

**SOCIAL EXCLUSION AS A BARRIER TO
POVERTY REDUCTION: THE CASE OF
BASARWA IN BOTSWANA**

MORRIS DICKSON NYATHI

Submitted in fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
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University of Natal, Durban.

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Supervisor: Professor Julian D. May

Declaration

I declare that this is my own unaided work, except the acknowledged assistance and referenced citations. It has not been submitted for any previous degree at any university.

Date: 31 August, 2003

Signature: 

Name: Morris Dickson Nyathi

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Abstract

In most developing countries the characteristics of the poor go beyond the traditional definition of poverty. Whilst the latter broadly refers to lack of access to material resources, there are other factors that are linked to poverty. This thesis identifies one of these factors as social exclusion which is suggested as a barrier to poverty reduction efforts.

Drawing from the experience on the concept of social exclusion as developed in the north, and extended to some countries in the south, the social exclusion framework is applied within the context of a country in the south, namely Botswana. The thesis investigates the operation of social exclusion within the Basarwa minority group in the country, by identifying the appropriate mechanisms that drive social exclusion, describing the processes of exclusion, and delineating its characteristics. This is done within the context of testing the proposition that social exclusion is one of the factors linked to the persistence of poverty. Noting that persistence of poverty is conventionally attributed, among others things, to shortfall in education and skills, lack of opportunities and capital or land, the thesis investigates the root causes of these factors in as far as Basarwa are concerned. It is argued that such shortfalls and failure to obtain adequate resources are due to exclusionary processes operating at two levels.

The major findings are that the concept is multidimensional and that the target group faces exclusion in political, socio-cultural, economic, spatial and legal terms. This exclusion operates at the national and local levels. Owing to this multiple exclusion, Basarwa generally face difficulties in escaping poverty, with the older generation being the most affected. Social exclusion is a barrier to poverty reduction because it makes it difficult for the Basarwa to obtain equal and satisfactory access to opportunities, assets, and resources available in political, economic and social fields of society. The thesis offers some policy suggestions about how to reduce social exclusion.

Abbreviations

ANC	African National Congress
ARADP	Accelerated Remote Area Development Programme
BCC	Botswana Christian Council
BDF	Botswana Defence Force
<u>BDP</u>	Basarwa (Bushman) Development Programme
BDP	Botswana Democratic Party
BIP	Botswana Independence Party
BNF	Botswana National Front
BPP	Botswana Peoples Party
BHDR	Botswana Human Development Report
BCHR	Botswana Centre for Human Rights
BIDPA	Botswana Institute For Development Policy Analysis
BOCONGO	Botswana Council of Non-Governmental Organisations
CBS	Community Based Strategy for Rural Development
CCDO	Chief Community Development Officer
CERD	Committee on Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
CKGR	Central Kalahari Game Reserve
CSO	Central Statistics Office
DA	District Administration
DC	District Commissioner
DET	District Extension Team
DSE	<i>Deutsche Stiftung fur Internationale Entwicklung</i>
EPF	Employment Promotion Fund
EU	European Union
FAD(s)	Fringe Area Dweller(s)
FAP	Financial Assistance Policy
FC	Farmers Committee
FHH	Female Headed Household
FG	Focus Group
FPK	First People of The Kalahari
GDC	Ghanzi District Council
GDDC	Ghanzi District Development Committee
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HDI	Human Development Index
HH	Household
HIES	Household Income And Expenditure Survey
HIV/AIDS	Human Immuno-deficiency Virus/Acquired Immuno-deficiency Syndrome
IDEA	International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance
IDS	Institute of Development Studies
ICHRP	International Council on Human Rights Policy
IFAD	International Food and Agricultural Development
IFS	Integrated Field Services of MCI

IILS	International Institute for Labour Studies
ILR	International Labour Review
ILO	International Labour Organization
IWGIA	International Working Group for Indigenous Affairs
KDT	Kuru Development Trust
FPK	First People of the Kalahari
MCI	Ministry of Commerce and Industry
MFDP	Ministry of Finance and Development Planning
MLH	Ministry of Land and Housing
MLGLH	Ministry of Local Government, Lands and Housing
NDP	National Development Plan
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NORAD	Norwegian Agency For International Development
OECD	Organisation For Economic Cooperation And Development
PPA	Participatory Poverty Appraisal
PDL	Poverty Datum Line
PhD	Doctor of Philosophy
PRU	Poverty Research Unit Of IDS
PTA	Parents Teachers Association
RAD(s)	Remote Area Dweller(s)
RADP	Remote Area Development Programme
ROB	Republic of Botswana
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SCPO	Social and Cultural Planning Office, Netherlands
S&CD	Social and Community Development
SALDRU	Southern African Labour and Development Research of the University of Cape Town
SHHA	Self Help Housing Agency
SNV	<i>Stichting Nederlandse Vrijwilligers</i> (Netherlands Development Organisation)
SPSS	Statistical Package For Social Scientists
TGLP	Tribal Grazing Lands Policy/Programme
TLA	Tribal Land Act
UK	United Kingdom
UNAIDS	The Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS
UN	United Nations
UNCHS	UN Centre for Human Settlements
UNESCO	United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNRISD	United Nations Research Institute for Social Development
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VDC	Village Development Committee
VET	Village Extension Committee
VHC	Village Development Committee
VLC	Village Literacy Committee

UB	University of Botswana
WB	World Bank
WDC	Ward Development Committee
WIMSA	Working Group of Indigenous Minorities in Southern Africa

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Social Exclusion As A Barrier To Poverty Reduction: The Case Of Basarwa In Botswana.

Chapter 1 Introduction

1.1 A Way Of Interpreting Disadvantage

In the literature of development there are numerous fashions. One of those fashions, which became a widely used term in development circles three decades ago, is social exclusion. This term was conceived in the industrialised countries of Western Europe and has dominated social policy there, being employed to explain social disadvantage. It did not remain in use in Europe for long. It has acquired global interest through its export to the developing world. It is intended to apply this term, developed in the northern hemisphere, in the context of a country in the southern hemisphere, Botswana, by exploring its potential to contribute towards the interpretation of persistence of poverty.

1.2 A Way To Interpret Persistence Of Poverty

Traditionally poverty has been conceptualised as the lack of access to resources, assets and income arising from a state of material deprivation. This income-poverty perspective has been increasingly challenged after the realisation that income does not necessarily guarantee a place in the mainstream of society. Those who are income-poor and those who are not income-poor have both been excluded from the mainstream. One of the recent conceptualisations of poverty is the social exclusion approach. Shifting from the traditional understanding of poverty in terms of lack of income, this perspective gives prominence to the role of institutions and norms in excluding certain groups and individuals from a variety of social networks, rights, assets, goods and services and the importance of cohesion in sustaining livelihoods (Cagatay, 1998).

Social exclusion challenges all countries to strive for societies where all groups will be included in the fruits of development. It brings attention to the need to keep issues of equality at the centre of development strategy. According to Roy (1997:2121) social exclusion has value because it raises questions about the nature of social justice.

1.3 Statement Of Research Problem

This thesis documents research that focuses on the barriers to poverty reduction in Botswana, and identifies one of these as social exclusion amongst one of the ethnic minority groups, namely the Basarwa. These people have tended to lag behind in the development process of the country. A major exercise of the research is to test the contention that social exclusion is *one* explanation for persistence of poverty in the study groups. The main research questions are to investigate the extent of exclusion of the target groups and what impact it makes on their standard of living. The Basarwa people consist of two groups. One group includes those Basarwa who live in remote areas, and are spatially remote from the mainstream society. The other group includes Basarwa living in the outskirts of Ghanzi settlements, such as villages and the Ghanzi Township. Whilst not fully integrated, they are nearer to the mainstream society than the former group. It is therefore necessary to find out whether spatial proximity increases opportunities for integration or not.

Botswana society presents a situation in which the Basarwa find it difficult to participate fully, since the benefits of development tend to favour the dominant groups. Discriminatory practices, working mainly through legal and policy framework, operate against them and tend to deny them equal access to economic and political resources. To the extent that they are the most despised of all ethnic minorities (Mazonde, 2002), Basarwa have remained the most disadvantaged and rejected of the minority groups in the country. Their difference from other population groups in terms of culture has been a basis for exclusion. This exclusion has tended to place them at the bottom of the social, economic and political hierarchy (Dahlgren, S. Molutsi, P. and Duncan, T., 1993:41).

1.4 Rationale For Research

The reasons for undertaking this research are the following:

- To investigate the extent to which the social exclusion approach can explain the persistence of poverty amongst Basarwa, and;

- To make a contribution in terms of a methodology of studying social exclusion. In terms of originality of work, most field data are original because no study of this nature has been undertaken before in Botswana.

1.5 Argument and Contribution of Thesis

1.5.1 Argument

Ethnicity, in terms of cultural difference, is central to social exclusion of Basarwa. In what way does cultural difference manifest itself? Basarwa differ from other citizens of Botswana in terms of language, culture, religion and general world-view. Their ethnic difference has been the basis of discrimination by other Batswana (Mogwe, 1992). The failure by the Government of Botswana to recognise difference between Basarwa and other citizens of Botswana is the main problem and source of exclusion. Both non-Basarwa and Basarwa perceive this difference in the following way.

Basarwa see themselves as being different from others in Botswana, and the [other citizens of Botswana] see the Basarwa as distinct, as well. At the same time, the Basarwa see themselves as being treated differentially, and they have the sense that their rights are not regarded in the same way as those of other groups, including those with whom they live closely (Hitchcock, 2002: 823).

A major difference between ethnic Basarwa and other ethnic groups in Botswana is that the former have historically been associated with hunting and gathering while the latter have been associated with an agro-pastoral way of life. Hitchcock (1996) identifies one of the biggest problems facing foragers in their interactions with other groups as being that the hunting and gathering lifestyle sometimes had a stigma attached. Consequently they tended to be treated differently from other groups. Members of the foraging communities were often not allowed to speak on their own behalf. They had little say in land allocations. They had the local resources upon which they depended extracted by other groups. Woodburn elaborates on the stigma by identifying negative attitudes towards former hunter-gatherers. He notes that these attitudes have been the basis upon which foragers have been discriminated. Neighbouring agro-pastoralists have treated foragers as culturally subordinate, perceiving them stereotypically as:

Dirty, disgusting, gluttonous, stupid, ignorant, primitive, backward, incestuous, lacking a proper culture and a proper language and even as animal-like, not fully human (Woodburn: 1997: 349).

The agro-pastoral Tswana came to dominate the hunter-gatherer Basarwa, thus imposing a system of land tenure that gave precedence to the agro-pastoral use of land as a major component of definition of land rights and failing to recognise the hunting and gathering as a land use. Against this background, the Government of Botswana failed to recognise hunting and gathering as land use. Its policies have done little to accommodate under law some of the distinctive features of Basarwa land tenure and land use. This failure results from conventional national views that hunting and gathering is an economically meaningless activity; that it is backward and should be replaced by Tswana agro-pastoral forms of land use; and that because Basarwa are nomadic, no claim to any particular tract of land can be laid (Wily, 1994).

Through the assimilationist policy, Government has legalised the teaching of one national language – Setswana, in schools. This has required Basarwa and other the non-Setswana speaking groups to give up many of their local customs and traditions. This education system has created various problems for Basarwa children, such as:

- Being taught in a language variety other than their own;
- Being taught by teachers from cultures that are different from, and dominant to, their own;
- Being taught by people who use instruction and disciplinary styles that do not match that of the student's home life;
- Separation of children from their families while they attend school (often boarding schools far from their communities) (Hays, 2002: 74-75)

Social exclusion is a multidimensional phenomenon, and Basarwa are excluded in multiple ways. These are the political, economic, socio-cultural, spatial and legal dimensions. Being excluded in this manner results in persistence of poverty. Social exclusion is generated through the media of the above dimensions. It operates through the action of individuals, groups, state and non-state actors who employ various mechanisms to drive social exclusion. Exclusion acts on specific groups in different degrees, with the most excluded suffering the highest level of exclusion. Among others, exclusion results from lack of participation. For example rural communities fail to participate actively in development strategies because of the technocratic top-down nature of policy implementation. One of the biggest problems many Basarwa confront today is lack of entry into decision-making processes that directly affect them (Hays, 2002).

1.5.2 Contribution

The contribution that this thesis makes to current literature can be summarised as follows: It:

- Addresses questions seldom handled in social exclusion debate. These are who, to what extent, why, from what, by whom and how of exclusion;
- Builds up on the notion that social exclusion is multidimensional. Noting that current literature has focussed on the political, economic and social dimensions, it suggests additional dimensions, namely the legal, spatial and cultural;
- Suggests various strategies to reduce social exclusion;
- Adds to research on social exclusion in the context of a country in the south, and in this regard can be viewed as an expansion to the work pioneered by the International Labour Organisation;
- The difference between this and other research on Basarwa is the emphasis given to social exclusion as the underlying cause of persistent of poverty within this ethnic group.

1.6 Outline Of Thesis

This thesis is organised into 9 chapters including the introduction. Chapter 2 reviews literature on the concept of social exclusion. It shows that the concept originated in Western Europe and has lately been extended to developing countries. In order to grapple with the complexity of the idea, it is useful to deal with some questions about it. In particular, it is not sufficient to say people are excluded without specifying the nature of their exclusion. For a social exclusion approach, it is necessary to find out who is excluded, why, from what, and by whom. Since the title of this thesis suggests a relationship between poverty and social exclusion, the chapter deals with that relationship. Chapter 3 deals with the theoretical framework for the research. Among other things the chapter shows the various ways in which social exclusion operates. Chapter 4 tackles the methodology of the research. Chapter 5 gives the context of the research. It describes the country and the location in which the study was undertaken. The target research groups are described as well. Chapter 6, which is the poverty profile

for the study groups, estimates their poverty levels. Both Chapters 7 and 8 provide the bulk of empirical evidence to the research questions. The findings suggest that Basarwa are excluded in five senses, politically, legally, socio-culturally, economically and spatially. All these dimensions of social exclusion combine to generate exclusion. In each of these latter chapters, an analysis of the findings is made. Chapter 9 details the conclusions arising from the study, including recommendations for reducing social exclusion.

1.7 Glossary Of Terms

A number of words and terms specific to Botswana are used in this thesis. To assist the reader in understanding the text, a glossary is included below.

Basarwa are the subject of this thesis. Basarwa describe other natives of Botswana as black people. This is said to be the reason why the Basarwa are not in favour of being referred to just as Batswana. The word 'Basarwa' is used with or without the definite article 'the' in front of it.

Batswana are the citizens of Botswana. Unlike in South Africa where the citizens are known as South Africans, in Botswana, citizens are *not* called 'Botswanans' or 'Botswanians' but Batswana. An adjective form of Botswana is not 'Botswanan' but is Botswana. For instance, we refer to Botswana society rather than Botswanan society. Botswana has numerous tribes. A list of these tribes is given in Chapter 7. For example, the list includes eight tribes namely the Bakwena, Bakgatla, Bangwato, Barolong, Batawana, Balete, Bangwaketse and Batlhokwa, and so on. They are also named without the prefix 'ba', for instance Kwena, Kgatla and so on. Similarly Basarwa are also named without the above prefix, such as in Sarwa. Without the prefix, the other meaning is that 'Kwena, Kgatla, Sarwa' refers to of Bakwena, of Bakgatla and of Basarwa, respectively. The above eight tribal groups form the dominant group in Botswana. They speak Setswana and are also known as the Tswana. The Tswana are a southern Bantu people closely related to the Sotho (of Lesotho and South Africa). They are associated with Botswana, which means the 'Land of the Tswana'. They are the only tribes listed in section 78 of the Constitution of Botswana, and ex-officio members

of the House of Chiefs come from the eight tribes (ROB, 2000b). This section has been criticised as discriminatory because Botswana is made up of dozens of clearly defined ethnic groups with distinct cultural traditions and historic identities. It has also been criticised because the listing of eight tribes serves to legitimise perceptions of their superiority within the wider community (ROB, 2000c). The eight tribal groups tend to apply a demeaning prefix 'Ma' instead of 'Ba' in reference to other tribal groups. For example Batswapong, Basarwa, Bazezuru, Bakgalagadi are called Matswapong, Masarwa, Mazezuru and Makgalagadi, respectively.

A cattle post is an area where livestock are raised in a customary manner in communal land but where an owner, having a water point, has de facto rights within 8 km radius of the water point.

Khadi is a traditional beer

Kgosi is a Setswana word for headman or tribal leader. *Dikgosi* is plural for *Kgosi*.

Kgotla is a traditional public meeting place where the traditional leader informs the people, consults and settles disputes within the tribe. It is also a forum where the Government meets villagers for consultation, information and holding of official functions and celebrations.

Mafisa 'is cattle loaned to others for draught purposes and/or milking in return for their proper husbandry. It is also a way to disperse heifers for lowering risks of reproductive failure' (Morton, F. Murray. A. and Ramsay, J., 1989: xviii).

Morafe is people who accept the authority of the *Kgosi* thereby constituting a member of a Tswana polity.

Motswana is singular for Batswana. The prefix 'Mo' is also used for an individual member of a tribe. For example, a Mosarwa, Mokgalagadi, Mongwato, and so on are individual members of the Basarwa, Bakgalagadi and Bangwato tribes, respectively.

The prefix 'Se' is used for names of languages. For instance, Sekgalagadi is the language of the Bakgalagadi, whereas Sesarwa is the language of the Basarwa.

Setswana is the national language and 'is widely spoken by over 80% of the population. Setswana is used in schools and the national mass media' (Department of Information and Broadcasting, 1999: 35).

Shebeen is an illegal drinking place.

A village is a traditional settlement with a minimum population of 500 and is established on tribal land. It is an important administrative, commercial and social centre. It serves as a focal point for development of its rural hinterland and is a primary target for provision of social and economic infrastructure and the generation of income earning opportunities (ROB, 1997b: 23).

Chapter 2

Literature Review

2.1 Introduction

The objective of this chapter is to review literature on social exclusion. The chapter consists of four sections.

Firstly, it starts by showing how the word *exclusion* can be interpreted. It is mentioned that exclusion can be both negative and positive depending on who is affected. On the one hand, exclusion is a state of disadvantage. On the other hand, exclusion can be used to advantage those who wish to further their interests, while excluding others. In the literature, exclusion tends to be interpreted in negative terms, implying that inclusion is positive. There are, however, cases where inclusion is not necessarily advantageous, where such inclusion is based on terms that are not favourable to the 'included', or where those included are at risk.

Secondly, it describes the origin of the concept of social exclusion. The concept originated in Western Europe where it was conceived in the early 1970s. It has undergone various changes in interpretation, accumulating in increased complexity with the passage of time. It has only recently been applied in the contexts of developing countries.

Thirdly, the chapter enumerates the problematic issues related to the definition of social exclusion. Among others, these include the heterogeneous nature of the concept, and arising from this, the fact that there is still no agreement as to its definition. The concept overlaps with poverty and there has been the risk of using the two concepts interchangeably. Questions about who is excluded and excludes, from what, why and how are rarely discussed in literature. The section attempts to fill this gap.

Fourthly, to address the overlap between social exclusion and poverty, the relationship between the two concepts is analysed. Relevant literature is analysed to show different ways in which the concepts of poverty and social exclusion are related. Four

interpretations of this relationship are mentioned. The interpretations range from the first one which views the concepts differently, to a second and third that depict a two-way causal relationship between them. The last analysis includes those who see social exclusion as not improving the understanding of poverty, and thus argue that it should be discarded. On the basis of these interpretations, I take the view that the concepts are different and that there is not necessarily a direct causality between social exclusion and being poor. On the one hand, people can be excluded yet not poor, or they can be poor but not excluded. But if you are poor and excluded then you will stay poor. I see exclusion as leading to the persistence of poverty.

2.2 Definition Of Exclusion

This section shows the different senses through which the word exclusion can be conceptualised. What does exclusion itself entail? To exclude is 'to shut out, restrain or hinder the entrance of, to bar from participation, enjoyment, consideration or inclusion; to prevent or refuse to tolerate the occurrence, use, or existence of, to put out; expel especially from a place or position previously occupied' (Webster's Dictionary, 1993:793). Exclusion can be voluntary or involuntary. The former involves people who take an active part to exclude others for their self-interests. People who do not take an active part, but are excluded from benefits enjoyed by others, and encounter constraints in claiming such benefits experience the latter.

The definition of exclusion implies that the reverse situation is possible, that is, inclusion, which normally implies an advantaged position. Not all inclusion, however, is beneficial. People may seem included when in reality their inclusion is on terms over which they have no control.

From the above account, it can be seen that exclusion can be applied to numerous situations. Silver (1994) notes that 'by all accounts defining exclusion is not an easy task, and the term is so evocative, ambiguous, multidimensional and elastic, [with] varied usage,' (Silver, 1994:535-536). She concludes, however, that despite the difficulties in definition, exclusion can be interpreted differently since it is context and time specific, which turns the difficulty into opportunity.

In the senses carried above, exclusion is presented as a negative concept, a disadvantageous situation where those who are involuntarily 'excluded' seem to have no room to extricate themselves from the condition. Representative of this opinion is one author's statement that 'the human landscape can be read as a landscape of exclusion ... power is expressed in the monopolisation of space and the relegation of weaker groups in society to less desirable environments' (Sibley, 1995:ix).

Whilst acknowledging the above statement, Gore, C. Figueiredo, J. and Rodgers, G. (1995:28) state 'the most common response to exclusion is the active improvisation of household strategies'. Those who face rejection, which accompanies exclusion, tend to keep to their own group. It is certainly rational to seek security and identity in one's group or to seek a place where one can be assured of 'inclusion'. Those who are excluded have their own social networks, which have social boundaries around them. While they seem excluded on one hand, they will also be excluding, on the other. Exclusion can indeed be used to disadvantage some and benefit others. The definition of exclusion as introduced at the beginning of this section misses the fact that some population groups take a voluntary action to exclude themselves to further their interests. One analyst observes that exclusion has mainly focused on the poor and not on the ways 'the rich can [voluntarily] exclude themselves from common citizenship by purchasing market alternatives to public goods such as education, health care and personal security' (Purdy, 1999:2).

The definition loses sight of the fact that exclusion can exist alongside inclusion. People may be included in some respects but excluded in others. Discussing aspects of social integration, the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD) (1994) argues that when intended to draw those formerly excluded into the mainstream, there can be a tendency to lose sight of the fact that the 'excluded' have their own forms of social organisation. UNRISD explains:

In all too many cases, international discussion of social development is phrased in terms of integrating those with nothing into the modern mainstream, as though the groups so defined as excluded are surviving in a virtual vacuum ... Those who are excluded from some areas of society – even those who are most impoverished and apparently disorganised – are included in other forms of social organisation (UNRISD, 1994:3).

I note this ambiguity but I argue that exclusion can mean unsatisfactory inclusion. Not all inclusion is necessarily good, since it tends to disadvantage some groups and benefit

others. It is the way some groups and individuals are included that can be problematic. A group may be included but in an unsatisfactory manner, that is, under terms which are not to its advantage. A group may seem assimilated into mainstream society, but what should be noted is that such assimilation may not be beneficial since the group may be incorporated in a subordinate manner where it is forced to reject its own culture and language, and conform to the dominant one. For instance, since Botswana's independence in 1966, non-Tswana groups have been forced to assimilate into the dominant Tswana groups. In the process they have abandoned their culture and language. The impacts on the assimilated groups have been negative, including cultural erosion, loss of their traditions and customs and adoption of those of the Tswana (Nyati-Ramahobo, 2002a). Such a process has been described as assimilation, which is 'based on the idea of the superiority of the dominant culture [aiming] to produce a homogenous society by getting minority groups to discard their culture in favour of the dominant one' (Saugestad, 1998b: 220).

Another aspect, which should be borne in mind in the definition of exclusion, is that those included may bear a cost. One international organisation asserts that 'exclusion is reflected in shattered self-confidence, alienation, mental problems, crimes against individuals and society, outbursts of localised violence, and other social ills' (UN 1995:21). Groups who encounter such difficulties pose problems for those who are included, since the included live in a society threatened by rapid increases in crime, which perpetuates sustained fear of victimisation. Nowadays the cost involved in response to this fear is to withdraw from contact with the community, and invest heavily in personal security behind lofty walls and burglarproof doors and windows. These exclusion devices that protect the rich from the poor are a reflection of a culture of fear and insecurity. Klein (2000) reports about the insecurity felt by the non-poor, who see the poor as a mob ready to attack them, as follows:

A friend of mine whose family lives in India says her Punjab aunt is so afraid of an insurrection of her own household staff that she keeps the kitchen knives locked up, leaving the servants to chop vegetables with sharpened sticks. It's not so different from the growing number of Americans moving into gated communities because the suburbs no longer provide adequate protection from the perceived urban threat (Klein 2000: 263).

Willis (1999) has summed up the costs associated with inclusion when he remarks:

The lifestyles of those who are 'included' are not all unproblematic and involve many frustrations, and much waste, unfairness, and potential for unhappiness and harm (Willis, 1999:2).

Against the above quotation, an article wrote in 1993 on the prospects for South Africa during the post apartheid era is worth citing. The article shows a division of the country's groups into those who continue to enjoy privilege and a majority who face marginalisation. Prior to the democratic elections in 1994, Morris (1993) argued that social forces were leading South Africa into what he termed 'a new Two nation Society, a 50% solution' that would allow some South Africans to embrace opportunity and privilege, but banish the rest to the margins. Class rather than race would determine who was included in the new system and who was excluded. The scenario he predicted was that of intense differentiation in the society with growing inequalities accompanied by an emergent black middle class and a marginalized sections of shanty towns. Issues of redistribution being subordinated to those of growth, he argued, would cause these inequalities. He identified a transition where the inclusion of the opposition (the ANC and its allies) into existing institutions was still inhabited by the same old social forces and people (albeit with different agenda but still with major power). He identified the major challenge facing the country as that of 'forging a more equitable social order that softens inherited hostilities and social divisions' (Morris, 1993:8), where the marginalized majority in the urban and rural areas would gain access to opportunities and resources they were denied previously.

The scenario predicted by Morris has been reflected by persistent disparities in the country. For instance UNDP (1998c: 34) records the nature of inequalities in these terms: 'South African whites had a life expectancy of 68 years in the early 1990s, 14 years more than the 54 for blacks. Disaggregating the HDI for South Africa in 1994 gives a value for whites of 0.878 almost twice the 0.462 for blacks'. According to the International Council on Human Rights Policy (2001:10), in post-apartheid South Africa, the number of black households earning as much as or more than the average white household has risen from fewer than one thousand to 1.2 million in less than a decade. Those gains, however, were concentrated in a black upper-middle class that benefited from the new government's affirmative action policies. Over the same period, the average annual income of the poorest 40% of black South Africans declined, as the government's restructuring of the economy failed to create jobs for unskilled workers.

A 'two nation' notion is in place, with whites continuing to embrace privilege accompanied by a new black middle class, but the majority black population has not gained much. There are prospects for improvement, however, because of 'political commitment to poverty eradication and a strategy based on public – private and people-driven process of development' (UNDP 1997:103).

In exclusion, those who are more powerful usually instigate the exclusion of the weak and/or poor. The more powerful are those who are not only better organised but also have greater resources, irrespective of whether they are numerically a minority or majority (Bierstedt, 1950). With this power, they tend to dominate since they have the economic muscle to shape society and influence political leadership in order to maintain a situation where strategies to advance the poor's position never completely bear fruit. The poor are thus excluded from attaining satisfactory standards of living, in the sense that they cannot steer the poverty reduction efforts to their full advantage. To this extent, the non-poor direct the nature of the development programme in that they dominate programme design. Hvinden (1995) observes that schemes for poor relief are never operationalised to equalise levels of living standards between the poor and non-poor, but to maintain a gap.

Succinctly he states that the schemes:

have not been designed to create equality or an equalisation of the living conditions of the poor and the better off. Rather they have sought to modify the most extreme expressions of social differentiation, and hence the social structure could continue to be based on this differentiation. Since the goal has been to maintain status quo, the assistance provided [*to the poor*] is not made more generous than deemed necessary to achieve this objective (Hvinden, 1995:17, italics mine).

In discussing social exclusion it is important to relate it to poverty because literature seems to depict some overlap between the two. A question that arises is whether poverty stems from exclusion or not. In other words can one be income poor yet not excluded, or the opposite, where one is non-poor but excluded? Both scenarios occur in practice. It is possible for an individual to be poor but not excluded, but 'fully integrated in networks of social protection and mutual assistance' (Sindzingre, 1999:4). It is possible to be excluded yet non-poor due to discriminatory practices (O'Brien, D. Wilkes, J. de Haan, A. and Maxwell, S. 1997:7). The excluded but non-poor category is

exemplified by certain rich minorities especially those who stay aloof from mainstream society on religious grounds, and are excluded in national terms. Examples given here are East African Asians (O'Brien et al, 1997:7). There is also a case whether exclusion and poverty go together. Many disadvantaged people can experience both simultaneously.

In sum, exclusion is the shutting off of individuals or groups from situations of opportunity and privilege. This is done because of barriers that are erected to ensure that paths to the situations mentioned above are blocked. It is the process of being locked out in the margins. 'Exclusion draws attention to two major actors, the excluded as well as excluders' (Cert, 1999:184). It is a monopolisation of space through the interaction of these groups. It is the exercise of power to keep others from equal utilisation of resources.

2.3 Origin Of The Concept Of Social Exclusion

This section charts the evolution of the concept of social exclusion, which can be seen in phases, lasting from the 1970s to date.

The first phase started in France in the early 1970s when Rene Lenoir, a Secretary in the Chirac government, published *Les Exclus: Un Francais sur Dix* in 1974. He basically saw social exclusion as a reflection of a broad range of disadvantage encountered by groups and individuals. According to this report, the *exclus* who were estimated then at 10% of the French population included various categories of people who were excluded by being unprotected under social insurance principles. These included 'mentally and physically handicapped, suicidal people, aged invalids, abused children, substance abusers, delinquents, single parents, multi-problem households, marginal, asocial persons, and other social "misfits"' (Silver, 1995:63).

The second phase in the 1980s saw a shift in usage. It is worth noting that before 'social exclusion' became commonplace in Europe, European countries did not generally have problems of unemployment and failure of the welfare state owing to their level of development. To this extent one can talk of a phase of 'inclusion' in both the labour

market and welfare state transfers. With the failing of the welfare state and restructuring of the economies, long-term unemployment and a related problem referred to as 'new poverty', and the situation of ethnic minorities, became major concerns. Social exclusion started taking root in social policy discourse in recognition of the failure of some groups to get employment and services from the welfare state. The term became central about the nature of 'new poverty', linked to economic restructuring and technological changes. In her contribution to this evolutionary process, Silver (in the Poverty Research Unit (PRU) Newsletter 1996:1) mentions that in the early 1980s, unemployed youth leaving school became subject of debate. By the mid 1980s the focus shifted towards the unemployed, and the so-called 'new poor'. This group included those who suffered rising unemployment resulting from processes of 'privatisation, deregulation, reduction of public services, a shift towards targeted assistance and deregulation of the labour market in Europe' (Saith, 2001:3). The above forces have caused growing poverty for many in work, and according to the following description, it can be seen how new poverty was created.

With the labour market fragmented, jobs for the relatively unskilled have been available only at falling real wages. Making jobs part time has cut real wages, temporary, insecure – or just low paid. At the bottom of the labour market, low paid jobs have grown – offering a wage so far below the median that people with such jobs qualify for supplements. In all countries women are particularly affected (UNDP, 1997: 78).

During the 1980s in France social exclusion was seen as:

A process of social disintegration, in the sense of a progressive rupture of the relationship between the individual and society, which was occurring because of increasing long-term unemployment, particularly focussed on unskilled workers and immigrants, the inability of young people to enter the labour market for the first time, greater family instability and isolated single-mother households, increasing numbers of homeless people, and rising tensions and periodic violence in the low-cost housing settlements on the periphery of the cities. (Gore et al, 1995:2).

Since the 1980s, the concept has spread across Europe initially through the European Union (EU) channels and research institutions. To start with the EU embraced the language of 'poverty' through which it developed a series of anti-poverty programmes (Room, 1995). Three such programmes to deal with poverty were introduced from 1975 to 1994 (Room, 1995). As Room (1995:3) put it, 'within the succession of programmes there has been a varied vocabulary of disadvantage. 'Poverty' was at the heart of the [EU] Council Decisions that launched the first and second programmes.... The third

programme, in contrast, was concerned with the integration of the 'least privileged' ... by the time the programme was actually launched 'social exclusion' became the fashionable terminology'.

Fridberg (1995) suggests the following reasons for this shift:

Towards the end of the 1980s the concept of poverty was gradually supplemented with the concept of social exclusion as it became obvious that the emerging problems were not only related to a lack of material wealth, but to various phenomena characterised by a weakening of attachment to the labour market, a weakening of family ties and informal networks, and a weakening of the access to human rights and the participation in society (Fridberg, 1995: 5).

Bhalla and Lapeyre (1997) quoting Berghman (1994), give another insight in the interpretation of the shift in these terms:

In the EU, the concept of social exclusion was adopted for both political and conceptual reasons. On political grounds, Member States expressed reservation about the use of the term 'poverty'. The concept of social exclusion was considered less disparaging of the structural social problems being faced. The concept of poverty was also deemed inadequate, given that the welfare state guarantees a minimum income and access to basic services, while an income-based notion of poverty was considered too static and narrow approach to social problems. (Bhalla and Lapeyre, 1997:417).

Another source attributes the EU's embracing of social exclusion to the French political debate on the matter. The EU terminology placed emphasis on relational aspects particularly 'inadequate social participation, lack of social integration and lack of power' (Room 1995:243). In keeping with this understanding, the European Foundation has stressed the lack of participation in spheres of society as characteristic of social exclusion; defining exclusion as:

The process through which individuals or groups are wholly or partially excluded from full participation in the society in which they live (European Foundation 1995, quoted in de Haan and Maxwell, 1998:2).

Unlike in France where poverty was not a favourite concept due to the French 'association with Christian charity, the *ancient regime* and utilitarian liberalism' (Silver, 1994:537), the concept of poverty was common talk in Britain. For instance, Room says that research into poverty:

is closely associated with the liberal vision of society, under which society was seen by the relevant intellectual and political elites as a mass of atomised individuals engaged in competition within the market place. The goal of social policy was to ensure that each person had sufficient resources to be able to survive in this competitive arena (Room, 1995:5-6).

Given its preoccupation with poverty in the 1980s, policy-making and research in Britain has tended to downplay the importance of social exclusion. During the Conservative Government the concept of social exclusion never featured in policy debate. During this era, researchers and policy makers tended to regard 'social exclusion' as rather unhelpful, and linked with the idea of the 'underclass' (Room, 1999:166). A change of government in Britain towards the end of the 1990s changed all this. A Labour Government was elected in May 1997 and subsequently established a Social Exclusion Unit concerned with social exclusion programme implementation. A number of activities are ongoing under the auspices of the Unit. At government level, the Unit has 'laid emphasis on states of multiple deprivation as the defining characteristic of social exclusion, creating groups of social excluded people' (Porter, 2000:77). The Unit has defined social exclusion as:

what can happen when individuals or areas suffer from a combination of linked problems such as unemployment, poor skills, low incomes, poor housing, high crime environments, bad health and family breakdown (quoted in Eyben, 1998:2).

From the above history of the concept of social exclusion, the following conclusions can be drawn. First, the concept has evolved over time and was widely used in the 1990s by various parties, including politicians, academics and policy makers. Second, as will be shown below, it has been subject to various interpretations, the dominant one being the concentration of various aspects of economic exclusion in relation to exclusionary effects of economic restructuring. Third, the concept is not yet fully established since there still exists disagreement about its precise meaning. According to Peace (2001:17), 'despite twenty years of its use in the EU (especially in France) and in the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland, there is debate about what social exclusion signifies and how it is best used in rhetorical and policy contexts'. In spite of this, the term has gained acceptance and 'has become the dominant discourse of disadvantage and need in many European countries' (Jackson, 1999:125). It has a potential to provide a central organisational framework for research on poverty (de Haan, 1998).

2.4 Operationalisation Of Social Exclusion Outside Europe

The above assessment has been limited to Europe where the concept started. Through the work of the International Institute for Labour Studies (IILS) of the International Labour Organisation (ILO), 'social exclusion' has been exported to other continents of the developing world. IILS's objective has been to fashion 'a notion of social exclusion which is not Eurocentric but relevant globally' (Gore et al, 1995: 9). Whilst the European conceptualisation tended to emphasise individual factors, the ILO expanded the term to cover both individuals and groups, conceiving social exclusion in a two-fold manner. One aspect emphasises disempowerment at individual level, and the other stresses structural barriers at the level of society, which deny some groups' access to resources associated with citizenship (Das Gupta, 1999). In preparation for the 1995 Social Summit, ten empirical studies were completed by the IILS of the ILO, showing the ways in which the concept could be operationalised, and the variety of meanings it could take (de Haan, 1998). This work is a package that described and analysed trends within countries in terms of patterns and processes of exclusion of individuals and groups from sources of livelihood and citizenship rights. It also examined the applicability of social exclusion at various levels of development. Subject countries were Mexico and Peru in Latin America, Cameroon and Tanzania in Sub-Saharan Africa, Yemen and Tunisia in the Arab World, Thailand and India in South and South-east Asia, and Russia and Kazakhstan in the former Russia (Rodgers et al, 1995).

According to ILO (1996), a description of the nature of some of the studies follows. Different conceptions of social exclusion were applied in the relevant case studies. In Russia and Tanzania, material deprivation in consumption and possessions was one aspect of social exclusion. Social exclusion included social deprivation of various kinds and could be seen as a multi-dimensional concept of poverty, which in Russia, included individuals and groups' sense of self-esteem. In the Thailand study, in contrast, social exclusion was regarded as different from poverty. The study argued that it could be possible to have a falling incidence of poverty amongst the population simultaneously with recurrent incidences of social exclusion. The other studies identified a different relationship between material poverty and social exclusion. In India poverty was described as an important cause of social exclusion because purchasing power acted as

a barrier to the actualisation of welfare rights. The Indian study showed that it is possible to be incorporated into society – in a system of castes – but in a perpetually subordinate and materially disadvantaged position. More than exclusion, poverty results from unjust and uneven terms of inclusion. In the study on Peru, social exclusion was analysed as a cause to poverty.

IILS built in the following considerations in its application of social exclusion (Cert, 1999). It emphasised the concept as an approach to social disadvantage rather than as an outcome of specific processes occurring in European countries. The application was based on four main features. I highlight these below because they serve as background for my conceptualisation of social exclusion in Chapter 3. The first stressed the multidimensionality of social exclusion, where the concept was viewed as a broadening of the traditional analysis of poverty. In order to ensure the widening of the concept, social exclusion had to be viewed not only to include the European focus on social rights, but to also include civil and political rights. The IILS country studies point to denial of rights as a cause rather than a consequence of poverty (Cert, 1999). Secondly, the IILS gave primacy to the idea that social exclusion focuses attention on process, thus capturing situations of poverty and the mechanics that lead to them. Thirdly, the IILS 'emphasised the importance of agency in the creation of exclusion by affirming that not only processes but also actors "include and exclude"' (Cert, 1999:179). Finally, social exclusion was viewed as an attribute of both individuals and society. It should be noted that research on social exclusion was not limited to the IILS. Other international organisations such as the UNDP, the World Bank, and the UNCHS have applied the concept in pursuit of their development programmes, contributing to the debate on the concept. Why has social exclusion discourse gained prominence in development discourse? Four reasons, which I think point to the value added by social exclusion, are attributed to Cert (1999), and mentioned below. First, social exclusion was adopted in association with the re-emergence of inequality in nations, and the need to pursue the goal of social justice and redistribution. Second, the emergence of the social exclusion discourse reflects the need to address its call to inequality between and within nations. Third, social exclusion became necessary in pursuit of democracy and guaranteeing of rights. Fourth, a need arose to give prominence to the right to difference, respect and to value diversity.

2.5 Definition Of Social Exclusion: Problematic Issues

2.5.1 Diversity In Conceptualisation

The purpose of this section is to review the problematic issues pertaining to the definition of social exclusion. This will include discussing questions related to exclusion, which Ratcliffe (1999) correctly observes have been rarely and explicitly addressed. These relate to exclusion from what, who is excluded and by whom, why, and how.

As I will show below, social exclusion has a variety of interpretations. It seems that social exclusion, probably due to its suggested multidimensional nature, covers a broad range of types of disadvantages encountered by groups and individuals in a society. I will summarise what the definition includes, and indicate problematic issues that arise.

The definition of social exclusion is peculiar in the diverse ways the term is used. The ILS has reflected this varied conceptualisation; where it is seen variously as a state or process, a description of disadvantage or attribute of a society. Citing an ILS source by Gore and Figueiredo (1997), Jackson (1999) has summarised the various meanings in four senses as follows:

- negative state or process, in both cases, this entails going beyond resource allocation mechanisms, including power relations, agency, culture and social identity;
- can also be regarded as a subjective or objective feature of people's lives, expressed for instance as a sense of inferiority or being materially deprived, respectively;
- can be regarded as a description of individual disadvantage;
- can be regarded as an attribute of societies, and is manifest in recurrent patterns of social relationships in which individuals and groups are denied access to goods and services, activities, and resources which are generally associated with citizenship (Jackson, 1999:127-128).

According to the definitions above and below I think there is unanimity that social exclusion is a multidimensional process, which affects certain groups in society, by denying or preventing these groups from access to goods and services that are available to other groups. It is a process that results in inequalities of opportunities between groups in society.

According to Madanipour, A. Cars, G. and Allen, J. (1998:279), 'social exclusion is a multidimensional process, in which various forms of exclusion are combined; participation in decision making and political processes, access to employment and material resources, and integration into common cultural processes. When combined, they create acute forms of exclusions that find a spatial manifestation in particular neighbourhoods'. Narayan, D. Patel, R. Schafft, K. Rademacher, A. and Koch-Schulte, S. (2000a) point out that social exclusion refers to norms and processes that prevent certain groups from equal and effective participation in the social, economic and political life of societies. Elliott (1999) views it as a process by which particular groups are deprived of access to socially provided goods and services, including employment, education, health and welfare, and political structures. The concept includes issues of deprivation and poverty in developing countries. Finally Appasamy, P. Guhan, S. Hema, R. Majumdar, M. and Vaidyanathan, A. (1995:237) define social exclusion as a process which restricts the access of certain social groups to valued resources and entitlements, relegating them to the status of social outsiders. It is a multidimensional concept, conceived to capture different forms of social disadvantage – economic, social, political, cultural – that persist in multiple variants and with different intensity. This diversity in definition confirms the point made by Silver in Section 2.2 that the term has varied usage. It is heterogeneous and there is little agreement on its definition (Bruto Da Costa, 1995).

In the next chapter, I develop an analytical framework, which builds on the idea of multidimensionality. Following from the above definitions, I identify five dimensions in which social exclusion can be interpreted. These are the political, economic, socio-cultural, legal and spatial. In the framework, I identify the main role players in exclusion, namely the excluders and excluded, the mechanisms that spur exclusion and the consequences.

2.5.2 Overlap With Poverty Concept

To the extent that poverty can also be conceptualised as a state, a description of disadvantage and an attribute of population groups, there isn't much difference between definitions of poverty and social exclusion. Both concepts share multidimensionality and there is a 'difficulty ... to properly separate poverty and social exclusion, since

often indicators for both concepts overlap' (Friedrichs, 1995:80). Eyben (1998) is forthright in concluding that social exclusion has a number of different definitions, some of which are in fact re-statements of a multidimensional understanding of poverty. According to Madanipour et al (1998:279) 'social exclusion is often used interchangeably with other words, as a synonym for ... poverty. Such a broad and careless use of concepts risks diluting and transforming the idea of social exclusion into a term which can characterise any unwanted social situation'.

In my discussion on the relationship between the two concepts, which is presented later, I will attempt to make a distinction between them. Meanwhile, de Haan's analysis is helpful in identifying the common elements in social exclusion, which separate it from poverty. The elements include multidimensionality to the extent that the concept refers to exclusion in the political, economic and social dimensions. It covers issues like 'power relations, agency, culture and social identity, [and refers] to processes and mechanisms by which people are excluded' (de Haan, 1998:13).

2.5.3 Treating 'Excluded' As Homogeneous

Another problematic issue with the definition of social exclusion is treating the 'excluded' (and by implication the 'included') as if they are a homogenous group (Boughanemi and Dewandre, 1995). Exclusion transcends the excluded category. Ratcliffe (1999:19) reminds us that: 'social actors grouped together in this process [of exclusion] are far too heterogeneous to be collectively characterised as the "excluded"'. Within the so-called excluded group, exclusion affects the members differently depending on a myriad of factors including age, gender, educational and health status, location, and so on. In Chapter 3, I draw attention to 'objects' of exclusion. This means those who face exclusion at the hands of others, in short the 'excluded'. I note that exclusion is experienced in various degrees. To that extent, I introduce the concept of 'degrees of exclusion' to show that people experience exclusion differently.

2.5.4 Spatial/Geographic Exclusion

Another usage of the concept of social exclusion is that related to geographic exclusion. This interpretation looks at specific areas as excluded (Ratcliffe, 1999) and

approximates the French idea of *banlieues* (that is low cost housing settlements on the periphery of cities) (Gore et al, 1995). In some quarters such areas have similar condescending names such as 'ghettos, slums, squatter settlements'. This view of excluded locations fails to recognise that social exclusion cannot be explained without reference to local, national and international relationships. If we look at particular areas in isolation, they will stand as if they were self-excluded. Discussing the problems of social exclusion in Britain, Willis (1999) points out a mistake made in conceptualising exclusion as a specific problem that belongs to and is located in specific areas, when such areas are in fact the victims of processes taking place elsewhere.

2.6 Questions Of Social Exclusion

Literature on social exclusion has rarely addressed questions about to what extent exclusion occurs, who is excluded, from what, by whom, why and how. It is to the answers to these questions that I now turn.

2.6.1 Extent Of Exclusion And Who Is Excluded

To what extent does exclusion occur? It is argued that 'social exclusion should be seen as a matter of degree' (Singer, 1997:1). I see its extent as a continuum from the least to the most excluded or from the lowest to highest degree of exclusion¹. How can I draw the line between these points? I endorse Klevmarken's (1995) in this regard. He advises that one should consider the mechanisms that drive social exclusion, and how the individual or group is able to cope with the situation. He suggests that exclusion depends on the economic and social profile of the individual or group and the impact and duration of the mechanism. On the basis of this advice, if a group is voluntarily excluded and has the capability to integrate into the mainstream if it so desires or even stay outside, I would consider it least excluded. On the other hand, a group which suffers involuntary exclusion through, for instance, systematic discrimination and is unable to cope with the event and its social and economic profile is such that the group cannot successfully extricate itself from this condition, I would consider it most excluded.

Klevmarken (1995) further advises that:

Those who have been brought up in a disadvantaged environment with respect to health and safety, under poor circumstances with few opportunities to invest in human capital and in good health are more likely to become exposed to events which might bring people into social exclusion and perhaps less well equipped to cope with situations of stress and thus become more likely to become disintegrated from normal life (Klevmarken, 1995:202).

Those who suffer multiple exclusion, that is, those who are excluded along several dimensions and forced to stay outside mainstream society but make no significant progress in whatever coping strategies they adopt, would comprise what I call the most socially excluded or having the highest degree of exclusion. In other words the more dimensions of exclusion a person is exposed to, the more excluded he is. I will come back to this issue of extent of exclusion in the next chapter.

I now turn to who is excluded. In reviewing literature on social exclusion and Africa south of the Sahara, Gore (1994) includes in a list of the excluded the following: women, female-headed households, pastoralists, former hunter-gatherers, rural poor, and most broadly minorities at risk. This list nearly coincides with that of the UNDP (1993:27) whose list of those excluded from benefits of development includes the poorest segments of society, people staying in rural areas, religious and ethnic minorities – and in almost every country, women, children, the disabled, and poor nations themselves. Literature on these groups shows that one common problem they face is discrimination, which blocks equal access to resources and assets. They experience problems with full participation in the political process, and cannot therefore participate in decision-making in their own interests (UNDP, 1997; World Bank, 2001). I will concentrate only on those who approximate the group who are the subject of this thesis. These are the minority and indigenous groups².

According to UNDP (1993: 26), both these groups often encounter difficulties in participating fully in societies that consistently operate in favour of the dominant groups. Discriminatory practices operate to ensure that equal access to education, employment opportunities and political representation is frustrated. Even if discrimination is not legal, everyday practice is discriminatory in spite of policies against discrimination. Minority and indigenous groups have experienced problems, which are related to the way they relate to dominant groups. Internationally, indigenous

groups have been incorporated into the socio-economic systems of expanding states, often at the lowest levels. Generally nations tend to pay little attention to their needs. As a result of encroachment into their traditional areas, environmental changes resulted in the disappearance of the hunter-gatherer lifestyle with little alternative but increasing dependency on state handouts. The levels of unemployment are much higher in indigenous groups than others, mainly due to lack of access to education and low literacy rates. Social difficulties have also surfaced, such as being treated as culturally inferior and discriminated against in a variety of ways. It should be noted that the indigenous people are a heterogeneous group with differences in cultural, historical and economic aspects and the way the above problems affect them (Hays, 1999).

What then is the criterion that distinguishes those excluded from those who are not? I think the excluded are those who do not have equal access to institutions of political, social and economic power. Such institutions may not be structured and distributed in such a way that gives real voice and space to the people and create mechanisms through which the powerful can be held accountable. The excluded may be located in a heterogeneous society, and may be not only poor, but also different from the rest of society, in cultural terms. Certain socio-cultural markers may be used to delineate those excluded. These markers include gender, race, ethnicity, age and place of origin. Discrimination and prejudice may be used to exclude people, making it difficult for them to have adequate access to productive assets and services, which enable them to attain a satisfactory standard of living. Such services include education, health, water, sanitation, credit, information, technology and so on.

From the poverty participatory assessments undertaken by World Bank consultants, the most excluded were defined as those cut off from the networks that provide access to power and resources, and included women, children old people, widows and AIDS sufferers (Narayan et al, 2000a).

2.6.2 Exclusion From What?

From what are people excluded? They are excluded from enjoying without discrimination all rights and obligations – including human, political, economic and cultural rights – that belonging to a state implies, and from having equal access to

political, social and economic policy making processes, and equal benefits from them³. In other words, people are excluded from the political, economic, social, legal spheres of society. Politically they are denied access to the political system and the decision-making portfolio that goes with it. Economically, people lack adequate access to productive assets, income, basic services such as education, food shelter, labour and financial markets. Socially people are excluded from access to networks that provide a route to political and economic power. They are also denied humanity in terms of lack of respect and dignity. Legally, people may be excluded from fair judicial systems.

Against this background, a list of things from which people are excluded has been suggested. In developing countries people are excluded from 'economic activities, the labour market and services such as health and education (or good quality services), exclusion from social and economic life, exclusion from policies, participatory processes and voicing' (Sindzingre, 1999:5). Gore (1994) lists similar factors such as lack of access to land, productive assets, to organisation and representation. In some cases it is not only a problem of access but also control of productive assets, especially land. People are not only excluded from credit market but from insurance and labour markets too (Figueroa, A., Altamirano, T. and Sulmont, D., 1996).

2.6.3 Who Excludes?

Apart from voluntary exclusion, exclusion does not happen by itself. Social processes generate it. It is an activity which one group does against another. Excluders are usually the powerful political and economic elite. Bittman (1998:2) describes social exclusion as 'always some action, that through a particular set of institutional arrangements, one social grouping does to another'⁴. Notwithstanding this description, it should be noted that exclusion could be self-induced. Therefore a society can have self-excluded groups 'who may be devalued by the dominant social groups, but nevertheless prefer their outsider status because it allows them to define their own values and priorities' (Kabeer, 2000:28). This preference can be viewed as voluntary exclusion, and is different from involuntary exclusion, which refers to a phenomenon where 'groups or individuals are excluded owing to casual processes beyond their control' (Sindzingre, 1999:2).

What one group does to the other is not always to the latter's advantage. An example of this is the relationship between a dominant and minority group in a nation-state. Problems faced by the latter include disparaging attitudes by the former, and the tendency of the majority to dominate the terms of interaction. The skills and competence of the minority people are not considered relevant qualification within the education and political systems. Such exclusion marginalizes the minority group making it difficult for it to achieve satisfactory social progress.

Social exclusion can be engineered by institutions such as the state and the market, the practice of discrimination with respect, for instance, to ethnicity, and non-enforcement of legal provisions (Gore et al, 1995). The state can be an excluder. Rodgers, G., Gore, C. and Figueiredo, J. (1995) have identified cases in which the state can perform this role. This includes operating in the interests of the dominant groups, promoting a policy that is not capable of integrating particular groups or integrating them against their will, or distributing goods and services unequally. The role of governmental institutions and public policy is important in this regard. The state is an arena where there is competition among different classes and groups for its power, each seeking to penetrate the state and influence development policy to its own interests. In most cases, the most powerful get most of the power and resources. In this connection, Chazan, N. Lewis, P. Mortimer, R. Rothchild, D. and Stedman, S. (1999) point out that:

The state in Africa, influenced by dominant class interests ... has all too often tended to skew its resources allocation policies in such a way as to favour other classes to the disadvantage of [poor groups] (Chazan et al, 1999:125).

It is the dominant class, particularly the rich and powerful, that monopolises state resources, and on which the state seems to depend for its sustenance. In other words the state can operate in the interests of dominant groups. Martinussen (1997) has added his view in this matter by asserting that:

The state in most economically backward countries is organised so as to exclude the large number of poor people from influencing decision-making mainly because meeting their demands would imply serious threats to the powerful elites who control the state (Martinussen, 1997:300).

Exclusion can result from the failure of governmental institutions to enforce laws and regulations. Despite a constitution which includes a bill of rights predicated on a

commitment to the rule of law and human rights, and a great emphasis placed on the individual and assurance of his liberty, freedom and equality with fellow individuals, in most developing countries, equal protection is not necessarily afforded (or always) to all sections of the society. On the one hand, lack of education and information on the part of the poor makes it difficult for them to take full advantage of their rights under the law. On the other hand, enforcement of laws is not always guaranteed. Molokomme (1989:172-173), citing a human rights author, says 'constitutional provisions are, in any case, a mere guide to statements of principle, to which adherence can be assumed only when the political culture engenders respect for the constitution, and when there are institutional means for forcing government to respect it'.

2.6.4 Causes Of Exclusion And How People Are Excluded

What causes exclusion? From the above discussion of who excludes, the causes of social exclusion can be deduced. Exclusion derives from inequality of access to wealth, and factors of production, and mal-distribution of power. This can in turn be reduced to inequity of opportunities in the political, social and economic institutions of society (Sachs, 1994; Byrne, 1999).

Difference, which is any characteristic that distinguishes one person or group from another, has been used as a basis of exclusion. People are excluded because they are different from the mainstream society to the extent that their culture and norms deviate from the ones accepted in society. Societies are characterised by difference, whether ethnic, cultural, religious, racial, gender or class based. One of these, ethnic difference in terms of language, culture, and religion has been the basis of excluding people through discrimination. People are excluded because their difference is not recognised and accepted. Rather than celebrating difference, it is viewed in negative terms, as a threat to dominant culture. Those seen as different are not considered as talented people with a potential to contribute to society, but problems. This structures society into categories of them and us, where opportunities for common understanding and unity in diversity are lost. Those who are excluded are perceived to be on the 'outside' of what might be termed 'normal'.

Illiteracy can contribute to exclusion either in the labour market or accessing information, which is vital for development processes. It can reduce the ability of people to take part in many aspects of life, including civic activities, employment and use of public services. As I showed above, exclusion can be engendered by the state. In this connection, the way public policy is implemented (or not implemented), and failure to ensure compliance with legal provisions, can also cause exclusion. In Chapter 3, I identify lack of enforcement of rights as one of the mechanisms of exclusion.

How are people excluded? They can be excluded politically, socially, economically, geographically and legally. I elaborate on these dimensions of exclusion in Chapter 3. Within this framework, Narayan et al (2000a) identify five mechanisms of exclusion. These are related to geography, certain barriers to entry, corrupt practices in public and private institutions, intimidation, and physical violence. To these must be added discriminatory practices. Regarding geography, where one lives can have a bearing on one's exclusion from chances to obtain employment. For instance people who live in poor neighbourhoods tend to have difficulty in getting jobs because of the stigma attached to these areas (Narayan, D. Chambers, R. Shah, K. Petesch, P. (2000b). Clustering of poor people in unserved areas may promote exclusion. Residence in a particular locality may stigmatise or lead to poor health and make community integration more difficult. Prejudice may force some people into restricted and poor quality areas and isolate them from mainstream community. Living in marginal areas therefore increases cycles of poverty and exclusion. Some people are relegated to infertile areas or areas which are remote from sources of services. Others live in informal settlements of urban areas where they are not eligible for services available in other parts of towns/cities.

Barriers to entry refer to problems that some people face in meeting requirements for state assistance. Such assistance is mostly obtained after processing of documentation. Literacy is usually a passport to process documents and obtain assistance. Those who are illiterate may not meet the documentary requirements that have to be satisfied before provision of services, and are therefore cut off from assistance. Corrupt practices at official level may involve providing services only upon payment of bribes, or giving government benefits to an officer's friends or relatives. UNDP (1997:101) has reported

that some politicians use their offices as spring-boards to keep them in power, by benefiting those on whose support they depend.

Those who are too poor and cannot afford to bribe are excluded from assistance, and this exacerbates their poverty. In this connection UNDP (1997:101) writes:

Corruption increases poverty. Most directly, it diverts resources to the rich, who can afford to pay bribes, and away from the poor, who cannot (UNDP, 1997:101).

Corruption makes government services inaccessible. Corrupt practices may make it impossible for the Government to ensure equal access and fairness in provision of services, and this may cause alienation of people from their government. Regarding intimidation and physical violence, those who are powerless may not take action against those who ill-treat them for fear of reprisal. Moreover, if their rights to freedom have been infringed, they may not seek legal redress because of the cost involved which may be prohibitive, and due to unresponsiveness of the police and judicial systems. UNDP (2002b: 66) reports on surveys of the poor where the police and judiciary were considered as unresponsive and had to be prompted to meet clients' needs after being bribed.

2.7 Relationship Between Social Exclusion And Poverty

The various ways in which this relationship has been analysed can be ordered into groups. Group A identifies a difference between social exclusion and poverty (Room, 1995; Atkinson, 1998; Gore et al, 1995; Rodgers et al, 1995; Sindzingre, 1999). In an attempt to contribute towards understanding and alleviating poverty, group B sees social exclusion as a cause of poverty. (Jordan, 1996; Bessis, 1995; ILO, 1996; Das Gupta, 1999, Figueroa et al, 1996). Group C depicts an opposite causation where poverty generates social exclusion (ILO 1996). Group D comprises those cynical of the furore associated with social exclusion and recommends that the concept should be jettisoned because it scarcely illuminates the poverty question (Ratcliffe, 1999). In concluding this chapter, I suggest another relationship, which is termed Group E.

2.7.1 Group A: Difference Between Poverty And Social Exclusion.

This approach proposes that social exclusion is not the same thing as poverty. Poverty entails deprivation of goods and services. On the other hand, exclusion encompasses this deprivation as well as focusing on wider matters related to citizens' rights to participation in economic, social and political spheres (Hashem, 1995). Exclusion is much more than poverty. It is about lack of opportunities to participate in economy and society. Gore et al (1995) point out that social exclusion goes beyond the economic and social aspects of poverty and embraces political aspects such as political rights and citizenship, which outline a relationship between individuals and the state. Social exclusion encompasses exclusion from opportunities made available by services such as education, employment, and participation in wider society. Atkinson (1998), who implies that poverty is static whereas social exclusion is dynamic, also mentions that social exclusion and poverty are not the same. Discussing exclusion in Europe, Atkinson attributes exclusion not only to current unemployment but also to lack of future prospects to obtain a job with acceptable pay and which will confer dignity. The Social and Cultural Planning Office (SCPO) of the Netherlands also states that poverty is not the same as social exclusion. In its Poverty Monitor 1999, SCPO enumerates conceptual differences between the two concepts. On the one hand, poverty focuses on material factors of deprivation, for instance insufficient income. On the other hand, social exclusion deals mainly with non-material factors, including deviations from societal norms and patterns of behaviour, geographic exclusion, that is isolation and exclusion from services provided by the state or life in stigmatised areas. The social exclusion approach emphasises the importance of institutions and norms that exclude certain groups from a variety of social networks and the importance of social solidarity in sustaining livelihoods (Cagatay, 1998). Most definitions see poverty as a situation (that is having inadequate income at a given time), while social exclusion is seen as a process that results in marginalisation (SCPO, 1999).

2.7.2 Group B: Social Exclusion Causes Poverty

This group views social exclusion as a cause of poverty. Under this scenario exclusion is what Giddens (1993:221 and 762) refers to as 'strategies that groups adopt to separate

outsiders from themselves, preventing them from having access to valued resources, a phenomenon termed social closure'⁵. Jordan (1996) attributes poverty to the workings of exclusive groups. He explains:

In every society, individuals become vulnerable to poverty when they are excluded from access to certain goods that members of such groups supply each other through collective action, and when processes of allocation are influenced by the action of successful organised interests which they cannot join (Jordan, 1996:48).

Bessis (1995:4), Das Gupta (1999:1) and Room (1995) are also included in this group. Bessis contends that the economic dimension of exclusion directly generates poverty. Room suggests that social exclusion focuses attention on the socio-political processes that produce poverty and sheds light on factors related to the difficulty for some groups of people to escape poverty, while economic mobility is easier for others. In their study on social exclusion and inequality in Peru, Figueroa et al (1996:84-85) conclude that poverty is a consequence of a wide range of factors including exclusion from labour, insurance and credit markets, concentration of political and cultural assets, and the failure of the State to completely guarantee civil rights and counteract the inequalities in social and economic assets. Contributing on the same matter, ILO (1996: 3) accords importance to the social exclusion concept by indicating that 'at an individual level, it refers to processes of impoverishment. Focusing on processes – rather than on the poor – enables causal analysis. It directs the focus to the variety of ways in which people become poor, and the variety of ways out of poverty'. If a group or individuals face simultaneous exclusion along several dimensions this kind of condition can aggravate poverty.

Another attempt suggesting that social exclusion causes poverty can be deduced from Room's (1995) understanding of social exclusion. Room views social exclusion as a focus on relational matters, that is, insufficient participation and integration at societal level, and powerlessness (Room, 1995). Exclusion is more to do with societal relations than poverty, that is, how different groups in society relate to each other. In this connection social exclusion is a process involving relations between societal groups, where one group dominates, exploits and marginalizes another.

Such a process can be elaborated by a description of the following groups. On the one hand is a dominant group⁶ in society, which may be a numerical majority or not. Through legislation or various power sources, this group influences another group. The latter group, which I term the dominated, may suffer domination and discrimination, which usually results in such a group failing to tap opportunities available for societal development. The dominated group may face constraints to advancement since the dominant group employs several mechanisms to keep the other group in a weaker power position. Such domination includes utilisation of state power through policies and institutions, which tend to make it difficult for the dominated group to attain upward social mobility.

2.7.3 Group C: Poverty Causes Exclusion

This group's position is that poverty itself causes exclusion. de Haan and Maxwell (1998:3) summarise the linkage by attributing social exclusion to poverty arising from exclusion from market for labour, land or credit. Whilst one can be poor but not excluded⁷, poverty can make it difficult for such an individual to break through barriers to exclusivity created by deliberate efforts to exclude others, either through discriminatory practices or the actions of exclusive groups exemplified by Jordan (1996). Poverty may cause exclusion to the extent that poor people are not generally integrated into structures that have political and economic power, which normally facilitate access to resources that sustain a satisfactory standard of living. In this connection, 'being poor may lead to social exclusion, which increases stigmatisation and marginalisation from institutions, leading to greater poverty' (Narayan et al, 2000a: 188)

2.7.4 Group D: Social Exclusion Should Be Jettisoned

This group includes one who does not agree that there is a value-added by the term 'social exclusion' and therefore recommends that it should be discarded. Ratcliffe (1999) is the most vocal on this matter. While de Haan (1998) has argued that social exclusion has a potential to increase understanding of poverty, Ratcliffe (1999) thinks otherwise. The latter views discussions on social exclusion as an attempt to supplant or

even complement the concept of poverty. He is sceptical, however, as to whether the attempt has been achieved. He argues that in their efforts to cause social exclusion to supplant poverty, literature has failed to 'provide a potential for increased understanding of key problems' (Ratcliffe, 1999:19). He contends that social exclusion 'is often used in such a way as to obscure rather than enlighten ... [and] it is used in a vague 'descriptive' vein which leads itself too easily to mere sloganeering , providing a cloak to mask a lack of clear analytical thinking' (Ratcliffe, 1999:19).

2.8 Conclusion

As will be seen from the above exclusion has several applications. It has disadvantages and disadvantages depending on who is affected. Exclusion by some, especially the powerful, can be used to promote their self-interests. Power has a role to play in whether one is excluded or not. Those who are weak, that is, with poor organisation and fewer resources, are more susceptible to exclusion. Inclusion is not necessarily an advantageous position. It depends on how one is included.

The term social exclusion originated in Europe but has been exported and applied to the contexts of developing countries. Initially the concept referred to disadvantage encountered by particular groups and individuals in French society. From then, the collapse of the welfare state in Europe, which resulted in the failure of some groups to get jobs and services, was interpreted within the ambit of social exclusion. With passage of time, social exclusion started to overlap with the concept of poverty, when it was thought that it provided a potential for increased explanatory power to the concept in question. As I showed above, poverty and social exclusion are not synonymous, although the social exclusion approach has potential to explain attributes of poverty, most importantly persistence of poverty. To this extent, it has been asserted that:

Social exclusion has become a dominant discourse of disadvantage and need in many European countries and is increasingly part of social policy approaches in development agencies. Social exclusion offers an integrated framework for analysing social disadvantage (Jackson, 1999:125).

In spite of the origin of social exclusion in Western Europe, social exclusion is a worldwide phenomenon that is context-specific. Its meaning varies from country to country. In industrialised countries, social exclusion focuses more on rights to

economic welfare, particularly the inclusion or exclusion from the labour market, and benefits of the welfare state. Social exclusion is also related to long-term unemployment and loss of acquired rights. In developing countries, most people have not generally participated in the labour market nor had access to welfare benefits. Depriving them of rights, including legal, political and social rights, mainly due to lack of enforcement of such rights, has been the major form of exclusion. This thesis applies this major form of exclusion to a Third World situation.

The definition of social exclusion is as varied as exclusion itself is. Some problems related to the definition have been mentioned above. Some of these relate to the concept's overlap with poverty, the heterogeneous nature of the definition of social exclusion, and treating the excluded as if they were a homogenous group. Attention has been given to some questions that are rarely addressed in literature on social exclusion. Four positions regarding the relationship between social exclusion and poverty have been outlined. The first identifies a difference between the two concepts. The second position is that social exclusion causes poverty, while the third sees the causality in reverse. The fourth takes the view that social exclusion does not offer much of value in explaining poverty, and that it should therefore be discarded. I support the notion that there is a distinction between poverty and social exclusion.

I think the view summarised below indicates the value added by the social exclusion concept. de Haan believes that social exclusion:

has a certain advantage over [the poverty concept, in that] it takes away from seeing deprivation in terms of individual attributes and focuses on the societal mechanisms, institutions that cause deprivation (de Haan, 1998:15).

I do not support jettisoning of the exclusion paradigm. My position, which might be considered as a *Group E* stand, can be summarised as follows. I think social exclusion focuses attention on social relations and on the inability of groups to participate in activities that are essential to their economic, social and political development. I take the view that the relationship between the concepts in question is more complicated than the above analysis. I differ that there is a direct casual relationship between poverty and social exclusion as advanced by Groups B and C above. My position is that social exclusion does not automatically cause poverty, but exclusion does result in the

persistence of poverty. In this connection, the Human Dignity and Social Exclusion Final Report states: 'it is possible to be poor but not excluded, and vice versa, though many disadvantaged people will experience both simultaneously' (www.social.coe.int/en/cohesion/strategy/discuss/HDSE/chapter1.htm). As indicated in the title of this thesis, social exclusion is a barrier to poverty reduction. Social exclusion does not make individuals or groups poor, but it does make it difficult for them to escape poverty.

Chapter 3 takes up this position and explains the mechanisms by which this happens, by concentrating on the multi-dimensional nature of social exclusion that I alluded to earlier. In the literature much attention is given to three dimensions, that is the political, economic and social. I propose to expand this by suggesting other dimensions, namely the legal and spatial, and to elaborate on degrees of social exclusion.

¹ Subject to the qualification about heterogeneity, and that exclusion affects people differently.

² Further details about these groups appear in Chapter 3.

³ Adapted from a statement by Sadako Ogata on 'Inclusion or Exclusion: Social Development Challenges for Asia and Europe' (Ogata 1998).

⁴ Notwithstanding this definition of exclusion, it is also possible for exclusion to occur voluntarily, where people exclude themselves from others.

⁵ According to Giddens (1993: 221) two types of process are involved in social closure. One is 'exclusion' which refers to strategies that groups adopt to separate outsiders from them. An example of such would be livestock groups, which tend to restrict membership to family members or other relatives. Another is 'usurpation' – these are attempts by the less privileged to acquire resources previously monopolised by others – as where blacks in America struggle to achieve rights in union membership.

⁶ A group in society, either a majority or minority numerically, which successfully shapes and controls other groups through socio-economic, political and cultural power, for example white group in apartheid South Africa.

⁷ 'Being poor, or unemployed, or belonging to an ethnic minority group living in a segregated neighbourhood are not conditions which, in isolation, provide evidence of processes of social exclusion. Individuals can, despite these hardships, very well be part of a mainstream society. Having rich networks of relationships and taking part in a wide variety of social activities, individuals can have rich social and cultural lives. However, individuals or whole groups become more vulnerable to processes of social exclusion when they face social and economic hardship in one or more dimensions of their lives' (Madanipour et al, 1998:281).

Chapter 3

Theoretical Framework

3.1 Introduction

The objective of this chapter is to present a theoretical framework for my study. This chapter is organised into ten sections. At the beginning, in the first five sections, I show the ways in which social exclusion can be conceptualised. This entails describing the processes of exclusion and delineating those who exclude and the mechanisms of exclusion. Examples of those who face exclusion are indicated and the manifestations of this phenomenon highlighted. As much as possible I define selected terms, which are relevant to social exclusion, and draw the reader's attention to each term's linkage with exclusion. The terms themselves are used in the rest of the thesis. So their understanding is essential. I offer an operational definition of social exclusion followed by a description of the various dimensions and degrees of the concept.

In a review of literature on social exclusion and Africa south of the Sahara, Gore (1994) identifies two strands of literature. One strand focuses on the practices by which powerful and privileged groups seek to maximise economic advantage by excluding others from resources and opportunities. The other deals with marginalized or weak groups, and views the processes of exclusion in terms of constraints on access to key assets, resources and other social goods. It analyses the historical background to this exclusion, by identifying a stratified system in which some groups acquired more advantages over others, culminating in different paths to upward social mobility. In the process, some groups prospered, while others stagnated. It is within this literature that my study is located.

Work developed by Figueroa, A., Altamirano, T. and Sulmont, D. (1995) and Figueroa et al (1996) on social exclusion and inequality in Peru, where social exclusion was conceptualised as a cause of poverty, largely informs parts of my theoretical framework. As concluded in Chapter 2, I am not saying that social exclusion is the automatic cause of poverty, but that it results in the persistence of poverty, and I proceed on this fundamental

difference. Figueroa et al analysed the mechanics of inequality by investigating the role of social exclusion in the observed social inequality in Peru. They broke down exclusion into three dimensions (political, economic and socio-cultural), and paid particular attention to the processes of exclusion from basic markets, from rights and from social networks. Their major conclusions were that exclusion theory is a theory about processes, and that social inequality is a consequence of social exclusion. One finding was that the poor are excluded from basic markets (labour, credit and insurance), from rights, and from the cultural processes associated with modernisation. These exclusions were most severe for the indigenous populations, who are Peru's poorest groups (Figueroa et al, 1995).

3.2 Conceptualisation Of Social Exclusion

I take social exclusion to be a process. Figure 3.1 gives a representation of the process, through which various barriers to social mobility are created, which makes it difficult for some people to escape poverty. In this relational phenomenon, for ease of analysis, the main actors are reduced to two, namely the excluders and the excluded. Exclusion occurs through the interaction between these actors. The former who are usually the dominant groups in society, use various mechanisms to exclude others such as those mentioned in Figure 3.1. The latter are excluded from political, economic, social and legal institutions. This idea will be developed further when I discuss the various dimensions of social exclusion. The way the state interacts with members of society can explain exclusion. I will show below under the sections on power and its application, barriers to participation, rights and lack of enforcement, that the state's action (or inaction) can result in exclusion. Application of power, failure to enforce rights of particular groups, and failure to allow full participation of these groups in the political, social and economic spheres of society result in exclusion. Exclusion is not limited to the state since non-state actors such as non-governmental organisations (NGOs) can also exclude because they do not necessarily undertake the tasks they are famed (Tendler, 1982). The assumed ability of NGOs to reach the poorest sectors of society is one reason why the NGOs are considered as worth recipients of development resources. On the basis of Tendler's (1982) 'articles of faith'¹, one assumption arising thereof is that 'NGOs are better than other agencies at reaching

isolated people in isolated communities, and at addressing problems of the “poorest of the poor” (Vivian, 1994:183). Assertions about the positive aspects of NGOs have been propounded in literature on these organisations. For instance Kharono (2000) claims that NGOs have demonstrated their unique contribution to development because of the following distinct qualities.

- As part of the civil society, NGOs have organised around ideals of development, social welfare, social transformation, human rights, woman rights. NGOs have sought to be non-political and non-profit making;
- As a result of the above, [the main constituency of] NGOs tend to be the marginalized groups in society who lack a strong voice to articulate their interests particularly at fora where political decisions are made. NGOs have played an important role in articulating the interests and concerns of these groups, and through a variety of innovative strategies taken initiatives to impact on national, regional and international policy making processes on behalf of these groups;
- NGOs responsiveness to felt needs of the community. As African governments have either withdrawn from the social sector or have been unable to respond to felt needs of the people, NGOs have stepped in, responded to, and addressed some of these pressing needs through direct action and support in sectors such as health, education, savings and credit programmes;
- Regarding method of work, NGOs are highly motivated, issue-focussed, more flexible and less bureaucratic than governments machineries and institutions (Kharono, 2000: 76).


Whilst Robison and White (1997) indicate that literature highlights some positive aspects of non-state provision, they identify some deficiencies in the scope and coverage of this sector, by concluding that:

Despite the ability of some organisations to work in remote areas, some regions and groups of people are poorly served or are beyond the reach of [NGOs] due to resource constraints and a tendency towards concentration in core areas and to working with more accessible and vocal groups. Although [NGOs] focus their energies on poorer groups, equity considerations also arise... which have gender, class, and ethnic dimensions. By their very nature [NGOs] have a tendency to work selectively with sub-groups of a given population, especially when their mission and resource base derives from a particular ethnic or religious group. Gaps in coverage are a problem, and certain groups of poor people can be excluded by virtue of their physical location and the intractability of the situation (Robison and White, 1997:43-44).

For the purposes of my analysis, the excluded are the minority or indigenous group. It should be noted, however, that there are other groups who are excluded, for example on the basis of gender, race, religion and so on. The exclusion marker for the excluded group in my analysis is ethnicity. During the process of exclusion, certain manifestations occur as exclusion affects the minority or indigenous groups. These include disadvantage,

powerlessness and poverty². The exclusion of the groups in question results in failure to escape poverty. Figure 3.1 captures the issues or terms at hand in the process of social exclusion. Mechanisms are devices through which exclusion operates. Objects of exclusion are those who are excluded. Manifestation is a phenomenon that results from social exclusion. Below I define other terms and attempt to map out their relationship with social exclusion.

FIGURE 3.1: Representation Of The Process Of Social Exclusion



3.3 Process Of Exclusion

3.3.1 Dominant/Subordinate Group Interaction

In society, a dominant group is one which may be either numerically small or large but which successfully shapes and controls other groups through its superior access to social power.³ According to Tatum (2000:11-12), a dominant group has the following characteristics.

- It sets⁴ parameters within which the subordinate group operates;
- It holds power and authority in society relative to the opposite group and determines how that power and authority may be used;
- It has the greatest influence in determining who gets the best jobs, what language(s) will be taught in school, and so on.

The dominant group occupies the mainstream position in society. Mainstream society or mainstream refers to that part of society that is dominant, either numerically or culturally, whose norms and culture are dominant or characteristic of established tradition and therefore acceptable in a given social setting. If one considers a population group that has access to political, social and economic resources, with all leaders either in the political and economic spheres coming from this group, one could call it the mainstream part of the society. A state of structural separation from the mainstream society is a form of exclusion (Ratcliffe, 1998).

There is an asymmetrical relationship between the dominants and subordinates where the former labels the latter as defective or substandard in significant ways. Stereotypes such as perceiving the subordinate groups as lazy, backward, uncivilised are typical of this form of labelling. Thus the dominant group assigns roles to the subordinate that reflect the latter's devalued status, reserving the most highly valued roles in society for themselves. Subordinates are usually said to be innately incapable of performing the preferred roles. To the extent that 'those in the [subordinate group] internalise the images that the dominant

group reflects back to them, they may find it difficult to believe in their own ability' (Tatum, 2000:12).

Below I attempt to show how the dominant group applies various measures to keep the subordinate one excluded. The existence of a dominant group in society implies the corresponding existence of a subordinate group with lower social status and fewer privileges. Dominance is a characteristic feature of a dominant group relation with a subordinate group. It is exercised through various means, one of which is structural dominance⁵. This is a situation where dominance is exercised by the dominant group's control of political, social and economic structures. The aim is to frustrate attempts by other groups to develop power resources (Baker, 1978). Through group power contests, one group excludes another from obtaining power and succeeds in keeping it 'in its place'. Baker (1983) identifies some ways in which, through control of economic structures, a dominant group can restrict the resource and mobilisation capacities of a subordinate group. The ways exemplify exclusionary processes that can affect development of subordinate groups. First, the dominant group can deprive the subordinate group of the most important factor of production, namely land. By doing this, the subordinate group is forced to work for the dominant group under the terms set by the latter. Second, the dominant group can restrict the education of the subordinate group, ensuring that it does not acquire skills thus limiting its job opportunities and advancement. Third, the dominant group can keep the labour of the subordinate group unskilled and semi-skilled, thus generating surplus labour. By so doing the dominant group can curtail and control the economic power of the subordinate group.

Social structures can also be harnessed to maintain dominance. One way is through education and socialisation process (Baker, 1983). When education is not available to the subordinate group, their chances of obtaining educational and vocational training necessary to access employment opportunities is restricted. Education can also be used for the purpose of indoctrination, that is, as a means to inculcate within the subordinate group a belief that they are inferior to the dominant group (Baker, 1983). In spite of the above analysis, that seems to treat the 'subordinate group as a pawn that responds or reacts

passively or automatically to the dominant group's actions' (Baker, 1983: 4), it should be noted that the subordinate group may deal with or cope with this dominance. I will discuss this under the 'minority' sub-section below.

3.4 Mechanisms Of Exclusion

The mechanisms of social exclusion are discrimination, prejudice and stereotyping; power and its application, lack of participation, lack of representation, and enforcement of rights. Through these mechanisms, some groups and individuals are kept out of opportunities to which they are entitled, and fail to participate in activities that are essential for their livelihoods. Each of these mechanisms is elaborated on below.

3.4.1 Prejudice And Stereotyping

Figure 3.1 indicates that prejudice and stereotyping are two of the mechanisms of social exclusion. In this section, I will discuss these phenomena and attempt to show how they relate to social exclusion.

Prejudice has been defined by various authors (Zastrow and Kirst-Ashman, 1990; Blumenfield and Raymond, 2000; Popenoe, 1995; Simpson and Yinger, 1985). On the basis of their formulations, I understand prejudice to refer to a range of negative⁶ and generalised tendencies including expressions, beliefs, opinions, feelings, attitudes and values about different worth and abilities held by one group about another, or in-group members about out-group members. For instance, as I noted above, a dominant group may have negative attitudes towards a subordinate group, assigning disparaging traits to it. McAllister and Moore (1991) identify two components of prejudice. One is a 'negative feeling towards a group, which is expressed through hostile and unfriendly attitudes' (McAllister and Moore, 1991:128). Another is 'an incorrect belief or a broad generalisation about a group, causing a prejudiced individual to look upon all members of a group as if they were the same' (McAllister and Moore, 1991:128). A person is said to be prejudiced if he or she believes that all people in a group – say, Africans are inherently violent. This

generalisation is an orientation towards behaving with some hostility towards Africans. Prejudice is closely related to stereotypes because it operates through stereotypical thinking (Giddens, 1993). To this extent, prejudice has been described as 'a judgement of people in a stereotypical way' (Popenoe, 1995:243). Stereotyping is 'a process by which persons are assumed to possess certain traits by virtue of their membership of a particular group' (Berger, R. McBreen, J. and Rifkin, M., 1996:46). Thus stereotypes are generally expressions of prejudice against groups. Whilst they can be positive, they are frequently negative. In stereotyping, individuals or groups are assigned roles that reflect their devalued status. For instance the members of an outgroup may be seen in negative ways like those of a dominant group's perception of a subordinate one as described above. Cashmore, E. Banton, M. Miles, R. Troyna, B. and van den Berge, P. (1984:228) reported on research that found that many white residents of housing estates were prejudiced against Asians, believing them all to be, among other things, unhygienic, crafty and antiwhite. They further reported that the views were not gleaned from valid experience, but from hearsay and secondhand images. This is the nature of stereotyping and prejudice. In this connection Simpson and Yinger (1985) are correct when they state that prejudice is 'categorical thinking that systematically misinterprets the facts' (Simpson and Yinger, 1985:21)

Whilst the above conceptualisation of prejudice and stereotypes is important, what is more important is to show how the two phenomena generate social exclusion. Stereotyping and prejudice, by their role in misinterpreting facts, make it difficult for those who are victimised by these phenomena to be seen (by the prejudiced) as a source of strength and richness in society. The victims therefore carry a despised identity which compromises their chances to participate fully in society. Since stereotyping allows the prejudiced to focus on differences rather than shared humanity, opportunities of looking at society as consisting of members with a diversity of skills, who can complement each other, are lost. Stereotyping and prejudice cause the victimised groups to feel rejected to the extent that their social identities are devalued. This leads to isolation from the mainstream. Prejudice can result in loss of respect for its victims because they are not normally granted the dignity and courtesy accorded to others. Over time this may lead to victimised people beginning to

doubt their self worth, and eventually believing in their own inferiority. Such effects have been reported in respect of blacks staying in ghettos in the United States (Kenneth Clark (1965), cited in Zastrow and Kirst-Ashman, 1990:531). Stereotyping and prejudice make people to stand out or be seen as different. For any child this can be traumatic. Children who encounter prejudice in school through being stereotyped as dirty, backward or primitive, and whose parents may be accused of inability to do anything for themselves, are likely to grow into individuals with impaired self worth and doubt their parents' worth and abilities.

In sum, on the part of its victims, stereotyping and prejudice perpetuate feelings of isolation, being looked down upon, alienation and division, and being cut off from the mainstream society, all of which are characteristic in the experience of social exclusion. People experiencing such negative situations cannot satisfactorily participate in the political, economic and social life of society and are thus, according to one definition of social exclusion in Chapter 2, socially excluded.

3.4.2 Discrimination

As compared to prejudice which defines attitudes, discrimination is actual behaviour towards a particular group (Giddens, 1993). Haralambos and Holborn's (1995) distinction between the two terms is helpful. They associate prejudice with what people think about others, not necessarily translating their thoughts to action. In other words discrimination occurs when some form of prejudice is acted upon. Both terms are based on stereotypes about particular groups of people. Whilst prejudice and discrimination can occur independently (Simpson and Yinger, 1985:23), discriminatory behaviour derives from prejudiced attitudes.

Discrimination is unfair and unequal treatment of people because of a category to which they belong (Popenoe, 1995; Zastrow and Kirst-Ashman, 1990). It can be undertaken on the basis of gender, age, race, ethnicity, religion, social status and so on. In this activity, members of say, a subordinate group with the same qualifications as those of a dominant

group may be denied privileges and rewards that are available to the members of the latter group. Therefore discrimination 'occurs when individuals are unequally rewarded for identical work or services or excluded from access to opportunities for which they are equally qualified' (International Council on Human Rights Policy, 2001:5). A broad definition offered by the United Nations follows. It should be noted that it does not cover distinction based on gender. For my purposes, however, it serves to broaden the above formulations and can be used to judge whether UN member countries are discriminatory or not. Racial discrimination is 'any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life' (UN, 1966: 2).

Discrimination takes many forms. It can be 'attitudinal or institutional' (Yetman and Steele, 1975:361-373). Attitudinal discrimination refers to discriminatory practices attributable to or influenced by prejudice. Institutional discrimination refers to the effects of inequality that are rooted in the system-wide operation of a society, and is not based on prejudice. It has two forms, namely 'cultural and structural discrimination' (Yetman and Steele, 1975:365-371). The latter manifests in ethnocentrism where the dominant group has a differential power to define its cultural attributes, such as values and beliefs, as the standards and criteria for the evaluation of the entire society and to exclude anything that deviates from this interpretation. In this connection, groups that do not conform to the dominant group standards are excluded from participating in the economic and social mainstream of society until they measure up to standards. Structural discrimination exists to preserve a power imbalance between a minority group and a dominant one. On the one hand, the former has unequal status. On the other hand, the latter has disproportionate power. To this extent the dominant group can exclude the weaker group from equal participation in institutions of society.

Discrimination can be *de jure* or *de facto*. The former is legal discrimination. The latter refers to discrimination that actually exists, whether legal or not.

Against the above background, how does discrimination relate to social exclusion? It will be noticed that discrimination makes access to resources, opportunities and so on more difficult for some individuals or groups than others, on the basis of the category to which they belong. Narayan et al (2000a) state that in social exclusion, certain groups are prevented from equal access to resources. Given that discrimination itself results in unequal treatment of people, it can be concluded that discrimination prevents equal access to resources. I therefore agree with the World Bank (2001) conclusion that 'discriminatory practices associated with gender, ethnicity, race, religion or social status result in social, political and economic exclusion of people' (World Bank, 2001:131).

The above quotation suggests that discrimination results in social exclusion and it is consistent with my contention that discrimination is one mechanism engendering social exclusion. For instance Sindzingre (1999) identifies discrimination as a component of the socio-cultural dimension of social exclusion. This discrimination is based on norms and rules and through it people are rejected and pushed to the fringes of society. Being discriminated against makes it difficult to obtain a range of goods and services. In most developing countries, this results in non availability⁷ of economic resources such as capital, credit; assets such as land; services like quality education, employment and satisfactory health care and justice, and so on. It also includes lack of access to political decision-making capability. By definition those discriminated from obtaining the range of goods mentioned above are excluded.

Gender discrimination is one way where women are excluded from political, economic and social spheres of society, and this has been documented in literature, for instance UNDP (1993). Women are subject to discrimination in labour, credit and a variety of markets and they own less property compared to men. The nature of this discrimination can be gauged from the following statistics, taken from UNDP (1993:25). In developing countries, due to tradition and norms which are discriminatory, women have fewer job opportunities. Their employment participation rates are on average 50% of those of men. When they find work, they tend to earn much less. For example the above source mentions that in the Republic of Korea, women earn 47% of men's wages. Women are subordinated in labour markets because their efforts and time are absorbed by unpaid domestic work that limits their

chances for paid labour. Regarding literacy, women are much less likely than men to be literate. For example in South Asia, female literacy rates are only around 50% of those of males. With respect to higher education, in developing countries women lag far behind men. In Sub-Saharan Africa their enrolment rates for tertiary education are only a third of those of men. Opportunities for self employment are restricted because many women are not allowed to own property or to offer it as security for loans. Political representation in national legislatures is also poor. In 1980 women made just over 10% of the world's members of parliament and less than 40% of national cabinets, yet they are about half the world's adult population.

Discrimination in the education sector is one way through which exclusion occurs. Where minority group children attend school with the children of the dominant group, discrimination as a result of action by teachers and fellow students can lead to high drop out rates of the minority group children. Such action has caused Dalit children in India 'to sit at the back of classrooms and face physical and verbal abuse and other degrading treatment from their teachers and classmates, leading to high numbers of Dalit children dropping out of school' (International Council on Human Rights Policy, 2001:11). Similar discriminatory practices involving name-calling have been studied in Southern Africa with respect to minority groups such as Basarwa (Le Roux, 1999). In these examples discrimination meted out on minority group children results in underachieving on the children's part. It undervalues the abilities of the children concerned and affects their self worth, all of which contributes to cutting them off from school and benefits of education. The children's chances of finding work later in life are ruined, leading to higher than average unemployment in the community. Discrimination can restrict such children in adulthood to low paying and low skilled jobs, and make them vulnerable to being locked in poverty traps. Outside the education sector, similar experiences have been documented. On a related matter, Das Gupta (1999) gives an example of the United States where discriminated groups have lost self-esteem and belief in their own abilities. She notes that that similar patterns of low self-esteem and low performance have been reported among ethnic Koreans in Japan, who were strongly discriminated against.

Discrimination has targeted minority and indigenous groups throughout the world, and it has been responsible for the failure of these groups to participate fully in various fields of society, especially where societies operate in favour of dominant groups. In some cases where accusations of discrimination have been raised, authorities have tended to deny that discrimination exists: Silence and denial tend to perpetuate discrimination and protect those who discriminate. Where official policy does not permit statistics disaggregated by gender, ethnicity, age and so on, it is impossible to track discrimination in the economy, in health, education and other areas. Under the cloak of lack of data, discrimination flourishes without fear of it becoming public, with devastating effects for those victimised.

3.4.3 Power And Its Application

Definitions of power are legion (Gaventa, 1980; Baker, 1983; Dye, 1990, Bachrach and Baratz, 1979). There are common characteristics in any definition of power. Some of these include the fact that power is relational (Bachrach and Baratz, 1979). It is a relationship where A has the ability to influence or shape the beliefs or affect the conduct of B in accordance with A's will. For Bachrach and Baratz (1979:24) the existence of a power relationship is founded on three conditions, namely:

- Presence of a conflict between A and B;
- B's compliance with A's wishes;
- B's compliance because of fear of A's deprivation of values that B regards more highly than those that would be achieved if B did not comply.

From the above discussion, it can be deduced that there is an asymmetrical power relation between A and B. This leads me to another characteristic of power, which is its unequal distribution (Dye, 1990). In the above case, A has more power than B. A has sanctions to apply to B, that is rewards for compliance and punishments for disobedience. In light of the above discussion, power has been defined as:

The capacity to affect the conduct of individuals [and groups] through the real or threatened use of rewards and punishments (Dye, 1990:4)

Power can be utilised as an exclusionary device as indicated below. According to Bierstedt (1950), groups or individuals who are better organised and have more resources, have more social power. This power can be utilised to dominate and prevent the less powerful from equal participation in political, social and economic spheres of society, and exclude the less powerful from entry to political process or from debating any issue that is likely to threaten vested interests, or from tilting the balance of power in favour of the less powerful. Social exclusion is therefore a process that operates within the context of power relations. Those who wield power enjoy greater political, social and economic independence, and can influence events to suit their needs. On the other hand, those without power are not able to do this, and will always lose out. They have difficulty in getting themselves heard and recognised as having rights to claim.

The prevention of certain issues from becoming policy issues has been termed *nondecision*, which is a tactic employed by influential groups to thwart the emergence of issues that threaten dominant interests and values (Dye, 1984:326). It has been defined as:

A decision that results in the suppression or thwarting of a latent or manifest challenge to the values and interests of the decision-maker. To be more explicit, non-decision-making is a means by which demands for change in the existing allocation of benefits and privileges in the community can be suffocated before they are even voiced; or kept covert, or killed before they gain access to the relevant decision-making arena, or failing all these things, maimed or destroyed in the decision-implementing stages of the policy process (Bachrach and Baratz, 1979, quoted in Dye, 1984:326-7).

Nondecision making as above shows how some issues come up for debate and not others. Nondecision is an exercise of power and involves the ability to set the political agenda. Those who set the agenda have the most power. I think that through nondecision, power tends to be abused to the extent that those who wield it ensure that only their own interests are served, to the detriment of those who lack power or political voice.

3.4.4 Barriers To Participation

Participation is defined as 'all aspects and forms of taking part in life and society. On this basis, non-participation implies failing to take part, being excluded' (UNDP 1998b:7). As pointed out by Rahnema, to be real, participation should not be manipulative, that is 'where

the participants do not feel they are being forced into doing something, but are actually led to take actions which are inspired or directed by centres outside their control' (Sachs, 1992:116). In this participation, the government creates structures for participation, for example, community institutions, and determines the pace of participation to the extent that the government provides guidelines on how participation will be done. This control of the people usually results in manipulative designs that are not in agreement with what people want. Under this top-down approach, development is done for the people instead of with and by them and they do not feel that they have a stake in what is going on in their areas. It is therefore not possible for people to play a major role in their own development, that is, in identifying their own needs, and formulating and implementing development activities. This development philosophy stifles 'many grass-roots initiatives, holding them in check, rather than nurturing and extending them' (UNDP 1993:84). Mwansa, L. Lucas, T. and Osei-Hwedie, K. (1998) echo a related sentiment, when they point out that 'when policy initiatives are transmitted in a top-down fashion, they quite often take the forms of directives rather than consultations, and this obviously does not allow for people's participation in programme formulation' (Mwanza et al, 1998: 68).

According to Gaventa (1998), lack of participation of this nature can be understood as a form of social exclusion. For participation to be meaningful, there should be consultation between the government and the people. The outcome of this consultation should be such that there is agreement by both parties about what needs to be done to tackle a particular problem. One party should recognise the other's input in the process. As Gaventa (1998) has suggested that in respect of experiences with participation in the United States, 'mandates for participation from "above" must be linked with pre-existing capacities for participation from below' (Gaventa, 1998: 56). Participation should at least be interactive, that is the people should have a voice and influence in group decision (Agarwal, 2001). I wish to add that participation should be all embracing, that is, include all groups in the community. In most cases, the voices of women and minority groups are not captured in consultation exercises which government undertakes with the people.

UNDP's (1998b) position is that participation should not be restricted to merely sharing benefits of development, but should include an active and sustained role in determining how those benefits are generated and distributed. In most cases, those who have more voice tend to get more from available national resources. The kind of participation envisaged by the UNDP is essential because in most cases benefits of development tend to be shared unequally. Goulet (1989) concludes that participation is authentic if the government involves intended beneficiaries in the early stages of all phases of development, that is problem/project formulation, implementation, and evaluation. If involvement is in the later stages, participation has a chance to degenerate into an inauthentic exercise where beneficiaries' interests are not taken into account.

Gaventa (1998) shows that involving people at the grass roots in participatory exercises normally encounters resistance from traditional power holders. Resistance is an inevitable process of the development process. Since such exercises involve empowering people who may have had no stake in power before, it is not surprising that the power shifts that occur from empowering hitherto weak groups should attract opposition from those holding more power. It seems that participatory exercises should involve both groups at the grass roots, including the existing power holders who have to be convinced that wholesale participation will benefit them rather than threatening their positions. Failure to do this can frustrate central government's efforts to involve ordinary people in the development process and may result in their exclusion from influencing the decisions that have a bearing on their interests.

Participation should take place in a number of activities, at various levels, for example, political, economic, community and social levels. Participation should be broad and ensure that people are closely and fully involved in the economic, social, cultural and political processes that affect their lives, and have constant access to decision-making and power. Roy (1997) argues that it is essential that the poor exercise influence over the formulation and execution of poverty reduction policies that can fulfil basic needs, social and political justice. This requires that the poor participate more fully in the economic, social and political institutions of power. Such participation cannot be successful until barriers created

by powerful vested interests, to block the poor's access to political and economic power, are removed.

UNDP (1993:28) identifies four such barriers. These include legal systems which promote the interests of the more influential and non poor; social norms which perpetuate prejudice and discrimination, the maldistribution of assets especially land, and bureaucratic constraints in terms of administrative rules, control and documentation necessary to access government services.

The most challenging question arising from the above is how these barriers can be removed. Certainly they cannot be removed overnight. Only a change in the power equation can improve the chances of the poor to exercise 'influence' as Roy suggests. Changing the equation 'requires the organisation of a countervailing force, or [at worst] a revolution' (UNDP, 1993:29). In cases where those with vested interests are likely to be aligned with those holding positions in government, it is more difficult to remove barriers. In such cases the alternative is to create the capacity to deal with the problems outside the government system. One way is to establish community based organisations and non-governmental organisations that can successfully empower the poor and evolve into forces capable of counterbalancing the vested interests state and dominant groups.

The above discussion identifies several barriers to participation of people, particularly the poor. These barriers play a role in keeping the poor from taking part in life and society. It shows that participatory exercises should meet various conditions in order to be effective. I suggest that the evolutionary process of countering the power of vested interests can be started by creating forces to deal with such interests through empowering communities, by encouraging them to start organisations that deal with their felt needs. The above discussion on participation is biased towards constraints on participation as it operates between governmental institutions and the people at the grass roots. Another angle is to look at constraints on participation at the grass root level itself. I have already indicated that under well-intended bottom-up approaches to participation (that is where the central authorities promote people's participation), people's participation encounters resistance

from traditional power holders. Apart from this, there are other factors which affect participation at the grass root level. These include social norms and social perceptions, which may discourage well intended efforts by the government to improve standards of living at community level (Agarwal, 2001).

3.4.5 Rights And Lack Of Enforcement

Four sets of rights have been identified in literature. Within the Human Rights perspective, rights can be categorised into social, economic, political and civil rights (UNDP, 2000a, and Giddens, 1993). Civil rights include the right to liberty, equality in practising one's own religion, freedom from torture and not being detained without a fair trial. Social rights are those necessary for an adequate standard of living. They include rights to shelter, food, health, education, and freedom to participate in society without discrimination. Economic rights include right to property, right to work, and to social security. Political rights cover rights to vote, to join political bodies, to say what one believes, have access to information, and attend meetings and gatherings. People denied the above rights will be unlikely to be able to provide for themselves, thus increasing poverty and expanding the need for welfare and safety nets. Therefore poverty is the result of a violation of human rights.

Most countries have conferred rights on people but the major difficulty has been failure to actualise the claims on the rights. The other constraint is the general absence of public statistics for creating a culture of accountability and for realising human rights (UNDP, 2000c). There is also insufficient international action, especially to support disadvantaged people and countries to offset growing global inequities and marginalization. Some countries have neither signed nor ratified major international human rights instruments. For example within the SADC region, Swaziland and Botswana have neither signed nor ratified instruments such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the Convention Against Torture, and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (UNDP, 2000c). Consequently these instruments are not legally binding in Swaziland and

Botswana, and citizens of these countries are legally excluded from seeking legal redress for abuses related to these pieces of international legislation.

Failure to claim rights can be seen as proof of social exclusion. The general ignorance of the rights by people, particularly the illiterate lot, and the difficulties faced in ensuring their enforcement, have made it easy for most states to fail to uphold rights. The right to justice cannot be guaranteed where, due to poverty, few or no people bring cases of infringement in rights to court due to illiteracy, and transportation costs involved in bringing up cases. Illiterate people denied these rights are more likely to face political exclusion than educated people who are conscious of rights and enjoy greater access to institutions designed to enforce these rights (Bhalla and Lapeyre, 1999). An analyst on minority rights has noted that 'states cannot be forced by either their citizens or the International Court of Justice ... to follow prescriptions on human rights and fundamental freedoms contained in their constitutions; *even when they are signatories of the Declaration of Human Rights*. Rights remain paper rights unless they are enforced by higher authority' (Breytenbach, 1977:151, italics mine).

There are several difficulties related to enforcement of international legislation. One authority notes that the UN rights-based legislations 'do not have the force of law and the obligations which they contain are in reality, little more than recommendations or appeals for action by member states' (Horner, 1993: 56). The same source observes that despite the development of rules regarding human rights and rights of people to determine their own future, 'the more long standing principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity still tend to be given precedence in practice' (Horner, 1993: 57). In other words, governments are reluctant to become involved in events taking place entirely within the borders of another state under the guise of interfering in the internal affairs of another sovereign country. Horner argues that without the rationale of inhibiting interference, the strong nations could impose their will on the weak. The general failure to interfere implies that rules promoting human rights are not enforced. When people's rights are abused they then find it difficult to obtain international support for redress.

While countries have subscribed to international conventions 'evidence suggests that many fall short when it comes to implementation. The various human rights instruments are full of grand ideals, but they are ideals many ordinary people would have difficulty identifying in the behaviour of their governments' (Homer, 1993: 57). The absence of mechanisms for ensuring implementation of international instruments worsens the situation, making it difficult for people to seek judicial redress.

3.5 Objects Of Exclusion

3.5.1 Minority

Since my study targets a minority group in Botswana, it is necessary to be clear what a minority is. Several definitions have been suggested in literature (Yetman and Steele, 1975; Simpson and Yinger, 1985; and Chaliand, 1989). Common elements in these conceptualisations can be summarised as follows.

- Cultural and physical distinctiveness and self-consciousness of a social group that faces subjection to political, economic and social discrimination by a dominant part of the political society, and relegation to low positions in the social structure. Occupation of a subordinate position in terms of prestige, privilege and power, whether it has numerical majority or not (Yetman and Steele, 1975). According to the Report of the World Commission on Culture and Development, the term 'minorities' designates marginalized or vulnerable groups who live in the shadow of majority populations with a different and dominant cultural ideology. They find it difficult to participate fully in the societies that favour dominant groups (http://kvc.minbuza.nl/boekteksten/chapter2_2.html). On the one hand, this discrimination may be embedded in the legal framework. On the other hand, discrimination may not be legally allowed but is practised nonetheless. In these two cases, there is denial of the minorities to equal access to education, employment and political representation.

The above disadvantage renders a minority group generally unable to participate in numerous aspects of social life, equating it with a subordinate group.

On the basis of the above summary, I adopt Louis Wirth's definition because it captures the realities of a minority group, especially the Basarwa⁸ minority group, who are the subject of this thesis. He defines minority as:

A group of people who, because of their physical and cultural characteristics, are singled out from others in the society in which they live for differential and unequal treatment ... The existence of a minority implies the existence of a corresponding dominant group with higher social status and greater privileges. Minority status carries with it the *exclusion* from full participation in the life of the society (quoted in Simpson and Yinger, 1985:9, italics mine)

On the basis of the above definition, physical and cultural characteristics may include distinctive appearance, a different culture and language, all of which set the group apart from the majority of the population. This has relevance in Botswana where the minority group tends to be one that has a different language from the official one, which is also the language of the majority group. This difference may be used as the basis of prejudice with which the majority (or dominant) group regards the minority. The above definition tallies with Rose's (1968) formulation that a minority's position 'involves exclusion or assignment to a lower status in one or more of four areas of life: the economic, the political, the legal and social-associational' (Rose, 1968:370).

According to this source, a minority is normally assigned to lower-ranking positions or to lower-compensated positions within each occupation. The minority is prevented from exercising the full political privileges held by majority citizens, or not given equal status with the majority in the application of law or justice or completely excluded from both formal and informal associations found among the majority. The exclusion mentioned above can either be facilitated by *de jure* or *de facto* discrimination. Apartheid South Africa, and the United States during the era of the Jim Crow Laws (Longres, 1990) are examples where exclusion of the black majority in South Africa and blacks in America was enforced more or less along the lines described above.

Missing in the above definition is the prejudice with which the dominant group regards the minority. Rose (1968) identifies three types⁹ of prejudice but I will select only the one relevant to the minority groups covered in this thesis. This is an attitude in which power is the main element. In this situation, 'the dominant group wishes to exploit the minority for economic, political or for sexual purposes, or for prestige' (Rose, 1968: 368).

One problem with Wirth's definition is that it neglects the role of agency. In other words, it gives a static picture of the dominant-subordinate group relationship. It appears as if the subordinate group does nothing in response to this relationship. Baker (1983:29) citing Blalock (1967) identifies two 'power resources' available to subordinate groups. These are pressure and competitive resources. The former relate to the group's ability to indulge in strikes, boycotts, violence and warfare. The latter include the group's special skills.

Blalock (1982:105-6) identifies four alternatives that characterise minority reactions to dominant group power. First, the minority may try to disappear as a distinct group, assuming that the minority status can lose its conspicuousness or relevance to members of the dominant group. Second, the minority group may attempt to isolate itself from most contacts with the majority. An example of such a minority group are the Bazezuru group in Botswana, who have stayed aloof of the mainstream community on religious grounds. Third, in cases where there are several minorities, one may try to find a coalition partner or partners, thereby pooling resources to gain power in relation to the majority. Such a strategy is exemplified by the coming together of the blacks in South Africa in coalition with sections of Indians, White and Coloureds to gain power from the dominant white group during the fight against apartheid. Finally, the minority may, with the help of others, engage in a power struggle with the dominant group. An example of this is the coalition of Shona and Ndebele groups to wage guerilla warfare to overthrow white rule in former Rhodesia. Through employing the above strategies, some minorities have generally escaped domination, and developed a hierarchy among themselves. The degree of difference in culture and language has determined the capacity to escape. Minorities with similar cultures to the dominant group have been relatively stronger and successful in extracting concessions from the dominant group. Thus in Botswana, minority groups like

the Bakgalagadi whose culture is similar to that of the dominant Tswana, have been more involved in political decision making than the Basarwa, whose culture is different and devalued nationally.

3.5.2 Indigenous Group

There is an overlap between an indigenous group and minority in that both face similar problems. Both share the claim to assert their own identity. Indigenous peoples suffer various types of marginalisation and are often victims of racial prejudice and land seizures. Generally they are more likely to be marginalised and to live in poverty as their traditional cultures are progressively eroded (Gregoire, 1999).

According to Schulte-Tenckhoff (1999), there is a difference between an indigenous group and a minority group. The core aspect of the indigenous issue is a people's historical relationship with the land which is one specific to indigenous peoples. 'For them, the land is more than just a productive resource or an economic factor: it is their habitat, their territory, the basis of their socio-political organisation and cultural identification. It is the key element in cultural reproduction of the group, an essential condition for its survival' Survival International (1999: 58). Consequently their claims are very different from those made by minorities.

The term 'indigenous' includes ethnic groups that live throughout the world in a multitude of cultural experiences and patterns of living. This makes it difficult to reach an unambiguous definition for the concept, but there is a claim that:

Over the last decade or so a certain consensus regarding the criteria to be used as the basis for a definition of indigenous populations or peoples has ... emerged.

The most common criteria are:

- Pre-existence, - the people in question are descendants of those inhabiting an area prior to the arrival of another people;
- Non-dominance, - the people in question are a numerical minority and do not control the national government and;
- Cultural difference, - the people in question identify themselves as indigenous, and see themselves (or are seen) as different from the incoming people. Usually they are also identified with a

traditional adaptation that use natural resources and territories in a way that differs from the economic adaptation of the majority (Saugestad, 1993:6).

On the basis of the above criteria, Basarwa are an indigenous group in as far as first arrival, cultural difference and non-dominance are concerned. They share similar characteristics and experiences to those of indigenous groups worldwide. These criteria are in line with the International Working Group for Indigenous Affairs' criteria of indigenous people of 'having been deprived of their rights and possibilities to control their own affairs, territory, wealth and prospects for development, and of being marginalized and excluded from political decision-making processes' (quoted in Hitchcock, R. Vinding, D. and Andresen, K., 2000b: 33). The criterion of 'pre-existence' is synonymous to 'first people' or 'original people'. In this connection, it has been claimed that 'Basarwa are the original inhabitants of the Southern African region. Their existence in this region dates back at least 20000 years, until they were conquered and subjugated by Bantu tribes in the 19th century' (Milella, 1999: 3). Hitchcock et al, (2000b: 34) cautions that it is difficult, if not impossible, to prove who were the original inhabitants of the region, and without detailed oral history, ethno-historic, archaeological and ethnographic data, any decisions about indigenesness in the region are challengeable.

From other literature on indigenous groups, it is certain that consensus on the definition of this group does not include most governments, at least in Africa and Asia. According to Gregoire (1999) 'there have been seemingly endless attempts to define what "indigenous" means, because the three main criteria generally assumed to confer indigenous status – antecedence, non-dominance, and a claim to separate identity – can all be interpreted in various ways' (Gregoire, 1999:33). The principle of having a separate identity has international acceptance and is claimed by most indigenous peoples themselves. The recognition of such people by their respective states however, is more problematic. Rouland (1999) summarises the African and Asian States' position as follows. Most African states claim that they do not have indigenous peoples or that their entire population is indigenous¹⁰. In Asia the term indigenous is also rejected, since it is viewed as a potential threat to the state's integrity, because it

implies the possibility of a right to self-determination for the group involved. Acknowledging a group's right to self-determination is considered as tantamount to offering it independence.

The issue of 'indigenoussness' has been difficult to handle in all countries. Saugestad (1998c) suggests the following reasons for this situation. The concept of indigenoussness advocates a 'procedure for singling one group out for special treatment and/or affirmation action [and this] disrupts standard administrative routines for equal treatment, and goes against administrative preferences for clear-cut and unambiguous target groups' (Saugestad, 1998c: 297). She argues that no party in power likes the concept, since it calls for delegation of power. This may involve allowing some groups within a nation-state to have their own legislature, develop their language, cultural traditions and social customs. According to Bientie (1999), Norway is an example of a developed country that made such concessions by offering official status of Indigenous Peoples to the Saami people in 1990, when it ratified the ILO Convention Number 169. Through an Act of the Norwegian Parliament, the Saami have their separate Parliament, which works on an advisory basis. Other concessions to this group include the right to education and classes in the Saami language, a Saami college and the possibility of studying the Saami language and cultural heritage at tertiary level. The national radio and television in Norway has a separate Saami division.

Breakthroughs like the one above took place after a civil conflict lasting over a long period of time¹¹, and require capacity from representative indigenous organisations to negotiate with governments on a sustained basis. Saugestad (1998c) concludes that:

A gradual recognition of special problems and therefore special needs has only come about reluctantly, after indigenous people have mobilised. Few changes have been initiated by governments in power. Changes have come about *as reactions to pressure* from organisations, and from political movements (Saugestad, 1998c: 297). (italics in original).

According to the Government of Botswana, the term 'indigenous' applies to all Batswana and is not restricted to Basarwa. At the official opening of the Regional Conference on Development Programmes for Africa's San/Basarwa Populations in

Gaborone in 1993, the Minister of Local Government, Lands and Housing (MLGLH) said, inter alia:

Botswana supports the principles of the United Nations International Year of the Indigenous People in so far as they relate to the marginalized and disadvantaged sections of the population ... By our definition, these include Basarwa and other groups of ethnic standing. We have pointed out that in our context, all Batswana are indigenous to the country, except those who have acquired citizenship through naturalisation. The fact that Basarwa are believed to be among the first inhabitants of this country does not, in our view, make them more indigenous than other ethnic groups in the country (MLGLH, 1993:29).

The above position does not recognise that like indigenous peoples all over the world, Basarwa have become victims to a development that gradually has expanded into their traditional territories, leaving them socially and economically marginalized as labourers and squatters (Saugestad, 2000). This marginalization calls for affirmative action programmes. Yet the Government of Botswana has resisted affirmative action fearing local accusations of special treatment on basis of ethnicity¹². According to Saugestad (2000), the other reasons why the Government of Botswana does not recognise the term are the following:

- The official attitude in Botswana has been that indigenous rights is a foreign concept, imposed from outside.... Partly the attitude has been that the concept is not relevant in Botswana because the Basarwa are treated "like any other Batswana" as the saying goes, and hence there is no need for special measures;
- Arguments for special measures or affirmative action have been labelled as divisive, stirring up trouble and inciting local people to protest (Saugestad, 2000: 3).

To the extent that Botswana takes the position that all residents are indigenous, it has not ratified the ILO Convention 169, in which indigenous groups are defined¹³. Without the special treatment that the Convention requires Government to provide for their disadvantaged groups, people like Basarwa are vulnerable, because they have been excluded from the political, social and economic development provisions of the Convention. They are hence the focus of this investigation. As I will show in subsequent chapters, they have both the characteristics of a minority and an indigenous group.

3.6 Manifestations Of Exclusion

3.6.1 Disadvantage

As I suggested in Figure 3.1, one of the manifestations of social exclusion is disadvantage. What is it? A disadvantage is 'a condition of deprivation from needed material resources, emotional and social development, or opportunities to acquire them' (Barker, 1999:31). A disadvantaged position accompanies poor command over resources due to, for example, maldistribution of power. Sociologically, minority groups have been viewed as disadvantaged compared to the majority or dominant population. They have been subject to prejudice and discrimination, physically and socially isolated. Through deprivation a group or individuals tend to stagnate relative to the main body of society, mainly in terms of income, education and employment. Exclusion from political and economic structures can result in a disadvantaged situation.

3.6.2 Powerlessness

Lack of power can be viewed as powerlessness. Powerlessness is the inability to unleash one's creative and productive energy to achieve sustainable growth and continuous improvement in one's standard of living. Chambers's (1995 : 21) analysis of the concept in question in relation to the poor is useful for this discussion. He identifies four consequences of powerlessness. First, powerlessness makes it difficult for the poor to organise and bargain because they are not united. Second, it results in the lack of influence on the part of the poor because they are physically weak and economically vulnerable. Third, being powerless is to be subject to the power of others. This increases the chances of being easily ignored and exploited. Fourth, from the perspective of the powerful, powerlessness is the least acceptable point of intervention to improve the situation of the poor.

Powerlessness entails a belief that one cannot change one's condition for the better. A feeling of helplessness increases this belief. There is a strong sense that no matter how one

struggles to deal with a difficulty, nothing is going to work out. This sense is associated with a lack of hope that one's life will improve in the future. The group feels it has no control over its life and no power to influence the political and economic structures around it. In situations where unequal power relationships are dominant, the powerless are prevented from promoting their interests. Being weak and poor, they are prevented from access to resources and fail to seek legal redress for abuses. 'Consequently they develop a culture of silence, which may preclude the development of consciousness among them, thus leading to the dominant order an air of legitimacy' (Gaventa, 1980:18). Below is a summary that captures the phenomenon in question.

The sense of powerlessness is a construction of continuous interaction between the person and his environment. It combines an attitude of self-blame, a sense of generalised distrust, a feeling of alienation from resources for social influence and a sense of hopelessness in socio-political struggles' (Magojo, 1996:38).

3.6.3 Poverty

From the outset it is important to note that poverty has been conceptualised in different ways, and as yet there is no consensus about its definition. As a word, poverty has been used so extensively that it has concluded that 'it has not one meaning but a series of meanings linked through nothing more than a series of resemblances' (Spicker, 1999:150).

Izubara and Ukwayi (2002) observe that poverty itself lacks a universally acceptable conceptualisation. They argue that the inability to define it with precision 'has been located in the fact that poverty is an expression of objective life conditions, a state of mind, and perpetual evaluation of self and others in a complex web of social interaction' (Izubara and Ukwayi, 2002:82). May (2001) concludes that despite common elements among national studies in the conceptualisation and measurement of poverty, no consensus has emerged.

Against the above background a review of various poverty concepts follows. Much of the writing and research done on poverty focuses on defining it in terms of 'inadequacies', 'denials', 'lacks' or 'inabilities'. Thus it is typical to hear that the people are poor because

they lack, are denied or are unable to have adequate physical, natural, financial or social assets to attain basic necessities. It is against this background that I will review some definitions of poverty.

3.6.3.1 Income-based Definition Of Poverty

From this definition, many countries define poverty using a fixed level of household income below which the household is considered poor (Klasen, 1997a). To this extent, most countries have adopted a poverty line, which represents an income below which a person is held to be in extreme poverty. Those who are poor are those persons and households whose income falls below the poverty line (Allen and Thomas, 2000). The traditional view of poverty that corresponds to this line of reasoning is that of the World Bank which has defined poverty as ‘the inability to attain a minimal standard of living’ (World Bank, 1990b: 26).

The above formulation where poverty is defined in terms of inadequacy of income has advantages and disadvantages. Regarding the merits, if lack of income is used as a measure of poverty¹⁴, it is possible to make comparisons among persons, countries and places in a testable way since data is often available, and evaluation of poverty reduction policies can be undertaken. The demerits have also to be borne in mind. White, H. Killick, T. Mugerwa-Kayizzi, S. and Savane, M. (2000) caution that comparability across countries cannot be ensured and that it is difficult to establish an objectively robust definition of a poverty line. If a broader view of poverty were considered, income would take only part of the definition of poverty. Citing the UNDP Human Development Report (1996), Klasen (1997a) summarises the defects of focusing on income as follows:

Since the methods are focused on income, they omit other important characteristics of human well being, such as health, education, mobility, and the like, that are not necessarily correlated with income. Moreover, income only constitutes an important input to well being, but it does not measure the level of well being itself (Klasen, 1997a: 53).

Whilst groups that are poorer in terms of income and consumption tend to be poor in other respects, it is important to recognise that poverty is not only a question of being deprived of

income but of other things also. For example people may be deprived of opportunities such as access to markets and jobs, education and information necessary to upgrade their lives. Poverty is much more than inadequate income or consumption but must also include the inability to secure and sustainable livelihoods (Lipton, M. Maxwell, S. Edstrom, J. and Hatashima, H., 1992). For instance a central theme that emerged from the Poverty Hearing in South Africa in 1998 was that ‘poverty is not only about lack of money, but more centrally about a dearth of opportunities and choices which allow people to build decent lives for themselves’ (Commission on Gender Equity, South African Human Rights Commission and South Africa NGO Coalition, 1998: 1).

3.6.3.2 Non-material Aspects Of Poverty

The deficiencies of the income-based definition have resulted in broadening of the definition of poverty to include non-material aspects. The UNDP in its Human Development Reports from 1990 to date has championed the Human Development perspective. It sees poverty as denial ‘of opportunities and choices most basic to human development – to lead a long, healthy, creative life and to enjoy a decent standard of living, freedom, dignity, self respect and respect of others’ (UNDP 1997: 15).

In order to improve the understanding of poverty a need has arisen to incorporate the formulations of the poor themselves. This need arises from the view that ‘poverty is not an issue to be defined by words, measured by pitiless scientific tools that aim at universality or depicted by lifeless statistical values and notations. Poverty can only be understood and *appreciated and felt*’ (Ekong, 1991, cited in Izubara and Ukwai (2002: 82), italics mine). The World Bank and individual researchers have pursued this strategy through what has come to be called Participatory Poverty Assessments (PPAs).

PPAs have been applauded for being quick and cost effective data gathering exercises on the poor’s livelihoods and strategies, an avenue for the poor to be heard, and a chance to allow the government and other parties to share in a common understanding of poverty and collaborate on its nature and ways to deal with it (Lipton et al, 1992). The Poverty Hearings

referred to above are an example of a PPA. In the PPAs the poor people report their condition in terms of both material and non-material factors (White et al, 2000; World Bank, 2001). They affirm the many dimensions of poverty. Poverty is seen as material deprivation in terms of inadequacy relative to money, employment, food, clothing, housing and insufficient access to health services and clean water. In terms of non-material factors, a series of 'ill-being' situations are mentioned. On the basis of the 'voices of the poor' World Bank (2001), these include, for example, 'a sense of voicelessness and powerlessness in institutions of state and society, low self-esteem and insecurity' (World Bank, 2001: 34).

Citing Narayan et al (2000b), IFAD (2001) notes that poverty has physical and psychological dimensions. IFAD points out that poor people are reported to strongly emphasise the following in their experiences of poverty: 'violence and crime, discrimination, insecurity and political repression, biased or brutal policing and victimisation by rude, neglectful or corrupt public agencies' (IFAD, 2001:19). Earlier work on research similar to that undertaken by Narayan and others is that of Chambers (1995). As one of the forerunners to PPA work, Chambers (1995) has documented much about poor people's experience of poverty. He has identified eight conditions of deprivation. These include:

Poverty proper or lack of physical necessities, assets and income; social inferiority in the social sense; physical weakness due to being malnourished, sick or disabled; physical isolation – being marginally located, lack of access to extension, markets and information; vulnerability to any kind of emergency, contingency and risk of becoming even poorer; seasonality or coinciding of several factors in a single season, which affect the security of the household; powerlessness and humiliation (Chambers, 1995 :19-21).

One of the above factors, the relationship between vulnerability and poverty needs expansion. Vulnerability reflects the notion that poverty is dynamic, to the extent that whilst some individuals may face chronic poverty, others move in and out of poverty (May, 1998a). Vulnerability is an individual's current risk of being poor, or falling into poverty in the future. It entails the probability of exposure to risks such as war, drought, sickness of the breadwinner. While vulnerability affects everybody in society, the poor are more vulnerable since they have less capacity to withstand misfortune because they have fewer

assets. This vulnerability exposes them to insecurity and associated poverty. Not only do the poor lack assets but also they are unable to devise effective ways of coping with the risks mentioned above.

3.6.3.3 Operational Definition Of Poverty

Given the above review of selected concepts related to poverty, it is now possible to devise a definition of poverty to use in this piece of research. From the above review, one thing clear is that the concept of poverty is multifaceted. Starting from seeing poverty in material terms, that is, in terms of only lack of income, the formulation has broadened to include non-material issues. For this study I understand poverty as the inability of individuals or groups to meet material and non-material basic needs, due to inadequate access to resources and opportunities, because of political, social, cultural and economic barriers. I note that this inability is not static, since it is possible for people to move in and out of poverty.

3.6.4 Persistence Of Poverty

What then is persistence of poverty? May, J. Attwood, H. Ewang, P. Lund, F. Norton, A. and Wentzal, W. (1998b : 3) have identified three basic concepts which are useful in understanding the persistence of poverty. These are sufficiency, access and security. From this background, persistence of poverty can be viewed as follows:

- Not having sufficient food, income and essential services as well as non-material needs;
- Inability to acquire sufficient food, income and so on;
- Insecure and unsustainable access to essential commodities, services and other conditions for an acceptable life (May et al, 1998b:3).

Persistence of poverty is a sustained inability to meet needs basic to an adequate standard of living. It means long spells of poverty among groups and individuals due to unchanging circumstances that tend to last for a long time. If people continue being trapped in the

poverty types discussed above, this can be viewed as persistence of poverty. In developing countries these circumstances arise from deep-seated structural reasons. Examples are inequalities in society in the distribution of power, wealth and other resources that in effect force some groups to remain poor (Popenoe, 1995). Systems of governance, which fail to eradicate poverty, and the powerlessness of the poor themselves, are other contributory factors to persistence of poverty. Persistence of poverty is also caused by poverty traps, which 'are mechanisms by which once people become poor, they cannot escape it' (White et al, 2000: xiv). Limited endowments of the poor to land and education tend to perpetuate poverty. Another explanation for persistence of poverty is highly concentrated distribution of income.

3.7 Operational Definition Of Social Exclusion

On the basis of Chapter 2 and section 3.2, I understand social exclusion as a multidimensional concept. It is a process through which certain individuals or groups are barred from identical and satisfactory access to opportunities, assets, resources, services, rights available in the political, social and economic fields of society. The multidimensional nature enables us to understand the processes, mechanisms and institutions that generate the persistence of poverty in certain groups of people and make it difficult for them to fully participate in society. Figueroa et al (1996) concentrated on three dimensions¹⁵ of exclusion.

I wish to expand on this work by adding two others to emphasise the multidimensionality of social exclusion. The previous work of Figueroa et al provides a background and building blocks for additional work I envisage in my thesis. A study of the various dimensions affords one an opportunity to appreciate that not only one but also several factors are responsible for the persistence of poverty. It is through the interaction of the dimensions that the effect on poverty can be better understood. The importance I attach to dimensions is due to the fact that people can be excluded from various angles. There can be cases where exclusion arises from one dimension and not the other. Yet there are cases where groups face exclusion from different angles at the same time. Although there are

numerous dimensions of social exclusion, I have restricted them to five, namely political, economic, social, including cultural, spatial and legal dimensions.

3.8 Dimensions Of Social Exclusion

Below I describe each dimension. Where there is inequality of opportunities, social exclusion is bound to occur. Since inequalities in many of these dimensions occur internationally, no country is immune to exclusion in one form or the other.

3.8.1 Political Dimension

One way to analyse this dimension is to investigate the seeming inability of governments to adopt policies that reduce social exclusion. I think UNDP (2002b) gives one of the reasons. This organisation observes:

Much is known about how to promote equitable development that benefits poor people, widening access to credit, reforming land ownership, investing in basic social services for all, promoting the informal sector, following sound macroeconomic policies. But too often such policies are not adopted because of systematic biases that protect the interests of the elites (UNDP, 2002b: 59).

What the above quotation suggests is that programmes to reduce social exclusion are frustrated by the non-poor and powerful. This group is opposed to such programmes because of their potential to change the status quo and shift the power balance in favour of the excluded. Gaventa (1998) describes two programmes in the United States in the 1960s and 1990s, which were intended to reduce poverty. These programmes involved increased participation of the poor, but they encountered some resistance from traditional power holders. I think this resistance to change on the part of vested interests is a source of political exclusion.

Political exclusion arises from lack of accountability (UNDP, 2002b: 65). Lack of accountability involves the failure to exercise the democratic right of holding one's rulers to account, to demand answers to questions about decisions and actions, to sanction public officers or bodies who do not live up to their responsibilities.

UNDP (2002b) observes:

Even where arrangements for accountability exist, they do not function well in many democracies. They do not promote the interests of most people. And they do an even poorer job of protecting the interests of minorities, women and poor people. There are two main reasons [namely]: democratic institutions are subverted by corruption and elite capture. Democratic institutions have inadequate reach, and there are gaps in democratic practice (UNDP, 2002b: 65).

Political exclusion entails governmental refusal to meet the political demands of some population groups by denial of access to positions of political power and influence, where it is possible to influence national policy decisions to a group's interests. Sindzingre (1999) summarises the issues related to this dimension as follows:

In developing countries, many individuals are excluded de facto from formal institutions because of difficult access or barriers deliberately raised by officials [or even through disregard]... These individuals are first excluded from political institutions. Even when displaying a formal democracy, certain States are dominated by the political machinery of patronage which excludes certain groups from decision making at all levels, whether it is local, regional or national (Sindzingre, 1999:6).

Related to this is the fact that democratic structures in most countries do not cater for the needs of the excluded, like minority groups. While some countries have structures that provide for universal suffrage, minority communities do not have a level playing field for political participation. The democratic structures are not deep enough to be inclusive of all population groups. Those groups who are culturally different from the mainstream tend to fare badly in representation in political institutions.

Exclusion is conditioned by whether the state has sufficient resources to enforce constitutional rights conferred on citizens or whether it can grant basic rights *equally* to citizens. If there is a denial of human and political rights to certain groups of population, due to a gap between rights and their enforcement, we can certainly refer to such a phenomenon as political exclusion, particularly if such groups are not represented at decision-making at any level (Bhalla and Lapeyre, 1999). Such groups include some minorities who have tended to be placed in the lowest rung of the political, social and economic hierarchy, making it difficult for them to participate in decision-making.

This dimension can be understood from the notion of the instrumentalist perspective of the state. Under this approach the state is a tool of the dominant class in society. The state ensures that the interests of that class are maintained and extended (Gilbert and Ward, 1985). Under such a state it may not be possible to undertake measures to achieve parity between the dominant and a disadvantaged minority (Meerman, 2001). These measures might include affirmative actions.

The first is legal equality, where equality before the law is guaranteed and upheld, and discrimination against any citizen on any grounds is stamped out. The second action entails electoral empowerment, including reserving a percentage of seats for a particular minority group. The third aspect relates to a reservation policy permitting discrimination in favour of groups not adequately represented under the state, to obtain employment in the public sector. Current practice in most states negates against these affirmative measures. Social policies towards minority groups in Southern Africa are determined to a large extent by legal and ideological premises relating to equal treatment of citizens. Thus countries in the Southern African region have run into a situation, evident in many other democratic countries with minority population groups, where it is very difficult to win recognition for the fact that such groups, when disadvantaged, need extra, positive differential treatment, in order to achieve equal status (Granberg and Parkinson, 1988).

Failure to offer preferential treatment is reflected in standardisation in policy design, where development policies and programmes are homogeneous. The policies do not reflect differences in the countries' diverse cultures. Rather the bias is towards dominant group culture, values and interests. The peculiarities of disadvantaged minority groups, such as moving more slowly out of poverty than the majority, are not taken into account by such policies.

Of relevance to the political dimension is Young's (2000) distinction between 'external and internal exclusion' (Young, 2000 : 55). The former is a situation where people are kept outside the process of the political discussion and decision-making. It manifests itself in keeping groups or people out of fora of debate or processes of decision-making, thus

allowing some groups to dominate the public policy process. In most cases those who set the agenda or issues for discussion and resolution are the dominant groups, who give prominence to their interests. A related tactic may be used to dominate the policy arena. One mechanism through which this dimension works is the use of administrative machinery to prevent those issues that will result in a change in the status quo. For instance if the dominant elites fear that implementation of particular programmes will not serve their interests, they are likely to suppress them from entering the formulation stage. As I indicated in section 3.4.3, this is non-decision.

Internal exclusion relates to ways in which people lack effective opportunities to influence the thinking of others even when they have access to fora and procedures for decision-making. Even if people are included in fora of debate, they find that their views or contributions are not taken seriously. To this extent such people are denied the opportunity to influence the thinking of others and as such their interests are not represented. The victims of both forms of exclusion tend to be those without political voice, that is those who lack representation in all levels of decision-making.

3.8.2 Economic Dimension

This form of exclusion is most widespread and the centre of exclusion in the developing countries (Singer, 1997; Bhalla and Lapeyre, 1997), where poverty afflicts masses due to limited or absence of material and non-material resources. Economic exclusion has been defined as exclusion from access to a variety of resources, productive assets, especially land, labour and capital, and exclusion from labour and credit markets, all of which can result in poverty traps (Sindzingre, 1999). It has been argued that people are excluded from 'income and livelihood, from employment, and the labour market and from satisfaction of such basic needs as housing/shelter, health and education' (Bhalla and Lapeyre, 1997:418). Under this dimension exclusion from the above assets and other resources such as technology, extension, public services, information and skills, can contribute towards failure to obtain a range of goods and services. It is asserted that economic exclusion is a direct producer of poverty (Bessis, 1995). According to Bessis, the excluded are in the first

place, the unemployed who find themselves completely eliminated from the labour market and thus deprived of regular income. In Europe, the unemployed are totally excluded because they cannot participate in community life. Unemployment means being cut off from 'the primary space for interacting with others and for establishing an identity' (UNDP 1997:78). According to Figueroa et al (1996) in Peru 'workers excluded from the labour market do not become fully excluded, ... because of the existence of traditional social networks' (Figueroa et al, 1996: 78). I am not certain that this Peruvian situation can be compared with a developing country like Botswana, because traditional informal networks, which used to work well during the pre-colonial period, have suffered a great deal of strain ever since the colonial period (1885 – 1966) (Mwansa et al, 1998). According to Selolwane, O. Obuseng, S. Mokgathe, L. Bolaane, M. Nthomang, K. and Ketsitlile, P. (1997), the increasing selfishness and the breakdown of traditional systems of social welfare is lamented. 'No one wants to help a neighbour anymore, unless they are paid for the service' (Selolwane et al, 1997: 21). Another category of Bessis's excluded are those people, who being outside the sphere of salaried employment, are deprived of access to assets such as property and credit.

In developing countries, employment opportunities are in short supply in the formal *and* informal sectors for the majority of the people. Many of those who work in the informal sector are not protected by any social benefits, nor by labour legislation. Due to this workers have perpetual low-paying jobs, and are always at the mercy of employers who systematically exploit them. The lack of employment can deny an individual or group access to the income, dignity and social status normally associated with a meaningful job, and other social nets; assuming that one does not have access to other sources of income, which is usual in situations of extreme poverty in developing nations.

Economic exclusion is not only restricted to the labour market, but also to the financial market. It is here that most poor people suffer exclusion from credit. As the UNDP (1993) has noted, 'markets, in theory open to everyone, in practice exclude those whose poverty renders them uncreditworthy' (UNDP, 1993: 25).

3.8.3 Socio-Cultural Dimension

For this dimension I wish to distinguish between the social and cultural aspects. I will start with the former followed by the latter.

People affected by this dimension encounter social illbeing which Narayan et al (2000b) describe as the 'experience and feeling of being isolated, left out, looked down upon, alienated, pushed aside and ignored by the mainstream cultural and political processes' Narayan et al (2000b:133).

One aspect under this dimension relates to perceptions, particularly as they manifest in public negative attitudes towards particular groups. Attitudes of ethnic majority populations towards other communities are potentially important determinants of social exclusion and welfare of ethnic minorities. The way in which other citizens perceive people will influence the way in which they treat others and the quality of the others' life conditions. In a stratified system which is typical of most middle income countries, some people are considered more important than others, thus laying a foundation for discrimination. Discriminatory practices are embedded in social relationships and result in some groups getting unequal access to services in various sectors. For example, minority groups have barriers to equal access to services like education, health, judicial and police services. Further social groups tend to maintain boundaries between each other and avoid intermarriages.

Where there is a tendency to devalue and disparage certain categories of people, for instance, because of their differences in culture and language, their knowledge and skills will be considered as useless, and they will be held in disdain. Woodburn (1997) has found that former hunter-gatherer communities¹⁶ are subjected to negative stereotyping, denial of rights and segregation by their dominant neighbours, and that their culture is stigmatised. About stereotyping he says such communities are described by neighbouring agriculturalists as 'dirty, ignorant, primitive, backward...' (Woodburn, 1997:349). These negative attitudes result in self-depreciation of victims, which has been described as a

'characteristic of the [subordinated] which derives from their internalisation of the opinion the dominant group hold of them. So they often hear that they are good for nothing ... unproductive, that in the end they become convinced of their own unfitness' (Friere, 1972:38-39). A group that accepts the image of itself as inferior restricts its own development of power resources. It loses ties to the community it belongs. This impairs its dignity and self respect.

Another aspect is lack of social ties to family, friends and community, due to failure to participate in social networks. These networks are crucial in connecting people to sources of livelihood, and opportunities available to others. They are used to assist people to gain information, advice and make friends with people who might have contacts with those with vital information about jobs, how to access them, or how to access credit. Without social networks that can connect people to financial, employment and development activities, people tend to remain isolated, and cannot attain social mobility.

In Sen's terminology, 'a person's advantage is judged by his capabilities, that is what he can and cannot do, can or cannot be' (Sen, 1983:670). Citing Adam Smith (1776), Sen identifies one of the capabilities failure as being ashamed to appear in public because of the poverty of one's clothing. Failing to meet certain standards or satisfy the demands of convention, can be a source of exclusion. In her study of, inter alia, factors that contribute to failure to attend school among San children in Southern Africa, Le Roux (1999) indicates that not having the right kind of clothes for school is humiliating. She mentions that 'in their late teens and around puberty, children felt particularly embarrassed if the clothes they wore looked different from those of their peers' (Le Roux, 1999 : 63). The most shameful thing for a child was not having good shoes.

In its Newsletter, the Nicholls State University has described the effects of shame as follows.

Social abilities are impeded when one feels burdened by shame. A person [or group] may have a pattern of avoiding social interactions, which can lead to lack of development of social skills. They may avoid intimacy with others and have only superficial relationships, which deteriorate in times of stress (Nicholls State University, 2003).

Owing to shame people may withdraw from participating in community activities, thus missing opportunities for social interaction. For instance, some people decline to attend weddings because they cannot offer presents. Others inform only their immediate relatives about funerals because informing non-relatives would result in embarrassment due to failure to provide hospitality for numerous guests.

The above discussion has focused on the social aspects of the dimension under discussion. I now turn to the cultural aspects. At the outset it is necessary to define culture. I adopt the World Bank definition, which is inspired by the World Commission on Culture and Development, and reads:

Culture is the whole complex of distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual, and emotional features that characterise a society or social group. It includes creative expression (for example, oral history, language, performing arts, fine arts, and crafts), community practices (for example, traditional healing methods, traditional natural resource management, celebrations, and patterns of social interaction that contribute to group and individual welfare and identity), and material or built forms such as sites, buildings, historic city centres, landscapes, art and objects (World Bank, 1998 :12),

In most societies there are cultural differences in terms of ethnicity, gender, religious beliefs and traditions, to name just a few areas. One method of managing these differences entails adopting multicultural policies that deal with the ethnic diversity, plurality of languages and lifestyles. Another is to adhere to an assimilationist stance, where there is little or no room for the retention of distinctive cultural practices (World Commission on Culture and Development, 1998). In the latter case, through policy, one culture is chosen to the exclusion of others. Throughout the world, exclusion has resulted from discrimination. For instance, customs and traditions of indigenous people are looked down upon, and their cultures have not been mainstreamed in the development process. In Botswana, the hunter/gatherer lifestyle of Basarwa has been similarly despised, and their culture not considered as a basis for development. Giving official recognition to certain languages to the exclusion of others has been one way of ignoring language diversity. For instance in Botswana minority languages have suffered from exclusions. 'No government sector takes ethnic minorities and their linguistic and cultural individuality into account' (Chebanne, 2002 :48).

These exclusionary practices cause failure to nurture the diversity of belief systems and traditions that enhance people's self-images and give them confidence to act in their own interests while respecting and supporting the traditions of other groups (World Bank, 1998). This means that the long-term goal of cultural development, which is to encourage in the people, an appreciation of and respect for their own culture in order to re-enforce a sense of national pride and national unity, cannot be achieved. By excluding other cultures, their importance is not recognised, yet 'every community's culture represents a unique and irreplaceable treasure of values, traditions and forms of expression' (ROB, 2003: 435). This can lead to alienation and demoralisation in cultural groups not recognised, and a heightened lack of self-confidence in their relations with other groups.

3.8.4 Spatial Exclusion

Under this kind of exclusion, people can be excluded from safer and better-serviced parts of an area, be it a town or district (Sibley, 1995; Wood and Salway, 2000). Areas inhabited by excluded people are usually marginal, most hazardous to public health because if in towns, they are used as dumping sites for nearby built-up areas, and lack services like sanitation and adequate housing. Those who stay in such marginal areas do not have the same access to most basic services as the rest of the population, both in terms of quality and quantity, which contributes to the exclusion process. Being furthest from services, they incur more transport costs to reach services in built-up areas.

In an urban setting, unserved areas are inhabited by squatters. There may be areas which are not squatter settlements but have poorer services as compared to others in the same urban setting. Both have a stigma as places prone to criminal activities and unemployment, and inhabitants lack respect from outsiders. For example, residents of Teesside in the United Kingdom felt stigmatised because they lived in estates with a poor reputation. They believed that people living outside the estates thought that they were criminals and that their children were out of control. They also felt they were discriminated against because of where they lived. In particular they felt excluded from the wider population by being

denied equal participation in the labour market, access to credit and services (www.jrf.org.uk/knowledge/findings/housing/pdf/F469.pdf).

A similar example comes from urban Uruguay in Latin America where area stigma is a problem. Individuals from those neighbourhoods known to be poor or have high levels of crime and violence are often excluded from job opportunities because of the perceptions of potential employers (Baker, 2001). Narayan et al (2000b) report that in Latin America and the Caribbean, entire communities of poor people are stigmatised by society's general perception of their neighbourhood as a ghetto or one where violence and crime prevail. In Brazil, employers refuse to hire residents from stigmatised areas and residents therein have resorted to giving false addresses to obtain services.

People may also be excluded from better services and facilities by being located in remote areas, where such services like electricity, paved roads, shopping and entertainment centres, are considered too costly to provide. People living in these areas encounter constraints in terms of gaining access to markets, extension and development assistance. This results in exclusion from opportunities to earn an income or enjoy the public services that are available in non-remote areas. Saugestad (1999) states that in a number of African countries, 'minority ethnic groups have historically occupied inaccessible regions, often geographically isolated and socially marginalised' (Saugestad, 1999 : 8).

3.8.5 Legal Exclusion

This dimension has not been referred to in literature that the author is aware of. It should be considered as an additional one. Through legal means it is possible to exclude, that is to expel people from a place where they formerly belonged. An example of this is relocating people to less fertile locations, in order to accommodate others. During the colonial era the African population was removed from fertile areas and relocated in reserves, which were crowded and less productive. The settler white community usually took up fertile areas. Legal instruments backed all this action.

During the post colonial period, some governments in developing countries moved people from certain places under the guise that such areas were for public use. Examples include relocating people, usually against their will, from national parks or places that had been declared national monuments (Hitchcock, 1996). In relocating people to new locations, arrangements to continue the lifestyle that these people pursued in their former places are never adequately put in place. These people are then excluded from a livelihood they have developed over a long time. Consequently they cannot cope with the new situation, and become dependent on state handouts for a living.

It is also possible to use legal mechanisms to treat people differently by subordinating some to others. Examples include enacting legislation to deny use of some languages, and rights to use natural resources. In a country with several languages, it is possible to discriminate against these languages by giving only one language an official status, thereby denying other people's right to express their culture. Other examples of this exclusion type include the political and economic exclusion, which the African population faced during the colonial era, and the black people in the then apartheid South Africa.

3.9 Degrees Of Social Exclusion

In Chapter 2, I introduced the idea that individuals can face simultaneous exclusion along several dimensions and I said I would turn to this under this chapter. Figure 3.2 shows degrees of social exclusion. Social exclusion affects all societal groups and individuals but with varying degrees. At one end of the spectrum are those affected by the lowest degree of exclusion, and these are termed *excluders*. For the purpose of my study those at the national level are the dominant Tswana group, who face the lowest degree of exclusion. At the local level, that is the study area, we have the Bakgalagadi¹⁷, who have a low degree of exclusion. At the other end of the spectrum are those facing a highest degree of exclusion, and they are referred to as the *excluded*. This group consists of Basarwa.

FIGURE 3.2: Degrees Of Exclusion

Point	A	B	C
Degree of Exclusion	Lowest	Low	Highest
Group Affected	Dominant Tswana	Dominant Bakgalagadi	Basarwa
Level of Exclusion	National	Local	Local


Individuals may face one kind of exclusion and not the other. Bhalla and Lapeyre (1997) mention that in China there is political but not economic exclusion. In extreme cases, there can be multiple exclusion where exclusion is encountered in all the five dimensions with varying intensity. For my purposes, I consider groups or individuals encountering only political exclusion to be those affected by a low degree of exclusion. Those encountering multiple exclusion face the highest degree of exclusion. An important qualification is that excluded groups are not homogeneous in the sense that there are varying degrees of exclusion as the Figure 3.2 shows. What is significant is that the highest level of exclusion affects the majority in the group concerned. Another qualification is that, depending on an individual's circumstances, it is possible to move from one degree to another, that is, from a low to a high degree. The duration of exclusion in one degree depends on a group or individual's socio-economic profile, the impact of exclusion, and the capacity of the group/individual to deal with exclusion.

Those facing the highest degree of exclusion tend to have the lowest capabilities, fail to fully participate in the economic, social and political spheres of society, and are likely to remain poor, and least likely to experience mobility. Due to multiple exclusion they generally lack or have limited access to productive assets, skills, technology, credit, information, extension, human and financial capital, and have difficulty with securing social, human and political rights either due to illiteracy or failure to enforce provisions related to those rights. Under such circumstances social exclusion makes it difficult to deal with poverty reduction.

3.10 Reconceptualisation Of Social Exclusion

Now that I have delineated the terms related to exclusion and introduced the different dimensions and degrees of social exclusion, there is need to revise Figure 3.1 to incorporate these additional elements. This leads to a reformulated conceptualisation of social exclusion as shown in Figure 3.3. The reformulation includes the notion that exclusion is a multidimensional process or that it operates across many dimensions. The five dimensions discussed above are incorporated in the Figure.

FIGURE 3.3: Reformulated Process Of Social Exclusion



3.11 Conclusion

This chapter has shown how the process of social exclusion can be conceptualised. The key players in this process, and the mechanisms that spur exclusion, have been indicated.

Social exclusion is a multidimensional concept and five dimensions in which it operates have been identified. Through the concept of degrees of exclusion, it has been argued that those who suffer from a combination of the dimensions are likely to face the highest level of exclusion. Those who have the least power in most societies, such as the indigenous or some ethnic minorities, tend to be the most excluded. Social exclusion leads to persistence of poverty and it is in this perspective that it should be seen as a barrier to poverty reduction.

¹ These articles of faith include assertions that NGOs 1) reach the poor; 2) promote local participation in the development process; 3) define development in terms of a process whereby poor people take greater control over their own lives, rather than as the outcome of particular projects and programmes; 4) work 'people-to-people' rather than 'government to government'; 5) are able to be more flexible and experimental in approach than conventional development agencies because of their small size; 6) are better equipped to work with and strengthen local private institutions than are conventional development agencies; and 7) are more cost effective than conventional development agencies (cited in Arellano-Lopez and Petras, 1994: 566).

² It should be noted that powerlessness and poverty are both causes and effects of exclusion. Being powerless and poor makes it easier for those groups with political, economic and social power to protect this privileged position by denying other groups access to such advantage.

³ Social power includes other forms of power, namely political and economic (Bierstedt, 1950).

⁴ This setting is normally done to the advantage of the dominant group, thus creating unequal relationship with dominant groups. Eitzen (1983) observes that 'inequality is maintained because the dominant group provides the standards (values and norms) by which individuals and groups are judged and the reward-punishing system by which the standards are maintained' (Eitzen, 1983:89).

⁵ Other means in which dominance is exercised are coercive and psychological dominance (Baker, 1978:320).

⁶ Prejudice may be favourable, but for my purposes I am more interested with the negative aspects as these feature prominently in the relationship between dominant and subordinate groups.

⁷ It may also involve unequal or inferior availability of the same array of resources.

⁸ Details of this group appear in Chapter 5.

⁹ The second one is 'ideological – the dominant group believes that it has the monopoly on the 'truth', The achievement of ascendancy by one ideological group over the other results in drastic efforts to convert the minority to the dominant group's version of the "truth"; failing that, it banishes the minority by exile or death'. The third is 'racist - the dominant group believes itself to be biologically superior to the minority group, and it stereotypes the minority in terms of negatively valued characteristics (the minority may have the same attitude toward the dominant, but since it lacks power, this has few or no behavioural consequences) (Rose, 1968:368).

¹⁰ Thus African countries do not readily accept a definition which views indigenous people in terms of addressing the issue of internal colonisation and the suppression of aboriginal African groups by more dominant ethnic groups which control the state apparatus (for example, government bureaucracy, the police, parliamentary system, military, higher education, and so on).

¹¹ Bientie (1999) says the Saami won opportunities and rights after 100 years of struggle.

¹² Botswana adheres to a policy that shall make no distinction on the basis of race, place of origin, political opinions, colour, creed or sex (ROB, 1965a : 00;5). Due to this policy, ethnicity-based development efforts are not allowed, irrespective of the conspicuous marginalisation of an ethnic group.

¹³ The ILO Convention 169 uses the above criteria to define Indigenous and Tribal Groups. Article 1 of the Convention defines these people as:

1. The Convention applies to:

- a) 'tribal peoples in independent countries whose social, cultural and economic conditions distinguish them from other sections of the national community, and whose status is regulated wholly or partially by their own customs or traditions or by special laws or regulations;
- b) peoples in independent countries who are regarded as indigenous on account of their descent from the populations which inhabited the country, or a geographical region to which the country belongs, at the time of conquest or colonisation or the establishment of present state boundaries and who, irrespective of their legal status, retain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural and political institutions.

2. Self-identification as indigenous or tribal shall be regarded as a fundamental criterion for determining the groups to which the provisions of this Convention shall apply (www.ecouncil.ac.cr/indig/conventi/169eng.htm).

¹⁴ As has been done by the World Bank 'using a single poverty line worldwide and holding those in extreme poverty as those whose income is less than US\$ 1 per day' (Allen and Thomas, 2000: 10-11).

¹⁵ For similar work on dimensions see Bhalla and Lapeyre (1997, 1999); Sindzingre (1999) and Das Gupta (1999).

¹⁶ Of which Basarwa are an example.

¹⁷ Details of these tribal groups, namely Bakgalagadi, Basarwa appear in Chapter 5.

Chapter 4: Methodology

4.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the methodology for the study. It gives details of the research questions and target research groups. The activities that I carried out as part of the study are given in some detail. Like all research activities, the study had limitations, which I outline below.

4.2 Research Questions And Hypothesis

Three research questions were set out for the study. These were:

- What is the nature of Basarwa's exclusion and what effect has it on this group's standard of living?
- What are the dimensions of exclusion that affect this group?
- Does the proximity (in spatial terms) of fringe area dwellers (a Basarwa subgroup) to dominant groups in Ghanzi Township society increase opportunities for integration or not?

The study had a single hypothesis. It was hypothesised that social exclusion has several dimensions for Basarwa that result in the persistence of poverty.

4.3 Target Research Groups

The research groups included the Basarwa and Bakgalagadi. The Basarwa group consisted of two subgroups. One was those who live in the Ghanzi Township, the majority of whom live in the fringes of the Township. I therefore referred to this group as Fringe Area Dwellers (FADs). The other was those who live in a remote area settlement of West Hanahai. I adopted the official designation for such people who are called remote area dwellers (RADs). In the research area the Basarwa group is subordinate to the Bakgalagadi. The estimated 1998 population of the Basarwa, Bakgalagadi and others is shown in Table 4.1 below, by research area. Others include Baherero, Coloureds, Europeans, and people who are neither Bakgalagadi nor Basarwa and originate from other districts. A detailed description of FADs, RADs, Basarwa and Bakgalagadi is given in Chapter 5.

TABLE 4.1
Basarwa, Bakgalagadi And Other Population In Research Areas

Locality	Basarwa	Bakgalagadi	Other	Total Population	% Basarwa	% Bakagaladi	% Other
Ghanzi Township	1000	3980	2143	7123	14	56	30
West Hanahai	387	23	45	455	85	5	10

Source: Dekker, 1998

4.4 Prior Research Arrangements

4.4.1 Recruitment

After settling in Ghanzi Township¹, I undertook the recruitment of research assistants towards the end of March 1999. These comprised two young women and a young man who had completed their senior secondary education. All assistants were local people who spoke English, Setswana, and the dominant local Sesarwa dialect. The advantages of recruiting local assistants were that they understood local languages, were familiar with local culture and could be trusted to assist me in winning group trust and gaining access to members of the research population. An additional method of building rapport with respondents was approaching community leaders to explain the objective of the interviews. As most of the respondents could not speak Setswana, which was the dominant language in interviews, the assistants were useful in providing necessary translation from Sesarwa to Setswana. It was more cost effective to engage local assistants because they could arrange their own accommodation.

4.4.2 Training

During April 1999, I undertook the training of research assistants. I assembled all research materials including questionnaires (see Appendices 1, 3 to 5), stationery and support material for the research assistants. I explained the various research instruments that would be used in the study. In particular, training covered questionnaire design and

administration based on Smith (1975) and De Vaus (1986). Since none of the research assistants had undertaken research before, for the survey, interviews and other related work, I went step by step through relevant procedure. For instance, for the questionnaire, I took the assistants through it question by question, culminating in exercises where the assistants conducted interviews with members of the public so that I could determine whether they had understood the techniques of interviewing and filling in the questionnaire. I informed the assistants that their work would be thoroughly checked, and failure to follow instructions would not be tolerated. In view of the various meetings that the study would include, training also covered committee procedure, especially recording proceedings of meetings.

4.4.3 Explanation Of Objective And Nature Of Study

After informing my assistants that the title of the study was 'Social Exclusion as a Barrier to Poverty Reduction: the case of Basarwa in Botswana', I said the objective was to investigate the extent to which the social exclusion approach could explain the persistence of poverty amongst Basarwa. At this stage it was imperative to explain what social exclusion was. I described it as a process by which certain population groups in society are denied/prevented from full and equal utilisation of, or have restrictions to, goods and services, which are normally available to others. This process has various dimensions, the most important being political, economic, social, legal and spatial.

Through a combination of these dimensions, some population groups fail to participate fully in the political, social and social spheres of society. It is a process through which certain individuals or groups are barred from identical and satisfactory access to opportunities, assets, resources, services, rights available in the political, social and economic fields of society, including poor participation in these fields. I explained that individuals or groups are excluded on the basis of gender, ethnicity, place of origin, and caste. In this study Basarwa's ethnicity was the main basis for exclusion. I mentioned that the study proposed that social exclusion was one of the causes of the persistence of poverty in certain ethnic groups in Botswana. The study had identified Basarwa as such a group. It was therefore necessary to examine this proposition, by investigating the nature and extent of this phenomenon as seen by the research groups, through the

utilisation of various research instruments. In other words, the purpose of the study was to find out the extent to which social exclusion contributes to the persistence of poverty in Basarwa in the Ghanzi Township and West Hanahai settlement. The study investigated the extent to which Basarwa are prevented from equal and full participation in the economic, political and social structures of Ghanzi society in particular, and the national society in general.

I explained that this was a cross-sectional study. The unit of analysis varied according to the purpose of the study activity. It covered the individual for case histories, groups for focus group discussion and households for the survey.

4.4.4 Piloting Research Questionnaire

As part of the research process, I undertook a pilot exercise to test the questionnaire at Appendix 1. This exercise also gave the assistants and myself the opportunity to check whether the training had been useful and whether the assistants were ready to proceed with the main research. Of the 20 households targeted to be interviewed, each assistant was allocated 6 households. I did the balance. The pilot allowed us to determine the time it took to interview each respondent, and remove any items in the questionnaire that did not yield usable data.

4.4.5 Meeting With District Officers And Leaders

I met district officers for the following purposes:

- To inform them officially about the study, its duration, and seek support in terms of officers' time to respond to requests for information, and to be available for interviews;
- To seek official permission to interview people in the Township and West Hanahai, and to request any literature, such as reports done on similar studies; or any studies undertaken recently in the district, which are relevant for the study purposes;

- To meet extension staff to ask about the Ghanzi socio-economic situation and arrangements to tour possible study sites;
- To meet the Social and Community Development Department of the Ghanzi District Council about involving local people in responding to the questionnaire and participating in focus groups;
- To ask extension staff to assist me in selecting people to participate in the research. This was important since these officers have local knowledge of the research areas in terms of who lives where, what the livelihoods of the local people are, the nature of the participation in local structures and ideas on social relationships.

Similar meetings were held with community leaders. I held a public meeting in West Hanahai to explain the study to residents and what was expected from them. Their participation and cooperation in responding to the questionnaire, and contributing to discussions in the focus groups, was solicited.

4.4.6 Sampling Procedure

A number of difficulties were encountered prior to deciding on the sampling procedure. The research groups in the Township were located in areas where it was difficult to obtain a sampling frame. The areas do not depict an orderly, but a haphazard, settlement pattern. Some of the research groups live in squatter areas. The others live in the traditional part of the Township where dwellings are scattered. Second, some of the research groups, the Basarwa, are migratory. As an earlier study found out:

They do not stay in the same place for long so much that one may leave a group of them at a particular locality only to find that they have moved the following day or week (Ndozi, 1991:35).

I found that it was difficult to follow-up interviews with Basarwa respondents because of their nomadic nature. In most instances Basarwa wake up early in the shacks and return late in the evening. It was not possible to undertake a probability method of sampling, such as in random sampling, because there was no sampling frame for the research groups. With the absence of a sample frame, I decided to choose a non-

probability sample, particularly the purposive sampling. This sampling was selected on the basis of my knowledge of the population particularly in so far as the localities are concerned. Extension officers working in the study areas complemented this knowledge, and gave me a picture of the structure of the society in the study areas.

Apart from the poor prospects of using a probability sampling method as indicated above, I used the non-probability sample into order to exploit the following benefits:

- Cheaper,
- Used when sampling frame is not available;
- Useful when population is so widely dispersed that cluster sampling would not be efficient;
- Often used in exploratory studies (www.tardis.ed.ac.uk/~kate/qmcweb/s8.htm).

4.4.7 Sample Population

The sample population included the main target groups, the Basarwa and Bakgalagadi and other groups in the study areas. On the basis of Appendix 1, the total sample covered 169 households, broken down by ethnic group, number and percentage according to Table 4.2. This splits into the two research areas of Ghanzi Township and West Hanahai as shown in Table 4.3.

TABLE 4.2

Total Sample By Ethnic Group

	Ethnic Group	Number	Percent
	Mosarwa	98	58.0
	Mokgalagadi	40	23.7
	Other	31	18.3
	Total	169	100.0

Source: Survey, Morris Nyathi, 1999

TABLE 4.3**Breakdown Of Sample Into Individual Research Areas**

Ethnic Group	Ghanzi Township		West Hanahai	
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
Mosarwa	53	47.3	45	78.9
Mokgalagadi	35	31.3	5	8.8
Other	24	21.4	7	12.3
Total	112	100.0	57	100.0

Source: Survey, Morris Nyathi, 1999

4.4.8 Mixture Of Quantitative And Qualitative Approaches

This study combined quantitative and qualitative research methods. The socio-economic profile was based on the former method; otherwise the bulk of the study was based on qualitative methods. The study intended to obtain the research groups' feelings, perceptions about their neighbours and themselves and their life experiences. What I wanted were subjective dimensions to human experience. According to Sullivan, T. Monette, D. and DeJong, C. (1998) 'personal meanings and feelings cannot be captured very well through quantitative methods, since they emphasise numbers' (Sullivan et al, 1998: 86-7). They are better captured through narrative descriptions of people going about their daily life routine or through lengthy interviews with them.

My study deals with a phenomenon that was introduced into the social sciences only in the 1970s. As such, theoretical understanding on the subject is in the process of being built. Against this background, the qualitative method is more useful because it is more exploratory in nature. Ghauri et al (1995) maintain that research problems focusing on people's behaviour or where it is necessary to uncover and understand a phenomenon about which little is known, are typical examples of problems for which qualitative research is relevant. I also wanted the study to benefit from the strengths of qualitative research, which have been described as follows:

- Depth and detail. This may not be obtained from a standardized questionnaire;

- Openness. Potential to recognize phenomena ignored by most or all previous researchers and literature;
- Helps people see the worldview of those studies--their categories, rather than imposing categories; simulates their experience of the world;
- Attempts to avoid pre-judgements. The goal is to try to capture what is happening without being judgmental; present people on their own terms, try to represent them from their perspectives so reader can see their views. (<http://trochin.human.cornell.edu/kb/sampon.htm>)

This method is not, however, fault-free. Its weaknesses include:

- The fact that fewer people are usually studied;
- Unlike a quantitative method, the result of the qualitative approach is less easily generalized;
- It is also difficult to aggregate data and make systematic comparisons. (<http://trochin.human.cornell.edu/kb/sampon.htm>)

4.5 Data Collection Methods

I used a combination of the following methods to collect data for the study.

- A structured questionnaire on the basis of Appendix 1, from which resulted the socio-economic profile of the research groups;
- ✓ • Focus group discussions. These complemented some of the issues that came up from the above questionnaire, thus adding depth to survey results. Responses that remained unclear in the questionnaire were clarified in focus group discussions;
- ✓ • Semi-structured interviews. These covered key informants at national and district levels, members of the academia, village and Township leaders. This provided an opportunity where issues raised during the survey and focus groups could be verified, and sought information not obtained in other data collection methods. Key informants were also used to obtain special knowledge on various issues related to the study.
- ✓ • Case history material to document processes of exclusion;
- ✓ • Review of secondary literature, culminating in essential statistics, poverty profile for the study groups, review of various dimensions and aspects of the concept of social exclusion.

4.5.1 Socio-Economic Profile Of The Target Groups

To get some information on the research groups, a socio-economic profile was undertaken. This was based on a survey carried out in the two research areas of Ghanzi Township and West Hanahai. Details of these areas are included in Chapter 5. The survey was based on a structured questionnaire, which appears as Appendix 1. Given the high level of illiteracy amongst the research groups, the questionnaire had to be filled by the assistants (interviewers). Misunderstanding that arose from the various questions was dealt with on the spot by the interviewer. The assistants were available to explain and encourage respondents to answer questions.

The research instrument sought data for each household on the following issues: ethnic identity; languages spoken; where located; members of the household by sex, age, education, occupation and marital status; original and current residence status; access to facilities and services; sources of livelihood; access to government programmes; land use; employment data; ownership of assets; and involvement in community organisations.

4.5.2 Poverty Profile Of Study Groups

Since the title of the study was that social exclusion is a barrier to poverty alleviation amongst Basarwa, and given that one of the main arguments was that social exclusion causes the persistence of poverty, it was necessary to undertake a poverty profile of the research groups. This was based on two sources. First was the survey of secondary literature with emphasis on poverty issues in Botswana, and the socio-economic profile described above. This information was fed into the poverty profile, which was developed on the basis of World Bank guidelines (1990a).

4.5.3 Semi-Structured Interviews

I carried out semi-structured interviews with 55 respondents. Appendix 2 shows a list of interviews, including interviewee's name, date and place of interview, and category of interviewee. All the interviewees were key informants who included community

leaders, civil servants, NGO officials, university staff and international servants. Civil servants included officers based at central, local and settlement levels, and distributed as shown in note a) of the Appendix. The majority of community leaders were Bakgalagadi (6) followed by Basarwa (5), and two politicians who were councillors in the Ghanzi District Council. Central-based informants refer to those who were interviewed at central government level, and all these were met in Gaborone. The district-based informants were interviewed in Ghanzi Township. Settlement-based informants were met in West Hanahai. Community leaders were all interviewed in various locations in the Ghanzi District. The bulk of the interviews with university staff were conducted in the University Botswana, except interviewee 32 and 55 who were interviewed in Gaborone and Durban respectively.

Key informants were selected on the basis of the following criteria.

- Representatives from key organisations in Government, NGOs, international organisations, and community involved in formulation and implementation of policies relevant to the political and socio-economic development of the target groups;
- People who are particularly knowledgeable about certain issues, or act as repositories of the community history and memory, are judged as knowledgeable and reliable by the local community, have respect and acceptance of residents;
- People with specialised knowledge and unique perspectives on issues raised in the interviews as summarised in the paragraph below;
- People involved in Basarwa research at the University of Botswana and have published work on aspects about Basarwa relevant to this author's study;
- Officials closely involved in the implementation of programmes affecting target groups.

This data collection instrument provided flexibility so that I could explore more deeply the opinions of the respondents than a structured alternative would enable (Dane, 1990:129). According to May (1998), it gave me the opportunity to seek clarification and elaboration on responses given, and more latitude to probe as necessary during the

course of the interviews. The interviews made it possible for interviewees to respond 'more on their terms than the standardised interview permits' (May, 1998:111).

A variety of issues were covered in these interviews. Issues covered included social aspects of social exclusion, in particular the relationships between the main study groups, the Basarwa and Bakgalagadi, the latter's perceptions of the former and vice versa. The nature of study groups' representation in political and social structures in the study areas² was another subject of interviews. Major problems faced by the Basarwa at Township and settlement level; including Government attempts to improve the standard of living of Basarwa and other population groups under a special development programme³, were interrogated.

Socio-economic and political data, which had a bearing on social exclusion, was sought from some respondents. In this connection, the representation of study groups at political level was determined. Some ideas were sought on indicators of social exclusion and approximations made on the level of unemployment, illiteracy, and so on. Problems with access to productive resources, particularly land, housing, capital, education were discussed. Most of the information was sought to clarify, elaborate or verify points that were raised through other research instruments, namely focus group discussions, case histories, and the survey questionnaire. Interviews were also intended to get other information not captured by other instruments.

4.5.4 Group Discussions

I conducted discussions with 15 focus groups that were divided by age and gender, in Ghanzi Township and West Hanahai, according to Table 4.4 below. Nichols (1991) advises that several group discussions should be held, in order to include a wide range of community opinion, and members of the group should be of same sex to ensure sharing of similar background. The numbers under each age group in the table represent the number of participants in each group. The group discussions in Ghanzi Township were conducted through the use of discussion guides, which appear as appendices 3 and 4, to cater for groups living in fringe and non-fringe areas, respectively. The group discussions in West Hanahai were undertaken through the discussion guide in appendix

5. The discussion guides, which comprise an open-ended questionnaire, were developed in accordance with guidelines suggested by Folch-Lyon and Trost (1981).

TABLE 4.4
Focus Groups By Place, Ethnic Group And Gender

Group	Ghanzi Township		West Hanahai	
	Basarwa	Bakgalagadi	Basarwa	Bakgalagadi
Old men	9	7	18	
Young men	8	5	8	6
Old women	7	6	9	
Young women	6	6	6	
Mixed*				

Note*: This group consisted of Bakgalagadi group of 9 old men, old and young women, and a Herero/Rolong group of 6 old men and women.

Young means 15 –29 years old; Old means 30 years and above.

Source: Survey, Morris Nyathi, 1999

As shown in Table 4.4, participants of the focus groups included where possible both genders and two age groups. The discussions were based on thematic headings shown in the appendices mentioned above. In most questions, probes were used frequently to obtain information about the why and how of a situation. Each group was asked to enumerate development problems it faced. Next, questions were posed about the current residence, and what benefits or lack of were experienced there. Relationships between each group and their neighbours and those staying outside their areas, were investigated. In this connection, perceptions of a group about itself and others were interrogated. Questions relating to barriers to social and economic mobility were raised.

Although the discussion consisted of answering the questions listed in the guide, not all questions were answered in the order in which they appear. As most of the participants spoke Sesarwa, one of the research assistants took the role of interpreter. I led the discussion and two other assistants took a record of the proceedings. The discussion was tape recorded to facilitate report writing. At the end of the discussion, I summarised the issues deliberated, sought and obtained the participants' approval. The focus group

discussions were held in May and July 1999 in the Township and West Hanahai respectively. Like their Basarwa counterparts in the Township, participants from the Bakgalagadi group were invited to attend focus group discussions but declined the invitation, claiming that they were busy. Instead of focus group meetings, I together with my assistants decided to follow them up in their homes⁴ and conducted interviews on the basis of Appendix 4. In order to maintain a group idea, it was decided to interview a minimum of two people at a time. The maximum we reached was four people per group. Eventually, 7 old men, 5 young men, 6 old women and 6 young women, were interviewed. I did not manage to get a full complement of Bakgalagadi groups in West Hanahai. Only the young men were available. A mixed group of other ethnic groups than Basarwa and Bakgalagadi was assembled. Among other issues, such as development problems, views on places of residence, employment and educational matters, focus groups were given an opportunity to deliberate on perceptions about themselves and other groups, and issues they felt militated against social and economic mobility within their communities. Transcription of the tapes was done after all interviews had been completed.

4.5.5 History Material: Land-Related And Other

As part of this study it was planned to obtain information about case histories of selected individuals in the research groups. Hakim (1987:65) cautions that 'the term *life* history is misleading in suggesting that all aspects of a person's life are explored equally, rather than particular aspects'. In this study the case histories covered certain aspects of the respondents' lives, which depicted some aspects of social exclusion. The idea was to describe their lives in an attempt to find in their stories those issues that could be documented to show ways in which the process of social exclusion operates.

Three individuals were interviewed for these histories within the Basarwa group. Rather than taking the respondents' cases at face value, other sources of evidence were referred to, especially interviews with the other people such as family and friends, and the District Council officers dealing with some aspects of the respondents' welfare. As no evidence could be found in respect of Bakgalagadi, no histories were conducted. All Basarwa respondents live in Ghanzi Township and include one formerly staying in a

non-fringe area, and reverted to the fringe area during the course of the research. The other lives in the non-fringe area or non-squatter area.

The history material consists of 3 case histories. Two (History 1 and 2) show instances where Basarwa are denied of their right to stay freely in residential plots allocated by the state, by members of other tribal groups. These groups seem to take advantage of the illiteracy of old generation Basarwa and the relative neglect by governmental institutions to uphold their rights. History 3 negates the negative stereotype of a Mosarwa as unassertive, unaware of his/her rights and shows that education and character have a role in moulding one's identity and improves one's capacity to tackle life challenges. These histories describe instances of exclusion that victims have encountered in life and how they dealt or failed to deal with them.

4.5.6 Review Of Secondary Literature

Extensive review of secondary literature on Botswana and the communities studied was done. Relevant books, consultancy and research reports, journal articles, newspaper and worldwide web articles were consulted. The main objectives were to undertake a literature review of the concept of social exclusion, to understand what it is, where it originated, how it is used, why it occurs, how it operates and relates to other social phenomena, who are affected by this phenomenon and how it can be measured.

To understand the exclusion of the target groups, a review of their historical background was done. In this respect, looking at the past and present, I established what structures promoted exclusion and what kind of interactions have characterised Basarwa and the dominant group relations in Botswana, including outcomes from this relationship. I viewed structures as those things that have characterised exclusion, and are deeply embedded institutionally, for example land and its distribution, settlement patterns, legal codes that have been in place for a long time, and patterns of educational attainments. I took interactions to denote relationships between the subordinate Basarwa groups and the dominant Bakgalagadi group.

Since the topic of this thesis is that social exclusion is a barrier to poverty reduction, it was necessary to establish the relationship between poverty and social exclusion. Literature was consulted to determine this linkage. A number of studies undertaken on social exclusion were consulted. In this review it was established that social exclusion was a multidimensional concept with linkages to other concepts, which had to be studied as well. In addition, official records of the Ghanzi District, and various Botswana Government documents were reviewed.

4.6 Data Capture

Semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions were tape-recorded. For those respondents who could not use English fluently, interviews were conducted in Setswana. These included village leaders, members of extension staff in study areas, and private individuals. Other interviews were undertaken in English for district officers, members of the academic community, and other private respondents who could not speak Setswana. The focus group discussions were undertaken in Setswana, and Sesarwa with translation to Setswana for participants who could not speak Setswana. Two assistants took a record of the focus group discussion in Setswana. At the end of each interview and focus group discussion, I summarised the issues discussed and sought approval of the respondents, before transcribing. At the end of each focus group discussion, I met my research assistants to compare their notes and the taped discussion, culminating in an agreed version that was later transcribed and translated into English.

I undertook the transcribing of all interviews and discussions, and undertook the translation to English where necessary. This task was the most time-consuming and some difficulty was encountered where transcription was impossible due to faulty cassettes. The written record of meetings was consulted to fill the gap arising from such faults. The other major data capture instrument was the completed questionnaire based on Appendix 1. After a set of ten questionnaires had been completed, I met each research assistant to go over each one and check them. Where mistakes were discovered, I requested the assistants to return to the relevant respondent.

4.7 Data Analysis

Data was analysed quantitatively or qualitatively. The data collected from the survey was subjected to the former method through the SPSS computer software in which statistics in terms of frequency and percentage distribution of the data was obtained. From this distribution, tables were produced. A voluminous amount of qualitative data was generated from other data collection methods especially from focus groups and interviews. On the basis of these data, I presented findings by thematic area. A few direct quotes are included to provide some perception of social exclusion from the field. Other bases for data analysis looked at instances of exclusion on the basis of indicators shown below.

4.7.1 Operationalising Social Exclusion

In order to determine the exclusion of Basarwa, a need arose to come up with appropriate measures. Some ideas about measuring social exclusion have been suggested by de Haan and Maxwell (1998), Bhalla and Lapeyre (1997) and Klasen (1997b). According to the first source, how social exclusion is defined determines the indicators to use. 'If it is defined in terms of multiple deprivation, measurement should encompass items like health, housing, family status and other items of human development' (de Haan and Maxwell, 1997:8). On the other hand, if it is defined as a process, they suggest looking at what they term 'key arenas of social exclusion such as rights, resources, and relationships, and elements of social exclusion namely human and civil rights, market and state mechanisms, social networks and support organisations' (de Haan and Maxwell, 1998:3 and 8).

Bhalla and Lapeyre (1997) have suggested indicators to measure the economic, social and political dimensions of social exclusion. On the economic aspect, they suggest measuring the depth of poverty and income inequality. They remark that 'individuals or groups at the bottom of the income pyramid are usually excluded from benefits of growth and access to education, health and a decent livelihood' (Bhalla and Lapeyre, 1997:425-426). Regarding the social dimension, they have suggested three kinds of measures, namely access to public goods and services, access to labour markets and measures of social participation. On the political dimension, they recommend use of the

political freedom indexes, which entails examining the level of participation in the political arena, and access to the rule of law. Finally Klasen (1997b) starts by cautioning about the difficulty involved in coming up with definitive measures of social exclusion. Noting the heterogeneity of the concept and the need for diversity in its measurement he says:

As social exclusion, in the sense of denial of important civil and social rights or capabilities, contains diverse elements and components, there is no single measure that can capture its extent or intensity (Klasen, 1997b: 13).

The above source acknowledges that social exclusion carries objective and subjective connotations, implying that it should be subjected to both objective data and subjective assessments.

Another work related to measurement of social exclusion is attributed to Berman and Phillips (2000). According to this source, 'indicators of social exclusion on the level of the nation-state will measure the inaccessibility of rights and services to those who by definition of citizenship should have access to them. In this context social exclusion means the inaccessibility, ignorance or inability to receive those services, which are available as a right as defined by the state. It also includes being discriminated against which prevents the access to those services' Berman and Phillips (2000: 344-345). Other indicators relate to degree of identification and participation, that is, how far one interacts with others. Participation in social life depends on one's identity, and how that identity is accepted within one's social environment. As I indicated in Chapter 3, people with devalued social identities are likely to feel alienated and not participate in community life.

4.7.2 Indicators Of Social Exclusion

On the basis of the above literature review, I employed diverse indicators to measure the concept at hand, because of its multi-disciplinary nature. The measures included subjective assessments and objective data. Each dimension of social exclusion outlines these indicators below.

4.7.2.1 Political Dimension Related

In order to determine whether Basarwa were excluded under this dimension, I examined the level of participation of research groups in decision-making at national and local government institutions, in percentage terms. This examination covered the national and the local levels, and the representation of research groups in positions of power in the Legislative and Executive institutions, for example, Parliament, House of Chiefs and Cabinet. At the local level I examined representation in the local institutions such as the District Council and Land Board, and village organisations, such as Village Development Committees (VDCs)⁵. This examination involved a comparative analysis between Basarwa and non-Basarwa. I reviewed Government of Botswana policies that foster exclusion to the extent that they are characterised by a top-down approach to formulation and implementation, leaving little scope for participation by the community. The nature of the state and interests it serves was investigated for indication of exclusion.

4.7.2.2 Legal Dimension Related

Under this dimension, I investigated discriminatory practices enshrined in the legal documents and policies, both of which tend to promote interests of certain population groups and not others.

4.7.2.3 Socio-Cultural Dimension Related

In order to understand the operation of this dimension, I reviewed the historical background to the status of Basarwa. Against that background, I investigated exclusion with respect to a broad range of measures including:

- Perceptions of Basarwa of themselves and other tribes of Basarwa, and evidence of negative public attitudes or expressions of prejudice;
- Social distance between Basarwa and Bakgalagadi in terms of lack of intermarriage;
- Discriminatory practices in certain sectors such as education and police services;

- Problems of identity of Basarwa, particularly a Mosarwa as a remote area dweller;
- Extent to which cultural dimensions are integrated into the development process, and how national culture incorporates diversity, creative expression (for example, language, various arts) and community practices (for example, celebrations, traditions on natural resource management).

4.7.2.4 Economic Dimension Related

Regarding this dimension, I examined exclusion in three areas, namely:

- Exclusion from right to use property;
- Exclusion from capacity to accumulate resources;
- Exclusion from the labour market.

4.7.2.5 Spatial Exclusion Related

With respect to the above dimension, I estimated the proportion of Basarwa and Bakagalagadi who stay in the fringe areas of the Ghanzi Township and established reasons for this. I established that staying in a remote settlement excluded most residents from better services available elsewhere in the district.

4.8 Research Limitations

4.8.1 Lack Of Data On Study Groups

This was a research project that needed data on specific ethnic groups, the Basarwa and Bakagalagadi and others. In Botswana, however, official policy prohibits the breakdown of official data on an ethnic basis. The problem with this policy is that the special circumstances of individual ethnic groups are hidden in the generalised census and other socio-economic data. The research groups have unique features that cannot be obtained from data that is not disaggregated by ethnic group. The effect of this is that data on research is not reliable. What is available is restricted to unconfirmed or

unofficial estimates that have been assessed by various researchers (Childers, 1976; Guenther, 1986; Hitchcock, 1992; Dekker, 1998).

4.8.2 Research Fatigue

Most of the Basarwa respondents expressed concern that they had been interviewed many times in the past but had not benefited from these exercises. They complained that they were tired and sought assurance that something useful would arise out of new research or they would not cooperate. They wanted to know what action had been taken on responses they made to previous interviews. My response was that I was not aware of any previous research in which they were involved. I explained that my research was an academic exercise that would culminate in a report to the Government who was funding the research. I said it was up to the Government to follow up any recommendations that arise from the research but that I was not in a position to force the Government to respond to any of the recommendations. I also explained that nobody was compelled to participate in the research, but urged the prospective respondents to help as much as they could. In the event some people declined interviews. This was not surprising since most research recommendations about improving the standard of living of Basarwa have not been followed up by the Government.⁶

I came across some respondents who mentioned problems of housing, poverty, lack of services and facilities and who expected us to address these issues. There was disappointment when we informed such respondents that we could not solve their problems. We referred such people to relevant departments of Government and the District Council, but some preferred that we handle their problems ourselves, which we could not do. There were still other respondents who seemed unwilling to answer questions. The typical response to most questions was: 'I do not know'.

4.8.3 Lack Of Cooperation By Bakgalagadi

I encountered some lack of cooperation from the Bakgalagadi study group. It was typical of these group members to fail to attend focus groups or attend public meetings

on the excuse that they were 'busy'. The failure of Bakgalagadi meant that the advantage of stimulating ideas and complementary views among participants was lost. The views that I obtained from Bakgalagadi were not those of a properly constituted focus groups. This implies that the data thereof had a reliability problem.

4.8.4 Complex Nature Of Social Exclusion

Social exclusion was not an easy term to deal with. For the most educated the idea was closely associated with marginalization. Those who were excluded were also seen as marginalized. In the field, people were familiar with the notion of exclusion and could relate to situations of exclusion. It was in discussions on social relationships that instances of exclusion were mentioned. People felt pushed out of social activities, and complained that they were incapacitated from participating in such activities. Lack of recognition of other people's culture, and failure to accept differences amongst population groups, were seen as measures of rejection of other people from being full members of the society.

Basarwa respondents identified instances where they were expelled from certain areas that were later allocated to others. They identified exclusion as lack of participation in social domains especially in local institutions and said that this inhibited them from the decision-making process. Instances of lack of representation in political and social activities were perceived as evidence of exclusion. Social distance at the societal level and lack of intermarriage were identified as measures of lack of cohesion. Some people felt that discrimination caused them to miss out on better paying jobs and the acquisition of good education. This was one of the first studies of its kind and as such it lacked the benefit of comparing results with a study undertaken in a similar environment.

4.8.5 Problems With Data Gathering

Problems were experienced in fully completing the questionnaire for the several reasons. Follow up of respondents to deal with mistakes in filling of questionnaires was

not totally successful because some respondents could not be found. The nomadic tendency of some respondents made it difficult to locate them.

Illiteracy of some respondents made it difficult to give accurate information, especially on dates of birth. As this was a cross-sectional study, there was insufficient time to establish a firm understanding with the research groups.

Three languages were used during the study. These are Sesarwa, the language of Basarwa, Setswana, the national language and the official one – English. Given the need to translate information across the two languages to English, this resulted in loss of meaning, which could not be avoided. The refusal to be interviewed and the hostility the interviewing team encountered in some instances resulted in failure to reach some prospective respondents. In squatter areas where drinking places were located, it was not possible to interview people because owners refused to cooperate by claiming that interviews were for researchers' benefit than the people themselves⁷.

4.9 Conclusion

This chapter has outlined the methodology for the study. It incorporates the research questions and hypothesis, an introductory description of the research groups, and various activities I undertook to organise the research. Part of the research activities included undertaking a socio-economic survey and poverty profile of the groups, conducting focus group discussions and semi-structured interviews, gathering life history material, and a review of secondary literature. Typical of any research activity, this research had a number of limitations. I applied a wide range of measures to determine the nature of exclusion.

¹ The Ghanzi Township and West Hanahai were my research sites. Map 5.3 in Chapter 5 indicates the sites.

² It should be noted that similar information was obtained even in areas not covered by the study so that comparisons and similarities could be brought to the fore. To this extent, similar experiences in other parts of Ghanzi District and outside the district were cited, and will feature in the research findings.

³ The details of this programme appear in Chapter 5.

⁴ All interviewees were found in their residences in non fringe areas.

⁵ The District Council and Land Board are Local Authorities with delegated functions stipulated by law. VDCs are voluntary bodies responsible for implementing development programmes in villages and towns. Full details of all these institutions appear in Appendix 6.

⁶ Saugestad (1998b) catalogues a number of recommendations from conferences on improvement to Basarwa's livelihood, which have remained unimplemented.

⁷ During the course of the interviews, it became apparent that those people who discouraged others from being interviewed were pursuing their personal interest of keeping people in their drinking places rather than allowing them to attend interviews that they feared might investigate and unearth the illegality of their businesses.

Chapter 5

Research Context

5.1 Introduction

This chapter provides the contextual material for the study. This involves setting out the political, economic and social parameters of Botswana, and describing the research area and research groups.

5.2 Country Of Study

The study was located in Botswana. This is a landlocked country situated in the middle of the Southern African Plateau, sharing borders with four countries, namely Namibia, South Africa, Zimbabwe and Zambia. It measures 582 000 square kilometres, about the size of France (ROB, 1997a: 3). Maps 5.1 and 5.2 respectively show the country's location within the southern African region and the whole country with its administrative districts, villages and towns.

5.2.1 Climate

The climate is mainly arid or semi-arid, with mean annual rainfall ranging from 650 mm in the extreme northeast to less than 250 mm in the extreme southwest. The Kalahari Desert covers more than two-thirds of the country's land area, with an almost complete absence of surface water. The majority of the population is concentrated in the eastern part of the country, where the climate is more hospitable and soils more productive (ROB 1997a: 3)

5.2.2 People Of Botswana

Most of Botswana's citizens are members of the Setswana-speaking ethnic groups. Setswana is the national language and English is the official one. Apart from the above groups there are other non-Setswana speakers, including the Bakalanga in the northeast, Basarwa and other semi-nomadic groups in remoter areas, the Baherero and

Bakgalagadi in the west, and a small number of citizens of Asian and European extraction (ROB, 1997a).

5.2.3 Constitutional Framework

After 80 years as a British Protectorate, then called Bechuanaland, the country became self-governing in 1965 and attained the status of an independent country, with the name Botswana, in 1966. The Constitution established a non-racial democracy, and provided for a unicameral legislature, the National Assembly (or Parliament), executive and judiciary. In addition to the 44-member Parliament, there is a House of Chiefs with 15 members. The latter advises on matters related to custom and tradition. Botswana has held 8 national elections in 1965, 1969, 1974, 1979, 1984, 1989, 1994 and 1999. On each occasion the Botswana Democratic Party has emerged victorious. The head of the executive arm of the Government is the President who presides over the Cabinet. The independent judiciary comprises the High Court, presided over by the Chief Justice, the Magistrate courts, and Customary Courts (ROB, 1997a: 1).

5.2.4 Governmental Structure

The Government institutions are made up of 12 ministries of Central Government. At the local level are 15 elected Local Authorities, which include two city councils, three town councils, one township authority and nine district councils serving rural areas (UNDP, 1998b: 2). Appendix 6 carries terms of reference of these local institutions. The Government has created parastatals responsible for providing services such as water, electricity, postal services, telecommunications and airline services.

5.2.5 Development Strategy

Botswana's development strategy is based on national principles and planning objectives. The principles are democracy, development, self-reliance and unity, which together are intended to achieve social harmony. The objectives include rapid economic growth, social justice, economic independence and sustained development. Of these

objectives, social justice has been amply articulated in National Development Plans 3 and 4 (1973 - 1981) through the following statements.

All Batswana, wherever they live and whatever their social background, were to have equal access to services that the government provides, such as education, health and water supplies. Services available to different groups and in different areas were to be comparable in quality as well as mere availability. Government efforts to stimulate economic activity, whether by provision of infrastructure, or by extension work, or by the manipulation of markets, etc, were to be biased towards poorer groups and regions (BIDPA, 2001a: 21).

As I will show below, however, Botswana's development record deviates from the above principle of social justice. The inequality and poverty that have occurred contradict the national development goals enshrined in the above statements.

5.2.6 Economic And Social Development Since 1966

Since independence Botswana's development record has depicted both positive and negative aspects in as far as economic growth is concerned. The positive aspects can be summarised as follows. From being one of the poorest countries in Africa at the time of independence, Botswana's performance against the objective of rapid economic growth has been impressive. From 1966 to 1996 the country's annual rate of growth in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) averaged 6% in real terms. The mineral sector, particularly diamonds, has been the mainstay of the economy, with beef exports trailing behind. Expressed in 1993/94 prices, annual per capita real GDP has grown from P 1 682 in 1966 to P7 863 in 1994/95 (ROB, 1997a: 17).


The Government adopted the policy of reinvesting export revenues in physical infrastructure and expansion of services. School enrolment has improved over the years with over 90% of primary school aged children enrolled in primary schools. Progress has been made in the health sector, with about 85% of the rural population within 15 kilometres radius of a health facility (ROB, 1997a: 17). Formal sector employment grew over the years, from 69 500 in 1978 to 234 500 in 1995, an average yearly increase of 7% (ROB, 1997a: 20). During times of drought the Government has operated large-scale relief schemes that have checked extensive malnutrition. Public schemes have provided support for destitutes, remote area dwellers, and an old age

Map 5.1: Botswana's Location In Southern Africa.



Source: ROB, 1997a:4

Map 5.2 Republic Of Botswana



Source: ROB, 1997a:5

pension, which started in 1996, was an addition to the social protection schemes. Citing the 2001 Human Development Report, UNDP (2002a: 3) records that the 'Human Development Index (HDI) for Botswana rose from 0.495 in 1975 to 0.654 in 1990'. All elements of the index rose during this period, including GDP per capita, life expectancy and literacy.

Despite considerable progress made over the years, Botswana's economic progress or development has been uneven (Hope and Edge, 1996). In this connection the following observations from Vision 2016 on Report Remote¹ and Small Settlements Areas, is relevant. According to the above report, respondents (older members of the communities) recognised that there have been major economic, social and political changes in Botswana since independence. They expressed concern, however, that these changes had come about in a highly uneven manner, and that therefore all citizens have not enjoyed the benefits equally. In particular they observed that small settlements and the populations in these settlements (particularly people who were farm workers, unemployed or of Basarwa origin) have tended to benefit the least from the fruits of national development. Consequently in all areas of development (political, economic, infrastructural, educational, and so on) these settlements and population groups have lagged behind the rest of the country. These perceptions were succinctly captured by those who observed that in general the development of the country has been more substantial than the development of the people (Selolwane, O. Obuseng, S. Mokgathe, L. Bolaane, M. Nthomang, K. and Ketsitlile, P., 1997).

Calling for a moral and tolerant nation, the Vision 2016 document cautions against such growth, which has basically failed to raise productivity and incomes of poor people. It describes it as "ruthless" or "rootless" growth (Presidential Task Group, 1997: 60). The former is growth accompanied by large income disparities and increase in poverty. The latter is growth that is not inclusive of all ethnic groups. The inequality suggested by the above report can be gauged from the statistics below (UNDP, 1995). Income and asset disparities are widespread: the top 20% of the population earned 24 times as much as the poorest 20%, with the poorest 40% of the households earning 11% of the total cash income and the top 20% earning 61%. Regarding income distribution, nearly half of the national herd was owned by 4% of the farmers. It is estimated that almost 40% of Botswana's farming households did not own cattle. Of the 60% who did, half did not

own sufficient draught power animals to meet their own needs. Worst affected are female-headed households who are almost twice as likely to be without cattle than male-headed households. They constitute 4% of the population (UNDP, 1995). With reference to income inequality, I refer you to Table 5.1, which shows the Gini Coefficient for Botswana at 0.54, compared to other countries in the Southern African Development Community (SADC). The Gini Coefficient for all countries shown is higher than 0.5, which is among the highest in the world.

TABLE 5.1

Gini Coefficient, Botswana And Other SADC Countries (1998)

Country	Gini Coefficient
Angola	0.54
Botswana	0.54
Lesotho	0.57
Malawi	0.62
Namibia	0.70
South Africa	0.59
Swaziland	0.51
Zambia	0.56
Zimbabwe	0.63

Source: Pillay, 2002:5

Considerable problems of unemployment, poverty, and the emergence of HIV/AIDS, remain to be overcome. Problems of failure to implement fully the national principles and development objectives have had some bearing on the country's capacity to deal with outstanding problems. In 1981 the unemployment rate was 13%. This increased to 21% in the middle of the 1990s, and declined to 19% in 1998 and 15.8 % in 2000. Unemployment is prevalent in the 15-24 age groups, and is estimated at 37% (UNDP, 2002a: 57). Poverty rates are given in the Poverty Profile (Chapter 6). The extent and severity of poverty was concentrated in rural areas.

UNDP (2002a: 3) reports that 'trends in HDI since 1990 fell from 0.654 in 1990 to 0.621 in 1995 and 0.577 in 1999'. This downturn in national development is attributed

to a fall in the life expectancy index, and it is suggested that the HIV/AIDS pandemic has been responsible for the fall. For example in 1999, the GDP and the education indices stood at '0.71 and 0.74 respectively, while life expectancy was 0.28' (UNDP 2002a: 4). As shown in Table 5.2, the HIV/AIDS situation in Botswana is a cause for concern. With close to 1.2 million people, 290, 000 or (18.2%) were infected with HIV as of the end of 1999.

TABLE 5.2
HIV Prevalence In Five Countries In Southern Africa

	South Africa	Botswana	Namibia	Lesotho	Swaziland
Population (000s)	39 900	1 597	1 695	2 108	980
Population Aged 15-49 (000s)	20 982	876	795	1 000	468
% Of Total Population with HIV	10.5%	18.2%	9.4%	11.4%	13.3%
HIV Infected People (000s)	4 200	290	160	240	130
Adult Prevalence Rate of HIV	20.0%	35.8%	19.5%	23.6%	25.3%
Adult Female HIV Population: % of Total	54.8%	51.2%	53.1%	54.2%	51.5%
Pregnant Women HIV+ Prevalence	19.2%	43.0%	25.9%	N/A	30.3%
AIDS Orphans (Living)	370 952	54 943	53 023	29 469	10 705

N/A = Not available

Source: UNAIDS 2000

Of these, just over half (150,000) were women aged 15-49. Close to 36% of all adults are infected with HIV/AIDS. According to 'Secure the Future' (2001), life expectancy has dropped from 61 years seven years ago to 39 in 2000, and by the end of 2010, the figure is projected to fall below 29. Without HIV/AIDS, it would have been over 60. In Namibia, life expectancy in 2010 is projected at under 33, compared with over 70 were it not for the pandemic; in South Africa, 36 and 68; and in Swaziland, 33 and 63. Over 40% of pregnant women are HIV-positive. There were 54,943 living children who have been orphaned by the disease, and another 10,000 infected by HIV.

5.3 Research Area

The research was undertaken in Ghanzi District. Within the district, two specific areas were chosen, namely the District headquarters – Ghanzi Township, and a remote area settlement of West Hanahai. These areas are shown in Map 5.3. Each area is described in detail below.

5.3.1 Ghanzi District²

5.3.1.1 Location And Climate

Both the district and its administrative headquarters share the name Ghanzi. The Ghanzi District is situated in the western portion of Botswana. It measures 117 910 square kilometres. The District is bordered by Ngamiland District in the north, Central District in the east and Kgalagadi and Kweneng Districts in the south. To the west, Namibia borders it (see Map 5.2). Charles Hill is the only Sub-District, measuring 9 600 square kilometres (GDC and GDDC, 1997:1). In terms of the National Settlement Policy (ROB, 1997b) the district is situated in the Western Region, which it shares with a neighbouring district of Kgalagadi. This region is in the dry sand veld and the heart of the Kalahari Desert, or area just known as Kalahari, which covers more than two thirds of Botswana's land area, with thick sand cover up to 120 metres deep. It supports a

vegetation of scrub and grasses, but there is almost complete absence of surface water (ROB, 1997a). The common characteristic of this region includes low and sparsely distributed population, prevalence of saline water and semi-desert conditions (ROB, 1997b: 10). In this ecological zone, climatic and soil conditions are in most cases not suitable for arable agriculture. The rainfall is generally low (between 250 mm and 450 mm) resulting in lack of permanent surface water. According to the Annual Economic Report (ROB, 2000a: 48), the region is regarded as 'an economically depressed area', but with resources such as wildlife, and others, which can be tapped to boost its economy. It is in this same zone where a BIDPA (1997a) study on poverty found that the incidence of poverty was highest (see Chapter 6).

5.3.1.2 Disadvantaged Status Of District's Location

Owing to some eastern bias in development, the Western Region has not had the benefits of mainstream infrastructural development programmes (for example roads, telephones, electricity) enjoyed by the eastern parts of the country (Adams, M. Devitt, P. Gibbs, D. Purcell, R. and White, R., 1990). To this extent the region has been perceived as one of the least developed regions in Botswana, lagging behind³ in both social and economic development activities. The District's major development constraint is poor communication, which magnifies the physical distance, between the district and the rest of the country and between the settlements within the district. Most of the district's road network consists of gravel or deep sand, passable only by four-wheel drive vehicles⁴. Because of its remoteness, Ghanzi district has a generally negative image in the national context. Officers being transferred to the Ghanzi sometimes refuse to go the district and this has caused inadequacy of skills at all levels (GDC and GDDC, 1997). There is a perception of this disparity in development in the region and people do not generally see themselves as part of the country. It is common to hear them referring to eastern part of the country as the 'real' Botswana, and people living there as real Batswana (Interview, Koitsiwe, 18 November, 1999). Because of the weak economic base, there has been a trend for people to drift away, many towards the eastern corridor, which is currently home to over 80% of the national population, who live within 100 kilometres of the railway line (CCI/Landflow Solutions, 1999).

5.3.1.3 District's Population

In 1991 the district's population was 23 723. Of this population, 23.3% (around 5 550 inhabitants) lived in the Ghanzi Township. Approximately 45.5% or (10 802 people) of the district's population were Remote Area Dwellers (RADs) (GDC and GDDC, 1997:9). In the absence of economically viable arable and industrial potential, the majority of the RADs live from the marginal benefits from a combination of activities such as subsistence hunting and gathering, government handouts, casual labour, craft production, and small stock production (GDC and GDDC, 1997:1).

5.3.1.4 Land Use Planning

According to Hitchcock, R. Vinding, D. and Andresen, K. (2000b: 8), Ghanzi District is made up of five basic kinds of land, which largely correspond with details in Map 5.3, as follows.

- freehold land, including the Ghanzi and Xanagas Freehold Farming blocks (13.22% of the district);
- leasehold land (for example the Tribal Grazing Land Policy farms at Makunda and the Second Development Area) (2.56% of the district);
- Wildlife Management Areas (WMAs) (26,342 sq km, or 22.34% of the district);
- state land, including the Central Kalahari Game Reserve (52,313 sq km, 44.36% of the district), and
- communal land, or tribal land (17,619 sq km, or 14.94% of the district). The balance of the land is made up of government farms and trek routes, Remote Area Dweller settlements, and Ghanzi Township (133 sq km).

The most striking topographical feature in the district is the Ghanzi Ridge. The ridge is composed mainly of quartzites. The ridge crosses the district from the north (Kuke) to the west (Mamuno), over a distance of approximately 300 kilometres. The ridge contains the most productive land in the district, due to its high water potential and moderate quality soils. The bulk of the land along the ridge is freehold land, which used to be the territorial hunting grounds of Basarwa, from which they were dispossessed in the 19th century. A large number of commercial farming enterprises (ranches) are found along the ridge. The

majority of the population of the district is located along the ridge, with major population centres being Ghanzi Township and the villages of Charles Hill, Karakubis, Kalkfontein, and Dekar (GDC and GDDC, 1997:1).

5.3.2 Ghanzi Township

A Township is a settlement of varying size established on state or freehold land, which has been declared a township under the Townships Act (ROB, 1998a). Based on GDC and GDDC (1997:59-60), the following information pertains to the Township. Ghanzi Township, the district centre and administrative capital of the district, was gazetted in 1961. In 1980, it was declared a planning area under the Town and Country Planning Act. It occupies an area of approximately 220 square kilometres and had about 20% of the total district population in 1991. It is located in the middle of freehold farms running along the Ghanzi ridge. The Township has a surveyed area called "Town" and the traditional housing areas called "Village". The Village is divided into three areas (also called wards) of Khurakhura, Kgaphamadi and Kabakae. About three-quarters of the total Township population of 5 000 persons live in the Village area.

In light of this division, the Township has an ambiguous nature. It is administered by and is the headquarters of, a rural district council, the Ghanzi District Council. Because it is a Township, it has been treated as a town and the surveyed area has been provided with infrastructure commensurate with urban standards, but full cost recovery for infrastructure has not been considered attainable during National Development Plan 7 (1991-1997), owing to the relatively low standards of living in the Township compared to urban areas in the country. Most of the establishments with commercial activities detailed in Table 5.3 are located in this surveyed area. A project to upgrade the 'village' part was started in 1999 and this involves providing improved roads, water drainage, telecommunications, and electricity. Being mostly rural, the Township is far from offering a haven where minority status is less debilitating and urban life has not yet provided a context in which minorities like Basarwa can join and partially assimilate to national life. Bakgalagadi and some Tswana groups from outside the District are the dominant occupants of the Township. Fringe areas are spaces mostly occupied by Basarwa, where they feel most peripheral and minor.

On the basis of the Ghanzi District Council Minutes (5 to 6 February 1996:15 –16), the three wards cover an area of 309 hectares as follows: Khurakhura covers 76 hectares, Khaphamadi covers 118 hectares, and Kabakae covers 115 hectares. Khurakhura is defined in the north by a 30-metre road passing through the Township to Mamuno; to the west a 30-metre road separates the ward from the Ghanzi western section and another 30-metre road to the east. The ward has approximately 253 existing residential plots, one local centre, two sports fields, two civic/community plots. There are lots of gaps between plots and vacant waste spaces scattered about. Some of these spaces have been utilised and 277 additional plots, four additional civic/community plots and one additional local centre have been realised. Khaphamadi is defined to the east by the 60 metres wide Maun - Lobatse road, to the south by the 45 metre road to Mamuno, and to the north by the ward of Khurakhura. There are about 436 existing residential plots, two local centres and one industrial area with 6 plots. There are also two sports fields, a cemetery, a primary school, a reserved site for additional primary school and twelve civic/community plots. 95% of the area is developed, but the northern part is has lots of unused vacant spaces and gaps between plots.

Kabakae is defined to the northeastern part of Ghanzi Township. To the east of the ward is the proposed Botswana Defence Force (BDF) buffer zone. To the west is the 60-metres wide Maun - Lobatse road, to the north is the airstrip and to the south is the proposed BDF camp. The ward is densely settled in a haphazard manner. A number of gaps can be identified between plots and the extreme eastern part is virtually empty. There are about 392 existing residential plots. The site includes one local centre, one primary school, a reserved primary school site and one civic/community plot. The detailed design concept of the ward is based on clusters separated by 18 metre tertiary roads. As in the other two wards, a network of 15 metre roads follow approximately the existing tracks to give access to both existing and proposed plots.

Ghanzi Township is a secondary centre with basic services and businesses of a higher order, compared to West Hanahai (see Table 5.3). According to the National Settlement Policy (ROB, 1998a), a secondary centre is an intermediate centre with a population of 10 000 to 19 999, or a settlement even if it has less population and a weak economic base, but it plays a key role as district or sub-district headquarters. Secondary centres provide similar types of services but of a lower order than in primary centres⁵. Because

of the level of services and employment offered in the Ghanzi Township as shown in Table 5.3, it experiences an influx of young people seeking employment and educational opportunities. In addition the slow pace of development of secondary and tertiary centres encourages rural to urban migration. The demand for services and plots in Ghanzi Township is thus very high.

TABLE 5.3
Commercial Activities In Ghanzi Township And West Hanahai

Settlement	Bars and Bottle stores	Shebeens	Number and Types of Shops	Street vendors	Cooperatives	Fuel Stations
Ghanzi Township	9	>25	7 general dealers, 1 supermarket, 3 clothes shops, 1 shoe shop, 1 furniture shop, 3 wholesalers, 2 hardware, 3 butcheries, 2 vehicle spares/ repairs, 2 hair salons, 3 takeaways, 1 bank, 1 hotel, 2 fuel points	> 15	1 consumer's coop, 1 agricultural	3
West Hanahai	0	9	0	1	1 shop	0

Shebeen = Drinking Place

Source: Good, K. Mazonde, I. and Cassidy, L. (1999): A - 18

5.3.3 West Hanahai

West Hanahai, located along the Hanahai Valley about 50 km south of the Township, is one of the nine Remote⁶ Area Dweller Settlements which were developed under the

Remote Area Development Programme (RADP), to cater for Remote Area Dwellers (RADs), 'the disadvantaged members of different communities, the landless and those who have no affinity to any other settlement' (GDC and GDDC, 1997:60). The National Settlement Policy defines a Remote Area Settlement as a settlement with a population range of 250 to 499 people. It serves a catchment area of 5 km radius. West Hanahai is the first of four settlements for RADs that were originally planned in 1976 in order to provide a suitable place for Basarwa who were dispossessed of their original land. The settlement provided an alternative to life as squatters and unsatisfied labourers in the newly acquired freehold farms. In 1978 borehole water was supplied to the settlement, and an area of 400 square kilometres allocated around the borehole for use by the inhabitants. By 1979 several Basarwa had families moved from the several areas in the Ghanzi Farm Block to the settlement around the borehole in the Hanahai Valley (Childers, G. Stanley, J. and Rick, K., 1982).

5.4 Details Of Research Groups

In Chapter 4, I identified the research groups but indicated that the details pertaining to these groups would be given in Chapter 5.

5.4.1 Fringe Area Dwellers (FADs)

FADs are people who live outside a village or (township) physically but not a social sense. While not fully integrated, FADs are geographically nearer the mainstream society. They squat at the margins of villages/towns. In western Botswana, a significant population of Basarwa live as squatters on the outskirts of the villages, and I term them FADs. Those who live in village outskirts have been described as:

Outcasts of these villages ... exploited but at the same time neglected by the regular inhabitants, living a semi-nomadic life, using the village infrastructure irregularly ... and having lost any sense of group identity or self-esteem (SNV, 1996:32).

According to Saugestad (1998b) the squatter problem dates as far back as the 1970s. The current Township started as partly the Ghanzi Commonage, a small tract of state land in the middle of the Ghanzi Farm Block, where government facilities and shops had been located. The Commonage and its hinterland, including the neighbouring farm

block, were the original home-place of some Basarwa groups. When these Basarwa were evicted from the freehold farms, they drifted to the Commonage. Since this was state land, the Basarwa, who had been squatting on farms, did not have title to state land and were considered squatters in the Commonage as well. As part of its policy on Basarwa, the Government included the removal of these squatters as one of its policy objectives. It has not been possible to implement this policy fully since squatting continues even today, either due to lack of serviced plots, or lack of resources to develop plots if they are allocated to those who are poor.

According to my research, not all FADs are Basarwa but the majority are (see Poverty Profile in Chapter 6). In the Township, apart from non-Basarwa FADs, other FADs consist of three categories of Basarwa. One category is those Basarwa who originate within the environs of the Township as indicated above. The second are those who were displaced from land taken over by livestock farmers or removed from squatting on such farms. As mentioned in the Poverty Profile about 2 400 people mainly Basarwa, have left farms since 1991. The third group consists of those people who found life in settlements unbearable. Other non-Basarwa FADs come from a variety of places such as villages inside and outside the Ghanzi District. Given their socio-economic status those who live closer to villages seem to be particularly vulnerable to the process of marginalisation. In fact, it seems that the closer to a village/Township structure the squatters are, the more 'remote' they are in terms of economic and social security, because the squatter areas are more exposed to the expansion and population growth leading to increasing competition for scarce resources such as land and water (Gulbransen, O. Karlsen, M, and Lexow, J., 1986). Basarwa living near villages or Township have been described as follows:

In spite of or perhaps due to their lack of remoteness, [the Basarwa] are seen to be worst off not only in terms of their socio-political and economic conditions, but also in the loss of ... identity and pride in their culture (Rivers, 1999:52)

Gulbransen et al (1986) mention that Basarwa living in the Township are employed by Township dwellers on highly temporary piecework basis, for which they are typically compensated by some home-brewed beer. Most live on the outskirts of the Township as destitutes and face problems such as unemployment, alcoholism, poor housing, and stigmatisation.

5.4.2 Remote Area Dwellers (RADs)

Box 5.1

Definition Of Remote Area Dwellers (RADs)

RADs are basically defined as all citizens who live in small communities outside the traditional village structure in remote areas and who tend to:

- Live in small, scattered communities and are sometimes mobile, covering large areas.
- Reside far from basic services and facilities.
- Fall outside the scope of other national development programmes.
- Be poor, lack adequate income or have low wages.
- Rely heavily on hunting and gathering as a source of livelihood.
- Lack livestock.
- Have no, or inadequate, access to land and difficulties in getting land allocated to them.
- Have no, or inadequate access to water, and have few or no water rights.
- Be marginalized ecologically since the resource base upon which they depend is deteriorating, be culturally and linguistically distinct, using a language other than Setswana as their mother language.
- Have a low level of literacy and little access to formal education.
- Have egalitarian political structures, be a 'silent' sector politically, with no appointed leaders of their own and no representation in political bodies; including the Land Boards.

Source: Chr Michelsen Institute, 1996: 24

RADs are spatially remote from the rest of society. Box 5.1 shows the official definition of RADs that was formulated in the late 1970s. The definition has been the subject of debate by some researchers. Saugestad (1998a) has observed that the above definition provides a detailed description that fits the Basarwa more than any other group, such as Ovaherero, Bayeyi, Bakgalagadi or any other non-Basarwa group. As detailed in the Poverty Profile, a majority of RADs in Botswana are Basarwa. As more than half of RADs are Basarwa, 'the term RADs is often used interchangeably with Basarwa'

(Maendeleo (Botswana) 1993:52). In all remote area settlements in Ghanzi District, Basarwa are also a majority. As shown in Table 4.1, 85 % of the residents in the RAD settlement of West Hanahai are Basarwa. Not all Basarwa qualify for assistance under the Remote Area Development Programme (RADP), but most of them do. Due to this empirical overlap or seeming ambiguity between the term RADs and Basarwa there has been a tendency to treat the two terms as synonymous. The RADP is a continuing government programme which aims at improving the standard of living of that part of the rural population that lives outside established and recognised villages (Chr Michelsen Institute, 1996). According to ROB (1997a: 71)⁷, the programme provides funds for physical infrastructure, for example health and education facilities, and water supplies. It is also aimed at institution building, promotion of productive rural employment, and acquisition of land rights for RADs. Apart from continued infrastructural provision, since 1991 the programme has advocated a shift to issues of land, employment, education opportunities, institution building, leadership and training, and attempts to change the negative public attitudes towards RADs. According to Wily (1994), the Programme began as a Bushmen Development Programme in 1974, was renamed the Basarwa Development Programme in 1975, Extra-Rural Development in 1976 and RADP in 1978. The change of name reflected growing reluctance by the Government of Botswana to single out a sector of rural society on ethnic grounds. In 1988 the RADP became the Accelerated RADP (ARADP). The RADP and its predecessors were established in the recognition of the fact that other government programmes did not satisfactorily cater for what is now the target group of the RADP.

Over time the RAD definition has evolved into different formulations, some of which have overlapped with status of poor people not necessarily living in remote areas but urban poor who have similar features to those detailed in the above box. On the basis of the formulations, one analyst has developed eight criteria that indicate that there are problems with the definition (Hitchcock, 1998). I will cite some of the criteria to show how being a RAD has disadvantages. While Government has established a programme for RADs, the benefits thereof do not necessarily accrue to RADs. As I will indicate below, non-RADs have benefited from favours meant for RADs. It seems that non-RADs have taken advantage of the fact that RADs, especially Basarwa, are at the bottom of the socio-economic ladder in the country. They have also taken advantage of

the lack of the Government's capacity to ensure that assistance is properly targeted to RADs.

According to Hitchcock (1998:304-305), a RAD is defined on the basis of the following criteria; each of which poses a problem for the RAD himself.

- A person who lives full time in or most of the time outside a village in a remote rural area, and one who has no affiliation to a village;
- An individual who considers or identifies himself as a RAD. Not everyone who considers himself a RAD has in fact been one;
- One who is identified as a RAD by government and is eligible for state assistance under the RADP;
- Since most if not all RADs do not have water rights allocated to them as individuals, another criterion is that a RAD is one who has no individual water right in an area;
- A RAD is a person who normally resides in land whose use conflicts with other uses.

In Chapter 8, I will return to the problems arising from the RAD label in as far as it has the effect of excluding those so-named from resources/facilities.

Common features of FADs and RADs Basarwa are socio-economic marginality, lack of representation in public decision-making bodies, progressive loss of their subsistence base, and problems with access to services, for example, absence of water and land rights. A Study of Poverty and Poverty Alleviation (BIDPA, 1997a and b) reported on high levels of rural poverty with particular reference to RADs. A distinction between RADs and FADs can be made. RADs have a programme designed for them whereas FADs do not since they are expected to benefit from normal government programmes. Both groups, however, have difficulty in benefiting from government programmes due to non-targeting of assistance, which results in leakage to non-targeted individuals.

5.4.3 Basarwa

Basarwa have a distinctive appearance, and are traditionally a nomadic people subsisting from hunting and gathering, though few survive today exclusively through these methods. They are a numerical majority in Ghanzi District, estimated at 14000 out of the total population of 27 809 in 1998 (Hitchcock, personal communication, 27 June 2000). Of the rest of the Ghanzi population, many if not most are Bakgalagadi, but still

fewer than Basarwa in the district. There are other population groups in Ghanzi District such as Europeans, Tswana, Coloureds, and Baherero.

Although Botswana does not differentiate population on ethnic basis, estimates of Basarwa have been made. One such estimate put the national figure at 47 000 in 1998 (Good et al, 1999). Given that the national population was 1 448 000 in 1998 (Millela, 1999), the Basarwa then made up 3% of the population.

Below is a detailed account of Basarwa. In Botswana, apart from the name Basarwa or shorthand 'Sarwa', this group is known by other three names. These are San, Bushmen and Masarwa. Neither of these names is totally accepted by the people so-named. They are labels given to the people by outsiders or non-Basarwa, and they are derogatory in nature. For instance 'Basarwa' is a term coined by dominant Tswana speaking tribes, who hold political sway in the country. Basarwa is a word that refers to people who cannot have anything for themselves, including keeping cattle, the traditional occupation of the Batswana (The Botswana Guardian, 12 November 1999).

Before I give reasons why I choose the term Basarwa, on the basis of secondary literature, (Childers, 1976; Hitchcock, 1996; Kuru Development Trust (KDT) and Working Group of Indigenous Minorities in Southern Africa (WIMSA), 1999; Loermans 1993; Kann, U. Hitchcock, R. and Mberere, N., 1990; Mogwe, 1992; Mazonde, 1997; Saugestad, 1998b; MLGLH, 1993; Campbell, 1994), I provide background material to all the three names. San denotes those who gather wild food or 'aborigine'. It is a term that has been increasingly used by foreign researchers in Botswana, particularly anthropologists⁸ and is a preferred option for various organisations dealing with this group throughout Southern Africa (KDT and WIMSA, 1999). One source claims that San is an 'umbrella term covering people of different language groups such as Ju/'hoansi, Nharo, !Xo, /Gwi.' (Loermans, 1993:7).

The word Bushmen derives from a Dutch word *Bosjesmanneken*⁹, which the early settlers of South Africa applied to the hunter-gatherer people they encountered (KDT and WIMSA, 1999). It translates to 'bush people' (Ramsay, J. Morton, B. and Morton, F., 1996:41). This matches with one author's account that the name 'Bushman' was derived from what several Basarwa language groups in Ghanzi and other areas call

themselves, which can be literally translated as ‘people of the bush’ (Childers 1976:100). Another source mentions that ‘Bushmen’ is a name given to the San by early Dutch settlers, meaning ‘people who lived in the unoccupied country’ (Tlou and Campbell, 1994:21). Ramsay et al, (1996:41) say the term ‘Bushmen’ first appeared in the 1680s, when first used by the Dutch to describe Cape Khoe speakers who had not succumbed to their overrule in the aftermath of the 1673-1677 Dutch-Khoe war. These people were said to lack livestock¹⁰, land and traditional leaders. The white groups and the Boer descendants labelled those people as ‘bandits’ and shot them like game (Ramsay et al, 1996:41). Silberbauer, a former District Commissioner in Ghanzi in the late 50s was commissioned by the colonial government to conduct a “Bushman” Survey in 1958. In his report, he defined a bushman as ‘an indigenous inhabitant of the region speaking a language with a preponderance of click-consonants, with a present or recent hunter-gatherer lifestyle, and regarded by himself and others as a “Mosarwa” (quoted in Stephen, 1982:4)

In Botswana, Masarwa, like Basarwa, is plural. Singular for Masarwa is Lesarwa. ‘Masarwa’ is indicative of a negative stereotype in that it is used in reference to people of low socio-economic standing or inferiority¹¹. As one student has put it:

It has a derogatory appellation in that linguistically and historically the prefix ‘*ma-*’, in Setswana language denotes subhuman or servile origin, while the more commonly used prefix ‘*ba-*’ as ‘*Bangwato*’, for instance, denotes a sense of national consciousness as it has historically been used to refer to threatening and different people. This is evident in that all the 18th and 19th century invading hordes of Ndebele people, Afrikaners and Europeans were pejoratively referred as Matebele, Maburu and Makgoa, respectively (Thapelo, 1998:129).

According to Nyamnjoh (2002: 761) ‘the *le-ma-* (sing./pl.) prefix in Setswana usually designates someone as foreign, different or outside the community. It is not used just for ethnic groups but for any group or profession that seems to be set apart from average folks’.

Government of Botswana source (Ministry of Local Government, Lands and Housing Paper (undated)), mentions that Basarwa are a heterogeneous group for whom there is no acceptable label. This source identifies 10 to 15 distinct linguistic groups of these people in Botswana, divided into four main language families. Among the larger group are the !Kung (also known as Zu or Ju), Nharo, !Xo, G//ana, Deti, //ani, Buga and Kua.

Most of the languages spoken by these groups are mutually unintelligible. There is no word in their own languages that denotes all the groups together. As I indicated above, outsiders impose all the names on this research group. For this reason there is no consensus among those who are responsible for the various 'labels'. One author, who prefers to use the name 'Khwe',¹² accepts that this group is not homogeneous. He says they speak at least three mutually unintelligible languages each with its own dialects, and they have different customs (Campbell, 1994). In the Ghanzi District, it is estimated that there are seven different groups of Basarwa (Mogwe, 1992). Mogwe conducted an assessment of the human rights situation of Basarwa in the district and she reported:

The origin of the word 'Basarwa' was explained (*by respondents*) as being '*ba ba-ba-sa-ruing dikgomo* (those who do not rear cattle). The positive (those who rear cattle) is *ba-rua dikgomo* compared to the negative (those who do not rear cattle) is *ba-sa-rua dikgomo*. This phrase then became *ba-sa-rwa* (Mogwe, 1992:3).

At Government level, the research group is officially known as Basarwa (Childers, 1976:100). At a conference including Basarwa representatives in 1993, it was resolved that the names 'Mosarwa' and 'Basarwa' were acceptable, provided these were not used in a derogatory manner.

Basarwa groups have been critical of the terms used to identify them on the grounds of their being derogatory and pejorative. There are indications that some of the Basarwa research groups prefer to be called by their local group names. For instance one Ghanzi group, the Nharo, calls themselves *N/oakwe*, which means red people (KDT and WIMSA, 1999:6), and describe other natives of Botswana as black people. This is said to be the reason why the Basarwa are not in favour of being referred to just as Batswana (Chr. Michelesen Institute 1996). Similarly a majority of like groups in the Kalahari refer to themselves by their local group names, for example, G/wi, G//ana, Ju/'hoansi and !Xo, most of which translates as 'true people' or 'genuine people' (Hitchcock, 1996:27-28).

I chose the term Basarwa for the following reasons. It is a common name by which the group is known at local and national levels. An objection to one name or the other has tended to be a dominant feature in the academic landscape. Outsiders object to a

particular use and provide their own justification. The representatives that accepted the term in 1993 might not have represented the wider group. The fact that they accepted the term conditionally however, is one reason to use it. In Ghanzi where I did the field research, Basarwa respondents did not object to be called such. From here onwards I will consistently use the name Basarwa.

Literature on Basarwa describes their characteristics (Suzman and Pedder, 1998; Macdonald and Molamu, 1998; Kann et al, 1990; Selolwane, 1998). It will be noted that these features generally correspond with those of a minority group or an indigenous group as described in Chapter 3. Whether in the national or local sense, they have characteristics that set them apart from other ethnic groups in Botswana. I have introduced the notion of difference as a basis for discrimination and exclusion in Chapter 2. In Chapter 1, I showed how Basarwa are different from other Batswana. Owing to the difference, Basarwa have problems with social and material aspects of their life. They face difficulty in penetrating political and economic structures in Botswana. The Tswana groups, who have blended these structures with western ideals, dominate such structures (Interview, Selolwane, 3 April 2000). The following circumstances are associated with the difficulty. Basarwa are distinct culturally and often stigmatised as a minority. Other groups consider them inferior and they consider themselves likewise. Basarwa occupy the lowest rung of the country's political, economic and social ladder, and this status has a historical basis, as I will show in Chapter 8. Few Basarwa have adapted culturally to exploit what opportunities may arise. Basarwa generally suffer from cultural, social, economic and political exclusion on account of their ethnicity. Some of this exclusion is captured in the quotation below.

Not only have they suffered years of dispossession of land and stock, but they have also experienced other human rights violations such as rape, torture and detention without trial – simply because they are a minority. In a nation state that is internationally recognised for its liberal democratic record, this group of nationals has in fact also suffered from lack of representation (because their leaders have not been accorded recognition by the state) and participation in the system of government. They have therefore as a group not enjoyed the fruits of independence and economic development to the same extent as other nationals of Botswana (Selolwane, 1998:408).

Basarwa do not have group rights to land and do not participate in national legislative and executive institutions. One report has identified them as the 'poorest of the desperately poor' (Kann et al, 1990: x). They are engaged mostly in unskilled labour in

commercial livestock farms, cattle posts where wages are extremely low. In towns and villages they tend to live on the fringes. Terms used to characterise their social position include 'alienation, dependency, deprivation, despair, discrimination, disintegration, dispossession, exploitation, marginalisation, oppression, political exclusion and powerlessness' (Macdonald and Molamu, 1998: 327). Against the above background, in subsequent chapters, I will explain why and how Basarwa are in this disadvantaged position. History is mostly to blame.

5.4.4 Bakgalagadi¹³

Bakgalagadi is a name given to a number of different peoples because they live in the Kgalagadi or Kalahari Desert, and speak dialects of a Sotho-Tswana language called SeKgalagadi (Ramsay et al, 1996). Kuper (1970: 4) indicates that Kalahari is an anglicisation of Kgalagadi. He suggests that the desert was named after Bakgalagadi people. Five main groups of this research group have been identified, namely Bakgwatheng, Babolaongwe, Baphaleng, and Bashaga and Bangologa. The last subgroup is dominant in Ghanzi District (Kuper, 1970:10).

The Bangologa and Bakgwatheng are reported to have been living in the region then geographically known as southwestern Transvaal in 1300 AD, where they lived with the Barolong, a Tswana group.

In 1550 the Bangologa broke off from the Barolong and moved to the western part of present day Botswana where they settled in the Kgalagadi District. Later the group split and some went to north and reached Ghanzi in 1750. Wherever the Bakgalagadi went, they found Basarwa already living there. The Bakgwatheng grew crops and kept a few cattle, sheep and goats. Bangologa and Babolaongwe were pastoralists with large herds of sheep and goats and a few cattle. They grew crops on a lesser scale than the Bakgwatheng since they devoted more time to hunting and gathering. A close similarity between the Bakgalagadi and the Tswana was reflected in their politics, customs, and pottery. The main difference was in language (Pfothenauer, 1994). Like the Tswana, most of the Bakgalagadi established villages in southern Ghanzi. A minority remained with the largely non-sedentary Basarwa with whom they intermarried and eventually

considered themselves as Basarwa. Although a minority numerically, the Bakgalagadi are the district's dominant group in that they successfully shape and control other groups like the Basarwa. Although Bakgalagadi are accorded inferior social status by the Tswana, the former accord the same treatment to the Basarwa. The Bakgalagadi have historically been serfs to the Tswana and the former have enserfed Basarwa. (Kuper, 1970).

5.5 Nature Of State In Botswana

Below I present the political scenario against which the problems of Basarwa as described above should be understood. Efforts to improve the standard of living of Basarwa are surrounded by problems at the national level. These are the dominance of the state in public policy, and the absence of countervailing forces to keep this dominance under check, owing to the weaknesses of opposition parties and the civil society.

5.5.1 Class Character

This state has a class character. There is unanimity that the class forces that came to power at independence were of petty bourgeois complexion (Mogalakwe, 1997; Tsie, 1996; and Molutsi, 1998a). This class included mostly those who had been educated during the colonial era, people from the royal family and rich commoner families (Molutsi, 1998a). In Botswana, this class of petty bourgeois nationalists, including leading farmers, teachers, clerks, journalists, was represented in the ruling Botswana Democratic Party (BDP). Since independence the BDP has scored electoral victories, clearly dominating the political landscape of the country, leading to the conclusion that the country is a de facto one-party state (Molutsi, 1998a). The transformation of Botswana's economy, accompanied by high rates of economic growth, has generated substantial wealth for the state. 'The state possesses the financial resources and developmental capacities to alleviate poverty, but its controllers continue to prioritise other matters [other than development of Basarwa]' (Good, 1999a: 185).

State intervention in some spheres in the economy has served special interest groups. Before independence the colonial state promoted a specific form of capitalist development that favoured the growth of a class of cattle breeders. The post-colonial state, owing to its relative financial strength, continued this capitalist enterprise, among other things. According to Mayende (1994), the implementation of government policies was directed mainly at promoting the cattle industry, which was in the hands of the indigenous elite. 'Of the rural population 45% own no cattle, 40% own up to 50 head each and 15% own three-quarters of the national herd of 3.4 million' Mayende (1994:498). Senior national politicians and senior civil servants significantly represent these cattle barons within the state apparatus. The cattle barons and other rich agrarian strata earn 42% of the total rural incomes. It has been noted that 'policies on livestock, arable agriculture, income tax and land tenure system are more in favour of the country's leading cattle and arable farmers' (Molutsi, 1989:126). The foregoing scenario is in line with the observation that 'the state in Africa, influenced by dominant class interests ... has too often tended to skew its resource allocation policies in such a way as to favour its constituency...' (Chazan et al, 1999:125).

Another attempt to examine the nature of State in Botswana is that by Toteng (2001). Drawing from the elite theory of state or public policy by Dye (1984:28-29), Toteng (2001) summarises this theory as follows.

The elite theory of state or public policy development asserts that [public policy] is a set of preferences of the ruling class or elite. The ruling class, however, often wishes to depict public policy laden with and driven by their own class interests as a reflection of the 'people' or the 'public's wishes'. From a theoretical standpoint the elite tend to manipulate public opinion to set their own agenda (Toteng 2001:20).

The elite theory suggests that public policy is more the domain of the elite than of the masses. In Botswana there are indications that this theory has some relevance. According to Toteng (2001: 28) 'in Botswana state policies reflect the interests of the ruling class, and the political and ruling elite manipulates public opinion in the design of public policy'. Dominance in public policy by the elite is facilitated by the weakness of the civil society, which does not have much influence in policy-making. In addition to this I think the weakness of another sector in the political landscape in Botswana, the opposition parties, contributes to the dominance described above. I discuss this

weakness and its implications below in the context of the failings of the democratic exercise in Botswana.

5.5.2 One Dominant Party State

Kerr and Kwele (2000) point to the international acclaim Botswana has received as being a 'shining example of liberal democracy in a continent notorious for one party states and military dictatorships' Kerr and Kwele (2000:1314). According to Molutsi (1989) Botswana's system of government has the main democratic principles. These are regular elections, a multiparty system, universal adult suffrage, freedom of association, freedom of speech, protection of rights and property. When Botswana's democratic system was compared to other systems in and outside Africa prior to the wave of democratisation that started in Africa in the 1980s, it made sense to applaud the system, but it has flaws. This can be demonstrated by considering one of the principles, that of multipartyism. Despite regular elections, there has been no change in power as a single party has dominated the political scene. As indicated in section 5.2.3, the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) has been in power from 1966 to date, making Botswana a de facto one party state. The BDP has dominated Parliament¹⁴.

Molutsi (1998a) identifies one of the elements of Botswana's democracy for nearly three decades as the persistent weakness of the opposition political parties, which has resulted in a weak parliament. An observation made by Molutsi (1993) still largely holds to date. He remarked:

[Parliament] is fairly weak in relation to the Executive. There are not many cases of any policies, programmes or budgets changes that were brought about by the refusal of Parliament to endorse Cabinet proposals¹⁵. As a result, most of the discussions in Parliament, including those relating to development plans are a mere formality (Molutsi, 1993:29).

This weakness contravenes the principle of democratic governance, which requires 'widespread, substantive participation and accountability for those holding power' (UNDP, 2002b: 36). One reason why the opposition has failed to fare better is the lack of a level playing field for political participation. The problem is that opposition parties are 'not free to compete on equal terms with the ruling party which has a monopoly of access to media and other infrastructure necessary for political competition' (Medhanie,

1993:65). This media monopoly makes it difficult for the opposition to make its presence felt in the political scene, and makes it easy for the ruling party to dominate and pursue its own interests. Democracy cannot subsist without countervailing powers and competition for public office. One of the requirements of democracy, that of well functioning political parties (UNDP, 2002b) is not satisfied. As Molutsi has indicated one important implication is the weakness of Parliament in Botswana. Table 5.4 demonstrates the dominance of the BDP and the weakness of the opposition parties. It shows the number of parliamentary seats held by political parties from 1965 to 1994. BNF denotes Botswana National Front. BPP is the Botswana People Party. BIP stands for Botswana Independence Party. IFP is Independence Freedom Party. According to one newspaper, 'for a long time, the opposition [in Botswana] has remained very weak, not because it does not have the vote, but because it is not united' (Mmegi Monitor, 07 - 13 July, 2003).

Apart from the reasons shown in endnote 13, the opposition's representation has been nominal due to a history of splits and internal fights within opposition parties. In addition the parties have failed to present clear alternative policies to the ruling party. The major opposition party, the BNF, split in 1998 owing to infighting. The majority of its parliamentarians (that is 11 out of 13) together with 68 councillors formed the new Botswana Congress Party in 1998 (Molomo and Somolekae, 2000: 5). Partly due to this split, the BNF obtained half of the seats it had won in 1994. Since 1991, occasional efforts to unite political parties have not borne fruit. The opposition has thus failed to present itself as a coherent and united front that can provide an alternative government. This has been compounded by lack of party funding to run campaigns, advertising and securing transport for all constituencies available. The ruling party does not seem to have suffered from funding constraints since it is reported to have received generous donations from undisclosed sources for the 1999 election year (Molomo and Somolekae, 2000: 14).

TABLE 5.4**Number And Percentage Of Parliamentary Seats Held By Political Parties, 1965-94**

Party	1965	1969	1974	1979	1984	1989	1994
BDP	28	24	27	29	28	31	31
BNF	-	3	2	2	5	3	13
BPP	3	3	2	1	1	0	0
BIP/IFP	0	1	1	0	0	0	0
Total	31	31	32	34	34	34	44
% Of seats							
BDP	90	77	84	91	82	91	67.5
BNF	-	10	6.5	6	15	9	32.5
BPP	10	10	6.5	3	3	0	0.0
BIP	0	3	3	0	0	0	0.0

Source: Molutsi, 1998a: 371

This weakness of the opposition parties means that the success of their parliamentary motions, which might improve, for example, problems with implementation of existing policies, cannot be guaranteed. If it pleases the ruling dominant party to reject them, no barrier stands in its way. Motions from the opposition may be rejected but similar ones from the ruling party accepted. For example, a motion to amend sections 77, 78 and 79 of the Constitution of Botswana¹⁶ to recognise the equality of all the tribes of Botswana and their chiefs was tabled in Parliament by a member of the opposition in 1988 (Hansard, 2nd December, 1988:475). After a debate, it was rejected. In 1995 a member of the ruling party tabled a similar motion and it was accepted (Hansard, February 1995:85). Without a credible opposition, it is possible for authoritarianism to take root, and for those in the ruling party to reject changes, which might be beneficial to the nation. Political attempts by the opposition to debate policies likely to reduce social exclusion are not likely to be successful in such a dominant one party state. Botswana's democratic system is flawed to the extent it does not accommodate participation and decision making at all levels, which is the essence of democracy. It is in this context

that the persistent disadvantaged position of Basarwa (summarised above) should be understood.

5.5.3 Developmental State

Some analysts have described the Botswana state as a developmental state (Tsie 1996, 1998; Edge 1998). Citing related work Tsie (1996), cites Leftwich (1995) to argue that Botswana state is 'developmental'. Two years later, he substantiates this notion by arguing that the Botswana state meets five of the six major characteristics of a developmental state. These are: 'relative autonomy... a determined ... elite, an insulated, powerful and effective bureaucracy, a weak civil society, and effective management of public-private sector relations' (Tsie 1998:14). The foregoing conceptualisation has been further developed by Edge (1998). Edge identifies the manifestation of a developmental state in Botswana in terms of the following elements:

- The government's leading role in the development process;
- The existence of an authoritarian government directing state administration;
- State control and mediation of workers' wage demands upon employers;
- The existence of a weak military;
- Vast foreign aid provision in the state's infancy;
- The expansion of social services and infrastructure;
- Increases in the rates of growth, gross national product and per capita income during an extended period of time;
- Increased manufacturing output and government effectiveness in the delivery of goods and services;
- A national development plan that serves to unify the various sectors of economic, social and infrastructural development as a whole (Edge 1998:333-334).

What elements of the developmental state above are responsible for spurring exclusion in Botswana in general and of the Basarwa in particular? I think that two elements have had an impact on exclusion. These are the Government's leading role in the development process, and the weakness of the civil society. Tsie (1998) has identified one of the contradictions in Botswana's development policy as 'abject poverty [coexisting] with ostentatious wealth concentrated in the hands of the state and a

minority of large cattle farmers, business persons in the commercial, construction, manufacturing and real estate sectors, and top public servants who are also involved in these facets of accumulation' (Tsie, 1998:16).

5.5.4 Government's Leading Role

One of the elements of a developmental state is a domineering role, where the state controls every aspect of the economy and society to maintain its power and domination. This manifests in a tendency to dominate decision-making and policy processes, with the risk of stifling the efforts of non-state players, particularly the non-governmental institutions and the community, in contributing to the national development process. This dominance has implications for the quality of policy design. In this connection, a government publication attributes failure to efforts to strengthen rural economy and improve livelihoods to the following:

In many cases the formulation and implementation of rural development policies has been undertaken by government with only limited community involvement. This has contributed to a dependency on government support rather than to a momentum of self-standing, sustainable improvements. (ROB, 1997c: 1). Italics in original.

In other words, community participation, which is the involvement of communities and individuals in various stages of development activities, including formulation, planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation, has not been fully incorporated in government development strategy. This lack of involvement has been due to a top-down approach where programmes retain most of the power and responsibilities for formulation and implementation at the central level, treating communities as recipients rather than participants. It has been observed that the approach to policy formulation in Botswana 'has often been technocratic, allowing little input from or participation by the ordinary citizens in the public policy-making process' (Tsie, 1998:9). The pitfall of this arrangement is that if central or local government determines village level development activities, rather than by the communities themselves, there is a risk that there will be a poor choice in relation to the specific situation, constraints and opportunities of the particular community. Doing things for communities may contribute to ownership problem. Communities may they tend to perceive programmes as being imposed from outside.

An example of the above tendency is the Government's approach to the Remote Area Development Programme (RADP). This approach, typical of most development interventions in rural development in Botswana since independence (1966), is top-down, where development strategies are conceived *for* rather than *with* people. Under such a set up, people are denied the opportunity to be agents of development, that is, to have 'the responsibility to decide what development is, what values it is to maximise, and the methods for realising it – [and to] have the prerogative of making public policy at all levels' (Ake, 1996:126).

With respect to RADP, little effort has been made to develop communities that are self-sufficient and self-reliant. Evaluations of the RADP and some of the projects involving Basarwa in Botswana indicated that the degree to which local people were able to plan and direct project activities tended to be relatively limited (Kann et al, 1990; Egner, 1981). This lack of involvement has inevitably heightened dependency of RADs on the government. Childers et al (1982) have commented on this approach in this fashion:

The approach is often paternalistic and patronising. "We need to develop these Basarwa" is a common phrase heard, especially amongst politicians in Ghanzi. Government and Council officials, who approach Basarwa in this manner, as children who are not capable of making and implementing decisions on their own, only subject them to increased dependency and retrogression (Childers et al, 1982:33).

The Government approach is based on a development paradigm that is untenable in that 'it tends to have a negative view of people and their culture, [and] cannot accept them on their terms. Its point of departure is not what is, but what ought to be' (Ake, 1996:15). The paradigm focuses on the possibility of Basarwa becoming what they are not and probably can never be. The dominant Tswana want Basarwa to be like them, to become sedentary, live in villages, raise livestock, adopt Tswana-based institutions like traditional institutions, and so on. But the Basarwa are slow or have difficulty in conforming. The dominant group perceives Basarwa as needing to be 'developed' and as being 'uncivilised'. A former Vice President in Botswana has said: 'we have to civilise [Basarwa], whether they like it or not' (Perrott, 1992:152). The fact is that the mainstream development strategies adopted do not take account of Basarwa's cultural realities. Extension workers typically view the rural population, including Basarwa, as being themselves enemies to their own advancement. These officers often have to implement Government directives, and may not bother to interrogate why rural people

resist implementation of these directives. Giving reasons why bureaucrats do not have faith in the values of participation, Ayee (2000) argues:

The highly centralised character of bureaucracies does not allow the field staff any discretion to act. Their inability to act when the local situation demands that certain things be done promptly discourages the people to come forth. Rather than act and as a result get into trouble, the field staff prefers to sit back, and await orders from above. Often it is safer not to act than to act (Ayee, 2000: 11 –12).

5.5.5 Weak Civil Society

The centralisation of development strategy has not only affected communities, but also elements of the civil society. One author concluded that '[Botswana] ... has been characterised by ... a weak civil society' (Molutsi, 1998a: 372). The civil society can be viewed as an umbrella term for a variety of formal and informal organisations that exist between the public and private spheres. It includes various institutions, including non-governmental organisations, trade unions, religious institutions and professional institutions (Lekorwe, 1998). I will, however, focus on non-governmental organisations (NGOs) below. There has been a growth of civil society in Botswana, including non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and community based organisations over the past decades. 'These, however, have not had a significant effect on policymaking, planning, and implementation of rural development. Their lack of influence suggests that decentralisation and participatory development processes are far from being attained' (BIDPA 2001a: 7). Factors that militate against the emergence of a strong civil society have been identified in literature (Molutsi, 1998b; Lekorwe, 1998; Molomo and Somolekae, 2000; BOCONGO, 2000).

The first is the lack of financial and human resources to establish NGOs and run them effectively. The Government and the private sector have tended to take the lion's share of available human resources. NGOs have tended to rely on external donors for their sustenance. Since the 1990s, however, these sources of funding have been dwindling¹⁷. This has threatened the sustainability of civil society efforts, and increased the chances that the state remains dominant without a countervailing voice.

Secondly, even when money is available, there has been an absence of organisation and group effort (Molutsi, 1998b). Thirdly, Molutsi identifies another reason as the Government's hostility towards the civil society and private media, and its refusal to ratify many international ILO and UN conventions (Molutsi, 1998b). A manifestation of this hostility has been to consider the civil society as weak in relation to the state, and view it as 'primarily concerned with promoting interests of members and no so much with their relationship with the state'¹⁸. In addition to this problem was the tendency of the state to apply a corporate strategy of initiating the formation of civil society organisations. Molomo and Somolekae (2000) concur with the conclusion that:

As a result of the corporate strategy, the state has appropriately defined the role and functions of each organisation and circumscribed these such that it becomes easy to label and isolate other as political ... the effect of this strategy was that the state systematically denied itself a chance to hear the voice of the people (Molomo and Somolekae, 2000:5).

Not only did the state isolate those civil society groups seeking to influence policy, the 'state has also had the tendency to emasculate some sections of civil society labelling them as "agents of foreign influence"' (Molomo and Somolekae, 2000: 5). Basarwa-based organisations differ from those of other minority groups in Botswana because of the tendency to internationalise their movement whereas other ethnic groups have tended to focus more on issues at the national level (Hitchcock, 2002). Through this approach they have forged links with indigenous movements in other parts of the world, and associated themselves with northern human rights NGOs of the likes of Survival International. The Basarwa organisations such as First People of the Kalahari (FPK) have had substantial assistance from outside donors and researchers. Due to these linkages and the Government of Botswana's opposition to the indigenous rights movement, organisations like FPK have come under the above label. As Hitchcock (2002: 824) notes 'the efforts of some of the outside organisations were seen by the Botswana Government as disruptive and biased, and were taken as indicative of a lack of local commitment and a low degree of internal strength and resolve on the part of Basarwa organisations'. Against this background, the Government has seen the intervention of NGOs in Basarwa affairs as one of control rather than facilitation, 'accusing, not only outsider NGOs, but also the "most vocal Basarwa" for not articulating the views of their fellow Basarwa' (Tshepho, 2002: 11). In connection with this matter, the Botswana Council of Non-Governmental Organisations (BOCONGO)¹⁹

has identified a problem with the partnership between Government and NGOs, seeing it as ad hoc and undefined. This is compounded by the delay in formulation by Government of an NGO policy that is expected to specify the need for a solid partnership between NGOs and Government (BOCONGO, 2000: 23)

Owing to the weakness of civil society, the Government's domineering role has prevailed without effective challenge. Tangri (1999) notes that because of the limited development of civil society, new African leaders possess a relatively autonomous position in policy making, with the state bureaucracy and leading politicians enjoying considerable discretion in domestic decision-making. 'Given the weakness of civil societies, social forces have been unable to counterbalance state dominance' (Tangri, 1999:10). In other words, the weakness of the civil society has constrained the capacity of citizens working in concert to articulate their interests, exchange ideas and make demands on the state. In cases where civil society organisations have assisted concerned people to articulate their needs and have recommended action by the state, it has remained the prerogative of the state whether to take action or not. In cases where there has been lack of political will to do anything, important recommendations which could improve people's lives if implemented, have not been acted upon.

It should be noted that the judgement that Botswana civil society is weak has been biased towards the failings of the NGOs. It loses sight of the fact that there are exceptions and that NGOs have contributed something to the development of the country. Indeed there are those NGOs that have been able to influence public policy and exert democratic pressure to the state²⁰. Therefore the NGOs cannot be generally dismissed as 'weak'. Other studies have been positive about the impact of NGOs on development in Botswana. For instance, BIDPA (2003) notes that there are many NGOs operating in remote areas that often have skills and experience in conducting community led development projects. With respect to poverty alleviation, BOCONGO claims that NGOs have the following strengths:

- NGOs are not just facilitators but implementers of development programmes and projects;
- NGOs are better placed to conduct needs assessments for the development of poverty alleviation programmes;
- They can undertake capacity building for the communities to empower them to participate in project implementation, monitoring and evaluation;
- NGOs can be instrumental in disseminating information to local communities;

- They embark on extensive advocacy and lobbying programmes to ensure that development programmes are inclusive, targeted, sustainable and that communities are held accountable and take ownership around their lives;
- NGOs have proved that they are driven by a need(s) to exist and are therefore, responsive to such needs (BOCONGO, 2000: 15-16)

In spite of this potential, I will show from the example of KDT that some NGOs do not necessarily harness this know-how for the benefit of the broad community.

Below I assess the performance of some Basarwa-based NGOs. These NGOs are First People of the Kalahari (FPK hereafter), Kuru Development Trust (KDT) and Ditshwanelo (Botswana Centre for Human Rights [BCHR]). The first two are based in Ghanzi, whilst BCHR is located in Gaborone. The assessment is undertaken against the Tendler's 'articles of faith' (1982) and Kharono's (2000) claims, which I introduced in Chapter 3. In that chapter, I mentioned that non-state actors, especially NGOs engender exclusion, because of a gap between their aims and action. Through a case study of KDT, the gap is demonstrated. With respect to FPK and BCHR, it is more the weaknesses of these organisations than the gap that accounts for their contribution towards exclusion of their constituents. These weaknesses are endogenous and exogenous to these NGOs. Endogenous factors relate to lack of financial and human resources. Exogenous factors relate to mutual suspicion and hostility that sometimes characterise government - NGO relationship. In this connection, Somolake (1992) has observed:

Quite often NGOs in Africa have found themselves incapacitated in their activities by the hostile environment created by governments. This has been specifically true of human rights and environmental NGOs pushing for reforms that are in conflict with the political values of the governments in power (Somolekae, 1992: 13)

The case study on FPK concentrates on Basarwa who have lived in a Game Reserve and shows that the NGO's efforts to fight for these Basarwa's rights to continue living in the Reserve, have not been successful. Even if these Basarwa are not the subject of this thesis, what the case study shows is that efforts to improve the livelihoods of Basarwa have not been totally successful anywhere in Botswana. The Government has decided that Basarwa should assimilate into the mainstream society and has enforced this assimilation policy, even if it involves a cost to Basarwa, who have to forgo their culture, but generally face problems in adapting to the mainstream culture.

5.5.6 Battle For Basarwa Rights: Wrestling Between FPK And The Government Of Botswana

Below I describe the activities of FPK and the constraints it faces in its objective. I indicate the hostile environment under which FPK operates as evidenced by some disempowering spirit from the state. FPK has its internal weaknesses, which makes it difficult for the organisation to achieve its aims.

FPK is a Basarwa organisation focusing on human rights and the culture of the Basarwa. Advocacy, research on traditional resource rights, land mapping, and networking are its main strategies. Unlike KDT, FPK has the largest percentage of Basarwa staff of all Basarwa-related NGOs, and this has enabled the organisation to engage in what might be seen as overtly political activities. The uniqueness of FPK lies in its emphasis on lobbying and advocacy work on behalf of Basarwa people, and its ability to draw attention to Basarwa issues in international fora (for example the ILO and the UN Human Rights Commission, the United States Senate and United Kingdom House of Lords).

FPK's target group is defined as politically and socially marginalized Basarwa in Botswana. This group covers the residents of the Central Kalahari Game Reserve (CKGR) and those of settlements in the Ghanzi, Kgalagadi and North West Districts. Much of the activities of FPK have been concentrated in the Ghanzi District with special focus on the CKGR residents. FPK works on the principle that Basarwa have rights and should be allowed to stay in their places of origin and utilise their own natural resources.

According to FPK's analysis, Basarwa are not poor, but are made to be poor, by being pushed from their areas, far from the resources for their survival. According to Hitchcock et al (2000b: 11), FPK's aims are:

- Recognition of [Basarwa] as one people;
- Creation of a representative (duly elected) national Council for the [Basarwa];
- The recognition of [Basarwa] traditional land rights and human rights;

- The strengthening of [Basarwa] culture and the multiple forms of expression, which are significant to [Basarwa] culture.

In the light of the above aims, the organisation's main project is founded on the following objectives:

That CKGR communities are able to defend their human rights, their collective land rights and participate in the sustainable management and development of their communities; that a land claim documenting and ensuring that CKGR residents' ownership of land, their access to natural resources and their development rights has been presented to the Government of Botswana. (Hitchcock et al, 2000b: 13).

In view of plans by the Government to relocate Basarwa outside the Reserve (see below), the FPK has championed an initiative to counter the plans. It has set in motion efforts to register people in relation to a land claim should they be removed from the CKGR. Registration was undertaken in two settlements of New Xade and Kaudwane, where the first group of relocated Basarwa were settled. In 1996, a Negotiating Team, consisting of FPK, KDT, the Working Group of Indigenous Minorities in Southern Africa and Ditshwanelo, was formed. Its mandate is to represent CKGR residents in negotiations with Government of Botswana on the issues detailed in the above quotation. In 1999, the Negotiating team met the Minister of Local Government, Lands and Housing, who refused to recognise its mandate and stated clearly that the Government of Botswana would only grant ownership of land to Basarwa who moved out of the Reserve into the resettlement villages of Kaudwane and New Xade.

In its attempts to fight for the self-determination of Basarwa, FPK is working under a hostile political environment and considerable resistance from the Government. It seems that FPK's strategies contradict Government policies. These policies are based on the principles that development strategy should not be based on ethnic considerations, that Basarwa should not be treated as a separate, special group, and should be integrated into mainstream society rather than being left in areas like CKGR. On the other hand, FPK's agenda recognises the Basarwa as a tribe, eligible for representation in the House of Chiefs, and seeks that Basarwa be represented in national decision-making bodies like the Parliament, senior positions in central and local government services.

The historical background to the Government's position, which is opposed to FPK, follows. In 1958 a Bushmen Survey Officer was appointed to look into the situation of the 'Bushman people'. This culminated in a report which recommended, among other things, the establishment of the CKGR to 'save the fauna and flora of the area from extinction, and because it was the home of the 'wild' Bushmen ... who had expressed a wish to continue to live their traditional life [of hunting and gathering] without encroachment' (Stephen, 1982:10). The Government accepted this recommendation and the CKGR was established in 1961. Since then the residents of the Reserve have tended to have greater degrees of access to natural resources than those living outside the Reserve. In the 1990s, however, the status of the CKGR began to change, with Government starting a campaign in 1991 to move Basarwa communities out of the Reserve, although it maintained that it would not force anyone to leave the CKGR.

The Government's justification for relocating Basarwa can be summarised in the following arguments. The first is the land use conflict argument, which contends that bringing developments into the Reserve would destroy the pristine environment of the Reserve, and jeopardise wildlife-based tourism (Botswana Guardian, 20 April, 2001:5). In other words, Basarwa must move out to create room for wildlife. Basarwa have countered this argument by saying they have lived with wildlife for generations and protected it. This argument is supported by the fact that the wildlife in the CKGR still exists, as opposed to other areas (Mogwe, 1992). For the Basarwa, the decision to move them out of the Reserve has been perceived as alienation from their lifestyle, which was based on a close relationship with the land, and its wildlife resources. According to the Minister of Local Government, another rationale of moving Basarwa from the CKGR was that, 'it was government policy aimed at integrating them with the rest of society. It was intended to give them an equal opportunity in development' (Mmegi/The Reporter, 20-26 April, 2001:3). The relocation of Basarwa in Government-created settlements, has not, however, as will be shown in Chapter 7, given them 'equal opportunity in development' (Mmegi/The Reporter, 2001). As long as Basarwa lived in the Reserve, they were shielded from exploitation as cattle post/farm labourers or squatters, which their counterparts in other parts of Ghanzi encountered²¹. Whilst their counterparts outside the Reserve were distracted from fully enjoying RADP benefits by outsiders, the Reserve inhabitants did not face such disturbance.

Nonetheless, in 1997, residents of the CKGR from the settlement of Xade were resettled outside the Reserve in the newly created settlements of New Xade and Kaudwane, in the name of wildlife conservation and tourism. Basarwa and FPK, arguing that the Reserve was established originally as a means of protecting their own land and resource use rights, challenged this. About 600 Basarwa still remained in the Reserve settlements of Molapo, Metsiamanong, Mothomelo, Kikao, Gugama and Kgope. Another wave to move out the rest of Basarwa from the Reserve started in 2001. In 9 April 2000 the Ghanzi District Council resolved to cut services (specified below) to Basarwa staying in CKGR, on the excuse of the high expense incurred (Botswana Guardian, 20 April, 2001). The parent Ministry of District Councils did not approve this resolution. This decision changed a year later when the Minister concerned acted in accordance with the resolution by informing CKGR residents that 'from 31 January 2002, it will no longer provide any basic services such as water, food rations, transport of children to and from boarding schools, and the provision of health services' (The Botswana Gazette, 6 February, 2002: 5). The Government considered the cost of providing services as unsustainable, estimated at P55 000 per month or P73 per resident per month (The Botswana Gazette, 6 February, 2002: 5). It is clear that in spite of the Government's position that it does not support forceful removal of Basarwa, the latest strategy to phase out services will definitely force some people to move out. Already according to the Botswana Daily News, (13 February, 2002:1), 50 Basarwa families had relocated from Kgope, Mothomelo and Metsiamanong to Kaudwane settlement. 17 Basarwa in Kikao and Gugama, however, have refused to relocate either to New Xade or Kaudwane and risk forgoing services.

The above case study shows Basarwa are torn between conflicting objectives on how their needs can be met with the Government on the one hand, and the Basarwa-based NGO on the other. The Government's policy is to encourage and foster the integration of Basarwa into the mainstream Tswana communities, considering this to be the best way to address the marginalisation of Basarwa. According to Mazonde (1997) this policy has been criticised by sympathisers of Basarwa as discriminatory in two ways. First, the Government has been accused of trying to detribalise the Basarwa through its policy of integrating them into the mainstream tribes of Botswana, none of which has a culture similar to that of the Basarwa. The FPK has opposed the relocation of Basarwa from CKGR fearing 'that once Basarwa are detribalised, they would be weak as an

ethnic group and would no longer be able to exert force as Basarwa, speaking with “one voice” (Mazonde, 1997: 103). Secondly, through its policy of moving Basarwa out of the CKGR, the Government has been seen to treat them as second-class citizens who need not be consulted about their own fate. The Government’s action is seen as a violation of the human rights of the Basarwa. As I indicated above, FPK’s attempts to keep Basarwa in the CKGR have been thwarted by the Government’s withdrawal of services to prevent residents continuing to stay in the CKGR.

FPK’s position in this contest is weak because of the environment in which it operates. This environment, which affects all NGOs in Botswana, relates to the ‘shortage of professionalism, particularly in finance, management, marketing and innovation’ (UNDP, 2000a2: 49). According to Rivers (1999), FPK is weak in capacity, and most of the staff are relatively inexperienced. FPK’s chairman, who is one of its founders, is from the CKGR. He is illiterate and only speaks his vernacular language and Setswana²². Hitchcock et al (2000b: 20) claim that he is a natural leader and has the confidence of his fellow CKGR residents. He lives in the Ghanzi Township. Government officials have launched a campaign against this leader, which seeks to depict him as a troublemaker who enjoys the privileges of mainstream Setswana culture whilst persuading his people to resist offers of help from the government and remain in the CKGR (Molefhe, 2003). These problems make it difficult for FPK to perform its tasks effectively, and invalidate the assertion that NGOs are better equipped to work with and strengthen local institutions than are conventional development agencies.

FPK relies on donor funding, especially from external sources. Whilst this dependence has internationalised Basarwa issues and forged links with indigenous peoples worldwide, it is not sustainable²³. Mazonde mentions that the leaders of FPK ‘were not voted for by the Basarwa, they were brought together by their sponsors who helped them form the [organisation]’ (Mazonde, 1997: 101). The danger in this dependence is that FPK leaders must serve the interests of their sponsors. This compromises the sustainability of the organisation and jeopardises its capacity to wrestle the Government. The fact that FPK was not elected by the Basarwa they purport to serve brings into question the assertion that NGOs are more participatory than other agencies. In the final analysis the Government takes the upper hand in efforts to improve the standard of living of Basarwa in spite of the controversy that this involves.

5.5.7 Kuru Development Trust (KDT)

Starting in 1985 from a small committee to look into rights and living conditions of Basarwa in Dekar in Ghanzi District, KDT grew into a fully-fledged organisation with the objective of improving the socio-economic position of mainly the marginalized Basarwa communities in Botswana. KDT's primary objective is to 'assist marginalized communities in Botswana with the establishment and development of self-sustainable Community Self-Help Organisations, which will increase the capacity of these communities to gain control over their social and economic lives and which will be able to define, direct and implement the community's own development' (KDT, 1998: 1). In order to achieve this goal different activities are undertaken with the participating communities. These include:

- Income generation and business advice;
- Agricultural projects;
- Education and training;
- Cultural activities, and;
- Networking activities (Hitchcock et al, 2000b:8).

In their evaluation of KDT in 2000, Hitchcock et al (2000b) documented the NGO's achievements as follows.

KDT has had an important impact on the life of many poor Basarwa women and men in Ghanzi district. Impact has been in the field of knowledge and practical skills, but perhaps even more appreciated in the field of income through purchasing of their crafts, providing food and later cash for work opportunities and the scope for new economic activities. KDT has also been an important employer in the area.... KDT has been teacher, facilitator as well as the contact with the outside world and the provider of inputs to many people. Through the art project and other cultural activities KDT has helped the Basarwa to increase their self-respect and the recognition of their culture by the outside world. KDT has helped members of the community to get exposed to the outside world and also brought the Basarwa of Botswana in contact with other Bushmen groups in the region and with other minorities in the world. At the local level KDT has helped people to get organised in some places and secure control over the use of natural resources (Hitchcock et al, 2000b: 8).

In order to operationalise its objectives, KDT set up management structures. It was publicly presented as a Basarwa-owned and Basarwa-run organisation. This involved the election into a Board of Trustees, of community representatives from settlements and communities where the organisation operates. In addition to the Board, an Action

Committee, consisting of four Basarwa community elders, was established to oversee the day-to-day activities of the Trust. The organisation's staff complement consists of 28 members, 17 of whom are expatriates with university degrees, and others are non-Basarwa citizens. Almost all expatriate staff have Basarwa counterparts who have secondary school qualifications, and are being trained in their positions. However, the difficulty that the counterparts face is that they are not ready to take over senior management positions in the organisation, due in part to growing complexity of the organisation, and the high qualifications required by Government.

Both the Board and Action Committee members have little formal education and training, and have not had formal training in the tasks they are expected to perform. In light of lack of human capabilities, it is difficult for Board members to deal with issues currently facing KDT and oversee some of the more complex technical and managerial aspects of the Trust's work. The members of the Action Committee are overwhelmed with the complexity of matters that come up for their attention. Due to the lower capabilities of the Basarwa complement of KDT, that is, the members of the two institutions and the counterparts, KDT is Basarwa-owned only in word but not in practice. The unintended but factual consequence is that co-ordinator and other senior management positions are very powerful in terms of decision-making. KDT has also a Co-ordinating Committee that handles daily administration and management work of the Trust. It consists of heads of all the departments of the Trust (expatriate staff) and their Basarwa counterparts. In reality, expatriates dominate decision-making in this committee. KDT is a good example of an organisation where expatriate staff have taken advantage of the general dearth of formal educational qualifications, technical and organisational and management skills within Basarwa to dominate decision-making. The KDT is portrayed as a Basarwa organisation when reality is to the contrary. It appears expatriates co-ordinators of the Trust deliberately decided to include uneducated Basarwa in the two umbrella bodies in order to steer the direction of the Trust in accordance with their (expatriates) interests. This has effectively excluded Basarwa from making a contribution towards a development that addresses their values and needs. Recent press reports indicate that people living in Dekar, where KDT is headquartered, are not aware of its objectives. There is a perception that Basarwa's low socio-economic status is being exploited for self-interest, and that KDT has not done much to uplift the standard of living of its target group, the Basarwa. Relevant quotes

from the press, based on views from inhabitants of Dekar, which seem to question KDT achievements mentioned above, include:

Kuru is completely useless. It is of no assistance to the people of Dekar. I am the one who started it but there is nothing to show for that.... Even when it comes to employment they ignore us. They have brought a lot of whites to do the work the people of Dekar can do. The only locals they have employed tend to come from only one family.... Lots of people do not know its aims and objectives. The co-ordinators come and go without the people knowing what is going on. The problem is lack of transparency between the Trust and the community.... the general feeling is that the organisation was merely using the name Basarwa to rake in money for themselves.... Kuru has diverted from its first, honest mission of empowering the Basarwa.... if the project was meant to be owned by the people of Dekar, to be their own baby, then it has failed.... There is no upward social mobility at least evident.... In fact villagers do expressly complain that ordinary folks have been chucked out and only Form 5 schools leavers are employed (Mmegi, 5-11 October, 2001:11).

Contrary to KDT's statement that KDT was an organisation for the Basarwa in Dekar, Mmegi (2001) mentioned that the 'people of Dekar speak poverty, they dream poverty, live poverty and breathe poverty'. This newspaper carried views about that poor performance of KDT as follows.

[KDT] is growing very fast and is forgetting people ... that those who started it now do not understand it.... [KDT] has come to depend on levels of education and expertise, which will be beyond the reach of the Basarwa themselves for the foreseeable future. While the Basarwa may theoretically own [KDT] themselves, "outsiders" organise its affairs.... Only Basarwa with senior education can dream of entering senior administration positions. Basarwa do the listening, while outsiders do the talking. Unsurprisingly, as an empowerment project, [KDT] has failed. The Basarwa, under whose name funds are canvassed worldwide, are mere spectators.... To some [the KDT project] can no longer claim to be community based. But the people of Dekar moan and groan that they were never consulted.... In 1999, the Action Committee observed: " [KDT] belongs to the more educated staff, not the board or the founders, outside technical staff have all the power and benefits of [KDT] because they have the skills and overpower the board in taking decisions" (Mmegi, 12 -18 October, 2001: 14).

One of my respondents was very critical of KDT. Whilst acknowledging the contribution NGOs to development activities, he expressed concern about their tendency to criticise Government and make it possible to divert attention from being criticised themselves. He identified KDT as one such organisation. He viewed it as top-down, paternalistic and creating dependency (Interview, Lefhoko, 31 July 1999).

Based on the above assessment of KDT, it is clear that due mainly to the action of expatriate staff in the NGO, the potential of KDT has been stifled and it has generally failed to meet its objectives. As the above quotes show, KDT has failed to reach the poorest sectors of the society in Dekar. Instead, it has included Basarwa elite and

excluded the marginalized that are its constituents. KDT has not promoted governance seen by people as operating in their own interest – transparent and accountable to all its constituents and conducive to building a society in which all believe they are treated fairly and decently. It is clear from the quotation above that KDT's operations have not been participatory in the planning and implementing of its activities. KDT is accused of 'growing very fast and forgetting people'. This is a manifestation of bureaucratisation²⁴ within the NGO, which makes it difficult to maximise the organisation's small size by being by more flexible, or cost effective than conventional development agencies. From the above discussion, I think it can be concluded that the majority of Basarwa in Dekar have been excluded from the activities of KDT.

An important question to pose at this point is why did KDT's management hi-jack the good intentions, which KDT set out to achieve? Can this be restricted to the action of self-seeking expatriates? The expatriates not only took advantage of Basarwa's lower capabilities, but the hostility that existed between the civil society and government is another factor. Given the weaknesses of the civil sector, which is arguably promoted by government, there has been a gap to the extent that no structure has existed in Government to monitor civil society activities. Without a co-ordinating structure, gaps in policy and implementation within KDT have gone unchallenged at national level. It is hoped that this situation will improve since Government has undertaken to formulate a policy on its relationship with NGOs. As can be seen from the relationship between Basarwa and the Government on the one hand, and KDT on the other, both organisations have played a role in exclusion of Basarwa from a satisfactory standard of living. The Government's inaction can be attributed to non-decision and the seeming politically unsustainability of the efforts to develop Basarwa. It appears that this 'project' does not have political support of influential groups. Developments in KDT as described above display the irony that an organisation that set out to improve the lot of Basarwa and therefore fill the gap created by Government's inaction, has instead served the interests of a handful of expatriates.

5.5.8 Ditshwanelo (Botswana Centre For Human Rights [BCHR])

The BCHR is an advocacy organisation involved in promoting and protecting human rights in all respects. The BCHR Mission Statement is as follows:

It seeks to affirm human dignity and equality of all before the law irrespective of sex, ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation, social status and political convictions. In pursuit of this mission, the Centre strives to inform, educate, train, counsel, mediate and research on issues of human rights, with specific reference to the marginalized and the disempowered in Botswana (BCHR, 2001:2).

It is one of the few more activism oriented NGOs in the country. It has been instrumental in buttressing the efforts of KDT and FPK by bringing up human rights infringements as they affect Basarwa and other population groups. In a report commissioned by the Botswana Christian Council, its Director investigated the human rights issues in Ghanzi District in 1992. Her findings included abuse of human rights including torture of Basarwa hunters by wildlife officers, low socio-economic status of Basarwa, and negative public attitudes directed towards them (Mogwe 1992). The report drew international attention to the plight of the Basarwa, and led to concerns being expressed about human rights situation in Botswana by various governments, including the United States, the United Kingdom, Norway, Sweden and the Netherlands. It led to internal investigations and statements of commitment by government to fair and equitable treatment of Botswana citizens.

According to Mmegi (29th June – 05 July, 2001: 24), the Centre ‘plays the important role of giving “voice” to otherwise voiceless and marginalised sections of the Botswana society who could not protect themselves’. One activity related to this role is the paralegal programme whose objective is to empower, through the provision of legal advice and information, the poor, the marginalised and disempowered within Botswana society. A notable case under this programme involves two Basarwa men, who were to have been hanged for murder in 1999, and were saved from the noose by BCHR in the Ditshwanelo, Maauwe and Motswetla vs Attorney General court case. In 2000 the men were moved from Gaborone to Francistown and were re-charged with murder. They are currently awaiting trial. The Centre prepared a budget and proposal that would enable it to be part of the legal team together with lawyers. BCHR regularly provides the men with toiletries as these are not provided for awaiting trial prisoners and their families are

too poor to provide for them (BCHR, 2000). In response to the complex issue of land rights, in connection with KDT and WIMSA, Botswana, BCHR started procedures required to design and implement a land rights booklet. The booklet 'will be used to train opinion leaders within Basarwa communities about their land rights, and they in turn will be expected to educate their communities. The ultimate objective is to address the issues of democratisation and empowerment of a marginalized community of citizens' (BCHR, 1998: 3).

Like other NGOs in the country, Ditshwanelo faces financial and human constraints, and hostility from the Government, all of which limit its capacity to counterbalance the dominance of the state. This NGO mentioned in its annual report (2001) that during the latter part of 2000, it collapsed its programmes to minimise its administrative costs. In this report, Ditshwanelo indicated that it would be relying on its last financial resources, and feared that it would close its doors, if additional funds were not raised in 2002. Funding constraints continue to haunt this and other NGOs in the country, and threaten to limit the role of NGOs in discharging their role as alternatives to state provision. During 1998, as part of its torture assessment, BCHR strongly recommended the ratification of the Convention against Torture by the Government. The only official response was the dismissal of the credibility of BCHR as an organisation. In other words, the Government does not seem to realise that the era of a closed system is over, and that with democracy (of which Botswana is a 'shining example'), dialogue, criticism, and above all compromise, are the paramount issues.

5.6 Conclusion

This chapter has laid out the contextual details for the study by describing the country and the research area where it took place. Whilst Botswana's growth has been impressive, problems of inequality and poverty have emerged, in spite of the country's planning objective of social justice. The research was located in an area that has lagged behind in development compared to the eastern side where the majority of the country's population is situated.

From the description of the research groups, it will be observed that Basarwa are the most disadvantaged group. They have the most stigmatised ethnic identity, which has

had a role in their exclusion from participation in mainstream life. Unlike the Bakgalagadi, Basarwa have mainly occupied marginal areas either in the Township or remote areas. To this extent they have experienced more difficulties in accessing social services.

Basarwa have tended to lack self-determination. They have been subject to labelling by other groups and researchers, and their affairs have been the subject of debate without involving them. They seem not to have been given an opportunity to speak for themselves. In Botswana they have encountered numerous problems such as limited powers over land use, inadequate political representation, diminishing possibilities for their traditional livelihood of hunting and gathering, ridicule, discrimination, and negative public attitudes from the dominant ethnic groups, higher poverty rates owing to high rates of unemployment, illiteracy, and difficulty in equal utilisation of government programmes where they live with non-Basarwa groups. 'Negative public attitudes have manifested in, inter alia, derogatory application of the Mosarwa name, which has been used to depict backwardness, non-developed and generally uncouth character' (Saugetstad, 1998b: 253). Because of these problems, the Basarwa have tended to show signs of powerlessness and hopelessness.

Within the Ghanzi District, the Bakgalagadi are the dominant group. In Chapter 3, a dominant group was defined. One of the major characteristics is the dominance that this group exercises through control of political, economic and social structures. The Bakgalagadi are dominant to the extent that they control the political structures at the District level since the majority of councillors are of Bakgalagadi origin (see Chapter 7). Owing to more representation in the District Council, Bakgalagadi are more effective at getting their voices heard when decisions are being made. Most of the problems that Basarwa have encountered derive from their relationship with the Bakgalagadi. Like most non-Basarwa, Bakgalagadi's dominance has extended to treating Basarwa as culturally subordinate and the Bakgalagadi have placed them under some form of economic exploitation. One author has documented the advantage that Bakgalagadi have over Basarwa as follows:

From the perspective of the [Basarwa], Bakgalagadi have had greater opportunities that [Basarwa] to increase their livestock and land holdings and raise their living standards. Many

[Basarwa] see themselves as much less well off than Bakgalagadi, and, indeed, some described themselves as 'serfs' of the Bakgalagadi (Hitchcock, 2002: 802).

Bakgalagadi more frequently own cattle and control the water points. They more frequently have cattle posts and engage in hunting but for commercial purposes. By contrast Basarwa depend more on Government support in terms of destitute relief. Bakgalagadi have a more leadership tradition than Basarwa. Practice shows that they are dominant or where they are present, they quickly tend to dominate decision-making and business processes (Interview, Dekker, 26 July 1999). Bakgalagadi operate most business enterprises in Ghanzi District. Basarwa participate only as customers rather than owners.

The nature of the state in Botswana has been described. What emerges is that the state dominates public policy and this dominance is facilitated by the relative weakness of non-state players such as NGOs and the opposition parties. The weakness of the latter organisations means that efforts to counterbalance the dominance of the state are limited. There is less room for alternative approaches to problems of development, as they affect Basarwa, to be heard and acted on to the benefit of this ethnic group. With respect to two Basarwa-based NGOs, it has been shown that the assumptions commonly made that NGOs are more participatory, less bureaucratic, and more likely to reach the poorest sectors of society than government agencies, are not true. NGOs face similar problems that are faced by state agencies, and exclude some of the constituents they purport to serve. From the assessment of FPK and KDT it can be concluded that both NGOs are not as virtuous as proponents of NGOs want us to believe. They do not fully apply the strengths they are purported to have. Notwithstanding the constraints faced by civil society groups, the example of BCHR shows that there is scope of providing a voice outside Government thus making Government accountable. According to Maundeni (2001), the BCHR and Emang Basadi 'play an important role in giving "voice" to otherwise voiceless and marginalized sections of the Botswana society who could not protect themselves' (Mmegi, 29 June – 5 July 2001: 24).

On the basis of the background given in this chapter, I proceed in Chapter 5 to provide a poverty profile of the research groups.

¹ This Report was a result of a study commissioned to capture people's views in remote and small settlement areas of Botswana on how they would like to see the country developing within the next two decades. The major objective was to provide an opportunity for these remote citizens to add their voice to a nationwide effort to develop a Vision 2016. Some of the areas covered were West Hanahai and Dekar. (Selolwane, O. Obuseng, S. Mokgatlhe, L. Bolaane, M. Nthomang, K. and Ketsitlile, P., 1997:4).

² Most of the district's characteristics are based on statistical data from the Ghanzi District Council and Ghanzi District Development Committee (1997). [GDC and GDDC, 1997 hereafter]

³ I suggest the following factors in the slow development in western Botswana. These include the geography of the western region, the Kalahari Desert, and sparsely settled population, the poverty of the state at independence. The concentration of people in the east along the railway line or eastern part rendered it cheaper to provide services here than in the sparsely populated west. This prompted the eastern bias in development and relative neglect of the west. Other factors that militated against development in the west include remoteness. The west region was traditionally settled by the hunter-gatherer population, which was nomadic and could not utilise infrastructure such as schools and other facilities available for sedentary settlement. Another factor was that the operations of the District Councils in western Botswana started later than in other areas. This happened during the implementation of the Accelerated Rural Development Programme (1973-76), which led to the decentralisation of resources from the central government to the district level, and helped lay the foundation for the establishment of the Ghanzi and Kgalagadi District Councils in what had been Crown (later State) land in western Botswana.

⁴ It is worth noting that the communication constraint has been increasingly addressed to the extent that two recently constructed tarred roads have improved the situation. The Trans Kgalagadi road links the region with the eastern part of the country, South Africa and Namibia. The newly constructed Ghanzi-Sehitwa road, completed in 2001, has provided another link with the north of the district.

⁵ According to the same policy a primary centre is a settlement with a high development potential. It has a more diversified economy consisting of processing of raw materials, manufacturing and serving as a national market service centre. It is a host for high order infrastructure and services and has a population of at least 20 000 people (ROB, 1998a: 17).

⁶ 'remote' here refers to social and moral distance from dominant group centres, namely Ghanzi Township and villages, rather than geographic distance.

⁷ In Part II of this Document.

⁸ Who claim that the other name 'Bushmen' has pejorative connotations (Hitchcock, 1996).

⁹ Other sources say 'Bosjesman' (Hitchcock, 1996 and Ramsay et al, 1996).

¹⁰ Due to prejudice against Basarwa, non-Basarwa have always wished it to be common knowledge that Basarwa were fully a hunter-gatherer group. The truth is that these people 'in Botswana have for generations, just as have other groups in the region, engaged in varied pursuits as cattle keeping, fishing, agriculture, mining and migrant labour, as well as hunting and gathering' (Ramsay et al, 1996:41). Other evidence of livestock ownership by Basarwa is provided by Good (1992:81-82). The Basarwa subsequently lost their herds to appropriation by those who enserved them.

¹¹ Campbell, personal communication (1990) explains that the word Masarwa (or Basarwa) denotes people who are not of Bantu-speaking origin, not one of us and of inferior status. (Cited in Kann et al, 1990:100).

¹² On the excuse that other names like Bushmen and Basarwa tend to have racial and class connotations (Campbell, 1994).

¹³ Information for this section draws mainly from the work of Tlou and Campbell, 1994; Kuper, 1970; Datta and Murray, 1989. Singular for Bakgalagadi is Mokgalagadi.

¹⁴ Reasons for this are: a) uneven political playing field; that is unfairness of electoral system. This is a 'first-past-the post' or 'winner-take-all' system based on a single member constituency system. It benefits established parties that enjoy the advantage of incumbency and the fact of being politically tested. Under the system only one candidate makes it to the National Assembly. Over the years, opposition parties have tried to find advantage in this electoral system but end up marginalised after every election (Molomo and Somolekae, 2000: 6); b) monopoly by ruling party to Government media (Radio and Daily News), and claim by the ruling party that parties get equal and fair coverage to the media. c) political party funding not from the state, hence playing field not level. Ruling party, being incumbent party is able to get generous donations from various donors, an advantage which opposition parties do not have. (Molomo and Somolekae, 2000: 18)

¹⁵ One exception to this is that Parliament rejected the Works, Transport and Communications chapter of the draft mid-term review of the National Development Plan 8 in July 2000 (Botswana Daily News, 27 July 2000). This was an unprecedented move where a Minister's request was thrown out. It should be noted, however, that this action was caused by pressure from the backbench within the ruling party, rather than the opposition.

¹⁶ There is more on the legal dimension of social exclusion relating to these sections in Chapter 7.

¹⁷ The Botswana Council for Non-Governmental Organisations (BOCONGO) has identified lack of finance has a major constraints to NGO efforts in Botswana, and has enumerated the consequences thereof as low staffing, lack of transport, inadequate capacity building, over-dependence of foreign donors, lack of capital and land inadequate government support (BOCONGO, 2000: 24).

¹⁸ Holm, J. Molutsi, P. Somolekae, G. (1994). Report of the study of the development of the civil society in Botswana. Democracy Research Project. University of Botswana.

¹⁹ BOCONGO was formed to facilitate a coordinated response by NGOs in Botswana on issues of national development. Its mission is to 'assist in establishing an enabling environment for the NGO sector to become a recognised partner in the development process, and provide a platform for networking, advocacy, capacity building, and collective mobilisation of resources for the self sustainability of the NGO sector in Botswana' (BOCONGO, 2000: 6-7).

²⁰ Examples are Botswana Centre for Human Rights and Emang Basadi. The latter was formed in 1986 by a group of Botswana women to decide to challenge the 1982 Citizenship Act which denied Botswana women married to foreign men the right under law to pass citizenship to their children. The group tried to lobby Government to amend the Citizenship Act. When these efforts did not seem to bear fruit, a Botswana woman, Unity Dow (married to an American citizen) took Government to court on grounds that the Act denied her enjoyment of human rights and such discrimination violated the country's Constitution. Dow won the case but the state appealed and still lost (Molomo and Somolekae, 2000).

²¹ The major advantage, which the Reserve offered, was freedom from encroachment by livestock farmers, whose cattle cannot be allowed in the CKGR. Without this encroachment, the veld food 'sector' did not suffer from livestock and environmental damage. As such veld food continued to be more available than in other places. The Reserve provided more opportunities to sustain the traditional hunter/gatherer lifestyle. All settlements outside the Reserve do not have this important advantage. Neither have arrangements been made to offer a smooth transition from the nomadic lifestyle to a sedentary alternative. Further, within the Reserve, 'many Bakgalagadi have come to regard themselves as being [Basarwa], and both [Basarwa] and Bakgalagadi, claiming to be the original inhabitants of the Reserve, are opposing the government's policy of resettling inhabitants of the Reserve in other areas' (Ikeya, 1999:28). It is only in the Reserve that a cordial relationship has existed between the Bakgalagadi and Basarwa, otherwise in settlements outside the CKGR animosity between the two has been the order of the day.

²² This is in contrast to its former late leader, John Hartbattle, who was articulate, educated spokesman for the Basarwa and who was not afraid to speak out against the Government (Rivers, 1999). To this extent, FPK lacks the advantage which cultural organisations of other minority tribes have, that of being led by founders who are 'young, educated, urban-based and hold valued formal sector employment' (Solway, 2002: 723). This implies that FPK's capacity to translate substantial assistance that outside human organisations, researchers and donors to concrete local plans, is limited.

²³ The FPK office in Ghanzi Township is currently closed since the beginning of 2003, due to lack of funds (Molefhe, 2003).

²⁴ Arellano-Lopez and Petras (1994: 566) attribute increased bureaucratisation within NGOs to the fact that 'as NGOs become channels for larger amounts of development assistance from donor agencies, they become subject to financial controls and reporting requirements of those agencies, and resemble more closely the government agencies... to which they are supposed to represent an alternative'.

Chapter 6

Poverty Profile For Research Groups

6.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I give an indication of the poverty rates of the target groups, using poverty profile guidelines. I will identify some instances of exclusion of Basarwa that tend to perpetuate their poverty. It should be noted that because information on the Bakgalagadi group was unavailable the profile does not give much data on this group, except what I gathered during the research.

6.2 Poverty Profile Checklist

A poverty profile is based on a checklist of specific questions as detailed in Box 6.1 below (World Bank, 1990a). It depicts a comparison of poverty status, in particular how the incidence of poverty varies across sub-groups of society, with respect to residence, socio-economic category, employment status, access to public services and so on. On the basis of the checklist, I constructed a profile for research groups in the study areas, the Basarwa and Bakgalagadi. The data for the profile were derived from a number of sources, including household surveys, poverty study reports and my fieldwork. The profile was developed on the basis of answering the questions in the box, but not necessarily in the order that they appear. Where necessary, subtitles specified below show that some questions have been combined in order to provide relevant information.

Since socio-economic and other data in Botswana (including poverty) are not based on ethnicity, it is difficult to be precise about the poverty status of the research groups. An approximation based on the national picture will be attempted. In this context, the profile is based on national data, which is then disaggregated to the regional or local level. Even at the local level, only district totals can be estimated, and approximate information provided on the basis of ethnic based figures, where available. Such ethnic-based data are based on private researchers' estimates and cannot be officially approved. Despite this, they suggest the magnitude of the phenomenon at hand.

Box 6.1

Checklist Of Questions For Poverty Profile

1. What is the poverty line (upper and lower)?
2. How many people are poor and extremely poor?
3. What is the poverty gap?
4. What is the distribution of living standards among the poor?
5. Are the poor predominately urban or rural?
6. Has there recently been migration of the poor to urban areas?
7. How has poverty correlated with gender, racial and ethnic characteristics?
8. What are the main income sources for the poor?
9. What products or services do they sell?
10. How large a factor is unemployment or underemployment?
11. Which are the important goods in the consumption basket of the poor?
12. What is the educational, health and nutritional status of the poor?
13. What are the fertility characteristics of the poor?
14. To what public services do the poor have access? What is the quality of the services?
15. What assets – land, housing, and financial – do the poor own?
16. How secure is their access to – and/or tenure over – natural resources?
17. What are the environmental dimensions of poverty?
18. How variable are the poor's incomes? What risks do they face?

Source: World Bank (1990a)

6.3 Historical Background To Poverty Among Research Groups

Poverty within the research groups dates from the colonial era and has continued into the post-colonial period. The dominant Tswana tribes exploited the research groups. In the process, one of the groups, the Basarwa, has been excluded, for a sustained period, from access to basic operational capabilities such as knowledge and skills to escape poverty. Through some manipulation in the political field, the Basarwa have been excluded from recognition and inclusion in decision-making process. Below are historical and contemporary accounts of this exclusion.

During the 19th century, among the several non-Tswana groups that were held in subjection by the Tswana were the Bakgalagadi and Basarwa (Iiffe, 1987). Owing to cultural similarity with the Tswana, the Bakgalagadi had an edge over the Basarwa. Wilmsen and Vossen (1990) mention that Bakgalagadi retained and gained some cattle wealth. Although they found themselves between Tswana masters to whom they owed labour, they in turn extracted forced labour from Basarwa. Basarwa were the more exploited of the two groups. Iiffe (1987) documents the exploitation they suffered at the hands of the Tswana. In 1899, the British colonial government imposed a hut tax in the then Bechuanaland. To get income to pay the tax, a forced labour migration to South African mines occurred. Most migrants were restricted to the Tswana group, especially the male. The existence of a serf class of Bakgalagadi and Basarwa freed the members of the Tswana 'for cash earning opportunities, education and the lifestyle of the "new elite" that spanned Southern Africa' (Wilmsen and Vossen, 1990:19). Whilst the Tswana took opportunities elsewhere, the Bakgalagadi and Basarwa provided labour to replace migrants as livestock herders and work on arable fields. To this extent the Bakgalagadi and Basarwa were excluded from opportunities to earn income, accumulate property and create wealth. Their exploitation was the beginning of exclusion from basic services like education and jobs. The seeds of poverty, which has persisted particularly in the Basarwa group, were sown in this century.

The poor have been a large and deprived section of Botswana society since the beginnings of the pastoral economy, and the Basarwa have been prominent among them for some time. Poverty and impoverished Basarwa exist as a structural factor in the country's political economy. A contemporary situation describing the process of impoverishment of Basarwa can be gauged from the quotation below. I will cite it at length to show how a non-Mosarwa, wearing a politician's hat, comes to live in a Basarwa settlement, acquires at electoral victory, and instead of nursing the development interests of his Basarwa constituents, goes on an exploitation spree, and looks at his constituents with disdain.

The image of the present day [Basarwa] ... is of a shadow people who raise their heads at election time to vote for a councillor and for a member of parliament. Quite often the same councillor, who should then represent them and their interests, turns and ruthlessly exploits them in the name of business. In this way he becomes rich and powerful in the settlement and dominates the will of the people: for a [non-Mosarwa] is brought to the settlement by a political party, where people are told to vote for this man: 'here is your representative, if you don't like

him, you don't have to vote for him the next time (in four years time)'. He is elected. The first thing he does is to get a hawker's licence (to help his constituents) and he physically moves to the settlement. Instead of selling goods at reasonable prices, his prices are quite often the double of shops in the nearest town. He also sells alcohol, which is illegal. However the profits are higher, he gives credit easily, but is ruthless in collecting debts. Very quickly he is a livestock owner in the settlement. All the cash [earned] from [participating in] drought relief [projects] goes directly to him on paydays. He owns a 4x4 vehicle, so he exploits the people more in collecting firewood, veld foods, thatching grass for houses, lifts to town at exorbitant fees. These same exploited people are then called *apathetic, lazy, useless drunks* when development programmes fails, by those who exploit them (Hartbottle, 1993:3-4).

Where Basarwa are predominant, as in remote or fringe areas, poverty has been identified as an inherited problem, which has afflicted generations of families through lack of access to land and other productive resources. This population group did not see any way out of poverty other than through continued government provision of social security, because they had the greatest difficulty in re-establishing a viable livelihood. The transitional process from the traditional lifestyle of hunting and gathering to an alternative livelihood is bound to be a long and slow one, as has been the experience of similar groups in other countries, and will require a lot of time, sensitivity and commitment (Food Studies Group, 1990).

6.4 Poverty Line And Distribution Of Living Standards Among The Poor

On the basis of surveys undertaken by the Central Statistics Office (CSO), Botswana has established poverty datum lines (PDLs) since 1976. An earlier poverty line for rural areas was based on the 1974/75 Rural Income Distribution Survey. Subsequent PDLs for 1985/86 and 1993/94 were based on the Household Income and Expenditure Surveys (HIES) for these years, and included urban areas (CSO 1991).

A poverty line measures poverty and for Botswana's purposes, it is based on income and expenditure data. People are considered poor when their standard of living (usually income or expenditure) is below a minimum acceptable level – the poverty line (Poverty Datum Line (PDL)). As an example, the 1989 PDL is based on a basket that comprises six broad categories: food, clothing, personal items, household goods, shelter and miscellaneous items. This is constructed for selected households that are considered representative of families in the country. The poverty datum line represents the cost of a

minimum basket of goods and services necessary for living life in dignity and with adequate access to food, clothing and shelter. If the income of a household is below this minimum, the household is taken to be under the line or poor.

The most recent data on poverty in Botswana is based on a Poverty and Poverty Alleviation Study (BIDPA, 1997a). According to this source, 38 % of the country's households overall and 47% of the population, or 623 100 people, were living in poverty in 1993/94 (BIDPA, 1997a: 18). The poorest 10% of rural households to which the Basarwa undoubtedly belong had a mean income in cash and kind in 1993/94 of P115 per month (Macdonald and Molamu, 1998). For the period 1985/86 period, comparable figures were 55% of the households and 59% of the population or 650 719 people (BIDPA 1997a: 21). With respect to the 1993/94 figures, how does the national figure translate into district figures, and in particular, what are the corresponding figures for Ghanzi District? Based on the 1993/94 HIES database, there were 44 261 people living in poverty in this district. A corresponding figure for households was 11037 (Ditlhong, 2000, personal communication).

The problem with these figures is that they are not broken down into various ethnic or racial groups in any district. It is therefore not easy to break down the information by Basarwa, Bakgalagadi and other groups. Neither is it possible to break down these data into Basarwa and Bakgalagadi in the Ghanzi Township or West Hanahai or anywhere in the district. There are indications that, according to the SNV Country Policy Plan for 1995-2000, 40 - 60 % of Basarwa fell below the poverty line for Botswana (quoted in le Roux, 1999). Hitchcock (1999), citing Gulbransen, O. Karlsen, M, and Lexow, J. (1986) notes that Basarwa tend to have relatively low incomes, limited access to employment opportunities, uncertain access to land, low levels of literacy and education, low to moderate nutritional and health standards, moderate to high infant mortality rates and limited access to development assistance. All these circumstances are responsible for perpetuating poverty.

6.5 Spatial Location Of Poverty

Over the years, studies have shown that poverty is worse in small rural settlements, freehold farms, medium-size villages, large rural villages and towns, in that descending order (Molutsi, P. Selolwane, O. Mguni, B. Ntsabane, T. and Motlaleng, G., 1996; BIDPA 1997a and b). Poverty is severest in settlements but it is also here where it is most difficult to alleviate. According to Selolwane, O. Obuseng, S. Mokgathe, L. Bolaane, M. Nthomang, K. and Ketsitlile, P. (1997), communities observed that small settlements experienced the highest rate of unemployment and limited capacity to generate cash income of all settlements in Botswana. As a result, poverty tended to be more widespread and more absolute than in other, bigger settlements. 'Poor shelter, inadequate food resources, low levels of nutrition, and high levels of poverty-related diseases such as tuberculosis, high dependency ratios, inadequate clothing and poor sanitation indicated the level of poverty cited' (Selolwane et al, 1997:16).

Regarding the distribution of living standards among the poor, reference is made to BIPDA (1997a and b) data as summarised by UNDP (1998b) below. Poverty was higher and more severe in rural areas and lower in urban areas. 'In 1993/94, 55% of the rural population was living in income poverty¹, compared to 46% in urban villages² and 20% in urban areas. In rural areas, 40% of people were "very poor" and 15% were "poor" while in urban areas only 9% and 20% were categorised 'very poor and 'poor' respectively' (UNDP, 1998b: 23-25). People were considered 'very poor' if they had income or expenditure less than that needed to purchase the food component of the PDL, whereas those considered 'poor' were those who had sufficient income or expenditure to obtain the food component, but not enough to cover all the elements of the PDL.

Within the rural areas, poverty is more severe in remote locations. These are the areas where a high degree of dependence on government welfare exists. They have inferior soils and low rainfall, and therefore they have a very limited agricultural potential. Remote areas are very underdeveloped. They lack basic facilities and as a result, public officers are very reluctant to work in these areas. The public officers who seem comfortable in the remote areas are the unskilled, or those who have generally been

failures elsewhere. These areas get worse manpower resources for their development programmes than villages and towns. This means that whatever small developments these places might have are never sustained because of high staff turnover. Overall, this situation enhances the stigma on residents of the remote areas, and increases the negativity against Basarwa in particular (Mazonde, 1999).

BIDPA (1997a) records that the rural southwest region, which includes Ghanzi, Kgalagadi and the western parts of Kweneng and Southern districts, has the highest poverty datum line for families with more than 4 people. The BIDPA study estimated that 'the incidence of poverty was higher in this region where 71% of the population, compared to 47% nationally, were reported to be living below the income poverty datum line in 1993/94' (BIDPA, 1997a: 22). About 59% of them were in the 'very poor' category. This is a remote region and is inhabited by most of Botswana's Remote Area Dwellers (RADs). Government recognises RADs as some of the vulnerable members of the rural population because of their vulnerability to poverty and drought (ROB, 1998d). 'Over 75% of RADs are Basarwa' (UNDP, 2002a1: 72). RADs (including residents of West Hanahai) are a group encountering extreme poverty (Food Studies Group, 1990), and are definitely in the 'very poor' category. Their traditional means of livelihood, hunting and gathering, has been increasingly eroded by population increase and encroachment of livestock into their areas. Consequently dependency on state relief measures has increased.

It has been estimated that up to 90% of all RADs countrywide were dependent upon Government food relief in the period 1982 to 1990 (Kann et al, 1990). Most residents in RAD settlements are destitute because they lack secure livelihoods.³ The proportion of people defined as destitutes who receive assistance in the form of food and other goods from Government is higher among RADs than it is among most if not all other groups in Botswana (Hitchcock, 1998). 'The highest rates of destitution in Botswana were found in 1995/96 in Ghanzi and Kgalagadi [Districts], respectively 59.9 and 46.2 per 1000 population as compared with the national average of 11, and rural and urban averages of 14 and 1, respectively. The rate of registered destitution in Ghanzi and Kgalagadi was about fifty times higher than in urban Botswana' (BIDPA, 1997b: 370). Permanent registered destitutes in western region were '2 859 in 1999, of which 1 371

were in Ghanzi District, representing 5% of the population' (CCI/LANDflows, 1999:6-27).

Another place where poverty is located is on the fringes of the Ghanzi Township. As indicated in Chapter 5, the Township is divided into 'Town' and 'Village' parts. The Township has an ambiguous status and can be viewed as both a rural and an urban area. It is in the 'village' part that the three wards are situated and are inhabited predominately by non-Basarwa, such as Bakgalagadi, Baherero, and Tswana. For instance, 18.6% of Basarwa, compared to 60.5% of Bakgalagadi and 20.9% of other tribes live in these areas. The fringes of both the Town and Village are squatter areas mainly inhabited by Basarwa. For instance, 65.2% of Basarwa, compared to 13.0% of Bakgalagadi and 21.7% of others live in the squatter areas (Survey, Morris Nyathi, 1999). Table 6.1 summarises the above data. Squatter areas face similar problems to those encountered in settlements, as described by Selolwane et al (1997) above.

TABLE 6.1
Locality Where Living By Ethnic Group

locality name		ethnic group			Total
		Basarwa	Bakgalagadi	Other	
fringe settlement	Count	45	9	15	69
	% within locality name	65.2%	13.0%	21.7%	100.0%
Non-fringe settlement	Count	8	26	9	43
	% within locality name	18.6%	60.5%	20.9%	100.0%
Total	Count	53	35	24	112
	% within locality name	47.3%	31.3%	21.4%	100.0%

Note: the fringe and non-fringe localities are in Ghanzi Township

Source: Survey, Morris Nyathi, 1999

Squatter areas are locations where Basarwa cannot continue their traditional lifestyle. Living on the fringes of the Township, they are more vulnerable to health risks since fringe areas also serve as dumping grounds for litter from neighbouring built-up areas. As the District Council cannot provide services in these areas, they remain un-serviced and are stigmatised as areas with most the criminal activities.

According to my findings the Bakgalagadi and other tribal groups do not live in squatter areas necessarily for cheap accommodation but also for commercial reasons. About 15 (based on interview with respondent in Ghanzi Township) have shacks in squatter areas for business purposes. This compares with a Self-Help Housing Area inquiry report I prepared for Ghanzi Township which showed that of 109 squatter residents, I found that 13 owned residential plots in other parts of the Township, 10 of whom were Bakgalagadi (Survey, Morris Nyathi, 1999). In the shacks of these 13 plots, beer brewing for sale is the major occupation, and this beer was sold mainly to Basarwa. In her study of Basarwa/non-Basarwa relationships, Le Roux (1999) found that:

Alcohol, which was not part of [Basarwa's] tradition, was mostly sold by other people living around them who fed not only on the [Basarwa's] need for this substance, but also on the inferiority complex of people who felt that it was an honour to be "trusted" that you would be able to pay your debts, while the supplier knew that's/he could cash in on the support systems intended to alleviate poverty, such as drought relief and pension funds (Le Roux, 1999: 53).

Basarwa remain consumers rather than manufacturers of alcohol. According to Macdonald and Molamu (1998: 329), 'the Basarwa themselves earn little money from the lucrative and thriving alcohol industry located in and around [their locations]. Indeed it only increases their level of impoverishment and enmeshes them even deeper in a spiral of dependence'.

6.6 Causes Of Poverty

Research done on poverty in Botswana indicates that the causes of poverty are many and one organisation argues that much of this poverty is structural (BIDPA, 1997a and b). Poverty is rooted in the country's narrow economic base and in the social disadvantages that are common among the poor. Pillay (2002) has been clarified this narrowness and attributes the high incidence of poverty to two factors. First, Botswana's economic growth is based on capital-intensive mining and land-intensive

livestock rearing, both of which have few employment benefits for the majority of citizens. Second, formal employment has not grown fast enough to absorb school workers who enter the labour force or those migrating from the traditional sector.

Other causes of poverty are included in the terms of reference for a Consultancy on the formulation of a National Poverty Strategy, which the Government of Botswana engaged in 2001 (see www.paris21.org/pdf/sadc_docs/botswananationalpoverty.pdf). This source notes Government's commitment to eliminate poverty as demonstrated by the existence of a wide range of citizen economic empowerment programmes, sustained growth in formal sector employment over the past 35 years of post independence period, the existence of a number of social safety nets and income transfer programmes for the poor and the disadvantaged, access to basic services by a significant proportion of the population, and commendable improvements in the quality of life for the majority.

In spite of these positive outcomes, BIDPA (1997) reported insufficient impact of these programmes resulting in a significant proportion of the country's population still living below the Poverty Datum Line. The causes of poverty were attributed to key weaknesses in the above programmes, and these were identified as:

- Inadequate popular participation in programme design; implementation; and monitoring and evaluation; which resulted in poor targeting and under-utilisation of programmes;
- Inadequate co-ordination of poverty programmes leading to failure to capture synergies at both the central and local/district level, and
- Inadequate monitoring and evaluation, which means that programme outputs were not adequately reconciled with targets and gaps, were not identified early enough.

The above analysis concentrates on the explanation of poverty being caused by the narrow economic base of the country. In the research referred to above, no attempt has yet been made to link persistence of poverty to social exclusion. This study attempts to fill that gap by examining the extent to which social exclusion can be linked to the impoverishment of the Basarwa.

6.7 Population Of Poor And Very Poor

For analytical purposes BIDPA (1997b) broke down the poverty groups into 'poor' and 'very poor' categories. People were considered 'very poor' if they had income or expenditure less than that needed to purchase the food component of the PDL, whereas the 'poor' were those who had sufficient income or expenditure to obtain the food component, but not enough to cover all elements of the PDL. Of the 623 100 people who were poor in 1993/94, BIDPA (1997b) indicates that 225 144 were in the 'poor' and 397 955 in the 'very poor' categories, respectively. Translating this into Ghanzi population, this breaks down into a district total of 44 261, which includes 19 905 'poor' and 24 356 'very poor'. Table 6.2 below summarises these details. A corresponding household data is a total of 11 037 households split into 7 180 'poor' and 3 857 'very poor'.

TABLE 6.2

Estimated National And Ghanzi District Poverty Headcount Rates By Poverty Group 1993/94

Poverty Category	Number of Persons (National)	Number of Persons (Ghanzi District)
Poor Households	225 144	19 905
Very Poor Households	397 955	24 356
Total	623 100	44 261

Source: BIDPA, 1997b: 25

6.8 Main Incomes Sources For The Poor

According to BIDPA (1997a), at national level the sources of income for female headed households were: employment (part time mostly), farming, renting rooms, sales of beer, destitute rations, salary remittances from spouses and relatives, and school feeding programmes. For male-headed households it was employment (mostly full time) and

farming. At the district level, my findings are somewhat comparable to the above. I break them into minor and major sources for the two research areas, Ghanzi Township and West Hanahai. In Ghanzi Township, for the male-headed Basarwa households, major sources of income were informal employment and state assistance (mainly old age pensions). The minor sources were formal employment and self-employment. For female-headed Basarwa households, the major sources were informal employment and remittances/gifts. The minor sources were formal employment and state assistance. With respect to both male and female Bakgalagadi households the major sources were formal and self-employment. Minor sources were also the same for both gender, namely informal employment.

In West Hanahai, the situation was different. For male Basarwa headed households, informal employment and state assistance were the major sources, whilst minor ones were self-employment. For Basarwa female households the major sources of income were state assistance and informal employment. For Bakgalagadi male and female-headed households the major source was self-employment, while informal employment was a minor source for the male-headed households. Because of the high level of illiteracy and unemployment within the Basarwa ethnic group, Basarwa tend to be predominately engaged in menial unskilled work in the informal sector. In this sector terms of employment are uncertain, remuneration is significantly low, yet employees tend to be engaged for long hours. Reliance on the state pension is another characteristic of Basarwa households. Formal employment is not a major source of income for Basarwa. One source attributes this to discrimination. 'Although Basarwa make up 50% of [Ghanzi District] population, only 6% of government industrial class employees are Basarwa' (Rivers, 1999:47). Bakgalagadi are more involved in formal and self-employment. Hitchcock, R. Bollig, M. Nduku, C. and Reynders, J. (2000a) estimate that the unemployment rate among Basarwa is high, above 90%. This compares with unemployment rate of 16.44 for Ghanzi District (CSO, 1999). In Table 6.3 below I show selected poverty indicators for which data is available. A comparison is made between urban and rural Botswana, and Ghanzi District, which is used as a surrogate for Basarwa's poverty condition.

Table 6.3
Comparative Poverty Indicators: Urban And Rural Botswana And Ghanzi District

	Urban Botswana	Rural Botswana	Ghanzi District
Adult illiteracy rate % of people (1993)	16.7	37.8	43.3
Female illiteracy % of adult females (1993)	15.0	35.0	46.0
Population without health services (1995)	2	17	40
Botswana Human Poverty Index	11.7	27.1	31.2

Source: UNDP, 1998b: 95

6.9 Migration

Migration of Basarwa owes its origin more to state intervention than any other reason. 'Basarwa have been the most displaced and dislocated tribal group in Botswana, either in creation of game reserves, or ranches especially in Ghanzi and other areas in the country. Most places occupied by Basarwa for example in Ghanzi are government-initiated settlements, unlike other tribal groups who occupy their original territories in the country' (Mmegi/The Reporter, 1st to 7th March, 2002). Basarwa are still highly mobile. Since they were dispossessed of their original land, and prevented from squatting on freehold farms, and failed to cope in non-viable remote settlements, Basarwa have been in a state of flux, constantly migrating from place to place. Those who could not stay on farms and remote areas moved to either villages or towns in search for better livelihoods. Migration is also temporary and includes seasonal work on farms, foraging on seasonal key veld products at locations far from settlements, visiting relatives and attendance at school (Cassidy, 1999).

Within Ghanzi District, migration is mainly from farms and settlements to the Ghanzi Township. A recent study on the Ghanzi Farm workers project, of which the majority

are Basarwa, has found that over 2400 people have left Ghanzi Farms since 1991. As part of the household survey undertaken in June 2000, 537 informal, self allocated temporary 'squatter' type structures were counted in Ghanzi Township (Arup Botswana, Loci Environmental and Wareus Settlement, 2000). Unlike Basarwa, who have not stayed in traditional villages, or stayed in the Township in a master-servant relationship with non-Basarwa, Bakgalagadi originated from traditional villages within the district. It is from these bases that they initially migrated to Ghanzi Township temporarily. With passage of time, their migration has become one-way and the Bakgalagadi have established themselves predominately in the 'village' part of the Ghanzi Township. Some Bakgalagadi live in squatter areas. Others have migrated from their main village areas to settlements predominately inhabited by Basarwa, who, being the lowest in terms of resources, power and influence, have been dominated by these new arrivals.

6.10 Poverty And Gender

The National Gender Programme Framework (Ministry of Labour and Home Affairs, 1999) mentions that women and female-headed households (FHHs) suffer particular disadvantages that limit their income and economic opportunities. These include, principally, high dependency ratios, low labour productivity, limited access to and control of productive resources and development programmes. BIDPA (1997a: 18) found that '50% of FHHs were living in poverty, compared to 44% of male HHs'. In line with this observation, UNDP (1998b) identifies gender disparities between men and women, and a widening gap being evident in a variety of sectors such as employment, access to health, education and political activity.

Various factors contribute to women and men having different experiences in terms of human development. They include inequalities in access to employment, inequalities in resources and development programmes, the increasing burden of child care on women and a corresponding decline in men's responsibility towards their offspring. Apart from disadvantages faced by women in general, Basarwa women face a double disadvantage in that they are discriminated against as women and as Basarwa (Mogwe, 1992).

6.11 Poverty And Ethnicity

Basarwa are the most vulnerable to abuse by any other social group in Botswana. This is one factor responsible for their persistent poverty and low status, and translates into the lowest influence and self-worth (Mazonde, 1999).

Basarwa suffer from what has been termed 'participation poverty' which means the lack of due recognition of oneself and exclusion from decision-making process and the general life of the community or society, or exclusion from participation in the life of the community (UNDP, 2002a1). According to Hitchcock and Holm (1993:314), 'many Tswana community gatherings will not allow [Basarwa] to speak up in their discussions'.

Traditionally Basarwa lived in small bands in relatively large territories. They lived off the veld and did not accumulate wealth beyond what they could carry. In other words, wealth creation was a burden. All food was normally shared. The way they dealt with uncertainties, such as food shortages, was through sharing and investing in social relationships rather than through accumulation and storage. As a result, saving, accumulation and planning for times of shortage do not come naturally to most Basarwa. These strategies worked well at a time when food deficits generally occurred in a context of general sufficiency, when the influence of other cultures was limited and the economy was not monetised (Dekker, 1999). I came across cases where Basarwa continue the sharing norm. It was reported that when they were given monthly food rations, because everything was shared, these supplies lasted for a short time, a day in most cases (Interview, Chief Community Development Officer, Ghanzi District Council, 15 May 1999).

6.12 Ownership Of Assets

In the Township, with respect to productive assets, particularly land and housing, 84.9% of Basarwa are squatters (n53) or 40.2% of the total sample (n112). Only 25.7% of Bakgalagadi are squatters (n35) or 8.0% of the sample (n112). Living in squatter areas means that housing is a big problem. Because they are no rights in these areas, no proper or secure housing can be constructed and shack dwellings, which are unhygienic

and overcrowded, are the norm. Most residents of non-fringe areas have big residential plots and satisfactory housing. In West Hanahai, each resident has a residential plot and housing is much safer. See Photos 6.1 and 6.2 below for comparative housing.

Photograph 6.1
Traditional Housing In West Hanahai



By Morris Nyathi, 1999

Photograph 6.2
Typical Shack Dwelling In Ghanzi Township



By Morris Nyathi, 1999

6.13 Security/Tenure Over Natural Resources

Land tenure rights for RADs are uncertain (GDC and GDDC, 1997: 11). Unlike people who live in villages who have both rights to access and title to land, RADs have rights of access and not rights to title of land in Government-created settlements (Wily, 1994). The right to title is retained by the Government, which means that RADs do not own the settlement land area and other resources. A problem arising from this arrangement is that settlements are prone to encroachment from outsiders, leading to environmental degradation. Since settlement residents cannot preclude entry into the settlement by outsiders, it is difficult for the residents to implement any activities to arrest environmental problems associated with problems like overgrazing and depletion of veld foods, due to livestock herds from outside. To this extent RADs do not have secure access to the land and its fruits especially veld food. Although a significant number of people are squatting in the Township, their stay is problematic because they have to move to pave way for Township development.

6.14 Access To And Quality Of Public Services To The Poor

Because Basarwa are poor, most services provided to them and to other poor groups have been social safety nets. These tend to address the symptoms of poverty, leaving the root causes intact. As the Assistant Minister of Finance and Development Planning has pointed out: 'We must admit ...our poverty alleviation schemes do not allow graduation from poverty' (Mmegi/The Reporter, 17th to 23rd July, 1998:18). As pointed out by UNDP (2002a2: 85), 'at the root of material deprivation lies [Basarwa's] cultural and traditional practices and conviction, coupled with their general position as a distinctive and often-stigmatised minority'. The poverty of the Basarwa has caused them to fail to participate fully in using the available public services. Below I outline the safety nets and other services available and the difficulties encountered in accessing them.

In economically depressed areas like West Hanahai, the poor have access to services like the old age pension, destitute relief, and the livestock assistance scheme under the Remote Area Development Programme. High levels of unemployment in settlements

cause most people to rely on the state for employment in temporary labour-based relief projects operated under the drought relief programme. Because there is no alternative employment, relief projects have to be continued (even during non-drought years) so that people can have income.

For some Basarwa there is a problem in getting pensions because their identity cards are marked 'age unknown'. Cards endorsed as such mean that owners cannot get the pension because they cannot prove their date of birth. In October 1996 the Government of Botswana introduced an old age pension for all citizens aged 65 years and above, worth P100 per month and available in cash. According to the Member of Parliament for Ghanzi, however, the majority of the members of the Basarwa community who qualified for the pension did not receive it, as of March 1998, for the reason mentioned above (Good, 1999a).

In my sample of 112 households in the Township, 26 households reported that they did not receive pensions because of their inability to establish their age satisfactorily. Of this 69% (18) were Basarwa, 12% were Bakgalagadi and 19% were other ethnic groups. The major reason for failure of Basarwa (and other ethnic groups) to establish their age is illiteracy of the qualifying age groups. Illiteracy among Basarwa is 86% (Selolwane, 1995:7) compared to the adult illiteracy rate in 1998 of Ghanzi district of 43.3% (UNDP, 1998b), and the national average of 26% (Selolwane, 1995:7). In the Ghanzi Township the range of services that the poor potentially have access to is wider. Generally there is access to the above and many more, including educational and health facilities, proximity to the government offices that are headquartered in the Township. The quality of services depends, however, on extension services, and the literacy levels of the recipients. Basarwa generally complain that they are not aware of government programmes and their contact with government offices is restricted to those that distribute food rations and the old age pension to them. Findings of my research indicate that people in the Township were not satisfied with land, extension and health services in the Township. Table 6.4 below indicates the extent of dissatisfaction with the services in question, on the evidence of the 112 households interviewed.

TABLE 6.4**Percentage Of Households Fully Dissatisfied By Facility/Service**

Service/Facility	% of people who were fully dissatisfied
Health	47.3
Extension	58.0
Land	58.0

Source: Survey, Morris Nyathi, 1999

The dissatisfaction with respect to health services arises from the quality of services provided at the local primary hospital. Despite repeated requests by the District Council to expand the facility, the Government, which is responsible for the facility, has not responded positively. There is overcrowding and some people choose to stay at home rather than go to the facility. Nurses are failing to cope with the number of patients and morale is low. Regarding extension services, extension staff, who are supposed to publicise and explain government programmes and policies, do not seem to be doing this job satisfactorily. It has been reported that extension services are not functional and do not provide the advice that they ought to the village development committees (BIDPA, 2001b). This leads to a lack of information, which plays a role in the exclusion of people from services to which they are entitled. It is not surprising that Basarwa mention that they are not aware of these programmes. Regarding land, the major complaint is that the supply of residential plots is too slow. Some people resort to living in squatter areas since it takes about 5 years between an application for a plot and its allocation. Complaints about areas where people live relate to absence of government services and facilities since it is not Government policy to provide services to squatter areas.

In settlements such as West Hanahai, the Government gives qualifying residents 5 herd of cattle and 15 goats. In a recent review of RADP, there were complaints from some beneficiaries that these benefits are 'leaking' to those they were not originally intended. BIDPA (2003) found that:

Some Basarwa argued during the consultation that most cattle distributed to them through the RADP are stolen by people from the mainstream society, an allegation that was confirmed by a number of officials. In another community, people complained that when some members of the “mainstream society” stole their property, such as livestock, the authorities never took their reports seriously (BIDPA, 2003: 50).

Whilst Basarwa are about 50% of the population of Ghanzi District, their attendance in the literacy programme is low, compared to other Batswana. In focus group discussions in the two research areas, most of the respondents had not attended literacy classes because of the lack of literacy assistants (who undertake the training).

A 1999 report from the Non-Formal Education Department in Ghanzi, attributed the low attendance to:

- Poor participation and no learner groups in most settlements⁴;
- High ‘alcoholism’ mainly in Basarwa communities;
- Although not raised by the Department, it was clear that the language of instruction, Setswana, excluded most Basarwa who do not understand it. Kann et al (1990) also found that many adults did not participate in non-formal education or community development activities because they did not understand what was said.

Not only are the majority of Basarwa excluded from opportunities to acquire traditional and functional literacy, but they have also been less engaged in small industrial projects. These are projects that were funded by the Government through grants, to create employment and manufacture products that can replace imports. They include activities such as brick moulding, sewing/knitting, bakery, carpentry, tannery and welding. A report from the Integrated Field Services Office, Ghanzi, dated 1998, shows that since 1995, 126 projects have been approved. They were expected to create employment for about 281 people but actually only 108 jobs were created. Of the 126 approved projects, 85 (68%) were operational, while 38 (30%) were operating below capacity. The majority of the projects were concentrated on sewing (22), welding (18) and brick moulding (14) and all these were located in Ghanzi Township. What is significant is that none of the project sponsors in the Township were Basarwa. In remote settlements where Basarwa are mostly based, projects covered only two settlements of New Xade and East Hanahai. Otherwise other projects were located in villages of the District dominated by the Bakgalagadi.

Problems have been experienced in access to primary education. In the first place Basarwa were late starters in this level of education, starting school only in the 1970s (Stephen 1982). Problems of low educational attainment have tended to reduce the ability of the poor Basarwa to participate in many aspects of life, including civil activities, access to information, employment and use of public services. Discriminatory practices in the education sector are discussed in Chapter 8 as evidence of exclusion in this sector.

6.15 Conclusion

On the basis of secondary information mostly, this profile has attempted to give estimates of the incidence of poverty of target groups. For the Basarwa, poverty started after their contact with other population groups who tended to subjugate and exploit them. They have been denied the opportunity to continue their lifestyle of hunting and gathering, and have faced considerable difficulty in adjusting to mainstream life. In the remote areas poverty rates are highest and most difficult to alleviate. Dependency on state handouts is the norm given that alternative sources to the traditional lifestyle have not developed. The Basarwa have poor access to most government services due either to their illiteracy or failings of the bureaucracy.

In Chapter 2, I concluded that social exclusion causes the persistence of poverty. A major finding in this profile is the tendency for Basarwa to have limited access to employment opportunities, uncertain access to land, low levels of literacy and education, and limited access to development assistance. All these circumstances are related to exclusion and are responsible for perpetuating poverty. Looking at the profile alone, it is not certain that it can be concluded that exclusion causes persistence of poverty. There is a need to isolate exclusion-specific factors that spur the above circumstances before one can come to a conclusion of this sort. For this reason, I proceed to Chapters 7 and 8, where I will attempt to give a further interpretation of the poverty situation detailed in this chapter vis-à-vis the exclusion that Basarwa face, after which a definite conclusion can be drawn.

¹ Defined as the inability of a household to procure for itself a minimum level of consumer goods and services in order to meet basic needs (UNDP, 1998b).

² The following settlement types are important to note in this discussion. According to Botswana National Settlement Policy, an urban village is a village which has attained urban status, in that it has a minimum of 5000 people and at least 75% of its labour force is engaged in non-agricultural employment (ROB, 1998a: 7). A remote area settlement is a seasonally changing settlement mostly found in the sensitive ecosystem of the Kgalagadi sandveld. Such settlements are predominately inhabited by Basarwa in Kgalagadi, Ghanzi, and parts of Central, Kweneng and Southern Districts (ROB, 1997b: 22).

³ According to the National Policy on Destitutes (ROB,1980), a destitute is (a) an individual who is without assets or resources such as cattle, other livestock, land, cash and cannot plough due to ill-health or handicaps/close family members cannot/and will not assist him, or is; (b) physically or mentally incapable of working due to old age, physically or mentally handicapped; or (c) a child or children whose parent(s) have/has died or deserted the family, or is not supporting his family; or (d) an individual who is rendered helpless due to a national disaster or temporary hardship. Within the above framework, one can be a temporary or permanent destitute. The first case refers to a person who is temporarily incapacitated, and can be assisted until he can support himself. The second case refers to individuals whose age, physical and mental conditions render them completely dependent on outside resources.

⁴ There were learner groups in only two settlements of New Xanagas and Chobokwane.

Chapter 7

Political And Legal Dimensions Of Social Exclusion In Botswana

7.1 Introduction

This chapter gives the author's findings on social exclusion in Botswana at the national and local levels. It is an attempt to respond to two research questions stated in Chapter 4, namely: What is the nature of the Basarwa's exclusion and what effect has exclusion had on this group's standard of living? What are the dimensions of exclusion that affect this group? The findings are restricted to the political and legal dimensions of social exclusion, and are based mainly on secondary data sources. At the end of the findings on each dimension, the findings are discussed.

In order to understand social exclusion in Botswana at the national level and that of Basarwa in particular, whether they are RADs or FADs, elements of the political dimension that engender exclusion should be outlined. These elements are inherent in the state's role in development policy formulation, which is reflected in a dominant group bias, defects in policy design and mismatch between policy formulation and implementation. It is argued that state dominance has tended to have varying exclusionary effects on the non-dominant groups, with the worst consequences for the Basarwa population group.

While Botswana has social justice as one of its planning objectives, uneven development has occurred in the country. Development of the Basarwa appears to be politically unsustainable. Examples below show that Government seems not to have the political will to support strategies to uplift the standard of living of Basarwa. The findings also point to poor or lack of participation of Basarwa in the political institutions, implying lack of input in decision-making. Under the legal dimension, findings indicate barriers to access by Basarwa to productive resources, especially land, and discriminatory legislation that disadvantages minority groups in general and Basarwa in particular.

7.2 Nature Of Development Policy In Botswana

7.2.1 Dominant Group Bias In Development

In using the concept of 'dominant group bias', I am drawing parallels with earlier notions in literature, for example 'urban bias' (Lipton, 1977) and 'male bias' (Elson, 1991), and the point raised in Chapter 3 with reference to the political dimension of exclusion, that development programmes tend to ignore cultural diversity. My argument is that development policy development and programmes in Botswana have a dominant group bias. Policy operates to the advantage of the numerically dominant Tswana group and to the disadvantage of the non-Tswana groups. At the national level, the dominant group is the Tswana-speaking people, who are described in section 7.5.1. I recognise that the Tswana are not a homogenous group. Therefore not all Tswana are dominant, but those who have power and enjoy greater social, political and economic independence, and can manipulate the current agenda to suit their own needs. Within this group is the political and administrative elite - the Cabinet and senior government officials and farmers. At the local level, the dominant group are the Bakgalagadi politicians, local authority officers, farmers and other business people. The bias is reflected in a situation where dominant rules in society allocate people different values and unequal positions in society, and reward cultural qualifications and skills differently. In Botswana there are several instances where this bias is paramount. In sections 7.5.1 and 7.5.2, I will show how constitutional provisions have buttressed the dominant bias. In section 7.5.3, the language policy, which elevates a single language, Setswana, is described.

Rather than taking account of cultural diversity, which existed in Bechuanaland, efforts towards nation building in the new nation of Botswana tended to elevate the culture and language of the dominant Tswana people. Disregard for cultural diversity was a factor in exclusion. In this way an artificially culturally homogeneous state was created, thus assuring the supremacy of the Tswana. Saugestad (1996) captures this exercise in nation building well when she observes:

In a situation that was perceived as a choice between unity or diversity, the solution, in Botswana's case, has been to over-communicate an image of a non-racial, non-ethnic homogeneous state. In effect, this has meant that the culture and language of the numerically dominant Tswana people have achieved hegemony and become the dominant symbol for Botswana as a nation (Saugestad, 1996:6).

Tswana hegemony has been preserved through the post independence period, and the state has been forthright in achieving this. Nyati-Ramahobo (2002b)'s observation is relevant in this respect. She writes:

The state finds it appropriate to reserve group rights, along with tribal territory, for the Tswana-speaking tribes, and individual rights for others, in the name of 'national unity'. This government strategy, empowering the Tswana, disempowers the non-Tswana. When the state propagates the assimilation of the non-Tswana into the Tswana, it claims to be doing so for the benefit of the non-Tswana through social incorporation ... The state defines the struggle of the non-Tswana to preserve their identities as a rejection of government efforts to build a modern and united state through assimilation, with one language, one culture and one flag (Nyati-Ramahobo, 2002b: 708)

It should be noted that the bias in question has disadvantaged most of the non-Tswana groups. Most of these groups, with cultures similar to the dominant Tswana, have devised effective coping mechanisms, and seem to have assimilated more easily into the dominant society than the Basarwa. Examples range from those who have used education and training opportunities to elevate their status, for example Bakalanga (Mannathoko, 1978), Bakgalagadi (Solway, 1994), to those who for religious reasons, have stood aloof of the mainstream society, but remained vibrant communities, for example Bazeduru, (Opsal, 1987)¹. The dominant group bias has disadvantaged Basarwa the most, mainly due to their unique culture and the negative reception they have encountered nationally. Molefhe (2003) has described their culture in the following terms:

The culture of the Basarwa is furthest from the dominant mainstream [Tswana] way of life whereas the other 'minority' tribes share common traits, among them colour, language and perceptions about land rights. This makes the Basarwa more vulnerable to prejudices shared by the 'eight major tribes'² and the Bakgalagadi ... and others who are also engaged in the struggle for recognition of their group rights (Molefhe, 2003:18).

Arising from the above observations, whilst social exclusion and prejudice has been associated with stronger assertion of identity, collective organisation in respect of the non-Tswana groups mentioned above, with respect to Basarwa group, social exclusion has been associated mostly with demoralisation. At the other extreme end, social exclusion has been associated with rejection of Sarwa identity. One of my respondents

mentioned that as Basarwa become rich they hide their original identity (Interview, Lefhoko, 31 July 1999). This has been restated in one study that found that successful Basarwa often no longer identify themselves as Basarwa (BIDPA, 2003). As I will show below, Basarwa's land needs were not accommodated in the land-related legislation, which has tended to favour the agro-pastoral Tswana and other non-Tswana groups.

In Botswana, the dominant group bias has manifested itself in lack of action to address the needs and interests of the RADs, probably because the RAD sector consists of the least powerful members of Botswana society, the majority of whom are Basarwa. In Chapter 3 reference was made to the concept of *non-decision*. It was suggested there that this was a strategy to prevent certain issues from becoming policy issues or a tactic that is employed by influential groups to thwart the emergence of issues that may threaten their interests. Non-decision manifests itself in *inaction* by a Government, particularly where contrary intervention would not be politically sustainable. Below I describe the nature of non-decision as it relates to the RADP. Various initiatives have been undertaken to improve the lot of RADs, culminating in a policy draft prepared by the implementing Ministry in 1993 (Appendix 7).

Despite calls for political support and guidance to implement the RADP³, there has appeared to be some back-peddalling on the government's part to frustrate vigorous attempts to implement some of the essential components of the programme. For instance, Egner (1981) in his evaluation of the RADP, concluded that whilst the programme was highly rated at the District Council levels, the same could not be said of central government. The National Development Plan 7 (ROB, 1991a) recorded the fact that 'RADs continued to face... poverty, insecurity, inadequate education and training, weak institutions and leadership, and negative public attitudes', and committed Government to continue with infrastructure but with a shift towards 'issues of land rights, education opportunities, institution building, leadership training and change in negative public attitudes' (ROB, 1991a: 43). When the National Development Plan 8 (ROB, 1997a) was published six years later, the above plans had not yet been implemented. This is not surprising because one way in which Basarwa's low status manifests itself is that in the eyes of the dominant politicians and officials, the development of Basarwa is unnecessary. In the words of Hitchcock and Holm, 'it is not

unusual for politicians and civil servants to comment in public that development programmes for [Basarwa] are a waste of time because the Basarwa are “uncivilised”. From the politicians’ perspective this means that the [Basarwa know] only a nomadic life of hunting and gathering and are not able to work with “modern” ideas and technology’ (Hitchcock and Holm, 1993:314).

There does not seem to be a commitment and significant institutional capacity at the national level to address the problems. Attempts to formulate a RAD policy started in 1992 and by 1993 Appendix 7 was drafted. The Government has never approved this draft. An assessment of the draft policy shows that a radical approach was envisaged. The draft policy advocated the integration of the traditionally excluded RADs into the mainstream, thus challenging the prevailing systems of inequality. It proposed a shift towards land rights, leadership, and political representation. With reference to Appendix 7, the controversial issues and measures, which I think have sparked resistance to progress in the finalisation of the policy, can be summarised as follows.

- Recognition that RADs have a culture and tradition of their own, which should be taken into account in policy formulation and implementation for their development (section 6.1(a));
- Given reports that RADs have suffered exploitation as a source of cheap labour at cattle posts, that the Department of Labour should set a statutory minimum wage applicable to all agricultural labourers, as this is a serious cause of poverty to many RADs. Any breach of labour regulations on ranches or elsewhere will be punished according to law (section 8.1.4).
- Given the nature of the traditional lifestyle of RADs, and the fact that their land use requirements differ from those of the majority population, appropriate legal provisions will be drawn up to ensure adequate access to land for purposes of hunting and gathering (section 8.2.3). Fair and adequate compensation will be paid to inhabitants of remote areas who are displaced from their traditional territories (section 8.2.2).
- The ILO Convention Number 169 will be presented to Parliament for ratification (section 8.5.1).
- An institute dedicated to the study of indigenous institutions (section 8.5.4);
- Literacy programmes and teaching in mother tongue for the first two years (sections 8.3.1 and 8.3.2);
- Election of local leaders and a forum to bring elected leaders (sections 8.4.1 and 8.4.4);
- Training of extension officers to assist RADs in awareness about their rights, investigation and severely dealing with instances of discrimination (section 8.5.5).

These policy proposals met resistance from those who have benefited from the status quo, in particular the livestock owners who depend on RADs to sustain livestock-related wealth, by providing labour to livestock farms. On this matter, Saugestad (1998b: 181) suggests that the 'Government has vested interests in the maintenance of the status quo partly because many leading politicians and officials are large cattle owners'. Another source records, 'Farmers [in Ghanzi] still consider "any investment" in the [Basarwa] as a complete waste of money and energy and would rather get rid of [Basarwa-based organisations because they] increase the [Basarwa] awareness of their rights ...' (Hitchcock, R. Bollig, M. Nduku, C. and Reynders, J., 2000a: 105). On this issue a respondent remarked: 'there seems to be a hidden agenda to maintain a status quo where Basarwa continue as cheap labour for rich livestock owners' (Interview, Hitchcock, 20 August, 1999). In fact, Appendix 7, item 4.1.3 carries a complaint raised by RADs 'as a source of cheap labour at cattle posts by livestock owners'.

Cabinet reportedly rejected the draft policy and it was only agreed that it would be revisited as part of the review of the rural development policy, which was due to start towards the end of 2000 (Interview, Mothakaja, February, 2000). It was rejected for the following reasons. First, the policy measure that requires Government to recognise RAD culture in the development process is against Government's policy of ethnic neutrality where ethnic identity and culture are not considered as a basis for policy design. As such it is not likely that policy can be formulated to take into account RADs' peculiarities, which include a culture that is despised nationally. Second, in 1990, according to Good (1999a: 195), whilst Government granted salary increases of up to '82% to top bureaucrats, it reaffirmed its opposition to granting statutory minimum-wage protection to farm and domestic workers, even though an official survey in the late 1980s indicated that many agricultural workers received cash incomes of less than P30 a month, making them little better-off than destitutes'. The Government is reported to have rejected protection for these extremely low-paid workers in what Good (1999a) calls a 'peremptory fashion' as follows: 'the Government should not introduce laws, or regulations, which it cannot implement, or has no intention of implementing. To do so would raise workers' hopes unnecessarily ...' (Good, 1999a: 195). Given that most of the Cabinet members and top government officers own substantial herds of livestock, it is not surprising that Government rejected minimum wage legislation since anything to the contrary would increase the cost of labour engaged in livestock farms. Third, as I

indicated in Chapter 3, Government does not recognise Basarwa as indigenous groups. To this extent it has consistently resisted calls to ratify the ILO Number 169 Convention. It is for the same reason that the issue of establishing an institute to the study of indigenous institutions was not approved. Fourth, as I will show in section 7.6.1, land legislation excludes use of land for hunting and gathering purposes. This means that the rights of RADs to utilise land for these purposes is not recognised. Therefore any suggestions to amend the law to accommodate RADs' interests are unlikely to be considered positively. Fifth, no action has been taken on the issues in the last three bullet points above. This suggests that Government did not approve of the matters in question. In conclusion, a policy initiative that had great potential for the improvement of the standard of life of RADs in general and Basarwa in particular was thwarted by non-decision at the highest political level, thus excluding RADs from improvements to their standard of living.

7.2.2 Defects In Policy Design

At independence in 1966, Botswana chose a process of nation building that emphasised a unified and unitary nation-state, and abhorred ethnicity which was associated with tribalism and considered inimical to national development (Saugestad, 1996). Singling out a specific population group for development was associated with the separatist policy of apartheid in neighbouring South Africa. Yet, activities leading to and after independence (such as constitutional provisions), demonstrated a dominant group bias, and overlook the *de facto* cultural diversity of the nation.

Against the above background, development interventions proceeded as if the nation were homogeneous. To this extent, policies designed were *standard or homogeneous* in character⁴. Policy design casts all citizens of Botswana in the same cultural, social and linguistic mould, yet there are differences that should be borne in mind in culture, language, and community. In other words, policy depicts ethnic neutrality, with negative impacts on groups like Basarwa. Suzman and Pedder (1998) have identified the problems in this fashion:

Development policies which are framed in specifically non-ethnic terms cannot effectively address [Basarwa] problems, as they deny ethnicity, they deny the existence of the principal

determinant of [Basarwa] social and cultural marginalisation, that is, the fact that [Basarwa] have in the past been, and continue to be, excluded from meaningful participation in mainstream Botswana society (Suzman and Pedder, 1998 :10)

One newspaper has correctly observed that:

Ethnic neutrality exists in Botswana to negate the plurality and diversity of traditions, of traditional cultures found within these modern, political boundaries and forges ahead toward a homogenous ideal upon which the nation supposedly rests solidly. [This policy does] not encourage equal representation of Botswana's lifestyle but [coerces] cultures in extreme ends of the spectrum to fit into the neutral, homogenous Botswana middle ground (Botswana Gazette, 16 May 2001:12).

Due to such policy, the difference in Basarwa's situation as described by their characteristics in Chapter 5, is not recognised⁵. As indicated in Chapter 2, failure to take account of difference is the basis of exclusion. In terms of the Government's assimilation policy, Basarwa are expected to conform to dominant Tswana culture. In the process, development programmes intended for Basarwa are not sustainable because they do not fully address their problems/needs on the basis of their political, socio-cultural situation. Basarwa cannot integrate into mainstream society on their terms by maintaining their distinct identity and ethnicity. Suzman and Pedder (1998:10) have identified the disadvantages of the assimilation policy as summarised below. These are:

- Failure to allow for the recognition of the special needs of Basarwa with the result that, in practice, some groups (those already comparatively advantaged – for example the Tswana and Bakgalagadi) become somehow more equal than Basarwa;
- Tendency to be implicitly paternalistic and advocating a top-down approach to development which serves to entrench existing attitudes towards Basarwa whilst simultaneously disempowering Basarwa of the right to participate in decisions concerning their own future;
- Such a policy can only hope to succeed if there is a grass-roots will on the parts of the dominant majority and Basarwa minority to assimilate with one another, a state of affairs that is patently absent in Botswana;
- The policy tends to entrench existing social structures and hierarchies existent at the time of implementation, thereby making it exceptionally difficult for

previously marginalized communities to effectively change their marginal status.

One of my informants problematises the above situation as follows.

My concern with all the good things that have been done in the area of development here is that the ethnic group of the Basarwa is a non-category in official discourse. They do not exist in official discourse. They are called RADs, which denies them their identity, because as most people know over 80% of those RADs are Basarwa. Their distinctive characteristics are not taken into account in defining possible intervention. Their cultural background in terms of their distinct identity and their ethnic group needs are not addressed. Yet Government wants them to become part of the dominant society. This is doomed to failure (Interview, Dekker, 26 July 1999).

In government terms, Basarwa are a non-entity and due to this they do not shape government policy. As a non-entity government does not hear their voices. In this respect, Botswana's ethnic neutrality is the practice of moulding the constituency to fit the state and not the opposite as democracy intends.

Similarly policies are not differentiated to take into account variability in resources, gender, and geographic features of the country (BIDPA, 2001b; Interview, Ngakaeaja, 24 March 1999). The disadvantages of such design have been captured in the following observation:

The tendency within most development projects is to view communities in homogeneous terms, thereby limiting the possibilities for divergent needs and interests along class, gender, ethnic, or other lines. Possible sources of inequality and discrimination are neglected, and it is assumed that locally controlled projects will be broadly empowering (Brohman, 1996:344).

The above discussion shows that the way policy is designed can be exclusionary. To treat different things as if they were the same is the source of exclusion. To the extent that policy is not relevant to a situation on the ground, the needs of given situations are mis-identified and wrong interventions applied. Since policies are not relevantly applied, intended beneficiaries miss out or are excluded.

Analysing the RADP can demonstrate an example of the problem inherent in this policy defect. Whilst the majority of RADs are Basarwa, the RADP, being a standard government programme, has not reflected this fact. It is not a differentiated programme

reflecting different circumstances among certain groups in the targeted sections of the population. Lumping Basarwa under the RAD label has tended to exclude them from close examination. At official level their socio-economic problems have tended to be subsumed under RADs and this has rendered Basarwa invisible. Because the Basarwa are most vulnerable to abuse by any other social group, development packages that sometimes work successfully to empower non-Basarwa RADs do not work for the Basarwa, because these other groups discriminate against and dominate Basarwa. It has been against official policy to reflect socio-economic data on ethnic basis. The failure to disaggregate statistics on an ethnic basis effectively excludes interventions that would benefit a particular ethnic group if data were otherwise available. Data on Basarwa (or other ethnic group) cannot be known with certainty.

Another defect in policy design relates to lack of focus and targeting. Because programmes tend to be universal, that is, applied generally, without consideration of special needs in some groups, weaker groups like RADs are unable to take advantage of programmes intended for them, so that the programmes benefit non-RADs. As I demonstrated above, within the RAD group, the non-Basarwa RAD tend to take advantage of programmes more than Basarwa RADs do, but programme design does not reflect this reality.

There seems to be reluctance among policy makers to introduce targeted, hence exclusive policies, because of an insistence on reflecting homogeneity in policy design. Without such differentiated policies, the development planning landscape is dominated by policies that have universal coverage. In the absence of sufficient safeguards, universal provision and eligibility can result in benefits intended for the poor leaking to the non-poor. BIDPA (1997a: 199) has identified two reasons for the leakage. First, poor people have lower human capabilities, lower access to information and influence in their community. As a result, they might not be aware of available benefits or think that they are not eligible for them. Second, the non-poor, having better human capabilities and other advantages, have better ability to exercise their right of eligibility and are generally the first to benefit and the ones who benefit most from policies and programmes of universal coverage.

7.3 Representation In Decision-Making

7.3.1 Representation At The National Level

Politically Basarwa are not represented in the major decision-making institutions of the country at the national and local levels. Class and status have played an important role in determining access to political office in Botswana. 'Most who stand as members of Parliament or councillors are people with some form of status in their communities. Such status is usually obtained from high levels of education and/or substantial property holdings' (Molutsi, 1989:124). Without these advantages, and the lowly rating Basarwa are accorded in the country, no Mosarwa is represented in any of the national decision-making institutions.

For 1999, Tables 7.1 a and b show that at the national level, Basarwa did not participate in political bodies such as the National Assembly (Parliament) and the Cabinet. The representation in Parliament includes all eight tribes recognised in the Constitution, (details of these tribes are shown in sections 7.5.1 and 7.5.2) and four minority tribes. It is worth noting that Bakgalagadi are doing better than Basarwa because they have at least two members of parliament and a minister from this group. Neither are Basarwa represented in another institution of the legislature – the House of Chiefs. This body includes chiefs who are custodians of people's culture. Chiefs also bring unity amongst their people and provide a sense of self-esteem for the people. The House of Chiefs includes ex-officio members representing the eight tribes, four elected members from Ghanzi, Kgalagadi, North East and Chobe districts, and three specially elected members. None of the elected members is a Mosarwa, since representation from Ghanzi and Kgalagadi districts, where Basarwa are mostly found, is from the Bakgalagadi. According to a survey undertaken by UNDP, many residents in western Botswana, especially those from Basarwa, felt that they have been excluded from political decision-making processes, and they are looked down upon because of their relative remoteness, ethnicity and poverty. In the opinion of one elderly man from Ghanzi District, 'Government does not believe in the dignity of poor people – they prefer to work with the educated' (UNDP, 2000a1: 27).

TABLE 7.1 a**Member Of Parliament By Ethnic Group And Percentage Of Each Group, 1999**

Ethnic Group	Number of Members of Parliament	% Of Total
Indian	1	2
Bambukushu	1	2
Bakalanga	7	15
Bakgalagadi	2	4
Bakwena	9	19
Bakgatla	3	6
Bangwato	16	34
Bangwaketse	3	6
Balete	1	2
Barolong	1	2
Batawana	2	4
Batlakwa	1	2
Total	47	100

Source: Survey, Morris Nyathi, 1999

TABLE 7.1 b**Botswana Cabinet Ministers, 1999.**

Ethnic Group	Number in Cabinet
Bakalanga	2
Bakgalagadi	1
Bakwena	5
Batawana	1
Bangwato	7
Bangwaketse	1
Total	17

Source: Survey, Morris Nyathi, 1999

7.3.2 Representation In District Political Bodies

At the local level the situation is not any better. It was estimated at the end of the 1990s that the Basarwa population in Ghanzi District was 16 000, representing about 55% of the district population (Good, 1999b). In spite of this significant population size, Basarwa are underrepresented in two of the main decision-making bodies in the district (see Tables 7.2 to 7.5). These are the District Council and the Land Board, which are

two of the four Local Authorities in Botswana⁶. The Ghanzi District is one of the nine District Councils in the country. Like other District Councils, the Ghanzi District Council has elected councillors and the Minister of Local Government nominates additional councillors. At the political level, the District Council is headed by a Council Chairperson and a Council Secretary on the administrative side (ROB, 1997a). The District Council has delegated functions stipulated by law. Its responsibilities include: primary education, primary health care, tertiary roads, village water and waste water, social welfare and community development and remote area development. In large districts like Ghanzi, District Councils have decentralised some of their functions to Sub-districts. Central Government ministries complement some of the above functions by undertaking certain activities and responsibilities such as water, health, education, roads, and others. Main Land Boards are statutorily responsible for tribal land administration. The Ghanzi Land Board is one of the 12 Land Boards in Botswana. It has statutory powers to allocate tribal land for residential, commercial, industrial, arable and grazing use. In large districts like Ghanzi, Main Land Boards have decentralised some of their allocation functions to Subordinate Land Boards. While some members of Land Boards are elected representatives, the minister of Local Government nominates others (ROB, 1997a). Further details of these Local Authorities and village organisations can be found in Appendix 6.

TABLE 7.2							
Composition Of The Ghanzi District Council 1969 To 1994; Number Of Councillors By Ethnicity							
Election Year	Bakgalagadi	Basarwa	Barolong	Baherero	Europeans	Other	Total
1969	1	0	1	0	3	0	5
1974	3	0	0	0	2	1	6
1979	3	0	1	0	1	1	6
1984	7	0	4	3	1	0	15
1989	5	2	4	2	2	1	16
1994	7	3	5	4	2	0	21
Total	26	5	15	9	11	3	69
Note: Other includes Coloureds and Mongwaketse							
Source: Survey, Morris Nyathi, 1999							

TABLE 7:3							
Percentage Of Councillors By Ethnicity 1969 to 1994							
Ethnicity	Bakgalagadi	Basarwa	Barolong	Baherero	Europeans	Other	Total
Total	37.7	7.2	21.7	13	15.9	4.3	100
Source: Survey, Morris Nyathi, 1999							

As the above tables show, the political status of the Basarwa has been traditionally weak, and marked by the numerical minority in these bodies. Table 7.2 shows that Basarwa only started coming into the political scene in 1989 and have never exceeded three. They are still three from the most recent elections held in 2000. With respect to their representation in the Land Board the situation is worse with only one ever becoming a member. Tables 7.3 and 7.5 show a dominance of representation by the Bakgalagadi ethnic group: with 37.7% and 51.4%, compared to Basarwa's of 7.2% and 2.9% in the District Council and Land Board, respectively. Since data do not exist on the District's population by ethnic group, it is not possible to compare the above percentages with the estimated population share.

TABLE 7:4							
Composition Of The Ghanzi Land Board 1969 to 1994; Number Of Members By Ethnicity							
Election Year	Bakgalagadi	Basarwa	Barolong	Baherero	Europeans	Other	Total
1969	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1974	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1979	2	0	2	0	0	1	5
1984	5	0	1	1	0	3	10
1989	7	0	1	3	0	0	11
1994	4	1	4	0	0	0	9
Total	18	1	8	4	0	4	35
Source: Survey, Morris Nyathi, 1999							

TABLE 7:5							
Percentage Of Members By Ethnicity 1969 To 1994							
Ethnicity	Bakgalagadi	Basarwa	Barolong	Baherero	Europeans	Other	Total
Total	51.4	2.9	22.9	11.4	0	11.4	100
Source: Survey, Morris Nyathi, 1999							

It is one thing to become a member of a political body, yet another to make some impact. From literature there is concern about the small number of Basarwa members in the two institutions, and their ineffectiveness. This ineffectiveness derives from illiteracy. ‘The ... [Basarwa] councillors, for instance, rarely speak up at council meetings. Neither can read council documents; [they] must request that discussions in English be translated into Setswana’ (Hitchcock and Holm, 1993:330). Because of their negative image, they are usually outvoted (by the non-Basarwa members who are the majority in the District Council and Land Board) in matters that are not of interest to the majority of councillors. When the Basarwa political representatives attempt to raise Basarwa issues, ‘they are ignored or worse, accused of lying. In the end the people see the councillors as civil servants rather than their representatives...’ (Rivers, 1999:48). The same source reports on instances where Basarwa councillors were laughed at when speaking up in Council meetings (Rivers, 1999: 51).

One of my respondents, a Mosarwa himself, was critical of the effectiveness of Basarwa politicians. ‘Those who have joined politics have not started to have an impact because they are a minority in the District Council. Being a minority some councillors have joined politics out of desperation – to find bread for tomorrow. Politics is not at stake for them. From my experience Basarwa councillors join politics under the ruling party ticket through support from prominent members of the party. These are people with experience in campaigning for the Mosarwa nominee for councillor position. As such these councillors’ interests are not necessarily to serve their constituents but to maintain a friendly relationship with party cadres so as to safeguard their “employment”’ (Interview, Ngakaeaja, 24 March, 1999).

Another Mosarwa respondent who is a member of the Land Board reported that when she offers constructive criticism during meetings of the Board, she is 'rebuked or discouraged from speaking up' (Interview, Tina, 9 January, 2001). From the dominant Tswana or non-Sarwa perspective, a Mosarwa is supposed to behave according to some negative stereotypes. In other words, he is not supposed to be assertive, but subservient, illiterate, disorganised and lacking information about how he can rescue himself from a situation of oppression. Those who deviate from this behavioural pattern are considered 'untypical and not authentic' (Saugestad, 1998b: 38). 'This deviation to a demonstration of qualities believed to be more characteristic of dominants results in a subordinate being defined as an anomaly' (Tatum, 2000: 12). The following is an illustrative example. In the words of some respondents, a Mosarwa who looks organised, vocal and calls for self determination for his kin is dismissed as a 'mixed blood' or a product of a union between a Mosarwa mother and a non-Mosarwa father, or not truly representing the rest of his people but his/her self interest (Interview, Camm/Mango, 26 July, 1999).

Basarwa have encountered problems in entering the political arena. According to one respondent, 'the current nomination system for special nominations for election as a councillor done by the Minister responsible for Local Authorities does not include Basarwa. I feel the Member of Parliament for Ghanzi (who has to vet nominations) has a negative attitude towards Basarwa' (Interview, Mayane, 10 November, 1999).

7.3.3 Representation At Township/Settlement Levels

Where Basarwa are numerically less than non-Basarwa, it has not been possible for them to be represented in village institutions such as Village Development Committees⁷. For instance in the Ghanzi Township where there is a non-Basarwa numerical majority, no Basarwa were represented ever until one⁸ in 2000. In West Hanahai, where Basarwa are more than non-Basarwa (as shown in Table 4.1, Chapter 4), the former are more represented in these institutions. One of my respondents in West Hanahai, however, reported that Basarwa prefer Bakgalagadi to take leadership positions (Interview, Deputy Head Teacher, West Hanahai, 17 June 1999). This preference is cultural. According to Dekker (1999), Basarwa do not have a culture of representative leadership. In a band, people were 'leaders' because of their skills. If a

person was a hunter, this was recognised to some extent, and he would take the lead. He was not considered to be above others, for he was quickly levelled if he thought so. Choosing a leader who is to represent Basarwa is foreign to them. So they would appoint somebody and as soon as that person comes up as a leader he would be immediately attacked and criticised. This is one reason Basarwa end up appointing someone else (a non-Mosarwa) to represent them (Interview, Dekker, 26 July, 1999).

Le Roux (1998) has documented the above view. Culturally Basarwa took decisions jointly rather than subordinating themselves to one person at the top. Related to this is that the type of leadership the Basarwa have does not allow for one person to stand out too much. 'As soon as a person is singled out too much for whatever reason, the group will pour out their disapproval on him or her to 'level' the society again... [Basarwa] manage their affairs by reaching consensus and in this process each individual's viewpoint counts' Le Roux (1998:13-14). Individuals, therefore, if given a more dynamic leadership position, either withdraw or are marginalized by the rest of the group, becoming very unpopular with everybody. To this extent a Rolong and Mokgalagadi occupy the positions of secretary and treasurer respectively in the development committee in West Hanahai. 'But when Bakgalagadi take up the challenge, Basarwa become suspicious and jealous' (Interview, Deputy Head teacher, West Hanahai Primary School, 17 June, 1999)⁹. When two Basarwa elders were asked if it had made any difference having Basarwa headmen, both responded:

Much hadn't improved since we have had our *Kgosi* ... whenever the *Kgosi* speak they are told that they are 'involving themselves in politics'. The [Basarwa] generally remain afraid of speaking out against the government, subdued and cautious (Rivers, 1999:50).

As to the reasons for lack of Basarwa representation in the Township, one respondent explained exclusion by pointing out that the relationship between Basarwa and non-Basarwa in the Township is that of master and servant, where Basarwa take a subordinate position. This unequal relationship can be viewed at three levels, namely at personal, family and group levels. At personal level, the master-servant relationship manifests itself in a situation where the superior (or 'master') tribe treats the other (servant/inferior) tribe, as a second-class citizen group.

At family level, a non-Mosarwa child treats an adult Mosarwa like a child. Basarwa have been subjected to this treatment for a long time. Although the treatment is degrading, the Basarwa seem to be so used to such inhuman treatment that they do not always see it, as they were socialised to learn that they are minors and they have internalised this relational situation. One respondent has alluded to Basarwa being considered as minors and thinks this owes its origin to their historical treatment as serfs. According to this correspondent, Basarwa in Ghanzi Township did not participate in Township Committees for the following reasons:

Basarwa are fearful and have bitter memories of historical past where they suffered subjugation. They have a perception that non-Basarwa would condemn them if they assumed leadership positions. This is what makes Basarwa reluctant or afraid to involve themselves in village institutions. They lack self-esteem and consider themselves of inferior status (Interview, Ralehika, 20 June 1999).

At group level, if one takes an example of a village/ward development committee (VDC) meeting, some Basarwa who attend these meetings encounter a problem of not understanding the Setswana language used at the meetings. Apart from this, through prejudice, if a Mosarwa wishes to make a contribution at meetings, he is sometimes jeered at and remarks are made suggesting that being a Mosarwa, his contribution is useless. At such meetings, non-Basarwa pass remarks like 'What can he say?' or 'What contribution can a Mosarwa make?' (Interview, Kedise, 23 September, 1999). This information closely compares with comments in literature that 'in mixed settlements [Basarwa] sit at the back, or even outside the *Kgotla* and if they do speak, they are shouted down' (Cassidy, 1999:7)¹⁰. These remarks and treatment are intimidating, degrading and discourage input from Basarwa at such meetings and discourage them from attending subsequent meetings. On a related point a Mosarwa respondent said she and others did not attend *Kgotla* meetings because they were falsely accused by the dominant groups of attending such meetings only when food was served after meeting. She further said that even if food was served, Basarwa were pushed from the queues, and remarks made to the effect that they should rather wait for their monthly food rations from the state. Part of this story tallies with one Mokgalagadi respondent who said Basarwa were not people who are interested in doing voluntary community work which VDC/WDC membership requires. They tend to come to meetings where meals are provided (Interview, Setima, 21 February, 1999).

Focus group discussions had some contributions to make about the reasons for Basarwa not being members of the Township institutions. Given their poverty situation they seek informal unemployment rather than participate in organisations whose activities are remotely related to their situations. The following excerpts give the picture of what Township Basarwa had to say:

We cannot afford to spend time in committee work and lose out on piece jobs, which bring some money into our pockets.

Focus Groups of Young Men and Young Women

Community organisations such as the WDCs do not address our needs/problems. Some committees discriminate against us. For example when some of us start a living through alcohol sale some WDC members threaten to close our business and confiscate our property yet non-Basarwa do not receive such threats.

Focus Group of Old Men

A recent study undertaken by BIDPA (2003) has confirmed some of the views of the last focus group as follows.

Community organisations and leadership were perceived as to be generally weak. Many of the institutions were reported to be inactive or dormant. The degree of participation in them is generally low, most especially among the marginalized groups such as Basarwa. The VDCs therefore lack effective leadership and service delivery capacity (BIDPA, 2003: xvi).

Notwithstanding the weakness of VDCs, it should be recognised that they are held in high regard in rural areas. BIDPA (2000b) found that:

VDCs are perceived as the most important decision makers in village development. Amongst rural people, they rank highest in relation to the Chief, the District Commissioner, Councillors and members of Parliament (BIDPA, 2000b: 133).

In addition to this positive image, VDCs' potential can be improved. They 'need good leadership, members' commitment, due reward for services rendered, better-educated and knowledgeable members, and resources for the performance of their functions' (BIDPA, 2001b: 133). Government has accepted a recommendation that VDCs be strengthened as local development entities through restructuring of their composition, leadership and secretariat (ROB, 2002b).

7.4 Discussion Of The Findings

From the above data, it will be observed that Basarwa have limitations to participation in the political field. At the national level they are not represented in the major political institutions. This is because they are the lowest ethnic group in terms of resources, power and influence. As has been pointed out 'none of their number has entered the super-rich class of urban entrepreneurs, none has been elected to Parliament or promoted to a high civil service job since independence. No political party has seen it fit to elect even one [Mosarwa] to be a member of its national executive committee in the twenty-five years since independence' (Hitchcock and Holm, 1993:328). They are not included in the Judiciary as lawyers, magistrates or judges. Neither are they medical doctors.

At the local level, some development has occurred at District Council and Land Board. As shown in table 7.2, election of some Basarwa councillors started two decades after the first election year. It is significant that this did not occur as a result of a deliberate decision on part of the government to include Basarwa in the political field, but pressure from a major opposition party in the 1989 elections (Hitchcock and Holm, 1993). This party, the Botswana National Front, campaigned strongly in RAD dominated constituencies and drew the attention of prospective Basarwa voters to their exploitation by farmers and the neglect they experienced at the hands of the government. This prompted the ruling party to counter with its own measures to capture the Basarwa vote. In the event, two Basarwa councillors (out of seven candidates) won, one for the opposition party and another for the ruling party. From then on the ruling party continued to nurture the Basarwa vote through state resources, mainly food distribution during and after drought, and recruitment of Basarwa into the Land Board. From the above history, it may be concluded that state has included some Basarwa in political institutions. On the contrary, I think this is an example of unsatisfactory inclusion, which I alluded to in Chapter 2. It is the terms of inclusion I find questionable. Wherever they have been included in social structures in public life, Basarwa's incorporation has tended to be at the lowest levels. In section 7.3.2, there is evidence of inclusion of Basarwa as councillors. Unfortunately the politicians concerned are those with the lowest educational qualifications, making them ineffective

as politicians. This nominal political participation is not good enough. A recommendation made¹¹ at a RADP seminar in 1992 to the effect that the Minister of Local Government, Lands and Housing vigorously consider Basarwa in the nomination of councillors and land board members, has remained unimplemented to date. This has closed doors to possibilities of nominating better-qualified candidates.

At the Township level, it has been difficult for Basarwa to be included as members of institutions particularly where non-Basarwa are predominant. One effect of this is that non-Basarwa dominated institutions fail to uphold the interests of Basarwa. Basarwa are without political freedom, that is, they cannot join Township committees and express opinions and thus have fewer choices in life. They are denied a fundamental right in human existence that 'of being able to participate in the life of their community, commanding the respect of others and having a say in communal decisions' (UNDP, 2002b: 52).

One problem with lack of representation in local institutions like the VDC is that Basarwa miss the opportunity to channel their problems to the Council departments charged with their welfare. During this author's visit to Kang village in a neighbouring Kgalagadi district, I found out that a Basarwa community living on the outskirts of the village was not served by the relevant Council department because none of the Basarwa were represented in the Village Development Committee through which villagers needs/problems are channelled to the department. This meant that a prevalent problem of destitution within this Basarwa group was not systematically addressed¹².

How does all this relate to political exclusion as discussed in Chapter 3? The evidence above suggests that Basarwa face constraints about participating in politics. At the national level they are kept outside the process of political discussion and decision-making, or encounter external exclusion in Young's (2000) terms. Thus there are difficulties in attaining parity in standards of living between the dominant group and the minority Basarwa group in Botswana. No strategies exist in the country to initiate affirmative measures that could improve the status of Basarwa. In line with Bierstedt's (1950) concept of power, the dominant groups at the national and local levels have more social power with which they dominate and prevent the less powerful Basarwa from equal or satisfactory participation in the political sphere of society. This

monopolistic tendency has been highlighted in an editorial article in respect of the problem political leadership in Botswana in the following terms:

The problem with our political leaders - as we see it - is too much power concentrated in the hands of too few people; people who have wielded power since they were appointed to the public service in their youth and who after many years keeping their own counsel and listening only to themselves, have now retired into senior positions in politics. People who have never known the concept of power sharing, let alone practicing it. People who have not learnt the art of give and take that is part and parcel of politics' (Botswana Gazette, 6 March, 2002).

Whilst Basarwa are included in political and leadership positions at the local level, it is the terms of this inclusion that are problematic. They are subjected to 'internal exclusion' (Young, 2000), as defined in Chapter 3. As I indicated above, at Council meetings contributions of Basarwa representatives are treated with scorn. To this extent the inclusion of some Basarwa as councillors has not made any significant improvement to their role as representatives of their constituency, because they lack respect from their non-Basarwa colleagues. Their inclusion is too low and nominal.

At the Township level, in public meetings, Basarwa encounter disparaging remarks that discourage them from attending meetings or withdrawing from attending altogether. Therefore their contributions, which might be useful, are not given an opportunity to be heard, and as such they cannot impact on decisions taken at such meetings. This stifles initiative and de-motivates the Basarwa. I indicated that Basarwa leaders at headman positions have to toe the official line otherwise they face expulsion. This is a consequence of the assimilation policy, which the Government has adopted towards Basarwa. This policy implies that in order to be accepted, Basarwa should adopt the dominant Tswana customs and traditions and abandon theirs. It appears that there is no appreciation of the fact that the transformation into a dominant culture will be a slow and long process, and imposing it on Basarwa is a futile exercise. Without significant access to decision-making at almost all levels, Basarwa have been denied opportunities to learn and acquire political skills, which are essential in debating the problems/needs of Basarwa at large.

From the above account of the nature of development policy in the country, various processes that operate to exclude Basarwa from benefits of development have been highlighted. The policy has tended to serve dominant group interests. The dominant

group bias is consistent with the notion of the instrumentalist perspective of the state where the state is used as a tool of the dominant interests in society, and where the policies intended for the minority Basarwa group are frustrated. Opposition to improve their lot by politicians and some civil servants on the one hand, and non-decision by Government on the other hand, has excluded Basarwa from a satisfactory standard of living. I noted in Chapter 3 that whilst Basarwa meet the criteria for indigenous peoples status, the Government of Botswana does not accept this designation. Whilst Basarwa are culturally different from the mainstream Tswana, the Government does not acknowledge this difference. It perceives them as just as one of the economically disadvantaged groups. Against this perception it is not surprising that affirmative action measures to deal with their disadvantaged status as spelt out in Appendix 7, and summarised below, have not been approved. These measures include:

- Improved land allocation with special priority being given to people in remote areas. Increased representation of RADs in land allocation bodies and amendment to land legislation to allow RADs to utilise land for hunting and gathering in line with their traditional lifestyle;
- Reservation of quotas of places for RADs in institutions of higher education and any training courses provided by Government;
- Training of RADs as literacy assistants, primary schools teachers, and extension workers;
- Intensified public awareness programmes to educate and conscientise RADs about their rights and responsibilities, to make them aware that they have as much rights as any other citizen.

It seems that improving the lot of Basarwa is not politically sustainable.

7.5 Legal Exclusion

Legal exclusion is embedded in discriminatory devices found in legal documents, where the dominant group bias manifests itself clearly. This section covers a review of discriminatory legislation arising from Sections 77 to 79 of the Constitution, other legislation arising from those sections, namely the Tribal Territories and Chieftainship Acts, discriminatory policies and practices. Evidence of such discrimination, which I will highlight below, has been summarised by Nyamnjoh (2002) and it includes:

An unequal representation of cultural interests in the House of Chiefs, which is responsible for advising government on matters of tradition, custom and culture; an educational and administrative policy that privileges the use of Setswana to the detriment of 20 minority

languages, thereby denying the latter the opportunity to develop and enrich Botswana culturally; inequalities of access to tribal land and administration (Nyamnjoh, 2002: 760).

7.5.1 Discriminatory Provisions Of The Constitution Of Botswana

The Constitution of Botswana prohibits, amongst others, discriminatory practices. Particular provisions in the Constitution stipulate what discrimination is, as shown in Box 7.1. In spite of the above section of the Botswana Constitution, which legislates against discrimination, there is much evidence of this practice in the country. A motion calling for the amendment of the sections 77, 78 and 79 of the Constitution, for discriminating against certain tribes, was approved in Parliament in 1995. This culminated in the appointment of a Commission of Inquiry in 2000. Its terms of reference were:

- To review sections 77, 78 and 79 of the Constitution of Botswana, and to seek a construction that would eliminate any interpretation that renders the sections discriminatory;
- To review and propose the most effective method of selecting Members of the House of Chiefs and;
- To propose and recommend measures to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the House of Chiefs (ROB, 2000b).

Box 7.1

Constitution Of Botswana

Section 3: Relating to Rights

Whereas every person in Botswana is entitled to the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual, that is to say, the right, whatever his race, place of origin, political opinions, colour, creed or sex, but subject to respect for the rights and freedoms of others and for the public interest, to each and the following, namely –

- a) life, liberty, security of the person and the protection of the law;
- b) freedom of conscience, of expression and of assembly of the law;
- c) protection for the privacy of his home and other property and from deprivation of property with compensation.

Section 15: Relating to Discrimination

- (1) ... no law shall make any provision that is discriminatory either of itself or in its effect.
- (2) ... no person shall be treated in a discriminatory manner by any person acting by virtue of any written law or in the performance of the functions of any public office or any public authority.
- (3) In this section, the expression "discriminatory" means affording different treatment to different persons, attributable wholly or mainly to their respective descriptions by race, tribe, place of origin, political opinions, colour or creed, whereby persons of one such description are subjected to disabilities or restrictions to which persons of another such description are not made subject or are accorded privileges or advantages which are not accorded to persons of another such description.

Source: ROB, 1965a: 5 and 17

As can be seen above, one of the terms of reference attests the discriminatory nature of the Constitution, and seeks to change it in order to 'eliminate any interpretation that renders the sections discriminatory'.

The relevant sections of the Constitution for review were:

- 77 (a) there shall be a House of Chiefs for Botswana
(b) the House of Chiefs shall consist of –
 - (i) eight *ex-officio* Members;
 - (ii) four Elected Members; and
 - (iii) three Specially Elected Members
- 78 The *ex-officio* Members of the House of Chiefs shall be such persons as are of the time being performing the functions of the office of Chief in respect of the Bakgatla, Bakwena, Bamalete, Bamangwato, Bangwaketse, Barolong, Batawana, and Batlokwa tribes, respectively.

- (i) The Elected Members of the House of Chiefs shall be elected from among their own number by the persons for the time being performing the functions of the Sub-Chief in the Chobe, North East, Ghanzi and Kgalagadi districts, respectively
- (ii) The Specially Elected Members of the House of Chiefs shall be elected by the *ex-officio* and Elected Members of the House of Chiefs in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution from among persons who may not have been within the preceding five years actively engaged in politics.

To understand how discriminatory the Constitution is, a background to tribal groups in Botswana is necessary. The people of Botswana or Batswana, apart from other citizens of European and Asian descent, are made out of various tribes. This is reflected in the Table 7.6.

TABLE 7.6

People Of Botswana


Babirwa	<u>Bakwena</u>	Basarwa	Bazezuru	Barotsi
Baherero	<u>Balete</u>	Basubiya	Balala	Badalaonde
Bakalanga	Bambukushu	<u>Batawana</u>	Bakgothu	Baphaleng
Bakgalagadi	<u>Banqwaketse</u>	<u>Batlakwa</u>	Bandebele	
<u>Bakgatla</u>	<u>Banqwato</u>	Batswapong	Bakaa	
Bakhurutse	<u>Barolong</u>	Bayeyi	BaXhosa	

Source: Dambe, 1993, Department of Information and Broadcasting, 1999

The 8 tribal groups (underlined in the above Table) form the core Tswana dominant grouping and are Tswana-speaking. These groups have something in common to the extent that they share a common ancestor, language and certain cultural tenets (The Mirror, 4 to 18 April 2001:16). Their dominance was legalised in certain respects. During the colonial era, the British colonialists set the tone for the legislative process that was set in motion in the post-colonial period. The British named the eight Tswana-speaking groups as principal tribes, implying that the non-Tswana speakers were minor. Through its policy of indirect rule, the British gave much freedom to the traditional authorities to shape the administrative set-up of the country. Through consultation with these leaders, the British established Tribal Reserves for the principal tribes¹³. These are shown in Map 7.1. According to Ng'ong'ola (1997), this reflected a refusal to acknowledge or recognise political and territorial sovereignty of some Basarwa communities over certain parts of the country. Reserves were not proclaimed for minority tribes like the Basarwa and Bakgalagadi who stayed in the western, drier parts

of the country. Rather 'legal title to their lands and territories passed to the Crown under a 1910 Order' (Ng'ong'ola, 1997:9).

Map 7.1 Tribal/Native Reserves During The Colonial Era.



Source: Morton et al, 1989:xxv

These communities became 'tenants at will' of the Crown. This status was precarious because if the land was required for other purposes, the administration did not regard itself as bound to consult the affected communities, let alone compensate them for loss of land rights. This unsatisfactory tenure to land was improved when state land was reduced to create new tribal territories in the Chobe, Ghanzi and Kgalagadi districts in 1976. In spite of this arrangement, the Bakgalagadi have had better land rights in Ghanzi and Kgalagadi districts, settling predominately in villages, as compared to Basarwa, who have tended to be re-settled in remote settlements. When Botswana became independent, the rulers, who were predominately members of the principal

tribes, perpetuated the pre-independence policies and enacted appropriate legislation which continued their advantaged position, even when they were more aware than the departing rulers, that the Botswana nation was culturally diverse (Dambe, 1993). The Constitution's section 77 and 78 provide for the House of Chiefs, which advises Parliament on matters affecting customs and tradition, and consists, inter alia, of ex-officio members from the above tribes. This gives the eight tribes automatic representation in the House of Chiefs. Section 78 does not provide membership to the House of Chiefs of chiefs of non-Tswana speaking groups. Section 79 relegates members of the House of Chiefs in Ghanzi, Kgalagadi, North East and Chobe to the sub-chief status. All this smacks of discrimination. A failure to recognise certain communities on an equal footing has shaped and endorsed views that perpetuate cultural and ethnic dominance. It has prompted the interpretation that the eight tribes are 'main' implying that the rest are 'other' or lesser tribes. It has resulted in a perception captured in the following quotation.

While every Botswana national can claim to be a citizen legally within the framework of the modern nation-state, some (minority groups in the main) are perceived by others (among the majority Tswana groups especially), as less authentic nationals or citizens (Nyamnjoh, 2002:755).

The latter are generally referred to as minority tribes. 'Minority' as used in Botswana has various meanings, summarised as follows:

It refers to any group in Botswana that is not one of the eight 'tribes' listed in the constitution. Generally, 'minority' groups are former subject peoples, they include all the non-Setswana speaking groups that at some time were brought, voluntarily or by force, within the political orbit of Tswana chieftdom and subsequently the modern state of Botswana. 'Minority' most commonly connotes marginality (Solway, 2002: 714).

The above-cited constitutional provision has been criticised for promoting tribalism and subordinating 'other' tribes, despite the Constitution's stand that all tribes are equal.

7.5.2 Chieftainship And Tribal Territories Acts

There are other pieces of legislation whose authority derives from the above sections. One is the Chieftainship Act (Chapter 41.01 of the Constitution), which defines the above eight as the tribes of Botswana. According to this Act 'tribe' means 'the

Bamangwato Tribe, the Batawana Tribe, the Bakwena Tribe, the Bakgatla Tribe, the Bangwaketse Tribe, the Bamalete Tribe, the Barolong Tribe or the Batlokwa Tribe' (ROB, 1965b: 41:3). The non-Tswana speaking tribes are not recognised, since the assimilationist policy that Botswana adopted at independence requires that they have to be absorbed into other tribes. Another is the Tribal Territories Act that provided for the creation of territories whose names correspond with the names of the eight tribes (ROB, 1965c). These are the Bamangwato, Batawana, Bakwena, Bakgatla, Bangwaketse, Bamalete, Batlokwa, and Barolong Territories¹⁴. This Act provided group land rights to Tswana speaking groups only, and imposed the jurisdiction of the so-called principal tribes over all peoples living on these lands, irrespective of social affiliations, customs and languages. No consultation was done nor account taken of non-Tswana peoples' historic rights to land they lived. Several non-Tswana people lost their traditional lands in this process. In particular, Basarwa found the land that they previously inhabited was allocated to others, leaving them homeless. Having been given the right to own land, the main tribes took the responsibility to parcel out pieces of land to others, who remained under their protection during most of the pre-independence era.

In summary, existing legislation is biased towards the dominant Tswana. Manifest in this bias is the name of the country, Botswana¹⁵. The name assumes some ethnic homogeneity, but, given the country's ethnic diversity, the assumption does not hold. The Constitution is discriminatory because it does not allow tribes to view each other as one. In other words, it is against the fundamental principles of sections 3 and 15 of the Constitution in that all tribes are not treated equally. The Commission referred to above submitted its report towards the end of 2000. The Commission established two viewpoints, those who felt that Constitution was not discriminatory, and others who did consider it discriminatory. The main findings of the Commission, however, were the following:

A proportion of the nation's citizens interpret Sections 77, 78 and 79 of the Constitution as being discriminatory. Even if the Sections are not discriminatory, ... the fact that enough of the citizenry has the perception that they are, is sufficient cause to warrant the change. No tribe or ethnic community should be named in the Constitution (ROB, 2000c: 94-95).

The Commission recommended that Sections 77, 78 and 79 should be repealed/amended and new sections enacted and included to replace the three sections in question. It

further recommended that these new provisions should be cast in terms calculated to ensure that no reasonable interpretation can be made that they discriminate against any citizen or tribe in Botswana (ROB, 2000c: 98).

7.5.3 Language Policy-Based Exclusion

In social domains like education, the media and judiciary, particular languages are permitted. Nyati-Ramahobo (2002a) describes this situation as follows:

At independence, Botswana adopted a modernist/assimilationist policy of social development for its peoples. Setswana is the national language, while English is the official language. In order to build a nation state using Setswana, all other languages that were taught in schools before Independence were banned from use in all social domains ... Setswana became the medium of instruction in schools ... While English is the main language of the courts, Setswana is the only indigenous language which is acceptable in the courts, through interpretation or translation into English. It is the only language accepted in official public domains such as the *Kgotla* (Nyati-Ramahobo, 2002a: 17)

Against the above background, Botswana's curriculum is based on Setswana and English, and every child in every community is expected to learn in Setswana and later in English. The effect of this exclusionary practice was to marginalize the languages of various minority groups in Botswana. It meant that the national building process, which promoted Setswana at the expense of other languages, did not recognise, accept and respect other people's identities, language and cultures. The language policy makes Botswana 'officially a country with one African language, Setswana, a nation made up of only Tswana ethnic groups, and which uses only this language in all traditional or cultural activities' (Mmegi Monitor, 5-11 September, 2000:4).

In line with the language policy, the medium of instruction in primary school (Standard 1 to 4) is Setswana. This presents difficulties to population groups who do not speak the language. Hays (2002) has explained this problem in these terms:

Other minority groups also begin school in a language other than their mother tongue, and some also have linguistic difficulties. However, most seem to cope with this change better than do [Basarwa] students. ... The social structure of other groups allows them to more confidently approach school and the language transition that they will experience there, and children of most groups receive more parental support than [Basarwa] students in most places (Hays, 2002: 77).

Saugestad (1998b: 63) observes that 'in terms of linguistic competence it is easier for a [*non-Mosarwa*] speaker to adapt a Tswana curriculum in school than it is for a pupil

who is a [Mosarwa language speaker]'. The use of Setswana in school has also been problematic to other non-Tswana speakers, and engendered undesirable practices, which are still ongoing in some places, particularly in rural areas. Examples have been documented in the press. When non-Tswana children tried to participate in class, other children (Tswana speakers) would boo them because they spoke non-Tswana languages. This eroded the confidence and self-esteem of such children, some of whom dropped out of school. Coupled with this booing was teacher-oriented verbal abuse based on children's ethnicity for whatever mistake they made (The Sunday Tribune, 10 September, 2000:12). Further details of these disincentives to educational development are mentioned in Chapter 8.

Given the language policy, which elevated Setswana as the national language, non-Tswana speakers were discriminated against in that their languages were excluded from national life. The process resulted in the denial of the basic human rights of self-esteem and expression of languages of the non-Tswana speaking groups. In some cases this has resulted in the demise of these languages. The cultures of non-Tswana speaking groups were ignored. Non-Tswana were forced to learn and speak Setswana and use Setswana names. Names of places and people were changed from non-Tswana languages to Setswana language. For example, place names like *Chizwina* and *Donota*, which are *Kalanga* names, were changed to *Sebina* and *Tonota* respectively. Non-Tswana names took the Setswana equivalent. A *Seyeyi* name like *Muyenda* was changed to *Motsamai* (The Midweek Sun, April 1999:8). Many minority tribe people adopted Setswana names and rejected their own, in order to comply with the prevailing order. If anyone spoke his own language (other than Setswana) especially in the capital city of Gaborone, he would be considered *raw* (The Midweek Sun, April 1999:8). Such incidents made non-Tswana speakers ashamed to speak their mother tongue in public.

There are reports that Basarwa in Ghanzi Township were not allowed to speak *Sesarwa* in public places (Mogwe, 1992). Given this cultural oppression, non-Tswana speakers have lost their identity and dignity by pretending that their languages and culture do not exist, and imitated the advantaged Tswana speakers who claim superiority enshrined by the legal process. It should be noted, however, that the public debate prompted by the Commission about discriminatory provisions of the Constitution has resulted in some

minority groups challenging the hegemonic status of the Setswana language and demanding that their languages be accorded official recognition too.

7.6 Land Related Legislation

Through legislation, Basarwa, mainly because of their hunter-gatherer tradition, have encountered difficulties with respect to land rights and have found it difficult to change to the dominant lifestyles. The main piece of legislation related to exclusion from land is the Tribal Land Act and the implementation of the Tribal Grazing Land Policy.

7.6.1 The Tribal Land Act (TLA)

Before the arrival of other ethnic groups and white settlers in Ghanzi District, Basarwa who were pursuing a hunter-gatherer lifestyle inhabited the district. In the 17th and 18th centuries, Basarwa had ample land, each band owning its own territories. The size of these territories was large, some operating within areas of 3000 square kilometres (Wily, 1981). In the 19th century, new arrivals, who came at different times, included the Tswana and the Europeans who became dominant through conquest, occupation, and settlement of territorial lands formerly utilised by Basarwa.

While the colonial government recognised the dominant Tswana groups as having title to land, the Basarwa, as a tribe or distinct ethnic group, were not given a Tribal Reserve, and their rights within the different Tswana Tribal Territories were not defined. The Basarwa were not considered by the colonial government to have the unity and chieftainship organisation seen as prerequisites for a Tribal Area (Wily, 1994). In a process of dispossession that followed in the 19th century, most of the land allocated to the main tribes under the Tribal Territories Act was carved from land taken from Basarwa traditional hunting and gathering territories. By independence (1966), the Basarwa still had no tribal land of their own, and remained scattered throughout the country, attached to their original territories.

In 1968 the Tribal Land Act (TLA) was enacted. Several authors have demonstrated how the Act failed to cater for the land needs for Basarwa (Wily, 1994; Madzwamuse, 1998; Moeletsi, 1993; and Hitchcock et al, 2000a). The TLA basically mandated Land

Boards (see Appendix 6) to allocate land for 'tribesmen'¹⁶ for residential, arable, grazing, or commercial purposes. These land uses served the agro-pastoral interests of the dominant Tswana and other non-Tswana minority groups, but they did not serve the interests of the hunter/gatherer tradition of the Basarwa. The right of Basarwa to their traditional foraging and hunting areas was not specified in the Act or in any subsequent legislation. Traditionally, Basarwa need land for residence, hunting and gathering, and these uses were not recognised by the Act as land use practices.

Wily (1994) attributes the lack of recognition to a general dominant Tswana negative attitude 'that hunting and gathering is an economically meaningless activity, that it is backward, and should be abandoned' in preference for what the dominant Tswana consider to be conventional forms of land use, and that because Basarwa are nomadic, no claim to any particular tract of land can be laid (Wily, 1994:13). Contrary to negative attitude expressed above, hunting and gathering are productive economic activities even for the dominant Tswana themselves. In rural Botswana hunting is a major source of income. For instance, a recent study in south western Botswana found that in those households with low monthly cash incomes (less than P50), game meat may make an additional subsistence contribution to income by as much as 30%. For those households with no cash income, game meat and veld products contribute 100% to household income (Thompson 1998).

The TLA has been interpreted by some to exclude Basarwa from even making applications for land since they were not considered to be 'tribesmen'. Hitchcock and Holm (1993:317-8) note that a number of land boards concluded that local Basarwa were not 'tribesmen', even though they had lived in a given area for at least three or four generations. Moeletsi (1993:48) cites a complaint raised by a Mosarwa representative at a Remote Area Development Programme seminar held in Ghanzi in 1992. This delegate complained about encountering discrimination in Kweneng district. He alleged that the Land Board would never allocate a piece of land to a Mosarwa. If a Mosarwa and a non-Mosarwa were to compete for a plot, then the Land Board would rather, in a majority of cases, give the plot to the non-Mosarwa applicant. Culturally ingrained prejudice is the reason why Tswana applicants for land still tend to be favoured over Basarwa (Smith, A., Marlhebe, C. Guenther, M. and Berens, P., 2000). At the above seminar, the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Local Government,

Lands and Housing is reported to have summarised complaints that her Ministry had obtained from RADP beneficiaries. One was that RADs did not enjoy their rights as regards land as compared to other Batswana. The beneficiaries complained that Land Boards tended to drag their feet when it came to attending to their land requirements. It was understood that some went to the extent of refusing them land on grounds that '*o kile wa bona kae Mosarwa a na le lefatse?*' (Where have you ever seen a Mosarwa having land?) (Saugestad, 1998b: 253). The other complaint was that RADs were advised to apply for land only in remote area settlements.

7.6.2 Government's Response To Dispossession Of Basarwa's Land: Resettlement Policy

Basarwa were displaced from their traditional territories on the assumption that their land was considered *terra nullius*¹⁷. A prevailing stereotype about Basarwa has been that they lack a concept of ownership and territoriality of land. As indicated above, Basarwa had extensive land resources. Additional evidence comes from Saugestad (1998b) as follows:

Although [Basarwa] are a roaming people and therefore seem to be homeless and vague about their country, each group of them has a very specific territory that that group alone may use, and they respect the boundaries rigidly. Each group also knows its territory very well ... and have usually named every place in it where a certain kind of veld may grow (Saugestad, 1998b: 96).

The displacement of Basarwa was accompanied by the development of a livestock industry which resulted in the best areas of the land (especially the Ghanzi Ridge) being set aside for freehold farms for white settlers. Later Tswana farmers and other non-Basarwa groups set up their cattle posts. Commercial leasehold ranches were established in late 1970s, through a Government-introduced major livestock development and land reform programme, the Tribal Grazing Land Policy (TGLP). The TGLP became a serious barrier to acquiring land for the Basarwa, in that it accelerated the pace of dispossession of their land. When leasehold ranches were established under this policy, people were forced to give way but were not compensated either in kind or cash as had been promised. 'Basarwa living on such grazing lands were evicted by the ranchers without compensation because, not being members of any tribe, they were regarded as having no rights to land they had been occupying' (Mazonde,

1997:100). It should be noted that failure to compensate these people is contrary to section 3 of the Constitution as shown in Box 7.1.

After the displacement from their traditional territories, Basarwa encountered enslavement by the invaders, were exploited and mistreated. Their traditional lifestyle became untenable as encroachment resulted in environmental damage leading to depletion of game and veld foods. Basarwa had little alternative and were forced to sell their labour to livestock owners in return for poor remuneration (Good, 1992).

It should be noted that these outcomes were contrary to the original intention of TGLP. This policy was intended to promote conservation, raise incomes and commercialise the livestock industry (ROB, 1975). In order to allay the fear by small owners that as policy implementation proceeded, the rich would come to control all the land, the Policy made an undertaking that:

Planning will aim to ensure that land development helps the poor and does not make them worse off (ROB, 1975: 2).

The Policy assured land rights for every citizen to the extent that it promised to protect 'the right of every citizen to have as much land as he needs to sustain himself and his family' (ROB, 1975: 4). As will be seen from the above, the undertaking and promise of the Policy were dispensed with during its implementation. The poor Baswana, particularly Basarwa, became worse off and could not sustain themselves given the land loss they encountered at the hands of the rich. One author sums it up well when he observes:

Instead, as implementation progressed, it became clear that the main purpose of the policy was to expedite commercialisation of the cattle industry, from which mainly the cattle barons would benefit (Mayende, 1994:498).

Consequent to the above process of dispossession, there was a need to ensure that Basarwa got land. In Ghanzi District, it was decided to have the Land Board set aside areas for settlement schemes. This was part of the implementation of the re-settlement policy where hordes of Basarwa were relocated in areas that have been fraught with difficulties. Freehold farmers in the district opposed the schemes since they feared that resettlement areas would attract Basarwa from their farms, thus reducing farmers'

access to labour. In spite of this opposition, the Ghanzi District Council agreed, as part of the implementation of a Bushmen Development Programme (BDP)¹⁸ which was started in 1974, to set aside a certain amount of land to accommodate the land needs of those Basarwa who wished to leave the farms and have a place of their own.

According to Hitchcock (1996), the BDP was founded on the following principles.

- First and foremost, [Basarwa] were to be given encouragement to exercise their right as citizens of Botswana;
- Second, development projects were to be investigated only after careful analysis and discussion with local people;
- Third, the integration of [Basarwa] into larger society and economy of Botswana would be sought, providing that local people agreed with the objective;
- Fourth, self-reliance was a major goal;
- Fifth, projects were to be designed in such a way as to be responsive to variable situations of people in different areas (Hitchcock, 1996: 12).

From the above principles, it will be noted that the BDP had four main objectives, namely participation, consultation, self-determination and empowerment. As I showed in Chapter 5, the BDP was, however, short-lived. It underwent a series of name changes from 1975 until 1978 when it was eventually termed RADP. In spite of its potential to graduate Basarwa from their traditional status of serfs, the BDP was dispensed with in 1975 because Government resisted the Programme's affirmative action to Basarwa on the basis of their ethnicity and feared accusations of "separate development" abroad and accusations of "special treatment" at home (Wily, 1994: 14).

Under the RADP, social infrastructure such as water supplies, education and health facilities, and welfare services, was supplied on a limited scale. The settlement schemes provided land for residential and arable plots and limited grazing, but did not provide people with sufficient resources to enable them to make an adequate living in the absence of outside inputs or employment (Hitchcock, 1996). Although the provision of infrastructure has been reasonably good, there has been no development of productive employment opportunities. Owing to this, a shift to social, economic and political development relating to the rights of RADs was advocated, as indicated in Appendix 7, 5.1.1).

As the implementation of the successor to BDP proceeded, the original principles (and objectives) of BDP were not fully followed. The events described below bear testimony

to the gap between BDP aims and action. From the beginning of the settlement schemes (late 1970s) to date the livelihoods of dwellers in these places, especially Basarwa, have always been precarious, and poverty has been generated. The first reason for the poverty is that the needs of those who were intended to take up residence in the settlements were ignored. Places where most RADs live were not chosen by the RADs themselves. The Government created them without much consultation with RADs, given its adoption of top-down approach to policy implementation, as identified in Chapter 5. Many of the RADs interviewed during the review of the RADP in 1990 stated that they had not been properly consulted regarding various development issues affecting them (Kann et al, 1990). Consequently there was a mismatch between areas set aside and the land needs of the inhabitants. Given their tradition of using vast areas, the residents wanted to have fairly sizeable areas within which they could undertake a variety of activities, such as foraging, residence, arable agriculture and livestock rearing, hunting, and allow for growth in livestock and human populations.

In spite of these specific requirements the Ghanzi District Council arbitrarily decided to allocate blocks of land 20 x 20 kilometres for the settlements, which was clearly inadequate to sustain all the activities that were envisaged. There has been gross disparity in land allocation to Basarwa compared to other population groups. For instance, whilst a group of Basarwa, about less than 200, was allocated 400 square kilometres of land, commercial farm blocks were averaging 128 square kilometres each (Hitchcock et al, 2000a). According to the 1988 Ghanzi land use-zoning plan, the areas allocated for remote people, who were 42% of the district population, amounted to 2,400 square kilometres, which was 1.7% of the District's land. Further, 20 individuals and syndicates had acquired land amounting to 19 000 square kilometres, a share which is greater than that of more than 5000 remote area dwellers (Good, 1993:215).

The second problem relates to non-viability of some of the mainstream projects in the settlements. RADP envisaged that RADs would undertake activities practised in other parts of the country, such as arable agriculture, and non-agriculture small scale-projects. Arable agriculture cannot be meaningfully practised in these areas; however, because settlements are located in the desert sandy areas, where ploughing and growing of crops are very difficult, owing to poor soils and low rainfall. The remoteness¹⁹ of these areas means that most small-scale projects are not viable either because of lack of skills or


absence of markets for products made in the settlements. This author saw poultry projects supported by an NGO and run by local residents in West Hanahai. The produce could reach the market in the Township only when the NGO arranged transport.

The third problem is the lack of title to land in settlements. People who got freehold ranches, leasehold and cattle posts that were carved out of the land where Basarwa were displaced, were given full access and rights to this land by law. When it came to remote areas dwellers (the majority of whom are Basarwa as indicated in Chapter 6), the same favour was not extended. The Ghanzi District Council decided that settlement residents would not be allowed to have security of tenure over their areas. Rights to ownership of settlements and borehole areas were retained by the Government. This had the effect of taking away from the settlement inhabitants the right to control who entered settlements and reinforced the emerging character of settlements as open access resources. Wily (1994) explains that settlement schemes have in practice provided access, not title, but this access is in great danger of being thoroughly undermined through entry of non-settlers from all over the country into settlements. Settlement inhabitants cannot preclude outsiders from driving herds of cattle right within the settlements thereby turning the pastures of the settlement from a communal resource to an open areas resource. It should be noted that this problem is unique to settlements because in other areas of the country, outsiders cannot just drive their cattle into an area without the permission of locals. Local inhabitants have access and title to specific areas, but Basarwa were discriminated against in this regard, presumably so that the Tswana can find 'spare areas' to graze their stock.

Without security, settlement areas became open to outsiders who brought large herds to tap resources in the settlements, at the expense of the local population. According to Hitchcock et al (2000a), water resources (see Photograph 7.1) were the most sought after because they were free, and more water went to cattle than people. Water levels declined and people were no longer able to get enough water to sustain them during the dry periods. Excessive use of borehole equipment by external non-Basarwa cattle owners resulted in frequent breakdowns that took months to be repaired by the District Council. After encroachment on settlement pastures by herds from outside, ranges in the settlements were heavily exploited, and degradation of the vegetation was rampant. Available game and veld food resources diminished rapidly, threatening the hunter-

gatherer lifestyle²⁰. Efforts to get the immigrants and their livestock to leave have generally been unsuccessful, partly because the people to whom local residents must appeal (those on the top district institutions - the District Council and Land Board) are some of those who have moved into settlements to take advantage of the grazing, water and labour available (Hitchcock, 1999). Hitchcock et al (2000a) conclude that the problem is less the lack of land per se but the inability to control access to the land, which is limiting the efficiency and scope of agricultural activities in settlements. The District Council donated livestock to some Basarwa but it has not been possible to raise livestock under situations where the Basarwa cannot control access to their areas.

Photograph 7.1
Water point In West Hanahai Settlement



By Morris Nyathi, 1999

Few Basarwa owned livestock until the Government started a scheme in the 1980s to supply them with livestock. This scheme has not been successful because cattle given to Basarwa are subsequently sold back to non-Basarwa, some of whom trade alcohol for the animals. In this way the government is subsidising people who sometimes are already wealthy cattle owners.

Encroachment has not been restricted to the livestock industry. Those who started businesses such as general dealer and vendor shops, bars and shebeens also invaded settlements (Interview, Mango/Camm, 26 July 1999). Over time, these people often got dominant positions in the structures such as village institutions, and tended to subordinate Basarwa RADs and exclude them from development programmes and

projects (Mazonde, 1999). In one case in a neighbouring district of Kgalagadi, where non-Basarwa groups, namely Bakgalagadi, came to settle in a predominately Basarwa settlement of Zutshwa, Basarwa responded by distancing themselves from the settlement. The effect of this non-Basarwa immigration was the displacement of Basarwa who lost out from participating in decision-making roles in various aspects of the development of the settlement (Molamu, L., Monu, E. and Painter, M., 1995).

The fourth problem is that the relocation of people to an area with which they are unfamiliar is a socially painful experience. People have to start anew getting used to the area, and immediately lose the expertise that they have developed over centuries in the areas from which they came. 'It means people lose the previous advantages of intimately knowing an area and its resources, and therefore have to abolish old ways and become completely dependent on new alternatives being properly in place' (Saugestad, 1998b: 179). The problem is that alternatives are not always adequately available. From a place of independence the relocated people are forced into a long era of dependency.

These problems and the influx of outsiders into settlements have made places like West Hanahai areas where poverty is reproduced and is persistent. Analysts have found that communities in settlements are highly dependent on government destitute and drought relief, pensions and labour based relief projects undertaken as part of drought relief. (Kann et al, 1990). 'In all settlements, one fourth of the population was eligible to destitute relief. Drought relief was paid to the major part of the population even in years without climatic calamities' (Hitchcock et al, 2000a: 31). The same source concludes that a major part of the income of Basarwa inhabitants in settlements is not from self-controlled productive activities or regular employment but from state and other benefits of different kinds. To this extent Basarwa's reliance on government has been seen by the dominant society as 'dependency' and a stigma has been attached to what has become to be known as government handouts. Those who perceive this as dependency seem not to be aware that it was induced by the state. I have demonstrated that Basarwa's loss of their traditional land for hunting and gathering through displacement by the cattle-owning Tswana majority and lack of rights to government created settlements, has sown the seeds of Basarwa's impoverishment. Land is the basis for their socio-economy and has a unique value in their culture and identity²¹.

The Basarwa themselves do not see the situation in terms of dependency. According to Hitchcock et al (2000a), many settlement residents refer to government benefits as their right. They see outsiders (cattle farmers, including government) as having taken away their resources, and feel the government should therefore compensate them with other means. After recurrent droughts in Botswana, the government has intervened by introducing drought relief programmes. In areas like settlements where there are no employment opportunities outside drought relief projects or temporary road or water projects, these programmes have closed the gap. They have inevitably been regarded as a way of life in settlements, for example in West Hanahai and others. While poverty studies in Botswana have tended to attribute poverty to drought, poverty is not simply a drought related problem. It is the lack of, or few, alternative economic opportunities in settlements that is the real problem.

7.7 Discussion Of The findings

The legislative provisions discussed have tended to discriminate against tribes not specified in the laws of the land, in stark contradiction of the Constitution. Generally, rather than building a united nation, the seeds of disunity were sown. The nation was divided into two camps, the 'us' and 'them'. On the one hand were those whose hegemonic influence over others was based on law – the favoured tribes. On the other hand was another group, who was given little choice but to toe the line and bring all their ways into conformity with the rest. The latter have been under a physiological torment of growing up knowing that they are inferior people. Those who were included in the legal process claimed some measure of superiority over those excluded, and could claim that they had their own territories and chiefs. In such a scenario, it was difficult to sustain a peaceful situation whereby people live in harmony and unity, accept and appreciate each other's differences.

The Constitution's sections militate against the values of equality, justice and social harmony, which form part of the national principles and planning objectives of the country. They do not give democratic recognition of each tribe as an equal, separate entity, able to live in harmony with others. The sections in question subordinated the

minor tribes' interests to those of their neighbours on account of language and cultural differences. They elevated the status of the eight tribes into a superior position, where they feel more important than others and want to dominate others. The exalted tribes believe that they are 'super tribes' and one of these tribes' typical perception is that 'every so-called main ethnic group has got a minor one (derogatory termed *moratshwana* in Setswana)' (The Sunday Tribune, 27 August 2000:2). As indicated in Chapter 1, these groups tend to apply a demeaning prefix 'Ma' instead of 'Ba' in reference to other tribal groups. They tend to think that all minority tribes who live in their tribal territories should assume Setswana tribal names and reject their own. In other words, Batswapong who live in Central District (of the Bangwato) should call themselves Bangwato as well. The exalted tribes do not tolerate and respect others' cultures. They regard minorities as their subjects, and argue that the land on which minorities live belongs to main tribes²². This exaltation of tribes above all groups is tribalism at its worst.

Minority tribes have opposed the above legislative provisions over the years, culminating in the appointment of a Commission to address the matter as indicated above. In the interim, owing to assimilation into main tribes through intermarriage, most members of the minority tribes escaped the adverse effects of the provisions. Education and training of non-Basarwa minority groups contributed to neutralise those provisions that had adverse effects on their self-esteem and identity. Non-Basarwa minority groups all have an agro-pastoral tradition, something they have in common with the dominant Tswana. Both have negative attitudes towards Basarwa, whose hunter-gatherer tradition they consider backward.

It should be noted that the legal dimension has affected all minority groups in Botswana, but Basarwa have suffered the most. While other minorities made gains, the Basarwa continued to stagnate in as far as improvement to their self worth, respect and dignity are concerned. What is exceptional about Basarwa? As I postulated in Chapter 3, they are the most excluded. As indicated elsewhere in this thesis, they are more disadvantaged than other minorities. As I indicated in Chapter 5, they take the lowest position in the politico-socio-economic hierarchy of Botswana. Having characteristics of both a minority group and indigenous group described in Chapter 3, the Basarwa are the least powerful population group in the country, and this exacerbates their exclusion

from resources as evidenced by lack of land rights. They suffer the consequences of powerlessness as spelt out by Chambers (1995). According to Mazonde (2002), they are the most despised of all ethnic minorities, have many languages that are not mutually intelligible, and are scattered all over the country. This makes it difficult for them to unite and fight for self-determination as a single group.

In dealing with Basarwa, the Government ignores that it is dealing with different types of problems, which require different strategies or solutions. The most significant aspect of the difference between Basarwa from other people of Botswana include a unique cultural and social heritage, and a history of political and economical marginalisation (UNDP, 2002a2). Since differences in culture, language, and traditions often make it difficult for members of the Basarwa group to compete on equal terms with members of the majority, some sort of special treatment may be needed in order to achieve the objective of equal opportunity. The Government of Botswana appears unwilling to assure this equality and it has decided specifically not to target assistance on an ethnic basis. No policy that addresses the special needs of the Basarwa exists because Basarwa are seen as just one group among a number of economically disadvantaged people. This position has been the basis for exclusion from attaining a satisfactory standard of living within the Basarwa population groups in the country.

From the above findings, I think there has been systematic discrimination against Basarwa. For instance, while legislation calls for compensation for those dispossessed of their land, Basarwa were not compensated when the Tribal Land Policy was implemented. Examples have been given above where Basarwa have encountered problems in allocation of land owing to prejudice that they have no need for land. This is why some of them have been refused land on the false allegation that no Mosarwa has ever possessed land. The basis for this is a belief amongst some in the mainstream society that since Basarwa have traditionally been migratory in their hunting and gathering lifestyle, they have no justification for needing land.

In my discussion of discrimination in Chapter 3, I noted, among other things, that authorities tend to deny the existence of discrimination. Authorities in Botswana are no exception to such denial. In the findings, I think enough examples have been given to show discriminatory practices that are contrary to the provisions of the Constitution as

described in Box 7.1. In spite of the findings of the recent Commission on sections of the Constitution, which confirmed discrimination, the Government position remains defensive about any allegations that there is discrimination. For instance, the following quotation describes the Government's position. A Government Minister is reported to have dismissed utterances that Basarwa were discriminated against 'adding that Batswana were equal before the law regardless of ethnicity, culture, colour, creed or social status' (Botswana Daily News, 8 October, 2002). A UN Committee on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) met the Botswana Government in August, 2002, and expressed concern about the following:

The discriminatory character of certain domestic laws, such as the Chieftainship Act and the Tribal Territories Act, which only recognise the Tswana-speaking tribes. Other tribes, especially the [Basarwa] are reported to suffer from cultural, social, economic and political exclusion, do not enjoy group rights to land, and do not participate in the House of Chiefs (United Nations, CERD: 2002:3).

Certain aspects of the legal dimension of social exclusion described in Chapter 3 have characterised exclusion of other minority tribes in Botswana generally and Basarwa in particular. Both groups have been excluded from use of their languages in all social domains. Basarwa have borne more exclusion since they have been excluded from land under the Tribal Grazing Land Policy. The Policy resulted in dispossession of Basarwa from the traditional territories, and their relocation to settlements where they have been more vulnerable to poverty caused by the sedentary lifestyle with which they are not familiar. The Basarwa RADs have been the most affected by this exclusion. Living in settlements like West Hanahai, they have been denied the right to ownership of the settlement since the Government has retained the title. This has resulted in settlements suffering from encroachment from outsiders, and the inability of the residents, the RADs themselves, to control the encroachment.

7.8 Conclusion

This chapter has shown that Basarwa encounter political and legal exclusion. These dimensions of exclusion operate at national and local levels. Regarding the political dimension, the nature of policy development in Botswana, has encouraged exclusion. A dominant group bias in development and defects in policy design have had some effect on exclusion. The Basarwa's access to decision-making is constrained by poor or no participation in the political institutions at the national and local levels. Through the legal dimension, all minority groups in the country have experienced discrimination. This discrimination seems to have impacted most negatively on the Basarwa because of the culturally ingrained prejudice directed at them by non-Basarwa fellow citizens. Basarwa have been subject to discriminatory practices that have engendered their exclusion. The Basarwa have been denied satisfactory access to natural resources especially land. They have been dispossessed of their traditional land and moved to marginal areas without compensation. Similar treatment has not been extended to other Batswana who are not Basarwa. They have had problems with land rights in that on the land allocated to them they cannot continue a land use that closely relates to their tradition of hunting and gathering. In the settlements, unlike other nationals, Basarwa do not have title to land and are therefore subject to encroachment from outsiders who deny them unhindered use of local resources.

¹ Opsal (1987) studied one Bazeduru community in the village of Serowe. The study gives the reason that the Bazeduru's contact with the rest of society has largely been restricted to market transactions. His findings are that: the Bazeduru Church promoted independent trade, refused to accept wage work and put emphasis on maximising independence in all spheres of life. The Church stressed the importance of an economically independent community, and self-sufficiency. It represented a strategy whereby people attempted to gain control over their life situations, by withdrawing themselves from the influence of the large society (Opsal, 1987:92-94).

² See Section 7.5.1 for this categorisation.

³ Through RADP workshops from 1978 to 1980 and a national conference in 1992.

⁴ This has remained so to date.

⁵ Interviewees 14, 31 and 34 (see Appendix 2) underscored this point.

⁶ Others are the District Administration and Tribal Administration (see Appendix 6).

⁷ Development Committees exist in both urban and rural areas. In urban areas, including Townships, they are known as Ward Development Committees. So in Ghanzi Township the Committee is called a Ward Development Committee. Thus VDCs refers to those committees found in villages. While committees in settlements such as West Hanahai should be known as Settlement Development Committees, they are also generally known as VDCs.

⁸ When I interviewed this member he said his motivation for joining the WDC was that it was a source of employment. In fact villagers join on a voluntary basis and are given a small sitting allowance of P54 at each meeting. As he thought this was a job, he expected to get at least P150 or more per month. Given the little allowance, he said he would serve only until the end of 2001 (Interview, Kaashe, 9 January, 2001).

⁹ This is not to suggest that Basarwa have requested non-Basarwa to lead them in all instances and places where they reside. In fact in the late 1990s, the Government of Botswana fielded Basarwa headmen in all nine remote settlements in Ghanzi District, and indeed showed a good intention to include Basarwa in the leadership at the local level. These headmen, however, had to carry out their duties under a Tswana customary law, which is alien to them, rather than integrating Basarwa culture into the system. Exclusion from the right to freedom of speech happened when the headmen started to exercise their rights to freedom of speech especially by being critical of government policies. At least one was dismissed on these grounds, and the remaining had to toe the line to protect their jobs. As such these tribal leaders are not free to work for their people and are removed for being 'vocal' (Rivers, 1999).

¹⁰ Perrott (1992) carries a report that Basarwa from Botswana crossed to Namibia in 1991 for a meeting with their Namibian counterparts. At this meeting the former reported: 'In Botswana [Basarwa] haven't got an organisation: the Blacks [non-Basarwa] run all the meetings, we Bushmen are like baby ostriches blindly closed in our eggshells' (Perrott, 1992: 209).

¹¹ Cited in Saugestad (1998b: 338).

¹² This is a problem of extension and discrimination towards Basarwa particularly where extension officers are non-Basarwa themselves.

¹³ 'The reserves for the Bamagwato, Bakwena, Bangwaketse, Bakgkatla and Batawana were created in 1899. In 1909 and 1933, additional reserves were created near Gaborone for the Bamalete and Batlokwa, respectively. The last reserve for Barolong was created in 1935. The reserve for Batlokwa and some African communities in the Tati freehold area, were proclaimed on land requisitioned from the freehold sector by the Crown' (Ng'ong'ola, 1997:9).

¹⁴ 'Consequent to this Act, the country was divided into eight regions called Districts: Kgalagadi, Ghanzi, Kweneng, Central, Southern, Kgatleng, Ngamiland (Northwest), North East and South East Districts. In those districts in which Tswana speaking groups reside, the name of the district would be the same as the name of the tribe and that of the body that allocates land in the district' (Nyati-Ramahobo, 2002a: 18).

¹⁵ In fact the name of the country – 'Botswana' is a derivative from the colonial equivalent 'Bechuanaland', which means the land of the Tswana.

¹⁶ Defined in relation to any tribal area, these are citizens of Botswana who are members of the tribe occupying a tribal area (ROB, 1975).

¹⁷ Vacant land with no legal owner.

¹⁸ This is a predecessor to the Remote Area Development Programme (RADP), which was explained in Chapter 5.

¹⁹ Caused more by poor roads and lack of transport than distance to markets.

²⁰ 'Hunting and gathering accounted for 82% of RADs' total subsistence in cash and in kind in the 1970s as compared to 90% RADs' dependence on food relief for subsistence requirements during drought in the 1980s to 1990s (Gulbransen et al, 1986:32).

²¹ Basarwa's belief on land is that 'Land means life for [Basarwa]. Without land the [Basarwa] cannot survive, they are homeless. The [Basarwa] do not feel healthy if they cannot find veld food. They also need to walk in the bush and talk to nature. They believe that people benefit from the land and its resources. They also believe that land and natural resources must be treated well. Without land, they are unable to live according to their culture and they lose their identity' (Arnold and Elfriede, 1998:2). It will be noted that this description of Basarwa corresponds with the land-related characteristics of indigenous peoples as I indicated in Chapter 3.

²² The fact is that Land Boards hold tribal land in trust, and may grant customary and common law land rights in accordance with the Tribal Land Act (ROB, 1997a: 464).

Chapter 8

Socio-Cultural, Economic And Spatial Dimensions Of Social Exclusion

8.1 Introduction

This chapter continues to provide details of empirical evidence of social exclusion based mainly on primary sources. The findings are based on a survey of the research groups, the outcome of unstructured interviews and focus group discussions, and life history material. Like the previous chapter, this chapter deals with the research questions relating to the extent of exclusion of both FAD and RAD Basarwa. On the basis of the findings relating to the social dimension, part of this chapter is devoted to responding to another research question namely: Does the proximity of fringe dwellers to dominant groups in Ghanzi society increase opportunities for integration or not? At the end of each finding, an analysis and discussion of the findings is made. Regarding the first research question, it should be noted that not only Basarwa FADs are excluded. There are other non-Basarwa who live on the fringes. There are also non-Basarwa RADs in West Hanahai. But what is certain from the evidence is that Basarwa in general are the most excluded in the areas under study, in political, economic, social, and spatial terms. This chapter concentrates on the socio-cultural, economic and spatial dimensions. Through the data collection methods mentioned above, respondents highlighted various barriers that militate against their full participation in society.

8.2 Socio-Cultural Dimension

8.2.1 Historical Basis For The Social Status Of Basarwa.

The background to the seeming exclusion of Basarwa can be traced from the social stratification that developed in Botswana centuries before independence. Below I describe events that led to Basarwa becoming the population group at the bottom of the social hierarchy in Botswana. I will show how the Bakgalagadi appeared to have benefited from the process of serfdom, which was initially inflicted on them, but which they themselves later administered on Basarwa.

The socio-economic position of Bakgalagadi (and Basarwa) can be understood within the context of social stratification that existed in pre-colonial and colonial Botswana. Various authors have described this stratification (Tlou and Campbell, 1994; Datta and Murray, 1989; Steenkamp, 1991). It bred a social hierarchy with the Tswana taking the top position, some non-Tswana such as Bakalanga, coming in the middle and Bakgalagadi and others amongst those close to the bottom, with Basarwa relegated to the lowest position. During this period Tswana life was differentiated into three ranks of social classes. Datta and Murray (1989) mention that social class derived from cultural or kinship proximity to the *Kgosi* (chief) and his relatives, the *dikgosana* or 'nobles'. From this top position of nobles, there were in descending order of status: commoners, foreigners and serfs. Commoners were non-royal members of the Tswana nuclear group and immigrant and conquered groups who had proved themselves loyal subjects of the *Kgosi*. Within this class were the Babirwa, Bakaa and Bakhurutse. Foreigners were immigrant or conquered groups who had not yet attained the status of commoners, or who had no wish to meld their identity with that of the dominant Tswana groups. Included here were the Bakalanga and Ovaherereo. The serfs were those known as 'a people who had been absorbed by conquest, were acephalous and lacked identity, lived close to the capital and were alien in language and culture to their new masters [and were forced] into the class of serfs and would be exploited for the benefit of other classes' (Datta and Murray, 1989:59).

The serf groups were most disadvantaged in that they were exploited, looked down upon and treated like minors. They were considered socially and politically inferior. According to Steenkamp (1991), the serf group was known as 'clients' (*malata*) and was drawn mainly from Basarwa and to a lesser extent from Bakgalagadi. This group lacked any rights of their own and were attached to one master to whom they were compelled to pay tribute (usually game produce) and/or labour (as unpaid domestics, hunters and herdsman). Basarwa were generally made to live away from the village and were never considered as members of the *morafe* (mainstream community). Basarwa were victims of a form of hereditary serfdom called *bolata* by Bangwato and *botlhanka* by Batawana. The institution of *bolata/botlhanka* was responsible for impoverishing Basarwa because the Basarwa who had formerly existed on an equal trading relationship with Bangwato (trading in products from hunting such as ivory, skins) later

took up a servile relationship wherein Basarwa served first the Ngwato state and later became property of the Ngwato pastoralists, for whom Basarwa provided a dependable and easily exploitable labour force (Datta and Murray 1989). Iliffe (1987) testifies to the impoverishment that Basarwa suffered from this unequal relationship with the Tswana. He writes:

Most [Basarwa] were hunters, but masters occasionally seized children to serve in their households. These were occasionally bartered for goods, most often with Afrikaners but sometimes amongst Tswana. Women too, were taken into domestic servitude. [Basarwa] could not leave their master's service, they could be transferred from one master to another, they had no access to Tswana courts, and their status was hereditary (Iliffe, 1987:76).

The Bakgalagadi's position in the social hierarchy was ambiguous. They were closer to Tswana since their culture and language does not reflect much cultural distance. Thus, depending on the strength of their masters, they were given preferential treatment amongst subject groups. For instance Tlou and Campbell (1994) mention that among the Bakwena, the lowest people were the Bakgalagadi, although their position has changed from time to time depending on the circumstances of the *morafe*. During the 15th and 16th centuries, when Bakwena were weak and small, they accepted Bakgalagadi into the *morafe* as citizens. The Batawana did the same to the Basarwa in 1805, when the former were weak. Otherwise when the master group was strong, the Bakgalagadi were treated as inferior. Where Bakgalagadi were incorporated into a master tribe they made gains in cattle ownership through the *mafisa* system. This was/is a patron-client cattle-lending system. Under it, in return for herding a patron's cattle (for a *Kgosi* or one's master), the client was/is entitled not only to use the cattle but usually also to appropriate one or more of the offspring each year (Datta and Murray, 1989:60).

The system was not only used to benefit the client but was an important basis for state organisation. 'By lending out cattle obtained by conquest to commoners, 19th century *Dikgosi* created a client class which ... promised loyalty and service in return for use of their cattle' (Datta and Murray, 1989:60). The *Kgosi* loaned the cattle to clients who were supposed to care for them and use their products. In fact the chief was referred to as the 'milk bail'. The *Kgosi* could recall cattle anytime he desired. The loaned cattle, which held together this client system, were called *kgamelo or mafisa*. The system was not restricted to the *Kgosi* since any cattle owner of standing could loan out his cattle.

The mafisa system was also used to 'incorporate foreigners into the economic life of the *morafe*, and it has continued to be the most important means of access to cattle and cattle accumulation for the poor' (Samatar, 1999:42-43). From this enhanced position, the Bakgalagadi in the 19th century started to treat Basarwa as badly as the Tswana tribes treated them, by taking whole groups of Basarwa and forcing them to hunt on their behalf. The children of Basarwa became servants, and Basarwa men were used to herd whatever stock the Bakgalagadi owned. Kuper (1970) mentions that Basarwa who were serfs of Bakgalagadi have typically lived on the periphery of the latter's villages in Ghanzi. Not all Bakgalagadi did this since some intermarried with Basarwa and embraced the latter's customs and saw themselves as Basarwa to this day, especially those who have lived in the Central Kalahari Game Reserve.

8 2.2 Basarwa And Bakgalagadi Status In Ghanzi: Contemporary Situation

History has shaped the contemporary Basarwa/Bakgalagadi relationship, and has sown the seeds for a disadvantaged Basarwa position from which other population groups are benefiting. This relationship reflects the animosity between the two groups and is responsible for the difficulty Basarwa encounter in improving their standards of living. Childers (1976) has described it in the following manner:

Basarwa have been servants of Bangologa¹ ever since they came into contact with each other in the Ghanzi vicinity over 80 years ago. Even today the Bangologa see them as inferior people. They will never allow social interaction such as sitting together around the same fire or drinking from the same cup (Childers, 1976:25).

The current status of Basarwa has not drastically changed from the situation described by Silberbauer in the sixties, as follows:

The present inferior status of Bushmen and the low regard which not only Bantu [Tswana], but Europeans also have for them, is at least as much a social economic prejudice as it is a racial one and would be greatly ameliorated if the economic position of the Bushmen were to improve. Their situation is a vicious circle; their low socio-economic status militates against their economic advancement, the lack of which is the reason for their inferior position. The circle will not be broken while they follow, as dependents, behind the progress of the Bantu with whom they are in contact as they are at present, incapable of lifting themselves out of their low state, however they wish to do so (Silberbauer, 1965: 135).

The dominant discourse in Tswana society has been able to relegate those designated as Basarwa to the bottom of the social and economic scale. Being a Mosarwa or being labelled so can be a curse. Sarwa identity contributes to one's social isolation and marginality. 'By labelling some men, ... Sarwa, such discourse effectively excludes these people from access to a variety of institutions and deprives them of the productive resources entailed in access to these institutions' (Motzafi - Haller, 1994:541).

Childers (1976:75-76) mentions cases of discrimination and oppression of Township Basarwa. He notes that Bangologa often assault Basarwa, especially after they have been drinking, for no particular reason. If a Mosarwa tries to defend his rights, he is often severely chastised by those who feel the Basarwa should know their place of servitude and submission. Such term as *fetseke* or *o Mosarwa fela* (You are nothing but a Mosarwa), are commonly used to remind the Basarwa of their lowly position. There are numerous cases where Basarwa have been told to leave public meetings or even villages' Independence celebrations where they have gone to beg for a piece of meat. According to Childers, G., Stanley, J. and Rick, K. (1982), the Councillor of West Hanahai (a non-Mosarwa) in 1982 ardently pursued the Tswana-ising of Basarwa in West Hanahai. He expected Basarwa to understand Setswana and often did not have his words translated into the local Sesarwa language. He went as far as seeing it necessary to conduct a local funeral in the Tswana tradition, chiding people when they were reluctant to follow his instructions as to the proper behaviour to exhibit at a Setswana style ceremony. Through such actions, Basarwa in West Hanahai and other settlements were made to feel that their own traditions and customs were wrong and that they were ignorant people. As Childers et al (1982) have correctly concluded, these militate against any sense of self-pride and development of any local control over people's affairs, increase dependence and deter self-motivation and self-reliance.

Basarwa do not only suffer at the hands of local villagers but also get poor service from the Police. They are reluctant to report crimes committed against them to the police because of the possibility of being further molested. In cases that were reported to the Ghanzi police, 'I witnessed a certain ambivalence towards the Basarwa whereby the police officers would not take their cases seriously or would fail to follow up reported cases' (Childers, 1976: 76).

This was confirmed in my discussion with Basarwa focus groups in the Township as follows.

When we report cases at the police stations we are not taken seriously, but rudely advised to go and sleep because we are considered as drunkards.

Focus Group of Old Women

Ten years after Childers' study, a similar finding arose from Guenther's investigation. He also found that when Basarwa report cases at the Police station they are not taken seriously. According to him, 'when they report grievances to the Police officers they often receive no serious hearing and the reported offences are likely not to be followed up by the police' (Guenther, 1986:36). Similar dissatisfaction with the Police has been reported of Khomani San living near the Kgalagadi National Park in South Africa. According to a press report, Kuiper, who is the traditional leader of the San, does not trust the police who raid the community for dagga, which he says is used as part of San culture. He is equally suspicious of the local police and asks, 'not long ago a drunken man killed a woman, but no one has been prosecuted though they know exactly who the perpetrator is. Why is that?' (Mail and Guardian, 10 June 2003).

The position of the above population groups (Bakgalagadi and Basarwa) in the research area (Ghanzi Township and West Hanahai) is as follows. Bakgalagadi are the dominant ethnic group in the Ghanzi Township, and Basarwa are dominated and this relationship is similar to the way both groups were dominated by the Tswana from time immemorial. The Tswana historically consider Bakgalagadi and Basarwa with contempt. Basarwa themselves are looked down upon by the Bakgalagadi. This does not seem to be the case for Bakgalagadi/Basarwa groups who have lived together for a long time, like those in the Central Kalahari Game Reserve (for example the Boloongwe at Metsimanong), who do not consider themselves superior to their fellow Basarwa (Hitchcock, 27 June 2000, personal communication). The same goes for the Bakgalagadi who lived with Basarwa when they first occupied settlements like West Hanahai, though there are cases where the Bakgalagadi take advantage of their links with people in Ghanzi (for example District Councillors) to get advantageous allocations, for example business site rights from the Ghanzi Land Board.

8.2.3 Social Perceptions

As discussed in Chapter 3, the way in which some citizens perceive others will influence the way in which the latter are treated and the quality of their life conditions. In this regard, non-Basarwa's perception of Basarwa and Basarwa's perception of themselves should be examined. In society there are those who, due to being different, among other reasons, tend to be sidelined, are not respected and have problems mixing with others. It is how these people are perceived by the mainstream community that will determine integration between the two. If they are treated spitefully their co-operation in efforts towards integration may be difficult to harness.

Of the 48 respondents interviewed on relationship between Basarwa and non-Basarwa, namely Bakgalagadi, most had something to say about this issue. I think it is under the social dimension of exclusion that exclusion, which I described in the political dimension, can be explained. In other words, the social relationship between Basarwa and non-Basarwa, particularly the dominant Bakgalagadi, is not conducive to cooperation. Below I divide the findings according to specific headings. Bakgalagadi tend to devalue Basarwa so harshly that any efforts to bring the two together are fraught with difficulties.

8.2.3.1 Basarwa's Concept Of Themselves

Basarwa's loss of self-respect, due to long-term subjugation by other tribal groups has become a culture; particularly in as far as the old generation is concerned. The old generation is unwilling to challenge the prevailing system even if it subjugates and keeps them in a servile relationship with non-Basarwa. It is common to hear the old men refer to the Tswana as their 'masters' (Interview, Koontse, 4 December, 2000). It has been argued that due to marginalization and exploitation, Basarwa 'lack self-confidence, pride and self-respect ... and lack any form of independence and this tends to colour their thinking and to shape their way of life' (Campbell, A. and Main, M. 1991:58).

Basarwa despise themselves and seem to have internalised this negative concept of themselves from years of verbal abuse by non-Basarwa. For instance when asked how they perceive themselves, two focus groups of Basarwa in West Hanahai responded:

As Basarwa we see ourselves as the lowest of all ethnic groups and having the least resources.

Focus Group of Old Men

We see ourselves as lowest because we are most illiterate, unemployed and poorest.

Focus Group of Old Women

We consider ourselves to be at the lowest rung of hierarchy because of poverty. Further we do not put on nice and expensive clothes. Our men fail to marry black women because the latter accuse them of dirt and lice.

Focus Group of Young Women

One Mosarwa official claimed that Basarwa councillors are useless, since they were not assertive and fear to oppose fellow councillors who are non-Basarwa and numerically the majority.

8.2.3.2 Basarwa's Concept Of Non-Basarwa, Especially Bakgalagadi

Basarwa interviewees mentioned that Bakgalagadi were:

- their 'masters' (Old Men Focus Group- Basarwa, West Hanahai)
- People who despise, undermine, cheat, exploit and are troublesome (All Basarwa Focus Groups, Ghanzi Township).

Basarwa's perception of non-Basarwa, particularly Bakgalagadi, is a reflection of the powerlessness within the Basarwa group. Basarwa feel they have no control over their own lives, and no power to influence the political and economic structures around them. As I demonstrated in Chapter 7, the Bakgalagadi dominate the political structures. In the Ghanzi Township, the Basarwa live in a worker-dependent relationship with Bakgalagadi, who dominate the economic structures as well. The traditional master-servant relationship still continues because Bakgalagadi exploit the weakness of the Basarwa, which derives from illiteracy and lack of assets, especially land.

8.2.3.3 Other Non-Basarwa's Perception Of Basarwa

Non-Basarwa perception of Basarwa is loaded with negative description. The dominant group in Ghanzi society and their perception of Basarwa is similar to the national perspective. Public negative attitudes towards RADs (the majority of whom are Basarwa) were first reported in the evaluation of the RADP undertaken in 1990 (Kann et al, 1990) and Government acknowledged this issue and aimed to deal with it in the National Development Plan 7 (1991-1997) and National Development Plan 8 (1998/99 -2002/3). The issue has still not been dealt with. The negative attitudes are also perpetuated by public officers, the majority of whom come from communities in which Basarwa are widely despised. Such attitudes are often reflected in the language used and the general treatment of Basarwa by the officers in their daily interactions. The latest evidence comes from a recent review of the RADP programme by BIDPA (2003). Its findings are that:

Some officials and extension workers, even at senior levels, expressed extremely negative views about Basarwa, using expressions such as "*spoiled*", "*spoon-feed*" or "*troublesome*" and also some racist comments, such as that Basarwa are "*liars*" or that they "*have small faces*" (BIDPA, 2003:51). Italics in original.

These attitudes make it difficult for Basarwa to access legal and constitutional entitlements to land (BIDPA, 2003).

The dominant Tswana's perception of Basarwa emphasises those traits that give prominence to weaknesses. Thus Basarwa are viewed in a negative light as 'backward, uncivilised', or people who need to be 'developed' (Saugestad, 1998b: 61). Further, Basarwa are defined by the absence of valued Tswana traits. The same author identifies examples of such perception as the tendency to see Basarwa as people who live outside villages, as non-Setswana speakers, and people who lack resources. This perception emphasises the weaknesses of Basarwa and portrays them as a useless constituency in as far as national development is concerned. The Basarwa are seen as people who lack qualities beneficial to human progress. From the majority or dominant perspective there is nothing that the Basarwa can offer in terms of culture and skills. If anything, for them to advance they should become like the dominant majority. This supremacist attitude elevates one side and devalues the other.

Based on field interviews², the perception in question can be summarised as follows:

- Basarwa are viewed as people who live on welfare (state food handouts)
- They attend meetings only when food is served.
- They are not willing to toil but get things for free.
- They do not want to engage in voluntary work.
- They drink too much.
- Basarwa lack self-confidence and self-esteem.

One writer has pointed out that the Basarwa find themselves increasingly isolated in relation to government, and in relation to other minority groups seeking recognition of ethnic rights, despite the growing popularity of the issues of 'tribal' rights in the media and the NGO movement. He argues:

Tribal, ethnic or group rights do not apply to Basarwa because they are viewed with such contempt by [both Tswana and other non-Tswana groups] that they are practically regarded as less than human (Molefhe, 2003: 24).

In addition to the above, when Bakgalagadi were asked what a Mosarwa was, their response³ was equally negative as summarised in Box 8.1.

Box 8.1

Bakgalagadi's Perception Of A Mosarwa

Somebody who:

Is needy;

Is useless;

Cannot do anything without assistance;

Is not willing to fend for himself;

Thinks things should be done for him;

'*motho nyana hela*' (a lowly person or serf)

Is a dependent person

Source: Interviews and Focus Groups, 1999

8.2.3. Limitations Of Being A RAD.

In Chapter 5, in my definition of RADs, I identified certain problems related to the RAD label. I now wish to discuss these problems to show how being a RAD can exclude one from facilities/services. First, living outside villages, RADs, mostly Basarwa, have been unwilling to take up opportunities such as development initiatives, which come up in villages. When they migrated to villages, they have been shunned and resorted to living on the margins, and again missed the services available in villages. Since they lack village affiliation, they must of necessity find somewhere to live. They have resorted to live on one's cattle post, farm, ranch, or field. It is in these areas that their labour is intensively exploited⁴, and it is also here that public infrastructure and services are lacking.

Second, some people from the dominant tribes have masqueraded as RADs in order to benefit from state assistance. Examples include some people who absconded from the village of Mabule in Southern District to a neighbouring RAD settlement of Sekhutlane and only returned to Mabule when they had usurped livestock meant for the RADs who remained stockless (Botswana Daily News, 29 January, 2001). To evade paying P30 for cook's fees, some residents of Lephepe in Kweneng District transferred their children to nearby villages of Sojwe and Shadishadi where there are RAD hostels that provide free meals (Botswana Daily News, 31 January, 2001). Cattle owners from villages/towns have moved to exploit grazing and water resources intended primarily for RADs, and even benefit from drought relief supplies intended for RADs by using them for themselves and their employees. Where grazing and water exist, these are exploited 'with the tacit or explicit consent of the government, under the rubric of a citizen's freedom of movement in Botswana' (Mazonde, 1999:69)⁵. Some Tswana people, who were commoners in villages, have relocated to RAD settlements and taken up leadership positions as headmen. While such people are of lower status in their communities, this status is elevated when they live in RAD settlements. They are also literate and this makes it easier to qualify for government positions as traditional leaders. From the above account it is clear that RADs have not enjoyed the freedom promised by the Constitution. They are unwilling to settle on villages unless they locate in their fringes. As indicated above they resort to places where they are exploited.

Third, unlike in other areas in the country, the right to ownership of water points in settlements rests with the Government. This has denied RADs the opportunity to have water rights and form groups which can jointly raise livestock. This denial means that those RADs willing to venture into commercial ranching are constrained owing to lack of water. RADs of this description have complained to the effect that Land Boards and Sub-Land Boards⁶ refused to give them water and grazing rights as members of a group, whereas non-RADs were allowed to form groups and apply for leasehold land. Some RADs said that the differential treatment was a product of racial discrimination not so much because they were RADs as because they were Basarwa (Hitchcock, 1998:310-311).

Fourth, since most RADs have no affiliation to villages, in the past they have always lived in what used to be called traditional hunting and gathering territories. It is these areas that government and other members of the society have set aside for use, without taking account of the land needs of the original owners. For example these areas, in which Basarwa were mostly found, are far away from villages, and have been zoned as wildlife management areas, commercial grazing areas, and agricultural areas.

8.2.4 Discriminatory Practices and Negative Attitudes

This section documents discriminatory practices in the education, remote area development, and social and community development sectors. The interactions between Basarwa and local state agencies are important in understanding the ways in which Basarwa experience social exclusion. To this extent a review of the role of a selected sectors in Ghanzi District was undertaken. I found that teachers and other pupils perpetuate discrimination on Basarwa children. Further, I found that there is a gap between policy and action, due to political and administrative factors, and the status Basarwa. It is this gap and discriminatory practices that explain exclusion. Negative attitudes towards Basarwa have contributed to their exclusion.

8.2.4.1 In The Education Sector

Much has been documented about the failure of Basarwa youth to utilise educational services fully (Kann et al, 1990; Brorman and =Oma, 1998; Le Roux, 1999). Field interviews have supplemented this information. As will be shown, the education system perpetuates discrimination, and children of the Basarwa under-achieve, transmitting inequality to the next generation. Basarwa have difficulties in using formal education as a vehicle to connect them to economic opportunities available in the country.

Discriminatory treatment is undertaken mainly by teachers and other children. A summary of the factors responsible for limited access to school among the Basarwa children follows:

- Long distances to reach the nearest school;
- Irregular attendance particularly in winter;
- Dislike of hostel accommodation especially by young children who miss their familiar home environment, because a school hostel environment⁷ does not facilitate any freedom of choice and does not provide the emotional security that the extended clan's home environment provides. Reports on the inadequate accommodation arrangements in some hostels have been made. The worst of these include overcrowded rooms where girls are mixed with boys in the same rooms, and with only male matrons (Rivers, 1999:51);
- Attitudes and performances of teachers. UNDP (1998b) summarises the situation as follows. 'Most teachers in RAD schools [like West Hanahai's for example] are from the dominant Tswana tribes. Many have misconceptions and prejudices about RADs, and are reluctant to try to understand and relate to the life, culture and beliefs of the community they are serving. Teachers often point out that RAD children perform poorly, but are slow in showing any initiative about developing ways to tackle these problems in the schools' (UNDP, 1998b: 32). According to Molefhe, 2003: 24, 'some people from the dominant Tswana joke that Basarwa are educated only to know that they must strip naked and expose their genitals to passing European tourists in the middle of copulation in exchange for money for pictures taken';

- A great number of Basarwa children must endure the prejudice of their classmates and teachers, who manifest their prejudice against the Basarwa by ridiculing, bullying, discriminating against, and verbally and physically abusing Basarwa children. In an interview I had with the Deputy Head teacher of West Hanahai Primary School she reported: 'Basarwa kids and parents complain of discrimination against them by Bakgalagadi teachers especially during educational tours. Parents are reluctant to allow their children to participate in such tours when Bakgalagadi teachers supervise them. A nasty incident occurred whereby a teacher ill-treated Basarwa children during a recent tour. Bakgalagadi teachers generally ill-treat Basarwa children, and insult them, passing remarks like *Modimo o thusitse go bo ke se Mosarwa*. (God is good because he has not made me a Mosarwa). They subject children to remarks that belittle their ethnic group, such as telling them that as Basarwa they are 'useless and inferior' (Interview, Mango/Camm, 26 July 1999). According to one informant, Bakgalagadi and Basarwa kids take meals separately. 'There is a case where I invited a mixture of Bakgalagadi and Basarwa kids to my house. I served them a meal but the guests went about and took their meals separately' (Interview, Deputy Head teacher, West Hanahai Primary School, 17 June 1999);
- At most schools the Basarwa children (as in Ghanzi Township) constitute a minority. They often feel dominated by children from other more aggressive ethnic groups. Almost all the teachers educating classes attended by the Basarwa children belong to other ethnic groups, and they too have internalised the still prevailing regional prejudice against Basarwa culture. Consequently teachers lack an understanding of and sensitivity towards the Basarwa pupils' cultural norms, values and beliefs. According to Mazonde (2002:66), 'learning is made difficult for [Basarwa] children by the non-Basarwa teachers, apparently with the hope that these [Basarwa] children will discontinue their formal education and go back to join their parents in the settlements of their origin'⁸;
- The curriculum does not acknowledge the unique traditions and culture of the Basarwa. One example often cited is that Basarwa puberty rites are not recognised nor respected by education institutions in the country. As a result, school-going children (especially girls) are not allowed to attend such rites leading to loss of culture (MLGLH, 1993).

- Another issue is the generally high dropout rate among Basarwa pupils, particularly girls of 16 or 17 years, who are often forced by circumstances to leave school before completing their education. The high dropout rates can be attributed to the above factors. The significantly higher dropout rate among teenage girls can largely be ascribed to pregnancy and early marriage. As one respondent has mentioned, 'at Standard 2, 12 year olds leave school for marriage. Some children have left hostels to be married (Interview, Sankwasa, 12 August 1999). Many a Mosarwa husband refuses to allow his wife to continue with her schooling.
- Instruction is given in Setswana, a language that many Basarwa children cannot speak.

Table 8.1 shows the enrolment in three primary schools in the research areas. The first two schools are in the Ghanzi Township. As will be observed, Basarwa pupils constitute a minority in the Township schools because the Township is dominated by non-Basarwa. This situation is different in West Hanahai where the predominant population group are Basarwa.

TABLE 8.1

Enrolment By Primary School, Basarwa Roll And Dropouts

School	Enrolment 1999	Basarwa Pupils	% Of Total	Dropouts 1999
Kabakae	565	71	13	20 (1998)
Ghanzi	1064	69	6	5
West Hanahai	81	33	41	7

Source: Survey, Morris Nyathi, 1999

Regarding dropouts, during the first term in 1999, seven pupils left school, four boys and three girls, all Basarwa in West Hanahai. In Kabakae primary school, in 1998 there were 20 dropouts. Data was not available on the number of Basarwa. The Deputy Head teacher mentioned, however, that the non-Basarwa dropout is at a very low rate as compared to that of Basarwa (Interview, Deputy Head teacher, Kabakae Primary School, 15 July 1999).

In Ghanzi primary school, five Basarwa dropped out in 1999. Historical records for the last five years were not available except for 1997, when there were 11 dropouts, 9 of whom were Basarwa and only two were non-Basarwa (Interview, Head teacher, Ghanzi Primary School, 14 July 1999).

The reasons for the above dropouts vary from school to school but are generally in line with the summary given above. In Kabakae and West Hanahai primary schools, dropouts were attributed to failure by Basarwa pupils to attend during the winter months. This is usually caused by the fact that they do not have warm clothes to put on. One other contributory factor is Government policy that gives Basarwa children special treatment concerning readmissions as compared to other Batswana children. They are allowed to resume classes even after 20 days of continuous absence from school.

Other reasons were:

- Lack of parental care (also mentioned in Ghanzi Primary School);
- Poverty (the Social and Community Development of the District Council takes too long to assist those in need with school clothes);
- Influence from those who have already left school;
- Marriage; among Basarwa, girls are married at an early age from 13 years (a respondent mentioned that one girl left last year to be married).

The reasons given in West Hanahai for school dropout were that parents and children did not appreciate the importance and role of education in their lives⁹. Parents/children perceive coming to school, especially in cold weather, as a punishment. Thus during winter, attendance is low for most Basarwa kids. Another factor affecting attendance was that no school meals were available as there was no cook. Children coming from homes where there was no morning meal suffered from hunger. Consequently, at the morning break (10:30 am), teachers advised pupils to return home temporarily so that they could eat at home. In most Basarwa homes there was no food to eat, and the ensuing hunger caused children to fail to return to school after the break, as they wandered about looking for food and even followed parents to distant farms. Bakgalagadi in the settlement were generally richer than Basarwa, and could afford to feed their children. Given this relative advantage, these parents supported and encouraged their children to attend school. Both Basarwa and Bakgalagadi children have a place to pursue their education, but access is uneven between the two.

In West Hanahai, by July 1999, seven pupils had left school, four boys and three girls, all Basarwa. The Deputy Head teacher¹⁰ thought Bakgalagadi teachers were not keen to follow up dropouts, especially since this problem does not affect Bakgalagadi pupils. The school had established an ad-hoc committee on absenteeism, consisting of the Deputy Headmaster and two teachers. The committee monitored and reported absenteeism after its occurrence three days in succession. In spite of that effort, three dropouts occurred without relevant notice to the committee, all from classes taught by a Mokgalagadi teacher (Interview Deputy Head teacher, West Hanahai, 17 June 1999).

Within the Ghanzi Township a street children problem has emerged. These children are of school-going age and are predominately Basarwa. A private individual undertook some interviews to determine why the children were not in school. 50 children were interviewed. The outcome of the interviews was that the main obstacle to school attendance were lack of availability of food in children's homes and proper clothing. The children were ashamed and would rather stay away from school than be laughed at (B. Wessels, 25 January 1999, personal communication). Through Wessels' efforts, the children were registered in the Ghanzi Primary School. Continued attendance could not be guaranteed, however, because the Social and Community Development Department (S&CD), which caters for such needy children was slow in donating appropriate clothing to the children. Some of the street kids could not attend schools because they were forced to go and beg for food at the commercial establishments in the Township, when left alone with no food at home. Some parents spend whole days drinking alcohol and only come home to sleep (Kutlwano, April 2000: 9). Like other destitutes, such Basarwa families are supplied with monthly food rations by the S&CD Department. These rations may leak to non-intended beneficiaries since, according to the Township Chief, 'poor families were given food rations... but the food ends up being exchanged for alcohol' (Kutlwano, April 2000: 9).

8.2.4.2 In the Remote Area Development Sector

In order to gauge the extent of exclusion, I reviewed the role of one Extension Department of the Ghanzi District Council, to check whether it implements its role effectively. This agency is the Remote Area Development Department. In the event, I found that there is a gap between policy and action, due to political and administrative factors, and the status Basarwa. It is this gap that can explain exclusion. I also found that the target group of the Department – the RADs, face discrimination.

In as far as the RADP Department's role is concerned, the interaction should be seen against the background of political opposition to improvement of RADs's standard of living that I discussed in section 7.2.1. As indicated in Appendix 7, the policy objectives of the RADP are:

- To promote production-oriented, income and employment generating activities in remote settlements;
- To promote the RADs' access to land and other natural resources;
- To provide the RADs with training and education to enable them to be sustaining;
- To promote the social, cultural and economic advancement of the RADs by facilitating their integration into the mainstream of society, without detriment to their unique culture and tradition.

A review of relevant literature on RADP shows that there has been a gap between the above policy objectives and action. The main reasons are the following:

- Political opposition to improvement of RADs's standard of living as discussed in section 7.2.1;
- The status and RADP and beneficiary group - the RADs;
- The ineffectiveness of extension services available to RADP.

In section 8.2.3.3, I highlighted the negative perception against which Basarwa are held. Kann et al (1990) found that RADP did not have a high status, owing to a lot of discrimination and generally unacceptable behaviour towards RADs. They reported:

[RADP] is not very important in the eyes of many people, including officers whose support is badly needed in the programme. It appears that the status of the target group of the programme [RADs], affects the status of the programme and this in turn affects the status of the officers working within the programme (Kann et al, 1990: 112).

The above situation has not yet improved because the latest National Development Plan (NDP 9), like its predecessors, (ROB, 1991a and ROB, 1997a) is still identifying the problems of RADs as ‘... negative public attitudes’ (ROB, 2003: 41). This suggests that RADP has not been accorded much priority. For instance, no action has yet been taken on a recommendation by Kann et al (1990:103) ‘that an education/information activity on the situation of RADs directed to various groups in society be undertaken’. This is not helped by the fact that such attitudes, which have been nurtured over decades, cannot be changed overnight. They require great sensitivity and long-term attention, which does not seem to be given much attention in Botswana.

The latest review of the RADP has documented criticisms raised in connection with the effectiveness of extension services available to RADP (BIDPA, 2003). The criticisms relate to three areas such as training of officers, their attitude towards RADs and the residence of officers¹¹. The overall staff of the Remote Area Development cadre are not qualified for the very difficult and complicated tasks to be carried within the RADP, which involve implementing often difficult and sensitive policy decisions including resettlement of people. The Assistant Project Officers (APOs) were identified as inadequately and inappropriately trained officers within the RADP cadre (Interview, Lefhoko, 31 July 1999; BIDPA, 2003). These officers operate at the settlement level and occupy an important position in the RADP hierarchy since they in direct and constant contact with RADs. In spite of the requirement that they have to manage the various projects under RADP and interpret the programme objectives and strategy, they tend to be the least knowledgeable and qualified of the RADP cadre. APOs and senior RADP officers are inadequately trained. They have received some training in social work, and not community development, which is more relevant for the needs of RADs. The lack of training extends to other extension officers. As the latest review has found:

Other extension officers who service remote area settlements, such as teachers, nurses, court clerks and tribal police staff also do not have appropriate training. While these officers find themselves working in what they correctly interpret as an environment that requires special skills, few have reported ever receiving such training. They are thus unqualified to deal with development problems of the [RADs] (BIDPA, 2003: 116).

Under the above circumstances of poorly trained staff, it is not possible satisfactorily implement the RADP policy objectives outlined above, hence the gap between policy

and action. Without appropriate and adequate training, the full potential of the RADP and other extension cannot be fully exploited. This means that the needs RADs are not fully met. To the extent that current training arrangements do not take account of the special needs of remote areas, RADs' are excluded from 'having equal access and equal opportunity to partake in the social, economic and political activities of the country' as called for in Appendix 7, section 1.8.

Reference has already been made to the negative attitude of officers towards RADs in section 8.2.3.3. The extension officers I found in West Hanahai and a neighbouring settlement were all non-Basarwa. The attitude of these officers can be illustrated by a typical perception that 'in order to get anything worthwhile done, Basarwa have to be pushed (Interview, Taihuku, 10 June 1999) or 'Basarwa have a problem in that they have to be pushed to get them to do something' (Interview, Molatole, 17 June 1999). Basarwa are thus treated as 'problems'. This loses sight of the fact that it is the barrier that society places upon Basarwa that is the problem. With such attitudinal problems, a sense of partnership between administrators and Basarwa does not exist, and there is hardly any scope for Basarwa to participate in the development process.

Another discriminatory practice relates to residence of extension officers. Whilst extension officers are resident in all villages in the country, the same cannot be said of remote settlements. In these settlements, there are no resident extension officers like agricultural demonstrators, social and community development officers, and veterinary assistants. APOs who are supposed to be based in the settlement, are not always resident, but commute from district or sub-district headquarters. During this author's visit to West Hanahai in 1999, there was no veterinary assistant, social and community development officer and an APO in the settlement. The absence of resident officers militates against effectiveness of their interaction on a daily basis and participation in the communities' problems. An APO was posted to West Hanahai in 2000. However, inadequate training mentioned above incapacitated her. It should be noted that the RADP is a multifaceted programme, which requires the cooperation of almost all district level extension staff. This cooperation is meaningful when extension staff from other departments also take up residence in the settlement.

8.2.4.3 In The Social Services Sector: Basarwa In The Ghanzi Township

The socio-economic status of Basarwa in Ghanzi Township can be summarised as follows. Basarwa in the Township and their counterparts in remote areas share the disadvantage arising from the fact that their traditional source of livelihood, hunting and gathering, has been further and further eroded as population and especially livestock densities have increased, encroaching on their traditional hunting lands. More and more have been forced to seek alternatives, of which there have been few. They have gradually been drifting into specially established settlements where there are currently very few alternatives to welfare (Food Studies Group, 1990). Ghanzi Township is one such settlement, which was established in an area previously part of the traditional territory of Basarwa. Due to the erosion of their traditional livelihood, Basarwa have had the greatest difficulty in re-establishing a viable livelihood. They are undergoing a major process of transition in search of some other economic alternative. This transitional process to an alternative livelihood has tended to be long and slow. Consequently, the Township Basarwa form a group in the population facing severe poverty. Meanwhile those who have moved to the Township have occupied fringe areas as I showed in Chapter 6. In the Township, they have tended to squat and survive by working as farm labourers, finding piece-jobs and part-time work, and so on (Mogwe, 1992). As mentioned in Chapters 6 and 7, these Basarwa are illiterate, poorly represented in political institutions and ward development committees. They do not participate in small industrial projects as I showed in Chapter 6. As indicated earlier in this chapter, they are subject to prejudice. As indicated in section 8.2.4.1, a street children problem has surfaced in the Township, and the bulk of those affected are Basarwa children.

Apart from programmes provided by other District Council's Departments¹², Township Basarwa have to be serviced under programmes initiated by the Social and Community Development Department (S&CD). The Department's ultimate aim is to improve the living conditions of the people through the following strategies.

- To improve the ability of the community to articulate their interests through the support and formation of village voluntary organisations geared towards identified problems;

- To alleviate social problems through rehabilitation and social welfare programmes which will utilise the existing services and resources to the maximum;
- To teach men and women to be self-sufficient, able to generate income for their families and be able to cope with their present situation;
- To cater for the needs, aspirations and problems of youth (GDC and GDDC, 1997: 80-81).

To achieve its aim, the Department is divided into four sections, with the following functions.

- **Community Development:** Mobilises and assists the communities to identify and prioritise their needs/problems. Develops, plans (to address these needs) and implements them using their own efforts and available resources, that is, financial, human and so on.
- **Social Welfare:** Develops programmes and social services that concentrate on improving and maintaining the (socio-economic and cultural) well being of individuals, groups and communities. Also provides services that re-assert the individual to live harmoniously with the environment.
- **Youth:** Works with individuals and groups in identifying their needs, finding services and educating them on available resources, train them in relevant skills that will encourage them to start income generating programmes with a view to improving their standard of living. Enables youth to build and maintain systems of action which lead to their maturity.
- **Home Economics:** Works with individuals and groups in identifying their needs, finding services and educating them on available resources, train them in relevant skills that will encourage them to start income generating programmes with a view to improving their standard of living (Ministry of Local Government, Lands and Housing, 1997: 1-2).

Against the above strategies and functions, the implementation of the Revised National Policy on Destitute Persons (2002)¹³ is one of the major responsibilities of S&CD Department. The current definition of a destitute person is:

- An individual who, due to disabilities or chronic health condition is unable to engage in sustainable economic activities and has insufficient assets and income sources.
- Insufficient assets and income sources are
 - Possessing not more than four livestock units as the case may be, or
 - Earning or receiving an income of less than P120 per month without dependents or less than P150 per month with dependents.
 - Other criteria pertain to mental or physical disability, emotional or psychological disability, being terminally ill as well as children under 18 years of age living under difficult circumstances. (ROB, 2002a: 4)

Given the socio-economic status of Basarwa in the Township as summarised above, they constitute a majority of the permanent destitute category. A look at the strategies and functions of the S&CD Department shows that this organisation has a potential to empower and improve the standard of living of Township residents. However, given the condition of Township residents especially Basarwa, the Department's promises are hollow. It is the mismatch between the Department's objectives and action that can partly explain the exclusion of Basarwa from all aspects of their development. It is important to examine the source of the Department's failure to implement its noble

goals. Several factors can be isolated. First, as an extension Department, the S&CD Department does not appear to effectively perform its functions of linking people to ward committees, and appropriately advising these structures on the expressed needs, requirements and demands of the Township people. This is related to the problem of poor consultation with Township residents. During the author's fieldwork, most Township dwellers expressed great dissatisfaction with extension departments, of which the S&CD is one. Many of the Township Basarwa interviewed during the fieldwork stated that had not been properly consulted regarding various development issues affecting them. This is in no way unique in the context of development programmes, which frequently are organised in a top-down fashion. Under this set-up, consultation tends to mean that only Government will ask people their views on its proposals, rather than government listening to proposals that come from the people. As noted by BIDPA (2001b: 133) '[this] consultative process takes the form of informing, and seeking endorsement from, the grass roots level of what state bureaucrats have decided, rather than seeking inputs of demands and requirements for local development from the people'. This is clearly a mechanism to exclude people from policy formulation. In this manner Basarwa and other residents in the Township have not been consulted about their development needs. The socio-economic status of Township Basarwa was summarised above, and it is on the basis of that status, that development programmes relevant to their situation could be designed. It is necessary to consult with Basarwa and get their views of what assistance programme are suitable for them. Any deviation from this, of which Government departments like S&CD are typical, is exclusionary. The Department, being a Government agency has tended to employ top-down approaches in its dealing with people.

Second, the prejudice against Basarwa was mentioned in the discussion on the education and the remote area development sectors. This negative attitude is ubiquitous. Officers within the S&CD Department also have a low opinion of Basarwa. One of my respondents who has worked for a long time in the Ghanzi District Council suggested the following reason:

The S&CD staff have a negative attitude towards Township Basarwa. This expresses itself in remarks like 'Why can't they join other Basarwa in the settlements where they are provided with better services?' (Interview, Mayane, 10 November 1999).

As can be deduced from the above quotation, the Department regards Basarwa as a problem¹⁴, rather than people to be mobilised and assisted to identify and prioritise their needs. This creates a social distance between officials and Basarwa. Due to lack of measures taken to facilitate the graduation of Basarwa from destitution, the S&CD Department tends to be more associated with welfare than community development functions inherent in the Department's functions. The focus on welfare has done more harm than good to the beneficiaries, as I will show in the next paragraph.

Lastly, the fact that Basarwa are predominately permanent destitute persons tends to disempower them. This is probably one of the reasons that Bakgalagadi perceive Basarwa as shown in Box 8.1. That perception approximates the definition of permanent destitute persons. It makes Basarwa to stand out as different, or unable and unequal. This alienates Basarwa from the rest of society and lays foundations of shame and internalised feelings of inadequacy (Le Roux, 1999). Basarwa in the Township know the offices of the S&CD because they obtain their monthly food rations there under the Destitute Relief Programme¹⁵. This programme is one of Government's safety nets. On the one hand, for permanent destitute persons, welfare is necessary because these persons cannot help themselves. On the other hand, welfare creates dependency and is disempowering. In this connection, one study has concluded:

One of the biggest dangers of poverty alleviation programmes is the dependency created by handouts ..., which yet again diminish [Basarwa's] power and therefore their participation (Le Roux, 1999: 125).

In Chapter 7, I mentioned an incident where a Mosarwa complained that Basarwa are pushed from food queues during public functions because it is claimed that they do not deserve the food because they receive monthly food rations from the state. This is how Basarwa suffer marginalisation and fail to participate in some aspects of public life.

8.2.5 Illiteracy

Illiteracy excludes most Basarwa from the formal labour market. Illiterate people tend to be excluded from other things too, for example from constitutional and other rights, because their inability to read and write prevents them from knowing or claiming their rights. I indicated in Chapter 6 that a number of illiterate Basarwa had difficulty in

getting old age pension because they could not establish their ages. It should be noted that illiteracy rates are highest among the old generation. As mentioned in Chapter 6, Basarwa's illiteracy is high. The reason for this is that Basarwa were excluded from attending school during the colonial era. In the 1920s, members of this generation were tied in a system of servitude, which denied them opportunities to attend school or to engage in other profitable activities (Wilmsen and Vossen, 1990). This high illiteracy rate has resulted in Basarwa's limited participation in the decision making of the development process because Basarwa do not have enough educated members to equally compete for membership in the representative policy making bodies (BIDPA, 2003).

In Ghanzi Township, of the 53 Basarwa households, 49 (92.5%) had no education and 4 (7.5%) had primary school education. Of the 35 Bakgalagadi households, 16 (45.7%) had no education, 12 (34.3%) had primary education, 4 (11.4%) had junior secondary education, and 2 (5.7%) had tertiary education. Of the 24 'other' households, 10 (41.7%) had no education, whilst 12 (50.0%) had primary education, and 2 (8.3%) had junior secondary education. The above data are displayed in Table 8.2 below. In West Hanahai, of the 45 Basarwa households, 36 (80%) had no education, 3 (6.7%) had primary education, another 3 had junior secondary school education, 2 (4.4%) had senior secondary education. The situation with respect to the 5 Bakgalagadi households is that 2 (40%) had no education, whereas 2 others had primary and junior secondary education, and another had 'other' educational qualifications.

TABLE 8.2
Educational Attainment By Ethnic Group – Ghanzi Township

Education		Ethnic Group			Total
		Basarwa	Bakgalagadi	Other	
None	Count	49	16	10	75
	% within ethnic group	92.5%	45.7%	41.7%	67.0%
Primary	Count	4	12	12	28
	% Within ethnic group	7.5%	34.3%	50.0%	25.0%
Junior secondary	Count		4	2	6
	% Within ethnic group		11.4%	8.3%	5.4%
Tertiary	Count		2		2
	% Within ethnic group		5.7%		1.8%
Non formal	Count		1		1
	% Within ethnic group		2.9%		.9%
	Count	53	35	24	112

Source: Survey, Morris Nyathi, 1999

8.2.6 Lack Of Intermarriage

Intermarriage is an integrating mechanism between population groups. It helps to unify groups of different race, ethnicity and creed. To determine whether there was cohesion between the study groups, I investigated intermarriage patterns. My finding is that Basarwa and Bakgalagadi have tended to maintain their boundaries as distinct groups, thus keeping intermarriage rates at extremely low levels. To this extent, some social distance between the two has existed, making prospects for working together difficult. One author who studied Basarwa/Bakgalagadi relationship in Ghanzi in the 1970s found that:

Legal marriage between people of the two groups is virtually unheard of. One Mosarwa living in the Ghanzi Commonage summed up the feelings of the Ghanzi Basarwa when he stated: 'There is no friendly way to stay together but they don't like me because I am a Bushman' (Childers, 1976:25).

Lack of intermarriage is one way in which Basarwa's low status manifests itself in contemporary Botswana. According to Hitchcock and Holm (1993:314), 'for most [dominant Tswana] the idea of intermarriage with a [Mosarwa] person is inconceivable'. Ikeya (1999) points out, however, that the Bakgalagadi living in the Central Kalahari Game Reserve are an exception in that they have lived so long with Basarwa that they consider themselves as Basarwa too.

On the basis of interviews, the overwhelming evidence is that there is not much intermarriage between these groups. It is not uncommon to find a Mosarwa woman married to a non-Mosarwa man. But no cases were encountered of a Mosarwa man marrying a non-Mosarwa woman. One of the respondents suggested that if a Mosarwa's economic status is comparable to that of a non-Mosarwa, it might be possible for the former to command respect by the latter. His chances of being discriminated against would be minimised. Property ownership is an important consideration. Ownership of cattle qualifies one to marry and pay the bride price. I summarise his position as follows:

If a Mosarwa has the capacity to pay the bride price and is rich enough to sustain a marriage, he stands a better chance to marry a non-Mosarwa girl from a dominant group. The thing is that a Mosarwa should have property and instil some confidence that he is capable of supporting a family. Dominant or non-Basarwa parents express fears such as *Ngwana o nyalwa ke Mosarwa ele gore ota mojesa eng?* (If a Mosarwa marries my child what will he feed her?) (Interview, Mayane, 10 November, 1999).

These parents also require that a Mosarwa should be educated, employed and occupying a well-paying job. In other words the status of the subject Mosarwa should be comparable to a non-poor non-Mosarwa. In spite of the above view, practice tells a different story. During field research I did not come across cases of inter-marriage where Basarwa men have married non-Basarwa. Neither was it common to find a non-Mosarwa man with a Mosarwa wife. In his study of relationships between Bakgalagadi and Basarwa in the Kalahari, Kuper (1970) notes that '... while some [Bangologa] men take Bushmen concubines, I have not come across any case of Ngologa-Bushman marriage Kuper (1970: 48)'. It was common to find Basarwa illegitimate children

whose fathers are mostly non-Basarwa. A report from one Ghanzi settlement of Chobokwane, attributed to a Mosarwa traditional leader there, confirms the foregoing tendency to the extent that:

There are so many Bakgalagadi and Baherero men making Basarwa girls pregnant and leaving them with children because it would be belittling for them to pay their cows to marry a Mosarwa. The Bakgalagadi would not allow their children to marry a Mosarwa because they look down on them. So when a Mosarwa man impregnates a Mokgalagadi woman, the parents demand payment but refuse a marriage proposal if it is made (The Voice, 30 March, 2001:13).

The lack of intermarriage was confirmed in focus group discussions. The following are typical quotes from the groups.

There is no intermarriage between Basarwa men and non-Basarwa women.

Focus Group of Old Men – Basarwa Ghanzi, Township

A black man can have a Mosarwa girlfriend but is not willing to marry her.

Focus Group of Young Women- Basarwa, Ghanzi Township

There is no intermarriage between Basarwa and us. A Mosarwa man cannot marry a Mokgalagadi woman. Basarwa women are not married but stay as concubines of Bakgalagadi.

Focus Group of Old Women-Bakgalagadi, Ghanzi Township

There is no intermarriage between Basarwa and other tribes. However there are widespread pregnancies amongst Basarwa girls, and life as concubines. Black people cannot marry Basarwa for the following reasons. First, Basarwa are of low status. Second, a Mosarwa man is too lazy and would not afford to marry a Mokgalagadi woman who wants to stay at home and undertake various domestic chores, rather than joining the husband on drinking sprees.

Focus Group of Old Men, Old and Young Women - Mixed group of Bakgalagadi, Rolong and Herero, West Hanahai

8.3 Discussion Of The Findings

The exclusion of Basarwa as shown above is not only engineered by their neighbours, the Bakgalagadi, but also by non-Bakgalagadi, such as teachers, and officials in the public sector. The discriminatory practices directed at Basarwa children in the education sector are similar to the example of Dalit children mentioned in Chapter 3. These practices have the effect of de-motivating the victims and excluding them from educational opportunities, thus affecting their chances of obtaining employment opportunities in the formal sector.

Negative social perceptions and attitudes towards Basarwa operate at both the national and local levels. The perceptions are a product of history, and they are characterised by prejudice and stereotyping. The direct result of negative attitudes is abuse and discrimination. These attitudes make it difficult for RADs in general and Basarwa in particular to feel as valued and important as members of the dominant ethnic groups. They marginalize Basarwa because the core polity of the society does not represent their interests. The attitudes disempower Basarwa, making them to remain in an inferior or disadvantaged position with respect to the socio-economic, political or cultural power structure of society. In such a weak position, Basarwa characteristically lack influence on government policies on national development and are likely to be the last groups to benefit from the fruits of national development.

An asymmetrical relationship exists between Bakgalagadi and Basarwa in the whole of Ghanzi District. The former play the role of dominants, who, as I showed in Chapter 3, label the Basarwa as defective and substandard in significant ways. These perceptions correspond with Woodburn's (1997) findings on negative stereotypes which former hunter-gatherer groups, like Basarwa, are subjected to in Sub-Saharan Africa. Such negative attitudes are detrimental to any efforts to integrate Basarwa with the members of the mainstream society in that they militate against any ideals of living together, or possibilities of appreciating one another as equal. The culture of the Basarwa is looked down upon by the dominant group rather than considered as an ingredient that the development paradigm can build upon for the benefit of both Basarwa and members of the dominant groups. Through this negative relationship, Basarwa have been excluded from equal and effective participation in the social, economic and political life of Botswana society. They face discrimination and rejection in other spheres because they are not accepted socially. They remain stigmatised, despised and without clout.

From the above findings, it is certain that lack of education limits Basarwa's chances of employment and other opportunities. The old and current generations experience some illiteracy. Why are such difficulties placed on Basarwa? Mazonde (2002) argues that the dominant groups in Botswana have extended exclusion of Basarwa to formal education in a bid to maintain a status quo in terms of the social relationship between Basarwa and non-Basarwa. He concludes:

The dominant [non-Basarwa] are perpetuating the subjugation of the [Basarwa] by significantly reducing their chances of receiving formal education, currently the most crucial tool in connecting any people to economic opportunities (Mazonde, 2002:69).

Whilst it is morally unjust to deny Basarwa equal opportunities in the education sector, one correspondent has pointed out that it is in the interests of the economic and political elite to keep an illiterate Basarwa group. UNDP (1997: 94) notes that 'poverty often serves the vested interests of the economically powerful, who may benefit from exploiting the pool of low-paid labour'. My respondent identifies these benefits as cheap labour and an ignorant Basarwa group. The weak and voiceless Basarwa can be harnessed and exploited as cheap labour by the informed, powerful elite (Toteng, 2001, personal communication). Basarwa themselves feel there is a conspiracy by such an elite to disempower them. On the basis of her interviews and meetings with the Basarwa, Le Roux (1999) reported:

In the majority of [Basarwa] community meetings as well as interviews with individuals we were told how the more assertive, powerful groups who have taken [Basarwa's] land, have formed a force against the [Basarwa], to prevent them from being organised so that the injustices that have been done against them could not be reversed. [Basarwa] believed they were cheated out of chances to improve their educational and economic progress, because their improvement would challenge the forces that are now living on their land and hierarchies that have been put in place (Le Roux, 1999: 52-53).

Basarwa do not feel valued and important as other ethnic groups are, and because of this, they are excluded from participation in community life. Their higher illiteracy rate contributes towards their exclusion from employment opportunities in the formal sector, and exploitation by employers in the informal sector, where normal employment regulations are non-existent. Illiteracy is accompanied by the general ignorance of one's rights and the likelihood of facing political exclusion since illiterate people are less conscious of their rights and institutions that can enforce them. According to the findings, the study groups maintain boundaries among themselves by keeping intermarriage rates low to nil. In this case, the Bakgalagadi are not willing to marry Basarwa because they hold them in low esteem.

The negative perception I referred to above gives the impression that all Basarwa are useless and a 'pawn that responds or reacts passively or automatically to the dominant' group's actions' (Baker, 1983:4). It should be noted that some Basarwa have come up with strategies to deal with tendencies to devalue their dignity. A case history that

challenges the negative stereotype of a Mosarwa as unassertive and unaware of his rights, shows that education and character have moulded some Basarwa's identity to the better. It shows a situation where social exclusion has been associated with stronger assertion of identity. This case, described below, shows how a Mosarwa experienced and dealt with negative perception at the work place.

Case History Of A Mosarwa Court Clerk At Ghanzi Township Customary Court

XX¹⁶ is employed as a Court Clerk in the Ghanzi Township Customary Court. She completed secondary education at Junior Certificate Level in 1987. She is 29 years old and was born in New Xanagas, one of the RAD settlements in Ghanzi District. After completion of school, she did temporary teaching at primary level in Kuke primary school for one year. In 1992 she was employed as a court clerk in Ghanzi Township, and transferred to Kalkfontein a year later. She lives in her own house in Khurakhura, one of the wards in the Township.

In order to find out how XX dealt with certain aspects of social exclusion, particularly those relating to negative aspects in Basarwa/non-Basarwa relationships, I interviewed her to try to find what strategies she employed to cope with prejudice in society. I isolated relational aspects at the work place. In 1996 she complained about being derogatorily referred to as a 'Mosarwa'¹⁷ by her supervisor at the work place in Kalkfontein. She felt she was looked down upon and unfairly treated. She appealed to the head of department, and the Tribal Secretary in Ghanzi Township, but to no avail. She followed up her complaint with the District Commissioner who subsequently wrote to the Ministry of Local Government, Lands and Housing, who ruled that she should be transferred to the Township. According to XX the Tribal Secretary did not take her case seriously, dismissing it as normal to refer a fellow worker as a Mosarwa, even in a demeaning manner.

In 1998 she obtained funding to attend a certificate course in customary court duties in Gaborone. Just before she left for the course, she became sick and was granted sick leave. The leave was granted for three days from Wednesday to Friday and the following Monday she was to start her course. Her efforts to commence the course were thwarted by her senior who informed the Training Officer that she was sick and should

be replaced by somebody else on the course. Meanwhile XX recovered and was ready to attend the course. On discovering efforts to frustrate her chances to attend the course, she lodged a complaint with the District Commissioner. This did not bear fruit. Following this she lodged her case with the Civil Service Association and the Joint Ministerial Consultative Committee. She won her appeal and finally attended the next sitting of the course.

From the above account, it is clear that XX is assertive and has tried to fight rather than take a low profile to the injustice which most Basarwa face. Asked what her strategies were to deal with problems at the work place, she said the key was to fight for one's rights. She felt that it was futile to look down upon oneself as a Mosarwa. She strongly felt that since most Basarwa despise themselves, this gives non-Basarwa a chance to subjugate the former. Her position was that a Mosarwa should look at her/himself as a human being who is just as good as a non-Mosarwa. She said that Basarwa were wrong to despise themselves because this was responsible for the plummeting of their self-image. She was of the opinion that Basarwa should stand up and do things for themselves. They should consider themselves as equals, as human beings, not as 'Basarwa' or people of a lower class, no matter the historical circumstances that put them in the lowest rung of the social hierarchy.

At the work place, she said her strategy was to see herself as being responsible to serve the nation and to earn an income that could earn her independence and respect. She has resisted the tendency to look at herself as a Mosarwa if this meant that she was of lower status than her workmates. She said that Basarwa should be encouraged to fight for themselves and should resist labelling themselves as 'Basarwa' if that meant that they would sit back and not fight against the challenge that history placed on them.

She mentioned that two fellow Basarwa who were employed as local police had left their jobs since they felt they were unfairly treated. According to her assessment, these are some of the employees who are not prepared to fight for their rights but who recoil when abused by their non-Basarwa bosses and colleagues.

8.4 Economic Exclusion

8.4.1 Exclusion From The Labour Market

As indicated in Chapter 6, the national rate of unemployment amongst Basarwa is 90% compared to the District's rate of 16.44%. On the basis of my socio-economic survey, I found that unemployment was a major problem within the research groups, as is reflected by the fact that 83.9% of the sample households were 'fully dissatisfied' with employment conditions in Ghanzi Township, and 100% in West Hanahai. This means that they expressed concern with the rate of high unemployment in both places. For instance, in the Township sample, according to Table 8.3 below, within the Basarwa group, 45 (84.9%) were unemployed compared to 6 (17.1%) Bakgalagadi. In West Hanahai, out of a total of 45 Basarwa in the sample, 38 (84.4%) were unemployed, compared to 1 (20.0%) of Bakgalagadi, who were 5 in this sample. In sum, Basarwa are affected by employment to a greater extent than Bakgalagadi.

Elsewhere in this thesis it is indicated that Basarwa depend more on informal, insecure employment where remuneration is extremely inadequate. In the Ghanzi District there is a myth among the non-Basarwa that maintains low-income levels in Basarwa. The former claim that Basarwa have no desire for better-paying jobs, hence their tendency to undertake menial alternatives. Because a significant number of Basarwa are excluded from the formal labour market, they are also excluded from independence, self-respect, and the opportunities for advancement that work brings. They cannot have access to social networks that are possible in a working environment. They cannot resort to traditional informal networks because as I indicated in Chapter 3, these sources have dwindled over time. In settlements like West Hanahai, due to lack of employment opportunities, the Government has introduced labour-based relief projects under the drought programme. These are alternative sources of income for the majority of settlement residents, but they are not sustainable.

TABLE 8.3
Occupation By Ethnic Group – Ghanzi Township

Occupation		Ethnic Group			Total
		Basarwa	Bakgalagadi	Other	
Unemployed	Count	45	6	5	56
	% Within ethnic group	84.9%	17.1%	20.8%	50.0%
Employed	Count	6	17	14	37
	% Within ethnic group	11.3%	48.6%	58.3%	33.0%
Self employed	Count	2	12	5	19
	% Within ethnic group	3.8%	34.3%	20.8%	17.0%
	Count	53	35	24	112

Source: Survey, Morris Nyathi, 1999

For those who have the requisite qualifications, unfair labour market practices contribute to exclusion within the labour market. Complaints of discrimination were raised during a focus group discussion in West Hanahai. In this settlement, in 1999 I found five young Basarwa who had completed senior secondary education and had submitted letters applying for jobs in response to advertisements. They complained that:

When we submit applications for jobs we are either unsuccessful or do not get responses to our applications. We suspect that when those who receive our applications notice Sesarwa names (normally those starting with 'Q or X'), they put them aside for rejection.

Focus Group of Young Men – Basarwa

This author encountered a field experience where a Mosarwa who had completed his junior secondary school, went around offices in Ghanzi Township looking for a job. In three cases, he was advised that there were no vacancies but had an offer in one case from some officials of work in a cattle post, to look after livestock. I also heard complaints from some Basarwa job seekers that they could not find jobs yet some people who had completed school with them, and were Bakgalagadi, had been employed. In 2000 the Acting Minister of Presidential Affairs and Public

Administration presented a Memorandum to a Public Service (Amendment) Bill, which alluded to discriminatory practices. This memorandum carried some evidence that it had 'been noted that certain appointments, promotions, transfers or training of officers in the public service are being made not on merit but for other considerations such as tribal affiliations, blood and amorous relationships' (The Botswana Gazette, 26 July, 2000). In sum, some Basarwa who are qualified are excluded from the formal market because of discrimination. In some cases jobs are not advertised because employers rely on their workers to invite prospective employees for jobs. In other words, in order to get a job one has to have a friend or relative who has a job. As mentioned in Chapter 7, there are no Basarwa in senior management positions either in Government or the private sector. According to one of my Mosarwa respondents, she attributed this to differential in educational opportunities between Basarwa and other ethnic groups. Noting that Basarwa generally entered schools for the first time in the seventies, she argued that those who entered the labour market found non-Basarwa in senior positions, who are unwilling to facilitate progression of Basarwa either due to prejudice or ethnic considerations (Interview, Xukuri, 21 July 1999).

8.4.2 Exclusion From Owning Property

One reason for the poverty of the Basarwa is that their capacity to accumulate property has been frustrated by non-Basarwa groups, particularly those who have been dominating them. This has been achieved through a systematic dispossessing of Basarwa owners of their property. It has been observed by non-Basarwa that Basarwa take no interest in accumulating livestock, and that when given livestock, they tend to eat or sell it for immediate needs, and that the Basarwa deal similarly with money and other assets. Most non-Basarwa find Basarwa's handling of property strange and irrational.

According to Hitchcock et al (2000a), over the years the Basarwa have found property to be a difficult issue to deal with. Basarwa found themselves confronted with open and structural violence and for the last century they were permanently at the losing ends of conflicts. The Basarwa have been relocated to settlements and/or to highly volatile

livelihoods. Even in situations where they are formally allotted resources (pasture, waterholes) as in Ghanzi settlements, they find them difficult to maintain as a communal resource. All Basarwa communities have to manage their resources in open-access systems as they, unlike commercial farm owners, cannot prevent outsiders from using the resources that are formally theirs.

Typically of open-access situations, both Basarwa and outsiders try to take out as much as possible and trade in short term gains instead of long-term sustainability. Within open-access situations, nobody is sure whether he/she will be able to use the resource the next time; hence it is wise to take as much as possible when the chance is given. This situation results in short term decision-making. If key resources are highly unreliable and if their availability or non-availability is hard to predict, it makes perfect sense to maintain day-to-day decision-making. While Basarwa in the past were able to deal with climatic instability, nowadays their shaky and insecure position and high dependency adds to climatic variability. Basarwa's reluctance to accumulate property is directly connected to this dilemma. Accumulation of property makes sense if it can be protected against outsiders. As long as there is no protection, and even the settlements are not considered secure, '[Basarwa find it] wise to transfer economic capital (livestock, money) into social capital (friends, relatives) and symbolic capital (prestige to be a generous person)' (Hitchcock et al, 2000a: 84).

Another aspect relates to the fact that Basarwa's definition of property is different from Tswana's. In Sarwa culture, property is never to be sold but communally owned (Interview, Selolwane, 3 April 2000). Basarwa believe that there are certain things that cannot be owned by individuals but belong to the community. Such things are the land, wild animals, water, plants and the air. Therefore community's land, water and animals cannot be sold or exchanged (Le Roux 1997). There is also a spiritual aspect, which asserts that land is not to be sold or transferred, lest such sale hurts the dead. To the extent that Basarwa define property differently from the dominant Tswana and do not allow sale of land, they exclude themselves from the market in land and benefits that arise thereof.

8.4.3 Exclusion From Property Rights

On the basis of the economic dimension of social exclusion, as described in Chapter 3, what I found was that Basarwa were excluded from access to productive assets especially land. In Chapter 7 the legal problems related to rights to land were mentioned. Within the Township, some Basarwa have been allocated residential plots, but, apart from their lack of resources to develop these plots, they encounter exclusion from the right to utilise these plots freely. Two case histories depicting this situation are described below. Contrary to the case history discussed in section 8.3, these histories record instances where social exclusion is associated with demoralisation.

8.4.3.1 Case History 1

A case history showing the exclusion of a Mosarwa from his right to a state-allocated plot gives an example of how the process occurs and why some Basarwa choose to stay in fringe areas. QQ is 35 years old and a TB patient currently on medication. He and his wife are both illiterate and unemployed. He was born in Dekar and is a member of the Naro Basarwa sub-group. They were allocated a residential plot in Ghanzi Township, New Stands in 1996. The plot, measuring 450 square metres, was allocated on certain conditions, the most important being:

To erect on the plot at least one residential building and lavatory approved by Council within two years of signature of Certificate of Rights, land to be used for residential purposes and the occupier should not use the land for any other purposes except with written consent of the Council. The occupier shall not give up occupation or possession of the plot without first notifying the Council of the intended action in advance. The occupier shall not let the property to any other person except with written permission of the Council ... (QQ's Certificate of Rights).

In order to ascertain the facts surrounding the events leading to QQ's exclusion, members of his family and himself were interviewed. Their plot is situated next to another, which was a source of noise and nuisance to the QQs. In the plot adjacent to the QQs, a woman was allowed to set up a business involving brewing and sale of traditional beer. This business caused so much disturbance to the QQs that they eventually left their plot and settled in a squatter area, a kilometre away.

After the QQs had been allocated a plot, their neighbour accepted a request by a woman who wanted to start a business to trade in alcohol. This neighbour, a fellow Mosarwa, did not consult his neighbours, including the QQs. Both the QQ's and the neighbouring plot have road frontages and are not fenced. Because of the absence of fences, people use the plots as thoroughfares. People coming to the drinking place via QQ's road frontage have to pass through his plot. From the drinking place come all sorts of intolerable things. First there is the noise from the music played almost day and night. Second, all plots adjacent to the drinking spot are subjected to abuse by drunkards who urinate on them. Third, drunkards also steal, beat up, and burn neighbours' property under cover of darkness. The QQs, being the nearest neighbours to the noisy plot, bore most of the brunt of the abuse emanating from there. The most daring incident was when QQ's mother in law was beaten up and her blankets burnt one night. This incident was enough to cause the QQs to leave their plot.

When the QQs asked their neighbour to request the business lady to discipline beer drinkers, to reduce the noise level to acceptable levels, and to ensure that their plot was not used as a 'latrine', no remedial action was taken. Neither did the QQs report the matter to the Police or the District Council, which is responsible for allocating the plots, and administers byelaws, which legislate against noise and nuisance. It is certain that the QQs did not know that the Council could help. Even if they knew that action could be taken against the offending party, they mentioned during the interview that they feared reprisals from the business lady. The QQs left their plot in July 1999, and set up shacks in a squatter area. When I asked them how they lived in their new area, they reported as follows. Even though this was a squatter area where they could be displaced anytime, they felt more secure there in that they lived without noise and disturbance. All the abuse they had faced at their plot had ceased. They could leave their elderly members of the family all day. Nobody bothered them and nothing was stolen. The freedom that they enjoyed in this relocated area was the major incentive to continue staying there, even if they had illegally moved into the area. In this area, the QQ and family were no longer subjected to nuisance arising from drunkards.

Nobody disturbed them during the night. The family was able to share food amongst its members without beggars who used to bother them when they were living on their plot.

One other advantage they mentioned about their new place was the proximity of the nearby bush area that they could use as a toilet facility.

After the QQ family left their plot, another lady approached them and asked to stay in it. She was granted permission. She also sold beer and was allowed to move in on condition she conducted her business only up to 6 o'clock in the evening. This woman also undertook to help the QQs when necessary, to buy them fencing material and look after them. She was staying on the plot and had been requested to look after it whilst the QQs were away.

QQ and his wife have undertaken to return to the plot. This seems unlikely since the noise and nuisance, which caused them to leave their plot was still continuing since the business had not moved out. On the basis of my interviews, other members of QQ's family have vowed never to return. These include QQ's mother in law and his daughter. The former, who was once beaten up, had bitter memories about the plot and was convinced that the situation would never improve for the better. The latter had similar memories since she was also physically abused. She reported that some of this abuse, especially that of burning the old woman's blankets, was reported to the police. In response the police did not take any action against the woman who conducted the beer sales.

A subsequent visit to the QQ family in 2000 confirmed that they were not likely to return. I found QQ on 7 September 2000 still staying in the squatter area where I left him in November 1999. According to QQ's sister in law, QQ himself was still unwilling to return to his plot because he disliked the noise from the nearby shebeen and since his plot remained unfenced, it continued to be used as a thoroughfare. QQ mentioned that he would return to his plot when his hospitalised wife had been discharged. A visit to the plot revealed that a shelter had been put up (see Photograph 8.1 on the left). It was understood that it belonged to QQ's sister in law and her husband. A neighbour hired out his plot to a shebeen owner who sells alcohol in the black shelter on the right of QQ's plot (see Photograph 8.1). From this account, it was clear that QQs would not return to his plot in the immediate future. Three more shacks had been constructed in QQ's preferred home and it seemed that this place provided a

more acceptable and quieter environment. See Photograph 8.2, which is one of the 'rooms' in QQ's hideout. QQ is relaxing therein.

Photograph 8.1
QQ's Plot



By Morris Nyathi, 2000

Photograph 8.2
QQ's Preferred Home in a Squatter Area



By Morris Nyathi, 2000

8.4.3.2 Case History 2

PP is a 78 old registered destitute, living in a state allocated residential plot in Ghanzi Township, New Stands. He receives an old age pension from the state monthly. He is illiterate, not employed and widowed. He was born in old Xanagas, and is a member of the Naro Basarwa sub-group. He lives with a lodger Herero friend, and his daughter visits him occasionally.

PP's employment history covers different jobs whose employment terms were not satisfactory. All were poorly paid, and PP could not adequately maintain his family. Employers seem to have underpaid him because of his illiteracy and the general problems that Basarwa encounter, such as poor job security and terms of employment. Some employers gave him their old clothes, maize, food leftovers, but he was rarely given new issues of clothes.

PP benefits from state assistance in terms of getting destitute relief supplies (since the mid 80s), (valued at P90.28 per month currently), an old age pension since 1996 (P110 per month), a residential plot in Ghanzi Township in 1995, a national identity card (which qualifies a citizen to obtain various kinds of assistance from the state). PP has not received any assistance from NGOs. Apart from the residential plot provided by the state, PP does not have any assets. He depends entirely on social welfare assistance from the state as described above.

PP's knowledge of government offices and assistance obtained is restricted to the few where he gets the assistance mentioned above. He is familiar with the Social and Community Department Office (which provides his destitute entitlements), and the Post Office (where he gets his monthly pension). He knows the Tribal Administration Office (which incorporates the *Kgotla* (which includes the tribal assembly and customary court) but which has been unhelpful to him whenever he reported complaints about abuse of his plot. He knows the Police Office and the District Commissioner's office but has never been helped in these offices.

Regarding PP's settlement history, he has lived most of his life in the Ghanzi Commonage and for two periods on freehold farms around Ghanzi. Upon being asked why he stayed mostly in the Commonage, PP said this was the place where his forefathers originated. He started living in Ghanzi before the Government established its offices. At that time he lived anywhere he liked without fear of displacement to other areas. After the government established its presence in the now Ghanzi Township, land which used to be held by PP's tribe and others was turned into state land and it became difficult to live anywhere in the Ghanzi district. The Government's presence changed the land tenure system and this had the effect of turning traditionally held territory into state hands. The past land owners (Basarwa) found themselves being declared squatters. No efforts were made to allocate them a place where they could live without being pushed around to accommodate the expansion needs of Ghanzi settlement until 1995, when the Ghanzi District Council allocated 25 Basarwa (including PP) residential plots. PP is among many Basarwa who have stayed in squatter areas where there were no land rights, and where they were moved frequently to give way for physical development of Ghanzi Township. Residential, commercial and community plots have been allocated in the area from which they were displaced.

PP and his fellow Basarwa have been moved around around the Township and PP was moved five times before he was allocated a plot. According to PP, the District Council staff of the Social and Community Development Department advised him to apply for a residential plot in 1990. The staff knew him because, as a destitute, he frequently visited the Department where he obtained destitute relief supplies.

His application for a residential plot was submitted to the Self Help Housing Area (SHHA) department in 1990. He waited for five years until the plot was allocated in 1995. The plot, measuring 450 square metres, was allocated according to the same Certificate of Rights as quoted for QQ in Case History 1. Despite the conditions in the Certificate of Rights, no developments have been made on the plot because of PP's poverty. The Council waived the first condition. A woman who temporarily stayed in the plot for the last four years put up a used fence. The plot has five shacks constructed of plastic and cardboard material. This poor housing situation exposes the occupants to climatic and environmental hazards, such as dust, rain and heat. The plot does not have

a toilet and users have to use a bush area a kilometre away. The plot accommodates five people.

The events below describe the circumstances under which PP entered a situation of exclusion. In particular the right to his plot was infringed by a woman who stayed on his plot for a longer time than had been originally agreed. As soon as PP was allocated the plot in 1995, he moved into it. After that, an old woman approached him asking to stay with him. She wanted to conduct a business. The woman originates from Ncojane and owns a residential plot in another place in the Township (Kgaphamadi). She is a Mokgalagadi. Before the woman occupied the plot, PP understood that the woman would stay for two months. He also understood that the woman would be selling bread and cooked meat. When it turned out the woman was not doing this but brewing and selling *khadi* (traditional beer), PP ruled that the woman should not sell *khadi* on the plot but outside the premises, and that no sales should be done at night. It was agreed that the woman would feed PP and give him firewood when his children were absent. When it turned out that the woman was intending to build a shelter on the plot, PP's children complained and he then told the woman to build the shelter next to the plot. It was agreed that the woman would ask her customers to desist from making a noise and urinating on the property. PP's plot is shown photograph 8.3, with PP standing near his shack. On the right is the woman's shack where beer was sold. This shack was eventually built in PP's plot.


The woman did not honour all the above agreements because her two months stay lasted for four years. The woman did not sell bread and meat but beer. She fenced the plot without seeking the owner's permission. She built a shelter on the plot also without permission. She did not feed the PP, but occasionally gave him a cartoon or two of alcohol and later demanded payment. She did not ask her customers to keep the noise level at acceptable level. Neither did she stop them from urinating on the plot. The smell of urine posed a health hazard and because of the human traffic from beer consumers the plot turned into a shebeen. The woman's commercial interests were satisfied at the expense of PP and his family's peace and dignity. His children could not stay freely and were harassed by drunkards.

Asked what action he took to address the above infringements of his rights to his plot, PP said that he reported the matter to the customary court but no action ensued. PP did not seek other help to deal with the abuse of his plot. His children, however, protested about the woman's stay and even approached her themselves, demanding that she left. Nevertheless she continued her stay although the children were unhappy about the situation.

In spite of the above unsatisfactory situation, PP continued to live on his plot. The woman reported that she had a good relationship with PP and she gave him food when necessary. On being asked why PP had difficulty in defending his right to the plot, (that is, removing the woman who was not trustworthy and abusing his plot), and why he did not seek redress after the failure of the *Kgotla* to deal with his complaint, he said he and his children were ignorant of any alternative procedure to lodge his complaint. After my investigation, the woman left the plot at the beginning of August 1999, and was reported to have decided to continue her business elsewhere. She might have panicked thinking that my investigation would result in her illegal activity being exposed.

Photograph 8.3

PP's Plot



By Morris Nyathi, 1999

She knew that her business was illegal in that it contravened the conditions for the allocation of the plot. Her departure immediately lifted the exclusion that PP had suffered for the past four years. On my last visit to PP, he expressed happiness that he

was free to live on his plot without harassment and disturbance. During 1999 the University of Botswana students approached the Ghanzi District Council and offered to assist any poor person within the Township with house construction. The District Council nominated PP and within a year PP had a newly built house (see Photograph 8.4) on his plot, which replaced the shack in Photograph 8.3.

Photograph 8.4

PP's House



By Morris Nyathi, 2000

8.5 Discussion Of The Findings

The unemployment rate among Basarwa is high. Illiteracy and to some extent discriminatory practices, exclude this group from the formal sector employment. Basarwa are therefore mainly engaged in the informal sector where jobs are unskilled and low paying. I have shown above that Basarwa have difficulty in accumulating property. This means that their asset base is precarious. Without productive assets, it is not possible for Basarwa to escape poverty.

QQ and PP's exclusion from the right to use their plots is a consequence of a number of factors¹⁸. First, there is the problem of dealing with conflict. Traditionally, 'if there was a conflict within a Basarwa band, somebody would move away and he would have loyalties with other bands where he could move to' (Interview, Wessels, 8 September,

1999). In other words, Basarwa have survived in the past by going away from problems rather than tackling them head on. According to Childers et al (1982):

Basarwa traditionally have no superior authority from which they seek help to resolve conflicts with their neighbour. The person who has been wronged may confront the suspect directly with the problem or if a problem persists of a more serious nature, the resolution is often made by simply moving away and avoiding the conflict (Childers et al, 1982: 30).

One of my respondents, a Mosarwa youth, expressed concern that the old generation Basarwa are thwarting efforts by the younger generation to challenge the status quo, which keeps Basarwa disadvantaged. She complained that when the young generation challenges the status quo, 'our parents get apprehensive, thinking that it is risky and ungrateful to challenge blacks (and state institutions) who/which have developed, helped and educated us' (Interview, Xukuri, 21 July, 1999). This preference for Basarwa to avoid contact or confrontation with members of the dominant society results in Basarwa marginalizing themselves. QQ is an example of self-marginalisation. He has abandoned his plot in a serviced area and reverted to squatting. In this connection, Goulet (1989) has observed that 'when people are oppressed or reduced to a culture of silence, they do not participate in their own humanisation' (Goulet, 1989:165). Mompati and Prisen (2000) suggest that for minority ethnic groups living on the brink of survival, avoiding risk and maintenance of the status quo are their priorities. One study has found out that:

People living in situations of exclusion and extreme poverty feel that their dignity is not recognised or respected. For this reason they feel that they will not be heard and still less listened to. They may even feel that they are useless and have no place in society. (Human Dignity and Social Exclusion Project, Thematic Group Number 1, www.social.coe.int/en/cohesion/strategy/discuss/HDSE/themgro1.htm)

Both PP and QQ were promised some payment for use of their properties but no payment was effected, and they did nothing to follow up the defaulters. This seeming powerlessness has been taken advantage of by unscrupulous people intent on exploiting Basarwa properties for selfish gain. It is in this context that QQ and PP did not stand up and fight for rights to their plots. QQ quietly moved away to the fringes where he felt safer. The plot allocating authority, the District Council, did not monitor plot development, otherwise the illegal developments on the plots would have been detected. Neither did the authority enforce the noise and nuisance byelaw. Under such

circumstances it is easy to undertake illegal activities on the plots. Basarwa are not aware of their rights to the plots. Lack of knowledge about rights leaves Basarwa in an extremely vulnerable situation. It will be noted that PP reported the infringement of his plot to the customary court but no action was taken. This brings me to another point. As I have shown in 8.2.2, Basarwa are reluctant to report similar cases to the Police because the latter seem to be prejudiced against Basarwa clients. In sum the exclusion exemplified by the above cases is caused by various factors, most of which are beyond the plot holders' control.

8.6 Spatial Exclusion

8.6.1 Settlement In Township fringes

Basarwa are excluded in a spatial sense. In the Township, as in villages, they tend to live on the fringes as destitutes. Gulbrandsen, O., Karlsen, M, and Lexow, J. (1986) have found that:

In the villages, they seem to live in a miserable state of affairs. Alcoholism, malnourishment of children and unemployment characterise their living conditions. In addition they face social problems such as stigmatisation (Gulbrandsen et al, 1986:138).

My findings were that Basarwa living in the fringes were exploited and neglected by the regular inhabitants. They are engaged on temporary piece jobs in the informal labour market by Township residents, for which they are poorly remunerated. They live a semi-nomadic life¹⁹, using the Township facilities irregularly. Lack of housing is a serious problem on the fringes, and most live in overcrowded and unhygienic shack dwellings. These places are susceptible to hazards such as lack of safe drinking water, poor sanitation, poor waste disposal and associated diseases. As Township dwellers, they are not eligible for assistance under Remote Area Development Programme. They do not benefit from services that their counterparts in remote areas are supposed to enjoy, such as free water supplies, livestock donations, supplementary feeding to school children, freedom from displacement as squatters, opportunities to hunt and gather. They have generally lost group identity and self-esteem.


In the Ghanzi Township people interviewed were either living in squatter areas (or fringe areas). This is reflected in the following statistics. As shown in Table 6.1 in Chapter 6, 65.2% of Basarwa, compared to 13.0% of Bakgalagadi and 21.7% of 'others' live in the squatter areas. The reasons for a substantial number of Basarwa living in these areas were given during the focus group discussions (see below). In terms of spatial exclusion these people are excluded from safer and better-serviced parts of the Township, not necessarily because of lack of serviced plots as district officers emphasise, but because of differential in power between the ethnic groups in the Township. 'Many people living in disadvantaged neighbourhoods are excluded from other networks that would allow them to exercise their power in influencing local conditions and daily life' (Madanipour et al, 1998:280). Examples include non-participation in village institutions such as ward development committees and parent/teacher associations.

Basarwa stay on the fringes not because they like them but because of the animosity and stigmatisation expressed by Bakgalagadi. Settlement on the fringes should also be understood against the following background. Being historically a hunter/gatherer nomadic group, Basarwa missed the opportunity to settle at one point for a long time. Being nomadic they did not establish settlements. On the other hand, the Bakgalagadi, being an agro-pastoral group, developed settlements. In light of this, Bakgalagadi migrated to Ghanzi Township and took possession of the best part of the Township. When the nomadic lifestyle of the Basarwa became untenable, they also began to take on a sedentary lifestyle but could not find spaces in the best part of the Township as the Bakgalagadi had taken them all up. Even if Basarwa had originally inhabited areas in which the Township was later established, they did not mark their areas and could therefore not provide evidence to the Bakgalagadi that they had settled in areas that the Bakgalagadi later claimed as their own. The animosity that exists between them and the dominant Bakgalagadi causes mutual hostility. Childers (1976) sums up the feelings of Basarwa about life in the Ghanzi Township as follows:

The only thing that I can say is that water is worrying us. If I find a Mokgalagadi at the water tap, he will trouble me. If I say that this place is as much for Bushmen as Bakgalagadi, they will fight with me. ... The Commonage Basarwa all reside on the outskirts of the village area. These spatial relationships are due to their efforts to avoid conflict with other people yet to still be within access to a water standpipe (Childers, 1976:76-7)

Basarwa focus groups in the Township attributed staying on the fringes to animosity that existed between them and their dominant Bakgalagadi counterparts in the central areas of the Township. Basarwa were shunned and only felt free if they socially distanced themselves from Bakgalagadi. Figure 8.1 is a graphic representation of spatial exclusion of Basarwa. In most villages in Botswana where there are Basarwa residents, they tend to stay outside villages. This is a continuation of a historical practice where Basarwa did not stay in the village centre but occupied the outskirts (Kuper, 1970; Datta and Murray, 1989). I observed this settlement pattern in most villages in western Botswana, including the Ghanzi Township. If we take Figure 8.1 to represent this pattern, the blue rectangle represents the village or Township where most of the regular inhabitants are found. Outside the village is the red area, which is the outskirts of the village. It is here where most Basarwa are predominately found. This is an area that is unserved and far from services available within the village. According to my estimate some of the fringe area dwellers are located 5 to 10 kilometres from the Township boundary. The figure pictures the social distance that Basarwa find themselves in relation to other groups. As the village expands, the expansion encroaches into the outskirts, consequently pushing Basarwa to new outskirts. The reasons for the settlement pattern in question are mentioned below.

FIGURE 8.1 Spatial Exclusion



A focus group discussion of Basarwa was held to determine reasons why Basarwa live in the fringes. The typical responses were as follows:

We stay in the outskirts of the Township, not that we like staying in marginal areas. In the middle we are chased and accused of being dirty. Although we risk displacement for squatting, we have grown to like these areas because we are freer from harassment by troublesome neighbours and noise.

Focus Group of Old Men

Most of us stay in the fringe areas far from the mainstream community especially black people because these people ill-treat, subjugate and cheat us. After Government has given us clothes or food, blacks forcibly buy these goods at low prices.

Focus Group of Old Women

We stay in fringe areas because black people (for example Bakgalagadi) have progressively displaced us from areas that are currently inner areas. Some of us have been allocated plots and Bakgalagadi have asked to do business in these plots. Such people construct shacks in our plots without permission. In some cases it has not been possible for us to receive our visitors in our plots because of such structures. Extreme cases involve being chased away from our plots.

Focus Group of Young Women

8.6.2 Settlement In A Remote Area (West Hanahai)

In Chapter 7, I indicated the problems of RAD settlements (including West Hanahai), particularly the lack of employment opportunities and lack of secure livelihoods, which have turned most residents into dependency on state handouts. Squatters are not an issue for West Hanahai, but the settlements are situated in ecologically fragile locations. After encroachment into them, outsiders have mostly turned them into grazing areas. There are no markets for any locally produced goods. Basarwa who stay here are those with no affiliation to villages in other parts of the Ghanzi district. As such they are unwilling to take up residence in these villages, which have better facilities and services. Some remain in settlements, despite their problems, or migrate to the Ghanzi Township, where they live on the fringes of the Township.

According to my findings, the majority of residents in West Hanahai (about 85%), are Basarwa. Bakgalagadi represent 5% of the population and most of Bakgalagadi

households interviewed in the settlement include owners of livestock herds, shebeens and small shops. These are people who have other residences in villages elsewhere in the district, and appear to have come to the settlements to take advantage of available grazing and free water supplies for their livestock²⁰. A similar case exists in Kweneng District in a remote area settlement of Diphuduhudu. Here a non-Mosarwa farmer from outside this settlement waters his cattle from a borehole that is meant to water the livestock of the local RADs only. The settlement residents are powerless to restrain him. He defies their orders to keep his livestock out of their borehole, using derogatory language to the effect that he cannot be ordered out of the water point by 'Bushmen' (Mazonde, 2002:61). The encroachment from outsiders means that local residents are excluded from uninterrupted utilisation of available services. In this regard, a focus group in West Hanahai said:

Bakgalagadi herders deny us first place in watering our stock even if we are the first to arrive at the local water point.

Focus Group of Young Men

8.7 Discussion Of The Findings.

The Basarwa often live in the most marginal areas, either in remote settlements or squatter areas of the Township. As was shown in Chapter 6, poverty was most severe in the settlements and squatter areas. In the Township, squatting by Basarwa has been caused mainly by their rejection from other areas, rather than the official explanation that there is a shortage of residential plots. Where Basarwa have been allocated residential plots, they face two difficulties. One is the lack of resources to develop them. The other is the risk of dispossession by non-Basarwa through either illegal sales²¹ or disturbance of the nature described in one of the case histories above. One important point to note under this section is that the sources of poverty in remote areas and squatter areas lie outside the poor areas.

In both cases it has never been a deliberate decision of Basarwa to stay in remote, poorly resourced areas, and for their counterparts in the Township to take up residences in squatter areas. Regarding the latter case, quotations above indicate that there are forces that push Basarwa into the margins of the Township. One of the 'push' factors is

Basarwa's lack of power and influence and their position in the Botswana society, which is characterised by powerlessness. They complained during one consultation exercise that 'they were the beasts of burden for all other ethnic and racial groups they happen to live with' (Selolwane et al, 1997:20). They live in a country whose political system is not willing to accept that they have unique and special problems that require different approaches from those directed towards the mainstream society. Policies on the livestock industry and tourism have resulted in the dispossession of Basarwa from their traditional lands and inadequate compensation in terms of land has occurred. They have been pushed into government created settlements, which cannot accommodate their land needs. The lack of poverty alleviation strategies for people in urban areas generally, and Basarwa in the Township in particular, means that Basarwa either continue on the fringes or if they get plots, they cannot develop them because they lack financial resources.

8.8 Proximity of FADs To Dominant Groups

On the basis of the findings relating to the socio-cultural dimension of social exclusion, I now deal with the research question: Does the proximity of fringe dwellers to dominant groups in Ghanzi society increase opportunities for integration or not? I have defined FADs in Chapter 5 and dominant groups in Chapter 3. To recapitulate, the dominant groups in my study are the Bakgalagadi who mostly live in the established parts of the Township. The FADs are people who live outside the Township in a social sense, but not physically. These people squat at the margins of the Township. Before proceeding with tackling the above research question, it is important to clarify terms like 'proximity' and 'integration'. Proximity means geographical closeness. In other words, it is postulated that Basarwa FADs are geographically close to the dominant Bakgalagadi. Integration has been described as a process by which diverse elements (or population groups) are combined into a unity, while retaining their basic identity (Saugestad, 1998). As indicated in Chapter 2, integration is different from another process termed assimilation, which is 'based on the idea of the superiority of the dominant culture (aiming) to produce a homogeneous society by getting minority groups to discard their culture in favour of the dominant one' (Saugestad, 1998b: 220).

Given that Basarwa FADs are close to the Bakgalagadi dominant group, does this increase opportunities for integration or not? According to field experience, this proximity does not increase opportunities for integration. Proximity is not a sufficient condition for integration. There should be tolerance for each other's difference, respect and acceptance between the two groups, and willingness to learn from each other. As I have shown under the social dimension, the relationship between Basarwa and the dominant group in Ghanzi district has shown that possibilities for integration between the two groups are remote. Even if Basarwa FADs are geographically close to the dominant Bakgalalagdi, there is a social and moral distance between the two, and therefore no opportunities for integration with the dominant Bakgalalagdi for the following reasons²²:

- Bakgalagadi treat Basarwa as minors and they despise their culture.
- The enmity that exists between the two dates from pre-colonial times and continues to this day.
- The Bakgalagadi and other Batswana at large have negative public attitudes towards Basarwa and their culture, which has been associated with backwardness.
- The Government does not recognise Basarwa culture and is not willing to support any initiatives to improve the living standards of the Basarwa.

8.9 Conclusion

This chapter has attempted to show the extent of exclusion faced by Basarwa at settlement and Township levels. This exclusion has social, economic and spatial dimensions. It has negative impacts on the standard of living of the Basarwa. One point made is that Basarwa are the most excluded of the population groups in the research areas.

The lowest position of Basarwa in the Botswana's social hierarchy makes it easier for this population group, whether they are RADs or FADs, to be excluded from several spheres of society. They are the most despised and looked down upon group at national and local levels. Their powerlessness has caused them to be relegated to marginal areas of the District, either in remote disadvantaged areas or fringe locations of the Township,

where access to resources is poor. The proximity of Basarwa fringe area dwellers to the dominant groups does not increase opportunities for integration between the two groups, because of disharmony between these two groups.

¹ As indicated in Chapter 5, Bangologa are the dominant Bakgalagadi sub-group in Ghanzi District.

² From Interviewees Numbers 15, 19, 22, 24, 27, 30, and 53 as shown in Appendix 2.

³ This response is based on interviews with interviewees in Appendix 2, Numbers 2,15, 22,27 who are Bakgalagadi; 9 and 53 who are civil servants neither of which is a Mokgalagadi; and a focus groups of Bakgalagadi.

⁴ Citing Childers (1976), Good (1999a: 191) notes that Basarwa labourers in Ghanzi's freehold farms received average wages of P6.13 (roughly US\$3) per month in 1976. Farm workers commonly went two or three months before receiving food rations. A decade later ranchers in Ghanzi were paying rarely more than P15 – 20 per month. Since farm labour is excluded from minimum wage legislation, employers are free to exploit workers.

⁵ Article 14 (1) of the Constitution of Botswana reads: 'No person shall be deprived of his freedom of movement, and for the purpose of this section the said freedom means the right to move freely throughout Botswana, the right to reside in any part of Botswana' (ROB, 1965a: 16). As was shown in Chapter 7 not all people have the right to move. Basarwa who have taken residence in remote settlements find it difficult to relocate in villages in Ghanzi since regular residents shun them.

⁶ See Appendix 6 for the role of these institutions.

⁷ Hostels have been built in centrally based primary schools to provide accommodation for children of RADs taken from remote locations.

⁸ Ill-treatment at schools and in hostels (where Basarwa children are accommodated during school terms) is not restricted to teachers but also to different social groups among the Basarwa children themselves. Different Basarwa children group clashes have been reported, including sexual harassment of female Basarwa pupils (Mazonde, 2002).

⁹ In a study by Le Roux (1999), this teacher-oriented factor has been challenged by Basarwa parents. Contrary to conventional wisdom, Basarwa actually appreciate the value of education. 'They believed that once their children could understand the systems which the parents felt excluded from because of their illiteracy, they would be able to turn the tables for the Basarwa ...they wanted their children to learn English also ... to communicate to people like [English-speaking researchers and] write letters to people who come to help [Basarwa]' (Le Roux, 1999:53-54).

¹⁰ Respondent herself is a Mokgatla, one of the Tswana tribes (see Chapter 7).

¹¹ Information for the subsequent text draws heavily from the Draft Report on RADP (BIDPA, 2003).

¹² Such as primary education, primary health care, water supply, and residential plots.

¹³ Permanent destitute persons are entitled to packages amounting to P211.90 in rural areas and P211.40 in urban areas per month. Included in this amount is P55.00 cash for personal items. Temporary destitute persons are entitled to packages totalling P181.90 in rural areas and P181.40 in urban areas. Included in this amount is P55 cash for personal items (ROB, 2002a: 8). It should be noted that Ghanzi Township, being the headquarters of a District Council, is treated as a rural area for the purposes of this Policy. Permanent destitute persons are individuals whose age or physical or mental condition renders them completely dependent on outside resources, are not suitable for rehabilitation and cannot exit from

destitution. Temporary destitute persons are individuals who are temporarily incapacitated, until they support themselves. Persons in this category are expected to exit destitution within six months. (ROB, 2002a: 5)

¹⁴ Just like they are perceived in the Remote Area Development sector.

¹⁵ Of the 215 destitute persons in the Township, 158 were permanent destitutes in May 1999. It was estimated that a majority of these destitutes were Basarwa ranging from 55 to 60% of the total (Interview, Chief Community Development Officer, 15 May 1999).

¹⁶ Pseudonyms have been used for case histories to protect the anonymity of those who agreed to be interviewed. See QQ and PP below.

¹⁷ Along the lines expressed in Box 8.1 or in a manner that suggests that she belongs to a group considered backward.

¹⁸ I recognise the conclusion by Madanipour, A., Cars, G. and Allen, J. (1998:286) that 'social exclusion is not a phenomenon caused by a single specific event or problem. Rather it is the consequence of a number of different processes'.

¹⁹ It was difficult to follow up interviews with some Basarwa households because of their nomadic nature. If you visit one today, in two weeks time the dwelling is empty because of temporary migration either to relatives in a farm or settlement.

²⁰ One livestock owner arrived in West Hanahai in 1998. He bought a residential plot from one resident. After the sale, the livestock owner transferred his livestock (cattle and goats) into West Hanahai from a place outside the settlement where he was employed in the Veterinary Department. The livestock numbered 200 cattle and 40 goats and were of concern to the settlement since they damaged public property (standpipes, institutional buildings). The livestock owner (a Mokgalagadi) forcibly utilised one of the settlement's standpipes to water his cattle, denying local residents the chance to fetch water each time he watered his livestock. He is not normally resident in W/Hanahai. It is clear that he 'bought' the plot in order to justify 'settlement' of his livestock (Interview, West Hanahai Headman, 26 June 1999).

²¹ In focus groups with Basarwa in West Hanahai, when asked about their views about other Basarwa staying in the Township, they mentioned one problem the latter face as sale of their plots for low prices. They said non-Basarwa approached them and coaxed them into sale of plots, which is not allowed by the allocating authority.

²² The same reasons apply to Basarwa RADs, even if RADs are geographically, socially and morally distant from the dominant groups. Both groups face cultural and economic domination from the dominant groups regardless of where they are located relative to the dominant groups (Hitchcock and Holm, 1993).

Chapter 9

Conclusions

9.1 Introduction

This Chapter, starts by summarizing the major findings of this study. It proceeds to make a linkage between social exclusion and poverty by suggesting ways in which the former can be viewed as responsible for the persistence of poverty within the Basarwa target group. The policy implications of social exclusion processes are briefly alluded to and some constraints to reducing social exclusion highlighted. Policy recommendations are made to reduce social exclusion within the existing policy framework under the Botswana planning system. A point is stressed that reduction of social exclusion depends mainly on the capacity of the Government to implement those strategies, which have a potential to tackle social exclusion. Finally a call is made for an open discussion on the plight of indigenous people.

9.2 The Multidimensional Nature Of Social Exclusion

This is a study to apply the concept of social exclusion to a developing country. The concept has been largely applied in the contexts of developed countries but it has been possible to demonstrate that the concept is relevant in the context of a Third World country. In Western Europe social exclusion has been increasingly used to analyse social disadvantage (Jackson, 1999). In this study, I postulated that social exclusion is a barrier to efforts to reduce poverty. It is a barrier in that social exclusion makes it difficult for individuals or groups to escape poverty. Narayan, D., Patel, R. Schafft, K. Rademacher, A. and Koch-Schulte, S. (2000a) put it this way:

Poor people remain poor because they are excluded from access to resources, opportunities, information the less poor have. For poor people in developing countries, this translates to inter-generational poverty. In addition poverty is socially stigmatised, making it harder for poor people to gain access to networks and resources they need for survival. This vicious circle is difficult to break (Narayan et al, 2000a: 198-199).

My hypothesis was that social exclusion has several dimensions for Basarwa that result in the persistence of poverty. The study established that Basarwa are

multidimensionally excluded, and answered the research questions about the nature of Basarwa's exclusion and what dimensions are involved in this exclusion. This exclusion has political, socio-cultural, economic, legal and spatial dimensions. Figure 9.1 below summarises the process of exclusion of Basarwa. The study findings indicate that social exclusion of Basarwa has the following characteristics:


- The target group (Basarwa) feels it at both national and local levels.
- It has a historical basis that involves the relegation of Basarwa to the lowest position in the country's political, social and economic hierarchy.
- The mechanisms that drive social exclusion such as those identified in Chapter 3 operate in the process of social exclusion within the study areas. These are social attitudes expressed through stereotyping and prejudice, discrimination, nondecision on the part of the state, barriers to participation in political, social, legal and economic spheres of mainstream society.
- The exclusion marker that I used to delineate the exclusion of Basarwa is ethnicity. They are excluded mainly on the basis of who they are in the eyes of the mainstream society. Their difference from the rest of society in terms of culture is one basis for their exclusion.
- Whilst Basarwa are generally affected by exclusion, within this group, it appears that the old generation is the most affected. This is the generation that accounts for most of the illiteracy, and as such most unskilled and subject to exploitation by other ethnic groups. It has more problems with fighting for rights and tends to be apprehensive of fighting back at a system, which has disadvantaged them from the past. The younger generation consists of those who have dropped out from the school system and lack skills to utilize opportunities that exist in the formal labour market, and are thus trapped in the informal labour market where remuneration is extremely poor. The other part is those who have acquired education, and good jobs in the public and private sectors, enabling them to join and partially assimilate to national life. The young lady on whom one of the case histories is based mirrors this group of Basarwa.

As an excluded group, Basarwa are characterized by the following:

- Voicelessness and powerlessness;

- Invisibility in relation to national institutions. Where they are visible their involvement is nominal or they tend to be treated as ‘problems’;
- Exclusion from decisions that are crucial to their lives;
- Most vulnerable to human rights abuse.

FIGURE 9.1 Social Exclusion Of Basarwa



I think the study has addressed questions about to what extent exclusion occurs, who are excluded, from what, by whom, why and how. Figure 9.1 summarises the answers to these questions. The Basarwa are the excluded group. They are excluded from full participation in the political, social and economic spheres of society. The exclusion is

undertaken by the dominant Tswana at the national level, and by the Bakgalagadi who are dominant at the local level. Due in part to exclusion, Basarwa tend to have relatively low incomes, limited access to employment, uncertain access to land, low levels of literacy and education, low to moderate nutritional health standards and limited assistance to development assistance. The details of this exclusion follows.

Politically, exclusion of Basarwa can be viewed in three ways. Firstly, Basarwa are not satisfactorily included in decision-making institutions at the national and local levels. At the national level, data show that Basarwa are not represented in the legislative body, the Parliament. Neither are they represented in the executive institution, the Cabinet. At the local level their inclusion is nominal. As councillors in the Ghanzi District Council, they have attempted to bring up issues relating to Basarwa constituents but have encountered resistance from the non-Basarwa dominated political body. In the Township, their representation in the development committees is unsatisfactory. Poor or lack of representation prevents Basarwa from influencing policy decisions. Secondly, it appears that programmes to uplift the standard of living of Basarwa are not politically sustainable. As shown in Chapter 7, there seems to be lack of political will to address related problems. Examples include the abandonment of the BDP and the unwillingness on the part of the Government of Botswana to intervene positively in respect to RADP.

Appendix 7 is another policy initiative, which was intended to improve the perceived weaknesses of the RADP. It clearly points out that RADs (which largely include Basarwa) operate under difficult circumstances and suggests special measures to address their problems, including affirmative action measures summarised in section 7.4 of Chapter 7. As I showed in Chapter 7, the Government did not approve the policy proposals in this document, thus frustrating efforts to development RADs in general and Basarwa in particular. This action by Government has also contributed to exclusion of Basarwa. Not only is the Government opposed to Basarwa advancement, but the elite also. This includes some farmers, politicians and civil servants, who have been reported to question development programmes for Basarwa on the excuse that they are a 'waste of time'. This elite group are large cattle owners who benefit from labour supplied mostly by unskilled Basarwa. During the currency of the National Development Plan 7 (1991-1997) and National Development Plan 8 (1997/98 – 2002/3), among other things, Government undertook to tackle the problem of land rights for RADs and change

negative public attitudes towards RADs. What is frustrating is the wide gap between words and results. Since 1991, no action has been taken yet.

Secondly, the dominance of the State and the weakness of both the opposition parties and the civil society¹, which I mentioned in Chapter 5, make it difficult for these weak bodies to effectively bring Basarwa issues into the political agenda, and ensure that effective strategies are undertaken to reduce the exclusion of Basarwa.

Thirdly, even if the definition of RADs provides a detailed description that fits Basarwa more than any other group, Government does not take account of this in programme design. Programmes are standardised or homogeneous and therefore do not reflect differences in the RAD groups. In other words, programmes misidentify the real problems since individual RAD group's circumstances are not investigated and properly documented. It has been observed that Basarwa generally fail to obtain equal benefits from RADP projects when they stay with non-Basarwa RADs in the same locality. Non Basarwa RADs tend to dominate their Basarwa counterparts and exclude them from development activities. Related to the above point is the notion of dominant group bias that I alluded to in Chapter 7, where I argue that the bias has manifested itself in lack of action to address the needs and interests of RADs in general and Basarwa in particular. This bias is buttressed by the constitutional provisions, which exalt particular tribal groups to the disadvantage of others. The above situation can be viewed as a state system that is characterised by failure to accommodate significant minorities' interests in terms of culture and language. It is also a failure to meet the legitimate demands and involve minorities in meaningful and satisfactory ways in the political system that has evolved in the country.

Legally there is a lack of equality before the law, where Basarwa are among the minority groups who have not been given official recognition in the Independence Constitution. As I showed in Chapter 7, this means that they are not represented in one of the country's institution, the House of Chiefs and unlike other 'major' tribes; they do not have their own tribal territory. The law requires that Setswana, the national language be used in the educational programmes, the media, public meeting and court proceedings. The use of this language has excluded some Basarwa from participating in adult literacy programmes, *Kgotla* meetings, and not getting proper judicial redress in

courts, because they do not understand the language. Basarwa children have to learn Setswana in the first four years of primary schools, but face difficulties in coping with the language.

The land legislation is biased towards the agro-pastoral needs of the dominant Tswana and other non-Tswana minority groups but do not serve the interests of hunter/gatherer tradition of the Basarwa. Basarwa's needs for land for hunting and gathering are not accommodated in the law because the Tswana (who are the framers of the legislation), have an attitude that hunting and gathering is an economically meaningless activity, and backward (Wily, 1994). Due to the above legal barriers Basarwa have problems with land rights. They have encountered problems in being allocated land because land authorities have controversially questioned their need for land. Basarwa have complained that some authorities do not readily respond to their requests for land. Owing to these problems Basarwa do not enjoy the same rights as compared to non-Basarwa. A culturally ingrained prejudice has been suggested as the reason why there is a tendency to favour non-Basarwa applicants for land over Basarwa (Smith et al, 2000).

Economically Basarwa have been excluded from employment in the formal sector, mainly because of their illiteracy. Those with qualifications have failed to get jobs, complaining of discriminatory practices. These practices have made it difficult for Basarwa children to attend school, leading to high dropout rates. Attempts by Basarwa to accumulate assets which may be used to improve their standard of living, have been frustrated by non-Basarwa. Life histories included in Chapter 8 show that Bakgalagadi have infringed on some Basarwa's rights to property. Basarwa cannot own their property freely since Bakgalagadi take advantage of their powerlessness to exploit them and deny them full rights to state-allocated residential plots.

Socially, prejudice and stereotyping have played a role in instilling feelings of rejection in Basarwa from community life. Basarwa's socio-economic status heightens their exclusion. They are the most despised and exploited of all ethnic groups in Botswana. They are least accepted, respected and recognised of all ethnic minorities, and are stereotyped together with their culture as backward, uncivilised dirty, primitive, ignorant and so on. As indicated in Chapter 8, social perceptions towards Basarwa are loaded with negative description. This devalued identity would appear to be the reason

why there is a lack of political will to improve their standard of living, and why affirmative action towards their development has encountered opposition from certain groups who seem to benefit from the status quo. I think this negative perception has a negative effect on Basarwa's participation in other fields especially in politics and social activities. In other words since they are less respected, they have poor chances of joining institutions where dominant group members are a majority. This partly explains why there are so few Basarwa councillors in the Ghanzi District Council, and almost no Basarwa members in the Ghanzi Township Development Committees.

Culturally, due to their features of indigenous group people, Basarwa's culture and its hunter/gatherer lifestyle, have been looked down upon, and has been the main basis for their discrimination. I showed in Chapter 7 that this lifestyle has been source of Basarwa's problem with land rights. Rather than incorporating Basarwa or other minority cultural traits in it, the mainstream culture has tended to embrace foreign (western) cultural elements. Globalisation has tended to enhance this process. The neglect of Basarwa culture has had a negative impact on Basarwa's self-esteem and self-confidence in their relations with other groups. As with other minority languages in Botswana, the language of Basarwa has been marginalised. This has contributed to difficulties in Basarwa participating fully in one Government programme, the literacy project. The language problem has also denied Basarwa their fundamental constitutional rights in legal representation in courts.

Spatially the majority of Basarwa live in fringe areas of the Ghanzi Township and in the remote settlement of West Hanahai. Evidence suggests that Basarwa in the Ghanzi Township live in squatters due to certain 'push' factors. In particular they are rejected or harassed by their neighbours in non-squatter areas. In both places, provision of services ranges from none to inadequate. As I showed in Chapter 7, remote settlements (of which West Hanahai is one), can offer only precarious livelihoods. Settlements are located in sandy areas where arable agriculture cannot be practiced. They suffer from a lack of employment opportunities. Fringe areas in the Township are unserved.

9.3 Social Exclusion And Persistence Of Poverty

In Chapter 6, on the basis of poverty research undertaken in Botswana, I indicated the extent of poverty among RADs. Since Basarwa are about 75% of the RAD population, I used the poverty level of RADs as an approximation for that of Basarwa. To what extent is the poverty described in Chapter 6 related to the exclusions mentioned in Chapters 7 and 8?

On the basis of the exclusions described in Chapters 7 and 8, it is possible to conclude that efforts to reduce poverty amongst Basarwa are frustrated by the exclusion that they encounter from the various dimensions captured in figure 9.1. As I indicated in the above section, Basarwa suffer multiple exclusion, that is, exclusion from five dimensions. I wish to reiterate the statements I made in Chapter 3. The effects of this exclusion are that Basarwa fail to fully participate in the economic, social and political spheres of society, and are likely to remain poor, and least likely to experience mobility. Due to multiple exclusion they generally lack or have limited access to productive assets, skills, technology, credit, information, extension, human and financial capital, and have difficulty with securing social, human and political rights either due to illiteracy or failure to enforce provisions related to those rights. In other words, Basarwa are unable to meet material and non-material basic needs, because of poverty traps created by the political, social, cultural and economic barriers to mobility, which I have identified in Chapters 7 and 8, and summarised below. Under such circumstances social exclusion makes it difficult to reduce poverty.

I indicated in Chapter 7 that Basarwa lack adequate representation in political institutions. They therefore do not have the opportunity to contribute actively in determining how the benefits of development are generated and distributed. Without adequate representation in political institutions, Basarwa lack voice and cannot influence and shape the decisions that affect their lives. Without representation Basarwa cannot experience the possibility of exercising the democratic right of holding rulers to account, to demand answers to questions about decisions and actions, to sanction public officers or bodies that do not live up to their responsibilities. I think it is due to lack of

representation that economic growth in Botswana has been 'rootless' in that it has not been inclusive of all ethnic groups, especially Basarwa. Chapter 6 has indicated that Basarwa have the highest unemployment and illiteracy rates of all groups in the country. This has contributed to their powerlessness, and their being at the mercy of the dominant, powerful neighbours, the Bakgalagadi, who have a vested interest in keeping Basarwa in a disadvantaged position. The powerlessness of the Basarwa has generally contributed to efforts intended to improve their situation being ignored, or encountering opposition from political groups. Without adequate political representation, it has not been possible to convince the national authorities that Basarwa's problems are unique and need to be addressed in ways different from other population groups. The Government's attitude is that Basarwa are just like any other poverty group. This attitude means that strategies to deal with their poverty situation do not recognize the uniqueness of their culture.

In Chapter 7, I mentioned that Basarwa have problems with land rights. Those in settlements do not have control over who comes into their areas. Settlements are subject to encroachment by outsiders who exploit their natural resources to the disadvantage of local residents. As indicated in the same chapter, efforts to get immigrants and their livestock to leave have generally been unsuccessful, partly because the people to whom local residents must appeal (those in top district institutions – the District Council and Land Board) are some of those who have moved into the settlements to take advantage of the grazing, water and labour available. It should be noted that the lack of land rights and the problems of encroachment affect the RADs communities only. This is discriminatory and denies the freedom to these population groups, to use land resources to their advantage. Some Basarwa have been donated livestock by Government but it has not been possible to increase herds because of the problem of encroachment. RADs have thus been denied the opportunities to exploit land and other assets to reduce poverty.

In Chapter 8, I noted the discriminatory practices and negative attitudes that operate in the education, remote area development, and social services sectors. These practices drive social exclusion as indicated by the dropout rates of Basarwa children. Without education, children of the poor have no chances of escaping poverty. Without education it is not possible for Basarwa to increase the productivity of their labour, and thereby

their incomes from wages. Consequently they tend to remain in unskilled jobs where wages are too low to meet their basic needs. The lack of skills within Basarwa is related to the problems they face in education. Without education many children enter the adolescence unequipped with the basic skills necessary to fully join society.

In the same chapter I mentioned negative public attitudes and perceptions towards Basarwa, as they tend to perpetuate poverty among this population group. This negative behaviour means that Basarwa are not readily accepted in political institutions, cannot attend public meetings where issues relevant to their lives are discussed, and tend to settle in disadvantaged locations in the Township. These attitudes and perceptions encourage discriminatory practices, which make it difficult for Basarwa to receive equal and fair treatment in public life, and have access to services.

9.4 Policy Implications

Having deliberated on social exclusion and processes against which it operates, it is now necessary to suggest ways in which it can be reduced. But before I do that I summarise the context under which policy recommendations will be made. First, in Botswana like in most developing countries, the concept of social exclusion is new and there is little or no appreciation of it as a way to analyse poverty.

Second, one method of reducing social exclusion is to initiate affirmative action programmes (Rodgers, 1995). In Botswana, however, I have shown that such programmes have not been supported. Instead the Government has adopted standard approaches rather than targeting a specific ethnic group. Nonetheless on the basis of a review of the RADP undertaken by BIDPA early this year, many respondents called for affirmative action programmes for RADs in general and Basarwa in particular.

Third, associating Basarwa with the indigenous rights discourse is not acceptable to the Government of Botswana. As Saugestad (2000: 5) notes the 'concept of indigenous rights challenges vested interests and well established power structures, in the North as well as the South, and is inevitably regarded as a threat to existing social orders'. Currently, there does not seem to be any point to call for the ratification of ILO 169 Convention by the Government. While there is scope that the indigenous right discourse

will continue to press for rights of Basarwa, the process is long term. It is better to adopt short term strategies. One of these is appreciating that Basarwa's needs should be addressed as a priority, not because they are 'indigenous' but because they are the most conspicuously marginalized of Botswana's citizens. It is in this context that affirmative action programmes are justified.

9.5. Policy Recommendations

Given the multidimensionality of social exclusion, measures to address are necessarily multi-pronged. Working within the existing policy frameworks, I examine a number of strategies below.

First, there is need to create awareness within the country of the social exclusion approach and its potential to analyse poverty. Second, it is necessary to revisit the policy objectives that were set out in the past national development plans to deal with problems of Basarwa. To rehash, these objectives were based on the problems that 'RADs continued to face poverty, insecurity, inadequate education and training, weak institutions and leadership, and negative public attitudes' (ROB, 1991:43). Government undertook to deal with the above problems by emphasizing a 'shift towards issues of land rights, education opportunities, institution building ... and change in negative public attitudes' (ROB, 1991a: 43). As indicated in section 9.2, these strategies have not been implemented. I argue that the lack of implementation has contributed to exclusion of Basarwa. What can be done?

9.5.1 Follow-up Of National Development Plan (NDP) Strategies on RADP

NDP 7 and 8 have identified one of the problems that RADs face as negative public attitudes. Evidence of this has been highlighted in Chapter 8. These plans have promised to deal with attitudes, but it seems that little progress has been made. The current NDP is still identifying the same problem. The problem should be tackled with the context of the pillars of Vision 2016. A recommendation on attitudes in question was made to the effect that 'an education/information activity on the situation of RADs

directed to various groups in society be undertaken' (Kann et al, 1990: 103). It should be implemented during NDP 9.

Changing attitudes is bound to be a long-term activity and difficult exercise but it is not insurmountable. It is difficult because of the extent to which people in the mainstream are excluding Basarwa, due to prejudices that built up over time. Basarwa are seen as lower class people because they are on the poor end, and even if they become wealthy, they are still low class people. They would virtually have to change everything about themselves before they would be accepted as equals and completely integrated. I think it is important to use the media and other things to educate the main body of the populace about the values of the culture of the people that have been excluded. Such education activity should involve creating awareness that integration demands tolerance, recognition and acceptance of difference. Difference need not be considered as negative but should be respected. It should be realised that as long as people are excluded, their talent and potential contribution to society is lost. Excluded people like Basarwa should not be seen as a problem. The reality is that they are not one, but it is the barriers that Botswana society places upon them that is the problem. The lead in changing these attitudes should be taken by those high enough to do so. The education activity should not be one-sided. It should include the Basarwa themselves in intensified public awareness programmes to educate and conscientise them about their rights and responsibilities, to make them aware that they have as much rights as any other citizen. In addition to this the Government of Botswana should develop a policy to prevent social discrimination against Basarwa. It is important that such discrimination is publicly admitted and a national consensus obtained about how to deal with it.

9.5.2 Cultural Difference

Since cultural difference lies at the heart of the exclusion of Basarwa, it is important to include cultural difference in designing policy. This is line with the principle of human rights, which requires governments to acknowledge cultural and lifestyle diversities where they exist and to either enhance them or to assist those who are doing so (Maundeni, 2001). This involves recognition that Basarwa, as one of the minority

groups, have a right to maintain their languages and cultures, and that they have a right to express values and practices and pass cultural traditions to future generations.

In this connection, Botswana's National policy on Culture (ROB, 2001b) records the rationale for the policy as follows:

Botswana is an independent democratic state comprising of different ethnic groups which together represent a rich and diverse cultural heritage. This heritage gives Botswana a distinctive character from which it derives its unique personality. This valuable heritage must be preserved, nurtured and developed to foster a strong sense of national identity, pride and unity and to become a vitalising force in the development process (ROB, 2001b: 3).

As will be observed from the above quotation, the Government recognises cultural diversity. It is uncertain whether the country will reflect diversity in its cultural programmes. Noting that cultural identity is a critical ingredient for nation building and attainment of national sovereignty, the Government explains that this does not imply a homogenous culture, but rather, the acceptance and respect of other cultures as integral parts of the national stream (ROB, 2001b). The Policy promises two things in respect of development of languages. These are:

To facilitate the development of all the indigenous languages and analyse their level of development, use and limitations;
To devise strategies aimed at developing and encouraging the use of various indigenous languages at local level to facilitate national cohesion (ROB, 2001b: 36).

The above commitments challenge the Government to ensure that the country's heritage is 'preserved' and that the country's culture is made up of different cultures. In this way the exclusion of cultures will be avoided, and the national culture will take its place as one of the vehicles for national development. Incorporating cultural perspectives in the development process is extremely important, and an essential ingredient in poverty reduction. According to Wolfensohn;

We simply cannot conceive of development without cultural continuity. It must be acknowledged and must form the basis for the future. Serious attention to culture is basic to improving development effectiveness – in education, health, the production of goods and services, the management of cities. It is at the very heart of poverty reduction as well as quality of life (World Bank, 1998 : iii).

Interestingly, the Government's policy on culture acknowledges the work of NGOs in cultural activities and calls for their contribution in its implementation. This call for partnership should be encouraged, because NGOs can reinforce and complement government activities. In spite of its weaknesses as discussed in Chapter 5, Kuru Development Trust in Ghanzi has attempted to promote community-owned development that addresses equity, participation and cultural awareness. The tenets of this development initiative have been described as follows.

It is built on customs and values of the people and draws on their methods of dealing with one another, including consensus-based decision-making, the assurance that all people have a say regardless of age, gender or social affiliation and their emphasis on balancing spiritual and material lives of their everyday lives (Hitchcock, 1999: 25-26).

The Government could learn some useful lessons from the above approach, and apply it in its cultural activities.

In addition to the above Botswana's democracy requires further deepening as a strategy to alleviate poverty in such a way that it realises the rights and participation of all citizens in public life in a way that fosters cultural diversity. Vision 2016, which is discussed below, provides the basis for acknowledging cultural difference because it calls for support and strengthening of various cultural traditions in Botswana. Further, in designing programmes for Basarwa, the Draft Botswana Poverty Reduction Strategy² (UNDP, 2002a2) calls for taking into account the fact that Basarwa have a cultural and social heritage that is different from the other people of Botswana. Reducing social exclusion can be undertaken by supporting the culture of the poor. Noting that the poor's endowments are mainly sociocultural, the World Bank reports that other organisations' studies have shown that 'legitimising and supporting the culture and heritage of the poor and marginalised groups can bring about profound improvements in self-esteem, energise communities and help them get organised, and assist them in finding new ways to improve their livelihoods' (World Bank, 1998: 13). The Kuru Development Trust organises an annual dance festival that brings together dancers from various parts of the country and serves to enhance cultural awareness. It instils pride among the Basarwa in their cultural achievements (Hitchcock et al, 2000a).

9.5.3 Affirmative Action Programmes

Recommendations for affirmative action were made in 1992 (Saugestad, 1998b: 338). In 1993, they re-surfaced as shown in a summary to Appendix 7 in section 7.4 of Chapter 7. They have been made again this year (BIDPA, 2003). I think they can be implemented within the spirit of Vision 2016.

Within the national policy framework, the planning and development strategy for the new National Development Plan (NDP 9: 2003/04 – 2008/09) has a potential to reduce social exclusion only and only if the strategy is successfully implemented. According to ROB (2003: 60), the theme of NDP 9 is 'Towards Realisation of Vision 2016: Sustainable and Diversified Development through Competitiveness in Global Markets'. By achieving sustainable development through economic diversification, NDP 9 aims at building the pillars of Vision 2016, namely, *'an educated and informed nation; a prosperous, productive and innovative nation; a compassionate, just and caring nation; a safe and secure nation; an open, democratic and accountable nation; a moral and tolerant nation; and a united and proud nation'* (Presidential Task Group, 1997: 5 -13).

Vision 2016 carries the following issues that are suggestive of affirmative action.

- Botswana's wealth of different languages and cultural traditions will be recognized, supported and strengthened within the education system. No Motswana will be disadvantaged in the education system as a result of a mother tongue that differs from the country's two official languages (Presidential Task Group, 1997: 5);
- By the year 2016, Botswana will have a more equitable income distribution that ensures the participation of as many people as possible in economic success. There will be policies and measures that increase the participation of poorer households in productive and income earning activities. The economy will be growing in a distributive manner – that is in a way that creates sustainable jobs. Botswana will be a compassionate and caring society, offering support and opportunity to those who are poor, and including *all* people in benefits of growth. By the year 2016, Botswana will have eradicated absolute poverty, so that no part of the country will have people with incomes below the appropriate poverty datum line. Within the next ten years, the percentage of people in poverty will have been reduced to at most 23%, which is half the level in 1994 (Presidential Task Group, 1997: 8);
- All people will have access to productive resources, regardless of ethnic origin, gender, disability or misfortune... There will be a social safety net for those who find themselves in poverty for any reason (Presidential Task Group, 1997: 9);

- No citizen of the future Botswana will be disadvantaged as a result of gender, age, religion, creed, colour, national or ethnic origin, location, language or political opinion (Presidential Task Group, 1997: 12).

Reducing social exclusion requires ensuring that Vision 2016 is translated into tangible, concrete implementable programmes. As shown in the above bullet points, the Vision makes provision for some ways to deal with social exclusion. NDP 9 has adopted it as part of its strategy. I expect some reduction of social exclusion if the promises of the Vision are made good in the course of implementation of NDP 9. Vision 2016 has potential to contribute to reduce social exclusion for the following reasons. It recognizes that Botswana has a wealth of different languages and cultural diversity that require recognizing, supporting and strengthening within the education system. As I mentioned in Chapter 7 the language policy militates against language diversity and poses problems for non-Setswana speakers. If NDP 9 will indeed build on the pillars of Vision 2016, then some solution to the problem of exclusion can be expected.

According to the empirical findings in this study, Basarwa are disadvantaged in part due to their ethnicity. The Vision, however, stipulates that no citizen will be disadvantaged as a result of among other things, ethnic origin. I think this opens up the scope for considering cultural difference in designing policy. Within this understanding, there is potential to recognise that Basarwa are excluded multidimensionally and to design appropriate policies. This is good news for the future of Basarwa if the stipulation is implemented. I think that if the stipulation is implemented during NDP 9, this will reduce social exclusion because the Vision calls for a moral and tolerant nation where negative public attitudes towards ethnic groups such as Basarwa will become unacceptable.

Finally the Draft Report of the Review of the Remote Area Development Programme (BIDPA, 2003), recommended affirmative action programmes on education, land and so on as outlined below.

In view of the overall aim to promote the social, cultural and economic advancement of people in remote areas without detriment to their unique culture and tradition, the RADP should include programmes of affirmative action to assist historically disadvantaged communities to gain access to education, land and resources (BIDPA, 2003: 54)

The details of the above recommendation are based on feedback from BIDPA's respondents as summarised as follows:

- Lowering entry requirements for people from disadvantaged backgrounds;
- [Special priority] in allocation of land for people in remote areas;
- Provision of legal aid, or other negotiating assistance for people who have difficulty in gaining access to their rights;
- Granting hunting licences, for subsistence or commercial purposes. (BIDPA, 2003: 54)

As part of the monitoring of the above plan, it is important to ensure that recommendations for affirmative action as detailed above are implemented. I showed in Chapter 7 the difficulties RADs face in land rights. Ways of assisting RADs to gain land are suggested by Natural Resources Services (2002) as shown below. Discussing land rights for minority groups, this source calls for a policy that should aim to give RADs more control over land management arrangements, as other citizens already have, through:

- Upholding the rights of minorities to pursue a different life style and maintain a distinct culture from that of the majority;
- Promoting economic and social empowerment of all citizens, addressing the plight of the rural poor;
- Promoting sustainable use of land and conservation of natural resources, and
- Diversification of both the rural and the national economy.
- Within the land sector:
 - In those localities where RADs or the minority groups form a majority, new sub-land boards or related structures could be established to regulate the use of the land. Membership of these could be made up of mainly local residents (that is RADs);
 - New water development in RAD settlements should be put under the control of the RAD residents themselves (Natural Resources Services, 2002: 7-8).

9.5.4 Bottom-up Approach

In Chapters 5 and 8, I argue that rural communities fail to participate actively in development strategies because of the technocratic, top-down nature of policy implementation. Government acknowledges this problem because according to the Community Based Strategy for Rural Development (CBS) (ROB, 1997) it is pointed out:

A common failing has been that rural development activities and processes have often been conceived and implemented by Government along technocratic lines, with little emphasis on finding out what rural people want, attracting legitimate popular participation and building institutional capacity at grass-roots level. This has contributed to rural development schemes

having less impact than they might have had, and has discouraged the dependency phenomenon (ROB, 1997c: 12-13).

The CBS sets out the ideals of broadening development participation. As its starting point, it takes the ineffectiveness of past efforts to strengthen the rural economy and improve livelihoods, and emphasises enhancing people's participation in planning and implementing development programmes. The CBS's overall objective is to develop community-based approaches to rural development that will be effective at addressing the problem of economic stagnation of rural communities and the creation of employment opportunities and economic opportunities in rural areas. Its specific objectives are:

- To improve communities' capacity to actively participate in the planning, implementation and evaluation of programmes and projects in their areas;
- To take into account gender and environmental considerations in the development process;
- To improve programme design in an attempt to reduce poverty;
- To enhance planning and implementation capacities of District authorities in programme development (ROB, 1997c: 4).

The CBS main strategic elements include a shift in responsibility and control over rural development activities from the Government to communities; a shift in development activities towards those capable of improving income and employment, and a changing role of Government from being a lead implementer to a facilitator (ROB, 1997c: 17). BIDPA (2001b) has reviewed the CBS as part of the review of the Rural Development Policy and has identified the following constraints in the Strategy in its role as a guide to achieving the ideal of enhanced community participation:

- It does not make clear just who the economic actors in the community are and what actions they will be expected to perform. The terms 'community' and 'community participation' are defined in general terms that do not provide an indication of the nature and extent of the required economic participation that could lead to poverty reduction.
- The thrust of the strategy is essentially that of how central Government should facilitate community-based programmes and wider community participation. It is not clear how the target beneficiaries of the strategy have been involved in its formulation.
- The strategy focuses on administrative and technical solutions to what are essentially economic [and political] problems. The emphasis is on what the Government bureaucracy and decision-making institutions at the community level must do administratively to facilitate change and economic development. The problems are not recognised as economic [and political] and thus requiring economic[and political] solutions. The emphasis is on social mobilisation of people for collective decision-making within existing institutional frameworks (BIDPA, 2001b: 146).

CBS is an attempt to operationalise a participatory or demand-driven development as expounded in Appendix 7. However as the above evaluation by BIDPA shows, the Strategy still needs strengthening to make it effective as a vehicle for promoting bottom-up approach to development to promote active community participation. How can participation be enhanced?

The bottom-up approach should take cognizance of social differentiation of rural society. In this connection, the heterogeneity of the community should be borne in mind. It should be recognised that rural society is usually differentiated into the following categories³:

- Those who are poor and disenfranchised;
- Those who are marginalized and powerless and likely to be unorganised and silent and;
- The more powerful interest groups, who are likely to mute the voices of the organised among the second group above;
- Those with more substantial assets and political connections and use this advantage to get access to services from the state.

Such categorisation could help in defining the 'community' and fill the gap existent in the CBS as indicated above. Any participatory development methodologies intended to involve Basarwa in projects aimed at reducing social exclusion should examine the social structures in light of the above differentiation and ensure that *all* categories are consulted policy formulation and planning. Levin (1994) has provided a guideline about the nature of participation when he notes:

The key question of 'who' participates needs to be addressed in such a way that integrates the broad mass of people into the process. This can only be achieved through an understanding of the social structure of rural communities along class, gender, generational and ethnic lines (Levin, 1994: 53).

Participatory methods should take account of constraints faced by poor people like Basarwa and refer them for redress by relevant authorities. Ayee (2000) has isolated the poor's weaknesses as lacking the necessary skills in organising and managing their affairs collectively. Government of Botswana's Poverty Reduction Strategy (UNDP, 2002a) views weaknesses of the poor similarly. It identifies a number of problems faced by poor communities to lift themselves out of poverty as insufficient funds to begin

their programmes, inadequate organisational, administrative and technical skills to design and manage their programmes. Ayee notes that electing capable leaders, convening meetings, taking decisions, keeping records, raising subscriptions and handling funds are some of the roles that require for the poor's performance a certain degree of managerial competence. Yet they lack these skills and are therefore not in a position to establish their institutions to promote their own development.

Given the above constraints, how can improved participation be organised? I find Ayee (2000)'s analysis useful in responding to the above question. He advocates empowering the people and simultaneously reorienting state bureaucracy since it has a major role for furthering development. Empowering the rural poor involves teaching them a range of skills, including 'managerial skills, technical skills, political skills, economic resource management skills, and internal organisational management skills' (Ayee, 2000:16). In line with the above suggestion, the Government's Poverty Reduction Strategy calls for the strengthening of organisational capacity of the poor in order to build their capacity to participate in the decision making process. Both initiatives are crucial in promoting a people-centred development, which entails putting people at the center of processes that recognize political, economic, social and cultural aspects of their lives. They can empower the poor to take their own decisions, rather than being the passive objects of choices made on their behalf. UNDP (1997:99) cautions that 'poor people alone, however well organized, cannot force the policy shifts for poverty [reduction].' This source advocates involvement of all groups in society, as partnerships will sustain the effort.

Regarding the reorienting the bureaucracy, Ayee suggests adapting the administration to participatory development. Since administrators and the people view the participatory differently, there is need for mutual interaction between the two parties. The administration should recognise that it cannot necessarily identify local needs and priorities or work out how best to meet them. Local communities have valuable experience and a special understanding of their own environment. The bureaucracy should tap these strengths of the local people, and emphasise dialogue with the aim of reaching solutions that are responsive to local potential and needs. As noted by Ayee, 'adapting administration to make it more effective in coping with the complexities of participatory development is a task that must be tackled at all levels of the government'.

Reorientation should include those at the top echelons and those at the local level who are in daily contact with the grass roots. Finally he identifies the following ways as constituting the direction in which the administration should move.

- Decision making powers must move from the centre to the periphery;
- Beneficiary participation is unlikely to go far in situations where field level officials themselves have no say in any matter;
- Coordination mechanisms must pursue the single aim of making public services easily accessible to the people;
- The field staff is accountable only to superiors, and to no one else;
- There must be some accountability to the people as well whom alone it is supposed to serve;
- Attitudes of the field staff should change. They must view their role as responding to the needs of the people rather than to respond in a sheep-like manner to governmental initiatives (Ayee, 2000: 17–18).

Lastly, all parties should realise that the participatory process is time-consuming and labour intensive. Not only should the process be left to the two parties discussed so far. Other players, especially the NGOs should be involved in helping the Government to implement the CBS. One of the components of CBS is providing the opportunity for the involvement of NGOs in assisting rural development activities and serving as community development partners (ROB, 1997c). BOCONGO (2000) has taken up this challenge and claims that NGOs are ‘better placed to implement community based strategies, ... and the ability to use participatory development methodologies in project identification, project planning management, monitoring and evaluation’ (BOCONGO, 2000: 28–29). Their ‘abilities’ should be put to the test as part of CBS implementation.

9.5.5 Implementation of Government Poverty Reduction Strategy

For my analysis, one of the underlying causes of persistence of poverty within Basarwa is social exclusion. The Strategy alludes to poverty as being caused by exclusion ‘from participation in the life of the community and the nation [which expresses itself in] mental anguish, psychological trauma, powerlessness, helplessness, shame and a general awareness of low regard of oneself, all reinforcing each other to engender lack of self-esteem’ (UNDP, 2002a2: xi). There is evidence of these effects of social exclusion in Chapters 7 and 8 of this thesis. One of the ways social exclusion can be reduced is by implementing the Poverty Reduction Strategy, whose thrust is providing opportunities for people to have a sustainable livelihood. Government is committed to operationalising this as part of the implementation of NDP 9. The main elements of the

strategy recognise that social exclusion is multidimensional, because the measures to reduce it are multi-pronged. These are:

- Expansion of employment opportunities;
- Social investment in order to enhance the access of the poor to improved programmes in education, health and nutrition;
- Addressing the effects of HIV/AIDS pandemic;
- Strengthening the capacity of local government institutions to contribute to the implementation of the above elements;
- Strengthening the organisational capacity of the poor;
- Strengthening the national development capacity to enhance the effectiveness of the poverty reduction initiatives; and
- Use of well-targeted package of safety nets for the needy or vulnerable groups (UNDP, 2002a2: 95-98).

Enhanced job creation, coupled with expansion of education and training offers long-term solutions to the problem of social exclusion. Since the Government is committed to these strategies as part of its implementation of the national development plans, I recommend a multi-sectoral collaboration with the non-governmental and private sectors contributing towards their implementation. Education has an important role in enhancing participation of the excluded in society. According to Kerapeletswe and Moremi (2001):

Education enables participation in all aspects of life. In this regard, education has been called a leveller, since it provides a means by which disadvantaged groups can improve their socio-economic condition. The more an educated a person is, the easier it is to make use of health and other social services which enhance productivity (Kerapeletswe and Moremi, 2001: 234).

It is important that the barriers that I identified with respect to educational opportunity for Basarwa children are addressed. The policy to deal with social discrimination should also target discriminatory practices in the education sector.

Employment creation has always been a major strategy for dealing with problems of the poor and should be continued. The Government has provided funding to enable rural people to participate in labour based public works schemes, which have been useful in providing social infrastructure in rural areas. The only problem with this arrangement is that such funding is not sustainable. Owing to this constraint, people should receive education not only to work for others but also to create employment for themselves. Nowadays the young well educated but unskilled generation is finding it difficult to get jobs, and self-employment offers a way to escape unemployment. In this way the

burden of employment creation is spread beyond the government and non-government sectors to the people themselves.

Apart from the above strategies, there will always be a need to cushion income risks and reduce vulnerability of poor people to drought and other natural disasters. This need can be met through the safety nets and income transfer programmes which the Government has provided in times of need. Safety nets are crucial in increasing the ability of the poor to take advantage of opportunities. It is important that those who require such assistance receive it timely. This has implications for adequate monitoring and evaluation of programme output and reconciliation with targets. As I mentioned elsewhere in the thesis, the benefits intended for Basarwa tend to leak to non-Basarwa and this increases exclusion of Basarwa. In order to address this problem improved targeting and monitoring is necessary to ensure that benefits go to those they are intended.

For the Poverty Strategy activities to bear fruit, it is important to bridge the gap between intentions and action, which is one of the reasons for policy failure in Botswana. To maximise the impact of the measures, some of the issues raised in the Poverty Reduction Strategy are worth re-iterating. These are:

- Public and private initiatives must be targeted at the vulnerable groups within respective clusters on the basis of gender, geographic location, age and physical condition;
- Empowering the poor should play an active role in their upliftment;
- Policies and programmes arising from the Strategy must be directed at the underlying causes rather than symptoms [of poverty];
- Initiatives must ensure a multi-actor collaboration (UNDP, 2002a2: 102).

To devise effective measures to reduce poverty, it is important, as the Strategy points out, to identify the underlying causes of poverty. One such cause is social exclusion. It is my recommendation that poverty reduction measures should be expanded to recognise the multidimensional nature of social exclusion. In this way, the measures should provide for activities that deal with poverty arising from the political, legal and cultural dimensions of social exclusion. In other words, there should be measures to promote political participation of the marginalized, take account of cultural diversity and suggest ways in which legal exclusion can be eliminated.

9.5.6 Deepening Botswana's Democracy

Botswana is regarded as a 'shining liberal democracy' (Carbone, 2003) and has recently been ranked as Africa's top performer in good governance for upholding a stable, democratic system and transparency in the government machinery (Sunday Times, 15 June 2003). As I indicated in Chapter 5, there are a number of weaknesses in the country's democracy, including a fragmented political opposition and a weak civil society. This implies that the democratic system does not cater for participation and decision making at all levels. It does not fully provide for democratic participation, which has been described as 'a process where each citizen has equal opportunity to influence decisions that affect the condition of his or her life,' (Kamal, 2000: 3). Given the extent of exclusion of Basarwa as demonstrated in this thesis, it is clear that democratic participation has been inadequate. Deepening Botswana's democracy is one of the ways of reducing social exclusion, because democracy provides to a large extent the context or the enabling environment for reducing social exclusion and poverty. This can be done by strengthening the weak links in the democratic 'chain' through enhancing the role of civil society organisations and the political opposition.

In Chapter 5, I mentioned that mutual suspicion and hostility that characterises Government-NGO relationships. A confrontational relationship with government does little to enable either party to function properly. Multi-sectoral collaboration, which is necessary to tackle social exclusion, is not possible under such circumstances. What is required is an enabling environment where dialogue, criticism and compromise are tolerated between state and non-state actors. Both parties should view each other as partners in development. This requires an assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of each party and working out arrangements for sharing the responsibilities for implementing development programmes, on the basis of the comparative advantage of each party. Where NGOs manage to reach groups that the Government has difficulty in helping, it is cost-effective to rely on the NGO's capacity and vice versa. Robinson and Mark (1997) advocate 'collaborative, synergistic collaboration' between state and non-state providers. They note:

Such partnerships are premised on a scenario where the state has overall responsibility for ensuring a coherent policy framework and the bulk of financing, while [NGOs] perform an essentially catalytic role, fostering innovation and community initiative, while avoiding a wholesale transfer of responsibility for the financing and provisioning of resources to the voluntary sector (Robinson and Mark, 1997: 45).

Proponents of NGOs tend to assume that NGOs are virtuous (Tendler, 1982; Kharono, 2000; BOCONGO, 2000). I have shown in the case study on one NGO in Chapter 5 that this assumption is not true. NGOs are generally not democratic in their internal affairs and not responsive to the needs and aspirations of their constituency. In other words, they lack transparency and accountability. The solution to this problem comes from Adejumodi (2000: 14) who notes that 'non-state sector actors must not only demand accountability from the state, but must in themselves also internalize the virtues of accountability, transparency and internal democracy'. The state, non-state actors and individuals have a responsibility to adhere to these principles of good governance.

Botswana NGOs attribute one of their failings to the absence of a national policy on NGOs (BOCONGO, 2000). In 1997, Government undertook to formulate this policy to guide its relationship with NGOs, and spell out how NGO activities were to be coordinated (ROB, 1997a). This undertaking has not yet been accomplished (Carbone, 2003). Without a policy framework there are no opportunities to implement the following objectives⁴.

- To recognize the contribution of NGOs to socioeconomic development;
- To promote partnerships and collaborations between NGOs, the Government and other sectors;
- To improve lines of communication and cooperation with Government, the private sector, NGOs and other stakeholders;
- To facilitate the creation of sustainable mechanisms for resource mobilization through line ministries and from other bodies for NGO programmes (ROB, 2001a: 11).

A policy recommendation arising from the above review is that the NGO policy should be finalised without further delay. Two major advantages will arise from the completion. On the one hand a solid partnership between NGOs and Government will be born. On the other hand, Government funding for approved NGO activities will become available. This will eliminate a funding constraint that currently bedevils NGO operations. Whilst the policy will enhance civil society's role to counterbalance state dominance, the state itself will have an opportunity to audit NGO operations to ensure that principles of good governance mentioned above are upheld. It will also be possible

to require NGOs to make good their claims that they have the potential to reduce poverty.

In order for the opposition to present itself as an alternative to the ruling party, the following changes need to be done to Botswana's democratic system. First, the electoral system should be reformed because it tends to favour the incumbent Botswana Democratic Party (Molomo and Somolekae, 2000; Carbone, 2003). The winner-takes-all system produces a parliament that is disproportionate to the popular vote. The representatives of the opposition have suggested an alternative system - the proportional representation. According to a study conducted by the Independent Electoral Commission, the latter system is supported by 73% of Botswana people (Carbone, 2003: 64)⁵. Second, given the dearth of funds to contest elections by opposition parties, the latter have continuously called for public funding. It is recommended that the state should provide funding for viable political parties. Third, the opposition parties themselves need to minimize incidences of splitting, fragmentation and internal fights because these factors militate against a united opposition. The unity that was struck by Kenyan opposition parties and resulted in the defeat of Moi's party is a good example for Botswana's opposition.

Lastly, globally indigenous people like Basarwa continue to be excluded from various spheres of society. It is important that their needs be examined and discussed openly.

¹ Apart from a few exceptions

² Government has adopted this strategy (Botswana Daily News, 17 July 2003).

³ These categories are adopted from Thomas-Slayter (1994: 1486)

⁴ These are taken from the draft policy, which is still to be approved.

⁵ According to the Leader of the Opposition the proportional representation method has more potential to increase opposition seats in Parliament than the winner-takes-all system. Based on his estimates in 1999 if the former had been used, the ruling party would have won 22 seats as compared to 18 for the opposition parties. However the actual outcome, based on the current system, the ruling party won 33 seats compared to only 7 for the opposition parties (cited in Carbone, 2003: 64).

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The Voice

Botswana Magazines

The Writer

Kutlwano

Mokaedi

South African Newspapers

Mail and Guardian

The Sunday Times

Appendix 1

Research Questionnaire: Socio-economic and other information on Research Groups.

1. Identification

1.1 Interviewer's Name

1.2 Date of Interview.

1.3 Locality Name

1. Fringe Settlement
2. Remote Area Settlement
3. Non fringe settlement

1.4 Are you the head of the Household (HH)? Yes - 1 No -2

1.5 Ethnic/Tribal Identity

1. Mosarwa (specify sub-group)
2. Mokgalagadi
3. Moherero
4. Other (specify)

1.5 Languages Spoken

1. Setswana
2. English
3. Sekgalagadi
4. Sesarwa
5. Afrikaans
6. Other (specify)

1.7 Respondent Response

1. Completely interviewed
2. Partially interviewed
3. Refused
4. Unable to locate
5. Absent, sick

1.8 Observations

2.2 Members of Household Absent

Serial Number	Name of Member	Relationship to Head	Sex	Age	Location	Why Absent

Code

Why Absent

- 1. Mine Worker
- 2. Hunting
- 3. Gathering
- 4. Visiting relatives
- 5. Working elsewhere
- 6. Attending School (specify level).....

3. Original and Current Place of Residence

3.1 Where did you live before coming here?

- 1. Village
- 2. Farm
- 3. Urban area
- 4. Always lived here
- 5. Another part of Ghanzi Township
- 6. Other (specify)

3.2 Apart from the above places, which other places have you lived?

3.3 Within the Township, how many times have you moved until you settled here?

3.4 How long have you been resident in this area?

- 1. Less than 1 year
- 2. 1 – 4 years
- 3. 5 – 10 years
- 4. More than 10 years

3.5 Why did you settle in this area?

- 1. More facilities and services than in original area
- 2. Denied access in other areas
- 3. More secure in this neighbourhood
- 4. Do not qualify to stay elsewhere
- 5. Other (specify)

4. Access to Facilities/Services

Regarding quantity and quality, how satisfied are you and members of your household with access to the following facilities/services in your area, and other aspects addressed below. Indicate whether fully or partially satisfied or dissatisfied, and indicate reason for preferred option.

Facility/Service	Satisfied		Dissatisfied		Don't Know	Reason for option
	Fully	Partially	Fully	Partially		
Secondary Schools	4	3	2	1	0	
Primary Schools	4	3	2	1	0	
Health Facilities	4	3	2	1	0	
Extension Services	4	3	2	1	0	
Credit	4	3	2	1	0	
Water	4	3	2	1	0	
Roads	4	3	2	1	0	
Employment Opportunities	4	3	2	1	0	
Sanitation Facilities	4	3	2	1	0	
Area where Living	4	3	2	1	0	
Refuse Removal	4	3	2	1	0	
Leadership	4	3	2	1	0	
Security	4	3	2	1	0	
Reciprocity Within Research Group	4	3	2	1	0	
Reciprocity Without Research Group	4	3	2	1	0	
Kgotla use	4	3	2	1	0	
Land Use	4	3	2	1	0	

5. Social and Economic Mobility

5.1 What are your sources of livelihood?

6. Government Assistance Programmes

6.1 Have you benefited from a Government programme(s) during the last ten years?
1 - Yes 2 - No Go to 6.2

6.2 Has any member of your household benefited from a Government programme(s) during the last ten years?
1 - Yes 2 - No

6.3 If Yes to either 6.1 or 6.2 which programme(s) from the list below? Beneficiary 1 is HH head, 2, 3 and 4 or other HH members.

Code	Programme	Beneficiary			
		1	2	3	4
1	Drought Relief				
2	Destitute Relief				
3	Arable Lands Programme				
4	Financial Assistance Programme				
5	Old Age Pension				
6	Livestock Scheme under Remote Area Development				
7	Special Game Licence				
8	Adult Literacy Programme				
9	Institutional Feeding				
10	National Registration				
11	Other (specify)				

6.4 Have you been involved in the formulation of a government programme?
1 - Yes 2 - No

6.5 If yes, what has been the nature of the involvement?

6.6. If no, why not?

6.7. Are there any programmes you have felt shut out from participating?
1 - Yes 2 - No

6.8 If Yes, why?

8.2 Are there any employed children in the HH?
1 – Yes 2 – No

8.3 If yes, how many?

8.4 If no to 8.1, have you ever been employed?
1 – Yes 2 – No

8.5 What type of work do/did you do?

- | | |
|----------------------------|----------------------------|
| 1. Domestic worker | 6. Family Business |
| 2. Cattle post labourer | 7. Civil Servant |
| 3. Livestock farm labourer | 8. Private Sector employee |
| 4. Mine worker | 9. Other (specify)..... |
| 5. Drought Relief | |

8.6 What are/were arrangements for payment for work done?

1. In kind (specify).....
2. Cash
3. Both 1 and 2
4. Other (specify).....

8.7 How much were you paid over the last month/time?

1. Less than P30
2. Less than P60
3. P60 - P300
4. P300 - P600
5. P600 – P900
6. Over P900

9. Ownership of Assets

Code	Item	Number Owned by HH	Number Owned by Other but used by HH	Total Number
1	Cattle			
2	Donkey			
3	Horse			
4	Goat			
5	Sheep			
6	Dog			
7	Chicken			
8	Bed			
9	Radio			
10	Axe			
11	Plough			
12	Wheel Barrow			
13	Pot			
14	Water Drum			
15	Spade			
16	Gun			
17	Bow and Arrow			
18	Snare			
19	Donkey Cart			
20	Sledge			
21	Telephone			
22	Vehicle			

10. Community Organizations

10.1 Of the following types of organizations, how many are serving your community, and what is the extent of their utility?

Type of Organization	Number of organization	Number of Members	Usefulness of Organization		Why	
			Yes	No	Useful	Useless
Financial:						
<i>Metshelo</i>						
Burial Society						
Cooperative Society						
Production:						
Production Brigade						
Farmers' Committee						
Tannery group						
Sewing group						
Services						
Parent/Teachers Association						
Village Health Committee						
Village Development Committee						
Political:						
Political Party						
Cultural/Sports						
Soccer Club						
Music Group						
Cultural Group						
Religious						
Church denomination						
Other						
(specify).....						
.....						
.....						

Appendix 2: List of Interviews

			Category of Interviewee				
	Interviewee's Name	Date and Place of Interview	Civil Servant	Community Leader	NGO Official	University Staff	International Servant
1	A. Gergis	13/99/99 Gaborone	X1				
2	W. Babish	16/11/99 Kalkfontein		X1			
3	C. Dekop	23/03/01 Gaborone	X1				
4	E. Moabi	20/03/99 Ghanzi Township	X2				
5	G. Serebolo	18/11/99 Ghanzi Township	X2				
6	K. Good	13/09/99 Gaborone				X	
7	G. Keadire	15/06/99 West Hanahai	X3				
8	T. Kebaagetse	12/10/99 Gaborone				X	
9	K. Morakanyane	17/11/99 Ghanzi Township	X2				
10	S. Lefhoko	31/07/99 Maun	X2				
11	I. Mazonde	23/03/00 Gaborone				X	
12	D. Mokgethi	17/11/99 Ghanzi Township	X2				
13	N. Molatole	17/6/99 West Hanahai	X3				
14	J. Morris	28/07/99 Dekar		X2			
15	T. Ralehika	20/06/99 Ghanzi Township		X1			
16	R. Dekker	26/07/99 Dekar			X2		
17	R. Jansen	13/09/99 Gaborone			X1		
18	O. Selolwane	03/04/00 Gaborone				X	
19	S. Setima	11/10/99 Ghanzi Township		X1			
20	E. Taihuku	10/06/99 East Hanahai	X3				
21	A. Tapela	29/07/9999 Ghanzi Township	X2				
22	Mosokwe/ Setima	21/02/99 Ghanzi Township		X1			
23	VDC Chair WH	23/06/99 West Hanahai		X2			
24	J. Wessels	08/09/99 Ghanzi Township			X2		
25	D. Eaton	08/10/99 Ghanzi Township		X3			
26	M. Kaashe	09/01/01 Ghanzi Township		X2			
27	B. Jankie	11/11/99 Ghanzi Township		X1			

28	Ms. Tina	09/01/01 Ghanzi Township		X2			
29	H. Mcintyre	15/06/99 West Hanahai	X3				
30	M. Sankwasa	12/08/99 Ghanzi Township	X2				
31	T. Saleswki	28/03/00 Gaborone					X
32	R. Hitchcock	20/08/99 Gaborone				X	
33	C. Mothakaja	21/02/00 Gaborone	X1				
34	M. Ngakaeja	24/03/99 Dekar			X2		
35	Mango/Camm	26/07/99 Dekar			X2		
36	S. Kedise	23/09/99 Ghanzi Township	X2				
37	Education Secretary	06/08/99 Ghanzi Township	X2				
38	S. Koitsiwe	18/11/99 Ghanzi Township	X2				
39	N. Xukuri	21/07/99 Jwaneng	X2				
40	C. Koontse	04/12/00 Gaborone	X1				
41	D/Head, WH, Primary School	17/06/99 West Hanahai	X3				
42	D/Head, KPS	15/07/99 Ghanzi Township	X2				
43	Head, Ghanzi Primary School	14/07/99 Ghanzi Township	X2				
44	S. Mayane	10/11/99 Charleshill		X1			
45	Headman, West Hanahai	26/06/99 West Hanahai		X2			
46	CCDO	15/05/99 Ghanzi Township	X2				
47	Veterinary Assistant	09/08/99 Ghanzi Township	X2				
48	L. Kamara	31/07/97 Maun	X2				
49	Pre-school Teachers, WH	17/06/99 West Hanahai	X3				
50	Mr. George	12/07/99 Ghanzi Township	X2				
51	T. Kaashe	13/07/99 Ghanzi Township	X2				
52	Mr. Blockman	13/05/99 Ghanzi Township		X3			
53	M. van Zyl	23/08/99 Ghanzi Township	X2				
54	N. Rozemeijer	13/09/99 Gaborone					X
55	T. Leggett	09/06/00 Durban				X	
	Total		29	13	6	6	2
	% Of Total		53	24	9	11	3

Notes: a) For civil servant: X1=Central based (4); X2 = District based (19) and X3 = Settlement based (6)
For Community leader: X1= Mokgalagadi (6); X2 = Mosarwa (5); X3= Politician (2)
For NGO official: X1 is central based (1); X2 is District based (4).

- b) WH= West Hanahai; PS = Primary School; CCDO = Chief Community Development Officer; K = Kabakae; KPS = Kabakae Primary School; D = Deputy, VDC = Village Development Committee.
- c) Where two names appear under interviewee (No. 22 and 35), this means that the two informants were jointly interviewed.
- d) Copies of transcripts are in possession of the author.

Source: Survey, Morris Nyathi, 1999-2001.

Appendix 3

Focus Group Discussion Guide (FAD Group)

Perceptions on Social Exclusion

Introduction

The research's proposition is that social exclusion is one of the causes of the persistence of poverty in certain ethnic groups in Botswana. Basarwa are identified as such a group. It is necessary to examine this proposition, by discussing the nature and extent of social exclusion as seen by the community. The guide is intended to assist focus groups to discuss issues pertaining to the issues identified below.

Development Problems

What are the most important development problems in your community?

What are the less important development problems in your community?

What specific issues do you confront which do not apply to other communities?

Current Place

Why do you stay in the outskirts of the Township?

Are there any things you benefit from because of staying here?

Are there any things you do not benefit from because of staying here?

Are there any things you do not benefit from because of your ethnicity?

How would you feel if you stayed in a non-fringe area?

How would you feel if you stayed in a remote area dweller (RAD) settlement?

Relationship with neighbours and Remote Area Dwellers (RADs)

Who are your neighbours?

How do you interact with your neighbours?

In your relationship/interaction with your neighbours, what aspects do you find satisfactory?

In your relationship/interaction with your neighbours, what aspects do you find unsatisfactory?

What do you think of your neighbours?

What do you think of people staying in RAD settlements?

What is your relationship with RADs?

What do you think of yourselves in relation to your neighbours?

What do you think of yourselves in relation to your position and role in Ghanzi society?

Do you feel you are part of Ghanzi society or not?

Is there any intermarriage between you as Basarwa and non-Basarwa in Ghanzi Township?

What do people in the dominant ethnic group (Bakgalagadi) think of you?

What do people living in RAD settlements think of you?

What are the major differences between your community and that of your neighbours?

What do you think your neighbours benefit and you do not and why?

What do you think RADs benefit from and you do not ?

Employment

In the survey we have undertaken, most Basarwa respondents complained of discrimination in work places?

What is the nature of this discrimination? How is it done, why and to whom?

The survey also revealed that most Basarwa are engaged in casual (piece) jobs.

Why are Basarwa mostly piece-job labourers?

Who are the types of jobs concerned?

Who are the major employers?

Is payment satisfactory?

Education

The survey further revealed that most of the old generation Basarwa are not educated.

Why is this so?

Even children of school going age were found at home rather than attending school.

What are the major reasons for this?

Are Basarwa attending non-formal education lessons?

Kinship Networks and Reciprocity

As a Basarwa group, what networks do you employ to help each other?

What assistance do you offer to kin in times of need, disaster, hunger?

Do you have reciprocal relationships with other ethnic groups?

Community Organization

The survey found that Basarwa in the Township are not familiar with community organizations such as VDCs, VHC and so on.

Why is this the case?

What alternative arrangements exist in your communities for mobilizing community efforts?

Social and Economic Mobility

Is there any activity you feel or think excluded from participating or benefiting?

Is there any service you feel or think excluded from participating or benefiting?

Is there any government programme which you feel or think excluded from participating or benefiting?

Are there any benefits of developments which you feel you are excluded from enjoying?

In attempting to obtain social mobility or progress in life, what can you identify as your major stumbling blocks?

In attempts to uplift yourself, what constraints do you face which other population groups do not?

Any other matter?

Appendix 4

Focus Group Discussion Guide (Dominant Group)

Perceptions on Social Exclusion

Introduction

The research's proposition is that social exclusion is one of the causes of the persistence of poverty in certain ethnic groups in Botswana. Basarwa are identified as such a group. It is necessary to examine this proposition, by discussing the nature and extent of social exclusion as seen by the community. The guide is intended to assist focus groups to discuss issues pertaining to the issues identified below.

Development Problems

What are the most important development problems in your community?

What are the less important development problems in your community?

What specific issues do you confront which do not apply to other communities?

Current Place

Are there any things you benefit from staying in your places which others (such as Basarwa) do not?

Are there any things you do not benefit from because of staying here?

What are your perceptions of those people staying in the fringes?

What are your perceptions of those people staying in RAD areas?

Are there any things you do not benefit from because of your ethnicity?

Relationship with neighbours and Remote Area Dwellers (RADs)

Who are your neighbours?

In your relationship/interaction with your neighbours, what aspects do you find satisfactory?

In your relationship/interaction with your neighbours, what aspects do you find unsatisfactory?

What do you think of your yourselves?

What do people staying in the outskirts think of you?

What do people staying in remote areas (RADs) think of you?

What do you think of yourselves in relation to your position in Ghanzi society?

What are the major differences between your community and that of your neighbours?

What is it that you think your neighbours (squatters Basarwa) benefit from which you do not and why?

What is it that you think RADs benefit from which you do not?

Is there any intermarriage between you and Basarwa?

Employment

In the survey we have undertaken, most Basarwa respondents complained of discrimination in work places?

What are your views about this situation? How is done, why and by whom?

The survey also revealed that most Basarwa are engaged in casual (piece) jobs.

Why do you think this is so?

Who are the employers and is remuneration adequate?

Education

Are there any members of your group who attend non-formal education lessons?

What do you think about these lessons?

Kinship Networks and Reciprocity

As a Bakgalagadi group, what networks do you employ to help each other in times of need, disaster, hunger?

Do you have reciprocal relationships with other ethnic groups?

Community Organization

The survey indicated that Basarwa seem unfamiliar with community organizations.

What is the situation regarding yourselves?

Social and Economic Mobility

Is there any activity you feel or think excluded from participating or benefiting?

Is there any service you feel or think excluded from participating or benefiting?

In your attempts to attain social and economic upliftment, what mechanisms do you rely on?

In attempting to obtain social mobility or progress in life, what can you identify as your major stumbling blocks?

In attempts to uplift yourself, what constraints do you face which other population groups do not?

Any other matter?

Appendix 5

Focus Group Discussion Guide (RAD Group)

Perceptions on Social Exclusion

Introduction

The research's proposition is that social exclusion is one of the causes of the persistence of poverty in certain ethnic groups in Botswana. Basarwa are identified as such a group. It is necessary to examine this proposition, by discussing the nature and extent of social exclusion as seen by the community. The guide is intended to assist focus groups to discuss issues pertaining to the issues identified below.

Development Problems

The main aim of the Remote Area Development Programme is to integrate the marginalized sections of population into the mainstream of the society and to develop rural settlements to the level that is comparable with that of other rural villages in the country.

What is your opinion regarding the implementation of this objective?

In the integration process, what are you expected to do that you have difficulties with?

What are the most important development problems in your community?

What specific issues do you confront which do not apply to other communities?

Current Place

Are there any things you benefit from because of staying here, which others in other areas of the country do not?

Are there any things you do not benefit from because of staying here?

Are there any things you do not benefit from because of your ethnicity?

Relationship with neighbours and Fringe Area Dwellers (FADs)

Who are your neighbours?

In your relationship/interaction with your neighbours, what aspects do you find satisfactory?

In your relationship/interaction with your neighbours, what aspects do you find unsatisfactory?

What do you think of your neighbours?

What are your perceptions of people staying in fringe areas of Ghanzi Township?

What are your perceptions of people staying non- fringe areas of Ghanzi Township?

What is your relationship with Basarwa in Ghanzi Township?

What do you think of yourselves in relation to your neighbours?

What do you think of yourselves in relation to your position and role in Ghanzi society?

Is there any intermarriage between you as Basarwa and non-Basarwa in West Hanahai? Why?

What do people in the dominant ethnic group (Bakgalagadi) think of you?

What do people living in fringe area of Ghanzi Township think of you?

What are the major differences between your community and that of your neighbours?

What do you think your neighbours benefit and you do not and why?

What do you think fringe dwellers in Ghanzi Township benefit from and you do not ?

Productive Activities

A number of Employment Promotion Fund (EPF) and Financial Assistance Programme (FAP) activities (livestock, small projects, for example tannery, sewing, blacksmith) have been introduced in the West Hanahai settlement.

Where are the livestock provided?

What problems has the livestock project faced?

What problems have other projects (tanner, sewing, and so on) faced?

Education

Our survey revealed that most of the old generation Basarwa are not educated.

Why is this so?

Are there any Basarwa attending or have attended non-formal education lessons in the settlement?

What do you think of these lessons?

Kinship Networks and Reciprocity

As a Basarwa group, what networks do you employ to help each other?

What networks do you employ to assist non-Basarwa?

What assistance do you offer to kin in times of need, disaster, hunger?

Do you have reciprocal relationships with other ethnic groups?

Community Organization

What cultural groups used to exist?

What were their functions?

Why did they collapse?

Social and Economic Mobility

Is there any activity you feel or think excluded from participating or benefiting?

Is there any service you feel or think excluded from participating or benefiting?

Is there any government programme which you feel or think excluded from participating or benefiting?

Are there any benefits of developments which you feel you are excluded from enjoying?

In attempting to obtain social mobility or progress in life, what can you identify as your major stumbling blocks?

In attempts to uplift yourself, what constraints do you face which other population groups do not?

Any other matter?

Appendix 6

Terms Of Reference For District And Village Institutions

DISTRICT INSTITUTIONS

INTRODUCTION

One level at which massive efforts at institution building were directed during the first decade of Botswana's independence was the creation of local government institutions. One such creation was the establishment of **Local Authorities**. They include the following:

- District and Town Councils (Established by 1965 Act of Parliament)
- Tribal Administration (Established by 1965 Act of Parliament)
- Land Boards (Established by 1968/1970 Act of Parliament)
- District Administration (Established by 1965 Act of Parliament)
- Village Development Committees (Established by 1968 Presidential Directive)
- District Development Committees (Established by 1970 Presidential Directive)
- Urban Development Committees (Established by 1995 Ministerial Circular)

These institutions are still in place today. Together they form the institutional framework within which local government operates. They are charged with rural development and they are closest to the local communities in terms of their needs. In terms of decentralisation process, the strength, relative autonomy and performance of these local level institutions form an important test case of decentralised development in Botswana.

DISTRICT ADMINISTRATION (DA)

The DA is headed by the District Commissioner (DC) who is responsible to the Ministry of Local Government Lands and Housing (MLGLH) and is the senior representative of Central Government in the district. As such he exercises general supervision of the working of Ministries in his District. He is the chairman of the District Development Committee. With the introduction of the district planning process his coordinating function has become critical. His local knowledge and contact enables him to better fulfil duties of a development coordinator. Besides his planning responsibilities, the DC retains certain judicial functions, for example as a marriage officer.

Ghanzi District is one of the ten administrative districts in which the DA offices are located, with the headquarters being in Ghanzi and sub-district in Charleshill. Working under the DC are the District Officers. The District Officer (Development) and the Lands Officers have particular responsibilities for coordinating the work of Central Government agencies and land use planning respectively. In larger Districts the DC may have one or more District Officers or Assistants each in charge of a sub-district.

TOWN AND DISTRICT COUNCILS

The Councils are locally elected bodies. They have formal authority to take decisions within their localities. They have the power and the discretion to allocate resources within their areas of jurisdiction. The power base is local and their decisions reflect the aspirations of local communities. These bodies are, however, never left to run the administration alone. They exist side by side with the locally based officials of various central government departments.

Councils carry out their statutory duties through a system of standing committees. These include such committees as Education, Health, Works, Trade and Licensing, Physical Planning, and so on. The committee system allows more time for dealing with routine and specialised matters than would be possible at Full Council meetings. This also makes use of a pool of experts, mainly from various (though not restricted to) Council departments, who look at more complex issues in detail before they are referred to Full Council for decision.

The statutory responsibilities of these institutions involve the administration of primary education, primary health care, construction and maintenance of rural roads, water supply, community development and social welfare, and so on.

The Councils are accountable to MLGLH through which their development grants are channelled. Recurrent expenditures are met partially from locally raised revenues, but all Councils rely upon government for their deficit grants.

Ghanzi District Council is one of the district councils in the country, with a district and sub-district headquarters located in Ghanzi and Charleshill, respectively.

As the locally elected representative body, Council has wider interests and responsibilities for providing district development leadership. The Council and its Councillors must be innovators and spokespersons on behalf of their constituents. It provides local political guidance to district development planning and an important link between the people and their government. If government's commitment to decentralisation is to be realised, then the active participation of district's decision makers, the Councillors, must be ensured. Every opportunity should be taken to involve Councillors in district development, not only in the design and operation of development plans but also keeping them fully informed about implementation.

LAND BOARD

The Land Boards are responsible for leases and allocation of tribal land including open wells and boreholes. They confer land use rights on individuals or groups. There are twelve main land boards and thirty-eight subordinate land boards. Ghanzi has a main land board and a subordinate land board based in Ghanzi headquarters and Charleshill, respectively.

By law, a Land Board is a body corporate. This means that it has legal rights similar to an individual; for example, it can sue or be sued. In addition, the law states that a Land Board has the power to act and enter into any legal transaction, which it feels is appropriate to its function as a Land Board.

The MLGLH has responsibility for all the Land Boards in Botswana. The Ministry directs, coordinates and controls the activities of the Land Boards. It also provides financial assistance to the Land Boards in the form of recurrent grants.

The following are the functions of the Land Board:

- To allocate and vary customary land rights. This includes granting and cancelling rights of use, hearing appeals from Subordinate Land Boards, and placing restrictions or conditions on the use of tribal land.
- To describe grazing areas in consultation with the District Council;
- To set aside land for commonage in consultation with the District Council;
- To lease land for common law purposes. This includes: granting and cancelling leases and granting permission for a transfer of rights or change of use; and
- To grant land in consultation with the District Council for state purposes.

Functions of a Subordinate Land Board

The functions of the Subordinate Land Board are as follows:

- To allocate and vary customary land rights. This includes: granting rights of use; hearing and

approving applications for land for building residences or extensions to residences, ploughing lands, grazing areas and communal village land uses.

- To recommend cancellation of customary land rights and applications for boreholes and common law grants to the Land Board; and
- To hear and decide disputes regarding customary land rights in their areas.

TRIBAL ADMINISTRATION

Tribal Administration has traditional and developmental duties. It supports rural development initiatives, particularly at the community level.

Chieftainship is one of the oldest institutions in Botswana and has survived the vicissitudes of the colonial period. Chiefs have always wielded great power and enjoyed considerable prestige. They have many responsibilities including the maintenance of law and order, administration of justice, serving as spokespersons for their tribes, and so on.

The Chief, who is also the Head of Tribal Administration, is by virtue of his position an ex-officio Member of the District Council. The chiefs have considerable personal and political influence, popularity and legitimacy. They fulfil a wide variety of traditional, cultural and ceremonial duties and play an important part in the land allocation process. Their main task, however, is the administration of justice under the system of customary law; they conduct the network of customary courts which handles the majority of the criminal and civil cases in Botswana.

District Development Committee (DDC)

This is the most significant organisation at the district level for coordination of development activities. Its terms of reference are:

- To coordinate the activities of all local and central government agencies in the district with the view to promoting development;
- To serve as a planning body for the district;
- To advise the agencies referred to above on matters relating to development;
- To coordinate the planning, management and implementation of district development plans, annual plans, and any other plans for the district;
- To coordinate the development activities of NGOs in so far as they affect Government and/or communities with a view to harmonising them with Government policy and programmes.
- To monitor the process of decentralisation with a view to advising Government on possible course of action.

District Extension Team (DET)

This is a sub-committee of the DDC manned by heads of extension departments at the district level. The DET is responsible for the interpretation of the development policies; provides guidance to the VET and rural communities for proper implementation of their programmes within such policies. The DET's terms of reference are:

- To interpret national policies in order to develop plans based on such policies;
- To prepare district annual plans based on a priority list of identified village development programmes;
- To ensure the implementation of the District Annual Plan;
- To monitor the implementation of VET activities by reviewing their quarterly reports, making visits and providing the necessary assistance;
- To promote communication amongst extension staff in order to facilitate coordination and integration of programmes for efficient utilisation of resources;
- To organise VETs seminars and workshops to facilitate the flow of information among extension teams.

VILLAGE INSTITUTIONS

These institutions are divided into **Traditional** and **Modern** types. The former derive their name from their pre-colonial origin with chieftaincy, the Kgotla and wards being the main features. The latter were created after independence and are political divisions.

The Kgotla: traditional authority, chiefs, sub-chiefs, village headmen and ward heads are critical links between communities and government authorities. The Kgotla represents the "institution" where community consensus can be arrived at and where development initiatives and participation can be encouraged. If "bottom-up" planning and development is to take place then its base must be the Kgotla, to which each member of the community has access, and where community involvement in decision making is traditionally accepted.

All village¹ areas are served by the Kgotla. The village kgotla is led by the Chief (Kgosi or Chief's representative) who is responsible for calling the Kgotla meetings, trying cases under customary law, adjudicating land allocation matters and who is involved in village development. The modern role of the Kgotla has been identified as crucial to all rural development planning extension and implementation functions. The support of the Kgotla is often a key element in implementing projects at village level. The Kgotla is one of the fora for the discussion of the district's development plan. All the methods of consultation use the kgotla to a greater or lesser extent. Under the village kgotla are the ward-kgotlas, led by the ward-heads. Their functions are the same as the village kgotla but subservient in that they relate only to their wards.

Modern Institutions

Village Development Committees (VDCs) were established by a Presidential Directive of 1968 for the purpose of implementing development programmes in villages. A VDC is the main village institution responsible for all development matters. The VDC coordinates all village institutions' activities such as those of Parents Teachers Association, Women's Organisations and other voluntary organisations. The VDC is responsible to the Kgotla on matters related to development. The functions of the VDC are the following:

- Identify and discuss local needs;
- Help villagers to prioritise their local needs;
- Formulate proposals for the solution of identified local needs;
- Determine the extent to which the people can satisfy their identified needs on self-help basis;
- Develop a plan of action for their village area;
- Solicit the assistance of donors and other development agencies;
- Mobilise the community and its institutions for development action;
- Provide a forum of contact between village leaders, politicians and District Authorities to enhance the flow of development information; and
- Represent villagers in development matters and to act as a source and reference point in matters pertaining to village development.

A VDC includes 10 members elected at a Kgotla meeting. There are 5 executive members² and 5 additional members. In addition, there are a number of ex-officio members (people who by virtue of their positions are automatically members of the VDC). They are the Headmen, Councillors and Extension workers. They should not hold any of the executive offices. Further, there may be co-opted members. Only the ten elected members have the power to vote.

Village Health Committees

Members are elected at village Kgotla and work closely with Family Welfare Educators (FWEs) in assisting the health staff in promoting health campaigns including:

¹ In remote areas of the country, locations akin to villages are called settlements that have local Kgotlas and other village-based organisations.

² Includes the Chairman, Vice-Chairman, Secretary, Vice-Secretary, and Treasurer

- Encouraging cleanliness in compounds;
- Constructing pit latrines;
- Advising mothers on children's health;
- Assisting destitutes, the elderly, and the disabled;
- Following up TB cases; and
- Assisting Family Welfare Educators (FWEs) with work at health posts.

Parents Teachers Association (PTA) is composed of parents, guardians and teachers of children attending a particular school. It may also include any interested community members who are regarded as ordinary members of the Associations. The members of the association should elect ten members to form the executive committee. The Executive Committee is empowered to coopt 3 more members. These three members have no voting rights. The structure for PTA is the same as for the VDC. The above structure is suitable for both primary and Community Junior Secondary School. The functions of PTAs are as follows:

- Further the pupils' interest in education through coordinated parents and teachers efforts;
- Hold functions and collect monies for the development of the school such as the provision of suitable outdoor amenities and funding educational trips and excursions;
- Provide such facilities as may be necessary for the sound education and comfort of the pupils, and to supplement those provided by the education authority;
- Carry out any other duties conducive to the welfare and education of the pupils;
- Arrange social and educational programmes of interest to the members of the PTA;
- Act as a reference group over the schools program which finally builds the school's reputation amongst its community; and
- Report progress to the VDC quarterly.

Village Literacy Committees (VLCs) are responsible for the formation and subsequent development of literacy learning groups in the village. Their overall mission is to ensure fulfilment of the programme of eliminating illiteracy in their particular village or community. Their specific functions are as follows:

- Identify the learning needs, the learners and the learning resources;
- Assist in devising and formulating learning programmes in the villages;
- Motivate the village illiterates and semi-literates to participate in the learning activities specifically programmed for them and assist in publicity campaigns;
- Keep track of group attendance, and evaluate and report progress on the performance of literacy activities in the area to the VDC and other appropriate bodies;
- Recruit motivated persons to act as tutors or literacy group leaders;
- Assist in the creation of a literate environment through construction of reading rooms, book exhibitions, reading forums, development and distribution of reading materials;
- Foster co-operation between the Literacy Group Leaders, Literacy Supervisors, and resource persons, and the learners themselves; and
- Promote good functional relationships with the VDCs and VETs.

The Village Extension Team (VET) is a body of extension workers from different extension departments based at the village level. These officers should be armed with information of different services their departments offer, work together with villages to identify their villages needs and problems, and plan and implement their solutions. The strength of the Team highly depends on the officers' understanding of the need to consult and cooperate with other members who should also feel the same about working together. The following are the functions of the VET:

- Help clients identify problems;
- Help clients develop alternative solutions to those problems;
- Analyse the consequences of the alternatives to those problems;
- Assist clients to take up appropriate decisions on alternatives;
- Help villagers to prepare and implement the village development plan;
- Serve as a communication link between the village and the district;

- Participate in the village annual consultation exercises like the Village Development Conference, in order to make the district aware of problems and priorities of the village(s);
- Discuss the coordination and better integration of their programmes;
- Organise VETs seminars and workshops;
- Support and advise people in carrying out small village projects of varied type;
- Implement the annual plans and submit quarterly reports to the District Extension Team (DET);
- Appraise village development progress with VDC quarterly and report to DET;
- Responsible for the formation and maintenance of Village Development institutions including the VET itself;
- Acts as an information source and reference point for advice in all matters relating to development; and
- Acts as government representative.

Other Village Organisations: There are a number of other village organisations, which are also involved in consultation. In the main these are bodies such as voluntary organisations such as Young Women Christian Association, Botswana Red Cross Society, Botswana Council of Women, cooperatives and the churches. It is important that these bodies are involved in some way at the village level so that their views can be made known.

SOURCE: District Planning Handbook, 1997d: 24 –42.

Appendix 7

Ministry of Local Government, Lands and Housing: Draft Policy On The Remote Area Development Programme

1.0 INTRODUCTION

- 1.1 This paper sets forth Government's revised policy on the Remote Area Development Programme (RADP).
- 1.2 The paper explains the reason for the review of the existing policy and outlines the areas of emphasis in the revised policy.
- 1.3 It further maps out strategies for the implementation of the policy.
- 1.4 The revised policy is predicated on the realisation that Remote Area Dwellers (RADs) are hindered by their peculiar circumstances from fully exercising their fundamental rights and freedoms which are guaranteed by the constitution of Botswana.
- 1.5 The Constitution of Botswana guarantees and protects the rights and freedoms of all Batswana irrespective of race, colour, creed, ethnic, origin and social standing.
- 1.6 The Government of Botswana is committed to promoting social, cultural and economic development of all its citizens. However, the Government is conscious of the fact that not all sectors of its population have yet benefited equally from the rapid, post-independence development of Botswana.
- 1.7 Given the fact that the Constitution prohibits all forms of discrimination, the objective of this policy is to create a conducive environment for the RADs to fully exercise their fundamental rights and freedoms, and to have equal access and equal opportunity to partake in the social, economic and political activities of the country.
- 1.8 The development approach which this policy espouses is that that which recognises and respects the diversity of the ethnic traditions and cultures in the country.

2.0 BACKGROUND

- 2.1 The Government of Botswana introduced the RADP in 1974.
- 2.2 The main objective of the programme was, and still is, to facilitate the social integration of the marginalised section of the population into the mainstream of society, and to develop rural settlements to a level that is comparable with that of other rural villages in the country by providing education, health, an adequate supply of potable water, and other facilities necessary to improve the living conditions in those settlements.
- 2.3 The target beneficiaries of the programme are those Batswana who live in poor conditions in the remote areas of the country. The target beneficiaries include the following:
 - 2.3.1 Members of the ethnic minority groups who live without access to basic social facilities such as schools, clinics and potable water;
 - 2.3.2 Nomadic hunters and gatherers;
 - 2.3.3 Peripheral and unemployed farm squatters;
 - 2.3.4 Groups which are permanently settled in a remote settlement.

- 2.4 Emphasis is thus on the geographic, as opposed to the ethnic, identification of the beneficiaries of the programme.
- 2.5 Even though the programme has largely succeeded in providing infrastructure and improving living standards in the remote settlements, some weaknesses, such as those indicated below.

3.0 POLICY OBJECTIVES OF THE PROGRAMME

- 3.1 To undertake intensified development of remote settlements so as to bring them to a level of development comparable with that of other rural areas in the country by providing an adequate supply of portable water and educational, health and other facilities necessary to improve the living conditions of the RADs.
- 3.2 To promote production-oriented, income and employment generating activities in remote settlements.
- 3.3 To promote the RADs' access to land and other natural resources.
- 3.4 To provide the RADs with training and education to enable them to be self-sustaining.
- 3.5 To promote the social, cultural and economic advancement of the RADs by facilitating their integration into the mainstream of society, without detriment to their unique culture and tradition.

4 WEAKNESSES IN THE CURRENT POLICY

- 4.1 The following weaknesses in the programme were obtained through various fora, including research studies, seminars, workshops and consultation with the programmes officers and representatives:
 - 4.1.1 The complaints from RADs regarding lack of employment and economic opportunities, particularly for their children who have attended school.
 - 4.1.2 The complaints regarding refusal by Land Boards to allocate RADs land in some cases and in others were RADs are said to have been advised to apply for land only in remote area settlements and villages.
 - 4.1.3 Reports about the exploitation of RADs as a source of cheap labour at cattleposts by cattle owners.
 - 4.1.4 Complaints about the unfair processes for identifying representation of communities in terms of leadership. This contributes negatively to proper and effective representation in Village Development Committees and Councils to facilitate articulation of needs and aspirations of RADs.

5.0 AREAS OF EMPHASIS ON THE REVISED POLICY

- 5.1 The decision to undertake the review of the existing policy on the Remote Area Development programme is based on the identified weakness during consultation. In response to these problems, the Ministry of Local Government Lands and Housing undertook to carry out an in-house analysis of the complaints in relation to administrative processes used to implement the programme:
 - 5.1.1 There has to-date been a heavier emphasis on the development of infrastructure and less attention paid to social development of the RADs. There, consequently, has to be a shift from infrastructure to social, economic and political development relating to the rights of the RADs.

- 5.1.2 There is the continued problem of hampered access to land. There is, therefore, need initiate educational programmes aimed at improving accessibility of land to RADs.
- 5.1.3 There is need to assess and develop the economic viability of remote settlements, with a view to further developing the economic base which has been established through the Economic Promotion Fund. This will involve reassessment of the implementation of the Economic Promotion Fund, with the aim of expanding income employment generating opportunities in the settlements.
- 5.1.4 There is need to ensure RADs increased access of RADs to education and training so as to improve their accessibility of employment opportunities.
- 5.1.5 Ensuring environmental consciousness in development programmes in remote settlements by, for example, insisting that there should be replenishment projects alongside projects relating to economic exploitation of natural resources in these areas.
- 5.1.6 The need to develop special emphasis in the National Settlement Policy to facilitate smooth establishment of remote settlements.
- 5.1.7 The need to ensure social acceptance of the RADs by the general populace.
- 5.1.8 Direct participation in decision-making process which affect new settlements and how they are to be run.
- 5.1.9 Realisation of the problem that development activities which have been carried out in the remote settlements to-date have largely been prescribed by government, without thorough direct input from the beneficiaries.

6.0 PLAN OF ACTION WITH RESPONSE TO THE IDENTIFIED PROBLEMS AND ISSUES

6.1 DEVELOPMENT

Because “development” is largely an elusive and subjective concept, it is considered logical that development strategies for the RADs should be determined by the RADs themselves and adopted to their particular conditions and needs.

Specifically, RADs should have an active and full participation in defining their concept of development from the standpoint of their values and norms.

Such development must fulfil their aspiration to achieve the greatest possible measure of individual and collective social and economic advancement. Within this broad definition of development, specific attention will be paid to the following areas:

6.1(a) CULTURE

This policy underlines social integration, while recognising that Botswana is made up of a variety of ethnic groups with a variety of cultures and languages.

It therefore has to be recognised that RADs have a culture and tradition of their own which has sustained them over centuries.

They will therefore be encouraged to as part of this policy to pick aspects of their culture which they cherish such as arts, their medicine, their hunting skill etc. and integrate them into development programmes. It is important that a clear definition be made to distinguish poverty from culture. On this understanding it is pertinent that living habits which are adopted purely to survive are distinguished from cultural belief and custom.

6.1(b) **COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT AND LEADERSHIP**

The main thrust of this will be to promote community participation, build and strengthen the community and leadership structures so as to enable RADs to mobilise, articulate their views, identify their needs and participate in the structuring of their development programmes.

6.1(c) **ECONOMIC PARTICIPATION**

There will be increased emphasis on programmes which stimulate community participation as well as on projects with potential for generating income and employment in the remote settlements so as to make RADs self-reliant. Efforts will be made to generate sources to reinforce development programmes in the remote settlements with a view to promoting the economic potential of the settlements. Government will assist RADs in establishing sustainable projects in veld products utilisation, handicraft production, arable land management, livestock development, game ranching, etc.

6.2 **LAND**

RADs have to-date experienced a hampered access to land largely due to their nomadic lifestyle. In recognition of the fact that land is an important economic resource and also that it serves as a means of cultural identity, increased efforts will be made to improve RADs accessibility to land.

Government will also take measures to ensure the representation of RADs in local authorities. Increased attention will also be given to resolving the question of RADs hunting and gathering rights especially where there are competing land rights and uses.

6.3 **EDUCATION**

Government will aim at increased access to Education by RADs through the provision of schools in remote settlements through the provision of vocational and technical training e.g. The current "four grade" level at primary schools will have to be abandoned and upgrading of existing facilities to Grade 7 introduced.

Intensified public education programmes will be mounted to create awareness in the RADs of their rights and to encourage them to be assertive. Public education will be used to address the problem of negative attitudes or biases against RADs.

Career counselling will be provided so as to assist the children of RADs to make appropriate choices of careers, based on their abilities and inclinations. The running of day care centres by the community will be encouraged with government support, to help prepare children for introduction to formal education.

In so far as remoteness often hampers the schooling of the children of RADs, boarding facilities or hostels shall be provided with the aim of improving the schooling opportunities of these children. These facilities will be provided as an interim measure until such time that the schools are within walking distances.

6.4 **PUBLIC AWARENESS**

There will be intensified public awareness programmes to educate and conscientise RADs about their rights and responsibilities in society; and to make them aware that they have as much rights as any other Motswana.

The public awareness programme will help RADs to develop a sense of self-esteem and the realisation that they are an integral part of the society. The programme will also be targeted at the general public with the view of awareness of segregation on ethnic or tribal grounds.

7.0 DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY FOR REMOTE SETTLEMENTS

7.1 A development strategy will be formulated for each RAD community in each district, taking into account the resources available to each settlement. Under normal circumstances the following strategy will apply:

- 7.1.1 A strategic point in a catchment will be selected and developed into a settlement.
- 7.1.2 Where possible, the catchment area will be located close to a wildlife management area. Hunting and gathering territories will be retained.
- 7.1.3 a borehole will be drilled and equipped to provide portable water in the catchment area. Where possible, an additional borehole will be drilled and equipped.
- 7.1.4 A school, clinic and other necessary facilities will be provided in the catchment area.
- 7.1.5 Where RADs are to be relocated, compensation will be assured and paid in the normal manner.
- 7.1.6 Suitable are will be identified within the catchment are for the promotion of productive economic activities.
- 7.1.7 Establishment of hostels will not be encouraged.

8.0 MEASURES TO ADDRESS THESE WEAKNESSES AS PART OF THE REVISED POLICY

To address poverty, the following measures will be adopted:

- 8.1.1 Properly planned settlements will be established to accommodate all the landless inhabitants of remote areas.
- 8.1.2 Land surveys, including soil investigations, will be conducted to determine and establish the amount land required to ensure proper incorporation of the RADs' communal land needs now and in the future.
- 8.1.3 Support will be given to income generating and employment creating ventures within and around remote settlements, particularly to those that make use of available natural resources.
- 8.1.4 The Labour Department will be requested to set a statutory minimum wage applicable to agricultural labourers, as this is a serious cause of poverty to

many RADs. Any breach of labour regulations on ranches or elsewhere will be punished according to law.

- 8.2 To address insecurity, the following measures will be adopted:
 - 8.2.1 The Ministry of Local Government, Lands and Housing will ensure that Land Boards educate RADs about their land rights, and also assist them to apply for land allocations.
 - 8.2.2 Fair and adequate compensation will be paid to inhabitants of remote areas who are displaced from their traditional territories.
 - 8.2.3 Given the nature of the traditional lifestyle of RADs, and the fact that their land use requirements differ from those of the majority population, appropriate legal provisions will be drawn up to ensure adequate access to land for purposes of hunting and gathering.
- 8.3 To address illiteracy and poor educational attainment, the following measures will be adopted:
 - 8.3.1 The Department of Non-Formal Education will be charged with developing with immediate effect, literacy programmes in the languages of the RADs.
 - 8.3.2 The Ministry of Education will develop a timetable for the introduction of a new primary school curriculum, in which teaching will be entirely in the mother language of the pupils for the first two years of school.
 - 8.3.3 The training and recruitment of RADs as literacy assistants and primary school teachers will be pursued vigorously.
 - 8.3.4 A similar emphasis will be placed on provision of further education to RADs, both to overcome their disadvantages and to enable more of their number to return to assist in the development of their own communities. One way of doing this will be through the provision of quota of places for RADs, to be reserved by each institute of higher education in the country, and any training courses provided by government.
- 8.4. To address weak institutions and leadership structures, the following measures will be adopted.
 - 8.4.1 Communities will be encouraged to elect their own leaders in enabling them to articulate their own needs both among themselves and in dialogue with the national society, and to ensure that they themselves choose, rather than adopting models imposed from outside.
 - 8.4.2 In order that this can be done effectively, liaison officers acquainted with the languages of the RADs will be appointed to assist in communication between the elected leadership and other organs of the state (thus fluency in Setswana will not be a requirement for elected leaders). Such officers should be members of the ethnic groups concerned.
 - 8.4.3 In conjunction with the educational provisions above (8.3.3 and 8.3.4) every effort will be employed to recruit RADs as extension workers in all areas of service to their communities.
 - 8.4.4 A forum in which to bring together elected leaders of RADs will be established, in order to provide for free exchange of views among RAD communities, and also to provide a channel of communication between government as the responsible authority for RADP and its beneficiaries.

- 8.5 To address negative attitudes, the following measures will be adopted:
- 8.5.1 The International Labour Organisation Convention concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries (No. 169 of the 7th June 1989) will be presented to Parliament for ratification
 - 8.5.2 The ratification of the ILO Convention together with the enactment of legal provisions (8.1.4) and consequent adjustments to the remit of Land Boards, District Administration directives, etc , will be given the fullest publicity, and all officers of central and local government will be properly briefed on these changes and their reason.
 - 8.5.3 The Ministry of Local Government, Lands and Housing will, through the District Administration and District Councils, ensure that the Village Extension Teams, District Extension Teams and District Land Use Planning Units give priority attention to the implementation and monitoring of the RADP.
 - 8.5.4 An institute dedicated to the study of indigenous peoples, their languages, culture, history, etc, will be established within the structures of the University of Botswana, interest in this rich element of the national heritage, and its recognition as such.
 - 8.5.5 Specific programme of in-service training will be provided to all officials dealing in any way with the RADs regarding their rights and privileges of all the country's citizens, and any instances of discrimination will be investigated and severely dealt with.

O. O. Pitso
PERMANENT SECRETARY
8th July 1993