Masters Degrees (Philosophy)

Permanent URI for this collectionhttps://hdl.handle.net/10413/8206

Browse

Now showing 1 - 20 of 59

The pen and the sword : philosophy of science in the writing of Girard Thibault.
(2009) Dace, Peregrine.; Spurrett, David.
This work is an investigation of the influence of academic philosophy on non-academics in the Early Modern period (the 16th and 17th centuries). The first chapter will use Craig’s Similarity Thesis to examine Early Modern philosophy in general, Philosophy of Science and Theology and how they interacted to elevate human reason to the level of divine certainty. The second chapter will draw on Dear’s description of the changing status of mathematics in academia in the Early Modern period. This second chapter will draw the importance and divine relevance of rationality as developed in the first chapter into the discussion to further explore the relationships between science, metaphysics, mathematics and the divine. The third and final chapter will examine one particular instance of the influence of these ideas on popular thought, specifically in Girard Thibault’s early 17th century treatise instructing the reader in swordsmanship, who uses the view of mathematics and the rational mind that is discussed in the preceding chapters to inform his theories of martial arts practice and pedagogy.
Privatised peacekeeping : a necessary evil?
(2008) Waddington, Conway.
The rise of the Private Military Industry has been cemented in modern global political reality, but where next will this multi-billion dollar industry go and what form will it take after the market boom of Iraq? Post-Colonial Africa is considered the birthplace of the modern mercenary and historically features prominently as a testament to the potential for immoral privately sponsored military activities within unstable states. Moreover, it is a rich market that the Private Military Industry is increasingly turning its attention to, albeit focussing on support functions for now, but a massive industry with a competitive and poorly regulated market environment will invariably begin to explore different avenues as competition grows. With market diversification grows the ethical risk of abuse. At the same time, peacekeeping efforts across the continent are hampered by numerous factors, not least of all a chronic lack of trained personnel. Could the legal and political legitimacy, not to mention the sustainable market environment sought by the PMI potentially exist in multilaterally sanctioned, privatised peacekeeping and peace support operations in Africa? Can the ethical challenges of mercenarism be suspended or even bypassed for the sake of expedient intervention in potential genocides, or be perhaps pragmatically accepted as an inevitable development that should be embraced rather than condemned, for strategic security reasons? Can the ethical condemnation of the proposed means of peace support be overridden by the potential ends generated by such a move? Is the world ready for privatised peacekeepers? This dissertation explores the ethical background to the privatisation of military operations and how these foreign policy trends and social perceptions of control of force impact on the notion of privatised peacekeeping, particularly in the context of operations in Africa. It investigates the philosophical implications of privatised peacekeeping by way of a constrained pragmatic form of consequentialist evaluation that warns against reckless expediency. Ultimately, this dissertation offers a more philosophically suitable argument to justify and control this seemingly inevitable next step in the trend of privatisation of force.
Can we be particularists about environmental ethics? : assessing the theory of moral particularism and its practical application in applied environmental ethics.
(2008) Toerien, Karyn Gurney.; Roberts, Deborah.; Farland, Douglas.
Moral judgments have tended to be made through the application of certain moral principles and it seems we think we need principles in order to make sound moral judgments. However, the theory of moral particularism, as put forward by Jonathan Dancy (2004), calls this into question and challenges the traditional principled approaches to moral reasoning. This challenge naturally began a debate between those who adhere to principled accounts of moral rationality, and those who advocate a particularist approach. The aim of this thesis is thus to assess the theory of moral particularism as recently put forward by Jonathan Dancy. In pursuing this project I initially set up a survey of the field of environmental ethics within which to explore traditional approaches to applied ethics. This survey suggests that applied ethical problems have traditionally been solved using various principled approaches and if we are inclined to take the particularist challenge seriously, this suggests a philosophical conundrum. On the one hand, increasingly important and pressing applied environmental ethical concerns suggest there is a practical need for ethical principles, whilst on the other hand, the particularist claim is that we do not need principles in order to make sound moral judgments. The survey of environmental ethics then establishes the first side of the philosophical conundrum. I then move to explore the second side of the conundrum; the theory of moral particularism, looking at why the challenge it presents to traditional principled approaches needs to be taken seriously. I then move to explore theoretical challenges to moral particularism; this is done to establish the current state of the theoretical debate between the particularist and the generalist. I conclude from this that the theoretical debate between the two has currently reached a stalemate; it is, at present, simply not clear which account is correct. As the main goal of this study is to evaluate particularism, this apparent stalemate led me to explore certain practical challenges to particularist theory as a means of advancing the debate. As particularism is a theory that challenges our traditional conception of how to make moral judgments, there will be important implications for applied ethics if particularism turns out to be correct, and 1 thus finally apply particularism to a practical environmental problem in order to assess the validity of practical challenges to particularism. In order to do this, a particularist ethic is applied to the question of whether or not to allow mining in Kakadu National Park in Australia. This provides a means of seeing what an applied particularist ethic could look like, as well as providing something of an answer to the practical challenge to particularism and achieving the goal of evaluating it within the applied context of environmental ethics.
An investigation into the meaningfulness of moral language.
(2007) Goodwin, Carin.
No abstract available.
Embodied minds: a critical response to McMahan on personal identity.
(2009) Oyowe, Oritsegbubemi Anthony.
No abstract available.
Defending Rawls on the self: a response to the communitarian critique.
(2005) Matolino, Bernard.
This thesis aims at defending John Rawls from the communitarian critique by Michael Sandel and Alasdair Maclntyre. The main focus of the thesis is to investigate how cogent their criticism of Rawls's conception of the person is. In chapter one I summarise Rawls's theory of justice. I look at the two principles of justice and what they entail. These principles determine the rights of the citizens as well as how material goods in society should be distributed. He formulates what he calls 'justice as fairness'. Deeply embedded in establishing the notion of justice as fairness are two inseparable ideas. These are the idea of the original position and the idea of the veil of ignorance. The original position presents a thought experiment in which individuals are brought together to come up with an ideal society that they would want to live in. The ideas they have to discuss ultimately include individual rights and freedoms as well as how material goods are to be shared in that society. The individuals, however, are deprived of certain crucial information about how they would appear in the resulting society. This is what Rawls calls the veil of ignorance. The individuals do not know who or what they are going to be in their society. In other words, they do not know if they are going to be male or female, rich or poor, rulers or the oppressed or what their personality traits/character type or talents and disabilities will be. In chapter two I will look at the communitarian objection to Rawls's project. As a crucial part of his characterisation of the veil of ignorance and the original position he claims that these individuals do not know of their own conception of the good. This means that they are not aware of what they will choose as worthwhile and what they will consider to be a wasted life. Thus, these individuals, in considering principles that must govern them, that is principles of justice, will not discriminate between those who pursue a life of enlightenment and those who pursue a life of drugs and heavy parties. This has caused problems with communitarians who insist that one cannot be indifferent to what she considers to be worthwhile. They argue that an individual will defend what she considers to be worthwhile in the face of what she considers to be base, she will discriminate what is worthwhile from what is not worthwhile. Any interpretation that does not conform to this understanding is a distorted understanding of the nature of individuals. The work of communitarians is very broad. My main concentration is going to be on the work of Michael J. Sandel and Alasdair Mclntyre in so far as they argue that Rawls's project rests on a fundamentally mistaken view of the self. I have chosen Sandel and Mclntyre because their work is similar though expressed differently. They both argue that Rawls views the individual as preceding the existence of her society. They both claim that Rawls is committed to a certain metaphysical view of the self that leaves out the essence of community and values in the make up of individuals. In chapter three I argue that the objections by both Maclntyre and Sandel fail to apply to Rawls's project. I argue that their objections have strayed from metaphysics of the person. Sandel and Maclntyre claim that Rawls is committed to a certain metaphysical view of the self. Sandel calls it an "antecedently individuated self and Maclntyre calls it an "unencumbered emotivist self. Using the example of Derek Parfit and Bernard Williams I conclude that Sandel and Maclntyre are not discussing metaphysics of the person but have brought other issues that are at odds with our traditional understanding of the metaphysics of the self. In chapter four I conclude by considering the differences between my response to the communitarian critique and Rawls's response. Rawls explicitly denies that his theory is committed to any view of the person. He argues that justice as fairness is intended as a political conception of justice. He argues that justice as fairness is a moral conception that is meant for a specific subject. The subject he has in mind refers to the economic social and political institutions that make up society. Rawls chooses to explain what his theory entails and its limitations regarding metaphysics. I show how my response differs from Rawls's and argue that my response has got certain attractions over Rawls's own response. I end by looking at possible ways of furthering the debate.
Frantz Fanon and the dialectic of solidarity.
(2005) Pithouse, Richard.; More, Mabogo Percy.
No abstract available.
Defence of the primary quality view of colour.
(2001) Brzozowski, Jacek Jerzy.; Beck, Simon.
The aim of this thesis is to defend what is known as the primary quality view of colour. It will do this by arguing that this view better meets our conceptual schema than either of its rivals the subjectivist view or the secondary quality view. In pursuing this project, I highlight the five core beliefs (as identified by Johnston 1992) that make up our colour conceptual schema, identifying the two strongly realist beliefs as making up our prime intuition, and on these grounds I immediately reject the subjectivist stance. I then set out the primary quality view's main rival, the secondary quality view, and show how dispositionalists have argued that this view is best able to accommodate our core beliefs. However, I identify empirical findings that raise problems for the secondary quality view, revealing its inability to satisfy our extended colour concepts as well as an inability to adequately explain certain deviant cases. The core of my argument against the secondary quality view comes from what I call problems of causation, where I argue that as dispositions are not causes they are unable to meet our prime intuition, and therefore cannot be colours. I therefore set up a version of the primary quality view of colour, identifying colours with microphysical properties (or complexes thereof) and show why this view does not face the same problems of causation as the secondary quality view. I then argue that the secondary quality view does not have the advantage over the primary quality view, when it comes to the rest of our core beliefs, as its supporters would have us believe. I show how a primary quality view is able to fit all these core beliefs into our overarching colour conceptual schema, without having to appeal to the ontological extravagances that dispositionists must bestow upon colour. Finally, I address two criticisms from commonsense that are laid against the primary quality view, and argue that the primary quality view is able to meet these conceptual demands and thereby conclude that the primary quality view is the better of the putative candidates competing for capturing the ontological status of colour.
Beyond objectivism : an exploration in the epistemology and philosophy of science of Michael Polanyi and its relevance to truth claims in religion and ethics.
(2010) den Hollander, Daan.; Giddy, John Patrick.
No abstract available.
What's wrong with South African civil society?
(2011) Hobden, Christine L.; Matisonn, Heidi Leigh.
In a previous dissertation I argued that conceptions of citizenship and civil society have changed in three significant ways. Firstly, from being moral agents, citizens are now primarily rational agents. In other words, citizens now act in civil society when it best serves their own rational self-interest as opposed to recognising what I term the intrinsic moral worth of the public sphere. Secondly, the motivation for action by citizens used to be duty but is now instrumental: that is, citizens rarely act out of a duty to their country or their fellow citizen but instead act in order to achieve a certain end. Thirdly, while citizens used to act as a group, they now act individually, no longer pursuing a common good but each seeking their own individual good. In this dissertation, I move from the primarily theoretical nature of my honours dissertation to an empirical analysis of South Africa, establishing the validity of my theory while offering a more thorough analysis of South African citizenship and civil society. By looking at the empirical examples of the civil service in terms of Education, Bureaucracy, and the SANDF, this dissertation analyses both the state of South African civil society, and the underlying reasons for this state. Once it is clear how citizenship and civil society have changed and why this change is problematic, it then becomes important to establish why they have changed and who is responsible for the change. The attitudes of both citizens and the government are analysed as well as the influence they have on each other. I argue that the attitude of citizens is deeply influenced by governmental behaviour and thus if we want to alter the direction of citizenship and civil society, we need to change attitudes at the governmental level.
The role of moral residue in determining the reality of genuine moral dilemmas.
(2003) Poltera, Jacqueline.; Roberts, Deborah.
The debate surrounding whether genuine moral dilemmas exist or is a longstanding one. Proponents of the existence of genuine moral dilemmas like Ruth Barcan Marcus and Bernard Williams have appealed to the moral residue argument as a means of proving that moral dilemmas exist. Opponents like WaIter SinnottArmstrong, Patricia Greenspan, and Terence McConnell, however, have denied its efficacy on the basis that the moral residue argument begs the question on two counts: Firstly, by assuming that rationally irresolvable conflicts of commitments exist, and secondly, by assuming that agents who experience moral residue have necessarily done something wrong. I argue in this thesis that there is a way that the moral residue argument can be salvaged and provide a more precise account of appropriate moral residue - an account that simultaneously overcomes the objections. Specifically, I argue that the moral residue argument, when interpreted in terms ofthe independent standard of integrity, can provide an account of appropriate moral residue that can explain what the agent has done wrong, and that is neither too strict nor overlooks the fact ofthe agent's harsh self-assessment and moral residue. In so doing I show how the specific accounts of appropriate moral residue assumed in the objections are flawed and miss the force of the point about moral residue. By examining two case studies - Williams Styron's Sophie 's Choice, and Euripides' Jphigenia at Aulis - I show that it can be established independently that both Sophie and Agamemnon do something wrong and would do something wrong no matter how they acted in their respective situations. Through Lynn McFall's conception of integrity I show that Sophie and Agamemnon would undermine their integrity regardless ofwhich oftheir alternative they chose to act on. In so doing I establish that their moral residue is appropriate and would be appropriate had they acted on their other alternative. By this means I demonstrate how - when interpreted in terms of the independent standard of integrity - the moral residue argument can support the existence of genuine moral dilemmas.
Justice and reconciliation : transitional justice in post 1994 Rwanda in the light of the South African experience.
(2002) Agisanti, Edouard.; Herwitz, Daniel.
This study deals with the problem of transitional justice in post-genocide Rwanda in the light of South African experience. Transitional justice, a kind of justice pertinent to societies in transition from dictatorship to democracy where the new democratic regime faces the challenge of how to redress the abuses of the past, varies according to each case. While South African transitional justice has taken a form of mixed memory and punishment with the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the case of Rwanda still presents a number of difficulties. First and foremost, unlike South Africa, Rwanda is a case of genocide and so far there is no agreement about how to think of and understand this genocide. Of the three different sources considered in this study, Adedeji and the Human Rights Watch Report argue that genocide was planned in advance, while Mamdani contends that it was a result of the failure of governmental forces to win the war and the advancement of the rebels, and nothing as such was planned before. . Besides the genocide, the continuation of human rights violations and the lack of will to change, the lack of democracy, the continuation of international support despite the lack of transparency in governance, along with other elements, hold Rwanda in the pretransition stage. In this study, I examine the close links between transitional justice and Truth and Reconciliation Commission, I raise the question of what it would mean for Rwanda to have a successful Truth and Reconciliation Commission; given the history of genocide, and I discuss the failure of the Commission in Arusha. For transitional justice to take place in Rwanda, every form of armed struggle must stop so as to allow Rwandans (all conflicting parties involved) to take the genocide seriously and face its entire truth with courage and honesty. The truth of genocide would clarify the misconception of Rwandan history and would allow Rwandans to change their mentality and belief that ethnic majority means necessarily political majority and to embrace a more transethnic political identity. Then the establishment of a judiciary system capable of dealing with the abuses of the past would be possible. This new democratic regime, which would be democratically organized when all these requirements are met, would determine what kind of transitional justice would be pertinent to the Rwandan case.
Distributed cognition in interpersonal dialogue.
(2003) Blair, Grant.; Spurrett, David.
The study of cognition has suggested different views of what a system needs to perform computations. A strong computationalist approach aims at producing and preserving true statements through syntactic recombinations of elements. AJternately a more action-oriented approach stresses the environment in which the system is placed and the structure that this may provide in performing computation. What is at issue is that the strong computationalist view depends on a particular view of symbols that are decontextualised and function primarily syntactically, in the service of pragmatic goals. It is argued that some of the lessons learned from embodied cognition, in the form of epistemic and strategic action, can aid the ways in which symbols are supposed to function in dialogue. In so doing, attention is turned away from the reification of speech both in the fonn of text manipulation and transcript and begins to look at the environment, situatedness, function and properties of speech. Consequently, language comes to embody some of the ways in which we manage our interaction with the world and other agents, making it a little more than an artefact but a little less than a complete and disembodied picture of rational cognition.
Virtually explained : Daniel Dennett's theory of consciousness : explanation and implementation.
(2003) Edwards, Stephen James.; Spurrett, David.
This paper is an analysis of aspects of Daniel Dennett's theory of human consciousness. For Dennett, the reasons why human consciousness is so unique among earthly creatures, and so manifestly powerful, are not to be found in the differences between our brains and those of other higher mammals, but rather in the ways in which the plasticity of our brains is harnessed by language and culture. According to Dennett, the best way to understand the enhancements and augmentations that result from enculturation is as a von Neumannesque virtual machine implemented in the parallel-distributed processing brain. This paper examines two questions that arise from the latter hypothesis: (1) If nonsymbolic, parallel-distributed networks accomplish all the representation and computation of the brain, what kind of explanation of the functionality of that brain, can legitimately maintain descriptions of procedures that are symbolic, serial, and real? (2) What kind of structural design, training, and resultant processing dynamics could enable a (human) brain to develop a competency for symbolic, serial procedures? Through addressing these questions, I argue that Dennett's theory of consciousness is broadly correct, investigate some other theorist's ideas that are highly compatible with Dennett's work, and consider some criticisms that have been levelled against it.
Development and preliminary application of an instrument to detect partial dissociation of emotional mental state knowledge and non-emotional mental state knowledge.
(2010) Scheepers, Stefan.; Spurrett, David.
Theory of mind is the ability to have mental states about mental states. Among theories concerning the structure and role of theory of mind is the view that theory of mind is the cognitive component of empathy. It is proposed that there is partial dissociation within theory of mind between emotional state representation and non-emotional state representation. In trying to test this hypothesis, an instrument was developed and implemented in a pilot study. Current theory of mind tests are reviewed and design features discussed in relation to the new hypothesis. The instrument aims to measure emotional and non-emotional state representation on separate subscales, as well as coding representations from emotional stories and non-emotional stories separately. The instrument was administered to 33 third level or higher students from the University of KwaZulu-Natal. Groups were chosen from science major (n = 9) and humanities major (n = 24) students. The findings fail to show the group performance patterns reported in literature, for example that humanities students tend to score higher in ToM tests than science students. A number of factors might contribute to the finding, but principally, low sample size and unequal general cognitive ability between groups are proposed as vital. Problems with the pilot study are identified and improvements suggested for subsequent testing.
Structure discovery in hidden Markov models.
(2009) Murrell, Ben.; Spurrett, David.
The Baum-Welch algorithm for training hidden Markov models (HMMs) requires model topology and initial parameters to be specifed, and iteratively improves the model parameters. Sometimes prior knowledge of the process being modeled allows such specifcation, but often this knowledge is unavailable. Experimentation and guessing are resorted to. Techniques for discovering the model structure from observation data exist but their use is not commonplace. We propose a state split-ting approach to structure discovery, where states are split based on two heuristics: within-state autocorrelation and a measure of Markov violation in the state path. Statistical hypothesis testing is used to decide which states to split, providing a natural termination criterion and taking into account the number of observations assigned to each state, splitting states only when the data demands it.
Environmental ethics : the adequacy and applicability of extensionist approaches.
(2001) Sivil, Richard.; Gouws, Andries Stefanus.
No abstract available.
Deconstituting transition : law and justice in post-apartheid South Africa.
(2000) Lenta, Patrick Joseph Peter.; Herwitz, Daniel.
The aim of this study is to suggest, by selective example, a form of jurisprudence which relates to and may have a salutary effect upon law and justice in post-apartheid South Africa. I describe three ways in which South Africa can be regarded as negotiating a transition - from apartheid to post-apartheid, from modem to post modern and from colonial to postcolonial. I argue for a jurisprudence which directly concerns itself with each of these three overlapping and mutually informing modes of transition: an approach to law and justice which is post-apartheid, postmodem and postcolonial. Since my account of law and justice engages with all three transitions, it has the potential to bring about a positive transformation in the conservative legal theory currently in favour with the judiciary. I suggest that the positivist approach followed by the judiciary during apartheid led in most cases to a removal of ethics from the legal universe and a diremption of law and justice. I contend further that the current approach of the judiciary still bears the hallmarks of positivism, in its continued adherence to the 'literal approach' to constitutional interpretation and its misunderstanding of the role of morality in adjudication. I argue that positivism, with its potential to produce injustice, should be abandoned in favour of an approach based on a postmodem epistemology which incorporates a concept of justice which is both substantive and avoids the pitfalls of natural law: the historical exhaustion of classical teleology and the failure of religious transcendence to command widespread respect. The postmodem theorists I draw on, Michel Foucault, lacques Derrida and lean-Francois Lyotard, cumulatively point to the fai lure of the Enlightenment to ground legal practice upon the universalising faculty of reason. Postmodem jurisprudence. informed by postcolonial theory, postulates justice as an ethic of alterity and is able to reintroduce ethics into law in a manner which avoids the critique of Enlightenment epistemology. Having set out the jurisprudential views of these theorists, I turn to the activity of constitutional interpretation to demonstrate the way in which the judiciary's current approach to interpretation could be positively transformed through the introduction of interpretative techniques related to poststructuralism and specifically deconstruction. I argue that interpretation is an activity necessarily informed by values and that the indeterminacy of the language of the Constitution provides the interpreter with choice. Provided the choice is ethically motivated, interpretation is a transforrnative activity. Having concluded the expository section of this dissertation, I provide a close reading of two Constitutional Court judgements, Azanian Peoples Organisation (AZAPO) v President of (he Republic of South Africa and S v Makwanyane and Another. These judgements, decided under the interim Constitution, are arguably the most important judgements of the Constitutional Court to date. They represent sites of the judiciary's internal struggle to respond to the requirement for a new epistemology and practice of interpretation, which provide the means to adjudicate justly and also suggest ways in which to justify its decisions. My study is largely restricted to these two cases, and although I refer to other cases for their bearing on particular issues, I do not aim at a comprehensive survey of the Constitutional Court's record to date. Nevertheless. this study concludes with some provisional remarks about the record of the Constitutional Court since its inception and suggests possible ways in which the jurisprudence I have argued for may be pursued in furtherance of justice.
Ethical correlates of Indian metaphysics with special emphasis on Samkhya, Advaita and Visistadvaita.
(1988) Dewa, Harilal G.; Zangenberg, F.
The work undertakes an examination of Indian metaphysical theories and their relationship to ethical ideas and moral conduct, as these operate in Indian thought. Special account is taken of the samkhya, advaita and visistadvaita systems, the metaphysical conceptions presupposed in these systems, and the ethical theories proposed by them. The peculiarities characteristic of each system in terms of both metaphysics and ethics are set out and examined in terms of the vital concepts of dharma, karma and mok~a. It is demonstrated that, in the case of each system the original classical formulations, as supported by a relatively consistent dialectic through the centuries down to modern times, in fact accentuate and harden the distinctions among the systems . se fuat 1he three systems appear to be supporting distinctly differing patterns of ethical behaviours. The safukhya is seen to be supporting a somewhat simplistic model of life-denying ethics as flowing from its metaphysical premises, while the visistadvaita, with its clear accent on theism, gives the impression of a more positive attitude in ethical thought and practice. Its ethical concerns, however, are seen to be markedly individualistic in character and operation. The advaita system, with its singular peculiarity of a splitlevel theoretic orientation, is seen to vac~te between a negative withdrawal from life, and a mor-e positive concern towards life in the world. The complex character of advaita metaphysical constructs, in their relation to the more ~ractical aspects of life, are seen to be related to the operation of some stresses and tensions reflected at the individual and social levels.
The philosophical conflict between Swami Vivekananda and Bhaktivedanta Swami Prabhupada in the light of the history of the vedanta tradition.
(1986) Desai, Jayant G.; Zangenberg, F.
Abstract not available.

Browse

Browsing Masters Degrees (Philosophy) by Date Accessioned