THE DILEMMA OF LEADERSHIP AND DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA: A REFLECTION ON GENERAL ELECTIONS IN BURUNDI

By

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Dedication

This work is dedicated to AHMIRADO,whom God has given power to guide, inspire and empower the poor; and to late Denyse Reinker and Ahrim Reinker, who in their virtuousness and loving kindness dedicated their lives to working for and helping the poor and the disadvantaged. Their missionaries work in Africa will be a living legacy.

This work is also dedicated to my parents, brothers and sisters, and all Burundian victims of 1993 civil war.

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Declaration

I declare this work to be entirely my own. All citations and information obtained from the works and publications of others have been acknowledged accordingly. It is being submitted for the degree of Masters of Commerce in the school of Law and Management, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Westerville Campus, South Africa. No part of this work has been submitted for any other degree in another University.

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"Just like the king of Egypt, he hardened his heart against the will of God; Burundian leaders like many of the rest of African countries also sealed their hearts from the cries of their people. They refused to let people go under normal procedures of ballot. Bullets and breakout storm of war are expected to make change of leadership".

Abstract

This study investigates leaders as source of conflicts in a polarized Burundi society. The study adopted a qualitative-interpretative methodology in which social actors like politicians, journalists, members of civil society were interviewed, the outcome of which was matched with relevant literature on democracy, governance, and peace building in Burundi in order to answer the study's critical questions. Eighteen respondents were purposively selected six from each social actor's group were interviewed such that data was generated through face-to-face interviews. The data collected was manually analyzed and interpreted using an open coding.

Burundian leadership system was grossly hampered from pre-colonial era when the colonizer, who was more interested on self-enrichment than developing the local citizens, hijacked and extinguished the monarch of "*Ganwa*". The African leaders who took over leadership after the independence unfortunately adopted the colonizer's egotistic leadership style. The situation was further exacerbated by excessive hunger for and desire to stay in power of post-colonial African leaders. The long lived divine appointment to leadership was forgotten; new local leaders instead impatiently adopted self-appointment system. This gave birth to the systems of coup d'état that was replaced by democratization of 1990. The study further showed that even in so-called democratic regime, the authoritarian African perpetrate elections manipulation using violence to seize or remain in power against the craving of electorates. Thus the use of arms becomes the only tool to drive successful candidates to elections.

Contrary to common opinion the "Arusha" negotiations of Burundi power sharing was revealed to be another source of conflicts than ethnic diversity. Corporation of Hutu and Tutsi political leaders for their common interest as elites suggested a new ethnic group as source of war, "*ethiny of leaders*" who are ready to sacrifice anything to protect their power-intoxicated selfish interests. To adequately assess the leaders' behavior and their leadership system, the study has adopted the authentic theory of leadership which stress on living examples of leaders who respected the needs of their followers.

Findings confirm that leaders are the source of all problems that Burundi has experienced since the beginning of the transition process. Through the disguise of democracy, elites make war for positions of leadership and in the process people suffer tortures, arbitrarily arrest, and

killings while others run into exile. The study concludes that Burundians are under bondage of politicians and need liberation from their own leaders. The study recommends strong institutions, unity and decentralization of power. These three elements would restore the power of the state yet bringing back dignity to the people as citizens who hold power to vote in or out their leaders without interference of elites.

LIST OF ACRONYMS

CNDD-FDD: *Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie -Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie.* National Council for the Defense of Democracy-Forces for the Defense of Democracy

CENI: *Commission Electorale Nationale Indépendante.* Independent National Electoral Commission

FNL: *Forces Nationales de Libération''* – "National Liberation Forces

FRODEBU: *Front pour la Démocratie au Burundi.* Front for Democracy in Burundi

G7:   Hutu Group of political parties that signed the Arusha Agreement

G10:   Tutsi Group of political parties that signed the Arusha Agreement

PDC: *Parti Democratic Chretient.* "Christian Democratic Party", this party Was among contenders in the period of independence.

P P: *Parti du Peuple.* " Peoples Party,

UPRONA: Union Nationale pour le Progrès. National Union for Progress

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CHAPTER ONE

STUDY ORIENTATION AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

1.1. Introduction

This study attempts to investigate the issues of democratic elections of Burundian leaders into power and their system of poor leadership as source of conflicts in Burundi. This chapter serves as a prelude to the study. It begins by introducing the study, providing a background to the study and an historical overview of Burundian politics, and provides a motivation for the research. The chapter further outlines the research problem, and the critical questions to be addressed, and the objectives which the study aspires to achieve. It further presents a brief of the research design and the outline of the research chapters. The relevance of theory used for the study is also as important as the objectivity of the research itself. As such, the theory applied in this study will be discussed in-depth.

1.2. Background of the Study

Since the independence of most African states, politics in many countries like Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Sudan (among others) have been characterized by incessant political crises. According to Johnson, Slater and McGwan (2007), the election of leaders into political office has become a dangerous stage for contestation because of the greed and excessive quest by politicians to control and hold to power. This has created the crisis of poor governance/leadership and corruption, and has also become a source of conflict in many African states. A conflict over positions of leadership does not only have negative effects on the welfare of the people and the state at large, but also renders the whole aspect of democratic elections ineffective. Burundi presents a case in point where contesting for leadership positions has led to undemocratic election practices-- thus the preference of 'bullet over ballot', and the self-appointment of leaders through violence rather than through free and fair democratic election practices. This situation is not only ideal for Burundi but for Cote d'Ivoire and DRC as well as in other African countries, have too often been clouded by the problems of election rigging and malpractices, and the eventual outbreak of violence which in most cases transformed into full-blown civil wars or conflicts.

Since Burundi's independence in 1962, and following the country's first parliamentary elections in 1965 that saw the victory of Hutu candidates and the 'claimed' controversial appointment by King Mwanbutsa IV of a Tutsi prince as prime Minister, Burundi has witnessed raising tensions that exploded into violence and the pressure of civil war. However, it was not until 1993 that this long-lasting tension and violence that had carried on since independence matured into a fully-blown civil war, which lasted until 2005. The outbreak of civil war in 1993, following the country's first democratic presidential elections and the immediate assassination of the President-elect Ndadaye fuelled the prolonged civil war that caused the deaths and displacements of thousands of citizens, and greatly deteriorated and impacted on the country's political and socio-economic development, Alusala (2005).

As in 1993, the 2010 general elections were also followed by the outbreak of violence amongst other challenges of the protracted years of conflicts and fragile nature of peace in the country. According to Alusala (2005), while the civil war created a situation and a society where citizens were left victimized by the system, the process of elections though freighted with irregularities remained and is a regular practice. According to Samuel (2004:2) elections, and the manipulation thereof, especially in an atmosphere of political and social tension and ethnic polarization like in Burundi, can only make situations worse. The politisation of political leadership along ethnic lines has ignited conflicts in most parts of the African continent. This study details that Burundi is no different. Moving from a monarchy to an authoritarian system, to a 'democratic' system Burundi continues to suffer the scourge and dilemma of leadership, which is further exacerbate by the manipulation of elections by its elites.

1.3. Problem statement

The main focus in this study is linked with the problems related to transition process associated with leadership. The transition process includes periods from pre-colonial period to colonial administration, colonial to independence and independency to the present administration. This transitional period has resulted to deplorable political, economic and social changes. Lemarchand, (1996), has identified root causes of the ethnic conflicts and civil wars which Burundi endured for years now as the failure of the transition process, because the new republic failed uphold important leadership values used in traditional

system. As a result of failing to live up to these leadership values, the socio-political and economic situation in Burundi plunged into a crisis.

The period of transition in Burundi has been characterized by civil war triggered by the negative influence of Burundian's elite. During this transition period, the hero of independency was killed by the local elites through the influence of the Belgium administration (which constituted the elite). Since the deceased was a hero, the local people were divided among themselves. The first Burundian president, after the death of the hero, banished the monarch and killed the heir who supported the hero's political convictions. One should know that the second and third republic also took place through coup d'état, without proper procedures of transition and both regimes were characterized by discrimination, authoritarianism and violence. This trend of hostile takeover continues and even characterized the nature of Burundian election up to the present day. For example, Jean Pierre Chretien in Lemarchand,(1994:582) emphasized on emerging of a new political culture in both Burundi and Rwanda, a culture which has nothing in common with the political organization of Burundian tradition as an abuse of human rights and discrimination based on ethnic rights. Such an ethnic discriminatory stance, disguised in elections and democratic principles, led into the genocide which took place in 1993(in Burundi) and 1994 (In Rwanda).

The paper sought to investigate the underlying elements behind the leadership models which has shaped the present instable democratization system, in a bid to try and propose a relevant of leadership model capable of bring Burundi out of the present dilemma.

1.4. Brief Historical Overview of Burundi Politics

Burundi is a small country of 27834 square metres. It is one of the countries of the great lakes region. Its community presents an ethnic diversity in which the Hutu are the majority 85%, with just an estimated 14% of Tutsi, and about 1% of Twa.

Scholars like Gahama (2002), Lemarchand (1996), Ntahombaye, and Nduwayo (2007) speak of a stable pre-colonial Burundi society where all the ethnic groups lived in peace under traditional leaderships. During the era of traditional rule, access to leadership position was accorded to leaders, following the scrutinisation of their personal character and ability to be worthy leaders for the good and service of the people they were called to lead. Thus, leaders had special commitments and were requested to prove themselves prior to being appointed by

the citizen population as leaders. According to Nicayenzi (2002), this former political pattern in Burundi was in line with the traditional conceptualization of Kingship in Africa that had as a priority the wellbeing of the community. This form of leadership was neutral. In Burundi for example, the ruling family were neither Hutu nor Tutsi, but were Ganwa (Nindorera, 2003; Gahama, 2002; Frere, 2012). The neutrality of the king played a major role as he was regarded as the Father of all, bearing the responsibility of making the kingdom a dwelling place for all its citizens, and a place where all ethnic groups, clans and tribes were represented. This system of rule allowed and promoted inter-marriages between the royal household and the society, creating a culture and tradition that fostered unity in the Burundi society. Given this, the pre-colonial rulers enjoyed popular support from all ethnic groups. However, this system began to gradually change when Burundi became a German colony after the First World War and then a Belgian colony from 1912 to 1962.

1.4.1. Burundi under the colonial administration.

The conflicts that have so far plagued Burundi can be traced back to the period of European invasion of Africa (as will be detailed in chapter two). The German colonial administration took advantage of the peaceful political situation in Burundi prompting a rebellion from the local chiefs[1] in 1905, against King Mwezi Gisabo. They signed agreement of mutual help, this affinity moved from the king to the whole ethnic group of Tutsi, they were promoted to leadership position to the exclusion of the Hutu--thereby sowing division between the Tutsi and the Hutu (Daley, 2006). While this tactic was aimed by the Germans to use the Tutsi (who at the time had much influence) to gain access to power in Burundi, it also created the situation of ethnic division, which has since the German colonization become a source of conflict between the political elites of the Tutsi and Hutu ethnicities and spreading to involve their various communities.

In 1960, the Prince Louis Rwagasore (a Tutsi) introduced parliamentary democracy, with the hope that it would bring back popular participation within the Burundi kingdom (Nindorera, 2003; Lemarchand, 1996). Further attempts to reinstate the Burundian society that existed prior to colonisation and build national unity saw the union of marriage between Prince Rwagasore and a Hutu woman. This marriage, which bore with it a heavy political and social

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[1] Taking advantage of the freedom, local chiefs like Maconco and Kilima... claimed the independency of their regions. Germany administration helped the king to defeat rebellious chiefs and made an agreement to help each other. Germans became friend with local chiefs, gained their trust, and gradually they became part of Burundi leadership before they took completely over.

message, did not however achieve its intended purpose of unity and patriotism--instead, it resulted in his death (Nindorera, 2003; Lemarchand, 1996). With the death of Prince Louis Rwagasore, the problem of ethnic division in the government and the society at large became widespread especially as there were constant struggles over positions of leadership in the government.The struggles over power enforced ethnic divisions instigated by political elites from the Hutu and Tutsi ethnic groups.

For a long time, until 1993, Burundi was governed by Tutsi. Thereafter, under the regime of Ndadaye and the current government under President Pierre Nkurunziza, Burundi is often referred to as a Hutu government. The Hutu and Tutsi constitute the two conflicting ethnic forces fighting for the control of state power. The history of Burundi is replete with events of civil wars, conflicts and violence among its citizens. Just after the elections of 1961 which gave the Union National pour le Progrès (UPRONA) party an overwhelming victory, followed by the independence of the country in 1962, the prince Louis Rwagasore, founder of the UPRONA and acclaimed by many as a hero, was shot dead. Pierre Ngendandumwe, a Hutu who was appointed by the king to redress the situation as premier minister, was also shot dead on 15 January 1965 by a Rwandan Tutsi (Lemarchand, 1996:8). This further ignited the ethnic divisions in Burundian politics. The Hutu were not happy when, in 1965, the king Mwambutsa tried to appoint a Tutsi, Leopold Biha, to a top leadership position in UPRONA. This situation in itself caused clashes between the two ethnic groups, since the Hutu who constituted the majority of membership in UPRONA had the expectations that the position belonged to a Hutu.

President Micombero's regime in Burundi, as well as former President Mobutu Sese Seko's regime in Congo Republic, was based on an authoritarian system of rule. Under the rule of a Tutsi, the Burundi government was referred to as a 'Tutsi Government' --creating a sense of marginalization among the Hutu. In 1972, a number of Hutu intellectuals were exterminated following the attack on Burundi by rebels from the Hutu ethnic group based in Tanzania (Nicayenzi, 2002:3). The Tutsi government's decision to eliminate the rebels created a "Tutsi-Hutu" situation where addressing issues in Burundi up the present has resulted in killings of one ethnicity as a solution to problems. In French, the situation is explained as such "*Quand l'ethnie venge le tort causé, son action ne visera pas le coupable identifié mais n'importe quel membre de l'ethnie adverse. La vengeance devient aveugle*". That is, when ethnic groups decide to avenge any crime committed against it, the action does not

necessarily target the specific criminal, but any member of that particular opposing ethnic group (Nicayenzi, 2002:3). This is how ethnic divisions came about to be a considerably negative aspect and a source of conflict in Burundi and in other African states like Rwanda, evident in the Rwandan genocide. What is more troubling is that, ethnic divisions are promoted by elites, and are reflected in the methods of leadership, which have, as in the case of Burundi created the environment of undemocratic elections/leadership and poor governance.

1.4.2. Ethnic split-up as elites' strategy to power.
The polarization of ethnic groups in Burundi was never the real problem but a strategic plan of leaders to gain supporters. While Hutu elites mobilized Hutu to fight and destabilize government in 1965, 1972, 1988 and to win elections of 1993, Tutsi elites also mobilized the Tutsi population to fight and destabilize the Hutu Government after 1993 elections, 1994, 1995 until Tutsi leader (Major Pierre Buyoya) came back to power. This led to the mobilization of young Hutu men and women in 1994 by the Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie/Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie (CNDD/ FDD), a Hutu rebel movement. At the time of Arusha negotiations in 1998-2001, the Hutu rebels and their supporters were already strong to claim their share in negotiations for the power sharing deal. Though the movement did not receive the support of mediators, regional leaders and international community, CNDD/FDD being the majority Hutu armed movement, however forced and played their way into the negotiations and in victory took over political leadership power from the Tutsi.

Burundians as other citizens of many African states are victims of elites' manipulations for the quest and control of political leadership. While the pre-colonial era in Burundi was characterized by leaders who governed for the greater good of the people, today's Burundian leaders instead stake the lives of the people they are called to lead because of the greed to remain and be in control of power. According to General Rome Dallaire (a Canadian UN officer stationed in Rwanda before Genocide), alleges that the Rwandan Genocide was instigated by politician elites (Straus, 2006:26). Same too, the 1972 massacre of Hutu citizens in Burundi was instigated and commended by the then President Micombero (Lemarchand 1996). Also, the 1993 genocide that saw the massacre of thousands of Tutsi citizens in Burundi was perpetrated by FRODEBU leader's winner of 1993 elections (Vernon et al, 2008). This account of the genocide that was committed without fear or remorse led to the

labelling of the Hutu in Burundi as *"Abamenja",* meaning 'dangerous criminals', while the Tutsi were labelled *"Ibinywamaraso"*, meaning 'vampires who suck the blood of the innocent.'

A study by Berkeley (2001) revealed that the perpetrators of the Burundi genocide were motivated by political elites, among whom some were forced with death threats and others eliminated for allegedly refusing to carry out violence against the other ethnic group. The Burundi genocide in 1993, as well as that of Rwanda in 1994, were mainly the results of political power struggles, which by extension escalated to include the issues of ethnic differences (Ntahombaye et al 2007; Vernon et al, 2008).

In as much as colonial history is important in understanding our Burundi's present leadership dilemma, and the causes of the undemocratic election practices, there is need to critically acknowledge that political and social changes cannot be sustained without drawing lessons thereof as to what needs to be done to make right the current leadership situation (Hotep, 2010; Nicayenzi, 2002; Nindorera, 2003). As researches on Burundi history catalogue, the 1993 democratic elections in Burundi resulted in the tragic genocide that recorded the deaths of more than three thousand people and the displacement of many. Subsequent to the 1993 crisis, Burundi had more than four presidents within a period of less than one year. In October 1994 Francois Ngeze took over the power and ruled for less than 24 hours, when the former Burundian parliament speaker Sylvestre Ntibantunganya was appointed President. After the withdrawal of Francois Ngeze, an army senior officers, Cyprien Ntaryamira, acting under pressure of local and international community, took over power until his death in an air crash with the then Rwandan President Habyarimana. Hopes for a positive change in the conflict situation in Burundi increased following the ceasefire agreement by different combatants and the main fighting group the CNDD/FDD joined the government in Bujumbura in 2004. However, since 2005 general elections, violence and political crisis have remained to impact on the lives of the people, and on the political and socio-economic prosperity of the state, despite the various international measures at interventions.

1.5. Rationale of the Study

Since Burundi's independence, the country has been in a constant state of crisis. The elections of leaders into positions of political leadership have for many years always resulted in conflict, raising the question why does the election of leaders in to power always seem to

create the situation of leadership dilemma and eventual conflict in Burundi? As history shows, the conflict situation took a positive turn following the ceasefire agreement in 2004. However, election rigging and manipulation continue to define the Burundi political system. The 2005 election as well as the 2010 elections that ended up in boycotts and led to the creation of rebel movements are examples of the continuing leadership dilemmas in Burundi, and an area of focus that motivates this study. Situations of this nature are common in African politics, evidences being the case of Liberia where the international community had to intervene and arrested the two antagonist leaders, Fodey Sanko and Charles Taylor. Likewise, in Ivory Coast unrest clouded the state following election manipulation and the refusal of President Bagbo to hand over power; and the case of Somalia and the history of its piracy paints another picture of African conflicts. Conflicts over leadership positions in Africa have and continue to create insecurity in the continent. Swart (2009:43) states that, "as the end of the first decade of the 21st century fast approaches, it can rightly be asserted that transnational security challenges and threats have arguably dominated, shaped, influenced and adversely affected the stability of the global political landscape, particularly on the African continent." This is a painful reality because African leaders and their excessive quest to seize and retain power are the main contributors to the problem of democratization and democracy in many countries in the African continent.

As will be examined in this study, Burundi provides a good example to the above assertion, and it is the conviction of the researcher that exposing and addressing the insatiable quest for wealth and power by Burundian leaders is a good place to begin in finding the root cause of the leadership dilemma and associated conflict. The lack of proper channels for accountability relative to public property inspired competition over vast wealth acquired through misappropriation of public funds and corruption. The personalization of land in Burundi made serious changes in the community such that the old pastoral Tutsi became the owner of land while ancients agricultural Hutu were considered domestic workers who were social ineptitude and unequal.

1.6. Main Objective

This study seeks to explore the root causes of leadership dilemma and the undemocratic processes engaged in electing/choosing leaders in a polarized society such as Burundi. It also seeks to demonstrate mechanisms on how to address this leadership problem by

recommending ways and conditions that can be adopted to ensure peaceful and successful democratic election.

1.6.1. Sub- objectives

In order to effectively respond to and achieve the above objective the study identifies the following sub-objectives.

- To examine the extent to which elections contribute to democratic malpractices and poor leadership in Burundi;

- To examine and discuss the prospects and limits of elections as a holistic approach to solving the Burundian leadership stalemate;

- To explore alternative ways and conditions necessary for conducting free and fair democratic elections in Burundi to ensure the delivery of effective service of the people; and

- To find out what is the required contribution from the African and International community in helping to conduct peaceful elections in Burundi

1.6.2. Research Questions

In order to achieve the objectives outlined above, the study identifies the following questions to serve as engine for the entire investigation:

- Why have the elections of leaders always ended in conflicts and wars in Burundi?

- What were the strengths and weaknesses of non-elected leaders who ruled in Burundi?

- What are the benefits and limits of elected regimes in African context and in Burundi in particular?

- What are the conditions required to have truly democratic elections in Burundi?

- What has been the role of the international community in the appointment of leaders in Burundi?

- What are the conditions and mechanisms required to enable the elected leaders to effectively serve the people in Burundi?

1.7. Research Design

This study is designed within the interpretive paradigm using the qualitative research method. Interpretive approaches rely heavily on naturalistic methods such as interviews. Henning (2004) argued that the details and efforts involved in interpretive inquiry allow researchers to

gain insight into particular events and range of perspectives that may not have come to light without such scrutiny. The source of data collection consisted of semi-structured interviews. Views and opinions of politicians, journalists and members of civil society, on the consequences of elections within the Burundian context were sought and analysed. This was in view of examining the impact of elections in appointing effective and competent leaders. The use of qualitative research methodology in this study not only allowed for spontaneity and flexibility in seeking the 'truth' but also to explore the truth by the process of, and interpretation of data collected (Henning, 2004).

Nine participants were interviewed, of which three participants were purposefully selected from each of the category of people mentioned above. To ensure availability and accessibility of information during the period of the study, Consent Letters were sent and signed by selected participants. Ethical approval was secured from the relevant authorities to ensure that both the rights of participants and the researcher were protected. The participants were assured of the fact that their confidentiality, anonymity, privacy and identity would not be revealed. Authorisation was sought from the University of KwaZulu-Natal Ethics Committee for the approval and Ethical clearance to conduct the study. As such, the name of places and persons used in this dissertation are pseudonyms. Data collected was transcribed verbatim and analysed manually using open coding. Themes and sub-themes were identified, compared and contrasted in order to identify areas of convergence and divergence to ensure that research question(s) are answered.

1.8. Theoretical framework

This study adopts an 'Alternatives for Peace Building as Process for Democratization and authentic leadership theory that is entrenched in the work of Ilis *et al* (2005:385), (May 2005), Rego at al (2012), Menard and brunet al (2011)… and Nindorera (2003), Nicayenzi (2002), Gahama (2002). Authentic leadership emphasize on living examples of leaders whose behaviour shape the behaviour of the whole community now and then, people learn more from observation as they build continuously growing confidence on the leaders. Authentic leadership model states that individuals learn from observation (social learning), and future behaviour are guided by the consequences of past behaviour (experience) and social learning. Given the topic of this dissertation "The Dilemma of Leadership and Democracy in Africa: A reflection on general elections in Burundi" this theory raise questions towards the attitude of

the Burundian leaders, how leaders attitude has jeopardized peace building and peaceful election in Burundi.

Peace building is another important element to the study's theory which has many methods such as decentralization or devolution of power, federalism, power sharing, democratic negotiation, and so on. All of these model of peace building have been applied in vain because of attitude and behaviour' s shift of leaders as it was explained in Chapter two. From its various definitions like Illis (2005), May (2005), Rego et al (2012), … authenticity is being true to oneself, it drive away the external influence from leader, authenticity is being real not self-faking when one denies whom he is, it is all about acting in accordance to one's inner person, unchanged human being. The traditional system of leadership where the foundation of peace building is located was not self-centered leadership but it analyses leadership within the community, one's value vis a vis to the community. Authentic leadership theory in it dimension of "root *construct*" as highlighted by Rego et al (2012) comprises four dimensions: The first element is about "*self-awareness*", how the leaders rise while been aware of his/her weakness and strengths how they see him/her and how he/she impact others. It is about in brief a self-evaluation when leader have to check and see what contribution he/she is bringing to his/her society. According to Menard et al (201:333) "Humanistic theorists refer authenticity to self-respect, respect of one's needs and values, whereas self-determination or self-initiated behaviours". As it was pointed out in Nindorera (2003), Gahama (2002), Nicayenzi (2002) *"Ubushingantahe"* institution was referred to leaders who lead with their personal values and virtues, the sense of equity and justice was the driving engine of Burundian society in one hand. At the other hand the moral centred on truth, self-esteem grounded on hard-working character for the promotion of responsible leaders. Sincerity and honesty were the words often repeated by parents to direct kids to the promotion of high moral, in one word, integrity was one strong feature of Burundi leadership.

Driven by a power hungry obsession fuelled by a quest to stay in power they risked losing the character of authentic leader and become just inauthentic. Burundians leaders failed to hold their authenticity; the current Burundi lacks ingredients of authentic leadership like it was highlighted by Nicayenzi (2002). People have lost trust in leaders and just vote the stronger/ ruling party because they are tired of war (Berkeley, 2002). As pointed out by Complain (2009), the current leadership in Burundi is lacking essential quality of leadership which is integrity. Personal interests have become reference of leadership where loyalty to

the ruler depends on the needs of officials not to the quality of leadership. Leadership has become inauthentic pervaded with hypocrisy and manipulation strategy for personal gain, according to Bruce et al (2003:319). It has become obvious today that political statements have nothing to do with the truth. Elections therefore suffer manipulation of political elites and causes frustration to their competitors, Ntahombaye et al, (2007:239).

Efforts have been combined in the name of *"power sharing"* model from local community in 1994, (Kigobe, Kajaga) regional community through mediation of Mwalimu Julius Nyerere, former Tanzanian president, Mandela, former South African president and international community by former US president Bill Cliton, from 1997 to 2000 see Lemarchand (1996), Reyntjens (1995), (2000), Southall, [ed] (2006). The theory claims that practical peace-building strategy needed a strong leadership foundation in order to be effective; unfortunately the techniques applied little or nothing to do with behaviour and attitude of leaders and thus the man with gun behind him ended up winning. Based on this claim many recent researchers and enthusiastic scholars of peace in Africa have categorically stated that most leadership in Africa particularly in Burundi enormously lack the foundation of peace building (Nindorera,2003; Ndikumana, 1981; Ngaruko et al., 2000; Gahama,2002; Hotep,2010; Gordon, 2002; Alemazung,2010). The decentralization of power, in African co-called democratic rule, has a lot of irregularities such that different groups and of course huge number of political parties were given different roles to play in politics and social life of the state. Unfortunately, these rulers who were already affected with bad behaviour of self-serving instead of serving people were inauthentic and could not raise over their personal interests to deliver. In Burundian leadership, people want to change their leaders through the election against the wishes of their power-hungry and heavily-armed leaders. The theory helps to direct the inquiries towards how to make African leaders leave the leadership seat willingly reign after their power is over. This creates the question of how would the present government achieve a peaceful election.

Peace building in Burundi has not been free choice of politicians, who are under pressure and not wanting to be probed by the next regime. This has led to power sharing deal which on itself has not proved to be a better solution to African leadership crisis although part of the power sharing agreement signed in Arusha promised a conflict-free environment and a peace-building atmosphere. Power sharing has received a lot of criticism disqualifying it as appropriate move towards salvaging the election crisis in a socio-politically polarized society

such as Burundi see Lemarchand (1996), Tull & Mehler (2004), Kaufmann (1996). This enable us to investigate beyond differences of political parties but to ask the question what are the approximate cause of ethnic war and deep hatred among the people which cannot be reduced by sharing power or democratic elections Stedman (1997). Similarly, Ntahombaye at al (2007) affirms that African conflicting wars are not results of ethnic and tribal differences but they are just wars of interests where ethnicity becomes tool of people mobilization. Ndulo (2003: 316) put it in these words: "Conflicts in Africa have typically been rooted in struggles for political power, ethnic privilege, national prestige, and scarce resources". Hwowitz (1991:217), in Lemarchand (1996) argue that even federalism is bound by convention of different groups is also irrelevant to Burundi. The depths of divisions make all possible strategies for peace-building including devolution of power impossible. Though devolution of power would make ethnic hegemony difficult as one of Tutsi aspiration, it is also difficult to achieve to Burundi case. Devolution as concept of power decentralization is only operational in democratic country, not those African countries in which democracy exist by name like in Burundi. Leaders have lost the moral of which are very dangerous to the community, and consequently it is very difficult for the people to save themselves from their oppression. Carrow et al (1998:12) argued that despite many suggestions on the definition of morality, "Morality must be a social matter and must relate to consideration of the interest of others". The above paragraph cites very well how Burundian leaders have no consideration of other person than themselves.

1.9. Sequence of Chapters

Chapter one introduces the study, presents the study's background, problem statement, and outlines the study's objectives and critical questions. The chapter also introduces the research methodology, and structure of the dissertation.

Chapter two explores the political and social organization of traditional Burundi as a decentralized monarchy. It also highlights the changes that occurred in the political and social life of post-independence Burundi including aspects such as the divisions and centralisation of the state, democratisation and its effects and consequences on peace and development.

Chapter three examines African and international involvement and attempts to restore peace in Burundi and the challenges thereof.

Chapter four presents the research design and methodology as well as data analysis. The chapter also describes the choice or selection of population, reliability and validity of the tool used in this study.

Chapter five presents the findings and analyses the views and opinions of the targeted groups.

Chapter six: this chapter discusses the results and analyses the research findings.

Chapter Seven: this chapter summarizes and concludes on the findings of the research, proving some recommendations.

1.10. Conclusion

This chapter focused on the orientation of the study. The next chapter reviews literature that draws attention to the socio- economic and leadership issues that inform the proposed study. The theory applied to this study as "Authentic leadership theory" goes well with the study because is all about degradation of leadership. Authentic theory of leadership and *"Ubushingantahe"* of Burundi tradition fit each other as Inauthenticity and lack of *"Ubushingantahe"* within Burundi nation produce the same result. In Kirundi adage they say, *"Hari abagabo ntihagwa ibara"* wherever there is elders, there is order, and where leadership is missing, chaos will reign.

CHAPTER TWO

THE DEVELOPMENT OF LEADERS AND LEADERSHIP IN BURUNDI

2.1 Introduction

The main purpose of this chapter is to explore the causes of the dilemma of leadership presently associated with the chaotic democratic process in the Burundi. It seeks to ultimately develop a basis upon which a peaceful and successful atmosphere for a democratic election can be established. This chapter specifically reviews the literature associated with the development of Burundian leadership before and after colonialism. Areas of concern will include the nature of Burundian traditional leadership and how the western powers influenced the creation of the present divisions.

2.2. The Background of African Traditional leadership

The issue of colonisation in Africa has received a lot of attention and publicity, as if it marks the beginning of African history. A comprehensive understanding of the historical development of Burundi is necessary in this study because the pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial accounts are important in understanding the underlying problems of Burundi as a country. Lemarchand (2006) noted the importance of understanding Burundi's crisis and leadership problems in the context of colonialism and in the context of African political, economic, religious and cultural systems.

Traditional African religions played a major role in pre-colonial African leadership and social organization as a way of bringing people together. A leader in the African understanding was not only a political figure but a religious leader as well. The appointment of these leaders was from birth *"Kuvukanaimbuto"*[2], and these leaders had to be a product of the royal blood and an heir to the king. Such an appointment was attributed to the divine. Corrupt political practices and excessive quest for power were culturally hindered because the heirs to the throne were usually examined and confirmed at birth they were also put at test every year once at the throne. The life of African leaders in pre-colonisation was commuted to ensure not only success and prosperity but also public unity for the security and development of the community. The kings had the obligation to be accountable to the community. Leadership

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[2]Born with seeds or crop in his hand.

was also self-destructive if a leader failed in his duty as a ruler since a leader was made to be afraid of the gods who do not, and would not, condone any leader that ruthlessly incited conflicts and discord among the community Blier (1998:28). In the specific case of Burundi, once the heir was deemed sufficiently mature to rule, the king was required by tradition to kill himself by drinking poison *"Kwihaubuki"* to avoid any kind of division among his people that might lead to a conflict between his faction and those of the young heir.

On the contrary, modern African leadership is characterised by tyrants who rule states that are built on the remnants of colonial governments. This modern leadership reflects the impact of the colonial influence, which was religious, cultural and ideological in nature (Annan, 2004). Europeans thought African traditions were inferior, and they tried to replace them with European culture especially religion becomes the basis of Burundi politics. As such, many African states inherited systems foreign to them; systems which never identified with the core of what or who Africans are; systems that compromised African identity and lost the centre which held/holds African identity as Africans Ekeh (2007:94).

2.3. Traditional Leadership and Divine kingship in Burundi.

Prior to the colonial era, kingship in Burundi was conceived as divine and such a divine leadership was expected to serve humanity selflessly. As highlighted by Richards (1968:24) the king was believed to be "the dynamical centre of the universe", whose course of action must be carefully regulated and must support the well-being of his/her subjects. Richards (1968:23) asserts that most African divine kingships possessed characteristics, which were oriented towards the good as against bad governance. As such, if the king compromised his kingship and gave in to tyranny he was forced to commit suicide by the spirit.

 In the context of Rwanda and Burundi, this self-destruction was a radical way of ending a king's life which had unanimous acceptance and was practiced in both nations. In an African context, a king was not just a political figure, but also a father of all citizens of the state, and an elder who deserves royalty and respect from all subjects. The king was also identified as being neutral, and would only appear publicly to perform his leadership duties. As cited by Frazer Coloson (1993: 312), kings were supposed to be separated from the rest of the community for the "opposition and analogy between the life of the king and life within the kingdom to be made meaningful". Kings were also seen as spiritual figures capable of

communicating and interacting with the spiritual realm, which was identified as a source of commands and strengths of the nation.

Kallen (2008) asserted that the strong and sustainable Burundian political and social organisation collapsed when the traditional African religion was paralysed by colonial administration. However, Kallen (2008:7) defines power in pre-colonial African kingship as service which facilitated the well-being of the community. Traditional chiefs and kings were not chosen on the ground of their political ability but it was a spiritual appointment. Thus, the superficial glance at the classic ethnographies of African societies reveals that the kings and chiefs of the pre-colonial era were not 'political leaders' as the modern political theory suggests but quasi-spiritual leaders appointed from birth. African Traditional religion seems to be the overall influence of the social, political and cultural of the pre-colonial era; there was not a clear distinction or dualism which created a chasm between religious and political lives. The political and religious lives constituted two dimensions of the same reality. Being a leader was more of a gift to be shared than a platform of showcasing superiority over those whom you rule.

In ancient Burundi kingship was declared at birth (Lemarchand, 1996). The midwives were capable of declaring the birth of the new king. In that way a Burundian king was known at his birth, he was said to be born with crops (*kuvukanaimbuto*) in his hands as a sign of God's appointment and only midwives were witnesses (Nindorera, 2003; Nicayenzi, 2002; Gahama, 2002)**.** According to Evans- Pritchard (1948:36) in Carlson (1993), a king in Africa remained a representation of the whole community not part of it. The African leadership was conceived as a realm of the spirit, which was its source for a perfect rule to an extent that kings were also praised like gods (Beumers, and Koloss, (ed.) 1992:84) . Lemarchand (1970: 303) has recorded one of the songs which illustrate the symbols and magic surrounding the Burundi *"Mwamiship"* kingdom known as "Our Mwami owner of the drum....which means owner of the authority".

The ruling class was neither "Hutu" nor "Tutsi" (the major ethnic groups) but *"Ganwa"*. All of this was made possible by first the king and their subordinates who did not show bias towards any ethnic group. The nature of this kingship also explains the reason why people were united. *"Ubugabire"* which means exchanges of goods and properties, citizens and leaders alike were brought under brotherhood and love, and was the driving power of the

community (Nindorera, 2003; Nicayenzi, 2002). In this way, life in an African context was not identified with individuals but with the community. People were working towards a community goal not individual accomplishments as it has been characterised by the current African leadership where public property is reduced to personal property through corruption and other forms of public funds misuse. Some people were already receiving western education, which emphasised individualism to the detriment of the community. The system of representation in political and religious practice of the kingdom brought the whole community together. "Equality and justice were the highest moral values and constituted prerequisites for cooperation and peace" (Beumers et al, 1992:9). It is important to understand that the only and primordial criteria of choosing leaders were based on both competence and character from infancy to adulthood, and they were carefully monitored by the community. The unity and the collaboration that existed between leaders and citizens themselves played a major role to advance the economic and social life of the kingdom.

Burundian community was organized according to leadership characteristics; "*Ubushingantahe*" and was promoted from the grassroots such that the leaders and followers related well. Good leadership was also valued at all levels of the society from grassroots to the kingdom administration of the Burundian community. Unity as a result of good leadership was at the heart of pre-colonial leaders to advance political, social and economic life of the state and the people.

This description of the socio-political harmony prevailing in pre-colonial Burundi is in line with the view that the frequent civil wars, violence and bloodshed which characterised and continue to brand the post-independence Burundi have their sources outside the Burundian society and are not originally from ethnic cleavages. Moreover, the description of political and social organization of Burundi does not only prove the decentralisation of the kingdom as a powerful strategy of power control; but it also serves as picture of the whole Africa's political and social traditional organisation. According to Gordon (2000:41), Africa's pre-colonial political organisations were generally well organised/governed and able to maintain law, order and social harmony. Its stability was conducive to healthy economic development. This however is not to say that these traditional structures and leadership systems were devoid of conflicts, but the nature of leadership organisation as mention earlier was able to manage the conflicts in such that the societies and the communities were not destabilised.

2.4. The Impact of Western ideologies and Religion

African traditional religion was the depth upon which different groups found their common ground and unity, until its suppression by western values imbedded in their religions such as Christianity. With the mention of the religion aspect, it is logical to realise that missionaries also played a major part in destroying the strong pillar on which Burundi traditional society was built. African societies at colonization suffered the loss of their religion which was not only their way of respect , that is, coming together as family around one king and one nation but also the loss of their political, social, moral and cultural values. Kaplan (1986) has pointed out the arrogance of European missionaries over African culture. He claims that the character and attitude of European missionaries were almost the same toward indigenous Africans everywhere. This would explain why African religion and culture was at the end replaced with Christianity, a European religion and a tool for African civilization than serving it main purpose which was to introduce Jesus Christ to the Africans. This is so because faith can only be practiced through one's context. The context regulates the day to day lives of the people, which ultimately reflect their culture.

If a person is bringing one's faith, s/he brings cultural and social values along. Unlike faith, religion is a cultural way in which faith is practiced. When missionaries preached, the gospel which they preached possessed with it the conviction that the African traditional religion was an impediment to their mission. For the missionaries to be successful in their evangelization they exalted their western culture at the expense of African Traditional Religion, this is confirmed by the writings of African theologians and Philosophers like John Mbiti and Bediako. Kaplan (1986:168) highlighted that missionaries were unable to separate the Christian religion from European trappings such as monogamy, western dress, and etiquette and accordingly sought to impose an all-inclusive package upon the African population.

Christianity did not only come to Africa as a faith to advance the spiritual life of Africans but also as a vehicle of civilization to change primitive African culture contrary to the superior European culture Bediako (1992) argued that the end result of mission schools or Christian schools was nothing less than "Black Whiteman", an African educated in European cultured knowledge. Christianity or colonialism was just a way to transform the educated African elite in order to handle their duties in European culture and context Bediako (1992). In Christian churches or missionary schools, Christians were given European names to identify themselves with their masters leaving their culture behind. Bediako (1992:328) stressed that

religion was not introduced as faith but it was backed by school, technical and industrial training, modern agriculture, commerce and enterprise, all came in the Christian package. This made it irresistible for most African leaders and their subjects such that many of them adopted the religion of the master and adopted European names. From African tradition, the traditional names played major a role towards the identity and personality of the person. In Burundi they say *"Izinaniryomuntu"*, meaning that a name reveals the real identity of a person. Taking away the traditional name of the king for example was a great achievement for Europeans and this marked the mitigation of kingship to the role of a political leader and no longer representative and mediator of the gods as the name of the king was revealing his personality Bediako (1992; Pobee (1992); Davidson (1998); Kaplan(1986). Christianity then became a means of changing Africa from low race and primitive society to higher race (Europeans) and modern society Bediako (1992). As Christianity was targeting chiefs, they took kings from their people and citizens were left without common ground and went back to their different groups, ethnic, tribes…from which divisions were born. According to Gonidec (1976: 20), pre-colonial Africa was classless as Africans were associated with living in a community like family they had common ownership of the land and properties. The pre-colonialism in Burundi has two important characteristics for political and social organization. It is in other words the confirmation of the strong bond between the citizens, and it expresses the true unity between communities. This was how African Kingdoms (as found in Burundi) lived like a very big family which expresses a control of the use of resources for common good of the community. This communal living was also the source of social services and economic security while preserving solidarity among the people. The invasion of Europeans came with individualism creating different communities among Africans.

2.4.1 The birth and impact of division and disunity in Burundi

The colonial administration came with a new structure of society where Burundian leaders were encouraged by wages as personal gain instead of conservation and protection of social values. The new system of production brought by the West was encouraging individual gain instead of community interests. Different competing classes were born; religion and politics became different realms with different sets of leaders. Africa adopted social classes from the colonial era which later developed into ethnic divisions which we are witnessing today. In the case of Burundi, one should understand also that the ethnic division in which Tutsis appeared to be superior to Hutus was a brainchild of German colonial administration which took advantage of the problems of the Burundian monarchy. This German administration decided

to partner with one group the Tutsis as against the Hutus creating a great chasm of hatred between the two groups. The preference of Tutsis over Hutus by the German administration, as highlighted by Lemarchand (1970:53), was that Tutsis were talented leaders with perfect personality which would legitimise European ideologies through their trustworthy influence over mass population. Anyone threatening the interests of Colonial administration became the enemy of those loyal to them. Authority in such a situation was used for subjugation of one group as against the other in a bid for the German ideology to prevail. The hatred of the local people was used by the colonial master to stabilise their hegemony. Such a manipulation of authority by the colonial master gave birth into the disaster experienced in post-colonial era, that is in Burundi after independence, when Tutsis took power into their hands and the Hutu had no place in the political and social life of their nation and vice versa after 1993 elections when the Hutu were promoted to power. Mamdani (1996) in (Daley 2006:661) explains that

> The elite's ability to successfully manipulate ethnicity is historically related to the nature in which the colonial powers incorporated Africans into the modern states as either citizens or subjects reproduced in binaries of European and African Urban or Rural.

The present Burundian Leadership has successfully incarnated into persona of the European colonial power. Daley (2006) notes that patronage is the main source of conflicts in Africa today, as such the distribution of national funds through patronage therefore is at the Centre of conflicts in Africa. Daley (2006) emphasized that state control in a poor country like Burundi is the principal road to amassing and reproduction of privilege.

First, ethnic divisions were introduced to provide the colonizer with enough ammunition to comfortably manipulate their way in the political and social organization of African states. Second, Ethnic divisions in Africa were planned to provide protection and security for the colonizer in a foreign continent. Berman et al (2003) in Daley (2006: 660) claim that moral ethnicity emerged in the context of colonialism and modernity, to protect people when they were most vulnerable and alone; in urban centers and areas of colonial enterprise and among strangers. European strategy to separate Burundians was done by stressing that their pre-colonial unity was superficial because they are essentially three separate groups. The first group was the Twa, which were considered to be the local and indigenous people. The second group was "Hutu" also natives and the third group were the "Tutsis" or the "Hamatic" and immigrant to the land. As stressed by Sanders (1969:528) Europeans singled out the Tutsis and accorded higher status because they were said to have some physical features that made

them resemble the Europeans. The Tutsi were presumed to have potential for high achievement and they could influence the Hutu identified as Bantu. This automatically made the Tutsis see themselves not just as a separate and unique ethnic group but also superior than the majority Hutus. This has resulted in tragedies, which were witnessed in the whole of the Great Lakes region such as the 1993 Burundi bloody civil war and the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. The use of the Hamitic hypothesis to explain the origin of the Tutsi created an ethnic problem that extended from the national level to embrace the whole region (Lemarchand 1966:404).The Tutsi became a common problem for all Bantu of the region who began to see them as Hamites invaders and oppressors of the Bantu Lemarchand (1996:20). Some find here the reason why the Congo, Tanzania and Rwanda have been involved in Burundian ethnic conflicts.

2.4.2. The transition towards independence

It is not easy to separate revolution and independence movement which happened in 1959 in almost all African countries. This movement witnessed the rise of nationalists like Nkrumah of Ghana, Rudahirwa of Rwanda, Prince Louis Rwagasore of Burundi, Patrice Emery Lumumba of Congo….these dynamic leaders acted against the will of colonial masters who wanted to remain for their interests, and many of African patriotic leaders paid the price like Prince Luis Rwagasore who was killed with his two sons. During independence period, three parties were formed in Burundi, UPRONA (*Union pour le Progrès Nationale)* of Prince Louis Rwagasore, PDC *(Parti democratic Chretien*) and PP *(Party du Peuple).* UPRONA political party comprised the majority Hutus and its policies were open to other ethnic groups. PDC, an opposition party was formed by Chief Baranyanka's son, this party comprised the minority Tutsis. When Rwagasore, UPRONA leader claimed immediate independence, PDC judged Burundi immature to lead itself; it is not surprising that Belgian colonial administration were behind PDC. Nevertheless, UPRONA still won the majority votes to claim an independent Burundi. The Belgian administration was so angry when they knew about the victory of UPRONA because they assumed that it was probably the end of their stay in Burundi. "One of the key personalities associated with the PP was wealthy Belgian settler named Albert Maus; on learning of the UPRONA victory in legislative elections in 1961…committed suicide" (Lemarchand 1996:61).

The leader of UPRONA Prince Louis Rwagasore was killed and his death is believed to have been caused by both Belgian administration and Baranyanka's sons because he posed a threat

to their political positions in Burundi Lemarchand (1996), Nindorera (2003), Gahama (2002). In the same way, Belgian administration could not hold their peace with Congolese nationalist leader and hero of independence, Patrice Emery Lumumba as he was fighting for the wellbeing of the people. The hero of Congolese independence was tortured to death by a coalition of local leaders like Tshombe and Kassavubu…pro Belgian administration with the help of American security agency Badru (2010). The murder and replacement of patriotic leaders who emerged during African independence marks the beginning of conflicts in the Great Lakes region which paved the way to birth of republic in Burundi and the rest of the region.

2.5. Birth of Republic in Burundi.

The heroes, who played a pivotal role in the transition towards the independence of Burundi, were killed, while those loyal to the colonizers were given access to power for instance Marshal Mobutu Sese Seko ex-president of Congo. The death of Rwagosore and Pierre Ngendandumwe, both premier ministers left a vacuum in Burundi politics and social life. An army led by Captain Michel Micombero came in because of the breach of leadership when the inexperienced king Mwambutsa could not handle the situation. Captain Micombero, a colonial loyalist, as the secretary of the state rescued King *"Mwami" Mwambutsa* from the rebellion of 1965 led by Gervais Nyangoma and from then he was the only authority in place. As the seed of hunger of power was already planted in the heart of Burundian leaders, Captain Micombero who tasted the sweetness of power at the absence of the king in holiday in Switzerland failed to hold his peace, he instead killed the heir, the young king, Ntare V, and took over power, and Captain Micombera became the first president of Burundi.

The new president, the Captain Michel Micombero has been identified by Lemarchand (1996:23) as an upstart who was mostly concerned with building the power and respect around him first. He was from *"Bahima"* family in Bururi and since this tribe was not regarded as upper classTutsi like *"Abanyaruguru"* from Muramvya, the main objective of Micombero therefore was not only to build a name of *"Bahima"* but also to satisfy extremists Tutsi by repressing Hutu who wanted equal treatment as Tutsi. The advent of the president's rule brought deep ethnic divisions.

The first republic of Burundi came just after suppression of the Hutu rebellion influenced by colonial masters. They therefore took advantage to convince the Hutu about their exclusion

from Burundian political life while they were the majority group. Rwandese Hutu revolution of 1959 played a tremendous role in influencing the Hutu revolt and of awakening Tutsi self-protection of Burundi from 1965. From 1966 to 1993 the power was exclusively in the hands of the Tutsi while in the post-colonial era, the Hutu viewed democracy as rule of the majority Hutu (Lemarchand 1996). Permanent confrontation therefore was born over power and lot of blood was shed Badru (2010); Nicayenzi (2002); Gahama (2002); Alamazang (2010).

The cycle of violence in Burundi after independence has followed a pattern that is described as follows: Hutu rebels attack the Tutsi government (army and citizens) to force the recognition of their majority and consequently be included in, or takeover power. The Tutsi in their turn with their national army (majority Tutsi) react roughly to Hutu rebels and citizens in order to maintain Tutsi power Sullivan (2004:77).

The second republic laid by Colonel Jean Baptist Bagaza did not have many differences from the first republic. However, it is noticed that the first republic did not achieve any activity of development while Bagaza, the president of second republic has developed the nation and abolished "*Ubugeregwa*" (see explanation below). Lemarchand (1996: 78) has pointed out that the intention of the second republic was similar to that of the first republic. The two republics have all acted in the same way, not only that both appointed themselves to power, but they were brothers from the same province and even the same villages.

The second republic had to make sure that Hutus, the greatest enemy of Tutsis in general were suppressed. As it was argued by Lemarchand (1996, Prunier (1994), Nindorera (2003), though the second republic had slogan of national unity as the goal and target of the regime but nothing has been done towards that direction. Talking of national unity under the Bagaza regime had only one aspect of its practical outcome, the suppression of *"Ubugererwa"* which can be illustrated as "Hutu landless depending on Tutsi land owner" were allowed to have their own land as citizens. This was a great social change which lifted up the Hutu socially while Tutsi started to doubt the second republic capacity of protection to minority group, minority group do not only trust soldiers and guns for their protection, but they also need economic support. The action of eradicating *"Ubugeregwa"* was remarkable move toward equity of Burundi citizens and of course the first steps of giving hope to Hutu marginalized and distanced from political and social life of the state to the point of been denied piece of land. However, these steps were not taken forward to inclusion of government, and did not change Bagaza attitude of being dictator. As a result, Micombero, the first president and

Bagaza the second president 1966-1987 ruled the country as they wished giving opportunity to whoever they wanted.

From 1976 to 1979, the country remained formally under the control of supreme military council constituting of thirty officers and all of them Tutsi Lemarchand (1996:108). Among ministers, Governors of provinces, military officers from almost same ethnic group and region were predominant holder of these positions. In fact, as it has been pointed out by Uvin (1999:257), the three republics which Burundi knew were not only military rule, but family and personal business, managed in line with partners' wishes. The government turned into a family business, where outsiders were not welcomed. Many, especially Hutu were looking outside to pursue their education, however even Tutsi outside of presidential region were not regarded or given equal opportunities. The third republic differed from the second republic though it shared some characters like coup d'état as point of entry to power. The third republic is the one which began with the process of democratisation; a detailed description will be highlighted in chapter three.

2.5.1. Unconstitutional rule: the power and capacity of one person (Tyranny).

According to Lumumba-Kasongo (2005:27), the peaceful political change, the rotation of elites and renewal of political staff are possible through the ballot box. Unconstitutional rule therefore is against such process; unconstitutional rule is a rule that relies on the power and capacity of one person. The Burundian republic experienced personal rules from the birth of republic up to present, military regimes (self-appointment to leadership) under the two republics were not consulting people in any case. Today, under the mask of democracy, political elites pretend to consult people during elections, unfortunately the voice of the people over fabricated elections cannot affect change. According to Perlmutter (1981:1), autocracy, tyranny and authoritarianism have almost similar definition.

> The conventional definition of autocracy, tyranny and authoritarianism are quite similar, however, autocracy and tyranny describe the nature of the ruler while authoritarianism refer to the nature of the regime and structure of it management.

Autocracy is nothing less than the rule of one person holding the full power over the rest of the people. Autocratic government therefore had no law or rules regulating their power, they hold unlimited power to satisfy their unlimited ambitions. Autocratic government in a sense had no body to account for it actions, it doesn't have any order in succession and the rule is driven by force. Burnell (2006:546) defined autocracy as personal rule, absolute government

by one person, it relies on force and fear, the autocracy obviously is far from legitimacy. As Perlmutter (1981:1) argued tyranny is virtually synonymous being arbitrary government of no king instituted by law. Tyrannical authority is secured by conquest and maintained by fear. This kind of regime may be authoritarian, dictatorship, and military government or oligarchic government. However, wealth is always the engine behind tyrannical regime. As it was specified by Perlmutter (1981), a "tyrant" is a person who leads by force and in fact, they carry heavy possessions which bring to them kind of forced respect. Jackson et al (1992) however pointed out that Africa has been under several tyrants like Jean Bedel Bokasa of Central Africa, Idi Amin Dada of Uganda and Mobuto of Zaire, Sani Abacha of Nigeria, just to mention but a few. Their regimes were not only characterized by lack of legitimacy, but by terror! The current Tyrant in Africa like Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe continues to represent his predecessors correctly by consistent accumulation of wealth while people, the owner of these funds are dying of malnutrition.

Personal rule is "personal" because it is motivated by personal aspirations. Personal rule therefore is a system of relations linking rulers not with the public or even with the ruled (at least not directly) but with patron, associates, and clients, supporters and rivals who constitute the system Jackman and Rosberg (1982:19). This kind of political system is however vulnerable especially when changes among leaders happen since the system relies on persons instead of institutions. Personal rule present much weakness especially in the case of conflicts Persons as human figures can move while institutions guiding the system of rule remain for better guidance of the new leadership. However, when system relies on persons, chaos follows after the individual ruler's decay or dismay. This the reason Mobuto Sese Seko of Congo was always warning his people, " *le Zaire c'est Moi, Apres mois c'est le deluge*" , translated as " Zaire is me and after me flood will follow", the government, the whole regime was lying on the person of Mubuto not on guiding institutions Badru (2010).

Though elections of 1993 in Burundi were democratically accepted, ethnicity played a central role because people voted according to their ethnic groups and not because of good policies with potential for Economic development. Lemarchand (1996) argued that if it was for policies and programs for national and democratic development, no one was going to beat Buyoya as the initiator of Democracy in Burundi. Lemarchand (1996) discussed the evolution of FRODEBU (Front Pour la Democratic au Burundi), political party that won 1993 elections in Burundi. The death of President Ndadaye became the death of the whole nation because

the rule was lying on his person not on institutions. It is strongly possible that if the rule depended on institutions, innocent people were not going to be killed mercilessly for what they did not know. Lemarchand however stressed that:

> Only if we remind ourselves of the context of Burundi's transition including the extraordinary high expectation among the Hutu in General, we can began to understand the violent reaction of the Hutu Communities in the hills when they heard the shattering news. The announcement of Ndadaye's death hit the countryside with the force of an earthquake, Lemarchand (1996: xiii).

Violent reactions of Hutu against innocent Tutsi did not reduce the national presidency to ethnic president only, but the country was also ruled with ethnic laws. In this case, only the views of the president's ethnic group are respected and considered as legitimate. This explains why the army took the side of the Tutsi during civil wars. The state was run and controlled by personal whims which respected Hutu ethnic laws to the detriment of the Tutsi's wellbeing. The rule which was exercised during this period was called clientelism according Jackman et al (1982:93) because leaders and those whom they serve are bound together in the pattern of mutual assistance and support.

This kind of state has nothing to do with the people, like in the case of first and second republic Burundian politics tended to turn the regime into family business, which benefits exclusively the family members of the person in power. The personal rule turn the state to be a grouping of people's property, ethnic property in divided states for example the Burundi and Rwanda mass killing organized by government. Newbury (1988:73) has emphasized "the role of power in the Rwandan state, have viewed *"clientship"* a as coercive institution, simply one more means by which the powerful could control subordinates and extract services". The 1993 elections presented great opportunities to Hutu who were crying for many years seeking power control as majority group; however the harsh removal of Tutsis from jobs and continuing intimidation, which is contrary to the democratic approach which they promised the people. Their rule was synonymous to personal rule. As Motolino (2010) argued, personal rule can be called another system of rule, but it presents more negative effects on political rule than it provides political benefits. The fact that it is ultimately dependent upon persons rather than institutions is its essential vulnerability, since person changes according to interests, passion… Motolino (2010:56). In Burundi military regimes, rulers had to build fence around their government, making the rule as personal as possible to the point of reducing the public affairs into family affairs. The victory of Hutu also did the same thing by

ring-fencing power around them. As a result, succession to power in this manner calls for violence which leaves innocent people at the mercy of ruthless regimes.

2.5.2 Impact of Democracy in Burundi

Democracy as it has been described, discussed intensively, argued and claimed by various scholars of politics and policy analysis like Diamond (1999, Huntington (1968), (1991), Adejomobi (2000), Soumanasako (2002), Bratton (1998), Larry (2002)….it is the only best form of government. Democracy is expected to offer liberties and freedom, to promote human rights and rule of law; it is also expected to offer state accountability to leaders through elections. Democracy is construed to be the source of peace and security for all Snyder (2004), Diamond (1999), Braton (1998). Consequentially conventional wisdom holds that the promoting and spread of democracy will ultimately promote world peace and security", Snyder (2004:1). As a way of further showing how democracy is meant to promote the wellbeing of the people, Diamond (1999) and Bratton (1998) highlights four major aspects of democracy as:

1. Elections are a system people choose their leaders freely and fairly.
2. Participation active of the citizens in political and social life of the state.
3. Protection of human rights of all citizens
4. A rule of law, in which all citizens have equal access to justice and protection

Democracy is a political system which provides opportunities for the people to choose their own leaders and hold them accountable not only for their policies but also for their behaviour and conduct in general. Through election, people decide who will represent them as the head of the state and members of parliament; briefly the whole government is outcome of the consent of the people. People are the source and author of power, in democracy sovereignty of the people is highlighted. People are permanent holders of power while leaders hold power temporally and in accordance of how people view their leadership character, citizens maintain the highest authority to vote, in or out, leaders. In true democracy, even if laws and policies depend to majority supports in parliament, protection of minority is not left out. Citizens do not only have right to information and expression but they have also right to watch and criticise their leaders. As it has been emphasized by Anthony Hay (2005:135) "real democracy means liberal representative government under law, sustained by political culture

that accept open disagreement and demand accountability", as already discussed above section, it emphasize on institutions which could allow sustained political order.

Democracy depends on leaders as it has been discussed by Diamond (1999:66), "consolidation thus takes place in two dimensions: Norm and behaviour on three levels, at the highest level are the country's elites, the top decision makers, organizational leaders, political activist and opinions shapers in politics, government, the economy and society". Leaders have capacity and potentiality to influence the rest of citizens for good or bad, this may describe the problem of Africa as problem of leadership. Kaizer (2007) in his study tried to highlight how African leaders have been hindrance for democracy. Taking the example of Kenya, under persuasion of international donors it allowed a multiparty system from 1991 but failed to move from the very first stage of democratization, the ruling party of Arap Moi could not allow transition for a very long time. In the case of Burundi, their transition to a democratic system was impressive. The 1993 elections were impeccably carried out but ended disastrously, and the ancient elites under mono-party politics were preoccupied with political ambition to the detriment of people's needs. Democracy strongly encourages leaders who respects the opinions and suggestions of the people since people preferences will inspire elites' policies and laws to relevantly serve citizens development and protection. That is why Diamond (1999), Bratton (1998)…encourage the "*Bottom-up*" system of leadership where the involvement of citizens in decision making is ensured. Apart from allowing room for participation, political leaders need to behave in a manner befitting the credible of a leader. A leader is supposed to be followed and trusted by those who voted for him/her. Through information and transparency, democracy promotes authentic leaders whose behaviour develops harmonious relationship with their followers (citizens). Rego et al (2012:429) argued:

> Authentic leadership as a pattern of leader behaviour that draws upon and promotes both positive psychological capacities and a positive ethical climate, to foster greater self-awareness, an internalized moral perspective, balanced processing of information, and relational transparency on the part of leaders working with followers, fostering positive self-development

According to Rego et al (2012), authentic leadership is a reflection of all leadership qualities in Burundian traditional leadership system. That is the reason why many authors and scholars on African politics like Gahama (2002, Ntahombaye et al (2007), Badru (2010), Fuller (2007) make a reference on pre-colonial Africa as where one can look for a strong foundation of a

selfless leadership value system. Authentic leadership is built on qualities like self-awareness, which is the "internalized moral perspective, (which includes) balanced processing of information, and relational transparency on the part of leaders working with followers",Rego et al (2012), May et al (2005), Avolio et al (2003), Ilis et al (2005). Such qualities demonstrate the possibility of a leadership beyond ethnic politics.

In Burundi traditional leadership in general as it has been discussed in above paragraph, was source and peace of the community, today leaders take sides resulting in genocide and mass murderer outcome. This is the reason why Africans have claimed to have democracy long before. Features like freedom of expression and information flowing between leaders and their people as well as limitation of power of the rulers which includes the term in the office. Citizens must be informed about what is happening on governmental level as a way to allow them to participate in political activities. Participation of people in different activities of the state does not only help the people to feel the ownership of their country but it also help the government to improve how it considers opinions and criticism of their people. Democracy in this way promotes full cooperation and agreement between leaders and citizens. Positive beliefs and norms of elites are likely to create and guide their political actions while having greater influence on political and social events. Beyond their direct power over events and decisions, elites also play a crucial role in shaping political culture and in singling out what kind of behaviour is proper or improper Diamond (1999:67). Leaders are supposed not to lead only by words, but by examples, people learn democratic culture, democratic behaviour and belief from leaders, as it has been emphasized. When leaders are censorious of the rules and norms of democracy, their citizens also will react the same way. Authentic leadership is all about leaders first who have greater role to carry the whole state in whatever direction they wish. Good governance which is assumed to promote the wellbeing of all citizens cannot exist without good leaders who are willing to deliver effectively and efficiently.

However, because of human ambitions, emotions and other unpredictable behaviour that can arise at any stage of his/her life democracy provides the law and constitutions to guide and orient leaders; Diamond (1999) and Bratton (1998) spoke of "restriction from elites freedom" to carry out their own ambitions without consent and agreement from the ruled. Democracy therefore is not the rule of individuals but the rule of law designed to protect the rights of all citizens (majority and minority) while the power of government is limited. Diamond (1999:2) expressed democracy as the best realizable form of government, constitutional government in

which freedom is constrained by the rule of law and popular sovereignty is tempered by state institutions that produce order and stability". According to the World Bank (1989) cited in Soumanasako who described good governance in the following way:

> Good governance is conceived from a process perspective with emphasis on rule of law, accountability, participation, and human and civil rights. These elements are indistinguishable from governance elements of a mature liberal democracy (20002: 4).

Any government with interest in the people cannot apply rules, regulations, laws and institutions without consideration of how the people will be affected by those decisions and laws. If the greater good of citizens are not taken into consideration in state decision-making, then the state cannot claim to exhibit the principle of good governance. It is for this reason that Soumanasako (2002) argued that best institutions are often those built from the community level up, that is "*Bottom –Up*" system of government. African traditional leadership has such qualities as it has been illustrated earlier on in this chapter. The power and authority of the African kings were not only constrained by spiritual realm through yearly checks or tests, but also by the people who judged his efficacy and efficiency from the viewpoint of how prosperous and developed the state was under the king's rule. In the case of Burundi, *"bashingantahe"* as elders in the community had the power to change the decision of the King once they deemed it as being important and necessary for the greater good of the kingdom and the people. Thus, the power of the people was respected since the head of the state could not decide without the consent of peoples. The power and leadership was built from the "bottom-up", unlike with the present system where power is built from the "*top – Down*" (Lemarchand, 1996).

African countries have not honoured the ideal model of leadership system and have instead embraced the opposing model as it has been argued by most scholars like Larry (2002); Diamond (1999); Soumanasako (2002). The top-down model of leadership which does not take into consideration the opinions and criticism of masses seems to have caused a number of clashes with the masses who wanted their voices to be heard. Since Burundi entered the democratic period following the democratic elections of 1993, as acclaimed by many, the country has been in a constant state of war. Just three months after elections, the democratically elected Hutu president was killed by the Tutsi military. This created the situation of the dilemma of leadership, a period that was labelled by Burundian as "*Vacance*

d'authorite" meaning "Authority vacancy" where offices were closed. The military took control while politicians were outside in Rwanda instructing Hutu to kill Tutsi making the work of peace restoration by the international community impossible. The current leadership is missing the ingredients of authenticity and have been labelled a forged manipulator of elections causing conflicts among competitors and affecting the security and stability of the state.

2.6. Conclusion

This chapter has attempted to provide an overview of the literature relating to how Western religious hegemony and ideologies influenced Burundian social and political life and ultimately created discord and division among citizens. This was done by tracing the development of leadership in Burundi from the pre-colonial epoch, to the post-colonial and up to the present. It highlights the effects of this leadership in these different historical epochs. This historical development within Burundi specified the dynamics between the indigenous leadership and the western colonial leadership in relation to the Burundian society. The third chapter will restrict itself to the discussion related to elections, democracy and alternatives ways towards Peace Building in Burundi.

CHAPTER THREE

LEADERSHIP AND THE NATURE OF DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS IN BURUNDI

3.1. Introduction

Democratic values and practices are more important than the means through which democracy is achieved. This is not to deny that the means is foundational to the ends of democracy. My understanding of democracy is that the means through which democracy is achieved can only be justified by whether the end is achieved or not. Elections as a means can only be justified if they seek to justify the end, which are the democratic values. If elections perpetuate violence and create pandemonium amongst citizens, then we should doubt not only the relationship between elections and democracy but also the foundation upon which the values of elections are built. The success of democracy depends on the leaders whose behavior and convictions support and maintain a democratic culture.

This chapter defines leadership first and highlights the different leadership systems which the Burundian society experienced. It also highlights incidences in which different leaders in different epochs either deviated or tried to live up to democratic culture.

3.2. Definitions of leadership

It has been very difficult to have a common agreement on definition of leadership. In his work *"Leadership for the Twenty-First Century"*, Joseph and Rost (1995) has emphasised on definitional clarity and agreement on leadership and leaders as important elements missing from many scholarly work. This therefore has caused problems where each individual come up with his/her own definition of leadership. The other danger is when each writer assumes to know the definition of leadership as common knowledge. As Joseph et al (1995:133) argued, many therefore will think that they know meaning of leadership as they hold their own definitions in mind.

The work of Joseph et al (1995:132) has defined leadership as "What leaders and collaborators do together, the interaction that goes on among them as they propose significant changes that reflect their mutual purposes". Here, "leadership" is understood as a relationship between leaders and followers. According to Gini (1997: 224), "Leadership is a

power and value laden relationship between leaders and followers/constituents who intend real changes that reflect their mutual, purposes and goals". Gini further highlighted that there is no leadership without involvement of power, power to organize, power to guide… As Gini (1997:225) highlighted that the major issue of power is how it is used, power must be handled wisely and well. Burns (1978) in Clement and Washbush (1999:170) added unity as essential to the definition of leader and like Gini he also pointed out the importance of values. The combination of unity and values is of paramount importance to this study

Gini (1997) went on to define leadership as a dynamic relationship between leaders and followers, leadership cannot be understood in itself but in relation to the context of others. Therefore, there is no way can talk about leadership without mentioning followers as they play crucial role in leadership concept. Gini (1997: 327) further argued,

> "If leadership is an active and ongoing relationship between leaders and followers, then the central requirement of the leadership process is for leaders to evoke consensus in their constituencies, and conversely, for followers to inform and influence their leadership".

A good relationship between leaders and followers is a major characteristic of authentic theory of leadership, which characterises Burundi traditional leadership. This relationship is reflected by the way Burundians exchange of goods and properties, "*Ubugabire*" and intermarriage, as detailed in chapter two, leaders and followers were united in this.

The major trait which drive effective leadership is character, "*character of the leader*" Gail in Gini, (1997:226) argues that "character is the most crucial and most important element of leadership". Good character is a trait which comprises all the aspects of leader behaviour and attitude that makes his/her personality. For Gini (1997:327), the word "character is (derived) from Greek (a) word engraving, which is enduring mark for human beings, and this includes our inborn talents as well as the learned and acquired traits imposed upon us by life and experience". As detailed by Nicayenzi, (2002:3), Nindorera, (2003), Gahama, (2002), the process and procedures for a "*Umushingantahe*" as an ideal leader in Burundi traditional leadership were first inborn[3] then results of training and finally his experiences which lead him/her to maturity.

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[3] The Burundi tradition was going beyond to believe that a leader was born with seeds in his hands, when it comes to future king. In fact the king was chosen the same day he was born.

Therefore, the definition of a leadership in this paper does not just include power and how leaders relates with the followers but also the nature of relationship between the leader and his/her followers, the qualities of a leader and the values which the particular leader has to follow.

3.3. Leadership systems in Burundi

Burundi went through a number of leadership systems at different periods of time. The evolution of African politics therefore can be divided in four parts: 1) the pre-colonial phase which was characterized by the traditional leadership. Their ethos/precepts encompass the values of both transformational, Authentic and servant leadership models 2) the colonial period which was characterized by the invasion of the oppressors and disrupted the integrity of the values and logic of traditional leadership. 3) The independence period, characterized by heroism, nationalism and ideal thoughts of leadership; and. 4) The post-independence era which bred local corrupt leaders created by the colonizers. The post-independence time is divided into two parts: The first part, witnessed authoritarian regimes characterized by coup d'états as the only way to access power. The second was characterized by the introduction of quasi-democracy through multiparty elections. The former leadership was a system of mono-party political systems which was characterized by abuse of power, while the multiparty political system that exists today is generally characterized by the abuse of democracy through elections. It is unfortunate that under the umbrella of democracy, leaders have lost the virtues, which constitute the essence of human rights leadership. Democracy has become static, lacks both depth and substance (Diamond, 1999:22).

3.4. Burundian Traditional leadership System as a reflection of two Leadership Theories.

This section shows how Burundian traditional leadership reflects traits of both Servant leadership and authentic leadership theory. A Burundian traditional leader is born with special potential ability and capacity to lead by virtue of him[4] having royal blood. Nevertheless, the Burundian community took upon itself as its duty to train this infant king in strict discipline of leadership as a way of helping this growing leader realize his potential to leadership. In this sense, the Burundian community's understanding of leadership was more than just being born a leader but also included strict initiation, which prepares the leader to take his duties seriously and responsibly. In addition to the initiation, the leader was also

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[4] The leader was mostly a male

accountable to the divine who ensured that the King served people with dignity, integrity and honesty. Failure to carry out these duties resulted in the death of the king by forced suicide. In short, Burundian leadership's highest priority was to serve the people. Though the head of the kingdom was born a potential leader, as mentioned above, he was continually monitored as a way of ensuring that he becomes a genuine servant of the people he leads (Crippen, 2004; Washington et al, 2006; Karen et al, 2006; Robert et al, 2005). According to Crippen (2004:11), a Servant-Leader is a servant first; it begins with the natural feeling that one wants to serve. Then conscious choice brings one to aspire to lead. First, to make sure that other people's highest priority needs are being served. Servant- leaders are not looking at the position of leadership but they have something to offer to others, they wish to deliver services to others. Though the Burundian traditional leadership exhibits most qualities of a servant leader, it differs from this leadership in that the traditional leader does not choose to be leader but is compelled or obliged by virtue of him being born in the royal family. This applied not only to the king or princes, but also to children of non-royal families who displayed distinct leadership qualities and who were also considered future Burundian leaders. The difference between Burundian traditional leadership system and servant leadership theory lies not in the nature of leadership but in the way one becomes a leader. Both Burundian traditional leadership and servant leadership as expressed by Laub (1999) prioritizes the good of the community over the self-interest. Both types of leadership promote development of people than economic gain of leaders. The Authentic leadership does not just consider what a leader does but also the genuineness and integrity of the way he leads. These qualities are an integral part of traditional leadership as mentioned earlier.

3.5. Colonial period –The inception of ethnic divisions of Burundian community

Several attempts have been done to bring back the traditional peaceful Burundian community. Leaders at different periods have shown concerns at the degrading leadership situation of their country. The loss of traditional values of leadership started by ethnic divisions which offered the leadership ground to Europeans as explained by scholars like Lemarchand (1970) and Daley (2006) in the previous chapter. German colonial administration found Burundi as a well-organized state. Basically, colonizers had nothing better to offer to a society in which there was adequate representation of ethnic and tribal units in all political and social levels since the 13th century as pointed out by Gahama (2002). Nevertheless, they managed to make friendship with Tutsi local leaders, by offering them modern education. This was held under the auspices of Christianity as the main tool of

civilization. Through the ideology of ethnic separation, they took Tutsi from "*Bantu*", which is a common identification of most of black African and ranked them with Europeans. The theory of Hamatic in the work of Sanders (1969:528) stresses on the physical appearance of Tutsi, as they were said to have some physical features that made them resemble Europeans more than their fellow Africans. In 1930, Monseigneur Classe, Bishop of the Roman Catholic Church made a public declaration and qualified Tutsi as "well-born", born with qualities of leadership, Lemarchand (1970:73). The Europeans therefore decided to give preference to the Tutsi for the positions of leadership. The Hamatic hypothesis became a powerful weapon in the hands of European and later in the hands of local leaders. Hence, ethnic polarization was strengthened.

3.6. Independence and post-independent period: Attempt to recapture the glories of the Traditional leadership

There are no doubts that Burundian traditional leadership was service-oriented. Taking for example the "*Bashingantahe*, where unpaid leaders were in charge of ensuring peace and harmony within community. These traditional leaders were happy to sacrificially serve their people. In the footsteps of these great traditional leaders, were Rwagasore and Buyoya. This section will look at these two leaders, showing how they tried to bring sanity to the divided Burundian society.

3.6.1. Prince Louis Rwagasore

Louis Rwagasore, the prince and hero of independence declared at the independence celebration (01/July 1962) that the satisfaction of people will be his happiness and reward. His leadership style exhibited characteristics of a servant- leader. Rwagasore was a passionate leader who attempted to restore the values of leadership and unity in the community as reflected in Chapter two. He did not only come with political ideology from European school, but he came with an exemplary and sacrificial spirit. For the sake of political, economic and social development, the prince left his position as prince to associate himself with poor Hutu of Kayanza province. He went on to marry a woman from low social class, which shocked many while carrying a heavy political and social message. Nindorera (2003) has qualified Prince Louis Rwagasore as a "*charismatic leader*"; which is one of the important qualities of transformational leaders.

Rwagasore exhibited the traits of a transformational leadership where he was involved in his subordinates' lives and fulfilled the needs of his followers. It is through personality, behavior and attitude that charismatic leaders gather their followers, not by any external and coercive power or authority. According to Judge et al (2000: 753), transformational leadership stresses the needs of the followers as primary to those of the leader. Transformational leaders are good in reading the situation of their people and of the environment in general. They easily discern the moods and concerns of individuals and that of the public in general. These abilities allow them to plan actions and words relevant to the situation. This is what Prince Louis Rwagasore did by first putting ahead the idea of immediate independence and by proposing parliamentary democracy for restoration of inclusive leadership and participation of people in political life of the state.

3.6.2. Major Pierre Buyoya

In 1987, a Tutsi military commander, Major Pierre Buyoya assumed leadership and followed almost the similar trend of transformational leadership as Prince Louis Rwagasore. Major Pierre Buyoya was head of the third republic. He came from the same family with the two previous presidents who ruled the first and second republic respectively (1966-1976) and (1976-1987). Even though he was not democratically elected; what distinguished him from the previous presidents is that he was willing to heal the ethic animosity and introduced a unified Burundian front. Buyoya's goodwill was inspired by the democratic wave which coincided with the Burundian transition to self-rule. This section describes the nature of Buyoya's rule.

Buyoya's rule was described by Oloko-Onyago (2004) as dynamic leadership with democratic aspirations. Buyoya wanted to redress the situation experienced in the first and second republic and install an inclusive government never seen before in Burundi. The coming of Buyoya to power has been described by Oloko-Onyago (2004) as a *"New Breed of African leaders"*. The time of the *"New breed"* of African leaders was felt between 1980 and 1990. Oloko-Onyago argued that enlightenment in Africa leadership has arrived, such that the old ways of exclusionary government are over. Corruption is remarkably reduced and public management is reviewed and restored in new and better ways. Osaghae (1999) (in; Oloko-Onyago, 2004) affirm that the period of the *"new breed"* coincided with the new wave of democratization in Africa. Buyoya wanted to achieve national unity and transparency. Contrarily to the second republic, the third republic wanted to identify itself with

international standards by acknowledging international laws. Buyoya managed to open room for inclusive government as a response to African democratization.

However, Buyoya did not have much time and energy to reverse Burundian ethnic divisions which was so deepened and developed to the point of hindering any possible attempt of re-uniting Burundian society. Buyoya's efforts were established on an unstable ground, with fermenting disunity, caused by seeds of ethnic conflict planted during the first and second republic. The third republic came in the time when children who lost their fathers in 1965 ethnic war were around 22 years (1965-1987); old enough to take vengeance. Buyoya's efforts to break the ethnic taboo by discussing ethnic differences and social inequalities were meant to reestablish ethnic harmony witnessed before the colonial era. He created a platform for dialogue and opened doors for political pluralism while keeping unity as foundation of stability. His efforts led to the country's democratic election of 1993, but the harmony was short-lived because of the underlying problems which I mentioned above.

Buyoya was confronted by strong opposition from Tutsi who did not want political change and Hutu who did not trust his efforts as genuine. Even Ndadaye his successor and winner of 1993 elections, as quoted by Lemarchand (1996:61), qualified Buyoya's inclusive government as "*sell-ou.t*" Here privileged Hutu were qualified as "*marionettes*", instead of representatives. It is also important to note that president Buyoya's approach lacked political astuteness. This is seen when he allocated half of the government seats to the minority Tutsis which consisted of only 14% of the total population, as against the Hutus who were about 85% of the population. He also called for elections when the ethic confrontations were at their height. Hence, elections were called during the time when the country was experiencing instability. Reyntjens (1993:586) pointed out that Buyoye as a Tutsi rushed for elections amidst conflicts because he wanted this state of affairs to help him win the elections.

Therefore, Buyoya's failure to reestablish unity, peace and security in the country, marked the continuation of authoritarian in disguised or pseudo-democracy. Elections became the only aspect of democracy. Unfortunately in an instable environment elections cannot be free and fair. Consequentially these elections cannot produce genuine democratic leaders. There is no democracy without peace and security. The same problem was identified in both 2005 elections and 2010 elections. Burundian selection of leaders is not democratic because it is very hard to establish democracy in a polarized state, Nicayenzi (2002). Elections without

democracy serve as one of the biggest problems in establishing Burundian stability (Bethell, 2000; Larry, 2002). This problem made alternatives for peace building fail and power sharing could not end conflicts in a deeply divided nation.

3.7. Post-independence: Burundi after Buyoya

Democratization of Burundi so far has known three different elections. The first election was in 1993 where political party FRODEBU (Front Democratic du Burundi) mostly Hutu dominated won elections over UPRONA (Unite pour le Progress National), dominated by Tutsis. Considering the way Buyoya ruled Burundi, especially his inclusive policies, Tustis were confident that he was going to be re-elected again during the 1993 election. Surprisingly the Hutu dominated party FRODEBU won. The fundamental question to ask is whether such a change was based on the need for better leadership or on which ethnic group was ruling. Let us look at possible reason for this change in leadership.

The Elections of 1993 were characterized by ethnic domination. UPRONA, the political party that enjoyed monopoly of power for years since the dawn of post-colonization was labelled Tutsi political party even if Hutus joined the party afterward as a strategy of survival. Tutsis were not prepared give up power or even ready to share power. However they were confident of the victory during 1993 elections. They were caught unaware when FRODEBU, a Hutu dominated party, was proclaimed a winner. In terms of the electoral and democratic requirements, the elections were free and fair because the Hutu were the majority, but in terms of the intention towards good governance there was a problem. Good governance was secondary to ethnic domination, this can be explained by how the Hutus organised themselves in preparation to the election. All Hutu's strategic plans and organizations were born outside, mainly in Tanzania and Rwanda. Just after 1965 civil wars, the Hutu went into exile; their attempt to come back in 1972 by force put them in trouble when almost all intellectual Hutus were killed. They saw that there was no place for their development hence they adopted a new life outside Burundi, where they acquired education and later organized themselves as political groups.

Other members of the Hutu Organizations came one by one following the same strategy so as to have people inside while others were planning some actions of disruption from outside. It was from this undercover approach that even Ndadaye came in Burundi to start his FRODEBU party. Many members of FRODEBU were members of UPRONA in disguise; as

a result Buyoya never realized that those whom he perceived as his followers were actually his opponents. This disguise only serves to show that there was something more than party preference; ethnic divisions. Hutus who suffered so long under the oppression of the Tutsi (who were supported by the colonial regimes) were impatiently looking for an opportunity to rule. Hutu members of FRODEBU attended all UPRONA meetings and participated in their propaganda to an extent that the French embassy did not hesitate to predict Buyoya victory giving him 70%, while unaware that Hutus had their undercover meeting mobilizing all Hutu behind Ndadaye who stood against Buyoya in the election. Reyntjens (1993) summarizes the assumptions created by the Hutu's disguised intentions as follows:

> "For lack of sufficient understanding of both the profound aspirations for change and the ethnic variable, the international press and many diplomatic missions in Bujumbura expected Buyoya to win by a clear, if not overwhelming margin. Indeed, had he not been the architect of both processes of national reconciliation and democratization? And did he and UPRONA not control the whole apparatus of the state and, in particular, the local authorities whose role in the electoral process was crucial? To some extent this assessment was reinforced by the one-sided coverage of the campaign by the official media, which consistently entertained the image of widespread support for the incumbent. Without much critical sense, foreign media and press agencies relayed so-called 'opinion polls' provided by government spokesmen that gave Buyoya a 60-70 per cent victory" (Reyntjens, 1993:568).

Reyntjens (1993) went on to highlight that FRODEBU emerged as prominent party winner just some few days before elections. UPRONA members were very shocked by FRODEBU victory. Nevertheless, the 1993 elections in Burundi were not just democratic elections but ethnic competition. The election was built on hatred and ethnic divisions. After elections, UPRONA members and University students organized a march to deny ethnic elections but it was too late!

3.8. Aftermath of 1993 election- the Beginning of the Genocide

The Tutsis were not willing to give up power, especially at the time they believed Buyoya was going to win elections anyway. Not very long after the victory the Hutu President Melchior Ndadaye was killed. The obvious assumption was that the Tutsis were responsible for this murder. With the motivation of politicians like Dr Jean Minani and other important FRODEBU members, the Hutus decided to kill any Tutsi which they come across. Such activities marked the beginning of the Tutsis genocide and quandary of leadership in Burundi. Leaders proved their inadequacy in leadership, they were inauthentic and instead of giving sustainable solutions to the problems, they made situation worse by encouraging war among Burundian people. Avolio et al (2003:804) while assessing the major qualities of leadership

confirmed that attitude is important character of authentic leader, leaders should not be driven by emotions. Reactions of Burundian leaders[5] in 1993 were characterized by selfishness and sacrificed a lot of people for their interests. Infants, children, youth, adults and the old, without exception were either killed by machete; burned in the house, crucified on threes, cut in pieces ….any kind of death one could imagine became the fate of the Tutsi population, Lemarchand (1996)

The Tustis were further ostracized by the Hutus as vengeance, reflected in the humiliation they went through before Buyoya assumed leadership. The outcome of 1993 elections in Burundi was just a nightmare for Tutsi because they were chased from their old jobs like criminals, replaced with people without skills. As Lothe (2007) and Lemarchand (1996) have emphasized, majoritarian democracy can be defined differently, either as in political terms, where popular choice go to improve programs and policies of state development or in ethnic terms only the ethnic group matters. Therefore Buyoya's approach to majoritarian democracy was defined in political terms, while the approach of the Hutus is ethnocentric. By virtue of them being the majority, Hutus exhibited a democracy based on kinship and patronage which sought to crash the minority. The reaction of Tutsis who tried to regain power by force and the attitude of Hutu after they won elections proves degradation of Burundians leadership as explained in chapter two.

Graphical Presentation of the theories and trends of leadership models which the Burundian society went through

THEORIES OF LEADERSHIP AND BURUNDIAN LEADERSHIP SYSTEMS	CHARACTERISTICS (1)	PARTICULARITIES	CHARACTERISTICS (2)
Authentic Theory of Leadership	1.Self-awareness, identity, values, goals and motives, trust, 2.engagement, wellbeing of followers needs of community 3.preferences, emotions, self-control	1.Unbiased processing of information for fair judgment 2.reliability 3.Authentic behaviour	
Transformational Leadership Theory	1. Focus and support to the needy and		

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[5] By Burundian leaders, I refer to the leadership of both Tutsis and Hutus.

	community 2.kindness, gentleness, strong conscience, personality, behavior, attitude and character. 3. Discernment, relevant solutions and positive emotion.		
Burundi traditional leadership system	1. Community focused 2 .Hard working 3. Self- control, morally and ethically attuned. 4. Sincere and honest. 5. Integrity Good relationship between leaders and followers, Love and trust 6. Excellent behavior, character and attitude	1. Born with potential to leadership. 2. Trained and initiated into leadership by the community. 3.sacrifices for their people 4. Divine power as overseeing the authenticity of their leadership, rule with Justice and equality 5. Decentralization of power	
Colonial period		1.External invasions 2.Monarchy	1.Ethinic division, 2. manipulation of local leaders, 3.Civil war focus on economic gain, 4.oppression of people, centralization of power
Post-independence period		1.Self-appointment to leadership, 2. Birth of republic regimes	1.Ethnic divisions, 2. Social inequalities and abuse of public resources , oppression of people, 3.No relationship between leaders and followers, 4.economic interests, positions, 5.Honour, sacrifice people, 6.Inauthentic, leadership, 7.Civil war , centralization of power
Democratic period		Multi-party politics Elections	1.Ethnic divisions, 3.Positions and honour, 4.manipulation of people, 5.sacrifice and oppression of people 6. Irresponsibility, 7. Civil war mediocre performance, 7.expropriation of public resources, centralization of power

The table above gives the summary of the discussion on the theories of leadership. It also brings in the different leadership systems Burundi went through in different epochs.

3.9. Negotiations as an alternative to Peace building after the 1993

In 1994, the two prominent political parties UPRONA and FRODEBU agreed to make first negotiations toward power sharing in Kigobe. While the intention of FRODEBU was to replace their deceased president and regain power back, UPRONA needed to use the opportunity of constitution to deny FRODEBU reestablishing itself as the government. Negotiations moved from Kigobe to Kajaga where some progress was made because FRODEBU managed to replace their deceased president Ndadaye by Cyprien Ntaryamira. However, the Hutus worked hard to manipulate the constitution into their favour, while the Tutsi were trying to hold onto the constitution to prevent Hutu for restorating their old position of leadership. The negotiations which took place in Kigobe, Kajaga and Novotel did not reach any serious conclusions. The biggest problem was, they failed to reach a compromise in their power sharing.

What dominated this negotiation was ethnic selfishness and an obsession to control. Instead of looking deep into the root of the problem the parties concentrated on the distribution of posts in government, which frustrated the mediators in Arusha negotiation. It is unfortunate that what was agreed during the negotiation were nothing but just to furnish a false democratic front to the international community while those involved were out to fulfill their whims. To be more specific, leaders were exploiting the ethnic difference in order to win authority just as the colonial government used the minority to oppress the majority in order to command overall authority of the local people. Rentjens (1995), (2000), Southall (2006), Lemarchand (1996) reported that the two different mediators[6] who were involved in solving Burundi conflict were irritated and sometime confused by the way the two main parties were unwilling to compromise due to their selfish ambitions. Due to the pursuit of their selfish interests the negotiations excluded an important third party which is the Hutu army (CNN/FDD). This practice backfired because this military movement took lot of lives to bring attention to the themselves, through the power of gun; and ended up by taking over the country.

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[6] Julius Nyerere and Nelson Mandela

3.9.1. The Nature of Democracy after negotiations

The CNDD/FDD military movement which was formed to back up FRODEBU after they lost power in 1993 was founded in Congo under the command of Leonard Nyangoma the former minister of Interior under FRODEBU government. This military movement turned itself into a political party after the Arusha negotiations and managed to win both the 2005 and 2010 elections through manipulative and abusive means.

The Elections of 1993 did not change Burundi for better. 2005 and 2010 victory came as result of guns behind political party. As long as the problems of ethnicity are not resolved the main objective of electoral processes will lose their meaning because those who perceive themselves as the ruling party will take advantage of their political position and bend the rules to their favor. Such acts easily results in violence and anger, by those who feel cheated and taken advantage of and a further violation of human right by those who want to keep power by force.

In Burundi, it was always the military which assumes power as the main party; this is witnessed in Buyoya's reign during the third republic. CNDD/FDD through its military nature and as a Hutu strong hold was able to completely terminate the power of FRODEBU and transform itself as a political party of majority Hutu and it weakened Tutsi power as holder of majority in National army. FRODEBU was not only known as Hutu majority political party but as also as the mother party, since CNDD its military wing was formed by members of FRODEBU to fight for their victory in 1994. However, the Arusha negotiation revealed another side of Burundian leaders. Ntibantunganya Sylvestre, former president from FRODEBU proposed that negotiations should take place between only two political parties, UPRONA and FRODEBU, those who lose power and those who took over, more specifically, between Himself and President Buyoya who was back in power, (Rentjens ,1995, 2000;Southall ,2006). The reaction of former Hutu president Ntibantunganya was excluding all other Hutu movements which added frustration to Hutu rebel movement; they intensified attacks to prove their force. The new approach to negotiation by former president Ntibantunganya surprised many, it was moving from ethnic to self. President Ndayizeye who took over according to Arusha plans also supported the ideas of Ntibantunganya, he wanted to run elections without CNDD/FDD but with UPRONA only, both political parties suppressing other movements. After negotiations were closed, CNDD/FDD managed to pull back negotiations by increasing attacks to Tutsi areas in Bujumbura Musaga undermining the

ceasefire agreement. Mediator Mandela had no other choice except to abide to CNDD/FDD demands for the sake of people who were killed like flies. President Ndayizeye was forced to redraft electoral constitution which included CNDD/FDD. He was moreover surprised by excessive demand of the movement in 2003 negotiations in Pretoria. At this point, FRODEBU was already out of the picture even before the final work of CNDD/FDD which wiped away FRODEBU from the public scene, when CNDD/FDD walked tall in Gitega, surrounded by UN forces. The conflict was actually a result of the struggle for political position rather than an ethnic conflict. CNDD/FDD managed to present itself as major political party, representative of majority Hutu and then knocked FRODEBU down. For survival, Tutsi or Hutu started shifting their political affiliation to CNDD/FDD, because they knew CNDD has no challenger in the 2005 elections.

> "As noted, the power sharing negotiations that led up to the signing of the Arusha accord had featured agreement around a draft constitution whereby the Tutsi should enjoy 40 % of positions within government and the state at least for five years of post-election transition. However, UPRONA now felt this agreement to be threatened by pre-transition political dynamic that had seen the CNDD/FDD as the likely major post-election force attracting significant number of Tutsi supporters to cross the floor of parliament. UPRONA declared that Tutsi who had crossed over to the CNDD/FDD could no longer serve the Tutsi interests and immediately upped it demands for constitutional protection", Southall (2006:126).

For 2005 elections, CNDD/FDD had no influential opposition because its army was in charge of mobilizing people, especially Hutu behind FRODEBU. Anyone who observed the procession of CNDD/FDD organized from Makebuko (Commune in East of Gitega) to Gitega Centre, Pierre Nkurunziza ahead with his sons in military attire, they understood that they are the ruler of the country from that date. Many people were not even willing to vote, because they were tired of such games in which they were told to vote for someone who is the president already. In Bujumbura, people refused to register for elections and government used force to make them. Anyone without registration card could not be granted any government service or take public transport until the day of elections where CNDD/FDD fulfilled it last ceremony to power without any struggle towards victory. FRODEBU and UPRONA caught by surprise when they found out that their respected members left them for CNDD. This army managed to win 2005 and 2010 elections. Hidden behind democracy, Burundians are living under leaders who abuses power. The democratic approach which side with the (*Bottom-Up*) model of leadership sees elites as community chosen agents with greater concern on the administration of public affairs; while the opposite (*Top–Down*) make elites controllers of public goods. Nevertheless, Kohnert (2010) suggest that viable institutions would require nation building from below as precondition instead of reinforcing

"Top- Down" system. One can pick some differences between "administrator" and "controller" while administration in this particular case emphasize leaders tasks to administrate public business for their people who voted for them, *"Controller"* emphasize great authority and suggest the elites' ownership of public goods. This would explain how elites turn to lead for themselves without concern of their people.

3.9.2. What prompted the failure of Negotiation in Burundi?

The failure of negotiations was influenced by the unwillingness of the parties involved to share power. The endeavor to share power between these two major political parties was obviously weak, however even the sharing strategy as analyzed by scholar of democratization like Lijphart (1991) disqualified Burundi as competent candidate for power-sharing. According to Lisphart (1991) (in: Lemarchande, 1996:163), power sharing is the core principal of the consociation model. It works best where ethnic segments are of roughly comparable size and where more than two protagonists face each other across the ethnic fault line. Neither of this condition applies to Burundi. Consociational solution was not only limited by the number of antagonist in Burundi but also Hutus and Tutsis are widely different in numbers. Power sharing on a fifty-fifty basis is impossible when antagonist is not equal in numbers

Nevertheless, Burundian leaders never showed any intention of power sharing after pre-colonial era. Colonial masters had no intention of sharing power, they moved from indirect rule to direct rule, they were exclusively power holders. The period of post-independence conceived power as an entity exclusive to a particular group; when Tutsi were in authority, they had no intention of power sharing at all. Buyoya's endeavor to create an inclusive government was conceived as a betrayal of the Tutsis. Power had exclusive ethnic right in post-colonial Burundi.

3.10. Was there a relationship between Burundian elections and democracy?

However, elections in Africa, especially in Burundi, have never been reflected as major feature of democracy. It has been labeled as a stimulant of violence where citizens are harassed in advance, opposition political parties are seriously oppressed, jailed and tortured and forced to leave the country if they are not killed. Abbink (2000) argued that democratization was nothing more than just a continuation or another level of colonisation by a local dictator. Instead of inspiring peace and order, elections marked the beginning of the rule of *"jungle"* where the weaker has nothing to say but to bow and clap hands to masters of

the day. Everyone therefore in this context is looking out for 'himself'. This is the time when political elites rose to create chaos; war for leadership positions. Politicians are ready to sacrifice the lives of people than to lose their privileged position of power. People voted at 'gunpoint' or under the siege of obsessed power hungry leaders. People were intimidated and coercive by police and soldier as a way of determining who they should to vote for.

Huntington (1991) tried to summarize the democratic assumptions as accurate liberties, legality and equality, harmony and trust between leaders and people, effective citizens' control over policy, responsible and accountability, and openness in politics, flow of information and equal participation in public affairs. Diamond (1999) stated that, real democracy is supposed to deliver the best outlook of accountability, receptiveness, peaceful and predictable, good governance as well as freedom. Democracy maximizes opportunities for all, while citizens live under laws of their choice, democracy is assumed to be the source of peace as against dissention. Instead, FRODEBU regime ensured that their idea of democracy should bring joy to Hutus, while bringing pain and unhappiness to Tutsis. The outcome of electoral democracy has not produced peace and prosperity as it was preached and expected to be, in many African countries like Burundi, Liberia, Cote D'Ivoir, Kenya, and Republic Democratic of Congo. As Frere puts it:

> Instead of bringing about a peaceful political changeover and a more participatory and transparent state governance, the electoral experience led either to civil war (In Burundi and in Congo) or to the apparent legitimation of government reluctant to share decision making process in unstable context (Chad and Central Africa). In Mobutu's Zaire political liberalization was manipulated by moribund dictatorship and in Rwanda by extremist movement which pared the way to genocide, (2011:17).

Before the 2010 elections, there was rampant torturing and arresting of media personal and political opposition leaders, this intimidating and terror is used as a persuasive instrument to make people to vote for them. Synder et al (2000:1) clearly puts it:

> "The transition to democracy often gives raise to war not peace. This link between democratization and war has been world evidence in the years since the cold war but the fundamental pater is as old as democracy itself".

Elections therefore turned to be just an act which gives an authoritarian a false sense of legitimacy to exploit instead of being a platform upon which leaders give a commitment to serve everyone including those who did not vote for 'him'. Current African leaders as discussed, are not willing to serve, instead elections has been adopted as a means to access

public funds for their benefit not the wellbeing of the people. However elections alone cannot make democracy. Instead an attempt to make elections the only aspect of democracy have not only destroyed African politics, economy and social life but it has also affected democracy and took away its goodness as it failed to honor its promises to Africans who never ceased to live under hunger, wars, political oppression and violence.

3.11. What is the relationship of leadership and citizenship in Burundi?

For democracy to thrive, citizenship and nationhood are vital. In as much as ethnicity is important, people in a particular state need to identify themselves with national values and loyalty which transcends specific belief systems. Democratic values are normally those which are universal and can be contextualized within the confines of the country. As long as people are bought into a system where ethnic identity transcends citizenship democracy can never take root because such conditions are a rich breeding ground for disunity and dissension.

Ethnicity took over state power in Burundi and even in Rwanda where ethnic group was highlighted in identity card for better control. The state is powerless, as it has been highlighted in Nicayenzi (2002), where ethnicity was given absolute and higher value than anything else in the country every activity of the state have to be measured through ethnic standard, Ethnic members must be protected beyond national values even if they break the law, their justice is determined by ethnicity. Ethnicity takes over and dominates the whole social life, political and economy of the state and whoever does not belong to this particular ethnic group is excluded. Ethnicity has taken over the law and other political, social and cultural values and even the state itself is swallowed by ethnic power and its values leaving citizens without protection. Thus an ethnic group labels itself as "*The State*". The ethnic mass murderers and genocide become "state" organized, all this insanity driven by the obsession of power but hidden behind ethnic hatred as strategy of political elites.

The 1993 elections in Burundi even though it was internationally mandated as free and fair, intensified ethnic polarization between Hutu and Tutsi ethnic groups resulting in the death of over 200,000 people (Synder *et al*, 2000). In neighboring Rwanda an internationally orchestrated power sharing accord intended to usher in more pluralistic and open politics instead created the conditions for 1994 genocide that killed nearly a million Tutsi and some moderate Hutu (Synder et al 2000:4). One group would not want its opponents to take power;

people and local traditional leaders are told by political authorities that protection is guaranteed only if the power is theirs or the only way to overcome oppression like in the case of Hutu-Tutsi in Burundi. "Racial biases are a fundamental form of social control that support the economic, political and personal goals of the majority group" (Vernon et al, 2008: 52). Hutu or Tutsi are threatened by their political leaders, reminding them what they would face if they fail to vote their own people.

Nicayenzi (2002:2) described Ethnicity as slaying democracy "*Ethnicite qui tue la democratie*"; because political elites campaign in the name of ethnic groups. Their promises are also for that particular ethnic group to whom they swear to care, in this case universal/national concepts of equality like justice and human rights becomes ethnic bound. Hence, those beyond the ethnic affiliation cannot benefit because they are not recognized as deserving citizens or citizens at all. In this sense citizenship is reduced to ethnic membership which it is supposed to transcend. (Bethell 2000). An ethnic group is given the power to decide on national issues, hence, decisions made in such a situation aim at suppressing those who do not belong to the ethnic circle. This is witnessed when many Tutsis lost their lives on their way to Bujumbura-Gitega, Bujumbura-Cibitoke, Bujumbura- Rumonge, Bujumbura, kirundo-Ngozi, Kayanza and Kayanza-Ngozi when CNDD/FDD was still pushing Buyoya Government to its knees. Ethnicity undermines the power of the state as a mediator and protector of all citizens (Nicayenzi, 2002).

As mentioned before, Burundian leaders consisted of mainly ethnic bound leaders with a military background. Their leadership strategies were the "*Law of Jungle*". This '*Law of the Jungle*' replaced laws of human rights, liberties and other attributes of democracy which would be enjoyed in a state that is ruled with fairness. According to Nicayenzi (2002:4), ethnic groups and tribes were present during the pre-colonial era, but they were instead subordinate to the state, controlled by the state and operating under the power and umbrella of the state but now they have surpassed power of the state. Under such circumstance development cannot take place since the absent state cannot organize, cannot protect, cannot plan and ultimately the state's affairs are never integrated towards a definite goal. Democracy has no place in a divided and disorganized society.

Democracy is built on state institutions, therefore where the state itself does not exist, democracy cannot take place. African governments, especially Burundi, Somalia and Congo

have no national conscience because leaders are not united and people also cannot be united in one entity (the nation). Citizenship does not exist, people are Hutus or Tutsis not just Burundians, some consider themselves the owner of the states as Hutus or as Tutsis, and citizens are not clearly identified. It is important to ask how democracy can survive where the main stakeholders (the people) are discriminated and devalued (Nicayenzi, 2002).

3.12. Conclusion

This chapter has provided brief historical background showing different leadership systems which the Burundian society experienced. It also highlighted incidences in which different leaders in different epochs either deviated or tried to live up to democratic culture. It has also underlined the anti-democratic behavior of Burundian leaders and it impact on democratisation process and possible alternatives of peace building. Ethnic divisions which many see as source of conflicts and war in Burundi are just tool of manipulation in the hands of elites who are hungry of power. The next chapter is looking at research methodology and theoretical framework of the study.

CHAPTER FOUR

RESEARCH DESIGN, METHOD AND METHODOLOGY

4.1. Introduction

This chapter will discuss the research design and methodology the study. Research by Jane (2003:3) views qualitative research as the most naturalist approach of research which better understands the social phenomena. This methodology is important in understanding the Burundian leadership crisis, since this crisis is imbedded in the political and social fabric of Burundian society. After explaining the process of data collection and analysis, this chapter will then discuss the choice of sample and the validity of information gathered.

4.2. Research method

A combination of primary and secondary data was employed. The researcher used different methods to collect and analyse data. Firstly, a review on leadership was visited in order to formulate the theoretical and conceptual framework of the study. These include text books, journals, published and unpublished articles on the history of Burundi, different conflicting events; democracy and attempt at resolutions were applied for the provision of a theoretical framework of the study. The combination of primary data and secondary data is very important since it enforces reliability and validity of the study first and places it in the context of other research. The conflicting problems of Burundi as they have been identified by scholars like Lemarchand (1996) are behind its history. The study is therefore forced to consider other historical literature talking about Burundi's conflicting situation. Terre-Blanche (2006) spoke of literature review as it is widely used in the identification and analysis of information resources and/ or literature related to one's research project. "This process includes identifying potentially relevant resources in initial assessment of these resources, thorough analysis of selected resources" Terre Blanche, Kevin, and Painter, Terre Blanche (2006:19). Information search therefore requires not only strategy but also skills for the adequate selection of proper and information relevant to one's study. While firsthand information (usually from respondents) makes the research unique, the secondary information (from literature) puts the study in context. Primary data provides the relevance and the validity of the research while secondary data places the research in the world of social science for interaction. According to Kaniki in Terre Blanche et al (2006:19), "A research

project does not exist in isolation, but must build upon what has been done previously". Therefore, before embarking on a project, research reviews recently published material but also should include a review of historical and oral material". Secondly, individual interview (semi-structured interviews) was conducted on the field to provide valid and reliable information regarding the research topic. These interviews were focused on people who have been exposed to the election of leaders in order to get relevant opinions on problems involving leadership and elections. These target groups of people are believed to have the adequate knowledge and experience on Burundi's economic, social, and political context. From an interpretive perspective this primary data facilitated access to their understanding and their experiences which shed light on what make elections of leaders problematic.

4.2.1. Research methodology

As specified above, the study is qualitative research which combined ontological and epistemological approach as it seeks the reality in context through a careful listening to experiences from intellectuals who are active in the life of the state (Terre Blanche et al., 2006:273). Semi-structured interview will be adequate in this study since it seeks to get control over the conversation. The semi-structured interview will be carried out as a normal conversation. The individual face-to-face interview seeks to obtain knowledge about individual experiences and perspectives on particular context (DiGicco-Bloom and Grabtree, 2006:314). According to Terre Blanche et al (2006:274), "the interpretive approach does not focus on isolating and controlling variables, but on harnessing and extending the power of ordinary language and expression to help us understand the social world we live in". The first-hand accounts (primary data) will play a major role in providing detailed results, outcome from an engagement and interaction with the researcher. The open ended questions will permit respondents to express themselves comfortably in ample manner as they wish their views to be heard. According to Donzen (1989:42), "Open ended interviewing requires working from general list of information that the researcher wants from a set of questions for which the researcher wishes answers. Occasionally these questions are put to those studied in the manner of focused interview". The wording and order of questions reflected the technique of the researcher according to the aim of the research. The open ended set of questions are opposed to closed questions because they allow the flow of conversation from the respondent, who is in a position to more information from his/her experience. As it has been emphasized above, the study seeks to understand social reality in context through the language and experiences of social actors. Open-ended interviews go well if handled by a skilled

interviewer who obviously should be a good listener. It is an empirical research that seeks to bring social phenomena into reality to the listener for suitable interpretation, (ontological and epistemological approach). A good interviewer interviews his/her interviewee in the most natural way and ordered conversation. Denzin (1989:43) has emphasized that interview should be a give and take between interviewer and interviewee, not a dialogue where one person does the talking while another one just asks questions. But the interview is made simple and enjoyable when shared between two people, and thus becomes a conversation. The interview is a formal and more structured consultation (Leedy and Ormrod 2005). Nevertheless, a well-practiced interview should hold potential for relationship continuation. In this particular study, most interviewees showed much interest in the study and were willing to be contacted for further study.

4.2.2. The significance of interviews in research

Face–to-face interview already establish a kind connection where two individuals have to face each other. It seeks cooperation while it offers an opportunity to the researcher to clarify vague answers. Face–to-face interview requires planning especially in terms of timing; it means the interviewee sets aside amount of time for that particular conversation; that is why researcher is requested always to be precise about the needed time for interview. As it has been argued by Dunne (1995), face-to-face interview is and still the best method for obtaining the most satisfying information. Also it does not only limit itself to vocal words but it goes beyond to read the emotions through body language and facial expressions.

This particular study used face-to-face interviews to get the deepest and most reality of Burundi social life. Gorden (1987:41) argued that "most interviews are done to obtain information or opinion, beliefs or attitude rather than objective verifiable facts". This therefore required some techniques to get into the thoughts of respondents. Some interviews focus on type of respondents, another focus on type of interviewer and others one can focus on function of interview itself. This particular work focus on all the three types of interview (respondents, interviewer and interview function), While interviewer with familiarity of the social world studied is required as first tool of analysis, the interview function is also needed to be set up in order to gain information needed to the study. As Gorden (1987:42) argued: "The success of the interview nevertheless depends on general method and skills used to motivate the respondent to provide information necessary to specific purpose. It is also believed that the flow of communication was completely depending on interviewer,

respondents and questions asked". In order to answer the main questions of research, different information from different directions must be combined as it will be detailed in the following paragraph. Nevertheless, privacy and dignity of respondents are also major concern of research to ensure code of conduct as regulated by University of KwaZulu-Natal.

4.2.3. Ethical Concerns

For the collection and analysis of data, ethical issues have been considered as an important component of social research. It is strongly suggested by the University of KwaZulu-Natal for the researcher to abide to the ethical principles guiding relationship between the respondent and researcher. As it was indicated in the front page of the interview questions, participation in the study was voluntary and this is related to requirement of informed consent respect. Participants were informed prior before even interviews took place. Appointments to conduct interview were electronically sent in January 2012 along with my set of interview questions for those who showed willingness to participate in the study. The authorization to conduct research was obtained from the Minister of Interior of Burundi from December 2011. A special letter was sent to the president of the ruling party CNDD /FDD seeking appointment and permission to have interview with him (see appendix 5). Moreover, anonymity and confidentiality have been ensured while sensitive information is carefully handled avoiding the discomfort of the interviewees.

4.3. Sampling method

The sampling in this study was a representation of various groups where men, women, different ethnic groups (Hutu and Tutsi) participated. However, this research does not include the "Twa" ethnic group because they are not yet fully integrated in the social life of Burundi. Making them part of this exercise was going be very difficult, given the isolation of their political and social life in general. Children below eighteen were also not included in data collection. Since this study involves intellectuals who are active in political and social life of Burundi, it is unlikely to find a child even a teenager with such experience. Samples need not be a representative in all respects. As propounded by Terre Blanche et al (2006:272), "representativeness is limited to those characteristics that are relevant to the substantive interests of the study" .Therefore, the researcher consulted six representatives of political parties, six journalists, and six civil society representatives. Burundi has thirty political parties and only four are represented in parliament. The choice included the ruling party and opposition parties from Tutsi and Hutu political parties. Broadcasting radios are nine in total

while human right organizations are about the same number (eight). According to Gorden (1987:180), "The type of respondent needed depends mainly upon the type of information sought. First, it is necessary to determine which of the many unique positions (roles, status, or functions) are relevant to the purpose of the study". Likewise, the position should be occupied by more than one person so that the respondent can be anyone with such functions. Furthermore, the scrutiny over respondents, type of interviewer and the setting techniques of questions have a great role of ensuring relevance of information, validity and reliability. Valid information is a key issue in any kind of research; Maxwell (1992:279) argued that legitimacy of qualitative research depends profoundly on validity; otherwise "if qualitative studies cannot consistently produce valid results then policies, programs or predictions based on these studies cannot be relied on". As it has been confirmed by Campbell et al (1963) and Cook et al (1979) in Maxwell (1992) the validity in qualitative research depends heavily on researcher judgment, that why the issue of meaning and interpretation are for great importance in this kind of research. Validity in qualitative research is not guaranteed by following procedures but "should rely on patterns, examples of scientific practices instead of nonconcrete rules or sorts as the ground of validating the reliability of observations, interpretations and generalizations" Maxwell (1992:280). It is therefore the responsibility of the interviewer to ensure validity and relevance of the information. The interviewer therefore must have clear understanding of the purpose of interview and communicate clearly the questions while ready to correct any kind of misunderstanding from respondents to guide them into relevant topic. The interviewer has to stay closer to respondents and encourage them to give valid and reliable information. Gorden (1987) has stressed on selection of respondents with relevant information and who are willing to deliver, it accessibility is equal important as the information itself.

4.3.1. Relevance of respondents

The researcher had to choose people with experiences in the life of Burundi state. According to Maxwell (1992:282), "All qualitative researchers agree that not all possible accounts of some individuals, situation phenomenon, activity, text, institution, or program are equally useful credible or legitimate". The motivation behind the choice of respondents is the subject being studied in research; the researcher must look for relevant people with the information needed for the study. These three groups of respondents' members of (political parties, journalist and civil society) are fully involved in the life of the state; they cover the political, social and economic areas. Validity of information therefore will depend on the researcher's

judgment as explained above. This research will concentrate on three different groups (named above) of people because of its relevance to the research.

4.3.2. Rationale of study area

Bujumbura is an economic and administrative city and any organization is likely to be represented in the capital of Burundi. Different factors are involved to choose the location of interviews, as motivation behind the choice of respondents and the location is also important. Bujumbura is attractive to organizations because it has better facilities than other places, government's offices like ministries, and connection with the world because the seaport and airports are found in Bujumbura. All important organizations, governmental and non-governmental, are represented in Bujumbura. Respondents and their organizations needed in this research are based in Bujumbura.

4.3.3. Accessibility to information

Due to the socio- political experience that Burundi has been through, strong confidence between respondents and researcher need to be built before conducting any study such as this. It also requires the researcher to be aware of Burundi current situation, in order to make relevant questions to respondents. This arrangement was made as the researcher had not only spent time with respondents learning and building trust with community members in Burundi, but also he started to communicate with respondents from telephones calls and emails since 2011, and thus enabled him gain the trust of the respondents. The interviewees were ready to respond with the exception of members of the ruling party (CNDD/FDD) and some pro-ruling parties like (FRODEBU Nyakuri) and (UPRONA Nyakuri) who seem to be afraid of revealing the party secrets. I was forced to travel twice[7] from South African to Burundi for collection of data because of the Burundian political situation. Despite all the efforts the researcher invested, he could not get any information from the ruling party CNDD/FDD and pro-ruling party FRODEBU, (Nyakuri) and even the anti-corruption movement OLCOM. This serves to show that as long as rulers are not transparent in their leadership giving information is regard as self-exposition of their unorthodoxy practices.

 I wrote a letter (see Appendix 5) to the President of CNDD/FDD in addition of the permission for research granted by Burundian Minister of Interior (appendix 4). This time my efforts were rewarded because I was received by Deputy Mvuyekure Lazare (in charge with social issues) in his office, after he went through my questionnaires, he told me that the

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[7] In january and November 2012

questions were highly political and were going to compromise his work in the progress as they had plans of re-writing Burundi history. After seeing the Deputy I had to wait in the same building since I needed to see the president of the party, Jermie Ngendakumana. He also confirmed that my questions would compromise the project of re-writing Burundi history. They were very much suspicious to the point of doubting me as a student; such that the president of CNDD/FDD asked me how a student from the faculty of commerce and management can write a paper on politics. I realized that the ruling party was suspicious of anyone who will hold them accountable. I was scared and my collection of data was disrupted and I decided to go back to finish it in November.

Through interviews, the researcher collected data and analysis took the interpretive approach method. According to Babbie and Mouton (2001:281), "qualitative research is conducted in the natural setting of social actors; the focus is on the process that it is on the outcome and the main concern is to understand social actions in terms of its specific context".

4.4.1. Data Analysis

Data were analysed using interpretative viewpoint. Terre Blanche et al (2006:321) argue that interpretive analysis requires the researcher to stay closer to information as interpretation take point of empathetic conception. Looking at the prerequisite principals of interpretive approach in the research, the researcher needs to have a good understanding of the context and listening skills. As it has been emphasized by Gorden (1979) when it comes to interpretive approach, listening is as important as the analysis itself, it requires that the observer become good listener and several process are involved to accomplish such task. A good listener give much time in listening than talk to prevent any kind of interruption, but ready to share experiences with interviewees trying to turn interviews into simple conversation since listening only would create distrust. However, interviewer should wisely guide the conversation, knowing what to listen to then he should guide interviewee toward his/her research interests than running around any stories. This will explain why sampling focuses on those with the particular knowledge of the events and respondents should be guided by the interview topic and questions. From interpretive approach perspective, interviewees should be those who have been involved in the same experiences. "This special knowledge often goes beyond any superficial knowledge or skills which can be gained by the interviewer for the occasion," Gorden (1987:212). According to Terre Blanche et al

(2006:322), "interpretive analysis perspective requires the researcher not only to get close to data but also to read it repeatedly as one commit himself in breaking data down into categories and rebuild it in his/her own way according to the historical and contextual understanding". This action concerns thematic categorization, elaboration and interpretation.

4.4.2. Majors steps of Interpretive approach in analysis

Denzin (1989:48) argued that the interpretive approach starts by framing the research question. Next comes deconstruction and critical analysis of the phenomenon, capturing and situating the phenomenon in natural world and obtain multiple instance of it. The third step comes with bracketing the phenomenon and reduces it in essential elements, construction or putting the phenomenon back together in terms of its essential parts and finally contextualization or relocating the phenomenon back in the natural social world. According to Leedy et al (2005:138), "data analysis start by:

> Organization of details about the case: specific facts about the case are arranged in logical and chronological order. Categorization of data: Categories are identified that can help cluster data into meaningful groups. Interpretation of single instance: Specific documents occurrences and the bits of data are explained for specific meanings. They might have in relation to the case". Identification of patterns: The data and their interpretations are scrutinized for underlying themes and other patterns that characterize more the case broadly than single piece of information can reveal.

As it has been emphasized in above paragraph, the researcher is the first tool of analysis in interpretive approach. Denzin (1989) argues that the researcher uses his/her sociological thoughts or his/her life experiences as topic of investigation. Deconstruction involves first interpretation of previous definitions for best observation and analysis. Capturing the phenomenon is about, tracing and putting in place the phenomenon to be studied. The bracketing therefore comes as thoughtful scrutiny of the element that is to be studied. According to Husserl (1913) in Denzin (1989), "in bracketing, the researcher holds the phenomenon up for serious inspections. It is taken out of the world where it occurs, it is taken apart and dissected. Its elements and essential structures are uncovered, defined and analyzed". The bracketing put aside preconceptions which were isolated in deconstruction phase. The bracketing divide the document into important experiential units and then the interpretive analysis is applied to these different units where the subject matter is seriously confronted. Denzen (1989) has suggested that bracketing as major role prayer in interpretive approach should follow five steps: First, the subdivided units should be positioned within researcher' experience, Denzen (1989:56) speaks of " self-story" as key phrase and statement that speak directly to the phenomenon in question. Therefore, the researcher can interpret the

information about the subject of discussion to bring out meaning in the existing statement. The researcher has also to review the meanings for what possibly they can reveal. Construction has the role of re-assembling the phenomenon into their coherent and put the bracketed elements in order to clarify how each element relates to another or affects the other. The main objective of construction is to reproduce lived experiences in terms of its constituent's analytic element (Denzen, 1989).

Contextualization plays a major role in the interpretive analysis approach. It gives meaning to units set aside in bracketing and construction while locating them back into natural social world. It also revives the phenomenon in the world of interactions, as it draws the meanings from the analyzed sections of natural world where these elements are spoken in social and emotional language. Moreover, it reveals how the phenomenon is experienced by ordinary people which are in most of the cases aim of research. Interpretive approach in qualitative research serves to expose the social world to the reader.

4.6. Conclusion

According to Denzin (1989:8), "Interpretive approach in social science aims at making the lived world accessible". Through close relationship of interviewer and interviewee, interpretive approach does not only listen to social actors but it also read and scrutinizes their voices and their emotions and actions for better understanding of their social world. However, the choice of respondents is also of great importance, Interviewer must not only look to people who hold relevant information to study but also to people who are willing to deliver it. In interpretive research, the emphasis is on life experiences.

CHAPTER FIVE

DATA ANALYSIS AND PRESENTATION OF FINDINGS

5.1. Introduction

This chapter focuses on the presentation of the data collected for the study. The data was collected from Bujumbura, capital city of Burundi and the respondents were divided into three categories or groups, one group consist of individuals (leaders) from different political parties, the other group consists of journalists from different radio stations and the third and last group is composed of individuals from different civil society organisations. The findings will be presented under the four sections within Burundian history namely pre-colonial, colonial, republic and democratic era. The main objective which these findings serve is to discover and try to understand what lies behind the democratic and leadership conflicts in Burundi.

This chapter presents the findings gathered from eighteen respondents' understanding of Burundian's Conflictual democratic and leadership history. The interview out of which these views or findings were obtained was conducted from 17 to 29 January 2012 and from the 8th to 29th of November 2012.

5.2. Confidentiality

In order to guarantee the confidentiality, this chapter will use coding. Instead of using the actual names of the people or their organization, each category and each individual will be represented by an encryption which represents the organization. The six presidents of political parties were represented by symbols, which ranged from PL-1(Interview 1) to PL-6 (Interview 6). The six members of media- journalists the same criterion was used, in which the symbols ranged from JL-1 (interview 1) to JL-6(Interview 6). The same applied to the members of the civil society, which included human rights was represented by HR-1(Interview 1) to HR-6(Interview 6). The assurance of anonymity and confidentiality was emphasized before each interview. I explained to all respondents that their names would not be recorded in the written document, even if this was stated in their consent form, which each participant signed and returned to me (see Appendix 8). I used a tape recorder to capture all

the details of the interviews. The data was then transcribed and translated into English by language a specialist hired by the researcher.

5.3. Why have the elections of leaders always ended in conflicts and wars in Burundi?

All interviews witnessed to the fact that the root cause of instability was grounded on personal or ethnic interests, mismanagement of public funds and abuse of power. In an attempt to answer the question above, some sub-questions were also asked to respondents such as: *"To which extent do you think power can be the source of war or conflicts"?* Respondents from the media, family, journalist of private radios said:

> Power is source of conflicts, when leaders who are supposed to be custodians who ensure that the nation's political, social and economic resources are distributed equally to the people are the ones who irresponsibly misuse these resources against the people. Resources are used to benefit one tribe as against the other, and ultimately the disadvantaged side will be frustrated and decide to revolt against the tribes which are hoarding resources for itself. I think, it is the mismanagement of state resources that is the source of conflicts (21 January 2012, JL-3)

Power becomes a source of conflicts if it is used to promote as long as it is used for selfish in which one tribe benefits to the detriment of the other.

> If power is unharnessed it can be a source of conflict unless it is well managed and exercised. If the leadership system is exclusive and power abused, oppression is likely to dominate and the use of force pave way to conflicts. Power must be well managed in order to prevent conflicts, (13 January 2012 PL-2)

Power must be retained by institutions, once it is left in the hands of one person or groups of people, it is dangerous to the rest of people, for conflict**s** prevention, power must be shared.

5.4. Life in Pre-colonial Burundi

This sub-section investigates life in pre-colonial of Burundi. It asks the question like, *"How were ethnic groups' cohabitations in the pre-colonial era"? What were factors behind*?

> During pre-colonial era different ethnic groups lived in harmony. I am convinced that, such cohabitation was possible because of the inclusive system of monarchy which was in place. Within the Burundian society different tribes had different

> roles to play for the community's well-being. They were very well represented in
> the political and social life of the state, (11 January 2012HR-1)

During pre-colonial period, power was distributed among people through tribal representation; each tribe was represented in monarchic government. The control of power played a major role in keeping the state peaceful.

The next respondent to that question has emphasized on the honesty and excellent character of leaders.

> During monarchic period, different ethnic groups in Burundi had good co-existence. Reasons behind were clear; Burundian traditional leaders were not looking at any personal interests, therefore no political manipulation was used, (21 January 2012, JL-3).

In pre-colonial Burundi, leaders had only one goal; this goal was to serve the people. They had no other devious ambitions designed to manipulate people for their own gain. The current conflicts are as a result of elite' influences, which divide people in order to create chaos which helped them to cling to power and abuse resources in the name of tribal division.

The third respondent from a political family also emphasized unity as major source of harmony of pre-colonial Burundi.

> At ceremonies of "*Kwatigwa*", enthronization to "*Ubushingantahe*" institution, the candidate was escorted by someone from different ethnic group. All of these practices aimed to maintain unity between the people, (19 January 2012, PL-4)

All ethnic groups respected each other and played complimentary roles in the political life of the state.

The next question will assess factors behind unity of ethnic groups in Burundi traditional. *"What were the contributing factors to the unity of different ethnic group"?*

> Solidarity between members of Burundian community was maintained by the exchange of goods. Ethnic groups exchanged products. Tutsi gave out cows, and Hutu agricultural goods, in exchange of their artefact the Twa received from both cows and agricultural products. Ethnic groups enjoying excellent relationship without discrimination and rejection as it is experienced in modern times, (13 January 2012, PL-2)

The major factor that contributed to unity in pre-colonial era was *"c'est qu'ils partagent tous"*, "they were sharing everything". Mixed marriage known as *"Guhana abageni"* played a huge role in unity of Burundi for years, there was cohesion between families and ethnic groups, (20 January 2012, HR-2)

There is nothing that can bring unity among people than sharing! However, mixed marriage united tribes into one family.

5.4.1. *"Ubushingantahe"* as institution holding peace and security of pre-colonial Burundi

The sub-section investigates the power behind pre-colonial Burundi political and social organization. *"What was the role of "abashingantahe" during colonial regime"?*

"Ubushingantahe" institution was playing a major role in watching over peace and security of the community. My Father was one of them and was the director of Ngozi prison; I think this is where I got the idea of defending prisoners' rights *"tel père, tel fils"*, "Like Father *like Son"*. "Bashingantahe" played a major role in maintaining peace in the community. After I finished part of my high school education, I received training from this institution. The Institution of *"Ubushingantahe"* was very effective such that even kings were bound to obey to *"Bashingantahe"* decisions. (11January 2012, HR-1).

The Institutions of *"Bushingantahe"* played the role of an overseer and regulator of peace and security. And most importantly, it acted as the power above the power of elites. These institutions acted as the wisdom which guided the king as the head of the state.

"Bashingantahe" were respected because were chosen on the basis of character and integrity. Moreover, they were democratically chosen by the people and entrusted with the duty of ensuring security, justice, mediation and reconciliation, (17 January 2012, PL-5).

"Bashingantahe" as ideal leaders were chosen for their character first and were the choice of people and second, they were people's representatives.

5.4.2 Abandonment of Burundian traditional leadership style.

Burundian traditions were gradually replaced by modernization. The coming of Western colonizers played a pivotal role towards the deterioration of Burundi traditional values which had a direct negative effect on Burundi leaders.

5.4.2.1. External influence as source of evil

This sub-question assesses external invasion; how it affected local political and social organization. Respondents were asked if the coming of European religion negatively influenced the power of the king.

> *Mwami* before colonization or Christianization was both God and people's representative at the same time. Burundians understood that after God there is a king and between God and people there is mediator *Kiranga* to whom people where forwarded their requests for wealth or fertility. Nevertheless, the introduction of Christianity turned everything upside down. Christ became king of kings to whom the Burundian king had to bow and be baptized, (23 January 2012, JL-4).

Not only did Christianity undermined Burundian religion but it replaced the king status as deity to the rank of a normal human being. His authority was undermined in such way his own people lost faith in his capacity to unite, protect and develop the community. Burundian religion was equated to evil. The "*Mwami and Kiranga*" lost their credibility to the God of the Europeans.

5.4.2.2. Growing deterioration of Burundian values

This sub-question is proving how Burundian traditional values are undermined to the point of changing "*ubushingantahe*" institution with another concept "*abagabo,*" a new concept adopted by the current regime. When respondents were asked the same question: "Did *the coming of European religion negatively influenced the power of the king"?* Respondents went on to highlight how Burundian traditions are abandoned.

> "*C'est la banalization des valeurs traditionnelle*", "it is just deflation of traditional values" "*Ubushingantahe*" was a traditional valuable resource on which everything was grounded; once the foundation is gone surely nothing substantial is left. The current leaders rejected the name "*Abashingantahe*" and embraced the name "*Abagabo;*" Hence, that means the former's virtues stood for is no longer valid and relevant. One should not be surprised why corruption, mismanagement of public funds, mass killings and muggings, rapes, all of these evils are common because the life giving fabric, which hold people together, accountable and responsible is gone. While *Mushingantahe* was associated with truth, protection of society, human rights advocacy, protection of orphans and

widows; and hope of his people; "*Umugabo*" is an ordinary male, without special responsibilities, (13 January 2012,PL-2).

People are no longer united and bound by life-giving morals after "*Bushingantahe*"

> Burundian population is suffering from the loss of these values engendered by the "*Bushingantahe*" institution; the modern political conditions ignored the work of "*mushingantahe*" to the point of undermining the need of its existence, since its duties were taken over by governmental officials. The present government has tried to replace *abashingantahe*" with "*Abagabo*", (20 January 2012, PL-3).

This response reveals that the loss of traditional values is the roots cause of the problems Burundi is facing today.

5.4.3. What are the required conditions necessary for true democratic elections in Burundi?

This section will assess causes and consequences of ethnic divisions. All respondents have agreed that the major hindrance to democratic elections is not ethnic divisions as everyone would think but elitist leadership's ambition to create these divisions for their own political gain.

5.4.3.1. Creation of Divisions

This sub-section will help us to understand the sources and consequences of ethnic divisions. Respondents were asked the following question: *"What was the source and consequences of ethnic division and how was it spread"?*

> Ethnic divisions are not problematic but the influence of different regimes is behind the creation conflicts. The insatiable thirst for power by the leaders is the source of Burundian conflict. People do not kill each other because they are from different ethnic groups but because of their political allegiance to a particular leader. Burundian historical conflict is as a result of power succession not ethnic differences, (11 January 2012, HR-1).

Ethnicity in Burundi is the source, which creates opportunities of politicians' hungry for power not necessarily conflict.

5.4.3.2. Attempted reconciliation for promotion of peace.

The sub-section is assessing Prince Louis Rwagasore's attempt to Unite Burundians by marrying women from the low class. From this particular question: **"*Why did Rwagasore to marry a Hutu girl*"**?

> Rwagasore's marriage was politically motivated since it took place at the time when divisions highly Conflictual during the Hutu revolution. He wanted to prove to Burundians that the Hutu and the Tutsi can live together again, (11 January 2012,HR-1).

> By marrying a Hutu girl, Prince Louis Rwagasore foresaw the birth of divisions in 1961 and prevented its development. He opposed the growing logic of ethnic differences where the Hutu were taking lower class paving ways to marginalization, (23 January 2012, JL-4).

The response reveals the commitment of Prince Louis Rwagasore to re-unite Burundians again.

> My research reveals that, Rwagasore's fiancé was not a Hutu girl but Tutsi from the Hima tribe; it was invented by certain politicians of the time, who did not want a Prince from a ruling class to marry a Hima, since it was better to marry a Hutu than Hima. This tribe was forbidden to have close relationship with royal family. However, Rwagasore's reason for this marriage was to unite people beyond culture, beliefs and taboos. (20 January 2012, PL-3).

Rwagasore had intended to unite people at any cost even to the extent of sacrificing his dignity as prince. He opposed politicians who wished to maintain separation between the Ganwa and the Hima tribe.

5.4.4. Renovation of government to meet the growing demand of modern world.

Rwagosore was a prince and an educated man who wanted to implement democracy within the monarchy. This sub-section investigates the reasons behind introduction of democracy in 1960 by Rwagasore, the hero of Burundi independency. *"What were the motivations behind Rwagasore's introduction of democracy in 1960"?*

> Prince Louis Rwagasore fought for the emergence of multi-party politics. The drive for his quest for democratic change was influenced by the consequence of Second World War, (17 November 2012,PL-5).

Rwagasore, as a prince and educated politician went along the political changes, he did not introduce them but he was taught in Europe and had to implement the world's current politics in his homeland.

> Rwagasore was one of the Burundians who attended occidental (western) schools; he saw how other modern states were organised. He also thought to identify himself with other African politicians like Nyerere, Kwame Nkrumah… (18 November 2012, JL-6).

The patriotic leader, Rwagasore had the intention of taking his nation to the next level.

5.5. The loss of role models in Burundian leadership

This section is dealing with political killings which followed 1961 elections. It starts by investigating Prince Louis Rwagasore's death. It will further look at Pierre Ngendandumwe, a Hutu candidate to the post of the premier minister in 1965 as well as mutineer of soldiers which followed the murder of Pierre Ngendandumwe. Respondents seem to agree about the reasons behind the murders of ideal leaders, by eliminating their threats, the colonial administration needed to ensure that they remain in the country. The section also investigates what pushed the Hutu Gervais Nyangoma to think about taking over the kingdom by force.

5.5.1. Reasons behind Rwagasore's murderer.

This sub-section will only deal with reasons behind Pierre Ngendandumwe and Rwagasore's death. Respondents were asked to answer the following question: *"What do you think was the reason behind Rwagasore's murder and why was Pierre Ngendandumwe also killed"?*

> First of all, as son of the king Mwambutsa, Rwagasore's allegiances were against the will of Belgian administration. In this regard, Rwagasore founded a political party that preached unity and immediate independency. His main objective was to banish divisions, which will ultimately end the colonization of Belgian administration. Rwagasore's politics threatened Belgian's interests and as a result, with the complicity of PDC leaders he was killed. However, the king's strategy of replacing his son with Hutu Pierre Ngendandumwe who was co-

founder of UPRONA (Rwagasore's party) was because he had the same ideological ambitions as Rwagasore. Hence, Pierre Ngendandumwe was also killed, (19 January 2012,JL-2).

The respondents also revealed that the colonial administration knew that the prince's politics was going to open eyes of the people, hence they foresaw the danger. They planned to eliminate him with the hope of regaining their ground through political parties which were in favour of colonial 'extension for at least 30 years.

Rwagarore was claiming independency in a country where the powerful rulers (Colonizers, and their favourite's elites) were not prepared to leave their positions… (20 November 2012, HR-6).

5.5.2. Consequences of losing ideal leaders

"What impacts do you think Rwagasore's death brought to political and social life in Burundi"? How Pierre Ngendandumwe's death did affected national unity?

The Assassination of Rwagasore and of Pierre Ngendandumwe had a very negative impact on the political and social life of Burundi and this negative force still influence Burundi up to this day. A Leader like Prince Louis Rwagasore was a charismatic leader who could not be easily replaced as the head of political party UPRONA, and as the head of state. After his death people were fighting over leadership positions. The only person who could replace him was Pierre Ngendandumwe who was also killed. After the death of these two patriotic leaders People started fighting over the control of UPRONA, as a result serious ethnic divisions between militants were created. These divisions resulted in conflicts, (20 January 2012 PL-3).

The charisma of Rwagasore and Pierre Ngendandumwe was too high to be replaced and their death casted the Burundi peace and development. Respondents pointed out the negative results of the loss of these two leaders.

From then on political assassination never stopped, because no one could follow or to revive the idea of Rwagasore, the ideology of self-denial and personal sacrifice for the sake of unity and development of people which characterised the prince and hero of independency (23 January 2012,JL-4).

When the founder of a political party or any other organization is killed, the organization or the party cannot work accordingly because the founder is the one who sees the true objectives while others can only just join and respect the law and order in place.

> The death of Rwagasore was the loss of the source and foundation of Burundi independency. Rwagasore's death was a very bad news for all Burundians because he was carrying a bright democratic future for his nation and his death created political unbalances which were worsened with the death of right hand successor Pierre Ngendandumwe. Burundians felt as if they were left alone because leaders who came thereafter started to fight over power, forgetting the main goal of former leaders, the people (19 November 2012, HR-5).

The death of Prince Louis Rwagasore and his colleague Pierre Ngendandumwe brought to Burundi social and political instabilities. The respondents' answers also reveal negative consequences which led to a complete polarization of ethnic groups.

5.6. Self-appointment to leadership and the beginning of conflicts in Burundi.

This section will assess all attempts of self-appointment to power from Gervais Nyangoma who attempted to overthrow the king in 1965. It will also assess the response of the army under the command of Captain Michel Micombero who after rescuing the king decided to end the monarchy in 1966. Unfortunately, the event produced a complete change of political and social system of Burundi where force became the official way to access to power.

5.6.1. Motivations behind 1965 action of Hutu Gervais Nyangoma and its development.

In order to understand the purpose of overthrowing the king from power in 1965, by Hutu Gervais Nyangoma, respondents were asked to answer the following question: *"Why did Hutu (Gervais Nyangoma) tried to take power by force from the king in 1965"?*

> That is the beginning of rivalry and polarization of ethnic groups. As Hutu he wanted to ensure control of the state as a member of the majority group. The colonial administration wanted Burundi to be like its sister country Rwanda, (18 November 2012, JL-6).

The response revealed the influence exerted by foreign power like the Belgian administration and Hutu Rwandese revolution.

Foreign influence created doubt which affected the Hutu's faith in their King whom they tried to overthrow in 1965. Such an attempt was condemned by the local as well as international community but problems could not be reversed, ethnic divisions had already been propagated, (21 January 2012, HR-4).

The reaction of Gervais Nyangoma was motivated by the promotion of one ethnic group over another. The Tutsi were promoted to the ranks of leadership while Hutu were gradually relegated and distanced from power.

There was high competition brought by democratic wind, under the influence of Belgian administration, Hutu of Burundi saw majoritarian democracy as the rule of Hutu as majority ethnic group, not necessarily a political majority, (18 January 2012, PL-1).

5.6.2. The intervention of army and consequences of military involvement in politics.

The sub-section is investigating the military involvement in politics of Burundi. Respondents were asked to answer to the following question: *"How do you describe the attitude of Captain Michel Micombero toward the crisis of 1965"?*

Micombero was called for intervention as a military officer and state secretary. However, he took advantage from the political chaos, to secure a leadership position as a first president of Burundi. *"Malheureusement, la nature a toujours peur du vide"*, "unfortunately the nature always fear gaps", (13 January 2012, PL-2).

The Respondent revealed the absence of committed leaders as the source of the problems that Burundi is facing. Micombero appointed himself as president because all courageous leaders were killed.

Captain Micombero inadvertent found himself a big man in the royal court with the entire power into his hands in 1966…., (19 November 2012, HR-5).

The president of the first republic took advantage of the absence of patriotic leaders to advance his political ambition.

5.7. Consequences of political and social changes

This section will investigate major changes on political and social level under the republic introduced by Captain Michel Micombero. The section will also investigate the development of republics under regimes which followed.

5.7.1. Political and social changes under the first republic.

The sub-question will assess the first republic of Captain Michel Micombero 1966-1976. In an attempt to get information about the political and social changes during afore mentioned period, the respondents were asked the following question: *"What political and social changes did the first Republic bring to Burundians"?*

> Absolutely nothing, the president of the first republic was the leader who killed his people, he killed Mwami Ntare IV; the system was full of reprisal, he avenged against all Hutu intellectuals in 1972, he was s drunkard and a womanised leader… ., (20 January 2012,PL-3).

The response has revealed the attitude of a first president of Burundi; first of all he was not tolerating people stepping in his way, the king Ntare IV was killed because he was a threat to his power as the heir of the "*Mwami*". The Hutu forced themselves back in the country in 1972 because they believed they were the custodians of power by right, they were also a threat to Micombero power; he killed all intellectuals specifically those qualified for leadership. He promoted debauchery….

> The major change of the first republic is the abolition of monarchy and the introduction of the republic. The first change was the transition from divine appointed leadership to self-appointed leadership through force. The republic marginalized the monarchy and its elites while promoting monopoly of power by a single ethnic group. The first republic has promoted not only divisions but also regionalism and tribalism, Burundi saw its first bloodbath under the first republic in 1972, (13 January 2012, JL-2).

The self-promotion to power came with the selfish attitude of leadership; Micombero started to allocate his own family and members of his tribe Hima to leadership positions.

> The first republic failed by promoting divisions and as results, rebel movements like PALIPEHUTU were created to threaten people's security and peace. In short, the first republic's leadership weakened the state, (18 January 2012, PL-1).

The respondent has revealed the outcome of exclusive government as birth of rebellion, as people's attempt to rescue themselves from oppressing government. The selfish leaders promoted divisions among populations and distorted peace that Burundi had enjoyed for years.

5.7.2. Political and social changes under second republic

"How do you describe the second Republic under Jean Baptist Bagaza"?

> It is true that Bagaza has done a lot of work but he actually forgot what was essential. He did not resolve, some mistakes committed by his predecessor, (eg the 1972 massacres). Whatever the second republic tried to construct was later destroyed by civil war since the root problem of conflicts was not resolved, (21st january 2012, HR-4).

President Bagaza, got into power by force like his predecessor, moreover, he failed to secure peace as a foundation of sustainable political and social organization. Divisions, nepotism and regionalism left by the first republic were left untouched.

> No remarkable changes were noticed, but development took place during the early stage of regime, the second republic tried to reduce leisure among officials which was the tradition of Micombero regime. However, most tendencies which characterised the first regime remained, (21 January 2012, JL-3).

The second republic concentrated on re-storing the economy of the state which led to the downfall of the first republic. Unfortunately, it forgot social reconstruction since it was essential to focus on restoration especially after the war.

> President Jean Baptist Bagaza inherited the chaotic situation from the first republic. In fact, if I am not mistaken, in his very first speech, he said: "*We take over a state where everything needs to be worked over, we have to start from scratch, politically, economically and socially, the country needs to be restored in every angle of its life. There is terrible degradation of national life*". Despite the efforts displayed by the second republic like economic development, restoration of Hutu who were made destitute by "*Ubugeregwa*"…the regime ended in tail of fish. Bagaza started to build his own empire against the people, (13 January 2012, PL-2).

As the respondent stated, the second republic had a lot in its plate, Bagaza regime prioritized economic development leaving behind social reconstruction which was going to involve everyone in the development of the state. The regime got tired before its goals were achieved and turned into itself. The self-appointed leaders were always motivated by personal interests.

5.7.3. Abolition of the monarchy and introduction of the republic brought terrible changes to Burundi.

This sub section is all about some common changes brought by the two first republics of Burundi. The respondents were asked to answer to this particular question: *"What do you see as common from the first and second republic"?*

> The common aspects of the first and second republic is their love for power control, they were very anxious and exclusive controller of power. They turned the state to be a family and ethnic property, (19 January 2012, JL-2).

The respondents revealed the relationship between the two presidents who were cousins. These two republics had much in common; the same family, same region, same ethnic group and common enemy, Hutu.

> Towards the end of the first republic and at the beginning of the second republic, we observe the denigration of political and social situation. Regionalism and tribalism strengthened the existing ethnic divisions. The situation got worse during the second republic, and this affected the popularity of Jean Baptist Bagaza regime, (20 November 2012, HR-6).

Being relatives and military officers, people around Micombero regime and people around Bagaza regime were the same; they were no remarkable changes of regimes. The power and national resources became family business. The abolition of the monarchy was the abolition of the power of the state since ethnic groups, tribes and people from one region were privileged to exclusively own the state's resources. Even if Bagaza regime tried to abolish "*Ubugeregwa*", Hutu who had no right to land had no right to be called citizens. Loss of citizenship started with the republic and is the roots cause of violence

5.8. Personal leadership as source of evil

This section will attempt to prove how self-appointed leaders failed to serve the people. It will concentrate on the ineffective and inefficient of military leaders who assumed power without the consent of people. These answers will also assess the failure of the third republic.

5.8.1. The third republic's purpose

"How do you describe the third Republic regime under Pierre Buyoya"?

> President Buyoya made efforts towards national unity through inclusive government; he tried to confront the real problem ignored by the previous regimes. During the third republic, Burundi saw the introduction of democracy, (23 January 2012,HR-3).

The third republic of Buyoya came as a courageous regime with the purpose of bringing changes, he attempted unification and democratization.

> Contrary to the second republic, the third republic intervened from regional and international level. Buyoya wanted his government to rule in accordance with international standards. He was open to inclusive government as a response to the democratic wave of the 1990s affecting Africa that time. However, I think, Buyoya did not have much time and energy to resolve Burundian political and social situation which has been deteriorating for some years. While he thought of ending his honourable mission with the elections of 1993, he failed to deal with Burundian conflicts which at end exploded badly against his wish for unity,(20 January 2012, PL-3).

President Buyoya was different from his predecessors; he came as democratic leader, though it was very difficult to achieve his goals of unity and democratization. It is unfortunate that the third republic efforts failed to restore Burundi which was deeply torn apart.

> The third republic was marked by disturbances and serious challenges. People who were banned from expressing themselves took advantage of Buyoya's regime and exploded here and there. He did not have time to develop and unite the nation, (19 January 2012, JL-4).

The president of the third republic broke the taboo of ethnic silence; the question of ethnic divisions was debated openly. Lots of movements (social, political) were born under Buyoya's regime. It is regrettably sad that despite efforts invested in dialogue of Burundian unity, every effort was compromised by the 1993 storm.

5.8.2. Comparison of the three republics of Burundi

This sub section assesses the positive and negative effects of the three republics of Burundi. *"Which regime between (the first, the second, and the third) do you think was helpful and which one brought negative impact to the nation"?*

> For me, I would say that the second republic is better than the rest. The second republics laid down the economic foundation while the first and third are responsible for the massacre of people. Burundi experienced killings in 1972 under first republic, and the same Genocide was repeated in 1988 and 1993 under the third republic, (19 January 2012, PL-1).

The respondent reveals the outcomes of the republics. The second republic laid foundation for development in which people benefited. However, the efforts displayed by Buyoya regime were not supported and consequentially the outcome was completely destroyed by genocide which followed 1993 elections.

> The first and third republics witnessed a lot of bloodbath, and in my view if the leader or the state failed to ensure security of its population, what form of the positive effects can we talk off? (17 November 2012, JL-5).

The positive ideas of unity and democratization failed to control the anger of Hutu population oppressed for years, their reactions created insecurity for the state.

> "The third republic established itself on a very unstable ground left by the first republic and the second republic. Ethnic divisions were once again escalating, ethnic cleavage in addition to social disorganization created by second republic were beyond Buyoya's control. Children who lost their fathers in 1965 were 22 years old by 1987, old enough to maintain a frustrated society set for vengeance. The ethnic wars of 1988 were inevitable. Buyoya did lot of work without any positive results but at least he tried to resolve sensitive issues while Bagaza did not touch these very sensitive matters at all. In my view, Buyoya was better than the rest of presidents, (20 January 2012, HR-2).

The third republic inherited the unsolved problems of previous regimes, Buyoya's efforts toward unification and democratization were acknowledged by respondents even if the outcome of his work was not evidently tangible.

By order of classification, the first republic is the source of all the evil that defined the country up to today. The transition from monarchy to republic needed to be handled with care; this is where the first republic made mistakes and that fault continue to negatively affect the country. As far as I know all regimes have experienced crisis, but the third republic had more because Buyoya opened doors out of which people vented their anger. The second republic had focused on economic development but leaving out the social tensions. Buyoya did not only give platforms to all people but also he made attempts to unity through an inclusive government, paving the way to democratization. The third republic was the best regime Burundi has ever had, (18 November 2012, JL-6).

The second republic tried hard to restore the life of the state on political economy while the third republic focused on social harmony and popular participation. By following international standards of democratization Buyoya had a better regime.

"What are the common grounds between these three Republics"?

As stated by the respondents above, all three republics were military regimes that gained power by force. They are from the same family, tribe, ethnic group, region and province. The first republic of Micombero has been qualified as mediocre as it strengthened divisions, while promoting nepotism, tribalism and regionalism. The second republic tried hard to restore the life of the state but neglected what was essential matter of the social life. The third republic is qualified a better regime since it concentrated its efforts on the foundation of peace as unity and democratization.

5.9. Democratization and understanding of democratic ways

From the respondents' answers, this section will assess the understanding of democracy among social actors. It will also asses the democratization process of Burundi by touching on the development of elections of the years 1993, 2005, 2010.

5.9.1. Democratic elections of 1993

The respondents in this sub section were asked to describe the 1993 Burundian elections. *"How do you rate the elections of 1993? As Fairness b) free c) transparent and competitive"?*

Elections of 1993 were free but determined with ethnic bias, (18 January 2012, JL-1).

The 1993 elections as revealed by the respondent above were ethnically motivated. Political elites used ethnic based propaganda to gain votes. At the scene, the elections were looking free and fair.

I know a lot about the 1993 elections, I told you that I was a member of executive of FRODEBU political party, I travelled around the country with president Ndadaye, organizing meetings. I would not say that our elections were free or transparent because they were not well organized; they were built on hatred and ethnic divisions. I know that FRODEBU was not going to win over Buyoya if it was not for ethnicity; the Hutu population was mobilized by a Hutu candidate Ndadaye. The Elections therefore could be called competitive because they were competing anyway, but no one can say that they were free and fair and less transparent. Their strategy did work eventually because Hutu are obviously the majority, (11 January 2012, HR-1).

As the respondent above stated the elections of 1993 were based on ethnicity rather than true democratic competition.

As I told you, the elections of 1993 were constitutionally free, transparent, and competitive because political parties were allowed to compete among themeselves, unfortunately it turned out to be an ethnic competition instead of a policy and political ideological competition, (18 January 2012,PL-1).

Hutu, leaders of FRODEBU's political party took advantage from the past to mobilise Hutu ethnic group behind them. They were constantly reminded of the importance of having Hutu as winner of elections.

5.9.2. The Motivation behind FRODEBU victory in 1993

This sub-section attempts to answer the question on the power behind FRODEBU (political party that won the elections in 1993 in Burundi). *"What do you think motivated FRODEBU victory in 1993 elections"*?

The strategy behind FRODEBU victory was ethnic divisions, they had a clear message to feed Hutu, and they were accusing their competitor UPRONA (long

lived as the only national party) for being responsible of Hutu massacre. Looking at the history of Burundi, this message was easy to understand and for every Hutu to sympathise with FRODEBU, (19 January 2012, HR-5).

The Hutus were taught to choose political party led by a Hutu for their liberation. FRODEBU and UPRONA were not just regarded as political parties in competition but a race of ethnic rivalry. As the majority group of 85%, all Hutu voted for Ndadaye, a Hutu candidate, (13 January 2012, JL-2).

Ethnic divisions in Burundi determined the nature of democracy possible that is if this was really democracy at all.

I believe it was all based on what happened in 1972, Hutus wanted to gain power and use the opportunity to revenge, (13 January 2012, PL-2).

Elections of 1993 turned to opportunity for revenge. Motivated by their leaders, Hutu wanted to revenge against Tutsi who oppressed them during their regime.

5.9.3. Causes of 1993 genocide in Burundi

This sub-section will try and understanding the causes of civil war which erupted in Burundi in 1993. *"Why democratic elections of 1993 in Burundi ended in a civil war"?*

Politics of exclusion succeeded over the politics of inclusion because the spirit of vengeance was motivated by Hutu leaders before the elections took place. The Hutu were frustrated because they were excluded from political life. Hence, they needed to take over power and assert their position as the main political players. Once Hutu has the power they used it as pay back, which ended up into the genocide of innocent Tutsi, (18 January 2012,PL-1).

The spirit of vengeance controlled the1993 elections. Due to anger there was no room for any tolerance and understanding to create ground of cooperation.

Ethnicity characterises most of African electoral systems. Therefore, FRODEBU was a political party with an ethnic agenda. Its quest for vengeance was fuelled by other countries like Rwanda, Tanzania …and even in European countries, who protested that Hutu should liberate themselves from Tutsi domination, once and for good, (23 January 2012JL-4).

The message of Hutu liberation played different roles to Tutsi hearts and minds that had just lost their own positions of leadership. It became a message of humiliation and fear to Tutsi, who became desperate by trying to secure themselves by regaining power.

> The Elections of 1993 have turned into a civilian war because the teaching of ethnic divisions. They wanted to gain access to power and the easiest way to gain support from people was through ethnic divisions and hatred emphasis during their election propaganda. I remember even before Ndadaye' death: we use to gather Tutsi and tell them "*you see, if Ndadaye can be killed, you will also die*". Anyone would understand why hatred exploded so bad when the Tutsi attempted of take back the Hutus' victory, (11 January 2012, HR-1).

The war was prepared ahead of time by Hutu who could not trust Tutsi. At the same time warnings of hatred and intimidation were given to the Tutsi.

5.9.4. Old leaders decided to regain power

This sub-section is about to asses some reasons behind the military action of taking over power in 1993. *"What was the reason for the military attempt to take over the nation by force"?*

> The military forces always take orders from politicians. I don't think the military attempted to take over power, but someone else was behind military actions. Nevertheless, it is clear that old elites needed their power back. The only motivation behind this kind of action is hunger of power, nothing else, (13 January 2012, PL-2).

> It was the same president Buyoya who attempted to takeover power, (20 November 2012, HR-6).

The military came to take the blame as cover-up of Tutsi politicians who wanted their power back.

> Burundian politics exhibits selfishness and lack of political maturity, (20 January 2012, PL-2).

The respondent revealed that regaining power by force was result of immaturity in Burundian politics.

5.10. Elections as source of war

Evaluating of different elections and the democratization processes: The respondents will answer one of the major questions of research: *What are the conditions and mechanisms required to enable the elected leaders to effectively serve the people in Burundi"?* This sub section will first identify actions and events which followed elections after 1993, 2005 and 2010 elections.

5.10.1. Death of Ndadaye was linked to elections of 1993

The respondents were asked to answer to this question first: *"Do you think the death of president Ndadaye can be linked to elections"?*

> Certainly! They are related; the president Ndadaye won 1993 elections and was killed because of his political position… (20 January 2012, PL-3).

> Motivated by ethnic divisions and vengeance; elections' sent message of intimidation to Tutsi. Tutsi were scared to lose everything "*une façon de les écarter, de les rendre mendient*". Political changes were not good for the Tutsi, so they have to deal with the source of these changes, (19 November 2012, HR-5).

Respondent above and (JL-1, 18.01.2012), blame the context of elections, which was characterized by the spirit of hatred and vengeance.

5.10.2. Massacre of Tutsi population was linked to 1993 elections.

This section is about to investigate reasons behind 1993 genocide of Tutsi in Burundi. *"What do you think caused the mass population decision of killing each other"?*

> The death of Ndadaye, which was caused by Tutsi elites, was the main source of genocide in Burundi. The Hutu elites told the population to avenge the death of their president over innocent population, (23 January 2012, HR-3).

The respondent above sees both the political elites from both ethnic groups as responsible for the war that took the lives of people in 1993. While Tutsi elites are guilty of president Ndadaye death, Hutu elites are guilty of Tutsi massacre.

> "There were people who were promoting vengeance, they wanted to revenge their president's death, in fact some of them were saying "*si on ne nous venge pas, ce sara la deusieme 1972*" which means, "unless we avenge ourselves the

death of our president is nothing but the second 1972 Hutu genocide", (18 November 2012, JL-6).

Hutu politicians took their anger on innocent's Tutsi as a way to pay back to Tutsi elites.

5.10.3. Identification of elections and consequences related.

This section investigates the elections of 2005 and 2010; it focuses on features like free, fair, transparency and competitiveness in elections. This section also investigates the strategy behind electoral victory as well as to what extent can democratic elections solve Burundian problems.

5.10.4. Elections of 2005.

The sub- section will describe the 2005 elections and the motivation behind the victory of the ruling party CNDD/FDD. *"How do you describe the elections of 2005? A) Free and fair b) Transparent and competitive"? "What were the motivations behind CNDD/FDD victory over 2005 elections"?*

The 2005 Elections were not free, fair and competitive, because people were forced by intimidation of CNDD/FDD army, police and its demobilised soldiers. Moreover, elections were won because people were tired of war and needed change. CNDD/FDD with its army behind imposed itself as a strong Hutu political party, (19 November 2012, HR-5).

The respondent revealed that CNDD/FDD's victory in the 2005 elections lies behind its force. The fairness… and competitiveness of elections did not count.

The 2005 Elections took place in a very different context; consequently they could not be free or fair. Elections were not even competitive or transparent because people were held at ransom by CNDD/FDD. *"Si vous ne voter pas, on va retourner au marquis"*, "if you don't vote us we will return to the bush". Burundians who suffered, told themselves that it would be better to give them a vote instead of staying displaced forever, (PL-2, 13.01.2012).

Elections took place in a time of crisis, while some rebels were still working with their arms in and out villages; CNDD/FDD demobilized the national military and force people to vote for their political party, (19 January 2012, JL-4).

The CNDD/FDD as a dominant rebel movement who waged war against national army threated people that they will go back to the bush if they are not voted. The next point is the environment in which the elections took place; it was within unstable conditions. The elections could not be democratic in such context.

> The Hutus killed in 1972 lacked a strong army to defend them. On top of intimidations and other violations, the CNDD/FDD army was quickly considered by Hutu population to be their protection, (11 January 2012, HR-1).

CNDD/FDD propaganda carried along ethnic messages on top of intimidation and false propaganda founded on divisions, many Hutu were happy to have a Hutu army.

The second question in this sub-section investigates the motivations behind CNDD/FDD.

> The Reasons behind CNDD/FDD victory during 2005 elections are the same reasons which supported FRODEBU during 1993 elections. The two political parties have been like the Hutu movements which focus on power as way to liberate themselves from the Tutsi domination. CNDD/FDD which came with its own army could not resist using its force to gain access to power. On top of the huge number of Hutu population, CNDD/FDD forces pushed the population to vote, with the mobilization of army and police, it was very much promising to win the elections, (11 January 2012, HR-1)

The respondent has revealed that the 2005 elections were supported by Hutu ethnic group as majority group in addition of acts of intimidation of army and police. The security concerns at that time could not allow people to vote freely, they were forced by rebels groups and also citizens were very tired of war.

5.10.5. Some major characteristics of the 2010 elections in Burundi

The sub question analyses the 2010 elections and describes its developments. What are the major causes of elections boycott and their related consequences? This sub-section also investigates if the democratic elections can solve Burundian problems and works for recommendations for future elections.

5.10.5.1. Description of 2010 elections in Burundi.

This particular sub-section responds to this question: *"How do you describe the 2010 elections? a) Free and fair b) transparent and competitive"?*

The 2010 elections were full of irregularities and uncertainties because they were won before they even take place. One week before the elections, people had their cards in their hands, more than ten cards of winning parties just to prepare them to vote from different places. These elections were somehow already very complicated because with the modification of the electoral code. From the beginning, they were not prepared to follow the normal elections procedures. In short, they were not free or fair, they could not be transparent or competitive as the whole world knows, (20 November HR-6).

Respondents reveal that elections were characterised by frauds. Elections boycott came as results of unhappiness of opposition parties.

The 2010 Elections were neither free nor fair because they were rigged, (19 November 2012,HR-5).

The respondent highlighted lack of freedom and fairness during 2010 elections. Moreover, he revealed that CNDD/FDD a hidden agenda; fraud was planned before.

It is unfortunate that we realized that CENI was on side of government fraud, (20 January 2012, JL-3).

The respondent emphasized the disappointment of people when they noticed that CENI (*Commission Electorale Nationale Indépendante*) *"Independent national electoral commission"* was part of the government deal!

5.10.5.2. How confident CNDD/FDD was in the 2010 victory.

This sub-question is the response to the following question: *"How confident was CNDD/FDD in winning elections and why? What were it strengths"?*

They were confident because everything was set in place; elections were in their hands from the beginning. The starting point was imprisonment of pertinent competitors while ordinary citizens were constantly held by demobilized soldiers of CNDD\FDD who were telling them whom to vote for to avoid terrible consequences, (23 January 2012, JL-4).

They were very much confident as the respondent reveals. They had police to arrests members of opposition parties. And finally they managed to buy the election commission to their side leaving their opposition without hope.

> During the elections we could see members of CNDD/FDD party running up and down among people on queue making suggestions, we experienced a lack of cards for other political parties while CNDD had all electoral cards needed. We noticed failure of CENI to give reports (*des process verbaux*). On top of all of this, leaders of political parties were intimidated; CNDD/FDD was 100% confident of winning elections, (17 November 2012, Pl-5).

CNDD/FDD was very much confident of winning elections, first they had their back covered by its own armed force. While their movement (plus demobilized soldiers) was intimidating people, the government harassed the oppositions with imprisonment at one hand and on the other hand the elections themselves were manipulated with the support of CENI.

> The ruling party CNDD/FDD never detached itself from its combatants, "*Imbonerakure*", looked like rebel group supported by government, "*Imbonerakure*" and police have played a major role in winning 2010 elections, (20 November 2012, HR-6).

The respondent reveals that the ruling party was prepared to use force at any time because it does not trust democratic systems.

5.10.5.3. Reasons behind boycott of elections.

The third question tries to find out why the opposition political parties at the end boycotted elections. *"According to your understanding why did opposition parties boycott elections"?*

> It was because of fraudulent electoral organization. Opposition parties were not given resources to prepare their supporters for elections. Also, intimidation from the ruling party could not allow them to access the media for wider mobilization…. There was no body to complain to about irregularities, because the watchdog (CENI) was government controlled, (13 January 2012, PL-2).

The CNDD/FDD organized elections, with the purposes of creating chaos within the electoral system. The electoral organization was a setup of the government and its ruling party.

> They noticed fraud and intimidations then they had no other choice than to withdraw from contesting. They said, we cannot involve ourselves in elections full of frauds, terrors, they could not support CNDD/FDD in such activities of electoral deception, (19 January 2012, JL-2).

Boycott was the only way to denounce the dishonesty (prepared and carried out by the ruling party, CNDD/FDD) within electoral system.

> "After noticing massive frauds, after collecting enough evidence of what was going on in relation to intimidations and other deceitfulness involved in elections progress, they took the matter to different authorities, institutions seeking justice which was not granted. They discovered that even CENI which was supposed to be the independent body collaborated with the ruling party. They ran out of options and chose to withdraw from competition, (11 January, HR-3).

5.11. Consequences of elections of 2010 in Burundi

The sub question primarily looks at the consequences of 2010 elections boycott and analyses the impact it brought to Burundi political and social life and looks at the possible solutions to future elections.

5.11.1. Political disagreement of 2010 elections

In the first place, the respondents were asked to answer to the following question: *"What challenges did the Government experienced from that disagreement"?*

> From my political experiences, the current government has refused to share resources with its people. Burundi now has only one political party since oppositions have no chance of being accommodated. For those who resisted, they have no option but to join the ruling party. There is unhappiness in the country and the opposition is looking for other alternative means to challenge the ruling party because they cannot agree with the present rule. The government declined to dialogue with the opposition parties. I personally approached the government and their answer was clear regarding the issue of dialogue, they said: *« Pour le gouvernement, il très clair comme ils le dissent, pas de négociation, pas de partage du pouvoir »*, "The government is clear as they say, no negotiation, no power sharing", (18 November 2012, PL-6).

The ruling party prefers war to dialogue or power sharing. Regrettably, innocent's people will pay the price.

> The consequences of that political disagreement are the failure of peace building. When the government learned that the opposition parties were going to ally themselves with the main armed group, the government started to murderer

members of the opposition with the aim of weakening the alliance. This situation enforced the idea of self-protection and FRONABU-TABARA a rebel movement has already taken action. So, we are now seating on a bomb or a volcano which can explode at any time, (23 January 2012, JL-4).

As the respondent articulated, one can easily see that the CNDD/FDD has moved back to authoritarian rule. The opposition and their members are not given justice, human rights are not protected and promoted, and the government is not transparent at all. This kind of politics which suppress the rights of people has inspired self-protection to oppositions who combined efforts to fight against the government.

5.11.2. Democratic elections and Burundi political tension.

The focus here was to address the issues as to whether democratic elections in Burundi can be an answer to the current problem of leadership. *"Do you think the so called 'democratic election' is a solution to the political tension of Burundi? Explain"*.

> *"Yes, democratic elections can be an answer to Burundi political tension, but these elections must be democratically organized. Regrettably, the current elections are not democratic. A democratic election, in my view, is a process whereby every candidate presents himself/herself with a proper program of development to the public for approval. With the current system of elections, you will find for example in Kirundo on top of the list someone with grade 4, (as deputy candidate) who did not finish primary school. Which policy or program can this person make for his country"*, (18 January 2012,PL-1)?

The Electoral system is not democratic, so are the results. Instead, corrupt elections produce corrupt leaders with no proper political plans than their personal interests.

> Democratic elections are necessary and can offer solutions to Burundian problems like anywhere else. However, Burundi never experienced the democratic elections; all we know are strategies of accessing to power. We have been experiencing big problem of elections where candidates compete for power with the purpose of serving their own interests, « *Une poignée des gens qui s'enrichissent au détriment de la population* », "small number of elites who enjoy the country's resources at the expense of the majority of the population". Elections in Burundi bring more problems than solutions, (21 January 2012, HR-4).

Democratic elections are a solution to conflicts of Burundi, in fact according to the respondent above, democratic elections is what Burundi needs. The elections Burundi has experienced for quite some time are not democratic but a means to political elite's hunger for power.

5.11.3. Suggestions on Burundi future elections.

This sub-question gives suggestions on future elections in order in an attempt to find solutions to Burundian problems. *"What are your suggestions for future elections"?*

> Elections must be organized at constitutional level. Elections were supposed to take place under international community supervision from bottom to top, but they were instead conducted under the military and police (members of the ruling party) supervision. The judiciary body was not supposed to be a member of a political party like it is today but neutral body for unbiased law enforcement. The Minister of interior and minister of justice are members of the ruling party. If the electoral process lacks security at judiciary level and at local level the process is doomed to fail. For future elections I suggest that there be neutrality of supervision and security of the electoral body, (18 January, PL-1)

As revealed in the above interview, the respondent emphasized on the electoral mechanism; they suggested a neutral body, and preferably international community. There is no mechanism to regulate conflicts within the electoral process since positions of regulation and electoral control are occupied by members of the ruling party. For safe elections, independent judiciary body is needed and this body needs more professionals to regulate the conflicts.

> "May the elections be democratic where people gain civic education about democratic 'theories' and practices…, (20 January, HR-2).

Burundian political leaders confuse Burundians about democracy and democratization process. People have no clear understanding of democracy and fail in the trap of those politicians. Education on democracy is needed in Burundi before regulated elections to take place.

> Considering the Burundi situation, I would suggest the system of *"grand electeur"*, "Electoral College" as response to analphabetic of Burundi population, (21 January, JL-3).

The respondents have suggested a new electoral system which could suit well to the Burundi context. The respondent assumed that elites take advantage of Burundian population's ignorance. Differentiation of best and worse policies and programs of development would require certain level of education which the Burundian majority is missing. According to JL-3, 21.01.2012, votes by representation, the Electoral College was going to challenge and root out lies of politicians in order to know effective candidates.

5.12. Rebellions and possible alternatives of peace building.

This section investigates reasons behind CNDD/FDD creation in 1994 in Congo and possible objectives of the recent rebellion movement FRONABU-TABARA. This section also investigates the effectiveness of power sharing strategy, especially in Burundi. The section takes into consideration other alternatives like power shifting in the light of traditional practices and the separation of power for peace building. It assesses the differences between these alternatives while open to other alternatives proposed by the respondent.

5.12.1. Creation of CNDD/FDD in 1994.

The sub section looks at motivations behind the creations of CNDD as armed wing of FRODEBU in 1994. This rebellion was born in Congo under the leadership of Leonard Nyangoma former interior minister. *"Why was rebellion born in Congo in 1994 under the commandment of Leonard Nyangoma.*

> The armed force played the role of protecting its political party, as UPRONA had national army behind them and the current ruling party CNDD/FDD has its armed force behind them as well. Therefore CNDD was born to secure and protect FRODEBU at the time. The respondent emphasized that if CNDD/FDD had no army, it could not be in power today (13 January 2012, PL-2).

The gun is the power behind the regime, since democracy actually means nothing.

> The motivation behind CNDD creation were more historical, from 1966 the state was headed by members of the army with great need of protection. Then, FRODEBU members told themselves: As long we have no army, we will never have our power (23 January 2012, JL-4).

The armed force is the only guarantee of power in the history of Burundi; the Tutsi had their power behind them (national army, mostly Tutsi). FRODEBU stepped in without

guns, they failed to live their dreams, then decided to go back to arm themselves in order to regain their political place.

5.12.2. The Aim and objectives of FRONABU-TABARA (rebel movement).

This sub-question investigates the purpose of FRONABU-TABARA as a recent rebel movement born after the 2010 elections. *"What are the aims and objectives of the current rebel group (FRONABU-TABARA)?*

> I am not among or co-founder of that rebel movement to clearly know its objectives! However, as a politician I can see that the motivation behind the rebel movement in the present context of Burundi is self-protection against the government. People are killed in most scandalous ways, today people are called by police and tomorrow their bodies are floating over rivers, people of certain parties are much oppressed and have been moving into exile, but until when? The aim of FRONABU-TABARA might be a way to fight against the social injustice; they seek power to stop the government from murdering and imprisoning their members. The oppression exercised by the current government has created frustration which is at the ground of rebellion formation, it is a way to say; we cannot tolerate it anymore, (13 January 2012, PL-2).

The respondent has just revealed oppression and killings organized by the government to silence the opposition parties and their supporters. Force in this case is recourse to self-protection against the oppressive government.

> Even if the government refused to recognize that rebellion, what is known is the prevailing social injustice and political exclusion. Since they were formed out of opposition parties, I think their objectives is to fight against injustice and political division which is observed today in Burundi, (17 November 2012, JL-5).

The respondent reveals that the rebel movement was formed out of the opposition parties which boycotted the 2010 elections. Excluded political parties from government have no other choice than to arm themselves and claim their right by force.

5.12.3. The Strategy of power sharing as peace building.

This sub-section assesses the power sharing practiced in Burundi, which was signed in 2000. *"To what extent was the strategy of power sharing effective"?*

There has never been power sharing! *"Les choses d'Arusha Ce n'était que l'ethnisme déguisée",* "Arusha negotiations were done under the disguise ethnicity, (20 January 2012, PL-3)

Power sharing was turned into war of interests; the respondent reveals the strategy of politicians when they need to cut a lion's share for themselves. As it is in Burundi tradition, they manipulated ethnicity for supporters.

I believe efforts were displayed for peace building through power sharing strategy. Nevertheless, looking at the results through the lenses of 2005 and 2010 regime, only the members of ruling parties were privileged as power sharing was forgotten…(17 November 2012, PL-5).

Burundi did not enjoy the outcome of power sharing strategy even if it had a good purpose. It was underplayed by the regimes which followed Arusha negotiations, but also as long it did not go beyond ethnic categorization, its effectiveness was constrained.

In fact, at Arusha negotiation, Burundi was not represented, only Hutus were represented, Tutsi were represented and these politicians were absolutely representing their own interests' and not Burundians at all. Looking at state management, power sharing strategy was not only ineffective but lacked vision, (23 January 2012, HR-3).

During the Arusha negotiations, Hutu and Tutsi politicians were representing their interests. The respondent reveals how the power sharing initiative was undermined by the regime which refuses to consider the accord in their governing system.

The second question was asked to respondents is the following: *"How effective has power sharing been in Burundi"?*

The Arusha negotiation as power sharing strategy was a very good approach to the Burundi conflicts. However, the regimes that followed did not believe in power sharing, it ended up disappearing without any effect! What we can observe now, is that the power sharing strategy was never implemented, the method was not considered by people in power, (19 January 2012, JL-4).

Though power sharing was a very good strategy to Burundi conflicts, political leaders could not allow this method to work, as they are not prepared to share.

I have already responded to that question that there is no power sharing, "*le pouvoir est entre les mains des chefs du parti au pouvoir*" "power is in the hands of political leaders". The ruling party manages power as it wished, they chase brilliant and skilled workers and bring mediocre officials in offices because they are members of the ruling party, (13 January 2012, PL-2).

There is no power sharing, the strategy ended in Arusha negotiations; what is implemented is a continuation of authoritarianism where only one political party rules.

5.12.4. Other alternatives of peace building like power separation or power shifting.

This sub-section assesses other alternatives of peace building like separation of power or power shifting like in traditional Burundi. The sub-section goes to compare and contrast these different alternatives; it ends by giving opportunity to the respondents to give their views on other alternatives for peace building.

"What do you think about other alternatives of peace building like ethnic separation, and power shifting in the context of Burundi"?

I do not believe in any of these alternatives, because the problem is not that of separation of ethnic group or alternative of power. The problem is our leaders, because within the same ethnic group, people can kill each other, the issue that we have to deal with is power management. Good leaders whether Hutu or Tutsi can manage well power. And a good leader is leader who serves the nation, who serves people not himself or his allies, (13 January 2012, PL-2).

Alternatives of peace building can only work under good leadership, unless good leaders are in place the good strategies will suffer manipulation like elections.

Within the Burundi context, it is very difficult if not impossible to separate people based on their ethnic backgrounds. Power shifting alternative seems to be difficult to me unless supported by strong institutions. Otherwise when a new president comes into office, replace existing and experienced officials with his people; it would be continuous abuse of state resources as they cannot feel secure. Even if every term was going to have a new president, and unless institutions are strong to hold the system tight, to hold leaders accountable, the strategy remains useless", (20 January 2012, HR-2).

Any strategy of peace building cannot serve anything unless leaders are held responsible, in other words, the respondent instead suggest power above that of the leaders for democratic behavior enforcement.

> I do not see if your proposed alternatives are of great importance, instead, we need independent justice, we need a public weapon, we do not have public police, and all these strong institutions are under one man, but the president. As long things remain like they are, we will always have problems. Instead, I suggest strong institutions to hold the justice and police to the services of people and ensure the protection and security of people, instead of being the tools of people's oppression, (18 November 2012, JL-6).

There is no alternative which can suppress the greed of political leaders, unless institutions are put in place to enforce law and order, alternatives will just be manipulated as it happened in Arusha negotiations.

The next question seeks to know how power shifting was operating in pre-colonial era; the question also is to know if the same strategy can be considered as peace building today. *"How was power shifting in pre- colonial era, between (Abatare, Abezi, Abataga, Abambutsa)? Can this strategy be considered relevant for peace building now? Explain".*

> During the pre-colonial period, ethnic groups were insignificant because there was no rival of ethnic groups. Unfortunately, if power shifting may happen between Hutu and Tutsi, it cannot be source of peace. During pre-colonial period; they had social harmony and political stability which has been disturbed for now to facilitate power shifting, (10 January 2012, JL-1).

The respondent has just revealed that the necessary foundation for any alternative of peace building is social cohesion and social harmony which Burundi is missing today. Burundi needs political stability to apply the power shifting or any other possible strategy.

> You should always expect changes in politics, like the Abahima made themselves accepted afterward, the Hutu also did. Now you talk about power shifting, it was practical that time but now is out of discussion. The serious problem Burundi has is their leaders and not strategies to rules. Also, any tactic can be destroyed unless it has the right people to protect it from manipulation. I still doubt power shifting

especially if we take it as it was done in pre-colonial era. We need good governance which depends heavily on good leaders, 921 January 2012, HR-4)

Power shifting was a good process of handling power but it was facilitated by good leaders who had no double thought to manipulate the process for their own interests. Without the willingness of leaders, no positive change should be expected; bad leaders cannot facilitate peace building.

 The following question is the question of comparison, where power sharing, power shifting and separation of power are compared and contrasted. Respondents were asked to answer to the following question: *"In your opinion, how does power shifting differ from power sharing and ethnic separation"?*

> There is a difference between power shifting and power sharing since in power shifting, the one in power applies his/her programs and policies until another leader come and takes over. However, power sharing is similar to inclusive government when important state decisions are equally shared by different parties at the same time. Separation of power is extreme polarization of ethnic groups and has nothing good but evil and it is out of consideration. Nevertheless, power shifting has one positive aspect; it can be a remedy for cyclic Burundi conflicts since all could gain their turn of holding power. I think it could stabilize the country in a sense that it evokes popular participation not just power shifting. In short, power sharing and power shifting may have the same objectives. I am not in favour of any of these solutions but will rather suggest a popular participation that will include all parties in state management, (18 November 2012, PL-6).

The respondent has sided with popular participation, in other words, any inclusive strategy can work, and he is for the two alternatives (power sharing and power shifting) as long they are inclusive in participative government.

> Separation of power which is a similar ethnic separation is impossible, it happened in time of war when Tutsi were taken into displaced camps and Hutu in different displaced camps. However, the practice is just a temporarily measure and should not be taken as a strategy for peace building. Nevertheless, power shifting can be one of practical solutions as long it is with supportive institution which promotes social cohesion. Power shifting emphasizes on serving your

terms limit in the office which can give citizens more time to observe different parties delivering. Power shifting and power sharing should be implemented for the purpose of sharing which can offer a similar solution to Burundi problem, (17 November 2012 JL-5).

The separation of power and ethnic separation are the same, it is practically impossible for Burundi context as respondents reacted. Power sharing aims at taking all members of political family to participate in the life of their state. Power shifting, is not different but members of political family move to power one by one which is also good since everyone has his/her turn. However, regardless of their brilliant visions of these strategies, they must be voted by people, they must follow a democratic way to respond to the needs of citizens according to the above respondents 'suggestions.

5.13. Conclusion

The peace and security which characterized the pre-colonial period can be attributed to the nature of traditional leaders and strengths of traditional institutions as respondents stressed. The loss of traditional values which were holding leaders accountable marked the beginning of the present conflict. The introduction of Western colonial ideologies brought significant changes to Burundian leadership system. The modern leadership system contributed to the deterioration of relationship between leaders and people paving the way to ethnic polarization. The attempted unification and democratisation of Prince Louis Rwagasore in 1960 and by the third republic of Buyoya in 1993 was opposed by existing leaders who wanted to hold on power at any cost. Attempted peace building by regional and international community could not reach expected results since mediation failed to operate beyond ethnic categorisation. It is sad to note that the most violent movement CNDD/FDD ended up by imposing itself during the negotiations. The negotiations were not meant to serve justice but to give power to the violent movement in order to spare the innocents who were killed by the CDD/FDD. Subsequently, elections were held and the same violent movement won the elections because people voted for them because they were tired of war. In these sense elections has nothing to do with democracy, but everything to do with fear and manipulation by the powerful.

CHAPTER SIX

INTERPRETATION AND DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS

6.1. Introduction

Findings from the empirical investigation are discussed and interpreted in this chapter. Section two presents leadership as a strong commitment to promote unity, justice and equity. Section three explains institutions and values of leadership in Burundi. Section four explains loss of traditional values, self-appointment to leadership and elections without democracy in Burundi. Section five explains how Burundian leaders are a hindrance to democracy and presents alternatives ways to peace building. Section six explains the role of international community in democratization, the power of the gun behind Burundian elites which promote the 'law of the jungle' as result of rule by force; and section seven presents the conclusion.

6.2. Leadership as promoter of unity and equity

According to overrule respondents, the pre-colonial Burundi was peaceful because of the following three reasons:

1. The inclusive system of leadership
2. People as the main concern of traditional Burundian leaders
3. Unity of the people.

Respondents believed that the monarchic regime played an important role in promoting peaceful life because of its inclusive system of leadership. As seen in Chapter three, the Burundi traditional regime was decentralized and each tribe and ethnic group was represented in the socio- political life of the state (Gahama, 2002). Respondents continued that serving the people was the main objective of Burundian traditional leadership. They insist that the Burundian traditional leaders had no personal interests to make any political manipulation as it is today. Furthermore it was emphasized by respondents that the king as promoter of unity was keeping the people together through political and religious practices. These respondents believed that harmonious cohabitation was the result of the work of leaders. As 23 January 2012, HR-3 stated, "They were happy to be under divine protection". The word "*Divine*" here as opposed to "*corrupt*", meant they were under perfect protection. This statement emphasizes equity, as all Burundians were protected in the same way regardless of their

ethnic groups or their tribes. The people being referred to one common name "*abarundi*" meaning "people of Burundi", not "Hutu or Tutsi". This isfurther understood from the response of 19 January 2012, JL-2, who emphasized on the primary role of the king, stating "*Ils avaint le roi, ils avaint la nation*", "They had the king and they had state". The king was there to ensure protection and security while giving opportunity to all without discrimination. Burundi was a nation in which inhabitants were regarded equally. This stresses on the importance of the king as the head of the state and the state as a dwelling place of all.

 As concisely pointed out by respondents, the hierarchy of political organization included at the top of the God of Burundi from whom came the perfect leadership, seconded by the king who was regarded as a representative of God and then "*Abarundi*", the Burundian people. The king was at the centre of the political and social organization as a vehicle for promoting peace and security. The 'divine' kingship in Burundi implied a king who could represent God perfectly, a divine king for his people; therefore, the king could only identify himself with God by saving and treating Burundians equally. All different ethnic groups or tribes were equally regarded by the king. Accordingly, four elements are kept together to ensure unity, peace and security of the people in Burundi.

❖ Divine God that controls the power of leaders (king); The king who act in likeness of God of Burundi to become not only the head of the state but the father of Burundians;
❖ The state as a dwelling place for all inhabitants of Burundi.
❖ The people of Burundi as source and recipients of leadership.

This also indicates an emphasis on identity and citizenship. "Burundians" as an identity reflected the unity of the people having "Burundi" as their nation. The people shared one common name "Burundians" (*abarundi*) and one nation- Burundi. According to these respondents, it is the loss of identity and citizenship that marked the beginning of division and violence as well as the loss of Burundians traditional values and relationship between leaders and followers as it will be explained in paragraphs below.

6.2.1. Leaders and followers had a strong relationship.

Respondents pointed out the importance of social solidarity which was the responsibility of leaders especially the king. The king had a great role to keep Burundi as one body with same objectives where leaders and followers were interconnected by traditional values. The ethnic group of the first king and the founder of Burundian dynasty were not revealed (Chretien, 1990:6). The ethnic group of Ntare was hidden to distinguish him from the rest of people and

enhance his objectivity as a leader. Respondent 19 January 2012, PL-4 stated, "*C'est le caractère qui était l'ethnie des dirigeants*" meaning Character[8] was the ethnic group of leaders. The character and attitude of leaders reflected integrity. Nindorera (2003:2) has highlighted the main features of Burundi traditional leaders which comprised the personal qualities. In his view, "the understanding of Burundians, whether Hutu or Tutsi *Umushingantahe* describes a set of personal virtues, including a sense of equity and justice, a concern for truth, a righteous self-esteem, a hard working character (Nindorera, 2003: 2)". Moreover, the king as head of the state was a special person; he was made different from the rest of the people. Portrayed as a spiritual figure (as God's representative), the king was required to make various sacrifices which distinguished him from the rest of the people in the kingdom. This was mostly expressed through the sacrifices that they were expected to offer. Sacrifices were not only limited to self-destruction but also included sacrifices of dignity and personality through different rituals ceremonies.

Peace, harmonious cohabitation of Burundians in pre-colonial era was the result of leaders as all respondents have emphasized. Burundi was led by people with good character, as it was discussed in chapter two and three, strong character was the only criteria for position of leadership. According to scholars of authentic theory of leadership such as Walumbwa et al (2008), Avolio et al (2003), May et al (2005) character when defined refers to the assemblage of qualities which distinguish one individual from another. It is seen as one's emotions, thoughts, motives, intentions, intellects, one's ideas, behavior, thinks one love, thinks one hate, one' s judgment, imagination and perception… Through character, leaders influence and gain popularity, they win people and lot of friends or vice-versa. Thus, character is grounded on one's beliefs. Once beliefs are internalized they develop into thoughts and later become actions and constant behavior. Unfortunately character is not one sided perspective but there is good character and bad character, which are respectively the presence or absence of virtues from one's personal identity. Burundi's leadership is therefore characterized by two different types of leaders which influenced two different system of leadership. The pre-colonial leadership system composed by leaders with good character was driven by justice; they were consumed by desire to serve their people and their nation Burundi. This is the reason they were making sacrifices, which include even death. Respondents mentioned the

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[8] Ethnic group, tribe or any other identification has no importance in choosing leaders in traditional Burundi, but only "*good character*" was the accepted identity of the leader.

parable of "*Ngoma ya sacega*", a sage Burundian who died instead of betraying justice. They were making sacrifices to protect unity and prevent conflicts among citizens.

Chapter two, indicated that the religious practices of African kings were as much as important as their responsibilities as man-God, (see Luba kingship in Ancient Zaire chapter two). The practice was not different in Burundi where the king, during "*Umuganuro*" ceremony, performed for the blessing of the crops, be the first to beat the royal drum "*Kadyenda*" after having sex with the royal drum keeper "*Mukakadyenda*" a Hutu girl (of a lower class) whose role had to guard the royal drum. Thus, Burundi traditional leadership was pulling the whole community together as big family through blood relations. These traditional practices were holding all Burundians together from the king to the lowest class citizen. The major traditional celebration, "*Umuganuro*", (celebration of sorghum festival) carried two important symbols: The king normally took wives from the Tutsi, (Gahama, 2002), but at this time also had intimate relation with Hutu and Twa women, (Low classes) thus elevating them to a higher rank, the "*Ganwa⁹*"class. This class was above all ethnic groups, whether Hutu, Tutsi or Twa. The beating of royal drum (*Kadyenda*) which symbolized the beginning and the blessings of crops was accompanied by sexual relation "*Mukakadyenda*", and blessings were sent to all citizens without discrimination. This ceremony made the honorable king to be part of the Hutu lower class as he was with his Tutsi wives. This traditional practice was acting as a mystic bond, unifying the deceased, the living and those who were still to come, unborn and likewise giving sense of corporate unity to Tutsi, Hutu and Twa, (Lemarchand, 1970). This sexual relation between the king and Hutu women as enshrined in the practice of "*Umuganuro*" festival symbolized both Unity and Equity and strong relationship between leaders and their people.

6.2.1.1. Why Strong Character implies self-sacrifice

Good character always sees something greater than self. This is how heroes come to existence; they give up their lives for others or something they judge has high importance or high value. Leaders with strong character aspire for highest and common good. This philosophy is opposed to the current political and social organization in Burundi where leaders seeks personal gain as philosophy nourished and developed during the 17th and 18th century as the work of Bragues (2007), "*The Ancients against the Moderns: Focusing on the*

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⁹ From the beginning of Burundian dynasty foundation, leaders did not want to be part of existing ethnic groups (Tutsi, Hutu or Twa) but they made the fourth ethnic group "*Ganwa*" to avoid to take sides as decision makers.

Character of Corporate Leaders" has emphasized. Strong character, as major characteristic of pre-colonial Burundian's leaders, is composed by three principals' elements:

- ❖ Discipline.
- ❖ Commitment.
- ❖ Responsibility.

Discipline is simply meaning the amount of control one has over oneself, how much control one imposes over one's life. Discipline here is all about self-control over things which normally drive human emotions. Things human heart and mind desires the most like wealth, love of money and sexual desire. Discipline therefore comes as power to deny oneself desire and point to other things greater than self. This is the reason; Burundian traditional leaders were keeping national resources as common properties instead of sharing among themselves (between elites) as it is today. As explained in Chapter Two, Burundians had common lands. There was no personal possession. Apart from inherited land "*Itongoryumuheto*" as a reward or encouragement for being a brave leader or a brave warrior, the people shared lands. According to respondents, sharing of national and personal properties through "*Ubugabire*", "exchange of goods" practiced during pre-colonial Burundi was a strong political and social strategy for preventing conflict among the people. People were living an equal life, where no one was jealous of the other. Respondents admitted that the people of Burundi had a communal land and they worked together, "*Ils faisaient tout ensemble*", (13 January 2012, PL-2) "They were doing everything together". Discipline of Burundian leaders of pre-colonial era constrained them from taking public resources as their personal property as it is today. Once again, the discipline of political leaders promotes not only justice and equity but also strong relationship between people themselves and between leaders and followers. Equity removes jealousy which is the root of evil. Scholars have argued that Burundian traditional history did not set light on high officials, and also Burundian history did not point a special attention to high authorities of Burundi pre-colonial (Lemarchand, 1970; Chretien, 1990). Burundian leaders and their followers were almost the same because they had common property, common goals, and common interests. They worked together. In fact, leaders were devoted to people's services.

6.2.1.2. Leaders were strongly committed at serving their people.

Leaders with strong character hold tight to what they value the most, they are characterized by strong obligation. Leaders with good character direct his/her actions and thoughts to what they are attached to, Ancient Burundian leaders reflected strong attachment to their people.

This is how; the king in his ceremonies has intimates relationship with different ethnic groups to prove his neutrality and love to all his people as explained above. Nindorera (2003) describes the day of Burundi independence 01/07/1961, where nationalist leader the prince Louis Rwagasore, the hero of independence declared: *"Votre satisfaction sera ma fierté"*, "Your satisfaction will be my delight". The declaration above set fourth the leader's goal and priority as an authentic leader. Prince Louis Rwagasore came when Burundi leadership and politics were facing serious challenges; his statement meant the restoration of traditional values of Leadership. While the Hutu and the Tutsi relationship was deteriorating, Prince Louis Rwagasore came to mary a Hutu girl, Rose, for the sake of national unity, which carried a heavy political and social message in Burundi (Nindorera, 2003). One can interpret this situation as a way of self-denial just like his ancestors had done. Respondent 18 November 2012, PL-6 stated: "Rwagasore, *"wanted to break ethnic taboos like his ancestors"*. Under normal circumstances, princes were taking women from the Tutsi ethnic group. However, the political situation required sacrificial action. Respondents stressed that "he wanted to prove to Burundians that they could cohabite again like before, therefore he chose to marry a Hutu girl to set an example to the rest of the Burundian community" (23 January 2012, HR-3). Rwagasore's decisions were inspired by the need of the people. This action by Rwagasore indicates how traditional leadership was engaged in serving its people, as opposed to the current leadership when elections are just an opportunity for access to leadership positions instead of being an occasion for self-engagement and commitment to serving the people.

6.2.1.3. Strong Character Implies Responsibility

Burundian traditional leaders were responsible and accountable for their decisions and actions. Respondents believed that all traditional leaders were people with high moral and ethics. They were fighting to maintain their moral standard, set of self-control. Moral responsibility therefore does not take alternative; this is how Burundian kings were killing themselves as the only way of transition of leadership. Their sacrifices to the people and nation were going beyond from delivery of services to life sacrifice. As explained in chapter two, Burundian leaders were caught between God of Burundi and the People. While Divine kingship demanded Divine king, the people were demanding delivery of services. In order to ensure that leaders are carrying out their responsibilities, Burundians set in places institutions in addition to religious powers and their own conscious which were watching over Burundian

leaders. Institutions therefore came as additional power to control, ambitions, emotions and desires of Leaders.

This section two looks at the strengths of traditional leadership through institutions. The strengths of traditional leadership were rooted within institutions which were guiding the whole political and social system. As Respondents 11 January 2012, HR-1 pointed out, "the role played by institutions in traditional Burundi made people to have supremacy over the decision of the head of the state". In addition, the study of Nindorera (2003) has revealed that the king was bound to obey to "*bashingantahe*" decision. Institutions of "*Ubushingantahe*", "*Ubupfasoni*" and "*Ubuntu*" found in pre-colonial era, was built on three strong pillars (Nicayenzi, 2002:1). The first pillar was *Imana* (God of Burundi), the second was "*Ingomay'ubwami*" (Royal drum) and the third was "*Intahe*" (stick, symbol of justice), "*Ubupfasoni*" and "*Ubuntu*". These pillars and institutions were important principles guiding the Burundian leadership and rule from the pre-colonial period throughout to independence time.

"*Ubushingantahe*" refers to qualities of leadership rooted within one's heart and life, while "*Ubupfasoni*" means self-control and respect toward others. "*Ubuntu*" is in one word the recognition of the value others hold in one's life. The leadership was grounded at the grass root of the community (village) where children were reared in the spirit of sincerity, honesty and equity in order to grow with a sense of responsibility. As he was assessing African leadership, Gordon (2002:2) stated: "Regardless of the form of political organization, the village served as genesis of leadership, a configuration of various extended families or lineages each with its own head". The pillars upon which Burundian traditional system of rule and traditional institutions were based on, are three in number:

1. "*Imanay'Iburundi*", "God of Burundi" as supreme power controlling the power of the king.
2. "*Ingomay'ubwami*", "royal drum", symbol of authority in the hands of the king who acts on behalf of God of Burundi as his representative
3. "*Intahe*", "*Symbol of justice*", justice to all as the only sign of a perfect king.

God of Burundi was the supreme power holding and controlling the power of the king, constraining him from running the state by his ambitions. This would explain why the king was given yearly bath to test whether he was still spiritually fit for his position as it was

revealed in the study of Beumers at al (1992). The king was given authority to act on behalf of God of Burundi and serve the people as children of the God of Burundi. By acting lawfully, the king was serving the God of Burundi as his master and the people as his children (the king as representative of God). Therefore the God of Burundi from whom authority and power flew gave authority and power to the king of Burundi to serve his people. Justice was the measurement of the lawful king; he was requested to offer justice to all without discrimination. This might explain the political and religious practices of the king as detailed in the above paragraphs, the king was caught in between the God of Burundi and the people of Burundi. While the God of Burundi implied divine kingship for the king's proper representation as a perfect leader, the people demanded delivery as proof of ideal leadership. As the people's representation, "*Ubushingantahe*" institution held the king accountable.

According to respondents, "*Ubushingantahe*" institution was the strongest institution on which others took roots. "*Umushingantahe*" as member of "*Ubushingantahe*" was a person chosen by people on the ground of his personal character. "*Umushingantahe"* derives from Kirundi language "*Gushinga- intahe*", (*gushinga*, to fix, "*intahe*", stick symbolizing justice). "*Intahe"* was not given to anybody but to mature men tested and proven. "*Bashingantahe*" were judges, counselors, mediators, educators and promoter of security and peace among communities. *"Ubushingantahe*" was made by wise men from different ethnic groups; even the king had no power over their decision. The power was not in the hands of the king but in the hands of "*Ubushingantahe*" institution. According to Nindorera (2003) "*Bashingantahe*" had power over the king's decision. Respondent 17 January 2012, PL-5 described the power behind "*bashingantahe*" as members of "*Bushingantahe*" institution as follows:

1. "*Bashingantahe*" were respected because of their character; they behaved as ideal leaders being the light to the rest of the community.

2. They were chosen by people; *Bashingantahe* were the choice of the people who mandated them. Burundian traditional leaders were acting beyond the call of duty to serve better their people.

6.3. Why Burundian traditional leadership is over- discussed?

The researcher would like to point out that this thesis is using the Burundian traditional leadership as the best possible model of leadership, which is used as an analytical tool to evaluate the present Burundian leadership and political crisis. The researcher brought forth

two other contemporary leadership models as intensively discussed in chapter three simply because they share the same values with the traditional leadership. As expressed by the researcher earlier in theoretical framework (chapter four), the traditional leadership is not preferred on the basis of its context, which changes; it is preferred because of its political make up (e.g, decentralization) and leadership values.

6.4. Burundi problem as paradigm shift of leadership system

As it has been stressed in Chapter two and three, problems Burundi is facing took root from the loss of traditional values. New republics failed to move traditional values of leadership from monarchic regime to republics, Lemarchand (1996). Even Respondents see the root cause of Burundi conflicts from transition from monarchic regime to the republics. According to respondent, abandonment of traditional values is traced from outside Burundi. Like a good number of African countries, Burundi was labeled "failed state" just after cold war as this period coincides with period of colonization. By examining Samuel Huntington's 'clash of civilisations' theory, Fox (2003) highlights two major aspects of modernism which are:

1. Internal conflicts
2. Severe state failure

Through civilisation, colonisation confronted local culture with view of radical change to European culture. This is what Huntington (1993) in Fox (2003) has called "*Clash of culture*". The European invasion came with its political and religious practices which later replaced the local traditions. Christianity as a tool of colonization took the power and authority from the king as "*Man God*", representative of the God of Burundi. As a religion of the European (see Bediako, 1992:34), Christianity installed Jesus, as a European king to whom the king of Burundi had to bow and be baptized. Furthermore, Respondents highlighted how the Burundian king and God of Burundi both lost their consideration from the public. The king became a normal leader without the power to act beyond himself. In the process, as the king's name was changed by baptism, he was completely rooted out from Burundi traditions and transplanted into the European culture. At this point, the king could no more serve God of Burundi who was undermined and equated with evil by European missionaries. He could no longer serve the people as he, the "*Mwami*" "king" had to please the Europeans (missionaries) acting as religious leaders hand in hand with the colonial administration. The respondents above contend that already the three strong pillars "*Imana y'iBururundi*" (God of Burundi)…as specified in above paragraph (Institutions *as strong*

supports to leadership) on which Burundi system of rule rested were removed. Burundians, therefore, were left without a king as those who were favored by Europeans like chiefs followed the king in the church while the rest adopted their own way of worship like "*Kubandwa*"," traditional practice of worshiping spirits". In the absence of traditional values of leadership and national institutions, Burundian leaders moved their focus from the people to themselves, promoting divisions, nepotism, corruption and other behavior related to selfishness.

6.4.1. Burundian leaders break away from their people.

As explained in above paragraph, Burundi pre-colonial leaders were different from colonial leaders and different from post-colonial leaders as well. Both colonial and republics were characterized by leaders who had nothing to do with the people, whether in their election or in consultation during decision making. Leaders became people lifted up high far from their people loosing connection and relationship with their followers The Tutsi, especially local chiefs favored by colonizer, benefited from missionaries' education and became local intellectuals helping in colonial administration. As explained in chapter two, the colonial administration lifted the Tutsi on high as people with high quality of leadership (Lemarchand, 1970). The Hutu therefore were gradually removed from their earlier position of leadership. Moreover, the Tutsi who were educated were somehow separated from uneducated Hutu socially. The study of Ekhey (2007) explains the birth of social classes in Africa as a process by which local educated identified themselves with their maters, Europeans. In Burundi Tutsi chiefs identified themselves with colonizer, western patrons, and the rest as peasant Hutu were left without any right to national resources. This therefore would explain ethnic and regional conflicts as tension between people on power and those distanced from leadership positions. Respondents pointed out the root cause of polarization of ethnic groups and the creation of distance between the leaders and the people:

First, when the Tutsi were promoted as people born with leadership qualities and capacities to influence the rest of the people (Bantu) for better, the Hutu were not only removed from leadership positions, they were also expelled from fertile lands. The lands later became the property of the colonial administration and the missionaries, the rest belonged to local Tutsi chiefs. Educated chiefs therefore had no relationship with the masses except to dictate orders for executions. Second, Tutsi landowners became patrons while landless Hutu became

clients, the relationship between the two ethnic groups were immediately changed from brotherhood to *"patron-client"*, patrons who had nothing to do with clients. Respondents emphasized on loss of identity where the marginalized Hutu left the level of normal citizen and became "*Umusuku*" "servant" of Tutsi landowner. The Hutu had no choice but to sell their labor when lands were taken by the colonizers, missionaries and Tutsi chiefs. The status of the Hutu was pushed so far from "*Umusuku*" to "*Umushumba*", *"poorer",* just someone who had no property neither land, nor cattle… who had nothing and sought where to stay and work for survival. Furthermore respondents stressed on the developed of the concept *"Ubugeregwa",* a contract by which a land owner could give a piece of land to a landless servant who could then build his small house on it. This was seen as generous act from a Tutsi who was willing to help the poor servant by offering him land and cattle which symbolized wealth in traditional Burundi (Ndayizigiye, 2005). Respondent 19 January 2012, PL-4 emphasized on distribution of resources as a root cause of conflicts. "The state and its official's leaders have a great role of distributing national resources to people. This implies political and social positions in leadership and access to public funds. When these leaders fail to distribute these resources equitably, power becomes a field of war". The mismanagement of state's resources and abuse of power means that, some are excluded or oppressed, when few are set on high standard of life at the expense of others. This is where social inequality was sharpened to inspire jealousy and hatred. The dominion of one ethnic group in Burundi gave birth to the creation of Hutu rebel movements like the PALIPEHUTU in Tanzania and other movements in Rwanda through which the excluded people were preparing to claim their rights as citizens. The politics of exclusion is at the heart of Burundi conflicting wars up to now, when people on power fail to accommodate others, the result is rebellion as the oppressed look for ways to organize and seize power by force. Bragues (2007) in his article "*The Ancients against the Moderns: Focusing on the Character of Corporate Leaders*" spoke of unjust conduct of leaders to highlight the negative impact of leaders with bad character. When ethical standards of leaders drop down, the inner moral core to influence good choices like decision promoting common good and wellbeing of people. As explained above, colonial system of Leadership undermined Burundi traditional leadership and replaced leaders with character by educated, modern leaders. The later lacked inner strong person to constraint their ambitions, as results selfishness dominated their behavior. Their leadership became self-centered promoting opportunism and self-interest, conveyed in excess love of economic gain and love of money which dominated their entire political system. This behavior of modern

leaders did not only suppress good character of leaders but also destroyed institutions which were strong support of Burundi traditional leadership.

6.4.2. Divide to reign as colonial philosophy.

The colonial administration watered hatred by favoring the Tutsi and inspiring revolt to the Hutu. They adopted the hamitic hypothesis which described the Tutsi as outsiders and invaders. When they saw the Tutsi intellectuals supporting the coming of independence, the perception of the Tutsi changed from competent administrators to monsters oppressors of Bantu. The Hamitic ideology affected both the identity and the citizenship of the Tutsi. The Tutsi turned to be considered outsiders not Burundians like before. The loss of identity and citizenship by the Tutsi made theme very vulnerable, this is the reason why ethnic conflicts has grown to be more regional than national. This problem of Burundi has expanded to Rwanda, Tanzania and Congo (Sanyders, 1969). *"The Hamitic Hypothesis"* traces Tutsi in North Africa, (Probably) among Ethiopians and Nubians highly civilized than Negros.

The Hutu and the Tutsi were completely polarized; while the Hutu were forcing themselves to power as the majority ethnic group, the Tutsi began to construct strong fence around them for their security against the Hutu, perceived as their prominent enemy. Unhappiness was raised on high when the oppressed Hutu tried to liberate themselves (20 January 2012 HR-2). This would explain why the elections of 1993 were characterized by ethnic bias. Respondents confirmed that the 1993 elections were, without question, ethnically grounded. As it has been presented in the previous chapter, the Hutu were told to grasp that very unique opportunity to liberate themselves. The victory of the Hutu came with genocide of the Tutsi in 1993. Respondents concluded that social injustice which resulted from removal of traditional values and institutions is the major source of Burundi conflicts. In his proper words, Respondent 13 January 2012, PL-2 stated: *"C'est la banalisation des valeurs traditionnelles qui est la source des conflits"*, "it is the deflation of traditional values which is the sources of conflicts". The removal of God of Burundi as power above the power of the leadership (King), the removal of the king himself as father of the whole nation resulted in people's divisions. People lose their common identity as Burundian; they became Hutu, the other group Tutsi and Twa.

Through divisions, colonial administration took over Burundi leadership and used the opportunity to strengthen polarization of Burundians. The country after independence was left in the hands of new leaders trained by colonial administration who had no concern to the people but to themselves. This is how the position of leadership turned to be the position of

amassing wealth, a position to fight for, and a position which even call for sacrifices of innocent people instead of being a position of commitment and responsibility to deliver to the people. This is where leadership by force started as highlighted in Chapter two and three. The relationship between leaders and followers loosened paving way to a dictatorship system of rule where the ideas and needs of people are not considered. It is unfortunate that the current government has even changed the name of "*Abashingantahe*[10]", to" *abagabo*" which simply means ordinary male without leadership responsibilities, just to burry for good the voice of people.

6.5. Absence of care and protection of people.

The post-colonial marks the birth of republic and abolition of monarchy. The new regime is characterized by self-appointed leaders, the three republics (1966-1976), (1976-1987), (1987-1993), took place through coup d'état. Respondents, see self-appointment to leadership as that which marks the beginning of rivalry among political elites. The respondents stressed on on the negatives impacts that the loss of patriotic leaders, namely Prince Louis Rwagasore and Pierre Ngendandumwe brought to Burundi. First of all, the prince Louis Rwagasore who had just worked on the people's re-unification introduced parliamentary democracy as discussed in chapter two. Moreover ,respondents mentioned of that leaders like Prince Louis Rwagasore and Pierre Ngendandumwe could not be replaced, even the inexperienced king could not manage the growing demand of people awaken by the wind of democracy. The respondent pointed out the loss of trust in the king who, after the death of Pierre Ngendandumwe, failed to appoint a Hutu at the head of UPRONA party while the Hutu were over 70% in the party (see Chapter II). After the death of these two patriotic leaders who had vision of reuniting Burundi, people felt deep gap of leadership, there was no one with concern of their needs. Therefore, People started to fight for themselves because they had no leaders and institutions to guide them. Both groups lacked ideal leaders and state to ensure equity, security and protection. The respondents emphasized that the desire of the Hutu of Burundi, who wanted to be like their brothers in Rwanda who had just revolution which promoted them on power. At the same time; the colonial administration was desperately looking for something to keep them around after they heard about the wind of independence. Two major reasons were behind the Hutu revolution in Burundi: They needed to liberate themselves first and rule as the majority ethnic group. The Tutsi who foresaw the tension started the strategy of self-protection by holding on to power strongly. Respondents sees

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[10] As highlighted by Nindorera,(2003) "*abashingantahe*" is plural word of "*umushingantahe*" which means a person of integrity. He was considered to be ideal leader by all Burundians.

power as a root problem of conflicts not ethnic divisions as believed by many.The respondent therefore has stressed on ambitious leaders who hide themselves behind divisions to fight their competitors.

Respondents believed that the president Michel Micombero was not going to be the first republic president of Burundi if it was not the absence of leadership. Respondents believed that while he was intervening as the secretary of the state to protect the kingdom as one of his duty, he later realized that he was the only big man in the royal palace. Moreover, all nationalist leaders had just been killed. The king was living in Switzerland most of his time, then after suppressing the mutiny; Micombero was then the man in charge of the affairs of the kingdom. He therefore moved immediately to fill the gap. Respondent 13 January 2012, PL-2, said: "under normal circumstances, Captain Michel Micombero was not going to be the first president of Burundi". He emphasized and said "unfortunately nature does not tolerate gaps"! Micombero took advantage of the political chaos following the death of political elites, the revolt of the Hutu and the confusion of the king. For Captain Michel Micombero, Respondent 19 November 2012, HR-5 also admitted that Micombero saw himself as the only big man around the kingdom to take power into his hands. Lemarchand (1996) qualifies Micombero as an "upstart" (see chapter two), he just came from nowhere, and he was not among expected leaders, especially under monarchic regime where leadership was by inheritance.

The parliamentary democracy had no intention of walking away from monarchy; they needed to keep traditional values of leadership within democracy. The death of ideal leaders therefore marked the beginning of violence as a means for succession to leadership since nobody could follow the good example of Prince Louis Rwagasore. Like the Hutu Gervais Nyangoma who wanted to kill the king and take over power, Captain Michel Micomboro also failed to tolerate the heir of the king. Mwami Ntare V was killed violently at his palace in Gitega Province (Lemarchand, 1996). Micombero therefore managed to establish himself as the first president of republic of Burundi and he publicly announced the end of monarchy. As it has been discussed in Chapter two, decentralization of power was completely destroyed and replaced by centralization of power when Micombero appointed himself in various post, as president of republic, prime minister, defense minister, president of national party and National Bank Governor.

6.5.1. Consequences of self-appointed leaders

Military involvement within Burundi leadership came as a means of self-establishment on leadership by force. This is where the top-down system of leadership was strengthened, where political elites dictate their plans to the people without consideration of the people's needs. Self-appointment to leadership and personal rule is the system where leadership lies in the hands of one person, where the ambition and the desires of the ruler cannot be restrained or controlled. The Hutu were majority in the Gendarmerie (National police) at the time Gervais Nyangoma decided to attack the king's palace in 1965. With the support of the Tutsi army, Micombero managed to overpower the Hutu rebellion. From then, Burundi leadership was left in the hands of military- Tutsi. Respondents believe that there was nothing positive brought by the first republic. Micombero first killed the king Ntare V, whom he was supposed to protect. This was a scandal in the history of Burundi. Second, he conducted the most violent reprisal over the Hutu exiled during the confrontations of 1965 who were trying to re-enter the country by force in 1972 and consequently divisions were strengthened by the birth of a rebel movement, the PALIPEHUTU, (18 January 2012,PL-1). While the regime openly declared itself an official enemy of ethnic Hutu by its actions, it introduced nepotism, and tribalism on top of divisions. Respondents did not believe that divisions is the real problem in Burundi politics, instead, power is. As explained in above paragraph, the respondent describes divisions as a tool for power control. In the case of Micombero, divisions were further narrowed down to tribes and regions. The president wanted to build a stronger fence around his regime. He promoted his clan (Hima) previously marginalized. The Hima from Bururi region in communes Rutovu, Matana and Vyanda were given preeminence in terms of opportunities in government and the rest had to fight for the left over (Lemarchand, 1996; Gahama, 2002). This might explain why the president who succeeded Micombero was also from the same family. The president of the Second and Third Republic was also a Hima from Rutovu commune in the province of Bururi. Schoolars like Gahama (2002) argued that these three presidents turned Burundian leadership into their family business. Moreover all have ascended to power by coup d'état.

6.5.2. Authoritarianism abolished the power of the state.

Respondents believe that the common ground for the First Republic and the Second Republic was the concern for power control. They pointed out that the two presidents were very much anxious to holding on to power. Centralization of power in the hands of few people affected the power of the state; it was hijacked by one family, the president's family. Respondent 20 November 2012, HR-6 suggests that the abolition of the monarchy was also the abolition of

the power of the state. Nicayenzi (2002) argued that ethnicity took absolute value to surpass the power and responsibility of the state. Self-appointed leaders took the power from the people and the state into their hands. As it has been explained in chapter two, personal rule is always motivated by personal interests. This explains why the respondents believed that self-appointment to leadership did not bring anything positive. It did not only undermine traditions but also the people and the importance of the people's consent. The first republic introduced selfishness in Burundian leadership, the regime moved from the people as beneficiaries of leadership to self. Respondents 13 January 2012, JL-2 underlined the promotion of the Hima tribe, and their region Bururi. National resources since then have been viewed as property of political elites, creating high competition[11] to leadership positions. Since then hunger for power increased in the hearts and minds of Burundian politicians who use any available means, including mass murder to accede to leadership positions.

The Second Republic under Colonel Jean Baptist Bagaza, (1976-1987) tried hard to correct some mistakes done by the First Republic. It abolished "*Ubugeregwa*", a contract over land as explained in chapter two and in chapter two. The regime initiated some development projects; however, it failed to work on the unity of the people. Respondents acknowledged the work of the Second Republic which tried to restore life within the state especially on issues of politics of development. However, other respondents observed that Bagaza forgot to do what was essential, "To dig out the roots of 1972 ethnic war, which took many lives of Hutu intellectuals". To re-unite the Burundians was the most essential work needed at that time. Moreover, as respondent 13 January 2012, PL-2 stated, his regime ended in tail of fish. Bagaza too wanted to build his own empire. He started to sideline and harass those who were suspected to be a threat to his plans like churches and other individuals, including even those from his own army. His tight control over the lives of people created disorder and chaos in religious organizations even in families.

The third regime of Buyoya (1987-1993) tried to make positives change by introducing unity and a politic of inclusion. Unfortunately the self-established regime failed to meet its primary targeted goals of unifying the people before introducing and conducting its first democratic elections. Self- appointment has changed the whole image of leadership in Burundi.

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[11] Election of leaders in Burundi is the fire starter of war. Violence, torture and arbitrary arrest always start long before the election to take place. This serve to intimidate competitors and scale opposition away leaving the only man on power to compete alone, as it happened under Colonel Bagaza regime, it still taking place today(see elections 2010).

Illegitimate regimes drove Burundi backward politically as the leadership had no consent of the people. Each time the people learnt from the Radio about the rising of a new leadership and the appointment of a new government. An illegitimate regime has nothing good in it, a regime which ignore the consent of people already deviates from the principal mission of leadership. Unfortunately, even the modern democracy as it was introduced by president Pierre Buyoya failed to change the attitude and behavior of leaders. They remained anti-democratic and affected the image of democracy.

6.6. Burundian Leaders as hindrance to democracy.

Democracy has never been the choice of Burundian leaders during republics regimes. Self-appointed leaders were not going to embrace democracy that promotes the power of the people. Democracy which is simply defined as the rule of people by people for people Diamond (1999), could not find favour from Burundian politicians. Nevertheless Collier et al (1997:431) has given different dimension of democracy like"*Authoritarian democracy*," "*neo-patrimonial democracy*," "*military-dominated democracy*"to accommodate different regimes. It is unfortunate that the world of global politics does not give special connotation to each kind of democracy present in a particular state. The word "*Democracy*" is generally known as one from America to the rest of the world, including Burundi as discussed in chapter three.

Respondents have denied the existence of democracy in Burundi. In their words, they said: "The word Democracy means nothing but source of war and political conflicts to Burundians. It is a word adopted by politicians to make rational their claim when they fight for positions of leadership and to legitimize their regime once on power" (18 January 2012, PL-2). The modern democracy which Africa claims to adopt today was born from global system of governance. Unfortunately, Burundi like other African countries, did not welcome the system with a willing spirit. It was forced on them due to their financial situation. In fact, elections were not born from the willingness of African leaders, but they were forced by the degrading economic situation as pointed out by Lemarchand (1996:65). In 1978, national census in Burundi revealed a tremendous growth of the population. Bagaza regime saw that the local economy was completely incapable to satisfy the demand of that growing population. They were therefore forced to adopt international standards of politics in order to be eligible to international aid which came with international political structure as part of the package, Abbink (2000:23). In 1981 under the leadership of Colonel Jean Baptiste Bagaza, the national

political party UPRONA organized a constitution referendum which was followed by presidential elections in which only one man was allowed to contest.

Respondent 18 January 2012, PL-1 qualified the Second Republic as authoritarian regime despite the fact that it organized elections. Lemarchand (1996) has compared the Bagaza regime with that of Napoleon of France especially on issue of tightened control of the population, but he was forced to hold elections as a requirement for democracy. Burundian leaders are anti-democratic while holding elections regularly like in other African countries such as Cameroun, Kenya, and Uganda…, elections in Africa and in Burundi in particular have been identified as too powerless to affect authoritarian regime. Regular elections are not taking power away from Paul Biya of Cameroun since 1982; he won elections of 1984, 1992 and 1997 before claiming more than 70% of the votes in of 2004 race and even in 2007. As it was stressed by Van Ransburg (2007:3), even the wave of democracy of 1990 in Africa did not scare the president of Cameroun, he organized elections and eventually won them, this is almost the case with Burundi.

Jean Baptiste Bagaza organized elections in 1981 where he was the only candidate. He obviously won them with 99.89%, almost 100 % (Frere, 2011). In the 1981 elections only one party was contesting. These elections were neither competitive nor transparent. First of all, Bagaza regime was an authoritarian rule which was opposed to the rule of law. Human rights were not respected and justice was not recognized to all. Elections therefore have been accepted by Burundian elites to please the international community not as a major element of democracy which is the best system of rule as defined by scholar like Diamond (1999), (Huntington 1991)…As Respondents view democratic elections, they are just a setup of leaders who wish to maintain legitimacy in public eye.

6.6.1. Elections as a setup of political elite's not democratic aspect

Respondents have identified elections as a source of wars in Burundi. They trace the 1993 genocide of the Tutsi in Burundi from the failure of the politics of unity and from the success of politics of exclusions. Respondents pointed out that the reaction of the Tutsi to regain power in 1993 as explained in chapter two was the result of political immaturity of Burundian leaders. They exposed their anti-democratic character. Respondents believe that the president Melchior Ndadaye was killed because of the 1993 elections. They believe that the genocide of 1993 was a result of the 1993 elections. Moreover, as Diamond (1999) argued, violence is likely to happen before or after elections. In the case of Burundi, elections preparation was

just a confrontation of two antagonistic political parties not a political competition. Respondent 19 November 2012, HR-5 stated:

> "It was war between two ethnic groups (Hutu and Tutsi); lack of respect between each other, exchanging insults, assaults and lot of injuries between their members and that was before elections. Hutu behind their president (Ndadaye), Tutsi behind their presidents (Buyoya) there were no needs of bright policies and programs to attract supports. While Hutu were looking up to their liberation, a Hutu to rule over them as their source of insurances and protection, Tutsi wanted to maintain power as well as their source of security as minority group".

According to the respondents above, the 1993 elections were a preset of Hutu elites who harnessed hatred and divisions in their Hutu members. The pre-elections propaganda, what 23 January 2012,HR-3 called "*house by house propaganda*" was a campaign carried out during night preaching from house to house in Hutu families, reminding them what the previous Tutsi regimes have done to them. This campaign made all other aspects of democracy to be dropped off. Moreover, the resulting elections were not free or fair. The only motivation behind election is to get on power and access public resources for the benefits of leaders. This has been demonstrated during FRODEBU regime, and it is taking place today under CNDD/FDD regime where public resources are just in the hands of few elites.

During the three months of the FRODEBU regime all national resources were plundered, no rule of law was experienced, no justice, accountability and respects of human rights. As discussed in chapter three, the Tutsi of Kirundo-Muyinga were accused of witchcraft and killed before any police investigation. The nature of the FRODEBU propaganda was centered on their past suffering caused by Tutsi regimes. Respondents affirmed that for the majority Hutu, the conditions of elections were to vote for Hutu into leadership for their liberation. Burundi experienced democracy as end result without democratic procedures. Democratic regimes are not the result of elections only as defined in the work of Collier et al (997:434):

> Within this framework, we focus on a "procedural minimum" definition that presumes fully contested elections with full suffrage and the absence of massive fraud, combined with effective guarantees of civil liberties, including freedom of speech, assembly, and association.

The elections of 2005 have been qualified as self-imposition by respondents. As a powerful military movement, CNDD/FDD managed to establish itself as a prominent political party above its mother[12] FRODEBU as it imposed its wish to the mediator during the 2003

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[12] The CNDD/FDD was born as military wing of the FRODEBU when the Tutsi took back their power using the national army (mostly Tutsi). They were born to support their politicians on power since it was clear to them that without military force, they cannot survive the Tutsi politicians.

negotiations. Respondent 19 November 2012, HR-5, has pointed out that the elections of 2005 could not be free or fair not even competitive because the CNDD/FDD, with its military and demobilized soldiers behind it, CNDD/FDD had no competitors.

While CNDD/FDD was not considered as a major party in the negotiations, it imposed itself by killing innocent people in order to be considered in power sharing. Example is intensive fire the movement (CNDD/FDD) put on population of Musaga, Kanyosha and kinanira, in Tutsi areas like in Bujumbura in 2003, bombings day and night, people were killed, others had to vacate the area. The mediator, Nelson Mandela, had no other choice but giving them what they wanted to save the poor Burundian population who were killed like flies. This is to say that Burundian leaders are determined to do what it can take to accede to power by force. Not only the people have no power to deny self-imposing leaders but even regional and international community failed to stop them. Respondents described the context in which the 2005 elections took place: it was a climate of war. While the demobilization of rebels groups was taking place, soldiers were circulating among the population telling them whom and how to vote. The people's safety was at stake. The people were warned "*Si vous ne votez pas, on va retourner au maquis*", "if you don't vote we will return in the bush", as explained in previous chapter. People were very much stressed and intimidated by war, it was better to exchange their vote for peace. The CNDD/FDD was the only movement with a strong army since the national army was discredited by its *coup d'état* (17 November 2012, PL-5). Respondent 20 January 2012, HR- 2, commenting on the power of the gun behind 2005 elections stated:

> "Young soldiers of CNDD/FDD, and demobilized soldiers were intimidating the population, people were afraid of facing again the CNDD/FDD attack. In addition the CNDD/FDD was the only movement with an army, people decided to abide to the wish of the movement instead of continuing in the same problems of instabilities".

In his words, 17 November 2012, PL-5 stated: "Elections of 2005 could be neither free nor fair; it was not transparent or competitive because they took place in a climate of tension". Two factors constrained democratic elections:

1. Guns that produce tension and suppress the power of the ballot.
2. Tiredness of voters who just wish to get over the situation.

As it has been stressed by respondents, elections of 2010 were not different from 2005 elections, it was even worse since only one man contested elections.

6.6.2. Election without political changes

This section looks at the benefits and limitations of an elected regime in Burundi. Discussing whether democratic elections are a solution to tension in Burundi, respondents stressed on re-assessing the democratic system in Burundi. According to Respondents democratic elections in Burundi need to be re-evaluated. What is known is that the party in power, the CNDD|FDD, never considered a democratic system in its regime. Even the Arusha accord ended as a piece of paper. The elections of 2005 could not promote democracy in Burundi but "*military-dominated democracy*" as defined by Collier et al (1997:431). And 2010 elections failed to set difference between authoritarian regime and democratic regime, just like election of 1981 under Colonel Bagaza regime, only one man Pierre Nkurunziza contested elections. According to respondents, there was no big difference between the 2005 elections and the 2010 elections. The elections of 2010 were characterized by torture and arbitrary arrest of members of opposition parties like for instance the president of MSD, Alexis Sinduhije and Agathon Rwasa president of FNL. Moreover the work of Lemarchand (2006) reveals disappointment in Burundian leaders who were claiming to fight for democracy. The respondents believe that elections in Burundi have never been democratic and consequentially never had power to influence changes. Democracy never moved from it first stage of elections which are not even free or fair.

First, the elections of 2010 had one man contesting while members of opposition were driven out by frauds and intimidation of the police and demobilized members of the army of CNDD/FDD, the ruling party. The regular elections which Burundi is going through do not make any political change, elections make leaders to look like democratic leaders but in reality they establish themselves by power. Self–appointed leaders started from the First Republic in 1966-1976, when they moved from divine appointment (when leaders were born leaders, kings were kings from birth not by merit) to force (when leaders were appointing themselves by their force). This period was characterized by *coup d'états*. The wind of democracy in Africa which is located in 1990s did not change the behavior of Burundian leaders. They took elections as an imposition from global politics but it was seriously constrained for the security of their power. Votes never been engagement but just symbol, voters were manipulated by the elites to suit their interests. Elections remained with the purpose of satisfying international community while democracy was abused. As it has been explained in chapter three, Burundi could not handle elections without democracy.

Looking at the current Burundian government and it political party in power, on top of known national army, the government has *"Imbonerakure"*, demobilize solders to support exclusively political party on power especially during elections. The party has its own army and everyone must follow the command without questions. The respondents commented on the way elections themselves were organized: "Elections were organized to satisfy the wish of politicians. The ruling party combined its forces for the manipulation of the voters. They were forced to vote for the party in power". Respondent 23 January 2012, JL-4 stressed on electoral fraud: during the counting of votes, electricity was purposely cut on top of intimidation by the police and demobilized soldiers from CNDD\FDD.

Commenting on the frustration of the members of opposition parties boycotting the elections, the respondent explained they had no choice and had nowhere to complain. This practice takes us back to self-appointment of leaders characterized by the use of forces to win elections. Respondents stressed that the victory of CNDD/FDD did not depend on their overwhelming support, but on the power of the gun. Succession to power in Burundi does not depend on ballot but on bullets. Frere (2011) and Lemarchand (2006) admitted that the current government of Burundi practices naked oppression of the citizens' rights and corruption. They are not accountable and restrain the rule of law. They are not effective and efficient leaders who can deliver justice to all. The tight and over-controlled elections with strategic plan to direct voters to the prepared and designated elites always breeds conflicts as it has been stressed by Lindberd (2006) in (Kohnert 2010),: "Violent breakdowns of states are most likely before and after the elections". Elected leaders under the current set up are not different from authoritarians leaders, they are abuser and violent like their predecessors (Abbink, 2000). Respondents believe that leaders created variegated disorders during elections to give many opportunities to fraud. According to Lemarchand (2006:6) the elections of 2010 were run with a lot of intimidation, arbitrary arrests especially for members of the opposition parties. Powerful Hutu rebel movement won elections by force, whoever needed to be part of the national cake had to beg for membership instead of claiming their rights to share the resources as the opposition. This would explain why opposition parties joined the ruling party, and those who persist in opposition would either leave the country or risk being suppressed, tortured arrested and even killed. The intolerance of opposition is the source of insecurity to the Burundi population. The respondents above reveal the inadequacy of local leaders to supervise elections; they use their power to promote themselves.

Respondent 20 November 2012, HR-6, witnessed movement of police and members of CNDD\FDD running up and down in the queues telling people whom to vote. The respondent said as human right activist took the step and spoke to journalist about the issue, that complaint had nowhere to go; it had no effect to powerful ruler. "Even CNI as independent electoral supervisor was on the side of ruling political party!" Opposition is unwanted within the political system and whoever persists is domed to live in jail or exile. Unfortunately elections in current Burundi have become a tool of authoritarian control while the international community is trying to give them a positive image. Without many alternatives, the opposition parties formed a coalition commonly called "*ADC Ikibiri*" to fight the political party in power. This has created consistent tension.

6.6.3. Burundian leadership system limits alternatives of peace building.

As it has been explained in chapter three, Oloko-Onyago (2004) describes Buyoya former president of Burundi as a dynamic leader who had ambitions of changing Burundi politics for the better. After he ascended to power Buyoya introduced an inclusive government to the point of making the ratio of the Hutu and the Tutsi to reach 50%/ with respect to political positions in government, something that had never happened under previous republics. Unfortunately, the longtime polarized society had created corrupt elites who strongly opposed Buyoya plans. Respondents pointed out challenges met by the Buyoya regime 1987-1993: he opened a dialogue to settles Burundian differences in open space; he promoted an inclusive government and politics of national unity. Unfortunately while the Hutu abused the right of expression (as it will be explained below) long time denied to them by previous governments, the Tutsi were not happy with Buyoya politics of promoting the Hutu in leadership. The Tutsi were scared at the thought of losing their authority and security as a minority group. On the other hand, the Hutu could not trust Buyoya as a Tutsi and expressed themselves violently to test the patience of the democratic process of Buyoya Government, (Lemarchand, 1996).

6.6.4. Strategy of power sharing was constrained
As democratic regime initiated by Buyoya regime ended in disastrously by coup d'état and genocide of Tutsi in 1993, Regional leaders from 1997 to 2003 committed themselves in rebuilding peace in Burundi. The power sharing strategy had the aim of settling Burundi conflicts by helping Burundians elites to share the national cake (Reyntjens, 2000; Lothe, 2007). Unfortunately, this strategy could not work with the unwillingness of Burundian leaders to share power. Respondents do not recognize the existence of power sharing as it

was initiated by the regional and the international community because the president and his political party in power give opportunity to whom they wish without consideration of rules and policies ascribed in power sharing strategy. According to Lijiphart (1991) politics of accommodation can never be accounted for within Burundian community. The politics of accommodation, which is defined as "Power sharing" by Lijiphart (1991) is all about settlement of differences, but ignores the political rights in order to advance peace for all. Respondents, pointed out that the selfishness of Burundians leaders hindered all alternatives to peace building, especially (power sharing) that require sacrifice of personal interest for peace. Due to the hardness of Burundian leaders who advance their own interests to the detriment of the Burundian community, power sharing as it was prepared by regional leaders and international community failed to work. The negligible progress of negotiations angered the mediator to the point of exploding (Southal, 2006:116). The mediator failed to understand why Burundian leaders were creating impasse to keep negotiations to a standstill. The participants of this negotiation were not interested in the outcome of the negotiation because their interest was on the benefits incurred during the negotiations. According to Human rights league Iteka, "by saving on daily allowance delegates can earn their normal income for five months in just one week's attendance at Arusha" (Reyntjens, 2000:17). Respondent 20 January 2012, PL-3 pointed out that Arusha negotiations failed to reach its target "*the power sharing deal*". It became an opportunity to enrich oneself.

Respondents have revealed the dangerous strategy of politicians when they wanted to serve themselves, they did not care about people who were subjugated under the power of gun day and night. Respondents appreciate efforts displayed by regional and international community even if the results were regrettable, as CNDD\FDD first undermined the strategy by imposing itself as strong rebel movement and second by rejecting its implementation into their regimes. Respondent believed that CNDD/FDD imposed itself as major rebel movement on different levels. Firstly on the level of negotiations when it managed to bring back already closed negotiations. Secondly imposed itself over FRODEBU government who had to re-draft electoral constitution and create new posts for them in the government (Southal, 2006). Finally it imposed itself over people by demanding votes.

As respondents emphasised, this is how former vice president Alphonse Marie Kadege was tortured by police for claiming the rights of Tutsi to share privileges in government as it was stipulated in Arusha agreement. "*C'est pour ce la que vice president Kadegen'etait pas*

compris par le pouvoir", "It is for that reason that the vice president Kadege was not understood". The government never plans to share power just like its predecessors. Respondents, 19 November 2012, HR-5 called *"FRODEBU politics"* a politic of *"Ratissage"*[13], all Tutsi were violently removed from office, as vengeance of the years Hutus suffered from Tutsi. As non-democratic republics of Burundi distributed positions to their allies as they wished, CNDD/FDD also did and still doing the same thing. Observers have qualified the current regime of Burundi as worse than military regimes which preceded (Lemarchand, 2006:7). As long regular elections are kept, the regime calls itself democratic and legitimate holder of power. Furtherer, Respondents denied the effectiveness of power sharing which took place in Arusha from 1998 to 2003. Respondents denied possibility of success of any alternatives of peace building strategy. Strategies cannot work against the will of leaders who supposed to be its facilitators.

The problem does not reside at level of strategizing but application of the strategy by people with true leadership qualities. Leaders did not change from first republic up to the present; they still authoritarian leaders undercover of elections, they still practice elections to gain favor of international community. When the Government keeps tight control over the media, Human right and other related civil society, elections are kept regular. During the data collection phase in January 2012, journalist Hassan Ruvakuki of Radio Bonesha and ElogeNiyonzima of RPA (Radio Africaine) were arrested while the human right activist Ernest Manirumva was killed in 2009 (See chapter four). Respondents expressed their worries on the current government that has returned the country to one party politics. The self-imposition of the former rebel movement CNDD/FDD on power against the will of people, against the will of local leaders, regional leaders, against the will of mediator and international community have undermined peaceful and legal procedures of peace building.

6.7. Local, regional and international community failed to solve Burundi Problem.

While, regional leaders were also considering forcing rebels groups and government to sort their differences, Pierre Nkurunziza as leader of CNDD insisted that Arusha must be reopened to offer chances to other groups to participate in transitional government. Nevertheless, his armed power was speaking so loud to the point of turning back the clock. On the other hand, South Africa backed Ndayizeye's position that the CNDD/FDD should

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[13] A politic of Cleansing

seek to gain access to the transitional government as it was already constituted (Southall, 2006:120). Nevertheless, Ndayizeye, president of FRODEBU who had already drafted the transitional constitution without CNDD had no other choice than to increase the number of ministries and other senior political positions on top of 50% in military as offer to the CNDD. Respondents have emphasized the weakness of international community in the application of "power sharing strategy" as it was initiated by regional leaders under mediation of two African presidents; Julius Nyerere and Nelson Mandela in second place both respectively former presidents of Tanzania and South Africa. Two reasons are the ground of international community's failure:

1. They failed to move beyond ethnic categorisation
2. They failed to act beyond the politicians' wish

As Respondents qualify the whole Arusha negotiation to be ethnic mandate, respondents emphasized the misrepresentation that characterized Arusha negotiations. The respondent reveals the absence of Burundians during Arusha negotiations: "Burundians were not present during negotiations; only Hutu and Tutsi were present". Respondent 11 January 2012, HR-1) said: "Le *Burundi n'était pas present dans le partage du pouvoir*", "Burundi was not present in power sharing". Supported by their army, only Hutu or Tutsi were represented, not nation not citizens. Participants in Arusha negotiations were classified as follow: "G 7, which was coalition of all political parties Hutu and G10 was coalition of all Tutsi political parties" (Reintjens, 2000:22). Elites proved their primarily objectives as their own proper interests, civil society was not going to miss such negotiation as people representatives.

Involvement of regional leaders like presidents of Tanzania Julius Nyerere as mediator, Yowerimuseveni of Uganda and other African and international community representatives like Reverend Matteozuppi from the Sant' EGedio (Rome) community, the South African Professor Nicholas Hayson, the Mozambicano Politician Armando Emilio Gwebuza and Georges Lenken director at Australian Ministry for development cooperation, and Bill Clinton former president of USA who joined them at the second round after Nelson Mandela has taken over from Nyerere (Reyntjens,2000). However, all efforts combined could not suppress the wish of powerful rebel group movement, CNDD\FDD as it has been detailed above in the section entitled 'Burundian leaders as hindrance to alternatives of peace-building'. During re-negotiations, CNDD/FDD was so confident and wanted more than

expected, they demanded the vice presidency instead and this made Ndayizeye the president of Burundi that time to walk out during negations in Pretoria in 2003.

CNDD/FDD terminated completely the power of FRODEBU as a political party of majority Hutu and it weakened Tutsi power as holder of majority in National army. At this point, FRODEBU was already out of the picture even before the final work of CNDD/FDD which wiped away FRODEBU from the public scene, when CNDD/FDD walked tall in Gitega, surrounded by UN forces. It took its procession from Makebuko toward Gitega where they took their transport to Bujumbura, all Hutu were excited showing full support to their fellow Hutu like if FRODEBU never existed. CNDD/FDD managed to present itself as a major political party representative of majority Hutu.

Arusha process was platform for those with power not those with program of peace and development. McClintock and Nahimana (2008) qualify Arusha process as denigration for those who were excluded in it. Respondents qualified the involvement of international community in Arusha negotiations as additional support of strong movements like CNDD\FDD, they helped them to achieve their desired malicious goals legally. The international community involvement into negotiations made CNDD\FDD movement legitimate holder of power, despite its oppressive strategies. Moreover, mediators, regional leaders and international community failed to act beyond interests powerful rebel movement. This however would explain how the power of the gun had grown strong to surpass the power of people, the power of local, regional, international leaders and the power of ballot. While CNDD/FDD was not considered as a major party in negotiations, by it power it imposed over negotiations and then over elections, it ended up taking over leadership through uncontested power.

People did not vote CNDD/FDD willingly, but they were tired of its terror. Not only that they were intimidated by its army but they thought by voting them, peace and economy of the country would materialise. Peace process played the symbolic role of power sharing, but the reality on the ground was never fully examined by the international community. Respondents confirmed that people knew that CNDD/FDD were leaders without values, virtues and integrity. They knew that these leaders will not respect the wish or consider people's decision. However, people had no alternative choice, the violence of CNDD/FDD did not only push regional and international community to abide to its decision but also forced people

to vote them The International community failed to enforce implementation of power sharing during negotiations and afterward, instead CNDD\FDD managed to impose itself on power as strong rebel movement despite disapproval of regional and international leaders.

6.8. Conclusion

Having studied leadership in its variegated dimensions especially with a specific reference to Burundi, it is particularly imperative to underscore that successful leadership thrives on cordial interactions and or relations between the leader and the followers. This study agrees with the respondents that the poor management of people and resources of Burundi was initiated by colonial involvement and sustained through the same. Clearly, this chapter provided answers to the major research questions by interacting with literatures and findings from field work to offer a more conclusive and reliable reactions. According to the data presented, leaders are source of all problems that Burundi has been living with for years.

This study affirms that pre-colonial administration of Burundi was near perfect, however, conflicts and crisis took roots in the State from the external invasion, globalization and westerns influences. Without a doubt, these external invaders instilled animosity which took Burundian leadership system away, leaving people under leaders without concern of their needs. The loss of traditional values as pillars of leadership system introduced self-centered leaders who sacrifice people for their survival. The modern leaders developed desires for power to the point of putting themselves in positions of leadership. Due to the fear of external powers, Burundian leaders did not reject modern democracy but accepted it and tailor-made it to fit their interest. Instead of holding in control their ambitions, Democratic processes (elections) are used as means to facilitate the leader's abusive tool where elections are taken as the only aspect of democracy and manipulated in favor of elites. In the process people are sacrificed while war and disorder is maintained by politicians who are prepared and willing to do anything to force their way into leadership. The international community has failed to rescue the masses who are victims of democracy's abuse from their oppressive leaders. In light of traditional values of leadership, the next chapter will discuss how the current leaders' behavior can be rehabilitated towards genuine democratic behavior. Burundian people cannot save themselves from violent leaders; they need something higher, powerful capable of holding and restraining the power from corrupt leaders.

CHAPTER SEVEN

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

7.0. Introduction

This chapter summarizes and makes recommendations on the findings of the study. It highlights the gradual degradation of Burundian leadership due to continuous conflicts and wars that have threaten and impede the peace and stability of the country for years. The present study has shown that Burundian people are unable to free themselves from the oppressive government. Moreover, the local and international communities have failed to establish peace and order which can be sources of efficacious elections. This study recommends the establishment of strong institutions which can hold the leaders accountable, and encourages them to change their behaviors and attitudes toward good governance. The chapter also highlights the stability of Burundi before elections. Generally the thesis endeavors to show that the source of Burundian conflicts is not imbedded in ethnic differences but in leadership disguised in ethnic divisions.

7.1. Summary of the findings

Respondents involved in this study were selected from the civil society, political parties and media. They all agreed that peace, security and harmonious co-habitation of traditional Burundi (pre-colonial) were founded on the respectable behavior of leaders in well-organized institutions.

7.1.1. The Traditional Burundi system of leadership was source of peace and security

The respondents revealed the strengths and foundation of the Burundian system of leadership. As expressed in this previous chapter, Burundi system of leadership was grounded on the following foundations:

- ➢ Leaders were democratically elected.
- ➢ Relationship between leaders and people was strong and characterised by:
    - Traditional practices of the king as the head of the state
    - System of *"Ubugabire"* that played the dual roles of mutual help and rewards to encourage hard work.

➢ Institutions that guided the leadership system from village to royal palace.

Respondents believe that traditional Burundi was peaceful because leaders were chosen by the people. Ancient Burundi had an informed strategic ways of identifying adequate leaders who upheld the qualities of good leadership. The "*Ubushingantahe*" was regarded as the ideal leadership system in Burundi, which was designed by men trained from birth to be custodians of leadership values. More importantly, men chosen as "U*mushingantahe*" were selected on the basis of impeccable character imbued with integrity and fairness. Respondents also believed that Burundian tradition was grounded on respectable leaders with integral morals and ethics. Burundi leadership consisted of people capable of discerning ideas and policies before they enforce them.

7.1.2. Power of leaders was under control

Respondents stressed on the control of power control, through popular representation. "*Bashingantahe*" as strong institutions in which all ethnic groups and tribes were represented had the right to question the King's decision. The institution of *Ubushingantahe,* acted as a watchdog and spiritual guides of the people. Hence they commanded immerse respect from the people. Leaders were chosen on the bases of their competence. The respondents agreed that Burundian traditional leadership controlled power through the following ways:

1. Burundian religion was above political leaders.
2. People's voices in collegiality with the institution of *Ubushingantahe* controlled political leaders' decisions.
3. Decentralization of power was another way of regulating power.

As emphasized in chapters five and six, respondents believed that equity and justice played a great role in maintaining peace and security in the kingdom.

7.1.3. Justice and equity as prevention of conflicts

Respondents emphasized on the characteristics of Burundi traditional leadership as inclusive. Different groups regardless of their ethnic background or tribe had a role to play in the political and social life of Burundi. Different groups that make up the Burundi society were regarded as equal in terms of opportunities and justice. One of the respondents stressed the seriousness of Burundian traditional leadership when it came to justice. He expressed himself through Kirundi parable "*Ngoma ya Sacega*", "Honest leaders will choose death instead of betraying justice". This Kirundi parable emphasizes the character of Burundi leaders who

could not compromise truth. Respondents agreed that the king "*Mwami*" of Burundi and the rest of leaders were the source of equality and justice. First the king was the father of the nation, and the people were equal before the law. As they stressed on the roots of conflict, respondents proved that equality and justice are inseparable.

Burundi traditional leaders had to ensure security and protection of the population and also sharre national resources equally. This showed the neutrality of the king and of the leadership in general. Traditional Burundian community had one king, one nation and one name as stated in Chapter six. Decentralization of power prevented leaders from abusing power and public resources, while popular participation and inclusion in national affairs promote accountability of leaders. Whereas people shared their belongings, the land was regarded as common property. Because of the character of Burundi leaders who put people's interest before their own, the Burundi community was bounded together as one entity under one name "*Abarundi*", "Burundians", under one God "*Imana y'Iburundi*", "God of Burundi" under one king "*Umwami w'Iburundi*", "King of Burundi" and in one nation, Burundi. This unity was result of equity and justice opposed to inequality and injustice as causes of divisions and conflicts.

7.2. The root causes of Conflicts in Burundi

Respondents believe that power is the source of the unstable and Conflictual situation that faced and continue to confront Burundi. This problem appeared first with the arrival of the colonizers, who sought positions of dominion to accomplish their wish without the people's consent. They introduced a new religion (Christianity) and centralized power which automatically abolished popular representation. The three pillars on which Burundi was build *Imana* (God of Burundi), *Ingoma y'ubwami* (Royal drum) symbol of authority and *Intahe* (symbol of justice) were taken away. By removing these foundations, the essence of these traditional institutions collapsed. The colonial period was characterized by centralization of power, lack of popular representation, lack of justice and abuse of power while appointing themselves to leadership positions. All these oppressive qualities of leadership were transferred to new republics.

Local chiefs became ruthless towards the people who fail to pay tax. This was the time violence first emerged as those who failed to pay taxes were beaten while the chiefs knew that they had no sources of income. Families of chiefs were enjoying honey and milk of the states. Those man who fail to pay tax were expelled from the villages; leaving their wives and

children as widows and orphans respectively. "*Ikimoko*", is a "flexible stick" which was used to expel people for higher production of agricultural exports and other public works. The history of "*Ikimoko*" and heavy taxes is still bad memories to Burundians. The moral and dignity of Burundi leaders were compromised and financially valued. As physical, emotional, psychological and economic violence was inflicted on the people, seed of anger and hatred were planted, and therefore trust between leaders and followers was broken. Burundi political culture was removed for good since the focus of Burundian Leaders shifted from people to economic gain. Leaders adopted use of violence to collect as much as possible from people, up today, the abuse and violence is still a major method politicians use to hold or access power.

7.2.1. Political elites abuse and violate the rights of people.

The ideology of post-independence period was the same as that of the colonial period. The new republics came with the same ideology of dominion and control. Captain Michel Micombero and his successor Colonel Jean Baptist Bagaza used power to benefit their families' members. Yet Colonel Jean Baptist Bagaza did not cause physical violence, respondents stressed on his authoritarian attitude, which denied other people opportunities but his family.

As respondents stressed, the Buyoya regime became the source of the genocide of Tutsis in 1993 for the following reasons:

1. The Presidents Buyoya called for elections while there was still a strong ethnic tension on top of political tension between his party UPRONA and FRODEBU.
2. Buyoya was expecting to win in the elections.
3. When he realized his mistakes, he failed to accept disappointment and initiated coup d'état which provoked anger on Hutu population and resulted on Tutsi genocide.

In fact, all respondents believed that the president Buyoya was the master mind behind 1993 coup d'état. Though the president Buyoya initiated democracy, he failed to hold his peace when he lost elections. Tutsi Leaders provoked anger of majority Hutu when they killed a Hutu president who was democratically elected in 1993. Hutu leaders in turn called all Hutu to kill all Tutsi residing in Burundi territory. Both Hutu and Tutsi were affected by Burundian political elite decisions as they were fighting for power. Burundian leaders therefore are not only denying rights to Burundi population over publics resources and services delivery but they also deny right to life to their own people.

7.2.2. Conflicts in Burundi are war over power

FRODEBU regime was not different, not only their propaganda turned to ethnic competition, the 1993 government was exclusive and almost all Tutsi were chased from their jobs. This trigged the mind of Tutsi who thought of reinstating themselves on power by force. Tutsi were not only humiliated, but their protection and security was not insured since FRODEBU regime revealed vengeance as their main focus from their early stage. Respondents stressed on ethnic vengeance which characterized FRODEBU propaganda, it was their only way to easily earn majority Hutu support. The same happened during 2005 elections, 2010 elections…on top of army, police and "*Imbonerakure*" (demobilized soldiers) who forced people to vote CNDD/FDD, ethnic division still played an important role as a strategy to win voters and hold on to power. 1993, 2005, 2010 elections took place during ethnic and political tensions. Respondents emphasized that selfishness and hunger of power of Burundian leaders resulted in war, extreme poverty and misery that affected Burundian population. While ethnic division is a powerful tool to manipulate population as main supporters of political elites, power is the main source of Burundi conflicts. Respondents have highlighted major characteristics of 1993, 2005 and 2010 elections. Respondents highlighted intimidations, tortures, jailing and killings of members of opposition parties, members of media civil society and human right activists during elections. Burundian Leaders therefore manipulated elections into their favor.

7.2.3. Burundians are hungry of peace and order

Respondents have expressed themselves regarding pain Burundian population is enduring now for years. Respondents underlined the injustice and social inequality prevailing in Burundi. People have no rights to free and fair elections. Respondents expressed their views on the issue of CNDD/FDD's open manipulation of the 2005 and 2010 elections. The ministry of justice was headed by the ruling party and was also given the election observer status. Respondent from human rights, media and political party all were very much disappointed when they found out that the Independent National electoral Commission (CENI) supported the ruling party. As they were left without choice, opposition parties boycotted elections and formed a coalition and later a major rebellion. Respondents have raised their disappointment on Burundian leaders and on the role of the international community to re-establish peace and security. Respondents have all emphasized on regional and international community failure to save the Burundian population from their interminable war. According to respondents, this situation explains why, Burundian people form groups or

combine efforts to fight for their survival. Government is born combat and positions of leadership are distributed as rewards to war lords.

7.3. General Conclusion

Burundi traditional leadership was built on the integrity of their leaders and institutions. Burundian leadership in pre-colonial era was characterized by excellent behavior. Nicayenzi (2002) stated that "*umushingantahe*" as ideal Burundian leaders had to go through severe training with several test and trials before he/she was approved as leader. During the process leadership traits such as cognitive ability and diligence, honesty and sincerity, hard worker and level of commitment were demanded as necessary. Among major characteristics of successful leadership were self-control, leaders were also kind and gentle to the people they lead. The relationship between leaders and followers was strong as it was based on trust. Kickul and Neuman (2000) in their study "*Emergent Leadership Behaviors*" argued that interpersonal leadership is one of strongest tool in problem solving. Leaders were not only legitimate and adequate to their position but they were also accountable, and failure to serve could result to death (see chapter three).

In pre-colonial Burundi, leadership position was not about superiority but was about service. Leaders were united through goals and vision to serve a common purpose (the people) and this unity was a powerful tool in problem solving. Politics and power in traditional Burundi was just a tool for state structure to enforce social norms. Competition for leadership position was strictly a means to access political roles, where each ethnic group, tribe or social class was represented. The leadership in general therefore was a combination of ethnic majority, ethnic minority, high social class like princes and low social class like Hutu and Twa. The individuals therefore held offices on behalf of the people they represented. Such leadership system which is based on popular representation is what Burundi requires for the current modern democracy. It is opposed to "*winner take all*", which is the source of the prevailing conflicts (Annan, 2004).

Burundi today is characterized by centralization of power, lack of participation, social injustice and social inequalities. Burundi needs strong institutions but also wise leaders who possess progressive qualities of leadership accountable to the people.

7.3.1. People are forced to serve elites

The introduction of ethnic identity by colonial masters did not only introduce ethnic divisions and conflicts, but it took away the power of the state as well. The state as a source of wealth, and the people as supporters and means of production became the property of the elites. This system of leadership was developed and extended from colonial to post-independence period and to modern democratic Burundi. As people were ethnically divided, the general pride of Burundian people gradually vanished, as people became Hutu or Tutsi or Twa. The concept of oneness disappeared leaving behind ethnic and regional grouping loyal to ethnic organization than to the state of Burundi.

In the 'new democracy', the people and state are hijacked to serve the interest of elites. The state of Burundi is a contested landscape and the purpose of this contest is nothing other than the private appropriation of state power by elites. This is why leadership in post-independence Burundi is characterized by violent elections, characterized by torturing and jailing political opponents. People are portrayed as only passive supporters of politicians without political will to challenge their leaders. Unfortunately, international community focuses on elections as the only evidence of a democratic process.

7.3.2. Political elites hold on power

Post-independence Burundi leadership has been characterized not only by self-appointment, but also unwillingness to leave office by existing leaders. Burundian leaders have demonstrated totalitarian behavior and culture since colonial period to the present, and the rule of majority is just legendary. The state power and resources are supposed to belong to all Burundians through participation and representation but public resources belong to elites. Burundi conflicts and wars took roots from the paradigm shift of Burundian leadership, the link between leaders and people was cut off and leaders started to focus on themselves. Economic gain became the major focus of leaders; they fight for position of leadership because of public resources. The only way to access the national resource was through patronage. Election of leaders therefore is nothing but the foundation of war, a platform to manipulate power. While traditional leader's personal qualities were defined by the way s/he serves the community, the modern leaders are instead exploiting and marginalizing the communities and the people. Burundi post-independency period has created two forces in Burundi society:

1. Political elites on power
2. Political elites who want to gain that power.

The confrontation of these two forces keeps the whole Burundi community in constant war as they fight over power. During the war, innocent people are killed, those who survived were exiled and the rest live under extreme poverty and misery. So far, people cannot save themselves from oppressive government that monopolies national wealth, national army and police, allies and guns..

7.3.3. Strategy of supporters' mobilization

Leaders in Burundi mobilize the supporters through various ways but major ways of mobilisation are through ethnic division and arm forces. Ethnic divisions are used as s colonial tool of manipulation remained the main road of elites to gain local supporters. In 1993, FRODEBU used Hutu majority ethnic group to win elections, their propaganda was grounded on ethnic divisions. In the same way, UPRONA leaders approached Tutsi army to regain power; they killed FRODEBU leaders in place. It was also approved by CNDD/FDD leaders during their two elections (2005, 2010) it used its army and police to force people to vote into their favor because they wanted to keep power forever.

Driven by appropriation of public resources, power contestation has so far obstructed the democratic process. People are forced, tortured and intimidated to make sure that they vote in favor of existing leadership. The organization of election and the voting depicts a picture of leaders playing a democratic role, and make them look democratic in the eyes of international community. Nevertheless, elections without democracy in Burundi have killed many people, while others have been driven into exile. Elections as the only aspect of democracy in Burundi have distorted the image of democracy. Elections in Burundi are a customary event not a democratic system of selecting leaders. Jean Baptist Bagaza run unopposed elections in 1984, Pierre Nkurunziza did the same thing just in 2010. Elections without competition is another problem Burundi is facing, this resulted in creation of rebel movement. Elections therefore are set up in the way to constraint development of democratization and establishment of peace.

The concentration of wealth and public resources in the hands of a few political elites who are not willing to leave power has created a lot of resentment from other groups, who constantly fight the government in a bid to take power by force. This explains the reasons behind the birth of rebellions and violence. While the rest of people are living in deep poverty, political figures are living beyond their income, and many Burundians today can

barely manage their mortgages, especially given the value of the currency. The population is constantly under the manipulation of the elites, especially during elections. While it can be said that Burundians were saved from colonial oppression, it can also be argued that they were handed to a new form of oppression by local elites. Burundians today suffer from heavy government taxes, pillage of armed groups and forced financial contribution, rape and HIV/AIDS infections. They have lost hope in the system of democratization. However, the question of whether a rebel will make a good leader or be like the predecessors remains a huge challenge. As stated by respondents, if the current government had no support from the army support, maybe the situation would have been different. This study has evidently demonstrated that Burundian leaders are not only a hindrance to democracy but also an obstacle to human development. Unfortunately, the behavior of the local elites is a deterrent to any program or plan that would save Burundi and Burundians. The alternative of reconstructing Burundi organization requires political elite's cooperation which facilitates implementation. Lijphart, (1991) in his article *"Consociation and Federation: Conceptual and Empirical Links"* stressed that power sharing in most of the cases would require people giving up their rights for the sake of peace. This study demonstrated that Burundi has leaders with characters which lack integrity instead of sacrificing they opt to put their interests first. Ways and procedures of choosing leaders must be reviewed. For the international community to be help, it needs to understand the Burundian context.

7.4. Recommendations

Any attempt for the restoration of peace and security in Burundi should start by leaders who can carry out such program. The use of force as the only means to access power has promoted the selfish leaders to power. Leaders should be democratically voted and be the choice of the people. Given this, Burundians need their voting power to be able to vote/elect their own leaders. This condition would not only restore the pride of Burundian as citizens but enables them to embrace the destiny of their country. If the citizens are given the rights to vote freely and to own the democratic process, leaders will be hold accountable, which will save public funds while promoting economic, social and political development. For this to happen Burundi needs to

- Regain its integrity and the ability to serve its people.
- Find strategies for unification of people
- Decentralize its power

- Democratic principle before any election takes place.

The restoration of the power of a serving state is highly recommended in Burundi. Ethnic divisions took away the power of the state and the right of citizenship to Burundians. The state as a dwelling place is also the sole guaranty of security and protection to inhabitants. Ethnic identity which took away individual freedom and liberty should be first abolished and a program of national reconciliation should be introduced. This practice has received considerable reputation in Africa when South Africa applied the program called 'Truth and reconciliation Commission' (TRC) to reconcile its people after apartheid government. As it was highlighted by Southall (2006), the (TRC) became a wider platform to address the grievances, racial discrimination and violence accounted during apartheid era. Burundians also need to express themselves on a wide range of issues, which they suffered for years now. This should be the starting point of healing process before policies and institutions to maintain human rights, justice, equity and respect of public resources can be put in place.

This program is also helpful when it was adopted by Rwanda as strategy of behavior change after genocide. The program of truth and reconciliation would restore Burundi unity while promoting leaders with behavior and a culture, which is people-centred. Moreover, Burundi needs strong institutions to restore the power of the state for justice and security to all citizens. This would eventually abolish formation of rebellions which destroy life of citizens.

Burundi needs unbiased and authentic not bound by ethnic bias to restore the state as a dwelling place for all citizens. Burundi must be a state of all Burundians not Hutu nation or Tutsi nation. This is only possible if leaders change and work for the common good of the people and not for their own interests.

7.4.1. Reconstruction of Burundi society

French adage says "*Il faut reculer pour mieux soter*", "you must move backward first in order to jump high." Scholars of Burundi history and politics like Lemarchand (1970), (1996), (2006), Gahama (2002), Nicayenzi (2002), Ntahombaye et al (2007), Reyntjens (2005) and many of respondents were looking behind for realiable foundation for peace building. Two principal points have destroyed Burundian traditional leadership system: 1) Divisions and 2) Centralization of power.

The re-unification of Burundian community and decentralization of power at different level (Vertical and Horizontal) would be the answer to the current conflicts and dilemma of

leadership. Nevertheless one should understand that monarchy or kingship cannot be relevant political or social approach to address modern Burundi questions. Hence, Burundi must go back to its initial slogan "*One people, one nation.*"

Reunification of Burundian community is the grounding foundation which Burundi hopes and aspires for political, economic and social stability. As it was said above "*one nation, one people*" is the only way Burundi to regain its feet down. This process must start by redefining Burundian's Identity. People of Burundi had common identity as Burundians, not as Hutu or Tutsi as it has been from colonial period. Burundi must be a dwelling place for all Burundians not a nation of the ruling family. Identity and citizenship would promote all Burundian communities to true independency, sovereignty and security. Restoration of "*One people, one nation*" embodies all Burundian traditional values of leadership. The promotion of national identity would bring much power to the nation to console and to reconcile. Nevertheless, this cannot be possible as long the power is concentrated in the hands of one man, one political party, and one family and ethnic group so there is a need for power to be decentralized.

Burundi needs both African and foreigner ideologies, and there is also the need of compromises and balances. As earlier discussed, the democracy seen in pre-colonial Burundi differs from the modern democracy. As illustrated before, the traditional system of leadership cannot be used to solve Burundi's current problems, unless updated to the current context. Burundian traditional values and its system of leadership have wisdom and insights as well as shortcomings as the western values and leadership system. The combination of western and traditional values would promote a democracy that suits the Burundi context. Burundi needs democracy which will address the community demands, develop social integration and common identity of the people, and promote strong institutions to guide Burundi system of leadership. This would shift the power from the hands of the president to the people, while promoting trust between the people and their leaders.

7.4.2. Restructure of Burundi government

As it was pointed out by scholars of democracy like Sorensen (1993), Diamond (1999), Lijphart, (1991)…and all respondents, power is source of conflicts unless it is well managed. Power is the main source of conflict in Burundi and divisions are just tool of manipulation in the hands of political elites who are hungry of power. Decentralization of power would likely

end ethnic tensions and restore equity and justice in Burundi. The concentration of power in one body of government (executive) has not only promoted oppression and abuse of power, but has been a source of war in Burundi. Separation of powers of Burundian government is strongly recommended as a way forward to democratic regime. Separation of power will have the significant role of restraining the current unlimited power of the president.

7.4.2.1. Horizontal organization of power.

Powers needs to be separated. The executive power must be separated from Judiciary power and Legislature. In Burundi, political power needs to be separated so that no one could expropriate complete power for himself/herself. As it was mentioned by respondents, when they complained about 2010 elections, the power of judiciary was swallowed by the power of executive leaving no room for opposition parties. This model therefore helps to divide the state into branches where each branch is given separate and independent power in its area of responsibility. The independency of the justice system is highly recommended in Burundi, because justice had become a property of those in power, and a threat to the people, especially opposition party. The Judiciary needs absolute freedom from civil obligation to carry out their central functions. The independency of the justice system will not only foster accountability among government officials, but it will re-establish the rule of law in general, while eradicating impunity which increases corruptions and other crimes related.

Burundi is placed among presidential system of government where the parliament is supposed to be independent with equal power as executive and judiciary. The independence of parliament would restrain the power of veto from the executive. The separation of power has the purpose of gaining different ideas from different branches of government. In the case of Burundi, the head of government assumes all functions and the other two bodies (Judiciary and parliament) are just string-puppet. Separation of power in Burundi would prevent abuse of power of the government, and promote equity, transparency, participation, accountability, justice to all, security and development of the state.

7.4.2. Vertical organization of power.

The separation of power at vertical level is also one of the strongest strategies to involve minority and majority in leadership. It is also an adequate solution for its social complexity, and will be a good strategy for Burundi. The former UN Secretary General Annan (2004), (1999) in his two articles, *"The Causes of Conflicts and Promotion of Durable Peace And sustainable Development in Africa" and "Two concepts of sovereignty"* emphasized that

"*Winner take all*" approach is the main source of conflicts in Africa. Exclusion of people from leadership position is the root cause of conflicts and creates interminable tensions. Burundi experienced only exclusive governments from colonial period to now.

The separation of power at vertical level is as important as separation of power at horizontal level. In fact one will concur with Nourse's (1999:751) assertion that "the image of horizontal separation is incomplete if it does not take into account the vertical aspects of political power, aspects that are intimately connected with notions of constitutional risk and institutional incentive". This strategy will include everyone in leadership, especially those who lost in the election. For instance, in the commune zones where Tutsi are predominant they have to choose their leaders. The practice of taking Hutu from the province of North for example and make him/her administrator of Commune in the South area predominantly occupied by Tutsi is somehow oppression. The strategy of separation of power does not only prevent conflicts but it is the best way to foster democracy. Scholars like Diamond (1999) sees separation of power as strategic behaviors of democratization, since it facilitates the consolidation and the deepening of democracy. Therefore, vertical organization provides a good forum for balancing power while promoting wider range of participation by the people to choose their leaders, as well as bring the government closer to the people.

If Burundi needs to break the circle of ethnic conflicts, which always arise in the time of elections, they need to adopt the separation of power at the horizontal level and vertical leve.

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8. Appendix

APPENDIX 1.

November 25.2011

To The Minister of Interior and Public Security

Rue de ici 75,

Bujumbura,

Burundi. BP 05

REQUEST TO CONDUCT RESEARCH AS PART OF A MASTERS OF COMMERCE REQUIREMENTS

This letter serves as a request, to ask for your permission to allow one of our students Rev. Ernest Nkunzimana to collect data from your country. It is a requirement for our students doing a Master's Degree in Commerce (Leadership) to undertake an empirical research project in their final year of study. An empirical research project requires a field work; in which students collect data in the form of questionnaires or interviews to relevant individuals in the area of their study.

Rev. Ernest Nkunzimana is a fully registered student of the University of KwaZulu-Natal and his student number 210527374. He is currently registered for a Master of Commerce (Leadership) degree, which requires a submission of a dissertation. The topic of his dissertation is **Dilemma of Leadership and Democracy in Africa: A Reflection on General Elections in Burundi.** Typically, this project will be a "practical problem solving" exercise, and necessitate data gathering by interviews to the relevant and consulted citizens in your country.

Your assistance in permitting the student mentioned above to have access to political party leaders, media and civil society will be appreciated. Please be assured that all information gained from the research is only for academic purposes and will be treated with utmost circumspection. Further, should you wish the results of this dissertation "to be embargoed" for an agreed period of time, this can be arranged. The student will strictly adhere to confidentiality and anonymity, which is also part of the University policy.

If permission is granted, the University of KwaZulu -Natal requires that this be done in writing on a letterhead and signed by the relevant authority.

With hope of meeting your consideration to our request, we are grateful for your assistance.

Supervisor: Prof R G Taylor
Tell: (027) 312601297
Email: taylorr@ukzn.ac.za
Westville, Block J, J01
Leadership Centre

APPENDIX 2

REPUBLIQUE DU BURUNDI

MINISTERE DE L'INTERIEUR

CABINET DU MINISTRE

N°5 30/1592/CAB/2011

December 5th, 2011
Ministry of Home affairs
Bujumbura
Burundi 1910

5th December 2011

To Prof. RG Taylor
Westville Block J, J01
Leadership Centre
University of KWAZURU-NATAL
INYUVESI
YAKWAZURU-NATAL

PERMISSION TO CONDUCT RESEARCH AS PART OF A MASTER OF COMMERCE

The present is to allow your student number 210527374 named rev. Ernest Nkurunziza, to collect data from Burundi for the dissertation **"Dilemma of Leadership and Democracy in Africa: a Focus on Elections in Burundi."** requirement of a Master degree in Commerce (Leadership).

Wishing the research work to be the most empirical and successful,

Sincerly yours.

MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS

P.o. Hon. Edouard NDUWIMANA

APPENDIX 3

UNIVERSITY OF ™
KWAZULU-NATAL

INYUVESI
YAKWAZULU-NATALI

12 June 2013

Reverend Ernest Nkunzimana 210527374
Graduate School of Business and Leadership
Westville Campus

Protocol reference number: HSS/0813/012M
Project title: The dilemma of leadership and democracy in Africa : A reflection on general elections in Burundi

Dear Reverend Nkunzimana

Approval of change of project title

I wish to confirm that your application in connection with the above mentioned project has been approved.

Any alteration/s to the approved research protocol i.e. Questionnaire/Interview Schedule, Informed Consent Form, Title of the Project, Location of the Study, Research Approach/Methods must be reviewed and approved through an amendment /modification prior to its implementation.   In case you have further queries, please quote the above reference number. Please note: Research data should be securely stored in the discipline/department for a period of 5 years.

Best wishes for the successful completion of your research protocol.

Yours faithfully

....
Dr Shenuka Singh (Chair)

/px

cc Supervisor : Professor RG Taylor
cc Mr Christopher Chikandiwa
cc Academic Leader Research : Dr E Munapo
cc School Administrator : Ms Eileen Mohamed

APPENDIX 4[14]

Révérend Pasteur Ernest NKUNZIMANA
Université de Kwazulu-Natal
Mob: 71549067.

Bujumbura, le 27/01/2012

Objet : Demande D'Entretien.

A Monsieur L'Honorable et
Président du partie CNDD/FDD
à
Bujumbura

Monsieur le président,

J'ai un grand honneur de m'adresser auprès de votre très haute autorité pour solliciter un entretient dans le cadre d'une recherche académique.

En Effet, Monsieur le président, l'université de Kwazulu-Natal a obtenu une autorisation auprès du ministère de l'intérieur. L'étude en cours a pour titre : « Dilemme entre direction et démocratie en Afrique : *cas des élections au Burundi* ». Cette étude vise les intellectuels qui sont actif dans la vie sociale et politique au Burundi. Le parti CNDD/FDD dont la direction vous appartient pourrait amener des contributions énormes a l'étude ; C'est dans ce cadre que je vous supplie de m'accorder cet entretient. Je reconnais déjà que les responsabilités qui vous ont accorde sont aussi démesurés, l'entretient ne pourrait prendre qu'au moins 45 minutes.

Veillez agréer Monsieur L'honorable et président du parti au pouvoir mes considérations hautement distinguees.

Révérend Pasteur Ernest NKUNZIMANA.

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
[14] The Appendix above (4) is a special letter in French the researcher wrote to political party in power (CNDD/FDD) in Burundi. The researcher meets lot of difficulties to access information from ruling party in Burundi Despite the official authorization from Minister of Interior (Appendix 3). Even after this special letter above (Appendix 5), the interview was refused.

APPENDIX 5

Introduction

Mon nom c'est Révérend Pasteur Ernest Nkunzimana, étudiant à la Faculté de droit et administration (Graduate school of Business and Leadership) à l'Université de Kwazulu-Natal, Westerville Campus. J'ai entrepris une recherche intitulé *« Dilemma of Leadership and Democracy in Africa : A Reflection on General elections in Burundi »* (Dilemme entre direction et démocratie en Afrique : cas des élections au Burundi). Ce travail se focalise sur l'élection de dirigeants comme source de conflits dans une société polarisée en considérant le Burundi comme un cas d'étude.

J'ai choisi le Burundi, un pays qui convient pour mon sujet d'étude en raison de sa situation sociopolitique surtout en rapport avec la construction de la paix à travers des institutions démocratiques en évolution.

Cette recherche est un travail académique comme complément pour un candidat à l'acquisition d'un diplôme de Maîtrise en « commerce et leadership » à l'Université de Kwazulu-Natal (UKZN). Il n'y a aucun paiement prévu. Cette recherche sera guidée par des règles d'éthique reconnus par l'Université du Kwazulu-Natal.

Il n'y a pas de contrainte à participer à cette recherche. On peut même arrêter à volonté à n'importe quel moment sans aucune conséquence. Aucun nom ou autre identification ne devrait être révélée sauf à la demande de l'interviewé. Les textes et enregistrements des interviews seront gardés par le superviseur du travail pendant une période de 5 ans, après quoi ils seront brûlés.

Je sollicite votre participation à cette recherche qui pourrait vous prendre tout au plus 45 minutes.

Contact :

Chercheur : Rév. Ernest Nkunzimana   Superviseur : Prof R G Taylor

Tél : 027781483831   (027)33260129

Email adresse : ercunest@yahoo.fr   Emails adresse : taylorr@ukzn.ac.za

Signature des participants :…………   Signature du chercheur :……

Date :………………..   Date :……………

A. Information générale

1. Quel est votre emploi/ votre travail ?

2. Quelles sont vos expériences politiques ?

B. Compréhension des participants sur le pouvoir précolonial

1. Comment est-ce que les différentes ethnies cohabitaient-elles pendant la période précoloniale ?

2. Quels étaient les facteurs qui ont contribué à l'unité entre différentes ethnies ?

3. A quel point pensez-vous que le pouvoir peut être source de guerre et de conflits ?

4. Quel était le rôle des « abashingantahe » durant la période coloniale ?

C. Les divisions entre groupes ethniques burundais

1. Quelle était la source et les conséquences des divisions ethniques et comment elles ont pris de l'ampleur ?

2. Quel était le but de Rwagasore en se mariant avec une fille hutu ?

3. Quelles étaient les motivations de Rwagasore en introduisant la démocratie en 1960 ?

4. Que pensez-vous pourrait être la raison de l'assassinat de Rwagasore et pourquoi Pierre Ngendandumwe a également été tué après ?

5. Quelle fût l'impact de l'assassinat de Rwagasore sur la vie politique et sociale du Burundi ?

6. Comment la mort du premier ministre Ngendandumwe a-t-elle affectée l'unité nationale ?

7. Pourquoi un Hutu du nom de Gervais Nyangoma a essayé de renverser le roi en 1965 ?

D. Compréhension des participants sur la période des régimes républicains

a) **Premier et deuxième république**

    1. Comment décrivez-vous l'attitude du Capitaine Michel Micombero envers la crise de 1965 ?

    2. Quels changements politiques et sociales la première république a –telle apporté aux Burundais ?

    3. Comment décrivez-vous la deuxième république sous Jean Baptiste Bagaza ?

    4. Quelle point commun voyez-vous entre la première et la deuxième république ?

b) **Troisième république**

    1. Comment décrivez-vous la troisième république sous Pierre Buyoya ?

2. Quel régime entre les 3,(la première, la deuxième et la troisième a plus aidé le peuple et quel est celui qui a eu un impact négative sur la nation?

E. Compréhension des participants au sujet de la démocratie

a) Elections de 1993

1. Comment qualifiez-vous les élections démocratiques de 1993. a) juste b) libre c) transparent et compétitif ?

2. Que pensez-vous aurait contribué à la victoire du FRODEBU au cours des élections de 1993 ?

3. Pourquoi les élections démocratiques de 1993 au Burundi ont abouti à une guerre civile ?

4. Quelle est la raison qui a poussé les militaires à tenter de prendre le pouvoir par la force ?

5. Pensez-vous que la mort du Président Ndadaye peut-être liée aux élections de 1993 ?

6. Que ce qui a poussé la population à s'entretuer ?

b) Elections de 2005

1. Comment décrivez-vous les élections de 2005 ? a) libre et juste b) transparente et compétitive ?

2. Quelles sont les raisons qui sou tendent la victoire du CNDD/FDD pendant les élections de 2005 ?

c) Elections de 2010

1. Comment décrivez-vous les élections de 2010 ? Etaient-elles a) libre et juste b) transparente et compétitive ?

2. A quel degré le CNDD/FDD était-il confiant de gagner les élections de 2005 ? Quelle était sa force ?

3. A votre avis pourquoi les partis politiques de l'opposition ont boycotté ces élections ?

4. Quels sont les défis du gouvernement consécutivement à ce désaccord politique ?

5. Pensez-vous que ce qu'on appelle élections démocratique est une solution à la tension politique qui règne au Burundi ? Expliquez.

6. Quelles sont vos suggestions pour les élections futures au Burundi ?

F. Comment comprendre les rébellions et voies de la paix

1. Pourquoi est ce que la rébellion dirigée par Léonard Nyangoma a pris naissance en RDCongo en 1994 ?

2. Quels sont les objectifs des récentes rébellions comme le FRONABU-TABARA?

3. A quel degré la stratégie du partage du pouvoir a été effective ?

4. Comment est-ce que le partage du pouvoir au Burundi a été fait compte tenu de cette stratégie ?

5. Que pensez-vous d'autres solutions alternatives comme la séparation ethnique ou l'alternance au pouvoir dans le contexte du Burundi ?

6. Comment cette pratique fonctionnait-elle dans la période précoloniale entre (Abatare-Abezi, Abataga, Abambutsa ? Peut-elle être utilisée pour la construction de la paix maintenant ?

7. A votre avis, en quoi l'alternance politique diffère-telle du partage du pouvoir et la séparation ethnique ?

8. Avez-vous quelque autre considération à me faire sur le partage du pouvoir?

Introduction

My name is Rev Ernest Nkunzimana, a master's student in faculty of commerce and management (Leadership) at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, Westerville Campus. I am conducting a research project entitled "*Dilemma of Leadership and Democracy in Africa: A Reflection on General elections in Burundi*". The present work focuses on elections of leaders as source of conflicts in a polarized society using Burundi as a case study.

I have selected Burundi purposefully because of its political and social relations with the study, especially on peace building through democratic institutions in progress. The interview is for academic purpose this research project is for academic purpose only as partial fulfilment of my Masters of Commerce (Leadership) as a registered postgraduate student at UKZN. There is no payment or reward involved; the interview will be guided by ethics policy compiled and recognized by University Of KwaZulu-Natal.

Participation in this research is voluntarily and does not bind anyone; anytime one can withdraw his/her participation without further consequences. No name or any kind of identification should be revealed unless by request of respondents. All the interview scripts

and tapes will be kept by the supervisor for the period of five years and then everything will be incinerated.

 I would like to request your participation in the research; this interview should take about 45 minutes of your time.

Contact details:

Researcher: Rev Ernest Nkunzimana   Project Supervisor: **Prof R G Taylor**

Contact Number: 027781483831   Contacts Details: **(027) 33260129**

 Email Address: ercunest@yahoo.fr   Emails address: taylorr@ukzn.ac.za

Signature of Participants:………………   Signature of Researcher:………………

Date:…………………………………….   Date:……………………………

A. **General information**

1. What is your employment/occupation?

2. What are your political experiences?

 B. Participants understanding of pre-colonial regime.

1. How were ethnics' co-habitations in the pre-colonial era?

2. What were the contributing factors to the unity of different ethnic group?

3. To which extend do you think power can be source of war or conflicts?

4. What was the role of "*abashingantahe*" during colonial regime?

C. Divisions among Burundian ethnic groups

1. What was the source and consequences of ethnic division and how it was spread?

2. What was the purpose of Rwagasore to marry a Hutu girl?

3. What were the motivations behind Rwagasore's introduction of democracy in1960?

4. What do you think was the reason behind Rwagasore's murder and why Pierre Ngendandumwe was also killed after?

5. What impacts do you think Rwagasore's death brought to political and social life in Burundi?

6. How Piere Ngendandumwe, premier minister death affected national unity?

7. Why Hutu (Gervais Nyangoma) tried to take power by force from the king in 1965?

D. Participants understanding of Republic regime

a) First and second republic

1. How do you describe the attitude of Captain Michel Micombero toward the crisis of 1965?

2. What are political and social changes that the first Republic brought to Burundians?

3. How do you describe the second Republic under Jean Baptist Bagaza?

4. What do you see as common from the first and second republic?

b). Participants understanding of third republic.

1. How do you describe the third Republic regime under Pierre Buyoya?

2. Which regime between (the first, the second, and the third) do you think was helpful and which one brought negative impacts to the nation?

3. What are common grounds between these tree Republics?

E. Participates understanding on democracy

a) 1993 elections.

1. How do you understand the term 'democracy'? a) Fairness b) free c) transparency and competition?

2. What do you think were motivations behind FRODEBU victory in 1993 elections?

3. Why democratic elections of 1993 in Burundi ended in civil war?

4. What was the reason for military attempt to take over the nation by force?

5. Do you think the death of Ndadaye (president) can be linked to elections?

6. What do you think caused the mass population decision of killing each other?

b). Elections of 2005

1. How do you describe elections of 2005? a) Free and fair b) Transparent and competitive?

2. What were the motivations behind CNDD/FDD victory over 2005 elections?

c). Elections of 2010

1. How do you describe elections of 2010? a) Free and fair b) transparent and competitive?

2. To which degree of confidence was CNDD/FDD in winning elections and why? What was it strengths?

3. According to your understanding why opposition parties boycotted elections?

4. What are challenges that Government experienced from that disagreement?

5. Do you think the so called democratic election is a solution to the political tension of Burundi? Explain.

6. What are your suggestions for future elections?

F. Participants understanding of rebellion and ways of peace building

1. Why under Leonard Nyangoma command rebellion was born in Congo in 1994?

2. What are the aims and purposes of the current rebels group (FRONABU-TABARA)?

3. To what extend the strategy of power sharing was effective?

4. How effective the power sharing has been in Burundi?

5. What do you think about other alternatives of peace building like ethnic separation, and power shifting in the context of Burundi?

6. How was power shifting in pre- colonial regime, between (Abatare, Abezi, Abataga, Abambutsa)? Can this strategy be considered relevant for peace building now? Explain.

7. In your opinion, how the power shifting can differ from power sharing and ethnic separation?

8. Do you have anything related to power shift and power sharing that you would like me to know about?