

# **An Analysis of South Africa's Role in Regional Integration in Southern Africa: Prospects and Challenges**

**by**

**Sbusisiwe Philile Gwala**

**208505389**

**Supervisor:**

**DR B.R Mngomezulu**

Submitted in fulfilment of the academic requirements for the degree of Master of Social Sciences, in the Graduate Programme in the School of Social Sciences. University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg, South Africa.

**The financial assistance of the National Research Foundation (NRF) towards this research is hereby acknowledged. Opinions expressed and conclusions arrived at, are those of the author and are not necessarily to be attributed to the NRF**

**July 2015**

## DECLARATION

I Sbusisiwe Philile Gwala declare that:

1. The research reported in this thesis, except where otherwise indicated, is my original research.
2. This thesis has not been submitted for any degree or examination at any other university.
3. This thesis does not contain other persons' data, pictures, graphs or other information, unless specifically acknowledged as being sourced from other persons.
4. This thesis does not contain other persons' writing, unless specifically acknowledged as being sourced from other researchers. Where other written sources have been quoted, then:
  - a. Their words have been re-written but the general information attributed to them has been referenced
  - b. Where their exact words have been used, then their writing has been placed in italics and inside quotation marks, and referenced.
5. This thesis does not contain text, graphics or tables copied and pasted from the Internet, unless specifically acknowledged, and the source being detailed in the thesis and in the References sections.

\_\_Gwala, S.P\_\_

Student Name

\_\_\_28/09/2015\_\_\_

Date

\_\_Mngomezulu, BR\_\_

Name of Supervisor

\_\_\_\_\_  
Signature

## **Dedication**

**To my Mum and Dad, We did it!**

## **Acknowledgements**

First, I give thanks to God for His grace that has made possible the completion of this thesis.

I am extremely grateful for the invaluable guidance, encouragement and patience of my supervisor, Dr Bheki Mngomezulu. I could not have finished this project without his supervision.

I am deeply grateful for National Research Foundation (NRF) for funding this project, all financial concerns were relieved from me upon embarking on this journey.

To my family oMphephethe, thank you for your love & support throughout the duration of this work. I would like to acknowledge Mr Kofi Otubuah Quartey and Kofi Gyan Quartey for their Academic support.

I am also thankful for the support and the encouragements of my friends.

## **Abstract**

Since the success of Regional Integration (RI) in Europe epitomized by the European Union (EU), the mutual potential benefits that could be attained from RI initiatives and agreements have attracted much attention to the topic of RI. In the African context, RI has been hailed as the mechanism that nurtures the development of economic income, trade and bargaining power. This has resulted in the establishment of a number of Regional Economic Communities (RECs) in different parts of Africa. Despite the prevalence of Regional Economic Agreements (REAs) across Africa, RI has been largely unsuccessful due to a confluence of factors. Having been disregarded as a legitimate state by the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region due to its apartheid regime prior to 1994, South Africa has since emerged as one of the well-developed countries in SSA. Having transitioned from the apartheid regime to a post-apartheid era, South Africa rose to become one of the dominant economic powerhouses in SSA, and a leader in the SADC region. The role of South Africa as a hegemon in SADC has been contested by some, citing the State's inability to resolve some of its domestic problems to a satisfactory level. This research is an investigation or inquiry into the prospects of South Africa as the most qualified State to carry out the responsibility of spear-heading the RI process in the Southern African region. In the process of compiling this research secondary data obtained from books, journal articles, newspaper articles and existing theses dealing with RI in Europe, Africa, and Southern Africa were analysed. The results of this study portray South Africa as the most suitable candidate for leading RI in Southern Africa. This is primarily due to its advanced infrastructural development, superior economic strength and peace enforcement capabilities in conflict-ridden Africa. South Africa is also the largest capital contributor and the biggest investor in individual states in the SADC

region. Based on these results, one recommendation is that the African continent in general and the SADC region in particular has reasons to cooperate with South Africa in reviving the RI agenda that would benefit the entire African continent. South Africa can still play its role as the leading economic powerhouse while the presidency of SADC block of nations is rotated annually amongst the member countries as in the EU. South Africa will then not be viewed suspiciously as having usurped the hegemonic status within the region. Giant strides have already been made in the political and economic arena; South Africa can build on these successes.

**Key terms:**

RI (RIAs), Southern African Development Community (SADC), European Union (EU), African Union (AU), South Africa, Southern Africa, Hegemony.

## Abbreviations List

<b>AMU</b>	Arab Maghreb Union
<b>APEC</b>	Asia, Pacific, Economic Cooperation
<b>APRM</b>	African Peer Review Mechanism
<b>APSA</b>	African Peace and Security Architecture
<b>ARF</b>	African Renaissance Fund
<b>ASEAN</b>	Association of South East Asian Nations
<b>BRICS</b>	Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa
<b>CAADP</b>	Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme
<b>CEEAC-ECCAS</b>	Economic Community For Central African States
<b>CEN-SAD</b>	Community of Sahel Saharan States
<b>CM</b>	Common Market
<b>COMESA</b>	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
<b>CU</b>	Customs Union
<b>DRC</b>	Democratic Republic of Congo
<b>EAC</b>	East African Community
<b>EAEC</b>	European Atomic Energy Community
<b>EC</b>	European Community
<b>ECCSA</b>	Economic Community of Central African States
<b>ECOSOCC</b>	Economic, Social, and Cultural Council
<b>ECOWAS</b>	Economic Community of West African States
<b>ECHR</b>	European Court of Human Rights
<b>ECSC</b>	European Coal and Steel Community
<b>EEC</b>	European Economic Community
<b>EFTA</b>	European Free Trade Association
<b>EU</b>	European Union
<b>FDI</b>	Foreign Direct Investment
<b>FIP</b>	Finance Investment Protocol
<b>FLS</b>	Front Line States
<b>FTA</b>	Free Trade Area
<b>FTAs</b>	Free Trade Areas

<b>GATT</b>	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
<b>GDP</b>	Gross Domestic Product
<b>GEAR</b>	Growth Employment and Redistribution
<b>GNP</b>	Gross National Product
<b>G8</b>	The Group of eight
<b>HDI</b>	Human Development Index
<b>HS</b>	Hegemonic Stability
<b>IGAD</b>	Intergovernmental Authority on Government
<b>IMF</b>	International Monetary Fund
<b>KZN</b>	KwaZulu Natal
<b>MFN</b>	Most Favoured Nation
<b>MNC's</b>	Multi-National Corporations
<b>NAFTA</b>	North American Free Trade Agreement
<b>NDP</b>	National Development Programme
<b>NEPAD</b>	New Economic Partnership For African Development
<b>OAU</b>	Organisation of African Unity
<b>OR</b>	Oliver Reginald
<b>PAP</b>	Pan-African Parliament
<b>PTAs</b>	Preferential Trade Arrangements
<b>REAs</b>	Regional Economic Agreements
<b>RECs</b>	Regional Economic Communities
<b>REI</b>	Regional Economic Integration
<b>RI</b>	Regional Integration
<b>RIAs</b>	RI Arrangements
<b>RISDP</b>	Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan
<b>SACU</b>	South African Customs Union
<b>SADC</b>	Southern African Development Community
<b>SADCC</b>	Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference
<b>SADPA</b>	South African Development Partnership Agency
<b>SANDF</b>	South African National Defence Force
<b>SAPs</b>	Structural Adjustment Programmes



<b>SIPRI</b>	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
<b>SSA</b>	Sub Saharan Africa
<b>TNCs</b>	Trans National Corporations
<b>TP</b>	Trade Protocol
<b>UNDP</b>	United Nations Development Program
<b>UNGA</b>	United Nations General Assembly
<b>UK</b>	United Kingdom
<b>UMOA</b>	Union Monétaire Ouest Africaine
<b>USA</b>	United States of America
<b>USD</b>	United States Dollars
<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>WTO</b>	World Trade Organisation

## Table of Content

<b>DECLARATION</b> .....	<b>ii</b>
<b>Dedication</b> .....	<b>iii</b>
<b>Acknowledgements</b> .....	<b>iv</b>
<b>Abstract</b> .....	<b>v</b>
<b>Abbreviations List</b> .....	<b>vii</b>
<b>Table of Content</b> .....	<b>x</b>
<b>List of Tables &amp; Figures</b> .....	<b>xiii</b>
<b>CHAPTER 1 - BACKGROUND &amp; INTRODUCTION</b> .....	<b>1</b>
<b>1.0 Introduction</b> .....	<b>1</b>
<b>1.1 Conceptualization of RI</b> .....	<b>2</b>
<b>1.2 Origins of RIAs</b> .....	<b>3</b>
<b>1.3 RIAs in Europe</b> .....	<b>3</b>
<b>1.4 RIA's in Other Parts of the World</b> .....	<b>5</b>
<b>1.5. RI in Africa</b> .....	<b>6</b>
<b>1.6 Pan Africanism &amp; RI</b> .....	<b>7</b>
<b>1.7 African Renaissance</b> .....	<b>7</b>
<b>1.8 Challenges Facing RI in African</b> .....	<b>9</b>
<b>1.9 The History of RI in Southern Africa</b> .....	<b>10</b>
<b>1.10 Benefits of RI</b> .....	<b>13</b>
<b>1.11 The importance of a hegemon in a Regional Bloc</b> .....	<b>14</b>
<b>1.12 SA to lead or Not to Lead SADC - The Debate</b> .....	<b>17</b>
<b>1.13 Theories used in the study</b> .....	<b>18</b>
1.13.1 Hegemonic Stability Theory.....	19
1.13.2 RI Theory.....	20
1.13.3 Research Methodology.....	20
1.13.4 Research aims and objectives.....	21
<b>1.14 Significance of the study</b> .....	<b>22</b>
<b>1.15 Structure of dissertation</b> .....	<b>22</b>
<b>1.16 Limitations of the Study</b> .....	<b>24</b>
<b>1.17 Conclusion</b> .....	<b>24</b>
<b>CHAPTER 2 - LITERATURE REVIEW</b> .....	<b>26</b>

<b>2.0</b>	<b>Introduction</b> .....	<b>26</b>
<b>2.1</b>	<b>The RI Concept &amp; history</b> .....	<b>26</b>
<b>2.2</b>	<b>RIAs</b> .....	<b>28</b>
<b>2.3</b>	<b>What is RI?</b> .....	<b>30</b>
<b>2.5</b>	<b>Contentions of South Africa as Hegemony</b> .....	<b>31</b>
<b>2.6</b>	<b>South Africa’s monetary contribution to other countries</b> .....	<b>36</b>
<b>2.7</b>	<b>The EU Model of integration</b> .....	<b>46</b>
<b>2.8</b>	<b>Pax Africana</b> .....	<b>48</b>
<b>2.9</b>	<b>Conclusion</b> .....	<b>51</b>
	<b>CHAPTER 3 - THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK</b> .....	<b>53</b>
<b>3.0</b>	<b>Introduction</b> .....	<b>53</b>
<b>3.1</b>	<b>Hegemonic Stability Theory</b> .....	<b>55</b>
<b>3.1.1</b>	<b>Historical origins</b> .....	<b>55</b>
<b>3.1.2</b>	<b>Scholarly definitions &amp; Characteristics of a Hegemon</b> .....	<b>56</b>
<b>3.1.2.1</b>	Political influence.....	<b>57</b>
<b>3.1.2.2</b>	Economic Power and Military Muscle.....	<b>58</b>
<b>3.1.2.3</b>	Establishment of Institutions & Ideology.....	<b>58</b>
<b>3.3</b>	<b>Counter-Hegemony</b> .....	<b>59</b>
<b>3.4</b>	<b>RI Theory</b> .....	<b>59</b>
<b>3.4.1</b>	<b>Definition</b> .....	<b>59</b>
<b>3.4.2</b>	<b>Historical Origins of RI</b> .....	<b>60</b>
<b>3.5</b>	<b>Economic integration theory</b> .....	<b>61</b>
<b>3.5.1</b>	<b>Preferential Trade Arrangements (PTAs)</b> .....	<b>62</b>
<b>3.5.2</b>	<b>Free Trade Area (FTA)</b> .....	<b>63</b>
<b>3.5.3</b>	<b>Customs Union (CU)</b> .....	<b>64</b>
<b>3.5.4</b>	<b>Economic Union</b> .....	<b>66</b>
<b>3.6</b>	<b>Conclusion</b> .....	<b>67</b>
	<b>CHAPTER 4 - BENEFITS AND CHALLENGES OF RI</b> .....	<b>69</b>
<b>4.0</b>	<b>Introduction</b> .....	<b>69</b>
<b>4.1</b>	<b>Consensus on RI</b> .....	<b>70</b>
<b>4.2</b>	<b>Benefits of RI</b> .....	<b>71</b>
<b>4.2.1</b>	<b>Trade Creation &amp; Trade Diversion</b> .....	<b>72</b>
<b>4.2.2</b>	<b>Investment</b> .....	<b>74</b>

4.2.3	<b>The impact on Human Development and poverty .....</b>	<b>74</b>
4.3	<b>Challenges of RI.....</b>	<b>75</b>
4.3.1	<b>The unwillingness of member states to cede their sovereignty .....</b>	<b>75</b>
4.3.2	<b>.....</b>	<b>76</b>
4.3.3	<b>Overlapping membership.....</b>	<b>77</b>
4.4	<b>The EU .....</b>	<b>79</b>
4.4.1	<b>Case Study: The EU Economic Integration Process.....</b>	<b>79</b>
4.5	<b>SADC.....</b>	<b>85</b>
4.5.1	<b>Transition from SADCC to SADC .....</b>	<b>86</b>
4.5.1.1	<b>SADC Finance and Investment Protocol.....</b>	<b>88</b>
4.5.1.2	<b>Consensus to establish a Common Market by 2015 .....</b>	<b>89</b>
4.5.1.3	<b>SADC Trade Protocol.....</b>	<b>89</b>
4.5.1.4	<b>SADC Free Trade Area (FTA) .....</b>	<b>90</b>
4.6.0	<b>Formation of the AU.....</b>	<b>90</b>
4.6.1	<b>Formation of NEPAD.....</b>	<b>91</b>
4.6.2	<b>Progress and setbacks .....</b>	<b>92</b>
4.7	<b>Conclusion .....</b>	<b>94</b>
	<b>CHAPTER 5 - SOUTH AFRICA'S ROLE IN AFRICA'S RI AGENDA .....</b>	<b>95</b>
5.0	<b>Introduction.....</b>	<b>95</b>
5.1	<b>South Africa's role in SADC &amp; Africa .....</b>	<b>96</b>
5.1.1	<b>South Africa in the AU &amp; NEPAD .....</b>	<b>99</b>
5.1.3	<b>South Africa's foreign policy in Africa .....</b>	<b>102</b>
5.1.3.1	<b>The National Development Plan 2030 (NDP) .....</b>	<b>102</b>
5.2	<b>What is Hegemony? .....</b>	<b>107</b>
5.3	<b>South Africa's character traits as Hegemon.....</b>	<b>108</b>
5.4	<b>South Africa and Nigeria: Statistical Contestation for Hegemon.....</b>	<b>115</b>
	<b>Source: SIPRI 2014 .....</b>	<b>117</b>
5.5	<b>Nigeria's role in West Africa.....</b>	<b>119</b>
5.6	<b>Conclusion .....</b>	<b>122</b>
	<b>CHAPTER 6 - CONCLUSION &amp; RECOMENDATIONS .....</b>	<b>123</b>
6.0	<b>Introduction.....</b>	<b>123</b>
6.1	<b>Conclusion .....</b>	<b>125</b>
6.2	<b>Recommendations .....</b>	<b>139</b>

**7. Bibliography .....146**

**List of Tables & Figures**

Figure 1 Share of total Southern African GDP by country.....32

Figure 2 Overlapping Regional Memberships of African-states.....77

Figure 3 A regional map of SADC.....87

Table 1 Military expenditure in selected Sub-Saharan African countries.....116



# **CHAPTER 1 - BACKGROUND & INTRODUCTION**

## **1.0 Introduction**

Regional Integration Agreements (RIAs) have been around for centuries. Since the early 1950s, the EU has been a pioneer in RI (Cameron, 2010). RI is the process that occurs when states that share a common defined geographical area voluntarily surrenders their sovereignty in one or more areas to carry out specific transactions, in view of achieving a goal(s) or enjoying specific benefits to a higher degree than they would if isolated. RI is considered as an important route towards attaining development of income, trade and bargaining power (Gibb, 2007).

World economies gave revived increased levels of interest and have thus devoted much attention and time in making RI schemes within their own regions a success for their political, economic, social and cultural benefit (Chauvin & Gaulier, 2002). Implementation of RI schemes are a way of overcoming the increased global competition in trade, all of these increased levels of competition is mostly attributed to the increased prevalence of globalization where the world continues to merge to create quick and linkages characteristic of a global village (Chauvin & Gaulier, 2002). Most countries in the world are part of one or two RI communities and Africa is no different. RI can take different forms such as economic integration and political integration. In most cases economic integration precedes political integration and that if the first one fails the second one does not materialize. For example, the EAC, which was established in 1967 and disbanded in 1977. This meant that political integration could not materialize in East Africa. This chapter will focus on briefly discussing the conceptualization of RI. It will also trace the origins of RI, which is important in

understanding RI and why African states have tended to make example of the European integration in their own integration initiatives. Thereafter, this chapter will discuss integration in Southern Africa.

## **1.1 Conceptualization of RI**

RI is the process or situation where states in a defined geographical area voluntarily surrender their sovereignty in one or more areas to carry out specific transactions, in view of achieving a goal(s) or enjoying specific benefits to a higher degree than they would individually (Fye & Senghor, 2015). The term 'integration' therefore describes an activity that involves bring parts of an object in to a complete whole (Mutharika, 1972). The parts of objects brought together to form a collective, are a group of individual states. A study of RI involves a study into the way in which units come together to share their decision making authority or sovereignty with an emerging international organization (Schmitter, 1970).

The prominent way, which regions use to achieve their integration, is through RIAs (Madyo, 2008). RIAs are agreements that can be entered into by two or more countries that are, or are not part of the same geographical location for purposes of unifying their social, political or economies structures (Rathumbu, 2008). Looking at RI from this vantage point, we can safely say that the pull and push factors force countries to come together. They are either attracted by the regional body due to what it promises to offer them or join a regional body with the hope of finding solutions to internal (national) challenges. In both instances, countries join the regional body voluntarily. Any forced RI would not work. This is the broader context within which RI in the SADC region as discussed in this study is conceptualized.



## **1.2 Origins of RIAs**

An example of this is the customs of Union of the provinces of France, which was proposed in 1644 (Schiff & Winters, 2003). RIA's have been around for many years. Mattli (1999) recounts examples of the first major voluntary RI initiatives to have appeared in the period of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Mattli (1999) also cites Prussia establishment of a customs union with Hesse-Darmstadt and later developments of the Bavaria Wurttemberg CU, the Middle German Commercial Union, the German Monetary Union, and finally the German Reich. It was these integration efforts that gave rise to the Swiss market and political union in 1848, and later gave rise to political and economic unification in the Risorgimento movement in Italy (Mattli, 1999). In the 1930s when the world trade system underwent a fragmentation, regional preferences were adopted as one of the solutions to this problem (Schiff & Winters, 2003). The process of voluntary RI schemes can be traced back to nineteenth century Europe.

## **1.3 RIAs in Europe**

Since the early 1950s, the EU has been a pioneer in RI (Cameron, 2015). The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was formed out of concerns to preserve the European economies after the Second World War (Schmitter, 1970). In 1958 the ECSC grew to become the European Economic Community (ECC) which was later renamed the (EC) in 1992, and then European Union (EU) in 1997. The purpose of RI initiative was to advance economic growth. The successful integration of the EU that has been securely established today has undergone much economic hardships and political hostilities. In yielding their sovereignty, member states of the EU collaborated to form a supranational unit. Over the years RIAs s have multiplied and

this has increased the importance of regional state member countries in politics, money and trade (Mattli, 1999). RI has not been restricted and exclusive to Europe. The model of RI has been presented as the blueprint for African nation states to achieve successful RI. Developing countries are turning to RIAs as a mechanism for promoting development. However, interest in RI has also been resurrected in developed regions of the world (Melo & Panagariya, 1995). This has happened either within the context of globalization or for other reasons. RI has been one of the major developments in international relations such that virtually all countries are members of one regional bloc (Schiff & Winters, 2003).

Academic work on the EU has generated much conceptual literature because of the high level of success that is attributed to it. The EU model of RI is described as a “stunning instance of state cooperation and concomitant institutionalization” (Rosamond, 2000:1). Cameron (2010) argues that EU model is the most developed globally and it serves as an example that RI could work worldwide. According to Larsen (2004) the EU is a unit that has a duty to take on leading roles in international challenges and it has managed well its domestic affairs.

The EU is founded on the rule of law; there are EU treaties, which govern operations within the EU constituency and international operations. This bears the significance that every state belonging to the EU, may not violate any of the rule of law specified within the treaty (Pech, 2012). The core objectives of the EU are to promote Union’s value, peace and the welfare of the people within the Union. Furthermore, the Union has added objectives, which are meant to support the core objectives, listed above. These objectives include fostering an internal market where competition is free and

undistorted; and the promotion of social justice and protection, and solidarity among Member States (Eur

In the EU constitutional framework, the EU objectives and the rule of law are treated to the utmost importance and used as a yardstick for checking the actions of the member states. Member states that are found to be in violation of the treaties, the law or the judgement of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) where there are often penalties imposed (Pech, 2012). In 2004, there were 144 cases brought before the ECJ, where member states were found to have failed to meet its requirements under community law. The total number of proceedings that were submitted by the Commission against member states increased to 2.497 since 1952. On the 12 July 2005, a judgement was made on the case brought forward by the Commission against the French Republic. It was for the first time that the ECJ ruled that a member state must pay a hefty fine and a periodic penalty payment for the continuous failure to obey Community law. This was after France's persistence failure to comply with Community processes for the preservation of fisheries. Between 1984 and 1987 the ECJ had already found France to have contravened Community law by allowing the sale of undersized fish. In so doing undermining the one of the Community's objectives of managing and preserving fish resources (Europa.eu, 2005).

#### **1.4 RIA's in Other Parts of the World**

MERCUSOR , the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), Asia, Pacific, Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC) are some of the Regional Blocs that have been created in other parts of the world apart from those in Europe and Africa. MERCUSOR is made up of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay (Mattli, 1999), NAFTA consists of the USA, Canada

and Mexico joined NAFTA in 1994 (Mattli, 1999), ASEAN which currently made up of 10 member states consisting of Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam (Ginbar, 2010). APEC which Mattli (1999) describes as one of Regional blocs that has experienced immense rapid expansion, was established in 1989 by the joint efforts of Australia, Japan, New Zealand, Canada, South Korea, the USA and the ASEAN countries . Today APEC boasts 21 members (Bergstein, 2011).

### **1.5. RI in Africa**

Regional economic integration has a fairly long-standing history in virtually all parts of Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) (Sarpn.org, 2005). The initial roots of Pan-Africanism can be traced back to where ideological philosophy of a united Africa became a direct response to the western colonialism and European slavery that was present in Africa. It was George Padmore and Le'opold Senghor that led Pan-African "campaign against the destructive against the destructive legacies of the Berlin Conference (1884; 1885) and triggered the belief that Africans, whether born on the continent or abroad, should be unified as part of a global African community" (Tavares & Tang, 2011: 217). Moreover, leaders such as Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana, called for the integration of Africa already soon after independence (Sarpn.org, 2005). However, it was only in the 1970s and 1980s that tangible steps were taken to establish economic integration institutions in all sub-continents regions (Sarpn.org, 2005). According to the UNCTAD (2008), Africa boasts the longest tradition of regional cooperation, and this is evident in its trade and monetary schemes are the oldest amongst developing regions of the world. Africa revived serious efforts towards regional integration schemes in the beginning of the 1990's after the demise of the apartheid regime of

South Africa (UNCTAD, 2008). The time that Africa has been actively experimenting with economic integration is estimated to be around half a century (Chauvin & Gaulier, 2002).

## **1.6 Pan Africanism & RI**

Pan Africanism embodies a political, economic, social and cultural movement that seeks to unify political divisions that exist on the African Continent (Maloka, 2001). Mazrui distinguishes between two forms of pan Africanism. There is Pan African liberation (Mazrui, 1995). This form of pan Africanism is characterized by the freedom of African states from the rule of their colonial powers (Mazrui, 1995). Mazrui states that pan African liberation has been successful in the latter part of the 20<sup>th</sup> century since African states are no longer under the oppressive rule of formal colonial powers (Mazrui, 1995). The second form of Pan Africanism Mazrui (1995) discusses is the Pan Africanism of integration or RI as referred to in this study. According to de Mabior (2008) unity is one of the major challenges that Africans face today. Pan Africanism of integration has failed dismally on the African Continent and this is reflected through unsuccessful RI efforts. Pan Africanism as a political philosophy or ideology seeks to enhance the liberation of African way of life independent of the imposed ideologies of the Western world on African states. Pan Africanism as an ideology would therefore reject African motives of implementing the European blueprint to RI on the African continent.

## **1.7 African Renaissance**

African Renaissance is a term that was popularised by former president of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki during his 1998 speech to the Constitutional assembly of South

Africa (Bongmba, 2004; Maloka, 2001). The term African renaissance has the undeniable quality traits and characteristics of Pan Africanism. The term African renaissance is a new form of Africanism that seeks to promote a new political culture that offers new opportunities for African states to improve their social conditions (Bongmba, 2004). It “calls for the liberalisation of African states and their economies; the institution of values that must replace corruption and incompetence; as well as seeking the peaceful resolution of conflicts, and encouraging an Africa-centred engagement that will promote trade and sustainable development” (Bongmba, 2004: 291). In South Africa, it was Mbeki’s African renaissance that popularized terms such as Ubuntu. The term Ubuntu, a concept that has been around and gained popularity. According to (Bogmba, 2004) the concept '*Ubuntu*' makes reference to 'humanity' or 'humanness'.

In the continent of Africa, there are a number of Regional Economic Communities (RECs) that have been established in order to meet this need for integration on the African continent (Davies, 1996). The formation of the unification of states into supranational units has been the strategy to overcome challenges that have been brought about globalization. An array of RECs, including eight considered as the building blocks of the African Economic Community have been established. These eight are: Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), East African Community (EAC), Economic Community For Central African States (CEEAC-ECCAS), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Intergovernmental Authority on Government (IGAD) and SADC (Uneca.org, 2015).

## **1.8 Challenges Facing RI in African**

RI initiatives remain a major challenge in Africa because African states are burdened with obstacles of political instability, corruption, economic fragilities, high levels of poverty, lowest share of world trade, and poor development rates of human capital and poor infrastructure (Madyo, 2008). Although there have been numerous commitments to create integration, Africa has the lowest percentage of trade within the region of 12% worldwide as compared to the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) which has 25%, and the EU which has over 60% (Ko, 2013). Another hindrance to regional communities is the high transactional cost of conducting business which stems from overlapping membership of regional bodies, and also the lack of adequate infrastructure, the nature of its trade and non-trade barriers (Nagar & Daniel, 2014). This means that while Africa has joined the rest of the world in terms of establishing regional blocs, it is clear that there are still a number of hurdles the continent has to contend with. As such, RI efforts are facing a number of challenges. However, this does not deter Africans from pushing for RI because they believe that a lot could be achieved through joint effort than if each country were to operate as a separate and individual entity. The economies of African nation-states are characterized by weak growth rates. RI therefore presents opportunity for African nation-states to achieve and experience significant economic growth levels (Chauvin & Gaulier, 2002). RI presents itself as the most ideal mechanism due to the fact that the economies of most African states are too weak and hence lack the negotiation power to be taken seriously by the more influential economic trading blocs (Chauvin & Gaulier, 2002).

Challenges facing RI in Africa has contributed to the lack of success of RI schemes. The hindrances facing RI in Africa are those of overlapping membership, where African states in one geographical region are members of other regional bloc within more or less, a common geographical space (Chauvin & Gaulier, 2002). Attempts at RI in East Africa happened much earlier. As mentioned above, the East African Community (EAC) was established in 1967. This followed earlier attempts by the British Government to push for RI in East Africa as a way of bringing together countries in that region and keep administrative costs manageable. But the EAC only lasted for ten years as it was dissolved in 1977.

### **1.9 The History of RI in Southern Africa**

RI efforts in Southern Africa began with the South African Customs Union (SACU). SACU was originally formed in 1910 with its founding members being South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. When Namibia gained independence in 1990, it became a fifth member to formally attain SACU membership status these five countries are referred to as the BLSN (Botswana, Lesotho, South Africa and Namibia) (Chauvin & Gaulier, 2002). Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), which had the initial name as the Preferential Trade Area (PTA), was established in the latter part of 1981. COMESA's initial purpose was to launch a combined market by 2000 and eventually the establishment of an economic union (Chauvin & Gaulier, 2002). By the year 1990 members of COMESA included Angola, Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. In 1994 Madagascar and Mauritius joined COMESA, and in 1996 saw



Mozambique and Lesotho revoke their COMESA membership (Chauvin and Gaulier, 2002)

It was in 1980 that nine Southern African states - Angola, Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, Lesotho, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe came together to establish the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) (Heinonen, 2006; Amin, 1987). SADCC was formed in terms of the 'Lusaka Declaration: Southern Africa: Towards Economic Liberation.' (Schoeman, 2002: 2). The main objective of SADCC was to reduce reliance on the Apartheid government of South Africa (Kok, 2015; Schoeman, 2002; Amin, 1987). The formation of the SADCC was "a defence mechanism by the Front Line States (FLS) to the PW Botha government in South Africa's idea of a constellation of states in the region" (Schoeman, 2002: 2). Although South Africa was not included in the SADCC during its establishment; the formation of the SADCC was the initiation of the first step toward the RI process in Southern Africa (Heinonen, 2006; Scheoman, 2002; Amin, 1987).

The formation of SADC was a result of or response to changing international trends and demands. It was also a response to a changed political climate within the region (Schoeman, 2002). One of the major political changes that took place was the unbanning of the African National Congress and the release of former President Nelson Mandela and other leaders of the liberation movement (Schoeman, 2002). SADC was established in order to create the enabling environment that would allow for a deep integration between its member states (Schoeman, 2002). As years passed by, this regional body's agenda was expanded to accommodate the demands of the time.

SADC is generally perceived as one of the wealthiest regions in Africa (Chauvin & Gaulier, 2002). With the abolishment of the apartheid regime, South Africa being the largest economy in SADC and the second largest economy in Africa, provides the basis for successful economic corporation in the Southern African region (Chauvin & Gaulier, 2002). SADC strives to achieve successful integration founded upon the mutual aspirations that bind its fourteen member states within SADC (Southafrica.info, 2015). The promotion of peace, security and economic growth are its core objectives. Amongst others, it aims to create common political values, systems and institutions amongst its member states (Southafrica.info, 2015). Included in the list of focal areas are: development, poverty alleviation, human rights, the rule of law and many others that are promoted (Southafrica.info, 2015). Countries of SADC include Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe (Southafrica.info, 2015). Over the last two decades SADC has adopted over thirty protocols and declarations to harmonize policies and legislation, however the problem lies in the weak integration and implementation of these policies across all SADC states at national level (Adebajo, 2014).

In 2005 The Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISD) of SADC was presented at the SADC Summit and it was approved in 2003, its effective implementation began in 2005. The RISD is a complete fifteen-year tactical roadmap, which presents strategic directions for achieving SADC's long-term social and economic goals (SADC, 2012). The RISD briefly examines the SADC Framework for integration, economic, human and social trends and also identifies gaps, current policies and strategies within SADC (SADC, 2012).

## **1.10 Benefits of RI**

According to Wentworth & Chikura (2013) the goal of regional economic integration is driven by the unification of markets with benefits of improved trade and unrestricted movements of factors of production. States integrate regionally to reap efficiency gains, exploit economies of scale, and reduce the thickness of borders (de Melo & Tsikata, 2014). RI is therefore an important mechanism for the development of income, trade and bargaining power (Gibb, 2007). As mentioned earlier, there are a specific number of possible reasons that governments may want to take their nations to a regional bloc. The reasons include convenient and easy access to markets, promotion of security and democracy, and promotion of foreign investment, economic growth, and trade liberalization (Schiff & Winters, 2003).

RIAs present both traditional and non-traditional benefits and gains (Saprn.org, 2005). Traditional gains that have already been mentioned include Trade gains through open regionalism arrangements, increased returns and increased competition, and attraction of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) (Saprn.org, 2015). Non-traditional gains from RIAs include “lock into domestic reforms”, signaling, insurance, co-ordination and bargaining power, and security (Saprn.org, 2005). The importance of serious efforts toward RI is being felt across the continent. The fact that African leaders are now voluntarily requesting for a free trade area by 2017 serves as evidence of this renewed interest by African leaders to RI (Ko, 2013).

Another benefit of RI is the collective power that it gives member states. Regional economic blocs have a stronger voice internationally (NEPRU, 2012). Put succinctly, countries across the globe view RI in a good light because they believe that they stand

to benefit from shared resources. While it is true that being a member of a regional bloc sometimes weakens national sovereignty and independent action, it appears that the advantages of becoming a member of a regional bloc outweigh the disadvantages. This is true for Africa as it is true for the entire world. It is for this reason that RI is not only an African phenomenon but includes the global community as evidenced, for example, by the EU.

### **1.11 The importance of a hegemon in a Regional Bloc**

With every regional economic community lies a regional hegemon or dominant power in that region. Hegemonic countries are those considered to have a major large advantage over all other countries in the custody of such resources (McKeown, 1983). Such an advantage is presumed to translate into unusually great influence over the actions of other countries (McKeown, 1983). It suffices to say hegemonic status could be derived from political or economic power. In other instances this status could be derived from both sources of power. Like in the global arena, in RIA's the existence of a hegemonic power is needed due to the fact that it is more conducive to development of strong regimes whose rules are relatively precise and well obeyed by other member states.

There are four criteria that are generally proffered as characterizing a state as a hegemon in a regional bloc. These are said to be: claim to leadership, power resources, employment of foreign policy instruments and an acceptance of the leadership role (Flemes, 2007). In the SADC region, South Africa is recognized as the hegemonic power in the region due to the fact that it is the largest contributor and investor in SADC member states. South Africa contributes sixty three per cent of the

aggregate GDP of SADC (Hartzenberg & Kalenga, 2015). Another characteristic that distinguishes South Africa from other SADC member states as a hegemon is the fact that it enjoys a far stronger and well-diversified economy in comparison to the other member states of the SADC region. South Africa is also privileged to have the most business linkages with industrialized states across the globe (Draper et al., 2006). South Africa's major trading partners are those in Europe, North America and Japan (McGowan & Ahwireng-Obe, 1998).

Moreover, in comparison to the other SADC member states, South Africa harnesses the strongest military capability. Based on these facts, it should not come as a surprise that South Africa has been accorded a higher status in the SADC region, both in the political and economic fronts. On the political front, South Africa has played a mediating role in a number of countries in the region. The list includes countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Mozambique, Lesotho, and Zimbabwe. South Africa's political significance has even transcended the regional geographical boundaries. The country has lent a hand in other countries in different parts of the African continent. These countries include: Burundi, Sudan, South Sudan, Central African Republic, Mali, and many others. This is what happens when a country is accorded a hegemonic status either overtly or covertly (Ogunnubi, 2013).

On the economic front, South Africa's economy is undoubtedly the strongest in the region. Given this economic strength, South Africa has provided financial assistance to a number of SADC member states at different moments. Some of the beneficiaries include Swaziland and Zimbabwe although these are not the only ones (Ogunnubi,

2013). However, it is worth noting that not everyone accepts South Africa's hegemonic status (Ogunnubi, 2013).

Those who question South Africa's economic and political dominance cite instances where the country has not done well. In the political sphere, they argue inter alia that South Africa's has failed to resolve the political crisis in Zimbabwe and the fact that South African soldiers failed to deal with the rebels in the Central African Republic – an incident which resulted in the death of more than ten South African soldiers.

The critics also question South Africa's economic hegemonic status, not only in the SADC region alone but also on the African continent as a whole. The debasing of Nigeria's economy and the announcement in 2014 that Nigeria has overtaken South Africa as the African continent's strongest economy is used to buttress the assertion that South Africa is not as economically strong as we want to believe. But despite these criticisms, the reality of the matter is that South Africa remains a force to be reckoned with in Africa in general and in the SADC region in particular. As things stand, South Africa remains SADC's dominant force. This can be gleaned from the country's infrastructure, GDP, diversified economy, stable political environment and many such characteristic features. Based on these factors, RI in the SADC region would be difficult (if at all possible) without South Africa's involvement. As history shows, regional blocks formed in a bid to ostracize apartheid South Africa failed because individual member states still relied on South Africa for their survival.

## **1.12 SA to lead or Not to Lead SADC - The Debate**

South Africa has increased its trade dominance in Africa. It is a full-blown member of BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) since 2011. The EU also remains South Africa's biggest trading partner compared to other SADC countries (Bezuidenhout & Claassen, 2013). Furthermore, as mentioned above, South Africa has also contributed to peacekeeping and peace building initiatives on the African continent (Kok, 2015). South Africa has also contributed to the progress made by the AU and New Economic Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). Moreover, South Africa is the biggest investor in SADC member states and undoubtedly has the largest GDP in the region.

Although South Africa is the dominant force in the SADC region, there is a debate as to whether South Africa should lead RI within SADC. Those in favour of South Africa as a leader of RI in SADC argue that South Africa has become an important role player in peace keeping and peace building on the African continent, has contributed to the growth of the African Union (AU) and APSA, is the biggest investor in the SADC countries and is also the biggest financial contributor to the region (Kok, 2015). 82% of the net GDP of SADC comes from South Africa (Hassan, 2015). South Africa's actions are often viewed with a sense of distrust both in Africa and in the SADC region.

This sense of distrust stems from the fact that South Africa is perceived as a hegemonic bully in the region. Some argue that South Africa cannot be a leader of RI in SADC because of its inability to effectively address domestic problems of crime, inequality, and poverty. Those that hold this view believe that a leader should lead by

example, having first dealt with in-house problems. Prevalent xenophobic attacks such as those of 2008 and 2015 are also given as reasons why South Africa cannot lead RI in SADC. South Africa's inconsistencies in its foreign policy, and the lack of representative staff in the SADC headquarters have been used to strengthen the arguments of its inability to lead SADC.

While these accusations are plausible, the question becomes: which country in the region does not have its internal or domestic problems? Even more importantly, if South Africa were to be ripped off its hegemonic status, which SADC country would take its place? Would that country be able to provide economic and political support to the region in the same or better manner than South Africa has done? The answer to the last question is an emphatic no. Thus, from the look of things it appears that despite the real challenges faced by South Africa at the moment, there is enough evidence to suggest that the country still remains better positioned to lead the region. Indeed, this is a bitter pill to swallow for those who do not approve of South Africa's hegemonic status.

### **1.13 Theories used in the study**

The theoretical framework is discussed in detail in Chapter 3 of this dissertation. However, the theories that guided the study are introduced in this first chapter with the aim to prepare the reader's mind-set. These are: hegemonic stability theory (HST) and RI theory.



### 1.13.1 Hegemonic Stability Theory

HST has been used to explain how successful cooperation in the international system can be achieved (Snidal, 1985). Kindleberger (1973) being the first to advance this theory argues that the lack of a world leader with a leading economy was partially the cause for the economic disarray between interwar periods that led to the Great Depression. HST argues that international economic openness and stability is most likely to occur when there is a single dominant state present (Webb & Krasner, 1989). The beginning of the HST can be traced back to the period of the 1950s when Organski claimed that there was a relation between British hegemony and the rise of free trade in the nineteenth century (Organski 1958). The basis of this “hegemonic cooperation” is the leadership of the hegemonic state; its appeal rests on attractive implications about distribution (Snidal, 1985).

The presence of a hegemon is an important feature of international systems that participate in long-term co-operation. The HST reveals that RI would stand a chance of being more successful in regions that have a regional hegemon capable of creating and maintaining regional economic institutions (Alden & Lepere, 2009). This study made use of the HST because the study wanted to argue that there is a need for a leader for RI to be sustainable, and HST is in support of that view. It was perceived to be the best theory that explains the hegemony’s effects on international economic relations. Moreover, it was felt that the HST would aid in assessing whether South Africa is a regional hegemon or not, and whether South Africa has the capacity to lead RI in the SADC region or not.

### 1.13.2 RI Theory

Essentially, the theoretical foundations of conventional approaches to RI can be traced back to three important schools of political and economic thought, which are Marxist, neoclassical and developmental economics. The stages of integration are a good roadmap for any country whose intention is to integrate. RI theory states that countries, which share the same geographical region or common neighbouring space, collaborate to achieve political unity, economic unity and enhance the general quality of life for the citizens of member states of the region. RI theory is made up of two primary components. These are: economic integration and political integration. Economic integration is identified and distinguished by four stages of economic integration, namely Free Trade Area (FTA), Customs Union (CU), Common Market (CM), and an Economic Union (EU).

Both the HST and the RI theory are useful for this study because they give a sense of the level of progress experienced by Southern Africa with regards to RI. These two theories may also shed insight on that which can be done to overcome the constraints of successful RI in the SADC region.

### 1.13.3 Research Methodology

This research is analytical research and therefore employed the qualitative research approach, it also analyses existing information and makes a critical evaluation of the information. This research took the form of applied research because the study aimed at finding a solution to the immediate problem of the failure of RI in the Southern African region. The bulk of the study was based on desktop research and document analysis. Materials sourced for information included journal articles, books and

existing dissertations and newspaper articles that deal with the subject of RI, Regionalism, RECs, South Africa's role in SADC and on the African continent. Other materials having any relevant information regarding RI, South Africa's position on the region as well as the whole of Africa, and its relationship with other international countries was used. Obtained data was analysed thematically. Where necessary, statistical data obtained from the sources enumerated above will be presented in the form of tables, a charts and a map.

#### 1.13.4 Research aims and objectives

In terms of political and economic development RI remains one of the most important mechanisms for achieving such. The need for a hegemon is a requirement for ensuring a successful integration Agreements. The central aim of this research is to assess the possibilities that South Africa could assume leadership role in spearheading successful RI in Southern Africa. This research will assess whether South Africa is the best country in the continent to lead integration in SADC, an important step toward achieving more solidified unity amongst African states.

Besides the research objectives above, that guided the study, there are research questions the study intends to address. This research plans to address the following questions:

- Why has RI in Southern Africa been hard to achieve?
- What is South Africa's role in the RI processes in the SADC region?
- Is the decision to place more emphasis on the EU model of integration beneficial to Southern Africa?
- What are the barriers to inter-regional trade in Africa?

- Is South Africa the dominant force in Africa and whether it is an exploitative supremacist?

#### **1.14 Significance of the study**

RI is important and because it is the most viable tool to make African countries relevant to the international arena. African countries operating independently as sole actors in international relations are at the present moment irrelevant. This study serves as a significant endeavour in clarifying South Africa's potential role as a leader of RI. It will serve as a future reference for researchers on the topic of RI and South Africa's role, RI initiatives in Africa.

The research will generate new information on the eligibility of South Africa being the driver of RI. It will help in showing where South Africa stands in the face of these new developments. This research will seek to assess whether South Africa is the best country in the continent to lead integration and thereby make Africa relevant to the rest of the world. This will be done within the broader RI debates that have been happened in the past few decades both the in the African and global contexts.

#### **1.15 Structure of dissertation**

##### **Chapter 1 Introduction & background**

Chapter one provides the background of the study and includes a discussion of the research objectives, research questions, and the significance of the study. A description of the research methodology for this study is also contained herein.

##### **Chapter 2 Literature review**

The Literature review chapter provides the most relevant and most recent literature pertaining to RI in Africa in general and in Southern Africa in respectively. The international literature on this theme will also be discussed. The reasons for and against South Africa being a leader of the integration process in Southern Africa will be discussed. Existing gaps in the literature will be identified and pointers given on how the present study will fill those gaps.

### **Chapter 3 Theoretical framework**

The theories used in this study will be discussed in detail in this chapter, namely. The HST and the RI Theory was used to guide the scope of the study and they will be dully discussed in order to justify their relevance to the study.

### **Chapter 4 Benefits and challenges of RI**

A general discussion on the benefits and disadvantages of RI will be the focus of chapter four. A review of the existing RI communities in Southern Africa will be discussed in order to assess their successes and failures. The chapter will make use of examples of successful RIs, such as the European Union (EU) as case studies that shall serve as reference points.

### **Chapter 5 South Africa's role in Africa's RI agenda**

Chapter five focuses on discussing the role and influence of South Africa in Southern Africa. The discussion will also include a discussion of the contestation between South Africa and Nigeria as the two leading economic powerhouses on the African continent. The basis of this discussion is to provide an insight into the assessment of South Africa's potential ability in leading the regional agenda in the SADC region.

### **Chapter 6 Recommendations and conclusion**

Chapter six concludes the study, further making recommendations and presenting the results of the analysis of the study.

### **1.16 Limitations of the Study**

One of the limitations to this study is that, there has not been a lot of scholarly articles on the new developments of South Africa coming second to Nigeria owing to Nigeria's take-over as the leading economy in Africa. This is not surprising given that the announcement has been made only recently in 2014. As such, scholars are still ruminating about it. However, since there is information already about the role that South Africa has played in the region, as well as that of the other countries, including Nigeria, the limitation may be eliminated. However, there is enough literature on RI which will provide the theoretical context of the study.

### **1.17 Conclusion**

Although the earliest RIAs can be traced to continent of Europe, the continent of Africa also has a long-standing integration attempts. RI in Europe can be traced back to nineteenth century. Integration in Europe has passed through a number of stages, leading to the formation of EU as we know it today. In Africa, formal steps towards integration were taken between 1970s and 1980s under the leadership of African leaders such as Kwame Nkrumah. RI initiatives remain a major challenge in Africa, the continent is grappling the weak economic status and the low levels of development while also trying to eliminate the unsettling effects of long standing colonialism.

The chapter discussed benefits and one of the benefits of RI is that it an important tool for trade, the development of income, and bargaining power. Furthermore, there is a recognizable role and importance of a regional hegemon in a region. The SADC has played a major role in RI attempts in the region of Southern Africa and it has also defined the RI in the region. The SADC's core objectives are to promote peace,

security and economic growth. It is usually the countries that have a considerably larger political and economic advantage over the other countries in the region that are hegemons.

In the SADC region, South Africa is argued to be the hegemonic power in the region due to its political and economic contributions to the SADC, currently; South Africa is the largest investor in SADC member states. However, contentions have risen more recently over the role of South Africa in the region and the rest of the continent of Africa. This chapter makes mention of the fact that there are clear disagreements and criticism levelled against South Africa and its arguably hegemonic status. There is a sense of mistrust against South Africa within the countries in the region.

Furthermore, this chapter listed and briefly discussed the theoretical framework that will guide this study: The Hegemonic Stability theory and the RI theory. The research aims and objectives were outlined in the chapter as well as the structure that the dissertation will take. Chapter two will then be a literature review of the study, in which differing arguments on RI in the Southern African region will be discussed.

## **CHAPTER 2 - LITERATURE REVIEW**

### **2.0 Introduction**

RI efforts have been slow and have failed to change the ill conditions and the realities in Africa, (Madyo, 2008). The African continent has long standing history of integration efforts, which have been traced back after independence between the 1970s and 1980s. Chapter one was the introduction of this study where a background was discussed and the main aim and the objectives of the study were discussed. This chapter will discuss the RI concept and history, so as to give an understanding of the historical significance of integration. This chapter will discuss the process of RI in Southern Africa. A number of arguments have centred on South Africa as a hegemon, this chapter will explore some of those arguments, the reasons for and against South Africa being accepted as a hegemonic leader. South Africa has emerged as the well-developed country in the region, compared to the other countries, (Davies (1996: 73). The monetary contribution that South Africa has made in the region will be discussed. The chapter also discusses some of the arguments levelled against the EU Model of integration in the African context. The importance of literature review is that it describes how study relates to similar studies done prior, it discusses ‘general’ and ‘specialized’ studies to the particular area of the research problem, ( Shi, 2006: 3).

### **2.1 The RI Concept & history**

Since the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the concepts and the theories of integration have undergone major significant changes. Most of the early literature on RI had much focus on shedding light on the European integration. Although attempts at RI in places like East and central Africa were made by the British authorities between the 1920s and



the 1940s it is back in 1952 that the earliest organized RI can be traced. Birthed from a reaction to the concern to preserve the Europe economies, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) came into existence (Schmitter, 1970:22). This was seen as a strategic move aimed at uniting Europe. This earliest integration grew in 1958 when this first organized integration developed into the European Economic Community (EEC). From the EEC, there came the European Community (EC) in 1992, and from EC it grew in 1997 to be the European Union (EU) as we know it today. Europe's main goal was for economic as well as security advancement, mainly because after the Second World War there was much economic difficulty.

When the war ended, majority of the European economic set up were found to have been built on the Bretton Woods Agreement provisions of 1944 in conjunction with the Marshal Plan which was an American aided program that was meant to assist European countries to rebuild their economies devastated by the war.

Amidst doubts and tensions between states, European nations pursued integration after much economic hardships and political hostilities. This was considered a big step, considering the fact that it required that they yield some parts of their sovereignty in order to form a supranational unit. Europe's successful construction of supranational organizations revealed a new trend that the world was assuming. By this time, the sway of Europe had already been passed to other countries by means of colonization (Schmitter, 1970). After independence, Asian, Latin American and African states were now adopting policies and structures that were inspired by the ones from European nations. For example, in Africa, the need for RI started to be realized in the early 1960's as many African states got independence. One of the earliest attempts at RI in Africa was with the formation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), which was mandated to foster unity amongst African states. The

economic realities of the continent forced the leaders to consider pursuing some form of economic integration, which would allow them to work together.

The late 20<sup>th</sup> century force of globalization took the concept of RI (and particularly economic integration) to a different level all together. The global trading and economic system had been changed with the formation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) to replace the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1994 and it's coming into effect in 1995. In the wake of globalization, the concept of RI gained momentum. The reality of a globalization basically made urgency for development and economic growth (Mistry, 1996). Currently, regional hegemons exist all around the world. These include France and Germany in Europe, India in South Asia, Japan in East Asia, and the United Kingdom. Southern Africa as a region also arguably has a regional leader being South Africa. South Africa has positioned itself as the dominant power in the Southern African Region after a transition from an apartheid regime to an all-inclusive post-apartheid rainbow nation. In that sense, RI is the concern of Africans too.

## **2.2 RIA**

RIAs are defined as agreements that can be entered into by two or more countries that are, or are not part of the same geographical location for purposes of unifying their social, political or economic structures (Rathumbu, 2008). Strong ties in the form of agreements bring together countries to form RECs (de Melo & Tsikata, 20014). States that consent to RECs agree to lower their tariff and non-tariff barriers so that the transaction costs could be lowered in the hope that this would lead to the achievement of higher levels of both static effects and dynamic effects (Madyo, 2008). Static effects are effects that are characterised by productive efficiency and consumer

welfare. The resolution of conflicts through strengthening economic ties, the promotion of regional security and political contact among member states are examples of static effects (Carbaugh, 2004). The dynamic effects of economic integration relate to member states' long-term rates of growth (Madyo, 2008). Apart from collective benefits that members of a REC may enjoy, REC can also enhance and solidify the individual domestic reforms of member states of a REC (Madyo, 2008).

Africa is known for its political instability and economic fragilities, high levels of poverty, lowest share of world trade, and poor development rates of human capital and infrastructure (Madyo, 2008). It is for this reason that REI makes for an ideal strategy for Africa. Although REI initiatives have been implemented in Africa the continent has been sluggish in achieving the resultant benefits that many industrialised states have managed to achieve (Madyo, 2008). The African continent faces leadership problems. Leaders are often vested in themselves. RI can only be successful with one regional leader. The leader has to be a state that has the characteristics of a benevolent hegemonic state which has interests to provide the collective good on behalf of REC member states (Giplin, 1981). According to Krapohl, Meissner & Muntschick (2014) the presence of a hegemon is a necessary supply condition for successful integration. The behaviour of hegemons in developing nations is very unpredictable and it is this volatility that results in an unstable economic integration process. The focus of this dissertation is to investigate the prospects and challenges of South Africa as a leader of REI of southern African RECs. Undertaking this investigation involved an analysis of the successes and failures of RI attempts in Southern Africa, and the prospects and challenges obtained from assessments of existing literatures on the social, economic and political

contributions made by South Africa towards its own national development and the development of other southern African states.

### **2.3 What is RI?**

RI is not a new occurrence. Its process dates back to the period where RI was forced or involuntary (Mattli, 1999). Since the period preceding the end of the Cold war numerous integration organisations have been established and old ones have been revived (Heinonen, 2006). RI is voluntary and the first voluntary form of RI appeared in the 19<sup>th</sup> century in Europe. Today the theory and practice of RI has gained significant amount of attention and popularity practically all over the world (Heinonen, 2006). This popularity of RI has caused a boom in RI schemes and has increased the importance of regional groups in the domain of politics, economics and trade (Mattli, 1999). A precise definition of RI is not easy to formulate (Soomer, 2003). According to Haas (1971) fifteen years of work has not been enough to create a clear definition on the subject.

According to Mutharika (1972) the term ‘integration’ means to bring parts of an object in to a complete whole. RI leads to a circumstance in which a group of people within a territory experience a sense of community, institutions and practices that are solid enough to guarantee, for a long time, reliable expectations of peaceful change among its population (Hartzenberg, 2011). For RI to occur, two or more national economies have to come together and develop a formal agreement regarding how they will conduct trade with each other (Mapuva & Mayengwa-Mapuva, 2014). Regional economic integration therefore involves the merging of various economies in a region into a single unit primarily for the purpose of economic development (Mutharika, 1972). According to Wentworth & Chikura (2013) the goal of regional economic

integration is driven by the unification of markets with benefits of improved trade and unrestricted movements of factors of production. Smaller economies within a given region are insignificant when they operate as sole entities rather than members of a RI initiative (Wentworth & Chikura, 2013; Soomer, 2003). RI may take the political, social and economic forms (Madyo, 2008). The prominent way which regions use to achieve their integration is through RI arrangements (Madyo, 2008).

#### **2.4 Definition of State Sovereignty**

Morgenthau defines 'sovereignty to be “ the supreme legal authority of the state to give and enforce the law within a certain territory and, in consequence, independence from the authority of any other state and equality with it under international law” (Morgenthau 1950, 249). Sovereignty according to (Heinonen, 2006) is a quality that can be attached only to a state. One of the first steps towards a successful unified regional bloc is that state leaders within the specific region combine their political will by ceding their sovereignty for the collective benefit of the regional bloc.

#### **2.5 Contentions of South Africa as Hegemony**

Southern Africa is made up of ten countries, namely Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia, and Zimbabwe (Resakss.org, 2013). Compared to the other geographical regions in Africa, the Southern African region makes up a larger share of continent's economy, with South Africa generating the largest GDP until recently (in 2014) when the country was said to have been overtaken by Nigeria ( Resakss.org, 2013).

Compared to the other countries in Southern Africa, South Africa has the largest GDP in the region. While Swaziland and Lesotho have the smallest GDP in the region (see Figure 1 below).




Figure 1. Share of total Southern African GDP by country Source: resakss.org

Chiroro (1994) states that the region has achieved a great degree of economic interdependence. The theory of hegemonic stability argues that, strong leadership is required in order to drive the RI initiatives in a manner that is mutually beneficial to all the states in the region (Draper, 2012). But does Southern Africa have the leadership capabilities? This brings the argument to the debates of whether or not South Africa is a hegemon in the region. Knowing this is important because the role of South Africa as the dominant hegemon both in Africa a whole and in the SADC region has been contested. South Africa's growing economic presence across the African continent has sparked debates in public and scholarly circles as to its intentions (Alden & Soko, 2005). Gibb (1997) assert that, since its democracy, South

Africa's role in the region has been highly criticized and has been caught up in debate resulting in conflicting interpretations.

South Africa's position and perceived role in Africa has been somewhat complex, that is owing to the differing views about South Africa's position and role in the region. Hanlon (1987), and Tostensen (1982) argue that interdependence amongst REC member states is vastly uneven and that it favours South Africa more than it does the other countries in the region. Hanlon (1987) and Tostensen (1982) are not the only ones who are of the view that South Africa has large benefits from the region and indeed from the continent at large. Before 1994, South Africa was not acknowledged as a legitimate state in the SADC region (Gibb, 1997). After the successful conclusion of its first democratic elections and the election of the new democratic national government things began to change. The successful conclusion to South Africa's first all-race elections in April 1994 marked a turning point for political and economic relations throughout the whole of Southern Africa (Gibb, 1998). This afforded the opportunity for South Africa to actively participate as a member in RECs (Gibb, 1997).

By 2000, South African direct investment in the thirteen SADC countries was above US\$5.4 billion (Chidushe, 2010). In 2001, the UK's investment in the region sat at R3.98 billion, coming second to South Africa at R14.8 billion (Alden & Pere, 2009). According to the classification of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) Human Development Index (HDI), South Africa is a medium-income country. Owing to South Africa's economic position and perceived role in the region as well as in the continent, some scholars argue that South Africa is a hegemonic state (Chidushe, 2010).

But, what is a regional hegemon? The term regional hegemony derives from the realist school. David Myers simply defines regional hegemony(s) as a state that possesses enough power that it is able to dominate lesser state systems. Mills & Soko (2007) argue that a lot of study on South Africa's foreign policy supports the view that South Africa falls within this realist positioning. The HST, which contends that international economic stability, informs perceptions as to South Africa is a hegemon or not, and advances openness as most probable where there is a single dominant state (Webb and Krasner, 1989).

Furthermore, Chidaushe (2010) argues that there is great expectation and continual pressure put by the international community on South Africa to guide and lead the rest of the continent. Some authors argue that South Africa is a hegemon in the region, citing mainly South Africa's economic prosperity which is richer in comparison to the rest of the countries in the region, while other scholars argue that, South Africa's actions in the region have not been reflective of a hegemonic leader. For example, South African companies in other African countries have been criticised for being exploitative. Available literature analysing the behaviour of these corporations and whether or not they are behaving any different from the transnational corporations (TNCs) "indicates that they are not interested in strengthening Africa's private sector and human resources and have their focus on profit-making", (Chidaushe, 2010:25).

Reports of worker exploitation are commonplace with low wages, contract workers and poor working hours characterizing working conditions for locals employed by South African corporations. Nearly all products and goods are imported as finished goods from South Africa denying local production and manufacturing opportunities and also undermining small – to medium-scale producers/businesses who often cannot survive the competition. Key management positions "are usually held by South



Africans”, (Chidaushe, 2010:25). South African interests of economic expansion are perceived as being no better than the exploitative aims of TNCs. Thus, in Africa “South Africa’s role is not always perceived positively. it is these same views undermine its so-called leading role in forging genuine partnership under the spirit of SADC”, (Chidaushe, 2010:25).

Existing literature points out that South Africa does have growing economic engagements in the region of Southern Africa, for instance, South Africa’s deepening economic engagement with Mozambique. Over the past decade Mozambique has risen as the biggest destination for South African investment, accounting for 49% of total Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) from the year 1997 to 2002. Mozambique has managed to rise above the dark past, and has managed to leverage its relationship with South Africa to its great benefit.

Over 250 South African companies have been involved in more than 320 projects and partnerships, registering an accumulated investment value of US\$1,330 billion by the end of 2003 (Grobelaar 2004: 30). There are certain criteria that automatically give South Africa the dominant hegemonic power in Africa and Southern Africa. According to Flesher (2007), regional powers can be distinguished by four pivotal criteria, namely, claim to leadership, power resources, and employment of foreign policy instruments and acceptance of leadership.

Firstly, South Africa has initiated and engaged with a number of multi-lateral initiatives at the regional and international levels. It is part of SACU, which is the oldest customs union in the world comprising Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland (or so-called BLNS states) and South Africa. South Africa contributes 98 per cent of SACU’s annual common revenue pool, which in 2009/10 represented

US\$3bn (Grobbelaar & Chen, 2014). South Africa is also a member of BRICS, which make it a potential bridge builder between developing and developed nations. South Africa is also among the biggest African contributors to multilateral peacekeeping operations through the African Union and the United Nations. South Africa has had expansive efforts in regional peace building over the past 20 years in Burundi, the DRC, Sudan, Somalia, and Madagascar. However, the country had less successful interventions in Côte d'Ivoire, Angola and Zimbabwe (Grobbelaar & Chen, 2014). Furthermore, South Africa is the biggest African investor in its region, and the second largest developing country investor in Africa after Malaysia, and is ahead of China (Grobbelaar & Chen, 2014). It occupies a prominent position within the region's political economy with its GNP twice as large as that of the rest of SADC as illustrated in fig. 1 above. From this vantage point, South Africa holds a commanding position in the region and the African continent as a whole, despite some challenges.

## **2.6 South Africa's monetary contribution to other countries**

According to Davies (1996), there are arguably three countries that function reasonably effectively in Southern Africa, although with some problems: Namibia, South Africa and Botswana. However, it is South Africa that has emerged as the well-developed country in comparison to the other countries. Internationally, South Africa is a member of the WTO, UN, and GATT. South Africa also holds membership in the G20; it is also a member of BRICS since 2011. Additionally, it is a member of the developed-oriented organization IBSA. In the region, South Africa is a member of the SADC, SACU, and the AU (Bouille, 2011). South Africa has managed to position itself as a pivotal state on the African continent.

The World bank classifies the South African economy as a “dual economy, with a developed, high-end economy that resembles that in Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development countries coexisting with a less developed, low-end economy functioning mostly in townships and informal settlements in urban areas and former homelands in rural areas”, (Mahajan, 2014: 26).

South Africa’s economy makes up 70 % of Southern Africa’s overall economy, and it makes up 40 % of the whole economy of the sub-Saharan Africa (Monyae, 2014). There are notable leadership roles that South Africa has played not only in the region but in the continent as well. General observation shows that South Africa has emerged as a major donor in the continent. Chidaushe asserts that many countries have been the recipients of aid from South Africa. A number of countries have received donations, even from and during the time South Africa was under the oppressive rule (Chidaushe, 2010). During the Post-Apartheid era there was a change, especially under the leadership of President Thabo Mbeki, when the idea of an African Renaissance was pioneered. This was because the Mbeki Administration sought to bring renewed hope to the African continent. Numerous African countries have been beneficiaries of aid from the African Renaissance Fund (ARF) through the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) (Chidaushe, 2010). The AU fund has assisted by providing financial support to peacekeeping and conflict resolution efforts in the DRC, Burundi and Mali (Chidaushe, 2010).

In 2011 South Africa gave 180 tons of emergency aid to Somalia, and shipped an additional 2000 to Somalia’s capital Mogadish. South Africa also provides 877 tons of fertilizer, 5 000 litres of bio pesticides and 12 000 protection kits for workers applying pesticides to Niger alone (News24.com, 2012). In 2013 alone, South Africa gave a total assistance of \$200 Million (globalhumanitarianassistance.org, 2013). 91%

of South Africa's total humanitarian assistance over the past decade has gone to states within Sub Saharan Africa. Furthermore, over the past decade, Mali has received \$3.6 million in humanitarian assistance from South Africa. Zimbabwe has received \$ 3.3 million in humanitarian assistance, and Somalia has received \$3.1 million (globalhumanitarianassistance.org, 2013). These three countries are the largest recipients of South Africa's humanitarian aid (globalhumanitarianassistance.org, 2013).

Approximately 70% of South African aid is currently targeted for SADC member states and, across the continent; the aid targets "general improvements in governance and local priorities such as conflict prevention, peacekeeping, resolution, mediation, post-conflict reconstruction, and research for development" (Chidaushe, 2010:28). It is a positive move to aspire and make efforts into having the biggest donor to Africa being from Africa because, "traditional Western aid has largely been criticized as being ineffective and undesirable, for being donor-driven, tied and linked to strategic political and economic interests of the donor countries rather than the needs of the poor. Despite decades of billions of aid, no positive and significant change or impact is visible on the ground" (Chidaushe, 2010: 27).

South Africa claims to aim to be a different donor to the continent, with a goal to foster a different model of aid delivery that is distinguishable from the traditional North- South donor hierarchies. South Africa aims at promoting cooperative engagement with its African countries (SAIIA, 2008). Chidaushe (2010) also argues that, South Africa has supported a number of projects across Africa through loans and grants and other financial and technical assistance under the African Renaissance Fund (ARF) pioneered by Former South African President, Thabo Mbeki. It has been estimated that for the year 2006, aid going out of the country is between 1 & 3 billion

ZAR, that is about 0.18 % of the annual budget (Chidaushe, 2010). At the same time, aid coming into the country only makes up 1% of the national budget (Chidaushe, 2010). Gibb argues that it is undeniable that South Africa's economy is the leading economy of the SADC region. In his view, it is probable that such domination of the South African economy is to extend into the future (Gibb, 1998). Alden & Le Pere (2009) makes an examination and analysis of the reasons behind the constraints on South African leadership. They assert that there is a “multi-faceted aspects of leadership dilemmas in the South African case” (Alden & Le Pere, 2009: 146). Statistics for the years 2003-2011 showed that Southern Africa makes an aggregate of 25.1 % Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (Alden and Le Pere 2009).

Alden and le Pere (2009) assert that despite the efforts that South Africa has made, it is becoming clearer that the South African government's efforts in taking decisions that are African driven are more commended in the global arena such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the G8 than they are within Africa. For example, more often, at important international meetings, South African diplomats have found themselves secluded from fellow African positions. The South African government has been rebuked by African states for the manner in which they dealt with mediation efforts in Ivory Coast and also in Zimbabwe (Alden and le Pere, 2009). There have also been contentions regarding the nature of South Africa's economic relations with other African countries. They see South Africa as looking for a way to control other African countries (Alden & Soko, 2005). In that sense, South Africa is portrayed as Africa's 'Big Brother' (Alden and le Pere, 2009: 13).

Much of the criticism comes from the fact that some of African states do not agree that South Africa is a hegemon. Consensus among the majority is important because, as Alden and le Pere (2009: 13) argue, “... real power comes not so much from

tangible resources as from the fact that the hegemon's ideology is acceptable to others, and forms a consensual order in its sphere of influence. The essence of hegemony is the power to persuade" (Alden and le Pere, 2009: 13). South Africa, under Mbeki's leadership, did certainly play a prominent role in helping to craft development strategies for Africa driven initiatives, especially in the form of NEPAD, representing Africa's interests in global forums as well as pursuing an active and consequential peace and diplomacy in difficult conflict theatres such as Burundi, the DRC and Cote d'Ivoire (Alden & Le Pere, 2009; Grobbelaar & Chen, 2014). However, this does not seem to have been enough to garner enough confidence and persuasion for South Africa to be regarded as a hegemon by some African states. For a hegemon to be a hegemon, it doesn't need acceptance as such by all states, but by the majority.

Alden and le Pere (2009) argue that South Africa is struggling to create a moral economy that is sensitive both to domestic needs and continental challenges. The recent xenophobic mayhem has demonstrated not only a highly atomized society with shallow roots in democracy and tolerance but also how poorly South Africa has internalized the seeming altruism it attempts to extend to Africa. As if providing incontrovertible evidence for the maxim, its own levels of inequality have led to a rise in social protest and the probability of political violence as was the case before the 2014 general election. A fragile welfare base exacerbates this: weak state protection for the poor, chronic levels of unemployment, a public health system in crisis, and elevated rates of crime and criminality (Alden & Le Pere, 2009).

According to Alden and le Pere (2009) the degree to which South Africa's hegemonic position can effectively be translated into a leadership role in Southern Africa depends upon two considerations. First, South Africa is still grappling with the challenges of

consolidating internal democratic transformation. The new political order still bears the deep scars of the apartheid legacy: vast social and economic problems. There is thus still a great reluctance on the part of politicians and policymakers to pursue policies that will undermine the interests of key domestic constituencies. Second, the region continues to suffer from a divisive historical legacy and, more significant, continuing tensions over issues of security, leadership and democracy.

Given its historical role in the political and economic destabilisation of the region, South Africa has been anxious to prove that it is a good regional citizen and has striven to ensure that it acts in a manner that does not undermine the cohesion of the SADC. Over the past few years, South African regional diplomacy has focused on building unity and consensus, tackling the SADC's institutional problems, and pursuing multilateral solutions to regional conflicts. Even so, South Africa's leadership role in Southern Africa – especially in conflict resolution – has not produced unqualified success, due to stiff resistance to South African efforts by some SADC countries (Alden and le Pere, 2003).

In particular, the leadership in Angola and the DRC (until Laurent Kabila's death) successfully resisted South African mediation efforts in their respective conflicts, while Pretoria's 'quiet diplomacy' over Zimbabwe has had little effect in moderating Robert Mugabe's conduct or satisfying the concerns of the G8 countries. The range of actions available to South Africa that would not exact costs in terms of SADC unity, domestic politics and relations with the West, turned out to be far smaller than policymakers in Pretoria had anticipated (Alden & le Pere 2003).

According to Grobblaar (2004) the overall South African trade with Africa has risen by more than 300% since 1994 (Grobblaar 2004). There remains, however, a vast

trade discrepancy between South Africa, which accounts for 40% of sub-Saharan Africa's total GDP, and its continental trade partners. South Africa's total trade with the rest of the continent remains heavily skewed in its favour: exports to Africa, mostly manufactured goods, increased from US\$1.3 billion in 1994 to US\$5.9 billion in 2003, while imports from Africa to South Africa increased from a low base of US\$0.4 billion to US\$1.2 billion during the same period (ibid.). This disparity, which has been a source of friction between South Africa and its continental trade partners, is concrete.

An article titled "South Africa in Africa," written by Adebajo, et al (2007) aptly raises the fundamental question on the nature of partnership and leadership that South Africa is pursuing as well as the interaction that South Africa should foster with the neighbouring countries and the rest of Africa. Other scholars also question South Africa's capability to govern the rest of the continent and argue that South African state itself still suffers from the effects of the apartheid legacy. They argue that the country's administrative and operational structures are still highly entrenched in the Apartheid legacy.

Chidaushe (2010) argues that a study conducted in 2009 which was done by the International Race Relations Institute revealed that a huge number of management positions across the corporate sector is still occupied by white male and 60% of the country's economy is still dominated by the white population, which is the minority in the country. Furthermore, according to Chidaushe (2010) in 2009, there were a number of complaints of racism being exercised in large and well-established corporations. More recently, there has been heavy political unrest with mass workers' strike, the most documented being the Marikana Massacre of 2012.



All of these issues raise serious questions on the eligibility of the country to be exemplary to the rest of the region and the continent as a whole. As such, there is a view that without real transformation of the people owning the means of production, the authors argue, apartheid can only be spread across the continent in the name of expanding the country's role in Africa (Adebajo et al. 2007; Chidaushe: 2010). While South Africa aims to play a key role in making provisions for development assistance both in SADC and in the African continent, it is not unfounded to conclude that currently it may not be ready for this crucial role. South Africa needs to transform and strengthen itself first to ensure that its structural weaknesses are not replicated in the continent, thus further weakening the African opportunities for genuine SSDC as enshrined in the Bandung principles (Chidaushe, 2010: 27).

The explosion of the xenophobic attacks across South Africa in 2008, 2009 and 2015 on mostly poor African (Zimbabweans, Mozambicans, Congolese, and Somalis) portrayed the country negatively. South Africa is expected to champion democracy, security efforts and socio-economic development. The word Xenophobia is defined as “the deep dislike of non-nationals by nationals of a recipient state” (Sahistory.org.za, n.d.).

However, against this, the criticism is that South Africa is failing to manage its own domestic affairs. On the other hand, it is only expected that South Africa will be judged on a larger scale, since it is a country that is better off than most of the African countries.

Amidst the criticism, South Africa has, to some extent, reacted thoughtfully to these criticisms and concerns. For instance, the SADC Trade Protocol of 1996, which came into force in 2000 and calls for the establishment of a regional FTA by 2008, provides

for an asymmetrical reduction of industrial tariffs, mainly in the clothing and textile sectors, with South Africa making the speediest and deepest cuts to offset regional trade imbalances. Some allowances will be made for infant industries, thereby granting some SADC countries a leeway to apply for 'extended grace periods' during which tariff and subsidy reductions could be limited, within WTO provisions (SADC, 2000:377).

There has been considerable change on the South African foreign policy. Davies (1996) argues that a country's foreign policy is considered to be a highly valued strategic tool in the field of international relations and politics because it is used to develop the country and foster good relations with other countries abroad. For South Africa, having a well thought out foreign policy is important for positioning itself in the region, and so as to foster the country's role as an "active agent of progressive change" (Davies, 1996: 20). Without doubt there has been notable progressive changes from the old national role to the new national role idea for both South Africa and the Southern African region.

As previously mentioned, pre-1994 there was a lot of speculations as to the role and the influence that the newly democratic government would have on the continent and the region. Within South Africa itself, a question arose as to whether the region should be prioritized at all. However, the democratic government realized that involvement in regional projects would significantly assist South Africa in its own goals of development and growth. Secondly, there was the realization that South Africa's hope for growth and dominance could not come into maturity while the region is in poverty. Therefore, the overall regional economic stability would be necessary for a democratic South Africa. To this effect, the realization rested on the

fact that in the South African foreign policy, it is imperative that Southern Africa is considered as a matter of urgency (Davies, 1996).

More recently, the South African government has set out its intentions to tackle existing hindrances and to engage new opportunities in the region. In the wake of regional integration development plans, the South African government has put RI at the forefront of its national interests recognizing itself as an integral part of regional growth. To that effect, one of the strategic plans that has been developed by the South African national government is the National Development Plan vision for 2030 (NDP 2030). The NDP 2030 provides a vision for the country to the year 2030 and was adopted as the central development policy in 2012 (Sidiropoulos, 2014).

In chapter 7 of the NDP, the importance of regional and global economy is realized by the government as a way of creating space and means for the enhanced wellbeing of South Africans. The NDP asserts that its trade needs to be expanded in the region by means of removing tariff barriers to trade (NDP, 108). Additionally, the plan refers to enabling economies of scale and scope in the region through the larger market and possible production chains. There is acknowledgement that South Africa's growth potential will be 'tightly linked' to the region (Zarenda, 2013). There is continual reference to the potential for South Africa with regard to commodity investments, large infrastructural projects and growing consumer demand in the region. In order for this potential to be unlocked, a much more integrating and active role as far as South Africa is concerned is required.

There is acknowledgement of the fact that South Africa will act as a spur to regional growth, rather than merely relying on it. Within this context, this will involve greater commitment to regional industrialization and supply chain linkages, shifting trade

balances, power purchase agreements, the establishment of a Financial Centre for Africa and substantially more financial resources devoted to funding projects in the region with linkages to South African companies (Zarenda, 2013). Chapter 3 of the NDP generally envisages a relatively positive role regarding South Africa's constructive participation in the region; a more nuanced impression emerges in Chapter 7, dealing specifically with positioning South Africa in the world (Zarenda, 2013).

The chapter begins with the key objectives of expanding intraregional trade in Southern Africa from present levels of 7% of trade to 25% by 2030 and, over this same period, expanding trade with regional neighbours from 15% of South Africa's trade to 30%. In summary, the anticipated actions involve a strong emphasis on road, rail and port infrastructure in the region, a reduction in red tape, corruption and delays at border posts, using financial institutions to partner with businesses wanting to expand on the continent, strengthening regional cooperation in food and energy markets and water management, and identifying and promoting practical opportunities for cooperation based on complementary regional endowments, (Zarenda, 2013).

## **2.7 The EU Model of integration**

The EU is a distinct economic and political agreement between 28 European states that together occupy much of the European continent (europa.eu, n.d.). After the Second World War economic cooperation was forged because it was believed that states, which engaged in trade with one another, became economically interdependent and were more likely avoid conflict (Europa.eu. n.d.). The formation of the EU can be traced back to when the EEC was formed in 1958. EEC consisted of six countries

namely, Belgium France, Germany Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. After the formation of the ECC, came the establishment of the EU in 1993 (Europa.eu, n.d.).

Scholars agree that most RI cases are built mainly for security considerations. Much like Europe, where the European community was established because of the objective to manage Franco-German relations, in order to prevent a repeat of the first and second world wars. Draper (2012) argues that the essential element within this integration was the objective to support shared wealth creation and that there should be a well-managed resource competition amongst the constituent states. As a result, in order to promote pacification, three ideological foundations were used to construct the European RI: commerce and trade; democracy; and institutions or 'regulatory liberalism'. Similar ideological foundations were used at the global level for the establishment of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) where the core Western democracies were driving the agenda. Under such conditions, the theory of hegemonic stability arose. The HST maintains that, a hegemon plays the most important role in maintaining a good economic and political relations, as well as peace in the region. Also, the role of the strong state also becomes liable for the costs of ensuring coercion are prevented and integration maintained (Draper, 2012). The EU model of integration although imperfect, member states are bound by a sense of Ubuntu. This is because EU Member States having established the *supremacy* of Community, law set aside national law in the event of conflict between national law and community/ regional law (Best, n.d.). Member states also renounce rights to all autonomous action that is the right to act independently of the EU. According to Best (n.d, 6) "these include external relations, the customs union, and some parts of competition policy, fisheries conservation and monetary policy for the Eurozone" ( Best, n.d , 6).

## 2.8 Pax Africana

One of the issues with RI as mentioned earlier is the fact that EU principles have been adopted in hopes of solving Africa's problems. The late Kenyan Scholar Maloka (2001) uses the term "Pax African, meaning "African solutions for African Problems" (Mazrui, 1995). Pax Africana on its own is a philosophy that most pan Africanist scholars would allure to. The philosophy of Pax Africana is applicable to RI initiatives. The African approach to RI tries to emulate the European model and experience of RI. The mimicking of the EU model of integration by African regional blocs is most evident in their adoption of supranational institutions and a proposed new currency in West Africa (Letz, 2012; Farrell, 2009). Moreover Letz (2012) states that SADC and MERCUSOR and SADC for example, have been pursuing RI. Is that they have supranational courts which are exact copies of the EU model of RI. Haas (1958: 59) defines supranationalism as "the existence of governmental authorities closer to the archetype of federation than any past international organisation, but not yet identical with it". Furthermore, Best (n.d.: 3) describes supranationalism as that which sovereign states agree to abide by norms that are adopted at a higher level of organization. From a Pax Africana point of view, RI may adopt some of the principles of the EU, that is, those principles that would be suitable for Africa's successful integration. The EU model should not be blindly adopted and followed in its entirety.

Southern Africa needs to find a model that is suitable to the conditions of the region. Furthermore, Draper (2012) argues that Southern Africa needs to engage with herself so as to find the finest design for RECs in the region. To arrive at this fine design of REC's, Draper (2012) argues that there should be an extensive exploration of the literature that already exists, which speaks on regional economic integration, which

stems from the economics and security paradigms. He argues that to isolate one paradigm and give focus to only one is disadvantageous; the reason being that the applicability of the conclusions reached is limited when only one approach is focused on. For that reason, both paradigms need to be explored in order to arrive at a whole conclusion of the possibilities and limits, (Draper, 2012).

However, there is not a clear consensus as to the correct model to use in the African context. According to Draper (2012) the influence of the EU model on Southern African thinking is visible, the two areas where it is influential is the institutional level as well as the political level. At the political level, the justification is taken from the hypothesis of liberal peace, which states that member states are less likely to engage on aggressive military actions against each other when there is a close economic integration, (Draper, 2012). At the institutional level, there is a tendency for the African RECs to copy from EU model (Draper, 2012).

It is therefore no surprise that progress so far has not been steady, at this rate. It is illusive to believe that planning timelines will be achieved. Draper (2012) argues that the type of economic integration envisaged in the Abuja Treaty is not at all favourable to the African context; the problem is that the Abuja Treaty relies on the European model. Furthermore, Draper highlights the main setbacks to Africa using the EU Model. He asserts that firstly, the present Africa characterised by different economic, social and political ethos from Europe at that time – there are vast differences in political leadership, infrastructure, economic development, whence fore, the spur for integration is different from that of Europe. On the other hand, the EU arose in the

1950s. Secondly, Africa's population is mounting up to one billion people with 45 countries.

The EU only accounts for half the population of Africa. Lastly, while Europe's regional agenda has been motivated by an economy, in Africa it is a different story, it is the political agenda that dictates the economic agenda. Political issues remain a priority over economic issues and a huge bulk of the resources is dedicated towards security goals (Dube, 2013). It is also clear that most African literature on RI initiatives do not support the EU model of integration for African RI. Dube (2013) asserts that there needs to be other strategies that are more suitable and practically applicable to the African context. This must not be mistaken to propose that African states should not work towards regional economic integration. However, in pursuing REI initiatives it is important to note that the strategies adopted in one region may not be suitable for another since each region has its own unique challenges (Dube, 2013)

The role of South Africa in the African renaissance has been at the forefront of political debates in the African continent. It cannot be denied that South Africa has an important role to play on the continent and thus in the African renaissance. Arguments pertain to whether South Africa can lead in Africa, SADC or not. South Africa has a tendency to take a cautious approach when it comes to conflict situation. There also exists this sensitivity within the government of South Africa that South Africa should not be perceived as a regional hegemon in SADC. These two reasons explain South Africa's passive nature in assuming the dominant role in the SADC region. This form of passiveness is evident in the African National Congress's (ANC) strategy and tactic document, which states that "In these efforts towards the African Renaissance, we



should not overestimate ourselves as a small middle-income country. Neither should we underestimate the relative influence we enjoy deriving from our democratic project, the strategic location of our region and the resources and potential it commands” (Maloka, 2001 :). These prevent South Africa from taking a more decisive leadership approach.

## **2.9 Conclusion**

This chapter has attempted to show important issues concerning RI in the region of Southern Africa. The concept of RI has experienced remarkable changes over the years since the successful integration of the E.U. Countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America have been inspired by the EU model of RI and have long since, formed their own regional blocs. In Africa the adoption of active consensual RI schemes was motivated by the severe economic hardships that were prevalent on the continent. RIA's to be effective; countries within the same geographical area are required to consent to their unification of their social, economic, political and cultural structures. This can only be achieved by political will. States that enter into RIA's utilize their political will to lower their tariff barriers due to the fact that it makes intra-regional trade easier.

The collective perks that member states enjoy from RIAs, is that it strengthens domestic reforms of the member states that form the regional bloc. In the case of South Africa's role in Africa and SADC, arguments that SADC MNCs are exploitative, and as a result seeks its own interest above that of the collective interests of the entire African continent. Existing literature South Africa still has growing engagements in the Southern African region. Growing economic engagements with Mozambique. Moreover South Africa's engagements in the continent are one of an

Aid donor. Countries in Africa such as Zimbabwe, Mali and Somalia have received billions of dollars' worth of humanitarian assistance from South Africa over the past decade. South Africa has also given out loans and grant under the African Renaissance fund which was founded by former president of South Africa Thabo Mbeki. Scholars such as Gibb (1998) argue that these contributions afford South Africa the status of a capable leader of the SADC region.

The legitimacy of South Africa's ability to lead is questioned because it still battles with its own national ills. Despite its national ills, South Africa has made more economic progress as a country than other countries in the SADC region. Some scholars argue that South Africa struggles in finding a balance in creating a moral economy that is sensitive both to the domestic needs and continental challenges. Recent xenophobic attacks demonstrated in 2008, 2009 and 2015 growing economic instability within the country. Some South African citizens argued that they were unable to actively partake in the economy, thus lacked economic security as a result of foreign competition from non-south African nationals. Another important issue is that of finding a suitable model for attaining integration in the region. Most Literature on Africa integration rejects the use of the EU model towards Africa's RI processes. There are two principal theories upon which the study is built; these will be expounded on in the chapter three. The theories offer an insight into the importance of RI as well the importance of a hegemon. The history of the origins of these theories will be discussed.

## **CHAPTER 3 - THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK**

### **3.0 Introduction**

One of the most important aspects of a research is the theoretical framework because it serves as a blue print for the study, which means that it is the foundation from which the entire research study will be constructed. The theoretical framework serves as a basis for the literature review, it also helps in the formulation of the research questions, the problem statement, and the significance of the study. Furthermore, the theoretical framework gives a clear vision and structure for a research study (Grant & Osanloo, 13).

Thus, this theoretical framework forms a foundation of this study and is presented as the structure that guides this dissertation. The two theories for this study: The HST and the IR theory will be discussed. These two theories used embody a collection of beliefs of scholars of both the HST and scholars of the RI theory. The HST and RI theory are the two main theories that have grounded this research and have thus assisted in measuring South Africa's role and its prospects and challenges in being a regional hegemon. The purpose of this chapter exists to inform the research questions and methodology of this dissertation, and it aids in justifying the research problem of this study. In the context of this study, these two theories help to give more insight on South Africa's role in the RI process in Southern Africa; on the issue of why successful RI in Southern Africa has been difficult to attain; the controversial question of whether the EU model of integration is beneficial or suitable for Africa and whether South Africa's role in Africa is one of a dominant force or exploitative supremacy. The two theories have also contributed to examining the challenges or barriers to inter-regional trade in Africa.

This chapter will begin by discussing the HST. Scholarly definitions as to what a hegemon is will be compared and contrasted, the defining characteristics of a hegemon being economic power, political influence and influence in decision making will also be discussed. Although the Hegemonic theory applies to the global context, the application of the theory is not restricted to the global level. The HST can also be applied to the congenital and regional levels.

The purpose of employing the HST is that it clearly expounds on the characteristics that a hegemon should possess; it is these characteristics that will help to assess, prove or disprove claims as to whether South Africa is in fact a stable, dominant hegemon in the Southern African region. The importance of a hegemon according to Santos (2009) is that there can be no stability without a hegemon. After concluding discussions of the HST in relation to South Africa's position of power in the Southern African region, the chapter will then go on to discuss the RI theory in relation to the Southern African Region focusing primarily on regional economic integration as it applies to developing regions, and concentrating on the rationale for the formation of RIAs, how RIA formation differs according to the experiences of developing regions, and the measurement of successful RI (Rathumbu, 2009).

The theory will also discuss the level of progress that the Southern African region has made in terms of unifying (1) preferential trade agreement, (2) Free trade agreement, (3) Customs union and (4) common market. In explaining the theory of economic integration, Balassa's (1961) work on economic integration of the stages of economic integration is important to use as a theoretical basis for this work. Specifically, this study will use the forms or the stages of economic integration. The reason for choosing Balassa's forms of economic integration is because Balassa's work is considered to be the foundation of any work done in relation to issues pertaining to

economic integration. There have been a number of authors in internationally recognized journals that have reviewed Balassa's work, and it has been used as a theory and as a policy (Hosny, 2013). Using the stages of economic integration will aid in analysing the nature of economic integration in southern Africa.

### **3.1 Hegemonic Stability Theory**

#### ***3.1.1 Historical origins***

The dominion of some countries over others has been indispensable in international relations since a nation's financial and political powers play an important part in ensuring a nation's global position and survival in the international arena (Agnew & Crobridge, 2002). HST being one of the most influential theories yet with controversial ideas is a theory of international relations, which has its roots in political science, economics and history. It is widely accepted amongst scholars that the economist Charles Kindleberger was the first to espouse the HST. It was through his analysis of the history of the Great Depression that the HST was popularized (Liu & Ming-Te, 2011). Kindleberger (1973) argues that, the lack of a world leader with a leading economy was partially the cause for the economic disarray between interwar periods, which led to the Great Depression. He states that the long depression, which occurred in the late 19th century, led to the rise of American power and the decline of British dominion in the global arena. There is also the view that the 1930s solidified this process (McCormick, 1990). In studying the Great Depression Kindleberger (1973) discovered that economic chaos of the interwar period was what led to the great depression and that the economic chaos can be blamed on the lack of world leader with a dominant economy.

Since the theory's development in the 1970's a substantial body of literature has emerged both critiquing and advancing the original idea behind the theory. The HST can provide useful interpretations of regional cooperation schemes that take place in the developing world since regional hegemonies mimic strategies of global hegemon but at a regional level (Sotirios, 2007).

### ***3.1.2 Scholarly definitions & Characteristics of a Hegemon***

The word 'hegemony' has its origins in the ancient Greek word 'hegemonia' which plainly refers to the dominant position of one element in the international system over the other elements within the international system (Yilmaz, 2010). The central claim of the HST is that the international system, an environment in which states engage with one another, is more likely to remain stable with the presence of a nation-state as the single great power (Ikenberry, 1989; Snidal, 1985; Liu & Ming-Te, 2011). McCormick (1990: 49) describes a hegemon to be that single great power that possesses "a built-in incentive to force other nations to forsake their economic nationalism and protectionist controls and to accept a world of free trade, free capital flows, and free currency convertibility." Liu & Ming-Te (2011) argues that the presence of a hegemon in the international system is a necessity for ensuring continued development of the international market economy. Therefore this is the sole responsibility of a sole-hegemon; maintaining a successful and fully united liberal international economy which safeguards international order and the world economy (Liu & Ming-Te, 2011).

According to Snidal (1985) when there is no single dominant actor, integration efforts become unfruitful and also the international system becomes chaotic. Co-operation amongst states becomes difficult. The presence of a hegemonic power is therefore the

simple antidote for co-operation ills since co-operation between states is what helps to bring peace amongst states in the international system. Kindleberger (1973) states that the maintaining of a liberal international economic order requires the long-term support and leadership of a hegemonic power and the power must possess economic, political and military capabilities to control the arrangement of international political and economic norms. A hegemon must also have “access to crucial raw materials, control major sources of capital, maintain a large market for imports, and hold comparative advantages in goods with high value added, yielding relatively high wages and profits” (Keohane, 1984: 115). It is important that the hegemon not only has access to resources of capital, raw materials, and over markets, it must also wield significant control of these resources. Having this control enables hegemons to gain competitive advantage in the production of highly valued goods (Gilpin, 1987: 76).

#### *3.1.2.1 Political influence*

Alden & Le Pere (2009:3) recognizes the necessity of the presence of a hegemon as an important feature of international systems. The role of hegemony in international politics is to create and sustain order and openness within the international political economy (Ikenberry, 1989). In sustaining order and openness in the international political economy a hegemon uses its political influence. Political influence is strategically used to “preach the universal virtues of freedom of the seas, free trade, open door policies, comparative advantage, and a specialized division of labour” (McCormick, 1990:127). This is done to secure the interest of the hegemon because all states prioritize their self-interest above those of other states first. A hegemon preaches because it has the most to gain from a free world, and has the most to lose

especially if the free movement of capital, currencies and goods are limited in any way.

#### 3.1.2.2 *Economic Power and Military Muscle*

According to Joseph (2002) there is more to hegemony than meets the eye. He describes the hegemon as a state that “has an objective basis in material conditions” (Joseph, 2002: 20). This points to the fact that a hegemon’s interest is not only vested in ruling groups of states, but also in the accumulation of material which can be translated into capital – the driving force of modern society.

There is interplay between military power and economic power because it is the strength of a state that will provide the productive base for increasing military power. Military power coupled with economic power commands both the attention and respect of other states (McCormick, 1990). In the past, hegemonies for example have used their economic power to create institutions and rules that fostered the internationalization of capital (McCormick, 1990). During the colonial era, the British enforced their dominance on their colonies with the help of gold and guns (Persaud, 2001) while Americans in the neo-colonial era of today have used complex and diffuse strategies to increase and maintain their country’s role as a global hegemon (Persaud, 2001).

#### 3.1.2.3 *Establishment of Institutions & Ideology*

Another requirement that a state has to meet in order to gain recognition as a hegemonic power is that it has to possess the ability to exercise dominance in both “institutions” and “ideology”. Hegemonies achieve dominance in the establishment of both ideology and institutions that spread and popularise the life-standard and cultural



values of the hegemon (Uzgel, 2003: 31). According to Kindleberger (1973) achieving and maintaining stability in the international arena has a lot to do with whether or not the state offers public goods. This means that a state that does not provide or offer public goods cannot in any way claim hegemonic status.

### **3.3 Counter-Hegemony**

Contrary to this view however are counter-hegemony arguments from those that critique the HST, opposing its legitimacy in politics and international relations. Various critics have written against the feasibility of the HST, supporting their stance by citing the example of the declining economic position of the United States of America and the emergence of a multi-polar configuration of the world economy (Snidal, 1985). Oloruntoba & Gumede (2014) critique Kindleberger (1973) and Giplin (1987) by arguing that although the presence of a hegemon is believed to be a necessary precondition, this precondition is not a sufficient condition for the establishment of a peaceful and prosperous international system. That is because hegemony stands to benefit the most from the free movement of currencies, capital and goods. This has contributed to the arguments that present hegemons act as bullies that act in their own self-interest.

### **3.4 RI Theory**

#### ***3.4.1 Definition***

RI theory is a theory that sheds insight on how individual states come together to share part of their decisional authority or sovereignty with an emerging international organisation (Schmitter, 1970). Mattli (1999) asserts that, RI is when two or more states come together to connect their political and economic areas such that, national

policies of these countries caters for and supports the union. It is important to note that for the union of the political and economic structures of two or more states to be considered as RI, it is required that they share a common neighbouring space within the same geographical region (Frankel, 1997). Generally, RI requires some level of sacrifice from the states that are part of the integration process. The reason for this is that, RI usually increases development and economic activities. Obviously owing to different political, social and economic environments of each country, strategies towards attaining integration are different (Heinonen, 2006).

### ***3.4.2 Historical Origins of RI***

Mattli (1999) asserts that, RI dates back to the 19<sup>th</sup> century, although at the time, smaller states would be coerced into RI processes. However, there has been a growth and a shift in the way that regional communities are formed and that is evidenced in the fact that almost all the countries are part of at least one regional community (Schiff & Winters, 2003). Today the EU (European Union) stands as one of the most outstanding models of successful RI. In this section of this chapter economic integration is discussed mainly from the standpoint that acknowledges economic integration as an extension of broader RI. According to the Economic Commission for Africa (2005) and Mistry (1996) economic integration in the developing world differs from that of the third world countries, because in that third world countries pursue RI with the aim of fostering economic development, industrialization and the reduction of poverty ( Rathumbu, 2009 : 45).

### **3.5 Economic integration theory**

Economic integration is the process by which different countries within a region agree to remove trade barriers between them. Trade barriers can be in the form of tariffs taxes imposed on imports to a country, quotas (a limit to the amount of a product that can be imported) and border restrictions (EU Learning, 2014). Some scholars argue that, it is Balassa (1961) who broadened the theory of economic integration. While other scholars believe that, it is the work of Viner (1950) and Meade (1955), which contributed to the beginning of this theory (Madyo, 2008).

Essentially, the theoretical foundations of conventional approaches to RI can be traced back to three important schools of political and economic thought, which are Marxist, neoclassical and development economics. Originally, the theory of economic integration was developed from traditional trade theory, which accepts perfect competition, and whose major concern is the location of production of different kinds of goods. (Imbriani & Reganati, 1994 ; Biswaro, 2003) the earliest theoretical work on regional economic integration emanated from the theory of comparative advantage in international trade, and the interests of liberal economists in promoting the reduction of tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade (Madyo, 2008).

The theoretical template most social scientists think of when referring to RI is a template usually referred to as the Balassa forms of integration after Balassa (1961), (Crowley, 2006). Balassa's five forms of economic integration (Balassa (1961) constituted a free trade area, customs union, common market, economic union and total economic integration (Crowley, 2006). Balassa's forms have since been expanded and now usually include the following steps: free trade area, customs union,

common market, economic union, monetary union and political union (Crowley, 2006). These forms have been predominant in different approaches to the study of RI. They have been used to explain both the origins of the integration processes as well as the dynamics of such processes, (Heinonen, 2006).

### ***3.5.1 Preferential Trade Arrangements (PTAs)***

Usually this entails that the participating nations reduce barriers on trade between themselves; while the barriers outside the participating nations remain higher. Panagariya (1998; 2000) cite the example of a Preferential Trading Agreement (PTA) using the Muslim countries of the Developing Organization, the eight member states of this organization are subject to reduced trade barriers (Hosny, 2013). Some economists have proposed that PTA is the first phase of economic integration. However, PTA is limited in its scope, hence it is referred to as the lowest form of regional economic integration (Madyo, 2008). Furthermore, preferential access schemes offer developing countries additional tariff cuts below MFN rates agreed on by the WTO (ATPC 2004). In the process known as preference erosion, the overall value of preferences will be reduced in the long-term as reductions in general tariff levels are agreed upon through the WTO, other preferential agreements are concluded, or changes occur in market prices. This will be good for Africa, as it will smooth the region's integration into the global trading system and lead to growth that will expand market opportunities and stop the distortion of incentives within African countries. However, this does not assume that there will be no short-term costs, but rather that those can be overcome through various measures (Madyo, 2008).

### **3.5.2 Free Trade Area (FTA)**

A free trade area refers to the condition where member states agree to gradually remove all trade restrictions on goods that are produced within the union (Madyo, 2008). However, concerning the states outside the union, each country keeps its own tariff restrictions to trade with the non-members. Examples are (a) the North American Free Trade Agreement NAFTA formed by USA, Canada, and Mexico in 1993 and (b) the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) formed by Norway, Liechtenstein, Iceland, and Switzerland (Rathumbu, 2008 & Honsy, 2013). Madyo (2008) argues that, trade barriers towards non-member states are normally higher, and this is beneficial especially to countries like Africa because at present intra- industry levels are low and as a result, trade revenue will not be affected that much.

The main purpose of a free trade area is to achieve a state where there is perfect competition between industries of member states. A relevant example is the EFTA which has been able to promote (a) sustainable economic expansion of full employment, (b) bustling economic activity, (c) increased productivity and (d) rational utilization of resources in the association as a whole and within each member state. This has ensured that trade among member states contribute to the harmonious development and expansion of world trade (Maydo, 2008).

Madyo (2008) asserts that, the very nature of free trade areas in Africa is that member states are well aware of the importance of the development and consolidation of trade through the removal of intra-regional barriers as a means of accelerating economic development in member states. The fact that this level of integration does not call for the immediate removal of all customs and other restrictions will allow national

economies to prepare for the gradual removal of restrictions. Furthermore, Madyo argues that, African countries cannot generally increase trade among themselves simply through the creation of FTAs. According to the Commission for Africa Report (2005), only 12 % of all African goods go to other African countries, and this basically means that intra-trade still remains a fairly small part of total trade in Africa. There are other important aspects in economic integration that do not receive much attention, these factors help explain the low levels of intra-regional trade: the network of finance and credit, and the availability of channels communications and transport (Madyo, 2008).

### ***3.5.3 Customs Union (CU)***

A Free Trade Area progresses into a Customs Union (CU). This is where member states impose a common tariff against non-member states (Hosny, 2013). Generally, the elements of a FTA with the protection policies are also found in a customs union. That is because the FTA offers for freedom of movement of goods between member states, while protecting the market within the union from competition outside the union (Madyo, 2008). Madyo (2008) asserts that, African countries are not at the same levels of development. Economists argue that the primary negotiations aimed at the abolition of customs duties should start by having an annual rate of reduction of tariffs in the African countries. For within the less developed countries it is most beneficial to them when a list of goods with different levels of customs duties is drawn up so that weaker member states are not harmed. This is more important when considering the fact that weaker states will be exposed to larger industries, and where it is most probable that loss of revenue is inevitable. Madyo (2008) further argues

that, this stage is the stage where deserving industries are given advantageous treatment as well as rates in Least Developed Countries (LCDs).

According to Pearce (1970), the aim of a customs union is to distribute world income in favour of member countries through an improvement of the terms of trade with the rest of the world. In contrast, the neo-classical view of unilaterally dismantling tariffs on a non-discriminatory basis does not improve terms of trade, or may even lead to a deterioration of terms of trade. However, in practice, creating a customs union for this purpose is akin to introducing an optimal trade restriction at the national level, and when joining the customs union, a country can do more than when it acts individually (Madyo, 2008).

Customs unions have been considered to be more difficult to create than FTAs. Although customs unions offer greater market integration and lower costs, they also require more on-going co-ordination, which includes reconciling the interests of member states and then establishing continuing political arrangements in order to deal with subsequent adjustments, (Madyo, 2008). Additionally, customs unions require member states to surrender their autonomy, both in multilateral trade talks and in the application of anti-dumping measures and other forms of contingent protection. This implies that member states might end up with external trade barriers that are not nationally optimal from an economic and political perspective (Madyo, 2008). This constitutes the downside of customs union

### 3.5.4 Common Market

A Common Market (CM) further allows free movement of labour and capital among member nations (Hosny, 2013). Carbaugh (2004) argues that a common market is made up of trading nations that allow (i) the free movement of goods and services between member states; (ii) the initiation of common external trade barriers against

non-union states; and (iii) the free movement of factors of production across national borders within the economic bloc (Madyo, 2008). A common market, as a higher level of economic integration than a free trade area and a customs union, ensures that member states' unity is strengthened and that there is harmonization and co-ordination of policies and activities. This can be effectively achieved through the elimination of customs duties and quantitative restrictions between member states with regard to goods originating from member states (Madyo, 2008). In accordance with its definition, a common market is established mainly because the movement of goods and services among member states is restricted, especially when these countries adopt different trade and commercial policies and practices. In addition, Mutharika (1972) has argued that the common market also implies that there will be free competition between productive units in member countries (Madyo, 2008).

#### ***3.5.4 Economic Union***

Balassa (1961) describes an economic union as a common market in which national economic policies are harmonised in order to remove discrimination due to disparities in these policies. Carbaugh (2004) has defined it as a common market in which economic policies such as monetary, fiscal, social and countercyclical policies are unified, and in which a supra-national authority is set up to administer these policies, and whose decisions are binding for member states. According to Madyo (2008) it is important for markets to become highly integrated in Africa, particularly in terms of industrial and agricultural products. A direct method of measuring the extent of market integration would be to establish patterns of price convergence per product over time (Pelkmans, 1987), but such an approach might be ambitious for Africa. Even if tendencies towards price convergence could be found, they are likely to be



associated with changes in the product structure of member countries' trade, and hence with altering production structures and spatial relocation within the union.

### **3.6 Conclusion**

This chapter had discussed the two main theories, namely the HS theory the RI theory. HS theory is one of the most influential theories in international relations, having roots in political science, economics and history. Widely accepted amongst scholars that the HS best explains RI due to the fact that it deals with the dynamics relating to economy, social development, political influence and the nature of historical power relations. Substantial body of literature critique and advance the original idea behind the HS theory.

HS theory advances that RI is only successfully achieved when there exists a single dominant power or hegemon. The counter critiques against this are that a dominant hegemon is not a pre-requisite for a successful unification of regional blocs. HS theory defines or characterizes a hegemon by the following criteria: Political influence, economic and military power, and the establishment of influential institutions and ideology. Dominance of ideology involves spreading and popularizing one's own cultural values and life standards. The critique of the hegemonic stability theory is that the preconditions for the establishment of a peaceful and prosperous international system since the hegemon would stand to benefit from the free movement of goods, capital and currencies. This has contributed to the argument that the present hegemons are bullies that act in their own interest.

RI dates back to the 19<sup>th</sup> century even though the RI initiatives were not voluntary. Over the years however, RI has become achievable through mutual consent rather than coercion. RI in developing nations differs from that in the developed world. Failures of RI in that of developing nation states like those in Africa serve as one of these differentiations. RI theory, propounds that RI occurs when two or more countries unify their economic and political structures to cater for and support the growth of the union. One of the pre-requisites for RI to be considered true RI is that countries that consent to unifying their economic and political structures, must share the same geographical location. RI theory discussed by Balassa (1961) discusses five stages or levels of economic integration. The first stage of RI is the establishment of a FTA; the second is the formation of a Customs Union, achievement of a Common Market, the establishment of an economic union, and a monetary union.

## **CHAPTER 4 - BENEFITS AND CHALLENGES OF RI**

### **4.0 Introduction**

Chapter 3 discussed two theories that form the foundation for this study: HS theory and RI theory. The word ‘hegemony’ originating from the ancient Greek word ‘hegemonia’ plainly refers to the dominant position of one state in the international system over the other states within the international system (Yilmaz, 2010). The same concept has been applied to the topic of RI where in Regional Blocs a dominant state assumes characteristics of a hegemon. It is often argued that Hegemon is needed for successful integration in that a hegemon brings order. Others however others assert that the presence of a hegemon causes unfruitfulness and results in chaos. It is argued that hegemons control resources and thus assume the role of a bully.

RI theory however upholds that common space or geographical location shared by states that consent to RIA’s are very necessary as they create more neighbour-like linkages convenient for economic transactions and trade activities. Moreover, The RI theory is founded on the work of Balassa (1969), who outlined five stages of regional economic integration, namely (1) Preferential trade agreement, (2) Free trade agreement, (3) Customs union and (4) common market and (5) economic union. These stages of regional economic integration were discussed in relation to Southern Africa.

Following the theoretical framework of RI in chapter two, this chapter highlights some broad discussion of the benefits and disadvantages of RI. In doing this, a review of the existing efforts towards RI initiatives involving regional communities in Southern Africa will be discussed in order to assess their successes and failures. The chapter will make use of examples of successful RIs, such as the European Union

(EU) as case studies that serve as reference points that can be learned from. The chapter then concludes with a discussion on how Africa could overcome some of the challenges that will be discussed.

#### **4.1 Consensus on RI**

A number of countries all around the world are in one-way or another part of RI arrangements (Economic Commission for Africa, 2004). There is a long-standing consensus among African leaders that RI and cooperation is an important effort in consolidating development (Lebale et al, 2009). As things stand, there are various RI arrangements that are currently operational in Africa. Examples include the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in West Africa, the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCSA) in Central Africa, the East African Community (EAC) in East Africa, SADC and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) in Southern and Eastern Africa, (Tanyanyiwa, & Hakuna, 2014). These RI groups that have been made by member states is an effort to achieve the desired integration and cooperation.

The significance of regional economic integration and cooperation is widely accepted as imperative in accelerating increased competition, an opportunity to larger markets, and trade opportunities (Economic Commission for Africa, 2004). Countries all over the world are cognizant of the possibilities that RI is able to bring. The most success that the world has seen is that of RECs in developed countries, this is shown by their increased levels in intra-regional trade, e.g. The European Union (EU) and ASEAN (Tanyanyiwa & Hakuna 2014). In Africa, the existing RECs have made an important but smaller impact than that of the successful EU and ASEAN. Regional economic integration in Africa has not succeeded, but there is no denying that a lot can change

with RI in the continent. The AU echoes this idea, which is why they are hoping that by year 2028 a phenomenon like poverty can be significantly reduced. This then emphasizes the need for an analysis of the challenges and disadvantages of RI so that RECs within Africa may reap the best harvest from RI.

There is consensus amongst Southern African countries that there are enormous benefits consequential to RI (Gibb, 1998). Alemayehu and Haile ( 2002) argue that for an accurate analysis of the success and failure of a RI initiative, the success or failure should be evaluated against the backdrop of the economic, political and institutional context under which it operates as well as in the context of the set objectives that it aims to achieve. The next section will focus on the benefits which accrue to a country from being a member of a regional body.

#### **4.2 Benefits of RI**

The idea of regional economic integration is widely supported by the governments in the region as a tactic to promoting economic development in relation to certain things. These include inter alia: larger markets, new trade opportunities and increased competition (Gibb, 1998: 289; Economic Commission for Africa, 2004).

One of the striking features of the Southern African economy is the inequality it possesses. Traditional Customs Union (TCU) theory contends for development that is relatively analogous between member states in the RI efforts. The inequalities present in the region raise concerns as to how best to overcome these challenges in order to meet the objectives towards regionalism. South Africa is a predominant state in the region. As such, many least developed states in the region had expected that South Africa would replace the current cooperating partners by providing monetary assistance (i.e. economic aid) to other states within the region. According to Gibb

(1998: 293) South Africa does not possess the significant and the necessary capacity to be able to meet the expectation.

Alemayehu and Haile (2002) argue that generally, all the countries involved in RI are able to benefit from it, although each country's level of development is not the same and their sizes also differ. RI can be used as an engine towards attaining political, social and economic development of countries (Tanyanyiwa & Hakuna, 2014). Schiff & Winters (2003) argue that some of those reasons are the assistance in developing social and political institutes as well as the maintenance of national peace and security. They further argue that, because of the nature of these reasons, being public good, the most success attainable in achieving these goals is through some form of intervention. Furthermore, they are easily attainable on regional basis, because such benefits are typically a joint with other limited numbers of countries, who are normally neighbours (Schiff & Winters, 2003). RI must never be seen as an end in itself, but as vehicle towards improving the welfare of the countries that are involved in integration processes (Economic Commission for Africa, 2004).

#### ***4.2.1 Trade Creation & Trade Diversion***

Trade creation and trade diversion serve as classical justification normally put forth as a benefit of RI trade. The argument is that, through the reduction of trade (tariff barriers), firms and consumers are able to make acquisitions from the low-cost source of supply (Schiff & Winters, 2003). According to the Economic theory, welfare is improved by free trade, because it enables the citizens to be able to buy goods and services from the cheapest source. This leads to the production being reallocated according to comparative advantage (Economic Commission for Africa, 2004 and Schiff & Winters, 2003). Therefore, it is justified to conclude that RI engagements

always lead to gains, (i.e. an increase in welfare). However, in contrast, Economic Commission for Africa (Economic Commission for Africa, 2003) argues that, RIAs are both trade creating and diverting. This is because RIAs encompass preferential reductions in trade barriers.

Generally, trade diversion means the displacement of lower cost of production away from a more efficient supplier outside of the FTA and towards a less-efficient supplier within members forming the FTA. This is as a result of lower trade barriers within the FTA. Trade creation means that a free trade area creates trade that would not have existed otherwise. As a result, supply occurs from a more-efficient producer of the product. In all cases, trade creation raises a country's national welfare. Economic Commission for Africa, argues that, welfare is only generated through RIAs "only when trade creation dominates trade diversion", (Economic Commission for Africa, 2004:11).

Furthermore, Economic Commission for Africa (Economic Commission for Africa, 2004:11) asserts that, this is not the only benefit of RI. It is argued that there are two other trade effects benefitting for RI whose value differs from country to country. RI decreases the states' revenue from tariffs. It does this by reducing tariffs among member states, as well as through increasing more trade from within the member states. Secondly, such regional agreements "may improve the terms of trade of member countries if changes in trade volumes (because of more demand for goods originating from an integration area and less demand for the same goods originating from outside it because tariffs make them more expensive) lower world prices" (Economic Commission for Africa, 2004: 11). A larger potential gain for member countries is largely influenced by how great the level of the regional agreement's share is in the world market. However, that is conditional to non-member states,

because it is non-members who contribute to the terms of trade gain. The effect on global welfare is therefore indeterminate.

#### ***4.2.2 Investment***

According to Niekerk (2005) investment is one of the traditional gains from RIAs. Regional trade arrangements are known to potentially increase FDI from both outside the RIAs and from within the RIA. This is because, on the formation of an RIA, there is an expansion of the market by the coming together of different, usually neighbouring states. Niekerk (2005) argues that foreign direct invest is also increased when sub-regions increase their markets on condition that foreign investors are discouraged from taking part in “tariff-jumping”, through the provision of incentives.

#### ***4.2.3 The impact on Human Development and poverty***

When the welfare and the GDP results from the success of integration, the possibilities of poverty being eradicated become higher (United Nations Development Programme, 2011). The United Nations Development Programme, (United Nations Development Programme, 2011) acknowledges that, integration is not the saving grace for reduction in poverty, but that there are other dynamics that lead to a decline in poverty i.e. the sector composition of growth, how it links with the entire economy, its demand for employment, as well as the policies that accompany such increase, among others.



### 4.3 Challenges of RI

#### 4.3.1 *The unwillingness of member states to cede their sovereignty*

Among the challenges associated with RI Dube (2012) argues that, it is the unyielding nature of member states to give up their sovereignty. They are unwilling to cede their authority to regional institutions so that they can make the necessary decisions to drive the integration agenda. Udombana (2002) also makes mention of this constraint to successful RI in African regional blocs. Udombana states that African leaders lack the certitude to face the challenges of RI (Udombana, 2002). African leaders have been unable to make the necessary changes that would sustain growth and development (Udombana, 2002). Some African leaders are also unwilling to surrender essential elements of their sovereignty to regional institutions as is done in the EU (Udombana, 2002). Alemayehu & Haile (2002) argue that in the case of COMESA it is identified that there exists fear among the weaker member states that they may be taken advantage of by the stronger states. Furthermore, Alemayehu & Haile (2002) assert that, the region has countries that are at different levels of development. As a result, the unequal benefits that arise amongst member states of a regional bloc are inevitable. The adverse effects of this is that it could cause lack of commitment needed to implement agreed upon agreements.

Furthermore, they argue that, even if the stronger states were to agree to compensate the weaker states, it would be difficult to create a mechanism that all the member states would agree with, and that would be sustainable in the long run. The failure to address solutions to the sentiments and worries of the weaker states has contributed to the slow progress of the RI initiatives in the region (Alemayehu and Haile, 2002).

Another reason for African states' unwillingness to cede sovereignty is because of historical legacies of colonialism (Graham, 2015). The current governments of South Africa, Algeria and Zimbabwe for example, have experienced a struggle for national liberation in the past, therefore, their governments take a more cautious approach when it comes to ceding their sovereignty. (Welz, 2014:15). President of Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe, speaking in relation to the national elections in 2008, said that neither SADC, AU nor international countries can give him a directive on how to run the elections (Welz, 2014:16). Furthermore, he threatened that the statements made by some leaders in the SADC may cause the dissolution of the regional grouping (Welz, 2014). Moreover, Angola the second largest economy in SADC, fears that opening up its borders to duty free trade with other SADC members will cripple its emerging industries leaving it more oil dependent ( Redvers, 2015).

#### ***4.3.2 Lack of practical commitment***

Alemayehu and Haile (2002) argue that many REC's lack practical commitment. A number of REC's that are not only SADC but also other REC's including COMESA show more commitment to bilateral and multilateral agreements than to regional covenants. Some of these other commitments are the Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs). Part of the reason the member states would be more committed to SAPs than to regional agreements is because of their dependence on aid of member countries (Alemayehu and Haile, 2002). Dube also cites the lack of commitment and of political drive as a hindrance. Dube argues that, this is usually seen in the member states unwillingness to make regional objectives part of their national policies (Dube, 2012). Additional difficulty that this brings is that, though regional communities like the SADC and ECOWAS form secretariats, there is however, no legal backing afforded

to the secretariats and therefore, they do not have the legal capacity to force countries to satisfy their obligations (Alemayehu and Haile, 2002).

#### ***4.3.3 Overlapping membership***

Others argue that the issue of overlapping membership is a big hindrance to progress towards integration and cooperation. According to Draper, Halleson & Alves, (2007) Africa currently has 14 RI groups and each of the sub regions have a minimum of two groups. From figure 2 it is evident that most countries belong to two or more of the regional organisations. This has resulted in complications of multiple overlapping memberships characteristic of what (Draper, Halleson & Alves, 2007) call a ‘spaghetti bowl’ that obstructs RI due to the fact that it creates a complex entanglement of political commitments and institutional requirements, further addition costs of conducting intra-regional business. However, not everyone agrees. For instance, Alemayehu and Haile (2002: 14) quote Lyakurwa (1997: 196) as saying “in the African context, such an approach of overlapping membership or ‘variable geometry’ could, for example, mean making genuine progress at ECOWAS level while maintaining the achievements and benefits of UMOA”.




Figure 2. Overlapping Regional Memberships of African-states. Source: UNCTAD 2009

However, others argue that multiple memberships are a hindrance to RI efforts. Dube & Hakuna (Dube, 2012 & Tanyawika et al, 2014) contend that member states belonging to the SADC region that have multiple memberships create inconsistencies and have damaging connotations towards the application of SADC's Trade Protocol provisions because these regional initiatives also have their own different regional economic objectives. For instance, SADC member states are also part of COMESA, EAC and SACU. Furthermore, a study that was done by the OAU revealed that countries that are involved in many RECs face problems (Alemayehu and Haile, 2002: 14). The implementation of regional trade agreements (RTAs) is affected when member states have overlapping memberships, because it "Complicates the overall continental integration process, and puts enormous strains on governments' ability

and resources to cope with diverse agendas and exigencies” (Economic Commission for Africa, 2004:10).

#### **4.4 The EU**

##### ***4.4.1 Case Study: The EU Economic Integration Process***

Since the early 1950s, the EU has been a pioneer in RI (Cameron, 2015). The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was formed out of concerns to preserve the European economies after the Second World War (Schmitter, 1970). In 1958 the ECSC grew to become the European Economic Community (ECC) which was later renamed the (EC) in 1992, and then European Union (EU) in 1997. The purpose of RI initiative was to advance economic growth. The successful integration of the EU that has been securely established today has undergone much economic hardships and political hostilities. In yielding their sovereignty, member states of the EU collaborated to form a supranational unit. Over the years RIAs s have multiplied and this has increased the importance of regional state member countries in politics, money and trade (Mattli, 1999). RI has not been restricted and exclusive to Europe. The model of RI has been presented as the blueprint for African nation states to achieve successful RI. Developing countries are turning to RIAs as a mechanism for promoting development. However, interest in RI has also been resurrected in developed regions of the world (Melo & Panagariya, 1995). This has happened either within the context of globalization or for other reasons. RI has been one of the major developments in international relations such that virtually all countries are members of one regional bloc (Schiff & Winters, 2003).

Academic work on the EU has generated much conceptual literature. This is because the EU model of governance perceived as an impressive example of utmost state cooperation and united institutions (Rosamond, 2000:1). Cameron (2010) argues that EU model is the most developed globally and it serves as an example that RI could work worldwide. According to Larsen (2004) the EU is a unit that has a duty to take on leading roles in international challenges and it has managed well its domestic affairs.

The EU is founded on the rule of law, there are EU treaties which govern operations within the EU community and international operations. This bears the significance that every state belonging to the EU, may not disobey any principles pertaining to the rule of law specified within the treaty (Pech, 2012). The core objectives of the EU are to promote Union's value, harmony and the well being of the people within the Union. Moreover, the Union has additional objectives that are meant to support the core objectives listed above. These additional objectives include an internal market where competition is free and undistorted; and the promotion of social justice and protection, and solidarity among Member States (Europa.eu, n.d.).

In the EU constitutional framework, the EU objectives and the rule of law are treated to the utmost importance and used as a yardstick for checking the actions of the member states. Member states that are found to be in violation of the treaties, the law or the judgement of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) where there are often penalties imposed (Pech, 2012). In 2004, there were 144 cases brought before the ECJ, where member states were found to have failed to meet its requirements under community law. The total number of proceedings that were submitted by the Commission against member states increased to 2.497 since 1952. On the 12 July 2005, a judgement was made on the case brought forward by the Commission against

the French Republic. It was for the first time that the ECJ ruled that a member state must pay a hefty fine and a periodic penalty payment for the continuous failure to obey Community law. This was after France's persistence failure to comply with Community processes for the preservation of fisheries. Between 1984 and 1987 the ECJ had already found France to have contravened Community law by allowing the sale of undersized fish. In so doing undermining the one of the Community's objectives of managing and preserving fish resources (Europa.eu, 2005).

It became necessary for the European continent to undergo reform in the aftermath to World War II in 1945. This is when the European integration process started to unite and recover from the economic woes occasioned by the war (Heinonen, 2006).

The Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Treaty) in 1991 was established through the merging of various European nation states, i.e. the European Coal and Steel Community, the European Economic Community and the Steel Community and the European Atomic Energy Community, who then signed a Treaty of Rome in which lead led to the formation of the European Community (EU) in 1967, (Madyo, 2009; Mattli, 1999). By the time the European Monetary System was formed, the European integration had progressed beyond just a trade. In the year 1979 saw the formation of the European Monetary system, and in 1993, testament to the successful progression of the integration was seen; the Union had changed its name to European Union (Mattli, 1999).

Owing to the success of the EU integration, it has become a benchmark for RI in the developing countries (Rathumbu, 2008). The EU is now the largest political and economic entity on the European continent, comprising approximately 493 million people and an estimated GDP of €10.5 trillion, which is second only to that of the US.

The EU's GDP is the second largest GDP in the world, it is estimated to be €10.5 trillion. Furthermore, the EU is the biggest economic and political integration community on the European continent (Rathumbu, 2008). Heinonen (2006) argues that, the process towards reaching the level of success in the integration that EU now enjoys did not come cheap.

An Austrian aristocrat, Count Richard Coudenhove-Kalegri, advocated for a unification of the European States. In 1923, he established a Pan-European Union, and he also published a book called Pan Europa (Heinonen, 2006). Through all of this, he was able to give rise to more interest and he attracted some politicians into the idea. However, that was not enough, in fact, during the recession as well as the popularization of the nationalist socialist regime in Germany, the RI agenda lost the attention it had gained in the political sphere (Heinonen, 2006).

The EU is a single market and it is a customs union having a common trade policy. The Euro, is the EU's own currency, Furthermore, The EU has a Regional Policy, a Common Agricultural Policy, and a Common Fisheries Policy in place to support poorer regions (Rathumbu, 2008). The far most important sector in the EU is the services sector which covers 69.4 per cent of the GDP while the manufacturing industry is at 28.4 per cent of the GDP and agriculture at only 2.3 per cent of the GDP (Rathumbu, 2008). As the most successful RI community in the world, it is important that, we do not disregard the background of the European Integration (Madyo, 2009).

The merging of integrating communities, eventually leading to the establishment of the Treaty on the European Union is one of the indications that, the success of the European Integration was a gradual process. Madyo (2008) argues that, Africa needs to learn from the process which led to the European Integration, then he argues that



Europeans had realistic reforms that helped lead to the community that they now are. Madyo (2008) praises what he calls the “EU institutional framework”. Madyo (2008) also argues that, Africa should however, has to have its own framework informed by Africa’s unique, economic and political setting as it is different to that of Europe (Madyo, 2008). Furthermore, Kalunga (2012) argues that, some analysts have argued that, what also led to the success of the integration of the EU was because of their effective legal and institutional framework, which helped ensure that the member states kept to their obligations. In SADC the issue is that the institutional framework remains an issue that is disputed because its benefits necessitates that nation states give up their sovereignty (Kalunga, 2012).

Madyo (2008) argues that Africa should study to and learn from the work done by the EU institutions, namely, the Council of Ministers, the Commission, and Parliament as these provide a strategic direction and ensure that, the integration objectives are being met, and that member states continue to engage with issues arising and work together. Madyo (2008) also states that, the most important thing is implementation, and a great deal of “investment in human resources in research, negotiation and monitoring “has been important to the success of the EU, and the AU needs to learn from this” (Madyo, 2008: 81).

The Maastricht Treaty, which came into force in 1993, was amended when other member states joined the agreement totalling the membership to fifteen. This was followed by a revising of the Rome and Maastricht Treaties, leading to the formation of The Nice Treaty. However, 2007 saw the reviewing and replacement of all the treaties at the time. This was informed by the agreement by the EU heads of states who agreed to the formation of a New Reform treaty. Madyo (2008) argues that, this denotes the need for the constant reviewing of regional agreement schemes so that

they are in line with the realities of the continent. He further argues that, Africa should follow suit in amending treaties that are redundant in place for and replace them with the ones that are relevant to the current conditions and developments of the continent (Madyo, 2008).

As has been discussed earlier on in the chapter, scholars argue that true to Southern Africa's setbacks is the unwillingness to give up some amount of state independence to the regional economic integration communities, an argument this study supports. The EU road to success demonstrates success through the level of commitment from member states and their willingness to yield a certain level of sovereignty needed for the attainment of integration. Heinonen (2006) asserts that the two most important institutions to which Europe yielded their sovereignty are the Council of Europe and the European Union. The council of Europe's dealings have only been the issues of human rights protection. What is worth noting about the Council of Europe is the fact that individuals are able to take "signatories of the European Convention of Human Rights to an international court should there be human rights violations" (Heinonen, 2006: 105). This European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) is able to formulate binding rules for the signatories (Heinonen, 2006).

Madyo (2008) further argues that one of the fundamental goals that African states should also learn from the example of the European Union is that the heads of states made and decided to follow deeper levels of integration - this was at the time when the EU was already becoming a common market. The results of this decision led to the Maastricht Treaty being officiated in 1991 which was aimed at the formation of a European Monetary Union and a European Central Bank. Fundamental to the treaty was that, it explicitly stated that each country's economic performance has to be analogous to that of other member states in the region before the union could be

considered ready for a monetary union (Madyo, 2008). This meant that the EU members make their monetary and economic policies similar because, member states could not pursue dissimilar economic growth, inflation and monetary growth rates, different currencies that did not move relative to each other (Madyo, 2008).

#### **4.5 SADC**

One cannot talk meaningfully about the Southern African RI agenda and the role of RECs without talking about the role of SADC (Dube, 2015: 20). SADC is arguably the region that shows the most prospects to being the greatest REC in the region, and it is seen as the one having the most potential to lead efforts towards the united Africa vision (SADC, 2012). Therefore, this section will look more closely at SADC in assessing the failures of the region towards RI.

Dube argues that in southern Africa, regional economic integration is defined by the SADC (Dube, 2012: 20). The main objective of the SADC is to make the region a competitive and a successful player in the world economy, by way of promoting equitable and viable socio-economic development and economic growth through good governance, deeper integration and cooperation, long-lasting peace and security, and efficient productive systems, (SADC, 2012). Dube (2012: 20) argues that the primary determinant of the SADC economic agenda is the SADC Trade Protocol. The legal and structural framework for free trade is provided for in the Trade Protocol Agreement. The agreement further makes provision for the gradual removal of trade barriers. That is because, ultimately, SADC wants to achieve free trade within the region. Therefore the goal of the SADC Trade Protocol is the creation of a Free Trade Area (FTA) (Dube, 2012: 20).

SADC has adopted a development integration approach which seeks to address production, infrastructure and eliminate barriers to growth and development. In the area of trade and economic liberalization, the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) articulated the roadmap for SADC integration through the establishment of a free trade area (FTA) by 2008, a customs union in 2010, a common market in 2015, a monetary union in 2016, and an economic union with a single currency currently in 2018.

2012 marked two important milestones in SADC-the completion of the member states' tariff phase down schedules to reach a status of an effective free trade area and the current review of the RISDP (Kalanga, 2012:1). Generally, SADC has made significant progress in liberalizing trade. Most SADC countries have reduced and eliminated tariffs and quotas under the Protocol on Trade since 2000. However, the protocol extends beyond this shallow integration to include issues that also regulate the business environment such as customs and trade facilitation, product standards and technical regulations, competition policy, intellectual property rights, investment, and services. It is in this deep integration where progress lags behind.

However, efforts towards translating this unanimous desire for cooperation and integration into tangible progress has not gone without strife, therefore understanding the circumstances can be better understood through an investigation of the conditions that are regionally specific. This section will look at those challenges as well as milestones that are specific to SADC as the REC.

#### ***4.5.1 Transition from SADCC to SADC***

The beginning of SADC can be traced back to April 1980 when it became clear that there was a need to formalize the rearrangement of SADCC to SADC. A summit was

held in Lusaka, Zambia, where nine independent states of the Southern African region were represented. These states were: Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe (Kalenga, 2012; Heinonen, 2006).

Quite a number of things caused this transition. Heinonen (2006) asserts that SADCC had failed to meet its objectives. The SADC was also well aware that there had been very little progress in eliminating the region's economic dependence on the then apartheid South Africa, which was not incorporated in the regional plan of Africa. So, this dependence slowed the progress towards economic integration. Kalenga (2012) asserts that, attempts at reducing the dependence on South Africa led to the adoption of a functional regional cooperation approach. Another cause for the transition was that there was uncertainty over the structures responsible for decision-making in the organization, as well as the uncertainty over the organisation's legal status (Heinonen, 2006). With the end of the cold war, in the beginning of the 1990's, there was a new RI framework also in Southern Africa (Heinonen, 2006).

In 1992, the SADCC finally became the SADC, a transition from an organization that was mainly politically motivated as opposed to being more economically motivated. Through an increased regional trade, SADC aimed at improving the livelihoods of its people (Tanyanika & Hakuna, 2014). However, it has been claimed that "the old SADCC always portrayed itself as an economic body, although it was more political and ideological" (Mengesha, 2009:5). SADC has a population of approximately 248 million, and the region's market is currently US\$431 billion of the combined income. South Africa, makes 65% of the total SADC market, it is the leading economy with a

US\$282 billion GDP (Tanyanika & Hakuna, 2014). The Map below (Figure. 1) shows the countries that form part of SADC.




Figure 3. A regional map of SADC. Source: [sadc.int](http://sadc.int)

SADC has faced a number of challenges in trying to meet its objectives of poverty reduction and economic growth. Some of those challenges have been discussed in the previous sections of this chapter. There are a few more milestones that are noteworthy. These are discussed below.

#### 4.5.1.1 *SADC Finance and Investment Protocol*

The SADC has been able to establish a SADC Finance and Investment Protocol (FIP), which came into effect on 16 April 2010. This Finance and Investment Protocol is a means to lay a footing for the establishment of the Economic Union by 2018 and also the Monetary Union by 2016 (Kalenga, 2012). The FIP works at creating the

necessary environment for the creation of a single financial market with shared systems, institutions and regulations by way of improving each nation state's investment climate so that the necessary frameworks and policies in the region are complementary to each other which is needed to achieve regional financial integration. Kalenga (2012) argues that this is considered to be important for establishing a single monetary zone.

#### *4.5.1.2 Consensus to establish a Common Market by 2015*

Furthermore, what is also regarded as a milestone for the SADC has been that there has been a consensus to establish a Common Market by 2015. The Common Market will serve the purpose of uniting the internal market by way of negotiating instruments on the free movement of factors of production and substantial harmonization of commercial policies. It is envisioned that the successful establishment of the Common Market will then lead to the legal instrument on free movement of all factors of production (Kalenga, 2012).

#### *4.5.1.3 SADC Trade Protocol*

The SADC Trade Protocol is a legally binding agreement that is aimed towards the liberalization of trade in the region, it was amended in 2005 (Kalenga, 2012 & SADC, 2012). The Protocol on Trade's objectives is to ensure efficient production, cross border and foreign investment, further liberalization of intra-regional trade in goods and services, and enhancement of economic development, diversification and industrialization of the region (SADC, 2012).

#### *4.5.1.4 SADC Free Trade Area (FTA)*

In 2008, the SADC Free Trade Area (FTA) was established. This was established after the minimum conditions were reached, enough to enable the establishment of the FTA. This was influenced by the fact that there was a zero duty attained for intra-regional trade between partner states which equalled 85% Tariff liberalization, which was only achieved in January 2012. Resulting from the instigation of the SADC Trade Protocol, it is estimated that intra-SADC trade has increased from about US\$13.2 billion in 2000 to about US\$34 billion in 2009 ( SADC, 2012).

#### *4.6.0 Formation of the AU*

The AU began with the formation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), a charter that was signed by 30 African states in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia on 25 May 1963. The aim of the OAU was to bring peace and harmony to the fragmentation of the rival blocs of Brazzaville, Casablanca and Monrovia (Paterson, 2012: 6). It was in July 2002 in Durban, South Africa that 53 African heads of state inaugurated the AU (Powell & Tiekou, 2005). The formation of the AU replaced the OAU and its formation marked the call for major changes to Pan Africanist approaches to peace and security (Powell & Tiekou, 2005). Moreover, Powell & Yiekou (2005) state that the norms underpinning the formation of the AUs emerging peace and security regime are that which draws from the philosophy of Pax Africana...African Solutions for African problems. According to (Fagbayibo, 2008: 493) “the AU is the organization that has been charged with the responsibility of taking Africa to the Promised Land”. The term “promised land” used by Fagbayibo (2008: 493) denotes the destination of African renaissance, African Unity or successful integration on the African Continent.



#### **4.6.1 Formation of NEPAD**

NEPAD was implemented both by African Heads of State and Government of the OAU in 2001 (Paterson, 2012: 8), and was ratified by the AU in 2002 to address Africa's development problems within a new paradigm (nepad.org, 2015). The formation of NEPAD was an initiative to put the African continent back on the path of political and sustainable development (Ogola 2002). The main objectives of NEPAD are to reduce poverty, put Africa on a sustainable development path, put an end to the marginalization of Africa, and also empower women (nepad.org.2015)

The main objectives of the AU are to promote solidarity and unity of African states; to do away with all forms of colonialism and its effects in Africa, to safe guard the continent's territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence; to coordinate and strengthen their cooperation and efforts to attain a better life for the continent's citizens; to coordinate and ensure synchronization of member states' political, economic, diplomatic, welfare, educational, cultural, health, scientific, technical, and defence policies. To integrate Africa into the global economy and to promote global cooperation, giving due regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) and the Charter of the United Nations (1945). Furthermore, it aims at establishing an African Common Market by 2028 (Paterson, 2012: 8). According to Paterson (2012: 2) the African Union (AU) has attempted to follow the EU's model of integration, this against the fact that Africa has vast uniqueness to EU that may not be comparable. He further asserts that this is also seen in the way that Africa is still battling with reversing and remedying the colonial effects that are still evident in Trade and Commerce, whereas the EU has been able to reap the benefits from the EU integration. The AU has embodied the vision for an "African Renaissance". It

envisions fulfilling its role in the continent which is to promote a democratic governance, economic development and political unity, (Paterson, 2012: 1).

#### **4.6.2            *Progress and setbacks***

The AU established the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) in 2001. The NEPAD was established to serve as the main economic programme of the AU. In 2012, the initiative was able to get 425 million external funding for its development plans and it was able to oversee water management and infrastructure projects. However, the AU has been criticized for the slow pace which the implementation of these envisioned programs has seen (Paterson, 2012: 2). The problem of poor infrastructure is still a big problem. For example, it is one of the great reasons for the high tariffs, lack of diversity in production and low intra-African trade rate. Furthermore, NEPAD is reliant on donor funds, but even the donor funds remain unpredictable. Adding to the setbacks is also the issue that has been previously discussed earlier in this chapter, the issue of overlapping membership which creates a reiteration of efforts when it comes to African RECs. This hampers NEPAD's efforts of trying to curl out uneven development of Africa's RECs (Paterson, 2012: 2).

In 2003, NEPAD succeeded in establishing The Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) as well as the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). The APRM aims to investigate the standards of government within the continent, and the CAADP aims to better the agricultural sector by coming up with a policy framework. The agricultural sector contributes about 35 to 40 % of Africa's GDP. 33 countries had become part of the APRM by 2013, and 17 countries had started carrying out their review process. However, the compliance to the mechanism

has not been a smooth process, owing to the fact that the findings are not binding as well as the fact that the implementation at the national level has not been as was envisioned. According to Paterson (2012: 3) since the formation of the AU there has been a decline in the number of civil wars within Africa. In 2002 there were 8 civil wars, and by 2012 there were just 4. However, there has been an increase in the number of localized crises that escalated into violence. There have been 11 coups d'état between 2003 and 2013, and CAR, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar, Mauritania, and Niger got their membership suspended by the AU as a result of political instability in those countries. However, there has been an outcry and criticism that the sanctioning of military coups should also be extended to presidential term limits (Paterson, 2012:3). Some African leaders refuse to leave office when their terms end. This was the case with Presidents Daniel Arap Moi in Kenya, Frederick Chiluba in Zambia, Olusegun Obasanjo in Nigeria and many others. The recent case is Pierre Nkurunziza in Burundi.

In January of 2012, the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance of 2007 was able to secure 15 signatories. Although this is a good achievement, the disadvantage of this is that it was supposed to have been reached sooner. Paterson (2012:3) argues that the reason for that is because if member states are not willing to cooperate the progress is compromised, as Africa's governance framework is heavily reliance on the willingness of the member states to fulfil their roles. The AU considers the role of the civil society to be important for the development plans, and steps have been taken to increase the role of the civil society. For example, 2004 saw the formation of the Pan-African Parliament (PAP) as well as the Economic, Social, and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC) in 2005. However, both the PAP and the

ECOSOCC have been largely ineffective. That is because the PAP has not been allowed legislative powers, and as a result it has not been able to function. The ECOSOCC has not been able to safeguard the participation of the masses in the AU's bodies (Paterson, 2012).

Thabo Mbeki, the former president of the Republic of South Africa and one of the founders of the AU criticized the AU as having fundamentally failed to meet its objectives. He argued that there are three main areas that the AU has failed at. One of the failures has been that there has not been an advancement of the African common people through “the social, cultural and economic development” as was envisaged in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) Declaration. He also asserted that there has been failure to safeguard a collective respect for, and adherence to human rights, and failure in ensuring that important freedoms are protected, i.e. religion, race, sex or language. Thirdly, he stated that world leaders have continued to undermine the practice and the principle that is prescribed by the UNGA declaration which emphasizes the freedom that the masses have to choose their political status and to pursue their social, economic and cultural development (Mbeki, 2012).

#### **4.7 Conclusion**

It is certain that regional economic integration is an important and best model for which global, regional and national economic challenges could be overcome (Madyo, 2008). There has been a demonstration by the region and the continent that there are sound frameworks and a number of treaties have been signed, however with regards to implementation minimal efforts are made towards complying with treaties.

While there are great differences between the economic and political settings in Africa to that which obtains in Europe, there are lessons to be found in the EU that Africa could emulate, i.e. the seriousness of the lack of political will from member states in Africa could be worked on by the RECs in the region and this is not an issue that the region should, at this stage, be still dealing with if the RI vision is to be realized. What is also important is that it must be clear what the consensus is on RI, and how the goals and plans of the RI purposes could be harmonized into strategic agendas at the national level of each of the member states. The chapter discussed the benefits of RI, specifically in the region. It also discussed, some of the factors that have caused setbacks to RI in the region. The chapter also discussed the EU, and the SADC as an organization and its important role in the region.

## **CHAPTER 5 - SOUTH AFRICA'S ROLE IN AFRICA'S RI AGENDA**

### **5.0 Introduction**

Chapter 4 provided a general discussion of the benefits of RI. In doing so advantages and the disadvantages of RI were expounded on. Although some progress has been achieved regarding RI, Southern Africa still faces a lot of challenges. Some of these

challenges have negatively affected RI in the SADC region. Challenges to RI in SADC include lack of uncompromising political commitment and political will and the unwillingness among states in the region to cede their sovereignty. Another challenge to RI is the issue of multiple membership which has scattered priorities of member states and has caused stagnation to RI. Chapter four also discussed the EU integration process, for the simple reason that although the EU is faced with challenges of its own, it remains the best example of a successful integration scheme globally.

The fundamental aim of this chapter is to explore South Africa's role and influence in the region of Southern Africa. This chapter presents key predominant arguments made against the perceived role South Africa is said to play in the region. This includes a discussion of the role South Africa has made in African Institutions such as the SADC, AU and NEPAD. A discussion of the nature of South Africa's foreign policy is also presented. Finally, a comparison between South Africa and Nigeria regarding their contributions and roles on the African continent is made. Through this discussion, South Africa's current role in the region will be defined thereby concluding the assessment of South Africa's potential in leading the regional agenda in southern Africa.

## **5.1 South Africa's role in SADC & Africa**

According to Amos (2010) South Africa's most prioritized agenda and its greatest main concern of its foreign relations is Southern Africa. This dedication is evident in the social, economic and political commitment that the country has demonstrated in SADC (Amos, 2010). Like many other States in the geopolitical game of international relations, South Africa finds itself in an important and delicate position within the

region. This is due to the fact that South Africa is expected to maintain a balance between the interests of the country as well as its priorities of being an effective regional, continental and global player (Amos, 2010). Amos (2010) further argues that, it is in this context that South Africa finds itself in a tight spot. For this reason, it is to be expected that South Africa would be susceptible to encounter difficulties in pleasing all the different states in the global arena.

In the SADC region, economic inequalities are evident amongst member states, and the major bulk of the Southern African region's economic clout resides within South Africa. SADC's overall trade is made up of South Africa's trade, which is about 60%. South Africa also makes about 70% of the region's GDP (Soko, 2007). The southern African region is of topmost priority to the South African government. South Africa has pursued an "Africa first" policy now and has diplomatic representation in 46 of Africa's 54 countries. By 2007, Africa received more than any other region of the country's R3, 282 billion per annum budget, reinforcing the country's commitment to the continent and the African Agenda (Landsberg, 2009). For this reason, the South African government has sought to renew the quest for regional economic integration.

Trade policy reform has also become an important tool for South Africa to reconstruct economic and political cooperation amongst African states as well as to establish itself as a pivotal role player on the African continent, especially in the SADC region. The weight of the SADC region's concerns has been the concern also of South Africa's foreign policy which is seen with regards to the economic, political and security issues made mention of in the foreign policy. South Africa has also been an important and active player in the NEPAD and the AU (Soko, 2007). Moreover, South Africa

has taken a lead role in the region to address such issues to ensure closer collaboration and economic integration, and has used SADC as a vehicle to drive this agenda for the region. To some extent, this has benefited the region since South Africa's position on the global front helps magnify the region's potential in many respects. South Africa has taken the lead to work on issues of RI in the region, such as economic integration and cooperation. This it has done by using the SADC to accomplish this goal in the region (Amos, 2010).

It is certain that South Africa has the most developed economy within the region as well as in Africa (Amos, 2010). Acknowledging this rests on the fact that, RI in Africa needs to be taken seriously and part of that is acknowledging South Africa's position which is also important because of the crucial role that it plays in the region which could potentially make or cause a discontinuity on RI in the region (Amos, 2010). It is also crucial that commercial relationships with countries in the region and the continent be equally beneficial. Since South Africa's transition to a democratic state, the government has prioritized the region in its foreign affairs. To give an example, upon the national government's adoption of its first foreign policy document was a "Framework for Co-operation in Southern Africa" ( Soko, 2007: 124).

South Africa's rise as the leading investor in Southern Africa and its rapid economic growth throughout the African continent has been a remarkable feature of South Africa's political economy post-apartheid (Soko, 2007). South Africa's relationship with Mozambique is a fitting illustration of South Africa's deepening economic growth in the region. Mozambique has emerged as South Africa's leading destination and the Mozambican Investment Promotion Centre reports that, there are more than



262 investment projects belonging to South Africa that have been registered since 1985 which by the end of 2003 had accrued US\$1,330 billion worth of investment value (Soko, 2007).

Upon the demise of apartheid, many South African companies began dominating the Southern African region and its dominance also moved northward, making South Africa one of the world's fastest growing sources of FDI in Africa (UNCTAD, 2003). South Africa is Southern Africa's 'growth pole' that can help develop regional economies by means of provision of FDI capital, technology transfer and contributions to human resource development (UNCTAD, 1999), (Luiz & Charalambous, 2009).

### ***5.1.1 South Africa in the AU & NEPAD***

South Africa played a fundamental role in the formation of the AU in 2002. South Africa chaired the AU from June 2002 to June 2003, after the transition from OAU (Landsberg, 2009 & (Thepresidency-dpme.gov.za, n.d.). When the AU was officially transformed from the OAU to AU and the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) was adopted in the 2002 Durban Summit, South Africa played an instrumental role in the formation of the policies, procedures and the institutions of the AU. South Africa also contributed significantly in the formation of the AU Peace and Security Council and the Pan-African Parliament, (Thepresidency-dpme.gov.za, n.d.)

South Africa's domestic growth is greatly entwined with the growth of the region and the continent (Amos, 2010). Rather than having a constricted mercantilist approach to

development in the SADC region, South Africa has, on the contrary, demonstrated a more developmental approach (Amos, 2010). The Director General of South Africa's Department of Trade and Industry, Tshediso Matona confirmed this stating that South Africa's economic strategy in Africa is guided by asymmetry and the country needed to make bigger concessions in trade and economic dealings with African partners. (Amos, 2010). Amos (2010) argues, "South Africa's economic strategy is multi-faceted, promotes trade and supply capacity as well as investment and infrastructural development. South Africa's economic strategy had to be located within the NEPAD framework and should emphasize the importance of partnerships on the continent" (Amos, 2010: 18). It is this philosophical idea from which it views Africa that has formed the basis for South Africa's relations with the AU (Tieku, 2013).

South Africa's national interest' on the continent is embodied clearly in the NEPAD. This is South Africa's expression of interest and efforts towards improving the political and economic governance for the development of the economy in the continent as a whole, (Gelb, 2001: 2). Former South African President, Thabo Mbeki devised and popularized the term 'African Renaissance'. This notion has been fully realized. It has united scholars, civil servants and policy-makers as a notion that is relevant to African pride, self-respect and dignity (Melber, 2004). South Africa has played a proactive role in the NEPAD since its establishment. Though not without critics, NEPAD has had a good inter-continental impact and has been referred to as a 'pact among elites' that strive for Africa's development (Melber, 2004).

Since the liberation of South Africa, it has been South Africa's goal to work on improving and strengthening its relationship with the African continent. The South

African government did not regard the path to unification as an easy one. According to Mandela (2010) Dr Dlamini-Zuma, South Africa's former Foreign Affairs Minister provided a sound justification for South Africa's foreign policy in the region thus: "our collective experiences as South Africans have placed us in a unique position to understand the challenges facing humanity ... firstly, ours is a reality of two nations, one developed and wealthy, the other marginalized and poor ... Hence we have committed our foreign policy to the eradication of poverty and underdevelopment and for the transformation of the continent and the global environment" (DFA, 2003; Mandela, 2010:45).

South Africa being one of the well-developed countries among other African states is faced with challenges of eliminating the consequences resulting from the Apartheid legacy. These obstacles are manifested in the form of social and the economic imbalances inherited by a significant population of South Africa's civil society. The inequalities in the production and distribution of goods and services, still show in living conditions, with the bulk of the people still living in poverty (Mandela, 2010). There is some understanding shown by the South African government. The South African government therefore acknowledges that, new forms of wealth must be made in order for the realization of justice and development in the country. In attempts to meet basic needs of citizens at the domestic level, South Africa formed the Redistribution and Development Program (RDP), which was later replaced by the adoption of Growth Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) (Mandela, 2010). These structural adjustment programs have been criticized for failing to achieve their objectives for development, and reduction of inequality. Progress toward solving these economic disparities at the domestic level is very important. This will help to

eliminate the criticism that South Africa is unable to solve its own domestic issues.

For the first time after the democratic elections, South Africa was able to establish economic and diplomatic relations with other African countries. This was a significant change for the foreign policy in the country (Pfister, 2000). As Nelson Mandela stated, “South Africa cannot escape its African destiny. If we do not devote our energies to this continent, we too could fall victim to the forces that have brought ruin to its various parts... We are inextricably part of southern Africa and our destiny is linked to that region, which is much more than a mere geographical concept” (Pfister (2000:6) in (Mandela, 2010: 53).

### **5.1.3 South Africa’s foreign policy in Africa**

#### **5.1.3.1 The National Development Plan 2030 (NDP)**

The National Development Plan is important to talk about in this study, because it carries with it significant implications for the existing RECs in the Southern African region and shows South Africa’s plans of involvement in that agenda. The New Development Plan (NDP) 2030 is the country’s main vital “development implementation modality”. In the NDP, the country shows its commitment to the RI agenda (Lalbahadur, 2015). In their National Development Plan 2030 (NDP 2030), the South African government has set up the NDP as a linear guide for South Africa’s deeper involvement to the integration efforts (NDP, 2030: 2012). Zarenda states that, the NDP was launched by the government as socio-economic tactic for the country to assist in national development (Zarenda, 2013).

South Africa is not the first country to adopt a long-term development plan. A number

of other countries have adopted long term goals and planning frameworks with more vigour than before. Like all the policies adopted by other African states, the main focus of the NDP is on sustainable development, employment creation, accelerated growth and structural transformation (Zarenda, 2013: 8). According to Zeranda, (2013) these development plans often take into consideration the existing continental and global frameworks and objectives.

In the NDP, the South African government argues that they are cognizant of that. In order to achieve its national goals, its relations with other countries must be determined by the internal demands of the country including the commitments to the SADC region, the African continent and the entire world (NDP 2030, 236). According to chapter 7 of NDP 2030 (2012: 235) South Africa should expand its collaboration and co-operation on the African continent through deeper integration and increased trade with its regional trade partners in Africa and the global south in general. Furthermore, the NDP states that the emerging Tripartite Free Trade Area must be one of the top priorities in South African foreign policies as it is an important phase towards integration in the continent (NDP 2030, 2012: 235). The plan also calls for a well thought out and objective assessment of present international relations. There is expressed concern on the overlapping of the memberships in RI communities; it is therefore necessary to resolve this issue in the light of the envisioned integration objectives among the African states (Zeranda, 2013). Zeranda (2013) levels some criticism against the NDP, that, South Africa's detailed review of its position in the continent was not included in the NDP. This is attributed to the fact that, it was not the planning commission's mandate to fulfil the omitted obligations. Rather the focus for the commission was on finding and discussing areas of

comparative advantage to South Africa in so much as it relates to the region and as well as how the country could contribute to the existing regional communities and plans in place for further growth and development.

#### *5.1.3.2 Peace and Security interventions / The Promotion of peace and security: Interventions*

Conflict resolution and peacekeeping has been another pillar of South Africa's relation and foreign policy in the SADC region as well as on the African continent (Mandela, 2010). It is therefore important to scrutinize the purposes of this study. South Africa has made tremendous impact in the area of the promotion of governance and post-conflict reconstruction as well as peace making in Africa. Pretoria became vital when peacekeeping deals had to be made towards peace among some rebel leaders and politicians in Africa (Van Nieuwkerk, 2014). Tjemolane et al. (2012) argue that South African has transitioned to being an Africa-centred and peace-oriented state and shows readiness to engage with the continent in co-operative relations.

Areas in which South Africa has taken part include “involvement in peace-making, governance and post-conflict reconstruction processes in Burundi, the Central African Republic, Comoros, the DRC, Ethiopia/Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Mali, Rwanda, São Tomé and Príncipe, Somalia, Sudan, and Zimbabwe” (Van Nieuwkerk, 2014: 3). South Africa has not always succeeded in its interventions in conflict situations. The country, for example, failed to convince the governments of the DRC, Angola and Mozambique not to resort to military force against the rebel groups in order to allow for a peaceful negotiations and

arrangements necessary (Van Nieuwkerk, 2014).

It is also worth noting that, South Africa should be commended for the work that it has put in towards peace and conflict resolution efforts. Since the mid-1990's, both former presidents of the democratic South Africa stated that "that the ANC-led government was more than willing to embark on transforming Africa into a stable 'zone of peace' through a process of democratization" (Landsberg, 2000). Post-1994, the South African government on many occasions made known that its strategy in resolving cases of conflict was not through aggression nor, threatening measures towards its regional neighbours. South Africa reassured the region and the African continent that it would make use of measures that are rooted in principles of regional peace and deterrence. This was important to address because the apartheid government had employed military defined state –security policy (Tjemolane et al, 94). This strategy was devoid of social justice and human security within the country at the time (Tjemolane et al, 94).

Regarding regional peacekeeping and development in southern Africa, South Africa has been moving towards a more active leadership role. Tjemolane et al (2012) cites Kagwanja (2008) arguing that South Africa's role in Africa in the area of peace and security, according to policy and academic considerations, is undoubtedly associated with that of a regional hegemon. This hegemonic status is based on three viewpoints. The first major factor, it is argued, is that because of South Africa's domestic political transformation, the country has a 'huge moral capital'. Furthermore, there has been arguments that South Africa should use this moral muscle to help bring change by positively influencing the countries in the continent that are plagued by conflicts.

Another argument is that, South Africa is seen as having the necessary capacity to be able to help Africa with development and take them out of poverty owing to its military strength as well as its large economy. However, Tjemolane (2012) argues that South Africa does not have enough economic strength and only has limited resources that would not be enough to be able to finance peacekeeping in Africa. Finally, it is argued that, since the apartheid period, including the period just after the democratically elected government in 1994, South Africa has always been a hegemonic state. Political observers had become optimistic that South Africa would take a leading role in peacekeeping and mediating roles in the continent because of the country's internal transformation and the commitment to regional peace that it showed in the mid-1990s. Although South Africa had expressed commitment to peace-keeping operations in Africa, its government has been cautious engaging in such operations because it does not want to be presumed as assuming a leadership role and pursuing domination which could cause political uneasiness (Tjemolane, et al 2012).

South Africa's earliest experience in conflict resolution can be traced back to 1996; this was when South Africa acted as a mediator between Mobutu Sese Seko who was the president of the then Zaire (now known as Democratic Republic of Congo) and Laurent Kabila who was behind the overthrow of Mobutu from presidency (Soko, 2007). Additionally, with the United States support, South Africa succeeded in stopping the then Zambian President, Frederick Chiluba, from altering the country's constitution so that he could attain a longer term in office. However, this ignited questions about South Africa's plans in the region (Soko, 2007). The South African National Defence Force (SANDF) deployed troops in support of the United Nations



Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Other significant contributions made by the SANDF were the deployments of troops to Burundi and Ethiopia (Soko, 2007). These contributions to peace-keeping efforts did not go unnoticed; they rather boosted the image of the country in the eyes of the international community. Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, key roles that South Africa has played in African peacekeeping missions include countries such as the DRC, Lesotho, Burundi, Côte d'Ivoire, Eritrea-Ethiopia, Sudan and the Comoros (Soko, 2007).

South Africa's interventions and mediation goals have been fuelled by the goal to facilitate sustainable development; political stability and good governance within Africa so as to achieve eliminate poverty. Because of this, South Africa has profoundly invested in the Pan African Parliament (PAP) and the AU. This is also in support of the doctrine of 'African renaissance' that has become important in South Africa's foreign affairs (Soko, 2007). As mentioned earlier, the South African government peacekeeping and intervention record contains mixed results since not all its intervention missions have been successful (Van Nieuwkerk, 2014).

## **5.2 What is Hegemony?**

There have been increasing discussions in IR about which countries can be said to be hegemons in their regions. In the last decade, South Africa, India and China have increasingly received scholarly attention for progressively becoming regional leaders. Though there is an increase in the subject of hegemons, there is thus far little engagement on what a regional hegemon actually means (Tetenyi, 2014). Tetenyi (2014) describes a hegemon as a country which dominates and is more powerful

compared to other countries in the system. This dominance is characterised by military power above all the other states. A hegemon is a state that is the only one in the system that has great power. According to Tetenyi (2014: 2) “A state that is substantially more powerful than the other great powers in the system is not a hegemon, because it faces, by definition, other great powers”. Tetenyi (2014) asserts that there is no country at the moment that can attain the position of hegemony. But the closest possibility to being a hegemony is a position of regional hegemony.

In the Western hemisphere, the USA is the only regional hegemon at present. Furthermore, Tetenyi (2014) argues that, according to Nolte (2010) a regional hegemon has regional supporters and also makes efforts into making regional governance organisations. The acceptance of a country by other countries in the region as a hegemon is important. Also important, are the specific actions taken by the hegemon in the promotion of its own national agenda as well as that of the region, for example, the efforts include: the hegemon’s mediation efforts during conflicts, monetary assistance, the formation of region interested institutions and setting plan for within those institutions (Tetenyi, 2014).

### **5.3 South Africa’s character traits as Hegemon**

There have been a number of arguments seeking to prove South Africa’s position in the SADC region and the continent as a key role player (Draper and Scholvin 2012). President Zuma stated that one of the features of the South African economy is that of being a ‘gateway to Africa’. In their paper Draper and Scholvin (2012) seek to analyse the factors that make South Africa a gateway to Africa. Draper and Scholvin (2012) argue that, the likelihood of a successful integration in Africa is when

integration is around geographical core states such as South Africa. It is contended that such states have better global connectedness because they are gateways. They argue that, private and public sector policies are important for the role of South Africa as a gateway to Africa. MNC's that do business in Southern African countries have tended to set up their headquarters in South Africa (Draper & Schlovin, 2012).

South Africa has an edge over other countries in the region as well as the continent because of its location and physical geography which provides support for transport by rail and road. Furthermore, Draper and Scholvin (2012) argue that proper infrastructure is one essential development requirement that most countries in Africa still lack. These authors further espouse the view that in order to connect to the markets outside Africa, Southern African states are reliant on the South African transport infrastructure, i.e. roads, railway lines, harbours and airports. OR Tambo in Johannesburg is an example of a major hub for the entire sub-Saharan region. Moreover, regarding logistics Johannesburg and Cape Town are used by overseas companies as primary locations for establishing regional main offices for their businesses in sub-Saharan Africa (Draper and Scholvin, 2012).

However, South Africa's location lacks centrality, this makes it the most non-favourable location because it lacks centrality from other African countries and countries from North America, the Far East, and Europe. However, being the only African country that has shores on the Indian and the Atlantic oceans makes it easily accessible by cargo ships from the world's developed economies including the emerging ones Draper & Scholvin (2012). Serious challenges still exist within intra-regional trade in Africa in terms of transportation. This is despite the fact that there

has been success made by the regional governments at simplifying cross- regional transport (Draper & Scholvin, 2012). A report from the World Bank shows that on the border of Zimbabwe and South Africa the delays there are eleven hours for traffic heading South and thirty four hours for traffic heading North (Draper & Scholvin, 2012).

There are also certain challenges to South Africa's role as a gateway. Draper and Scholvin (2012) state that, Dubai and Western Europe are two countries so far have emerged as MNC headquarters that have businesses in sub-Saharan Africa. These two countries are a step ahead with the advantages that they have over South Africa. Also, some smaller countries in Southern Africa offer good incentives to attract headquarters investments such as timely visa processes, cheap office rentals and low tax rates. These countries include, Mauritius and Botswana. There have also been several concerns that affect South Africa's status as a centre for supply and logistics activities. Political instability, labour relations, availability of skills and the fluctuations of the currency have been one of the main reasons for problems faced by businesses in South Africa (Draper & Scholvin, 2012). Alden and Schoeman (2015) argue that there have been premature expectations of South Africa as a gateway to Africa.

The scholarly debate about South Africa's role in the region has been imperative and controversial. The dominant arguments are centred on whether South Africa is a hegemon or a Pivotal state (Tjemolane et al, 2012). At the emergence of a democratic South Africa, there were very high expectations of a new role for a new South Africa both within Africa and globally. The expectation was that South Africa would play a

leading role on continent's goals for growth and development (Tjemolane et al, 2012 and Makgetlaneng, 2011). To this effect, South Africa's foreign policy and diplomacy saw a fundamental change (Tjemolane, et al, 2012). Immediately after the new democratically elected government, foreign policy took centre stage in the government's national interests. As early as 1993, the ANC stated that, one of its major plans was for South Africa to be entirely integrated into the global economy. As such, the Department of Foreign Affairs highlighted that they were well aware that the government had it in its hands to support regional and continental economy (Tjemolane et al, 2012).

Furthermore, literature on this issue shows that scholars have approached this debate from different angles. Whereas some literature argue that South Africa has always played a benevolent role in the continent by providing leadership in order to further the integration of Africa, other intellectuals have differed. They have argued that South Africa is an exploitative power that has demonstrated its intentions of being a bully in the region as well as in the continent. This perception refuted the argument that South Africa is a hegemon. Rather, it argues that South Africa's ambitions of playing a leadership role in the continent is only to further its national goals (Alden & Soko, 2005; Makgetlaneng, 2011). As Alden & Soko (2005) correctly state, the vitality of these differing views are illustrative of an on-going and deepening disunion among policy circles, the regional populace as well as academic analysts.

Makgetlaneng (2011) argues that South Africa's relation with the global capitalism has contributed to the view that South Africa is a foe of the African continent. The global capitalism is perceived to be having antagonistic interests to those of Africa.

Therefore its association views South Africa viewed to be having homogenous interests. The reason for Western Europe to provide international aid to some African countries is so that Africans may not find the need to migrate from their countries. The reasons for this international aid are only for their own interests. Therefore, for the West, South Africa is the hope for the continent. Furthermore, global capitalism places their hope for development of Africa on South Africa for the reason that they perceive South Africa as being 'different from the rest of the Sub-Saharan Africa'. This is because of the higher role it plays in the continental and global economy, as well as because it has a more diversified economy and its developmental level is higher (Makgetlaneng, 2011). However, it is maintained that, the continental importance that is apparently placed on South Africa has been over-stretched.

Alden and Pere (2009) state that South Africa's decisions made for African interests have received more applause from the global settings like the WTO than they have within the African continent. Moreover, as an example Alden & Le Pere (2009) mention that South Africa received criticism from within the continent as well as from the international community for their mediation efforts between Ivory Coast and Zimbabwe. Some African states have secluded South African trade negotiators from some positions at important international meetings. According to the HST, the presence of hegemony in the international systems is important, especially where the countries involved intend to participate in long-term cooperation (Alden and Pere, 2009). South Africa's perceived hegemonic role comes up against a lack of unanimity; South Africa has been heavily accused of being a bully to other countries in the region and the continent.

Additionally, South Africa's Multinational Corporations (MNC's) have been argued to propagate the behaviour of South Africa's bullying tactics. Chidaushe (2010) argues that some literature on the behaviour of South African MNC's have shown that they are only concerned about making profit and none of their interests is on consolidating Africa's private sector. In fact, it has been reported that South African MNC's exploit their workers, pay low wages and have poor working hours. Most of South Africa's products come into other countries as finished goods; this destabilizes the local small to medium scale businesses (Chadaushe, 2010).

Moreover, it seems that South Africa cannot accept people who are not from South Africa, specifically nationals from other African states (Alden, 2009). An example of this unwelcoming behaviour from South Africans is the attack on foreign nationals. The eruption of the xenophobic attacks across South Africa in 2008 and 2009 saw poor Africans particularly those living in townships and informal settlements viciously assaulted, leaving more than 70 dead. More recently, in April 2015, approximately 7 people were killed from similar attacks, which started in KwaZulu Natal and extended to Johannesburg. Alden (2009) argues that, these attacks on Africans are an example of the unfriendly behaviour of South Africans towards other Africans. This behaviour undermines South Africa's perceived role in the region and also it causes a rift with other African countries thus hindering forging sincere partnership (Chidaushe, 2010).

South Africa is a twenty-one-year-old democratic state. It is still battling with its own internal issues such as the high levels of unemployment, inequalities amongst others. There certainly is a paradox when it comes to South Africa's leadership. In the

presence of much controversy, South Africa is still considered fit for leadership by the international community but with many African governments, there is much concern and suspicion. A hegemon's acceptance by neighbouring states is important because that is where power comes from (Alden and Pere, 2009). Furthermore, the Nigerian GDP has come up as the largest in the continent. According to the Nigeria's National Bureau of Statistics, Nigeria's GDP has risen to 509.97 billion USD while South Africa's is 370.0 billion USD. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) recommends that the base years be updated every five years, but Nigeria had not done so since 1990. The revised GDP figures indicate that the country is not only an oil reliant state, but its manufacturing sector has risen, as well as telecoms, Nollywood and music (The Economist, 2014).

Langalanga (2014) argues that questions of how the Nigerian GDP rebasing will affect South Africa's standing in the Southern African region and on the continent of Africa, has been of much concern. It seems like Nigerian policy makers intended to send a message across the continent of Africa that Nigeria is not lesser to South Africa. Langalanga (2014) contests that the rebasing of the South African economy does not weaken South Africa's role in the SADC region and in the continent. South Africa is still the most diversified economy in the region, its infrastructure is still the best and it still attracts the most foreign investment in the continent. Furthermore, South Africa still plays a prominent role in the region – both politically and economically.



#### **5.4 South Africa and Nigeria: Statistical Contestation for Hegemon**

The relations between South Africa and Nigeria under the leadership of Presidents Mbeki and Obasanjo were relatively good. The relationship that existed between these two men of states can be traced back to the 1970s. Mbeki and Obasanjo had built a personal relationship, dating from the time when Mbeki was in exile (Mngomezulu, 2015). The two countries worked hand in hand in leading and promoting socio-economic development through NEPAD. Under the leadership of Mbeki, South Africa made significant contributions in assisting with formulating development policies for the African continent. A prominent role was played in the formation of NEPAD as well as in facilitating peace keeping in countries such as DRC, Burundi and Cote d'Ivoire (Alden and Pere, 2009).

South Africa is the only country in Africa that is part of BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa). These are emerging power countries in their continents and as such represent the continent for development. In 2013, South Africa successfully hosted the first BRICS forum called BRICS Leaders-Africa. In this forum the BRICS leaders committed themselves to helping Africa in its development strategy. Other discussions were about making a customs union from SADC (Tetenyi, 2014). Despite the criticism that South Africa is a bully, in 2012, South Africa succeeded in lobbying for the appointment of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma as the chairperson of the AU Commission. From this, and the other points that have already been made mention of in this chapter, it is an indication that South Africa is playing an active role in both the regional and global governance (Tetenyi, 2014).

When it comes to Nigeria's foreign policy, there are five major principals that have been central. These are: multilateral diplomacy, non-alignment, Afrocentrism,

equality for all and non-interference. Nigeria played a crucial role in the creation of Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which offers a good platform for interregional efforts. Nigeria's commitment to ECOWAS is visible. In the period from 2004 to 2009, the ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development gave financial support to member states totalling to about one billion USD. In 2009 Nigeria contributed more than half of ECOWAS funding. Furthermore, Nigeria played a leadership role in the mediation efforts in Togo, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Equatorial Guinea. However, the member states of ECOWAS show little cooperation in economic matters. This is because of the low manufacturing capability within the region, their heavy reliance on non-tariff barriers, and their trading relationships with states of the global north (Tetenyi, 2014).

With regards to foreign policy from both Nigeria and South Africa, South Africa has the edge over Nigeria. South Africa has a more measurable and observable foreign policy. There is evident progress that South Africa has made, and the country shows more interest in the region. With the ending of Apartheid, the 1996 White Paper on Defence and the 1998 Defence Review were the basis for South Africa's defence strategy. One of the objectives of the South African Defence Review is to promote security and peace. The document also makes mention of the nations goal to attaining regional peace. However, the more detailed 2012 South African Defence Review has since replaced the 1998 Defence Review. The Defence Review's strategy for attaining regional peace is to place South African personnel into regional organizations, which hold a greater responsibility for regional policy on security (Tetenyi, 2014). Furthermore, what is included in the Defence Review is to offer support to joint peacekeeping tasks in the continent.

Table 1 below shows a few of the Sub-Saharan African states' military spending. The countries shown are those that send 2000 troops and above for peacekeeping each year. The table shows that South African defence expenditure is two times higher than Nigeria, although when equated to International states, South Africa's defence spending is still low (Tetenyi, 2014).

**Table 1: Military expenditure in selected Sub-Saharan African countries**

Country	2013 military Expenditure (USD, billion)	2013 military expenditure ( as % of GDP
Ethiopia	0,3	0,7
Ghana	0,2	0,6
Kenya	0,7	1,9
Nigeria	1,9	1
Rwanda	00,7	1,1
South Africa	4,9	1,2
Tanzania	0,3	1,2

*Source: SIPRI 2014*

Although table 1, above shows that Nigeria's expenditure is low on its military troops, however for peacekeeping operations Nigeria has provided a lot more troops than South Africa. Tetenyi (2014) argues that, it is possible that the reason for Nigeria's active participation in peacekeeping missions in West Africa is because having failed

states as neighbours could bear negative consequences for the country especially in terms of investment. Nigeria seeks to promote regional cooperation, developing markets for investments, and keeping regional stability. Nigeria's great contribution is evident in ECOWAS, however, the constraints that undermine the leadership efforts by Nigeria is the misuse of resources as well as the high levels of corruption (Tetenyi, 2014).

Nigeria has provided more than three peacekeeping contributions, this is two times more than the total of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) yet it is only in three missions that Nigeria took a lead role, and this is the equal sum as South Africa. The SANDF has had good successes in retaining peace. Both countries have achieved similar results "where Nigeria was providing more troops in numbers; however South Africa was taking a larger role in mediation" (Tetenyi, 2014: 7). As discussed in the previous chapter, South Africa's trade relations are rising. Nigeria's trade with Africa has not been promising since 2009. Nigeria is also not the most dominant exporter in the continent.

When it comes to Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), South Africa has the biggest number of investments coming into the country as well as investments going to other countries within Africa. Nigeria secured 9% of FDI projects between 2007 and 2013, while South Africa was chosen by 24% of the FDI projects (Tetenyi, 2014). South Africa is ranked in third position when it comes to top investors in Africa. The US is the top investor in Africa and the UK is ranked second in this regard. In terms of the number of projects within the continent, South Africa ranked among the 5 investors, having projects in a number of African countries such as the DRC, Tanzania, Mozambique, Uganda, Angola, Ghana, Zambia, Kenya, Mauritius, and Nigeria (Tetenyi, 2014).

Tetenyi (2014) asserts that according to the interviews that were conducted for his study, in the face of the prevalence of workers strikes may make foreign investors have second thoughts about reinvesting in South Africa. Nigeria is increasingly becoming Africa's most attractive country to do business in Africa after South Africa. One of Nigeria's biggest achievements is the establishment of a Sovereign Wealth Fund. However, continuances of corruption, violence, political instability and poor governance and the presence of the terrorist group Boko Haram affect the country's image as a business partner in Africa.

Consequently, South Africa is the most preferred destination for conducting business in Africa. However, Nigeria is showing growing strength in important areas as well and, as mentioned earlier, it has recently overtaken South Africa as the largest GDP in the African continent. South Africa however, still remains the largest in terms of FDI into Africa. Although Nigeria has the largest GDP, when trade and investment is considered it has not yet attained the same level of influence as South Africa (Tetenyi, 2014). Finally, in terms of providing human development aid the EU, USA, UK, France and Germany have been important donor for South Africa in 2012. Even though South Africa itself receives aid, it provides aid to other countries within Africa. However, some countries within the continent do not have full confidence in South Africa's developmental assistance because it is sometimes perceived to be motivated by an imperialistic agenda (Tetenyi, 2014).

## **5.5 Nigeria's role in West Africa**

Nigeria has played a defining role in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). ECOWAS is a regional community comprising of 15 states in the

region. ECOWAS aims to promote inter-regional political and economic cooperation. (Ecowas.int, 2015). Nigeria has played an important role in RI efforts in the region of West Africa. In 2003, former president Obasanjo played a lead role in securing a settlement between President Taylor and rebel soldiers. The settlement also led to the establishment of the Government of National Unity in Liberia, (Alli, 2012). In 2003, he also brokered a settlement between rebel soldiers and President Taylor which facilitated the establishment of the Government of National Unity in Liberia and provision of asylum for Taylor in Nigeria (Sanda, 2004). That settlement included an arrangement for Taylor to be granted asylum in Nigeria, thus facilitating the process for the establishment of a government of national unity in Liberia.

However, Nigeria has been confronted with challenges in its leadership role in West Africa, particularly with regards to security policy, not only in the sub-regional level but also at the national level. At the national level, security concerns have risen which is damaging to the country's effectiveness in international matters. Nigeria has failed to implement the principle of Responsibility to Protect. This is crucial for the country because a country's role in international affairs and its foreign policy objectives is determined by its capabilities, (Alli, 2012).

Furthermore, the perception of other countries in regarding Nigeria's role in the region has been characterised by mixed reactions. Some countries question the ability of Nigeria to lead the region. For example, Sierra Leone voted against Nigeria's submission for a United Nations Security Council's permanent seat despite the fact that Nigeria had helped Sierra Leone in a number of issues in the past (Alli, 2012). Both South Africa and Nigeria have played defining roles in their regions. However, when comparing roles in the continental level, South Africa has played much more defining role because the contributions that it has made. This study has shown that

South Africa role in Southern Africa has been defining. It has provided leadership on important issues in SADC.

Nigeria is also a major recipient of donor funds. Tetenyi (2014) asserts that Nigeria's development assistance has not been institutionalized. This makes it difficult to assess. Between 1987 and 2000, Nigeria's Technical Aid Corps Scheme was able to reach the goal of sharing its knowledge and skills with other developing countries. Nigeria also established a fund called Nigerian Technical Cooperation, with the aim of rebuilding countries devastated by war. In 2004 payment was \$25 million. Though both countries have made contributions to the continent, what South Africa has managed to do has been to work towards the establishment of South African Development Partnership Agency (SADPA) which seeks to broaden the country's development assistance to the whole continent.

Both South Africa and Nigeria have provided development and economic assistance to countries of the region, however neither one has yet the opportunity to fully institutionalize the provision of development assistance. South Africa is making the necessary steps with the creation of SADPA, which will hopefully in time act as a coordinator and facilitator of South African assistance (Tetenyi, 2014). South Africa's development assistance is the African Renaissance Fund (ARF). Humanitarian assistance in Somalia, agricultural projects in Zimbabwe, Lesotho water dams, and cultural projects in Mali have been some of the ARF projects in the continent. The ARF have also had to assist by repaying the debts of some countries in the continent, countries such as Mozambique, Gabon, Malawi, Comoros, and the Central African Republic (Besharati, 2013). Tetenyi (2014) argues that, South Africa's actions have been more coordinated than Nigeria's.

## **5.6 Conclusion**

Since South Africa's transition to a democratic state, its government has prioritized the region in its foreign affairs. It has been South Africa's goal since liberation to work on improving and strengthening its relationship with the African continent. South Africa has a strong and most developed economy within the region, therefore South Africa's role in the region is important. South Africa has played a leading role in the formation of the AU as well as the NEPAD. As instrumental as South Africa is in the region as well as in the continent, continually facing a struggle to erase the traces of the Apartheid era and the social and the economic imbalances inherited by the society, it therefore, becomes equally important that South Africa be able to manage the situation at home.

The data presented reveals that there are different views on whether or not South Africa is a hegemon in the African continent. One of the arguments is that a regional hegemon has regional supporters and also makes efforts into making regional governance organizations. Other arguments on South Africa's role are that South Africa is an exploitative power that has demonstrated its intentions of being a bully in the region as well as in the continent. Other arguments support the assertion that South Africa is indeed a hegemon in the region of Southern Africa as well as in the continent. What is clear from this study, however, is that South Africa has made the most contribution in the region in a lot of aspects than other countries have been able to. From these achievements there is an expectation that South Africa should lead in most developmental initiatives and processes in the continent. Chapter 6 is a concluding chapter, the conclusion of the study will be drawn in chapter 6 as well as the recommendations thereafter.



## **CHAPTER 6 - CONCLUSION & RECOMENDATIONS**

### **6.0 Introduction**

Chapter 5 discussed and assessed the role that South Africa plays in the region. It was argued that, South Africa's contribution to the region and the continent cannot be overlooked. The role that South Africa has played since its democracy has been important and meaningful in the region, and it led to the formation of important

organisations in the continent, i.e. AU and NEPAD in which South Africa played an instrumental role. Different sentiments emerge concerning the role of South Africa in the region and these must not be overlooked, while at the same time the validity thereof must also be analysed. Some scholars argue that RI in African would not be possible in Africa without South Africa's active and emerging leading role post 1994.

South Africa has the most developed infrastructure in Africa, It is the highest contributor of FDI in other countries in SADC and in the African continent. The South African economy is one that is diversified. Furthermore, regarding RI in SADC, South Africa has contributed much. In spite of these achievements, its role in the continent however, remains controversial. Some African countries are cautious when engaging with South Africa because they perceive that South Africa is imperialistic in nature, and an exploitative power, that seeks its own interests above that of other states in the region. Some have gone as far as to refer to South Africa as a bully. Regarding the contestation of hegemonic status between African economic giants, South Africa and Nigeria, Scholars argue that South Africa cannot be a hegemon because it has fallen behind Nigeria as having the Highest GDP. Others however argue that Nigeria's GDP on the African continent does not affect South Africa's role as the hegemon of the African continent. South Africa is the gateway to Africa and as a result, remains the most preferred destination for conducting business in Africa. Argued to be the many foreign MNC's have their headquarters based in South Africa. Nigeria's High levels of corruption, political instability such as issues with Boko haram, and poor infrastructure, makes it difficult for foreign businesses to operate in the country at convenience. Regarding trade and investment both South Africa and Nigeria have contributed to development in Africa. Contributions made

by South Africa, however remains significantly higher. This chapter will therefore, provide a conclusion based on the study and the recommendations.

## **6.1 Conclusion**

As shown at the beginning of this dissertation, the term integration is not an easy one to define. But what is clear is that it involves the merging of different states of a particular territory which formally agree to working together to mostly achieve economic objectives, where for example they strengthen their trade relations. The term 'integration' is used to describe an activity or sets of activities that involve bring individual parts of an object together to form a complete whole (Mutharika, 1972). The parts of objects brought together to form a collective in RI, are a group of individual states. According to Schmitter (1970) the study of RI involves a study into the way in which units come together to share their decision-making authority or sovereignty with an emerging international organization. It is for this reason that RI has been defined and identified as the process or situation where states in a certain geographical boundary voluntarily cede their sovereignty in one or more areas so that they can carry out certain specific transactions. These transactions encompass those that are political, economic and social in nature. In today's day and age that is characterised by globalisation, the goals of RI is to overcome the challenges that globalisation presents, and also to maximise the benefits that globalisation has to offer. Individual states cannot survive in the geo-political game in the international arena, since international relations the contestation for power can only be achieved when a state has membership with one regional bloc or another. This is a requirement especially for weak states many of which are located in African continent. RI blocs may help a collective group of nations enjoy specific benefits to a higher degree than

they would enjoy if they operated individually. It is evident that it is through the prominent method of consenting to RIAs that states can come together to achieve RI. For RI to be considered as RI, it is required two or more countries that are, or are not part of the same geographical boundary come together to unifying their social, political or economies structures. Push and pull factors that may persuade countries to become members of a regional bloc. Attraction to membership often occurs when a nation-state perceives that the benefits or promises that membership would offer them would better improve on their existing economic, political and social conditions. Nation-states may also join a regional bloc with hopes of garnering assistance to find solutions to internal domestic challenges they may be faced with. Regardless of the reasons for joining a regional bloc, states have to acquire membership through consensus.

RI is not a new occurrence. Earlier forms of integration were characterized by force. However this thesis has only discussed instances of voluntary RI that can is only achieved through RIAs. Most existing literature on RI in one way or another discusses the European Integration epitomised by the EU. European scholars give examples of the early CUs in Europe. Schiff & Winters make reference to the formation of the CU of the provinces of France, which was proposed in 1644. Mattli (1999) recounts examples of the first major voluntary RI initiatives to have appeared during the period of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. These include Prussia's establishment of a customs union with Hesse-Darmstadt and later developments of the Bavaria Wurttemberg CU, the Middle German Commercial Union, the German Monetary Union, and also the German Reich. These early forms of integration efforts also led to the birth of the Swiss market and political union in 1848, and also the birth of the political and economic unification that took place in Italy during its Risorgimento

movement (Mattli, 1999). The reason that most literature focuses on European integration is that Europe has been the beneficiary to the most successful integration in the world hence has been used as a benchmark of integration. The EU however went through a lot of challenges during its various transitions. It was faced with multi-faceted political and economic difficulties. However, it managed to overcome these challenges and evolve into the EU that we know it to be today. It is for this reason that academic work on the EU has generated much conceptual literature, the EU model of regional governance has been described scholars like Rosamond (2000 : 1) as “a stunning instance of state cooperation and concomitant institutionalization”.

In ceding their sovereignty that the member states of the EU cooperated to form this supranational unit we know today. The EU has served as a teacher to the point that the roots of its success, namely RI have been implemented all around the world. This has increased the importance of regional trade. As a result RI has not been restricted Europe alone. The model of RI in Europe has been adopted as the blueprint for African nation states wanting to achieve successful RI initiatives. The implementation of RI blocs, RIAs and RI schemes has been one of the major developments in international relations such that virtually all countries are members of one regional bloc (Schiff & Winters, 2003).

Since the early 1950s, the EU has been a forerunner of RI (Cameron, 2015). The ECSC is the earliest organized RI whose formation can be traced back to 1952. The ECSC was formed out of concerns to preserve the European economies after the Second World War. It was in 1958. It was in 1958 that the ECSC developed to become the ECC. The ECC was then renamed to the EC at a later stage in 1992. The EC later matured into The EU in 1997. The purpose of RI in Europe was to advance

economic growth in the region. The successful integration of the EU that has been firmly established today has indeed undergone much economic hardships and political hostilities.

Mercado Común del Sur, Portuguese: Mercado Comum do Sul, Guarani: Ñemby Ñemuha, Southern Common Market, also referred to as MERCUSOR, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), Asia, Pacific, Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC) are some of the Regional Blocs that have been created in other parts of the world apart from those in Europe and Africa. MERCUSOR is made up of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay (Mattli, 1999), NAFTA consists of the USA, Canada and Mexico joined NAFTA in 1994 (Mattli, 1999), ASEAN which currently made up of 10 member states consisting of Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam (Ginbar, 2010). APEC which Mattli (1999) describes as one of Regional blocs that has experienced immense rapid expansion, was established in 1989 by the joint efforts of Australia, Japan, New Zealand, Canada, South Korea, the USA and the ASEAN countries . Today APEC boasts 21 members (Bergstein, 2011).

Integration has been successful to an extent in ASEAN and especially the EU. The success of RI in the EU and ASEAN required that all states within their respective geographical areas surrender their sovereignty to achieving a level of success that would not be attainable individually. The EU's principle of RI remains the most successful and adopted approach in Africa. Integration in EU was not devoid of challenges. In tracing the progress of the EU from its stages of infancy, the EU has undergone political hostilities and economic hardships. The formation of the EU arose

out of a general concern amongst its member states to advance economic growth within the region. The benefits across RIA's in EU and ASEAN have contributed to the increasing perception of the importance of RI in solving political issues, environmental issues, economic issues, and trade matters. It is for this reason that RI has not been restricted to these areas because of its traditional and non-traditional benefits. RI brings about trade gains, increased returns, and the attraction of FDI, lock in to domestic reforms, increases bargaining power and security, signalling and insurance.

A case study of the EU integration was used for this study. The study discussed and examined factors that made the EU integration successful. The EU is a single market and it is customs union having a common trade policy. The Euro, is EU's own currency. The formation of the EU was a process, it went through a lot of stages that moulded it to be what it is today.

Developing countries also began turning to RIAs as a mechanism for promoting development. Leaders of Developing countries have turned serious attention towards RIA's as a mechanism for promoting development. RI in Africa has been around since the period of colonialism. It has also been around since the avocation of African unity by pan African leaders and scholars like Kwame Nkrumah. In spite of the early forms of the presence of RI in the continent, it was only in the 1970's and 1980's that RIA's began to materialise at a practical level. Since this period, the path to achieving a successful RI has been widespread across all regional blocs on the African continent. When compared with EU and ASEAN, Africa possesses the lowest trade percentage. RI has been a slow process on the African continent. Time and again RIAs have failed to change the poor conditions of underdevelopment and poverty on the African continent. Some of the main attributions to the failure of RIA's in Africa

are the lack of commitment from leaders to prioritise and enforce Regional objectives, overlapping memberships which result in a conflict of interest. Other issues that need to be addressed to facilitate a more successful and conducive integration of Africa's Regional Blocs are issues of the lack of proper infrastructure, and the nature of its trade and non-trade barriers.

SADC being the richest regional bloc on the African continent, fits into the global conception of RI. It is one of the important strategies for promoting growth and development in the region. Africa's RI efforts have stalled, and therefore much of the ill conditions have remained the same. Most scholars have argued that Africa would however, have to have its own framework informed by sensitiveness and the uniqueness of Africa's economic and political setting. Although not limited in scope to Southern Africa only, the formation of the AU exists as another important feature in the integration efforts made within the SADC region. In 2002, the AU was formed, African leaders wanted a vision and a strategy that would no longer be dependent on donors and that would be Africa's own strategy for development and integration. This also led to the formation of NEPAD. One of the things that the AU aims to achieve is to promote solidarity and unity of African states; to do away with all forms of colonialism and its effects in Africa. The AU has been criticized for the slow pace which the implementation of these envisioned programs has seen. Also, NEPAD is reliant on donor funds, but even the donor funds remain unpredictable. The former president of the republic of South Africa and one of the founders of the AU (Thabo Mbeki) criticized the AU as having fundamentally failed to meet its objectives.

From the theoretical framework two different theories, namely the RI theory and the HST were propounded to better understand the importance of RI and the reasons



states opt for RI schemes. It was argued that HST is both a popular and influential theory. However it remains a controversial topic in the area of international relations. It was Charles Kindleberger's analysis of the history of the Great Depression that popularized the HST. The theory gives good explanations for regional cooperation schemes that have taken, and are taking place in the developing world. The HST primarily claims that the international system, is more likely to remain stable with the presence of a nation-state as the single great power. The significance of a hegemon in the international system is that it ensures sustainable development. A regional hegemon has to possess the ability to effectively exercise dominance. The discussion on RI theory relied heavily on Balassa's work, for his work is considered to be important for the theory and the scholarly debates on the topic of RI. RI progresses from one stage or form to another: a free trade area, customs union, common market, economic union and total economic integration. These stages of the integration have been used to explain the dynamics of the integration process and the processes involved.

The beginning of SADC can be traced back to April 1980 when it became clear that there was a need to formalize the rearrangement of SADC to the SADCC. At the time, South Africa did not form part of SADC but became part of it after democratisation. SADC aims to make the region a competitive and a successful player in the world economy, yet it has been faced with a number of challenges making RI as slow process so far. No state wants to give away its power, by any measure. States in the region are unwilling to cede their authority and sovereignty to regional institutions so that they can make the necessary decisions to drive the integration agenda. This study has also revealed that there is also concern from weaker states that RI will only benefit the stronger states. The failure to come up with solutions to help address the

sentiments and worries of the weaker states has contributed to the slow progress of the RI initiatives in the region. The lack of commitment and political drive has slowed progress. Member states tend to show more commitment to multilateral and bilateral agreements than to regional commitments. Multiple membership has been cited as the other main hindrance to RI efforts. It creates inconsistencies and undermines the overall continental integration process. The SADC regional bloc is considered the most developed regional bloc on the African continent economically.

A prevailing common sentiment among lesser states in the SADC region is that South Africa keeps dominating the SADC region when it comes to trade. The trade sector is a very important part of every State's economy. A state must be able to receive FDI from other states, and also invest in other States. The topic of RI in SADC has received much attention; much of this attention is owed to the nature of South Africa's role within the region. One of the arguments of scholars is that for RIAs to be successful, the existence of a dominant hegemon is needed. It is evidently true that with every regional economic community lies a regional hegemon or dominant power whether that power is acknowledged by other member states or not. Hegemonic states are those considered to have a major large advantage over all other countries in the custody of such resources (McKeown, 1983). Such an advantage is presumed to translate into unusually great influence over the actions of other countries (McKeown, 1983). It suffices to say hegemonic status could be derived from political or economic power. In other instances this status could be derived from both sources of power. Like in the global arena, in RIA's the existence of a hegemonic power is needed due to the fact that it is more conducive to development of strong regimes whose rules are relatively precise and well obeyed by other member states. South Africa's role is likened to that of a hegemon, and sometimes has been described as a bully. This is

one of the contributing factors to the existing tensions between South Africa and some of the SADC member states.

It has been found that some of SADC states oppose recommendations made by South Africa purely on the grounds that it is South Africa that makes those recommendations. Some contest that South Africa is a hegemon, others contest that it cannot be a hegemon. South Africa is the largest contributor to SADC's GDP; South Africa is the largest investor in the SADC member states. The country enjoys a far stronger and diversified economy as compared to most SADC member States. Moreover, when it comes to non-African relations, South Africa has the most business linkages, and major trading partners are with the EU, Japan and North America. South Africa is also a member of the new emerging economies BRICS which consist of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. Moreover the peacekeeping and peace-building missions it has undertaken on the African Continent, and its contribution to the progress of African institutions such as NEPAD and AU, remains paramount. These attributes characterise South Africa as the regional hegemon in SADC.

Scholars like Kindleberger argue that a hegemon brings economic openness and stability in a region. In the world USA is the hegemon, in SADC it is South Africa. Four criteria that a hegemon must meet include 1) claim to leadership, 2) power resources 3) employment of foreign policy instruments and an acceptance of leadership. In spite of the fact that South Africa is accredited with all of these achievements, South Africa does not meet all the four requirements that fully endorse it as a hegemon. South Africa has the claim to leadership not through verbal claim, but through the fact that it takes initiative in leading the process of RI in SADC, in addition to peacekeeping and peace building on the African continent. The

headquarters of SADC being in Gaborone undermines South Africa's hegemonic status and also communicates disregard for South Africa as a regional leader.

Furthermore, this study also elaborated on some of the successes of southern Africa's RI. Since the year 2000, significant progress has been made in liberalizing trade. Most SADC countries have reduced tariffs and quotas under the Protocol on Trade. In Southern Africa, regional economic integration is defined by the SADC. SADC's main objective is to make the region a competitive and a successful player in the world economy. 2012 marked two important milestones in SADC, namely the completion of the member states' tariff phase down schedules to reach a status of an effective free trade area and the current review of the RISDP. Generally, SADC has made significant progress in liberalizing trade. Most SADC countries have reduced and eliminated tariffs and quotas under the Protocol on Trade. The SADC has also been able to establish a SADC Finance and Investment Protocol (FIP), which came into effect in 16 April 2010.

Regarding the challenges of RI in SADC one of the interesting things about Southern African economy is the inequalities that are prevalent across member states. Concerns on how best to close these inequalities have long been one of the dominant topics in Southern Africa's RI talks. Some scholars have emphasized that RI should not be taken as an end in itself, but as an important means to achieving development and stability. One of the benefits that integration is that of trade creation and diversion. When there is free trade, welfare improves because citizens are able to buy goods and services from the cheapest source. This will lead to the production being reallocated according to comparative advantage. When trade barriers are lowered, firms and consumers are able to make acquisitions from the low-cost source of supply. In simple terms, the movement of lower cost of production away from a more efficient

supplier outside of the Free Trade Area and towards a less-efficient supplier within members forming the FTA is preferred. This results in the lowering of trade barriers and this is called trade diversion. “Trade creation— the displacement of higher cost domestic production by lower cost production from partner countries due to lower barriers within RI arrangements— increases welfare”. Trade creation is when low barriers to trade with the region cause the movement of higher costs of domestic production by a partner’s lower cost production. Ultimately, a free trade area is created where it would not have existed before. Investment is one of the advantages of RIAs in the form of FDI which thus helps in reducing poverty levels.

The issue of overlapping membership regarding regional blocs is a big hindrance to progress towards integration and cooperation amongst African-states in their respective regions this has been evident across all the 14 regional blocs in Africa. This type of overlapping membership is caused divided priorities and intersecting commitments that Draper, Halleson & Alves (2007) have referred to it as a spaghetti bowl. It is this spaghetti like membership that also contributes to the obstruction of achieving effective RI. This is because spaghetti bowl creates a complex entanglement of political commitments and institutional requirements, further addition costs of conducting intra-regional business.

Apart from Draper, Halleson & Alves (2007), other scholars like Dube, 2012: 20 & Tanyawika et al (2014: 111) also contend that member states belonging to the SADC region that have multiple memberships create inconsistencies and have damaging connotations towards the application of SADC’s Trade Protocol provisions because these regional initiatives also have their own different regional economic objectives. Some SADC member states are also part of COMESA, EAC and SACU. A study that

was conducted by the OAU revealed that countries that are involved in many RECs are faced with a myriad of problems (Alemayehu and Haile, 2002: 14). The implementation of regional trade agreements (RTAs) is affected when member states have overlapping memberships, because it “Complicates the overall continental integration process, and puts enormous strains on governments’ ability and resources to cope with diverse agendas and exigencies” (Economic Commission for Africa, 2004:10). In the research of scholars like Lyakurwa (1997: 196) it is evident that in the African context, the approach of having overlapping membership or what he refers to as ‘variable geometry’ could ensure genuine progress at one regional block whilst maintaining achievement and benefits from another regional block

Chapter five discussed South Africa’s role in the region. It was shown that most of the Southern African region’s economy is found within South Africa. This study went on to discuss South Africa’s role as a hegemon in the region as well as the continent. This study shows how South Africa’s foreign policy has evolved over time. The National Development Plan 2030 which outlines South Africa’s foreign policy objectives was discussed. The NDP presents a linear guide for South Africa’s deeper involvement to the integration efforts. The national plan has both been praised and criticized. Inspire of the criticism what is important to take note of, is the progress from the previous apartheid government’s foreign policy to the policies of the current government. The democratic government has shown more drive for the progress in the region and the continent. South Africa has also been involved in a number of peace-keeping initiatives. Conflict resolution and peace-keeping has been an important aspect in South Africa’s relations and foreign policy with the region as well as the continent.

South Africa comes up against Nigeria contending for the leadership status in the region. More recently, there has been easily visible division between these two countries. This study traced back the relations between these two countries, and found that, for the most part, there has always been animosity between these heads. In contrasting both the these countries, the study found that, although Nigeria has grown and now the leading GDP in Africa, South Africa still has an edge over Nigeria. Furthermore, the leadership status that it had still holds in the region and having the highest GDP is not the only important factor. This study also touched on the recent spat between these countries. When the Nigerian government decided to recall its high commissioner to South Africa following the attacks on non-South Africa nationals. This did not go down well with the South African government and it sparked a lot of debate among scholars and citizens in the country.

Although South Africa is clearly the dominant economic force in the SADC region, there is a debate as to whether South Africa is capable of RI within the SADC region. Those in favour of South Africa as a leader of RI in SADC argue that South Africa has become an important role player in peace keeping and peace building on the African continent, has contributed to the growth of the African Union (AU) and APSA, is the biggest investor in the SADC countries and is also the biggest financial contributor to the region (Kok, 2015). 82% of the net GDP of SADC comes from South Africa (Hassan, 2015). South Africa's actions are often viewed with a sense of distrust both in Africa and in the SADC region. This sense of mistrust comes from the fact that South Africa is seen to be but a hegemonic bully in the region. Some argue that South Africa cannot be a leader of RI in SADC because of its incapacity to effectively address domestic problems of crime, inequality, and poverty to satisfactory levels. Those that hold this view believe that a leader should lead by example, having

first dealt with in-house problems. The violent xenophobic attacks of 2008 and 2015 also substantiate reasons as to why South Africa cannot possibly lead effective RI in the SADC region. South Africa's inconsistencies in its foreign policy, and the lack of representative staff in the SADC headquarters are but a few examples of that stand in its way of being perceived and accepted as a regional hegemon.

While these arguments made against South Africa are plausible, this question arises which country in the region does not have its internal or domestic problems? Even more importantly, if South Africa were to be ripped off its hegemonic status, which SADC country would be able to fill South Africa's shoes? Which country has an equal economic in the region to assume South Africa's role as a Peace builder in the Region and in Africa? Would that country be able to provide economic and political support to the region at a higher level or in the same manner than South Africa has done? At this age, the answer to the last question would be both a resounding and an emphatic no! Thus, from the general outlook of things it appears that in spite of the real challenges faced by South Africa at the moment, there is enough evidence to suggest that the country still remains better positioned to lead the region. Indeed, this is a bitter pill to swallow for those who do not approve of South Africa's hegemonic status. South Africa has heightened its trade dominance in Africa and is an official active member of BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) since 2011. Moreover the EU stands as South Africa's biggest trading partner as compared to other SADC countries (Bezuidenhout & Claassen, 2013). The peacekeeping and peace building initiatives on the African continent have been dominated by South Africa having taken initiative regarding these (Kok, 2015). South Africa has also contributed to the developmental progressions made by the AU and NEPAD



institutions. As the biggest investor in SADC member states South Africa undoubtedly has the largest GDP in the region.

South Africa possesses the three of the four criteria that are generally proffered as characterizing a state as a hegemon in a regional bloc. South Africa however lacks the claim to leadership. Hegemonic characteristics such as leadership, power resources, and employment of foreign policy instruments are attributed to South Africa's role in the region and in Africa. This is undeniable. In the SADC region, South Africa is recognized as the hegemonic power in the region due to the fact that it is the largest contributor and investor in SADC member states. South Africa contributes sixty three per cent of the aggregate GDP of SADC (Hartzenberg & Kalenga, 2015). South Africa is also privileged to have the most business linkages with industrialized states across the globe (Draper et al., 2006). South Africa's major trading partners are those in Europe, North America and Japan (McGowan & Ahwireng-Obe, 1998). However, South Africa lacks acknowledgement from regarding its leadership role as a hegemon, although not official. Acceptance of the leadership role as hegemon is also lacking on South Africa's part (Flemes, 2007).

## **6.2 Recommendations**

This study recommends that African countries need to show serious commitment into putting into play developmental programs to help increase the legitimacy of their trade sector. Both smaller and the bigger economies need to work together to achieve successful integration.

Although intra-regional trade is better now than it has been in the previous years, it still however, has not risen to a satisfactory level. This study also recommends that,

African states need to prioritize trading within the continent more than with international countries. Having looked at the European Union integration process, it is clear that, African countries need be more reliant on each other rather than international countries for integration to be a success. This also lies closely with the fact that international donors fund the development initiatives of most African countries. Africa needs to take more initiative to come up with a realistic framework that will address directly the issue of self-reliance and a steady transition to eliminate the heavy dependence on donors. Achieving self-reliance in Africa and in SADC relies also on the cooperation and the good relations between the two continental heads who are currently seem to be at loggerheads for continental dominance. The truth of the matter is, integration and continental development is dependent on these two countries working together for one common goal. It is suggested that, these two countries mend their strained relations and find common ground for the benefit of the continent. Neither Nigeria nor South Africa will be able to achieve progress of their own countries or that of the continent on their own or by being at logger heads. They are in as much need of Africa as Africa needs them.

South Africa is a relatively new democracy, having just celebrated twenty one years of democracy. It is still working on finding its feet's on a lot of issues and trying to do away with the aftermath of the apartheid regime. Yet, it has also been able to achieve commendably immense progress both nationally, continentally and globally. There is no single country that does not have internal issues, all at different levels than the others. Likewise, South Africa battles with the high levels of unemployment which has largely led to the alarming levels of criminal activities.

The recent attacks on foreign nationals are something that South African government has outright rebuked. Therefore, this study refutes the argument that, South Africa is

unable to welcome and live in harmony with other Africans. South Africa has always welcomed and lived in harmony with Africans from a number of years ago. This study recommends that, the national government develop strategic objectives and framework for addressing the levels of unemployment especially among the youth. A framework that will facilitate the reconciliation and the foster good relations with non-South African nationals. It is recommended that these objectives be enforced and implemented without compromise in order to yield the expected results.

Africa should draw from the work done by the EU, their effective legal and institutional framework helped ensure that the member states kept to their obligations. Although the EU offers great insight and remains inspirational to other regional groupings, it is argued that, the region's integration needs African solutions best suited to solve African problems as advanced by Pax Africana. Therefore, the EU integration may only be used to inspire and direct African RIA's. The EU model of RI is not to be emulated in its entirety. Moreover South Africa has achieved a lot in the region of SADC and in the continent. They have contributed in spearheading key African institutions such as the AU and NEPAD. South Africa has also been heavily involved in peace keeping and peace building missions in Africa.

While taking into cognisance the work that South Africa still has to do and the shortfalls that currently exist, South Africa remains a pivotal state in the region. In spite of the recent developments in the continent, that of Nigeria replacing South Africa as the biggest GDP. The dominance and the importance of South Africa in the region remains true. No doubt, although Nigeria still grapples with a number of national issues, it has come far as a country and credit must be given for that.

A prevailing common sentiment among lesser states in the region is that South Africa keeps dominating the region in terms of trade. The trade sector is important for any country. A country must be able to both be the recipient of FDI and also the investor in other countries. For any successful integration to happen the gap between Southern African countries and South Africa would have to be reduced. The Key to RI in SADC also lies in total surrender of political will to achieve personal goals relative to each nation –state that forms the SADC region. The implementation of RIAs is founded on the principle of collective power and to an extent synergy. African states, and those in SADC cannot survive if they operate on their own in today's globalised world. Individual strength cannot dominate the collective Political force of supranational institutions. Such that operate alone cannot be taken seriously by other states in today's day and age. Leaders in SADC should therefore cede their sovereignty in all seriousness. All SADC member-states should not put their personal ambitions above that of the collective goals of the SADC region. It is when this political, economic and social synergy is achieved amongst SADC states that Africa as a continent and even SADC as a region would begin to experience the fulfilment of goals that it has already set to achieve. This same unity that has granted the EU the benefits of the successful RI that it enjoys today. It is therefore important that Africa overcome its disunity and fragmentations on the continental and regional levels and back to the principles of Pan-Africanism and historical African doctrines of Unity and solidarity, as characterised by Ubuntu. Regarding the issue of overlapping membership, African regional blocs, and memberships of each state need to be more defined. Overlapping membership may bring benefits from various regional groups, however having multi-memberships should only be allowed at a later stage of integration once Key membership to one main regional block has been clearly

defined. The issue of overlapping membership multiplies the priorities of African states, which leads to a lack of focus on a specific set of objectives. Moreover the issue of overlapping memberships needs to be addressed because it also contributes to increased expenditure on conducting multiple regional business.

Finally, one of the striking characteristics of the EU is that is founded on the rule of law, and there are EU treaties which govern operations within the EU constituency and international operations (Europa.org, n.d.). Pech (2012) states that it this characteristic that bears the significance that every state belonging to the EU, may not violate any of the rule of law specified within the treaty (Pech, 2012). Moreover the core objectives of the EU exist to promote the EU's value, peace and the welfare of the people that reside within the EU. These are the EU principles that SADC can draw from and follow. SADC should indeed be founded on the rule of law, and also enforce that members may not be able to violate any of the specified rule of law. SADC should also promote peace amongst South Africans and non-south Africans and put aside their differences and work for the common good of the Southern African region. Moreover, of Xenophobia should be harshly dealt with as the issues of racist slurs are not tolerated at all in Britain as such action is deserving of imprisonment. The resolving of xenophobic attacks at such a level may help to ease the tensions between South Africa and other member states of SADC. For RI to be successful in the African continent and also in SADC, the enforcement of policies and objectives must also be ensured and penalties should be introduced for member states that do not prioritise and enforce SADC policy. One of the criticism of RI in Africa is that, the treaties are never respected and rules never implemented thus undermining integration processes. This is another aspect where EU has been very successful. African countries need to draw from this lesson from the EU. The EU has treaties and

rules that guide the behaviour of each states, in relation to states within the EU and also to those outside of the EU.



## Bibliography

Adebajo, A., Adedeji, A. and Landsberg, C. (2007). *South Africa in Africa*. Scottsville, South Africa: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press.

Alden, C. and Le Pere, G. (2009). South Africa in Africa: Bound To Lead?. *Politikon*, 36(1), pp.145-169.

Alden, C. and Schoeman, M. (2015). South Africa's symbolic hegemony in Africa. *Palgrave-journals*, (52).

Alden, C. and Soko, M. (2005). South Africa's economic relations with Africa: hegemony and its discontents. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 43(3), pp.367-392.

Amos, S. (2010). The role of South Africa in SADC: The making or braking of the organization. *Journal of international law and technology*, [online] 5(3). Available at: <http://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/jcolate5&div=18&id=&page=>.

Apec.org, (2015). *Member Economies - Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation*. [online] Available at: <http://www.apec.org/About-Us/About-APEC/Member-Economies.aspx> [Accessed 18 Jul. 2015].

Baccini, L. (2011). *The Return of Hegemonic Theory: Dominant States and the Origins of International Cooperation*. [online] <http://ncgg.princeton.edu/>. Available at: [https://ncgg.princeton.edu/IPES/2011/papers/F410\\_rm1.pdf](https://ncgg.princeton.edu/IPES/2011/papers/F410_rm1.pdf) [Accessed 11 March 2015].

Baker, P., Boraine, A. and Krafchik, W. (1993). *South Africa and the world economy in the 1990s*. Cape Town: David Philip.

Balassa, B. (1961). *The theory of economic integration*. Homewood, Ill.: R.D. Irwin.

Besharati, N. (2013). The establishment of the South African Development Partnership Agency: Institutional complexities and political exigencies. *South African Journal of International Affairs*, 20(3), pp.357-377.

Bergsten, C. (2011). Toward a free trade area of the Asia Pacific. *Estudios Internacionales*, 39(156).



Bezuidenhout, H. and Claassen, C. (2013). South African trade hegemony: Is the South Africa–EU Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement heading for a BRICS wall?. *South African Journal of International Affairs*, 20(2), pp.227-246.

Boulle, L. (2015). *The Republic of South Africa and the G20: Its Political, National Interests and Priorities as Member of the Process*. [online] <http://www.kas.de/>. Available at: [http://www.kas.de/upload/dokumente/2011/10/G20\\_E-Book/chapter\\_14.pdf](http://www.kas.de/upload/dokumente/2011/10/G20_E-Book/chapter_14.pdf) [17 June 2015].

Bongmba, E. (2004). Reflections on Thabo Mbeki's African Renaissance. *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 30(2), pp.291-316.

Cameron, F. (2010). *The European Union as a Model for Regional Integration*. [online] Council on Foreign Relations. Available at: <http://www.cfr.org/world/european-union-model-regional-integration/p22935> [Accessed 17 August 2014].

Carbaugh, R.J. 2004. *International Economics*, 9th edition. Australia. Thomson South-Western.

Charalambous, H. and Luiz, J. (2009). *Factors Influencing Foreign Direct Investment of South African Financial Services Firms in Sub-Saharan Africa | ERSA*. [online] Econrsa.org. Available at: <http://www.econrsa.org/publications/working-papers/factors-influencing-foreign-direct-investment-south-african-financial> [Accessed 11 May 2014].

Chidaushe, M. (2015). <http://www.realityofaid.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/ROA-SSDC-Special-Report2.pdf>. [online] Available at: <http://www.realityofaid.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/ROA-SSDC-Special-Report2.pdf> [Accessed 11 May 2014].

Chikura, L. (2015). *Private Sector Steering African Regional Integration - The Trade Beat - SAIIA*. [online] The Trade Beat - SAIIA. Available at: <http://www.thetradebeat.com/opinion-analysis/private-sector-steering-african-regional-integration> [Accessed 13 August 2014].

Chinkin, C. (2000). The state that acts alone: bully, good samaritan or iconoclast?. *European Journal of International Law*, 11(1), pp.31-41.

Chiroro, B. (1994). *A critical analysis of regional integration in southern Africa*. Masters. Durham University.

Cooper, R., Schiff, M. and Winters, L. (2003). Regional Integration and Development. *Foreign Affairs*, 82(5), p.171.

Davies, R. (1996). Promoting Regional Integration in Southern Africa. *African Security Review*, 5(5), pp.27-38.

de Mabior, J. (2008). *Pan-Africanism and Africannationalism: Putting the Africanation in context - The case of the Sudan*. [online] Africanafrikan.com. Available at: <http://www.africanafrikan.com/folder15/alot%20more%20of%20african%20%26%20african%20american%20history17/panafricanism/RedSeapressbook.pdf#page=241> [Accessed 17 June 2015].

de Melo, J., & Tsikata, Y. 2014. *Regional integration in Africa: Challenges and prospects* (No. 2014/037). WIDER Working Paper.

de Melo, J. & Panagariya (1995). Regional integration in Africa Challenges and prospects. [online] Available at: [http://www.imvf.org/ficheiros/file/wp2014-037\\_1.pdf](http://www.imvf.org/ficheiros/file/wp2014-037_1.pdf) [Accessed 10 May 2015].

Dlamini-Zuma, N. (2003). *South Africa in Africa and the World – Address by the Minister of Foreign Affairs Dr Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma - London, 25 October 2003*. [online] Dfa.gov.za. Available at: <http://www.dfa.gov.za/docs/speeches/2003/dzum1025.htm> [06 April 2015].

Draper, P. (2012). Breaking Free from Europe: Why Africa Needs Another Model of Regional Integration. *The International Spectator*, 47(1), pp.67-82.

Draper, P., Halleon, D. & Alves, P. (2007). *SACU, Regional Integration and the Overlap Issue in Southern Africa: From Spaghetti to Cannelloni? South African Institute of International Affairs, Trade Policy Report NO. 15*. Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs.

Draper, P. & Scholvin (2012). Breaking Free from Europe: Why Africa Needs Another Model of Regional Integration. *The International Spectator*, 47(1), 67-82.

Dube, M. (2012). Regional Integration and Infrastructure Opportunities in Southern Africa. [online] Available at: [http://www.hitachi-hri.com/research/organ/pdf/vol17\\_2\\_5.pdf](http://www.hitachi-hri.com/research/organ/pdf/vol17_2_5.pdf) [Accessed 11 June 2014].

Dube, M. (2013). *Traditional and Emerging Partners' Role in African Regional Economic Integration: Issues and Recommendations*. [online] Saiia.org.za. Available at: [http://www.saiia.org.za/doc\\_download/437-traditional-and-emerging-partners-role-in-african-regional-economic-integration-issues-and-recommendations](http://www.saiia.org.za/doc_download/437-traditional-and-emerging-partners-role-in-african-regional-economic-integration-issues-and-recommendations) [Accessed 11 March 2014].

McCormick, T. J. 1990. World systems. *The Journal of American History*, 125-132. [Online]. Available from: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/207864>. [Accessed on 18 November 2014]

The Economist, (2014). Nigeria's GDP: Step change. [online] Available at: <http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21600734-revised-figures-show-nigeria-africas-largest-economy-step-change> [Accessed 14 May 2014].

*European Court of Justice: European Commission clarifies rules*. [online] Available at: [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_MEMO-05-482\\_en.htm?locale=fr](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-05-482_en.htm?locale=fr) [Accessed 17 July 2014].

Europa.eu, (n.d.). *EUROPA - EU treaties*. [online] Available at: [http://europa.eu/eu-law/decision-making/treaties/index\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/eu-law/decision-making/treaties/index_en.htm) [Accessed 11 June 2014].

Europa.eu, (2005). *Commission Européenne - COMMUNIQUES DE PRESSE - Communiqué de presse - Financial Penalties for Member States who fail to comply with Judgments of the European Court of Justice: European Commission clarifies rules*. [online] Available at: [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_MEMO-05-482\\_en.htm?locale=fr](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-05-482_en.htm?locale=fr) [Accessed 17 June 2015].

Fagbayibo, B. (2008). *A supranational African Union? Gazing into the crystal ball*. [online] Repository.up.ac.za. Available at: [http://repository.up.ac.za/bitstream/handle/2263/10063/Fagbayibo\\_Supranational%282008%29.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y](http://repository.up.ac.za/bitstream/handle/2263/10063/Fagbayibo_Supranational%282008%29.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y) [Accessed 10 June 2015].

- Flemes, D. (2007). Conceptualising Regional Power in International Relations: Lessons from the South African Case. *SSRN Journal*.
- Forje, J. (2004). Facing the challenges of globalization and regional integration: problems and prospects for Africa at the dawn of the third millennium. *African Identities*, 2(1), pp.7-35.
- Frankel, J., Stein, E. and Wei, S. (1997). *Regional trading blocs in the world economic system*. Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics.
- Frieden, J. A. (2006). *Global capitalism*. New York and London: WW Norton
- Fye, A. (2015). *Regional Integration and Democracy in Africa*. Masters. Pan African University - Institute for Governance.
- Geda, A. and Kebret, H. (2007). Regional Economic Integration in Africa: A Review of Problems and Prospects with a Case Study of COMESA. *Journal of African Economies*, 17(3), pp.357-394.
- Gelb, S. (2001). *South Africa's role and importance in Africa and for the development of the African agenda*. [online] sarpn. Available at: [http://www.sarpn.org/documents/d0000577/P467\\_RSA\\_role.pdf](http://www.sarpn.org/documents/d0000577/P467_RSA_role.pdf) [Accessed 11 April 2015].
- Global Humanitarian Assistance (GHA), (2015). *South Africa - Global Humanitarian Assistance*. [online] Available at: <http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/countryprofile/south-africa> [Accessed 16 Jul. 2015].
- Gibb, R. (1997). Regional integration in post-apartheid Southern Africa: the case of renegotiating the Southern African customs union. *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 23(1), pp.67-86.
- Gibb, R. (1998). Southern Africa in transition: prospects and problems facing regional integration. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 36(2), pp.287-306.
- Gibb, R. (2007). Regional Integration in Post-Apartheid Southern Africa. *Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie*, 98(4), pp.421-435.

Gilpin, R. and Gilpin, J. (1987). *The political economy of international relations*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Ginbar, Y. (2010). Human Rights in ASEAN--Setting Sail or Treading Water?. *Human Rights Law Review*, 10(3), pp.504-518.

Graham, M. (2015). '*Integrating Africa: Decolonization's Legacies, Sovereignty and the African Union*', Martin Welz. [online] Academia.edu. Available at: [https://www.academia.edu/5437637/Integrating\\_Africa\\_Decolonization\\_s\\_Legacies\\_Sovereignty\\_and\\_the\\_African\\_Union\\_Martin\\_Welz](https://www.academia.edu/5437637/Integrating_Africa_Decolonization_s_Legacies_Sovereignty_and_the_African_Union_Martin_Welz) [Accessed 27 Sep. 2015].

Grobbelaar, N. (2004). Can South African business drive regional integration on the continent?. *S. African J. of Int. Affairs*, 11(2), pp.91-106.

Grobbelaar, N. and Chen, Y. (2014). Understanding South Africa's Role in Achieving Regional and Global Development Progress. *Institute of Development Studies*, [online] (64). Available at: <http://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/handle/123456789/3880#.VaiSxvIVikp>.

Grobbelaar, N. (2015). *Understanding South Africa's Role in Achieving Regional and Global Development Progress*. [online] Ids.ac.uk. Available at: <http://www.ids.ac.uk/publication/understanding-south-africa-s-role-in-achieving-regional-and-global-development-progress> [Accessed 06 April 2015].

Hailu, M. (2015). Regional Economic Integration in Africa: Challenges and Prospects. *Miz Law Rev*, 8(2), p.299.

Hartzenberg, T. (2011). *Regional integration in Africa*. 1st ed. [ebook] Geneva: Trade Law Centre for Southern Africa (tralac). Available at: <http://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/57595/1/669412368.pdf> [Accessed 17 August 2014].

Hartzenberg, T. (2015). *National policies and regional integration in the South African Development Community*. 1st ed. [ebook] wider.unu.edu. Available at: [http://www.wider.unu.edu/publications/working-papers/2015/en\\_GB/wp2015-056/\\_files/94053610053173574/default/wp2015-056.pdf](http://www.wider.unu.edu/publications/working-papers/2015/en_GB/wp2015-056/_files/94053610053173574/default/wp2015-056.pdf) [Accessed 16 July 2014].

Hubbard, J. (2010). *Hegemonic Stability Theory: An Empirical Analysis*. [online] ISRJ | th INK Globally. Available at: <http://isrj.wordpress.com/2010/05/28/hegemonic-stability-theory/> [Accessed 09 March 2014].

Hassan, H. (2015). *Contending hegemony and the new security systems in Africa*. [online] <http://www.academicjournals.org/>. Available at: [http://www.academicjournals.org/article/article1431360482\\_Hassan.pdf](http://www.academicjournals.org/article/article1431360482_Hassan.pdf) [Accessed 16 July 2014].

Heinonen, H. (2006). *Regional Integration and the State. The Changing Nature of Sovereignty in Southern Africa and Europe*. Ph.d. University of Helsinki.

<http://www.gov.za>, (n.d.). NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN 2030 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. [online] Available at: <http://www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/Executive%20Summary-NDP%202030%20-%20Our%20future%20-%20make%20it%20work.pdf> [Accessed 6 Aug. 2014].

Ikenberry, G. (1989). Rethinking the Origins of American Hegemony. *Political Science Quarterly*, 104(3), p.375.

Joseph, J. (2002). *Hegemony*. London: Routledge.

Jordaan, A. (2014). Regional integration in Africa versus higher levels of intra-Africa trade. *Development Southern Africa*, 31(3), pp.515-534.

Kagwanja, P. (2008). Cry sovereignty: South Africa and the UN Security Council in a hegemonic world, 2007–20081. *International Journal of African Renaissance Studies - Multi-, Inter- and Transdisciplinarity*, [online] 3(1), pp.35-58. Available at: [http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/18186870802321533#.VajMS\\_IViko](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/18186870802321533#.VajMS_IViko) [Accessed 17 April 2014].

Kalenga, P. (2012). *Regional integration in SADC: retreating or forging ahead?*. [online] [www.tralac.org](http://www.tralac.org). Available at: <http://www.tralac.org/wp-content/blogs.dir/12/files/2012/09/D12WP082012-Kalenga-Regional-integration-in-SADC-retreating-or-forging-ahead-20120919.pdf> [Accessed 8 May 2014].

Keohane, R. (1984). *After hegemony*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Kindleberger, C. (1973). *The World in Depression, 1929-1939*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Kok, N. (2015). Post-conflict development What South Africa can achieve through SADC. *Institute for security studies*, [online] (279). Available at: [http://reference.sabinet.co.za/webx/access/electronic\\_journals/ispaper/ispaper\\_n279\\_a1.pdf](http://reference.sabinet.co.za/webx/access/electronic_journals/ispaper/ispaper_n279_a1.pdf)

Ko, (2013). *Africa: Regional Integration Is a Must for Africa*. [online] *allafrica*. Available at: <http://allafrica.com/stories/201305101741.html> [Accessed 12 March 2014].

Krapohl, S., Meissner, K. and Muntschick, J. (2014). Regional Powers as Leaders or Rambos? The Ambivalent Behaviour of Brazil and South Africa in Regional Economic Integration. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 52(4), pp.879-895

Lake, D. (1993). Leadership, Hegemony, and the International Economy: Naked Emperor or Tattered Monarch with Potential?. *International Studies Quarterly*, 37(4), p.459.

Lalbahadur, A. (2015). *South Africa's Foreign Policy: Tempering Dominance Through Integration*. [online] *Saiaa.org.za*. Available at: [http://www.saiaa.org.za/doc\\_download/755-saia-sop-213-lalbahadur-20150402](http://www.saiaa.org.za/doc_download/755-saia-sop-213-lalbahadur-20150402). [Accessed 8 September 2014].

Landsberg, C. (2000). Promoting Democracy: The Mandela-Mbeki Doctrine. *Journal of Democracy*. [online] Available at: [https://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal\\_of\\_democracy/v011/11.3landsberg.html](https://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_democracy/v011/11.3landsberg.html).

Landsberg, C. (2009). *South Africa's "African Agenda": Challenges of Policy and Implementation*. [online] <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/>. Available at: [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009\\_2014/documents/d-za/dv/3\\_african\\_agen/3\\_african\\_agenda.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/d-za/dv/3_african_agen/3_african_agenda.pdf) [Accessed 16 July 2014].

Langalanga, A. (2014). *GEGAfrica - Nigeria Rising? South Africa should not worry about Nigeria's GDP*. [online] *GEGAfrica*. Available at: <http://www.gegafrika.org/blogs/nigeria-rising-south-africa-should-not-worry-about-nigeria-s-gdp> [Accessed 18 October 2014].

Larsen H (2004) Discourse analysis in the study of European foreign policy. In: Tonra B, Christiansen T (eds) *Rethinking European Union Foreign Policy*. Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, pp. 62–80

Lebale, N. add other author (2009). Challenges and Opportunities of Regional Integration in Africa: The case of SADC. In: *AFRICAN ECONOMIC CONFERENCE 2013*. JOHANNESBURG, SOUTH AFRICA.

Leys, R. and Tostensen, A. (1982). Regional co-operation in Southern Africa: the Southern African development co-ordination conference. *Review of African Political Economy*, 9(23), pp.52-71.

Lyakurwa, W. (1997). Comments on 'Trade Policy and Regional Integration in the Development Context: Emerging Patterns, Issues and Lessons for Sub-Saharan Africa' by T. Ademola Oyejide. *Journal of African Economies*, 7(Suppl. 1), pp.150-161.

Madyo, M. (2008). *The Importance of Regional Economic Integration in Africa*. Masters. University of South Africa.

Maharaj, S. (2014). Economics of South African Townships: Special Focus on Diepsloot: World Bank Studies. *World Bank Studies*. [online] Available at: <http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/abs/10.1596/978-1-4648-0301-7> [Accessed 26 April 2014].

Makgetlaneng, S. (2011). The Role of South Africa in the Democratic Republic of Congo: The View of the Congolese State, Capital and Civil Society. *Africa Insight*, 40(4).

Maloka, E. (2001). *The South African “ African Renaissance Debate ”: A Critique*. [online] Polis.sciencespobordeaux.fr. Available at: <http://www.polis.sciencespobordeaux.fr/vol8ns/maloka.rtf>. [Accessed 17 Jul. 2015].

Mandela, B. (2010). *Regional Hegemony as a tool for peace: An evaluation of South Africa’s role in regional development*. Masters. University of Stellenbosch.

Mapuva, J., & Muyengwa-Mapuva, L. (2014). *The SADC regional bloc: What challenges and prospects for regional integration?*. [online] <http://www.saflii.org/za>. Available at: <http://dx.doi.org/10.4314/idd.v18i1.2> [Accessed 19 May 2015].



Mattli, W. (1999). *The logic of regional integration*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Mazrui, A. (1995). Social Engineering and Political Bridge-Building For the 21st Century: An African Agenda. *African Development Review*, 7(2), pp.132-153.

Mbeki, T. (2012). *The African Union at 10 years old: A Dream Deferred*. This article is in the September edition of *The Thinker*. [online] Thabombekifoundation.org.za. Available at: <http://www.thabombekifoundation.org.za/Pages/The-African-Union-at-10-years.aspx> [Accessed 20 May 2015].

McCormick, T. (1990). World Systems. *The Journal of American History*, [online] 77(1), p.125. Available at: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2078644> [Accessed 12 March 2014].

McGowan, P. and Ahwireng-Obeng, F. (1998). Partner or Hegemon? South Africa in Africa: Part Two. *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 16(2), pp.165-195.

Melber, H. (2004). South Africa and Nepad-quo vadis?. *South African Journal of International Affairs*, 11(1), pp.89-100.

Mengesha, Y. (2009). *Trade Effects of Regional Economic Integration in Africa: The Case of SADC*. [online] <http://www.tips.org.za/>. Available at: [http://www.tips.org.za/files/13.Trade\\_effects\\_of\\_Regional\\_Economic\\_Integration\\_-\\_SSD.pdf](http://www.tips.org.za/files/13.Trade_effects_of_Regional_Economic_Integration_-_SSD.pdf) [Accessed 24 March 2014].

Mutharika, B. (1972). *Toward multinational economic cooperation in Africa*. New York: Praeger Publishers.

Mistry, P. (1996). *Regional integration arrangements in economic development*. The Hague: FONDAD.

Nagar, D. and Daniel, R. (2014). *Regional integration is the key to Africa's prosperity*. [online] Business Day Live. Available at: <http://www.bdlive.co.za/opinion/2014/12/15/regional-integration-is-the-key-to-africas-prosperity> [11 February 2015].

NEPRU, (2002). *Monitoring Regional Integration in Southern Africa Yearbook Volume 2 (2002)*. 1st ed. [ebook] Available at: [http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas\\_2759-1522-1-30.pdf?080221153014](http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_2759-1522-1-30.pdf?080221153014) [Accessed 18 April 2015].

News24, (2012). *South Africa An Aid Donor?*. [online] Available at: <http://www.news24.com/MyNews24/South-Africa-An-Aid-Donor-20120322> [Accessed 16 Jul. 2015].

Nolte, D. (2010). How to compare regional powers: analytical concepts and research topics. *Rev. Int. Stud.*, 36(04), pp.881-901.

Nyiramu, M. (2004). Appraising Regional Integration In Southern Africa. *African Security Review*, 13(1), pp.21-32.

Ogunnubi, O. R. (2013). Hegemonic order and regional stability in Sub-Saharan Africa: A comparative study of South Africa and Nigeria, PhD Dissertation, University of KwaZulu-Natal.

Oloruntoba, S. & Gumede, V. (2014). *Regional hegemons as catalyst for continental integration: A comparative note on the roles of Nigeria and South Africa in Africa's integration and development*. [online] <http://www.vusigumede.com/>. Available at: [http://www.vusigumede.com/content/2014/ACADEMIC%20PAPERS%202014/Working%20Paper%20\(with%20Femi\).pdf](http://www.vusigumede.com/content/2014/ACADEMIC%20PAPERS%202014/Working%20Paper%20(with%20Femi).pdf) [Accessed 23 July 2014].

Pech, L. (2012). *Rule of law as a guiding principle of the European Union's external action*. 1st ed. [ebook] Pech, The Netherlands: T.M.C. Asser Instituut inter-university research centre. Available at: [http://www.asser.nl/upload/documents/2102012\\_33322cleer2012-3web.pdf](http://www.asser.nl/upload/documents/2102012_33322cleer2012-3web.pdf) [Accessed 17 August. 2014].

Pelkmans, J. 1987. The Community's Vivid Core: Integration Process in Industrial Product Markets. In Dunning, J.H. and Usui, M. ed, Structural Change, Economic Interdependence and World Development. Proceedings of the Seventh World Congress of the International Economic Association. Volume 4. Madrid, Spain.

Oganski, AFK. 1958. World Politics. New York: Knopf.

Persaud, R. (2001). *Counter-hegemony and foreign policy*. Albany: State University of New York Press.

Patel, Z. (2015). Nigeria's new GDP status is only on paper. *Business Day, BD Live*. [online] Available at: <http://www.bdlive.co.za/opinion/2014/04/13/nigerias-new-gdp-status-is-only-on-paper> [Accessed 16 April 2014].

Paterson, M. (2012). *The African Union at ten: problems, progress and prospects*. [online] [www.fes.de](http://www.fes.de). Available at: [http://www.fes.de/afrika/content/downloads/AU\\_Report\\_FINAL.pdf](http://www.fes.de/afrika/content/downloads/AU_Report_FINAL.pdf) [Accessed 08 April 2015].

Pfister, R. (2000). *South Africa's Recent Foreign Policy Towards Africa: Issues and Literature*. 1st ed. [ebook] Available at: <http://e-collection.library.ethz.ch/eserv/eth:23586/eth-23586-01.pdf>. [Accessed 16 April 2014].

Powell, K. and Tiekou, T. (2005). *The African Union's New Security Agenda: Is Africa Closer to a Pax Pan-Africana?* on JSTOR. [online] Jstor.org. Available at: [http://www.jstor.org/stable/40204092?seq=1#page\\_scan\\_tab\\_contents](http://www.jstor.org/stable/40204092?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents) [12 May 2015].

Rathumbu, I. (2008). *Regional Economic Integration and Economic Development in Southern Africa*. Masters. University of South Africa.

Redvers, L. (2015). SAIIA - Integrating SADC: Why Angola is the odd one out. [online] SAIIA. Available at: <http://www.saiia.org.za/opinion-analysis/integrating-sadc-why-angola-is-the-odd-one-out> [Accessed 27 Sep. 2015].

Resakss.org, (2013). *Southern Africa | ReSAKSS*. [online] Available at: <http://www.resakss.org/region/monitoring-progress/southern-africa> [Accessed 12 April 2014].

Rosamond, B. (2000). *Theories of European integration*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Sahistory.org.za, (n.d.). *Xenophobic violence in democratic South Africa | South African History Online*. [online] Available at: <http://www.sahistory.org.za/article/xenophobic-violence-democratic-south-africa> [Accessed 6 May 2015].

Sidiropoulos, E. (2014). [www.saiia.org.za](http://www.saiia.org.za). [online] Saiia.org.za. Available at: [http://www.saiia.org.za/doc\\_download/524-poland-sa-event-speech-elizabeth-sidiropoulos-the-national-development-plan-2030-south-africa-and-poland](http://www.saiia.org.za/doc_download/524-poland-sa-event-speech-elizabeth-sidiropoulos-the-national-development-plan-2030-south-africa-and-poland) [Accessed 12 June 2014].

- Schäfer, Armin. *Stabilizing post-war Europe: Aligning domestic and international goals*. No. 03/8. MPIfG working paper, 2003.
- Schiff, M. and Winters, L. (2003). *Regional Integration and Development*. Washington, DC: World Bank.
- Schmitter, P. (1970). A Revised Theory of Regional Integration. *International Organization*, 24(04), p.836.
- Schoeman, P. (2002). South Africa as an emerging middle power. *African Security Review*, 9(3), pp.47-58.
- Shi, S. (2006). *Literature Review: An Overview*. [online] <http://web.cortland.edu/>. Available at: <http://web.cortland.edu/shis/651/LitRevOverview.pdf> [Accessed 11 April 2014].
- Snidal, D. (1985). The limits of hegemonic stability theory. *International Organization*, 39(04), p.579.
- Soko, M. (2007). *The Political Economy of Regional Integration in Southern Africa*. 1st ed. [ebook] Available at: <http://www.notre-europe.eu/media/etud63-regionalintegrationsouthernafrika-en.pdf?pdf=ok> [Accessed 11 March 2014].
- Soko, M. (2008). Building regional integration in Southern Africa: Southern African Customs Union as a driving force?. *South African Journal of International Affairs*, 15(1), pp.55-69.
- Soomer, J. (2003). Why Regional Integration Benefits. [online] Available at: <http://www.eccb-centralbank.org/PDF/newspaper3.pdf> [Accessed 09 April 2014].
- Sotirios, P. (2007). *Rethinking Hegemonic Stability Theory: Some reflections from regional integration experience in the developing world*. Ph.D. Harokopion University.
- Southafrica.info, (2015). *SADC pushes regional integration*. [online] Available at: <http://www.southafrica.info/africa/sadc-au-030707.htm#.VagVxPIViko> [Accessed 10 April. 2015].
- Tai-Ting Liu, T. (2011). *Hegemonic Stability and Northeast Asia: What Hegemon? What Stability?*. [online] Academia.edu. Available at:

[http://www.academia.edu/988912/Hegemonic\\_Stability\\_and\\_Northeast\\_Asia\\_What\\_Hegemon\\_What\\_Stability](http://www.academia.edu/988912/Hegemonic_Stability_and_Northeast_Asia_What_Hegemon_What_Stability) [Accessed 09 April. 2014].

Tavares, R. and Tang, V. (2011). Regional economic integration in Africa: impediments to progress?. *South African Journal of International Affairs*, 18(2), pp.217-233.

Tetenyi, A. (2014). *South Africa vs. Nigeria: competing countries for leadership position in Sub-Saharan Africa*. 1st ed. [ebook] Budapest, Hungary. Available at: <http://web.isanet.org/Web/Conferences/FLACSO-ISA%20BuenosAires%202014/Archive/6086c7d5-abaf-460c-bd29-95c912752033.pdf> [Accessed 18 September 2014].

Tieku, T. (2013). Pan-Africanism as International Relations Theory: Agency and Constructivism in African Politics. [online] Available at: <http://Pan-Africanism as International Relations Theory: Agency and Constructivism in African Politics>.

Thepresidency-dpme.gov.za, (n.d.). *South Africa in the Global Arena*. [online] Available at: <http://www.thepresidencydpme.gov.za/news/Documents/20YR%20Chapter%208%20SA%20in%20Global%20Arena.pdf>. [Accessed 12 April 2015].

Tjemolane, T., Neethling, T. and Schoeman, A. (2012). *South Africa's Foreign Policy and Africa: Continental Partner or Hegemon?*. [online] Academia.edu. Available at: [http://www.academia.edu/5523251/South\\_Africa\\_s\\_Foreign\\_Policy\\_and\\_Africa\\_Continental\\_Partner\\_or\\_Hegemon](http://www.academia.edu/5523251/South_Africa_s_Foreign_Policy_and_Africa_Continental_Partner_or_Hegemon) [Accessed 13 August 2014].

Uneca.org, (2004). *Economic Report on Africa 2004: UNLOCKING AFRICA'S TRADE POTENTIAL*. [online] Available at: <http://www.uneca.org/publications/economic-report-africa-2004> [Accessed 23 October 2014].

United Nations, (2003). *Economic Development in Africa. Rethinking the role of foreign direct investment*. [online] <http://unctad.org/>. Available at: [http://unctad.org/en/Docs/gdsafrica20051\\_en.pdf](http://unctad.org/en/Docs/gdsafrica20051_en.pdf) [Accessed 10 March 2015].

Uzgel, İ. (2003). *Hegemonic Power Box (Hegemon Güç Kutusu)*. Yayınları, İstanbul: Türk Dış Politikası.

Van Niekerk, L. (2005). [online] *Regional Integration: Concepts, Advantages, Disadvantages and Lessons of Experience*. Available at: [http://www.sarpn.org/documents/d0001249/P1416-RI-concepts\\_May2005.pdf](http://www.sarpn.org/documents/d0001249/P1416-RI-concepts_May2005.pdf) [Accessed 23 October 2014].

Van Nieuwkerk, A. (2014). *South Africa and the African Peace and Security Architecture*. [online] <http://www.peacebuilding.no/>. Available at: [http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow\\_site/storage/original/application/8e49f907f05d51bc0a848dcf3745a11c.pdf](http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/8e49f907f05d51bc0a848dcf3745a11c.pdf) [Accessed 05 April 2015].

Vincent Itai, T. and Constance, H. (2014). Challenges and Opportunities for Regional Integration in Africa: The Case of Sadc. *IOSRJHSS*, 19(12), pp.103-115.

Webb, M. C., & Krasner, S. D. (1989). Hegemonic stability theory: an empirical assessment. *Review of International Studies*, 15(02), 183-198.

Welz, M. (2014). A "culture of conservatism": How and why African Union member states obstruct the deepening of integration. *Strategic Review of Southern Africa*, [online] 36(1), pp.15-16. Available at: [http://www.up.ac.za/media/shared/85/Strategic%20Review/Vol%2036\(1\)/03-welz\\_pp4-24.zp39513.pdf](http://www.up.ac.za/media/shared/85/Strategic%20Review/Vol%2036(1)/03-welz_pp4-24.zp39513.pdf) [Accessed 27 Sep. 2015].

Wentworth, L. and Chikura, C. (2013). *Private Sector Steering African Regional Integration*. [online] ECDPM. Available at: <http://ecdpm.org/great-insights/political-economy-regional-integration/private-sector-steering-african-regional-integration/> [Accessed 17 April. 2014].

www.undp.org, (2011). *Regional Integration and Human Development: A Pathway for Africa*. [online] Available at: <http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/Poverty%20Reduction/Trade,%20Intellectual%20Property%20and%20Migration/RIR%20English-web.pdf> [Accessed 20 Jul. 2015].

Yilmaz, S. (2010). State, Power, and Hegemony. [online] Vol.1(No,3). Available at: [http://www.ijbssnet.com/journals/Vol.\\_1\\_No.\\_3\\_December\\_2010/20.pdf](http://www.ijbssnet.com/journals/Vol._1_No._3_December_2010/20.pdf) [Accessed 16 March 2015].

