



Metaphysics of Race: Revisiting Four Philosophical Views

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Declaration

I, Sibongakonke Mthiyane, hereby declare that:

I undertake that this research study is my original work. Where the work of others has been used (in the form of electronic and printed sources), it has been appropriately and accurately acknowledged with referencing that follows the requirements of the university. All sources used in their original form have been specifically acknowledged. The source is detailed in text and within the reference sections of this thesis. This dissertation has not been submitted to any other university for another degree.

Student Signature:

Date: June 2022.

Dedication

In loving memory of:

Siyabonga Good-well Mthiyane

May your soul rest in power Mfo.

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Abstract

What does race mean in post-apartheid everyday life? Is race real or an illusion? The answer to these questions lies in the idea of how race emerged and is made real in terms of racial categories. South African apartheid government used to classify South Africans by law into a hierarchy, with correspondingly differential access to human rights and freedoms. These racial categories were based on how one looked, how one lived, and what language one spoke. In this context, race in South Africa became normalized through the assumptions about racial culture understood as an expression of race-given essence. Racial categories further created defined places for people in the material and social world. South Africans came to see themselves as these categories, making them subjectively real. This history means that after apartheid, most South African's experiences continued to be shaped by racialized material and subjective realities. In this regard, it is worth asking: are we warranted in using classifications? What role do they place in shaping our ordinary ontology of race? What influence do they have on racism, and what do people think about race? Hanslanger questions the importance of using racial classifications and asks if they are warranted. In light of this, this thesis answers the question left by Hanslanger about whether racial classifications give us a fruitful way of understanding facts about race. It will argue that racial categories are not warranted; race is an illusion.

Introduction

Before the European Enlightenment, humans perceived the world as a natural place. While individuals were considered equal in the eyes of Gods, they did not share the same social and legal status. Slavery was both legally sanctioned and socially acceptable during this time (Erasmus, 2010). Emmanuel Eze (2002) further explains that "During the period of Enlightenment, the concept of race gained currency." As science gained prominence, it challenged the biblical account of creation and replaced religious authority with reason. Eze (2002) notes that the idea of "Nature" still retained a hierarchical structure during this period. Moreover, Eze (2002) describes the Enlightenment as instrumental in codifying and institutionalizing a scientific and popular European self-perception that positioned "non-whites" as dialectical opposites of reason when compared to the rest of the world. This mode of thinking can be traced back to influential philosophers of the time, including Immanuel Kant, John Locke, David Hume, Johann Herder, and Baron de Montesquieu (Eze, 2011). Notably, these Enlightenment thinkers served as spokespersons of their era, with a common emphasis on skin color as the defining factor for distinguishing the "Negros" as a distinct group (Eze, 2011). Hume (1896) asserted that scarcely any civilized nation had the same complexion as the "Negros." Kant, on the other hand, believed that there existed a fundamental difference between the mental capacities and skin color of these two races of humanity. Such ideas of classical racialism spread across the globe, shaping perceptions even in South Africa, where race was forged through scientific practices akin to a human laboratory. For instance, the indigenous "Khoisan people became specimens that scientists used to prove the controversial missing link between apes and humans, and the existence of primitive human types" (Erasmus, 2010, p.8). Tragically, the case of Saartje Baartman stands as an example of how race was subjected to scrutiny, as the anatomist Georges Cuvier dissected her to further his study of race as a natural type or kind. These racial ideas permeated into various socio-cultural aspects of human life, resulting in a hierarchical human order that positioned whites at the top and non-whites at the bottom (Erasmus, 2010, p.9). Regrettably, such notions heavily influenced the establishment of the apartheid system in South Africa, where races were geographically separated into different racial groups, perpetuating normalized segregation (Ibid, N.D, p.10).

In 1951, mainstream science spoke with one authoritative, anti-racist voice. Paul Taylor (2004) enlightens that “The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) published a statement by experts on race problems” (p. 75). This was the first “International statement of the view that classical racialism is false and false as a matter of science” (Taylor, 2004, p. 75). These experts agreed that studying racial physiology with political and economic relations caused racial distinctions. The “Decline of classical racialism was first witnessed with apartheid systems falling out of favor and western nations giving up their colonies” (Taylor, 2004, p. 76). According to Frederickson (2015), “These ideas in our societies are still a lively experience” (p. 3).

Recently, a Middelburg High Court sitting in the Middleburg Magistrate court found Pastor Harry Knoesen guilty of a racist plot that was discovered in 2019. The court found Knoesen guilty of “Planning the possibility of using a biological weapon to infect and kill Black people through poisoning of water reservoirs” (ABC News, 2022). The state declared that Knoesen’s plot was motivated by highly racial views, which he sought to justify through his religious beliefs, claiming that he was ordained to reclaim South Africa for white people. Knoesen’s plot was prevented by South African intelligence services, which dismantled the organization's cells across the country and made the arrest to its leaders. The National Spokesperson of the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) declared that “Knoesen used the social media platform Facebook to incite violence against Black people and recruit former members of South Africa’s military to join his plans” (ABC News, 2022).

This incident also draws upon a racial incident in Durban due to looting on July 12, 2021 (Singh, 2021). Two geographically neighboring races clashed on the streets of Durban over racial profiling. Inanda and Phoenix are two racially divided places, in which the former is occupied by Blacks and the latter by Indians. During the looting phase, Indians and Whites created roadblocks in their areas due to the fake WhatsApp voice notes that were circulating on WhatsApp that Blacks were targeting Whites and Indians. This created tension between Blacks and Indians, which outbroke racial violence in phoenix, where both races were randomly racially targeting each other. The premier of KwaZulu-Natal Sihle Zikalala “Referred to this event as a massacre” (Singh, 2021, p. 3). This event resulted in about “30 people dead and two burned to death due to racial profiling”

(Singh, 2021, p. 3). The seriousness of this made President Cyril Ramaphosa “To deploy thousands of reserve soldiers to calm down the situation” (Singh, 2021, p. 3).

In some areas in Pietermaritzburg, Blacks were denied services or entry to Public Malls because of being Black. In areas like Pelham, Whites and Indians took routine night shifts guiding their residential places, checking every respectable car. Even randomly stopping respectable black people at night. This reveals that “Race still matters in South Africa” (MacDonald, 2006). Such events of racial tensions are still with us as much as apartheid ended and academic scholars collapsed the classic typology of race. Such settings in South Africa still carry such ideas, and these events become markers of how ordinarily South Africans take racial categories.

Despite these continuities, Ndumiso Dladla (2017) argues, "Race and racism have received little attention in academic philosophy departments in South Africa" (p. 5). Dladla (2017) points out that "The general results of this are of a general under-representation of historical victims of racism from academic philosophy in South Africa, as well as a continued commitment to ignorance of African philosophy can be seen by the overall commitment to continue along the colonial lines of mimesis of either continental or analytic philosophy in South African Universities departments of philosophy" (p. 5). However, Dladla (2017) further puts it that "Western critical philosophy of race has succeeded in making the point that race and racism is a philosophically relevant subject" (p. 5). Despite South Africa's fame as a once racial polity (p. 5), it is very surprising that South African philosophy has done little work examining the philosophical significance of racism and race or seen the light in terms of teaching and publishing. Dladla (2017) argues that "Racism and race must be a concern to all philosophers in all areas of philosophy" (p. 5). In this dissertation, I aim to fill up the gap resulting from the absence of philosophy engaging in discussions about racial matters in South Africa. I seek to answer the question of whether our system of racial classifications is warranted or not, and if racial classifications give us a wide range of facts about the ontology of race, should we continue to use them or not? I do this by unfolding this thesis in a sequence of five chapters.

In chapter one, I go under the assessment of the subject matter that concerns this research. In this chapter, I survey three ontological perspectives found in the literature on the metaphysics of race. This chapter aims to introduce the theme of race, framed on the ontology of race. I introduce a wide range of different perspectives on this ongoing heated discussion. These different theories

argue over the epistemic nature of race. Mallon nicely introduces three different camps found in this debate, namely: social constructivism, biological realism, and anti-realism. These views are concerned with whether race in today's language refers to something real or not; if so, what that is? The debate rests on how we argue race should be defined. These camps disagree about how race should be defined. And more substantively, they "Disagree about the strength of their competing justification for the kinds of definitions race they argue for and against" (Msimang, 2022, p.116). What are the important features for defining race? In the latest installments of the metaphysics of race debate, anticipating this debate (Hanslanger et al., 2019) says, "These camps seek to answer different questions". Joshua Glasgow and Quayshawn Spencer are focused on classifications. In this sense, when answering what is race and when considering systems of classification, are we warranted in using the classifications; do they give us a fruitful way to understand the range of facts. Are there things that fall into each of the various categories in the system? On this ongoing discussion about the nature of race, Mallon (2006) argues that this "Debate is non-substantive in its nature which invites other critiques from different scholars".

In chapter two, I look at the critiques that have been submitted to this project which are supposed to destabilize the metaphysics of race. I then review how metaphysicians respond to deflationists. My focus in this chapter is directed at finding the reasons why these theorists are engaged in the metaphysics of race. I will not defend any position between deflationists and the metaphysics of race because I believe the merits of such claims will require rigorous independent research on its own. In this chapter, I examine and understand what this debate is about and what is its purpose through how metaphysicians respond to deflationists. Particularly, this section focuses on the importance of this debate. My strategy is to assess the current standing of the metaphysics of race. I look at the claims that seek to show that this debate is about how we use our and how we should use racial concepts. What is happening with the metaphysics of race is the discussion that should do social justice to the people who experience race in the living social category, which includes political and normative considerations about what we want our racial terms to do for us in our communities.

In chapter three, I explore the characterization that race is relative to the context of the idea from chapter two that this debate is about how we use and should use our racial concepts in our communities. This chapter looks at how race is not supposed to travel and should be examined

contextually. This claim is found in the literature on race, which is supposed to justify that the assessment of race should be based on where you are situated. Generally, metaphysicians have claimed that their focus on the American context is justified by these claims that race concepts vary from context to context. The general aim of this chapter will be to show how the referent of race varies from context to context. I will extend my investigation of contextuality by analyzing the importance of contextuality. I will look at the merits of analyzing our concepts and conditions where we are situated. This chapter will allow me to shift my focus on the question concerned in the context of South Africa. The importance of this chapter is the shift from the American race debate to the focus on the South African race contextuality. In the next chapter, I closely examine race and racism in the South African context.

In chapter four, I will turn to answer the question that is my main concern in this research. I return to the question introduced in chapter one asked by Hanslanger. In chapter two, I have assessed this debate about how we use our racial concepts and how we should use them. In chapter three, I have examined how race is relative to context and why contextuality is important in this chapter. I argue racial categories are not warranted by first analyzing the conception of racial categories in South Africa. Secondly, I look at how the a of non-racialism develops itself against racial classification. I will show what non-racialism is about, and its quest for adoption was interrupted and not adopted. After this, I show South Africa is now shaped by another version of non-racialism and is popularized by the idea of the apartheid era. Hereafter, I revisit the apartheid racial categories in South Africa, I look at the discussion about racial categories in South Africa. I finally make my case that racial categories in South Africa are not warranted. The argument I make in this case pertains to the fact that our racial categories emanate from an unscientific specific historical ground. The strength of this argument has a connection to the background of how we ordinarily use these racial categories and we take them. I, therefore, contend that race is an illusion in South Africa. However, these racial categories are governmentally used for regress policies. Since what I contend in this chapter is urgent backward to the normative question of what we should do with the concept of race in the face that government use race categories but are not warranted, and race is an illusion. I reflect on this in the final chapter of this project.

In chapter five, I evaluate and answer what we should do with racial categories. I answer this chapter by appealing to chapter four claims that race is not real and racial categories do not tell us

facts about race; therefore, race is not real. What rises then is the normative question of what to do with the concept of race and racial categories. I assess how we can still operate programs of social justice such as affirmative action that rely on the concept of race and racial categories. In this chapter, I seek to provide a way forward on these normative considerations. I will first present two semantic policies: Eliminativism and conservativism. After that, I will review three anti-realist views that want to converse race but acknowledge it is not real. Finally, I continue with my discussion from chapter four that we should conserve racial categories while maintaining that race is not real. I make this point by appealing to how citizens should be made to participate in un-officializing the apartheid racial discourse. In this sense, we can retain racial categories, but race will have no great significance in our lives. This will be fruitful because we can maintain conceptual tools for dealing with social justice programs and racism.

Chapter One: The Race Debate

1. Introduction

In this chapter, I draw on the theme of the discussion which is heavily grounded within the ongoing debate about the meaning and nature of race. This discussion foregrounds and explores the divergence in meaning and construction of race following key philosophical scholars. The debate is divided into three components of thought that allude to diverse explanations concerning the nature of race or the ontology of race. This chapter is divided into two sections. The first section will investigate the foundation of the metaphysics of race debate instigated by the debate between William Edward Burghardt Du Bois and Kwame Anthony Appiah. Section two introduces three philosophical views that emerge out of this debate. This section will discuss the contemporary race debate framed around these contesting views.

1.1 W.E.B Du Bois and Kwame Anthony Appiah Debate

There is a general consensus among philosophers that Du Bois's paper, *The Conservation of Races* (1985), has largely influenced and shaped the philosophy of race. Du Bois (1985) characterizes the problem of the 20th century as a problem of the color-line. The color-line is problematic as it classifies and distinguishes people in their skin color as belonging to different social groups. Du Bois (1985) points out that we must “Acknowledge that we have divided human beings into races”. The pressing question which we must consider is, what is the meaning of race. It becomes difficult to reach a definite conclusion when we decide on this question. Various criteria of race difference have been proposed in the past. If these criteria were in agreement with each other, it would be easy to classify mankind. For scientists, “These criteria of race are exasperatingly intermingled” (Du Bois, 1985, p.8). However, scientists conclude that we have “At least two or three great families of human beings been whites, and negroes, possibly the yellow race” (Du Bois, 1985, p.9). According to Du Bois (1985), other races have “Arisen from the intermingling of the blood of these two”. The results of the cross-race blending introduced racial divisions and conflicts. According to Du Bois (1985), “Common blood, descent, and physical peculiarities” have rapidly been carried down. Du Bois (1985) concludes that they have divided and classified human beings into races that “Transcend scientific definition”. Du Bois (1985) states if this is true, then the “History of humankind is not of individuals but groups and races”.

Du Bois positions the meaning of race, considering history as a factor that defines race. In his terms races are:

“A vast family of human beings, generally of common blood and language, always of common history, traditions, and impulses, who are both voluntarily and involuntarily striving together for the accomplishment of certain more or less vividly conceived ideals of life” (1985, p.12).

Appiah (1985) opposes this. In his article *The Uncompleted Argument: Du Bois and the Illusion of Race* (1985), he interprets Du Bois's idea of race as an illusion. Appiah (1985) suggests Du Bois's attempt to set aside the scientific term for socio-historical concept fails in a discussion. He poses the question that if Du Bois attempts to strive above the scientific term, then what is the role of his talk about blood. Appiah (1985) explains if “Du Bois's notion is purely socio-historical, then the issue is common history and traditions, at least in part, common biology”. Appiah (1985) challenges Du Bois's definition of race and undermines his argument. In his line, he says, “If race is a vast family of human beings that share a common history, we must understand what a family of common history is” (Appiah,1985, p.25). According to Appiah's (1985) thinking, Du Bois's definition of race fails to trace the scientific term that ranges beyond this question. Two answers are supposed to answer what a family is. Through adoption and biological law, Appiah (1985) voices his doubts that Du Bois never attempted to understand family in an adopted option. For Du Bois (1985), “A family is culturally defined only through either patrilineal or matrilineal”. A family could be understood and explained through biological understanding Du Bois's conception, akin to the scientific conception, demands comprehension. Common ancestry encompasses all biological implications of ancestry. Appiah raises concerns about Du Bois's definition, deeming it problematic.. The supposed criteria (adding common history) for deciding the distinctions between Slav and Teuton can never be a commonality to make distinctions between races as Du Bois thinks. Appiah (1985) debates that sharing a “Common history cannot be the criteria for being members of the same group”. One would have to identify the group, for we would have to identify its history (Appiah regards this objection as a circular issue). Consequently, Appiah says the language Du Bois admits is neither necessary nor for racial identity, but common history and traditions must go too. The remaining factors in Du Bois's definition are common descent and common impulses and strivings.

Du Bois's socio-historical ideology, to distinguish it from scientific terms, fails to do the work that impulses and strivings are left to do. The socio-historical understanding observes common impulses and strivings. Appiah (1985) argues that “the common impulses can never be a criterion of group membership”, and if that is so, we are left with a scientific conception of race that Du Bois tries to run away from. This is because such impulses are allegedly discovered to be a posterior property of racial and national groups, not criteria of membership in them. Appiah believes Du Bois's definition of socio-historical conceptions reverts him back to the scientific definition he aims to avoid. Du Bois advocated the conservative of races. Appiah muses, otherwise, to this, and he writes:

“Even if the concept of race is a structure of oppositions-white opposed to black (but also to yellow), Jew opposed to Gentile (but also to Arab)-it is a structure whose realization is, at best, problematic and, at worst, impossible. If we can now hope to understand the concept embodied in this system of oppositions, we are nowhere near finding referents for it. The truth is that there are no races: there is nothing in the world that can do all we ask ‘race’ to do for us” (1985, p.23).

This response consequently directed Du Bois's followers in defense of Du Bois's conception of the idea of race. I want to focus on the most noticeable responses in the literature by Lucius Outlaw (1995) and Taylor (2000). Outlaw (1995) comes in defense of Du Bois's conservative of races by expressing his dissatisfaction with Appiah's reading of Du Bois's conception of race. Outlaw (1995) questions what evidence Appiah has for the interpretation that Du Bois relies upon engaging the revaluation of the negro race in the face of the sciences of racial inferiority. Outlaw states (1995) that Du Bois sought to articulate a concept of race that includes socio-historical, cultural, and biological factors. He further states that “One should not think of a criterion individually isolated but a cluster concept” (Ibid). This statement precludes that one must determine for oneself how Du Bois's characterization of race can be understood. For Appiah to understand Du Bois, he must understand Du Bois's strategy. Appiah misreads Du Bois due to his commitment to analyzing and valuating each of the elements.

Outlaw (1995) says this is depicted when Appiah excludes the idea that Du Bois, in his conception of race, “Argues that members of a racial group 'generally' share a common language”. Also, Outlaw (1995) thinks Appiah is wrong to dismiss common history, language, and history as

inessential from Du Bois's definition. Appiah would only be right if Du Bois's strategy were circular; however, Du Bois's strategy is not circular and needs not be ruled out. Without common history and traditions, Appiah sees Du Bois's definition left with "Common descent, impulses, and strivings as a remaining factor as a basis of a socio-historical definition of race as Appiah concludes that these can never amount to criteria of races" (Outlaw, 1995, p.12). As a result, the notion of a common group history conceals a super-added geographical criterion. The conclusion from this to be drawn, then, "Is people are members of the same group if they share features in virtue of being descended from people of the same region" (Outlaw, 1995, p.16). What is significant is Du Bois's definition is founded on a tension that reflects the fact that for European historiography, it was the cultural features that mattered, but for American social and political life, the shared physical features of a geographical population mattered. Outlaw disagrees with Appiah's thinking that the tension resulted from conflicts between the two different agendas. What Appiah fails to note is that there are not two different agendas. This tension, as Outlaw (1995) understands, is a function of his attempt to capture in the same term refers to changing cultural factors. Outlaw's (1995) view is that Du Bois's effort to give an account of race in 'conservation' was one of the arresting examples of courageous independence, intellectual and brilliant creativity when it was not widely accepted that the essential biological of races was false.

Taylor (2000) contributes to the support of Du Bois (1985) and Outlaw (1995). Taylor (2000) starts by giving out the same understanding as Outlaw mentions that Appiah has, unfortunately, failed to notice a straightforward way of reading Du Bois's argument (1995). Taylor (2000) explains, "There is a number of worries worth raising about Appiah's argument regarding his interpretation of the talk of races as families". Taylor focuses on the significant objection that cuts through both definitions: the complaint about circularity. Taylor's protest depicts that it is misplaced because Appiah misunderstands what Du Bois means by race history. Taylor (2000) put Du Bois explains that "Two individuals are black because they share a common black history." But according to Appiah, "We do not know yet what history that predicate black picks," and there is no non-question that specifies the nuances of history. Taylor (2000) states that he believes that "Du Bois ideology details that the black race consists of those who have had black experiences". But one does not know what those experiences are until we know what happened to black people, as it is difficult to discern. Appiah assumes that Du Bois's historical criterion points to a global feature of the group. But Du Bois's (1985) varied perspective argues that "Certain persons

compromise the group we know as the black race because, and to the extent that, they have parallel individual histories that are relevantly similar individual experiences of dealing with certain social and historical conditions”. Taylor (2000) says Du Bois also foregrounds this kind of perspective elsewhere in his work. Appiah's critique specifies what counts as a relevant similarity; he also presents the question, when are biographies ever parallel. As a Mixed-race, Du Bois presents the difficulty in its starkest form. Taylor highlights that Appiah misses the subtlety of Du Bois's account (2000). The point is not that Dutch were not Negroes while Du Bois was. However, what is crucial is to note how Du Bois was perceived as a negro while Dutch's were not. Further, one concern Appiah (1985) displays are that "The choice of a slice of the past in a period before your birth as your history is always exactly that a choice". Taylor (2000) responds that Appiah fails to note Du Bois's subtlety. In this case, his philosophical and metaphysically subtlety. In response to Appiah, Taylor (2000) states Appiah's "Circularity concern dissolves once we recognize that Du Bois to common history appeals to parallel individual histories, not to a single group history”.

In her recent studies (1993, 2002, 2018), Naomi Zack affirms Appiah's position against race realism. Zack (2002) implores that "Race does not have a biological basis; however, it is a social construction". According to Zack (2018), "Race as a social construction in racial categories like Blacks, Indians, and Whites are based on false knowledge". Contemporary biological science does not support common-sense notions of racial taxonomy. Zack (2018) seizes a normative position like Appiah that "The concept of race should be discarded”.

I will outline three contemporary metaphysical positions in the contemporary debate in the following sections. In section 1.3, I will outline how this debate develops itself to section 1.3.4, where the recent debate about the metaphysics of race has been focused on theorists that are my focus in this research study. I focus on these theorists to show where the question that concerns this research comes from. These two sections are connected to the debate in section 1.3.4 emanates from views in section 1.3.

1.2 Contemporary Metaphysical Positions on Race

In his paper, *Race: Normative, Not Metaphysical or Semantic* (2006), Ron Mallon introduces the birth of different ideologies that defend different views on the status of race. Mallon states (2006),

“The metaphysics of race debate has raised important questions regarding the meaning of race and the normative question closely related to this question”. By normative, Mallon further explains:

“What ought we to do with 'race' talk? ... 'race' talk, I mean the practices of using terms like 'race', 'white', 'black', 'Asian', and 'Hispanic' (and their associated concepts) to label and differentially treat persons” (2006, p.5).

The normative question is collected into two segments: racial eliminativism and conservatism. Additionally, Mallon (2006) views the metaphysics of race as emerging against the background of a cluster of normative disputes. That includes labeling practices, terminology, and the significance of racial identity. Ever since Appiah's attention to Du Bois's notion of race, recent philosophers have been focused on giving and finding out the nature of race. Mallon (2006) depicts three metaphysical positions. He highlights that the current work has been separated into three answers that seek to answer the question raised by Du Bois (Mallon, 2006). The first school of thought argues in support of racial skepticism that races do not exist. The second school of thought argues that race is socially constructed in support of racial constructivism. A final variant that is part of this debate views races as biological categories, a realist racial population (Mallon, 2006). The metaphysics of the race debate is a broad composition that transcends the scope of this research project. I would like to focus on the recent discussion about the ontology of race. The metaphysics of race has been incredibly focused on the United States' conception and concept of race. These selected major advocates that I have chosen include philosophers of race, who are currently the leading advocates of these groups in answering race's normative and ontological questions. The primary objective of this research emanates from the debate among these scholars.

1.2.1 Social Constructivism

Constructivism is a metaphysical position that seeks to outline race as a virtue of being socially constructed. It usually contrasts the view that race is an important biological kind (biological racial realism) and the recent claim that race does not exist (anti-realism) (Msimang, 2016). There are three kinds of constructivism, namely: thin constructivism, institutional constructivism, and interactive kind constructivism (Mallon, 2006). Thin constructivism holds a position that suggests racial groups are demarcated along the lines of superficial traits. According to Mallon (2006), these “Traits have no fundamental exclusive biological basis for races in this arrangement”. Interactive kinds hold that “Racial labeling and racial practices have casual consequences on how

individuals are perceived and treated by other individuals because of the racial labeling they are socially identified by” (Mallon, 2006, p.7). Lastly, Institutional constructivism claims that race is a social institution whose characteristics are determined by the times and places these individuals are in. Race in this manner is “Perceived to have an institutional reality” (Mallon, 2006). These kinds of constructivism are what shape social constructionists. For example, Sally Hanslanger, in her paper, *Gender and Race: (What) Are They? (What) Do We Want Them to Be?* (2000) begins a mark of answering the concept of race. Hanslanger (2000) states that “Biological basis and our racial categories do not match up”. Hanslanger explores what race is in the absence of the biological basis of race. Firstly, she distinguishes the kind of methodology that is most suitable to answer what race is. Hanslanger dismisses the other methodologies: descriptivism and conceptual analysis¹, and adopts analytical² methodology as the best candidate for answering the truth about race (2000). For Hanslanger (2000), “Race is socially real and constructed”. It is stated that race considers members of the group as socially positioned based on supposed treatment. Hanslanger believes races are racialized groups if:

“Its members are socially positioned as subordinate or privileged along some dimension (economic, political, legal, social, etc.), and the group is "marked" as a target for this treatment by observed or imagined bodily features presumed to be evidence of ancestral links to a certain geographical region” (2000, p.10).

Hanslanger’s definition of gender and race is deemed “Explicative, as a kind of stipulation done for a certain theoretical and political purpose” (Carlson, 2010,p.8). Her aim is to figure out the target concepts that would be most useful in order to achieve social justice (Hanslanger, 2010). However, later, Hanslanger’s conception of the definition changed not in their content but their status, which she calls debunked social constructivism (Carlson, 2010). Hanslanger’s definition of race is supposed to capture, which in practice, decides the empirical extension of the terms. When Hanslanger distinguishes the kind of definition I mentioned earlier: conceptual analysis, descriptive and explicative definition, she wants to ask about the point of using the concept at hand

¹ A conceptual inquiry into race or gender would seek an articulation of our concepts of race and a descriptive project is not concerned with exploring the nuances of our concepts; it focuses instead on their extension (Hanslanger, 2006).

² Hanslanger characterizes this project as revealing manifest concept. That is, the concept we take ourselves to be using, or would come easily to mind if we are asked.

(ameliorative). These different kinds of projects are not always competitive; in some cases, they run together (Hanslanger, 2010). Hanslanger (2010) is interested in cases where there is a gap between conceptual analysis (what people take the concept to mean) and (ameliorative) what it ought to mean for theoretical and political reasons and its empirical extension. Therefore, for Hanslanger, these racial groups are what has been socially done to them. Michael Root (2000) states these groups are a real kind. Since Du Bois maintained (cited in Appiah, 1985), “There are no biological races; race is real and should be conserved”. Root seeks to defend the notion supported by Hanslanger that these groups are a real social kind and that they exist (Root, 2000). Root opposes the idea that Appiah holds, as I mentioned above, the idea since race has no biological make-up, it is not real (Root, 2000). Root explains that our category of own making can be real. Root (2000) argues social scientists use racial categories to discover racial statistics. To say 60% of female blacks are headed households and white are only 40% is something that we keep being socially real because by doing that, we remain race-conscious here through our practices (interactive constructivism); It can be said that race is a construction to reach a census about population density (Root, 2000). These kinds of definitions, like race are dependent upon rather independent of how we think and talk about ourselves; therefore, race is real. Although Root (2000) recognizes that race is a social construction and socially contingent, he argues that “It has biological features that are key components of its social construction” (Root, 2000, p.11).

Ronald R. Sundstrom (2002) follows Root's metaphysical pathways by holding that “Race is real precisely because socio-politics has made it so”. Sundstrom (2002) states that “What is meant here is social, not biological reality; saying it is a 'kind' is not to say it is a naturally occurring one. Its foundation is a false belief that race is natural, biological, and in our genes”. Sundstrom (2002) argues that “Race is a socially constructed reality or a kind made by the human social construction of human society by power, social forces, and prejudice”. As stated by Hochman (2019), such kind-hood, according to Sundstrom, is real when its members are unified and held together by a number of shared properties. The properties that unify a kind vary with the domain. Biological kind is unified by biological relation while humankind is real when it is unified by social relation. These shared properties and relations list disparities in income and political and legal inequality. Sundstrom (2002) concludes that “The concept of racial phenotype is simply wrong, as held by Root”. It is overwhelmingly rejected by modern biology. Characterizing race is a difficult task. It is believed to never connect social and biological groups strengthening the concept of biological

race; metaphysically, it sums up nothing. Linda Martin Alcoff (2005) also rejects the essentialist position that race can be explained through deeper natural traits because it assumes racial identities are easily demarcated, and racialized groups are homogenous. Furthermore, Alcoff (2005) also rejects what she refers to as nominalism, “A claim that race is not real and racial terms refer to nothing because recent science has invalidated race as salient as a meaningful category”. Alcoff (2005) argues, “This position fails to capture multiple meanings of race and assumes incorrectly that race only refers to biology”. This objection goes to anti-realist who hold these sentiments. The best term to describe race is what Alcoff (2005) calls contextualism, in which “Race is real and acknowledges that race exists through the explanation of a variety of racial beliefs and practices across cultures in which racial identities are produced and transformed through social beliefs and practices, and that sense race is real; real as anything else lived experience with operative effects in the social world”. Alcoff’s statement reaffirms Hanslanger’s sentiments that a starting point with race is the social experience of race and the social implications of race. Blacks, whites, and other racial groups are racialized groups that are socially constructed. As a constructivist, Chike Jeffers (2013) has taken a distinctive and curving discussion that forms a sub-branch within this segment. Jeffers introduces another sub-position within social constructivism, which is referred to as cultural constructivism; this gives birth to a new philosophical position within the metaphysics of race debate. Specifically, Jeffers finds Du Bois talking about two socio-historical accounts of race. Du Bois (1985) talks about “Race as a social phenomenon whose reality depends on an ongoing history of discrimination and oppression”. But Jeffers deconstructs Du Bois's definition of race in a cultural sense. The political theory of race gives a clear reason for the abolition of race, Jeffers contends another method that opposes this view not entirely but a more contesting position to political constructivism that is held by other constructionists. The “Notion of race as the cultural group suggests the possibility that race represents forms of life to be celebrated rather than eradicated” (Jeffers, 2013, p.23).

Jeffers (2013) holds it important to focus on a range of cultural practices significant to each racial group. The political theory of race adequately captures this by exploring the many segments of ideology linked to race. However, when we discuss the impact of race on our lives, we must also consider how our indoctrination has shaped our lives into particular ways of living. One of the kinds of identification that influences how we think and act is race. Race must be taken into consideration. As a result, it should also be considered a cultural phenomenon. On the other hand,

Taylor accentuates a political view of race in which races in the west are sociological constructs. Taylor (2004) states, “They are things that humans make as part of the social transactions that characterize our lives”. The statistically defined demographics come from white supremacist drive to correlate appearance and ancestry to social status and life chances. These views are strongly witnessed in his book *Race: A philosophical introduction 1st edition* (2004), where he says, “The social condition assigns probabilistic meaning to appearance and ancestry”. Taylor’s (2004) view has been that not only do “Social conditions create races, but they give new content to the things that we were already thinking as capital-R-races”. What Taylor (2004) believes is that white supremacists created races. All of this is to say western races are social constructs. They are things that we humans create in the transactions that define social life. Specifically, there is a probability that they define populations that result from white supremacist determination to link appearance and ancestry to social location and life chances³. Lastly, one particular version of the social constructivist position is historical constructivism. Historical constructivism claims that the properties that make a group of people a race are certain historical properties of the individual that belongs to that group⁴ (Diaz-Leon, 2015). One defender of this position is Esa Leon-Diaz (2015), who says, “When these historical properties are understood as a social property, this account of race counts as a version of social constructivism”.

From the social constructionists’ perspective, race could thus be defined as a social kind, distinguished on the basis of real or imagined differences. Although, it is worth noticing and useful to see how social, racial realists or social constructivists have separated themselves into different ideological views that refer race as a social kind. Hanslanger (2012), Sundstrom (2002), and Taylor (2013) argue and understand race as a political construct only. Jeffers understands race as a social, political, and cultural construct. While others, like Outlaw (1995), view race as a socio-biological construct. And others like Diaz-Leon (2015) argue in defense of historical constructivism. Due to space constraints and running away from rigid explanations discussing direct objections from other metaphysical branched scholars against them, I will focus on collective criticism from other metaphysicians that target race as a social construction.

³ Taylor says to talk about race, is to talk about the field that forces and dynamics that produce and follow the linkage between body and social location. What he means is that to talk about what group a person belongs to, is to speak of the specific populations that racial dynamics of racial formations processes create.

⁴ Here we can mention the life histories of the members of the group, or their ancestors.

1.2.2 Anti-Realism

Anti-realism is a metaphysical position that refutes the existence of race. One of the first recognized anti-realists in the metaphysics of race is Appiah and Zack. Zack (2002) states that “The term cannot refer to anything real in the world since the things to which the term could uniquely refer have been proven not to exist”. Zack (2002) explains, “The biological foundation of races, phenotype, post mendelian transmission genetic, essence, and geography fail to show race is real”. Appiah (2006) employs the theories of references to deny anything that the concept of race refers to. Appiah argues (2006), “The challenges the reality of race on two fronts: the first attack is against racial classificatory terms as defined by the descriptivist theory of reference”. Secondly, the other front attacks race terms defined by a historical-casual account of racial references. Appiah (2006) argues that “Traditional racial ideology is untrue and that traditional racial categories lack their attributes in traditional racist ideology”. Appiah (2006) elucidates this point by stating that “There are no races because he believes that present racial nomenclature is inaccurate”. Appiah later modified his position to soften his eliminative position. Appiah (2006) argues that “Human folk race is important as they form a racial identity “. Racial identity does exist. The only problem is how we treat these social identities because we tie them with biological underpinnings. Our folk theory of race is false; however, we continue to categorize people along its lines. As a result, we come to live as these identities and look to them as a central source for constructing our lives. Lawrence Blum (2002) implores the importance of distinguishing between actual races and racialized groups is lost in the well-known Appiah discussion of racial identities. Blum states (2002), given this critique: “Racial identities can mean two things”. Blum (2002) states, “A contemporary black person who regards herself as black may be thinking of herself as a member of an actual race”. Still, when they reject this position, they recognize racialized groups. Blum (2002) argues that “What we call race is widely accepted that races do not exist”. The “Classic racial groups are not races because they do not possess most of the required characteristics”. It is suggested that since there are no races, we must replace what we call races as racialized groups because it is involved in discarding the moral and conceptual trappings that attend popular understanding of race (Blum, 2002). To constructionists, Blum saw the idea of social constructivism has been subject to misunderstanding that bears clearing up if we are to make the best use of it understanding race. Blum (2010) says, “They are mixed with confusion because to say race is socially constructed is to say it is not biological; the social practices were done on

false beliefs”. Race could be in a falsehood sense, but according to constructionists, they are real since they are socially created on false beliefs, and people apply them through practice. Because “Social constructivism sometimes holds biological races are not real, but social races are or race is socially but not biologically real” (Blum, 2002, p.158). This seems constructionists are confused about this part, which also overlooks how social constructionists can emphasize race's historical contingency. This is because the contingent sense emphasizes both the reality that people frequently hold erroneous ideas about the entities or groups in question and that they tend to view the society on negative light. This social interpretation reimports all the associations of radical differentness among groups and commonality among all members of a group, excepting only the idea that the characteristics of a group are grounded in their biology. He concludes by saying, “Any conferring of the reality of race will likely to carry these false and invidious associations” (Blum, 2002, p.160).

Joshua Glasgow (2009) also emphasizes that the social constructionist's attempt to rehabilitate the concept of race as a social kind fails because a biological reference is built into the concept. Glasgow (2009) argues that “Our race talk is predicated on a conceptually non-negotiable but factually false belief”. Constructivism seems to revise our understanding of race heavily, and we must ask ourselves whether that revision no longer represents race in the ordinary sense. Glasgow proceeds to offer a series of thought experiments (amnesia and Utopia) to show the radical divergence between the implication of the constructionists' conception of race and the everyday conception. For example, Glasgow says (2009), “What if we stopped calling people Asian (amnesia)? Would the people we currently call Asians stop being Asians? On the constructionist account, we stop being Asians or white”. Glasgow (2009) then states our intuitive usage or ordinary concept of race does not work like this. In conclusion, he says, “Constructionism fails to go beyond our common conception of race”. Glasgow declares races are:

“By definition, are relatively large groups of people who are distinguished from other groups of people by having certain visible biological traits (such as skin colors) to a disproportionate extent” (2010, p.20).

Further on new biological realism, Glasgow (2009) is not apologetic that there is no biological trace of race being real. It is said that race would be biological real if it had a role in biological science. There is no principled biological reason to put one racial boundary. Glasgow calls this

spectrum. This spectrum of racial lines is only arbitrary. They are a blurred image of humanity, and it is this sense that races are not biologically real. As much as “Our skin colors are biological, it does not mean our racial lines are” (Glasgow, 2009, p.25). Biological medicine is hard to find advocating for the common sense of race. Therefore, this meets the mismatch objection. Glasgow (2009) argues, “The cladistic definition of race characterization lines up to the mismatch objection of the ordinary folk meaning of race”. The source of this mismatch is that genealogical populations are determined by reproductive patterns, while race is supposed to be determined by how we look (Glasgow, 2009). This objection is called extensional mismatch (Glasgow, 2009). Extensional argument offers two reasons for this claim. The first one has to do with the number of races offered by the genealogical races, while folk notions usually include three and five races but cladistic offers nine races. The second reason has to do with the specific racial classification. Glasgow (2009) argues that “The cladistic approach regards North-East Asians and South-East Asians as belonging to different racial groups while folk notions typically classify them under the same label”. The second argument is called the intentional argument; Glasgow posits that Andreassen’s cladistic approach does not map into any dominant folk conception of race (Glasgow, 2009). The intentional argument holds that according to the folk notion of race, a person falls under race black if she satisfies conditions, while the cladistic approach says a person falls under a certain category that is different from the folk notion (Glasgow, 2009). As a result, the folk notion of race does not refer to cladistic races. The last argument Glasgow throws at Andreassen is a synthesis of both intentional and extensional arguments, which says by Andreassen's definition, race exists, but again they disappear; therefore, races cannot be cladistic groups. Later, Glasgow and Jonathan Woodward (2015) argued that if race is not socially constructed nor biologically real, why does it mean it could never exist? They say race can exist as a basic thing or, like Sundogs, they call this position basic racial realism. Because biological realism faces a mismatch with the ordinary concept of race, basic racial realism can say that races are basic kinds organized along visible-trait lines, allowing the view to track the ordinary concept of race. This plays a trick from running away to mismatch objection that new biological realism and social constructivists face. By connecting with what we ordinarily call race rather than the elitist notion that both rival camps contend. It allows talking about race as a basic kind of thing.

1.2.3 Biological Racial Realism

The last position in this debate is described as biological racial realism in a non-essentialist sense, where race is real biologically. While Du Bois, Zack, Roots, Jeffers, Hanslanger, Glasgow, Blum, etc., have all rejected the biological stance of race. Robin Andreasen and Philip Kitcher have lately challenged the consensus or a trend that race should be rejected biologically. Kitcher and Andreasen (1998) argue that “Social constructionists have arrived at the mistaken belief that biological races do not exist because they assume that objective classifications must be based on similarities and tend to ignore the historical explanation of race”. Racial population naturalists insist that if there are no racial essences, it does not mean that race is not a natural kind. Race may be biologically in some other sense. Andreasen (1998) argues that “Cladistic furnishes a scientific concept of race”. Andreasen (1998) highlights a defense of biological race needs to be taken seriously. Kitcher and Andreasen offer a new biological criterion of race that does not depend on genetic or phenotypic criteria. According to this new biological criterion, “Biological classifications can rely not only on genetic or phenotypic criteria but genealogical criteria and in terms of who someone’s ancestor was” (Andreasen, 1998). Andreasen and Kitcher are trying to complete a phylogenetic tree of the history of evolution as a sort of branching diagram which articulates the evolution of human groups in terms of common ancestry across time. The phylogenetic tree distinguishes different breeding populations that largely reproductively isolate each other. They distinguish different monophyletic groups that are ancestor-descendant sequences of breeding groups that share a common origin through this pattern. Andreasen conceives a cladistic account of race as a historical individual and a dynamic category that comes and goes. The cladistic approach is a reserved taxonomical group at the species level and above. She offers an objective biological definition of race. Andreasen refers to cladistic races:

“As monophyletic groups which are ancestor-descendent sequences of breeding groups that share a common origin” (1998, p.9).

Andreasen (2000) explains this “Concept is objective because it describes the evolutionary history of species in terms of a phylogenetic tree whose branches represent the subdivision of the ancestral subdivision of the breeding population”. Further, they represent a process of evolutionary branches that have taken independently of human classification. Andreasen (2000) thinks, “Social constructionists are mistaken on the belief that biological races do not exist”. They assume that

“Objective classification must be based on similarities and ignore that race might be defined historically” (Andreasen, 2000). To acknowledge that race's biological reality exists need not invalidate social constructionists. I would like to focus more on Andreasen because Kitcher (2012) later rejected his definition of race because it is no longer persuasive. Kitcher debates nature does not come up nicely organized with a fence post. The division we see in nature is very much of the particular inquiries we take. Kitcher (2007) adds that it does not mean there is a world independent of us.

In his book *Preludes to Pragmatism* (2012), Kitcher added that race is the product of both biological and social factors⁵. Andreasen tries to defend her position against the objection raised by anti-realist Glasgow. Andreasen highlights that Glasgow has overlooked other common-sense definitions that focus on genealogy (2004). Andreasen (2003) highlights that Glasgow's definition is problematic when discussing the cladistic racial concept; we should privilege “Common-sense conception that relies on morphology over those that need ancestry”. Because when providing biological conceptions of race, scientists often use common sense as a starting point. Secondly, the intentional mismatch argument that Glasgow uses results in an overstatement of the divergence between common-sense and cladistic racial concepts. The cladistic racial concept has been recognized between three and eight racial categories at different times. It is committed to a nested hierarchy of race that the diagram has always shown the subraces within these groups. Andreasen becomes aware that the cladistic approach does not match the folk definition of race as per Glasgow's extensional argument. Andreasen (2004) affirms this by stating that a “Cladistic definition is not committed to providing a folk notion of race but seeks to offer an account of the scientific notion of race”. The example of whales and fish by pointing out that whales, according to the folk notion, are fish, but science labels them as mammals; That is to say, the fact that this does not meet the folk notion of whales does not mean there are no whales (Andreasen, 2004).

Andreasen's similar position has been escalated by a new emerging radical pluralist racial realist Quayshawn Spencer. Spencer (2012) enters a debate by proposing a new biological kind (genuine kind) that the metaphysics of race should adopt. He illustrates how his position outstands others

⁵ Kitcher writes, the biological phenomena, the incipient isolating mechanism, is an effect of social attitudes, the result of marginalization and prejudice. Specifically, the phenotypic features that have become salient in our system of racial classification are taken as indicators of differences in social and cultural phenomena (Carter, 2014, p. 5).

by arguing that it falls out of Glasgow's critique thrown at biological realists (Andreasen and Kitcher). Glasgow depicts two biological classifications: genetic racial realism and superficial theory. He says genetical racial realism, as adopted by Andreasen, does not come up for biological kind because they fail to adequately count as real and capture epistemologically important kinds of biology since questions of objectivity often lead to murky scientific realism issues. Spencer says cladistic has two tenets: biological cladistic and cladistic subspecies as a monophyletic group of a breeding population (2012). Spencer highlights that Andreasen takes the right approach defending its reality as a principle of cladistic classification (2012). Still, Andreasen's defense of race as an "Objectivity" fails to explain how cladistic subspecies are epistemically useful as a cladistic kind (2012). And Andreasen does not outline how cladistic subspecies are well-motivated from a cladistic point of view. Spencer highlights Andreasen provides no justification for why it is justified to identify cladistic subspecies at every level in a co-specific monophyletic hierarchy and why the breeding population is a valid kind of population used in cladistic (Spencer, 2012).

In this paper, Spencer offers a genuine biological kind that is more valid for grounding observational law, theory, and presupposition the intrinsic natural kinds do not. Spencer states, "The meaning of biological racial realism should be the one that adopts genuine kind for threefold reasons; it has a minimal interpretation of important scientific kind-hood, does not adopt unnecessary and contentious metaphysics assumptions, and captures important epistemically issues" (Andreasen, 2012). Adopting genuine kinds under biological racial realism, as valid kind in which monophyletic group as an example of a relativized a priori kind. Spencer (2014) says, "As monophyletic is epistemically useful in cladistic" (Andreasen, 2012). In his paper, *A Radical Solution to the Race Problem*, Spencer describes races "As biological classification entities". Here, Spencer tries to locate US racial meaning. Spencer says, "Metaphysicians like Glasgow, Jeffers, and Hanslanger are interested in what race means according to competent English speakers in the United States", therefore his aim is to also answer whether race is biologically real, and more specifically, whether it is anyway race used in American English real in the same way as an entity like monophyletic group (Spencer, 2018). Spencer (2014) asserts, "US meaning of race is just its referent". The census discourse is a national, racial discourse. The census bureau defers to the Office of Management and Budget to define race (OMB). He characterizes OMB

race talk as specialist race talk. It is the default race talk that agencies in the US government use. According to the Office of Management and Budget, to define race, “Race is a primary minimum set of racial categories: blacks, whites, Asians, American Indians, and Pacific Islanders” (Spencer, 2014, p. 13). Spencer (2014) argues, “US racial census categories as determined by their OMB”. This is Spencer's OMB race theory. According to this theory is part of what Spencer calls radical pluralism in which race has many appropriate definitions. This group is a real biological set of a population group that owes its foundation and study to Johann Friedrich Blumenbach. These groups are determined by worldwide genetic clustering analysis, which:

“Objects are arranged into fresh segments. In fluffy apportioning (e.g., structure investigation), objects are arranged into fluffy parts. The parts in each parcel are called 'hereditary bunches', and each parcel is known as a degree of 'hereditary structure'. Likewise, it is standard to name each level in a hereditary design ordered progression a 'K level', where K compares to the quantity of parts in the parcel” (Spencer, 2014. p.7).

Given the sort of genetic data used in human genetic clustering, this result indicates that the $K = 5$ partition of human genetic clusters is a partition of human populations. Namely, the $K = 5$ level of human genetic structure corresponds to black Africans, Caucasians, East Asians, Amerindians, and Oceanians. Spencer (2015) details when Americans are talking about race it is evidence that they pick the Blumenbach partition. A primary claim by this group is that race is a biological population characterized by partial reproductive isolation. This kind of partitioning and results give the genetic population clusters that are continental ancestry groups Spencer argues are races that are selected from a variety of genetic studies from the turn of the twenty-first century by Noah Rosenberg.

1.3 What is Race?: Challenges

The book, *What is race: four philosophical views* (2019) extends the debate and views held above. In the above section, I have introduced what these authors mean in the recent debate about the ontology of race. In this book, these authors attempt to make close direct responses to each other's views about the meaning of race. These authors take a chance to criticize each other and discuss fundamental issues that each author's definition does and does not capture, which gives rise to the concerned question that this research takes foundation. This book highlights some central themes

and compelling arguments in a difficult and contested debate taken from the above submissions. Since the history of sorting out the nature of race has been fraught, implicated both in oppression and in efforts to liberate from that very oppression (Hanslanger et al., 2019). This book's objective focuses on some promising lines of argument, analysis, and inquiry to facilitate our understanding and progress of race. Some preliminary clarifications need to be made that the discussion below does not contain all theorists in the literature on the philosophy of race; however, the limitation of the discussion is limited to Glasgow, Spencer, Hanslanger, and Jeffer. In this section, I seek to offer some challenges of accounting to the question what is race as stipulated by the aforementioned philosophers.

1.3.1 Social Constructivism Response

According to Hanslanger et al. (2019), she grants that "The OMB to define race categorizing is in line with ancestry population of races." But (Hanslanger et al., 2019) have worried about some claims Spencer makes. First, Hanslanger denies the Rosenberg classification to promote biomedical research. (Hanslanger et al., 2019) reports that "Rosenburg K-5 is not the best one for research purposes, and it has diminutive great significance". Secondly, Hanslanger denies that O.M.B. is the use of experts that ordinary speakers defer to. (Hanslanger et al., 2019) states, "The authority imposes census to the citizens". It is not like they have a choice, and there is much evidence that people mark themselves in any way they like that is not harmonious with their life. Hanslanger moves on to critique Glasgow. (Hanslanger et al., 2019) explains that "The phenomena of racial classifications are complex, and our common practices, as Glasgow maintains, are less consistent". (Hanslanger et al., 2019) states that "Racial passing defeats Glasgow's claim that we attribute race based on visible racial features because there are individuals who appear white but are black". This shows our racial classification is more complex than Glasgow thinks; they are just a matter of appearance. This suggests that races need not to be attributed to individuals based on appearance alone. Further from this, (Hanslanger et al., 2019) states, "The assumption that race is just a matter of skin color should be rejected" (2019). From this, (Hanslanger et al., 2019) maintain, "Race is not real in which should be replaced as racialized groups", but she sees it as a way of reading the history of our understanding of race such that it is apt to claim races exist as social groups through a projection of color markings and systematic subordination along those lines. And these disagreements between her and Glasgow have different costs and benefits depending on the context they are implemented. Lastly, Hanslanger poses two criticisms to Jeffers. Firstly, race

cannot be meaningfully linked to culture because racial groups are vast, and their members are too heterogeneous and geographically dispersed.

In this first critique, Hanslanger employs the term Pan-ethnicity to describe the observable cultural differences between racial groups in a particular region, such as the United States, claiming that it is possible for members of a pan-ethnicity to develop a shared way of life but that the same is not possible racial groups. Hanslanger differentiates ethnicities from races, defining the former as cultural groups and denying that the latter can be such because they are made up of people from different cultures. Secondly, she argues that we should not desire the preservation of racial identities in a post-racist society because they are divisive, exclusive, and restrictive. Extending these critiques, Hanslanger asks Jeffers what counts as a set shared way of life. (Hanslanger et al., 2019) the response says: "This faces a mismatch with a way of understanding racial formation". This concern Hanslanger has with Jeffers is the normative consideration. (Hanslanger et al., 2019) says retaining "Race in a cultural sense means retaining it as a minimal conception of race". Carrying this "Idea in the long term is not good because retaining the idea of race as culture goes with a conception of different geography, appearance, and ancestry" (Hanslanger et al., 2019).

According to the argument presented by Jeffers et al. (2019), "Spencer faces a mismatch objection that marks Asians as the same race as those of English or German heritage." If a child born in England from parents of Bangladesh marks white on the census, that undermines prejudice targeted against Asians as a group. This mismatch objection shows the weakness of the census in tracking racial differences between groups. What formerly becomes substantial with this mismatch objection is that the biological human population continuities and discontinuities are subjects independent of social and racial indifferences (Jeffers et al., 2019). He uses a thought experiment to highlight that using K-5 as a means of common sense could reshape ideas about counting non-biological things biological. This would put white people in the same category based on skin color as Asians while spitting out South Asians as a different racial group. As Glasgow rejects ancestry and relies on appearance as a core commitment to race. Jeffers admits appearance plays a role; however, that does not mean ancestry does not play a role. In a thought experiment of Dalai Lama, Jeffers believes that even "If racial lines (appearance) disappear, ancestry would still play a role; The inter-population breeding would continue along ancestry lines" (Jeffers et al., 2019). And this continuation of ancestry would still count as racial. Jeffers also rejects the idea of basic racialism

because: this view collapses into social constructionism because it recognizes something real (reality). That reality is worth our attention when we want to understand the nature of our race. Basic racialism highlights that Barrack Obama counts as several racial memberships. (Jeffers et al., 2019) explains that “This does not accord with our common-sense understanding, or we all fall under the different spectrum of humanity”. In conclusion, criticizing Glasgow's suppositions, (Jeffers et al., 2019) say “Anti-realism is not adequate”. If Glasgow proposes to talk of black racialized groups instead of a black group, it is unreasonable to understand this aspect of their nature (Jeffers et al., 2019). Lastly, Jeffers responds to Hanslanger’s objection that ethnic groups have diverse cultures, not races because people can have diverse cultures but still belong to the same race. (Jeffers et al., 2019) says he did not “Give a robust cultural constructionist”. He does not mean that culture robustly figures out racial membership. These racial differences give rise to Pan-ethnicities. Some racialization of groups gives rise to pan-ethnicity. The combining of ethnicities to form a certain resistance or protest, but this process is localized and may be restricted in scope to people in that locale⁶.

For (Hanslanger et al., 2019), “Pan-ethnicities therefore present, like ethnicities, a subset of races”. While Jeffers agrees with this as well, he says at least this reassures him that he is not talking about Pan-ethnicities. The critical question is how he makes such claims of race fundamental to culture and however not mention Pan-ethnicities. The critical question is how people are included in his account of race if Hanslanger’s idea that people in Asia may be included within an Asian pan-ethnicity if they identify as Asian in response to racialization in the United States and elsewhere seems to make sense as a model of the social construction of a cultural group. Then Jeffers answers that he takes the insight as Hanslanger that what is important is how that particular person will be viewed in the context of U.S. However, Jeffers does not want to limit his account of race in the American context; therefore, this does less for him. (Jeffers et al., 2019) then says, “Hanslanger focuses on ethnicities sharing a form of life but ignores the countries sharing forms of life”. Races have a broad scope; Jeffers cites that this “Derives from historical developments involving encounters between isolated groups”. Jeffers makes his point clear by quoting Jemina Pierre that such segregation and resistance to white supremacy are key to this cultural diversity (N.D). In this

⁶ Hanslanger uses the example of Asian Americans that some people in Asia taking themselves to be Asian, but this self-identification in response to the racialization of Asians in the United States and elsewhere would not widen it so far as to include all who count as racially Asian.

regard, he talks about the issue of skin bleaching as a cultural issue in black culture. He takes this to be the continuation and connection of black culture even though they are in different places like Ghana and Jamaica, where skin bleaching is the issue. Jeffers does not mean in this stance that this is what defines black culture. In his concluding section, (Jeffers et al., 2019) state, "Being black must be valued and not be exhausted through the history of intimidation, subordination, and insult". But he sees each race distinctively embracing each uniqueness and respect for other groups. This Black culture should take pride in its race, and white pride should take its role in a society not promoting white supremacy but by working with other races.

1.3.2 Biological Racial Realism Response

Spencer advances his reply in a different method to all other three co-authors. He assesses whether, as they are focused on theory offering what race is and to a single dominant meaning of race, modeling dominant race theory provides us with adequate U.S. race theory. Spencer explains what and when empirical adequate or un-empirical adequate theory is. As he differentiates, he says, "A theory is empirically adequate when it can explain all the phenomena is designed to explore whether observed or unobserved" (Spencer et al., 2019). While it is un-empirical when it takes the opposite of this or just explains its phenomena observed only. Spencer shows how his theory of race is empirically adequate in this course, and the rest of the theories are not. Firstly, he shows that 93.8% of American citizens self-report in the census questionnaire. This is used to estimate the extent to which U.S residents are competent in the usage, which is 92.2% (Spencer et al., 2019). The report, according to the human genetical populations, therefore, O.M.B. is a dominant race meaning. The other competing theories fail to be empirical and adequate standards when compared to a radically pluralist race theory. (Spencer et al., 2019) further explains that "These theories misdiagnose what race is or what race is compared to O.M.B.'s presupposed racial scheme". Secondly, they are oversimplifying the complexity of the American community regarding race. (Spencer et al., 2019) debates they "Do not provide a correct way of dealing with national debates involving issues like affirmative debates". He uses the example of Rachel Dolezal to illustrate his point. Dolezal is a biological born white but represents herself as a black person. (Spencer et al., 2019) says, "This instance of relevance delivers a clue on how other theories do not capture important complicates of the national debate". The debates involved include that could Dolezal be black without black ancestry, black with an artificial black face, or black without black experience. This shows how complicated this was an attempt to simplify it to a single meaning of race could

not capture what was going on (Spencer et al., 2019). It is in this sense that other theories are un-empirical adequate theories.

Lastly, Spencer argues against the use of thought experiments in this discourse. He finds it inadequate to use thought experiments to explain theories. (Spencer et al., 2019) argues that thought “Experiments are not reliable in a metaphysic of race debate”. For Spencer, there is a danger in relying on thought experiments. Jeffers and Glasgow rely mostly on intuition-based thought experiments. Without them, their theories are left open to objections. (Spencer et al., 2019) debates that their “Theories are not based on the reliable evidential method”. Spencer relies on Peter Smith for two types of reliable inference concerning induction. The inferences/induction must be based on a large sample and random, while the other must be not. Spencer debates relying on small induction to assume the large statical population is unreliable when concerning the ordinary English speakers. Spencer makes use of Glasgow's findings on the dominant use of racial classification. Spencer's aims are that it is so unreliable to use such thought experiments based on non-random samples and small sample sizes to determine a parameter of any statical population (Spencer et al., 2019).

1.3.3 Anti-Realism Response

In their response, Glasgow et al. (2019) begin by mentioning Jeffers' argument that anti-realism relies on semantic practice, where race includes ancestry, visible traits, and geography. However, Glasgow et al.'s (2019) definition contradicts this, emphasizing that anti-realism cannot realize social facts. They further point out that we inherit visible traits from our ancestors from different regions, but historical facts and the definition of race are distinct concepts. Glasgow et al. (2019) argue that anti-realism can explain social realities by recognizing the race-related aspects. They highlight the disagreement between anti-realism and social constructionism, where the latter acknowledges the existence of racialized groups as real races. Regarding combating racial inequality, Glasgow et al. (2019) emphasizes the importance of recognizing and fighting it, but they do not elaborate on how to achieve this or why motivation should come from elsewhere. Moving on to address the mismatch from the constructionism account, they respond to Hanslanger's statement that a group must be subordinated or privileged to be considered a group, which implies that one cannot be black without being subordinated. Glasgow et al. (2019)

dismisses this idea as it violates the core commitment of race and negatively impacts the pursuit of racial equality.

Furthermore, Glasgow et al. (2019) refers to Jeffers' work, advocating for the preservation of race as a distinctive way of life. They question why the preservation of cultural differences must be tied to race and raise the inquiry of what happens when both cultural differences and power disappear – does it mean we lose our races? Glasgow et al. (2019) strongly opposes this claim, asserting that race persists beyond these factors. Glasgow et al. (2019) further explores the challenges faced by constructionism and non-essentialist biological racial realism. They delve into the complexities of understanding racial identity and its preservation in the face of changing cultural differences and power dynamics. Despite these challenges, they emphasize the significance of acknowledging the persistence of race as a social construct. Moreover, Glasgow et al. (2019) advocate for a comprehensive approach to combating racial inequality. They stress the need to recognize the complexity of the issue and propose that fighting racial inequality requires a multifaceted strategy that addresses various aspects of social, economic, and political systems. While their response critiques certain views, they also aim to encourage a deeper understanding of race and its implications for society. Glasgow et al. (2019) recognizes the necessity of motivation to drive change, but they leave open the question of where this motivation should originate. They urge for collective efforts from different sectors of society to challenge racial inequality and work towards creating a more inclusive and just society.

Glasgow et al. (2019) observe an inconsistency with Spencer's account. They disclose that "it is impossible to have bureaucratic categories fit common sense or fit the population vindicated by biology to fit the same." Additionally, Glasgow et al. (2019) mention that "the absence of Middle Eastern or Latinx from Spencer's five-races does not correspond with our commonsense conception of race." This discrepancy arises because the way people fill out forms may not necessarily align with their personal understanding of race. The authors further argue that the biological facts do not align with the ordinary concept of race. They state that if the classification seeks to align with common sense, it will no longer be purely biological. Glasgow et al. (2019) assert, "Biology has not vindicated a set that includes Latinos and Mena." The seven Rosenberg categories, which lack Latinos and Mena, present a challenge when O.M.B. (Office of Management and Budget) aims to represent common sense while including biological aspects.

Glasgow et al. (2019) point out that Spencer needs to demonstrate a coherent way of sorting people with O.M.B. since its boundaries are indistinct. The problem, as they discuss, is that if people must use any of their ancestry population, they may fall into more than one race. This issue could change the whole common-sense classification if individuals are classified based on their recent relevant ancestry, such as Hispanic origin.

Adding to this objection, Glasgow depicts that Spencer miscommunicates with other countries that do not use the five-set categories as the meaning of race. This concern has serious implications for the conversation that philosophers are engaged in. The implications entail that we cannot dialogue with people who wrote about race before O.M.B. Glasgow et al. (2019) states that "We should not let the set of categories be constitutive of race meaning." Race must be usable in the sense of discussing almost the same subject around the world. As a result, Glasgow et al. (2019) say "Spencer's definition of race is irrelevant in our lives." They emphasize the need for a theory of race that accounts for a range of social practices, and to understand the meaning of race, it must capture the realities and consequences of racialization in our world.

Spencer et al. (2019) has argued that "There is an error in using intuition thought experiments." Glasgow et al. (2019) respond that "There is more job than thought experiments due to our concepts." These thought experiments map the contours of our concepts and show their limits. On the contrary, they agree that there is more data outside us, as Spencer argues. Glasgow et al. defend the use of thought experiments by arguing that using them does not disconnect theorists from reality, and sometimes relying solely on polls to find systematic data can lead to mistakes too. They implore that "We need to be systematic with this approach." Additionally, they press that "We cannot have an interest in referring to the same thing." Different interpretations regarding the debate on race exist, and we must use all the available tools and evidence to navigate these differences. The challenge remains in determining which interpretation to hold onto and compromise with. In the end, the first question will always be, "What is race?" according to Glasgow et al. (2019).

It is precise and highly observant without a doubt that there is no great or less consensus within these philosophers about the nature of race. Each is dissatisfied with others' way of bringing the epistemic nature of race to the position that fits how ordinary people use races without criticism. That position has to capture what we ordinarily mean by race and how we would understand race

and reshape race while still meaning what we refer to eliminate racial ills. In light of the disagreements about the ontology of race. This chapter, all in all, seeks to introduce the archaeological problems that have prompted this current study of the philosophy of race. As mentioned immediately above, the debate between Appiah and Du Bois forms a pillar of the current debate as it is from this debate that most of the discussions arise as Appiah's analysis of Du Bois's definition of the notion of race creates several problems and simultaneously asks fundamental questions on our knowledge and how we use the notion of race. Therefore, the chapter presents the study of race under the proposed concern to be assessed in this research.

In their work, Hanslanger et al. (2019) emphasize that understanding what race is requires placing it within a broader framework. They note that the four metaphysicians, Glasgow, Spencer, Jeffers, and Hanslanger, are asking and answering different questions regarding race. Glasgow and Spencer focus on race as a classification of human beings, considering questions like whether someone is black or Asian and what features underlie these attributions (Hanslanger et al., 2019). On the other hand, Jeffers and Hanslanger explore a broader range of social and cultural practices, racial identities, and the factors that define a group as a racial group. With this in mind, Hanslanger et al. (2019) assert that when considering systems of classification, two pressing questions arise: Firstly, on what basis does the system differentiate between kinds of things? This helps resolve controversies over specific cases. Secondly, are we warranted in using these classifications? Do they provide a fruitful way to understand the range of facts, and do things genuinely fall into each of the various categories in the system? Answers to these questions help evaluate the explanatory potential of the classifications within a broader explanatory framework (Hanslanger et al., 2019). The present research aims to address the second question raised by Hanslanger et al., which is whether we are justified in using racial classifications. By examining the validity and implications of racial classification, this study seeks to contribute to a better understanding of race within the broader context of social and cultural practices.

In this ongoing debate, Mallon has held that it is committed to a non-substantive metaphysical debate asking an ontological question of race (Mallon, 2006). In the second section of this chapter, I have outlined that Mallon precisely summarizes the metaphysical positions of race. In this paper, Mallon opened a passage of critique by calling this debate a non-substantive semantic disagreement and the disagreements within the metaphysics of race are useless (2006). This

critique had gained academic followers in criticizing the metaphysics of race as a valuable philosophical tool for defining the nature of race. In the next chapter, I will seek to view the debate between the metaphysics of race theorists and deflationists. And how metaphysicians defend themselves against these claims. My discussion in the next chapter is mostly focused on what metaphysics of race is committed to by analyzing how metaphysicians respond to these critiques.

1.4 Conclusion

This chapter has discussed different concepts concerning the ontology of race found in the metaphysics of race debate. This gives rise to the objective of this research thesis, which is to answer the imperative question of whether racial classification is warranted or not. This chapter has outlined Appiah's attention to Du Bois's work on race gives foundation to the contemporary metaphysics of race debate. Appiah and Du Bois have raised two important questions concerning the race debate: normative and the ontology of race. The current metaphysics of race is framed on one theme: the ontology of race that has been born by Appiah's attention to Du Bois's notion of race which is connected with the normative question. Therefore, this chapter has critically discussed what these authors that are the attention of the study concern understand the nature of race to be and address the complication of what to do with the concept of race. This chapter has aimed to also introduce the research question concerned in this discussion and debate between these philosophers.

Chapter 2: Why Metaphysics of Race

2. Introduction

I have introduced the metaphysics of race in this study. Scholars like Mallon (2006) have gone against the project of metaphysics of race as a most valuable philosophical tool for understanding the nature of race. My aim in this chapter is to review metaphysicians' commitment to the metaphysics of race. I want to assess the aims and what this debate is about (what is its purpose). I do this by revisiting metaphysicians' replies to the critiques by deflationists. I will first outline how deflationists critique this debate. Secondly, I will outline how metaphysicians defend themselves against these submissions made by deflationists. In this chapter, I do not develop any line of argument in support of either metaphysics of race or deflationists. I believe this requires independent research on its own, considering the limitations of this research and issues at stake about meta-metaphysics involved in defending the metaphysics of race (Spencer, 2016). Therefore, my aim with this chapter is to evaluate the metaphysics of race literature at large, particularly the question of why this debate is important in the project because it assesses the concept of race and what it is about. For deflationism, I will take the recent works of the foremost advocates for this group⁷: Mallon (2006), Lisa Gannett (2010), and David Ludwig (2015). For metaphysicians, I will target the recent publications of Spencer (2014), Hochman (2017), and Diaz-Leon (2021).

2.1 Deflationists

Eli Hirsch (2011) and Theodore Sider's (2011, 2017) distinction between genuine substantive and non-genuine substantive metaphysical debates has formed the line or foundation of thought that seeks to critique the metaphysics of race as dis-genuine and non-substantive metaphysical debate. One of the leading and noticeable protagonists against the metaphysics of race is Mallon (2006). Mallon argues against the metaphysics of race being valuable as a debate over the nature of metaphysics (not metaphysical) but semantic. Mallon notes how Zack and Appiah conclude that there is nothing that race refers to (1985, 2002). Appiah and Zack have argued against causal-historical and descriptivist characters of references for race theories. Mallon uses Appiah and Zack

⁷ I will not include Olivier Lemeire (2017) here. His work has not received responses from metaphysicians. My goal is to set out a thorough and visible engagement between deflationists and metaphysicians. Metaphysicians have not yet responded to Lemeire's work.

to conclude that there is nothing that race refers to, like the theories of references pick nothing in the actual world. Mallon confirms that skepticism would be right before Zack and Appiah's conclusion that racial terms refer to nothing. Therefore, the race theories are engaged in an improper and misleading linguistic practice. He presented the three contending accounts in this paper, these being anti-realism, biological realism, and social constructivism. Mallon (2006) states that "These different accounts suggest a set of substantial metaphysical disagreements as to whether race exists and if it does what kind of a thing it is". He commences with this by saying, "It is deceptive to say these theories are engaged in a metaphysical dispute" (Mallon, 2006). These theories begin with semantic strategies that give different assumptions regarding race's correct theory of reference (Mallon, 2006). In this paper, there is what Mallon distinguishes as metaphysical facts and metaphysical assumptions about race. The metaphysical facts, as he writes, "Include questions of public importance that can be discussed without importance metaphysical disagreement within different phrases of race talk" (Mallon, 2006). Metaphysical assumptions begin with race theories ascribing to theories of reference to say what race is, which is confused with being metaphysical. Mallon (2006) states that "It is very misleading to say these metaphysical assumptions amount to metaphysics." Consequently, Mallon as he believes that what is presumed in the metaphysics debate is just semantic disagreements. Even if we rely on semantic strategies, there is still a problem. For the metaphysics of race to be metaphysical, it needs a determinative of such theory of reference and to know which theory of reference is correct (Mallon, 2006). Approaching the metaphysics of race by finding a determinative theory of reference for terms is also unsuccessful unless there is an absolute answer to determine what is right. The semantic strategy makes a philosophical debate over characters of reference over a metaphysical disagreement about what is in the world. As a result, it is unsuccessful because it cannot solve how we use race talk. Mallon holds that what follows is:

"The semantic strategy makes discussions over the correct account of race hostage to issues in the philosophy of language and metaphysics about which there is little agreement" (2006, p.23).

Even if we use a plausible theory of reference, we will never reach a standard answer to what race is above explaining which theory is plausible or not. In his conclusion, Mallon (2006) discusses that "The issue of race is not tied up to semantic strategy but with the normative question of race".

The parallel position has also been taken by Lisa Gannett (2010). She put metaphysics pursuit of 'really real' has shortcomings when it comes to addressing questions about race as a category (Gannett, 2010). It is productive to forego the 'really real' for the pursuit of real. Secondly, the metaphysics of race leaves many questions unasked. Gannett (2010) states, "The philosophers of 'really real' tend to ask how race is socially constructed or a biological reality, which prevents asking certain questions that matter socially and politically". Gannett's arguments follow this sequence, and she shows that races, as natural kinds of essentialists, have been devoted to the 'really real'. Many times, this position has been attacked to argue that races are not a natural essentialist kind. The essentialism and reductionistic approach that defines races have been rejected. Once the biological basis of race is identified, philosophers resume being philosophers, so the 'really real' issue is not discarded for long. As Gannett (2010) states, "As there are different biological race concepts, with the preoccupation of 'really real,' it is inevitable that metaphysical assumptions about monism versus pluralism will shape the ensuing debate over who gets it right". The debate about "Metaphysics of race assumes that there is one correct concept or different concepts" (Gannett, 2010). She argues that "Deciding the metaphysics of debate in favor of pluralism does not solve the problem", but Gannett's problem is the dichotomization between pluralism and monism (Gannett, 2010). Her second critique is how race's biological and social characters have been dichotomized. Gannett surmises that:

"There are also research questions that cannot be satisfactorily addressed unless allowance is made for casual interactions that occur among biological and social factors" (2010, p.363-385).

Gannett depicts that Andreasen acknowledges this and draws no ontological conclusion from it. For Gannett (2010), "Metaphysics of race appears to dichotomize the two, which is an error activity". She also critiques the dichotomization of scientists-expert, and non-scientist common-folk conceptual schemes raise metaphysical at stake. Gannett (2010) impresses that "This dichotomization ignores how scientific ideas about race and broader cultural ideas about race intersect".

Gannett further articulates that she is concerned with how philosophers of science approach debate about genetics and race. What matters is how this question, race as an appropriate category of classification in biomedicine already a question of practical importance, is addressed. She declares,

“The answer lies in metaphysics as natural kinds, but the practical context in which the question emanated falls away” (Gannett, 2010). She expresses that “This concern privileges specific questions and leaves others overlooked and systematically ignored” (Gannett, 2010). Gannett strengthens her point by pointing out that “The metaphysical debate about monism and pluralism comes from competing definitions that say monism ignores racial concepts in other biological and biomedical science areas” (Gannett, 2010). Privileging theoretical questions leads to questions of practicality being ignored. What is essential for Gannett is to attend empirically to what concepts of race are in actual biological sciences. Recall that Gannett criticizes the dichotomization of monism and pluralism. She addresses that “This methodology will call for an epistemological framework open to either monism or pluralism” (Gannett, 2010). The debate over monism and pluralism results in inevitable questions privileged and others ignored. The philosophers must forego the metaphysics of ‘really real’ that theorizes races as natural kinds (Gannett, 2010). For the reason that these natural kinds of limit questions that should be asked. As people, we need to embrace the conceptual analysis of ‘real’ to thoroughly understand the ‘messy’ world we live in (Gannett, 2010). By Gannett (2010), “The metaphysics of race is involved in theorizing a natural kind that has dichotomy from monism and pluralism, dichotomization of scientific-expert and non-expert, dichotomization of a natural kind, and social kind are not sufficient for metaphysics of race, but they signify degrees of metaphysical investment”.

This position has also been paved by David Ludwig (2015) differently. Ludwig argues for a similar position against the metaphysics of race. Ludwig defends his thesis of argument by using three claims or notions of non-substantive metaphysics: one from Hirsch, one inspired by Sider, and one by Ludwig himself (Spencer, 2016, p.2). According to Ludwig (2015), “The metaphysical debate is confused about metaphysical and normative classification issues”. Like Gannett and Mallon in this paper, Ludwig (2015) argues that “The ‘new metaphysical debate’ obscures important epistemological, ethical, and political issues in scientific classification”. In his argument, empirical and non-empirical evidence underdetermines the metaphysics of race project. Matching Gannett, he argues “This is all permissible to pluralism that eventually leads this debate to merely verbal dispute because of multiple candidates' meaning of race” (Ludwig, 2015). In as much as Gannett does not explicitly prefer pluralism, she is sympathetic to pluralism rather than monism (Hochman, 2015). But Ludwig sees pluralism as the problem.

Ludwig's argument assumes that the metaphysics of race is committed to one fundamental ontology of race. Ludwig mentions two empirical elements that underdetermine the metaphysics of race. The first element claims that contingent explanatory interests underdetermine the metaphysics of race. To make his claim, he relies on Jonathan Kaplan and Rasmus Winther (2013) about different metrics and meanings of genetic variation used to conduct the biological, genetic basis for race which leads to different biological ontologies of race postulate different kinds. Ludwig here follows these two theorists in arguing that if there is a plurality of equally legitimate but distinct ways of subdividing species into legitimate biological kinds, then empirical evidence undermines the ontological status of race. Ludwig's first underdetermination holds that there is no agreement to identify legitimate meanings that are biological. What follows is that this evaluation requires explanatory interest. The second empirical underdetermination is logically independent of the debates about the existence of biological kind. Ludwig (2015) says, "Even if we assume there is exactly one system of objective, interested independence, and unambiguous that carve at it jointly, it will not solve any disagreements regarding the existence of human races". Because there could still be disagreement between racial realists and antirealists regarding the question of whether we should identify any of the objective, interested-independent, and no ambiguous kinds with human races (Ludwig, 2015). Ludwig's second underdetermination is what he calls non-empirical underdetermination evidence, which looks beyond scientific evidence and would hold that there is a diversity of concepts. These differing concepts have some implications for the ontology of race. Ludwig (2015) says, "The general problem is that the meaning of race can be specified in different ways in different contexts in which both realists and anti-realists metaphysicians of race need to show that there is one prior way of specifying race, but this is unclear given the possible diversity of relevant contexts in current debates about the reality of human races". He says, "One way another even if we draw boundaries based on contexts, we may find diversity" (Ludwig, 2015). Other philosophers are engaged in a commonsense and scientific ontology of race that gives different answers about the nature of race. For example, commonsense may refer to the ordinary concept of whether race exists, while scientific may be concerned with the scientific existence of race. Ludwig (2015) asserts, "The biological definition adopts a different definition of race that include races as ecotype, monophyletic, and subspecies". Given the absence of one canonical use of race it is highly plausible the philosophers will identify one fundamental meaning of race. If we turn to commonsense, the situation is even worse because the current

possibility of criteria for commonsense involves an intense debate. With this diversity, one may argue that we should also distinguish between different concepts of race. For Ludwig, this candidate of meaning seems to be a problem for the metaphysics of race debate. And this problem does not disappear even when we exclusively follow race based on the United States. It still provides evidence for heterogeneous uses of race. For example, Glasgow is aware of the multiply candidate meanings and rejects race is compatible with them. Because he says race is ambiguous, and we are talking past each other. To Ludwig, as Spencer seeks to suggest another definition of race that excludes the alternative specification of race provides evidence about the nearly unique definition of race that can capture what is race because of equally ontological meanings of race.

Ludwig (2015) also says, “Even if as Spencer does metaphysics of race focuses on national meaning to avoid pluralism, it needs to show that a national meaning of race that the widest used meaning is a national that would exclude the alternatives hypothesis that most uses of race in the United States involve contextually unresolved polysemy of race”. Secondly, Spencer would have to show that the meaning of race he adopts is the only relevant candidate of meaning. As a result, Ludwig says this is bad news for the metaphysics of race. The only thing it needs to do is to least look at Hanslanger’s project of understanding race. Generally, Ludwig (2015) thinks what is non-empirical and undetermined in the metaphysics of race is how has different permissible views. And this leads to a deflationist position. As a deflationist, Ludwig rejects that there are different but equally correct ways of talking about the existence of things. Ludwig takes what he calls Hirsch⁸ analysis of non-substantive verbal dispute. For instance: objects' existence depends on how we want to talk about things. He makes an example of universe particles (x1, x2, x3) and other objects (x1, x2, x3, x4,5, x6, x7) to put this point into the spotlight. He says, “Once philosophers realize the availability of different conceptual frameworks, there is no point in a further dispute” (Ludwig, 2015). What remains is just a non-quotative verbal dispute. Ludwig would mean that once we recognize the truth in each of the differing accounts, there will be no need to discuss its fact, but only verbal disagreement will be left. His last argument utilizes Sider's definition or notion of non-substantivity. Sider notion of non-substantivity is that a dispute about

⁸ Hirsch defends the distinction between merely verbal dispute and one that are not with several examples from history of science and philosophy. For example, Hirsch shows that the dispute between John Locke and Joseph Butler about whether a tree can survive a change in its parts was merely verbal since either side could charitably interpret the other side’s assertions as true using other’s meaning of ‘identity’ (Spencer, 2017, p.7).

the expression of *E* is non-substantive if its disputants are endorsing multiple, equally joint-carving candidate meaning for *E*. Therefore, for Ludwig, “New metaphysics of race is a dispute that is non-substantive” (2015, p.24).

2.2 Metaphysicians Defending the Metaphysics of Race

Quayshawn Spencer (2016) leads the way in defending the metaphysics of race. Spencer views Ludwig's critique against ‘actual metaphysics of race’ as irrelevant in his response. In the beginning, Spencer sees Ludwig's arguments as sound even though it does nothing to undermine what he calls ‘actual metaphysics of race’ because the actual metaphysics of race is more akin to the metaphysics done in philosophy of science than mainstream analytics. For these reasons, the term used by Ludwig ‘fundamental ontology’ is not even used in the actual metaphysics of race. It does not appear even once in Ludwig’s 40 cited publications. Secondly, as Ludwig (2015) says, “The metaphysics of race is committed to one fundamental ontology of race, Spencer (2016) says actual metaphysics embraces a pluralist ontology for the nature of race in the relevant context”. Spencer cites his work in the article, *the national meaning of race* (2014) to show he concedes that ordinary Americans use multiple meanings of race (geographic and ethnic). Spencer (2016) begins his work by saying upfront that his project is “Merely to ‘debunk’ the idea that folk racial classification has no biological basis”. Spencer (2016) says his “Work attempts to accomplish that goal by showing race in its national meaning in the current US is a directly referring term for a biological entity, set of the particular human population”. Therefore, Spencer (2016) says, “There are several ways that Americans use ‘race’”. What Spencer is saying is that the actual metaphysics of race or metaphysicians embrace pluralism about the nature of race. Pigliucci and Kaplan are happy to grant that both the ecotype and subspecies are equally legitimate ways of dividing species into biological races. Kaplan does not hide that race can be defined and picked out in various ways. For example, Kaplan (2003) says explicitly “Races, then, can be defined and picked out in several ways”. Spencer does not oppose that metaphysicians are not pluralistic, but that does not denote they do not entertain pluralism as a metaphysical possibility, which is enough to show that Ludwig's metaphysics does not presuppose a single fundamental ontology of race. Not to mention Glasgow, who entertains the possibility that ordinary Americans sometimes talk past each other when they use race. He also explicitly says race in some contexts is used to refer to a social kind of thing and in other contexts to a biological kind of a thing.

Additionally, Ludwig views the debate ‘within’ each metaphysical camp: the US race debate and biological race debate. Spencer says Ludwig’s claims are hypothetical of what he calls ‘new metaphysics of race.’ As the US race debate is the debate about the nature and reality of race according to what race means in the ordinary discourse of contemporary Americans. The people Ludwig classifies in the US race debate have interests in the biological race debate. Spencer says, “This critique is not relevant to these two debates” (Spencer, 2016). Neither the US race debate nor the biological race debate satisfies Hirsch’s criterion for non-substantive dispute that Ludwig uses as a weapon against the actual metaphysics of race. The US race “Debate is not merely a verbal dispute because racial realists cannot interpret racial anti-realists in the debate, same as anti-realists” (Spencer, 2016). If the US race debate is non-substantive in Ludwigian or Sider-style sense, it does not mean or infer confusion about metaphysics and normative classificatory issues. This is because

“Actual metaphysicians of race are adopting a different view of substantive metaphysics—namely, one that does not require metaphysical disputes about race to presuppose a single fundamental ontology of race or anything about joint-carving. Thus, while Ludwig’s argument is relevant to the hypothetical new metaphysics of race, it does not make contact with actual metaphysics of race” (Spencer, 2016, p.14).

Lastly, Spencer places that when Ludwig defines ‘the new metaphysics of race,’ he anticipates the worry that he may mischaracterize the actual metaphysics of race. In response, Ludwig (2015) says he “Does not want to engage himself in a verbal dispute about the meaning of metaphysics of race”. He only wants to challenge a particular type of metaphysics of race while proposing an alternative. This leaves Spencer (2016) confused because if the new metaphysics of race is a purely speculative metaphysics that does not describe the disputes in the actual metaphysics of race and if the conflict in the actual metaphysics of race already does away with monist and fundamentalists assumptions about race (Spencer, 2016). It is hard to imagine the purpose of lodging Ludwig’s critique in the first place. Reading Spencer and Hochman, you find likeness in their line of thinking against deflationism. Spencer’s work focuses only on Ludwig, while Hochman responds to almost all the above deflationists.

Like Spencer (2016), Hochman (2017) believes deflationists against the metaphysics of race attack the wrong definition of metaphysics. However, Hochman does not want to defend any definition

of metaphysics. That should be the work of deflationists. Similar to Spencer, Hochman (2017) argues, “It is wrong to assume that the metaphysics of race aim is monist. Their attack does not show why we should engage in pluralism and normative”. He says they all cite Hanslanger as a right race theorist without fully understanding that Hanslanger understands herself as a metaphysician. He further states, "The deflationist approach is aimed at an outdated version of the metaphysics of race" (Hochman, 2017). Hochman (2017) delivers that “Some verbal disputes are substantive, and to most philosophers, how we understand metaphysics is very important” (2017). Hochman responds in three ways: Monism versus pluralism, normative versus metaphysical, and scientific versus commonsense.

In response to monism, Hochman (2017) argues that “Ludwig is wrong to say metaphysicians are engaged in a monist approach to race”. Hochman (2017) says, “Some metaphysicians are sympathetic with other views and pluralist in their direction”. The metaphysics of race project does not aim for a monist definition of race. Pluralism is one of the metaphysical options. As he continues, he mentions that “Ludwig believes that monism is definitional of the metaphysics of race only ‘within’ each race debate” (Hochman, 2017, p.10). Nevertheless, this does little to help his argument because there is no good reason to believe monism is definitional of metaphysics of race approach ‘within’ each race debate. The only way we should interpret Ludwig’s challenge is only specific against monists. He further states that he does not show that the plurality meaning of races is permissible.

Returning to Gannett, Hochman (2017) says, “Gannett's approach of avoiding ‘really real’ to the validity of race in biomedicine is unnecessary in achieving pragmatic biomedicine goals”. Metaphysical commitment does not leave out practical questions (Hochman, 2017). Hochman here cites the work of anti-realism theorists in their article ‘race and health’ who endorse races does not exist, but racialization does exist. After responding to this criticism, he goes on to another aspect of criticism that is targeted in advocating for normative, not metaphysics.

Mallon (2006) argues, "We should focus on the normative question about race and abandon the metaphysical questions". For Hochman (2017), this also seems confusing because, as Spencer discussed, one would need semantic and metaphysical assumptions to arrive at ontological conclusions about race. Remember, Mallon’s worry is that there is no single theory of reference. Hochman (2017) then says, “If there is no single theory of reference, we still adopt a specific

approach to reference to define our terms”. When we express our terms, we cannot avoid making assumptions about references (Hochman, 2016). It is part of the act of defining. Mallon’s thinking is that metaphysics and semantics are in opposition. Hochman fairly dismisses that; they are not in opposition. That also goes with normative and metaphysics. They are not in opposition. He says much of the metaphysics of work is normatively engaged. As Mallon and other deflationists support Hanslanger, we should follow the same inquiry of asking what we want our racial terms to do for us. This does little to support them because Hanslanger is a metaphysician whose definition of race is real. When metaphysicians discuss race, they have normative outcomes squarely in their minds. In support of this argument, Hochman includes Mills and Appiah’s assertion that

“You can get various possible candidates for referent for race” (2017, p.2723).

To show that metaphysicians are actively engaged in normative considerations of race. Not even normatively, but sometimes political. Deflationists are confused about what is happening with the metaphysics of race. Taylor, as a metaphysician, defends a political approach to the metaphysics of race. Furthermore, he believes the ontology of race depends on practical considerations. Another person is Sundstrom, who is normatively engaged in his discussion of race as a proposition that should do justice to the people who experience race in the living social category (Hochman, 2017). This part of the criticism is that there are normative inquires within the metaphysical approach to race. Hochman also responds to Gannett’s worries about dichotomization between biological and social causation.

Hochman (2017) agrees, “There are questions that will never be pleasingly addressed without biological and social interactions”. The metaphysics of race has not focused on how social factors influence biology, but that does not mean they dichotomize biological and social causation. Gannett is concerned with this and framing race as either biological or social real. Hochman (2017) says, “The real problem is that this contrast leaves out other positions, such as anti-realism”. Framing a debate between biologists and mere social constructions is a straw man position. Lastly, Hochman attends to the dichotomization of scientific and conceptual schemes. He also agrees that “Gannett is correct to say they are not different as metaphysicians assume and interact” (Hochman, 2017). In his final response, he holds that “There is no tension between this causation because David Serre and Svante Paabo argue for anti-realism about biological race” (Hochman, 2017).

Their work demonstrates how folk assumptions about race can affect the sampling schemes used worldwide in population genetic studies.

Lately, Diaz-Leon (2021) has focused on the unique nature of the critiques made by Mallon (2006) and Ludwig (2017). Even though her claims belong to what she calls an amelioration project, she defends the metaphysics of race full-fledged⁹. Before I illustrate her response, I would like to explain Diaz-Leon's meta-metaphysics moves that answer Elizabeth Barnes (2014) and Sider (2011, 2017). I explain this because Diaz-Leon responds to Sider and Barnes in a way that eventually answers Mallon and Ludwig's objections about metaphysics (especially metaphysical debates about race).

Diaz-Leon focuses on the question and the nature of what counts as the substantive metaphysical debate concerning Sider and Barnes. Sider has argued that

“Metaphysics at bottom is about the fundamental structure of the world. Not about what is necessarily true. Not about what properties are essential. Not about conceptual analysis. Not about what there is structure. Inquiry into necessity, essence, concepts or ontology might help illuminate realist structure. But the ultimate goal is insight into the structure itself, into what the world is like, at the most fundamental level” (2011, p.7).

This quote suggests that a genuine metaphysical debate involves perfectly joint carving terms that perfectly involve fundamental properties (Diaz-Leon 2021). What counts as a substantive metaphysical debate is if at least one of the candidate meanings is perfectly fundamental. If none is perfectly joint carving, that debate will be none-substantive. Sider claims that:

“Sentence S is non-substantive if and only if S would have different truth-values under different candidate meanings, i.e., alternative meanings for S that are equally joint-carving and equally faithful to S, conceptual role” (2011, p.9).

This means that there are two ways in which a sentence is substantive: either the sentence does not have different truth values to different candidate meanings, or even if it does have different truth values, there is one candidate meaning that is more joint carving than the alternative. (Diaz-Leon 2021). As Diaz-Leon (2021) understands, “Sider is not claiming that a dispute is only genuine

⁹ Diaz-Leon defends metaphysics of race and gender regardless of his view belongs to another project of metaphysics of race called analytical project.

when one of the candidates meaning is more fundamental or more joint-carving than the alternatives”. As Sider argues, a comparative notion is needed from Diaz-Leon's understanding. This comparative notion introduces notions of terms that are not perfectly joint-carving but can reasonably well joint-carving, in the sense that they are more joint-carving than the alternatives. In simplicity, we compare different candidate meanings to find which is more joint carving than the rest. Diaz-Leon (2021) puts on the idea that comparative joint-carvingness gives rise to the question of how we can determine whether a candidate's meaning is more joint-carving than the alternatives. Sider (2013) argued, "A candidate meaning is more joint carving than another depends only on how the world is, independently of our conceptual framework”.

What follows from Sider is the claim that ‘There is a constitutive relation between joint-carvingness and explanatory power/success’ (Diaz-Leon, 2021). This means that we should understand the questions about joint-carvingness or fundamentality in terms of the explanatory usefulness of that entity. Regarding these sentiments, Barnes (2014) has argued that “Sider’s account of what genuine metaphysical debate rules out feminist and race metaphysics from being substantive metaphysics because it is not clear there is a term that is perfectly joint carving”. Secondly, Sider’s conception of objectivity does not capture what feminist metaphysicians are interested in. What this means is that “We cannot reduce all questions about what the referent of a term such as a woman is, to questions about what the most explanatorily useful candidate meaning is” (Diaz-Leon, 2021).

What then, Diaz-Leon (2021) argues is that “If we accept there is a deep relation between explanation and joint-carving-ness, it could then be argued that questions about which candidate meaning is more joint-carving will depend, in turn, on which candidate meaning is the most explanatorily useful”. But what is crucial for Diaz-Leon is that these questions cannot be answered satisfactorily unless we make clear what the aims and purposes of our explanations are. Diaz-Leon (2021) says, “Our aims and purposes of our explanations can vary from context to context, depending on the inquiry at hand”. Diaz-Leon sees a problem with Sider’s account is not scientific as Barnes (2014) suggests. As she sees it, the main problem is that Sider understands scientific questions as being interest-independent. However, if “We accept and embrace a more pragmatic interest-dependent conception of what makes a scientific theory more explanatory efficacy, then we can still hold joint-carvings depending on explanatorily efficacy” (Diaz-Leon, 2021, p.5). It is

this sense that we can capture what many debates in feminist metaphysics are about. Nevertheless, as the question remains, how can we find out whether a sentence is joint carving than the alternative. Sider (2013) says, “That depends on the one that is law-like generalizations and more explanatorily than the rest”. Again, Barnes (2014) said, “It is unlikely that theories of social construction will fit this model”. What Barnes (2014) says is that “The kinds of explanations that they give are not kinds that Sider suggests contribute to joint-carving-ness, and these theories are not lawlike”. In response, Diaz-Leon (2021) says objections to Sider by Barnes are not sound, “The comparative notion of joint-carving-ness in terms of explanatory efficacy can capture what many debates about the ontology of race and gender are about” (2021, p.5).

Firstly, we should remember that substantive claims do not have to talk about perfectly fundamental entities, only about entities that are more joint carving than alternatives. Secondly, we should understand the notion of explanatory power in a broader sense so that explanations in social science count. Diaz-Leon (2021) says, “This can be in the sense that claims can be substantive to the extent that corresponding concepts are sufficiently joint carving, where this could be understood in terms of functional concepts that are more explanatory useful than the alternatives candidate meanings”. However, Diaz-Leon is compelled to believe one may say there is always a candidate meaning at the vicinity of race than social constructionism. But as Sider (2014) explains, “Despite having a simpler basis in the fundamental, the competing concepts will be incapable of playing the explanatory role in social theory that is played by gender” (or we can say race as well here). Diaz-Leon says, as Sider puts it, “That is to say to defend a theory according to which terms such as gender and race refer to a social rather than biological kind” (2021, p.7). Moreover, this leads Diaz-Leon to a third point that it is easy to see why social kinds can be more explanatorily useful than some alternative candidate meanings if we understand explanatorily power in a broadly pragmatic sense. In terms of “Those explanations that can better satisfy a series of theoretical and practical criteria that we can use to compare the virtues of our explanations” (Diaz-Leon, 2021, p.14-16). The relevant notion of explanatory efficacy is that explanations are more theoretically virtues than others. What is crucial in this sense, as Diaz-Leon (2021) also believes, is that “Philosophers have argued that questions among competing theories involve normative and evaluative considerations as well as purely epistemic or theoretical considerations”. In this sense, to understand the debates about metaphysics of race as disputes that give rise to the best explanations, where explanations in the social sciences also count, and where the assessment

of different theories appeals to normative considerations having to do with social justice¹⁰. Diaz-Leon believes this is what we should understand in recent defense with social kinds (2021). In response, Barnes says:

“An interesting question that follows is whether allowing morally loaded concepts in terms of our casual explanations compatible with Sider’s notion of subjectivity as completely independent. As Sider argues, whether a certain property or entity is more fundamental than others depend independently on our aims and purposes in that specific discipline” (2017, p. 2473).

In Diaz-Leon’s view, there might be tension here. Because if we want to argue in some cases, a social kind can be more explanatorily useful than biological kind. We need to show that explanations involving social kind are more useful than explanations involving social kind. But in turn, both are useful. But the reasons for choosing the former over the latter could be by appealing to our interests and aims. And this is going to be subject-related. Eventually, there is no way of choosing among these explanations from an objective- mind-independent point of view. Because “If we want to explain human reproduction, we go to biological kind” (Diaz-Leon, 2021). To explain and understand social injustice, we consult social kind. Therefore, there is no way of choosing between the two. But whether a certain explanation is useful in a certain context depends not only on whether the casual claims are true but also on pragmatic criteria such as whether the explanation focuses on the explananda that are most relevant and significant ones in that context given the purposes of the inquiry. And whether the explanation is intelligible enough and useful enough to predict the behavior of the entitles that we want to focus on and so on (Diaz-Leon, 2021). It is in this sense that Diaz-Leon thinks explanations appealing to social kinds are more appealing than biological kinds (when it comes to injustice regarding race, and it is not clear how we can understand explanatorily power away from practical and pragmatic factors). This takes Diaz-Leon to the second issue.

The second issue is substantivity and verbal disputes. This second issue follows from the claim that if a sentence has several candidate meanings that are equally joint carving, the corresponding

¹⁰ Aaron Griffith further opts for the same view that having metaphysical accounts of the concepts and categories central to social justice movements can also aid in defending the claims of social movements, movements like Black Lives Matter and the Campaign to End the New Jim Crow, which seek justice for people of color aim at undermining not only interpersonal injustices but also “systematic” or “structural” injustices (Griffith 2019, p. 6).

dispute will be non-substantive. Diaz-Leon (2021) claims that “This view is very problematic”. What is at issue here is that if all candidate meanings are equally joint carving, then it is more likely that we will have a dispute where different parties think they disagree about some non-terminological matter regarding whether *p* is true. In contrast, they are arguing about the terminological matter (ontology of race, for instance). Diaz-Leon (2021) says, “We need to figure out what is at stake here”. She relies on David Chalmers's (2011) dissimilitude between merely verbal and (none-merely) verbal disputes. Chalmers (2011) says, “There are verbal disputes where we are interested in how we use the term, and that have significant consequences, regardless of whether all candidate meanings are equally joint-carving or not”. From this, Diaz-Leon (2021) says, ‘What is important to be noticed is that this could be understood as a descriptive question about how people use the term in that community¹¹. Alternatively, as the ameliorative question about how we should use the term in that community¹²’. Therefore, “Verbal disputes are significant precisely to the fact that whether we use the term in one way or another can have important consequences beyond the linguistic realm¹³” (Diaz-Leon, 2021). Diaz-Leon challenges the thinking of calling verbal disputes non-substantive by uttering that we could instead talk about verbal disputes that are politically significant vs. verbal disputes that are not political. In this way, we will not suggest that disputes about terminological matters are somehow less significant than disputes about non-terminological matters. But we will emphasize that significant verbal disputes

¹¹ Glasgow (2009, 2010) also say he is concerned with the concept of race that has the currency in ordinary discourse. What he is interested is that this concept lurks behind our racial conflicts. He is interested with how various people use the term because behind it lies broad conversation about practices that implicate race.

¹² (Hanslanger et al., 2019) says it will become clear to the reader that my methodology for answering the question “What is race?” is different from that of my coauthors. According to all of them, we should be seeking an understanding of what we are ordinarily talking about when we talk of race. But Hanslanger is more interested into how we should use our terms.

¹³ Griffith (2019) have also argued for the same claims. Griffith says metaphysics offers rigorous conceptions of the basic concepts that are foundational to many endeavors, both practical and theoretical. Understanding the connections between the concepts at the base of social justice movements and those in the metaphysician's toolbox can enrich and supplement the former, which are developed out of local, lived experience. Griffith says metaphysics, focused on the social world, can help make perspicuous and justify the commitments and aims of social justice movements. He makes an example about Natalie Stoljar's (1995) work on the category ‘women’. Stoljar argues that the gender categories should not be understood in terms of Aristotelian essences. The concept of “women”, she claims, should be understood as a cluster concept that applies to a resemblance class, i.e., a concept involving a cluster of different features that applies to persons who have enough, but not necessarily all, of those features. Importantly, as she states, there is no set of particular features necessarily and sufficient for category membership on this account. Stoljar claims that this account captures certain key feminist insights and commitments: It allows individuals without female sex characteristics to be women, it allows us to understand gender as a matter of degree, it explains the “felt similarities” between women, and it can accommodate revisionist conceptions of the category of women.

have a moral and political significance in how we use the term (Diaz-Leon, 2021). Diaz-Leon (2021) says, “We can call this view deflationism about metaphysics of race and gender” (2021). This is an application of metaphysical deflationism as a general view to the specific case of race and gender. She thinks that metaphysical deflationism can capture what is at stake here with the metaphysics of race.

Following Amie Thomasson's (2017) metaphysical deflationism, "All debates in metaphysics are solvable in principle by a combination of analysis of concepts plus empirical investigation". Diaz-Leon (2021) thinks metaphysical deflationism can capture debates about the ontology of race. According to metaphysical deflationism, we understand metaphysical debates based on two options. The first option we call a verbal dispute. This option says, “Some metaphysical disputes are verbal disputes in the sense that different parties are using crucial terms with different meanings so that they are not really expressing incompatible propositions when they assert or deny the same sentence” (Diaz-Leon, 2021). The second version or option holds that metaphysics is easily solvable in two steps. Firstly, we have to figure out the applications of the corresponding concepts. What would it take for something to fall under the concept associated with the term. The second step entails that we need to figure out empirically whether the application conditions are satisfied in the actual world or not. In this sense, we can combine both steps to solve metaphysical debates. Diaz-Leon (2021) says, “We should take both versions of deflationism as complimentary”. Because “Verbal dispute idea assumes that different parties can all be reinterpreted so that their competing claims of what is race all come out as true” (Diaz-Leon, 2021, p.13). On the other hand, to establish the truth value of those claims, we must first figure out different application conditions for the concept of race or gender in each idiolect. Secondly, we need to argue that on different reinterpretations of the concept, the application conditions are satisfied by different entities so that the competing sentences come out as true. Diaz-Leon afterward holds, as Thomasson claims, “The easy ontology gives understanding to the common understanding of our concepts” (Diaz-Leon, 2021). Common sense varies from community to community or from speaker to speaker, so we can observe various application conditions. Nevertheless, “These theories are engaged in a verbal dispute, it does not mean they entail a dismissive attitude” (Diaz-Leon, 2021, p.14). This does not mean the debate is any less significant. Contra, when different parties in a debate use a term with a different meaning, this might suggest that the debate is about how we use a term within that

specific community¹⁴. As Thomasson reaffirms, “these debates are not about the terms meaning but how we should use our concepts” (Diaz-Leon, 2021). If we understand these debates on normative terms about how corresponding terms should be used, then we can do justice to the significance of the debate (Diaz-Leon, 2021). Diaz-Leon (2021) emphasizes, “What is important is that we should understand these debates about how the terms are used in different communities”. Then how does Diaz-Leon answers Mallon and Ludwig from this?

In response to Mallon (2006), Diaz-Leon (2021) makes two points. The first point, Diaz-Leon (2021) says, as we have seen above, “Metaphysical deflationism many paradigmatic metaphysical debates amount to disputes of this kind”. Metaphysical debates have two stages: firstly, a semantic stage, where different views offer different accounts of the application condition of the concept. Secondly, an empirical step, where we find out whether alleged application conditions are satisfied by any entities in the actual world or not. Metaphysical debates amount to these steps (Diaz-Leon, 2021, p. 15). Therefore, Diaz-Leon (2021) claims that “It would be useful in many areas of philosophy to use substantive metaphysical debates to refer to disagreements of either of two stages”. In this sense, “Metaphysical debates about race can count as substantive” (Diaz-Leon, 2021, p.16). The second point she makes is that it might be argued that despite all the agreement about empirical facts that Mallon rightly points out, there is still disagreement in the second stage (empirical stage). But “What turns out to be the disagreement is about, is what the main goals of the explanation should be, and therefore they disagree about what the most explanatorily useful kind turns out to be” (Diaz-Leon, 2021). These “Explanations are about what turns out to be the most explanatory useful property that racial groups have in common” (Diaz-Leon, 2021).

In response to Ludwig, he agrees that finding out what properties are more explanatorily useful depends on the aims and goals of inquiry, which vary from context to context. But this does not show debates about what is the most explanatory and useful kind in the vicinity of race are not substantive. Contra to these claims, Diaz-Leon (2021) says, “This shows we should broaden our

¹⁴ Hanslanger (2019) has made a point regarding what Diaz-Leon is arguing for here. She says although Mallon is right that we need to ask a wide range of epistemic and moral questions of the sort he lists, his characterization of the task retains too much of the semantic strategy. What is at issue with the current debate about race is not only our talk and thought, but racial structures and practices of all sorts ranging from linguistic, cultural, medical, political, juridical. We begin our theorizing already situated in these practices. In this sense, Hanslanger says what metaphysicians are concerned with is to understand how they work.

understanding of what genuine metaphysics looks like”. This will allow normative dependent considerations to play a role in our metaphysical disputes about which candidate meaning is the most joint-carving one. As we have seen the disagreements at different stages of the dispute: “At the semantic level, where we are concerned with applications conditions, at an empirical level, where we are concerned with which entitles satisfy the application conditions, and at the normative level, which regards which values and goals we should give priority to at a certain context to figure what is the most explanatory useful kind in the vicinity” (Diaz-Leon, 2021, p.16). If any of these factors varies from context to context, then the referent of race will vary from place to place. And this does not mean debates about the metaphysics of race are non-substantive.

Metaphysicians of race argue that this dispute is not committed in a monist definitional project. But our discussion is both normatively and metaphysical engaged. The debate amount to how we use our racial concept (descriptive project) and how we should use them (analytical project). This involves assessing the application conditions for these concepts and what entitles correspond to them out there in the world for normative purposes. Spencer, for instance, held ‘actual metaphysics’ of race embraces a dispute about how specific linguistics communities actually use ‘race’. As mentioned by other interlocutors of the debate, the dispute does not embrace unimportant social and scientific consequences. Hanslanger motivates the US race debate by pointing out that engaging in it will help us frame and evaluate social policies and address stubborn inequalities in health. Also, Pigliucci and Kaplan point out that “Engaging in the debate can help biologists debunk hereditarian hypotheses about race and intelligence, yield insights into human evolutionary history, and yield insight into human migration history” (2003). The purpose of this chapter was to assess how metaphysicians answer the claims that are supposed to destabilize the metaphysics of race, mainly what are the commitments of this debate and why is it important. My discussion in the next chapter will explore the claim that our concepts of race rely on commonsense that differs from community to community if this is how we are supposed to and should understand this debate about how concepts are used and should be used in different communities. My discussion in the next chapter will continue concerning the evaluation that race is relative to context, making race to be examined contextually. I will assess metaphysician's claim that the concepts of race do not travel.

2.3 Conclusion

This chapter demonstrated that Mallon (2006) “Deflated metaphysics and focus on normative and political questions” (2006). Gannett (2010) has also wanted to let the air out by contending the same position that the metaphysics of race is involved in monism, dichotomizes social and scientific causation that we should forego the ‘really real’ of metaphysics because practical questions remain unasked, and dichotomize the scientists and commonfolk conceptual schemes. Ludwig (2017) further supported these views by defending his thesis using an argument premised on the claim that the ‘new metaphysics of race’ is non-substantive according to three notions of substantive metaphysics from contemporary meta-metaphysics, which include Hirsch, Sider, and himself. He argued that “Ontologies are shaped by interest dependency, and multiple allowable ontologies underdetermine race metaphysics” (Ludwig, 2017). Ludwig exclaimed, “Metaphysics is undetermined by an equally ontological candidate of meaning because it is aimed at one fundamental ontology of race” (2017). He held Hirsch’s analysis to argue that metaphysics is involved in a merely verbal dispute and held Sider’s definition of substantivity to argue that even if we assume a near candidate is a means that is carve-jointing than other. We will never find referent to race because different communities have different conceptions of race. As he supposes, empirical and conceptual underdetermination leads metaphysics to a non-substantive debate. Spencer (2016), Hochman (2017), and Diaz-Leon (2021) have then responded to all the critics that should destabilize the metaphysics of race. Spencer has said these critiques are irrelevant. They fail to undermine the metaphysics of race because metaphysics is not committed to monism, and metaphysics does not presuppose a single fundamental ontology of race. Spencer posited US race debate is not merely a verbal dispute because racial realists in that debate cannot plausibly interpret racial anti-realist and vice versa. He also mentioned that “Ludwig is using an old version of Sider’s notion of substantivity because Sider has redefined his definition of substantive metaphysical dispute” (2016).

Hochman states, “The metaphysics of race in its approach is normative and political issues are deliberated” (2017). Hochman responds to Gannett that “It is incorrect to say metaphysics dichotomizes scientific and commonsense conceptual schemes because David Serre and Svante Paabo argue for anti-realism about biological race, and their empirical work demonstrates how folk assumptions about race can affect sampling schemes used worldwide population genetic clusters” (2017). Secondly, metaphysicians do not dichotomize between normative and

metaphysical issues. However, we use verbal tools to define our terms. Diaz-Leon has lately made a meta-metaphysical move to show what this debate is about and how Ludwig-Hirsch and Sider style and Mallon could be solved. Diaz-Leon put the flesh in the bones by arguing that we should broaden our understanding of substantive metaphysical debate to understand what these debates are about and their purpose. Diaz-Leon contended that metaphysics debates discuss metaphysical deflationism against Mallon (2006) and Ludwig (2017) by stating that metaphysics has two stages. The “Semantic level (concerning the application condition), at the empirical level (entities that satisfy the conditions of the application)” (2021). At the semantic level, we give meaning to concepts that vary from different communities. And at an empirical level, we apply these conditions that match the conditions of the application. Diaz-Leon argued that we “Should see these debates as not about the terms meaning but how we should use our concepts” (2021). If we understand these debates on normative terms about how corresponding terms should be used, we can do away with injustices that have been done in these concepts. What metaphysics is committed to is how we use and should use our terms and concepts in our communities, using metaphysical methods. Therefore, In the next chapter, I investigate how these concepts of race are said not to travel.

Chapter 3: Relativism and Race

3. Introduction

In chapter two, I sought to evaluate metaphysicians' commitments to the debate about the nature of race. In this chapter, I explore the characterization of how race is relative to context, and it should be examined and assessed contextually as held in the literature on the philosophy of race. This chapter is systematically divided into four sections. Section one summarizes Mallon's three metaphysical constraints: Passing, traveling, and reality of race. Section two discusses the passing constraint. Section three outlooks the traveling constraint and reality of race. Section four evaluates the importance of contextuality.

3.1 Three Metaphysical Constraints from Mallon

Mallon provides the good groundwork for discussing the use of race from place to place. Mallon's Paper, *Passing, traveling, and reality: Social Constructionism and the metaphysics of race* (2004) displays how the constraints of racial passing, traveling, and reality are mutually inconsistent with each other in the case of social constructionism. The first constraint shows that social constructionism cannot account for passing. The second constraint entails that race cannot travel. Mallon makes sense by endorsing an interactive kind that race cannot travel but cannot account for passing. The institutional principle can satisfy both constraints while failing to account for the reality of race. Mallon's critique wants to show how these three constraints about the reality of race can never unequivocally amount to any theory of race. As opposed to his aim, my focus on Mallon (2004), Glasgow (2010), Taylor (2010), and Diaz-Leon (2021) is not to argue in defense of constructionism as failing to meet all these constraints. My target to these theorists' papers is orthogonal in exploring how race should be interpreted contextually (thereby drawing Bernard Matolino's (2015) crucial emphasis on philosophy and the place. Any theories of race will face these same restrictions constructionism faces on passing and traveling. These two are metaphysical on the nature of racial thinking and talking (Taylor 2010). Glasgow (2007) mentioned that Mallon's challenge should be worrisome to all social kind realists and should be considered a potentially potent line of argumentation for social kinds of anti-realists. And it should be an argument of interest to all realists and anti-realists about race in particular.

3.2 The Passing Constraint

The three accepted phenomena by constructionism are racial passing, one's race does not travel, and race is real. According to Mallon (2004), "There is no way for constructionism to account for all three of the phenomena simultaneously". Since constructionists' account of race aims to offer a version of race, as Mallon thinks, this account should allow us to understand passing. Walter Benn Michaels charges that the constructionist's account fails precisely on these grounds to account for passing because it is believed passing involves a person objectively belonging to one race while being believed to belong to another. Roughly, constructivism says that because I practice a lawyer's duty, I am a lawyer regardless of the qualification. Michael believes this is not possible. Passing in constructivism means being that race. Michael's critique of constructionism stems from his belief that the idea of cultural identity to do any work beyond describing people's beliefs that they hold resorts to essentialism (Mallon, 2004). The passing constraint provides a test case. As Mallon (2004) puts it, Michaels believes, "The idea of passing involves something separate from the way you hold in as much it takes the form of looking like you belong to a specific race". The constructionist's task is to provide this non-essentialist account of race. For Michaels, this task is impossible to carry out. As Taylor (2010) understands it, Michael implicates that this task is impossible to carry out. In his view, "Anyone who wants to remain a racist must remain an essentialist" (cited in Taylor, 2010). And anyone who wants to abandon essentialism must also abandon race. It is not hard to see that this threatens the racial constructionists with an unsolvable dilemma. According to Michaels, "Race-thinking and social construction are not compatible. The racial constructionist cannot hold both her defining views at once" (cited in Taylor, 2010). Michael's arguments go into two segments of a dilemma. The first segment is:

1.1 "Social constructionists hold that Race [is] nothing but culture" (Mallon, 2004)

1.2. "Culture is nothing more than what we do and believe (Mallon, 2004)

A distinctive array of beliefs and practices" (Mallon, 2004).

1.3. "So, race is nothing more than what we do and believe".

1.4. "Therefore, to believe and practice what the members of any race

believed and practiced would, by definition, make you a member of

that race” (Mallon, 2004).

1.5. “This makes one's race a voluntary choice, for people could change their racial identity, siblings could belong to different races, people who were as genetically unlike each other as it's possible for two humans to be could nonetheless belong to the same race. None of these things are possible in the U.S. today. And were they to become possible, we would think not that we had finally succeeded in developing an anti-essentialist account of race but that we had given up the idea of race altogether” (Mallon, 2004).

Accepting this identification makes passing impossible. Robert Gooding-Williams has challenged Michael's argument by denying (1.4) and (1.3). Gooding-Williams says, “The first segment assumes that if race is nothing but the culture, it means what makes someone a member of a race differentiated way of act” (Mallon, 2004). Merely race can be nothing but culture and not depend on the individual's belief or identification of those racially labeled. Gooding-Williams holds that “constructionism posits that practices of racial classification are nothing but culture in that these practices determine racial membership” (Mallon, 2004). Michael does not consider this as a challenge; however, he sees it as it falls on the other side of the segment:

2.1. “Alternatively, constructionists hold that one's race is a matter of how one is classified” (Mallon, 2004)

2.2. “This makes it the case that "If you are perceived as black, you are black" (Mallon, 2004).

2.3. “And this makes passing impossible since to pass as a member of race R would be sufficient to be a member of race R” (Mallon, 2004).

Gooding-Williams does not think this response responds directly to his criticism, but it is confused with Adrian Piper's passing discussion. Piper claims that “Blacks are Black is the shared experience of being visual or cognitively identified as blacks” (N.D). Gooding-Williams sees that

Piper's account relies on more than visual modes of identification. Michael only focuses on visual traits and ignores Piper's cognitive attributes. Mallon (2004) thinks, "This cannot answer criticism to Michael even in agreement that we align racial ascription in more than one way". This objection can still stand even if Michael decides to make this objection without reference to his visual identification. This connotes that if to be black is to be visually recognized, on what grounds can someone not identified by that society as black be said to be black? The problem with Piper's critique is that it entails experience rather than what Michael implied. The pressing matter for meeting passing constrain is someone who passes into herself and almost his whole life. The perfect example is in Mark Twain's novel, where two boys (one white and one black) are switched from infancy. The novel shows that two infancies were racially passing, not in the virtue of experience but in parentage and ancestry. Piper and Gooding-William fail to account for passing in this paradigm.

Nevertheless, Mallon (2004) says, "This can still point us in an adequate direction". This suggests that we can be mistaken in our perception of someone's race relative to the racial ascription. Resorting to Mills for a response, Mallon (2004) states that, according to Mills, "Racial ascriptions are judgments about whether a person meets the relevant criteria". In ascribing race, we agree upon the criteria for applying the concept. After that agreement, we determine the race of an individual based on those criteria. This criterion is objective rather than subjective to Piper's account. Mallon (2004) calls this "An objectivist account of race" as Mills is interested in ordinary/folk talk on how the racial criteria are made up. Mallon (2004) develops this account into a folk objectivist account of race. Using this account, we can explain passing as long as we make sense of mistaken judgment about whether someone meets the relevant criteria. Mallon then embraces Gooding-William's perceptual and cognitive criteria as useful for the reason that there is a discrepancy. Other properties include the central one in that a criterion of P for the application of a term or concept is central to the extent that users C consider P's obtaining to be a necessary or sufficient condition for the application of C. In as much as indicative features of racial membership, central ones are important for criterion. The racial concepts allow us to understand the criterion that a person is classified in terms of central features. Mallon (2004) says his "Folk objectivist account allows us to understand passing". Passing occurs when someone has a property central to membership in one category but other properties that indicate membership in another category. The distinction from William-Gooding allows us to understand that indicative features are insufficient for counting as

members of that race. According to Mallon (2004) “Being identified or appearing as a member of a certain race is not enough to be a member of that race”. A person’s race is determined by central features, not the experimental and how someone behaves or how one is thought to satisfy the main criteria. In light of this, Michaels suggests that “The middle ground does not exist for social constructivism” (Mallon, 2004). We must think of race as an essence or an illusion. Mallon dodges Michael’s essentialism strike by arguing that folk objectivist racial ascription holds thin racial endowment. This is because a reference to thin racial endowment does not contain a racialism account of race. Thin theories ascribe based on traits that are independent of choices. Experiences of oneself or community; therefore, account for passing. Mallon quotes Mill’s comment that central features like ancestry are:

“Crucial not because they necessarily manifest themselves in biological racial traits but simply, tautologously, because it is taken to be crucial, as there is an inter-subjective agreement to classify individuals in a certain way based on known ancestry” (2004, p.33).

Features like ancestry are epistemically unimportant. They have been permeated with social significance in determining someone’s particular race. Allowing objective facts about membership in racial categories that depend on the part of someone’s biological feature does not mean that such features are explanatorily significant. Nevertheless, since Mill’s common sense of race can be racialist, that takes racial ascription to indicate racialism. We may consider that if the concepts have meanings based on historical facts and localism, we may find them understood locally. In this case, concepts of race are a poor basis for inferring the properties of members of racial groups. Mallon offers a good developing argument against Michael. Taylor (2010) also provides a revised profound response to Michael. Taylor firstly shows his reluctance in responding to Michael’s sophistry. He changes his mind because he thinks people like Michael are important for clarity. In short, Taylor says there is rehabilitated race talk and thinking that we are engaged in against the old racialism, including essentialism.

Advancing his argument, eliminating such essentialism does not lead many to an eliminativist position but more critical approaches. The new racialism does not treat race as biological but as social artifacts like money. On this account, metaphysics is not abstract. It is a way of accounting for practical willingness to engage in positive mobilization for social organizations. Surviving this constraint, Taylor (2010) says, “Race and racial identities are institutional facts created and

maintained by our practices”. These practices assign meaning to the bloodline, which results in people acting in ways that reveal their commitment.

3.3 The No Travel Constraint and Reality of Race

The second constraint involves no traveling constrain. Root argues:

“Race does not travel. Some men who are black in New Orleans now would have been octoroons there some years ago or would be white in Brazil today. Socrates had no race in ancient Athens, though he would be a white man in Minnesota” (2000, p.6-7).

Mallon considers Root's claim dramatic for two reasons: conceptual sense has revealed that a person can fall under concepts like black and white even if they existed in a distant place or time. A person's race does not change through travel because people's races are ascribed to one based on one thin racial endowment that does not change. Constructivism no travel constraint on their account a person's race is dependent upon the culture they live in. The folk objectivism seemed threatened here when objective racial criteria refer to properties such as ancestry that do not change from place to place. Simply folk objectivism can satisfy this constraint by adding institutionalism. The institutional principle holds that:

“Where R is a race, it is a logically ‘necessary’ condition on a person being R at a site that the concept is used at that site to divide people” (Glasgow, 2007, p. 9).

According to Glasgow (2007), “Institutionalism can account for no traveling as it allows that one might be R1 at one site and R2 at another depending on what racial concepts are used at the different sites”. Both “Folk objectivist and institutionalism can account for no traveling constrain. As membership in R will require falling under the concept “R” at particular sites, one will be “R” only at those sites,” argues Glasgow (2007). Folk objectivist institutional account for no traveling and passing: A person is race R if:

- (1) “He or she is the type of person that satisfies the criteria central to the application of a folk racial concept” (Mallon, 2004).
- (2) “And (2) the person is at a site where the concept R is used to divide people” (Mallon, 2004).

Understanding institutional makes a restriction on race from time to time or place to place if we understand race in an institutional sense. Institutionalism holds that we know race based on institutional facts that we create ourselves on a collective understanding of who counts as what race 'here.' After arguing for all this, Mallon takes a sharp shift that institutional realism, meeting both the passing and no travel, fails to meet one of the core commitments of a realist account of race. Mallon (2004) says, "Social realists face two problems". Firstly, no one thinks of herself as white by having a functional status imposed on her by the collective intentionally. Mallon (2004) explains, "It seems people apply false belief in identifiable biological differences that match up with social, racial membership". If race concepts are never used, then it turns out that no one has races because institutional implies racial criteria for membership, and race concepts are institutional concepts. Mallon (2004) states, "Institutional racial concepts do not apply to people unless those who know are academic philosophers". The institutionalized concepts are empty. Since institutionalized accounts of race have little in discussions of actual processes of racial differentiation. No one uses these concepts in everyday life. Secondly, they cannot play a role in explaining the reality of race. Katharine Clare Jenkins (2016) shows us the answer to the objection to Mallon from John Searle (2007) on how institutionalism realism deals with the fact that many people seem to have false beliefs about race. In a revised account of Searle's institutionalism.

Searle states, let us take an example of monarchs ruled by divine authority. If our opinions changed rapidly that before 1688, people believed in monarchs believed in the doctrine of divine right; however, after 1688, no one did. Before 1688 was systemically wrong about the nature of monarchs that they feature divine rule. Monarchs today are a cause of institutional entitles. If, before 1688, monarchs were not intuitional, what could they have been? Searle (2007) argues, "The two possible options are that they could have been pre-social entitles or did not exist". However, it seems strange to say there were no monarchs before 1688. This compels us to believe that there were monarchs, then the question left for institutionalists is how intuitional reality can exist without recognizing status function. Searle (2007) explains, "The fact that people do not generally use institutional race concepts that do not entail there are no institutional races". The institutional race categories can exist even in the face of widespread false beliefs.

The second problem is that there are generalizations that we make that involve border crossing. Root (2002) noted that "Black people are seven times more likely to die from tuberculosis in the

U.S than in Britain”. These “Rates are not the result of thin biological endowments but racism¹⁵” (Root, 2002). The point by Root is that racialism in everyday life is mistaken. The aim is to offer a differential explanation that undermines racialism and reveals a contingent character of social difference. When we generalize, we need to identify members of racial groups in other contexts free of the consequences of racial categorization. Mallon (2004) argues, "Intuitionism holds race is a product of context, and localized collective intentionality border-crossing may seem impossible". This is impossible because it allows for race to travel. Glasgow (2007) firstly answers Mallon's part that says the second part of institutionalist realism cannot meet features in the formulation and explaining non-accidental generalization. Glasgow (2007) responds, "We need to be more specific about what kind of intuitionist realism we are putting in mind". Because people who are not avowed with institutionalism can still have institutionalized races, just like cocktail parties and wars are institutionalized, so is race.

People do not have to have an epiphany for the ontological fact of institutionalization to hold races exist or hold the way relevant to satisfying the no travel constraint. Glasgow (2010) distinguishes two ways of understanding the localized nature of race. Concepts localism where racial concepts, different communities have different conceptions of race. However, there is intense localism, which he calls ontological localism. Ontological localism holds when one moves to other communities and his race change with her classification. The key to saving constructivism is to hold two kinds of ontological localism: modest and extreme ontological localism. For example, with modest ontological localism, if you are a doctor in your community, you are only a doctor if you satisfy the local criteria for the concept of a doctor. If a doctor cross border, he no longer qualifies as a doctor. If doctorhood is a social construction with locally variable membership conditions the same as race, its nature is social contingent. If one is in the United States and falls under the concept of black, one is U.S-black, and if someone is in Rio and he falls under the concept of a white, he is Rio-white. One's race does not change when crossing a conceptual border. In the example given by Jinkens:

“A US dollar bill that is located in the UK at time. It seems right to say that, at T, this piece of paper has the institutional property of being US-money, even though it lacks the

¹⁵ Mallon then endorse a casual claim, American racism causes American black people to die of tuberculosis at much higher rates than American white persons.

institutional property of being UK-money. If someone – perhaps a shopkeeper to whom it has been offered as payment for goods – says of the bill at t ‘that’s not money!’, this is best interpreted as the (perfectly correct) claim that the bill is not money in the relevant sense – i.e., it is not UK-money (‘that’s not money round here’). This is modest ontological localism: there are locally indexed properties that persist through travel, although they change in salience” (2016).

Jenkins’s example explains that if you are in South Africa, Mallon’s definition reads ‘necessary condition’ as a casual claim or that is used where one is situated to become that race. Suppose you are Brazil-white but travel to South Africa. We may perceive you as black in South Africa. If you say you are white, we may say you are not. This is not to say you no longer have race; however, our property of determining whiteness does not match or correspond with the property of being white in Brazil. The extreme ontological localism, on the other hand, claims that one has many unrestricted races, which can change upon changing locations. The difference between the two is modest localism one’s race is a conjunction of several localized races. He does not change when one travels, but a different localized becomes relevant. Extreme localism opposes by saying you have more than one race which changes upon location. There are three localisms, including concept localism, which Glasgow deems weaker. Racial concepts are local, not races. The realist version says one has a non-localized race, in which different locations fall under other racial concepts, but one’s race does not change at all. Glasgow thinks a modest view is at least more profound than two kinds of localism. Again, back to the doctorhood example, doctorhood does not travel since qualifications differ from place to place. The “Modest view makes more sense to this by holding that P is a doctor at Y, and P is not a doctor at X. The local criterion of doctors is objective from different communities” (Glasgow, 2007). Glasgow states, “Race also operates similarly, which we might say, P is only black at Y and V at T since there is no universal standard” (Glasgow, 2010). It emphasizes the no travel constraint.

Glasgow (2007) says, “What is more important is our conceptual discourse conceals race to travel”. Our concepts are left non-localized. For example, when P goes to South Africa, she changes from black to white. While on this change, “Modest ontological localism finds it misleading” (Glasgow, 2007). She is still black even though she is identified as White in Spain, so she is Spain-White. Glasgow holds the modest ontological localism is consistent with our ordinary

practices of racial classification. If an average person were asked in Spain, she would say, ‘I would still be Black if I am in Brazil,’ and when she is told in Spain, she is white, she would say, ‘Well, I guess we do it differently’ (Glasgow, 2007). Glasgow (2007) explains, “Classification determines race”. Localism is “Not part of the explicit folk theory of race; it is still consistent with practices of racial classification” (Glasgow, 2007). Glasgow thinks border-crossing is also compatible with modest ontological localism, that is:

“We can pick out the same kind of group in Great Britain and America by fixing the location of the racial concepts we use, and therefore, for modest ontological localism, of the two groups’ locally indexed race. If we want to understand what is happening with tuberculosis fatality rates in the United States, we can compare those in the United States who are black on U.S. racial criteria (and are therefore U.S.-black, according to modest ontological localism) with those in Great Britain who are black according to, again, U.S. racial criteria and are therefore also U.S-black” (2007, p.29).

The modest ontologically localist institutionalized folk objectivism seems to satisfy the viability of three phenomena. Modest ontological localism favors that race concepts differ from place to place, and there is an option we can make evaluative generalizations.

Diaz-Leon (2019) says, “There are some clarifications that need to be made from Mallon’s folk objectivist institutional constructivism”. Diaz-Leon (2019) speaks that “Not only the concept can be said to divide people”. Diaz-Leon (2019) says for condition 2¹⁶, “The folk conception of race is used to divide people rather than the concept itself”. Not that the concept does not play a role, but there are two ways of reading this objectivist institutional constructivism for no travel constraint. This conception is one needed to divide people. This comes from the fact that sometimes the concept of race can be empty. So, condition 2, “Should not appeal to concept R since folks have no idea of the concept of race” (Diaz-Leon, 2019). As a result, there are two ways of the version of social constructivism. The one she introduces holds that property P can require something weaker than the one provided by Mallon. That is “In order for subject S to instantiate P, they need to bear a relation to certain cultural and social practices which may require the

¹⁶ Condition 2 says the person is at a site where the concept R is used to divide people (Diaz-Leon, 2019).

employment of certain concepts but not the concept P itself” (Diaz-Leon, 2019, p.5). According to the culture-dependent version of social constructivism, someone is race R if they satisfy the folk criteria that are the target of discrimination and privilege without ascribing label R itself. Therefore, in this case, we can conclude that no travel requirement seems to be the consequence of many standard versions of social constructivism about race. Thus, “According to many versions of social constructivism, someone’s race is relative to their context” (Diaz-Leon, 2019, p.11-12).

In chapter two, I reviewed metaphysicians’ commitment to the debate about the ontology of race. According to metaphysicians, analyzing race involves a kind of this sort that makes one reflect on the concept that is relative to their context Spencer (2016), Hochman (2017), and Diaz-Leon (2021). What metaphysicians are arguing is that when our commonsense differs from context to context, it makes sense that we will speak and analyze these based on how they are used where we are situated. This is what the debate about metaphysics is concerned with, either descriptive or ameliorative project. In this chapter, I then assessed how race (our race concept) is said to be relative to its context, making race metaphysically examined contextually. In the next section, I want to expand my investigation to the importance of contextuality. I am interested to find out what the merits of analyzing these concepts or conditions where we are situated are? My assessment will be based on Matolino’s (2015) work on philosophy and place.

3.4 Philosophy and Contextuality

Matolino (2015) says, “When we talk about place and philosophy, we have to search what philosophy is carefully”. The guiding question is what its purpose is. Matolino (2015) says, “The use of philosophy must be understood in twofold ways”. Firstly, it is used to achieve certain ends. Secondly, philosophy makes humans better as moral agents. These senses operate in exercising philosophy. The immediate question is, do both senses yield the same results to all humans. The first answer represents the specificity of local conditions that humans operate in, and the former insists on the specificity of these local conditions (Matolino, 2015). Matolino undercuts that both of these situations’ philosophy can be useful. Matolino (2015) believes “Philosophy is not an abstract exercise for an abstraction sake from philosophical reflection”. What turns out to be the case is that abstraction is in service of philosophy, and philosophy is in service of humanity. That humanity includes different conditions from different localized places. Philosophy is more about a reflection of these conditions. These conditions talk about what humans value, their meaning to

life, etc. Reflecting or philosophizing about this human condition is not abstract, but it induces the task of reflecting on the human life of that place. And we need to concede that “Human life is not abstract” (Matolino, 2015). Human life must be taken as a matter of being here, of going through life, to live and doing at that moment. When we reflect on these conditions as philosophers, we are not engaging in an abstract activity, but our questions emanate from these human social conditions. To philosophize is to be placed in a position where ideas are born due to that placement, so affirm place reflects the conditions where you are positioned. Remember the two senses that Matolino (2015) gave; then, to philosophize, according to Matolino, is to search for what can be done or be improved in one’s location. To philosophize is the search for how one can better understand one’s situation or better how one’s situation may be taken to be close to the truth and reality.

In this case, situated in South Africa, Matolino then turns into a second question, and he asks, can we say we have a South African philosopher? He admittedly answers positively that a South African philosopher is a philosopher¹⁷ that minimally obligates to the obligation she has in her place. A “South African philosopher is the one who reflects questions affecting the humanity of this particular place” (Matolino, 2015). Matolino set out that no tie requires people to follow this path as academic freedom exists. The only thing that must be secured is that it is untenable for a philosopher to operate in ways that ignore her place or do not take philosophical needs because the place is inevitable for a philosopher. The place makes its presence felt no matter how you could run away from reality. The philosopher’s relation to this place is a duty to engage with human affairs through philosophical reflection. The duty of this philosopher is the responsibility of that duty to wonder about what is relevant to the child, man, woman, dog, and cat of this place. Once this philosophy fails to speak in a contextualized sense to the woman, child, and man of this place, his work is in vain. In concluding his paper, he points out that the philosophical struggle in this place must be addressed. From the exclusion of black people in philosophy from participating in philosophy and in every structure that philosophy practices to how philosophy has been represented as a universal interpretation of humankind. The philosophy of South Africa has a lot

¹⁷ In this case Matolino uses a thought experiment about the case of Professor Plymouth. Professor Plymouth is South African by birth and takes pride to the country of South Africa. Her areas of specialization in philosophy are language and determinism of which she has written on Western philosophers. More particularly what arises from their work and offered interesting philosophical analysis. According to Matolino Professor does not hesitate to call her South African but we cannot refer to her as a South African philosopher. What Matolino reveals is that Professor Plymouth has violated some minimal obligation she has to her place because she has failed to reflect on questions affecting humanity in this particular place.

to do in terms of philosophizing about the human conditions of this place. As I am in South Africa, I follow the guidelines discussed in this chapter to reflect on the question concerned in this study in the context of South Africa.

3.5 Conclusion

In this section, I have aimed to explore the influential claim that race does not travel. Mallon (2004) challenges constructivism about the inability of racial passing, no traveling, and race reality to form a univocal account of race. Mallon has postulated an account for passing by endorsing folk objectivism that we ascribe race based on agreed criteria. You become part of a particular racial category based on this objective fact. Mallon shows how the no traveling constraint can be satisfied by combining folk objectivism with institutionalism. The challenge is folk institutionalism cannot account for reality constrain. For these reasons: there are no sites where ordinary racial concepts incorporate this institutional principle, so on institutionalism, no one would be an R. Thus, if Institutionalism were true, then the race would never figure in explanations because nobody would be race. Additionally, he says we cannot make a national comparison on race because racial comparison can only be made if South Africa uses the same concept as the United States. This violates the second constraint that race does not travel. Searle (2007) has sought to answer Mallon's first worry by arguing that even if people do not generally use institutional race concepts that do not entail there are no institutional races. The institutional race categories can exist even in the face of widespread false beliefs. Glasgow (2007) also argued that "Even wars and cocktail parties are institutionalized, but that does not deprive their existence". He further bids to respond to the second critique by drawing modest and extreme ontological localism in which race cannot travel, but we can still make generalizations. Glasgow endorsed the modest ontologically localist institutionalized folk objectivism by showing that race does not travel while we can still make generalizations by fixing the criteria of concept that match with the one we want to make generalizations with. We fix our concepts that match our criteria of race. In this sense, Diaz-Leon (2019) has made clarification from the folk intuitionalism principle held by Mallon by saying there are many versions of no travel requirement.

We do not have to choose between these versions with a no travel requirement. Diaz-Leon said the no-travel requirement does not only require the concept itself per se. She introduced the culture-dependent version of this requirement that does not employ racial terms or concepts, but there

needs to be a certain relation between social and cultural practices of discrimination in the virtue of folk criteria to satisfy this position. This chapter sought to show from two levels in the metaphysics of race presuppose that if our application condition to concepts varies from place to place (to understand how we should use and how these concepts are used, which includes the complementary of normative and metaphysical issues). The race concepts do not travel; therefore, our analysis remains contextual. I cemented this expository assessment analysis of contextuality by showing why this contextual analysis is important by drawing Matolino's (2015) analysis of place and philosophy. Matolino concentrated on the fact that philosophy is responsible for the place where one is situated. This accords with assessing the conditions of that place. As a philosopher, one has a contextual philosophical responsibility. In the next chapter, I follow the guidelines of these claims to answer the question concerned in this research.

Chapter 4: Race: Rethinking Racial Categories in South Africa

4. Introduction

In chapter one, (Hanslanger et al., 2019), in her discussion of deciding what X is and what to be X, rises in the context where we are uncertain about adjudicating instances of X or how we are trying to situate X in an explanatory framework. Hanslanger highlights that there are two pressing questions that are important when deciding what race is. Namely, on what basis does the system differentiate between kinds of things? This helps us sort out controversies over cases. Secondly, are we warranted in using the classifications; do they give us a fruitful way to understand the range of facts (Hanslanger et al., 2019).

In this chapter, I will attempt to answer the second question of whether present racial classifications are warranted or not. I seek to assess a question concerned by dividing this chapter into four sections. In the first section, I will follow Michael Hardimon's (2003) suggestion that focusing on the conception of race tells us how the concept of race is used. This section will investigate the epistemological underpinning of apartheid racial categories. In section two, I assess the ideology of non-racialism that sought to challenge apartheid racial categories. In this chapter, I will show that the authentic idea of non-racialism to challenge these apartheid categories was not adopted, resulting in another version of non-racialism. In the third section, I will elucidate the understanding of non-racialism that shapes South Africa today and the impact of racial categories. In the final section, I will argue racial categories are not warranted.

4.1 Conception of Racial Practices and Categorization

Today, South Africans are compelled to self-racialize themselves when making applications. These applications array from university and job application forms. You are asked to fill or tick the race you associate yourself with within this form. I want to focus on investigating where these racial categorizations come from. What is the nature of their formulation and motivation? To reflect a rigorous inspection of racial stratification and practices, one must review the history of racial play within that context. This section of this chapter explores the conception of racial categories and practices pre and during the apartheid era in South Africa. To understand the contemporary epistemological underpinnings of racial classification, reminiscing on past categories is vital. This reminiscence's importance lies in understanding the formation and conception of racial echoes and their interlink to modern society. This analysis methodology can

trace the drops in current racist attitudes, racial practices, and categories. Paul Maylem argues that “These policies and practices of apartheid have affected the system up to today” (1990). While Jeremy Seekings (2008) also remains worried that South Africa remains deeply racialized. According to Seekings (2008), “South Africans continue to see themselves in the racial categories¹⁸ of apartheid”. This suggests that the course of pragmatic racial analysis should be voluminous to evaluate the presence of those virulent racial practices and categories.

The “Apartheid racial classification was shot through contradiction, uncertainties, irrationalities, and lapse of control” (Posel, 2001a). Seekings (2008) highlights that “The system of racial classification was endured through the normalization of race”. Where the white supremacist foundation created a racialized society in South Africa. To understand apartheid as legalizing these racial categories, we will need to look at the configuration of racial classification after 1948. Posel (2001a) highpoint two stages up until now regarding the conception of racial categories. I will select the important points that will direct clear knowledge around their formation. This racial classification dates back to the twentieth century. According to Posel (2001a), “Racial categories were used by Transvaal and Orange free state and Cape and natal”. There were only two recognized races, coloreds and blacks, under the same category and whites. What is critical to know is these racial categories had no definition at all. These categories lacked definition because where attempts were produced, it resulted in what Posel calls ‘excelled in vagueness’ (Posel, 2001a).

There were no specific criteria used to define these races. It was only through the process of the Union in 1910 that a number of laws with advanced segregation proliferated. In as much as these laws were created, this increased ambiguities and inconsistencies surrounding the definition of race. There was no constitutional definition of racial categories. The difficult task was to pave a stable category that would separate mixed races and non-whites race from whites. For example, there was no specific definition of the category of natives. As a result, these decisions were left to the courts to decide on their own. Without notice, these created further confusion around the justified definition of the term. The decisions taken by courts were not consistent. As Posel (2001a)

¹⁸ Seekings note that South Africans continue to inhabit social worlds that are largely defined by race, and many express negative views of other racial groups (Seekings, 2008, p .16).

explains, “Race was at least accepted as a matter of history from this standpoint”. Although when the department of native affairs promoted the rules of thumbs test, there was no reference to the issue of descent. These also created problems in responding to these sorts of puzzles. Department of native affairs declared racial categories as not a fixed, stable category.

This only meant that racial categories were situational judgments drawing on multiple pieces of evidence. As these inconsistencies intensified, many South Africans were racialized. The ontology of race was only perceived through how one looked through the notion of blood. This was referred to as full blood, pure blood, and mixed blood. While reading through how one looked meant, they were closely linked to their social standing in society. The biological means of living were associated with the means of living. Posel (2001a) affirms that this “Sort of racial categorization was always hierarchical”. This meant:

“Epistemology of race, as for the most part a matter of common sense, seeped into the discretionary spaces created by the loose-ness of the bureaucratic guidelines for racial classification. The Department of Native Affairs provided no instructions on how to measure so-called appearance, repute, or modes of association or how to weigh their relative significance, which meant that the officials concerned had to decide largely for themselves” (Posel, 2001a, p.10).

Posel (2001a) also mentions that “The idea of racial classification as a large naming project turned everyone into an expert on the subject of race”. There was no consensus on the subject of race. Some officials declared they could distinguish coloreds by their cheekbones. The motivations of this were dipped into a potpourri of eugenicist myths. In short, before 1948, it advanced the interests in the subject matter of race. Many approaches to justify race were largely opposed. However, laws were continually made to enforce racial classifications.

Patrick Mulan (1921) proposed creating a national population registration to allocate a fixed racial identity. While his idea was stillborn, in 1935, it was revisited, but due to avoidance of unnecessary cost, the incoherent definition was still adopted. In 1950 the National party was elected to power, escalating the race classification situation. The National party sought to create an orderly and rigid racial classification system by implementing the 1950 population registration act. The only change that was made was to create a new legal system of classification swiftly, as this system was

supposed to create a fixed definition of race. It instead instituted what was called ‘jackal-proof fencing’ between races (Posel, 2001a).

For these purposes, the version of race was written into the population registration act. The mixture of race was considered evil, and protagonists of racial purity argued race should be defined strictly by biological criteria. However, “The architects of apartheid saw it as a waste of money and time for the introduction of scientific precision to the definition of race” (Posel, 2001a). This was going to disturb the political agenda of the time. Verwoerd took it that there were no purely biological determinants of race. Verwoerd further states, “The difference between blacks and whites should be taken as socially rather than biological” (Posel, 2001a). The Interior Minister also argued that “Racial classification was a judgment of a person’s social status” (Posel, 2001a). Motivating this act, it was argued person’s appearance or social associations was a deciding factor in classification. But the emphasis was put on two: appearance and social acceptance. Population registration was then implemented. It recognized four racial groups, whites, blacks, Indians, and coloreds.

Moreover, under this categorization, a person’s future would be vindicated by how he is classified. In 1951 the national population census was put into place. This census¹⁹ became the classifier of races. Yvonne Erasmus and George Ellison (2008), in their paper, *what can we learn about the meaning of race from the classification of population groups during apartheid?* says, “The finding of race reflects the elusiveness of the concept of race and the difficulty of establishing criteria capable of measuring race consistently”. As Taylor (2003) argues, “Knowing race involves knowing how more than knowing that”. With apartheid, as soon as the attempts were made to explain the underlying rules involved, confusion, elusiveness, and ambiguity arose. Erasmus and Ellison explain:

“In this sense, the most important mechanism through which racial identities were socially negotiated and determined was through what Stone calls ‘review’, in which for any identity to ‘achieve significance’, it ‘must match the review of others’—very much as racial identity was subject to the test of social acceptance during apartheid, as applied by the Supreme Court and in everyday life” (2008, p.13).

Erasmus & Ellison further assert that:

¹⁹ Race was determined by census enumerators, who had no specific expertise and received no special training

“South Africa was defined by, and subject to, whatever everyone understood race to be. As such, racial identity was partly determined by whatever it was possible to ‘get away with’ when ‘performing’ an identity with sufficient proficiency to be accepted as such. These analyses, therefore, offer insight into what race might also mean elsewhere—simply a flexible, yet pragmatic and acceptable social classification of identity” (2008, p.15).

However, it is important to note that most people were against these racial categories, especially those who were seen as subordinates. In this context of apartheid anti-segregationist, political parties such as African National Congress (ANC) wanted to challenge this system of racial classification. There is one ideology that sought to challenge these racial categories. Rupert Taylor (2005) put into great analysis that around the formal establishment of what then was called Congress Alliance, the emphasis was on advancing racial cooperation, not inclusive membership but due to criticism that this understanding was close to apartheid. This ideology was then reformulated into broader analysis to reject racial categories and advance integration through challenging official racial categories. John Sharp (1998) sustains that “South Africans have long used the idea of non-racialism as a brave challenge to apartheid and racial categories”. This idea was supposed to transform South Africa from the conception of apartheid racial categories. Sharp (1998) states that “non-racialism came to communicate a profound, well-known obligation to destroy both the acts of politically sanctioned racial segregation and the arrangement of thoughts concerning race on these practices”. The idea was that it anticipated “An essential rebuilding of South African culture not simply to the formal annulment of politically sanctioned racial segregation laws and the closure of segregation in view of race, yet additionally to the annihilation of the conditions of long-haul imbalance and acquired impediment which made conceivable the creation, and proliferation, of a dream of a general public arranged along racial lines” (Sharp, 1998). Below, I want to assess the implications of non-racialism and whether non-racialism successfully challenged racial categories. If not, why?

4.2 Non-Racialism as an Ideology

I have delineated the conception of South African racial categories. Under the influence of the ANC, the anti-apartheid movement called for and made non-racialism the official ideology of South Africa. This section seeks to assess the implications of non-racialism as a challenge to apartheid’s racial categories (Sharp 1998). I evaluate what non-racialism is and what does it mean?

The non-racialism idea is one of the ethical values found in the South African bill of rights and constitution. South Africa's "Democratic constitution identifies non-racialism as a founding value which for most South African scholars raises a serious question" (MacDonald, 2006). Michael MacDonald (2006) indicates, "As the term implies, non-racialism derives much of its meaning from what is not, from what it negates". MacDonald firstly distinguishes that non-racialism has two contextual meanings. Firstly, "Americans use it much as racism to denote racially motivated bigotry, inequality, and oppression" (MacDonald, 2006). The second meaning is used by South Africans, which is not necessarily coterminous with racism. Racialism in South African understanding simulates race as a defining human attribute, a central axis of human society and political organization. Racialism may mean either racism or racially organized political participation in this sense. MacDonald relies on Neville Alexander (1989) to fully flesh out the meaning of non-racialism. By Alexander's definition, the most radical form of non-racialism begins by challenging the existence of race altogether and ends by demonstrating the existence of races socially and politically. It argues that "Races are an illusion and cannot be real" (Alexander, 1989). Apartheid was racist and racialist project; it was systematically racist and racialist in defining political participation racially. MacDonald (2006) says this "Is why 'non' in non-racialism may reject racist domination and racialist political organization or racist domination". Therefore, this term as an ideal consisted of three objectives: overcoming racism, eradicating official racialism, and propounding universal citizenship. Posel (2010) states that "non-racialism was an encompassing ideology to anti-realism". Joleen Steyn Kotze (2012) also undercuts that "non-racialism is understood as an ideological doctrine that does not recognize race". Kotze (2012) highlights that "non-racialism seeks to create non-racial citizens within a harmoniously integrated social setting". Kotze (2012) says, "The doctrine of non-racialism would have proved ideologically valuable in that the notion of race would become void". Posel (2010) further states that "To look at this term, we have to interpret how this term was used".

Ahmed Kathrada, one of the apartheid activists arrested alongside the iconic figure of anti-apartheid Nelson Mandela, says, "This term had long withstanding practice within the ANC" (N.D). There were two dimensions of that practice: normative and strategic dimension. The strategic one entailed a mode of discipline to promote organizational cohesion. And normatively, it was being together in the midst of a race. This idea was held during a transition from apartheid to new democratic South Africa. The strategic dimension meant a substantial commitment to being

together that was a solution to the highly racially politicized system. The normative embraced the notion of being a human in relation to other beings. In Posel's investigation, this binary dimension wanted to welcome a new human method without the need for a system of race. MacDonald (2006) traces how this ideology was used within the ANC. The ANC spoke of an inclusive and embracing national identity. ANC dissociated culture from race. Here, MacDonald notes Albert Luthuli's words that in trying to build a new homogeneous democratic South Africa, where color and race should not come into the scene. The origin of a nation then situates Nelson Mandela and Liver Tambo's understanding that a nation envisioned a common political construct formed through common citizenship, which is a non-racial nation. In this sense, ANC was struggling to form one people, to be represented in one particular parliament in one country. ANC was seeking to forge one nation-building a non-racial democracy in a unitary state.

However, in this transaction, Posel (2010) argues, "There was no point where there was any philosophical imagination or aspiration to a version of non-racialism where the language of race could not be used, rather than asserting the metaphors of new South Africa, rainbow nation, and unity diversity". Posel (2010) further adds that "The meaning of non-racialism that was used in the transition to democracy was not post-racial". This was not a utopian project where it imagined a future with no race. It was not a utopian project that would leave the idea of race in the past as a source of brutality that innocent people faced. This utopian project was going to welcome a new South Africa outside the subject of race. Kotze (2013) explains that "From the exclusionary apartheid history South Africa needed to effectively break itself from the constructed citizenship based on race and ensure equal socio-economic benefits to all South Africans". In response to apartheid, constructed identities from racial categories had to do away with race consciousness as a relic of the apartheid regime to divide-and-rule strategy. Kevin Whitehead (2011) believes, "The failure of this adoption is because the term lacked content and sometimes had ambiguous and contradictory meanings". This resulted in a lack of clarity with respect to the implications of non-racialism in the status of racial categories, and there was confusion about the practical meaning of non-racialism.

Gerhard Mare (2003) takes Rusty Bernstein's assertions in his autobiography, that "This confusion was there even if the Freedom Charter was written with a positive intention to introduce new ideas as the foundation of new South Africa". It was never properly discussed before being accepted at

the Congress of the People in Kliptown. David Everett (2012) clearly underlines “The disruption that resulted in this ambiguity in the face of adopting non-racialism in South Africa”. Non-racialism emerged in opposition to racial categories and apartheid. During the 1950s and 1960s, there was some divergence between ANC and South African Communist Party (SACP). As the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM) rose and strengthened, it criticized the non-racial approach to abandoning racial categories. The party grew to encourage race consciousness among oppressed South Africans. The emergence of Black Consciousness (BC) as a major force in Black politics resembled the same demands as those of the ANC. But with, its general analysis of and redress for racism was different. In this regard, MacDonald (2006) says, “As apartheid prescribed racially distinct political organizations and identities, insisting people must be associated with their own kind, Stevo Biko as the leader of BC seemed to agree blacks must avoid political associations with whites”. The blacks begin to see the need to rally around the common cause of their suffering (their black skin). On these grounds, Biko rejected what passed for ‘non-racial’ politics in South Africa. MacDonald (2006) emphasizes, “It does not mean Biko rejected non-racial politics in principle”. But he rejected or objected to ‘non-racialism’ for producing predictable and pernicious outcomes in practice. This left open whether non-racialism was a good or bad principle. Biko entirely was arguing that non-racial politics is an illusion.

MacDonald (2006) mentions that the ANC absorbed “BC activists in the aftermath of Soweto rebellion, BC had ideas, but ANC had organization”. The ANC incorporated BC into it. Everett (2012) says later, “The term was used interchangeably with multiracial, non-discrimination, and anti-racism”. MacDonald (2006) further makes a clear point that “New definition of non-racialism had superseded old ones not because they were intrinsically superior and not because they had offer sharper insight into the essence of non-racialism but because they spoke more usefully to the needs of the moment”. What Everett (2012) continues to explain, she says, “When this term was used interchangeably, there was no clear definition of what it means, and when Freedom Charter was drafted, there was no philosophical analysis to employ the authentic nature of this ideology as hoped for”. Everett (2012) states that “The term and pragmatic transition should have been accompanied by the leaving behind of racist projects”. Whitehead (2010) suggests that “non-racialism despite its commitment, it took a varied and sometimes ambiguous and contradictory meanings, which may have clouded understanding of its practical application for ordinary citizens”. Despite these differing approaches, Everett (2012) says “The literature suggests a

relative consensus about the meaning of non-racialism within the liberation movement: it meant opposition and active work to deconstruct the apartheid system and completely do away with racial categorization”. These different terms of non-racialism are now often used interchangeably with multiracial and interracial. However, the failure of its adoption still haunts us. In 2004 the minister of Sport, Makhenkesi Stofile, and Mosiuoa Lekota put the question of non-racialism of nationally importance. In their words, they assert:

“When will we cease to be Africans, Coloureds, Indians and so on and simply be Africans? This question of representivity, at some point we need to look at this and say there are no Indians here, Indians live in India and these people called colored are probably more South African than anyone” (Stofile and Lekota, quoted in Alexander, 2006).

Lately, Mare, Kathryn Pillay, and Kira Erwin (2019) elaborate more on this content of non-racialism in South Africa by emphasizing what non-racialism or should mean is a question worth pursuing. These scholars are more interested in the idea of non-racialism as a utopian future. They agree with Posel (2015) that “non-racialism during the struggle against apartheid was a fundamentally more pragmatic reality in engagement with realities of the presence and as a tool of transitioning South African away from fragile national collectiveness”. However, they are less convinced with Posel that this was not a Utopian project looking forward where race would be erased. In response they say “non-racialism did encompass a future-orientated framework with a desire where race would no longer determine life chances or essentialize our beings” (Mare, Pillay and Erwin, 2019). In their thoughts, “Future imagining can be useful as to escape the confines of present paradigms and ways that imagine other ways of being” (Mare, Pillay, and Erwin, 2019). Secondly, it can be a mechanism through which we confront the challenges that stand in the way of achieving a non-racial society. Thirdly, “Future thinking can make us think about how and why race remains so obvious with other systems of oppression like gender” (Mare, Pillay, and Erwin, 2019). They cite Rick Turner as their reference: “Utopian thinking could be more than exercise in fantasy if used to recognize and confront the obstacles to the imagined utopia” (Mare, Pillay and Erwin, 2019).

There is a consensus amongst many South African scholars, activists, human rights advocates, and citizens that South Africa should become a non-racial society. At the crux of the challenge of how to define and realize a non-racial society is the democratic government’s continued use of apartheid

race categories, specifically for purposes of redress and affirmative action. This post-national citizenship position has caused division among South African scholars like Jon Soske (2015), Fiona Anciano (2016), Kevin Durrheim (2017), Itumeleng Meko (2019), and Greg Ruiters (2021). The attention of this debate is given to the question of the attainment of such a society. The debate seems to be gaining momentum on whether South Africa will ever be a non-racial state or not. The nature of this debate is not my interest in this section. But my interest was to outlook the ideology of non-racialism in South Africa as a challenge to apartheid racial categories because, as argued by Posel, the lack of adoption of this ideology has made South African society be framed with another version of non-racialism. Many races continue to be excluded from socio-economic benefits. Kotze points out that “For almost three decades, one still finds fragmented citizenship dictated by the notion of apartheid racial categories” (2013). According to Kotze (2013), “Citizenship should include basic assessment into health, lifestyle, education, job opportunities, and economic freedom”. Blacks do not possess all the citizenship benefits of being South Africans because of the current problems related to excluding black people. Revisiting apartheid racial categories and replacing them with new indicators seems to be the active discussion among South African race researchers for reaching this utopian non-racial society.

4.3 Revisiting Apartheid Racial Categories

Dee Smythe (2012) fairly admits that Posel’s work, *What’s in a name? Racial categorization under apartheid and their afterlife* (2001) “Provokes us to think about the social and material ubiquity of race in understanding its post-apartheid persistence”. In this paper, Posel poses a serious question about race in South Africa. What triggers Posel is the various questions about the issue of racial classification in South Africa. Posel asks:

“If apartheid’s racial categories were previously the locus of racial privilege and discrimination, these very same racial designations are now the site of redress – for, how else can the damage be undone, and equitable treatment established? Yet, what are the consequences of these reiterations? Can we continue to construct our social realities in racial terms – in particular, drawing on apartheid’s very own catalogue of race – in ways that transcend the ideological burdens of the past? What are the grammars of racial?” (2001, p.4)

Posel (2001b) says from, “Apartheid population registration act produced techniques of thoroughgoing racialization”. The constructs of race imagined its imprints in an elastic matrix of biological and social factors, which were enabled by apartheid social geography and economic structure. The links of these orders remain in place as there are racial categories. The majority of the black population is still impoverished and economically excluded. The majority of white are still confined within apartheid borders of thoughts and experience. What seems to be a problem is that the conception of racial categories retains the ways that continue to reinforce apartheid modes of reasoning and separateness. What Posel (2001b) wants to point out is the fact that “Race has now become the site of redress”. But the variant of this transformation is now legal requirements as well as social and political pressures to restate old racial categories. What becomes important for Posel (2001b) once again asks: “Are the questions that have remained in the shadow in political debates. These questions include: how do you post to determine who is African, colored white, and Indian? What are the criteria for racial classifications? Who is the authority of categorizing vested? On what basis will claims of knowledge about race be issued and defended? What are the consequences of these exercises for the pursuit of non-racialism?” (Posel, 2001b). With these questions, Posel calls for further research to be needed into the epistemologies and ontologies of racial naming in a range of contemporary settings in this country. Posel concludes this suggestion with a few pointers. What she mentions is “The effect of these changes is to destabilize the lynchpin of old bio-culturalists conception of race” (Posel, 2001b). Other authors like Adam Habib and Kristina Bentley (2008) have re-evaluated the impact of regress and affirmative actions. Firstly, they point out that “Two enduring legacies characterize the racial division in our country” (Habib, Bentley, 2008). The permanence of apartheid-constructed socio-political identities and the socio-economic concentration of poverty among the black population because of apartheid projects. Secondly, they argue for three consequences of redress as it is currently being implemented: “It advantages the more privileged sections of historically disadvantaged communities, it has compromised service delivery, and it has the unintended consequence of heightening racial consciousness” (Habib, Bentley, 2008). As a remedy, they propose that the relative emphasis on race and class be switched to a ‘nuanced class defined redress program, supplemented by race-based initiatives. Kevin Durrheim says, “They are careful to distance this ‘progressive’ refocus on economic marginalization from the more ‘subversive’ arguments against

racial redress of the official opposition, which deflect attention away from the implementation of affirmative action” (2009, p.3).

This debate has invited other South African writers to propose different resolutions with racial classifications. Erasmus (2010) argues for what she calls a critical race standpoint²⁰. In her argument, she raises a standpoint that troubles the taken-for-granted idea that apartheid racial categories remain administratively and analytically necessary. Erasmus presents the idea to conceive race as socially constructed is to allow thought and political practice toward its eventual demise methodically. This implies that moving away from race as an analytical category towards analyzing the changing, often obfuscated, use of race and use of apartheid racial categories for administrative policies. Erasmus (2010) says, “This implies doing the scientific work to devise and test new indicators that eventually replace these theoretical administrative categories”. Erasmus (2010) calls for a need for “Conceptual conception of race in order to name racialized inequalities that continue to thrive behind apartheid race categories and so differences access to various forms of wealth and well-being. And eventually to undermine race”. Erasmus’s (2010) upshot argument is that “We do not need race as an administrative category in order to enable redress that is socially just. Crudely, Erasmus says we should seek to challenge notions of race not simply because of the ways the impositions of race ‘strait-jackets’ or restricts identities but also because of the ways it inevitably privileges some at the expense of others”. Erwin (2012) becomes interested in a similar question and descriptive remark by Erasmus where she calls for a standpoint that troubles the taken for a granted idea that “Apartheid race categories remain administratively and analytically necessary and urges us to pay attention to the possible consequences of the continued bureaucratization of apartheid race categories”. Erwin (2012) says, “The form of taxonomy continues to say about our sense of self”. Racial categories provide “Social and cultural capital, which nurtures privilege, entrenches poverty, and reproduces ideas around racial difference” (Erwin, 2012). What shapes South Africa today is racial categories that are still present. The fuzzy ontology of race is still normalized through classification rituals in countless performances of everyday life. What is stressing about “Racial categories in South Africa is that our race language is overpopulated with apartheid meaning, making it difficult to speak about race without reproducing these meanings” (Wale, 2010). What becomes of this is that “If people talk about race

²⁰ Critical race standpoint stresses the importance of analyzing race and race thinking for addressing economic, political and social inequalities and injustices that race conceals.

as an issue, they risk being labeled racist, reinforcing race barriers within these races” (Wale, 2010). Erwin offers a critical examination of the uses of race in academic research practice and of the research challenges posed by racialized lived realities. She suggests a vigilantly reflexive research practice. Erwin (2012) proposes engineering “Social spaces for the emergence of cosmopolitan identities”. Erwin (2012) relies on Goldberg's phrase ‘emperor clothes’ that refers to a way the state has neglected to attend reaching for non-racial state. Erwin (2012) says, “non-racialism is much-punted term in various documents and state rhetoric and there has been little dedication to publicly tackling meaning behind it”. What then she says is needed is “A political agenda that debunks essentialist thinking about individuals and collectives and reflects on how policies impact on existing heterogeneous spaces, creating or stifling cosmopolitan dialogues” (Erwin, 2012). And that is where research comes in. Erasmus says, “Erwin’s work resonates Norman Duncan’s call for greater engagement with elements of common-sense understanding of race in South Africa, and with Garth Stevens call for examination of the conditions that un-doing meanings of race either difficult or impossible” (2012). Taylor (2012) in response to the continuation use of racial categories, he says “The answer lies in changing our angle of vision to recognize that apartheid should be understood as a particularly pernicious form of systematic racism that is not a thing of the past”. And such racism is deeper than most South Africans think. This is because apartheid constituted the most racist of racism. Smythe (2012) thinks “The most critical concerns with race and law should look beyond the courts in order to understand the institutional²¹ persistence of race”. For Smythe (2012) race in South Africa “Remains deeply institutionalized”.

We need to think more about ways in which our institutions are infused with race thinking, what Smythe (2012) suggests in her analysis, “We cannot talk about apartheid grand project of race classification without talking about its sub-classification project”. Smythe (2012) then view “Apartheid sub-classifications as a way we really see its institutional persistence”. What Smythe wants to alert us about is that we have ignored our focus on sub-classification within each race

²¹ Rupert views another similar way in which race is still an issue in South Africa. In his thoughts no one has successfully sought to unpack the implication of structural racism. And it is not difficult to notice this racism in South Africa today. He further says, “It is no coincidence that white South Africans own most land, receive most capital income, live in a safe and quiet neighborhood, go to the top schools and best universities, and get the most high-paid jobs” (Taylor 2012). This is due to structural racism, which will be seen in terms of racial group differences with regard to wealth, income, and education. The “Residential location are all systematically interlinked through structural racism.”

group. For example, she mentions, “The 1951 Bantu Authorities Act (BAA) which took the classificatory experiment to even more absurd levels” (Smythe, 2012). The aim of this act was to create fixed tribal identities premised on race and tied into a defined territorial land mass. In her view, the aspects of the Black Authorities of 1951 were repealed because it was a cornerstone of apartheid by means by which Black people were controlled and dehumanized and is reminiscent of past division and discrimination. But now, these laws are renewed through new laws like Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act (TLGFA). What these laws does is to deem their area of jurisdiction to be those established by BAA. What is ironic for Smythe (2012), is that the BAA provided for the possibility of detribalized black to be administered under a community authority while the TLGFA does away with this. What it means now is you cannot be black in a former homeland without also having a tribal identity, that makes it dehumanizing. By Harry Garuba (2012) asserts, “There are broad question that must be asked thinking through the question of apartheid race categories and transcending their continuities” (2012, p.173). Many have said that these classifications are racist, but it is not clear that without all of the material, institutional, and discursive conditions that produce racialization, racists attitude are perpetuated. He says, “If racialization were simply a question of the names we use, then changing names will be sufficient to make it go away” (Garuba, 2012). But playing the gaming of language alone without changing the material and discursive conditions of their productions will not do. What Garuba suggests is that as we lodge to find indicators, they must be discursively loaded. Garuba (2012) furthers more on the issue that “Apartheid did not create categories; therefore, we need to consider historical instantiation of race to do away with it”. He references Frantz Fanon “The fact of blackness” to cement the point that doing away with race must involve a way in which we see the world. Thinking beyond race categories needs to begin with this recognition. His ultimate point is that “Once within the public sphere, there is government intervention in the lives and circumstances of the poor and question that would normally ask the world” (Garuba, 2012). It is clear that the law will assume to produce a template of life. In this manner, once the state provides the template by decreeing race out of official circulation, de-racialization of subjects will follow. But in light of the global scale, he thinks, “This will be difficult, but we have to keep imagining another better indicator for a better world”. (Posel, 2001b). Zannie Bock & Sally Hunt (2015) extend these views by indicating that “Race continues to be an underlying motif and Racializing discourses structured by old apartheid hierarchies and stereotyping also permeate the talk of

participants who self-identify as black and colored” (Bock, Hunt, 2015). Despite the dismantling of apartheid, race continues to have profound effects on people’s lives. Our society remains or continues to be severely racialized socially, economically, and politically. The racial system, racial classification, and practices remain deeply racialized. There is still deep inequality in terms of distribution of income, job opportunities, etc. The apartheid entrenched racialized identities and fostered racial division simultaneously as exacerbating inequality in income distribution. South Africa “Still faces the challenges of tackling these social engineering legacies” (Seekings, 2008). Posel (2015) articulates that “Racial categories play themselves on politics”. Posel (2015) alludes on an analysis that when “Julius Malema was expelled from African National Congress Youth League (ANCYL), Malema drove a politics of black conspicuous consumption as a racial retort to repertoires of white supremacy that conferred material affluence as a badge of white superiority thereby reproducing the very categories of racial privilege as the basis of their alleged rebuttal”. What Posel wants to reveal in this paper is that when Malema launched his political party Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), he set out to mobilize the poor, largely on overtly racial lines. On a different set of view, Posel wants to emphasize her point that under these conditions, the project of non-racialism seems fragile. And calls for urgent research on ways to attain a non-racial society in South Africa. Recently, Bock and Christopher Stroud (2018) have referred to the continuities of these racial challenges as what they call “Zombie landscape”. They refer to such “Constellations of place and subjectivities as a 'zombie landscape' in the sense that the 'undead' and highly racialized ways of speaking about space and place endure haunting the present” (Bock, Stroud, 2018).

4.4 Are Racial Categories Warranted?

Race scholars' underlying assumptions and goals in South Africa are that the continued use of racial classifications is racist. It compels people to racially classify themselves and others and therefore perpetuates racial thinking. Lastly, it reproduces racialized subjects and society. As a result, that undermines the goal of creating a non-racial society and non-racial subjects. In this chapter, I seek to analyze the framework of racial categories and make my case that racial categories are not warranted. I am more interested in how ordinary people in South Africa conceive of racial classifications. I want to argue that racial classification does not give us a fruitful way or facts of understanding race.

There has always been an issue about the relationship between race and biology. This relation is what Paul Gilroy calls 'bio-culturalist.' South Africans believe "Both cultural and biological markers provide evidence for mutually cause and effect of the character of others" (Gilroy, 2009). Bundy says, "Race in South Africa is a lively experience" (2014). Wade argues that "Race as a lively experience in South Africans connotate race as a biological barrier between racial groups" (2014). As seen with Posel, the constructs of race have imagined its imprints in an elastic matrix of biological and social factors (2015). Instigating apartheid racial categories, Verwoerd took it that there were no purely biological determinants of race. He said that "Blacks and white's differences should be considered socially rather than biological" (Posel, 2000). After numerous attempts to prove the biological justification of race, apartheid developers were unsuccessful. Thinkers like Gilroy (2009) assume from this position that "The biological racial thinking people have on race, is mistaken".

This points us to a resolution in which we should understand our racial categories as merely apartheid project which became acceptable. Posel (2001a) understands "Racial categories as an arbitrary decision based on social standing and 'acceptance' into the broader community than genetic inheritance" (2000). Where this intensity fixed one's position within a racial hierarchy, firmly associating whiteness with power, privilege, opportunity, and blackness with dispossession, poverty, and lack of advancement. These racial categories were accepted as correct and justified by the apartheid government. Despite the social acceptance of racial categories in South Africa, there is what Chalmes defines as "Ontological and assertional correctness" (2009, p.33). The correctness and incorrectness depend on the world's state, not what a speaker finds acceptable. To understand this, Chalmes (2009) makes an example of a conversational illusion where participants are engaged in a particular conversation. One speaker may say there are three glasses on the table wherein there are no glasses. Chalmes (2009) then says, "Accepting that there are three glasses while there are no glasses does not amount to correctness". What Chalmes discusses here is that if there is no evidence about the existence of a particular entity or objects, no matter how we can, on our own terms, bring it to existence through our acceptance, it does not make that thing correct. He further says, "Ordinary existence assertion is constitutively connected with our commitment to commonsense ontology" (Chalmes, 2009). What is being mentioned here is that our ordinary

assertion is connected to the commonsense ontology of something. What we ordinary talk about (race talking) is connected to the commonsense understanding of the ontology of something.

There is a way I understand this, which I hope will be persuasive. According to Posel (2001a), “The formation of racial categories had no biological basis, as apartheid officials said to have come up with uncontroversial test proof for biological racial difference; however, the attempts failed”. Secondly, as Posel states, “Racial categories were arbitrary decisions based on social ‘acceptance’ into the broader community” (2001a, p.10). Race was made real based on an objective decision taken by subjective apartheid officials wherein evidence points the attempts to justify these categories were absent, null, incoherent, and unjustified. Stone weighs that apartheid racial categories formulated through what he calls ‘review’ that your identity must match up to what apartheid officials found socially ‘acceptable’. Erasmus confirms this “South Africa was defined and subject to what everyone understood race to be”. As a result, racial categories were ‘accepted’ as correct despite the lack of justification for racial division. In this case, racial categories were made real and socially accepted out of nowhere. When the “Population registration act was once put into play, it was said to have fixed the vague definition of race and provided a correct definition” (Posel, 2001). Later, “It is an indication that this was done through exploitation, white supremacy, and excluding other races from economic benefits” (Erasmus, 2000). This gives two impressions: racial categories emanating from incorrect evil specific historically ground and made real despite lack of sound biological evidence. They are not justified if they emanate from a specific historical period, that is, apartheid. One good direction for this claim is in former apartheid president F.W De Klerk's last message to South Africa. He professes,²² “The first issue I want to focus on is apartheid; I am still often accused continued to justify apartheid or separate development as we later prefer to call it. It is true that in my younger years, I defended separate development. I never liked the word apartheid” (News24, 2021, 00:01:14-00:07:14). He further states, “I realized that apartheid was wrong. I realized we have arrived at a place which was morally unjustifiable.” (News24, 2021,00:05:10). This is, however, not new; many apartheid cabinet ministers have made constant references to the need to close the book of the past and acknowledge that past acts of separation were morally wrong and unjustifiable. We can refer to De Klerk's ‘Apology for Apartheid’ in 1992. There is one way to understand this as national party politicians

²² The video can be watched on YouTube (see <https://youtu.be/QwL2NpgvKf8>) (accessed 11 November 11, 2021).

are concerned is that the apartheid was repudiated because it was a grand experiment that failed. My mention of De Klerk is to offer support for my claim that South African racial categories take foundation from the specific historical ground that is populated by apartheid racial discourse. And present racial categories fall under the dark, suppressive, and unfair specific historical grounds. As De Klerk and other national party members later regarded separate development or racial categories as unjustified, this reasserts the point made by Anthony Christopher (2002) that “Race classification was used for political purposes, to discriminate negatively. Where the state undertook the process for its own purposes” . Those racial categories were used not as means to racial order but through racial oppression, which is not justified. The way we perceive race in terms of racial categories in South Africa is not real but an illusion. Erwin has highlighted that the fuzzy ontology of race is still normalized through classification rituals in countless performances of everyday life. What is stressing about racial categories in South Africa is that our race language is overpopulated with apartheid meaning, making it difficult to speak about race without reproducing these meanings. While it may be the case that South Africans talk about real races when they perceive racial categories in South Africa, our racial categories that are supposed to tell us about race are not warranted and not real. What may be the case in terms of racial discourse is mentioned by Everett (2012) and Alexander (2013); it is important to remember that even though they are constructed, social identities have a primordial dimension for most individuals precisely because they are not aware of the historical, social, and political ways in which their identities have been constructed, and they seem to have a primordial validity for most individuals. What is needed “Is the inner transformation that is needed to fix issues about racial identities is through reflective social analysis in which society is taken apart to reveal that race is a social construction that does not exist” (Taylor, 2015). Suppose racial categories do not have an underlying biological basis and were incorrect apartheid projects. Are we justified in believing in them and recognizing them as something that genuinely tells us facts about race in South Africa and provides the explanatory framework of how we are categorized? I argue that our apartheid racial categories are not warranted, and they do not provide us with a range of facts that give us potential explanatory power to discuss how we are classified.

It might be objected that racial categories are useful for governmental regress policies such as affirmative actions in South Africa. There is no merit in qualifying them as unwarranted in our society. The objection points out that the government uses these racial categories for regress

policies like affirmative action. For example, Phila Msimang (2018) argues why racial classifications should be retained in South Africa. Msimang posits that:

“The elimination of racial concepts in policy, monitoring and evaluation, official statistics, and so on, amounts to a decision to disregard relevant social or demographic phenomena which are captured through the use of racial classificatory tools” (2018, p.7).

The continued use of apartheid race categories is specifically for purposes of redress and affirmative action. It can be held that these racial categories work with national policies like Employment Equity (EE). EE is a national policy that relies on racial categories towards workplaces for regress. These policies guarantee fair discrimination in the workplace to Africans, Coloureds, Indians, women, and people with disabilities are equitably represented at all occupational levels. In the following chapter, I will adequately and rigorously answer this objection if apartheid racial categories are not warranted and race is not real, but the government uses them for regress policies; what would then be the concept of race in South Africa? What we would do with racial categories and racial thinking and talking in South Africa is what I attend in the next chapter. I argue this in the next chapter because it is urgent referring to the normative question of race.

4.5 Conclusion

In conclusion, this chapter's objective was to examine the status of racial classifications and argue that racial categories are not warranted. The first section sought to get to the epistemological foundations of South Africa's racial categories. According to Posel (2001) coming up with a definition of racial categories, no specific criteria were used to define races. The difficult task was to pave a stable category that would separate mixed races and non-whites from whites. Posel defined how race as common sense seeped into the discretionary spaces created by the loose-ness of the bureaucratic guidelines for racial classification. The idea of racial classification as a large naming project turned everyone into an expert on the subject of race. Erasmus and Ellison (2008) emphasized that the finding of race reflects the elusiveness of the concept of race and the difficulty of establishing criteria capable of measuring race consistently. South Africa was defined by, and subject to, whatever everyone understood race to be. As such, racial identity was partly determined by whatever it was possible to 'get away with' when 'performing' an identity with sufficient proficiency to be accepted as such. Sharp (1998) and Sharp (2005) said there is one ideology that

sought to challenge these racial categories. MacDonald (2006) defined this ideology as a radical form that challenged racial categories through challenging the existence of race. This term as an ideal consisted of three objectives: overcoming racism, eradicating official racialism, and propounding universal citizenship. In this transaction, Posel argues there was no point where there was any philosophical imagination or aspiration to a version of non-racialism where the language of race could not be used. Whitehead (2011) believed this failed because the term lacked content. Everett's (2012) lenses looked at how the emergence of BCM challenged non-racial politics. The failure of this adoption resulted in what Posel calls a new version of non-racialism that shape South Africa today. In which we must ask if apartheid's racial categories were previously the locus of racial privilege and discrimination, these very same racial designations are now the site of redress. How else can the damage be undone, and equitable treatment established? Habib and Bentley discussed the effects of redress in the status of racial categories. Where scholars like Erasmus (2010), Erwin (2012), Smythe (2012), Posel (2015), and Bock and Stroud (2018) argued for new pointers for eradicating racial categories and discussing the impact of retaining them if we do not look for new pointers to replace them. My argument followed this. I argued that the absence of biological evidence for these racial categories makes us understand them as merely apartheid projects which became acceptable. This acceptance is not morally justifiable and correct because accepting the racial divergence on our terms does not make it correct. I continued to show that race classification was used for political purposes, to discriminate negatively. They fall under a specific historical ground, and we are not warranted in using them. Nevertheless, one would argue that it is wrong to say we are not warranted in using this classification because the government uses racial categories for regress policies since this objection reflects the normative question about what we should do with racial concepts or racial categories. I extend this discussion in the next chapter.

Chapter 5: Normative Considerations

5. Introduction

This research project began with Appiah's analysis of Du Bois's definition of race, which gives birth to two philosophical questions: What is race, and what should we do with the concept of race. One of the most pressing questions about race is the normative question of whether race should be eliminated from or conserved in public discourse and practice (Glasgow, 2009). This normative question is often answered in part by appealing to the ontological status of race. In chapter four, I have appealed to the ontological status of racial categories that give us the ontology of race, and I argued racial categories are not warranted and race is not real (illusion). What arises is the normative question of what we should do with the concept of race and racial categories in the status of moral policies like affirmative action and EE.

In answering what we should do with racial categories, this chapter will be folded into a sequence of three sections. Section one will illustrate two contending positions, namely eliminativism and conservatism. Section two will discuss three anti-realist conservative positions. In chapter four, I have argued that the South African idea of what is race is an illusion because racial categories are not warranted. This section will present three conservative positions for anti-realists. Finally, section three will illustrate which position is well-matched and sound for South Africa when answering the second objection that I promised to answer in chapter four.

5.1 Semantic Policies: Conservatism and Eliminativism

The question of whether we should conserve or eliminate race is tied between two theorizing camps: eliminativism and conservatism (Mallon, 2006). According to Mallon (2006), "Eliminativists argue that we reject the view that races might be reproductively isolated human groups because they are skeptical that there are contemporary groups that have the requisite reproductive isolation". Eliminativists (2006) suggest that many "Biologists and anthropologists are skeptical of the concept of race as a useful scientific tool because no racial population, past or present, has ever been completely isolated from other races in terms of breeding" (Mallon, 2006). This means that races as reproductively isolated groups do not match our societies' scientific reproductive human isolation. Eliminativists (2006) argue that "If there is no biological basis of race, the race concept should be rejected". Conservativisms want to preserve race, and eliminativists wish to eradicate the concept of race. From Appiah (1985), "Anti-realists had argued

that there is no evidence for biological realism of race and should be eliminated as it refers to nothing in the world". Appiah (1985) states that "We should reject race talk and work towards abandoning it because if race is either what has been hypnotized to be (biological) and does not refer to what ordinary people believe to be". It is recommended that we reject race because it refers to things that do not exist. Appiah's approach is twofold: the first is analytic and the second is normative. His theory of race borrows from philosophy of race, namely referential and the ideational in which he combines to arrive at the normative stance. Appiah (1985) ultimately says, "Racial categories and identities are fictitious and overburdened with historical and conceptual baggage that they ought to be jettisoned". However, in more recent work, Appiah has taken such a rethinking of his skeptical-eliminativist project. In his third 2016 BBC Reith Lecture, he said, "The forward domain towards racial domain is not as he used to think" (Appiah, 1985). We should not pretend as if racial identities are not there; that is to moderate them. Appiah (1985) says if "We move beyond racism; one can reasonably infer that racial identification is social practice". Appiah endorses racial identities as they play important roles in our lives and how we conceive them. Zack (2002) argues that he is "Interested in exposing the false biological foundation of ordinary and intellectual ideas of race". Zack (2002) questions, "If there is no biological race, why do liberal and even radical intellectuals want to retain the concept". Mutshidzi Maraganedzha (2015) summarizes the views held by eliminativists. The first view is academic eliminativism, which seeks to hold that there is nothing that race refers to. From the reference that there are no racial essences. The second view is political. The political version of the eliminativism issues that racial categories should be eliminated from all formal state policies, documents, and institutions. The third eliminativism is public. This view would say the notion and practices of race should not be recognized. The final racial eliminativism is global racial eliminativism, which eventually aims to eliminate race-thinking worldwide. In the case of South Africa, most scholars have argued against the retainment of racial categories (Posel, 2001, Erasmus, 2010, Hall, 2015, Mare, 2014).

In South Africa, there are two predominant ways in which academic South Africans use race. One "Sees race as nothing, this approach refers to a position of color-blindness" (Erasmus, 2012). This approach is dismissive of race, arguing that race as a biological concept is invalid, an illusion, and hence should be dropped completely. For the most part, "Those who subscribe to this approach insist that since the end of apartheid, race is no longer politically significant, and therefore any use or recognition of the concept is itself a racist practice harking back to apartheid" (Erasmus, 2012).

Proponents of this view argue that the concept should be abandoned in the interests of building a society in which race no longer matters (non-racialism). From this perspective, “It is futile to consider the ways in which ideas of race have shaped formal and commonsense thinking, institutionalized practices, as well as material and subjective realities in the present” (Erasmus, 2012, p.50). Most of these scholars on this position argue for non-racialism, and one strategy they have proposed realizing non-racialism is the idea of eliminativism. South African eliminativists propose the idea that apartheid racial categories in South Africa should not be realized (Benatar, 2010, Erasmus, 2012, Posel, 2015). These scholars argue that open ended use of “Apartheid racial categories as a way to achieve transformation is problematic and ultimately self-defeating because it perpetuates and institutionalizes apartheid group thinking and identity, as well as division” (Msimang 2018, p.50). In efforts to define and discern the correct progress towards non-racialism, Taylor and Foster (1999) have added that in realizing non-racialism, “The concept of race should be rejected as an independent determining force in world history”. And rather treat it as something socially constructed that does not exist. Alexander (in Suttner, p. 27) writes the word “Non-racial can be accepted by a racially oppressed people if it means that we reject the concept of race, that we deny that the existence of races and thus oppose of all actions, practices, beliefs, and policies based on the concept of race”. Erasmus (2010) contends “Apartheid race categories as they in favor of class or merit that would set back the few gains made towards regress”. Erasmus (2010) says, “The current government’s attempt to address past inequalities by making race a political matter amounts to nothing less than apartheid race classification in a new form”. Even though there are limits and problems with current government policy on redress, what it is important to question the continued use of apartheid categories in current policies. Erasmus adopts what she calls a ‘critical race standpoint’ to eliminate racial categories. The critical race standpoint will need the analytical conception to name racialized inequalities that leave behind racial categories and undermine the idea of race. She moreover furthers his position by what she calls the ‘radical form of love.’ Zinhle Manzini (2019) explores this love as a romantic notion that does not consider the everyday realities of race in South Africa. The question that we must ask ourselves is what is the purpose of this love that makes people feel good about themselves while not sufficient for racial justice. Jabulani Ncayiyana explains:

“Racial categories perpetuate and institutionalizes apartheid “group think” and identity and promotes division by linking benefit – or the withholding thereof – to membership of a group rather than to the disadvantage it seeks to redress” (2012, p.12).

Cachalia (2010) puts on an inquiry to displace and depoliticizing racial and ethnic identities. Bock (2017) entrenches that “The consequences of racial categories are that many people are required to view themselves in terms of the old apartheid categories”. Race is so pervasive in contemporary South Africa because it has been reinvigorated in the name of regress. Researchers should “Critique and destabilize this classification” (Bock, 2017). Same as David Benatar (2007) has argued that “Affirmative action perpetuates two fundamental errors of Apartheid: an insistence on classifying people by face and distributing some benefits”. By using race as a proxy (for disadvantage, which he likens to), a kind of racial profiling (Erasmus 2015, p.7).

Following a similar dialectical strategy, “Those who want to retain the racial discourse and practice have challenged this idea to reject the concept of race because the notion of race has a number of uses in our daily dealings as human beings” (Glasgow, 2009). We make reports that there is a clear difference amongst races. If we eliminate race, we cannot account for practices of racism that exist across the globe. Hanslanger confirms that the eliminativist views need to be rethought. Sundstrom states that:

“Wisps of human fancy or human creations they may be, but as social constructions, they are penetrating and inescapable in our individual and communal lives, and they are just as absolutely fundamental to our investigations of the social, political, and economic landscape. And frankly, to fight our fight, to end racism and ‘racial’ disparities in income, health, education, and so on, we need to be able to coherently talk about ‘race’. We need to point to it and discover what it is. The role plays in our lives” (2002, p. 20).

To Sundstrom (2002), “Racial concepts are essential in fighting against racism and inequality in our society”. This reveals that this can only be done if we retain the concept of race. Conservatives are worried that if there is no concept of race, we might be unable to distinguish between ethnicity and race. Albert Alkin, in the case of Australia, also believes race should be conserved as:

“We might drop talk of race and simply talk about the tribal ethnic communities that the subjects we are interested in are from. However, once we start to talk about the rates of

school completion among the Darug, Kuringgai, or some other group, we begin to lose something from our explanation. Certainly, the tribal group differences are worth acknowledging. However, the decreased chances of employment experienced by a member of the Pindjarup are due not simply to their being a member of that group, but to the Pindjarup being one of the many groups of Indigenous Aboriginal peoples in Australia” (2004, p.14).

There are potential reasons why racial identity and racial categories can be conserved. Conservatives argue racial identities have become salient. Racial identity can inform one’s self-understanding. They are useful because they can be a source of self-esteem to generate a feeling of connectedness (Jeffer, 2013). Alcoff (2005) highlights that these racial identities can produce a sense of life in which we come to know ourselves. As Outlaw (2006) states, “Race would be useful if there were no racism”. Outlaw (2006) claims, “The term race is a vehicle for notions that are deployed in organizations if these worlds in our encounters with people who are significantly different from us”. As Outlaw (2006) argues, “It seems like we should conserve race because we come to know ourselves through reflecting with others”. Jeffers (2013) believes “Racial categories should be preserved in the fight against racism”. His viewpoints are that we should be “Orienting ourselves in the present toward the eventual achievement of a world in which races exist only as cultural groups” (Jeffers et al., 2019).

This is because people who are treated in similar ways might do well to join forces to resist their common oppression. As well as Taylor (2004) views “Race as important as we can trace the predictions of what one will experience”. Taylor (2004) says, “Looking back at the history of race-thinking does reveal ethical problems, but when we look forward to the continuing need to traverse the social terrain that’s been shaped by racially motivated wrongs and strategies, we may find it more useful to hold on to race than to abolish it”. Taylor (2004) says, “We need the concept of race to help us note and track the consequences of racism”. Because past instances of racism still shape current social conditions. Jennifer Corns (2016) entails even “The term could be eliminated scientifically due to the lack of referential utility”. The distinction matters if any terms are rightly retained for daily use despite being scientifically rejected. Bernard Boxill (2012) is also one of the people who believe, even “If the concept of race is not biologically and scientifically relevant, that does not entail there is no race”. The concept of race has been used for categorizing people. We

can then account for problems mainly caused by visible differences in appearance if we eliminate the concept of race. Ludwig (2014) argues that “The point of racial elimination is unfortunate because it often leads to the implicit use of an oversimplified ‘phlogiston mode’ of ontological elimination”. Ludwig charges that “The phlogiston model of ontological elimination is not enough for other questions, while to others, it is”. Race in this model can be eliminated from empirical entities but not on conceptual spheres. At this juncture, Kitcher (2012) says the “Problem with the notion of race rests on a mistaken view about natural kinds”. His pragmatism inclines him to think that there are many inquiries driven by specific questions we find it important to answer. It is worth quoting Kitcher in great length here:

“Given pragmatism about kinds, it is necessary to point to particular purposes that drawing racial divisions in this way would serve, purposes that can themselves be defended. If no such defensible purposes can be identified, then we should simply acquiesce in eliminativism. . . . Given the immense harm that use of racial concepts has generated in the past, insisting on race as a legitimate biological category, even though that concept is linked to no valuable biological project, can seem irresponsible and even perverse. Moreover, even if the concept of race plays a role in some biological inquiry, the values of those lines of inquiry, and of pursuing them through retention of the concept of human race, would have to be sufficiently great to outweigh the potential damage caused by deploying this concept in the other contexts in which it plays so prominent a role, namely in our social discussions”(In Carter, 2012, p.7).

What Kitcher believes here is that “Developments in evolutionary biology and advances in genetics have made possible ways new ways of understanding and using race that open possibilities for pursuing socially beneficial ends” (In Carter, 2014).

Here I have discussed how normative policy recommendations are on whether to conserve race or eliminate it. In the next section, I will narrow my discussion to three anti-realist conservative views that want to retain race but believe race is not real (illusion). I will outline the debate between three anti-realist conservative views on the normative question of race.

5.2 Normative Question: Three Anti-Realist Conservative Views

Above I have introduced reasons illuminated by academic scholars on why we should conserve and eliminate the concept of race. In this section, I seek to show a debate between three conservative anti-realists who are Glasgow (2010), Blum (2010), and Hochman (2017). This debate is triggered by moral obligation (conservatives), as stated by Zack that those who are anti-realists are morally obligated to replace race with something else. Glasgow (2010) also perceives the need to fulfill these claims, as he states that “It is crucial for any theories that argue that race is an illusion to satisfy two constraints (I will show these two constraints below)”. Hochman (2017) states such, “First attempts are witnessed on Blum”. Blum (2002) discussed such a problem raised by conservatives could be solved while maintaining race is not real. We can recognize that “People unquestionably act as if race is real by recognizing that our behaviors seem to have created racialized groups” (Blum, 2002). In this discussion, Blum (2002) suggests that “We jettison race because it has more moral benefits than costs”. In this manner, jettisoning race would rid us of one of the strongest barriers to experiencing a sense of common humanity with those now thought of as others. But Blum (2002) is aware that if we give up race entirely, we abandon the ability to name the racial wrongs that have been done to these groups. What we need to do to go ahead, as he suggests, is that we distinguish races from what he calls racialized groups. He says, “Recognizing racial doings does not require the reality of race” (Blum, 2002). Solving these issues would require eliminating any form that purports the classic racial thinking. And he thinks the creators of official census categories have viewed races as current natural human groupings, and this had failed to distance itself from false racist understanding. Blum says that if the federal government encouraged a broad understanding that the purposes for which the census is now used explicitly do not require a commitment to the existence of race but racialized groups, the legitimate discrimination monitoring function of census racial categories could be severed from any implication of racialism. Blum says (2002), “The racial terms and categories should just be eliminated only replace it with racialized groups”. Glasgow (2010) states, “There is indeed some moral imperatives, such as ensuring children equal education, which requires repairing racial disparities in resource allocation”. As pointed out by Glasgow (2010), “There are many significant political, prudential, and moral imperatives that require racial categories”. This puts those who want to retain race to satisfy two core requirements. It must be something that racial groups do to satisfy the political imperatives. The first constraint is morality, politics, and prudence constraint

(MMPC)²³. Discarding race may seem to discard morality, prudence, and justice with erroneous racial discourse. The MMPC is complied with adopting policies that target specific groups for regress. Eliminativism denies the existence of those groups. When we look at race debate from the normative side, eliminativism may seem weaker than conservatism. While retaining these categories may cause or encourage false beliefs. This requires fulfilling the second normative principle, which he calls the epistemic constraint (EC)²⁴. Glasgow has then thought of a substitution that can also be taken to address this without race being real.

He calls this position reconstructionism. This position is not an eliminativist view. However, it holds that we should replace the race discourse with a nearby discourse. According to Glasgow (2010), “There are ways in which we can replace the present racial discourse”. The first way is to keep the word race, cognate, and related terms (Glasgow replaced race with what we can call race*). The second way is to keep the current racial categories. For the reason that we can still be talking about what we refer to. Thirdly, key differences will be separating contemporary racial discourse from post-reconstructivism discourse. With the third way, our racial discourse will only refer to race as a social kind without further conceptual complications. There is a way that Glasgow thinks this post-reconstructionism can work. Post-reconstructivism needs to satisfy the semantic, ontological, and normative accounts to make it work. The ontological task is to make race real. One way to change this is to change their properties into social existential malleability. To justify their formation, we can create our social identities for good, widely knowledgeable, and productive reasons. These identities will work, so we create identities of being a professor or a supreme court justice. We can only eliminate race, still satisfying two constraints, through a convention. Glasgow ponders if these racial identities can be created. We can also recreate them. The crucial step in creating these racial categories is to justify having races and racial identities. To fulfill this, we need to non-negotiable criticize any biological basis that purports race. Reconstructivism does not require new institutions, language, or anything. The only thing it requires is attaching new meanings to existing ones. The reconstructionism project requires a fine-tuning of our conceptual resources. Reconceive the nature of racial classifications in which people

²³ MMPC says all theories of race should attempt to supply or preserve an adequate discourse that facilitates compliance with the political, prudential, and moral imperatives (Glasgow, 2010, p.137).

²⁴ EC says theories of race must either demonstrate that the beliefs of racial discourse override the obligation to not encourage false beliefs. Securing benefits from policies of affirmative actions without encouraging false belief in race. (Glasgow, 2010, p.138).

fall into. Glasgow (2010) agrees with Blum's (2002) substitutionism that “We need some quasi-racial discourse”. But the two views claim to have different strengths with respect to some other concerns. Blum (2002) maintains that “Race does not exist, but race implies a cognitive gulf among racial groups”. Glasgow assesses that he is less pessimistic than Blum. His assessment seems to neglect the dynamic history of race thinking in general and how it is moralized, and inherent baggage has been significantly reduced in particular. He further says, “Blum’s substitutionism (racialized groups) would require that those who care about being, say, black, stop thinking of themselves as members of a race, or even a race*” (Glasgow, 2010). Instead, these people will have to conceive of themselves as members of erroneously racialized groups so that their identities are, in some sense, fraudulent. This entails “A problem as it unnecessarily requires us to treat some people not as they wish to be treated and identified” (Glasgow, 2010). Glasgow's problem with Blum is that his race substitution does not give people the freedom to categorize themselves as they wish. We need a discourse that can mimic racial discourse without talking about the burdens of racial discourse.

Blum (2010) responds to Glasgow. Blum's plight is Glasgow’s principle that we should treat persons as they wish to seem implausible as there is a possibility of falsehood-based identities. But the identity of a racialized group is not based on a falsehood. He then lays down reasons why his substitution of the racialized group is more advantageous than of Glasgow. Firstly, races* are defined negatively and only as a social kind. In contrast, “Racialized groups involve sociohistorical processes and historical ideas that are a matter of shared understanding” (Blum, 2002). We can be clear to know what racialized groups are not races*. Secondly, racialized groups bring out false views of race, and races* do not. This is due to the reason that:

“On race, this new discourse does not express the way that false beliefs about race have shaped the experiences and sense of historical peoplehood of, for example, black and white people in the United States. It does not recognize how classic racist theory is thus a live presence in the character of the racialized group Blacks” (Blum, 2010, p.10).

By this, Blum says, “The feature of being black is not given an expression about racial discourse” (2010). Blum proposes that since Glasgow’s substitution fails to bring in a sociohistorical consensus, it has fewer recommendations than racialized groups.

Hochman (2017), therefore, develops Blum's idea of substitutionism about racialized groups. Between Blum and Glasgow, Hochman wants to defend Blum's idea of substitutionism by introducing interactive constructivism as a framework for understanding racialization. Constructive interactionism appeals to or takes its foundation from developmental systems theorists (DST) that propose every trait results from interactions between a wide range of developmental resources. That is, the interaction between many system elements is responsible for development. According to DST, it is wrong to dichotomize between interactive elements that contribute to a result of something. For example, a car is made up of many components or parts; therefore, understanding what a car is involved in allows all these elements to interact to give an idea of a car. This means that there is no part in the car that is given privilege. From this understanding, what Hochman's theory suggests is that it has no metaphysical privilege over what makes racialized groups.

Drawing on DST, interactive constructivism is the view that racialization is a process involving a wide range of interactions that are jointly involved in the production of racialized groups. On this account, racialized groups emerge out of an interaction between biological, geographic, gendered, cultural, economic, historical, and political factors. Therefore, in light of the above, racialized groups reject the claim that race is only socially constructed or biological, but all these factors contribute to racialized groups. For Hochman, "It is therefore important to know what this account does, which is to make breath central for claims or facts made by anti-realists, social constructivists, and race naturalists to be able to fit together in one overarching framework" (Hochman, 2017). Same as Blum, Hochman (2017) highlights that with an "Interactive constructivism account, it does not make sense to ask what a certain person's race is because it does not prescribe how we ought to classify people". It offers a descriptive framework for understanding how racialization works.

5.3 Conserve Racial Categories

In the case of South Africa, I am apt to the view that racialized groups will not work without a category or concept of race. We cannot solve political questions without a reconstructed racial discourse. Glasgow (2010, 2019) puts it; "We do three things when we have faulty information about what an X is. Firstly, the eliminativist would say, let us get rid of our ontology". Secondly, we can acknowledge that our X concept is mistaken, and it fails to refer to anything. To offer a

remedy, we replace our meaning of the term. Or lastly, we can provide backtracking of our concepts. If our concept is mal-formulated we can replace it with what it is.

My recommendation is to also allow us to acknowledge we have mistakenly identified and categorized ourselves while changing that to our benefit, which reshapes the apartheid racial discourse. As Root (2000) explains, “We should divide but not regulate by race. We would retain the races* but not conserve their reality”. That is, I would still be white, but being white would be no more significant than having a 612-area code. We can still use racial categories without holding racial significance as they hold now. This is only possible if we recreate a justifiable basis of these racial categories. If we eliminate racial categories, we cannot discuss other political inquiries that demand race talk. If we eliminate the racial terminology, we would be doing away with the conceptual tools that are used to talk about those issues; as I see, the problem does not rely upon our racial categories but the employment of apartheid racial ideas that give error meaning to these categories give. Because “Racial categories might foster racial labelling, but it is hard to believe the acute consciousness of race would vanish if the state were to abolish racial categories” (Seekings, 2008). What is at issue is apartheid race-thinking that persists alongside a strong commitment to transcend racial divisions. According to Seekings, “Apartheid race thinking is deeply rooted more in ourselves” (2008, p.8). Therefore, we need a revised terminology race. Because if we were to leave a revised terminology, we are dismissing ourselves in discussing institutional racism. That means we cannot discuss institutional racism that requires racial discourse. To eliminate racial categories is to be blind to such issues. We can still use racial categories without holding racialist significance as they hold now. As explained by Raymond Suttner (2012) that “To banish racial terms in our discourse does not bring us closer to a non-racial society and does not create an equal relationship between people”. To eradicate racial terms that blind us, actual dynamics between people who have suffered under artificially created yet socially significant racial categories. As Suttner (2012) continues to put it that “These categories are still required for measuring social relations over time and in particular what progress has been made in addressing inequalities”. In this respect, Suttner (2012) says, “One has to use the notion of race before one can assess what is entailed in realization and assessing whether or not and or to what extent progress has been made”. Suttner (2012) furthers by arguing with a situation where “non-racialism recognizes races but should be in a society where we do not organize ourselves based on race”. To make this case, he shows that one of the commitments to non-racialism is the combability

with a willingness to organize on a racial basis at various times. He cites Max Sisulu's speech that one of the struggles fighting against racism was to organize along racial lines. To do that was not simply to sit back and say we do not recognize these racial categories and race. But you actively fight against it, and that is the essence of non-racialism. Suttner (2012) says, "Propositions alike that asserted by Alexander may be correct that race does not exist at the ontologically level for the construction of generic humanism". But denying the existence of race is a negation of the experience of a wide range of struggles against apartheid. It makes sense to talk of race as not existing when addressing the question of what it is to be a human being. But this is not valid in the context where race is a mechanism of exclusion and inequality. Because even in a non-racial organization, there are still inequalities. Suttner brings to light that one needs to evaluate transformation away from inequality increases the need to attend to race as a basis of measuring whether inequalities have been addressed. That means race matters for any inquiries into non-racialism. The danger of adopting non-racialism as not recognizing race includes premature closure of issues that require debate. Many South Africans belong to racial groups whose experience is still with us, even marked on their bodies, from the struggle and from various attacks under apartheid which have injured them in a range of ways. Resolving these issues is hampered by impatience about knowing when the day race will no longer be salient. Suttner (2012) says that "No purpose is served by speculating on dates for completing the transition of achieving regress where the criteria are not clarified". What we need to realize is that non-racialism can only be viable if it also recognizes and is not in conflict with attempts to address distinct qualities and experiences, particularly disadvantages and disabilities of various groups.

Caryn Abrahams (2012) cements this line of thought by assessing the incumbent on us that the imperative of research on non-racialism is to re-cast economic redress and the economic uplifting of disenfranchised South African as the new challenge requiring non-racial intervention and support. What the anti-realist project of non-racialism is to squarely focus on the socio-economic features of South Africa as a transactional democracy. At best, what non-racialism needs to explain is the cooperation on a larger vision of equality for all will require conceding that the disadvantaged African majority should benefit from transformative economic policies.

I believe Abrahams (2012) and Suttner (2012) cement crucial points, and as I believe in arriving at a non-racial society, we need to recreate a justifiable basis of these racial categories as Glasgow

proposes. To make sense of this is to understand our racial categories' role in our racial discourse. Suppose racial categories permeate apartheid racial discourse. We need to give ourselves a chance to reformulate our labels and correct our terms. To do that, we can begin by re-justifying our terms to what is correct. Once we correct our terms, we have justified reasons to keep racial categories. In this sense, our racial categories will be shaped by our language that these racial categories are only used for regress plans, and they do not hold any great essentialist significance. Luisa Farah Schwartzman (2009) explains one of the approaches un-officializing the racialist racial discourse in the case of Brazil. The recent racial project in Brazil was set up by social activists who wanted to change the racial discourse.

The policy of these racial projects aimed to benefit those who have been victims of racial injustices in Brazil. But what is essential is that these designed racial categories of this policy were gradually consistent with it. It is compatible with how students were made to actively participate in this official categorization process and make sense to them. Altogether with their relationship to it. What is also important, as Schwartzman sees, is that the students were not merely subjects, but they need to understand the motivations of policy designers. This is the approach I am arguing for retaining racial categories in South Africa. Racial categories should be preserved with the justification that fits the benefits of society. In one of the interviews in the book *Tracing the unbreakable thread: non-racialism in South Africa* (1990) by Julie Frederikse, Kathrada talks about the role of education in non-racialism. Kathrada believes “Education has an important role in un-officializing apartheid racial discourse and thinking”. I also believe if the ordinary people can be taught about the social construction of racial categories and race in South Africa. My utopian considerations are that we have taught ourselves to make races, which means we could unlearn our distinctions between the colored races if we could summon the political will (Taylor, 2004). Unlearning our apartheid version of race thinking requires a massive effort at public education. At least as I can think, quasi-racial discourse for the abolition of race will get us through to getting rid of it. In this manner, people should be made to participate in un-officializing apartheid race discourse in South Africa.

Alexander (2011) and Everett (2012) have made a constant point that most South Africans do not know how these racial categories were constructed, and more particularly important as I see the state of South Africa is that many disadvantaged black communities do not know what affirmative

action and EE policies is in correlation to racial categories. What I mean here is that South Africans are not made to actively participate in this official categorization process altogether with their relationship to affirmative action. In return in which, they can make sense to them. There is a huge gap in how people understand racial categories in light of their plan for regress policies. If we imagine how these policies are set to readdress past injustice, it is careless if their retainment is not made of citizens to have a connection with and lack of providing education to the citizens about their retainment rather than conserving racial categories without the effort of un-officializing the racial discourse that these racial categories carry. In chapter two, I reviewed what metaphysics of race is about, and this debate is about normative terms about how corresponding terms should be used; then, if we re-justify our racial terms, we can do justice. Currently, our racial classification does not give us a fruitful way to understand the range of facts about race in South Africa. In chapter four, I showed how racial categories are perceived here in South Africa. Therefore, I propose if we can reformulate our racial categories and concept of race to a justified basis on how we use racial categories in South Africa, that would help us evaluate the explanatory potential of the classifications within a broader explanatory framework.

What distances, this approach I am proposing, in light of those mentioned above, is that we can still retain racial categories only through changing the error meaning of race in South Africa while acknowledging race is not real. While many South African scholars argue against racial categories, as seen, my recommendation is that we should conserve racial categories because doing away with racial categories will hinder us from conceptual tools to deal with racial inequality and institutional racism. This approach satisfies two constraints raised by Glasgow in the case of South Africa. We can solve moral-political issues by referring to what we mean by our justified terms. This approach requires attitudinal meaning to our concepts by guiding and monitoring our concept use to meet the second requirement.

5.4 Conclusion

This chapter carried out the discussion held in chapter four. Racial categories are not warranted, and race in South Africa is an illusion. However, the objection held that these racial categories are used by a government for regress policies. In this chapter, I attempted to illuminate my case that racial classifications should be conserved with a racial discourse that matches the facts about race. This chapter sought to provide one of the ways in which we can retain racial categories by changing

what we mean by race, for the reason that our racial categories can match facts about how we perceive them to be. Firstly, I showed two semantic policies, namely: eliminativism and conservatism. Eliminativism wants to eliminate racial categories and the concept of race. Conservatism argues that races can still be important for numerous reasons that include readdressing injustices of the past done in the name of race. Secondly, I showed three anti-realist conservatism positions that want to conserve race but acknowledge that race is not real. Between these three positions, I argued that Glasgow's race* can work in South Africa by retaining racial categories while remodeling the notion of racial categories and the concept of race that match the facts that these categories are only used for regress. I argued that education could play a crucial role if citizens can be made to participate in un-officializing apartheid racial discourse by racial categories. In this sense, how we perceive racial categories in South Africa can transit us to a non-racial state without doing away with racial categories that help us conceptualize racial issues and social justice programs.

6. Conclusion

In conclusion, in this thesis, I have aimed to argue that our use of classifications is not warranted. I sought to answer under the theme of discussion of metaphysics of race which is currently framed on the ontology of race. In chapter one, I reviewed today's main metaphysical views that seek to discuss the nature of race as discussed by Mallon (2006): racial constructivism, anti-realism, and biological racial realism. In this section, I assessed each position along with its protagonists. I then showed in this paper when Mallon summarizes these views, and he extends his comments to claim that this debate is non-substantive.

In chapter two, I assess why the metaphysics of race is important and what this debate is about. I began by framing what deflationists hold, led by Mallon. Mallon (2006) presented that the three contending accounts over the nature of race are engaged in a non-substantive metaphysical debate. Because these theories begin to disagree over different theories of reference. Mallon distinguished metaphysical facts and metaphysical assumptions to show that the current stand of metaphysics is based on metaphysical assumptions rather than metaphysical facts. Mallon's (2006) point is that approaching the debate over metaphysical assumptions will never get us to reach a standard answer of what race is. Gannett (2010) extended these views broadly by claiming: that the metaphysics pursuit of 'really real' has shortcomings because it leaves many important social questions unaddressed. Metaphysics is interested in the preoccupation between monism and pluralism and the dichotomization between biological and social characteristics of race. Ludwig (2015) paved this position by holding metaphysics is underdetermined by two claims: first, underdetermination holds that there is no agreement to identify legitimate meanings that are biological. What follows is that this evaluation requires explanatory interest. The second underdetermination is what he calls non-empirical underdetermination evidence. From this claim, Ludwig's argument relied on three claims or notions of non-substantive metaphysics: one from Hirsch, one inspired by Sider, and one by Ludwig himself. Ludwig's basic claim was that metaphysics is committed to one fundamentalist notion of race. Spencer led the way in defending and clarifying what this debate is committed to, what it is about, and why it is important. Spencer responded to Ludwig by entailing that metaphysics of race is not committed to one fundamental ontology of race. Because metaphysicians are committed to the pluralist idea of race. What Ludwig is attacking as new

metaphysics of race is not what the 'actual metaphysics of race' is committed to. Spencer views Ludwig's use of Hirsch's analysis of verbal dispute against metaphysics as not a target against actual metaphysics of race debate. Because race debate cannot be reduced down to merely verbal dispute just because racial realists and anti-realists cannot interpret each other well. The metaphysicians are adopting a different view of substantivity that does not require anything about Sider's notion of substantivity or a single fundamental ontology of anything. Hochman (2017) agrees with Spencer on the basic that deflationists are attacking a wrong definition of metaphysics. Deflationists attack the wrong definition of metaphysics. The verbal dispute that Mallon and Ludwig talk about is very important to most philosophers because how we understand metaphysics is also very important. To Gannett, Hochman said metaphysics does not leave out practical questions because, as discussed by Mallon that we should focus on a normative question, Hochman dismisses metaphysics, and the normative question goes non-correspondingly to metaphysics. Metaphysicians are normatively engaged and sometimes politically engaged. Political engagement lies in practical considerations. Hochman finally made his point by responding to Gannett's worry that metaphysics dichotomizes biological and interaction by holding that there is no tension between this causation because David Serre and Svante Paabo argue for anti-realism about biological race. Diaz-Leon (2021) says we should understand this debate about metaphysics of race as disputes that give rise to the best explanations, where explanations in the social sciences also count, and where the assessment of different theories appeals to normative considerations having to do with social justice. In this regard, what is at stake here is that metaphysicians are arguing about the terminological matter. She cites Chalmers to show there are verbal disputes where we are interested in how we use the term, which have significant consequences, regardless of whether all candidate meanings are equally joint-carving. From this, Diaz-Leon (2021) says what is important to be noticed is that this could be understood as a descriptive question about how people use the term in that community. Or as an ameliorative question about how we should use the term in that community. Verbal disputes have a moral and political significance in how we use the term. On the hand, Diaz-Leon (2021) adopted Thomasson's metaphysical deflationism to show all debates in metaphysics are a combination of analysis of concepts plus empirical investigation. This combination capture what this debate is about because the verbal dispute idea assumes that different parties can all be reinterpreted so that their competing claims of what is race all come out as true. On the other hand, to establish the truth value of those claims, we must first figure out

different application conditions for the concept of race or gender in each idiolect. Secondly, we need to argue that on different reinterpretations of the concept, the application conditions are satisfied by different entities so that the competing sentences come out as true. Common sense varies from community to community or from speaker to speaker so that we can observe various application conditions. When different parties in a debate use a term with a different meaning, this might suggest that the debate is really about the issue of how we use a term within that specific community. If we understand these debates on normative terms about how related terms should be used, then we can do justice to the significance of the debate.

In chapter three, I discussed the relative of race concepts to contexts. This chapter proceeds from the claim that we should understand this debate about how we use and should our racial concepts. In this chapter, I extended the investigation that commonsense concepts of race vary from community to community. In this sense, if metaphysics is a combination of two claims, our analysis remains contextually. I analyzed how race is relative to context, making race to be examined contextually. I began this investigation from Mallon (2004). I used Mallon as he embarks on the claim that the three accepted phenomena by constructionism can never univocally form a sound account of race. These phenomena are racial passing, travel constraints, and the reality of race. Interactive constructivism can account no travel constraint, but it cannot account for passing constraint. Mallon changed to adopt institutional constructivism that can account for passing and no travel constraints. But it cannot account for the reality of race on twofold reasons: no one thinks of herself as white by having a functional status imposed on her by the collective intentionally and there are generalizations that we make that involve border crossing, which allows race to travel. Searle (2007) and Glasgow (2010) responded to the first issue. Searle made an example about monarchs, that if our opinions changed rapidly that before 1688, we believed in the doctrine of divine rule. After 1688 we no longer believed in them. Today monarchs are institutional entities. If before 1688, they were not institutional, does that mean they did not exist? Searle opposed this, and Glasgow responded that we need to be more specific about what kind of intuitional realism we are considering because just cocktail parties and wars are institutional entities, but it does not mean they do not exist. After this first issue, Glasgow moved to the second issue. In this issue, Glasgow distinguished two ways in which race remain local: concept localism and ontological localism. Ontological localism further expands on two localism: modest and

extreme ontological localism. Glasgow adopts ontological localism as a way we can understand how race does not travel. On modest localism, P is Z at Y, and P is not Y at W. The local criterion of race is objective from different communities. In which we might say P is only black at Y and V at T. We can make generalizations by picking out the same group in Great Britain and America by fixing the location of the racial concepts we use. If we want to know what is happening with other countries, we will meet the racial criteria that match the location of where the comparison is made. Diaz-Leon (2019) clarified Mallon's folk objectivist institutional constructivism by saying not only does the concept play the role but there are two ways of understanding the no travel constraint. We do not have to appeal to the concept per se, but that is in order for subject S to instantiate P, they need to bear a relation to particular cultural and social practices, which may require the employment of certain concepts but not the concept P itself. This chapter resonated with chapter two in that metaphysics of race involves two metaphysical stages that make race contextually. I extended this idea by analyzing the importance of contextuality through Matolino (2015). Matolino discussed that when we talk about philosophy and place, we have to search what is philosophy carefully. The guiding question is what is its purpose. Philosophy is about achieving certain ends and making human better as moral agencies. What turns out to be the case in Matolino's sense is that philosophy is about a reflection to our local conditions that yield to these two functions. To philosophize is to be placed in a position where ideas are born due to that placement and reflect to the conditions and needs of that place. This analysis makes Matolino to ask in this case what is a South African philosopher. A South African philosopher is a person who reflects to the conditions and needs that affects this place called South Africa. As I am in South Africa, this made me to answer the question introduced on chapter one in the context of South Africa.

In chapter four I turned to answer the question that is the concern of this research. This chapter inaugurated with the epistemological underpinning of racial categories in South Africa. It traced the nature of their formation and motivation. Posel (2001a) paved a way in highlighting that putting racial categories there was no specific and definite criteria surrounding the definition of race. Coming up with racial categories there was inconsistency, the decision was left to law to decide on their own. This created further confusion around justified definition of the term. The decisions taken by the courts lacked biological evidence. This turned everyone into the expert on the subject of race. The failure to come up with biological basis for race, race had to be made a social accepted

fragment. The vague definition of race had to be enshrined into law through 1950 registration act. This created race as social construct made real through social standing. Sharp (1998) and Sharp (2005) show that most people were against this categorization. The apartheid segregationist and political parties such as ANC wanted to challenge these categories. This categorization was challenged through an ideology. This ideology wanted to reject official categories and transform South Africa from the conception of apartheid racial categories. In the following section I assessed what does this ideology mean. MacDonald (2006) characterize more on what non-racialism as an ideology meant. Non-racialism sought to challenge the existence of race in South Africa by arguing that race is an illusion. This term as an ideal consisted three objectives: overcome racism, eradicate official racialism, and propound universal citizenship. In this transaction Posel (2010) says there was no point there was any philosophical imagination to a version of non-racialism. Kotze (2013) put South Africa needed to break itself from constructed citizenship and welcome new notion of humanness. Whitehead (2011) believed that the failure of this adoption is because the term lacked content and meaning. Mare (2003) said this confusion was there in the freedom Chapter, even if it was written with pure intention to do away with race and racism. But the term was never properly discussed before being accepted at Congress of the people in Kliptown. Everett (2012) had to put more lenses on the disruption of adopting non-racialism. He underlined the divergence of views between SACP, ANC, and BCM. Macdonald reaffirmed that the BCM views non-racialism as an illusion and woken up racially consciousness between black people. In this sense the BCM rejected non-racialism. And this left the ideology meaning interchangeably with terms like multiracial and anti-racism. Macdonald said the authentic meaning of non-racialism was then superseded by new ones because the essence of these new meaning spoke to the needs of that moment. Mare, Pillay and Erwin (2019) emphasized more on this content of non-racialism. These authors they imagine future through the utopian consideration where race would not matter in South Africa. They convince us to think of ways where we would reach non-racial society. The lack of adoption of non-racialism makes South Africa to be shaped in another version of non-racialism in which Posel (2001) questions the current use of racial categories in South Africa. Smythe (2012) admitted that Posel paper had proved South African thinkers to think about the impact of continuation of racial categories and new pointers or research to replace racial categories. Habib and Bentley (2008) re-evaluate the impact of regress by categorization in the manner that they implement more privileged sections of historically disantavanated communities. And they propose the relative emphasis on

race be switched to class defined redress. Erasmus calls for a critical race standpoint where we should replace racial categories. Erwin (2012) discusses that racial categories continue to have a sense about self to many South Africans. Erwin offers a critical examination focuses of race in academic research practice and suggest a vigilant reflexive research practice which proposes engineering social spaces for the emergence of cosmopolitan identities. Steven calls for examination of the conditions that un-do the meaning of race. Smythe said race in South Africa remain highly institutionalized. We should not only focus on official classifications but also sub-classifications. Bock and Hunt extended these views by labelling these continuities as zombie landscapes.

After the current assessment on current standing on race. I made my case that we are not warranted in using this classification. I first showed the relationship between race and biology in South Africa. This relation is what Paul Gilroy calls 'bio-culturalist.' South African's believe both cultural and biological markers provide evidence for mutually cause and effect of the character of others. I highlighted that race is still a lively experience in South Africa. However, instigating apartheid Verwoerd took that there were no purely biological determinants of race. In this stance I resort to show we should understand racial categories as merely apartheid projects which became acceptable. I drew on Chalmes definition of ontological and assertional correctness. The correctness depends on the world's state. Not what a speaker finds acceptable. I drew on Chalmes to argue that racial categories were accepted as correct despite the lack of biological differences between races. When the 1950 registration act was adopted, it was said to have fixed the incorrect definition of race. The main point in this argument was that accepting there are racial categories whereas there are no racial categories is not correct even if apartheid officials socially accepted this racial division. I proceeded with my point to claim that in the latest message by the former apartheid president, he declared that apartheid or racial segregation was wrong and was the place that was morally unjustifiable. I showed this point to highlight that racial categories were used as a project of exploitation which still carries an apartheid discourse that seeks to discriminate and carry an idea about a sense of self. In this case, I concluded race is an illusion in South Africa. However, government uses these categories as site of regress. I pleaded to answer this objection on the final chapter on this thesis.

In chapter five, I focused on the normative consideration of race. The normative question concerned what we should do with racial categories and the concept of race in particular. In this chapter, I argue that we should conserve racial categories. My discussion swerves from on what grounds we should preserve racial categories. In this chapter, I began by outlining two normative views. The first view wants to eliminate race. The second view wanted to preserve race because racial discourse has several uses in our daily lives. After that, I viewed three anti-realist that wants to preserve race while acknowledging race is not real. A moral obligation triggers these three views led down by conservatives. Zack states that anti-realists are morally obligated to replace race with something else. Blum discussed that the problems conservatives raised could solve while maintaining races are not real. Blum held that we distinguish races from what he calls racialized groups. Blum wants to preserve races as racialized groups without racial categories or the concept of race. Glasgow (2010) also wanted to preserve races as racialized groups; however, his point is that we should preserve racial categories. Glasgow contended Blum's suggestion seems to deprive people of categorizing themselves as they want. Blum (2010) responded to this by saying his position seems more plausible than Glasgow's for two reasons: Firstly, races* are defined negatively and only as a social kind. In contrast, racialized groups involve sociohistorical processes and historical ideas that are a matter of shared understanding. Secondly, racialized brings out false views on races. Hochman developed Blum's account by proposing another anti-realist view, which he called interactive constructivism. interactive constructivism is the view that racialization is a process involving a wide range of interactions that are jointly involved in the production of racialized groups. On this account, racialized groups emerge out of an interaction between biological, geographic, gendered, cultural, economic, historical, and political factors. Therefore, in light of the above, racialized groups reject the claim that race is only socially constructed or biological, but all these factors contribute to racialized groups. In light of these three views, I argued it would make sense to speak of races* here in South Africa. My recommendation is to allow us to acknowledge we have mistakenly categorized ourselves. We should find a nearby discourse for race, where we could not conserve the reality of race. Because if we eliminate racial categories, we cannot discuss other political inquires that demand race-talk. The problem does not rely upon our racial categories but the employment of apartheid racial ideas that give error meaning to these categories. I bring Suttner to this point as he emphasizes that eradicating racial terms blind us to actual dynamics between people who have suffered under artificially created yet socially

significant racial categories. Suttner says one has to use the notion of race before one can assess what is entailed in realization and assess whether or not and or to what extent progress has been made. My argument in answering chapter four objection I said in Brazil un-officializing racial discourse. What is essential is that these designed racial categories were gradually consistent with it. It how students were made to actively participate in this official categorization. I relate this practice as a recommendation in South Africa in the sense that my utopian consideration is that we have taught ourselves to make races. We can also unlearn it. Unlearning our apartheid version of race thinking requires a massive effort at public education. I made a point about the gap on how people understand racial categories in light of their plan for regress policies. My ultimate point is that education should be a priority in unlearning apartheid racial thinking. Because, as put by Everett (2012), most South Africans do not know how these racial categories were constructed, and in the aftermath, they do not know why they are retained to the extent that many South Africans, predominantly in rural areas, are not aware of the meaning and role of affirmative action in relation to racial categories. I proposed if we can reformulate our racial categories and concept of race to a justified basis on how we use racial categories in South Africa, that would help us evaluate the explanatory potential of the classifications within a broader justified explanatory framework.

6.1 Further Research

The metaphysics of race provides great knowledge about the nature of race. There are many commitments we have made regarding race, while we do not know what the nature of their formulation is. The current racial categories and racial identities are permeated by apartheid racial discourse. And how we continue racial divide ourselves proceed to divide people. South Africa continues to be racially divided, and racial tension continues to exist between these groups. Even racial inequality continues to advance itself in our daily lives. In this research, I have tried to show that our racial categories are not warranted. I have sought to prove our error to commitment about knowledge of racial identities and categories.

Regarding this I think, a further interesting question will be to investigate will be whether it is possible to transform South Africa into a non-racialism state. What are the stakes of the viability of turning this country into a state where race would not be recognized. It would be very interesting to find out what are the ways that could be adopted to develop non-racialism. Is it possible at this stage for South Africa to transform itself into a state where people will longer regard race as they do now. Somehow if non-racialism will not be viable, what then can be a theoretical and empirical strategic transformation that South Africa can take to do away with apartheid racial identities and racial categories.

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