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Doctoral Degrees (Classics)

Permanent URI for this collectionhttps://hdl.handle.net/10413/12705

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    Theory and practice in Kant's moral and political philosophy.
    (1979) Singh, Ratnamala.; Rauche, Gerhard A.
    No abstract available.
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    Galen's pathology : concepts and contradictions.
    (1982) Bain, Peter G.; De Wet, B. X.
    Abstract not available.
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    A critical analysis of Plato's theory of justice in the light of his Thumoeides concept, with special reference to the Republic.
    (1985) Simpson, Graeme James Francis.; Rauche, Gerhard A.; Singh, R.
    No abstract available.
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    The emergence of mind, a theory in evolution.
    (1986) Beater, Bernard Edwin.; Rauche, Gerhard A.
    No abstract available.
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    Atticism in Achilles Tatius : an examination of linguistic perism in Achilles Tatius' Leucippe and Clitophon.
    (2018) Gammage, Sonja Mary.; Hilton, John Laurence.
    Abstract available in PDF file.
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    The actually possible: an essay in modal psychology.
    Omoge, Michael Oladapo.; Spurrett, David.; Whitaker, Monique.
    Our beliefs about possibilities and necessities face a problem of justification. This is the problem of modal justification and resolving it has become the holy grail for modal epistemology. For a considerable period, the problem has been approached without consulting our experiences of possibilities and necessities. The thought was that it is part of the nature of possibility and necessity that they transcend experience. In this dissertation, I turn this around. I argue that even though it is part of the nature of possibility and necessity that they transcend experience, we should consult our experiences of possibilities and necessities when trying to resolve the problem of modal justification. More importantly, I argue that when we consult such experiences, especially what is going in our minds when we are having the experiences, we can make significant progress with the problem of modal justification. Consequently, I argue that we can perceive and imagine possibilities and necessities, and that when we investigate the perceptual and imaginative processes involved in experiences of possibilities and necessities, the operations of those processes suffice as the evidence we need to show that we are indeed perceiving and imagining possibilities and necessities. By consulting the tribunal of experience, our beliefs about possibilities and necessities no longer have a justificatory problem. Izinkolelo zethu ngokungenzeka nezimfanelo zibhekene nenkinga yencazelo. Ukuxazulula lenkinga sekwaba isinkwa semihla ngemihla kwaba hlaziyi bolwazi (epistemology). Esikhathini eside, lenkinga yayibukwa ngaphandle kwesipiliyoni sokungenzeka nezimfanelo. Lomcabango wawuthi ingxenye yendlela yokungenzeka nezimfanelo kuguquka kweqele isipiliyoni. Kulolucwaningo, ngizukuguqula konke lokhu. Ngizoveza iphuzu lokuthi noma ngabe kuyingxenye yemvelo yokungenzeka nezimfanelo ukuthi kuguqukele kusipiliyoni, kufanele sibuze izipiliyoni zethu kanye nezimfanelo uma sizama ukuxazulula le nkinga yencazelo. Okubaluleke kakhulu, ngizoqhakambisa iphuzu lokuthi sibuza isipiliyoni, ikakhulukazi kulokhu okwenzeka ezingqondweni zethu uma kukhona esikwenzayo, singakwazi ukuyixazulula ngempumelelo inkinga yencazelo. Ngiphinde futhi ngiqhakambise iphuzu lokuthi singabuka siphinde sicabange okungenzeka nezimfanelo, futhi uma sicwaninga indlela yokubuka neyokucabanga efaka isipiliyoni sokungenzeka nezimfanelo, indlela okwenzeka ngayo ivela njengobufakazi esibudingayo ukuveza ukuthi impela siyakucabanga okungenzeka kanye nezimfanelo. Ngokubheka isipiliyoni, ziyashabalala izinkinga ezibhekene nokuchaza izinkolelo zethu.
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    Philosophical counselling beyond the socratic: a preliminary investigation into expanding and developing philosophical practice.
    Sivil, Richard.; Clare, Julia.
    A review of philosophical practice, commonly referred to as philosophical counselling, reveals an array of approaches with a variety of aims. These aims include problem solving, therapy, scepticism, self-knowledge, wisdom and virtue. I argue that the various approaches to philosophical practice can be understood as aspects of a singular vision of philosophy as phronetic: practical wisdom directed at bringing about / increasing well-being. Contrary to the view that philosophical practitioners use a wide variety of methods, I give evidence that most practitioners endorse a Socratic vision of philosophizing. In accordance with this, the philosophical practitioner applies the Socratic Method and adopts the position of the Socratic gadfly – a critical dialogical partner intent on getting the participant to access and assess her worldview. I argue that such a vision of philosophizing is insufficient to meet the phronetic ends of wisdom and well-being. As such, I maintain that additional visions of philosophizing are required. The central focus of this dissertation is dedicated to exploring alternative visions of philosophizing, with the view to developing and enriching philosophical practice. I associate philosophical practice with the conception of philosophy as a way of life. I identify five essential elements of a philosophical way of life: it promotes a transformative aspiration; the aspiration informs a transformative project; it provides a vision of philosophizing that is holistic and personally invested; it provides transformative tools; and it constitutes a self-contained and coherent philosophical system. I offer these five elements as criteria to identify additional philosophies that could enrich and develop philosophical practice. I explore a selection of Western philosophies that, I argue, offer philosophical ways of life. These include: the Stoics, the Epicureans, Kant, Dewey, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. I pair these on the basis of two criteria: shared philosophical aspiration; and divergent metaphysical and ethical tendencies. Firstly, each chapter is orientated around a single aspiration: to ‘be happy’; ‘be good’; and ‘become authentic’. Secondly, in each chapter the philosophies have either ‘transcendent’ or ‘immanent’ metaphysical and ethical tendencies. This serves to highlight the richness and diversity of philosophies that share a philosophical aspiration. By investigating these six I make the following contributions: illuminate a divergent array of ethical, metaphysical and epistemological views; increase the scope of phronetic ends; significantly augment the pool of philosophically prescribed practices; expand the range of roles that the philosophical practitioner can assume; and sketch a tentative view of what philosophical practice could look like.