Masters Degrees (Philosophy)

Permanent URI for this collectionhttps://hdl.handle.net/10413/8206

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Heidegger and the problem of alienation.
(1975) Singh, Prem Ramdhari.; Rauche, Gerhard A.
Abstract available in PDF.
Man's end in Aristotle’s ethics.
(1975) Posel, Rosalind.; Conradie, A. L.
Abstract available in PDF.
The operation of freedom in the individual : a study in Stuart Hampshire's philosophy of mind.
(1975) Mountford, Mary Linda.; Neser, Margaret.
No abstract available.
A critical examination of J.-P. Sartre's concept of freedom in the light of the relationship between en-soi and pour-soi.
(1981) Mashuq, Ally.; Rauche, Gerhard A.
No abstract available.
The existential implications of Berdyaev's idea of freedom.
(1985) Pillay, Nirmala.; Rauche, Gerhard A.
No abstract available.
The philosophical conflict between Swami Vivekananda and Bhaktivedanta Swami Prabhupada in the light of the history of the vedanta tradition.
(1986) Desai, Jayant G.; Zangenberg, F.
Abstract not available.
The socio-ethical aspects of scientific theory with particular reference to biology.
(1987) Ganga, Karamchand Saroop.; Rauche, Gerhard A.; Singh, R.
In this dissertation scientific theory is investigated in order to show its socio-ethical aspects. An historical approach shows that prevailing historical conditions influence the development of scientific theory. These conditions are also created by the theories that they influence. Thus there is a continual interaction between theory and practice, pointinig to the socio-ethical aspects of theory. An investigation of scientific theory including biological theory also shows this continual interaction. Efforts to derive moral precepts from biological theory, e.g., Darwinism, sociobiology and genetic theory reveal the influences and prejudices of the particular historical periods in which the theories are developed. These aspects of scientific theory show that the scientific enterprise is not characterised by objectivity and disinteredness. The community aspect of scientific practice also shows that scientists are dependent on one another and that theories are interrelated. These spects of scientific theory show the transcultural and transnational nature of theory and lays a foundation for the basis of ethics and for scientific responsibility.
Ethical correlates of Indian metaphysics with special emphasis on Samkhya, Advaita and Visistadvaita.
(1988) Dewa, Harilal G.; Zangenberg, F.
The work undertakes an examination of Indian metaphysical theories and their relationship to ethical ideas and moral conduct, as these operate in Indian thought. Special account is taken of the samkhya, advaita and visistadvaita systems, the metaphysical conceptions presupposed in these systems, and the ethical theories proposed by them. The peculiarities characteristic of each system in terms of both metaphysics and ethics are set out and examined in terms of the vital concepts of dharma, karma and mok~a. It is demonstrated that, in the case of each system the original classical formulations, as supported by a relatively consistent dialectic through the centuries down to modern times, in fact accentuate and harden the distinctions among the systems . se fuat 1he three systems appear to be supporting distinctly differing patterns of ethical behaviours. The safukhya is seen to be supporting a somewhat simplistic model of life-denying ethics as flowing from its metaphysical premises, while the visistadvaita, with its clear accent on theism, gives the impression of a more positive attitude in ethical thought and practice. Its ethical concerns, however, are seen to be markedly individualistic in character and operation. The advaita system, with its singular peculiarity of a splitlevel theoretic orientation, is seen to vac~te between a negative withdrawal from life, and a mor-e positive concern towards life in the world. The complex character of advaita metaphysical constructs, in their relation to the more ~ractical aspects of life, are seen to be related to the operation of some stresses and tensions reflected at the individual and social levels.
Overcoming Nihilism : Nietzsche on self-creation, politics and morality.
(1994) Clare, Julia.; Gouws, Andries Stefanus.
This thesis explores three of Nietzsche in terms of his conception of nihilism and his attempt to overcome it. It is argued that Nietzsche views modernity as being characterized by nihilism and in a state of crisis. Nietzsche responds to this crisis by offering both an aetiology of it, and a vision of a future beyond nihilism. It is Nietzsche's vision which is the primary concern of this work. Nietzsche's first attempt to overcome nihilism is found in Thus Spoke Zarathustra. In this book Nietzsche offers a solution of individual salvation which is elucidated in terms of a trio of ideas - the Superman, the will to power and eternal recurrence. Since nihilism is a social problem, however, this individual overcoming of it is insufficient. In Beyond Good arid Evil Nietzsche, realizing this, offers a more inclusive solution which centres on a political vision of an aristocracy which lies beyond, and outside of, social morality. In On the Genealogy of Morals Nietzsche attempts to show that the creation of such a future does not involve any ahistorical leaps, that the potential for it is already present, though repressed, in Western culture. In sUbjecting Nietzsche' s vision of the future to critical evaluation it is argued that his visions of individual and society are both unattractive and unfeasible. The Nietzschean individual is argued to be less a model of psychological health and well-being than a case study in alienation. The aristocratic society which Nietzsche envisages seems sure to lead to a new crisis. It is further argued that this lack of a workable and attractive vision of the future is based in a misinterpretation of the present, which, I suggest, is not characterized by a crisis.
Fear, anxiety and death in Freud and Heidegger.
(1999) O'Riordan, Alex.; Gouws, Andries Stefanus.
This mini-thesis attempts to understand what it means to fear death. It does this by first investigating how Heidegger and then Freud explain fear of death. Heidegger believes that the relationship Dasein has towards its own death allows it the possibility of 'authenticity'. Death presents to Dasein its ownmost potentiality for being. Heidegger explains that this means that in facing death Dasein has the possibility of completeness and absolute individuality. Dasein is called to this possibility of authenticity by the anxiety it experiences in the face of its own death. However, Dasein does not necessarily respond to this call. By reducing anxiety to a fear it is possible for Dasein to disregard its fear of death and correspondingly not respond to the call of authenticity. Thus, for Heidegger, fear of death is symptomatic of inauthentic Dasein's relationship towards its own death. For Freud, on the other hand, death cannot be conceptualised without reference to the social world. Freud believes that the relationship we have towards our own death is learnt through living in this world. Furthermore, Freud argues that it is impossible for the human being to ever understand that death can be an annihilation. When the human being dreads, fears or even desires death, Freud believes it does so symbolically. In this regard Freud explains, by way of the death instinct, that the psyche understands death as a return to before birth. One of Freud's explanations of fear of death is that this fear is actually for the loss of Eros. This fear, however, is in conflict with the phantasy to return to before birth. One of the results of this conflict is the arousal of anxiety. The differences and similarities between Freud's and Heidegger's explanations are detailed in the final chapter. Examining these details leads to a closer investigation of Freud's and Heidegger's explanations of anxiety. On this issue this mini-thesis finds that Freud's and Heidegger's explanations of anxiety are in conflict with each other. After attempting to avoid placing Freud and Heidegger against each other, this mini-thesis demonstrates that Heidegger's explanation of anxiety is lacking in detail.
Deconstituting transition : law and justice in post-apartheid South Africa.
(2000) Lenta, Patrick Joseph Peter.; Herwitz, Daniel.
The aim of this study is to suggest, by selective example, a form of jurisprudence which relates to and may have a salutary effect upon law and justice in post-apartheid South Africa. I describe three ways in which South Africa can be regarded as negotiating a transition - from apartheid to post-apartheid, from modem to post modern and from colonial to postcolonial. I argue for a jurisprudence which directly concerns itself with each of these three overlapping and mutually informing modes of transition: an approach to law and justice which is post-apartheid, postmodem and postcolonial. Since my account of law and justice engages with all three transitions, it has the potential to bring about a positive transformation in the conservative legal theory currently in favour with the judiciary. I suggest that the positivist approach followed by the judiciary during apartheid led in most cases to a removal of ethics from the legal universe and a diremption of law and justice. I contend further that the current approach of the judiciary still bears the hallmarks of positivism, in its continued adherence to the 'literal approach' to constitutional interpretation and its misunderstanding of the role of morality in adjudication. I argue that positivism, with its potential to produce injustice, should be abandoned in favour of an approach based on a postmodem epistemology which incorporates a concept of justice which is both substantive and avoids the pitfalls of natural law: the historical exhaustion of classical teleology and the failure of religious transcendence to command widespread respect. The postmodem theorists I draw on, Michel Foucault, lacques Derrida and lean-Francois Lyotard, cumulatively point to the fai lure of the Enlightenment to ground legal practice upon the universalising faculty of reason. Postmodem jurisprudence. informed by postcolonial theory, postulates justice as an ethic of alterity and is able to reintroduce ethics into law in a manner which avoids the critique of Enlightenment epistemology. Having set out the jurisprudential views of these theorists, I turn to the activity of constitutional interpretation to demonstrate the way in which the judiciary's current approach to interpretation could be positively transformed through the introduction of interpretative techniques related to poststructuralism and specifically deconstruction. I argue that interpretation is an activity necessarily informed by values and that the indeterminacy of the language of the Constitution provides the interpreter with choice. Provided the choice is ethically motivated, interpretation is a transforrnative activity. Having concluded the expository section of this dissertation, I provide a close reading of two Constitutional Court judgements, Azanian Peoples Organisation (AZAPO) v President of (he Republic of South Africa and S v Makwanyane and Another. These judgements, decided under the interim Constitution, are arguably the most important judgements of the Constitutional Court to date. They represent sites of the judiciary's internal struggle to respond to the requirement for a new epistemology and practice of interpretation, which provide the means to adjudicate justly and also suggest ways in which to justify its decisions. My study is largely restricted to these two cases, and although I refer to other cases for their bearing on particular issues, I do not aim at a comprehensive survey of the Constitutional Court's record to date. Nevertheless. this study concludes with some provisional remarks about the record of the Constitutional Court since its inception and suggests possible ways in which the jurisprudence I have argued for may be pursued in furtherance of justice.
Environmental ethics : the adequacy and applicability of extensionist approaches.
(2001) Sivil, Richard.; Gouws, Andries Stefanus.
No abstract available.
Defence of the primary quality view of colour.
(2001) Brzozowski, Jacek Jerzy.; Beck, Simon.
The aim of this thesis is to defend what is known as the primary quality view of colour. It will do this by arguing that this view better meets our conceptual schema than either of its rivals the subjectivist view or the secondary quality view. In pursuing this project, I highlight the five core beliefs (as identified by Johnston 1992) that make up our colour conceptual schema, identifying the two strongly realist beliefs as making up our prime intuition, and on these grounds I immediately reject the subjectivist stance. I then set out the primary quality view's main rival, the secondary quality view, and show how dispositionalists have argued that this view is best able to accommodate our core beliefs. However, I identify empirical findings that raise problems for the secondary quality view, revealing its inability to satisfy our extended colour concepts as well as an inability to adequately explain certain deviant cases. The core of my argument against the secondary quality view comes from what I call problems of causation, where I argue that as dispositions are not causes they are unable to meet our prime intuition, and therefore cannot be colours. I therefore set up a version of the primary quality view of colour, identifying colours with microphysical properties (or complexes thereof) and show why this view does not face the same problems of causation as the secondary quality view. I then argue that the secondary quality view does not have the advantage over the primary quality view, when it comes to the rest of our core beliefs, as its supporters would have us believe. I show how a primary quality view is able to fit all these core beliefs into our overarching colour conceptual schema, without having to appeal to the ontological extravagances that dispositionists must bestow upon colour. Finally, I address two criticisms from commonsense that are laid against the primary quality view, and argue that the primary quality view is able to meet these conceptual demands and thereby conclude that the primary quality view is the better of the putative candidates competing for capturing the ontological status of colour.
Justice and reconciliation : transitional justice in post 1994 Rwanda in the light of the South African experience.
(2002) Agisanti, Edouard.; Herwitz, Daniel.
This study deals with the problem of transitional justice in post-genocide Rwanda in the light of South African experience. Transitional justice, a kind of justice pertinent to societies in transition from dictatorship to democracy where the new democratic regime faces the challenge of how to redress the abuses of the past, varies according to each case. While South African transitional justice has taken a form of mixed memory and punishment with the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the case of Rwanda still presents a number of difficulties. First and foremost, unlike South Africa, Rwanda is a case of genocide and so far there is no agreement about how to think of and understand this genocide. Of the three different sources considered in this study, Adedeji and the Human Rights Watch Report argue that genocide was planned in advance, while Mamdani contends that it was a result of the failure of governmental forces to win the war and the advancement of the rebels, and nothing as such was planned before. . Besides the genocide, the continuation of human rights violations and the lack of will to change, the lack of democracy, the continuation of international support despite the lack of transparency in governance, along with other elements, hold Rwanda in the pretransition stage. In this study, I examine the close links between transitional justice and Truth and Reconciliation Commission, I raise the question of what it would mean for Rwanda to have a successful Truth and Reconciliation Commission; given the history of genocide, and I discuss the failure of the Commission in Arusha. For transitional justice to take place in Rwanda, every form of armed struggle must stop so as to allow Rwandans (all conflicting parties involved) to take the genocide seriously and face its entire truth with courage and honesty. The truth of genocide would clarify the misconception of Rwandan history and would allow Rwandans to change their mentality and belief that ethnic majority means necessarily political majority and to embrace a more transethnic political identity. Then the establishment of a judiciary system capable of dealing with the abuses of the past would be possible. This new democratic regime, which would be democratically organized when all these requirements are met, would determine what kind of transitional justice would be pertinent to the Rwandan case.
Distributed cognition in interpersonal dialogue.
(2003) Blair, Grant.; Spurrett, David.
The study of cognition has suggested different views of what a system needs to perform computations. A strong computationalist approach aims at producing and preserving true statements through syntactic recombinations of elements. AJternately a more action-oriented approach stresses the environment in which the system is placed and the structure that this may provide in performing computation. What is at issue is that the strong computationalist view depends on a particular view of symbols that are decontextualised and function primarily syntactically, in the service of pragmatic goals. It is argued that some of the lessons learned from embodied cognition, in the form of epistemic and strategic action, can aid the ways in which symbols are supposed to function in dialogue. In so doing, attention is turned away from the reification of speech both in the fonn of text manipulation and transcript and begins to look at the environment, situatedness, function and properties of speech. Consequently, language comes to embody some of the ways in which we manage our interaction with the world and other agents, making it a little more than an artefact but a little less than a complete and disembodied picture of rational cognition.
Virtually explained : Daniel Dennett's theory of consciousness : explanation and implementation.
(2003) Edwards, Stephen James.; Spurrett, David.
This paper is an analysis of aspects of Daniel Dennett's theory of human consciousness. For Dennett, the reasons why human consciousness is so unique among earthly creatures, and so manifestly powerful, are not to be found in the differences between our brains and those of other higher mammals, but rather in the ways in which the plasticity of our brains is harnessed by language and culture. According to Dennett, the best way to understand the enhancements and augmentations that result from enculturation is as a von Neumannesque virtual machine implemented in the parallel-distributed processing brain. This paper examines two questions that arise from the latter hypothesis: (1) If nonsymbolic, parallel-distributed networks accomplish all the representation and computation of the brain, what kind of explanation of the functionality of that brain, can legitimately maintain descriptions of procedures that are symbolic, serial, and real? (2) What kind of structural design, training, and resultant processing dynamics could enable a (human) brain to develop a competency for symbolic, serial procedures? Through addressing these questions, I argue that Dennett's theory of consciousness is broadly correct, investigate some other theorist's ideas that are highly compatible with Dennett's work, and consider some criticisms that have been levelled against it.
The role of moral residue in determining the reality of genuine moral dilemmas.
(2003) Poltera, Jacqueline.; Roberts, Deborah.
The debate surrounding whether genuine moral dilemmas exist or is a longstanding one. Proponents of the existence of genuine moral dilemmas like Ruth Barcan Marcus and Bernard Williams have appealed to the moral residue argument as a means of proving that moral dilemmas exist. Opponents like WaIter SinnottArmstrong, Patricia Greenspan, and Terence McConnell, however, have denied its efficacy on the basis that the moral residue argument begs the question on two counts: Firstly, by assuming that rationally irresolvable conflicts of commitments exist, and secondly, by assuming that agents who experience moral residue have necessarily done something wrong. I argue in this thesis that there is a way that the moral residue argument can be salvaged and provide a more precise account of appropriate moral residue - an account that simultaneously overcomes the objections. Specifically, I argue that the moral residue argument, when interpreted in terms ofthe independent standard of integrity, can provide an account of appropriate moral residue that can explain what the agent has done wrong, and that is neither too strict nor overlooks the fact ofthe agent's harsh self-assessment and moral residue. In so doing I show how the specific accounts of appropriate moral residue assumed in the objections are flawed and miss the force of the point about moral residue. By examining two case studies - Williams Styron's Sophie 's Choice, and Euripides' Jphigenia at Aulis - I show that it can be established independently that both Sophie and Agamemnon do something wrong and would do something wrong no matter how they acted in their respective situations. Through Lynn McFall's conception of integrity I show that Sophie and Agamemnon would undermine their integrity regardless ofwhich oftheir alternative they chose to act on. In so doing I establish that their moral residue is appropriate and would be appropriate had they acted on their other alternative. By this means I demonstrate how - when interpreted in terms of the independent standard of integrity - the moral residue argument can support the existence of genuine moral dilemmas.
Frantz Fanon and the dialectic of solidarity.
(2005) Pithouse, Richard.; More, Mabogo Percy.
No abstract available.
Defending Rawls on the self: a response to the communitarian critique.
(2005) Matolino, Bernard.
This thesis aims at defending John Rawls from the communitarian critique by Michael Sandel and Alasdair Maclntyre. The main focus of the thesis is to investigate how cogent their criticism of Rawls's conception of the person is. In chapter one I summarise Rawls's theory of justice. I look at the two principles of justice and what they entail. These principles determine the rights of the citizens as well as how material goods in society should be distributed. He formulates what he calls 'justice as fairness'. Deeply embedded in establishing the notion of justice as fairness are two inseparable ideas. These are the idea of the original position and the idea of the veil of ignorance. The original position presents a thought experiment in which individuals are brought together to come up with an ideal society that they would want to live in. The ideas they have to discuss ultimately include individual rights and freedoms as well as how material goods are to be shared in that society. The individuals, however, are deprived of certain crucial information about how they would appear in the resulting society. This is what Rawls calls the veil of ignorance. The individuals do not know who or what they are going to be in their society. In other words, they do not know if they are going to be male or female, rich or poor, rulers or the oppressed or what their personality traits/character type or talents and disabilities will be. In chapter two I will look at the communitarian objection to Rawls's project. As a crucial part of his characterisation of the veil of ignorance and the original position he claims that these individuals do not know of their own conception of the good. This means that they are not aware of what they will choose as worthwhile and what they will consider to be a wasted life. Thus, these individuals, in considering principles that must govern them, that is principles of justice, will not discriminate between those who pursue a life of enlightenment and those who pursue a life of drugs and heavy parties. This has caused problems with communitarians who insist that one cannot be indifferent to what she considers to be worthwhile. They argue that an individual will defend what she considers to be worthwhile in the face of what she considers to be base, she will discriminate what is worthwhile from what is not worthwhile. Any interpretation that does not conform to this understanding is a distorted understanding of the nature of individuals. The work of communitarians is very broad. My main concentration is going to be on the work of Michael J. Sandel and Alasdair Mclntyre in so far as they argue that Rawls's project rests on a fundamentally mistaken view of the self. I have chosen Sandel and Mclntyre because their work is similar though expressed differently. They both argue that Rawls views the individual as preceding the existence of her society. They both claim that Rawls is committed to a certain metaphysical view of the self that leaves out the essence of community and values in the make up of individuals. In chapter three I argue that the objections by both Maclntyre and Sandel fail to apply to Rawls's project. I argue that their objections have strayed from metaphysics of the person. Sandel and Maclntyre claim that Rawls is committed to a certain metaphysical view of the self. Sandel calls it an "antecedently individuated self and Maclntyre calls it an "unencumbered emotivist self. Using the example of Derek Parfit and Bernard Williams I conclude that Sandel and Maclntyre are not discussing metaphysics of the person but have brought other issues that are at odds with our traditional understanding of the metaphysics of the self. In chapter four I conclude by considering the differences between my response to the communitarian critique and Rawls's response. Rawls explicitly denies that his theory is committed to any view of the person. He argues that justice as fairness is intended as a political conception of justice. He argues that justice as fairness is a moral conception that is meant for a specific subject. The subject he has in mind refers to the economic social and political institutions that make up society. Rawls chooses to explain what his theory entails and its limitations regarding metaphysics. I show how my response differs from Rawls's and argue that my response has got certain attractions over Rawls's own response. I end by looking at possible ways of furthering the debate.
An investigation into the meaningfulness of moral language.
(2007) Goodwin, Carin.
No abstract available.

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