African Solutions to African Problems: Assessing the African Union’s Application of Endogenous Conflict Resolution Approaches

By

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation advances the discourse on Africa’s substantive values and priorities in conflict resolution. This is done by exploring the principles of ‘African solutions to African problems’, particularly in conflict resolution, and the implications of the identified ‘African solutions’ for the African Union’s conflict resolution efforts. The thesis is premised on the background that the maxim ‘African solutions to African problems’ was developed in the context of growing misgivings about the reliability, motive and efficiency of external interventions in Africa. This is coupled with the belief among African thinkers and politicians that the lasting solutions to Africa’s challenges can only be secured by African-oriented solutions. However, there have been inadequate explorations of what constitutes African solutions and its influence on Pan-African conflict resolution interventions.

Using a constructivist framework and a qualitative methodology with reliance on interview data from African peace and security experts as well as literary discourses on African indigenous conflict resolution, this dissertation explores the substantive value of the maxim ‘African solutions to African problems’ and the implications for the interventionist outlook employed by the African Union. The research employs the case study of the African Union’s intervention in Somalia to assess the achievements, challenges and prospects in the application of African solutions.

The findings of the dissertation highlights that ‘African solutions’ in conflict resolution does not refer to unique elements. Rather they refer to Africa’s prioritized values in conflict resolution that may be in consonant or discordant with those of other geopolitical regions, but significant enough to advance self-determination, local ownership and the quest for sustainable solutions in Africa. Although it emerged from the misgivings about external impositions and interventions in Africa, the maxim ‘African Solutions to African problems’ indicts African actors for their failure to exhibit appropriate agency in terms of advancing context-sensitive solutions to the continent’s challenges. In line with the theoretical framework of constructivism which argues that the international system is influenced by prevailing ideas, the ideals of African solutions obliges Africa to critic and enhance its values and priorities, and negotiate them within the prevailing theory and practice of conflict resolution without being constrained by the dictates and approaches of dominant powers.

Keywords: Pan-Africanism; Constructivism; African Union; Indigenous conflict resolution; African solutions to African problems; African Peace and Security Architecture; Identity
DECLARATION

I, Ndubuisi Christian Ani, 212510102 declare that:

1. The research reported in this thesis, except where otherwise indicated, is my original research.

2. This thesis has not been submitted for any degree or examination at any other university.

3. This thesis does not contain other persons’ data, pictures, graphs or other information, unless specifically acknowledged as being sourced from other persons.

4. This thesis does not contain other persons' writing, unless specifically acknowledged as being sourced from other researchers. Where other written sources have been quoted, then:

   A) Their words have been re-written but the general information attributed to them has been referenced

   B) Where their exact words have been used, then their writing has been placed in italics and inside quotation marks, and referenced.

5. This thesis does not contain text, graphics or tables copied and pasted from the Internet, unless specifically acknowledged, and the source being detailed in the thesis and in the References sections.

Author: -------------------------- --------------------------

Ani Ndubuisi Christian Date: 28 November 2015

Supervisor: Dr. Khondlo Mtshali Date: 28 November 2015
DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to the African Union and conflict resolution organizations in Africa.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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Chapter 1:

Setting the Scene

1. Introduction

This dissertation advances existing literature on African conflict resolution principles and approaches by exploring the substantive values of the maxim ‘African solutions to African problems’ and its implications for the African Union’s conflict resolution initiatives. The research is premised on the background that a number of authors have explored Africa’s peace and security mechanisms and interventions with focus on issues such as resource capacity, political will and institutional objectives. While the foregoing discourses are important, the ideas and values that constitute ‘African solutions’ to African problems are not well captured. There is little inquiry about what constitutes African oriented-solutions and how it could be reflected in the interventionist efforts of African actors.

The interest in Africa’s solutions in conflict resolution is based on the growing misgivings about external interventions in Africa as well as the dominant belief and activism among African thinkers and politicians that only African-oriented solutions can secure lasting solutions to Africa’s challenges. The recent robust security stance and interventions of Africa’s continental organizations – however limited and wanting – are signs of the renewed commitment by African actors to uphold and fulfil the ideals of African solutions wherever possible (Dersso 2012; Apuuli 2012; Williams 2011). For this research project, the clamour for African solutions raises interests around the following relevant but under-explored question:

- What constitutes African-oriented solutions in terms of conflict resolution?

It is worth noting that there is a growing critique that peace and security initiatives in Africa and other developing countries are undertaken under the paragons of dominant powers to the detriment of other outlooks that could contribute to sustainable solutions (Avruch 2002; Lacroix and Neufeldt 2010). For Salem (2007), the mainstream conception of conflict resolution portrays fundamental ideas, assumptions, beliefs, values and thought processes of dominant/western powers. Such considerations have led to the quest for context-specific solutions and the clamour for an inclusive conflict resolution perspective in the global scene. Despite the growing activism for ‘African solutions’ in Africa
however, there remains a paucity of attention paid to the nature and relevance of Africa’s prioritized approaches in terms of conflict resolution.

Using the theoretical framework of constructivism\(^1\), this doctoral thesis thus advances the existing literature on African solutions in peace and security by examining the key elements of African conflict resolution framework based on two benchmarks:

- Firstly, based on the perspectives of peace and security experts in the continent and

- Secondly, based on the consideration of the literary discourses on African traditional conflict resolution model.

With the feedback received from African peace and security experts and the literary discourses on African traditional conflict resolution model, the thesis further explores the implication of the highlighted African values (solutions) in conflict resolution approaches for the African Union’s interventions. The thesis utilizes the case study of Somalia - where the AU has been playing a leading role in the resolution of the conflict for a longer duration using multi-dimensional approaches – to assess the African Union’s achievements, challenges and prospects in the provision of African solutions to the internal challenges in Africa. By so doing, the dissertation contributes to the understanding of Africa’s substantive values in the theory and practice of conflict resolution.

The following section provides an overview of the background and aim of the research.

1.1 Research Background

As observed aptly by Arman (2014), ‘one of the most potent intoxicants in Africa today is canned phrase “African solutions to African problems”’. Nathan (2013) observes aptly that “African solutions to African problems” ‘is an emotive, politically charged call that resonates equally among governments and civil society on the continent.’ The maxim mirrors the dominant belief among African thinkers and politicians that only African-

\(^1\) Constructivism advances the view that the significant influence in international relations is the prevailing ideas generated from social relationships as opposed to the view of neo-realists and neoliberalists that material factors influences global relations. In line with the notion of constructivism, it is imperative to understand the prevailing ideas around what constitutes African oriented solutions in the theory and practice of conflict resolution.
oriented endeavours can provide long-lasting solutions to Africa’s challenges, irrespective of the laudable efforts of external actors (Nhema 2008: 3; Ayittey 1994; Ngwane 1996; Mazrui 2008; Apuuli 2012). During the July 2012 African Union (AU) summit in Addis Ababa, Jean Ping, the outgoing AU Commission chairperson, surmises this confidence by stating that ‘the solutions to African problems are found on the continent and nowhere else’ (Pambazuka News, 2012). This raises interests around what constitutes ‘African solutions’.

In the interdependent global order, the maxim ‘African solutions to African problems’ is particularly concerning as it tends to suggest the existence of essential ‘African solutions’ to a unique African-based problem. Yet, historical experiences show that the solutions to the problems of a particular region could be found not only within the region but also outside the state or region. Likewise, the problems faced by Africa—such as conflicts, state failure, poverty, underdevelopment etc. - are not uniquely African problems per se but are global problems (Cusimano 2000; Hoeffler 2008). Hence, why is there a clamour for African solutions to African problems rather than a call for a coordinated effort to resolve the challenges faced by Africa? Is the idea of African solutions an isolationist notion that cuts off other actors in the response to African problems?

A critical overview of the literature on African’s history and challenges however reveal that the maxim ‘African solutions to African problems’ is anchored on:

1. The misgivings about the motive, reliability and efficiency of the interventions from powerful actors from other geopolitical regions, and

2. The view that the lasting solution to the problems in Africa can only be secured by African-oriented solutions

The following sub-sections provides a concise highlight of these issues which are engaged in-depth in chapter 4.

1.1.1 External Solutions to Africa’s Problems

Firstly, the rhetoric on “African solutions” presupposes that Africa has not been at the forefront of addressing its challenges and that external actors play leading roles in the
resolution of Africa’s challenges. The UN\(^2\) and its agencies, and the European Union (EU) as well as powerful states such as the United States (U.S), France, Britain, Russia, etc. have been at the forefront of proffering and implementing solutions for the socio-economic and political challenges in Africa.

Pertinent to peace and security, the proactive interventions of external actors have aided in containing many conflicts in Africa. However, the maxim on African solutions to African problems thrives on the concerns around such interventions. There has been growing critique that external interventions may at times be driven by ulterior interests and that they often provide cosmetic solutions, worsen security contexts, undermine local interests and values, and perpetuate neo-colonialism in Africa (Brock-Utne 2001; Nhema 2008: 3; Boege 2011; Bukari 2011; Run 2013). These criticisms are considered in terms of the efficiency, motive and reliability of external interventions.

In terms of reliability, the 1994 Rwandan genocide points to the possibility of African states being abandoned by foreign actors in times of need especially when intervention in a crisis scenario is not in their interest. During the armed conflicts in DRC, Liberia and Sierra Leone in the late 1990s, the UN and western powers that are keen to intervene in Africa were not proactive enough to seek an end to the crisis (Williams 2011). In the cases of Liberia and Sierra Leone, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) responded to the crises by sending troops to the two countries to quell the crisis. Moreover, Africa is faced with numerous socio-political and economic challenges that could hardly be solved by outsiders whose national interests take precedence.

In terms of efficiency, while the interventions of external actors have played a role in containing conflicts in Africa, the approaches used have been adjudged to provide cosmetic solutions that do not yield lasting peace and security in many conflict regions (Zartman 2000; Ayittey 1994; Somerville 1990). Some authors have noted that the intervention of external actors, particularly western actors who are the dominant interveners in Africa’s political affairs, are mainly coercive through the use of militaristic

\(^2\) Even though Africa is represented in the so-called global organization “the United Nations (UN)”, the UN is often deemed to be driven by powerful states. The interventions of the UN Security Council (UNSC) which is particularly charged with world peace and security represents mainly the views and resolution of the five powerful states in the world namely the US, Britain, France, China and Russia. Hence, the study considers the UN as an external actor alongside other states and actors outside Africa.
and legalistic approaches in the attempt to address Africa’s challenges (Brock-Utne 2001; Nhema 2008: 3; Boege 2011; Bukari 2011; Run 2013).

The US-led UN intervention in Somalia in 1992 was adjudged to have been embarked on with little consideration of the efficiency of military intervention in the conflict setting (Life and Peace Institute 1995). The case of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)’s 2011 military intervention in the oil-rich Libya is a glaring case were dominant powers imposed their solutions with dire consequences in Africa. The anarchy and state failure that threatens Libya’s stability as well as the stability of neighbouring regions have a lot to do with the abrupt military solution applied to resolve the uprising against Gaddafi’s regime. Zartman (2000: 3) maintains that despite the intervention of foreign seasoned peacemakers and peacekeepers in the attempt to solve conflicts in Africa, many conflicts in the continent remain unresolved.

In terms of motive, the parochial interests of foreign powers with regard to Africa’s mineral wealth tend to raise alarm about interventions from foreign powers. It is feared that interventions of external actors are geared towards gaining access to Africa’s resources. Even if it is well intended, external intervention in Africa conjures up images of colonialism, imperialism and the blatant display of superiority by western powers in particular (Somerville 1990: 1). Despite the denigration of claims to racial superiority and the decolonization of Africa, it is still feared that the vestiges of white western superiority persists through the ready solutions and recommendations imported/imposed on the continent.

Some authors argue that the subtle motive of external interventions is to deepen the idea of the superiority of dominant powers (Jeng 2012; Salem 2007). It is worth noting that the while some of the implemental initiatives for addressing Africa’s challenges are carried out by African actors, there is a school of thought that insist that many peace and security initiatives are often carried out under the paragons of dominant powers/western actors (Avruch 2002; Lacroix and Neufeldt 2010). For Salem (2007), the mainstream conception of conflict resolution portrays fundamental ideas, assumptions, beliefs, values and thought processes of dominant/western powers. In ‘Decolonizing Conflict Resolution’, Walker (2004) argues that the power imbalance in the research and practice in conflict resolution perpetuates colonialism and upholds the hegemony of western views, while indigenous worldviews are marginalized.
Thus, whether an intervention is carried out by an African actor or an external actor, the interventions could reek of the construction, perspectives and disposition of dominant powers as discussed in chapter 3. Many African thinkers have noted this dynamics and the limitations of the so-called dominant western perspective by advocating for a critical engagement with the role of Africa’s indigenous values in terms of peace and security (Run 2013; Ramose 2011; Boege 2011). It is against the foregoing background that calls for African solutions gain momentum.

1.1.2 The Role of Africa in Solving its Problems

The entailments of ‘African solutions’ however remains a complex issue in terms of what to expect when the concept is invoked in a bid to address security challenges in the continent. In view of the divergent capacities and value systems of the different states in Africa, what could be considered African solutions and how can they be identified. Notably, the uneven power capacities in Africa entails that some powerful states in Africa such as Nigeria, South Africa and Egypt could assert their views and approaches as continental approaches. Moreover, different values and interests in Africa raises concerns on how to identify common positions or approaches to conflict resolution that could be considered ‘African’.

Furthermore, the maxim ‘African solutions to African problems’ has become a selling-brand for individuals (especially politicians), groups, associations and organizations seeking to garner support for any course initiated in (or for) Africa without an adequate engagement with the values and entailments of the maxim. Some African leaders have also misused the idea of ‘African solutions to African problems’ to advance their interests (Møller 2009; Dembinski and Reinold 2011). When they face internal challenges in their respective states they accuse external actors and colonialism for the challenges faced in the continent. To guard against being scrutinized and criticized, regimes and political figures in Africa have also invoked the maxim ‘African solutions to African problems’ to suggest that their actions are in sync with traditional approaches to governance (Alulai 2013).

While the foregoing are concerns that challenges the understanding of the discourse on African solutions, the maxim in itself begs for a deeper engagement to highlight its fundamental entailments in Africa. In the conclusion of his article entitled ‘African solutions to African problems: South Africa’s foreign policy’, Nathan (2013) notes that
‘in the absence of unity (among AU member states), it is unclear what the ‘African solution’ is, the AU and sub-regional bodies are unable to act with common purpose and there is hence more space for non-African actors to intervene.’

The engagement with existing literature however indicates that the aphorism ‘African solutions’ is a call for a continent wide coordination and harmonization of interests and values in a bid to address the common challenges faced by Africa (AU Agenda 2063, 2014; Parker and Rukare, 2002; Murithi, 2009). The aphorism has its roots in Pan-Africanism which developed in the 1900s to espouse African unity for common cause and freedom from domination.³ Pan-Africanism has over the years motivated African actors to pursue a continent wide cooperation to address the challenges in the continent. The calls for African solutions to African problems resonate with Marcus Garvey’s Pan-African arguments in the early 1900s. Garvey argued for Africa’s self-governance through his motto: “Africa for Africans”.

In I Speak Freedom, Kwame Nkrumah (1961) had posited that ‘for too long in our history, Africa has spoken through the voices of others. Now what I have called the African Personality in International affairs will have a chance of making its proper impact and will let the world know it through the voices of Africa’s own sons.’ It is along these lines that Ali Mazrui in his 1967 seminal work titled Towards a Pax Africana insisted on an inter-African intervention to the challenges in Africa as against the external meddling in the newly independent states in the continent.

In a like-manner, the maxim of African solutions to African problems is a quest to engage with the ideals of pan-Africanism which encourages the self-reliance and unity of people of Africa to confront the continent’s challenges and materialize Africa’s aspirations. In the early 1990s, George Ayittey (1994), in ‘Policy Analysis: The Somali Crisis: Time for an African Solution’, stresses that African-solutions should be employed to tackle the Somali crisis given the supposed poor interventionist effort of external actors. Ayittey (1994) insists that African states should be more proactive in resolving the conflicts in the

³ The maxim also resonates with the notion of African Renaissance which developed in the late 1990s to assert that the people of Africa and nations overcome the continents challenges and attain cultural, economic and scientific rebirth. The brief dalliance of the African Renaissance movement during Thabo Mbeki’s leadership tenure from the late 1990s to the early 2000s also highlights Africa’s desire to address its challenges.
continent to guard against unsuitable external solutions. A respondent for this study from AU Mission in Somalia observes that:

*The catchall phrase 'African solution to African problems' was coined by the eminent political economist George Ayittey in response to the behavior of the international community in the crisis in Somalia. Since then the phrase acquired a degree of autonomy. The author advocates what he calls ownership of solutions i.e. if you formulate your own solutions to your problems, you would have every reason and incentive to see them work* (Respondent 10).

While the idea of African solutions to African problems was extant since the decolonization of Africa and the creation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), a significant number of authors observe that the clamour for African solutions gained momentum around the establishment of the African Union which marked Africa’s renewed commitment to address its challenges (Dersso 2012; Apuuli 2012; Nathan 2011). Although the OAU established the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution in June 1993 in view of the cognizance of the security conundrum in the continent, the regional body was not able to intervene proactively to resolve Africa’s conflict challenges. This was based on the non-interference foundation of the policies and mechanisms of the regional body. The incapacities of the regional led to the debate for a more united and integrated Africa to address the challenges in the continent at the OAU Summit on 9 September 1999 (OAU 1999).

The AU since its establishment in 2002 has been equipped with normative and institutional mandates to coordinate and spearhead the provision of African solutions wherever possible (AU CADSP: Preamble; Apuuli 2012; Williams 2011; Tieku 2007; Kioko 2003; ISS Today 2008; Nathan 2013). Relative to the OAU-era, it has been argued that the robust security interventions of the AU as well as the sub-regional organizations are examples of the renewed commitment by African leaders to uphold and fulfil the ideal of African solutions to African problems wherever possible (Dersso 2012; Apuuli 2012; Williams 2011).

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4 The African Union’s Key Message document that circulated prior to the 50th Anniversary of OAU/AU celebration in 2013 stated that by 2063, it is hope that the ‘African Peace and Security and Governance Architectures’ would be strengthened ‘to ensure African Solutions to African problems’ (AU 2013: 3).
Some authors however argue that many peace and security efforts carried out under the banner of African solutions to African problems have not shown that they are indigenously driven and conceived (Arman 2014). Dersso (2012: 11) notes that ‘despite the fact that the political ideal of ‘African solutions to African problems’ underlying the APSA is routinely used in the literature and policy circles, questions still remain on what it actually entails and how it informs and shapes African policy making on peace and security issues affecting the continent.’ As observed earlier, the interest in Africa’s solutions for conflict resolution derives from the increasing critique that peace and security initiatives in Africa and other developing countries are undertaken under the paragons of dominant powers to the detriment of other outlooks that could contribute to sustainable solutions (Salem 2007; Avruch 2002; Lacroix and Neufeldt 2010).

In Africa, despite the growing activism for African solutions, there remains a paucity of attention paid to the nature and relevance of Africa’s values particularly in terms of conflict resolution. The AU Study on an African Union Government: Towards a United States of Africa observes that expertise, education including technology and trade in Africa have seen over-dependence on foreign actors thereby requiring African Actors to collectively enhance the capability and capacities of Africa to fully participate in shaping international norms and agenda (AU Study on an African Union Government: Towards a United States of Africa, 2006: 6-8). While this is an aspiration of Africa, there has been little research that engages with what constitutes ‘African solutions’ to ascertain Africa’s substantive contribution to the theory and practices of peace and security as emphasized in chapter 2.

Informed by the foregoing problematic, this dissertation advances the knowledge of Africa’s conflict resolution framework by inquiring into the contemporary peace and security stance and initiatives of the African Union and linking it to the debate on Africa’s indigenous conflict resolution outlook. As such, the study engages with the meaning of ‘African solutions’ in conflict resolution and its implication for the African Union’s interventions.

The study is cognizant that there are no ready-made solutions to conflicts in Africa and anywhere in the world given that each conflict case presents its unique challenges. Each

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5 In July 2007, the notion of “African solutions to African problems” was discussed and popularized at the Accra Summit of the AU where African leaders debated on the formation of the Union Government (ISS Today 2008).
conflict scenario require its creative solution. Thus, rather than examine the strategies or systems that could solve conflicts, the study restricts its analysis to the guiding principles, ideas or outlooks that could answer the question; what constitutes African solutions? Drawing from the case study of the AU’s interventions in Somalia, the project investigates the achievements, challenges and prospects in terms of the realization of the ideals of African solutions to African problems.

1.2 The Primary Research Objectives and Questions

Objectives: The three primary objectives of the research are to:

1. Investigate the substantive values of the maxim ‘African solutions to African problems’ in terms of conflict resolution.

2. Examine the implications of African-oriented solutions for the African Union’s conflict resolution outlook and interventions.

3. Explore the African Union’s achievements, challenges and prospects in implementing African solutions in terms of conflict resolution in Africa.

Questions: The three key questions to be asked are:

1. What are the African-oriented solutions in terms of conflict resolution?

2. What are the implications of the African-oriented solutions for the African Union’s conflict resolution outlook?

3. What are the African Union’s achievements, challenges and prospects in implementing African solutions to the conflicts in Africa?

1.2.1 The Broad Research Objectives and Questions

The broad objectives of the thesis are to:

1. Explore the potential of African conflict resolution frameworks in terms of securing lasting peace and security in the continent.

2. Explore the grounds for the complementary role of external actors in the conflict resolution efforts in Africa.
3. Examine Africa’s contribution to the global theory and practice of conflict resolution.

The Broad Questions to be asked are:

1. What is potential of African conflict resolution frameworks in terms of securing sustainable peace and security in the continent?

2. What are the grounds for the complementary role of external actors in the conflict resolution efforts in Africa?

3. What is Africa’s contribution to the global theory and practice of conflict resolution?

1.3 Significance of Study

The significance of this thesis lies in its input to the comprehension of Africa’s values in conflict resolution for lasting solutions to Africa’s peace and security concerns. The dissertation argues that the significance of the maxim ‘African solutions to African problems’ is not only for the political merit of improving security conditions in Africa. The materialization of the ideals of ‘African solutions’ is highly significant in bolstering the identity and dignity of Africans who remain fettered to lingering racist assumptions and attitudes that suggest the inferiority of African minds and their inability to solve their problems. This includes the need to challenge and dispel the negative impression of Africa as a conflict-prone region. The attainment of the ideals of African solutions goes a long way to empower Africa to negotiate its ideologies and values in the global system where it has thus far played the role of a mere add-on with negligible consequence.

The dissertation comes in line with the increasing expectation for the Pan-African organization, African Union, to coordinate the efforts to address the internal conflicts that have negatively affected peace, self-determination and development in Africa (AU 2005). In 2009, the AU Heads of States and Governments adopted the Tripoli Declaration on the Elimination of Conflicts in Africa and the Promotion of Sustainable Peace. In the 50th Anniversary Solemn Declaration, African leaders insist that ‘we pledge not to bequeath the burden of conflicts to the next generation of Africans, and undertake to end all wars
in Africa by 2020. Through Agenda 2063⁶, the African Union has committed itself to maintaining peace and engaging in ‘a sustained strategy to silence the guns by 2020’ (AU Agenda 2063: 6-7; AU Commission 2014: 28). Such declarations and agenda emphasizes the need for endogenous African solutions to the conflict challenges in the continent to ensure sustainable solutions.

Hence, the dissertation stimulates intellectual debates on African identity and values, and explores Africa’s substantive values in the theory and practice of conflict resolution. The research highlights the aspirations, pessimisms and optimisms for an efficient inter-African solutions in conflict resolution. This is to provide specialists, scholars, and policy makers with nuanced data on how to address the conflict challenges in the continent and generate complementary models for the resolution of conflicts in other spheres of the globe.

1.4 Scope and Limitation of the study

The research restricts its examination primarily to the exploration of the principles that underline ‘African solutions’ to the intra-state conflict challenges in Africa. The thesis also engages with the African Union’s achievements, challenges and prospects in actualizing African solutions. The following sections accounts for the scope and limitations of this research:

1.4.1 The choice of the phrase ‘African solutions to African problems’

It is important to note that the idea of African solutions has been phrased under different headings such as “African solutions to African challenges”, “African solutions to African problems” and “African-led solutions to African problems”, among others. The first two phrases tends to be quite parallel. However, the common phrase used is “African solution to African problems” as seconded by the African Union’s documents and other literatures with the headings ‘African solutions to African problems’ (Apuuli 2012; Møller 2009; Ayittey 1994; Nathan 2013). The latter with the heading “African-led solutions to African problems” as employed by the IPSS and used by Komey, Osman, and Melakedingel

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⁶ In line with the AU Vision through the 50th Anniversary Solemn Declaration and African aspirations, African Leaders charged the AU commission to develop Agenda 2063 which ‘is an endogenous, Shared Strategic Framework for Inclusive Growth and Sustainable Development, for Africa’s transformation over the next 50 years’ (AU Commission 2014). Agenda 2063 seeks to ensure that Africa is at the forefront of spearheading the solutions to the challenges in the continent in line with the aim of providing African solutions to African problems.
(2013) tends to be complementary with the notion “African solutions to African problems”. However, the difference between the two lies in the fact that “African-led” solutions places emphasis on who implements rather than the quiddity (essence) of the solutions.

The maxim “African solutions to African problems” allows for a broader understanding and debate on implemental and conceptual aspects of solutions applied to solve Africa’s problems. It also provides opportunities for African oriented approaches to be negotiated at the global arena irrespective of the actor that leads the solution attempts. It is important to also bear in mind that by reference to African values, principles and approaches, the author does not espouse the rejection of external solutions. Rather, these references are made to understand Africa’s disposition towards the resolution of challenges.

Furthermore, it is noteworthy that the African problems referred to by the maxim “African solutions to African problems” encompass political, social and economic issues. However, the African problems referred to in this thesis are particularly focused on the conflict challenges in the continent. As observed by Nathan (2013), although the notion of African solutions to African problems is relevant to every issue, it is commonly used in relation to the efforts to secure peace and security in the continent. By attending to the security concerns in the continent, African actors hope to provide the much needed security needed for Africa to materialize its political, economic and social aspirations including being a strong actor in the global arena as noted in page 3 of the African Union (AU) Constitutive Act.

In terms of security challenges, the research restricts its unit of analysis to intra-state conflicts. This is informed by the contemporary predominance of intra-state conflicts in Africa and across the globe since the demise of the Cold War era (Butler 2009; Cusimano 2000). The research further focuses on the broad approaches to ‘conflict resolution’ as delineated in chapter 3.3.1. This is to make the study more focused and manageable.

1.4.2 The interest on the African Union

The object of this research is the African Union and its African Peace and Security Architecture. The interest in the African Union’s role in terms of ‘African solutions to African problems’ is based on the backdrop that the continental body enjoys greater representation of African states than other sub-regional organizations that make up the
geopolitical region called “Africa”. While the sub-regional organizations in Africa could lead in the provision of African solutions, their interests are mainly for a limited group of African states. Through the Constitutive Act of the AU as well as other relevant policies, the AU has been bestowed with the primary role of harnessing and coordinating the agenda and power capacities of Africa in the attempt to ensure the realization of African solutions. As noted by Kobbie (2009), the capability to resolve the conflicts in Africa is a major determinant of the role of the AU as a continental leader and the AU being a continental organization, has an institutional and moral responsibility to promote and enforce peace and security in Africa.

Moreover, by reference to ‘African solutions to African problem’, the maxim is often used in reference to the continent-wide attempt at addressing the continent’s challenges. Thus, the study investigates the African Union’s initiatives through the African Peace and Security Architecture which is the specialized framework and mechanism for Africa to pursue its agenda for peace and security in the continent. The study contends that if the AU, as a pan-African institution, is to pride as an institution that is committed to representing the values of Africa, it needs some guiding African principles to guide its attempts at conflict resolution.

1.4.3 The case study of Somalia?

The case of the African Union’s response to the conflict in Somalia is especially important for the assessment of the “solutions” that have been used by the AU to respond to Africa’s conflict challenges. One may want to see a broad examination of the conflict resolution efforts of the African Union in various states to enable a deduction of the AU’s approach. However, the examination of the AU’s resolution efforts in Somalia is based on the fact that the African Union has been playing a leading role in the resolutions of the conflicts using a multi-dimensional approach that involved both diplomatic, mediatory and military mechanisms over a longer period of time.

The research is cognizant that the African Union has only carried out short-term interventions in countries like Burundi and Comoro Islands. The African Union’s missions in Burundi (from 2003 to 2004) and Comoro Islands (in 2004, 2006 and 2007 to 2008) lasted in less than two years intervals. The recent AU peacekeeping deployments in Mali and in the Central African Republic also provides little avenue for examining the AU’s conflict resolution efforts because the missions were short-term and more
militaristic in nature and there is no indication of the AU taking a leading and continued role in resolving the conflicts.

It is worth noting that the AU established a mission to address the crisis in Darfur - Sudan between 2004 and 2007 and the AU has continued to play a role in the resolution of the crisis through the joint AU-UN mission in Darfur (UNAMID) that was established in 2007 to date. However, given the shared responsibility of the UN and the AU in Darfur, an examination of the AU’s role in Darfur will present challenges in terms of assessing the AU’s solutions to the conflict challenges in Africa in terms of the discourse on African solutions. Examining the AU’s relatively short-term responses in Burundi, Comoro Islands, Sudan, Mali and CAR presents challenges in terms of engaging with the sundry issues surrounding African solutions.

To make the study more manageable and in-depth, the study focuses on the African solutions in Somalia. The African Union’s interventions in Somalia stands out as an interventionist cases where the African Union continues to spearhead the peace and state-building efforts in the country since 2007. At the time of the completion of this thesis, the AU mission in Somalia is the only existing peace operation launched under AU command and control. Through the case study of Somalia, the research looks into the approaches and principles adopted by the AU in providing African solutions to the conflict scenarios and assesses the effectiveness of the solutions applied.

1.4.4 What is African?

This dissertation notes that generalizations about geographical, cultural and social groupings as expressed in terms such as “western” and “non-western”, “Africa” and “non-African” are faced with the risk of essentialism, over-simplification and reductionism. In the globe today, categorizations of people based on distinct groupings is flawed because of the fluidity of values, identity and interests. A person of western origin may hold values and interests that are akin to persons from an African origin and vice versa. This study notes from the outset that the use of the foregoing categorizing terms is not meant to essentialize the interests and values of a group. Rather, they are meant to refer to the identified patterns of values and interests of groups of people with shared experiences, culture, norms, beliefs and value system. Based on the scope of this study, the research is limited in terms of seeking to establish the criteria for the categorization of people and making distinctions between ‘African’ and ‘non-African’. The research thus works with
a limited notion of ‘African’ that is derived based on the considerations of geographical history and experiences as well as some identified shared values and interests that runs across the continent of Africa.

Furthermore, the thesis uses external and foreign interventions to refer to intervention by ‘non-African’ actors unless stated otherwise. It is crucial to note that external, foreign or non-African intervention are difficult and complex concepts to comprehend given the complicity of local actors in some of those interventions. Moreover, the intervention by an African country or organization in another African state could be seen as an external intervention. For the purpose of this study however, external, foreign or non-African interventions is used interchangeably to refer to those interventions from actors outside Africa whose principles, values and goals could run parallel or divergent from the predominant values, principles and goals of Africa.7

As highlighted in chapter 3, the traditional and cultural disposition of western actors informed their interventionist approaches across the globe. Through the resource and power base of the west, these interventionist approaches and views have been propagated as mainstream perspectives. From a constructivist perspective, one could argue that dominant perspectives in global relations is one-sided as it is based on the ideas and frameworks of particular groups. If equilibrium is to be attained, or rather, if divergent perspectives are to be highlighted, there is value in projecting ones ideas to contribute or challenge prevailing mainstream ideas. Hence, the need to engage with the so-called African solutions in contemporary world order that is dominated by the perspectives of dominant powers.

1.5 Research Methods:

1.5.1 Research Design and Methodology

The dissertation’s research design is premised on the consideration that the primary research question for this thesis is around what constitutes African solutions in conflict resolution as problematized by the maxim African solutions to African problems. As noted earlier, this question is highly imperative for engaging with the historical rhetoric and claims around the marginalization of Africa’s view in the global and mainstream

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7 In this study, the values, principles and goals refers to the prevailing viewpoints, perspectives and priorities of Africa that could be different or similar to that of other geopolitical regions. The study examines these values, principles and goals by engaging with primary and secondary sources.
developments, especially in the field of peace and security where the paragons and powers of influential geopolitical regions hold sway. The increasing activism and efforts by African actors to address the continents challenges based on context-specific values requires in-depth analysis and engagement with the comprehension of what could possibly be implied as African values or context specific priorities in dealing with challenges, especially in terms of conflict resolutions.

As hinted earlier and argued in chapter 2, there are limited studies that highlight what constitutes African solutions in conflict resolutions and how African actors could critic and develop such approach in the quest to ensure the continent’s self-determination and lasting solution to conflict challenges. Chapter 3 of this thesis observes that some authors indicate that the historical subjugation and debasement of ideas from Africa as well as the indoctrination of African citizens in western standards have had significant impact on the extent to which African authors explore the relevance of African values, traditions, and systems in contemporary settings. Notably, there are no existing literature that provides clear ideas around African solutions/values in conflict resolutions especially as it pertains to the initiatives and interventions of Pan-African institutions such as the African Union that serves as the continental leader.

Based on the theory of constructivism which notes that the international relations is influenced by prevailing ideas, this research engages with prevailing suggestions and views around what could be African solutions in conflict resolution and how they implicate the African Union’s conflict resolution outlook. The prevailing ideas are sought after by engaging with the views of peace and security experts in Africa as well as scholarly sources on ‘traditional values’ in dispute resolution in Africa. Given the nature of the inquiry, the dissertation employs a qualitative methodology to explicate and analyse the data received from primary and secondary sources. The quest to generate ideas around the meaning of African solutions to African problems presents value judgements that could not be quantified thereby demanding a qualitative research methodology. Qualitative research methodology entails understanding some aspect of social life using words as currency for analysis (Patton and Cochran 2002: 2). Hence, the research contends with the what, how and why questions related to understanding of the maxim “African solutions to African problems” and the role of the African Union in this regard. The research adopts an explanatory research design to understand what ‘African
solutions’ entails in terms of conflict resolution. To this end, the research design of the thesis is as follows:

Firstly, the research engages in extensive review of literature on African initiatives in peace and security in order to draw out the dominant views and existing gaps on African solutions in terms of conflict resolution as covered in chapter 2. Secondly, the research adopts the theoretical framework of constructivism to contextualize the discussion on African solutions in chapter 3. This is done by exploring the value of endogenous conflict resolution framework in the international order. Thirdly, the research sets the scene of the discussions of the thesis by exploring the rationale and contextual background of Africa’s quest to provide solutions to its peace and security conundrum as presented in Chapter 4.

In Chapter 5, the research explore the substantive elements of African solutions in terms of conflict resolution based on the views of African experts and literary discourse on African solutions in conflict resolution. In chapter 6, the dissertation adopts a case study analysis approach by examining the African Union’s practical responses to the Somali crisis in the bid to provide African solutions. This is to highlight some of the practical achievements, challenges and prospects in terms of the application of African solutions. The dissertation culminates with chapter 7 which provides the findings, recommendations as well as the general conclusions of the thesis.

1.5.2 Data Collection and Sample

The completion of this dissertation was achieved through the joint use of primary and secondary materials. The researcher elicited data from two kinds of primary sources through interrogating the primary documents of the African Union and the use of semi structured interviews. In terms of primary documents, the research makes use of reports, communiques, resolutions, and press releases on African Union’s peace and security initiatives.

Secondly, the research engages in in-depth interviews with practitioners in the field of conflict resolution in Africa to garner ideas on the following crucial interest issues:

- the significance of African solutions in the international order;
- African values (solutions) in conflict resolution and
• Africa’s attempts to provide African solutions through the African Union, and

• The role of external actors in addressing Africa’s peace and security challenges.

Given the impracticability of engaging every practitioner in the field, the researcher adopted a purposive sampling method by focusing on eliciting information mainly from 20 practitioners in the field of peace and security in the African Union and three (3) civil society organizations (CSOs) namely—the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD); the Institute for Security Studies (ISS); the Institute of Peace and Security Studies (IPSS). While the selection of the sample organizations is based on purposive sampling, the research makes use of a snowballing technique to identify individual practitioners to interview. The choice of the sample population is justified in the following paragraphs.

As the major object of interest in this study, the views of African Union’s officials are highly crucial for understanding the meaning of “African solutions to African problems” and the role of the African Union in realizing the ideals of the maxim. To this end, the research targeted the views of African Union officials working in the AU Peace and Security Department (PSD). Given that the African Union’s response to the Somali crisis is the case study for this dissertation, the study also elicited information from AU personnel who are part of the African Union Mission in Somalia. The interviews were aimed at collating immediate information regarding the African Union’s mechanisms, achievements, challenges and prospects in terms of conflict resolution.

Given the relevance of this research for all Africans in terms of articulating the vision of the continent, the researcher also consulted practitioners from selected African-based civil society organizations that work on peace and security across Africa. The research purposively selects three (3) civil society organizations in Africa namely the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD), Durban South Africa; the Institute for Security Studies (ISS); and the Institute of Peace and Security Studies (IPSS) Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.8 ACCORD works ‘throughout Africa to bring creative African solutions to the challenges posed by conflict on the continent.’ The ISS is an African organization that is dedicated to advancing ‘human security in Africa through evidence-

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based policy advice, technical support and capacity building.’ The IPSS works in partnership with the AU and Regional Economic Communities (RECs) to promote ‘practical African led-solutions for peace and security challenges’, and ‘is mandated by African Union with a task to take up the intellectual challenge to define African-led Solutions (hereafter AfSol) for peace and security issues in the continent’ (Komey, Osman, and Melakedingel 2013: 1). The CSOs are envisioned to play a valuable role in providing useful insights on Africa’s conflict resolution initiatives, best practices and recommendations of various societies in the continent.

The importance of civil society organizations for this research is based on the background that they engage grassroots communities on key issues affecting society (Krishna 2012). Civil society organizations also play a role in representing and championing the need of people in society in national and international matters through advocacy and lobbying (Southern Africa Trust 2007). They play useful role as watch dogs and in shaping political decisions and policies to suite the contextual reality of people in society – an influence which has made many national and international actors to recognize the importance and effect of CSOs (Piebalgs 2013). In terms of peace and security, some civil society organizations work with societal and local structures to resolve conflict challenges. They serve as custodians of the needs of the society by flagging local particularities for national and international interveners to take account of.

The selection of the CSOs are based on three criteria in line with the objectives of the study. These criteria include: firstly, the CSO should have a continental outlook and should have worked or collaborated with the AU on peace and security initiatives to be in a better position to comment on the continent’s initiatives for conflict resolution; secondly the CSO should be able to make comments on the vision and trends of African societies in terms of the expectation around African solutions to African problems; thirdly the CSO should have contributed to Somalia peace and security research or initiatives so as to provide a broad perspective on the interventions used to address the crisis.

The selected three organizations are among the civil society organizations that work in different communities across Africa unlike other civil society organizations that have national focus. These civil society organizations also work closely with the African Union on matters of peace and security across the continent. They have also researched and worked on issues relating to the international response to the Somali crisis which is the
case study for this study. Having partnered with the selected organizations before in the course of my research fellowship at ACCORD, I was able to access relevant officials of the AU and CSOs – through purposive and snowballing sampling. The interviews were conducted through physical consultations, Skype and telephone calls, as well as written submissions based on the interview questions from some respondents. In total, the research engaged the views of 20 peace and security practitioners from the aforesaid organizations including the African Union.

The research also makes critical use of secondary data from textbooks, journals, newspapers and news commentaries that relate to Africa’s values and practices in relations to conflict resolution initiatives. The thesis also benefited immensely from the researcher’s participation in high level forums, conferences and workshops on African peace and security.

1.5.3 Data Analysis

The data extracted from the primary and secondary sources were processed using an interpretive form of qualitative data analysis which entails drawing meaning out of social phenomena; in order words, constructing an interpretation about the data received from primary and secondary sources (Elliot and Timulak 2005; Schutt 2010 Cassidy 2013). Pertinent to this study, the interpretive form of data analysis enables the researcher to assess and make deductions on views pertinent to African-oriented solutions to African conflicts as well as the responses of the African Union in conflict situations.

The problematic with the interpretive approach is that different analysts could have different understanding of reality depending on their backgrounds (Hammersley 1992). This may engender subjective and biased analysis of data as people’s interpretations are often affected by their different assumptions, world views as well as cultural, educational and geographical backgrounds. Through inter-subjectivity, the researcher takes into

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9 Some officials from the AU Mission in Somalia opted for written submissions due to security challenges.
10 This includes meetings such as Third Retreat of the Pan-African Network of the Wise (PanWise), Addis Ababa, Ethiopia from 16-17 November 2015; and the High-Level Expert Group Meeting on Conflict-Induced Migration in Africa: Maximizing New Opportunities to Address its Peace, Security and Inclusive Development Dimensions’ from 23-24 November 2015 in Durban South Africa; The 2015 American Political Science Association (APSA) Africa Workshop on “Conflict and Political Violence” that took place from July 20-31 at United States International University in Nairobi, Kenya; Next Generations Social Science Research Development Workshops in Accra-Ghana from 21 to 25 July 2014 and in Cape Town-South Africa from 19-23 January 2015; among others.
11 Inter-subjectivity is a principle that claims that different people can agree on empirical evidence (Neuman, 2011).
account a wide variety of perspectives and arguments from primary and secondary sources on the discourse to enable the validation of the interpretive presentation of the perspectives in the thesis. Thus, the outcome of the thesis is a critical engagement of the insights garnered from scholarly primary and secondary sources on the ideals of ‘African solutions’ in terms of conflict resolution and the implications for the African Union’s interventionist role in Africa.

To inquire into the form of solutions to conflicts that have been used by the African Union, the researcher adopted a case study analysis approach to inquire into the solutions or approaches used to resolve conflicts in the continent particularly by the pan-African institution, African Union. A case study analysis is chosen in order to make the research design more specific, focused, and practical. To this effect, the study looks into the AU’s solutions to the Somali crisis through the critical use of the vast number of primary and secondary materials.

The interest in the case study of Somalia is based on the fact that the African Union has been playing a leading role in the resolution of the conflict in Somalia for a longer duration using multi-dimensional approaches. This is unlike other missions – like in Burundi, Comoro Islands, Mali as well as the Central African Republic – where the regional body’s interventions were short-term. The African Union’s interventions in Somalia stands out as an interventionist cases where the African Union continues to spearhead the peace and state building efforts in the country. By looking at the case study of AU’s response to Somali conflict scenario, the research examines AU’s enduring and dynamic solutions or approach to conflicts.
Chapter 2: 

Literature Review

2. Introduction

Trending literatures on African solutions to the continent’s challenges have explored Africa’s peace and security initiatives, achievements, failures and challenges in tandem with the ideal of African solutions to African problems. These literatures emphasize the principal role of the African Union (AU) in effecting African responsibility and ownership of peace and security endeavours. However, there is paucity of research that looks into the uniqueness of the initiatives applied to solve problems in Africa especially in terms of conflict resolution.12 Extant sources merely discuss universal issues such as resource capacity, political will, commitment and institutional objectives in relation to the ideal of African solutions to African problems. These problematic are concerns that are relevant to any organization that hopes to be efficient and successful.

Thus, this review examines the core issues that dominate the concern of authors on Africa’s security efforts with particular focus on the AU’s initiatives towards attaining African solutions to African problems. The review is structured under three main themes based on the materials that addresses the (1) Normative, (2) Institutional and (3) Operational security-related initiatives of the AU, albeit these thematic literatures have overlapping references. The review provides a compelling argument for the originality and need for this research project.

To attain this aim, this chapter is divided into four main sections. The first section examines the literary arguments on the African Union’s normative instruments for conflict resolution in Africa. The second section considers the literary views relevant to the institutional security initiatives of the AU. The third section examines the discourses germane to the African Union’s interventions. The fourth section unearths the unaddressed gaps in literature and the crux of this study.

12 To avoid duplication of arguments, chapter 3, through the exposition of the theoretical framework, engages in in-depth analysis of the challenges in mainstream conflict resolution and interventionist approaches that are employed in Africa which necessitates the need for the concerted effort of scholars to explore context-specific outlooks
2.1 The African Union’s Normative Instruments for Conflict Resolution

Scores of research materials on the peace and security effort of the AU have underscored that African solutions reflects the normative stance of AU. One of the highlighted Africa’s stance for African solutions is the AU’s remarkable transition from OAU’s weak normative stance to a proactive security posture (Williams 2011; Dersso 2010; Ado 2011; Apuuli 2012; Murithi 2009; Kioko 2003; Tieku 2007; Kekerou 2007; Shinn 2012; Scanlon, Eziakonwa, and Myburgh 2007; etc). Kerekou (2007: 3) refers to this resolution as a paradigm shift in Africa’s security stance. For Møller (2009), the principle of non-indifference built around the maxim African solutions to African problems marks a transition from Africa’s past disposition of blaming European colonialists and neo-colonialist successors and demanding that powerful states should solve the problems in Africa.

In his ‘The Quest for Pax Africana’, Dersso (2012) notes that while the mission to provide African solutions to African problems has its roots to the Pan-Africanist movement, the contemporary motive for African solutions is based on the post-Cold War dynamics in international interventions in Africa as well as the changing nature of conflict in the continent. The ‘decade of international disengagement and UN inaction, or lack of effective involvement, in Africa’ is a driving force for Africa’s proactive stance in peace and security (Dersso 2012).

Dersso (2011: 116) argues that the transformation from the OAU to the AU could be viewed as a regime change in Africa’s regional organization, a normative and institutional change that marked the commitment of African leaders to attend to the security challenges that plague the continent. The objectives and mandates of the AU as contained in the Article 3(f) of the AU 2001 Constitutive Act13 and the AU Protocol for the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council (PSC Protocol) reflect the resolve of African leaders to wrestle with the challenge of insecurities in Africa.

In contextualizing its non-indifference principle, the African Union extended the notion of security beyond the state-centric concept to human security in line with contemporary realities (Hanson 2009: 1; Poku, Renwick and Porto 2007: 1158). The AU’s normative stance for intervention leans more on human security which has to do with the security of

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13 Article 3f charges the AU to ‘promote peace, security, and stability on the continent’
individuals and groups unlike the state-centric disposition which focuses on state/regime survival (Tieku 2007).\textsuperscript{14} Tieku (2007: 26) insists, in his ‘African Union Promotion of Human Security in Africa’, that ‘human security concerns informed the formation of the AU’ contrary to the OAU’s state-centric security concerns. For Tieku (2007:27), the principle of human security informed many AU key declarations and policy documents including its right to intervene in conflict settings.

The often highlighted norm of the AU which bestows the right for non-indifference and humanitarian intervention on the regional body is Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act. Article 4(h) mandates the AU to respond to war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity as well as a serious threat to legitimate order (Kioko 2003: 807; Tieku 2007: 29). When deemed necessary, the AU Assembly wields the power to authorize humanitarian intervention with or without the consent of the host states.

Bizos (2011: 2) and Murithi (2009: 93) observe that the AU is possibly the only regional body in the globe to institutionalize the ideas contained in the doctrine of the responsibility to protect prior to the popularization of the doctrine during the 2005 UN Summit. The ‘responsibility to protect’ doctrine mandates the international community to intervene in situations where civilian populations suffer serious harm and the state is not willing or unable to stop or avert the suffering (ICISS 2001). The doctrine was propagated by the 2001 report of the Canadian-sponsored International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS)\textsuperscript{15} and was endorsed and popularized during the 2005 UN World Summit. The AU has already taken an interventionist posture to protect civilians and respond to war crimes, genocide attempts and mass atrocities against civilians with or without the permission of the state in crisis as contained in Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act of 2001. Hence, the responsibility to protect standard was already etched in its system before the idea was propagated and adopted at the UN World Summit of 2005.

It is generally a consensus among many authors that the African Union’s normative stance for intervention is progressive and proactive in nature. The first Chair of the AU Commission, Alpha Oumar Konare, maintains that African states cannot afford to be

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\textsuperscript{14} Notably, through Article 3(h) of the Constitutive Act, the AU charges member states to ‘promote and protect human and people’s rights in accordance with the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and other relevant human rights instruments’ (AU Constitutive Act, 2001).

\textsuperscript{15} ‘Co-Chaired by Gareth Evans and Mohamed Sahnoun, the ICISS comprised 12 Commissioners from both the North and South and was charged with the task of confronting key questions surrounding intervention for human protection purposes’ (Powell 2005: 7).
passive while atrocities are committed in neighbouring countries (cited in Murithi 2009:95). Even though sub-regional organizations have been taking leads in the resolution of disputes in their regions, the robustly established AU is expected to spearhead and coordinate the peace and security initiatives in the continent so as to champion the interests of Africans and provide a safe and secure environment for Africa to materialize its goals (Scanlon, Eziakonwa, and Myburgh 2007; Parker and Rukare, 2002; Murithi, 2009; Williams, 2011).

Having examined the sources on AU’s positive disposition towards addressing conflict, the subsequent section considers the mechanisms and structures that the AU has in place to materialize its ambition.

2.2 The Institutional Initiatives of the African Union towards Conflict Resolution

In accord to Nathan (2013) and Dersso (2012), the efforts of African leaders to realize the notion of African solutions to African problems is evident from the establishment of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). Williams (2011: 6) notes that the APSA ‘denote a complex set of interrelated institutions and mechanisms that function at the continental, regional, and national level’. At the heart of APSA is the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) which is expected to coordinate peace and security initiatives in the continent (Williams 2011; Mathiasen 2006; Murithi 2009). The PSC, made up of fifteen member states, takes care of the day-to-day conflict management in the continent and coordinates the peace and security agenda of the APSA (Murithi 2009: 92; Poku, Renwick and Porto 2007: 1164; Williams 2011: 7). The PSC is complemented by its subsidiary bodies namely: the African Standby Force (ASF), the Military Staff Committee, the Continental Early Warning System CEWS), the Panel of the Wise

16 The African Standby Force (ASF) was created in May 2003 in accord with Article 13 of the PSC Protocol to serve as the operational arm of the AU poised to be deployed to crisis regions across the continent
17 The Military Staff Committee is a subsidiary body of the PSC that is supposed to serve as an advisory body to the PSC on military matters.
18 The Continental Early Warning System collates and receives data from the various Regional Early Warning Systems (REWS) and other independent means in order to enable the African Union to engage in early warning action to arrest security threats.
(PoW), the AU Policy on Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD), and the Peace Fund (PF).

The trending subsidiary body of the PSC that is expected to play a crucial role in the management of conflict in Africa is the ASF. The ASF is envisioned to respond rapidly – within 30 days – to crisis situations once a decision has been made by the AU. Batware (2011) observes that the ASF is an important case as it is the only standby force in the world, at least conceptually. In his ‘The African Standby Force: A Solution to African Conflicts?’ Batware (2011) argues that a proper development of the ASF may not only aid in efficiently attending to the security challenges in Africa but will also be a model to the UN in terms of responding to conflicts. For Batware (2011), although the ASF is not the solution to African conflicts, it is an important element towards finding a solution to the conflicts in the continent. Dersso (2010) notes that the ASF is ‘one of the most important - and probably the most ambitious - institutional tools that the AU decided to establish as part of the APSA’.

In his examination of the critical role of the PCRD in conflict prevention and peacebuilding in Africa, Addo (2011) affirms that the AU has developed credible structures to engage in conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction. For conflict prevention, the AU has structures such as the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) which provides data that enables the AU to assess the stability and security situation of the countries in Africa so as to respond timely to prevent any brewing aggression and conflict (AU PSC 2010; Williams 2011: 9). The Panel of the Wise comprises of renowned dignitaries with moral influence to assist in preventing and resolving conflicts in crisis regions (Møller 2009: 13). The Post-conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) structure provides a platform for the AU to engage in peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction to avoid relapse to conflict (Addo 2011: 91). To generate funds for AU peace missions, the AU Peace Fund is operational as funds and donations are received from member states and external actors (Mathiasen 2006: 6). The AU Commission, which is the executive/administrative arm of the AU, also serves a crucial role in facilitating,

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19 The Panel of the Wise are expected to use their expert knowledge and moral influence to resolve conflicts peacefully via diplomacy and mediation as well as provide advice to the PSC.
20 The Post-conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) framework was developed at the 7th Ordinary Session of the Executive Council in Libya in July 2005 to drive the regional body’s responsibility to rebuild and to avoid the resurgence of conflict.
21 The AU Peace Fund, under the Peace Support Commission, makes funds available for peace and security operations according to Article 21 of the PSC Protocol.
coordinating and monitoring AU’s progress towards its overall vision of peace and security (William, 2011: 8).

Generally, the founding vision of the APSA denotes the will of African leaders to address the security conditions in the continent – a will that extends not only to putting out conflicts but preventing conflicts and engage in post-conflict reconstruction. Even though there is a long way to go to make the ideal of ‘African solutions to African problems’ a reality, significant progress has been made by African leaders to address conflict challenges through the APSA. Today, the APSA is seen as the structural realization of African solutions and it is often relied on by both local and foreign actors to address the security challenges in the continent (Alulai 2013).

2.2.1 The Challenges with the AU Instruments

The challenge with the APSA is that most of its institutional tools are still at the developmental stages. As noted by Williams (2011: 13), institutions such as the Military Staff Committee (MSC), which is supposed to play a paramount role in advising the AU PSC on military matters, rarely has meetings and it has so far been unproductive. The ASF which was formed in 2003 has not yet been operationalized and the deadline for its full operational capacity has shifted from 2010 to 2015 with little hope of it coming to life at the latter date. Misgivings remains around the ambitious timeline for the deployment and objectives of the ASF in light of the required force strength of the ASF as well as the resource and logistic capabilities of the AU (Kioko 2003: 822; Dersso 2011). Batware (2011) further notes that there is also lack of clarity on how the AU and RECs/RMs would authorize the use of the brigades located in the 5 regions in Africa. Dersso (2011) recommends that clarification should be made on the roles of the troop-contributing countries, the regional economic communities (RECs) and/or regional mechanisms (RMs), and the AU with respect to the use of the ASF capability.

Vorrath (2012) examined the APSA and notes that the imbalances in the APSA’s regional mechanism make it hard for the AU to attain it security agenda. In line with the APSA, RECs/RMs ought to play crucial role in ensuring the peace and security of their sub-regions (De Carvalho, Jaye, Kasumba and Okumu 2010: 16). In fact, the AU, in line with the APSA structure, relies on sub-regional mechanisms to address conflict challenges in the regions while it coordinates the efforts (Vorrath 2012). However, the unevenness of the regional bodies makes it hard for the AU to achieve its aim (Batware 2011). For
instance, the RECs in the South and West are stronger and they have well established security instruments. While the North, Central and Eastern RECs tend to be weaker and lacking in a regional power base to influence issues in the region; they also lack effective peace instruments to wrestle with conflict challenges.

Given that the AU relies on regional organizations, weaker RECs are unable respond adequately to the crisis in conflict regions (Vorrath 2012). The crisis in Libya presented a scenario where the AU could not make adequate response because of the lack of an effective sub-regional organization (Arab Maghreb Union) in the region to respond to the conflict. In fact, the Arab League, which Libya is also affiliated to, became the major player in the crisis. This thwarted AU’s role in the region. But in other regions with stronger RECs conflict could readily be addressed by sub-regional mechanisms. For instance, at the outbreak of conflict in Mali, the AU PSC authorized ECOWAS to ‘guarantee the security of Mali’s transitional government, reorganize the security forces, restore the Malian State’s authority over the northern part of the country, and combat terrorist and criminal networks’ (Vorrath 2012). ECOWAS deployed its forces to Mali and the mission was further transformed to an AU mission but with forces mainly from the West African region.

The lack of effective regional organizations in the Central and Eastern Africa has also made it possible for neighbouring states to engage in uncoordinated interventions in states in crisis. Arman (2014) insists that in the case of the crisis in Somalia, for instance, Ethiopia and Kenya have made many inappropriate interference with the peace processes in the country as they sought to protect their national interests. In Central Africa, Rwanda has also allegedly interfered severally in the crisis in the Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Additionally, in terms of the establishment of the ASF, Dersso (2011) notes the weak RECs of the North, East and Central Africa lack adequate structures to enable the formation of the ASF regional brigade. This imbalance causes political and organizational challenges that make it difficult to operationalize the ASF in a balanced and timely manner (Batware 2011).

Vines (2013:104) further highlights that there tends to be a lack of harmony between the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and the African Union. The RECs tend be less committed to AU’s leadership (Vines 2013: 101). At times the quest to gain funds from external donors has led the RECs to seek incompatible peace and security initiatives that
go athwart to the AU’s initiatives and agenda (Franke 2006: 13). A case of RECs discordant with the AU has to do with the establishment of the ASF. The RECs have failed to provide the resources needed or to show commitment to developing the ASF by recruiting troops from the different regions. Here, the ASF agenda tends to be regarded as an AU’s initiative that is costly for the RECs who also have particular objectives. Yet, as noted by Vines (2013: 104), there will be no effective continental peace and security structure without the cooperation of the RECs.

2.3 The African Union’s Interventions

As the primary body charged with maintaining world peace and order, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) have mandated several interventions to respond to conflict challenges in Africa. However, as observed by Ekeus (2001: 519), the huge responsibilities of the UNSC across the globe as well as the UNSC financial constraints, lack of political will and abuse of veto power preclude the organization from effectively dealing with the security threats in Africa. The failure of the UN to respond properly to the continent’s predicaments (e.g. the Somali crises, the 1994 Rwandan genocide, the Liberian and Sierra Leonean Civil war in the late 1990s and the numerous social and economic challenges in the continent) point to the need for Africa to closely attend to its security challenges (Williams 2011:4). Remarkably, since the formation of the AU in 2002, Africa, through the APSA, has adopted a leading stance in the resolution and management of conflicts in the continent.

Despite being an embryonic organization compared to other regional organizations such as the EU and Arab League, the African Union has made practical efforts to arrest and address the insecurities in the continent (Addo 2011; Murithi 2009; Olonisakin 2007; Sesay and Omotosho 2011). In stark contrast to the OAU, the AU has carried out a significant number of peace operations with relative success even when the outside world seemed indifferent to African problems (Moller 2009: 16; Williams 2011: 14; Murithi 2009: 106). Franke (2006) notes that the limitations of the UN and the increased willingness of African regional organizations to respond to security challenges in the continent is a promising feature for the future of regional peace operations in Africa. The AU’s peace missions reflect the continent’s will for self-reliance and responsibility for peace operations in the continent (National Model United Nations 2008: 20).
The AU has proven its metier in terms of mediation and diplomacy. This is evident from the work of the AU Panel of the Wise (PW), AU High Level Panels, Special Envoys and diplomats deployed to engage warring factions and communities in dialogue and negotiation (Ahire, Ani, Ensenbach, Forti, Kunama, Ngubane, and Singh 2014). To support negotiated agreements, the AU has sent peacekeeping missions to Burundi, Sudan, Somalia, Comoro Islands, and recently to Mali and CAR. In the case of Sudan for instance, the AU in 2004 established a peacekeeping mission in the Darfur region of Sudan when violence erupted in Darfur in 2003 (Murithi, 2009: 99). Given the atrocious nature of the conflict coupled with the regional and international concern over the crisis, the AU stood up to the challenge by taking up a mediatory role that eventually led to a peacekeeping mission in the Darfur region of Sudan (AMIS) in 2004. The peacekeeping mission which lasted between 2004 and 2007 was charged with the mandate of protecting civilians as a priority, facilitating the delivery of humanitarian aid, monitoring the ceasefire agreement, and restoring peace and stability in Sudan (Farmer, 2012: 99). When its mission expired in 2007, the AU backed a stronger UN peacekeeping force in the region in 2008 (Scanlon, Eziakonwa, and Myburgh 2007: 21).

The regional body has also supported peace operations in Africa that is sponsored by the UN, EU, NATO and other major powers like France and USA (Addo 2011). The AU’s interventionist roles depict the regional body’s commitment to the ideal of providing African solutions to African problems. This betokens the possibility of a continent that forges solidarity between African states in a bid to solve the conflicts in the continent.

2.3.1 The Challenges with the AU’s Interventions

The AU’s peace and security operations have often come under criticisms based on the resource capacity and political will of AU member states. Williams (2011) notes that despite the impressive, but grandiose normative and institutional frameworks of the regional body, the AU is faced with incapacitating shortcomings such as poor resources, small number of bureaucrats and the divide between member states on how to respond to conflict. This led Møller (2009: 16) to maintain that there is a huge gap between the ambitions and accomplishments of the AU. The following sections considers some of the highlighted issues of resource capacity and political will in terms of the AU’s ability to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts.
2.3.1.1 Resource Capability Assessment

The resource limitations of the AU has been one of the most emphasized major setback for the regional organization to attain its objectives in terms of the resolution of conflicts (Kobbie 2009; Sesay and Omotosho 2011: 1; Vorrath 2012; Vines 2013; Nathan 2013). Considering the AU’s role in Libya and Cote d’ivoire, Rupiya (2012: 165) argues that AU’s diplomacy, mediatory efforts and sanctions on member states are negligible and incapable of achieving desired effects due to the AU’s lack of economic and military power to back up its stance. Pertinent to peacekeeping, Kioko (2003: 822) notes that the ‘average cost of sustaining peacekeepers is estimated at US$130 per day, excluding ordnance, equipment and transportation’. Thus, there are huge financial burdens involved in carrying out peace operations effectively; a resource which the AU does not have (National Model United Nations 2008: 17).

For Murithi (2009: 100) the Darfur crisis was an immense test for the AU that is under-resourced and ill-equipped to effectively manage conflicts. Likewise, Evans (2006: 720) observes that in 2006 the African Union’s Mission in Sudan (AMIS) was staffed by only ‘seven thousand inadequately mandated, insufficiently mobile, and otherwise militarily incapable personnel on the ground’. Aside from being unable to adequately protect civilians, AMIS troops and personnel fell under grievous attacks from belligerents (Luqman and Omede, 2012: 61; Agada 2008: 51). With limited resources, AMIS was hamstrung in quelling the unrest and deterring Darfur warring parties from fighting and it lost about sixty troops (Møller 2009: 15; Williams 2006). This prompted the call for a stronger UN peacekeeping force in Darfur. At the end of 2007, AMIS was subsumed into the African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur, a mission funded by the UN (Luqman and Omede, 2012; Murithi 2009). In view of the resource limitation of the AU, Williams (2011: 1) insists that the AU is bent on making grandiose or rather ambitious projects that go beyond the bounds of its capacities.

Williams (2011:15) continues that the AU does not have the necessary sea and airlift capacity, training facilities, management structures, weapons, information technology and mobile carriers to engage in an effective peace operation. Notable among these is the AU’s lack of airlift capacity as emphasized by Diop and McConville (2012). For Diop and McConville (2012), the AU’s lack of airlift capacity such as armoured helicopters, jet-powered aircraft, turboprop aircraft, drones, etc. limits the regional body from
transporting troops and equipment in a timely manner to operation areas and this exposes
troops to the risk of ambushes by warring parties. It is based on the limited resources of
the AU that most of its missions are designed as stabilization operations to be replaced by
a UN peace operation from about 90 to 120 days (De Carvalho, Jaye, Kasumba and
Okumu 2010: 41).

The most worrying aspect of the AU’s resource limitation is the dependency on external
support – a donor syndrome –, which has debilitating implications for the regional body’s
aim to provide African solutions (Vorrath 2012; Vines 2013; Kobbie 2009; Sesay and
Omotosho 2011). Most of the AU’s funding for peace operations are dependent on the
generosity and support of external bodies such as the UN, EU, G8 as well as states such
as the US, China and Canada (Mathiasen 2006: 7). As noted by Vines (2013: 107) and
Vorrath (2012), the AU has only provided for 2% of the funds used for peace and security
while international donors provided 98% per cent of the funds. In addition to financial
dependency, the AU is further beset by the lack of relevant expertise. Sharamao and
Ayangafac (2011: 5) note that despite the progress and the experience gained by African
troops during peace operations, they still require training and technical support from
external bodies. For Kobbie (2009), there is a long way for the AU to go to be capable of
managing or solving the conflict challenges in the continent without external support.

In ‘Who owns African ownership’, Franke and Esmenjaud (2014) examine the impact of
external dependency on the principle of African ownership in peace operations and insist
that while security has been Africanized there are compelling reasons to insist that the
process does not bode well for the principle of African ownership. Using the case studies
of the AU mission in Darfur (AMIS) and the MICOPAX (Mission de Consolidation de la
Paix) in CAR, Franke and Esmenjaud (2014) stresses that external actors have an
immense influence on the so-called African decisions to establish a mission under the
grounds of ‘African solutions’ and external actors also hold sway on the mission mandate
and termination. The over reliance on external financial, military and expert assistance
runs contrary to the AU’s rhetoric and commitment to finding African solutions to African
problems (Williams 2011: 15). In this light, Franke and Esmenjaud (2014) argue that Ali

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22 For Franke and Esmenjaud (2014), Africanisation is ‘the increasing participation of African actors in a
particular field, and ownership’ and ‘the de facto political control over an issue (meaning the control over
decision-making processes).’
Mazrui’s vision of a ‘‘Pax Africana that is protected and maintained by Africa herself” is far from being realized’.

Concerns remain that the mantra of African solutions to African problems could let non-African states off the hook in the resolution of conflicts in Africa (Møller 2009) and ‘further marginalize Africa strategically’ (Kihunah 2005: 128). For Møller (2009: 16), the active engagement of the international community is required in the resolution of Africa’s conflict. Vines (2013: 109) and Sesay and Omotosho (2011) however argue for the AU’s self-reliance and minimal reliance on external support.

2.3.1.2 Political Will and Commitment

Sharamao and Ayangafac (2011: 5) notes that the capacity of the AU to undertake any conflict management initiative depends on the capacity and willingness of its various member states to provide necessary influence and commitment. However, most African states are at the risk of state failure, civil wars, rebellion and instabilities (Møller 2009). Discouragingly, powerful states – that are expected to play significant role in Africa – such as Algeria, Nigeria, South Africa, Ethiopia and Libya23 are also bedevilled by internal weaknesses (Møller 2009: 3). Howard (2010) observes that ‘Africa is undoubtedly plagued by systematic state failure in that the region lacks strong governance, comprehensive economic development, and fails to provide security to its citizens and order in its territories’. Hence, the AU – composed of weak and unstable states – is hamstrung in its ability to meet up to expectations (Sharamao and Ayangafac 2011: 4). It is in view of the limitation of the states in Africa that Sesay (2008) contends that ‘how can weak states generate the resources necessary to create domestic cohesion on matters of political power and economic distribution; and at the same time pursue regional or continental goals?’

Beside the often cited capacity and resource limitations, Dersso (2012: 25) notes that the main hurdle for realizing African solutions to African problems is political in nature namely; the nature of international politics and the ‘inadequacies of the African political leadership’. The former highlights the role of foreign powers in frustrating the African Union’s efforts as the cases of NATO’s intervention in Libya portray (Nathan 2013). Moreover, given that foreign powers contribute the bulk of AU’s financial resources for

23 These countries are arguably considered to be sub-regional hegemonies in Africa.
peace operations, foreign actors could have a huge influence on the intervention decisions of the AU. In face of foreign powers interests in Africa’s mineral wealth (Renou 1999; Williams 2011; Somerville 1991), it is possible for the continent to experience more external meddling under the guise of humanitarian assistance.

The latter point on the inadequacies of the African political leadership points to the problems of weak states and bad governance of some states in Africa. In this regards, Tieku (2007: 33) posits that regimes notorious for human rights abuses in Africa would be reluctant in promoting human security and would show poor political will in AU’s preventive and reactive initiatives towards conflict management. This led Makinda and Okumu (2008: 1) in ‘The African Union: Challenges of globalization, Security, and Governance’, to stress the importance of good governance for the attainment of the security and developmental goals of Africa.

In his ‘The Peace and Security Council of the African Union’, Williams (2009) notes that the AU Peace and security Council has only paid attention to managing conflicts than preventing them or confronting the issues of bad governance in African states. The PSC has become a fire extinguisher rather than a body working effectively to prevent conflicts. It has not also paid attention to other security issues such as terrorism, disease and environmental degradation. Yet, the AU’s security agenda encompasses security threats such armed conflicts, environmental degradation, terrorism, transnational criminal activities, trafficking, etc.

Some authors further observe that despite the paradigm shift from non-intervention to the non-indifference to the internal conflicts of member states, the AU is yet to invoke Article 4(h) and launch military intervention against a member state despite the presence of plausible circumstances to do so (Williams 2011: 5). The AU PSC has rather shown strong preference for interventions carried out with consent of the crises state as evident in its missions in Burundi, Comoros Islands, Sudan, Mali, CAR as well as in Somalia where the consent was from a transitional government (Bergholm 2010: 10). For Williams (2011), the crises in Cote d’Ivoire and Libya presented instances where the AU could have adopted a military stance to protect civilian populations. It is also argued that the strength and influence of certain states and their rulers militates against AU’s ability to invoke Article 4(h) such as the case of 2011 crisis in Libya were the AU was alleged to
have been biased in favour of Gaddafi. For Williams (2011), the AU is still battling to rise above member states and gain a bold stature to confront its member states.

Nathan (2013) observes that a major challenge to attaining African solutions to African problems is the disunity among African leaders in the resolution of conflict in Africa as evident from the varied opinions of different African states during the Libyan, Malian and Côte d’Ivoire crisis. For Apuuli (2012), the half-hearted measures and poor political will of the AU which led to the French-led UN intervention in Cote d’Ivoire (2010-2011) and NATO’s intervention in Libya (2011) made the regional body incapable of attaining the expectations entrenched in the notion of African solutions to African problems.

Furthermore, Cilliers, Boshof and Aboagye (2010:2) notes that African states tend to be less committed to AU’s peace operations in Africa in terms of contributing forces. For instance, during the July 2010 AU Summit in Kampala, member states agreed to reinforce AMISOM by increasing its troops from the 6300 troops (mainly comprising of Burundian and Ugandan soldiers) to the 8000 targeted size that was mandated in 2007 (Cilliers, Boshof and Aboagye 2010). Yet, AMISOM remained with a force strength that is less than the 8000 required troops until the recent achievements of AMISOM forces in 2011 which led to the reinforcement of mission. In the case of the AU’s mission in Sudan (AMIS), Evans (2006: 720) notes that the mission’s 3,320 force strength that was mandated in October 2004 only reached its full strength in April 2005, six months after the decision was reached. When AMIS troop reached its reinforced force strength of about 7,000 troops in 2006, extra five thousand troops were needed in the region due to Darfur’s huge land mass (Evans 2006: 720; Hanson 2009: 1; Scanlon, Eziakonwa, and Myburgh 2007: 21; Møller 2009: 15). The African Union lacked the political will to mandate a further reinforcement of the force strength until the mission was transformed into a hybrid AU and UN mission UNAMID in 2008 (Evans 2006: 720).

Moreover, few member states within the AU have shown great commitment while others show nonchalance in relation to sending armed troops to support the AU’s cause (Møller 2009; Williams 2011). Contributors such as South Africa, Uganda, Rwanda, Egypt, Nigeria, Senegal, Kenya and Ethiopia seem to be the main pillars of AU peace operations (Møller, 2009:14; Williams, 2011:15). With such a small number of contributors out of fifty four member states, the AU peace operations suffer from lack of adequate support from member states (Williams 2011: 15). For Coleman (2011), regional peace operations
in Africa suffer from poor commitment from member states due to the preference for UN/global peace operations. This is because African states prefer to send their troops to participate in well-funded, prestigious and secure UN peace operations unlike in the case of regional peace operations, where they, as member states, have to contribute to the upkeep of their soldiers. In such instances, the commitment and political will of African leaders to solve African problems seems to be a pipedream (Coleman 2011).

A phenomenon that further raises concern for AU’s political will and commitment to engage with African solutions to African problems is that regional peace operations are conceived as interim - and not alternative - operations to be taken over by a stronger UN mission. Shinn (2012:2) observes that African states prefer short-term peacekeeping missions while shying away from long-term missions. Realistically, the arrangement to replace AU (stabilization) missions with a stronger UN operation is inevitable given the minimal financial and resource capacity of AU (De Carvalho, Jaye, Kasumba and Okumu 2010: 15). However for Coleman (2011: 519), regional peacekeeping does not necessarily derive its legitimacy from the UN and it may not be funded by it. Hence, if the AU is to go in line with its mandate of providing peace and security in Africa, it should be willing to take up the responsibilities involved in both short term and long term peace operations in the continent (Coleman 2011: 519; Sesay and Omotosho 2011: 1).

Franke (2006) deviates from Coleman’s position by noting that despite its resolution to intervene in crisis, regional interventions in Africa is not meant to be an alternative to the ‘sustained peacekeeping missions led by the UN’ because ‘the underlying idea of geographically internalising responsibility of peace operations never was intended as a real alternative to traditional UN missions in the first place’. In this regard, arguing for the contrary would lead to the misinterpretation of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter – which bestows the UN with the primary responsibility for world peace and security – as well as ignoring the limitations of regional institutions (Franke 2006: 1). Franke (2006) espouses the idea of regional peace operation that is meant to complement rather than supplement the UN or the broader international community’s role to address conflict.

Scanlon, Eziakonwa, and Myburgh (2007: 7) note that while the African Union bears the responsibility for peace and security in the continent, the complexity of the conflicts in the continent thwarts its ability to contend with them. In accord with Williams (2011: 1), AU’s limitations stem from its emergence at a time when conflict had engulfed much of
the continent. As the organization makes grandiose declarations of intent, new and complicated conflicts as well as the lack of resources to handle the conflicts continue to cripple the organization.

In his assessment of the efficiency of the AU as a security provider, Murithi (2009: 106) argues that it is premature to pass judgments on the AU’s efficiency because it is still an embryonic organization. The AU as a supranational organization is yet to gain expertise and adequate resources to face the complex challenges in the continent. The nascent life of the AU and its limited experience with conflict resolution in Africa are constraints on the regional organization’s efficiency in conflict resolution (National Model United Nations, 2008: 7). For Sesay (2008: 7) the principles, objectives and institutions of the African Union are dreams we hope will come true. It is commendable that the African Union did not wait to strengthen all its forces and mechanisms before confronting the continent’s challenges. From its successes and failures, the AU is hoped to continually gain beneficial experiences and lessons to support its peace and security agenda (Møller 2009: 15). For Maasdorp (2010: 11) the AU, with time, would mature to adequately contend with the series of challenges impeding peace, security and development in Africa.

2.4 The Grounds for this Study and Conclusions

The foregoing issues climax the dominant issues considered in line with the AU’s attempt to provide African solutions. While the foregoing discourses are important, the peculiarities of ‘African solutions’ to African problems are not well captured. Extant literature addressing the topic African solutions to African problems have only considered Africa’s implemental role (not solutions or values) in solving Africa’s problems. The discourse is merely about African personnel implementing solutions to the problems in the continent without an appraisal of how African-oriented those solutions are. Even works that contain headings that indicate “African solutions” such as Apuuli (2012), Arman (2014), Møller (2009), Ayittey (1994), Nathan (2013), Dersso (2012), etc. tend to argue mainly along the lines of African sense of responsibility in responding to the challenges in Africa without actually explaining how the response should look like for it to be considered as African solutions.24

24 The study observes that the reduction of the entailment of African solutions to African problems to a problem of ‘implementation by Africans’ could reduce Africans to mere copyright defaulters that lack the capacity to initiate solutions for their challenges if the solutions employed are constantly imported solutions. The exploration of Africa’s conceptual contribution is advanced as not only important for attaining lasting
A study by a team of IPSS staff, Komey, Osman, and Melakedingel (2013), under the title ‘Operationalizing African-led Solutions in Peace and Security’, engages with the understanding of African-led solutions. The study is an applied action research in South Sudan and Somalia to explore the application of African-led solutions in mission areas and its implication on the management of peace and security issues in the continent. However, the foregoing study does not engage in an exploration of Africa’s conflict resolution outlooks, values and principles which provides a better ground to understand what to expect in the operationalization of African solutions. In other words, the study moves from applications or efforts of African actors on the ground to future policy directions. The focus remains on the hazy conception of the entailment of African solutions that is tied to the agency of implementation. The endogeny of the approaches and principles of APSA and its operations are not captured.

This begs the question, to satisfy the notion of “African solutions”, does a response to African problems merely entail a solution that is implemented or spearheaded by Africans alone? If so, the argument on African solutions to African problems could be seen as superficial because any form of solution is welcome as long as it is carried out merely by someone of ‘African descent’. Here, the solutions could be imported solutions executed by Africans. This relegates the notion of ‘African solutions’ to a mere political agenda about who does what or owns the implementation processes.

Komey, Osman, and Melakedingel (2013: 1) notes aptly that ‘one can learn that African solutions are usually based on either ownership i.e. of being African-led or of being ‘working’ solutions rooted in African identity manifested in its culture, values and realities of societies.’ This however remains an area that is under-researched and under-explored. If Africans are to take the issue of tackling the conflict challenges in the continent seriously, African scholars, experts and leaders ought to inquire deeply on conflict resolution approaches and practices that reflect the contextual and indigenous realities and values of the continent. As hinted earlier and discussed in-depth in chapter 3, this is in light of the growing concern that the conflict resolution approaches used do not provide effective and durable solutions to the contextual dimensions of the disputes and priorities in the continent. The effort to pursue conflict resolution outlook that reflects

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peace and security in the continent. Rather, it is also important in humanizing and dignifying Africans whose values, thought processes and culture have suffered from the ‘inferior’ classification, a class just above the expressions of non-humans.
the issues in the continent could be done not only by encouraging African responsibility and leadership for the resolution of conflicts but by also engaging the contextual and evolving peace and security stance of Africa. This includes examining the relevance of Africa’s traditional principles for conflict resolution in contemporary peace efforts.

In terms of engaging the contextual and evolving outlook in African contemporary efforts for peace and security, there is a need for Africa to identify its priorities and values in its efforts for peace operations. In terms of the relevance of Africa’s traditional principles, it is quintessential to engage with the linkages between Africa’s contemporary stance and practice of conflict resolution with the indigenous/traditional values of conflict resolution of African societies. On the one hand, this serves to legitimise the peace initiatives of African actors as being representatives of the values of African societies. On the other hand, the inquiry into the indigenous values of conflict resolutions serves to explore new grounds and opportunities to pursue lasting peace and security in Africa. This includes the creating opportunities for the complementary role of Africa’s indigenous values with other approaches.

It is important to note that there are research materials that consider traditional conflict resolution approaches in Africa. Adegoju (2009) for instance considered the role of Yoruba proverbs in resolving social conflicts. Isike and Uzodike (2011) investigated the traditional role of African women in conflict resolution which could be useful for the modern day conflict resolution in Africa. By examining conflict resolution in South Africa, Murithi (2006) explores how conflicts could be resolved through the principle of Ubuntu which emphasizes unity of humanity, cooperation, sharing and empathy. Using Eastern and the Horn of Africa as case studies, Mutisi (2012) examines how traditional and modern conflict resolution mechanisms could be integrated. Looking at the eastern Hararghe zone of Oromiya regional state of Ethiopia, Angessa (2013) considers the role which traditional conflict resolution mechanisms could play in resolving conflicts and in reintegrating conflicting parties into society.

Additionally, Lacroix and Neufeldt (2010) examine how West African Dance serves as a creative means of conflict resolution. Looking at Baganda in Uganda, Sentongo and Bartoli (2012) examines the Ekika system of conflict resolution. Miti, Abatan, and Minou (2013) consider whether power-sharing is the solution to African conflicts given that it is always suggested as a mechanism for reconciling the interests of conflicting parties vying
for political and economic power. Considering the case of abunzi mediators, Mutisi (2012) looks at the effectiveness of local conflict resolution in Rwanda. To guard against repetition, the study affirms the existence of materials that examines some indigenous practices for conflict resolution in Africa.

Nevertheless, these materials focus largely on particular traditional resolution mechanisms of an ethnic group or region in Africa. Most of these materials do not consider the possibility of deriving a pan-African conflict resolution approaches or principles to guide the peace operations of the AU. Moreover, to justify the presupposition of the term “African” solutions it is important to inquire into solutions that resonates with the cultural values and principles well as the socio-political and economic capacities of different states in the continent in light of the increasing role of Africa’s continental organization, the AU, in the resolution of conflicts. It is worth noting that the maxim historically emerged out of the quest for Africa’s continental organization, with the collective effort of all African states, to contend with the problems in the continent.

Noting that cultural practices vary in many African communities, the dissertation relies on the identified commonalities of values in African communities – however contentious – coupled with the contemporary interventionist values of Africa to understand what African solutions entails in terms of outlook. As a regional institution, the AU could play a crucial role in upholding indigenous conflict resolution values through its peace-making, peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts in its member states. The African Union, through its Constitutive Act and its documents relating to the formation of a Union Government and recently on Agenda 2063 has emphasized that Africa’s integration agenda is rooted in the cognizance of Africa’s shared culture, traditions and values. The welcome note of the African Solutions Blog (AfSol Blog) of the Institute for Peace and Security Studies notes aptly that ‘there has been growing interest on the part of the African Union (AU) and Member States to chart their own course, particularly in conflict resolution and peace and security through policy frameworks and initiatives that are consistent with the historical, social, political and institutional realities of African states.’

As noted by Jeng (2012: 10), the AU’s capacity to fulfil the Constitutive Act’s philosophy hinges ‘on its ability to appropriate a life of its own, one that constructs is frame of reference from Pan-African principles and matters of social justice and integration’. Jeng

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25 For more information see: [http://afsolblog.org/2012/10/24/welcome-to-the-afsol-blog/](http://afsolblog.org/2012/10/24/welcome-to-the-afsol-blog/)
(2012: 10) continues that this would help the AU to avoid the pitfalls of its predecessor OAU and enable the regional body to shape ‘a genuine legal space capable of constructing an inclusionary approach to durable and sustainable peace’. This requires the AU to identify its unique role and methodologies in responding to conflict challenges in line with African values.

This thesis, hence, undertakes the task of inquiring into Africa’s framework for conflict resolution in line with the maxim African solutions to African problems. This is done by engaging the evolving peace and security initiatives of Africa and exploring the linkages and opportunities of Africa’s indigenous conflict resolutions values. The following chapter – chapter 3 – engages with the theoretical framework of constructivism upon which the research is conceived and developed. Chapter 3 complements the literature review by providing in-depth analysis of the comprehension and shortcomings of the mainstream idea and practice of conflict resolution which requires the engagement with context specific approaches as presupposed by the maxim “African solutions to African problems”. Through this complementary approach, the thesis avoids the provision of a weak argument on conflict resolution in chapter 2 and the duplication of arguments in both chapters (chapter 2 and 3).
Chapter 3:

Theoretical Framework and Conceptualizations: The Constructivist Perspective of African Solutions

3. Introduction

To attain the objectives of this study, this research employs the theoretical frameworks of constructivism to investigate the entailment of ‘African solutions’ in terms of conflict resolution and its realization through the interventions of the pan-African institution, African Union. The tenets of constructivism which conceives the world as an ideational phenomenon enables the in-depth engagement of the significance, entailments and implications of African solutions on the African Union’s conflict resolution approaches. In accord with the quest for African solutions, the chapter argues that if the international order is based on prevailing ideas that are amenable to change in line with the tenets of constructivism, Africa is challenged to be a significant agent in addressing its internal problems and be active contributors in the mainstream theory and practice of conflict resolution.

The chapter sets the scene by engaging with the understanding of constructivism as a theoretical framework for the dissertation as achieved in section 1. Given that the study is focused on international intervention in intra-state conflict settings, section 2 and 3 provides a constructivist view of intra-state conflicts and third party interventions with a particular focus on conflict resolutions. Section 3 engages with the shared ideas around the theories and practices of third party intervention, and highlights some of the issues therein.

The fourth section examines the implication of the maxim ‘African solutions to African problems’ using a constructivist approach which places ideas or social meaning at the centre of analysis. This is done by making sense of the terms ‘African problems’ and ‘African solutions’ particularly in peace and security. This section observes that that in the global context with divergences of ideas and values, some powerful regions assume monopoly of knowledge and impose their ideas across the globe as though it is universal. The growing recognition of divergences in the so-called global village have however engendered some activism among marginalized regions to assert their interests and ideas. This has led Africa to exude greater activism for African-oriented solutions in a bid to
highlight regional values in the global context. This is based on the shared ideas of common challenges, history, culture and experience in the continent. The following section sets the scene of the discussions.

3.1 The Tenets of Constructivism: The World of Our Making

The theory of Constructivism focuses on consciousness and its influence in international relations. An adequate conception and appreciation of the tenets of constructivism would be hazy without reference to its contrasts to the dominant and long-standing theories in international relations; namely, neorealism as well as its rival theory, neoliberalism. Neorealism and neoliberalism, which dominated international relations discourse in the eighteenth century, are embedded in the theory of materialism which holds that every phenomenon is consequent from material or physical interactions.

For neorealists, the distribution of material power such as economic and military capabilities defines the international system (Jackson and Sorensen 2006). In accord with neorealists, the anarchic international system is composed of independent and atomic sovereign states selfishly seeking their narrow interests for material power (Baldwin 1993: 11). This inexorably leads to competitions, insecurities, uncertainties and tensions between states seeking to maximize their parochial interests (Baylis 2005: 304). Given their grim image of world politics (realpolitik), realists insist that cooperation is a façade used as a decoy for powerful states to dominate weaker ones coupled with the claim that cooperation between states is difficult to attain and sustain (Baylis 2005: 304). For neorealists, the uncertainty in the international system leads states to pursue the maximization of their interest through competition and balance of power mechanisms.

Neoliberalism which emerged towards the end of the eighteenth century, on the other hand, agree with realists that material interests, particularly economic interests, determine state behaviour. Neoliberalism argues in line with rationalism by observing that individual states pursue individual advantages by calculating costs and benefits and following the most favourable option (Hurd 2008: 299). Thus while self-interest is common in the world order, Neoliberals argue that in the interdependent nature of the international system individual states choose to pursue cooperation with each other because it is considered more favourable than competition (Keohane 1984; Baldwin 1993: 12). Thus, contrary to the neorealist emphasis on anarchy and competition, neoliberals insist on the cooperation
of states as a means to satisfy their narrow interests and to surmount common challenges based on the recognition of their interdependence in the international order.

In the late 1980s after the Cold War era, the theory of constructivism established itself as a compelling theory in International Relations having been introduced by Nicholas Onuf who coined the term in his *World of Our Making* (1989) and by Alexander Wendt who provided an adequate conceptualization of the theory. The striking feature of Constructivism is its divergence from, and challenge to, the fixation of dominant theories on material capabilities in influencing world affairs. For constructivists, the significant influence in international relations is social consciousness as opposed to the material. Concerns relating to security in the world order, for instance, are not just about the consideration of the resources, weapons and other material elements of other states as insisted by neorealists. Rather, it is about ideas or social consciousness that prevail in the international system based on the social relationships of states.

Constructivists insist that the international system is not an objective phenomenon like a solar system that is ‘out there’ (Jackson and Sorensen 2006: 162). Rather the international system exists only as an intellectual and ideational phenomenon of human invention that could change depending on social relations. The ideas referred to do not only mean those of an individual or a single state. Rather it is the inter-subjective ideas that are shared among people and states as well as the institutionalized ideas that are expressed as practices and identities (Hurd 2008:301). Legro (2005, 6) highlights the constructivist understanding of ideas by noting that ‘ideas are not so much mental as symbolic and organizational; they are embedded not only in human brains but also in the “collective memories,” government procedures, educational systems, and the rhetoric of statecraft.’

In his *Anarchy is what States Make of it: the Social Construction of Power Politics*, Wendt (1992) explains the construction of relationships in international relations. Wendt illustrates this by arguing that ‘500 British nuclear weapons are less threatening to the United States than 5 North Korean nuclear weapons’ (Wendt 1995: 73). In this claim, the U.S. perceives Britain as a friend while it harbours an idea of enmity with North Korea whom it views as capable of acting aggressively. If the case is merely about material capability, the U.S. would be more wary and threatened by Britain than North Korea. For Wendt, such view is consequent from the historical, rhetorical and behavioural
interpretations of the social relations between the U.S and Britain on the one hand and North Korea on the other.\textsuperscript{26}

Thus, negative or positive attitudes that people and states have towards others are dependent on the ideas about the kind of social relations they have for the other. Thus, if states have grim views about each other, then they are frantic about each other’s military power but if they see each other as friends, they tend to cooperate with each other. Hence, the international system is not merely an inevitable consequence of material power. Material resources only acquire meaning and prompt human action through the structures of ideas they exist in (Reus-Smit 2001: 217). This implies that if the ideas in international relations change, the relationships in the international relations change as well. While states can harbour ideas of enmity, states can also choose to be more benign and friendly with each other. Hence, depending on the ideas that emanate from relationships, states could either compete or cooperate with each other others.

In terms of the growing trend of international cooperation, the idea of belonging to an international organization has become fashionable since the eighteenth century. Despite the neorealist emphasis that the international system is another tool used by powerful states to dominate smaller states, many states have come to join international organizations such as the United Nations. The number of member states of the United Nations has grown from 51 when it was established in 1945 to 193 member states today; comprising virtually every state in the world. For neoliberalists, this cooperation is as a result of the mutual selfish interests of states that propel the interest in cooperation. For them, without international institutions such as the UN, it is unimaginable conceiving a non-chaotic post-1945 international order, the future of humankind is dim and gloomy (Keohane 1988: 393). But constructivists would insist that the move by states to join the United Nations, for example, is a matter of social meaning and the prevailing emphasis on common interests, interdependence and the relevance of international cooperation. In Africa for instance, the idea of shared identity, challenges and goals have contributed to many states being part of the continental organization African Union rather than the European Union which is in the European continent for instance.

\textsuperscript{26} Relevant to the Cold War era for instance, if the United States and the Soviet Union decided earlier in 1960 for example that they are no longer enemies, the Cold War would have ended then (Hurd 2008).
On constructivist influence, Martha Finnemore in her book titled *National Interests in International Society* (1996), focuses on how international norms and laws affect state identity and interests. For Finnemore (1996), state identities and interests are influenced by the norms of behaviour that are advocated for in the international system through international organizations. Finnemore buttresses that international organizations – such as the United Nations (UN) and its subsidiary bodies such as the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF); as well as regional organizations like the European Union (EU), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the African Union, among others - wield immense influence on the behavior of member states. Such institutions which emerged out of the idea of cooperation play a crucial role in shaping the interests of states. For instance, the decision of the South African government not to detain and hand over President Omar Al-Bashir of Sudan to the International Criminal Court (ICC) – when Bashir came to South Africa for the AU Summit in June 2015 – could be said to be influenced by its membership with the AU which resolved against the trial of incumbent regimes in the continent.

In accord with Finnemore (1996), international norms created out of collective meaning have come to hold sway in international relations. For instance, international laws such as the International Humanitarian Laws and International Human Right Laws play crucial roles in influencing state behavior. A good instance of the influence of international norms is that the UN through the *International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty* (ICISS) of 2001, has come to adopt a doctrine called the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). This doctrine which was endorsed by the 2005 UN World Summit Outcome Document insists that the broader international community bears the responsibility to intervene in the internal affairs of member states when a particular state in question fails or is unwilling to protect civilians in line with Chapter VI and VII of the UN Charter. Thus, the classical inviolable right to sovereignty – an ‘exclusive and final jurisdiction over territory, as well as resources and populations that lie within the territory’ as endorsed by the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia – have become diluted with conditions which states need to fulfil to avoid external interference (Cusimano 2000: 2). Hence, via international governance and standards, the behaviour of states are constantly defined, regulated, coordinated and constrained (Abbott and Snidal 2001: 346)\(^{27}\). In the same vein,

\(^{27}\) For Burton (2015: 32), the role of third parties such as international institutions in conflict avoidance is crucial because governments and particular entities do not look into the future to address issues that could
international standards are not static because they are redefined in the relationship process.

Based on the constructivist framework, the following sections articulates issues around intra-state conflicts which is the unit of analysis for this study. The subsequent section further engages the theory and practice of third party interventions especially in terms of conflict resolution.

3.2 The Conception of the Challenges of Intra-State Conflict

Among peace and security experts, there is widespread consensus that conflict is an inevitable phenomenon in societies because it is a logical consequence of human diversity (Boulding 2015; Agada 2008: 23). A world without conflict would mean a robotic-world without diversity. This is based on the consideration that within diversity, conflicts could result from competition over some incompatible interests. For Tillett (1999: 1), conflict could be intrapersonal as experienced within an individual; interpersonal as disagreements between two individuals; intra-group as disagreements within members of a group; and inter-group as experiences between different groups. While intrapersonal and interpersonal conflicts are subjects of concern in society given that they are smaller conflicts that could spiral into major conflicts in societies, international relations discourses have often focused on intra-group and inter-group conflicts particularly as intra-state/internal and interstate conflicts respectively.

Tillett (1999) notes that conflict could either make or mar societies. In line with the former sense, many experts insist that while conflicts lead to tensions, conflicts are particularly healthy for development and progress at all levels of society (Butler 2009; Tillet 1999). It helps societies to harness diverse ideas and interests for the development of the society. In the latter sense however, conflict could lead to destructive and unpleasant consequences especially when conflicts are expressed through actions. The destructive aspect remains the troubling aspect of conflict given that it jeopardizes the security of lives and properties.

\[\text{28 For Boulding (2015: 22) “Conflict is an activity that is found almost everywhere. It is found throughout the biological world, where the conflict both individuals and of species is an important part of the picture”}\]
Among ordinary people as well as scholars, the destructive perspective of conflict has led to a somewhat common understanding of conflict as the pursuanta of incompatible interests through the threat and actual use of force. It is along this consideration that Edward Azar (2015: 48) in The Management of Protracted Social Conflict (1986) observes that ‘regardless of source and type, conflicts are generally conceived as such only when they are overt and violent. Covert, latent or non-violent conflicts are seldom regarded as appropriate objects of study’.

Beside the experiences of ‘low scale’ violent expressions between persons and groups, large scale armed conflicts or wars raise considerable concern for human, national and international security. Armed conflicts, from an international relations perspective, could be either intrastate wars which occurs within a state or interstate wars between two or more states. Since the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s however, armed conflicts have become predominantly intrastate in nature (Butler 2009). Cusimano (2000: 4) is informative in noting that since the demise of the Cold War era, the world recorded more intra-state conflicts, decline of inter-state conflicts and decline in state power.

29 Although the growing emergence of terrorist organizations have international dynamics and effects, internal state factors remain the major propellant and platforms for the growth of international terrorist organizations. For instance, Al-Shabaab of Somalia, the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant and Boko Haram of Nigeria all emerged out of discontents with internal factors.

Generally, intra-state conflicts have exposed civilians to untold sufferings that have challenged the state-centric conception of security and raised concern for a more human-centric paradigm of security. Particularly, the awful images of the ethnic cleansing of the

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29 Since 1990, only four wars were dubbed interstate war i.e. the India and Pakistan war (1997 to 2003), Ethiopia and Eritrea (1998 to 2000), the Persian Gulf War (1990 to 1991) and the Iraq and US/allies war.
Bosnians by the Serbs, the 1994 Rwandan genocide, the Somali civil war, famine and ongoing civil war in the 1990s had dismantled the international community’s exclusive conception of security from the perspective of the state. As established by the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, states are guaranteed the rights to sovereignty and are considered the primary actors in international relations. Significantly, technological advancements as well as the development of the media industry led to a generous coverage and popularization of the horrific nature of intrastate conflicts that results from the political, economic and/or social challenges of people across the globe (Gottwald 2012: 6). The wide coverage has provoked the sympathy of citizens in non-affected states and reinforced the idea of our common humanity. It is along this concerns coupled with the dominance of democratic principles in the Post-Cold War era that the Human Security paradigm emerged to focus on the security of individuals, groups and societies rather than state security (Kaldor 2007).

The 1994 Human Development Report by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) which first propagated the notion of ‘human security’ shifted the discourse on security from its state-centric/national terms to human security by highlighting that security should be conceived as the freedom from fear and from want. The report identifies seven elements of human security namely, economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community and political security (Kaldor 2007: 182).

In line with the human security discourse, the international community has mandated many peace operations and interventions that contravenes the sacrosanct sovereignty of states (Cusimano 2000: 2). In his 20 September 1999 Report to the United Nations General Assembly, former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, contends that despite the limitations and imperfections of humanitarian intervention, ‘it is testimony to a humanity that cares more, not less, for the suffering in its midst, and a humanity that will do more, and not less, to end it’ (Annan 1999).

Moreover, intra-state conflicts have turned many states into failed and crisis states with dire consequences to international security. Failed and crisis states have provided grounds for state collapse, refugee flows, spread of diseases, trade disruptions and the rise of criminal and terrorist organizations whose activities have global outreach (Kaldor 2007). This entails that internal security challenges have impacts across the globe. Additionally, like the cases of Somalia, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the recent crises
in Libya and Syria, intrastate conflicts have also proven to be notorious for metastasizing into regional crisis thereby jeopardizing regional stability and international order.

Cusimano (2000: 12) notes that ‘when sovereign states collapse, the international system feels the shock waves’. The 2004 UN Report of the *High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change* maintains that any threat to a state and to human life *en masse* constitutes a threat to international security. In this regard, there is increasing realization that national borders can no longer contain internal insecurities.\(^{30}\) Even though Article 2.7 of the UN Charter notes that problems ‘essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of a state should not be a concern for the UN’, the realization of the human and international threats posed by intra-state conflicts have led the UN to take on leading role in the resolution of intra-conflicts in contemporary times.

In his 1992 Agenda for Peace report, the former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali argues that the time for sacrosanct sovereignty has passed (Boutros Boutros-Ghali, 1992: paragraph 17). In his milestone article in 1999 to the United Nations General Assembly, Kofi Annan argues in line with Francis Deng’s claim\(^{31}\), that the principle of sovereignty contained in the UN Charter should be interpreted as a responsibility to adequately carry out both domestic and external duties (Annan 1999). Based on Annan’s plea in the Millennium Report to the General Assembly in the year 2000, the UN commissioned the Canadian-sponsored *International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty* (ICISS) in 2001 to investigate the chasm between sovereignty and humanitarian intervention. The ICISS report titled *Responsibility to Protect* which was endorsed in the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, highlights that although it is the primary responsibility of sovereign states to protect their own citizens, the broader international community bears the responsibility to protect civilians when a particular state in question fails or is unwilling to protect civilians in line with Chapter VI and VII of the UN Charter.

As contextualized by the tenets of constructivism, the changes of ideas towards human security perspectives have remarkably belittled the idea of sacrosanct sovereignty as

\(^{30}\) The Commission on Global Governance observed that ‘people in many areas of the world feel insecure more than ever, not in most cases due to external aggression but because of insecurities from within states’ (Commission on Global Governance 1995: 79).

\(^{31}\) In an attempt to address the predominance of internal conflicts and the growing number of internally displaced person IDPs, Francis Deng along with other scholars In 1996, had argued innovatively for the idea of ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ (Scanlon *et al* 2007: 14; Bellamy 2008: 20).
established by the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia thereby providing a greater avenue for third party involvement in crisis states. Security concerns emanating from crisis states have attracted various unilateral, bilateral, multilateral and international interventionist efforts to prevent, manage, settle and resolve conflicts. Regardless of the issues presented by third party interventions with regards to the influence and interest of dominant powers, third party interventions have, over the years, gained bolder stature especially those under the coordination and authorization of the UN which serves as the legitimizing international body.

3.3 Conceptualizing Third-Party Interventions in Conflict Settings

In terms of third party interventions in conflicts, experts in peace and security have considered security interventions using broad terms such as conflict prevention, conflict management, conflict settlement, conflict resolution and conflict transformation initiatives. The forgoing interventionist frameworks however are intersecting practices that tend to highlight specific focus or stages in the attempts to address conflict challenges. For instance, while conflict prevention is understood as the attempts to avert potential or developing conflicts, conflict management entails measures to alleviate the dangers of conflict, lessen actual or potential suffering as well as contain, control and end on-going violent conflict (Viotti and Kauppi 2001: 196; Butler 2009: 1; Wallensteen 2011: 5). Beside conflict prevention which is an ongoing measure in every society to avert potential or developing conflicts, conflict management is quintessential as the initial attempt to respond to violent conflict to inhibit conflict from escalating and to end or deter violent expressions of conflict.

In this regard, the management of conflict involve the use and/or the threat of the use of force; the use of legal, normative and extra-legal mechanisms to enable belligerents to settle their differences legally; and the use of other diplomatic measures to enable aggressors to broker agreements (Butler 2009: 14). To end conflict, conflict management encompass attempts at peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement. Peacemaking efforts are manifest in the diplomatic and mediatory efforts to attain ceasefire agreements and peace agreements between warring parties (Wallensteen 2011: 8). In cases where ceasefire agreements are reached and widespread violent conflicts end, the international community may establish peacekeeping missions with the consent of the state to ensure
adherence to the terms of the agreement, alleviate tension, stabilize hotspots, monitor the implementation of ceasefire agreements and protect civilian populations.

Much of the international community’s intervention in conflict scenarios are designed as peacekeeping missions in principle. The UN has mandated over 69 peacekeeping missions across the globe since its formation in 1945, thereby establishing peacekeeping as the preferred military form of international intervention given that it requires the impartiality, neutrality and the consent of host states thereby paying greater respect to the sovereignty of states. Conflict management also involves peace enforcement which entails a third-party intervention in a violent conflict scenario where conflict parties express no desire for peace; thus the enforcement aids to bring an end to the conflict as endorsed in Chapter VII of the UN Charter. This involves the use of military coercion to ‘create or impose, by force, a cessation in hostilities so as to provide the conditions amenable to the negotiation of a cease-fire or peace agreement (or to help maintain that cessation)’ (Butler 2011: 160). Unlike peacekeeping which requires the consent of the state, peace enforcement only requires an imperfect consent given that the interveners could engage in combat with any of the conflict parties that resorts to violence (Butler 2011: 163).

While the peacekeeping and peace enforcement require some form of consent from host states however, third party interveners also reserve the option of humanitarian/military interventions in conflict scenes without the permission of host states (Dawson, 2004: 1). Though this is expected to be last resort measures, humanitarian or military intervention involves the use of military force to provide humanitarian aid to civilians, protect civilian population, coerce belligerents to engage in peaceful negotiations, and to prevent genocide and crimes against humanity such as the cases of US-led UN intervention in Somalia, US intervention in Kosovo as well as the NATO intervention in Libya (Viotti and Kauppi 2001). Most significantly, apart from being a one track form of international intervention, conflict management is instrumental in creating non-violent or stable environment for the settlement or resolution of conflict to take place.

Conflict settlement involves achieving compromises between warring parties (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall (2011: 31). This is attained without necessarily removing or addressing deep-seated issues in the society (Jeong 2010: 9). Conflict settlement maintains the status quo while attaining some form of compromise to diffuse or end conflict. Peacemaking and power sharing deals are reflective of conflict settlement
efforts. Many power sharing deals in Africa could be considered as a conflict settlement strategy where the leaders of conflict parties are placated with official positions in the government. This is sometimes achieved without addressing the social and economic injustices experienced by ordinary people.

The challenge with conflict settlement lie in the fact that conflict settlement mainly lead to short term solutions to conflict. As noted by Jeong (2010: 10), pragmatic solutions that ignore central interests of conflict parties only tend to secure short term non-violence. Conflict settlement is also often criticised because it is mainly achieved by imposition or coercion by third parties. In this situation, it is difficult to attain an attitudinal change from a conflicting party or from conflicting parties if fundamental goals that initiated the conflict are not addressed (Jeong 2010: 10). Nevertheless, like conflict management, conflict settlement can provide non-violent environments for proper resolution of conflict to take place.

3.3.1 Conflict Resolution

Conflict resolution, which serves as the focus for this study, is premised on the belief that despite the inevitability of conflict in human society, conflict, no matter what stage it is at, is solvable through non-violence means. It is against this backdrop that conflict resolution deals with the processes of solving conflicts for lasting peace between warring parties (Wallensteen 2011: 3)\(^\text{32}\). Relevant to internal conflicts, conflict resolution attempts are built on the cognizance that conflicting parties would eventually live within the same territory, share same resources and relate with each other. Thus, conflict resolution confronts the foundation of conflicts including underlying grievances so as to secure lasting solutions to conflicts. In line with its aim to attain lasting solution, conflict resolution extend to efforts aimed at reconciling conflict parties and ensuring that warring parties respect and cooperate with each other and deal with future differences through non-violent means (Wallensteen 2011: 10).

In this regard, conflict resolution goes a long way to create interdependent and symbiotic relationship between the warring parties. Conflict resolution aims at attending to the inequitable socio-economic relations and power imbalances that ferment conflicts in

\(^\text{32}\) As noted by Wallensteen (2002: 7) conflict resolution emerged in more recent times with the emergence of peace research topics on international cooperation and integration contrary to dominant studies on balance of power.
society. This includes efforts aimed at achieving perceptual and attitudinal changes, altering underlying behavioural patterns, and altering institutional processes and structures that sustain conflict (Jeong 2010: 10; Butler 2009: 15).

The concept of ‘conflict transformation’ has emerged to somewhat advance a deeper relationship-centred effort at resolving conflict (Lederach 2003). Conflict transformation discourses espouse ‘a deep transformation in the institutions and discourses that reproduce violence, as well as in the conflict parties themselves and their relationships’ (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, and Miall 2011: 32). Lederach (2003) notes that conflict transformation is grounded in enhancing relationships and it seeks to achieve constructive change as opposed to the conflict resolution perspective that suggests quick solutions to deep social-political challenges. However, in line with the claims of Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, and Miall (2011: 9), the tenets of conflict transformation remain part and parcel of the efforts at conflict resolution at its deepest level. The resolution of disputes requires concerted and constructive efforts to address underlying issues that foster conflicts including relationships challenges as contained in the idea of conflict transformation. This study uses the concept of conflict resolution – as it remains the earliest and lasting generic term – for efforts aimed at addressing conflicts in line with the perspective that it does not really matter what name is used to describe efforts to address conflicts as long as every stage of resolution could be understood (ibid). Moreover, the efforts of conflict resolution, management and settlement as well as transformation are often complementary and are often interlinked in such a way that it is hard to understand where one ends and the other starts.

In conflict settings, conflict resolution attempts go beyond conflict management and settlement initiatives to attempts that promote negotiations between warring parties, peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction. Such platforms however, is only possible with conflict management initiatives that bring an end to widespread violence. Wallensteen (2002: 8), for instance, observes that without some form of agreement or cessation of violence between warring parties there would be no discourse on conflict resolution. For instance, the peace agreements repeatedly signed by the South Sudan warring faction leaders President Salva Kiir and the rebel leader Rachel Machel in 2014, provide a platform to engage stakeholders in negotiations to attain lasting peace. While the agreements were repeatedly broken by the warring parties, they remain crucial for conflict resolution to take place. For conflict resolution to take place, peacekeeping
missions such as those in the CAR, South Sudan, Mali and DRC remain crucial in monitoring and deterring conflict parties from violence.

Negotiation and dialogues are vital aspect of conflict resolution (De Coning 2010: 171). In conflict settings, third parties serve the crucial purpose of encouraging and facilitating negotiations. This is to attain lasting resolution of disputes. As part of conflict resolution attempts is peacebuilding which entails altering structural – social, economic and political – contradictions, improving relations between the conflict parties and changing individual attitudes and behaviour so as to develop a society that is less likely to resort to conflict in the future (Henrard 2002: 18; Abdi 2012: 62-64). Peacebuilding could be applied in all stages of conflict and even in relatively peaceful societies as preventative measures to promote peace and overcome violence – thereby taking a conflict prevention perspective (Abdi 2012: 62). In post-conflict societies, peacebuilding include supporting the constitution writing processes, the restoration of state authority and state services; the establishment of human rights and the rule of law; the disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR) processes; humanitarian assistance; election processes; security sector reform.

Generally, conflict resolution aims at resolving the root causes of conflict and developing conditions to prevent the resurgence of conflict (Fearnely and Chiwandamira 2006: 10). However, the resolution of conflicts remains a big challenge to the international community given that conflicts could escalate and become pathological if the resolution used is inappropriate.

### 3.3.2 Issues with Third Party Interventions

In international relations, the perennial challenge for third party interventions is that it is in conflict with the principle of sovereignty as established by the Treaty of Westphalia of 24 October 1648; the treaty ended the thirty years war in Europe and endorsed the

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33 Disarmament entails the ‘collection, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons of combatants and civilians. Demobilization is ‘the process by which armed forces either downsize or completely disband’. Reintegration programmes entails ‘assistance measures provided to former combatants that would increase the potential for their and their families’ economic and social reintegration into civil society’ (Jennings, 2007: 205).

34 The conceptual thin line between conflict management and conflict resolution is evident in the fact that recent peacekeeping operations have taken multi-dimensional outlooks that encompass peacebuilding initiatives. This is in accord with the understanding in the international community that efforts to stabilize hotspots could fail if peacebuilding initiatives are awaited at a latter stage (Carvalho and Ettang 2011: 4). Hence, current peacekeeping initiatives involve attending to causal issues such as lack of justice, poverty, unemployment and weak state authority and institutions.
sovereignty of states. Emerging from the European framework, the principle of sovereignty gradually spread all over the world as the right form of political organization. At its earliest conceptualization, sovereign states have the right to be internally organized into different forms of government – autocracy, theocracy, monarchy, dictatorship, democracy, etc. – without interference from other states. Sovereign states were entitled to relate with its citizens as it pleases and contend with its internal affairs without interference from external forces (Cusimano 2000: 2). As endorsed in Article 2.4 of the United Nations Charter, the principle of sovereignty entails that states have the right to self-determination and self-rule without external interference. However, with globalization, human security concerns and the escalating impact of conflict beyond borders, third parties have intervened in conflict settings without ‘legal’ backing or with some legal support in accord with international law and the mandate of the UN.

The major controversy with third party intervention has to do with the fear of and abuse of interventions by powerful states. Weaker states in the international system are constantly wary that powerful state exploit the window of intervention to pursue their narrow interest under the guise of resolving conflicts. Whether diplomatic, mediatory or militaristic, interventions threaten the independence of states. Coercive interventions in the form of military/humanitarian intervention which are carried out without the consent of the affected state however are the major concerns in international relations. Critics of the human security doctrine, as well as the resultant Responsibility to Protect doctrine as discussed above, contend that such doctrines are ploys of powerful states to meddle in the affairs of weaker states (Gottwald 2012: 8).

As a general rule and as contained among the six criteria for intervention propagated by the 2001 ICISS Responsibility to Protect report including the report of Lakhdar Brahimi Panel of 2000, military interventions and peace operations can only be embarked in conflict settings where there is a reasonable prospect for success (ICISS 2001). This automatically rules out military interventions in cases where powerful states embark on war with other states or experience internal violence. Thus, interventionist principles that contravene the sovereignty of states are deemed to be targeting weaker states.

Moreover, Third World states like those in Africa are youngsters or amateurs in the practice of ‘statehood’ and hence bound to face internal challenges (Ayoob 2001: 130). As highlighted by Ayoob (2001:130), it took several years – about four hundred years –
of suffering, deaths and unchallenged conquests and wars for European states to attain the stability they currently enjoy. For Di John (2008:2), the historical process of state formation in old Europe was chequered by ‘violence and uncertainty over the institutional structure as’ various ‘groups compete to establish positions of power and legitimacy’. In this regard, the challenges of internal conflicts faced by many Third World states especially those in Africa are situations that some observers will consider to be normal events which entails that self-determination and non-interference principles should be allowed to prevail (Buzan 1991).

Along this thinking, Micheal Walzer (1977) argued that the right to self-determination enshrined in the principle of sovereignty demands that states should sort out their internal crises without external interference. For Walzer (1977), in rare cases, only interventions in emergencies such as genocide could be justified. In ‘The Curse of Inclusive Intervention’, Edward Luttwak (2001) argues that wars should be allowed to follow their natural course which is an end. For Luttwak (2001), intervening in war situations only ends up prolonging the war. When wars are stopped by third parties, warring parties re-group, retrain and rearm themselves for a reinvigorated conflict. Luttwak (2001) adduces the example of the Arab-Israel War of 1948 – 1949 where (as he claimed) the intervention of the UN Security Council gave the belligerents the opportunity to rearm and continue the arms struggle which could have ended in few weeks. In tandem with Luttwak (2001), wars should be allowed to ripen and warring parties should be allowed to attain victory, reach a mutual exhaustion or lack the necessary arms to further their armed struggles.

However, experiences like the 1994 Rwandan genocide including the ongoing conflicts in the Central African Republic, South Sudan, Mali and Syria have shown that international involvement in conflict situations when necessary is crucial. There is no guarantee that internal conflicts will ebb away if left alone. At times, internal conflicts metastasize to pose regional/international threats like the case of Somalia, Afghanistan, Bosnia, Rwanda and Congo where other neighbouring states where dragged into the conflicts as well. For instance, the internal crisis of Somalia also led to the problems of refugee flows, spread of diseases, trafficking, piracy as well as the onslaught of Al-Shabaab terrorists in and outside of Somalia. Furthermore, the Syrian conflict has also overflowed into neighbouring states such as Turkey, Iraq and Lebanon, and have provided

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35 Buzan in his work People, States and Fear, insists that the state bears the primary and ultimate prerogative to satisfy the conditions of human security (Buzan 1991).
suitable ground for the emergence, growth and terror of the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant. The ICISS argues that the principle of non-intervention entails that states should solve their own internal problems to avoid the conflict spilling over to neighbouring countries as well as becoming an issue of international peace and security (ICISS 2001: 31). Issues that pose actual and potential threat to international peace and security demand international responses (ICISS 2001: 13).

Third Party interventions remain a delicate terrain however in the attempt to resolve conflict. Apart from the concern for sovereignty, when third party interventions occur in conflict settings, concern persist around the motive and reliability of the interveners like the French intervention in Cote d’Ivoire and Mali. When it is neglected as in the case of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda and currently in Syria including when interventions are delayed, questions arise around the international commitment to human security and global peace and security. As such, third party interventions remain a contested phenomenon based on the constructs of sovereignty and the ideas around the imperative for humanitarian action.

The foregoing discourse has provided the mainstream theoretical and conceptual background for the considerations of Africa’s quest to intervene in its security challenges. For a closer engagement with Africa’s quest for African solutions, the following section engages with the constructive implication of the maxim African solutions to African problem for Africa.

3.4 Constructivist Implications of the Term “African solutions to African Problems”

To engage meaningfully with the implications of the maxim ‘African solutions to Africa problems’, the following section divides the maxim into two compartments namely “African solutions” and “African problems”. Given that problems often precede solutions, the study thus sets the scene by engaging with the constructivist implications of ‘African problems’ in terms of peace and security.

3.4.1 Making Sense of “African Problems” in terms of Peace and Security

While there are many achievements and prospects in Africa, the often highlighted facts and impressions about the continent are the challenges and issues it faces. Without making too much efforts at contextualization, analysts from different regions of the world could easily make assertions that Africa is faced with problems such as conflicts, poverty, state
failure, underdevelopment, etc. Such challenges, however true, tends to be the first perceptions that are evoked in the minds of people when the name Africa is mentioned. As noted by Williams (2007:121), others see Africa as ‘a stricken continent in need of charity, whose development should be seen as moral imperative; a potentially dangerous continent that needs order and strong governments capable of effectively policing their territory’.

Nevertheless, to adequately understand Africa’s problems – which is the unit of analysis in this study, it is important to comprehend the extent of the challenges in the continent which calls for African solutions. While a more comprehensive overview is provided in chapter four (4), this section provides a brief overview of Africa’s problems based on the conditions it faces in the international system and secondly based on the contextual challenges of the continent especially in terms of peace and security. By so doing, the overview in this section provides a context for engaging with the theoretical considerations of African solutions in terms of conflict resolution.

3.4.1.1 Africa’s Problems in the International order

As noted aptly by Ramose (2002: 1), ‘for centuries, discourses on Africa have been dominated by non-Africans.’ Relevant to understanding Africa’s problems, colonial and post-colonial African societies had little to do with the state-system and boundaries it has today. Elise Boulding (2015: 68) affirms that ‘highly evolved indigenous systems of government and laws, land tenure, and agricultural practices were brushed aside without ever being noticed.’ The analysis of Africa’s challenges have been preconditioned and described by powerful actors in the international system. The common descriptions of African states as weak, failed, underdeveloped, fragile, conflict-prone region, reflect the judgements of powerful states who dominate the international order. From the onset of independence, African states were automatically adjudged weak and underdeveloped states (Ayoob 2001). This was because with limited knowledge of the running of the colonial-type state-system and governance, Africa faced the problem of being weak and underdeveloped states.

As entities discovered by European powers, African states where only left with the choice of meeting-up with the already developed framework of the international system as established by dominant powers or lag behind in the scale of development (Osaghae 2007). At this stage from 1950 to 1970, the ‘international community’ – dominant powers
– were not in any pressure to insist on development in Africa given that at that time there were no major threats to dominant powers emanating from the weak Africa. In fact the weaknesses of African states at that time served their purpose of meddling in African affairs because the weak African regimes were quick to call on the assistance of superpowers in times of crisis. The imperial powers and to further their ideological struggle during the Cold War era. State leaders who were unable to conceive viable policies for development in their countries opted for corruption and state terror to silence opposition voices.

At the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s however, the insecurities beyond borders that emanated from Third World States, like those in Africa, raised concerns that failing and failed states may jeopardize international security particularly through refugee flows and providing breeding grounds for transnational criminal networks and international terrorist organizations. Because the activities of criminal and terrorist networks affect powerful states as well, dominant powers began frantic attempts to sustain the state and to address Africa’s insecurities.

The international development community such as the World Bank and IMF began advancing and popularizing the notion of “fragile” “failed” and “collapsed” states in reference to Third World states that have deviated from the requirements of the ‘dominant and supposedly universal (but western) paradigm of the state’ (Osaghae 2007: 691). Analysts emphasize that failed states are used by terrorist organizations to arm and train terrorists for attack in other states. For instance, since state collapse in the early 1990s, Somalia has been identified as a hotspot for piracy and terrorism and has been indicted for providing safe haven for the terrorist bombings of the U.S Embassies in Tanzania and Kenya in 1998. Osaghae (2007: 691) is instructive in noting that ‘while the image of fragility is historically associated with the Third World in general, the focus here is mainly on Africa’.

Since the 1990s, the international community led by dominant powers has been making desperate attempts at keeping African states “afloat” through suggested, but imposed developmental programmes such as the infamous Structural Adjustment Programmes.

36 Notably, the challenges posed by international terrorist organizations today highlight the fact that the imperialist or ‘imposition-ist’ approach of dominant powers have not been efficient. Significantly, many terrorist groups emerge out of the aversion for foreign impositions to argue for a more society-centric approach.
that was introduced into the region (Di John 2008). African states were presented with the choice of either adopting the policies or be denied foreign aids which interested many state leaders who were obsessed with power. However, despite favouring the former, Africa’s failing status has not made significant turn. As evident from the failed state index, African states continue to occupy the pinnacle of state failure.

Moreover, with the end of the Cold War era, many African regimes lost external protection from the Cold War superpowers (Reilly 2008: 18). Without external support, the gap between the state and the masses was quickly bridged by aggrieved non-state actors and opposition forces who became emboldened to confront state excesses even by the use of force. What resulted from this is the persistent internal conflicts in the continent, a phenomenon which brought out a new dimension of conflict. The internal conflicts in Third World weak states became a challenge for powerful states who observed that states undergoing civil war are susceptible to failure and collapse which further jeopardizes the security of the international order.

To address this challenge, ‘human security’ considerations became a highlight taking over centre-stage from the failed or fragile state discourse. The human security discourse tended to be aimed at pushing for a so-called people-centric view of security so as to, among other objectives, present opportunity for powerful states to keep an eye on the less powerful and intervene in the guise of upholding human security. With the assessment of Africa’s condition together with other Third Worlds, the 1994 UNDP’s Human Development Report released seven human security concerns namely economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community and political security (Kaldor 2007: 182). Through this framework, the international community sought to highlight the urgency of development and to put a close eye on Africa and other Third Worlds. For Buzan (1991), the broadening of the concept of security as espoused by UNDP merely provides a conducive platform for external involvement in the internal affairs of weaker sovereign states.

This overview highlights the quagmire which Africa is faced with especially when considering the fact that many of Africa’s problems are not of Africa’s making. They are

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37 The fourth chapter shall engage in-depth with the developmental programmes that serve as self-serving projects for dominant powers.

38 For Keith Somerville (1990:1), peace and war in Africa, is determined by foreign powers. The African nationalists and elites who fought for self-rule turned out to be handmaids and agents of colonial and foreign powers. When things go wrong, they quickly request the assistance of foreign powers.
rather constructed problems that Africa has to face in the global system where some states have assumed monopoly of power. While it is true that Africa faces some challenges of state failure, crises and underdevelopment, these problems are constructs of dominant powers that set the agenda of what should be the terms used to describe Africa’s issues. Based on the latter, one could ask: if the defining structures of international relations did not exist at the time of Africa’s independence, could these issues be phrased differently? In terms of Africa’s development challenge for instance, could the terms used and the meaning attached to Africa’s developmental challenge be different if it is not defined by the developmental views and priorities of the west?39

3.4.1.2 The lived challenges in Africa in terms of peace and security

As a lived reality however, Africa’s crises are undeniably daunting. Pertinent to peace and security, a number of actors have observed that many African states have experienced, are experiencing or are prone to experience violent conflicts. This is due to the challenges posed by artificial colonial boundaries, state failure, inequalities, poverty, scarce resources, secessionist and irredentist struggles, religious and ethnic differences, bad governance, elite corruption, post-election violence and political repression (Dersso 2011: 115; Somerville 1999). The conflict challenges in Africa are further highlighted by the fact that about 70% of all UN military, police and civilian peacekeeping officers are in Africa deployed in countries such as Central African Republic (CAR), Darfur, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), South Sudan and Mali (DefenceWeb 2014)

As noted by Hoeffler (2008), between 1960 and 2002, about 1.55 million people were killed in civil war related-deaths in Africa out of the 3.86 million people killed globally in civil war related battles. Thus, war-related deaths in Africa account for 40 per cent of global war related deaths. A research conducted by the Armed Conflict and Location Event Data Project (ACLED) found that, among five African war zones in 2014, Nigeria – one of the supposed powerhouse of Africa – is the deadliest country with 11 360 fatalities (29% of total deaths in sub-Saharan Africa), followed by South Sudan (6 383, accounting for 16%) (cited in De Villiers 2015). Somalia accounted for 4 425 deaths

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39 It is within such considerations that Dei and Simmons (2009) observe that development is a concept that varies from place to place but western universalisations have made it seem mainly about ‘economic, technological and material constraints and possibilities, with little emphasis on the spiritual, emotional and social-cultural dimensions’. For Wiredu (1980:43) ‘technological sophistication is only an aspect, and not the core, of development’.
(11%), Sudan for 3 888 (10%) and the CAR, where the rate of violence virtually doubled from 2013, accounted for 3 282 (8.5%).

These conflicts have resulted in grave human rights violations, large-scale displacement of people and refugee flows with worrying impact on non-combatants, especially women, children, the disabled, the poor and the elderly. In accord with the 2006 UNHCR report, Africa, being a home to about 12 per cent of the population of the world, has about 31 per cent of the world’s refugee population. Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, and Miall (2011: 85) note that ‘in African countries like Angola, Eritrea, Liberia, Mozambique, Rwanda, Somalia and Sudan, up to half or more of the total population have been forced to flee at some point.’ According to a 2014 UNHCR Report, Sub-Saharan Africa was a host to about 3.7 million refugees (26%) of the world’s total number of refugees at the end of year 2014. These refugees were mostly from Somalia (753,000), South Sudan (615,300), Sudan (627,000), the Democratic Republic of Congo (487,800), the Central African Republic (410,400) and Eritrea (239,600). Similarly, the Middle East and North Africa regions are said to host 3.1 million (21%) of the total number of world refugees. The continent also has over 42 per cent of the global Internal Displaced Persons (IDPs) in accord with the UNHCR report of 2006.

According to Hoeffler (2008), ‘one clear cost of civil war is a reduction in economic growth’. Hoeffler (2008) explains that one year of conflict reduces a countries growth rate by 2.2 percent. Looking at the conflicts in Africa, he argues that since each conflict last for about seven years, this implies that the economy of these conflicting states will be depleted by 15 percent at the end of the war. Having surmised that during the post-war recovery, economies tended to have increased by annual rate of more than 1 percent, Hoeffler calculates that in all the war affected states, it will take about ten years to return to its pre-war growth rates. This implies that it will take 17 years to return to its normal growth rate after the conflict started.\(^40\)

Apart from making citizens vulnerable to human right abuses and economic costs, the internal conflicts of particular states have also metastasized into regional problems. For instance, the so-called Arab Spring that began in 2011 in Tunisia and spread across

\(^{40}\) Still on the national cost, it is said that the welfare of a nation’s populace is greatly depleted due to increased military spending during and after the war (ibid). Military spending is said to increase at about 1.8 percent during war and can only fall back by 0.5 percent after the war. If such increased spending lasts for ten years, for instance, it therefore implies that additional cost to government is about 18 percent of the GDP.
Northern Africa and other Arab states in the Middle East is a vivid testimony of how intra-state conflicts could spiral sparks of conflicts everywhere. The conflict in Somalia is notorious for dragging neighbouring countries like Ethiopia, Kenya and Eritrea into the crisis. With many stakeholders, the Somali crises turned into a complex and prolonged regional security conundrum. To further stress the metastasizing of intra-state conflicts into regional problems, the internal crisis of Somalia has also led to the problems of refugee flows, trafficking, piracy, etc. Furthermore, the political instability and conflict in Libya and Egypt has also overflowed and affected the political situation of Niger, Mauritania, Chad, Sudan and Mali (Rupiya 2012: 178).

Armed groups in post-conflict African states further sell out their weapons to rebel groups in other countries at affordable prices. Such practice leads to arms proliferation thereby making weapons accessible for rebel groups in other countries to further their interests via the use of force. This entraps Africa in a circle of conflict. With regards to Mali for instance, Malian Touareg and Salafist rebel groups accessed sophisticated weapons used during the 2011 Libyan armed conflict to enforce their secessionist agenda (Rupiya 2012: 178).

Conflict in Africa has slowed down the development in the African region. Using regression analysis, Hoeffler (2008), posits that the growth rate of neighbouring countries not directly involved in the conflict is reduced by 0.9 percent during war. This means that in Africa any conflict affecting a country has inevitable effect on neighbouring countries. Hoeffler (2008) argues that a one percent increase in military spending of any country in conflict gives rise to about 0.23 percent increase in the spending of its neighbouring countries. This military spending has had negative effects on economic developments and poverty alleviation. Thus, conflict entangles the continent in a vicious circle of conflicts precipitated by poverty and underdevelopment which in turn spawn further conflicts.

Amidst persistent internal conflicts in Africa, terrorism, as a politically motivated violence, have advanced to compound and compete with other human security threats such as economic, food, health and environment and community distresses in the continent. While terrorist movements emerge from internal grievances within a state, their impacts often transcend local origins and threaten world peace and security. The threats posed by terrorist groups – such as Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the Boko Haram of Nigeria, Al-Shabaab of Somalia, Ansar Al-Shariya of Tunisia and the Al-
 Qaeda-linked Mulathameen Brigade (the ‘Masked Ones’) in Algeria as well as the Ansar Dine of Libya and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) of Uganda – have not only compromised human security but have jeopardized national, regional and international order and peace. Coupled with other ills such as political instability, poverty and underdevelopment, the increasing foothold of terrorism including human and drug trafficking, transnational organized crime, money laundering, piracy, among others, in Africa has further encouraged the grim images of Africa. It is within this considerations that based on the prevailing idea among many observers, ‘the word Africa conjures up images of a continent in crisis, riddled with war and corruption, imploding from disease and starvation’ (Schmidt 2013: 1).

3.4.2 Making Sense of African Solutions in Peace and Security

In tandem with the tenet of constructivism which holds that the international relations is determined by the prevailing ideas, it becomes imperative to engage with the extent of Africa’s contribution to the dominant ideas and practices that seeks to address the challenges in the continent and across the globe. This will provide a valuable rationale for the quest for African solutions. As discussed in the subsequent sections, the quest for African solutions could be broadly considered based on

1. The concerns about the dominance of the perspectives and ideas of powerful actors in terms of providing solutions to challenges.
2. The divergences of the values in conflict resolution. This includes considerations around:
   a. the discourse on the indigenous model of conflict resolution
   b. Divergences of prioritizations: The individual versus the society.
   c. Divergences of peace paradigms

3.4.2.1 The Dominance of Dominant Frameworks: Towards an Inclusive World Order

Among peace and security experts, there is a growing recognition that much of the theory and practice of conflict resolution are based on perspectives from dominant actors (Osei-Hwedie and Rankopo 2012; Lacroix and Neufeldt 2010; Brock–Utne 2001; Bukari 2013). It is no doubt that western-oriented world-view has been well-traded in today’s global world in such a way that people across cultures are expected to measure up to its standards. This condition has led to the tacit reduction of the complexities across the globe to a
simplified version of western viewpoint. Given that many scholars from non-western backgrounds are schooled in western systems and standards, other outlooks have not found useful expressions in theoretical and practical discourses especially at the international level.

Some authors observe that the so-called mainstream conception of conflict resolution portrays essential ideas, thought processes, beliefs and values western powers (Avruch 2002; Salem 2007; Walker 2004; Lacroix and Neufeldt 2010; Boulding 2015). Even when adapted for implementation in non-western societies, the overarching principles guiding the conflict resolution techniques are indicative of the dominant western approaches. Lacroix and Neufeldt (2010) observe that the term conflict resolution itself emerged in mid-1950s with viewpoints and theories from North America and Europe.

In *Culture and Conflict Resolution*, Avruch (2002) maintains that even though mainstream conflict resolution tends to be presented as being neutral and objective, culture has a significant sway in people’s action at the subconscious level and western actors have intentionally and unintentionally dominated conflict resolution method with western cultural values and approaches. Yet, when culture – the culture of non-western actors – is invoked in conflict resolution lexicon it is considered a barrier to resolution and reconciliation processes (Gellman 2007). Lacroix and Neufeldt (2010), for instance, argues that the mainstream conflict resolution approaches shuns emotions in conflict resolution and reconciliation processes because emotions are considered as impediments to these process. For Lacroix and Neufeldt (2010: 10) such legacy is derivative from the American middle class’s notion of what is suitable in negotiation; over time, emotion thus becomes an anathema-sit in conflict resolution attempts.

Thus, as foregrounded by Jeng (2012: 6) the ‘dominant peace advocacy had generally conceptualised peace and peacebuilding in the context of Eurocentric thinking.’ Such state of affairs encouraged Theron (1995: 12), a bastion of western civilization, to insist that the rest of humanity are mere users and beneficiaries of the ‘….Western movement of technology, natural and social science, philosophy and, even or especially, religion’. Tony Blair, former British Prime Minister had argued that “the best defence of our security ...... lies in the spread of our [liberal international law] values. But we cannot advance these values except within a framework that recognises their universality” (cited in Jeng 2012). Although, Blair seems to suggest that the views are subjective to Europeans, he equally
espouses the universalization of such views. This affirms Michel Foucault’s contention, in his seminal work titled ‘Madness and Civilization’, that power makes absolute truth because those with power capacities insist on universalizing and objectifying their values (Foucault 1977: 131-132).

It is crucial to note that most of the international values, standards, and rules that are promoted through globalization were not arrived at through consensus; rather they are derived from discourses and prioritization of western actors. This has nurtured the impression among the colonized communities that globalization remains ‘a form of colonialism and neo-colonialism that were responsible for the oppression and alienation of their forebears for centuries’ (Makinda and Okumu 2008: 3). Through the process of globalization, western values and standards – the means of resolving conflict included – have however come to be propounded as the objective values and standards of human life and relations. As noted by Makinda and Okumu (2008:4) globalization ‘comprises multi-layered and multi-dimensional processes, most of which are derived from Western, and especially capitalist, values’. Globalization hence reflects ‘hegemonic Western ideas and interests’ (Makinda and Okumu 2008:4).

Walker (2004) in Decolonizing Conflict Resolution: Addressing the Ontological Violence of Westernization argues that the power imbalance in the research and practice in conflict resolution perpetuates colonialism as indigenous worldviews are marginalized while the hegemony of western views are upheld. The very existence of a supposed ‘indigenous model of conflict resolution’ highlights the dominance of a certain perspective in the purported mainstream conflict resolution tradition. Besides being dismissed as naïve and regressive, the activism for the recognition of other value-systems highlights the crisis faced by non-western perspectives in the global order.

To engage with the second grounds for non-western perspectives as implied by African solutions, it is imperative to explore the divergences in values which makes it plausible to contend for ‘other’ perspectives such as African-oriented solutions. The following section engages with the divergences of values in conflict resolution which calls for

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41 This affirms Bush and Szeftel (1998: 176) argument that globalization ‘performs very…powerful political functions – above all legitimating the international pressure for states in the South to accept the hegemony of international pressure within their borders’.
society-centric solutions to conflicts as well as a more complementary approach to resolution approaches.

3.4.2.2 The Divergence of Values in Conflict Resolution: Towards Society-Centric Solutions and Complementarity

This section expands three major points of divergence in conflict resolution as it pertains Africa. This includes: the discourse on the indigenous model of conflict resolution; divergences of prioritizations especially in terms of the individual versus the community; and the divergences of peace paradigms.

3.4.2.2.1 The Indigenous Model of Conflict Resolution

One of the considerations on African solutions is around the need to incorporate African indigenous model of conflict resolution in contemporary peace and security agenda. In terms of the indigenous model of conflict resolution, some authors observe that while conflict exists in every human society, the nature, analysis and resolution of conflict had differed from society to society (Run 2013). Thus, in terms resolving conflicts, indigenous models which are more society-centric provides an avenue for communities to own resolution processes. Where indigenous models are wanting, other approaches or complementary approaches across the globe should be explored. This entails not only resorting to western approaches that are deemed mainstream approaches in every context and locality.

The indigenous model is based on traditional approaches that have been practiced over a considerable period of time in particular societies. For Osei-Hwedie and Rankopo (2012) ‘traditional conflict resolution processes are part of a well-structured, time-proven social system geared towards reconciliation, maintenance and improvement of social relationships.’ Though the dominant western conflict resolution approaches are traditional approaches as well, the focus of indigenous model of conflict resolution is on the traditional approaches of non-western societies that are mostly marginalized in mainstream debates on conflict resolution (Brock-Utne 2001).

The culture specific nature of the indigenous model runs athwart to the current disposition of western approach that claims universality and objectivity.\textsuperscript{42} In accord with the tenets

\textsuperscript{42} As noted by NADRAC (2006), the indigenous model of conflict resolution is reactive of the western models of dispute resolution that are inconsonant with the values of indigenous societies.
of constructivism, it is important to note that tradition rooted in culture is in constant flux due to new experiences and interactions with the outside world. Gellman (2007) notes that ‘cultures are the continually evolving, vibrant filters that generate situated perspectives and notions of time, and govern social interactions through shared, socially constructed norms and values.’ Relevant to Africa, Gellman (2007) and Boege (2011) highlight the challenge of identifying what could be considered essentially African because external influence and import in the continent. Notably, through colonialism, religious exchange, globalization and relationships, the African culture and traditions have been influenced by new cultures and traditions. Thus, it is somewhat hard to differentiate between an exogenous (modern) and endogenous (traditional) methods in indigenous societies (Boege 2011: 436).

Nevertheless, indigenous societies retain some fundamental principles and aspects in such a way that the past and present methods intersect. These principles guide practices that seem to have been learnt in the present time. It is along such logic that Isike and Uzodike (2008) in Modernization without Westernizing argue that different cultures could go through processes of modernization not westernization which has been traded as the standard of modernity. Along this view, Zartman (2000: 7), insists that ‘tradition is likely to have been updated, adjusted, and opened to new accretions in order to stay alive through changing times…tradition does not mean unaltered or archaic.’ The traditional approach thus provides opportunity for conflict societies to address their challenges. As highlighted by Dr Jean-Emmanuel Pondi in a forword of George Ngwane book titled Settling Disputes in Africa: Traditional Bases for Conflict Resolution (1996: vi), ‘it is becoming increasingly clear that for conflicts to be resolved in the long term, elements of cultural perceptions must be included.’

Boege (2011: 444) notes that traditional approaches are relevant in many Third World states that are characterized by state weakness and fragility. In environments where the state is considered as an alien and/or a hostile entity, traditional approaches provide the required legitimacy. Rather than focusing on state building, indigenous approaches focus on peace building from the bottom up. As noted by Malan (2012: 15), despite the denigration of indigenous systems by the emergence and practice of western oriented systems, many people still maintain their traditional methods of conflict resolution. Boege (2011: 432) notes that traditional African approaches could improve the legitimacy and effectiveness of third party attempts to address conflicts. A poignant question worth
asking however is: how relevant is the indigenous model for contemporary national and international initiatives?

The contemporary national and international order encompass people of different traditions, cultures, backgrounds and ways of life. It remains interesting identifying the relevance of indigenous models that grew out of a different order in contemporary multipolar world. This thesis observes that while the indigenous model tends to be seen as relevant for particular communities that share the same value, there are ongoing debates around the relevance of the indigenous values of different communities in national and international debates. It is crucial to note that there are movements organized around exploring the role of indigenous values in addressing pressing global issues such as climate change, development, health, as well as conflict resolution. Pertinent to conflict resolution in national and international context, some will however maintain that intergroup conflicts as well as other macro conflicts that involve various stakeholders from different backgrounds present a challenges for operationalizing the context specificities of indigenous conflict resolution. In this perspective, the applicability of traditional approaches is limited to a small community given the variance of culture and tradition from one society to another (Zartman 2000: 224).

Such considerations however remain the basis for the marginalization of the significant contribution of other indigenous value-systems in ensuring sustainable resolution of conflicts in national and international efforts. As indicated in section 3.4.2.1, the cultural/traditional disposition of intervening powers – western actors – served as a basis for addressing modern conflicts despite the new mechanisms used. In tandem with Avruch (2002), western actors – who worked to resolve conflicts in Africa and across the globe – made use of some new means of resolving conflicts, but at the same time, the new means of addressing conflicts are informed by dispositions that reflect their culture and value systems. The traditional and cultural disposition of western actors informed their interventionist approaches across the globe leading to the assumption that such approaches are global or mainstream perspectives. By naming some approaches as indigenous approaches that are relevant to certain communities only, powerful actors of the globe has thus marginalized other approaches that could aid in the resolution of the challenges in globe.
In Africa for instance, African experts have continually observed some common values that run across the many societies in Africa in terms of conflict resolution approaches (Osei-Hwedie and Rankopo 2012; Lacroix and Neufeldt 2010; Brock–Utne 2001; Bukari 2013). As expanded in chapter 5, these themes include claims around Africa’s value for community and restorative approaches that accords greater value to communal harmony and the conflict-resolution disposition to repair broken relationships that result from conflicts; this is not just for the continuation of orderly-living but for harmonious and cordial existence in societies (Boaduo 2010; Boege 2011; Brock-Utne 2001). This is contrasted to value systems that emphasize the interests of individuals in conflict resolution as well as value systems that seeks to punish and exterminate offenders from societies. As noted by Boege (2011: 439), the African traditional approaches “follow the line of restorative justice instead of (western-style) punitive justice” as evident from the legalistic and military interventionist approach of western powers in Third World countries under crisis.

African conflict resolution tradition is also considered as placing emphasis on a holistic approach to conflict resolution that does not only attempt to engage in rational political debates with political figures. Rather, the African heritage in conflict resolution requires a public and sustained dialogue process that can extend beyond set times and timetables. In this approach, the African model is not limited to seeking a physical resolution, rather it seeks emotional, social and spiritual resolutions to conflict so as to address the impacts of conflicts in its totality rather than a mere one-sided approach (Osei-Hwedie and Rankopo 2012; Brock–Utne 2001). Although these values are shared by many communities outside Africa, African communities have been observe to prioritize these values as primary rather than secondary approaches. While these African perspectives developed from the consideration of the different value systems in Africa, the perspectives are expected to have national and international impacts in the field of conflict resolution.

It is important to note that the focus here is not on traditional practices which could be mainly relevant for particular societies, rather the focus is on the principles, ideas or

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43 For traditional African perspective, conflict is analysed, understood and resolved based on their social contexts with respect to the beliefs, values, interests, needs, attitudes, networks and relationships of the society (Boege 2011; Brock-Utne 2001; Bukari 2013; Malan 2012).

44 The issues raised here will be discussed in-depth in chapter 5 which engages the conceptualization of African solutions in terms of the views of African experts and the views shared by literary sources on African solutions. While some of these values are common to many human society, the so-called African values in this regard are noted as Africa’s prioritized values for conflict resolution.
rationale for such practices which provides a philosophical value-system. Thus instead of considering how practices such as the *Gacaca* practice in Rwanda or the *Mato Oput* in Uganda could aid in addressing national and international issues, the study focuses on the philosophical rationale or principles upon which those practices are undertaken. For instance, the African community-based approach entails that in attempts to address intergroup conflicts – conflict between different parties – , interveners could re-framed the conflict as a ‘we-group’ conflict so as to accommodate outsiders and adversaries (Boege 2011: 444). Here, the parties consider each other as belonging to one community of people who are interdependent on each other however having some clashes of interests. This approach is different from those that highlight differences in communities and needs. This measure entails finding points of convergence between conflict parties from different societal backgrounds set up. In terms of addressing national and international issues, one could also begin from the vantage point of the nation or globe being a community of groups or states.

Kofi Annan (2006: 2), in his final report to the UN General Assembly as Secretary-General in September 2006, insists that while the present state of globalization seems to benefit some ‘states’ to the detriment of others, globalization poses a threat to those who tend to be benefiting from it. This is because in the process of globalization, the benefiting states who are powerful actors end up only with a myopic perspective about the superiority of their ideas and values. As such the dominant powers loose-out in the gains of sharing knowledge and value from other centres; although they remain adamant in identifying this lose and careless about what other centres of knowledge could offer. The increasing deficiency of western approaches in attaining lasting solutions to crisis in conflict states nudges one to ask: why should one approach to conflict resolution be valued over the other?

It would be delusory however to insist that other indigenous approaches, beside the western approach, could provide sustainable solutions in peace and security in the contexts where they are applied. In Africa, the experiences of heinous crimes against humanity such as wars, genocidal attempts, xenophobic attacks and the persistent relapses into violence question the often-highlighted noble traditional African values such as kparakpor (Yoruba-Nigeria), Ubuntu (Zulu-South Africa) and Ujamaa (Swahili-Tanzania) that denote togetherness in the spirit of human- hood. One wonders why such gallant African outlooks does not translate to peace and harmonious existence in the
continent. Such observation could however be tampered with the consideration that the context with which these African values were developed have been eroded by the new state-system and imposed values in the continent.

In tandem with Bob-Manuel in A cultural approach to conflict transformation (2000), the upheavals and tensions in Africa are consequent from the breakdown of the order and context that African values and principles were developed and applied. Chinua Achebe, in his Things Fall Apart and No Longer at Ease, attests that the imperialist mission of western actors through colonialism and neo-colonialism distorted the traditional way of life and things fell apart because Africa’s traditional approaches run athwart to the imposed foreign systems and standards that has become the status quo.

Notably, the replacement of the traditional leadership structure in Africa, during the colonial era, with an alien structure that was led by persons loyal to the colonial system meant a total collapse of people’s framework of conceiving order. The current state system, which builds on the colonial form of administration, provided a platform for a leadership structure that tends not to be accountable to its people because it did not derive legitimacy from traditional and social dynamics but from external imposition. The state leaders in practice could be said to account to the capitalist and colonial system that created the platform for their leadership position and practice. Just like the colonial system, the leaders maintain power mainly through the threat and use of force as well as the so called constitutional and legal backings. Such realities are behind Antonio Gramsci’s notion of the state as ‘an instrument of the ruling class and a machine for the repression of one class by another’ (cited in Simon 1991: 68).

In this framework that shook off the contexts where African values had thrived, people, in their scramble for survival in the new state system, began seeking personal interests rather than the interests that emphasize togetherness as highlighted by values such as Ubuntu. The violent expressions in Africa mainly reflect the consequences of the greed of political elites and the attendant mass discontents for state and governance failures and lack of accountability in the continent as contextualized in chapter 4.2. Nevertheless, African values, when properly considered, has a huge potential of promoting peace and harmony in the continent and across the globe. It becomes essential to engage indigenous value-systems by critiquing them and exploring their relevance in contemporary world order beside the sole reliance on one indigenous system that has become a mainstream
international standard. The following section engages with divergence in terms of prioritizations in terms of approach to conflict resolution in communities.

3.4.2.2 Prioritizations: The State/Individual-Centric versus the Society-Centric Approach

Along with the discourse on indigenous value systems, peace and security experts in Africa argue that prioritizations ought to be placed on the society rather than the state (Uwazie 2011). In Africa’s context where many state elites have accumulated powers to themselves with the capacity to incite conflicts if they desire, there is an increasing advocacy for a people or society-centred value system in Africa that dismantles the patrimonial system or ‘strong man’ syndrome in Africa. This is to accord more power to people and ensure that the state works to serve its people in transparency, justice and accountability. However, much of the conflict resolution mechanisms that have been predominantly employed to address conflicts in Africa have been geared towards extending the authority and powers of the state – a state where individual elites hold unimaginable powers.

The state-centric perspective of statehood is, as defined by Charles Tilly (1990), ‘a relatively centralized, differentiated, and autonomous organization successfully claiming priority in the use of force within large, contiguous, and clearly bound territories’ (cited in Ayoob 2001:129). In this state-centric model, state elites and individual representatives seeking to participate or interact with the state structures, pride as the primary actors of attention. Authors such as Azarya (1988) makes a second consideration of statehood from a society-centric perspective. In line with Azarya (1988: 10), the society-centric perspective refers to the state as a platform for different sectors of the society to interact, corporate and compete. This is unlike the state-centric perspective where an autonomous organization (known as the state) enjoys monopoly of control over a given territory through its institutions. While the society-centric model entails a bottom up system, the state-centric model entail a top-down relationship where the state dictates or, rather mildly, influences the rules and goals of the country and mould the society according to its image (Azarya 1988: 4). However, the society-centric model remains an imagined state-system that is constantly being highlighted by the growing influence of non-state actors across the globe.
For some authors, the state institution are increasingly becoming less formidable institutions that can hold sway in dictating terms in some societies because their legitimacy remains contested. As noted by Azarya (1988: 3), ‘after focusing for a decade or more on the capabilities of the state in its incessant efforts to mould society in its image, scholarly debate has shifted to the state’s incapabilities, its functional decline, instability and inability to bring about intended changes in society’. Many states especially in Africa tend to have poor legitimacy and low popularity among the population. This is because the state-centric approach gives undue power and credence to individual elites. In Africa, the state-centric approach have led to a patrimonial and ‘strong man’ order where individual elites hold the power to make peace or make war in the continent. However, state corruption, elite obsession with power and failure to provide political goods has led to mass discontents in African societies (Somerville 1999; Osaghae 2007; Reilly 2008). The poor justice systems in the continent have also not been efficient in addressing grievances of discontent groups. For Uwazie (2011),

Many African citizens have lost faith in the ability of their nations’ courts to provide timely or just closure to their grievances. A 2009 survey in Liberia found that only 3 percent of criminal and civil disputes were taken to a formal court. Over 40 percent sought resolution through informal mechanisms. The remaining 55 percent went to no forum at all. This includes cases where claimants felt the need to take justice into their own hands, often with violent consequences.

Many rebel groups have risen in this regard to assert their interests, and sometimes, with the aim of toppling state governments. This is evident from the crisis in Somalia, Mali, the DRC, CAR and Burundi as well as the so-called revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. Some rebel movements that do not see a prospect of toppling the government merely continue destabilizing the security condition of the state and/or benefiting from the economic gains of war. The political economy of war has led to the rapid emergence of warlords, militia groups, radical criminal networks and private military companies. These players have no interest in upholding state sovereignty or territorial integrity (Boege 2011).

45 For Ngwane (1996: 3), ‘the assumption that only those parading the corridors of power, that only political leaders know what the people need has remained a universal fallacy’.
Mass discontents against the state also engender many misplaced grievances and conflicts between groups as evident in crimes, indiscriminate killings, terrorist attacks and xenophobic attacks in some African societies. Notably, terrorism has advanced amidst persistent internal conflicts in the continent. The rapid internationalization of terrorist organizations that undermine territorial integrity and sovereignty reflect the growing outright defiance of state structures and world order. In this context, the state and its structures is continually loosing many of its privilege of being the main actor and the frame of reference.

Thus, conflict resolution efforts that use state-like mechanisms to resolve conflict do face significant failures in terms of attaining lasting solutions to conflicts. For some authors, the solutions from the west and its statist-model have consistently leaned towards the use of the state’s legal processes, formal mediatory and negotiation techniques, and militaristic approaches to wrestle with the conflict challenges in Africa (Boege 2011; Brock-Utne 2001; Bukari 2013; Salem 2007). In reference to the ethnic conflicts in the Bawku region of Ghana for instance, Bukari (2013) argues that the conflict resolution outlook used in finding solutions to the conflicts fail because non-indigenous mechanisms (formal legal processes and the use of force) were employed to resolve them. For Bukari (2013: 88), ‘many of the conflicts in Ghana are traditional because many of them revolve around traditional quest for power (chieftaincy) intricately linked to land ownership.’ In accord with Bukari (2013), the uncritical use of western legal means to resolve the conflicts in the Bawku region of Ghana that are deeply rooted in tradition have only led to the protracted nature of conflicts in the region. Additionally, the debacle of the US-led UN mission in Somalia is largely attributed to the obsessive effort of the interveners to restore and build the state system instead of building peace (Ayittey 1994; Menkhaus 2008).

Salem (2007) argues that western actors who are key interveners are oblivious that in some societies, the state and its laws are not taken seriously as it is in western states. Citizens in weak states are less rule-abiding as citizens in western societies with some reliable states and justice system that emerged from their contextual dynamics after years of violent struggles. Salem argues that the stability and development enjoyed by western states have created ‘the "good" citizen/subject who generally accepts authority and rules (even if fairly anonymous), pays his taxes, stops at red lights’ etc (Salem 2007). But in some Third World states, the state and its rules have less authority in the eyes of the
citizens. Hence, state-centric conflict resolution efforts that aim to attain agreement between conflict parties and prop up the supremacy of states are hard to attain successes because the legitimacy of the states are in question. In the context of the state’s unreliability and inability to provide political goods, according high regards to the role of western-oriented state structures – such as the national armies, formal mediation, courts and legal documents and militaristic approaches – to resolve conflicts does not point to justice for people seeking to express their grievances.

It is along this summation that analysts such as Brock-Utne (2001) and Reamaykers (2005) postulate that the collapse of the Somali state and the thriving of societal organizations are clear signs of the significance of societal resilience and mechanisms in restoring order in contemporary times. Reaymaekers (2005) notes that state collapse in countries such as Somalia saw the emergence of various societal organizations that provide order in the society. In Somalia, different clans made alliances and formed various forms of organizations and local conflict management mechanisms. Others resorted to the traditional method of social and political organization and formed decentralized governments such as Somaliland, Puntland, Galmudug, etc. In Somaliland, the gurti system of Clan Elders was restored to settle conflicts and mediate the resolution of conflicts between different warlords. For Brock-Utne (2001), such system highlights the relevance of societal systems in ‘the hostile environment created by social relations and politics of modernity’. However, given the obsession of the international community on the state-system, society organizations and decentralized systems of governance that emerged in Somalia were unrecognized. Even though the state-system has been restored in Somalia, there remains a huge task in consolidating the credibility of the state for Somalis and the active role of non-state actors in the face of the continued governance flaws of the incumbent regime.

For Raeymaekers (2005), the failure of states increasingly point to the relevance of a society-centric world order rather than the rigid state-system that claims autonomy. In the African context, there remains the ongoing discourse on how to ensure that states are modelled in the image of the society rather than those of imported state institutions.

Alongside the state-centric-focus, it is argued that western-oriented conflict resolution experts often tend to focus on individual players involved in the conflict without paying closer attention to the community and seeing the individuals as representative of groups
(Boege 2011). The intellectual legacy of the west encourages the perception of conflict as the result of the thoughts and impulses of the individual, the causes of which are largely within that individual. Thus, for western experts, individual causes could be easily identified and their interests addressed. However, individual players spearheading different causes are mere representatives of aggrieved groups and focusing on the individuals is a superficial route that is not only easy but provide grounds for the individual leaders to exalt their personal interests to the detriment of the societies that they represent. Such state and individual centric perspective have been considered to be at the heart of Africa challenges.

The following section engages with the issue of divergences in what amounts to peace in various localities.

3.4.2.2.3 The divergence of peace paradigms

Hansen (1987) in Africa: Perspectives on Peace and Development argues that despite the value attached to peace, there are divergent views on what constitutes peace and how it should be achieved. For some authors, peace in some localities could be a psychosocial state while in some societies, peace entails the absence of physical crisis. Based on the latter, Boaduo (2010: 171) argues that western actors conceive peace as the absence of widespread physical violence and the existence of rational order. But in some societies, peace is about human dignity and freedom for self-determination. In oppressed societies for instance, oppressed groups could persist in violent expressions even when they are less likely to win in the combat because physical peace is not the goal.

In some societies, dignity and honour is imperative. This is because one’s personal dignity reflects the dignity of the community and on the other hand, one’s dignity is the medium through which one participates effectively in society. Thus, the attenuation of such human dignity signifies lack of peace. As researched by Cohen, Nisbett, Bowdle, and Schwarz (1996), in some societies, conflict can result from a mere verbal insult to one’s personality or a group’s identity. Hence, in maintaining/restoring one’s dignity and reputation which is the major currency for communal existence, people could go through bitter means to achieve that end. As an illustration, the sundry conflicts in some so-called developing countries, such as those in Africa, reflect the quest for dignity and freedom of disadvantaged groups. With the intransigencies and repressive regime of many governments in Third World states, violent activism has been adopted by opposing groups
to stamp the dignity of oppressed and affected groups. Even though some of the conflict parties are not certain of victory, the quest for dignity and freedom at all costs is their peace. Without justifying violence, it become crucial that conflict resolution attempts should understand the psychosocial and emotional aspects of conflicts so as to find a better resolve for them.

Salem (2007) argues that based on western approaches to conflict resolution which tends to be judgemental of so-called ‘savage’ societies undergoing conflicts, westerners have become oblivious of the violent revolutions that led to the stable statehood they enjoy today. To attain national independence and popular/legitimate governing system, western states had to undergo many years of violent struggles (Ayoob 2001). The works of Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche and Darwin had exalted the ideal of violent struggles for a greater good. The decisive revolutions in 1776, 1789, 1848 and 1917, the wars of Napoleon and World Wars I and II including colonial conquests were also indicative of the violent struggles that characterize western history. After years of violence and revolutions, modern western states now enjoy relative state of stability, political security, economic growth, considerable wealth distribution, popular culture, and claims to different forms of rights.

The reward of political stability and development that the west enjoys presently tends to have made them oblivious of the contextual realities of some non-western societies. The maximalist interferences of western actors in the new states in Africa further preclude these states from developing a social, political and economic ‘state’-order that is grounded on the local dynamics of the people. In fact, what is noticeable, is that western states have resolved that new and developing states must reach the standards of their (western) states and they must do so now irrespective of their internal dynamics.

Moreover, in line with the theoretical underpinnings of Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill’s claims on happiness, the west have come to assume that pain is bad and pleasure is good (Salem 2007). Thus, western oriented conflict resolution experts in non-western societies tend to exert so much effort at alleviating or removing the pain involved rather than solving the structural and underlying issues involved. In some societies however, attaining dignity and justice overrides the suffering/pain experienced by pursuing a just
causes.\textsuperscript{46} Moreover, suffering has become a familiar aspect of life, in some societies, in such a way that conflict related sufferings are not out of the ordinary.\textsuperscript{47}

In his book titled \textit{Native Nostalgia}, Jacob Dlamini (2009) argues that despite the attainment of democracy in South Africa in 1994, some black South Africans – who were previously disadvantaged – express fond memories of the Apartheid order where there was a fine line in the resistance struggle. Dlamini (2009) argues that order and rhythm was created among blacks in townships within the resistance struggle against white supremacists in such a way that resistance became a mark of pride for many. While people appreciate the current democratic dispensation, the apartheid era evokes fond memories that has not been matched by the failed promises of democracy in the new order (Dlamini 2009). It is no doubt then that in South Africa, to have been an active participant in the resistance struggle in whatever form is dignifying for many. Thus in many conflict societies with people resisting oppression, resistance – violent or demonstrative –, it is a matter of pride and they tend to have nothing to lose unless their interests are satisfied.

Given the ease at which things are handled based on legal processes and agreements in the west, western oriented conflict resolution experts assume that they can manage and resolve issues easily using legal and “formal” processes with set timetables (Osei-Hwedie and Rankopo 2012). Western conflict resolution experts tends to ignore the revolutionary effect of conflict by insisting on attaining quick agreements and resolutions coupled with the ‘self-righteous’ challenge to non-western societies to emerge out of a so-called savage culture of violence.

Malan (2012) in ‘Indigenous Dispute Resolution and Reconciliation’ observes that in recent times, western conflict resolution experts have come to pay greater attention to attaining peace in conflict regions with less acknowledgement of the conditions and paths for its attainment. Instead of using conflict-plus-participles such as conflict resolution, conflict management and conflict settlement, ‘experts’ prefer to use peace-plus-participles such as peace keeping, peace building and peacemaking. Malan (2012: 15) argues that while the use of “peace-plus-participles” could positively lead negotiators to peace, it could alienate perpetrators of conflict who are keen on attaining their objectives

\textsuperscript{46} Moreover, in some non-western societies, suffering is part of a spiritual or moral purification process as well as a given aspect of reality.

\textsuperscript{47} Salem (2007) further highlights that negotiations that have to do with the “have-nots who have nothing to lose, nothing to preserve, and everything to gain” is demanding unlike with those who have a lot to gain.
at all costs. Conflicting parties could also show more caution that peace efforts would only lead to compromises that retains the underlying grievances. In the African context where many rebel groups challenge the authority of corrupt and illegitimate state elites, emphasis on peace could yield no result than efforts emphasizing the resolution of the conflict. Moreover, obsession with peace can also lead peace-makers/builders to take superficial routes to peace (Malan 2012: 16). This leads to short-term peace arrangements that fail soon after peace agreements are endorsed. Notably, Africa has experienced many peace deals and agreements that superficially settles disputes; after few years, the conflicts recurs and undermine the settlement efforts.

The foregoing divergences thus make a case for a more nuanced approach to conflict resolution, an approach that respects local particularities and values. Mehta (1978: 92) argues that the remedy to European universalisations is for non-Europeans to redefine their path to self-fulfilment because their ‘broke mosaic cannot be recreated in the image of the west’. Mehta (1978: 104) further advocates for an indigenous process of social change through the pursuit of goals that are corollary with a society’s history and way of life. As initiated by this study, one is challenged to ask; how can African-sensitive values and contexts ensure the sustainable resolution of disputes within Africa and the globe as well.

In line with the theoretical framework of constructivism, this research advances the need for complementarity in conflict resolution perspectives towards a more inclusive world order. This is done by exploring Africa’s principles and values in conflict resolution, which has been marginalized and suppressed by dominant frameworks. With this, the project provides experts with knowledge and policy implications for context-specific solutions in Africa as well as a model for a more complementary approach to conflict resolution at the global scene. By so doing, the project highlights the need for approaches that complement and supplement each other rather than those that marginalize and suppress other perspectives.

While there are ongoing discourse on African solutions, there is also the need to consider the question of common consensus for the so-called African-oriented solutions.
3.4.3 A Common Consensus on African Solutions? African Solutions as Homogenous or Heterogeneous

It is vital to understand how one could refer to a value-system as African solutions in a continent that is diverse in ethnic, religious, traditional and cultural compositions. A way to making sense of this is to consider African solutions in a heterogeneous sense and in a homogenous sense. In a heterogeneous sense, “African solutions” could refer to solutions owned and led by the different individuals, groups, organizations, communities, nations and states in Africa at different socio-economic and political contexts. At this state, African solutions could mean different things to different people in Africa in different contexts. Pertinent to conflict resolution in intra-state contexts it could refer to traditional ideas and mechanisms for resolving conflicts of different communities in Africa.

On a more homogenous sense, “African solutions” could refer to solutions or efforts that could resonate with Africans across the continent. As considered in the literature review, the dominant outlook in the propagation of the aphorism “African solutions to African problems” suggests the quest for continental-wide solutions that could be termed “African” rather than the label of the different groupings that make up the vast African continent.

As foregrounded earlier, the discourse on African solutions to African problems historically emerged out of the quest for a collective effort of all Africans to contend with the challenges in the continent. The OAU/AU, which is the topic of interest on this, have historically been driven by the quest to provide African solutions wherever possible in the continent (AU 2013). The African Union is required to approach conflict scenario using African-sensitive values. Thus, if Africa is to have a common position on issues such as conflict resolution attempts, it becomes crucial to engage with the shared values and viewpoints of Africans in the attempt to provide African solutions. Hence, the homogenous sense tend to be more attune to the discourse. Nevertheless, the homogenous aspect of “African solutions” remains the most controversial aspect in the maxim African solutions to African problems.

From the onset, the question around who is an African is not a given fact for many. For Cossa (2009), the term Africa refers to ‘those individuals, and things associated to them, who are native to Africa and can (in one way or another, but not necessarily in terms of genealogy) trace their ancestry to indigenous African people-groups.’ While this native-
based definition could be accepted, it hardly translates to an African identity for the so-called natives to pursue an African-based solution. As a continent with various racial, religious and cultural dimensions, the African identity, like every identity classification, is a challenge to description (Adibe 2009). Although many people with roots in the continent could identify with being ‘African’ geographically, some will be reluctant to see this identity as a unifying identity let alone a cause to generate a common ‘African’ solution or position on issues.

While people in the so-called “sub-Saharan” Africa could readily identify themselves as Africans alongside their ethnic/religious groupings, people in North Africa as well as some countries in East Africa would be hesitant to consider themselves as sharing the same African identity as black Africans. They are rather most inclined to consider themselves as Arabs, Arab-Africans or their ethnic/religious/national classifications. In this regards, their Africanness is only regarded as an accident of geography which they hold little or no sentiments to. Furthermore, among the other people in Africa there are divisions based on language, nationality, religion, among others, divisions that have sometimes resulted in conflicts and xenophobia. Hence, advocating the homogeneity of Africa is fraught with contradictions as it undermines the multitude of identities, cultures, values, norms and systems within the continent that are sometimes incongruent with each other.

Nevertheless, there remains a body of research and evidence that suggest some commonalities among many African societies especially as it pertain culture, norms, beliefs and values. For instance, discourses on African philosophy and Pan-Africanism, as discussed in chapter 4, thrive on such claims of commonality. The existence of the African Union, as a pan-African institution, point to the cognizance of the cultural and experiential commonalities of the people in Africa. Beside the shared geographical experiences of Africans, these commonalities have been the basis for Africa’s cooperation and quest for African solutions.

Furthermore, challenges arise around the possibility of dominant voices and cultures in Africa to set the agenda for what African solutions ought to entail. The fact that Nigeria and South Africa has proven to be ‘supposed hegemons’ in Africa, and have been relied on for almost every major decisions in the continent, could entail that the national agenda and policy of the foregoing countries could dictate the agenda for African solutions rather
than the agendas of the collective members of the regional organization. In the same vein, considering the influence and assertiveness of countries such as Nigeria, South Africa as well as Kenya, Ethiopia and Egypt, African solutions could end up being about the ideas propagated by the actors from these regions.

Beside this, the narrow national interests of some African states may overshadow efforts at implementing lasting solutions to conflicts in the continent. As actors with high stakes in conflict settings, neighbouring states with direct interests in conflict states could pursue self-serving interventionist approach that could harm the peace processes in conflict states. For instance, Ethiopia’s role in the peace initiatives in Somalia has been criticized for being based on ulterior motive that is aim at keeping Somalia unstable or ensuring that structures that will not challenge the Ethiopian government is instituted in the country (Arman 2014). Additionally, neighbouring states could also use the conflicts in nearby states for their own narrow interests as in the case of the DRC were Rwanda and Uganda were accused of aiding in the perpetuation of the conflict so as to illegally tap the country’s mineral resources such as diamonds. In this regard, regional actors could be contributors to the escalation of conflict. From this perceptive, some region skeptics are more interested in a broader international intervention with regional actors serving as parties to the conflict rather than interveners (Franke 2006: 2).

In contrast to the argument highlighting the narrow interest of regional interveners, one could also question whether ‘self(state)-interest’ is always wrong. For Franke (2006: 5), there could be hardly any fault in interventions that benefit the majority of people ‘(no intervention will ever benefit everyone)’ even if the intervention is carried out under national interests. Third party interveners – neighbouring parties – with stakes in the conflict could play the much needed role in seeking genuine resolution of the conflict within other states in view of the costs involved. For Franke (2006: 6), regional actors possess more political will in seeking the resolution of conflict in neighbouring states. Extrapolating from the interventions in Africa, many peace operations by the UN in the continent have been motivated by the interventions of African actors. Prior to the establishment of UN missions, African regional organizations have intervened in Liberia,

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48 This is in view that a stable Somalia may turn interests to other issues such as that which led to the Somalia-Ethiopia war of 1977-8, a war which was precipitated by Somalia’s quest to ‘regain’ its missing territory (Ogaden) in Ethiopia.

49 The sustained history of Africa with colonialism and imperialism has however jeopardized interventions from foreign actors.
Serra Leone, Burundi, Sudan, Mali, and CAR to stabilize the regions and create conducive environments for UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations. This points to the greater political will of regional actors in seeking the resolution of conflicts in neighbouring states.

Nevertheless, in line with the tenets of constructivism, the idea of friendly relations, common historical background and identity in Africa remains the basis for which African states tend to be more amenable to thinking positively about interventions from other African countries than those of ex-colonial or imperialist powers. In this regard, the quest for African solutions derives from the common perception amongst Africans that solutions from within the continent are more benign and desirable than those from non-African actors. The following chapter substantiates the issues at the global, regional and national levels that gave rise to the maxim ‘African solutions to African problems’ and draws out the significance of the maxim for Africa.

3.5 Conclusion

Thus far, this chapter has provided a theoretical and conceptual scene for a more informed engagement with the tenets of African solutions to African problems. The dissertation situates the discourse on ‘African solutions to African problems’ around the theory of constructivism which holds that the international system is driven by prevailing ideas rather than material elements. Using the theoretical framework of constructivism, the thesis contends that much of the discourse on African solutions to African problems are based on the prevailing ideas and issues that emerge from the historical and social relationships at the global and continent levels. In this relationship context, the dominance of powerful actors in the theory and practice of interventions have marginalized other perspectives and have given rise to activisms for context-specific solutions, such as the activism for African solutions to African problems. If the World is of our making as noted by Nicholas Onuf, why should a particular perspective dominate the theory and practice of conflict resolution across the globe? With the World of Our Making, Africa is challenged to pursue African-oriented solutions and negotiate its values in mainstream theory and practices of interventions as well.

In terms of structure, the chapter sets out by laying out the constructivist perspectives and issues of intra-state conflicts and third-party intervention – especially in terms of conflict resolution. Section 3.4 engages with the constructive implications of the maxim African
solutions to African problems by attempting to make sense of the relevant issues worth noting from the terms ‘African problems’ and ‘African solutions’. Relevant to ‘African problems’ in terms of peace and security, section 3.4.1 argues that Africa’s security problems point to challenges that are constructed or shaped by the dominant frameworks and actors in the international order; on the other hand, Africa faces actual security challenges that demands concerted effort to address.

Pertinent to ‘African solutions’ in peace and security, section 3.4.2 observes that the quest for African solutions is founded on (a) the dominance of powerful frameworks and actors in international relations and (b) the divergences of values which calls for context specific solutions as well as a complementary and inclusive international order that respects and appreciates different value-systems. The chapter culminates with a constructivist consideration of the possibility of a consensus on African solutions in section 3.4.3. The section observes that in line with the tenets of constructivism, the notion of common identity, shared culture and experiences in Africa have served as a basis for sustained cooperation among Africans to address common challenges irrespective of the internal power and capacity dynamics within the continent. The next chapter provides a substantive rationale and significance of African solutions to African problems based on the issues at the global, national and regional level.
Chapter 4:

The Political Philosophy of the Maxim ‘African Solutions to African Problems’

4. Introduction

This chapter engages with the rationale behind the maxim ‘Africa solutions to African problems’ and draws out the significance of the maxim for Africa. This chapter relies on the rich body of literary sources on Africa’s quest for self-determination. The chapter also makes use of some interview data on the significance of the maxim ‘African solutions to African problems’ to support the claims. This chapter contends that the clamour for the maxim African solutions to African problems is engendered by global, regional and national conditions as highlighted by the first-three major sections in this chapter.

In the global context, post-colonial Africa’s marginal role in global relations and, most importantly, the poor ownership of its internal affairs has motivated the activism for Africa to assert itself as being capable of addressing its challenges. At the national level, it has become a customary narrative for African leaders to indict external factors for Africa’s internal challenges – however true or skewed this perspective is – without considering their complicity in the woes and external meddling in the continent. Parallel to the national discourse, the quest for African solutions at the regional level highlights the shortcomings of Africa’s regional organization in promoting African integration in terms of attending to Africa’s problems. This constraints has however been blamed on the dominance and meddling of powerful non-African actors. While the maxim ‘African solutions to African problems’ highlights the misgivings about non-African actors in resolving Africa’s challenges, the maxim thrives on the failures and optimism of Africa’s leadership in contending with the continent’s challenges. The contention for African solutions thus derives from the attempt by leaders to highlight their commitment to Africa’s goals.

Three sections of this chapter engages in a more critical and in-depth examination of the precipitants of the maxim “African solutions to African problems” at the global, national and regional contexts. The fourth section engages with the various aphorism and ideologies that are analogous to the maxim ‘African solutions to African problems’ so as to highlight the historical underpinning of Africa’s quest for self-determination.
4.1 Africa in the Global Context

Historically, Africa, like many developing regions, has witnessed oppression and marginalization in international relations. To explain relationships between developed and developing states, many analysts use dependent and hegemonic frames of reference to aptly belabour the fact that in the international system powerful states influence the texture of global politics and that they do so with the intention of bolstering their status. As a dominant theory on political rights and duties, the social contract theory has endured as a framework for the understanding of the origins and legitimacy of political units, a framework which could be further advanced to explain political dynamics in international relations. Theorists such as Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Immanuel Kant and Jean-Jacque Rousseau advanced the social contract theory as the binding agreement that led to the formation of an interdependent political unit. In the social contract context, it is argued that to secure their property in the anarchic “state of nature”, individuals gave up certain rights and powers to a political entity so as to receive protection in return.

In international relations, Lake (2009) observes that the relationship between powerful and less powerful countries is considered as a socially contracted relationship. Powerful countries provide conventional economic and political values and public goods while less powerful states pledge ‘compliance’ to the edicts of the powerful and support the legitimacy of their global leadership (Lake 2009: 36). While the foregoing theory provides a good framework for analysis, Charles Mill’s Racial Contract theory however provides a more useful departure in terms of comprehending factors at the international level that precipitated the clamour for African solutions to African problems.

Charles Mills (1997) argues that the espoused social contract theory which dominates political thought does not account for the realities in the global system. Mills takes issue with the founding arguments of the social contract theory which presumes the equality of human beings as the modus vivendi for ceding power to a political unit in terms of the so-called need to live in a safer, secure and mutually beneficial society. For Mills, the humans – individuals and people – who were referred to in the theory were whites who, at that time, qualify as the only rational beings that satisfy the criteria for humanhood. Thus, by reference to humans (whites), non-whites were not parties to the contract because they do not qualify as rational beings, and hence do not qualify as humans based on the
perceptions of whites.\textsuperscript{50} For Mills (1997), by not accommodating non-whites in the conceptual understanding of the parties to the contract, the Social Contract theory reigns as the theoretical architecture that justifies the idea of the inferiority of non-whites and the superiority of whites. Thus, from the onset, the social contract led to the formation of political units for the protection of the interests of whites alone.

\subsection*{4.1.1 The Racial Contract}

To establish his theory, Mills (1997: 19-20) highlights that the social contract theory is rather hypothetical. There were no moments in history that humans could be conceived to be in the espoused “state of nature” or moments when humans ceded their rights to formed political governments. In international relations as well, there were no moments in history when less powerful states bestowed imperialist or hegemonic status on powerful states.

Against this backdrop, Mills (1997, 19-20) argues that the Racial Contract is a better theory to explain actual historical and realistic facts in human society than the social contract theory. For Mills, the ‘Racial Contract theory is a set of meta-agreements between whites to categorize non-whites as sub-persons of inferior moral and legal status relative to whites.’ While there is no formal signing of a “racial contract”, series of acts serve as its normative, juridical and operational equivalent of the contract. This includes ‘papal bulls, theological pronouncements, treaties, legal decisions’ that reinforces the inferiority of non-whites (Mills 1997, 20-21). The Berlin conference of 26 February 1885, the colonial decrees and grand narratives from western societies established a “racial contract” that espouses the imaginary inferiority of non-whites. In line with Mills (1997), it is this condition that has over the years defined the history and conditions of blacks or non-whites at different epochs.

Mills racial contract theory is of course not without blemish given that he interpreted the social contract mainly as a theory developed from the exogenous segregation between whites and non-whites, a segregation that relegated non-whites to subservient and insignificant positions. This is contrary to the social contract claims by Locke and Hobbes who postulate that the social contract theory is developed around property rights. For Locke and Hobbes, it is the quest to preserve people’s right to property in the uncertain

\textsuperscript{50} As pointed out aptly by Ramose (2002: 2) Aristotle’s definition of ‘Man’(sic) as a rational being serves the major factor for the denial of reason from non-whites who were deemed non-human because their perspectives and logic does not meet the standards of white logic.
state of nature that the social contract was instituted.\textsuperscript{51} In this context, people without property (some whites included) were considered to have less rights in the society and are deemed the wards of the states instead of citizens since they have no property that accords them rights. Hence, the social contract theory could be said to begin from endogenous segregation among whites to exogenous segregation of non-whites.

Although Mills’ account of the social contract theory as espoused by Locke and Hobbes is somewhat skewed, the crux of his discourse is not mistaken as it provides a good description of the reality of non-whites, particularly Africans in global relations. Mills (1997: 1) stresses that ‘white supremacy is the unnamed political system that has made the modern world what it is today’. Through colonialism, imperialism and neo-colonialism, white supremacy has contributed to the stratification of the globe based on unwritten racial order that privileges whites over other races. Even after the debasement of racial essentialism and the end of colonialism, the racial order persists with the white race/white-predominated-regions controlling world order and prioritizations.\textsuperscript{52}

A glance at the OAU/AU 50th Anniversary Solemn Declaration in 2013 saw the recommitment of African leaders to issues that pertain race and colonialism 50 years down the line. The OAU/AU 50th Anniversary Solemn Declaration commits African actors to make progress in:

2. Continue the Struggle against Colonialism and the Right to Self-determination of People still under colonial rule.
3. The Integration Agenda: Implement the Continental Free Trade Area to ultimately establish a united and integrated Africa;
4. Agenda for Social and Economic Development:
5. Peace and Security Agenda
6. Democratic Governance

\textsuperscript{51} It is important to note that people without property or slaves are considered to have less rights in the society.
\textsuperscript{52} Just as the Bible in Genesis enjoined human’s to conquer the world, whites and colonial powers found it imperative that they, as real humans, should conquer the world including the “pseudo humans – blacks”.

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7. Determining Africa’s Destiny

8. Africa’s Place in the World (AU 2013)

These commitments, particularly point 1, 2, 7 and 8, highlight that Africa remains deeply troubled by its identity and place in the globe as it continues the struggle against neo-colonialist and imperialist agendas that were initially founded on the inferiority of Africans.\(^{53}\)

It is within this consideration that Tsenay Serequeberhan (1994: 8) in *The Hermeneutics of African Philosophy* notes that it is between the ‘ideality’ of African independence and the ‘actuality’ of neo-colonialism that many discourses on Africa find its expression. Thus, while the racial domination of Africa through colonialism was degraded after independence, the so-called ‘freedom’ of African states did not translate into freedom from domination from erstwhile colonizers. In this framework, race endures as a defining feature of international order.

To buttress this racial order it is useful to note that Mills’ Racial Contract is akin to Carole Pateman’s (1988) Sexual Contract framework which highlights male domination and female subordination. While Pateman highlights gender as the defining feature, Mills highlights race. For Mills, it is true that gender and class have influenced relationships among humans, but racial identity endures as the determining factor for opportunities and oppression (Mills 2007: 182). In *Contract and Domination* (2007), Mills’ racia-sexual framework grades society in descending order as white men, white female, non-white male and non-white female. He then argues that while at one extreme you have white males who have both racial and gender privilege, at the periphery are non-white females who are disadvantaged in both respects. He emphasizes that being a non-white male does not translate to having better privilege over a white female because race is the major yardstick for classification rather than gender (Mills 2007: 185).

In the jointly written chapter by Pateman and Charles Mills in the book titled *Contracts and Domination* (2007), Pateman agrees with Mills by highlighting the orthodox way of judging the black race against the white race. She noted that as a white woman, she would be expected to be more educated and affluent than Charles Mills, a black man. As she

\(^{53}\) Agenda 2063 which is Africa’s developmental blueprint by 2063 emphasises Africa vision that ‘by 2020, all remnants of colonialism would have ended and all African territories under occupation fully liberated.’
further reveals, the opposite is actually the case between the two of them because Pateman was groomed by lowly educated parents while Mills comes from a highly educated family. In this case a black man can rarely be considered to be on a higher societal rank than a white woman.

For Mills (1997: 40), many ‘white people, Europeans and their descendants, continue to benefit from the Racial Contract’, accepting and pretending that their privileges are legitimate entitlements and that their views are universal. It is interesting to note how recent arguments from some western authors tend to advance white superiority. Theron in his *Africa, Philosophy and the Western Tradition* (1995: 16), asserts that rationality and spirituality is common to humans but Westerners developed this tradition first. Hence, it is their (westerners) prerogative to share those riches with others (Theron 1995: 26). Such arguments resonate with works of renowned Western authors – like Immanuel Kant and David Hume, George W.F. Hegel, Lucien Levy-Bruhl and Diedrich Westermann, among many others, who ascribe inferior status to non-whites. In his *Essay of National Characters*, Hume (1776: 152) sums the prevailing white supremacists view that:

> There never was a civilized nation of any other complexion than white, nor even any individual eminent either in action or speculation. No ingenious manufactures amongst them, no arts, no sciences.

While it has become a cautionary venture to subscribe to racial categorizations due to the degradation of the arguments on racial essences, African systems remain largely modelled and dependent on western systems that where founded on the notion of white supremacy; hence racial structures persist in supposed non-racial world. In this regards, the discourse on ‘African solutions to African problems’ is not merely a political discourse. It is also a philosophic discourse that hinges on the rational capacity of Africans to conceive their destiny and address their challenges. The following section contends with the manifestations of racial contract as a basis for the quest for African solutions.

### 4.1.2 Manifestations of the Racial Contract: Understanding External Solutions to the Peace and Security Challenges in Africa

The manifestations of the racial contract are crucial in understanding the growing momentum in the propagation of African solutions to African problems. Beside the
consideration of colonialism and the colonial structures in Africa, the role of non-African actors in the continent after independence is a critical condition to the clamour for African solutions to African problems. As the countries in Africa gained independence in the 1950s and 1960s, there was widespread euphoria around African ownership and responsibility for self-determination and development. However, the newly-formed state-system in Africa exposed Africa to many socio-economic and political challenges that provided grounds for external powers to have sway in the continent. It is not surprising then that Africa’s colonial powers, who reluctantly abdicated power to African presidents, were readily available and willing to intervene in Africa coaxingly or coercively for peace and the supposed growth and development of Africa.

Within the context of Mills’ racial contract theory, it is useful to note the nexus between the conviction that led to the colonialization of Africa as well as the paternal or rather imperialistic stance of the previous colonial powers in Africa. Mills maintains that “the thesis of specialness and exceptionalism” lingers on even though the purported biological superiority of the white race to other races is obsolete and inaccurate (Mills 1997, 33). As captured by Alexander Wendt (1992: 398) under the lense of constructivism, ‘identities are the basis of interests’. The identity of superiority of the white race as surmised by Hume in the foregoing excerpt has inspired western states to pursue unequal and dominant role in their relationships with non-whites. While writing for European audience, Placid Tempels who introduced the debate on African philosophy captures the western disposition to define and address Africa’s challenges when he writes:

We do not claim, of course, that the Bantu are capable of formulating philosophical treaties, complete with an adequate vocabulary. It is our job to proceed to such a systematic development. It is we who will be able to tell them, in précised terms, what their inmost concept of being is. They will recognize themselves in our words.

Pertinent to peace and Security, western actors have played leading roles in the resolution of Africa’s challenges; roles that are called to question by the maxim African solutions to African problems. The following sections notes some of the attempts by external actors to address conflicts based on efficiency, motives and reliability.
4.1.2.1 Efficiency of External interventions

As maintained by many respondents, the solutions imported by western actors in the continent have been cosmetic and do not achieve lasting solutions in many conflict regions in Africa. While responding to a question on the significance of ‘African solutions to African problems, respondent 10 from the African Union Mission in Somalia indicates that the maxim

\[ \text{was born out of a strong desire to revive a marginalized and exploited continent that has been undermined by centuries of slavery, colonialism, neo-colonialism, exploitation, oppression, war and hunger.} \]

\[ \text{External or foreign solutions were not viable in Africa since they were either 'imported' or 'dictated' to Africans. Therefore, Africans would not own those solutions. In a nutshell the notion of 'African solutions to African problems' implies that this is the time for Africans to take things into their own hands and make use of their resources to solve Africa's troubles.} \]

For instance, the case of the U.S.-led UN mission in Somalia between 1992 and 1995 is considered as an intervention based on the belief that military or coercive actions could address issues across the globe. Yet, the intervention turned into a debacle as the mission vacillated from protecting the delivery of humanitarian assistance, maintaining secure environment, capturing leaders of factions, to coercing conflict parties to negotiations. The interveners did not consider whether it was possible to disarm thousands of armed bandits scattered all over the country or if military force was required to settle the issue in Somalia.

To highlight the aversion to external interference in Africa, Ayittey (1994) stresses that ‘the violence aimed at the United Nations has been due precisely to [the fact that] many Somalis' resent that the solutions to their problems would be dictated from outside’. Somali disputing factions considered the UN and the U.S. forces as obstacles and forceful occupiers of their land. The U.S.-led UN offensives on insurgents only succeeded in radicalizing the insurgents and increasing bloodshed and chaos in the country. The resultant effect was a bloody offensive between the clan militants and the U.S. military
force. In 1993, 18 U.S. Army Rangers were killed – some of the bodies of those killed were desecrated while others were paraded on the streets of Mogadishu. Following the incident, U.S. forces abandoned the mission and withdrew from Somalia in 1993. The UN forces remained in Somalia until 1995 when they too withdrew from the state, realizing the futility of their effort.

The Al-Shabaab militants that have continued to destabilize security in Somalia and in neighbouring Kenya were brought to birth after the defeat of the Islamic Court Union (ICU)’s forces by the U.S backed Ethiopian forces. As part of their war against terrorism, US forces conceived the ICU to be linked with Al-Qaeda. The latter was alleged by U.S intelligence units to be using Somalia as a base for operations (Emathe 2006: 2). Thus, the ICU was blacklisted and eventually routed by US backed forces. What followed after the end of the group was the growth of the Harakat al-shabaab al-Mujahideen (Movement of Warrior Youth known as Al-shabaab) a militant group of the ICU that became one of the fiercest militant Islamist movements domestically and internationally.

The recent NATO’s 2011 intervention in the oil-rich Libya is considered as one of the numerous cases where non-African interveners undermine African voices and ended up providing cosmetic solutions for a crisis in Africa. Besides the high handed suppression of the opposition movement, Gaddafi’s alleged intolerance to western imperialism tended to have driven the passionate campaign of the western interveners to end Gaddafi’s regime. Moreover, being an oil-rich country, a prolonged conflict in Libya would have an effect on global oil market to the detriment of the interests of western powers (Dembinski and Reinold 2011). As a less powerful entity, the African Union’s suggested political paths to peace in Libya was side-lined for a more coercive solution that saw the ousting and murder of Gaddafi.

Having ousted Gaddafi, peace has not been restored in Libya. The quick or rather cosmetic solution by NATO has left Libya on the verge of state collapse given the continued upheaval and lack of a credible faction that could unite the state. In the current uneasy stasis of Libya, western powers including the United States, Britain and France who were the leading actors in the NATO coalition to oust Gaddafi through military intervention,

54 Following the 9/11 attack on the World Trade Center by terrorists in 2001, U.S government identifies Somalia as one of the feasible hot spot for international terrorism, especially the Al Qaeda movement. Hence, the United States was bent on supporting any anti-terrorist movement in failed states like Somalia (Makhubela, LM 2010:62).

55 Communiqué on the situation in Libya (10 March 2011), para. 7. AU Doc. PSC/PR/COMM.2(CCLXV)
now insist on political solution to the crisis in the country (AFP 2015; RT News 2015). Thus, without acknowledging their misjudgement and solution, Western powers now make recourse to the line of argument employed by the African Union who had initially insisted on a political solution to the Libyan crisis. With the abrupt ouster of Gaddafi, the intervention in Libya have dislodged the security context of the country and provided grounds for violent extremism to fester in Libya.

Today, Africa battles with the deleterious problem of terrorism in the Libyan region due to the coalescence of western intervention gone wrong. This highlights the truism in the Yoruba proverb “O tò eniketa ni i dàkùn ijà” which means it is third person’s intervention that fuels the conflict. In response to a question on the rationale for African solutions, respondent 6 from a Civil Society Organization (CSO) insists that:

*I believe that the entire thinking around African solutions is driven by the desire for Africans to take responsibility for its own future. In terms of peace and security, the issue of ownership is first. We have seen very often that decisions when it comes to crisis on the continent are not handled well. You can name some examples of this; Libya is one of the case, Mali is one of the case, CAR is another case, etc. and you realize that the issue of ownership remains critical to any endeavour to come up with long terms solutions to crisis in the continent. So first and foremost, the issue of African ownership is important when it comes to responding to crisis in the continent.*

Coupled with the problem of bad governance in Africa, the ills of foreign made policies for Africa has seen the emergence of radical and extremist movements in Africa that aver western perspectives. This includes terrorist groups such as the Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Boko Haram of Nigeria, Al-Shabaab in Somalia, Ansar Al-Shariya in Tunisia, the Al-Qaeda-linked Mulathameen Brigade (the ‘Masked Ones’) in Algeria as well as the Ansar Dine led by a former close ally of Gaddafi, Iyad Ag Ghaly. Despite their unjustifiable means, these extremist groups are bent on making an impression against western influence in their localities and across the globe.

**4.1.2.2 Concerns about the Motive for External Interventions**

It is however hypothetical to hold that with the absence of foreign interventions in post-colonial Africa, Africans would have been able to contend with their problems (if such scenario was possible in the first place because many of the newly formed states in Africa
were weak states with little capacity for state control and development). In fact, the interventions of external actors has aided in lessening the impact of conflict in Africa. There have been over thirty UN Peacekeeping missions in Africa since 1948. Under the auspices of dominant powers, over 70% of all UN military, police and civilian officers, as by 2014, are in Africa to address Africa’s security challenges (DefenceWeb 2014). As noted by the Human Security Brief 2007, the peace operations in Africa have led to the 60% reduction of the number and magnitude of conflicts in Africa since the mid-1990s (Williams 2010: 1). The recent interventions of powerful non-African actors such as France’s interventions in Mali in 2012 until to date, Cote d’ivoire in 2010 and Central African Republic in 2014 has saved countless lives and minimized conflict related suffering in the continent. The EU, US and China have also invested enormously in Africa’s peace and security projects.

The United Nations’ Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), which was set up in 2005 to help countries emerging from war had consistently prioritized African states. Since its formation in 2015, the PBC has only prioritized African countries namely: Burundi, Sierra Leone, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia and the Central African Republic. The effort of foreign powers in containing the conflicts in Africa can only be understated. Pertinent to France’s effort for instance, Robert Dussey, Minister of State and Minister for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of Togo, during the 2014 annual UN debate of the sixty-ninth session of the General Assembly, affirms that ‘Togo knows too well the value of the efforts made by France to fight alongside African countries’ (cited in UN News Centre 29 September 2014). Dussey encouraged the continued and strengthened support of the international community in addressing Africa’s problems.

In fact, critics of dominant powers have often contradicted themselves in many instances. When dominant powers intervene in crisis settings as in the case of French’s intervention in Mali in 2014 and the NATO intervention in Libya in 2011, critics cry out against imperialism and call for African solutions. However, when dominant powers show reluctance in intervention as the case of the 1994 Rwandan genocide, the 2015 election crisis in Burundi or the terrorist challenge in Nigeria, critics argue that powerful states care less about human lives in Africa. In the case of Nigeria some analysts hypothesize that if the over 200 abducted girls in northern Nigeria were from the west, western powers will not hesitate to route the culprits and bring the girls back (Velez 2014). Yet, when they do intervene, a barrage of criticism follows suit.
However, much of the criticisms around external intervention is foregrounded on the *modus operandi* of dominant powers which portrays arrogance, nonchalance, debasement of local structures and authorities. With Africa’s running with racial domination and colonialism, external interventions carried out with little backing from local structures conjures images of colonialism, imperialism and the blatant display of the superiority of Western powers in particular, even if the interventions are well intended. It is important to note in this regard that white racial superiority which begot colonialism and imperialism was emphasized and maintained through violence (Fanon 1967). An interventionist stance from former “superior race”, especially those that are military in nature, relives the violence with which racial supremacy was upheld. Foreign interventions portray Africans as benighted people incapable of solving their own issues without external involvement (Ayittey 1994).

Worryingly, the parochial interest of foreign powers with regard to African mineral wealth makes the continent vulnerable to external meddling. France for instance, is dependent on Africa for a number of raw materials and energy resources (Renou 1999). The need to access Africa’s cheap materials on a permanent basis informs much of its policies in Africa. Renou (1999) notes that under different forms of agreements, there are about 38 African countries engaged in cooperation with France. On its own part, France supplies certain African regimes with weapons, logistic support, military training and the protection of the regimes from aggressions. African leaders reciprocate by giving France almost unfettered access to raw materials. While discussing about the rationale for African solutions, respondent 15 from a CSO indicates that ‘French speaking countries in Africa has never been free because French policies and influence remain alive in those areas; the same is the case for many other African states’.

In a working paper titled The African Union’s Conflict Management Capabilities that was written with the aim of assessing how the US can support the African Union’s security initiatives, Paul Williams (2011) is instructive in noting that Africa ‘offers profitable business opportunities, especially in the energy, telecommunication, and minerals sectors’. The interest of the U.S. and other Europeans in Africa is continually growing as more resources are discovered in Africa. In the face of the growing Chinese and Indian

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56 Renou (1999) observes that in 1998, 50% of French Official Development Aid of about 18 billion Francs was dedicated to Sub-Saharan Africa with a bigger share to francophone African states. Using such means, France ensures the monopoly of African raw materials for France’s transnational companies.
influence in Africa, powerful states are engaging in a new scramble for African resources. Increasingly, the attitude of powerful states in Africa highlights the pseudo-evolutionary thinking which advocates an imperialist beatitude that suggests ‘Blessed are the strong, for they shall prey upon the weak’ (Banton 1967: 48). As such, the continent could experience more external meddling and interventions that are ostensibly meant to address Africa’s challenges under the responsibility to protect\textsuperscript{57} and human security\textsuperscript{58} justifications.

4.1.2.3 The Reliability of External Interventions

The uneven responses of the UN and the Western states to the insecurities in some parts of the African continent further raise concern about the value accorded to African lives. One of the most recounted failures of external actors – that are keen to intervene in Africa – is the failure to halt the massive killings of people during the Rwandan genocide in 1994. For Dersso (2011: 16), ‘in the global power calculus of the time [of the genocide], Africa was far less significant than other parts of the globe such as the Middle East and Asia to Western hegemonic powers’. Though African actors are indicted in their poor response, that episode suggested that Africa could be abandoned by foreign actors in times of need especially when intervention does not satisfy the interests of powerful states. More disturbing was that there was an (impotent) ongoing United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR- from October 1993 to March 1996) at the time of the massacre. At the time of the genocide that left over 800 000 people dead within one hundred days, UNAMIR with over 2500 officers, was mandated to assist in ensuring the security of the capital city of Kigali; monitor the ceasefire agreement, including establishment of an expanded demilitarized zone and demobilization procedures; monitor the security situation during the final period of the transitional Government's mandate leading up to elections; assist with mine-clearance; and assist in the coordination of humanitarian assistance activities in conjunction with relief operations.\textsuperscript{59}

\textsuperscript{57} The doctrine of the responsibility to protect (R2P) mandates the international community to protect civilians from genocide, war crimes and mass atrocities against civilians (Kioko 2003).
\textsuperscript{58} The concept of human security focuses on the security of individuals, groups and societies rather than state security.
It becomes worrying that the mission could not anticipate the violence or request for the reinforcement of the mission to arrest the crisis. This made it clear to Africa that the solution to their challenges lies within.

Moreover, during the armed conflicts in Sudan, Liberia and Sierra Leone in the late 1990s, the UN and Western powers were conspicuously inactive (Williams 2011). In the Liberian and Sierra Leonean crises, ECOWAS was most responsive before a reluctant UN peacebuilding intervention was established. It is based on the foregoing concern that Ramose (2002: 2) asks ‘why is it that the African’s right to life continues to be denied, derecognized, and remains practically unprotected by the beneficiaries of the violence, irrationality, and the inhumanity of colonization?’

Beside the foregoing concerns, another worrying concern around non-African solutions is the argument on the role of external powers in engendering and stoking conflicts in the continent as discussed in the following section.

4.1.3 The Role of Non-African Actors in Africa’s Insecurities

As argued by Ngwane (1996: 4) ‘even though the West are the first to appear in any trouble spot or war zone in Africa posing as humanitarian relief agents and Peace Keeping forces, they are sometimes the catalysts of most tragic reactions in Africa’. The legacy of colonialism and neo-colonialism evident in the wanton external meddling and impositions of foreign powers in Africa remains a major driver of conflict in Africa (ISS Report 2014). The condition placed on Africans by imperial and colonial powers has put Africa in such quagmire that it can hardly seek a ‘true’ self-determination on its own terms. The following sections considers some of the imposed conditions as well as meddling that have significant impact on the security of the continent.

4.1.3.1 Africa’s Weak States and Fragile States

*Ab initio*, colonial and post-colonial African states are artificial, weak or even failed states (Osaghae 2007: 696; Brown 2001). African states, operating under the colonially introduced state system, were inevitable pseudo-states because the new state-system did not speak to the socio-cultural, economic and political system of African societies. The attainment of independence and the pseudo-statehood of the countries in Africa only left Africa with numerous political, economic and social issues that created tensions in the continent (Somerville 1990; Osaghae 2007; Reilly 2008). Somerville (1990: 4) argues
that African conflicts and state inefficiency stem from the colonial legacy of arbitrary constructed colonial boundaries and the lack of national cohesion that resulted from such boundaries.

The arbitrary boundaries of the Berlin Act of 26th February 1885 resulted in the indiscriminate conglomeration of different ethnic, linguistic and religious groups under one polity. Previously hostile and/or unrelated communities were housed together and expected to interact with each other without respect of their cultural, ethnic and religious differences. To aggravate the challenge of unification, the colonial administration subjected them to unsuitable forms of governance. The colonialists adopted a tactics of ‘divide and rule’ by creating political and economic policies that favored one group at the expense of others. Consequently, the tactics of ‘divide and rule’ prevented national integration and fostered tribalism and ethnic hatred (Adedeji 1999: 3).

Colonial experience in Somalia, for instance, saw the unfamiliar introduction of centralized state structures that were incongruent to the Somali decentralized pastoralist structures (Ahmed 1999: 238). Moreover, by partitioning Somali clans into different colonies, the colonial administration encouraged different Somali clans to engage in a political struggle to preserve and assert their interests. Beside the role of President Siad Barre’s regime in pitting groups against each other, the clan wars that ensued after the collapse of the central government in 1991 attests to the challenges of lumping different autonomous clans under a political unit.

Additionally, colonial boundaries led to the split of ethnic groups. For instance, Somalis were split into Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia. What ensued is the Somalia-Ethiopia war in 1977-78 that emerged from the desire of Somalis to fulfil their aspiration for “a unified Somalia”, among other motives (Emathe 2006: 10).

Like Somalia, many contemporary ethnic and religious conflicts in the continent are based on state-system that left many ethnic and religious groups struggling to assert their ethnic autonomy, significance and/or interest in post-colonial African societies. Furthermore, ‘colonial powers destroyed old methods of conflict resolution and traditional African political institutions, and failed to create effective substitute ones in their place’ (Mazrui 2008: 37).
Generally, colonial misrule in Africa has been indicted for the experiences of state failure, ethnic conflict, secessionism, irredentism and border conflicts in the continent. This does not mean that there were no wars in pre-colonial Africa, rather as noted aptly by Mazrui (2008: 36-37), pre-colonial Africa experienced less bloody and escalated wars than post-colonial wars. A question that remains however is, if Africa had not been colonized, what would an un-colonized Africa look like?

4.1.3.2 External Meddling in Africa

It is also argued that the introduction of the western state-system in Africa did not come with proper ethics of good governance in state-like systems (Mazrui 2008: 37). Colonial powers merely exalted some people, who were not rightful rulers in the traditional sense, into leadership positions. These stooges of colonial powers were bent on serving colonial interests and ensuring their sustained foothold on power. Thus, the attainment of independence did not change the status quo. Rather, independence saw the emergence of leaders that were willing to tear the country down so as to remain in power. To this end, erstwhile colonial actors played pivotal role in supporting and protecting the leaders in exchange for the resources and privileges in the continent.

The ideological struggle during the Cold War, which African states were born into, saw decisive western interventions in Africa to guard against the proselytization of Africa to the socialist camp and to keep Africa within their grips (Dersso 2011: 13). The notable consequence is that the newly-formed weak African states were caught in the middle as western actors sought to imprint their economic and political ideologies in the continent. Illegitimate African regimes were ‘sponsored (legitimized) by the competing alliances throughout the Cold War’ (Reilly 2008: 18). Using foreign arms and foreign support, African leaders repressed opposition groups that voiced the ills of the government. For Mbeki (2012), ‘as the Cold War fuelled some of the longest conflicts in Africa and supported corrupt and authoritarian governments, the hope of a self-determining Africa that the end of direct European colonial rule brought was turned into a nightmare.’

With the end of Cold War in the late 1980s, illegitimate regimes lost external protection and legitimacy and were left in the cold. Latent opposition groups quickly felt emboldened to fight for their cause relentlessly resulting in civil wars across the continent. Ismail I Ahmed (2010:199) is informative in noting that since the end of the Cold war, the globe has recorded an unprecedented number of failed states. Timeously, Somalia’s state
collapse in 1991 supports the forgoing argument that the end of the Cold War saw the collapse of states propped up by foreign powers.60

4.1.3.3 The Burden of the International System: Preying on Africa’s Resources

Ali Mazrui (1980), in the third lecture of the 1979 Reith Lectures that makes up the book The African Condition, notes that compared to other Third World regions, Africa has witnessed the most rapid pace of westernization and western impositions that engender many crisis in the continent. For instance, in terms of development which has been equated with technological and economic advancement, the thesis of specialness remains extant in the way western powers claim monopoly of developmental paradigms that are useful across the globe.61 The so called ‘developmental’ challenges faced by African states after independence exposed the African continent to the ideologies and recommendation of the supposed developed states and their institutions. In accord with the dominant developmental paradigm from the west, the World Bank, IMF and other donor agencies propagated the notion of weak, crisis, fragile, failing, failed and collapsed states to primarily denote the level of developmental challenges faced by Third World countries vis-à-vis western states that are the yardstick of development (Osaghea 2007).

With the enormous natural resources in Africa, foreign powers were not willing to allow the so-called underdeveloped states and regions to determine the path to their development. Even though inept and greedy African elites played significant roles in maintaining the interferences of foreign actors, western actors where keen to ‘lead’ Africa to development through foreign aids, policies and interventions that have dire consequences for Africa’s present condition.

Notably, foreign aid was readily available for ‘needy countries’ in Africa as long as they comply with the prescriptions of powerful states (Nichols 2011: 205). While the aid was considered necessary for the growth of developing states, the deleterious impact of foreign aid in Africa can only be understated. Glennie (2008: 37) highlights the “dual impact” of aid on the benefiting countries – impacts that have compelled benefitting “countries to make sweeping policy reforms that will have lasting consequences for decades to come.”

Firstly, foreign aid discourages actual growth and encourages a dependency syndrome.

60 See chapter 6.1 for a deeper engagement with this claim.
61 However, the paradigms end up only at the service of western expansionism, exceptionalism and dominance.
among the recipients on the one hand (Hellinger 1994, Glennie 2008). Secondly, it serves as a channel through which donor countries impose their values on the recipients (Glennie 2008; Lancaster 1999).

Pertinent to the former, it is as though the more aid African countries receive, the more dependent they become on donor regions. For instance, Barre’s regime relied heavily on foreign aid which his regime barely used for the nation’s development (Pham 2011). In his bid to sustain his inefficient regime, the aid was used for self-aggrandizement, maintenance of power, and oppression of opposition groups and rival clans. As government elites looted the national treasuries, the regime kept requesting foreign aids for the country through humbug initiatives and propaganda.  

However, following the end of the Cold War between 1988 and 1989, western aid to Somalia diminished thereby leading to the weakening of the Somali central government. To compound Barre’s political foothold, the World Bank and the IMF in 1989 criticized the government for misappropriation of public funds and Somalia was deemed ineligible for financial aids (Ismail 2010: 196). External donors then terminated support to Somalia. Menkhaus (2006:80) contends that by mid-1980s, Somalia could be referred as a failed state already due to its weak foreign-aid based economy. It is rather ironic that countries that have received the most aid in Africa, like Somalia and the Democratic Republic of Congo, “have slid into virtual anarchy” (Maren 1997: 11).

In terms of the second concern about foreign aid, Maren (1997: 11) regards foreign aid as “a self-serving system” that bolsters the profile of the donors as powerful states. The policies and conditions attached to aids are meant to serve the interest of the donor states. Western actors have particularly played the role of being the ‘rational-self’ for by advancing various developmental programmes for the good of developing states - programmes that provides a clearer insight into the self-serving policies of western actors. In the early 1990s, the trending recommendation for Africa was the structural adjustment programmes (SASP) which was crafted for Latin America by the Washington-based international financial institutions (IFI). The SAPS was promptly exported to Africa

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62 Ismail (2010: 191) notes that in terms of foreign aid, Somalia was one of the most privileged states than other African countries. Somalis received development aid and refugee aid from the Soviet Union, Italy and the Western and Arab states.
because it was surmised that the dismal economic state of Africa was akin to Latin America.

A glance at the SAPS recommendations however exposes the intent to infiltrate Africa’s economy and exploit its potentials and resources. Among the ten recommendations of the SAPS are 4 recommendations that clearly expose the exploitative intent of the policy, namely

1. Quantitative trade restrictions to be rapidly replaced by tariffs, which would be progressively reduced until a uniform low rate in the range of 10 to 20 percent was achieved.

2. Abolition of barriers impeding the entry of FDI (foreign direct investment).


4. Abolition of regulations that impede the entry of new firms or restrict competition (Williamson 2004: 196)

While the foregoing recommendations could enable foreign investors to develop Africa’s economy, the recommendations advanced that Africa should readily welcome foreign interest by relaxing restrictions and abolition barriers for foreign direct investment (Williamson 2004: 197). Yet, the recommendations are not reciprocal as African economies go through a stricter trade and migration policies in terms investing in western economies (Maren 1998).

In their desperation for foreign aid which was contingent on adopting such policies, some African states adhered to the dictates of the policies. Yet, the SAPs failed to account for the interests of the masses of ordinary African citizens because multinational companies (MNCs) that took charge of Africa’s economy did not have the interest of Africa at heart (Goodwin 2005: 135). Mo Ibrahim (2014) highlights some of the problems with MNCs by noting that they do not pay their taxes because small African countries have weak tax collection systems and lack lawyers and forensic accountants to challenge the companies. The report of the High-Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows from Africa that was presented by Thabo Mbeki to the AU summit in early 2015 provides a clearer idea of the ills of MNCs in Africa. The report highlights that much of the illicit financial flows from
the African continent, about 65%, are from multinational companies that evade tax payment (AU and ECA 2015).

It is along this considerations that Murobe (2002: 574) surmises aptly that ‘the success of powerful countries is based on their ability to prey on the economic and political weaknesses of poor countries’. In this regard, the economic bent of the racial contract offers great import in understanding the policy impositions in Africa. Mills argues that “the Racial Contract is calculatedly aimed at economic exploitation” (Mills 1997: 32). Fanon in his work *Wretched of the Earth* (1967) shared similar view by insisting that racism is eventually realized in the economic sphere. For Fanon (1967), race and class intersect in such a way that to belong to the privileged race is to belong to the rich class and to belong to the disadvantaged race is to belong to the poor class. For the dominant race to maintain its superiority then, the economic exploitation of other race serves such purpose. This goes in line with Mills’s contention that the establishment of racial hierarchies renders legitimate the ‘privilege of those individuals designated as white…and the exploitation of those individuals designated as nonwhite/subpersons (sic)’ (Mills 1997: 32-33).

In the name of development and globalization, African states ended up accepting or implementing foreign made policies – by imposition and/or persuasion – because “it is assumed that rationalism and science, innovations and inventions found their special home” in predominantly white regions or erstwhile colonial masters (Mills 1997: 33-34). However, despite the foreign policies imported in the continent, poverty and underdevelopment remain rife because African leaders received easy foreign aids which they pocketed than working to make creative developmental strategies for Africa. This has led to mass grievances that resulted in many conflicts in Africa. Hence, if foreign powers and their impositions contribute a great deal to the foundational causes of conflicts in Africa, how could they adequately address Africa’s security challenges? Hence, the view around the dominance of external actors in shaping Africa’s destiny including challenges, have led to the clamour for African solutions.

Nevertheless, it is not a clear-cut phenomenon for a conflict in Africa to be attributed to colonialism and imperialism given that conflicts are complex and dynamic events that implicates local and external actors. As warned by William Minter in the forward of the ‘Foreign Intervention in Africa: From the Cold War to the War on Terror’; what should
be clearly rejected, however, are simplistic accounts that reduce events to a simple story of outside interventions or a clear dichotomy between external and internal causes of conflict’ (Schmidt 2013: xiv). The degree to which foreign intervention have a hand in the persistent conflict in Africa is subject to opinion as its absence could have either led to a more peaceful or anarchic Africa. This turns our attention to the internal factors that contributed to the call for ‘African solutions to African problems’.

4.2 The National Context: The Complicity of African Actors

A critical assessment of African politics presents the gloom reality of African involvement in the challenges that overwhelm the continent and the ill-solutions used to address them. While it is politic to recommend that Africans should seek appropriate policies suited for Africa, the exclusive blame on non-African actors exonerates African political misbehaviour. As observed by many respondents, the mantra on African solutions to African problems is one of the means adopted by African elites to divert attention to imperialism while masking their culpability in Africa’s problems. Respondent 17 from the AU stresses that African actors:

*should not be fixated with condemning external interferences in the continent because they (African leaders) are among the major causes of Africa’s challenges and the ones that provide conditions for external interferences.*

Frantz Fanon chapter called the ‘Pitfalls of National Consciousness’ that is found in his polemic work *The Wretched of the Earth* (1967) provides a good framework for the understanding of the inadequacies of African elites in materializing African solutions and aspirations; and thus their complicity in Africa’s woes. Fanon gives an elaborate explication of how postcolonial African states continue to stumble under the leadership of African elites. For Fanon, the African middle-class - a significant number of them educated under the auspices of colonial mother countries – who eventually took on leadership powers could not match the colonial middle-class that administered the former colonies – now states (Fanon 1967: 120). After independence, these elites reckoned that they had the political, economic and intellectual expertise needed to develop Africa, but once in power, the African middle-class realized their blatant lack of political and economic prowess to materialize Africa’s development (Fanon 1967: 121). These elites eventually turned to their erstwhile colonizers for expertise because “the economy has always developed outside the limits of their knowledge” (Fanon 1967: 121).
Realizing their inefficiencies in leading the state structure, the post-colonial leaders used their newly gained political influence to maintain power at all costs (Yeh 2011: 630). It could be argued aptly that the racial and colonial system that groomed many African leaders did not train the nationalist to effectively run the newly introduced state-system; or that the colonial system nurtured African leaders that cared less about the development of African states (Mazrui 2008). However, dwelling on such argument only denies African actors of responsibility for the woes in the continent and advancing the argument on the gullibility and inferiority of African minds.

The principles of democracy and good governance were not alien to Africans. African indigenous polities had governance systems that ensured the provision of peace, security and basic services to their subjects. One can only look to some states – like Brazil, Singapore and Hong Kong that experienced colonialism – to note that colonial legacies could be transcended. Thus, the following sections contend with some grave traits in African leadership that has worsened Africa’s problems (with focus on the security conditions) and entertained imposed ill-suited solutions in the continent.

4.2.1 Poor Governance/Political Economy of Predation

In tandem with Ake (1993), inasmuch as external factors could be used to explain instabilities in Africa, the failure of some African leaders to govern African states effectively is an indispensable factor causing the prevalence of conflict and state failure in the continent. Ayittey (1994) observes that at the dawn of independence in the 1960s, African countries radiated of enthusiasm and optimism for the future. Ethnic and religious groups united together for a common cause. They put off their disagreements in the hope for self-rule and self-development. However, not so long after independence, the enthusiasm and optimism of African states became shattered by the ineptitude of African elites as highlighted by Fanon in the ‘Pitfall of National Consciousness’. Serequeberhan (1994: 9) affirms this claim by contending that ‘the challenge of our post-colonial situation is grounded in the failed actuality of the promise of African independence.’

After taking over leadership from colonial powers, domestic elites alienated the rest of the masses from the political and decision-making life of the state. The state became an independent sector with little or no connection to the society. Instead of changing the colonial structure of administration to their democratic aspirations, the nationalist leaders took over the rein of leadership and maintained the colonial structure of administration.
Many African leaders are reputed for identifying the ills of neo-colonial structures and systems (Ocheni and Nwankwo 2012) but they do not make effort to deviate from or reconcile those systems and structures with African or society-friendly ones. Hence, the debates on decolonization by African leaders remains superficial as colonial boundaries, state systems and constitutions remained unaltered mainly because those structures served the interest of African regimes.

While the continent is endowed with mineral resources and other income generating endowments, African states seem not to have the will to turn resources into marketable materials. As noted by Mo Ibrahim (2014), colonialism is not really the problem of Africa given that ‘at the moment of independence, many African countries like Ghana and Egypt had higher income per capita than China, India or Singapore. Where are we now? And where are those guys?’ African leaders have not inspired growth that can rival the West in any significant economic, political and social context.

Coupled with their ineptitude, African leaders have tended to play the role of schizophrenics who on the one hand are desperate for an economic boost to allay mass discontents against their inefficient regimes and on the other hand renowned for looting national economies. Based on the former, African leaders are famous for going after recommendations for economic growth from foreign powers as evident from their receptive aptitude to the policies of donor countries (Naim 2000: 505; Idahosa 2004). Many African states are notorious for erecting mega-structures akin to those in Europe just to imitate the west without pursuing society-centric advancements. This is well emphasized by Ali Mazrui (1980: 2) observation that Africa is caught up in a dilemma: ‘rebellion against the West and imitation of the West’. At the African Renaissance Conference in 1998 in South Africa, the then deputy President Thabo Mbeki insists that ‘the further reproduction of wealth in the countries of the North has led to the creation of poverty in the countries of the South’ (Mbeki 1998).

Pertinent to the latter concern on looting national economies, African elites, due to lack of foresight, have tended to ignore the developmental issues and the welfare of citizens

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63 The colonial-type state-system and structures had dismantled the traditional order and values in Africa and had forced Africa to learn a new order and system. The swift endorsement of the colonial systems of governance, administration and laws by African leaders did not provide African actors the opportunity to explore the relevance of its values in the attempt to address the continent’s challenges. African leaders who benefitted from the colonial-type state system were rather unwilling to challenge the values of the state system or explore the role of their traditional value-system in the new order. This is because the new order provided a conducive platform for their self-interests and obsession for power.
by mismanaging and embezzling public funds. National treasuries as well as the foreign-aid pumped into African states are plundered and stashed away in private and covert foreign banks of political elites (Ayittey 1994). The flagrant avarice and corruption of African elites – like Sani Abacha of Nigeria and Mobutu Sese Seko of the DRC – have committed many states in Africa to poverty while few connected people live in luxury. To bring the corruption issues with Africa close to present realities, the 2014 Corruption Perceptions Index by the Transparency International, confirm that ‘nine of the 20 most corrupt countries in the world are in Africa’ (IPSS Report 2014). Ngwane (1996: 2) surmises the predicament of African states by noting that ‘whenever a leadership comes to power, it metamorphoses itself into a coterie of black termites eating deep into the coffers of the country’s wealth especially when such a leadership is cocooned by a swarm of spineless sycophants and insulated by a horde of military hounds’. Thus, coupled with the impact of continued Western exploitation, the stark truth is that African elites have also played a huge part in deepening post-colonial poverty and dependency.

Through Africa’s leadership ills and dependency, external actors seem to have benefited more from Africa’s resources. Thabo Mbeki’s Report on Illicit Financial Flows (IFFs) from Africa to the AU Summit in February 2015 approximates that over US$50 billion of illicit money flows out of Africa every year – greater than the money that is flowing into Africa in the form of official development assistance (ODI) from donor countries and organisations (AU and ECA 2015). The illicit money flows from Africa accounts for money transferred by multinational companies through tax evasion, as well as criminal enterprises and corrupt officials.

The irony is then that the illicit money flows from the continent supersedes the foreign aids flowing into the continent. As such, through illegal means, Africa then becomes a significant and implicit donor to developed states where the money is destined. Yet, the number of people living under $1.25 a day in the continent has risen from 290 million in 1990 to 414 million in 2010 (Fabricius 2015). Mbeki’s report further notes that the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) could be achieved in a timely manner if the outflow of funds from the continent is stopped. Even with such realization, there remains little hope around Africa’s disposition to revamp its gloomy economic system. This

64 The High Level Panel on IFFs refers to IFFs as ‘money illegally earned, transferred or used’ (AU and ECA 2015).
thereby deepens the pessimism and disappointment of African masses since independence.

Based on the frustration-aggression theory as propagated by Ted Robert Gur (1970) in his *Why Men Rebel*, discontents due to the gap between expectation and achievement contributes to various forms of aggressive acts. When the state and its institutions do not fulfil people’s basic needs – due to corruption and bad governance –, the state gradually loses its authority and legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens leading individuals and groups to suspect that they are particularly marginalized in the system. Without proper and reliable avenues to express their grievances, aggrieved citizens as well as interest groups resort to unconstitutional means to articulate their political ideologies and interests. *Ipso facto*, disloyalty and rebellion could be expected of acrimonious individuals and groups. Aggrieved masses could also be easily manipulated or recruited by rebel leaders, with messianic ideologies for salvaging the state (Anyanwu and Njoku 2010:22). In Somalia for instance, the poor economic policies of political elites created widespread social discontent and oppositions towards Barre’s regime leading to state collapse in 1991. Hence, ‘the roles played by domestic elites in transforming potentially violent situations into deadly confrontations’ cannot be underestimated (Brown 2001: 210).

To shift blame from themselves, it has become a commonplace for African leaders to continually deflect the continent’s ills to external factors. Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe has frequently blamed the country’s woes on Britain and the United States due to the travel and economic sanctions imposed by the Britain and US against Zimbabwean elites who are responsible for political intimidation and violence. Yet, it remains hard to find foresight in the policies adopted by Mugabe’s regime to address the economic challenges faced by his country. Fanon’s concept reveals the cunning way through which African leaders elongate their leaderships; by turning people’s attention to their colonial past or emphasizing their role to fight against colonialism. This reminiscence is used as way of promoting a feeling of indebtedness in the leader among ordinary people. The current euphoria and clamour around ‘African solutions to African problems’ could be seen as another concerted effort by Africa’s political elite to highlight the blame on non-African actors/solutions and the spurious resolve of African leaders to pursue African-oriented solutions.
4.2.2 Authoritarian Systems and Political repression

With the realization of the inadequacies of their escapist arguments, some leaders are willing to use every means possible even if it entails tearing the country apart to remain in power. Bates (2008:7) observes that ‘the conditions that led to the breakdown of order in Africa is the authoritarian nature of its states and their rulers’ penchant for predation’.

Some leaders in Africa have designed national constitutions to suite their interests. In times when the constitution seems to hinder their interests, they call for the amendment of the constitution or blatantly contravene the norms entrenched in the constitution. Recently, African leaders – such as the leaders of Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Rwanda and Benin– have embarked on constitution reform projects mainly to elongate their stay in power. Between 2000 and 2015, 16 African states tried constitution reform for the purpose of extending presidential term limits and 10 of the states were successful (Zimbabwe Times 2015).

In Burundi, the quest to sit tight in office led President Pierre Nkurunziza to run for a third term in office in defiance of the Arusha Accords and disregard to the oppositions and protests against such move. In this case however, there tends to be no decisive opposition leaders in the country because power is concentrated in only one political party, as in many other African states. With insignificant opposition parties, one political-party-systems in Africa tend to run the state as their personal fiefdom. In some countries like Gambia, Djibouti, and Chad as well as Togo, Sudan, Angola, Uganda and Equatorial Guinea, there is no term limits thus making it possible for incumbent rulers to sit tight in office. Under this one-party system, the leaders ruled as dictators under the guise of democracy with ‘unlimited, unopposed and unchecked’ powers (van Wyk 2007: 12).

Ayittey (1994) observes that since independence, most African leaders were either forcefully overthrown or assassinated in military coups. The military juntas that succeeded the civilian African leaders claimed to be messiahs emerging to address the social ills of their predecessors. Yet, they turned out to be worse than the civilian regimes. Having tasted power, they refuse to abdicate power and ran the state as their personal fiefdoms. This is true of the dictatorships of Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire, Mohammed Siad Barre of Somalia, Emperor Bokassa 1 of Central Africa, Samuel Doe of Liberia, Idi Amin Dada of Uganda, and Sani Abacha of Nigeria.
African so-called civilian leaders also exhibit signs of unwillingness to abdicate power and this has led to many conflicts in contemporary Africa. The Arab Spring in North Africa that is generally said to have begun when Aziz Bouziz, a destitute student in Tunisia, set himself on fire in demonstration against Tunisian leadership, have led to widespread rebellion in North Africa extending to some Arab states in the Middle East (Rupiya 2012: 173). Thus, North Africa joined the rest of Africa in a bid to transform from one-party state-system to working democracies (Rupiya 2012: 180). Between January and February 2011, Tunisians and Egyptians deposed Presidents Ben Ali and Hosni Mubarak’s regime respectively and the Libyan President was also deposed and murdered in the same year with the assistance of NATO’s forces.

The Ivory Coast and Burkina Faso post-election crisis, as well as the pre-election crisis in Burundi in 2015 show the difficulties involved in attaining peaceful transition of civilian leadership in the continent. Little wonder, the ‘relative’ peaceful transition of power in Nigeria in 2015 – which saw the shift of power from the dominant People’s Democratic Party (PDP) to the All Progressive Congress (APC) – was received in the international community with so much admiration given that conflict was expected to have ensued in such scenarios in the continent where one-party reigns supreme and elections are dented by widespread rigging, fraud, violence and thuggery.

Other African leaders have remained victorious regardless of every contestation to their leadership. One has only to consider the length of leadership of some incumbent leaders to affirm this.

- Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo, President of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea has been in office since 1979 after ousting his uncle Masie Nguema Biyongo Ndong in a coup.
- Jose Eduardo dos Santos, Angola’s President has been in office since 1979. Cameroon’s President Paul Biya has been in power since 1982.
- Since 1986, President Yoweri Museveni has been leading Uganda after the ouster of Idi Amin and Milton Obote.
- Zimbabwe’s President and the 2015 AU Chairperson Robert Mugabe have been in power since 1989.
- Sudan’s President Omar Hassan al-Bashir has been the president of Sudan since 1989 after a bloodless military coup (He is the first sitting head of state to be indicted by the ICC).

- Idriss Déby of Chad became president in 1990 after ousting the then-president Hissene Habré with the support of Libya and Sudan.

- Eritrea’s President Isaias Afwerki has also been in office since 1993.

- Gambia’s President Yaya Jammeh in serving his 4th term in office and has been in power since 1994.

- President Dennis Sassou Nguesso of the Republic of Congo has been in power since 1997 after the civil war where his forces ousted President Pascal Lissouba but he had earlier served as a president from 1979 to 1992.

- Togo’s President Faure Gnassingbé has been in power since 2005 after his father Gnassingbé Eyadéma died in 2005 having ruled the country for 38 years.

These leaders show no sign of allowing other visionaries to unseat them yet their countries remain deeply polarized with majority of people leaving below the average standard of living. Some of these leaders are notorious for seeking the assistance of external actors to gain access to material elements to remain in power (Renou 1999). As observed by Brown (2001), violent oppositions are likely to erupt if a state adopts oppressive or violent measures against its people. By trying to suppress opposition movements and terrorize their citizens, tyrannical African regimes ended up fostering and strengthening rebellious movements that are willing to do all it takes to get rid of such regime.65

4.2.3 Politicization of Ethnicity

Many conflicts in Africa – such as that of Rwanda that culminated in the 1994 genocide and the clan conflict in Somalia – are ostensibly dubbed ethnic conflicts. Based on a traditionalist view, ethnicity is indicted for being detrimental to state cohesion. However, Claude Ake (1993: 1) examines the role of ethnicity in African conflicts closely and contends that it is a misconception to hold tenaciously that ethnicity is at the heart of

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65 Thus, the meddling of external actors were done under the quislings and selfish choices of the leaders. In this case, the racial contract now involves the complacency of African leaders who in their bid to amass wealth and remain in power have served the interest of external actors.
African problems. He argues along the instrumentalist view by noting that the seeming ethnic conflict in Africa is consequent from the manipulation of ethnic differences by political leaders for selfish interests.

According to Anthony Smith, ‘an ethnic community is a named human population with a myth of common ancestry, shared memories, and cultural elements; a link with a historic territory or homeland; and a measure of solidarity’ (quoted in Brown 2001:210). Adedeji (1999:8) notes that ethnic or tribal identity is not an absolute phenomenon that can be identified by tangible facts like mere language or dress code. Rather, ethnic and tribal identities are perceptions of how a group of people behave. Since ethnic identity is largely perceptual and as a result subjective, it shifts or metamorphoses over time in the face of added facts or experiences.

In line with the instrumentalist view, political leaders find ethnicity an instrument in the society to create disorder so as to assert their interests and maintain a sustained foothold on power (Ismail 2010: 19). For Ake (1993: 1), ethnicity does not necessarily cause people of a particular ethnic group to be antagonistic towards people of different ethnic groups. Rather, the changing nature of ethnic identities makes it susceptible to manipulation by some influential people who doctor ethnic identities for their selfish interests. When their political and economic interests are threatened, opportunistic elites transform their personal issues and problems into ethnic issues.

To rally support for their unpopular or shaky state power, some leaders rely on ethnic solidarity by devaluing and demonizing other groups. At other times, leading elites may privilege one or more ethnic groups to the disadvantage of others in order to gain the support of the privileged and/or to suppress the disadvantaged. By so doing, leaders end up pitting ethnic groups against each other. Some elites create and transform ethnic communities/identities in a struggle for political power and economic interests (Brown 2001: 211). Thus, ethnicity has fallen prey to the construct of influential leaders who manipulate ethnic identity for their benefit.

An example of this is the case of Somalia where Somalis share the same culture, ancestral origin, language and religion. However, when Somali elites began drawing on clan solidarity by devaluing and demonizing other clans, clan divisions became pronounced in Somalia. Particularly, Barre resorted to kinship and clan ties by projecting his interests as
though it were the interest of his Darod clan. When threatened by opposition groups, Barre scapegoated and demonized the clan of the leaders of the opposition groups and mobilized his clan to stand in solidarity with him to protect the interest of the clan. He even went to the extent of arming his Darod clan members with weapons to kill members of other clans.

As noted by Rotberg (2002: 95), ‘Mohammed Siad Barre arrogated more and more power and privileges to himself and his clan’ to the disadvantage and dismay of other clans. Consistent with Thomas Scheff (1994:281), the feeling of being alienated and oppressed could instigate a group to take up arms against its perceived enemy. When a cultural group’s shared grievances about marginalization and social ills are combined with a strong sense of group identity, there is a tendency for the eruption of violent responses against the source of their marginalization and problems, either real or imagined (Gurr 1994:347-377; Osaghae 2005:100-119). By favouring his Darod clan members and other sycophantic clans, marginalized and mistreated clans embarked on a widespread opposition movement against Barre’s regime in the 1980s that culminated with the collapse of the government in 1991. Thus, it is a superficial diagnosis to indict ethnicity, or as in the case of Somalia clanism, for Somali problems tends.

Having displayed poor leadership and governance, many governments in Africa are wont to call for African solutions to (a) relieve blame from themselves by blaming the colonially imposed system of governance and external meddling in the continent (b) to exercise a cheap foresight on the remedy for Africa’s challenges. For some, African solutions to African problems is reflective of the deficient and self-serving thinking of African leaders who instead of pursuing standard leadership and solutions prefer to advance supposed African solutions that is based on alleged cultural values in a bid to escape accountability (Alulai 2013: 1-3). At a time when the discontents around African leadership got to tipping-point, the tendency of African leaders to direct Africa’s challenges to the handwork of imperial powers is palpable from the increasing usage of the maxim ‘African solutions to African problems’ by political leaders.

Colonial powers have already done their part in politicizing clans in Somalia by dividing their colonies along clan lines. Given that they recognized some clans as allies while others enemies, they ended up pitting clans against each other (Ismail 2010:42). To aggravate the colonially sown hatred, Siad Barre’s regime further politicized clanism in Somalia.
Grasa and Mateos (2010) notes that the turnout of events in Africa since independence had driven the “Afropessimism” about Africa’s future. Amongst most analyst, scholars and even ordinary citizens, leadership failures stand as the paramount cause of Africa’s woes and inability to conceive of a more prosperous Africa. In view of the challenges faced by African states, regional integration has been advanced as a panacea to the common challenges faced by Africa. The following section considers the regional attempts to provide solutions to Africa’s challenges.

4.3 Regional Contexts: Pan-African Integration for African Solutions

There have been numerous initiatives at the continental level to address Africa’s challenges in a coordinated manner. Pan-Africanism, among others has endured as a motivating framework for Africa’s cooperation and integration agenda at all levels of society. While ideologies such as Pan-Africanism are motivating factors for action in Africa, the materialization of Africa’s vision has not been adequately realized. The study observes that the clamour for ‘African solutions to African problems’ could be seen as another frantic attempt, to pursue the realization of the ideals of Pan-Africanism. The following sections contend with the precepts of Pan-Africanism with focus on the achievements, challenges and expectations that sustain the call for ‘African solutions to African problems’.

4.3.1 Pan-Africanism and the Quest for African Unity

The activism against the domination of Africans began formally with diaspora black Africans in the 1900 around the notion of Pan-Africanism; an ideology that continues to inform the aspiration of many Africans today (DeSaulnier, Haney and Knapp 2008). Pan-Africanism emerged not only to uphold the dignity and freedom of Africans from racial and colonial oppression but also to espouse the unity of Africans as a panacea for the sundry challenges faced by Africa. The ideology is premised on a perceived common destiny of Africans which requires solidarity, collective self-reliance and unity of people of African descent.

Pan-Africanism however remains a complex concept for definition given its assumption of different nuances and contextual meanings to different people at different stages, time and place. To adequately understand the meaning of Pan-Africanism, it is imperative to understand its historical evolution and the underlying ideas and issues that sustained it.
Pan-Africanism began as a movement initiated by diaspora Africans who were forcefully moved from Africa as slave-labourers to Europe, Americas and the Caribbean. With the abolition of slavery in 1833\textsuperscript{67}, diaspora Africans remained subject to the inferior class of human beings because their erstwhile white owners and predominantly white communities failed to humanize them. In defiance against continued racial oppression, segregation and marginalization, the Pan-Africanist movement began among diaspora Africans as an ideology in the struggle for freedom from the bondage of inequality and racial inferiority as ascribed by their European counterpart (Adogamhe 2008).

Although the idea of Pan-Africanism could be said to be a common desire for many Africans who were subjected to forced migration to foreign lands, Pan-Africanism as a distinct movement could be traced to the establishment of the African Association in London in 1897 and the Pan-African Conference that took place in the same city in 1900 (DeSaulnier, Haney and Knapp 2008). The five Pan-African Congresses between 1900 to 1945 in the United States and Europe played crucial role in advancing the liberation of Africans from the bondage of oppression and discrimination. The movement was significant as it not only sought to provide a voice for Africans but to also engage in the deconstruction of the psychological and intellectual beliefs that kept Africans in chains. Renowned founders of the movement such as W.E.B Dubois, Marcus Garvey, George Padmore, Hunton, C.L. R. James, and Paul Robeson played immeasurable role in deconstructing the inferiority complex that shroud the perception of who Africans are.

While it was initially focused on the challenges of diaspora Africans, the movement was cognizant of the colonial domination of Africans in their homelands – a domination that was justified based on the ‘white superiority context’ that considers blacks as inferior, uncivilized and primitive beings to be exploited, manipulated and civilized. Marcus Garvey who served as a dynamic leader of the Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA) insists that Africans, in diaspora or in their homelands, should be allowed to govern themselves and path a way for their destiny (Adogamhe 2008).

In support of African self-governance through his motto ‘Africa for Africans’, Marcus Garvey insists that “We desire to help them build up Africa as a Negro empire, where every black man, whether he was born in Africa or the Western world, will have the opportunity to develop on his own lines under production of the most favourable

\textsuperscript{67} In 1833, the Slavery Abolition Act of the Parliament of the United Kingdom abolished slavery.
democratic institutions…” (Quoted from Marcus Garvey’s Speech in Amy Jacques 1969). From Garvey’s speech, Pan-Africanism in diaspora also portrays a dalliance with the idea of re-uniting diaspora Africans with other Africans in their native homelands. Hence, the movement served to unite all black Africans against a common problem, racial domination.

Having attained some equality status with whites on a legal basis after the institution of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964, the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and Immigration and Nationality Services Act of 1965, black Africans particularly in the US became more engrossed with the social cohesion and development challenges in the country and much of the discourse on Pan-Africanism became predominantly in support of the emancipation of Africans under colonial bondage in Africa.

4.3.1.1 The Shift of Pan-Africanism from Diaspora to the African Continent

After the World War II, African nationalists who had come in contact with the diaspora Pan-Africanists adopted Pan-Africanism in their quest to battle against colonialism and white dominance in the African continent. The Fifth Pan-African Congress held in Manchester, England in 1945 saw the shifting of the Pan-Africanist discourse to the African continent having been predominantly centred in Europe. The fifth congress which was organized by Kwame Nkrumah and George Padmore brought together various influential figures that were united in the condemnation and criminalization of racial discrimination, colonialism and imperialism in Africa (Adogamhe 2008).

Based on collective history of racial oppression, colonialism as well as shared experiences, culture and challenges, Africans developed a sense of oneness and an African consciousness that nudged them to cooperate and unite to address common challenges. Under the Pan-Africanist precepts, African nationalists like Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Nnamdi Azikiwe of Nigeria, Modibo Keita of Mali, Ahmed Sekou Touré of Guinea, Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, and Tom Mboya, and Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya, among other leaders advocated the unification and total emancipation of the continent. As argued by Nkrumah (1970: 88), the liberation and unification of Africa is imperative for attaining the ‘aspiration of Africans and people of African descent everywhere’. In this regards, the Pan-African quest for African unity presupposes that the fates of the people of Africa are interlinked with a shared common destiny that stresses the need for a “collective self-
reliance”. This collective self-reliance is not only at a governmental level but also at the grassroots (AU ECHO 2013).

Over the years, Pan-Africanism has continued to inspire Africans to concrete action as seen in the coordinated fight for the liberation of Africa as well as the establishment of the Organization of African Unity, now African Union.

4.3.2 Institutionalizing Pan-Africanism: From the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to the African Union (AU)

Post-colonial African states were introduced into an international system that they had no hand in forming and a system that put them on a needy position. A united front served as a crucial remedy for African states to attend to the challenge of state building and to defend themselves against the imperialist stance of erstwhile colonial masters and powerful states. However, the degree of unity, in accord with the Pan-African ideology, remains a contentious debate in Africa.

4.3.2.1 Transcending the OAU and its Limitations

In the early 1960s, the disagreement that ensued around the degree of African unity led to the splinter of the Pan-African movement into two main ideological blocs: the Casablanca progressives and the Monrovia conservatives. The Casablanca progressives consisted of Ghana, Morocco, Guinea, Algeria, Congo, Tanzania, Mali, and Egypt. The Casablanca group which was led by Ghana’s Kwame Nkrumah espouses the political integration of Africa and a socialist path to economic development. Renowned nationalists such as Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, Ben Bella of Algeria, Patrice Lumumba of Congo, Modibo Keita of Mali, Ahmed Sekou Toure of Guinea, and Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt gave impetus to the idea of the group by insisting that the boundaries that differentiate African states are artificial and arbitrary (Murithi, 2008). Thus, the group advocated for a federalist model that demands the establishment of a politically united Africa with a central government (United States of Africa), therefore arguing beyond a mere cooperation of African states to a political unification of African states.

The twenty-four Monrovia conservative members consisted of Nigeria, Liberia and most of the French-speaking African countries. This group which was led by Nigeria favoured a functional approach to cooperation that entails an incremental unification of Africa. By advocating a gradualist approach to African unity, the group expressed misgivings about
the political unification of African states at a time when African states were yet to fully comprehend the dynamics and capacities in the continent. As surmised by the then Prime Minister of Nigeria, the late Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa (1964: 159) Africans must first “understand themselves before embarking on the more complicated and more difficult arrangement of political union”. From these debates, one could hold aptly that the nature of ‘African solutions to African problems’ – and in this case problems relating to governance and political formation – had been at the centre stage of Africa’s agenda since independence.

The compromise following the debates was the decision to postpone the federalist model of the Casablanca progressives in favour of African cooperation. This led to the formation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) on 25 May 1963. The OAU was expected to drive the then Pan-African agenda that was centred on limiting external involvement in the continent's affairs and upholding the sovereign and territorial integrity of the newly independent states in Africa. Article II of the OAU’s 1963 Charter which served as a crucial Article in the Charter has the defence of sovereignty, territorial integrity and eradication of all forms of colonialism in Africa as the core objectives of the regional organization. However, with the focus of OAU on anti-imperialist agenda, the regional organization ignored other important issues that needed attention in the continent.

4.3.2.1.1 Constraints at the Level of Security

Of worrying concern is the OAU’s inability to address the security threats that dominate the reality of post-independent African states. It could be held that the OAU least expected that security challenges would dominate the reality of Africa in a continent where there was so much euphoria and optimism for Africa’s self-governance and supposed harmonious and humane dispositions as suggested by ideologies such as Ubuntu and Ujamaa. At the wake of the interstate and intrastate conflicts that ensued in post-colonial Africa however, the OAU was unable to intervene given its unpreparedness for such eventualities. With the ineptitude of African elites as highlighted in the previous section, the states in Africa were also unable to address conflict challenges. The OAU’s non-interference stance as summed in Article II of the OAU’s 1963 Charter, prevented the regional organization from interfering in member states because the continental body did
not have a robust normative and institutional frameworks for proactive regional response to security issues.\textsuperscript{68}

For Poku, Renwick, and Porto (2007), over 3 decades of OAU’s existence was characterized by nonchalance to the internal affairs of member states. Conflict states in Africa were left at the mercy of the reluctant interventions of the UN and the worrying interventions of foreign powers. In this regard, powerful non-African actors became principal actors in the quest to address Africa’s security challenges. Even with the formation of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution in June 1993 in view of its cognizance of the security conundrum in the continent, the OAU rather constrained by its normative stance. Incidents such as the 1994 Rwandan genocide occurred while the OAU and its Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution were supposedly functional.

Møller (2009: 6) notes that the non-interventionist norms of OAU led it to be a guardian of incumbent state regimes at the expense of the rights of ordinary civilians. The principle of non-intervention served as a conducive principle for illegitimate regimes to resist the interference of other states in their internal affairs and to ensure their regime survival and absolute control over their territory. In the maiden speech to the Ordinary Session of Heads of State and Government of the OAU in 1986. President Museveni of Uganda charged the OAU and its non-interference principle for overlooking the massive massacre of Ugandans by Idi Amin. Besides its failure in terms of security, regional economic development which was a significant agenda of the OAU also failed to indicate any progress thereby leaving Africa underdeveloped with high rates of poverty; conditions that jeopardize peace and security in the continent.

4.3.2.1.2 Inefficiencies at the Level of Development

An important step taken by the OAU toward solving the economic crisis of the continent was adopting the \textit{Lagos Plan of Action} (LPA) in 1980, which was aimed at restructuring the economic foundation of Africa based on the principle of “collective self-reliance”\textsuperscript{(Adohambe 2008 )}. The LPA was aimed at reducing the dependency on foreign economy and advancing industrialization in the continent so as to strengthen Africa’s

\textsuperscript{68} Many states in Africa were subjected to the dictatorship and ill-governance of state regimes that vacillated from civilian to military tyrants. The principle of non-interference thus served a conducive purpose for the tyranny of state regimes as well as the indiscriminate violence by armed factions and government forces thereby leaving many states in Africa on the brink of state failure and collapse.
bargaining power in relation to world economic superpowers. However, with its bare implementation, the Lagos Plan of 1980 was replaced by the IMF’s Enhanced Structural Adjustment program.

In 1991, another concerted effort was made by the OAU to pursue economic growth through the launching of the Abuja Treaty which established the African Economic Community (AEC) that was aimed at empowering Africa to compete effectively in the global economic environment. The treaty sought to provide a framework for the establishment of the African Economic Community (AEC) to facilitate free movement of persons, goods, services and capital as endorsed in Article 4 (i) of the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community. However, this treaty like the LPA failed to incite any meaningful development in the continent, at least a development that alleviates poverty among the vast majority of Africans.

As highlighted in the preceding section, foreign actors became key in providing solutions to Africa’s economic growth; an economic growth that has largely benefited imperial powers and African elites to the discontent of the majority of Africans. The constraints and inefficiencies of the OAU objectives and disposition in the 1990s made the regional organization defunct thereby requiring a rethink of the objectives of the regional body (Apuulí 2012: 136).

4.3.2.2 Africa at the Crossroads: The African Union and the Expectations

While the debate on the unification of Africa was shelved during the existence of the OAU, the mounting challenges that defy solitary state efforts reignited the pan-African discourse on the unity and integration of Africa. Having learnt from the limitations of the OAU, the discourse was mainly on how to transcend the OAU’s constraints and to conceive a strong regional organization with relevant principles and objectives to play an active role in the continent as well as in the global arena. Besides, the OAU’s primary objective of eradicating every form of colonialism in Africa was arguably attained with the collapse of apartheid in South Africa which was the last European colony (Laporte and Mackie 2010: 49). Hence, the regional body needed an upgrade to remain relevant.

During the Sirte Summit on 9 September 1999, the debate on Africa’s unification was re-lived by Muammar Gaddafi, the former President of Libya. Akin to Nkrumah, Gaddafi proposed the establishment of the United States of Africa (USA model) or alternatively,
the Union of African States (Soviet Union model)\(^69\) (OAU 1999). This entailed a political unification of Africa under a federation or confederation system that is organized around a central government with clearly defined supranational power and authority. The central body is expected to set and fast track the socio-economic and political integration and development of African states. Other actors however insist on the gradualist approach or “neofunctional approach” which supports a bottom-up approach which allows every state to spearhead its own development though participating in the community of African states. Like in the 1960s, African leaders expressed caution around the political unity by choosing to pursue Africa’s integration agenda through the establishment of a stronger regional organization. This led to the re-launch of the OAU as the African Union (AU) to ‘effectively address the new social, political and economic realities in Africa and in the world’ (OAU 1999: para 6).

The AU is to serve as a vibrant regional organization to accelerate the processes ‘of integration in the continent and to enable it play its rightful role in the global economy while addressing multifaceted social, economic and political problems compounded’ (African Union 2015). At Lome Togo in 2000, the Constitutive Act of the African Union was adopted and signed, and was legally put into force on 26 May 2001 at the Lusaka Summit of 2001 where the roadmap for the implementation of the AU was drawn. In July 2001, the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) was also established to serve as the blueprint for a full-scale socio-economic development of Africa through the newly established AU. In July 2002, the African Union was formally inaugurated in Durban, South Africa.

For Murithi (2007), the “AU represents the third phase of the institutionalisation of the Pan-Africanism, following as it does on the Pan-African Congress and the OAU.” The change of name of the continental body could been seen from the perspective of the dire need to dispel the negative connotations attached to the OAU in light of its defunct and negative undertones that it attracted for its inability to ensure peace and hold leaders accountable. Notable among its negative connotations is the name “Heads of State Club” which was used to refer to the regional body’s nonchalance for Africa’s challenges and an avenue for African leaders to pride their leadership reigns (Kioko, 2003: 814).

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\(^69\) Kwame Nkrumah was a powerful proponent of a politically and economically united Africa as evident in his book ‘Africa Must Unite’. Since his unsuccessful argument for the unification of African states prior to the formation of the OAU in 1963, the idea of a united Africa lingers on in pan-African political debates.
The new founded AU was established to be a continental body that is hands on in terms of addressing the sundry challenges of Africa – a continental body that is not tolerant of the internal instabilities of member states and is bent on ensuring that African people have a ‘right to live in peace’ as endorsed in Article 4(i) of the Constitutive Act. The AU has undertaken many diplomatic, mediatory and military interventionist stance alongside policy formations to address security threats as will be delineated in the subsequent chapter. Marked by the adoption of the Constitutive Act of the African Union as well as the CSSDCA\textsuperscript{70} at Lome Togo in 2000 and the transformation of the OAU to AU, African leaders embarked on the task of working for Africa’s integration and development with a cognizance of the prerequisite of peace and security (OAU 2000).

4.3.2.2.1 Expectations on the African Union

There remain huge expectations on the AU to address Africa’s socio-economic and political challenges. Coupled with the expectations, doubts persist around the political will and commitment of African leaders, who are not so different from the leaders of the OAU, to attending to Africa’s challenges. For instance, relevant to addressing the structures that perpetuate discontent and instabilities in the continent, the AU’s economic blueprint, NEPAD, inspired hope ‘to reverse Africa’s declining economic fortunes’ (Akokpari 2008: 33-34). However, amid sentiments by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) that ‘the rise of the South is unprecedented in its speed and scale’ (UNDP 2013: 1) after the 2008-2009 global economic crisis, sub-Saharan Africa still remains the least developed region in the world. This thereby undermines the reported growth in Africa’s economies which have only benefited a few wealthy elites. Gilley (2010) notes that Africa is the only region in the world that has made insufficient progress or worsened across every single Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) indicator over the last decade (Shaw 2012: 839). By his own admission, Thabo Mbeki (2012), who was among the leading founders of NEPAD and the AU, acknowledges that NEPAD and AU have not realized many of their promises.

In terms of peace and security, there remains a major concern on the continental organization to address the security concerns in Africa. The Ebola crisis in West Africa has also exposed the incapacities of the regional body to respond to emergencies. The lacklustre intervention of African actors led the US to send a number of soldiers and

\textsuperscript{70} Declaration on the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA)
medical personnel to spearhead the efforts, particularly in Liberia, to contain the virus following the repeated clarion call for assistance by the World Health Organization (WHO). When the AU garnered some capacity to intervene, thousands had already died. The political instability in the continent – recently in Libya, Tunisia, Mali, Central African Republic and Egypt – only work to aggravate the already weakened continent. Although the AU has established about five peace operations to address the challenges in the continent, the interventions still expose the constraints and limitations of the regional body as discussed in the next chapter. Hence, it is within the expectations, doubts and failures of the AU that the maxim ‘African solutions to African problems’ make meaningful defensive expression.

4.3.2.2.2 Challenges with the Ideals of Pan-African Unity for African Solutions

A challenge with attaining “African solutions” as anchored on Pan-Africanism is that it is highly tied to anti-colonial narratives and anti-imperialism that there tends to be inadequate exploration and popularization of the usefulness of integration for Africans per se, as a condition for seeking African solutions. Since the emergence of the idea as well as its introduction into the African continent, Pan-Africanism has endured as a least-challenged ideological blueprint for unity and development in Africa. Adohambe (2008) goes further to attest that the difficulty involved in promoting Pan-Africanism is the “lack of clear ideological definition of the concept as well as their inability to discern it as a viable ideological blueprint for continental unity and development”. In other words, there remains a poor consideration of how Africa could unite in light of the several and variant capacities in the continent including the ethnic, religious, cultural, social and economic differences in Africa. As highlighted by respondent 4, the challenge with the attempt at considering an ‘African solutions to African problem’ is that Africa, nearly 20 per cent of the Earth mass, is made up of 55 states with an estimated 2000 ethnic groups with varied values, priorities and values that could run athwart to each other.

The African identity that derives from the ideology of Pan-Africanism, holds a lot of meaning only when considered from the perspective of race. Without race as a major issue, the African identity tends to diffuse and become an empty identity. In this regard, there tends to be no cohesive notion of African identity beyond race. Ali Mazrui observed that the liberation struggle in Africa transformed ‘Pan-Africanism from the movement of peoples, to a movement of governments’ (cited in Makinda and Okumu 2008: 19). The
discourse on Pan-Africanism is mostly at the political level with less emphasis on how it affects identities at the grassroots. In this light, Pan-Africanism has not done enough to prevent conflicts among African. This includes conflicts such as xenophobic attacks that target African migrants in the African continent as well as ethnic and religious conflicts.

Even at the political level, African actors have not been able to present themselves as a united front to the world. In many crisis cases such as the 2011 Libyan crisis for instance, many African states had varied views and stance that undermined the AU’s reliability. Moreover, the competition that sometime unfold between the AU and sub-regional organizations is a worrying phenomenon for Pan-Africanism. For instance, the post-elections crisis in Côte d’Ivoire and the crisis in Mali show how ECOWAS sought paramount control of interventionist attempts without the leadership of the AU (ISS 2014). Without advocating for a continent that is not diverse, unison in global discourses is crucial for the regional body’s capacity for African solutions. Respondent 6 observes this challenge while responding to a question on the expectations around African solutions by arguing that:

*It is important that we reinforce the idea and understanding of shared values in the continent. Unless we are aware of our shared values, then we can’t come up with our own solutions.*

Hence, there remains a challenge in comprehending how Pan-Africanist ideals of unity and integration can lead to sustainable solutions and development in the continent.


Pan-Africanism as elaborated in the previous section has endured as a dominant ideology that has not only spurred Africans to action but has also given rise to many other ideologies for Africa. The aphorism ‘African solutions to African problems’ as well have developed around various similar precepts developed around the ideals of Pan-Africanism.

In the early 1900s, Marcus Garvey had propagated the motto ‘Africa for Africans’ alongside the ideals of Pan-Africanism to espouse self-governance for Africans. Garvey who was the leader the Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA) was a strong advocate of African nationalism and self-government. Through the motto ‘Africa for
Africa’ Garvey submits that Africans, in diaspora and those in their homelands, should be allowed to govern themselves and path a way for their destiny. Under the Pan-Africanist ideology, Garvey imagines and espouses the return of all blacks to the African continent to pursue self-development as a panacea to domination, oppression and marginalization by whites (DeSaulnier, Haney and Knapp 2008). However, as many blacks in diaspora nationalized in western states and were gradually accorded civil rights in 1964 after decades of civil right movements, the idea of the return of diaspora Africans to Africa gradually rescinded to the figment of imagination.

In Africa however, the ideals of Pan-Africanism became prominent in the fight against colonialism. After independence, a common precept that garnered momentum is “African Unity” as spearheaded by Kwame Nkrumah. ‘African Unity’ was espoused to gather the fragmented African colonies – now states – to unite and integrate to attain common goals. In most of his writings including Africa Must Unite, Nkrumah (1970) emphasizes that the solutions to Africa’s problems lies in the unity of African pseudo states in defiance of the colonial borders imposed on Africans. Ngwane (1996: 219) notes that ‘individually, no African country can have any serious meaningful impact on the world scene’. Nkrumah’s advocacy for ‘African Unity is vivid from his staunch advocacy for a ‘United States of Africa’ during the African conferences that led to the formation of the OAU in 1963. Although the stance on the unification of Africa gave way to a more incremental cooperation of African states through the OAU, Nkrumah continued to advocate for African Unity under socialist principles (Adogamhe 2008).

In a like manner, George Ngwane (1996: 219) argues that ‘yesterday, the cry was for Pan-Africanism which was the concept of looking back to our identity. Today my cry is for African Unionism which is the concept of looking forward to progress and looking inward to our Development’. Ngwane (1996: 220) considers the wall of Pan-Africanism to have been broken by the rise of nationalism in Africa; a phenomenon he construed to have downgraded the ideals of Pan-Africanism. Through the concept of African Unionism, Ngwane (1996) advocates for an end to the retarding indictment of Africa’s colonial and oppressive history in favour of a more progressive outlook that places Africa as subjects spearheading their development.

71 In I Speak Freedom, Nkrumah (1961) advances the development and significance of Africa in global relations where the continent’s impact will be known “through the voices of Africa’s own sons” with Africa playing the role of subjects rather than objects.
Ngwane’s concept of Pan-Africanism, as looking back to identity, could be said to be limited as Pan-Africanism is also about unity for common cause and Pan-Africanism has served as an ideology motivating Africans to cooperation and regional integration. The forward-looking attitude as advocated by Ngwane (1996) requires the cognizance of the past and contextual consideration of the present reality of Africa as advocated by Serequeberhan (1994: 219) who highlights that any quest for seeking a way forward for Africa cannot be done without engaging the colonial and post-colonial actuality of Africa. Moreover, Ngwane’s concept of African Unionism is reliant on the ideology of Pan-Africanism as it builds on the Pan-Africanist tenets of unity of Africans. Nevertheless, Ngwane’s clarion call cannot be mistaken as it is a call for a united and forward looking Africa rather than a continent that constantly returns to colonial narratives to define itself.

In view of the dominant role of foreign actors in post-colonial Africa, a dominant perspective that became prominent in the continent is on African ownership. While arguing for the notion of ‘continental jurisdiction’, Ali Mazrui in his 1967 book that is entitled Towards a Pax Africana insists on an inter-African intervention to the challenges in Africa as against the external meddling in the newly independent states in the continent. Based on the notion of racial sovereignty, Mazrui deemed interventions from non-African actors in African affairs as contravening the continents right to self-determination. Mazrui (1967) argued rather for inter-African interventions towards ensuring peace that is maintained by Africans.

The ideals of Pax Africana tasks African actors to pursue ownership, responsibility and will to maintain peace in the continent. Many authors have made recourse to Mazrui’s Pax Africana as a point of departure for African solutions in terms of peace and security (Dersso 2011; Franke and Esmenjaud 2014; Apuuli 2012; Nathan 2013). Nevertheless, Mazrui’s notion of Pax Africana tended to be rather hypothetical as it downplays the limitations in the continent and the role of external actors in view of the interdependent global system.

have regularly proven [to be] ineffective and even counterproductive.’ Ayittey (1994) argues that the complexities of local particularities cannot be solved by impulsive and ulterior foreign solutions and strategies. In his submission, Ayittey (1994) insists that ‘the United Nations and the United States must allow Africans to work out their own destiny.

Following the mounting pessimism for Africa’s destiny in the 1990s in view of Africa’s record of internal conflicts, state failures and mis-governance as well as the apparent inefficiency of Africa’s states and regional organizations, there was an urgent need to redirect Africa’s mood to a greater optimism. In this regard, Thabo Mbeki found it politic to begin a movement around African Renaissance. The following section engages in-depth with the ideals of African Renaissance as a remedy to Africa challenges, however short-lived.

4.4.1 The Experiment with African Renaissance

In the late 1990s, a movement dubbed ‘African Renaissance’ was advanced and fanned into flame by former South African President Thabo Mbeki. In the 1990s, many regimes in Africa faced legitimacy problems in view of security and economic downturns. The efficiency of the OAU which was supposed to coordinate Africa’s response to Africa’s challenges, left so much to be desired. As discussions at the political level gravitated toward the establishment of a more robust regional organization (African Union) to change the perceptions in and about Africa, Thabo Mbeki initiated a movement dubbed African Renaissance to suggest hope and progress for Africa. In an address to the Corporate Council on Africa in Chantilly - USA in April 1997, Thabo Mbeki officially introduced African Renaissance as a movement in Africa (Mbeki 1998). Akin to the sixteenth century Renaissance in Europe, African Renaissance was used to advance the idea of Africa’s overcoming of the continent’s challenges and the attainment of cultural, economic and scientific rebirth. At a time when Africa faced a quagmire of security and economic challenges that fostered Afro-pessimism and dampened the potency of Pan-Africanism, the African Renaissance concept was welcomed as an anti-thesis to the Afro-pessimism in continent. The distinctive element of the African Renaissance was that it sought to motivate Africans to have value for their heritage and identity as a point of departure for socio-economic and political flourishing (Van Kessel 2001).

72 Renaissance means ‘rebirth’ or the enthusiasm in literary and cultural movements in Europe, which led to the reformation of religion, arts, science, etc around the 14th, 15th and 16th centuries (Solomon 1996:163).
The African Renaissance as an idea has prevailed before its popularization by Thabo Mbeki. Prominent African authors such as Cheikh Anta Diop, Ngugi Wa Thiong’o and Ali Mazrui had argued for revisiting and reforming Africa’s indigenous systems and values in contemporary contexts. Cheikh Anta Diop (1996) in his book *Towards the African Renaissance: Essays in Culture and Development, 1946-1960* articulated the ideas for African Renaissance. Diop (1996) stresses the need for the return to indigenous languages which is a prerequisite for a true African Renaissance after Africa’s colonial domination and impositions. For Diop (1996), through foreign languages, Africans are forced to not only assimilate the meaning of words but to also make intellectual efforts to understand the reality expressed by the same words. Hence, while advocating for the use of African languages as *lingua franca*, Diop enjoined African writers to write using African languages for African audiences.

Conceptually, African Renaissance was the dominant thinking of post-colonial Africa; a thinking that considers the reborn of Africa’s freedom to drive its destiny in terms of African values and systems. However, post-colonial Africa seemed to have not moved away from colonial bondage as the structures of colonial powers remained and even worsened as African leaders sought to replicate western systems and structures in Africa (Gilley 2010).

In accord with Diop’s contention, the language used in the post-colonial education system perpetuates the culture and values of erstwhile colonial powers. Indigenous languages on the other hand are considered “inappropriate” languages to use not only in the school environment but in outside settings as well. Ngwane (1996: 223) notes that ‘language is a forceful identity that liberates people of alien cultural trappings’. In accord with Ngwane (1996: 223) for African unity and development to take place, there is an urgent need for Africa to identify and support the use of one language ‘that binds the African people’.73 Ali Mazrui (1996) insists that:

> no country has ascended to a first rank technological and economic power by excessive dependence on foreign languages. Japan rose to dazzling industrial heights by the Japanese language and making it the medium of its own industrialization. Korea has approximately scientificated the Korean language

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73 Ngwane (1996: 223) advocated that a language notably Kiswahili be used as the major language in Africa as English and French.
and made it the medium of its own technological take-off. Can Africa ever take-off technologically if it retains so overwhelmingly European languages for discourse on advanced learning?

Moreover, it remains a concern that the western-oriented educational system in Africa has produced academics who are trained to perpetuate the domination and exploitation of Africa (Rodney 1981). It is against this backdrop that Ngugi Wa Thiong’o in *Decolonizing the Mind: The Politics of Language in African Literature* (1986) cautions African elites trained in the western system to watch against imperial expansionist and supremacist agenda. For Wa Thiong’o (1986), African elites that are educated in the Western system within Africa or in the Diaspora are interpreters just like the philosopher in “allegory of the Cave” as narrated by Socrates. In the Allegory of the cave:

Plato describes how Socrates viewed the role of the philosopher as one who illuminated the residents of the cave by interpreting the reality of the shadows they saw in the cave, which reflected what was actually happening in the world outside.

In Wa Thiong’o’s contextualization, the interpreters – African elites educated in the western system – ought to be sensitive to the reality of those in the cave when interpreting the realities outside the cave instead of merely stoking the conditions that subjects those in the cave to be where they are. For Wa Thiong’o, African elites educated in the western system should not regurgitate the realities outside the cave (in the western world) and expect those in the cave (Africans) to emulate the world of westerners. Rather, Wa Thiong’o advances a scenario were African elites that are trained in the western system reconnects with those in the supposed cave, and together, share ideas and create pathways to break free from the bondage of colonialism and imperialism (Cossa 2009). Hence, ‘educated’ elites should be mindful to value their heritage and traditional systems and, with added insights from others, seek ways to advance the freedom and development of their indigenous society.

Having attained freedom at a latter stage, South African leaders found it crucial to highlight the need for reformation in Africa, one that respects Africa’s heritage and restores dignity to Africa. During his address at the OAU Summit in Tunis - Tunisia in 1994, Nelson Mandela newly elected as President of South Africa declared the advent of African Renaissance. Mandela insists that ‘we need a New African Renaissances, which will bring about a better quality of life, more dignity to the Black people, through
improved governance, efficient economies and greater freedoms to the peoples of the African continent’ (cited in Ngwane 1996: 219). During the tenure of his presidency, Thabo Mbeki took on the term African Renaissance to advance Africa’s rebirth.

However, in contrast to the renaissance philosophies before his time, Mbeki particularly advocated for accelerated economic development and the need for Africa to be a significant actor in the global economy. This was in contrast to the focus of previous African intellectuals who argued for cultural rebirth and the spirituality of African soul (Van Kessel 2001: 47). As noted by Van Kessel (2001: 47), Mbeki is not particularly interested in advancing a unique African identity as advanced by Nkrumah, Senghor, Nyerere and Kaunda. Rather, he was concerned about development in Africa and how Africa could meet up to the fast paced global progress and participate on equal terms. For Mbeki, African Renaissance is the remedy to Africa’s conundrum in view of the challenges of globalization.

Under Mbeki’s leadership, African Renaissance dominated South African foreign policy agenda as evident from the document titled Developing a Strategic Perspective on South African Foreign Policy. Mbeki emphasized the imperative for Africa’s development so as to position the continent as a competitor in the global economy. Mbeki notes that African Renaissance entails Social cohesion, democracy, economic rebuilding and growth. However, a subtle difference from Mbeki’s view is that popular view of the African renaissance movement relates to the return to one’s root. As defined by the African Renaissance Institute (2000: 1), African Renaissance is, “a shift in the consciousness of the individual to re-establish our diverse traditional African values, so as to embrace the individual’s responsibility to the community and the fact that he or she, in community with others, together are in charge of their own destiny”.

Unfortunately, the African renaissance movement failed to gain sustained growth as it was dependent on the motivation and political will of Thabo Mbeki. Markedly, the movement petered away with the end of Thabo Mbeki’s presidency. Moreover, the use of the term ‘Renaissance’, akin to the sixteenth century renaissance in Europe, to denote the tenets captured in the idea of African renaissance is problematic. As noted by Cossa (2009), can Africans legitimately use the term African Renaissance without being accused of lack of originality? Pixley ka Isaka Seme (1906) echoed similar concerns when he insists that creativity in Africa should come from inner initiatives not from initiatives that
are acquired or inspired from the west. To live up to the quest for de-colonialization in the continent, Africans ought to express and define phenomena in their own way without adopting or seeking to replicate movements in other regions.

With the above substantiation, it is evident that the quest for African unity and ownership in the continent has been at the forefront of discourses in the continent. The maxim African solutions to African problems have long been part of the idea inspiring Africa to action however limited the actions are. As stressed by most of the respondent for this study, even though African solutions could be considered as a political manoeuvring and fraught with many implemental and conceptual challenges, it does not mean that it does not embody aspirations of Africans at different levels. In response to a question on the need for African solutions, Respondent 2 from a Civil Society Organization (CSO) indicates that:

*A lot of studies have been justified around African solution because it is a phrase which congregates non-state actors, state and international organizations in the continent and who agree that there is a need for new approach to the challenges which Africa has been experiencing for a long term. I think it is not so much different from what you consider, it just a means of resolving conflict which is acceptable to Africans.*

In the next chapter, the thesis goes further to engage with the means of addressing conflict that could be said to be ‘acceptable to Africans’ in accord with unravelling the conceptual value of ‘African solutions to African problems’.

**4.5 Conclusion**

Thus far, this chapter has exposed the maxim ‘African solutions to African problems’ in inherent indictment of stakeholders at all levels including powerful global actors as well as national and regional players. In the global context, Africans have endured years of domination in the form of slavery and colonialism that tends to be palpable even after independence in the forms of neo-colonialism and imperialism. This is evident from the wanton interventions from the community of erstwhile ‘superior race’ and colonizers. At the heart of the maxim African solutions to African problems, is the quest to humanize Africans and dispel lingering assumptions of the inferiority of Africa’s capacity to address its challenges.
Based on the national perspective, the maxim African solutions to African problems is a mirror that reflects the failure and guilt of African actors in taking advantage of the continent’s independence and opportunities for self-determination. The bad governance, politicization of ethnicity, political repression and civil wars that engulf post-colonial African states undermine the faith and high hopes for Africa’s self-determination.

On the regional context, the regional cooperation and institutions geared towards addressing Africa’s challenges have not lived up to expectations in terms of addressing regional concerns. The AU which was established in 2002 to serve as a panacea for the defunct OAU is overwhelmed with expectations that are not matched by the resources, political will and commitment of African actors. The aphorism on African solutions to African problems only serves to deflect the limitations of the regional body to the alleged continued campaign of imperialist powers in the continent. It also serves to raise confidence in Africa’s ability to address its challenges and forge bolder united stance to resolve the continent’s challenges.

With the foregoing substantiation, the following chapter attempts to give meaning to African solutions by highlighting its entailments with emphasis on the distinctive value of the maxim for Africans.
5. Introduction

The theoretical framework of constructivism is premised on the claim that the international system is determined and influenced by dominant ideas in the international order. Thus, this chapter engages with the dominant ideas around what constitutes African solutions/values and how those solutions/values implicates African interventions that are geared towards the provision of African solutions. With regards to the research objectives, this chapter contends with two of the three primary objectives of the thesis namely (a) to investigate the substantive values of the maxim ‘African solutions to African problems’ in terms of conflict resolution; and (b) to examine the implications of the African-oriented solutions for the African Union’s conflict resolution outlook and interventions.

Based on interview data as well as primary and secondary data, this chapter contends that African solutions does not imply a unique solution that is peculiar only to Africans. Rather, it entails Africa’s prioritization of certain values based on the contextual realities and value-systems in the continent. Hence, the distinctiveness of African solutions lies in the prioritized values that may be in consonant or discordant with the prioritizations of other systems. Without claiming the essentialism of African solutions, this chapter explored the prioritized and context-sensitive solutions of Africa in line with Africa’s quest for self-determination and lasting solution to the continent’s challenges.

To expound on this, the chapter is broadly divided into two main sections namely African solutions as responsibility and African solutions as ownership. The following section under the heading “African solutions as responsibility” examines the ideal of African solutions in terms of the normative resolve of Africa to bear the responsibility for its peace and security. This section sets the scene for the discussion on the substantive value of African solutions. The subsequent section on ‘African solutions as ownership’ engages in the exploration of substantive values of African solutions in terms of conflict resolution as well as the implications/obligation of those values on the AU mechanisms for conflict resolutions.
5.1 African Solutions as ‘Responsibility’ for Africa’s Peace and Security

Based on consultations with peace and security experts, the primary entailment of African solutions to African problems is about African actors taking responsibility to address the challenges in the continent without relying on external actors to take the lead. Many times in Africa’s history until the 1990s, African actors have mainly ‘looked to the former colonizers or to the west for solutions to problems in the continent’ as indicated by respondent 3 from the AU Peace and Security Department (PSD). However, with the increasing reluctance of the United Nations and the west to facilitate lasting solutions to the sundry challenges across the globe, the need for African actors to take responsibility and lead the processes of addressing Africa’s challenges has become not only an alternative but a necessity. As far back as 1992, the former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s *Agenda for Peace* insisted that “regional actions is a matter of decentralizations, delegations and cooperation with United Nations efforts as means of easing the burden on the Council” in line with Chapter VIII of the UN Charter.

While the UN Security Council (UNSC) have been instrumental in intervening in Africa prior to the formation of the AU, the UNSC’s response to Africa’s conflict challenges were marked by un-strategic, reluctant and indecisive responses as discussed in chapter 4.1.2. On the un-strategic criticism, the UNSC interventions in Congo in the early 1960s and in Somalia in the early 1990s were criticized for the poor mandate and approach that failed to resolve or mitigate the crises. The reluctance and indecision of the UN in responding to Africa’s issues was palpable in the 1990s. Notably, after the Somalia experience that ended in a debacle, the UN intervention in Africa declined and was marked by caution and poor political will as reflected in the UN’s failure to intervene in the Rwandan conflict in 1994 and reluctance to intervene in Sudan, Liberia, and Sierra Leone in the 1990s. In the cases of Sierra Leone and Liberia, the UN only intervened after the stabilization missions of ECOWAS. The SADC had also intervened in the conflicts in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Lesotho to address the conflict crisis in the region. Africa’s intervention thus, became a matter of necessity.

The continental organization OAU now African Union was particularly awakened from the blind reliance on external actors particularly in the context of the Rwandan genocide in 1994. At the OAU Chiefs of Staff meeting in June 1996, the then Secretary General of the of the OAU, Salim Ahmed Salim stated that the UN is responsible for global security
but in cases like Rwandan genocide where the UN failed to carry out its duties, the continental body will take responsibility on itself and act unilaterally on its own to address the challenges. While responding to a question on the entailments of African solutions, respondent 10 from the AU Mission in Somalia maintains that African solutions to African problems is:

*a rallying call in response to the international community's failure to address the growing numbers of refugees and internally displaced persons, control widespread hunger and disease, and halt the endemic violence in many African conflicts.*

For respondent 8 from a CSO, whether Africa’s problems is of internal or external origin, African actors should take the lead in addressing the challenges to ensure that the values and priorities of African societies are well-considered. This resonates with Nkrumah (1961) assertion in *I Speak Freedom* that ‘for too long in our history, Africa has spoken through the voices of others (westerners)’. Nkrumah (1961) argues that to attain Africa’s freedom, Africans ought to articulate their issues and lead the processes of addressing those challenges. Indeed, as noted by Nhema (2008: 3) ‘there is a new realization in Africa that, while the role of external actors is indeed laudable, Africa will have to rely increasingly on its own to provide the long-term solutions to its own problems within the framework of its sub-regional groupings and the African Union and the United Nations.’

In tandem with the theoretical framework of constructivism, the re-invigorated quest for African solutions signals a shift from a past view of Africa’s limitations and need for external assistance to a view that highlights African responsibility and capacity to address its challenges. At a special meeting of the UNSC in September 2007, Alpha Oumar Konaré, the first chairperson of the AU Commission, insists that:

*... the primary responsibility for ensuring peace in Africa belongs to Africans themselves. They must shoulder that responsibility. Our partners must let Africans run their own business. Financing is important, but it does not justify unbridled intervention or conduct. I feel that to be of extreme importance, because the vital interests of the African peoples are involved [...] Africa is no longer a private hunting ground; it is no longer anyone’s backyard; it is no longer a part of the Great Game; and it is no longer anyone’s sphere of influence. Those are the few simple rules that will allow the continent to*
Franke and Esmenjaud (2014) affirms that in term of peace and security, African sub-regional and regional actors have since the 1990s taken immense responsibility in addressing Africa’s challenges. This responsibility stance of African actors have rather been accentuated with the establishment of the AU (Franke and Esmenjaud 2014). Since 2002, most of the peace operations in the continent were initiated by the African Union and sub-regional organizations as evident from the cases of the regional interventions in Burundi, Comoro Islands, Sudan, Somalia, Mali and CAR. Africa’s push for greater responsibility in peace and security falls in line with the argument that regional actors are more abreast with issues that pertain their region than more distant actors (Peck 2001: 562). The socio-cultural affinity of regional actors to issues within the region makes them more keen and reliable in addressing regional issues. Africa’s current stance for leading resolution attempts in the continent has been a burden-easer for the UNSC that has been limited by its mandates across the globe including the prioritizations, resources and political constraints of the organization.

Thus, at the heart of the maxim African solutions to African problems is the enjoinder for Africa to take responsibility for peace and security in the continent so as to materialize the Pan-African vision of ‘an integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens and representing a dynamic force in global arena’ (AU Vision, 2015). The maxim serves as a reminder and goal-focused axiom for Africa to materialize its quest to control its destiny and spearhead its development. The following section therefore engages with the normative instruments that defines Africa’s responsibility stance in terms of addressing the continent’s security challenges.

5.1.1 Africa’s Normative Regime on Peace and Security

The significant change made by the AU in terms of peace and security is its transition from its predecessor’s sacrosanct principles of non-interference to a normative order that requires proactive regional intervention. Prior to this nonchalance stance, the AU’s predecessor, the OAU had insisted on the principle of non-interference in its bid to uphold the territorial integrity of the newly independent states in Africa as well as to inhibit the meddling of foreign powers in African states as championed in Article II of the OAU’s 1963 Charter. As highlighted earlier, this objective prevented the OAU from influencing
the politics of member states and intervening in the internal crisis of member states to prevent gross human right violations.

Having experienced some of the most brutal wars in the post-Cold War era – such as the Somali civil war and state collapse, Eritrea/Ethiopia Civil War; the DRC brutal civil war, Liberia’s civil war, Sierra Leonean civil war; and the Rwanda’s genocide that left about 800,000 people dead in a period of one hundred days – African leaders were no longer given to the idea of being spectators to devastating conditions in the continent while they insist on sacrosanct sovereignty or hope on the intervention of the UN Security Council. The AU which was established as a panacea to its predecessor OAU, resolved to be a proactive actor in Africa’s security concerns. The continental body’s landmark stance for responsibility in peace and security is clearly articulated in the founding and policy documents of the African Union. The following are four key norms that define the AU’s responsibility posture:

- The Interdependence and Indivisibility of Africa’s Security
- The Primacy of Human Security
- Peaceful Resolution of Conflict
- Non-Indifference to Insecurities within the Continent

In the context of Africa, these four key norms serve as substantive values for African responsibility as engaged in the following sub-headings.

5.1.1.1 Interdependence and Indivisibility of Africa’s Security

In 2000, the Assembly of Heads of States and Governments in Lomé adopted the Solemn Declaration on the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA) which was the first Africa’s most comprehensive and harmonious framework for responding to security challenges in the continent. The CSSDCA, in accord with Paragraph 10c clearly pronounced that ‘the security of all Africans and their States as a whole is indispensable for stability, development and cooperation in Africa.’ In tandem with the tenets of constructivism, this article was to alter the impression among some states in Africa that the internal instabilities faced by other states in the continent is a confined issue that does not warrant the assistance of other states. By highlighting the interdependence of African states, the article challenged Article II of the OAU’s 1963
Charter that insists on the principles of sacrosanct sovereignty and non-interference in member state’s affairs.

Under the spirit of the CSSDCA, the clauses endorsed in the AU Constitutive Act in 2001 and the Protocol Relating to the establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the AU (known as the PSC Protocol) in 2004 formalized a hands-on continental body that is not tolerant to the internal instabilities of member states and is bent on ensuring that African people have a ‘right to live in peace’ as endorsed in Article 4(i) of the AU Constitutive Act. The PSC Protocol enables the AU to monitor and operationalize peace and security initiatives through the Peace and Security Council of the AU as shall be engaged in the section on African solutions as ownership.

To share the same frame of reference and understanding, the AU adopted the Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP) in 2004 to ensure coordinated and harmonious peace and security initiatives in the continent. Akin to the CSSDCA, the CADSP highlights that the security issues of one state in the continent are indivisible from the security of other African states thereby requiring the harmonization of the peace and security initiatives of Africa (AU CADSP 2004). Thus, any aggression against a member state of the AU is deemed a threat to the entire member states of the regional body. The CADSP further envisions the use of the armed forces and capacities in Africa for the collective defence of Africa’s security interests and goals.

5.1.1.2 The Primacy of Human Security

In accord with the increasing concern for human security beyond the state-centric concerns, the African Union was established to advance a Pan-African notion that deals with the challenges of ordinary Africans rather those of state regimes (Tieku 2007: 28). While the implementation remains a matter of concern, Africa – through its policy documents and the trending debates and common position – has resolved that ‘the concept of security must embrace all aspects of society including economic, political, and social and environmental dimensions of the individual, family, and community, local and national life. The security of a nation must be based on the security of the life of the individual citizens to live in peace and to satisfy basic needs while being able to participate

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74 During the Second Extraordinary Session of the AU in Sirte, Libya, on the 28 February 2004, the African Union adopted a Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP) in tandem with Article 3(e) of the Protocol Relating to the establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the AU that enjoined the regional body to establish a common defence policy for the African continent.
fully in societal affairs and enjoying freedom and fundamental human rights’ (CSSDCA 2000: Paragraph 10a). Article 3(h) of the AU Constitutive Act enjoins Member states of the AU to ‘promote and protect human and people’s rights in accordance with the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and other relevant human rights instruments’. Coupled with Article 4(o) of the Constitutive Act which commits member states to promote and respect the sanctity of human life, the foregoing article reflects the AU’s new security paradigm that pays greater attention to human security at all levels rather than the state-centric focus of its predecessor OAU.

In accord with Article 3(g) of the Constitutive Act as well as paragraph 9(h) of the CSSDCA of 2000, the AU charges member states to adopt democratic principles and institutions, good governance, popular participation and rule of law to promote human rights and dignity. Article 3(c) of the AU Non-Aggression and Common Defence Pact further enjoins state parties ‘to promote such sustainable development policies as are appropriate to enhance the wellbeing of the African people…. and to ensure freedom of worship, respect of the cultural identity of peoples and the rights of minorities’. Through these norms, the AU pays cognizance that much of the security challenges in the continent owes to the governance and developmental failures of many states that incite discontents and violence. Thus, the regional body’s resolve for finding sustainable solutions to its challenges becomes grounded in Africa’s sense of responsibility for the internal problems of development and governance in the continent.

5.1.1.3 Peaceful Resolution of Conflicts

As a rule for conflict prevention and resolution, the AU in 2005 adopted the Non-Aggression and Common Defence Pact (AU Pact) to promote the cooperation of member states in terms of non-aggression and common defence issues. As ratified in Article 3(a) of the AU Pact, no aggression whatsoever is justified in the continent as all parties are enjoined to pursue peaceful means of resolving conflict as highlighted in Article 4(e) of the AU Constitutive Act, Article 4(a) of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council (PSC protocol) as well as Paragraph 11(c) of the CADSP. Article 15 of the AU Non-Aggression and Common Defence Pact mandates that ‘State Parties involved in any dispute shall first seek a solution by negotiation, inquiry,

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75 Paragraph 9 of the CSSDCA notes that ‘security should be seen in its wholesomeness and totality including the right of peoples to live in peace with access to the basic necessities of life’.
mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, or resort to regional and continental mechanisms or arrangements, or other peaceful means.’

5.1.1.4 Non-Indifference to Insecurities within the Continent

Inasmuch as the regional body recognizes the inviolable rights of states to sovereignty and non-interference from external actors as endorsed in Article 3(b) of the Constitutive Act, the AU stresses its right to interfere in the internal affairs of member states in response to human rights violations and grave security threats in line with article 4(h). Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act notes that the AU has the right ‘to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity’ as well as a serious threat to legitimate order’. The last clause of Article 4(h) ‘as well as a serious threat to legitimate order’ gives the AU the opportunity to pre-empt and intervene at any phase of a conflict to ensure that conflicts do no deteriorate. With a two-third majority, the AU Assembly could authorize an intervention in its member state contrary to the complete consensus of the OAU regime.

While the AU is yet to authorize military intervention in terms of Article 4 (h), the regional body has established peace operations in member states, with the consent of the state parties pursuant to Article 4 (j) which bestows right on member states to request for intervention to restore peace and security.

Reflective of the AU’s proactive resolution, Article 16(1) of the PSC protocol insists that the AU has ‘the primary responsibility for promoting peace, security and stability in Africa’. This apparently contravenes Article 17(1) of the PSC protocol which endorses that the UN Security Council ‘has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security’ in line with Article 53 of the UN Charter. However contradictory this may be, the Article 16(1) reflects the AU’s disposition to lead the security initiatives in the continent despite recognizing the UN’s primary responsibility in this regard as established by Article 53 of the UN Charter which insists that all

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76 Article 4(h) was amended by the Protocol on Amendments to the Constitutive Act, which was adopted in February 2003 and “as well as a serious threat to legitimate order to restore peace and stability to the Member State of the Union upon the recommendation of the Peace and Security Council” was added at the end of the sub-paragraph.

77 The African Union Constitutive Act bestows member states to request for AU’s Intervention through Article 4(j). Here, any member state of the African Union can request for intervention in its state or in another member state in need of humanitarian intervention.
humanitarian interventions must be authorized by the UNSC, the primary actor responsible for world peace and security.

Nevertheless, in the Ezulwini Consensus on the reform of the UNSC in February 2005, the AU notes that its interventions shall be carried out under the authorization of the UN. For efficiency and coordination, the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to cooperate and work closely with the UNSC in matters of peace and security for coordination and harmonization of efforts as highlighted by paragraph 38 of the CADSP. As stressed by an Adviser to the African Union in Peace and Security:

*the African Union in all its policy documents acknowledges that the UN is primarily responsible for global peace and security but at the same time, African institutions have a particular role to play in African conflicts. So we are not saying that Africa should take over from the United Nations but that Africa has a particular interest in resolving African conflicts and therefore in addition, complementary and partnership with the UN, Africa has a particular role to play in dealing with African conflicts as opposed to sitting back and leaving it to the UN or other actors* (respondent 3).

The AU has also adopted many other subsidiary policies to grant it the capacity to intervene efficiently to address Africa’s challenges. The following section examines some of the steps adopted by the AU to implement its security stance towards the ownership of peace and security remedies in the continent. The section further engages with the prescriptive and descriptive values of African solutions in terms of conflict resolution; as well as the implications of those values on the African Union’s interventionist mechanisms.

5.2 African Solutions as Ownership of the Peace and Security Conceptualizations and Implementations in Africa.

‘seeks to bestow Africa, as a matter of principle, the lead role or ownership in the endeavour to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts on the continent.’ This requires the AU’s leading role in the implementation and conceptualization of peace efforts. In response to a question on the rationale for African solutions, a respondent from the AU mission in Somalia insists that:

External or foreign solutions were not viable in Africa since they were either ‘imported’ or ‘dictated’ to Africans. Therefore, Africans would not own those solutions. In a nutshell the notion of ‘African solutions to African problems’ implies that this is the time for Africans to take things into their own hands and make use of their resources to solve Africa’s troubles (Respondent 10).

Since the establishment of the African Union, African actors, particularly at the continental political level, have made concerted and comprehensive efforts to institutionalize African solutions to peace and security. This is evident from the establishment of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) which was institutionalized by the Protocol Relating to the establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the AU (PSC protocol). Under the coordination of the AU, the APSA serve as a network of structures, objectives, principles and values at all levels – including national, sub-regional and continental structures in Africa – toward attending to security challenges. The APSA harnesses and coordinates the capacities in the continent for the efficient prevention, management and resolution of security threats in the continent (AU PSC Protocol 2002: para 17). Through the APSA structure, African leaders highlight the concern around ‘the continued prevalence of armed conflicts in Africa and the fact that no single internal factor has contributed more to socio-economic decline on the continent and the suffering of the civilian population than the scourge of conflicts within and between our States’ (AU PSC Protocol 2002). The following section examines the Peace and Security Council (PSC) as the coordinating mechanisms of APSA and as a vehicle for realizing African solutions – in terms of implementation and conceptualization.

78 While the sub-regional bodies are independent bodies, they are also expected to align their policies to that of the AU in line with Article 4(b) of the Protocol on Relations between the African Union (AU) and Regional Economic Communities (RECs). Moreover, Article 16 of the PSC protocol further states that the Regional Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution are part of the security architecture of the African Union which has the primary responsibility for peace and security in Africa.
5.2.1. The AU Peace and Security Council (PSC)

The AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) is the pivotal coordination and enforcement mechanism within the APSA. The PSC came into force on the 26th of December 2003 and was officially launched in May 2004 through the PSC Protocol to facilitate and implement the peace and security commitments of the AU. The PSC replaced the OAU’s Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution that was created in 1993. The PSC serves as the primary referent body for the ‘collective security and early-warning arrangement to facilitate timely and efficient response to conflict and crisis situations in Africa’ (AU PSC Protocol 2002: art. 2). The robust and proactive mandates of the PSC indicates a new wave of commitment by African leaders to pursue peace not only by preventing conflicts or recommending the intervention of the UN, but by spearheading and establishing missions where necessary for the prevention and resolution of conflicts.

The PSC is made up of fifteen-member states like the UNSC. However, the PSC is an elected forum without permanent members with veto powers like the UNSC. The composition of the PSC is based on the principle of equitable regional representation and rotation in such a way that the members are representative of the north, south, central, east and western regions of the continent as stipulated by article 5(2) of the PSC protocol. While the different regions are responsible for presenting PSC candidates, prospective candidates for the PSC are assessed based on the state’s standing in terms of governance, rule of law, payment of dues as well as willingness and ability to manage the responsibility of the PSC membership.

Ten members of the PSC are elected for a two years term and the other five members are elected for a three years term thereby nurturing a built-in mechanism to ensure that the workings of the PSC do not discontinue and start anew with the election of new members into office. The PSC is complemented by its subsidiary bodies namely: the Continental Early Warning System, the Panel of the Wise, the African Standby Force, the AU Policy on Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development, and the Peace Fund. Using this five subsidiary bodies of the PSC as a framework, the following sections engages with the

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79 Unlike the UNSC that could enforce peace operations and military interventions upon consensus, the PSC could mandate a peace operation involving the consensus of the host state but can only recommend the adoption of Article 4(h) to the AU Assembly for approval in cases that warrant military intervention in the internal affairs of member states in line with Article 4(j), 13(2) and 10(3b) of the PSC Protocol.
80 The PSC’s decisions are based on general consensus and in the absence of general consensus, the majority or two third majority vote amounts to a decision by the PSC (AU 2004: Art 8, 13).
ideals of African solutions from the feedbacks received from interviews with peace and security experts. This is contextualized using primary and secondary documents on African peace and security mechanisms and approaches.

5.2.1.1 The Continent’s Early-Warning System: The Value of Good Governance, Orderly Transition of Power and Community-based Approach

The Continent’s Early-Warning System (CEWS) was established under Article 12 of the PSC protocol to serve as the trigger of the APSA in terms of early warning and early action. Under the auspices of its central observation and monitoring centre, known as the ‘situation room’, located at the Conflict Management Directorate of the Union, in Addis Ababa Ethiopia, the CEWS collects and analyses data and feed the AU Commission\textsuperscript{81} and the PSC with indicators of risks, threats and vulnerabilities (PSC Protocol 2002: art 12.2). Through the information received from the CEWS and other independent means, the AU PSC is informed on potential threats so as to make timely interventions. The CEWS has grown in recent times with appropriate information technology, infrastructure and well-trained analysts to exert efficiency in support of conflict prevention and management in Africa (Komey, Osman, and Melakedingel 2013: 73).

At an Open Session organized by the PSC on how to ‘turn early warning into early response’, Vasu Gounden, the Founder and Executive Director of ACCORD highlights that although significant efforts have been made with the establishment of the CEWS, the AU is still wanting in terms of effective response (ISS PSC Report 11 August 2015). This is attributed to the lack of adequately-trained and experienced analysts to make sense of received data as well as the poor geographic representation within the Situation Room to grasp regional and local nuances. The low political drive of the PSC to respond to crisis and implement recommendations is also deemed a weakness of the AU. Respondent 11 from the AU highlight that

\begin{quote}
the challenge with realizing African solutions is that political leaders show less political will to respond timely to conflicts and insecurities in member states because their governance and political system are often unstable as well.
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{81} AU Commission is the executive/administrative arm of the African Union and is composed of the Chairperson, the Deputy Chairperson, eight Commissioners and Staff members (African Union, 2013). The Commission is responsible for the daily management of the African Union. It coordinates and implements high-level decisions of the African Union. In terms of peace and Security, the AU Commission facilitates, coordinates, and monitors AU’s progress towards its overall vision of peace and security.
This indicates the view that one of the major challenge to conflict prevention and resolution in Africa is the challenge of good governance which tends to limit the moral capacity of African actors to intervene in conflict settings as discussed in the next section.

5.2.1.1 The Prioritization of Good Governance and Non-Tolerance to Unconstitutional Changes of Government:

As part of its early warning action and conflict prevention standpoint, the African Union has been clear in highlighting the need for democratization and good governance in Africa given that the poor record of governance in the continent as discussed in chapter 4 has led to many rebellious movements that threaten the stability of the continent. In its bid to contribute to conflict prevention, Article 3(g) of the AU Constitutive Act enjoins member states ‘to promote democratic principles and institutions, popular participation and good governance’. Yet as argued by many respondents, good governance remains a coveted phenomenon in the continent and the AU has been indicted for not possessing the legitimate and credible grounds to effectively challenge African leaders to pursue good governance. It is along this considerations that respondent 9 from a CSO argues that:

*African solutions to African problems should not be used as a means of pandering to the desires of African leaders who use the maxim to wade off legitimate criticisms. We should rather seek a more global standard of leadership that holds every leader accountable and a leadership standard that prevents conflicts.*

The governance challenges in the continent is evident from the chronic state failure in African states as highlighted by the failed state index where African states compete against each other for the pinnacle of state failure.82 With the AU being represented by African leaders whose legitimacy and popularity are subjects of concern, the regional body’s moral aptitude for insisting on good governance are constrained. For instance, it remains a challenge determining how the AU President for 2015, Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe whose governance capacity has been a subject of controversy could influence other states with poor records of governance in Africa.

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82 The Fund for Peace 2015 index has only African states – South Sudan, Somalia, Central African Republic and Sudan – at the very high alert zone in terms of state failure. See: http://library.fundforpeace.org/library/cfsir1306-failedstatesindex2013-06l.pdf
It becomes interesting when one considers the governance status of the members of the PSC who are expected to be in good standing to wield the required credibility to pursue peace and security endeavours in the continent. For instance, among the 15 elected members of the AU PSC is Burundi whose President was embroiled in a Presidential Third Term saga in 2015. Africa’s most powerful states Nigeria and South Africa that have been serving as leading figures of the AU and the PSC are embroiled in internal turmoil with Nigeria among the top 15 less peaceful countries out of 162 countries in the world and South Africa among the top 30 less peaceful countries (Global Peace Index 2015). The precarious security context of Libya, which is also a current member of the PSC, raises concerns around the extent of the influence of the country in debates pertinent to good governance and conflict prevention and resolution in other member states.

When Sudan served as a member of the PSC between 2004 and 2006, the Darfur region of the country was (and is still) embroiled in a long rebellion against the government and the southern region was engaging the government in a secessionist struggle. Pertinent to the Darfur conflict, the Sudanese government at the dawn of the Darfur rebellion had embarked on a high handed reprisal of the opposition groups as well as the non-Arab ethnic groups which the rebel movements sprang from. The government carried out aerial bombardments and attacks on the rival movements as well as civilians (Dunne 2009). Given that the government had sent much of its military forces to south Sudan were the second civil war was ongoing and to the east were rebels were threatening a newly constructed oil pipeline, the government provided support to the pro-government Janjaweed militia that is notorious for indiscriminately attacking non-Arab civilians in Darfur (Aboagye 2007). Jointly, the state military and Janjaweed militia attacked and terrorized non-Arab villages accused of harbouring rebels in the Darfur region (Kangwanja and Mutahi 2007: Dunne 2009).

Moreover, as a member of the PSC, the Sudanese government played an active role in setting the bounds of the deployment and operations of the AU mission to Sudan (AMIS) that was meant to deter skirmishes between the conflict parties which includes the government (Jibril, 2010: 12). This contravenes Article 8.9 of the PSC Protocol which insists that ‘any Member of the Peace and Security Council which is party to a conflict or a situation under consideration by the Peace and Security Council shall not participate either in the discussion or in the decision making process relating to that conflict or situation.’ The AU PSC also gave the government the veto power in situations that called
for the amendment of the mandate of AMIS (Luqman and Omede 2012). This tended to undermine the operation of AMIS as the insurgents and observers perceived AMIS to be biased in favour of the government of Sudan (Luqman and Omede, 2012). This impression was further encouraged by the failure of the AU to enforce the arrest of President al-Bashir on charges of war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity as mandated by the International Criminal Court (ICC).

Besides, the Sudanese government had on several occasions interfered with the operations of AMIS thereby undermining the peacekeeping mandate of the AU. For instance, the government in 2005 delayed the delivery of 105 Armoured Personnel Carriers of AMIS for three months. The carriers were only allowed into the country after an attack on AMIS that led to the killing of four AMIS troops allegedly by elements of the pro-government Janjaweed militias (Dunne 2009). Within this period, Janjaweed armed militias also destroyed farms and households in Darfur while attacking non-Arab villages (Luqman and Omede, 2012). In addition, the government imposed curfews on AMIS and denied them freedom of movement between 8pm and 8am daily (Bergholm 2010). This not only shows that the AU faces significant challenges with its member states but also that the AU is yet to attain a supranational capacity to hold members states accountable.

While the value of good governance is required for every geopolitical region across the world, the African context highlights the challenges of good governance and therefore stresses its value as an integral part of African solutions. This is due to the contextual reality of Africa where good governance principles eludes many states in the continent. The value of good governance is vital in two respects. Firstly, good governance in the continent will drastically reduce conflicts that result from the mass discontents against the state as emphasized in chapters 3.4.2 and 4.2 of the thesis. Secondly, good governance in the continent entails that the African Union – which is represented by African leaders – would be equipped with the necessary moral and supranational capacity to intervene in conflict settings. It is along with the value accorded to good governance that Agenda 2063, (aspiration 3) highlights Africa’s vision for ‘a universal culture of good governance, democratic values, gender equality, respect for human rights, justice and the rule of law’ (Agenda 2063, Aspiration 3).

Regardless of the shortcomings and questionable representation of its Member states, the AU as a collective body is envisioned to exert a moral and supranational authority to
influence and challenge member states to pursue good governance. The AU has shown some commitment in challenging some governance challenges in the continent. For instance, as part of its effort at conflict prevention, the AU has unreservedly condemned every overthrow of a democratically elected government by its military, mercenaries, or armed rebels and all unconstitutional changes of government in line with article 4(p) of the AU Constitutive Act. The AU’s standpoint on unconstitutional changes of governments as endorsed in Article 4(p) are informed by the Decisions on Unconstitutional Changes of Government, adopted by the 35th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU in Algiers, Algeria, in July 1999, and the Declaration on the Framework for an OAU Response to Unconstitutional Changes of Government, adopted by the 36th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU, in Lomé, Togo, in July 2000. These Declarations banned unconstitutional changes of government including the refusal of an incumbent government to relinquish power to the winning political party after free, fair and regular elections. The African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance which was adopted in Addis Ababa at the 8th ordinary summit of the AU in January 2007 builds on these Declarations by banning ‘Any amendment or revision of the constitution or legal instruments, which is an infringement on the principles of democratic change of government’ as noted in Article 23(5) of the Charter.

The AU have been consistent in condemning the coups in Africa such as in Central African Republic (2003), Guinea-Bissau (2003), São Tomé and Príncipe (2003), Togo (2005), Mauritania (2005 and 2008), Guinea (2008), Madagascar (2009), Niger (2010), Ivory Coast (2010), Mali (2012), Egypt (2013), Burkina Faso (2014 & 2015) including the attempted coup in Lesotho (2014) and Burundi (2015). In the cases of unconstitutional changes of government like in Egypt, Madagascar, Mauritania, Guinea –Bissau, Guinea, and Cote d’Ivoire, the AU have not relented in suspending states where unconstitutional changes in power take place for an initial six-months pending the restoration of constitutional order. This is in line with Article 30 of the Constitutive Act which stipulates that ‘Governments which shall come to power through unconstitutional means shall not be allowed to participate in the activities of the Union’. Beside continued suspension, the refusal to return to a constitutional order after a period of six month could result in sanctions targeted at the regime ranging from visa denial, restrictions of government-to-government contacts, trade restrictions, etc. in line with Article 23(2) of the AU Constitutive Act.
Although the AU’s condemnation of unconstitutional governments seems mechanical in recent times, the condemnations aim to express the AU’s intolerance to conditions that are undemocratic and threatening to stability in Africa. In response to a question on key values of African solution in conflict resolution, respondent 3 from the African Union argues that

*the AU has taken a particular decision to reject unconstitutional chances of government and no one else has that same stance. This has been used quite effectively as a preventive measure against military coups and as a sanction against countries that had wanted to change government unconstitutionally and as a way of emphasizing that we do not want power vacuums and revolutionary overthrow of government. The orderly transition of power is in the best interest of the people in the longer term. I think that is an important principle and we have seen it in the case of Libya where the West was keen to intervene to overthrow Gaddafi and thought quite naively that if they could just overthrow Gadhafi, everything will be brought to normal. Africa had a different approach as it warned against power vacuum and asked for a politically negotiated transition. And the west rejected that and pushed through with the military solution and today we have absolute chaos not only in Libya but we have seen that as a result of the intervention, we have destabilised region in Congo and Nigeria and etc. So the African position in that sense is a position of much more caution when it comes to dealing with these conflicts and preference for politically negotiated solutions rather than military interventions and a preference for orderly change of government.*

Hence, along with the value of good governance is the value in ensuring constitutional or orderly changes of government. While it is indubitable that the AU has taken this resolute stance in frowning upon bad governance and unconstitutional changes of government, the effectiveness of the regional body remains a question of concern. One wonders how the declarations and reprimands of the AU to recalcitrant states could make effective impacts. As highlighted earlier, many AU member states are not without internal blemishes. This undermines their capacity to stand as moral interlocutors in cases of crisis in fellow states.

From the foregoing concern, it could be surmised that much of the attention for Africa’s security results from the concern around the power of African elites to determine peace...
or war in the continent. In order words, there is a growing concern that Africa’s peace and security is highly dependent on political elites. This owes largely to the dominant state system in Africa that has accorded greater power and privilege to individual elites rather than the community. While it is often highlighted that the growing trend in world politics, including Africa’s regional politics, leans towards human security which is concerned about the interest of people as highlighted in chapter 3, there remains concern that the state-centric view of security remains dominant in Africa as individual elites are central to Africa’s security, peace and development. Respondent 15 from a CSO insist that the ‘ineffectiveness of the AU owes to its top-down approach that side-lines ordinary Africans. The solutions to Africa’s problems have merely been remedies devised around the whims and caprices of African elites.’

For respondent 1 from a CSO, the divide between African political elites and ordinary Africans is that the elites merely adopt policies that ensure their sustained foothold on power as opposed to ordinary Africans who seek greater representation in policies and implementation effort. Africa needs a political system that bestows power on the people, not individuals’.

In this security paradigm that accords greater concern for individual elites, the following section examines the discourse around the ideals of African community-based conflict resolution approach that shuns elite centric peace and security efforts.

5.2.1.1.2 The Community-Based Approach to Conflict Resolution: Against the Elite-Centrism of Peace and Security

One of the prevailing idea about African value system is the community-centric approach to reality. Concepts such as Ujamaa and Ubuntu – which simply refers to the notion of ‘I am because we are’ – have become trending terminologies that denote the value of communal relationships in African systems. Pertinent to conflict resolution, literary

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83 Many populist leaders have emerge from discontents over the issues of governance and they go on to assert interests that gradually reflect their personal interests through the use of violence or non-violent means. This further create platform for individual elites to continually emerge to assert their personal interests. As noted by a respondent (14), the knowledge that violence draws people’s attention and that the international community will bring the leaders of the violence to a negotiation table and ensure that their (the leaders) interests are met, have driven many so-called African leaders and elites to take up arms in Africa. In this scenario, the interest of the community is continually side-lined.
discourses on traditional African approach highlights that the African system accords greater value to social networks in the comprehension, analysis and resolution of conflicts. This however begs the question: is Africa the only region where emphasis is placed on the social? Limiting the comparison to western actors who have exerted significant effort in solving Africa’s challenges, it is contended that while a traditional African perspective consider the community to be primary, western actors see the community as secondary.

It is important to note that the focus on individual political elites as the major actors in peace processes has been criticized by experts, at all levels, for not providing a platform for sustainable peace (Menkhaus 2006). Hence, contemporary peace and security experts make massive attempts to include different factions of the society in peace processes. However, these efforts tend to be done in a less important manner as it is with engaging individual political actors in dialogue and negotiations; thus the community approach remains a secondary initiative (Boaduo 2010: 171). Conflict analysis remains situated within the interests and greed of individuals.

The analysis of conflict from the individual perspective has remained a dominant motivation for intervention in accord with the arguments in the theoretical framework chapter 3.4.2.2.2. Salem (2007) elaborates that the universalism of Thales and the atomism of Democritus gave rise to a western view of conflict as the result of the thoughts and impulses of the individual, a view that has become a dominant perspective in global debates and interventions. This is well-tied to western epistemological tradition where knowing tends to be an individual expedition as palpable from the works of philosophers such as Renê Descartes, Francis Bacon, Augustus Comte, David Hume, John Locke, Bishop George Berkeley, etc. who in their quest for universal truth, sought to attain absolute certainty in knowledge. In this venture, they deem whatever becomes unquestionable to them as universal truths as evident from Descartes’ proclamation: Cogito Ergo Sum. With the seventeenth century western Scientific Revolution, science further highlighted the capacity of the individuals to solely observe, experiment and rationalize reality.

84 One needs to be cognizant that many of the lessons learnt from conflict resolution attempts are lessons from international peace operations in Africa. Africa has been at the forefront in shaping the theory and practice of peace operations. The challenges with the experimented individualist approach and the conflict contexts in Africa have challenged experts to consider the value of inclusivity in Africa and elsewhere.

85 Simply translated as ‘I think, therefore I am’
From this viewpoint, conflict is perceived to originate from an individual’s interests and rationalizations and is better resolved by identifying, analysing and addressing the interests of individuals (Lacroix and Neufeldt 2010: 13). Along with the individualist perspective that has permeated the state and capitalist system that has been traded across, contemporary African interveners have shown great preference for paying greater attention to the interests of individual elites than that of the community. In South Sudan, for instance, questions abound on why the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) facilitated peace agreements that were repeatedly signed by the two main opposition actors – South Sudanese President Salva Kiir and the rebel leader Riek Machar – fail to bring an end to the conflict in the region. Violence tend to worsen soon after the signing of Agreements by the two main rival leaders. While getting leaders to a negotiation table could serve as a starting point for conflict resolution, one wonders how the agreements reached by the leaders can be effective without the communal backing of the agreements. Given the ease at which things are handled based on legal processes and agreements in the west, western oriented conflict resolution experts tend to assume that they can manage and resolve issues easily using legal and “formal” processes. However, this formal approach, that trusts that the leaders will be law abiding’ have only led to the hasty peace agreements that collapse soon after the signing of the papers.

Ngwane (1996: 3) insists that ‘the assumption that only those parading the corridors of power, that only political leaders know what the people need has remained a universal fallacy’. This fallacy that originates from the thinking of a dominant culture remains extant even in initiatives spearheaded by African actors. Even though the AU including other actors in the international community have made reference to the primacy of human security rather than state or regime security, one is still to wonder how the interest of ordinary people are considered primary to the interest of individual elites.

As contextualized in chapter 3.4.2.2.1, literary sources on traditional African conflict resolution outlook maintain that in Africa’s indigenous heritage political elites and renowned actors in conflict are not the only ones to be involved in negotiation or finding resolution to conflict. Rather, all the conflict parties including families, neighbours, and the entire community engage in the negotiation at different levels, a negotiation process which could drag on for weeks and months until an agreement is reached. It is based on the observation of the community centred approach of African practices that Placide Tempels (1959: 41), who sparked the debate on African philosophy, stresses on the notion
of the world of forces (beings) as the African philosophical/epistemological tradition – a perspective where each being – inanimate and animate – exert influence on the other like ‘a spider’s web of which no single thread can be caused to vibrate without shaking the whole network’. Discourses in African epistemology have stressed on this perspective by maintaining that the African knower is preferably disposed to knowing in a social context in such a way that the individual thinks in, for and through his/her society (Ani 2013). Acquiring knowledge thus becomes a ‘we’ or ‘community’ enterprise.

In line with this epistemological aptitude, indigenous African conflict resolution approach perceive and analyze conflicts based on their social contexts with respect to the beliefs, values, interests, needs, attitudes, networks and relationships of the society (Brock–Utne 2001: 6). The analysis of the roots of conflict thus does not start from the immediate conflict cause but from the possible web of relationship deteriorations that led to the conflict. As noted by Brock-Utne (2001: 9) a western mediator could begin a resolution process by retracing the immediate cause and outbreak of the conflict. However, an African traditional mediator will set out from the vantage point of the socio-historical and relational factors upon which the conflict arose. Here, the experienced African elder asks relevant questions that situate the conflict within a social framework rather than the isolated incident, thereby unearthing the social network clues and historical perspectives that precipitated the immediate conflict. This could go deeper to reveal long-standing rivalry and grievances between the parties and seek measures to mend the social networks and restore the social harmony that deteriorated to give rise to the immediate conflict cases. In doing so, the entire community – including those directly involved in the conflict and those who are not – takes responsibility for the conflict and seek ways to address it. Hence, African conflict resolution tradition goes beyond seeking solutions among individual elites to seeking solutions that are holistic, encompassing political, economic, social and spiritual resolutions so as to reintegrate conflicting parties to the society and re-establish the energy flow in communities.

However, respondent 20 from a CSO who is an ex-government official in South Sudan raises concerns about the growing trend among peace and security experts to include many stakeholders in conflict resolution in line with the community based approach to conflict resolution. Respondent 20 argues that the recent efforts to ensure wider inclusion of various stakeholders in the negotiation process in South Sudan have not been productive. He argues that the add-on stakeholders that are not figures directly involved
in the conflict merely complicate the resolution process. In his words, ‘the major cause of the conflict is the fall out between the leading SPLM in Juba and the SPLM in opposition led by Riek Machar and a comprehensive peace agreement needs enhanced engagement with this parties.’ This argument thus raises concern about the efficacy of inclusivity and ensuring a community based approach especially in many African states where leading figures have come to hold a significant sway in society.

For respondent 20, because of the current state of the international system, inclusivity which is often equated to community based negotiation process should be in stages. In his words

*wider inclusions in negotiations could only jeopardize concrete efforts to attain peace........... and in the context of the increasing power and influence of individual leaders in Africa today community approaches to peace should pay close attention to leading figures for political negotiation and at the same time engage other community figures in consultation about their vision for the society. Negotiation processes should initially involve the leading figures of warring parties and later on various stakeholders can then be involved in peacebuilding initiatives.*

However, negotiations that focus on leading figures are equally fraught with challenges as they tend to be reliant on the goodwill of the leaders of the conflict factions who tend to be the main targets for these interventions. When asked about the gaps in the implementation of African solutions, respondent 14 from a CSOs argues that

*the problem and maybe future hope for African solutions is that African solutions is on a foundation that hopes that African elites will one day put their interests aside and emphasize the interest of the people. Virtually all the decision about Africa are made by individual elites at the political level.*

In the state-centric international system, individual leaders claim to represent the views of groups while in many cases they tend to emerge somewhat from their group to highlight their personal interests. In cases where agreements are reached with individual elites, the agreements may be pseudo-agreements that fail overtime due to poor support from the vast populace. In the case of Africa where laws and agreements tend to be less binding as discussed in the theoretical framework chapter, the signed the agreement serve as a façade.
for the international community to think that signatories are committed to peaceful resolutions.

For instance, the case of South Sudan where several IGAD-brokered agreements were reached, signed and broken severally presents a challenge for identifying the efficiency of peace agreements that results from solutions that focus on individual elites. In the case of Somalia, the several (over fourteen) internationally sponsored peace conferences created conditions for Somali domestic elites engaged in the negotiations to engage in a political economy of ‘peace agreements’. The Somali leaders gladly participated in the peace talks organized in fancy hotels outside Somalia with considerable allowances and prestige (Menkhaus 2008). These peace talks, which are like “holiday programmes” for them, resulted in agreements which were broken as soon as the parties return to Somalia. Then, another peace talk is set again. Ayittey (2010) notes that there has been over 30 peace agreements in Africa since 1970 but these peace accords have failed to bind conflict parties; ‘only Mozambique's 1991 peace accord has endured, while shaky pacts hold in Central African Republic, Chad, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, and Niger’ (Ayittey 2010). This portends that the reliance on pandering the interest of political elites through peace deals is deficient.

Thus, while attention ought to be paid to individual elites who have become very powerful figures with the power to guarantee peace or war in African states. African interveners including the AU are obliged to explore mechanisms to ensure the primacy of the community and the accountability of the leaders to the people. In accord with the constructivist perspective, it is a prevailing notion among African actors, and even non-African actors, that the community based approach is an African value but the dominance of the individualist worldview as traded by dominant powers remains the status-quo. Respondent 14 from a CSO reckons that African politicians and experts know that the community is of essence in Africa but because they benefit from the individual perspective of things, they maintain the individualist worldview and they analyse things from this perspective. To pursue lasting peace in Africa, Africa is challenged to pursue a society-centric order that places more power on the interests of the communities in Africa rather than the myopic interests of political elites.
5.2.1.2 The African Union Panel of the Wise: The Value of Sustained Negotiated Solutions and the Role of Women

A significant number of consultations with peace and security experts highlight that the aptitude of the African Union in terms of intervention has been its bias for negotiated solutions to conflict through diplomacy, mediation and negotiation. As a signature of its peace and security stance, the AU has pursued the resolutions of crisis with priority on negotiations in line with Article 4(c) of the AU Constitutive Act as well as Article 4(a) of the PSC protocol and Para 11(c) of the CADSP which enjoints all parties to pursue peaceful means of resolving conflict. In this regard, the AU Panel of the Wise (PoW), which was officially inaugurated in December 2007 in accord with Article 11 of the 2002 PSC protocol, have been very instrumental in spearheading dialogues, mediation and negotiation initiatives of the AU.

Representing the five regions in Africa and appointed by the AU General Assembly, the PoW is composed of five members with outstanding profiles of past contributions to peace, security and development.86 The members of the PoW are appointed by the AU Assembly based on the recommendations of the Chairperson of the AU Commission. Based on their reputation, members of the PoW employ their expert knowledge and moral influence to advice the PSC and facilitate the peaceful resolution of conflicts via diplomacy and mediation.

In 2010, the PoW adopted a policy where former members of the Panel are retained as Friends of the PoW, and they continue to support the PoW especially in light of the increasing scope of work of the PoW (AU 2014). More recently, a structure known as the Pan-African Network of the Wise (Pan-Wise) was established during the inaugural High Level Retreat of the AU Panel of the Wise in 2012 in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso. The Pan-Wise includes the AU (Commission, the PoW and Friends of the PoW), civil society organisations (CSOs), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA), Southern African Development Community (SADC) as

86 During the 23rd Ordinary Summit of the African Union Heads of State and Government in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea on 26 and 27 June 2014, the third Panel members of the AU PoW were appointed for a five year tenure; they include Dr Lakhdar Brahimi from Algeria, representing North Africa; Mr Edem Kodjo from Togo, representing West Africa; Dr Albina Faria de Assis Pereira Africano from Angola representing Central Africa, Dr Luisa Diogo from Mozambique representing Southern Africa, and Dr Specioza Naigaga Wandira Kazibwe from Uganda, representing East Africa.
well as the secretariats of the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), East African Community (EAC), Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and the African and Malagasy Union (AMU).

The Pan-Wise expands the mediation capacity of the AU for a broader and community-based mediatory approach. As indicated by some respondents, the Pan-Wise network is the only active international institution that is responsible for mediation because other international mediators are recruited on an ad hoc basis. But the AU Pan-Wise network allows for a decentralised approach to mediation on the continent by encouraging greater engagement of national, civil and regional actors to ensure coherency, harmony and efficiency of mediation efforts in Africa.

Ingeniously, the PoW/Pan-Wise network provides an avenue for Africans to champion the traditional conflict mechanisms and values in light with current realities. For respondent 11, ‘a part African Identity is that we have a tradition of respecting elders and using respected elders for intervention and very often, our mediation initiatives have been led by former presidents and respected leaders in Africa.’ In African conflict resolution tradition, kings, chiefs, priests, healers, elders often spearhead the resolution efforts. Particularly, elders are respected as trustworthy mediators in Africa, because of their accumulated experience and wisdom. For respondent 2 from a CSO:

*The panel of the wise is founded in the African philosophy that wisdom comes with age. It is a philosophy which runs through the different indigenous traditions in different countries and so having a panel of the wise which is made up of imminent personalities of the continent somehow sages to guide and orient the AU peace and dispute resolution. This fits well within the contemplation that that in itself is African. Persons chosen by Africa are persons knowledgeable who can inspire and give guidance for the positive direction of this continent, only those can sit in that panel.*

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87 To harmonize this broad mediation network in Africa, a Secretariat of the Panel of the Wise was established to coordinate the efforts of Africa’s mediators. Since 2012, an annual Retreat of the AU Special Envoys and Representatives takes place in different regions in Africa to harmonize mediation initiatives in the continent with the support of Africa’s civil society organizations such as the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD).

88 It is in recognition of the complexity of African epistemology that Ruch (1984:27) maintains that philosophizing is the interest of few people (elders) with intuitive sights and rational stamina to probe deeper into challenging problems. Onyewuemyi (1991:43) observes that ‘there are many talents and clever skills that remain far short of wisdom’.
Speaking during the opening Address of the 14th Meeting of the African Union Panel of the Wise, Ambassador Smail Chergui, Commissioner for Peace and Security, notes that:

Since its inception, the Panel of the Wise has captured African (and one could add international) curiosity and imagination. After all, we created a structure at the heart of our organisation – of our decision-making on conflict prevention, management and resolution – inspired by the centuries’ old practice of African elders’ centrality in dispute and conflict resolution in our communities. Indeed, in creating a Panel of the Wise, the AU has in many ways recognised the importance of customary, traditional conflict resolution mechanisms and roles and the continuing relevance of these mechanisms in contemporary Africa. Independence, experience, maturity, respect – these are but some of the characteristics of our Panel’s members. Above all, as called for in the 2002 Peace and Security Council Protocol, Panel members must be highly respected African personalities who have made outstanding contributions to the cause of peace, security and development on our Continent. (AU PSC 2014).

Thus, through the AU PoW and Pan-Wise, the AU highlights its resolve for negotiated solutions. Significantly, the AU’s prejudice for negotiated solutions is seconded by many respondents who argue that African solutions should be predisposed to negotiated solutions rather than those imposed through military responses. Respondent 2 from a CSO maintains that for an African intervention:

*I expect sustained dialogue between stakeholders, a winding and long dialogue which can sometimes get boring.......The AU prefers mediation and dialogue but the western world considers them as alternative sources of dispute resolution. Thus you are very much likely to see that in the event of a conflict, what will come from the western world is let us check who the bad guys are, arrest them and detain them or take them to the ICC or let us eliminate them. Judicial settlement and military coercion seem to be the principle methods of dispute resolution in the contemporary or secular world and western systems but in Africa it seems to be mediation and dialogue. Yes we could say mediation and dialogue are not indigenous to Africa but the fact that Africans prefers that first and the fact that Africa prefers that dialogue to take as long as the Burundi
peace process which lasted four to six years is indicative that the preference for dialogue in Africa is in itself a distinct characteristic of conflict resolution in the continent.

For respondent 1 from a CSO, African conflict resolution tradition entails that the AU should ensure a ‘wide participation in dialogues that creates an extended platform for inclusivity.’ Some literary sources have observed that the extended platform for dialogue in the context of African perspective runs athwart to the western approach that involve set timetables and timeframes for conflict resolution in such a way that the political actors in dialogue are meant to speak about the particular conflict issue at hand without digressions (Malan 2012). In traditional African approach every issue pertinent to the conflict and even peripheral issues are discussed at exhaustible lengths to ensure that the community of conflict parties are able to reach inclusive and lasting consensus to problems (Boege 2011; Brock-Utne 2001). Although consensus is hard to reach in this instance, it is more beneficial to engage in such approaches which ensure that the community of conflict parties is able to reach a lasting consensus to problems. This process ensures that every side to a story is heard and addressed.

In conflict situations, members of the PoW, the Friends of the Panel as well as other members of the Pan-Wise network, have served meaningfully in mediating an end to conflict by being appointed as members of High-Level Panels or Special Envoys to mediate an end to conflict. These actors have been very instrumental in contending with issues of electoral-related violence, justice, impunity, reconciliation and the situation of women and children in armed conflict (AU PSC 2014). For instance, the AU established a High Level Panel on Darfur (AUPD) on Sudan in March 2009 headed by the former South African President Thabo Mbeki (Communiqué, October 2009). The AUPD consistently engaged with different role players like non-state actors, traditional leaders and the government officers in Darfur as well as relevant national and international stakeholders.

For De Waal (2009), the AUPD exhibited signs that it pursued inclusive consultation in line with Africa’s values for wide publicity. The AUPD consulted over 3000 people from various sections in Darfur for over forty days thereby coming up with a report that reflects the thinking and views of the people (De Waal 2009). The 8 October 2009 report of the AUPD received support from the AU and was considered credible by citizens of Sudan
because of the participatory listening\textsuperscript{89} approach that was used to gather information from the people.

To implement the recommendations of the AUPD, the Chairperson of the AU Commission further established the AU High Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP) comprising of three African presidents including former President Thabo Mbeki, Pierre Buyoya, and Gen. Abdulsalami Abubakar to assist in the implementation of the AUPD recommendations and assist the Sudanese parties to implement the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) (Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the activities of the African Union High-Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP) on Sudan, July 2010). The effort of the AUHIP facilitated the relative peaceful secession of South Sudan from Sudan in 2011 leading to the end of the decades long civil war initiated by the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) in the south against the northern based government.

\textbf{5.2.1.2.1 The Challenges and Prospects of Negotiations}

Africa’s stance for negotiated solutions, however, faces some challenges. For Rupiya (2012: 165), the African Union’s mediatory efforts and sanctions on member states are negligible and incapable of achieving desired effects due to the poor and marginal economic and military power of the organization.\textsuperscript{90} As noted by respondents 12 from a CSO:

\begin{quote}
the AU’s insistence on political solutions – in the face of the numerous upheavals in the continent that sometimes seem to defy diplomatic efforts – is driven by AU’s lack of alternative namely military capacity to drive its peace and security agenda. For example, the marginalization of the AU by the UN and NATO during the Libyan crisis was because the AU could not own up to its limitation in terms of deploying troops to protect civilians or decisively engage in military intervention.
\end{quote}

It is argued that the sanctions and condemnations only take on a symbolic posture of dissatisfaction with the recalcitrant state and are ineffective in influencing the politics of

\textsuperscript{89} Dersso (2012) describes participatory listening as a method that ‘focuses on listening to members of the affected people from all walks of life to define their problem and propose solutions’.

\textsuperscript{90} As noted by Williams (2011: 18) ‘Sanctions serve many purposes: they can signal dissatisfaction, stigmatize the target, act as a substitute for armed conflict, and potentially change political behavior’.
member states. Hence, powerful states of the west then become prominent actors as they have the resources to threaten recalcitrant states. Along this view, it is argued that the history of Gaddafi who has served as a prominent and leading member of the regional body and had allegedly paid the dues of poorer African states tended to cripple the AU’s response and relegated it to formulating half-hearted political solutions (Apuuli 2012; Dembinski and Reinold 2011). This led the UN to undermine the AU’s proposal for a political solution to the Libyan crisis. NATO’s intervention eventually led to the overthrow and death of Gaddafi in October 2011. For respondent 18 from a CSO, ‘in the context where there are divergent views, those with unlimited resources have their decisions respected and implement; while those with limited resources and – in this case the African Union – have their decisions relegated to the back seat.’ Respondent 20 from a CSO argues that

without necessarily sending military intervention to Libya, the AU could have sent fact finding mission or deterrent peacekeepers to reduce tensions in the region because some conflicts do not merely go away without decisive intervention.

However, the present turmoil in post-Gaddafi’s Libya owes largely to the unacknowledged poor interventionist choice of the UNSC and NATO. By exterminating Gaddafi, the non-African forces created a political vacuum with no political entity to fill or clear roadmap to ensure a good transition in the country. Perhaps, with the political settlement advanced by the AU, the present upheaval in Libya could have been avoided.

The contradictory arguments made by different respondents reflects the constant dilemma for the international community in terms of how best to intervene especially when violent conflicts arise. When conflicts arise there are ambivalent expectations about how the international community should intervene depending on one’s background and prejudice. For illustration, the crisis that erupted in Burundi in April 2015 following President Pierre Nkuruniziza’s ‘alleged’ third term bid91 presents a crisis situation in terms of intervention.

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91 At the heart of the contention around President Pierre Nkuruniziza’s alleged third term bid is the interpretation of the constitution alongside the Arusha Agreement with regards to the presidential term limits. Article 96 of the Burundi Constitution stipulates that the ‘The president of the republic is elected by universal direct suffrage for a mandate of five years renewable one time.’ For president Nkuruniziza’s CNDD-FDD party, Nkuruniziza’s supposed first term was not through a universal adult suffrage but through an election by the National Assembly. For the CNDD-FDD, the second term in office for Nkuruniziza is only the first tenure as a president elected by Universal Adult suffrage. Hence the supposed third term bid is a second term bid in principle. For the opposition however, by virtue of being elected by the National
as some quarters argued that the AU should intervene militarily and others were content with the diplomatic stance of the regional body.

In response to the crisis, member of the PSC met severally to discuss the resolution options for the Burundi crisis. The PSC at its 507th meeting on 14 May 2015 re-iterated ‘the AU’s responsibilities as guarantor of the 2000 Arusha Agreement for peace and reconciliation in Burundi’. The AU Commissioner for Peace and Security Smail Chergui has travelled to Burundi on several occasions to negotiate a way forward for the country. The AU on 9 May 2015 had already sent a high-level delegation led by a member of the Panel of the Wise and former Togolese Prime Minister Edem Kodjo to Burundi. The AU along with the East African Community (EAC) – which has been taking the lead in the resolution attempt – called for the postponement of the elections pending a political solution and have deployed mediators to address the issue.

The African Union deployed a team of human rights observers, military experts and some civilian personnel in line with the communiqué adopted by the PSC at its meeting held in Johannesburg, South Africa, on 13 June 2015. The deployed team is to support the prevention of an escalation of violence in Burundi and to assist in the resolution of the crisis with respect to Burundi’s sovereignty and right to self-determination. In June-July 2015, a ‘non-inclusive and non-consensual’ election took place in Burundi, an election which saw the reinstitution of President Nkurunziza to power (ISS Peace and Security Council Report, 6 November 2015). During the meeting on 9 October 2015, the PSC express no confidence on the elections and worsening security context of the country. The PSC resolved to impose targeted sanctions including asset freeze and travel ban against

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Assembly for the first term in 2005, President Nkurunziza has served a first term and a second term from 2010 and should not be eligible for a third term bid. Moreover, the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi (‘the Arusha Accord’) of 2000, which serves as the inspiration and spirit with which the 2005 constitution was written, there should be no third term in office as endorsed in Article 7 and 302 of the Arusha Agreement (Kabumba 2015). In this regards, the judgement on President Nkurunziza’s third term bid could be dependent on one’s bias to elevate the primacy of the constitution or the primary of the Arusha Agreement over the letter of the constitution. With the increasing protests, government’s excesses to contain the protests and the failed coup on the 14 of May (which was condemned by the AU), African actors and the international community faces strong challenge in intervening in Burundi to address the crisis without trampling on the principle of sovereignty or making a coercive intervention that jeopardizes the security condition of the region.


93 See: http://au.int/en/content/african-union-drafts-high-level-delegation-burundi

parties responsible for the political impasses and worsening security. The AU Commission is urgently required to compile a list of relevant Burundians to be sanctioned. It was also decided that no member of the Burundian defence and security forces that took part in the violation of people could participate in AU-led peace support operations. The AU PSC proposed mission, the AU Prevention and Protection Mission in Burundi (MAPROBU) which was envisioned to operate without the consent of the state, has been turned down by AU assembly for a sustained negotiations amongst stakeholders.

Nevertheless, the AU’s response has been criticised for being slow and ineffective. That the PSC did not send a peace operation to Burundi or adopted a high handed approach to the Burundian president prior to, and after, the election period, have been met with criticism from some quarters. Burundi’s prominent role as a peacekeeper in the AU mission to Somalia is considered as one of the considerations that precludes the AU from pressurizing the President to step down. Member states of the AU as well as the EAC have been accused of low political will and moral base to exert the required pressure to resolve the crisis. For instance, Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni is identified by the EAC as the lead mediator in the attempt to resolve the crisis. However, concerns abound around the moral grounds of President Museveni on matters around presidential bid considering that he has been in power since 1986 and has been accused of removing term limits from the Ugandan constitution thereby making it viable for him to be a president for life.

In this regard, mediatory interventions by African actors faces constant challenges not only because of the tensions between sovereignty and the need for intervention but also because of the questionable moral aptitude of some African actors. While engaging a discussion on the expectation of African solutions, respondent 16 from a CSO argues that:

*Although African elites leave much to be desired, negotiations and mediation which is key to conflict resolution in Africa is far much better than adopting coercive approaches that does not solve anything. Negotiations brings everyone to order including the intervener who is also not without blemish.*

The foregoing excerpt lends support to mediation and negotiation that is carried out by third parties who are not entirely neutral or impartial to a conflict situation. This is based

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95 See: [http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/aug/06/burundi-african-union-assassination](http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/aug/06/burundi-african-union-assassination)
the interveners in the on going conflict in South Sudan tend to present themselves as neutral and impartial parties even though they all have interests in the conflict in the country. The stakeholders of IGAD-led mediation in South Sudan include mediators from the East Africa including South Sudan neighbouring states, the AU, UN, EU, US and China all who have interests in the oil-rich South Sudan; but they ignore their partiality and pretend that they are neutral. ’ The mediators fail to acknowledge their biases which make them prefer certain resolutions or issues than the others; it is high time interveners note that they have some biases that affect the way they approach issues.

In essence, in African traditional contexts, as observed by Boege (2011), mediators could have some affiliations with a conflict party and still be accepted as mediators as long as they have the status and authority to mediate. This makes conflict resolution less informal and involving of people with stakes in the conflict. Moreover, from experiences of conflict resolution in Africa, aversion and hostility towards external actors – who tend to take on high moral grounds – could fester and even exacerbate conflicts (Ayittey 1994; Hislaire 2011). This observation has given rise to the discourse on ‘insider mediation’ which entails the use of respected and trustworthy figures that have in-depth knowledge and experience of the dynamics and context of a conflict in the quest to find solutions to conflict that are recognized and valued by all parties (Hislaire 2011).

By making recourse to mediators with stakes, influence and knowledge of the society, conflict parties, including the mediator, seek the actual and binding resolution of disputes given that the mediators do not take on a high moral ground but is at one with the people. This view however requires ongoing research in terms of noting the extent to which the bias of interveners contribute to peace or mar peace efforts. In view of the questionable character of some African leaders, the AU is challenged to ensure that it’s mediatory
assignments for some of its leaders creates a platform for the leaders to not only resolve conflicts but to also have their questionable leadership roles shaped through the mediation exercise.

Another perspective to African value in conflict resolution through peaceful means is the role of women, although this role is often seen as a subtle role and largely unaccounted for.

5.2.1.2.2 The Role of Women in the Peaceful Resolution of Conflicts

Many authors have observed that, in traditional African societies, women play a vital role in the resolution of disputes even though their role is regrettably marginal in contemporary settings (Okome 2001; Ibewuike 2006; Achebe 2005; Amadiume 1987). The marginal role of women in contemporary peace and security initiatives in Africa sustains an impression among some observers that women had only played marginal role in traditional African societies thereby contributing to the ongoing marginalization of women in the active life of contemporary African societies (Modupe 2012). For some authors, it was only with the dawn of colonialism and the post-colonial democratic order that African women became preview to rights and privileges that stressed their significance in society (Umeh 2002; Modupe 2012). Within this narrative, international analysts and experts have found it important to embark on a so-called new project for Africa to empower women in terms of rights and privileges including active participation in peace processes. While this is pivotal, it is useful to underscore that the significant role of women as agents of conflict resolution is not new in Africa, rather it is a role that needs re-emphasis, albeit in line with current realities, given that women have played paramount roles in the cultural and traditional African societies.

Notably, historical proofs have emerged outside the colonial education and civilization to highlight that, in traditional African societies, women and men played some form of complementary roles (Okome 2001; Ibewuike 2006; Achebe 2005; Amadiume 1987). Amadiume (1987: 25) contends that the ‘patrilineal and matrilineal dichotomy as a tool of analysis’ distorted the prominent role of African women in the political and economic sphere. While deconstructing gender perceptions of African societies, Onyewumi (2005: 10) argues that based on the sexist Victorian Ideology96 of traditional western societies,
western feminists have come to erroneously universalize women’s subordination in all traditional contexts, a gender perspective that is a delusory grand-narrative.

Achebe (2005) and Ibewuike (2006) adduce the case of the dual sex organization in Igbo communities in Eastern Nigeria to show that in many traditional African societies there were twofold governing organizations; one comprised of women and the other is comprised of male who exerted harmonious influence in the society and on each other’s decisions. For instance, prior to colonialism, the *Omu*, queen of Onitsha and the *Ekwe* (queen) queen of Nnobi, is said to possess authority parallel to the leader of the male association and she wielded power to make binding decisions in the society until colonial administrators began focusing mainly on the male leaders (Hafkin and Bay 1976: 50). Pertinent to conflict resolution, the *Omu* as the mother of the community, and her cabinet comprising other women, are responsible for ensuring the welfare of every member of the society and she makes the necessary sacrifices for the maintenance of peace and order (Hafkin and Bay 1976).  

As noted by Ineba Bob-Manuel (2000) the women of the Luo tribe in Kenya were actively engaged in peace processes by intervening directly in conflict scenes. In the impending outbreak of conflict, women adopt preventive diplomacy by insisting that the community and elders engage in negotiation with the enemy camps. For Brock-Utne (2001: 14), ‘the Luo people believed that if a woman said “no” to something, you should not do it’ as one is bound to fail if women’s approval is lacking. For Brock-Utne (2001: 15), the traditional African belief that women are carriers of life inevitably highlight the role of women as custodians of human security and development. This is reflective of the idea contained in the word and name ‘Nneka’ (meaning mother is supreme) in Igbo societies which denotes the paramount role of women as leaders and custodians of order in society.

In exercise of constraint from digressing into a lengthy discourse on this topic, one can only turn to emerging narratives that reveal how women and women associations play significant roles in traditional African societies. It is useful to note however that the advent of colonialism muddied the role of women in African societies given that the colonial structure established a different political system that created leadership structures that accorded regard only to the male political organization (Achebe 2005). In his novel, “The

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97 However, the advent of colonial administration paid little cognizance to the dynamics of leadership in the society by failing to consult and engage with the women association that was headed by the *Omu*.
Joys of Motherhood”, Buchi Emecheta (1982) argues that colonialism redefined the notion of patriarchy in Africa to include connotations of male-domination and women inferiority and subordination as it was in the homelands of the colonialists. Nevertheless, it is true that many cultural practice in African societies tend to be oppressive to women especially when considered in the context of contemporary world order. Yet, there is need to critically engage with the potentials of the traditional roles, mechanisms and structures of women in traditional African societies. This is to explore the relevance of such roles, mechanisms and structures for contemporary Africa. In this light, the project for women empowerment in peace processes would not be viewed as a so-called external project for Africa. But rather a project that is rooted in Africa’s tradition.

The African Union have emphasized the critical role of women in resolving disputes leading it to pursue the active participation of women in conflict resolution efforts. The election of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma in 2012 to serve as the AU Commission Chairperson marks Africa’s recognition of the paramount role of women in leadership. Out of the 5 dignitaries elected to serve as the members of the AU Panel of the Wise are three prominent women namely Dr Albina Faria de Assis Pereira Africano from Angola, Dr Luísa Diogo from Mozambique, and Dr Specioza Naigaga Wandira Kazibwe from Uganda. This points to some recognition of the significant role of women in mediation and leadership. The 24th AU Summit of 23 to 31 January 2015 which was held under the theme ‘Women’s Empowerment and the Development towards Agenda 2063’ sought to make a stronger call for the empowerment of women in Africa to enable the materialization of the developmental goals of Africa as elucidated in Agenda 2063.

During his inaugural speech as the AU Chairperson 2015, President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe insists that women including youth are the greatest asset for Africa. However, there remains a crucial need for the AU to mainstream gender and ensure women representation in the day to day conflict resolution efforts in the continent. From a constructivist perspective, the value of the role of women remains a prevailing and much emphasized trend but at the same time the dominant idea of women subordination as well as the challenges of gender inequality remain the limiting factors for emphasizing the significant role of women. Although African thinkers are engaging with the traditional value of the role of women as a solution to the challenges in Africa, the benefits of women subordination in contemporary order remain a significant constraints in maximizing the role of women in the resolution of disputes. The role of women continues to be seen as an
optional or alternative role rather than an integral role in societies. In line with the second objective of this thesis, the African Union is obliged to pursue a more concerted effort for gender equality and the active participation and role of women in the resolution of disputes.

5.2.1.3 The African Standby Force (ASF): The Value of Flexibility in Interventions

In May 2003, African Chiefs of Defence and Security (ACDS) adopted the policy document on the establishment of the African Standby Force (ASF) and of the Military Staff Committee (MSC)98 in accord with Article 13 of the PSC Protocol. The ASF which is the trending body of the AU is envisaged to serve as the operational arm of the continental body that is poised to be deployed to crisis regions across the continent. Article 13.1 of the PSC protocol positions the role of the ASF as a body established to ‘enable the Peace and Security Council perform its responsibilities with respect to the deployment of peace support missions and intervention pursuant to article 4 (h) and (j) of the Constitutive Act’.

Although African actors increasingly emphasize the value of negotiated solutions to crisis, African organizations have adopted military posture to seek the stability of states in the continent. The AU’s interventions in Burundi, Sudan, Mali, Somalia and CAR are indicative of the military nature of some African responses to conflicts. Does this contravene the so-called African value for sustained negotiation? Respondent 19 from the AU insists that:

Even though the AU has instituted peace operations, the operations are borne out of significant engagement between stakeholders who agree to some peace deals prior to the establishment of the AU peace operations. The peacekeeping mission of the AU are interestingly different; peacekeeping has always been used in the African context at the side-line of negotiations.

There is an increasing realization that many conflicts in Africa pose threat especially to civilians which require humanitarian interventions to deter violence and protect civilians. Moreover, African interventions has thus far been established with the consent of conflict parties rather than the coercive and non-consensual approach as discussed in section

98 The MSC consists of senior military officers from the PSC member states, the Military Staff Committee is another subsidiary body of the PSC that is expected to serve as an advisory body to the PSC on military matters and they are expected to be pivotal in guiding the operation of the ASF.
5.2.1.3. The ASF thus provides the avenue for Africa to respond timely to conflict occurrences. Ingeniously, the ASF conceptualization remains the only international standby force expected to be established in contemporary times. The formation of the ASF is in line with Africa’s aspiration for ‘an African Army at the final stage of the political and economic integration of the continent’ as endorsed in Article 4(d) of the AU Non-Aggression and Common Defence Pact.99

The ASF framework consists of five brigades at each of the sub-regions in Africa (AU PSC 2010). The standby arrangement in the north is called the North Africa Regional Standby Brigade (NASBRIG) which is to be coordinated by a sub-regional body called the Northern African Regional Capability (NARC) which is headquartered in Algeria.100

The eastern standby arrangement which is composed of members of the Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) is known as the East African Standby Force (EASF) with the Brigade Headquarters located in Addis Ababa and the Planning Element in Nairobi. The central African arrangement comprises members of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and is called the Force Multinationale de l'Afrique Centrale (FOMAC) with the Regional Headquarters located in Libreville, Gabon. In West Africa, the standby force known as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Standby Brigade (ECOBRIG) has its Regional Headquarters in Abuja and is composed of member states of ECOWAS. The southern force composed of member states of Southern African Development Community (SADC) is called the Southern Africa Standby Brigade (SADCBRIG) with a Regional Headquarters in Gaberone, Botswana.101

The African Standby Force (ASF) is required to be composed of a military, police and civilian component ‘in their countries of origin and ready for rapid deployment at appropriate notice’ (PSC protocol 2002: art 13.1). The standby arrangements are expected

99 The idea of a ‘pan-African army’ has its history in the 1960s with the proposal of Kwame Nkrumah for a ‘common defence system with African high command’ (Nkrumah 1963).
100 Composed of Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Mauritania, Tunisia, and Western Sahara, NARC was established to fill the void of an active sub-regional organization in the north due to the dormancy of the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) since its establishment in 1989.
101 The five brigades are expected to be composed of about 5000 personnel thereby bringing the number of the entire ASF to 25000 personnel. With the 25,000 maximum force strength of the ASF however, there remains concerns that the standby force can only handle one or two conflicts at a time in the continent (Dersso 2011: 126). The robust peace operations established by the AU in Somalia as well as the UN missions in South Sudan, Mali, DRC and Sudan show that over 20,000 personnel is often required for peace operations in African states with huge landmasses. While this presents a significant concern in terms of efficiency, the vision behind the mandate of the ASF is to enable it respond timely to crisis regions with the possibility of fortifying the mission over time.
to have a Rapid Deployment Capacity (RDC) with pre-identified, trained and verified personnel that could be deployed within 14 days. The recruitment and rostering process which is underway is envisaged to generate well-trained and verified military, police and civilian personnel for AU missions.

In line with Article 13(1) of the PSC Protocol, member states are expected to second military, police and civilian personnel to the standby arrangements in their regions. The AU could also recruit through direct hiring by advertising available posts especially in the case of recruiting civilian experts. Given that the recruitment of military and police officers are more predictable from member states’ military and police structures, the AU Peace and Security Operations Division (PSOD) has worked jointly with Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and Regional Mechanisms (RMs) since 2010 to establish the AU Civilian Standby Roster. The roster is to serve as the integrated continental platform for the generation, retention and utilisation of civilian capacities on a standby basis for deployment across a range of peace and security operations, including mediation missions, peace support operations, and post-conflict reconstruction and development undertakings. The rostering process has been greatly supported by the training centres that make up the African Peace Support Trainers Association (APSTA).102

Under the coordination and activation by the PSC, the ASF is designed to monitor and observe missions; contain conflict from overflowing into neighbouring states, protect civilians; engage in peacekeeping and peace-building operations; engage in military intervention in the affairs of member states as well as engage in post-conflict reconstruction. The mandate of the ASF however falls within the peace operations of the AU that are aimed at enforcing negotiated settlements and protecting civilians. The following table details the AU peace operations between 2002 and 2015.

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102 As part of its training initiatives, members of APSTA train civilians and include them in the roster of civilians that will receive peace operation vacancy announcements when missions are established.
Table 1.0 African Union peace operations 2002 to 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Mission and Acronym</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Contributors Main</th>
<th>others</th>
<th>Approximate Size</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Special Task Force Burundi</td>
<td>2006 – 2009</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td></td>
<td>750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comoros</td>
<td>AU Military Observer Mission in the Comoros MIOC</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td></td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AU Mission for Support to the Elections in the Comoros (AMISEC)</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AU Electoral and Security Assistance Mission to the Comoros (MAES)</td>
<td>2007 – 2008</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td></td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Democracy in Comoros</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Tanzania, Sudan</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,350(+450 Comoros)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UN-AU Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID)</td>
<td>2008 – present</td>
<td>Nigeria, Rwanda, Ethiopia, Ghana, Senegal, Egypt, South Africa, Gambia, Kenya</td>
<td>Bangladesh, China, Indonesia, Nepal, Pakistan and others</td>
<td>23,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA)</td>
<td>2012-2013</td>
<td>Nigeria, Benin, Togo, Senegal, Burkina Faso and Chad</td>
<td>Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia,</td>
<td>6,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Despite the limitations relating to resources and commitment, Africa’s regional actors have proven to be more expedient than the UN in mandating and deploying troops for

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103 Adapted from Williams 2011 and Møller 2010
peace operations in the continent even when there is no peace to keep. For instance, the AU has established peacekeeping missions in Mali and CAR including Burundi and Somalia at tensed scenarios which falls between ASF scenarios 4 to 6; scenes where the UN would only insist on the attainment of comprehensive peace agreements and cessation of widespread violence before establishing peace operations.

The AU’s peace operations thus far has contravened the UN’s persistence that peace operations should not be established in regions with no peace to keep in line with the experiences of the UN over the years as in the case of the UN interventions in the DRC in the early 1960s and Somalia in the early 1990s. The interventions undertaken by the AU, albeit short term, in hotspots with frail ceasefire deals has injected new dimensions to the concept and practice of peacekeeping. These peace operations often referred to as peace support operations thereby exhibit an endogenous peace operation that pays cognizant to the difficulty in securing comprehensive peace agreements prior to the establishment of peacekeeping missions.\textsuperscript{104} For Ndiaye (2015), a fledging African model of peace operations is in the making – a model that will inform future international peace operations across the globe.

With the envisaged operationalization of the ASF, the AU peace and security initiative in the foreseeable future would continually reflect a robust stabilization mandate in the contexts of volatile peace and security contexts in the continent. Nevertheless, there remains significant hurdles in attaining a functioning ASF as discussed in the following section.

\textit{The Challenges with Operationalizing the African Standby Force}

In July 2013, the AU Commission appointed an independent panel of experts to comprehensively assess the implementation of the ASF. The panel’s report which was submitted to the AU in December 2013 share misgivings about the full operationalization of the ASF by December 2015 which is the second deadline after the first deadline elapsed in 2010.\textsuperscript{105} Much of the challenges with operationalizing the ASF owes greatly to the

\textsuperscript{104} The experiences of peace agreements in Africa in regions such as South Sudan, Sudan Burundi, Somalia, Mali and CAR show that they are less binding for many conflict parties.

\textsuperscript{105} In view of the slow development of the ASF, the AU established the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crisis (ACIRC) at its 22\textsuperscript{nd} session, held in Addis Ababa in May 2013 as an interim force for rapid deployment until the full operationalization of the ASF. The decision to establish the ACIRC was particularly considered quintessential following the 2012 crisis in Mali that exposed Africa’s lack of rapid deployment capability and readiness to engage in peace enforcement thereby creating platforms for external
imbalances in the Regional Economic Communities (RECs). It is important to recall that the PSC Protocol envisages the use of national, regional and continental capabilities within the continent for the expedient prevention, management and resolution of disputes. Pertinent to the contribution of regional actors, Article 4(b) of the Protocol on Relations between the African Union (AU) and Regional Economic Communities (RECs), charges RECs to align ‘their programmes, policies, and strategies with those of the AU’. The RECs are expected to play significant roles in the APSA by addressing the conflicts in their regions under the leadership of the AU (Vorath 2012).

The African Union is privileged by the invaluable lessons learnt from the experiences of peace operations led by the RECs who have played an immeasurable role in addressing security challenges in their regions even prior to the establishment of the proactive continental body in 2002. Notably, ECOWAS and SADC have been prominent in engaging in peace operations in Africa particularly in West Africa and Southern Africa respectively. The intervention of ECOWAS in Liberia and Sierra Leone in the 1990s, for instance, remains a trending reference of the role of sub-regional organizations in maintaining peace and security. Since early 2000s, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) has been playing a remarkable role as a mediator in East Africa. The three regional organizations (SADC, IGAD and ECOWAS) have made remarkable effort in operationalizing a standby force.

However, the regional economic communities in the North Africa and the Central Africa tend to have weaker and marginal influence to contribute effectively to the AU’s grand initiative for sub-regional organizations to play leading roles in requesting and/or establishing an African-led peace operation. In the case of northern Africa, the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) which was established in 1989 had been ineffective in harnessing the capabilities of northern African states thereby leaving a huge regional void in the region. The crisis in Libya presented a scenario were the AU could not easily facilitate a rapid response because of the lack of an effective sub-regional organization. In fact, the

actors like France to intervene prior to an intervention by ECOWAS and later AU. The ACIRC is to serve as a voluntary mechanism for a coalition of willing countries to deploy forces rapidly for an AU peace operations. ACIRC is expected to be financed by the member states of the AU on voluntary basis. Nevertheless, the voluntary foundation of the ACIRC entails that the AU could continually face the challenge with challenges of engaging in rapid development because experience show that many African states are reluctant to commit resources and personnel for missions. The ACIRC is also yet to be functional thereby only serving the purpose of derailing or dividing the efforts to establish the ASF. The full operationalization of the ASF remains pivotal for the AU to have a predictable mechanism for intervention (De Coning 2014).
Arab League, which Libya is also affiliated to, became the major player in the crisis. Thus, a recurring challenge for a fully functional ASF is how a standby force can be instituted and managed in regions with weak RECs such as in North Africa. Moreover, with the murder of the former Libyan leader Gaddafi who had been a passionate and major actor in the north, there has been limited discussion of operationalizing a standby force in the north.

Nevertheless, the functioning of the ASF is highly quintessential for the AU to retain and deploy ample number of forces to engage in peace operations without having to go through the challenge of painstakingly expecting the pledges of member states especially when urgent response is required. This would avert problems such as the cases of AU’s missions in Sudan and Somalia where the hurriedly generated AU troops were ill-trained and ill-equipped to handle the complex crises.

Additionally, having a well-trained and coordinated ASF would help to avert problems such as lack of coordination as witnessed in December 2013 when a group of Burundian soldiers that were newly deployed to the CAR under MISCA – ‘opened fire on a Chadian unit, killing three peace-keepers’ (A Norwegian Council for Africa CAR 2014). The troops from different countries in Africa were also reportedly slow to cooperate with each other (ibid). The question of professionalism in AU troops is brought to fore when the UN reported that Chadian troops had opened fire in a crowded market in the CAR capital Bangui on 29 March 2014 in an unprovoked attack that left around 30 people dead and 300 injured. This, among other concerns led Chad to withdraw more than 800 of its troops from the African-led International Support Mission in the CAR (MISCA) on 16 April 2014. The ongoing concerns about the professionalism of AU peacekeeping officers particularly in Somalia with regards to allegations of sexual and gender based violence further bring AU troops to disrepute. The aspired extensive training of the ASF in peace operations would contribute to the reliability and efficiency of African responses to conflicts.

5.2.1.4 The AU Post-conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) Framework: Local Ownership; Restorative Justice and Holistic Approach to Peacebuilding

To drive the regional body’s responsibility for post-conflict reconstruction and preventative peacebuilding, the Post-conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) framework was developed at the 7th Ordinary Session of the Executive Council in Libya
in July 2005 and adopted during the 2006 AU Summit in Banjul, in The Gambia. The PCRD provides guidelines for the development of strategies and policies for the consolidation of lasting peace and sustainable development in post conflict states.\textsuperscript{106} The PCRD policy defines Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development as ‘a comprehensive set of measures that seek to: address the needs of countries emerging from conflict, including the needs of affected populations; prevent escalation of disputes; avoid relapse into violence; address the root causes of conflict; and consolidate sustainable peace’\textsuperscript{107}. The PCRD is based on five core principles namely African leadership, national and local ownership, inclusiveness, equity and non-discrimination, cooperation and cohesion, and capacity building for sustainability (AU PCRD 2006). From the first two principles, it is deducible that the AU intends to pursue African-led post-conflict endeavours that find its legitimacy and credibility from national and local ownership. By national and local ownership, post-conflict reconstruction entails efforts that reflect the needs, vision and aspirations of African societies. This is to be done in accord with the spirit of inclusiveness, equity, non-discrimination, cooperation and cohesion with the goal of attaining sustainable solutions in the society.

However, a phenomenon that raises concern about the extent to which the AU is committed to leading peacebuilding initiatives in Africa is that, in praxis, its peace operations thus far are conceived as interim operations to be taken over by a stronger UN mission after 90 or 120 days. The regional body’s missions to Burundi, Sudan, Mali and CAR, were all designed as interim missions to be replaced by a well-equipped, financed and stronger UN mission. This includes the AU mission to Somalia which took longer than envisioned (however, there remains active discourse on ensuring that the mission transitions to a UN mission). Realistically, the arrangement to replace AU missions with a stronger UN operation is inevitable given the minimal financial and resource capacity of AU to engage in long term peace operations.

On the downside, by shying away from long-term missions, the AU tends to pay less attention to the issue of peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction that is pivotal for an actor seeking to spearhead peace processes in the continent. Besides, the AU’s recent

\textsuperscript{106} The development of the PCRD including the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) signifies the increasing need to support states emerging from conflict to encourage peace and avoid resurgences to conflict.

\textsuperscript{107} The PCRD initiative is particularly aimed at enabling a coherent African-led initiative in security sector reforms (SSR), demobilization, disarmament and re-integration (DDR), return and reintegration of displaced populace, justice and reconciliation at all levels of the affected society.
proactive role in seeking peace and security in Africa has set a precedence that could entail that external actors would eventually be more reluctant to intervene in the crisis in Africa. For respondent 17 from the AU, ‘Western powers are no more keen to sacrifice their troops for Africa’s conflicts. The trend is that they would rather provide funds, logistic, expert and technical support for peace operations in the continent.’ In this context, the UN could end up being content with providing financial assistance and support to the AU to engage in peace operations in the continent. Hence, the AU ought to prepare itself for eventualities where the UN relies on the AU’s growing sense of responsibility and expertise in peace and security.

Moreover, if the AU is to go in line with its resolve to provide African solutions to Africa’s challenges, it should be willing to take up the responsibilities involved in both short term and long term peace operations in the continent. This will enable it to engage with the demands of peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction in the continent so as to spearhead the vision and values of Africa in this regard. Some of these values include Africa’s disposition for restorative justice as against retributive justice as well as Africa’s disposition to pursuing a more holistic approach to conflict resolution and reconciliation. The following sections engages with these African-oriented values and its implication to the African Union’s interventions.

5.2.1.4.1 Restorative Approach to Resolution and Reconciliation

Drawing on its communal focus, African conflict resolution outlook considers conflict as an ailment in relationships in societies, an ailment that requires the restoration of harmony and order (Boege 2011). It is against this backdrop that the traditional African conflict resolution approach “follow the line of restorative justice instead of (western-style) punitive justice” (Boege 2011: 439) which places emphasis on punishing offenders as evident from the coercive, military and incriminatory interventionist approach of western powers.108 This however does not mean that there are no punishments in African practices (Bukari 2013). Indeed, the methods employed by some African societies have been notorious for contradicting universal standards of human rights due to the gruesome treatment of wrongdoers. However, the distinctive element in the treatment of wrongdoers is that the focus of African traditional approach lies not on adjudicating blame or

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108 Bukari (2013: 90) notes that the western conflict resolution practice that seeks to apportion blame and punishment using the court or security system only end up aggravating hostility among conflict parties
exterminating offenders but on enabling the conflict parties to transcend their differences and attain reconciliation for continued mutual and harmonious existence.109

Traditional African approaches favour the atonement route where the offenders atone for their offences. Depending on the offence, wrongdoers in some African societies compensate for their offence using material goods, gifts, blood money, etc. Here, compensation takes the place of vengeful violence. The atonement and restorative route helps to ensure that different groups in the community are able to look beyond differences to a greater harmony and respect for the interdependence of communal living (Boege 2011). For instance, among the Acholi people in Northern Uganda, Mato Oput, which literally means ‘to drink a bitter potion made from the leaves of the Oput tree’ is a mechanism for forgiveness and reconciliations (Katshung 2006). The reconciliation process which entails drinking the bitter herb means that the conflicting parties accept the bitterness of the past and vow not to taste such bitterness again. This ceremony is followed by the payment of compensation to the victim by the perpetrator.

As such, an African oriented value in conflict resolution and reconciliation leans towards a restorative approach. The restorative outlook of African conflict resolution pays cognizance that the disputants, offenders and victims are all linked to one another and the attempts to exterminate or punish offenders also have impacts on their family, clan and group members. This restorative outlook thus enables the re-integration of different parties into society to avoid the resurgence of conflict by aggrieved families and groups. In this context, if people in society merely condone the “other” and do not associate with them, the work of conflict resolvers is not yet complete.110

In this regard, the AU is enjoined to accord greater value to repairing broken relationships through its conflict resolution attempts not just for the continuation of orderly-living but for harmonious and cordial existence in societies. The African Union has shown some bias to the restorative approach to conflict resolution particularly through its condemnation of the International Criminal Court (ICC)’s supposed retributive “witch-hunt” for African leaders. However, the worrying concern is whether this stance is about

109 It is in view of this approach that Ruch (1984) notes that Africans seek the order that ought to be in the universe through knowledge acquisition and practices.
110 For Boaduo (2010: 171), in the western perspective, as long as there is no violence and people condone each other, peace reigns. But for African-oriented approach, peace is not about the absence of violence or the mere overlooking of each other’s differences. Peace in this African perspective is said to entail living in harmony and somewhat friendliness where one does not merely bear or tolerate the “other” but respects and values the other.
restoring broken relationships in African societies or merely supporting the represented leaders of the AU who have been summoned by the ICC.

The ICC has been lambasted by African leaders as a biased international court that only targets weak states, particularly African states, since its establishment in 2002 by the Roman Statute. It is also a concern that the ICC’s indictment is mainly divisive than resolving or restoring peace in the society. In the cases of Sudan and Kenya, the AU rejected the move by the ICC to prosecute Presidents Omar al-Bashir of Sudan and Uhuru Kenyatta of Kenya as well as the Deputy President William Samoei Ruto of Kenya on charges of war crimes, and crimes against humanity (Pinchon 2014).

In the report of the Twenty-Fourth Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly from 30 to 31 January 2015, the AU reiterated its stands that incumbent African leaders should be immune from trial while in office based on the amendments of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICC adopted by the 12th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute held in the Hague, the Netherlands in November 2013. In Article 17 of the Decision on the Progress Report of the Commission on the Implementation of Previous Decisions on the International Criminal Court (ICC) after the 2015 Assembly, the AU calls for the termination or suspension of the case against Deputy President William Samoei Ruto of Kenya and President Omar al-Bashir of Sudan and commended the suspension of the case against President Uhuru Kenyatta of Kenya in 2014. The report also urges the concerted effort from Africans to operationalize the exercise of jurisdiction of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights to try Africans in line with African values.

While the AU tends to champion the interests of African actors one is challenges to ask: is the concern of the AU meant to mend broken relationships through restorative justice or is it merely advancing the ulterior interest of the individual leaders that are represented in the AU? The interesting point is that half of ICC’s indictment of African individuals as in the case of DRC, CAR, Uganda and Mali are all at the behest of the governments of the states. Others like the case of Libya and Sudan were brought by the UN Security Council and the case of Côte d’Ivoire and Kenya were embarked on at the initiative of the ICC’s chief prosecutor (Goldberg 2014). In this regard, African actors have played critical roles in presenting individual cases for investigation, however the cases for investigation suggested by African governments are against ‘rebel’ leaders. Those by the UN and the
ICC tend to be the most contested cases as they challenge incumbent regimes, regimes represented at the AU.

Moreover, African actors are well represented in the ICC regardless of the concern around the sway of international system on the ICC and perspectives on the structural make-up of world order. To highlight this, ‘the organization’s current chief prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, is Gambian, and one quarter of its judges (including the first vice president) are from various African nations.’ (Goldberg 2014).

If the AU is keen on pursuing a justice system that speak to the vision of Africa, it should operationalize the African Court of Justice and Human Rights. The African Court should be empowered to deliver justice and promote the respect of human rights as it is mandated to do (Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, 2008). The AU ought to ensure that African leaders do not hide behind state sovereignty while they engage in human right violations. This will enable the AU to ensure that the continent’s population ‘enjoy affordable and timely access to independent courts and judiciary that deliver justice without fear or favour’ (Agenda 2063, Aspiration 3). With such disposition, the African Union could be taken seriously when the ideal of “African solutions to African problems” is invoked to address conflict challenges in the continent.

In pursuing a restorative approach to conflict resolution, African leaders are challenged to consider how retributive justice could be factored in the context of contemporary wars where conflict parties commit heinous crimes. Failure to provide justice to the victims could inspire or encourage impunity where would-be-perpetrators would engage in destabilizing activities knowing that restorative justice would be sought after by intervener. For instance, one wonders what the effect of Africa’s stance on ICC’s indictments has on the leaders of the warring factions in South Sudan who have thus far carried out heinous attacks that reek of impunity. These conditions then require African actors to pursue principles that mend broken relationships and restore order and harmony while considering the contemporary context of conflict resolution where the unaccountability of leaders could foster discontents and impunity in societies.

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111 The African Court of Justice and Human Rights was established through the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights (African Court) as adopted by the Eleventh Ordinary Session of the Assembly on 1 July 2008. It merges the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the Court of Justice of the African Union
5.2.1.4.2 Holistic Approach to Conflict Resolution

One of the literary considerations of Africa’s indigenous conflict resolution and peacebuilding outlook is the holistic dimension of African values which entails a more encompassing approach to conflict resolution/reconciliation – an approach that engages with rational, emotional, artistic, religious and spiritual aspects. It is worth observing that supposed mainstream conflict resolution approach have tended to esteem rational initiatives over supposed ‘non-rational’ ones (Avruch 2002; Gellman 2007). Culture, emotions, religion and other non-rational expressions are only considered as impediments to societal growth that need to be submerged for peace and development to take place.

It has been argued, however, that initiatives that pays less regard to cultural and societal factors and belief system is oblivious that people’s thinking and initiatives are unavoidably swayed by societal beliefs, values and systems (Avruch 2002; Jean-Emmanuel Pondi cited in Ngwane 1996: vi). Notable postmodernist thinkers such as Thomas Kuhn (1922-1996) and Paul Feyarabend (1924-1994) are instructive in noting that every from of scientific study including pure sciences are socially constructed in such a way that one’s judgement inevitably reflect the background beliefs, values and imagination of people in society (O’Hear 1989). Kwame Gyekye in An Essay on African Philosophical Thought (1987: 25) insists that rationality is fundamentally a cultural phenomenon that reflects the cultural experience and background of people.

Along this thinking, Gellman (2007) observes that while western conflict resolution principles view culture as a barrier and challenge to conflict resolution, culture is actually an asset and not a barrier to conflict resolution. Conflict resolution attempts that respect people’s humanity, traditions, beliefs and ways of life has the capacity to ensure lasting solution than those that ignores or undermines culture. Thus, if one is to consider conflict in logical and strictly analytical manner, one is bound to encounter challenges.

Drawing from the African perspective, conflict resolution entails a holistic approach, - approach that does not only give room for rational debates but for emotional, religious and spiritual expressions so as to satisfy the entirety of people’s wants, needs and interests. Based on the holistic approach of African practices, Ruch (1984:46) affirms that African indigenous knowledge “does not follow the fragmenting activity of abstractive knowledge, its contact with the real is more immediate and involves the whole man (sic) and not only his intellect”. Conflict resolution attempts, thus, encompass rational,
emotional, mythical, experiential, religious, intuitive, symbolic, and spiritual elements (Boege 2011: 449).

It is worth noting that incorporating religion and spiritual elements in modern day conflict resolution contexts presents enormous challenges given that contemporary societies are multicultural and multi-religious. However, in many societies in Africa and across the globe, religious/spiritual perspective plays a significant role in maintaining peace and attaining reconciliation. In the African context, spiritual ceremonies, rites and rituals are pivotal in ensuring that one’s commitment is not only at the physical level but also at the spiritual level. It could be maintained in present times that muddying conflict resolution attempts with spiritual inputs could be a naïve approach to life in the face of the arguments against spiritual beings and the havoc caused by some religious sects based on religious convictions. Nevertheless, whether the spiritual realm can be validated or not, there are many people who lead their lives in recognition and respect for the divine. This has a huge impact on how they perceive conflict and seek its resolution.

It is also crucial to note that human existence including challenges such as conflict remain mysterious to humans and many people find spiritual connection as avenues for contending with the unknown. For Gyekye (1987: 15) and Ruch (1984), spiritual and mythical expressions address the deeper issues that are incomprehensible to the human intellect. Here, the spiritual and mythical elements ‘negotiate between material and supernatural existence thereby satisfying the physical and spiritual elements’ in the human desire for fulfilment (Ani 2013: 311). The spiritual and religious elements fill the void that empirical and scientific facts cannot reach. It is on this point of view that Lacroix and Neufeldt (2010: 22) insists on creative and holistic approach in conflict resolution because conflicts are not straightforward, logical, reasonable and orderly. This then demands greater creativity for the AU in terms of responding to conflict challenges. The AU should ensure that resolution attempts do not remain at the political level. Support should also be provided to conflict parties to find closure emotionally and spiritually through reinforcing local resolution/reconciliation approaches that facilitates healing.

5.2.1.5 The AU Peace Fund: The Value of Internal Capacity for Intervention

Adequate finance determines the willingness of the regional body to respond to crisis and informs the mandate, size and duration of its intervention and initiatives. However, financial constraints remains the hovering issue around the AU’s capacity to materialize
African solutions to African problems. To surmount this challenge, the AU established the Peace Fund in accord with Article 5 of the PSC Protocol to generate and retain funds for the AU peace and security initiatives. The Peace Funds is expected to provide an avenue for the retention and use of funds generated through the ordinary budget funds of the AU, voluntary contributions from member states, fund raising and other sources of funding from private and external donors. However, the ongoing concern around the AU’s financial capacity is that the regional body is far from attaining financial independence and the predictability of its sources of funding.

Notably, the member states of the AU have failed dismally in paying their dues to the AU budget (PSC Report 2015). Until now, most of the funds generated from AU member states for peace operations accounts for only 2% of the funds used for the peace operations initiated by the regional body in the continent (Vines 2013: 107). The 98% of the funds for AU’s peace and security is generated from international donors such as the UN, EU, G8 as well as states such as the US, France, and China.

To address the challenges of generating funds from local capacities in the continent, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, the AU Chairperson since assuming office in 2012, has been pushing for AU’s self-reliance to enable the regional body to emerge from its dependency syndrome. During its 24 Summit, the AU adopted a proposal to increase the contribution of member states for the AU’s operational budget to 100%, its programme budget to 75 per cent and its peacekeeping budget to 25% (PSC Report 2015). To generate funds, alternative options of payment was given to member states of the AU such as paying from their treasury or establishing a US$10 levy on tickets for international flights originating in Africa; a US$2 hospitality levy; or an SMS levy for the AU budgets. Nevertheless, this ingenious plan for AU’s self-reliance remains an ongoing discussion that faces reluctance in implementation by member states.

Hence, AU missions including the mission in Somalia depend on the generosity and support of external bodies. In the case of the AU mission in Sudan, the EU and U.S. contributed about 80 per cent of the cost of AMIS. They still contribute about 80 per cent of the ongoing AU mission in Somalia (AMISOM) (De Carvalho, Jaye, Kasumba and Okumu 2010: 37; AMISOM 2015). For Möller (2009: 16), ‘it would be surprising if the world’s poorest continent were able to solve the world’s most frequent and widespread as well as most deadly conflicts’. Most of the respondents agree that African solutions do
not entail a resistance or denial of external support in the interdependent world order. On a question on the expectations around African solutions, Respondent 6 from a CSO indicates that

*I don’t believe in isolation, the world is a global village and Africa cannot be isolated. I believe that it is important to have external actors but their role should be limited to support some of Africa’s endeavours. In peacekeeping operations where you have hybrid mission like that in Darfur, the role of external actors is extremely important because the UN has the mandate for peacekeeping in the world. The crisis in Africa doesn’t mean that the UN has no right to intervene. The responsibility to protect is part and parcel of the mandate of the UN and I believe that what is importance is to minimize the role of external actors and increase the role of African actors.*

Petlane (2009) insists that there is no shame in seeking outside help when home-grown formulas and capacities are limited. The complexity of contemporary conflict scenarios that is characterized by terrorism, transnational crime and asymmetrical tactics alongside traditional warfare demands robust interventions based on the requisite coordination between the AU, sub-regional organization and the UN as well as other multilateral, bilateral and unilateral parties. It is in view of this that Article 7(k) of the PSC Protocol charges the PSC to ‘promote and develop a strong “partnership for peace and security” between the Union and the United Nations and its agencies, as well as with other relevant international organizations’. Respondent 10 from the AU Mission in Somalia insists that:

*When speaking of African solutions we need to realize that solutions encompass the notions of content, ideas, practical action, and financial dimensions. The content and ideas should emerge from Africans. When it comes to financial sources and action, the domain can be expanded to include the rest of the world. Some of the problems in Africa are not only Africa’s problems, because the United Nations Charter for example reserves the right to maintain international peace and security. Thus, the rest of the world should share the burden of responsibility since there is mutual obligation and accountability between Africa and the rest of the world.*

Thus, African solutions calls for a partnership with external actors. While responding to a question on the role of external actors, Respondent 3 from the AU insists that:
There are ongoing strategic relations with China, US, EU, UN and you will see that they are largely contributing to building African capacity aimed to contribute to African peace and security. African solutions do not suggest isolation. Because of the growing African ownership, we have changed from donor relationship to partner relations. Ten years ago, the UN or the EU looked to Africa as a beggar that needs to get handouts, today they look to Africa as a partner with whom they can cooperate to achieve world peace and security to achieve economic growth and the relationship is maturing to a relationship of partnership not a donor relationship.

However, the current reality is that the external support to the AU is uncertain and based on charity to the regional body. The uncertainty of external support entails that the AU is restricted in making tangible and binding decisions unless its decisions are accepted and funded by external donors. In this unpredictable context, the AU can only make short term commitments pending external confidence and approval of its budgetary needs.

The limited AU budgets for peace operations and the uncertainty of external donations have led to the following major issues for the AU’s capacity to provide African solutions to African problems:

1. The AU restricts its peace operations to short-term missions to be taken over by a more resourceful UN mission.

2. The AU’s missions suffer from being understaffed and under-resourced and thus limited in mandate and capacity.

3. Pertinent to Article 4(h) of the AU Constitutive Act, the AU is constrained in decisively deploying a robust military intervention

4. Other more powerful organizations and states could readily marginalize the AU or impose their dictates and views on the AU

In terms of the first scenario, most of the AU’s missions as highlighted earlier are short term missions designed to be replaced by a UN mission due to the AU’s limited financial strength and institutional capacity to pursue a long-term peace mission. Peacekeeping

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112 IGAD’s ad hoc budget for one battalion for a period of nine months in Somalia stood at about 52 million US dollars (Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Support of the African Union to the
and Peacebuilding initiatives tend to be open-ended missions that could extend for years depending on the conditions on the ground. Many missions such as those instituted by the UN has gone on for over the initially conceived durations. The AU lacks the capacity to engage in such long term mission.

The challenge engendered by the AU’s financial constraint also determines that its missions are often understaffed and under-resourced as noted in the second point. For instance, as observed by Evans (2006: 720), the African Union’s Mission in Sudan (AMIS) in 2006 was manned by only ‘seven thousand inadequately mandated, insufficiently mobile, and otherwise militarily incapable personnel on the ground’. Due to limited funds, the AU does not have the necessary sea and airlift capacity, training facilities, management structures, weapons, information technology and mobile carriers to engage in an effective peace operation (Williams 2011: 15). The AU also lack armoured helicopters, jet-powered aircraft, turboprop aircraft, and drones that are necessary for transporting troops and equipment in a timely manner (Diop, Peyton and McConville 2012). For instance, AMIS forces had to undertake dangerous journeys into mission areas like Darfur, Mali, Somalia and CAR stalked by vulnerability to landmines and the risk of ambushes by warring parties and attacks from irregular forces. For Diop, Peyton and McConville (2012), AMIS could have avoided the numerous attacks on its personnel – leading to the loss of over sixty (60) troops – if it had been supported by airlift resources as these could have been used to reinforce troops under ambush or attack. AU forces could also use the airlift capacity to strategically target the resources of defaulting parties and to ensure the safety of civilians who increasingly come under attack from warring parties (Møller 2009: 15; Williams 2006).

Moreover, as highlighted by the third point, the resource constraints of the organizations entails that the AU could hardly deploy a full-fledged military intervention in terms of Article 4(h) of the AU Constitutive Act. While military intervention is not a coveted interventionist mechanism, having the capability to deploy such mission serves as deterrence to would-be member states’ regimes and rebels that infringe on the rights of

Transitional Institutions of Somalia, 2005). For the AU, this almost amounts to half of the AU’s budget for 2008 which was US$140 million. See http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/EX%20CL%20DEC%20378%20-%20414%20-%20XII%29%20_E.pdf

113 Airlift resources would go a long way to enable the regional organization to contend to issues of illicit trade that take place in the seas and by air and prevent criminal and terrorist networks from easily occupying ‘ungoverned’ areas in Africa.
citizens. Nevertheless, as argued by Evans (2006: 711) the criteria for the responsibility to protect entails that military intervention should have reasonable prospects of success. This automatically rules out intervention against states where chances of success are remote, even when the intervention is justified. At present, the AU could rarely boast of a strong and well-resourced peacekeeping force let alone a robust and well-resourced force to engage in military intervention. Arguably, the AU had been expected to act proactively in states like Cote d’Ivoire and Libya where mass atrocities took place (Williams 2011). The AU however did not opt for humanitarian intervention because even if the regional body intends to intervene militarily, it does not have the capacity to do so.

This weakness, coupled with the poor confidence and political will of African actors, leads the AU to be marginalize by more powerful states who could easily make impacts with their resources as indicated by the fourth issue engendered by resource constraints. This thereby highlight the poor power base of the regional body. The 2011 Libyan revolution exposes the blatant marginalization of the AU in a crisis happening within its jurisdiction. It remains troubling reconciling the UN’s quick solution to the Libya conflict and its reluctance to establish an overt military intervention to the case of the conflict in Syria. Continually, the international body advance political settlement to the crisis in Syria but failed to do so Libya. Although the two conflict scenarios are different, the double standards exhibited in these circumstances beg the question whether African states are experimental zones or easy areas to carry out ulterior military interventions. Without a power base built around ample resources for the AU to pursue the provision of African solutions, external actors with the funds will continue to dictate the terms of Africa’s peace and override the views of African actors.

The funding challenges of the AU has led it to also rely on so-called experts contracted from donor countries. This is because

A. The AU neither has the resources to support the training of expert or the foresight to promote experts within the continent. Respondent 11 from the AU observes that

*The AU often invite experts from non-African states to advice and guide African personnel on peace and security projects. Over time, these trained-personnel regurgitate the ideas learnt from other spheres. Even though there remains value in information sharing across different values in the globe, there*
has been little attempt to invest in exploring the worth of African-value system through training home-grown experts in the continent.

B. Because donor countries provide the funds, they impose or strongly suggest experts from their countries on the AU because they perceive African actors to be lacking in adequate knowledge of what to do with the resources provided. This reaffirms the idea that power makes knowledge. Using the case studies of the AU mission in Darfur (AMIS) and the MICOPAX (Mission de Consolidation de la Paix) in CAR, Franke and Esmenjaud (2014) argue that due to the provision of expertise and funding, external actors have an immense influence on the African decisions to establish a mission under the grounds of ‘African solutions’ and external actors also hold sway on the mission’s mandate, composition and termination.

C. Furthermore, some African actors have become complacent with the idea that expertise resides in more powerful countries. The apparent financial constraints of the regional body further makes it amenable for African actors to play subservient roles to the donor countries.

As highlighted above, many respondents contend that African solutions does not restrict external support. However, that most of the funds and resources required for solving Africa’s problems are derived from, and dependent on, external bodies raises a huge concern about the ownership of AU missions that are geared towards providing African solutions to African problems. For respondents 3, 15 and 19, the idea of African solutions to African problems does not isolate the involvement of non-African actors but rather espouses African actors being at the forefront of efforts to address Africa’s issues so as to ensure that Africa’s values are respected. This is to ensure that the views and priorities of African societies are integral aspects of resolution attempts. Respondent 10 from the AU Mission in Somalia remarks that:

Member states should strive for financial independence for more political independence. As an African scholar once remarked, “He who pays the piper, calls the tunes.” Western nations, who are the leading donors, will always push for agenda (s) which may not reflect the aspirations of the majority of the stakeholders, but nevertheless hold sway through funding of resolution of conflicts mechanisms
For Komey, Osman, and Melakedingel (2013: 67), outsiders – who are not directly affected by conflicts – are mainly concerned about the immediate outcomes of crisis regardless of the process and the long-term consequences as portrayed by the response to the 2011 Libyan crisis. It is along these considerations that the former AU Commission Chairperson, Jean Ping insists that

"lasting peace on the continent can only be achieved if efforts to that end are based on the full involvement of Africa and a recognition of its leadership role because, as stressed by the Summit in August 2009, without such a role, there will be no ownership and sustainability; because we understand the problems far better; because we know which solutions will work, and because, fundamentally, these problems are ours, and our peoples will live with their consequences (AU Commission 2011: 4)."

Respondent 20 from a CSO insists that while the remedies for Africa’s issues should be open for the input of all stakeholders, it should be a process that Africans play leading roles in. This is in line with Article 7(i) of the PSC protocol which enjoins the PSC to ‘develop policies and action required to ensure that any external initiative in the field of peace and security on the continent takes place within the framework of the Union’s objectives and priorities’. This is to ensure that African values and contextual reality is given due respect and consideration in peace and security initiatives.

5.3 Concluding Remarks

This chapter has engaged with the pertinent ideals of African solutions in conflict resolution and its implication to the AU based on feedbacks received from consultations as well as primary and secondary sources. With pedigree on the theoretical of constructivism which holds that the international order is determined by the prevailing ideas at a time, this research attempts to engage with the prevailing ideas of what constitutes African solutions to African problems. From the feedbacks received from African experts and literary discourses on African tradition in conflict resolution, African solutions to African problems refers to the continent’s sense of responsibility to address its challenges in line with solutions, mechanisms, processes, initiatives that are informed by Africa’s contextual experiences and priorities. The chapter explored the entailment of African solutions from two broad perspectives namely responsibility and ownership. On African solutions as responsibility, the research highlights Africa’s normative stance for
The second section on African solutions as ownership explores the ideals of African solutions and the implications on Africa’s mechanisms for intervention. This is done by engaging the Africa Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) which provides the AU a platform to pursue peace in Africa despite recognizing the role of external actors like the UN in this regard. Notably, the establishment of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) and its five subsidiary mechanisms namely the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), the Panel of the Wise, the African Standby Force, the AU Policy on Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development, and the Peace Fund tells of the creativity of African actors for home grown peace and security initiatives. Using the five subsidiary bodies of the AU PSC, the dissertation explored the ideals of African solutions.

Through the CEWS, the African Union created a platform to engage in expedient conflict prevention and management initiatives. This is not only through identifying and arresting emerging threats to security but also by engaging in preventative measures through promoting and encouraging the value of good governance in African states. Good governance remains a coveted feature in Africa. The adherence of African elites to good governance is necessary to create an avenue for the drastic reduction of conflicts that arise from grievances emanating from the state oppression, corruption and poor service delivery. Good governance is also crucial for the representatives of the Member States of the AU to adopt and initiative projects that prioritizes African communities rather than the interests of few leading elites. In this section, the chapter further argues in line with the literary discourses for the community based approach of African conflict resolution against individual and elite driven conflict resolution outlooks.

The Panel of the Wise (PoW) further presents the AU the opportunity for the peaceful resolution of disputes. Based on feedback from peace and security experts as well as literary sources on African solutions, this section observes that Africa has prioritized the value of sustained negotiation in conflict settings. While negotiation in Africa faces the challenges of the moral and legitimate capacity of some African mediators, mediation practices in Africa provides a greater opportunity for the attainment of lasting solutions and a platform for conflicting parties as well as mediators to attain transformation. This
sub-subsection further highlight the crucial role of women in traditional African societies in terms of conflict resolution – a role which needs further re-emphasis in the contemporary setting where the role of women has rather been marginal.

The African Standby Force on the other hand is crucial to highlight the resolve and capacity of the regional body to enforce its peace and security agenda and highlight the regional bodies resolve for non-indifference in the affairs of member states. The peace operations of the AU provides the regional body the platform to stabilize conflict regions and protect the civilian population for negotiated solutions to take place.

The AU Policy on Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development stresses the regional body’s responsibility to support the peacebuilding and reconstruction of post-conflict states. Through this framework, the AU is challenged to ensure that peacebuilding efforts are congruent with the needs of the local community. One of the highlighted African values in peacebuilding is the restorative approach to conflict resolution that supports a reconciliation process that mends relations between conflict parties given that conflict parties are eventually expected to live together. In the same vein, African interveners are challenged to ensure the accountability of conflict parties while pursuing a restorative approach. This section also identified Africa’s value for a holistic approach to conflict reconciliation and resolution that encompass rational, emotional, spiritual and religious aspects so as to attain closure at all levels.

Lastly, the Peace Fund (PF) is a crucial mechanism for Africa to ensure Africa’s ownership in peace and security. Most of the funds for Africa’s peace operations have however been from external actors. It is worth emphasizing that the quest for African solutions is not a call for intellectual xenophobia and exclusivism. The community-based approach of African traditional conflict resolution demands the incorporation of ideas within a community and in this case, Africa exists within a larger international community. In line with this and in tandem with the tenets of constructivism that emphasizes social meaning, the African Union ought to ensure that its call for African solutions does not promote a prevailing impression that suggests ostracizing non-Africans.

\[\text{footnote}{114} \text{In the increasing interdependent global order, the society could not be considered in isolation of other societies.}\]
In the same vein, Africa should ensure that the involvement of external actors does not give undue privileges to powerful groups to subjugate Africa within the larger international system. It is along this view that Ayittey (2010) argues that African solutions “is one rooted in African culture, tradition, and heritage, but not cut off from the rest of the world.” As every challenge to humanity, conflict is a complex terrain that defies myopic approaches that does not pursue complementary initiatives to resolution and reconciliation. In the same vein, this does not entail pandering to the interests and values of dominant powers. For African actors to negotiate its values in global relations and be a significant actor in the international community, the continent needs to attain some confidence and power base through local funding and development.

The following chapter assesses the African Union’s attempt at operationalizing African solutions using the cases study of its response to the Somalia crisis.
Chapter 6:


6. Introduction

Based on the third primary objective of this thesis, this chapter engages with the achievements, challenges and prospects in the provision of African solutions using the case of the African Union’s intervention in Somalia. The chapter investigates the AU’s interventionist role in Somalia within two broad threshold of the ideals of ‘African solutions to African problems’ namely; African solutions as responsibility and ownership. This chapter relies on primary documents of the African Union, Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the UN for the validation of substantive decisions and issues regarding the African Union’s role in Somalia. Secondary sources were used for the contextualization of the arguments relating to the achievements, challenges and prospects in the application of African solutions. The chapter also adduces some interview data to enhance the perspectives on the African Union’s provision of African solutions in Somalia.

Section 1 sets the scene by contextualizing Somalia’s security issues that necessitated international concern and subsequent intervention by the AU in 2007. Section 2 examines the African Union’s responsibility stance in addressing the security challenge in Somalia in line with its commitment to provide African solutions. Section 3 interrogates the African ownership of the conflict resolution approach in Somalia.

6.1 Setting the Scene: Somalia’s Security Context

Like many analysis in the international system, the security context of Somalia have largely being described based on the dominant state-centric worldview.\textsuperscript{115} This has informed the numerous interventions geared towards restoring the collapsed state.

\textsuperscript{115} Since the treaty of Westphalia in 1467, state-centric perspectives have dominated the conception of security. As engaged in chapter 3, security from this paradigm is considered from the nature, survival and stability of state institutions. Along with the constructivist perspective, the dominance of the state centric perspective drives many interventions in the international system. This includes the intervention by African interveners who are increasingly acknowledging that the state-centric interventions are deficient in the African context.
structures and weaving “peace” in the country. The following sections engages with the security contexts of Somalia that precipitated the African Union’s response.

6.1.1 Instituting the State in Somalia

The Somali security crisis highlights the prevailing concern in Africa that a significant number of state institutions and state elites have not inspired confidence amongst Africans. Parallel to the experience of many states in Africa, the state-system, introduced by colonial powers in Somalia, re-organized the country’s political and socio-economic system. Prior to colonialism however, Somalia could be conceived as a large ethnic group that is made up of many clans and sub-clans (Elmi 2010: 17). Some authors hold that Somalia had a relatively peaceful pre-colonial history partly because Somalis were bound by a common language, ancestry, nomadic pastoral culture and they profess the same Islamic faith (Ahmed 1999: 236; Fitzgibbon 1982: 2). Coupled with these commonalities, the fluidity of clanship contributed to the relative peace in pre-colonial Somalia as argued by Ismail (2010: 9) and Brooks (2010: 9). Due to alliances, marriages, protection rackets, etc., one can take on membership of other clans thereby maintaining some level of integration and cohesion in Somali communities.

Without romanticizing Somalia’s the pre-colonial history, pre-colonial Somalia has had many inter communal tensions. Some scholars consider Somalia as a historically vengeful society. For instance, based on the *dia* (blood money) decent, one lineage could pursue revenge from any other group or individual that harms or threatens members of their lineage (Emathe 2006: 8). The dia-paying group ‘is a cluster of close kinsmen, united by a specific contractual alliance’ to support one another (Emathe 2006: 8; Ahmed 1999: 236). Members of the dia-paying groups are obliged to help fellow members who are in crisis situation through practices such as mixed herding, loan sharing, alms giving and *Xoola Goyn* (giving animals).

The dia-paying groups also share a collective responsibility for making reparation for wrongs done to someone outside the group (Pham 2011: 157). Conversely, when a wrong is done to a member of their group, they collectively seek vengeance or share the

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116 The Somali ethnic group comprises the following major clans: the Darod, Dir, Hawiye, Isaaq, Digil and Rahanweyn clans (Elmi 2010: 17). The Darod, Isaaq, Hawiye, Dir, Digil and Rahanweyn clans are further made up of several sub-clans, primary lineages and dia (blood money)-paying group.
compensation that may be given for atonement.\textsuperscript{117} It is through this process that the term *dia* derives its meaning “compensation”. To resolve conflicts, a traditional Somali mediator in conflicts, known as ‘Wadad’, mediates by assigning *dia* fees (Brooks 2010: 10). While seeming to portray hostility, the *dia* system maintained some balance of power in the communities as the fear of reprisals precluded members of the society from initiating conflicts; and when a group member incites violence, the other members seek means to make atonement and deescalate the crisis. For Pham (2011) and Emathe (2006: 8), most conflicts in traditional Somali society where resolved at the level of the *dia*-paying group and for some observers, the *dia*-paying group is one of the most stable groups within the Somali clan families. At the clan level nevertheless, Somali clans had collective responsibilities for settling acts committed by, or against their members under the leadership of a council of elders. The clans dealt with both personal and communal conflicts through the application of traditional and *Sharia* laws (Ahmed 1999: 237).

However, the colonial and post-colonial era introduced a state system that disrupted the dynamism of the traditional socio-political system among Somalis. Somalia’s colonial era began in the late 19th century when British forces took control of the northern part of Somalia in 1886 while southern Somalia which was run by the Sultans of Obbia and Aluula became an Italian colony between 1897 and 1908 (Elmi 2010). In 1960, the British and Italian Somali colonies were granted independence and the two regions amalgamated to form a united Somali state despite their different colonial experience (Ahmed 1999: 239).

Some conflict analysts argue that the cause of the crises in Somalia can be traced to the rapid union of the Somali territories – the British Somalia and the Italian Somalia – to form the United Somali state in 1960 (Ahmed 1999: 239). This is because Somali leaders, especially those from the north, became disillusioned with the unification movement almost immediately after independence because power was immediately concentrated in the southern region to the dismay of northerners. Under the April 1960 constitutional conference held in Mogadishu, Mogadishu which was in the southern region was made the capital city. Key government offices where instituted in the south and manned by southern Somalis (Ahmed 1999: 239). The leaders from the south made hasty and non-inclusive plans that failed to contend with the issues of underdevelopment and socio-

\textsuperscript{117} Based on such vengeance-relationship, it is no doubt that the use of one clan by Barre’s regime to attack another brought a whole lot of demands for vengeance among aggrieved clan groupings.
economic inequalities in the north (Ahmed 1999: 239). Ismail (2010: 62) notes that the north and south officials were receiving unequal payments and were operating under ‘different conditions of services’. The disadvantaged northerners grew acrimonious of their situation in the state.

On their part, the southern Somalia’s elites, who benefited from the colonial-type state structure, became complicit in the region’s woes. As noted by Brown (2001:210), ‘the roles played by domestic elites in transforming potentially violent situations into deadly confrontations’ cannot be underestimated. The subsequent section thus engages with the complicity of Somali domestic elites in the country’s security issues which contributed to the uneasy stasis of Somali until the present time.

6.1.2 Towards State Collapse: The Failures of Somalia’s State Elites

From independence in 1960 until state collapse in 1991, Somalia’s governance was largely wanting as it was characterized by corruption, incompetence and oppression. In the attempt to make sense of the demands of the newly introduced state structure, Somali nationalists, having fought for independence, began an infamous scramble to enjoy the spoils of independence. The nine years of civilian leadership (1960-1969) in Somalia was mired by chronic mismanagement with a proliferation of political parties that were divided along clan lines with competing interests and unstable allies (Ahmed and Green 1999: 117). The utter disregard of the interest of the electorate and the discontents against the state resulted in a bloodless coup on 21 October 1969 as masterminded by Maj. Gen. Muhammad Siad Barre, the Commander of the Somali Army. With the deposition of Mohamed Ibrahim Egal’s civilian regime, Barre took over the reins of leadership from 1969 to 1991 (Ismail 2010: 86). Upon assuming power, Barre suspended the country’s democratic institutions including the constitution, National Assembly, Supreme Court and political parties (Ismail 2010: 85). He abolished all forms of political and professional association and sought to mould a new Somalia (Ahmed and Green 1999: 117).

Reckoning that clan identity and affiliation was incommensurate with the nationalism and scientific socialism he championed, Barre embarked on an aggressive campaign to extirpate clan identity by abolishing clan structures and rendering the positions of traditional clan elders impotent (Ahmed 1999: 240). People were barred from making references to clan identity. Pham (2011:159) observes that under Barre’s regime, ‘jaalle’, a non-kinship term meaning friend or comrade was introduced to substitute the traditional
polite address ina’adeer (cousin). Regardless of the objective for usurping power, Barre’s regime complicated Somalia’s issues.

Barre introduced a socialist experiment in the country and controlled every facet of the economy. Instead of developing the state, the socialist practice created a platform for Barre’s regime to use national funds and foreign aids for self-enrichment and to finance clampdowns on opposition groups. The socialist experiment further created a large, wasteful, corrupt and inefficient public sector because public offices were not held by merit but by loyal elites and clan members of Barre (Menkhaus 2006: 80). Notably, the state was run by Barre’s Darod sub-clans specifically the Marehan sub-clan of his paternal relations; the Ogaden clan of his maternal kin; and the Dulbahante clan of his principal son-in-law Ahmed Suleiman Abdulle (Emathe 2006: 12).

To maintain order and silence opposition voices, Barre militarized the state and used force to stamp his leadership. This encouraged a wide range of fear and resentment towards state institutions (Emathe 2006). Similitude to colonial tactics, Barre devised the divide-and-rule tactics by using his Darod networks to dominate and suppress opposition movements that developed among aggrieved clans such as the Merjerten, Isaaq, Habagidir clans that were deemed enemy clans. Barre pitted such clans against each other by using military officers from one clan to engage in violent killings of members of another clan. As noted by Ahmed and Green (1999: 118), ‘to create enmity between clans, senior military officers in the Somali army from Isaaq clans were deliberately posted in the Merjerten regions where the government was waging war against local people’.

With a waning popularity among the populace, Barre capitalized on a ‘pan-Somali vision’ by launching an irredentist struggle to regain the Ogaden (Eastern region of Ethiopia) from Ethiopia in 1977. This was is in a desperate bid to assert his legitimacy and credibility. The pan-Somali vision known as Soomaaliweyn (greater Somalia) is an aspiration by Somalis for a unified Somalia (as it was in pre-colonial era) that encompasses the Somali region, the Ogaden region as well as Djibouti, and North Frontier District (NFD) of Kenya (Makhubela 2010: 43, Emathe 2006: 10). Ismail (2010:63) notes that ‘every Somali wanted the ‘Missing Territories’ to become part of Somali’ as it had been prior to colonial boundaries. Successive Somali governments had been unable to

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118 Ismail (2010:155) notes that ‘in 1986, 34 out of 47 army brigades were commanded by officers from three clans – Marehan, Ogaden, Dulbahante’.
achieve this pan-Somali vision. Thus, Barre cashed in on this to engage in the 1977-1978 Ogaden war with Ethiopia in a bid to regain the Ogaden region (Makhubela 2010: 43)\textsuperscript{119}. Inauspicious for Barre, the Soviet Union, whom he relied on, switched support to Mengistu Haile Mariam’s Ethiopia refusing to back the Somalis during the Ogaden war.\textsuperscript{120} With limited support, Somalia was ruthlessly defeated by the Soviet and Cuban backed Ethiopians. To Barre’s disadvantage, the defeat of the Somalis in the Ogaden War further antagonized Somalis against the regime\textsuperscript{121} and the hope for national unity gave way to disintegration and disunity (Emathe 2006: 12).

Moreover, after the 1977-78 Ogaden war, arms proliferated in Somalia and dormant opposition groups formed armed rebellious movements against Barre’s dictatorial regime (Ismail 2010: 151). The worsening economic situation of Somalia made it easy for opposition movements to recruit a significant number of militants from poor, disadvantaged and aggrieved Somali backgrounds. In 1978, Merjersten officers and clansmen formed the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) under the leadership of Colonel Ahmed Yusuf (Emathe 2006: 12). This was followed by formation of the Somali National Movement (SNM) by Isaaq clan members (Pham 2011:160). The United Somali Congress (USC) dominated by the Hawiye clan and the Ogadeni-led Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) – emerged in opposition to Barre’s regime as well. The sole aim of the leaders of the opposition groups was to depose and replace Barre (Ismail 2010: 160). With diminished external support, Barre’s corrupt regime disintegrated and weakened.

Between 1989 and 1990, the Hawiye based movement, the USC, led by General Mohammed Farah Aidid – and supported by the businessman Ali Mahdi – launched a relentless military campaign against Barre’s regime in the south leading to the demise of Barre’s regime. This was marked by the escape of Barre and his son-in-law General Siad Hersi Morgan to the South-west of the country in the Gedo region, Siad Barre’s home area on 26 of January 1991 (Department of State 2011). The next section provides an overview of the challenges faced by post-Barre’s Somalia leading to various international interventions, including the AU’s interventionist role in the country.

\textsuperscript{119} In 1945, the British colonial administrators had given the power of autonomy over the Ogaden region to Ethiopia to the dismay of the Somalis who denied the validity of the arrangement.

\textsuperscript{120} After the Ogaden War in 1978, the relationship between Somalia and the Soviets was severed and Somalia turned it allegiance to the west (U.S Department of State 2011).

\textsuperscript{121} Thomas Scheff (1994:301) notes that when people ‘feel desperately humiliated’, they ‘choose imagined communities over real ones’. Somalis began to nurture the urgency of a regime change.
6.1.3 Failure of State Revival and Futile Interventionist Attempts

The fall of Barre’s regime created a political vacuum and cataclysmic civil war between clans, warlords, religious opportunists, nomads and pastoralists (Ayittey 1994; Menkhaus 2006; Pham 2011: 160). Pham (2011: 160) observes that post-Siad Barre’s Somalia turned into ‘a land of clan (and clan segment) republics where the would-be traveler needed to secure the protection of each group whose territory he sought to traverse’. The drought and famine that ensued in 1992 amidst the heavy fighting further compounded the Somali crisis. Menkhaus (2006:81) observes that the civil war and famine caused the death of over 300,000 Somalis between 1991 and 1992. Given the devastating civil war and the escalating food crisis in country, the UN Security Council (UNSC) adopted resolution 794 to intervene in Somalia in 1992 by establishing the UN operations in Somalia (UNOSOM). As the initiator and lead country for the mission, the U.S deployed 30,000 troops to Somalia (Makhubela 2010: 62).

Somalis however have tended to resent the fact that the solution to their problems will come from outside forces whose agenda were suspicious (Ayittey 1994). This resentment, coupled with the entanglement of the peacekeeping mission in the fighting, led to the killing of 18 U.S Army Rangers in 1993. Following the killings, the then President of the U.S, Bill Clinton declared Black Hawk Down (Operation Gothic Serpent) and ordered the withdrawal of US forces from Somalia in October 1993. The remaining UN forces, mainly Pakistani troops, lingered on in Somalia until early March 1995 when they withdrew from the state in realization of the futility of their military effort in the country.

For Ismail (1999: 247) the lack of information and the un-preparedness of the UN mission led to an un-strategic, uncreative and uncoordinated humanitarian intervention. Through its delivery of weapons to local police and allied forces, the UN's withdrawal also left Somalia with many weapons than it had earlier (Muigei 2013). Menkhuas (2006: 75) notes that the extended period of Somali state collapse led to the complication of the interest of several Somali actors and the failed UN’s intervention led to the further deterioration of the security context. Leaders of different clans and factions including defeated Siad Barre’s generals turned into warlords vying for the control of major Somali cities (Makhubela 2010: 48). Through arms sales, piracy, smuggling, trafficking and other illicit economic activities, Somali warlords benefited from the political economy of violence.
(Marten 2007: 54). With these incentives, warlords proliferated in Somalia by 1996 and the conflict shifted from a predominantly clan war to wars among warlords.

It is worth noting however that much of the contestations and strife in Somalia is mainly in the Capital City, Mogadishu as well as the southern region of Somalia. As will be discussed in-depth in section 6.3.4.2, many regions in Somalia – such as Somaliland and Puntland – had formed independent/autonomous states with relevant government structures that provided relative order albeit with some security challenges resulting from the general political instabilities in the state.\textsuperscript{122}

Since 1993 nonetheless, the UN had organized over ten highly publicized and costly reconciliation conferences outside Somalia with fixed timetables to address the Somali crises. However, the conferences were indicted for isolating the affected communities, the elders, merchants, women and other mushrooming stakeholders within the Somali region (Menkhaus 2003). Focusing on the reconstitution of a central state, the conferences facilitated the signing of agreements that ended with the end of the conferences. The protracted failure to revive the state earned Somalia the reputation of being a prototypical collapsed state; until recent years when the consideration of the country holds some degree of optimism due to the establishment of a new Federal Government in Somalia in 2012.

6.1.3.1 The Emergence and Growth of Political Islamist Movements

Currently, one of the major challenges facing Somalia as well as the international community is on how to contend with the armed radical Islamist movement in the country. The rise of armed Islamist movements could be traced to the mid-1990s. For Taarnby and Hallundbaeki (2010: 10), the collapsed and anarchic nature of the state created a vacuum for Islamic fundamentalism to fester. At a time when clan struggles tended to disintegrate the country and plunge it further into anarchy, some fundamental Islamists reckoned that political Islam is the unifying and remedial movement for a country sharing the same Islamic faith (Tadesse 2001: 1). The first armed Islamist movement is the Al-Ittihad al-Islamiya (AIAI) which was a political movement formed in 1984.\textsuperscript{123} When the central

\textsuperscript{122} With the Capital City, Mogadishu being in turmoil, the entire country is largely conceived to be embroiled in strife.

\textsuperscript{123} The Al-Ittihad al-Islamiya (AIAI) was formed in the 1980’s following the weakening of Barre’s regime. It is important to note that in the 1970s, Siad Barre had disbanded every Islamist movement in the country in his bid to monopolize power. It is within this grievance that the AIAI emerged in 1984 following the numerous opposition to Barre’s regime. The leaders of the group were intellectuals who graduated from
government collapsed, the AIAI took up arms in 1992 as a political movement (Taanby and Hallundbaeki 2010: 10, Hoehne 2009: 7, Medhane 2001: 1). In 1996, the group was defeated by Ethiopian forces. The dispersed members of the AIAI joined the *Sharia courts* that emerged among sub-clans in the mid-1990s - courts that later merged to form the Islamic Court Union (ICU).

*The Islamic Court Union*

At the outset, the Sharia courts among various sub-clans had power only within their local jurisdiction and they assumed policing and adjudicating roles and restored order in several Somali regions (Menkhaus 2006: 86). In 2004 however, leaders and militias of the disparate local *Sharia* courts formed the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) also known as the Supreme Council of Islamic Courts (SCIC) or the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC). With its base in Mogadishu, the ICU, headed by Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys, grew to become a force to reckon with. The ICU ended the extortionist regime of warlords, reopened the port of Mogadishu, restored security and provided basic governmental services (Pham 2011: 163). The ICU was nevertheless accused for imposing restrictions on civic organizations, outlawing local administrations, and marginalizing traditional elders (Menkhaus 2006: 7).

However, the governance and order offered by the ICU received little support from the international community and they were demonized by reporters. The radical positions of extremist ICU members alarmed the United States and the Ethiopians who were intolerant to Islamic fundamentalism. With the 9/11 attack on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon in the US, Somalia, as a failed state, had long been considered as a breeding ground for international terrorists. The U.S intelligence agencies claimed that Al-Qaeda used Somalia for their operations (Emathe 2006: 2).124 As an Islamic movement led by Aweys who was a prominent figure of the AIAI in the 1990s and an al-Qaeda suspect, the ICU raised suspicious and mistrust for the US government and the western world. Added to the mistrust, the ICU was accused of refusing to cooperate with the United States in exposing some purported members of al-Qaeda in the areas under their control.

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124 Pakistan, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia who stretched the interpretation of the Sharia laws to another level different beyond the traditional form of Islam in Somalia.

124 Following the 9/11 attack on the World Trade Center by terrorists in 2001, U.S government identified Somalia as one of the feasible hot spot for international terrorism, especially the Al Qaeda movement.
Meanwhile, to guarantee the monopoly of power, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia which was formed in 2004 accused the ICU of being allied with al-Qaeda and they solicited external forces to root out the supposed terrorist organization (Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Situation in Somalia, January 2007). The peace talks known as the inter-Somali dialogue organized by the League of Arab States – for the TFG and the ICU from June to July 2006 – failed to create binding agreement between the parties (Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Situation in Somalia, January 2007). The peace talks was to get the parties to agree to reconstitute the Somali national army and national police force and work towards the re-integration of the forces of the UIC (Union of Islamic Courts ‘UIC’ also used to refer to the ICU), the TFG and armed militias once an agreement on a political programme was in place; practice the principle of peaceful co-existence between Somalia and its neighbors; discuss remaining aspects, including political, power-sharing and security issues (Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Situation in Somalia, 2007).

In June 2006, a U.S. backed coalition of warlords and business leaders - a coalition known as the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism – engaged in a futile battle with the ICU militias. The ICU emerged victorious and took control of much of Mogadishu and their control gradually extended as far as the central and southern regions of Somalia as well as the southern border of Puntland in the north and the Kenyan frontier in the south (Makhubela 2010: 62). In October 2006, the ICU declared ‘a “Jihad” against Ethiopia and expressed its intention to extend its authority throughout Somalia. This raised renewed fears in the international community that the ICU could stir up a regional conflict.

By December 2006, the United States Assistant Secretary of State for Africa Jendayi Frazier made a public announcement that the ICU was led by Al-Qaeda thereby limiting the chances of dialogue with the movement. As a consequence, the ICU were marginalized from peace talks and assumed to be villains. Eventually, the ICU was defeated and routed by heavily armed and well-trained U.S backed Ethiopian forces on the eve of Christmas in 2006.
**Al-Shabaab Movement**

At present, much of the security considerations in Somalia is considered from the perspective of the battle against the Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen (Movement of Warrior Youth commonly known as Al-Shabaab). Al-Shabaab was a militant group of the ICU which grew and became one of the fiercest militant Islamist movements domestically and internationally. The Al-Shabab militant group was formed by one of the ICU extremist leaders, Sheikh Hassan Dahir ‘Aweys, to serve as the military wing of the ICU. After the Ethiopian forces destroyed the ICU in 2006, the Al-Shabaab movement survived and became an independent entity. The Al-Shabaab governance framework is considered to be based on a decentralized system of governance where various leaders govern their home areas; this thereby made it possible for the group to garner support from both clan ties and Islamic identities (Pham 2011: 171).

In January 2009, the movement took control of several parts of central and southern Somalia and imposed Sharia administration in those areas. Menkhaus (2008) notes that Al-Shabaab insurgent attacks were ‘aimed at ensuring that Somalia is not governed according to the whims and desires of the western nations and their puppet regimes (the TFG)’. In a bid to wade off external influences in Somalia, the movement took on international interests. The organization made a formal declaration of affiliation to Al-Qaeda in July 2010 after series of attacks in Uganda and Kenya. The preoccupation of the international community to date has since revolved around reining in on the excesses of the group, exterminating the movement as well as strengthening and extending state power over the Somali territory.

### 6.2 Africa’s Shift to Greater Responsibility in Somalia

The following sections consider the crucial role of African actors under the coordination of the African Union in supporting peace processes in Somalia.

#### 6.2.1 The Revival of State Institution in Somalia

Since the failed military operation in Somalia in the early 1990s, the United Nations has been indecisive and rather reluctant in intervening or authorizing a peace operation in the

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125 Apart from the local recruits, the Al-Shabaab movement recruited a significant number of people from Somalis in Diaspora. It is alleged that Somalis in Diaspora fund the movement and its insurgent activities. Other Al-Shabaab recruits came from law enforcement officials and terrorist networks (Pham 2011: 171).
complex security context of Somalia. After the UN military intervention in Somalia ended in 1995, much of the UN’s involvement in Somalia was to support peace talks for Somalia together with African actors as well as the Arab league. However, having been established in 2002 with the enthusiasm for African solutions to African problems, the African Union found it as a matter of responsibility for Africa to respond to the Somali crisis. The most fruitful intervention of Africa in Somalia began in 2002 when the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) – in line with the enthusiasm around the formation of a more robust continental organization – took on the responsibility for Somalia’s peace process with the support of the international community. From 15 October 2002, IGAD sponsored the Somalia National Reconciliation Conferences that were held in Kenya. After 2 years of IGAD sponsored negotiations, the Conferences eventually led to the signing of the ‘Declaration on the Cessation of Hostilities and the Structures and Principles of the Somalia National Reconciliation Process’, also known as the Nairobi Peace Accords, by 22 Somali leaders on 27 October 2002 (Report of the Interim Chairperson on the Reconciliation Process in Somalia, August 2003).

The Declaration was followed by the adoption of the Transitional Federal Charter in 2004 which paved way for the establishment of the internationally recognized Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in October 2004. Remarkably, this was the first time, a viable agreement was reached in Somalia after about fourteen failed peace conferences since 1991. To constitute the TFG, a power sharing deal was brokered between four major clan-families, the Darod, Dir, Hawiye, and Digil Mirifle clans (Digil and Rahanweyn) including some minority clans (Pham 2011: 162). Based on a unicameral system, the TFG, composed of 275-member Transitional Federal Parliament (TFP) of faction leaders and warlords, was intended to be a vehicle of national unity (Menkhaus 2008). The TFG was expected to be an interim arrangement fulfilling a five year political transition to create a platform for elections that will usher in a new Somali government in 2009.

6.2.2 The Considerations for an African Peace Support Operation in Somalia

Because the TFG did not emerge from the social dynamics in Somalia, the transitional government was unable to assert major influence in the country because Mogadishu

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126 After years of state collapse, Somalia had put Africa on the map as a region with a typical collapsed state where numerous international interventions have failed.
127 It is important to note that the intervention of IGAD falls within the AU APSA structure which requires Regional Mechanisms to respond to challenges in their respective regions.
128 However, the Isaaq clan refused to participate in the power sharing deal (pham 2011:162).
warlords and the ICU were already powerful in the region and were unwilling to recognize the legitimacy of a TFG. Due to the control of the Warlords in Mogadishu and the ICU, the TFG officials could hardly enter the capital city and they run the government from Nairobi, Kenya.\textsuperscript{129}

To explore appropriate means to support the TFG and the Nairobi Peace Accords, the AU and IGAD instituted a Joint Technical Fact-Finding Mission to Somalia from 22 May to 2 June 2003. The mission revealed the interest of ‘Somali parties and large sections of the population for the AU to deploy a military force in Somalia to carry out disarmament of the military factions and other armed groups’ (Report of the Interim Chairperson on the Reconciliation Process in Somalia, 2003). The 2003 Report of the Fact-Finding Mission thus proposed the establishment of ‘a mechanism to monitor the cessation of hostilities in the form of an AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) that would comprise up to 75 military observers and civilian staff’ (ibid).

However, considering the ongoing security challenges in Somalia, the AU considered the need for a full-fledged peace support mission in Somalia rather than the military and civilian observer type of mission. In July/August 2003, the AU commissioned a Reconnaissance Mission to Somalia. The Reconnaissance Mission however advised the AU not to deploy a peacekeeping mission because of the insecurity in the region (Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Outcomes of the Fact-Finding/Reconnaissance Mission to Somalia and the IGAD Military Planning Meetings, 2005).

With the limited support base of the TFG in Somalia, the TFG President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed relentlessly appealed for an African peacekeeping mission to enable the TFG move to Somalia and extend its authority. At the 18\textsuperscript{th} meeting of the PSC on 25 October 2004, President Abdullahi Yusuf appealed to the AU to pledge and mobilise ‘a 15 to 20 thousand peacemaking force comprising the Frontline States, Africa at large, brotherly Arab States and the rest of the world, including Indian Ocean countries’ to enhance the security in the country, back the government and regain the Capital City, Mogadishu to facilitate the move of the newly formed government from its base in Nairobi to the Capital City (Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Support of the African Union

\textsuperscript{129} When the Kenyan government grew tired of harbouring and paying the bills of the leaders, the TFG where enjoined to return to Somalia in 2005 (Emathe, 2006:2).
to the Transitional Institutions of Somalia, 2005). President Yusuf further requested that ‘until such a time when the Transitional Federal Government can stand on its own feet and generate revenues through taxation and resource mobilisation, the international community has to bear the financial burden of bringing peace and security to Somalia and putting together a reconstruction program of about US$15 billion, including the security package’ (ibid).

Prior to this formal request from the TFG in October, the AU had again dispatched a second Reconnaissance Mission to Somalia in August 2004. Contrary to the first mission, the second mission advised the AU to deploy a mission in light of the supposed improved security situation in the country (Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Outcomes of the Fact-Finding/Reconnaissance Mission to Somalia and the IGAD Military Planning Meetings, 2005). To build consensus around the possible deployment of the mission, the AU Commission convened a number of internal and inclusive meetings with experts from the AU and its Member States, IGAD, TFG, EU, Arab League, UN, Italy, Sweden (Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Outcomes of the Fact-Finding/Reconnaissance Mission to Somalia and the IGAD Military Planning Meetings, May 2005). The meetings boosted the AU’s confidence to deploy an interim peace support mission prior to a takeover by a more robust UN peace operation.

Meanwhile, IGAD, in accord with its commitment to resolve the crisis in its region, established a 10, 500-strong IGAD Peace Support Mission to Somalia (IGASOM) in March 2005. As a welcome development, the AU approved the mission on 12 May 2005 and the regional body enjoined the international community to provide logistic, political and financial support to the mission.130 Counting on the deployment of IGASOM, the AU PSC – following discussions between IGAD and the AU in June 2005 noted that the AU will take over the peace operation of IGASOM after some months (Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Outcomes of the Fact-Finding/Reconnaissance Mission to Somalia and the IGAD Military Planning Meetings, May 2005). However, faced with resource constraints, IGASOM failed to be operationalized. The contentions around the involvement of Front Line States (FLS) – neighbouring countries of Somalia – in the peacekeeping mission further dampened the commitment to peacekeeping mission in the country. With Sudan and Uganda as the potential troop contributors from

IGAD, there was no requisite political will to deploy due to Sudan’s internal crisis that left Uganda as the only viable contributor (Hull 2008: 24).

In mid-2005, notwithstanding, the TFG resolved to move to Somalia (UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia, 16 June 2005). The Prime Minister of the TFG, Mohamed Ali Ghedi attempted to enter the capital city but he escaped an assassination attempt (UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia, 16 June 2005; para 8). Ghedi together with other TFG officials resorted to settle at Jowhar, a province at the north of Mogadishu, under the protection of a local warlord Mohammed Dheere and fellow Hawiye clansman131 and subsequently to Baidoa (Emathe, 2006: 2). In August 2006, with the support from the US government, the Ethiopian forces had moved to Baidoa to ostensibly ‘support the TFG authorities but also to create a buffer zone in case more radical voices within the SCIC (or the ICU) gained the upper hand and incited irredentist violence in eastern Ethiopia’ (Bruton and Williams 2014: 37). The ICU’s alleged fundamentalist views as well as their anti-Ethiopian rhetoric alarmed the Ethiopia government leading to the US-backed Ethiopian assault in 2006 that routed the ICU. With the defeat of the ICU, the Ethiopian backed TFG was installed in Mogadishu.

However, the internal divisions among the political elites132 as well as the divergent interests of the elites undermined the TFG’s governance role in the country. Particularly, the infightings between President Abdillahi Yusuf133 and Prime Minister Ali Mohammed Gedi complicated the relationship within the TFG134 and hindered its capacity to reach a consensus and provide political services to Somalis (Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Situation in Somalia, January 2008). In an attempt to monopolize power, the political elites of TFG did not co-opt important stakeholders (warlords and the ICU leaders) in the governance structure through sustained negotiation and compromise. As observed earlier, the TFG repeatedly referred to the ICU as having ties with Al-Qaeda leading the U.S. backed Ethiopian forces to sack the ICU from Mogadishu on the 28 of

133 With the resignation of the intransigent Abdullahi Yusuf as president of the TFG, Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed was installed the president of the TFG in January 2009.
134 Eventually in 2007, Prime Minister Mohammed Gedi resigned from office.
December 2006. Yet, the TFG government and security forces were disorganized, corrupt and ineffective enough to garner support from the local population (Pham 2011: 165).

6.2.3 The Establishment of the African Union’s Peace Support Operation in Somalia

By 2005, the AU has already garnered significant support from the international community to establish a peace operation in Somalia. To popularize and garner ideas from the local population about the deployment of an AU mission, the AU dispatched a Fact-Finding/Reconnaissance Mission to Somalia from 14 to 26 February 2005. The mission received ambivalent feedbacks. On the one hand, some Somalis wanted some definitive peace and order in the country with the support of a legitimate external force while others object the deployment based on the desire for Somalis to determine their future without external interference.

Based on the latter, participants at a meeting with representatives of the business community, ‘expressed the desire to see that, first, the Somalis fully reconcile among themselves before any involvement/deployment of external forces’ (Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Outcomes of the Fact-Finding/Reconnaissance Mission to Somalia and the IGAD Military Planning Meetings, May 2005). This sentiment was further re-echoed by the Acting Chairman of the Somali National Alliance (SNA), Abukar Ganey, who resided at the Presidential Palace. Ganey insists that the SNA is:

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\text{totally opposed to the deployment of foreign troops in Somalia, which ever, be they “African, European or Arab”. The organization preferred that the Somalis themselves solve their own problems, including on the issue of disarmament. In the view of the organization, the deployment of foreign troops in the country would bring more problems than there are currently in the country (ibid).}
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The leaders of the ICU also stated that they ‘did not see the need for the deployment of foreign forces in Somalia’ (Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Outcomes of the Fact-Finding/Reconnaissance Mission to Somalia and the IGAD Military Planning Meetings, 2005).

Many other actors welcomed the idea of the AU intervention. However they cautioned against the deployment of Front Line States (FLS) who have high stakes in the conflict that could jeopardize peace effort in Somalia. At the meeting with stakeholders, some
stakeholders ‘expressed opposition to the deployment of an AU PSM (Peace Support Mission) in Somalia which could include troops from the FLS’. This was informed by the view that ‘Ethiopia and Djibouti had taken sides with the different factions in the country, thereby becoming part of the problem’ (Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Outcomes of the Fact-Finding/Reconnaissance Mission to Somalia and the IGAD Military Planning Meetings, May 2005).

While others opposed the idea of the inclusion of front line states, some such as the President insists that “it is unacceptable for any deployment, whether AU or IGAD, to exclude the FLS; the TFG itself has considered the matter and has a common view that the Frontline States have to be involved in any deployment in Somalia” (Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Outcomes of the Fact-Finding/Reconnaissance Mission to Somalia and the IGAD Military Planning Meetings, May 2005).

Considering the consultations with relevant stakeholders as well as the mounting need to restore stability in the east African region, the African Union established the African Union Mission in Somalia on 19 January 2007 (AU PSC Communique, 19 January 2007). The mission was subsequently approved by the UNSC on 20 February 2007 through Resolution 1744. The mission was meant to be a six month deployment to stabilize the country and pave way for the establishment of a UN Peace operation (Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Situation in Somalia, January 2007: Para 38). In view of the contentious context with which the mission was established, Alpha Oumar Konare, the former AU Commission Chairperson, highlighted that

I am fully aware of the challenges facing our Organization. Indeed, unlike the United Nations, the AU does not have a system of assessed contributions to fund its peace support operations; we rely to a very large extent on the support of our partners. This means that the funding of our operations remains precarious. I am also aware of the limitations of the Commission with respect to its management capacity to oversee large-scale peace support operations, as clearly demonstrated by the AMIS operation. Finally, the challenges of an operation in Somalia, a country that has been without central Government for the past 16 years and where security remains precarious, cannot be

135 The establishment of AMISOM was to provide an exit strategy for the Ethiopian forces who increasingly met with the aversion of Somalis.
underestimated. Yet, the African Union cannot abdicate its responsibilities vis-à-vis Somalia and fail its people. The African Union is the only Organization the Somali people could readily turn to as they strive to recover from decades of violence and untold suffering. We have a duty and an obligation of solidarity towards Somalia. Furthermore, enhancing the prospects for lasting peace and reconciliation in Somalia will have a tremendous positive impact on the Horn of Africa as a whole, a region that has been and is still plagued by the scourge of conflict and instability (Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Situation in Somalia, January 2007: Para 36-37).

6.2.4 The Contribution of AMISOM to Somalia’s Security

The AU’s mission in Somalia has been characterized by mixed results that evoke negativities and/or hope for the stability of the country. The initial mandate of AMISOM at the time of its formation was to:

- to support dialogue and reconciliation in Somalia, working with all stakeholders,
- to provide, as appropriate, protection to the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs) and their key infrastructure, to enable them carry out their functions,
- to assist in the implementation of the National Security and Stabilization Plan of Somalia, particularly the effective reestablishment and training of all inclusive Somali security forces, bearing in mind the programs already being implemented by some of Somalia’s bilateral and multilateral partners,
- to provide, within capabilities and as appropriate, technical and other support to the disarmament and stabilization efforts,
- to monitor, in areas of deployment of its forces, the security situation,
- to facilitate, as may be required and within capabilities, humanitarian operations, including the repatriation and reintegration of refugees and the resettlement of IDPs, and
- to protect its personnel, installations and equipment, including the right of self-defense (AU PSC Communiqué, 19 January 2007)
With limited resources and personnel as well as the complex and unpredictable nature of Somali, AMISOM was constrained in its ability to attain its envisaged mandate (Cilliers, Boshoff and Aboagye, 2010: 3). AMISOM was particularly constrained from effecting its mandate in terms of disarmament, stabilization and humanitarian operation due to the limited number of peacekeeping force on the ground. Much of its mission revolved around protective key government building and officials (Bruton and Williams 2014).

One of the major reason for its restricted scope of work is that the mission lacked personnel to stabilize Somalia, facilitate disarmament, mitigate the humanitarian crisis or look towards repatriation and resettlement (Agada 2008: 51). As at 31 March 2008 over 13 months after it was mandated in January 2007, the strength of the Mission stood at 2,614 troops (two Ugandan battalions and one Burundian battalion), which is about 30 per cent of the authorized total strength of 8000 troops (Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the State and Prospects of the Peace and Reconciliation Process in Somalia, June 2008). With this force strength, AMISOM was mainly on the defensive. AMISOM forces increasingly came under direct attack from better-armed militant movements like Al-Shabaab. For instance, soon after its deployment, four Ugandan peacekeepers were attacked in May 2007. In October 2008, Burundian forces were attacked soon after their arrival. Between 2009 and 2012, AU forces lost over 500 troops in Somalia (Crisis Group Africa Briefing, 2012).

The numbers of AMISOM however gradually grew to about 6300 troops by 2010 about 3 years after the authorization of the mission. During the AU Summit in Kampala in July 2010, the AU Commission chairperson Jean Ping called for the urgent reinforcement of AMISOM following the terrorist attack in Kampala few days before the summit. For Cilliers, Boshoff and Aboagye (2010: 2), the complex, unstable and violent nature of the Somali crisis deterred African states and UN members from making effective commitments of troops to Somalia. On 22 December 2010 however, the UNSC adopted resolution 1964 (2010) that authorised AMISOM to increase its force strength from 8,000 to 12,000 troops to enable the mission attain its objectives. By April 2011, the force strength of AMISOM stood at 9,595 (Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Situation in Somalia, September 2011).

With the increment of troops, AMISOM began to make bolder attempts at making significant security gains and extending state authority to regions controlled by militia
groups. To AMISOM’s advantage, the devastating famine that hit Somalia in 2011 weakened the Al-Shabaab movement and created opportunity for AMISOM to extend the state’s authority (Pham, 2011: 184). The popularity of Al-Shabaab waned as thousands of people in the regions they controlled lost their lives because in the wake of the famine, Al-Shabaab had reportedly expelled and banned all international aid agencies, including the UN World Food Program from the southern part of the country where they held sway (Democracy Now 2011). International aid workers were captured and held for ransom by the militants and Somalis who volunteered for aid works were threatened and/or murdered.\(^{136}\)

For Al-Shabaab, the hunger crisis was an exaggerated ploy to infiltrate external forces into Somalia to oppose them (Pham 2011: 182). They also contended that humanitarian assistance only dulls people from working to sustain themselves. Through force or threat, Al-shabaab prevented the people within its territory from leaving to other regions like Lower Shabelle, and Gedo and Bay regions to gain humanitarian assistance. With the limited interaction of the region under their jurisdiction with the international aid agencies, the food scarcity in Al-Shabaab-controlled areas worsened. When the famine in Somalia aggravated, Al-Shabaab relaxed its principles but extorted huge security fees and taxes from the NGOs willing to offer humanitarian assistance (Pham 2011: 182). At times, Al-Shabaab militants attacked humanitarian basis and appropriated food donations for themselves.

Through “Operation Panua-Eneo (meaning “expand space” in Swahili), AMISOM by early 2011 began a robust offensive campaign together with the TFG to bring many regions in Mogadishu under the control of the state. With the weakening of the group’s political and financial stands, Al-Shabaab withdrew from many of its key hold areas in Mogadishu on 6 August 2011 with the impending offensive by AMISOM forces. Seizing this opportunity, the UNSC in February 2012 approved the boosting of AMISOM forces to 17,000 troops to consolidate recovered areas and extend the state’s power (AU PSC, February 2013). While the security condition of Somalia remained volatile due to the insurgencies of the militant groups, the security gains of AMISOM engendered hope for

\(^{136}\) Since 2008, Somalia had already been considered as the world’s most dangerous humanitarian zone given that between July 2007 and June 2008, about 20 aid workers were killed in Somalia out of the 65 killed worldwide (Menkhaus 2008).

Most significantly, AMISOM oversaw the inauguration of the new National Constituent Assembly as well as a new Constitution which was adopted on 1 August 2012 and the inauguration of the new Federal Parliament on 20 August 2012 thereby paving way for the elections in September.137 The widely acclaimed elections in September 2012 led to the election of Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, one of ICU’s former leaders as President by the 275-member parliament. This ended the 8 year transition processes in the country. On its part, AMISOM continued the quest to provide security and support the government. The security gains by AMISOM led to the deployment of the police component of AMISOM in 2012 to enforce the public order, protect vulnerable groups as well as monitor, prevent and arrest criminal elements in the country (Bruton and Williams 2014: 45). By 2013, AMISOM was further authorized to increase its force strength from 17,731 troops to over 22,000 troops. Having originally began the mission with mainly Ugandan and Burundian troops, AMISOM currently has the following major troop contributing countries; Uganda since March 2007, Burundi since December 2007, Djibouti since December 2011; Kenya since June 2012; Sierra Leone since April 2013; Ethiopia from January 2014 (Bruton and Williams 2014: 45).

Despite the boosting of AMISOM forces, the security context of Somalia remains volatile and fragile (Report of the African Union Commission on the strategic review of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), February 2013). As noted by the Report of the African Union Commission on the strategic review of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in February 2013, ‘a significant portion of Somalia remains under the control of Al Shabaab and the recovery of the entire territory of the country still requires a significant sustained effort.’ While the security context have improved, the threat posed by Al-Shabaab remains menacing. The group has continually engaged in asymmetrical warfare with the Somali government and AU ‘with increasing efficiency and lethality’ (AU PSC Communiqué, 18 September 2015).

On 18 September 2015, the AU developed a revised Concept of Operations (CONOPS) for the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in accord with the security strategy endorsed

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in paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 2232(2015). The aim of the CONOPS is to equip AMISOM to

(i) continue offensive operations against the al-Shabaab strongholds,

(ii) enable the political process at all levels, including through securing critical political processes throughout Somalia, and

(iii) enable stabilisation efforts and delivery of security for the Somali people, as part of the wider process of peace building and reconciliation, including through the gradual handing over of security responsibility from AMISOM to the SNA (Somali National Army) and, subsequently, to the SPF (Somali Police Force) (AU PSC Communiqué, 18 September 2015).

The AU intervention in Somalia remains a vital mechanisms for providing African solutions to the Somalia security context. While responding to a question on the expectations around African solutions, respondent 6 from a Civil Society Organization (CSO) maintains:

*I think if you look at the practical case of Somalia, the peace operation of AMISOM is hundred percent led by African forces which is currently no longer a peacekeeping operation but a military operation to counter the intransigencies of Al-Shabaab. That is a true African solutions and we would like to see such a type of peacekeeping repeated and not see all the time our efforts being rescued by the West.*

6.3 The African Ownership of the Conflict Resolution Attempts in Somalia

The following sections engages with the extent to which the intervention in Somalia is owned and coordinated by African actors as well as the challenges faced thereof. By so doing, the section engages with the substantive value and challenges of African solutions.

6.3.1 The Context for Intervention: The Commitment and Flexibility of the African Union’s Intervention in Somalia

From the onset, the African Union’s intervention in Somalia in 2007 was an extra-ordinary peacekeeping mission at a crisis zone with no peace to keep. Prior to the relative successes made by the mission since 2011, the establishment of the mission at the
The precarious security context of Somalia had been considered as a poor move by the regional body (Murithi, 2009: 101). As the pioneer of peace operations, the UN has over the years developed a stance to deploy peacekeeping forces in regions where comprehensive peace agreements have been reached. Particularly, the UN’s interventions in the civil war in Congo in the early 1960s as well as in Somalia in the early 1990s played significant roles in shaping this stance. The UN peace operation in Congo in the early 1960s for instance saw the death of about 250 UN peacekeepers despite the fact that the mission comprised over 20,000 troops and 2000 civilian technical experts. The loss of life includes the death of the then Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld, who died in a plane crash in September 1961 en route to Congo to negotiate a ceasefire between UN forces and Katangese troops. With this experience, the UN resolved to avoid interventions in civil war situations where there are no comprehensive ceasefire deals. The abortive UN intervention in Somalia between 1992 and 1995 that saw the death of about 18 US soldiers also directed the UN to opt for a more secure context for its peacekeepers to operate.

The 2000 report of the Lakhdar Brahimi Panel further highlights that peacekeepers should ideally deployed in contexts where there is peace to keep (Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations 2000). In the cases of the crisis in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Darfur, Burundi, Mali and CAR, the UN has basically relented from intervening until Africa’s regional organizations have stabilized the conflict zones and attained some binding peace agreements.

The AU however, intervened in the Somalia context where there was no comprehensive ceasefire agreements. Indeed, AMISOM’s primary consenting actors was the TFG which had no significant support base internally; the mission was established to provide the necessary support to extend the TFG’s authority across the state. Considering other AU missions, it has however become a trend for the AU to deploy stabilization missions in high intensity regions. The AU’s missions Burundi, Comoros Islands, Sudan, Mali, CAR as well as Somalia highlight the stabilization nature of AU peace operations in line with scenarios 4 to 6 for the AU deployment. The daring and bold effort of the AU to stabilize conflict regions within the continent, at least to create a condition for a more resourced UN mission is a defining feature of the regional body’s attempt to take responsibility and

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138 The circumstances of the event remain unclear leading the present Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon to establish an Independent Panel of Experts on 16 March 2015 to investigate new information relating to the death.
ownership of the peace processes within the continent. In the case of Somalia however, the AU mission has exceeded the ‘status quo’ where the regional body normally deploy peace support missions for at least six months and a subsequent take-over by a UN mission.

It is crucial however to note that at the time of AMISOM’s establishment in 2007, the AU PSC envisioned that the mission will help to stabilize Somalia’s security context and create a condition for a UN’s takeover after six months (AU PSC Communique, 19 January 2007). The volatile and unpredictable security context of Somalia however precludes the UN from deploying in Somalia. In November 2007 when the six month mandate of AMISOM had expired, the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, noted that a UN mission in Somalia was “neither realistic nor viable” due to the precarious security context. The strategic directive of AMISOM was continually tampered to create a safe and secure environment in preparation for the transition to the UN. Over seven years down the line, the AU remains in Somalia as the peacekeeper with the UN still prevaricating on a UN mission given the high intensity security context of Somalia. This has continually presented the regional body the opportunity to play a more proactive role as a peacekeeper and peacebuilder in the region unlike its missions in states like Burundi, Sudan, Mali and CAR. On 28 July 2015, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 2232 (2015) to extend the AU’s mission to 30 May 2016 (AU PSC Communiqué, 18 September 2015).

The uncertain nature of the mission in Somalia however provided the AU an opportunity to experiment with ‘untested, ad hoc and insourced approaches to establish and maintain stability, peace, and a functioning government’ (Komey, Osman and Melakedingel 2013: 36). Although this entail that the mission lacked clear roadmap as it vacillated from peacekeeping, peace enforcement and peacebuilding, AMISOM made significant experimentation of different approaches that remains useful sources of reference for modern day peacekeeping. As a mission undertaken in a volatile security context that is not traditional for peacekeeping, the mandate and operations of AMISOM has over time

140 Nevertheless, the UN has continued to consider the possibility of a UN deployment in Somalia. The latest resolution of the UNSC which extended the mandate of AMISOM for an additional 10 months, until 30 May 2016 still expressed the desire for a UN take over of the mission after May 2016. See http://amisom-au.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Resolution_on_SomaliaE11.pdf
exuded flexibility in line with the changing and dynamic Somali security context. For Bruton and Williams (2013)

As the mission gradually transitioned from being perceived as a failure by some analysts to a relative success story, international talk of “an AMISOM model” started to proliferate. It influenced discussions on how to respond to a variety of crises, most notably in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, Mali, and the Central African Republic.

The mission has transformed from an authorized force strength of 8,000 troops in 2007 to over 22,000 peacekeepers by 2013 with an active military, police and civilian component. Based on the Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Situation in Somalia of 16 October 2014:

The strength of AMISOM uniformed personnel deployed across the six Sectors stands at 22,056 out of the authorized strength of 22,126; the difference arises from rotations of the various contingents. The troops in theatre are composed of 6,220 Ugandan soldiers; 5,338 Burundian soldiers; 4,395 Ethiopian soldiers; 3,664 Kenyan soldiers; 1,000 Djiboutian soldiers; 850 Sierra Leone soldiers; and 75 Staff Officers in the Force Headquarters. The Police component has 383 officers deployed in the Mission area, consisting of 96 Individual Police Officers (IPOs), 280 officers in the FPUs from Nigeria and Uganda, as well as 7 officers who make up the Police Senior Leadership Team (PSLT). A detachment of 5 IPOs each has been deployed in the towns of Dhobley, Baidoa, Beletweyne, Jowhar and Kismayo. There are 97 civilian personnel in the Mission, comprising 52 personnel and 45 local Somali personnel. The majority of the internationally recruited staff and the Somali national staff are deployed in Mogadishu.

Notably, AMISOM’s successes owes mainly to its commitment and perseverance in keeping to the course in Somalia despite its numerous challenges and losses. Bruton and Williams (2013: 3) suggests that “whatever the true figures for fatalities and injured AMISOM personnel, they are certainly far higher than those sustained in most peace operations”. The death of over 50 AMISOM personnel in the volatile and precarious security context of Somalia did not convince the AU to withdraw from the mission as the US-led UN mission did after the loss of about 18 US troops. The AU troops particularly
Ugandian and Burundian have shown resilience in engaging with the dicey operation and mandate of the mission without reneging.

6.3.2 Africa’s Capacity for Intervention: Challenges resulting from the AU’s Financial Constraints

The AU’s intervention in Somalia has been encumbered by lack of a long-term strategic directive of operation given that most of the mission’s existence had been based on prevarication between being an interim mission expecting a UN mission and a mission unwilling to desert the country to further instability as the UN did in 1995. The poor funding foundation of AMISOM had a significant sway on the uncertain strategic directive of the mission. If the regional body had had adequate funding and resources for the mission in Somalia, the mission could have adopted a long-term strategy that will see to the deployment of ample number of troops and support facilities and mechanisms that will enable it conceptualize a durable peace and security framework to work with.

However, this is (at least at present) not feasible given that the AU lacks a predictable funding base. The total budget for a fully deployed AMISOM of about 8000 troops, using United Nations standards, for a period of one year, amounts to US$ 817,500,000 (Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the State and Prospects of the Peace and Reconciliation Process in Somalia, June 2008). This is way beyond the AU’s budgets, even way beyond the AU’s approved full budget for 2015 which stood at US$ 522,121,602 (“A total amount of US$131,471,086 assessed on Member States, and US$225,536,171 is secured from International Partners and further US$149,266,824 to be solicited from partners”) (Decision on the Budget of the African Union for the 2015 Financial Year, 2014: 1).

Most of the funding for the mission is dependent on the funding from the UN logistical support packages, donations from actors such as the UK and US as well as the European Union (EU) which provides ‘the resources needed for the payment of troop allowances and other related expenses, within the framework of the African Peace Facility (APF)’ (AMISOM 2015). An estimated U.S., EU, and UN funding of AMISOM between 2007 and 2012 is said to stand at about US$1.5 billion with an average cost of $800 000 per day (Bruton and Williams 2014: 69). However, the external funding has been largely

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141 From the breakdown of the AU’s ordinary budget external actors already provide bulk of the funds for its operations and programmes.
unpredictable and unreliable leading the AU to be stagnated in making relevant and timely implementation of decisions (Report of the African Union Commission on the strategic review of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), February 2013: 5).

There has been many reviews of AMISOM that are geared toward addressing the mission’s challenges including its funding conundrum. One of the notable reviews is the Strategic Review\textsuperscript{142} which was commissioned by the AU Commission in December 2012 to consider ‘how best AMISOM can further contribute to the stabilization of Somalia and align its activities to the priorities of the Federal Government of Somalia’ (Report of the African Union Commission on the strategic review of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), February 2013). At the end of its investigations in January 2013, the Review Team suggested the following:

a. A handover of AMISOM to the United Nations

b. The Enhancement of AMISOM

c. The Establishment of a new joint AU-UN mission.

The Review Team however observes that a UN mission is not feasible as a comprehensive ceasefire has not been reached thereby debasing the considerations of option 1. Moreover, as will be discussed in subsequent section, Somalia has witnessed a significant aversion to foreign interference in the country which could be compounded by a transition from AMISOM which they are more familiar with to a new mission by the UN that seem as a more distant external actor (Report of the African Union Commission on the strategic review of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), February 2013). Option 2 however calls for the reinforcement of AMISOM provided that the AU’s international partners provide a comprehensive support package to AMISOM together with enhance peace enforcement mandate. Option 3 presented the option of adopting the UNAMID-style mission in Somalia by establishing a joint AU and UN mission in Somalia for burden sharing so as to address the funding challenges of the regional body. The Team recommends a joint AU-UN mission in Somalia however it requested that option 2 - which is the enhancement of the AU mission – to be the interim arrangement prior to the establishment of the joint AU-UN mission (Report of the African Union Commission on

\textsuperscript{142} Chaired by Professor Ibrahim Gambari, the Review Team comprised a five-member team that were supported by civilian, police and military officers from AMISOM as well as the Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD) of the AU.
the strategic review of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), February 2013: 13).

In this regard, the AU opted to reinforce AMISOM pending the decision of the UN to re-hat the mission to a UN mission or to establish a joint AU/UN mission in the country. However, given the unstable context of Somalia, the UN remain unwilling to authorize a UN mission or a joint AU-UN mission in Somalia. This was clearly highlighted by the joint review of AMISOM which was undertaken by the AU and the UN from 26 August to 6 September 2013. The Review highlights that ‘AMISOM should not at this stage be re-hatted to a UN mission’ because ‘the current security situation in South Central Somalia is not conducive for a UN peacekeeping operation in Somalia, hence the need to continue providing support to AMISOM’ (Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Joint AU-UN Benchmarking Exercise and the Review of the African Union Mission in Somalia, October 2013).

Moving forward then, the AU is inexorably dependent on external actors for support to its peace operation. In view of the financial constraints of the AU commission, the AU from the inception of the mission has understandably appealed and relied ‘on the UN and the EU to provide full support to the AU in the planning and management of the envisaged AU Mission, including in the undertaking of field reconnaissance missions’ (Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Support of the African Union to the Transitional Institutions of Somalia, 2005). Understandably, the AU being existent within a community of states with its limitations is understandably expected to corporate with relevant stakeholders to attain success.

This is clearly articulated by the AU which upon the establishment of AMISOM requested ‘the United Nations and its Security Council to provide all the support necessary for the speedy deployment of AMISOM and the effective accomplishment of its mandate, including the review of resolution 1725 in light of the recent developments in Somalia and the provision of financial support, bearing in mind that in deploying a mission in Somalia the African Union is acting on behalf of the entire international community’ (AU PSC Communiqué, 19 January 2007: para 13).

143 Even though Ethiopia’s withdrawal in early 2009 created some vacuum that raised international concern, the UN remained reluctant to deploy a mission in Somalia following the lack of political will among member states (Bruton and Williams 2014: 49).
For some observers however, while the cooperation and support of external actors is benign, the capacity of powerful states to direct the mandate of AMISOM shows that the AU lacks adequate ownership of the mission (Vorath 2012; Franke and Esmenjaud 2014; Vines 2013). Particularly, the interest of powerful states like the US in supporting the supposed African led peace efforts in Somalia is conceived as merely part of the war against terror after the 9/11 terrorist attack in the US. The attack had raised concerns that failed states provide conducive environment for the operation of terrorist networks. Incidentally, the funding for establishment, deployment, training and operation of AMISOM was made possible largely by western actors following the renewed concern for Africa based on the perceived threat posed by failed states in Africa. The renewed support of the UN, EU, UK and US to African actors to address the conflict in Somalia is thus conceived as an agenda by powerful states to impose their dictates on Somalia. In this light, the AU could be seen as a body contracted by external actors, as a mask, to address the Somali challenge that is increasingly posing threats to powerful states.

As a major funding partner of the AU, the US had particularly played a crucial role in providing the logistic, equipment, training and mentoring support that kept the AU mission to Somalia afloat. Since 2007, the US and UK had contracted DynCorp International to assist in the deployment, equipping, logistics and training processes of AMISOM (Bruton and Williams 2014). The Bancroft Global Development was another U.S.-based firm that was contracted by the US to provide expertise in urban warfare to AMISOM including mentorship in areas such as civilian-military cooperation, combat engineering operations, counter-IED operations, explosive ordnance disposal, information analysis, logistics, and medical training and casualty evacuations (Bruton and Williams 2014: 46, 77-78). The Africa Contingency Operations Training & Assistance

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144 This is beside the support provided by the US to Ethiopian forces since the early 1990s in the bid to flush out alleged fundamentalist groups from Somalia as discussed in the following section. Between 2007 and 2013, the US provided over $341 million to AMISOM (United States Government Assistance to the African Union, Fact Sheet, May 2013)

145 ‘DynCorp International is a USA-based private military contractor. Begun as an aviation company, the company also provides flight operations support, training and mentoring, international development, intelligence training and support, contingency operations, security, and operations and maintenance of land vehicles.’ See: http://www.dyn-intl.com/

146 ‘Bancroft Global Development is a multinational, not-for-profit nongovernment organization that implements stabilization initiatives in conflict zones. Drawing on its own capital, and augmented by public and private sector contributions, Bancroft’s stabilization efforts help to transform armed conflict zones into fertile ground for legitimate commercial enterprises consistent with local values, culture, and goals.’ See: http://www.bancoftglobal.org/about-bancoft-global/
ACOTA is also a vehicle of the US Department of State to train African peacekeepers and AMISOM forces had benefitted from this mechanism.

While the foregoing support is crucial for the AU mission, it could be argued that through this support structures and training, the donors and providers of expertise and support hold sway on the thinking and ideas that sustained AMISOM personnel in the mission in Somalia. On the question of the role of external actors in African solutions, respondent 6 from a CSO argues that

If you look at most of the peace operations that have been going in crisis areas, most of the funding is external and Africa has not been able to mobilize enough funding to pay for their own peace operations in the continent. That is why the AU has put together a panel of expert led by Obasanjo to come up with alternative sources of funding. The funding is to assist Africa to own peace and security operations in the continent......It takes you back to the idea of promoting our own solutions through the way we conceptualize our peacekeeping missions, and interventions in the continent and the resources as well as the quality human resources that we are putting for the peace and security in the continent.

As is usually the case, Africa tends to be seen – by international partners as well as leading African actors – as lacking the requisite structures and expertise for specialized tasks such as peace operations. One wonders whether there is a long-term plan in Africa to develop and empower African peace and security training organizations to provide training and support that is nuanced with the knowledge and contextual realities of the continent. African specialized peace and security centres of excellence such as those that are part of the African Peace Support Trainers Association (APSTA) remain deficient in terms of providing training in combat engineering operations, counter-IED operations, explosive ordnance disposal, information analysis, logistics, and medical training and casualty evacuations to African missions. At present, they merely provide some courses training to African peacekeepers with. Without considering the external support as undermining African solutions, African actors are increasingly challenged to

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147 The African Peace Support Trainers Association (APSTA) is made up of training institutions of excellence in Africa. The APSTA which was founded in 2001 was aimed at improving the capacity of peacekeeping training institutions in Africa by facilitating the exchange of best practices and capacity development support, and for enhancing the impact of peacekeeping initiatives by the African Union (AU) and Regional Economic Communities / Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs).
work towards attaining self-sufficiency in line with the ideals of African solutions to African problems.

6.3.3 The Coordination Role of the African Union in Somalia

A crucial issue that needs to be factored in the AU’s interventionist role is on how it coordinates the support of external actors towards attaining its vision to address the crisis. This is because ‘AMISOM’s external supporters often had different agendas and priorities’ (Bruton and Williams 2014: 83). The issue of coordination in the Somali context is particularly crucial because nowhere in Africa has received so much aversion for external intervention as is the case in Somalia. Since international interventionist efforts from outside actors began in Somalia in 1992, there has been barrage of criticisms and insurgencies aimed at purging the country of foreign elements. This includes foreign elements from neighbouring states in Africa as well as non-African actors. While the Somalis showed significant resentment to external interferences in the country, much of the resentment was around the aversion for the interventions carried out or backed by western powers as well as the UN148 (Bruton and Williams 2014).

There remains concern that the AU have not adequately coordinated the effort in Somalia to ensure that they are in line with Somalia’s interest. Respondent 15 from a CSO argues the ‘with the growing number of countries involved in AMISOM, there are increasing accusations of different agendas within the command.’ For authors such as Arman (2014), the ‘African solutions to African problems’ which is often invoked as the motive for the response to the crisis in Somalia is not substantive but rather a mission driven by the national interests of some African states and powerful states. Particularly, the role of Ethiopia, Kenya and the US in Somalia have been subjects of concern for Somalis.149 The following sections examines the role of some key stakeholders such as Ethiopia, Kenya and the US in the Somali crisis as well the AU’s role in coordinating the effort of these actors.

148 Although the UN is an international body that comprise all states accross the world, the organization is largely understood to be driven by western powers.
149 This includes neighbouring actors accused of supporting different factions in Somalia. For instance, through training, provision of weapons and ammunitions and funding, Eritrea has also been indicted for providing support to armed groups in Somalia that destabilize peace and security efforts in Somalia; this led the AU to call on the UN to sanction to relevant actors that provide assistance to armed groups (AU PSC Communiqué 22 May 2009: para 5).
6.3.3.1 Ethiopia and the U.S. Involvement in Somalia

Ethiopia is one of the countries with high stakes in the Somalia’s crisis. Ethiopia had long considered the Somali crisis as a threat to its national security based on the claim that fundamentalist groups in Somalia had engaged in secessionist and destabilizing struggle at its border communities with Somalia. Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Meles Zenawi had insisted that the Islamist movements in Somalia were responsible for inciting upheavals in eastern Ethiopia (Bruton and Williams 2014: 36). The first direct interference of Ethiopia in Somalia is its combat with the Al-Ittihad al-Islamiya (AIAI) which was supposedly engaging in irredentist struggles with the Ethiopian government in the eastern part of the country. The combat eventually saw the defeat and routing of the AIAI in 1996. The dispersed members of the AIAI however influenced the formation of the ICU in the early 2000s.

Significantly, the US government played active roles in backing most of Ethiopian incursions in Somalia. As allies in the war against terror, the US concurred with Ethiopia and the TFG that the ICU is led by al-Qaeda. With the support of the US government, Ethiopian forces moved to Baidoa in August 2006, to support the TFG and they maintained a sustained presence in Somalia with a watchful eye on the fundamentalist groups that threaten its security. As the TFG’s security guarantor, the Ethiopian forces patrolled and policed Somali cities.

The occupation of Somalia by Ethiopian forces has raised resounding criticisms from Somalis. Given the unresolved tensions between Ethiopia and Somalia over the Ogaden war, a significant number of Somalis were averse to Ethiopian meddling in Somali affairs. Ethiopian forces in Mogadishu were accused of indiscriminate attack on civilians, theft and rape, kidnapping and murder of Somalis.

While the TFG considered Ethiopian forces as allies, the Islamist movement and a significant number of Somalis resent Ethiopian interference in the country. The joint effort of the Ethiopian forces\(^{150}\), the UN and the U.S forces in backing the TFG, only succeeded in alienating the TFG from the Somali populace. The TFG eventually took on a derogatory nickname *daba dhilif*, which means a “government set up for a foreign pur-

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\(^{150}\) Given the resentment over the Ogaden war, most Somalis were averse to Ethiopian meddling in Somali affairs. The ties of the post-2004 leaders of Somalia with Ethiopia contributed to the unpopularity of the government among Somalis.
pose” or a “satellite government.” (Bruton and Williams 2014: 9). For some Somalis, the TFG was an external backed movement seeking to assert their power as every other warring factions in Somalia.

AMISOM however struggled to convince Somalis of its neutrality as they increasingly bore the backlash of the public and became targets of jihadist fighters Bruton and Williams (2014: 30). For instance, the US government have carried out targeted attacks in Somalia against suspected members of al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab since 2006; however the attacks had severe consequences on the AU forces in Somalia. The US attacks led to the killing of prominent Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda leaders such as Aden Hashi Ayro in 2008 and Ahmed Godane in 2012 with civilian casualties. Following the killing of Aden Hashi Ayro in 2008, AMISOM lost about 28 peacekeepers including the Burundian deputy force commander after two major attacks on AMISOM headquarters in February and September 2009.

Furthermore, the US and Ethiopia’s role in labelling the ICU a terrorist group and exterminating the group could also be considered as a move that complicated the Somali crisis and radicalized Al-Shabaab movement. With the occupation of US backed Ethiopian forces in Somalia, foreign Jihadi fighters were keen to be in solidarity with the Al-Shabaab movement which succeeded the ICU.151 It was reported that over 20 members of the Minnesota’s Somali diaspora returned to Mogadishu to fight against the excesses of the Ethiopian and TFG forces (Bruton and Williams 2014: 10). This brought the number of Diaspora Somalis that returned from the US to an alleged number of over 40 persons. Bruton and Williams (2014: 9) note that “by early 2008, confidential Somali sources estimate that some 2,000 foreign fighters had entered Somalia, approximately 40 percent of them from the Somali diaspora.” A Somali mob on 21 March 2007, dragged the bodies of Ethiopian and TFG soldiers around the streets of Mogadishu and subsequently set them on fire as a sign of defiance and aversion (Bruton and Williams 2014: 10). Ethiopian forces continued to suffer severe causalities leading the Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) – in a desperate bid to pull out of Somalia – to reduce the Ethiopian troops in Somalia by the end of March 2008.

151 ‘On 5 January 2007, for example, Osama bin Laden’s deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri issued a videotaped message entitled, Help Your Brothers in Somalia! that called for jihadists to supply fighters, money, and expertise against Ethiopia’ (cited in Bruton and Williams 2014: 10).
Meanwhile, the limitation of AMISOM in terms of troops at the initial stage of the mission had made the regional body amenable to the continued presence of Ethiopian forces. It is worth noting that a large number of Somali political figures had long been against the deployment of troops from front line states such as (Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya) due to their interests in Somalia (UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia, 16 June 2005). This led the AU to restrict front line states from the mission. However, given that Ethiopia was already in Somalia, the deployment of AMISOM was meant to provide an exit strategy for Ethiopia. While the establishment of AMISOM was to provide an exit strategy for Ethiopia, the AU was equally cognizant that the withdrawal of Ethiopian forces, at a time when the mission lacked personnel, would have a heavy toll on the mission. While thankful of the presence of US backed Ethiopian forces, AMISOM is cautious of being a body that provides legitimacy for individual states to further their national interests. With the growing jihadist movement against the US backed Ethiopia’s presence in the country, it became increasing clear that the withdrawal of Ethiopian forces from their military commitment in Somalia is imperative for the stability in the region.

In 2008, AMISOM provided support to the Djibouti Peace Talks between the TFG and the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS) that was formed in May 2008 to coordinate the Jihad against the foreign-backed TFG. Among other concerns, the peace talks was to provide clear direction for the exit of Ethiopian forces from Somalia (Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Situation in Somalia, September 2008). The Peace talks which was led by the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative, Ambassador Amadou Ould-Abdallah led to a series of agreements on 9 June, 26 October and 25 November 2008 in Djibouti. In line with the 9 June 2008 agreement, the territorial integrity of Somalia was affirmed and the Ethiopian forces where charged to withdraw from Somalia for a UN stabilization force to be deployed to take over from the AU within 120 days.\textsuperscript{152} In accord with the Djibouti agreements, Ethiopian forces withdrew from Somalia in early 2009. However, the withdrawal of Ethiopian forces did not end the insurgency, rather it created a vacuum for Al-Shabaab militants to take over many towns.

\textsuperscript{152} Excluding neighbouring states, the UN forces is envisaged to come from countries with friendly ties with Somalia as highlighted in paragraph 7 of the agreement. However, the ARS-Asmara faction led by the Hassan Dahir Aweys that was not party to the agreement intensified hostilities in Somalia along with Al-Shabaab growing violent insurgency in the capital. Modalities for the Implementation of the Cessation of Armed Confrontation, 26 October 2008, at: www.hdcentre.org/files/ceasefire%20Agreement%2026%20OCT.pdf.
in Somalia including strategic areas in Mogadishu. When Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed took over the reins of government in January 2009, Al-Shabaab had taken over most of the towns outside the Shabelle region (Pham 2011).

6.3.3.2 Kenya’s Involvement in Somalia

While Kenya had mainly played mediatory role in the Somali crisis prior to 2012, it had long been cagey about the security threat posed by extremist movements from Somalia in Kenya. Kenya had been long concerned about the influx of Somali refugees and conflict-induced migrants within its territory. The flows of Somali refugees as well as the operation of Somali radical groups within Kenya remains a concern for the Kenyan government. Prior to 2012, Kenya had been considered to be merely providing financial and arms support to clan-militias to fight Al-Shabaab particularly in Juba and Gedo regions (Bruton and Williams 2014: 60). Al-Shabaab’s attack at the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi Kenya in 2010 was one of the defining features that led Kenya to consider going beyond supporting clan-militias to intervening directly in Somalia. On 16 October 2011, Kenyan forces embarked on Operation Linda Nchi (Swahili for protect the nation) by deploying troops to Somalia. The justification for the operation was to prevent Al-Shabaab operatives from crossing into Kenya along with the immense number of refugees that poured into the country following the 2011 famine in Somalia. This marked the beginning of Kenya’s open involvement in Somalia’s crisis.

The direct intervention however came as a surprise to many states as the crisis in Somalia had long affected the security situation in Kenya. The operation which began in 2011 had come 2 years after the bombing of the US embassy in Kenya and several months after refugees flowed into neighbouring countries following the 2011 famine in Somalia. The controversy around the motive of Kenya’s intervention was further compounded as the KDF were supported by the U.S., a phenomenon which reinforced the idea that western actors are leading military campaigns in the country. Moreover, while Kenya claimed it took permission from the TFG to engage in the military action, the then Somali President, Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, had moaned that “Kenya had not informed him of the

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153 Along with the terms of agreement for the 5 years transitional period of the TFG, Abdullahi Yusuf resigned as the President of the TFG and Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed was elected and installed the president on 31 January 2009.
invasion plans and that their transgression “would not be allowed.”154 (Bruton and Williams 2014: 61).

Regardless, the KDF undertook Operation Linda Nchi from October 2011 to June 2012 as a separate mission outside the scope of AMISOM’s mandate. While supporting the mission, IGAD on 25 November 2011 requested that Kenya consider integrating its forces into AMISOM. Following the calls to harmonize the African response to the Somali crisis, Kenya on 7 December 2011 declared its intention to join AMISOM and signed the technical Memorandum of Understanding with the AU on 2 June 2012 thereby officially integrating its forces to AMISOM. Meanwhile Ethiopian force re-entered Somalia in November 2011 following Kenya’s operation.156 Ethiopia justified its intervention by noting that the Kenya intervention is a call to act decisively against Al-Shabaab (Bruton and Williams 2014: 62). Kenyan and Ethiopian intervention however enable the AU to expand its base in Mogadishu. This contributed significantly to the rapid successes made by AMISOM and TFG forces between 2011 and 2012.

However, the modalities of the involvement of different actors in Somalia shows the difficulties posed to the regional body in terms of strategic coordination. The different troops from different countries under the AMISOM mandate tended to receive their orders mainly from their countries of origin rather than a unified command structure (Komey, Osman and Melakedingel 2013: 38-39). Bruton and Williams (2014: 83) observes that because AMISOM’s Head of Mission was based in Nairobi, the force commanders on the ground faced numerous challenges in terms of coordinating AMISOM. This leadership gap has led to the AU been indicted for poor discipline and disregard to the safety of civilians. This is based on the high levels of civilian causalities caused by AMISOM’s battle with Al-Shabaab including the infamous reports of the gender and sexual based violence allegedly committed by AMISOM officers. To a greater extent, the troop contributing countries held a significant sway on the operations of their deployments. Even though operations in Somalia are carried out under the banner of the

155 Kenya’s support to the formation of the Jubbaland state in 2013 only created further tensions between the government of Somalia and Kenya.
156 In January 2014, Ethiopian forces integrated into AMISOM.
AMISOM, the zest with which Kenyan and Ethiopian forces carry out operations in Somalia suggest that the interests involved goes beyond seeking genuine stability in Somalia to pursuing national interest and security (Arman 2014). Arman (2014) continues that

The UN deliberately bypassed AMISOM when it commissioned a Ugandan contingent of over 400 Special Forces to guard its facilities and staff. This particular contingent is neither officially part nor does it take any orders from AMISOM. Why? Because, the controversial implanting of Ethiopia and Kenya into AMISOM has changed its dynamic from a peacekeeping force into a political vehicle.

Kenya and Ethiopia’s involvement in Somalia raises issues for Somalis as their involvement in the country is seen as a ploy to keep Somalia weak for their state interests. With the resource limitations of the AU, the support from the additional forces of neighbouring powers tended to be a welcome development to the regional body. At a discussion with a Diaspora Somali and practitioner in peace and security, the respondent (respondent 18 from a CSO) argued that ‘African solutions in Somalia is façade. Whose solutions? Ethiopia has used Somalia as its playing ground because of its national interests’. For Arman (2014),

It is clear that no Somali can pursue a political career in his own country without first getting Ethiopia's blessings. Already, Ethiopia has installed a number of its staunch cohorts in the current government and (along with Kenya) has been handpicking virtually all of the new regional governors, mayors, etc.

The interferences of the neighbouring powers also go unnoticed or rather unchallenged by the African Union. While this has led to some security and political gains for the government of Somalia and AMISOM, some locals have considered AMISOM along with Ethiopian and Kenyan forces to be driven by national interests and puppets of western War against terrorism.
6.3.4 The Community-Based Approach of the African Union’s intervention in Somalia

Regardless of the considerable successes of AMISOM and its allies in Somalia however, there remains an important question to be asked in line with the ideals of African solutions:

To what extent did AMISOM support self-determination (or local ownership) for Somalis in the attempt to resolve the crisis? Or rather, how is the intervention of AMISOM supportive of conflict resolution that is people-centric?

Subsequent sections shall endeavour to contend with the foregoing question. The following section examines that the AU’s intervention in line with the requisite injunction to pursue a community based approach to conflict resolution that supports local ownership and self-determination in Somalia.

6.3.4.1 The Local Ownership of the AU Conflict Resolution Attempt:

The question on AU’s support for self-determination in Somalia is a difficult but crucial question for consideration. The difficulty of the question resides in the consideration that security and peace in Somalia is required not only for Somalis but for neighbouring countries as well as the international community at large. While AMISOM’s intervention is ostensibly meant to support peace processes in Somalia, it is invariably also meant to keep the world at peace – ensuring that the former “ungoverned” or “collapsed” state is looked after to prevent opportunistic forces from posing threat to Somalis and to other states and international investments.

However, the question of self-determination is equally crucial based on the fact that it is undeniable that the international intervention had off-set many local dynamic processes in Somalia thereby raising concerns whether the achievements in Somalia are imposed solutions. Azar (2015: 57) argues that:

as conflicts protracts, communal actors rely more and more on support and aid from others and thus external actors are systematically drawn into the conflict. Decision-making power is increasingly exercised by external actors, so that communities suffer further loss of access and control over their lives.
In the case of Somalia, external actors in Somalia have come to play leading role in the conceptualization and implementation of resolution attempts in the country. A focus on AMISOM’s interventionist role however needs to set off from the consideration of the fact that the intervention came after numerous failed interventions as well as neglected opportunities by the international community in Somalia. At the onset of the crisis in Somalia between the late 1980s and 1991, the United Nations (UN), OAU, Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), and the Arab League were all hesitant to respond to Somalia’s then ongoing civil war leaving the Somali state to collapse in 1991.

When the UN intervened in Somalia in 1992 following the famine that hit the country, the conflict had already matured with various non-state factions developing their identity within the failed state context. In light of the failure of the un-strategic mission to bring about peace in the country, the pull out of UN from Somalia in the early 1990s without setting conditions for peace further set a stage for the country to run into further anarchy as local actors grappled with the essence of the international interventions and the new dynamics that the intervention brought in. Between 1993 and 2002, the conferences and peace attempts for Somalia however reeked of the international community’s fixation on resurrecting a state system that could guarantee the security of the state-centric international order and “then probably” the security of local Somalis. Along with the theoretical framework of constructivism, this is in accord with the dominant fixation of the international system – that is steered by western values – on the state-system and aversion to political systems that are in discord with the understanding and framework of western actors who dominate the perspectives of the international order.

Furthermore, the international recognition of Al-Shabaab as a terrorist organization, as propagated by the U.S. and Ethiopian governments, automatically limits the capacity of AMISOM to engage the group in dialogue. AMISOM also found it difficult to even engage in dialogue with Al-Shabaab defectors given that the U.S. government was keen on probing and prosecuting the defectors rather than considering some form of deals with them (Brutons and Williams 2014: 80). Additionally, AMISOM’s peacekeeping and peace-enforcement stance in Somalia against Al-Shabaab is only justified based on the

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157 In such protracted collapsed system, Somali elites, warlords, businesspeople, transnational criminal enterprises and terrorist groups have come to thrive and derive their livelihood from the anarchy. Ordinary Somalis as well devise means of coping with the collapsed state. The two decades of protracted state collapse created conditions for the people to acclimatize with the anarchic reality of the state. Even children born in the anarchic system grow to find their identity shaped by the anarchy and the reality of the country.
radicalized/terrorist dimension of the group. Perhaps, if there had been sustained negotiations and dialogue with the ICU, Al-Shabaab which emerged after the disbandment of the ICU could have not been radicalized.

Thus, from the onset, AMISOM was exposed to a conflict setting with many hypothesis suggesting that if the international community had done something other than what they had done so far, a timely and conclusive solution could have been secured in the region. As a fire-brigade intervention that hopes to inject stability in a region lacking stability, the AU embarked on a mission where its interventionist approach had already been determined by past precedents and the international order.

The obsession for an internationally recognized and endorsed state-system led the international community to show reluctance in engaging in sustained dialogue with the Islamist groups that emerged with political intent in the country. Notably, the ICU which became prominent in Somalia in the early 2000s was quickly extirpated based on allegations that the ICU was linked to Al-Qaeda, was destabilizing peace in eastern Ethiopia and that the group was imposing stringent Sharia law on Somalia and extorting exorbitant revenues from people. In terms of the first two allegations, the international community did not consider the option of engaging in sustained negotiation with the group to attain compromise. Within few months or years of discussions, US-backed Ethiopian forces moved in to vanquish the movement, which they eventually did in December 2006.

On the imposition of Sharia law on Somalis, many Somalis share the same Islamic faith. While the stringent rules may not be desirable to some locals and international actors, a significant number of authors note that the ICU had garnered popular support from many Somalis. However, because its governance mechanism is not congruent with the so-called prevailing ideas about what a government should look like – a government that is friendly to the west –, the group was deemed illegitimate and demonized by external actors.

Moreover, on the allegation about the group’s extortion of revenues from the people within its jurisdiction, every government requires a significant revenue base to extend its authority and meet the needs of its people (Pham 2011). The ‘mainstream’ states, across the globe, thrive on the ‘extortion’ of revenues from its people. The international community did not seek to support the group with funds to provide public goods as it was willing to support the then (unpopular) transitional government in terms of having the
relevant resources to provide political goods to the people. The combative stance of the international community on the Islamic groups has however led to the growth of Al-Shabaab, a military wing of ICU that has perhaps lost faith in the international community’s capacity to consider it as a reliable and relevant actor to negotiate with.

The following sub-section contends with some particular issues that engages with the local ownership of the resolution attempt in Somalia as spearheaded by the AU.

6.3.4.2 Top-Down State Centric Approach versus a Bottom-Up Approach

Many authors observe that the challenge of securing lasting peace in Somalia is consequent from the obsession of the international community in reviving a state system in the country irrespective of the contextual realities of Somalia (Menkhaus 2003: 407; Pham 2011, Ahmed 1999). For many international actors, the building of a functioning state government – akin to international practice and standard – is a prerequisite for peace and order in Somalia. However, since state collapse in Somalia, the decentralization of power in Somalia tells of Somali’s restlessness with the state-centric system where power is concentrated on a central government. Notably, the claim to autonomy by various regions in Somalia is crucial for the comprehension of the challenges with the state-centric paradigm (at least a state centric paradigm that considers the state as wielding monopoly of power) in Somalia. In post-Siad Barre’s Somalia, Several autonomous states such as Somaliland formed in 1991; Puntland formed in 1998, Galmudug State formed in 2006, Himan Iyo Heeb formed in 2008 and other local governance mechanisms assumed autonomy and provided governance services in their local jurisdiction (Pham 2011).

In 1991 for instance, elders of the northwest Somalia – formerly under the British Somaliland Protectorate – met in Burao and agreed to invalidate the amalgamation of the northern British and Southern Italian protectorate (Pham 2011: 173). As noted earlier, this was informed by the grievance that power had been concentrated in the south coupled with the need to dissociate from the political vacuum created by the ongoing turmoil in the southern region. Though not recognized by the international system, northwest Somalia assumed Sovereignty status in May 1991 under the name Somaliland as it had been called after gaining independence from Great Britain in June 26, 1960. At the Burao conference, the leaders of the Isaaq dominated Somali National Movement (SNM) negotiated with other clans in Somaliland like the Darod clan and Dir clan and established a governance mechanism in the region. Abdirahman Ahmed Ali ‘Tuur’ was appointed
the interim president of Somaliland for a period of two years by a consensus of the clan representatives. Somaliland has provided some relative stability to its people under the leaders of Haji Ibrahim Egal (1993 – 2002), Dahir Riyale Kahin (2002-2010) and Ahmed Mohamed Mohamoud (2010-till date).

Furthermore, clans such as the Darod clan-family’s Harti clan including Dhulbahante, Majeerteen and Warsangeli sub-groups formed an autonomous state called Puntland State of Somalia in 1998. Another decentralized state was Galmudug State, derived from the conflation of Galguduud and Mudug provinces that emerged in the central region of Somalia in 2006. In 2008, Habar Gidir clansmen in central Somalia north of Mogadishu, established an autonomous administration known as Himan Iyo Heeb. In 2015, the State of Jubbaland which had allied itself with the federal government of Somalia opted to sever ties with the government to add to the autonomous states in Somalia. Several other clans have teamed up with other clans to provide for their political administration. Despite the lack of international recognition, the self-declared autonomous states provide considerable peace, security, rule of law and economic progress in their regions.

Along this reality, some analysts (Ahmed 1999, Menkhaus 2003, Pham 2011) observe that Somalis favour a bottom-up state system rather than a top-down state system. This entails a state system that derives its legitimacy from decentralized community structures. Though the decentralized arrangements were born out of the anarchy and crisis in Somalia, most of the decentralized states show preference to remaining autonomous in the long run having gone through the grueling experience of a centralized system of governance under Siad Barre’s regime. For Raeymaekers (2005), state collapse and failure could be order, a chance for other systems of political and social organization to prevail.

Caught up in the state-centric social construct of the international order however, the African Union through its intervention was mainly contributing to extend the authority of the “state” – TFG now Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) that is established based on a top-down framework. As observed earlier, the Somali government did not spring from the social dynamics of the country. Rather, it came from the increasing worry of the

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158 Unlike Somaliland, Galmudug considers itself an autonomous state within the larger Somalia.
159 See: [http://english.alshahid.net/archives/47463](http://english.alshahid.net/archives/47463)
international community to establish a state system that is friendly to the international order. By re-establishing the state however, the international community along with African Actors were keen on establishing and supporting an ‘international-friendly’ state that will align itself with the principles and norms of the ‘international order’. While this intervention is important, the question of support to local ownership remain prominent.

Notably, when the ICU provided relative security structure and order in the regions it controlled, the international community never considered providing support or at least engaging in sustained dialogue with the organization to support its services to locals and as well win the favour of the group to be amenable to international standards. Rather, the international community was keen to dislodge the ICU and implant or rather resurrect a state system from the leaders represented at the conferences.

The Islamist movements that emerged in Somalia were particularly castigated for demanding exorbitant taxes, extorting people and seeking to monopolize power. However, it is worth observing that the very nature of the state, which the international community seeks to prop in Somalia, is based on taxation, exploitation of people’s resources, monopoly of control of power and the domination of rival entities. Relevant to taxation, Pham (2011: 178) maintains that one of the most significant banes of state formation in Africa is limited revenue base through taxation and that post-colonial African states crumbled due to lack of taxation; they survive only as rentier states. Pham goes further to argue that apart from raising income for state, taxation helps a regime to bond with the society. However, given the divergence of the supposed radical groups, the international community have come to demonize the governance approach of the Islamic groups so as to annihilate them and spare themselves the task of engaging in sustained negotiation. For the international community, it is better to establish a predictable state than support an unpredictable state structure. For respondent 18 from a CSO,

*the international community’s obsession with the state system and the suspicion of systems that are different from the views of powers that be led to the missed opportunities for peace in Somalia, like the peace that could have resulted if the ICU was provided an opportunity to provide order in the state. From my research project on the views of Somalis about the ICU, a good number of people express some fondness for the ICU and lamented that the ICU could have established and*
maintained order in the country if they were not overrun by the Islam-phobic west and Ethiopia.

Such view thus begs the question; whose peace was the priority of the international engagement in Somalia. Inasmuch as the state system has become the mainstream political system across the globe, peace building that emerges from local dynamics ought to precede state-building efforts in Somalia. As hinted earlier, the state-centric model is not the major problem. Rather, it is an issue when much of the effort to revive statehood emanates from external actors rather than internal yearning. As maintained by one of the winner of the 2011 Nobel Peace Award named Leymah Gbowee, ‘it is insulting when outsiders come in and tell a traumatized people what it will take for them to heal. …People who have lived through a terrible conflict may be hungry and desperate, but they are not stupid’ (Gbowee 2013).

Remarkably, external actors have in contemporary times shown keenness in engaging with affected communities in the attempt to resolve disputes. However, the challenge is making sense of how external actors analyse the feedbacks and recommendations from locals. The interesting question worth investigating is, do external actors listen to locals but analyse the feedback received based on their rigid preconceived impressions? In re-establishing the state in Somalia, the international community has engaged in various attempt to have a widely representative conferences for peace and reconciliation in Somalia which eventually led to the formation of the TFG in 2004. However, what perplexes keen observers is that the TFG which was supposedly developed from an inclusive conference was largely unpopular among the local population; it took the support of a US backed Ethiopian force and AMISOM to stamp the legitimacy of the TFG. If the TFG was representative of the local population, would it not have had a strong support structure in Somalia that will recognize its legitimacy and political power even without external support?

On the contrary, the ICU as well as Al-Shabaab enjoyed significant support from the local population because they were formed from local dynamics; their support gradually waned when the international community’s intervention began re-orienting people to pursue alliance with an international friendly system. Bruton and Williams (2014: 86) observed that
al-Shabaab was not an insurgency; it held sway over more than 90 percent of southern Somalia’s territory, delivered some important human services, provided security, collected taxes, and was tolerated by the public, albeit often because collaboration was perceived as being the least worst option. From 2007 to 2012, AMISOM’s de facto mission was to install an unelected government that controlled no territory, delivered no services, provided no security to the public, and was broadly perceived by its own citizens as illegitimate.

Although the AU conducted reconnaissance and fact finding missions to ascertain the country’s amenability to the peace support operation, a significant number of people were not disposed to AMISOM’s intervention. And because the TFG did not receive adequate support from the populace, AMISOM was perceived by locals to be partisan. Moreover, for those that support the mission initially, the lack of significant change on the ground at the initial stage of the mission made people worry that Al-Shabaab will engage in reprisal attacks on civilians for their support to AU troops (Bruton and Williams 2014: 84).

Nevertheless, what should have been clear to international interveners is that any system of governance in Somalia ought to come from the locals and local dynamics and encouraged by the international community; rather than a solution that is imposed and continually tailored to work for Somalis or Somali elites. Seyoum (2015) observes that the international community have organized various conferences and most recently in Copenhagen in 2013 to support the government of Somalia to create regional and Federal States, adopt a constitutions and organize national elections by 2016. However, the effort of the international community come mainly from the vision of the donor community with less regard for the interest of Somalis. The donor community overlook local ownership by merely focusing on working with political elites.

For Seyoum (2015), ‘the international community also made state building a lucrative business for the elites who engaged with the international community, as the latter brings aid for institutional and nation building.’ This has only tarnished the accountability of the nation building project to the Somalis and has highlighted the interest of the political elites who are unwilling to pursue genuine peace and order in Somalia because they benefit

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160 This will ensure that the non-imposed institutions that would be created is able to stand on their own and function meaningfully even when international engagement in the state is over (Samuel 2005: 728).
from the political economy of state fragility and state failure. It is probable that the possible end of Al-Shabaab and heightened insurgency in Somalia will expose the corruption and obsession for power among the current Somali political elites. It only remains a hope that the state, with the support of its bastions, will over time gain local support and that the withdrawal of robust international presence in the country will see a lasting solution to the crisis.

As discussed in the next section, the current government of Somalia as well as its predecessor the TFG have not proven to be efficient and committed to the needs of its people. The next section engages with the assistance of AMISOM to develop the Somali state’s capacity for governance.

6.3.5 After International Intervention: The Question of Governance and Post-Conflict Reconciliation

With the re-institution of the state structure in Somalia however, the challenge remains on how to ensure that the state continually garners credibility, legitimacy and support on the ground and in the same vein work effectively with the self-autonomous states in the region. The apparent lesson in Somalia is that the state leadership has not given Somalis a lot of reason to trust state governance. Since independence, there has been hardly any state regime in Somalia that enjoyed sustained support and reliability among the populace. Many have contended that the challenge with state revival in Somalia is based on a conception of the state as an agent of oppression. Beside the failures of the post-independent state regimes as discussed in 6.1, the TFG which came into power in 2004 was equally corrupt and inept like the past leadership in Somalia (Menkhaus 2008; Pham 2011: 185). President Abdillahi Yusuf of the TFG was reputed for his intransigency and intense animosity towards all forms of opposition and political Islam in the country (Menkhaus 2008). Makhubela (2010: 59) observes that Abdillahi Ahmed Yusuf’s inaugural statement after being elected president of the TFG was “those who want to fight should know that he too can fight”. For Makhubela (2010: 59), the speech did not work well to promote national forgiveness and reconciliation. It rather created an atmosphere

161 In 2011 when Somalia recorded one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises, the TFG did little to prevent or manage the savage famine that claimed the lives of several Somalis. Pham (2011: 185) also notes that TFG soldiers were used by the leaders to steal food meant for famine victims. Local businessmen with relationships with the leaders of the TFG sold thousands of food aid at markets around Mogadishu.
for further conflict. With the support of Ethiopian force, the TFG sought to stamp its authority in Somalia.

Beside the high-handed approach of the Ethiopian backed TFG, the TFG leaders did not commit themselves to the economic growth of the country because money kept flowing into the state from external actors with little or no effort from them. On how they use external funding in the country, the TFG were not accountable to the Somali people but rather to their donors; hence they manipulated figures and created ‘unrealistically expansive, patronage-based visions of the state that are out of line with Somalia’s very weak tax base’ (Menkhaus 2006: 77). Between 2009 and 2010, only $2,675,000 of the $75,600,000 international aid pumped into the country could be accounted for by the TFG (Pham 2011: 165). The UN Monitoring Group reports that ‘between one-third and one-half of armaments supplied to the regime ended up in the illicit market’ as the TFG leaders diverted arms and ammunition to arms dealers in Mogadishu (cited in Pham 2011: 165). In 2011, the International Crisis Group indicted the TFG for being unfit and uncommitted to public office and demanded the resignation, isolation and sanctioning of the leaders (Pham 2011: 165).

It is based on this considerations that the UN High Level Panel on Peace Operations (2015) notes that ‘the focus of peace processes and State-building efforts tends to be on the capital and on a small political and civil service elite.’

With the new state government, leadership issues remain a huge concern for Somalis. The current government with the support of its international bastions is working aggressively to bring the autonomous states in Somalia under its control. For Bruton and Williams (2014) the government of Somalia have opted to pursue bringing every state under its control through dialogue and subsequently through a more forceful means in some region such as Jubbaland. This however portends a security challenge in the country. Moreover, the continued corruption that seemed entrenched in the Somali government further bedevils the security gains in the region and questions the ability of the state to continually garner some support from locals (Bruton and Williams 2014). The AU has

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162 As noted by Menkhaus (2003:407), the ‘protracted state collapse and armed conflict’ in Somalia has created ‘opportunity for profit, not a crisis to be solved’.

163 As highlighted in Article 7 of the Somalia 2012 Constitution, Somaliland and Puntland including other fragmented regions remain part of Somalia as defined by the 1960 constitution.

164 For Muigei (2013), ‘the stability of Somalia is dependent on the stability of Puntland, Somaliland and other separatist regions.’
however provided support to the state peacebuilding effort and to strengthen the state’s
capacity for public service as discussed in the following section

6.3.5.1 The AU’s Peace and Nation-Building Initiatives

The AU’s intervention however cannot be faulted mainly on the state-centric focus
because the regional body along with different African actors have engaged the Somali
community in peace efforts.\footnote{One could hold that the international order entails that African actors are preconditioned to pursue state
revival and seek peace from thereof.} Indeed, the mediatory efforts of African actors that led to
the formation of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in 2004 is a significant step
that highlights the disposition of African actors to pursue a well-represented solution for
Somalia. The Somalia National Reconciliation Conference which was held from October
2002 to October 2004, saw a remarkable and viable political achievement in Somalia after
the failure of over fourteen peace agreements organized by the international community
under the auspices of the UN. The power sharing deal that led to the formation of the TFG
saw a significant representation of various actors from Somalia’s four major clan-families,
the Darod, Dir, Hawiye, and Digil Mirifle clans (Digil and Rahanweyn) including some
minority clans (Pham 2011: 162).\footnote{However, the Isaaq clan refused to participate in the power sharing deal because they were more
comfortable with being part of the independent state of Somaliland (Pham 2011:162).}

It is important to recall that prior to the establishment of AMISOM, the African Union
commissioned over three reconnaissance and fact-finding missions to Somalia as noted
earlier. This fact-finding missions have not only been expedient in ascertaining the
security condition of the country, but also crucial in popularizing the intended peace
operation among Somalis.

When the peace support mission was established in 2007, AMISOM provided full support
to the TFG’s initiated National Reconciliation Congress (NRC) from 15 July to 30 August
2008. The NRC which was attended by over 2,600 delegates provided an inclusive
platform for reconciliation in the country (Report of the Chairperson of the Commission
on the Situation in Somalia, 2008). The NRC motivated the signing of important peace
pacts among Somali actors; pacts that highlighted the need for unity through the TFG’s
leadership. As a build-up to the NRC, the TFG and the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of
Somalia (ARS)\footnote{The ARS was formed by moderate members of the SCIC who fled to Eritrea and Djibouti after the defeat
of the ICU} had signed an Agreement on 9 June 2008 to restore trust, confidence
and end the conflict between the stakeholders. The parties agreed to terminate all acts of armed confrontation by the ARS and its allies and by the TFG and its allies (Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Situation in Somalia, September 2008). The TFG also signed a Framework of Cooperation Agreement with Ahlu Sunna wal Jama’a (ASWJ) in Addis Ababa on 15 March 2010; thereby ending the conflict between the two parties. In 2012, AMISOM oversaw the inauguration of the new National Constituent Assembly as well as a new Constitution which was adopted on 1 August 2012 and the inauguration of the new Federal Parliament on 20 August 2012.168

One of AMISOM’s priority as determined by the government of Somalia is the support to the Somalia National Security and Stabilization Plan (NSSP) which was endorsed by the Somalia government in 2012. The NSSP states that the national security vision of Somalia is ‘a Secure and enabled federated Somalia that is in lasting peace with itself and with its neighbours; enjoying restored security, access to justice and the rule of law; upholding the human rights of its citizens; accountable, able to defend its constitution, people, territorial unity and integrity’ (Report of the African Union Commission on the strategic review of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), February 2013). Notably, the civilian component of AMISOM is highly committed to aiding the new Somalia to harness peace and ensure the effectiveness of state institutions.

In 2011, the civilian component of AMISOM which was initially based in Nairobi for security concerns was relocated to Mogadishu following the attainment of some stability in the region (AMISOM 2013). The component was in the same year expanded from its initial size of 50 to 97 civilians – although the number of civilians in AMISOM are quite less compared to the number in UN missions which ranges up to about 2000 civilian officers. The expansion of AMISOM civilian component however highlighted the AU’s keenness to embark on the challenge of peace and state-building processes after the years of military focused engagement in Somalia. The mandate of the civilian component of AMISOM was extended from a minimal support to the government to providing capacity-building assistance to Somalia’s main institutions (ISS Today 2013). This is to strengthen the capacity of the government to provide public service and to extend the state’s authority.

In December 2012, the African Union commissioned a team of five experts led by Professor Ibrahim Gambari to provide a strategic review on how AMISOM can better contribute to the stabilization of Somalia (Report of the African Union Commission on the strategic review of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), February 2013). Drawing from the Somalia’s government goals as well as the National Security and Stabilization Plan (NSSP), the Review Team based its 2013 report on the 6 policy pillar frameworks of Somalia’s NSSP namely:

a. Full Stability: This requires the supremacy of the law and good governance, that incorporates rule of law and security;

b. Economic Recovery: This entails support to the livelihoods and economic infrastructure of the state;

c. Peace building: This involves social reconciliation through building bridges of trust among Somalis and relevant stakeholders

d. Service Delivery: The key priorities are in the areas of health, education and environment;

e. International Relations: This involves building collaborative relations and polishing the national image the country

f. The Unity and Integrity of the country: This entails striving together for a better future for Somalia.

The civilian component of AMISOM is envisioned to work closely with the government to attain these objectives (Report of the African Union Commission on the strategic review of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), February 2013: 6).

The civilian component of AMISOM, which is supervised by the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission (SRCC), consists of six units, namely: the Political, Humanitarian, Gender, Civil Affairs, Security and Safety, Support Unit (Public information and Administrative Units). These units help in the management and coordination of the efforts of the military and police components to restore peace and security in Somalia. The component trains, mentors and advices state administrators on how to attain efficiency and works with all stakeholders to support reconciliation and dialogue in Somalia (Kromah 2010). The component also conducts various training
exercises for Somalia civil servants as well as military and police officers. For instance, between 17 and 29 May 2014 for instance, the Political Unit of AMISOM conducted a ten-day Intensive Training for 80 Executive Leaders and Managers in Somalia Civil Service at General Kahiye Police Academy in the country's capital Mogadishu. The training covered courses on Public Finance Management, Patriotism, Project Planning and Management, Monitoring and Evaluation, Strategic Planning, Policy Development and Human Resource Management. The training was aimed at re-building the country’s civil service which had been virtually dysfunctional since Somalia state collapse in 1991.¹⁶⁹

However, much of the AU’s peace efforts to date is dominated by the quest to attain security gains against Al-Shabaab and the mission prevaricates between being a short-term mission without an exit strategy. Coupled with lack of funding, this has limited the regional body’s capacity to engage effectively in peace building and post-conflict reconstruction initiatives in the country. Respondent 20 from the AU mission in Somalia observes that

\[AMISOM’s \text{ main deficiency is its lack of an exit strategy. This is very concerning to the Somali government and National Army. That is an issue that needs to be discussed. What we must do now is to find out how to best empower the government of Somalia and such in order to reach a place where we can exit responsibly in the future.}\]

6.4 Conclusion: Key Lessons Learned

Using the case study of the African Union’s intervention in Somalia, this chapter has explored the AU’s effort to operationalize its resolve to provide African solutions to African challenges. Since state collapse in 1991, Somalia has raised significant concern of the international community leading to various interventions from various stakeholders in the region. The African Union’s intervention came in the aftermath of the failed 1992 to 1995 UN intervention, fourteen failed peace talks as well as the IGAD sponsored conferences that led to the re-establishment of an internationally recognized state structure in Somalia. Having come after a plethora of interventions and missed opportunities in

¹⁶⁹ On 26 May 2014, the Gender Unit in collaboration with the Somali Ministry of Gender and Human Rights and the Ministry of Information conducted an awareness workshop on the Somali Draft National Gender Policy and Gender Based Violence for Somali media practitioners. Such initiatives are geared towards fighting gender based violence and discrimination.
Somalia’s security context, the AU intervention in Somalia operated under a context that suggested that if the international community had acted timely, proactively and differently in Somalia, the security condition of the country would have been improved.

In response to the third primary objective of this thesis, this chapter observes that the AU intervention in Somalia has yielded ambivalent results in terms of the provision of African solutions. On the one hand, the AU’s intervention is marked by a high sense of responsibility and commitment in Somalia regardless of its financial/resource constraints as well as the casualties incurred by its troops. The intervention of the AU forces in Somalia is highly significant for the relative stability that has been attained in Somalia including the establishment of a new Federal Government of Somalia in 2012. While the security context of Somalia remains fragile, this has largely raised hope for a secure and stabilized Somalia and the improved capacity of the government to provide political goods to its people.

However, the AU’s intervention in Somalia along with the international intervention in Somalia has contributed to off-setting some local dynamic processes in Somalia raising concerns about the right to self-determination and local ownership of the interventionist efforts in Somalia. The consideration of Somalia’s right to self-determination and local ownership is particularly relevant for the need to ensure that peace and stability is maintained when the international support for Somalia’s government is withdrawn. Notably, the quick dismissal and routing of the Islamist movements in Somalia as well as the failure to recognize or provide support to the decentralized political structures in Somalia tells of the international community’s keenness to establish and nurture a state that is international friendly irrespective of whether the government is supported by the local populace or not. This challenges the so-called African emphasis on community-centric approach to conflict resolution which entails a careful analysis of the community dynamics to ensure the local ownership of peace processes.

It worth observing that Al-Shabaab’s domestic and international terrorist posture highlights the frustration of some groups around the international community failure to engage in sustained dialogue with previous Islamic movements such as the AIAI and the ICU. Although the AU’s intervention came after series of interventions that had sort to purge radical Islamist movements, the AU’s current counter-insurgency posture against Al-Shabaab reflects an African effort to see how the already imposed state system will
gain legitimacy and capacity to provide political goods. In this context, it depends on one’s judgement to either perceive the counter-insurgent effort of the AU as been a useful element of African solutions or a worrying elements that maintains the status quo of international impositions in Somalia.

Furthermore, the African Union exhibits constraints in its capacity to coordinate the interferences of disparate actors in Somalia such as Ethiopia and the US who pursued their national interests in Somalia. This is largely consequent from the AU’s limited resources to exude itself as a dominant actor in the region and to pursue sustained long-term strategy for Somalia. The AU has engaged in some support to the negotiations and peace building efforts in Somalia. However, the regional body’s limited funding base and its reluctance to take on a long-term strategic direction has precluded it from engaging further with peace building and reconstruction initiatives in the bid to provide African solutions. This raises concerns around who will lead the peacebuilding efforts of ensuring a holistic approach to the resolution and reconciliation effort in Somalia. This includes the concern around how the questions of restorative justice and retributive justice are answered in Somalia.\textsuperscript{170}

\textsuperscript{170} There is no clear direction as to whether the UN will eventually take over the mission or not. If the UN does not, is the AU willing to lead the resolution process and ensure the peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction of the country?
Chapter 7:

Findings, Recommendations and Conclusion

7. Introduction

This chapter concludes the discussion by highlighting the major findings of the study as well as some recommendations pertinent to materializing the maxim African solutions to African problems. To this end, the chapter is divided into three main sections namely Findings, Recommendations and Conclusion.

7.1 The Findings

This dissertation has engaged with primary and secondary sources to advance the understanding of what constitutes African solutions as well as the intricacies surrounding the application of African solutions in terms of conflict resolution. As set out in chapter 1.2, the three (3) primary objectives of the thesis are to:

1. Investigate the substantive values of the maxim ‘African solutions to African problems’ in terms of conflict resolution.

2. Examine the implications of African-oriented solutions for the African Union’s conflict resolution outlook and interventions.

3. Explore the African Union’s achievements, challenges and prospects in implementing African solutions in terms of conflict resolution in Africa.

The realization of the first and second primary objectives was achieved in chapter 5 titled ‘Conceptualizing African Solutions: The Entailments and Implications for the African Union’s Conflict Resolution Architecture’. The conflation of the two objectives in the chapter was based on the consideration that the implications of African solutions flows directly from the identifications of the substantive values of African solutions. The focus on the substantive values of African solutions is based on the consideration that extant literatures on ‘African solutions to African problems’ have mainly focused on the implemental role of Africa in solving its problems without engaging with the values of the solutions applied to solve Africa’s problems. This chapter engaged the interview data of Africa experts in peace and security as well as literary sources on African indigenous conflict resolution to unearth Africa’s substantive values in conflict resolution and the
implications for the African Union. As such, the thesis establishes linkages between the contemporary views of African practitioners in conflicts resolution and the aspirations around the African values which have not found meaningful expression in contemporary world order as argued in chapter 3.

The third objective – which is aimed at inquiring into the achievements, challenges and prospects in the application of African solutions – was realized in chapter 6 entitled ‘The African Union’s Intervention in Somalia: The Achievements, Challenges and Prospects in the Operationalization of African Solutions’. This chapter engages the primary documents of the AU and the UN, and secondary sources including some interview data to engage with the achievements, challenges and prospects in terms of the provision of African solutions. The case of the African Union’s intervention in Somalia was adduced to engage with the intricacies in the application of African solutions.

The following sections engages with the findings of the first-two objectives as discussed in chapter 5.

7.1.2 The substantive values of ‘African solutions’ in Conflict Resolution and the Implications for the African Union

Based on the tenets of constructivism, chapter 5 engaged with the prevailing impressions about the substantive values of African solutions – whether realized or aspired – in terms of conflict resolution and how the solutions or values could inform the AU interventions. Notably, many respondents stress that African solutions does not refer to any practice or value that is unique to Africa. Rather, it refers to Africa’s self-determination and the prioritizations of particular values in the attempt to resolve conflicts that could be parallel or divergent from those of other regions. As gleaned from consultations as well as primary and secondary sources, the two primary framework for understanding ‘African solutions to African problems’ are (a) responsibility and (b) ownership. Under the two frameworks, the following sub-sections identifies key values of African solutions.

7.1.2.1 African Solutions as ‘Responsibility’ for Africa’s Peace and Security

The primary entailment of the maxim African solutions to African problems is that African actors should unreservedly take responsibility for the peace and security agenda and initiatives in the continent. In Africa’s context where powerful states have played significant roles in addressing security challenges, the collective responsibility of African
states in addressing the continental issues is considered as a value in itself. This is in tandem with Africa’s vision of ‘an integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens and representing a dynamic force in global arena’ (AU Vision, 2015).

Since its formation, the African Union is obliged and expected to externalize Africa’s responsibility by attending to Africa’s conflict challenges. The African Union has been equipped with normative stance to intervene in conflict settings. It is argued that even though the responsibility for international peace and security lies with the United Nations, Africa actors are no longer given to relying on external actors and the UN which is constrained by internal politics between the superpowers that represent the UN Security Council in particular. Thus, the African peace and security architecture (APSA) which is under the coordination of the African Union’s Peace and Security Council (PSC) is considered the primary referent body for peace and security in Africa, albeit with the cooperation of and support from the UN.

7.1.2.2 African Solutions as Ownership of the Peace and Security Initiatives in Africa

The most complex and contentious aspect of the maxim African solutions to African problems is the ownership of the peace and security initiatives in Africa as discussed in chapter 5.2. The thesis categorized the highlighted African values/solutions based on five peace and security instruments of the AU namely the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), the Panel of the Wise (PoW), the African Standby Force (ASF), the AU Policy on Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development, and the Peace Fund (PF).

7.1.2.2.1 Continental Early Warning System (CEWS): The Value of Good Governance, Orderly Changes of Power and the Community-Based Approach to Conflict Resolution

The CEWS provides an avenue for Africa to engage in timely identification and prevention of security threats. The following sub-headings highlights the resolutions and prescriptions for conflict prevention.

a. Good Governance: For African practitioners in peace and security, one of the solutions to Africa’s conflict challenges is the entrenchment of the values of good governance in the continent. In the African context where many wars are fought over state weaknesses, illegitimacy and inability to provide political goods, good governance is considered as one of the crucial requirements to prevent mass
discontents and resultant conflicts. Beside the need to prevent internal challenges among African states, the African Union’s credibility as a continental leader is dependent on the good governance status of its member states.

b. **Non-Tolerance stance for unconstitutional changes of government:** One of the resolve of Africa, especially through the African Union, is a non-tolerance stance for unconstitutional changes of government. Unlike other international organizations\(^{171}\), the African Union has unreservedly condemned every coup in the continent and sanctioned coup leaders accordingly. This is in tandem with its insistence that the democratic and orderly transition of power is highly beneficial for the stability in the continent than any coercive transition as discussed in Chapter 5.2.1.1.

c. **Community-Centric Approach to Conflict Resolution:** The Community-centric approach of African conflict resolution is advanced by literary discourses as a remedy to conflict challenges that arise from the greed of individual leaders. The African traditional value-system is considered to be community-centric rather than individual-centric approaches. Many authors in African indigenous conflict resolution insist that the community-based approach to conflict resolution should be prioritized in Africa as discussed in chapter 5.2.1.1.2. This is to address the sundry conflicts in Africa that emerge from the greed of individuals who manipulate and project their interests on African societies. The AU is thus challenged to pursue a community-based approach to conflict resolution – an approach that de-incentivizes the gains of individualism through its conflict resolution interventions.

7.1.2.2 **The Panel of the Wise: The Value of Sustained Negotiations and the Role of Women**

The Panel of the Wise (PoW) is a mechanism for Africa to champion one of its important resolution which is to pursue the peaceful resolution of disputes in the continent through mediation, negotiation and dialogue as discussed in chapter 5.2.1.2. African practitioners and literary discourses agree on Africa’s bias for sustained negotiated solutions. Africa’s

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\(^{171}\) Notably, many unconstitutional changes in government occurs within Africa and it is of the interest of African organizations such as the AU to have a common position on the issue. This highlights the fact that African solutions entails values that are congruent with the realities of Africa.
prioritization of negotiated solutions is notable from the sustained effort of African organizations to secure dialogues and negotiations for the resolution of conflicts. This includes Africa’s unreserved caution against the use of military and coercive solutions which could end up yielding cosmetic solutions.

a. As discussed in 5.2.1.2 Engagements with some African literary sources also reveal that women in African societies have traditionally played a significant role in getting conflict parties to negotiate, reach consensus and resolve conflicts timeously. The role of women in contemporary times has however been undermined by the colonial structures that paid less regard to the role of women in conflict resolution. Thus, the attempt at propagating the role of women in conflict resolution in Africa ought to be enhanced with the re-emphasis of the paramount role which women occupied in resolution attempts in traditional African societies.

7.1.2.2.3 The African Standby Force: The Value of Flexible interventions

The ASF provides the AU the opportunity to react rapidly to contain conflict challenges and create conducive platform for the peaceful resolution of disputes. Although the ASF has not yet become fully functional, it is the only conceived and developed international standby force in the globe. Many peace and security experts observe that while the AU considers negotiated solutions as primary to conflict resolution, the development of the ASF highlights the cognizance that violent conflicts have dire impacts on civilian populations and the stability of neighbouring, regional and international security.

At present, the AU’s peace operations – which falls within the scope of the responsibilities of the ASF – has ingeniously been in regions with little or no peace to keep unlike the UN peace operations that is established in regions with relative stability. Along this considerations, it is argued that a fledging African model of peace operations is in the making – a model that will inform future international peace operations across the globe.

7.1.2.2.4 The AU Policy on Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development: The Value of Local ownership, Restorative justice and Holistic approach

The AU Policy on Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development (AU PCRD) is a policy framework for the continental body to pursue its responsibility for peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction in the continent. Among the five core principles of the AU
PCRD is the need to ensure the local ownership of peace efforts to ensure that peace gains last after external interveners complete their mission. Literary discourses further emphasize Africa’s value for restorative justice and the holistic solution in the bid resolve conflicts and building peace as discussed in chapter 5.2.1.4.

a. **The Restorative Approach to Resolution and Reconciliation**: Scholarly sources on African traditional conflict resolution and reconciliation paradigm highlight that the African heritage for the resolution of disputes is founded on the need to mend broken relations. This is based on the consideration that African conflict resolution tradition considers conflict as ailment in relationships in societies that needs to be mended for a harmonious living. This is unlike other approaches that prioritizes punitive or retributive justice system.

b. **The Holistic Approach to Resolution and Reconciliation**: Literary source on African conflict resolution outlook also emphasis that African indigenous practice of conflict resolution is holistic in dimension. That is to mean that African conflict resolution does not merely engage in political or rational facets of conflict resolution but also emotional and spiritual aspects of conflict resolution.

7.1.2.2.5 The Peace Fund: The Value of Internal Capacity for Intervention

The Peace Fund of the AU was established for the generation and retention of funds for the AU’s peace and security initiatives. Many experts note that although the support of external actors – who have provided the bulk of the funds for AU missions – is quintessential, However, the limitations of the AU’s internal funding base creates dependencies and limitations on the AU’s capacity for independent and proactive intervention. This has created conditions for external actors to influence the AU interventions and at times side-line and impose solutions on the continent. Thus, one of the highlighted values for African solutions in the need for ensuring local funding in Africa.

Ingeniously, this dissertation, through this chapter, exudes originality based on its unmatched engagement with substantive values alongside Africa’s core mechanisms for intervention. The dissertation situates the discourse on Africa’s substantive values

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172 This includes African leadership, national and local ownership, inclusiveness, equity and non-discrimination, cooperation and cohesion, and capacity building for sustainability (AU PCRD 2006).
(solutions) in conflict resolution within contemporary and trending African mechanisms for intervention. By so doing, the thesis argues that if Africa is to realize African solutions, African actors and organizations such as the African Union ought to explore creative means of realizing values or principles such as:

a. The community-based approach which deposits power on peoples rather than the state and state-elites. This includes efforts to ensure good governance and orderly transitions of power;

b. Sustained and timely negotiations which engages the society in dialogue rather than the use of coercive force to settle conflicts. This includes engaging with the role of elders and women in leading resolution attempts;

c. Flexible peace operations aimed at ensuring the dignity of human lives.

d. Restorative justice which entails measures to encourage harmony and peace amongst conflict parties who eventually live together when conflicts are resolved;

e. Holistic-approaches to conflict resolution to ensure a multipronged approach to conflict resolution with engages with the physical, emotional and spiritual realities of people in society; as well as

f. Enhanced internal capacity for conflict resolution.

As argued in chapter 3, these values are not merely for asserting differences but to engage with home-grown and endogenous approaches in the quest for lasting solutions. At the backgrounds, the study have maintained the idea that while Africa’s values in conflict resolution need a renewed investigation in terms of their relevance for addressing conflict challenges, the attainment of sustainable solutions can only be realized with the complementary role of other peace and security outlooks that supplements it. This is in view of the limitations of parochial views as well as the contemporary complex and interdependent global setting that require global partnership in the attempt to address challenges at local, national and international levels. Yet, for Africa’s perspective to be considered in the international setting that is dominated by powerful actors, there remains the need to explore, assert and project Africa’s principles in addressing challenges within the continent as well as in the globe. Next section – particularly in the African solutions as ownership subsection – the thesis highlights the assessment of the realization of some this principles through the African Union.
7.1.3 Exploring the African Union’s achievements, challenges and prospects in implementing African solutions in terms of conflict resolution in Africa.

Chapter 6 engaged the AU intervention in Somalia in order to investigate the achievements, challenges and prospects in terms of the provision of African solutions. Although the sole examination of the AU’s intervention in Somalia does not provide avenue to assess the various entailments of African solutions as mentioned above, the AU’s intervention in Somalia – when compared to other AU missions – provides a better context to explore the complexities in terms of the provision of African solutions. Before engaging with the AU’s contribution, it is worth observing that the AU’s intervention in Somalia came after many missed opportunities and failed interventions in the country. The AU’s intervention came to support the transitional government to gain some stability in the country. The following are some of the assessed role of the AU in Somalia based on the two broad frameworks of African solutions namely responsibility and ownership.

7.1.3.1 African Solutions as Responsibility

A good case for the achievements in the implementation of the African solutions is that the AU’s intervention in Somalia highlights Africa’s responsibility in terms of spearhead conflict resolution efforts in the continent. Irrespective of its limited funding base and the challenges of reviving a collapsed state, the continental body have displayed a commendable tenacity to pursue stability in Somalia and not abandon the state as the UN did in the early 1990s. The AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) has considerably attained some successes in its efforts to extend the authority of the states and its counter-insurgency against Al-Shabaab. The AU has also has promoted dialogue and negotiations for the restoration order and peace in the country. Remarkably, its intervention has led to the attainment of relative peace in Somalia leading to the establishment of a Federal Government of Somalia in 2012. While the security context of Somalia remains fragile, the AU’s intervention has largely raised hope for a secure and stabilized Somalia and the improved capacity of the government to provide political goods to its people.

7.1.3.2 African Solutions as Ownership

The following are some of the assessments of the efforts of the AU to ensure ownership in the provision of African solutions.

a. Flexibility in Peace Operations
The AU’s interventions have exuded remarkable ingenuity in the attempt to resolve the Somali crisis.\textsuperscript{173} Firstly, the AU mission in Somalia was established in a high-intensity conflict context where the UN have continually declined calls for intervention. As the AU peace operation matures in terms of duration, the mission has taken on various strategic directives for stability in the country. In the initial years of AMISOM’s formation, the AU had mainly engaged in the protection of key instalments and officials of the Somali government. Over time, the mission has been boosted to adopt peace-enforcement outlook by engaging in counter-insurgency operations against Al-Shabaab. The mission has also engaged in some state building initiatives by supporting the state in terms of extending its authority and gaining the required capacity for public service.

However, the conceptualization of AMISOM as an interim mission to be taken over by the UN coupled with AU’s limited capacity contributed to the lack of an African long-term strategic directive for resolving the crisis in Somalia as discussed in the next section.

\textit{b. Internal Capacity for Peace Operations}

While African actors have exhibited a significant degree of commitment to addressing the Somali crisis, funding challenges encumbered the mission. The funds for AMISOM’s operations were generated mainly from external actors, which raises concern that the mission exists at the mercy of external donors. Some observers argue that the establishment of AMISOM was only possible after the 9/11 attack that raised heightened concern among the western community that failed states are breeding grounds for terrorist groups. Somalia on its part had long been categorized by the west as a region hosting prominent leaders of Al-Qaeda that carry out domestic and international terrorist activities. The AU mission in Somalia is thus considered as a proxy for the western war against terrorism in Somalia.

Furthermore, the external funding mechanism for the mission have been considered unpredictable and uncertain. In this regard, AMISOM, at the onset, suffered from insufficient number of troops to engage with the task of creating an atmosphere of stability

\textsuperscript{173} Most of the peace operations undertaken by the UN in the last decade often come after an African peace operation which stabilizes the host states and provides conducive platform for a UN intervention. To create conditions for a UN intervention, the AU undertook the arduous task of securing stability in the volatile and contested security contexts of Somalia, likewise in many of its interventions – Burundi, Sudan, Mali and CAR. Despite the attainment of some relative stability in Somalia and the establishment of a new Somali government, the UN has continually declined any call for it to take over the AU mission as conceived from the onset of the mission.
in Somalia. Although the mission currently has over 22,000 troops with the massive financial support of external donors, the unpredictability of the funding for AMISOM remains a concerning element for the mission’s ability to attain its mandate.

Coupled with the conceptualization of AMISOM as an interim mission, the unreliable funding base precluded AMISOM from making a long-term strategic directive to restore peace in Somalia. In this context, the AU mission has generally operated with short-term directives that involve peacekeeping, counter-insurgency and support to government institution as a UN intervention is awaited.

The overall resource limitation of the AU also contributed to the mission’s reliance on the support and expertise of external actors thereby raising concerns about AU’s internal capacities in terms of peace and security. Without advocating for the absence of external support, the resort to external expertise challenges Africa’s resolve for self-sufficiency in line with the ideals of African solutions to African problems.

c. The Community-based Approach to Conflict resolution: The Local Ownership of the AU Conflict Resolution Attempt

One of the test for an African ownership of peace efforts is the ability of the peace effort to underscore local ownership in line with the community-based approach of African conflict resolution paradigm. Local ownership of peace efforts is highly significant to ensure the self-determination of communities and to ensure that peace efforts lasts beyond the presence of international actors in the region. The following are some of the highlights of the issues involved:

i. Coordinating the Interests and Efforts of External Interveners in Somalia: As a state belonging in the international ‘community’ the intervention of external actors – African and non-African actors – is crucial to attaining peace in Somalia. Nevertheless, the local ownership of the conflict resolution attempts in Somalia is primary to the interests of external actors if lasting peace is to be attained. This is particularly imperative in the context of Somalia where external interventions has been met with internal criticisms. Although the AU provided a commendable platform for various actors to support the peace process in Somalia, it has been found wanting in effectively coordinating and harmonizing the efforts and interests of the international community in the conflict resolution attempt in Somalia as discussed in chapter 6.3.3.
ii. *Limitations in Sustained Negotiations and the Fixation on an international friendly-State:* The research observes that the AU’s intervention including the support of external actors have off-set many local dynamic processes in Somalia that questions the local ownership of the interventionist approach in Somalia. Among the criticism for the international engagement in Somalia including the AU’s role is that the interventions where fixated on re-establishing the state rather than promoting peace in the country. The international community’s intervention in Somalia failed to engage in sustained negotiation with the Islamic movements that emerged in Somalia leading to the further radicalization of Al-Shabaab. Al-Shabaabs apparent uncompromising stance tend to reflect a loss of faith in the international community’s willingness to consider it as a reliable and relevant actor to negotiate with. Additionally, the fixation of the international community for an internationally understood state-system had led to the insufficient recognition and attention to the decentralized autonomous states in Somalia. With the establishment of the new state system in Somalia there tends to be worries about the fate of the autonomous states as the international community continues to back the Federal Government to extend its authority. While the state structure is not an issue, the seeming campaign by external actors to revive an international friendly state-system for Somalis undermines local dynamics as discussed in chapter 6.3.4.\(^\text{174}\)

*d. The Question of Good Governance*

With the re-formation of the state in Somalia, the dominant concern is on how to ensure that the state parties pursue genuine peace efforts in the country and provide political goods to its people. One thing that is clear from the Somali context is that the state has not given the Somalis enough reason to trust its efficiency and reliability. The successive government regimes in Somalia has been characterized by corruption, mis-governance and political repression. To enable the state to perform better, the AU has provided valuable support to the Somali government to extend its authority across the state and provide services to its people. However, the question remains around who the government will be accountable for; the people or the international supporters/donors that established and nurtured it.

\(^\text{174}\) It is worth noting that the Islamic groups (at least at the initial stages) as well as the decentralized groups in Somalia seem to enjoy more popularity among the populace even more than the introduced government of Somalia.
e. Post-Conflict Reconstruction: The Questions of Restorative Justice and Holistic Approach to Conflict Resolution

As discussed earlier, one of the significant challenges with the AU mission in Somalia is that it has continually conceived itself as an interim mission for over eight years. It is continually hoped that the UN will take over the mission. This raises questions around how African actors can spearhead the peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction policy of the AU as highlighted by the AU PCRD. Among the concerns here is how issues relating to justice and reconciliation is addressed in Somalia. With the uncertainty around African Union’s continued role in Somalia, there remains concerns regarding the realization of restorative justice and a holistic approach to conflict resolution in Somalia – a holistic approach that accounts for the political, economic, social, religious, emotional and spiritual realities in the country.

7.2 Recommendations for Materializing African Solutions in Conflict Resolution

The following sections explore some recommendations for the materialization of African-oriented solutions in conflict resolution.

7.2.1 Improving the Internal Relevance of the Ideals of Pan-Africanism

For Africa to operationalize the ideals of ‘African solutions to African problems’, Africa needs to engage with the internal significance of a common African identity, African unity and African integration with less focus on how these Pan-African ideals link to the struggle against colonialism and imperialism. Since the ideology of Pan-Africanism emerged in the early 1900s, Africans have united over a supposed common African identity to pursue African unity and integration in a bid to surmount common challenges. The ideals of Pan-Africanism saw Africa’s attainment of freedom from slavery, the debasement of the racial inferiority of Africans and the end of colonialism. Pan-Africanist ideals of African unity continues to motivate African actors to fight against neo-colonialism and imperialism in Africa.

However, much of the considerations around Pan-Africanism have been overly highlighted in relations to the struggle against external powers in the international order. Little attention is paid on the relevance of the concept of Pan-Africanism for social cohesion in various African communities. Africa’s discourses around the gains of African
unity and cooperation are considered *a priori* without a significant consideration of the internal incentives and necessity for Africa’s cooperation and unity.

It is noteworthy observing that through Agenda 2063, Africa reaffirmed the need for seamless borders characterized by free trade and movement of people as part of the Pan-African vision of a United Africa.\(^{175}\) The agenda for a borderless Africa has hovered over many considerations in Africa with many states seeming to favor the idea in theory based on the so-called ideals of Pan-Africanism. However, there has been little research done on the value of African unity and open borders for the various states that make up the African continent. Notably, Africa has many states with varied social, economic and political capabilities. In terms of economic capabilities, South Africa, Nigeria, Algeria and Egypt account for half of the continent’s GDP and contains nearly a third of Africa’s total population. In this light, under what circumstances should South Africa with its advanced economy, for instance, seek the unity of states with poorer countries in the continent.\(^{176}\) The heightened sense of nationalism that is defined by the colonially constructed borders in Africa – in light of the impression around limited resources in African states – proves to be a challenge for Africa’s hope for a united Africa with seamless borders.

Beside Africa’s witness to many high levels of religious and ethnic violence, many states in Africa, including the local population, adopt anti-immigration stance especially when the immigrants are from other parts of Africa. Since the independence of African states, there has been several cases of anti-immigration sentiments and violence in African states – sentiments and violence that target immigrants from other African states. Historically, examples of such include the Aliens Compliance Order of 1969/70 that was issued by the Ghanaian government against nationals from other West African regions leading to the expulsion of West African immigrants, especially Nigerian immigrants in Ghana (Aremu and Ajayi, 2014). Ghanaians were, in turn, expelled from Nigeria as ‘aliens’ in the 1980s (Aremu 2013). In 1995, the government of Ivory Coast changed the meaning of the term ‘Ivoirité’ – which initially referred to the common identity of all who resided in Ivory Coast – to mean only those living in the South and East of the country.

\(^{175}\) As part of its vision of a United Africa, Agenda 2063 envisages seamless borders in Africa with world class, integrated infrastructure that criss-cross the continent (Aspiration 2, AU Agenda 2063: 2).

\(^{176}\) Moreover, the integration discourse in Africa is elite-driven given that there are less continental initiatives promoting interaction between Africans in the continent yet African leaders through regional organizations have established platforms for interaction and theorizations of continental integration.
In 2008 and 2015, South Africa recorded massive onslaughts against foreign nationals – from other African countries – leading to deaths and the displacement of thousands of foreign nationals. In Kenya, citizens and refugees from Somalia allegedly suffer from xenophobic sentiments and attacks. Refugees from various countries within the continent have also suffered harsh treatments in host African countries. Such challenges expose the weaknesses in the apparent cohesion and common identities of Africans in the different geo-political regions in the continent – with dire consequences on the need for common approach in Africa. The inability of many African states, and its population, to understand and/or propagate the so-called indivisibility of Africa’s peace, security and development, have also contributed immensely to the reluctance among African actors to commit resources and energy to continental initiatives.

Furthermore, many smaller/weaker states in Africa, are wary of the hegemonic stance of some states such as Nigeria and South Africa. The obsession of some leaders with power remains a concern for many Africans in terms of having a united Africa. The push for a United States of Africa by Gadhafi and his willingness to fund it was construed as a personal quest by Gaddafi to dominate and rule the African continent. As observed earlier, Africa has recorded many experiences where leaders in their obsession for power are willing to tear a country apart for their ulterior motives. What will be the fate of a united Africa?

In this light, African actors through the African Union ought to invest in promoting social cohesion in African communities and providing tangible information that delineates the incentives for African unity and cooperation. It becomes essential that African leaders and policymakers engage in deep reflection on Pan-African unity and integration beyond the racial, colonial and imperial meaning of the idea, so as to enact policies and devise measures that will promote cohesion in the continent. With this, the quest for African solutions could make meaning to Africa.

**7.2.2 Improving Good Governance and Accountability in Africa**

One of the major projects required for Africa to pursue credible African solutions is creating a system of good governance that is accountable to African people. Good governance is also particularly crucial for the reduction of insecurities that result from (a) the role of the state in inciting discontents and conflicts and (b) the subservient attitude of some states to powerful states who engage in ulterior and destabilizing activities in the
continent. Based on the former, many of the internal conflicts within the states in the continent result from state mis-governance and repression as indicated earlier. With limited democratic space to advance their views, opposition movements have adopted violent approaches to advance their interests. Secondly, some of Africa’s leaders have resorted to playing subservient role to external powers that provide them with the necessary enablers to remain in power. As such, powerful states exploit the continent’s vulnerabilities.

For the African Union to coordinate the effort to attain African solutions, it is crucial that the AU develops its legitimacy and credibility which is dependent on the status of its member states. If many states in Africa have questionable resumé due to bad governance, lack of transparency and accountability, and political repression, ordinary citizens as well as internationals actors would not take the organization seriously. In this light, it remains crucial that Africa works on attaining good governance at all levels.\footnote{This will enable Africa to realize its vision of ‘a universal culture of good governance, democratic values, gender equality, respect for human rights, justice and the rule of law’ (Agenda 2063, Aspiration 3).}

The African Union has a vital role to play in this regard by not only enacting policies and establishing mechanisms for good and accountable governance system but also enforcing and following up on pertinent issues relevant to good and accountable governance in the continent. Without re-inventing the wheel, the African Union should use mechanisms such as the African Governance Architecture (AGA),\footnote{In January 2011 The African Governance Architecture (AGA) was adopted during the 16th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the African Union under the theme “Towards Greater Unity and Integration through Shared Values. AGA provides a political and institutional framework for Africa to promote good governance in the continent.} the Parliamentary Parliament (PAP) and the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) to drive the need for a people-centred governance system.

The AGA, through the Democracy, Elections and Governance Platform, is envisioned to provide opportunity for Africa to monitor the governance structures at the national level and monitor the implementation of democratic electoral processes among other duties. The AGA should take on a proactive stance by issuing annual reports on the State of Democracy and Governance in Africa as it is envisioned to do through ‘the African Governance Report’. The AGA’s Public Service, Administration, Anti-Corruption, Decentralization and Local Governance Platform should also facilitate the monitoring and sharing of best practices in service delivery efforts in AU Member states in line with the
African Charter on the Values and Principles of Public Service and Administration. Through this Platform, the AGA is expected to issue an annual index on the “State of Service Delivery” as part of the African Governance Report. Such Reports – “State of Democracy and Governance in Africa” and “State of Service Delivery” which are part of the ‘African Governance Report – will encourage states to compete for good governance and service delivery for their citizens.

The Parliamentary Parliament (PAP) that was inaugurated on 18 March 2004 and situated in South Africa is envisioned to provide Africans and grass roots organizations a platform to be more involved in the discussions and decision making on the issues facing the continent. The PAP structure is to contribute to encouraging good governance, accountability and transparency in Africa by ensuring that the interest of the masses is of paramount importance. The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) also provides a platform for African actors to challenge each other’s adherence to democracy, good governance and socio-economic development so as to ‘to encourage conformity in regard to political, economic and corporate governance values, codes and standards, among African countries and the objectives in socio-economic development.’

To ensure that the foregoing structures remain true to representing the view of African people, the Citizens and Diaspora Organizations Directorate (CIDO) unit of the African Union Commission should be more proactive in ensuring that the voices of non-state actors are highlighted in the AU’s initiatives; thereby ensuring that projects such as the PAP, AGA and the APRM remain true to the value of representing the voices of ordinary Africans who remain at the peripheries of debates and implemental initiatives in the continent.

7.2.3 Improving Africa’s Resource Base

For Africa to solve its problems and be respected as a significant actor in global relations, the continent needs a powerful resource base. While Africa has remarkable ideas, visions and human capital, limited resource capacity is a major constraint that precludes the continent from implementing those initiatives and ideas. As indicated earlier, this has provided platforms for more powerful states to impose their views on the continent.

179 For more information, see: http://www.au.int/en/organs/pap
180 For more information, see: http://aprm-au.org/pages?pageId=mandate
181 For Komey, Osman, and Melakedingel (2013: 75), it is the involvement of grass root institutions which give a real content to the AfSol’s dimensions of identity, participation and ownership.”
2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development that was adopted by World Leaders during the UN General Assembly on 25 September 2015 clearly indicates that Africa is a region needing special attention in terms of eradicating poverty and hunger.\textsuperscript{182} This shows the extent to which Africa has become somewhat synonymous with poverty and vulnerabilities thereby creating room for powerful entities to impose their solution on the continent.

Yet, in terms of natural resources, Africa is not poor. Rather, African states have not translated raw riches to meaningful riches for the people as indicated in Chapter 4.2. Respondents 8 and 17 stressed that African actors constantly provide opportunity for western powers to intervene in the continent by portraying African states and organizations as poor, needy and desperate for external assistance. Considering the illicit funds transferred outside the continent as published by Thabo Mbeki, Africa has a latent capacity to finance its operations.

To materialize the values embedded in the notion of African solutions to African problems – which hinges on self-reliance – as spearheaded by the AU, African states ought to take considerable responsibility of the challenges involved in solving African problems not only by highlighting Africa’s ideas and visions but by devising means to generate resources for the implementation of those ideals. A Swahili proverb observes that ‘when you want peanuts, get yourself a roasting pan’ (Ajei 2007: 200). This requires that to attain African solutions, Africa ought to generate and consolidate the capacity to do so.

At present, the AU which is expected to pursue African solutions in peace and security lacks adequate financial and material resource for peace operations as indicated in 5.2.1.4. During its Twenty-Fourth Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the Union of 30 - 31 January 2015, the AU adopted alternative funding proposals to increase the contribution of member states for the AU’s operational budget to 100%, its programme budget to 75 per cent and its peacekeeping budget to 25% (PSC Report 2015). Nevertheless, it is not certain that the alternative source of funding will encourage member states to capacitate the regional body.

\textsuperscript{182} The Agenda 2030 notes that ‘the most vulnerable countries and, in particular, African countries, least developed countries, landlocked developing countries and small island developing states deserve special attention, as do countries in situations of conflict and post-conflict countries’ (UN General Assembly, 25 September 2015).
To address Africa’s resource challenge, the AU through monitoring and evaluating the governance and development in Member States, could support the developmental initiatives of member states and encourage relevant stakeholders to meet up to their responsibilities in this regard. Accountability initiatives such as the High-Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows from Africa should be enhanced with projects and binding resolutions that are aimed at curtailing or addressing the challenges of illicit financial flows. This includes extending appropriate inter-African sanctions to individuals, multinational companies, etc that aid and abet illicit flows. This is to ensure the internal development of states where these finances are generated from.

By extension, the development of the states in Africa would enable Member States to be in a better position to support the AU with necessary resources for continental initiatives. Resources would capacitate the regional body to (a) be proactive when necessary without relying on external approval and support of its proposals; (b) respond timely to avert ulterior interventions and influences that undermine the sovereignty and right to self-determination of African states; and (c) guarantee that the needs, demands and fears of the AU member states are met in tandem with the values of Africa. A respondent for this study observed the gap in the discourse on African solutions by insisting that:

> the issue is not only at the level of financial contribution but it is at the level of owning conceptually but also in the approach we use to contend with conflicts in Africa. But emphasis is put more on the financial level. The issue of ownership should not be limited to financial ownership. It goes beyond financial ownership to who we are as Africans and what we can do.

> We will like to see, initiatives such as that by Obansanjo which seeks to ensure that alternative source from member states enables Africa to have enough

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183 Nevertheless, while pursuing development to attain a powerful resource base, Africa should be keen to pursue developmental goals that does not attenuate the dignity and rights of people and the environment. Sefa Dei and Simmons (2009:16) observe that the dominant use of the term development is anchored in ‘economic, technological and material constraints and possibilities, with limited emphasis on the spiritual, emotional and social-cultural dimensions’. Undoubtedly, economic, technological and material based development has led to huge advances that make lives and work much easier. Over the years however, developments based on such mainstream emphasis have led to disastrous consequences such as ecological destruction and global warming. This has led to mass killings and genocides consequent from the production of weapons of mass destruction; the attenuation of the value of human life given the over reliance on technology; deep-rooted corruption and killings in the quest for wealth accumulation; etc. Hence, discourses on development in Africa should be holistic in line with Africa’s traditional values of extolling a holistic/multidimensional approach to life. This is to guard against evil outcomes in other spheres of life. In the view of Ajei (2007: 11), development should be about ‘… the preservation and improvement of human dignity and welfare …’.
resources. That will give you more solid grounds to negotiate with partners and it is an issue of pride for the continent. And part of it is to reaffirm that the continent can find the solution to its problems (Respondent 6, CSO).

7.2.4 Building a Credible Research Base and Expertise in Africa

The development of the research base in Africa is quintessential for Africa’s quest to attain African solutions. One of Africa’s downside in terms of pursuing self-determination and internal development in Africa is the limited investment on context-specific and indigenous-based research and expertise that is born out of the considerations of the rich values and capacities in the continent. As observed earlier, much of the information about Africa and the expertise for addressing Africa’s challenges are from external actors. African actors look to outside actors to garner reliable data about the continent and also invites so-called experts from outside Africa to spearhead the resolution of the challenges in the continent. To ensure that Africa is equipped with reliable information and expertise to provide African solutions, there remains the need to invest on research on the values and contextual realities of the continent.

In his *The Conversation of Races*, W.E.B. du Bois (2007: 12) maintains that Africa should strive to enhance their mode of existence by adapting to current realities and at the same time ensuring that its values are not subsumed by the views, ideologies and values of others. This demands African actors to exhibit greater commitment in standing up against reductionist paradigms irrespective of the challenges. This can only be realizable with Africa’s commitment to supporting research and expertise within the continent. The Declaration on the Theme of the Summit: “Towards Greater Unity And Integration Through Shared Values” during the 16th Ordinary Session of the AU in 2011 encourages ‘efforts directed at enhancing the participation of African Research Institutes, Universities, Civil Society and the Media in promoting Shared Values as part of wider efforts directed at securing African ownership.’ Interestingly, the African Union’s 2006 Study on an African Union Government: Towards a United States of Africa highlights that

Although Africa has, for well-known historical reasons, lost some of its self-sustaining characteristics, it is of paramount importance to use the shared values as a leverage towards closer unity among and joint purpose of action by African countries and people. They should particularly be used at the national,
regional and continental levels to devise and implement developmental policies and programmes that are people centred and well rooted in African traditions. Thus through a skilful combination of indigenous and modern knowledge systems, African countries could devise well thought-out and creative strategies for the transformation of their social structures, political systems, and economic organizations to the present world environment so that the continent as a whole would successfully claim the 21st century (AU Study on an African Union Government: Towards a United States of Africa, 2006: point 21).

On its part, the AU is required to sponsor research on African contextual realities and indigenous knowledge systems that explore the relevance and usefulness of indigenous African approaches in contemporary settings that are dominated by the frameworks of dominant powers. However, without adequate investment from Africa, inquiry into the relevance and usefulness of African approaches will continue to take back stages. Pertinent to conflict resolution, not enough studies have been invested on critiquing and exploring how expertise could be developed around African approaches for its utilization at the national, regional and international level.

In terms of developing expertise in conflict resolution, Africa should groom African expertise in terms of mediation expertise; country and regional expertise; monitoring and analytical expertise; thematic expertise; communications expertise; and management, logistics, administrative and financial expertise. This is to promote expertise within the continent and reduce the over-reliance on external expertise for Africa’s peace and security initiatives. The African Union should also support and work closely with traditional institutions to ensure local ownership of peace efforts; provide society-centric solutions; and pursue lasting solutions that speak to the contextual realities of societies. With this Africa’s position could be advanced from a continent that is developing at all levels to a continent that wields the internal capacities to ensure peace, security and development.

7.2.5 Stronger Cooperation between the AU and CSOs & RECs

For the AU to attain a stronger capacity to address the challenges in the continent, it ought to pursue a stronger cooperation between different actors in the continent. Particularly, a stronger cooperation with the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and civil society
organizations (CSOs) is quintessential for the coordination and harmonization of the Africa’s quest to provide African solutions.

The significance of engaging with CSOs is that they engage with local communities on key issues affecting society (Krishna 2012). As such, civil society organizations play a key role in representing and championing the perspectives of ordinary African citizens and they flag local particularities for national and international actors to be mindful of. The AU should thus engage more proactively with CSOs to bring the continental body’s initiatives to the grass roots. Engagement with CSOs will also make the regional body attune to the fears and needs of ordinary Africans.

Relevant to the cooperation with RECs, it is worth noting that the RECs are the building blocks of the AU and are the operational channels of the AU. In terms of peace and security, the RECs as part of the APSA structure are expected to take the first step to address the conflicts in their respective regions. However, there remains concerns that the RECs tend to pursue greater autonomy from the AU in line with the specific goals and targets of the sub-regional organizations. Notably, the disagreements between ECOWAS and the AU in terms of the management of the Mali crisis indicates that the AU has some challenges in terms of establishing itself as a continental leader (ISS 2014).

Moreover, the imbalances in Africa’s RECs as discussed in 5.2.1.3.1 entails that Africa has an uneven platform for the operationalization of the continent’s initiatives which are often anchored on the capacity of RECs to implement. Notably, the uneven efforts to operationalize the ASF highlights the need for the AU to support the development and strengthening of the capacity of some RECs and/or Regional Mechanisms (RMs) to meet up to their requirements. This includes supporting and enhancing the capacity of RECs/RMs to attend to sub-regional concerns. The AU’s support will go a long way to provide credibility to sub-regional efforts and in the same vein strengthen its role as a continental leader.

7.2.6 Coordination and Subsidiarity between the UN and the AU

For the African Union to spearhead the provision of African solutions to conflict challenges it ought to pursue greater cooperation and partnership with multilateral parties.

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184 The Protocol on Relations between the African Union (AU) and Regional Economic Communities (RECs) highlights that the RECs are integral bodies of the AU and that they should align their policies to that of the AU.
such as the UN. The complexity of contemporary conflicts that are characterized by terrorism, transnational crime and asymmetrical tactics alongside traditional warfare demands robust interventions which the AU alone may not be able to provide. While the AU has taken a proactive stance to address its challenges, the continental body remains limited in pursuing a sole interventionist attempt to realize Africa’s vision for peace, security and development. Beside its gaps in terms of resources, the AU may not claim to have a monopoly of the ideas and expertise required for addressing Africa’s peace and security; likewise no entity could claim monopoly of such knowledge and expertise.

The UN remains committed to providing technical and planning expertise to the AU in terms of conflict prevention, mediation, military and police planning, security sector reform, financial and logistics management, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and mine action. Nevertheless, partnership with the UN should be built on mutual respect and recognition of the AU’s leading role in the continent and the referent body in terms of Africa’s peace and security. In the same vein, it is crucial that the AU and member states attain international confidence through pursuing good governance, justice and credible efforts at development and peace.

7.3 General Conclusion

Since the establishment of the African Union in 2002, there has been a heightened activism in Africa for the materialization of ‘African solutions to African problems’ particularly in the bid to secure lasting solution to Africa’s conflict challenges. The maxim ‘African Solutions to African problems’ emerged from the misgivings around the motive, reliability and efficiency of external impositions and interventions in Africa. This concern is amplified on the background of the failure of African actors to exhibit appropriate agency in terms of conceptualizing and implementing context specific solutions to the continent’s challenges. Although external actors hold significant influence in Africa, the governance conundrum in the continent and the failure of Africa to build a powerful

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resource base to assert its values has further blurred the lines between the impositions of external actors and the complicity of Africa in its predicament.

In this regard, the maxim mirrors the anti-imperialist, guilt-driven and re-invigorated ambition of Africa to shape its destiny in tandem with the dominant belief among African thinkers and politicians that only African-oriented solutions can secure lasting solutions to Africa’s challenges. In a coordinated manner, the African Union as a Pan-African organization is envisioned to spearhead the provision of African solutions wherever possible. This is in sync with the theoretical framework of constructivism which observes that the collective/prevailing idea of common identity and shared culture and experiences in Africa have led African states and actors to pursue stronger cooperation and integration to surmount continental challenges.

However, there have been inadequate explorations of the distinctive value of the maxim ‘African solutions to African problems’ and the implications for the interventionist outlook employed by the African Union. Literary discourses on the entailments of ‘African solutions’ have mainly emphasized Africa’s implemental role focusing on issues such as resource capacity, political will, commitment with less emphasis on Africa’s values or substantive role in addressing its challenges. Yet, concerns persist that the dominant value frameworks and impositions of powerful external actors remain the basis for interventions in the continent. This has marginalized and suppressed the potential of other outlooks – such as African perspectives in the resolution of disputes – in the attempt to address local and international security challenges. In line with the claim that the international system is influenced by prevailing ideas from social relations, the ideals of African solutions obliges Africa to negotiate its values in the prevailing theory and practice of conflict resolution without being subservient or constrained by the dictates and approaches of dominant powers.

Using a qualitative methodology, this dissertation advances existing literature on African conflict resolution approaches by exploring the substantive value of the maxim ‘African solutions to African problems’ and the implications for the African Union’s conflict resolution initiatives. The research employs the case of the African Union’s intervention in Somalia to assess the achievements, challenges and prospects application of African solutions in the bid to address conflict challenges in the continent. Noting that practical
solutions to different conflicts vary, the thesis focuses particularly on the overarching ideals, principles and values of Africa that could guide conflict resolution efforts.

The dissertation finds that ‘African solutions’ in conflict resolution does not refer to unique elements; rather they refer to Africa’s prioritized values in conflict resolution. The thesis categorized African solutions (values) using two benchmarks namely responsibility and ownership. In term of African solutions as Responsibility, the maxim ‘African solutions to African problems’ highlight Africa’s responsibility to spearhead the resolution processes in the continent. These stance has spurred African actors to action particularly through the African Union since its formation in 2002. In terms of African solutions as Ownership, the dissertation engages with the understanding of African values in conflict resolution – values that sheds light to African-oriented solutions in conflict resolution. As discussed in chapter 5, this includes values such as good governance, non-tolerance to unconstitutional changes of government, community-based approach to conflict resolution; sustained negotiation; flexibility in peace operations; local capacity for peace operations; local ownership of peace operations; restorative justice and a holistic approach to conflict resolution and reconciliation. In accord with the tenets of constructivism, these values highlight some of the collective and prevailing ideas about what could be considered as African values or solutions based on the information from primary and secondary sources. Given that the world is of our making as argued by constructivists, the African Union is expected to critically pursue the realization of Africa’s prioritizations in attaining lasting solutions to Africa’s challenges.

Using the case study of Somalia, the study observes that Africa through the AU has made remarkable efforts to materialize the ideals of African solutions. In terms of African solutions as responsibility, the AU has shown commendable responsibility and commitment to resolving Somalia’s challenges. The proactive effort of the AU has led to the attainment of relative stability in Somalia including the election of a new Somali government in 2012 since the state collapse in 1992. In terms of African solutions as ownership, the AU has shown ingenuity in terms of engaging in a flexible peace operation using multidimensional means that has adapted to the contextual realities of Somalia over the years. However, the intervention faces limitations in terms of internal capacity for peace operations; coordinating the interests and efforts of external interveners; and engaging in sustained negotiations as well as the fixation on reviving an international friendly-state.
While the intervention of the AU is influenced by the conditions in the international system, the regional body is expected to gain a bolder stature in negotiating its values within rigid international systems that are dominated by the frameworks of powerful actors. This includes challenging mainstream systems such as the state-system and conflict resolution attempts that places more power and attention on individual elites rather than the community which is often highlighted disposition of Africa. In terms of the Somali case study, the African Union requires a long-term strategy to coordinate the efforts of the interveners in the country for peace-building rather than state-building. This is to ensure local/community ownership of peace efforts rather than peace efforts that reek of the imposition of state structures that extolls the power and privileges of few elites; elites who are often accountable to international donors rather than the people they represent.

The thesis argues that for the materialization of ‘African solutions to African problems’, the following are key recommendations for Africa’s ownership of peace and security in the continent:

- Improving the internal relevance and incentives of Pan-Africanism for unity, social cohesion and cooperation in Africa

- Enhancing Africa’s resource base for the continent to implement African solutions independently and garner a considerable power base to negotiate its terms in continental and global debates.

- Improving good governance and accountability in Africa to reduce the sundry conflicts that emerge from public discontents as well as to bolster the legitimacy and credibility of the AU in the attempt to address Africa’s challenges.

- Building credible research and expertise in the continent to ensure that African potentials and contextual realities are better exploited for the resolution of challenges in the continent.

- Encouraging stronger cooperation and coordination between the AU and civil society organizations, African sub-regional organizations and the UN in conflict resolution efforts.
With the foregoing improvements, external actors including ordinary African citizens could then take African actors seriously when the maxim ‘African solutions to African problems’ is invoked in the quest to address Africa’s challenges.
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Appendix 1. Ethical Clearance Letter

UNIVERSITY OF
KWAZULU-NATAL

INUVESI
YAKWAZULU-NATALI

18 November 2014

Mr Telubu Chad Christian Ani
School of Social Sciences
Pietermaritzburg Campus

Protocol reference number: HSS/1509/014D

Dear Mr Ani

Expedited Approval

In response to your application dated 14 November 2014, the Humanities & Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee has considered the abovementioned application and the protocol have been granted FULL APPROVAL.

Any alteration/s to the approved research protocol i.e. Questionnaire/Interview Schedule, Informed Consent Form, Title of the Project, Location of the Study, Research Approach and Methods must be reviewed and approved through the amendment/modification prior to its implementation. In case you have further queries, please quote the above reference number.

Please note: Research data should be securely stored in the discipline/department for a period of 5 years.

The ethical clearance certificate is only valid for a period of 3 years from the date of issue. Thereafter recertification must be applied for on an annual basis.

I take this opportunity of wishing you everything of the best with your study.

Yours faithfully

Dr Sivenka Singh (Chair)

cc: Supervisor: Dr.keyonce Mitchall
cc: Academic Leader: Research: Professor Sabine Marschall
cc: School Administrator: Ms Nancy Mudau

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Founding Campuses: Pietermaritzburg, Westville, Howard College, Medical School, Pietermaritzburg, Westville
Appendix 2: Template of Informed Consent

Dear Participant,

My name is Ndubuisi Christian Ani, a PhD candidate at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa. I write to kindly request your inputs on a doctoral project titled ‘African Solutions to African Problems: Assessing the African Union’s Application of Endogenous Conflict Resolution Approaches’. The project is developed against the backdrop that in light of the maxim ‘African solutions to African problems’, there seems to be insufficient study and appraisal of African endogenous approaches for conflict resolution. Informed by the foregoing concern, the project seeks to conceptualize the entailments and implications of ‘African solutions to African problems’ for the African Union’s conflict resolution efforts.

I am interested in interviewing you so as to share your experiences and observations on the subject matter. Please note that:

a. The information that you provide will be used for scholarly research only.
b. Your participation is entirely voluntary. You have a choice to participate, not to participate or stop participating in the research. You will not be penalized for taking such an action.
c. Your views in this interview will be presented anonymously. Neither your name nor identity will be disclosed in any form in the study.
d. The interview will take about 15 minutes.
e. The record as well as other items associated with the interview will be held in a password-protected file accessible only to myself and my supervisors. After a period of 5 years, in line with the rules of the university, it will be disposed by shredding and burning.

If you agree to participate please sign the declaration attached to this statement (a separate sheet will be provided for signatures).

I can be contacted at: School of Social Sciences, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg Campus, Scottsville, Pietermaritzburg / Howard College Campus, Durban. Email: christian-ani@outlook.com; Cell: 0717524252

My supervisor is Dr. Khondlo Mtshali who is located at the School of Social Sciences, Pietermaritzburg Campus / Howard College Campus, Durban of the University of KwaZulu-Natal. Contact details: email: Mtshali@ukzn.ac.za Phone number: +27824038876.

The Humanities and Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee contact details are as follows: Ms Phumelele Ximba, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Research Office, Email: ximbap@ukzn.ac.za, Phone number +27312603587.

Thank you for your contribution to this research.
Appendix 3: Template of Informed Consent Declaration

I, ……………………………………………………..(full names of participant), hereby confirm that I understand the contents of this document and the nature of the research project, and I consent to participating in the research project.

I understand that I am at liberty to withdraw from the project at any time, should I so desire. I understand the intention of the research. I hereby agree to participate.

I consent / (do not consent) to have this interview recorded (if applicable)

Signature of Participant……………………………… Date: ………………………………………
Appendix 4: Interview Instrument

Guiding Questions

1. What is the meaning and significance of the maxim ‘African solutions to African problems’?

2. Pertinent to peace and security, what do you expect when the idea of ‘African solutions to African problems’ is invoked to address conflict challenges in the continent?

3. From your experience and view, are there unique African-oriented solutions applied by the African Union to resolve conflicts in Africa? Please elaborate and give examples if possible.
   - Do you think African solutions was applied in Somalia? Please elaborate?

4. In your view, what are the key values of African conflict resolution?

5. What measures do you think should be taken by the African Union to implement African solutions to African problems?

6. What do you think is the role of non-African actors in the resolution of conflicts in Africa in view of the maxim “African solutions to African problems”? 