POST-CHRISTIAN THEOLOGICAL CONCEPTS AND CULTURAL EROSIONS AS PERCEIVED BY FRANCIS A. SCHAEFFER

by

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Abstract

Francis A. Schaeffer's Perceptions of Theological and Cultural Decline

This study analyses twentieth century theological and cultural decline as perceived by American-born Christian apologist Francis A. Schaeffer (1912-1984), founder (1955) of the L'Abri Fellowship in Huèmoz, Switzerland.

Schaeffer traces philosophical, cultural and theological erosions in the West from the Renaissance to the early part of the present century. These have culminated in a "shift in thinking", thus ousting the Christian world view of the West and ushering in a secular humanist world view based on relativism. Theology and ethics have been radically affected by this shift. Philosophy, art, music and general culture have similarly suffered a qualitative decline. The crisis Schaeffer detects in epistemology prevents the acceptance of absolutes in any field.

Bearing in mind the eclectic nature of Schaeffer's writing, this thesis endeavours to show both the effectiveness and the shortcomings of his apologetics. The American evangelical context of his work is repeatedly stressed.

Eight chapters provide the framework for this dissertation. The first defines the problem--as Schaeffer sees it--of diminished Christian values in the contemporary world. It includes essential biographical detail and summarises the chief works by which Schaeffer illustrates his thought on theological and ethical erosion. This first section

concludes by viewing the problem in the context of the contemporary American Protestantism that was Schaeffer's life-long environment.

The thesis next considers twentieth century theological thought with particular reference to Karl Barth as its principal representative thinker. His view of revelation and of Scripture is outlined, particularly in the light of Schaeffer's opposition to neo-orthodoxy and existentialism, originating, he believes, from Kierkegaard.

The ethical and cultural climate of the present century is considered in the third chapter, noting the contribution Schaeffer has made to increased evangelical interest in art and music. His belief in the close connection between world view and artistic creativity is analysed, and the conscious and unconscious processes underlying art and music are discussed. Continuing, Schaeffer's methodology and goals, his interest in evangelism, apologetics, and his resistance to modern forms of psychological or biological determinism are the dominant themes of the fourth chapter.

In the penultimate section a comparison is made between Schaeffer and C.S. Lewis (1898-1963). It discusses their respective achievements and understanding of the modern world; poses the question as to whether or not Lewis might be considered a fore-runner of Schaeffer; notes the place that each gives to rationality and how each interprets the role of Scripture in the apologetic task he has undertaken.

Finally, by way of a critique, the dissertation con-

siders a number of questions that have been raised by evangelical scholarship, some during Schaeffer's lifetime and others since his death (1984) concerning the accuracy of his assessments. His so-called "broad brush" technique is shown to make him simultaneously effective as a communicator and vulnerable as a pastoral apologist.

This study reaches its own conclusions about Schaeffer, and while identifying a number of areas in which valid criticisms apply, recognises him as one of the most successful stimulators of American evangelical thought in the last half-century.

The probability or otherwise of Schaeffer's long-term survival as a Christian apologist is currently under discussion, especially in the USA. This thesis contributes to the debate by concluding that while in many particulars Schaeffer has been proved wrong, his main charge against Western Christianity cannot be ignored, neither now nor in the future.

FOREWORD

On this last-written page I happily record some sincere expressions of thanks to those who have shared in the motivation that gave rise to the research involved in this thesis.

My first contact with Schaeffer was in West Berlin, Germany, where we both attended a week-long evangelical conference, but the interest then awakened was little more than casual. His death in 1984 prompted me to correspond with his son-in-law Ranald Macaulay in Huèmoz, Switzerland; then with Dr. Lane T. Dennis of Crossway Books in Illinois; also with Dr. Os Guinness in Washington, DC; and with other L'Abri contacts in Britain. Inevitably, research material began to accumulate and, as thesis writers know, their work is a river fed by many tributaries.

What was originally intended as a shorter research paper that would help students (my own among them) has developed beyond expectation. I hope it may prove useful and stimulating to those wanting to understand Schaeffer.

I appreciate the encouragement given by the Faculty of Theology at the University of Durban-Westville in agreeing that I should build this dissertation. My thanks are especially due to Professor N.A.C. Heuer, Dean of the Faculty and my Promoter, for his interest, most valuable comments and specific encouragement in the project. I must also record my sincere appreciation of the constructive comments received at a crucial earlier stage of the work from the Reverend A.L.M. Pitchers, Senior Lecturer in the same Faculty.

My partner Emma has borne the burden of my long hours in the study; has tolerated my neglect of other things to see this work completed; has had a share in numerous mealtime discussions on Schaeffer's world view. To her, most of all, my devoted thanks and appreciation.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

(Schaeffer)

AB	Art and the Bible
BFD	Back to Freedom and Dignity
CBWW	The Church Before the Watching World
CETC	The Church at the End of the Twentieth Century
CM	A Christian Manifesto
DITC	Death in The City
EFR	Escape From Reason
GST	Genesis in Space and Time
HSWTL	How Should We Then Live?
HTHS	He is There and He is Not Silent
NLP	No Little People
PDM	Pollution and the Death of Man
TGED	The Great Evangelical Disaster
TGWIT	The God Who Is There
TS	True Spirituality
WHHR	Whatever Happened to the Human Race?

(Barth)

CD	Church Dogmatics

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CHAPTER 1

A Definition of the Problem

This study endeavours to define and analyse a dominant theme in the writings of Francis August Schaeffer, American writer and Christian apologist (1912-1984). His works cover a wide range of subjects from philosophy, the arts, ethics and theology to biblical topics. Schaeffer wrote ad populam and not ad clerum.[1] None of his works therefore attempts anything approaching a systematic formulation of theological truth. This was neither their author's intention nor within his academic competence. He made no pretensions to scholarship in the formal sense. From his writings, however, there has emerged a central statement, variously expressed, concerning diminished and weakened Christian values in the contemporary world. These are seen as being under attack, indeed, as being eclipsed by aggressive humanism and other forms of anti-Christianity, some of which are not always easily detectable.

This central assertion was the burden of his lectures delivered in the course of an itinerant ministry to American college students in the 1960s. The substance of these lectures had begun to take shape several years before their final consolidation and appearance in print.[2] Of this series of campus encounters Schaeffer wrote:

> As I listened, I continued to learn what contemporary thought forms really were, and I learned how to present the gospel to the twentieth-century man so that it was clear to him. And gradually a message came forward which I began to use in various places. I called

> it 'Speaking Historical Christianity into the Twentieth Century World'. I gave this lecture at a number of universities, including Harvard and MIT. After I presented it at Wheaton College, they put it out in pamphlet form. That was the first thing to come out in print. When I saw that this was really a rather extensive piece, I knew I had in my hands something the Lord could use to give the gospel to my own generation. So we took it to a publisher in England. . . .[3]

Thus, Schaeffer at 56 years of age published his first work,[4] The God Who is There, followed almost immediately by the smaller book, Escape From Reason.[5] Both were soon being avidly read, mainly by evangelicals who regarded them as providing a more intellectual approach, certainly a more thoughtful and satisfying alternative to the kind of popular evangelism and writing of Billy Graham.[6]

The 1970s brought popularity and spreading fame to Francis Schaeffer and his wife Edith. Few religious writers of the time could match the rapidity of his success in reaching the Christian public. He was soon in great demand as a conference speaker and (as will be seen later) his work at the L'Abri community in Huèmoz, Switzerland, was given a great deal of exposure in both the Christian and the secular Press. Freelance writer David Porter, in a tribute to Schaeffer, noted that he "rapidly became a cult figure among students",[7] while Stephen Board alluded to resentment among academics over the "guru role Schaeffer filled for many of their students".[8]

During the crowded three years (1968-1971) a further six books by Schaeffer were published.[9] Then there appeared

the book He is There and He is Not Silent which, together with The God Who is There and Escape from Reason Schaeffer regarded as the completion of a trilogy.[10] He thought of them as making a unified base, saying: "Without them the various applications in the other books are really suspended in space".[11] The central statement is best expressed in these three works, but, as will be seen, it is a recurrent theme that comes to the surface in other writings. Indeed, the title of his final book, completed not many weeks before his death from lymphatic cancer on May 15, 1984, demonstrates this. Schaeffer titled it The Great Evangelical Disaster.[12]

The aim of this chapter is to give adequate definition to the problem Schaeffer thought of as the most crucial one of our time. To do so requires that a number of difficulties must be overcome. Probably chief among these is that of Schaeffer's eclecticism. He makes no attempt to expound the doctrines of the Christian faith in a systematic way, but chooses to apply them to specific contemporary problems of theology and ethics. Thus he applies his understanding of the doctrine of Scripture to Barthianism, while his view of man made in the image of God is applied to ethical issues such as abortion and euthanasia.[13]

The wide variety of subject matter in Schaeffer's books constitutes a further difficulty in analysing his thought. His unusual interest in music, art and literature, while lacking the fine expertise of academic excellence, contributes to a wide-ranging defence of historic Christian values as Schaeffer perceives them. This interest will be explored in a later chapter.

This chapter will pursue four lines of enquiry:

(1) What is Schaeffer's central statement?

(2) How does history illustrate his view of decline?

(3) How was the central statement formed in Schaeffer's life and circumstances?

(4) How must it be seen in American Protestantism?

I The Central Statement Defined

Schaeffer addresses Christians in general, but also the non-Christians whom he thought could hear the gospel in their own terms. The Western (Christianised) world, he asserts, has largely abandoned its inherited values and has moved (is still moving) into a post-Christian age. This shift away from past values has created a gulf, a "chasm between the generations . . . brought about almost entirely by a change in the concept of truth".[14] The new concept has achieved an almost universal consensus. At times it appears to approach a monolithic quality. Whether one is reviewing the arts, literature, or newspapers or magazines, the impression remains the same. A new approach to truth and to knowledge has, Schaeffer asserts, gained what is tantamount to a stranglehold on society. It may be compared, he thinks, with the suffocating effects of a bad London fog. Neither doors nor walls can protect us from the miasma, nor have we been able to prevent the new way of thinking from seeping into the common Western mind, a mind for long centuries under the discipline and tutelage of Christianity.[15]

The mere fact of the new consensus, however, is not the sole disaster. Chief among its dangers, Schaeffer

thinks, is the general unawareness of the significance of the change. While the process has had a long and gradual development in history, its present impact is overwhelming. Thus he writes:

> The tragedy of our situation today is that men and women are being fundamentally affected by the new way of looking at truth and yet they have never even analysed the drift which has taken place. Young people from Christian homes are brought up in the old framework of truth. Then they are subjected to the modern framework. In time they become confused because they do not understand the alternatives with which they are being presented. Confusion becomes bewilderment and before long they are overwhelmed. . . . So this change in the concept of the way we come to knowledge and truth is the most crucial problem, as I understand it, facing Christianity today.[16] (Emphasis Schaeffer's)

Schaeffer explains that while the shift is one of methodology--a way of approaching truth and knowledge--it is chiefly destructive of certain basic presuppositions or assumptions. He writes:

> What were these presuppositions? The basic one was that there really are such things as absolutes. They accepted the possibility of an absolute in the area of Being (or knowledge), and in the area of morals. Therefore, because they accepted the possibility of absolutes, though men might disagree as to what these were, nevertheless they could reason together on the basis of anti-thesis. So if anything was true, the opposite was false. In morality, if one thing was right, its opposite was wrong. This little formula, 'If you have A it is not non-A', is the first move in classical logic. If you understand the extent

> to which this no longer holds sway, you will understand our present situation.[17]

The abandonment of absolutes in favour of relativism is a twentieth century phenomenon strongly underlined in Paul Johnson's concise and weighty History of the Modern World (from 1917 to the 1980s).[18] Indeed, his first chapter is titled " Relativistic World" and takes its starting point from the day in 1919 when there was convincing scientific evidence (following a solar eclipse observed) of the credibility of Albert Einstein's Special Theory of Relativity. This meant that space and time are relative rather than absolute. Not only did this complex theory mean the discarding of long-held Newtonian concepts of the physical world, but, says Johnson, "it was to illustrate what Karl Popper was later to term 'the law of unintended consequence'".[19] As to this consequence Johnson explains:

> At the beginning of the 1920s the belief began to circulate, for the first time at a popular level, that there were no longer any absolutes: of time and space, of good and evil, of knowledge, above all of value. Mistakenly but perhaps inevitably, relativity became confused with relativism.[20]

Schaeffer, who makes but passing mention of Einstein on three occasions[21] in his first book, may not have known that no one was more distressed by this confusion than Einstein himself, who lived long enough to see moral relativism develop into a social pandemic. The application of his scientific theory to philosophy, religion and ethics evoked from him the protest written to his friend Born:

> You believe in a God who plays dice, and I in complete law and order in a world which

> objectively exists and which I, in a wildly speculative way, am trying to capture.[22]


Schaeffer's firm conviction is that belief in absolutes is consistent with biblical and Christian truth; that it implies antithesis; that even the non-Christian, living in the environment of Western Christian tradition, accepts this norm. On this basis it was once possible clearly to distinguish (and intellectually to conceive of) right and wrong. Before the great shift such distinctions were common ground among thinkers. The non-Christian, despite the inadequacy of his intellectual base to support him, could participate in the consensus. Schaeffer writes:

> It may be argued that the non-Christian had no right to act on the presuppositions he acted on. That is true. They were being romantic in accepting optimistic answers without a sufficient base. Nevertheless they went on acting as if these presuppositions were true.[23]

The shift or gulf is all the more drastic in Schaeffer's view because of its universality, covering all aspects of life and culture. To this aspect Johnson as an historian adds his argument. He contends that Newtonian physics formed the framework of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment, and that Darwinism was a key element in Marxist class concepts as also in Hitlerian race philosophies. In regard to the twentieth century he continues:

> So, too, the public response to relativity was one of the principal formative influences on the course of twentieth-century history. It formed a knife, inadvertently wielded by its author, to help cut society adrift from its traditional moorings in the faith and morals of Judeo-Christian culture.[24]

In order to illustrate the historical process of decline in philosophy, art, music and culture that led ultimately to a precipitous shift in theology, Schaeffer uses the device of simple diagrams. He employs these in various ways in The God Who is There and in Escape from Reason. Although the diagrams seem uncomplicated they require some explanation, without which Schaeffer's meaning may not be clear. One of the basic diagrams is presented by him "not as a simple horizontal line but as a staircase" as follows:[25]



The connecting line (staircase) between these disciplines is fundamental to Schaeffer's argument. He calls it "the line of despair", representing a historical boundary, a point of calendar time. It is a dividing line, as he sees it, between the old prevailing idea of absolutes and the new idea of relativism.

Schaeffer's main interest is in the decline he detects in theology. He believes that in the case of Europe there was a general abandonment of absolutes dating from "about 1890", while in the United States this decline was delayed for some decades till "about 1935".[26] These dates refer to what he believes to have been a kind of theological crossing of the Rubicon, although his calls for reform do not preclude the possibility of a return to old values.

In regard to other disciplines, Schaeffer wishes to

illustrate by means of the staircase that this sinking below the line was a historical process. So, for example, the staircase will show that philosophy underwent change first, that is, before art. Hence the importance of the Renaissance and the Enlightenment as periods during which philosophical developments took place. Art followed philosophy, while music and general culture experienced fundamental changes still later. Last of all came changes in theological thought. Schaeffer writes of his diagram: "Each of the steps represents a certain stage in time. The higher is earlier, the lower later. It was in this order that the shift in truth affected men's lives".[27]

What does Schaeffer intend to convey by "the line of despair"? While it represents a historical boundary, it is important to realise that by "despair" Schaeffer means that man has abandoned the hope of finding a unified circle of all truth. He has forsaken hope in rationality as the basis of Christian faith and has taken refuge in non-reason or in the equivalent of Soren Kierkegaard's "leap of faith" by which he became, Schaeffer believes, the progenitor of both secular and theological modern existential thought.[28]

The line of despair, therefore, marks a point in history prior to which man had a rational faith, (if not in fact then at least available to him) but after which he sank into the despair of non-reason. The search for a unified circle that would contain all thought ceased. Schaeffer writes: "It was as though the rationalist suddenly became trapped in a large round room with no doors and no windows, nothing but complete darkness. . . . no exit at all!"[29]

Schaeffer believes that when philosophy came to the realisation that it could not discover a unified rational circle it departed from the classical methodology of antithesis by shifting the concept of truth, and so modern man was born. He writes:

> In this way modern man moved under the line of despair. He was driven to it against his desire. He remained a rationalist, but he had changed. Do we Christians understand this shift in the contemporary world? If we do not understand it then we are largely talking to ourselves.[30]

In Schaeffer's opinion the shift has been tremendous. In the past one could say "This is true" or "This is right" and been clearly understood. People spoke to each other as if the idea of antithesis were self-evident. "Thus in evangelism, in spiritual matters and in Christian education, you could have begun with the certainty that your audience understood you".[31] Yet this position has changed. Schaeffer considers this comprehension has been so severely damaged that an unbridgeable gulf now exists between the old and new way of thinking. Hence the first chapter of The God Who is There is called "The Gulf is Fixed".[32]

Schaeffer's basic statement or central conviction of decline in theology and culture is abruptly introduced, without prologue or prior explanation, on the basis of its self-evidence to him. Yet its implications have by-passed the awareness of many evangelical Christians. The inevitable consequences of this ignorance he regards as serious because they lead to deviations from true faith, to spiritual apathy such as the Schaeffers saw at first hand during their evangelistic ministry in post-war

Europe in the 1950s.[33] Unfortunately, Schaeffer observes, Christian thinkers in the time before the shift took place neglected to preach and teach presuppositional apologetics. This contributed to a general ignorance of what was in process of happening. This position has not changed or improved, because the importance of thinking in terms of Christian presuppositions is still not being taught. The flood-waters of secular thought have overwhelmed the Church and Schaeffer believes that instead of being far ahead in both defence and communication, the Church has lagged behind, which is a weakness difficult to rectify among evangelicals today.[34]

As to the spread of the new way of thinking about truth, it took place, Schaeffer considers, in three ways: First, geographically, from intellectual sources in the German universities. Once again (as on pages 6 and 7) support for Schaeffer's view may be found in historian Paul Johnson who ascribes the impact of relativity ('the new way of thinking', as Schaeffer calls it) to the fact that it virtually coincided with the public reception of Freudianism in 1920. "Even more spectacular, and in the long run more important," he writes, "was the sudden discovery of Freud's works and ideas by intellectuals and artists".[35] European thought forms, as Schaeffer says, then crossed to Britain and America.

Second, the new way of thinking percolated through social strata from intellectuals to the better educated, down to the working classes, but reaching the traditionally conservative upper middle classes last of all.[36]

Finally, as the staircase diagram (p. 8) shows, the

new thinking spread itself from one discipline to another, reaching theology last.[37]

At this point some preliminary questions and comment on Schaeffer's basic statement are appropriate. His reasons given as to why and how the new way of thinking spread are likely to find general acceptance among Christian thinkers. Yet there may well be considerable hesitation about accepting his definition of man's "despair" as arising from the abandonment of the hope of a unified answer for knowledge and life.[38] Is it true that modern man has given up on the search for answers to the basic philosophic and theological questions? Has he in fact turned his back on biblical truth, thereby discarding the element of hope and the possibility of real knowledge of God? Is it not too sweeping a statement on Schaeffer's part when he states that modern man "lives in despair--the despair of no longer thinking that what has always been the aspiration of men is at all possible"?[39] Perhaps, by his drastic diagnosis Schaeffer intends to drive home the reality of what he considers to be Christianity's defection from truth, but in so doing he appears at times to come close to destroying the hope of recovery which is an essential part of his apologetic task.

Schaeffer is right in contrasting past and present in respect of the time it once took for intellectual and cultural changes to spread. Today's world experiences actual or impending change without delay, making it possible for a new culture to spread swiftly throughout the civilised world. No political or geographical boundaries can now stem the flow of new ideas. He writes: "As the world . . . has become post-Christian, both sides of the Iron Curtain have

followed the same methodology and the same basic monolithic thought-form . . . leading to pragmatic relativism".[40]

Schaeffer is also undoubtedly right in his assertion that those standing in the stream of historic Christianity "have been especially slow to understand the relationships between various areas of thought".[41] The orthodox Christian, in his view, has paid a very heavy price for his failure to think as an educated man at grips with the uniformity of our modern culture.[42]

Schaeffer attaches great importance to the basic ideas he brings forward in The God Who is There, his first work. In it he "lays the groundwork, establishes the terminology and sets out the basic thesis".[43] Having done so, some of these ideas are transplanted, like seedlings, to other works, notably to his magnum opus, How Should We Then Live? which deals with the rise and decline of Western thought and culture.[44] This is a source book for much information on Schaeffer's thinking regarding intellectual and cultural development from the time of the Renaissance to the twentieth century.

Escape from Reason, which followed The God Who is There almost immediately and initially made a greater impact than its predecessor, pays particular attention to the subject of unity between Nature and Grace. Schaeffer's starting point is Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) who denied such a unity and asserted that man's intellect was left unimpaired by the Fall. This, thought Schaeffer, changed the world in a very real way. "From this incomplete view of the biblical Fall flowed all the subsequent difficulties. Man's intellect became autonomous".[45]

Schaeffer regards this as a grave step in the progressive departure from biblical truth. The gulf between nature and grace began to widen. As nature (intellect) assumed its autonomy it began to "eat up" grace. By the time the Renaissance had reached its apex, nature had triumphed over ("eaten up") grace. The Reformation, when it came, sought to restore the biblical position and to reverse the teaching of Thomas Aquinas by accepting the "biblical picture of a total fall . . . (of) the whole man, . . . including his intellect and will".[46]

In contrast to Aquinas, then, Schaeffer believes that the Reformation's teaching on the nature of man, based on sola scriptura, gave adequate answers to the questions man needs to know about himself. Why is man at one and the same time so wonderful and yet so flawed? Schaeffer finds the answer to this question in the biblical doctrine of man made in the image of God, yet fallen.[47] Thus the Reformers' (and Schaeffer's) insistence on the dignity of the whole man, made with no division between nature and grace. He observes that the modern, deeply pessimistic notion that man is nothing was foreign to Calvin, and that "the people who, following the Reformation, built the culture of Northern Europe knew that, while man is morally guilty before the God who exists, he is not nothing".[48]

The Reformers, therefore, possessed a true unity of knowledge and did not have the Renaissance problem of a chasm between nature and grace. This unity was "on the basis of what God had revealed in both areas".[49]

The next major line of enquiry concerns Schaeffer's understanding of theological decline in history.

II. How History Illustrates Schaeffer's View of Decline

Schaeffer's interpretation of his central theme--Western man's defection from Christian truth--is rooted in his understanding of history. While he views the Bible or Christian revelation as constant, he also observes that events, persons, thought-forms and various philosophies are in process of continuous change. Of this process the case of Thomas Aquinas (referred to on pages 13 and 14) is a notable first example.

Following the Renaissance came the Protestant Reformation (1517-). While it countered Aquinas's teaching in respect of the human intellect, it was unable to roll back the tide permanently. The emergence of a new theology in the nineteenth century reopened the gulf that had originated during the Renaissance; a gulf between theocentricist and anthropocentrist presuppositions which in the twentieth century has further widened to its present dimension.[50] This is historical evidence of the decline as Schaeffer sees it. He has been accused of being selective in his choice of examples by which to illustrate the decline, so exposing himself to the charge of superficiality in his generalisations.[51] Yet these defects, even if conceded, do not appear to have been fatal to his case. His profound sense of the importance of history as a teacher and interpreter gave to several of his books considerable thrust. The impact of volumes like Death in the City, Genesis in Space and Time and How Should We Then Live? illustrates the point.

Death in the City[52] uses the events of Jeremiah's day

as a backdrop against which Schaeffer expounds the parallel Old and New Testament revelations of decline and apostasy. This is another form of expressing the central statement under discussion. He makes his point by observing:

> We live in a post-Christian world. What would be our perspective as individuals, as orthodox Christians, as those who would claim to be Bible-believing? How should be look at this post-Christian world and function in it?[53]

All the familiar terminology of his post-Christian analysis is found in this work: man's alienation from God; impending judgment; man without the Bible; man in the image of God. In what seems to him a Bible-forsaking environment the author pleads for a "constructive revolution in the orthodox, evangelical church".[54] Otherwise, he sees only judgment. So he writes:

> There is only one perspective we can have of the post-Christian world of our generation: an understanding that our culture and our country is under the wrath of God. Our country is under the wrath of God. Northern Europe's culture is under the wrath of God. It will not do to say how great we are. It will not do to cover up the difference between the consensus today and the consensus of a Christian world. The last few generations have trampled upon the truths of the reformation and all that those truths have brought forth. And we are under the wrath of God.[55]

This impassioned appeal, more than most others reveals Schaeffer's deepest conviction that there must be reformation and revival among the people of God.

Genesis in Space and Time is a defence of the historicity of Genesis 1-11, which he calls "space-time history".

A later companion volume in the same category is Joshua and the Flow of Biblical History. Schaeffer's tenacity in defence of Scripture was widely known. One of his sharpest critics (himself an evangelical writer), Stephen Board, wrote of him: "He enjoyed unusual credibility among most American evangelicals and many fundamentalists. This is partly traced to his strong stand for biblical inerrancy and against accommodation to the world spirit".[56]

Genesis in Space and Time is, however, more than a defence of biblical history. It is an essay on creation, man made in God's image, the Fall and the promise of redemption through Jesus Christ. Two extended footnotes explain Schaeffer's views on historicity and deserve to be quoted in full.

> (Re. chapter 2.) For example, the Tower of Babel: Whether we come to it from biblical knowledge given by God or by scientific study, the Tower of Babel was either there or it was not there. The same thing is true of Adam. Whether we begin with the conceptual apparatus of archaeology and anthropology or whether we begin with the knowledge given us in the Bible, if it were within the realm of science's knowledge to do so, in both cases we would end with knowledge of Adam's bones. . . . In those cases where science can know, both sources of knowledge arrive at the same point.[57]
>
> (Re. chapter 5.) That there was a Fall is not an upper-storey statement--that is, it is not in this sense a 'theological' or 'religious' statement. Rather, it is a historical space-time brute-fact, propositional statement. There was time, space-time history, before the Fall, and then man turned from his proper integration

> point by choice, and in so doing there was moral discontinuity; man became abnormal.[58]

These assertions by Schaeffer were undoubtedly part of his early theological background when the historicity of Genesis 1-11 was debated in American seminaries. In Schaeffer the issues were intensified by his collision with Barthian theology and other modern forms of thought encountered by him during the 1950s in Europe. For him the abandonment of belief in the historicity of antediluvian biblical events was clear evidence that the 'gulf' had widened. What he felt to be the central problem also included an awareness of the destructive nature of existentialist theology.[59]

How Should We Then Live? is Schaeffer's major volume that served as the basis of a filmed series of lectures on the decline of Western civilisation. Schaeffer describes it as "an analysis of the key moments in history that have formed our present culture, and the thinking of the people who brought these moments to pass".[60] Beginning with Ancient Rome, it moves rapidly through successive periods of history: the Middle Ages, the Renaissance, the Reformation, the rise of modern science, the breakdown in philosophy and the advent of modern theology in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Important sections of this work are devoted to art, music, literature and films, all of which have the same purpose, namely to demonstrate civilised man's moral decline following his forsaking of biblical truth. The secular world and Christian civilisation both share in this process of decay. The gradual decline of New Testament Christianity during the Middle Ages (c. 500-1400) best illustrates this process. Pristine Christianity, Schaeffer teaches, was

distorted by ecclesiastical bondage and casuistry as the papacy grew in power, but this is not the complete picture, as Schaeffer makes clear:

> These distortions generated cultural elements which mark a clear alternative to what we call a Christian or biblical culture. Part of the fascination of mediaeval studies is to trace the degree to which different aspects of the complex Western cultural inheritance were emphasised or de-emphasised according to the moral and intellectual response of people to the Christian God they claimed to worship. It would be a mistake to suppose that the overall structure of thought and life was not Christian. Yet it would be equally mistaken to deny that into this structure were fitted alien or half-alien features--some of Greek and Roman origin, others of local pagan ancestry--which . . . obscured the Christianity underneath.[61]

Schaeffer notes that humanist elements entered the Church during this period. "Fallen man was considered able to return to God by meriting the merit of Christ".[62] There was a mixture of Christian and ancient non-Christian thought, as shown by Thomas Aquinas's emphasis on Aristotle. The Scholastics aimed at the proof and systematising of the doctrines of the Church by means of Aristotle's philosophy.[63] This paved the way for men to think of themselves as autonomous and the centre of all things. The Renaissance reaffirmed such trends and so contributed to setting the scene for a coming conflict between humanism and the more Scriptural Christianity of the Reformation.

What has been noted thus far of Christian history adds to an understanding of Schaeffer's major preoccupation,

namely Christian values retreating in the face of anti-Christian thought or unorthodoxy in various forms.

From what we know of Schaeffer's early theological background--including his Seminary training and his ordination as a Presbyterian minister, his sympathy for the Reformers comes as no surprise. By the space he gives to the Reformation in his major work, How Should We Then Live? he makes it clear that he regards himself as a spiritual child of the Reformation. He writes: "The Reformers turned not to man as beginning from himself, but to the original Christianity of the Bible and the early church. . . . (They) accepted the Bible as the Word of God in all that it teaches".[64] Because of his central concern about the defection of Christian Europe and America from their biblical principles he was at great pains to underscore his belief in the Bible as the Word of God. For him, therefore, the Reformers provided a model to be followed. He remarks:

> In contrast to the Renaissance humanists, they refused to accept the autonomy of human reason. . . . Rather, they took seriously the Bible's own claim for itself--that it is the only final authority. And they took seriously that man needs the answers given by God in the Bible; to have adequate answers . . . to know the present meaning of life and how to have the final answers in distinguishing between right and wrong. That is, man needs not only a God who exists, but a God who has spoken in a way that can be understood.[65]

It was not that Schaeffer thought the Reformation was a golden age; far from it. He repeats emphatically that it had "many and serious weaknesses", yet in the matter of religious and secular humanism its leaders "did return to

the Bible's instruction and the example of the early church".[66] For Schaeffer the centrality of the Bible is paramount, a standard by which he measures the Church at all times in its history. His survey of The Reformation[67] contains a number of statements and phrases that underline this conviction. They are characteristic of his ministry.

The next section discusses biographical circumstances that helped to shape Schaeffer's central statement.

III. How Schaeffer's Central Statement Was Formed and Settled

The various ways in which Schaeffer expressed his case concerning the "shift (which) is the most crucial problem . . . facing Christianity today"[68] have been described thus far in this chapter. This central statement was not shaped by any cataclysmic event, but was forged over a period of time in the crucible of personal and public conflict. Schaeffer's conversion, seminary training, pastoral work in America, along with almost thirty years of arduous and unusual Christian work in Europe combined to make the crucible in which the Schaefferisms that evangelicals have come to know were produced. Some understanding of Schaeffer as a man is therefore essential to this chapter's purpose. A logical starting point is his conversion to Christ, the account of which contains useful indications of his approach to theology.

A. Schaeffer's conversion and early background

Schaeffer's upbringing was non-Christian and at high school he considered himself to be an agnostic. Yet an early interest in philosophy brought some basic questions

to the fore. He relates: "I saw the questions that the thinkers and philosophers were asking, but found that they had no answers".[69] He describes his frustration while attending a liberal church where the minister was not providing answers to life's problems:

> In my search for answers I read and studied all the philosophy I could find. I even went back into the time of the Greeks. While reading Ovid one night, I thought, 'Well now, I'm reading all this material; maybe I should read the Bible, too, just as a matter of curiosity and honesty!' So I began to read. Each night I read a little from Ovid and a little from the Bible. I never finished reading that particular book of Ovid, but I have read the Bible I don't know how many times since. I found truth in that Book. In my reading of philosophy I saw that there were innumerable problems that nobody was giving answers for. But in the Bible I began to find answers, not merely individual answers that shot down the problems one at a time, but even though I was finite it put a cable in my hand which bound all the problems together and gave a systematic answer to them. The Bible, it struck me, dealt with man's problems in a sweeping, all-encompassing way.
>
> In about six months I was flattened. . . . I don't know exactly when the change came, but I know that at the end of those six months I was a Christian.
>
> What this experience did was to give me a total confidence in the Bible. Since then I have studied it for over forty years. . . . Every year I become more convinced that the Bible, when it is read as it is written, gives the answers to all the intellectual questions and to all of life.[70]

Within this outline of his conversion process there are discernible stages bearing upon Schaeffer's theological method and his personal conclusions as to the way of reaching truth. Lane T. Dennis, in analysing Schaeffer's conversion in an evangelical context, has found six distinct stages in Schaeffer's account. These stages are:

(i) The raising of basic questions about existence.

(ii) Investigation of philosophical alternatives.

(iii) Investigation of the Christian alternative.

(iv) Turning point and acceptance of Christianity.

(v) Grounding of Christian perspective in the Bible and theology.

(vi) Extension of Christian perspective and the Bible to more and more areas of life.[71]

What is pertinent to Schaeffer's account of his conversion is that the event had a determinative influence on his conviction as to the great shift in theology. This shift, in other words, had already been felt by him in his contact with the liberalism of his day. He had experienced its reality and known its futility. The awareness that something was seriously wrong with his Christian environthus came very early in life. That these early impressions were intensified during the College and Seminary years is mainly due to the theological climate of the 1930s. The latter is acknowledged as having played a principal role in shaping Schaeffer's theological stance.[72]

Remembering that Schaeffer was only eighteen years old when he became a Christian by a personal commitment, his investigation of philosophical alternatives could hardly have had great depth. Yet, as the process of biblical

education continued, new Christian impressions such as are mentioned in step (v) above were intensified, especially his awareness of the Bible as a problem-solving book. He noted: "This experience (gave) me a total confidence in the Bible", while later he repeatedly wrote of theological and cultural retreat from truth as "a departure from biblical Christianity".[73]

B. The Great Shift in the Seminaries influencing Francis Schaeffer's Thought

Schaeffer spent his College and Seminary years in an atmosphere of intense--sometimes acrimonious--theological conflict known as the Fundamentalist-Modernist Controversy. Some of its issues dating from well before the 1930s have never been settled. The controversy left its scars on Schaeffer. Yet it would not be fair to say that his theological outlook was completely set in immovable concrete. He showed expreme reluctance whenever attempts were made, in the years to follow, to discuss the controversies in which he had been engaged. He was critical of those who wished to identify the supposed sources of his theology.[74] Having been theologically educated in the climate of conflict he knew the issues at stake, yet evidently shrank from the confrontational approach so frequently found in the circles of American church life in which he served as a Pastor for ten years before the Schaeffers moved to Europe in 1948.

No useful purpose is served by examining Schaeffer's emotional response to the conflict of his early years, yet one must enquire how the debate deepened his intellectual awareness of the core problem, namely the shift away from biblical truth and absolutes as Schaeffer saw them.

Theological climate of the 1920s. By the time the 1920s had arrived the challenge of naturalism and science, following Charles Darwin's theories, had long been evident in the market-place of theological debate. Traditional biblical interpretation was under heavy siege. The prevailing outlook favoured new ways of thinking. The natural tended to prevail over the supernatural. The earlier cosmology of the Christian faith was regarded as outmoded.[75]

The new intellectual approach was applied also to the study of the biblical text. German Higher Criticism had developed techniques using scientific methods in textual analysis. Many hallowed traditional assumptions concerning the authorship (and authenticity) of specific books were jettisoned. Scholarship was seen to be taking on a new role as the herald of a new kind of Christianity differing substantially from the traditional evangelical suppositions of the latter half of the nineteenth century.[76]

As the Bible was under attack as to its trustworthiness and authority, the shift in thought had already had a marked effect. Theological seminaries, in particular, were in the forefront of the intellectual controversy which has since been well documented.[77]

The response to the new intellectual ferment was a movement in two directions:

(i) Modernism accepted wholeheartedly the findings of science and adapted traditional theology to the new position. An example from Harry Emerson Fosdick of Riverside, New York City, will suffice. In 1922 he preached his famous sermon "Shall the Fundamentalists Win?" in which he set out the issues of the Fundamentalist-Modernist controversy.[78]

The sermon was, moreover, accepted as being a leading statement on the new approach to the Bible.

(ii) Fundamentalism's response came over a period of years. Indeed, more than three decades before Fosdick, in 1885 at a Bible conference a group of biblical conservatives had outlined five "fundamental doctrines" held by them to be essential tests of Christian orthodoxy. These were: (a) The inerrancy of Scripture.
(b) The virgin birth and divinity of Christ.
(c) The substitutionary atonement provided by Christ in taking the place of sinners by his death on the cross.
(d) The physical resurrection of Christ from His tomb.
(e) The bodily return of Christ to the earth in His second coming.[79]

These "fundamentals" provided a test of orthodoxy which appeared to remain in force among evangelicals for many years. It seems clear from his terminology that Schaeffer thought of orthodoxy chiefly in these terms. A series of small books called The Fundamentals had been published in 1910 as part of a major offensive by Fundamentalists. Lane T. Dennis mentions that over the next five years (before 1915) twelve of these essays were published under the sponsorship of a wealthy oilman in California, and that three million copies were sent out, one to every Christian worker and theological student whose address could be found.[80]

By the time Schaeffer had graduated from College and entered Westminster Theological Seminary (1935) most American Protestant denominations were seriously divided. Bitter attacks were launched by both sides. Some leading

professors of theology were indicted for heresy and dismissed or defrocked. The Presbyterian Church of America was among those most affected. The battle raged around Princeton Theological Seminary, once committed to the scholarly defence of Christian orthodoxy but now finding itself divided over the whole question of inspiration of Scripture. Among the ablest protagonists of orthodoxy was Princeton professor John Gresham Machen (1881-1937), author of a number of works written in defence of traditional Reformation theology.[81] The so-called Old Calvinist Theology had a formidable champion in Machen who was regarded by some evangelical thinkers as the greatest leader of the whole evangelical cause, not only in America but in the English-speaking world.[82]

In the reorganisation of Princeton, following much theological controversy, in the late 1920s Machen resigned. He soon became a principal founder of the new Westminster Theological Seminary, giving his support to a newly founded separatist body known as the Independent Board for Presbyterian Foreign Mission. This action, however, resulted in his eventual indictment for insubordination, his suspension from the Presbyterian ministry and final unfrocking. Before this, however, a new denomination had been established, the Orthodox Presbyterian Church. The new denomination was split by controversy within a year, and so the Bible Presbyterian Church and yet another new seminary, Faith Theological Seminary, emerged.[83]

C. The effect of the 1930s controversy on Schaeffer

Before their marriage, Schaeffer's wife-to-be Edith Seville had introduced him to Machen's Christianity and Liberalism which greatly influenced him. She had been a

reader of Machen's writings during her high school years. When Schaeffer witnessed the expulsion of Machen from the Presbyterian Church of America in 1936 he saw this defrocking by liberal forces in the mainline church "as a paradigm of the intellectual conflict, first of Christianity and Liberalism, then of the entire culture".[84]

These formative seminary years provide us with important indicators of Schaeffer's views on Scripture, orthodoxy and Christian loyalty. They show the origins of his loyalty to the principles of the Reformation and the faith it proclaimed, of which Machen was a chief exponent. They also suggest that Schaeffer's life-long awareness of the perpetual conflict between truth and error was born during these years. Clearly, that awareness grew rapidly during this period. As Stephen Board suggests, the conflict was not confined to theology but extended to the entire culture in which Schaeffer took an interest.[85]

Schaeffer assigns dates for his suggested "line of despair" (see p. 8) which are 1890 and 1935 for Europe and America respectively. The latter date is significant for Schaeffer. Although he does not say so it would not be unreasonable to conjecture that he coupled the turbulent events of the 1930s among American Protestants with his belief that the great shift in values occurred at that very time. Most certainly their occurrence then made an indelible impression upon him, so that thirty years later, when The God Who is There was being produced, his mind formed a conscious link between the shift and what he had personally observed. For this reason the student years assume importance as a kind of matrix in which convictions took shape.

The next logical line of enquiry concerns the impact of the years the Schaeffers spent in Europe, with L'Abri being in particular focus.

D. The Impact of the L'Abri Fellowship on Schaeffer's Mind

In the formulation of Schaeffer's central theme of the decline of Christian presuppositions, L'Abri plays an indispensable part. Without the L'Abri community the name and fame of Schaeffer as speaker, writer and prophet-apologist would have been greatly diminished. It may be argued that his books--taken by themselves--were decisive, but to say this is to overlook the fact that his writings were for the most part edited transcriptions of lectures given, at L'Abri and elsewhere, with only rough notes as a base. L'Abri provided the forum for discussion without which it is highly improbable that Schaeffer's books would have originated. Their substance was rehearsed in numerous conversations, debates and L'Abri workshops that became a standard pattern for learning among those who visited the village Huémoz in Switzerland. At L'Abri, Schaeffer says, "As I listened, I continued to learn what contemporary thought forms really were".[86] Parkhurst is equally emphatic that Schaeffer's training as an apologist came from "talking to real people with real questions" and from "deep involvement with individual human beings" and not the human race in general.[87]

Edith Schaeffer has adequately chronicled the entire L'Abri story.[88] The ensuing account in her words sets the scene of the Schaeffers' labours from 1948 to 1955, -- the years in Europe before L'Abri ('place of shelter') was established. During this time Schaeffer was still working

under the aegis of the right-wing Protestant group and separatist body known as the American Council of Christian Churches (ACCC). In Edith's account there is a dual emphasis on rationality and biblical truth and once again there are indicators toward a central problem of a departure from Bible Christianity. She writes:

> It was right after the war, and Europe still bore its scars--war-damaged buildings, and people living under stringent conditions as far as home and food went. But that which became a deep concern to us was not the result of physical bombs which had torn up and scattered orderly matter into rubble, but the philosophical and theological 'bombs' which had torn up and scattered faith and orderly thinking. It was not only that theology and philosophy were denying the existence of a personal God such as the Bible sets forth as being really there--that has been loudly expressed for many years--but the alarming thing was the generation growing up to be taught that one might as well not even argue about what truth is, because 'absolute truth' is non-existent . . . all things are relative.
>
> Religious freedom is important, but the word 'Christianity' is frequently a clever mask used to cover up the age-old wrinkles of agnosticism. Just as Communism freely uses the word 'democratic' as an adjective applying to its most undemocratic teachings, so terminology in theological realms needs defining these days.[89]

Seven years were to pass before L'Abri became fact. During this time the Schaeffers made contacts by teaching small groups basic Bible truths and engaging in a low profile itinerant evangelistic ministry. The content of Schaeffer's teaching deserves notice. Edith writes of it:

> Fran would give a talk on 'The History of the Church' from the early Church, in the Book of Acts in the Bible, down to the present day, in an outline form. He would show how simple the early Church worship was, and how Roman Catholicism arose at the time of Constantine, and then give a summary of the Reformation and its going back to the two 'pillars', (1) a non-humanist authority, which the Bible gives . . . and (2) a non-humanist approach to the absolute Holy God, upon the basis of the finished, absolute work of Christ upon the cross in space, and time and history.[90]
>
> Then he would show how German Higher Criticism came into the Protestant church about two hundred years ago, and . . . how this destroyed the faith of many theological leaders and pastors in the inerrancy of the Bible . . .
>
> He would then go on to show how Barthianism--the more modern and subtle deviation from the Bible--arose . . .[91]

L'Abri was established as a work independent of any connections with the American Council of Christian Churches in 1955. Its growth from a one-family unit into a community and world-wide fellowship, with branches in several countries, is a matter of record. Schaeffer tells how men and women of widely different backgrounds came to stay for periods of weeks, up to three months; how Farel House--used for lectures and study--was established. He writes:

> They heard that L'Abri was a place where one could discuss the twentieth century questions quite openly. To the best of my ability I gave the Bible's answer. But all the time I tried to listen and learn the thought forms of these people.[92]

Two things come to notice again: (i) Schaeffer's

insistence on giving "the Bible's answer", and (ii) the firm belief that Christianity demands a rational approach and that it has intellectual credibility. This credibility was affirmed by a strong emphasis on philosophy rather than on mere scientific evidence for biblical truth. The approach to the historicity of Genesis 1-11, as in his book, Genesis in Space and Time, demonstrates this.

Those who visited L'Abri after it had achieved a certain intellectual respectability among evangelicals as a place where no questions were disallowed, were often surprised by what they found. David Porter, a biographer of Malcolm Muggeridge,[93] was one such. He found Schaeffer to be a gifted listener with a large fund of sympathy who studied everything he could find to know more accurately what his contemporaries were thinking. He writes:

> His apologetic framework was hammered out in discussion with non-Christians and tested in the same arena. He reserved his prophetic oratory and strongest denunciation for those who corrupted the purity of biblical truth.[94]

It is obvious that L'Abri's conversations and informal lecture-discussions even at meals contributed enormously to the making of Schaeffer the apologist. The twentieth century questions discussed there were--many of them--basic philosophic material: the origin of the universe, the existence of God, definitions of morality, the possibility of knowledge and the like. At times a single belligerent questioner could spark off an intense debate: "You really believe all those myths recorded in the Bible took place?" Or else, "You mean you just start with the Bible and go on from there?"[95]

The fame that L'Abri brought Schaeffer gave him access to lecture platforms that might otherwise have been denied to someone with so obvious a fundamentalist background. In the long aftermath of the theological debate that followed the publication of John A.T. Robinson's Honest to God[96] in 1963, Schaeffer was frequently asked to state his views. J.A. Kirk, a professor at Union Theological Seminary, Buenos Aires, who heard Schaeffer give a series of lectures, said he was "none too happy that the current evangelical approach to this modern debate was really satisfactory".[97] Schaeffer, in his view, was an exception to the unhealthy practice among evangelicals of dismissing contrary views as either ungodly or insincere. His was an entirely new and fresh approach, thought Kirk, especially because of the panoramic sweep he gave of the last two hundred years of Western and Eastern thinking. Kirk wrote:

> This was something I had never heard an evangelical doing before and to me it had exciting possibilities in the total witness to biblical truth. I would hazard a guess that the way in which Dr Schaeffer himself became a Christian has very much controlled the way he understands these things today.[98]

Here, as elsewhere, Schaeffer is seen in the role of an apologist whose constant theme was that the Church and Christian world had forsaken first principles, based on biblical truth, once taken for granted. Admittedly, the terminology of his message was varied according to circumstance, but the core of it was unchanged. It is accurate, therefore, to speak of a central statement coming from Schaeffer.

This chapter concludes with an essential consideration:

IV. Schaeffer's Central Statement in the Context of American Protestantism

To place this statement in accurate perspective requires some understanding of the main features of Protestant religious groupings in the U.S.A. Although Schaeffer spent thirty years in Switzerland, he remained throughout that time an integral part of American Christian life. L'Abri, for all its international contacts, was American-orientated in outlook, support structure and organisation.[99]

Lane T. Dennis sketches four types of religious orientation within Protestant America.[100] These are:


(1) The recoverers, those who aim to recover the original Christian paradigm, namely the pure teaching of the New Testament church. This group corresponds substantially to the fundamentalists.

(2) The elaborators, those who aim to extend the original paradigm to allow for changing social and cultural conditions, though the paradigm itself is believed to have once-for-all parameters. This group corresponds to the evangelicals.

(3) The reinterpreters, who want to reinterpret the original Christian paradigm which is perceived as containing much truth, rather than being truth itself. Reinterpretation is regarded as necessary to make the message meaningful to the modern world. Reinterpreters correspond to neo-orthodoxy.[101]

(4) The adapters are seen as mainly reconstructors of

the Christian paradigm and correspond substantially to Protestant liberals. However imprecise this may be, this is the perception as Dennis describes it. The following diagram illustrates the groupings mentioned and helps one to place Schaeffer in the context of American Protestant religious life. Dennis calls it "A Typology of Christian Orientation".[102]



Schaeffer's roots lay in fundamentalism. This group has, however, been torn by strife and disunity with great frequency over the years. Hermeneutical differences, disputes over eschatology and dispensationalism, attitudes to cultural and intellectual pursuits and above all the issue of separatism have caused schisms within denominations and individual congregations. Schaeffer's wider ministry and his specific emphasis on the need to understand art and culture[103] did something towards taking him out of the rigid mould of his fundamentalist background. His confrontation or serious differences with Carl McIntire of the American Council of Christian Churches[104] had the effect, first, of asserting his independence and second, of aligning him with the elaborators, the evangelicals, and with their attempts to present a Christianity in contemporary social and cultural context. Schaeffer never renounced his allegiance to fundamentalism though he detached himself from some of its

leaders and their excesses. Had he not done this his wider ministry would not have developed at all. Yet Schaeffer has at all times to be seen as belonging to the conservative side of the theological spectrum. He made this decision early in his ministry, and, as Linette Martin remarked of him, "Scratch Schaeffer and you would find a Germantown fundamentalist. It was his strength".[105]

The diagram suggests that whereas there might, conceivably, be some intellectual traffic between evangelicals and neo-orthodoxy, there never could be any traffic at all between fundamentalists and neo-orthodoxy. This was also Schaeffer's standpoint in theology. Barthian teaching was to be resisted and spoken against.[106] Yet Barth was not to be held in contempt or made the object of personal enmity. Evangelicals like Edward J. Carnell and Bernard Ramm might find it possible to discuss neo-orthodoxy without pronouncing prior anathemas on it, but Schaeffer, being less the academic and more the preacher, felt it his duty to denounce it from the start as a "more modern and more subtle deviation from the biblical faith".[107]

Schaeffer's identification with the group Dennis calls the recoverers (fundamentalists) accounts for his motivation to protest against the growing apostasy of the Church. The central concern of fundamentalists had, from the start of the movement, been the defence of the Bible as the Word of God and its inerrancy as a Divine revelation. Schaeffer's links with evangelicals in a wider circle enabled him to express those cultural concerns that were--on the whole--ignored by fundamentalist preachers and writers. His perceptions of decline therefore went beyond those of

American fundamentalism, since the latter saw the shift mainly as a rejection of the Bible as God's Word. It is accurate to say that Schaeffer's further insights led him to probe into (a) The intellectual antecedents to be sought in the history of philosophy and in religion; and (b) the moral consequences, not only for the Church, but for the entire Western society built on Christian foundations. This included his enquiry into the decline in music and the arts. Schaeffer was articulate about trends that fundamentalism had either ignored or had detected in embryo without exploring their full social and ethical implications.

Schaeffer's central statement, with which this chapter is concerned, is seen to be wider-ranging and more significant than the concept of decline would at first suggest. It traverses the intellectual territory from the time of the Renaissance to the twentieth century, and it touches on the major activities of Western man.

CHAPTER 2

Schaeffer and Contemporary Theological Thought

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the theological climate of the 1960s and 1970s in the context of Francis Schaeffer's perceptions of it. His books, having all been published between 1968 and 1984, (the year of his death) therefore make the second half of the twentieth century a major area of interest. Inevitably it leads to Karl Barth as the most representative theological thinker of the present century and to what Schaeffer loosely calls "the new theology".[1]

It is, however, essential to follow's Schaeffer's reasoning concerning the decline of historic Christianity before the advent of Barth. Schaeffer does not regard Barth as in any sense an original culprit; rather, he sees him as a catalyst in a theological climate that had been thoroughly prepared by others for new ways of thinking. Philosophic rationalism had made a major contribution by its rejection of everything miraculous.[2] Schaeffer contends that theology has followed this line closely by its acceptance of natural theology, which he ascribes to "the old liberal theologians in Germany (who) began by accepting the presupposition of the uniformity of natural causes in a closed system".[3] Schaeffer uses the term "old liberalism" therefore, to denote, chiefly, naturalistic theology such as it was in America when the great Fundamentalist-Modernist controversy began in the early part of the twentieth century. The "new theology", on the other hand, Schaeffer holds, comes

later, when the basic issue is the shift in epistemology. While, indeed, this position rests on a "liberal" view of Scripture, "yet in the new theology the real issue is now not only their view of Scripture but their divided view of truth".[4] This is the basis of Schaeffer's adoption of the term "new theology". The role played by Karl Barth in bringing about a wide acceptance of this new theology is an important sub-topic in Schaeffer's general argument.

Thus, for Schaeffer the so-called "older form of liberalism" was replaced by the neo-orthodoxy of Barth, concerning which Schaeffer writes:

> It was not so much neo-orthodoxy which destroyed the older liberalism, even though Karl Barth's teaching may have been the final earthquake which shook down the tottering edifice; rather, it had already been destroyed from within.[5]

Indeed, Schaeffer contends that had Barth arrived on the scene fifty years earlier than he did, few would have paid much attention to him, because the intellectual groundwork for his theology was then still incomplete. The climate of the 1870s, both in Europe and America, was vastly different from that of the new era that began in 1919,[6] shortly after Barth's theological bombshell, his Epistle to the Romans, burst upon the intellectual world.[7]

From the new theology's point of view Schaeffer may have been right in his assessment of the timeliness of Barth's rise to prominence. During the 1930s successive volumes of Barth's Church Dogmatics[8] appeared, and for the next forty years he remained the dominant theological force of the present century. His leading role as an exponent of neo-orthodoxy is overwhelmingly representative of contemporary

theology. This fact made Schaeffer's attack on Barthianism the equivalent of his resistance to all "modern theology" which is basically existentialist in nature. He writes:

> Karl Barth opened the door to the existentialist leap in theology. . . . He has been followed by many more, men like Reinhold Niebuhr, Paul Tillich, Bishop John Robinson, Alan Richardson and all the new theologians. They may differ in details, but their struggle is the same--it is the struggle of modern man who has given up a unified field of knowledge. . . . (the theologians) separated religious truth from contact with science on the one hand and history on the other.[9]

Schaeffer's method of combating the influence of Barth has been described by his wife Edith in her account of their labours among small groups of lay people in Switzerland during the years before the L'Abri community was established.[10] In his books he makes no systematic attempt to analyse Barth's thought as a whole. His interest lies in showing how, in Barth, the new theology has emerged as dominant, and that Barth's view of scripture is based on existentialist understanding of truth.[11]

This chapter considers the following:

(1) Schaeffer's view of the intellectual ancestry of modern theology.

(2) Schaeffer's position on Scripture and his conflict with modern theology.

(3) Karl Barth's teaching on revelation and on Scripture, in relation to Schaeffer's thought.

The clear disparities between Schaeffer's and Barth's positions must then be seen as evidence of the existing "gulf" which, according to Schaeffer, is "fixed" both in philosophy and theology.[12]

I. Schaeffer's View of the Intellectual Ancestry of Modern Theology

For Schaeffer man's thought is the key to his action. History and culture, he says, have a flow and "this flow is rooted and has its wellspring in the thoughts of people".[13] Philosophy, therefore, is important, for where it retreats there is moral decline. For Schaeffer, ideas are seminal and their consequences are clearly discernible in history.[14]

We have noted (p. 13) Schaeffer's criticism of Thomas Aquinas for insisting on man's intellectual autonomy[15] and denying a unity between nature and grace. While this serves as a starting point for Schaeffer it goes no further to describe the contribution of Scholasticism as marking the high intellectual and theological achievement of the Middle Ages.[16] In any event, this is not his primary purpose, which is principally to mention the influence of Aristotle on Aquinas[17] which, Schaeffer says, resulted in the reintroduction of ancient non-Christian philosophy.

In his survey of "key moments in history which have formed our present culture",[18] Schaeffer moves from the Middle Ages, through the Reformation (1517 onwards) to the post-Reformation era where Rationalism began a heavy onslaught on historic Christianity. Rationalism is closely associated with the Enlightenment which, in its theological aspect reached a final stage where it placed reason--seen more as a rule of thumb logic[19]--on the throne of judgment, insisting that every Christian doctrine be subjected to its scrutiny. Whatever was judged to be rational could be retained as valid. In the course of this judgment doctrines

such as the divinity of Christ, original sin, miracles, forgiveness and sacraments were put aside, sometimes out of condescension but often because of a genuine feeling of puzzlement. They were rejected in the sober assertion that, since they fell short of the new canons of truth as determined by Rationalism, they could not be true.[20]

The body of doctrine known as the teachings of Jesus came under the scrutiny of Rationalism. Obscurities supposedly due to Rabbinism or Greek philosophy had to be eliminated to make the gospels conform to the new canons. The search was soon on for the "historical" (real) Jesus, one to be distinguished from the Christological teachings of Paul and other apostles. Pauline theology, in particular, came under criticism for being alien to the spirit of a supposed simple Christianity in which the historical "Jesus" is separated from the apostolic "Christ". In a well-known chapter, and in a manner that Schaeffer would approve, J.G. Machen deals with this subject and with the desire of such as Adolph von Harnack to produce an uncomplicated religion.[21]

Earlier, the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century had had a decisive impact that deeply influenced the thought of the succeeding two centuries, and Schaeffer notes:

> The teachings of the Enlightenment became widespread in the various faculties of the German universities, and theological rationalism became an identifiable entity. . . . As the Renaissance had tried to synthesize Aristotle and Christianity and then Plato and Christianity, these men were attempting to synthesize the rationalism of the Enlightenment and Christianity. This attempt has often been called religious liberalism.[22]

Schaeffer charges four men with particular responsibility for having caused a breakdown in philosophy and science.

While he concedes that their relative importance is open to question he asserts that their combined influence had an enormous effect on Western culture, reaching even the man in the street.[23] These four men are Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Immanuel Kant, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel and Søren Kierkegaard; a Swiss Frenchman, two Germans and a Dane. To complete the picture, in our view, we shall add a note concerning Friedrich Schleiermacher.

1. The Pelagianism of Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778)

Schaeffer concentrates on Rousseau's concept of freedom as expounded in his best-known Ducontrat social ou Principes du droit politique[24] (The Social Contract). Barth, on the other hand, as we shall see, finds Rousseau's theology principally in his Confessions of Faith of a Vicar of Savoy. As to freedom, Schaeffer sees Rousseau as advocating freedom "from God or the Bible (and) freedom from any kind of restraint--freedom from culture, freedom from any authority, an absolute freedom of the individual--a freedom in which the individual is the center of the universe".[25]

Rousseau's belief in man's essential goodness and nobility made him view primitive man as superior to civilized man, yet vulnerable to the corruption of foreign ideas. Schaeffer points out the essential flaw in Rousseau's reasoning by showing that the French Revolution's Reign of Terror meant a drastic loss of freedom to many individuals. He exposes the contradiction in Rousseau's argument that the social compact tacitly includes the undertaking, which alone can give force to the rest, "that whoever refuses to obey the general will shall be compelled to do so by the whole body".[26]

By his detailed consideration of Rousseau, Barth puts him in the line of intellectual ancestors of modern theology, as much as Schaeffer does. He sees him as "not so much a critic and reformer of his time as its leader, its most eloquent tongue, its most perfect culmination".[27] Barth concludes decisively that from Rousseau onwards "and originating from Rousseau, the thing called theological rationalism in the full sense of the term, exists".[28]

Barth heavily underlines Rousseau's Pelagianism but is not satisfied with judgments made on him purely on this basis. While finding his theology chiefly in the Confessions he discovers a surprising depth of thought, dismissing any accusation that Rousseau's Pelagianism was mere lightness of conscience.[29]

What is evident in both Schaeffer and Barth, is a common recognition of Rousseau's place in the ancestral line of the theological mode of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In strong contrast to the depressing failure of Rousseau's personal and domestic life,[30] his writings[31] profoundly influenced events that overarch the centuries far beyond his time.

2. The Unconditional Faith in Reason of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804)

Schaeffer calls Kant the second of "the four crucial men who directed the shift from the older optimistic view of philosophy to the modern outlook where hope is lost".[32] In strong contrast to Rousseau, Kant has an "infinitely grave doctrine of the radical evil in man".[33] By his deep pessimism Kant shows himself to be in the ancestral line of modern theology; not only in this, but by his emphasis

on man's emergence from a self-inflicted state of minority to a state of maturity where the watchword is, "make use of your understanding".[34]

Kant has, both for himself and for what he demands from others, an almost unconditional faith in reason. Before his time the Enlightenment had proclaimed an absolute affirmation of reason. Kant employed it as the intellectual basis of his particular form of subjective idealism variously described in his famous works: Critique of Pure Reason (1781); Critique of Practical Reason (1788) and Critique of Judgement (1790).

Though he was not satisfied with his form of subjective idealism (so reminiscent of George Berkeley who said we cannot be sure the external world exists at all[35]) Kant could do nothing to stem the flow of its logical consequences. The first of these was that the objective value of knowledge had to be sacrificed. Phenomena, he taught, are in the last resort nothing but ideas and cannot exist at all beyond our minds. To be noted in passing is that this concept destroys, at a blow, the basis for traditional apologetics with its proofs for the existence of God. Since God cannot be presented to the mind in sense terms, within Kant's meaning of the word "God" there can be no such thing as knowledge of him.

Schaeffer presents Kant as making an attempt to keep the noumenal and phenomenal worlds together; that is, to maintain a unity between concepts of meaning and value and an objective world that can be weighed and measured by scientific means. For Kant, however, the world of concepts remained in what Schaeffer calls the "upper storey" of a

diagram he sketches as follows:[36]

NOUMENAL WORLD - the concepts of meaning and value

PHENOMENAL WORLD - the world that can be weighed and measured, the external world, the world of science

Schaeffer says that despite his efforts Kant failed to produce a unity. "There was no way, beginning from man alone, to bring the noumenal and phenomenal worlds together".[37] With Kant's thought, says Schaeffer, "the hope of a unified knowledge was on the threshold of splitting into two parts, neither having a relationship with the other. The humanist dilemma . . . of individual things versus meaning and value, was now ready to explode".[38]

While Schaeffer's interest in Kant is directly related to Kant's philosophy he says very little that relates to Kant's influence on theology. In this area Barth has more to say about Kant. Barth--himself so insistent on a genuine Christology--reminds us that to the best of his knowledge the name of Jesus Christ never flowed from Kant's pen, and that he found ways of avoiding it in numerous quotations from the Bible, substituting phrases like "teacher of the Gospel", "founder of the Church" or "ambassador of God".[39] In the same vein Mackintosh remarks that Kant could not see the inevitable correspondence between our adoption of right and good as supreme, and our deeper awareness of hopeless inward guilt. He writes: "That is why Kant has nothing to say concerning the Mediatorship of Christ. In the ultimate sense one who is prepared to take charge of his own moral life needs no mediator".[40]

Seen as a total philosophical system, Kantianism has been weakened by the passage of time. His status as a giant among intellectuals is, however, unimpaired. Two aspects of

his teaching survive in the thinking of his successors among a limited number of modern theologians. These are the importance of subjectivism and an emphasis on the role of reason.

3. The Philosophy of Self-confidence of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831)[41]

Hegel is the third of Schaeffer's four selected men whom he charges with having changed the modern world's intellectual patterns. In him we are taken almost thirty years deeper into the nineteenth century's thought world than Kant. Of Hegel's extensive philosophic writings the following four works rank as the most important: The Phenomenology of Mind (1807); Science of Logic (1812-16); Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences (1817), and Philosophy of Right (1821).

Schaeffer says of Hegel that "he struggled with (the need for a unity between the noumenal and phenomenal worlds) in a complex series of religious concepts, but left us in reality only a flow of religious words".[42] It is to Hegel, however, that Schaeffer pays very particular attention, attributing to him, along with Kant, the responsibility of having been the doorway to modern man as a thinking phenomenon.[43] Addressing the lay mind, Schaeffer explains Hegel:

> What Hegel changed was something more profound than merely one philosophic answer for another. He changed the rules of the game in two areas: epistemology, the theory of knowledge and the limits and validity of knowledge; and methodology, the method by which we approach the question of truth and knowing.
>
> What he said was this. Let us no longer think in

> terms of antithesis. Let us think rather in terms of thesis-antithesis, with the answer always being synthesis. In doing so he changed the world.[44]

Schaeffer recoils from this method of reaching truth in the very beginning of his first work.[45] He sees Hegel as playing a revolutionary role in the area of epistemology which, when applied to theology becomes, for Schaeffer, a major disaster. No less catastrophic is its application to ethics in family life, as Schaeffer writes:

> The reason Christians do not understand their children is because their children do not think any longer in the same framework in which their parents think. It is not merely that they come out with different answers. The methodology has changed.[46]

As Schaeffer perceives it, Hegel's teaching arrived at the precise moment in history to ensure its maximum effect.[47] Barth has a similar view of the timeliness of Hegel's philosophy of self-confidence. He writes:

> It was because it at once postulated and affirmed this principle (self-confidence) which this age in particular found to the highest degree comprehensible, that it seemed so suited to its time, that it was so much a fulfilment in relation to what the whole century felt as a promise within itself.[48]

Although Barth points out that Hegel, within his own lifetime, experienced a partial eclipse of his teaching in academic circles, so that Barth writes, "pure Hegelians became a species as rare as the ibex and were close to being figures of fun"[49] he nevertheless takes him seriously. Schaeffer insists: "If one understands the development of

philosophy, or morals, or political thought from that day to this, one knows that Hegel and synthesis have won".[50]

It comes as something of a surprise to read of Schaeffer's heavy emphasis on Hegel as the philosopher reponsible for opening the door into the "line of despair"[51] --Schaeffer's characteristic phrase. Hegel is clearly essential to his case. Schaeffer concedes that Hegel had not himself gone "below the line"; indeed Schaeffer notes that a good case can be made for thinking "that he remained an idealist (since) he thought that in practice synthesis could be arrived at by reason. But this did not prove possible".[52] On this basis Schaeffer regards Hegel as the first man to open the door into the line of despair, while Kierkegaard (later considered) is the actual pioneer of both secular and religious existentialism.[53]

Schaeffer's concern with Hegelian thinking is that he believes it to be a factor in modern thinking; he does not view it merely as an historical manifestation. It is, for him, a present threat, as can be seen from his arguments against the concept of synthesis found both in The God Who is There and Escape from Reason.[54]

By way of comparison, Barth (while giving full weight to Hegel) is less concerned with his continuing influence. Yet he makes it clear that Hegel cannot be ignored, and says: "Quite apart from the intrinsic weight of the thought Hegel represents it is impossible to pass him by, simply because we cannot pass by that modern man. We must not be led astray by the fact that modern man became unfaithful to Hegel".[55] Indeed, Barth goes further and asserts that while modern man may ostensibly have turned from Hegel, he actually means

what Hegel meant.[56] In this last statement some insight is gained into the reason for Schaeffer's constant interest in Hegel.

It is beyond this chapter's purpose to reach conclusions about the validity or otherwise of Hegelianism; its complexities being too numerous. It is sufficient that we take note of the seriousness with which Schaeffer selects a dominant principle from Hegel as the basis for a massive protest against the moderns. By contrast Barth treats Hegel in a more broadly-considered fashion, expressing himself as content "to understand him as the man he was: as a great problem and a great disappointment, but perhaps also a great promise".[57]

Mackintosh usefully reminds us that Hegel's sympathies lay with Hellenism; that in contrast with the Hebrew prophets for whom God was the great, free, creative Person, Hegel valued the speculative rationalism and metaphysical experimentation so eagerly espoused by the Enlightenment.[58] Schaeffer's explanation of Hegel to his lay readers is simpler but effectually in harmony with this comment.

4. A Note about the Father of Modern Theology, Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834)

Before this chapter considers the last of Schaeffer's four men who directed the shift in modern thinking[59], namely Kierkegaard, it is appropriate to take note of the thinking of Schleiermacher. Schaeffer omits him without explanation from the list of ancestors of modern theologians, yet his place among them is assured.

The two cardinal questions discussed by Schleiermacher in his theological works are: What is Religion? and What is

Christianity? These are dealt with in his famous Addresses (1799) and his great dogmatic work The Christian Faith (1821). Schleiermacher's principal ethical concept is that man's highest responsibility lies in shaping the self into an individual. In his Monologues he writes:

> Each man is meant to represent humanity in his own way, combining its elements uniquely. . . This thought alone has uplifted me, and set me apart from everything common and untransformed in my surroundings; it has made me an elect creation of the Godhead, rejoicing in a unique form and character.[60]

A warm-hearted and passionately religious man, Schleiermacher seemed to engage in a life-long struggle between inherited Christian belief (in his case, Pietism) and tendencies to Pantheism.[61] Like Hegel, though for different reasons, he failed to understand Jesus other than as a rootless person severed from the pre-incarnate Old Testament Christ. Barth sums up a discussion on this particular aspect by saying of him: "For Schleiermacher . . . the historical element in religion, the objective motif, the Lord Jesus, is a problem child".[62]

Schleiermacher's is, above all, the theology of feeling. He expounded the Romantic or emotional view of religion and its place in life in the face of a supposedly enlightened and sceptical audience. Hence the title of his famous work: Addresses on Religion to its Cultured Despisers.[63]

Any deviation from historical fact, such as Schaeffer frowns upon in his constant refrain about "space-time" events[64], was unacceptable to Schaeffer. Thus, although Schaeffer would be likely to admire the devotional spirit

of Schleiermacher he could never approve any ambivalence towards Scripture or history, or tolerate Schleiermacher's seemingly truncated view of Messiah and his romanticised picture of Jesus. Taken as a whole these tendencies in Schleiermacher would mean, for Schaeffer, a negation of the Reformation theology he strongly endorsed.

The fact that some of these concepts survive in aspects of modern theology shows that the man who was called Der Kirchenvater des 19. Jahrhunderts cannot be ignored. If there is a discernible line from Hegel to the moderns, as Schaeffer insists, then there is an even more prominent line of descent from Schleiermacher to our time.

5. How Schaeffer sees the Theology of Paradox of Søren Kierkegaard (1813-1855)

Kierkegaard, Danish philosopher and author of more than twenty books, remained virtually unknown outside his native country until his works began to appear in translation in the early part of the twentieth century. Schaeffer selects him as probably the most important influence on modern theology prior to Barth. Some of the most disturbing Christian literature of our age comes from him. As William C. Fletcher remarks: "(He) uncovers paradoxical insights nobody before him had even dreamed existed".[65]

For Kierkegaard, reality was own experience, brought to pass and realised through the inner decisions of the individual. Scholars studying Kierkegaard's ideas find it necessary to begin with his personality as a guide towards the meaning of the term "existential".[66]

Two basic presuppositions from him are to be noted:

(i) Spiritual inwardness or subjectivity, by which is meant the apprehension of divine truth through "passion", as Emil Brunner also describes it.[67]

(ii) Kierkegaard's deep distrust of Hegelianism. Karl Heim has remarked that Kierkegaard's new apprehension of the problem of God dates from the moment when--in conflict with Hegelian philosophy -- , he "rediscovered the way back from abstract thought to the actually existing reality".[68]

Schaeffer mentions three of Kierkegaard's philosophical works in particular: Either/Or (1843), Philosophical Fragments (1844) and The Concluding Unscientific Postscript (1846). He says there will be a continuing discussion among scholars "as to whether the secular and religious thinkers who built on Kierkegaard did him justice".[69] He considers that what can be called secular and religious Kierkegaardianism brought to full tide the notion that reason will always lead to pessimism, and that one must try to find optimistic answers in regard to meaning and value on an "upper level" outside of reason. That is, through a "leap of faith" one must try to find meaning without reason.[70]


Kierkegaard's rejection of Hegel's higher synthesis idea did not prevent him from developing his own qualitative dialectic where absolute distinctions such as holiness and love, grace and responsibility, time and eternity, gave rise to his theology of paradox where antimony rules.

Schaeffer's major objection to Kierkegaard is to the existentialism illustrated in Kierkegaard's "leap of despair" which is introduced in Stages in the Way of Life (1845).[71] Using for his model Abraham in his dilemma over the commanded slaying of his son Isaac, Kierkegaard builds his case for

a definition of faith in terms of despair. It is not possible to eliminate the paradox from Christian faith, and Kierkegaard writes:

> Christianity has declared itself to be the eternal essential truth which has come into being in time. It has proclaimed itself as the paradox, and it has required of the individual the inwardness of faith in relation to that which stamps itself as an offence to the Jews and a stumbling block to the Greeks -- an absurdity to the understanding.[72]

For Schaeffer, Kierkegaard is the father of modern secular as well as religious thinking, which he illustrates diagrammatically as follows:[73]




Schaeffer asks:

> Why is it that Kierkegaard can so aptly be thought of as the father of both? What proposition did he add to Hegel's thought that made the difference? Kierkegaard came to the conclusion that you could not arrive at synthesis by reason. Instead, you achieved everything of real importance by a leap of faith.[74]

In discussion Schaeffer seems willing to raise questions about the genuineness of Kierkegaard's Christian faith; whether in fact he was "a real Christian".[75] He believes Kierkegaard's "leap of faith" concept to mean the discarding

of rational thought in attempting to achieve knowledge of truth. The result, for modern philosophy, says Schaeffer, is a consensus that radically denies the possibility of a unity of truth; and this, he thinks, connects Kierkegaard to Barth in particular. He therefore extends the diagram of our previous page (54) to look like this:[76]



Schaeffer may well be thought to be over-simplifying Kierkegaard's position; a criticism that might apply equally to his treatment of Barth (later discussed).

For Kierkegaard, God's qualitative absolutes preclude the possibility of close, positive relations with him. Man's inner subjectivity, he argues, is dominated by God's absoluteness.[77] Thus God is the absolutely Unknown, the unqualified Being--terms resembling those of pantheistic mysticism and far removed from the evangelical understanding of "the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ".[78] This is clearly an important criticism of Kierkegaard since it is plainly not the only interpretation that Christians have of the matter that corresponds to an authentic faith. It is basic to all theology that God is unfathomable. That is one thing. It is quite another to assert that He is "absolutely Unknown", because this is a denial of the revelation of God through the prophets and supremely in

the person of our Lord Jesus Christ.[79] Nor can the idea of "absolutely Unknown" as Kierkegaard has it be justified by an appeal to the Hebrew prophets, since the resemblance is wholly superficial.

In contrast to Kierkegaard's idea of God, the Christian affirms that God is far beyond being a mere regulator of life. He is a living, acting, knowable Being. Hence Schaeffer's insistence on a God "who is there". The paradox that seemingly escapes Kierkegaard is that man is both unlike God and yet like him, thereby contradicting his own theory of a dualism between them. This dualism, in the mind of Kierkegaard, takes on an aspect of obscurity. It is also sinister in the extreme. There is in it no ray of hope or of light. We hear Kierkegaard say (through his "Judge William" in Either/Or):

> I am the humbled man, conscious of my guilt; I have only one expression for what I suffer, guilt; one expression for my pain, repentance; one hope before my eyes, forgiveness, and I find this difficult . . . I have only one prayer, I would cast myself upon the ground and implore of the eternal Power that guides the world . . . that sooner or later it might be granted me to repent.[80]

When Kierkegaard discovers that human nature and sin are one and the same, the gloom deepens. This may partly account for Schaeffer's query as to whether Kierkegaard, the man of deepest melancholy, was in fact the possessor of assurance of the saving grace of God in Christ.[81]

Having now considered Schaeffer's views on the ancestors of modern theology, this chapter returns to a consideration of Schaeffer himself. In particular it concerns itself

with his opposition to modern theology and to Karl Barth.

II. Schaeffer's Position on Scripture and his Conflict with Modern Theology

Schaeffer sees himself, through his books and lectures, as a defender of "biblical Christianity". Similar phrases, such as "historical biblical Christianity", "the biblical system", "a serious view of the Bible" and "biblical faith" are generously interlaced throughout Schaeffer's works.[82] Even the most cursory perusal of the titles in L'Abri's tape cassette library will show his concentration on the problem of a departure from biblical Christianity. Thus, for him, apologetics is "the defence of biblical Christianity".[83]

By seeking to defend "historical biblical" Christianity Schaeffer adds what is for him an important dimension, namely to preserve and defend the substance of the Church's teaching concerning Scripture itself through the centuries. The importance of history for Schaeffer has already been noted. The L'Abri discussions and lectures (as reflected in tape cassettes) abound with this emphasis.

Schaeffer's range of interest in the Bible must not be seen as narrowly biblicist in a pejorative sense. It denotes that while some felt free to look at Scripture from a critical vantage point, he always felt himself to be standing on Scripture, from which platform he observed all else from philosophy to culture in all its forms.[84]

Under this section four main divisions make up the enquiry into Schaeffer's position on Scripture.

(i) How Schaeffer views the Bible and its role in the world and the Church.

(ii) How Schaeffer interacted with Fundamentalism and the debate on inerrancy of Scripture.

(iii) Some representative views among leaders of Fundamentalism in Schaeffer's time.

(iv) The influence of J. Gresham Machen and distinctions between him and later fundamentalist trends.

1. How Schaeffer views the Bible and its Role in the Church

Schaeffer sees the Bible as a God-breathed book, inerrant and having absolute authority. He believes that this was substantially the position both before and after the Reformation, and that evangelicals today "are facing a watershed concerning the nature of biblical inspiration and authority".[85] In asserting that the problem of full biblical authority is of fairly recent origin, Schaeffer goes on to say:

> Up until the last two hundred years or so virtually every Christian believed in the complete inerrancy of the Bible . . . The problem with the pre-Reformation mediaeval church was not so much that it not hold to a belief in an inerrant Bible as that it allowed the whole range of non-biblical ideas and superstitions to grow up within the church. These ideas were then placed alongside the Bible and even over the Bible, so that the Bible's authority and teaching were subordinated to nonbiblical teachings.[86]

Significantly, towards the end of his life Schaeffer's stance on the Bible was even more explicit than it was in earlier years. During the final years of his ministry Schaeffer aligned himself with those who called themselves "Bible-believing" Christians[87] and his last book[88] describes the rejection of full biblical inspiration as a watershed of the evangelical world.

While the L'Abri tape cassette library contains many tapes on biblical topics, its catalogue lists five tapes on The Bible, Its Nature and Approach, dealing specifically with the problems of those who deny the validity of the Bible's self-authentication. The titles are of interest:

> The archaeological problem of Albright.
> The literary problem of E. Auerbach.
> The technical or statistical problem.
> The legal problem, dealing with the use of the Higher Critical method in a plagiarism case against H.G. Wells.
> The problem of religious authority, inspiration, and the claims of Jesus.[89]

Initially in examining The God Who is There this biblical stance is not obvious, chiefly because Schaeffer begins with philosophy and its deviation from truth. Yet when the Bible once comes under discussion, the position he takes among the inerrancy advocates is clear. This is shown by an introduction to his tapes, by Richard W. Cook of Sound Word Associates who describes Schaeffer's position in emphatic terms:

> Some have supposed that L'Abri is 'only for the intellectuals'. This has never been the case. A wide range of people visited Greatham L'Abri and the other L'Abri centres. Three things flow out of this: (1) Because the Bible is authored by God it is completely reliable and free of mistakes in whatever it says, whether in the area of theology, morals, history or science. The Bible is both objective and demonstrable truth . . .
> (2) The truths found in the Bible are relevant to all human experience. The Bible speaks to every area of human activity and cannot be limited to what twentieth century man calls 'religion' . . .

> (3) Because the Bible is objectively true, it is there for all types of people, so there is the possibility of speaking both to those who have had considerable exposure to the thinking of our day, . . . and also to those who have had little.[90]

2. How Schaeffer interacted with fundamentalism and the debate on inerrancy of Scripture

In his book Battle for the Bible (1976) Harold Lindsell approvingly quotes Schaeffer as saying:

> Those who first give up biblical inerrancy may have a warm evangelical background and real personal relationships with the Lord . . . they can 'live theologically' on the basis of their limited-errancy viewpoint. But what happens when the next generation tries to build on that foundation?[91]

Neither Lindsell nor Schaeffer takes the position (a) that belief in inerrancy guarantees church purity; nor (b) that it is an automatic inoculation against heresy; nor (c) that non-belief in inerrancy destroys personal faith in Jesus Christ. In the context of the debate this last point is more important than it may seem and sheds light on the tone, if not the content, of Schaeffer's apologetics.

It is important for us to know what kind of Christianity Schaeffer taught. Simply to say that it was "biblical Christianity" is not enough. Even to say that it was Christianity based on a faultless Bible--however true this might be as a description--is also not enough. The terms "fundamentalism" and "evangelicalism" within which Schaeffer exercised his apologetics, need to be looked at more closely in order to give clearer definition to the kind of Christianity Schaeffer practised and taught.

For the purpose of this section we shall use the terms

fundamentalism (as used mostly in America) and evangelicalism (more common in Britain) as practical and demonstrable equivalents despite many nuances of difference, some of which are described later in this thesis. In any event, the real debate between neo-orthodoxy and evangelicalism involves both abovementioned groupings.

James Barr[92] takes the provocative position that the core of fundamentalism resides, not so much in the Bible as in a particular kind of personal religion. This religious tradition, he feels, controls the interpretation of the Bible in fundamentalist circles. Barr considers that among the fundamentalists the kind of religious experience characteristic of the evangelical revivals of past centuries[93] is a basic requirement. He argues that two principal elements are to be identified in evangelical practice and belief: (a) A clear distinction is always made between nominal and true Christians; and (b) there is an insistence on the maintenance of right doctrine. These two elements are part of Barr's general criticism, but they would meet with Schaeffer's approval. A departure from truth, for Schaeffer, meant in the first instance not a deviant Christology or Soteriology, but a departure from the Bible itself as the objective standard of all true doctrine.[94]

On the above basis, among fundamentalists, belief in the Bible becomes in itself a doctrine which, though it has no place in the historic creeds, is regarded by fundamentalists as of first importance in interpreting them.

The Bible, for fundamentalists and for Schaeffer, is more than the source of truth. It is part of the Christian religion itself, a central focus of religious faith and

expression. From its centre the radial lines spread outwards into life and thought and conduct at every level. Schaeffer's emphatic conviction, voiced after his conversion, was that the Bible was worthy of complete trust because it had within its pages all the answers.[95] For Barr, this is consistent with fundamentalism and he says: "If you have the Bible, you have the earthly essence of the Church. Though all other forms of Christianity also have the Bible, its symbolic function within fundamentalism is different".[96]

This remark is part of Barr's polemic, but he goes a good deal further in saying:

> The Bible in fundamentalism is comparable to the Virgin Mary in Roman Catholicism; it is the human visible symbol involved in salvation; as she through the immaculate conception is free from the contagion of human imperfection, so it has a kind of perfection and sublimity that makes it sacrilegious for us to criticise its seamless fabric.[97]

Though this is a plausible comparison it would naturally be offensive to Schaeffer's Protestant position. Yet it seems entirely probable that, for some at least within the fold of fundamentalism, the "seamless fabric" of divine truth in the Bible can become a human and visible symbol of salvation. As for the rest of the comparison most evangelicals--and Schaeffer among them--would regard it as something of a caricature.[98]

Schaeffer's conversion does not conform to the alleged pattern of nineteenth century revivalism as sketched by Barr. It contradicts Barr's assertion that a certain kind of religious experience is the controlling factor in interpreting the Bible. If Schaeffer's account of the event is

soberly correct; if he is not rationalising his religious experience, then his response to the truth was not emotional but somewhat clinically rational. That element of rationality is prominent in his subsequent approach to theology.[99]

In common with others in the inerrancy school of thought, Schaeffer regarded the infallibility of the Bible as the constant principle of rationality within evangelicalism. Inerrancy was not a conclusion to be arrived at after exhaustive enquiry (though this is not excluded) but it is a starting point from which all judgments in religion and doctrine were made, including all ethics and theology. Any modern, subjective view of Scripture, writes Schaeffer,

> stands in sharp contrast to the historic view presented by Christ himself and the historic view of the Scripture in the Christian church, which is the Bible being objective, absolute truth . . . in all areas it touches upon.[100]

If it be asked on what objective basis inerrancy can be held, if not on the basis of external, scientific evidence, the answer lies in Scripture's self-authentication. The Bible, so the argument proceeds, is not only its own interpreter but its own witness to the truth. Such a view has not prevented evangelicals from presenting objective scientific evidence for the truth of the Bible, Schaeffer being among them[101], although this form of apologetics was not his major concern. Unlike Barth, however, he accepted the reality and the biblical affirmation of natural or general revelation.

A number of Schaeffer's defences of inerrancy are found in the L'Abri cassette tape library and their titles are indicative of Schaeffer's wide-ranging apologetics.[102]

3. Some representative views among fundamentalist leaders in Schaeffer's time

It is useful to note some views expressed among evangelicals within Schaeffer's milieu on the subject of inerrancy and the self-authentication of the Bible. These might be regarded as representative, the first being from Harold Lindsell whose book on the inerrancy debate was published (1976) while he was still editor of Christianity Today. Lindsell writes:

> The very nature of inspiration renders the Bible infallible, which means that it cannot deceive us. It is inerrant in that it is not false, mistaken or defective. Inspiration extends to all parts of the Word of God and it includes the guiding hand of the Holy Spirit even in the selection of the words of Scripture. Moreover, the Bible was written by human and divine agencies; that is, it was the product of God and chosen men. The authors of scripture retained their own styles of writing and the Holy Spirit, operating within this human context, so superintended the writing of the Word of God that the end product was God's. Just as Jesus had a human and a divine nature . . . so the written Word of God is a product that bears the marks of what is truly human and truly divine.[103]

Thus Lindsell states the position of a probable majority of inerrancy advocates. There are those who assert that this refers only to matters of faith and salvation but against this John Murray argues as follows:

> If human fallibility precludes an infallible Scripture, then by resistless logic it must be maintained that we cannot have any Scripture that is infallible and inerrant. All of Scripture comes to us through human instrumentality.

> If such instrumentality involves fallibility, then such fallibility must attach to the whole of Scripture. . . . If infallibility can attach to the 'spiritual truth' enunciated by the Biblical writers, then it is obvious that some extraordinary divine influence must have intervened and become so operative so as to prevent human fallibility from leaving its mark upon the truth expressed. If Divine influence could thus intrude itself at certain points, why should not the same preserving power exercise itself at every point in the writing of Scripture?[104]

Some would resist Murray by saying it is an argument from probabilities, but it is nevertheless representative of the inerrancy school of thought.

Thirdly, an important point is made by Edward John Carnell when, during the public discussion concerning the Bible's inerrancy in the 1960s he wrote:

> B.B. Warfield clearly perceived that a Christian has no more right to construct a doctrine of biblical authority out of deference to the (presumed) inductive difficulties in the Bible, than he has to construct a doctrine of salvation out of deference to the (actual) difficulties which arise whenever one tries to discover the hidden logic in such events as (a) the Son of God's assumption of human nature, or (b) the Son of God's offering up of his human nature as a vicarious atonement for sin. This means that whether we happen to like it or not, we are closed up to the teaching of the Bible for our information about all doctrines in the Christian faith, and this includes the doctrine of the Bible's view of itself. We are free to reject the doctrine of the Bible's view of itself, of course, but if we do so we are demolishing the procedure by which we determine the substance of any Christian doctrine.

> If we pick and choose what we prefer to believe, we merely exhibit once again the logical (and existing) fallacy of trying to have our cake and our penny, too.[105]

The 1970s were years during which Schaeffer enjoyed great prominence and his books were widely publicised. During this period the inerrancy debate reached an intense phase. Schaeffer, while avoiding public controversy in the matter was nevertheless a supporter of the organisation formed in Chicago on May 16, 1977 "for the purpose of defending the historic orthodox position concerning Scripture".[106] Schaeffer records that "there was no rush of the evangelical leadership to this cause".[107] His own involvement in the movement, however, makes it justifiable to place his views on the subject alongside those of other representative leaders within evangelical and fundamentalist circles.

Two phases of the fundamentalist-modernist conflict must now be considered. The earlier revolved around the leadership of J. Gresham Machen (d. 1937) while the second, dating from the mid-1950s, remains largely unresolved even in the 1980s. Both relate to American Protestantism.

4. <u>The influence of J. Gresham Machen on Schaeffer and developments in American Protestantism considered</u>

In order to place Schaeffer in historical context it is necessary to realise that he was during his lifetime the child of two similar, yet separated, environments. One is not now thinking of America and Europe (both of them spheres of his work) but of two periods of time. These are the 1930s on the one hand, and the 1950s to 1970s on

the other. The similarity is in their common preoccupation with the Bible, its inspiration and authority. The differences between them lie in the personalities involved and the tone, temper and intellectual level of the dispute. Yet the two periods are indissolubly joined; indeed, the second was the outflow of the first.

Schaeffer, ordained in the American Presbyterian Church, was confessedly Reformed in doctrine, "a man of the Reformation" in every respect concerning Scripture. He spoke of Calvin with favour, lauded the fruits of the Reformation in Western culture and cited the influence of early American Puritans. Furthermore, he constantly prayed for "Reformation revival" in his day.[108]

The importance of J. Gresham Machen and what he meant to Schaeffer is evident from the attention Schaeffer pays to him in several of his works. This interest persisted to the last months of Schaeffer's life. His final book[109] summarises the conflict of the 1930s ushered in by the acceptance of German higher criticism that eroded the authority of Scripture. Schaeffer regards this as the turning point of the century. He writes:

> By the 1930s liberalism had swept through most of the denominations and the battle was all but lost. Then in the mid-1930s, there occurred an event which I would say marks the turning point of the century concerning the breakdown of our culture. By 1936 the liberals were so in control of the Northern Presbyterian Church that they were able to defrock Dr. J. Gresham Machen. . . . Machen's defrocking and the resulting division of the Northern Presbyterian Church was front-page news in the secular news media in much of

> the country. (. . . in the 1930s religious events were still considered important enough to be front-page news).[110]

Schaeffer is quite emphatic that this event was the culmination of the drift within Protestantism in the United States, and that it laid the base "for the cultural, social, moral, legal and governmental changes from that time to the present".[111] He says that a good case can be made that the news about Machen was "the most significant U.S. news in the first half of the twentieth century".[112]

Whereas Schaeffer sees the Machen-Princeton controversy (which led ultimately to Machen's expulsion from the Presbyterian church) as the starting point of one protracted struggle, it had two phases. The second phase arose out of renewed controversy dating from about 1948--the year the World Council of Churches was established at a conference in Amsterdam. Both phases are part of a larger ongoing contention about evangelical truth confronted with various forms of assault on perceived Christian orthodoxy. While Schaeffer was still a seminary student during the first phase, therefore had no direct participation in it, he was deeply affected emotionally and intellectually by its issues. These provided him with settled theological convictions which, during the second phase of the conflict--the 1950s to 1970s--were put to the test.

While Machen was at Princeton Theological Seminary as a teacher (1906-1929) he eventually became an acknowledged primus inter pares of the Princeton Old School Calvinists. At the time, America had a number of defenders of the faith, men of erudition and deep insight such as C.W. Hodge and

B.B. Warfield.[113] Warfield's magnum opus, The Inspiration and Authority of the Bible[114] to this day is regarded as admirably representing the views of the Princeton School of thought. The intellectual quality of theological debate during this early period was of a high order, and J.I. Packer says of the developing clash: "Some of B.B. Warfield's polemical articles, and J.G. Machen's Christianity and Liberalism, crystallized the issues at stake in their broadest implications with a judicious mastery that cannot be too highly praised".[115]

Yet the uninhibited character of American liberalism in theology contributed to making the conflict a hard one, especially when fundamentalism itself responded in the same vein.

While Machen acknowledged that not all liberals went to the extreme of the theological spectrum he contended that the trend was a deduction from the nineteenth century view of religion as being a universal human phenomenon; an attempt to reconcile Christianity with the anti-supernatural axioms of nineteenth century science and philosophy. This led him to describe it as "having really relinquished everything distinctive of Christianity".[116]

Given the perspective of time one has to conclude, as evangelical scholar Ned. B. Stonehouse says, that most of the liberal-evangelical clash was a stress by evangelicals on historic Christianity--the Christianity come down to us in creeds and confessions, in historic debate and clarification. Stonehouse writes:

> Though many modern critics are blameworthy for failing to distinguish within fundamentalism

> between the solid core of Biblical Christianity and certain excrescences, fundamentalists have often contributed to the judgment that it is essentially a religious novelty. The emergence of new emphases and the lack of others, the presence at times of a zeal not according to knowledge and the frequent absence of historical perspective and the appreciation of scholarship, have influenced this evaluation. . . . Oftentimes pietistic and perfectionist vagaries have come to be accepted as the hallmark of fundamentalism. And a one-sided other-worldliness, often associated with a dogmatic commitment to a futuristic chiliasm, has come to be widely regarded as essential to fundamentalist orthodoxy.[117]

These observations provide some insight into the qualitative difference between the two phases of controversy that Schaeffer experienced regarding biblical inerrancy and fundamentalist issues. The earlier phase appears to be of first class intellectual quality. The second (to which Stonehouse refers) was marked by many blemishes: it was often intensely personal in its tone, often hostile, often anti-intellectual. Indeed, something that has not always been understood about Machen is that his main charge against the liberalism of his time was that it was anti-intellectual and unscientific.[118] Yet in Machen's day there was no lack of qualitative intellectual debate. The polemic had not degenerated--as it did later--into mere quarrels such as characterised the separationist movement among fundamentalists. Nor were hermeneutical differences as prominent in the earlier phase as in the later. Stonehouse made his comment about "a dogmatic commitment to a futuristic chiliasm" as a protest against futile arguments about

eschatology. The contention in Machen's day was not about dispensationalism, nor was this of any significance in Schaeffer's defence of biblical truth. Hermeneutical disputes came into the conflict later, and this is an important difference between the first and second phases mentioned.[119]

Machen disliked the term "fundamentalist". Stonehouse, in his biographical memoir of him, remarks that "judged by various criteria adopted by friend and foe, he was not a fundamentalist at all".[120] Norman F. Furniss, author of The Fundamentalist Controversy, called Machen "a strange bedfellow for most Fundamentalists"[121] by reason of his vigorously expressed belief in the rational superiority of evangelicalism over its modern rivals. In a time when it was thought that to maintain evangelical orthodoxy in the twentieth century was intellectually retrograde or even dishonest, Machen maintained that liberalism was really superficial, and, in his view, demonstrably so.[122]

The point of connection between Machen and Schaeffer lies precisely here. Machen regarded the anti-evangelical trend of his day as basically attributable to the radical anti-intellectual outlook of the twentieth century. He felt that the very quantity of books to read and facts to master with which the twentieth-century man is confronted "encourages him to think broadly and superficially about much, but hinders him from thinking deeply and thoroughly about anything".[123] Schaeffer's view of anti-intellectual trends is perhaps best expressed in his opposition to Kierkegaard's "leap of faith" concept, which Schaeffer sees as a flight from the rational into the irrational.[124] On this point he follows Machen's basic argument.

In rejecting the allegation that "conservatives" cling to certain beliefs merely because they are old, Machen writes: "On the contrary, we welcome new discoveries with all our hearts, and we believe that our cause will come to rights only when youth throws off its present intellectual lethargy" to recover some independence of mind.[125] In the belief that Christianity flourishes in the light rather than in darkness, Machen urged youth to turn from uncritical repetition of current phrases and concepts to a "genuine examination of the basis of life" precisely because "one of the means which the Spirit will use, we believe, is an awakening of the intellect".[126]

The introductory chapter of Machen's What is Faith? (1925) is an argument for the rational superiority of the evangelical position. Its principal contentions form a broad base upon which, later, Schaeffer built his argument for a rejection of existentialism and a return to rationality. The difference between Schaeffer and Machen was that each fought in the theological climate of his day, which in Schaeffer's case meant Barth and existentialism,[127] whereas Machen's opponents preceded the neo-orthodox theologians.

The two phases of the conflict in which Schaeffer was concerned, although both involved the Bible, differed in significant details. It seems obvious that there is no real point in opposing Karl Barth on the same basis as older evangelicals like Machen had opposed scientific rationalism. Would Machen's charge of anti-intellectualism have prevailed in the climate of neo-orthodoxy? Yet Machen made the charge against what Schaeffer termed "the older form of liberalism"[128] with some success, as evangelicals judged it.

The point has been established that Schaeffer's biblical and theological stance bears marks of Machen's influence. Schaeffer's understanding of Scripture may now be summarised. In its earliest stage it was simplistically based: the Bible had the solution to every problem.[129] In subsequent seminary years it was re-formulated by the Princeton Old Calvinist school (of which Machen was a leader) that made Schaeffer the "man of the Reformation"[130] he was. He emphasized all the historic doctrines of Protestantism while insisting on plenary, verbal inspiration of Scripture.[131] The Bible, for him, was inerrant and finally authoritative, not only in matters of faith but in its totality.[132] His defence of it followed traditional lines as shown in his insistence on the historicity of Genesis 1-11[133] and in his taped lectures on cosmology and related topics.[134] The encounter with neo-orthodoxy brought with it, not a change of view about the Bible, but an adjustment of his methodology in defence; there came a more philosophical approach in seeking to establish and defend the truth.[135] Thus Parkhurst says that, by 1982, when his Complete Works were being published, they show us "the full scope of his learning and why he was able to give the world a new respect for the words 'fundamentalist' and 'evangelical'".[136]

A new phase of Schaeffer's conflict came to him late in life. By 1980 the teachings of evangelicalism in the U.S.A. were, according to Parkhurst, in such disarray, and some of them so anti-biblical, that Schaeffer chose to be called a "Bible-believing Christian" and spoke about standing for "Bible-believing Christianity".[137]

The term "Bible-believing" was adopted by a considerable

segment of American Protestantism in the late 1970s, many of whom were soon identified as a New Christian Right political movement. Schaeffer was at one time embarrassed by a charge that he shared its political aims, but he denied any politicising of his ministry or change in his views.[138]

Schaeffer's biblicism is therefore also the key issue in his opposition to the neo-orthodoxy of Karl Barth.

III. Karl Barth's Teaching on Revelation and Scripture, in relation to Schaeffer's Thought

By common agreement among scholars, Barth achieved within his lifetime a theological turnabout "through an angle of 180 degrees".[139] Even the briefest description of his thought on revelation, and on Scripture--coming immediately after a study of Schaeffer's biblicism-- makes for an awareness of an enormous disparity and indicates the daunting task of reflecting, adequately, the immense range and depth of Barth's theological perceptions.

In the remainder of this chapter which outlines Barth's teaching the following topics are considered:

(1) What is Revelation?

(2) Barth's understanding of Revelation.

(3) Barth's teaching on the Word of God in its Threefold Form.

(4) Scripture as a Witness to Divine Revelation.

(5) Schaeffer's Opposition to Barth.

(6) Some Conclusions to be drawn.

The logical connection between revelation and Scripture means that revelation comes first in this consideration.

1. What is Revelation?

Historic Christianity has always regarded revelation as the unique glory of the Christian religion. In common terms it has a twofold meaning: (i) That general unveiling of God's power and majesty manifested in the objective, visible universe, to which all men--including unbelievers--have access, but which falls short of revealing the Triune God or His saving grace in Jesus Christ.[140] (ii) That special revelation of God's saving, redeeming purposes, and his acts in history recorded in the Scriptures demonstrated by his dealings with a chosen people, culminating in the incarnation, death and resurrection of His Son, Jesus Christ.[141]

Schaeffer took the Reformed position which rejected the dualism of the Scholastics and aimed at a synthesis of God's twofold revelation. Reformed teaching held that, in order to remedy man's spiritual blindness God did two things: He republished the truths of natural revelation, cleared them of any misconception and so incorporated them in his supernatural revelation of redemption.[142] To this he added a cure for man's blindness by his work of regeneration and spiritual illumination.

As to general or natural revelation, Barth dismisses it, along with its correlation, natural theology. Indeed, he wages a constant war on it. In a notable controversy with Emil Brunner on the subject of nature and grace[143] he dealt with it, as also in his Gifford Lectures: The Knowledge of God and the Service of God (1937-38).[144] Finally and more exhaustively he wrote on the topic in his Church Dogmatics.[145]

The general trend of Barth's reasoning is as follows:

(i) Man can know God only by faith as a result of an act of God's free grace and by his self-revelation in Jesus Christ and the power of the Holy Spirit. To this self-revelation Holy Scripture is a witness. Man cannot, could not, know this apart from that revelation.

(ii) Natural theology is excluded because it is incompatible with the sovereign grace of God in Jesus Christ. For Barth the Reformation truth of sola gratia is paramount, and Hartwell comments by saying:

> With Barth God's grace in Jesus Christ is the beginning of all the works of God ad extra, including even the creation of the universe and of man, and that man, as God's creature and reconciled with God in Jesus Christ, is represented by him as being in everything dependent on that grace, including his knowledge of God, the world and himself.[146]

2. Barth's Understanding of Revelation

Barth's concern is with the Christian understanding of revelation, which, for him, is unique and incomparable. For evangelical orthodoxy, indeed, special revelation is also unique and is wholly equated or identified with the Bible, its history and doctrines; whereas for Barth the meaning of revelation is by no means the same as it is for Schaeffer or evangelical orthodoxy. Thus Barth writes:

> The Bible is the concrete medium by which the Church recalls God's revelation in the past, is called to expect revelation in the future, and is thereby challenged, empowered, and guided to proclaim. The Bible is, therefore, not itself and in itself God's past revelation, just as Church proclamation also is not itself and in itself the expected future revelation. But the Bible speaking

> to us and heard by us as God's Word attests the past revelation. . . . By really attesting revelation the Bible is the Word of God. . . . The Bible, further, is not itself and in itself God's past revelation, but by becoming God's Word it attests God's past revelation and is God's past revelation in the form of attestation.[147]

Among the characteristic key-words we have "attest" and "become"--frequently recurring as Barth's definition proceeds. For Barth the term Word of God denotes that which is addressed to man and is the living God in His revelation. It is his action in coming to man; an action initiated, executed and completed by the sovereign free grace of God. Thus we look at Barth's concept of revelation through some of its facets as follows:

2.1 True revelation requires, as an integral part of it, that the revelation should actually reach the consciousness of man. It is not revelation unless this occurs. While it proceeds from God, initiated by him out of free grace, we cannot talk of it as separated from man's receiving of it. It cannot be considered merely as a kind of objective (external) unveiling of God. This conforms to Barth's rejection of general or natural revelation. To comprehend Barth at this point involves the element of subjectivity and helps towards a better grasp of Barth's concentration on God's revelation in Jesus Christ as the only revelation of ultimate significance for theology.[148]

2.2 The Christian revelation is a specific action of the Triune God. In essence it has taken place in Jesus Christ and still takes place in him. Barth says:

> Just as a man can have only one father, is born once and dies once, so he can only believe and

> know one revelation. . . . a revelation which is unique, taking place once for all, irrevocable and unrepeatable.[149]

Yet, though this happened once in the fulness of time, the revelation must continually happen afresh to individual persons, representing itself as an I-Thou relationship as the Spirit of God communicates with man; a personal revelation from God that cannot be initiated by man.[150]

2.3 Supremely, Jesus Christ is God's revelation because, in his existence, he is the reconciliation. Man may think he knows something about God, but this is only an idol in his own heart. The yawning gulf between man (the sinner) and God, is bridged by God stepping into sinful man's place. Thus, for Barth, reconciliation is revelation. An "utter interchange of parts between God and man" has taken place in Christ.[151] This exchange between God and man is the reconciliation, being simultaneously the justification, sanctification, forgiveness and regeneration to new life.

2.4 For Barth, the subject of revelation always remains God himself, while the event, however, occurs on earth. In the context of natural and historical events revelation takes shape. Therefore, Jesus Christ is a human fact that points to the presence of revelation and is a sign that revelation is there. Thus the words and deeds of Jesus are not themselves revelation and only become so as God makes them so. Not even the crucifixion and resurrection are in themselves revelation, but they may be instruments in God's hands by which he makes himself known. We, on our part, says Barth, cannot make a direct connection or

an identification between revelation and the Bible.

> Such direct identification of revelation and the Bible, which is the practical issue, is not one to be presupposed or anticipated by us. It takes place as an event, when and where the word of the Bible becomes God's Word, i.e. when and where the word of the Bible functions as the word of witnesss, when and where John's finger points not in vain but really pointedly, when and where by means of its word we also succeed in seeing and hearing what he saw and heard. Therefore, where the Word of God is an event, revelation and the Bible are one in fact, and word for word one at that.[152]

2.5 Revelation, says Barth, does not follow the Bible but it precedes it. Indeed, revelation "engenders the Bible that attests it, because Jesus Christ has called the Old and New Testaments into existence".[153] His argument is therefore to this effect: Holy Scripture is the document of a special listening to a special call; it is the document of a peculiar obedience to a special command; therefore it could become the canon, and therefore it "can become from time to time the movable canon, the publisher of revelation, God's call and behest, God's word to us".[154]

Amid much that is admittedly difficult and at times initially obscure in Barth's developing thought, he comes to conclusions, repeated in various ways, where we are enabled to recognise Barthian distinctives.

> According to all that has been said, revelation is originally and immediately what the Bible and Church proclamation are derivatively and mediately, God's Word. We said of Church proclamation, that from time to time it must become God's Word. And we said the same of the Bible, that it must from time to time become God's Word.[155]

By the phrase "from time to time" Barth is not referring to human experience (as if our being affected by an event, or our attitude towards it could make it God's word) but to the freedom of God's grace. In virtue of that freedom, as God chooses, the Bible and Church proclamation are God's word.

2.6 Every state of revelation, says Barth, must be thought of as a "process"; that is, as being conditioned by the very act of revelation. As to its content, "in fact it does not differ from Jesus Christ, and does not differ from the reconciliation that took place in Him". He writes:

> To say revelation is to say 'The Word became flesh'. Of course we may also claim to say by the word 'revelation' something different, something purely formal, and in that case relative as such. But then we are not asserting what the Bible means by this word, and therefore not the thing with which Church proclamation is concerned, if it is connected with the Bible, nor yet what in Christian dogmatics must be called revelation, if it claims to take itself seriously as dogmatics. But if we mean by the word 'revelation' 'the Word became flesh and dwelt among us", then we are asserting something that is to be grounded only within the Trinity; . . .[156]

2.7 Barth rejects any claim to revelation coming from the Roman Catholic Church's recognition of tradition as a source. The Church is at all times under the authority of Holy Scripture, namely the authority of the prophetic-apostolic (Old and New Testament) witness to Jesus Christ as Lord and Head of the Church. He alone is the source of all knowledge of truth in the Church. He writes:

> The witness of Holy Scripture is the witness of

> the Holy Spirit . . . By Him it became Holy Scripture; by Him and only by Him it speaks as such. In doing so it mediates revelation; it presents Jesus Christ; in the servant form of a human word it speaks the Word of God. Those who hear it, hear Him. Those who wish to hear Him must hear it.[157]

2.8 Revelation is an action of the Triune God--Father, Son and Holy Spirit. Barth's detailed teaching on the Trinity occupies a massive 220 pages of his Church Dogmatics (I.1. pp. 339-560) and forms the first part of his exposition of the doctrine of revelation. Hartwell (noting a similarity of approach to that of N. Berdyaev) summarises:

> In the Triune God the Father and the Son are united with one another through the Holy Spirit in a living communion of mutual love, and the eternal will of the Father is accepted, obeyed and executed by the Son in the power of the Holy Spirit. . . . God cannot only come to man in His Son Jesus Christ, He can also be in man through the Holy Spirit.[158]

So Barth designates the Father as Creator, the Son as Reconciler and the Holy Spirit as Redeemer, but insists that in creation and in reconciliation and redemption God is always at work in His three modes of being.

2.9 Two aspects of revelation, the objective and subjective, are separately dealt with by Barth, even though he regards them as one. These aspects, the external and internal, have been part of theological discussion for many years before Barth. Thus A.H. Strong records remarks by Morell: "The Bible cannot in strict accuracy of language be called a revelation, since a revelation always implies an

actual process of intelligence in a living mind".[159] For Barth there is a union between the objective and the subjective aspects, but Jesus Christ is the objective reality of the divine revelation, found not only in his incarnation but in His entire life and work culminating in His death and resurrection and ascension.

For Barth, Jesus Christ is the Son of God, a dominant thought in his theology. Under the heading Very God and Very Man, Barth devotes some forty pages of close exegesis to John 1:14.[160]

2.10 Faith, for Barth, is closely bound to experience. The Christian's experience is a sign of the reality of revelation. The believer's life is changed and moulded by this experience; but this is not directly perceptible to man. Rather, it is a reflex of his faith which in the first instance is bestowed by the Holy Spirit and thereby confirms him both in his faith and in the revelation that preceded it or evoked it. Experience, however, cannot bestow this confirmation, though Jesus Christ can employ it as a sign of confirmation.

In regard to Barth's idea of the character of faith as experience, some scholars discern a "striking change of tone" at this juncture.[161] Early passages in Barth suggest that when we savingly believe, it is not we who believe at all, but the Spirit in us. The later Barth, in Dogmatics, is clearer when he asserts the connection between experience and faith. "In faith men have an actual experience of the Word of God and (nothing) ought now to prevent us from taking this affirmation seriously, with all its consequences".[162] He says that experience is to be tested by

its relation to the believed Word of God. If God calls forth experience in us by His Word, and if we do not manufacture the experience ourselves, then alone can it be called right and true.

Barth is thus emphatic--in sketching the essential character of revelation--to show that it is God and God alone who acts to re-establish the broken relationship between Himself and man; and that, unless the revelation is apprehended as such a restorative action, it is not apprehended at all. This teaching from Barth offends human pride, but Barth insists that true thinking concerning revelation must give glory to God alone, since all depends on His sovereignty.

3. Barth on the Word of God in its Threefold Form.

When it is asked what Barth has in mind by the term the Word of God no simple answer is forthcoming.[163] It is difficult to find precision. For Barth the Word of God is not something to be objectively handled, observed or classified. It is, he holds, always an act of God, an event, a miracle in its own right; a particular event or act in which God speaks His word, either through the Bible or through the proclamation of His Word by the Church in Word or sacrament. If we think of this Word merely as an impartation of knowledge or information we miss the point. It is action, decision, reconciliation, forgiveness, a word of power that call us to obedience, yet it is a rational event. In the final analysis, as he notes repeatedly, the Word is the Lord Jesus Christ Himself.[164]

Yet even this outline of it is inadequate. The Word of God is shown in two main aspects, as follows:

(i) That which is found in the inner-trinitarian relations where God the Father speaks to His Son in the eternal mystery of His being.

(ii) The Word addressed by God to man in Jesus Christ, which unveils the meaning of grace, since God need not have spoken this at all. In this second aspect the Word of God, says Barth, appears in three forms: (a) As the proclaimed Word; (b) as the written Word; (c) as the revealed Word. Each of these must be looked at briefly.

Does the existence of three forms of the Word of God mean, in effect, three Words of God? No, says Barth, they are one but they have a mutual relationship which he describes as follows:

> The revealed Word of God we know only from the Scripture adopted by Church proclamation or from Church proclamation based on Scripture. The written Word of God we know only through the revelation which makes proclamation possible or through the proclamation made possible by revelation. The proclaimed Word of God we know only by knowing the revelation attested through Scripture or by knowing the Scripture which attests revelation.[165]

If neither the words of the Bible nor the words used by Church proclamation are in themselves the Word of God; and if we do not know the revealed Word of God apart from the witness of the Holy Spirit, then how do we come to know the Word of God?

An answer to this question involves some understanding of Barth's concept of subjectivism not to be considered in any detail now. In effect Barth teaches that since God Himself cannot be known directly, therefore we cannot know

the Word of God except indirectly, clothed "in the garments of creaturely reality".[166] Barth holds that whether we are talking of Holy Scripture, or Church proclamation or sacraments, "we do not possess the Word of God otherwise than in the mystery of its worldly form".[167] This means that God veils His Word in order to unveil it; the "worldly form" being an integral part of the Word which, with its divine content, has to be grasped "in their togetherness" to constitute the true Word of God. This grasp or knowledge is, however, accomplished solely in faith and therefore by grace.[168]

Barth is therefore not suggesting, by his use of the word Welthaftigkeit (worldly form) that the Word of God is itself transparent or self-evident. Far from it. Man as fallen is incapable of true knowledge of God; nor do his innate capacities help him. Grace from God and faith aided by the Holy Spirit are the essential prerequisites.

3.1 The Word of God as proclaimed, in Barth's thought.

Barth's elucidation is not immediately clear when he writes:

> Real proclamation . . . means the Word of God preached, and the Word of God preached means . . . man's language about God on the basis of an indication by God Himself fundamentally transcending all human causation, and so devoid of all human basis, merely occurring as a fact and requiring to be acknowledged.[169]

Reduced to simplicity this is saying that preaching is an event in which God is speaking through men. The Second Helvetic Confession (1566) says, "When this Word of God is now preached in the Church by preachers lawfully called, we

believe that the very Word of God is preached".[170] Barth's emphasis, however, lies on the concept of preaching as an "event", which is consistent with his use of the word in connection with revelation. Yet proclamation is more than this. The Word of God, according to Barth, "is the object which as such must be given to proclamation, in order that it may be real proclamation".[171] The Word is the commission under which proclamation is done. It is that which constitutes or makes a man's word to be the very Word of God; and God, only God, can make it to be such as He pleases.

Barth makes the further point that the Word of God is the judgment "in virtue of which proclamation can alone become real proclamation".[172] He elaborates:

> Proclamation as such, as it takes place in preaching and sacrament, presupposes that neither the nature of the object nor the situation or desire of the speaker are or can be so clear to any man as to put him in a position to make a judgment as to its truth. If there is a judgment at all of Church proclamation as such, it must be formed from a different point of view. We mean and signify precisely this fundamentally different point of view of the judgment upon proclamation as such when we acknowledge it to be the Word of God.[173]

3.2 The Written Word of God in Barth's Thought.

Barth's explanation is that the Church's message is spoken either by way of recollection of something in the past or in expectation of something in the future, or both. The ground of the expectation and the object of the recollection are, he says, obviously identical. He writes:

> We speak--hoping for what we cannot see, for what we cannot assume to be present--of a realised proclamation, of a Word of God proclaimed in the Church; on the basis that God's Word has already been spoken, that revelation has already taken place. We therefore speak in recollection.[174]

What is the meaning of this recollection of revelation that has already taken place? It includes the recollection that God has already spoken once for all in Jesus Christ in the incarnation (which is in history but not of it). The Church does not draw her message from her own submerged consciousness but speaks as the canonical Scriptures--witnessing to a unique event--prompt and guide her to do so. The Bible is thus the written Word of God in so far as it is a witness to the revelation in Jesus Christ.

As the written Word it is attested in Holy Scripture but not identical with it. Barth denies an identity between the words of the Bible as written or preached by the Church, with the Word of God. Indeed, by the action of God in unique revelation they may become so, and then are the Word of God in letter and in truth, as God pleases.[175]

Scripture is therefore neither the Church's creation nor her private possession. The Church, in Scripture, is being addressed. Mackintosh comments in connection with Barth:

> The Bible is the canon or rule of preaching for the definite reason that it imposes itself, as such, in virtue of its content. Thus we can say that the Bible is God's Word in so far as He speaks through it; and this He does--for the thing always is His act--when a portion of it lays hold of us in God's name and by the working of His Spirit. In that concrete happening it becomes God's Word to us . . . ever and again.[176]

When, as Barth expresses it, "the Bible has reached out to man (it) therefore becomes God's Word in this event".[177]

3.3 The Revealed Word of God in Barth's Thought.

Here Barth expresses his meaning in an argument that may be condensed as follows:

The Bible, he says, is the "concrete medium by which the Church recalls God's revelation in the past, is called to expect revelation in the future, and is thereby challenged, empowered, and guided to proclaim".[178] Thus the Bible is not itself or in itself God's past revelation; no more than Church proclamation is in itself the expected future revelation. Nevertheless, the Bible, as it speaks and is heard as God's Word, "attests the past revelation". By attesting revelation the Bible is the Word of God, and by promising revelation, proclamation is the Word of God. The promise in proclamation, however, rests on the attestation of the Bible. Barth says: "Therefore the decisive relation between the Church and revelation is the attestation of it by the Bible".[179]

In summary, the Bible must never be identified with the revelation itself. Or, expressed in other terms, as printed matter the Bible is not identical with God's Word, though at any moment God may choose to make it so; which actually happens when the Bible functions as a witness.

Barth's frequent emphasis on the Word of God as an "event", and that where it occurs revelation and Scripture are one in fact, is the chief characteristic of his writing on the revealed Word of God.[180] He writes:

> The revelation upon which the Biblical witnesses gaze, looking and witnessing away from themselves,

> is, purely formally, different from the word of the witnesses just in the way in which an event is different from the best and most faithful narrative about it.[181]

When the Word of God is an event, it and revelation become one, yet are not the same thing. Under such circumstances we must regard revelation as primarily superior, and "the Bible primarily as the subordinate principle". As noted before, Barth insists that revelation

> engenders the Scripture which attests it, as . . . the 'burden' laid upon the apostles and prophets . . . as the event of inspiration in which they became speakers and writers of the Word of God.[182]

The prophets were not self-appointed vehicles of past revelation. The revelation of God happened apart from their existence. What has generated Scripture and what Scripture attests, did, finally, once for all, happen.

4. Scripture as a Witness to Divine Revelation in Barth's Thought

This topic has been outlined under the heading of Barth's position on the Written Word of God. Part Two of his first volume of Church Dogmatics contains a lengthy (280 pp.) chapter on Holy Scripture, the first sub-section of which is devoted to the witness aspect of Holy Scripture. Its argument, substantially, is an elaboration of what is found in the first part. Further points deserving of notice are made as follows:

4.1 Barth's major concern appears to be whether the Church recognises the "superior authority confronting the proclamation of the Church", namely the extent to which it and Scripture are a witness to divine revelation. He calls

this witness a "sign". He writes:

> It has proved itself a true sign. It has shown us something. It has in fact indicated a higher, judicial, decisive authority superior to all the proclamation which takes place in the Church and can claim the authority of the Church. Does the Church recognise this authority? Does it, therefore, recognise the concrete significance of the Bible as the sign which points to this authority?[183]

For Barth, the statement that the Bible is the witness of Divine revelation, is based on the fact that the Bible has answered our question about the revelation of God, and has brought before us the lordship of the triune God. This latter is a favoured and meaningful phrase for Barth.

4.2 Again Barth is at pains to emphasise the distinction between the witness and the fact. We do well, he says, to pay attention to this distinction. It involves a limitation: we distinguish the Bible as such from revelation. A witness is not identical with that to which it testifies.[184] For Barth the emphasis is constant: the Bible gives us "human words written in human speech" as a witness. Yet this witness still has something of positive value. The words of prophets and apostles written in the Bible are still alive for us "as the immediate and direct recipients of revelation, by which they speak to us".[185] That is, when the Word of God becomes so by reason of an "event", we become immediate and direct recipients of revelation.

In summarising the three forms of the Word of God as Barth perceives them, the Revealed Word establishes the written and the preached Word. Barth finds their mutual relationships analogous to those of the three Persons in the Trinity.

It seems, therefore, futile to expect a universally applicable answer to the question: What is the Word of God? God and His Word are not presented to us in the same way as our experience of natural and historical entities or concepts. Neither by introspection nor by anticipation can we determine what God is, nor, for that matter, what His Word is. God must always repeat it afresh to us since it is always in the process of "becoming".

One may, at this juncture, recognise the clash between Barth and "the old Protestant idea that Scripture is a fixed total of revealed propositions to be systematized like the sections of a legal corpus".[186] God is not bound to it, but it is bound to Him, and He has free disposal of the verbal character of Holy Scripture. Nowhere is God more a Person than in His Word.

Finally, for Barth, "God's Word" means God speaks. He calls this "the purposiveness of the Word of God".[187] We know the Word only as it is addressed to us, is directed to us and comes home to us, though this fact is by no means self-evident. When God speaks and His Word is heard a unique divine action has taken place.

4.3 Some preliminary observations

There is much to learn from Barth's theology of the Word of God; this despite the fact that his route to a conclusion seems often circuitous. Ultimately one is led to understand:

(a) That the Word of God is finally Jesus Christ and in Him God speaks once and for all as to His judgment and His grace. The historic Jesus forms a crucial element in Barth's theological outlook, as he makes clear.[188]

(b) That the Word of God, and the revelation of God, occurs (happens) rather than exists; is an event rather than an historical process or record. "In that concrete happening it becomes God's Word to us . . . and it is to its being in this becoming that the tiny word 'is' relates".[189]

(c) That the event is always unique, occurring between God and the individual person (not mankind in general). Revelation comes to be in two ways: in the once-for-all form of Incarnation; and in its repeated apprehension of individuals. God spoke in Jesus, yet through Jesus he is always speaking anew to men.

(d) That the Bible is not to be confused or equated with revelation or the Word of God, though it may become so as God, in grace, determines to make it so. Both the Bible and the proclamation of the Church are the result of human activities, and on that account they are merely the word of man and not the Word of God, unless God makes of them an "event".[190]

Finally, in our consideration of Barth, there are four positions on Scripture he clearly rejects:

(i) The Roman Catholic position in which Scripture is seen as subordinate to the Church and its authority is balanced alongside that of tradition.

(ii) The traditional Protestant position, with its idea that Scripture is a fixed total of revealed propositions which constitute an unvarying mimimum of truths essential to the faith.[191]

(iii) The neo-Protestant position, which identifies revelation with history.

(iv) Mysticism, which, says Barth, like orthodoxy,

holds to a completed revelation, and finished revelation, he says, is no revelation. The Holy Spirit does not speak through "holy history" or "holy psychological datum".[192]

For Barth these positions on Scripture are insufficient and not activistic. They seek for a direct revelation of God either in history or experience. By contrast, revelation is one contemporaneous act by which God speaks to us, along with His speech to prophets and apostles. The Church's task is to discover in the Bible the primary form of the revelation.

There are some similarities between Barth and evangelical Protestant orthodoxy, such as the stress on Divine grace and sovereignty. Yet there are also differences that make for a gulf between traditional orthodoxy and Barth's theology of the Word of God. One must, therefore, return to Schaeffer's position by way of understanding his opposition to Barth.

5. Reasons for Schaeffer's Opposition to Barth's Teaching.

Having encountered the results of Barthian teaching during an early 1950s ministry in Switzerland, as related in Edith Schaeffer's L'Abri, Schaeffer opposed it on the following grounds:

5.1 Barthian neo-orthodoxy uses words and terms without careful definition of their content, such as "Jesus Christ", "resurrection", "Word of God", "revelation", etc. He protests:

> The New Theology seems to have an advantage over secular existentialism because it uses words that have strong connotations as they are rooted in the memory of the race; words like 'resurrection', 'crucifixion', 'Christ', 'Jesus'. These words

> give an illusion of communication. The importance of these words to the new theologian lies in the illusion of communication, plus the highly motivated reaction men have on the basis of the connotation of these words. One hears the word 'Jesus', . . . but it is never defined.[193]

Schaeffer goes further by saying that the use of such words (as quoted above) is always in the area of the non-logical, the irrational and that they are separated from history and the cosmos and are impossible to verify in the area of "downstairs" reason.[194]

This objection by Schaeffer is, however, difficult to sustain. To say, as some critics supporting Schaeffer might do, that Barth is so negative to the historical Jesus that it would make no real difference to faith if it could be shown that he had never lived, is a serious misrepresentation of Barth. Barth's exposition of the Apostles' Creed contradicts the critics and makes it plain that the historic Jesus is crucial to his theological outlook, while in his Dogmatics he makes this quite clear.[195]

The answer to the problem lies in a closer examination of what Barth means by "historical". The ultimate basis for faith, Barth teaches, is behind and beyond externally perceptible history, and while Schaeffer would not agree with this he disposes of the problem too easily by saying that in Barth words like "Jesus" are never defined. This is manifestly not the case.

5.2 Schaeffer objects that Barth has made a sharp separation between the Scriptures and the "Word of God"; a position unacceptable to traditional Protestant orthodoxy, where the two were equated. In the Barthian position there is no essential, inherent connection between the two, and

only the sovereign action of God at a particular moment makes such an identity possible and actual.

Schaeffer regarded this teaching as destructive both of the historical basis of Scripture and its content, as also of its authority and educative function in the area of Christian doctrine. One cannot make a textbook, he felt, out of a book whose authority has been undermined in advance.

5.3 Schaeffer charged neo-orthodoxy with having encouraged or ignored the "older liberal" [196] view of errors in Scripture. This it did by regarding the historical content of Scripture or its accuracy as unimportant compared with the use God chooses to make of it when He acts in revelation. Thus the whole question of the inerrancy of Scripture, in which Schaeffer was so intensely involved, was swept overboard as being irrelevant, or in practice absurd. It is clear that such a position was anathema to Schaeffer, especially in his situation as a leader in traditional evangelical orthodoxy. The earlier discussion on Schaeffer in relation to the inerrancy debate of his time is illustrative of this point.

5.4 Schaeffer also held that Barthianism destroyed the historical basis of Protestant orthodoxy by his views on Scripture, and he comments:

> In recent years it is often said that Karl Barth has changed his views. If this is so then all could be cared for easily by his writing one more book amongst his many books and, while he is yet living, making it known that his views on Scripture, his lack of a space-time Fall and his implicit universalism have been publicly repudiated. In the light of his crucial influence as the originator of the new theology or his wide

> publication, it would seem difficult to think that anything less could meet his responsibility before God and men. If he did this many of us would truly rejoice.[197]

Barth is not known to have disavowed his essential theological beliefs and between his view and that of Schaeffer, in respect of Scripture, therefore, there is a considerable gulf. Schaeffer was committed to objectively verifiable (what he called "space-time") history for his understanding of the contemporary world and for the foundation of his hermeneutics. Any other kind of interpretation of the significance of history meant that, for Schaeffer, Bible events were left suspended in space.

5.5 Schaeffer resisted Barth on the grounds that his early apparent concurrence with Kierkegaard in regard to the "leap of faith"[198] gave to his theology a quality of irrationality. Schaeffer admits that after the first edition of Barth's Romans he renounced any debt to Kierkegaard. "However, still believing the higher critical theories, his 'leap' still continued to be the base of his optimistic answers".[199] As Kierkegaard with his leap opened the door to the existential leap in general, so "Karl Barth opened the door to the existential leap in theology. As in other disciplines, the basic issue is the shift in epistemology".[200]

In Schaeffer's later books he continues to charge Kierkegaard with being responsible for introducing an existential methodology, with Barth named as its heir.

> With Karl Barth the existential methodology and the dichotomy were accepted in theology. After the older theological liberalism had failed, Barth stepped into the vacuum with his Kierkegaardian theology.[201]

Schaeffer insists that for many modern theologians, even if they reject the 'God is dead' type of cliché, certain other things are dead. Because they reject what he calls propositional truth (God-given truth that may be expressed in the form of propositions) "for them all content about God is dead and all assurance of a personal God is dead".[202] One is left with contentless religious words plus emotions still evoked by certain traditional phraseology.

5.6 Schaeffer further opposes Barth on the grounds of what he feels is Barth's deficient Christology. For Schaeffer, the Christ of the New Testament is rooted in the Christ of the Old Testament and the history of God's dealings with Israel. Christ is revealed as the Eternal Son of the Eternal Father.

As to the deity of Christ there can be no encounter with Barth. One needs to read Barth's detailed study on the Trinity to understand this.[203] For Barth, however, the historical Jesus so avidly sought by others is of subordinate importance and it is in any event impossible to obtain accurate information about Him. Yet the significance of Jesus lies in the Cross where, as Barth believes, all the inadequacy of our humanity is manifest.

Schaeffer is concerned that while cross and resurrection are terms used in evangelical orthodoxy, this does not prevent neo-orthodoxy from using them with different meanings in mind.[204]

5.7 Finally, Schaeffer opposes Barth because of what he sees as diminished views on the authority of Scripture. The careful but convoluted Barthian argument about revelation

and the witness of Scripture to its reality, runs counter to all Schaeffer believed and taught. His understanding of the witness of the Spirit to the truth of Scripture came into prominence at the start of his Christian life.[205] He saw the Spirit as a witness to Scripture, not Scripture as a witness to revelation. Schaeffer felt that the entire trend of Barthian thought, despite its massive intellectual appeal, tended to denigrate the Scriptures. It made the Bible no more than an instrument (a human word) in a series of unpredictable, inexplicable existential encounters, instead of being a daily, living voice from God. The Schaeffers' entire lifestyle and their habit of obtaining daily guidance from God through prayer and the Bible was based on the presupposition that God had spoken through his Word.[206] Revelation, for Schaeffer, was a divinely accomplished fact and not a series of divinely planned "happenings" on a one-to-one basis.

6. Some Conclusions to be Drawn

In this chapter the current theological climate, best represented by Barth, has been under consideration. It seems that Schaeffer is not averse to generalisations about what he calls "the new theology", yet he does recognise the tremendous "diversity within the unity of the new theology" of which Barth is the most representative.[207] While he attempts to deal with an identifiable theological climate Schaeffer is inclined to be weak on specifics which are the essence of true analysis.

By way of analogy Schaeffer argues that the Reformers were confronted with a total system under Rome's leadership. They could not deny the presence of true Christians within

the Roman Catholic Church, nor did they fail to discern differences within various Roman Catholic Orders. Yet they knew that the underlying system unifying the whole was in opposition to biblical teaching. Today, Schaeffer argues, evangelical orthodoxy is once more confronted with a "system"--not, indeed, a visible organisation but consisting of an overwhelming consensus--"a methodology accepted by theologians on every side".[208] It is true, he says, that one may get some insights into detail from some theologians--Bultmann for example; indeed, some splendid exegesis in particulars can be found in him. Yet the system as a system is in error.

Schaeffer tries to illustrate his point about the fundamental error of the "system" by referring to the failures of philosophy which took place several decades earlier than the crisis in theology. When the old liberal German theologians began to accept the presuppositions of the uniformity of natural causes as a closed system, the downward trend had begun. The miraculous and the supernatural fell by the way. Thus the philosophers "failed in the same way that the rationalistic philosophers had failed . . . caught in a round room without an exit".[209] Instead of returning to the biblical position of the Reformation, says Schaeffer, "they chose a third way . . . a way which had been unthinkable to educated man before this, and which involved the division of the concept of truth".[210]

Theology followed philosophy because the surrounding consensus of thought was comfortably normative. Thus everything was in readiness for Barth and neo-orthodoxy when the time came. Barth's new teaching was merely a

final earthquake that destroyed an edifice already weakened from within.[211] The answers of neo-orthodoxy were not new. What existential philosophy had been saying in secular language, neo-orthodoxy was now saying in theological language.

It may appear as if Schaeffer's opposition to Barth arose exclusively from his loyalty to evangelical orthodoxy in regard to Scripture, but this is only partly true. His dispute with neo-orthodoxy is broader-based than first seems to be the case. He views Barth as the man who opened the door to an existential leap in theology but contends that "the basic issue is the shift in epistemology".[212] Others, says Schaeffer, have followed Barth:

> . . . men like Reinhold Niebuhr, Paul Tillich, Bishop John Robinson, Alan Richardson and all the new theologians. They may differ in details, but their struggle is the same . . . it is the struggle of modern man who has given up a unified field of knowledge.[213]

Such broad generalisations ("all the new theologians") have only a limited persuasive power since Schaeffer makes no attempt to prove his case by detailing what individual "new theologians" actually taught.

Schaeffer is not unaware of the opportunity in today's world for the success of the new theology. He says it stands to play a leading role, especially in the social sphere. Discussing "Today's Opportunity for the New Theology" he writes:

> There are reasons why this is the moment for the new theology to take a privileged place in our culture, a place theology has not enjoyed for a long time. It may become a leader in tomorrow's

> affairs.
> For some time society has been in danger of losing all sociological form. . . . As the old sociological forms have been swept away, new ones must be found. . . .
> The time, therefore, does seem right for this new theology to give the needed sociological forms and motivations. . . The new theology has some strong advantages.[214]

Schaeffer's discernment here is a mixture of prediction, warning and seeming approval. The advantages given to current theology as seen to be the following:

(i) The existing vocabulary of Western culture is a ready-made instrument and easier to use than new and untraditional words. It is easier to give new meanings to old words than to find a new religious vocabulary.

(ii) The new theologians, says Schaeffer, control almost every large Protestant denomination, plus a large segment of progressive Roman Catholicism. This gives them access to a huge organisational and linguistic continuity.

(iii) People in our culture are already becoming accustomed to accepting non-defined, contentless religious words and symbols without rational or historical control. "Such words and symbols", says Schaeffer, "are ready to be filled with the content of the moment. The words 'Jesus' or 'Christ' are the most ready for the manipulator".[215]

Schaeffer feels that the new theology now has the opportunity of supplying society with "an endless stream of religiously motivated absolutes" and says that "it is against such manipulated semantic mysticism that we do very well to prepare ourselves, our children and our spiritual children".[216]

Schaeffer may well have been right in his contention (c. 1968) that the terms "Jesus" and "Christ", among others, might be open to future manipulation. But by whom? Such words, as indeed many others from the Christian vocabulary, are exposed to the same danger if and when they are separated from their biblical-historical context.

If Schaeffer intended his general censure concerning manipulation to apply to Barth or neo-orthodoxy then he was being altogether too imprecise. He certainly does not deal either fully or fairly with Barth's position and might even be accused by some of expressing a simplistic view of it. This will be discussed as part of the general criticism and evaluation of Schaeffer that forms the substance of the final chapter of this thesis.

In Schaeffer's attempt to gain some theological perspective from history he has some success. His handicap, it appears, is that in the broad survey of the intellectual landscape he overlooks or ignores important detail and significant distinctions between things that differ. In his judgment of Barth, it seems, this tendency is present.

CHAPTER 3

The Present Ethical and Cultural Climate in Schaeffer's Interpretative Thought

There are good reasons why ethics and culture should be linked in a study of Schaeffer's thought; not because they are indistinguishable but because in the context of Western man's decline they are inseparable. Schaeffer's interest in the devaluation of modes of thought (philosophy) and modes of conduct (ethics) betrays a deep anxiety: the fear that monolithic culture, spreading with great speed, will irreparably damage all good moral action;[1] a process already begun.

I. The Moral Basis of Western Ethics and Culture

Schaeffer regards the Christian moral basis of past Western culture as no longer distinctive of today's Westernism. A twentieth century departure from Christianity is now paralleled by world-wide ethical and cultural revolt. Propositional truth is being abandoned and being rapidly followed, Schaeffer believes, by ethical erosions.[2]

1. How ethical erosions are taking place

Deviations are indicated in changes taking place in concepts of public and private morality. Schaeffer thinks the whole concept of law has changed; that in America people now live under arbitrary or sociological laws potentially affecting everything in life, "including who should live and who should die".[3] Whereas a previously-existing Christian consensus held that no majority and no elitist group was absolute, contemporary practices such as abortion, infanticide and euthanasia are now based entirely on the

personal preferences or the moral framework established by a minority, subsequently entrenched in laws.

For example, Schaeffer says, we are faced today "with a flood of personal cruelty"[4] based on a modern humanistic view of man. The same humanism is fascinated by the power to manipulate human nature, such as is found in genetic engineering and what Johnson calls "social engineering" of large masses of people.[5]

The virtual abandonment of the propositional truth that man is made in the image of God has led to serious ethical deterioration in regard to attitudes towards children. Schaeffer cites the increase of child abuse, sexual abuse, incest and exposure of children to pornography, but his concern is as much with public apathy to these evils as with the abuses themselves. In support of Schaeffer, Harry Giarretto, Director of the Child Sexual Abuse Centre in San Jose, California, says that incest is "an epidemic in America" (1979).[6] Schaeffer says there is no outcry against it and cites the words of Dr Irwin Hedlener who said: "If child abuse were polio, the whole country would be up in arms looking for a solution".[7]

Schaeffer's historicist approach means a generally long introduction on his part to problems of modernity. His basic, familiar "staircase" diagram supports this. Each downward step represents a stage in time.[8] At times he appears to be more attentive to Westernism's past than to its present, as may be shown by the content of his book How Should We Then Live? Its analysis of the causes of decline is not always matched by a commensurate and similar examination of current ethical-cultural-religious trends.

A further problem is his seemingly arbitrary choice of illustrative examples from the art and music worlds. This applies to the persons selected and to specific works of art, music and literature. To the art critic this is a fault, yet the world of the arts offers so great a variety to the critic that an arbitrary element in choosing illustrative examples seems inevitable; but it does not make a thorough and systematic examination of Schaeffer's topics easy.

2. Schaeffer's concern about a monolithic culture

His starting point is that the post-Christian world is threatened by a monolithic secular culture. He says:

> Today the world is small and it is very possible to have a monolithic culture spreading rapidly and influencing great sections of mankind . . . As the world has shrunk, and as it has become post-Christian, both sides of the Iron Curtain have followed the same methodology.[9]

Our perspective, Schaeffer feels, has been clouded by modern forms of specialised education that cause our preoccupation with parts to obscure the dimensions of the whole. True education means "thinking by association across the various disciplines", therefore a Christian thinker must take trouble to understand the links between various disciplines in order to know "what confronts him antagonistically in his own moment of history".[10]

The assertion that the world is now basically "post-Christian" is not difficult to sustain. A great deal of Western literature clearly supports Schaeffer's view. To take but one authoritative sampling: In a survey of one hundred "key books from England, France and America, 1880-

1950", done by the distinguished literary critic Cyril Connolly for the London Sunday Times,[11] humanist influence is seen to be the dominant characteristic of our time. The critic simply assumes that the modern movement is essentially humanist. Among his chosen authors are some few traditionalists from the religious (Christian) fold. For the most part, however, his key books are representative of a modern atheist and humanist spirit. Joseph Wood Krutch of Columbia University, assessing Connolly's selections, says of them that while some are neither beatnik, sadistic or sexually perverse, "at least a half--and perhaps two-thirds--might, I think, be classified as guideposts to perdition".[12]

3. What contemporary popular reading reflects

Contemporary modernism, as reflected in popular reading material, is further described by Krutch as "the tendency to elevate raw sexual experience to a position of supreme importance, so that the Quest for the Holy Grail becomes a quest for the perfect orgasm".[13] Other characteristics are homosexuality, drugs, nihilism and the drive to self-destruction. All come under Schaeffer's scrutiny. Sometimes the philosophic and theological causes he advances seem to lack close connection; yet they are there. Although Schaeffer avoids the crudities of some reformers, he leaves no doubt about the cause and effect mechanism which, he feels, threatens our civilisation because of its apostasy. Pamela Hansford Johnson wrote of this:

> When the Sermon on the Mount was bundled into the dustbin a moral vacuum was created: and the liberal humanists have not succeeded in filling it . . . They have been unable to offer an alternative faith to the one they have renounced,

> except for faith in the beneficial effects of total permissiveness in every form of culture.[14]

In the line with this reasoning Schaeffer contends that ethical and cultural development is a logical process that follows changes in man's thought. "People's presuppositions lay a grid for all they bring forth into the external world. (These) also provide the basis for their values . . ."[15]

II. Ethical and Philosophical Meaning in Modern Art

All true art, says Schaeffer, is an expression of philosophic significance, but whereas philosophy itself in the formal sense--the "first step in the line of despair --touched only a few people; art, the second step, touched many more".[16]

There is fundamental agreement among thinkers as to the impact of art upon philosophy, and the influence of changing philosophical concepts upon art, music and literature. Schaeffer's attitude to changing art is one of concern for the devaluation of Christianity that might accompany or follow such movements. By implication he is a pessimist, except in so far as his hope for a revival of Christian values may bring with it a restoration of greatness in the world of the arts.

Psychologist and art critic Erich Neumann, a penetrating analyst of meaning in modern art, is more optimistic as to the future of art as a whole. He writes:

> Despite all the despair and darkness which are still more evident in us and our art than the secret forces of the new birth and the new synthesis, we must not forget that no epoch, amid the greatest danger to its existence, has shown so

> much readiness to burst the narrow limits of its horizon and open itself to the great power which is striving to rise out of the unknown, here and everywhere in the world.[17]

Neumann's optimism comes from a direction other than that of Christian hope, but finds its source in a confidence in man. He looks ahead to a time when, despite all menaces such as nuclear war, "every act of destruction will be answered by a rebuilding, in which the unity of everything human will be affirmed more strongly than ever".[18] His special emphasis, moreover, is on the "creative unconscious" of man who produces art forms rather than on deliberate statements of philosophic significance with which Schaeffer is chiefly, though not exclusively, concerned. Although Schaeffer does not express himself in terms of the psychological so much as the philosophical or ethical, he would agree with Neumann's statement that -

> there is in modern art a psychic current which descends like a waterfall into the chasm of the unconscious, into a nonobjective, impersonal world. With their animism that brings to life the inner world and the realm of participation mystique, many of (certain works, including some of Picasso) are charged with a demonic force that can suddenly leap out at the overwhelmed and terrified beholder at any time, in any place. . .[19]

For an orthodox evangelical, Schaeffer's interest in art along with his knowledge of it owed much to his long friendship with Professor Hans Rookmaaker of the Free University, Amsterdam.[20] Rookmaaker's standard treatise, Modern Art and the Death of a Culture[21] is the obviously authoritative basis for Schaeffer's beliefs on the philo-

sophy of art. So, in discussing a painting of the Madonna, Rookmaaker's quoted view is also Schaeffer's:

> Such a painting is much more than just decoration, or a memory of an event, or a didactic statement about the structure of a situation. The painting is loaded with religious meaning. It is crucial that we understand this . . . It has often been more loaded than is justified by its being art. . . . And this was not only because of its subject-matter, but more often than not simply because it made visible a particular view of life and the world and expressed deeply-felt values and truths.[22]

The phrase "deeply-felt values and truths" refers to a conscious thought process, whereas Neumann's emphasis is different, as he says:

> Modern paintings are no museum pieces. Since they are not primarily the product of a directing consciousness, they can only be effective and fruitful when the beholder himself is in an adequate psychic situation--that is, not centered in his ego consciousness but turned toward his own unconscious, or at least open to it.[23]

As Schaeffer understands art, it may reflect philosophical change or initiate it. It might draw attention to embryonic change, thereby giving it definition and confirming its reality. Schaeffer believed that art provided "a doorway into the line of despair"[24] which he illustrates by the Impressionists.

A. Schaeffer's View of Impressionism

When the Impressionists began they did not regard themselves as rebels against classic concepts.[25] They were in fact more interested in a study of light, as was Turner with his landscapes. Realism and Romanticism were phases

that preceded the Impressionists; the former attempting to paint "things as they are" while the latter gave a new dimension by adding idealism. Rookmaaker comments on realism in reference to Goya's painting The Execution of Spaniards by the French, 3 May, 1808, and he writes: "We simply see men being shot and others doing the shooting . . . the sole facts are the ones we see".[26] There is no moralising, no "message".

Impressionists brought a change. The way was prepared for them, says Schaeffer, by a "curious twist in the way naturalists were painting". The viewer comes to the picture, and while on the one hand he sees what the artist is painting, on the other he asks himself whether or not there is meaning behind what he sees. Such questioning, thinks Schaeffer, was a kind of pointer to the fact that art had become sterile.[27] It also posed a challenge to naturalism and eventually paved the way for Impressionism which created a new dimension among painters and critics.

The artists responsible for a break-through were Claude Monet (1840-1926) and Pierre Auguste Renoir (1841-1919), soon followed by Camille Pissaro (1834-1917). These men were all great artists who "painted only what their eyes brought them", but this raised the question as to whether there was reality behind the light waves reaching the eyes.[28] The artists called their work "following nature".

In 1885, however, Claude Monet took a bold step towards modern art. He reasoned that one cannot know whether or not there is reality behind the sensations we receive; though the sensations themselves are very real. So he did

a series of paintings in one spot, but in varying conditions: rain, snow, morning, afternoon. Naturalistic as these were, their effect was almost ghost-like, immaterial, a world that induced sensations. The trees by a river that he painted had a semblance of reality, but, says Rookmaaker, "the reality does not seem so real".[29] Monet's series included Poplars at Giverny, Sunrise, now displayed in the Museum of Modern Art, New York. It illustrates what both Rookmaaker and Schaeffer wish to convey, namely that Impressionism opened the door for art to become the vehicle for modern thought.[30] This applies equally to sculpture as an art form making philosophical statements.

Yet neither Schaeffer nor Rookmaaker as his mentor explains the change to Impressionism except in elementary terms of a venture into something new. Neumann probes more deeply into the creative unconscious by saying that the system of consciousness in the artist is replaced "by the anonymous vitality of the flowing unconscious, of the creative force in nature and the psyche".[31] This process, he says is evident in the landscapes of the Impressionists. "The transformation begins with the outside world, which becomes psychic and gradually loses its objective character" and becomes a psychic symbol.[32] He continues:

> Through participation mystique this psychic symbol has a closer, more effective, and more inward contact with the segment of the world to which it relates than a naturalistic, objective picture, dictated by consciousness and 'made' with detachment.[33]

Modern paintings, therefore, may well contain a strange mixture, a unity of world and psyche floating in a continuum.

B. Post-Impressionism and its search for reality

The post-Impressionists, says Schaeffer, "attempted to solve the problem by trying to find the way back to reality, to the absolute behind the individual things".[34] The problem related to the loss of universals that was never reversed, even though they tried without success to achieve a synthesis. It was not that post-Impressionists always consciously expressed their philosophy of life in painting, but that their work as a whole reflected their world view.

Schaeffer had four post-Impressionists chiefly in mind: Paul Cézanne (1839-1906, Vincent van Gogh (1853-1890), Paul Gauguin (1848-1903) and Georges Seurat (1859-1901). These talented great painters were among the pillars of the modern art establishment. As Leonardo Da Vinci had tried to do centuries before them, they also strove to find a universal in their art. What the philosopher was attempting within the scope of the whole universe, these men endeavoured to do within the limits of their canvasses. Schaeffer says: "Art became the vehicle for modern man's view of the fragmentation of truth and life".[35] Philosophy had moved from unity into fragmentation at an earlier period; now the process was carried into the field of painting. Schaeffer writes:

> The fragmentation shown in post-Impressionist paintings was parallel to the loss of hope for a unity of knowledge in philosophy. It was not just a new technique in painting. It expressed a world view.[36]

In this opinion Schaeffer is supported by Rookmaaker whose work Modern Art describes the post-Impressionists we

have listed here. Although they are grouped together, there is considerable diversity among them and it requires the finely tuned expertise of the art critic to analyse this; which skill was beyond that of Schaeffer's training.[37]

Certainly some of the work of the post-Impressionist school, such as Vincent van Gogh, had great beauty. Though he was not concerned with an accurate representation of natural objects he painted his own poetic, emotional reaction: his vision--trees like flame, mountains like waves of a great sea--everything in bright, strong colours. True, he believed in reality but painted only his personal reaction, "hoping to reach a deep and general truth, and longing to bring joy to ordinary people, for he was strongly attracted to the ideals of socialism, as were most of the impressionist and post-impressionist painters".[38]

Van Gogh, tragically dead by suicide at 37, never reached his pot of gold at the foot of the rainbow. His personal mental torment defied description. His dreams of starting a new artistic community in Arles, or of founding a new religion, were shattered by his separation from his friend Paul Gauguin (who went to Tahiti to champion the cause of the noble savage but was ultimately disillusioned). In Van Gogh, Schaeffer sees a man in whom "the death of hope in man had taken place", and one whose letters cause one "to weep for the pain of this sensitive man".[39]

What Schaeffer is saying has been expressed in greater depth and detail by others. Neumann writes about the sense of isolation, forlornness, homelessness and alienation that takes hold of the artist for whom the security of the cultural canon of his time has disappeared. The twentieth

century has produced a great number of isolated individuals who have, each one, felt the necessity of starting from the very beginning.[40] This was equally true of some of their predecessors, such as Cézanne, Van Gogh, Gauguin, and of Matisse and Picasso. Neumann says of them:

> Each of them is a world in himself, endeavouring alone to ward off the chaos that menaces him or to give it form, each with his own characteristic desperation. . . And the profound anxiety, the sense of insecurity, uprootedness, and world dissolution, at work in these painters also move modern composers and poets.[41]

Although Schaeffer expresses himself in other terms, based on his Christian world view, in essence he is not saying anything different from Neumann in this respect. He finds in these artists tragic examples of mankind's loss of hope when he goes "below the line of despair".

Rookmaaker has some insights concerning their more positive contributions to art. He writes of them:

(i) That they tried to depict "something that is more than what the momentary, fleeting impression can make us understand", and that, instead, they looked for a way "to find something of the values and the lasting principles of reality, the deeper universal".

(ii) That they brought together the "two great principles of the modern post-Enlightenment world: the principle of starting from sense-perception in order to gain knowledge of the universe"; and the second principle of "human freedom, the search for a humanist society".[42]

The achievement of this synthesis has meant that their art was probably the most complete in richness and splendour

of all art the world has seen since the seventeenth century.

In discussing other notable artists--among them Picasso and Mondrian--Schaeffer stirs an awareness of the complicated nature of modern art interpretation. His own mentor in this field underlines this:

> Modern art is very complex. It is a fruit of the Enlightenment; it expresses the consequences of its basic principles. What is at stake is man's insight and knowledge of reality.[43]

Schaeffer's survey next moves to abstractionism and to Picasso in particular.

C. Abstract art: Pablo Picasso (1881-1973)

Picasso combined the fragmentation we see in Cézanne with Gauguin's concept of the "noble savage". He added the forms of African tribal masks which, earlier in the century, had become the rage in Paris. This combination of ideas is to be found in his celebrated Les Demoiselles d' Avignon (1906-1907), now exhibited in New York's Museum of Modern Art.

Schaeffer says of this work that it "marked the birth of 'modern art'".[44] On what does he base this verdict? It was a distinct departure from acknowledged forms. The women to the left of the canvas are similar to those he had painted before, though already showing Cézanne's influence. Those to the right, however, have become demonic beings, synbols, as they wear African masks that negate their humanity.[45] Schaeffer thinks Picasso was searching for a universal, and he comments:

> As he abstracted further one cannot tell whether his women are blondes or brunettes. . . If you go far enough your women can become 'all women' or even everything. But the difficulty is that

> when you get to that point the viewer has no clue what he is looking at. You have succeeded in making your own world on canvas, and in this sense you have become god. But at the same time you have lost contact with the person who views your painting. The problem of modern man's loss of communication and his alienation did not have to wait for the computers and cybernetics. Picasso, the modern man, exhibited this at the time in his art.[46]

Art critic David Douglas Duncan (b. 1916) is cited in his book Picasso's Picassos (1961) as saying of a certain set of Picasso's works: "Not one of these pictures was actually a portrait but his prophecy of a ruined world".[47] With this one must agree but it does not fully answer the question of Picasso's motivation, whether conscious or unconscious. What was Picasso really endeavouring to say? When he makes a human into a demonic form, when faces dissolve into colours and a blob of paint looks at us as if a human, when everything falls into an abyss of cosmic suffering, when all is mixed together with what is quite unintelligible, is Picasso not saying that this is what life is really like? To questions like these Neumann comments:

> Even if we recognise that this modern art is an authentic expression of our time, the question arises: Is it still art in the same sense as all previous art? And although those who first called it 'degenerate art' were themselves degenerates, has our art not really gone astray?[48]

Schaeffer believed that Picasso's abstractionism was seriously handicapped by its deep subjectivism. How could he convey a message through his art when its meaning was known only to himself? Does the answer lie in a kind of

Kierkegaardian "leap" towards meaning? Whatever the case, the appeal of Picasso's abstract art is a fact of the twentieth century art world and beyond it. Picasso's vast wealth was proof enough of that, and though some of his more bizarre creations defy the canons of present and previous generations of art lovers, the almost universal interest in them says as much about the viewers as about the artist.

Schaeffer was not an automatic iconoclast in regard to all modern art. His criticisms are not indiscriminate. His censure on Picasso is moderated by recognising that Picasso was capable of greatness in a conventional way. His painting of Jacqueline (one of the two women he married), done in oils and charcoal, is a masterpiece of beauty and integrity, quite different from the dehumanised forms of Les Demoiselles d' Avignon. This temporary forsaking of the abstract indicates the strength of the older philosophy of wholeness and beauty, of truth and goodness coming through to Picasso when he was emotionally involved.[49]

We consider now the work of Marcel Duchamp who revealed his concept of the absurdity of all things.

D. Marcel Duchamp (1887-1969) and the idea of absurdity

In Duchamp we are introduced to the "Dada" group of painters: a word chosen at random from a French dictionary and meaning "rocking horse". Its significance lay in the idea of chance at the base of this philosophy. Poetry, art, and music alike were all eventually affected by the Dada school of thought. Schaeffer calls Duchamp the "high priest of destruction" who is best known for his celebrated work Nude Descending a Stairway, now displayed in the Philadelphia

Museum of Art. Another Duchamp painting, in New York, is Le passage de la vierge à la mariée (The passage of the virgin to the married state").[50] Evidently Duchamp's real purpose is to exploit the process of the viewer's thought life and destroy him from within. The painting of the nude is an abstract work resembling a piece of psychedelic decor. There is in it no human being, nor the least correspondence between the title and the painting. The artist seems to have conveyed his own fragmented, subjective concept of what is, and it has led him to the devaluation and absurdity of all things.[51] Duchamp realised that this absurdity includes the absurdity of art itself, and this is demonstrated by his "ready-mades": among them a painting of a bicycle wheel perched atop a small table.[52] The same artist in about 1960 conceived the "happenings" in which the art viewer is placed, as it were, within the picture in order to observe others acting. This is calculated to defile the viewer's mind.

Absurdity in art. In an age when ugliness ranks as a virtue superior to beauty, and disorder and chance are thought superior to harmony and design, the "message" is that chance rules the universe. When a compilation of junk metal is offered to the viewer as if it were a sculpted work of art, the "message", again, is that art, along with all things, is absurd.

Among the avant garde some examples of absurdity as art are now almost a commonplace. Schaeffer mentions Jackson Pollock (1912-1956) as a prime example. He painted with intent to make the point that all is chance. Placing his canvasses on the floor, with swinging cans of paint

dripping various colours on them, he thought the result would be due entirely to chance. Schaeffer denies this by saying there is a form of order in the lines of paint on the canvas, and this is "because the universe is not a random universe; it has order", which means that "the lines of paint are following the order of the universe itself. The universe is not what these painters said it was".[53] Rookmaaker, in his Modern Art reproduces a cartoon from "The Catalogue of the Salon, 1889" entitled "Caricature of an Impressionist" showing a man, eyes veiled, tossing a bucket of paint at an easel-mounted canvas in order to produce a painting. The chance philosophy in art is thereby shown to be at least a century old.[54]

The concepts of chance and absurdity, embedded as they are in various past and present philosophies, are related to each other. Paintings have been admired as masterpieces of depth and subtlety before they were exposed as hoaxes painted by monkeys and foisted on critics and viewers alike. Some genuine critics of art have on occasions lost credibility through this deception, but this is not confined to art. Schaeffer is reluctant to pour ridicule on them, neither on the perpetrators nor the victims:

> Dare we laugh at such things? Dare we feel superior when we view their tortured expressions in their art? Christians should stop laughing and take such men seriously. Then we shall have the right to speak again to our generation.[55]

Thus we come to some conclusions about art as an ethical and philosophical expression. For centuries prior to the shift in philosophy, traditional and classical art forms were a bulwark against the spread of alien, revolution-

ary ideas. Some significant contemporary art forms are now vehicles for the spread of new ideas. Sir Herbert Read, a Marxist and art critic, has said:

> Everywhere the greatest obstacle to the creation of the new social reality is the cultural heritage of the past--the religion, the philosophy, the literature and the art which makes up the whole complex ideology of the bourgeois mind.[56]

Read states the complementary truth by quoting Picasso: "Art is not to decorate apartments. Art is a weapon of revolution and my art is revolutionary art".[57]

Rookmaaker, Schaeffer's tutor in this field, has the conviction:

> Modern art is not neutral . . . To look at modern art is to look at the fruit of the spirit of the avant garde: it is they who are . . . building a view of the world with no God, no norms.[58]

If Rookmaaker and Schaeffer are right that modern art is not neutral, but that it is substantially hostile to the Christian world-view, they are obviously ascribing this hostility to conscious thought processes. Or are they speaking of the artist as an unconscious reflector of an anti-Christian spirit? This seems doubtful. Schaeffer's emphasis everywhere seems to be on rational and volitional man and not on his unconscious. This contrasts with Neumann who stresses that the roots of every man's personality "extend beyond the historical area of his factual existence" into the world of the unconscious.[59] It is true that Neumann also thinks of art as making a statement, but there is a clear distinction between his concept of how the statement arises and Schaeffer's idea which is based on his view of fallen man in a state of moral regression.

For Schaeffer the ethical and philosophical statement at the base of the artist's mind and work is most significant. Ultimately, he believes, ethics and culture cannot be divorced from theological convictions. Thus, music follows art.

III. How Schaeffer sees Music as an Instrument of Cultural Revolt

Cultural and ethical revolt in the twentieth century is probably more clearly shown in music than in art. The esoteric nature of the art world contributes to the problem of communicating its trends to lay minds. It is doubtful whether this is so to the same extent in music. Music lends itself to more lucid analysis than art, although it, too, has its esotericism. Yet it has a broader base among the masses. It is also the most intrusive, ubiquitous human experience of our time.

In contrast to art, plebeian tastes in music are likely to be predominant. In art the trained eye and expert judgment of the critic are highly regarded but less commonly understood. As for music, its all-encompassing nature is such that it invades human privacy and is with us, at home, during work or travel, with a demanding persistence. For these and other reasons the effects of music are likely to be further-reaching than those of other cultural media of our time; and if not further-reaching, then more rapid.[60]

Schaeffer's choice of illustrations for his thesis that music is an instrument of cultural revolt is, however, somewhat limited. The instances he cites in support of his protest do not seem immediately obvious. In other words, the "revolt" is not self-evident until we come to

the world of pop and rock music where the message is in no doubt. Yet, possibly for lack of full exposure to this type of music, Schaeffer seems less sure of himself in this field than in that of classical music.

A. A Shift of Values in Classical Music

In classical music Schaeffer notes the German and French streams, and begins with Beethoven.

1. Ludwig von Beethoven (1770-1827). Schaeffer says: "The first shift in German music came with the last Quartets of Beethoven (1825-1826".[61] In support of his view he cites, first, Leonard Bernstein (b. 1918) who names Beethoven as the "new artist--the artist as priest and prophet"; and, second, Joseph Machlin, author of Introduction to Contemporary Music (1961) who writes of Schoenberg as having taken his point of departure from the final Quartets of Beethoven;[62] and third, Stravinsky, who praised the Quartets as "my highest articles of musical belief . . . indispensable to the ways and meaning of art".[63]

Schaeffer makes no attempt to analyse the specific elements in Beethoven's Quartets that place him among the pioneers of the "shift" in classical music. Except for Bernstein's remark that he was "priest and prophet" we are left mainly with conjecture. Three successors to Beethoven are identified by Schaeffer: Wagner (1813-1883), Mahler (1860-1911) and Schoenberg (1874-1951), each of whom became a vehicle for modern thought by his music. Mahler provides a good illustration.

2. Gustav Mahler. Leonard Bernstein said of Mahler (1973) and especially of his Ninth Symphony:

> Ours is the century of death and Mahler is its

> musical prophet . . . If Mahler knew this (personal death, death of tonality and the death of a culture) and his message is so clear, how do we, knowing it too, manage to survive? We are now face to face with the ultimate ambiguity, which is the human spirit . . . the most fascinating ambiguity of all . . . We learn to accept our mortality; yet we persist in our search for immortality . . . All this ultimate ambiguity is to be heard in the finale of Mahler's Ninth.[64]

Contrary to our earlier expressed opinion that cultural decline is more easily traceable in music than in art, Schaeffer finds it more difficult to trace the downward steps of music, because music has a subjective element in it.[65] Yet this is just as obvious in the evaluation of art for reasons that have already become clear.

3. Arnold Schoenberg. With Schoenberg we are launched into the music that became a vehicle for modern thought. Various histories of music devote impressive amounts of space to his composition and genius. Schoenberg rejected tradition by inventing the so-called "12-tone row" which was modern in that there was "perpetual variation with no resolution".[66] This stands in opposition to J.S. Bach's biblically-based music with its diversity and resolution. As a Christian Bach had a coherent view of life and the universe and therefore also of history. The music coming from such a biblical and Reformation view was deeply affected by it; similarly, modern music has been shaped by a secular Weltanschauung.

Donald Jay Grout (b. 1902) remarks--partly in reference to Schoenberg's subject matter--that it is "isolated, helpless, in the grip of forces he does not understand, a

prey to inner conflict, tension, anxiety and fear".[67]

4. The French Stream. Here the shift began, Schaeffer believes, with Claude Debussy (1862-1918) whose direction was towards fragmentation. This trend has influenced a great many composers both in classical and popular music. Even black jazz and black spirituals were affected by infiltration. Fragmentation runs a close parallel to the same phenomenon in painting; neither of these was merely a new technique but expressed a world view that might never have filtered through to the masses by other means.[68] Arts reviewer Leonard Marcis expressed it thus in 1965: "Theologians have always had artists to bridge the gap to their flock. Now, for better or for worse, the antitheologian has a powerful, artistic statement".[69] This applies equally to music as to art. Whereas theology once found allies in Christian culture, music and art, now it finds as many opposers. Yet the theologian might use this opposition, as Schaeffer does, to demonstrate the truth of his biblical position.

5. John Cage (b. 1912). Cage was Schoenberg's pupil, a key musician and a good example of what, precisely, is involved in the shift to modernity in music. Calvin Tompkins, writing his "Profile of John Cage" in 1964, gives some insight into Cage's purposes:

> What he is proposing is, essentially, the complete overthrow of the most basic assumptions of Western art since the Renaissance . . . The power of art to communicate ideas and emotions, to organise life into meaningful patterns, and to realise universal truths through the self-expressed individuality of the artist are only three of the assumptions that Cage challenges.[70]

What is Cage proposing? He wants an art arising out of a philosophy of chance and indeterminancy. He would do away with the self-expressive art created by the desires, tastes and imagination of the artist himself.

Although in this Cage was not altogether a pioneer, yet he became a leader followed by artists, writers and composers moving in the same direction (as, for example, his contemporary, artist Jackson Pollock, 1912-1956, with his swinging paint cans).

a. Schaeffer says Cage believed chance dominates the universe. To demonstrate his belief he produced music by this "method", and tried to do it with great consistency which, by common logic, is already contrary to chance. He would at times flip a coin to decide what the music should be. Sometimes he erected a machine to direct an orchestra by chance motions, so that the orchestra would have no prior idea what to expect. No logical sequence was apparent. Two conductors might be appointed to lead the same orchestra. Separated as they were from each other by a partition, the result was cacophony.[71]

To illustrate the link between art and music, and to prove their supposed common origins in the philosophy of chance, Cage composed (1947) his Music for Marcel Duchamp which consisted merely of noise without order or harmony. Schaeffer comments on this:

> In Cage's universe nothing comes through in the music except noise and confusion or total silence. All this is below the line of anthropology. Above the line there is nothing personal, only the philosophic other or the impersonal everything.[72]

Cage, in a cynical kind of way, conceded that he was unable to live by his own chance philosophy. As a keen and skilled amateur mycologist, he gathered mushrooms in large numbers, but had to be meticulous in banning chance from controlling his hobby lest he poison himself. Perhaps the most important thing to note about John Cage's philosophy is that he predicates an impersonal universe in which there is no personal God, making it, effectually, an empty universe and one that does not fit the facts as we know them.[73]

b. For Schaeffer the teleological structure seen in the universe is important, and his question to Cage and his followers is whether their philosophy of a chance universe fits the verifiable knowledge we have right up to the age of Einstein and beyond. The design and structure of the observable universe is, in Schaeffer's thought, in sharp contrast to "the intellectualised art which states that the universe is chance".[74] In reality the universe does not correspond to the description given to it by Cage in his music or by Pollock in his painting, neither does it fit the facts as to what people are in the realm of intellect.

Finally, one questions whether any activity "governed" by chance can really be thought of as art. Does not the action then become merely a bare intellectual, though so-called philosophical statement, severed from the reality of the material universe?

Schaeffer's methodology and approach in this might be challenged here as producing unsatisfactory half-answers. His broad coverage permits him no detailed analysis. While this does not invalidate the illustrations he uses to sustain his case, discerning readers might find them open

to further debate. Schaeffer's method, of course, is not to use the microscope so much as the telescope.

From classical music Schaeffer moves to a consideration of popular modern music, in aspects of which the shift in philosophical and ethical values is clearly seen.

B. Pop and Rock Music as a Vehicle of Ethical Revolt

Had Schaeffer wanted to lead convincing evidence for the prosecution of his case against modernity he could have found it in the growth and influence of modern pop and rock music. Yet his indictment of it is milder than the facts warrant. He does not avail himself of all the facts at hand, nor does he use it as a supreme illustration of degeneracy. The reasons for this may lie within Schaeffer's personality, not least with his greater attachment to the classical music of earlier times.

Schaeffer's concern is with the religious significance of this kind of music. Bearing in mind that his first book, The God Who is There was published in 1968, the phenomenon of Beatlemania had been in full swing for some time, hence his reference to the Beatles in the book.[75] Whether or not Schaeffer was able to see it in perspective as the immense landmark it was of ethical revolt, is not completely clear. The preoccupations of those who were reading Schaeffer's book or listening to his lectures had less to do with the Beatles or pop music than with philosophies hostile to Christian teaching. The connection between them has since become obvious.

What Schaeffer does say is that the Beatles era is closely linked with the drug scene and with Eastern mysticism. Both topics are dealt with later in this chapter. Of the

Beatles he writes:

> No greater illustration could be found of the way these concepts are carried to the masses than 'pop' music and especially the work of the Beatles. The Beatles have moved through several stages including the concept of the drug and psychedelic approach . . . In their record, Sergeant Pepper's Lonely Hearts Club Band . . . psychedelic music, with open statements concerning drug taking, is knowingly presented as a religious answer. The religious form is the same vague pantheism which predominates much of the new mystical thought today.[76]

At this stage of the discussion one must refer to aspects of pop and rock music in contemporary ethics:

1. Pop and Hard Rock as a Degenerative Process

The retrograde movement in modern music finds its best illustrations in pop and rock. Such music, enormously popularised by the Beatles and their imitators, was a major influence in two decades and continues to be so in the 1980s. "Hard rock" must be singled out for special mention as being related to drugs, sexual licence, violence and some forms of civil rebellion. The lyrics of numerous rock songs are explicitly sexual, openly rebellious towards all authority and constitute an invitation to a lifestyle that defies all Western norms. Kingsbury Smith, well-known American syndicated columnist, says parents of the 1980s are being bombarded with rock music's advocacy of "sadism, masochism, incest, necrophilia, homosexuality, bestiality, rape and violence",[77] and if this continues in addition to ever-present rebellion, drug abuse and promiscuity, the results, he forecasts, will be stupefying.

The United States of America is the largest social laboratory in which strong statements such as Kingsbury Smith makes can be tested. They must be seen in this context. Schaeffer's interest in the Beatles is of a different order, and the philosophy of John Lennon best illustrates a connection between musical decadence and moral corruption.

2. The Legacy of John Lennon

When Lennon was murdered on December 8, 1980 he left an enormous fortune plus annual royalties in millions and huge sums generated by the post-humous boom in record sales. His true legacy, however, cannot be computed in figures but must be dovetailed into the sub-culture of hedonism, atheism and rebellion of which David Noebel wrote:

> Lennon's philosophy did not stop with music. He was more than a musician. He was a social activist. It was natural that as the Beatles rocketed to fame, Lennon would be the one most quoted and most listened to.[78]

More important than Lennon is what the world thought of him. When he died, eulogies to him swept across the world as if America had lost one of its finest sons. His hymn to humanism, "Imagine", became a ritual. Max Rafferty, former Secretary of Public Education in California, said "the deification of John Lennon by the mass media only proves the complete desperation of Western culture".[79] This bankruptcy of Western culture is more significant than Lennon's impact on it. The concern here is not with Lennon's overt leftist activism or his love for the Soviet Union[80] but with his Pied Piper role as a leader in thought and lifestyle to an entire generation.

3. The Youth Culture of the 1960s

Since the Beatles era the new culture has produced lyrics promoting social rebellion, permissiveness and drugs. U.S. News and World Report has shown how X-rated music flooded the air waves and how "hot-selling songs with sexually explicit lyrics . . . (cause) widespread concern about their effects on youth across the U.S."[81]

Former New York Times writer McCandlish Phillips sees the youth culture of the late 1960s as "shot through with the philosophy of Satan . . . promoting fornication, mysticism (the occult), marijuana and violent revolution".[82] The Beatles, he says, "began it, set some of its most obtrusive styles, rode it like a wild steed, and . . . made the big break-through into the West for Yogism and Eastern mysticism".[83]

Bryon Hawkes attributes youth's sexual anarchy to "living in a society in which kids are continually bombarded with sexually suggestive messages. They can't listen to a rock 'n roll band and not hear suggestive passages".[84]

Morton Kelsey, however, in his book Encounter with God, takes a softer line by seeing young people as groping for religious values: "searching in diverse ways . . . for reality that could give religious orientation to their lives".[85] But how is the search conducted?

> The trouble is that this new generation is expressing in various ways its dissatisfaction with the way of life and values of our generation . . . While they are essentially moved by anger and rebellion, what they are rejecting is the point of view of their parents, the values of twentieth century competitive materialism.[86]

Schaeffer's attitude to rebellious youth does not, in this instance, differ much from Kelsey's. He is aware of the religious element in youth, despite degenerate music and rebellious action. The Beatles' statements on drug-taking, as found in Sergeant Pepper's Lonely Hearts Club Band, says Schaeffer, are presented as a religious answer.[87] While he might not wholly support Kelsey's view that "the essence of religious revival among this younger generation is their anger against the view of man which underlies the attitude of their parents"[88] he does, nevertheless, discern religious desire in youth's anger.

Under the tutelage of Rookmaaker who saw the new music of youth as "each line and each beat (being) full of the angry insult to all Western values"[89] Schaeffer saw the trend as part of the "staircase" going down to despair. Educationist Max Rafferty complained that "the arts say we're insane; maybe the arts are right".[90] But Schaeffer's appeal to man as a rational creature avoided extremes in judging the young who were ignorantly reflecting the fragmented world view of Westernism.

C. Literature and Films in Cultural Rebellion

The shift in values shown in the media includes poetry, novels and the film world. At the outset one notices Schaeffer's self-imposed limitations in choosing illustrative material, as was the case in his survey of music. He includes essay, drama and newsmaking. Most of his topics are grouped under "general culture" which follows the arts as the "fourth step in the line of despair". The American novelist Henry Miller is his starting point.

1. Henry Miller (b. 1891)

Young people defending the pornographic content of some of Miller's writings, says Schaeffer, often say his writing is really a "philosophic statement". Schaeffer agrees. Miller's books, he says, "are certainly dirty books and because of this will soil you. However, they are not intended to be mere pornography. Miller is an anti-law writer. He smashes everything to pieces so that there is nothing left".[91] Even sex is smashed, something especially devastating to modern man because in his disillusionment he often turns to the sexual area, hoping to find some kind of reality or meaning.

Schaeffer sees destructiveness in many writers who can be judged "by the way they use the girl" in their books. The playmate becomes a mere plaything, reminiscent of the Marquis de Sade with his "sadism" in the name of nature.[92]

2. John Osborne (b. 1929)

Osborne is one of the "angry young men" Schaeffer selects as an example of modern dramatists who have gone "below the line". Osborne the idealist has lost his way. He is a man of good temperament, courage and sensitivity. He is on his charger with lance at the ready to fight the foe, but, says Schaeffer, his defective approach is summed up in his play, Martin Luther. The early part of Luther's life is sketched with commendable accuracy. The moment of truth, however, comes forcibly at the end of the play:

> Luther is standing with one of his babies in his arms. The elderly head of Luther's old monastery comes to visit him. They face each other. The old man says, 'Martin, do you know you are right?'

> And against all history Osborne makes him reply, 'Let's hope so'. The lights come on, the curtain is down and the play is finished- The drama critic of The Times understood it. He said, 'Isn't it interesting that he had to put in that last line to make it a twentieth century play?'.[93]

So the current lack of absolutes is demonstrated. The playwright could not bring his hero to express the certainty for which he had earlier faced death rather than deny it.[94]

Schaeffer's limited number of examples to drive home his point exposes him to some criticism. When writing of drama, Schaeffer's evidence lacks the impact of the contemporary. Much modern drama offers a better launching pad for criticism of the despair and uncertainty of the present age.

3. Dylan Thomas (1914-1953)

Schaeffer selects Dylan Thomas who, he thinks, typifies the strong pull towards despair in much modern poetry, and cites Thomas's "Elegy".[95] The correct order of its thirteen stanzas is in doubt, but the whole poem is loaded with the burden of despair.

> Too proud to die, broken and blind he died
> The darkest way, and did not turn away,
> A cold kind man brave in his narrow pride.
> . . . . . .
> Being innocent, he dreaded that he died,
> Hating his God, but what he was was plain;
> An old kind man brave in his burning pride.

Schaeffer thinks none can look at the bust of Dylan Thomas in one of the high galleries of London's Festival Hall without compassion for the poet of despair.

This is sensitivity crying out in darkness. But

> it is not mere emotion . . . These men are not producing an art for art's sake, or emotion for emotion's sake. These things are a strong message coming out of their own world view.[96]

Whether it is fair to typify Dylan Thomas as the poet of despair may be questioned. Thomas's work deserves more comprehensive treatment than Schaeffer gives it in half a page. To read his poem "And Death Shall Have No Dominion",[97] would show him as capable of deep insights surmounting all despair. Schaeffer would not deny this.

4. Schaeffer's View of the World of Cinema

Philosophic concepts are seldom formalised in propositional statements. Most are articulated in art, music, poetry, novels and drama. Sartre's and Camus' existentialist concepts are cases in point. Sartre's Nausea (1938), and Camus' The Stranger (1942) and The Plague (1947) are prime examples of informal philosophy.

a. Schaeffer sees a "fragmented world" in all expressions of modern culture including the cinema.

"Poetry, drama, the novel, and especially films carried these ideas to the mass of people", he says, so leading to an almost unanimous voice proclaiming the dogma of a fragmented universe. Since it comes "from every side and with many voices, it is difficult not to be infiltrated by it".

> We and our children now get this message from every side . . . from art, music, general culture, modern theology, the mass media, and often even comic books. Perhaps cinema, especially in the Sixties, proclaimed this message in a way that spread it most widely.[98]

Major (informal) philosophic statements gaining the

widest hearing are being made through film and television. In the 1960s a number of movies with a "message" reached many more people than were influenced by art or general literature.

b. Schaeffer's film selections show a preference for European (as contrasted with American) settings and sources, as also for European producers. His list includes The Last Year at Marienbad, by Alan Resnais, (1961); The Silence, by Ingmar Bergman (1963); Juliet of the Spirits, by Federico Fellini (1965); Blow-up, by Michelangelo Antonioni (1966); Belle de Jour, by Luis Bunal (1967); and The Hour of the Wolf, by Ingmar Bergman (1967).[99]

These films portray a message with dramatic effect: that man is a machine to be manipulated; that life itself is irrational. They suggest that the rapid move towards irrationality is taking place with unstoppable momentum. No categories are being left to man. He has no plumbline by which to measure right and wrong. He cannot distinguish objective truth from fantasy or illusion.[100] Moral categories are effectually erased, and replaced by what is pragmatic, useful or convenient.

c. As an example of meaninglessness Schaeffer cites Antonioni's film, Blow-up, the blurb for which reads "Murder without guilt, love without meaning". The producer is expressing his personal conviction that in an irrational world there are no certain moral values. They never enter the reckoning. They are excluded, not formally but by the simple assumption of non-existence. Thus Blow-up had no hero, no heroine. The main character keeps snapping pictures

of persons and things, but their significance is lost in obscurity. The models he snaps, says Schaeffer, have lost all humanity and meaning. He writes:

> After a scene in which clowns play tennis without a ball, there is at the end of the film a reverse zoom shot in which the man who is the central character disappears entirely, and all that remains is the grass. Man is gone. Modern people, on the basis of reason, see themselves only as machines.[101]

d. Ingmar Bergman provides a good example of an attempt to deny all certainty and to confuse reality with illusion. When The Silence (1963) had been filmed, he said he had come to conclude that God is dead. There was only silence in the universe, on which basis the film was made. His later film The Hour of the Wolf (1967) confuses viewers by fusing reality and fantasy as to make them indistinguishable, and the problem is never resolved. The films Last Year at Marienbad and Belle de Jour might be viewed a hundred times "and there would still be no way to be sure what was portrayed as objectively true and what was part of a character's imagination".[102]

Schaeffer regarded Bergman's The Silence as a statement of "utter nihilism" with immoral and pornographic themes, its message being that life has neither a rational nor moral base. Bergman found it impossible to live out the practical implications of his philosophy. His use of Bach's Goldberg Variations was done, he said, in response to the "small, holy part of the human being" where music speaks.[103]

e. Schaeffer's analysis of cinema follows the

pattern of his earlier survey of music, where his major concentration was classical music, not pop or rock. Similarly, in surveying films, he focusses on the more sophisticated films as examples of the message to be conveyed. The mass of hundreds of lesser films are not mentioned by him. Yet these inferior productions present to the world the same fragmented message, no less effectively than the "high-brow" films. Of the two kinds of films Schaeffer regards the sophisticated as the greater threat in terms of the message transmitted.

f. Schaeffer does make a distinction between good and bad cinema. Not all escapist films are condemned simply because violence is a component. Yet he says that in recent years most of the so-called "good" pictures "have almost all been developed by men holding the modern philosophy of meaninglessness".[104]

5. Some of Schaeffer's Omissions

Since most feature films are shown also on television the brief account of them in this section also includes that medium. In Schaeffer's coverage an important omission is the potent influence of television's major money spinners in the form of so-called soap operas that run for years on major networks world-wide, shaping the ethics of society. Were analyses to be made of their influence, it would be found to be more potent than that of the cinema.

a. In commenting on Schaeffer's omissions it must be noted that in his over-all review of the arts, literature and films his selectivity and brevity diminish the claim of being a true analysis. Yet on the basis of the

evidence presented Schaeffer makes a good case. His choice of novels has a somewhat "dated" feeling about it. He disregards the modern paperback bestseller type of fiction with its successfully selling mixture of violence, sex, intrigue and crime. Such literature has an enormous sale throughout the entire world. It is not difficult to conjecture what Schaeffer might have said of modern novels such as those by Lawrence Sanders (The Lovers of Harry; "sun-warmed sex and luxury); David Lindsey (Heat From Another Sun; "the blood runs cold"); or the highly explicit sex scenes in Harold Robbins's novels like The Carpet Baggers, Never Love a Stranger and others. All these, along with super-spy stories from such as Le Carré, Robert Ludlum and Ian Fleming, portray a lifestyle of elegant, casual and happy amorality in which the values of our Western heritage are assumed to be a thing of the past. Had Schaeffer wished it, he could have found in these abundant material to stiffen his case against Western ethical decline.

b. An important area of modern communications that gets no more than passing mention from Schaeffer is the news world and the Press. While he includes them in "mass media" he has made no analysis of any part of them except to say that objectivity in news is no longer a primary quality found in its presentation. Here, too, as in other aspects of Western culture, subjectivism has begun to play a major role, and the effective management of news is a skill that runs parallel to the new suppositions Schaeffer sees as governing society today. He shows a limited understanding of the complex problems of a free Press.[105]

IV. Mystic Religious Experience in the Twentieth Century Western World

Religious practice has a place in any discussion of twentieth century ethics and culture. A proven surge of interest in mysticism and the occult are features of the modern era. Schaeffer connects this partly with the influence of the Huxleys who encouraged the use of drugs as a route to psychological or mystical experience. Eastern religions, chiefly elements of Hinduism and Buddhism, became fashionable in the 1960s. For Schaeffer this was "grasping for a non-rational meaning to life and values", thus constituting "the central reason why these Eastern religions are so popular in the West today".[106] While he believes that Goethe, Wagner and others "with their vague pantheism" had opened the door to Easternism, he says:

> It came floodlike into the West with Huxley and the emphasis on drugs . . . Young people (and older ones) tried the drug trip and then turned to the Eastern religion trip. Both seek truth inside one's own head and both negate reason.[107]

C.S. Lewis had predicted an upsurge of interest in the occult and in witchcraft among Britain's youth, but he thought this would follow a decline (in Britain) of sound Christian teaching. Interest in the occult, Lewis thought, would follow inevitably. "Spiritual nature, like bodily nature, will be served; deny it food and it will gobble up poison", he wrote.[108] This prediction was fulfilled in the formation of numerous witches' covens, Satanist churches and groups practising occultism and cultivating mystic religious experience. The trend has continued into the 1980s.

Morton Kelsey has referred at length to this phenomenon among young people and others in America.

> This ground swell of common reaction and thinking--for it can hardly be called a movement--is characterized by interest in communal living, abolition of war, in the black culture, drugs, ecology, back to nature simplicity, sexual freedom, and the occult! Its hero is the American Indian, with his closeness to nature, his appreciation of the dream, his vivid rituals. Marijuana and other "mind expanding" drugs are used by the large majority of these youths as a way of breaking out of ordinary perceptions of time and space and making contact with nonphysical reality, and for many this has a religious quality. At the same time there is a fascination with astrology, numerology, the tarot cards, the I Ching, transcendental meditation, yoga, witchcraft and demonology.[109]

A. <u>The Link between Drugs and Occultism</u>

This link is better known today than when Schaeffer first wrote of it. Both seek truth within the subjective personality. Both negate reason. Another aspect pushes occultism forward as an "upper storey hope". While demons do not fit modern man's rational concepts, "many moderns would rather have demons than be left with the idea that everything in the universe is only one big machine". People will still put the occult in the upper storey of non-reason with the idea of having some kind of meaning.[110]

History has shown the truth of C.S. Lewis's celebrated remark: "There are two equal and opposite errors into which our race can fall about devils. One is to disbelieve in their existence. The other is to believe and then feel an excessive and unhealthy interest in them".[111]

Some observers see the trend to the occult as surprising. Os Guinness thought that, until comparatively recently, a professed belief in an astral, supernatural, or occult world would have been rejected as absurd. Such ideas are like horror films, he feels, and are no more than modern man's substitutes for his loss of belief in hell. He writes:

> Perhaps stories of the occult were to be expected as part of the Middle Ages or the missionary world, but certainly they had little to do with the twentieth-century West and still less to do with the avant garde and the young. But the occult can no longer be relegated in time or distance. Yesterday's sceptics are some of today's firmest believers.[112]

The trend to occultism has not taken place in a cultural vacuum, and Guinness mentions several predisposing factors:

B. Predisposing Cultural Factors in the Swing to Occultism

1. The first among these is the eclipse of rationalism. Whereas Reformation theology strengthened rationalism, the weakening of Reformation theology, along with the new expanding science of psycho-analysis and modern existentialism have opened windows on the side of the "super-rational". Occultism, an ancient practice, has appeared at this window. Now that rationalism is weakened, or even removed, occultism experiences no barriers to its own development.

2. A second factor that encourages the occult lies in liberal theology's handicap in the realm of its critical function. The Bible teaches the reality of the occult.[113] It provides norms for judging the real and the

counterfeit. But liberal theology's scepticism towards the supernatural undermines its faith in the Bible's credibility when the Scriptures speak of occultism. Thus some in the church who fail to find spiritual reality there take refuge in another reality--occultism. Eventually, therefore, experience (whether true or false) becomes the essential yardstick by which religion is judged, and on this basis occultism flourishes.

3. Yet another predisposing factor, as Guinness sees it, is the momentum achieved by psychic and para-psychological research. Although William James's basic work on religious experience was first published as far back as 1902, it pointed to the possibilities of what he called "a diabolical mysticism, a sort of religious mysticism turned upside down" which may spring "from that great subliminal or transmarginal region of which science is beginning to admit the existence".[114]

Much has been done since James's time. Work on extra-sensory perception, synchronicity, and a paranormal state which Guinness refers to as one "which closely parallels what was once held to be the astral plane of the occult";[115] all this and more has been subject to investigation. Jung has referred to astrology as "scientia intuitiva".

While Schaeffer regards the swing to the occult as a "breakdown" others, like R.D. Laing, think of it as a "breakthrough".[116] Marshall McLuhan is quoted as saying that "the current interest of youth in astrology, clairvoyance and the occult" is no coincidence, because "mysticism is just tomorrow's science dreamed of today".[117]

Within Christianity the natural and supernatural co-exist as realities. Historic Christianity has always distinguished good and evil supernatural powers as Paul and others taught. Occultism, therefore, is not non-spirituality, but evil spirituality, and the distinction is important.

C. Areas in which Modern Occultism is Visible

In this section some imagery from Os Guinness may usefully be borrowed. His eighth chapter of Dust of Death is called "Encircling Eyes".[118] The practice of African safari hunters is to build fires at night to keep away wild animals. But when these burn low one can see all around the shapes of animals and a ring of encircling eyes in the darkness--a vivid picture of the truth that Christianity's decline encourages predators, of which occultism is one.

Three main categories in which the revival of occultism shows itself are superstition, spiritism and Satanism, each of which must be briefly considered:

1. An illustration of superstition

Schaeffer cites Nobel prize winner Francis Crick (1962) as having been shocked to find university bookstores full of books on astrology and wondering "whether people who feel that way should be at a university".[119]

Crick's sense of shock was, of course, almost naïve. Time magazine estimated (1969) that there were 10 000 full-time astrologers in the U.S.A.

Evangelical orthodoxy has paid little interest to this phenomenon, though throughout history belief in astrology has played a part in decisions affecting the destiny of nations or armies. The metaphor of the predator is apt,

however, in showing how uncertainties and loss of Christian faith create a vacuum that must be filled.

2. The attraction of Spiritism

Belief in the reality and power of evil spirits has an ancient pedigree and well documented history.[120] One of Schaeffer's chief complaints is that this is the day of contentless religion when few ask about the origins of spiritistic phenomena, so long as the experience itself is plausible. "We are now in an era", writes Guinness, "in which the counterfeit flourishes alongside the genuine and the spiritistic passes for the spiritual".[121]

Though cultic spiritism flourishes in the world on a low-key basis it remains what Ralph Casson has called "The Challenging Counterfeit"--the title of his 1966 volume.[122] All the predisposing conditions that make it attractive are still present in society. It remains a part, therefore, of the intellectual and religious climate of the century in which Schaeffer contended for evangelical orthodoxy.

3. Modern Satanism in the West

For Christians this is occultism in its most offensive form. Examples of its extremes are found in all Western countries. While a city like San Francisco has a 10 000 member Church of Satan, many smaller groups are flourishing. Some are more religious stunts than genuine beliefs. Yet much of Satanism is deadly serious in purpose. Books like Dennis Wheatley's The Satanist and films like Rosemary's Baby have been vehicles for its propagation. The road to Satanism is signposted with sex, drugs and occult experimentation. Young women have been its easiest targets.[123]

V. Schaeffer's View of Cultural Erosions in 'Christian' America

Schaeffer's deep concern about the trend in America towards permissiveness, family breakdown, pornography and abortion is intensified by his belief that America was founded on Christian principles. But a shift in world view has taken place.

> This shift has been away from a world view that was at least vaguely Christian in people's memory (even if they were not individually Christian) toward something completely different--toward a world view based upon the idea that the final reality is impersonal matter or energy shaped into its present form by impersonal chance.[124]

The differences between the two world views are most pronounced in society, government and law.

A. Ethical Erosions in Politics and Law

Schaeffer avoids the chessboard of international power play and concentrates on movements within the American social order, tracing their retreat from Christian values.

1. The student protest movement. Society in the 1960s was made "campus aware", aided by a surge of leftist governmental victories in Asia and the Third World.[125]

Schaeffer's coverage of "Our Society"[126] is American-oriented, with student movements to the fore. The great Free Speech Movement had arrived. Idealistic youth was questioning the very meaning of education, or even of work. "The work ethic, which had meaning within the Christian framework, now became ugly as the Christian base was removed." With motivation destroyed and values gone, in 1964

Berkeley's students "carried out these ideas of meaninglessness into the streets".[127]

From there the step to drugs and the flower children was easy. It brought "a new society with bells, beads and flowers, peace and love, acid and psychedelia, as if the dream world of the unconscious had suddenly become tangible".[128]

Yet this was but an interlude before the serious business of left-wing political activity and the Free Speech Movement led by Herbert Marcuse as prophet and hero. His books were arguments for revolution, chiefly against the dictatorial power of the mass media that Guinness described as "the monolithic mentality of 'telenewsmagspeak' which Theodore White has called 'the opinionated Mafia'".[129]

Through its own excesses of violence and depravity the New Left lost ground and the personal values of peace and prosperity once more prevailed. The end of the Vietnam war brought an artificial lull in revolutionary fervour to an exhausted society.

2. Erosions in American law. Schaeffer devotes attention to what he perceives as a movement away from Lex Rex towards a concept of sociological law in America. In terms of this, in the words of an eminent jurist, Oliver Wendell Holmes (1841-1935), "Truth is the majority vote of that nation that could lick all others".[130] He cites a former Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, Frederick Moore Vinson (1890-1953) as saying, "Nothing is more certain in modern society than the principle that there are no absolutes"[131] and that all is relative. For Schaeffer this

is a slide into post-Christian thinking that touches society in one of its former bastions of truth. Thus today the "humanist world view", says Schaeffer, "controls the consensus in society, much of the media, much of what is taught in our schools, and much of the arbitrary law produced by the various departments of government".[132]

3. Political violence and Christianity.

Schaeffer's rejection of violence as a catharsis of society is explicit. He endeavours to make a clear distinction between force and violence which he regards as crucial to understanding society's role. He cites Os Guinness: "In a fallen world the ideal of legal justice without the exercise of force is naive".[133] Yet he interprets violence merely as an "overreaction" that crosses the line from force to unjustified violence. His discussion lacks depth and does not solve the dilemmas arising from contemporary political situations. Guinness has tried to be more incisive in his discussion of the topic.

> It is important to understand the emergence of the theory of violence, particularly as it relates to the modern dilemma . . . One essential point must be grasped. In all of them is the idea that violence in human society has a certain normality. Here is the Achilles heel. In these theories violence, beginning as 'normal', soon slides to 'necessary' and then to 'legitimate'.[134]

Schaeffer believes our century has rationalised violence into a virtue, and echoes of this approach are found in Marcuse, Cleaver, Stokely Carmichael and R.D. Laing. The outworking of this theory finds its expression, ultimately, in aspects of Liberation Theology.[135]

4. The place of civil disobedience. The connection between this and political violence is close. Schaeffer discusses it in his Christian Manifesto, first by commenting on basic scriptures like Romans 13:1-4 and I Peter 2:13-17. He then asks what the duty of Christians might be when the state violates its legitimate function, concluding that the "bottom line" is that "at a certain point there is not only a right, but the duty, to disobey the state".[136]

Schaeffer quotes many examples of protest from Protestant history in Europe. He supports Rutherford's Lex Rex (1644) asserting the law as above the king. Yet his total treatment of civil disobedience (like that of political violence) lacks depth. If it is not ambivalent, it is inconclusive and seems far removed from the modern world. Neither does he raise the important ethical matter of the attitude of the civil protester who defies the law, a point explicitly made in First Peter and in the Gospel accounts of the trial of our Lord. Schaeffer does not solve the problem of deciding who must be the arbiters of alleged transgressions by the State, especially when its actions are not overt. These questions remain important and need to be discussed in realistic, contemporary situations.

Thus Schaeffer regards force "in the defensive posture" as legitimate, but does not explain this in practical terms. While illustrations are given from the American Revolution period and from Hitler's Germany, these are unsatisfactory. Nor is it enough to say that German Christians "should have defied the false and counterfeit state and hidden (their) Jewish neighbours from the German SS troops".[137]

While Schaeffer recognises that civil disobedience is a double-edged weapon used also by revolutionaries and even cranks, he insists on its validity.

> If there is no final place for civil disobedience, then the government has been made autonomous and . . . put in the place of the Living God . . . because then you are to obey it even when it tells you in its way at that time to worship Caesar. And that point is exactly where the early Christians performed their acts of civil disobedience even when it cost them their lives.[138]

B. Ethical Erosions in Respect of Human Dignity

Schaeffer puts the highest possible value on human dignity, hence he protests violations of it in all spheres of life. In his Back to Freedom and Dignity he condemns deterministic theories in biology or psychology that reduce the human person to a conglomerate of genes subject to manipulation. Individuals have inherent dignity: "Made in God's image, man was made to be great, he was made to be creative in life and art".[139] In his view, although cultures can be judged in many ways (their achievements, riches, art, conquests) "eventually every nation in every age must be judged by this test: How did it treat people?"[140] He believes, therefore, that when Christian presuppositions are abandoned, societies will begin and continue an inevitable decline to what may be morally unthinkable now, but acceptable tomorrow.

While Schaeffer makes reference to a number of ethical issues throughout his writings, the areas that receive special attention are what Dennis P. Hollinger calls bioethics; then ecology, race, economics and war.[141]

1. Abortion, infanticide and euthanasia. In their compactly written book Whatever Happened to the Human Race?, Schaeffer and co-author C. Everett Koop put their case against the abandonment of Christian values in these areas that infringe human dignity.

Schaeffer sees the 1973 Roe v. Wade U.S. Supreme Court decision as showing that secular humanism has swamped the Christian consensus concerning the value of life in general. "Of all the subjects relating to the erosion of the sanctity of human life, abortion is the keystone. It is the first and crucial issue that has been overwhelming in changing attitudes toward the value of life in general".[142]

His arguments against abortion, while not supported by any direct appeal to Scripture, are based on belief that the possibilities for viability of the sperm and ovum are being increasingly demonstrated by genetics. "All that makes up the adult is present as the ovum and the sperm are united--the whole genetic code!"[143]

While Schaeffer also argues against abortion on the grounds of its after-effects on women concerned, his main concern is that the logical result of abortion will be the eventual condonation of infanticide, defined as "the killing of a born child--whether that killing is accomplished by a direct act on the part of someone, or whether ordinary care vital to the child's survival, such as feeding, is refused".[144]

The discussion then moves to the issue of children born with serious physical defects, and Schaeffer is at pains to underline the fact that quality lives have resulted from such handicapped persons, even when at other times there is

inward and justifiable relief on the death of some severely handicapped child.

The third aspect of bioethics Schaeffer discusses is euthanasia. His treatment illustrates what is later referred to as the "slippery slope" argument (see further, chapter 8). Schaeffer links abortion to euthanasia because the Roe v. Wade case had said that "only viable human beings who have the capacity for meaningful life may, but need not, be protected by the state".[145] This statement has an ominous ring for Schaeffer who sees it as a potential licence to kill, and he argues:

> Will a society that has assumed the right to kill infants in the womb--because they are unwanted, imperfect, or merely inconvenient--have difficulty in assuming the right to kill other human beings, especially older adults who are judged unwanted, deemed imperfect physically or mentally, or considered a possible social nuisance? [146]

It is clear that Schaeffer understands perfectly the difference between active euthanasia and the withholding of extraordinary means of treatment--prolonging the experience of dying rather than extending life.[147] Yet he thinks that treatment termination is often active euthanasia, done out of low views of the value of human life.

Finally, Schaeffer argues that contemporary discussions about euthanasia take us within range of the Nazi extermination atrocities under Hitler, which, he says, "started with the acceptance of the attitude that there is such a thing as a life not worthy to be lived. That is exactly what is being accepted today in the abortion, infanticide, and euthanasia

movements".[148]

Schaeffer has been criticised for taking so pessimistic a view of twentieth century thought on bioethics. He goes so far as to predict that the time might come when "if you are a social burden and an economic burden, no matter how precious life might be to you, there will be little chance of your surviving".[149] So strong is this pessimism that Schaeffer sees no way out except through a reinstatement of the moral and legal basis of Western culture.

2. Schaeffer's main point is proven. It is true that the current ethical and cultural climate is more complex than Schaeffer can describe. His attempt lacks the analytic method of the trained scientific observer. Yet while he is not a sociologist using statistics as evidence of the retreat of Western norms, he is at times persuasive, especially when describing changes in art forms. Inevitably, however, he pays a price for the breadth of his interests.

He succeeds, nevertheless, in sketching an over-all picture of ethical and cultural patterns of thought and theology, as underlying causes. His main thesis is largely proven: Western culture and ethics have suffered serious setbacks and are under enormous pressure from secularism in the twentieth century.

CHAPTER 4

Schaeffer's Methodology and Goals in relation to the Church

Schaeffer's goals of revival and reform in the Church of the twentieth century were not clear to him in his early years of ministry but emerged after a protracted spiritual struggle.[1] He knew the true condition of the post-war Church in Europe only after personal involvement in the 1950s. Even then, some years elapsed before it was clear that his ministry would take place in a wider field, that is, wider than L'Abri, even though this particular and unusual venture became a path to opportunity and fame.

Two things led directly to the ministry of pastoral apologetics in the service of the church at large. The first we might call (non-pejoratively) the "novelty" of L'Abri (established 1955) and the attraction it had for many disillusioned evangelicals; its message being spread by word of mouth through the visitors from all quarters. In this first factor one must include the publicity given to L'Abri by Edith Schaeffer's book, L'Abri, and by many magazine articles in evangelical publications preceding the book itself. All this expanded the human interest of the L'Abri story and reached large numbers of people.

The second factor had nothing directly to do with L'Abri, but with Schaeffer's almost accidental discovery that he had a publishable manuscript in his hands. "I knew I had in my hands something the Lord could use to give the gospel to my own generation".[2] For him it was like a surprising revelation of the potential impact of

the printed word. Once the discovery had been made, his methodology became a dynamic approach, with the immense advantages of printed works to advance his message. The wider ministry to the Church was rapidly expanded. With this the circle of influence was enlarged and the goal came into clear focus. Schaeffer's concern for evangelism was expressed in his particular methodology.

I. Schaeffer's Interest in Evangelism

At various times throughout his public life Schaeffer insisted that his primary interest was in evangelism. He and his wife had gone to Europe as missionaries. Years later his publishers, for reasons of their own, were fond of stressing his "profound scholarship in the various fields of theology, philosophy, history, sociology and the arts",[3] but this was so obviously an exaggeration that Schaeffer himself emphatically rejected it. In a published personal interview he declared:

> My interest is in evangelism. To evangelise in the twentieth century, one has to operate across the whole spectrum of disciplines and have answers to the questions . . . Evangelism, then, is two things: first of all, giving honest answers to honest questions to get the blocks out of the way so that people will listen to the Gospel as a viable alternative, and then, secondly, showing them what Christianity means across the whole spectrum of life.[4]

The following year at a film seminar, someone tried to call him a theological apologist, but Schaeffer broke in:

> You are trying to press me into the category of a theological apologist, which I'm really not.

> I'm not an academic, scholastic apologist. My interest is in evangelism.[5]

This disavowal was made at a time when he had come under criticism from Stephen Board and others (referred to on page 2 of this thesis) for overstepping the boundaries of his competence and so appearing to be a kind of dilettante in the theological world. This will be further discussed in our final chapter. Whether Schaeffer was seeking to offset this criticism is difficult to say. His protest about evangelism as his major interest does not settle the question, but leads to other questions.

What did Schaeffer mean by evangelism? Is this his goal or his method of approach? If a goal, then one might ask whether he addresses himself, in speech or writing, to an audience that requires to be evangelised? On the face of it, it appears not to be so, for, as will be shown, his books make their appeal, not to the unchurched man in the street, but to Christian people of all kinds. His writings have had no discernibly significant impact on secular man or the non-religious world, except to the extent of the publicity his fame has had. One must presume that Schaeffer knew the parameters of his work and the borders of his constituency. The response he looked for was not expected from non-Christianity, but from the Church, and, for that matter, a defined sector of the Church.[6]

By definition evangelism might be several things;
(a) an attempt by means of the proclamation of the gospel, to bring men into a relationship with God, in which case the end is evangelism; or,
(b) a method of presentation of the good news (as distinct

from education, teaching or cultural enrichment) in the hope of eliciting a response of faith; in which case the method itself is evangelism. Yet the term evangelism has much broader implications than either ends or methods.

Schaeffer's interest is in both goal and method, but not merely with technique. He and his wife had come to Europe in 1948, initially to evangelise--preach the good news. In this enterprise they were hindered by the disappearance, among people, of presuppositions that had been for many generations the acknowledged basis of Christian thinking; as also the basis of evangelism. Thus, from what had been a single purpose (to bring good news) sprang the prior need to clear away misconceptions so that the good news could be planted in prepared soil. This pre-evangelism process was designed to demonstrate the reality of a God who exists, as they tell of it in establishing L'Abri:

> Edith and I committed ourselves to God with one aim. It was not an evangelistic work we wished to start nor a young people's work nor a work for intellectuals nor an outreach to drug people. . . (We) asked God if he would use us to demonstrate that he exists in our generation.[7]

II. Evangelism in Schaeffer's Writings

Clearly, one might have an interest in evangelism without being an evangelist. In the major part of his writings Schaeffer does not directly engage in evangelism. The most cursory survey of his books shows him as addressing a number of problems across the spectrum of several related disciplines. The God Who is There is a mixture of theological and philosophical observation based on an

historical approach and dealing with Western man's defection from absolutes. It is--as previously described-- a "pot-pourri of apologetic thought". A section of it might be called pre-evangelism, what Schaeffer describes as "(getting) the blocks out of the way so that people will listen to the Gospel as a viable alternative".[8]

Similarly, Escape From Reason plunges into Nature and Grace and argues against Aquinas's defective view of the Fall and stresses the essential dignity of man despite his fallen state. It discusses rationality and faith and the folly of pitting one against the other. It warns the Church against a conglomerate of intellectual enslavement and spiritual darkness that menaces our century. Yet the appeal of this book is not that of an evangelist.

He is There and He is Not Silent (the third part of Schaeffer's trilogy as he calls it) presents us with "the philosophic necessity of God's being there and not being silent, in the area of metaphysics, morals and epistemology".[9] It is closely argued, and its goals are to persuade the thoughtful Christian, but certainly not to reach the unconverted. As such, neither its aim nor its method is evangelism except in the broadest sense. It is couched in terms already difficult for the Christian and even more obscure for the non-Christian. Although it is a strong argument for the existence of a God who is and for man made in His image, there is in it no direct proclamation of the gospel of grace.

Death in the City endeavours to answer the question: "What should be our perspective as individuals, as orthodox

Christians . . . Bible believing? How should we look at this post-Christian world and function as Christians in it?"[10] It deals with themes such as man's alienation from God; impending Divine judgment; the futility of external religion; man without the Bible. The author's stated aim is reform and revival: "constructive revolution in the orthodox, evangelical church".[11]

Although here the method includes the exposition of certain Scripture passages the book has all the marks of the lecture form and it would be nearly impossible to fit it into the category of evangelism. Its final appeal is to the evangelical church to promote constructive revolution of itself "even in the midst of death in the city".[12] While the author's interest might be in evangelism, the approach to it is indirect and there is no proclamation of the good news to non-believers.

Such works as Pollution and the Death of Man, Whatever happened to the Human Race?, A Christian Manifesto and Art and the Bible all deal with specialised topics: ecology, abortion, euthanasia, art, general culture. None of these has an overtly evangelistic aim, but they demonstrate the author's key statement that the task of evangelism is to show "what Christianity means across the whole spectrum of life".[13]

How Should We Then Live?, probably Schaeffer's best-known work apart from his first book, is too historical in its treatment to fulfill the requirements of an evangelistic appeal or proclamation of grace. Other volumes, like Genesis in Space and Time and Joshua and the Flow of Biblical History have a firm Scripture base, as also his

volume True Spirituality. Their substance is uniformly evangelical and to that extent important as showing Schaeffer's concern for the "inwardness" of a genuine spirituality.[14]

Schaeffer's last book, The Great Evangelical Disaster (1984) is the appeal and warning of an evangelical prophet (as his son-in-law called him)[15] to the Church which had heard but not heeded his previous exhortations to return to a biblical Christianity. It summarises and re-states much of what had been said before, but is addressed specifically to the Church of his time.

This brief survey of Schaeffer's major writings does not presume to answer all questions relating to his evangelism. It goes no further than to show that Schaeffer was occupied in his writings with much more than evangelism. He says of them:

> My early books dealt especially with the intellectual questions of philosophy and matters in the area of culture. Then there were books dealing with the Christian life and the church. More recently (1980s) my books have dealt especially with the area of civil needs and the needs of law and government. Throughout . . . there is a common unifying theme . . . the Lordship of Christ in the totality of life.[16]

The fact that Schaeffer was often described in terms of his intellectual approach shows the image that was frequently projected to young people. It made him popular with students from evangelical backgrounds who felt cheated by the sparse intellectuality of the Billy Graham type of evangelism. A fair compromise to be found in regard to Schaeffer's contribution to evangelism is that his thinking

provided a useful framework upon which evangelists in conservative circles could build their case.

III. Evangelism in Schaeffer's Public Ministry

Schaeffer's spoken ministry was a response to questions people were asking. His knowledge, he says, was gained by years of hard study and "trying to listen to the twentieth-century man as he talked".[17]

There were some qualitative differences between Schaeffer the author and Schaeffer the preacher, lecturer or conversationalist. He was more naturally at home with the spoken word than with the discipline of writing. His early books, edited transcripts of spoken addresses, had a communication potential that is far from being fully effective. This is a common criticism found among readers of works such as The God Who is There and He is There and He is Not Silent. We know from the facts of his public engagements that in student gatherings and seminar-type discussions there was a greater degree of intellectual penetration than could be achieved merely by reading a book. Question time at the close of many lectures (or during them) provided Schaeffer with the opportunity to be the evangelistic apologist to an extent that went far beyond his books or notes.

Schaeffer describes how his world-wide tape cassette ministry started during one such informal session. "One day we were having a bang-up conversation with some Smith College girls, all of them really bright girls, agnostic or atheistic" when a hidden microphone was found which was "the unplanned beginning of our tape programme".[18]

1. Dialogue evangelism at L'Abri

In the L'Abri setting Schaeffer was at his most effective as a communicator. His interest in evangelism is seen in the conversations and classroom situations of L'Abri where the desire to present Christianity in an appealing and rational fashion was a chief part of his evangelistic purpose. He called it balanced Christianity.

> This is something for which we have struggled and struggled at L'Abri--a Christianity which has balance, not only exegetically and intellectually, but also in the area of reality and beauty . . . beginning with the Christian system . . . in the verbalised propositional revelation of the Bible, one can move along (into) every area of life.[19]

In our earlier survey of Schaeffer's books we noted that in them the evangelist is less prominent than the apologist and prophet, despite what Schaeffer has to say about his aim. In the L'Abri situation, however, there was an evangelistic emphasis evoked, probably, by the presence of non-believers.

The results of the L'Abri ministry could be measured by the conversion to Christ of a number of persons of various ages and stations in life as a response to Schaeffer's direct personal ministry. Furthermore, numbers of confused and perplexed Christians whose coming to L'Abri was motivated by a desire for restoration, were renewed and strengthened by the experience. Vernon Grounds says: "It was a community where divine reality and sufficiency permeated life. . . . Little wonder, therefore, that hundreds of thankful guests left L'Abri committed or recommitted to the Christian faith".[20]

2. The Schaeffers' Lifestyle Evangelism

When in June 1955 the L'Abri Fellowship was formally established the Schaeffers adopted four principles as basic to its growth and development. These were:

(a) They would maintain an open home with prayer to God in respect of the people He would send to them.

(b) They would pray for money, food and supplies on a daily basis, for themselves and their visitors.

(c) There would be no blueprint or plan for the development of the work, but the group would wait on "God's leading" as to whether the work remained small or grew.

(d) The workers needed would be prayed about and positions would not be advertised.

These principles are found also in the foundations of the original China Inland Mission established by Hudson Taylor, of which organisation Edith Schaeffer's parents (George and Jessie Seville) had been missionaries.[21]

In a day when "lifestyle evangelism" is still a comparatively new concept, the Schaeffers are found to have made their choice of lifestyle the central part of their evangelism and witness. The principle of living on the basis of daily dependence on God for all material needs was not new. The core of this belief had long been part of the tradition of evangelical "faith missions". By the time the Schaeffers adopted this plan they had had seven years experience of work in Europe and had built up a considerable network of contacts among praying and giving Christians in the U.S.A. Their faith lifestyle choice, however, was undoubtedly an important factor in the over-all evangelism

objective and it led to the expansion of L'Abri in the years following. Inevitably Schaeffer's growing fame and popularity in the 1970s following the publication of his books, affected the early simplicity and the "romanticism" associated with the L'Abri community, but there is no evidence that organisation impaired the original vision the Schaeffers cherished.

To summarise Schaeffer's interest in evangelism: He prescribed no plan. He attempted first to remove the intellectual obstacles or misconceptions in order to clear the way for proclamation of the good news. No special technique is suggested, although conversational evangelism on a personal basis or in classrooms did in fact become a feature of his ministry. Schaeffer's focus is on the Church as the instrument of evangelism. Also, pre-evangelism is of vital importance and his writings show this to the full. All is backed by lifestyle evangelism as being a model for believers and a witness to non-believers.

IV. Some Perspectives on Schaeffer the Apologist

Many evangelicals see Schaeffer in profile as a robust defender of the faith, roughly in the same league as British evangelicals two decades earlier had seen C.S. Lewis, with whom he will be compared and contrasted in the next chapter.

Schaeffer's apologetics had an impact on all of English-speaking evangelicalism and to many other groups who read his works or heard his tapes in translation.[22] It was, however, heavily concentrated on those who shared his main theological concerns. As an apologist even the secular press

recognised his influence. In a feature article on Schaeffer, Time Magazine called his work at L'Abri a "Mission to Intellectuals"[23] which was denied by Schaeffer. Eternity magazine reported that in the 1970s he had "more influence with today's youth . . . from members of the drop-out world to the disillusioned heirs of evangelicalism . . .than any other man".[24] In the last years of his life there was a broad consensus (though not without its objectors) within evangelical Christianity that he and the L'Abri community were a major influence in evangelicalism.

The fundamentalists, especially, were appreciative of him. His stand on biblical inerrancy (discussed in chapter 2) was enough to ensure fundamentalist admiration for him. Cal Thomas, in the Fundamentalist Journal, wrote a eulogy of him, saying: "He glorified and magnified God, won men and women to Christ, and was faithful to the truth, the inerrancy, the infallibility of the Word of God to the end".[25] This adulation across the board prompted his co-author in their book on abortion, U.S. Surgeon-General C. Everett Koop, to call him "God's man for this era", while, on his death President Ronald Reagan wrote to his family: "He will long be remembered as one of the great Christian thinkers of our century".[26]

The element of extravagance that might be found in these tributes does not diminish Schaeffer's stature, nor does it explain his popularity as a champion of evangelical orthodoxy, but it does suggest that evangelicals were responding to what they felt was a need to defend a faith that was under siege. C.S. Lewis's apologetics had met with

similar enthusiasm on the part of British evangelicals.

V. Evangelicalism in the 1970s as Perspective to Schaeffer's Apologetics

For the sake of accuracy Schaeffer needs to be seen as part of a forward movement among U.S.A. evangelicals throughout the 1970s. While the American context is primary, its overflow was visible in all parts of the English-speaking world.

To those who had thought of the church as weak, the 1976 Gallup Survey indicating the strength of evangelical religion came as a surprise. Part of this report, published later as "Religion in America, 1977-78", showed that while evangelicals shared a number of beliefs, the one most familiar to outsiders was the emphasis on having been born again, a turning point in life when a personal commitment to Christ had taken place. The report noted:

> Currently one person (of voting age) in three, 34 per cent, says he or she has been born again --a figure that projects to nearly 50 million Americans, 18 and over. Among Protestants, nearly 48 per cent say they are born-again Christians.[27]

Those professing the new life experience have varied backgrounds, from Roman Catholics to Baptists, but the survey's importance lies in its secular origins and its sociological methods of research.

On the basis of this and other surveys it was optimistically thought that the late 1970s were the start of a religious revival. The rise of the Charismatic movement (which emphasised spiritual experience) and of the Moral

Majority (which emphasised social action on moral issues) contributed substantially to this belief and especially to the use of the phrase "born again". The secular Press took up the term as a slogan as if it were a new discovery instead of a long-standing scripture.[28] Evangelicals became more aware of their influence and religion was once more being discussed in the market place.

Thus American conservative Christianity in the 1970s gained impressive strength and publicity, and the rise of Schaeffer coincided with it. Newsweek wrote a six-page cover story on "the most significant--and overlooked--religious phenomenon of the 70s: the emergence of evangelical Christianity into a position of respect and power".[29] The year 1976 was dubbed "The Year of the Evangelicals". climaxing a decade in which "evangelical Christianity has been growing quietly for ten years--often at the expense of played-out mainline churches".[30] Michael Novak, respected Catholic theologian and columnist, wrote that "the most understated demographic reality in the United States is the huge number of evangelical Protestants".[31]

This interest in the growth of evangelical religion was as much a sociological phenomenon as it was religious. Dean M. Kelley, a mainline ecumenical Protestant, had earlier written extensively on the growth of the conservative movement in his work Why Conservative Churches are Growing: A Study in the Sociology of Religion (1972). Theologically conservative groups, he showed, "have made amazing gains in recent years. . . conservative churches, holding seemingly outmoded theology and making strict demands on their people" had in many cases surpassed in growth "the yearly

percentage increases of the nation's population".[32]

Kelley reached two conclusions about the growth of conservative religion: first, that these churches provided people with more effective answers to ultimate questions of God, and life and death; second, that they call forth, more effectively, a personal commitment because of their emphasis on strictness and discipline.

There is a clear correspondence between Schaeffer's thought and Kelley's researches. If Kelley's findings are accepted it may be seen that Schaeffer's total ministry of apologetics, through his books and lectures, whether in Europe or America, took place in an upward spiral of conservative evangelicalism. His popularity was with the stream and not against it, which makes it possible to see the breadth of his platform and constituency.

Of interest to evangelicals is a report published eight years earlier than Kelley's, in which Rodney Stark and Charles T. Glock reported on their research, a random survey of 97 Protestant congregations and 21 Roman Catholic parishes in four Northern Californian counties. Their objective was to discover "the nature of religious commitment"--something different from Kelley's purpose in 1976. At the conclusion of their study they speculated about the main features of the "changing character of American Christianity" and were led to two conclusions:

(i) The religious beliefs which had been foundational to the Christian faith for nearly two thousand years "are on their way out; this may very well be the dawn of a post-Christian era".

(ii) The expectation was (according to Stark and Glock)

that people would move away from the traditional faith into denominations "with more demythologised positions".[33]

There appears to be a direct conflict between the findings of Stark and Glock (1968) and those of Kelley (1976). The earlier report was, however, very parochial and limited in its objectives. The later one was researched over a wider area and a longer period and is borne out by the observations of a more knowledgeable support group. Stark & Glock examined a much less generalised sampling of American Protestant life known to be one of the most "liberal" areas and atypical of the country as a whole.

Stark and Glock's conclusion that "the religious beliefs which have been the bedrocks of the Christian faith . . . are on their way out", and that this may herald a post-Christian era, corresponds substantially to Schaeffer's fear expressed in The God Who is There.[34] Indeed, Schaeffer does not debate post-Christianity but takes it as fact. It is a strong part of his motivation in wanting to defend values that are neglected or jettisoned by post-Christian thinking. Schaeffer did believe that the Christian consensus was rapidly being lost, and to that extent Stark and Glock were right within the context of their own research. Where they were wrong was in the assumption that conservatism had not power to recover in the years ahead, or even in their neglect of the potential of religious revival under God. As is now known, a resurgence of conservatism occurred and Schaeffer, along with others, rode the crest of its wave during one particular decade of his popularity.

The evangelical community that supported Schaeffer in his apologist's role felt he saw the issues clearly and was

willing to stand up for them, and this leads directly to the issues which Schaeffer felt bound to defend.

VI. The Positions That Schaeffer Defends

Schaeffer's disclaimer about being a "theological apologist" has been noted, and while his stress on evangelism has been examined, it is necessary to ask why the Christian public saw him chiefly as a defender of orthodox, historical Christianity. What, then, were the positions that he defended?

1. Schaeffer defended historic Christianity.

His first series of published messages shows his concern for "Speaking Historic Christianity into the Twentieth Century Climate". His argument proceeds along these lines:

> Christian apologetics has a dual purpose. The first is defence and the second is to communicate Christianity in such a way that the present generation can understand it. The techniques of communication vary from one generation to the next and apologetics will reflect these changes. Because historic Christianity is always under attack in successive generations, it needs to be defended, but this is not the same as being on the defensive. We must be competent to give adequate answers when questions are raised. Conversation and dialogue are an important part of the communications process directed towards obtaining answers. Such answers must be found for two reasons: First, to maintain our own intellectual integrity, and, second, for the sake of those for whom we have a responsibility.[35] Schaeffer says of this:
>
> It is unreasonable to expect people of the next

> generation in any age to continue in the historic Christian position unless they are helped to see where arguments and connotations brought against Christianity and against them by their generation are fallacious. We must prepare Christian young people to face the monolithic twentieth century culture by teaching them what the particular attack in our generation is, in contrast to the attacks of previous generations.[36]

Such a defence of historic Christianity must be a "conscious defence" requiring careful planning, preparation and detailed knowledge. Lack of such knowledge has robbed the Church of its apologetic armour and diminished its effectiveness as defender of the faith.[37]

The positive aspect of apologetics is "communication of the Gospel to the present generation in terms of what they understand".[38] Theoreticians are like people living in a castle with the drawbridge up and occasionally tossing stones over the wall. This is a citadel mentality that nullifies apologetics because it has no effective point of contact. Apologetics, argues Schaeffer, must not merely be a new kind of scholasticism, but it must be devised and practised in real life situations. "The Christian should be interested . . . in something that has constant contact with reality . . . questions asked by his own generation".[39]

With the past gone and the future yet to come, the present is all-important. We are to realise, Schaeffer says, that no-one becomes a Christian unless he <u>understands</u> what Christianity is saying; hence the importance of our communication of the faith to our own generation.

At this point in the argument for a relevant apologetics comes a strong emphasis on <u>knowledge</u> as the basis for

salvation and spiritual action. Schaeffer calls this "pre-evangelism" which is not a "soft option". He says:

> The biblical emphasis that knowledge is needed prior to salvation will influence us in attaining that knowledge needed to communicate the Gospel. Historic Christianity has never separated itself from knowledge . . . The invitation to act comes only after an adequate base of knowledge has been given.[40]

As to what this "knowledge" is, it is of an historical nature. The writer of John's gospel says that Jesus did many other signs not written in his book, "but these are written that you may believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God" (John 20:31). These signs--which Schaeffer calls "space-time proofs"[41]--are observable historical facts capable of being considered by all. We are not asked to believe until the question has been faced as to whether this is true on the basis of the evidence.

Such an approach to Christianity with its heavy emphasis on rationality is a principal characteristic of Schaeffer. It exposes him to the criticism that his teaching on faith is dependent, ultimately, on intellectual persuasion or logical demonstration, or on the proofs of history. He illustrates both from John's and Luke's gospel, citing the careful historical data of Luke's prologue. He says: "We know from the prologue that Luke is dealing with a framework of historic truth, and we are to place Herod, Zacharias and Christ within this space-time framework".[42]

Unalterable history is a fact reflecting itself also in a fixed body of truth that Schaeffer believes to be the foundation of the historic Christian faith. It is true that

the manner and style of proclamation will differ from one generation to another, yet not its essential truth.

Schaeffer's own grasp of Reformation principles meant he understood that doctrine and theology were subject to historical development. His use of "historic faith" is, however, narrowed down to mean the events of God's revelation in Old and New Testament history.

2. Schaeffer defended the authority of Scripture.

This he did as being part of historic Christianity.[43] Schaeffer's resistance to Barth's theology of the Word of God and to his teaching on the revelation of God in Jesus Christ, led him back to the Reformation as he saw it:

> Evangelical Christians need to notice . . . that the Reformation said 'Scripture alone' and not 'the revelation of God in Christ alone' . . . Modern theology uses the word 'Christ' without content because Christ is cut away from the Scriptures. The Reformation followed the teaching of Christ himself in linking the revelation Christ gave of God to the revelation of the written Scriptures.[44]

For Schaeffer, the Scriptures give the key, first to the knowledge of God and second to the knowledge of man and nature. He agrees that the Bible does not give exhaustive truth, but that it does give "true truth", that is, a true and unified knowledge.[45]

3. Schaeffer defended the biblical doctrine of man.

His defence begins with an insistence on the "space-time Fall" and the essential dignity of man made in the image of God.[46] As a rational creature man possesses the attributes that make him potentially God-like but for the intrusion of

sin. Faith and rationality must not be pitted against each other; to do this is to discard the answer to the problem of evil. Once the Fall is denied we are driven to Baudelaire's conclusion that if there is a God, "he is a devil".[47]
A final result of setting faith in opposition to reason is that by doing so we reject the opportunity of evangelising twentieth century people in their predicament. Christianity has an obligation, Schaeffer thinks, to speak clearly in answer to man's dilemma. It "provides a unified answer to the whole of life . . . On the basis of what can be discussed, man has the possibility of recovering his rationality".[48]

4. Schaeffer defends and explains the biblical teaching about man's relation to nature.

Here he ventures into a little-explored field by means of his compact work Pollution and the Death of Man, which examines the topic of ecology. It is more than an exposé of the rape of earth's resources, but makes a statement on man and nature. Schaeffer refutes the current tendency among ecologists (such as Richard L. Means with his belief, "we are all of one essence") to glorify pantheism as a solution to the problem of man and nature.[49]

Schaeffer points out that nature has a benevolent and also a hostile face, the latter being ignored by non-Christian pantheism. A Christian view of ecology is expressed along three lines of thought:

i. Creation in a specifically Christian sense,

ii. Substantial healing involving new attitudes towards wounded nature in the here and now.

iii. The Church acting as a "pilot plant" promoting the Christian community's attitude, so exhibiting man's dominion

over nature without being destructive.[50]

5. Schaeffer is a defender of Christian ethical and cultural values.

In what Schaeffer sees as a post-Christian society, the encroachments of humanism on all sides of the cultural environment provokes his opposition and protest. He sees this in the area of education, in the United States especially, where humanism makes a great impact. "The materialistic, humanistic view is being taught exclusively in most state schools", he writes, and we must not be blind to the fact that "in the public schools of the United States all religious influence is as forcibly forbidden as in the Soviet Union".[51] The humanistic counter-morality has not only been diffused throughout education, but shows itself in the fields of abortion, euthanasia and infanticide, where its views, for practical purposes, prevail in all major areas of American life. Schaeffer's defence of the Christian position is essentially a resistance of secularism and a plea for us to see man as a spiritual being who does not live by bread alone.[52]

Tim La Haye has supported Schaeffer by recording aspects of the increasing secularisation of America in his book, The Battle for the Mind (not to be confused with William Sargant's book of the same title).[53] In it he details the phenomenal rise to influence of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) in achieving a bar to all "prayer, Bible reading, Bible study, released time classes, Easter, and Christmas celebrations".[54] Easter has become a "spring break" and Christmas a "winter vacation". Christmas pro-

grammes may feature Santa, Rudolph the rednosed Reindeer and Scrooge, but not the Babe in the Manger. La Haye's chapter, "Humanists Control America" cites Schaeffer's writings on abortion and his stand against it and euthanasia. It predicts that as these themes achieve greater prominence they will receive "scientific" endorsement from the prestigious World Health Organisation, saying that "humanists believe that the major decisions of the world should be made by the elite--and they are the elite".[55]

Schaeffer's crusade against ethical decline has been outlined in the previous chapter of this thesis. Consideration will now be given to his explicit confrontation with what he calls "The Humanist Religion" as expressed in his A Christian Manifesto (1981) in response to Humanist Manifestos I and II (1973). The humanist view of a self-existing universe is propagated at all levels of Western education. Popular scientists such as Carl Sagan, through his television series "Cosmos", have advanced this view among the masses. Schaeffer urges Christians to deny it:

> If we are going to join the battle in a way that has any hope of effectiveness. . . then we must do battle on the entire front. We must not finally even battle on the front for freedom, and specifically not only our freedom. It must be on the basis of Truth. Not just religious truths, but the Truth of what the final reality is. Is it impersonal material or is it the living God?[56]

Schaeffer shows that Humanist Manifestos I and II[57] assert humanism as a faith, a religion. This being so, Christianity and humanism must be seen as the two great antagonists of this century. They are counter-poised "as

totalities". Two United States Supreme Court judgments are indicative of humanist advances in past decades. In Torcaso vs Watkins (1961)[58] secular humanism is specifically defined as a religion on the same qualitative level as theism or non-theism. The judgment showed that in the almost three decades from 1933 to 1961, the Supreme Court had made a radical turn-about from a Christian view to a purely humanist consensus. In 1933 Justice Hughes had stated that "the essence of religion is belief in a relation to God involving duties superior to those arising from any human relation" and "assuming the existence of a belief in supreme allegiance to the will of God".[59] By 1961 the Torcaso vs Watkins case had made a complete turnabout.

In yet another case--also concerned with conscientious objection--namely United States vs Seeger (1965), the Court defined religious belief as a "sincere and meaningful belief which occupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled by the God of those admittedly qualifying for the exemption".[60] Thus subjectivism, without regard for the content of belief, had come to replace the Christian religious beliefs of some decades earlier. The change from belief in God as the essence of true religion, to belief in virtually anything that parallels it as being also "religion" or "religious" is, in Schaeffer's mind, a disturbing development and the direct result of humanist influence.[61] The final verdict, which has now become also the consensus of most Western societies, is that theism, non-theism and materialism, seen as religions, are all on an equal footing, not only before the law, but on the level

of social and ethical acceptability. Schaeffer's version of the change is purely American in its setting, but its influence has since transcended many geographic boundaries.

6. An appeal for reform

Within an American context Schaeffer appeals for reform through a reversal of thought and action. He turns to his own and other related evangelical constituencies such as the Moral Majority, for support.[62] More is said about this group under the next heading. Schaeffer argues that his country as a democratic republic "was born of the Judeo-Christian base"; that its liberties are rare and must be used while they can be. Only one-sixth of earth's 150 nations have any significant degree of freedom, and it is "our calling to use it in our democracy while we have it".[63]

VII. The Church in a Secular Society

Schaeffer believes that the Church has neglected its obligation of being the "salt of the culture" and that this is a principal reason for the condition in which our culture finds itself. Significantly, however, he rejects the idea that this condition is due to a conspiracy.[64]

What, then, is the Church to do? Schaeffer believes that the slide towards authoritarianism can be reversed, but only if we have a committed Christian Church dedicated to "total revolution in the reformative sense".[65] These terms are, presumably, a pre-emptive caution against the fashion of doctrinal revisionism and new hermeneutics that have produced Liberation Theology and a Christ who is a political figure with whom the masses under political or

economic oppression can identify.

1. The Moral Majority as a U.S.A pressure group

Schaeffer considered the Moral Majority--America's estimated fifty million conservative Protestants earlier identified as having arisen from the resurgence of conservative evangelical religion in the 1970s--as significant. Yet he distanced himself from its political objectives when, late in his career, he was identified with the movement.[66] Hence he treats this large group with reservations and says:

> Some of us may perhaps have some questions about the Moral Majority and some of the things they have said. But I would say one thing we certainly must do is get our information about anything like the Moral Majority not from the secular media, which so largely have the same humanistic perspective as the rest of the culture has today.[67]

Certainly Schaeffer believed the Moral Majority had done one thing right: it had used its freedom in the political arena to stand against the other total entity. It had taken the principle of Lex Rex--that God is the supreme law-giver--into the arena of life where it always should have been. This is part of a true spirituality.

> The Moral Majority has drawn a line between the one total view of reality and the other total view of reality and the results this brings forth in government and law . . . All Christians have got to do the same kind of thing or you are simply not showing the Lordship of Christ in the totality of life.[68]

There seems little doubt that Schaeffer would have liked to harness the immense potential of this movement for his declared purpose of reform in the Church. Yet this could not be done without the risk of being categorised with them

in all respects, and here Schaeffer's caution (learned in the school of an earlier close relationship with the right-wing ACCC) asserted itself. The appeal for reform, therefore, was made within as broad a framework as he could find, consonant with his own theological beliefs.

Schaeffer's view of the role of the media must also be considered as he sees the Church in a secular setting.

2. Schaeffer's views on the news media

The media's humanistic perspective which, Schaeffer alleged, made them "see through the spectacles of a finally relativistic set of ethical and social standards",[69] was almost universally endorsed. When, for instance, the film Whatever Happened to the Human Race? was offered to Public Television in Washington DC, it was refused without having been seen, on the grounds that "we can't program anything that presents only one point of view".[70] Yet during the same period the network was running a totally pro-abortion program, Hard Choices, of which the accompanying Study Guide was proof that the concept of materialistic final reality dominated the presentation. Schaeffer says the network asserts that modern biology has overthrown the old assumption of a designed, cause-and-effect universe with moral order. Schaeffer says: "Even though it is often asserted that science is fully compatible with our Judeo-Christian ethical tradition, in fact it is not".[71]

Schaeffer shows that the Hard Choices study guide, in strong opposition to the Christian position, states (a) that chance and necessity, that is, natural selection, rules; (b) that God has no role in the physical world; and

(c) that there are no moral laws other than those of pragmatic convenience, but no absolutes. Thus Schaeffer thinks that future morality will adapt itself to new social situations and for this reason ethical choices will become more difficult; people will not be able to justify their ethics with "fairy tales"--with biblical precedents arising out of Judeo-Christian values.[72] In much of its detail this corresponds to the content of Humanist Manifesto II which asserts that "traditional theism . . . faith in a prayer-hearing God . . . is an unproved and outmoded faith".[73]

The previous chapter of this thesis noted that Schaeffer said comparatively little about the impact of television so-called "soap operas" with their trivia and situation ethics. He does, however, concern himself with the influence of television news coverage as it is used to expand humanism. The media as a whole, but television especially, have changed the modern perception of current events and the political process. Thus the perception of a given event may be quite different from the event itself.[74] Since, in addition, television actively enters into and powerfully influences the political process, true objectivity becomes virtually impossible to achieve. For the sake of a "good story", or else out of political bias the media may and often do inject their own philosophy. Thus Charles Peters, Editor-in-Chief of The Washington Monthly, writing in his book How Washington Really Works says that the media, instead of exposing the "make-believe" of the U.S. federal government, are themselves "part of the show".[75]

Television, therefore, and the media as a whole are

doing more than reporting news but are also "making" news.[76] It must be added that the general perception of the function of the newsmaking process in the USA has gone further than in most Western democracies, for reasons which its freedoms allow, and with which Schaeffer is in substantial agreement. Financial interests, combined with an enormously competitive market have contributed to the idea of newsmaking being a business (or industry) in the same league as the creation of financial empires.

Schaeffer's proposal to resolve the problem arising from the media's assumption of the powers of a "fourth estate" seems curiously naïve. He writes: "The solution is to limit somehow television's power to use its bias in 'the editorial' reporting of events, and most specifically to keep it from shaping the political process".[77]

The use of "somehow" at once points up the dilemma, for the immediate rejoinder is "but how?". As for the idea of preventing television from shaping the political process, this is to make so drastic a distinction between visual and written news as to be totally impractical. It is also to forget that newspapers and television networks have in many instances been called into existence by a demand by partisan political interests that their voice be heard.[78] Schaeffer, in his comments, is doing no more than express his frustration at the risks that must be taken in a democratic society. The notion of keeping editorials from shaping the political process is therefore totally impractical, quite apart from the incursion it makes on free speech or opinion.

The problem of balancing freedom with responsibility

in a democratic society is a typically Western problem that has nowhere been perfectly solved. At best, Schaeffer can and does appeal to Christians to exercise their critical powers in sifting truth from falsehood in media newscasts.[79]

VIII. The Goal of Schaeffer's Evangelism: Revival and Reform

Schaeffer's writings indicate a greater skill with diagnosis than with remedies. This is not uncommon among prophets. Biblical history can show many words spent on the analysis of moral decline, while the positive command is reducible to a single imperative: repent! Schaeffer does more than this, but his initial word is: change your thinking!

He believes that the central mark of our generation is the acceptance of a dichotomy, "the separation of optimism about meaning and values from the area of reason . . . (which is) existential methodology".[80] If we follow our own form of existential methodology, he thinks, the next generation will be "undercut" as far as historic Christianity is concerned; in which case we cannot be "the voice we should be to our poor and fractured generation; we cannot be the restorative salt which Christians are supposed to be to their generation and their culture".[81]

1. Schaeffer's call for reform in Christian thought.

The first call is for reformation in Christian thinking. Since the process of decline is directly traceable to our slide in thought, restoration must begin at this point. There is no way in which this can occur, except first through

an understanding of where we have gone wrong. Schaeffer believes that in the near future "we are going to be called upon to answer questions we have never considered before, and we should be prepared to respond".[82] This entails some grasp of what is happening:

> We must help those in decision-making capacities to recognise the implications of the issues we face together as a human race. In short, Christians should prepare to take a lead in giving direction to cultural change. And if it goes poorly, as well it might in the post-Christian world, then we should be consciously preparing the next generation for the new battles it will face.[83]

By strong implication Schaeffer calls his generation to an intellectual repentance. His steady emphasis on the need for rationality leads him to see the salvation of the social order in a new embracement of this primary quality of man made in God's image. The argument has all along been to the effect that man has forsaken (escaped from) his reason, therefore nothing will avail him until he returns to the biblical basis of rationality and obedience.

2. Schaeffer's call for a return to freedom and dignity

His argument for rationality reaches an important stage when he pleads for a rejection of belief in a chance-oriented universe. The background to this was the publication of B.F. Skinner's volume, Beyond Freedom and Dignity (1971) to which Schaeffer responded with his small book titled Back to Freedom and Dignity (1973).[84] In it Schaeffer analyses a number of articles that had appeared prominently in the US media, among them reviews of Jacques Monod's

Le Hazard et la Nécessité (1970) published in English as Chance and Necessity in 1971. Monod's highly controversial and sophisticated argument relied much on data and judgment concerning molecular structure and cell structure. Its primary thrust is not scientific but philosophic. He writes:

> . . . Chance alone is at the source of every innovation, of all creation in the biosphere. Pure chance, absolutely free but blind, at the very root of the stupendous edifice of evolution: this central concept of modern biology is no longer one among other possible or even conceivable hypotheses. It is today the sole conceivable hypothesis, the only one that squares with observed and tested fact. And nothing warrants the supposition--or the hope--that on this score our position is likely ever to be revised.[85]

Monod's radical views made his book a best-seller that caught the attention of the media, and Newsweek summarised his position as follows:

> . . . After some 30 years of research in biochemistry and genetics, the short, trim scientist is convinced that man's existence is due to the chance collision between the miniscule particles of nucleic acid and proteins in the vast 'prebiotic soup'. Indeed, Monod argues that all life results from the interaction of pure chance--unpredictable mutations--and necessity, or Darwinian selection.[86]

Schaeffer asks the question, that if man lives in a universe such as Monod regards as the only thinkable position, where will he get his moral principles? How can he understand what value is?[87] Monod believed that one cannot derive any "ought" from the scheme of things as they are, and said he drew his own value system from the existential

ethics--based on a free choice-- of his friend the late Albert Camus. Schaeffer comments on this:

> Monod is not claiming objectivity for the value he has chosen to place on objective knowledge. This value resides in a prior choice that Monod has made, and thus it is totally man-centred, even one-man-centred. Essentially, Monod's ethic, as all existential ethics tend to be, is solipsistic.[88]

Monod's chance universe is by no means Schaeffer's only concern in his Back to Freedom and Dignity; it is no more than a beginning of his argument for a return to reason. It leads to a strong plea for a return to the freedom and dignity of man as made in God's image.

IX. Schaeffer's Apologetic Argument for Man's Freedom and Dignity

Schaeffer shows that Monod's thinking on chance led him to consider the development of an elite as mankind's only workable possibility in settling on moral values. Monod, says Schaeffer, regards a stable society as achievable only by some form of world authority, without which the human race cannot survive "much later than 2050".[89]

Such elitist control of humanity implies the end of human freedom as we know it and the imposition, by force, of arbitrary absolutes in total opposition to Christian thinking. Under such a system, thinks Schaeffer, "all values are open to manipulation".[90]

Schaeffer considers the views of biologist Francis Crick[91] who, in agreement with Monod says:

> The major conclusion which one draws from present

> day biology is the importance of natural selection. The essence of natural selection . . . is that it is motivated by chance events. It is not pre-programmed but is driven by chance events. You can make an argument that chance is the only real source of true novelty.[92]

Yet Crick's conclusions, as Schaeffer shows, go much further than an endorsement of chance as a ruling factor in the universe. Crick goes on to argue that technology can make changes for human beings, not only externally, but as to the kind of human beings that will survive into a new age. This implies the use of science to control and limit the quantity and quality of human beings on earth. Decisions as to who should be allowed to live and who should die will need to be taken.

Schaeffer continues his argument against manipulation of mankind by reference to Aldous Huxley's Brave New World (1932) which at the time of its publication was thought to pre-figure a society centuries hence, but which, Schaeffer says, is on our doorstep.[93] Indeed, Schaeffer's comments on the coming of the test-tube baby and the possibility of large-scale genetic engineering and chemical manipulation of man by various means, have, since he wrote, been seen with far greater clarity than was possible in 1973.

In reference to a Newsweek cover story on the topic of electrical stimulation of the brain (abbreviated, ESB) Schaeffer quotes Arthur Koestler as a futurist several times, especially his assertion that if man is to be saved from himself he had better begin the "psycho-civilising process" as soon as possible.[94] The possibility of the

use of "biochemical manipulation to insure the dominance of the brain's rational cortex over the irrational, animal-like 'old cortex'", as Koestler says, is a race against the clock for mankind.[95]

Schaeffer comments by referring to a novel by C.S. Lewis:

> Here is C.S. Lewis's That Hideous Strength with a vengeance. I strongly urge Christians to read carefully this prophetic piece of science fiction. For what Lewis casts in fantasy and science fiction is with us not tomorrow but today.[96]

In the next chapter of this thesis more detailed consideration is given to C.S. Lewis's apologetics. In defence of man's freedom and dignity under God Schaeffer discusses B.F. Skinner whose book Beyond Freedom and Dignity (1971), he says, "will be one of the most important books for discussion in intellectual circles in the next several years".[97] This has proved to be the case.

1. What is the essence of B.F. Skinner's teaching?

All Skinner's basic ideas are contained in two of his books: The novel Walden Two (1948) in which a utopian commune based on behaviouristic principles is envisaged. Such ideas received considerable exposure in the 1950s and 1960s in academic and popular circles, but because of their fictional setting it was easy to dismiss them. His later book Beyond Freedom and Dignity (1971) is probably one of the most important books of twentieth century psychology.[98] It is explicit and claims scientific objectivity and is therefore harder to refute than Walden Two.

Skinner advocates a cultural revolution for our over-crowded, impersonal and over-consuming society. Our survival

as a human race may well depend on it. We cannot achieve anything by governmental action. What is required is to apply behavioural science to our lives and to discover more about the effects of environmental conditions on behaviour. Beyond Freedom and Dignity, therefore, is a treatise on the need for behavioural technology in today's world.

a. Behaviourism says all human conduct is the result of environmental conditioning, whether that occurred prior to birth or subsequent to it. Skinner says: "Personal exemption from a complete determinism is revoked as scientific analysis progresses, particularly in accounting for the behaviour of the individual".[99]

b. Behavioural psychology denies the concept of autonomous man, that is, the notion that man can actually make free moral choices. Autonomous man is non-existent. "His abolition" says Skinner, "has long been overdue . . . he has been constructed from our ignorance".[100]

c. Man's environment controls his conduct by what is called "operant conditioning". Its basic idea is: "When a bit of behaviour is followed by a certain consequence, it is more likely to occur again, and a consequence having this effect is called a reinforcer".[101] Two kinds of reinforcers, the negative and the positive, exist, but only the positive has value in the conditioning process.

d. Some other ideas at the base of Skinner's theory are: that there is a functional relationship between environment and behaviour; that in order to have a useful behavioural science man must discover these relationships; that only observable properties are relevant, hidden thoughts

and motives are not; that there are generic principles of behaviour, the science of which must be developed inductively; and that a relevant science of behaviour generates a useful practical technology.

e. Skinner's behavioural psychology has its own keywords, among them such terms as reinforcement (positive and negative), operant behaviour, operant discrimination, environment control, punitive control and the like. Skinner calls his teaching operant behaviourism consisting of action followed by consequences that influence further action. Such consequences may be positive, negative or even neutral.[102]

f. Skinner, in his behavioural-technology approach to solving society's problems, suggests that we must move beyond traditional concepts of freedom and dignity and cease to act in terms of individual autonomy. We must develop environmental conditions aimed at reducing overpopulation, disease, pollution and all other social ills while promoting health, peace and the conservation of natural resources.[103] He believes that as long as people are seen as autonomous, deciding by their actions their own freedom and dignity, they will not focus on the controlling influences of the environment. Hence the need for a scientific behavioural technology that must be imposed upon the social order.

In regard to Skinner's views on punishment--and these are important--he suggests that a society can be built in which punishable conduct occurs but rarely or even not at all. If behavioural technology were used to control conduct

"in non-punitive ways, good behaviours would be common and there would be little need for punitive techniques".[104]

Skinner's main point, therefore, is that traditional values of freedom and dignity, which underline abolition of external control, prevent the maximum development of behavioural science and technology. Skinner believes that we are all controlled all of the time, and that it would be better to design positive controls to replace those that are aversive or punitive. This would help to ensure the survival of our culture.[105]

2. How does Schaeffer react to Skinner's views?

Schaeffer clearly understands the importance of the issues raised by Skinner, whom he groups with Sigmund Freud and Francis Crick as scientific determinists. Whereas Freud's is psychological determinism and Crick's is chemical or genetic determinism, Skinner's is sociological determinism.[106]

a. Schaeffer distinguishes between Skinner's autonomous man and the concept of autonomous man described in his books Escape from Reason and The God Who is There. He says:

> I have used the phrase to describe the person who tries to divorce himself from God, who attempts to set up his own autonomy and his own dignity on his own basis, who tries to make man as man the measure of all things. But this is not what Skinner means. By autonomous man he means the notion that man is not a part of the cosmic machine, that something in man stands in contrast to the cosmic machine and allows man to make real choices.[107]

b. From this Schaeffer concludes that, according to Skinner, man neither initiates, originates or creates, and

that "this makes Michelangelo's painting on the ceiling of the Sistine Chapel purely the result of conditioning".[108] Effectually this means that all morals and everything that makes life valuable from the standpoint of God's intention for man in his image, is eradicated.

c. Schaeffer does not dispute the facts of conditioning. The Christian, he asserts, does not say that chemical or psychological conditioning does not exist. To argue thus is to get trapped. A man's height and bone structure are determined by the chemical properties of his genes and many aspects of the physical and intellectual capacity are conditioned by heredity. Yet Schaeffer says:

> But to a Christian, though man may undergo a good deal of conditioning, he is not only the product of conditioning. Man has a mind: he exists as an ego, an entity standing over against the machine-like part of his being.[109]

d. Schaeffer says that Skinner recognises the implications of his teaching; that within it democracy, for example, is essentially impossible. Since all behaviour is controlled by the environment it is possible to manipulate the environment to modify or shape behaviour. Skinner has said that "it is the environment which is 'responsible' for the objectionable behaviour, and it is the environment, not some attribute of the individual, which must be changed".[110] Schaeffer thinks that Skinner's views are the negation of personal virtue or goodness because, as Skinner puts it: "The problem is to induce people not to be good but to behave well".[111] For Schaeffer the idea of controlling conduct other than through new motivations in the Christian

sense is an impractical notion.

e. Schaeffer raises the question as to who, in Skinner's scheme, will do the controlling? Who will decide what is and what is not the norm of behaviour? Time magazine had this comment to make:

> The ultimate logical dilemma in Skinner's thinking is this: what are the sources of the standards of good and evil in his ideal society? Indeed, who decides even what constitutes pleasure or pain, reward or punishment, when man and his environment can be limitlessly manipulated? Skinner himself believes in Judeo-Christian ethics combined with the scientific tradition. But he fails to answer how it is possible to accept those ethics without also accepting something like the 'inner person' with an autonomous conscience.[112]

Schaeffer says Skinner lives in the memory of the Christian value system, having come from a Christian background, but that to "hang on to the Christian values even when he has supposedly given them up" is a form of cheating.[113]

f. Since Skinner says that men of good will must adopt more effective techniques so as to prevent despots from using techniques for bad purposes, Schaeffer asks the question as to where such good men must be found. "This", says Schaeffer, "is the most utopian concept of all".[114] How can fallen man, without any supernatural aid, produce the kind of goodness that Skinner has in mind? This, for Schaeffer, is another form of the Pelagian heresy with its stubborn rejection of original sin and its equally tenacious belief in man's innate ability to live above his sinful nature or eradicate the evil in it. Almost every new generation experiences this illusion again.[115]

g. Schaeffer is much aware of the growing popularity of Skinner's behavioural psychology and is concerned at the expansion of its programme and development of ingenious techniques for the radical modification of human behaviour by operant conditioning.[116] He says: "Everywhere I go I find behaviourists completely committed to this view. Man is accepted as a machine, and he is treated as a machine".

Skinner's war, Schaeffer believes, is not simply against Christians, but against anyone who thinks there is such a thing as a mind or who writes concerning man's freedom and dignity, to which Schaeffer responds:

> We are on the verge of the largest revolution the world has ever seen--the control and shaping of men through genetic engineering and chemical and psychological conditioning. Will people accept it? I don't think they would accept it if (1) they had not already been taught to accept the presuppositions that lead to it and (2) they were not in such despair. But many have accepted the presuppositions and they are in despair.[117]

3. Are there misconceptions of Skinner's position?

It seems clear that there are some to be considered. The first among them is that Skinner turns man into a machine. This is also Schaeffer's objection, used in his protest against many modern films.[118] Yet, in fairness to Skinner it must be said that he sees operant-behaviour as the approximate equivalent of voluntary action, a person acting without knowledge of causal stimuli. Operant-behaviour implies the generation of energy that is translated into behaviour, and Skinner does not describe mechan-

istic functions that account for the way in which energy results in a particular action. To accept determinism is not the same as accepting a mechanistic view of man.

Another objection is that Skinner's theory equates the human and the rat in psychological terms. Skinner denies this by explaining that man and rat share some psychological features with lower animals, and that all animals obey certain laws of behaviour, modifying their actions according to reward or punishment consequences. It is a misconception to say that Skinner's study of rats is meant to cover all human action.

A final misconception has to do with Skinner's alleged dogmatism in setting himself up as the supreme authority in deciding on what should be done. It is sometimes thought easy to identify him with the master manipulator of Walden Two, Frazer. By way of response to this one has to keep in mind that Skinner's goal is to persuade men of his behavioural psychology, that there are better ways of dealing with social problems, and that these should be approached on a step by step basis, whereby parts of the problem can be dealt with by applying operant behaviour techniques.

Objections to Skinner's position are not limited to misconceptions of his objectives. Schaeffer's comments on Skinner show a good understanding of what Skinner is saying, though perhaps the conclusions he draws might be more than disquieting, even alarming. Schaeffer urges his readers not to believe "Skinner's unbased utopianism" because, he says, "it is the death of man".[119]

As Schaeffer considers his goals as an apologist within the Church he reflects on the quality of its leaders.

X. The Role and Quality of Leadership in the Church of Today

Schaeffer's idea of reform in the Church embraces the hope that Christian thinking will again assert itself (as it did in the Reformation) in leadership. He feels that Christianity has lost its sense of destiny and responsibility. It has settled into the comfortable role of the spectator observing Western civilisation rolling towards the abyss but feeling helpless to stop it. With this in mind he writes of "Revival, Revolution and Reform".[120]

> As we turn to the evangelical leadership of this country . . . we must come to the conclusion that often it has not been much help. It has shown the mark of a platonic, overly spiritualised Christianity all too often. Spirituality to the evangelical leadership often has not included the Lordship of Christ over the whole spectrum of life. Spirituality has often been shut up to a very narrow area.[121]

Not only has spirituality been narrowed down but leadership has often come to mean the protection of highly individualised projects, so that leadership means self-appointed entrepreneurs developing their enterprises among Christian people. Christian leaders of former generations, such as the Wesleys, Whitfield and others, showed attitudes very different and their labours issued in social action at many levels. "In the days of the revivals and today there are Christian answers for social action . . . such as ecology".[122]

Our evangelical leadership seems to have forgotten its heritage, thinks Schaeffer. Possibly his opinion was coloured by his disappointment at the poor response that greeted his appeal to leaders through his book on abortion, Whatever Happened to the Human Race? Its call for united action was initially poorly supported, its seminars sparsely attended. Schaeffer noted that "much of the evangelical leadership did not want to get involved".[123]

Yet these observations about Christian leadership may not have been accurate if measured by the response to a debate on abortion, a subject to which he had himself until recently paid little attention. He was dismayed because "the Christian lawyers, theologians and educators, indeed, much of the evangelical establishment, certainly have not been in there blowing the trumpet loud and clear".[124]

As an avowed follower of the Protestant Reformation Schaeffer hoped that a new kind of resurgence of pure faith would emerge from today's darkness and that the past would repeat itself under new circumstances. Reformation preaching of the gospel brought two things essential to the central message: "an interest in culture and a true basis for form and freedom in society and government".[125]

This hope is concurrent with the appeal for new thinking. This seems the utmost Schaeffer felt he could do. His major models of reform and revival (the Reformation and the Wesleyan movement) were carried along by extraordinary and sovereign energy by the Spirit of God. Some would say that this is the essential ingredient, absent today, and that this makes reform on a world-wide scale presently

impossible. Yet Schaeffer says he sees an "open window" to the future.[126]

1. Schaeffer's "Open Window" on the future.

In his Christian Manifesto Schaeffer writes of two alternatives--he calls them "tracks"--that lie before evangelicalism. Surprisingly, he names the first of them "the fact of the conservative swing in the United States in the 1980 election".[127] He calls this fact a "unique window" because it has been a long time since it was as open as it is "now" (that is, 1981). He hopes it will remain open, not just on one issue (abortion laws) but in regard to a world view. Christians must take advantage of the more conservative political climate to try and roll back "the other total entity" of a "chance world" view.[128]

No guidance is given as to how this should be done and Schaeffer concedes the immense difficulty of an assault on such a world-wide philosophy. "Those who hold this view are deeply entrenched, and they have had their own way without opposition for a long time" and will therefore do everything possible to maintain the momentum they have achieved, says Schaeffer.[129]

Though Christians are in the battle area every step of the way "it is our task to use the open window . . . at this very late hour".[130]

The "second track" for the future is very different. "What happens in this country if the window does not stay open? What then?"[131] It leads to a further question as to whether Schaeffer has read the signs of conservatism correctly in the first place.

2. Has Schaeffer's "Open Window" any real meaning?

Schaeffer's optimism about the conservative political swing in the USA in 1980 is open to question. He saw it as a distinct ray of hope and a trend to be developed at all costs. George F. Will, political analyst and syndicated columnist, has said: "In 1980, the electorate's mandate probably was about 20 per cent for conservatism and 80 per cent for improved economic numbers, no matter how produced".[132]

The trend, therefore, is seen as one of desire for economic improvement; pragmatic, but not of genuine principle. In this instance conservatism was seen as a desire to protect and increase personal economic advantage. With this opinion Schaeffer was in agreement, yet he believed it to be an optimistic sign. The whole question of the economic component in conservatism and elections is far too complex to be discussed here, except to note that it is a factor to be reckoned with.

The second track--if the window closes--poses a more serious question for the future. There are signs (1987) that the window, as Schaeffer saw it, is less "open" than it was, and the reasons for this, too, are complicated. Schaeffer believed that if the window were to close people would not necessarily return "to the old liberalism of the last fifty years. Rather, my guess is that there will be some form of an elite authoritarianism" as suggested at the close of How Should We Then Live?[133]

Such predictions are speculative, yet Schaeffer's fears for the Church have substance, based as they are on a number of indications in the USA that freedom for Christianity

is being eroded. Schaeffer cites Robert L. Toms, an attorney who listed some thirty issues directly affecting religion which are due for adjudication by USA courts and legislatures during the current decade.[134] Among them are the following:

Is a pastor liable for malpractice to a counselee for using spiritual rather than psychological techniques?

May Christian high school students assemble on the public school campus for religious purposes?

Can seminary trustees refuse to graduate a practising homosexual on ethical grounds?

Must a religious school accept as a teacher an otherwise qualified practising homosexual?

Can a state department of health close a church-run juvenile home for policies that include spanking?

All these and many other questions are current realities in Christian-oriented education in various parts of the USA. Schaeffer cites these examples as warnings to the Church of what might lie on the "second track" if an elitist, authoritarian government were to come to power. If we have not run well in the past when it has been so easy, "I wonder what is going to happen to us if we have to run with the horsemen? Who will protect us from what is happening in most of the world today?"[135]

In these terms, then, Schaeffer the evangelist wears the mantle of the prophet in order to reach his goal of repentance, revival and reform of the Church.

CHAPTER 5

An Evaluation of Schaeffer as a Christian Apologist: Some Comparisons with C.S. Lewis

The principal objective of this chapter is to advance an understanding of Schaeffer as a Christian apologist by using the work of C.S. Lewis as a contrasting background. It is not enough to say that because Lewis (1898-1963) and Schaeffer (1912-1984) lived as contemporaries for fifty years they ought to be compared. The reasons for a comparison go beyond the coincidence of contemporaneity.

A comparison between two near contemporaries in the same field--Christian apologetics--has the effect of bringing both into sharper focus, and in the case of Schaeffer this is useful and necessary. The choice of Lewis as a foil is not arbitrary, since no other modern apologist of comparable standing in the popular sense would have provided the necessary breadth for this study.

Six reasons are put forward for making this comparison: Their common world view; their respective successes; their belief that modern man needed a new approach; their impact on America; their concentration on apologetics; their common concern over theological and cultural decline.

The major divisions of this chapter examine Lewis and Schaeffer as persons; explore their understanding of the modern world; discuss the possibility that Lewis might be a forerunner to Schaeffer; assess their respective literary achievements; see the place they give to rationality and how each interprets the importance of Scripture; and finally

how they differ on the doctrine of man.

I. Reasons for comparing Schaeffer with Lewis

1. Despite many differences they are substantially at one in their world view. Both were outspoken defenders of Western man as shaped by history and Christian thought. It has been repeatedly noted that Schaeffer insisted on the heritage of Christian values, expressed by his adherence to Reformation theology and biblical truth. In addition to his close attachment to "biblical Christianity" he emerges as a man rooted in the Christian West. Hence he deplored its cultural retreat, mourned its philosophical defection and hoped for its spiritual restoration.[1]

Lewis was known (to use his own phrase) as "an Old Western Man"[2] sharing the world view of Western man as it developed from mediaeval times to the nineteenth century. Both in lifestyle and thought he was the opposite of a modern man. The computer age would not have suited him and he died unaffected by its intrusion. Modern philosophies were alien to his habitual thought world.

The topic of this thesis--Post-Christian Theological Concepts and Cultural Erosions as perceived by Schaeffer--could, with some modifications, also have suited a study of Lewis. In his role as an apologist Lewis had defended the same basic theological values as Schaeffer did after him.

Among Lewis's chief theological works are: The Pilgrim's Regress (1933), the first-fruit of his Christian faith; The Problem of Pain (1940); The Screwtape Letters (1942) which made him famous in America; Mere Christianity (1952) and his trilogy of so-called space novels in which he

introduces his readers to a near-perfect world whose creatures obediently take their places in a Divinely structured hierarchy: Out of the Silent Planet (1938), Perelandra (1943, and That Hideous Strength (1945). To these must be added The Abolition of Man (1943), The Great Divorce (1946), the autobiographical Surprised by Joy (1955) and Reflections on the Psalms (1958), in which Lewis sets out in some detail his views on inspiration, Scripture and the relevance of the Old Testament. Aspects of Christian apologetics are discussed in all of these works.

2. A second reason for comparison is that Lewis, and after him Schaeffer, each in his own arena, fought with conspicuous success against those who considered them anachronistic and outmoded. This may sound strange in view of their immense popularity, but it is true that the odds against Lewis in his sphere and Schaeffer in his, were extraordinarily heavy. Their successes, therefore, in attracting a reading public and expressing the case for Christian orthodoxy, were beyond expectation. Both were able speakers. Schaeffer was "a quick and able thinker who could present the case for Christianity reasonably and forcefully" as Parkhurst testifies.[3] As for Lewis, "he was the dialectician all his life . . . he was superb, . . . a Black Belt among novices", as John Lawlor has described him.[4]

3. In the third place, both Lewis and Schaeffer believed that the change in modern man's thinking meant that he needed to be approached with a gospel along a different route from that which had been so long traversed

by others. Much of traditional apologetics had lost its meaning for modern man. Arguments for the existence of God cast in classic forms of dogmatic theology had no appeal. Man's presuppositions, Schaeffer argued, had changed. The deviation lay in man's philosophical framework, therefore Schaeffer's apologetic method was to approach man on the basis of his rationality, to get him to understand what was happening in the world of thought and the departure from absolutes.

Lewis had the same ends in mind, but his apologetic method differed much from Schaeffer's, as will be noted in this chapter. He felt that while earlier Christian preachers could count on a sense of guilt as an ally, thus making the gospel the Evangelium, the good news, this is no longer so, and he therefore concentrated much on diagnosis before presenting the cure.[5] This throws some light on Schaeffer's belief that one could not preach the good news until one had cleared away the obstruction of wrong presuppositions. Whereas in Lewis's belief the blockage was chiefly of a moral nature, Schaeffer inclined to see it in terms of an intellectual aberration. Yet this is only part of the distinction.

4. An important point of comparison is in the impact that Lewis and Schaeffer, respectively, made on America. In the case of Schaeffer this has already been examined and his place in the Protestant life of America has been identified. Schaeffer's outlook, work, methods and lifestyle were American and this made him a prophet in his own country and his acceptance a fact of note.

In the case of Lewis it comes as a surprise to learn that for many years his popularity in the USA was greater than it was in Britain. This was certainly so during the two decades following the (1943) publication of his Screwtape Letters in America. Chad Walsh has said: "During those two decades I am convinced that he had an impact on American religious thinking and indeed on the American religious imagination which has been very rarely, if ever, equalled by any other modern writer".[6] In evangelical academic circles in America this was very true. Wheaton College has an extensive library of "Lewisiana" and, since Lewis's death, a number of doctoral dissertations based on Lewis's apologetics have been produced in various American universities, as described by Clyde S. Kilby.[7]

By 1950 Lewis had become something of an institution in America.[8] The Screwtape Letters had had a special appeal, as also some of the space novels such as Perelandra and That Hideous Strength. Lewis also corresponded with a number of Americans and his letters to some of them have been published.[9] Sheldon Vanauken, another American, author of A Severe Mercy[10] further illustrates Lewis's intellectual appeal to a select influential group of USA evangelicals.

Significantly, twenty years later Schaeffer was becoming a celebrity as a foremost apologist, not, indeed, as following in the footsteps of Lewis, but in his own right. The point of correspondence lies in the effectiveness of each as a defender of the faith; Lewis of classical Christianity and Schaeffer of orthodox evangelicalism. These differences become clearer as this chapter proceeds towards its goal.

5. A fifth reason for considering parallels between Lewis and Schaeffer is in their deliberately chosen role as Christian apologists. What does this mean? A Christian apologist is a writer who responds to an attack. Whereas an advocate taking the initiative is either a preacher or expositor, apologists for Christianity have always laboured to remove misconceptions or misrepresentations concerning their faith. Austen Farrer remarks: "When pagans thought the Church worth writing against, apologetic took the shape of book answering book".[11]

Neither Schaeffer nor Lewis was a dogmatic apologist; both were eclectic in their presentation, therefore more effective for reasons that Farrer notes:

> A systematic theologian may vindicate the rationality of the faith more solidly than any apologist; but he does so simply by thinking it out and articulating the parts. He looks for the heart and sense of the doctrine. The apologist's eye is on the point of attack. He is a frontiersman.[12]

This "frontiersman" role belongs both to Schaeffer and to Lewis, though each fulfilled it according to the direction from which the attack came. Apologetic is likely to flourish when orthodoxy is under pressure or even when it is in discredit. Lewis and Schaeffer, each in his sphere, did something towards clarifying the nature and function of apologetics. If apologetics is thought to consist in academic discussion of abstruse problems of faith and intellect, then, indeed, neither Lewis nor Schaeffer can lay claim to the designation of a defender. Richard B. Cunningham feels that the apologist should "wade into the mainstream of life, confronting modern problems and encount-

ering the masses of men, gaining a hearing for the Christian faith by any possible method".[13] Schaeffer says the Christian should not be interested in presenting a nicely balanced scheme "like some Greek metaphysical system, but rather something that has constant contact with reality".[14] As for Lewis, he thought that the best, perhaps the only service he could do "for my unbelieving neighbours was to explain and defend the belief that has been common to nearly all Christians at all times".[15]

6. Finally, it seems that a comparison between Lewis and Schaeffer in many further points not yet mentioned will be a distinct help in understanding Schaeffer's intense awareness of theological and ethical decline. Schaeffer had known Lewis's books for many years before his own writing career began.

In Schaeffer's response to B.F. Skinner's behavioural psychology, namely Back to Freedom and Dignity (dealt with in the previous chapter) he makes reference to the fact that Skinner had taken note of Lewis and tried to refute him in his book Beyond Freedom and Dignity. Noting this attack from Skinner, Schaeffer asks why he does it:

> Why? Because he is a Christian and writes in the tradition of the literature of freedom and dignity . . . He understands that a man like C.S. Lewis who writes literature that stirs men is indeed a threat. So he turns on Lewis (pp. 200 and 206) at exactly this point.[16]

On the basis of what we have considered thus far it seems clear that a firm foundation is laid for a comparison of Lewis and Schaeffer that will serve the interests of a clearer view of Schaeffer's apologetics.

II. Lewis and Schaeffer compared in relation to personality, temperament and disposition

By the time C.S. Lewis went to Cambridge as professor of Mediaeval and Renaissance Literature in 1954 he was a living legend, lauded--in Tom Driberg's words--as "the most popular theologian of the day" whose influence was said to be "more marked than that of the University's theological faculty".[17] This tribute, many times and variously underlined, has led to certain false impressions of Lewis as a personality.

1. Lewis as a man apart from his books

Some have concluded from his writings, their style and sharp wit, that Lewis was extroverted and outgoing in the social sense; that the hearty voice, the John Bull image and the geniality of his letters must mean a person ready at all times to meet the world.

In fact, the opposite was the case. Lewis was "a withdrawn man (who) desired to keep his private life obscured from the glare of publicity" and concerning whom, for years after his death, no wealth of detailed information as to his personal life existed.[18]

John Peters' recent appraisal of Lewis (1985) describes him as "an unusual and complex person" who had "few chosen friends" and who was "a paradoxical person in many ways", who "disliked the cult of personality" and who, while at times gentle and tactful with people less gifted than himself, could also be "heavy handed and bullying in debate".[19]

Despite the geniality with carefully chosen friends[20]

one finds in Lewis a curious sensation of distance, of remoteness and detachment. This has the effect of concealing his emotions, evoking the criticism that even his most revealing work, Surprised by Joy, was a disappointment. Even when he wrote on prayer, or grief, one was made more aware of intellect than of "soul".[21] In other respects he was, expectedly, English to the core, "John Bull himself".[22]

These vignettes taken together produce a sketch rather than a portrait of Lewis as a man who was a multi-faceted personality.

2. Schaeffer as family and friends knew him

American-born and somewhat rough-hewn Francis Schaeffer was by temperament and training a very different man from Lewis. His less refined background may have equipped him the better to live in the limelight than the academic and very private Lewis. Not that Schaeffer sought the publicity that eventually preceded and followed his doings; but that, when it happened, he adjusted himself more readily to it than Lewis could ever have done.

In conversation with troubled people Schaeffer was gentle, sympathetic and patient to a fault.[23] In public debate he was strong and courteous. Unlike Lewis, Schaeffer, as a trained and gifted pastor, was rich in personal relationships among a wide variety of people of all ages.

Like Lewis, though probably for different reasons, Schaeffer attracted to his platform (and to L'Abri) a large number of young, enquiring minds, many of them disillusioned with conventional American fundamentalism, others from among the Hippie groups prominent in the Sixties.[24]

One cannot outline the personality of Schaeffer without reference to his domestic situation. Schaeffer's role as husband and father preceded his fame and remained the major influence throughout his life. He had married at the age of 23 and leaned heavily on his wife Edith's support and prayers for almost fifty years.[25] Some of the issues that Schaeffer dealt with in his apologetics were directly related to family situations; abortion, infanticide and euthanasia being among them.

In contrast to Schaeffer, Lewis's experience of domestic life was severely limited by bachelorhood, until, at age 57, he married Joy Davidman, who died three years later. Although this was an experience that enriched Lewis and is reflected in his work A Grief Observed, it could not compensate for the lack of married life in the middle years. The major part of life was spent in male company, and possibly, as J.R.R. Tolkien thought, without a genuine understanding of what domestic responsibilities entailed.[26]

III. How Lewis and Schaeffer Understood The Modern World

It may be taken for granted by some that a Christian apologist should know the modern world and meet it at the point of the world's attack. Yet this is by no means always obvious, certainly not in Lewis. It may also be argued that an apologist who understands the modern world too well loses the cutting edge of debate. An other-worldly vantage point might conceivably offer a more lucid picture of reality. If so, both Schaeffer and Lewis qualify with ease. Schaeffer cannot be accused of writing from the

shelter of an ivory castle. His voluntary exposure to modern questions and to sceptics was the most prominent feature of his pastoral ministry and apologetic method.[27] He read avidly from newspapers and periodicals and knew what modern minds were thinking. In so far as it was possible to be involved in the Christian religion at all levels, Schaeffer was such, while probing into secular thought was part of daily experience.

1. Was Schaeffer concerned with ideas, not events?

Lane T. Dennis answers this question in the affirmative. He thinks Schaeffer's writing is concentrated on ideas. Dennis says that Schaeffer has "an ideational view of history", thus:

> Schaeffer's writing focuses largely upon the realm of ideas--upon philosophy, religion, the intellectual basis for science, culture and so forth . . . The danger, as some of his critics have pointed out, is that other factors, such as economics, politics, geographical considerations, may not be given sufficient consideration.[28]

Yet Dennis does not regard these two factors--the ideational and the material--as mutually exclusive. Both need to be taken into account.

Schaeffer's world was far removed from that of business, social status and wealth. He was philosophically aware to an unusual degree.[29] His world was not one of pure intellectual speculation but of reality in terms of the thoughts men have and propagate today. His writings reflect the correlation between thought and action.

The modern world, familiar to Schaeffer, was more of a problem to Lewis, as can be seen in his writings.

2. Was Lewis's Modern World Really an Adult World?

His first notable Christian book, The Pilgrim's Regress (1933) was intended to sketch a picture of contemporary culture as a background to his apologetics. In this it failed to present an accurate background and showed Lewis as having had but a casual acquaintance with the rapidly changing secular intellectual world, and scant sympathy with it in any event.[30]

When Lewis became popular with his Broadcast Talks[31] on "Right and Wrong as a Clue to the Meaning of the Universe", his views were widely received and also strongly rejected.[32] Those who acclaimed him were people for whom the crisis in metaphysics had not yet had an effect. Thus the talks, with their assumption of a universal moral law, were welcomed. Not long before this there had been some evidence of a return to tradition from such diverse sources as Barth, Jung, Maritain and T.S. Eliot. The shock suffered by humanism through World War Two contributed to a concern for myth and imagery. Thus Lewis might, through circumstance, have gained a ready readership.

Yet W.W. Robson suggested in the Cambridge Quarterly that he lacked understanding of his intellectual contemporaries. "It is not always clear whether the 'modern' world he supposed himself to be attacking was really the adult world".[33] Lewis, because of his literary vocation was insulated from many of the urgent issues of the day. These were social, economic, scientific and political, yet so pervasive that by avoiding them as a theologian he left his readers with a sense of unreality.

3. Differences between Lewis and Schaeffer in their links with the Modern World

In a period of thirty years of turbulence, war and world unrest, Lewis wrote little to link his books with the post-war period. Austen Farrer argues that this omission makes them timeless and relevant. Certainly they are not "dated" as Schaeffer's are likely to be. Farrer writes:

> You cannot expect a writer whose peculiar merit is a massive entirety of view to play chameleon to every passing colour of conflicting doctrine. Lewis lived just long enough to comment somewhat unsympathetically on Dr John Robinson's excursion into the field of popular theology. It was not to be expected that he should care for it, for what could be less congenial to his mind?[34]

Lewis's presentation of himself as an old Western man, the survivor of an antediluvian extinct race, was, says Farrer, "a trick of rhetoric. He had no interest . . . in assessing whether he were an antediluvian or not".[35] Lewis's concern was that men should not place expiry dates on moral or metaphysical principles as though these were perishable consumer goods having outlived their shelf-life.

It may well be said that the modern world no longer heeds the arguments of The Problem of Pain[36] but Lewis's continuing success as a much-read apologist shows the contrary. On the other hand, Lewis's limited stock of modern scientific knowledge made him vulnerable to the charge that he did not understand the ethos of the modern world. A reading of The Four Loves, for instance, with its play on affection, friendship, eros and agape, shows that Lewis

either deliberately ignored or had no interest in the problems raised by the new psychology. This could not be said of Schaeffer, as has already been noted.

In contrast with Lewis, Schaeffer's preoccupations in his major works have to do with secularism in all its forms. Lewis, through some of his novels like The Great Divorce[37] has provoked the suspicion that he thought of Christianity as bound up with ancient mythologies that had no connection with living in the twentieth century; but such a criticism goes too far. At most it can be said that Lewis seems so set on being fair to the past that he does injustice to the present by ignoring important aspects of contemporary life. This was the penalty of his chosen vocation.

What of Schaeffer? He was a man of his time schooled by and under his environment, especially in post-war Europe with its physical and intellectual disorder. Schaeffer's books tell us when he is living. Unlike Lewis he is not timeless in the sense that Farrer describes the term. Like Lewis, however, he spoke to his world effectively because the issues were at hand. One reads books like Whatever Happened to the Human Race?, Christian Manifesto, Back to Freedom and Dignity and The Great Evangelical Disaster and finds them thoroughly contemporary.


A paradox worth noting arises out of Lewis's and Schaeffer's respective understanding of modernity. Schaeffer had the advantage of a better grasp of secular realities in the market place, so giving his books immediate relevance. Yet this advantage could prove to be temporary. Lewis virtually ignored modernity, glossing over the harsh

actualities of war and human depravity, yet this might ultimately ensure his longer survival as a Christian apologist. In his religious writing Lewis was anxious to relate "the changeable to the changeless", as Farrer says, therefore "the special excellence of his apologetic was not undermined by his detachment from the passing fashions".[38]

The paradox is, of course, that the man who is more thoroughly acquainted with the world (i.e. Schaeffer) might, in the end, sooner lose his influence over the world than the one who has so largely ignored it (i.e. Lewis); but the question remains unresolved.

Consideration must now be given to a question of some interest thus far not raised: How much of Schaeffer does one already encounter in Lewis?

IV. Areas of Thought in Which Schaeffer appears to be a Follower of Lewis



If we represent the apologetics of Lewis and of Schaeffer in simple diagram form, two intersecting circles of different sizes would be appropriate, with Lewis's the larger of the two. The degree of commonality would depend on how much of Lewis one discerns in Schaeffer's work.

Among the sources for Schaeffer's many themes are secular and Christian history, the development of philosophy, changes in ethics and theology. C.S. Lewis was among the Christian writers known to him, and an examination of Lewis's thought will show some distinct correspondences in the writings of Schaeffer. Whether these are conscious

adaptations of Schaeffer's thought is not the main point of this enquiry, although there is a distinct possibility that Schaeffer found in Lewis a stimulating source. This opens a new train of thought.

1. Lewis's view of the present era in process of change, and Schaeffer's starting point

Schaeffer's apologetic begins with the statement that the world has changed in radical fashion.[39] He dates this change from about 1890, calling it the great shift from absolutes to relativism in thinking; therefore a philosophical change deeply affecting epistemology. Prior to this, however, major changes in philosophy, the arts, culture and theology had already taken place over the centuries, as shown in his staircase diagram.

In all this Schaeffer had been preceded by Lewis; not, of course, in the same terms or imagery, yet so clearly that Schaeffer would merely have had to expand (or condense) Lewis's thought on the process of change in order to arrive at his own conclusions on the decline in Western values.

The thesis of Lewis's inaugural lecture at Cambridge in 1954, De Descriptione Temporum, was that the present era is in the midst of the greatest change in Western man's history. He saw twentieth century man as cut off from his historical roots. However great the changes that have been in the past none of them has equalled what has happened in this century. Thus, whether at the transitions from the Fall of Rome to the Dark Ages, to the Middle Ages, to the Renaissance, to the Enlightenment, none can compare with the change that has taken place since the time of Jane

Austen and Scott; that is, about 1800.[40]

The difference between Lewis and Schaeffer on this is first that Lewis regards the change as incomplete and still in process, whereas Schaeffer thinks it is finalised, and second that Lewis assigns an earlier date to the outward manifestation of the change than Schaeffer does. In principle and in many details they are in complete agreement as to its magnitude and depth.

2. Areas of life in which change has taken place

Lewis sees four areas that indicate the great change in Western thinking: politics and government, the arts, religion and the birth of the machine.

a. Government has moved away, Lewis thinks, from its task of creating order in society, and, whether in democracies or dictatorships, is concerned with promoting mass excitement as an organ of political power. Government figures are no longer "rulers" characterised by justice, incorruption, responsibility and clemency; instead, they are now "leaders" whose main objectives are power, whose principle characteristics are perceived as charisma, initiative and magnetism. Image has become more important than character.

b. Modern art, for Lewis, is "shatteringly and bewilderingly new". The novelty found in modern-day Cubism, the Dada school, the Surrealists or Picasso can nowhere be found in a previous era. Many modern works of art are only "puddles of spilled sensibility or reflection". As for modern music, some of it demands "more talent in the performer than in the composer".[41]

c. Poetry, too, thinks Lewis, is new. While trained

critics of earlier poetry might have encountered difficulties in reading, there was consensus as to the answers. This is not so with much modern poetry. Lewis cites a critical symposium on T.S. Eliot's "Cooking Egg" where, among seven experts, there was "not the slightest agreement among them as to what, in any sense of the word, it means".[42]

d. The "un-christening" of Europe is included in the religious and cultural change Lewis detects as coinciding with the birth of the post-Christian age. Lewis found this cultural change more radical than the change from the pre-Christian to the Christian era. He wrote:

> Christians and pagans had more in common with each other than either has with a post-Christian. The gap between those who worship different gods is not so wide as that between those who worship and those who do not.[43]

It has now become clear that all the areas of change mentioned thus far in Lewis were an integral part of Schaeffer's apologetic scheme. Changes in the arts and the deliberate choice of the First World in favour of post-Christianity are among Schaeffer's most prominent themes. It is highly probable that, as one who was familiar with Lewis's writings, he was influenced by these aspects of his thought, more especially because they came from a known defender of classic Christianity.

e. The birth of the machine is a further area of change mentioned by Lewis. Yet here he is principally interested in the psychological effects of the machine age. He thinks that uneducated people regard technical advances as milestones of life towards the possession of new and

better goods. What our fathers called permanence we now call stagnation. Progress means that everything "latest" is automatically thought to be "best". The net result is developmentalism or universal evolutionism which Lewis defines as -

> the belief that the very formula of universal process is from imperfect to perfect, from small beginnings to great endings, from the rudimentary to the elaborate: the belief which makes people find it natural to think that morality springs from savage taboos, adult sentiment from infantile sexual maladjustments, thought from instinct, mind from matter, organic from inorganic, cosmos from chaos.[44]

Where Schaeffer writes of the machine he is thinking much about man as being made into nothing more than a machine, as depicted in parts of modern literature and films. His view of science and technology may be less complicated than Lewis's; technology being always a pragmatic necessity. His real concern is less with the development of the machine than with the application of scientific techniques to the control of mankind and as a powerful instrument in the hands of the manipulators of man.[45] This is not an original thought, for Lewis had written about it decades before Schaeffer.

f. The grave dangers Lewis felt to be inherent in the advance and the philosophy of modern science were dramatised in the characters of his space novels: Out of the Silent Planet, Perelandra, and That Hideous Strength. What Lewis most dreaded was expressed by Feverstone in That Hideous Strength: "If science is really given a free hand it can now

take over the human race and recondition it".[46] Again he is made to say: "Man has got to take charge of man. That means, remember, that some men have got to take charge of the rest".[47]

For Lewis this possibility is a real threat. As science allows man to manipulate all aspects of nature according to his wish, man will do things to nature (such as vivisection of animals and men) that Lewis regards as degrading and impious.

g. Our understanding of Schaeffer is heightened by showing the close correspondence between Lewis's and Schaeffer's thought. Schaeffer feared the manipulation of man as much as Lewis had done, and in terms of political coercion, mass conformity, humanist education and psychological conditioning, he expressed his forebodings.[48] As for Lewis, his darkest fear is spoken out of the mouth of his character Feverstone:

> At first, sterilisation of the unfit, liquidation of backward races, selective breeding. Then real education, including pre-natal education . . . Of course, it'll get on to biochemical conditioning in the end and direct manipulation of the brain.[49]

Schaeffer was acutely aware of this threat to man and, in his Back to Freedom and Dignity, commented on Arthur Koestler's advocacy of chemical control over man: "Does it not follow"?, wrote Koestler, "that society itself might someday be governed by the wholly rational supermen with their superbrains whom the brain researchers . . . have created?".[50] This, thought Schaeffer, was Lewis's That Hideous Strength with a vengeance.

V. Lewis and Schaeffer compared as to their respective Literary Achievements

Once again our earlier diagram of intersecting circles serves the useful purpose of illustrating that while Lewis and Schaeffer had substantial common concerns in regard to apologetics, in other areas they are not to be compared, neither in their writings nor in the daily interests of their lives.

1. Schaeffer's books and his tape cassette ministry

Schaeffer wrote 23 books of which some half a dozen are no more than extended lectures. He scripted and produced two major film projects based on two of his books[51] and wrote an unspecified number of magazine articles. In addition he inaugurated the world-wide tape cassette ministry for which L'Abri eventually became famous as it spread Schaeffer's message.[52] This shows Schaeffer's extensive use of the spoken word and lecture method that was a central feature of L'Abri.

Schaeffer's writings and cassettes have a base in his belief that the Bible is true and that out of this three things flowed: i) The Bible is inerrant in theology, morals, history or science. ii) Its truths are relevant to all of human experience and cannot be limited to religion.[53] iii) It is true for all types of people, educated or not.

The following cassette categories show the topical variety of Schaeffer's personal spoken ministry and give an approximation of his major interests, namely biblical doctrine and exposition as foundations for other topics such as ethics, the arts, philosophy and Christian living:

Apologetics: The Defence of Biblical Christianity - 10 tapes

Analysis of Modern Thought - 41 tapes

The Bible: Its Nature and Our Approach - 13 tapes

The Bible: Expositions - 48 tapes

Doctrinal Studies (including 40 on prophecy and 43 on Revelation) - 152 tapes

Christianity and the Arts - 10 tapes

The Christian Life: Spiritual Experience - 5 tapes

Prayer, Worship and the Church - 6 tapes

Marriage, Society and the State - 4 tapes

While Schaeffer's books relate to his more public ministry his tapes[54] better reflect Schaeffer in his L'Abri setting, but the distinction is not absolute.

Schaeffer's published work is listed in the Bibliography following this thesis. We have noted that all of his publications were done during a period of sixteen years.

2. A Summary of C.S. Lewis's Literary Work

Walter Hooper has compiled a detailed bibliography of Lewis's published work[55] that occupies twenty-eight book pages of Jocelyn Gibb's volume, Light on C.S. Lewis (1965). It is divided into seven categories, as follows:

a. Books, of which there are 44, on a wide variety of topics: novels, children's stories, poems, essays, theological works, literary criticism, etc.

b. Short Stories.

c. Books edited or with prefaces written by Lewis.

d. Essays and pamphlets, secular and religious.

e. Poems, of which Hooper records 67 separately published in a wide variety of literary magazines.

f. Book Reviews, of which 34 are on record.

g. Published letters, of which Hooper had collected 47, but since then three further volumes of (mostly personal) letters have been published.

While Lewis's literary work continued for more than forty years and covered an immensely wider area than that of Schaeffer, the present comparison is useful only to the extent that it throws light on them as apologists.

3. Characteristic themes in Lewis

Lewis deals with Man rather than with men. This is not so in Schaeffer whose principal concern is with trends taken by the Church or society, not with the individual. Lewis looks at the elements of the psyche with a moral purpose. He pays close attention to the unitary soul as the arena of conflict, in the fashion of John Bunyan.[56] Among his themes are the following:

a. Joy, in the sense of the immortal longing,--Sehnsucht--as discussed in his sermon "The Weight of Glory".[57]

b. Inexorable love, borrowed from George MacDonald and expounded in The Problem of Pain.[58]

c. Human freewill; every road in man's life forks and redivides in indispensable and unavoidable choices that collectively determine his destiny.[59]

d. Hell and heaven: the imagery of both is frequent and powerful, as in The Great Divorce.

e. Salvation and sanctification, which meant for Lewis the restoration of the imago dei, and not the unfolding of inherent potentialities.[60]

f. The "bellum intestinum" or holy war within, is prominent in his Pilgrim's Regress, Screwtape Letters and

Surprised by Joy.

g. Right and wrong, which is a favourite theme for Lewis, used by him in Broadcast Talks in defence of natural law and the "Tao" which he regards as the necessary expression "of what God by His own righteous nature necessarily is".[61]

4. Characteristic themes in Schaeffer

Most of these have already been dealt with in this study, but now, having noted themes in Lewis, a clear distinction can be made between the two apologists. Whereas Lewis largely ignores social issues, so much that he says: "Of forms of government, of civil authority and civil obedience, I have nothing to say"[62] Schaeffer involves himself in social man, whether in the Church or the Western world. Man's conflicts, aberrations, regressions, social evils, philosophical and theological thoughts, irrational behaviour and defections from truth are all part of his enquiry and apologetic. Tangible social movements and ethical issues of the day come within the orbit of Schaeffer's concern as illustrated in works like The God Who is There, Death in the City and How Should We Then Live?

R.B. Cunningham remarks of Lewis that his hands-off attitude in respect of social issues "leaves him out of step with current social Christianity" and considers this to be one his weakest points.[63] This could not be said of Schaeffer who ran the risk of being criticised within his own evangelical constituency for involving himself in such social issues as ecology, which had to be justified on theological grounds, and abortion and euthanasia.

VI. The Place of Rationality in the Apologetics of Schaeffer and of Lewis

In their apologetics both Schaeffer and Lewis give prominence to reason. Schaeffer says: "Because the early scientists believed that the world was created by a reasonable God, they were not surprised to discover that people could find out something true about nature and the universe on the basis of reason".[64] Schaeffer was, however, criticised for expounding a "cold rationalism" in his early books. George Giacumakis Jr and Gerald C. Tiffin thought he applied his "antithesis" method to every conceivable situation, so by-passing all subtleties and nuances.[65]

Questions arise as to whether Schaeffer sees reason as the only path to Christian faith; whether emotions or Sehnsucht must be taken into account. How would Schaeffer identify with English poet George Herbert? Does the restless human spirit find any response in Schaeffer?

> . . . Let him keep (these gifts)
> But keep them with repining restlessness:
> Let him be rich and weary, that at least
> If goodness lead him not, yet weariness
> May toss him to my breast.[66]

Such emotions as these are alien to Schaeffer's advocacy of the Christian faith. For him, rationality is more important than romanticism. The latter is too illusory, too ethereal for Schaeffer. Yet he was neither cold nor unemotional as a man; he wept with the sorrowing and despairing.

Schaeffer's critics raise the matter of his constant stress on logic and rational conclusions. Thus Thomas V. Morris points out that Schaeffer has not demonstrated

the logical necessity of his conclusions, but only their plausibility, and thinks he is too dogmatic in regarding his arguments as all-persuasive.[67]

Yet Schaeffer admits that no amount of argument can prevail with someone who holds a totally different set of presuppositions.[68] Thus he writes:

> The Christian is not rationalistic, he does not try to begin from himself autonomously and work out a system from there on. But he is rational: he thinks and acts on the basis that A is not non-A. However, he does not end with only rationality, for in his response to God his whole personality is involved.[69]

1. Modern theology's divorce of faith and reason

Schaeffer resists modern theology's tendency (as he sees it) to divorce faith from reason. He quotes an 1890 prediction by T.H. Huxley that a time would come when men would remove all content from faith, of which Huxley boasted that faith would then be forever inaccessible to the attacks of the infidel.[70] Schaeffer comments: "So then, in our day, the sphere of faith is placed in the non-rational and non-logical as opposed to the rational and logical, the unverifiable as opposed to the verifiable".[71]

He argues that if faith becomes unchallengeable because it can be anything, then there is no way to discuss it in normal categories. This divorce of faith and reason has, in Schaeffer's mind, led directly to the existentialism of Kierkegaard and his non-rational leap of faith which Schaeffer rejects as opposed to Christian thinking. Modern theology has accepted a dichotomy by which it now differs little from agnosticism, says Schaeffer.[72]

2. Lewis's view of the role of reason in faith

Lewis argued consistently for the responsibility of rationality and contemporary learning:

> (For a Christian) not to be able to meet the enemies on their own ground, would be to throw down our weapons and to betray our uneducated brethren who have, under God, no defence but us against the intellectual attacks of the heathen.[73]

His own conversion, following an atypical route, was guided along a path of reason: from "popular realism" to philosophical idealism, thence to pantheism, to theism and finally to Christianity itself.[74]

Schaeffer's much less complicated conversion took place in a similar milieu of rationality where questions were steadily being asked by his probing mind. It gave Schaeffer an enduring respect for rationality.

Lewis, declaring himself a "rationalist" since reason deals with truth or falsity[75] nevertheless knew and taught that imagination's conceptualising function was an indispensable part of rationality. The "reasonableness" of Christianity made him more than willing to subject the Christian faith to the scrutiny of reason. Indeed, he insisted on it because rational argument places the struggle between truth and falsehood on God's chosen territory. Cunningham illustrates from Screwtape Letters:

> Screwtape warns Wormwood not to argue with his 'patient' but rather to keep a dozen incompatible philosophies dancing around in his head; to avoid asking whether a question is proved or disproved, but rather to ask whether it is 'academic' or 'practical', 'outworn' or 'contemporary'. 'Jargon, not argument', says Screwtape, 'is your

> best ally'. Once reason is awake, Screwtape worries, 'who can foresee the result?'[76]

3. Reason as the organ of truth

If in Schaeffer reason was thought to be cold and unemotional, in Lewis it is unrelenting. He scorns the kind of tolerance that is content with honest opinions sincerely held. In The Great Divorce he says, "Thirst was made for water, inquiry for truth".[77] All knowledge, whether of theory or practice, is totally dependent on the validity of reason. This must be tested in science, philosophy and morality. The validity of reason is self-evident and demands no proof. Lewis believes that "to have an open mind about the ultimate foundations either of Theoretical or Practical Reason is idiocy".[78]

This argument for reason as the organ of truth marks out a track in much of Lewis's writing. As individual human reasoning requires a rational cause to be valid, so the entire process of human reasoning demands the same. Since mind is the principle behind the universe it guarantees the validity of reason.

Lewis considers that because reason is at the foundation of the cosmos the weight of logic is on the side of the Christian apologist. Therefore reason, properly pursued, makes a path to God; yet not directly nor without mediation. In his Pilgrim's Regress it is Reason as the master who leads the pilgrim John and points him to the Church and to Christian experience.

Schaeffer's exposition of reason is less subtle. In essence he agrees with Lewis that reason is the organ of

truth; the difference between them being one of degree, influenced by Schaeffer's doctrine of Scripture which takes precedence over all else in his thinking.

4. The relation between faith and knowledge

Lewis discerns two levels of faith, a distinction he appears to borrow -- though not its terminology -- from Thomas Aquinas; fides being intellectual assent to propositions and fiducia being trust in another person; the latter, according to Aquinas, not being essential to salvation.[79]

For Lewis as well as Schaeffer, there is a level of faith attainable by the intellectual persuasion of evidence. Lewis demands that it be so, saying, "I am not asking anyone to accept Christianity if his best reasoning tells him the weight of evidence is against it".[80] Any attempt to live by this first-level faith, however, leads through frustration and fallibility to a higher level of personal trust, where the Christian comes to trust in God for what he cannot do for himself. Thus the logic of personal relations changes the role of reason or of evidence.

Schaeffer contended for propositional truth as essential to Christian faith; the first statement of which is "God is there" and made the world. "If a reasonable God created the world and put me in it, he should also give a correlation of the categories of my mind to fit that which is there".[81] This correlation has been given in the faculty of reason, an element in the imago dei. The further and higher component of saving faith, namely personal trust, is equally regarded by Schaeffer and Lewis, and reason plays its part in leading the believer to it.

For Schaeffer the truth is ultimately inseparable from the biblical revelation. Yet even here he regards truth, finally, as related "to something behind the Scriptures". "The Bible, the historic creeds, and orthodoxy are important because God is there, and, finally, that is the only reason they have their importance".[82]

This introduces what is probably the most marked of the distinctions between Lewis and Schaeffer:

VII. How Schaeffer and Lewis each understood the Nature and Importance of Scripture

Schaeffer's position on Scripture has been fully explored in our second chapter where he is contrasted with Barth's view of scripture and revelation. He is shown to be a fundamentalist holding the inerrancy view and choosing the term "Bible believing" to describe himself. Schooled in the old Princeton theology mould--with Warfield, Hodge and Machen in the background--Schaeffer never varied his stance. His final book, completed not more than two months before his death (1984), The Great Evangelical Disaster, takes an even stronger and more explicit line than he had done before. He writes:

> We must, with prayer, say no to the theological attack upon Scripture. We must say no to this, clearly and lovingly, with strength. And we must say no to the attack upon Scripture which comes from our being infiltrated in our lives by the current world view of no-fault in moral issues.[83]

A large number of tape cassettes on biblical topics in the L'Abri resource centres proves their author's preoccupation

with biblical truth and exposition. As a perusal of the topical indices of L'Abri's tape library will show, Schaeffer was unashamedly a biblicist by conviction. He was among the ten persons who formally organised the International Council on Biblical Inerrancy in May 1977 in Chicago.[84] He remained to the end of his life a supporter of the inerrancy lobby in American evangelical life.

1. Lewis's mixture of orthodoxy and unorthodoxy

Lewis never involved himself in any pro-inerrancy debate. His expressed desire to defend Christianity had a broad, classical and ecumenical shape to it. Yet he had definite views on Scripture, and if this comparison is to be useful these need to be noted.

His approach to the Bible corresponds to his known mixture of orthodoxy in theology and unorthodoxy in apologetical method. His repeated claim to amateur theological status gave him some latitude but also brought criticism.

Lewis set definite boundaries to the science of biblical criticism, opposing the excessive subjectivism and historical scepticism characteristic of some form critics.[85] Yet he retained mythopoeic expression and was apparently either unaware of or unconcerned about some elementary critical problems. His free admissions about mythologies, metaphors and inconsistencies in Scripture alienated him from more conservative thinkers.[86]

2. Lewis's view on the inspiration of Scripture

His view of inspiration is broader and looser than Schaeffer's. Lewis regards inspiration as applying not only to the biblical writers, but also to Hebrew and Christian

compilers, scribes, custodians, editors and copyists, all of whom, Lewis says, were acting consciously or unconsciously as the instruments of the Spirit of God.[87] Thus theopneustos (2 Tim. 3:16) is extended by Lewis to include divine superintendency of circumstance.

Far from regarding Scripture as uniformly inspired, Lewis sees sub-Christian ideas, contradictions and even errors.[88] He does not take for granted the historical or scientific accuracy of the Old Testament nor regard these as of primary importance. He writes:

> The human qualities of the raw materials show through. Naïvety, error, contradiction, even (as in the cursing Psalms) wickedness are not removed. The total result is not 'the Word of God' in the sense that every passage, in itself, gives impeccable science or history. It carries the Word of God and we . . . receive that Word from it, not by using it as an encyclopaedia or an encyclical but by steeping ourselves in its tone and temper and so learning its over-all message.[89]

The perfect teaching of Christ, thinks Lewis, is not given to us in systematic fashion nor can it be understood by intellect alone. Lewis has a problem with St. Paul: "I cannot be the only reader who has wondered why God, having given him so many gifts, withheld from him . . . the gift of lucidity and orderly exposition".[90]

From what has been considered thus far it is already obvious that Lewis's view of Scripture is in some respects widely different from Schaeffer's. A further deviation from traditional interpretation lies in Lewis's idea of transposition, a neo-Platonic concept of Lewis's. He means

that there is a continuity between natural and spiritual things. Transposition occurs whenever there is a movement from a lower to a higher medium, or vice-versa. The detail of his lengthy argument is not to our present purpose, except to say that his use of transposition is basic to his approach to Scripture. The Old Testament, for Lewis, is a body of literature "taken up" and made the vehicle of what is more than human in origin. The Scriptures "proceed not by conversion of God's Word into literature but by taking up of literature to be a vehicle of God's Word".[91]

As one would expect, Lewis's further ground for acceptance of the Old Testament is our Lord's authentication of it. He cites the Emmaus journey (Luke 24:25-27) to illustrate the "second meaning" of many passages.[92]

3. Where Schaeffer and Lewis disagree on Scripture

Schaeffer and Lewis agree that Jesus' authentication of Scripture makes the Old Testament authoritative--a common evangelical view; but transposition falls strangely on the ears of conservatives like Schaeffer. As for Lewis's view of inspiration and his idea that the Scriptures "carry" the Word of God, this idea, taken at face value, would be seen by Schaeffer as having Barthian undertones or connotations. Yet Schaeffer's respect for Lewis as an apologist was a known fact.

Lewis explained his ambivalence towards Scripture when answering some who thought of him as a fundamentalist. "That is because I never regard any narrative as unhistorical simply on the ground that it includes the miraculous".[93] Citing St. Jerome and John Calvin in support of his view

of mythically expressed truth, Lewis continues: "I have to decide on quite other grounds (if I decide at all) whether a given narrative is historical or not".[94]

In his work The Dialectic of Desire Corbin S. Carnell comments that for Lewis "the great myths of the Bible as well as pagan literature refer not to the non-historical but to the non-describable". He continues:

> The theological validity of the myth rests upon its uniqueness as an account of real creation, or its psychological insight into the rebellious will of man, and on its clear statement that man has a special dignity by virtue of his being made in God's image.[95]

4. Schaeffer's uncompromising views on Scripture

In this section on Scripture more has been said of Lewis than of Schaeffer for reasons that are obvious. The differences between Lewis and Schaeffer are nowhere as sharp as in their understanding of the nature and purpose of Scripture, not only as a revelation from God but as a hermeneutical responsibility for interpreter and reader.

Schaeffer bore the mark of the 1930s controversy over inspiration to the end. Among his last written references to Machen were these words: "A good case could be made that the news about Machen was the most significant US news in the first half of the twentieth century"[96]--an allusion to Machen's expulsion from the Presbyterian ministry in 1935. So, for Schaeffer the great evangelical disaster is the failure of evangelicals to stand for truth as truth, and by that Schaeffer meant biblical inerrancy. "There is only one word for this", he wrote, "namely, accommodation: the evangelical church has accommodated to the world spirit

of the age".[97] Much more in the same vein shows that the gulf between Lewis and Schaeffer in the matter of Scripture appears to be unbridgeable. The paradox is that both men were eminently successful defenders of perceived orthodoxy.

VIII. Variances in Lewis and Schaeffer in their teaching of the Doctrine of Man

Lewis's doctrine of man made in God's image is at variance with Schaeffer's Reformed and orthodox teaching in two main points: first, in his concept of man's physical evolutionary development prior to his "creation" as man made in God's image; second, in his teaching on man's "immortal longing" which he calls Sehnsucht.

1. Man's creation and fall considered

Schaeffer's understanding of man as God's special creation is Reformed and orthodox. Man is defaced by sin but not destroyed. He is capable of the highest dignity and is "not nothing".[98] The anthropology of the Reformation answers all the questions Schaeffer wanted to know.

Lewis's doctrine of man stems not only from the biblical myth-revelation but from his perception of man as the intellectual and moral being whose rationality leads him to the knowledge of God, to the Church and to truth in Christ; thus to his restoration after the Divine nature.[99]

Schaeffer does not pause to discuss man's creation except to receive it as a revelation from God in the simplest terms, to him uncomplicated and orthodox. Lewis, by contrast, thinks man's physical descent may well

have been from animals.[100] He leaves room for this evolutionary idea and rejects the assumption that "primitive" is co-extensive with moral degradation. His view is "an amalgam of Scriptural myth and scientific theory".[101] He sees the biblical account of creation and Fall as a "myth in the Socratic sense", that is, of what may have been fact, not to be confused with Niebuhr's myth concept. Perhaps too ingeniously, he manages to balance the biblical emphasis on man's uniqueness as special creation with the modern belief in man as the product of a continuous physical development. At some point in this process the Divine creative fiat made man truly man in all his faculties of intellect, conscience and self-transcendence.

Schaeffer approaches man by the shortest route; a special and direct fiat of creation "out of nothing".[102] Unlike Lewis who sees the creation of the human race in the plural rather than of an original pair, Schaeffer affirms the literal historicity of the Genesis account.[103]

Schaeffer's view of the Fall follows the same pattern. It is a space-time fall with consequences in man's history.[104] It has resulted in an abnormal universe, and has separated man and God, man and himself, man and nature.[105]

Lewis arrives at his "abnormal universe" by a different route. The number of God's created God-conscious humans and the duration of the Paradisal state are, he says, unknown to us, "but sooner or later they fell". The question of how they fell "is of no consequence".[106] As a result of the Fall man is now "a horror to God and to himself and a creature ill-adapted to the universe" through the abuse of

his God-given free will.

2. What man became after the Fall

Where Schaeffer and Lewis agree in their doctrine of man is in the emergent condition of man after the Fall. It is a new kind of man; a new species never made by God had sinned itself into existence; a radical alteration of his constitution, a disturbance of his natural harmony and a perversion of an integral inner component. In effect the Fall has made of man two persons: "This shadowy inner accomplice has all the same properties as an external one . . . a witness . . . a potential blackmailer, one who inflicts shame and fear".[107]

3. Lewis's idea of "immortal longing" in man

This idea, so prominent in Lewis's thought, is a part of a much larger consideration of romantic religion as expounded by him. Sehnsucht is closely associated with man's alienation from God and his existence in a hostile universe. In this longing is "our lifelong nostalgia, our longing to be reunited with something in the universe from which we now feel cut off". This desire to be inside of some door which we have always seen from the outside "is no mere erotic fancy, but the truest index of our real situation".[108]

The Sehnsucht theme is several times expounded in different ways by Lewis, the best single account of it being found in his essay The Weight of Glory, and its most elaborate exposition is in the allegorical Pilgrim's Regress.

Lewis's teaching on Sehnsucht, seldom formalised, is very much a part of his doctrine of man. His apologetics

are best understood by realising that he combines a tough-minded theology with a mystical Sehnsucht. His romanticism and his religion are inseparable.[109] He believes that this intense longing "is the secret signature of each soul, the incommunicable and unappeasable want . . . which we shall still desire on our deathbeds".[110]

4. Schaeffer's realism in apologetics

Schaeffer's realism precludes any inclination to venture into romanticism in religion. We look in vain among Schaeffer's diverse topics for anything approaching immortal longing as Lewis expounds it. Any form of mysticism was given a wide berth, but this does not mean that Schaeffer rejected the validity of religious experience, but that he was distrustful of anything that might seem to intrude on the authority and content of the Bible as the Word of God. His fundamentalist background was averse to any amalgam of feeling and divine revelation. It posed, for him, an ever-present danger of being led away into the speculative realm of the imagination.

Where Schaeffer and Lewis are solidly at one is in their conviction that God is. This is paramount in everything Schaeffer wrote. As for Lewis, God's existence is persistently real and had been so to him even before he became a Christian. J.B.S. Haldane has noted that Lewis's belief in God is deduced, not from cosmology but from the nature of man, hence his frequent appeals to variations of the moral argument under which aegis he makes his strongest defence of Christianity.

CHAPTER 6

A Critical Assessment of Schaeffer's View of Decline in Modern Culture and Thought

Part One: Philosophy, Art and Music

The chief purpose of the next two chapters is to offer a critique on Schaeffer's treatment of his main theme as outlined in this thesis. Some of his controversial views ensure, from the point of view of this thesis, a continuing debate as to his effectiveness in the role of a Christian apologist and whether his principal charges against Western thought are proven.

Schaeffer's staircase chronological diagram (see page 8 of this thesis) is basic to his treatment of the various disciplines. Philosophy is first among these and it has a logical first place in the critique that follows.

I. Schaeffer on the Decline in Philosophy

Among Schaeffer's wide-ranging intellectual interests philosophy was the first. He rapidly surveys the landscape of this discipline by mentioning a considerable number of philosophers, but, with some exceptions, devoting to most of them no more than a few lines each. This applies equally to his sparse descriptions of philosophical systems, among which, however, three are of special concern to him, namely Existentialism, Logical Positivism and what he calls "Defining Philosophy".[1] A first criticism has to do with the latter. Comments on Existentialism will be given a place later when Kierkegaard is discussed. These criticisms

uncover several defects in Schaeffer's grasp of philosophy.

A. Schaeffer is not always familiar with developments in philosophy

"Defining Philosophy"--as Schaeffer calls it--had its origins in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations from which a movement called Ordinary Language Philosophy arose.[2] Schaeffer says of it that "the starting point with those who subscribe to this philosophy is, as the title suggests, definition".[3] He calls it "Defining Philosophy", criticising it as dealing only with details and not with universals, thus being essentially "anti-philosophy".[4]

In saying this Schaeffer seems to be less than up to date with developments in this field as shown by Stephen Davis's review of Schaeffer's How Should We Then Live? in which he wrote:

> It could once be said that analytic philosophers concerned themselves only with linguistic analyses and ignored what Dr Schaeffer calls "the big questions", but this is certainly no longer true and has not been true for years. I think it would be difficult to think of any major philosophical question (including the "big" ones) that has not been dealt with carefully and thoroughly by analytic philosophers in the last 30 years.[5]

While this is but one instance, Schaeffer's somewhat unsatisfactory treatment of the history of philosophy is best illustrated in his survey, not of systems, but of philosophers. He mentions many philosophical writers, three of which are representative for the purposes of this critique, namely Aquinas, Hegel and Kierkegaard. Brief consideration must be given to Schaeffer's grasp of the importance of each of these.

B. Schaeffer's interpretation of Thomas Aquinas may be challenged as unfair

Schaeffer asserts two things, principally, about Aquinas: first, that he brought an Aristotelian emphasis on individual things (particulars) into the philosophy of the late Middle Ages, so setting the stage for humanistic elements of the Renaissance;[6] and second, that "the will of man is fallen, but the intellect was not".[7]

While it is true that Aquinas, following the teaching of Aristotle, emphasised particulars more than Plato had done, it must be noted that Plato had found hardly any place at all for particulars.

The second assertion, that Aquinas means that the intellect has become autonomous and that natural theology and philosophy are thereby freed from Scripture's authority, is a more serious charge against Aquinas. Is this the case? Aquinas explains his position in his Summa Theologiae in terms that allow a different conclusion.

He argues that as regards truths about God open to human investigation, man needed to be taught by divine revelation. Truth about God within the reach of reason would be known only by a few, after long enquiry and the possibility of errors. Since man's whole salvation depends on the knowledge of this truth, God ordained that such knowledge be brought about "more fitly and more surely" by a process of divine revelation. Such revelation is additional to philosophical disciplines investigated by reason and is "a sacred doctrine by way of revelation".[8]

Aquinas therefore clearly distinguishes between theology

and philosophy, but not in the terms that Schaeffer describes him as doing. Aquinas says some truths knowable only through special revelation are proper to theology, but other truths are appropriate to philosophy since they have been generally revealed. He also notes that some truths are proper to both disciplines since they can be known by reason. The question arises whether Schaeffer does not in fact go beyond the need of the case by accusing Aquinas of making reason altogether independent of revelation. While this may indeed have been the case with some thinkers after Aquinas, this is not the point of Schaeffer's argument concerning Aquinas.

When Schaeffer considers post-Reformation philosophy he pays particular attention to Kant and Hegel, but it is Hegel who, Schaeffer believes, profoundly affected the theory of knowledge (epistemology) by his theory of synthesis.

C. It is doubtful whether Schaeffer is right in charging Hegel's synthesism with being directly responsible for relativism in philosophy

Schaeffer is clearly right in saying Hegel's system is one of synthesis. But Ronald W. Ruegsegger argues that rather than looking for the roots of contemporary relativism in Hegelian idealism, consideration should be given to the changes of thought brought about by his predecessor, Immanuel Kant. Following his revolutionary theory of knowledge, Kant proposed that if we cannot explain our possession of synthetic a priori knowledge on the supposition that the mind conforms to objects, we should seriously consider the possibility that objects conform to the mind. Thus Ruegsegger explains:

> Specifically, Kant argued that after objects act on our senses, our minds organize and structure this sensory data by imposing mentally created notions on them. These mind-produced ways of making sense experience intelligible include such ideas as space, time, cause and effect, and substance and attribute.[9]

In Kant's view, what we experience depends partly on what we contribute to the act of knowing; what we know is relative to the knower. Such a version of relativism is moderate compared to subsequent versions that developed Kant's relativism to a radical point where there is a gap among knowers as well as one between knowers and the known.

In some respects Hegel's thought is an adapted form of Kantianism. The change made by Hegel has had less impact on modern epistemology than Kant's original insights which held that knowledge is relative to the perceiver, an assertion that is at least compatible with realism.

Schaeffer seeks to prove that as a logical consequence of Hegel's dialectic there is no attainable absolute truth. This is an over-simplification of Hegel's position and Schaeffer seems to have gone further in his conclusions than is warranted by a careful reading of Hegel.

By far the most important of the philosophers, seen from the point of view of his influence on modernity, is Søren Kierkegaard, whom Schaeffer regards as the first man to have gone below the line of despair.[10] Schaeffer thought of Hegel as the door into the line of despair, but that Hegel himself had never gone below it because he still believed that synthesis could be achieved by reason, whereas Kierkegaard added a new proposition to Hegel's thought.

D. Schaeffer's view of Kierkegaard's irrationalism

The new proposition Kierkegaard added, says Schaeffer, is that he "came to the conclusion that you could not arrive at synthesis by reason. Instead, you achieved everything of real importance by a leap of faith".[11] Thus Kierkegaard separated the rational and logical from faith. But this argument by Schaeffer may be criticised as follows:

1. This interpretation of Kierkegaard is admittedly common. But it is not the only explanation to be considered. In his book Kierkegaard's "Fragments" and "Postscript": The Religious Philosophy of Johannes Climacus,[12] C. Stephen Evans offers another view. Climacus is a pseudonym for Kierkegaard, and it can be shown from Kierkegaard's journal that he shares Climacus's perspective on Christianity, except that later in life Kierkegaard is personally committed to the faith. In the beginning, however, Climacus represents an outsider's point of view, and it is he who uses terms such as "paradox" and "the absurd" in portraying aspects of Christian faith. Thus he finds the doctrine of Incarnation absurd, asking: "What is the absurd? The absurd is, that the eternal truth has come into being in time, that God has come into being . . . exactly like any other individual human being".[13]

Schaeffer sees in Climacus's use of paradox and absurdity a reason for accusing Kierkegaard of irrationalism; by extension, the same charge is made against all Existentialism.

Evans solves the problem by saying the contradiction of the Incarnation is neither logical nor formal, and that Schaeffer's idea of contradiction must be seen against the

background of dialectics in which opposites are more commonly complementary and not mutually exclusive. He writes:

> The Hegelians were familiar with the concept of a contradiction as positing a task for thought. For Hegel all such contradictions are relative and can and must be "mediated" or resolved. On this view no boundaries can be set to reason, and rational thought can penetrate reality completely. Climacus wishes to explain a contrasting view that posits boundaries or limits to rational understanding. In Hegelian language this is simply the concept of a contradiction that cannot be mediated or resolved by thought. Such a contradiction would be "absolute" in comparison to the relative opposition thought is capable of resolving. But the opposition that resists mediation is not necessarily a formal contradiction . . . [14]

Thus the contradiction involved in Incarnation is apparent, but neither formal nor real. It might be concluded that what Kierkegaard is at pains to convey is that faith is above reason, not contrary to it. If Evans is right, Kierkegaard is not denying rationality nor is he divorcing reason from faith; in which case Schaeffer's charge of irrationality against Kierkegaard is seen as an exaggeration of his position. This element of exaggeration is further illustrated in Schaeffer's view of the "leap of faith":

2. Is the "leap of faith" basically irrational?

Schaeffer contends that it is, and this is central to his criticism of Kierkegaard and Existentialism. Evans's explanation may be summarised as follows:

The actual expression, "the leap", is taken from Lessing and has been much misunderstood. Popularly, Kierkegaard's leap is presented as a "blind leap" or even

a "leap in the dark"; but these expressions are never used by Climacus. The leap is neither blind nor arbitrary since, as Evans says, "the individual must have a clear idea of what he is leaping to and why he might choose to leap". He concludes:

> The leap is simply Climacus' metaphorical way of emphasising that the decision to become a Christian is a choice, a free personal decision. Every choice is for Climacus a "leap", a decisive resolution of the self made possible by passion.[15]

If Schaeffer's interpretation of the "leap" is rejected, this will clearly affect the response to his criticism of Existentialism, as will be seen when theology is discussed.

3. Two preliminary conclusions following the consideration of Schaeffer's philosophical scheme:

The first is that Schaeffer appears to succumb to the temptation of wanting simple answers to subtle and complex questions. This is a trend in popular apologetics, both in authors and readers, that may well lead to errors.

The second conclusion is that while among specific Christian groups there may be agreement on the truths of the faith, the philosophical arguments supporting these truths may well be intellectually unacceptable. There is a case for saying that this applies to aspects of Schaeffer, and it reinforces the dangers facing any populariser. Not only does it test the apologist himself but also his understanding of the reading public whose knowledge of a particular discipline is less than his own. Whatever Schaeffer's final verdict on Kierkegaard (and he has, of course, given it) Schaeffer owed it to his readers to give

a more analytical account of Kierkegaard's total position. Not having done so, he made Kierkegaard a villain of the piece rather than a man struggling towards faith and truth.

II. Schaeffer's Understanding of Art and the World View of Artists

For evangelicals, until the middle of the present century, art was a Cinderella among topics. Art was regarded as esoteric, unspiritual and--apart from great works with Christian or biblical themes--an unnecessary extravagance.

Schaeffer was a pioneer among evangelicals who saw a correlation between art and world view, but his appreciation of art goes much further than that. In his book Art and the Bible, which consists of two essays, Schaeffer reminds his readers that Christianity must not be equated with an anti-cultural attitude; that the arts, far from being relegated to the periphery of life, are occasions of praise to God. Hence he condemns artistic mediocrity of the kind that many evangelicals have seemed content to accept. Harold M. Best says of him: "Quite literally, Francis Schaeffer puts God on the side of quality. For this alone, he deserves the thanks of countless artistically caring evangelicals".[16]

The concern of this part of the critique is chiefly with Schaeffer's writings as they reflect on the relationship of artistic content to the history of thought. His concept of a direct link between world view and artistic expression is expounded in a number of examples found in three books, namely Escape From Reason, The God Who is There, and How Should We Then Live? Some of these must be examined.

A. Schaeffer fails to prove his main thesis about the relation between world view and artistic expression

The principal assertion here is that whatever the artist believes is inevitably expressed in his artefact and is capable of being interpreted. Therefore (the argument goes) the Impressionists--to take a first example--made changes in their art work because changes in thought and world view had already taken place within them; they had begun to shift from absolutes to relativism. This is Schaeffer's argument. Taken to its logical extreme it assumes that one would be able to interpret the world view of any artist, irrespective of his cultural situation, by judging the work he produces.

Schaeffer makes no attempt to show, precisely, how this disclosure of world view takes place, nor does he deal with the multitude of systems of belief in the world, nor try to match them with past or present artistic creations.

While one cannot dispute the view that many artists have a world view (Picasso being a more easily understood example) the problem arises when one states categorically, as Schaeffer does, that all such world views are exposed with force and clarity, enabling the viewer to read them; or when it is asserted that the artist intentionally makes a world view statement. When Schaeffer says that the distinctive mark of the twentieth century lies in its concept of a divided field of knowledge, he writes:

> Whether the symbols to express this are those of painting, poetry or theology, is incidental. The vital question is not the symbols used to express these ideas . . . but the concept of truth

> and the method of attaining truth involved. The watershed is the new way of talking about and arriving at truth, and not the terms the individual disciplines used to express these ideas.[17]

This is a kind of Platonic thinking on Schaeffer's part; a union of truth and beauty which is inconsistent with Schaeffer's over-all thought. He develops this thesis by reference to several individual artists among the Impressionists, as shown in the following observations concerning Van Gogh, Gauguin, Cézanne and others.

B. Schaeffer's idea of "fragmentation" must be critically examined

The following examples serve to illustrate the present critique on Schaeffer's evaluation of modern art:

1. Van Gogh, Gauguin and Cézanne. Schaeffer groups these together as being pillars of modern art.[18] All of them, he says, reached towards an artistic universal and failed to find it, thereby crossing the line of despair. Yet, as to the actual crossing of the line, it is, on Schaeffer's part, mere conjecture, connected, he might think, with deep problems of personal depression such as are found in Van Gogh. If this is the ground upon which Schaeffer decides that these men have crossed the line, then the same can be said of numerous other artists all through the long history of art. Furthermore, if despair is to be rightly understood, its significance might be very different from that assigned to it by Schaeffer. Despair is not necessarily synonymous with conscious failure and might, conceivably, be an element in the genius of great artists.

2. Schaeffer's comments on other Impressionists[19]

He depicts the hypothetical viewer as asking himself whether there is any hidden meaning in a work of art; anything beyond what the eye may see. Schaeffer thinks this questioning attitude indicates a change in the viewer. In fact it does not, for viewers throughout the history of art have been asking the same thing. As for the artist, Best observes: "Great art always goes beyond its precedent, not subtractively, but metamorphically. It is part of the privilege of the artist to say something yet another way".[20] If, therefore, Van Gogh chooses to paint trees and branches in silvery greens and blues it does not have to mean that he is contradicting reality or attempting to deny the true colour of what he sees. On the contrary, as Best says:

> It is not the replacement of reality with a dream, as Schaeffer accuses the Impressionists, any more than the surreal composite of the Son of God in the Book of Revelation (1:12-16) is a replacement for the bodily resurrected and ascended Christ.[21]

This kind of Impressionism is a new way of viewing truth through insight; it surpasses imagination. It does not destroy the original but enhances its meaning; an aspect which, however, neither appeals to nor comes to the fore in Schaeffer. On the contrary, when he writes of Monet's series of tree paintings (especially Poplars at Giverney, Sunrise, and Poplars at Epte) their quality of dreamlikeness is a signal to Schaeffer that the door is opening into modern and degenerate art; that is, art moving under the line of despair. That such a view seems extreme becomes obvious when it is realised that Monet's works are in fact

quite realistic representations of what the eye does see under different light conditions, while fantasy has a place.

It is a valid criticism that Schaeffer's presuppositions about the abandonment of absolutes prevents him, in this instance, from seeing any merit or positive development in Impressionism, Instead, he sees only a deterioration which he attributes to a changed world view.

3. Cézanne as an example of world view in art

Schaeffer, while still engaged in the topic of fragmentation in modern art (later in this chapter also discussed under music) takes Cézanne as an example. He discusses the artist's choice of geometric forms and links this with his supposed search for a universal. He writes:

> As philosophy had moved from unity to a fragmentation, this fragmentation also carried into the field of painting. The fragmentation shown in post-Impressionist paintings was parallel to the loss of hope for a unity of knowledge and philosophy. It was not just a new technique in painting. It expressed a world view.[22]

No explanation is given as to how Schaeffer reaches the conclusion that Cézanne's geometrical forms are his particular comment on fragmentation and brokenness. As to the use of the form, it is common among many artists, used as a means to achieving coherence, roughly in the same category as a writer might employ certain language forms to achieve impact or to assert his individuality.

It seems that Schaeffer's "fragmentation" carries a stigma the artist himself would not have accepted. Instead, the artist might justify it as a permissible technique of composition, as Mondrian did. A distinction to be borne in

mind is that while Schaeffer thought of fragmentation as expressing a world view, Cézanne was using a particular method of composition, not necessarily with a philosophical statement in mind.

The principal concern of this chapter is a critique of Schaeffer's view of decline in twentieth century thought and culture, of which art is a major component. Thus, in pursuing his idea of fragmentation, Schaeffer illustrates his case by reference to the artist Duchamp.

4. Duchamp's painting, Nude Descending a Staircase

Schaeffer sees this work as portraying fragmentation, not as a method but as an end result. But the question to be asked is whether Duchamp is actually stating that he sees the universe as chaotic and fragmented. Is it indeed his purpose to make a statement of philosophic significance? It is true that Duchamp is using fragmentation as a way of presenting his ideas, but there is clearly a difference between fragmentation as a world view and fragmentation as a method of composition. Again, as in his treatment of Cézanne, Schaeffer concludes that the work is designed with the purpose of conveying a message. A major criticism of Schaeffer, at this point, is that he seems to import into his perception something that is not found in the work of art. In other words, he is not practising exegesis (which originates from the work or text) but eisegesis (which is brought from sources alien to the text). Something is read into the art work that cannot be properly described as being there, and this, by analogy with theology, may thus be called an eisegetic tendency. This becomes more obvious as one

considers Schaeffer's evaluation of Michelangelo's sculpture.

C. Schaeffer's bias in assessing sculptures from the Renaissance period

1. To illustrate his bias two examples of art described in How Should We Then Live? are selected. The first is a group of four incomplete sculptures known as The Captives. Schaeffer writes:

> Here we see on either side Michelangelo's statues of men "tearing themselves out of the rock" . . . They make a real humanistic statement: Man will make himself great. Man as man is tearing himself out of the rock. Man by himself will tear himself out of nature and free himself from it.[23]

Each unfinished statue is still half embedded in stone. Schaeffer infers that this represents man breaking free from nature to make himself great. Yet might it not be seen as breaking free from ignorance and servitude in order to enjoy knowledge and liberty? Schaeffer ignores this and imports an idea into the art which, to the viewer, must be new. Plausible it may be, but it is more important to know whether Michelangelo intended to convey this idea by his work. It might also be asked whether breaking free from nature is wrong or rebellious, as Schaeffer implies, whereas in his earlier description of nature "eating up" grace[24] nature is the villain. Why then should breaking free from nature be presented as a rebellious action?

2. Schaeffer is similarly subjective (eisegetic?) in describing Michelangelo's statue of David in Florence.

As a work of art it has few equals in the world.

> . . . But let us notice that the David was not the Jewish David of the Bible. David was simply a title. Michelangelo knew his Judaism, and in the statue the figure is not circumcised. We are not to think of this as the biblical David but as the humanistic ideal. Man is great![25]

The grounds upon which Schaeffer bases his conclusion that the statue is a humanistic statement are, first, the uncircumcision of the male figure, and second, the disproportionately large hands. He also notes the non-Semitic face of David, but this might simply mean that Michelangelo was doing contextually what many artists had done before and continue to do today, namely produce art to fit in with the contemporary scene. Thus there have been black Madonnas or Japanese apostles. Schaeffer had advocated that "Christian art should differ from country to country . . . If a Christian artist is Japanese, his painting should be Japanese".[26]

Schaeffer interprets David's large hands as saying that man is powerful. But is not the response to this that literalism and realism in art may easily be confused? Is it not hazardous for the art critic to read into an art work a world view where none exists or none is intended? These are valid questions.

3. Duchamp's painting, Le passage de la vierge à la mariée[27] is cited by Schaeffer as causing the viewer subjectively to defile himself while searching for a connection between the title and the work itself. Schaeffer omits the biblical censures on evil thoughts issuing from within the human heart. Thus it is not the painting (which is not even implicitly sexual) that is at fault, but the viewer, if indeed such defilement does take place.

4. A critique of Schaeffer's view of Jackson Pollock

Pollock made some of his paintings by the device of suspended and swinging paint cans.[28] But does Schaeffer prove that Pollock's world view was one of chance? Has he correctly understood Pollock or fairly represented him? He says Pollock "painted deliberately in order to make the statement that all is chance".[29] As an explanation this is far from complete. It is known that Pollock had personally, carefully and with much effort placed his canvas on the floor with a number of dripping paint cans above them. The result was a composition that turned out to be a controlled achievement, one that showed individuality and effort.

By contrast, Schaeffer--in making his film series--[30] re-created a Pollock-type painting and photographed it for publication. He attempted to imitate Pollock's technique and to prove his own point about chance. But he can be accused of superficiality, because the resultant production emerged as something very different from Pollock's, as Best says:

> (It is) exactly the opposite of Pollock's and contradicts his own criticism: Pollock turns out to be the individual who exercised control; the Schaeffer "painting" turns out to be robotic, predictable--the kind of pseudo-twentieth-century art one can find at any walk-on weekend sidewalk art show. Whether we like these drip paintings or not, we must admit that it is obvious that a human being made the one and a contraption the other.[31]

Schaeffer omits to mention that Pollock was a highly gifted artist expressing his work in many different styles. The dripping paint cans were but one experiment and do not

necessarily represent a supreme assertion of his world view. Schaeffer appears to be to some extent the prisoner of his own presupposition, that what man makes can always tell us what he believes. This principle he applied not only to the visual arts, but also to music, which must be considered next.

III. A Critique on Schaeffer's Evaluation of Music

Schaeffer's thesis is that what the composer produces is like an artefact: it expresses a world view. In several respects this standpoint is vulnerable to criticism.

A. Schaeffer's superficiality in research

This criticism finds support in the following:

1. The sources Schaeffer cites in The God Who is There (pp. 37-39) and How Should We Then Live? (pp.190-197) would be considered by musicologists as sketchy. Best remarks that with two exceptions books and articles to which Schaeffer refers as authorities are "of questionable substance for the kind of basic thinking (he) should be trying to do", and he continues:

> In particular (Joseph Machlis's Introduction to Contemporary Music) is a very popularised, music appreciation-type textbook and carries with it little weight of insight and scholarly substance. Beyond the technical and scholarly quality of these works, they bear no evidence of anything except typical secular thinking about the arts. Nonetheless, Schaeffer leans on both their data and their interpretations to support his own, seemingly without asking the question as to whether music criticism, along with music compos-

itions, can also be said to contain a world view.[32]

2. As in his discussion of philosophy and the visual arts, Schaeffer lists many names but fails to elaborate on them or identify them in context, or even to outline some basic distinctions between them. This fault of generalising gives the impression of superficiality and is not easily dismissed. Thus Schaeffer mentions composers such as Hassler and Praetorius only as hymnwriters; their diverse styles and quality of work are not mentioned. Nor does he devote sufficient time and space to record the connection between one kind of musical activity and another, and the resultant picture of musical development emerges as blurred.

3. Schaeffer's omissions with regard to music from Italy, France or Spain--from the Baroque Era to the twentieth century--are obvious. There are also many gaps in his descriptions of the two streams of music mentioned--the German and the French. He links Schoenberg and Stravinsky[33] by noting their common admiration for Beethoven's final Quartets which, says Schaeffer, were a door opening into modern music. Yet we are not told what musical processes join Schoenberg and Stravinsky. In similar fashion he links Debussy with Pierre Shafer and his musique concréte.[34]

Since Schaeffer's main objective here is to utilise music to illustrate world view and Western cultural decline, it is doubtful whether he attains his goal. It is difficult to follow his reasoning that the carefully controlled distortions of musique concréte carry the message that "all is relative, nothing is sure, nothing is fixed, all is in flux".[35]

B. The issue of Schaeffer's idea of a world view

Schaeffer appears too anxious to introduce the idea of a world view. Having decided that music inevitably expresses the world view of its composers, he believes it is therefore open to interpretation by every listener, in the same way as visual art is open to the interpretation of its viewers.

1. Thus, for example, his concern about modern music is related to the demise, as he calls it, of tonality; an effect that is consequent upon Schoenberg's twelve-tone system, in contrast to Bach. Bach's music, says Schaeffer, contained resolution, "because as a Christian he believed that there will be resolution both for each individual life and for history".[36]

This statement might be challenged on the grounds that it fails to see that resolution relates to musical context. No music can continue for too long in a state of tension (irresolution) without losing its appeal and impact. So, therefore, resolution must take place in all music, also in Schoenberg's, as can be shown.

2. The chief objection to Schaeffer's approach towards deviations in modern music, such as Schoenberg introduced, lies in his simplistic diagnosis and too-easy perception of world view. While on the one hand his desire for quality in music (as in visual art) is highly commendable, he fails to convince his more thoughtful readers that he has the background knowledge appropriate to his task. The result is that while in general there might be agreement on his main thesis, in numerous particulars he fails to substantiate his case.

C. Schaeffer fails to define "fragmentation"

The term "fragmentation" is frequently used by Schaeffer. He uses it in connection with the post-Impressionists in art. "The fragmentation shown in post-Impressionist paintings was parallel to the loss of hope for a unity of knowledge in philosophy".[37] Thus, Cézanne is said to have brought the appearance of fragmented reality also to man himself.

As art became the vehicle for modern man's "view of the fragmentation of truth and life", so also music became such a medium. Schaeffer writes of Debussy's music: "His direction was not so much that of non-resolution but of fragmentation. . . he opened the door to fragmentation in music and has influenced most of the composers since".[38]

Here one is left to speculate as to what Schaeffer means by "fragmentation". He does not indicate how the process is actualised in Debussy or the other composers to whom he alludes. Does he mean that Debussy chose to use harmony in ways unconventional to classical forms? If so, he does not explain how this is degenerative, nor does he say how he reaches a conclusion about a shift from wholeness to brokenness. Best makes a comment on Schaeffer's general approach to Debussy:

> Debussy simply used a different language than his forebears. His grammar is complete and his syntax clear. There are no more grounds for construing it to be a shift from wholeness to fragmentation, than the transition from modality to tonality (which took place roughly from 1300 to 1600 A.D.) should be construed to be an exegesis of the shift from salvation by works to sola fide.[39]

D. Schaeffer's understanding of the Beatles

Schaeffer's insights--rather than his expertise--are found to be useful when he deals with popular music, jazz, rock and modern jazz. He cannot go into detail about their stylistic development from the 1920s onwards, but focusses at once on the Beatles and their impact in the 1960s.[40]

1. Because of the Beatles' widespread influence on pop music, their inventive genius, diversity of style and performance skills, Schaeffer sees them as trendsetters, not so much as musicians but as leaders of a lifestyle that has influence in the 1980s. The Beatles' world view was far from Christian, but proof of this came less from their music than from what they said of themselves and in the lyrics they wrote. Much of their music shows creative genius and immense variety from ethnic pop music to Bach.

2. Schaeffer thought that the religious answer the Beatles were endeavouring to give[41] was cast in "the same vague pantheism which predominates much of the new mystical thought today".[42] Schaeffer is probably thinking more of lyrics than of music since there is no clear line of connection between pantheism and the Beatles' music.

He regards the way the Beatles use the words, syntax and music (as in Sergeant Pepper's Lonely Hearts Club Band) as forming a "unity of infiltration".[43] This is a genuine insight of some worth, though Schaeffer has not developed it in detail nor has he told us what the Beatles intended by their musical "statement" in more specific terms.

By his sparse comments on the Beatles and pop music in general Schaeffer shows that he has not taken the opportunity of illustrating cultural decline through this medium. Had he paid more attention to the lyrics of the 1960s and 1970s he would have gathered material to support his case against Westernism.

IV. Some Positive and Negative Aspects of Schaeffer's Love for the Arts

The criticisms thus far made of Schaeffer's concern with world view in artists and musicians need to be offset by some positive aspects. First among these is his active promotion of the arts as having intrinsic worth.

A. Schaeffer's view of art and the Bible

His book Art and the Bible[44] consists of two essays, the second of which comments on eleven perspectives by which Christians are said to be able to assess the value of art. Summarised, these are:

(1) Art has intrinsic value.

(2) Art forms lend support to prevailing world views.

(3) All forms of writing are affected by a continuity or discontinuity with definitions of words in normal syntax.

(4) No work of art is sacrosanct simply by being art.

(5) Basic criteria for judging art are technical quality, validity, intellectual content (world view) and the wholeness of content and medium.

(6) Any kind of message--from history to fiction--can use art forms to communicate.

(7) Changes in art forms and in style are permissible.

(8) No art style is in itself either good or evil.

(9) The Christian world view has both a major and minor theme (redemption and fallenness).

(10) Christian art must not be thought of as consisting only of religious themes.

(11) The problem of creating an individual work or of building a total body of art work is common to all artists.

The net positive value of Schaeffer's essay is that through it he brings art into evangelical thinking as having value in itself, quite apart from religious themes. This applies both to music and the visual arts; both being a means of expressing praise to God, "and with this beauty a freedom before God"[45] says Schaeffer. For this contribution many Christian evangelicals who have in the past neglected the arts, will feel they are indebted to him.

B. Schaeffer's commitment to world view

Schaeffer is almost compulsively concerned with world view. He seems to want to infuse every artistic principle with this idea. He reads into art the intention of the artist and is concerned less with wholeness or content than with the motivation he judges to be behind it; thus even the creation of art under patronage becomes suspect.[46] Content becomes significant only to the extent that it reflects the artist's world view. This distorts reality. So persistent is Schaeffer's desire to link world view with content in art and music that he appears to equate some aspects of Western art with the gospel itself.

As to Schaeffer's principle on the neutrality of styles in art, he seems to contradict it when he says: "Styles themselves are developed as symbol systems or

vehicles for certain world views or messages".[47] Later he elaborates: "Therefore, an art form or style that is no longer able to carry content cannot be used to give the Christian message".[48] One cannot say this in the same breath as asserting the neutrality of styles.

Unfortunately, neither in Art and the Bible nor in How Should We Then Live? does Schaeffer give any guidelines as to what he believes to be acceptable styles in art, and one is left with an unexplained concept.

C. Concluding Observations on Schaeffer and the Arts

In spite of Schaeffer's immense helpfulness in making Christians aware of the import of the arts, on balance he must be judged a pessimist. His courageous advocacy of the arts and his pleas for quality notwithstanding, the final outcome is to leave one with a sense of deep regret (or even despair) that the arts have led the way into spiritual decline; or else have reflected the downward trend in Western man's thought.

Schaeffer's purpose is to make Christians aware of the erosion of their Western cultural heritage and to galvanise them into changes of thought towards reform. We cannot be certain, however, that his total views on the arts will further this objective. His sense of gloom is such that by far the greater part of the twentieth century art world is under censure and judgment. The effect of this on Christian thought might be the opposite of what Schaeffer wanted. It could further alienate Christian evangelicals (who for generations have kept their distance from the arts) and make them more intensely aware of the potential evils

of the art world. It might make others fear artistic innovation and convince them that what is overtly "spiritual" is automatically best quality, and that, conversely, creativity must always be regarded with suspicion. The same applies to music.

One must not suggest that this is what Schaeffer would have wanted. Yet many young and deeply Christian artists would dispute his view that most modern art embodies post-Christian world views. Possibly, young artists might feel that Schaeffer does not encourage them in their vocations nor has he outlined alternatives for them in the current climate of thought. Best has a valuable observation:

> If he would only have spent as much time constructing a thoroughgoing, profoundly Christian alternative for art and music as he did in bringing judgment to it, his whole approach, the "body of his work"--to use one of his own phrases--would have had immeasurably greater value. The final irony is that as much as Schaeffer treasured the importance of having a world view, he failed to show his own with clarity and integrative prowess --at least for the arts.[49]


There are probably two extremes to be avoided in any Christian assessment of art. The first is that art is always an exegetic expression of a value system. The second is a Positivist view of art as objective, impassive and sterile. Schaeffer's position seems to approximate more nearly to the first of the two we have mentioned, and it is the view of this thesis that he loses a part of his positive impact by maintaining it with such persistence. On the other hand many have seen art in a new light under Schaeffer's tutelage.

CHAPTER 7

A Critical Assessment of Schaeffer's View of Decline in Modern Culture and Thought


Part Two: The Content and Direction of Modern Theology

The second part of this critique, like the first part (Chapter 6), follows the sequence of Schaeffer's thought concerning the disciplines set out in the staircase diagram. Initially it is depicted as follows: (TGWIT, p. 16)



By this Schaeffer conveys his thought that the "shift in truth", as he calls it, affected men's lives in this order, beginning with philosophy and concluding with theology. The staircase represents Schaeffer's concept of the "line of despair" below which absolutes are no longer recognised. Theology, the last of the disciplines affected by the shift in truth, has its own chronological line of despair. Thus Schaeffer adds to the above diagram, as follows:

(TGWIT, p. 53)



As this thesis moves to its conclusion, its concern is

to assess Schaeffer's thought on the decline affecting the content and direction of modern theology. He regards the intellectual decline in modern theology as the "fifth step of despair", but intimately connected with "the rest of the cultural consensus we have been reviewing".[1]

For Schaeffer "modern theology" means "modern existential theology" with its origin in Kierkegaard. There is an essential methodological unity "which binds together all expressions of modern theology". Taken together, these provide an overwhelming consensus, a unifying factor, namely its wrong methodology.[2]

I. Schaeffer's View of Modern Theology in Decline

His own basic theological position must first be stated.

A. The basis of his theology: An inerrant Bible

1. While Schaeffer's tenacious belief in biblical inerrancy is the foundation of his theology, it is also the brake on his thinking. His position on Scripture has been analysed in chapter 2. The implications of his stand can be taken further. Schaeffer was a self-confessed man of the Reformation, exulting in his heritage. Yet where the Reformation proclaimed justification by faith as a first priority, for Schaeffer the emphasis on the inerrancy of Scripture became an article of practical and theological belief so vital that all else depended on it. His book, The Great Evangelical Disaster made inerrancy a watershed issue for theology today.[3]

2. When reading an account of the Schaeffers' 1950s European ministry[4] the impression is gained that it was of supreme importance to establish the credibility

of Scripture. So intense was Schaeffer's preoccupation with this that he did not mind if Christians were divided over his views on Scripture. Clark Pinnock remarks:

> A theologian like C.S. Lewis, for example, who rejected biblical inerrancy but who defended the gospel of the Incarnation, would by Schaeffer's criteria be on the other side of the great divide that separates those who hold the "full view" of Scripture and those who do not.[5]

3. It is highly probable that Schaeffer's inerrancy platform greatly limited his ministry and effectively hid the gospel from some who ought to have heard it. Paradoxically, the more intense the focus on inerrancy, the more diffuse became the goal, evangelism. This censure on Schaeffer must be read in the context of the present discussion of a major component of his theology.

Schaeffer's pro-Reformation stance notwithstanding, it may be asked whether he properly understood Luther who judged the Bible on the basis of whether Christ was being preached. Schaeffer seems so anxious to establish the Bible's inerrancy that he seems to overlook its primary function, to bear testimony to Christ as Saviour and Redeemer.

4. Schaeffer's advocacy of biblical inerrancy was not modified by time. He eventually felt it to be crucial to defend it in painstaking detail, down to the accuracy of the Genesis 5 genealogy and the creation of Eve out of Adam's rib.[6] Not that he tried to prove the correctness of details through history or science, but that he insisted, on the basis of coherency, that they have to be true to fit in with the overall system of an inerrant book.

Schaeffer takes the risk of so committing himself to

the inerrancy position that if in one detail it can be shown to be at fault, the entire inerrancy thesis must collapse. His tenacity in this respect barred the way for a broader evangelical scholarship to see him as an ally in the Church's common warfare with secularist philosophies.

5. On the other hand, inerrancy gained Schaeffer many friends to the right of the theological spectrum.[7] For these he was a champion of a "whole" Bible, though he was unwilling to join in conflicts on questions of separatism, despite his earlier support for Carl McIntire's militancy.

6. In summary, inerrancy was at one and the same time essential to Schaeffer and a serious handicap to him. With a strong desire to recover the theology of the Princeton School under men like Warfield and Machen, he saw inerrancy as essential and was convinced of its intellectual respectability. The problem was that he could only assert it, not prove it, believing that no doctrine is secure if even one biblical statement of fact could be proven to be false. This places apologetics under a tremendous and unnecessary strain, to no good purpose.

B. Schaeffer's perception of the gulf between the Reformation and Modern Theology

In Schaeffer's view the gulf between the older theology and the new theology was caused by autonomous reason having destroyed the basis for holding to biblical absolutes, so forcing modern theology into a choice between despair and a leap of faith. Thus modern theology is now characterised by an "upper storey" existential quality, of which first Kierkegaard and then Barth are the chief representatives.

As to the gulf between the theology of Luther and Calvin and that of Schleiermacher down to Bultmann and Barth, Schaeffer is completely accurate. He is also right in recognising a common quality in much modern theology, namely its emphasis on an interior experience of faith rather than on the objective truth of a self-unveiling God.[8] This made him challenge it as a new modernism, especially when its definitions of the Word of God were blurred.

Schaeffer's problem, however, was that he did not seem to grasp the reasons for theology's shift to an "interior" faith position. He ascribed it to the abandonment of presuppositions and consequent loss of a rational truth system leading to despair and the leap of faith. He seemed to be unable to acknowledge the reality of modern tendencies to reject the Bible as presented, namely that orthodoxy demands its acceptance. For Schaeffer the only way was to insist on a closed rational system coming from an inerrant Bible, not realising that such a system was doomed to fail through lack of credibility.

C. Schaeffer's use of the "upper storey"

1. Is this his best contribution to theology?

Some will think so. It is doubtful, however, whether he has taken sufficient pains to explain in detail his concept of upper storey theology.[9] Yet it is probably among his best contributions to theological thinking that he has discerned such a basic characteristic in contemporary theology. He realised that theology had shifted from the realism that demands an objectively existing God and a bodily risen Christ. It now looks to a fictive (upper storey) theology which stresses human needs and aspirations.

Schaeffer saw this move as an activity in which man imaginatively injects meaning into what is, objectively speaking, a meaningless world. Under such a thought system theological truths are not meant to be universally valid but concern themselves with moral convictions about what is right. Pinnock expresses this trend as follows:

> (Such beliefs) are not to be thought of as objectively true, or to be considered binding upon other communities. Our beliefs are the symbolic expression of the values we have chosen and nothing more. Theology is good fiction--it grants us useful theology, people fictively frame a surreal world beyond the rational which, though it has no cognitive signficance, fills life with meaning and hope.[10]

2. Schaeffer ignores a vital aspect of theology.

He has attempted to describe what is happening in the the theological world. He insists that modern theology in general is saying that what may be religiously true might be historically or metaphysically false. In his reaction to this Schaeffer is seen to be more concerned with asserting the historicity of certain biblical events than with meeting the problems of human aspirations. His opposition to this upper storey theology leads him to ignore vital aspects of theology which do have meaning and value, and which are beyond any scientific verification.

So, for example, Schaeffer is so anxious to establish the literal accuracy of early Genesis that he fails to expound the main point of it, which is not a treatise in geology or biology, but a revelation of God's relation to man and the cosmos. In other words, though Schaeffer's

insight into upper storey theology has real value, it also puts him into a theological box from which there is no real hope of exit.

What is Schaeffer's alternative to upper storey theology? He calls for a return to biblical presuppositions and acceptance of the Bible as inerrant towards giving us a rational system of truth. But this too has its problems, as all voluntarism has problems when applied in existential thinking. Does Schaeffer think that choosing one's presuppositions is basically any different from the existential leap? This question leads to a closer consideration of Schaeffer's presuppositionalism.

D. The Problem of Schaeffer's Presuppositionalism

1. Do men choose their presuppositions?

Presuppositionalism is so foundational to Schaeffer's thought that it appears on the opening pages of his first book.[11] "The basic one was that there really are such things as absolutes". Schaeffer regards our acceptance or rejection of absolutes as a voluntary process-action. We choose our Christian presuppositions. If this is so we face the same thing as is found in existential theology with its leap. Is this a point that escapes Schaeffer? He argues that reason has been used (i.e. autonomous reason) to overthrow the rationality of Christianity's theistic position; that the Church must return, via a voluntary choice, to where it was before autonomous reason did its damage to the intellectual and theological framework of the past. This return must be accomplished by re-acceptance of presuppositions, especially in regard to absolutes.

2. The way back to theism

It is doubtful whether presuppositions can be regarded as a matter of conscious choice. They are shaped by intellectual climate over a period of time; therefore any attempt to reverse the erosions made by secularism must employ reason and intellect. If Christian theism has been undermined by reason or rationalism, then reason must be harnessed in the restoration process. Christians must use their minds to achieve this in the present generation: which makes the task of Christian pastoral apologetics the more meaningful and urgent.

It may be thought that Schaeffer had tried to do this in defending and upholding the Bible, and this is so, but his concern has been with detail that often fails to touch the most important issues of modern theology. What is needed, therefore, is an apologetic that does not demand from anyone that he begins with right religious assumptions, and attempts to vindicate the truth of Christianity without any presuppositional leap of faith.

3. Presuppositions subject to verification

Voluntary commitment to a set of presuppositions does not make them true and Schaeffer nowhere suggests this. He was careful to make it clear that presuppositions are open to verification and discussion.[12] Thus: "Verification is the procedure required for the establishment of the truth or falsity of a statement".[13]

It can be shown that Schaeffer's presuppositionalism has roots in Cornelius Van Til, one of his professors at Westminster Theological Seminary, although there are

differences between them. For Schaeffer a presupposition is "a belief or theory which is assumed before the next step in logic is developed".[14] So he does not ask Christians to commit themselves to a system they cannot verify or a God whom they do not believe exists.

It may be argued that foundational presuppositions like the existence of God cannot be verified since they belong to the ultimate; but for Schaeffer the verification of the Bible as God's Word is within the realm of possibility. The teaching of Scripture touches on "the cosmos and history, which are open to verification".[15] Here lies an important difference between him and Van Til, who uses the term presupposition to mean beliefs that lie beyond the possibility of verification. Schaeffer asks: "Is the biblical position intellectually possible? Is it possible to have intellectual integrity while holding the position of verbalised, propositional revelation?"[16] His emphatic answers drew many young aspiring intellectuals into his circle.

Gordon R. Lewis is right in saying that Schaeffer would have communicated more effectively with his readers had he called presuppositions "hypotheses" that can be shown to be true or false, and he adds:

> When Schaeffer says, "More than ever before, a presuppositionalist apologetic is imperative"[17] he does not imply that presuppositions are beyond examination. He means that it is imperative to detect presuppositions, especially epistemological assumptions that make any truth about reality impossible, and by appealing to common ground help people see that truth is possible with intellectual integrity.[18]

E. Schaeffer's lack of credible scholarship weakens his apologetic impact

While this applies to his knowledge of philosophy, theology and history, here we have theology chiefly in mind.

1. His literary resources were generally sparse.

Pinnock has some strong criticisms here, and he is not alone:

> One gets the impression when reviewing his sketching in of the data base on which his grander claims are mounted that much of the time Schaeffer is beyond his depth. He has, as I have already suggested, some astute instincts about the general flow of intellectual and theological history, but when it comes to specific knowledge about Aquinas or Kant or Kierkegaard, there are large gaps. What he says about them is minimal, and even then his judgments are controversial and undefended in the face of alternative readings. For whatever reasons, Francis Schaeffer is poorly informed about the historical side of the topics he elects to talk about. This explains, of course, why he is loved by the crowds and ignored by many evangelical scholars.[19]

Devastating as this may sound, this judgment is well founded. Some who visited L'Abri and saw its meagre literary resources, and who knew that Schaeffer was inclined to work from newspaper clippings and magazine articles backed up by debates and conversations, had reason to support this allegation. Yet the comparative poverty of his resources made his astuteness the more remarkable and increase one's admiration for his skill and intelligence. But these could not compensate for his lack of detailed knowledge in areas where the expert needs much more than insight. Such deficiencies have become more obvious with time.

2. Schaeffer is inconsistent in his treatment of the fallenness of human reason. We have already noted earlier in this chapter his misinterpretation of Aquinas's position on autonomous reason. He complains that Aquinas employs reason as if it were autonomous (that is, unimpaired); but then goes on to employ his own reason to the full in a dialogue with fallen men and women. He brushes aside Aquinas, but fails to see that--far from being a source of upper storey theology--Aquinas is an opponent of it, and that nothing might better suit the need of the Church today than a resurgence of the intellectual energy of an Aquinas. This would help dispel the anti-theism which is at the heart of so much upper storey theology today.

As for reflecting on the Reformation, Schaeffer seems to think Luther and Calvin took a view of presuppositionalism like his own and that their defence of Scripture is matched by his. This is not so. Neither Luther nor Calvin spoke in such terms, nor did they presuppose the authority of the Scriptures as to subordinate all reasoning to it.[20] A problem with both of them is that scholars have variously interpreted their philosophy of religion. Warfield thought of them as rationalists and Barth as fideists. Furthermore, so strong is their stress on the witness of the Spirit to the Word of God that undertones predictive of neo-orthodoxy may be found in what they taught. Such assessments would be anathema to Schaeffer. His writing on Reformed thinking seems to be restricted to the broad issues--the headlines--with much of the fine print omitted.

Finally, Schaeffer's deficiency in scholarship shows

up in his uncompromising hostility to Kierkegaard and Barth.

3. Schaeffer gives neither Kierkegaard nor Barth his proper place in theology. We shall consider Kierkegaard first. More than 130 years after his death Kierkegaard is still under discussion. This is a measure both of the depth and complexity of his thought and theology. When we charge Schaeffer with being unfair to Kierkegaard it is not because he disagrees with his philosophy or theological existentialism. It is that he has not taken the trouble to expound, as best he can, in as little as three or four pages, the part of Kierkegaard that impinges on New Testament Christianity. Schaeffer--committed in advance to his rejection of the "leap"--does not pause to ask, analytically, precisely what Kierkegaard meant. Nor does he mention relevant matters like Kierkegaard's grave doctrine of sin, his awareness of the abyss that is between him and God[21] nor his personal spiritual struggle towards faith nor the despair that--in Kierkegaardian terms--was the surrender by which he flung himself into the arms of a pardoning God.

It seems to be a serious imbalance in Schaeffer that he brushes aside all these aspects of Kierkegaard in order to paint him with the broad strokes of theological liberalism. Kierkegaard was an orthodox believer who was sure that classical apologetics had failed in its objective and what was needed today was to emphasise faith as inner passion. In this he may have been wrong, but if so it is an error of intellectual judgment, or of theological perception, but not one of spiritual rebellion. Schaeffer sees him only as a theological transgressor and nothing more.

What of Schaeffer's treatment of Barth? He says: "As Kierkegaard, with his leap, opened the door to existtentialism in general, so Karl Barth opened the door to the existential leap in theology".[22] He holds him responsible for having initiated virtually all that is bad in modern theology, bearing in mind that for Schaeffer existentialism is the arch foe of orthodoxy. It is true that Schaeffer concedes that Barth abandoned the early existentialist position he had taken in following Kierkegaard during the early 1920s. Yet Schaeffer gives him little credit for this, nor does he publicly recall that in the 1930s Barth launched his massive series of Church Dogmatics on quite a different basis, for he continues to treat him as a mortal enemy of orthodoxy. He ignores the fact that in the total task of defending the Christian faith Barth is most surely an ally, not an opponent.[23] He notes that Barth, "as a Swiss teaching in Germany, made a public stand against Nazism" in 1934,[24] but sees this mainly as an act of courage and does not analyse its theological implications. Richard V. Pierard says of this:

> He refuses to give any positive credit to the theological outlook of Karl Barth, who was one of the strongest voices of resistance to Nazism. Barth probably came closer to having a "Reformation base" in his theology than most of his contemporaries. Though Schaeffer grudgingly expresses "profound admiration" for Barth's stand in the Barmen Declaration of 1934, he does not deal at all with this, the most important statement criticizing the Third Reich made by the German Protestant Churches.[25]

Schaeffer's hostility to Barthianism flows, of course,

directly from his own position on biblical inerrancy. As with his views on Kierkegaard, Schaeffer owed it to his readers to present Barth's teachings with greater balance and intelligent objectivity. Had he done that first, and then rejected Barth's position as untenable, his credibility would not have suffered in the way it has done.

4. It must be noticed that Schaeffer does not conduct any meaningful dialogue with theologians--not in the sense of having an exchange of views on important topics. One cannot have such an interchange if--as Schaeffer does--the views of modern theologians are dismissed as "upper storey" not worth the serious consideration of orthodox believers; or else when such views are not actually heard or fairly stated.

Although Schaeffer is neither a pioneer of any new thought in theology nor a guide to intellectual treasures, his discernment and spiritual insights were such as to gain him an enormous following. His practical wisdom was deeper than his theoretical knowledge; it far surpassed his scholastic ability and revealed him as being a man who had an understanding of many of the broad issues of his day, though, as can now be seen, his grasp of the detail involved in defending these issues was not adequate. Clark Pinnock says of him:

> In many ways he ventured beyond his intellectual depth. One could not compare him in a class with Carl Henry or Van Til, or with Barth or Bultmann. His influence as a thinker will not last long. But what is impressive is . . . the total quality of the man in whose face the glory of God shone.[26]

II. Schaeffer's Understanding of History as a Teleological Process

Although Schaeffer nowhere enunciates a personal philosophy of history, his understanding of its process can be discovered.

A. The Basis of Schaeffer's Thought on History

The "flow of history" governs Schaeffer's providential view of human affairs from the creation to the consummation of Christ's kingdom. In God's plan the past, the present and the future are joined, and, "on the basis of his character" God works in human history, judging his people or "turning the wheels of history" as He thinks fit.[27] In this space-time continuum Christ is central. His life on earth, death on the cross and bodily resurrection are historical "brute facts" that can be verified.

The dynamic of history, thinks Schaeffer, is ideas. Man's thought world determines his actions, his creativity and his social systems. Man's "world view" determines his ethics, political institutions and scientific endeavours. Schaeffer practically ignores economic, social and psychological factors as additional influences in the flow of history.[28] What he calls "the Judeo-Christian world view" stresses "the significance of men in history".[29] Man is able to impregnate history with either good or bad.[30]

Schaeffer takes an activist stance concerning history, which means that man has a part to play, that history is not merely the unfolding of the inevitable. There is a gulf between what mankind and human history are now, and what they might have been, and this provides a moral foundation

and framework for life.[31]

After his film series on How Should We Then Live? (1976) Schaeffer as historian came under scrutiny. Some Protestant observers regarded the series as a Christian counterpart to Kenneth Clark's Civilisation and Jacob Bronowski's Ascent of Man projects.[32] Schaeffer shared this view.

B. Criticisms of Schaeffer as an Historian

By his own testimony Schaeffer does not attempt a chronological record of Western culture but "an analysis of the key moments in history which have formed our present culture, and the thinking of people who brought those moments to pass".[33]

1. Schaeffer has attempted too much with too little in terms of equipment and space. Any qualified historian who elects to write about the modern world has a massive task on his hands. Therefore the dimensions and the synopses provided by a work such as Paul Johnson's History of the Modern World (1983) are of astonishing quality; their broad sweep being phenomenal. Our century (with its technology and capacity to acquire and store facts) now generates such a mass of source material that most historians now concentrate on specific topics.

Schaeffer chose otherwise and tried to develop an entire scheme that aimed to identify all the complex movements of Westernism with an eye to fitting them into a framework; a Christian one at that. It was, of course, an impossible task, and while the result was plausible and attractive to the lay mind, it could not stand up to the

scrutiny of expert investigation.

2. Schaeffer can be accused of careless historical scholarship. Among many examples the following may be noted:

a. His treatment of the "fall" of Rome is no more than a moralistic explanation, reminiscent of Gibbon, and presented along with analogies to present-day social and ethical conditions. Rome fell because it worshipped a finite god and lacked an "inward base"; yet by the time the fifth century had come such a base had largely been acquired through a Christianising process.[34]

Had Schaeffer looked at even part of the body of literature available he would have mentioned many other causes contributing to Rome's fall: among them Christianity itself; and the growth of the Germanic tribes in western and central Europe.

b. His treatment of the Reformation--of which he is the strongest protagonist--does not deal with its defects in an objective way. Despite his admission that it was not a golden age[35] and despite his clear understanding of its major achievements in religion, culture and politics, Schaeffer is not an interpreter of this period whose detailed judgments can be trusted. Among the Reformers there was considerable divergence of view as to forms of government. One thing is clear: these views were not derived exclusively from Scripture (as Schaeffer appears to think). The ideals of some of those Schaeffer admired were theocratic rather than democratic. Richard Pierard confirms this by saying that the Reformation pattern of government Schaeffer

would have liked to see instituted today "is a moderate theocracy in the guise of the 'Judeo-Christian' tradition".[36] David K. Watson has shown that Schaeffer relied heavily on the writings of Rousas J. Rushdoony, whose school of thought known as theonomy does advocate theocracy.[37]

Negative aspects of the Reformation and subsequent period, such as its authoritarianism--the burning of Servetus and the harsh treatment of the Anabaptists--are ignored by Schaeffer.

The complexity of the Reformation can be shown only by the most careful examination of its many contributory strands of thought, among them humanism itself. But for Schaeffer humanism is the antithesis to Christianity, and he therefore fails to understand that one of the problems of defining the significance of the Reformation lies in understanding the connection between Renaissance humanism and the Reformation. Ronald A. Wells sees Protestant Christianity as Christianity synthesized with a form of humanism and concludes that the Protestant Reformation "is an extremely complex and paradoxical movement, and it cannot be wrenched out of its time and context to be made a repository of timeless truth".[38] This is what Schaeffer appears to have attempted to do, also making Calvinism identical with the Reformation. The result is that, whereas Schaeffer thought of the Reformation as a single base, it is more likely that it was productive of several new bases of thinking. Schaeffer's wish to return to Reformation thinking involves the question of returning to ecclesiastical forms that would be found totally unacceptable by the great

majority of evangelical Protestants.

c. His treatment of early American history is questionable. In his Christian Manifesto Schaeffer cites the example of John Witherspoon--Scottish-born divine and first president of (what became) Princeton University--as the man chiefly responsible for linking Reformation Christianity to concepts of government in America. Witherspoon is presented as having carried Samuel Rutherford's principle of Lex Rex (1644) into the constitution.[39]

Wells says of this theory that it does not hold. He explains that Schaeffer's praise for Witherspoon's role is based on a faulty source, namely a biography of Witherspoon published by a self-described "inspirational Christian publisher".[40] Had Schaeffer done more detailed reading on this subject it might have saved him from his errors in interpretation. Better data have been supplied by Mark Noll, Nathan Hatch and George Marsden, and their consequent portrait of Witherspoon is not what Schaeffer would have wanted or approved. They cite James McAllister as follows:

> The answer to the question regarding the biblical contribution to Witherspoon's teaching about the law and liberty is: almost nothing . . . his theory of society and civil law was based not on revelation but on the moral sense enlightened by reason and experience.[41]

Noll, Hatch and Marsden comment on Witherspoon--"the most self-consciously evangelical of the founding fathers":

> (In him) there is little of the effort which marked the work of earlier Christian thinkers to ground politics in specifically Christian propositions . . . Witherspoon remains valuable as an example of courageous activity by a Christian in

> public life. . . . But it would be foolish to believe that the way in which Witherspoon reasoned about politics should ever serve as a model for Christian political thought.[42]

d. Schaeffer's analysis of history is often based on secondary sources. This opinion has been expressed by many different reviewers of How Should We Then Live? One said Schaeffer explained events that had never occurred and thoughts that were never thought until Schaeffer put them on film. Another said he would not impress thoughtful readers and that he had not used history accurately. Another accused him of making assertions which, had they been part of an undergraduate essay would land him in serious trouble.[43]

As Pierard has remarked: "He all too often prooftexted from writers and philosophers whose works he had not mastered in order to fit them into his preconceived interpretation".[44] With the exception of Whatever Happened to the Human Race? footnotes in his other books are rare and incomplete.[45]

Those who criticised Schaeffer's scholarship were not necessarily among those who disagreed with his basic thesis, but who wanted Christian scholarship to be highly regarded for its own sake. Sometimes even the sharpest censures reflect the concern of people who identify with his evangelical purpose but feel that in his apologetics he may have failed, and that the larger concerns of Christian higher learning may have been harmed by Schaeffer's lack of fine accuracy. For this reason Pierard thinks the flaws in his treatment of cultural history are serious "and these place his whole interpretive system in jeopardy".[46]

3. Schaeffer's ideational emphasis leads him to ignore many factors, apart from thought, influencing history. His commitment to presuppositionalism is far too simple. The inner world governs the outer. We can and must choose our inner world; the ideational starting point can be determined by individual choice. But this reasoning ignores extraneous factors influencing human behaviour: social changes, natural disasters, economic factors, geographical situation, psychological pressures and the like. Stanford Reid says of Schaeffer that like Karl Marx in his insistence on the economic interpretation of history, "he believes that the ideational is basic to all else, and consequently the more mundane matters of economics and the like can be ignored".[47]

4. Many historical details or concepts Schaeffer mentions are found to be inaccurately represented. Thus when he compares the civil disobedience of the early Church with the use of force in Reformation countries he stretches history beyond its limits. When he uses certain terms such as reason, rational and rationalism, he can be, as Kent Hill shows, confusing and deficient.[48] When he talks of the concept "totalitarianism" he is unaware of its strictly twentieth century meaning involving a single official ideology; that it is not merely a ruling elite nor a system of police control or manipulation by a state or party. He uses the term, erroneously, as an equivalent for dictatorship or authoritarianism. Thus he describes Ahab of Israel as "totalitarian", and Imperial Rome in the same way.[49] While none of these errors, taken singly, destroys his main thrust, taken together they weaken his credibility.

C. How Schaeffer sees a way back from historical and cultural decline

Having diagnosed the West's condition as due to a "titanic shift" in thinking, Schaeffer believes the way back lies in a return to a monistic society of the kind that America is perceived to have had before 1848, when mass migration from famine-stricken Ireland began.

Ronald A. Wells[50] has discussed Schaeffer's relation to Protestant America in a few pages of unusual penetration whose argument is chiefly followed here. It begins by citing Gary Scott Smith who (Wells says) gives a summary paragraph on modernisation that begets secularisation.

> Cultural pluralism divides society into subunits with distinct cultural traditions, thus challenging the universality of traditional religious views. Pluralistic societies deprive people of the constant social confirmation they need to sustain their beliefs about ultimate reality. Structural pluralism separates life into public and private spheres. It confines religious symbols and authority to private dimensions of life--church, family, and leisure--while public institutions and structures--politics, economics, education, media and the like--come to rest upon secular values.[51]

Schaeffer would oppose this process which would mean that, paradoxically, religion becomes less significant as society differentiates and compartmentalises, despite the fact that (as in America) more people are being "born again".

Such a prognosis of secularisation is bad news for the conservatives like Schaeffer who want to see America restored to its "Christian foundations" (though these are already

somewhat suspect). This has given rise to a resistance to modernisation, even though it is becoming clear that the process cannot be stopped. Wells says that neither he nor other Christians can be happy with a world "system" into which all must "fit". He adds:

> With Schaeffer I feel rage against the sort of world I must live in, a world vastly different from my father's. With Marx I feel the alienation that is a natural outgrowth of the specialised and impersonal environment in which I must live in modern industrial society.[52]

Schaeffer is only half right in arguing that because people began to think differently they acted differently across the board. The truth is that thought (world view) is never independent of its social context. The new industrial state being that social context, the thought forms of people began to run parallel to the new reality. Consequently modernity has come to mean much more than secularity and much more than "secular humanism". It means a new pattern of social organisation and of world view.

In this new situation the options for Christians are (a) to work within the system and achieve some accommodation to it, or (b) to oppose it at every level. Only a small minority appear to have chosen the second option.

What was Schaeffer's response to modernity? What would his continuing response be if he could have lived for ten more years? The answer to the second question is mainly speculative, based on what Schaeffer has revealed about his fascination for theonomy, a movement supported by R.J. Rushdoony, and one which contends that New Testament

Christians are still required to obey the Old Covenant and to work for Mosaic law in society's structures.[53] Theonomists are said to be proud of their influence over the "New Christian Right", according to David K. Watson.[54] Two other writers, North and Chilton, are quoted by Watson as saying that Schaeffer had been a reader of Rushdoony's writings for twenty years and that Rushdoony's thought had been a major influence on Schaeffer.[55] Wells also mentions that Schaeffer borrowed significantly from Rushdoony's legal-religious system of "secular humanism" but without actually acknowledging his debt to him[56] because of his caution regarding theocracy, a theological "hot potato". Some of Schaeffer's followers have been less circumspect about their admiration for Rushdoony, notably his son Franky, who quotes freely from him.[57] John Whitehead was another theonomist whose work Schaeffer endorsed.[58]

By showing the intellectual affinity Schaeffer had with the Christian Reconstruction movement led by Rushdoony, some indications are given as to his concepts of the healing and restoration of society, especially that of his native America as a leader in Western thought. His book A Christian Manifesto assumes new significance in the light of the Rushdoony connection.

Wells concludes his brief critique of Schaeffer and Protestant America by saying that the American "jeremiad" is a tradition of Calvinist writing. It is a familiar theme: faith is betrayed, grace is forsaken, but there is time left in which to return and recapture the vision.[59] In this call Schaeffer is the typical prophet.[60]

CHAPTER 8

Conclusions: Seeking a Balance between the Shortcomings and Successes of Schaeffer's Apologetics

This brief final chapter endeavours to balance Schaeffer's perceived shortcomings and successes as a Christian apologist. The value of his judgments on contemporary Christianity depends partly on his accuracy or insights, and partly on the public response to them. Thus a prophet might be essentially right in his vision while being an apparent failure in his ministry. The converse, obviously, also applies.

In surveying Schaeffer's understanding of theological and cultural decline, this thesis has traversed the following route: It has -

a. defined the problem of the gulf between past and present epistemology which has led to relativism in thought;

b. exemplified the theological climate of the twentieth century by outlining the views of its most representative thinker, Karl Barth, whom Schaeffer rejects;

c. described characteristic aspects, as Schaeffer sees them, of post-Christian ethical and cultural retreat;

d. defined Schaeffer's methodology and identified his goals as an evangelist and apologist;

e. compared and contrasted Schaeffer with C.S. Lewis so as to obtain a clearer picture of each;

f. suggested a number of criticisms of Schaeffer arising from his study of philosophy, the arts, theology and history. Such criticisms, however, are not complete until questions have been answered about his over-all impact.

The obvious imperfections already uncovered in details of Schaeffer's works must not be allowed to obscure his main objective, namely to reach the Christian minds of his day; "helping orthodox evangelicalism so that it will be a thing of strength and beauty in the second half of the twentieth century".[1] It is pertinent to ask, therefore:

1. To what extent did Schaeffer effectively alert his generation to the importance of the issues he raised?

The answer is that his books, lectures and the L'Abri Fellowship generated intense debate over a wide spectrum in contemporary Christianity. Numerous book reviews of Schaeffer's works, critical articles, commendations and refutations alike testify to the fact that Schaeffer was one of the most effective communicators of his time.[2] The response to Schaeffer--whether approving or disapproving--was enormous. Few evangelical writers could, at any one stage, claim a following in Protestant America equal to his. This aspect has already been explored and needs no more than simple re-statement here. Leaving aside his acclaim, criticisms levelled against him effectively aroused greater interest in his main charges against modernity.

Schaeffer was helped by the rising tide then flowing for evangelicalism. It was accompanied by a sense of urgent conviction that evangelicals needed to confront error and draw intellectual battle lines. Schaeffer wrote: "Truth carries with it confrontation; loving confrontation, but confrontation nevertheless".[3]

Schaeffer's twin focus on personal devotion and holiness, and love for his fellow man, gained him a strong and loyal following. Quite contrary to the impressions that might be

gained from his writings alone, his personal contact with people of all kinds was marked by visible love.[4] When, for example, he was to debate with Bishop James Pike, his principal concern was that "a clear Christian position" might be presented and the debate conclude "with a good human relationship" between the two men.[5]

The cumulative impact of his work, writing, travel and public ministry leaves no doubt that he alerted his generation--and especially conservative evangelical Christians--to the importance of what he was endeavouring to say.

2. Will Schaeffer's legacy as a Christian apologist have any enduring value?

This is a common question; it was asked also about C.S. Lewis (d. 1963) and has since been answered in a most positive way by an extraordinary continuing demand for his work. Clark Pinnock--by no means hostile to Schaeffer though much aware of his deficiencies--tersely observes: "His influence as a thinker will not last long".[6] With the emphasis on "thinker" Pinnock is probably right. Schaeffer was not an original thinker though he was a deeply thoughtful man. He was a populariser and as such seems bound to pay the price by means of an eclipse, rather sooner than C.S. Lewis whose originality, style and range mark him out as a potentially longer survivor.

The fact that Schaeffer's main contention with modernity is closely linked with a specific period within the present century makes his future impact less likely than it was even ten years ago.

When one has had opportunity to think analytically about Schaeffer, his originality diminishes, his thought world

seems more limited, his message more repetitious. Yet his habit of repeating his basic conviction in different ways and in the terminology of different disciplines, gives Schaefferism a peculiar strength for lay minds. For this reason alone it would be wrong, certainly premature, to dismiss him as a thinker. He is clearly a thinker on behalf of many who have not the background enabling them to think deeply about issues he raises.

Thus, for many of his student listeners his teaching on presuppositionalism came as a revelation. While other students might eventually outgrow him, they retain deep respect for his pioneering role in awakening their minds to philosophical questions of which they had been unaware. James Hurley, discussing the effect he had on students, says:

> By and large their (students') grasp was simply too vague. Between the students and his constant reading about current events, Schaeffer was in a good position to speak with authority about the impact of twentieth century culture . . . This was the audience that initially responded so strongly to him. In his later years he became its interpreter to a larger evangelical population.[7]

If Schaeffer's legacy endures for a time, it will be because of his insights about the future of the Church in an increasingly secularised social order. These insights may continue to be imparted by his followers or those whom God calls to wear his prophetic mantle.

Hurley--a psychologist--says some hostile professionals in his field have questioned Schaeffer's competence to speak on the views of major psychological thinkers, and "might try to evade his central thrust by faulting his details".[8]

This is undeniably correct. Schaeffer's continuing influence is linked to the credibility of his main thesis, not to its details or particulars in various disciplines. Thus, while some of the deficiencies of his major book, How Should We Then Live? may weaken its over-all impact, they fail to blunt its main thrust.

3. Does Schaeffer paint with too broad a brush?

The question suggests the answer. Schaeffer does paint with a broad brush. In his platform ministry as in his writing, he had a flair for dramatic illustration, pitting extremes against each other, drawing an arresting picture of theological and ethical realities. He polarised the thoughts of hearers and readers by presenting an either-or situation: either an infallible Bible or a rapid descent into eventual apostasy;[9] either a complete resistance to euthanasia in all its forms or an inevitable capitulation to legalised murder. These are examples of the broad brush technique.[10]

Its advantages are obvious. It made him a most effective communicator. Not that this was merely a device to gain attention. Schaeffer perceived these polarised alternatives as realities. Another advantage was the simplicity of the method. In apologetics (among teachers and pupils alike) the desire for simplified solutions is commonly strong and it outweighs the desire to grapple with abstruse or subtle problems. Thus, for example, Schaeffer's treatment of the problem of social justice is probably simplistic, some would say naïve. His ability to present a chart of Western history or of centuries of theology within a two hour lecture made it a vivid broad brush picture, especially when delivered with the passionate sense of urgency he felt.

In this way Schaeffer was a catalyst to a whole generation of truth seekers.

The disadvantages of the broad brush technique are obvious in that detail is lost and subtle distinctions are overlooked; yet one cannot imagine Schaeffer as making any real impact without it. Some of his scholarly contemporaries were more accurate in their assessments, but this very attention to fine detail cost them the attention of the audience.

In summary it may be said that for what he set out to accomplish, Schaeffer's broad brush was essential. Among the most effective examples is his presentation of the "line of despair" concept which made abstractions visible and graphic. It sprang from the idea that finite man--at first optimistic that reason can discover truth--was led into despair by realising that his finitude precluded him from discovering truth.[11] When reading Escape From Reason or The God Who is There, the average student feels he has "seen" the dynamic that forces various disciplines below the line of despair.

4. Is Schaeffer a messenger of hope or of despair?

At the base of Schaeffer's ethics lies an explicit philosophical idealism. Ideas are the dynamic of history. Thus world view determines action. Schaeffer writes: "The real battle for men is in the world of ideas, rather than in that which is outward".[12] This idealism is reductionistic and even deterministic. Schaeffer stresses the inevitability of results flowing from particular ideas.

> (World views) inevitably produce totally different results. The operative word here is inevitably. It is not just that they happen to bring forth

> different results, but it is absolutely inevitable . . .[13]

Dennis P. Hollinger argues that due to his idealist reductionism Schaeffer is unable to develop a full-orbed social ethic that can handle structural and systemic dimensions of social problems.[14] With this one must agree. Furthermore, Schaeffer's determinism leads to what has been called the "slippery slope" fallacy. This is best illustrated by his arguments against abortion and euthanasia. He contends that "the thinkable of the eighties and nineties will certainly include things which most people today find unthinkable and immoral . . . They will slide into each new thinkable without a jolt".[15]

Problems in fields related to euthanasia and abortion have begun to multiply, posing a serious challenge to ethics. Among these are in-vitro fertilization of the ovum, frozen embryos, surrogate motherhood and the rights of men and women involved in ever more complex situations involving advanced genetics. Schaeffer is right in some of his fears that a post-Christian society may be tempted to act out of motives of convenience and not principle. On the other hand Schaeffer may have underestimated the extent of genuine debate on the ethical issues involved.

The main effect of Schaeffer's "inevitability" type of argument, however, is that it diminishes his opportunity of becoming in any sense a messenger of hope. The stress on the slippery slope, says Hollinger, "has prevented him from seriously grappling with thorny dilemmas that cannot be swept away with generalisations about humanism and its inevitable slide into euthanasia".[16]

Schaeffer had need of a message of hope to a generation which--by his own diagnosis--had been brought to despair. Such hope cannot emanate from the inevitabilities of human history such as Schaeffer appears to sketch them.

A final question is -

5. How will Schaeffer be remembered?

There are good reasons to believe that his contributions to philosophy or theology, which were neither substantial nor formalised, will soon be dissipated. Evangelicals will not be able to refer to his theology so much as to his insights. He will survive as having been among the most prominent stimulators of American evangelicalism in the mid-twentieth century. He will be remembered for being a courageous catalyst in awakening conservative Christians to a more intellectually aggressive stance in the church of his time.

Biographical summations, whether from close friends or avowed critics, are both likely to be suspect. Schaeffer was, by every measurement, an extraordinary Christian man. A comment from Clark Pinnock, who admired him but disputed much of his theology, closes this thesis. He wrote:

> Francis Schaeffer, warts and all, was a great Christian man . . . I have not known another like him . . . (In) modern theology, he was an insightful interpreter. Although the details of his analysis will not bear much close scrutiny, the general lines of his intuitions need to be taken seriously . . . What is impressive and what will last, as in the case of Bonhoeffer, is not the thought but the total quality of the man in whose face the glory of God shone.[17]

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Notes

[1] Originally said of C.S. Lewis, English lay theologian and apologist (1898-1963), between whom and Schaeffer some comparisons are to be made in this thesis.

[2] L.G. Parkhurst, Jr, Francis Schaeffer, the Man and His Message, Wheaton, Il: Tyndale House, 1985, p. 92. (Subsequently cited as Parkhurst)

[3] Francis Schaeffer, Introduction to Francis Schaeffer, London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1974, p. 56. (Subsequently cited as Introduction)

[4] Francis Schaeffer, The God Who is There, London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1968; Chicago: I.V.P., 1968. (Subsequently cited as TGWIT)

[5] Francis Schaeffer, Escape from Reason, London: I.V.P., 1968. (Subsequently cited as EFR)

[6] Linette Martin, "Francis Schaeffer, 1912-1984", Third Way Magazine, United Kingdom, June 1985, p. 15.

[7] David Porter, "Francis Schaeffer, 1912-1984", in Third Way magazine, United Kingdom, June 1985, p. 15.

[8] Stephen Board, "An Evangelical Thinker Who Left his Mark", Christianity Today, June 15, 1984, p. 60.

[9] Death in the City, Pollution and the Death of Man, The Church at the End of the Twentieth Century, The Church before the Watching World and True Spirituality were all published between 1968 and 1971.

[10] Francis Schaeffer, He is There and He is Not Silent, London: I.V.P., 1973. (Subsequently cited as HTHNS)

[11] Introduction, p. 57.

[12] Francis Schaeffer, The Great Evangelical Disaster, Westchester, Il: Crossway Books, 1984. (Subsequently cited as TGED)

[13] Francis Schaeffer and Everett Koop, M.D., Whatever Happened to the Human Race? London: Marshalls, 1980. (Subsequently cited as WHHR)

[14] TGWIT, p. 13.

[15] TGWIT, p. 13.

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[16] TGWIT, p. 13.

[17] TGWIT, p. 14.

[18] Paul Johnson, A History of the Modern World, London: Weidenfeld, 1983, 817 pp.

[19] Johnson, p. 3.

[20] Johnson, p. 4.

[21] TGWIT, pp. 57, 63, 185.

[22] The Born-Einstein Letters, 1916-1955, London, 1971; cited in Johnson, p. 4.

[23] TGWIT, p. 14.

[24] Johnson, p. 5.

[25] TGWIT, pp. 15, 16.

[26] TGWIT, p. 15.

[27] TGWIT, p. 16.

[28] TGWIT, p. 22.

[29] TGWIT, pp. 17, 18.

[30] TGWIT, p. 18.

[31] TGWIT, p. 14.

[32] TGWIT, p. 13.

[33] Edith Schaeffer, L'Abri, London: Hodder Christian Paperbacks, 1969. (Subsequently cited as L'Abri)

[34] TGWIT, p. 15.

[35] Johnson, p. 6.

[36] EFR, p. 43.

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[37] EFR, p. 43.

[38] EFR, p. 45.

[39] EFR, p. 45.

[40] TGWIT, p. 19.

[41] TGWIT, p. 19.

[42] TGWIT, p. 19.

[43] Introduction, p. 57.

[44] Francis Schaeffer, How Should We Then Live? The Rise and Decline of Western Thought and Culture, Westchester, Il: Crossway Books, 1976; paperback, 1983. (Subsequently cited as HSWTL)

[45] EFR, p. 11.

[46] EFR, p. 19.

[47] EFR, p. 22.

[48] EFR, p. 22.

[49] EFR, p. 23.

[50] See also Johnson, p. 11: "Marx, Freud, Einstein all conveyed the same message to the 1920s: the world was not what it seemed. The senses, whose empirical perceptions shaped our ideas of time and distance, right and wrong, law and justice, and the nature of man's behaviour in society, were not to be trusted. Moreover, Marxist and Freudian Analysis combined to undermine, in their different ways, the highly developed sense of personal responsibility, and of duty towards a settled and objectively true moral code, which was at the centre of nineteenth-century European civilization".

[51] Stephen Board, "The Rise of Francis Schaeffer", Eternity, Vol. 28, June 1977, p. 41. This article is in part highly critical of Schaeffer's HSWTL.

[52] Francis Schaeffer, Death in the City, Chicago and London: I.V.P. (Subsequently cited as DITC)

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[53] DITC, p. 9.

[54] DITC, p. 7.

[55] DITC, p. 14.

[56] Stephen Board, loc. cit., Christianity Today, June 15, 1984, p. 61.

[57] Francis Schaeffer, Genesis in Space and Time, Chicago: I.V.P., 1972, p. 166. (Subsequently cited as GST)

[58] GST, p. 167. (Emphases Schaeffer's)

[59] TGWIT, p. 53.

[60] HSWTL, Author's note, p. 15.

[61] HSWTL, p. 32.

[62] HSWTL, p. 56.

[63] A.H. Strong, Systematic Theology, Rochester, 1886, p. 23.

[64] HSWTL, p. 81.

[65] HSWTL, p. 81.

[66] HSWTL, p. 84.

[67] Schaeffer's survey of The Reformation in HSWTL (pp. 79-119) contains a large number of statements and phrases, indicating his emphasis on the Bible as central to Christianity. The following statements and phrases all occur in the section mentioned:

The original Christianity of the Bible and the early church (p. 81); The Reformers accepted the Bible as the Word of God (p. 81); They did return to the Bible's instruction (p. 82); The Bible gives a unity to the universal and particulars (p. 82); The Bible tells men and women true things about God (p. 82); The Reformation returned to biblical teaching (p. 86); The Bible gives a different way to come to God from that teaching which had grown up . . . through previous centuries (p. 87); The Bible and the Bible only (p. 88); Farel holding the Bible aloft (p. 88). The foregoing are typical examples.

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[68] TGWIT, p. 13.

[69] Edith and Francis Schaeffer, "Words to a Directionless World", (An Interview by Charles Warren), Christian Life, 40, August 1978, pp. 41-42.

[70] Introduction, pp. 51-52

[71] Lane T. Dennis, Conversion in an Evangelical Context: A Study in the Micro-Sociology of Religion, Unpublished Ph.D Diss., Northwestern University, Evanston, Il., University Microfilms International, Ann Arbor, Mich., USA, 1985, p. 127. (Subsequently cited as Dennis)

[72] Dennis, p. 120.

[73] TGWIT, p. 51.

[74] Dennis, P. 120.

[75] Dennis, p. 120.

[76] Dennis, p. 121.

[77] On the history of fundamentalism see further: Norman F. Furniss, The Fundamentalist Controversy, New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1954; J.I. Packer, "Fundamentalism" and the Word of God, London: I.V.F, 1958; and Ernest R. Sandeen, The Origins of Fundamentalism: Toward a Historical Interpretation, Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1968.

[78] Harry Emerson Fosdick, "Shall the Fundamentalists Win?", The Christian Worker, 102, 10 June 1922, p. 719.

[79] Dennis, p. 122. See further George C. Bedell, Leo Sandon, Jr., and Charles T. Wellborn, Religion in America, New York: Macmillan, 1975, p. 233.

[80] Dennis, p. 122.

[81] John Gresham Machen (1881-1937), professor at Princeton Theological Seminary, 1906-1929, author of The Virgin Birth of Christ, The Origin of Paul's Religion, Christianity and Liberalism, The Christian View of Man, What is Faith? et al. Described by C.W. Hodge as the "greatest leader of the whole cause of evangelical Christianity".

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[82] C.W. Hodge, quoted on the dust jacket of a re-issue of J. Gresham Machen, The New Testament, Banner of Truth, London and Edinburgh, 1976.

[83] Dennis, p. 123.

[84] Stephen Board, Christianity Today, June 15, 1984, p. 61.

[85] Stephen Board, p. 61.

[86] Introduction, p. 56.

[87] Parkhurst, p. 91.

[88] L'Abri

[89] L'Abri, pp. 27-28. (Emphases Edith Schaeffer's)

[90] L'Abri, p. 33.

[91] L'Abri, p. 34.

[92] Introduction, p. 55.

[93] David Porter, The Practical Christianity of Malcolm Muggeridge, London: I.V.P., 1984.

[94] David Porter, "Francis Schaeffer, 1912-1984", in Third Way magazine, United Kingdom, June 1985, p. 15.

[95] L'Abri, p. 140.

[96] John A.T. Robinson, Honest to God, London: S.C.M. Press, 1963. The book that caused widespread and often passionate debate among clergy and laymen was introduced the public by a headline in The Observer, "Our image of God must go".

[97] J.A. Kirk, "A Word Concerning L'Abri", published as an appendix to TGWIT, p. 172.

[98] Kirk, p. 172.

[99] See especially Parkhurst, chapters 3-6, where the context makes this very clear.

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[100] Dennis, pp. 165-178.

[101] Barth, Brunner, Niebuhr and Bonhoeffer may be cited as examples.

[102] Dennis, p. 173.

[103] HSWTL, p. 133. "Creative stirrings of the arts".

[104] Stephen Board writes of the "serious breach" between Schaeffer and "the most vocal figure in his American denomination, Carl McIntyre", and that Schaeffer was a "principal figure in the anti-McIntyre element". See Board in Christianity Today, June 15, 1984, p. 60.

[105] Linette Martin, Third Way magazine, June 1985. "Germantown" - a suburb in Philadelphia, Pa.

[106] TGWIT, p. 54.

[107] L'Abri, p. 34.

Chapter 2

Notes

[1] TGWIT, p. 53.

[2] TGWIT, p. 52.

[3] TGWIT, p. 52.

[4] TGWIT, p. 54.

[5] TGWIT, p. 52.

[6] The end of The Great War (1914-1918) is by common agreement among historians seen as the starting point of the modern world. "With the end of the war, modernism sprang onto what seemed an empty stage in a blaze of publicity", says Paul Johnson, A History of the Modern World, London: Weidenfeld, 1983, p.9.

[7] Barth's Romans, first published in 1918, revised and reissued in 1921 and many successive editions. See also P.E. Hughes, Creative Minds in Contemporary Theology, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1966, p.28.

[8] Barth's Kirchlike Dogmatik appeared in twelve successive volumes between 1932 and 1967.

[9] TGWIT, p. 54.

[10] L'Abri, p. 34.

[11] TGWIT, p. 54.

[12] TGWIT, p. 13.

[13] HSWTL, p. 19.

[14] cf. D.R. Davies, On to Orthodoxy, London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1939, pp. 7,8: "Marx and Spengler have done something to familiarise us with the idea that the contemporary, visible surface of social life is largely the expression of historic forces--ideas, institutions, relationships."

[15] EFR, p. 9.

[16] See further Williston Walker, A History of the Christian Church, Edinburgh: T.& T. Clark, 1959, pp. 244 et seq.

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[17] HSWTL, p. 52. "Aquinas managed to have Aristotle accepted, so the ancient non-Christian philosophy was re-enthroned".

[18] HSWTL, p. 5.

19 H.R. Mackintosh, Types of Modern Theology, London: Fontana Books, 1964, p. 22.

[20] Cf. A.H. Strong, Systematic Theology, New York: A.C. Armstrong, 1896, p. 50, where the argument against rationalism is developed by reference to Pelagianism.

[21] J.G. Machen, The Origin of Paul's Religion, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1925; 1947 ed., pp. 117-169.

[22] HSWTL, p. 175.

[23] HSWTL, pp. 152, 153.

[24] J.-J. Rousseau, The Social Contract: Discourses, Introduction and translation by G.D.H. Cole, London: Dent, Everyman's Library, 1955.

[25] HSWTL, p. 155

[26] Rousseau, The Social Contract, cited in HSWTL, p. 155.

[27] Barth, From Rousseau to Ritschl, London: SCM Press, 1959, p. 108. (Subsequently cited as Barth, FRR)

[28] Barth, FRR, p. 117.

[29] Barth, FRR, p. 159.

[30] Rousseau sent the five children born to his mistress off to orphanages and played no role as a father. In 1768 he married his Therese Le Vasseur, prompted more by gratitude than by love.

[31] Among the best known of Rousseau's writings were: The Social Contract, Confessions, and Profession of Faith of a Savoyard Vicar. He also wrote A Complete Dictionary of Music. All are available in English translation.

[32] HSWTL, p. 160.

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[33] Mackintosh, p. 31.

[34] Immanuel Kant, Religion within the Boundary of Pure Reason, Edinburgh, 1838; Religion within the Limits of Reason (transl. by Theodore M. Green and Hoyt H. Hudson), Chicago/London: Open Court, 1934, p. 197.

[35] Modern idealism is the development of a principle found as far back as Locke. Locke derived all our knowledge from sensation. Berkeley said that externally we could be sure only of sensations, therefore could not be sure the external world exists at all. Hume carried the principle further and held that internally also we cannot be sure of anything but mental phenomena.

[36] HSWTL, p. 160.

[37] HSWTL, p. 162.

[38] HSWTL, p. 162.

[39] Barth, FRR, p. 171.

[40] Mackintosh, p. 30.

[41] The phrase 'philosophy of self-confidence' is used by Barth, FRR, p. 275.

[42] HSWTL, p. 162.

[43] EFR, p. 40.

[44] EFR, p. 41.

[45] TGWIT, p. 20.

[46] EFR, p. 41.

[47] TGWIT, p. 20.

[48] Barth, FRR, p. 275

[49] Barth, FRR, p. 269.

[50] TGWIT, p. 20.

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[51] TGWIT, pp. 20, 21.

[52] TGWIT, pp. 20, 21.

[53] TGWIT, p. 21.

[54] TGWIT pp. 20-22, and EFR, pp.40-45

[55] Barth, FRR, p. 281.

[56] Barth, FRR, p. 281.

[57] Barth, FRR, p. 305.

[58] Mackintosh, p. 116.

[59] HSWTL, p. 160.

[60] Friedrich Schleiermacher, Soliloquies, English translation by H.N. Fries, London, p. 317

[61] Mackintosh, p. 56.

[62] Barth, FRR, p. 342.

[63] Schleiermacher, On Religion: Addresses to its Cultured Despisers, London, 1893; New York: Harper Torch Books, 1958. (Introduction by Rudolph Otto)

[64] GST, p. 85.

[65] William C. Fletcher, The Moderns, Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1962, p. 83.

[66] Hastings' Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, London, 1960, art. "Kierkegaard", by Alexander Grieve.

[67] Emil Brunner, The Word and the World, pp. 71, 72.

[68] Karl Heim, Glauben und Denken, I, p. 93.

[69] HSWTL, p. 163.

[70] HSWTL, p. 163.

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[71] Søren Kierkegaard, Stages on Life's Way, transl. by Walter Lowrie, London: O.U.P., 1940.

[72] Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, transl. by David F. Swenson and Walter Lowrie, London: O.U.P., 1941, p. 191.

[73] TGWIT, p. 21.

[74] TGWIT, p. 21.

[75] TGWIT, p. 22.

[76] TGWIT, p. 53.

[77] John A. Gates, The Life and Thought of Kierkegaard, London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1961, p. 98.

[78] Romans 15:6

[79] John 1:18

[80] Kierkegaard, Either/Or, London: O.U.P., 1944, Volume II, p. 199.

[81] William C. Fletcher, p. 91; also TGWIT, p. 22.

[82] See Parkhurst, p. 233; HSWTL, pp. 82, 84, 86, 87; EFR, pp. 25, 28, 29; TGWIT, pp. 87, 106.

[83] Parkhurst, p. 230.

[84] See HSWTL, pp. 22, 26, 43, 48, 51, 52, 56, 79, 80, 81-88, 105, 110, 128, 204, where the Bible is referred to as source of authority and absolutes.

[85] TGED, p. 44.

[86] TGED, p. 45.

[87] Parkhurst, p. 99.

[88] TGED, Part II.

[89] Parkhurst, p. 233.

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[90] Parkhurst, "The Works of L'Abri", pp. 227-228.

[91] Harold Lindsell, The Battle for the Bible, Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1976, p. 142.

[92] James Barr, Fundamentalism, London: SCM Press, 1977, p. 11.

[93] That is, movements of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries such as those under the Wesleys, Whitfield, Moody, Finney and others, leading to Billy Graham in the 1960s to 1980s. The word "evangelical" has laid special stress on personal religion and commitment to Christ, although in England its associations were sometimes seen as an interest in social reform as shown in the days of William Wilberforce (1759-1833).

[94] TGED, p. 43 et seq., where the entire chapter is devoted to the question of departure from biblical authority.

[95] Introduction, p. 52.

[96] Barr, p. 36.

[97] Barr argues similarly in his Old and New in Interpretation, London: SCM Press, 1966, p. 204.

[98] That there are degrees of expressed loyalty to the Bible within Fundamentalism is well known. In some circles that perceived loyalty is to certain versions of the Scriptures (as for instance the King James Version). Barr's remarks about mariolatry, seem to go beyond the actualities of Protestant practice.

[99] TGWIT, p. 108 et seq.

[100] TGED, p. 155.

[101] This refers chiefly to Schaeffer's works on Genesis and Joshua where he defends their historicity.

[102] Cassette titles are:
Freedom and limitation in Biblical Cosmogony; Chance and Evolution (four tapes); The Inspiration of Scripture; The Problem of Dating the Early Chapters of Genesis.

[103] Lindsell, p. 31.

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[104] John Murray, "The Attestation of Scripture", in The Infallible Word, N.B. Stonehouse and P. Woolley, eds., Nutley, NJ: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1946, pp. 4,5.

[105] Edward John Carnell, Christianity Today, October 14, 1966, p. 39.

[106] TGED, p. 186 and Lindsell, p. 142.

[107] TGED, p. 186.

[108] Larry E. Wilson, "What Can We Learn From Francis Schaeffer?", Presbyterian Journal, USA, October 3, 1984.

[109] TGED, 1984, p. 11. Ranald Macaulay (Schaeffer's son-in-law) says it was published "not much more than a month before his death".

[110] TGED, pp. 34, 35.

[111] TGED, p. 35.

[112] TGED, p. 35.

[113] Benjamin Breckinridge Warfield, Professor of Didactic and Polemic Theology in the Theological Seminary of Princeton, New Jersey, 1887-1921.

[114] Published in a new edition, 1951; edited by Samuel G. Craig with introduction by C. van Til.

[115] J.I. Packer, Fundamentalism and the Word of God, London: Inter-Varsity Fellowship, 1958, p. 25.

[116] J.G. Machen, Christianity and Liberalism, New York: Macmillan, 1924, pp. 7f.

[117] N.B. Stonehouse, J. Gresham Machen: A Biographical Memoir, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, pp. 336f. For a fuller discussion with similar conclusions see Carl F. Henry, Evangelical Responsibility in Contemporary Theology, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1957; especially Chapter II.

[118] Machen, Christianity and Liberalism, p. 7.

[119] Lindsell, p. 141. He sees three phases: one before Machen; one during Machen's time; the third battle "right now".

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[120] Stonehouse, p. 337.

[121] Norman F. Furniss, The Fundamentalist Controversy (1928-1931), New Haven, Conn: Yale Univ Press, 1954, pp. 127f.

[122] Machen demonstrated his own analysis of the current eclipse by two critical studies: The Origin of Paul's Religion (1921) and The Virgin Birth of Christ (1930).

[123] J.I. Packer, Fundamentalism and the Word of God, p. 35. This author has been told (Washington, D.C., 1985) that Senators have no time to read documents more than ten pages long.

[124] TGWIT, p. 55.

[125] Machen, What is Faith? Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1925; re-issued 1946, pp. 17f.

[126] Machen, What is Faith? p. 18.

[127] TGWIT, pp. 52-54.

[128] Schaeffer's use of "the older form of liberalism" indicates liberalism following German higher criticism which accepted the uniformity of natural causes as a closed system; which rejected supernaturalism even in the life of Jesus Christ, yet still hoped to find an historical Jesus in a rational, objective and scholarly way. See further TGWIT, p. 52. This form of liberalism predates the neo-orthodoxy of Barth.

[129] Introduction, p. 52.

[130] Larry E. Wilson, Presbyterian Journal, October 3, 1984.

[131] TGED, pp. 44, 45.

[132] TGED, pp. 54, 55.

[133] GST, p. 15f.

[134] Parkhurst, p. 233f.

[135] We note the early introduction of the subject of philosophy (and Hegel) in TGWIT, p. 20.

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[136] Parkhurst, p. 99.

[137] Parkhurst, p. 99.

[138] Stephen Board, "An Evangelical Who Left His Mark", Christianity Today, June 12, 1984.

[139] Herbert Hartwell, The Theology of Karl Barth: An Introduction, London: Duckworth, 1964, p.1.

[140] Romans 1:20; also see further T.C. Hammond, In Understanding Be Men, London: I.V.F., 1936, p. 16.

[141] Cf. Romans 16:25,26.

[142] L. Berkhof, Systematic Theology, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1941, p. 38.

[143] Barth, Natural Theology (1934), comprising "Nature and Grace" by Emil Brunner, and Barth's "No!". Translated by P. Fraenkel, 1946.

[144] Barth, The Knowledge of God and the Service of God, London, 1938.

[145] Barth, Church Dogmatics, I.1. pp. 147f., 219, 448, 540. (Subsequently cited as CD)

[146] Hartwell, pp. 51, 52. See also CD IV.1. p. 139.

[147] CD, I.1. p. 125. (Emphasis added)

[148] Hartwell, p. 70.

[149] Barth, Offenbarung, Kirche, Theologie, p. 18, cited in Mackintosh, p. 264.

[150] Hartwell, p. 70.

[151] Mackintosh, p. 267.

[152] CD, I.1. p. 127.

[153] CD, I.1. p. 129.

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[154] CD, I.1. p. 129.

[155] CD, I.1. p. 131.

[156] CD, I.1. p. 134.

[157] CD, I.2. p. 538.

[158] Hartwell, p. 74.

[159] Strong, p. 7.

[160] CD, I.2. pp. 132-171. "The Word became flesh and dwelt among us".

[161] Cf. Mackintosh, p. 271, who draws attention to Barth's earlier-expressed deep distaste for "any accentuation of the experimental realisation of Divine truth, as though content alone mattered, not inward form".

[162] CD, I.1. p. 250.

[163] Cf. CD, I.1. pp. 98ff.

[164] CD, I.1. pp. 1ff; also Dogmatics in Outline, pp. 17f.

[165] CD, I.1. p. 136.

[166] CD, I.1. p. 189.

[167] CD, I.1. p. 188. Welthaftigkeit = "fixed to the world".

[168] CD, I.1. pp. 198ff. "God's language as mystery".

[169] CD, I.1. p. 101.

[170] Ralph T. Turnbull, Ed., Baker's Dictionary of Practical Theology, Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1967, Art. "Preaching", p.1.

[171] CD, I.1. p. 101.

[172] CD, I.1. p. 103.

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[173] CD, I.1. p. 103.

[174] CD, I.1. p. 111.

[175] Barth, Gifford Lectures, pp. 177ff; CD, I.1. pp. 79ff.

[176] Mackintosh, p. 277.

[177] CD, I.1. p. 124.

[178] CD, I.1. p. 125.

[179] CD, I.1. p. 125.

[180] CD, I.1. p. 127.

[181] CD, I.1. p. 127.

[182] CD, I.1. p. 129.

[183] CD, I.2. p. 458.

[184] CD, I.2. p. 463.

[185] CD, I.2. p. 463.

[186] CD, I.1. p. 157.

[187] CD, I.1. p. 158.

[188] CD, I.2. pp. 373-375.

[189] CD, I.1. p. 124.

[190] Hartwell, p. 62.

[191] CD, I.1. p. 159.

[192] Barth, Christian Dogmatics, p. 361.

[193] EFR, pp. 52, 53.

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[194] EFR, p. 53.

[195] CD, I.2. pp. 373-375.

[196] Cf. Footnote 128 for an explanation of Schaeffer's use of the term liberalism. Also see further TGWIT, p. 52.

[197] TGWIT, p. 184, end-note.

[198] TGWIT, p. 54.

[199] TGWIT, p. 54.

[200] TGWIT, p. 54.

[201] HSWTL, p. 176.

[202] HSWTL, p. 178.

[203] CD, I.1. pp. 339-560.

[204] Cf. TGWIT, p. 80, where Schaeffer discusses his view of the dilemma of neo-orthodoxy regarding, among other doctrines, the bodily resurrection of Christ.

[205] Introduction, p. 52.

[206] The Schaeffers lived as a missionary couple in the daily exercise of guidance and direction by biblical principles and Bible passages, as recorded in Edith Schaeffer, L'Abri.

[207] TGWIT, p. 51.

[208] TGWIT, p. 51.

[209] TGWIT, p. 52.

[210] TGWIT, p. 52.

[211] TGWIT, p. 52.

[212] TGWIT, p. 54.

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[213] TGWIT, p. 54.

[214] TGWIT, pp. 82, 84.

[215] TGWIT, p. 84.

[216] TGWIT, p. 84.

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[1] TGWIT, p. 19.

[2] cf. Psalm 14:1-2.

[3] WHHR, p. 7.

[4] WHHR, p. 8.

[5] Johnson, pp. 94, 139, 159-160.

[6] Gay Pauley, "Of Cries, Whispers, and Incest", in Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, 3 October, 1977.

[7] US News and World Report, 3 May, 1976. (Reported words of Dr Irwin Hedlener, investigating child abuse at Jackson Memorial Hospital, Miami, Fla.)

[8] TGWIT, p. 16.

[9] TGWIT, p. 19.

[10] TGWIT, p. 19.

[11] Cyril Connolly, The Modern Movement: 100 Key Books from England, France and America (1880-1950), London: Hamish Hamilton, 1965, pp. 6-9, 3, 85-86.

[12] Joseph Wood Krutch, A Review of Connolly's 100 Books, in Saturday Review, USA, 6 May, 1967, p. 26.

[13] Krutch, p. 26.

[14] Pamela Hansford Johnson, On Iniquity, London: Macmillan, 1967, pp. 129-130.

[15] HSWTL, p. 19.

[16] TGWIT, p. 30.

[17] Erich Neumann, Art and the Creative Unconscious, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1959, p. 134.

[18] Neumann, p. 134.

[19] Neumann, p. 123.

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[20] Conveyed to this author in a personal letter, 5 September, 1985, from Os Guinness, author of Dust and Destiny.

[21] Hans Rookmaaker, Modern Art and the Death of a Culture, London: I.V.P., 1970.

[22] Rookmaaker, p. 18.

[23] Neumann, p. 123.

[24] Neumann, p. 123.

[25] TGWIT, p. 30.

[26] Rookmaaker, p. 52.

[27] HSWTL, p. 183.

[28] HSWTL, p. 183.

[29] Rookmaaker, p. 86.

[30] The "door" metaphor, like the "line of despair" is characteristic of Schaeffer. In theology it is applied to Kierkegaard and Barth, and in philosophy, to Hegel.

[31] Neumann, p. 119.

[32] Neumann, p. 119.

[33] Neumann, p. 119.

[34] HSWTL, p. 183.

[35] HSWTL, p. 184.

[36] HSWTL, p. 184.

[37] Rookmaaker, pp. 96ff.

[38] Rookmaaker, p. 94.

[39] TGWIT, p. 23. Also HSWTL, p. 183.

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[40] Neumann, p. 111.

[41] Neumann, p. 112.

[42] Rookmaaker, p. 96, both (i) and (ii).

[43] Rookmaaker, p. 62.

[44] HSWTL, p. 184.

[45] TGWIT, p. 32.

[46] TGWIT, p. 32.

[47] HSWTL, p. 187.

[48] Neumann, p. 121.

[49] Discussed on these lines in HSWTL, p. 187.

[50] TGWIT, p. 35.

[51] HSWTL, p. 188.

[52] See illustrations, HSWTL, pp. 191-192.

[53] HSWTL, p. 190.

[54] Rookmaaker, p. 94.

[55] TGWIT, p. 40.

[56] Herbert Read, A Concise History of Modern Painting, London: Collins, p. 160.

[57] Read, p. 160.

[58] Rookmaaker, p. 222.

[59] Neumann, p. 131.

[60] An opinion well based in many contemporary discussion groups on teenage problems in the Western world.

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Notes

[61] HSWTL, p. 190.

[62] HSWTL, pp. 190-193.

[63] HSWTL, p. 193.

[64] Leonard Bernstein, Norton Lectures, Harvard University, (1973), cited in HSWTL, p. 193.

[65] The question has been raised as to whether, had he paid nore detailed attention to pop and rock music, he might not have found a more objective standard by which to assess the decline.

[66] HSWTL, p. 193.

[67] Donald Jay Grout, A History of Western Music, cited in Schaeffer, HSWTL, p. 193.

[68] HSWTL, p. 194.

[69] Leonard Marcis, High Fidelity magazine, New York, February, 1965, p. 35.

[70] Calvin Tompkins, "Profile of John Cage", in The New Yorker, New York, November 28, 1964.

[71] HSWTL, pp. 195-196.

[72] TGWIT, p. 73.

[73] HSWTL, p. 196.

[74] HSWTL, p. 196.

[75] TGWIT, p. 42.

[76] TGWIT, p. 42.

[77] Kingsbury Smith (syndicated column) Seattle Post Intelligencer, Hearst Newspapers, USA, April 12, 1980.

[78] Vern Stephanic, Tulsa World, December 12, 1980, p. 1C.

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[79] Max Rafferty (on John Lennon) in Human Events, Washington DC, March 14, 1981.

[80] Chicago Tribune (report from Pravda, Moscow), September 3, 1966, p. 3.

[81] US News and World Report, Washington DC, October 31, 1977, p. 47.

[82] McCandlish Phillips, The Bible, the Supernatural and the Jews, Minneapolis: Bethany, 1970, p. 272.

[83] Phillips, p. 294.

[84] Bryon Hawkes, Washington Post, February 6, 1980, p. 10.

[85] Morton Kelsey, Encounter with God, Minneapolis: Bethany, 1972, p. 15.

[86] Kelsey, p. 15.

[87] TGWIT, p. 42.

[88] Kelsey, p. 16.

[89] Rookmaaker, pp. 188-189.

[90] Max Rafferty, quoted in The Pensacola News Journal, April 1, 1979, p. 21A.

[91] TGWIT, p. 38.

[92] HSWTL, p. 159.

[93] TGWIT, p. 39.

[94] T.M. Lindsay, The Reformation, Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1882, pp. 15ff.

[95] Dylan Thomas, Collected Poems, 1934-1952, London: Dent, Everyman's Library, 1959, pp. 179-180.

[96] TGWIT, p. 41.

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97 Poems of our Time, 1900-1960, London: Dent, 1961, p. 265.

98 HSWTL, pp. 197-198.

99 HSWTL, p. 201.

100 HSWTL, p. 201.

101 HSWTL, p. 202.

102 HSWTL, p. 202.

103 This idea may be compared with C.S. Lewis's theme of Sehnsucht which is especially prominent in his autobiographical Surprised by Joy (1955).

104 TGWIT, p. 41.

105 CM, p. 61.

106 HSWTL, p. 170.

107 HSWTL, pp. 170-171.

108 C.S. Lewis, "Equality", in The Spectator, London, 27 August, 1943. cf. Luther's view that if God is discarded a substitute will take his place.

109 Kelsey, pp. 16-17.

110 HSWTL, p. 171.

111 C.S. Lewis, The Screwtape Letters, London: Geoffrey Bles, 1942, p. 3.

112 Os Guinness, The Dust of Death, Leicester: I.V.P., 1973, p. 278.

113 See Mat. 12:45; Mk 1:26; Lu 10:19; Acts 8:7; Eph 6:12; I Tim 4:1; Jas 2:19.

114 William James, Varieties of Religious Experience, (1902); republished New York: Mentor Books, 1958, p. 327.

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[115] Guinness, p. 282.

[116] R.D. Laing, The Politics of Experience, London: Penguin Books, 1967, p. 110.

[117] Marshall McLuhan, cited in Time magazine, March 21, 1969, p. 48.

[118] Guinness, p. 277.

[119] HSWTL, p. 231.

[120] Montague Summers, A History of Witchcraft and Demonology, New York: Macmillan, 1965.

[121] Guinness, p. 297.

[122] Ralph Gasson, The Challenging Counterfeit, Plainfield, NJ., 1966, p. 23

[123] Sunday Times, Johannesburg, (ordeal of young woman in cultic orgy) September 22, 1985, p. 40.

[124] CM, p. 18.

[125] i.e. Latin America, Cuba, Korea, Turkey, Greece: the events of 1959 and 1960.

[126] HSWTL, chapter 11, p. 205ff.

[127] HSWTL, p. 206.

[128] Guinness, p. 92.

[129] Guinness, p. 129.

[130] HSWTL, p. 217.

[131] HSWTL, p. 217.

[132] CM, p. 24.

[133] Guinness, pp. 177-178.

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[134] Guinness, p. 153; cf. D.R. Davies, Secular Illusion or Christian Realism, p. 16, where the argument is that war is mankind's "normal state".

[135] More fully discussed in Ernest Lefever, Amsterdam to Nairobi, Ethics and Public Policy Center, Washington DC, 1979.

[136] CM, p. 93.

[137] CM, p. 118.

[138] CM, p. 130.

[139] BFD, p. 48.

[140] Francis Schaeffer and Everett Koop, M.D., Whatever Happened to the Human Race? London: Marshalls, 1980, p. 15.

[141] Dennis P Hollinger, "Schaeffer on Ethics", in Reflections on Francis Schaeffer, Ronald W. Ruegsegger, Ed., Grand Rapids: Academie Books, 1986, p. 249.

[142] WHHR, p. 31.

[143] WHHR, p. 41.

[144] WHHR, p. 55.

[145] WHHR, p. 90.

[146] WHHR, p. 89.

[147] WHHR, p. 91.

[148] WHHR, p. 107.

[149] WHHR, p. 111.

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Notes

[1] Francis Schaeffer, True Spirituality, Wheaton Il: Tyndale House, 1971, Preface. (Subsequently cited as TS)

[2] Introduction, p. 56.

[3] HSWTL, dust jacket, hardback edition, 1976.

[4] Christianity Today, (An Interview with the Editors), Vol. 21, 8 October 1976, p. 20.

[5] Jack Rogers, "Francis Schaeffer: The Promise and the Problem" (part 1), The Reformed Journal, 27; May 1977, pp. 12-13.

[6] Schaeffer's message was directed first of all to American Protestantism, then to evangelicals and fundamentalists within this group, but this does not presuppose that he thought of his ministry as confined to strict boundaries within these groupings.

[7] Introduction, p. 54.

[8] See note 4. above.

[9] HTHS, p. 15.

[10] DITC, p. 9.

[11] DITC, Preface; also p. 9.

[12] DITC, p. 127.

[13] CM, p. 9.

[14] TS, Preface and biographical note.

[15] TGED, Foreword by Ranald Macaulay, p. 15.

[16] TGED, p. 9.

[17] Introduction, p. 55.

[18] Introduction, p. 55.

[19] HTHS, Introduction, p. 9.

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[20] Vernon C. Grounds, "A Friend of Many Years Remembers Francis Schaeffer", Christianity Today, June 15, 1984, pp. 61-62.

[21] L'Abri, p. 13; also Parkhurst, p. 42.

[22] Taped lectures in some 24 languages are listed in the L'Abri tape cassette library.

[23] Time magazine, "Mission to Intellectuals", 11 January, 1960, p. 62.

[24] Originally from Eternity magazine, quoted by Philip Yancey in Christianity Today, 23 March, 1979. p. 17.

[25] Cal Thomas, The Fundamentalist Journal, July/August 1984, p. 48.

[26] Parkhurst, p. 27.

[27] American Institute of Public Opinion, "Religion in America, 1977-78", The Gallup Opinion Index, Report no. 145, p. 41.

[28] In the USA 1976-1980 were the "Carter years" during which the President personally popularised the "born again" phrase. Thus it came inevitably to be linked with his image and style. Since then, however, it has become the characteristic property (from a media standpoint) of the evangelical renewal movement as a whole.

[29] Kenneth L. Woodward et al, "Born Again", Newsweek, 25 October 1976, p. 68f.

[30] Woodward, p. 68.

[31] Michael Novak, quoted in David Kucharsky, Christianity Today, 22 October, 1976, p. 12.

[32] Dean M. Kelley, Why Conservative Churches are Growing: A Study in Sociology of Religion, New York: Harper and Row, 1972, p. 8.

[33] Rodney Stark and Charles Y. Glock, American Piety: The Nature of Religious Commitment, vol. 1, The Patterns of Religious Commitment Series, University of California Press, 1968.

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[34] Introduction, p. 56.

[35] TGWIT, p. 139.

[36] TGWIT, p. 139.

[37] TGWIT, p. 140.

[38] TGWIT, p. 140.

[39] TGWIT, p. 140.

[40] TGWIT, p. 141.

[41] TGWIT, p. 141.

[42] TGWIT, p. 142.

[43] See chapter 2, pp. 58-60.

[44] EFR, pp. 20-21.

[45] EFR, p. 21.

[46] GST, pp. 41, 85ff.

[47] EFR, p. 81.

[48] EFR, p. 82.

[49] Richard L. Means, "Why Worry About Nature", printed in Appendix II of Pollution and the Death of Man, pp. 86-93.

[50] PDM, chapters 4, 5, and 6.

[51] CM, pp. 111-112. A point of continuing controversy in the USA, both in education and in courts of law. The comparison with the Soviet Union is, however, incomplete since it makes no mention of privately financed education in the USA. Schaeffer's argument is against the official humanist philosophy he sees in public education.

[52] WHHR, p. 116.

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[53] William Sargant, Battle for the Mind, London: Heinemann, 1957. Tim La Haye, The Battle for the Mind, Old Tappan, NJ:Fleming Revell, 1980

[54] La Haye, p. 167.

[55] La Haye, p. 171.

[56] CM, pp. 53-54.

[57] Humanist Manifestos I and II, New York: Prometheus Books, 1973.

[58] A case about conscientious objection on the grounds of religious belief.

[59] CM, p. 55.

[60] CM, p. 55 ; cited by Schaeffer.

[61] CM, p. 55.

[62] CM, p. 56.

[63] CM, p. 56.

[64] A conspiracy theory concerning a supposed Illuminati (a group of financiers manipulating the world's financial and political conditions) goes back many years and has in recent decades gained further currency, especially in American fundamentalist circles. It seems likely that Schaeffer's words, "not because of a conspiracy" are meant as a low-key denial of this theory.

[65] The phrase is borrowed by Schaeffer from John W. Whitehead, The Second American Revolution, Elgin Il: David C. Cook, 1982.

[66] Stephen Board writes: "Because his son, Franky Schaeffer, expounded a conservative political ideology, the public began to identify both father and son with the New Christian Right. But Francis Schaeffer denied there was any shift in his outlook and agenda or any politicising of his ministry". See Christianity Today, June 15, 1984, p. 61.

[67] CM, p. 56.

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[68] CM, pp. 61-62.

[69] CM, p. 56.

[70] This author's experience of the media and especially of television both in the USA and Britain supports the contention that this is the controlling view. In practice this goes against objectivity since networks have basic presuppositions that make true balance virtually impossible, especially in ethics and politics.

[71] CM, p. 57.

[72] Cited in CM, p. 58.

[73] CM, p. 59.

[74] Differences between perception and reality can be demonstrated in the experience of viewers. Short sequences, inadequate background and emotional factors can cause perception to be distorted. This author's observations while serving in an official position with special responsibility for the media, confirm Schaeffer's view of the matter.

[75] Charles Peters, How Washington Really Works, Reading MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1980, p.17.

[76] The phrase "making news" is in some sense peculiar to journalism and is not to be confused with "manufacturing" it (although this may and does happen). Making news forms an element in the charter of some established newspapers and magazines.

[77] CM, p. 61. See also HSWTL, pp. 239-243.

[78] This can be shown in the origins of some British, European and American newspapers as well as several in South Africa. The Rand Daily Mail, Die Transvaler, The Citizen and Beeld are suitable examples of papers founded to serve specific and legitimate political objectives.

[79] CM, p. 61.

[80] HSWTL, p. 255.

[81] HSWTL, p. 255f.

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[82] Francis Schaeffer, Back to Freedom and Dignity, London: Hodder Christian Paperbacks, 1973, p. 9. (Subsequently cited as BFD).

[83] BFD, p. 9.

[84] B.F. Skinner, Beyond Freedom and Dignity, London: Penguin Books, 1971.

[85] Jacques Monod, Chance and Necessity, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1971, pp. 112-113.

[86] Newsweek magazine, April 26, 1971, p. 99f.

[87] BFD, p. 12.

[88] BFD, p. 13.

[89] BFD, p. 15.

[90] BFD, p. 15.

[91] Francis Crick, The Origin of the Genetic Code; and Of Molecules and Men. References to Crick's thought are based on his lecture "Why I Study Biology", delivered in St. Louis, Mo., March, 1971.

[92] BFD, p. 17. cf. note no. 91.

[93] BFD, pp. 21-28.

[94] Newsweek magazine, "Probing the Brain", Cover Story, June 21, 1971.

[95] Newsweek, see note 94 above.

[96] BFD, p. 29.

[97] BFD, p. 31.

[98] Skinner, publisher's note.

[99] Skinner, p. 21.

[100] Skinner, p. 196.

Chapter 4

Notes

[101] Skinner, p. 27.

[102] Skinner, "Punishment", pp. 63ff.

[103] Robert D. Nye, What is B.F. Skinner Really Saying? Englewood NJ: Prentice Hall, 1984, p. 150.

[104] Nye, p. 153.

[105] Nye, p. 155.

[106] HSWTL, p. 228.

[107] BFD, p. 33.

[108] BFD, p. 35.

[109] BFD, p. 35.

[110] Skinner, p. 74.

[111] Skinner, p. 67.

[112] Time magazine, September 20, 1971, Cover Story.

[113] BFD, p. 38.

[114] BFD, p. 38.

[115] BFD, p. 40.

[116] BFD, p. 41.

[117] BFD, p. 43.

[118] HSWTL, p. 202.

[119] BFD, p. 46.

[120] CM, title of chapter five, p. 63.

[121] CM, p. 63.

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[122] CM, p. 66.

[123] CM, p. 68.

[124] CM, p. 69.

[125] HSWTL, p. 110.

[126] CM, title of chapter six, p. 73.

[127] CM, p. 73.

[128] CM, p. 74.

[129] CM, p. 74.

[130] CM, p. 75.

[131] CM, p. 75.

[132] George F. Will, "Rhetoric and Reality", International Herald Tribune, Chicago, February 16, 1981.

[133] CM, p. 79; see also HSWTL, pp. 228ff.

[134] CM, p. 83.

[135] CM, pp. 87-88.

Chapter 5

Notes

[1] CM, Chapter Five, pp. 63-71.

[2] C.S. Lewis, "De Descriptione Temporum", (Inaugural Lecture, Cambridge, 1954) Cambridge University Press, 1955.

[3] Parkhurst, p. 88.

[4] John Lawlor, "The Tutor and the Scholar", in Jocelyn Gibb, Ed., Light on C.S. Lewis, London: Geoffrey Bles, 1965, p. 68.

[5] Richard B. Cunningham, C.S. Lewis: Defender of the Faith, Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1967, p. 196.

[6] Chad Walsh, "Impact on America", in Light on C.S. Lewis, p. 106.

[7] Clyde S. Kilby, The Christian World of C.S. Lewis, London: Marcham Manor Press, 1965, Appendix, pp. 191-206.

[8] Chad Walsh, p. 108.

[9] e.g. C.S. Lewis, Letters to an American Lady, Clyde S. Kilby, Ed., Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1967.

[10] Sheldon Vanauken, A Severe Mercy, London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1977.

[11] Austen Farrer, "The Christian Apologist", in Light on C.S. Lewis, p. 23.

[12] Farrer, p. 23.

[13] Cunningham, p. 16.

[14] TGWIT, p. 140.

[15] C.S. Lewis, Mere Christianity, London: Fontana, 1952, p. 6.

[16] BFD, p. 45.

[17] Tom Driberg, New Statesman, Vol. XLIX, March 19, 1955, pp. 393-394.

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[18] Cunningham, p. 22.

[19] John Peters, C.S. Lewis: The Man and His Achievement, London: Paternoster Press, 1985, pp. 114-115.

[20] Notably "The Inklings", a group of literary friends in Oxford who met regularly on Thursday evenings for discussion and the reading of each others' work.

[21] W.W. Robson, The Cambridge Quarterly, Summer 1966, pp. 260ff.

[22] John Peters, p. 8.

[23] David Porter, "Francis Schaeffer, 1898-1984", Third Way magazine, June, 1985.

[24] L'Abri, p. 13f.

[25] This comes out strongly in L'Abri and in Schaeffer's own Introduction.

[26] Humphrey Carpenter, J.R.R. Tolkien: A Biography, London: George Allen and Unwin, 1977, p. 237.

[27] David Porter, Third Way, June 1985.

[28] Dennis, p. 156.

[29] This awareness comes to the fore in his trilogy, viz. TGWIT, EFR and HTHS.

[30] Lewis evidently recognised some of these defects, as is suggested by his long preface to the second edition of the Regress, 1943.

[31] Published in 1942, London: Geoffrey Bles, from talks given in 1941. Subsequently incorporated as Book I of Mere Christianity, London: Fontana Books, 1952.

[32] As e.g. by Alistair Cooke who complained that "the personal values of several million Britons and Americans stand in imminent danger of befuddlement at which Mr. Lewis is so transparently adroit". See "Mr Anthony at Oxford", The New Republic, 24.4.1944, p. 579.

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Notes

[33] W.W. Robson, p. 271.

[34] Farrer, p. 29.

[35] Farrer, p. 27.

[36] C.S. Lewis, The Problem of Pain, London: Bles, 1940. Deals with Divine Omnipotence, The Fall of Man, Human Pain, Hell, and other topics. The author says: "I write as a layman of the Church of England, but have tried to assume nothing that is not professed by all baptised and communicating Christians".

[37] C.S. Lewis, The Great Divorce: A Dream, London: Geoffrey Bles, 1946.

[38] Farrer, p. 29.

[39] TGWIT, p. 13.

[40] C.S. Lewis, They Asked for a Paper, London: Geoffrey Bles, 1962, p. 17; also De Descriptione Temporum, C.U.P., 1955.

[41] Lewis, They Asked for a Paper, p. 19.

[42] Lewis, They Asked for a Paper, p. 19.

[43] They Asked for a Paper, p. 14.

[44] They Asked for a Paper, p. 163.

[45] HSWTL, pp. 199-200, 230, 232-233.

[46] Lewis, That Hideous Strength, p. 41.

[47] That Hideous Strength, p. 42.

[48] These themes are prominent in Schaeffer's Christian Manifesto, especially.

[49] That Hideous Strength, p. 42.

[50] BFD, p. 28.

[51] HSWTL, and WHHR.

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[52] Parkhurst, pp. 229-241. Lists the nine categories of L'Abri tape cassettes by Francis Schaeffer, which show the breadth of his interests and emphasis on apologetics. The catalogue contains much more than can be found in a list of Schaeffer's books.

[53] Parkhurst, p. 228.

[54] Parkhurst's tape catalogue is accurate up to 1985, but is likely to have been amended and supplemented since.

[55] Walter Hooper, "A Bibliography of the Writings of C.S. Lewis", in Light on C.S. Lewis, pp. 117-148.

[56] C.S. Lewis, Allegory of Love, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1936; reprinted 1938, p. 61.

[57] C.S. Lewis, The Weight of Glory and Other Addresses, New York: Macmillan, 1949, pp. 9-20.

[58] C.S. Lewis, The Problem of Pain, London: Fontana, Chapter III, "Divine Goodness".

[59] Lewis, The Great Divorce, p. 7.

[60] C.S. Lewis, Rehabilitations and Other Essays, London: O.U.P., 1939, pp. 185, 188.

[61] Kilby, p. 190.

[62] Lewis, The Problem of Pain, p. 103.

[63] Cunningham, p. 122.

[64] HSWTL, p. 133.

[65] George Giacumakis Jr and Gerald C. Tiffin, "Francis Schaeffer's New Intellectual Enterprise: Some Friendly Criticisms", Fides et Historia, Spring 1977, pp. 52-58.

[66] George Herbert, "The Gifts of God", The Golden Treasury, F.T. Palgrave, Ed., London, 1861, p. 60.

[67] Thomas V. Morris, Francis Schaeffer's Apologetics: A Critique, Chicago: Moody Press, 1976, pp. 81-86.

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[68] HTHS, pp. 62-63.

[69] TGWIT, p. 113.

[70] EFR, p. 75.

[71] EFR, p. 75.

[72] EFR, p. 75.

[73] Lewis, Transposition, p. 51.

[74] Lewis, Pilgrim's Regress, Preface.

[75] Lewis, Rehabilitations, p. 154.

[76] Cunningham, p. 77. cf. Lewis, Screwtape, pp. 11-12.

[77] Lewis, Great Divorce, p. 41.

[78] Lewis, Abolition of Man, p. 36.

[79] Cunningham, p. 80.

[80] Lewis, Mere Christianity, p. 108.

[81] HTHS, p. 101.

[82] TGWIT, p. 145.

[83] TGED, p. 65.

[84] TGED, p. 186.

[85] Lewis, Reflections on the Psalms, p. 112.

[86] Cunningham, p. 84.

[87] Kilby, "Psalms, Miracles and Orthodoxy", p. 147f.

[88] Lewis assures us that the biblical account often turns out to be more accurate than our interpretation of it. See Kilby, p. 156.

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Notes

[89] Lewis, Reflections, p. 94.

[90] Lewis, Reflections, p. 95.

[91] Lewis, Reflections, p. 97. cf. Transposition, p. 18.

[92] See Acts 8:27-38; Isa 53; Mk 15:34; Ps 22; Mk 12:35-36; Ps 110; Mat 4:6; Ps 91:11-12; Ps 118:22; Acts 2:27; Ps 16:11.

[93] Lewis, Reflections, p. 72.

[94] Lewis, Reflections, p. 72.

[95] Corbin S. Carnell, The Dialectic of Desire: C.S. Lewis's Interpretation of Sehnsucht; unpublished Ph.D. diss., University of Florida, 1960; University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, Mich., p. 124.

[96] TGED, p. 35.

[97] TGED, p. 37.

[98] EFR, p. 22.

[99] This is the major theme expounded in the allegorical Pilgrim's Regress.

[100] Lewis, Problem of Pain, p. 60.

[101] Cunningham, p. 111.

[102] GST, p. 29.

[103] GST, p. 41.

[104] GST, pp. 86-100.

[105] GST, p. 100.

[106] Lewis, Problem of Pain, p. 68.

[107] Lewis, Studies in Words, Chapter 8, section 4.

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[108] Lewis, Transposition, p. 30; as also other citations in this paragraph.

[109] Robert J. Reilly, Romantic Religion in the work of Owen Barfield, C.S. Williams and J.R.R. Tolkien; unpublished Ph.D. diss., Michigan State University, 1966; University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, Mich., p. 161.

[110] Lewis, Problem of Pain, chapter 10.

Chapter 6

Notes

[1] TGWIT, p. 24.

[2] Also called Analytic Philosophy. Both Logical Positivism and Ordinary Language Philosophy are indebted to the writings of Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951).

[3] TGWIT, p. 25.

[4] TGWIT, p. 26.

[5] Stephen T. Davis, Review of HSWTL, The Evangelical Quarterly, 50, 1978, p. 111.

[6] HSWTL, p. 52.

[7] EFR, p. 11.

[8] Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, in Basic Writings of Saint Thomas Aquinas, ed. Anton C. Pegis, rev. of the English Dominican Fathers' translation, New York: Random House, 1945, I. q. 1. a. 1.

[9] Ronald W. Ruegsegger, "Francis Schaeffer on Philosophy" in Reflections on Francis Schaeffer, Ed. Ronald W. Ruegsegger, Grand Rapids: Academie Books, 1986, p. 117. (Subsequently cited as Ruegsegger).

[10] EFR, pp. 42-43; HTHS, p. 46; HSWTL, p. 163.

[11] TGWIT, p. 21.

[12] C. Stephen Evans, Kierkegaard's "Fragments" and "Postscript": The Religious Philosophy of Johannes Climacus, Atlantic Highlands NJ: Humanities, 1983. (Subsequently cited as Evans).

[13] Søren Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, transl. by David F. Swenson and Walter Lowrie, Princeton NJ: Princeton University, 1941. p. 188.

[14] Evans, p. 214.

[15] Evans, pp. 274-275.

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[16] Harold M. Best, "Schaeffer on Art and Music", in Reflections on Francis Schaeffer, Ed. Ronald W. Ruegsegger, Grand Rapids: Academie Books, 1986, p. 133. (Subsequently cited as Best).

[17] TGWIT, p. 44.

[18] TGWIT, p. 30f., HSWTL, p. 183f.

[19] TGWIT, p. 183.

[20] Best, p. 137.

[21] Best, p. 137.

[22] HSWTL, p. 184.

[23] HSWTL, p. 71.

[24] EFR, p. 16.

[25] HSWTL, pp. 71-72.

[26] Schaeffer, Art and the Bible, p. 51. (Subsequently cited as AB).

[27] TGWIT, p. 35.

[28] HSWTL, pp. 190, 195.

[29] HSWTL, p. 190.

[30] HSWTL, p. 195.

[31] Best, p. 143.

[32] Best, p. 144.

[33] HSWTL, pp. 190, 193.

[34] TGWIT, p. 37.

[35] TGWIT, p. 38.

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[36] HSWTL, p. 93.

[37] HSWTL, p. 184.

[38] HSWTL, p. 194.

[39] Best, p. 148.

[40] TGWIT, pp. 37, 42, 43; HSWTL, p. 170.

[41] TGWIT, p. 42.

[42] TGWIT, p. 42.

[43] TGWIT, p. 43.

[44] Best describes the first of the two essays in AB as having "a gentle, pastoral touch to it", and that some parts of it are "moving, warm and positive" in their communication of his love of art.

[45] AB, p. 27.

[46] AB, p. 42.

[47] AB, p. 52.

[48] AB, p. 54.

[49] Best, p. 167.

Chapter 7

Notes

[1] TGWIT, p. 51.

[2] TGWIT, p. 51.

[3] TGED, p. 43.

[4] L'Abri, pp. 27-28.

[5] Clark Pinnock, "Schaeffer on Modern Theology" in Reflections on Francis Schaeffer, Ed. Ronald W. Ruegsegger, Grand Rapids: Academie Books, 1986, p. 191. (Subsequently cited as Pinnock).

[6] GST, pp. 44-45.

[7] Parkhurst, pp. 217-218.

[8] TGWIT, p. 133.

[9] TGWIT, pp. 78-81.

[10] Pinnock, p. 183.

[11] TGWIT, p. 14.

[12] EFR, p. 82.

[13] TGWIT, p. 180.

[14] TGWIT, p. 179.

[15] TGWIT, p. 108.

[16] HTHS, p. 62.

[17] TGWIT, p. 15.

[18] Gordon R. Lewis, "Schaeffer's Apologetic Method", in Reflections on Francis Schaeffer, Ed. Ronald W. Ruegsegger, Grand Rapids: Academie Books, 1986, pp. 79-80. (Subsequently cited as Gordon Lewis).

[19] Pinnock, p. 185.

[20] EFR, chapter 2.

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[21] Mackintosh, p. 228.

[22] TGWIT, p. 54.

[23] For elucidation of the story of how evangelicals have interpreted Barth: see Gregory G. Bolich, Karl Barth and Evangelicalism, Downer's Grove, Ill.: I.V.P., 1980.

[24] HSWTL, p. 174.

[25] Richard V. Pierard, "Schaeffer on History", in Reflections on Francis Schaeffer, p. 216. (Subsequently cited as Pierard).

[26] Pinnock, p. 192.

[27] NLP, pp. 202, 226-227; GST, pp.29, 63-64; DITC, pp. 17, 20, 31.

[28] HSWTL, p. 20.

[29] NLP, p. 129.

[30] DITC, p. 81.

[31] WHHR, p. 155.

[32] Philip Yancey asked Schaeffer whether he was satisfied with the film series and he got a positive answer: "We've got something that is useful, obviously. I think it answers both Clark and Bronowski". See Christianity Today, 23; (April 6, 1979): 26.

[33] HSWTL, p. 15, Author's Note.

[34] HSWTL, p. 29.

[35] HSWTL, p. 84.

[36] Pierard, p. 216.

[37] More information about this movement may be found in articles by David A. Rausch and Douglas E. Chismar, "The New Puritans and their Theonomic Paradise", Christian Century 100, August 3-10, 1983, pp. 712-715; and "Regarding Theonomy: An Essay of Concern", Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society, 27, (September 1984): 315-323.

[38] Ronald A. Wells, "Schaeffer on America", in Reflections on Francis Schaeffer, Ed. Ronald W. Ruegsegger, p. 230. (Subsequently cited as Wells).

[39] CM, pp. 31-34.

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Notes

[40] See David Walker Woods, John Witherspoon, Old Tappan, NJ: Fleming Revell, 1906.

[41] Mark Noll, Nathan Hatch, and George Marsden, The Search for Christian America, Westchester, Ill: Crossway, 1983.

[42] Noll, Hatch and Marsden, pp. 92-93 as cited in Wells, p. 233.

[43] Pierard, p. 218, draws attention to reviews by Robert W. Matson, Wittenburg Door 37 (June-July 1977): 28; James Daane, Christian Century 94 (Ocotober 12, 1977): 923; George Giacumakis, Jr., and Gerald C. Tiffin, Fides et Historia 9 (Spring 1977): 57; and W. Stanford Reid, Westminster Theological Journal 40 (Spring 1978): 381.

[44] Pierard, p. 208.

[45] This is one frequent point of criticism, also mentioned to this writer in personal correspondence from Os Guinness, September 1985. Pierard wonders whether during the writing of HSWTL Schaeffer ever consulted with any academically trained historians besides Jeremy C. Jackson, author of No Other Foundation: The Church Through Twenty Centuries, Westchester, Ill: Crossway, 1980.

[46] Pierard, p. 208.

[47] W. Stanford Reid, Westminster Theological Journal, 40, Spring, 1978, pp.380-381.

[48] Kent R. Hill, "Francis Schaeffer: An Evaluation of His Life and Thought", in Faith and Imagination: Essays on Evangelicals and Literature, ed. Noel Riley Fitch and Richard W. Etulain, Albuquerque: Far West Books, 1985, pp. 144-148.

[49] NLP, p. 147; HSWTL, p. 26.

[50] Ronald A. Wells, Professor of History at Calvin College, Grand Rapids, Michigan, has edited The Wars of America: Christian Views.

[51] Gary Scott Smith, "Can Evangelicalism Resist Modernity?", TSF Bulletin 8 (March-April 1985), p. 25.

[52] Wells, p. 240.

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[53] See Greg L. Bahnsen, Theonomy in Christian Ethics, Nutley, NJ: Craig Press, 1979.

[54] See David K. Watson, "Theonomy: A History of a Movement and an Evaluation of its Primary Text", unpublished Master's thesis, Calvin College, 1985.

[55] Cited in Watson, p. 36. Also confirmed to this writer by personal correspondence with Os Guinness, September, 1985.

[56] Wells, p. 235.

[57] Wells, p. 235.

[58] John Whitehead, The Second American Revolution, Elgin, Ill.: David C. Cook, 1982, pp. 73-82, 181-192.

[59] Wells, p. 236.

Chapter 8

Notes

[1] TGWIT, p. 163.

[2] Ronald W. Ruegsegger, Ed. Reflections on Francis Schaeffer has listed 11 books discussing Schaeffer, 33 articles on him and 96 book reviews on his works.

[3] TGED, p. 65.

[4] James B. Hurley, "Schaeffer on Evangelicalism", in Reflections on Francis Schaeffer, Ronald W. Ruegsegger, Ed., Grand Rapids: Academie Books, 1986. (Subsequently cited as Hurley), p. 288.

[5] Hurley, p. 288.

[6] Pinnock, p. 192.

[7] Hurley, p. 274.

[8] Hurley, p. 274.

[9] TGED, chapter 2.

[10] WHHR, chapter 3.

[11] EFR, p. 45.

[12] TS, p. 121.

[13] CM, p. 18.

[14] Dennis P. Hollinger, "Schaeffer on Ethics", in Reflections on Francis Schaeffer, Ronald W. Ruegsegger, Ed., Grand Rapids: Academie Books, 1986, p. 261.

[15] WHHR, p. 17.

[16] Hollinger, p. 264.

[17] Pinnock, p. 192.

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