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Abstract

Land reform in South Africa has not been very successful. The process of land delivery has been slow and livelihoods in South Africa are becoming increasingly vulnerable as land reform fails to meet its objectives. Since 1994, millions have been made homeless due to farm evictions that have counteracted the positive impact of land reform. Intensive debate has been initiated about the approach to land reform; however, current programme-specific information has been unreliable in providing insight into the impact of land reform projects that have been implemented.

This thesis examines the Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development (LRAD) programme, to determine how it can be enhanced to improve the lives of the programme’s intended beneficiaries. Monitoring and evaluation is examined as a tool for improving programmes. This research also explores some of the shortcomings of the current monitoring and evaluation mechanisms for land reform. It is proposed that the LRAD programme should have a comprehensive M&E system in place to ensure that targets are met and to inform the promulgation of appropriate new land reform policy.

An LRAD project at Loteni in rural KwaZulu-Natal is used as a case study and exposes some of the contextual challenges for LRAD policy. The qualitative analysis given provides insight into some of the problems of implementing the programme and reveals challenges for extension support. As a result of this critique, some recommendations are provided for improving the performance of LRAD. Key among the recommendations made to enhance LRAD is a set of measurable indicators for each of the stated objectives of the LRAD programme. Adopting such indicators will enable the programme to contribute to the improvement of the lives and livelihoods of the intended beneficiaries of LRAD.
This study represents original work by the author and has not otherwise been submitted in any form for any degree or diploma to any University. Where use has been made of the work of others it is duly acknowledged in the text.

Signed:
(candidate)

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Introduction

Poverty and inequality, around the world, are common developmental problems especially within poorer countries. A contributing factor to inequities and poverty, initiated by former government regimes, is that a large proportion of people remain landless. Land reforms in developing countries have begun to turn around inequities in land. South Africa is one such developing country where land reform is of critical importance. The historical dispossession of land in South Africa resulted in the majority of productive agricultural land belonging to white people. This racially skewed land ownership pattern is currently being addressed through a programme of land reform.

The approach to land reform has significant value to the future of South Africa. Land reform creates an opportunity for poor rural South African's to make a better life. Therefore, land reform is more than just redistributing land it has the potential to improve livelihoods. It is government's responsibility to ensure that land reforms are implemented to rectify injustices of the past but also and more importantly to improve the livelihoods of previously disadvantaged South Africans.

This thesis provides an overview of land reform in South Africa before focusing on the Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development (LRAD) programme, which is currently the favoured means of implementing land reform. The land reform programme has experienced a number of problems related to policy formulation and implementation. This thesis shows that the LRAD programme has not overcome these problems. Therefore, this research aims to address this by examining how the LRAD programme can be enhanced.

The LRAD policy is in place, and although there are a number of fundamental problems with LRAD as detailed in this thesis, the focus of this thesis is not on changing present LRAD policy as there has already been a shift in land redistribution policy (see Chapter 1). Instead, this thesis focuses on how to enhance present policy and its implementation.

The main problem examined in this study was that the LRAD programme had a system for evaluating the implementation of it its work, but did not have a system for evaluating the impact of its work. Thus it would be possible to conclude that LRAD was successful simply because it was implemented according to plan. However, without a means for determining
the effect of LRAD on the intended beneficiaries the true impact of LRAD cannot be determined. While the lack of impact assessment was identified in the planning of the research, the research was structured to examine LRAD on a broader front. Thus the overarching question addressed by this study is: How can the LRAD programme be enhanced?

In order to assist with examining the primary research question, the study was designed to explore the following sub-questions:

- Is LRAD achieving its objectives?
- How does LRAD contribute to land reform objectives?
- Can market based land reform achieve the objectives of land reform in South Africa?
- How is the achievement of land reform objectives measured?

The research also explores an LRAD project and uses it as a case study to confirm the assertions maintained in the literature under review.

The aim of the study was to provide insight into ways in which LRAD could be improved in terms of the outcomes derived by the people intended to benefit from the programme. It was understood from the beginning that this would be a discovery process, resulting not in a definitive and fixed set of answers, but in an initial set of considerations – derived in large measure from LRAD beneficiaries – that could begin a process of continuous reassessment of impact and programme enhancement based on the expansion of evaluation from a limited implementation focus to a results-based focus informed by the people affected by the programme.

Chapter 1 looks at the limited success of the South African land reform programme. This chapter explains how the history of land legislation in South Africa has impacted on land distribution and the task for land reform to change this. The chapter looks at the achievements of the land reform programme thus far and how globalisation has shifted the approach to land reform.

Chapter 2 reopens the debate on land reform and explores issues important for land reform policy makers and practitioners to consider. Livelihoods in South Africa are examined in the
context of increasing urbanisation, tenure insecurity and HIV/AIDS. Land reform is posed as primarily an issue of human rights but that land rights are often undermined. Different approaches to land reform are examined to understand options for implementing land reform. Finally, it is proposed that in South Africa where commercial agriculture is increasingly a difficult activity to make economically viable, the promotion of sustainable livelihoods, through multiple livelihood strategies, offers some security for beneficiaries of land reform.

Chapter 3 introduces monitoring and evaluation systems. M&E systems are posed as important for enhancing the performance of land reform projects. The M&E system for land reform is analysed and shown to be problematic. M&E of LRAD is argued to be necessary to the success of LRAD projects and a number of suggestions are made.

Chapter 4 examines the LRAD programme in more depth, critically assessing the policy and examining the extent of impact the LRAD programme may have on rural landlessness and poverty. The Comprehensive Agricultural Support Programme is introduced as an extension support mechanism for LRAD projects.

Chapter 5 presents the methodology for the research undertaken at a LRAD project in KwaZulu-Natal. The research is based in the constructivist paradigm in order to provide a representative reality through the qualitative research process.

Chapter 6 and 7 present the findings and analysis of the research conducted at an LRAD project in KwaZulu-Natal. This involved working closely with stakeholders, in particular LRAD beneficiaries, the Department of Agriculture and the Department of Land Affairs, to examine the implementation of the LRAD programme at this site. Analysis of the LRAD project enables for critique of the LRAD programme.

Chapter 8 draws conclusions about the LRAD programme and land reform in general offering some recommendations to enhance the performance of LRAD.
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<td>ADSS</td>
<td>Agricultural Development Support Services</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASGISA</td>
<td>Accelerated and shared growth initiative for South Africa</td>
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<td>CPA</td>
<td>Communal Property Association</td>
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<td>CASP</td>
<td>Comprehensive Agricultural Development Programme</td>
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<td>DoA</td>
<td>Department of Agriculture</td>
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<td>PDA</td>
<td>Provincial Department of Agriculture</td>
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<td>NDA</td>
<td>National Department of Agriculture</td>
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<td>DLA</td>
<td>Department of Land Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>DAEA</td>
<td>Department of Agriculture and Environmental Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>GEAR</td>
<td>Growth, Equity and Redistribution</td>
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<td>Ha</td>
<td>hectares</td>
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<td>KZNSGA</td>
<td>KwaZulu-Natal Spice Growers’ Association</td>
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<td>LCC</td>
<td>Land Crisis Committee</td>
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<td>LDC</td>
<td>Loteni Development Committee</td>
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<td>LRAD</td>
<td>Land for Redistribution and Development Programme</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-government organisation</td>
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<td>QoL</td>
<td>Quality of Life</td>
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<td>RDP</td>
<td>Reconstruction and Development</td>
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<td>SLAG</td>
<td>Settlement Land Acquisition Grant</td>
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Chapter 1:
The status of land reform in South Africa

Introduction

Land reform in South Africa has been termed as the “country’s paramount welfare question” and is considered “essential to racial peace, economic prosperity, and environmental justice” (Geisler and Letsoalo, 2000: 5). The World Bank (2003) considers South Africa is a leading example of market based land reform. This optimistic view of land reform in South Africa has been disputed by many academics and practitioners. They maintain that land reform in South Africa, contrary to the World Bank’s claims, has not been very successful (Bernstein, 1997; Wildschut and Hulbert, 1998; Turner and Ibsen, 2000; Aliber, 2003; Andrew et al., 2003; Hall et al., 2003; Mapadimeng, 2003; National Land Committee, 2003; van den Brink, 2003; Wegerif, 2004).

It is the intention of this Chapter to examine this divide through a historical and contextual account of land reform in South Africa in order to expose the limited successes of the South African land reform programme. Section 1.1 shows how the history of land legislation and segregation has shaped the unequal distribution of land in South Africa. It introduces post 1994 policy established to deal with this unequal distribution. Section 1.2 looks at each component of the land reform programme in turn and the related status of each component. In section 1.3, land reform policy is explored and shows how it has since changed due to the external pressures of globalisation. Section 1.4 looks at some of the consequences of land reform for agriculture in South Africa.

1.1 History of land legislation and segregation in South Africa

The history of land dispossession in South Africa has resulted in the skewed pattern of land ownership prevalent today. The historical precedent of segregation based on racial classification and culture was responsible for land dispossession. In 1913, the all white Government of the Union of South Africa passed the Natives’ Land Act that legalised exclusive white land ownership outside of ‘Native Reserves’. The intention of this Act was to remove the black South African population to these reserves. It was only in 1948, when the apartheid government came to power, that the enforcement of the Land Act
intensified. Black families who still owned land or lived ‘illegally’ outside reserves where forced to relocate (Department of Land Affairs, 1996; Greenberg, 2003). Between 1960 and 1980, 3.5 million black people were forcibly removed from their ancestral lands to settle in black Reserves (Surplus People's Project, 1983). These black reserves constituted 7% of South Africa’s land area and became overcrowded and environmentally degraded. People living in the reserves resorted to operating as cheap migrant labour for white farmers and mines as a livelihood (Department of Land Affairs, 1996). Thus, rural areas became dominated by large highly mechanised white owned farms surrounded by overcrowded black reserves, better known as homelands, and dormitory towns. The Natives’ Land Act also initiated insecurity around labour tenancy on farms resulting in evictions of black people from white farms where they had been employed (Deininger and May, 2000). The formulation and enforcement of this Act met considerable resistance from, and subsequent popularity for, the South African Native National Congress that promised to address land inequities (Department of Land Affairs, 1996).

By the end of the 1980s, many black families had been forced off their ancestral land and formerly self-sufficient farmers now worked as wage workers on large farms, mines and industries. Ninety percent of agricultural land was white owned. The remaining 10% was given over to homeland areas supporting 55% of the South African population (Mbongwa et al., 2000). Subsistence farming in former homeland areas had diminished drastically and 80% of families living in these areas had to support themselves from migrant earnings and pensions. The effects of the Native Land Act are still evident today in the racial territorial divisions within South African demographics and geography (Harley and Fotheringham, 1999, Department of Land Affairs, 1996). When the Natives’ Lands Act was repealed in 1993 the government had the responsibility of reversing the inequitable land distribution in South Africa.

In order to combat the discriminatory effects of the Natives’ Land Act, the post apartheid government implemented a programme of land reform (Deininger and May, 2000). The approach to land reform in South Africa developed from South Africa’s Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) policies setup in 1994. The RDP aimed to supply land and security of tenure to the rural poor and aspirant farmers (Wells, 1995). Government aimed to address poverty in rural areas by securing access to land. In 1997, the Department of Land Affairs (DLA) established the land reform programme. The
objectives of this programme were to redress the injustices of apartheid, to foster national reconciliation and stability, to promote economic growth, and to improve household welfare and alleviate poverty (Department of Land Affairs, 1997).

A number of factors impacted on the successful implementation of Land reform. A critical factor was the downsizing of the public sector. Government faced a severe capacity problem which made land reform an extremely challenging undertaking particularly in the former homeland areas (Oxfam Briefing Paper, 1997). Homeland areas had serious institutional problems inherited from the apartheid era, such as chaotic land administration and record-keeping in some areas was totally absent, which enabled squatting and exploitation of land. Additionally, landlessness and overcrowding in the former homeland areas had resulted in land degradation (Department of Land Affairs, 1996).

Therefore, the historical legacy of land confiscations and relocations to homelands had not only resulted in the majority of black South Africans becoming landless and poor but also caused deterioration in the institutional systems governing land. It was within this context that approaches to land reform had to consider means of addressing land tenure security for the improvement of previously disadvantaged livelihoods.

1.2 Post-apartheid approach to land ownership in South Africa

The general process of the land reform programme has been unimpressive in terms of households resettled or gaining secure tenure. In this section, each component of the land reform programme is examined in order to establish the status of land reform in South Africa.

The key roles of government in the land reform process provide institutional arrangement for land reform. Land reform is primarily the responsibility of national government. National government is responsible for the drawing up of land reform policy and the procedure by which it is implemented and has established a land reform programme. This programme consists of three key components, restitution of land rights, the reform of tenure systems and the redistribution of land, discussed in further detail below (National Land Committee, 2003). Implementation of these programmes is carried out at the
provincial level and the DLA is accountable for land transactions whilst the DoA is involved with extension support (Department of Land Affairs, 1996).

It is important to consider the national objectives of land reform to be achieved through the land restitution, redistribution and tenure reform programmes. The three components of land reform should satisfy the following objectives established in the White Paper on South African Land Policy (Department of Land Affairs, 1997):

- The injustices of racially based legislation
- The inequitable distribution of land
- The need for security of tenure for all
- The need for sustainable use of land
- The need for rapid release of land for development
- The need to record and register all rights in property
- The need to administer public land in an effective manner

Each of the Land Reform sub-programmes are introduced below and assessed in terms of their progress towards achieving the national land reform objectives shown above.

1.2.1 The land restitution programme

The purpose of land restitution is to restore land or provide compensation to people dispossessed of land rights by racially discriminatory legislation and practice since 1913. The approach to restitution is outlined in the Constitution of South Africa, and the Restitution of Land Rights Act, No. 22 of 1994 (Department of Land Affairs, 1996). The Act states the qualification criteria for claims, the forms of restitution and compensation, and the processes necessary for the settlement of claims. It also makes provision for the establishment of a Land Claims Commission and Land Claims Court to facilitate and adjudicate the process of claims.

Land restitution in South Africa has been a slow process. Up until 1997, less than five cases out of the 12000 cases submitted had been finalised. NGOs, at that time, were concerned that 12000 claims cases were a small number compared to the 3.5 million people who were forcibly removed under the Land Act of 1913. By the end of 1998, a
total of 68,878 restitution claims were registered and only 49 claims had been resolved (Lyne and Darroch, 2001; Harley and Fotheringham, 1999). However, the restitution process was sped up significantly and by the end of March 2002, the Commission on Restitution of Land Rights had settled 29,877 claims out of the total 68,878 claims that had been lodged. By 31 March 2005, the number of claims settled by the Commission on Restitution of Land Rights' increased to 59,395 benefiting a total of 900,000 individuals on land extending 887,093 hectares (Department of Land Affairs, 2005).

Although the land restitution programme has made significant progress towards completion there are some concerns. Lahiff (2002) notes that there has been a bias towards settling urban claims (72%) over rural claims (28%) and most restitution beneficiaries have been financially compensated. Thwala (2003) indicates that 40% of land claimants chose to be financially compensated for their losses. This means that 40% of land claimants have therefore not benefited from the restoration of land rights, land tenure security or the potential of this the land asset to improve livelihoods (Thwala, 2003). The 2005 national budget earmarked the land restitution process R4 million to take it through to expected completion in 2008 (Department of Land Affairs, 2005). It is doubtful whether this will be enough as recent independent estimates have put a conservative completion figure in excess of R10 million (Hall et al, 2003; Groenewald, 2004; Sapa, 2004).

1.2.2 The land tenure reform programme

The purpose of the land tenure reform programme is to secure tenure for all South Africans (Department of Land Affairs, 1996). In 1996, the Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act was passed and gave labour tenants secure rights to land on which they lived. This was especially important for people living in homeland areas as it provided protection against abuses such as the sale of their land by corrupt chiefs or the construction of illegal development projects (Turner and Ibsen, 2000; Adams et al., 1999).

In 1997, the Extension of Security of Tenure Act (ESTA) was put in place to enable anyone who had been granted permission on or after 4 February 1997 the right to live and use that land (Harley and Fotheringham, 1999). Two additional measures were put in place to achieve secure tenure for farm workers. Firstly, farm workers approaching retiring age (60 years and older) or disabled whilst working had the right to reside on the
land permanently. Secondly, farm workers living on land for at least 10 years also had the right to make this their permanent residence (Harley and Fotheringham, 1999). The Communal Land Rights Act (CLARA) was enacted in 2004 to provide for secure land tenure rights to communities and persons who occupy and use land in communal areas (Department of Land Affairs, 2005).

Tenure reform should have far-reaching consequences because of the masses of people involved. It is estimated that there are 3.9 million black rural households in the former homeland areas (May et al, 2000a). Additionally, there are about 1.3 million households living in urban informal settlements and 800000 farm labourer families (roughly 6 million farm dwellers) staying on farms (May et al, 2000a; Roodt, 2006). Therefore, tenure reform has the potential to benefit about 6 million households and, as a result of tenure security, improved food security for a vast number of people (May et al, 2000a). Currently, only 100,175 hectares have been secured through this programme (Department of Land Affairs, 2005). Although the policy is in place there is no proof of ESTA enforcement. In fact, a recent report initiated by Nkuzi Development Association on farm evictions in South Africa revealed the disturbing statistics that some 1.7 million people were evicted and 3.7 million people were displaced from farms since 1984, but that the majority of evictions have occurred since democracy in 1994. Almost 1 million people have been evicted from farms and 2.35 million people have been displaced from farms since 1994. This indicates that current legislation is not enforced and not adequately securing land tenure rights (Social Surveys Africa and the Nkuzi Development Association, 2005). Many of these evictions were motivated by the promulgation of ESTA and government is currently exploring how to remedy this situation (Department of Land Affairs, 2005).

1.2.3 The land redistribution programme

The land redistribution programme was established to provide the poor with land for residential and productive purposes in order to improve their livelihoods (Department of Land Affairs, 1996). Land redistribution was intended to assist the urban and rural poor, farm workers, labour tenants, and emerging farmers. The programme aimed to achieve the RDP goal of redistributing 30% of farmland in the period until 1999. The land redistribution programme provided a Settlement and Land Acquisition Grant (SLAG) to households or groups to purchase land from willing sellers, including the state. In setting
out its policy the Department maintained the importance of giving priority to the marginalised, to women in need and to projects that could be speedily implemented (National Land Committee, 2003).

However, delivery has not been a strong characteristic of the land redistribution programme. From 1997-2001, a total of 121,484 hectares of farmland was acquired by historically disadvantaged people in KwaZulu-Natal (Lyne and Darroch, 2002). In that 5 year period, only 2.3% of the land available for redistribution had been transferred in KwaZulu-Natal. The national figures reflected similarly poor performance in land transfer. It was estimated that 1.76 million rural households across South Africa required farmland amounting to 23.6 million hectares but by 1998 only 161,317 hectares (0.7%) of land had been transferred. This rate of land transfer was significantly distant from the national target of redistributing 30% of agricultural land by 1999 (Harley and Fotheringham, 1999).

The SLAG programme was the primary redistributive agent during this period of poor delivery. The SLAG programme did not attain government’s goal of redistributing 30% of white-owned farmland to disadvantaged people (Lyne and Darroch, 2001). Additionally, SLAG projects were often situated on land of lower agricultural quality on which it was difficult to grow crops or rear livestock and this was not conducive to improving livelihoods of the poor (Graham, 2000). As a result the Minister for Agriculture and Land Affairs placed a moratorium on the SLAG programme in 1999 (Wegerif, 2004).

The under performance of the SLAG programme was one of the reasons government devised a new redistribution policy (Wegerif, 2004). In 2001, the Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development (LRAD) programme was announced. In contrast to SLAG, where the black poor were the primary beneficiaries and did not need to invest money to benefit, LRAD beneficiaries have to invest initial capital to qualify for a grant. The level of the grant is linked to the applicant’s own financial contribution. LRAD grants start at R20000, with a minimum beneficiary contribution of R5000, rising to a maximum grant of R400000 where the required beneficiary contribution is R100000 (Lyne and Darroch, 2001). Therefore, LRAD aims to benefit those already with some financial resources (Hall

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1 It is important to note that Schmitz (2001: 6) argued that "while faulty, the [SLAG] programme had probably not been in such a bad state as to warrant an abrupt halt to the approval of new projects".
et al., 2003). LRAD is not only focused on reducing poverty but at creating an environment for economic growth through farming (Wegerif, 2004).

The SLAG programme, with its focus on the provision of land for settlement purposes, is still in operation focusing on those communities who require land for housing mostly in urban areas. For example, a farm of 1000 hectares worth R4 million was acquired for the residents of Alexandra in Gauteng purely for residential purposes (Didiza, 2002). Although SLAG is still operational it is seldom used as LRAD is the new DLA flagship for redistributing land in rural areas (Hall et al., 2003).

This shift from SLAG to LRAD exemplifies government's keen interest in establishing economically viable enterprises. However, critics of LRAD warn that land redistribution is unlikely to effect more than 1.5 million households over the next decade (May et al., 2000a). Government's revised target of redistributing 30% of agricultural land by the end of 2014 may be out of reach again, as predictions indicate that only 4.6% of agricultural land will be redistributed by 2015 (Sibanda, 2001). If government's objective is to be attained, a delivery rate of 2.2 million hectares per year would need to be reached. This seems unlikely considering that during the period 1996-2005 only 3.1 million hectares had been delivered through all Land Reform sub-programmes (Department of Land Affairs, 2005; Hall, 2004a). Further, it was estimated that LRAD would probably only benefit 2000 households per year taking, at current spending patterns, 125 years to complete the redistribution of 30% of agricultural land to black people (Aliber, 2003; Thwala, 2003). In fact, LRAD has achieved even more poorly transferring 72,687 hectares of land to 5109 beneficiaries since its inception (Department of Land Affairs, 2005). And the mounting pressure to place 30% of South Africa's agricultural land in the hands of black farmers could result in a land crisis, similar to that in Zimbabwe, especially when land reform is not on course to meet the target deadline of 2015 (Hall et al., 2003; Greenberg, 2003).

1.2.4 Administrative capacity

As noted earlier, land reform is identified as one of the most important unresolved components post-apartheid South Africa needs to address. Yet the DLA, the primary agents for the land reform programme, only received a paltry 0.3% of the 2003 national
budget to implement land reform. Further, under-spending within the department has been problematic in the past. However, improvements were seen in 2005 with spending reaching 98% (Department of Land Affairs, 2005). This lack of finance and associated administrative incapacity has contributed to the slow delivery rate of land reform in South Africa (May et al., 2000a). Administrative irregularities have occurred where land has been bought for land reform purposes. Land purchase over and above the market value, is depleting financial reserves and leaving fewer resources available for effective land reform. For example in Mpumalanga, government paid 300% more for property than the last market value pricing (Arenstein and Groenewald, 2004).

1.3 Policy change and land reform

South Africa has seen a fundamental shift in the approach to land reform. Section 1.2.3 explained that the land redistribution programme initiated a new sub-programme called Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development (LRAD). LRAD is a direct result of the adoption of macro economic policy. This had critical impact on the way land reform was implemented, who it benefited and what its impacts would be (Wegerif, 2004).

1.3.1 The policies impacting on the approach to land reform

Following the 1994 elections in South Africa, the new ANC led government developed the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP). The RDP aimed to address the many social and economic problems facing the country. A key aspect of the RDP was that it recognised the connection between different social problems, such as the lack of housing, a shortage of jobs, inadequate education and health care and a failing economy. It proposed job creation through public works and the building of houses and provision of services would be done in a way that created employment. However, the RDP could not attain the targets in the short period of time it set for itself and the sustainability of the RDP housing and infrastructure programmes were questionable (Terreblanche, 1999).

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2 In 2003, the DLA received R1.09 million (0.3%) of the R287.9 billion national budget (Department of Land Affairs, 2004). Projected revenues for 2005/2006 are expected to reach R379.2 billion and the DLA has been allocated R2.03 billion (0.5%) for this period (Manuel, 2005).
In 1996, the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) policy, effectively replacing the RDP, was accepted as macroeconomic strategy aimed at strengthening economic development and international competitiveness, encourage employment, and the redistribution of income and socioeconomic opportunities (Knight, 2004; Strydom, 2000). This policy document was supported strongly by business. However, there was opposition to the strategy from trade unions, NGOs and other people-centred organisations. COSATU and the SACP saw GEAR as inappropriate for South Africa (Terreblanche, 1999). They maintained that GEAR, with its focus on stringent monetary and fiscal targets, conflicted with the RDP goal of growth based on job creation, meeting people's needs, poverty reduction and a more equitable distribution of wealth (Knight, 2004). COSATU highlighted how, thus far, GEAR had failed to deliver the promised economic and job growth or significant redistribution of income and socio-economic opportunities for the poor (Knight, 2004). This is confirmed by May et al (2004, 18): “GEAR’s principle achievements have been reductions in the budget deficit and the inflation rate rather than in growth, job creation and poverty reduction.”

As shown above, there are ambivalent views about the ideological policy shift from the RDP to GEAR. The critics of GEAR believe that land reform should benefit the “poorest of the poor” in the creation of sustainable livelihoods. However, there are others, like Bernstein (2005), who do not think Government has the capacity to implement a nationwide project like land reform and should rather concentrate on empowering those with some resources available to them in order to maintain agricultural production on redistributed agricultural land. However, land reform that is not pro-poor orientated contradicts the stated objectives of land reform as outlined by the white paper (Strydom, 2000).

In order to understand this shift in policy, GEAR needs to be considered in the context of globalisation.

1.3.2 The effects of globalisation

In the preceding section, national macroeconomic policy was shown to have shifted land reform policy from a SLAG to a LRAD driven approach. The shift in national policy from a pro-poor RDP transformative agenda to an economically driven GEAR approach has
failed to contribute substantially to the redistribution of income and socio-economic opportunities for the poor. This section extrapolates on how globalisation has put great pressure on the South African government to conform to global market requirements.

Globalisation has been and will continue to influence economies strongly throughout the world, including South Africa. The phenomenon of globalisation has emerged as a global capitalist economy. It has been created through the use of technological advancements in the business world which have made markets more accessible and competitive. Global markets have enabled trade to expand and high-tech manufactured goods are the commodities most important to global economies and hence international trade today. This has changed what is produced and the way the production of goods and services operates through a network of multinational corporations, small and medium businesses. The result is that globalisation has moved beyond the control of any one nation, country or state (Castells, 2001).

Globalisation has forced South Africa into a scenario where they must produce commodities to compete internationally (Mboweni, 2000). This pressure resulted in the formulation of the GEAR policy. In the context of GEAR, land is a resource that South Africa has to utilise effectively to maintain and improve its economic performance globally. Land reform and, specifically, LRAD offers an agricultural opportunity for South Africa to increase its agricultural output for export and foreign currency.

Globalisation has more negative effects for developing countries. This is mainly due to the under resourced status of developing countries and economies compared to their technology affluent counterparts. The global economy is an economy dependent on technological needs and therefore puts developed countries at a particular advantage in the market place. This means that developed states will stay stronger than developing states (Gelb, 2001; Goodenough, 2003). This is an environment in which exploitation of weaker developing economies can occur. Often developing countries will accommodate industry and services from developed countries. This promotes local economic growth within a developing country but often it allows for the exploitation of cheap labour and the environment to make short term gains (Goodenough, 2003). The products, where the real

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3 In 2006, the Accelerated Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (ASGISA) succeeded GEAR as guiding macroeconomic policy. Analysis of ASGISA is outside the time frame of this study.
economic value lies, remain in the hands of the original investor country. The developing country may only benefit marginally in comparison to the value of the product. Thus, developing countries continue to be exploited to sustain a superior economy that holds little long term benefit for them. This continues to keep developing countries less competitive, marginalised and less developed than developed countries (Gelb, 2001).

Based on the above it can be concluded that to escape the exploitative effects of globalisation South Africa has to join the global market and establish viable opportunities for economic growth in a competitive global arena. It is within this context of globalisation that South Africa developed the GEAR macro-economic policy. The problem with the transformative pro-poor RDP approach was that it was not economically orientated. Globalisation does not support non-economic orientated programmes, like the RDP approach to land reform. Therefore, the economic pressure on South Africa to make land economically productive is a result of fierce global competition.

1.3.3 Black economic empowerment

Globalisation has encouraged the formation of a new black elite, now a formidable force, that put pressure on government to accept the free market ideology of GEAR (Terreblanche, 1999). Black business stands to gain significantly, locally, from GEAR. Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) strategies aim to transform the South African economy. The Black Economic Empowerment in Agriculture (AgriBEE) charter states that black South Africans must own 30% of agricultural land by 2014 and hold 50% of agricultural senior management posts by 2008 (AgriBEE Steering Committee, 2005).

Public perception is that, presently, BEE has not boosted employment creation. What seems to be happening is that black business is not actively pursuing building new business and investment. BEE companies have not invested in businesses and initiatives that lead to job creation for a greater number of people (Hassen, 2004; Groenewald, 2004). Unless BEE “serves the interests of the poor it will go wrong” as there are dangers in developing a black neo-colonial class (Turok, 1999: 7). However, the framework for BEE in which to operate is still at a developmental stage and expectations may be, at this point, over ambitious. Land reform offers BEE a chance to focus on the emerging farm companies.
and boost economic growth through employment and increased agricultural productivity. However, it seems that there is no clear link between BEE and land reform initiatives.

1.4 The agricultural challenge for land reform in South Africa

The transformative agenda of the land reform programme aims to address the unequal distribution of land by dividing land more equitably among South Africans. The majority of land in rural areas is used for agricultural purposes. The South African agricultural sector has two economies: a commercial agricultural economy and subsistence agricultural economy. The challenge for government and post-apartheid society is to merge the two without debilitating the commercial agriculture economy or South Africa’s agricultural potential for production (Cousins, 2007; Mbeki, 2004).

Commercial agriculture was heavily subsidised by the apartheid government, but with the liberalisation of markets in South Africa commercial agriculture has had to compete internationally. This has resulted in commercial farmers operating on smaller budgets, realising lower profit margins and the closing of numerous agricultural operations (Hall, 2004b).

However, even within a predominantly white owned agricultural industry struggling to remain productive and economically viable, many have embraced land reform. Commercial farmers and corporations have accepted that land reform must be implemented and that resisting land reform would contribute to probable expropriation, the confiscation of land and “Zimbabwe” type land invasion. Tongaat Hulett, as an example of corporate agriculture, has implemented a land redistribution programme to ensure the sustainable agricultural production of cane for the sugar mills⁴. This process of Black Economic Empowerment (BEE), through the promotion of black small to medium size cane farmers, has been successful in producing commercial surplus-creating farming in KwaZulu-Natal (Boyce, 2002). Other racially transformative means within the agricultural sector proving successful are share equity schemes whereby farm workers buy into partnership with commercial farmers using their land grants (Ranchod, 2004).

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⁴ Tongaat Hulett Group Limited is a company in KwaZulu-Natal that produces sugar amongst other commodities. Tongaat-Hulett owns 23 000 hectares of land in South Africa. In 2005, 21% of total cane procurement was purchased from previously disadvantaged South Africans. [http://www.tongaat.co.za/au/introduction.asp](http://www.tongaat.co.za/au/introduction.asp)
1.4.1 Small scale farming: The future of South African agriculture

Commercial South African agricultural sector has been historically elitist. Currently, agriculture is dominated by relatively large farms that are owned and operated by a few individuals (Pantland, 2001). Despite South Africa’s apartheid history of policies favouring large, high-input farms there is local and international evidence claiming that large-scale mechanised farms are inefficient when compared to small-scale farms (Ghimire, 2001; Varadarajan, 2003; van den Brink, 2003). This does not mean small-scale farmers produce higher yields (van den Brink, 2003). It means that large-scale farmers produce higher yields because their inputs are higher. The World Bank supports the small-scale farming sector for three reasons: efficiency (small-scale farmers generate more profit for every monetary unit invested), poverty reduction and equity. Therefore, trends, policies and distortions that favour large farms over smaller farms should be removed (van Zyl et al., 1995). Additionally, any opposition to land reform due to arguments that agricultural productivity will suffer as a consequence of decreasing farm sizes is unwarranted. In fact, if literature\(^5\) is to be believed, as farm sizes decrease, as a result of land reforms, agricultural efficiency should increase. As populations increase in size land becomes more scarce and more contentious. The increased agricultural strain on land, due to population growth, creates unfavourable farming conditions for large scale farmers and a trend to carving up of land into smaller parcels (Varadarajan, 2003).

Farms will have to become even smaller if the skewed land ownership patterns are to be rectified in South Africa and as more people become dependent on land to survive. Small farms are efficient and can produce proportionally at least the same and more than their large scale counter-parts. The difficulty is making emerging black farmers with limited land and agricultural skill as productive as their white competitors.

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\(^5\) Literature does conflict over the farm size vs production issue. However, recent literature does accept the inverse relationship between farm size and productivity. It must be remembered that small scale farmers under Apartheid were predominantly black and faced a long list of government policies which had crippling effects on any hope of small scale agriculture competing with white large scale commercial farms (Van Zyl et al, 1995).
Conclusion

Despite World Bank optimistic reports, land reform in South Africa has not achieved its objectives. Land reform has not been as successful as was hoped initially in changing inequitable land ownership patterns in South Africa. The land restitution programme has been the most successful but with large numbers of restitution claimants benefiting financially has been disappointing in contributing to land ownership transformation. The focus of land reform has moved away from redistributing land to account for the injustices of the apartheid past in South Africa towards a strong emphasis on making land economically viable through agriculture. The shift from the RDP, pro-poor approach, to the GEAR, pro-production approach, has sparked debate about the intentions of land reform within a global market.

Instead of pursuing an approach to land reform for purposes of social justice, a market based approach is being driven that should improve economic performance and enhance the position of South Africa to create economically viable agricultural enterprises through LRAD. However, this is difficult as emerging farmers are often under skilled. The aim of LRAD was to provide land reform beneficiaries with a programme to support their farming needs and revive and grow the agricultural sector. Whilst the new land redistribution flagship, LRAD, is probably not going to speed up the land reform process it does offer an opportunity for rural agricultural development to contribute to the economy and the improvement of rural livelihoods. LRAD is critiqued in more detail in Chapter 4.

Land reform has the potential to address the historical land ownership imbalances caused by South Africa's past and improve livelihoods. While land reform has had partial success with the former, the latter remains largely ignored in land reform policy. Chapter 2 reopens the debate on land reform to explore the issue of land reform in South Africa further.
Chapter 2:

Reopening the debate on land reform

An introduction to the debate

Van den Brink (2003) affirms the argument established in Chapter 1, that is, that land reform in South Africa has not been as successful as planned. "International experience demonstrates that even though the ‘land question’ is often said to be a priority equity issue, many countries in the world have made remarkable little progress on it" (van den Brink, 2003: 17). In July of 2005 the National Land Summit in Johannesburg reopened the debate on land reform to investigate the poor delivery of land to potential beneficiaries by the land reform programme (Goebel, 2005). The South African Government admits that under the market-based approach to land reform, the primary objective of distributing land to previously disadvantaged people has not been achieved (Didiza, 2006). Land reform targets continue to be revised, and the shift from SLAG to LRAD has not improved the delivery rates required (Lahiff and Rugege, 2003). This has initiated debate about whether the current market-based approach to land reform is effective.

Critics of market-based approaches to land reform maintain that substantial change in land distribution does not occur due to unfair markets (Hall et al., 2003; National Land Committee, 2003; El-Ghonemy, 2001; Aliber and Mokoena, 2002). Chapter 1 has shown that government’s targets for land delivery have not been attained. Every time government has revised their land reform targets or changed their policy they have done so without appropriate programme and product specific performance information (Hall, 2004a; Hall et al., 2003). This questions the appropriateness of policies that have been adopted to implement land reform.

Government has failed to address the needs of communities before moving to consider forms of land transfer that may or may not speed up the process of fulfilling the promise of the DLA’s slogan: “Getting people back to the land” (Sonjica, 2001: 1). Additionally, while the objective of the DLA is to get 30% of South Africa’s land back to black people

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6 In Chapter 4, evaluation of the land reform programme and LRAD is examined to emphasise the importance of programme evaluation to future policy making and further debate on land reform.
by the end of 2014, it is not the DLA’s responsibility to ensure that land be utilised for productive agricultural purposes (Ministry for Agriculture and Land Affairs, 2000). Critics of land reform have used this issue of non-utilisation of land as a caution against using fast track land reform techniques to move people onto land (Moyo, 2004; MMPZ, undated).

Van den Brink (World Bank senior economist) and Cousins (Director of the Programme for Land and Agrarian Studies at the University of the Western Cape) maintain that fast track land reform, or expropriation, is slower and can be more expensive than other forms of acquisition (Groenewald, 2006; van den Brink, 2003; Cousins, 2000). Van den Brink (2003) elaborates on the issue of expropriation to emphasise that international experience has shown the legal process of expropriation is time consuming as every farm owner can contest expropriation orders in court, contributing significantly to the cost of expropriation and associated compensation. In South Africa, government has faced similar negative experiences and this may explain why expropriation has only been utilised where negotiated redistribution failed (Groenewald, 2006).

There has been limited achievement of land reform targets and the review process has provided little indication of the direction for land reform. While there are no published empirical facts, news reportage indicates that the review process has been disappointing. Government has not come out with a clear direction for land reform to attain its targets of the completion of the restitution process by 2008 and transferring 30% of farmland to black owners by 2015 (Groenewald, 2006).

The purpose of this chapter is to explore the complex nature of the land question as advocating a change in approach to land reform may not be the solution to landlessness and poverty if this does not achieve land reform objectives. Vulnerable livelihoods are examined in section 2.1. It is argued that land reform has increased the vulnerability of the poor to urbanisation, insecure tenure and HIV/AIDS. In section 2.2, access to land, livelihoods and land reform processes are exposed as issues of basic human rights. Thus the increasing vulnerability of livelihoods indicates growing violation of these rights. Section 2.3 looks at different approaches to land reform and the case of Zimbabwe in Section 2.4. In section 2.5, agricultural restructuring as a means of land reform is posed as creating an inequitable agrarian system. In Section 2.6, the concept of sustainability is
introduced as a key consideration for land reform and future land use. Elements of this research take into account popular debate around land reform.

2.1 Vulnerable livelihoods in the new South Africa

"Poverty is generally characterised by the inability of individuals, households or entire communities to command sufficient resources to satisfy a socially acceptable minimum standard of living."7

The inequitable policies of apartheid and the existence of the former homelands have meant that landlessness, overpopulation, overgrazing and increased land degradation occurred in many rural areas of South Africa (Ekbom, 2003). These previously disadvantaged communities, now the urban and rural poor, have not had access to appropriate assets upon which livelihoods can be established to deal with disasters and events that disrupt the functioning of society (Moore, 2001).

The actual extent of poverty at the end of apartheid in 1994 was unknown. The newly-formed, democratically elected South African government took the initiative to conduct a nationwide poverty assessment to analyse the extent of poverty and inequality in South Africa. In 1998, the findings of the assessment were published in the Poverty and Inequality Report which indicated that 50% of the national population was poor, defined as surviving on less than R15 per day. It was also found that poverty is more common in rural areas and severe in former homeland areas. (Ranchod, 2004)

Recently, South Africa has been labelled as a country with one of the highest levels of income inequality (known as the Giri coefficient which indexes the gap between the rich and the poor) in the world. While income inequalities between racial groups have been declining, income inequalities within groups, or intra-group inequalities, have increased (Cousins et al., 2005). In South Africa, 17% of the population receives 72% of the income whilst 50% of the population only obtains about 3% of the income (Terreblanche, 2002). The notion that economic growth must occur before poverty can be reduced seems to have been accepted by the South African government (Mbeki, 1999). The claim that "redistribution" can only take place after growth has increased a society’s resources results in the marginalization of the poor.8 Bo Goransson (2004) suggests that instead of ignoring the rights and priorities of the poor focusing on capacity building, security and stability at

7 May, 2005: 5
8 This is the so called 'Trickle down effect' (Bo Goransson, 2004).
the grass roots level will provide an empowering environment for improving livelihoods. Cousins (2007, 5) calls this “accumulation from below” which encourages the promotion of multiple livelihood strategies. Poor people rely on multiple livelihood sources including agriculture, and also employment, government welfare packages and micro enterprises. Bartering, the harvesting of natural resources and construction are also important forms of income in rural areas (Cousins, 2007).

Deininger and May (2000) state that the development of the productive potential of the rural sector appears to be a critical pre-condition for sustainable poverty reduction. May (2000) argues that sustainable improvements in the quality of life are best achieved by enhancing the capabilities of disadvantaged communities. Therefore, policy must focus on initiatives that improve the ability and capabilities of the majority of South Africans. This includes current efforts to implement policy that redistributes land. However, while the redistribution of assets, such as land, to the poor is important in South Africa it is not instrumental in reducing poverty and inequality unless there is appropriate policy to provide opportunity for asset building (May, 2000).

The following subsections examine how urbanisation, land reform, foreign land ownership and HIV/AIDS have contributed towards making livelihoods vulnerable.

2.1.1 Urbanisation and the emergence of slums

Global urbanisation has increased substantially from only 86 cities worldwide with a population over 1 million in 1950, to 400 cities in 2006 and it is projected that by 2015 there will be at least 550 such cities (Davis, 2006). The world is entering an era where, for the first time, urban population numbers are exceeding rural population figures. And in the next 30 years virtually all of the world’s population growth will occur in urban areas of low and middle income countries (Landsberg, 2005). As Davis (2006) points out, there is no indication whether this many cities are biologically or ecologically sustainable. Especially since cities have large, and growing, poor populations. The majority of the urban poor cannot afford formal housing and thus often have no alternative but to reside in

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9 This is what has been termed the ‘Trickle up effect’.
10 There is also evidence from sub-Saharan Africa to suggest that increasing levels of urbanisation reduces a country’s GDP (Walker, 2002).
slums where housing conditions are grossly inadequate (UN-Habitat, 2003). Slums, also known as informal settlements, are by definition an unsafe living environment. Slums expose poor people to vulnerable situations in the process of urbanisation. Slum ecology is a hazard for those residing in slums. Slums are prone to disaster because they emerge through an informal process rather than by formal municipal planning. The mountains of rubbish, excrement and other foreign substances that characterise slums put people at risk of disease. Slums are often located in geologically unstable areas where rain can cause mudslides and flooding or near dangerous industrial areas where pollutants infect the slum dweller environment (Davis, 2006). Further, slum dwellers are exposed more easily to water borne diseases and HIV/AIDS (UN-Habitat, 2003).

Seventy two percent (72%) of Africa’s urban population lives in slums (Landsberg, 2005). South Africa has a growing slum population and, according to research conducted by the University of Stellenbosch, up to 80% of South Africa’s population will reside in cities or towns by the year 2026, which makes South Africa one of the fastest urbanising countries in the world (Jenkins, 1997). The housing backlog has grown exponentially from 1.4 million, 12 years ago, to 2.4 million in 2006 (van der Westhuizen, 2004). The City of Johannesburg established that there are 189 informal settlements (209 308 informal structures) within the jurisdiction of that city. The City aims to eradicate informal settlements by 2008 through the provision of formal accommodation (Landsberg, 2005). However, it is unclear whether the City will be able to achieve this objective or how many more informal settlements will have established themselves by 2007. In KwaZulu-Natal, the provincial government has drafted the Elimination and Prevention of Re-emergence of Slums Bill to deal with the escalation of informal settlements in urban areas (Chief Directorate: State Law Advisory Services, 2006). Media reportage indicates that government may be more concerned with eradicating informal settlements than providing alternative accommodation to those that inhabit them. This viewpoint is supported by the slow progress with the building of low cost housing, as there will not be enough houses to cater for displaced informal settlement residents as a result of slum clearing (Pithouse, 2006). The potential eradication of slums indicates that tenure security for slum dwellers remains uncertain.

Oscillation between rural and urban contexts is a significant component of livelihood strategies for many urban poor (Walker, 2002). There are numerous reasons why South
African’s might migrate to urban centres like Johannesburg. There are the attractions of better employment prospects, housing and basic services (Bernstein, 2005). Increasingly one of the reasons for urbanisation is insecure tenure. Social Surveys Africa and the Nkuzi Development Association (2005) documented that over 67% of evicted farm dwellers settled in urban areas, many in informal settlements.

Insecure tenure is not only a rural phenomenon. Davis (2006) documents the failing of developing countries to provide housing for new urban workers as post independence governments abdicate responsibility for the poor to rule in the interests of local elites. A consequence of urbanisation is mass eviction of people back to the rural areas. When a city administration cannot cope with the influx of people, municipalities move to evict and demolish informal settlements (Davis, 2006).

2.1.2 Failure of land reform to promote land tenure security

The increasing dissatisfaction amongst the landless regarding the progress of land reform is apparent in media reportage. The Landless People’s Movement has warned that “the people’s anger will break out” if land redistribution targets are not achieved (Goebel, 2005: 346). Aliber (2003) and Walker (2002) recognise that people’s perceptions of land is a highly emotive issue and one that takes on a far greater importance than its apparent importance to the economy.

The progression of Zimbabwe’s controversial land reform programme and the resultant land invasions have exacerbated anxiety about land in the (white) South African commercial farming community (Goebel, 2005; Lyne and Darroch, 2002). This anxiety is heightened by perceptions of land reform. Hlopoyiya (undated) indicates that there is the perception amongst some black people that land reform is there to topple white commercial agriculture and replace it with black commercial agriculture or black land owners. Land invasion can compromise the viability of agriculture on farms (Boyce, 2002). However, even though South African law does not permit land invasions they do occur, as exemplified in the Vryheid-Babanango invasions (refer to Appendix 1). Evicted

11 Zimbabwe’s Operation Murambatsvina is a case in point where rapid urbanisation and subsequent slum growth resulted in the eviction of over 700,000 people from their homes and livelihoods (Tibajuka, 2005).
farm workers and labour tenants without alternative accommodation have no where to go and as a result invade former employer’s land (Department of Land Affairs, 1996). In KwaZulu-Natal, Boyce (2002) confirms that there have been cases at Nqabeni (South Coast), Mangete, Nonoti and Kranskop (North Coast) where farmers have been driven off their land.

The Zimbabwe situation indicates the potential volatility of land reform within Southern Africa. In Zimbabwe, the slow pace of land reform resulted in a politically unsustainable and explosive situation (Deininger et al., 2002). Part of the problem in Zimbabwe was that commercial farmers opposed national land reforms which contributed to delaying the implementation of land reform. Deininger et al (2002: 16) issue a warning. “The pattern described for Zimbabwe might not be unique to the country. South Africa and Namibia for instance are also characterised by an extremely inequitable distribution of land, along racial lines and a land reform programme that makes little progress”.

Referring to South Africa (Sibanda, 2001: 2) noted that: “Land invasions and other related illegal acts are not tolerated by government”. However, when farm invasions occur and the perpetrators are not dealt with appropriately then it seems to imply that government does tolerate land invasions. In South Africa, enforcing the law remains vital to political stability, economic growth and, in the case of invasions, food security. Political instability undermines land tenure security which has a negative effect on food security (Walker, 2002). For example, the Zimbabwe five year land reform campaign resulted in about 4200 of 4500 agriculturally productive farmers leaving their farms which compromised food security in Zimbabwe. The evidence from Zimbabwe shows that the fast track approach to land redistribution threatens food security, at the household and national level (COHRE, 2001). The apparent lack of action against unlawful land invasions will add logically to speculation over government lacking the political will to implement land reform. Goebel (2005: 364) confirms that “the South African government is down-playing the land question”. As long as land reform remains politically marginal to the concerns of government land invasions will continue to occur (Deininger et al., 2002) which results in an unstable political environment, compromised food security and economic crises.

As shown in Chapter 1, the land redistribution programme has not benefited communities on the scale required to retain people in rural areas. In fact, redistribution target dates have
been repeatedly shifted in order to account for slow land delivery (Lahiff and Rugege, 2003). Presently, LRAD only tends to benefit small groups of aspiring farmers (Ministry for Agriculture and Land Affairs, 2000). These beneficiaries become owners of large tracts of land, which in effect excludes other members of their communities from land tenure. The land tenure reform programme failed to prevent the eviction of farm workers and their families from farms (Social Surveys Africa and the Nkuzi Development Association, 2005). The result is that land tenure is elusive for many rural families in South Africa. Van den Brink (2003) concurs saying that where there are no or unclear property rights and tenure security the problems of eviction, land invasion and disputes over land are common.

The legacy of Colonialism in Africa tended to favour European settlers over indigenous population groups and European land administrative systems above indigenous systems. A land tenure administrative system emerged dominated by the Colonial legal systems, through formalised individual land titling, as a result of the commodification of land (Walker, 2002). Recently, new legal frameworks to land tenure have begun to be investigated as formal individual title deeds to land have failed to solve the problems of homelessness and tenure insecurity among the rural and urban poor (Cousins et al., 2005; Ayieko, 2004).\textsuperscript{12} Although formal titling is accepted to be important it cannot deliver security of tenure to the majority of citizens, particularly in Africa, on its own. There is growing consensus that developing nations should rather look at other innovative approaches to security of tenure including building upon customary tenure and group rights (Alcock and Hornby, 2004; Walker, 2002).

2.1.3 Ownership of land by foreigners in South Africa

In countries such as South Africa where land policy has changed or is changing the redistribution of land becomes critical to social justice and the sustainability of societies (Vorley, 2002). News reports in South Africa indicate that land redistribution, tenure security and livelihoods are beginning to be negatively affected by capitalism through

\textsuperscript{12} De Soto (2000) suggests that formalising property rights for the poor in houses, land and small businesses will enable the poor to access capital and participate in the economy. However, critics of de Soto's approach have substantiated their rejection of this idea on the fact that there have been numerous such tiling systems that have failed to achieve the results he suggests. Additionally, there are different principles that govern property systems in rural areas that should be accommodated rather than replaced (Cousins et al, 2005).
growing globalisation (Manyathi, 2006). Globalisation, described in Chapter 1, has exposed South Africa to global market forces. Approximately 68% of land in rural South Africa is privately owned and thus accessible for purchase (Walker, 2002). The increasing demand for land by various parties (including the mining industry, housing estates, golf course developments and eco tourism ventures) continue to pose a threat to tenure security (Panel of Experts on Foreign Ownership of Land, 2006). In this context, the regulation and monitoring of land ownership cannot be overlooked.

While land reform has failed to provide land to the majority of poor South Africans, there have been some positive steps made in addressing land ownership. Over the last few years, it has been raised that the lack of knowledge about land under foreign ownership and the unregulated ownership of land and property by foreigners might seriously impact the amount of land available and affordable for land reform. As a result of this concern the Panel of Experts on Foreign Ownership of Land (PEFOL) was constituted to provide recommendations to government policy development on foreign ownership of land. The PEFOL is of the opinion that foreign ownership of land in South Africa is significant enough to require policy and legislative regulation (Panel of Experts on Foreign Ownership of Land, 2006).

2.1.4 HIV/AIDS

“HIV/AIDS will influence who gets land in the initial reform process, how the land is then used, and how it will be subsequently redistributed in future.”

Another aspect that has high impact on livelihoods in South Africa is HIV/AIDS. The South African land reform programme has neglected to address this issue which negatively affects the lives of all South Africans (Walker, 2002). HIV/AIDS is affecting negatively both the institutions that manage land reform and the beneficiaries of land reform (Ranchod, 2004). HIV/AIDS affects the official capacity to deliver on government programmes (Walker, 2002). Beneficiaries of land reform are already taking a great risk in participating in the land redistribution programme as the little income that beneficiaries have is invested in acquisitions of land and agricultural inputs and implements. Compounding this, the risk of participation in land redistribution programme is raised substantially by HIV/AIDS. Poor people are more vulnerable to contracting HIV/AIDS and have little means to address the illness (Ranchod, 2004). This has a negative impact
on small scale and labour intensive agriculture as resources are diverted to pay for medical costs, funerals and orphans (Walker, 2002). This is problematic for the viability of small scale farms (Ranchod, 2004; Wegerif, 2004). Wegerif (2004: 9) goes further to say that, “The effects of HIV/AIDS may well neutralise the prospects for growth in agriculture.”

2.2 Land access and human rights

Throughout the world, human rights are increasingly recognised as pivotal in human development (UNDP, 2000). Secure tenure is an internationally recognised human right; this right includes the human right to livelihood and land. International law respects that people depend on land for their livelihoods in order to survive (PDHRE, 2006a). In confirmation of this, El-Ghonemy (2001: 63) notes, “Land reform is primarily an issue of basic human rights. It implies access to land and its benefits on more equitable and secure terms for all of those who physically work it and primarily depend upon it for their livelihoods”.

The history of land in South Africa makes the issue of land important to the vast majority of rural people. The inequitable land ownership patterns resulting from South Africa’s past has presented land reform as an issue of basic human rights. The South African government confirms that rights in land, including the right to land and access to land, are rights endorsed by the South African constitution which instructs the State to enable access to land on an equitable basis (Didiza, 2006). However, rights pertaining to land access and tenure security continue to be undermined. Forced eviction is a violation of basic human rights including those in land (PDHRE, 2006b). Social Surveys Africa and Nkuzi Development Association (2005) documented the extent of evictions from South African farms. Since 1994 almost 1 million people have been evicted from farms and 2.35 million people have been displaced from farms. Almost, 80% of those evicted are women and children. The number of farm dweller households evicted from 1994-2005 was 199,611 households. Whereas the land reform programme, for the same period, only settled or secured tenure for 164,185 households. Land reform has indirectly contributed to these farm evictions. The land restitution process enabled labourers and tenants living on farms to claim land according to a set of criteria. This resulted in the eviction of tens of

thousands of labour tenants as farmers feared they risked losing land through the claims process. Similarly, the 1995 Labour Relations Act, 1996 Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act, 1997 the Extension of Security of Tenure Act, 1997 new Basic conditions of employment Act and the revision of the 2003 minimum wage all contradicted their purpose and resulted in mass eviction of farm dwellers throughout South Africa (Social Surveys Africa and the Nkuzi Development Association, 2005).

Ideally, in order to secure rights in land, the redistribution of land should benefit the landless and poor (El-Ghonemy, 2001). In South Africa, the land reform programme aims to correct skewed land ownership patterns. The restitution programme has carried the responsibility for remedying the dispossession of land since 1913 and there has been a clear human rights impetus. As part of the land reform programme, the redistribution and land tenure programmes are also rights-based vehicles for addressing the equitable distribution of land and tenure security for those that were not able to claim land or compensation through the restitution programme (Wegerif, 2004; Aliber, 2003; Department of Land Affairs, 1997). But since the inception of the land reform programme in South Africa, the land redistribution programme, as described in the previous chapter, has shifted away from its rights-based focus of benefiting the majority of the landless and poor (Walker, 2002).

The next two sections describe different approaches to land reform and some of their characteristics. The land reform scenario in Zimbabwe is used as an example from which South Africa can learn valuable lessons.

2.3 Approaches to land reform

The implementation of land reform, around the world, has been dominated by two different modes of thought. One places more importance on economics than any other aspect of land reform; the other is more concerned with human rights (El-Ghonemy, 2001). These different approaches to land reform have manifested themselves as land market reform and redistributive land reform respectively.

Redistributive land reform is a process whereby land is taken from large scale farmers and given to the landless poor and previously disadvantaged. This type of land reform often
occurs after conflict situations (FAO, 1998). Redistributive land reform promotes social transformation and poverty alleviation especially since land market reform is out of reach as the poor battle to afford land at market prices (El-Ghonemy, 2001). Redistributive land reform can reduce poverty through triggering increased agricultural production (Wegerif, 2004). Redistributive land reform has been very successful in a number of countries including Egypt, China, South Korea and India. In South Korea poverty dropped 50% as a result of successful redistributive land reform (El-Ghonemy, 2001).

Land market reform or market-led reform, also known as the willing buyer/willing-seller approach in South Africa, is presently the most common mode of conducting land reforms (Karumbidza, 2002, El-Ghonemy, 2001). Since the 1980s there has been a move towards economically orientated land reform. The global market has pressured governments to opt for land market reform (El-Ghonemy, 2001). The western institutions of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank have played a role in the deregulation of land markets (Karumbidza, 2002). They ensured that loan applications were refused unless their conditions of land markets ‘liberalisation’ were endorsed (El-Ghonemy, 2001). This tends to provide enabling conditions for settlers rather than the local rural poor (Karumbidza, 2002). Theoretically, market-led land reform makes land available to those too disadvantaged to enter into normal land market transactions (FAO, 1998). The state’s role is to provide the former owner with compensation at market or near market value as a poor farmer is unable to do so. Although market land reform aims to provide land to the poor it has battled throughout the world to meet set targets (Karumbidza, 2002; El-Ghonemy, 2001). In South Africa, there is growing opposition to market land reforms as the willing-buyer/willing-seller approach “redistributes little land and benefits few landless families” (Aliber and Mokoena, 2002: 4). Karumbidza (2002) notes that the slow impact of market-led land reforms often result in radical campaigns for land reform. Even though the land reform objectives are driven by the principles of social justice and basic needs as opposed to market forces, market value remains as a basis for paying owners for their properties because of the difficulties in calculating a productive value for land (Aliber and Mokoena, 2002). As the National Land Committee (2003: 122) state, “The market is not a solution for a fair land redistribution after the apartheid…markets are never truly free”. Sunstein (1997) agrees stating that free markets can perpetuate injustice.
An alternative market-led land reform process is supply led redistribution. This is where land is secured for purposes of redistribution before applicants have indicated their wish to acquire it. In South Africa, land redistribution is currently demand driven whereby beneficiaries identify land and approach the DLA to acquire it. In theory, supply-led redistribution could increase the speed of delivery of land to beneficiaries as land would be available to beneficiaries on application. It could also enable land to be acquired more inexpensively, as negotiation could commence prior to redistribution. Lastly, supply led initiatives could ensure the acquisition of high quality land. However, this would require government to be strategic in their thinking about where to redistribute. There is no shortage of willing sellers and government can buy land for redistribution in sensible areas where demand is high and infrastructure and support accessible (Aliber and Mokoena, 2002; Cousins, 2007).

Land reform is complex (Walker, 2002). There is no one ideal approach to land reform as both redistributive land reform and land market reform are open to abuse. The collapse of land market reform and the subsequent controversial redistributive land reform in Zimbabwe has confirmed fears of non-market approaches to land reform. But market approaches to land reform often exclude the very people land reform is supposed to benefit. The obligation of land reform to redressing human rights violations of the past and to simultaneously satisfy market requirements is complex as the two perspectives are often in conflict. As Cousins (2007: 19) points out: “Political dynamics, rather than rational arguments, are likely to be the key determinant of the content of land and agrarian reform in South Africa in years to come.” Until political prerogatives change, it seems that land reform in South Africa will remain predominantly market orientated and demand driven in its approach.

2.4 The Zimbabwean land reform programme: The benchmark for South Africa?

The land history of Zimbabwe and its proximity to South Africa is of relevance to land reform in South Africa. At Zimbabwean Independence in 1980, the white minority owned the majority of agriculturally suitable land (Goebel, 2005). The land reform programme established to address the injustices of British Colonial rule is of importance to this study. There are striking parallels between Zimbabwe’s land reform programme and the South
African land reform programme. This section extrapolates on this in order to expose the effects of inequities in land distribution.

Although the Zimbabwean land reform programme is widely understood to be a failure, in the late 1980s there was progress being made on resettlement projects. At that time, ambitious targets for land resettlement were partially achieved, mainly through the reduction in the number of large scale commercial farms and, by 1989, 29% of commercial farmland had been transferred to 54000 households (Walker, 2002). However, during the 1990s the Government of Zimbabwe changed their land reform strategy. This was predominantly due to political pressure from war veterans and the numerous land invasions that had taken place. The Government of Zimbabwe felt that the colonists needed to face up to their obligations of addressing the injustices they had caused over land inequities and should therefore fund land reform in the former colony. While the British agreed in principal this never happened. The British withheld their financial support because they felt that the Government of Zimbabwe was ignoring the Land Reform and Resettlement Programme principles they had agreed to (Goebel, 2005; COHRE, 2001).

The lack of financial support and Zimbabwe’s lack of progress of land reform resulted in a land crisis and the large scale invasion of white owned farms across Zimbabwe (Goebel, 2005). The Zimbabwe five year land reform campaign resulted in about 4200 of 4500 agriculturally productive farmers leaving their farms which compromised food security in Zimbabwe. The evidence from Zimbabwe shows that the fast track approach to land redistribution threatens food security, at the household and national level (COHRE, 2001).

Zimbabwe’s land crisis resulted due to the following:
1. The highly politicised and emotive nature of land.
2. Lack of funding.
3. Budget allocations indicated that land redistribution was not a priority for government.
4. Poor administration as government failed to follow its own legal and procedural requirements.
5. Shift away from settlement of the poor to settlement of individual black commercial farmers.

(COHRE, 2001: 17)
In the points mentioned above, there are alarming commonalities in the run up to Zimbabwe’s land crisis and South Africa land reform programme presently. At least three of the above points are common.

Point 1: Land reform has become highly political and emotive for land owners and the landless alike (Goebel, 2005).

Point 3: The South African national budget allocates a small proportion to land reform (0.3%-0.5%) as explained in section 1.2.4.

Point 5: The emergence of a new land reform policy (LRAD) focused on benefiting black emerging farmers (Hall, 2004a; Hall et al, 2003).

Elaboration on the fifth point is necessary as this has relevance to the focus of this thesis. The Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP), introduced in 1990, was a market based land policy framework that favoured productive land use and the establishment of black emerging farmers in Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe’s economic adjustment process led to a shift in land policies, land ownership structures as well as the uses of land and natural resources towards new global markets. Moyo (2000) found, from his studies in Zimbabwe, that economically focused land redistribution led to two things. The first was a struggle for land rights between land holders and land seekers. The second was greater polarisation of not only land distribution but resource distribution with an elite few controlling the majority of resources while the majority of the population is left in poverty. Similarly, Sobhan (1993) confirms that agrarian reforms can perpetuate polarisation and poverty if a rural elite survives. He maintained that land reform should eliminate any current or potential dominant rural class by redistributing land as widely as possible to the landless and land poor. Moyo (2000: 166) issues a cautionary note: “Worsening conditions in an inegalitarian agrarian system with underutilised land now being redirected towards external markets and with low employment and income, lead instead towards ‘radical’ strategies of community led self-provisioning of land, continued and increased conflicts amongst white and black elites against the poor, and increased transaction costs in the land markets.”

In Chapter 1 it was established that the LRAD programme is also a by-product of market-based policy. Therefore, the effects of the LRAD programme could see a situation emerging similar to that which Moyo (2000) indicates. This is the subject of the following section.
2.5 Agricultural restructuring and land redistribution

The White Paper on land policy (Department of Land Affairs, 1997) identified critical areas that land reform should address:

- The past injustices of racially based land dispossession;
- The need for a more equitable distribution of land ownership;
- The need for land reform to reduce poverty and contribute to economic growth;
- Security of tenure for all and;
- A system of land management that would support sustainable land use patterns and rapid land release for development.

However, the approach taken to meet these objectives seems to be hindering the participation of the poor in land reform, as described in section 2.4. In fact, international historical evidence shows that land reform often favours those with more land or capital (Oberai, 1988). Those who are able to take best advantage of government assistance and agricultural credit are the capitalist farmers and not the subsistence farmers for whom the programmes were intended (Oberai, 1988). In South Africa similar trends are occurring whereby the beneficiaries of land redistribution schemes tend to be the better resourced (Wegerif, 2004; Hall, 2004a; Hall et al, 2003; Mapadimeng, 2003).

The World Bank assisted in the shift from the RDP focus and an emphasis on redistribution to a GEAR emphasis on production (Karumbidza, 2002). The LRAD programme was a result of this shift, as detailed in section 1.2.3, and concentrates on redistributing land to previously disadvantaged black farmers for agricultural production. This is a tactic by government to ensure that the minimum production levels are sustained on farms. However, grants are dependent upon the borrower beneficiary providing capital. This may be difficult for previously disadvantaged farmers, who lack savings (Lyne and Darroch, 2001). The tendency of LRAD to benefit better resourced black individuals in order to create a class of black commercial farmers is bound to marginalise the poor (Davis, 2001). Davis (2001) also points out that the DLA may not have the capacity or the budget to implement an ambitious land redistribution programme.
Although LRAD is a market-led approach, it does try to balance the effects of the market by providing grants to beneficiaries. This may allow the poor to enter the market but it continues to support class formation. As described earlier by Moyo (2000) in section 2.3, class formation is often a result of market-led land reform. Leo (1984) supports the claim that development of agriculture under capitalism involves class formation. This implies that the South African LRAD programme could create a class of agriculturally productive black small scale farmers. Whilst this may be seen as a positive step towards transformation within the agricultural industry there are some cautions. There are modes of thought that warn against agricultural production as a means of land redistribution, not only because it perpetuates class formation but because the value of land to people with histories and cultures based in land cannot be underestimated (Bernstein, 1997). The economic value or viability of land is not the only currency of importance to people and the inherent value of land should be respected (Aliber, 2003; Walker 2002). As Bernstein (1997: 27) states, “The history of dispossession and their effects mean that issues of restitution and redistribution of land extend beyond those of restructuring agriculture and that land and farming should not be conflated”.

The LRAD programme is associated with agricultural restructuring rather than a means of land redistribution. Creation of a farming elite under the auspices of land redistribution is contrary to the objectives of land reform. And although LRAD has the potential to achieve some level of sustainability for individual projects it is unlikely that LRAD will have a significant impact on delivery of the land redistribution objectives (Mapadimeng, 2003).

2.5.1 Commercial agricultural decline

Land reform is rooted firmly in agriculture. LRAD is specifically geared to promote agricultural production of redistributed land. However, experience from Asia, Africa and Latin America has shown that land reform has made little impact on enhancing agricultural production. Land reform programmes are often in response to political pressure rather than part of a long term rural development strategy. Therefore, commitment to them wanes as political prerogatives change (Deininger, 2003).

Historically, commercial agriculture has been the mainstay of rural life. Studies have shown that agriculture has a positive impact on the rural poor. This is because agriculture
typically employs a large number of people and therefore even small growth in agriculture will have a positive impact on employment and rural incomes (Wegerif, 2004). In South Africa, agriculture and associated activities are contributing progressively less to the GDP of South Africa. The liberalisation of markets in South Africa, loss of agricultural subsidies and a highly competitive global market has seen the contribution that agriculture makes to the South African GDP diminish substantially as other sectors become dominant in the economy (Bernstein, 2005). For example, the growing tourism sector contributed 7.1% to the GDP in 2005\(^\text{14}\) (Fair Trade in Tourism South Africa, 2005) compared to agriculture’s GDP contribution of 4.5% in 2004 (Department of Agriculture, 2004). As a result farmland continues to be converted for other land uses as agriculture becomes less profitable (Hall, 2004b). And although there has been some redistribution of farmland to black farmers, especially in the timber and sugar industries, the agricultural sector is not growing fast enough to accommodate emerging black farmers to participate in commercial agriculture (Bernstein, 2005).

The shift in commercial agriculture toward more advanced agricultural technologies also poses a problem for emerging local farmers. Biotechnology is firmly rooted in globalisation and provides efficient and cost effective means for agricultural production. However, the initial costs involved in biotechnology for agriculture excludes emerging farmers from participating in this emerging market (Busch, 1997).

Another factor that has not been given enough consideration by the land reform debate is agricultural disinterest. The notion that black people want land for agricultural purposes has been found erroneous by a Centre for Development Enterprise study (Bernstein, 2005). Aliber (2003) confirms this indicating that in 2000 a survey showed that only 1.3% of South African respondents mentioned land as a priority. In fact, most black people want jobs and housing in urban areas rather than rural land (Bernstein, 2005). The rate of urbanisation in South Africa would support the fact that South Africa is no longer predominantly a rural society. However, for the majority of those that remain in rural areas land remains critical to their survival (Vorley, 2002). But there is little motivation to farm on a commercial basis where people are increasingly urbanised and disinterested in farming, the market is progressively agriculturally stagnant and the sustainability of current

\(^{14}\) Tourism contribute a total of R53.9 billion to the GDP in 2005 (Fair Trade in Tourism South Africa, 2005).
commercial agricultural models are intensive and questionable. This is a global phenomenon that is creating a new space for sustainable alternatives for land use (Vorley, 2002; Walker 2002).

2.6 Sustainable livelihoods and land reform

The aim of this section is to bring into the land reform debate the concept of sustainable livelihoods. This chapter has already introduced the vulnerability of livelihoods in South Africa in the context of the poor delivery of land reform, continued tenure insecurity and poverty. The argument here is that ideally land reform in South Africa should promote sustainable livelihoods.

The concept of sustainable livelihoods is important for rural development and poverty alleviation (Scoones, 1998). The FAO (2002) noted that livelihoods approaches are increasingly utilised by governments and development agencies in addressing food insecurity and poverty. The UK Department for International Development (1999: 1) defines a sustainable livelihood as: “A livelihood comprises the capabilities, assets (including both material and social resources) and activities required for a means of living. A livelihood is sustainable when it can cope with and recover from stresses and shocks and maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets both now and in the future while not undermining the natural resource base.”

Land redistribution provides a basis from which sustainable livelihoods can be launched. However, the redistribution of assets, including land, to the poor is important but it is not instrumental in reducing poverty and inequality unless there is appropriate policy to provide opportunity for asset building (May, 2000). This is where the Sustainable Livelihood Approach can assist.

The Sustainable Livelihoods Approach is a way of thinking about the objectives, scope and priorities for development, in order to address poverty (Ashley and Carney, 1999). The essence of the approach is putting people at the centre of development, through investigating people’s lives, thereby increasing the effectiveness of development assistance (Department for International Development (DFID), 1999). The approach also considers that people have multiple livelihood strategies, which are dynamic, that are part of the
complex environment in which people live (Scoones, 1998). Analysis of assets (namely human, social, financial, physical and natural) in peoples’ possession and the vulnerabilities, factors that threaten livelihoods, people are exposed to enable the approach to focus on what resources people have available to them (Ashley and Carney, 1999).

2.6.1 South Africa follows global trends away from sustainability

The United Nations defines a sustainable society as one which: “meets the needs of the present without sacrificing the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (UN World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987: 43). The premise behind the concept of sustainability is the fact that the earth’s resources are finite (Dobson, 2000). South Africa much like other developing countries of India, Brazil and China is conforming to current global trends. Globalisation, discussed in Chapter 1, is a powerful factor dictating how economies participate in global markets. Globalisation deteriorates the environment with its emphasis on production and development without concern for the environment can only be short term and in the long term may increase poverty and oppression (Bamberger and Valadez, 1994). Roberts (1995: 3) notes that, “Global society is affecting our finite planet in three different ways:

1. By the numbers of people the earth is expected to sustain.
2. By the levels of consumption of ever more materialistic societies, which harvest renewable resources beyond their sustainable harvest rate.
3. By pollutants or byproducts, including and increasing range of synthetic products which nature cannot decompose.”

Governments often react inadequately to problems of the environment with the belief that environmental problems can be solved without fundamental changes in present values or patterns of production or consumption. However, sustainability is much more than signing up to a concept, it has essential financial and social connotations that cannot be ignored but it seems that the concept of sustainability will remain peripheral until it becomes a valuable commodity on global markets (Dobson, 2000).

In South Africa, the land reform programme has placed some emphasis on sustainability (Ministry for Agriculture and Land Affairs, 2000). The sustainable use of land is an
objective of land reform (Department of Land Affairs, 1997). Land goes along way to improving livelihoods and provides a platform to create sustainable livelihoods for the rural poor (Wegerif, 2004). Therefore, the sustainability of land and its environment is critical to people who live and depend on this resource for their livelihoods. As such sustainability should be a principle of any intervention that impacts on the natural environment. In this context, agriculture should be moving away from unsustainable, large scale, high input farming.

Conclusion

The land reform programme was established to address inequitable land distribution in South Africa by entrenching land rights. The lack of progress in delivering land to the landless has not impacted on poverty or inequality on a significant scale. The market related approach to redistributing land is not a fair approach to address the scale of land need and tenure security for residential, agricultural and non-agricultural activities. Additionally the objectives of land reform are compromised if only previously disadvantaged black farmers and not the landless majority are target beneficiaries.

The process of urbanisation is drawing people away from their homes in rural areas. However, the majority of these people (poor people) can only afford to live in informal settlements. People are searching for a livelihood whilst simultaneously making themselves more vulnerable than their rural counterparts. Therefore, urbanisation is not a sustainable long term solution to unemployment, evictions, land tenure insecurity and other factors that contribute to rural flight. Effective land reform and income generating activities in rural areas are therefore crucial to alleviating the population pressure on urban centres. Presently, land reform is exacerbating problems of urbanisation through the direct failure of land reform to secure tenure and improve the livelihoods of the poor. Farm evictions indicate the extent of the human rights violations still occurring on farms. This points to current law (and the enforcement of this law) supposedly protecting farm labourers as being incomprehensive and ineffective. Additionally, and importantly in the context of this thesis, the farm eviction statistics show how current trends in farm evictions have dramatically counteracted the impact of land reform.
The establishment of PEFOL to monitor and regulate foreign land ownership is a progressive step towards reducing land ownership inequities. But there is still a need to regulate local ownership, especially large scale land holdings, in a similar manner if government is truly committed to redistributing land for the benefit of the majority of rural people. However, whether it is possible to monitor land ownership remains to be seen.

A change in approach to land reform hinges on politics. The current market-led approach to land reform is entrenched in economics and while much has been done to assist with creating a more racially equitable land market through Black Economic Empowerment and other transformation policy, not enough has been done in practice to ensure that the majority of South Africans benefit from land reform. Economic approaches tend to ignore the rights of the landless poor and there is growing dissatisfaction with the current resource distribution measures. The signs of dissatisfaction are there in the form of land invasions and landless people’s movements. However, until such time as there is the political will to implement land reform on a large scale the status quo will continue.

Agriculture is an increasingly difficult business to make viable especially for emerging farmers, like LRAD beneficiaries, entering the market. Agricultural decline and the land reform programme’s dependency on agriculture as a livelihood strategy does not bode well for land reform beneficiaries. The low growth within the agricultural sector and the increasing number of stakeholders, black and white farmers alike, sharing the sector may be cause for concern. In an economy where agriculture plays an ever decreasing role it is doubtful whether LRAD will revive and grow the agricultural sector. Therefore, land reform policy needs to consider other strategies for land based livelihoods as multiple strategies contribute to making livelihoods sustainable.

It has been established clearly that the land issue in South Africa is very complex. The objectives of land reform have been manipulated for perceived market gains from which the poor are expected to feel the ‘trickle down effect’. The right to land is not enforced and the landless poor continue to be excluded from land reform processes. The decreasing contribution of agriculture to the formal economy and the net effect of growing agriculture on rural livelihoods presents motivation for transferring land to the poor for agricultural production on any scale.
The importance of dealing with land issues in an efficient and effective way is an aspect that the South African government has not taken seriously. In the context of LRAD this means not only handing over land to prospective emerging farmers but enabling them to farm the land productively. To do this effectively requires the use of a system to monitor and evaluate the process of land redistribution and agricultural development for the purposes of improving implementation. Monitoring and evaluation is the focus of the next chapter.
Chapter 3:  
Evaluation in land reform

The previous chapter exposed some issues for debate on land reform. The land reform debate is complex and requires adequate information in order for debate to be informed. This chapter introduces evaluation as an important component of any intervention. Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) systems are vital for information generation on programmes or projects and this information is used to assist with decision making and inform debate. Additionally, this chapter strengthens justification of the research carried out in the case study. In section 3.1, a review of literature commences to provide a background to evaluation. In section 3.3, this review is used as the basis for analysis of evaluation of land reform in South Africa and some of the challenges for LRAD. It is argued that for effective land reform to occur there has to be an effective system of evaluation in place.

3.1 A brief introduction to evaluation

There is growing interest and usage of evaluation as a result of social interventions becoming more popular and effective throughout the world (McEuen, 2002; Babie and Mouton, 1998). Evaluation was first utilised by the economic sector to account for funds spent and profit made (Bamberger and Valadez, 1994). Evaluation has developed to become widely practiced throughout different sectors for different purposes. In the development sector, evaluation is used to assess whether programmes and projects are attaining their goals. Evaluation is used to assess and improve performance of an ongoing programme or to estimate the impacts and evaluate the performance of completed projects (Babie and Mouton, 1998, Bamberger and Valadez, 1994).

Evaluation generates knowledge by understanding how programmes work and how people change their attitudes and behaviour as a consequence of successful programmes (Babie and Mouton, 1998). This enables for the provision of information for making decisions about current as well as future programmes and projects (Rossi and Freeman, 1989). Further, Sang (1995: 2) states, “Project evaluation is a study to determine worth, quality and in general, the desirability of a project for a given purpose".
Evaluating the outcomes or impact of development projects is critical to the progress and improvement of projects, programmes and policy (Marsden and Oakley, 1990). Therefore, evaluation needs to become an integral component of increasing the effectiveness of development work within South Africa.

### 3.1.1 Types of evaluation

The two main types of evaluation are quantitative and qualitative evaluation. This is dealt with in more detail in Chapter 5 but a brief introduction is required for putting evaluation into context. In the past, quantitative evaluations were more common but increasingly the limitations of quantitative evaluation are being felt (Guba and Lincoln, 1989). Traditionally, most indicators used in quantitative evaluations were focused on inputs and outputs rather than the outcomes or results of programmes (Kumar, 1995). Quantitative evaluation posed a problem for the social sciences as abstract concepts, issues, feelings and ideas are impossible to quantify (Stake, 1995; Kumar, 1995; Bamberger and Valadez, 1994).

Qualitative evaluation has more use in social settings. The goal of qualitative research is to understand the impact of interventions from the perspective of the individuals or groups being studied (Bamberger and Valadez, 1994).

### 3.2 Monitoring & Evaluation (M&E) systems: An introduction

This section is intended to introduce M&E as suggested by M&E practitioners. The idea behind structuring the document this way is that the reader can then compare the theoretical framework for M&E against the land reform M&E system currently utilised by the DLA and described in section 3.3.

The World Bank (1987) cited in Bamberger and Valadez, (1994: 4) noted that “The success rate for development projects in Africa is often less than 50%”. This is as a result of a number of reasons including:

- A gross lack of information about projects.
- The inability of projects to sustain the delivery of services in the long term.
• The extent to which projects are able to produce their intended development impacts.
• A shortage of financial and professional resources.

Thus the need for M&E in developing countries is growing. Monitoring is a process that systematically collects data on specified indicators to provide the management and stakeholders of a development intervention with necessary progress information. This information is used to make decisions about the intervention. To be effective monitoring should occur continuously. The aim of M&E is to provide constant monitoring throughout the programme or project process building a database that provides information for evaluation (Bamberger and Valadez, 1994).

M&E systems assist with the clarification of goals and objectives, identify good programmes or practices and identify weaknesses within projects and take action to correct them (Kusek and Rist, 2004).

Monitoring of programmes is directed at the extent to which a programme is reaching the target population, whether or not delivery of services is consistent with programme design specifications and what resources have been or are deployed (Rossi and Freeman, 1989). Monitoring enables the assessment of the implementation of a programme. If an evaluation is conducted, without monitoring information, it may reveal that a programme has little or no impact. However, the monitoring information will determine that the cause may have been due to poor implementation and not an ineffective programme (Bamberger and Valadez, 1994).

For the purposes of this research, three categories of stakeholders are used:
1. International agencies (NGOs, donors, research foundations)
2. National and sectoral agencies (government, local NGOs, consultants, project implementation agencies)
3. Project beneficiaries

Each stakeholder group has a different interest in M&E, what should be studied, how and what the results should show (Bamberger and Valadez, 1994; Guba and Lincoln, 1989).

15 International agencies are not the focus of this research but have been included here for conceptual understanding of the stakeholder categories.
3.2.1 Centralised M&E systems are problematic

Governments in Africa and other developing countries tend to utilise centralised M&E systems. This is a relatively cost effective and simple way, depending on the accessibility, reliability and quality of current M&E information from completed and ongoing projects, to provide governments with broad information about a programme (Bamberger and Valadez, 1994). Unfortunately, centralised M&E systems do have problems. Bamberger and Valadez (1994) oppose the centralisation of M&E saying that it is not practical or effective especially where M&E structures are under developed, like in most developing countries.

Reviews generated by centralised M&E systems are often so broad, usually a national analysis, that they cannot be utilised by project managers for the improvement of local projects under their supervision. Additionally, the centrality of an M&E system often results in a communication and coordination breakdown. This can result in a total collapse of the M&E system where information is not appropriately collected, analysed or utilised (Bamberger and Valadez, 1994).

3.2.2 Moving away from the implementation focus of M&E

Traditionally, the main focus of M&E systems has been on monitoring project implementation through simple quantitative measures. Less emphasis has been placed on the operation and sustainability of programmes and whether they are producing their intended impacts. This is often due to the fact that most government resources go into the implementation of programmes and that M&E units are usually located in the agencies implementing projects. Therefore, monitoring of implementation has remained the focus. This means that M&E is relatively short term and longer term qualitative studies on impacts are rarely performed (Bamberger and Valadez, 1994; Kusek and Rist, 2004).

M&E is more substantial than the traditional implementation focused M&E system. An effective M&E system needs to provide feedback on actual outcomes and goals of government interventions. Traditional implementation of M&E is compliance orientated (i.e. Did government mobilise the inputs, do the activities and deliver expected outputs?). However, M&E must work towards achieving the intended results, outcomes and effects of
a programme rather than just assessing whether the programme is being executed responsibly as responsible execution of a programme does not guarantee the success of a particular programme or project. Traditional implementation of M&E has to be built upon to become results orientated rather than input orientated. What emerges is a results-based M&E system (Kusek and Rist, 2004).

3.2.3 Towards a results-based M&E system

Continuous feedback to management about a programme is important for progress towards a goal. This requires a quality M&E database to easily access information and thereby increase transparency and accountability. However, “designing and building a reporting system that can produce information on performance of government projects, programmes and polices requires experience, skill and real institutional capacity”. (Kusek and Rist, 2004: 21).

For example, Kumar (1995) suggests that an effective results based project M&E system includes a management information system based on target groups, beneficiary contact monitoring to understand the response of target groups, diagnostic studies to identify practical solutions to implementation problems and regular process and impact evaluations.

Kusek and Rist, (2004: 21) raise another issue of critical importance:

“This capacity for a results based reporting system has to include, at a minimum, the ability to successfully construct indicators; the means to collect, aggregate, analyse and report on the performance data in relation to the indicators and their baselines; and managers with the skill and understanding to know what to do with the information once it arrives. This is a long term process.”

3.2.4 Context specific indicators

There has been a shift in development from a top-down, largely technically and economically driven process to an approach where people and communities define and take responsibility for their own progress (Kusek and Rist, 2004). Evaluation at the local or project level has become the means by which progress can be measured by communities. Bell and Morse (1999) emphasise the need for indicators to be set by those
best placed to define sustainability, the beneficiaries. Most indicators are set by outsiders, policy makers, politicians and social or natural scientists who may not be familiar with the context or needs of the beneficiaries (Bell and Morse, 1999). Jackson (1998: 57) confirmed this, "The (evaluation) process calls for the community to choose its key indicators itself." Indicators are an important part of determining progress in the evaluation process. Indicators determine when the desired outcomes have been achieved (Bell and Morse, 1999; Bamberger and Valadez, 1994).

Governments, donor agents, implementing organisations, consultants and beneficiaries all have different expectations from programmes and different objective and indicator requirements (Garaycochea, 1990). This has implications for the setting of objectives and indicators. At the macro or programme level, indicators have to be established at the start of a programme and can be modified over time. Attempting to identify indicators after a programme has run for a period of time is difficult (e.g. the Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development programme). In contrast, at the local or project level, forming indicators for projects cannot be generalised and are context specific (Kusek and Rist, 2004). However, even though indicators are important, Bamberger and Valadez, (1994: 9) noted that in "only a few cases are clearly defined output and impact indicators identified."

3.2.6 Participation in evaluation

The approach one takes to evaluation is important to the initial success and sustainability of an intervention or project (Kusek and Rist, 2004; Guba and Lincoln, 1989). As described before, a results-based approach to evaluation is designed to address the "so what" question and provides feedback on actual outcomes and goals of government actions. This approach builds onto traditional implementation focused approaches (Kusek and Rist, 2004). However, it is vital to include participation as integral to the evaluation process. A participative approach to evaluation is explained by Jackson and Kassam, (1998: 3):

"Participatory evaluation is a process of self-assessment, collective knowledge production, and cooperative action in which the stakeholders in a development intervention participate substantively in the identification of the evaluation issues, the design of the evaluation, the collection and analysis of data, and the action taken as a result of the evaluation findings."
It is widely argued that local people should evaluate their project's performance. Self-evaluation enables the evaluation to become an inside activity done by the community or group. Since project participants are to evaluate themselves, evaluation methodology must take into account the level of capability the project participants (Garaycochea, 1990).

3.2.7 Pilot projects can identify problems

Many programmes identify problems as they progress. This results in programmes being delayed, as problems are resolved, or being ineffective. However, these drawbacks could be avoided. Part of the problem is, as Rossi and Freeman (1989: 228) point out, the lack of piloting:

"When an innovative programme is put in place, it is generally started in a limited number of sites and an effort is made to gauge its effectiveness. Obviously, it is foolish to implement a new programme in hundreds of sites across the nation without some knowledge of its impact."

Piloting is a means of evaluating a programme prior to roll out. Therefore, implementation can be checked for problems before programme commencement. Pilot projects can also assist in determining whether the intended objectives and impacts of the programme will be achieved. Problems can be determined at this experimental stage and dealt with appropriately before implementing a problematic programme on a large scale (Rossi and Freeman, 1989).

3.2.8 Utilisation of M&E information

Many countries around the world have M&E systems in place. However, Rist (1995) warns that there is no guarantee that governments are utilising evaluation appropriately. The implementation of any M&E system is dependent on political support for it from government, stakeholder groups and individuals affected (USAID Center for Development Information and Evaluation, 2000). Kusek and Rist (2004: 164) state that, "Building such (M&E) systems is first and foremost a political activity with technical dimensions rather than vice versa". Conversely, as Germaine and Rea-Dickens (1992: 8) note, "Whatever the nature of the innovation, it should result from an evaluation of some kind". This means
that an innovation or intervention should be informed by evaluation research and not only political prerogatives.

Often resource limitations are blamed for the poor use of evaluation or its total absence. Many countries face resource constraints with mixed utilisation of evaluation. Therefore, resources are not the determining factor in the successful use of evaluation but instead it seems that there is a poor understanding of evaluation and its potential contributions (Kusek and Rist, 2004; Bamberger and Valadez, 1994).

When an evaluation is performed the evaluator should understand the different perspectives of stakeholders (Checkland, 1993). The information needs of the stakeholders are important to ensure that the evaluation is focused on utilisation. The evaluator needs to understand how best to represent data for the utilisation of the evaluation findings by different stakeholders (Bamberger and Valadez, 1994).

An important component of utilisation is accessibility. It is important that M&E information is available for planning purposes. A commitment to producing useful information, making this information accessible and working with the users of such information will enhance an organisation's efficiency. M&E information needs to be accessible and useful for project managers, and increasingly for beneficiaries, and not just donors and central government (Jackson and Kassam, 1998; Bamberger and Valadez, 1994).

In the last 15 years, the importance of evaluation to policy making and programme assessments has grown substantially. The challenge now is making evaluation or M&E more useful and not just a political necessity (Bamberger and Valadez, 1994).

3.2.9 Organisational learning

"Evaluation is essential to good management."  

Sustained and self-reliant development depends on the strength and quality of the organisational learning and development of implementing institutions (Bell and Morse, 1999). The utilisation of M&E information is dependent on the organisational structures

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16 Germaine and Rea-Dickens, 1992: 19
that manage M&E. Without effective evaluation organisations cannot identify the root causes that generate their problems (Rist, 1995). However, good management is often lost because authoritarian systems see evaluation as a means of control (Germaine and Rea-Dickens, 1992).

A key aspect of effective M&E is the willingness and capacity of organisations to learn. The willingness and capacity of organisations to learn can be undermined by the culture of an organisation. Organisations can use evaluation as a threatening means to make people feel accountable for their work and this can place a negative emphasis on evaluation. Often as a result there is unwillingness within the organisation to accept the consequences of an evaluation. This discourages openness and learning as there is as much to learn from failures as success stories (Kusek and Rist, 2004).

Organisational learning is often ignored when planning shortcuts are taken due to pressure to start working and meeting targets. High staff turnover impacts on the effects of organisational learning as staff leave before the impacts can be felt in the implementation of M&E systems. This results in a loss of institutional memory and reduced organisational learning (Bamberger and Valadez, 1994).

Another issue is that of expertise. However, this is hardly surprising when “no country seems to have an M&E training strategy” (Bamberger and Valadez, 1994: 448). Evaluation research programmes are frequently not offered at universities or M&E is normally a component of courses on project planning and management. There is little for those wanting to specialise in M&E (Bamberger and Valadez, 1994).

The responsibility for M&E of national interventions lies with the government. The fact that a government is not accountable to an external funder or independent organisation means that they are the sole input on content and organisation of M&E systems (Bamberger and Valadez, 1994). This responsibility for M&E in an environment where organisational learning is not fostered has negative consequences for the quality and utilisation of M&E.
3.2.10 Developing a framework for comparing M&E systems

The checklist below summarises the main points from sections above. The framework that emerges forms the basis for analysis of M&E in South African land reform in section 3.3.2. This framework is compared against the current approach to M&E of land reform in South Africa.

A: Results based M&E systems

Implementation is crucial to the effectiveness of a project and thus implementation has to be evaluated. However, the impact of the implementation cannot be ascertained without an analysis of the results. Hence any M&E system should be results based ensuring that both the process (implementation) and the impact (result) of an intervention can be explained and understood.

B: Sustainability of interventions

An intervention is only successful if it is sustainable. Project sustainability is the delivery of the project's "intended benefits over an extended period of time" (Bamberger and Valadez, 1994: 185). This is dependent on:

- context specific indicators
- participation
- piloting of projects
- the political environment

C: Usage of M&E information

The purpose of evaluation is to generate information that can be utilised for improving interventions. However, this is dependent on a number of factors:

- The political will of a government to implement a M&E system
- Ensuring that the M&E information is utilised
- Centralisation of M&E systems and its impact on the quality and usage of M&E information
3.3 M&E in land reform: a shambles

This chapter, so far, has introduced evaluation as a tool for improving and determining the impacts of interventions. Importantly it has laid down the theoretical framework for effective evaluation. This section looks at evaluation as used by the DLA to contrast it with that suggested in Section 3.2. The aim of this section is to provide some insights into the M&E system the DLA utilise and some of the shortcomings of this system and suggest a way forward for LRAD.

Section 3.3.1 is initiated by examining how the DLA evaluate the impact of land reform through Quality of Life (QoL) research and the current status of QoL assessment in land reform. Section 3.3.2 analyses this approach to M&E of land reform using the framework developed in 3.2.

3.3.1 Evaluation in practice

What is Quality of Life (QoL) Research?

The DLA uses QoL research as its primary means for evaluating the impact of land reform (May, 2004). The DLA’s approach to QoL research is explained in more detail in the next section. The focus of this section is to elaborate on what QoL research entails.

Quality of life is difficult to define and inconsistently used throughout the human sciences (Rapley, 2003: 19). However, Rapley also indicates that quality of life can be inferred from the health of a populace. The World Health Organisation (1997: 1) in Rapley (Rapley, 2003: 27) believes QoL is “A state of complete physical, mental and social well-being”. However, what this means is open to interpretation and it is suggested that the purpose of a QoL assessment is to assist service providers evaluate the performance of their services and allow participants to have their say (Rapley, 2003).
GDP, in the past, has often been used as a measure of quality of life, assuming the higher the GDP the greater the quality of life. However, Todaro (1982) found that many countries that experienced high GDPs simultaneously had high levels of poverty, unemployment and inequity. He argued that GDP and other economic indicators were insufficient for measuring QoL. Further, Salvaris (1998) in Rapley (2003), explains that the GDP cannot reveal information about the health of the community or the environment or the social costs of what has been produced in the economy all of which are factors related to quality of life (Rapley, 2003: 21).

Modernisation and Westernisation has also been commonly used as an indicator of QoL (Rapley, 2003). However, as Veenhoven (1996) cited by Rapley, (2003: 19) points out, it is misleading to measure quality of life based on the degree to which characteristics of the dominant Western society are apparent in a nation. Modernisation or Westernisation cannot and should not mean people have a better quality of life.

The question about what constitutes a life of quality is a debate still continuing today (Rapley, 2003). This is because quality of life, as a means of measurement, varies depending on the value society places on life. It is submitted that QoL research, like many current evaluation methodologies, is not unlike evaluation and M&E as described in section 3.1 and 3.2. The nature of QoL research is participatory, results-based, and qualitative. The subjective nature of QoL research requires that qualitative methods be utilised. Thus QoL research is a system to assess the quality of life people may be experiencing (Rapley, 2003).

The DLA and the Quality of Life (QoL) Survey

This next section describes QoL research in South Africa as utilised by the DLA. This highlights some of the problems faced by the government in implementing a M&E system as well as some of the constraints this system poses for land reform.

The Directorate Monitoring and Evaluation is the component within the DLA responsible for evaluating and monitoring the Land Reform Programme through the QoL Survey. The school of Development Studies at the University of KwaZulu-Natal was contracted to
assist with the QoL survey. This section is taken from a series of concept notes and reports generated by the school overseen by Professor Julian May.

The first QoL survey implemented by the Monitoring and Evaluation Directorate of the Department of Land Affairs was done in 1997. Sixty-two land reform projects were surveyed but the information collected was not sufficient to permit evaluation analysis required by the DLA (May et al., 2000b). This resulted in the survey being revised in 1998/9 and is the same framework utilised presently.

The framework that underpins the present M&E system is based on the following five indicators of well being:

1. **Food security** was deemed the most important determinant of well being. Food security affects well being either directly through the cultivation of crops for household consumption and sales or indirectly by securing tenure accessibility enabling households to reallocate income towards food security, receive services and invest in improved shelter and thus improving quality of life.

2. **Access to services**: although not the DLA’s mandate, service provision was considered central to quality of life of land reform beneficiaries.

3. **Local institutions** were considered indicative of the effective utilisation of land, mobilisation and organisation for service delivery and empowerment.

4. **Targeting**: comparison between beneficiary and non-beneficiary households was necessary to examine the extent of land reform benefits. A land reform beneficiary profile was to be compared to the national October Household Survey (OHS).

5. **The role of agriculture**: this was deemed important with the establishment of the LRAD programme.

(May, 2005; May, 2004)

These indicators are assessed with two instruments. A household questionnaire to investigate the characteristics of land reform beneficiaries. And a new community/project
questionnaire to collect information concerning the projects that have been established by the land reform programme (May, 2005; May, 2004).

In 1999, it was decided that these instruments were to re-interview households every three years to build up a database of land reform beneficiaries (i.e. the beneficiary profile) that would enable for comparison and analysis of different land reform beneficiaries and projects over a long period of time. Land reform beneficiaries would then have been compared to a control group of similar demographic and socioeconomic status. This would be drawn from the annual October Household Survey (OHS) that Statistics South Africa conduct. Comparison of beneficiary and non-beneficiary groups enables for unobservable characteristics of beneficiaries to be accounted for. This ensures that benefits are not attributable to any other factors other than land reform (May, 2005).

However this did not happen. Only two QoL reports were produced, for 1999 and 2000, both of questionable use. Low response rates, small samples, data capturing errors, questionnaire ambiguities and interviewing difficulties have severely affected the data quality. More importantly, the sample design for creating a beneficiary profile has been compromised as repeat surveys did not take place when they should have and “no electronic records have been kept showing the names or addresses of those interviewed in 1999 and it appears that the original questionnaires on which names would have been recorded have been misplaced” (May, 2005: 5).

May (2005) outlined the repercussions of this:

- “This will mean that the changes in the quality of life of beneficiaries since receiving land cannot be determined with any accuracy at this stage” (May, 2005: 5).

- “and links between access to land and improved quality of life can only be partly investigated” (May, 2005: 5).

- “The impact of earlier land reform policy, in particular SLAG, will be more difficult to establish, as will the impact of the change in policy from SLAG to LRAD” (May, 2004: 6).
The QoL survey restarted, from scratch, in 2005 with the collection of baseline data. The process of assessment remains the same but re-sampling will occur every 2 years instead of every 3 years in the period 2005 to 2009. According to May (2005), this will enable for the land reform programme to be assessed at a provincial level and allow for assessment of the different land reform programmes. The OHS was replaced by the General Household Survey in 2000. However, the inadequate quality of life information and time lag has persuaded the DLA to conduct their own control group survey (May, 2005).

3.3.2 Assessment of M&E in land reform

The section above describes the severity of the situation of evaluation in land reform. It is difficult to determine the extent to which the land reform programme has significantly improved the lives of its beneficiaries or how the different land reform programmes have contributed to this. The slow progress of land reform is indicative of the calamity of the M&E of land reform. The South African government has not managed to learn from international experience on land reform and as a result has encountered shortcomings in terms of ensuring that the outcomes of land reform can be consistently and effectively evaluated. This section uses the framework developed in 3.2.10 to assess the fundamental M&E shortcomings of land reform in South Africa.

A: Results based M&E

In section 3.2.1, it was submitted that QoL research is results based. This is not in dispute. However, in South Africa the failure of the QoL surveys to provide consistent and reliable data has compromised the ability of the QoL Report to determine the impacts of land reform. Thus present information from the QoL surveys is not a reliable reflection of the impacts of land reform. The QoL Report is predominantly implementation orientated due to the failure of the QoL surveys to provide information on the impact of land reform. Since the land reform programme was made operational in 1996 there has not been a comprehensive study on the impacts of land reform. However, there are positive prospects that the QoL Report will, once the QoL surveys are operational again, be able to reliably assess the impact of the land reform programme. This can determine, by consistent and reliable analysis over a long period of time, whether the benefits of land reform programme are improving the livelihoods of land reform beneficiaries. Unfortunately,
what the survey cannot do is pinpoint problematic areas so that these can be addressed. The broad national level focus of the QoL Report means it cannot assess the extent to which the different land reform sub-programmes are impacting on beneficiaries' lives. Evaluation specific to each programme needs to be established if M&E is to improve different programmes or provide useful information for decision making.

B: Sustainability of interventions

The DLA has assigned high priority to the implementation of LRAD. However, as described in previous sections there are not yet means for determining the project sustainability. Below the sustainability of land reform is compared against the checklist in the framework described in 3.2.10.

- Context specific indicators

The sustainability of any intervention is dependent on measurable objectives and indicators. Land reform objectives are very broad in scope making them difficult to measure. Furthermore, there are no established indicators by which to measure the achievement of these objectives. Therefore, the QoL survey, alone, carries the heavy burden of determining whether the land reform programme has achieved its intended objectives. Unfortunately, the inadequacy of the QoL Reports to consistently show the impact of land reform on the target populace has contributed to the poor performance of land reform in general. This has also prevented review of the QoL indicators, described in 3.3.1, as effective indicators for land reform projects.

- Participation

Participation in the implementation of the land reform programme has been mixed. It is suggested that the success or failure of an intervention is closely linked to beneficiary involvement in the implementation of the project (Bamberger and Valadez, 1994; Tandon, 1990; Bahai International Community, 1998). Certainly, LRAD requires committed participation from beneficiaries. This research will show some of the complexities of participation. However, the management of programmes is still top-down in approach and participation of beneficiaries in M&E or programmatic decision making does not occur.
M&E has not progressed to the stage where beneficiaries are able to evaluate their own progress.

- **Piloting of projects**

The land reform programme was subject to some piloting of projects initially (e.g. SLAG). However, when the political prerogatives of national government shifted, with the introduction of GEAR, the LRAD programme went from draft policy to roll out without the necessary piloting phases and the subsequent problems with implementing LRAD have severely affected the performance of the programme.

- **The political environment**

Although, as established earlier, land reform may not be as much a priority as employment and housing there is a need and demand for land reform in South Africa. Broader society supports land reforms. The slow progress of land delivery is contributing to hostility in rural areas, farm invasions and violence. Thus the South African Government is under mounting pressure to deliver land for residential and productive purposes to maintain national stability.

This analysis shows that the sustainability of the land reform programme, at this point in time, is questionable. The QoL surveys have been unable to provide quality information on land reform. This factor alone has compromised the sustainability of the land reform programme. Unless M&E of land reform becomes more comprehensive and accurate, land reform will remain relatively passive in the achievement of its objectives and the contribution to transforming South African society.

**C: Usage**

The usage of M&E information is dependent on the factors indicated in A and B above. Informed decision making is dependent on reliable quality information. In South Africa, the lack of reliable quality information on land reform has resulted in both under utilisation of M&E and poor decision making. This section explores some of the key issues for the utilisation of M&E.
• The political will of the South African government to implement a M&E system for land reform

The DLA does have a M&E system established. However, the extent to which it is established is questionable. M&E does not seem to be a high priority for the government. The multitude of problems associated with the M&E process and institutions involved makes it more of a hinderance that government has to deal with rather than a resource government can draw on. Therefore, government has not given M&E the attention it requires.

• The utilisation of M&E information

Chapter 1 described some of the problems with the implementation of the land reform programme. One of the reasons for the policy shift from SLAG to LRAD was due to the slow implementation of land reform at that time. However, the implementation of land reform is still slow and indicative, to a certain extent, of decisions made about the future of land reform that have not been based on impact or results based M&E systems. Instead policy makers and politicians have made decisions based on implementation orientated evaluations, global economic trends and political perogatives without consultation with the beneficiaries of land reform.

The Land Restitution process is an example of this. In June of 1998, a Ministerial Review of the Land Restitution process was commissioned. The findings of this review were:

• Slowness of delivery.

• A crisis of unplannability as a result of the absence of a reliable database. The basic information necessary for planning, institutional design and resourcing in the restitution process was wanting.

• A strong perception that there is an opposition between restitution and development.

• Low level of trust between implementers.

• High levels of frustration within the implementing organisations and among claimants.

(Roodt, 2003)
Roodt (2003: 20) highlights that:

“Attention should be focused, not on whether or not restitution should be rights based, but on exactly how rights are allocated by the Restitution Act, on the procedures whereby these rights are given force, and the discourses and practices that arise in implementation structures.”

The findings from the review of the Land Restitution process identified problems with implementation, as far back as 1998, that are still apparent in land reform processes. This points to institutional mechanisms for using monitoring and evaluation information as problematic. Additionally, as noted in 1998, it is not so much the approach to land reform that is at issue but rather the implementation of land reform in practice. However, the impact of this review on the land reform process indicates that this information was not utilised for improving programme performance.

Land reform was reviewed again in 2001 and May et al (2000b) indicated the importance of M&E for the land reform review process. May et al (2000b: 2) emphasised the importance of M&E for “all policy analysis in South Africa and provides both insight into management and implementation processes”.

Again in 2005, the land reform programme was under review due to poor performance and subsequent political pressure to act. However, evaluation information was unable to be useful. Firstly, because of the lack of reliable data and secondly, because the scope of evaluation of land reform is too general.

There is good reason for government and society to be concerned with the clear slow delivery of land to the landless. However, a call by many, including the Deputy President at the 2005 Land Summit, for economic approaches to land reform to be replaced by redistributive land reform or expropriation is based on a lack of appropriate information, including a total absence of information about the performance of current land reform products, like LRAD. What there is room for is a dualistic approach to land reform, that seems to have been informally adopted already, where market-led reforms as well as expropriation work in tandem to alleviate some of the bottlenecks to delivery. But evaluation of land reform in as much detail as possible, using context specific indicators, still needs to be prioritised.
The reliance on the failed QoL surveys to provide results based evaluation has meant that quality information on land reform has been unavailable. This has meant that policy decisions on the direction of land reform have been at best informed through assessment of implementation and at worst informed by agendas unrelated to land reform.

- Centralisation of M&E systems

The centralisation of M&E has resulted in a broad survey, the QoL survey, that cannot determine the extent to which land reform sub-programmes, like that of LRAD, have contributed to land reform. This has limited the quality and usage of the QoL Report as a resource for decision making.

- Organisational learning

A feeder for the utilisation of evaluation is that the willingness of organisations to learn. Reorientation of development efforts through action learning need to occur to facilitate institutional development. The past apartheid government encouraged the independence of black homelands. This resulted in a relative lack of experience of development issues both in theoretical debates and teaching practice. Neglect for development issues was the outcome. Opportunities for addressing the skills gap are imperative for the future of development in South Africa. Cross agency collaboration and the networking of institutional development and development in general is required to make the best use of the skills which exist. In Chapter 7, problems of collaboration between different government departments and service providers will be examined in more detail. Additionally, the process of conducting the research at Loteni revealed the initial fear of the DLA in exposing themselves to public scrutiny. The culture of fear within an organisation is not conducive to organisational learning.

There are obviously some big gaps in evaluation of land reform. One of crucial importance and highlighted by having to start the QoL survey over again is that of expertise. High staff turnover has contributed to this, as institutional memory is lost. The government has much to learn with respect to land reform. However, the organisational learning of the government has been severely limited by the lack of evaluation information
on land reform. This has contributed considerably to the poor performance of the programme.

- Initial conclusions (the evaluator’s representation of different issues)

A centralised M&E system severely limits the ability of the evaluator, the DLA, to represent the reality of land reform in South Africa. The QoL Report cannot adequately represent the issues and concerns of the different stakeholders, especially those of the beneficiaries. This would be a huge undertaking at a national level and is justification for the decentralisation of M&E to provincial and local levels. However, this is reliant on the competence of the DLA and the resources available to represent different realities of land reform by different stakeholders. The result of this will determine the utility of the M&E information.

Usage is a complex issue with many factors playing a role in determining whether M&E information is utilised appropriately.

3.3.3 Assessment of M&E for LRAD

It has been established that the QoL survey is too broad in scope to be able to determine the impact of LRAD. At present the current M&E system, the QoL survey, addresses the land reform programme as a whole. LRAD is a programme that consists of four different project categories and therefore requires M&E that can assess each of these independently (i.e. food safety net projects, equity schemes, production for markets and agriculture in communal areas).

It is important to build a picture of the institutional and policy arrangements around the M&E of LRAD and not just of land reform. The policy document of LRAD fails to indicate the means for programme monitoring and evaluation. The LRAD policy document describes audits as the means by which physical and financial expenditure will be accounted for. However, there is no mention of how M&E will be used to assess the performance of LRAD. Holism emphasises the importance of the parts (i.e. LRAD) that make up the whole (i.e. the land reform programme) (Checkland, 1993). Therefore, M&E at present is limited in what it can contribute to the improvement of LRAD and hence land
reform as a whole. If there is the political will to make LRAD successful then M&E will have to be conducted at this level.

Evaluating LRAD through Communal Property Associations (CPAs)

Most LRAD projects operate as a CPA. This section documents what the Legal Entity Assessment Programme (LEAP) found when investigating whether CPAs were achieving their intended objectives.

In support of the deficiencies of LRAD M&E the LEAP found that

- Many of the objectives did not have indicators or the indicators related to the CPA Act and were not relevant at the local level.
- There were unrealistic expectations of CPAs. CPAs were expected to perform many functions at an early stage meet the objectives of democracy and equity and exhibit viability and sustainability.
- There was a lack of understanding in what constituted an institution. It was not just about registering as a CPA but building the capacity to ensure practices progress through different management designs.
- CPAs were isolated. They were not linked to other institutions of land administration like local government unless they did this themselves. There was no support offered to CPAs. The DLA was supposedly responsible for monitoring and supporting CPAs but this was not done.
- The language used in the founding documents was in English and contained complicated legal terminology which made it difficult for non-english speaking members to understand and contained clauses that the community did not know about. Additionally, these documents were not available on site and did not explain the key issues of land rights management.

(Cousins and Hornby, 2002)

As a result of these problems, LEAP could not make a judgement on whether these institutions were working. This exemplifies the need for agreed, clear and appropriate criteria for evaluation of CPAs. These finding highlight the need for proper assessment of LRAD projects.
Conclusion

Land reform in South Africa carries the burden of being politically, economically, socially and culturally sensitive. The success of land reform is therefore critical to the stability of rural South Africa. This places great necessity and importance on the evaluation of land reform. However, as shown in this chapter, evaluation of land reform has not been as successful or useful as planned resulting in uninformed decision making and ineffective policies. Progress with land reform and its different products is dependent on a comprehensive M&E system that can inform policy makers as well as project managers about the direction of future decisions. The participatory and results based approach that M&E should consider is indicative of the direction M&E and evaluation in general is moving, towards the people.

The analysis of M&E of land reform in South Africa has been critical of its poor performance and contribution to policy and decision making. However, the potential for M&E is growing and, now more than ever, vital to agriculturally productive land reform.

3.4.1 Setting up the future evaluation of LRAD

This conclusion proposes a way forward for the M&E of LRAD. This section will augment Chapter 7 where specific reference to objective and indicator setting will be important for showing the complexity of evaluation.

It has been shown in this chapter that the need for evaluation of land reform and LRAD is crucial to directing implementation towards achieving the objectives of the respective programmes. This chapter has examined evaluation broadly and looked at the short comings of the current evaluation of land reform in South Africa. In this context the research undertaken is important to contributing to knowledge of the benefits of an LRAD project and land reform in general.

3.4.2 This research focuses on evaluation at two levels

The previous section emphasised that there is a need for a shift from M&E systems that are primarily activity based or implementation focused to results based or impact focused. It is
also crucial for the success of LRAD for M&E on at least two levels. The first is at the
government level and the second is at the beneficiary level.

**LRAD at the government level**

Results based M&E means that government will have to measure achievements of the land
reform programme from impacts of the programme rather than what inputs they supply and
outputs they achieve as this may not impact substantially on the beneficiaries or contribute
to achieving LRAD goals. However, M&E can only be conducted if there are clear
goalposts and means to measure if goals have been achieved. The LRAD policy document
has established the objectives but lacks the indicators for M&E.

Due to the significance of LRAD politically and as an economic tool it is imperative that
LRAD is successful for the purposes of political stability and economic growth. The need
for M&E is vital to the implementation of LRAD in achieving its outcomes as no pilot
projects where run prior to commencement of the programme. This means that M&E will
have to provide recommendations for future LRAD projects learning from the mistakes of
present LRAD projects.

The need for independent assessment of LRAD is exemplified in the national QoL report.
This report cannot account for progress within LRAD projects as it focuses too broadly on
land reform in general. What is required is system that can pinpoint that a certain result
was due to the LRAD programme so that replication or improvement can occur.

For the purposes of this research, indicators have been proposed for the LRAD objectives
(see Chapter 8). The indicators are suggested as a starting point to the M&E of LRAD.
Indicators are, by nature, flexible and subject to change or adapt over time.

**LRAD at the beneficiary level**

This chapter has put forward that participatory evaluation is necessary for the success of
interventions. Beneficiaries need to be able to manage their resources and as such will
require a direction forward. Beneficiaries should establish their own objectives and
indicators to use as a M&E framework by which they can evaluate their progress.
This type of evaluation promotes beneficiary ownership of the project. The success of LRAD projects is primarily in the hands of the beneficiaries themselves and evaluation is a tool that can be used to assist in the process. The knowledge created by citizens and professionals together can make interventions sustainable in the long term.

The research at Loteni looks into the establishment of a locally managed participatory M&E system. This is presented and discussed in Chapter 7.

3.4.3 LRAD and evaluation

The problems of centralised M&E systems have been highlighted in section 3.1.2. Bamberger and Valadez (1994) suggest that M&E units should be created within each project. However, this requires great institutional capacity and resource allocation by government. Therefore, capacitating beneficiaries to establish an M&E system may be an alternative to reliance on current centralised M&E practices. The project level M&E can then contribute to the centralised M&E system.

The focus of this research is on how to make LRAD more effective. A number of activities are proposed as a start:

1. Develop measurable indicators for the LRAD objectives so that M&E of the programme can commence and yield useful results for the improvement of programme delivery/implementation.
2. Develop objectives and indicators, with LRAD beneficiaries, through a process of empowerment and participatory workshops so that they can M&E their progress towards their own vision for their land.
3. Through the process of 1 & 2 identify strengths and weaknesses of LRAD and provide some recommendations for government to improve implementation.
4. Continue to contribute baseline data to the M&E database of the LRAD programme so that comparisons over time of the beneficiaries can occur to determine whether the programme is having a positive effect.

The findings from conducting the above activities are reported and discussed in Chapter 7.
The poor performance of the Settlement and Land Acquisition Grant (SLAG) programme, described in Chapter 1, was instrumental in the Government of South Africa establishing a new land redistribution programme. Essentially, land redistribution during 1995-1999 under SLAG was too slow, the land that was redistributed was agriculturally poor, and the necessary structures were not in place to support beneficiary communities in creating viable enterprises.

GEAR macroeconomic policy, largely a policy politically and economically motivated to follow global trends, created the context in which the LRAD programme emerged. The focus on emergent commercial farmers from historically disadvantaged communities is indicative of GEAR's influence in making land productive rather than its distribution equitable (Mapadimeng, 2003).

The LRAD programme is designed to do more than just redistribute land. It is a process incorporating capacity building, improved services and infrastructure to establish viable farming ventures. This chapter highlights some of the problems with LRAD policy.

4.1 The policy

The LRAD policy was initiated in August 2001 (Schmitz, 2001). According to the Ministry for Agriculture and Land Affairs (2000: 2) the objectives of LRAD, which are to be achieved in the 15 years from 2000, are to:

- "Increase access to agricultural land by black people (Africans, Coloureds and Indians) and to contribute to the redistribution of approximately 30% of the country's commercial agricultural land (i.e. formerly 'white commercial farmland') over the duration of the programme.
- Contribute to relieving the congestion in over crowded former homeland areas
- Improve nutrition and incomes of the rural poor who want to farm on any scale
- Overcome the legacy of past racial and gender discrimination in ownership of farmland
• Facilitate structural change over the long term by assisting black people who want to establish small and medium sized farms
• Stimulate growth from agriculture
• Create stronger linkages between farm and off-farm income generating activities
• Expand opportunities for promising young people who stay in rural areas
• Empower beneficiaries to improve their economic and social well-being
• Enable those presently accessing agricultural land in communal areas to make better productive use of their land
• Promote environmental sustainability of land and other natural resources.

Despite attempts to define objectives it is apparent that the objectives of LRAD are vague and have no means for assessment (i.e. no indicators). The policy does not indicate how much LRAD is expected to contribute to the target of redistributing 30% of the country's commercial agricultural land. Wegerif (2004) points out another issue for clarity: that is, there is confusion over whether LRAD is to redistribute 30% of all agricultural land or just 30% of formerly white commercial farmland (Wegerif, 2004).

Under the auspices of the LRAD programme there are four different categories of LRAD projects. These are summarised below:

• **Food safety net** projects enable LRAD beneficiaries to acquire land for crop and livestock production to improve household food security.

• **Equity schemes** allow LRAD beneficiaries to access a grant that will enable them to buy into existing agricultural enterprise. The grant recipient will be a co-owner and an employee of the farm.

• **Production for markets** is a commercial agriculture activity. These LRAD beneficiaries will use their financial and technical resources to produce for markets, over and above what they require for subsistence needs.

• **Agriculture in communal areas** projects assist communities, and individuals part of communities, in making productive investments in their communal land to enhance production and food security.

(Ministry for Agriculture and Land Affairs, 2000)
Clearly, LRAD is intended to supply land for a range of categories of projects including subsistence through food safety net projects. However, according to Wegerif (2004), who conducted extensive case study research into LRAD projects in Limpopo Province in 2004, ascertained that land acquired through LRAD is ultimately not for subsistence but for commercial agricultural enterprises and this is the trend in South Africa at large.

When the LRAD policy document came out in 2001 there were concerns about the programme needing to transfer assets relevant to agricultural production and this would mean working with other stakeholders (Schmitz, 2001). However, only the DoA is referred to in the policy document. In fact, between August 2001 and December 2002, the Land Bank was involved in co-financing LRAD projects with the DLA. This proved successful as LRAD projects routed through the Land Bank generally moved quickly to completion. However, the Land Bank was a victim of its own success as the budget allocation from the DLA was spent quickly and resulted in a strained relationship between the DLA and the Land Bank and the subsequent termination of agency agreement between the two institutions (HSRC, 2003). In can be argued that the poor coordination and collaboration between institutions is a direct indication of unclear policy.

The LRAD policy document also indicates that LRAD is important for redressing gender imbalances in land access and ownership, citing that “not less than one third of the transferred land resources should be accrued to women” (Ministry for Agriculture and Land Affairs, 2000: 3). However, the policy then states that: “Group production projects will be discouraged” (Ministry for Agriculture and Land Affairs, 2000: 3). This is difficult to avoid, particularly where beneficiaries have grouped together to acquire the land. Additionally, as pointed out by Wegerif (2004), women tend to be included in group projects and not individual LRAD projects. Therefore, LRAD is contradicting itself by discouraging group production projects in which women are more likely to participate. However, the concern government has about group projects is not unfounded. In an earlier assessment of land reform projects, Deininger and May (2000) found that smaller projects (less than 10 households) were more successful than larger projects. This was confirmed by the HSRC report which indicated that group farming projects tend to fair poorly in comparison with family farm type projects, and although cooperative farming under SLAG tended to fail this model still appears popular with beneficiaries (HSRC, 2003). It was also found that the management structures of unsuccessful projects consisted mainly of trusts or
common property associations (Deininger and May, 2000). This has implications for the tenure security of LRAD projects since LRAD favours groups formed as common property associations.

The LRAD policy document clarifies that it is the responsibility of the DoA to provide agricultural support services to LRAD projects (Ministry for Agriculture and Land Affairs, 2000). However, the support from the DoA has been deteriorating since inception of the land redistribution programme (Aliber, 2003) which is problematic because the DoA’s failure to provide extension compounds problems of LRAD projects.

4.2 LRAD grants

The LRAD programme is a grant based mechanism that enables beneficiaries to provide capital for purchasing land. To receive a R20000 grant a beneficiary must contribute R5000 up to a maximum contribution of R100000 for a R400000 grant. The minimum contribution of R5000 can be contributed in the form of sweat equity (i.e. their own labour) but any contribution greater than R5000 must be provided in cash or loans (Ministry for Agriculture and Land Affairs, 2000).

Group applications have to register as a legal entity, usually a common property association, to own the land. This enables the beneficiaries to combine their grants in order to finance the land and enterprise acquisition. Any further finance would have to be arranged through loans or other government programmes (Wegerif, 2004).

Generally, the larger the grant the more commercially orientated the project. Projects where beneficiaries access the minimum grant of R20000 are deemed Food Safety Net Projects (HSRC, 2003). However, according to Cousins (2000) this should not prohibit LRAD beneficiaries from scaling up their farming operations. In fact, the LRAD policy document indicates that the approval of an LRAD grant is based on the profitability of the project (Ministry for Agriculture and Land Affairs, 2000). This indicates that projects are expected to advance towards financial viability and food safety net projects will not be approved unless they intend to become profitable.
There have been indications that LRAD applicants are not always able to identify land on the market that suits their needs. The Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act, Act 70 of 1970, allows for the subdivision of agricultural land so that potential LRAD beneficiaries can afford to purchase the smaller parcels of land with their LRAD grant (HSRC, 2003). However, the time and resources taken to process applications for subdivision is restricting the implementation of LRAD (Lyne and Darroch, 2002).

4.3 LRAD application

The LRAD Policy document determines that the national departments of Agriculture and Land Affairs are jointly responsible for the design of LRAD, policy issues and the design of training programmes. The national DLA is responsible for budgeting for provision of LRAD grants whilst the provincial DoA is expected to budget for post settlement support for LRAD projects. The Provincial Grant Committee (PGC) is the body set up to approve LRAD projects and is made up of various stakeholders including the departments of Agriculture and Land Affairs (Ministry for Agriculture and Land Affairs, 2000). The HSRC indicates that the LRAD project cycle is simpler than the SLAG programme as it does not require ministerial approval. Instead, the PGC approves the project for authorisation by the Provincial Director of the DLA (HSRC, 2003).

The DLA oversees LRAD processes up until the transfer of land to the beneficiaries (Wegerif, 2004). This involves assisting potential beneficiaries with LRAD applications. An LRAD application is complicated and often design agents are appointed to assist beneficiaries. Beneficiaries are expected to:

- provide detail on the size of the grant they would prefer;
- identify the land they wish to purchase;
- provide a business plan on their intention for land use;
- obtain an endorsement from the local DoA office regarding the feasibility of the plan; and
- confirmation from a professional valuer that the land price is reasonable.

(Ministry for Agriculture and Land Affairs, 2000)
They also need:

- A provisional agreement of sale;
- Proof from the Restitution commission or DLA that the property is free of claims.
  - Confirmation of the sellers legal possession of the land.

(HSRC, 2003)

This information is submitted to the PGC for approval or rejection. A number of reasons could result in rejection. These include:

- Poor land quality;
- Disapproval of the land use intended;
- A high asking price for the land or;
- The applicants have already obtained land grants (Wegerif, 2004).

In practice, there is much variability in the sequence and content of the steps (HSRC, 2003). The variability between the LRAD policy and LRAD application is problematic because this enables for manipulation and abuse of the LRAD programme which has resulted in the poor performance of LRAD projects.

4.4 Scale of benefit of LRAD

There was enormous positivity about LRAD when it emerged in 2001. It was well positioned to impact on the access of rural communities to an essential productive resource, land (Schmitz, 2001). Unfortunately, LRAD has some fundamental weaknesses that contradict land redistribution objectives.

Aliber (2003) indicates that LRAD maintains the willing buyer / willing seller principle which is objectionable to the landless precisely because the landless have to buy back their own land. The LRAD programme has also been shown to perpetuate the concentration of land in the hands of those with financial and political power (Greenberg, 2004; Wegerif, 2004; Hall, 2004a; Walker, 2002). Chapter 2 has already gone into detail about the class formation that LRAD creates through the favouring of better resourced individuals. Poorly resourced individuals and groups will continue to be excluded by LRAD for a number of reasons, including language and knowledge barriers, the lack of access to finance and the
approval of projects only if they are perceived to be financially viable (HSRC, 2003; Wegerif, 2004; Aliber, 2003).

LRAD can benefit only a limited number of people can accommodate only about 1700 to 2000 households per year, which is insufficient given LRAD’s target. If LRAD managed to reach its target of redistributing 30% of agricultural land this would only benefit a maximum of 300,000 households. In 2003, rural landlessness was estimated at about 675,000 households and rural unemployment affected at least 3.2 million black people. Therefore it is questionable whether this would satisfy the land demand of the majority of South Africans (Aliber, 2003; HSRC, 2003; Thwala, 2003).

Cousins (2000) takes the limited benefit of LRAD further to note that the redistribution of state land to emerging farmers exclusively is robbing the poor of a key resource. His estimate of the number of potential emerging farmers ranges between 20000-30000. This is far lower than that indicated above and represents about 2% of those in need of land. However, an important point that Cousins makes is that funding allocation for LRAD should be proportional to the number of those to benefit. Therefore, based on his estimate, allocation of funds larger than 10% of the land redistribution budget would not be justified if the primary goal is to address poverty and inequality (Cousins, 2000).

Post-transfer production and benefits are also questionable. The settlement of large populations (twenty or more families) on land makes the viable production of land difficult. Paterson (2006), an independent agricultural consultant, emphasised that already established commercial farmers with 2000 cattle and extensive lands were not making much profit. Where about R400000 of cattle are stolen annually farmers can expect returns of only 2-3% (Paterson, 2006).

Clearly, LRAD objectives are not being achieved (Hall et al., 2003). To reach the target of 2014 the delivery rate will have to rocket to 2.2 million hectares per year (Hall et al, 2003). However, by 2005, the land reform programme had only delivered 3.1 million hectares of land in total. Additionally, LRAD was 40% below its projected target number of hectares to transfer even though 101% of the LRAD budget was spent. (Department of Land Affairs, 2005) This points to a lack of finance available for LRAD transactions.
Table 1 below shows the performance of LRAD during the period 1 April 2004 – 31 March 2005. The limited number of beneficiaries reduces the possibility of LRAD achieving its objectives and contributing to broader land reform objectives of rectifying the injustices of the past regarding skewed land ownership patterns (Aliber, 2003).

Table 1: LRAD performance for period 1 April 2004 – 31 March 2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Output performance measures/service delivery indicators</th>
<th>Actual performance against target quantity/quality/timeliness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Target</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of farms transferred</td>
<td>372</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of beneficiaries</td>
<td>8418</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of hectares (ha)</td>
<td>120128 ha</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Department of Land Affairs, 2005: 64)

Additionally, there have been cases where LRAD projects have had to be taken over by private agricultural companies. For example, the Mamahlola Project and the Sapekoe Tea Plantation outside Tzaneen has been taken away by the Minister for Agriculture and Land Affairs in Limpopo Province from the CPA (consisting of LRAD beneficiaries) due to mismanagement. A private agricultural company is now running this R43 million farm (SABC, 2006). The DoA has responded to the shortcomings of the LRAD programme with an agricultural extension support programme, this is the subject of the following section.

4.5 Comprehensive Agriculture Support Programme: The DoA’s response to agricultural development

"The Department of Agriculture should redirect its budget and redeploy staff to create a special programme to assist land reform beneficiaries."17

The LRAD programme was established to redistribute land specifically for agricultural purposes. However, the LRAD policy document only provided details on the land

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17 South African Government: Ministry for Agriculture and Land Affairs, 2000: 10
redistribution of land without providing any detail on post-transfer agricultural development other than designating responsibility for extension support to the DoA (Ministry for Agriculture and Land Affairs, 2000).

Wegerif (2004) indicates that the Provincial Department of Agriculture (PDA) provision of post-transfer assistance includes business planning, on-farm development and technical assistance. However, by 2003, most LRAD projects in Limpopo Province had not received this support (Wegerif 2004).

The gross absence of a strategy for agricultural development within the framework of the 2000 LRAD policy document and the poor delivery of extension support since 1994 has resulted in LRAD having a limited impact on agricultural development (Hall et al, 2003). The DoA confirms that the LRAD programme failed to provide adequate financial support for the agricultural development aspect of LRAD. In fact, the delivery of land through the land reform programme far exceeds the availability of agricultural services to land reform beneficiaries (Department of Agriculture, 2004).

In August 2004, in response to the lack of clear policy on post-transfer support for LRAD and the growing demand for the agricultural support in a deregulated agricultural environment, the DoA introduced the Comprehensive Agriculture Support Programme (CASP) to assist with addressing agricultural development (Hall, 2004a).

R750 million, to be dispensed over a three year period, has been earmarked for CASP (Hall, 2004a). The aim of CASP is to enhance the provision of support services to promote and facilitate agricultural development targeting the beneficiaries of land and agrarian reform.

The Department of Agriculture (2004) has identified six areas of support that CASP addresses in terms of providing agricultural extension support:

1. Information and knowledge management
2. Technical and advisory assistance, and regulatory services
3. Training and capacity building
4. Marketing and business development
5. On-farm and off-farm infrastructure and production inputs
6. Financial assistance

However, it is unclear how these aspects of support will impact on LRAD projects as CASP is not specific to LRAD and feeds at least four different programmes (of which LRAD in only one). CASP identifies four categories of client: the hungry and vulnerable, subsistence and household food producers, farmers (including LRAD farmers) and commercial agriculture (Department of Agriculture, 2004) which are not necessarily aligned with the LRAD programme’s categories of project.

4.6 Agricultural support services

LRAD is a unique component of the land reform programme in that it focuses on creating viable farming operations. However, this is huge challenge, as found by Mamphololo and Botha (2004) because LRAD beneficiaries lack information for making decisions. Ranchod (2004: 74) explains that “human capital is one of the most consistent and economically important predictors of farm efficiency.” The legacy of apartheid has left a severe shortage of agricultural skills in black communities and especially former homeland areas (Ranchod, 2004). Therefore, the supply of agricultural support services to emerging farmers is critical to successful LRAD projects. The DoA has set up a dedicated support service called the Agricultural Development Support Services (ADSS) that deals with accessing funds for LRAD projects so that inputs and other extension support can be obtained by emerging farmers (Lonsdale, 2005, pers comm.*).

A workshop held in Pietermaritzburg (November 2005) revealed a number of problems with extension relevant to this thesis. Firstly, there is a severe shortage of competent extension personnel. Secondly, there is little contact between extension personnel and target communities. Thirdly, there is insufficient information on veld and natural resource management and especially on communal rangelands (Morris, 2005). Finally, the training of emerging farmers has not been very successful. The lack of transport to training workshops and the commencement of training only late after projects have been initiated has contributed to this (van der Westhuizen, 2005). And although mentorship has been recommended as a means of exchanging knowledge and showing farmers directly on farm

* Lonsdale, J. Project Manager, ADSS, Cedara.
processes this has only been implemented on a small scale with varying degrees of success (Terblanche, 2003).

Conclusion

This chapter has shown that there is room for improvement of the LRAD programme. LRAD policy formulation has been conceptualised poorly. The process for graduating LRAD projects remains unclear. CASP categories of client are not aligned with the categories of project stipulated in LRAD policy. Theoretically, LRAD farmers could fall into all four of the CASP categories of client and has implications for the type of extension support provided to LRAD farmers. The non-alignment of land redistribution and agricultural policies and programmes may be indicative of the coordination and cooperation problems between the DoA and the DLA.

The role of extension support remains vital to LRAD. However, evidence from Limpopo Province suggests that extension support available is inadequate. Additionally, the favouring of large groups of LRAD beneficiaries may not be conducive to successful agricultural projects.

LRAD remains exclusionary, only enabling those with the relevant resources to participate. The LRAD programme does not address the land need of the majority of previously disadvantaged communities. Instead it intends to establish emerging black farmers that will contribute to the economic growth of the agricultural sector. However, the achievements of LRAD so far have not been impressive and it remains doubtful that the objectives of land reform will be attained through LRAD. Also, security of tenure for LRAD beneficiaries is not guaranteed, as it seems that government has the authority to confiscate LRAD projects that are not performing. It can only be hoped that with the post-transfer assistance of CASP, LRAD projects will be able to become more sustainable.
Chapter 5: Methodology

5.1 Introduction

The previous chapters have shown the complexity of land reform and that the monitoring and evaluation of land reform remains difficult. M&E of land reform in South Africa remains predominantly implementation focused. This research aims to explore the dimensions of an LRAD project in order to provide recommendations for enhancing the LRAD programme. Therefore, an approach suited to exploration is required. The approach is discussed below and locates the research in the constructivist paradigm although drawing on both quantitative and qualitative research methods.

This chapter has three objectives. Firstly, a review of different research approaches. Secondly, a research design informed by the research approach. Thirdly, explanation of the methods utilised by the research.

5.2 Research approach

Adams (2003) clarifies that methodology means more than the application of the methods. Methodology indicates the philosophical approach behind the methods. Adams (2003) goes on to say that there is nothing absolute about science as scientific perspectives are all human constructions. Importantly, Adams (2003) indicates that it is the role of the researcher to interpret the reality through methods that can provide insight into this reality.

Determining how to approach social research is often difficult because of the complexity of issues involved. A review of the philosophical approaches or paradigms that will inform the research approach is undertaken below.

5.2.1 Positivist paradigm

Positivism verifies claims through empirical and observational means only. The positivist paradigm has difficulty explaining uncontrolled, complex contexts (Guba and Lincoln, 1989). Essentially, the positivist paradigm is used for measuring, describing and judging and therefore is limited when applied to the social sciences (Bharadwaj, 1996).
Social research avoids using of the positivist paradigm for a number of reasons. Firstly, linear science does not cater for alternative ways to think about a particular situation (Guba and Lincoln, 1989). The fact that differences in opinion between stakeholders cannot be accounted for shows that the positivist paradigm is incompetent when dealing with qualitative data. Also, science makes factual claims based on statistical methods; this is often inappropriate as speculation is an important component of building research (Bharadwaj, 1996). Secondly, the over-dependence on science and its formal quantitative measurements for hard data in an unpredictable environment results in biased or left out material (Checkland, 1993). Guba and Lincoln (1989) state that nature cannot be predicted whereas science maintains certainty. Experimentation using scientific method makes science’s claims certain under the conditions set. However, the argument is whether this certainty is valid in an unpredictable, dynamic and complex world (Checkland, 1993).

Thirdly, the positivist paradigm traditionally keeps the researcher or observer outside of the situation. Social sciences are intrinsically different from the natural sciences where the observer is concerned. Observations may be attributed different meanings depending on the individual doing the observation. This subjectivity forms the core of social research recognising that an error in the eyes of one individual may be seen as success by another (Checkland, 1993). As a result, positivist approaches to research, although popular in the past, have become increasingly redundant where complexity is integral to the research as in the case of the Loteni site (Guba and Lincoln, 1989; Stake, 1995).

5.2.2 Constructivist paradigm

Constructivism is a holistic approach that has developed an interactive process that includes the researcher and stakeholders in constructing the realities of the case. Historically, research has ignored other actors in the situation and their values and constructions. The constructivist paradigm enables stakeholders affected by the research to table their claims, concerns and issues (Stake, 1995).

Constructivism, also known as social constructionism or phenomenology, recognises that knowledge, rather than being discovered, is constructed (Guba and Lincoln, 1989). This explains how people experience and describe the world in which they live. Thoughts,
descriptions and interpretations of the world are socially constructed (Slife and Williams, 1995).

Constructivist research is determined by involving stakeholders in negotiations. Constructions of reality are developed by the stakeholders. These constructions, i.e. qualitative data, are used for the research rather than quantitative data. Constructivist, methodology rejects the idea of an objective reality but rather emphasizes that realities are social constructions (Guba and Lincoln, 1989).

Having discussed the philosophical perspectives of research it is now necessary to outline wherein the current research is located.

Positivism and constructivism represent two opposite ends of a continuum, as shown in Table 2. A preference for the positivist paradigm is unlikely in this research as perceptions of individuals and other social phenomena do not fit within the positivist tradition (Adams, 2003). Preference for the constructivist end of the continuum provides opportunity to represent reality from the stakeholders perspective. Constructivism is also open to the utilisation of a range of methods, even those informed by the positivist paradigm. The point here is to provide a representative reality and constructivism itself is a construction of the mind presented to enable exploration of a social constructed reality.
Table 2: Continuum extremes of competing philosophical perspectives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics of positivism</th>
<th>Characteristics of social constructivism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ontological position: the nature of reality</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• External and independent of the observer</td>
<td>• Reality is socially constructed and apprehendable in multiple forms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Objective and ordered</td>
<td>• Interpretive: socially and experientially based</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Single reality</td>
<td>• Changing realities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Belief in laws, uniformity and generalisability of knowledge</td>
<td>• A product of human minds and has no independent status of its own, reality is determined by meanings individuals give to experience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Reductionist and deterministic</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Epistemological position: acquiring knowledge of reality</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Value free acquisition of sense data accessible by the scientific process which is the only reliable foundation for knowledge</td>
<td>• There is no neutral ground for knowledge since all observation is value laden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Neutrality</td>
<td>• Observer becomes part of what is observed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Dualism: researcher remains objective and exterior to the subject</td>
<td>• Getting close to the subject</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Reduction of the natural world</td>
<td>• Adopting a holistic view of social phenomena</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Nomothetic (law giving) generalisations</td>
<td>• View social phenomena in their natural environments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Direct experience</td>
<td>• Idiographic (relating to individuals) generalisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Sense data</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Empirical verification</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Aim of the research</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Suited to the study of “It” beings to generate causal and fundamental laws to human behaviour</td>
<td>• Suited to the study of human beings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Explanation, prediction, control</td>
<td>• Those metaphysical things that positivism discounts or cannot access through empirical facts, such as values</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Attitude of the researcher</strong></td>
<td>• Understanding, exploration, emancipation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Detached, independent, impartial</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Methods</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Natural sciences methods</td>
<td>• Multiple methods to establish different views of the same phenomena</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Measuring operationalised concepts</td>
<td>• Small samples investigated in depth over time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Use of large samples</td>
<td>• Social constructions can be elicited and refined through interaction between the researcher and the respondent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Manipulation and control of isolated variables for the measurement of their relationships with others</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Uniformity and generalisability of knowledge</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.3 Research design

Quantitative research is utilised in the pure sciences where explanation for certain phenomena and control of these phenomena are sought (Stake, 1995). Quantitative research is strongly linked to the positivist paradigm.

Qualitative research is associated with a constructivist paradigm (Golafshani, 2003). It is an alternative to the traditional form of quantitative scientific method and focuses on personal interpretation. Qualitative studies draw out patterns and relationships even if they are not expected. Here the data is gained experientially rather than by a procedure or an operation. The methodical observation and careful instrumentation in controlled environments of quantitative research is replaced by qualitative researchers making direct subjective interpretations of data (Stake, 1995). Qualitative research is derived from paradigms that try to capture reality and produce descriptive data that describe interactions in the social world (Stake, 1995; Kitchin & Tate, 2000).

Qualitative research, used in social research, looks for understanding complex relationships in context specific settings (Golafshani, 2003). As far back as 1971, von Wright (in Stake 1995) argued that there is a difference between explanation and understanding, even if understanding is sometimes expressed by explanation (Stake, 1995). The difference is that explanation (quantitative research) is seeking to identify cause-and-effect relationships, whilst understanding (qualitative research) is assessing human experience (Slife and Williams, 1995).

Given the desired information (explanation) and process (understanding and empowerment) outcomes of the research, both quantitative and qualitative research methods offer opportunities for exploration. This research utilises predominantly qualitative but also quantitative methods to provide explanation and understanding of the situation under study.

This study is a critical examination of the implementation of LRAD at Loteni up to the end of 2005. The overarching question addressed by this study is: How can the LRAD programme be enhanced?
In order to assist with examining the primary research question, the study was designed to explore the following sub-questions:

- Is LRAD achieving its objectives?
- How does LRAD contribute to land reform objectives?
- Can market based land reform achieve the objectives of land reform in South Africa?
- How is the achievement of land reform objectives measured?

The complex and dynamic nature of the situation being research required a variety of methods to reveal the level, quantity and quality of detail needed to ensure an accurate and realistic analysis of LRAD at Loteni. This research represents a construction of the realities posed by the different stakeholders from which the researcher makes interpretations.\(^\text{18}\)

5.3.1 Choice of research site

In 2003, when this research was initiated on the LRAD programme there were only a few projects in KwaZulu-Natal sufficiently advanced in the process to warrant investigation. At that time, the DLA identified Loteni and Equeefa Projects as having been transferred to the beneficiaries. Most of the other LRAD projects in KwaZulu-Natal were still waiting for approval. Permission was applied for in order to conduct research into these projects as required by the DLA. After a six month application process, the DLA granted permission for research to be conducted into the LRAD project at Loteni. However, permission to conduct research at Equeefa was refused. This was primarily because it was a Tongaat Hulett operation and the management reasoned that they did not have the capacity to assist with academic research.

The LRAD project at Loteni, known as the Sibonginhlanhla Project, consists of 15 beneficiaries already living in the area. Field research commenced in June 2004 as a result of the application process for permission. A more detailed description of the research site is provided in Chapter 6.

\(^{18}\) The term 'stakeholder' is specifically defined in this thesis as those parties with a stake in the Sibonginhlanhla Project (e.g. DLA). Whereas the term 'role player' is more inclusively used to reflect parties that were or are involved in the Sibonginhlanhla Project, including stakeholder parties.
Drawing generalisations from a single case study is difficult. However, literature shows that where the research approach supports exploratory and indicative studies, insights for academics and practitioners prove useful (Adams, 2003). Therefore, it is also important that multi-dimensional approaches to context specific research consider issues of validity and reliability (Golafshani, 2003).

The term reliability is a concept used in quantitative research. Reliability in quantitative research is concerned with consistency of results obtained in broad-based research which is only valid for the positivist paradigm (Adams, 2003). Interpretive approaches utilise alternative terminology. Instead, trustworthiness of the research is vital to reliability of qualitative research (Golafshani, 2003). Validation in qualitative research is determined by confidence in the findings accepting that rigor, in the context of qualitative research, is exploring subjectivity and social interactions (Adams, 2003; Golafshani, 2003).

5.4 Methods of information collection

Information gathering was performed using the following methods.

5.4.1 Secondary data

Documents from the DLA and DoA were obtained regarding the LRAD programme and the Loteni Sibonginhlànhla Project. This information was vital in providing some background to the case and data for comparison purposes.

5.4.2 Semi-structured interviews (SSI) with key informants

SSIs were held with key informants involved with the Sibonginhlànhla Project. This process assisted in confirming information obtained from the secondary data as well as providing new information, perceptions, concerns and issues about the LRAD programme and, specifically, the Sibonginhlànhla Project.

A SSI with each Sibonginhlànhla Project farmer was undertaken to obtain their perceived issues and concerns about the Project. The structure and content of the questions posed to all 15 of the Sibonginhlànhla Project beneficiaries was loosely informed by the sustainable
livelihoods framework (SLF). Basic demographic and household information about the Sibonginha1hlhla Project beneficiaries was also captured through these SSIs.

SSIs were held with three key informants engaged with the Sibonginha1hlhla Project including the DLA, the DoA, and Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife. These informants were selected primarily on the basis of their involvement with and knowledge of the Sibonginha1hlhla Project. Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife was also chosen as a key informant on the strength of the regional manager for Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife being closely involved with commercial farmers in the area. The set of questions for these SSIs was based on the information obtained from the secondary data.

Therefore, three distinct sets of information emanated from the SSI process. The first set of information provided insight into the issues and concerns of the Sibonginha1hlhla Project farmers. The second group of information was about the institutional arrangements and processes of implementing LRAD at Loteni obtained from the DLA and DoA. A third set of information was obtained from Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife providing the perspective of established, predominantly white, commercial farmers on farming in the Loteni area and their concerns about black emerging farmers.

5.4.3 Focus groups

The first two sets of information were the subject of focus group discussions. This process enabled for consensus between farmers, on certain issues and concerns, to be reached and a rich picture (see Section 6.2) to be drawn of the agreed upon concerns and issues affecting the Sibonginha1hlhla Project. Three methods of interactive data collection were used: rich picturing, visioning and a planning matrix.

The data collected from the SSIs with the farmers was represented in the form of a rich picture. The aim of this rich picturing exercise was to provide a visual representation of the concerns and issues affecting the Project from the collective perspective of the farmers. This construction of the farmers’ reality is in keeping with the constructivist paradigm. A discussion of the rich picture enabled the farmers to improve their understanding and awareness of the Sibonginha1hlhla Project and provided a basis from which they could pose interventions for future development of the Project. This process was aimed at being
emancipatory in nature. Human improvement was considered important in the research process.

Rich picturing is a tool taken from Soft Systems Methodology (SSM). SSM, informed by the constructivist paradigm, is an approach that recognises that problems do not exist separate from the people involved in them and appreciates the multiple viewpoints of those participants (Checkland, 1993). This tool was used to collect a range of qualitative information about the complex situation of the Project. Rich picturing was chosen, not only because it combines insights into and different perspectives of a complex situation, but also because it has the ability to engage illiterate and semi-literate people as full participants in the process of depicting the situation. It is important to note that rich picture only depicted the Sibongínhlanhla Project farmers' perspective. This was done intentionally to ascertain the farmers' awareness of factors that affected them. However, other stakeholders' perceptions have been included separately in order to ensure that a representative reality of the LRAD project at Loteni is understood.

A visioning exercise was used to determine what the Sibongínhlanhla Project farmers wanted to achieve. A vision was described as the most ideal situation for the Sibongínhlanhla Project to be in. Due to the literacy barrier, the farmers depicted, on a flipchart, their vision for the Sibongínhlanhla Project.

A planning tool was introduced to the Sibongínhlanhla Project farmers as a proposed intervention. This tool was provided so that the farmers could start to plan a direction towards obtaining their vision. The planning tool took the form of a conventional matrix shown in Figure 1.

**Figure 1: Planning matrix**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Picture reference</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Person responsible</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Start/End</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The rich picture and vision were used as two ends of a spectrum (shown in Figure 2, p84). The planning matrix was intended to provide the means for achieving the vision.
Figure 2: Research process with Sibonginhlanhla Project farmers

Rich picture:
Current situation
(e.g. broken fences, no crop production)

Planning matrix

Vision:
Future (where Sibonginhlanhla Project farmers want to go)

The purpose of the planning matrix was to develop objectives and appropriate action for the achievement of the vision identified by the farmers for the Sibonginhlanhla Project.

Table 3 below shows the phases of research conducted at Loteni. In the first phase of research, the investigation phase, semi-structured interviews were conducted at the Sibonginhlanhla Project site. This process enabled for information about and issues affecting the Project to be exposed. Second phase research provided the Sibonginhlanhla Project farmers with visual representations of (1) the present situation of the Project, in the form of a rich picture and (2) a vision of what they wanted to achieve. Finally, follow up research allowed for a comparison of the Sibonginhlanhla Project over time.

Table 3: Phases of the research at Loteni

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Investigation</th>
<th>Conceptualisation of issues</th>
<th>Follow up</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>June - October 2004</td>
<td>Secondary data, semi-structured interviews and observation</td>
<td>Focus group</td>
<td>Semi-structured interviews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data collection method</td>
<td>Background and description of Sibonginhlanhla Project, institutional implementation problems, perceptions of farmers and commercial farmers</td>
<td>Rich picture, vision, planning tool</td>
<td>Update on the changes at Sibonginhlanhla Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sample:</td>
<td>Sibonginhlanhla Project farmers, DoA, DLA, Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife</td>
<td>Sibonginhlanhla Project farmers</td>
<td>Sibonginhlanhla Project farmers, Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife, DLA, DoA, DoH, Indlovu district planner, KZNSGA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Conceptualisation of issues</th>
<th>Follow up</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>November 2004</td>
<td>Semi-structured interviews</td>
<td>Update on the changes at Sibonginhlanhla Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 2005</td>
<td>Semi-structured interviews</td>
<td>Update on the changes at Sibonginhlanhla Project</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **Data collection method**: Secondary data, semi-structured interviews and observation
- **Outputs**: Background and description of Sibonginhlanhla Project, institutional implementation problems, perceptions of farmers and commercial farmers
- **Investigation**: June - October 2004
- **Conceptualisation of issues**: November 2004
- **Follow up**: November 2005
- **Sample**: Sibonginhlanhla Project farmers, DoA, DLA, Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife
- **Vision**: Sibonginhlanhla Project farmers, Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife, DLA, DoA, DoH, Indlovu district planner, KZNSGA
Secondary data and the three sets of information provided by the SSIs are reported in Chapter 6. The farmers’ perspective is explained through the rich picture. Further information and extrapolation on information already set out in the rich picture is provided by the DLA, DoA and the perception of commercial farmers in the latter part of Chapter 6. This provides for a broader constructed representation of reality, beyond that of the farmers’ perspectives contained in the rich picture, so that comparison of these different perceptions can occur. Analysis of the research occurs in Chapter 7. The four groups of key informants remain the primary information resources but other information from role players is used to enrich the data and thus the analysis. This research specifically focuses on analysis from information obtained from the three stakeholders: the Sibonginhlanhla Project farmers, the DLA and the DoA. Examination of the Sibonginhlanhla Project over time (June 2004 –November 2005) enables for analysis of LRAD implementation at Loteni and challenges posed for the Sibonginhlanhla Project. Further, the M&E activities proposed in Section 3.4.3 are reported on and a policy analysis is performed by drawing on secondary data and information from SSIs. As a result of these analyses recommendations are made.
Chapter 6
Research findings

6.1 The LRAD programme in KwaZulu-Natal

The LRAD programme was initiated in August 2001 and by 31 March 2003 only one LRAD project had been processed and transferred to the respective beneficiaries in KwaZulu-Natal (Department of Land Affairs, 2005). This project, the Sibonginhlanhla Project situated at Loteni in the Drakensberg, is the focus of this study. Figure 3 (p87) shows the progress of land reform in KwaZulu-Natal during the period 1 April 2002 to 31 March 2003 and that the only LRAD project processed was that of the Sibonginhlanhla Project: Moshesh/Coombe (Department of Land Affairs, 2003).

By March 2005, the LRAD programme in KwaZulu-Natal had improved delivery significantly. The period 1 April 2004 to 31 March 2005 established 27 LRAD projects, as shown in Appendix 2.

6.1.1 Background to the LRAD programme at Loteni

The study area of Loteni falls within the Impendle West district of Sub-region Four of the iNdlovu Region. Loteni is a small rural community situated at the base of the southern Drakensberg. The southern Drakensberg forms part of the western boundary between KwaZulu-Natal and Lesotho. This area previously formed part of the KwaZulu homeland under the apartheid dispensation. Seven farms have been owned in freehold title by black landowners since 1886. Other landholders in the area are the State, Mkhomazi State Forest situated in the east, and the Loteni Nature Reserve (operated by Ezemvelo KwaZulu-Natal Wildlife) in the West. Agriculture is the main form of land use at Loteni, and includes cropping and grazing of livestock. Loteni residents live in traditional housing consisting of mud, wood, stone and grass. There is a general store, two tuckshops, a community hall, church and two schools in the area (Urban-Econ Development Economists, 1999).
Figure 3: Projects processed during period 1 April 2002 to 31 March 2003

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of project</th>
<th>Project name</th>
<th>Number of beneficiaries</th>
<th>Number of women</th>
<th>Number of hectares</th>
<th>District</th>
<th>Municipality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Labour tenants</td>
<td>Corrie Lyn/Petrus Stroom</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>314.4337</td>
<td>Umhlanga</td>
<td>Howick</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour tenants</td>
<td>Portion 16 of 5 of Elandslaagte</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>Uthukela</td>
<td>Klip River</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour tenants</td>
<td>Ebouweni/Portion 7 of Driefontein</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>Uthukela</td>
<td>Klip River</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour tenants</td>
<td>Mt St Bernards</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>937</td>
<td>Umzinyathi</td>
<td>Umvoti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour tenants</td>
<td>Boshoek</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>313</td>
<td>Amajuba</td>
<td>Utrecht</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour tenants</td>
<td>Sherwood/Weltevreden</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>629</td>
<td>Umhlanga</td>
<td>Howick</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour tenants</td>
<td>Glenbella/Welverdient</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>596</td>
<td>Uthukela</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour tenants</td>
<td>Portion 4 of Kleinfontein</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>327</td>
<td>Uthukela</td>
<td>Klip River</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour tenants</td>
<td>Portion 54 of 4 of Elandslaagte</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>Uthukela</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour tenants</td>
<td>Balmoral/Onverwaght</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>Umhlanga</td>
<td>Muoi River</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour tenants</td>
<td>Goudina</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>335.4138</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour tenants</td>
<td>Geluk</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>Amajuba</td>
<td>Utrecht</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour tenants</td>
<td>Uitvlught</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>Zululand</td>
<td>Vryheid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Redistribution</td>
<td>Mabaso/Mngundeni</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1867.1196</td>
<td>Umzinyathi</td>
<td>Utrecht</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour tenants</td>
<td>Mt Alice</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>Uthukela</td>
<td>Okhahlamba</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour tenants</td>
<td>Groothoek – Grange/Klippoort</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>912.0914</td>
<td>Uthukela</td>
<td>Ladysmith</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commongage</td>
<td>Rietvallei/Potshini</td>
<td>70</td>
<td></td>
<td>675</td>
<td>Uthukela</td>
<td>Ladysmith</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Redistribution</td>
<td>Palmietfontein</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>500</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Redistribution</td>
<td>Kalazo</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>Uthukela</td>
<td>Ladysmith</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour tenants</td>
<td>Dansekraal</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>Uthukela</td>
<td>Ladysmith</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour tenants</td>
<td>Craignathan</td>
<td>52</td>
<td></td>
<td>475</td>
<td>Uthukela</td>
<td>Dundee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour tenants</td>
<td>Springfield Stud</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>26.3590</td>
<td>Umhlanga</td>
<td>Muoi River</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour tenants</td>
<td>Tweefontein</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>383.5890</td>
<td>Umhlanga</td>
<td>Umswhati</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour tenants</td>
<td>Rietfontein/Rosedale</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>47.2886</td>
<td>Uthukela</td>
<td>Bergville</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LRAD</td>
<td>Moshesh/Coome</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>301</td>
<td>Umhlanga</td>
<td>Impendle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commongage</td>
<td>Bromsgrave</td>
<td>53</td>
<td></td>
<td>440</td>
<td>Ugu</td>
<td>Hibiscus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour tenants</td>
<td>Corriesrus/Umvoti Heights</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td>95.3849</td>
<td>Umhlanga</td>
<td>Muoi River</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ncalu</td>
<td>61</td>
<td></td>
<td>196.1411</td>
<td>Sisonke</td>
<td>Ixopo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Total</td>
<td>1,272</td>
<td>393</td>
<td></td>
<td>10199.6788</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Department of Land Affairs, 2003, 75)
6.1.2 The history of land redistribution at Loteni

As a result of tensions over land in the late 1990s, the Impendle area was identified as important for land redistribution purposes (Drimie, 2003). In 1995, the Loteni Land Crisis Committee investigation determined that overcrowding, a high tenant population and a lack of access to grazing lands were a root cause of tensions. At the same time due to new labour law, white commercial farmers were evicting farm labourers from their land so as to avoid land claims made by tenants and farm staff. As a result, theft was becoming problematic as farm labourers lost their jobs. The Minister of Land Affairs decided to resolve this land tension through the acquisition of land for redistribution to the community (Urban-Econ Development Economists, 1999).

The Department of Land Affairs (DLA) under the Settlement Land Acquisition Grant (SLAG) was to settle 352 members of the Loteni community on land for residential and productive purposes. The 352 beneficiaries were one of four groups that the greater Loteni community was divided into. Each of the four groups was to apply to the DLA separately (Urban-Econ Development Economists, 1999).

The proposed project consisted of 11 farms which were to be transferred to the 352 SLAG beneficiaries and totalled approximately 1500 ha (refer to Table 4, p89). Seven of the farms were already utilised for residential purposes by the community. Through a land swap the Department of Land Affairs acquired the farms Bravo 10665, Glenora 10187 and Westview 11447, with the former KwaZulu-Natal Parks Board, in exchange for Duarte Castle 9426. Moshesh 8399 and the Remainder of The Coombe 6260 had been identified for transfer from private ownership to community ownership. To enhance the SLAG acquisition process a full time project facilitator was employed to interact with the community for data gathering purposes. Workshops, surveys and interviews were conducted and documented with various stakeholders. Land owners offered to sell their land to tenants living on farms and a land commissioner was to be appointed to deal with issues of land ownership at Loteni (Urban-Econ Development Economists, 1999).
Table 4: Farms forming part of the SLAG project at Loteni

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Farm name</th>
<th>Registered owners in 1999</th>
<th>Extent (ha)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bravo*</td>
<td>RSA</td>
<td>850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glenora*</td>
<td>RSA</td>
<td>431</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Westview*</td>
<td>RSA</td>
<td>960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>2241</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moshesh</td>
<td>Mariannhill Mission Institute</td>
<td>235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Rem of the Coombe</td>
<td>Mariannhill Mission Institute</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>303</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Ridge</td>
<td>Private (Loteni land owners)</td>
<td>370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maitland</td>
<td>Private (Loteni land owners)</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FP 178</td>
<td>Private (Loteni land owners)</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cathcart</td>
<td>Private (Loteni land owners)</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shirley</td>
<td>Private (Loteni land owners)</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunset</td>
<td>Private (Loteni land owners)</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The End</td>
<td>Private (Loteni land owners)</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Approx 830</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Only portions of these farms will be for use by the Loteni community

(Urban-Econ Development Economists, 1999: 3)

The consultative process used by the DLA was part of the planning for development at Loteni. Design agents then planned a settlement to house the 352 beneficiaries and provide running water, electricity, telephones, roads and a clinic. An extensive report by Urban-Econ Development Economists (1999) was compiled that assessed and provided recommendations for SLAG development at Loteni. This included the building of a craft centre, an agricultural training institution, water pipelines to schools and other recreational facilities.

However, in 2000 a review of land redistribution in South Africa placed a moratorium on redistribution projects. This halted all work on the proposed development of Loteni under SLAG. In 2001, the DLA was obligated to redistribute land under the new Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development (LRAD) programme. This had serious implications for the 352 SLAG beneficiaries at Loteni. The original plans of land
redistribution and associated development at Loteni under SLAG were scrapped and only 15 people from the original 352 SLAG beneficiaries were eligible to benefit from the new LRAD programme.

Unlike SLAG, the focus of LRAD was not to provide land for settlement purposes but rather agricultural development. Through the LRAD process, 15 LRAD beneficiaries obtained the title deeds to two farms at Loteni. There were at least two other groups in the area waiting to be considered for LRAD grants by the DLA.

6.1.3 The Sibonginhlanhla Project

The Sibonginhlanhla Project consists of two farms, Moshesh 8399 and the Remainder of The Coombe 6260, situation latitude 29°29'42"S to 29°30'50"S and longitude 29°34'10"E to 29°35'35"E. These farms were purchased from the land owner, the Catholic Diocese of Mariannhill, by the DLA on behalf of the 15 beneficiaries of the Project. In fact, the reason that the Diocese had made this land available for land redistribution purposes was because the Loteni community had been utilising this land for grazing purposes. The land transaction was secured through the R20 000 per member LRAD grant. An independent valuer (Shead and Lang) put the figure on the land and associated buildings at R308 350 (see Table 5).

Table 5: Valuation of Moshesh and The Coombe farms prior to LRAD acquisition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Valuation</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Land at Moshesh 8399 (234 ha)</td>
<td>R146 250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buildings at Moshesh 8399</td>
<td>R104 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rem of The Coombe 6260 (68 ha)</td>
<td>R 58 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total valuation</td>
<td>R308 350</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(DLA memo, undated)

The Mariannhill Diocese, St Anne's Mission, offered to donate the buildings on Moshesh 8399, except for the church and one hectare surrounding it. Therefore, the final selling price was reduced to R203 325 (see Table 6, p91).
Table 6: Final price for acquisition of Moshesh and The Coombe farms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Selling Price</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Price for Moshesh 8399 (233 ha @R625 per ha)</td>
<td>R145 625</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Price for Rem of The Coombe 6280 (68 ha @ R853 per ha)</td>
<td>R 58 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>R203 325</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(DLA, undated)

Application process for LRAD

There was urgency for the LRAD application of the Sibonginhlana Project to be processed because of the length of time that land disposal had already taken at Loteni. Besides, LRAD applications are processed faster than SLAG applications and the DLA did not have to obtain much information, as this had been comprehensively documented in material related to the SLAG programme. As a result of this, the beneficiaries did not see much paper work including the proposed business plan drawn up for them by the DoA. However, the Provincial Grants Committee (PGC) bases its approval on the endorsement of the business plan by the DoA. This means that the approval of the Sibonginhlana Project was made outside consultation with the beneficiaries.

Transfer of title deeds

The LRAD project was initially set up in 2001 but only was approved by the PGC in May 2002. The transfer of the properties to the Sibonginhlana CPA took place in January 2003 and the title deed, for the 302.9301 ha farm, was officially handed to the CPA in December 2003. The remaining capital (indicated in Table 7, p92) from the LRAD grant was used to buy a tractor, trailer, plough, fencing and seed potatoes (Department of Land Affairs, undated). The DoA South West Region compiled a business plan for the Sibonginhlana Project detailing the proposed plan for the development of the farm. The Sibonginhlana Project remained unproductive, other than for minimal subsistence agriculture, for three years whilst transfer of the title deed occurred two years after transfer of land to the beneficiaries.
Table 7: LRAD beneficiary grant transaction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LRAD grant</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R20 000 per member x 15 beneficiaries</td>
<td>R300 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less selling price of Moshesh and Rem of The Coombe</td>
<td>R203 325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grant remaining</td>
<td>R 96 685</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Research into the situation of the Sibonginhlanhla Project at Loteni commenced in June 2004. By the end of 2004, the 15 beneficiaries had bought a tractor, although none of the beneficiaries could operate it, and trailer with the rest of their LRAD grant. The DLA donated fencing but it was not enough to fence off the whole farm. The Department of Agriculture was the designated extension support. They provided an advisory service on a quarterly basis (Department of Land Affairs, undated). However, the promises of soil analysis and agricultural training were not met. Potatoes were planted and harvested by the Sibonginhlanhla Project in 2004.

In 2005, the ADSS mobilised CASP funding through the Siyavuna Programme which enabled the beneficiaries to obtain agricultural training, more fencing and other inputs. They contracted a farmer to assist with the planting of seed for their crops. However, by the time this research had been completed, no large scale cultivation of the Project land had occurred. The research below is an account of the development of the Sibonginhlanhla Project from June 2004 until November 2005.
6.1.4 Demographic information on the membership of the Sibonginhlanhla Project

Demographic information for the membership of the Sibonginhlanhla Project was obtained from documents in possession of the DLA and research carried out at Loteni. Information indicated below is included in Appendix 5 (Figure 4) and Appendix 6 (Figure 5).

Income of the Sibonginhlanhla farmers

The data from 2001 shown in Figure 4 was obtained from the DLA. The data from 2005 shown in both Figure 4 and 5 was obtained through interviews with Sibonginhlanhla membership in 2005.

Income within the Sibonginhlanhla Project is limited. Eight of the member farmers do not have a stable monthly income. They make a marginal income from selling vegetables and other crops, doing maintenance such as wall-plastering in the summer, sewing and selling clothing and working other people’s fields within the community at Loteni. The other seven members obtain income from varying sources, including pensions and child grants and employment at the Loteni Nature Reserve.

In 2001, DLA records indicate that the average income of the Sibonginhlanhla members was R551 per month. The maximum and minimum incomes were R2000 and R0 respectively. In 2005, this research determined that the average income of the Sibonginhlanhla members had increased to R896. The maximum and minimum incomes were R1560 and R180 respectively. Over the period 2001-2005, an increase in average income of R345 (63%) occurred which is equivalent to a 12.5% increase year on year (see Figure 4, p94).
The increases in incomes are attributed mainly to social grants like pensions (R780 per month), child support grants (180 per month), disability grants (R780 per month), and foster care grants (R560 per month). Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife employed three members at R960 per month.

Figure 5 (p95) shows the percentage contribution of pensions, child support grants (CSG), disability grants (DG), foster care grants (FCG) and employment to total income (R13600 per month) of Sibonginhlanhla Project members in 2005. Eighty two percent of income emanates from social grants and only 18% of incomes can be contributed to employment.
Collectively the Sibonginhlanhla membership owned 86 cattle and 84 goats. Contributions to these livestock totals varied through the Sibonginhlanhla membership. The type of cattle would not fetch high grade meat prices. In 2005, Avian flu substantially diminished the chicken population at Loteni.

**Education**

There was a low level of educational training amongst the members. This research revealed that the average formal education level of the Sibonginhlanhla farmers was Grade
5. Five members had not been to school at all; seven members had primary education; two members had a high school Grade 10 qualification and one member has a high school Grade 11 qualification (refer to Appendix 5).

Family dependents

There was a notable discrepancy between statistics released by the DLA and the LRAD beneficiary applications forms in 2001 and this research in 2005. The DLA statistics indicate a higher average of dependents (7.27) than both the LRAD applications indicated (4.5) and the research in 2005 found (4.93). It is reasonable to assume that the time interval between the LRAD applications in 2001 and the research in 2005 resulted in a number of changes within families and the Sibonginhlanhla Project membership. These include new births, independence of former dependents and a change in membership. The DLA statistics seems to reflect the total size of families including extended family that do not reside at Loteni.

Gender and age

The Sibonginhlanhla Project consisted of 8 male and 7 female beneficiaries at inception. However, by 2005 this demographic had changed to 9 male and 6 female beneficiaries. All the members have lived their whole lives at Loteni. The youngest member was born in 1970 and the oldest in 1920. The average age of the Sibonginhlanhla Project membership was 55.5 years. A fifth of the farmers are in their 70s and 80s and the limited extent to which they can contribute to farming places more responsibility on those capable. The findings in 2005 indicated that one more farmer was widowed and another became divorced.

The members of the Sibonginhlanhla Project

The purpose of this section is to introduce the members of the Sibonginhlanhla Project, shown in Figure 6 (p98) below, and provide some detail about their particular personal circumstances.
Africa Ndlovu and his wife live near the community hall. They are both pensioners and are well known in the community. They feel that because of their age they cannot move to the Sibonginhlanhla Project farm.

Michael Duma and his wife, Thembani, feed 9 people at home. They do not have a steady income other than a grant they receive from the government for taking on an orphan and Thembani's pension. Thembani says she has a small garden at home and they have begun a small garden at the Sibonginhlanhla Project.

Nonhlanhla Nkabini gets a child support grant for her 8 year old child. Her husband is deceased. She says she battles to make ends meet and sells clothing to help buy food and pay for her children’s school fees of R100 per year. Thokozile, Nonhlanhla’s mother, presently resides with Nonhlanhla as they feel she is too old to live alone. Thokozile’s homestead lies dormant.

George Duma is a pensioner. He contributes to his grand children’s school fees and welfare.

Thobile Mthalane is the daughter of George Duma. She is another single parent with four children, three of whom school in Pietermaritzburg. Thobile works for Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife for 3 months of the year. She maintains the paths at Loteni Nature Reserve. She also plasters walls and tills land for cash. Thobile, also a Sibonginhlanhla member, is currently building herself a house at the Sibonginhlanhla Project farm.

John and Margaret Mnikathi have seven children and four grand children. They are both unemployed but manage to survive on John’s KZN Wildlife severance package, Margaret’s pension and social grants. They are planning to move onto the farm.

Note: The first name mentioned is the LRAD beneficiary.
Sibongile Mgoza is no longer a member of the Sibonginhlanhla Project. The circumstances of her resignation from the Project are unclear but the poor progress of the Project played a role in her decision to leave. Her membership has been taken up by Soka Mhlongo. Soka Mhlongo is the father of 7 children. Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife has employed Soka at Loteni Nature Reserve for the past 25 years. His wife has applied for child support for their children. They are presently building on the Sibonginhlanhla Project farm as their present home is situated a long distance away.

Albert Mnikathi is a pensioner. He had 8 cattle stolen by suspected Basotho raiders a few years ago.

Sylvester Mnikathi is unemployed. Sylvester is a widower and cares for his three children with the help of his mother. They survive on his mother’s pension.

Sipho Mnikathi is the chairperson of the Sibonginhlanhla Project. He is unemployed. He and his wife have five children and receive a child support for four of them. At present, he is building a house at the Sibonginhlanhla Project farm.

Nomthandazo Molefe is the secretary of the Sibonginhlanhla Project. She is trying to collect enough money to build a house on Sibonginhlanhla Project farm. Presently, she
resides at Mpophomeni near Howick in a 30m² house with her sister and nine children. Her three children live with her at Mpophomeni.

Paulos Zuma is married with nine dependents. The Zuma family obtain one disability grant and four child support grants for their children.

Ntombikayise Duma works for R500 per month. She has 7 dependents but has not applied for child support. The Duma family has not decided to move to the Sibonginhlanhla Project farm.

Bonani Malaba has six children. Her husband works at the Loteni Nature Reserve. The Malaba also obtain child support for three of their children. The Malaba family is considering moving to the Sibonginhlanhla Project farm.

6.2 The Sibonginhlanhla Project: The farmers' perspective

This section provides a description of the Sibonginhlanhla Project from the perspective of the 15 beneficiaries mentioned above.

As described in the methodology semi structured interviews (SSI) were used to gather information from the members of the Sibonginhlanhla Project (see Appendix 8 for SSI interview questionnaires). This information was used to produce a rich picture (see Figure 7, p100) of the situation facing this group of emerging farmers. Meetings were held to discuss the issues captured by the rich picture. This process of discussion facilitated thinking about other issues affecting the Project. Some of these issues only became vocalised later on in the research process and hence are not captured in the rich picture but are included in this section. This is information provided directly from the farmers unless otherwise stated.
Figure 7: Rich picture of the Sibonginhlanhla Project
To facilitate explanation of this rich picture the following headings have been used:

- Infrastructure: off-farm and on-farm (including equipment)
- Residence
- Extension support
- Theft
- Agricultural productivity of Sibonginhlanhla Project
- Role players and stakeholders
- The vision for the Sibonginhlanhla Project

Additionally, this section refers directly to Figure 7 and uses numbers to assist with locating depictions (for example, Figure 7: 2 refers to Figure 7 and position number 2 on the rich picture).

6.2.1 Off-farm infrastructure

The first issue the farmers raised was the lack of basic infrastructure to support farming in the Loteni area. Loteni is situated about 40km from the nearest town, Underberg, on poor gravel roads (Refer to Figure 7: 1). Transportation is limited and as a result Loteni remains relatively isolated. The farmers felt that gravel roads from Underberg and Impendle to Loteni were inadequate for transporting produce. The farmers complained about the prices that they had to pay for travel. Prices to the most frequent destinations are shown below in Table 8.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>From Loteni to:</th>
<th>Underberg (40km)</th>
<th>Impendle (50 km)</th>
<th>Howick (145 km)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Return trip</td>
<td>R30</td>
<td>R30</td>
<td>R70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single / One way trip</td>
<td>R20</td>
<td>R25</td>
<td>R50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8: Taxi fare prices (2005)

Telephones are available at Loteni, however people have to walk between 2-3 km to access them. Cell phone coverage is not comprehensive as the Loteni Valley is in a network shadow. There is no running water or electricity (See Figure 7: 2).
People fetch water from the Loteni River and use candles and paraffin for light at night. The use of fire is common for cooking, warmth and light, and wood from nearby wattle (*Acacia Mearnsii*) stands is the predominant fuel.

### 6.2.2 On-farm infrastructure (including equipment)

As described by the farmers, the Sibonginhlanhla Project consists of a farm (Figure 7: 3) without infrastructure. There is no water available on the farm. The watering of crops is done by hand and carried from the Loteni River up to the fields. This is portrayed by the drawing of a woman carrying water on her head walking the steep path and dreaming of an irrigation system in Figure 7: 4.

"The tractor is a big problem."—Albert Mnikathi, Sibonginhlanhla farmer

The farmers purchased a tractor and trailer with their LRAD grant (Figure 7: 8). The farmers indicated that the tractor was not functioning and needed to be repaired. However, the farmers do not know how to operate or repair the tractor. The farmers were considering selling it and some members of the group felt that they were on the receiving end of a bad deal set up by a tractor salesman in Pietermaritzburg. Repairs can only be done at Stepmore (15 km away) or Underberg (40 km).

Fencing was another major issue for the farmers. They wanted to be able to:

1. Demarcate their farmland boundary - shown by the kneeling farmer in orange erecting a fence in Figure 7: 9;
2. Contain their livestock - shown by the cow, goat and horse eating the cultivated fields in Figure 7: 10; and
3. Reduce the potential of stock theft - indicated by the arrows pointing over the mountains in Figure 7: 11.
In 2003, the Project purchased some fencing with LRAD funding and fenced a section of the farm with the intention of using this fenced area for grazing livestock. In 2005, four of the male farmers put up another section of fencing along the boundary with the Loteni road to reduce livestock wandering.

6.2.3 Residence

The rich picture shows a representation of land divisions and one division is marked with an ‘R’ in Figure 7: 12. This represents the issue of residence. The farmers have only recently, since the end of 2005, been able to start building their homes on the farm. The mentor appointed by the DLA initially opposed any settlement on agricultural land without the approval of the authorities. Up until 2005, the farmer’s were still trying to obtain permission to move onto the farm. It seems as if there was some confusion about whom to approach on this matter. The farmers wanted to be present on the farm in order to counteract stock theft but also to reduce travelling distances, of up to 3 km over steep terrain, from present residences to the Sibonginhlanhla farm.

In 2005, The DLA, DoH, town planners from the Umgungundlovu district, DoA and the farmers met to discuss the location of the new houses on the farm. The DoH required nuclear settlements in the event of service provision being supplied to them by local government. There are three sites for houses at Sibonginhlanhla, five farmers and their families at each site. By the end of 2005, no houses had been completed. At least one member and his family did not want to move onto the farm as they were too old.

6.2.4 Extension support

The LRAD farmers stated that there was a DoA extension worker assigned to the area (Refer to Figure 7: 13). However, the extension worker that visited was not always the same person and they did not visit regularly. In the farmers’ opinion this was a factor contributing to their slow achievement. As shown by the rich picture, the DoA extension had promised to provide them with agricultural training and inputs. However, DoA extension support did not manage to provide, this citing lack of transportation resources and time.
In 2004, the farmers wanted the agricultural training that the DoA had promised so that they could start planting. However, it was only in 2005, with the assistance of the CASP grant, that the farmers were able to afford to participate in agricultural courses and buy needed inputs. By the end of 2005, two members of the Sibonginhlanhla Project had been on a planting and farm management course. The farmers continue to request assistance towards making the Project operational (Figure 7: 7).

6.2.5 Theft

Livestock theft was raised as an issue (Refer to Figure 7: 11). The Loteni community has faced numerous occasions whereby livestock have been stolen and the community say the culprits are Basotho cattle rustlers. A member of the Loteni community lost 27 head of cattle on the 12 November 2005. Sibonginhlanhla members have also been affected by cattle raids. George Duma lost 12 cattle in 2002 and Albert Mnikathi had 18 cattle stolen from him in 1999. The farmers related livestock thefts to the fact that they are not allowed to live on the farm, the predominant area where their livestock are put out to graze. The stock theft unit (represented by the yellow van), based at Loteni, had failed to recover the livestock.

Fencing has been bought and erected to contain livestock within the farm boundaries and keep livestock that does not belong to Sibonginhlanhla out. However, the fences do not stop stock theft as any fence in the path of the animals is cut.

Whilst conducting this research 29 head of cattle were stolen from a member of the Loteni community. The newly erected fence along the roadside was cut to allow passage and the whole fence collapsed. According to the KZN Wildlife Regional Manager, the fence was poorly erected as only a portion of the fence should have collapsed if cut. He said that the collapse was due to the standards (fencing poles) being suspended rather than dug into the ground.

6.2.6 Agricultural productivity of the Sibonginhlanhla Project

The Sibonginhlanhla Project is situated on a spur. The land is rocky and steep, which makes it susceptible to erosion (shown in Figure 7: 20). As a result only certain sections of
the farm are arable. Additionally, the farmers complained that years of overgrazing and poor veld burning regimes had reduced the quality and quantity of forage available for grazing (portrayed in Figure 7: 5).

The farmers said that the land was under utilised by their membership. Most of the farmers live relatively long distances from the farm and thus prefer to use land closer to their homes for cultivation (see Figure 7: 6).

The farmers said that they cannot cultivate on a larger scale because they have no seed to sow. They blame the government for this and for not allowing them to stay initially on the farm. To assist with purchasing agricultural inputs the farmers invested R20 per month in a joint bank account (see Figure 7: 14). However, the payments are not regular as the farmers cannot always afford the R20. Most forms of income are through pension and other social grants (Figure 7: 15).

The Sibonginhlanhla farm was spatially planned to ensure that every farmer had a plot for household cultivation and the remainder of the farm was designated for collective production under the auspices of the Sibonginhlanhla Project (represented in Figure 7: 3).

The KwaZulu-Natal Spice Growers Association (KZNSGA) had offered to provide paprika plants to grow at Loteni and find a market for the produce (see Figure 7: 17). Since this initial offer, there has been no contact between the KZNSGA and the Sibonginhlanhla Project.

The weather at Loteni is unpredictable. This is represented in Figure 7: 19 by the rain gauge and thermometer. Productivity is often hampered by drought. The lack of rain in 2004 resulted in land lying fallow and a reliance on external sources for food. Income usually spent on seed and other inputs was used for buying maize.

The issue of labour was discussed and it was indicated that labour would be hired when the rains started in late spring 2005. This would be labour to help Sibonginhlanhla specifically with hoeing, planting, watering, weeding and harvesting. The tractor would assist with the fetching and carrying of water, tools and implements and harvest.
Productivity by the end of 2005

The farmers received assistance from Cedara ADSS in the form of a CASP grant. This enabled them to buy inputs and with the remainder of the grant want to employ a contractor to plough and plant 10 ha of maize. This would cost R15000 of which the members have paid R7000 already. The members were hoping that the contractor would arrive on 16 November 2005.

By November 2005, only six of the members had utilised Project land for household cultivation purposes. As stated before, some of the farmers live too far away from the land to warrant them using the land for cultivation purposes. Seven of the members were cultivating land at their own residences (i.e. off-farm) and of these seven, four members were using both household and Project land.

6.2.7 Role players and stakeholders

A number of role players and stakeholders were identified at Loteni. They are included for reference in Appendix 3. The role players are represented in the rich picture by the community hall and the meetings between groups in Figure 7: 16. The most involved role players during the setting up of the Sibonginhlanhla CPA were the Loteni Land Crisis Committee (LCC) and the Loteni Development Committee (LDC). The LCC initially identified Loteni as being important for land redistribution. The LDC was instrumental in the LRAD process. This committee, chaired by a woman, identified the LRAD applicants for the DLA. The ward councillor, Mr Kunene, was also part of this process. The DLA and DoA were identified as the most important stakeholders for the Project.

6.2.8 The vision for the Sibonginhlanhla Project

The visioning exercise undertaken on the 8 November 2004 posed the current agricultural yields against those of the vision. The blue and green writing in Figure 8 (p107), shows that in 2004, the Sibonginhlanhla Project purchased seed potatoes for R100. These potatoes, known in Zulu as amazambane, were planted and harvested for household consumption.
The farmers vision for the Sibonginhlanhla Project is to produce for external markets. The red writing in Figure 8 shows that the farmers are expecting to produce commercial crops and livestock. Table 9 (p108) shows the crops, livestock and infrastructure identified as necessary for achieving their vision.
Table 9: Crops, livestock and infrastructure identified from the vision

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crop</th>
<th>Livestock</th>
<th>Infrastructure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cabbage (amacabishi)</td>
<td>Cattle (inkomo)</td>
<td>Fenced grazing camps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tomatoes (amatomatisi)</td>
<td>Goats (imbuzi)</td>
<td>Working tractor (ugandaganda)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spinach (isipinshi)</td>
<td>Sheep (isikhephu)</td>
<td>Storage shed (igushede)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sorghum (amabhele)</td>
<td>Pigs (ingulube)</td>
<td>Plough (igeja)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peaches (amapentshisi)</td>
<td>Chickens (inkhukhu)</td>
<td>Crop sprayer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apples (amaapula)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Irrigation system / water pump (ipump)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apricot</td>
<td></td>
<td>Planter (idisc)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pears</td>
<td></td>
<td>Houses (indlu)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beans (ubhontshisi)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White and red maize (umbila)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Paprika</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

A market for paprika was identified in Pinetown and the KZNSGA promised to facilitate this transaction. The farmers recognised that they would have to secure loans from sources like the Land Bank in order to initiate this paprika project but initial attempts failed as described in section 6.2.7. A pig market was identified at Alberton. Markets for other crops and livestock were restricted to Loteni due present demand and the lack of transportation to other destinations.

6.3 Department of Land Affairs

This information was obtained through extensive consultations with Khosi Madonsela, the DLA field officer, over the 2003-2006 period.

6.3.1 Policy change and its effects for Loteni

The DLA has been working in the Loteni area since 1995, initially to clarify issues of land ownership. The ownership of these properties was resolved through the Loteni Land Crisis Committee. The registered owners of the properties were all deceased and so it was a matter of transferring the deeds to the next of kin. In 2000, the moratorium on land redistribution resulted in the halting of the SLAG project that was to provide housing and
basic services at Loteni. Six years was spent on planning the SLAG project and a large amount of resources were wasted.

The LRAD programme was introduced by the DLA in order to replace the SLAG proposal at Loteni. The selection of LRAD beneficiaries was managed by the community. This was done to prevent accusation of the DLA manipulating the selection process. The Loteni Development Committee (LDC), a body set up to deal with concerns of the community, was authorised by the community to decide on who the LRAD beneficiaries would be. The process of selection by the LDC was a private affair and a response by the members of the committee could not be obtained. However, as the DLA field officer pointed out, “Fifteen (farmers) was a conservative number looking at the number of hectares and activities that they are going to do on the farm.”

Since the successful transfer of land to the Sibonginhlanhla Project, two other farming groups have formed in the Loteni area. These two groups are hoping that they too can benefit from the LRAD programme.

At the beginning of the LRAD programme the relationship between the DLA and the Loteni community was strained. After the change in policy away from SLAG, some of the community felt that the department had failed them. Those that were not selected to be LRAD beneficiaries were left saddened and there may have been some jealousy towards the 15 LRAD beneficiaries selected.

The LRAD grant enabled the Sibonginhlanhla Project to purchase some 300 ha of land. The remainder of the grant the beneficiaries spent on fencing and a tractor and trailer. The fencing was used to enclose a small area for livestock and the tractor has not been operational for some time. A mentor was appointed by the DLA and paid R1000 per month to guide the Sibonginhlanhla Project. However, this mentor soon lost interest as a lack of funding at the time hindered the progress of the Project. The DLA recommended the Sibonginhlanhla Project for CASP funding and funds were approved.

The DLA considers the Sibonginhlanhla Project under the food safety net category as documented by LRAD policy. However, their concern is that the members are impatient to
become commercial farmers rather than gradually developing their infrastructure, capital and skills.

6.3.2 Coordination and collaboration of institutions

The DoA has complained that the DLA transfers land that is not suitable for agricultural production. This has created some tension between the two institutions. The DoA blames the DLA for the difficulties they encountered with LRAD projects, again, based on the claim that the land is not suitable for agricultural production. At the Sibonginhlanhla Project the following reasons were given by the DoA as problematic for agricultural production:

- steep terrain
- cold climate
- rocky soils
- distance from markets

Additionally, internal DoA coordination between ADSS and the Extension Support (including coordination between the Provincial and District DoA) especially over CASP is very poor. After the DLA has identified projects that need CASP funding, it is the role of the Extension Support and ADSS to implement CASP. However, the confusion between the Extension Support and ADSS over CASP funding and projects to benefit has resulted in delays. It was the perspective of the field officer that there would be under-spending by CASP in 2004/2005 as a result of a lack of coordination between ADSS and Extension Support.

6.4 Extension Support - Department of Agriculture

This section details some of the problems associated with extension as described by Caswell Nakuna, the extension officer for the Impendle region in which Loteni is situated. He explained that institutional constraints impacted on his ability to perform his job.
6.4.1 Staff contingent

"The DoA does not have sufficient staff to provide the necessary service."\textsuperscript{20}

The key problems he identified related to a lack of staff, the large number of households to which he was expected to provide extension support and a lack of transport. In general, extension officers are responsible for providing extension support over a large area (in excess of 100km radius), which strains both the resources of the Department and the extension worker.

However, the extension officer also indicated that he managed to visit the Sibonginhlanhla Project monthly. He was aware of most concerns made by the Sibonginhlanhla Project farmers, but not their intention to produce crops for markets external to Loteni. He was responsible for providing agricultural training to the farmers. However, because the LRAD grant funds had been utilised elsewhere the farmers had not been able to access this resource.

On a personal level the extension officer indicated that he was from the former Venda homeland. His different cultural background caused tension for his work with Zulu communities and was one of the reasons why he was looking for work closer to his home in Limpopo Province.

6.4.2 Logistical arrangements

Extension officers report to the DoA headquarters in Pietermaritzburg weekly. They tended to use this time for administration purposes but due to the large area covered by extension officers, petrol consumption was high. "The vehicle has a small petrol tank. There is only one petrol station in the area and I have to keep returning to Boston to fill up. The vehicles need to be fitted with long range fuel tanks." Communication was identified as difficult as cell phone reception is disrupted by the mountainous geography.

The extension officer was unaware of the LRAD programme or the impact of LRAD on his work. The extension component of the DoA was focused on providing technical

\textsuperscript{20} Nakuna, 2004, pers. comm.
support to rural farmers irrespective of how the farming group was formed, acquired land or functions (CPA or otherwise).

6.5 Agricultural Development Support Services (ADSS) – Department of Agriculture

Jimmy Lonsdale, project manager for ADSS and supervising the allocation of Comprehensive Agricultural Support Programme (CASP) funds to the Sibonginhlanhla Project explained that the implementation of the CASP in 2005 had improved the extension support available to the Sibonginhlanhla Project. ADSS had become involved with the Sibonginhlanhla Project as their application for CASP funding under the Siyavuna Programme, a programme that targets black emerging farmers, was recommended by the DLA. The ADSS administers funding through CASP and the Siyavuna Programme. CASP funding was allocated by national government to be spent on infrastructure. Siyavuna funds are specifically for inputs, training and mentorship (not wages or diesel). ADSS provides support to the DoA Extension Support and DLA in the implementation phase of LRAD projects. The Siyavuna funding of some R398800 allocated to the Sibonginhlanhla Project had to be spent by the end of 2006.

Information about the balance of the LRAD grant was difficult to obtain. Lonsdale estimated it to be about R10 000. This, according to Lonsdale, should be transferred to the relevant municipality for the provision of infrastructure and services.

6.5.1 Constraints for the business plan

The DLA deals with the transfer of the land, the business planning and the monitoring and evaluation. However, due to the lack of expertise in agriculture in the DLA the DoA and other consultants have taken on designing business plans. The business plan prepared by the DoA Extension Support South West Region, according to Lonsdale, will be implemented. However, there are some constraints.

It was difficult to send members of the Sibonginhlanhla Project for agricultural training. This was because of the distant location of Loteni from the training centre. ADSS could not provide transport to the training. As a result, three opportunities for training were lost
as members of the Sibonginhlanhla Project failed to attend these agricultural training workshops.

Eventhough, analysis of the soils had been deemed necessary by the DoA Extension Support it was not done. This analysis would have provided information about the soil structure and chemical composition. Lonsdale indicated that irrigation would saturate the land, as the soil is predominately shallow clay and suggested that water from the Loteni River would be pumped up to a 5000L water tank on the farm. However, a simple irrigation system has still not been implemented.

Contracting out farming operations was encouraged by Lonsdale as the Sibonginhlanhla members did not have the resources to farm themselves. This would have cost R1500 per hectare for ploughing and planting of maize seed. Green maize had good crop returns (R48000 per hectare) and Lonsdale expected this crop to be viable for the Sibonginhlanhla Project.

6.5.2 On-farm expenditure

ADSS mobilised the funding available from the CASP grant into the Sibonginhlanhla Project bank account and a number of purchases were made. In 2005, purchases for seed and fencing were made and an amount had been allocated to pay for a contract farmer to plough and plant the Sibonginhlanhla Project fields. The funding also enabled a few Sibonginhlanhla Project farmers to participate in an agricultural training. Agricultural training (including pigs poultry, cattle and crops) in South Region was done by an independent agricultural group called Zakhe Training Institute situated in Baynesfield.

The management of this CASP funding and the farm was left to the LRAD beneficiaries in order to provide farmers with real experience. This process was, in the ADSS manager’s opinion, not conducive to ensuring viable operation of the farm. For example, a shed was bought by the Sibonginhlanhla Project and paid for with CASP/Siyavuna funds. However, the shed has not been constructed as a concrete base has to be established and the shed erected on top of this. As a result of mismanagement of funds by CASP/Siyavuna beneficiaries, like in the example above, 2005 is the final year in which funds will be paid
into a beneficiary bank account. Instead, the DoA will administer all funds for beneficiaries.

Mentorship was to become operational again from 2006 onwards as a result of Siyavuna funding. Mentors were to be contracted for 50 hours a month with remuneration of about R7500. This means that Sibonginhlanhla will be allocated a mentor but this will probably only occur in 2007.

6.6 Commercial farmers

There were numerous problems encountered at Loteni by commercial farmers as explained by Edward Goosen, Regional Manager for Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife. As explained in Chapter 5, Goosen was a key informant for information regarding commercial farmers. His interaction with commercial farmers in the area, both on a personal and professional level, established him as a reliable source on commercial farming in the region. Theft, agricultural competition and labour were three issues that contributed to farmer anxiety and the general lack of enthusiasm towards assisting emerging black farmers.

Commercial farmers were cautious about assisting with LRAD projects and other small scale black farming enterprises. Firstly, farmers face the constant threat of crime from within the community and further afield. One commercial farmer previously sold eggs to the community. However, this stopped when he was robbed of his merchandise and vehicle. Commercial farmers are also affected by stock theft predominantly executed from the Lesotho side of the border. Secondly, commercial farmers may consider LRAD emerging farmers as competition. Commercial farmers are interested in decreasing market competition to ensure higher prices for products. Therefore, assistance to emerging farmers from established commercial farmers is limited.

Surprisingly few people are employed by established commercial farmers in the Loteni area as most farms deal in livestock few labourers are required. Commercial farmers utilise chemical compounds for the control of livestock sicknesses, weeds and crop production which decreases the need for a large labour force. Additionally, there is usually limited scope for promotion or skilled positions as people are insufficiently educated and farm managers are contracted in from outside the Loteni area. The decrease in the number
of labourers working on farms has been a result of land claims and labour laws. A large labour force has become a liability for commercial farmers as labour laws impose a minimum wage and other policy favouring farm labour. Land tenure reform has impacted on the number of people living and working on farms. To reduce the risk of land claims commercial farmers evict farm labourers and dwellers. For example, a commercial farmer in the Loteni area could not rid himself of labour tenants so he burnt their homes down in order to avoid future claims on his land. Therefore, commercial farmers are hesitant to assist black farmers after negative experiences with labour.

Summary of the findings

Loteni land disposal

- Catholic Diocese of Mariannhill sold land to DLA under the SLAG programme
- 352 beneficiaries of SLAG programme
- LRAD replaced SLAG in 2000

Demographics of the Sibonginhlanhla Project membership

- Average age was 55.5 years old
- The Project consists of 9 males and 6 female
- Average number of dependents is 4.93
- Average education level is grade 5
- 83% of income is from social grants whilst only 18% can be contributed to income from employment
- Average monthly income has increased from R551 per month in 2001 to R896 per month in 2005

Farmer key issues identified were:

Off-farm infrastructure

- Tele-communication limited
- Piped water and electricity were absent
- Roads were poor quality
- Transport was unreliable and expensive

21 Increased pay, less working hours, entitlement to land after a certain number of years etc.
On-farm infrastructure (including equipment)

- Lack of on-farm infrastructure
- Tractor is dysfunctional
- Inadequate fencing

Residence

- No on-farm residences have been established

Extension support

- Lack of service
- Promises of agricultural training and inputs not provided

Theft

- Livestock theft problematic
- Fencing does not prevent cattle rustling

Agricultural productivity of Sibongihlanhla Project limited by

- Rocky and steep terrain
- Poor quality veld
- Unpredictable weather
- Lack of finance for seed and other inputs
- Distance from homesteads to Project land

The farmers' vision for the Project is to generate produce for markets.

The DoA Extension officer identified the lack of resources as being a major issue constraining his work. These resource constraints were:

- insufficient number of staff
- lack of transport
- poor communication

Also, the extension officer was unaware of relevant agricultural policy (like the LRAD programme).
DoA ADSS provides additional support to LRAD projects, in KwaZulu-Natal, in the form of funding from CASP through the Siyavuna Programme. In addition to the LRAD grant (R300000), a CASP grant of R398800 was approved for the Sibonginhlanhla Project. This grant has to be spent by the end of 2006.

Implementation of the business plan drawn up by the DoA Extension Support South West Region was confirmed. However, a number of concerns were raised:

- A number of agricultural training opportunities were missed
- Soil analysis of the Sibonginhlanhla Project had not been done
- An irrigation system had not been designed or constructed

Contracting out operations for agricultural production was deemed necessary, due to the lack of necessary resources, but viable for the Sibonginhlanhla Project.

By the end of 2005, a number of on-farm purchases were made including fencing, seed and a shed which was waiting to be erected. A few of the Sibonginhlanhla Project members were afforded agricultural training and finance was earmarked for outsourcing ploughing and planting of green maize. It was evident that a mentor would be appointed by the end of 2007.

Commercial farmer concerns affect their potential to assist black small scale farmers in the Loteni area. These concerns are:

- Theft and other crime in the area
- Negative experiences with labourers related to land claims and labour laws
- Agricultural competition from emerging black farmers
Chapter 7:
Analysis of the findings

This chapter provides deeper insight into the implementation of the LRAD programme at the Loteni Sibonginhlanhla Project. Analysis is drawn from Chapter 6 and additional information is provided for better understanding of the LRAD programme and the Sibonginhlanhla Project. Information is taken from personal communication, where specified, as well as interpretation of information received and observations made by the research team.

7.1 Demographics of the Sibonginhlanhla Project

The low monthly incomes of the Sibonginhlanhla Project members restrict any form of savings or contribution to on-farm infrastructure or productivity. It is important to note that most of the incomes are in the form of social grants as unemployment within the membership is high. Incomes have increased in the period 2001-2005 but this is not due to the presence of income generating activities or development of infrastructure in the region but is the result of accessible social grants.

The current low level of education and farming competency amongst the beneficiaries limits the capacity of the Sibonginhlanhla Project to become commercially productive, at least in the short term. Favouring older LRAD beneficiaries, in the case of Sibonginhlanhla (55.5 average age), is cause for concern. Older people may have a stable income in the form of a pension but their physical ability to contribute to agricultural development of land is limited. Some of the children of the LRAD beneficiaries do assist with household food production and it is expected that they would continue to assist in the event of a family death. However, the knowledge and experience lost as a result of an LRAD beneficiary death will test the resilience of the Project.

7.1.1 The youth and the community

The role of children is essential to the success of the Sibonginhlanhla Project. The youth, and specifically the Project farmers’ dependents, will have to assist the Project with agricultural endeavours due to the elderly component of the present Project membership.
Also, many of the farmers are women who have additional household commitments and therefore can only devote a limited proportion of their time to the Project. Furthermore, it is important for the youth to participate if the long term viability of the Project is to be ensured.

Loteni has a high HIV/AIDS prevalence rate and due to the migratory patterns of the working generation at Loteni in search of work in the cities and other farming areas, the spread of HIV/AIDS into Loteni homes has increased. As a result, there has been a rise in instances of funerals, which are expensive. These funerals further exacerbate the dire financial situation of the Loteni community as a whole.

The Loteni community is a very close-knit community, especially amongst the older generation. This is a result of the area originally being settled by only a few inhabitants. The families have had a long history of partnership and interdependence. Hence there is a tendency, especially amongst the older generation, to share resources including contributions towards funeral costs of friends and family where necessary.

The Sibonginhlanhla Project is affected by the same ethos of community concern and interest. This Project does not operate in isolation from the broader community. However, the Project has not been able to offer anything substantial to the community.

7.2 Infrastructure

The lack of off-farm infrastructure at Loteni limits agricultural production and access to external markets. The poor state of the roads and lack of transport available restricts any sale of agricultural products to within the Loteni community. The lack of infrastructure and services in areas where land reform is being implemented has been found by Del Grande (2006) to be a common problem within the municipalities mandated to provide integrated planning and development (IDP) within their jurisdiction.

On farm infrastructure is equally poor. The livestock of the farmers roam freely, as there are no fenced camps and as a result damage crops. This fact and the lack of irrigation infrastructure has limited attempts at cultivation. Livestock farming would require a substantial investment in fencing, dipping equipment and transportation as well as training
in livestock breeding and grazing strategies as the land is presently over grazed and poorly managed. Cultivation seems the less expensive option, although some fencing to prohibit grazing would have to occur. There is a natural spring on the farm that could be dammed for limited irrigation and household usage in the interim until a pump and piping for an irrigation system is installed, which further supports the option of cultivation.

7.3 Residence

The farmers have been waiting to occupy their land since they received the title deeds in 2003, almost one year after the official transfer of the properties to the Sibonginhlanhla Project Common Property Association (CPA). Only in late 2005 did the Sibonginhlanhla Project farmers obtain ‘permission’ to live on their land.

The farmer’s confusion over their access to land is of concern, especially when they have the title deeds. It seems that their initial mentor informed the farmers that they were not to build on the farm without permission. The farmers did not know from whom they should get permission. This created confusion and tension for the farmers as there was a need to move onto the farm as many of the members lived relatively distant from the farm. This became an important issue to resolve for the farmers. Hence their focus was not on production but rather on securing the necessary arrangements and infrastructure for farm operation. However, this issue over residency was out of their control for reasons that are unclear and delayed the farmers in establishing agricultural produce on their land. This illustrates the importance of efficient post-transfer support to LRAD projects.

The research team influenced this matter by asking questions around the issue of residency. The Sibonginhlanhla Project memberships’ lack of clarity on the issue of residence and misunderstanding on ownership resulted in them querying the issue of building farm residences with the DLA. The ‘permission’ the farmers sought was needed from by government departments and these reasons are described below.

The land use planner for the Indlovu District and the DoH wanted to ensure that any service provision could be carried out without vast expense or difficulty. Nuclear settlements are favoured as they are more easily and cheaply connected to piped water and electricity services. The DoH required that the farmers build on terrain conducive to the
construction of other infrastructure, like roads. The DoA wanted to ensure that land demarcated for homes was not prime agricultural land or negatively affected the environment. However, this proved difficult as sites for building had to be on relatively flat land in an area of steep and rugged terrain. As a result only three main zones for construction were demarcated, the Sibonginhlanhla Project membership took the decision about where each member's family would reside within each zone. The buildings were to be built out of a mixture of block brick and traditional mud and wattle, depending on what each family can afford. The Sibonginhlanhla Project membership still hope that basic services will eventually reach Loteni and then their farm.

At their original homesteads, the Sibonginhlanhla Project membership had, on average, almost 4 buildings per plot. These had been built over the life time of the home owners. Therefore, moving to the Sibonginhlanhla Project land and the construction of new homes will be a lengthy process and initially involve straddling between original homes and their new homes at the Sibonginhlanhla Project.

7.4 Stock theft

The issue of stock theft in the Loteni area is a severe problem and increases the agricultural risk for the Sibonginhlanhla Project as it has been demonstrated that fencing does not prohibit stock theft. However, the erection of inadequate fencing along the road may have been avoided had the farmers been provided with proper training in or supervision with fence construction. Also, the age of the men involved in this endeavour may have restricted their ability for digging the many holes required for comprehensive fence construction.

Stock theft is often blamed on the Sothos. But as the Regional manager from Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife remarked it is most likely to be other people in areas neighbouring Loteni (Goosen, 2005, pers. comm.). This dislike for the Sothos has a long history and dates back to before the Zulus fought for the British against the Sothos in the late 1800s. In fact, the seven farms under freehold ownership at Loteni (shown in Table 4, p89) were payment
for fighting for the British during the Basotho Wars (Urban-Econ Development Economists, 1999).

The result is that stock theft remains problematic from within the Loteni area and across the border limiting the potential for intensive stock farming.

7.5 The natural environment

The Sibonginhlanhla Project land may have soils that are well-drained and have fair cropping potential (although no soil analysis has been done and opinions differ on soil structure) but the farm is situated on a spur which is steep and rocky thereby reducing the land available for cultivation to only 40 ha (Xulu, undated). The rainfall for the region is good at 900mm per annum, most of this falling during summer. But winters are particularly cold with snowfalls and temperatures frequently below freezing point thereby limiting crop production. The Loteni river runs in the valley very close to the farm. The water is of good quality providing water all year round. However, the terrain does not allow easy access to collect water. There is no irrigation system and collection is done by bucket. This is a major factor hindering the production of crops as reliance on rainfall is a great risk especially in drought prone areas like this. The carrying capacity of the farmland at present is low as the veld is in poor condition due to overgrazing and irregular burning regimes. Therefore the stocking rates have been recommended to not exceed 2.5 ha/animal unit for 250 days of the year and must be reduced to 3.64 ha/animal unit for 365 days if grazing during winter occurs (Timler, 2001). Considering that eventually 40 ha out of a total of 303 ha farmland will be under cultivation only about 250 ha will be available for grazing purposes. Therefore, the farm can accommodate a maximum of 100 animal units. This, again, means that there is limited growth for the Sibonginhlanhla Project’s livestock since they have already exceeded the grazing capacity as the Project collectively own some 86 head of cattle and 85 goats.

Summer crops and livestock, including goats, sheep, cattle and poultry, are all suitable activities for the Sibonginhlanhla Project. According to the Urban-Econ Report, certain horticultural crops like peaches, plums, apples and some other deciduous fruits would be suitable for cultivation (Urban-Econ Development Economists, 1999). As has been
explained above, the limitations on land available makes the farm suited to small scale production.

The Sibonginhlanhla Project is a small farm but can produce agricultural products. The extent of agricultural production on this farm is limited by the size of the farm, climate, geography and veld condition of the area, especially whilst there is no irrigation available.

7.6 Markets

The geography and poor transport systems restrict market opportunities in areas beyond Loteni. The costs of transport may be prohibitive for moving produce to markets. Additionally, running a viable business without reliable communications has been difficult for the Project. For example, they could not contact their contract farmer to ascertain his arrival date for ploughing and planting of their fields. The KZNSGA offered to provide the Sibonginhlanhla Project a market for paprika in Pinetown. However, there has been no response from the agent involved in this initiative. Therefore, agricultural markets for the Sibonginhlanhla Project are not established and finding viable markets for produce, grown on a relatively small scale, remains unlikely.

7.7 Loans and collateral

The ownership of land was to enable emerging farmers the ability to access loans and use their land as collateral (Wegerif, 2004; Lyne and Darroch, 2002). However, in practice this has not been possible for the Sibonginhlanhla Project. The Sibonginhlanhla members applied for a loan at Ithala Bank (represented in Figure 7: 17). However, their application was rejected on the grounds that they did not submit a viable business proposal and some of the members of the Sibonginhlanhla Project had been black-listed for failing to keep up with instalments at particular stores. This indicates that the requirements for a loan were not clarified on application by the financial institution concerned.

The rejection of their application for a loan felt like a huge failure to the Sibonginhlanhla Project members who were thoroughly disheartened. After this disappointment, the members have not attempted to obtain any further loans. Fortunately, the initiation of CASP enabled the Project to obtain necessary funds to initiate an ambitious business plan
drafted by the DoA Extension Support (explained in more detail in section 7.13). However, loan possibilities for the Sibonginhlakanha Project remain limited as it also seems doubtful that the business plan developed by the DoA, on behalf of the Sibonginhlakanha Project, would be endorsed by financial institutions.

7.8 Work force

The issue of labour became an important issue in the event of the Project becoming productive and even producing for markets. Although the Loteni area has an active labour force and contracting in labour to work on the farm would be done easily, compensation for work done could be a problem. The likely possibility of a lack of cash flow for the Sibonginhlakanha Project may only make payment possible in the form of food rather than cash. Additionally, the impact of HIV/AIDS on the Sibonginhlakanha Project farmers could result in reduced productivity.

7.9 LRAD Policy at grassroots

The LRAD policy was poorly understood by the Sibonginhlakanha Project farmers. This may be indicative of the educational level of farmers. However, an important consideration is the fact that the medium of communication in government departments is English. Policy documents in the Zulu language were not available on site (like the LRAD policy document, the CASP policy document, DoA agricultural assessments, business plans and applications for funding) and this limited the ability of LRAD farmers to make informed decisions. It also increased reliance on external support services to assist in decision making.

7.10 Reliance on external support for decision making

The lack of information provided to the Sibonginhlakanha Project farmers about factors that impact on them, like LRAD policy, has made farmers reliant on the authorities. Dependence was shown in the way that the farmers rely on the authorities to support their decisions and sometimes take decisions for them. For example, the fact that the farmers are the owners of the land and yet were still required to obtain permission to build their residences from an external source is problematic for a number of reasons. Firstly, it
creates confusion over ownership of the Project. The owners of the Project should be the ones taking decisions as the government does not own the Project. Secondly, even though the farmers may have the title deeds to the land, the process of obtaining permission from an authority creates confusion over who owns the land and thus terms of tenure. There is research to show that if security of tenure is disputed then project sustainability may be compromised (Goebels, 2005). Thirdly, decisions that are taken by government departments and officials for the farmers perpetuates dependence on external sources without fostering independent collective action or sustainability of the Project in the long term. And lastly, this is a show of power from the state that is, in a sense, autocratic as they have the ultimate authority on any matter related to the tenure security of the farmers and project operation.

The issue of the broken down tractor shows (1) poor decision making over the acquisition of a tractor initially, (2) an absence of mechanical skills and (3) the inconsistency of government involvement in decision making. The reasons for purchasing such an implement are questionable especially when no training on its use or maintenance was considered. However, the farmers’ view of agriculture was such that for farming to be successful it must be mechanised. The absence of mechanical skill within the Sibonginhlanhla Project membership has led to the desire to rather sell the tractor at a loss than learn how to resolve the problem. The way in which the problem with the tractor was described to the research team, it sounded as if it could be something as simple as a flat battery and yet the farmers was immobilised by this. This has practical implications for training around ensuring that farmers do have some level of mechanical skill. Policy and extension have to react to what the farmers need and their capability to fulfil these needs as opposed to what the farmers’ or the government want. Additionally, government needs to decide on their level of involvement in decision making within their areas of competency.

Over the two years that this research was conducted limited progress was made on the Sibonginhlanhla Project. The vision of the farmers to produce for markets has not been achieved. Although some of the inputs, like fencing and training, have been realised, with the support of the CASP grant, this is insufficient for emerging farmers to become productive. This was illustrated by the Sibonginhlanhla Project farmers’ reliance on a contract farmer to plough and plant their fields for them.
Extension support may be implemented with the best of intentions. However, it perpetuates the development model of dependency on external organizations. In development work there has been a shift away from this for reasons of sustainability (Ziervogel, 2006). In the case of the Sibonginhlanhla Project, CASP funding has provided the farmers with another chance to obtain financial resources to farm for profit. However, any agricultural production will be dependent on efficient external support that fosters the Project towards independence and sustainability.

7.11 Unrealistic expectations and lack of planning

The farmers’ expectations of the Sibonginhlanhla Project and the perception of their own ability proved to be too high. Their expectation of achieving commercial production was unrealistic considering the resources available presently. The farmers’ unrealistic expectations of their own ability may indicate their initial enthusiasm, but now they are tired and lack self-confidence. Their ability to utilise the Sibonginhlanhla Project land productively, even at a subsistence level, has been compromised. The farmers have land available at their homesteads for subsistence and household production that lies fallow after putting their energies into meetings, trainings and other work for the Sibonginhlanhla Project. This indicates the importance of clarifying LRAD farmer expectations prior to commencing farm operation. In the case of the Sibonginhlanhla Project, a food safety net project - at least for the short term - remains the most logical approach to the gradual improvement of livelihoods.

One member resigned from the Project due to the slow pace of progress and her different expectation of the Sibonginhlanhla Project. She wanted land for residence and household cultivation.

The members of the Sibonginhlanhla Project have been operating without a plan of action. The vision exercise was the first time that the membership had congregated to discuss possible activities for their farm. As shown by the vision is can be concluded that the farmers are aware of the different crops and livestock options as well as the infrastructure necessary for producing these. Local knowledge of these agricultural products is apparent and planting seasons understood (where w = winter crop and s = summer crop). However, the farmers consider their indigenous agricultural knowledge inferior to commercial
agriculture and are thus openly unsure about implementing an agricultural project that produces for external markets.

7.12 Post-transfer extension support

The support systems that the Sibonginhlanhla Project farmers require have put an immense strain on government resources. Emerging small scale farmers require agricultural extension services, credit facilities and banking services (van Zyl et al., 1995). Whilst the demand for these services is apparent, they have not yielded any significant improvement for the emerging small scale farmers of the Sibonginhlanhla Project.

Prior to CASP, the extension support to the farmers was not sufficient for the scale of need. As a result, decision making has been absent or poorly informed regarding agricultural production. This shows the high level of reliance on external support by emerging farmers. For example, promises made by DoA extension support were misleading. The department had promised to provide agricultural training and inputs, like seed and fencing. However, these promises were not fulfilled. This research has determined that the extension support and funding available to the Sibonginhlanhla Project before 2005 amounted to, at most, a visit every month from the extension officer whose impact on the Project was negligible. Although the DLA indicated that DoA extension visits only occurred on a quarterly basis (Madonsela, 2004, pers. comm*).

During this time, the DLA was more supportive to the Sibonginhlanhla Project than the DoA. The DLA was involved with post-transfer support to the Project through dissemination of LRAD funds, some advice on the utilisation of these funds and the appointment of a mentor. The system of post-transfer support is shown to be inconsistent with LRAD policy which supports Hall’s (2004a) findings on the status of land reform projects.

Additionally, no less than three surveys were conducted by the Department of Agriculture and Environmental Affairs South West Region (2001 and undated) and Natural Resources Section (January 2004). The first was a preliminary agricultural report for the Moshesh 8399 and Rem of the Coombe 6260 farms in 2001. The second was a business plan for the

Sibonginhanhlha Project and the third was an agricultural resource plan for the Coombe/Moshesh farms. A summary and short analysis of these reports is given below.

In 2001, a preliminary Agricultural report for the Rem of the Coombe 6260 and Moshesh 8399 was performed by the DoA Hilton Extension Office, South West Region. This report suggested that the land be used for settlement as the potential incomes from crop and animal production would constitute a maximum of R62798.30 a year. Additionally, if the land was to be used primarily for productive purposes then it was suggested that both farms should be settled by one farmer (Timler, 2001). This analysis indicates that the land is not viable for commercial agricultural production and would have been better utilised for settlement purposes. This, again, questions the logic behind the implementation of the LRAD programme at Loteni.

In 2002, a business plan was compiled by the DoA Underberg Extension Office, South West Region. The plan proposed by the DoA Underberg Extension office was to plant 40 ha of crops, those being red maize and potatoes. It was proposed that the Sibonginhanhlha Project farm chickens (broilers and layers at 25 000 birds), sheep and dairy cows. The livestock numbers would depend on a veld condition assessment carried out by the department. The DoA also proposed building a processing centre at Loteni where potato chips from potatoes, popcorn from maize, butter from milk and canning from broiler meat can be performed. Additionally, the DoA suggested that a training centre be built to ensure that people obtain proper agricultural training. The centre should offer accommodation for at least 10 people. This would also operate as a tourism centre from which handwork and other craft can be sold to passing visitors. This business plan indicated that potential income could reach R300000 per annum (Xulu, undated).

The assumption was that R100000 capital, remaining from the LRAD grant, would be present for initiation of the Project. However, it is highly unlikely that that R100000 would be sufficient to initiate this ambitious Project. Importantly, the proposal has not considered some of the vulnerable aspects of Loteni, like stock theft. Neither has the plan incorporated a process of training for those operating the Project.

The Natural Resources Section of the Department of Agriculture and Environmental Affairs performed an agricultural resource assessment and management plan for the
Coombe/Moshesh Farms in January 2004. This document proposed three scenarios. Scenario 1 combined irrigated and dryland cropping with animal production. Scenario 2 combined irrigated crop production with animal production, while scenario 3 concentrated on dairy production. The plan recommended that the community receive training in livestock, vegetable production and soil conservation (Botha, 2004). As indicated before, intensive livestock production is not advisable from a security point of view. Dairy production is expensive on infrastructure and promises low returns especially with the distant locality of Loteni. The cultivation of crops remains the most viable option at this stage of project development.

The three reports compiled for this relatively small land area (303ha) is indicative of the poor coordination within the DoA during this time. It is of concern that these documents were not distributed to the LRAD beneficiaries and thus the Sibonginhlanhla Project has not been able to utilise these resources. The reports are also inconsistent in their findings and recommendations for the Sibonginhlanhla Project. This also shows the ineffectiveness of post-transfer support provided to emerging farmers.

What happened instead, as the Sibonginhlanhla Project was unaware of any business plan, was that the remainder of LRAD beneficiary grant, after acquisition of the land, (R96 675) was spent on a tractor and trailer (R70000), fencing and seed potatoes.

In August 2004, when CASP came into existence it was hoped that this programme would remedy most of the problems with extension support described above. At Loteni, CASP was only implemented in mid-2005 and the constraints experienced by the DoA Extension Support have not been remedied. Problems posed for CASP, as a result of fairly dysfunctional extension support in the past, are examined below.

Resource constraints continued to be problematic for the provision of extension support. The DoA battled with a low number of staff available to cater for the extension support need and this has reduced the impact of their work. Staff turnover was high and the DoA had to continue hiring personnel. Interviewing for new staff on a regular basis creates

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23 The DoA advertised 1007 posts, between April 2004 and March 2005, but only 850 positions were filled. The department was also finding it difficult to recruit well qualified and experienced staff (Department of Land Affairs, 2005).
unnecessary administration which restricts the DoA from performing its real functions. Additionally, especially at an entry level, the DoA has to provide adequate supervision and capacity building of a new staff member.

The staffing problems compound logistical problems in situations that are already difficult. Project managers only saw their staff weekly, rendering management of personnel and projects more difficult. This was exacerbated by the long distances that DoA extension staff travel. Long travelling distances also indicate the problem of safety for staff and the many hours travelled is often an inefficient use of resources.

Prior to CASP, the lack of direction for post-transfer support within the LRAD policy was problematic for the DoA extension. This resulted in the approach to extension support for LRAD projects being no different from other projects.

The need for agricultural training and mentorship remains critical to small-scale farming. Small-scale black farming in South Africa was purposely restricted by white elite governments of the past in order to supply labour to white farmers and reduce black farmer competition. This has resulted in a deterioration and loss of knowledge and skills in agricultural practices in black communities (Goebel, 2005).

Over the period 2001-2005 the Sibonginhlanhla Project beneficiaries had built up the idea that training would enable them to farm productively like their commercial farmer counterparts. This perception resulted in training becoming a high priority especially since the DoA extension component had been promising and thereby consistently reaffirming this belief in agricultural training. This shows the uniformed nature of the Project farmers regarding training, and the extent to which training enables for productive land utilisation, and that the DoA extension officer had not been briefed about funds for training or the initiation of CASP. It was only in 2005, as a result of ADSS (and not Extension Support) mobilising CASP funding, that a few members were able to attend a course on farm management. The impact of this intervention remains to be seen but without follow up training, advice or mentorship this training will probably have a limited impact.

The Sibonginhlanhla Project records indicate that they did receive some support from a mentor in 2004, on instruction from the DLA and funded by the LRAD programme.
However, as a result of the slow progress of the Project the mentor lost interest in providing assistance. Therefore, the establishment of a mentorship programme is not new. However, the issue of how this programme of mentorship, now funded by CASP rather than LRAD, will be implemented continues to remain unclear.

Support for emerging farmers has not been forthcoming from commercial farmers in the Loteni area. The predominant reason for this seems to be racially based. If the mentorship programme becomes operational their neighbouring farmers may be employed to assist. The sustainability of such appointments needs to be considered carefully by the DoA especially where prejudices exist but consistent mentorship remains critical to the success of projects.

7.12.1 Coordination and collaboration of institutions

The role of government in land reform is critical. Post-transfer support is problematic as admitted in the DLA annual report published at the end of 2005 (Department of Land Affairs, 2005). Some of these problems are external to government explained in Chapters 1 and 2. However, a large proportion of these problems are due to present government structures.

LRAD policy puts the responsibility of land transfer in the hands of the Department of Land Affairs and agricultural production with the Department of Agriculture. The apparent lack of communication and subsequent poor coordination and collaboration between and within the two departments in terms of policy alignment, land use planning and service provision has been instrumental in the stagnation of the Sibonginhlanhla Project. Information at the district level has been erroneous or non-existent. These problems have been exacerbated by the centralisation of headquarters in Pietermaritzburg as the DoA extension officer was unaware of the LRAD programme. This indicates further the low value the DoA ascribed to LRAD as their responsibility for providing agricultural support was not specified in the policy document which may also indicate a lack of consultation between departments in the drafting of the policy. Therefore, the capability of the DoA to provide the necessary post-transfer support to LRAD projects was undermined by:
1. The LRAD policy's lack of detail on post-transfer agricultural development and the roles of each institution

2. The expectation that a single extension officer could initiate and operate a farming enterprise without LRAD specific training, additional expertise or support.

This resulted in the DLA carrying the bulk of the post-transfer support which is outside their mandate and field of competence. Other examples indicating problems between institutions include that the Department of Agriculture blames the Department of Land Affairs for the difficulties they encountered with LRAD projects due to the fact that the land is not suitable for agricultural production. In response to the DoA's claim that land transferred was not conducive to agricultural development, the DLA referred to agricultural assessments that were not performed, submitted after land transfer or underutilised. The reports generated for the Sibonginhlanhla Project have not been used for post-transfer development. Wegerif (2004), in research undertaken in Limpopo Province, confirms that agricultural assessments there were also not utilised properly.

The disparity in possible land use scenarios between the DoA extension and DoA natural resource section shows the poor coordination and communication within the institution. Additionally, the fact that none of these proposals were discussed with or disseminated to the farmers has ultimately wasted resources and the chance of the Sibonginhlanhla Project to adopt a proposed plan.

The DoA ADSS complained that it did not receive all the necessary information on the Sibonginhlanhla Project. For example, records on expenditure were not supplied by the DLA to ADSS. As a result, ADSS managers were making uninformed decisions regarding funding allocation for acquisitions and other inputs (Lonsdale, 2005, pers comms*).

From the foregoing it can be concluded that the effectiveness of institutional support to emerging farmers is compromised by a lack of available resources but also, and more importantly, the lack of coordination and collaboration between and within institutions responsible for agricultural extension support. CASP may be able to provide funding for

* Lonsdale, J. Project manager ADSS. DAEA, Cedara.
inputs, infrastructure, training, mentorship but without government departmental support that is effective, small scale farming enterprises will continue to fail.

7.13 Agricultural model

The agricultural model that the government is driving is commercial agriculture. Therefore, extension support, mentorship and training of emerging farmers is based on the commercial agricultural model of high input, high output farming. In Chapter 1, this form of agriculture is portrayed as inefficient and in Chapter 2 as in global decline. However, the DoA continues to promote a mode of agricultural production and support that is elitist, giving preference to more resourced beneficiaries, and environmentally and economically unsustainable and resource inefficient. In a struggling agricultural economy where farming subsidies are absent and profit margins are ever decreasing, the perpetuation of this model through emerging farmers, especially where the global agricultural market is elitist and inefficient, seems misinformed. Pursuing solely large scale agriculture restricts the success for the majority of small scale emerging farmers.

7.14 Policy Analysis

The research at Loteni identified a number of problems with LRAD policy. This section sets out to examine four of these problems in more detail under the following headings:

- Disposal of land under LRAD
- Beneficiary selection
- Category of project
- Policy: post-transfer; and
- Organisational learning

7.14.1 Disposal of land under LRAD

The Sibonginhlanhla Project does not fit the technical description of an LRAD project. The primary objective of LRAD is the redistribution to black people of 30% of commercial agricultural land (confusion over this objective was emphasised in Chapter 4). However, the land was put up for sale by the Catholic Diocese of Mariannhill and was not used for commercial agriculture in the past. Therefore, the Sibonginhlanhla Project is not situated
on former commercial farmland, white owned or otherwise, and therefore cannot be counted as contributing to the redistribution of 30% of commercial agricultural land. However, contrary to the policy specifications, the DLA continues to regard this project as an official LRAD project.

7.14.2 Beneficiary selection

LRAD policy does not specify how the beneficiary selection process is conducted. Loteni was an unique case where the shift in policy from SLAG to LRAD has disadvantaged the greater Loteni community. The decrease in the number of beneficiaries under LRAD has made the issue of selecting LRAD beneficiaries important for this case. However, the selection process is a secret held by the community at Loteni. The truth about the selection process for the LRAD beneficiaries of the Sibonginhlanhla Project may never become public knowledge as the DLA distanced itself from this process. It is unclear why 15 beneficiaries were chosen but this seems to be a decision taken by the DLA and the LDC. Is it possible that the decrease in the number of beneficiaries for LRAD compared to land for settlement purposes (the SLAG programme at Loteni consisted of 352 beneficiaries) indicates that there is a perception that more land is required for agricultural production. However, there is no specific mechanism in the LRAD policy for determining the number of beneficiaries and this would vary depending on the type of category of project pursued.

7.14.3 Category of project

The LRAD policy document distinguishes between four different categories of project. These are detailed in Chapter 4. The categorisation of projects enables stakeholders to pursue the objective of that category of project.

However, there were at least two problems identified here. Firstly, the requirements for implementation of each category of project should be stipulated in policy. There are marked differences between each category of project. The inputs and resources required vary depending on the category of project. For example, food safety net projects will not devote all their time and resources to agriculture. According to Schmitz (2001), the cut-off points in terms of hectarage for cropland, horticulture, pasture grazing and extensive grazing are 40, 15, 50 and 600 ha respectively, above which projects are considered to be
commercial. Therefore, the Sibonginhlanhla Project, which only has 40 hectares of potential cropland, whilst the remainder of the 303 hectare farm is dedicated to grazing, would not be considered a commercial enterprise and thus the category of project is easily determined if such a definition was put into practice. However, the Sibonginhlanhla Project was initiated and managed by government departments in the same way as all the other LRAD projects irrespective of the category of project. Thereby, the categorisation of project is made irrelevant.

Secondly, classification of the Sibonginhlanhla Project into one the four categories was not done in consultation with all stakeholders. As a result, the DLA categorised the Sibonginhlanhla Project as a food safety net project while the Sibonginhlanhla Project farmers wanted to produce for markets. The DoA had already started to implement the business plan with its focus also on production for external markets. This created a discrepancy between the DLA’s perception, the DoA perception and Sibonginhlanhla Project farmers perception of the type of farming to be undertaken.

7.14.4 Policy: Post-transfer

The post-transfer stage of the LRAD Programme was problematic for all stakeholders involved and limited action was taken to enhance this. This highlights that LRAD policy does not adequately address post-transfer agricultural development. LRAD policy only provides land on which agricultural development may take place as the LRAD grant enables for acquisition of land and some inputs. When the LRAD Programme was initiated there was no programme in place to develop emerging farmers once the land was transferred to the beneficiaries. This fact made the institutional arrangements for carrying out extension support to LRAD farmers difficult. Since the inception of CASP there is more finance available for post-transfer agricultural support. However, CASP was designed to provide extension support to a range of agricultural programmes and not just the LRAD Programme. As a result of being designed separately, the two programmes are not aligned comprehensively.

It remains unclear if, at inception, the LRAD programme was to be complimented by CASP. This confusion arises as, firstly, the CASP was implemented four years later than the LRAD programme and, secondly, the LRAD grant, in most cases, provides finance for
some initial on-farm purchases. This points to a lack of thought between the DLA and the DoA about post-transfer support in LRAD policy. LRAD policy-makers should have been involved with the formation of CASP policy. Whether CASP was to compliment LRAD or not is now irrelevant as emerging black farmers have been waiting since 1994 for an agricultural support programme that will assist them. However, the effectiveness of CASP is still to be examined but this is beyond the scope of this thesis.

7.14.5 Organisational learning

Attempts have been made to promote organisational learning. For example, a number of staff involved in land reform in South Africa were selected to visit Brazil to engage with their land reform counterparts and process there in order to bring back knowledge to South Africa (Madonsela, 2005, pers. comm.*). However, although this experience was useful for gaining insights into land reform in Brazil it seems that this learning opportunity has not enhanced land reform in South Africa.

M&E has not been utilised fully by government as described in Chapter 3. A culture of fear predominates in institutions where M&E is seen as exposure to public scrutiny. However, this does not contribute to organisational learning. The implementation problems of SLAG were not reviewed and as a result the same mistakes were duplicated in the LRAD programme. M&E is still focused on outputs rather than outcomes. Therefore, the M&E of LRAD remains focused on land delivery rather than the impacts of land delivery on the target population.

The learnings associated with Sibonginhlanhla Project can contribute to the implementation of future LRAD projects. A repeat of the Sibonginhlanhla Project should be avoided. M&E systems can assist in the process of organisational learning so that LRAD performance is enhanced. Additionally, projects should be monitored so that problems can be identified and LRAD project beneficiaries assisted to avoid disillusionment.

7.15 Working towards the same objective?

As seen at the Sibonginhlanhla Project, the expectations of the different stakeholders vary significantly. Table 10 below shows the main areas of disconnection between the Sibonginhlanhla Project farmers, the DLA and the DoA. The DLA operates according to the LRAD policy and understands the Sibonginhlanhla Project to be categorised as a food safety net project. However, LRAD policy is not clear enough in providing adequate means of assessment for determining each category of project as stated in Chapter 3 and 4. Objectives and indicators for each category of project is absent and LRAD objectives have no means for assessment either.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 10: Table of Disconnection between stakeholders</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sibonginhlanhla Vision</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vision</td>
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</table>
The DoA operate according to the CASP policy where the objectives are different from the LRAD policy. The CASP policy does not entertain the same categories of project as LRAD policy. Similarly, M&E of CASP is based on outputs rather than results and there are no indicators to assess the achievement of objectives. Importantly, the M&E of CASP funded projects is mentioned as a function of the DoA. This raises two issues. Firstly, there may be duplication of M&E of a LRAD project by the DLA and then the DoA. Secondly, according to the Department of Agriculture (2004: 26), the DoA “will monitor projects on a continuous basis according to the monitoring and evaluation schedules in the business plans”. But as was the case with the Sibonginhlanhla Project, their business plan had not been implemented nor did the plan contain a monitoring and evaluation schedule. Therefore, M&E of CASP funded projects can account for funds spent however it cannot determine whether these funds have made any significant impact on the respective project.

7.15.1 LRAD programme objectives

The LRAD programme aims to achieve objectives that, at current implementation levels, will remain unachievable. This thesis has identified that the primary aim of the LRAD programme is to enable black emerging farmers to obtain land for agricultural production. However, the objectives of the LRAD programme have been stretched to reach further than just agricultural production. Chapter 8 shows the objectives of LRAD and proposed indicators developed by the author. The LRAD programme is expected to achieve the objectives of land redistribution but LRAD is not designed to do this. LRAD is designed to promote black agriculture but to expect LRAD to achieve transformation on such a large scale is short sighted and relates to the lack of M&E information available for policy makers to consider during programme design.

7.15.2 Sibonginhlanhla Project objectives

This research ascertained that the Sibonginhlanhla Project farmers have a different vision for their land. A series of workshops were held with the Sibonginhlanhla Project farmers to work, firstly, on a vision for their project (discussed already) and, secondly, on a plan of action for the attainment of this vision (refer to Table 11, p139). This process revealed a number of problems with the establishment of objectives and indicators for the beneficiaries as the concepts of evaluation were not fully understood. Therefore, a
planning matrix was utilised to facilitate achievement of their vision. Objectives for attaining their vision, associated activities for each objective and farmers responsible for carrying out the activities were identified. Pictures were utilised to make the identification of each objective easier for illiterate farmers (see Appendix 7). This process was accepted as being easier to understand but still difficult for the farmers to work on.

Table 11: Sibonginhlanhla Project activity chart (English interpretation of Appendix 7)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Person responsible</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>29Nov04</td>
<td>To erect fencing around the farm</td>
<td>Communicate with DoA (J. Lonsdale at ADSS)</td>
<td>S. Mnikathi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29Nov04</td>
<td>To build houses on the farm</td>
<td>Communicate with DLA (M. Madonsela)</td>
<td>T. Duma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26Nov04</td>
<td>To utilise the tractor</td>
<td>Farm the garden</td>
<td>G. Duma, P. Mnikathi, M. Duma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29Nov04</td>
<td>To plant vegetables</td>
<td>Plant vegetables</td>
<td>T. Duma, S. Mnikathi, T. Nkabini</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29Nov04</td>
<td>To plant beans</td>
<td>Plant beans</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29Nov04</td>
<td>To plant potatoes</td>
<td>Plant potatoes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan05</td>
<td>To breed and produce sheep</td>
<td>Purchase livestock</td>
<td>S. Mnikathi, T.C. Molefe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29Nov04</td>
<td>and chickens</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun05</td>
<td>To harvest crops</td>
<td>Communicate with DoA</td>
<td>N. Molefe (Kunene)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This process of planning made it clear that there was a disparity between the Sibonginhlanhla Project vision, to produce for markets, and their objectives and associated activities for the achievement of their vision, which tend to indicate farming at a food safety net level. The low level of management capability within the Sibonginhlanhla Project membership shows that the farmers need assistance and guidance in their pursuit of producing for markets.

Their vision is not specific enough to enable for a business plan to be drawn up and thus this Sibonginhlanhla Project farmers would need assistance with this. It is probable that they would accept the business proposal established by the DoA without many changes not
because it is realistic but rather because it is appealing and fits their vision of producing for markets.

The poor establishment of M&E in both LRAD and CASP policy and with emerging farmers themselves questions whether the stakeholders are working towards the same objectives. This research at Sibonginhlanhla Project has shown clearly that the expectations (and thus objectives) between stakeholders are not the same. Additionally, the objectives of the Sibonginhlanhla Project are vastly different from the objectives of the LRAD programme showing how each LRAD project is context specific.

In terms of the CPAs, the Sibonginhlanhla Project has not been given in further training on the operation of a CPA. To the farmers the CPA remains just a legal requirement for acquisition of land and their Constitution is under utilised. This shows that the concept of a CPA is not fully understood.

7.16 What was the justification for LRAD at Loteni?

The shift in mode of land disposal at Loteni, from the SLAG to LRAD programme, was implemented without consultation with the Loteni community, the Land Crisis Committee, the Loteni Development Committee or the previous land owner, the Catholic Diocese of Mariannhill. The perspective of the Mariannhill Diocese on the disposal of the land should be considered important since they had participated in the land reform process at Loteni and provided the Sibonginhlanhla Project land at a reduced price. Importantly, the lack of consultation with stakeholders about the shift in land disposal renders the motivation for farming at Loteni unclear, especially since the community was expecting land for settlement purposes under the SLAG programme.

The primary objective of LRAD is the provision of land for agricultural development. The responsibility for post-transfer support is that of the DoA. This thesis has documented, that the post-transfer development of the Sibonginhlanhla Project has not been sufficient to promote agricultural development even on a small scale.

The Sibonginhlanhla Project is clearly made up of individuals who are markedly poor. Appendix 4 confirms that the socioeconomic characteristics of the 352 beneficiaries under
the SLAG programme are very similar to those of the Sibonginhlanhla Project beneficiaries. An important consideration in the implementation of LRAD is the scale of benefit to communities. Direct beneficiaries of LRAD are limited to small groups as in the case of Loteni where 15 beneficiaries were allocated 303 ha for agricultural development. In comparison, SLAG offered to benefit 352 individuals and their families for primarily residential purposes. This shows the difference in scale of benefit and land use between the programmes confirming Moyo’s (2000) argument that land redistribution, through processes like LRAD, does create a rural farming elite in the context of Loteni.

In terms of land use, the Sibonginhlanhla Project has failed to become a productive agricultural enterprise. A viable agricultural project would have positive implications for the community, for example, by providing employment thereby justifying the project. However, the Sibonginhlanhla Project has not yielded any economic returns or benefits to the community. An LRAD project that creates household stability through a food safety net project has merits, but the history of land reform at Loteni warrants that LRAD provide justification for the shift from SLAG which would have provided for household subsistence farming anyway.

The amount of financial and human resources to initiate farming, even at a subsistence level, is of concern. The Sibonginhlanhla Project, thus far, has spent R400000 (R300000 LRAD grant and R100000 of the R398800 CASP grant). This seems somewhat excessive considering that only 15 individuals are benefiting and no agricultural production has been initiated. In comparison, the estimated cost for service provision (water, roads and sanitation) at the Moshesh Farm according to Urban-Econ Development Economists (1999) was R500700. That estimate was based on the assumption that 800 people would benefit. Therefore, the expenditure per individual through the LRAD programme is significantly higher than any of its predecessors confirming Cousin’s (2000) concern that LRAD expenditure would be disproportionate to the number of those benefiting.

The Sibonginhlanhla Project is an example of how financial resources have not resulted in the initiation of viable farming ventures. Mentorship, training and extension support form a crucial part of the process. However, this has to be done in such a way as to make farmers responsible for their actions and not dependent on external sources. LRAD was designed to enable the building of agricultural skills already available in communities to
assist emerging farmers in their farming endeavours and develop their farms into larger enterprises over a longer period of time. However, LRAD should never have been implemented without a complimentary comprehensive post-transfer support plan.

This section has questioned the wisdom of implementing LRAD at Loteni. The justification for the LRAD at Loteni seems weak. An aspect noted at Loteni was the need for land for purely settlement purposes. This initial reason for the DLA presence at Loteni was to clarify issues of ownership and land tenure. The Urban-Econ Report documented that the most important needs of the Loteni community were identified as job opportunities and improved housing (Urban-Econ Development Economists, 1999). The preference for LRAD by the government has left a huge demand for land for settlement purposes at Loteni. The Sibonginhlanhla Project beneficiaries could only access land through the LRAD programme. Although the farmers may have all been dedicated to farming initially the frustrating experiences in attempting to initiate farming at Loteni has left many of the Sibonginhlanhla Project farmers disinterested. Some of the older beneficiaries do not actually have any intention, due to their limited physical capacity to participate in the labour, of farming the land themselves but rather saw the LRAD programme as an investment that they hoped would subsidise their pensions and create a livelihood opportunity for their children.

Therefore, if the LRAD programme does not attempt to ascertain the need for agriculturally productive land within a particular community but continues with land disposal regardless, the success of that particular LRAD project remains unlikely. Providing land for agricultural purposes solely is inadequate, given the wide variety of possible land uses, and is problematic for the success of the LRAD programme as LRAD applicants’ motivations for land may not be agriculturally orientated.
Chapter 8: Conclusions and recommendations

As stated in the introduction, the aim of this study was to provide learnings and insights into ways in which the LRAD programme could be enhanced. This process of discovery, research and interpretation has resulted in a set of considerations that could contribute to a process of improvement within the LRAD programme and thus the improvement of future LRAD projects. Therefore, this section is not about drawing definitive conclusions or making fixed generalisations about the LRAD programme but rather providing a contribution based on research experience for LRAD policy-makers, implementers and other people dealing with land and agrarian issues to consider in their work.

This research has shown that LRAD policy as a means to address land reform objectives is questionable. There are critical problems with the implementation of LRAD projects. Until implementation processes can adequately achieve the targets of respective land reform programmes, it is pointless shifting approaches to land reform. Even the effect of expropriating land will be limited without efficient implementation systems in place to ensure the quick delivery of land to the respective beneficiaries.

The farm invasions in Zimbabwe have created a nervous farming environment in South Africa. In this regard, government’s response to land reform and invasions is critical to farmer and investor confidence. Government’s response to the slow implementation of the land reform programme must not jeopardise the integrity of the programme (that is, by inappropriate “fast tracking”). Additionally, illegal land invasions need to be condemned openly, followed by swift and decisive action, if productive agriculture in South Africa is to continue. The Department of Land Affairs has been slow in the validation of land claims but this does not justify land invasions. In South Africa it is apparent that poor land delivery is leading to an increase in land invasions and expropriation of land to invaders may only intensify land invasions.

There is a direct link between economic policy and land reform. Presently, economic policy dictates land reform policy. In the case of Loteni, the shift to macroeconomic policy favouring agricultural development on land has impacted negatively on the broader community by ignoring their land and livelihoods needs. This illustrates that land reform
dependent on economic policy does not benefit the majority of previously disadvantaged black South Africans.

In principle, LRAD does address land ownership patterns, empowering rural communities and promoting agricultural production in South Africa. However, the slow progress of LRAD in transforming land ownership patterns and developing agriculture questions the wisdom of government utilising LRAD as the flagship for land redistribution in South Africa. The present form of the policy and the implementation problems that have arisen at Loteni confirm this. Even if LRAD manages to redistribute 30% of agricultural land to black emergent farmers by 2014, the production capacity of the majority of LRAD projects will be severely limited by resource constraints. The inadequate post-transfer extension support for the current number of LRAD projects would continue to be insufficient and ineffective should the redistribution of 30% of agricultural land be achieved. Should CASP assist with agricultural development initially, there is no guarantee that farmers will utilise resources appropriately or that finance will result in a viable farming enterprise. Additionally, the budget that would be required for the post-transfer farm development of LRAD projects, should 30% of agricultural land be redistributed under LRAD, would not be economically viable for the South African economy at current levels of economic growth. The shrinking agricultural economy would caution against over-expenditure on agricultural development especially when LRAD perpetuates commercial agricultural practice that is not efficient or sustainable.

The Government of South Africa has shifted emphasis from the original rights-based principles of land reform. The establishment of GEAR and now ASGISA has entrenched a market based framework for land redistribution and utilisation as a priority over the rights-based principles sought initially by land reform.

8.1 Recommendations

The purpose of this thesis was to address the question: How can the LRAD programme be enhanced? A number of recommendations have been made below. These recommendations were formed through direct and indirect contact with a range of role players, land reform and LRAD policy and intervention at the Loteni LRAD project and are a direct outcome of this thesis research and writing process.
Implications for LRAD policy

Government needs to be cautious when trying to meet land reform targets (i.e. the redistribution of 30% agricultural land by 2014) if this is at the expense of national food security. Government must be careful not to see land reform merely as a means for redistribution of land and neglect the post-transfer development of redistributed land. Government has said that it is committed to land reform and that land reform is more than just transferring land to black owners: it is about creating productive ventures on the land. Whether government has the capacity with current resources to implement an effective post-transfer development strategy is questionable. However, LRAD cannot be implemented or its objectives satisfied without a comprehensive strategy in place that stipulates the requirements of LRAD, the needs of the people, and the roles and responsibilities stakeholders have to play for success.

LRAD policy

One of the key findings of this thesis has been the lack of clarity of LRAD policy. Although the objectives of this programme are stipulated in the policy document, clear indicators are not. Additionally, and more importantly, there is no clear direction for the post-transfer support which the policy document indicates is the key responsibility of the DoA. Although CASP addresses some of the key concerns for post-transfer development it is not aligned comprehensively with LRAD policy.

Shown below are the strategic objectives of LRAD as described in the LRAD policy document. Indicators are proposed as a result of this study to provide clarity on objectives and as a means for assessment of the objectives in order to improve programme performance. Further, an additional objective is proposed.

Strategic objectives of Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development (LRAD)
(as set by the Ministry for Agriculture and land Affairs, 2000. Indicators developed by Daniel Bailey)

1. Contribute to the redistribution of 30% of the country’s agricultural land over 15 years.
Indicators:

• 30% land transfer.
• Independent audit of transfer of land confirms increases/decrease in land as an instrument of political conflict in SA.
• Increase in number of small and medium scale farms.

2. Improve nutrition and incomes of the land dispossessed who want to farm on any scale.

Indicators:

• Reduced vulnerability per key primary health indices (Infant and maternal mortality/ TB/ cholera and STIs).
• Increased availability and range of cash crops in rural poor communities.
• Increase in school attendance (School attendance is a recognised indicator of poverty reduction).
• Increased number of income earners per household.
• Increased potential access to cash crop markets.
• Increase in available cash per household (compared with baseline data).
• Assessment of assets: TV, hifi, tractor etc.

3. Decongest overcrowded former homeland areas.

Indicators:

• Increased land accessibility and agricultural production amongst rural poor.
• Increase in number of small-scale farming co-ops.
• Fewer farms on more land.
• Decrease in illnesses (HIV infection rate).
• Increase in interest in reducing risk-taking health behaviour.

4. Expand opportunities for women and young people who stay in rural areas.

Indicators:

• Increase in number of women/ young people who choose to remain or move to rural areas.
• Increase in number of young people employed in the formal and non-formal agricultural sector.
• Decreased dependence on subsistence farming.
• Entrepreneurship: Increase in cooperations formed within the community.
  Presence of organised groups (e.g. craft groups, community gardens, caterers).

Additional objectives for LRAD include:

1. Increased access to agricultural land by black people and to contribute to the redistribution of approximately 30% of the country’s commercial agricultural land.
   Indicators:
   • Statistical measure (as 1 above)
   • Increase in the number of black owned farms.

2. Overcome the legacy of past racial and gender discrimination in ownership of farmland.
   Indicators:
   • Increased percentage land owned by women.
   • Increased percentage land owned by black people.
   • Increased participation of women in decisions affecting land use.
   • Increased leadership of women in rural areas.

3. Facilitate structural change over the long term by assisting black people who want to establish small and medium sized farms.
   Indicators:
   • Increase in number of black owned farms.
   • Increase in financial assistance to emerging black farmers.
   • Increased number of visits per month by extension services.
   • Increased participation of women in decisions affecting land use.
   • Increased leadership of women in rural areas especially in established cultural/religious institutions.

4. Stimulate growth from agriculture.
   Indicators:
   • Increased area of land available for cultivation.
   • Increase range and yield of crops planted.
• Increased scale of land irrigation.
• Increase use of technology.
• Increased evidence of extension support.
• Financial support services available.

5. Create stronger linkages between farm and off-farm income-generating activities.
   **Indicators:**
   • Increased access to markets.
   • Decreased dependence on subsistence farming only as a means of livelihood.

6. Empower beneficiaries to improve their economic and social well-being.
   **Indicators:**
   • Increase in Adult literacy rate.
   • Increase in number of years at school.
   • Increased access to formal employment.
   • Increase access to primary health services (sanitation, drinking water, reduction in HIV/AIDS prevalence, access to reproductive health - contraceptives, infant / maternal mortality rate, access to medical care/facilities, awareness of health information).

7. Enable those presently accessing agricultural land in communal areas to make better productive use of their land.
   **Indicators:**
   • Responsible access to and use of fertiliser.
   • Range of crops.
   • Access and responsiveness to markets.

8. Promote environmental sustainability of land and other resources.
   **Indicators:**
   • Increase in land area protected (Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife).
   • Decrease in land degradation / and reclamation of degraded land.
   • Decrease in pollution levels / waste disposal and other emissions.
   • Increase in responsible burning regimes.
   • Popularised grazing strategies.
• Decrease in wood collection for fuel/use of alternative energy sources.

**New objective and indicator as a result of this research**

To make the LRAD programme beneficiary compliant.

**Indicators:**

- Development of context specific objectives and indicators for each LRAD project in consultation with beneficiaries.
- Distribution of LRAD policy in language of choice.
- Understanding of LRAD policy.
- Development of business plan in consultation with relevant stakeholders.

**Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E)**

Government M&E has concentrated primarily on the land reform process as a whole. This thesis has highlighted the fact that M&E has to address the requirements of LRAD and not just land reform in general. It is therefore recommended that M&E be set up specifically for LRAD related projects.

Additionally, the means for assessing land reform, in the form of the QoL report, is questionable. The inconsistency found in the research process will have to be rectified if QoL is to remain the primary tool for evaluation of the Land Reform Programme.

A M&E system will pose challenges for government in that it may uncover intelligence that officials may be opposed to. An effective M&E system acts on intelligence regardless of political agendas or prerogatives. Universities and NGOs should assist the monitoring of land reform projects.

The adoption of CASP as the agent for post-transfer agricultural development creates a new dimension for the M&E of LRAD projects.
Common Property Associations (CPAs)

Policy needs to be amended for the inclusion of indicators by which the evaluation of the effectiveness of CPAs can be measured. This could assist with M&E of LRAD projects as most operate as CPAs. Additionally, the reconsideration of the Land Rights Bill which was shelved by the DLA in 2001 is important for strengthening these associations especially where LRAD projects remain as food safety net projects.

Reading to understand

The LRAD Policy is only available in English. This information should be freely accessible to all citizens of South Africa (in the official languages). Therefore, it is important that LRAD policy documents are supplied in the Zulu language in KwaZulu-Natal. Further, it would be of benefit for other documentation, like the CASP, business plans and agricultural assessments, to be provided in a language the LRAD beneficiaries are able to engage with.

The process towards achievement of a common vision between stakeholders

The categorisation of projects in policy has been shown to be irrelevant in practice with regard to the Sibonginhlanhla Project. The process of land reform is about improving the livelihoods of people and the LRAD process is a means to attaining improved livelihoods. However, classification of projects into different categories complicates this process. The Sibonginhlanhla Project should be in its context as a unique project where the stakeholders should be in consultation with each other to determine the best course of action towards achieving a commonly understood objective, which could be production for household consumption, production for markets or both. However, what is important in achieving the objective(s) of the project is that a clear process for action is established, which is driven by all stakeholders, so that gradual development of the Project can occur. Therefore, indicators for the objective(s) need to be identified so that a system of M&E can assist in directing the process towards success. As much as possible, this process should be aligned with CASP processes to ensure effective support from government departments. It is imperative that the extension support understands their responsibilities identified by
stakeholders involved in the Project. A business plan should reflect these processes towards the stated objective in a manner that financial institutions will endorse.

Business plans

The process for the drafting of business plans needs to include relevant stakeholders to ensure that the proposal is desired and viable. Ideally, business plans should be drawn up by emergent farmers in consultation with DoA Extension Support and design agents, and not, as in the case of Sibonginhlalanga Project, solely by DoA Extension Support. An important consideration for the business plan is that it can be submitted to financial institutions and approved for loan purposes where CASP funding cannot support the Project.

Farm and farmer development

- LRAD projects must be complimented by a comprehensive programme of development for emerging farmers that increases self sufficiency and independence with decreasing reliance on extension services or mentors. This should include a process of education in management practices whereby skills for M&E can also be acquired.

- Key agricultural projects should be identified by the DoA to which they provide dedicated extension support with their own field staff and other resources as necessary. Projects that the DoA cannot manage are identified for assistance by mentors, non-governmental organisations, agricultural institutions and other independent sources, which are monitored by the DoA on a periodic basis. This will make better use of the limited DoA staff contingent whilst improving agricultural extension support services.

- The employment of extension officers is critical to the sustainability of LRAD projects. Selection processes need to ensure that the best person is chosen for the job (Preferably local, committed and appropriately qualified personnel). Training programmes for extension staff need to be in place for better understanding of LRAD policy, management principles, project planning and transfer of other information (e.g. new technology). Extension staff vehicles travelling long distances in areas where refuelling is problematic should be fitted with long range fuel tanks. Additionally, the
decentralisation of the provincial offices and district offices to local offices would ensure for better use of resources and greater impact of extension work.

- A mentorship training programme needs to be established to ensure that mentors are properly equipped to assist the emerging farmers they support. This includes a briefing on the LRAD programme, resources available for LRAD projects, expectations of the mentor and the project they undertake to mentor. Further, in addition to the proposed mentor salary, a system of profit sharing would be conducive to encouraging dedicated support from mentors and reduce drop out rates.

- Commercial farmers wishing to sell their land must be incorporated into the LRAD strategy (this is currently being reviewed by DLA, that is the sale of property according to a market based value or a productivity related value). Sale to emerging farmers should be encouraged with the use of incentives. The transfer of land to the LRAD beneficiaries must be speedy in order to avoid commercial farmers selling elsewhere. As part of their sale agreement, a process of mentorship of LRAD beneficiaries should be included.

- Appropriate incentives (For example: remuneration, tax rebates, reduced interest on loans and fees) need to be considered in order to encourage white commercial farmers and former commercial farmers to foster emerging farmers on a continuous basis.

- There are present resources that are under utilised. For example, the University of KwaZulu-Natal could act as an education and information agent. Training could be conducted with DoA staff within this capable setting. Additionally, students could engage with some of the LRAD projects to assist with programme evaluation, project sustainability and implementation.

**Enabling a farming environment**

LRAD requires the scrapping of the Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act, 70 of 1970, as smaller farms are more affordable. Lyne and Darroch (2002) also recommend reducing the inflation rate and decreasing the cost of subdividing and transacting farmland so that
farming can be accessible to those at whom land redistribution is aimed. This would also make agricultural production more accessible to more people making livelihoods more stable and sustainable.

*Land reform should not be seen as an isolated programme*

This thesis has argued that merely distributing land to people has limited effects on the livelihoods of those that stand to benefit. Post-transfer support and development must accompany land reform initiatives if people are to benefit from land reform. Post-transfer support has to include government sectors like health, agriculture, education, housing, welfare and especially local government. The role of local government through integrated planning and development (IDP) should facilitate development on infrastructure and services to support land reform projects.

It is therefore critical that inter departmental communication and collaboration occurs to ensure effective overlap of development initiatives that can support and encourage local communities in the pursuit improved livelihoods.

*Increase the budget*

The DLA’s budget is about 0.5% of the national budget. If land reform through LRAD is to alleviate poverty then more finance will have to be made available not only to the institutions that administer land and support services but also the beneficiaries of land reform.\(^{24}\) The Comprehensive Agricultural Support Programme is one such vehicle whereby finance is made available to emerging farmers. However, as yet it is unclear how many people will benefit or what impacts this programme will have.

Although the DoA has not attained spending targets yet, the DLA is consistently spending its budget which now points to under funding of, rather than under spending on, land reform.

\(^{24}\) Social grants, as the dominant source of income for people in rural areas, should be increased to assist LRAD beneficiaries with their agricultural enterprises.
Determining the land need

A needs assessment should be performed with communities where land is in demand. This will identify what the land is in demand for (agriculture, residence or both) thereby suggesting the appropriate means of land disposal. It is important that the DLA considers land redistribution for settlement purposes as an alternative to the LRAD programme for settling the land need but also for increasing the rate of land redistribution to eligible applicants. Any approach to land redistribution and post-settlement support needs to be aligned with other programmes across departments and municipalities. A budget to adequately address land reform and development needs to be substantial enough to show that government takes this task seriously.

The LRAD policy also fails to consider all forms of agricultural production including permaculture and tunnel propagation where smaller amounts of land are required. Theoretically this would then enable more people to benefit from LRAD.

Regulating land ownership

Land in South Africa is still relatively cheap compared with global prices and it is important that government consider ceilings on land ownership. A step towards regulating foreign ownership has already been made through the PEFOL.

The review of the willing buyer willing seller principle has indicated that criteria need to be established for situations whereby different approaches to land reform, like expropriation, should be taken. This must be done in conjunction with a needs assessment of potential beneficiary communities with serious attempts to listen and act upon the views of the poor.

Sale of LRAD farms

The sale of LRAD farms is a potential problem for government achieving its goal of redistributing 30% agricultural land by 2015. Consideration needs to be given to sales of LRAD farms both in economic distress and where farmers use LRAD grants to upgrade farms and sell for profit.
Enforcement of the law

It needs to be made clear that land invasions and unlawful eviction are not tolerated by government. This thesis has brought out that there is a clear discrepancy between what is on paper (the law) and what actually happens in practice (enforcement). Law makers need to ensure that the law enforcers, the police, have the resources, the know-how and the will to deal with land invasion scenarios. This also indicates that a process of awareness campaigning around issues of land rights would assist in alleviating land tensions between land holders, land occupiers and the landless. The marketing of land redistribution as a procedure for procuring land should also be considered.

Ownership vs leasing of land

While the transfer of land to previously disadvantaged communities is a requirement for inequality and poverty reduction, government should consider reviewing its land ownership and property rights legislation to ensure security of tenure for all who live on land whilst promoting agricultural and non-agricultural ventures. Also, land invasions and evictions continue to undermine the effects of land reform in South Africa. Temporary lease agreements could assist with securing tenure until alternative plans have been made.

Further recommendations for Loteni:

Crime

Stock theft at Loteni is an issue that could be addressed through the Ukuhlamba-Drakensberg Transfrontier Park between Lesotho and South Africa. Civilian patrols by locals working with local police and the Loteni stock theft unit could improve security in the Loteni area.

The improvement of infrastructure

If government is committed to its development goals and growth of the economy it is necessary to provide basic infrastructure. Evidence from Loteni suggests that roads are a
priority if the LRAD beneficiaries are to access markets. Local government needs to
come more focused on service delivery at Loteni.

Markets

Special attention should be given to the needs of small scale farmers to ensure equitable
access to the market for all participants. Small scale agricultural production for markets
should be promoted through incentives.

Sustainable utilisation of natural resources

Agriculture is viable if the supporting natural resources are sustained. This is an important
issue especially where inexperienced emerging farmers are concerned. Monitoring of land
use and natural resources, with appropriate enforcement, is critical to the sustainability of
LRAD projects and rural livelihoods.

Understanding between stakeholders

The viability of LRAD projects is dependent on the LRAD beneficiaries. However, the
Sibonginhlanhla Project consists of people without farm management experience. Whilst
production for markets may be possible over time, after some farming experience has been
gained, it is too early in the Project to encourage this. It should be the role of government
departments to ensure that LRAD beneficiaries only undertake what they are capable of.
DoA extension drafting a business plan without consultation with those it is destined for is
an example of the misunderstandings that persist within government and between other
stakeholders. In the case of the Sibonginhlanhla Project, their aspirations have not yielded
a commercial crop and the diversion of producing for markets has resulted in unnecessarily
low utilisation of land for subsistence cultivation.

Land for settlement

Importantly in the context of the proposed Loteni project under SLAG, Bravo farm was
identified as the preferred land for agricultural activity (Urban-Econ Development
Economists, 1999). However, Bravo, Westview and Glenora are still under state
ownership and these large tracts of land, totaling 2241 ha (more than seven times the size of the Sibonginhlanhla Project), could assist with alleviating the land need at Loteni.

Tourism

A SWOT analysis shown in Appendix 4 shows that one of the opportunities for Loteni is tourism. The issue of land reform and tourism has been sidelined by LRAD and perhaps it is time for government to consider this as alternative land use.

8.2 Conclusion

In conclusion, land reform, and specifically the LRAD programme, cannot be seen in isolation from a broader strategy for development in South Africa. Municipal structures and associated IDPs are important in this process of developing a comprehensive plan, that includes land reform, agricultural reform, food security, local economic development and rural development, to improve the livelihoods of people living in South Africa.

The recommendations above have been suggested to enhance the LRAD Programme. Key among the recommendations made to enhance LRAD is a set of measurable indicators for each of the stated objectives of the LRAD programme. Adopting such indicators will enable the programme to contribute to the improvement of the lives and livelihoods of the intended beneficiaries of LRAD. This makes M&E critical to not only the consistent improvement of LRAD but informing the development of new land reform policy.

8.3 Further research

The effectiveness of CASP for post-transfer agricultural development needs to be ascertained. Additionally, indicators for the objectives of CASP need to be identified and a system of M&E established.

Research into appropriate extension approaches that foster the development of emerging farmers would further contribute to project sustainability. Linked to post-transfer extension support is the role of mentorship. Research into approaches to mentorship that suit South African situations would enhance the impact of mentorship interventions.
Research into exploring the land need in South Africa would inform policy on an appropriate multi-dimensional approach to land redistribution. Exploration into how to enhance IDPs in the facilitation of land redistribution.
References:


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Seizing land, seizing power

The current land invasions along the Vryheid-Babnango road have more to do with a struggle for chieftainship than with the upfitting of a rural community, writes FRED KOCKOTT.

In the government response to the ongoing land invasion, a farm in the Vryheid district was served as a litmus test of any one's ability to deal with land invasions, there is cause for grave concern, not only for the future of organized agriculture but also for general stability, safety and security in the province.

To date, local police and prosecuting authorities have failed to take any action, either against the illegal settlers or self-proclaimed chief Jabulani Mdlalose, who is allegedly encouraging the invasion by allocating plots of privately-owned farmland in exchange for money.

Seemingly emboldened by the absence of law enforcement, Mdlalose recently notified the provincial Department of Rural Development and Land Affairs in writing that the Okhahlamba Tribal Authority had taken possession of 200 farms in the area that had been given back to him by the former government in 1981.

Although no such land claim has been validated, Mdlalose has been telling farmers for the past three years to vacate several farms, which, he says, were promised to his father, the late Chief Dalwanyoni Mdlalose, by the former KwaZulu government.

Illegal occupations have since begun with more than 35 families allegedly occupying land in Vryheid since April last year.

In support of the occupations, Mdlalose showed The Natal Witness a certified copy of a letter from the Department of the Chief Minister of KwaZulu, dated November 17, 1989, that an area comprising 14 farms west of the Vryheid-Babnango road had been allocated to KwaZulu "on condition that the land be used for occupation by Chief Dalwanyoni Mdlalose and his followers".

As the proposal was subject to further negotiations with affected parties, the letter advised the president that the area could be allocated to the tribe that had occupied it in the past, and that the area has as yet been incorporated into the area under jurisdiction.
"I advised Mr Mdlalose that I was willing to sell my land to him and his followers. Since the meeting, he has continued me several times with the same claim. At the first, I feel that I am being intimidated... Snack feed, the stripping of crops, the stealing of fencing and wood, and arson have increased dramatically over the past three years... Hunting with dogs takes place regularly and sometimes my calves are tipped to pieces by their dogs."

Another farmer, Dirk Kotze, advised Steltehorst that his farming operations had supplied 1,005 families with food per month and 100 families with milk each day but that, because of the situation on his farm, he could not keep on producing food. Farms bordering his have been occupied by illegal settlers.

The safety situation has deteriorated drastically over the last three years," said Kotze. "Regular threats have been received. On February 6, my wife and I were brutally attacked by a group of men and robbed of all our possessions from the farm. Money and my vehicle. We fear for our lives. I would like to urgently request the government to purchase my farm at market value." In his letter, Steve van Jaarsveld said he was visited by Jubulani in July 1999 and told of his plans to settle people on various farms. However, Jubulani did not take any action, and he advised the Department of Land Affairs that he could not take possession of the farm.

"It's now a matter of enforcing the law and establishing whether there is sufficient evidence to prosecute Jubulani Mdlalose."

However, in March 2002, Jubulani sent a messenger advising that the occupation was about to begin. Starting with the farm, Wambesnuur, which had been vacated by its owner, Neil Finslooe, for financial reasons and was rented to Landbou Kroëd, the first squatters started erecting structures on April 11, 2002. Van Jaarsveld immediately reported the matter to Gluckstadt police. However, the police declined to take action on the grounds that the legal owner of the farm, in this case Landbou Kroëd, had to lay the charge. Despite many calls to Landbou Kroëd, the matter remained unresolved, although it later emerged that the organisation had submitted affidavits in the interdict application against Jubulani.

On June 24, 2002, Van Jaarsveld noticed another structure being completed on the neighbouring farm, Matzelen, which he is renting. This time, police investigated and reported back to Van Jaarsveld that they could not identify the occupant's structure because the squatter said he had purchased the land from Jubulani.

In appealing for full co-operation from government, Van Jaarsveld said he is willing to support a land-reform programme by selling at market value. Steltehorst forwarded the farmers' letters to KZN Premier Lionel Mkhwebane, who responded on October 21, 2002, advising that he had requested provincial ministers Narend Singh (Agriculture and Rural Development) and Nkosinathi Kunene (Traditional Affairs and Safety and Security) to investigate the matter. In the absence of any action, Steltehorst again wrote to Mkhwebane on November 21.

Jubulani subsequently hosted a meeting in December last year with affected farmers, advising them to take civil action. However, the legal firm representing the farmers, Cox and Partners, is highly critical of this approach. "It might give us lots of business," said the firm's Bertus van der Merwe, "but it can hardly be justified as a citizen to incur the costs of civil litigation to protect his rights where criminal sanctions are available."

"It's really a matter of the authorities concerned doing their jobs properly in this case," said Van der Merwe. "While Cox and Partners have been instructed by farmers to proceed with applications for eviction orders, Van der Merwe said delays in the process will mean that, by the time an eviction order is granted, other squatters might have moved onto the land, giving rise to an endless cycle of litigation that never achieves its end. In one instance, where an eviction was granted, the occupant simply moved back on to the farm and has since resumed building."

Van der Merwe has since written to the Director of Public Prosecutions advising that "a very dangerous situation is developing along the Vryheid-Babamange road, where properties are now being invaded by people who seem to get the impression that authorities will not step in to take the necessary steps to protect the rights of owners."

We urge the Department of Justice and police to do the necessary to ensure the protection of bona fide landowners who are now confronted with unlawful actions that have the potential to create serious conflict, political unrest and instability in the area." Van der Merwe's concerns are shared by the head of the Land Affairs office in Vryheid, Vela Moqwegwe, who has already held several meetings with Gluckstadt police to address their reluctance in dealing with illegal occupations. "Police were saying that there is a fine line between a criminal act and occupation of land where ownership is under dispute," says Moqwegwe. "We sat down to clarify their role in this regard and to some extent have made progress. It's now a matter of enforcing the law and establishing whether there is sufficient evidence to prosecute Jubulani Mdlalose for perpetrating the land invasions."

After their latest meeting with farmers and Nkosinathi Kunene on April 1, ministers Moqwegwe and Singh announced that another meeting with relevant government departments would be held to "strategically proceed forward."

"We must do something as a government to address the issue of invasions as we know that in South Africa invasions are not allowed."

In the meantime, illegal settlement continued with the building of permanent homes and the stocking of land along the Vryheid-Babamange Road.

For more, see the latest issue of Farmers' Weekly.
Appendix 2: LRAD Projects 1 April 2004 to 31 March 2005

Achievements

Despite these challenges, Provincial Land Reform Office in KwaZulu-Natal has been able to implement Labour Tenant Strategy, with the most notable settlement negotiation acquisition being for the Basters Project in Northern KwaZulu-Natal, were 485 Labour Tenants took ownership of 14 235 hectares.

In terms of partnerships, the Minister attended the launch of INKEZO Land Company in September 2004. INKEZO is a Section 21 Company created by the South African Sugar Association (SASA) with the objective of facilitating the transfer of 78 000 hectares of land under sugar cane production by 2014.

KwaZulu-Natal PLRO - consolidated LRAD Projects 1 April 2004 to 31 March 2005

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Consolidated ESTA, churchland & settlement projects

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Appendix 3: Role players identified by the Sibonginhlanhla farmers

The iNdlovu Regional Council is responsible for land use planning, infrastructural development (roads, electricity, water) and the promotion of tourism.

Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife: The neighbour to the community and of importance in terms of employment and tourism is the Loteni Nature Reserve. There have been tensions between this organisation and the community over issues of trespassing for grazing purposes and poaching. This nature reserve is involved with assisting different projects in and around Loteni.

KZN Spice Growers Association is attempting to establish paprika production with Sibonginhlanhla. The Spice Growers association of South Africa was identified as the key stakeholder for income generation in the short term through the propagation of paprika.

The Loteni Development Committee (LDC) is a locally established institution involved with development in the area.

The Loteni Land Crisis Committee (LCC) was established to inform government of the land shortages and encourage land reform at Loteni.

The Business Support Centre (BSC) is sourcing a loan (R25000) for Sibonginhlanhla’s paprika initiative.

The Land Bank has assisted the DLA in the administration of LRAD grants. Sibonginhlanhla has tried to obtain a loan from this bank for production purposes.

KwaZulu-Natal Agricultural Union (KWANALU) is the voice of farm labourers and owners. KWANALU has agents that visit Loteni.

Commercial farmers, there are a number of established commercial farmers in the area.
Appendix 4: Socio-economic information of SLAG beneficiaries

The most important socio-economic characteristics of the 352 SLAG Loteni beneficiaries are:

- The average household size is seven people per household
- The majority of the population is still of school going age
- Most of the community has an educational level of standard four
- The average income per household is R650 per month
- 44% of the community has no income at all
- 16% of the population are unemployed, while 11% are formally employed
- most of the community members have lived in the Loteni area for longer than 10 years
- The Loteni community owns large numbers of livestock

The most important needs of the Loteni community were identified as job opportunities and improved housing.

SWOT Analysis

Strengths:

- Road to Loteni Nature Reserve established
- Linked to Underberg
- Strong community ties
- High rainfall area – agricultural potential
- Good soils
- Tourism established at Loteni Nature Reserve
- Local knowledge of Loteni history
- Art and craft groups already formed

Weaknesses:

- Lack of infrastructure (roads, electricity, water, sanitation, social facilities)
- Mountainous (i.e. steep slopes)
- Low income levels
- Poverty is high
- Large number of dependents
- Low levels of education
- Agricultural limitations - steep slopes
  - limited arable land
  - poor drainage
  - cold temperatures
  - irrigation
  - stock theft
- Distance from market
- Poor bush and veld management (i.e. invader species)

Opportunities:
• Agricultural potential – stock and crop
• Irrigation and water storage potential
• Tourism potential – Loteni and other nature reserves, eco-tourism attractions, tour guiding
• World Heritage Site
• Agricultural training
• Local market for animal and crop production
• Support from various institutions and organisations

Threats:

• Erosion
• Flooding
• Overgrazing
• Pollution of water sources
• Removal of indigenous forests
• Poverty
• Lack of investment
• Population growth
• HIV/AIDS
• Poaching
• Inadequate land management

(Urban-Econ Development Economists, 1999)
## Appendix 5: Demographic information for the Sibonginhlanhla Project

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Appendix 7: Sibonginhlana Project activity chart (refer to Table 11 for English interpretation)
Appendix 8: Leading questions for the semi-structured interviews with the different role players at Loteni

Sibonginhlanhla Project farmers:

Infrastructure

1. Is it easy to get to Underberg?
2. Will it be difficult to get crops to Underberg to sell?
3. Do you think you will be able to make a profit?
4. Where can you buy fertilisers? Are they expensive?
5. Who can help you buy fertilisers?
6. Can you use the tractor yet?
7. Do you have electricity and running water at home?

Environment

1. Is the soil good here?
2. Do you need to irrigate the fields or is there enough rain?
3. When was the last drought or flood?
4. How long have you been a farmer? Do you think the land is still in good condition for growing crops? When was the land in better condition?
5. Do you plant crops every year? What do you plant? Who helps you plant?
6. Is it for family consumption? Can you sell any produce?
7. Do other people use the Sibonginhlanhla land?
8. Who controls land use at Loteni? Can local people participate in decision making over resources?

Understanding of policy

1. What is your understanding of LRAD?
2. What do you think LRAD is meant to do?
3. Do you think other people in the community know about LRAD?
4. How were the LRAD beneficiaries chosen? (i.e. democratically or dictatorially)
5. Do you think people who were not chosen are jealous/angry/upset?
6. Do you remember SLAG?
7. What about the people who were promised homes? Are they angry with government for not providing houses?
8. Where you one of those people?

Support services

1. How often does the extension worker visit Loteai?
2. What has the DoA contributed to the project?
3. Do you think the DoA extension worker must continue to visit or is he/she wasting your time?
4. Has the DLA returned to visit?
5. Have they offered to help?
6. Have any other organisations offered your group assistance?

Finance

1. How many family members live away from home? Do they send money home?
2. What other income do you have?
3. How easy is it for you to obtain a loan?

Visioning

1. How often does the group meet?
2. Who leads the meetings?
3. What do you talk about?
4. What does the group want to do with the land? Does everyone agree?
5. Has the group written this (the goals of the project) down?
6. What do you need to achieve your goals?
7. How long will this take?
8. How has/will this project make your life better?

Demographics

1. How many dependents do you have? What are their ages?
2. What formal education have you had?
3. What form of income do you get and approximately how much is this?

DLA field officer:

1. What is the history behind the involvement of the DLA at Loteni?
2. How was the shift from the SLAG approach to the LRAD approach received at Loteni?
3. How were the LRAD beneficiaries selected?
4. How has the agricultural development component of LRAD been implemented at Loteni?
5. What is the relationship like between the DLA and the DoA?
6. How does the DLA see the Sibonginhlanhla Project progressing?

DoA extension officer:

1. How has the DoA assisted the Sibonginhlanhla Project farmers?
2. What does the DoA want the Project to achieve?
3. What constraints is the Project / DoA facing? And how can these be remedied?

DoA ADSS project manager:

1. What is the role of the DoA ADSS in LRAD?
2. What is the situation at Loteni from the perspective of ADSS?
3. Which business plan will be implemented? And how?
4. Do you see the Sibonginhlanhla Project being viable?
5. How effective is the DoA in providing extension support?

**KZN Wildlife regional manager:**

1. Are the commercial farmers in the area supportive of emerging black farmers?
2. What are some of the key issues for established commercial farmers in the area?