-ordination. In Port Elizabeth the need for co-ordination was recognized as early as 1948 when the municipalities of Port Elizabeth and Walmer formed a joint planning committee (Mercer, 1974). Provincial authorities refused recognition of this joint body for what appears to have been largely bureaucratic and legalistic reasons. A joint town planning committee was, however, eventually established for the Port Elizabeth metropolitan area in 1970, largely as a response to chronic transportation problems. In Durban/Pietermaritzburg and Cape Town similar committees were established in the 1960's. In Durban/Pietermaritzburg, the formation of some sort of metropolitan committee was suggested in 1963 by the Natural Resources Development Council and in 1963 the Pietermaritzburg/Durban Regional Planning Committee was formed under the auspices of the Natal
Town and Regional Planning Commission. It was comprised of representatives from central government, provincial government, the main local authorities and the University of Natal, and was responsible for the preparation of a Pietermaritzburg-Durban regional plan (published in 1973) and a metropolitan guide plan (published in 1974).

From a theoretical point of view, the calls for co-ordination arose out of a recognition of the economies of scale that could be realized in the co-ordinated production of physical infrastructure to promote production, consumption and exchange on the one hand, and the provision of services on the other. On the Witwatersrand, for example, the need for high speed motorways to promote the development of North-South and East-West development corridors was recognized in the 1950’s. However, the construction of such motorways required a great deal of co-ordination between local authorities and other government bodies. After seven years of negotiation a local/provincial/central government consortium commenced with the construction of these motorways in 1962 (Mandy, 1984). Moreover, there were concerns that land-use be co-ordinated to ensure that the provision of infrastructure occurred in a spatially efficient way. Thus, most of the early metropolitan plans identified development corridors.

Apart from concerns with the promotion of capital accumulation through the provision of a spatially efficient accumulation infrastructure, there were also calls for metropolitan co-ordination to ensure that land use clashes did not occur between local authorities and, more importantly, to ensure the reproduction of labour. While the central state already exercised some control over the transport of Black Workers at the metropolitan level, the importance of greater co-ordination in this sphere became very apparent particularly as bus transport came to replace trains as the dominant means of commuter transport. The result was the formation of a number of metropolitan transport advisory boards in the late 1970’s.

Most of the moves to establish metropolitan government and land use planning were, however, tentative at best. In part, this was because the co-ordination problems were not that severe and many of the wealthier local authorities felt they had little to gain from metropolitan
ventures. Moreover, provincial authorities did exercise some jurisdiction over metropolitan growth and seemed to mitigate the worst excesses of jurisdictional fragmentation. It was not until the early 1970's that a form of metropolitan planning became more widespread. Once again, apartheid spatial engineering and not locally perceived co-ordination needs, provided the impetus.

The Physical Planning and Utilization of Resources act of 1967, not only placed limitations on industrial growth in metropolitan areas, but also made provision for the establishment of Guide Plans for such areas. To utilize the power provided by the Act, the government established a Central Guide Plan Committee in 1971. The specific purpose of the Guide Plan programme was to acquire greater centralized control over the location of productive activity, on the one hand, and to deal with emerging contradictions of Group Areas zoning which were developing in the metropolitan areas on the other. With regard to the latter, problems were arising as various local authorities expanded in the direction of other local authorities within the metropolitan areas. In some instances, the Group Areas configurations of the respective authorities did not cohere, while in other instances, small local authorities presented a barrier to the expansion of a single Group Area attached to a rapidly growing and large city. Mercer (1974, p 123) discusses the Group Areas problems of the Port Elizabeth metropolitan area as follows:

"The previously accepted expansion of the Black residential area towards Uitenhage had presented very serious difficulties when viewed on a metropolitan basis. This would effectively split the metropolitan area in two, creating communication difficulties as well as the sterilization of large areas of land arising from the buffer zones on either side of public roads. This is probably the greatest problem that has faced this young metropolitan authority."

By the early 1970's, land use planning at a metropolitan level was being conducted almost entirely under the auspices of Guide Plans. Moreover, more technicist aspects of metropolitan planning, such as the rationalization of service provision and land use, had become totally articulated with "grand apartheid." In 1974, the South African Institute of Town and Regional Planners made metropolitan planning the theme of its conference for that year. The articulation of metropolitan
planning and the grand scheme for reproducing racial capitalism is quite evident from the proceedings of this conference. Thus, Viljoen (1974) in a paper on the Johannesburg Metropolitan Area, argues for the introduction of high speed trains which could extend the radius of the metropole up to 300km (assuming train speeds of 150 km per hour and a one way commuting time of two hours). In effect, Viljoen's paper was nothing other than an attempt to give spatial effect to separate development policy.

In short, by the 1970's, metropolitan Guide Planning was being conducted in all of South Africa's metropolitan areas. In 1975, the Physical Planning and Utilization of Resources Act of 1967 was amended to accord statutory status to Guide Plans. Guide Plans thus became binding on all levels of the public and private sector. Moreover, the plans were to take the form of framework plans rather than strict delimitations of land use. Detailed town planning still had to occur within the framework of the Guide Plan. The metropolitan co-ordination of land-use (for purposes other than grand apartheid) occurred as a by-product of apartheid spatial engineering rather than as the outcome of a grass roots perception of the need for metropolitan planning.

Finally, it should be noted that the articulation of apartheid and efficiency-orientated metropolitan planning had not always proceeded unproblematically. A great deal of conflict had developed between some local authorities and the central state over the curbing of metropolitan growth on the one hand, and over the efficiency problems associated with stubborn application of the Group Areas. Thus Mercer (1974, p 123) complains about the effects of Group Areas zoning as follows:

"Various proposals for expansion have been vetoed, resulting in what is considered, from a planning point of view, to be an unsatisfactory compromise."

CONCLUSIONS

In retrospect, the McCarthy and Smit (1984) characterization of the t3 phase as one of 'physical and ideological intervention' remains apposite, but perhaps too much emphasis was placed on the relation of such
intervention to the process of accumulation. Clearly, the period will long be remembered as one of apartheid spatial engineering. This engineering, in turn, was in large part due to the influences of the White working classes and the petty bourgeoisie within the power bloc, who assisted in fashioning the 'hard-line' solution to the crises of the 1940's. Nevertheless, apartheid spatial engineering was not inconsistent with the designs of capital: the tightening of influx control was, for example, a direct response to the interests of agricultural capital, and there is evidence that unplanned squatter settlements pre-empted horizontal expansion possibilities for construction and industrial capital, and played havoc with property values in higher income areas. Moreover, the elimination of squatter settlements not only provided suitable avenues and areas for the activities of a growing financial/construction sector of capital; but also the new planned housing estates that accommodated displaced Black populations provided an outlet (albeit a modest one) for commodity production activities of a growing construction sector. Regional variations in realizing the apartheid city model suggests that, in some instances, political control and domination was the prime motive, while in other instances, rationalization of spatial organization with a view to promoting capital accumulation was more important. By the 1960's, however, the manipulation of urban spatial form was predicated on the doctrine of separate development and the satisfaction of Black political aspirations within "independent" bantustans. The creation of commuter suburbs within the borders of the bantustans was part of this broader scheme to ensure the long term reproduction of racial capitalism. It was this scheme that provided the impetus for the regional planning interventions of the 1960's.

Whereas regional planning in the 1950's was conducted on a relatively technocratic basis, by the 1960's, it had become almost totally articulated with the state's separate development policy. Separate development itself was at least in part a response to the growing political militancy of the 1950's and the Sharpeville crisis of 1960. The decentralization of industry to "border" areas was an essential component of the process of creating economically viable bantustans to provide a basis for the political reproduction of Blacks. The decentralization programme failed for several reasons. The most
important was the contradiction between the success of repressive measures in securing political stability in the short term, and the necessity of implementing a longer term programme to ensure such stability. Given the boom years of the 1960's and given the quiescence of labour, neither individual nor collective capital saw any reason to move to decentralized locations.

From a planning theoretical point of view, there are a number of important points of general interest arising out of the analysis of apartheid spatial engineering. The first is that any concept of the state as a simple instrument of capital must be rejected out of hand. While the apartheid spatial engineering of the South African city was not out of line with the interests of capital, the decentralization programme was vigorously opposed by most fractions, even if it could be argued that such a policy was in their long term interests. Moreover, it can be argued that support for the state's apartheid politics from the White working class and the growing army of White state bureaucrats, was a decisive factor in the state's determination to implement apartheid spatial policies, notwithstanding the opposition of capital. It should also be noted that the engineering of the apartheid city was quite successfully concluded, even if the state's decentralization programme failed. Perhaps this was because the apartheid city was quite in line with capital's interests, if not necessitated by them. The failure of the state's decentralization policy is clear testimony of the structural limits of state power in an economy dominated by capitalist social relations of production.

Another important theoretical point relates to the importance of ideology in affecting policy outcomes. There can be little doubt that Afrikaaner nationalism played a relatively autonomous role in the formulation of and implementation of apartheid spatial policy. Moreover, it was this ideology that provided the cement necessary to cohere a disintegrating power bloc. It is, of course, arguable that Afrikaaner Nationalism is itself materially determined, but it would be a brave and probably foolish analyst who would be prepared to reduce it to such determination.

A further point worth noting, is the importance of, and substantial regional variation in the relations between, the local state and central
state in determining spatial policy outcomes. An understanding of these
relations appears crucial in understanding the massive but spatially
uneven Black public housing programme of the 1950's and 1960's. The
apparent concentration of house building programmes in local authorities
where manufacturing, construction and landed capital, rather than the
White working class, were hegemonic, suggests that the housing programme
received its impetus at the local rather than national level. The
building of the Black townships appears to be primarily explicable as the
creation of a built environment for the reproduction of a stable Black
labour force in the cities. The fact that the immense housing programme
stands in contradiction to the anti-urban stance of the Nationalist
Government, further reinforces the importance of the local state and the
ability of capital to get its way even in the face of a relatively
hostile central government.

An important feature of the 1950's and 1960's is the growing
centralization of state interventions in the spheres of both production
and reproduction. This tendency towards centralization is evident in:
the establishment of the machinery for regional and national planning;
the growing centralization of state control over Black living
environments and housing provision (e.g. the Mentz Committee, the
establishment of central state controlled Administration Boards, etc);
the increasingly centralized control over the location of industry (1967
Physical Planning Act); and finally in the growing demands for
metropolitan planning and government (Guide Plans, etc). This
trend towards centralization appears to have been more closely associated with
social control and with domination, than with any rationalization
associated with the expansion of a modernizing industrial economy.
While the early regional planning activities appear to be associated with
rationalization of resource utilization, most of the concrete moves
towards centralization in this period were more clearly linked to
apartheid spatial engineering, which in turn had its roots primarily in
the need for the political reproduction of racial capitalism and the
maintenance of the particular configuration of the power bloc. However,
apartheid spatial engineering also became articulated with more
technicist spatial rationalization of production and consumption, so that
it is difficult, in the end, to clearly identify the determinants of
centralization.
The impetus for urban reconstruction and expansion did not only come from the need for restoring social control. The growth of finance capital and the construction sector, together with the rapid overall growth of the economy in this period, resulted in massive investment in the built environment. The growing concentration of capital made it possible for individual firms to undertake large scale development projects. Skyscrapers and distinct finance districts emerged in the CBDs of most South African cities, giving rise to congestion and the introduction of height and bulk controls, and the building of parking garages and freeways. Moreover, the growth of the tertiary sector led to demands for the decentralization of office space and commercial activity, and for urban reconstruction and renewal. Conflicts emerged between planners and fractions of capital over the redevelopment process and the dominance of the latter became quite apparent. These conflicts can be theorized as conflicts between the idealist perspectives of city planners (with romantic overtones) and the accumulation interests of particular capitals. They also represented conflicts between individual capitals (as represented by particular developers) and the collective interest of capital in general (as represented in the public interest ideology of planners). Use value/exchange value conflicts also emerged, but to the extent that decentralization and reconstruction seldom directly affected the working masses, the growth of urban social movements around this form of urban reconstruction was not particularly evident. Given the removal of Blacks to the periphery and given the tendency towards decentralization into affluent areas, the conflicts that developed around reconstruction were essentially of an intra-class nature. In fact, it is fair to say that the activities of professional urban planners employed in municipalities in this period were predominantly focused on the management of urban reconstruction conflicts within the ruling classes and on facilitating accumulation and circulation. The reproduction of labour at economic, political and ideological levels had become an increasingly centralized process.

The establishment of a National Housing Commission to control funding and of watchdog committees staffed by central government officials (e.g. the Mentz Committee) were indicative of such centralization. Local authorities were still responsible for the construction of public housing
schemes under central control. However, by the end of the period even this function had been moved to central government level. Thus, by the end of the period two relatively distinct groups of professional planners had emerged -

(a) those working within local authorities with a primary concern for the spatial management of production and consumption activities of the ruling classes, and

(b) those working under the control of the central state and concerned primarily with the reproduction of the popular classes.

Given these circumstances, planning soon came to mirror the basic divisions within the society as a whole.
CHAPTER SIX: THE ORGANIC CRISIS AND URBAN AND REGIONAL PLANNING IN SOUTH AFRICA, 1975 TO 1987 - THE ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS

INTRODUCTION

Whereas the 1960’s and early 1970’s were characterized by political quiescence and rapid accumulation, the post-1975 period in South Africa has been one of great political turbulence and severe economic crisis. The crisis has been so deep and lasting that Saul and Gelb (1981) have likened it to Gramsci’s notion of "organic" crisis. In explaining the concept they quote the Prison Notebooks as follows:

"A crisis occurs, sometimes lasting for decades. This exceptional duration means that incurable structural contradictions have revealed themselves ... and that, despite this, the political forces which are struggling to conserve and defend the existing structure itself are making efforts to cure them within certain limits, and to overcome them. These incessant and persistent efforts ... form the terrain of the conjunctural and it is upon this terrain that the forces of opposition organize" (quoted in Saul and Gelb, 1981, p 3).

Following Gramsci, Saul and Gelb (1981) argue that if a crisis is organic, the political forces seeking to conserve the existing order cannot be purely defensive, but must also be "formative". In this regard they quote Stuart Hall:

"If the crisis is deep - 'organic' - these efforts cannot be merely defensive. They will be formative: A new balance of forces, the emergence of new elements, the attempt to put together a new 'historical bloc', new political configurations and philosophies, ..., a new sort of 'settlement' - 'within certain limits'. These do not "emerge" they have to be constructed." (quoted in Saul and Gelb, 1981, p 3).

There can be little question that the post-1975 period in South Africa has been characterized by substantial upheaval; by major attempts to restructure the power bloc; by relatively ambitious attempts by the state to restructure the political economy within certain limits; and by the re-emergence of oppositional political forces attempting to shift this restructuring well beyond the limits of the state’s programme. Given the links that we have already demonstrated between developments in the political economy and urban and regional planning in previous chapters,
it should not be surprising that the post-1975 period has ushered in major upheaval and change within planning itself. Major changes have occurred not only in planning policy, but also with regard to the issues which planners address, the locales within which they attempt to do so, and the theory in terms of which they pursue their changing practices. So central is the politico-economic crisis in the post-1975 period, that most of the recent developments in planning theory and practice can only be explained with reference to it. Moreover, as was noted in the introduction and in Chapter Two of this dissertation, a rather detailed analysis of the nature and trajectory of the contemporary conjuncture was considered necessary in order to identify possibilities for progressive practice. As a consequence, the next few chapters (Chapters Six to Eleven) provide a detailed account of organic crisis in South Africa and its implications for urban and regional planning. This particular chapter focuses on the economic dimensions of crisis and their implications for planning.

The chapter begins with an analysis of the nature and extent of the economic crisis with particular reference to the crisis in the manufacturing sector, the massive growth of state spending, balance of payments difficulties, inflation, unemployment and the increasing tendency towards the concentration and centralization of capital. State responses to the economic crisis and their implications for urban and regional planning are then explored. To begin with the relationship between the macro-economic growth strategy of export-industrialization and regional policy is examined. The influence of fiscal crisis on regional policy is emphasized. Attention then moves to the relationship between economic crisis and the adoption of a positive urbanization strategy in the mid 1980's. It is noted that the government's reversal of years of policy aimed at constraining the growth of metropolitan areas, represents one of the most significant shifts in urban and regional policy in decades. It is argued that this shift in policy bears an important relation to the growth strategy of "inward-industrialization", itself a response to economic crisis. Also discussed is the relation between deregulation/privatization and urban and regional planning. The focus then shifts to the relationship between economic crisis and another particularly important change in policy - the new housing policy which was announced in 1983.
In particular, the links between housing policy and inward-industrialization are investigated. The constraints that the balance of payments crisis (or debt crisis), imposes on the pursuit of inward-industrialization using housing as a lead sector, is highlighted. This is followed by a discussion of the relationship between fiscal crisis and emerging transport and associated land use policy. The discussion then focuses on the way in which crisis has spawned a vigorous debate on urbanization and the spatial management of South African cities, and in particular on the development of domestically generated theory which substantially challenges conventional town planning wisdom. I am referring here in particular to the path-breaking work of David Dewar (1982a, 1984, 1985). Finally, and in the same vein, the emergence in South Africa of local economic development planning, corporate planning and strategic planning procedures, is linked to local manifestations of economic crisis. Before proceeding it should be noted that some of the major changes in urban and regional planning that are addressed in this chapter are investigated in later chapters insofar as they bear a relation to political crisis (e.g. positive urbanization and housing policy). Moreover, a number of additional development in urban and regional planning in the post-1975 period which are more closely linked to political crisis (e.g. upgrading and the emergence of a progressive planning movement) will be taken up in later chapters.

THE ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS OF CRISIS

Prior to 1975, the accumulation process under racial capitalism was seen as relatively unproblematic by both establishment and radical scholars alike. So buoyant was the South African economy in the sixties that an establishment economist was prompted to comment that:

"Given the built-in propelling force of industrialisation, on the one hand, and the positive national approach to modern economic development on the other, it appears that economic growth will not constitute a major problem in South Africa during at least the next twenty-five years" (T.A. du Plessis, cited in Scheepers, 1982, p 22).
Likewise, radical scholars such as Wolpe (1972) and Ehrensaft (1976) saw accumulation proceeding quite unproblematically fuelled by the "super-exploitation" that was possible under racial capitalism. Nowhere in the literature was there any sense of "crisis" or impending economic collapse (Freund, 1986). The reasons for this portrayal of the accumulation process are not hard to find. Economic growth has, apart from the occasional hiccup, proceeded quite steadily since the 1930's. The dynamo or engine of this growth was the manufacturing sector. Black and Stanwix (1986) report that between 1946 and 1984, the manufacturing sector's contribution to total GDP grew at the average annual rate of 6.3% by comparison with 2.7% for the mining sector and 3.0% for agriculture. Total GDP grew by an average of 4.2% per annum over the same period.

However, by the late 1970's, a growing band of mainly radical economists began to write about the "economic crisis in South Africa" (Saul and Gelb, 1981; Gelb and Innes, 1985; van Holdt, 1986; Innes, 1986; Black and Stanwix, 1986; Black, 1986). Establishment economists such as Reynders (1975) and The Kleu Study group (1983) have also noted structural aspects of the crisis. Saul and Gelb's (1981) discussion of the crisis was particularly noteworthy insofar as it was written at a time when soaring gold prices provided the basis for a short but substantial boom in South Africa in the late seventies and early 1980's. Their analysis was particularly prophetic insofar as they correctly predicted that the boom was a fragile one and that the South African economy was, in fact, destined for difficult times. Few would dispute the veracity of this prediction, given the performance of the South African economy since then. The stuttering upswing of 1987/1988 notwithstanding, almost every indicator of economic performance reveals that South Africa is currently in the midst of the deepest long-term economic crisis of its history.

Gross Domestic Product (GDP) showed negative real growth in 1982, 1983, 1985, and the first two quarters of 1986 (Black and Stanwix, 1986). It should be noted that this is the first time that GDP has actually fallen in real terms since World War II. Moreover, Lombard (1988) points out that since the middle of 1974, the growth of the economy (as measured by GDP) in real terms has been less than 1% per annum most of the time. He observes further that such a growth rate is exceptionally slow even when
compared with mature Western industrial nations whose populations are declining and whose need for growth is therefore not as great. Gross domestic fixed investment (GDFI) declined in real terms in every single year between 1981 and 1986 and has improved only slightly since (Black, 1986). In fact, in the decade 1977 to 1987, total net domestic investment amounted to only 78% of net savings (Lombard, 1988). In 1986 vehicle sales dropped in absolute terms to 1970 levels and the Rand fell to an all time low in 1985 (Black and Stanwix, 1986). Unemployment estimates vary between 10% and 40%, but most reliable researchers estimate a rate of about 30% (Financial Mail, 1986). There is a widely held belief that the poor performance of the economy is largely attributable to the inability of the Nationalist government to deal with the political crisis in the country. While there can be little doubt that the political crisis is dialectically related to the economic crisis and the resolution of the economic crisis depends critically on resolutions to the political crisis, analysts such as Saul and Gelb (1981); van Holdt (1986); Black and Stanwix (1986) and Black (1986) argue that the crisis is more fundamentally due to the particular history, context and structure of the South African economy itself. Thus, they argue that manifestations of economic crisis were evident before those of political crisis, and that the economic crisis has contributed substantially to the deepening of the political crisis. Moreover, these authors stress that the current poor performance of the economy should not be seen as a "normal" downturn in the business cycle. The crisis, they argue is well into its second decade and will require structural changes if it is to be resolved by the power bloc. The most significant structural feature of the South African economy which these theorists see as accounting for the crisis, is the particular nature and trajectory of the manufacturing sector. It has already been noted that South Africa's post-war growth has been largely attributable to the growth in manufacturing. It is, therefore, not surprising that the explanation of the current economic crisis is to be found in the crisis of the manufacturing sector.

The Crisis in Manufacturing

Black and Stanwix (1986) argue that the crisis in manufacturing is essentially a crisis of markets. As has already been discussed in
earlier chapters, growth in the South African manufacturing sector was predicated mainly on a strategy of import substitution. Thus, manufacturing production was aimed almost entirely at a limited local market and depended substantially on protectionist state policies. While the initial impetus for growth in the South African economy was provided by gold, the logic of accumulation in the gold mining sector imposed major constraints on growth (Black, 1986). The cost-sensitivity the gold mining industry meant that input costs had to be kept as low as possible. Since the most significant variable cost in the industry was labour, the mining sector relied heavily on super-exploitation. Wages were kept very low through the compound and migrant labour system. Such a strategy, however, also meant that the local market for manufactured or other goods was limited. However, the gains made through struggle by White workers and the wealth that gold mining made available, allowed the development of a local market which was large enough to stimulate import-substituting manufacturing growth. By the mid-1970’s, however, it became quite clear that the limits of local markets had been reached. As early as 1972, the government-appointed Reyniers Commission reported that import substitution no longer held much potential for growth. Moreover, by the mid-1970’s, the rate of manufacturing employment was falling at an even more alarming rate (see Table 6.1). By the 1980’s both manufacturing output and manufacturing employment displayed negative growth rates.

Table 6.1 : Gross Domestic Product and Manufacturing 1946 to 1984. Average Rate of Growth Per Annum.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Manufacturing Output</th>
<th>Manufacturing Employment</th>
<th>Total GDP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1946 - 1950</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950 - 1955</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955 - 1960</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960 - 1965</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965 - 1970</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970 - 1975</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975 - 1980</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980 - 1985</td>
<td>-1.2</td>
<td>-1.0</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Reynders Commission (1972) argued that the country would have to develop a large export-orientated manufacturing sector in intermediate and consumer goods, if production in the manufacturing sector was to be boosted and the growth of South African economy maintained. This has not occurred, however, largely because South African manufactured goods are not particularly competitive on international markets for two reasons. Firstly, South African firms have not employed the most advanced and sophisticated production technology available because this technology requires long runs (and therefore, large markets) to effectively reduce costs (McGrath, 1986). Given the small local market and given a lack of confidence concerning South Africa’s export possibilities, local investors have as consequence not acquired the technology necessary to reduce costs and allow South Africa to compete on international markets. The current threat and reality of international sanctions has further reduced the likelihood of such investment. The second major reason for the inability of South African manufacturers to compete on international markets concerns the “relatively” high price and low productivity of South African labour by comparison with the newly industrializing countries (NICs) of South East Asia in particular. An economic consultant to Anglo-American stated recently that the wages of textile workers in South Africa were one third more than those of textile workers in Hong Kong, two thirds more than in Rio de Janeiro and almost three times more than in Singapore, Manilla, Seoul and Bangkok (van Holdt, 1986). Whether these statistics are exaggerated or not is difficult to determine, but there can be little doubt that in recent years Black trade unions in South Africa have made significant strides and that manufacturing wages in South Africa are substantially higher than in the “sweat shops” of South East Asia. Thus, it is not surprising that free marketeers (such as Leon Lowe and the Free Market Foundation) have vociferously called for the restoration of “laissez-faire” economic conditions and the creation of South African “Hong Kong’s” in locales such as the Ciskei.

In any event, it is clear that the limits on a pattern of industrialization based on import substitution have been reached. Lombard et al (1985) report, for example, that 86% of demand for clothing and footwear; 92% of demand for fabricated metal products (excluding machinery); and 96% of the demand for food is met by domestic production.
While South Africa imports vast quantities of capital and intermediate goods such as machinery, transport equipment and industrial chemicals, prospects of import substitution in these sectors are not good given the small size of the South African market (Black, 1986). The local production of such goods would also require tariff protection which in turn would raise the cost structure of the South African manufacturing sector at a time when inflation is already a problem (Black, 1986). It follows therefore, that either the local market has to be expanded or that manufacturing growth will have to rely on exports. The major structural barriers to the latter have already been mentioned, but the state still appears to be backing this option (see, for example, the 1985 White Paper on Industrial Development Strategy in the Republic of South Africa). A more detailed discussion and assessment of the power bloc response to the crisis in manufacturing will be outlined in a later section. It is, however, desirable to preface such a discussion with a brief outline of other related aspects of the economic crisis in South Africa.

The Openness of the South African Economy and the Crisis in the Balance of Payments

The South African economy is very open. Black (1986) estimates that approximately 60% of South Africa's Gross National Product (GNP) is derived from exports and imports. This means, of course, that the South African economy depends heavily on trade and that the economy is extremely sensitive and vulnerable to changing conditions in the world economy, particularly as they affect major trading partners. In the past decade, South Africa's position in world trade and the international division of labour has weakened and this has contributed to the economic crisis. As Kaplan (1983) notes, the outstanding feature of the international economic landscape has been a deep and prolonged economic recession. The contraction of the economies of the advanced capitalist world has resulted in their purchasing less abroad, which in turn has meant lean times for countries who rely heavily on exports to these advanced economies. The shrinkage in demand has been particularly severe in respect of primary goods exports such as minerals and raw materials. The reason for this is primarily the decline of the so-called "smokestack" industries (such as steel production, heavy
machinery, rolling stock and so on), which for so long have been the
group of major industries (von Holdt, 1986). Recovery of these
industries is unlikely given the restructuring of production and the
labour process in the world economy. New growth within the advanced
economies is likely to be predicated on a combination of relatively
skilled labour and electronic and computer technology. Thus the demand
in these economies for "smokestack" industry inputs is likely to decline.
Micro-chip technology has also resulted in an overall decline of demand
for intermediate goods such as steel. All of these developments have
serious implications for South Africa’s economy and the goods it has
traditionally exported.

To begin with, it should be noted that South Africa has historically
relied heavily on the export of primary goods (e.g. gold, coal, wool,
maize) and intermediate goods (mainly semi-processed goods such as steel
and so on), to earn foreign exchange and balance its international
accounts. The decline of the "smokestack" industries has as a
corollary had severe implications. Iscor, for example, is exporting
iron at a loss and has been doing so for some years. Coal has been a
very important export and here too, severe problems are being encountered
(von Holdt, 1986). In addition, exports may also be substantially
affected by economic sanctions, but the overall impact of such sanctions
is difficult to assess. These considerations notwithstanding, South
Africa’s ability to earn foreign exchange may depend much more critically
on the performance of its primary export, gold. In 1980, gold accounted
for more than 50% of the value of all exports and while this share has
dropped slightly since then, there can be no question of its central
importance (Kaplan, 1983). Various commentators such as von Holdt
(1986) and Black (1986) argue that South Africa can no longer rely on
gold because variations in the gold price are caused by factors outside
of South Africa’s control, and secondly, that gold is unlikely to ever
reach its earlier peaks again. Both of these conclusions are, however,
highly debatable. Reaganomics in the USA has produced a massive trade
deficit, and there are signs that the American economy is headed for
recession. If such a recession materializes, it is possible that the
price of gold will rise sharply. It is a distinct possibility, therefore, that South Africa could be bailed out of its current crisis by
a sustained and substantial rise in the price of gold. Most economists
however, agree that South Africa’s long term economic growth cannot be based on gold. Moreover, even if gold does bring in foreign exchange, the question of how any surplus capital is to be used remains an open one. Many believe that the answer to long term growth is the same as the answer to the stagnation of the manufacturing sector, i.e. the development of manufacturing exports (von Holdt, 1986). Historically, growth in the manufacturing sector of the South African economy has relied heavily on the importation of large quantities of machinery and equipment. In 1970, machinery and transport equipment accounted for 46.7% of all imports (Kaplan, 1983). By 1981 this proportion had risen to 52% (Kaplan, 1983). The ability of South Africa to produce such machinery locally seems limited, given the small size of local markets and the difficulty of competing in international markets. It follows therefore, that if the manufacturing sector is to grow and become export-oriented, such growth will continue to depend on the importation of machinery from abroad.

A close positive relationship therefore exists between economic growth and rising imports. In the past this relationship was not that problematic. South Africa was able to sustain periods of growth by using substantial reserves to pay for imports or by getting foreign banks to roll over credit. This meant that upswings in the economy could be sustained for relatively long periods and high average growth rates were possible. However, since the mid-1970’s, South Africa’s balance of payment problem has become increasingly acute. Between 1977 and 1980 a deficit of R7 700 million was accumulated (Kaplan, 1983). “The dramatic rise of the gold price in 1980-1981 helped reduce the deficit but also led to an increase in local investment and the importation of capital goods. Thus by mid-1982, the deficit was still R2 473 million (Kaplan, 1983). This led the South African authorities to apply to the IMF for the largest loan in South Africa’s history (Kaplan, 1983). However, a consumer-led mini-boom, which government had hoped would promote support for its proposed constitutional reforms, combined with a falling gold price after 1982, allowed the trade deficit to reach a massive R2.86 billion by 1984 (Innes, 1986). In any event, in 1985 foreign banks lost confidence in the future of the South African economy and refused to roll over credit. Moreover, South Africa was refused access to the IMF and the World Bank for political reasons. The impact of these developments
has been so substantial that the BOP constraint has itself been a major component of economic crisis in South Africa. Robinson (1988, p 13) describes the Reserve Bank Governor’s summary of the crisis as follows:

"South Africa’s problem, says Dr de Kock, is that it has been forced to play the economic game without a back-stop. Ever since foreign banks refused to roll over credits and ran for the exit since August 1985, South Africa, already bereft of new IMF and World Bank loans for political reasons, has been deprived of new bank credits, apart from a few trade related items. As a result we have no alternative but play safe and run a current account surplus, even though that means lower growth and unemployment’, said Dr de Kock."

With total debt in 1988 standing at a massive 21 billion American dollars, the prospects for an average growth rate in excess of 2% to 3% per annum over the next decade seems remote. As soon as domestically generated growth begins to gain momentum it has to be curbed to deal with BOP difficulties. Moreover, whatever surpluses are achieved on the current account have to be used to finance debt repayments and not for domestic growth.

**Inflation**

Inflation is both a major indicator of, and contributor to economic crisis. It is damaging to the economy primarily because it makes investment decisions risky given the instability of the price environment. This, of course, reduces the propensity of foreign investors to invest capital in South Africa. Moreover, inflation raises the price of South African exports making them less competitive on international markets. Inflation is thus a contributory factor to the crisis in manufacturing which, in turn, has been isolated as the key structural feature of the current economic crisis. Inflation became a problem in the South African economy in the 1970’s. Gelb (1987) has argued that the "oil shock" of 1973 and the rising price of capital imports from abroad (itself an indicator of the tendency for the rate of profit to fall in the advanced capitalist world), were the major external reasons for the onset of inflation. However the inflation spiral of the 1980’s was also associated with local consumer spending. The spiral was started when the authorities used the bullion stampede that swept the
gold price above $850 an ounce to encourage a wild spending orgy rather than reinforcing economic foundations. This, of course, led to demand inflation. By 1984, the inflation rate was running at 12% and by 1985 at 16%. In 1986, inflation actually exceeded 20% notwithstanding the drastic action taken by government to curb domestic spending. This, in part was due to the dramatic decline of South African currency and consequent increase in the price of imports, but also to increasing state expenditure in the 1980’s. Von Holdt (1986) notes that state expenditure has increased by 18.5% per annum since 1980. In any event the intermittent use of monetarist policy instruments since 1985 has brought inflation down to more acceptable levels (13% in 1988), at the cost of high levels of unemployment. Political pressures may, however, tempt government to print money to finance its process of socio-economic reform which in turn will fan inflation.

State Expenditure

In 1981-82 state expenditure amounted to 22% of GDP (von Holdt, 1986). By 1984-85 it had risen to 29% of GDP, and Gelb (1986) estimated that expenditure for 1985-86 was even higher. High levels of state expenditure are particularly problematic if revenues are raised by printing money rather than being tied to increased productivity. For monetarists this is the primary cause of inflation. If the necessary revenues are raised through borrowing or through increased taxation, there are other negative economic effects. In any event, it is almost the conventional wisdom that state overspending is a major economic problem. Moreover, it is not one that can be easily resolved. Reasons for exorbitant state spending are manifold, but relate mainly to the difficulties associated with managing the contradictions of racial capitalism. To start with, vast sums of money have to be spent wastefully on apartheid bureaucratic structures such as the separate homeland governments, the tri-cameral central government structures and the mainly White-staffed state bureaucracies. For mainly political reasons it is difficult for the government to reduce expenditure in any of these areas and particularly with respect to the White bureaucracies which form an important part of the Nationalist Party’s political constituency. Vast sums are also necessary to finance an expensive and growing military sector. It has been estimated that the war in Angola
has been costing R4 billion per annum (Robinson, 1988). Again, as the struggle in South Africa intensifies, the government's ability to reduce spending in this sphere may be severely limited. Keeping troops in the townships is a very expensive business. Large sums also have to be spent in the sphere of collective consumption. Since the late 1970's, popular mobilization around education, housing and transport reached unprecedented levels.

Education is a particularly sensitive area given the increasing militancy of the Black youth, the demands for equalization of expenditure and facilities, and the reluctance of politically powerful Whites to give up any privileges. In 1984-1984 per capita expenditure on White education was over seven times as great as that of Blacks (Sutcliffe, 1986). Moreover, the Black secondary school population is growing at an astonishing rate of 19% per annum. Housing too is an area in which there are substantial demands for government expenditure. It is estimated that by the year 2000 some four million homes will have to be built (de Vos, 1988). While the state is trying to opt out of public provision, the circumstances which have made public housing a necessity in the first place have not changed. At the very least the state will have to write off large sums on site-and-service provision. As will be elaborated later, transport too is a highly politicized arena and one which is posing major fiscal problems for the government. In short, political circumstances in South Africa are such that reductions in state spending will be very difficult to achieve.

**Capital Intensification**

One of the striking features of the South African economy is the increasing capital intensity of production. Since 1973, there has been a dramatic increase in the proportion of Gross Domestic Fixed Investment (GDFI) allocated to machinery and other equipment. This proportion has grown from 28% in 1976 to 40% in 1985 (Sutcliffe, 1986). Furthermore, Black (1986) reports that the annual growth of manufacturing capital stock per worker has increased from 2.59% between 1960 and 1965 to 4.14% between 1975 and 1980. He points out that this increase takes on particular significance when compared with a long term increase of only 1.5% per annum between 1919 and 1976. Capital intensification does not
in itself contribute to a slowing of economic growth, although in the long run the increasing organic composition of capital may lead to a fall in the rate of profit and a consequent slowing of investment. Capital intensification is much more problematic when considered in relation to its effect on employment. Table 6.1 shows quite clearly that manufacturing employment has not grown at the same rate as manufacturing output since about the mid 1960’s. Moreover, Lipton (1986) reports that capital intensification has dramatically reduced the demand for labour in agriculture and mining, the other particularly important sectors of the South African economy. When combined with the effects of recession, capital intensification has contributed to probably the most severe employment crisis since the “Great Depression” of the 1930’s. Unemployment, of course, has contributed to the deepening of the political crisis and poses a major threat to the political reproduction of the system.

The reasons for capital intensification are related largely to low real interest rates since the 1970’s on the one hand, and an increase in the real price of labour over the same period on the other. As has already been noted in an earlier section, domestic savings have exceeded domestic investments in the 1970’s and 1980’s, depressing interest rates. At the same time, the growth of a militant trade union movement since 1972 has resulted in wage gains for labour. These trends together with a rapidly growing population, have dramatically increased unemployment.

Concentration and Centralization

As discussed in a previous chapter, the concentration of capital became particularly marked in the 1960’s. In the 1970’s, as growth slowed, centralization became the dominant tendency (Innes, 1983). By the late 1980’s, levels of centralization are quite staggering. An analysis by McGregor Research Services (Sunday Tribune Finance, January 11, 1987) shows that three corporate giants in South Africa control 76.3% of listed companies in the country. They estimate that one firm, Anglo-American, controls 54% of such companies. Monopolistic practice arising out of such concentration and centralization, can contribute to economic and political crisis by:
(a) fanning inflation (as discussed in the section on inflation)
(b) reducing production and growth as a consequence of the net revenue maximizing strategies of monopolies
(c) increasing unemployment as a consequence of the association of bigness with capital-intensive production (which is a statistical but not a necessary relation)
(d) increasing unemployment through its net revenue maximizing strategies, particularly in times of recession (cutting production, laying off staff and raising prices)
(e) increasing inefficiency as a consequence of growing bureaucratization of production.

In summary, the economic crisis in South Africa has been precipitated largely by a crisis in the manufacturing sector. This crisis is related to the saturation of local markets and the development of BOP constraints on domestic growth. However, high labour costs in relation to productivity, the difficulties associated with employing the most sophisticated technology, and economic sanctions constitute substantial barriers to South Africa’s ability to shift the emphasis in manufacturing towards exports. The slowing of economic growth occasioned by the crisis in manufacturing, has also been exacerbated by a decline in demand for some of South Africa’s exports (such as minerals and raw materials). This decline is related to: a long recession in the advanced economies; the changing place of South Africa in the world division of labour; and the international restructuring of the labour process. Furthermore, consistently high rates of structural inflation and massive state overspending contribute to a lack of investor confidence and act as a brake on economic growth. The South African economy is also afflicted by high levels of concentration and centralization of ownership which, together with increasing capital intensification of production, has resulted in an employment crisis. The South African economy at the end of 1988 is, in short, in dire straits.
STATE RESPONSE TO THE ECONOMIC CRISIS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR TOWN AND REGIONAL PLANNING PRACTICE AND THEORY.

The State's Response

Given the centrality of the crisis in manufacturing, it is not surprising that the state has focused its macro-economic response on attempting to promote growth in the manufacturing sector. Establishment economists see the answer as the promotion of export-oriented manufacturing growth (Reynders, 1975; Kleu Study Group, 1983; and the RSA White Paper on Industrial Development Strategy, 1985). While it is recognized that there is some scope for additional import substitution (in industries such as chemicals, machinery and motor vehicles), the 1985 White Paper on Industrial Development makes it clear that South Africa's industrial strategy has to be reoriented from import substitution to export promotion. In order to pursue such a strategy the state has relied heavily on tinkering with monetary policy rather than developing a planned programme for export industrialization (Black, 1986).

Perhaps the most significant example of such tinkering is the Reserve Bank's decision in the early 1980's to allow the fall in the price of the rand to continue. A weak rand, it was hoped, would make exports more attractive and reverse a growing BOP deficit (von Holdt, 1986). Moreover, as has already been mentioned, in 1984 the government deliberately chose to drive the South African economy into a deep recession by raising interest rates and making it more difficult for consumers and firms to borrow money. While the immediate purpose of these "austerity" measures was to bring inflation under control and change BOP deficits, von Holdt (1986) argues that the hidden agenda was to effect structural changes necessary in order to ensure a new phase of accumulation. More specifically, the measures appear to have been directed at the rationalization of production on the one hand, and the weakening of labour on the other, thereby creating some of the conditions necessary for an export-oriented phase of industrialization.

The use of monetarist strategies to bring about structural changes in production has, however, not been without its contradictions. To begin with, an already serious unemployment problem was exacerbated badly.
Innes (1986) reports that between August 1984 and June 1985, White, Coloured and Indian unemployment doubled (from 30 000 to 60 691). African unemployment has been even more severely affected. In 1985 and 1986, levels of civil unrest escalated to unprecedented levels. Furthermore, high unemployment levels amongst Whites fuelled the dramatic growth of a highly reactionary White political right-wing. These events and unhappiness about the damage that monetarist policies were inflicting on the country's economic base amongst capitalists (see Innes, 1986), forced the state to drop the "austerity package" at what many monetarists regarded as a premature stage and to reflate the economy.

Such reflation briefly regenerated consumer-led growth but did little to promote exports. By 1988 the state moved again to curb growth because of BOP difficulties and there are indications of a return to monetarism. In any event, our concern here is much less with the specifics of economic tinkering than with the relation of urban and regional planning to economic crisis. One aspect of urban and regional planning that seems particularly germane in this regard is evolving regional policy. Before proceeding it should be noted that export-industrialization is not the only leg of the state response to economic crisis. The other important element is inward-industrialization which has had major implications for urban planning and which will be discussed later in the chapter.

Export Industrialization and Regional Policy and Planning

In the previous chapter, it was noted that the South African government dramatically overestimated its ability to affect industrial location through regional policy in the period 1960 to the mid-1970's. The relative failure of decentralization policy notwithstanding, the state has nonetheless persisted with the policy into the 1980's. In the late 1970's and early 1980's, the government reasserted its commitment to making the bantustans work. Four such bantustans became independent between 1976 and 1981. Moreover, a major policy adjustment was announced at the Cape of Good Hope Conference in 1982 where the incentives package for decentralization was dramatically upgraded. The number of decentralization points was, however, reduced. In addition to the upgraded incentives, two major shifts in regional policy were announced at the Good Hope Conference. The first was that certain
points near metropolitan areas were to receive incentives to attract industrial activity. These points were termed "deconcentration" points. The second was the identification of economic development regions across bantustan boundaries. When economic development regions were first identified in the National Physical Development Plan of 1975, bantustans were treated largely as economically autonomous units. Moreover, the number of regions was reduced from the thirty-five identified in the National Physical Development Plan of 1975 to eight in 1982.

The introduction of the concept of deconcentration and the rationalization of economic development regions notwithstanding, it is clear that regional policy in the post-1985 period was still heavily dominated by decentralization policy. For example, only eight deconcentration points were identified by comparison with forty-seven decentralization points (or industrial development points-IDPs - as they are now termed). Moreover, decentralization points generally received more generous incentives than deconcentration points. Clearly the most important reason for the continued emphasis on decentralization is the continuing need to provide an economic foundation to support the rather fragile political regimes in the bantustans. From an economic perspective, it is tempting to suggest (as some authors have) that one reason for the continued commitment to decentralization is the belief that it is consistent with the strategy of export-industrialization, which itself is considered necessary if the economic crisis is to be overcome. There are, however, also reasons for believing that the economic crisis and the pursuit of export-industrialization as well as inward-industrialization (which will be elaborated in the next section) may precipitate the abandonment of decentralization policy. Both possibilities will be considered here.

The argument that decentralization is consistent with export industrialization takes the following form. In the preceding section it was noted that monetarist macro-economic tinkering was aimed at rationalizing production and lowering the cost of labour. Decentralization policy can be seen as an additional mechanism for achieving the same ends. In contexts such as the USA and Britain, spatial restructuring of the accumulation process has been an integral part of the "rationalization" of production and the cutting of labour
costs (Massey, 1984, 1985; Massey and Meegan, 1979, 1982). In the USA, for example, there has been a substantial shift in industrial activity away from the highly unionized North East Region to the lower wage "sunset" in the South and South West. Moreover, firms have taken advantage of the process of relocation to trim the size of their labour forces and to introduce new technology. There is some evidence that "South Africa may be in the early stages of a reorganization of industrial production towards a regional division of labour-specifically the relocation of labour-intensive processes to peripheral cheap-labour areas" (Black, 1986, p 26).

In an earlier chapter it was argued that capital's disinterest in decentralization during the 1960's and early 1970's stemmed from the fact that they had no real reason to support it. The cheap labour policies of the 1960's had been so successful that by 1973, the average wage rate for Africans in a large metropolitan area (Durban) was R13 a week, a figure which was well below the poverty datum line which was then estimated at R18 per week (Friedman, 1987). Moreover, there had been virtually no labour or political unrest and there were agglomeration economies to be exploited in the metropolitan areas. By the mid-1980's however, this situation had changed dramatically. Card-carrying membership of Black trade unions had increased from no membership at all to more than 500 000. Friedman (1987), by way of comparison, points out that at its height the African National Congress had a card-carrying membership of 100 000. The union movement had made substantial gains and the metropolitan areas had become cauldrons of labour activism and political ferment. At the same time the South African economy ran into the structural difficulties described earlier in this chapter. Cheap labour became increasingly important at the very time that the unions were successfully "bidding-up" its price (see Gelb, 1987).

Given the increasingly adverse climate for capital accumulation in the metropolitan areas, there are reasons for believing that the interests of capital and of government in decentralization are moving into closer accord. Moreover, it is also reasonable to hypothesize increasing decentralization of productive activity away from the metropolitan areas. While inconclusive, the limited empirical work that has been conducted in this regard, is supportive of the above postulates. The most
detailed work on industrial location trends has been done by Bell (1983, 1985, 1986). His data shows there has been a persistent decentralization of labour intensive industry from the late 1960's to 1980. The metropolitan core, on the other hand, has gained in capital-intensive industry and its share of national output has continued to increase, notwithstanding a decline in the share of national employment (see Table 6.2).

Table 6.2: Percentage Shares of Total Manufacturing Employment and National Output: 1965/66 to 1979

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>1965/66</th>
<th>1979</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PWV</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment</td>
<td>46,6</td>
<td>43,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Output</td>
<td>49,9</td>
<td>52,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALL METROPOLITAN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment</td>
<td>81,9</td>
<td>86,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Output</td>
<td>80,3</td>
<td>81,6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Bell (1985): p 2

Bell (1986) reports that on the PWV the decline in the region's share of national employment occurred mainly in six low-skill and high-labour-intensity industries (textiles, clothing, footwear, leather, wood and wood products and furniture). Whether or not this decentralization is due to state incentives and coercion or to a spontaneous attempt by fractions of capital to restructure production through spatial reorganization, is debatable. In either case it appears that a territorial reorganization of the labour process is taking place. Moreover, there is evidence that large firms are establishing labour intensive branch plants in decentralized locations to take advantage of unorganized and cheap labour. They are also using the opportunity to transform the labour process in their favour. FOSATU Worker News (quoted in Coleman, 1986), for example, points to the establishment of a branch of the multinational Bata Shoe Company at Keates Drift, a small village in KwaZulu. Instead of employing workers on a full time basis, they have instituted an "out-work" or "piece rate" system. Workers are paid between R3,00 to R4,00 for every ten pairs of shoes processed (Coleman, 1986). This system has a number of advantages for capital.
First, the amount of factory space that has to be provided is minimized. Second, workers need only be employed when market conditions are favourable. When production needs to be slowed as a result of market saturation or recession, workers do not need to be employed at all. Third, the "piece rate" system dramatically impairs the ability of workers to organize collectively. The Bata relocation is not an isolated instance. BMW, for example, has recently established a branch plant in Bophuthatswana and baldly stated that the reason for the relocation was more favourable trade union legislation. The following statement by John Copelyn (quoted in Coleman, 1986, p 140) illustrates the generality of the tendency well:

"Over the last year Bata has announced that it will be closing various of its Pinetown operations and will be opening a plant in Kranskop. Similarly, Paton’s and Baldwin’s have announced they will be closing their factories in Randfontein and moving production to Bophuthatswana. The attractions of cheap labour and government assistance are so great in Natal, the union is unaware of a single clothing factory being started in Durban, while there are dozens growing up every day at Isithebe, Ezakheni, Mnambithi, QwaQwa and such homeland places."

Many of the bantustans are hostile to any but the most limited forms of labour organizations. Most labour reforms won by workers in the 1970’s and 1980’s do not apply in the bantustans. In some bantustans the authorities have actively moved against the unions. In the Ciskei, for example, the authorities banned the largest union in the area, the South African Allied Workers Union (SAAWU), in 1983 after the Mdantsane bus boycotts. In Bophuthatswana too, there have been a number of instances of union repression. In 1983 the authorities expelled all unions operating in the Hammanskraal area and the bantustan police helped management break a number of strikes (Friedman, 1987). In KwaZulu, the Canadian-owned Bata Shoe company found that by moving across the Natal/KwaZulu boundary to Loskop just outside the Natal town of Estcourt, they were able to flatly refuse union recognition. Nor did they have to pay attention to the minimum wage arrangement the Industrial Council agreement imposed on the Estcourt plant (Friedman, 1987). Pudefin and Ward’s (1986) study in Isithebe, suggests that not only is

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1 SAAWU were intimately involved in the organisation of the boycott.
decentralization associated with escaping from the influence of unions and reorganizing the labour process, but also with the increasing feminization of low income, low skilled labour. Such feminization is argued to have a number of advantages for capital. First, female workers tend to be more stable and disciplined workers largely because in many instances women have almost solely taken on the role of providing for their families. Secondly, women are often the least educated and least mobile members of the labour force and, as a consequence, can be paid very low wages.

Although there is substantial evidence of the reorganization of the territorial division of labour, it is not clear just how robust and lasting the tendency towards decentralization will be. While the highly regressive labour legislation in the bantustans (see, for example, Haysom’s (1985) account of labour repression in the Ciskei) will continue to offer attractions for capital, there are other forces which are simultaneously increasing the attractiveness of the metropoles. Changes in technology, production organisation and the international division of labour have increased the advantages of manufacturers, component suppliers and consumers being located close to one another (Maasdorp, 1986). As Maasdorp (1986, p 20) points out, this tends to increase the advantages of large centres with markets and agglomeration economies. This is particularly the case where advances in production organization are concerned. New organizational techniques have been pioneered by the Japanese and up to 70% of recent productivity gains in Japan are attributable to the introduction of such techniques (OECD, 1986; Sunter, 1987). Key organizational techniques include "just-in-time" component provision; "flexible specialization"; decentralization of management functions; and the creative establishment of new relations between small and large firms. "Just-in-time" involves the provision of inputs into production precisely as they are needed avoiding the need for storage and hence the unproductive tying-up of capital. Clearly, a system of this kind requires a great deal of co-ordination and linkage between firms. Such linkages are best developed in metropolitan areas. "Flexible-specialization" refers to the development of worker capacity and machines which are not confined to the production of a particular product. This requires a skilled workforce which in turn implies a metropolitan location for firms using flexible-specialization.
In addition to the development of technological and organizational forces which may reinforce the location of industrial activity in major towns and metropolitan areas, there is a growing concern over the ability of the state to sustain expensive regional policy in the light of economic crisis. The fiscal crisis of the state is so severe and inflation so rampant, that there is an increasing perception that the state simply can no longer afford decentralization. Maasdropr (1986, p 22) summarizes the situation as follows:

"Because of the generous scale of inducements and the considerable response to them in the post Good Hope period, and the increasing budgetary stringency, the policy is more and more being perceived by the private sector (especially free marketeers) as unduly costly ... There is a growing conviction that South Africa today cannot afford to decentralize economic activity."

Black (1986) has estimated that the costs of incentives have increased from R107 million in the 1982/1983 financial year to R618 million in 1985/86. Moreover, Dewar et al (1984) have estimated that the creation of each decentralized job costs four times its metropolitan equivalent. Given these costs it is not surprising that the Deputy Minister of Trade and Industry commented recently that the "success of government's decentralization policy was becoming a fiscal problem, and the continued invitation to relocate might have to be narrowed" (quoted in Black, 1986 pp 29-30).

Concern over the high costs and inefficiency of decentralization policy have also been expressed by a number of advisory groups to government. One such group was the government appointed Study Group on Industrial Development Strategy (The Kleu Group) which reported in 1983. The group cautioned that decentralization policy, apart from being very expensive in its own right, may also be prejudicial to economic growth in the metropolitan areas. The net result, it argued, was that overall economic growth was being curtailed and that fewer jobs were being created. In its report the group also explicitly recognized that the South African economy is facing serious structural difficulties and that as a consequence expensive regional policies need review. Similar points were also made in the National Manpower Commission (NMC) and
Econanic Advisory Council (EAC) recommendations on the reduction of unemployment presented in 1983. The NMC/EAC recommended that regional development policy should focus on job creation not the spatial redistribution of jobs. It also expressed concern about the costs of decentralization policy at a time when South Africa could not afford the loss of employment opportunities. The NMC/EAC accepted that there was a spatial imbalance between the location of productive activity and the location of a large proportion of the populace in South Africa. They stressed, however, that in the past, too great a reliance had been placed on decentralization to rectify this imbalance. Instead they suggested that removal of constraints on labour mobility might serve better. The dropping of influx controls in 1985 suggests that government may in fact be heeding the advice of the NMC/EAC and that decentralization may no longer be regarded as an effective means of promoting spatial equity. It should be noted, however, that government rhetoric notwithstanding, a concern with spatial equity has never really featured as a major determinant of regional policy.

The return (in 1988) to stringent monetarist austerity measures with particular emphasis on controlling the money supply and cutting state expenditure, suggests again that decentralization policy will come under severe pressure. Moreover, organized capital is being advised to call for the dropping of the decentralization policy in its present form, notwithstanding the fact that existing policy may favour some sectors of industrial capital (Maasdorp, 1986). The basis of this opposition derives mainly from a concern about the efficiency losses that the implementation of decentralization has involved. The constraints on metropolitan growth have been particularly unpalatable. Instead the unfettered growth of metropolitan areas and highly selective support for a few decentralized growth points is what is being advocated. It is, quite probable that "organized" capital will continue to oppose decentralization.

Decentralization policy is currently under review by government and the Development Bank of South Africa has been charged with the task. Speculation on the outcome of the review, however, cannot be made without adequate reference to the politics of decentralization in the 1970's and 1980's. This task will be undertaken in the chapter that follows. From
a narrowly economic perspective, however, apparently contradictory pressures are developing. On the one hand, the increasing concentration of capital and the growing importance of cheap labour in order to make export-industrialization work, suggests that the interests of capital and government in decentralization may be coalescing. On the other hand, the high cost of the policy and changing developments in technology and the labour process, suggest that decentralization is becoming too expensive. Of course, accommodation of these contradictory pressures is possible and the servicing of one set of pressures does not necessarily imply exacerbating the other set. The structural difficulties of the economy do, however, place very definite limits on what is possible.

Deconcentation Policy, Economic Regions and the Economic Crisis

It has already been noted that the Good Hope Plan entailed a reassertion of commitment to decentralization policy. However, the policy package included several concessions to economic efficiency in a context of economic crisis. Examples include the introduction of deconcentration policy on the one hand, and "functional" economic planning regions on the other. In some respects deconcentration policy represents a return to short-distance decentralization. When the border industrial policy was introduced in the early 1960's, incentives were granted at points which "de facto" constituted deconcentration points (or short-distance decentralization points). Examples include places such as Rosslyn, Pietermaritzburg and Hammarsdale. These short-distance decentralization points immediately proved to be the most successful of the decentralization points. Hammarsdale, for example, accounted for a third of all jobs created at decentralization points in the 1960's (Lenta and Hofmeyer, 1986). In 1967, however, government shifted its emphasis from short-distance to long-distance decentralization. As a consequence incentives were phased out in the short-distance decentralization points between 1967-1971. The major reason for the shift in emphasis to long-distance decentralization in the period 1967-1982, was the more single-minded pursuit of the separate "national states" vision which matured in the mid-1960's. Moreover, the government may have felt that points such as Rosslyn and Hammarsdale had reached the point of self-sustaining growth and no longer required assistance. In any event, the return to short-distance decentralization in the form of
deconcentration policy in the 1980's, represents an acknowledgement of the relative success and efficiency of such short-distance decentralization. Moreover, it represents a partial trading-off of political goals in favour of economic goals.

There are also indications that deconcentration may become increasingly important in the future precisely because it provides a compromise solution between the dictates of apartheid spatial engineering on the one hand and dictates of economic efficiency on the other. Thus, the government appointed Study Group on Industrial Development Strategy (the "Kleu Group") which reported in 1983, was very enthusiastic about the possibilities of an emphasis on deconcentration.

The Kleu Group felt that deconcentration policy had a much better chance of working than decentralization because it took account of the importance of agglomeration economies. Moreover, they felt that deconcentration allowed the expansion of agglomeration economies without aggravating the negative external costs that they associated with uncontrolled metropolitan growth. Further support for deconcentration was also evident in the President's Council document - "An Urbanization Strategy for the Republic of South Africa", and also in the government's White Paper on urbanization strategy both of which were published in 1985. These documents mark an important break in the "anti-urban" policies of the past and imply a major reorientation of regional and urban policy. In these documents, deconcentration becomes associated with the spatial management of metropolitan growth. Moreover, it becomes part of a package of mechanisms which attempt to harness the economic growth potential of urbanization in a "positive urbanization strategy". This positive urbanization strategy is itself partly a response to economic crisis and it is to a discussion of its role in this regard that I now turn.

The Positive Urbanization Strategy and Inward-Industrialization

In 1986, the government released one of its most significant policy documents for decades - the White Paper on Urbanization. This policy document effectively reversed years of anti-urban policy. Instead, a positive urbanization strategy is embraced in which it is recognized that
Urbanization is inevitable and that it should be used positively to enhance the quality of life of all South Africans (Cairns, 1987). The White Paper is a wide ranging document incorporating developing state policy in a variety of arenas - devolution of political power, housing, transport, promotion of small business and so on. The essence of the new urbanization policy is, however, the dropping of influx control and the development of policy to ensure "orderly urbanization". At a conceptual level it is clear that the state envisages the establishment of a number of economically and politically autonomous satellite towns surrounding the major metropoles. Since most so-called Whites, Coloureds and Asians are already urbanized, it is likely that these satellites will be almost exclusively Black settlements.

The reasons for the adoption of a positive urbanization strategy are manifold and complex. At a general level however, it can be interpreted as a very comprehensive response to politico-economic crisis. The political dimensions of the response will be dealt with at length in the next chapter. In this chapter, however, the focus falls on an understanding of the extent to which the positive urbanization strategy can be considered a response to economic crisis. As has already been noted, South Africa's economic crisis is primarily the result of the decline of manufacturing growth, as the local market has become increasingly saturated. In responding to the crisis, the state has essentially three options:

1. The promotion of export-industrialization.
2. Further import-substitution.
3. Inward-industrialization.

As Thomas (1987) points out, none of the options are likely to be ignored. While the state appears to favour export-industrialization at this stage, sanctions and inability to compete with the Newly Industrializing Countries (NICs) of the East, may make this strategy increasingly unattractive. Another constraint on export-industrialization is the increasing tendency towards the imposition of tight import controls on products from abroad by countries in the developed world (Black, 1986). Already import quotas are being imposed and this has led firms from South East Asia to establish plants
in the bantustans, simply to take advantage of underutilized quota allowances in these areas (Rogerson, 1987). There are also major constraints on the extent to which further import-substitution can occur. Thomas (1987) reports that whereas there is some scope for further import-substitution in the capital goods sectors, such scope is clearly limited. The relatively bleak outlook for both export-industrialization and import-substitution suggests that "inward-industrialization" may become an increasingly important strategy in promoting growth. It is the contention of the author that positive urbanization is an important component of the increasingly important macro-economic growth strategy of inward-industrialization.

Precisely what is meant by inward-industrialization requires some elaboration. Perhaps the best known version is that associated with Reserve Bank Deputy Governor, Jan Lombard. This version is defined quite conveniently by the Old Mutual's Economic Monitor as follows:

"Inward-industrialization is domestically generated growth based upon supplying basic consumer products to the rapidly urbanizing Black population, with the increasing labour force coming from the rural areas simultaneously finding employment in these industries" (Cited in Financial Mail, 1987, p 33).

The Old Mutual's Economic Monitor comments that it is not so much a development strategy as an economic process; one which has generated growth in Europe for many centuries. People move to the cities where they enter into mutually beneficial economic relations with others in order to take advantage of the scale and agglomeration economies the large cities offer. The goods and services produced are directed mainly at a growing domestic market. The impetus for growth of the domestic market is itself provided by the wages or profits earned in the newly established enterprises. It should be noted then that in adopting a "positive" urbanization strategy the government has conceded that the growth-generating potential of the cities can no longer be entirely subordinated to the pursuit of territorial apartheid. This is not to suggest that the dropping of influx control and the adoption of positive urbanization has been caused by economic crisis. As will be argued in a later section, political considerations have perhaps been more important in accounting for the positive urbanization strategy. But there can be
little doubt of the link between positive urbanization and inward-industrialization.

In arguing a case for inward-industrialization, Lombard et al (1985) argue that Black consumer demand is already effective and that it will grow rapidly. They estimate that by the year 2000 the urban population of the country will double to reach a total of approximately 30 million. They estimate further that the number of urban Blacks is expected to increase from 9 million in 1980 to 21 million by the year 2000. Moreover, they expect disposable income of households to grow from R35 000 million in 1980 to R80 000 million in the year 2000. Significantly, Black disposable income is expected to triple from its 1980 level of R10 000 million to approximately R30 000 million, and Lombard et al (1980) argue that given higher incomes in the urban areas, most of this R30 000 million will be spent in urban areas.

While establishment economists are confident that Black consumer demand is effective and will continue to grow, it is nonetheless too small to ensure growth rates which are sufficiently high to procure relatively full levels of employment. For many future urban dwellers, the move to the city will not be a move to a job. In fact, Ben Vosloo (cited in the Financial Mail, 1987), managing director of the Small Business Development Corporation, estimates that by the year 2000 the labour force will have grown to 18 million and that only 10 million of these will be accommodated in formal jobs (even assuming a 3.5% economic growth rate which is not very likely). It is this recognition that led Jan Lombard to tie his version of inward industrialization to deregulation, privatization and small business development. The promotion of small enterprises becomes the mechanism for: expanding production; for directing production at local markets; and for ensuring that the benefits of such expanded production are more widely distributed than has hitherto been the case. This process, it is argued, will allow the expansion of local markets which in turn will stimulate further production.

In sum, government interventions necessary to bring a Lombard-style inward-industrialization strategy into motion involves the following three components. The first is the promotion of urban growth and the
dropping of anti-urban policies. This has already partially been done through the adoption of the "positive urbanization" strategy. The second is deregulation and the promotion of small business in as many spheres as possible. The third area is more controversial and involves dealing with the reluctance of both foreign and local capital to invest in South Africa. For some analysts (Kaplan, 1986) this latter area is the crux of the current crisis and perhaps the crux of inward-industrialization. Kaplan's (1986, p 41) comments in this regard are worth quoting at length:

"... what constitutes the current economic crisis? The answer is that capitalists are presently not investing, or at least not productively investing, the profits being made. Gross Domestic Fixed Investment has fallen dramatically. This is coupled with significant capital flight, mostly unrecorded, as plant and equipment are despatched for sale overseas where, at current values of the rand, prices are considerably higher. The overall stock of plant and equipment is shrinking. It might even be termed an "investment strike" - a strike by capitalists who are unwilling to invest."

Kaplan (1986) argues that while there are many contributory factors, the major reason for this investment strike is political uncertainty. In making fixed investments, capitalists have to consider profits not only in the short run but also in the long run. Given the high level of uncertainty about South Africa's future, capitalists have been unwilling to make investments even if they are highly profitable. Given this situation, analysts such as Wolfgang Thomas (1987) argue that an important component of state intervention to promote inward-industrialization, is intervention aimed at directing, encouraging or perhaps even coercing capital investment in industries producing consumer goods for the urbanizing Black population. Thus Thomas (1987) suggests that changes to certain tax laws can force investment in such industries. A very significant example of government attempts to encourage and direct investment inwardly, is the establishment of the South African Housing Trust late in 1986. This effort can be understood, largely, as an attempt to provide institutional guarantees for investment in an area previously considered too risky and insufficiently profitable - low-income housing. In fact, the provision of low-income housing is seen as the most important of the "inward-industrialization" industries. It is this centrality of built
environment production to the entire process of inward-industrialization that deserves special attention because of the opportunities and dangers it presents to progressive organizations.

In their seminal piece on inward-industrialization, Lombard et al (1985) explicitly identify the provision of low-income housing as a key component of their strategy. It is, in fact, the only industry explicitly referred to. The reasons for its centrality are not hard to find. The current housing backlog is conservatively estimated by the NBRI to stand at 832 000 units. It is estimated (NBRI, 1987) that 5,9 million people currently live in 466,000 formal units which means an average of 13 people per unit. Moreover, it is generally agreed that approximately 4 million units will have to be built between now and the year 2000. Also of significance given the current political crisis, is the government's attempt to deal with so-called "legitimate" grievances of people living in massively underprovided housing environments (no water, electricity, roads and so on). While the political motivation lying behind housing and upgrading programmes is generally quite well understood, the economic motivation is not. Upgrading and low-income housing provision is a highly labour-intensive process. It is also a low-skill industry which allows easy market entry for small businesses and the informal sector. These characteristics are important because the growth of the South African economy depends on the growth of Black incomes. Moreover, low-income housing provision and upgrading are processes which utilize primarily domestically-produced inputs. Thus the industry is a reasonably low-import industry and therefore a low debt and low-inflation producing industry. A further advantage is that a growth strategy based on low-income housing and upgrading would be much less vulnerable to fluctuations in the international economy.

The major problem with inward-industrialization or any other growth strategy devised around domestically-generated growth, is the so-called "balance of payments constraint". Lombard (1988, p 11) makes the point as follows:

"The international political position of South Africa has, however, deteriorated to such an extent that South Africa now has to maintain surpluses on the current account to reduce the country's foreign debt rather than to build up reserves to pay
for imports involved in a domestic cyclical expansion. Nor do we any longer have access to the financial facilities of the IMF which we traditionally enjoyed. These circumstances seriously hamstring the economy's recovery prospects. Indeed it seems as if upswings which are mainly led by domestic components of expenditure such as consumption, investment or government expenditure have very little chance of running their full course."

In short, the moment any domestically generated growth precipitates the need for capital imports, balance of payments difficulties are soon encountered since South Africa has neither the reserves nor the ability to borrow capital to sustain the growth. Even in the field of low-income housing Lombard (1988) argues that the current structure of the South African construction industry militates against the success of an inward-industrialization strategy using housing as a lead sector. He estimates that even a programme which starts with 25,000 houses and 25 serviced sites and grows at 20% a year to eliminate the backlog in fourteen years, will incur import leakages of R300 to R400 million in one year. Moreover, the problem becomes even more serious when the existing engineering and other industries reach full capacity in terms of existing fixed capital, and have to import machinery and other goods. Thus Lombard (1988) argues that if housing (or any other sector) is to provide the basis for domestically-generated growth, then the predominantly capital-intensive nature of production processes in South Africa will have to be transformed. This observation, together with the recognition that the balance of payments constraint will limit formal sector growth to 3% or less per annum, leads Lombard (1988) to conclude that macro-economic policy must focus on shifting the entire structure of the economy in a more labour-intensive direction.

"How does a country deal with the structural problem of domestic unemployment and low growth together with a deficit on the balance of payments due to heavy imports of capital goods? Fundamentally the answer lies in the readjustment between four cost items, namely the exchange rate, the interest rate, the wage rate and the rate of taxation. The objective of the readjustment is to bring about a rise in the unit output cost of capital intensive methods of production relative to the output cost of labour intensive methods of production" (Lombard, 1988, pp 13-14; emphasis original).
Whether or not it will be possible to achieve this objective through macro-economic policy-tinkering is another matter altogether, but we cannot entertain discussion on the possibilities here. Before moving on however, it is worth briefly considering the prospects of an inward-industrialization strategy in a context in which it was in fact possible to gain access to foreign loans. Considering such a possibility is useful precisely because it suggests a direction for the development of progressive policy, both in the short- and medium-term, and also in a post-apartheid economy. If loan capital was available it would be possible to embark on an ambitious inward-industrialization programme using housing as a lead sector. Such strategies have been successfully pursued in other national contexts (see for example Currie (1978) on the Colombian experience). In short, the theory is that housing production produces substantial multiplier effects and thereby stimulates economic growth. Provided that economic growth occurs at a rate fast enough to allow for the accumulation of reserves to pay off the loans and as long as growth does not overly increase imports, a long-term growth path is sustainable. The possibility of using such a scenario to win progressive gains in both the short and long term will be addressed in the final chapter of this dissertation, along with a range of additional possibilities.

In summary it should be noted that the model of inward-industrialization being pursued by government essentially amounts to the promotion of small business and informal sector activity through allowing urbanization on the one hand, and through deregulation on the other. More ambitious inward-industrialization programmes underpinned by government expenditure and inward investment are, for the time being, ruled out by the balance of payment constraints. Anxiety amongst the organic intellectual of capital about the possibility of government pursuing a more ambitious inward-industrialization strategy is evident in the following comment by the Financial Mail (February 20, 1987, p 34):

"A danger with catch phrase economic policy making, too, is that heresies can easily be committed in its name; there are those prepared to argue that to be effective inward-industrialization must include tariff protection and subsidization. Nothing could be further from the truth. So it might be wise to talk about deregulation when deregulation is meant."
Finally, it should be noted that the state's positive urbanization strategy fits this conservative model of inward-industrialization almost to the letter. Only the deconcentration (satellite town creation) component of the strategy is more closely associated with the "neo-apartheid" spatial engineering of the past decade. This point will, however, be elaborated in a later chapter. For the moment, however, attention shifts to an assessment of the extent to which major changes in housing policy in the 1980's, can be ascribed to economic crisis and to state strategies aimed at resolving the crisis.

Economic Crisis, Housing and Urban Land Policy

As will be recalled from earlier chapters, in the 1950's and 1960's, the state embarked on a major mass housing programme in the larger towns and cities. In the late 1960's, however, attention shifted away from building mass-housing in the cities, to the urbanization of bantustans (Morris, 1981). This meant that the mass housing programmes of municipalities like the Johannesburg City Council virtually ground to a halt (Mandy, 1984). Thus, during the 1970's and early 1980's, there were only marginal additions to the urban housing stock whilst urbanization continued apace. This, in turn, gave rise to the housing shortage referred to in the previous section and to massive levels of overcrowding. The relationship between deteriorating township conditions and the political revolt of the 1970's and early 1980's is the subject of extensive discussions in later chapters. The focus in this section is on the relationship between economic crisis and the very substantial housing policy changes that have evolved in the 1980's.

In January 1983, dramatic changes in housing policy were announced by central government. Firstly, government announced that in future the building of houses for all "ethnic groups" was to be the responsibility of the private sector. Only in exceptional circumstances would government actually produce housing. Instead, government would play a supportive role in the promotion of self-help housing delivery: by making serviced plots available upon which people could build their own houses; by facilitating access to loan finance; by subsidizing loan finance for
people within certain income categories; and by easing access to building materials and skills. Moreover, government announced that some 500 000 state-owned houses would be sold to the present tenants. Legislation was also passed allowing the participation of non-profit utility companies in housing provision.

The shift in policy was preceded by a vigorous debate about appropriate housing policy which began in the mid-1970's. Ironically the impetus for the debate was provided by redistributive liberal scholars such as Maasdorp and Humphreys (1975) and Dewar and Ellis (1979). These authors attacked government shack removal programmes, arguing that the "shacklands" provided functional housing which was well-adapted to user needs. Moreover, they attacked the sterility, uniformity, austerity and high cost of formal government housing projects. The foremost of these liberal scholars, David Dewar, was clearly influenced by the then highly fashionable work of John Turner. Like Turner he argued that housing was a process not a product, and an important part of individual and community development. He conducted careful analyses of the affordability of public housing schemes built for Coloured people in Cape Town, and concluded that even subsidized rentals were unaffordable for the large majority of people living in these schemes (see Dewar, 1982b, 1983). Given the rise of inflation in the late 1970's and early 1980's, the problem was particularly acute in newer housing projects. When public housing became unaffordable, Dewar argued that it became oppressive. As an alternative he proposed a self-help system in which the role of the state was to provide security of tenure, basic services, advice (if asked for), access to materials and access to loan finance.

By the early 1980's the notion of "self-help" had become a catchword used widely in debates about virtually every sphere of collective consumption (social welfare, health, housing, education, community services and so on). In the housing sphere, debates developed between liberals such as Dewar (1980) and radicals such as Wilkinson (1980) which mirrored the debates between Turner (1976, 1978) and Burgess (1978) in the international literature. Radicals argued that the self-help approach was an ideological mystification of a process of state withdrawal from the sphere of collective consumption, thereby reducing the social wage and lowering the cost of reproducing labour. Liberals, on the other
hand, argued that the housing shortage had become so acute and public housing so expensive that there were few alternatives to self-help.

While the work of the liberal scholars certainly seems to have influenced government thinking, developments within the political-economy were perhaps more decisive. In a later chapter it will be argued that political considerations were of primary concern, but the economy was also important. It should, however, be noted that at the time the new policy was announced, the economy was not in nearly as parlous a state as is currently the case. In fact, the government raised civil service pay by 40% in 1983 to ensure electoral support for the proposed tri-cameral constitution (Robinson, 1988). This, in turn, spawned a consumer led mini-boom against the backdrop of a deteriorating gold price (Robinson, 1988). As is well known, this resulted in 1984 in what Robinson (1988, p 12) calls a "panic-stricken emergency package" which "pushed the prime rate to a record 25% and ushered in a steep recession - and two years of violent Black revolt". These considerations notwithstanding, there can be little doubt that the state was nonetheless aware of the structural difficulties facing the economy. As far as expenditure on housing specifically is concerned, the Executive Director of the Institute for Housing of Southern Africa, Mr. D.M. Roelvert, had the following to say:

"When the government announced its new housing policy in 1983, it did so because ... funds for housing purposes are extremely limited and in view thereof the National Housing Commission is compelled to obtain the vast portion of its capital funds at market related rates of interest on the capital and money markets.

This fact together with the fact that all costs have lately risen at an alarming rate has compelled the Department to follow a new line of approach in respect of the financing of housing and the utilization of housing funds" (Roelvert, 1988, p 3.)

However, the extent to which new housing policy should be seen as an attempt to decrease the fiscal burden should not be overemphasized. Van Horen (1988) points out that given that government was spending very little on housing anyway in the 1970’s and 1980’s, privatization was unlikely to have a major effect on overall government spending. He estimates that if spending on housing had been completely eliminated in
1985, total government expenditure would have declined by only 1.7%. On the other hand, it is clear that if existing and projected housing strategies are to be met by the building of public housing, a very substantial increase in state spending will be necessary. The NBRI, for example, estimates that in the urban areas alone an average of 366 000 units per year would have to be built. Assuming a modest cost of R5 000 per serviced site and R15 000 for a 55 square metre house, a total of R20 000 per unit, an amount of R7.3 billion at present costs will be required annually (Roelvert, 1988). As Roelvert (1988) points out, the largest amount that government has ever been able to allocate to housing was R1.3 billion in the 1986/7 financial year. There can be little doubt that in the early 1980's, the government was very concerned about a housing policy that implied a sixfold increase in expenditure at a time of growing fiscal crisis.

While the economic crisis may not have been critical in shaping the new housing policy announced in 1983, it has certainly become of central importance in subsequent years and has dramatically influenced the form of emerging policy. As has already been pointed out, in 1986 the state moved to reflate the economy after the disastrous recessionary impacts of their monetarist policies introduced in 1984. An important part of the reflationary package was the provision of R750 million for expenditure on housing, serviced sites and upgrading. Lombard (1988) notes that such expenditure was possible because economic activity outside of the housing sector was so low that imports could be afforded. He goes on to add that without the housing programme, domestic growth "would have been at least one percent less than it actually was" (Lombard, 1988, p 12). However, by 1988 when the economy showed signs of recovery, the balance of payments constraint soon became a problem and expenditure on housing has been reduced. In fact, the balance of payments constraint has become absolutely central to the formulation of housing policy and for that matter, land policy. Lombard (1988, p 15) outlines the challenge and the required elements of housing strategy as follows:

"In view of the various resource constraints on a comprehensive programme of developing almost 3 million sites for urban settlers by the year 2000, the programme would have to be carefully decomposed into those elements which require the
least real resources and have few backward repercussions on imports, on the one hand, and those that can only be undertaken over time as scarce resources become available and as our basic economic reforms materialise.”

More concretely, Lombard (1988) suggests that the first phase of such a programme is land purchase for orderly settlement. The provision of land has few backward economic effects, provided the funds for the purchase of such land are raised in ways which are non-inflationary (Lombard, 1988). Thus he argues that land acquisition should be the primary focus of contemporary policy. The second phase of the policy is to make the land available for settlement in two stages. In the first stage people are allowed to settle on land which has been planned and surveyed but for which no services have as yet been provided. It should be noted that this is a major reversal of conventional planning practice. The traditional practice is to only make land available for settlement after basic services have been provided. Lombard (1988) argues that putting people on the land ahead of services minimizes the utilization of real resources in the short-run. In time, when the economic circumstances are more favourable, basic services can be provided as part of the second stage of land settlement. Moreover, to the extent that subsidization is necessary, it should occur at the first stage, primarily because subsidization at later stages (for example the house construction stage) might end up being a subsidy to developers rather than end users (Lombard, 1988). As far as the actual building of houses is concerned, Lombard’s (1988) position is that the system of finance should be subjected to ordinary market principles and in this way reflect the relative scarcity of capital in the economy as a whole. Again house building would occur when economic circumstances were favourable. In the meantime, people would have to meet their shelter needs informally, either by building temporary shacks or by building some sort of starter unit which could be extended later.

It is worth noting that the strategy outlined by Lombard (1988) probably maximizes the number of people that can be involved in the housing process by giving them immediate access to land. It also substantially promotes the decentralized production of housing by small enterprises and the informal sector. This, it will be recalled, is in line with Lombard et al’s (1985) vision of inward-industrialization using labour-intensive
low-income housing production as a lead sector. Moreover, it is likely that capital will be channelled into service provision and upgrading in an uneven and sporadic fashion as economic circumstances allow. The balance of payment constraint suggests that for the foreseeable future, South Africa's growth path is going to be a stuttering one, with shorter cyclical booms and busts.

The implication of the above discussion is that evolving housing policy cannot simply be seen as the state bailing out or attempting to reduce the social wage as some authors have suggested (see for example McCarthy and Smit, 1984). Instead it has to be seen as a complex response to changing macro-economic and political circumstances and it is possible that at particular conjunctures, state expenditure on housing may actually increase. However, the prognosis for the next few years is unquestionably one of austerity.

Whatever the relative merits of the arguments presented above, the dramatic changes in housing policy in the 1980's have significantly affected planning practices and posed new challenges. To begin with, the focus on land acquisition, together with the dropping of influx control and the acceptance of a "positive urbanization" strategy, have resulted in a dramatic increase in layout work. Moreover, hundreds of planners throughout the country have for the past few years been feverishly involved in urban land identification exercises. Planners have also had to come to grips with the theory and practice of self-help and site- and-service delivery systems. The crisis has brought the theory of the late 1970's into closer accord with practice and, as a consequence, planners are learning a great deal more about the limits and possibilities of "self-help" housing. The notion of settling people on the land ahead of service provision has already, and will in future, pose significant design and technical challenges for planners. In many ways settlement without services requires far greater design ingenuity and professional design input than conventional serviced layouts. Far greater attention, for example, has to be given to topography, soil conditions and natural drainage systems. As a consequence, a new literature on "Layout for Zero or Very Low Service Levels" is likely to emerge. It should be noted too that the new housing policy does offer some potential for progressive practices. The focus on land
acquisition, for example, does provide planners with the opportunity to
evacuate in creative land banking exercises which could at a later stage
provide a source of finance for low-income housing.

Furthermore, the intermittent and selective flows of capital into built
environment production could also be used to build community
organizations around community control of such flows. Finally,
substantial ideological capital can be made by progressives out of the
reality that an ambitious inward-industrialization programme using
housing as lead sector would be possible if it were not for apartheid and
the effect it has on the country’s access to loan capital. These
possibilities will, however, be elaborated in the concluding chapter of
this dissertation.

**Economic Crisis, Bantustan Urbanization and Transport Policy**

In the preceding chapter, reference was made to an emerging transport
crisis in the late 1960’s and 1970’s as a consequence of the
extraordinary attempts by government to shift Black urbanization behind
bantustan boundaries. From 1967 onwards, all Africans living within 50
km of bantustan boundaries could be shifted to new townships behind
bantustan borders. An estimated 670,000 were moved in this manner
between 1968 and 1980 (Platsky and Walker, 1985). Thus, by 1985, some
80% of African workers spent an average of 2.5 hours commuting each day
(McCaul, 1987). Moreover, 20% spent an average of 4.5 hours travelling
to and from work each day. McCaul (1987) reports that the bantustan-
based commuter population (frontier-commuters) has increased by 150%
since 1970 and stood at 773 000 in 1982.

The implementation of bantustan urbanization and frontier commuting was
made possible by the rapid economic growth of the 1960’s. With the onset
of the economic crisis in the mid 1970’s, however, apartheid spatial
engineering has become increasingly problematic. In 1985, the state was
subsidizing up to 80% of the economic-transport tariff for workers living
more than 50km from their workplace (McCaul, 1987). The state pays an
average of R200 per annum for each bus commuter and in the case of those
who live more than 90 km from work, an average of R1500 annually (McCaul,
1987). While bus subsidies amounted to a mere R2.3 million in 1966-67,
they had escalated to R209 million in 1984-85 (McCarthy and Swilling, 1984). Moreover, McCaul (1987) estimates that the total subsidy bill (buses and trains) for working-class African commuters was R500 million. And in 1987, the South African Transport services estimated a loss of R1,1 billion on passenger services. Not surprisingly, the state has indicated that it can no longer continue to foot these bills.

Perhaps the most dramatic instance of state recognition that it can no longer afford the inefficiencies of Verwoerdian apartheid, was the reprieve granted in 1985 to the residents of 50 townships under threat of removal to the bantustans. A senior government minister (Sam de Beer) explained that the reason for the policy change was that long commuting distances were no longer affordable (McCaul, 1987). But major shifts in state policy in the transport sphere were, however, evident from the early 1980's. The Welgemeed Commission of 1983 recommended the phasing out of transport subsidies altogether. In compensation for the proposed abolition of subsidies, the Welgemeed Commission proposed that state protection of the large transport monoplies against competition from "pirate taxis" and small operators be tightened. Attempts at implementing the Welgemeed proposals proved futile and between 1982 and 1985 the number of pirate taxis had increased by about 28% by comparison with 11% for legal vehicles. The proposals also involved substantial political opposition. Thus, by the mid-1980's, it was apparent that emphasis in transport policy was shifting in the direction of promoting competition and privatization in the transport sector. This, in turn, has implied a dramatic shift towards the active promotion of small operators. The 1985 President's Council reports on urbanization, for example, recommended that the transport sector be deregulated and that the pirate taxis be seen as a very important part of the overall transport system. Clearly, a deregulated and competitive transport sector is now being seen as the alternative to subsidized transport. Moreover, such privatization allows the state to withdraw from the highly politicized transport sphere. Promoting small transport operators is also quite consistent with the pursuit of inward-industrialization.

It appears that the state will also be devolving transport policy to a new tier of government operating at a metropolitan level - the Regional Service Councils (RSCs). In fact, McCaul (1987, p 442) argues that RSCs
will become "the linchpin of the new passenger transport deal". It is RSCs that will decide on the sorts of operators that will operate in their areas and on the extent of subsidy. Should subsidies be necessary, they will have to be financed by RSCs themselves (McCaul, 1987). Interestingly, since RSC finances are to be derived primarily from a levy on businesses, it seems likely that government hopes to use such RSC taxes as a disincentive to location within the metropolitan core areas (and thereby encourage deconcentration). It should be noted too that the spatial proposals for managing the growth of metropolitan areas associated with the new positive urbanization strategy bear a relation to the transport crisis. The emphasis on satellite towns and associated deconcentration suggests two things. Firstly the emphasis on deconcentration represents an attempt at an ex post facto rationalization of the spatial inheritance of Verwoerdian apartheid and an attempt to reduce commuting from existing satellites. Secondly the proposed creation of further self-contained satellite towns is clearly an attempt (if ill-conceived) to reduce the need for commuting.

The emerging shifts in transport policy are not without contradiction however. To begin with, it is quite apparent that the phasing out of subsidies and attempting to off-load them on capital and labour alike is likely to precipitate substantial political resistance. In the 1980’s transport has become an intensely politicised terrain (see McCarthy and Swilling, 1984). Moreover, it appears that even if the RSCs are willing to subsidize transport, fiscal constraints will allow only small contributions from the RSC coffers. McCaul (1987) points out that the RSCs are expected to raise R1,3 billion annually in the four main metropolitan areas and that existing commuter subsidies already amount to nearly half of this amount. Since the RSCs have other priorities (especially service provision in the massively underprovided Black townships), few resources are likely to be available for transport.

A second major contradiction of emerging transport policy is that while privatization and reliance of small operators may reduce pressure on the fiscus and even promote inward-industrialization, the increased demand for small vehicles, that such a policy shift implies, may exacerbate existing balance of payments difficulties, since most vehicle parts are imported. Moreover, given the increasing devaluation of South African
currency, motor vehicles are becoming prohibitively expensive. In many other parts of the Third world which have experienced similar structural economic problems, currency devaluation has resulted in a reversal of previous trends towards the use of private vehicles and to increasing reliance on public transport. If this is also the case in South Africa, then transport policy is shifting in the direction of privatization at the very time when greater emphasis should be placed on providing efficient public transport. The growing need for public transport highlights another contradiction between transport policy and housing policy. In the previous section it was noted that in the short and medium-term at least, it seems likely that housing policy will focus on putting people on surveyed sites ahead of services and ahead of formal housing provision. Given that very low servicing levels are likely to be the norm, it follows that settlement densities will have to be low. This, in turn, means that commuting distances will be increased and that it will be difficult to make public transport systems viable.

The contradictions referred to above - fiscal problems, the exacerbation of balance of payment difficulties, the escalating price of private vehicles and the conflict between housing policy and transport policy, have been highlighted here because they throw the need for an entirely different approach to urbanization and transport into sharp relief. Such an approach, it will be argued, is possible, but only in a South Africa that is re-integrated into the international community. This, in turn, would, of course, require the dropping of apartheid and negotiations with the African National Congress. The possibilities in this regard will be discussed in the final chapter where the prospects for progressive urban planning practices will be assessed. However, it is clear that transport policy and policy for managing South Africa's cities are closely intertwined. This provides a useful entree into a discussion of the way in which politico-economic crisis and state responses to it, have precipitated developments in urban planning theory. Particularly important in this regard is the work of Dewar (1982, 1984, 1985).
DAVID DEWAR AND THE STRUCTURE OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN CITY

Dewar's (1982a, 1984, 1985) proposals for transforming the nature and structure of South African cities represents one of the most significant theoretical contributions to the literature on urban and regional planning in South Africa. While the development of the theory is not directly traceable to economic crisis, its resonance is a direct function of its "appropriateness" at this conjuncture. Dewar's theory has its roots in an analysis of what it was that made "old towns" in Europe and elsewhere urbane and prosperous on the one hand, and an analysis of what it is that makes cities in South Africa sterile, unpleasant and impoverished on the other. The theory has, however, increasingly been associated with urban strategies for countering poverty and unemployment. Thus, in 1984, Dewar (1984) presented a paper outlining his proposals to the Second Carnegie Conference into Poverty and City Development in Southern Africa. Moreover, at a conference on Urban Planning and the New Constitution in 1985, Dewar (1985) prefaced his proposals for "re-planning" the South African city with a description of what he considered to be four major realities of the urbanization process in South Africa. The first was the observation that the rate and scale of the urbanization process in South Africa was such that more urban stock would have to be created within the next two decades than had been produced in the last 300 years. The second was that poverty and inequality was endemic in South Africa and that most of the people urbanizing would be poor. The third reality was that unemployment had already reached crisis proportions. Finally, he pointed out that urbanization would take place in a context of scarce financial and natural resources. In many respects these are the same conditions described by Lombard et al (1985) in outlining their vision of inward-industrialization. In fact, Dewar's proposals for managing the spatial growth of South African cities are very consistent with the macro-economic strategy of inward-industrialization, but also with export-industrialization in certain sectors (see Smit and Todes, 1987).

Dewar's (1982a, 1984, 1985) theory is at once a critique of the apartheid city and an alternative to it. He attributes the woes of the South African city to two major causes: apartheid and significantly, traditional town planning practices. He argues that the tenets of
territorial apartheid and traditional planning maxims have a great deal in common. To begin with, both stress segregation: territorial apartheid of races, and traditional town planning of land-uses. Secondly, both stress the notion of "inward-focused" or self-contained communities. Thus, apartheid stresses separate facilities for members of different race groups, and traditional town planning is often structured around self-contained neighbourhoods, villages, towns and so on. Of traditional planning in South Africa, Dewar (1985, p 2) has the following to say:

"The form of city management and planning which predominates in South Africa at present has a number of overriding characteristics. Firstly, ... the direction and form of urban growth is more determined by where authorities can obtain land easiest and cheapest than by any social or environmental objectives. Secondly, upon that land which is available, there is a belief that it is possible and necessary to plan everything: Each parcel of land has its segregated, designated use; each activity has its segregated, designated place. Thirdly, the mode of living imposed by dominant planning constructs - is underpinned by the values of the more wealthy classes: particularly the profoundly erroneous belief that every family does or will own a car and that equity of access prevails..."

This type of planning imagination, together with apartheid and bantustan urbanization, tends to produce sprawling, low-density and highly attenuated urban areas. It is precisely this attenuation which lies behind the transport crisis referred to in the previous section. Dewar (1985) goes on to argue that the burden of this grossly inefficient urban structure is borne primarily by the poor who not only have to commute long distances but who are also excluded from a number of "life-opportunities" offered by the city through spatial isolation. Dewar (1985, p 3) elaborates on some of the impacts on the poor as follows:

"... the creative capacity of cities, defined in terms of their ability to create economic, social and recreational opportunities to which people, both rich and poor, can respond, is massively dissipated. Effectively ... each local area has to operate independently, in terms of generating social and commercial infrastructure and economic opportunities - there is little reinforcement of one area by others. When these areas are almost exclusively populated by low income people, of course, the resources available to support this infrastructure
simply do not exist. Thirdly, those opportunities and facilities which do exist in the cities are increasingly inaccessible to the majority of people, and particularly the poor ... Smaller less powerful, economic enterprises struggle to find opportunities at places where they have a genuine chance of becoming viable - they (particularly informal sector operators) are increasingly pushed into marginal locations ... Life is simply a struggle for survival."

In order to counter these negative impacts on the poor, Dewar (1982a, 1984, 1985) argues that emphasis has to shift away from segregation and attenuation, to promotion of compact, integrated cities.

"Clearly, changes are necessary, perhaps the most important is to achieve the greatest possible integration and overlap of activities, so that people can experience most necessary urban activities over relatively small distances ..." (Dewar, 1985, p 3).

The primary spatial planning mechanism for achieving such integration is the use of "activity corridors" (Dewar, 1982, 1984, 1985). These activity corridors, it is envisaged, would act as "seams" binding together previously compartmentalized and isolated areas. The corridors would be focused around major public transport networks (a key feature of the proposals) and high density settlements would be encouraged along them. In principle, efforts would be made to channel people in such a way that activity and enterprise thresholds could be achieved along the corridors. This, together with deregulation and a permissive approach to land use, would promote the emergence of small businesses and the informal sector in the corridors. Moreover, the increased supply of land in which businesses could be established (in the corridors) would ease market entry. Finally, conscious attempts would be made to locate public facilities and infrastructure within corridors.

Whilst it is not possible to dwell on the details of Dewar's (1982a, 1984, 1985) proposals, it is important to reiterate that his activity corridor model is highly appropriate at this conjuncture if viewed from the perspective of the economic growth strategies available. Smit and Todes (1987) have conducted an in-depth analysis of the relation between such growth strategies and alternative spatial models for managing metropolitan growth. They conclude that the activity corridor model
performs best with regard to both inward-industrialization and export-industrialization. It should be noted too that the compact and integrated city is clearly at odds with the deconcentrated satellite model proposed in the government’s positive urbanization strategy. In a later chapter it will be argued that government has opted for the deconcentrated satellite model for political rather than economic reasons. This suggests, of course, that there continues to be a tension between economic and political goals in government policy-making. Such a tension could be sustained in the high economic growth periods of the 1950’s and 1960’s. In the late 1980’s policies which exacerbate economic difficulties are under extreme pressure. The implication, of course, is that progressive planners may be able to exploit this tension to move urban policy in the direction of Dewar’s proposals which are far more progressive than what is currently proposed by government. In the concluding chapter of this dissertation, it will be suggested that a modified version of Dewar’s activity corridor model may well provide the basis for the spatial management of South Africa’s cities. It will also be argued that economic and political circumstances are such that it may be possible to pursue the reconstruction of the South African city along these lines now.

In any event, it is clear that economic crisis is contributing to the emergence (for the first time since the 1950’s) of a vigorous debate about spatial management and structure of South African cities. Recent contributions by Naude (1984), Hindson (1986), Kok and Gelderblom (1988), Kok (1988), De Beer (1988), van Zyl (1988), Oosthuizen (1988) and Olivier (1988) provide the necessary testimony in this regard. The increasing recognition of the role of major cities in economic development is paralleled by new concerns with local “economic development” planning in some of these cities. These new developments are the focus of the next section.

THE RISE OF LOCAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PLANNING AND NEW PLANNING THEORY AND PRACTICES

One of the more interesting responses to politico-economic crisis from a planning theoretical point of view, is the emergence of local economic development planning. Not only has the introduction of localized
economic development planning broadened the scope of urban planning, but it has also resulted in the increasingly widespread adoption of new planning approaches, procedures and practices. Examples include, inter alia: the adoption of corporate planning in cities like Cape Town and Pietermaritzburg; the use of strategic planning procedures at the local level; and the rethinking of traditional land-use control mechanisms (such as zoning) to make them more consistent with economic development thinking. This section discusses the relation between the emergence of local economic development planning and specifically local manifestations of economic crisis. Reference is made to the two cities in which local economic development planning is most developed - Cape Town and Pietermaritzburg. Some reference is also made to the Durban response to economic crisis.

Cape Town introduced local economic development planning as part of a corporate planning exercise in the mid-1980’s. The local economy was in a parlous state. Unemployment was conservatively estimated at 25% of the economically active population (City of Cape Town, 1986a). This high level of unemployment was partly attributable to the fact that Cape Town’s economy has historically been heavily dependent on manufacturing which, as we have pointed out, is a sector currently experiencing substantial decline nationally. In 1968, manufacturing accounted for 27,8% of the Gross Geographic Product (GDP) for Cape Town. The comparable statistic for the country as a whole was 23,6% (City of Cape Town 1986b). By 1978 the proportional contribution of manufacturing to Cape Town’s GDP had declined to 22,7%, indicating the decline of the manufacturing sector locally. The city’s port, once a major contributor to the local economy, is now massively underutilized (for a variety of reasons which cannot be addressed here). Moreover, the city was experiencing severe fiscal difficulties. By 1985, the value of rateable land per capita had declined by nearly one third by comparison with the situation in 1940 (City of Cape Town 1986a). This, in turn, necessitated continual rates increases and by the mid-1980’s large cuts in municipal expenditure with a corresponding decline in service and infrastructure provision. To add to the problem, a doubling of the population of Greater Cape Town is expected by the year 2000, with virtually the entire increment to the population being accounted for by the poorest sectors of the community, who, it is anticipated, will make
substantial demands on the city coffers for housing, welfare services and so on (City of Cape Town 1986a). Given these conditions, officials of the Town Planning Department of the city, motivated the introduction of local economic development planning as follows:

"If there ever was a time in the history of this City which demands a strategy for survival, it is, surely, now" (City of Cape Town 1986a, p 5).

In May 1985, the Cape Town City Council made a commitment to the preparation of an economic development plan as a priority (City of Cape Town 1986b). Significantly, it was the Town Planning branch of the City Engineer's Department that was charged with the task. The local focus of the plan was to be complemented by the more regional focus of an economic development plan for the Western Cape region, initiated by the private sector (the Wesgro initiative). In November 1985, the City established an ad hoc committee to examine the operation of the "free market economy". Its brief was to "identify those factors which impede the optimum operation of the free market economy - both formal and informal - and thus act as a brake on the growth in the metropolitan area" (City of Cape Town 1986a, p 3). Not surprisingly, the activities of this committee have focused primarily on deregulation. In the meantime, an economic development planning section has been created in the town planning branch of the City Engineer's department. This section produced a report on low-cost job creation in Cape Town in July 1986. While the analysis of the local economy was in the preliminary stages, the tentative proposals made went far beyond deregulation and reflect the input of left-of-centre planning professionals into the process. Hence, in addition to deregulation and small business promotion, the report also refers to the possibility of using local public works programmes and the provision of low income housing as strategies for reducing unemployment.

Of some interest in the Cape Town economic development strategy are the tentative steps taken towards "corporatism" at the local level. By corporatism I am referring to attempts by the local state to create consensus on the part of both capital and labour over concrete strategies, and to engage the active participation of these structurally
opposing groups in policy formation. Thus, in discussing public works programmes, the authors of the low-cost job creation report comment as follows."

"Unions and craft associations may be extremely suspicious of any job creation schemes which provide employment under conditions which undercut negotiated rates and working conditions within an industry. This sensitivity must be recognized, and fears allayed through extensive discussion and consultation beginning in the early stages of a job creation programme" (City of Cape Town 1986b, p 11).

Informal contacts have been made by city officials with trade union leaders, in order to secure a level of working class participation. Moreover, the strategy has parallels at the political level where in 1985, the essentially liberal Cape Town City Council proposed an alternative "democratic" form of metropolitan government to the Regional Service Councils proposed by government. Here attempts were made to gain the support of political organizations (such as the UDF and AZAPO), or civic organizations (such as CAHAC and CAL) and of non-racial trade unions. This particular local initiative cannot be discussed at length here. Suffice it to say, that Cape Town’s local economic development planning was linked to political initiatives which attempted to build alliances around the interests of a locale - Cape Town. This is not to suggest that either the economic development plan or the local political initiative were attempts to mask structural differences between classes and political groupings (although it was certainly seen in this light by some analysts and politicians). Given the contingent circumstances, the Cape Town response was potentially progressive and opportunistic (in the better sense of the word). Important in this regard is the redistributionary potential that arises from the linking of economic development planning to the democratic metropolitan government option. Whether or not Cape Town planners will be successful or not, is another matter altogether. The political "local option" initiative seems to be stalled for a variety of reasons, mostly related to central government opposition on the one hand, and the unwillingness, for the moment, of major Black political movements to consider local options.

Before moving on to a discussion of local economic development planning in Pietermaritzburg, two further implications of economic crisis and
local economic development planning for urban planning practice in Cape Town warrant discussion. The first is the emergence of corporate planning. The second is changes in traditional land-use planning practices. Corporate planning should be more clearly distinguished from the corporatism referred to above. As outlined, corporatism refers to attempts to get capital and labour actively involved in policy-making around issues of common interest. Corporate planning, on the other hand, refers to the co-ordination and integration of different actors and departments in city planning in order to conduct strategic planning.

"This report proposes that Council now take positive steps to take further the process by which it and its community will guide and manage change. The key is seen as comprehensive planning which involves the councillors, the bureaucracy and the public at large in the preparation of a Corporate City Plan for Cape Town.

The Corporate Plan is intended to minimize disparities of policy and action within the City Council by providing a coherent co-operatively determined framework for future planning, development and management. It should synthesize the operations, budgets and functional plans of different departments, with relation to the total city system and its future." (City of Cape Town, 1986a, p 5)

Of course, the notion of corporate planning is hardly new in an international context. The fact that it was only in the 1980's that corporate planning ideas were adopted in a South African city is, therefore, of some interest. This late adoption of corporate planning cannot be attributed to the "backwardness" of South African planning institutions and practices. The principles of corporate planning have been taught at most South African universities for years. A much more compelling line of argument is that corporate planning is being taken more seriously precisely because it is now an appropriate organizational response to crisis. In the Cape Town instance, the town planning branch's call for a corporate plan (City of Cape Town, 1986a), is prefaced by discussion of the politico-economic crisis in Cape Town. In the course of this discussion the following comments by Melville C. Branch are quoted with apparent approval:

"Government by crisis exists because of a persistent refusal to face reality, to recognize the inevitable consequences of ignoring problems until they become so critical that something
must be done to prevent breakdown ... We have refused to plan deliberately for their ... solution" (Quoted in City of Cape Town, 1986a, p 5).

The Cape Town planners then go on to suggest that corporate planning is a way of moving beyond mere short-term crisis response. They argue that the two main components of a corporate plan would be a strategic plan and a structure plan. Interestingly in outlining the nature of the strategic plan, the Cape Town planners explicitly talk about the "broadening" of the traditional physical orientation of city planning.

"The strategic plan would encompass all of the activities and concerns of Council, not merely traditional physical land use planning concerns.

The Strategic Plan would have two policy emphases, one defining the role that Council should take in the region, the services it should offer, and the organizational and operational structures and procedures needed to give effect to Council's policies and decisions" (City of Cape Town, 1986a, p 6).

In addition to broadening the scope of city planning, economic development planning and corporate planning have also begun to change the way in which conventional land-use planning is practiced. Thus, in order to promote small enterprise creation, the Cape Town City Council has reviewed its Town Planning Scheme in order to allow the establishment of home industries. Moreover, in their document on low-cost job creation, Cape Town's planners stress the economic importance of reducing commuting; suggest that mixed-use zoning may be promotive of small enterprises and reduce commuting; call for the provision of appropriate spaces to accommodate small, noisy and noxious activities; and suggest that cheap land should be made available to vendors (City of Cape Town, 1986b, p 7). The impact of corporate planning on conventional land-use planning is spelled out by the Cape Town planners as follows:

"The strategic and structure plans are part of a single stream of planning where functional policies and their land use aspects are considered simultaneously. It is most desirable to formulate a land use structure plan in isolation from a comprehensive examination of municipal functions which are a major determinant of land uses. Conversely in an era of land scarcity, land use policies directly affect municipal functions" (City of Cape Town, 1986a, p 6).
In short then, not only has the traditional concept of city planning in Cape Town been broadened, but conventional land-use planning has also changed. It has been suggested here, that these changes have come about not because of some logic internal to city planning in Cape Town, but largely because the local manifestations of politico-economic crisis are very deep. In other words, changes in planning theory and practice are not coming about because planners have refined "rationalist" models or procedures to the point where change in past practices are indicated. Instead it is the politico-economic crisis of the 1980's in Cape Town, that has provided a favourable context for new practices. It should also be noted, however, that the politico-economic context may have provided a favourable context for change, but it did not necessitate the shifts in planning theory in practice that have actually occurred. Similar conditions pertained in other parts of the country but the same planning responses have not been forthcoming (e.g. in Port Elizabeth where the depth of the economic crisis was even deeper). In part then, the nature of the Cape Town response must also be attributed to the agency of those who pushed for new practices. In Cape Town, the quality and drive of both upper and middle levels of planning management, appears to have been decisive in this regard.

A concern with the broadening of conventional city planning beyond land-use was, however, not confined to Cape Town alone. In the mid- and late 1980's, Johannesburg, Pietermaritzburg and Durban all began to address economic development planning as part of a broader "strategic planning" approach. In Pietermaritzburg a great deal has been made of the launching of a new strategic planning exercise - the Pietermaritzburg 2000 Exercise. In October 1984, the City Engineer of Pietermaritzburg, W. Atkinson, wrote to the Town Clerk proposing a strategic planning exercise for Pietermaritzburg:

"This approach proposes to move away from the current preoccupation with production of a detailed physical plan, such as a master plan or town planning scheme, and concentrate more on understanding the urban system and its current and possible future problems. This will enable better decisions to be made regarding what actions should be taken by the City Council and other planning agencies ..." (G.W. Atkinson, 1984, p 2).
The process was given additional impetus by the arrival on the scene of Jim Hudak, a strategic planning consultant from the USA. Hudak had been involved in strategic planning in projects in San Francisco, Chicago, Dade County, the State of Wisconsin and even the Republic of Ireland. Hudak, through the firm Arthur Anderson and Associates, also became involved in the strategic planning exercise in the Western Cape. He brought with him a well-packaged strategic planning procedure, which can be briefly summarized as follows. The procedure starts with an organizing phase in which key actors, participants and analysts are drawn together. An environmental scan is then conducted to identify key issues which need to be addressed. Issues are kept to a minimum, certainly no more than four or five. An overall mission statement is developed and this is followed by an analysis of external and internal factors which can affect its attainment. The external environment is the environment over which local decision-makers have little or no effect but which needs to be taken into account in planning. Detailed goals, objectives and strategies are then devised, implemented and monitored by periodic scanning (Abrahams, 1988).

As with corporate planning, there is nothing particularly new about the planning procedures described above. They are, after all, not very different from the procedures of mixed-scanning which have been well known in South African city planning circles for at least a decade. As with corporate planning, what is interesting is the fact that these procedures were favourably received in the mid-1980’s. While individual agency (in the form of dynamic individual inputs from people such as Atkinson, Hudak and Radford) and the progressive nature of the local decision-making environment certainly have played a part, it was essentially the severity of the economic crisis in Pietermaritzburg which accounted for the enthusiastic adoption of strategic planning procedures. It has conservatively been estimated, for example, that out of an estimated labour force of 200,000, as many as 60,000 are unemployed (Natal Witness, cited in Abrahams, 1988). Moreover, it is anticipated that an additional 200,000 jobs will have to be created by the turn of the century (Abrahams, 1988). Furthermore, the Pietermaritzburg City Council has been experiencing severe fiscal difficulties since the early 1980’s. Expenditures have been increasing at a rate faster than revenues and the deficit has increased from R2,1 million in 1981 to R6,0 million
in 1985 (Abrahams, 1988). This has led to politically unpopular rate increases and it has recently been recommended that rates be increased by an amount that is 3% above the inflation rate (Abrahams, 1988). In addition to overall fiscal crisis, a local transport crisis has also added to the overall economic crisis. In 1980 the deficit on the city's general bus service (to White, Indian and Coloured areas and to two African townships) was a negligible 2.5% of the budget. By 1984/5 the deficit had risen to R2.6 million and by 1986 stood at R4.0 million (Abrahams, 1988). Attempts to raise fares have met with political opposition, especially in Black residential areas, who see such increases as an assault on the social wage. Downward pressures on the social wage and associated political opposition is also evident in the sphere of housing, where it is estimated that between 55 000 and 65 000 units will have to be built by the year 2000 for the Indian and Coloured population alone (Abrahams, 1988).

An in-depth explanation of the specific circumstances which led to the manifestations of crisis in Pietermaritzburg is beyond the scope of this dissertation. Of course, developments in the national economy have been very significant and these have been explained at some length in the introductory sections of this chapter. Particularly important as far as the fiscal, housing and transport crises are concerned, is inflation. Also important as far as the fiscal crisis is concerned is a declining rate base in relation to population growth associated with rapid urbanization and natural increases. There are currently only 24 500 ratepayers out of an estimated population of 464 100, and as in Cape Town, it is anticipated that most newcomers to the city will be low-income people (Abrahams, 1988). As far as employment is concerned, it should be noted that between 1964 and 1971, Pietermaritzburg was part of the central government Border Industrial Programme. In 1971, incentives to industrial enterprises were removed and this coincided with the overall downturn in manufacturing nationally. Sales of industrial land declined dramatically (see for example the data presented by Foster and Fox (1987), and Abrahams (1988)), and unemployment increased substantially. Representations were made to central government to restore incentives. Pietermaritzburg was as a consequence designated as a "deconcentration" point in 1982 and again received an impressive array of incentives. The incentives have proved reasonably successful in
attracting new industry and some 41% of the city’s current industrial base has located in Pietermaritzburg in the last 5 years (Abrahams, 1988). This success notwithstanding, however, new jobs created by new firms have largely been offset by retrenchments from existing firms (running at 6.2% per annum according to Abrahams). Moreover, in line with national trends, new industry has been capital- rather than labour-intensive. Thus, notwithstanding the fact that Pietermaritzburg is rather favoured as far as industrial incentives are concerned, new industry has done little to solve the unemployment crisis.

Given the depth and severity of the economic crisis in Pietermaritzburg, it is hardly surprising that in applying strategic planning methods, the participants in the Pietermaritzburg 2000 plan have identified the following four issues as the key issues to be addressed by the planning process:

1. Employment
2. Housing
3. City finances
4. Human relations

The human relations issue refers, quite specifically, to local manifestation of political crisis. Of course, employment, housing and city finances are also issues of political significance and these political aspects of the crisis will be addressed at a general level in the chapter that follows. The contention of this section, however, is that local manifestations of economic crisis have played a very big part in creating conditions favourable to the adoption of new planning theory and practices.

CONCLUSION

The South African economy is in crisis, manifestations of which have been evident since the mid-1970’s. The crisis is related largely to a crisis in the manufacturing sector which has been the primary generator of economic growth since the 1950’s. The crisis in manufacturing is, in turn, related primarily to the saturation of local markets on the one hand, and to the emergence of major BOP constraints on growth. The
former is related to a highly skewed and racially structured local market (an inheritance of apartheid), and the latter to a decline in world demand for South Africa's exports, sanctions and a real increase in price of imports. In responding to the crisis, the state is pursuing a mix of export-industrialization on the one hand and inward-industrialization on the other. Export-industrialization is limited by sanctions and by the difficulty of breaking into world markets. Inward-industrialization is constrained by BOP constraints. Inward-industrialization could work if the state had access to foreign loans or could roll over its debts. In the final chapter of this dissertation, the strategic possibilities that this reality provides for progressive forces and progressive planning will be elaborated.

Changing regional policy in the post-1975 era appears to have been related to economic crisis in the following respects. Firstly the reduction of the number of decentralization points, the shift in emphasis from decentralization to deconcentration, and the specification of economic development across bantustan boundaries all appear to be concessions to economic efficiency. Economic crisis is arguably bringing state regional policy under a great deal of pressure and major changes are possible. A possible relation between export-industrialization and decentralization/deconcentration exists insofar as lower wages can be paid in peripheral locations. But the evidence is contradictory. Except for the quite explicit creation of Export Processing Zones in certain areas such as the Ciskei, there appears to be no necessary relation between export-industrialization and regional policy. There is, however, a very clear relation between positive urbanization and the strategy of inward-industrialization. While the general strategy of promoting urbanization is clearly in line with inward-industrialization, the specific spatial strategies for managing the growth of the metropoles discussed in the White Paper on Urbanization (satellite cities), are not. In a later chapter it will be argued that the satellite cities model for accommodating growth needs to be understood primarily at the political level.

As far as changes in housing policy are concerned, fiscal crisis was clearly a consideration in the state's attempt to withdraw from the sphere of collective consumption. However, the fiscal crisis should not
be placed at the centre of an explanation of emerging state policy. In fact, were it not for the BOP constraints, it is quite likely that the state would be using housing as the lead sector of an aggressive inward-industrialization programme. Moreover, should economic conditions become more favourable (e.g. a sustained and large increase in the gold price), it will not be surprising if the state directs capital into housing for both political and economic reasons. For the moment it seems that state funds will be allocated mainly to land acquisition and people will be put on the land ahead of services. This, in turn will change both planning theory and practice. New land-use planning challenges will also emanate from changing transport policy which itself appears to be directly related to fiscal crisis. However, it should be noted that emerging housing, transport and land-use policy are not simply rational reflections of economic logic. It could be argued that high-density and compact cities structured around public transport are the most appropriate spatial forms from an economic perspective. This is the thrust of David Dewar’s proposals. However, the promise of Dewar’s proposals are unlikely to be fully realised for largely political reasons.

Local manifestations of economic crisis have, in some contexts, led to planners becoming involved in new substantive areas, new organizational procedures and new planning methods. In Cape Town, for example, the local planning department was responsible for initiating a local economic development programme, for introducing corporate planning into the municipal structures, and for adopting strategic planning issues. Finally, it should be noted that whereas state policy in the 1950’s and 1960’s focused on reproduction issues, since the mid-1970’s there has been a shift to the sphere of circulation and production and the promotion of job creation without increasing state spending. Deregulation and privatization are the primary tools being advocated to promote job creation.
CHAPTER SEVEN: POLITICAL CRISIS AND URBAN AND REGIONAL PLANNING: 1975 TO 1988

INTRODUCTION

In the previous chapter the focus fell on crisis of accumulation. In the next five chapters, attention shifts to the political crisis and its implications for urban and regional planning. It should be stressed again that the political dimensions of organic crisis are not considered to be autonomous of the economic dimensions. For the most part, they are dialectically interrelated. As a consequence, constant references will be made to the interrelations between the crisis of accumulation and particular manifestations of political crisis. However, it is insufficient to simply assume a dialectical relation between politics and economics since there are instances in which the two realms develop autonomously. In any event, the popular perception of crisis in South Africa is that it is a political crisis. This too is often the perception of the outside world. In fact, it is fair to say that perhaps few other issues have captured and sustained world attention quite as much as political crisis in South Africa. Moreover, this political crisis is often understood, both locally and abroad, quite simply as a political struggle between Blacks and Whites. While such an interpretation does capture a great deal of the essence of the crisis, it is too simplistic. After all, we have already shown that crisis in South Africa is underpinned by a deep economic crisis. Furthermore, political crisis in South Africa is far more subtle than a simple bi-polar clash between two nationalisms.

In this chapter, an attempt will be made to outline the nature of the political crisis, and to explain its emergence. More specifically, early manifestations of political revolt are attributed to: the growth of the Black consciousness movement; the emergence of independent Black trade unions; early reform responses by the ruling bloc in response to changes in the accumulation process; the growth of international pressure; and the Soweto uprisings. Attention then turns to the growth of civic organizations in the late 1970's and to the popular political response that reform itself engenders. Here the re-emergence of mass organizations (such as the UDF) in opposition to major state reforms,
such as the tri-cameral system, is stressed. Finally, the development of deep divisions in the power bloc is discussed.

The outline of the crisis provides a preface for a discussion of related changes in urban and regional planning which are taken up in the four chapters that follow. In these chapters, a number of planning issues discussed in the previous chapters will be revisited, but this time emphasis will fall on their political dimensions. These include state regional policy; influx control and positive urbanization; and housing policy. Planning issues not discussed in the section on economic crisis, but which will be addressed here include: local and metropolitan government reforms; the politicization of planning practice and thought; the militarization of planning; the emergence of advocacy planning; the emergence of a progressive planning movement; the effect of reformist thinking on planning theory and the mooted use of town planning schemes as an alternative to the Group Areas Act.

THE POLITICAL CRISIS : THE IMPETUS FROM BELOW

The Resurgence of Political Activity

After the quiescence of the 1960's, the resurgence of political activity in the mid-1970's and early 1980's certainly calls for explanation. A useful place to start is with political developments in the regions of South Africa's periphery. In the early 1970's, the liberation struggles in Angola, Mozambique and Rhodesia intensified. Moreover, as Stadler (1987) points out, it was in the early 1970's that South Africa's control of South West Africa came to be militarily contested by a new guerrilla force controlled by the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO). The importance of these struggles for the re-emergence of political resistance in South Africa is described by Stadler (1987, p 30) as follows:

"The main significance of the decolonization of Mozambique, Angola and Zimbabwe was political rather than simply military and strategic, in the sense that these countries offered examples to Black people living in the Republic of successful resistance to White domination, notwithstanding the determination and technical sophistication of states
controlled by European minorities. This was particularly important in the demise of White rule in Rhodesia.

The demonstration effect of these conflicts increasingly preoccupied South African political leaders during the 1970’s. They also explain in part the resurgence of political activity among Blacks in South Africa after the long political depression which had settled over Black politics during the decade following Sharpeville. The success of guerilla action in Zimbabwe and Mozambique in ending White rule in those territories contradicted the comfortable though historically ill-founded doctrine that changes in the region would not come about through armed struggle."

In addition to the developments described above, the 1960’s also saw the growth of a more politically assertive aspirant petty bourgeoisie. As Lodge (1983) points out, one of the corollaries of rapid economic expansion was the growth of a large African clerical workforce. Moreover, "Bantu Education", notwithstanding all of its shortcomings, had substantially increased literacy in urban areas and many more Africans were entering tertiary educational institutions. Apartheid certainly provided a major obstacle to the upward mobility of this aspirant petty bourgeoisie which, in turn, produced growing bitterness. It was in the universities that the philosophy of "Black Consciousness" first developed. In 1969 Black students broke away from the liberal National Union of South African students (NUSAS) to form a new all-Black movement, the South African Student’s Organization (SASO). From the beginning SASO argued that the main obstacle to Black political mobilization was psychological. Conscientization was necessary to liberate Blacks from feelings of dependency and inferiority. The Black consciousness scholars of the 1960’s became the school teachers, medical doctors and lawyers of the 1970’s and, as a consequence, Black Consciousness began to assume mass movement proportions in the 1970’s. This development, together with the psychological effects of the success of liberation movements to the north, certainly contributed to the mood of opposition which burst into open political revolt in 1976.

Another contributor to the growing political confidence of Blacks, was the emergence of an independent Black trade union movement which had its origins in the catalytic 1973 strikes in Durban (Saul and Gelb, 1981; Lodge, 1983; Friedman, 1987). The reasons for this wave of labour
militancy are not hard to find. In a previous chapter, we noted that average African pay in Durban in 1973 was around R13 per week, well below the poverty datum line of R18 (Friedman, 1987). Moreover, Lodge (1983) reports that the price of basic goods for Africans had risen by 40%. In short, a sharp rise in inflation in the context of painfully slow rises in real income through the 1960’s largely accounts for the strikes. On January 9, 1973, 2 000 workers at the Coronation Brick and Tile Works in Durban gathered on a football field and called for a pay rise. By mid-February, nearly 30 000 workers were on strike, and there was talk of a general African workers’ strike in Durban (Friedman, 1987). The labour unrest soon spread to other towns. The scale and importance of the strikes are evident in the following statistics provided by Lodge (1983). During the 1960’s, an average of only 2 000 workers went on strike each year. In the first three months of 1973 alone 61 000 workers took part in strikes. Industrial militancy continued in the period 1973 to 1976 and was concentrated in Durban, East London and the East Rand (Lodge, 1983). A feature of the militancy was the relative success that workers enjoyed in surviving repression by both management and the state. In Durban, for example, striking workers refused to identify leaders, making it difficult for the state to repress such leadership. Naked repression was no longer effective. The Standard Bank Review (quoted in Saul and Gelb, 1981, p 107) lamented that "the days are past when employers could bargain with Bantu workers from a position of unchallenged strength". The relative success of the strikes gave the working class "a new sense of its own power and of its ability to challenge capital successfully" (Saul and Gelb, 1981, p 107).

The economic recession; the success of liberation movements in the subcontinent; the emergence of labour militancy; and the development of Black Consciousness, provided the background to the political revolt that rocked the country and made world news out of politics in South Africa. On June 16, 1976, Police fired into a crowd of 15 000 school children who had gathered to protest the use of Afrikaans in their schools. The school children retreated, but regrouped and by the mid-afternoon rioting broke out in several parts of Soweto. The unrest spread dramatically over the next few days to the East Rand, Kasigo (Krugersdorp), Thembisa (Kempton Park) and to a number of universities (Lodge, 1983). By August of the same year, the revolt had assumed national proportions with
violence and protest erupting in Cape Town and many Eastern Cape townships. By the end of the year, virtually all urban communities across the country were affected, with the exception of those in Natal.

Late in 1976, a number of stay-at-homes were launched. The first achieved a 60% stay-away of workers in Johannesburg and the tactic was to be used again and again in the 1980’s (Lodge, 1983). In 1977, the educational system was almost entirely disrupted in Soweto and in many other parts of the country. But, by the end of the year, the intensity of the revolt had subsided, leaving at least 575 dead and 2,389 wounded (Lodge, 1983). But the Soweto revolt had fundamentally transformed the political environment and set the stage for a decade of intense popular opposition. Moreover, it was during the revolt that the ANC again became quite visible in the townships, distributing pamphlets and organizing opposition. After 1976, the ANC stepped up its armed opposition, attacking symbols of oppression and apartheid such as police stations, government buildings and labour control offices. Given the overall mood in the country, these activities won considerable support for the ANC. By the early 1980’s, the Congress tradition was once again in the ascendancy at the expense of Black Consciousness. The break from Black Consciousness was apparent in urban movements that developed in Port Elizabeth, in the Cape school boycotts of 1980, and in the use of the Freedom Charter by members of the Indian community as symbols in opposing the state-supported South African Indian Council in the period 1980-82.

The Rise of the Civics

The early 1980’s were marked by the growth of civic organizations across the country. This development was itself an indication of the re-emergence of the Congress tradition. As had been the case in the 1950’s, the mass mobilization of people in the townships around rents, transport fares, removals and constitutional issues were taken up with vigour again in the 1980’s. Many of these civics became significant

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1 The Congress tradition refers to a non-racial style of political mobilization around the principles of a Freedom Charter adopted by the African National Congress and its allies at Kliptown in 1955.
building blocks of the United Democratic Front (UDF) which was launched in 1983, and which became the formal unifying body for "legal" Congress politics. In Durban and Cape Town, civic organizations were brought together in strong umbrella bodies. The Durban Housing Action Committee (DHAC) came into being in 1980 as a federation of seven civic associations drawn from the Indian and Coloured areas. Its influence soon grew and numerous other civics were either initiated by, or incorporated into DHAC. In 1980 and 1981, DHAC successfully mobilized members of working class areas (such as Phoenix) around rent issues. They also fought a successful battle against attempts to turn metropolitan satellite towns into autonomous entities.

In the African areas around Durban, the Joint Rent Action Committee (JORAC) was formed in 1983 to fight rent increases. Like DHAC, JORAC acted as an umbrella body for six residents' associations. On the transport front in Durban, the Joint Commuter Committee was formed in response to a proposed increase of bus fares of 20% (Smit, 1983). In Cape Town, a number of umbrella civic bodies emerged to co-ordinate civic activities. The Cape Areas Housing Action Committee (CAHAC) was formed in 1980 to fight rent increases in the Coloured areas and has since taken up a wide variety of housing and urban issues. CAHAC is a Congress-oriented civic which became an affiliate of the UDF. Another umbrella body to emerge in the Coloured areas was the Federation of Civics which was founded in 1979 and which has Trotskyite leanings. Also operating in Coloured Areas of Cape Town was the Cape Action League which saw itself as an explicitly socialist movement. In the African areas, the Western Cape Civic Association was formed.

In Port Elizabeth, the residents of Zwide refused to pay rent for eight months. Moreover, the Black Consciousness-oriented Port Elizabeth Black Civic Organization (PEBCO) started to link point of production and community struggles 1. In Soweto the Committee of Ten, which had been formed in the wake of Soweto revolt, formed the Soweto Civic Association. In East London, a "Committee of Ten" emerged to co-ordinate bus boycotts. Within a very short time, civic organization was widespread. In many instances the terrain of civic politics was volatile. In 1983,

1 PEBCO was later to become a UDF-affiliated civic.
for example, between thirty-five and fifty bus boycotters were shot by Ciskeian police whilst they waited at a station for a train and refused to board nearby buses (Swilling, 1984).

The Formation of the United Democratic Front and the Congress of South African Trade Unions

Perhaps the most significant event of early 1980's was the formation, in 1983, of the United Democratic Front to oppose political reforms designed to co-opt Indians and Coloureds. The Nationalist government had introduced the new constitutional proposals in 1982 as a major component of their political reform package. In short, the new constitution involved the creation of a three-chamber parliamentary system - one for Whites, one for Coloureds and one for Indians. Of course, safeguards were built in to ensure the hegemony of Whites. On the 29th of August 1983, the national launch of the UDF was attended by 15 000 people at Mitchell's Plain near Cape Town. More than 500 organizations (youth, civic, women's, students, etc) became affiliates. Among the first campaigns taken up by the UDF were boycott campaigns against Indian and Coloured management committee elections in the Western Cape, and against Black Local Authority elections in 22 African townships. These campaigns were extremely successful with less than 10% of eligible voters going to the polls in both instances. More important though, was the UDF success in organizing a boycott of the 1984 elections for Coloured and Indian parliaments in the tri-cameral system. Only an estimated 20% of Indian and Coloured voters went to the polls (Isizwe, 1986).

In the wake of the Soweto revolt, labour militancy tended to take a back seat to more overtly political protest. However, by 1980, the number of "man days" lost (175 000) through industrial action broke all records (Saul and Gelb, 1981). Moreover, explicit links were being established between political and shop-floor struggles. In 1979, the organization shop-floor struggle at Fatti's and Moni's pasta factory in Cape town was supported by a national consumer boycott of the company's products. Support came from political, youth, student, civic and women's organisations, and ultimately forced the company to settle. In Port Elizabeth, the firing of the Port Elizabeth Black Civic Organization's (PEBCO) president for his political activities, led to a spontaneous
eight week strike at the Ford Motor Company. Throughout this time PESCO provided material support for striking workers. In East London, the South African Allied Workers Union (SAAWU) became centrally involved in the East London bus boycotts of the early 1980's. The interaction between shop-floor organization and community/political organizations was, however, not always unproblematic. The leadership of perhaps the most important trade union federation (the Federation of South African Trade Unions - FOSATU) were reluctant to become involved in community politics and urged their membership to stick to shop-floor issues. They feared that the shop-floor democracy and the autonomy of the working class would be compromised by the "popular" political style of the Congress movement. Because of the size and importance of FOSATU, a bitter struggle developed between so-called "workerists" and Congress supporters (see Friedman, (1987), for a detailed account of this conflict). By 1985, however, the Congress faction had gained ascendancy. This much is evident in FOSATU's decision to join forces with eleven newer unions, identified by their affiliation to the United Democratic Front (Friedman, 1987). Significantly, the name of the new unified movement was the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) (emphasis added).

It was, however, the two-day stay-away in the Transvaal in November 1984 which really marked the beginnings of united action by labour, community, youth and student organizations. Nearly 800 000 workers stayed away with some 400 000 students boycotting classes. This momentum was carried through into 1985 and 1986, which saw the burgeoning of massive political opposition on all fronts. In September of 1984, a protest against rent increases in the Vaal areas resulted in a bloody confrontation between police and residents. Sixty-six people died in the first week (Isizwe, 1986). In March 1985, twenty-two people were massacred by police on their way to a funeral. Consumer, rent and transport boycotts became endemic. Civic organizations developed complex democratic structures at street, area and zone levels (particularly famous were the structures that developed in Port Alfred and Cradock in the Eastern Cape and which spread to other parts of the country). School boycotts virtually paralysed Black education and the slogan "Liberation Before Education" was everywhere in evidence. In 1985, it is estimated that over 35 000 troops occupied 93 townships on a
semi-permanent basis, indicating just how widespread and serious political revolt had become. In July 1985, a partial State of Emergency was declared. This Emergency was lifted in March 1986. However, the momentum of revolt was so well developed that the state was forced to reimpose a National State of Emergency in June 1986. Nearly 12,000 people were detained. The "emergency" notwithstanding, there was a nationwide stay-away on the 10th anniversary of June 16, 1976. Moreover, the Soweto Civic Association called for a rent boycott to protest high rents and to pressurize community councillors to resign. This boycott rapidly spread to 39 townships, and is still in progress.

However, in two years since the declaration of the second State of Emergency, the state has moved ruthlessly to restore control. Hundreds of township organizations have been repressed. Assassination squads and fear of detention by state security forces have driven progressive leadership underground. Early in 1988 the state banned the UDF and confined COSATU's activities to the shop floor. Several individuals have also been banned or their movements restricted. The consensus even within left-wing circles is that the political revolt of the past decade has been stopped in its tracks, temporarily at least. There have been some signs of a resurgence of resistance. Sharpeville Day in 1988 brought tensions in many townships back to the boil and a successful national stayaway was organized, notwithstanding the repression of organizational infrastructure. The relative success of state repression has, however, restored the confidence of "hawkish" elements, both within and to the right of government. In fact, a feature of the politics of 1987 and early 1988 has been the re-emergence of the "far-right" as a significant force in South African politics. The ultra-right wing White party - the Conservative Party - and the fascist Afrikaaner Weerstands Beweging (AWB) have made dramatic gains in White electoral and White popular politics. For the first time in forty years, the Nationalist Party is in real danger of being displaced at the polls. The containment of Black oppositional politics, and the swing in White politics to the right, could, of course, have major implications for progressive planning practices. These implications will be explored later in the chapter. At this stage, however, it is necessary to reflect further on the nature of the political crisis.
Up to this point the political crisis has been presented as a "crisis of political control". It has been implied that the political crisis derives largely from the spontaneous rejection by the oppressed masses of apartheid in a context of economic crisis, the advance of the liberation movement in the sub-continent and the growing political confidence on the part of Blacks. It should be noted that the crisis has not been presented as a "legitimation" crisis of any kind. The South African state has never enjoyed popular legitimacy. Repression, rather than ideological hegemony, has always underpinned the relative stability of the South African state. It is for this reason that the "crisis of control" thesis has proved popular amongst political analysts. Thus, Lodge (1983, p 356) writes as follows:

"But ... it should be evident that a qualitative transformation has taken place in African political life. The complex combination of social forces present in Black resistance have succeeded in igniting a conflagration which no amount of repression or incorporation will succeed in extinguishing."

Whether or not Lodge is correct is a moot point. While it may be a little early to judge, the relative ease with which the state has been able to bring the revolt under control since 1986, suggests that the political crisis of the last decade may never have been, or is perhaps only partially, a crisis of control.

If the political crisis can only be partially understood as one of control, how is it to be understood? Perhaps an answer is to be found in the emergence of the state reform programme during the decade in question. Only brief reference has so far been made to this reform programme. Moreover, the reforms mentioned have been presented as responses to political revolt. When the origins of the reform programme are examined, the possibility is raised that political revolt was itself as much a product of reform, as reform was a product of revolt. This is certainly the view of the far right wing.
"Verkramptes" and "Verligtes"

The earliest political reforms can be traced back to the so-called "verkrampte-verligte" struggles of the late 1960's and early 1970's. The structure of Afrikaanerdem had been largely reshaped by the economic growth of the 1950's and 1960's, and by the "Afrikaaners first" policy of the Nationalist government. Within Afrikaans society a class of urban and rural capitalists developed. Moreover, the White working class had been largely transformed into a petty bourgeoisie of supervisors and bureaucrats. In 1970 only 8% of Afrikaaners were still economically active in agriculture (Lipton, 1986). Eighty-eight per cent were urbanized and the number of Afrikaaners in white-collar jobs stood at 65%, although many were at low levels (Lipton, 1986). Only 27% were still in blue-collar jobs (Lipton, 1986). Afrikaaner ownership of private sector assets rose from 3% in World War Two to 15% in 1975; from 5% to 21% in finance; and from 1% to 30% in mining (Lipton, 1986). The divisions between verligtes and verkramptes were related to these changes. As Lipton (1986, p 308) puts it, verligtes were Afrikaaners who "had made it and no longer needed protection against Blacks, English or foreigners". They were drawn from a wide cross-section of the Afrikaaner elite; leading capitalists, professionals, the intelligentsia, the top echelons of the civil service and so on. The verkramptes, on the other hand, were largely blue-collar workers, rank and file bureaucrats and some professional classes such as teachers, the military and the clergy. They needed, and therefore supported, "Afrikaaner first" policies.

The first overt conflicts between verligtes and verkramptes occurred in the period 1969 to 1972, over the relaxation of petty apartheid. Verligtes began to lobby for changes in social apartheid for a variety of reasons. Lipton (1986, p 311) explains as follows:

"The crucial factor in the relaxation of 'petty' apartheid was international pressure, interacting with a particularly effective internal pressure group, the Afrikaans verligtes. A wide spectrum of the rising Afrikaans elite - sportsmen, academics, journalists, doctors, businessmen, diplomats - found
themselves shunned by their peers abroad. Vorster was more responsive to their need than Verwoerd. He was also persuaded by their argument that social discrimination constituted a barrier in Africa, and that the separate development policy would be more defensible if shorn of 'unnecessary discrimination'."

International pressure and the threat of isolation was to remain a major pressure for reform. However, it was change in the structure of the economy which accounted for the most significant of the very early reforms. In 1973, Vorster announced that Blacks would be allowed to do skilled work in White areas. This reflected not only the growing need for skilled labour in a context of capital-intensification, but also the declining power of White agriculture and labour. This led to the later (in 1979) abolition of Section 77 of the Industrial Conciliation Act (which provided for job reservation). However, while there was a great deal of talk about reform, reforms introduced prior to 1976 were limited. Lipton (1986, p 313) argues that the outburst of anger (to use her terminology), evident in the 1973 strikes and the 1976 Soweto riots, resulted from "the disappointment of expectations fuelled by promises of reform".

The severe economic recession of the period 1973 to 1978, increasingly made it clear to economists and business people that international isolation posed a major threat to economic growth, especially if macro-economic policies of export-industrialization were to be pursued. Moreover, both capital and the verligtes were shaken by the Soweto revolt. Growing unrest and international pressure affected reform ambiguously however. On the one hand, verkramptes argued that the international community kept "moving the goal posts", and that no amount of reform could satisfy. Moreover, they argued for tough repressive measures to deal with revolt. Vorster and the verligtes, on the other hand, used both international pressure and political revolt as justifications for political reform. However, there should be little doubt that, from the beginning, reform was seen in certain sectors as "the problem". In fact, if it were not for the "Muldergate" scandal, 1

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1 The Muldergate Scandal refers to the use of public funds to set up English newspapers sympathetic to the Nationalist party and to the fact that Mulder, a senior cabinet minister, lied to Parliament about these funds.
the verligtes might not have won the struggle for hegemony within the Nationalist Party. When Vorster retired, the verligte's candidate P.W. Botha only narrowly defeated arch-verkrampte, Mulder. Afrikaaner capital had actively supported Botha and this cemented a growing reformist alliance between capital and the Nationalist Party. The scene was set for the major reformist experiments of the late 1970's and early 1980's. The reform package was part of P.W. Botha's "total strategy" designed to counter what the Nationalist government called "total onslaught".

The Reform Programme

The temporary economic revival occasioned by the rapid rise in gold price between 1979 and 1982 provided the material basis for the reform programme during these years. Swilling (1987) has argued that during this period there were four main components of the reform programme:

* changes in urban policy
* the creation of an industrial relations system
* constitutional reform and "rationalization" of all tiers of government
* the expansion and reorganisation of the security apparatus.

Changes in urban policy obviously have direct relevance for urban and regional planning, while the other components have all had indirect implications. The various elements of reform also gave rise to substantial political protest and unrest.

The first major indication of change in urban policy came with publication of the Riekert Commission Report in 1979. The Riekert proposals will be elaborated in the chapter that follows. Suffice it to say that they addressed the question of the permanence of urban Blacks and marked a major departure from the urban policy of the past. Riekert proposed that a strong distinction be made between "urban insiders" and "rural outsiders". The quality of life of the urban insiders was to be dramatically improved through state welfare provisions and through
preferential treatment in the labour market. Influx controls were to be tightened and made even more severe to keep outsiders out.

These proposals invoked substantial protest, particularly from the increasingly powerful trade unions, who had mobilized many migrant workers. For a variety of reasons, the Riekert proposals were never implemented, but they did provide the basis for the much more sweeping urban policy changes of 1985 and 1986.

The Riekert proposals can be interpreted as a response to the urban revolt in the period immediately following Soweto. Organized capital put substantial pressure on the state to address the question of creating a contented and stable urban labour force, and it should be noted that capital initially supported the Riekert proposals (Hindson, 1987b). However, the proposals themselves became highly politicized and a nexus of oppositional organization.

The Wiehahn Commission report was also published in 1979 and proposed major changes in the industrial relations system. The Wiehahn reforms were, without question, among the most concrete and significant reforms of the entire reformist period. They resulted in the formal recognition and institutionalization of Black trade unions. While formal recognition was a concession to labour, it was hoped that by registering trade unions and formalizing communication, greater control over the unions could be achieved (Friedman, 1987). However, the recognition of trade unions has turned out to be a two-edged sword. Many trade unions made use of the space registration provided to build powerful shop-floor organization (Friedman, 1983). These increasingly well-organized unions became increasingly militant through the 1980’s, much to the alarm of both verligtes and verkramptes. In fact, the militancy of trade union organization is often cited by verkramptes as being indicative of the folly of negotiation and reform (Schaarfsma, 1987).

As far as precipitating political revolt is concerned, however, the new constitutional proposals of 1983 are perhaps the most significant of the reforms. These constitutional reforms were briefly referred to earlier in the chapter to explain the emergence of the major "legal" Black political movement of the 1980’s - the UDF. The constitutional
proposals were a reformist effort to show the world that the Botha government was serious about moving away from apartheid. They were also an attempt to selectively co-opt Indians and Coloureds (Smit, 1983). Whites, Indians and Coloureds were to be linked in common first-tier decision-making on "general affairs" of common interest, but would control their "own affairs" separately. This first tier government could potentially be linked to the bantustans in some sort of overarching confederal structure.

The remaining issue as far as constitutional engineering was concerned, was the question of urban Blacks within so-called White South Africa. There was conjecture about "city- states" in government circles in the early 1980's and again in 1987. A tentative step in the direction of incorporating urban Blacks politically was the attempt to create fully-fledged and autonomous Black Local Authorities (BLAs) in 1983. The proposed imposition of BLAs produced massive protest and unrest. BLAs were rejected by Black mass organizations as political crumbs on an already bare constitutional table. They were also seen as an attempt by the state to withdraw from provision of collective consumption goods, leaving this responsibility in the hands of impoverished local authorities. Those who chose to serve on the BLAs were branded as collaborators (Lodge, 1983). They were socially isolated and often physically attacked. Many were forced to flee and numerous BLAs collapsed or existed in name only. BLAs became the major targets of the mass movements "ungovernability" programme.

In order to bolster collapsing BLAs, the state began to give them greater financial resources and introduced the concept of redistributive metropolitan bodies - the Regional Services Councils (RSCs) (Todes, Watson and Wilkinson, 1986). Government now openly admitted that the townships could not be financially self-sustaining. RSCs were to provide "hard-services" on a metropolitan basis, and in their early form there can be no question that they were meant to circumvent the problems posed for BLAs as a consequence of non-existent tax bases. Political resistance to the particular form of RSCs has, however, delayed the implementation of the programme and the promulgation of a state of emergency was necessary to get the first RSCs put in place in the Bloemfontein, Witwatersrand and Cape Town metropolitan areas.
In the period since the enactment of the second State of Emergency, it is noteworthy that constitutional reform has been put on the backburner. Whether this was part of the strategy to bring Black popular revolt under control, or whether it was a response to growing opposition from the right, is debatable. Instructive is the fact that constitutional reform seems to have come unstuck on the question of "group areas" - a sacred cow of the right. Moreover, it was in the lead up to the general election of 1987, that Nationalist Party rhetoric shifted to the right. This was obviously an attempt to regain the ground it was losing. History has made governments in South Africa fear the right. The very substantial gains made by the Conservative Party, both in the elections and subsequent by-elections, have made the Nationalist Party very nervous about reform.

Since 1986, government's approach to those reforms that it is pushing forward, has also changed. To begin with it is increasingly clear that a conscious decision has been made to impose reform "top-down". This implies that prior to 1986, the government actually provided "space" for popular Black organizations, in the hope that they could ultimately be drawn into negotiation on the question of reform. This approach now seems to have been abandoned. It should be noted, however, that since 1986 a new division within the Nationalist Party has developed. Whereas the division of the 1970's was between verligtes and verkramptes, the new division is a division within the verligtes, between the so-called "hawks" and "doves" (Swilling, 1987; Sarakinsky, 1988). The doves cohere around Minister Chris Heunis and the Department of Constitutional Development and Planning. The other institution which is clearly in the dove's camp is the dynamic and growing Development Bank of South Africa. The hawks, on the other hand, cohere around the State Security Council, which many people now regard to be more powerful than parliament (see for example Lipton, 1986).

When P.W. Botha came to power in 1978, he immediately involved senior military and police personnel more actively in government, precisely because he needed dependable supporters in his struggle to assert his authority over the Nationalist Party and the state. He achieved this through the creation of the National Security Management System (NSMS)
(Lipton, 1986). Those active at various levels of the NSMS have become increasingly influential in recent years. While the positions of the doves and the hawks should not be seen as in direct opposition, the doves favour a "bottom-up" approach. As has already been implied, it appears that since 1986, the "hawks" have gained the upper hand (Swilling, 1987). The hawks stress the importance of improving the material living conditions of Blacks in the townships, whereas the doves, whilst not opposing township upgrading, stress the need for political reforms to accompany the material reforms. The hawks, on the other hand, argue that political reform cannot proceed effectively until township conditions have been improved. Once this is achieved, and the government is seen to be "good", a willingness to participate in political reform will follow. In the meantime, order must be maintained (by repression) and upgrading imposed from above (Swilling, 1987). This "hearts and minds" strategy is not opposed by the doves, but they argue that community participation in and control of "development" issues can be turned into political accommodation as well. They argue also that the mere improvement of the material circumstances of township people will not be sufficient to entice the popular masses to participate in structures imposed from above (Swilling, 1987).

The major weakness of the "hearts and minds" strategy of the hawks, is the limits that economic crisis imposes on the programme. Unless vigorous economic growth is restored, the material base necessary to finance the strategy effectively will simply not be available. This possibly explains why the state has switched its focus from political to growth-promoting economic reform in the period since 1986. In any event the constraints imposed by a limited economic cake probably mean that in the short-run at least, the upgrading of Black townships will be confined to rhetoric and a few model projects. In the meantime, there has been some movement on the constitutional front. Much of this activity focuses around the much-vaunted National Council. This constitutional initiative is designed to give Blacks some say at first tier government level. The government has, however, been unable to get credible Black leaders to participate in negotiations. This includes so-called moderates like Buthelezi, who fear that they will be regarded as stooges if they participate.
There is speculation that the fact that government has pushed through with Black Local Authority elections in October 1988 along with Local Authority Elections for all other groups, is partially explained by its desire to find elected leaders (no matter how small the polls) with whom they can negotiate. Certainly the Nationalist Party is under immense pressure from both the right and the left to demonstrate that the reform programme is going somewhere. The future of the reform programme is therefore, very uncertain.

How then is the political crisis of the 1970’s and 1980’s to be understood? Two hypotheses have been presented in this chapter. The first is that the political crisis is a crisis of control and was generated from below. The growth of Black Consciousness, the frustration of the aspirations of a growing Black petty bourgeoisie, events in the sub-continent, a spontaneous labour militancy were all advanced as reasons for the emergence of this crisis. Political revolt, it was also argued, was later sharpened by economic recession and opposition to political reforms. If this analysis is correct, the potential for further revolt can be at least partially assessed by evaluating the extent to which the contributory factors have changed. A change which will make revolt less likely is the removal of many apartheid barriers to the upward mobility of the Black petty bourgeoisie. Slow economic growth does, however, remain an important brake on this process.

Events in the subcontinent are exceptionally fluid and likely to produce contradictory effects on the political confidence of the Black masses. On the one hand, P.W. Botha has just completed a series of apparently successful trips to a variety of African countries, including Mozambique. Botha’s ability to make these trips in a context of international and African hospitality, will perhaps be interpreted as indicative of South Africa’s military and economic power. On the other hand, South Africa’s recent withdrawal from Angola and its willingness to negotiate the future of South West Africa has raised doubts about the Botha regime’s overall military hegemony in the sub-continent. The effect of developments in Angola and South West Africa may have very important effects on popular consciousness, especially in the light of the overall pall of depression that descended after the 1986 internal clampdown.
The second hypothesis presented to explain political crisis in South Africa holds that the crisis is not exclusively one of control arising from spontaneous revolt. Instead, revolt itself is seen as a partial response to attempts by the ruling bloc to institute certain reforms. On the one hand, revolt is precipitated by a disappointment of rising expectations. On the other, it arises out of opposition to the particular form that reforms take, which, because of the contradictory structure of the political economy, must always fall short of what the oppressed masses demand. Moreover, again because of the contradictory structure of the political economy, real reforms may also provide space for the oppressed masses to more vigorously pursue change, which, in turn, enhances the climate for revolt. In this view, the need for reform in the first place arises primarily in response to international pressures, fear of cultural and economic isolation, and the need to make structural change in the economy. Particularly important in this regard is the integration of South Africa into an increasingly "globalized" economy. David Carte captures the essence of the rationale as follows:

"As South Africa becomes ever more isolated by sanctions and disinvestment, the rest of the world is drawing closer economically. Thanks to computers, telecommunications, satellites and jet aircraft, plus some thawing of the cold war, the global village has truly come of age...

It remains true that if we are to avoid becoming a Third World wasteland, we have to remain part of the world economy. Although our metals and minerals are still getting through, further disengagement precludes the most obvious economic strategy for us - adding more value by bonification of the raw materials we depend on.

Gaining readmission to the world economy will take time, patience, stability, less upheaval - but most of all, accelerated political reform" (Sunday Times, Business Times, April, 1988).

Steven Gelb (1987) is, perhaps, the first theorist to cast this rather loose line of analysis into a coherent theoretical framework. In explaining reform he stresses the need for the creation of a new social, institutional and political environment for accumulation. He casts his theorization within the framework of a so-called "regulation" approach, referred to in an earlier chapter and which was pioneered by Aglietta.
and developed primarily by de Vroey (1984) and Leipitz (1985). Gelb (1987, p 35) explains the basis of the approach as follows:

"The underlying perspective is that capitalist social relations ("class struggles") exist not abstractly, but within a variety of structures and institutional forms (economic, social and political) which shape the way in which these relations develop over time. Furthermore, these relations are 'historically specific and contingent': an economic crisis expresses contradictions within (and between) these various forms of existence of capitalist relations. Such contradictions can be resolved by transforming the specific structures and relations, without changing the fundamental capitalist nature of the social relations themselves. An economic crisis is, thus, seen more appropriately as a turning point in the form of capitalism rather than as a terminal disease."

Key concepts are "the regime of accumulation" and the "mode of regulation" or the American term "social structure of accumulation (SSA)". The regime of accumulation refers to the way in which changes in the conditions of production (changes in technology, the labour process etc) are related to changes in the conditions of realization (consumption patterns, aggregate demand etc). The mode of regulation on the other hand (or SSA), refers to the ensemble of social, political and economic institutions which canalize and regulate the conflict between class and other groups which together affect the path of accumulation (Gelb, 1987). When the two concepts are placed in an historical framework, a distinction is made between long-run boom and cyclical fluctuations in accumulation. In a long-run boom, a dynamic equilibrium is achieved within the regime of accumulation. Cyclical booms and busts are functional and reproductive of the regime of accumulation. In a short-run downturn, economic agents respond predictably (as specified by the existing SSA) and the conditions for accumulation are quickly restored. However, in long-run decline (or what regulation theorists call economic crisis), cyclical downturns no longer restore the conditions for further accumulation i.e. are non-reproductive. When business cycles are no longer reproductive disequilibrium is said to exist within the regime of accumulation. There can be many reasons for the shift from reproductive to non-reproductive cycles. However, regulation theorists argue that contradictions within the regime of accumulation put pressure on the institutions of the SSA. At some point some institutions are no longer able to manage the magnitude of the
conflicts they are meant to regulate. The process becomes cumulative and pressures develop for the establishment of a new SSA.

Regulation theory allows for precise definition of economic crisis - the point where business downturns are no longer reproductive. Gelb (1987) argues, therefore, that in South Africa the lower turning point of the first non-reproductive cycle occurs in 1977. Particularly important to the debate outlined in this chapter, Gelb, (1987) notes that this is also the time that marked efforts are made to restructure the SSA - the reform period. The political activity that this attempt to restructure the SSA precipitates is what is often interpreted as "political" crisis. Ultimately, however, the crisis for Gelb (1987) is at root a crisis of accumulation. Gelb's (1987) economic reasons for the development of this accumulation crisis have already been discussed in the previous chapter. He does not, however, explain why the particular form of the accumulation crisis places pressure on the existing SSA. He points only to the rise of Black wages after the strikes of 1973. This, he argues, reflected the growing inability of the structures "through which 'racial Fordism' incorporated African workers into the wage relation, to continue to perform their regulating function" (Gelb, 1987, p 45). This, in turn, provided the impetus for changes in industrial relations. The importance of the approach, however, lies in the way in which attention is drawn to crisis in the accumulation process and the consequent need to restructure socio-political institutions as the basis of the political crisis. Moreover, if we accept Gelb's analysis, then it follows that amongst other things, the construction of a new SSA is still necessary, if the accumulation crisis is to be resolved. Precisely in which direction (or whether) the SSA will be restructured will, however, be determined in the cauldron that is South African politics in the 1980's.

THE COLLAPSE OF THE WHITE POPULIST ALLIANCE

Whether the political crisis is understood as one of controlling an increasingly militant Black populace, or whether it is seen in terms of how to introduce reform without precipitating insurrection, there can be little question that the power bloc is under extreme pressure. The alliance based on ethnicity which was struck in 1924, is in the process of fragmenting. It appears that three distinct groupings within the
power bloc are becoming evident. The first is the grouping to the far right which has grown substantially since 1986. It is comprised mainly of Afrikaaners drawn from the White working classes, the lower echelons of the bureaucracies including the police and military, the teaching profession and agriculturalists in the far North (in essence the verkrampte grouping referred to earlier). The political expression of this grouping is the Conservative Party, and is calling for a return to a heavy-handed version of Verwoerdian apartheid. According to a prominent member of the Conservative Party in Natal, Duncan Du Bois (1988), this grouping is prepared to accept international isolation as an acceptable price to pay for "self-determination". While the notion of a "siege-economy" is considered acceptable, Du Bois (1988) argues that a return to Verwoerdian apartheid need not mean continued economic isolation. The restoration of "law-and-order", he argues, could bring a return to the halcyon days of economic prosperity of the 1960's. Moreover, South Africa could use its military might to ensure markets in Africa.

The second major power bloc grouping, and the grouping that is currently hegemonic, is dominated by Afrikaaners led by P.W. Botha, but also includes an increasingly large element of English-speaking Whites, substantial segments of the Coloured and Indian populations, and a small segment of the African population. The Afrikaaner grouping is not entirely coincident with the "verligte" groupings referred to earlier or with the Nationalist Party, although it includes the vast majority of both groups. It is cohered mainly by elements close to the National Security Management System (the "Hawks"). The low polls in the 1984 tri-cameral election notwithstanding, recent surveys suggest that there is substantial support for P.W. Botha in the Indian and Coloured communities, particularly from the petty bourgeoisie and the working classes (The Johannesburg Star, 1988). The grouping also has support from bantustan leaders and their entourage, most notably elements of the civil service and military.

The particular visions of the future that the organic intellectuals of this grouping have are not at all clear. As Glaser (1987, p 383) puts it, South Africa's leaders have been left looking "increasingly directionless". However, apart from some concessions to the right, there is little to suggest that this grouping will depart substantially
from the path it began to tread in 1979. This path involved moving towards a society in which there is "multi-racial" participation in government at all levels, but a form of participation based on concepts of "power sharing" and "group representation" (Glaser, 1987). The purpose of such a strategy is to cement alliances with conservative elements within the Black Community, many of which have already been created by apartheid (e.g. bantustan leaders), and to create additional conservative elements. Thus, Frost (1987) argues that the state's insistence on pushing through with BLA elections in 1988 is based on precisely this sort of rationale. As Frost (1987) points out, bantustan governments do not, for the most part, enjoy popular legitimacy. But they do govern and they do have some popular support (particularly from those who are part of patronage networks). Frost (1987) argues that BLAs are designed to achieve the same effect. In any event, by building alliances with Indian, Coloured and African conservatives, the Botha government hopes to build a bulwark against what it calls "Black radicalism". Moreover, by giving government a multi-racial complexion at the level of surface appearances, it is hoped that the world will be duped into believing that apartheid is dead, or that it will at least be easier for significant western powers to justify continued dealings with South Africa.

While the Botha government has abandoned the "blue-print" politics of its predecessors, it is quite likely that their vision for the short- and medium-term is something akin to the following. With the BLA elections out of the way and with a network of such authorities in place countrywide, the authorities will move quickly to set negotiations in motion over first tier power-sharing with Africans. It is quite likely that an Urban Council will be established, through which urban Blacks living in White South Africa will exercise political rights at first tier level. Representatives on such a body would be elected through some mechanism of aggregation linked to the BLAs. The Urban Council would then enter into "multi-lateral" relationships with the tri-cameral parliament and the bantustan governments. Such multi-lateral relationships would involve political and economic co-operation on a consensus basis across jurisdictional boundaries. But ethnically defined groups would still maintain the right to "self-determination". A multi-lateral council (and there already is one in place to co-ordinate
relationships between South Africa and some of the bantustans) or some other body constituted to bring "power-sharers" together, could then elect a Black chairperson (President?) to show to the world. It is quite likely that the Botha government would like to see the Chief Minister of KwaZulu, Buthelezi, in a figurehead role. As a Black leader of some credibility he is known to have the backing of conservative Western governments.

The third power bloc grouping is relatively small in numerical terms, but strong in economic terms. It is comprised of significant elements of big business, a significant portion of the English-speaking White electorate, and an increasing proportion of disaffected White Afrikaaners, including a significant grouping on the left-wing of the Nationalist Party (the so-called "New Nats"). In recent years, relationships between organized capital and the Botha government have become increasingly strained. Glaser (1987, pp 390-391) sums up developments in this regard:

"After big business enthusiastically backed the Botha regime in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and as late as November 1983 supported the tri-cameral constitution, the business-state honeymoon came unstuck. The agent was the hammer blows of township rebellion and its economic consequences: the declining rand, the debt standstill, disinvestment and low investor confidence. Sections of organized business began to breach what has suggestively been called the Carlton Contract - the 1979 agreement by business to leave constitutional restructuring in Pretoria's hands. After 1985, the Association of Chambers of Commerce and the Federated Chamber of Industries began to spell out their own constitutional proposals, and prominent businessmen visited the ANC in Lusaka."

Glaser (1987, p 391) goes on to argue that:

"The possibility of a much more serious capitalist defection from the status quo, and its embracing of the ANC for instance, cannot be ruled out absolutely. But right now the politics of organized capital, though fluid and breaking fresh ground, remains cautious."

The defining characteristic of this third element of the power bloc is that it is tentatively exploring relationships with extra-parliamentary
groups and the ANC. Implicit in these explorations is an acceptance that no lasting or meaningful resolution to political crisis can be achieved without the participation of these organizations. Certainly this is the view of important elements within the Nationalist Party itself. Reference has already been made to the fact that significant actors in the Department of Constitutional Planning and Development favour negotiation and contact with extra-parliamentary forces. What is being suggested is that the "doves" referred to earlier in the chapter fall into the third element of the power bloc. Moreover, it appears that the very powerful Anglo-American group are nudging their business compatriots in this direction. This much is evident from Clem Sunter's (1987) widely-acclaimed book on the future of South Africa - written with the aid of a high-powered Anglo-American think-tank. Sunter argues that a "high-road" solution to crisis in South Africa would require inter-alia the unbanning of all extra-parliamentary groupings and the negotiation of a political settlement. However, as Glaser (1987) has noted, this grouping within the power bloc has not, as yet, been fully cohered and there are many directions it can take. The relationship of the grouping to actors such as Worrall and Buthelezi is also fluid and at this stage unpredictable. In any event, it is apparent that the political stage is delicately balanced and that we are entering a particularly critical phase of South Africa's history. The battle for the third element of the power bloc could be absolutely decisive.

The significance of the emergence of divisions in the power bloc for progressive urban and regional planning practices will be elaborated in Chapter Twelve. The four chapters that follow, however, explore the way in which political crisis and associated state responses have affected urban and regional planning in the 1950-1975 period. In Chapter Eight the focus falls on the relation between politics and changes in state urbanization policy.

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1 Dennis Worrall was a senior member of the Nationalist Party who defected in protest against the slow pace of reform. He too is believed to have substantial backing from western bloc governments.
CHAPTER EIGHT: THE POLITICS OF URBANIZATION AND REGIONAL POLICY IN SOUTH AFRICA: 1975 TO 1988

INTRODUCTION

In Chapter Six the economic underpinnings of changes in state urbanization and regional policy were examined. It was noted that the introduction of a positive urbanization strategy was one of the most significant policy shifts since the early 1900's. Moreover, it was suggested that the positive urbanization policy was closely linked to the macro-economic growth strategy of inward-industrialization. In this chapter, the political basis of changing urbanization policy is examined and it is argued that political considerations may have been even more important than economic strategy in accounting for the reversal of anti-urban policy. Of course, the adoption of a positive urbanization strategy has major implications for regional policy which had previously been designed to keep Blacks out of the cities and to provide an economic base for the creation of autonomous bantustans. Some authors (Cobbett et al, 1985, 1987) have suggested that the combination of new urbanization policy and particular shifts in regional policy suggest that the state is abandoning the notion of independent bantustans and is considering their re-incorporation into a unified South Africa. An examination of this hypothesis is the focus of the discussion on the politics of regional policy in this chapter. A related issue which is given some attention is the way in which politics affects and is likely to affect decentralization and deconcentration policy. In Chapter Six it was suggested that economic crisis may necessitate the abandonment of decentralization policy and also account for a shift to deconcentration policy. In this chapter, the political constraints on drastic changes in regional policy are examined.

RIEKERT, POSITIVE URBANIZATION AND DECONCENTRATION

One of the consequences of the crisis of accumulation since the early 1970's has been the further collapse of the Bantustan economies and the consequent flood of people to the cities - influx control notwithstanding. Moreover, the adoption of capital-intensive methods of production in White agricultural areas has resulted in the laying off of
many agricultural workers and to a decline in the demand for labour in the rural areas (Lipton, 1986). Furthermore, given high rates of population growth, and the halting of the house building programme for Blacks in the metropolitan areas in the late 1960’s, the inevitable result has been dramatic overcrowding in existing townships and the burgeoning of informal and squatter settlements. In Durban, for example, the number of people in informal settlements grew from 5 000 after the Cato Manor removals in 1960, to nearly 1 750 000 in 1985 (Haarhoff, 1987). Shack settlements were accommodating not only new arrivals from the rural areas, but also overspill from the cities.

The rapid growth of the urban Black population caused some alarm within the ruling bloc, especially given the recession after 1973 and the growing levels of unemployment. This concern was, of course, exacerbated by the growing political revolt of the mid- and late-1970’s. The Soweto revolt in particular, had shaken verligte elements within government. The first response to growing informal settlements was to attempt to bulldoze them. The attempts to remove squatters in the Crossroads and Modderdam areas became world news, and provoked resistance. Under pressure from both capital and the townships, government responded with the Riekert proposals in 1979. As noted in the previous chapter the Riekert proposals were a very tentative and ill-founded response to the need to contain and control rapid Black settlement on the one hand, and the need to make concessions to an increasingly militant township population on the other. One of the burning issues for Blacks was the question of stability and permanence in the urban areas. As noted in Chapter Seven, Riekert attempted to respond to these contradictory demands by attempting to divide the working classes into two groups - a permanently settled and materially well off group in the cities, and the rest, confined to the homelands. Substantial advantages in the labour market were to be granted to urban insiders, who would be free to move between urban areas. Moreover, stricter influx controls were to be introduced to keep outsiders out (see Hindson, 1987a and 1987b for a more detailed discussion of the proposals).

The Riekert proposals were, however, never implemented, for a variety of reasons. To begin with, they provoked a hostile reaction from both the
left and the right. Particularly important in cohering opposition from the left were the trade unions, who had set out deliberately to organize migrants, township workers and commuters into single organizations (Hindson, 1987b). Moreover, through point of production struggles, these unions reduced the wage differential between migrants and settled township-workers thereby eroding the basis for the division (there was no longer much point in reserving unskilled work for migrants). Since the corollary of permanence for insiders was stricter control over influx, squatter settlement removals were part and parcel of such stricter controls. However, bitterness and struggles over removals became commonplace. By the early 1980's, many communities had won the right to stay. Hindson (1987b p 87) comments on the struggles of the squatters as follows:

"... more than any other single factor it is their (the squatters) struggles that have finally forced the state to concede the failure of insider/outsider strategy, the impossibility of total territorial apartheid, and the inevitability of African urbanization outside of Bantustans."

More generalized township revolt also led to the abandonment of the Riekert strategy. One of Riekert's proposals was that urban insiders, whilst being afforded advantages in the labour market, would have to take greater responsibility for their own reproduction. State subsidies to housing, transport and other collective consumption goods were to be gradually removed. The purpose here was to make regular income essential to counter what Riekert called the "work choosiness" of insiders. It was also a response to growing pressures on the fiscus. In any event, attempts to implement this aspect of the proposal were disastrous:

"The township revolt of 1984 dealt a fatal blow to the Riekert strategy. In the face of deepening economic recession and an escalating crisis of township finances, the state moved to implement the policy of fiscal self-sufficiency and local government autonomy. A population already struck by falling real wages and rising unemployment now faced increased rents, service charges and transport fares. In response, township after township turned from resistance to revolt ..." (Hindson, 1987b, p 87).
Opposition from the right came mainly from bureaucrats in administration boards, who dragged their heels in granting rights of permanent settlement. Capital, too, opposed the proposals, having initially supported them.

Whilst the Riekert proposals were never fully implemented, there can be no doubt they provided the forerunner to the more substantial positive urbanization strategy. Hindson (1987b, p 88) argues that the new positive urbanization policy is a decisive break with territorial apartheid.

"An undeniable implication of the PC 1 report is the abandonment of the territorial and constitutional aims of apartheid as originally set out in the Sauer Report."

The basic principles of the positive urbanization have already been outlined in a previous chapter. The relation of these proposals to macro-economic responses to economic crisis, and their role in restructuring of labour markets, have also already been discussed. While these economic interpretations are a critical part of any explanation of the new proposals, a lion's share of the explanation must also be located in the political struggles which have been described here, and which led to the abandonment of the Riekert proposals. It is certainly tempting to interpret the positive urbanization strategy as a victory for the popular classes, and there can be little doubt that people's struggles have contributed substantially to the form of the strategy and have hastened the dropping of influx controls.

While the positive urbanization strategy must be seen as perhaps the most significant reform since the Wiehahn recognition of trade unions, to characterize it as an "abandonment of the traditional aims of territorial apartheid" as Hindson (1987b, p 87) and Cobbett et al (1987) do, is to project perhaps too optimistic a view. It is a view which arises out of an overly economistic understanding of the move from segregation to territorial apartheid in the first place. As will be

1 PC refers to the President's Council Report of 1985 which spells out the theoretical basis of the positive urbanization strategy.
recalled from the discussion of apartheid spatial engineering in the 1950's, Hindson (1987a) argues that influx controls were primarily designed to segment urban from agricultural and mining labour markets. While this line of analysis is useful, it overemphasizes the role of apartheid in accumulation and underemphasizes the role it has played in political reproduction and control. The period prior to the imposition of territorial apartheid (the late 1940's) had a number of things in common with the period prior to the acceptance of positive urbanization policy. One of the striking similarities is the fact that in both periods, urban influx accelerated dramatically. Moreover, in both instances, this influx was treated with some alarm by the ruling bloc (Lipton, 1986). Fear and security became central issues, which were fully exploited by the Nationalist Party in its election campaign in 1948. Likewise, fear and security have become major issues for the White electorate in the 1980's, and largely account for the swing to the right (which, of course, is also what happened in the late 1940's).

In a very real sense, the anti-urban politics of the 1950's reflected a fear amongst Whites of an unemployed and anarchic mob located close by. The particular form of positive urbanization policy similarly reflects and anticipates such fear. Moreover, the importance of political control cannot be underestimated, particularly given the climate of revolt which preceded the introduction of positive urbanization. As indicated above, the key to understanding this lies in the particular form of the positive urbanization strategy proposed. More specifically, the strategy's emphasis on deconcentration and the associated establishment of self-sufficient satellite towns around the metropolitan areas, are key. Hindson (1987b, p 101) explains such an emphasis on deconcentration in terms of an attempt to establish a more "highly skilled and better paid work-force in the core metropolitan areas and low wage (including reduced social wage) labour markets in the deconcentrated areas on the metropolitan peripheries".

Certainly, since the late 1960's, government has quite explicitly indicated an intention to create differentiated labour markets. It should be noted too, that this line of argument has also been used to justify decentralization policy (see McCarthy and Smit, 1988). Government argued that decentralization was "economically" logical, because it
prevented overconcentration in the metropolitan areas at the same time as not inhibiting appropriate metropolitan growth. Agglomeration economies, it was argued, were particularly important in higher-skill economic activities (Haffert, 1977). Low-skill, low-wage activities could be successfully decentralized, thereby leaving a less congested environment for higher order economic production (Haffert, 1977). Such decentralization was also supposed to contribute to better utilization of resources and to greater equity in the spatial distribution of development (McCarthy and Smit, 1988). Few analyses, however, regarded these arguments as anything other than ex post facto rationalizations of policy designed to promote the economic independence of bantustans for political reasons. While labour market considerations are no doubt part and parcel of government strategy, care should be taken in accepting government rhetoric at face value.

There is every likelihood that labour market and overconcentration arguments are ex post facto rationalizations of policy designed primarily to deal with the same contradiction that Riekert faced - how to contain and control influx on the one hand, and at the same time, satisfy the increasingly militant popular masses demands for urban permanence. Deconcentrated metropolitan growth is a relatively ingenious way of achieving this. For, if efficiency and cheap wages were really at the root of the policies, then alternative spatial models for managing metropolitan growth would have been more appropriate. Dewar (1985) and Dewar and Watson (1986) have demonstrated how inefficient deconcentrated metropolitan growth is. Of even greater significance in this regard though, Foster (1987) has shown how wage differentials between a typical deconcentrated metropolitan settlement, Hammarsdale, and the metropolitan core, Durban-Pinetown, were eliminated over a short time period, as unions moved in and as Hammarsdale was drawn into the metropolitan labour market. This tendency for satellite settlements to be drawn into metropolitan labour markets is noted by Hindson (1987b) and he criticizes Riekert for not understanding this. Yet, in the same breath he goes on to argue that differentiated labour markets are the basis of deconcentration policy.

If deconcentration is inefficient and if segmented labour markets are unlikely to last, and if accumulation is the issue, then a concentrated
city model is likely to be a more effective spatial unit for pursuing accumulation. However, accumulation is not the primary issue. This is why government is likely to disregard efficiency and accumulation critiques of positive urbanization policy and deconcentration (see Wellings and Black, 1987). The central issue appears to be security and control, and the spatial management of rapid urban growth without having to resort to pass controls. Moreover, there is not much evidence to suggest that government no longer sees bantustans as an important part of its political vision. This much is evident in the recent (December 1987) incorporation of Botshabelo into Qua Qua. Wherever possible, government is likely to establish satellite cities behind bantustan boundaries.

Given that most Whites, Indians and Coloureds are already urbanized, new satellite towns are likely to be almost exclusively African. They are also likely to be very low-income locales which are unlikely to attract much of a rate base for collective consumption provision. Regional Service Councils (RSCs) may transfer some income to the satellites, but most are likely to be impoverished shack settlements. It is also fairly likely that warlords, right wing vigilantes and "kitskonstabels" will be used to maintain order. In the metropolitan core areas, the spirit of Riekert will be kept alive by greater spending on collective consumption goods not so much to differentiate labour markets, but because middle-class Whites, Indians and Coloureds do not have much of a taste for shack settlements. Thus, the City of Durban, whilst committing itself in rhetoric to assisting and developing shack areas, has been "unable" to find land for shack settlements within its own jurisdiction and has continued (through 1987 and 1988) to remove squatters.

It should be noted that the criticisms levelled at Hindson (1987b) can also be directed at similarly economistic attempts to explain positive urbanization in a previous chapter. For example, whilst positive urbanization clearly does bear a relation to a Lombardian vision of inward-industrialization, the deconcentrated satellite city form of the policy is hardly compatible with it. Inward-industrialization would be

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1 "Kitskonstabels" are Black para-policemen hastily recruited and trained to restore "order" in Black townships.
far better served by a compact city model. Thus, while the acceptance of urbanization itself may support inward-industrialization, the particular mechanisms that the state is adopting to manage such growth are not. The specificity of the new urbanization policy then, can ultimately be best explained with reference to the control of influx, given the increasing failure of the mechanisms traditionally used.

The argument that the form of the positive urbanization strategy is ultimately about keeping low-income Blacks out of the cities must, however, also be able to account for the fact that in many cities government is making tracts of land close to the core available for Black settlement. For example, the Department of Constitutional Planning and Development has recently produced a blueprint for the orderly urbanization of the greater Mariannhill area (near Pinetown-Durban). Here an extra 1045 ha for Blacks has been proposed over and above the 510 ha already in Black occupation (Daily News, Tuesday, April 5, 1988, p 7). The proposals are significant insofar as they involve the deproclamation of 360 ha previously earmarked for Indian settlement, and some 430 ha previously allocated to Coloureds. In parts of the PWV (16,000 ha), the East Rand, East London and Port Elizabeth, there is also evidence of land being identified for Black settlement quite close to the core areas of the cities. The provision of land in the core areas is, however, not necessarily inconsistent with a policy that attempts to manage influx and keep the bulk of Black settlement out of the metropolitan core areas. There is a fairly substantial pent-up demand for land and housing on the part of a growing Black petty bourgeoisie. Moreover, in various urban struggles, local communities have demanded the provision of land for township expansion both for themselves and their children.

This is certainly the case in two Natal instances - St Wendolin's and Lamontville. St Wendolin's is a community some 14km from Pinetown which came under threat of forced removal in 1966, since it was in the path of an Indian expansion zone. The Indian area of Savannah Park was to be extended across the area then occupied by some 21,000 African people (Platsky and Walker, 1985). Early in 1979 the residents of St Wendolin's received eviction notices. These were ignored and a protracted battle with the state ensued. In 1984 St Wendolin's won the battle. This decision immediately opened up problems for the state,
since the largely unsettled areas - Savannah park 2 and 3 - immediately to the east of the township had also been designated for Indian housing development. Having won the battle to keep the land they already occupied, the St Wendolin's community then began to make demands for land for expansion. They called for land not only to meet pent-up demand, but also to accommodate future generations. It appears that such land has been won in the struggle. In the community of Lamontville, a very active resident's association has also made repeated demands for the development of proximate "buffer zone" land, and similarly has pressed for the provision of land to meet pent-up demands. Limited amounts of land have been made available in these areas. It appears, therefore, that the provision of land for Black settlement near the core areas is, at least in part, related to demands from existing township residents for expansion space.

In summary, it appears that state urbanization policy as it is currently evolving can be understood as follows. Firstly, it seems that the intention is to accommodate both influx and overspill from the cities in satellite towns behind bantustan boundaries wherever possible. Secondly, in order to accommodate the aspirations of the settled petty bourgeoisie within the existing core area townships, expansion of land for Black settlement can be expected in the core areas. Such an expansion of land supply is, however, likely to be limited. In the final analysis, however, the positive urbanization strategy is designed to deal with the contradiction between the need to control influx on the one hand and the failure of traditional mechanisms in achieving this. More specifically, it is designed to eliminate one of the most odious components of traditional territorial apartheid - pass controls. Such elimination was necessary because firstly, pass controls were simply not working and secondly, because they had become a very specific focus of Black anger and revolt. Moreover, the positive urbanization strategy is designed in such a way as to ensure that needed black labour is readily available and at the same time superfluous labour can be "dumped" in the satellites. This, it should be noted, is not the same as arguing that segmented or "hierarchical" labour markets are being created. Black labour in the cities will not (or cannot) be insulated from competition from the satellites. The commitment to the creation of satellite towns must be understood in terms of the intermediate role that such towns are
to play in reconciling the disparate goals of: dumping the marginalized; servicing bantustan constituencies through deconcentration; ensuring the "security of Whites"; preventing the swamping of "White" facilities such as beaches, parks, etc; ex post facto rationalization of the settlement patterns produced by Verwoerdian apartheid; and the pursuit of economic growth and less expensive forms of settlement policy than decentralization. In short, positive urbanization policy is a compromise between long-distance decentralization and bantustan policy on the one hand and "laissez-faire" settlement policy on the other.

Before moving on to a discussion of the politics of changing regional policy (which, of course, has been partly addressed here), it should be noted that positive urbanization puts the establishment of "new towns" firmly back on the planning agenda. The new town phase of the late 1940's and 1950's was related to the acceleration in the accumulation process associated with the growth of manufacturing industry and the discovery of the Orange Free State goldfields. In the new town phase of the late 1980's, new town creation occurs in the context of political crisis and economic decline. This places very severe constraints on new town creation and calls into question the ability of the state to set such a programme in motion. New town creation is expensive and, no matter how politically 'necessary' such an exercise may be, there are real questions as to whether it can be afforded. Certainly there is little movement in this direction. As has already been pointed out, most of the action appears to be occurring nearer to the core areas precisely because this is where the necessary infrastructure and agglomeration economies are. Whether or not planners in South Africa are likely to embark on a grand new town programme is a moot point. While government has voted large amounts of money for a new town programme in Natal, none of this money seems to be available. According to some senior officials (who must remain nameless) vast resources have, until recently, been diverted to the war effort in Angola. Increasing international isolation and the continued decline of the economy may yet lead the state to abandon its current satellite town programme and pursue less expensive city forms, which are also more supportive of the economic policy of inward-industrialization. In the meantime, "new town planning" is hardly likely to be an exercise in grand design (although the occasional model town such as Mmabatho in Bophuthatswana may be
built). Instead, new town planning is likely to involve little other than laying out of low service sites to promote "orderly" settlement and the allocation of land for commercial and industrial activities which will probably never materialize. "New slum" planning may be more appropriate terminology.

POLITICS AND REGIONAL POLICY

This section examines the politics of selected aspects of regional policy. Whereas the primary focus of a previous chapter was on decentralization policy with scant attention being paid to the rationalization of economic planning regions, in this section the emphases are reversed. Some attention will be paid to the politics of decentralization and deconcentration, but the focus falls firmly on the politics of the economic regions. Prominent analysts of South Africa's regional political economy (Cobbett et al, 1985; 1987; Hindson, 1987a, 1987b) have argued that the eight economic planning regions (now nine) announced in 1982 are more than functionally "rational" planning units, but provide the basis for sweeping constitutional change in South Africa. More specifically, they have suggested that these regions provide the basis for the abandonment of apartheid and the establishment of a new federal or confederal order. Thus Cobbett et al (1987, p 2) argue that new regional policy "is based on an abandonment of the political and territorial practices of apartheid, though not necessarily of race or ethnicity, and envisages the eventual reincorporation of the bantustans into a single national South African state".

Cobbett et al (1987) note that whereas the economic planning regions identified in 1975 preserved the notion of bantustans as coherent economic units, the regions identified in 1982 cut across bantustan boundaries. One fairly obvious explanation for this, and one which was offered in a previous chapter, is that government finally accepted that economic planning has to be based on "functional" regions. Cobbett et al (1987), however, argue that the development regions are being set up as the basis of a new second tier of government:

"What is apparent, however, is that the bantustans/provinces can no longer constitute the basis of a second tier of
government and therefore new intermediate regional governmental units are being established" (Cobbett et al, 1987, p 11).

They point out that government has already moved quite far in the establishment of powerful institutional structures for the development regions such as: the Multilateral Development Council to co-ordinate decision-making between South Africa and the Transkei-Bophuthatswana-Venda-Ciskei (TBVC) states; the Development Bank of Southern Africa; and the Regional Development Advisory Committees (RDACs) which have been set up to identify planning priorities in the planning regions. Through these structures the state is currently taking what the Buthelezi Commission (cited in Cobbett et al, 1987, p 11) once called the "economic route to power sharing rather than the political one, which is unacceptable to its constituency". More important though, Cobbett et al (1987, p 11) argue that the regions are a "testing ground for 'co-operative decision-making' and future constitutional arrangements".

Glaser (1985) and Cobbett et al (1985, 1987) suggest that the government is using Natal-KwaZulu as a laboratory for testing the federal option, and that if the Natal-KwaZulu experiment works, similar structures will be extended to the other planning regions. It should be noted, however, that government has repeatedly rejected the Natal KwaZulu Indaba\(^1\) proposals. What has been implemented in Natal are multi-lateral decision-making structures \(^2\). There has been no indication that it has ever intended, or intends, in the future, to move away from multi-lateral co-operation to federalism. Perhaps the biggest flaw in the Cobbett et al (1985, 1987) argument, however, is that they fail to explain precisely why it is that the economic development regions provide an appropriate territorial base for federalism. One could understand a set of boundaries which more or less corresponded with the economic geography that apartheid has already created. But the development regions' boundaries are drawn across these ethnic divides. Cobbett et al (1987) do

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\(^1\) The Natal KwaZulu Indaba is a forum led by sugar interests and the Chief Minister of KwaZulu and which has made constitutional proposals for the region.

\(^2\) The notion of multi-lateral co-operation was explained in Chapter Seven.
suggest that the federalism that reformers have in mind does not have to be a geographical one (although this has certain advantages) but could, in fact, be based on ethnicity or groups. But, if this is so, then the economic regions bear no apparent relation to federalism.

Cobbett et al (1987), in arguing the case that regional federalism is on government's agenda, rely heavily on reports sponsored by industry and capital - most notably reports prepared by Lombard (1980) and by Assocon (1985). In both reports, federalism based on racially or ethnically defined units, is rejected on the grounds that both locally and internationally they would be non-starters and would be dismissed as racist. Instead, they argue for the creation of geographic federalism, each with majority-elected governments but within which the rights of minorities are protected (through, for example, a Bill of Rights). Cobbett et al (1987, p 11) go on to argue that the rationale for a geographic federalism of this sort is as follows:

"Proponents of federalism argue that the only way to prevent a Black majoritarian state imposing socialism or a welfare state from above is to establish relatively autonomous local and regional political entities. These would hold sovereign power over limited coercive apparatuses and economic policies, fragmenting a national majority regionally."

It is never explained, however, how a federalism based on economic planning regions would, in fact, limit the coercive apparatuses that could be established. If the economic regions are the basis for separate federal units, then it is likely that in most, Black majority rule will exist. Unless the privilege of Whites was protected by something more than a Bill of Rights (the military and police, for example), the notion of geographic federalism would never be seriously considered (and perhaps never has). The argument that in a federal structure it would be difficult to mobilize nationwide forces around demands with a national scope is also dubious. To begin with, national mobilization may not be necessary since significant redistribution might be achieved by policy changes effected by Black majorities at regional levels. Secondly, in the absence of powerful first tier structures to protect White minorities in federal units, there is no guarantee that Black majorities in each of the federal units would not collaborate on
issues of national scope. If federalism based on economic regions has been considered by government, it must be that they have been considered only in a context where power (military, police) is centralized and maintained in White hands.

Certainly, this was part of Lombard's thinking in his book on Freedom Welfare and Order (1978) in which he discusses decentralizing what he calls the "welfare" functions of government and centralizing the "order" functions. Even so, it is hard to imagine Whites in the Free State, Transvaal and much of the Cape, being prepared to accept a Natal-KwaZulu Indaba-type model. This is not to say that government has no interest in the Natal-KwaZulu Indaba. It is likely that if Buthelezi finally accepts a government invitation to sit on the much vaunted National Council, the proposals will probably be given the go-ahead. Such a move would allow the state to fully co-opt Buthelezi (something which is desperately needed by government if the National Council is to have any legitimacy abroad and locally). Furthermore, Natal-KwaZulu could be presented to the world as an example of South Africa's progress towards reform and a new deal. But the replication of the Indaba proposals elsewhere is probably out of the question at this time or in the foreseeable future. It is also worth noting that the geographic area addressed by the Natal-KwaZulu Indaba is not consistent with that of Economic Planning Region E (which also includes a portion of Northern Transkei).

It seems then that the only basis for linking economic planning regions to economic federalism, is the fact that the planning regions do imply an attempt to effect a more even spatial spread of economic activity which, in turn, will provide an autonomous economic base for each region. Of course, the attempt to spread economic activity more evenly across space could be part of technicist regional planning attempts aimed at improving spatial efficiency and equity. Even if we assume that this is not the case, there are some problems with the idea that each region is to establish an autonomous economic base. Bell (1987, p 217) makes the following telling points:

"It may be that Cobbett et al are right in describing the strategy of decentralization policy in the current phase as that of 'integrative dispersal', with greater emphasis on
deconcentration points close to the metropolitan areas ... But in that case, how can the policy make a significant contribution to the creation of a federal system? ... Region D\(^1\) is a very serious problem for any federal constitution."

While government's constitutional planners have no doubt considered federal options, it is doubtful that they have ever been linked to economic regions. Instead, the economic regions need to be understood in terms of a correlation between the politics of segregation and the politics of economic interdependence. The economic regions should not be seen as providing the basis for dropping territorial apartheid at a political level. As McCarthy and Smit (1988, p 30) put it:

"... planning across political boundaries is not, in the contemporary South African political context, the same as redrawing the boundaries of political constituencies. On the contrary, it means consolidating these constituencies around more efficient and co-ordinated use of now more limited resources, whilst at the same time mopping up some of the accumulated contradictions of Verwoerdian separatism."

This is not to imply, however, that the designation of new economic regions and the transferring of substantial powers to new institutional structures attached to the regions, has been a solely technicist exercise in economic planning. While a more functional approach to economic planning is important, it seems that the development regions are based on a different kind of politics from that implied by Cobbett et al (1987).

A cursory examination of the "deconcentration" and "industrial development" points identified within each of the regions, immediately reveals in fact that with the exception of one region there are no growth points of either type which are not within bantustans or in a "back-to-back"\(^2\) relationship with bantustans. It is only in the Western Cape, where there are no bantustans, that a clear relation between points designated and bantustans does not exist. This, in turn, implies that

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1 Region D, is a very depressed area incorporating parts of the Eastern Cape, Ciskei and the Transkei.

2 The strategy of linking the identification of geographic locales for state assistance with existing White towns in the RSA is referred to as "Back-to-Back" development.
far from abandoning bantustans as territorial political units, the servicing of the political constituencies of such units remains an important priority for government. Bantustans, it seems, have always been, and will continue to be, an important part of this government's constitutional visions. As noted in Chapter Seven, rather than any geographic federalism based on economic regions, it seems that a confederalism based on the tri-cameral parliament, the bantustans (including the independent bantustans) and some sort of "council" or "chamber" for urban Blacks is a more likely scenario.

The political role of the economic regions, however, is to allow for more "rational" economic planning, but in such a way as to accommodate the "pork-barrel" politics that the maintenance of the bantustans entailed. In the Verwoerdian era, bantustans were to become relatively self-sufficient economic and political units. The need for economic autonomy was premised on the notion that in order for the new nation-states to be taken seriously and to achieve any legitimacy, it was necessary that their government's presided over at least a limited (as opposed to non-existent) economic kingdom. This is certainly not a point lost on many bantustan leaders, as exemplified in the struggles between Buthelezi and the Tongaat-Hullets Group over the location of a deconcentration point at Tongaat, near Durban.

KwaZulu has pressed for the redrawing of the bantustan boundary so that the deconcentration point falls within and not outside the bantustan boundary. The land is currently owned by the Tongaat-Hullets Group who are keen to realize the windfall gains that would eventuate should the land remain in their hands. The point is that even if the Nationalist government wanted to redraw political boundaries to coincide with economic regions, substantial opposition might be expected from the now relatively powerful political dependencies they have put in place, and whose support they cannot afford to lose. It is this reality which, more than anything else, will ensure that both decentralization policy and deconcentration policy (with strong bantustan overtones) will continue in the future, notwithstanding the economic crisis and the pressures for reduced state spending referred to in the previous chapter. As noted in the preceding section, what is likely, is that deconcentration (short-distance decentralization away from metropolitan
areas) to points behind bantustan boundaries is likely to become a compromise between "laissez-faire" and the long distance decentralization policies which received emphasis in the late 1960's and 1970's. It is through multi-lateral co-operation in the structures set up to accommodate the economic regions that the "politics" of more functional economic planning will be played out amongst power bloc actors.

There are more subtle roles that the economic regions are playing and are likely to play in the future. One such role bears a relation to Frost's (1987, p 9) suggestion that the state is now moving to repress politics "by reforming society and government in certain ways". One such means as Frost (1987) points out, is the creation of sham institutions which give the illusion of participation and more importantly "multi-racialism". It should be noted that such institutions are considered "sham" only in the political sense. They may, in fact, preside over substantial economic resources. In fact, "top-down" reform requires that they do control resources and are able politically to distribute such resources. Cobbett et al (1987) note that substantial powers have been transferred from provincial governments to the economic regions and suggest also that these regions are likely to replace provinces as second tier government. The restructuring of government and its implication for planning will, however, be more fully discussed in the next section.

CONCLUSIONS

The struggles of squatter and informal settlers against removals as well as the overall escalation of popular mobilization, were particularly important in precipitating the shift in the mid-1980's from anti-urbanism to a positive urbanization strategy. The particular spatial form proposed for managing the expected influx to the cities also has to be explained in political rather than economic terms. More specifically it has been argued that the deconcentrated (satellite-town) spatial model chosen by government attempts primarily to respond to a perennial contradiction facing the South African state - how to prevent the concentration of potentially insurrectionary masses on the urban peripheries, at the same time as satisfying the increasingly militant demands for urban permanence. The emphasis on the creation of satellite
towards is also related to attempts to confine as much urban settlement behind bantustan boundaries as possible and to attempt to rationalize the inherited landscape of Verwoerdian apartheid. As far as regional policy is concerned, it has been noted that the need to pander to political constituencies in the bantustans imposes limits on the extent to which decentralization and deconcentration policy can be trimmed, the economic crisis notwithstanding. Moreover, it is quite likely that as the contradictions of the positive urbanization strategy become increasingly apparent, pressure for the maintenance of the decentralization policy will increase, to help stem the flow of people to the cities. In sum, contemporary regional policy faces a range of contradictory pressures. The ultimate effects of these pressures on the trajectory of regional policy will depend on a variety of contingencies. The future of the regional policy is very uncertain.
In the 1970's and 1980's, there have been major changes in state policy regarding the sphere of reproduction. On the one hand, a new housing policy is being pursued which implies withdrawal from the sphere of reproduction. On the other hand the state has also made a number of highly visible, if selected, incursions into the sphere aimed, at least in the short run, at controlling every aspect of everyday life in selected areas. What is being referred to here is the occupation of a number of politically volatile townships by the military, and the implementation of extreme examples of "top-down" upgrading or urban renewal in previously neglected and undersupplied Black townships. The apparently contradictory withdrawal and simultaneous colonization of the sphere of reproduction and its relation to political crisis, is the subject of this chapter.

It will be recalled that emerging state policy in the sphere of reproduction and its relation to economics was discussed in Chapter Six. Here it was noted that while fiscal crisis in the past decade has been severe, its importance in accounting for the privatization of housing should not be overemphasized on account of the relatively small proportion of the fiscus that has historically been allocated to housing. On the other hand, it was also noted that in relation to the existing and projected housing backlog, fiscal crisis certainly necessitated a shift in policy. Moreover, reference was made to the constraints placed on investment in services and housing by the "debt crisis" and associated balance of payment problems. It was noted however, that were it not for the balance of payment problems, investment in housing could be part of an aggressive inward-industrialization strategy. Because of this constraint, any such strategy has to be confined to site (not service) provision and the promotion of labour-intensive informal housing provision. What this analysis suggests is that the upgrading of Black townships in South Africa in the 1980's (which has primarily involved capital-intensive service provision) cannot be seen as an economic intervention associated with inward-industrialization. It may have been associated with a temporary reflation of the economy in the wake of the disastrous effects of monetarist interventions in 1984 and
1985. However, for the most part, state expenditure on upgrading needs to be understood primarily in terms of its relation to political crisis. Likewise, it will be argued that political considerations have been very important in shaping new housing policy at a more general level. Moreover, it will be suggested that for mainly political reasons the state has not withdrawn from the sphere of reproduction in the sense that it has withdrawn investment. Instead it has changed the form of its intervention. The chapter begins with a discussion of politics and new housing policy.

POLITICAL CRISIS, NEW HOUSING POLICY AND URBAN PLANNING

Wilkinson (1983, pp 270-71) argues that:

"The intensified efforts over the past few years to establish a free housing market in the townships constitutes the most significant recent development in African housing policy."

As described in a previous chapter, these efforts have included inter alia: the introduction of appropriate tenure; attempts to sell-off and thereby commodity existing public housing stocks; attempts to draw the private sector into the provision of Black housing; the creation of utility companies; the promotion of self help; and the provision of surveyed and serviced sites in urban areas.

It should be noted at the outset that extensive deliberations about the promotion of home-ownership amongst Blacks and the creation of housing markets in Black areas had, in fact, occurred in the late 1940’s and 1950’s (Mathewson, 1957). However, with the maturation of Verwoerdian apartheid, measures "were introduced to reinforce the temporary status of the urban black" (Morris, 1981, p 91). Further acquisition of property on freehold by Blacks was prohibited, leasehold rights were withdrawn and influx control was considerably tightened. It was only in 1975 that limited leasehold rights were again reconsidered. In January of 1975, B.J. Vorster held discussions with homeland leaders, who raised the issue of home ownership for Blacks with him. Vorster, who had chosen a more "verligte" path than his predecessor, responded sympathetically. A year later (but before the Soweto revolt) a General Minute of the Department
of Bantu Administration and Development gave notice of a home-ownership scheme for Blacks (Morris, 1981). Freehold title would not be granted, but those who qualified to be in urban areas would be able to lease land from the Administration Boards. It should be noted that prior to the introduction of this scheme, Blacks owned 132,992 or 29.9% of the total of 444,733 units in Black areas within so-called "White" South Africa (Morris, 1981). The new home-ownership scheme was, however, treated with a great deal of suspicion, and during 1976, only 2,224 leases were taken-up (Morris, 1981).

However, it was the Soweto revolt in 1976, which really provided the impetus for the privatization of housing provision. It was capital that responded most quickly. In mid-December 1976, the Urban Foundation was formed, with Harry Oppenheimer as its chairperson, and Anton Rupert as its deputy. A Leadership South Africa (1987) article on the origins of the Urban Foundation is entitled "The Catalyst". The catalyst referred to, of course, is the Soweto revolt. The impact of the revolt on Whites and the private sector is described by Leadership South Africa (1987, p 12) as follows:

"The acrid smell of South Africa aflame stung the nostrils of all living in the larger towns and cities, and set their pulses racing with fear ... But what were they, the Whites, to do? For most of them - whether private individuals, workers or employers - the world occupied by Blacks was "terra incognita", to be dealt with and kept passive by government ... some businessmen were coming to think that the condition of the greater part of the country's population was far too important a concern to be left solely in Pretoria's hands ..."

The Urban Foundation, together with other representatives of organized capital, was to play a key role in the subsequent formulation of housing policy. It is worth noting, for example, that when Mr Justice J.H. (Jan) Steyn was offered the executive directorship of the Urban Foundation, he first visited B.J. Vorster and told him that "he would accept the Foundation job only if Vorster assured him that he would allow urban Blacks some real degree of security of tenure over their houses" (Leadership SA, 1987, p 13). Vorster gave the assurance, despite its implications for apartheid. Together with the building societies, the Urban Foundation put a great deal of pressure on government to introduce
more secure forms of tenure. This resulted in the introduction of legislation allowing 99-year leasehold in 1978. While limited leasehold tenure had been reintroduced in 1976, building societies and other financial institutions could not use these leases as security for mortgages. Furthermore, the leasehold provisions that existed allowed for the cancellation of the lease for a multitude of reasons. It was, for example, possible to cancel a person's leasehold if in the opinion of the township manager the person was simply not deemed a "fit and proper person" (Morris, 1981). Leadership SA (1987, p 44) describes the Urban Foundation's influence in getting 99-year leasehold introduced as follows:

"It is questionable whether government would ever have offered even the half-loaf 99-year leasehold, had the UF not made such a good case for tenure."

The 99-year leasehold scheme received a "cool" reception in the townships. Some four years later, in 1982, only 1727 leases had been registered under the scheme of which 1400 were in Soweto (Wilkinson, 1983). Reasons for the suspicion that the scheme evoked, included a strong feeling on the part of increasingly militant Blacks that leasehold was nothing but a sop, and a feeling that the entire process was an attempt to divide Blacks along class lines by promoting the emergence of a middle-class. There was certainly some empirical evidence to support the latter suspicion. Wilkinson (1983) reports that of the R15-million advanced by building societies to leaseholders by 1982, 80% to 90% was for the purchase of homes in the R20,000 plus bracket. The entire thrust towards home-ownership was received with suspicion by analysts on the left.

"The 'township revolt' of 1976-77 posed a political problem for South Africa's ruling class: how to contain the urban African population's refusal to accept its supposedly 'temporary' status in the 'White' cities while maintaining the fundamental structures of class domination and exploitation? Representatives of the most advanced sectors of capital were quick to recognize that a solution lay in facilitating the emergence and co-option of a materially advanced section of this population" (Wilkinson, 1983, p 270).
In any event a number of developments in the late 1970's and early 1980's paved the way for the much more wide-ranging changes in housing policy which were announced in 1983. To begin with, the Riekert Commission and Cillie Commission reports were tabled in mid-1979 and early 1980 respectively. The former had focused on a wide variety of issues relating to the utilization of labour and conditions in the townships, while the latter had investigated the causes of the Soweto riots. Both urged action on the housing front and Riekert heralded the first real indication of the acceptance of the permanence of urban Blacks. Furthermore, the Viljoen Commission Report was completed in 1981 and released to the public in January 1982. Viljoen recommended amongst other things, that leasehold rights be extended to developers and employers in Black areas, and significantly it also proposed the sale of existing rental stock. Wilkinson (1983) argues that the Viljoen Commission was extremely influential, particularly at the ideological level.

"Chaired by the President of the Association of Building Societies and with the executive directors of the Associated Chambers of Commerce, the Federated Chamber of Industries, the Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut and Roberts Construction as members (as well as a representative of the Urban Foundation), the Committee's perspective is saturated with the ideology of 'free enterprise'" Wilkinson, 1983, pp 273-274).

But perhaps more significant than the recommendations of these various committees, was the dramatic emergence of the civics in the late 1970's and early 1980's.

The rise of the civic movement was described in Chapter Seven. The importance of rising rents in a context of spiralling inflation in accounting for the rise of the civics was stressed. It should be noted that it was from about 1975 that "site" rentals became an important component of overall rent. Such site rentals were levied over and above repayments on loans from the National Housing Commission, to cover the capital costs of the building. 'Site' rentals were service charges covering inter alia; sewerage; cleaning; school levies; roads; administration; health; street lights; and community developments. In 1979 the Soweto budget made provision for the progressive increases of site rents by as much as 200% (Morris, 1981). Civic and Resident's
Associations, including the Committee of 10, registered their disapproval and urged rent boycotts. In the East Rand Board area site rentals were increased by nearly 100%. Similar increases were announced in many other areas and had provoked massive opposition.

Given the volatile political atmosphere that had developed in the wake of the 1976 Soweto revolt, and the re-emergence of Congress-style politics, the rent increases precipitated large scale mobilization of civic organization throughout the country. It is unlikely that when government announced its intention to sell off 500 000 state houses and to shift the responsibility for housing provision to the private sector, the depoliticization of the reproductive sphere was not that far from the minds of policy makers. The "great sale" is particularly instructive in this regard. Despite the fact that the Administration Boards had accumulated huge debts (see, for example, the account by Chaskalson et al, 1987), the state rental stock was offered for sale at "bargain" prices. When it became apparent that township resident’s were not responding, prices were dropped further. Notwithstanding an inauspicious start 18 876 units had been sold by 1984. With the dropping of prices the numbers rose to 50 000 by 1987 (Hendler and Parnell, 1987). What all of this suggests, of course, is that depoliticization of the sphere of consumption was the prime concern, not the fiscal crisis.

When the state announced its new housing policy in 1983, it had still not committed itself to freehold title for Blacks. Such a commitment would have implied the full acceptance of the permanence of urban Blacks and a substantial departure from the tenets of Verwoerdian apartheid. Full tenure rights were however finally introduced in the Black Communities Development Act of 1986. This followed the White Paper on Urbanization and its commitment to a positive urbanization strategy. Given the political context, the award of freehold cannot be understood purely as a cunning ploy to withdraw from the sphere of collective consumption, but also as a political victory for the popular masses. Certainly the period between 1983 and 1986 was perhaps the politically most turbulent of the entire decade following the Soweto revolt. Significant too is the fact that rent boycotts mushroomed throughout the country in this period. In September 1984, rent boycotts began in the Vaal Triangle
townships of Sebokeng, Sharpeville, Evaton, Boipatong, and Bophelong (Chaskelson et al, 1987). Early in 1985 boycotts began in Northern Free State townships such as Tumahole near Parys, Vredefort, Kroonstad, Bothaville and Viljoenskroon. In 1984 and 1985 rent boycotts also got off the ground in a number of Eastern Transvaal townships such as Ethandukukhanya (Piet Retief), Sibobela (Carolina), KwaThandeka (Amsterdam), KwaZanele (Breyton), Wesselton (Emelo) and Umgwenya (Waterval Boven). In 1986 the rent boycotts spread to the Rand townships - Soweto, Alexandra, Tembisa (Chaskelson et al, 1987). By this time the rent boycotts were not simply about 'bread and butter politics', but had become articulated with the politics of national liberation. The rent boycott in Mamelodi, for example, began as a protest against the "Mamelodi Massacre" of 1985 when police killed 13 in dispersing a crowd. By 1987, the national rent arrears was officially estimated at R177,6 million (Chaskelson et al, 1987). There can be little doubt then that continued political mobilization has provided an important impetus for the state's full commitment to the establishment of a free market in housing.

"In the long term, the state appears to be planning to wash its hands of the rents problem. The White Paper on Urbanization released late in 1986 provides for the further commercialization of township housing and introduces the basis for increased private-sector township development ... In short, the state envisages that the private sector will resolve both its financial and political contradictions" (Chaskelson et al, 1987).

How successful the state is likely to be in achieving such objectives is debatable. Hendler and Parnell (1987) argue that the ability of the state to reshape the housing terrain should not be underestimated. They point out that between 1980 and 1985, 1 700 new homes were built annually for private home owners in Black townships on the Witwatersrand alone. Moreover, they report that between 1986 and 1987, 3141 first-time home owners made use of the government's first-time-home-purchaser subsidy. In recent years there has been a flurry of private house-building in Black townships in response to the pent-up demand of the petty bourgeoisie. But what of those in the lower-income categories? Contrary to popular belief, Hendler and
Parnell (1987, pp 428-429) argue that the state has not entirely neglected the needs of this group.

"Despite deprioritising rented public shelter, official policy shows a continuing commitment to providing for the housing needs of at least some of those who cannot afford to buy their homes ..."

In support of their contention they point out that between 1982 and 1985, the state built 42 395 units in Black areas; 42 606 in Coloured areas; 26 356 in Indian areas and 11 862 units in White areas. They note also the fact that R1 billion has been set aside to finance infrastructure and service installation. There is also speculation that the state intends subsidizing site-only provision for very low-income people up to an amount of R5 000. Moreover, low-interest loans for materials in approved self-help schemes are also envisaged. It has also been noted, however, that whilst the state clearly intends to address the lower end of the market, the stringent economic policies announced in 1988 on the one hand, and the Angolan war on the other, have meant that in practice little public finance for housing has been forthcoming in the late 1980's. Whether this is a temporary phenomenon linked to the current balance of payments problem, or whether it indicates that the state is indeed withdrawing from the sphere of consumption is a moot point. At present promised financing for low income people in a number of projects is simply not materializing (Foster, 1987).

There is some question then about whether or not current state policy is aimed solely at the middle-classes or not. While the answer to this question will ultimately be revealed in state practices, the limited practices of the past five years suggests that the state realizes that crisis resolution cannot be achieved by addressing the material needs of the middle-classes alone. To the extent that the political crisis is a crisis of control, stemming at least in part from appalling township conditions, and to the extent that the working classes and the unemployed have been very active participants in revolt, so it follows that the housing aspirations of this group must be addressed. If this is so then the major changes in housing policy in the late 1970's and 1980's should not be understood as a withdrawal from the allocation and even financing of housing, but rather as a withdrawal by the state from its role as
highly visible landlord in the townships. In other words, we can expect continued government intervention in the sphere of reproduction, but in a changed form.

"Contrary to a popular wisdom - and the ideology of privatisation - public finance still contributes substantially towards investment in housing. Yet the form of government intervention has changed ..." (Hendler and Parnell, 1987, pp 431-432).

The long term goal of the policy seems to be the promotion of widespread home ownership among all classes, and the depoliticization of everyday life. Reform of this kind, it is hoped, will conservatise the townships.

"The growth of a class of home owners represents a new kind of township person for whom financial commitment and fixed employment become a necessary part of life. And state logic has been that such people will perhaps think twice before taking part in a general strike or consumer boycott" (Hendler and Parnell, 1987, p 341).

In short, the politics of the new housing policy can be summarized as follows. To begin with the policy represents a ruling-bloc response to the Soweto revolt and to the ongoing political crisis which has followed the revolt. Secondly the policy is designed primarily to achieve a depoliticization of the sphere of reproduction in both the short and the long term. This involves state withdrawal from the highly visible role of landlord on the one hand, and at least partially meeting the housing needs of all classes. Finally, the new housing policy must also be seen as a victory for the popular classes, albeit an ambiguous one. The new housing policy was only possible with a substantial reversal of apartheid policy and the recognition of the permanence of urban Blacks. In the context of having been denied this acknowledgement for sixty years, the new housing policy must be seen as a very real victory notwithstanding the form that it has taken. On the other hand, the victory has been won at the potential cost of divisions within the popular alliance.

In closing, it is worth noting that an important impact that this introduction of new housing policy has had on urban planning, is the way it has substantially increased the number and variety of institutions
involved in Black township development. This, in turn, has increased the variety of opportunities available to planners in practice. Many new private and utility companies have emerged on the Black housing scene seeking planning advice. The corollary of privatization is reduced state control of the sphere of reproduction, a reality which progressives could exploit.

THE POLITICS OF UPGRADE AND THE MILITARIZATION OF URBAN PLANNING

One of the more important impacts of political crisis on planning has been the resurgence of state interests in urban renewal - or upgrading. Official recognition that unsatisfactory environmental conditions are of key importance in accounting for political revolt was evident in a number of reports released in the wake of the 1976 Soweto revolt. The Cillie Commission (1980), which had been set up to investigate the 1976 Soweto events, placed some emphasis on living conditions in the townships and indicated that these conditions contributed to pent-up anger and frustration. Whilst these conditions were not considered a direct cause of the revolt, it was felt that they contributed to its intensity (Morris, 1981). The Riekert Commission (1979) too, drew attention to the urgent need to improve living conditions in the townships. However, it was only in the mid-1980's that the state finally accepted the permanence of urban Blacks. Moreover, forced removals were becoming more and more difficult to implement as opposition escalated. While the state ultimately won the battle over removals at Crossroads in the Western Cape, it was won at immense cost both materially and in terms of adverse international media coverage. Josette Cole (1987, p 131) describes the removals of the so-called satellite communities in the Crossroads area as follows:

"During the period 17 May to 17 June 1986, Cape Town and the international community witnessed the most brutal destruction and forced removal of squatter communities in the country's history. In a period of less than four weeks, an estimated 70,000 squatters from Portland Cement, Nyanga Bush, Nyanga Extension, and nearby KTC became refugees in their own land and hundreds of 'witdoeke', with the uncontested support of members of the security forces, declared war on these communities."
The literal "burning out" of the residents of these communities was the culmination of a protracted, difficult and costly struggle. Whilst forced removals in the future should certainly not be ruled out, it was becoming clear to government that new approaches to squatter settlements were needed. Upgrading is one such response. Even more important in accounting for the rise of upgrading, is the fact that by the mid-1980's the "hearts-and-minds" strategy favoured by the militarists in the State Security Council was becoming increasingly linked to upgrading. The militarists themselves had moved to centre stage and had defined the political crisis as one of control which could largely be addressed by socio-economic intervention.

There are three aspects of the evolution of upgrading which are of particular importance to planners from a planning theoretical point of view. The first is the way in which militaristic surveillance and interventions have become part and parcel of the planning world of the 1980's. Whilst such military control extends to planning spheres beyond upgrading, it is in the sphere of upgrading that it has become most blatantly evident. The second issue of interest to planners is the way in which upgrading has been used by fractions within the state apparatuses to experiment with negotiation politics between the state and popular organizations. In fact, the difference between this approach to upgrading and that employed by the militarists is indicative of the schism between the so-called "hawks" and "doves" referred to in an earlier chapter. Finally, also of interest to planners is the way in which upgrading has become a "stake-in-struggle" on the one hand and a focus for mobilizing community organizations on the other. In other words, upgrading cannot be seen simply as something imposed from above by a Machiavellian state. It is also something that ordinary people want and are prepared to fight for. The three issues referred to above provide a useful basis for structuring the discussion that follows. Each will be elaborated in turn.

Upgrading and the National Security Management System

In previous sections, reference has been made to the fact that when P.W. Botha came to power he proceeded to consolidate his position by bringing the military much more directly into the affairs of government. This was
largely achieved through the establishment of the National Security Management System (NSMS). Many political analysts (Swilling, 1986; Sarakinsky, 1988) have argued that real power in South African society lies with the NSMS. The Cape Times (cited in Harrison, 1988, p 101) describes the rise of the NSMS as follows:

"It has been called a 'creeping coup' heralding a transition to an even more authoritarian system. At the helm is the executive State President who presides over an elaborate structure of over 500 committees, comprising appointed bureaucrats and technocrats, and efficiently controlled by the military police. This faceless state structure whose members and activities are seldom known, exists alongside the conventional political systems and is rapidly usurping the functions of local government throughout the country. The committees are accountable to no-one except the security structure and deal only with Blacks as co-opted agents at the lowest level."

While the parliamentary cabinet is ultimately supposed to preside over the NSMS, the State Security Council (SSC) is considered by many as the "inner" or "real" cabinet. At the next level of the hierarchy is the Working Committee of the State Security Council which is comprised of the heads of all major government departments (bureaucrats) and ensures that SSC policy is co-ordinated in all relevant aspects of government intervention. At the regional level there are twelve Joint Management Centres (JMCs) and beneath these there are approximately 60 sub-JMCs which operate at geographic scales which roughly correspond with those of the mooted and existing Regional Service Councils (RSCs). Below these, at municipal level, are 448 mini-JMCs. Whilst the entire system is largely invisible, it is the activities of the JMCs which are most evident in upgrading exercises (Harrison, 1988).

The principle purposes of the NSMS are twofold. On the one hand it controls a system of repression. On the other hand it co-ordinates a strategy to win "the hearts and minds" of the people. Upgrading is most closely related to the latter, but the two functions are obviously closely interrelated. For example, the JMCs pay attention to every aspect of "everyday life" in the townships, scanning for any issue which may become a focus for mobilization against the authorities. The JMCs serve as an early-warning system, and as a powerful lobby to cut through
bureaucratic red-tape when needed. In other words, they often attempt to activate or sidestep often recalcitrant or ineffective local authorities and other government departments. In this way the government has been able to neutralize grass-roots bureaucratic opposition to its reform programme and also to ensure rapid co-ordinated action in any area to deal with any potential security problem.

Moreover, in many instances upgrading has been linked to the imposition of repressive warlord structures. The patronage that warlords are able to administer through the provision of the material goods that upgrading implies, provides one basis for strengthening the position of these warlords at the local level. In Crossroads, for example, warlord Johnson Nqxobongwana, has been made "mayor" in the newly imposed local authority and has been promised control over a substantial upgrading programme. The land burnt out by the "witdoeke" in 1986 has been "upgraded". Some 1 234 sites have been developed with taps and toilets and it appears that Nqxobongwana has been given control over site allocation (NCAR, 1987).

Perhaps the most dramatic instance of JMC and militarist intervention in upgrading is the so-called "Operation Alex Upgrade" (Weekly Mail, August 6, 1987, p 6). Alexandra township near Johannesburg is one of the most highly politicized and democratically organized areas in the entire country. The township also has a long history of resistance and revolt which is described by Badela (1987, p 7) as follows:

"Since the late 1950s - when Alex community mobilized for three months under the Alex People's Transport Committees to fight bus fare hikes - the government has tried to break the township.

In 1959 the authorities began moving families to Soweto and Tembisa, planning to flatten the township and replace it with a huge complex of single-sex worker's hostels. Tens of thousands of people were moved but the plan never succeeded. And in 1982, Co-operation and Development Minister Piet Koornhof acknowledged Alex's right to exist."

1 Warlords are self-appointed leaders of local communities who rule largely through the "barrel of a gun", and through the patronage and "control" they bring to largely informal settlements.
In the mid-1980's, Alexandra, along with most other older and established Black townships throughout the country, was a hotbed of political opposition. The Alexandra Action Committee under the dynamic leadership of Moses Mayekiso, who was also head of the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa, achieved a national profile. The Action Committee established street, zone and area committees to deal with local issues. In February of 1986, a skirmish between residents and police after a funeral led to the so-called "six day war". On June 12, 1987, Alexandra was invaded by hundreds of troops. They have been there ever since. Hundreds of residents were arrested, including the entire leadership of the Alexandra Action Committee. Shortly hereafter, plans were developed for the upgrading of Alexandra. A JMC official, Steve Burger, described the project as a "blending of the redevelopment programme with an urban renewal project" (cited in Bekker, 1987, p 7). Government has made some R95 million available for the upgrading which involves the installation of modern sewerage to replace an ancient bucket-system (still operative in many townships); the building of new roads; the installation of a storm water drainage system; the upgrading of some 3 000 structures which will be made available for sale; the destruction of shacks and sub-standard houses; the construction of core houses; the provision of new "greenfields" sites for development; three new schools; an open air recreation centre; and the provision of play parks. The planning and implementation of the project has been carefully supervised and controlled by a mini-JMC.

That the upgrading of Alexandra is part-and-parcel of the government's "hearts and minds" strategy is clear from statements by government officials. One such official (cited in the Weekly Mail, August 5, 1987) argued that "people must know that the government is good" in explaining the Alexandra upgrading. He went on to point out that such a perception of government was one of the "prerequisites for successful counter-revolution". JMC official, Steve Burger, (quoted in Bekker, 1987, p 7) explained the strategic concern of the Alexandra upgrade as follows:

"I believe Alexandrans have justifiable grievances which we must eradicate. The mini JMC creates an opportunity for us to speed up this process. It has not been detrimental in any way
to the residents of Alexandra. The opposite is true. I am not trying to influence the Blacks to become government supporters. What we’re trying to do is create a climate for evolution as opposed to revolution."

Of substantial significance for urban and regional planners, however, is the fact that top-down urban renewal programmes have become grist to the mill of a conscious counter-revolutionary strategy. Perhaps of even greater concern for progressive-minded planners is the fact that virtually every intervention in Black reproductive spaces now occurs under the watchful eye of a comprehensive state security network run by the police and the military. This, of course, poses serious practical and existential dilemmas for progressive planners. Possible responses to these dilemmas are addressed in the final chapter of the dissertation.

Tentative Experiments With Community-Level Negotiation

The autocratic top-down approach to upgrading is not the only way in which the state is conducting its upgrading programme. In a few instances, the state has entered into negotiations with popular organizations over the nature and control of the upgrading process. Prior to the imposition of the second state of emergency in mid-1986, local-level negotiations over the possibility of upgrading with popular organizations had reached fairly advanced stages in a number of areas throughout the country (Swilling, 1987). However, with the announcement of the second state of emergency, many of these initiatives simply collapsed, as the militarists moved in (Swilling, 1987). One area in which the state has continued to allow negotiation with popular leadership is in the St Wendolin’s area near Pinetown. Precisely why the government has allowed real popular control over the upgrading here is not entirely clear. The most likely explanation is that government, and the Department of Constitutional Planning and Development in particular, have been using St Wendolin’s as a negotiation laboratory for some time. The "attractiveness" of St Wendolin’s as a laboratory for testing local-level negotiation perhaps lies in the structure of the resident’s associations in the area.

While clearly popular (in the sense that they have genuine grass-roots support and are elected bodies) both Isolumusi (which represents the St
Wendolin’s Ridge area) and the Klaarwater Residents Association (KLARA) have avoided overt political alignment although it is clear that they are largely sympathetic to the United Democratic Front (UDF). Isolumusi, however, has both Inkatha and UDF supporters on its executive structures - a move designed to keep peace in the area, and allow the upgrading to continue. Clearly a relatively "apolitical" local structure with grassroots support is precisely the kind of organization that the factions within the government who favour negotiation would like to encourage and work with. However, the reality of the negotiations has been such that politics has never been far from the surface.

St Wendolin’s was originally a listed Black spot area. Removal was threatened in 1966 when the Group Areas Board zoned the area for Indian use. In the late 1970’s the state began to implement its removal programme. Some people were moved and notices were sent to all residents notifying them of impending removal. The existing community organization, an Inkatha-aligned liaison committee, saw its role not in opposing but in facilitating the removals. Not surprisingly, the legitimacy of the organization was immediately undermined and a new organization, the St Wendolin’s Welfare Committee, was formed to fight the removals. In April 1984, the government announced that a reprieve would be granted to St Wendolin’s. One of the conditions for the reprieve was that an upgrading programme would be undertaken.

The Mariannhill Mission Institute which is a large landowner in the area and which has a long-standing association with the St Wendolin’s community, agreed to initiate such a programme (in fact the Institute initially indicated that it would finance the upgrading through the sale of industrial land in its ownership). Given an impending upgrade, a resident’s association called Isolumusi (the voice of the community) was formed to ensure community control over the process. This committee had jurisdiction over the St Wendolin’s Ridge which had been given a reprieve. A similar reprieve had not been given to immediately surrounding areas and a Save St Wendolin’s Committee was established to

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1 Inkatha is a political movement linked to the Chief Minister of KwaZulu, Chief Buthelezi. Whilst initially spearheaded by the Congress Movement, Inkatha and Congress-aligned organizations such as the UDF have become bitter enemies in the 1980’s.
represent people living there. In 1986, Minister Heunis visited the area and, in order to facilitate the upgrading, initiated the establishment of a steering committee. This steering committee has become an important negotiation forum between government and the community.

While the local JMC structures keep a close watch on the proceedings (and it is suspected that several government officials and consultants actively involved in negotiations are JMC members), the style of government intervention is very different here from that adopted in Alexandra. After the declaration of the second state of emergency in 1986, for example, the St Wendolin's leadership was left untouched, although some activists in neighbouring Klaarwater were arrested. Moreover, in terms of the Emergency regulations, school buildings could not be used for community meetings. Since the school in St Wendolin's was Isolumusi's major meeting venue, Isolumusi indicated that it would discontinue its participation in the steering committee if the school remained "out of bounds". Isolumusi also demanded that the troops leave the township. Significantly they left, which indicates a level of government commitment to negotiation.

By 1988, negotiation is still occurring through the steering committee, but its future hangs in the balance. Very little has been "delivered" through the process so far, and elements within government and the JMCs have been attempting to use access to funding as a mechanism for getting Isolumusi to accept local authority status. In other words, the community is being held to political ransom over the upgrading. A tactic of this kind is potentially highly divisive and there is a possibility that this is what government is trying to do. Already there is talk of factions that are happy to enter Black local authorities while others are vigorously opposed to any such move. Once the popular organization is effectively divided it may be very much easier for the state to impose its own structures. In fact, it is Isolumusi's non-party political alignment which makes it even more vulnerable to such division. In the absence of a clear political line, divisions over the local authority issue seem certain to emerge and precisely how damaging such divisions are, will depend on the skills of community leadership. While it is possible that the state is actively trying to use the upgrade
to engineer divisions in the community, it seems more likely (at this stage) that the negotiation experiment is still being taken seriously by the so-called "doves" at least. But the future of local-level negotiations over upgrading is tenuous.

While it is unlikely that upgrading is consciously being used to divide the community in St Wendolin's there are a number of instances in which the opposite can safely be assumed. One of the most dramatic instances is the division of the previously coherent and UDP-affiliated civic Red Location near Port Elizabeth. As with St Wendolin's and Alexandra, Red Location was a township earmarked for removal. Following fierce opposition, a reprieve was won in 1983. Later the same year, the East Cape Administration Board recommended an upgrading and redevelopment programme (Eastern Province Herald, 3 August 1983). Some 200 "lodger" or "shack" families were, however, to be relocated to Motherwell, some 15 km away. The Red Location Action Committee successfully opposed the removals of the backyard shacks, and unity in the community was maintained. Instead a three-phase upgrading programme was proposed by government. The first phase involved the voluntary removal of the shack settlers to temporary structures on a nearby piece of land separated from Red Location by a narrow strip of railway reserve land. The second phase was to involve the development of new permanent structures on the railway reserve land. Once these structures were complete the residents of the existing (non-shack) structures would move into the newly constructed units, while their own units were upgraded (phase three). Once this phase was complete, the residents would move back to their upgraded homes and the shack settlers would move from the temporary structures into the railway reserve strip (Platsky, 1987). After protracted negotiation the Red Location Action Committee agreed to this process of upgrading and offered to preside over voluntary removals. Here is where the trouble began.

Early in 1987, the first shack settlers moved to the temporary tin structures in what has since become known as "Silvertown". There were immediate complaints about conditions in Silvertown. Moreover, rumours began to develop that some leaders in the Action Committee had been co-opted and were collaborating in a subtle removal process (New Nation, June 11-17, 1987, p 5). Certainly, by mid-1987 a number of people were
no longer moving voluntarily. Moreover, people were being moved to Motherwell and not to Silvertown as promised. Sharp divisions between previously unified residents developed. The extent of this disorganization is evident in the following quotations from an article in *New Nation* entitled "Things fall apart at Red Location":

"Residents of Red Location ... claim the Ibhayi Council has co-opted members of the Action Committee working against threatened removals. According to resident Peter Mjo, on May 24, municipal policemen drove around Silvertown inviting people to a mass meeting at Daku Hall. The residents of Red Location four-roomed houses with bathrooms and hot water to loud cheers from the crowd. Mjo said several members of the Action Committee were seen shaking hands with the councilors after the meeting ... 'We take this as an attempt to divide and rule us'" (*New Nation*, June 11-17, 1987, p5).

By mid-1987, a number of the Action Committee resigned. The community was effectively divided.

**Upgrading - A Stake in Struggle?**

The third aspect of the politics of upgrading which is of relevance in the formulation of planning theory, is the role that upgrading has played as a tool of struggle, as an objective of, or stake in struggle, and as a means of building progressive organization. The important point here is that upgrading and urban renewal programmes are not the exclusive preserve of the state. In the 1980's upgrading has become an important part of progressive struggle too. In the first instance, it has become a very important tool in ongoing struggles against removals. Numerous communities under threat have attempted to demonstrate that their communities are "upgradable", and have sought the assistance of advocate planners in this regard. This tactic is of particular importance in instances which the state makes use of technocratic arguments to justify removals (health hazards, flood plains, fire hazards, etc). Examples of instances in which communities have developed upgrading proposals as an alternative to removal include Langa (Uitenhage), Duncan Village (East London), Lawaaikamp (George), Oukasie (Brits), Muchinson/Bhobboyi (Port Shepstone), Clairwood (Durban), and a number of others. In some
instances (e.g. Clairwood, Oukasie,) the tactic appears to have contributed to the success of residents in warding off removals. In other instances, it appears to have made little difference. Since the best example of success, Clairwood, will be discussed in a later section, the focus here falls on failure.

A dramatic example is the recent destruction of Langa near Uitenhage. Langa was a squatter camp occupied by approximately 50 000 people (Sutcliffe, 1987). Like so many of the other communities referred to in this section, it too had been designated for removal in the 1950’s. However, by the 1980’s people were still moving into the area and building shacks. The countrywide revolt of the mid-80’s was particularly severe in the Eastern Cape and Langa itself was the site of bitter battles between oppositional groupings and the state. Langa itself became internationally infamous as a consequence of the "Langa Massacre" of 1985. Since Langa itself was located a mere 2 km from Uitenhage’s CBD, it is not surprising that the very conservative White ratepayers became alarmed by rising militance and began to call for the removal of the settlement (Swilling, 1987). It was in response to these renewed removal threats that community organizations emerged, calling instead for the upgrading of the area. They appointed a collective of progressive architects and planners to develop an "upgrading" plan for the area. This plan was then used in negotiations with a special "task force" appointed by the Department of Constitutional Development and Planning (Swilling, 1987). According to Swilling (1987) these negotiations were taken very seriously by state officials and an agreement was reached in June 1986, that Langa would be upgraded. However, in mid-July 1986, after the declaration of the State of Emergency, the state reneged on the agreement and removals began. The clearance of the entire community took only six weeks. Swilling (1987) argues that the militarists simply moved in and overruled government officials from Heunis’ department. The squatter community was considered a security threat and removed. Irrespective of the outcomes of struggle, however, it is important to note that in the Langa community, upgrading was a stake in struggle. It was something that ordinary people were prepared to fight for. They lost.
In the Langa instance, and in many other instances throughout the country, the threat of removal spawned coherent community organization. Upgrading became the progressive alternative to removal. But this is not the only way in which upgrading has been associated with community mobilization. In a number of cases the introduction of state initiated upgrading programmes has itself precipitated progressive community mobilization. One such instance, was the upgrading of a highly depressed Coloured township in Durban, Frobisher. This upgrade was initiated by the House of Representatives 1 and the Durban City Council. Once it became apparent that the area was to be upgraded, activists within the area mobilized the community and established a UDF-sympathetic civic. The issue around which the mobilization occurred was that of the control of the upgrading process. Another example of a similar sort was the formation of a civic organization in the Coloured township of Westbury in response to the upgrading and housing schemes of the Johannesburg municipality.

When the municipality began implementing a new housing programme in 1981, considerable dissatisfaction emerged over the designs of houses, plot sizes and general town planning (Swilling, 1987). Opposition to the municipality's programme became increasingly militant with people physically sabotaging the scheme (pushing over walls, breaking building materials, removing surveyor pegs and so on). Mass demonstrations and heavy-handed police action ensued. In 1985 the municipality realised that it would be impossible to go any further unless they entered into negotiation with the civic. As a consequence they invited the civic (the Western Rent Action Committee) to submit its own proposals. The civic in turn appointed a grouping of progressive architects, the Architects Collective, to assist them in developing an alternative. This was achieved through a process of widespread and in-depth community discussion. Thus the civic used the process to build and deepen its structures. An alternative was formulated and most of the key demands of the civic were met. However, as Swilling (1987) points out, once the new scheme was implemented the civic became dormant and the

1 The House of Representatives is one of three Houses in the tricameral parliament. It is the parliamentary chamber for the Coloured community.
organizational gains won during the negotiation stage were lost. The same is true of the Frobisher instance. Once a deal was negotiated the civic lost momentum and it is currently inactive.

The impact of mobilization around upgrading in both instances was clearly transient at best. Whether or not mobilization gains won around upgrading in other areas are likely to be equally transient, is a moot point. Much may depend on the creativity of leadership. Much may also depend on whether or not the "outside-system" civics find some way of becoming involved in the on-going administration of their locales. Participation at a distance may be possible, but the historical record thus far is not particularly encouraging. Of course, Westbury and Frobisher may not be particularly representative instances. In both cases the deals negotiated were very favourable to residents and it is unlikely that the state will, in fact, be able to negotiate equally favourable deals on a widespread basis and certainly not in African areas. What this suggests is that conditions in most African townships are likely to remain well below aspiration levels, given that upgrading programmes are likely to be minimalist at best. The struggle for better living environments is, as a consequence, likely to be a protracted one. This suggests that the building of stable and lasting civic organizations around township conditions may yet be a possibility. In fact, it may be a necessity if environmental improvement in Black townships is to occur. However, the weaknesses of organizing around upgrading will have to be clearly understood.

One such weakness which has become patently obvious in the St Wendolin's upgrading is the asymmetry of power relations in the process. Unlike struggles at the point of production, people in the communities cannot 'down tools' if demands are not met or if the state reneges on a deal. In the St Wendolin's negotiations there have been a number of instances in which state promises have not been fulfilled, but which the community can do very little about. What power communities do have seems to derive from overall (national/regional) levels of political mobilization which threaten overall reproduction of the system rather than from the local characteristics of the struggle or the organizations involved. Thus, at the height of the revolt in the mid-1980's, the state was prepared to at least listen to community demands. However, since the
successful repression of revolt, it is clear that those who favour negotiation have lost ground within ruling bloc circles.

In repressive circumstances such as these the process of entering into negotiations with the state to find the space for building organization has to be seriously questioned. The potential divisiveness of negotiations over upgrading has already been alluded to and also needs to be taken into consideration. Apart from the co-optive strategies of the state, upgrading tends to highlight class divisions in communities which can be damaging politically. In St Wendolin's for example, a conflict between so-called lodgers (tenants) and landowners simmers and threatens to burst to the fore from time to time. Moreover, substantial tension is developing between established residents who have control over the site allocation process and more-recently-settled residents. New arrivals have essentially been cut out of the site allocation process and the situation is potentially explosive. On the other hand, in the most difficult circumstances, St Wendolin's has built a system of local level democracy around upgrading which has no parallel in Natal. This system has remained intact for four years. While the proof of the pudding is still in the eating, and while St Wendolin's could go up in a puff of smoke (like Crossroads), there is also much to be optimistic about. In any event one thing is quite certain. Communities cannot afford not to respond to state-initiated upgrading programmes, simply because of the divisions such programmes may engender. Yet, the very process of responding may itself precipitate such divisions.

In a context of economic austerity however, it is unlikely that the state will be able to embark on anything but "selected"upgrading programmes in the foreseeable future. The fact that the state has very limited resources, together with the potential for division that upgrading may bring, suggests that communities may be better off by attempting relatively "autonomous" upgrading processes and avoiding engagements with the state except for very specific demands. This strategy will be elaborated in Chapter Twelve when progressive strategies for the future are elaborated.
It was in the 1950’s that the state began to intervene quite directly and on a large scale in the sphere of reproduction. It was suggested in Chapter Five that this intervention was aimed at effecting political control amongst other things. Thus, the state began to regulate most aspects of everyday life. Such control was, however, only possible in a context of political repression and economic growth. Moreover, intervention of this sort served to politicize everyday life. In the 1970’s and 1980’s, the highly visible role played by the state in townships in a context of political revolt and political control has become a major problem from the perspective of the ruling classes. The state has become the target of popular resistance around state-regulated issues such as rents and transport fares. However, in responding to the politicization of everyday life, the state has had to tread a highly contradictory path. On the one hand it has had to reduce its visibility and this has implied withdrawal from the sphere of reproduction. But total withdrawal has never been an option for the state, given the loss of control it implies. Total withdrawal would leave the neglected and undersupplied townships unattended and ripe for further popular mobilization. As a consequence, the state has chosen not to withdraw but to reduce its visibility through privatization. Privatization, it is hoped, will remove the state from the visible role of landlord and transform township people from a homogeneous grouping of renters at war with the state, into an atomized conglomeration of individuals nursing housing bonds. But this is as far as withdrawal goes. In the case of particularly volatile townships, the state has chosen not only to intervene, but to control everyday life in a militarist fashion while instituting urban renewal programmes which are designed to reduce the grievances around which the popular masses can mobilize. The economic crisis does, however, place major constraints on such a process and highlights a central contradiction for the state. At the very time when state expenditure is most needed to institute socio-economic reforms, the South African state is least able to afford such reforms. As a consequence it seems likely that the state will have to rely on repression until such time as economic circumstances improve. Finally, it should be noted that the contradictions that gave rise to the need for state control of the sphere of reproduction in the first place, will not simply be eliminated by a privatization programme.
Chapters Eight and Nine focused on major changes in state urban and regional policy. The emphasis in Chapters Ten and Eleven, however, shifts to the way in which political crisis has politicized "conventional" planning practices. This particular chapter deals with a variety of issues. It begins with a discussion of the effects of reform-oriented restructuring of state apparatuses on: planning outcomes; the environment's within which planners work; and the jurisdictions over which they preside. This is followed by an evaluation of the extent to which the introduction of new urban planning tools, such as structure plans and development plans, can be understood as part and parcel of broader political reform. Finally, attempts to link racial zoning quite explicitly to the conventional cornerstone of town planning practice in South Africa, town planning schemes, are discussed. In each of the sections, the way in which these developments have contributed to the politicization of urban and regional planning is noted. So too are the opportunities for and constraints on progressive planning practices that these changes have presented.

GoverNMENT RESTRUCTURING AND PLANNING

An important part of the National Party’s response to political crisis has been wide-ranging restructuring of all levels of government. As suggested in the previous section this restructuring was motivated in large part by the determination of P.W. Botha's verligtes to gain full control of the state apparatuses and to change the relationship of government to society (Frost, 1987). One particularly important component of the latter process was to move in the direction of replacing parliament, as the prime decision-making body, by the State Security Council which itself is largely insulated from popular politics. The implications for planning of the creation of a "parallel" government was discussed in the preceding chapter with particular reference to upgrading. This section focuses on the implications for planning of the restructuring of the less clandestine state apparatuses. It should be noted however, that a comprehensive analysis of state restructuring and its implications for planning is beyond the scope of this dissertation.
This section does little more than to provide a general overview of such restructuring and to hint at implications for planning.

The restructuring of government has affected urban and regional planning in the following major ways:

1. It has altered the political character of a number of government institutions within which planners work.
2. It has changed the scope and jurisdiction of urban and regional planning intervention.
3. It has affected planning outcomes in specific contexts.

These impacts will be examined with reference to restructuring at first, second and third tier respectively.

At a first tier level, the creation of the tri-cameral parliament has also meant the re-arrangement of existing state apparatuses and the creation of new bureaucracies to serve the so-called House of Delegates\(^1\) and also the House of Representatives. Housing has been designated an "own affair" and as a consequence housing and planning departments have been set up by both houses. In large part the "own affairs" administrations of each of the houses, have been forced to take relatively progressive stances in order to gain some legitimacy in their communities given the low turnouts at the polls and given the extent to which those who participated in the tri-cameral system were branded as opportunists and collaborators. In Durban, for example, the House of Representatives together with the Durban City Council embarked on a model upgrading programme in the Austerville community which involved high levels of community participation. Also in Durban, the intervention of the House of Delegates in the Clairwood issue may have been important in effecting what appears to be an imminent victory for the residents of Clairwood, who are opposing the industrialization of their neighbourhood by the Durban City Council. Since these and other issues will be described in greater detail in a later chapter, suffice it to say that

\(^1\) The House of Delegates is the parliamentary chamber in the tri-cameral structure for the Indian community. The House of Representatives is the equivalent structure for the Coloured community.
the House of Delegates has achieved some success in effecting policy changes. This is not to say that this success was achieved simply because of participation in the system. The changes were achieved at a particular moment in history when the legitimation of participation required that "progressive" gains be delivered.

In any event, it is important to note that the creation of the tri-cameral parliament certainly has altered the balance of political forces affecting planning decisions, at least at the local level. There can be little question that the influence of at least a segment of the local Indian community in Durban has been improved by House of Delegates intervention in the affairs of the Durban City Council. It should be noted, however, that behind virtually every progressive intervention by the House of Delegates stood a progressive community organization. Thus, although the House of Delegates introduced a more progressive rents formula for public housing in 1987, the Durban Housing Action Committee (a UDF affiliate) had been campaigning for a similar formula for a number of years. Whether or not progressive civic organizations in the Indian and Coloured communities would have been as successful in having their demands met, if the state was not trying to co-opt Indians and Coloureds through the tri-cameral system, is however, debatable.

The other major exercise in restructuring of state apparatuses at first tier is the gradual dismantling of the Department originally charged with implementing "Grand Apartheid" (the name of the Department changed many times from the Department of Native Affairs through to its current designation as the Department of Development Aid). In a previous chapter we noted how control over all aspects relating to the reproduction of the African working classes was removed from local authorities and centralized in a single state department. This, in turn, meant that planning activities became sharply demarcated along race lines. The average urban planner working within a municipality had no jurisdiction over what happened in African townships. The planning, layout, location and development of Black urban areas fell under the jurisdiction of the local satellites of the Department of Development Aid - the Administration Boards. At a regional level, a similar separation had taken place with independent bantustans and the Department of Development Aid controlling planning activities here. As was noted in
the earlier chapter, this separation of planning functions contributed to the dogma amongst most planners (the vast majority of whom were employed by municipalities) that planning was an essentially technical "public interest" profession.

In the mid-1980's, the reformists within government moved to dismantle the Department of Development Aid. A large number of functions were transferred to other more verligte departments (African education, for example, went to the Department of Education and Training and Labour Bureaux to the Department of Manpower). The major shift of functions was, however, in the direction of the reformist Department of Constitutional Development and Planning. The DCDP was given control over inter alia local authorities, the mooted RSCs 1, the Regional Development Advisory Committees (RDACs) 2, the Regional Liaison Committees 3, and other multilateral structures, and the Development Boards (the old Administration Boards) (Hindson, 1987b). Of course, many of these institutions were themselves the creations of reformists. In any event, one effect of the reshuffling was that, at second tier level at least, the separation of planning jurisdiction along ethnic lines was partially closed and partially reinforced. In Natal, for example, planners working for the province became involved in joint planning ventures with KwaZulu through the RDACs and a body established for this purpose - the KwaZulu/Natal Planning Council. In fact, the status of planners at provincial level increased dramatically as they were called upon to resolve the pressing problems of the entire region. At this time, the deliberations of the KwaZulu/Natal Indaba were also at their height, which also contributed to the importance and prestige of planning at the provincial level. Interestingly too, the Natal Town and Regional Planning Commission (the provincial planning body) began to take

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1 RSCs were referred to in the earlier chapters and are metropolitan bodies financing and co-ordinating "hard" service provision.

2 RDACs are committees set up to advise government on the planning of the economic regions referred to in chapters six and eight.

3 Regional Liaison Committees provide formal channels for economic co-operation and planning between the RSA and the Bantustans.
on a more overtly politico-economic role and the scope of urban and regional planning intervention was dramatically expanded.

A number of "liberal" planners within the Town and Regional Planning Commission became key actors in the entire process and spaces for progressive planning practices were opened up (Anon, 1987). The heyday of this reformist phase was in the period 1982 to 1986. By 1987, however, it became clear that given the dramatic swing of White political opinion to the right, the government was no longer very interested in the Indaba and federalism, even at an experimental level. The politico-economic role of the Natal Town and Regional Planning Commission came into question not only because the political "moment" had changed, but also because the central state began to take much more direct control over the second tier of government. Elected provincial councils were abolished altogether. Instead, the State President now appoints a provincial administrator and a multi-racial executive.

Prior to the imposition of direct National Party control over the provinces, Natal had a reputation for being something of a maverick. The Natal Town and Regional Planning Commission was certainly perceived as an institution with liberal tendencies. In fact, many of the younger planners who entered the Commission in the early 1980's were progressive and had joined the progressive planning organizations which had emerged in the mid-1980's ¹. Given overall state restructuring, these planners found themselves exercising jurisdiction not only over planning for KwaZulu but also the old Development Board areas which had been brought under the authority of the provinces. By 1987, however, as Frost (1987) has suggested, government moved to repress popular politics and to impose top-down reforms. Some progressive planners within the Commission were shifted sideways into relatively technicist and innocuous jobs (Anon, 1987). Others were directly intimidated by the state security apparatuses and many left the service of the Commission. Planners within the Commission were required to undergo "security clearance" checks and were made to sign security declarations (Anon, 1987). Clearly the phase in which the government was prepared to tolerate bright "crisis-resolvers" of the progressive ilk within the provincial

¹ These bodies will be described at length in Chapter Eleven.
structures was over. Generally speaking, all of those within the
government apparatuses who favoured "bottom'up" approaches to reform had
fallen from favour, particularly those with leftist associations.

The restructuring of third tier government has proven most problematic
for government, mainly because of resistance from below. As a
consequence, restructuring of the third tier is very much in its infancy
and the effects on planning practices have at this stage been minimal,
although the potential impact is very large. The major features of
third tier reform are the creation of autonomous and fully- fledged Black
Local Authorities (BLAs) in African, Indian and Coloured areas and the
introduction of metropolitan structures - Regional Service Councils
(RSCs). Prior to 1960, the only formal structures through which
Africans were able to articulate interests in local affairs was through
the Advisory Boards which were purely consultative (Morris, 1981). In
1961, the Urban Bantu Councils were introduced and given jurisdiction
over limited township functions such as layouts, creation of buildings
and the provision of welfare services. In Soweto, the first Urban Bantu
Council election was held in 1969 and a percentage poll of 32% was
recorded (Morris, 1981). However, the inability of these Councils even
to distribute patronage meant that by 1974 the percentage poll here had
dropped to 14% (Morris, 1981). By 1977, in the wake of the Soweto
revolt, all members of the Council resigned. In 1977, Urban Bantu
Councils were replaced by Community Councils which, in the end, had very
similar powers. By this time, however, government had become aware that
there was seething discontent in the townships over the ineffectiveness,
arrogance and repressive nature of existing structures of township
governance. The Cillie Commission (1980) identified widespread
dissatisfaction with Administration Boards and the Urban Bantu Councils
as an important contributor to the Soweto Revolt. The Riekert proposals
of 1979 also referred to the need for more effective local government.
Riekert went so far as to propose that autonomous Black Local Authorities
be established, and that these should achieve greater levels of financial
self-sufficiency than was currently the case. However, attempts to
impose autonomous Indian and Coloured local authorities had faltered on
this issue (and others) and the Browne Commission of 1980 recommended
that transfer payments be made from White to Coloured and Indian local
authorities (African local authorities lay outside of the commission's
brief) in order to make the latter viable (Todes, Watson and Wilkinson, 1986).

In 1983, thirty-four Black Local Authorities were introduced and it was hoped that by the end of 1984, one hundred and four would be in place (Cobbett et al, 1987). By 1985, however, only three were still functioning (Cobbett et al, 1987). The rejection of Black Local Authorities by the popular masses had been devastating. In 1985, the Government passed legislation allowing for the introduction of Regional Services Councils (RSCs). In the years immediately prior to the introduction of this legislation, RSCs had been presented as bodies which would have substantial redistributive powers. They were designed to provide bulk services across municipal boundaries for functional metropolitan areas. Opposition from White Local Authorities has, however, substantially whittled back the redistributive potential of RSCs. In terms of the Regional Services Council Act No 109 of 1985, representation of racially defined local authorities on the RSCs will be determined by the proportion of RSC services that they consume. While no local authority can have more than 50% of the votes, the net effect, is to concentrate power in the hands of the high-service consuming White Local Authorities (Todes, Watson and Wilkinson, 1986).

Precisely how redistributive RSCs turn out to be, therefore, will depend on the attitudes of these powerful White Local Authorities to reform, and the vested interests they have in such an approach. Thus, in the Western Cape and Durban-Pinetown metropolitan areas, the liberal city councils may have a progressive influence on the RSCs. Too much should not be expected in this regard however. It is rumoured, for example, that the expenditure of R200 million by the Durban City Council on CBD and beachfront improvements was precipitated by the fear that the introduction of RSCs would force Durban to spend its considerable wealth on redistributive upgrading projects (Mair, 1986). Interestingly, this sudden spate of expenditure provided city planners with an opportunity to become involved in grand urban reconstruction and design which would be the envy of any planning professional. While the Durban City Council has perhaps embarked on a defensive spending campaign, it has also recently indicated that it is interested in getting involved in the huge informal areas at the edge of the metropolitan area. Such a concern may
be motivated by a fear of the externality effects of the rapidly burgeoning "squatter" crisis, but in any event, progressive spending may eventuate.

As currently defined RSCs do not allow for the subsidizing and financing of Black Local Authorities, except with regard to the up-front provision of hard services (sewerage, water, electricity, roads and so on). So called "soft" services (health, welfare, etc) will be the sole responsibility of the local authorities. Thus, the RSCs cannot be regarded as anything more than a limited and technicist form of metropolitan government. But they may well be a bridgehead to a more comprehensive form of metropolitan government which could make effective metropolitan planning a reality. Since the provision of hard services has close links to land-use planning, co-ordinated metropolitan-wide planning and governance is likely to become a necessity. While the provinces and bodies such as the Cape Divisional Council have in the past produced metropolitan plans, the RSCs may, in the longer run, provide a basis for metropolitan planning and governance with real teeth. The metropolitan plans which have been produced to date by the provinces have been little more than land-use guidelines.

The provinces have been able to exercise power through negative development controls in the sphere of circulation, they have not been able to tie land-use planning to government investment and spending at the metropolitan level. This has limited the extent to which they have been able to get involved in proactive development planning at a metropolitan level. The RSCs may change this as land-use planning can be tied to metropolitan-wide institutional structures with investment powers. It should also be noted that the introduction of RSCs may bring Black reproductive spaces back into the sphere of influence of planners working for White municipalities, who, in turn, have an influence on the role that these authorities play in the RSCs. This is significant primarily because the major metropolitan areas tend to have much greater "liberal" representation on city councils and because the planners working for these authorities are generally progressive. On the other hand as Todes, Watson and Wilkinson (1986) point out, the imposition of RSCs in the Western Cape may dilute the progressive influence of the Cape Town City Council in the "Coloured" areas under its jurisdiction, and
this may affect the possibilities for progressive planning. The same
may be true for Durban.

It has already been noted that the building blocks of RSCs, the Black
Local Authorities, have encountered widespread political opposition.
However, government was determined to go ahead with the imposition of
such authorities, and having repressed popular organizations, held
widespread elections in October 1988. RSCs have already been imposed in
the Witwatersrand, the Western Cape and in the Bloemfontein area, but it
is too early to tell what the effects of these structures on urban
planning will be. As discussed earlier, Frost (1987) argues that in
imposing both Black Local Authorities and RSCs, government is not
concerned with achieving legitimacy at this stage. Its primary concern is
to impose authority, to technicize politics, and to create an army of
Black civil servants with interests in the status quo. If Frost (1987)
is correct, it is interesting that planning fits into these designs in
the following respects. Firstly, as Todes, Watson and Wilkinson (1986)
point out, part of the strategy to "depoliticize" RSCs has been to
present them as technicist bodies dealing with regional issues, according
to a scientific logic. Thus, the rationale for provision of services at
a metropolitan level, is presented in the familiar metropolitan planning
jargon of economies of scale in service provision, consumption
thresholds, indivisibilities in production and so on. The same can be
said of the role of technicist planning theory in other "multi-racial"
political structures that have been established, such as the Regional
Development Advisory Committees (RADCs) and other multi-lateral
structures at the second tier. The second way in which planning bears a
relation to the government agenda described by Frost (1987), concerns the
fact that Black planning professionals will be part of the bureaucratic
class that the state is trying to create.

Whether, or not, the creation of a Black bureaucratic class in the urban
areas will have the conservatising effects that the Government is banking
on, is however, by no means inevitable. Strategies of this kind have
been successful in the bantustans. But South Africa's metropolitan
areas are not the bantustans and a vastly different political
consciousness exists among the Black professional elites in the urban
areas. What this poses is, at least, the possibility that the creation
of Black Local Authorities and RSCs may open the space for the pursuit of more aggressive within-system advocacy planning than has been possible in the past.

This is not to suggest that as a general rule major material or political gains can be won through RSCs. It is simply to note that progressive planners should be alert to new openings, and should assess the possibilities for progressive practices in the light of the concrete circumstances they find themselves in.

An additional implication for planning of state restructuring at third and second tier level is the possible development of regional "corporatism" in the resolution of planning and development issues. Frost (1987, p 12) puts the case for corporatism succinctly:

"From the point of view of any one province, the key question in a time of scarcity (which will be all the time) will be how can this region get a larger slice of the cake from central government than the other regions? Thus a regional self-interest will emerge and that interest will be managed by a single local government."

The corporatist tendencies inherent in the local strategic planning initiatives in Cape Town and Pietermaritzburg have already been referred to. It is doubtful, however, that this will ever be more than a very limited corporatism, and it is unlikely that popular political and labour organizations will ever become part of such a corporatism. If this were to happen, however, planners could find themselves in a phase where genuine "public interest" planning at regional and metropolitan levels is possible. The major constraint on such a corporatism is the crisis in the economy which, in effect, would make the rewards to the popular masses of being involved far too low. If this is so, then it is quite likely that at all levels, the state will attempt to co-opt selectively rather than attempt corporatist solutions.

NEW IMPETUS FOR EVOLVING TOWN PLANNING MECHANISMS

In Chapter Five it was noted that notwithstanding the perennial tension between the need for social co-ordination of land use activity on the one
hand, and the pursuit of private profits on the other, town planning schemes proved to be relatively successful and widely accepted devices for effecting town planning.

"... with the particular conditions, and characteristics of land ownership in this country, the town planning scheme took root and has flourished for the past 40 years" (Oakenfull, 1985, p 104).

In fact, town planning in White residential areas has been based almost entirely on the use of the town planning scheme. By the 1970's certain shortcomings of an essentially "rationalist" sort were becoming evident. As a consequence, a debate developed around the introduction of new town planning mechanisms, but progress in this regard was slow. By the mid-1980's, however, the widespread introduction of a new town planning approach received a new impetus. Oakenfull (1985, p 104) describes the emergence of this new impetus as follows:

"Perhaps in the past our problems of urban development have not been so critical and so the shortcomings of the town planning scheme have not been so evident. More recently however, the need for a more adequate system of town planning has been recognized and we have already heard today what the proposed system is to be. The reason for this is, of course, that with the social and constitutional development trends in this country, planning for community welfare now has greater priority."

Whether Oakenfull (1985) is correct in advancing a new concern with reformism as a major reason for the reassessment of town planning schemes is, however debatable. In the discussion that follows the evolution of the debate around the shortcomings of town planning schemes will be discussed. The nature of the new mechanisms will also be outlined. Finally, the discussion will return to Oakenfull’s hypothesis that the new mechanisms are being taken more seriously because of reformism.

Van Zyl (1985) argues that the initial perceptions of the need for revised town planning procedures grew out of a recognition for the need for an overall planning system to deal with rapidly increasing urbanization on the one hand, and the emergence of certain symptoms of the urbanization process on the other. Initially, it was the symptoms
of this process that were most influential. As early as 1976, the Niamand Commission was established to investigate the high price of undeveloped urban land and of residential sites (van Zyl, 1985). As discussed in a previous chapter, the 1960’s had been a period of rapid accumulation. Moreover, this accumulation binge had been accompanied by the growth of White suburbia. As a consequence, local authorities came under increasing pressure to regularly revise their town planning schemes. This, coupled to the growing demand for suburban land, led to a tendency to "over-zone" land for residential use. In other words, a tendency developed to zone large tracts of undeveloped land around municipal boundaries for residential use. Since the town planning scheme is a statutory document which accords development rights, owners began to exercise their rights, which, in turn, began to place undue pressure on local authorities for extension of infrastructure and services.

Township extensions often did not occur on a rational basis (from a phasing point of view) and this contributed to the unrealistically high prices of residential lots. The concerns of the Niamand Commission gave rise to the consideration of the need for plans which outlined policy intent but did not accord statutory rights. Planners began to pay attention to the use of structure plans which, by this time, had become part of the planning machinery in Britain. The notion of overall "policy" plans as distinct from statutory town planning schemes was taken further in the Fouche Commission’s investigation into housing opportunities in 1977 and the Venter Commission’s investigation of township establishment in 1983 (cited in van Zyl, 1985).

In the late 1960’s and early 1970’s, planners were increasingly making use of informal structure plans to good effect. However, as van Zyl (1985) points out, these were essentially "bottom-drawer" plans. As a consequence little control was exercised over the quality of plans produced. Moreover, the use of such plans was haphazard and there were many municipalities which were not using even "bottom drawer" plans, even though there was a need for them (van Zyl, 1985). Problems were also developing in metropolitan areas where the contradiction between the unity of everyday life and its fragmented administration was increasing. Van Zyl (1985) argues that notwithstanding the need for overall
metropolitan structure plans, it was difficult to get local authorities, with their parochial interests to voluntarily establish and abide by such plans. The only formally recognized metropolitan-wide policy plans were the "guide plans", the emergence of which was discussed in an earlier chapter. These guide plans received statutory status in 1975 and by 1981 became binding on government. While the original intention of the guide plans was to rationalize ethnic spatial engineering in rapidly growing urban areas, they were increasingly used to set broad land-use policy in metropolitan areas. Such plans were, however, too broad to give specific guidance to township developers and a large gap existed between the immensely detailed town planning schemes and the very broad guide plans.

The Venter Commission (1983) set out to rationalize the planning system and to develop an approach which would cover the entire geographical and functional planning field (van Zyl, 1985). The commission proposed a hierarchy of plans - national, regional, sub-regional, urban and local. At each level, structure plans, and what were termed "development" plans, would be produced. While the structure plan was to give a broad indication of proposed land-use (a policy plan), the development plan would outline firm intentions for the phasing of service and infrastructure provision. The Venter Commission argued that whether or not these plans would have statutory status would depend on further analysis, but they did not rule out the possibility. They also charged the provinces with the task of investigating the viability of their proposals and of taking the proposals further.

It appears that the idea of a "development" plan had come from Natal, where the Town and Regional Planning Commission had already formulated a "three-plan package". This package had also clearly influenced the Venter Commission in other respects. The package covers those plans which can be related to a town planning scheme as the control document (Froud, 1985). Thus, the package can apply to the sub-regional (metropolitan), town and local scales (Froud, 1985). At each of these scales the following types of plans can be produced:

1. A structure plan (a 20 year policy plan)
2. A development plan (a 10 year implementation and budgeting plan)
3. A town planning scheme (a statutory control plan which confers rights).

The provincial administration will have the power to require that a local authority or any sub-regional authority within its jurisdiction, prepare one or more of the component plans (Froud, 1985). In this sense, each of the plans has statutory content. But, only the town planning scheme confers right and it is the only document that is binding. The other provinces have also developed similar systems in response to the Venter Commission. The new Cape Land-Use Planning Ordinance, makes provision for a hierarchy of structure plans which include regional, urban and local structure plans. Unlike Natal, the Cape approach does not specify the precise functions of development plans, but simply indicates that they may be prepared to facilitate implementation (Froud, 1985). In the Orange Free State a set of guidelines has been produced covering both structure and development plans (Froud, 1985).

From the accounts above, it should be relatively clear that the development of the new town planning mechanisms occurred relatively autonomously from the overtly political constitutional planning proposals. To a large extent their emergence can best be explained in Weberian terms. As the pace of industrialization and urbanization accelerated, so the need for more complex rationalist systems of control increased. However, there can be little doubt that once the new constitutional proposals began to crystallize, the necessity of co-ordinating them with the new planning proposals became apparent. Thus, in 1985, the South African Institute of Town and Regional Planners organized a conference on "Urban Planning and the New Constitution". The way in which the content of the conference was orchestrated is of some import. Overall there were three major sessions. The first dealt with urban change and development problems at a broad level of abstraction. The second focused on the new constitutional proposals and was introduced by Minister Heunis himself ¹. The third was entitled "Implications for Planning" but dealt almost exclusively with the new

¹ Heunis is the Minister of Constitutional Planning and Development and the architect of the new constitutional proposals.
planning mechanisms and their relation to the new constitutional proposals. Among the connections made were the following: Van Zyl (1985) pointed out that with the establishment of the tri-cameral parliament and three separate houses for own affairs, the potential for confusion around planning issues was compounded. Thus, he suggests that in establishing a hierarchy of plans, as much uniformity should be achieved across the country as possible.

"... maar daar is 'n aantal sake waaroor verder tussen die verskillende oorelgemane beraadslag kan word met die oog daar op om, soveer as moontlik, eenvormigheid in benadering te bewerkstellig. Dit is baie belangrik omdat, met totstandkoming van die drie huise vir eie-sake, die potensiaal vir 'n groot toename in verwarring duidelijk aansienlik verhoog het" (van Zyl, 1985, p 89).

Other speakers (e.g. Froud, 1985; van Zyl, 1985) drew attention to the role that the new planning mechanisms would play in contributing to the devolution of power to the local level, which was one of the major aims of the new constitutional proposals.

"In addition the package will aid the streamlining of township and other development procedures and it will form the basis for the transfer of planning autonomy to local authorities. This new planning approach will therefore play a major role in implementing the principle of greater autonomy at the local level, contained in the new constitution and advocated by the Venter Commission" (Froud, 1985, p 94).

Van Zyl (1985) outlined the way in which the planning ordinance in the Cape Province made provision for "delegation" plans which were specifically designed to promote the devolution of planning activities to the local level.

1 English Translation:

"...But there are a number of other matters which can be fruitfully discussed by the various governments with a view to establishing uniformity in approach as far as is possible. This is very important since, with the establishment of the three houses for own-affairs, the potential for an increase in confusion has clearly risen."
However, most of the debate focused on the relation of the new planning mechanisms and Regional Service Councils (RSCs). Numerous speakers (Haygarth, 1985; van Zyl, 1985; Oakenfull, 1985) saw the RSCs as a potentially exciting vehicle through which metropolitan land-use and transport planning could finally be conducted on a rational basis. Moreover, it was pointed out that since RSCs had their own sources of finance, these bodies would realistically be able to formulate structure and development plans for their jurisdictions. Van Zyl (1985, p 91) discusses the potential role of RSCs in planning as follows:

"Die SDRs sal 'n baie belangrike rol moet speel in koordinasie tussen eie-sake onderling en tussen eiesake en algemene sake te bewerkstellig. Om hierdie rede sal SDRs waar hulle ookal ingestel word, waarskynlik altyd die verantwoordelikheid vir die opstel van struktuurplande moet aanvaar. Ook ten opsigte van gidsplande en metropolitaanse vervoerplanne is die betrokke wette al reeds so aangepas dat die SDRs 'n belangrike rol sal moet speel. Dit is my oorwoe mening dat dit die SDRs se heel belangrikste funksie moet wees om die oorhoofse strategie vir die toekoms ontwikkeling van 'n gebied uit te werk en ook om beheer uit te oefen oor die uitvoering van sodanige strategie. SDRs moet op hierdie bree beplannings-funksies konsentreer en nie te veel betrokke raak by die fisiese levering van dienste nie ... Die SDRs self moet konsentreer op beleidsbepaling en die uitvoering daarvan. Kragtens die Wet op Streekdiensterade sal die SDRs die nodige statutere maat en die geld he om hierdie uiers belangrike taak aan te pak."

1 English Translation:

"The RSCs will have to play a very important role in co-ordinating own-affairs matters as well as effecting co-ordination between own and general affairs. For this reason, RSCs, wherever they are established, will have to accept responsibility for the production of structure plans. Moreover, the relevant laws with regard to guide plans and metropolitan transport plans have already been amended in such a way that RSCs will have to play an important role. It is my considered opinion that the main function of the RSCs should be to work out the broad overview strategy for the region and to exercise control in the implementation of the strategy. RSCs must concentrate on these broad planning functions and not on the delivery of services ... The RSCs must concentrate on policy formulation and its implementation. In terms of the Law on Regional Services Councils, the RSCs will have both the statutory power and the money to tackle this vital task."

Many of the planners at the conference endorsed van Zyl's view that RSCs provided a unique opportunity to conduct real metropolitan planning and to reintegrate metropolitan land-use planning and metropolitan transport planning which had become separated. However, the architects of RSC legislation pointed out that RSCs were legislatively confined to dealing with provision of services (Pistorius, 1985). Moreover, the subsequent limited implementation of RSCs has done little to suggest that RSCs will be anything but technicist service bodies. In a previous section, however, the view was expressed that RSCs may well be a bridgehead to a more comprehensive form of metropolitan government and planning. It is certainly apparent that most urban and regional planners would regard this as a logical development. Moreover, it is likely that as RSCs tackle concrete practices so the need to move towards full-fledged metropolitan government will become increasingly evident. On the one hand, it should be noted that if the swing to the right in the White electorate is sustained, it is unlikely that the forms of metropolitan government alluded to above will materialize. In fact, RSCs, even in their present form may come under so much pressure from the right that they may never really operate effectively. On the other hand the metropolitan areas are generally more moderate politically than other locales.

In addition to the links discussed above, Oakenfull (1985) argues that the new planning mechanisms bear a relation to the reformism implicit in the new constitutional proposals. He points out that the origins of modern planning in Britain and the USA were in social reform and that planning in South Africa was increasingly being influenced by the reformist mood:

"... Early town planning was ... based on social reform and the improvement of the urban environment associated with these reform ideals ... The ideals were of a better society, of social improvement and reform and were expressed in terms of the elimination of poverty and squalor, of more equal opportunity and a greater equity in the allocation of resources. In many respects, the very same ideals are being voiced in this country today" (Oakenfull, 1985, p 101).

Oakenfull (1985) argues that the traditional tools of town planning are, however, unequal to the task of re-introducing reformism into town
planning. Zoning and the town planning scheme, Oakenfull argues, are negative control mechanisms designed to protect amenity and not for social reformism:

"This is not to say that a town planning scheme has no validity; it is an important and vital tool in the management of urban development but it can only serve one purpose. That purpose is the effective regulation and control of development to achieve amenity in and attractiveness of the urban physical environment. Nothing more and nothing less" (Oakenfull, 1985, p 103).

Oakenfull (1985) goes on to argue that the new planning mechanisms allow planners for the first time to pursue "policy" issues as opposed to merely regulating physical growth.

"For the first time, an attempt is being made to create a proper framework for urban planning; to distinguish ideals from technicalities; to separate policy from implementation; and to differentiate planning from administration. The prognosis is good ..." (Oakenfull, 1985, p 108).

While there can be no argument with Oakenfull's characterization of mainstream town planning as minimalist and physicalist, there are reasons for being a little more dubious about his proposition that the new mechanisms allow for the expansion of mainstream town planning into the sphere of social reform. To begin with, the innovative elements of the new package - structure plans and development plans - do not necessarily imply a shift in the direction of social concerns and away from physicalism. A structure plan, as commonly used, is after all no more than a loose spatial land-use plan. Likewise it appears that the common conception of development plans is that they will be largely confined to the programming of infrastructure provision rather than with any broader concern with social and economic policy. Moreover, it should be noted that total reliance on the town planning scheme in no way has hindered physical, economic or social development interventions in Black reproduction spaces.

It has been argued elsewhere in this dissertation that whereas state intervention in "White" areas has been minimalist and administrative, intervention in Black reproductive spaces has been substantial and
through the years the state has tried to control every aspect of everyday life in the townships. Moreover, since town planning schemes have seldom been applied in Black residential areas, they can hardly be conceived of as ever having constituted a barrier to reformism. Ironically, it is the era of reform which has allowed the introduction of the minimalist town planning mechanisms into the townships. If the state is successful in its attempts to establish autonomous Black Local Authorities, structure plans, development plans and town planning schemes, may have to be prepared for these new authorities. Whether or not such plans will contribute to social reform will depend, of course, on the resources of such local authorities, which are likely to be scant. Thus Oakenfull’s (1985) optimism may only be justified if RSCs take on planning functions, and as has already been noted, there is some doubt about this. Oakenfull’s proposition that the new planning mechanisms open the way for a greater town planning concern with social reformism, seems a little far-fetched. However, the new mechanisms may offer opportunities for progressive inputs in specific circumstances, and progressive planners need to be alerted to such possibilities. A case in point is the redevelopment of the Clairwood area in Durban.

As will be explained in a later chapter, the residents of Clairwood have been involved in a 30 year battle with the Durban City Council over the industrialization of the area. It now appears that the residents have won the battle and a significant portion of Clairwood is to be declared a "local planning area" and the Natal’s three-plan package is to be applied to it. In the specific circumstances, this provides a number of opportunities for the residents and their advocate planners. It also provides opportunities for planners within the city’s planning bureaucracies who are sympathetic to the residents. Firstly, in Natal, the three-plan package allows for a certain amount of participation in the structure planning phase. Clearly this provides an opportunity for the residents to further build their organization around the participation process. It also provides planners within the bureaucracy an opportunity to take their plans to the community and to facilitate this process. Secondly, the fact that a development plan will have to be formulated also provides opportunities. Since the city had intended to industrialize the area, the residential infrastructure in the area is grossly underdeveloped and upgrading is an urgent priority if further
deterioration in the area is to be avoided. The fact that a development plan has to be devised means that the city has to commit itself on a specific development programme which is sorely needed. Furthermore, the residents of the area can contest the actual content of this development plan. Thus, in those contexts where disadvantaged communities fall under the jurisdiction of relatively affluent "White" local authorities, the new planning mechanisms may offer interesting opportunities. Given the state's apparent insistence on creating ethnically based autonomous local authorities, however, opportunities of this sort may be limited.

While the 1980's have witnessed the introduction of a new range of town planning tools, the reform process has also led to the contemplation of refashioning old and established town planning tools to serve entirely political ends. More specifically, by the mid-1980's, town planning schemes, the bread-and-butter of conventional town planning, were being explicitly linked to the reform of the Group Areas Act.

REFORM, THE GROUP AREAS ACT AND TOWN PLANNING - THE GAP CLOSES

As outlined in Chapter Five, the Group Areas Act has been a cornerstone of intra-urban ethnic engineering. By 1985, the Act had been used to create approximately 1700 racially exclusive residential areas in South Africa (Pirie, 1987). Given the rising anti-apartheid political clamour of the 1980's, on both the local and international fronts, the Act began to come under scrutiny from the reformist Botha government. In the mid-1980's, the Group Areas Act was referred to the President's Council for review and there was widespread speculation that substantial changes were in the offing. It was rumoured that government intended to apply the Act to areas smaller than whole suburbs such as street blocks or even blocks of flats (Pirie, 1987).

Towards the end of 1986, the President's Council recommended that town planning schemes and title deeds would be the mechanisms through which residential racial division would be regulated in accordance with the wishes of residents and property developers. Clearly, this was a matter of great import to the town planning profession since the proposals collapsed any distance that might have existed between ethnic spatial engineering and conventional town planning. Interestingly, the planning
profession reacted quite strongly against these proposals. Particularly vocal in their rejection was the Natal Branch of the South African Institute of Town and Regional Planners, which had received a "leftist" reputation at a controversial conference in 1985 at which the profession failed to condemn apartheid outright (see Chapter Eleven). The Natal Branch found the linking of town planning schemes with racial zoning unacceptable for the following reasons:

"(i) In such a system it would not be possible to achieve sound town planning goals such as the improvement of general welfare and improvements in efficiency and economy in the process of development. Racial zoning creates inefficient and inequitable towns and cities and causes considerable hardship and suffering. Any system which has these effects could not serve to promote the achievement of acceptable town planning goals.

(ii) Town Planning would without any doubt become politicised. The often bitter hatred and the widespread general rejection which is expressed against racial zoning would carry over onto town planning schemes. This would promote unwarranted flouting of schemes to the detriment of the community as a whole. It would also result in irrelevant racial issues delaying or complicating decisions about land and building use matters - the acceptable subject matter of schemes. The cost to individual citizens and the community as a whole would be significant.

(iii) The standing of the planning profession would be undermined. This would serve to reduce the entry of new planners into the profession at a time when the overwhelming problems of rapid urbanization require more and not less planning expertise. If urbanization issues are not adequately addressed the stability of the society may be jeopardised. Furthermore, South African planners would become more isolated by their overseas colleagues. At a time when South Africa is becoming increasingly isolated in many professional fields a move which would promote such isolation can only be ill-advised. A loss of contact with overseas planners would retard advances in the theory and practice of town planning" (Natal Branch, S.A.I.T.R.P., 1987, pp 1-2).

Reaction against the proposals from other provinces was more mild, particularly in the conservative Transvaal. However, the issue never really developed any momentum, largely because it was overtaken by
developments on the political terrain. Given the rapid growth of the extreme right wing in the period after 1986, the Botha Government back-pedalled and reaffirmed its commitment to the notion of racially exclusive Group Areas. By 1988, government had introduced highly-controversial legislation aimed at tightening Group Areas Controls. They have, however, also introduced the notion of "free-settlement" areas which could be designated in a limited number of areas. In any event, the current political mood within the White Community is such that significant changes to the 37-year-old history of zoning racially exclusive areas, are unlikely. However, should any attempts to move away from the Group Areas Act involve conventional planning mechanisms, it is likely that the town planning profession, already much more politicized than was hitherto the case, will become a terrain of increasingly acrimonious political debate.

CONCLUSION

The restructuring of state apparatuses which has followed in the wake of political crisis, has led to substantial changes in the political character of the environments within which planners work, and the jurisdictions over which they preside. As far as the political character of planning environments is concerned, there have been contradictory tendencies. On the one hand, at all levels of government, the restructuring has provided opportunities for relatively progressive crisis-resolvers. On the other hand, while state restructuring has involved the devolution of functions from central to regional and local levels, the government has moved to increase the centralization of control over all levels. In these contradictory circumstances, progressive planners within the state structures are both needed and simultaneously rejected. Up to 1986, those planners with a sympathy for and understanding of "bottom-up" development procedures and the dynamics of Black communities, were able to make significant gains. With the ascendancy of the "hawks" in the post-1986 period, however, the opportunity spaces have narrowed significantly. As far as the jurisdictions over which planners preside are concerned, state restructuring has resulted in partial reintegration at an institutional level of planning for White and Black areas. Given the observation in Chapter Five that the separation of these jurisdictions historically was
the prime determinant of the "apolitical" and "technicist" view that most planners in South Africa hold, so it follows that reintegration may serve to challenge conventional dogma, to politicize planning and perhaps provide opportunities for progressive practices.

While the analysis in this chapter has suggested that the introduction of new town planning mechanisms such as structure and development schemes, cannot be traced to political crisis per se, there can be little doubt that political crisis has provided additional impetus for their adoption. Moreover, it is quite likely that the adoption of new mechanisms to accommodate government restructuring, will itself become politicized. In fact, a feature of the period is the increasing politicization of conventional planning. This much was certainly evident in the linking of the Group Areas Act to town planning schemes. The overall politicization of planning is further elaborated in the chapter that follows.
CHAPTER ELEVEN: POLITICAL CRISIS, THE EMERGENCE OF A PROGRESSIVE PLANNING MOVEMENT, AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF PROGRESSIVE PLANNING THEORY AND PRACTICE IN SOUTH AFRICA

INTRODUCTION

Given the evidence produced thus far in this dissertation, it should be abundantly clear that urban and regional planning in South Africa does not cut a particularly progressive profile. The emergence in the 1980's of a progressive planning movement in South Africa is, as a consequence, a development of some import. The movement began with isolated "outside-system" advocacy practices in the late 1970's and early 1980's, and has developed into a maturing movement addressing planning practice both inside and outside of the formal planning apparatuses. The first section of this chapter traces this evolution and attempts to explain it. The analysis will hopefully reveal the close relation between the emergence of the movement and the political tumult of the late 1970's and the first half of the 1980's. It will become clear, however, that the emergence and trajectory of the movement cannot be explained solely with reference to the emergence of political crisis. It should also not be surprising that the development of a progressive planning movement has been accompanied by the development of theory to guide progressive planning practices. Developments in this regard will be investigated in a second section of the chapter.

THE EMERGENCE OF A PROGRESSIVE PLANNING MOVEMENT

The movement has its origins in the activities of a few planners attached mainly to the Durban campus of the University of Natal on the one hand, and the University of Cape Town on the other. In Durban, students and staff members of the university's Department of Town and Regional Planning became intimately involved in the activities of the civic organizations that were burgeoning in the area. In Cape Town planners attached to the Urban Problems Research Unit, which had itself been established in the wake of the Soweto revolt, also began to provide advice and support for the civics. The initiation of this involvement came, in the early stages, from civics themselves. Certainly in Durban, the Durban Housing Action Committee (DHAC) had become a sophisticated
and aggressive urban social movement by the early 1980's and they actively recruited sympathetic urban planners who were able to work outside the system. Later, advocate planners in Durban also became involved with the Joint Rent Action Committee (JORAC) from the African areas. While, in Durban at least, the civics were directly responsible for involving planners in progressive planning work, the fact that planners in the 1980's were amenable to their approaches, needs to be explained. After all, urban social movements existed in the 1950's, but advocacy planning practices certainly never occurred. It should be noted too that most of the planners who became involved with either the civics or the trade unions in the early 1980's, were White. In fact, there were only a handful of Black planners in the entire country. While this situation began to change towards the end of the 1980's as more and more Black students found their way into the planning profession, the advocacy movement was largely spearheaded by Whites with petty bourgeois backgrounds. Part of the explanation of this phenomenon is to be found in the politicization of English language universities during the 1960's and 1970's.

In the post-Sharpeville period (the 1960's) the English language universities became one of the few organized locales of resistance against the State. The National Union of South African Students (NUSAS) was a non-racial organization and led most of the protests. NUSAS provided a forum within which Black and White students could meet and work, and certainly exposed Whites to the views of their Black counterparts (Friedman, 1987). With the emergence of "Black Consciousness" in the late 1960's, however, Black students broke with NUSAS to form the Blacks only South African Students Organization (SASO). SASO argued that White protests against apartheid were "irrelevant" and only Blacks could bring about change. They also argued that their own development was being inhibited by their association with advantaged and skilled Whites in NUSAS. White students in NUSAS were wounded by the defection of Black students and were forced to rethink their role (Friedman, 1987). While they accepted the criticisms of SASO, White students were not prepared to be confined to the sidelines. As an African unionist later put it, they wanted "to be counted in the struggle" (cited in Friedman, 1987, p 42). Influenced by the French student movement of the sixties and by a particularly dynamic political
scientist, Richard Turner, the view that students could form an alliance with workers gained ground, particularly in Durban where the 1973 strikes occurred.

White students played a crucial part in the establishment of the trade union movement in this country and this, in turn, led to the development of a rich progressive political culture on the White campuses in the 1970’s. Through the 1970’s the rift between Black and White students was still there, and whilst White students cemented an alliance with Black workers, Black students were more active in the communities. This tension between two student elites was later to mature into a major ideological battle between so-called "workerists" and "populists". By the late 1970’s, however, Black Consciousness was no longer hegemonic and there was a return to the non-racial political traditions of the Congress movement. Thus, when the civic movement grew, Whites were again welcome in community politics. Moreover, White students were beginning to move into the sphere of town and regional planning since it seemed to deal with issues of such critical import to the future of the country (housing, transport, etc). They were disappointed with what they discovered, however, and particularly with the conservatism of the profession. Not surprisingly when the civics asked for assistance, this new breed of students and practitioners saw an opportunity to transform planning practices and theory.

Two other important influences on the emergence of advocacy planning, were the class positions of planners on the one hand and the importation of planning theory from abroad on the other. Reference has been made in previous chapters to the class differences between English-speaking Whites and Afrikaaners. The concentration of economic power has historically been in the hands of the English, while political power has been held by the Afrikaaners. However, as Lipton (1986) has pointed out, by the 1970’s Afrikaners had used political power to gain economic power and a substantial Afrikaner bourgeoisie had emerged. However, the concentration and centralization of capital on the one hand, and the incorporation of vast numbers of Afrikaners into the state bureaucracies on the other, meant that by the late 1970’s, the vast majority of White South Africans, Afrikaans or English-speaking, were petty-bourgeois. As a consequence, most of the students at White South African universities had
middle-class backgrounds and probably, middle to upper class futures. Now as Olin-Wright (1985) points out, in structural terms the petty-bourgeoisie occupies a contradictory class position between the working classes on the one hand and the bourgeoisie on the other. Thus, their interests in social transformation are usually contradictory and often depend on contingent circumstances.

When the spectre of revolt loomed large in South Africa in the late 1970's, the petty-bourgeoisie and aspirant bourgeoisie at English-language universities tended to align themselves either with the revolutionary aspirations of the popular masses and working classes, or with reform. On the Afrikaans-language campuses however, most students aligned themselves with the forces of reaction or with the reformist thrust. Only a very small minority threw in their lot with the popular masses. Given the similar structural class positions of students and staff at both English and Afrikaans institutions, the explanation for the differential responses has to be sought in the specificity of the revolt itself, and the historical links of these students and staff members to the major contenders on the politico-economic terrain.

Notwithstanding P.W. Botha's attempt to characterize the revolt of the 1970's and 1980's as part of a "communist" onslaught, it was nonetheless popularly understood, by both Blacks and Whites (and the international community), as a revolt primarily aimed at apartheid and at White hegemony. Certainly, there was an ideological struggle on both the left and the right over the definition and interpretation of the revolt. Organized capital had realized that since the early 1970's apartheid was potentially an obstacle to continued accumulation, and had openly begun to campaign for its reform or abolition (Lipton, 1986). Capital feared the conflation of the struggle against apartheid with the struggle against capitalism. Given the historical association of English-speakers with the ideology of organized capital, it is not surprising that students and staff on English-language campuses also began to oppose apartheid with new vigour in the 1970's and 1980's.

As far as mainstream Afrikaaners were concerned, however, it should be noted that a "racial" definition of revolt was very threatening. Among the most threatened were the bureaucrats whose jobs would surely be
threatened by the Africanization that seemed inevitable if the revolt was successful. Many of the people on Afrikaans campuses bear an historical relation to the economic interests of the White agriculturalists, bureaucrats and workers and to the associated ideology of Afrikaaner nationalism. Thus, again, it is not surprising that their reaction to revolt, ethnically-defined, was hostile. It should also be noted that urban and regional planning is a profession in which a particularly high proportion of job prospects lie within bureaucracies. Moreover, the planning programmes at Afrikaans universities were specifically geared towards the training of planners for these bureaucracies. That advocacy planning did not really feature in either the rhetoric or practices of the students and products of these universities is, as a consequence, not surprising.

Some empirical support for the observations made above is forthcoming from a survey of practicing urban and regional planners conducted by Smit (1985). The differences in class backgrounds between Afrikaans-speaking planners and English-speaking planners is evident in Table 11.1 below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>English-speakers (N = 169)</th>
<th>Afrikaans-speakers (N = 119)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional and business</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tradespeople</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculturalist</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Service</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Response/</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The data indicates quite clearly that English-speakers tend to come predominantly from business or professional backgrounds. In fact, the proportion of English-speakers in this category is more than double that of the equivalent proportion of Afrikaaners. On the other hand, substantial proportions of Afrikaaners were from the civil service and agriculture. Of course, practicing urban and regional planners are not students, but the students are a useful surrogate. Eighty-three percent
of the planners interviewed were under the age of forty, and 41% under the age of thirty. This suggests that most practicing planners have been educated in the past two decades. The differences in the political perspectives of the two groupings is evident from the respective responses to a proposition posed in the survey that: "on the whole our political system in South Africa is just". Nearly 90% of all English-speakers disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement. The corresponding figure for Afrikaaners was 57%. Moreover, only 10% of Afrikaaners strongly disagreed with the proposition by comparison with 50% on the part of English-speakers. There is substantial additional evidence from the survey demonstrating a clear distinction between the political views of the two groups, but this will not be reported here.

As has already been indicated, another important reason for the birth of a progressive planning movement on the English campuses was the importation of theory from abroad and its adaptation for local use. A literature on advocacy planning had, of course, developed in the USA in the 1960's and early 1970's during the civil rights and "anti-war" campaigns of the period (Davidoff, 1964; Peattie, 1968; Krumholtz et al, 1975). This literature did not, however, have much of an immediate impact on planning thought or practice in South Africa. It was only with revolt in the late 1970's, and the rapid growth of civics taking up "planning" issues, that the theory gained currency. Thus, while imported theory certainly influenced the nature and form of the progressive planning movement that has developed, it cannot be held to account for the emergence of the movement.

Apart from the early, essentially "liberal" advocacy theory, in the early 1980's students and academics on the English campuses were also reading and being influenced by the structuralist Marxism of the French school and, more specifically, the work of Manuel Castells. His theory of urban social movements seemed particularly appropriate in South Africa with the impressive rise of the civics. That academics and students were reading Marxist texts was partially attributable to the burgeoning of international interest in Marxist thought, particularly in urban and regional studies. As far as the former is concerned, it should be noted that the political economy of urbanism still does not feature in the curricula of Afrikaans planning schools. For example, Smit's (1985)
survey reveals that a far smaller proportion of Afrikaans-speaking planners have either heard of or are familiar with political economists of left-wing persuasion than is true for English speakers.

Table 11.2: Exposure to the Writings of Political Economists

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>English-speakers (N = 169)</th>
<th>Afrikaans-speakers (N = 119)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Heard</td>
<td>Familiar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andre Gundar</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frank</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manuel Castells</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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The Built Environment Support Group.

As indicated earlier, a few students and academic planners at the University of Natal and the University of Cape Town began to work with the civics in the early 1980's. In Durban, it became clear that the demand for professional planning input into civic activities was such that there was need to involve many more people. As a consequence, the Built Environment Support Group (BESG) was founded in 1982. BESG was established within the faculty of Architecture and Allied Disciplines at the University, and was originally comprised of approximately thirty academics and students drawn from various parts of the university. Some practicing planning professionals were also involved. Initially work was done on a voluntary and part-time basis. However, the growth in demand for BESG assistance was astronomical. In the first three years of its existence BESG was involved in more than one hundred projects. It became clear that if BESG was to be effective, full-time workers were necessary. Interestingly, the conjuncture was such that money was pouring into the country from abroad in support of burgeoning alternative organizations (civics, unions, service organizations etc). This flow is partially accounted for by genuine support in the West for the victims of apartheid, and possibly also by a concern on the part of Western powers to secure their interests in Southern Africa. In any event, the
availability of funding from abroad meant that BESG was able to establish a full-time staff (of eight by 1988) in addition to the voluntary workers. Thus the emergence of the first full-time advocacy jobs in South Africa were, without question, spawned by political crisis.

BESG’s involvement in progressive planning and development issues can be classified into the following broad areas:

1. Community defense: Alternative plans or upgrading plans have been generated for communities threatened with removal. BESG practitioners have acted as planning advocates for communities in a number of these instances.

2. Community buildings: BESG has attempted to contribute to the building of community organization around specific built-environment related projects. Here BESG’s role has been that of facilitation rather than advocacy.

3. Policy aid: BESG has assisted activists and civic leaders in developing policy and strategy regarding issues such as rents, upgrading, RSCs, local authorities and so on.

4. Technical assistance: BESG has provided assistance of a purely technical nature on request from civic organizations and trade unions (e.g. surveys, assistance in formulating grant proposals, data processing, plan interpretation or generation, assessment of building defects in public housing, building designs and so on).

5. Training and education: BESG has regularly participated in a variety of community-initiated (and sometimes BESG-initiated) activities aimed at transferring skills (workshops, specific training programmes).

6. Negotiation: On some occasions BESG has acted as the negotiator for community groups. There has been a growing recognition that this role is appropriate only in exceptional circumstances.
7. Mediation: In some instances BESG has been asked to mediate conflicts between the state and communities (in some cases the request for mediation has come from the communities and in others from the state).

From the very beginning then, BESG's activities were never of a narrow advocacy nature, although this role was certainly adopted in some instances. Practitioners within BESG had learned from critiques of advocacy planning in other contexts. However, BESG's activities were hardly free from contradiction, and this has led to changes in its practices. A discussion of these contradictions and associated changes is beyond the scope of this dissertation, but some reference will be made to them in the closing chapter.

PLANACT

In 1985 PLANACT, a progressive grouping of planners, architects, social scientists and engineers, was founded by academics and students from the University of the Witwatersrand, and by a group of recently qualified practitioners. PLANACT has chosen to work essentially as an action group and has a committed core-group of 15 to 20 voluntary workers. PLANACT also has a full-time staff.

As with BESG, PLANACT was originally initiated because of approaches from civics and the trade unions. They have been involved in a number of projects, not only in the Transvaal but also in the Eastern Cape. PLANACT activities in the Eastern Cape include upgrading plans for Kabah (Uitenhage), Duncan Village (East London), Mdantsane and Walmer Village (Harrison, 1988). In the Transvaal, PLANACT has been involved in numerous and varied activities including inter alia: the support of squatter organizations in KwaThema and Tembisa; advice to the residents of Actonville in critiquing a government plan for the area; and assistance to the National Union of Mineworkers in developing plans for the transformation of single-sex hostels into family housing.

The Conference of 1985

In 1985, the incipient movement of progressive planners was given additional impetus by the volatile South African Institute of Town and
Regional Planning's conference on "Urban Planning and the New Constitution". Here political issues were debated openly and vociferously in professional planning circles for the first time since the 1930's. Particularly interesting was the extent to which the conference revealed that a sizable proportion of practicing planning professionals were increasingly disillusioned by planning under apartheid. The power and depth of political revolt in the country has sharpened the existential dilemma that many "within-system" planners had been feeling for some time. Moreover, it also started to become apparent that the technocratic consensus that had tied planning professionals together since the 1960's was beginning to crumble. Political and economic circumstances were beginning to force planners to take sides. One of the speakers in a panel discussion on the New Constitutional proposals was Pravin Gordhan, a distinguished community activist and the driving force behind the Durban Housing Action Committee. Gordhan (1985, pp 71-72) commented on the dilemma facing planners as follows:

"As planners, it seems that in our documentation we articulate such lofty principles which contain four principal points. The first is that planning must promote the general welfare, not the welfare of particular groups; it must promote co-ordinated and harmonious development, not disordered chaos; it must promote efficiency and economy and not wastage and mismanagement and in the final instance it must promote the public interest and full participation in what is actually happening. It is sad that the record of the planning profession in South Africa seems to have been one where the planning profession has been dictated to by ideological and political factors other than those of the community as a whole ... 

There are forces at play which are going to substantially change the face of South Africa. What is the response of planners going to be to these forces? ...

It is in this context that we say, with respect, that planners in South Africa have an important choice ahead of them. The choice is one of either willingly being the functionaries of the apartheid system and all those unjust policies that go with it, or on the other hand, becoming participants in actively formulating a future approach to South Africa ..."

While Gordhan's (1985) argument was not qualified by an understanding of the constraints on planners in practice, he nonetheless articulated precisely the challenge which a new generation of planners was eager to
rise to. However, it was also clear that the vast majority of South African planners were not prepared to do the same. The voting of some of the conference resolutions was instructive in this regard. The following resolution was rejected by a vote of 93 to 45:

"We believe that apartheid and all its statutory manifestations is antithetical to development and our planning ethic of striving to improve the quality of life of all the people of South Africa. We therefore feel bound by our status as professionals to call for the abolition of apartheid. We dedicate ourselves to working for a just and democratic South Africa realizing that it is in the interests of the planning profession to become a truly relevant pursuit, respected and revered by all citizens of our country."

Another resolution also defeated by a large majority read as follows:

"Given the almost unanimous endorsement by this conference of the concept of public participation in the public interest, and given that the new constitutional proposals fall far short of allowing full participation by all South Africans, this Conference is unable to give full or unequivocal support to those constitutional proposals. Moreover, this institute urges the government to fully open up the planning process as soon as possible."

Instead the conference adopted the following watered down version by a large majority:

"We note with approval government's expressed intention to move away from discriminatory measures. By doing so rapidly, the effectiveness of the planning process for all the people of South Africa will be enhanced."

The inability of professional planners to clearly articulate their opposition to apartheid led to discussions among disaffected planners on the establishment of an alternative organization. In Natal, all planners were invited to enter into discussions on the formation of such an alternative organization. The result was the launching of the Planning and Development Association (PADA) on the 16th of October 1986.

PADA and DAG
PADA established three key ethical principles to guide planning practices:
1. Planning should be directed at efficient and equitable distribution of resources.

2. Opportunities for real participation by all groups in the process of planning and decision-making should be created.

3. Planning should be committed to the elimination of all forms of social and economic exploitation, be they predicated on race, class, gender or any other division.

PADA set up a planning aid programme along the lines of the service offered by the Royal Town Planning Institute (RTPI), and is currently involved in two major upgrading projects. In the Western Cape planners and other development professionals officially launched the Development Action Group (DAG) in July 1987. DAG's constitution is modeled on PADA's and as with PADA, a broad spectrum of planners, engineers, architects, community activists and other interested parties were invited to participate in the formulation of this constitution. In addition to the events at the 1985 conference in Durban, the impetus for DAG's formation came from the dramatic events in the Crossroads squatter settlement which were described in an earlier section. So outraged were planning and other built-environment related professionals at the nature of state interventions in Crossroads, that a statement of condemnation was formulated and published. Thereafter, the people involved began to think about ways of formalizing the unity that had developed amongst development professionals.

Like many of the other organizations, DAG has become involved in a variety of projects ranging from the short term and small-scale (e.g. the design of creches or community centres) to long term and highly ambitious projects (such as participation in the upgrading of Lawaaikamp). In addition to DAG, another planning-related support group has been established in the Western Cape - the Community Support Group for the Built Environment (COSBEN) - which was formally constituted in 1986.
While COOBEN’s practices are still in their infancy and have been confined largely to technical, organizational and logistical support to civics in specific struggles, COSBEN has articulated the most overtly political objectives and is perhaps the more overtly aligned of the progressive organizations described here. In the preamble to their information booklet COSBEN described their intent as follows:

"As persons directly concerned with the spatial planning and development of the built environment in South Africa, we pledge our commitment to serving the Liberatory Movement in the struggle towards a democratic and non-racial South Africa, free from economic exploitation and discrimination. Our participation, as a support group concerned with the built environment, is inspired by the belief in democratically working towards an equitable distribution of our country’s wealth and a responsible use of its resources. To this end we commit ourselves to the following aims…:

1. To provide support to progressive organizations (in the community) on matters relating to the built environment.

2. To encourage community awareness, involvement and participation in matters affecting the built environment.

3. To investigate conditions and practices within the built environment under which an alternative society would flourish, as well as laying the foundations within present society to achieve this" (COSBEN, 1988, p 1).

Interestingly, most of COSBEN’s membership is drawn from the so-called Coloured community. On the one hand, this reflects the increasing integration of Blacks into built-environment related professions in the 1970’s and 1980’s, and on the other hand, it reflects the growth of urban social movements in the Black communities during the same period. Prior to the mid-1970’s, the professions most favoured by Blacks were law, teaching and medicine. These professions enjoyed high status in the Black community and law and medicine had high-income earning potential.

Ironically, the initial impetus for the entrance of Blacks into the built-environment related professions, was the attempt to create independent bantustans run by a new class of bureaucrats. Development practitioners were needed and from the late 1970’s a number of
bantustan-funded Black students entered South African planning schools. A later impetus, of greater relevance in explaining organizations such as COSBEN, was the emergence of civics and the politics of reproduction in the late 1970's and early 1980's. Many Black activists began to seek formal training in areas relevant to the struggles of the civics. The Department of Town and Regional Planning at the University of Natal has, for example, attracted a number of Black community activists in the past few years, and these students have already begun to redefine the content of planning education. Interestingly, COSBEN have formalized their relationship with the civics insofar as COSBEN is an affiliate of the Bo-Kaap Action Group (BOKAG) - an umbrella civic body. The other progressive planning organizations have chosen not to do so for strategic reasons.

A National Organization?

It should be apparent then that through the 1980's substantial energy has been pouring into organizing planning and other development professions, and into the forging of new and more progressive planning practices. In 1987, representatives from BESG, PLANACT, DAG and PADA met in Cape Town and agreed to organize a full-fledged workshop on progressive planning organizations in 1988. In March of 1988, the four organizations mentioned above, together with COSBEN, the Grahamstown Rural Committee (GRC) and the National Committee Against Removals (NCAR), met in Grahamstown. While there were numerous items on the agenda, the question of national unity and possibly a national organization was the prime focus of debate. A liaison committee with representatives from each of the regions was established to further investigate the possibility of such a national organization. Moreover, a commitment to ongoing liaison and co-ordination of activities was obtained. It seem likely that a national organization will be established in the near future which, hopefully, will take the emerging movement of progressive planners into a new phase.

The particular form of any new national organization will have to be thought through very carefully given rapidly changing conditions. The first progressive planning organizations emerged to play a support role to the civics which themselves were growing rapidly. Since the clampdown
in 1986, civic organizations have suffered major defeats and, in many parts of the country, they have been smashed. Certainly, support organizations such as PLANACT have indicated that demand for their support activities from civics has declined as a consequence of the clampdown. Instead, their support work has shifted in the direction of the unions, whose organizations have survived repression better. Likewise, in Durban, BESG has noted a decline in demand for support work from the African areas (where the most vicious repression has occurred). The civics in Indian areas have, however, remained very active. As noted in Chapter Ten, the State is involved in a contradictory process of withdrawal from the sphere of consumption on the one hand, and selective intervention on the other. In this way the state hopes to "depoliticize" everyday life in the Townships. Whether or not the state will be successful in relegating the politics of collective consumption to a passing "historical" phenomenon (as perhaps Thatcher has done in Britain) is a moot point, but one which needs to be seriously considered. If the analysis suggests that it is likely to be successful, then it follows that the progressive planning movement needs to shift its emphasis away from support work towards the contestation of urban and regional policy, both inside and outside the formal state apparatuses. This latter approach also implies that the emphasis in progressive planning organization shifts away from the building of relatively small and politically coherent action groups designed to provide support for the civics, to the mobilization of broad, popular and mass-based planner organization, designed to address the existential problems of progressive planners on the one hand, but more especially, to contest urban and regional policy within the bureaucracies and on the terrain of popular politics. The contradictions of contemporary state policy are, however, such that it seems likely that unless extreme and continued repression is assumed (which is a real possibility), the civics are likely to be with us for some time. It seems, therefore, that from a strategic perspective, planners need to build organizations capable of accommodating both support work and the popular mobilization of planners.

THEORY AND PRACTICE

In preceding chapters on the relation between political crisis and urban and regional planning, numerous references have been made to changing
theory and practices in response to such crisis. Much of the theory referred to has been substantive theory rather than theory to guide planning practice. This chapter, by contrast, focuses on theory which has developed in response to political crisis, but which explicitly seeks to guide planning practice. The section begins with an analysis of the impact of political crisis on the introduction of reformist ethics into planning theory and practice in South Africa. Given the historical roots of the international planning ethos in social reform on the one hand, and the almost total lack of reformist influences on planning in South Africa on the other, this development is considered important. The discussion of reformism in planning is followed by an analysis of the way in which political crisis has also engendered planning theory aimed at more fundamental transformation of social relations than that implied by reformism. The section ends with a discussion of theoretical debates on urban and regional planning in a post-apartheid society and the influence of such debates on contemporary theory and practice. Again it is the politico-economic crisis which has precipitated such debates and made them seem meaningful.

Crisis and Reformism in Planning Theory

In Chapter Three of this dissertation, it was argued that urban planning in South Africa did not have its roots in social reformism as was the case in Britain and the USA. Significantly, it was only with the onset of politico-economic crisis in the late 1970's that social reformism began to constitute a central component of planning thought and consciousness. An influential figure in articulating what many planners were thinking, was the head of the Department of Town and Regional Planning at the University of the Witwatersrand, John Muller. As noted in Chapter One, in 1982 he presented an inaugural lecture entitled - "Theory and Practice : The Janus Face of Planning". In this lecture Muller notes with approval the reformist origins in Britain and the USA, and argues that social reformism should lie at the very centre of the ethos of planning.

"From among the people who responded to the condition of England question were those who, in separating themselves from the reactionary protestations of the majority and from the outraged but futile criticism of the radical few, sought
positive means of transforming the lives of the deprived - and
in so doing placed themselves at the fountainhead of the ethos
of planning" (Muller, 1982, p 7).

Muller (1982, p 17) goes on to bemoan the lack of this ethos in South
African planning thought and practice:

"From the outset then, the planning profession in this country
has lacked recourse to, or recall of, the original theoretical
base of its discipline and has neither accepted nor sought the
responsibility or opportunity of any role of reformist
character - a role consciously responsive to the real needs of
the deprived Black majority in this country."

Muller (1982) had been strongly influenced by the Soweto revolt. In
fact, he had given up a lucrative private planning job in the wake of
Soweto and had opted instead for an academic post from which he hoped to
influence the direction of planning. He argued strongly that the
planning profession in South Africa had to move away from its
preoccupation with "technically-based, control-oriented planning"
(Muller, 1982, p 17).

"It is now six years since the ground-swell of dissatisfaction
erupted in Soweto, and yet the profession appears to remain
unconcerned about, possibly uncomprehending of, the real
meaning of 16 June 1976 and its aftermath. The sobering
overview of the conditions under which Sowetans live contained
in the Urban Foundation's recent report (1980), points to the
need for professional response. The report is essentially a
resource document offering information and, by its own
acknowledgement, provides no solutions, prescriptions or plans.
It is therefore ultimately and correctly a challenge to
planning - to any planner with a conscience and consciousness of
the responsibility which the discipline must carry in
relation to this country's deprived communities" (Muller, 1982,
p 21).

"I see in Soweto but one example of the paramount issue of
today and tomorrow to be faced by the profession of planning.
There is no doubt that the established and necessary tasks of
planning must continue, but to remain closeted in the security
of entrenched procedures is no longer enough, nor good enough,
to cope with the condition of the disadvantaged. I believe
that at this time there is a need for the planning profession
in South Africa to widen its vision ..." (Muller, 1982, p 22).

Muller (1982) goes on to argue that planners should adopt an approach to
planning which he styles as "promotive" planning. Promotive planning
according to Muller, involves the promotion of democratic ideals and processes in planning in order to "release human abilities, to broaden the field of opportunity, and to enlarge human liberty" (Merriam, quoted in Muller, 1982, p 22). The goal of such promotive planning is ultimately to promote self-development, self-sufficiency and self-esteem.

Influenced both by Muller (1982) and the developing reformist ethos in the country as a whole, a number of planners began to join in the call for reformist town and regional planning. In a review article dealing with planning problems and priorities in South Africa, R.T. McCarthy (1983, p 24) argues that "... the planners preoccupation with the mechanisms of planning should be replaced by a return to the basic priority of reform". McCarthy (1983, p 26) elaborates as follows:

"... the primary challenge facing the town and regional planning profession is the abolition of the appalling living conditions in both the towns and the rural slums. Accordingly to fulfil its historical priority of social reform, the professional must strive for the reinstatement of universal priorities and common standards ..."

McCarthy (1983) also argued that planners should formalize their commitment to reform by adopting a set of professional ethics similar to those of the American Planning Association (APA) which specifically state that, "the planner shall serve the public interest" and in so doing, "recognize a special responsibility to plan for the disadvantaged groups and persons" (APA quoted in McCarthy, 1983, p 26). At the stormy 1985 conference of the South African Institute of Town and Regional Planners, further calls for a reformist stance in planning were made (see for example Oakenfull, 1985; van Zyl, 1985).

There can be little question then that the political crisis has placed social reforms firmly on the agenda of planners. Whether or not the reform impetus will be maintained in planning is, however, in some doubt given the growth of the right and ultra-right elements of the White electorate. Certainly, it appears that rightwingers are coming out of the planning woodwork. Early in 1987 the Natal branch of the SAITRP argued that a code of ethics for planners be established. A proposal
was then sent to the central council of the institute for referral to the other branches. When the draft code of ethics came back to membership for comment, it had been substantially revised. Particularly noteworthy was the fact that a statement indicating the institute's particular commitment to the needs of the disadvantaged had been removed. Rumour has it that this had occurred because of the influence of 'verkramptes' in the Transvaal.

The Emergence of Progressive Planning Theory and Praxis in South Africa

Apart from precipitating a new interest in reformism, the politico-economic crisis of the 1970's and 1980's also spawned a planning literature concerned with more fundamental social transformation. Contributions by McCarthy and Smit (1981, 1984), Smit (1984, 1986), and Coleman (1986) were outlined and discussed in Chapter Two. While the deepening of the crisis in South Africa certainly ensured the resonance of this literature, the theory also had idealist origins in the sense that much of it was imported from abroad and adapted for local use. Reference has already been made to the fact that it was in the late 1970's and early 1980's, that a "new" international neo-marxist urban and regional literature was on the rise. Authors such as McCarthy and Smit (1981; 1984) had both been involved in post-graduate studies in the USA in the late 1970's and were influenced by the emerging radical literature, and particularly the work of Harvey, Castells, Scott and Roweis. Thus, much of the early radical planning literature in South Africa involved the local application of theoretical work developed abroad rather than the development of homespun theory (see McCarthy and Smit, 1981 and 1984). Much of the theory has, however, proved praxis-relevant. Moreover, as progressive planners in South Africa immersed themselves in praxis, so they began to develop new theoretical insights.

Clairwood - The Need for Layered Organization

One of the major dilemmas facing progressive planners in South Africa is the question of whether or not they should work within the formal planning system. Certainly, the lessons learned in the struggle over Clairwood were to reinforce the position that struggles have to be fought
both inside and outside of the formal structures if meaningful change is to occur.

In the late 1950's, the City of Durban voted to industrialize an Indian working residential area called Clairwood. At the time some 40 000 residents lived in the area. Today less than 6 000 remain and large parts of Clairwood have been industrialized. The original impetus for the industrialization of the area derived from a perceived shortage of suitable flat land for industrial development within the municipal area. This problem had arisen as a result of the contradictions of urban growth and settlement under racial capitalism. The historical dominance of the institution of private property and the anarchy of private decision-making had ensured that rational forward planning for industrial needs had not taken place. In the absence of meaningful forward planning, the existing flat land in Durban was settled in a fairly haphazard fashion by low-income Indian people and was utilized mainly for market gardening and residential purposes. It should be noted that at the time, this land was "marginal" from the point of view of residential desirability. It was low-lying, poorly-drained, poorly ventilated and pest-ridden. In fact, large portions of Clairwood were reclaimed from swamplands through the collective efforts of the Clairwood settlers.

Given the rapid growth of manufacturing in the post-war period, demands for flat industrial land escalated. The contradictions of racial capitalism, and the land-use process it spawned, were now becoming manifest. At one level, the struggle over the industrialization of Clairwood had ethnic overtones and was popularly understood, in the Indian community at least, as a struggle between the interests of Whites and the interests of Indians. At a deeper level it was, however, essentially a capital-labour struggle over the built environment. On the one hand, there was a conflict between the interests of industrial capital and the largely working class residents of Clairwood over the use of the land in question. On the other hand, a use-value/exchange value conflict developed between large and often absentee landowners (most of whom were Indian), who were concerned with realizing the exchange values of their properties, and an alliance of tenants and resident landowners, (who for the most part were working class people owning small properties) who had rallied to protect the use-values of their residential
environment. Thus, the Clairwood Ratepayers and Resident's Association (CRRA) which emerged to organize the defence of Clairwood in the 1950's, could be understood as an urban social movement in Castellsian terms.

The CRRA has been a central actor throughout the thirty-five years of struggle over Clairwood's future. Interestingly, in the first twenty-five years of the battle the CRRA was a relatively weak organization which failed to organize people on a mass basis (Meuleman, 1987). Meuleman (1987) observes, for example, that the city of Durban's failure to effect an industrial zoning over this period had more to do with the "public interest" motivated interventions of the authority presiding over the issue, the Natal Town and Regional Planning Commission (henceforth "the Commission") than with the opposition mounted by the CRRA. When the Durban City Council declared Clairwood zoned for industrial use in 1954, the Commission refused to approve the zoning and, in fact, directed the City to zone the area for special residential purposes. The Commission's rejection was based on a concern about the lack of alternative housing for Clairwood residents on the one hand, and on the unsuitability of the existing layout and subdivisions for industrial use on the other. The Commission did, however, permit the city to approve selected light-industrial industries in the area. The city used this opportunity, along with existing slums legislation, to gradually "white ant" the area. Thus, in spite of the special residential zoning, substantial industrial incursions occurred amid accusations from the CRRA that the Durban City Council was deliberately 'slumming' the area (Meuleman, 1987).

In the 1960's the City again applied for an industrial zoning for Clairwood (Meuleman, 1987). This time the Commission indicated that it was prepared to go along with such a rezoning on the proviso that alternative accommodation was made available for residents and a comprehensive redevelopment plan drawn up. For a variety of reasons (described in some detail by Meuleman (1987) the Durban City Council continued to drag its heels in meeting the Commission's requirements. Thus, by the late 1970's, Clairwood had still not been formally industrialized. But, by this time, the tide had begun to turn against the Durban City Council. To begin with, the overall political mood in the country changed dramatically as the politico-economic crisis
deeper. Whereas in the 1960's only clientist political activity was tolerated, by the early 1980's aggressive political opposition once again came to the fore. The growth of a civic movement and other support organizations provided the CRRA with broader political and technical support for the first time. A "Help Save Clairwood" campaign was launched by a recently formed progressive church group (Diakonia). Moreover, an aggressive civic umbrella group, the Durban Housing Action Committee, had emerged and lent their support to the CRRA. It was also at this point that advocacy planners under the auspices of the Built Environment Support Group entered the fray. Moreover, by the early 1980's a number of progressive planners had taken up employment with the Commission. Interestingly, the Commission again asked the city to consider setting aside a portion of Clairwood for residential purposes.

The overall resurgence of interest in the Clairwood issue allowed the advocacy planners associated with the Built Environment Support Group to test emerging planning theory. They believed that the development of political crisis at a national level and the state's attempts to restructure the political terrain in order to resolve it, provided a major opportunity for the resolution of the Clairwood issue in the favour of the residents (Smit 1984). More specifically they focused on the "space" provided by the state's attempt to co-opt Indians and Coloureds through the tri-cameral system. Given the vigorous opposition to the tri-cameral system, both the Nationalist government and those from the Indian community who had chosen to participate, were keen to establish the ability of the new system to deliver the goods. The House of Delegates was particularly keen to curry favour with the Indian electorate and began to show an interest in Clairwood, which had by now started to assume symbolic significance of national proportions (Smit 1984).

The Built Environment Support Group felt that they could exploit the growing contradiction between the central state with its overriding interest in the political reproduction of the system and the local state with its greater sensitivity to serving the needs of local capital. In order to override the local state, the national state needed to counter the Durban City Council's industrialization proposals which had been dressed up in technicist "public interest" terms. In other words, the
City's argument was that industrializing Clairwood was sound town planning, and the central state could not capriciously intervene simply because it was politically expedient. Thus, the Built Environment Support Group concentrated on producing a strong technical argument for the residential retention of Clairwood and set out to debunk each of the City's "planning" arguments. They also set out to prove that a residential plan which met the City's own standards and criteria could be produced - something which the Durban City Council had denied. In doing so, BESG were able to exploit another long-standing contradiction between the central and local state - one concerning the location of industry.

In previous chapters substantial attention has been paid to the central state's attempts to direct industrial activity away from the metropolitan areas to decentralization or deconcentration points. Moreover, reference has been made to the development of conflict between metropolitan municipal authorities and the central state over the policy. Durban has been no exception in this regard. The Built Environment Support Group attempted to exploit this conflict by arguing that the industrialization of Clairwood was unnecessary, since alternative industrial land could be found in deconcentrated locations at the urban periphery (Smit 1984). Of course, these arguments were quite consistent with the central government's view on metropolitan industrial location. Given the central government's concern with the legitimation of the tri-cameral structures and given its policy of deconcentration, it is not surprising that BESG's proposals for retaining Clairwood for residential purposes were favourably received. This support soon began to take concrete form. Late in 1983, the Minister of Community Development announced that his department would not "give the Durban City Council one cent to resettle the 10 000 people living in Clairwood" (Daily News, 24 November 1983). This was a major blow, since the City was relying on the central government to finance public housing for tenants displaced from Clairwood. It became apparent that if the City wished to industrialize Clairwood, it would have to raise some twenty million Rand to rehouse displaced residents. This, perhaps more than anything else, was the fatal blow to the City's industrialization intentions. Further evidence of central state support became evident with the development of a plan for Clairwood by the Department of Community Development, which would retain 50 ha for residential use. Moreover, the House of Delegates began
to make numerous public statements in support of the residents (Smit 1984).

Under pressure from central government, the City finally rescinded all previous resolutions on Clairwood in 1985. In March of 1986, a joint statement was released by the Minister of Constitutional Development and Planning, Chris Heunis, and Mr Amichand Rajbansi (now a Minister without portfolio) in terms of which the central government's prior approval of the industrialization of Clairwood (in terms of the Environmental Planning Act of 1967) was withdrawn. Moreover, the statement indicated that the residents of Clairwood would be allowed to remain in the area and could develop their properties in terms of the existing special residential zoning. It appeared that the Clairwood struggle had finally been won by the residents. The victory celebrations that followed were, however, premature.

Late in 1986 it became apparent that the central government's interventions in Clairwood were, in fact, illegal, and therefore null and void. The authority over the future of Clairwood reverted back to the local authority and fears that Clairwood would again be in danger of industrialization re-emerged. However, since the City of Durban had rescinded all previous decisions, they were obliged to prepare plans for Clairwood from scratch. By this time, however, there had been major changes in the composition of the City’s professional planning staff. A number of progressive planners had found their way into employment with the Council. Interestingly, it was these planners who were charged with the task of developing plans for Clairwood. Whether this was a conscious decision on the part of the City’s planning hierarchy or whether it was inadvertent is not clear. In any event, the new planning team produced a residential concept plan which was accepted in principle by the Durban City Council in 1988. Moreover, the Council resolved that the residential concept plan be referred back to the residents for comment.

The City planning department has now indicated that it wishes to enter into a model development process, involving a substantial degree of citizen participation. It seems then that the residents of Clairwood have won an even more substantial victory than the victory of 1986.
Whilst it is clear that the CRRA is acknowledged as the most important political entity in the Clairwood struggle, it is also interesting that the intervention of the advocacy planners is considered decisive by the executive members of the CRRA itself. Meuleman (1987) interviewed several executive members of the CRRA, some of whom had remained involved with the CRRA over the entire duration of the thirty-year battle. When asked what they considered to be the most important reason for the change of the tide in their favour, they all indicated that the Built Environment Support Group's intervention had been critical (Meuleman, 1987). They pointed out that in the 1970’s, they had hired a private planning firm to assess the possibility of a residential future for Clairwood. Locked within a traditionalist approach to planning, this firm had indicated that it could not support a residential future for Clairwood on "planning" grounds. According to a long-standing member of the CRRA - Philip Jacob (1988), this had a demoralizing effect on the residents. The Built Environment Support Group's intervention, Jacob (1988) argues, not only helped restore morale, but had a major influence on politicians. Our own analysis (ie BESG's) is that while BESG's interventions were clearly influential, they were influential only because of the political conjuncture, and the particular nature of state responses to crisis of the 1980's. However, a theme that has been developed throughout this dissertation, is that political conjunctures do not, themselves, produce effects. It is the dialectic between structure and agency that produces effects. And the Built Environment Support Group's activities certainly appear to have been important at the level of agency.

Interesting too, is the way in which progressive planners within the bureaucracies exerted an influence over outcomes and were able to use the conjuncture to introduce new and more progressive planning practices. The contributions of the planners at the Town and Regional Planning Commission were very important in buying time for the CRRA. They achieved this largely through the assertion of planning’s "public interest" ideology, reaffirming the point that planning’s traditional intellectual dogma is not the preserve of the conservatives alone. The contribution of planners within the Durban City Council was also very substantial in the post-1986 period. Certainly, it is possible that the
task of reassessing the Clairwood issue in the light of the Council's 1985 resolution to rescind all previous decisions on the area, was given to the younger generation of more progressive planners, precisely because Council politicians and senior officials knew that forcing the industrialization proposals any further would only escalate conflict. These elected officials and senior bureaucrats needed good technical back-up to account for their change of heart, and to ward off the protests of vested interests. They knew that the bright young progressives were the most likely to tackle this task with vigour. The young progressives in their turn, handled the opportunity well, setting up a proposal which could be marketed as a compromise (allowing some "face-saving"), but which, in the end, went a very long way to meeting the demands of the CRRA. They also focused on the propaganda value to the Council of a "model" participation process. Furthermore, they have used the precedent of the Clairwood issue to set up participation process in other areas, thereby establishing new, and hopefully ongoing, planning practices of a more progressive ilk.

It is clear that the praxis in the Clairwood issue has thrown up a number of observations of general planning-theoretical interest. These can be summarized as follows:

(a) Roweis' (1981) hypothesis that opportunities for progressive planning practices may arise in times of crisis is supported by the evidence provided by the struggle over Clairwood.

(b) The value of careful politico-economic analysis of the conjuncture in identifying opportunities for progressive planning practices is confirmed.

(c) Contradictions can develop between the various state apparatuses and these can be exploited to progressive advantage.

(d) The agency of advocacy planners in supporting urban social movements can make a positive difference to the outcomes of urban struggles.

(e) The agency of urban social movements and planners outside of the formal structures is enhanced by the agency of progressive planners
inside the bureaucracies. If this is so, then it follows, that in order to be effective, progressive planners should attempt to work both inside and outside of formal structures. It is, however, unlikely that planners working within formal structures could have initiated and effected a progressive plan for Clairwood. The agency of the advocate planners was critical in this regard.

(f) Smit's (1984) conclusion that the ability of planners to make effective use of the opportunity spaces provided by crisis depends not so much on the acuity of their proposals, but on the balance of class forces at a particular conjuncture, is only partially correct. Given a particular balance of forces, the ingenuity of progressive planners may make all the difference.

(g) Pursuit of the planning dogma of the "public interest" does not always produce outcomes which favour the dominant classes. It appears also that the notion is amenable to progressive definition through concrete struggle.

(h) The influence that planners are able to exert in specific struggles, derives from the legitimacy accorded them by the public at large, as 'technocrats of the public interest'. Without this mantle of legitimacy, the claims of planners would bear the same weight as any other political actor's claim. Progressive planners therefore need to take the concept of the public interest seriously.

(i) The outcomes of particular struggles over the built environment depend on a whole variety of contingencies, and are not predetermined by structures. This suggests that Roweis' (1981) hypothesis that the very nature of the crisis or contradiction that creates space for progressive practices also imposes limits on the fulfillment of the full potential of the progressive intervention, is not always correct. In Clairwood, it was the central state's attempt to co-opt Indians through the tri-cameral system which provided the opportunity for securing a residential future for Clairwood. The particular nature of the opportunity space did, however, always contain the possibility that a victory in Clairwood would be Pyrrhic. In other words, central state intervention could
very easily have contributed to the co-option of Indians at the level of national politics. However, a peculiar set of circumstances, which were described above, combined with opportunistic agency, ensured that the Clairwood victory was delivered in a way that contributed to the strength of the local urban social movement and, by implication, to the progressive extra-parliamentary forces.

Of course, the Clairwood experience was only one of the numerous opportunities for testing progressive planning theory practice. Smit (1984, 1986), for example, theorized that in responding to both political and economic crisis, the state would have to pour material resources into the previously neglected townships. This, it was argued, provided an opportunity for mobilizing people around material interests, thereby strengthening civic organization. The role of planners operating outside the system was to assist civics in interpreting upgrading plans, and to help them take control over the process. As has been described in earlier sections, the flow of state resources into township rehabilitation has been slower than expected (in part because of choices made by the state in macro-economic policy, in part because of limits on foreign borrowing, and in part because of the war in Angola). Moreover, in cases where resources have been made available, such provision has usually been accompanied by repression of popular organization. However, as indicated in a previous section, there have been some instances in which popular organization around upgrading has been tolerated. In these situations, progressive planners have sharpened their understanding of divisions within communities and have learned that upgrading can be more divisive of such communities than it is cohering. They have learned too about the problems of explicitly political forms of mobilization and problems of "apolitical" mobilization around upgrading; they have not yet, been able to resolve the contradiction.

The empirical basis of these lessons has been described in the section dealing with upgrading. There are, however, three other important lessons deriving from the upgrading praxis of progressive planners which have not been discussed as yet. The first concerns the technical skills and implementation skills of progressive planners. It has become quite apparent that progressive planners do not, as yet, have the requisite
skills and experience to effectively assist other progressive organizations in upgrading and housing issues. There are, it seems, two reasons for this. Firstly, most progressive planners in South Africa are young. Secondly, planners operating outside of formal structures have seldom had the opportunity to hone their skills through actual implementation. Instead, they continuously play the role of critic of someone else's plans or implementation procedures. Much of this criticism is, however, inappropriate, since it is not grounded in experience. The second lesson deriving from progressive planning intervention in upgrading, is that it is very difficult for a community to control an upgrading process unless the implementation is under their control. In St Wendolin's, for example, the Built Environment Support Group has had great difficulty in keeping a rein on private development companies, and on government agencies. The implications are clear. Progressive planners are going to have to become involved in implementation if they are to be effective, and if they are to acquire the requisite skills.

The third lesson has to do with the relation between building community organization and community participation in upgrading processes. In their more honest moments, progressive planners who have seen community building as the raison d'etre for their participation efforts, will admit to being disappointed by what they have discovered. To begin with, it is now quite clear that community building through participation in planning and upgrading requires massive inputs by the planners, although this does vary with the level of community coherence that already exists. In instances where little coherence exists, planners need to literally live and work daily in the community if any coherence is to be built. Moreover, it seems that there are limits to the extent to which so-called "barefoot" planners can be used in this regard, because of the perennial complexity and sensitivity of the issues. In any event, these are issues which will be grist to the mill of the progressive planning movement in the next decade.

Post-Apartheid Thinking and Progressive Planning Theory

Apart from the opportunities that politico-economic crisis has provided for planners to test and to generate theory through concrete practices,
the crisis has also given rise to a new terrain of planning thought, which is proving useful as a guide to both contemporary and future practices. By the mid 1980's, political revolt had escalated to such an extent that it seemed that there was at least a possibility that the apartheid regime would soon be forced to the negotiating table, and that a "post-apartheid" society was in sight. This, in turn, spawned a whole series of international conferences at Bonn (1986), York (1986), Amsterdam (1986), Harare (1987) and Stockholm (1987) on the nature of a post-apartheid South Africa. Whilst these conferences were premature in the sense that it now seems that we are much further from a post-apartheid future than was previously thought, the process of thinking about such a society has had positive spin-offs, both to the activities and thinking of progressive organizations in general, and for progressive planners in particular. More, specifically, "post-apartheid" thinking has advanced planning thought in at least three respects:

1. It has provided additional insight into the question of whether or not progressive planners should enter formal planning structures.

2. It has highlighted the "power of the concrete alternative" and has spawned theoretical contributions in this regard.

3. It has provided a new basis for assessing the progressive content of contemporary planning practices and policy.

As far as the dilemma of practice in South Africa is concerned, discussions on the ability of a post-apartheid government to take over, and use, state apparatuses proved most enlightening. In discussing a paper delivered at the Amsterdam conference, for example, Wittig (1986) stressed that the state apparatuses were not tools which could simply be turned to progressive ends in a post-apartheid South Africa. Instead, the state apparatuses were comprised of real people with real skills, linked to each other and to civil society through a complex set of social relations. Wittig (1986) made the point that South Africa’s capability in the field of military technology could not easily be transferred to a post-apartheid government, or turned to more socially-useful purposes. The technologists themselves had cultural backgrounds and class interests...
which suggested that their skills would not necessarily be made available to a post-apartheid government.

Authors such as Smit (1986), extended the analogy to the state planning apparatuses. Whilst the existing state planning apparatuses are highly sophisticated and potentially very useful in a post-apartheid South Africa, most members of these apparatuses are currently aligned with the existing power bloc. Thus, if the accumulated technical knowledge of the past is to serve a post-apartheid government, then it follows that progressives will have to penetrate existing state apparatuses, acquire the skills and begin, now, to transform these apparatuses in a direction more amenable to harnessing by the progressive movement. Contemporary practices outside of formal structures are useful, and training abroad has a potentially important contribution to make. But neither, it seems, should be seen as a substitute for the geographic and institutional specificity of the training provided locally within formal structures. It appears, therefore, that progressive planners must enter the formal planning structures. Moreover, it seems that contemporary debate should focus not so much on whether or not they should enter such struggles, but rather on how such functionaries are to avoid co-option and remain in touch with the progressive movement. This, of course, brings the role of progressive planning and development associations, discussed earlier, more sharply into focus.

The second important contribution of post-apartheid thinking to planning thought mentioned above, is the way in which it has highlighted the power of the alternative. The African National Congress (ANC) has for example recently released a fairly moderate vision of a post-apartheid South Africa. This vision is being hysterically attacked by the Nationalist government as an attempt by the ANC, in alliance with the South African Communist Party (SACP), to dupe reasonable peace-loving South Africans and gullible business people. Government over-reaction to such proposals emphasises the power of concrete and workable alternative proposals in a time of crisis. Elements within both the power bloc and the people’s camp are casting about for new strategies, and looking for new alliances. It is in this context that a number of specifically urban and regional planning alternatives have been developed by progressive planning theorists in South Africa.
Reference has already been made to the growing significance of, and interest in, David Dewar's (1983, 1985) alternative vision for South African cities. Dewar, Watson, Bassio and Howes (forthcoming) are working on a detailed post-apartheid plan for Cape Town which, no doubt, will also influence contemporary policy. Tomlinson (forthcoming) is about to produce a book on the "post-apartheid" city. Likewise, Smit and Todes (1987) and McCarthy and Smit (1988) have examined the relationship between macro-economic policy and alternative spatial strategies for managing metropolitan growth in a post-apartheid South Africa. The Urban Foundation (who commissioned the Smit and Todes, and McCarthy and Smit contributions referred to above) are also in the process of developing their post-apartheid visions. While the current situation remains very fluid, it is clear that the generation of practical post-apartheid alternatives will remain an important task for progressive planning theorists for the foreseeable future.

A third contribution of post-apartheid thought to contemporary planning theory, concerns the creation of a new basis for assessing contemporary policy. Prior to an engagement with "post-apartheid", though, there was a tendency for most progressive analysts to avoid the policy terrain. Instead, there was a tendency to develop critiques of existing policy, mainly on ideological grounds, or in terms of a structuralist exposition of why such a policy either could not work or would serve to reproduce the interests of the ruling classes. This, in turn, has meant that radical theory has provided little guidance for the everyday practices of progressive planners, and a yawning chasm between theory and practice has emerged. Post- apartheid thinking has, however, restored some balance to the deliberations of progressive planners. Instead of "knee-jerk" reactions against policies such as "self-help" housing and small business promotion on ideological grounds, progressives are instead asking whether or not such policies would have a place in a post-apartheid South Africa. To the extent that it appears that such policies would have to be part of an overall policy framework in a post-apartheid society, so it follows that progressive planners should acquire skills in these policy areas now.
In any event, the major point is that contemporary policy proposals can be assessed in terms of whether or not they would be consistent with policies that would be pursued in post-apartheid South Africa. Of course, the meaning of the same policy might be quite different under the social relations of racial capitalism than under the relations that will pertain in post-apartheid South Africa. Thus, self-help housing may be regressive under existing social relations, but progressive under another set of social relations. This consideration notwithstanding, however, it is fair to say that post-apartheid thinking, whilst not providing definitive answers, has at least shifted the debate in a direction which progressive theorists can feel comfortable with. It may also lead to a much more vigorous contestation of the policy terrain by progressives.
CHAPTER TWELVE: SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND PROSPECTS

INTRODUCTION

At the outset three major aims were specified for this dissertation. These were as follows:

1. To examine the relationship between the nature and momentum of the South African political economy and the essence and trajectory of urban and regional planning in South Africa.

2. To contribute to the literature on the history of planning in South Africa.

3. To consider the historical record on and the possibilities for progressive urban and regional planning practices in South Africa.

The first two aims have been met largely through the adoption of an historical-materialist analysis of the emergence and development of planning in South Africa for the period 1900 to 1988. As far as the third aim is concerned, the historical record on the social role actually played by urban and regional planning has been part of the overall historical analysis. Moreover, in the chapter which dealt with the conceptual framework for the dissertation (Chapter Two), it was argued that the development of theory to guide progressive planning requires careful conjunctural analysis. Such an analysis has been the subject of the second half of this thesis (Chapters Six to Eleven). Of course, the conjunctural analysis has also been part of the overall historical analysis. What has not yet been done is to draw together the lessons of history on the one hand, and the findings of the conjunctural analysis on the other, in order to provide a clear assessment of the possibilities for progressive practices. As a consequence, some emphasis will be given to tying these ends together in this concluding chapter. However, the overall purpose of this chapter is to summarize the major findings of the dissertation.

The chapter is structured as follows. The first section provides an overview of the political economy of urban and regional planning in South
Africa for the period 1900 to 1988. General conclusions are made on the relationship between accumulation and planning on the one hand, and between politics and planning on the other. General conclusions on the historical relationship of planning to apartheid and of planning to politico-economic crisis are also specified. The focus then shifts to the task of assessing the possibilities for progressive practice. This discussion is prefaced by a discussion of important lessons drawn from the historical analysis as well as an assessment of the historical record of urban and regional planners and planning in promoting progressive social change. The salient features of both the political and economic environments of the contemporary period are then noted. Finally, the implications of these considerations for progressive practice are evaluated with particular reference to: the formulation of progressive planning policy; the contextual specification of what is meant by progressive planning practice; and the possibilities for progressive planning activities, both inside and outside of formal structures.

**THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF URBAN AND REGIONAL PLANNING IN SOUTH AFRICA: 1900 TO 1988**

The periodisation used in this dissertation to analyze the evolution of urban and regional planning, was based on a previous application of the so-called "Borja Model" in analyzing state urbanization policy in South Africa (McCarthy and Smit, 1984). The original application was poorly developed as far as empirical detail is concerned. The more detailed historical analysis conducted in this dissertation, suggests that the original application (which it should be noted did not focus specifically on urban and regional planning) was, in fact, quite sound, particularly as far as the early phases are concerned. The original application does, however, need to be modified in a number of important respects. In outlining an overall summary of the evolution of urban and regional planning in South Africa in this section, attention will be given to these modifications. As will be recalled from the chapter outlining the conceptual framework for this dissertation (Chapter Two), the Borja Model originally applied by McCarthy and Smit (1984) envisaged the unfolding of state urbanization policy in three overlapping stages, t1, t2 and t3. As a result of the evaluation of this original application in Chapter Two, a forth stage, t4 was added on the grounds that the
politico-economic crisis that emerged in the mid-1970's marked the beginning of a distinct period. Thus the political economy of urban and regional planning in South Africa has been explored in four periods: 1900 to 1930 (t1); 1930 to 1950 (t2); 1950 to 1975 (t3); and 1975 to 1988 (t4).

The t1 Phase - 1900 to 1930

McCarthy and Smit (1984) characterised the t1 period as one in which state urban policy and expenditure focused on the provision of productive infrastructure with a parallel neglect of the sphere of reproduction. The contradictions of such an emphasis, it was argued, led to rising labour and popular militancy which reached a crescendo towards the end of the period just prior to the ushering in of state interventions in the sphere of reproduction, including urban planning controls. Urban planning was therefore seen as a response to the contradictions of a rapacious stage of capitalist accumulation. The analysis in this dissertation revealed that while state expenditure was focused on the provision of infrastructure to promote accumulation, there were many more interventions in the sphere of reproduction in the t1 phase than originally envisaged. A possible explanation is to be found in the specificity of the accumulation process in South Africa which was such, that problems in the sphere of reproduction were particularly severe. This was because, in the t1 phase, the South African economy was dominated by gold mining which was a particularly cost-sensitive and therefore low-wage industry. Low wages in the context of the neglect of the sphere of reproduction was a recipe for slum development. Given that land and housing was produced in the commodity form, the sphere of reproduction also became a terrain for the appropriation of surplus.

There was a tendency for absentee landlords to "sweat" the land by cramming as many structures and tenants onto the sites they owned as possible. Appalling conditions developed and led to outbreaks of infectious diseases such as typhoid, tuberculosis and influenza. It was, in fact, a fear of the spread of infectious diseases that more than anything else gave rise to calls for intra-urban controls on land-use. These were first incorporated into health legislation, but the primary state response was to graze slums and expel Black residents to the
periphery. In fact, the slum problem was defined largely as being associated with the incursion of Blacks into white working class neighbourhoods. Given the rising militancy of the white working classes in general, and their opposition to the infiltration of Blacks into their residential areas in particular, the state introduced what amounts to perhaps a major state intervention in territorial social relations of the period - the Native Urban Areas Act of 1923. In terms of this legislation, Blacks were prohibited from occupying land outside of prescribed areas set aside for them - the "locations".

The first explicitly "town planning" legislation was, however, introduced by the provinces at the end of the tl period. This legislation was directed largely at the resolution of problems associated with the social co-ordination of land-use. Particularly important was the contradiction between the need for efficient patterns of land-use to promote accumulation and reduce the costs of reproduction, and the tendency away from such efficiency resulting from anarchic decision-making in the pursuit of profit. It should be noted, however, that evidence has been produced in this dissertation, demonstrating that the introduction of this planning legislation was not simply a response to structural contradictions. Agency and the importation of ideas were also important. More specifically, reference was made to the importance of the agitation of the Transvaal Planning Association which seemed more motivated by idealism (eg the creation of the "city beautiful") than by a particularly acute concern about the neglect of the sphere of reproduction. Moreover, reference was also made to the influence of particular individuals. In addition, the influence of ideas imported from Europe and the USA was noted. In this regard it is worth noting that the introduction of zoning was largely a pre-emptive measure rather than a response to contradiction and crisis. Once the decision had been taken at a national level to pursue a growth path based on import-substituting manufacturing, there was a concern to ensure that the blight which had developed in urban environments abroad was not repeated here.

In sum the tl period saw three major forms of collective intervention in territorial social relations. The first was the provision of infrastructure to promote accumulation. The second was the banishing
and confinement of Blacks to the urban periphery. The third was the introduction of controls on intra-urban land-use (conventional town planning legislation). These interventions were, in part, a response to the contradictions of a period of laissez-faire capitalism (comparable to the phase of "early capitalism" outlined by Roweis, 1981). But they were also a product of agency and idealism. Furthermore the introduction of planning was only partly a response to rising militance in response to neglect of the sphere of reproduction as posited in the Borja Model (McCarthy and Smit, 1984). Certainly, the period was one of rising militance, but mainly with respect to the White working classes. Black opposition was emerging but was diffuse and weak. This suggests that it was health concerns (the sanitation syndrome) more than labour militance that led to the introduction of the territorial interventions in the sphere of reproduction. Finally, it should be noted that the planning interventions which were ultimately aimed at affecting the sphere of reproduction were essentially interventions in the sphere of circulation (more specifically the land market) and were essentially negative controlling mechanisms rather than proactive devices aimed at "creating" environments.

The t2 Phase - 1930 to 1950

The t2 phase, in the Borja formulation, is characterized by increasing state intervention to deal with the crisis and contradictions which emerged in the t1 phase. The emphasis of these interventions is, however, on control and on "policing" the land-use process. The empirical analysis conducted in this dissertation suggests that such a description is for the most part quite appropriate for the period 1930 to 1950 in South Africa. Once again most state interventions directed at problems in the sphere of reproduction were confined to indirect measures in the sphere of circulation. There were few direct and substantial interventions in the sphere of reproduction and where such interventions did occur, they were confined largely to attempts to improve the living conditions of the White working classes. In the 1930's and 1940's a limited amount of public housing was provided for "poor Whites" usually on slum clearance sites from which Blacks had been expelled. As far as Blacks were concerned, apart from threats of and actual removal from
central city areas and tighter controls on where they could settle, neglect of the sphere of reproduction continued.

In the t2 phase professional town planning emerged as a distinct activity around the implementation of the provisions of town planning ordinances passed in the 1930's. It was a period in which the first town planning schemes were introduced. The tools which the new legislation made available to planners were for the most part regulatory mechanisms to be applied in the sphere of circulation (use zoning; density zoning; land reservation; bulk, coverage and height controls). However, since the built environment itself was a terrain of accumulation and since opportunities existed for the appropriation of portions of the social product through the private ownership of land and housing stock (rents), it was not surprising that attempts to regulate land-use were met with suspicion and some opposition. Thus, the actual implementation of planning in South Africa was slow and of a minimalist nature, and the tension that Rowes (1981) observes in capitalist societies between the need for urban planning on the one hand, and the simultaneous rejection of such planning on the other, has been evident in South Africa. Such a tension, as Rowes (1981) points out, gives rise to a contradiction between the promise of theory and the actuality of practice.

Early debates about the implementation of planning in South Africa suggest that Rowes' proposition in this regard similarly has resonance in South Africa. However, developments in the economy at a macro-level did, however, provide planners with an opportunity to bring theory and practice closer together and to indulge in grand design. Hobart-Houghton (1964) described the period 1933 to 1945, in Postovian terms, as the "take-off" stage of the South African economy. Gold was given new impetus by the devaluation of the South African pound; foreign capital flowed into the country; domestic capital formation increased substantially; Iscor came into production and expanded rapidly; and the OFS goldfields were discovered. This expansion of the economy and large-scale state intervention in production provided planners with the opportunity to become involved in the design of entire new towns (Vanderbijlpark, Sasolburg, Welkom, Virginia, etc). Thus, the first major phase of planned new town development in South Africa was closely
associated with expanded accumulation rather than with the need to address slum conditions and overspill in the metropolitan areas, as was the case with the British new towns. During this phase, South African planners were able to bring practice and theory closer together. It should be noted too, that the expansion of the accumulation process in this period also precipitated an unprecedented flow of Black people from the reserves and rural areas to the cities. Given that the contradictions surrounding the supply of land and housing for low-income people had never been resolved, problems of squatting and "unplanned" shack settlement became the order of the day. This, in turn, led to experimentation with "self-help" housing and set the stage for the mass housing projects of the 1950's. The experimentation with self-help housing occurred not so much because of a desire on the part of planners to try new ideas, but rather was necessitated by the struggles of the squatters themselves against removals. By the 1940's the Black working classes were beginning to assert themselves.

The t2 phase also heralded the first substantial regional planning interventions - betterment planning in the rural areas and attempts by the state to promote more "even" spatial developments at a regional scale. Betterment planning was introduced in part to ensure that the basis of cheap labour power, augmentation of wages through subsistence agriculture, was not undermined. This had to be achieved, however, without bringing reserve agriculture into competition with White farmers or eroding the need for migrancy. Thus, early rural development interventions did not involve attempts to stimulate reserve agriculture by linking it infrastructurally to markets. Instead, it involved the reorganization of agricultural settlement patterns or, more specifically, the grouping of peasant farmers into villages away from their fields and the consolidation of agricultural land to allow for some mechanization. It should be noted that betterment planning constituted a massive intervention into the territorial arrangement of production, reproduction and circulation in the reserves. This is in contrast, of course, to the minimalist interventions in the sphere of circulation that urban planning outside the reserves entailed.

Concerns about the uneven nature of capitalist development began to emerge in the 1940's. More specifically, there was a concern about the
underutilisation of resources such as labour and water in some parts of the country. This uneven development, it was argued, resulted from a mismatch between individual and collective rationality in location decision-making, and as a consequence collective intervention was necessary to promote accumulation and the development of underutilized areas. Certainly, the thinking and practices that emerged in the period were of a more "public interest" nature (and hence more technicist than the betterment planning interventions which were tied much more closely to a highly exploitative form of racial capitalism). In the period that followed, however, regional planning became highly articulated with apartheid.

The t3 Phase - 1950 to 1975

In the Borja (1977) formulation, the t3 period is one characterized by substantial and direct state intervention in the sphere of reproduction as a consequence of:

(a) growing militance in the sphere of reproduction on account of the shortcomings of previous strategy which focused only on control, and

(b) the recognition that the built environment itself can become a terrain of plunder and of ideological incorporation.

Certainly, the period 1950 to 1975 was one of massive direct intervention in the sphere of reproduction. This intervention took two forms. The first was the reconstruction of the South African city to transform the "segregation" city into the "apartheid" city. The second was the introduction of a massive public housing programme for urban Blacks. As far as the forging of the apartheid city is concerned, the state actively reconstructed South African cities, moving thousands of people from older or "unplanned" settlements to new and highly ordered encampments on the periphery. There are a number of contending explanations of this reconstruction. The explanation most consistent with the Borja (1977) formulations, is that it was a response to rising militance in the sphere of reproduction. Certainly the rapid urbanization of the 1940's was associated with the growth and maturation of Black political opposition, both at the point of production and in the
sphere of reproduction. There is evidence that the creation of the apartheid city was, at least in part, an element of an overall strategy aimed at quelling Black political opposition. Other explanations stress the importance of "ideology" and particularly Afrikaaner nationalism. Yet others focus on the need for rationalised city forms to promote the interests of those in real estate and property.

There are also a number of possible explanations of the second major direct intervention in the sphere of reproduction referred to above, i.e. the mass housing schemes of the 1950's. Like the reconstruction of the apartheid city the housing estates could be seen as a response to the rising militance of the Black working classes. Moreover, the building of the housing estates was part of the process of apartheid reconstruction. The housing estates may also have been related to a diversion of capital from the primary circuit of capital to the secondary circuit, as a consequence of overaccumulation in the former. Certainly, the construction sector of the economy grew faster than any other sector in the 1950's and 1960's, but this was more related to the growth of White suburbia and White commercial areas. There is substantial evidence that the mass housing programmes of the 1950's were perhaps most fundamentally related to the need of a rapidly growing industrial sector for a cheap, stable and relatively skilled labour force. Certainly, conflict emerged between city councils (dominated by capital) and central government (dominated by an alliance of White workers, the White petty bourgeoisie, and White agriculturalists) over the scale and extent of projects. This conflict was to lead to greater centralization of control over the sphere of reproduction of Black workers with the central state taking full control over the Black townships by 1970. In any event, it should be noted that the massive intervention in the sphere of reproduction that the mass housing programme implied, was underpinned by the rapid accumulation of the 1950's and 1960's. This rapid accumulation also provided the material basis for the introduction of an ambitious regional planning programme.

The regional planning programme of the late 1950's and 1960's revolved around the notion of industrial decentralization which itself was predicated on "growth-pole" theory which was fashionable at the time. It has already been mentioned that in the 1940's, some concern was
expressed about the spatially uneven nature of development and the underutilisation of resources in some areas. These concerns notwithstanding, the real impetus of the decentralisation policy had its roots in the ideology of separate development or "Grand Apartheid" which matured in the late 1950's and in terms of which Blacks were to exercise political rights in the bantustans. The bantustans, in turn, were to become economically and politically independent. The need for the policy of separate development was itself rooted in Afrikaaner nationalist ideology, but was perhaps more fundamentally related to the escalating Black militance of the 1950's. This militance was viciously repressed, but power bloc theoreticians recognised the need to accommodate Blacks politically. The industrial decentralization programme, then, was ultimately linked to the political reproduction of racial capitalism. It is certainly not explicable in terms of the logic of capital accumulation at the time. Organized capital vigorously opposed decentralisation policy. Whilst the international literature provided theoretical support (on efficiency and equity grounds) for more spatially even economic growth, this theory was used as an ideological prop for what amounted to a massively ambitious exercise in ethnic spatial engineering on a regional scale.

The implementation of grand apartheid in the 1960's also had a number of major implications for other aspects of urban and regional planning. Firstly the preoccupation of the Nationalists with directing settlement behind bantustan boundaries led to a rapid increase of such settlement 'up- against-the-fences' of these boundaries, but as close to metropolitan areas as possible. This, in turn, has produced a particularly attenuated form of urbanism in South Africa, which, in turn, has precipitated a transport crisis.

As late as the 1970's some urban and regional planners were still talking about the introduction of "rocket trains" and other equally exotic devices for addressing the contradictions of attenuated urbanism. On the housing terrain, whilst the state was prepared, in the 1950's, to fund mass housing in the cities, it was concerned to not make such housing too attractive. This, in turn, imposed limits on the extent to which planners were able to make the mass housing environments pleasant environments to live in. By the 1960's, the state slowed its mass
housing programme to promote the urbanisation of the bantustans. Housing availability was by this stage being used as a means of influx control. The concern with grand apartheid also provided the impetus for the interest in "national" planning that developed in the late 1970's and 1980's. Planning the development of new "national states" was now on the agenda.

The 1950's and 1960's also saw the emergence and growth of finance capital as a distinct capitalist form (Innes, 1983). The development of the OFS Goldfields, the mechanization of manufacturing and agriculture and the consequent increase in output, and the inflow of foreign capital, all contributed to the net amount of capital in search of valorization. A sizeable proportion was directed to built-environment production. Most sectors of the White community were increasingly able to enter the housing markets as a consequence of increasing affluence associated with their protected positions in a rapidly growing manufacturing sector, and the introduction of generous housing subsidies for the growing army of White bureaucrats. These trends, together with increasing private vehicle ownership amongst Whites, precipitated the emergence of White suburbia. As in the USA suburbia with its individual houses on individual lots provided a framework for high mass consumption (individual washing machines, individual swimming pools, etc). A great deal of municipal urban planning in the 1950's and 1960's was, not surprisingly, focused on the management of suburban growth. In the major metropolitan areas, suburban growth gave rise to the new transport needs and the emergence of freeways (in the mid-and late 1960's) which in turn generated further suburbanisation.

In the 1950's and 1960's, the tendency towards centralization and concentration of capital became particularly apparent and this, in turn, had implications for urban development and urban planning. To begin with, the centralization and concentration of capital made it possible for individual firms to undertake massive urban redevelopment projects. Thus, the first skyscrapers were built in this period, and this gave rise to conflict between planners and local property capital over bulk controls. Moreover, decentralisation of retailing and offices began to occur on a large scale, again bringing in their wake a series of
conflicts between urban planners and property capital, and also changes in planning thought and practice.

Suburbanization and decentralization also resulted in a proliferation of local authority formation in metropolitan areas. The contradiction between the functional unity of metropolitan areas and the fragmentation of its administration led, in the 1960's and early 1970's, to demands for metropolitan planning. Developments in this direction were, however, rather tentative. In fact the impetus for the limited metropolitan planning that did occur came from the need to rationalize racial zoning at a metropolitan rather than local authority scale. The actual fruition of metropolitan planning and government was, however, much more closely linked to the political crisis of the 1970's and 1980's.

In summary urban and regional planning in the t3 phase developed in a context of rapid urbanization and rapid accumulation. Many of the planning measures introduced were aimed at either stemming or controlling the urbanization of Blacks on the one hand, or at the management of contradictions arising out of the diversion of capital into built environment formation in White areas, on the other. The emphasis was therefore on control, regulation and management.

The t4 Phase - 1975 to 1988

Whereas the t3 phase was characterized by substantial direct intervention in the sphere of reproduction, in the t4 phase, a contradiction emerges between the state's need to intervene in the sphere of reproduction on the one hand, and its need to withdraw on the other. This contradiction has in turn been expressed in contradictory developments in urban and regional planning. Moreover, in the t4 period, there is a discernible shift away from a preoccupation with the sphere of reproduction, to a growing concern with the promotion of accumulation through deregulation of the sphere of circulation (particularly land and labour markets). Underpinning these contradictions and shifts is a deep politico-economic crisis - or what has been styled in this dissertation as an "organic crisis".
At an economic level the crisis has been manifest in inter alia a very slow average growth rate since the mid-1970's (about 1% per annum) and by an alarming increase in inflation and unemployment. It has been argued in this dissertation that the economic crisis has been precipitated by: the development of crisis in the international economy which has had the effect of increasing the costs of imports and thereby, together with sanctions, introducing balance of payments problems; and more particularly by the saturation of local markets. Political crisis has been manifest in the ongoing political revolt and strife between 1976 and 1986 and the inability of the state to resolve the crisis in such a way as to allow the reintegration of South Africa into the international community, which is so critical if the economy is to recover. The causes of political crisis have been manifold but include the growth of Black consciousness, developments in the subcontinent, economic conditions in the townships, unemployment, the reform process itself and a variety of other factors.

While political crisis has on the one hand led to a need to intervene in the townships to deal with housing shortages and the massive neglect of the urban townships (inherited from the period of Grand Apartheid when the state was trying to discourage settlement in the cities), it has also precipitated a need to withdraw, especially given the politicisation of rents and transport. Moreover, the economic crisis and more specifically the associated fiscal crisis has placed severe constraints on the state's ability to intervene directly in the sphere of reproduction. Yet ironically, were it not for balance of payments constraints which are partly attributable to apartheid, direct state intervention in the sphere of reproduction would represent one way of stimulating domestically generated growth. As a consequence, the state response has been a mix of intervention in, and withdrawal from, the sphere of reproduction.

On the one hand this has meant the introduction of a limited number of upgrading programmes which in turn has led to developments in theory and practice. The interventions have, however, also resulted in the virtual "militarisation" of some planning activities. On the other hand, the state response has involved the introduction of a housing policy which stresses privatisation and withdrawal. However, when economic conditions allow, state expenditure in the sphere of reproduction is being used to
reflate the economy. For the most part, however, the balance of payment constraint implies that state intervention in the sphere of reproduction in the short term will amount to little more than the acquisition of land to accommodate rapid urbanization and the settling of people ahead of service provision. This, in turn, is likely to introduce a whole range of new challenges for planning theory and practice.

One of the major changes in urban and regional planning policy in the "organic crisis" period has been the abandonment of decades of anti-urban policy and the embracing of a positive urbanization strategy. This reversal, it has been argued, is particularly attributable to the political struggles of an escalating army of immigrants against removals, and partly attributable to the adoption of a particular version of macro-economic growth strategy of inward-industrialization. This strategy involves the promotion of urbanization, privatization and deregulation, as well as an attempt to generate domestic growth in such a way that the balance of payments is not put under too much pressure.

The positive urbanization policy also implies new challenges for urban planners. On the one hand, it has precipitated debates about the spatial management of metropolitan growth. The analysis here has suggested that the state's proposals to manage growth through the creation of satellite new towns is linked mainly to a continued commitment to apartheid spatial engineering and to deal with the externalities associated with large encampments of poor people in the cities. In any event, new town planning is back on the planning agenda, but this time in a context of economic decline rather than growth. Furthermore, it should be noted that the emphasis on privatization and deregulation is not only linked to promotion of inward-industrialization, but also of export-industrialization. This, in turn, has led to experimentation with "enterprise zones" or deregulated "export-processing zones". Moreover, deregulation and privatization implies that an urban and regional planning based mainly on regulation (which is largely what planning in South Africa has been about) is likely to come under increasing pressure. State regional policy is also likely to come under similar pressure since it is no longer underpinned by the rapid accumulation of the 1970's. Already concessions to economic efficiency are evident in changing regional
policy. However, "pork-barrel" politics and state's unwillingness to abandon the notion of independent bantustans, will in all likelihood, continue to ensure the ongoing implementation of a streamlined version of decentralization policy.

Finally, it is worth noting that the "organic" crisis of the post-1975 period also spawned the emergence of progressive planning activities outside of formal structures and the emergence of a progressive planning movement. The emergence of such a movement has been explained as deriving largely from the growth of civic movements around housing and transport issues, the importation of ideas from abroad, and a reassessment on the part of at least a particular segment of planners, of where their long-term interests lie. Apart from the practices that this phase engendered, it also generated the production of theory aimed at promoting progressive practices. Hopefully, this dissertation will be regarded as one such contribution. Before concluding this section it should be noted that the salient features of this phase as far as progressive practices are concerned, will again be addressed later in the chapter. Thus, this section has attempted to provide only a broad overview of changing conditions and planning practices in the 1980 phase in order to compare them with prior phases.

By the 1980's, the planning challenge has shifted. Whereas the planning challenge of the 1940's, 1950's and 1960's was to cope with and regulate rapid urbanization in a context of economic growth, the challenge of the 1980's is to cope with even more rapid urban growth in a period of economic decline. Thus, planning in South Africa in the 1980's stands at the threshold of a major contradiction. Perhaps never before have the traditional regulation practices of planners been so necessary. On the other hand, there are substantial pressures for deregulation in order to promote economic growth. As will be elaborated shortly, this contradiction, along with a variety of others, provides both opportunities for and imposes constraints on creative progressives.

PLANNING AND APARTHEID

At the outset of this dissertation (Chapter Two) territorial apartheid was considered part of urban and regional planning by virtue of the
definition of the latter as collective intervention in territorial social relations. It was, however, noted that most practicing urban and regional planners in South Africa see a clear distinction between apartheid, which they see as a political imposition, and planning, which they see as a technical activity. Accepting that many planners make such a distinction, one theme explored in this dissertation was the extent to which the domain of planning which many regard as "technical" or "true" town and regional planning, has articulated with apartheid. Secondly, the dissertation has provided some insights into the material circumstances which have given rise to the dominance of the "planning as technocracy" dogma in South Africa.

In Chapter Two it was noted that in the propaganda in support of the introduction of town planning legislation in the early 1900's, senior members of the Transvaal Planning Association linked the application of planning to the removal of Blacks from central city slums and to the control of influx. Charles Porter's (1922, p 17) quote on the application of town planning principles to Johannesburg is worth repeating:

"1. That in order that the Malay location and the minor slums may be vigorously tackled, the Council continue its genuine efforts to provide accommodation for natives herding there.

2. That slums should not be dealt with by betterment schemes at great cost to ratepayers generally, but by the closure and demolition orders against the owners who have profited from them.

3. ...

4. That efforts be made to obtain legal powers:

(a) to secure a measure of effective control of influx of natives other than those coming to mining or other definite employment or to approved employment agencies."

It seems, therefore, that ethnic spatial engineering was considered legitimate urban planning right from the beginning. Moreover, provision for ethnic spatial planning was built into the first town planning ordinances in the 1930's. One of the tools that the ordinances made
available to planners was the ability to "reserve land" for "native" townships. Moreover, from the early 1920's, planning for Black residential areas was separated from planning for White areas. The Native Urban Areas Act of 1923, apart from banishing Blacks from the central city slums, required that municipalities keep separate revenue accounts for Black townships under their jurisdiction. Moreover, the act empowered local authorities to set aside land (land reservation) for Blacks and to provide housing for them. As a consequence separate "native affairs" or "housing" departments developed in many local authorities. When town planning branches were established (usually in City Engineer's Departments of local authorities) the municipal departments dealing with Black housing environments remained quite separate in most instances.

After the 1950's the reproduction of Black labour in the cities was brought increasingly under central state control. By 1970 the central state removed all jurisdiction over Black townships from the municipalities. Thus, by the 1970's there were two distinct sorts of planning professionals in South Africa. On the one hand, there were those planners who worked for the municipalities in highly technicist and regulatory work. They were concerned mainly with the establishment and administration of town planning schemes and occasionally they were required to preside over intra-power bloc struggles over the costs and benefits of urban development. Thus at the level of surface appearances their work was not very "political" and this in turn contributed to the widely held dogma that planning was a scientific activity which was occasionally influenced by politics. It should be noted that the bulk of planning professionals were by this time employed by the municipalities. On the other hand, there were those planners who were employed by central government and who were charged with the very political task of dealing with Black reproduction spaces. Thus, by the 1970's, for example, professional planners were being employed by central and regional government to prepare and administer apartheid guide plans.

The split in jurisdictional responsibility that is evident in urban planning was paralleled by a similar split in regional planning. Thus, by the time regional planning really gained momentum (the 1960's) the bantustans were set up as jurisdictions quite separate from the
provinces. Thus, professional planners working for the provinces, for example, found themselves conducting regional planning at least partly in accordance with the regional planning principles of the day. But, of course, the area of jurisdiction within which this "public interest" planning took place was defined in apartheid terms. However, in a political-economy as intertwined as that of South Africa, complete separation of planning jurisdictions was never possible. Throughout this dissertation reference has been made to the articulation of apartheid with so-called technicist planning. We have noted: the way in which it produced the impetus for regional planning; the way it subverted the urban renewal programmes of the 1950's; the way in which it affected the nature of Black housing environments including such relatively technicist aspects as layout; the way in which the contradictions of territorial apartheid have affected transport planning and a host of other articulations. Perhaps the closest that pure territorial apartheid and pure town planning have come to each other, was in the mid 1980's, when it was mooted that the dropping of Group Areas zoning become a local option. Moreover, it was suggested that racial zoning in these circumstances could be handled through town planning schemes.

Apartheid has also become articulated with urban and regional planning in South Africa in other more subtle ways. Whilst, in terms of the definition used here, urban and regional planning interventions occurred before the 1950's, it was only in the late 1950's and 1960's that urban and regional planning became a distinctive profession. Certainly a small vanguard had been around since the 1920's, but it was only in the period of rapid post-war growth that the profession grew. Up to the early 1980's there were literally no Black planners in South Africa. The vast majority of planners were White, middle-class and male. Numerous examples have been given of the way in which the values and prejudices of this group of planners has affected the way in which they have responded to planning issues. While there are now a handful of Black planners in South Africa, the profession is still overwhelmingly dominated by Whites. It is not surprising therefore that the planning profession was unable, in 1985, to unequivocally condemn apartheid as antithetical to its goals and traditions.
Interestingly, the politico-economic crisis of the 1970's and 1980's has had contradictory effects on the relation between territorial apartheid and planning. On the one hand state restructuring in response to the crisis has partially reintegrated the planning jurisdictions that apartheid and segregation rent asunder. Thus, planning at a regional level now takes place across bantustan boundaries (RDACs). Likewise at metropolitan level RSCs are making peripheral townships and shacklands the concerns of the municipalities once again. On the other hand, the reform period has brought town and regional planning perhaps closer to territorial apartheid than ever before. Thus, whilst one of the cornerstones of territorial apartheid, influx control through pass laws, has been scrapped, influx is now being controlled through more technical town planning constructs such as "deconcentration", "satellite towns", "land supply" and so on. Reference has already been made to the possibility of ethnic zoning being made part of town planning schemes. In the future too, it is likely that conventional zoning tools will be used in an exclusionary way.

In sum, the distinction between planning and apartheid in South Africa has never been clear, but there has been more than a fair measure of articulation. However, the distinction that professional planners have made which has become an integral part of their dogma, is not entirely reactionary in effect. A concept like "technicist planning in the public interest" gains new meaning in the context of redefining planning jurisdictions. It can be used by progressives to push for substantial material improvements in Black areas at this juncture. Moreover, the maintenance of distance between the traditions and theory of the international planning movement and the distortions wrought by apartheid spatial engineering, remains a useful political and ideological device at a time when the people-power bloc contradiction remains central.

PLANNING AND PROGRESSIVE SOCIAL CHANGE - THE HISTORICAL RECORD

Urban and regional planning in South Africa has not had a particularly progressive history. Unlike planning in Britain and the USA, planning in South Africa has never been a social movement for reform in its own right. In Chapter Three it was argued that the lack of social reformist content in the ethos and practices of urban and regional planners in the
early years, was related to a number of factors. Firstly, the slum problem was widely perceived as resulting from the incursions of Blacks into White areas. Dealing with slums was as a consequence not seen as requiring social reforms or even major physical improvements. The common perception was that what was needed was the expulsion of Blacks. Secondly, it was argued that the victory of the Pact Alliance in 1924 ensured the incorporation of the White working classes into the power bloc. One consequence of this was that the "poor White" problem was solved by ensuring preferential treatment for Whites in the labour market and by the absorption of many into the state bureaucracies. The limited provision of a few public housing estates for Whites notwithstanding, prior to 1950 there were no grand attempts at social reform through ambitious physical reconstruction. A third reason for the lack of social reformist content was the dominance of architects, land surveyors and engineers in the social movement, agitating for the introduction of town planning legislation. Their concern was primarily with the physical rather than the social environment. Finally, when the first attempts were made to implement town planning legislation, the resistance encountered from vested interests soon reduced planning to minimalist, administrative, technicist and regulation-oriented activity. Social change was certainly not on the agenda.

In contrast to town planning, the introduction of regional planning at provincial level was accompanied by a degree of social reformist concern. In Natal, which was the first province to set up formal regional planning structures, the introduction of regional planning was largely a product of individual agency and more particularly the idealism of E. Thorrington-Smith. Thorrington-Smith had been inspired by an account of the nature and intent of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) Scheme which he had read about whilst on military service in Britain. He hoped that regional planning could bring prosperity to people living in "backward" areas in South Africa. Whether or not this reformist concern extended beyond Thorrington-Smith himself is a moot point. What is clear is that his visions for the Tugela River Basin only gained momentum when articulated with apartheid spatial engineering.

The massive public housing schemes of the 1950's were also more closely linked to control, oppression, and cheap labour than a concern with
social reform. However, as is evident from the writings of authors such as Calderwood (1955) and Jennings (1954) there was a genuine concern on the part of many of the planners involved, to provide decent living conditions. Their ability to do so was, however, constrained by the dictates of apartheid, of cheap labour power and by their own paternalistic, and at times racist, mind sets. It should be noted too that in the 1950’s, there was a flowering of urban social movements around removals, housing and transport issues. However, there was no concomitant growth of an advocacy or planning support movement. This failure was largely attributable once again to the mind sets of planners which, in turn, was a function of their ethnic and class backgrounds, and the interests they actually served. Furthermore, in an earlier section it was noted that by this time the planning profession was split into those who presided over and mediated intra-class conflicts within the power block, and those who dealt almost exclusively with the reproduction of the Black working classes. Since the majority of professional planners were involved in the former, the view that planning was technicist and apolitical assumed dominance.

It was the politico-economic crisis of the post-1975 period which brought reformism squarely onto the agenda of urban and regional planners in South Africa. But even in the context of a broader power bloc reform initiative, planners have been slow to respond (Muller, 1982). Moreover, economic crisis has placed severe limits on the reform process. There can be no question, however, that the introduction of inter alia; metropolitan planning through the Regional Services Councils, the upgrading of Black townships, the introduction of a positive urbanization strategy and so on, are all reformist in intent, albeit in a very conservative framework. However, as was pointed out in Chapter Eleven, the South African Institute of Town and Regional Planning has still not been able to accept a special concern for the disadvantaged in the way that the planning profession in the United States and Britain has. Moreover, the kind of reform that has been pursued falls into the category that Kraushaar (1988) calls "social reform" as opposed to "radical reform". As will be recalled from the discussion of Kraushaar’s work in Chapter Two, "social reform" refers to attempts to bring about change within the existing set of social and economic institutions. "Radical reform" on the other hand, implies reforms which empower people
and which challenge the institutions of the status quo. In fact, some of
the reformist activities that planners have been involved in have been of
a distinctly "counter-revolutionary" nature. Examples include instances
where planners are working in close consultation with the military and
the National Security Management System (NSMS) in the upgrading of
politically volatile townships.

The post-1975 period has, however, seen the emergence of a progressive
planning movement. This movement has aligned itself quite explicitly
with the popular classes. As pointed out in Chapter Eleven, the reasons
for the emergence of such a movement are complex. An important reason
was the re-emergence and dramatic growth of civic organizations and trade
unions after the quiescence of the 1960's. Also important was the growth
of progressive movement on English-speaking White campuses where
planners were being trained, which in turn was a function of a variety of
influences. Finally, the importation of advocacy planning theory and the
"new urban sociology" also had its influence. While the new progressive
planning movement is an aggressive one and has been reasonably effective,
the numbers involved are small in relation to the planning profession as
a whole. It is sobering to note that even by the mid-1980's the vast
majority of professional planners in South Africa were still White (98%)
and male (87%) (Smit, 1985). However, an increasing number of Black
planners are being trained both locally and abroad and this may begin to
change the political profile of the planning profession.

In concluding, it is important to get the record on the relationship
between planning and social change into perspective. The profession
both is and has been a very conservative one. For the most part urban
and regional planning has served power bloc interests and its
articulation with apartheid has been summarized in a preceding section.
But, as recent struggles within the profession and over policy have
demonstrated, there is nothing inevitable about this conservatism.
Before proceeding to a discussion of the possibilities for more
progressive practices, it is useful to reflect on some lessons which can
be drawn from the historical analysis conducted in this dissertation.
PLANNING AND PROGRESSIVE SOCIAL CHANGE - THE LESSONS OF HISTORY

As is evident from the discussion in the preceding section, the history of progressive planning practices in South Africa is a short one and confined essentially to the post-1975 period. However, the historical analysis conducted in this thesis does nonetheless produce a number of findings which are salient to progressive planning practice. These findings, together with the lessons learned from the limited attempts at progressive praxis in South Africa, are summarized in this section.

One of the themes that has been stressed in this dissertation is that urban and regional planning in South Africa cannot simply be understood as a response to contradiction and crisis. Evidence has been produced to show that whilst structure exercises an important influence on the nature and evolution of planning, agency and idealism are also important. Reference has, for example, been made to the importance of the agency of the Transvaal Planning Association in getting planning onto the statute books. Reference too has been made to the importance of characters such as Bowling, in ensuring the smooth early implementation of planning, to the idealism of Thorrington-Smith in introducing regional planning in Natal, and to the opportunism of individuals such as Atkinson, Radford and Hudak in getting local economic development planning accepted. Of course, in all of the cases referred to above, structural circumstances provided opportunities for agency but also imposed constraints. However, structural circumstances do not cause agency. It has already been pointed out that the emergence of urban social movements in the 1950’s did not automatically lead to the growth of a progressive planning movement. The implications of these observations for progressives are fairly obvious. Active and creative agents are far more likely to make a difference than armchair critics.

In a similar vein, reference was made to the importance of the mind sets of planners in affecting outcomes. In Chapter Four, for example, reference was made to the fact that planners in the 1940’s need not have responded to the squatter problems around Johannesburg in the way that they did. The fact that they opted for removals and resettlement to public schemes rather than "in situ" upgrade was a function of their colonial mind sets. The influence of paternalistic, patriarchal and
racist world views on the design of the mass housing estates for Blacks in the 1950's was also highlighted. These and other examples suggest that planning ideology is an important terrain of struggle and that planning educators have an important role to play in this regard.

In Chapter Eleven it was argued that the mind sets of planners were quite closely linked to cultural and class backgrounds. English-speaking planners usually had bourgeois or petty-bourgeois backgrounds and were culturally linked to the ideology of monopoly capital. To the extent that monopoly capital has increasingly seen apartheid as antithetical to its interests, so an anti-apartheid ethos has become part of "Anglo-culture". Afrikaans-speaking planners on the other hand, have historical links to the civil service, the White working classes and agriculture. As such they are culturally linked to the classes which formed the backbone of the "apartheid" alliance which came to power in 1948. Not surprisingly therefore, Afrikaans-speaking planners tend to be more conservative, at least as far as apartheid is concerned. The important lesson though is that the mind sets and agency of planners bear a relation to their backgrounds. Thus, there is a pressing need to increase the number of planners drawn from Black and working-class backgrounds. The other point worth noting is that a substantial proportion of the planning profession (approximately 55%) in South Africa is part of what has historically been one of the most reactionary social groupings - White bureaucrats. This has major implications for the kinds of proposals made by authors such as Coleman (1986) who urge the pursuit of strategies aimed at transforming the bureaucracies themselves.

In Chapter Two reference was made to the debate within progressive planning circles about the nature of the state and whether or not it was possible to pursue progressive practices through the state. Instrumentalist and structuralist theories of the state were criticized as overly deterministic and tautological. It was argued, instead, that the nature of the state in any capitalist social formation, the interests that it served and the effects of its policies, should be treated as contingent and uncertain. The answers to these questions could only be provided by contextually specific analysis. It should be noted that there has not been any systematic attempt to analyze the nature of the South African state in this thesis. The analysis has
focused much more on explaining planning policy, but this has yielded, as a by-product, some interesting observations about the state. To begin with the most obvious observation is that the nature of the state, both national and local, has changed over time. In Chapter Three it was noted that for the period up to 1924, the state was dominated by imperial capital and the interests of mining capital. As such the state could best be understood in instrumentalist terms. After 1924, however, when the Pact Alliance came to power, state policy began to reflect conflict within the power bloc – between various fractions of capital, the White working classes and an emerging army of bureaucrats. In other words, the state could be best conceptualized as an arena of intra-class struggle (struggles between fractions of capital) and between capital and White labour (although in most instances White labour entered the fray in alliance with one or other fraction of capital).

The Black working classes and popular masses had not yet begun to assert their political power. The 1940’s and 1950’s however, saw the burgeoning and cohering of Black political opposition. Reference was made in Chapter Four to the way in which struggles by Blacks were directly affecting planning policy (e.g. the adoption of the first temporary site-and-service schemes as a consequence of the struggles of squatters around Johannesburg). By the 1950’s, the nature of state policy was much more fundamentally affected by struggles between the power bloc (defined on ethnic grounds since 1924) and the Black popular masses, than by struggles within the power bloc. The "power bloc versus the people" contradiction had become the dominant contradiction of the social formation. Of course, contradictions within the power bloc continued to affect planning policy and in some instances this was evident in conflicts between the national and local state. In Chapter Five, the effects of struggles between the Johannesburg City Council (dominated by an alliance of local manufacturing and mining capital) and the central state (dominated by an alliance of White workers, agricultural capital, White bureaucrats and Afrikaaner Capital) on local housing policy in the 1950’s, was highlighted.

The most dramatic collective interventions in territorial social relations in the 1950’s and 1960’s, were associated almost entirely with the power bloc/people contradiction in a context in which the balance of
power lay firmly in the hands of the power bloc. With the onset of politico-economic crisis after 1975, the balance of power has shifted in the direction of the popular classes. Power bloc/people conflict has intensified and increasingly state policies can be conceptualized as having been won in struggle. In Chapter Eight it was argued that the dropping of influx control and the adoption of a positive urbanization strategy was in large part due to victories won by squatters in their battles with the state in Western Cape. It has also been argued that upgrading and home ownership cannot simply be understood in terms of "power-bloc" cunning, but also as victories won in struggle. It is important for planners to understand that in cases like the upgrading of a Clairwood or a St Wendolins, they are delivering services that people have fought for and won. Whether or not the outcomes of policy changes or increases in the social wage won in struggle will have progressive outcomes in the longer term is, however uncertain. The particular way in which these victories are delivered may be of critical importance and an important terrain for progressive planning inputs. Thus, while the people of Clairwood have won the defensive battle against removal and the proactive battle for upgrading, the way in which the latter is delivered may be incisive in determining the ultimate impact of the struggles over Clairwood. If it is delivered in such a way that the community is further cohered rather than divided, significant progressive gains will have been won. Planners both inside and outside of formal structures are, in this particular instance, well placed to influence outcomes in a progressive direction.

The intensification of power bloc/people struggles in the post-1975 period has led to significant attempts to restructure the power bloc by incorporating elements of popular classes. The tri-cameral constitution arrangements and the mooted statutory council for moderate Blacks, are, quite simply, attempts at selective co-option. This restructuring of the power bloc has, however, given rise to a range of new conflicts and contradictions some of which have already been successfully exploited by progressive planners. In Chapter Eleven the way in which a contradiction between the central state interested in co-opting Indians and Coloureds, and a local state body dominated by the immediate interests of local capital, was exploited in favour of the residents, was outlined. Given the fluidity of the contemporary political terrain, contradictions of
this sort are likely to recur and will provide opportunities for vigilant progressive planners.

In any event, by the late 1980's, state planning policies have to be understood as the outcomes of vigorous conflict within the power-bloc where new alliances are being formed, and of intensifying conflict between the power bloc and the popular classes. I will return shortly to the changing nature of the state in the section which focuses on the prospects for progressive planning in the future. Before moving on to consider such prospects there are a few additional lessons which can be derived from the historical analysis and which should be noted. The first concerns the relationship between social reform and progressive social change.

In Chapter Two, Kraushaar's (1988) distinction between social reform and radical reform was raised and discussed. Social reform it was argued, was status quo reproducing, while radical reform was empowering and potentially transformative. Most analysts would probably classify the reforms of the Botha government in the late 1970's and early 1980's as very status quo conservative social reforms. Yet, what is striking about this period of social reform and the other significant period in which reform was pursued, the 1940's, is the dramatic escalation of oppositional mobilization that has occurred in these periods. This implies that there is a correlation between social reform and the development of progressive movements capable of bringing about transformation. The evidence in South Africa is not without its contradictions however. The decade between 1950 and 1960 was one characterized by repression but it was nonetheless one of unparalleled popular resistance. However, the massive repression that followed the Sharpeville shooting brought an end to popular mobilization and a decade of quiescence. In any event, few would contest the view that the Wiehahn reforms have provided the space for the emergence of a powerful trade union movement in South Africa, which may yet become the vanguard of social change. Moreover, few would take issue with observation that in the late 1970's and early 1980's the state was more tolerant of Black oppositional movements, precisely because it was attempting to co-opt certain elements of the Black popular classes. In fact, in the analysis of political crisis in Chapter Seven, it was argued that reform itself
could be regarded as one of the causes of political crisis. This is not to suggest that the reforms promote growth of progressive movements. Clearly, in many instances this is not so. The lesson for progressive planners, however, is that "knee-jerk" responses to reform should be avoided. The challenge is to isolate, promote, and use reforms which provide the space for pursuing progressive policy and mobilization. Again I will elaborate this point shortly with reference to the current conjuncture.

The brief history of progressive planning praxis in South Africa has produced some interesting insights. The Clairwood experience, for example, has demonstrated the importance of the presence of progressive planners on all the terrains upon which policy is contested. The success of the Clairwood experiment, can be ascribed to the existence of progressives at all relevant levels within the formal structures as well as the role played by aggressive advocates outside of formal structures. The Clairwood experience further suggests that the question of whether planners should operate inside or outside of formal structures in South Africa is actually a non-issue.

Progressive planners need to contest every terrain. Layered and complex organization is the key. The Clairwood experience also demonstrates that in times of crisis opportunities may arise which can be exploited by progressive planners. The St Wendolin’s experience discussed in Chapter Nine has a number of lessons for those specifically trying to build organization around upgrading. I will refer, however, only to those of general interest. Perhaps the most important lesson of the entire experience is the questions it raises about trying to engage the state (in struggles over the social wage) in the context of economic decline. Funds have never materialized and this has contributed to declining confidence in the civic organization and the increasing possibility of division. It would perhaps have been preferable for the community to take on many aspects of the upgrade on their own. Moreover, the experience in contexts such as the Westbury and Frobisher upgrading schemes (which are now complete), demonstrated that participation in the upgrade did not produce lasting community organization. In the case of Red Location in Port Elizabeth, it split a previously coherent civic organization. In short, the brief history of trying to build
organization around state upgrading programmes is not a particularly encouraging one.

PLANNING AND PROGRESSIVE SOCIAL CHANGE: PROSPECTS AND STRATEGIES

A theme that was emphasised in Chapter Two was that theory to guide planning practice could not be hatched in abstraction. It had to be based on careful conjunctural analysis. The features of the contemporary conjuncture were examined in detail in Chapter Six through to Chapter Eleven. Moreover, salient features of the conjuncture were summarised in the overview of the evolution of urban and regional planning in South Africa attempted in an earlier section of this concluding chapter. South Africa in 1988 is a social formation in crisis. In order to achieve economic growth rates which are reasonably in tune with rapid population growth and urbanization, the South African state has two options - promote exports and/or pursue inward-industrialization. Both paths are, however, impeded by sanctions. In the case of the former access to foreign markets is constrained; in the case of the latter the lack of access to foreign credit means that balance of payments problems place major constraints on domestically-generated growth. The ruling classes also face a major political crisis. On the one hand, the crisis derives from an upsurge of popular militance. On the other hand, the crisis is precipitated by the state’s attempts to introduce the reforms which it sees as necessary to end economic isolation. Moreover, political and socio-economic reform is expensive. Thus, the state is caught on the horns of a dilemma. On the one hand, economic growth is necessary to introduce the reforms which will hopefully end isolation. On the other hand, economic growth is itself dependent on the ending of isolation. The crisis also has another dimension as far as the power bloc is concerned. This relates to the difficulties that the hegemonic fractions within the power bloc are experiencing in cohering the bloc. The bloc is fragmenting. On the one hand, most fractions of capital are impatient about the pace of reform because of their obvious interest in reintegration into the world economy. Some fractions are clearly moving in the direction of the popular classes recognising that this is the only way in which apartheid can be ended (witness for example the numerous meetings between the captains of industry and the liberation movement both at home and
abroad). On the other hand, significant elements of the bloc, such as the lower echelons of the public services, the White working classes and elements of the agricultural community are joining political organizations to the far right (the AWB and the Conservative Party). Moreover, Afrikaanerdom, it seems, is irrevocably split.

While it is clear that the power bloc is in crisis, the same can be said for the popular classes and the liberation movement. The ease with which the state ended popular resistance in the post-1986 period suggests that an insurrectionary overthrow of the South African state is an unlikely possibility. Moreover, it is quite clear that the state is intent on repressing politics and that it is doing so reasonably successfully. Whether or not large scale mobilization of the masses will be possible again in the short and medium term is debatable. The outlook is, however, relatively bleak. While the apparent victory of liberation forces in Angola may boost morale, there are other dynamics that may mitigate against renewed popular mobilization. Apart from repression, there is the state’s selective withdrawal from the sphere of collective consumption. Then there is the fact that the urbanising masses are likely to be accommodated in sprawling and isolated informal settlements run by ruthless warlords (see Cole, 1987). Evidence from many parts of the world shows that such encampments do not generally breed progressive politics. In fact, the growth of reactionary politics in the burgeoning informal areas around South Africa’s cities may constitute more of a threat to the liberation movement in the long run, than the existing elements of the power bloc. The extent of the stalemate between the power bloc and the popular classes is perhaps most evident from the reactions of both sides to the recent state-imposed local government elections. The government is claiming that the 30% poll in African areas represents a success. The popular classes on the other hand are dismissing it as a dismal failure. The reality is that neither party has been able to win an incisive victory. The strongest card that the liberation movement holds, is its international influence and its ability to isolate South Africa. The strongest card held by the power bloc is its military might.

Given the conjunctural circumstances described above, the following criteria are tentatively suggested for assessing the extent to which
Urban and regional planning practices are progressive. Urban and regional planning practices (whether conducted inside or outside of formal structures) are progressive if they:

(a) contribute to the coherence, mobilization and strength of the popular alliance

(b) contribute to the "winning over" of elements of the power bloc into the popular alliance

(c) contribute to the division of the power bloc (or the disorganization of the power bloc)

(d) improve the material circumstances of the popular classes without facilitating their incorporation into the power bloc

(e) contribute to the shifting of the stalemate between the power bloc and the popular classes in a direction which favours the latter.

It should be noted that these criteria are far more conjuncturally-sensitive than those specified in my earlier works (see Smit, 1984; McCarthy and Smit, 1984). In these works, the definition of progressive planning was based on ideology and abstract theorization rather than careful conjunctural analysis. There is also a recognition that significant change in South Africa will not come about unless significant elements of the power bloc, and more particularly capital, are won over to the side of the oppositional groupings. This implies that progressive urban and regional planners should be entering into different relationships with the collective organizations of capital than previously implied. This is not to suggest that the capital/labour contradiction is now considered of secondary significance. It is simply to assert that at this conjuncture a realistic goal for progressives must be to remove the apartheid regime from power. Nor is it to suggest that progressive planning activities which contribute to the coherence and mobilization of the labour movement should be de-emphasised. It is imperative that a strong labour movement is built and that it assumes a leading role in the alliance of the popular classes.
Given the criteria specified above, the task that remains is to identify concrete strategies that can be pursued by progressive planners. It is to this task that I now turn.

The Power of the Alternative

Given the central concern of progressives with on the one hand cohering and reinforcing existing oppositional movements, and on the other with winning over new elements, progressive planners may play an important ideological role in promoting progressive alternatives. One of the most significant contributions, in terms of its impact, to the debate on South Africa is Clem Sunter’s (1987) The World and South Africa in the 1990s. One of the major reasons for the appeal of Sunter’s book, is that it offers hope for all. Sunter (1987) argues that South Africa has a number of choices and he distinguishes between what he calls the "high road" alternative and the "low road" alternative. The high road involves the unbanning of political parties, the negotiation of a settlement, and the pursuit of particular economic policies. While written from within the bowels of monopoly capital, Sunter’s (1987) contribution has a great deal of progressive content and has captured the imagination of significant elements within the power bloc who see the "high road" as the only way forward. There is a need for similar contributions from the progressive movement itself for two reasons. Firstly, it generates ideological enthusiasm about better things to come within the movement itself thereby adding to its coherence. Secondly, positive "high road" scenarios may bring power bloc elements into the progressive fold. Progressive urban and regional planners can play an important role in this regard.

Consider, for example, the impact of the "high road" city when counterposed with the emerging model of the "neo-apartheid" city. In an earlier chapter (Chapter Six), it was noted that because of the sanctions on foreign credit that apartheid has brought, the state has no alternative other than to put rapidly urbanising Blacks on sites ahead of service provision. This, in turn, implies low densities (because of sanitation problems), and the accommodation of the shack settlements, that will emerge, in new towns sufficiently distant from the core to insulate Whites from the externality effects of such settlements. The neo-apartheid city is therefore likely to be very inefficient, will
require vast amounts of long distance commuting, and will promote the
further impoverishment of the poor. On the other hand, if apartheid was
abandoned the "high road" city could be pursued. The economy of such a
city would be stimulated by a housing programme funded by foreign loans
and which would act as a lead sector. Balance of payment constraints
would be less problematic because of the availability of foreign credit.
A compact, high-density, efficient city based on public transport could
be built because proper services could be provided. As noted in Chapter
Six, Dewar (1985) and McCarthy and Smit (1988) have already provided some
indication of the potential configuration and advantages of the "high
road" city.

The "High Road" and Local Options

Apart from casting the "High Road" city into the political cauldron for
ideological reasons, "high road" cities or even regions could become
concrete political projects in their own right. Moreover, such projects
could be set in motion immediately. The liberation movement's shift of
tactics in dealing with the sports boycott, opens up some very
interesting possibilities. The fact that the African National Congress
has indicated that it may end the isolation of sports which effectively
de-racialise their activities rather than insist that apartheid in toto
must end before sports isolation ends, opens up the possibility of
pursuing local or regional options. Moreover, the liberation movement
has as much interest in breaking the existing stalemate as the power
bloc. The kind of scenario that I have in mind is as follows.

Metropolitan areas such as Durban and Cape Town are by far the least
reactionary of locales within South Africa and are controlled by liberal
city councils. Other metropolitan areas such as Johannesburg and Port
Elizabeth are less conservative than the country as a whole. There is a
good chance that the most significant power bloc elements within one or
more of these metropolitan areas might be persuaded to pursue the "high
road city" option and enter into negotiations with the liberation
movement in this regard. In Chapter Six reference was made to the depth
of the economic crisis facing the Cape Town metropolitan area. So deep
is the crisis that the Cape Town City Council has already explored the
possibility of a local political dispensation without much success. But
it is quite possible that in the changed circumstances of the moment, that the Cape Town City Council could persuade the liberation movement to give the council access to foreign loans specifically for housing and upgrading purposes.

A pre-condition for the granting of the loans could be that all upgrading would have to be conducted in a democratic fashion under the control of agents acceptable to the liberation movement. This, in turn, would give the movement access to the shack areas which it badly needs. Moreover, the Cape Town City Council could undertake to establish a non-racial local authority and put in place an island run on something akin to Charterist principles. Since a substantial housing programme in a place like Cape Town, would have multiplier effects throughout the economy as a whole, and since this programme may create balance of payments problems, the liberation movement could allow the country as a whole access to a limited amount of foreign credit. Whether or not the ruling Nationalist Party would allow such an initiative is not clear. But it may be difficult for them to refuse a carefully negotiated package with clear national benefits. And even if they refuse, the ideological gains would be substantial. Clearly the possibilities of taking such initiatives forward will ultimately rest on more detailed analysis and on a variety of contingencies. But there are a range of options. What is needed is for creative and dynamic progressives to put them together. Agency can and usually does make a difference.

From the Grandiose to the More Sober

While there is a reasonable chance that initiatives of the type referred to above might succeed, it should be clear from the analysis of the political crisis in Chapter Seven, that there are powerful forces within the National Security Management System (NSMS) who would vigorously oppose any negotiation with the progressive movement. To be realistic the "securocrats" are likely to gain ascendency and this suggests that the South African state will have to be pushed into an even more parlous position (both politically and economically) before negotiations with "real" Black leaders are taken seriously. If this is the case, then the likely scenario for the short and medium term is one of slow economic growth, selective socio-economic reform, continued selective co-option
(particularly attempts to incorporate conservative Blacks) and vigorous repression of political opposition. In Chapter Seven it was stressed that since 1986, the state has moved to repress most forms of "extra-parliamentary" politics. This scenario has major implications for the kind of progressive practices that can be pursued by urban and regional planners and the terrain upon which they can seek to do so. To begin with the scenario implies that the mobilization strategies of the progressive movement will have to change, particularly in the sphere of reproduction.

New Strategies for Civics and Their Support Groups

State withdrawal from collective consumption provision, repression, and overall economic austerity, suggests that mobilization around "social-wage" issues such as rents and transport may no longer be realistic. Even if the state is "willing", it is unlikely that it will be able to deliver. Whilst continued mobilization around social wage issues may sharpen contradictions of an embattled power bloc, it seems very unlikely that the state will allow the kind of mobilization that occurred between 1976 and 1986. This is not to imply that the state can totally dictate the nature and direction of politics in the sphere of reproduction. It is simply to suggest that the civic movement will, of necessity, have to begin to shift its tactics in response to changing state policy. One direction in which the civics could move is to start setting up democratic "co-operatives" around housing and transport issues. Our analysis has suggested that state housing policy will focus largely on site provision and that hundreds-of-thousands of people will be settled on the land ahead of services. In such a context organising communities into building and service co-operatives could carry substantial material benefits for the participants (and thus have a greater chance of becoming lasting community structures). Emphasis in such co-operatives would shift away from engaging the state in "social-wage" battles to an emphasis on building of "autonomous" and democratic co-operatives.

It should be noted that I am not proposing a simplistic shift to Turnerist self-help. The entire emphasis in such a project would be on building sustainable collective organization. Moreover, the state could
still be engaged in "social-wage" struggles but these should probably be based on demands which are realistic and which can be won. One lesson of the St Wendolin’s experience (discussed in Chapter Nine), was that the community would probably have been better off if it had never directly involved the state in the upgrade except for quite specific items (e.g. piped water). Once the state and other agencies became involved, the community found it very difficult to control the process. Moreover, very little has been delivered. Both effects, the loss of control and the failure to deliver, have undermined the civic. The argument that is being made is that if the state is going to be unable to deliver much, but is nonetheless able to viciously repress attempts to ideologically exploit the situation, then there is little to gain at this stage in directly engaging the state. Emphasis should fall on first building coherent organization.

An emphasis on autonomy implies that progressive planners working outside of formal structures may have a particularly important role to play. But their role is likely to shift away from playing an "advocacy" support role in struggles over the social wage to helping communities develop their own upgrading strategies and co-operatives. Since government is unlikely to leave the terrain of informal settlements uncontested, it may also be important for progressive planners to work through formal organizations who would be able to gain access to communities with less harassment from the seurocrats. The choice of appropriate structure through which progressives should work to facilitate the establishment of fairly "autonomous" co-operatives will, however, vary with context. What is clear, however, is that there is a need to explore the international experience with co-operatives and develop theory and practices appropriate to indigenous circumstances.

While it is widely accepted that economic growth in South Africa is likely to be exceptionally slow, this prediction should not be accepted uncritically. It is possible that the Botha government will succeed in finding export-markets particularly in the rest of Africa. Moreover, it is possible that developments in the world economy could lead to substantial and sustained increases in the price of gold. In either eventuality the balance of payments constraints on domestically generated growth would be substantially eased. Should this happen it is likely
that the state may direct substantial amounts of capital into the upgrading of townships, informal settlements, and the unserviced planned settlements (which will constitute an increasingly large proportion of the total). Progressives need to be aware of such possibilities for two reasons. First, there can be little question that the Botha government would like to pour more capital into the townships for political reasons. As discussed in Chapter Nine it is possible for civics to fight for control over the flow of capital into their environments and to use it to build their organizations. It was also noted in Chapter Nine that the difficulties of attaining such control notwithstanding, progressive community organizations cannot afford to ignore such flows because of their divisive potential. The second reason for being sensitive to changing economic circumstances concerns the need to evaluate the possibility of shifting back to "social wage" politics if appropriate.

An Increasingly Significant Role for the Unions in the Sphere of Reproduction

The progressive structures which have best survived the post-1986 repression of political organization are those of the trade union movement. Perhaps the main reason for their survival is the fact that the progressive unions opted to enter the formal industrial relations framework established by government in response to the Wiehahn proposals of the late 1970's. As noted in Chapter Seven, this framework represents one of the few real and reasonably successful reforms introduced by the government. As a consequence, government was far more reluctant about crushing organizations which were operating "within-system" despite their tendency to militancy in the late 1980's. Moreover, given the strength of grass-roots union organization, repressing the unions was perhaps potentially more costly than was true of extra-parliamentary political and civic organization.

One consequence of the survival of union structures is that they may have an increasingly significant role to play in the sphere of reproduction. Certainly in the past few years unions have been taking a more active role in addressing the housing needs of their constituency and have looked to the progressive planning movement for assistance (see Hendler, 1988). To begin with, unions have been considering a variety of
options for using their pension funds for housing purposes. Secondly, the unions are increasingly taking the social wage issue onto the factory floor and demanding that management take greater responsibility for the conditions that workers experience in the sphere of reproduction (Hendler, 1988). Thus, there is likely to be a growing demand from the worker movement for progressive planning support.

It will be recalled from the review of progressive planning theory in Chapter Two, that Cooke (1983) has argued that long-term economic decline in Britain has been associated with a shift in state intervention from the sphere of reproduction to the deregulation of the sphere of circulation, primarily in order to promote job creation. He also noted that this shift to the sphere of circulation has also been accompanied by the granting of increasing discretion and autonomy to local state structures. This, in turn, he suggested, provided opportunities for local state and union co-operation in the production worker plans. The prerequisite however, was the existence of local state structures sympathetic to such a venture. Of course, there are no local authorities in South Africa which are controlled by socialists as is the case in Britain, but we have made reference (particularly in Chapter Six) to the existence of more progressive local authorities such as Cape Town and Durban. Certainly the economic crisis in South Africa has similarly been accompanied by the devolution of power to the local level. Moreover, job creation is a national priority. There may as a consequence, be opportunities for entrepreneurial progressives to set up the structures through which the pursuit of worker plans can be pursued. The revitalization and the reuse of the idle Cape Town docklands is one area where such an exercise could perhaps be undertaken. Generally speaking, however, the opportunities for the production of local-state supported worker plans in South Africa is, however, limited by the general control that reactionary forces have over local state apparatuses. This reality raises the need for contesting this control and for the transformation of the apparatuses themselves. The possibilities and constraints in this regard are briefly examined in the section that follows.
Transforming the State Apparatuses

In discussing the transformation of the state apparatuses, a distinction needs to be made between the "political control" of the political institutions presiding over such apparatuses (town councils and so on) and the apparatuses themselves. I will deal first with the political control of state apparatuses. As noted in a number of chapters in this dissertation, Black progressive political movements have, since the late 1940's, generally shunned any kind of participation in the political structures established by the power bloc. In the past, this "non-participationist" strategy recognised that apart from the principles involved, the dummy political structures offered to Blacks had little access to real material resources. However, in the next decade there may well be a reassessment of this position. Certainly, the question of participation in the local government elections of 1988 was seriously contemplated by at least some significant segments of the progressive movements. Particularly important considerations in this regard included the need to find new "spaces" for political mobilization in the light of the state's fairly successful repression of extra-parliamentary organizations, and the possibility of gaining access to resources through the Regional Service Councils. For a variety of reasons the progressive movement chose not to participate, but it would not be entirely surprising if, in the not too distant future, there is a shift of tactics towards some form of participation. Should this happen it follows that there may be a very important role for progressive planners, either as members of staff serving municipal (or other) authorities run by progressives, or, in the case of authorities who would not be able to afford large full-time staffs, as consultants or voluntary advocates. Such developments could begin to make the state and its apparatuses a true terrain of struggle.

As noted earlier, a distinction between the political command structures of the state apparatuses (usually elected or appointed officials) and the apparatuses themselves (the assembly of civil servants) needs to be made. For even if the progressive movement decides not to move towards participation in the command structures, there are strong arguments that progressives should enter the attached civil service. To start with, we have already noted that the planning profession in South Africa is
dominated by Whites and there is a relation between the ethnic and cultural backgrounds of planners and the political interests they try to serve. Until there are many more Black planners in South Africa, it is unlikely that the conservatism of the planning profession will change. Thus, to the extent that the creation of a plethora of Black Local Authorities across the country creates job opportunities for Black planners, so it follows that an opportunity exists for swelling the ranks of progressive planners. Moreover, there need not be a congruent relationship between the political command structures and the service apparatuses. In Chapters Two and Eleven it was noted that the state apparatuses are not simply tools which can be put to use by whoever controls the command structures. History is littered with examples of politicians undermined by recalcitrant or even aggressive state apparatuses. In this regard Coleman's (1986) suggestion that progressive planners should try to build links to and possibly be formally aligned with the manual worker unions attached to the state apparatuses, may have substantial resonance.

In the emerging Black state structures there are real possibilities for transforming both the internal social relations of the typical bureaucracy, and also the political role played by the apparatus. This is not to naively suggest that petty bourgeois Black professionals will necessarily align themselves with progressive forces. What I am suggesting is that progressives probably have a far greater chance of transforming these structures both now and in a post-apartheid society, than is true of the White bureaucracies, because they are working with people who are culturally linked to the oppressed masses. Moreover, the material interests of Black civil servants may also lie with the transference of state power to the progressive movement. Thus, the very structures that the state is setting up as the bulwarks of conservatism may, in fact, become a wooden horse within and through which progressives will be able to make substantial advances. It should, however, be noted that such infiltration will not simply "happen". It is likely to require concerted effort. This places a particular burden of responsibility on those progressives who train Black planners, and on the progressive planning movement as a whole.
As far as the transformation of the established and mainly White planning bureaucracies are concerned, the prospects are not nearly so good. One of the lessons of history noted in an earlier section, is that the White bureaucracies in South Africa have historically been part of the most reactionary elements of the power bloc. Moreover, in the current conjuncture the tendency towards reaction seems to be intensifying rather than mitigating. Thus, Coleman’s (1986) advice that progressive planners should focus on transforming the internal social relations of the bureaucracies and that they should seek alliances with progressive worker trade unions, appears to have little chance of success in these structures. Since the vast majority of planners in South Africa work within the White structures, Coleman’s (1986) proposals provide little guidance for those of progressive ilk.

In the final analysis, the possibilities for substantially transforming the formal planning bureaucracies in a progressive direction remain relatively remote, at least for the foreseeable future. However, as noted in Chapter Eleven, it remains important for progressives to enter these structures, even if it is only to learn the skills which will be required in a post-apartheid South Africa. It should be noted too that statism is under fire, and the creation of new Black local authorities notwithstanding, more and more planners in the future will not be employed by the state, but will work in private consultancies. It is to the opportunities and constraints associated with the privatisation and deregulation of planning that attention now shifts.

Privatisation and Deregulation: Opportunities for Entrepreneurial Progressives

As noted above, one effect of the state’s privatisation programme is the privatisation of planning itself. This holds dangers for progressive planners but it also offers opportunities for those who are prepared to be creative. On the one hand it is arguable that since planners in private practice tend to get a great deal of their work from government, they are less able to take progressive stances since it is a fairly simple matter for the State to simply cut-off the flow of work to “troublesome” consultants. While progressives who contest policy within the bureaucracies may not get promotion, they seldom lose their jobs.
Moreover, the privatisation of planning may mean that mobilization of planners through unionisation as proposed by Coleman (1987) becomes an increasingly remote possibility.

It should be noted, however, that planning is not the only activity becoming privatized. The privatization of housing provision, for example, means that there are many more actors on the development stage than was true only a few years ago. Thus, it is possible for planners to build relationships with a whole new range of clients. The dependency on government is being reduced and this must favour progressive planners. Moreover, privatization allows for the establishment of flexible private practices. Some progressives in South Africa have already entered into collective arrangements whereby both formal and progressive practices are possible. This usually involves keeping the "bread-and-butter" work and progressive work separate, thereby ensuring that progressives are not compromised in either situation. A typical arrangement is to rotate the collective's progressive portfolio of work (which may or may not be voluntary) amongst the members. In this way progressives may be able to give a full month every year to voluntary support work. Of course, the variety of options are infinite. Furthermore, certain segments of the oppressed community are able to pay for services.

Deregulation too may offer progressives some opportunities. Deregulation is usually problematic for progressives when the labour process is under the control of unscrupulous owners who literally use deregulation as an excuse to set up "sweat-shops". However, there is no reason why workers could not use deregulation to set up co-operatives under their own control. Thus, there may be an important role for planners in identifying deregulation zones or corridors which are particularly suitable for the establishment of co-operatives. As noted earlier, this again implies that progressive planners need to pay more attention to the theory, practice and locational requirements of co-operative ventures.

In sum, the withdrawal of the state from the control of everyday life may offer more opportunities for entrepreneurial progressives than ever
before. One particularly important opportunity is in acting as a catalyst in the building of alliances around planning issues.

Building Alliances Around Particular Issues and Using Reform to Divide the Power Bloc

In an earlier section, it was argued that progressive planners should seek to promote strategies which might win over elements of the power bloc into the popular classes, or which might sow division within the power bloc. Moreover, reference was made to the building of alliances (and potentially an alternative power bloc) around the vision of the "high-road" city. It was noted, however, that while a real possibility, there was also a good chance that the government would simply quash any attempt to concretely pursue the "high-road" city. Should this be the case, it does not follow that alliance building around other issues is not possible. In fact, it may be more difficult to build an alliance around a grandiose vision than around a specific and highly concrete issue. Moreover, real alliances tend to emerge out of concrete practices and the building of confidence over time. Planners in a variety of locations may be able to act as catalysts in promoting such alliances. Those in private practice may be particularly well-located in this regard. Progressive private practitioners, for example, would probably be cultivating elements of progressive capital as clients as well as the civics and trade unions.

They would be well placed to identify opportunities for joint projects and could catalyze the entire process in much the same way as an entrepreneur would. Examples might include the building of alliances between property capital and civics over the abolition of the Group Areas Act. It is well known that there are many thousands of housing units in White areas standing empty because of racial legislation. It is also worth noting that in building alliances to push reforms at this juncture, tremendous pressure is placed on the power bloc. The observation has already been made that the decade of reform in the post-1976 period brought unprecedented popular mobilization. In the two years since 1986, it is apparent that reform has reached a threshold, the transgression of which has the potential to create multiple divisions within the power bloc. It is well known that there is massive
unhappiness in the reformist ranks of the Nationalist Party over the moratorium of reform since 1986. On the other hand, there are substantial elements who are prepared to go no further. In sum, the careful selection of issues can introduce pressures which may weaken the power bloc and strengthen the popular classes.

CONCLUSION

South Africa in 1988 is a country with a very uncertain future. The future of urban and regional planning is equally uncertain. It is quite possible that polarization and conflict will intensify and that political opposition in all quarters will be met by increasingly vicious repression. It is possible too that in this context of conflict, the economy will deteriorate further. An economic and political wasteland in South Africa is a real possibility. But there is nothing inevitable about this scenario either. Creative South Africans may yet be able to find a "high-road" to democracy, economic justice and prosperity. Hopefully, a growing breed of progressive and entrepreneurial urban and regional planners will be able to assist in the process of nudging actors on all sides towards a more sane future. The way in which politics and economics has shaped urban and regional planning has been a central focus of the dissertation. Perhaps in the 1980's, urban and regional planners can make their contribution to the shaping of a new economics and an alternative politics. The growth of such alternatives is an essential precondition for resolving a crisis which weighs so heavily on all of us.
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