THE ROLE OF LEADERSHIP IN THE STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONING OF COMMUNITY BASED NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATIONS: A ZIMBABWEAN CASE STUDY

by

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ABSTRACT

The objective of the Community Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) initiative is to enhance biodiversity conservation through approaches which balance the needs of local communities reliant upon natural resources, with national and international needs in conservation. This is achieved by addressing the imbalances in the distribution of costs and benefits in natural resource management (NRM). So those who live with natural resources should receive benefits for their effort in conservation. Once there is a benefit stream associated with a resource, communities can then be involved in NRM as a long term strategy. In this way sustainable use of resources is promoted.

For successful CBNRM, there has to be a vehicle for eliciting community participation and involvement through planning and decision making. In a communal property management regime, there exist sanctions and rewards for conserving/managing the resource. For community management to be successful there has to be an authority which protects the local rights and ensures that duties are fulfilled. This authority has to be local and national. Within the national context, the authority defining rights and duties in NRM is determined by the institutional framework in which the CBNRM initiative operates. At the community level, community leadership institutions are the authority protecting the rights and enforcing duties. Local leadership gains legitimacy from the wider institutional structures and from the community. How community leadership functions determines largely the structure and functioning of the CBNRM initiative locally.

The case study of Kanyurira Ward, a community involved in a CBNRM initiative, namely CAMPFIRE in Zimbabwe, attempts to find out the role of leadership within the evolving institutional structures in shaping the functioning and structuring of the initiative. Analysis of the historical progression of leadership within the community and the community perceptions on leadership selection, monitoring and evaluation, legitimacy and the distribution of costs and benefits between the community and the leadership were used to identify the salient factors for effective and efficient local leadership in CBNRM.

The study showed that local leadership effectiveness and community expectations of leaders influence performance based on understanding of the leadership role and objectives of the CBNRM initiative. The environments in which CBNRM programmes operate have forced the community to change its leadership selection and monitoring criteria over time. External agencies have their own role expectations for local leaders based on their organizational goals and objectives. These different leadership role expectations place undue pressure on leaders. Community perceptions on cost-benefit distribution within CBNRM programmes affect the sustainability of the programme as they can be an incentive or disincentives to follow NRM rules. Changes in the institutional structures within the communities due to government policies have resulted in overlaps and conflicts in roles of traditional and modern political leadership. Though traditional leadership does not have formal legitimation, it has community acceptance and has persisted over the years.

Approaches within CBNRM, need to be evaluated within the community's and leaders world view so that they can address any imbalances and mismatches in role, status and benefit expectations before negating on the CBNRM objective of community participation with benefits for sustainable NRM and development.

DECLARATION

The research described in this dissertation was carried out through the School of Environmnet and Development, University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg, from August 1997 to January 1998, under the supervision of Professor Charles Breen and Professor Marshall Murphree.

These studies represent original work by the author and have not otherwise been submitted in any form for any degree or diploma to any University. Where use has been made of the work of others it is duly acknowledged in the text.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ADMADE	Administrative Management Designs
CAMPFIRE	Communal Areas Management Programme For Indigenous Resources
CASS	Centre for Applied Social Sciences
CBF	Community Based Facilitator
CBNRM	Community Based Natural Resource Management
CCG	CAMPFIRE Collaborative Group
CEO	Chief Executive Officer
DA	District Administrator
DC	District Commissioner
DDCO	District Development Committee
DNP&WLM	Department of National Parks and Wildlife Management
DWC	District Wildlife Committee
IDO	Institutional Development Officer
MET	Ministry of Environment and Tourism
NGO	Non Governmental Organizations
NRB	Natural Resources Board
NRM	Natural Resource Management
RDC	Rural District Council
RMF	Resource Management Facilitator
VIDCO	Village Development Committee
VWC	Village Development Committee
WARDCO	Ward Development Committee
WINDFALL	Wildlife Industries New Development For All
WISDOM	Wildlife In Sustainable Development of Mankind
WWC	Ward Wildlife Committee
WWF	World Wide Fund for Nature
ZIMTRUST	Zimbabwe Trust

GLOSSARY OF TERMS

Community: The term has been used as a synonym for society, social organization, social system, but with a specific territorial locus. It is a social unit with members sharing a specific territorial area as a base for carrying out the greatest share of their daily activities with members interacting directly and having a collective identity both self and other defined with relationships being principally primary rather than secondary and conformity to group norms is achieved mainly by peer pressure. This definition implies that person interact within a local institutional complex which provides a wide range of basic services yet it also takes into consideration the fact that community is not necessarily a self-sufficient unit. Beyond a certain group size and certain spatial limits relationships, decision making and management become bureaucratized. (Gould and Kolb, 1964 -Dictionary of Social Sciences: 114-115; Murphree, 1994:406).

Institutional Structures: Hierarchy of leadership institutions and their specific positions

Leadership is defined as denoting "the occupancy of a status and the active performance of a role that mobilizes more or less organized collective and voluntary effort towards the attainment of shared goals and objectives". It is "a relation that exists between people in a speifice social situation, and may not necessarily be applicable in another situation" (Stogdill, 1948 quoted in Gould and Kolb, 1964:380). Leadership entails four elements namely: (a) role performance, (b) whose influence (status), (c) is central with regard to (d) collective action.

Legitimacy: denotes a condition of positive valuation, validity and acceptance enjoyed by individual rulers, political institutions and movements and by systems of authority by reason of accordance of such rulers, institutions, movements and systems of authority with some law, principle or source of authorization. It also incorporates the degree to which institutions are valued for themselves and considered right and proper. It's the "capacity of the system to engender and maintain the belief that the existing political institutions are the most appropriate ones for the society" (Gould and Kolb, 1964:386-387).

Mhondoro: a spirit usually the founder of that tribe or first inhabitants of the area who were rulers of the past (Spierenburg, 1995)

Vauyi are immigrants into the area from other districts of the country and are of a different ethnic grouping. The term is used by the oiginal residents of the area and means, "those who came".

Local organizations: are defined by Esman and Uphoff (1984:18, 58) as "local institutional structures which can be traditional (indigenous, informal) institutions evolved and supported by the local community to address economic, social, cultural, political and religious issues or "modern-political" organizations which have been assigned specific developmental tasks by the government or other, but the emphasis is on the organization's capability in enabling community members to participate and facilitate communication and cooperation between the central government and local communities.

Role performance: Existing role which leaders in any community are expected to fulfil and this is defined by social and cultural norms and institutions (Zelditch, 1968).

CHAPTER 1

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 BACKGROUND

The world is currently facing a major biodiversity crisis through the loss of species estimated at rates of 50-100 species extinction per day (Myers, 1986; Raven, 1989 quoted in Schucking and Anderson, 1991). These extinctions impact on the natural evolutionary processes. Causes of extinction are through human related destruction and degradation of ecosystems. The socio-economic and political causes of biodiversity loss vary from region to region and are linked to national government and international policies in economic development. A case in point is the policy of promoting export cash crops through subsidies resulting in the clearing of rain forests in Brazil (Schucking and Anderson, 1991).

Interest in biodiversity loss, and the need to conserve, started with Rachel Carson's book "Silent Spring" (1962) and the 1970 Earth Day made the environment a household name. Related issues gained much attention at the United Nations Conference on the Global Environment held in Stockholm in 1972. The publication of the United Nations' World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) report "Our Common Future"[1] in 1987 placed the environment on the international policy agenda (de la Court, 1990). The strong linkages between poverty and environmental problems were highlighted by the Brundtland report. These environmental problems were attributed to "lack of development and from the unintended consequences of some forms of economic growth. Many forms of development erode the environmental resource upon which they must be based, and environmental degradation undermines economic development" (de la Court, 1990). The recommendations of the report emphasized the need to marry biodiversity conservation and economics (Western and Wright, 1994).

Several conservation conventions came up in the 1980s' with possible ways of saving the environment. The United Nations Earth Summit held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil in 1992 signified a

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[1]   Sometimes referred to as the Brundtland Report after the Norwegian Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland who chaired the Commission (de la Court, 1990)

sharp turn toward local participation and rural-based conservation, with emphasis on sustainable development[2] (Western and Wright, 1994). In the same decade there was a move from the Western preservationist movement of protected zones for *in situ* conservation towards a realization that most of the world's biodiversity and its future lay in the hands of the poor people in the Third World (Western and Wright, 1994). Slowly emphasis was moving away from purely biodiversity conservation towards the inclusion of local people and their needs. Focus on sustainable development and the environment especially biodiversity conservation, is now on the developing world. The reasons for this focus are that these developing countries have rapidly growing populations and diminishing natural resource bases and their policies are influenced by the world economic order. The need for land use options which promote conservation with greater benefits to landholders is now crucial (Cumming, 1991).

Policies on environmental conservation have over the years originated in the developed countries (the North) and these have to a great extent contributed to the present environmental crisis in the developing countries (de la Court, 1990; Child, 1995; Shiva, 1991; Western and Wright, 1994). A case in point are the conservation conventions and treaties such as the International Convention for the Preservation of African Fauna and Flora of 1933, which prevented trade in fauna and flora, and advocated for total preservation of natural resources (Child, 1995; Cumming, 1990a). For countries in Africa, the result was the creation of large national parks and game reserves with the local communities adjacent to these areas (Child, 1995). A situation of conflict between local people and those in authority over use and access to these protected areas resulted. This placed the protected fauna and flora in danger from over exploitation by the local people as they saw no benefit in protecting a resource which they did not identify with (Child, 1995; Nabane, 1997).

With the move from the preservationist approaches in the 1980s, several international environmental organizations such as the IUCN, WRI and WWF developed approaches as to how protected areas could increase local people's welfare while protecting the environment (Western and Wright, 1994, Gray, 1991). This was coined in the Biodiversity Conservation Strategy Programme (BCSP) as well

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[2]Defined as "a development that meets the need of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs", (WCED, 1987 quoted in De Graaf, Musters and Keurs, 1996:205)

as the Strategy and Action Programme launched at the Rio earth Summit in 1992 (Schucking and Anderson, 1991). The programme advocated new ways of increasing biodiversity utilization based on the assumption that by "adding value to the natural resources loss of biodiversity can be controlled", (WRI, 1989 quoted in Schucking and Anderson, 1991). Community-based conservation stands on this assumption. This approach seeks to deal with the vast majority of the earth's natural resources which do not occur in protected areas (parks) and where interests of local people are paramount (Western and Wright, 1994). Community conservation covers a wide spectrum which includes buffer-zone protection[3] of parks and reserves on one extreme and natural resource use and biodiversity conservation in rural areas on the other (Western and Wright, 1994). This term encompasses conservation efforts from within the community and from external initiatives.

In this study focus will be on community based natural resource management (CBNRM), which is taken to mean the involvement of local communities in conservation of biodiversity through the methods of utilization, based on the assumption that there is a value to the community in conserving the natural resource.

During the last decade, there has been a realization of the need to understand local people's needs and perspectives, communication and to strengthen local institutional capacity (IIED, 1994). This realization has led to the involvement of local people in natural resource management through various participatory approaches. Support for participatory approaches involves a shift from central control over conservation and natural resources to local control (IIED, 1994; Little, 1994). Within the CBNRM initiative the assumption is that the local people's voice is heard through participation (CDCS, 1996). Local participation in community initiated conservation programmes is assumed as being granted since local people can use the existing participatory structures within the community. For externally initiated conservation and development programmes, community participation is elicited through local organizations (Little, 1994). Local organizations can be traditional/indigenous or modern, but the emphasis is on the organization's capability in enabling community members to

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Buffer zones are defined as, "areas adjacent to protected areas, on which land use is partially restricted to give an added layer of protection to the protected area itself while providing valued benefits to neighbouring rural communities (Wells and Brandon, 1993 cited in Lewis, 1997)

participate. Several types of local organizations can be found within rural communities. These can be "modern-political" organizations which have been assigned specific developmental tasks by the government or traditional (indigenous, informal) institutions evolved and supported by the local community to address economic, social, cultural, political and religious issue (Uphoff, 1986). The focal point of contact in eliciting community participation is the local organization leadership which is taken to be representative of the community's voice. Hence, in the new initiatives involving communities in the management of natural resources, leadership plays an important role in that it is the contact link between the external bodies and an embodiment of the internal aspirations. Thus, in many instances community leadership determines how the natural resource management initiative is received and performs at community level. Identifying and understanding community leadership and the institutions and processes of legitimacy at local level is one of the difficult tasks faced by CBNRM programme initiators (Seymour, 1994). This study focuses on the role which community leadership plays in the functioning and structuring of externally initiated CBNRM programmes, by considering the external and internal social, political and economic environment in which leadership operates.

1.2   STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Within rural development and environmental conservation programmes, monitoring and evaluation has been primarily based on financial, economic and ecological data (Murphree, 1990a). Rarely are programmes evaluated on the basis of the factors affecting the evolving institutional structures in which the community programme functions. Local level leadership institutions are one factor which impacts on the programme outcomes but are rarely considered by programme implementors and evaluators.

Much has been written about local organizations and institutions (Uphoff, 1986; Esman and Uphoff, 1984; Murphree, 1991 and others), but there has been little focus on the leadership within these organizations. Leaders are part of the community. In any community, there exists a leadership role performance which leaders are expected to fulfil and this is defined by social and cultural norms and institutions (Zelditch, 1968). For rural communities which have not been fully involved in the modern monetary economy and traditional leadership was the authentic authority, being involved

in CBNRM and the associated benefits and costs places unforeseen pressure on community relations (Gray, 1991). This is more so with the advances in technology where room exists for individual advances based on individual performance. Leaders have to contend with changes within the community and adjust to the external environment they face. With the structural conditions in which communities operate being determined by the international and national government policies, communities need leaders who can represent the community's needs within the wider forum. Thus, leaders have to fulfil the community's defined leadership role, while at the same time meeting the challenges of the external environment. This dual expectation from leaders has implications on how the programme will be sustained. Local sustainability of natural resource management and any community project is determined by the institutional capacity (locally and external) and the criteria of determining local benefits (IIED, 1994; CDCS, 1996). In most programmes the external criterion of community benefits is used, yet the communities who bear the costs are better equipped to evaluate the benefits.

Hence the problem to be addressed by this study is that the sustainability of CBNRM programmes depends on the legitimacy of leadership, cost and benefits distribution, community needs and perceptions of the programme. These are embodied in the community leadership as all initiatives pass through the leaders, yet the perceptions of local people on leadership selection, legitimacy and cost and benefit distributions are not considered in the monitoring and evaluation of CBNRM programmes. In the same context, the environment in which not only the community, but its leaders operate in and the challenges of a dual environment are not considered in programme assessment yet they are central to the sustainability of local programmes and local institutional capacity building.

1.3   AIMS OF THE STUDY

A case study of a Zimbabwean rural community (Kanyurira) involved in an externally initiated CBNRM programme (CAMPFIRE), was used to investigate the institutional structures, their functions and leadership, the community leadership selection criteria and the costs and benefits as challenges faced by community leadership. The findings could be interpreted to assist in formulating an evaluation and monitoring criteria for CBNRM which considers leadership. The overall objective of the study was to understand the role of local leadership in CBNRM with consideration of external

and internal socio-economic and political environment.

The aims of this study were to:

- investigate the institutional structures in which CAMPFIRE as a new CBNRM initiative operates

- investigate the changes in community leadership characteristics in response to the external pressures/challenges

- investigate the community's perceptions on leadership selection and leadership legitimacy

- describe the distribution of costs and benefits to leaders and the community within the CBNRM programme and issues shaping these

- identify the strengths and weaknesses of traditional and modern-political leadership institutions

- provide insight which will help practitioners understand leadership in the CBNRM context

1.4 DESCRIPTION OF THE STUDY AREA

Field studies were carried out in Kanyurira ward. Kanyurira ward is located in the Dande Communal Lands of Zimbabwe in Guruve District in the Zambezi Valley (Map 1). It falls within the arid agro-natural region four which has low and erratic rainfall of below 650mm per annum. Agro-natural region four is suited for livestock farming. Due to the tsetse fly (*Glossina spp.)* infesting the region cattle have not been present within the area (Child, 1995). The soils are poor and easily erodible with low livestock carrying capacity (Lynam, 1995). Some of the densest populations of indigenous wildlife in Zimbabwe, occur in the Zambezi Valley (Pecks, 1995 cited in Nabane, 1997:17). Studies comparing the economic efficiency of yields from game and cattle by the Mid-Zambezi Rural Development Project (1985 cited in Nabane, 1997) showed that in the marginal areas such as Kanyurira wildlife could yield as much as Z$12 per hectare compared to Z$4 per hectare for livestock. Studies under the Multi-species Project of WWF (Bond, 1993) also showed that wildlife as a land use option yielded more than crop farming and livestock in marginal areas of Zimbabwe.

Map 1: Kanyurira ward and neighbouring CAMPFIRE wards in Guruve District, Zimbabwe

Kanyurira ward has an area of 400km² of which 20km² has been designated as settlement and agricultural area. The remaining 380km² has been left unfenced as a wildlife area. A ward land use plan was developed with technical assistance from the Centre for Applied Social Sciences (CASS) and the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF). The settlement and agricultural area has been fenced with a solar powered electric game fence donated by WWF and Zimbabwe Trust (ZIMTRUST) as part of their support to CAMPFIRE. Erection of the game fence was in line with a socio-economic survey by Cutshall (1989) in which 49 percent of the Kanyurira population indicated the need for a game fence as a problem animal control measure against wildlife.

Kanyurira ward is bounded by the Chewore and Doma commercial Safari areas[4] on its western and south eastern boundaries (Map 2). Due to the ward's close proximity to these safari areas, it has abundant wildlife resources as wildlife migrates in and out of these protected areas. This has enhanced CAMPFIRE within the ward as the ward is one of the wards with highest wildlife revenues per annum in the district and country (Metcalfe, 1994; Olthof, 1995).

Agricultural production is restricted by low erratic rainfall, non-availability of seeds and other inputs within the ward (Nabane, 1997). Farmers have to travel distances of more than 100km to purchase agricultural inputs. Another constraint on agriculture is the lack of draft power due to the tsetse fly infestation. Hence people have to cultivate using hoes. In recent years tractors from some local Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) have started ploughing for the local farmers at a minimal fee. The main crops are cotton as a cash crop and maize as the major subsistence crop. Dry season production is limited to vegetables grown in gardens along the Angwa River on the northern side of the fenced settlement.

Kanyurira ward is made up of three villages hence there are three Village Development Committees (VIDCOs), two within Masoka settlement and one in the Mkanga settlement (Map2).

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[4] Defined in accordance with the Communal Areas Act as "Land that has been declared as a special protection area by the Minister concerned". These are areas of mostly prime wilderness with excellent game populations and strictly regulated sport hunting takes place (Child, 1995).

KEY

Protected Areas

Ward boundary

Rivers

Roads

1993 settled area

Forest

Fence

Angwa R.

Chewore safari area

Kanyurira Ward

E

KM

0   2   4

Doma safari area

Map 2: Kanyurira settlement area and surrounding areas

Each VIDCO has about forty-five households, which is unique as wards generally have six VIDCOs, consisting of one hundred households each (Nabane, 1997). The VIDCO structures in Kanyurira ward are of little administrative significance as they are non functional (Pers. Observations, 1995/96). The Ward Development Committee (WARDCO), is the main administrative structure within the ward.

Community Differentiation

Human population within the ward is fairly small with 2 400 people as of January 1997 (Kanyurira ward community health worker's records, 1997). There are two ethnic groups namely the Korekore with 127 households and the VaDoma[5] with 42 households in 1994. Immigrants include ten households from Masvingo District in the southern part of the country, of the Karanga ethnic group (Nabane, 1997) and three households of Malawian origin. The immigrants are called "*vauyi*" meaning "those who came" by the community (Pers. observations, 1995/96). Several groups and categories are emerging within the community namely, young people, *vauyi*, old generation, leaders in natural resource management and traditional leaders. This has created conflict and undercurrents (Pers. observations, 1996/97).

Regarding social stratification, the Korekore have a superior status than the VaDoma. The VaDoma provide wage labour for the Korekore. In community representation the interests of the two groups are dominated by the Korekore at all levels (Nabane, 1997). The Karanga and Malawians occupy more or less the same status, though they are not allowed to participate in the planning and decision making pertaining to development and Natural Resource Management {NRM}(Pers. observations, 1995/96).

Historical Overview of Kanyurira Settlement

The Korekore settled in the Zambezi Valley in the 15th Century, having travelled from the south of the present day Zimbabwe. During the colonial period Kanyurira ward was under the jurisdiction of Chief Chisunga. The headman of Kanyurira is referred to as the "chief" by the Kanyurira community though in effect he is a sub chief. The physical location of the ward was at the confluence of Mana and Angwa rivers (about 15km west of the present day settlement).

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[5] Several names are used to refer to the VaDoma. The term VaDema is sometimes used (Cutshall, 1989). This study will use the term commonly used in Kanyurira ward -VaDoma.

The people of Kanyurira believe they were moved from this area when the Chewore Safari area was designated in 1965/69 (WWF -SupCamp, 1995). During the liberation war, Kanyurira people were moved to security camps at Angwa Bridge, some 42km north-west of Kanyurira. In 1980, the people moved back to the present settlement which is also referred to as Masoka[6]. The ward has been isolated from much of Zimbabwe's modernization with little input from government (Nabane, 1997). People had to walk some 42km for transport, health and educational facilities.

The Doma people (VaDoma) first settled in Kanyurira ward in 1990/91. They came from an area called Yirira in a neighbouring ward some 60km from Kanyurira (Nabane, 1997). Due to traditional religious beliefs[7] the VaDoma are not treated as immigrants in Kanyurira. The VaDoma are not fully involved in subsistence agriculture and they are used to a nomadic life (in and out of the ward) of hunting and gathering wild fruit, honey and tubers. In Kanyurira ward they are known for wild honey harvesting and hunting. Currently the VaDoma in Kanyurira have an established settlement on the confluence of Mkanga and Angwa river (see Map 2). In this regard they are separated from the Korekore and generally do not participate in community meetings to the same extent as the Korekore.

1.5   METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY`

The aim of this section is to describe the data gathering methods, limitations and problems experienced during the data collection. Triangulation which is the use of more than one research method (qualitative and quantitative) was used as a way of validating differences in opinions.

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[6] The ward is Kanyurira after the sub-chief/headman and the village is known as Masoka after the spirit medium under whose jurisdiction the ward falls in. In this study, Masoka is the same as Kanyurira where it is used.

[7] The VaDoma came to settle in Masoka with a prominent spirit medium Mbuya Chinguwa (Nabane, 1997). Hence the VaDoma are taken as part of Masoka since the Chinguwa *mhondoro* has some influence in the Kanyurira spirit province

1.5.1 Data Collection methods

1.5.1.1   Field Research

Primary data was collected from the study area using structured interviews, questionnaires, group discussions, key informants and personal observations (informal conversations and attending community meetings). The population was taken to be the community and leaders. For sampling the community was assumed to consist of local people and immigrants. Within the community are various categories and groups. These consist of young and old people, educated and uneducated people and various extended families along kinship lines. A sample of 42 people[8] was drawn for the structured interviews using purposive sampling[9] to capture the categories to be investigated. The categories were age, educational levels, kinship and ethnicity. Hence, for age, young and old people were interviewed with the assumption that old people have a lower educational level and the young ones have a higher educational level. For kinship the six prominent families were selected based on observations and experiences of the researcher when working in the area from 1995-1996 and a socio-economic survey carried out by Cutshall (1989). From each family three young people and three older people were selected (see Appendix 1). The immigrants were taken as a family, though people from different families were interviewed. Of the 42 people selected, only one could not be interviewed because he was unavailable and there was no replacement within the family that he came from.

Leaders were taken as a separate entity from the community. The leadership structures within the community are traditional leadership (consisting of the kraal heads, headman and spirit medium) and the modern political leadership (consisting of local government administrative structures[10] and NRM related organizational structures[11]). A questionnaire survey (see Appendix 2) was used to interview past and present leadership in NRM. five not interviewed, one refused, one passed

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[8]This was on the premise that the adult population of Kanyurira is approximately 400 people, and hence 40 is a tenth of the population.

[9] Purposive sampling is a form of non random sampling which can be used where a small subset of a large population which is easily identified and judged to be of interest to the researcher is to be studied (Babbie, 1973).

[10]Ward Development Committees and Village Development Committees which incorporate the party political structures

[11]Ward Wildlife Committee

away and three were unavailable when the field study was conducted.

A guided group discussion was conducted with the kraal heads using participatory techniques (Pretty, Guijt, Thompson and Scoones, 1995). There are 15 kraal heads within the Kanyurira ward (Cutshall, 1989). During group discussions conducted at the central point within the ward, five of the kraal heads were present in person, and two sent representatives. The aim of the group discussion was to identify the hierarchy of authority, the decision making procedures within the ward before and after independence. This was achieved by understanding the history of leadership within the ward. Questions were posed to the participants for them to initiate discussions (see Appendix 3a).

Before conducting the field study, the headman as the overall leader of the community was informed of the study. The Ward Wildlife Committee (WWC) as the main leadership structure in the ward was also informed. A meeting was conducted with the WWC to clarify the role of the researcher[12] within the ward. The meeting was used as an opportunity to get the new WWC leadership's fears and expectations.

Key informants who were interviewed included the Community Based Resource Management Facilitator (CBF), who is employed jointly by WWF and the community, and the Guruve Rural District Council Acting Executive Officer (who was involved with the drafting of the Kanyurira ward wildlife constitution). The headman could not be interviewed due to his many commitments. Informal conversations contributed substantially to understanding the interrelationships within the community and the prevailing community perceptions on leadership, NRM and external agencies. A number of prolonged, unplanned discussions were carried out with members of the community who would drop by to update the researcher on the current situation and this led to discussions on other leadership related issues.

Several community meetings were attended. These included ward general meetings called by the councillor, the WWC and two called by the headman. Most of these meetings were related to

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[12]The researcher worked as a natural resource management facilitator with the community from 1995-1996. To avoid role conflict, it was necessary that the new capacity of the researcher be explained to the WWC.

the prevailing leadership crisis within the ward and provided an opportunity to analyze the community dynamics. Committee meetings were not attended to avoid role conflicts, as one could easily be drawn in to act in a facilitatory role while in the meeting. At the same time it was observed that once the WWC members were told of the transition from a facilitator to a researcher they viewed the researcher with suspicion. Feedback was however obtained from these meetings through the CBF.

Documentary information used included the minutes for the ward general meetings and WWC meetings, community household list and CASS demographic records for Kanyurira which are kept by the community. Field notes for the Resource Management Facilitator (RMF)[13] based in Kanyurira several issues arising during the field work and analysis.

1.5.1.2   Limitations

Several limitations arose while in the field. The main limitation was the time constraint given that the research had to be conducted within a month. Tensions existed within the community at the time the field research was conducted. These were related to leadership and greatly affected the approach to the study and the answers given by the respondents. The WWC leadership had just been removed from office due to community funds embezzlement and was under police investigations, thus, it was felt that group discussions with the community would prove to be either too volatile or people would be restrained, as they would if individual interviews were conducted. Hence structured interviews were used instead (see Appendix 3b). Carrying out 41, face to face interviews took longer than the time expected as the researcher had to accommodate the respondents' work schedule.

Appointments were made two or three days before the interviews which were carried out at the respondents' homesteads, though some offered to come to the researcher's base. However, appointments had to be changed to one day's notice as people tended to be absent from their homesteads if appointments were made two or three days before. Carrying out interviews at the respondents homesteads created another problem (especially for women) since the respondents would invite other members of the family to assist them. People had the notion that there were

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[13]The RMF employed by WWF, Support to CAMPFIRE project is also the researcher

wrong and right answers even, if this was explained to them at the start of the interview. This notion might have introduced some bias to answers given.

The overriding concern for the kraal heads was lack of boreholes for their people and their exclusion from the WWC decision making and meetings (allowances). These two concerns cropped up now and again in the discussions such that it was difficult to achieve the primary objective of the discussion.

Some of the people in present leadership were not often in the ward. This again contributed to delays in finishing the field research as well as missing some useful contributions from key figures as the headman.

1.5.2 Analysis and write up

Data were interpreted using qualitative approach through acceptable methodology. An historical and economic perspective was used to analyze the data while at the same time being placed in the NRM context within Zimbabwe and southern Africa. Relevant literature in CBNRM and leadership was consulted.

CHAPTER 2

2. ANALYTICAL OVERVIEW

2.1 INTRODUCTION

There are several key factors in achieving sustainable natural resource management through decentralization and community autonomy. These include the resource management system, political and legislative framework, institutions and the property regimes in which the natural resources occur (IIED, 1994). The main issues influencing how natural resource management can be made an attractive and beneficial long term option to the local people are:

(i)   the value of the natural resource in terms of the income it generates and the benefit distribution

(ii)   the socio-economic, cultural and political structures of the local people and their relationship with higher level structures.

These issues are fundamental for management of common pool resources in which CBNRM is based. Institutional issues include management regimes, authority and control of the natural resource. This chapter gives an overview of the management regime in which CBNRM occurs, the devolution of control and authority to local levels through existing local leadership institutions.

2.2 COMMUNITY BASED NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

In natural resource management the term common property has been largely misunderstood and misused. Many planners and development workers observing a situation where there is no management regime (open access) conclude that it is a situation of 'common property' (Bromley and Cernea, 1989). Resource degradation has been incorrectly attributed to 'common property' systems (Bromley and Cernea, 1989; Ostrom, 1990). The inadequate analysis has been based on the conventional wisdom in environmental studies based on Hardin's "Tragedy of the commons", which concluded that if common pool resources where not converted to private or state ownership then resource degradation was inevitable (Feeny, Berkes, McCay and Acheson, 1989). This misconception has commonly led to inappropriate recommendations and policy decisions (Bromley and Cernea, 1989), such as the conservation policies of the past (establishment of National parks, game parks and reserves).

Use of the term common property resource has been controversial. The controversy in the use of the term 'common property resource' arises due to the failure to distinguish between the common property resource and the common property regime. According to Bromley (1991) property is a benefit or income stream from a resource, while a property right is a claim to the benefit or income stream that some authority will agree to protect through assignment of duties to others who may covet the benefit. Thus, property is seen as a social relationship defining the holder with respect to the benefit stream. Ostrom (1990:30), uses the term 'communal property resources' to define resources which are jointly owned and or managed by a group of individuals with a common claim to the benefit stream and 'common pool resources' to refer to "a natural or man-made resource system that is sufficiently large to make it costly (but not impossible) to exclude potential beneficiaries from obtaining benefits from its use". For this study common property resource will be used to refer to communally owned natural resources. A resource management regime is " a structure of rights and duties characterizing the relationship of individuals one to another with respect to that particular environmental resource" (Bromley 1991:22). Institutional arrangements are therefore established to determine the scope and nature of the property regime over a respective natural resource.

2.2.1 Common Property Regime

Common pool resources have two characteristics namely subtractability[14] and excludability[15]. These characteristics make it difficult to manage these resources. The issue is how to exclude others, while ensuring that members get equal benefits. This is addressed by rules on who is included, who gets the benefits and how the resource is maintained. Those who use resources are taken to be the appropriators (Ostrom, 1990). A common pool resource can be held under several or a combination of the four property rights namely, open access, private, communal and state (Feeny et al, 1989).

Within the common property regime, the resource is held by an identifiable group of

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[14] Appropriation of a common pool resource unit by one user capable of reducing or subtracting from the welfare of others (Berkes, 1989)

[15] Limiting the access of potential beneficiaries from the use of a common pool natural resource (Berkes, 1989; Ostrom, 1990)

interdependent users who exclude outsiders and regulate use by members of the group (Feeny et al, 1989). These come together and decide on who has access and how much should be harvested. Once this is done collective action and decision making system comes into effect. Hence common property represents private property for the group of co-owners since all others are excluded from use and decision making (Bromley and Cernea, 1989; Bromley, 1991). Individuals have rights and duties within a common property regime.

How the actions of users/members affect the system, the yields and each others reaction needs to be considered (Ostrom, 1990). Within this system there is a great deal of uncertainty especially on the strategic behavior of the appropriators. Access to information or knowledge will reduce the uncertainty faced by appropriators (Ostrom, 1990; North, 1990). This however will not rule out or eliminate uncertainty from individual reaction to circumstances. This reaction is affected by external and internal factors. According to North (1990), the external factors include local and national government policies and the internal factors are the norms (social, cultural, behavioral) of the group.

2.3 ROLE OF LOCAL ORGANIZATIONS IN NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

Most literature in NRM, acknowledges the need to build local institutional capacity for sustainability of community based NRM initiatives (IIED, 1994; Murphree, 1994; CDCS, 1996). Local institutional capacity involves empowering local organizations. Local organizations are defined by Esman and Uphoff (1984:18, 58) as "local institutional structures ranging from local government bodies to rural enterprises that could facilitate communication and cooperation between the central government and local communities". Literature advocates the need to consider existing local organizations and to build on them as vehicles of community participation (Little, 1994; Uphoff, 1986). Murphree (1994) cautions on the danger of community participation becoming mere incorporation of the local elites who are in leadership positions within the local organizations. Therefore in choosing the local organizations to work with, in NRM initiatives, the implementing agencies have to consider the community needs and perspectives (IIED, 1994; CDCS, 1996). Blunt and Warren (1996), show how indigenous local organizations (*e.g. Panchayat*) can be used as vehicles for local community participation and

development. Uphoff (1986) states that introduction of new development initiatives into a community without considering existing local organizations/institutions can either destroy them or be destroyed by them. This is more so for externally initiated CBNRM, which may entitle the creation of new institutions as part of the institutional capacity building. Reasons given for creating new organizations is that existing ones are unrepresentative, domineering and exploitative and thus are inappropriate for the participatory development (Esman and Uphoff, 1984). Though this is true, it fails to take cognizance of the various decision making arrangements which exist in different social and cultural set ups and may not conform to the external agencies' concept of democratic decision making.

Local organizations act as a link between external and internal objectives, by understanding external needs and adjusting them to community aspirations. Local organizations are usually good at delivering and understanding local needs as they are closer to the community and may be community initiated, unlike central and external agencies. In decentralization of NRM control and authority, local organizations play a vital role and provide a forum for collective decision making (Uphoff, 1986). With involvement of local organizations in control and management of natural resources, conflicts may arise among existing local organizations if roles and authority status overlap and are not clearly defined.

2.4 COMMUNITY LEADERSHIP IN COMMUNITY BASED NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

Local organizations are led by local leaders appointed or elected from the community. Little has been researched on leadership (Esman and Uphoff, 1984). Leadership within community may be informal or formal. Formal leadership is usually associated with the modern externally introduced leadership with official recognition, while informal is taken as the traditional/indigenous leadership.

Customary common property regimes in developing countries are characterized by group ownership with management authority vested in a group or leader (Bromley, 1991). It is important within a common resource management regime to have a system of authority which ensures that the expectations of the appropriators are met. A consensus is needed in decision

making among the appropriators before action can be taken. This is done through meetings with the direction of leaders. Reaching a consensus is taken by some to be what makes communal resource management costly (Bromley and Cernea, 1989; Ostrom, 1990). Thus within the common resource management regime, leadership within the group plays an important role as its actions determine if the rights and duties within that group as stipulated in their rules are adhered to (Esman and Uphoff, 1984). This is important to avoid free riders within the group. Should this result then the common pool resource can easily become an open access resource as there will be no monitoring of the users as to how much should be harvested sustainably at a particular time for equitable distribution of the benefits within the group.

In areas where common pool resources are being managed communally leadership is in the forefront. A case in point is the African traditional /customary common property regimes, where the village heads were the management authority holding land in trust for the community, while ensuring that villagers use resources in such a way that all benefit (Ayittey, 1991; Holleman, 1969; Gelfand, 1965). Thus for any programme concerned with the management of common pool natural resources, the user group has to be defined and a leadership institution to act as the management authority must be in place. This leadership institution is, however, subject to influence from external and internal social norms, appropriators reactions, behaviour and expectation (North, 1990). These factors in the end determine how effective the leadership institution is as an authority system protecting the community's and individual's claim to the property rights that they enjoy over the resource in question.

2.5   KANYURIRA WARD AND CAMPFIRE

2.5.1 Background to Wildlife Management in Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe's wildlife policies like many other African countries have been shaped by its colonial history (Cumming, 1990b). The following sections give a brief outline of the wildlife policies of the country to until CAMPFIRE.

2.5.1.1   Pre Colonial Period

Like most countries in Africa, Zimbabwe has a long history of wildlife management. Before white settlement in 1890, human populations were small and wildlife and other natural resources plentiful. Management of resources was through customs and beliefs (taboos) and

not very elaborate (Child, 1995).

2.5.1.2   Colonial Period

With white settlement came radical alteration of the biophysical and socio-economic nature of wildlife management (Pecks, 1994 cited in Nabane, 1997). Changes in the property right configuration resulted in the indigenous people and the natural resources coming under state control. The Anglo-French concepts of wildlife protection (game reserves) were introduced with the creation of reserves and all game protected, and belonging to the king. Thus certain species could only be hunted with permits issued by the local administration officer (Child, 1995). This resulted in the inequitable distribution of costs with only the settlers permitted to hunt, and landholders especially those in the communal areas being marginalised from their wildlife. Other laws came into force which made it illegal to kill wild animals other than for protection of valued property such as crops, fences etc. (Child, 1995). This was feasible for white settlers since within the indigenous population only chiefs and headmen had firearms and animal traps were illegal.   Thus the state made it an obligation for people (settlers and communal land residents) to protect wildlife by not killing it with no compensation since products could not be sold if the animal was killed in defense.   However these laws were a contradiction to the government's own approach to controlling tsetse fly, which involved the elimination of all wildlife outside protected areas.

In the 1960s the state's outlook changed with laws coming into effect, which allowed for some trade in some animal products. The Parks and Wildlife Act 1975 was a turning point as it gave commercial farmers rights over wildlife occurring on their land. Thus most farmers no longer saw wildlife as vermin, but an asset, as there were returns to the cost of preserving it. For the communal area people however, any utilization of wildlife was considered illegal and people could be fined or jailed. This was however difficult for the state conservation agency to enforce. Thus, people in communal areas continued to face the costs of competing with wildlife for habitat.

Since the colonial land tenure legislature such as the Land Tenure Act, 1969 and the Land Apportionment Act, 1930, ensured that all the best lands in agro-natural regions 1, 2 and 3 were

taken for agricultural production by the white settlers, it meant that wildlife and the indigenous population had to compete for land in the remaining arid regions. Thus most wildlife in Zimbabwe is found in the semi-arid regions of the country which are sparsely populated and not suitable for crop production. Due to these reasons most protected areas of the country occur in agro-natural regions 4 and 5. Thus people in communal areas had to pay the cost of staying with wildlife which marauded through the villages and raided crops. Wildlife could still be found outside the protected zones, though people saw it as a nuisance due to the high costs incurred and hence continued illegal hunting. It was difficult for the government through the Department of National Parks and Wildlife Management to enforce the wildlife control laws due to shortage of manpower, the remoteness and vastness of the areas (Cumming, 1990a). Thus, the hunting of wildlife for consumption was not restrained in the communal areas.

2.5.1.3   Post Colonial period

At independence in 1980, the old legislation in natural resource management and land tenure did not change (IIED, 1994; Child, 1995) . Thus, wildlife conservation continued to be costly for protected areas and wildlife outside these areas. However, with the realization that within the commercial farms where landholders had the authority to utilize wildlife on a commercial basis, wildlife populations had gone up and most commercial farmers were entering the industry (Child, 1995; Cumming, 1990b), a few members of the DNP&WLM came up with alternatives. The first attempt was informed by the realization that for communities to conserve wildlife they have to attach an economic value to it. In 1978, the project WINDFALL[16] was initiated. WINDFALL, aimed at returning wildlife revenues to those communities living close to national parks as they bore the highest costs and posed the greatest threat (Child, 1995). The project failed to achieve its objectives due to lack of a local proprietorship of the wildlife resource and the absence of community participation in decision making (Murindagomo, 1993 quoted in Nabane, 1997). Benefits to the community were not significant as they were usually delayed and were not directly correlated to wildlife by the beneficiaries (Martin, 1986). The new approach to wildlife management in Zimbabwe evolved as a response to the challenges of wildlife management in the communal areas. This approach was supposed to be in line with the decentralization of decision making and planning to communities through the Prime Minister's

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[16]Wildlife Industries New Development for All

Directive of 1984. The new approach was aimed at involving local communities in the management of wildlife in their areas, with benefits accruing to the community.

2.5.2 CAMPFIRE in Zimbabwe

Communal Areas Management Programme For Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE) is a programme designed to assign the rights to use communal natural resources to small communities and providing an incentive for better use of the resources (Child, 1995). The programme was drafted in 1986 but formally established in 1988. New socio-economic institutions were created to achieve the technical objective of the programme. The programme has to operate in diverse ecological, economic and tribal situations while at the same time conforming to government policy.

The amendment of the Parks and Wildlife Act of 1975 in 1982, gave appropriate authority[17] to district councils under whose jurisdiction communal areas fell. Further devolution of authority from the district councils was supposed to enable communities within communal areas to act as natural resource committees. Responsibility of managing natural resources was supposed to be granted to the lower level community units such as the ward, village and household through the new establishment socio-economic and political institutional structures. To date there is a continued battle for more devolution of authority to the communities.

2.5.3 Historical Overview of CAMPFIRE in Kanyurira

CAMPFIRE in Kanyurira from a historical perspective is best explained by the community itself. The following historical account of natural resource management in Kanyurira is biased towards the community's perspective as explained to and learnt by the researcher through personal observations and interaction over the period 1995-1996. Documentary evidence backs up the community's story. Kanyurira Ward falls under the jurisdiction of Chief Chisunga. Prior to the war of liberation the people of Kanyurira lived at the confluence of Mana and Angwa

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[17]The district councils now have the same rights to manage and utilize through selling as commercial farm owners over wildlife in their areas (Jansen, 1989)

rivers some 25km west of the present-day settlement (Nabane, 1997). People believe that they were moved from this area when Chewore Safari area was designated. One view held within the community is that Chief Chisunga sold land to the colonial powers therefore people had to be moved (WWF Masoka LUP Report, 1995).

The people of Kanyurira were involved in hunting for subsistence and stories abound of the outstanding hunters within the ward. During the colonial period and soon after independence the people due to their geographical isolation, had little interference from DNP&WLM in the form of patrols though people would be arrested. After independence the community commenced intensive hunting based on the understanding that the country now belonged to them. They were surprised when they were arrested for poaching by the DNP&WLM officers from Chewore Safari Area. This created tension between the government conservation body and the people. In 1987, a classroom block was built with funds from wildlife (under WINDFALL), though most of the people mention it as "the food for work block".

The initial CAMPFIRE implementing agencies in Kanyurira were the Center for Applied Social Sciences (CASS) and World Wide Fund For Nature (WWF) (Crane, 1991). The concept of CAMPFIRE was introduced and explained to the people of Kanyurira by Professor Murphree of CASS in 1988. Through explanations, discussions and questioning sessions with the community and the headman, the concept was finally accepted by the community in 1989. As part of the process land use plans were developed by the community with CASS and WWF facilitation (Crane , 1991). These allowed the community to opt for a solar powered electric game fence as a way of reducing costs from wildlife through crop raids and attacks. To most people in Kanyurira their acceptance of the game fence is CAMPFIRE. This has created an unhealthy misconception whereby the fence and CAMPFIRE are synonymous such that people believe that if the fence collapses, CAMPFIRE would have failed in Kanyurira.

The Guruve Rural District Council was granted appropriate authority for managing wildlife in 1989. In 1989, the community was required to choose leadership for the new natural resource management committee within the community namely Ward Wildlife Committee (WWC). This would enable them to receive their monetary benefits from the district council (now RDC).

However, people did not turn up for the meeting as they failed to understand why they had to choose leadership. The headman appointed people from the few who came to be the first WWC in Kanyurira. The ward received their first dividends in 1989 (Jansen, 1990). A ward wildlife management constitution (see Appendix 4) was drafted with input from the Guruve RDC official assigned to wildlife management (Institutional Development Officer). This has been the governing constitution with by-laws stating rules of exclusion and regulating members' behaviour through rewards and sanctions in the ward.

Community game guards were selected by the community and trained by DNP&WLM to carry out anti-poaching patrols and other wildlife management activities. The game guards have worked closely with CAMPFIRE implementing agencies such as WWF, which is involved in ecological monitoring. These game guards are paid from community CAMPFIRE revenues. Fence monitors were also selected by the community and received training from WWF, with an agreement that WWF would pay the monitors for the first two years. In 1994, after the realization for the need to have a community -based resource person for CAMPFIRE, a community based facilitator from WWF, was based in the community. The role of the facilitator was to provide daily input to the WWC, fence monitors and game guards as well as carrying out other activities with the community. Between 1994 and 1996, the new NRM leadership in the ward received extensive input from WWF. In 1996, two of the WWC members went to represent the country in USA for a conference on CBNRM. In the same year, the ward won the WISDOM[18] Award for sustainable natural resource management. Within the Guruve district, the ward receives the highest wildlife proceeds due to its large wildlife area and small human population. The ward receives many visitors from various districts and countries with an interest in CAMPFIRE. Some members of the WWC have called the ward, "the university of CAMPFIRE". With all this acclaim to CAMPFIRE in the ward, the ward is an ideal site for any study pertaining to NRM, and has received a number of researchers and journalists. All these visitors are received by the WWC and this has implications for the sustenance of the programme as will be shown in subsequent chapters.

The following chapter gives an overview of the evolution of the institutional structure in which

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[18]Wildlife In Sustainable Development Of Mankind (WISDOM) Foundation

CAMPFIRE operates. Institutional structures in natural resource management and rural development for pre-independence, and post independence in Zimbabwe and the leadership functions within will be outlined.

CHAPTER 3

3. **ORGANIZATIONAL FUNCTIONS AND LEADERSHIP IN NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT**

3.1 INTRODUCTION

Community based natural resource management (CBNRM) is a new initiative in biodiversity conservation which advocates for community participation at grassroots level (IIED, 1994). In CBNRM, participation is seen as a goal which allows communities to have greater control over their lives and resources and is defined as:

> " An active process by which beneficiary or client groups influence the direction and execution of a development project with a view to enhancing their well-being in terms of income, personal growth, self reliance or other values they cherish" (Paul 1987, cited in Little, 1994:349).

Participation is also seen as a means of achieving improved social and economic objectives (Little, 1994). Local participation (participation of the local people in natural resource management) and biodiversity conservation cannot be pursued apart from the development objective if the CBNRM programmes are to be sustainable.

Community based natural resource management takes many lessons from local participation and rural development. Thus the concept of local organizations as intermediaries of development (Little, 1994; Esman and Uphoff, 1984; Uphoff, 1995) can also be used to see how local organizations function in NRM. Local organizations in this context refer to "Institutional structures which could facilitate communication and cooperation between the national centre (government) and local communities" (Esman and Uphoff, 1984:58) which are accountable to a particular membership. These can be local government units, cooperatives, interest groups and political organizations.

The terms "organizations" and "institutions" are commonly used interchangeably. There are organizations which are institutions and institutions which are organizations. Organizations are structures of recognized and accepted roles. If an organization has gained status and legitimacy for meeting people's needs over time, it may be said to have been "institutionalized" (Uphoff,

1986). Within the organizations and institutional structures there are positions of leadership which are occupied by members of the community. These can also be institutionalized. In this study institutional structures will refer to the hierarchy of leadership institutions and the specific positions (roles and responsibilities) making up the structure. These can either be formal and modern or informal and traditional but are area specific.

Formal and modern leadership institutions are those introduced usually by government to fulfill specific development objectives (Uphoff, 1986:6). The traditional and/or informal leadership institutions usually function according to shared understanding of common objectives, roles, expectations, responsibilities, sanctions instead of being determined by explicit codified rules and regulations (Uphoff in Blunt and Warren, 1996: xi). Uphoff (1986:8) defines informal leadership institutions as those organizations for which there is no legal or prescribed basis for the roles, or the authority or other resources associated with them. It is the latter definition which will be used in this context. Informal leadership institutions have been established by local people or modified over time to deal with different economic, social, politics and religious issues (Uphoff, 1986).

3.2   CAMPFIRE IN RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN ZIMBABWE

There are several CBNRM initiatives which have arisen in recent years. One such initiative is the Communal Areas Management Programme For Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE) in Zimbabwe. CAMPFIRE aims at the conservation and management of wildlife, grazing, forestry and water through the involvement of local communities in decision making and benefit distribution regarding natural resources of their micro-environment[19] (Nabane, 1997:7). Involvement of local communities requires devolution of control and decision making power to the lowest accountable units within the institutional structures in rural development. To be able to determine if this has been achieved within CBNRM in Zimbabwe it is necessary to understand the institutional structures of local development and administration in Zimbabwe and Kanyurira ward for the pre-independence colonial period, post independence and post CAMPFIRE periods. These are shown in the following sections. The leadership positions and their roles are also outlined.

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[19] The term micro-environment was here used to describe the immediate ecological environment within the confines of the community geographical/spatial boundary

3.2.1 Pre-Independence Institutional Structures

The pre-independence institutional structures for rural development in Zimbabwe are shown in Figure 1.

Positions and roles within the Institutional structure

District Commissioner

The District Commissioner *(mudzviti)* was the local colonial government administrator. He had jurisdiction over several chieftainships and was secretary to all native councils to ensure representation of, and control by central government. Local decision making was dominated by the District Commissioner (Thomas, 1995). The District Commissioner worked closely with the traditional leadership especially after the enactment of the Native Councils Act of 1937 and the African Councils Act of 1957.

Chief

At the local level, the District Commissioner whose jurisdiction was the district worked with traditional leadership namely the Chief *(mambo)* who could be in charge of the whole district or sections of it. Thus, the District Commissioner could have one or several chiefs responsible to him. The role of the chief was to administer the area and the community's religious, political, social and cultural affairs. Thus, the chief designated to the headman their areas of jurisdiction. He interpreted laws pertaining to natural resource management and development from the spirit medium and the District Commissioner respectively.

The government recognized chiefs as legal customary authorities whose contribution in the recruiting of labour for rural development such as road construction could be elicited. The chiefs would then send their messengers to pass on the message to the various headmen and kraal heads in the district. Initially chiefs were chosen from the ruling clan in line with their totem by the respective family and senior spirit medium of that chieftainship (Spierenburg, 1995). After colonization the government of the day also had a say in who could be chief with input from the headmen. This has been adopted into the present day system with the Ministry of Local Government, Rural and Urban Development appointing the chief with advice from the headmen and District Administrator (Chiefs and Headmen Act, 1982).

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                    │    Local Government     │
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                    │  District Commissioner  │
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┌──┐
│ SPIRIT MEDIUM   │
│ Worked together with the chief in the administration │
│ of the area, but dealt more with religious issues and │
│ was seen as link between the present rulers and the │
│ guardian spirits of the area   │
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┌──┐
│ CHIEF (*MAMBO*)   │
│ Assisted by a council of advisors   │
│ consisting of 4 of the headmen   │
│ (*makurukota*) in the district   │
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┌──┐
│ HEADMAN (*SADUNHU*)   │
│ Assisted by a council of advisors   │
│ consisting of the kraal heads[17] from   │
│ the Ward   │
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┌──┐
│ KRAAL HEAD (*SABHUKU/SAMANA*)   │
│ Head of clan who administered land   │
│ and settled disputes within the clan[18]   │
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│   Household (*Samusha*)   │
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┌──┐
│   Individual   │
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Figure 1.0: Pre-Independence Institutional Structures in Rural Development in Zimbabwe

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[17] Leaders of large family units within the village who control sections of the village but are still responsible to the headman (Holleman, 1969:6)

[18] A collection of family groups consisting of men, wives, children, sons' wives and childrren. These family groups trace their descent from a common ancestral line denoted through a common family name (Ayittey, 1991:2)

Spirit Medium

The spirit medium *(svikiro)* is not appointed by any one who is living. A person becomes possessed by a spirit *(mhondoro)* usually the founder of that tribe or first inhabitants of the area who were rulers of the past (Spierenburg, 1995). Thus the spirit medium acts as a communication medium between the spirit *(mhondoro)* of the area and the living. Other spirit mediums confirm the validity of the new *mhondoro*. The person then becomes a recognized spirit medium within the area. This position is not hereditary, but it is based on lineage and territory. Each *mhondoro* looks after a particular territory which is known by the inhabitants of the area. This may encompass a few villages or extend into different chieftainships. The *mhondoros* are referred to as "the real owners of the land and people" (Spierenburg, 1995). All aspects of the people's lives in the spirit's jurisdiction referred to by Garbett (1969 cited in Spierenburg, 1995) as "spirit provinces" are affected by the *mhondoro*.

Each village or group of villages within the spirit province has a local assistant of the spirit medium known as *"mutape"*. The *mutape* is usually the village headman or a relative of the headman. Village elders consult the *mhondoro* in the event of drought or other natural disasters. If there are any major developments which are to be introduced into the area, *mhondoro* has to be informed (Spierenburg, 1995). Thus, the chief and /or headman listen to the spirit medium as a representative of the departed. Going against the advice of the spirit medium can cause disaster for the whole area and the spirit has to be appeased. In this respect the spirit medium plays an important role in developmental and conservation issues within the spirit province in which they operate.

Rules on natural resource management, usually as taboos, were given by the spirit medium to the chief who would then pass them to those under his jurisdiction through the lower structures. At the death of a chief it was the duty of the senior *mhondoro* of the chieftainship to appoint a successor (Spierenburg, 1995).

Headman

The headman[20] is often a representative of the "houses" of the chief's lineage (the ruling family), but can sometimes be the head of a foreign community who owes allegiance to the chief of the territory (Holleman, 1969). He has jurisdiction over a number of separate and mutually independent villages, to make up the ward *(dunhu)*. This ward is a section of the district which is assigned by the chief to the headman which may differ from the council ward boundary. The population of the ward has a nuclear body consisting of the headman's kinsmen spread over several villages. Headmen are appointed by the chief with advice from the ward kraal heads. The headman has a number of clans under him and each clan has a clan head who are the kraal heads. These help in the administration of the area. Offences such as accusation of witchcraft, theft, rape could be tried by the headman (Holleman, 1969). Cases of murder and other criminal cases were referred to the chief who might refer them to the formal courts. The headman assigned portions of the area under his jurisdiction/ward to the various kraal heads and any new comers to the area would either be given land by the headman or sent to a particular kraal head to get land.

Kraal heads

Group discussion with Kanyurira Ward kraal heads, indicate that there are several kraal heads under the headman. These are selected by their respective families. Usually the oldest male member of that clan is the kraal head. If he becomes too old, he assigns one of his sons to act as the kraal head and on his death he becomes the new clan head. The kraal head is seen as the father of the family and gives land to the sons as they grow older and get married and to members of the clan who might have moved away from the area. The role of the kraal head included:

(i)   collecting various taxes for the District Commissioner

(ii)   receiving and explaining laws from the District Commissioner to the people

(iii) allocating land

(iv)   receiving visitors

(iv)   recruitment and administration of people for government work

(vi)   Receiving and explaining laws from the spirit medium and the chief to the people.

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[20] Due to the patrilineal nature of the Shona society, traditional leaders are commonly males, though there are female spirit mediums (Holleman, 1969).

These included natural resource management laws such as, which animals to hunt, how to conserve trees, springs, wells, pools of water and how to fish.

The kraal heads dealt directly with people at grassroots and were respected as they were taken as the fathers of the families they headed. As one respondent mentioned *"Sabhuku aigara nevana vake votaurirana"* meaning, "the kraal head sat with his children and they would discuss issues" signifying the closeness and intimacy of the relationship.

3.2.2 Post Independence Institutional structures in rural Development

After independence based on the socialist political orientation of the ruling government, new structures were introduced which erased (on paper) the pre-independence institutional structures. This was in line with the primary objective stated in the Transitional National Development Plan of 1982 of creating a "democratic, egalitarian and socialist society". The Prime Minister's Directive of 1984 outlined the institutional framework for development in Zimbabwe with the objective of defining the "administrative structures at provincial and district level and the relationships and channels of communication between all participants in development at provincial and district level in order to achieve co-ordinated of provinces and districts in Zimbabwe" (Thomas, 1995). This institutional framework is shown in Figure 2.

3.2.2.1   Positions and Roles within the Institutional Structure

District Administrator

The District Administrator (DA) is appointed by the Minister of Local government and was the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the District Council. Their role is to implement government policy as well as act as advisors to the District Council (Thomas, 1995).

WARDCO and VIDCO

The Village Development Committee (VIDCO) in principle, as the lowest unit of accountability submits village development plans to the WARDCO. The WARDCO would co-ordinate all the plans of the six VIDCOs and submit them to the District Development Committee through the Ward Councillor. These are then incorporated into a District plan to be approved by the District Council (Thomas, 1995).

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                    ▼
┌─────────────────────────────────────────┐
│       Ministry of Local Government       │
└─────────────────────────────────────────┘
                    │
                    ▼
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Provincial Development Committee                  │
│ Comprising of Provincial Admnistrator as the chairperson │
│ Provincial heads of Government ministries, security organisations, │
│ Chief Executive Officers of Rural District Councils, co-opted │
│ members of other organisations working with the province │
└──────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
                    │
                    ▼
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ District Councils (DC)                            │
│ Comprising of WARDCO chairpersons (Ward           │
│ Councillors)                                      │
└──────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
                    │
                    ▼
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ District Development Committee (DDCO)             │
│ Comprising of the District Administrator as the   │
│ Chairperson                                       │
│ Senior Chief Executive Officers, District Heads of │
│ Government ministries and Security organisations, co- │
│ opted members of Non Governmental Organisations   │
└──────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
                    │
                    ▼
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Ward (6 Villages)                                 │
│ WARDCO comprising of the Ward Councillor as the   │
│ chairperson                                       │
│ Chairperson and secretary of each VIDCO, 1 member │
│ each from ZANU(PF)'s Women's league and Youth     │
│ Bridages                                          │
└──────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
                    │
                    ▼
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Village (100 households)                          │
│ VIDCO comprising of 4 village members,            │
│ member each from ZANU (PF) Women's                │
│ League and Youth Brigades                         │
└──────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
                    │
                    ▼
┌─────────────────────────────────────────┐
│              Household                   │
└─────────────────────────────────────────┘
                    ▼
┌─────────────────────────────────────────┐
│              Individual                  │
└─────────────────────────────────────────┘
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VIDCO: Village Development Committee

WARDCO: Ward Development Committee

Figure 2: Post Independence Institutional Structures for Rural Development in
      Zimbabwe
Source: (Thomas, 1995)

3.2.2.2 Institutional Restructuring

Within the post independence institutional structures, there is no representation by traditional leadership. The new demarcations of the ward and villages (jurisdiction of the WARDCO and VIDCO respectively) are based on geographical boundaries. These do not align with the legal boundaries between communal lands, chieftaincy and the traditional villages (Thomas, 1995). As a result the transition from the traditional local, hereditary and long-standing authority to elected and formal authority (which might be immigrant) became a source of conflict (Thomas, 1995).

Power to allocate land and other aspects of resource management is vested in the District Council. Due to the new VIDCO and WARDCO structures the traditional leadership was in many cases excluded from the planning and decision making processes within the communal areas, thus creating conflict. The new leadership although assumed to be democratically elected, has yet to have its legitimacy sanctioned by their constituency (Thomas, 1995) as they are seen as instruments of local administration. Hence the situation within some communal areas is that the traditional leadership which is respected and seen as authentic by the communities has had its powers and authority limited, while the new modern-political leadership has no support (Land Tenure Commission Report, 1994). This situation has resulted in unclear collective decision making forum within the community and has created factions.

3.2.3 CAMPFIRE within the Institutional Structure for Rural Development in Zimbabwe

CAMPFIRE was introduced within the institutional structure and objectives of the Transitional National Development Plan of 1982 as shown by its objectives (Martin, 1986). The steps in achieving the goals of CAMPFIRE included the establishment of an administrative structure consistent with the existing Government structures of VIDCOs, WARDCOs and DDCOs in the rural areas (Martin, 1986: v). The current institutional structures within which CAMPFIRE functions in are shown in Figure 3.

In 1988 the Rural District Council Act made provision for the amalgamation of rural councils (responsible for commercial farming areas) with District Councils (responsible for communal

National Government

Ministry of Mines, Tourism & Environment

Ministry of Local Government Rural & Urban Development

Natural Resource Board

Department of National Parks and Wildlife Management

District Administrator

Rural District Council Ward Councillors

Natural Resource Conservation Committee

District Development Committee

District Wildlife Committee

Other Committees

NGOs

Ward Wildlife Committee

WARDCO

VIDCO

Village Wildlife Committee

Household

Individual

KEY

———▶ Accountability

·····▶ Representation

·· ·▶ Influence

— ·▶ Planning

Figure 3: CAMPFIRE within the Institutional Structures for Rural Development in Zimbabwe
Source: (Thomas, 1995)

areas). The Rural District Council was empowered to act as a Natural Resource Conservation Committee for the area or any part set aside as an Intensive Conservation Area by the responsible Minister (Thomas, 1995). Within the RDC Act there was a provision for the formation of sub committees within one or more wards in the district to which all or some of the functions of the Conservation Committee could be delegated. The chairperson of this sub committee would be the Ward Councillor and the chairperson of the RDC as an ex-officio member. Hence central (RDC) would continue to influence community decisions through these two members of the RDC.

3.2.3.1 Leadership positions and roles within CAMPFIRE
Positions

The Ward Wildlife Committee consists of 7 democratically elected members. Two of these namely Ward Councillor and secretary attend the District Wildlife Committee meetings. The Ward councillor should be the chairperson of the WWC although this may not be so.

Roles and functions of the Ward Wildlife Committee leadership

The WWC chairperson might also be the Ward councillor in some cases. In cases where he/she is not, the councillor is a co-opted member. Other positions are the treasurer, secretary and committee members with the headman as an ex-officio member. Resident heads of government departments and Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) sit in as advisors. In some areas the VIDCO chairpersons and secretaries make up the WWC. Traditional leaders such as the kraal heads (specifically for the study area) are consulted in the planning stages in identifying projects needed by the community and how much money should be allocated to each project.

The WWC operates by holding committee meetings which are specified by the RDC through a manual developed by one of the NGOs involved in institutional capacity building in CAMPFIRE (ZIMTRUST). It is mandatory for the WWC to hold general meetings for feedback to the community and an annual general meeting where they give a financial statement for the year, though this is rarely the case. The general meeting is the forum used for collective decision making within the community, though it may end up serving other purposes.

In financial matters, some Wards have their own bank accounts where they keep the wildlife

revenues set aside for projects, wildlife management, committee members' travel, subsistence and sitting allowances. In other cases the RDC keeps the money. In either case there are three signatories for any withdrawal to be made. These are the councillor, treasurer and secretary, chairperson (if it is not the councillor). The WWC members get a basic allowance determined by the people for any meeting that they hold. This has been termed as "a disturbance fee" by some Kanyurira WWC members as it acts as compensation for time lost for households and other personal activities.

In natural resource management in the study area, the WWC has the mandate to oversee the Ward game scouts who carry out anti-poaching patrols, fence monitors who maintain the solar powered electric game fence around the ward settlement area. The WWC is also involved in quota setting for the ward. To what extent WWCs are involved in natural resource management varies for each district where CAMPFIRE is being implemented. In some areas, the RDC carries out the anti-poaching patrols and natural resource conservation law enforcement through RDC game scouts (e.g. Nyaminyami and North Gokwe CAMPFIRE Districts). In other areas there are no patrols, in some areas they have Village Problem Animal Reporters who only reports any problem animal to the RDC. Thus, the degree to which communities are empowered, is also determined by the decision making authority that they have, not only in the distribution of benefits, but also in the management of natural resources in their immediate environment.

Traditional leaders have generally been included with the new CAMPFIRE leadership (Thomas, 1995). Inclusion of traditional leaders in CAMPFIRE is not formally/legally endorsed, though RDC officials encourage the WWC leaders to involve traditional leaders as they deal with issues pertaining to the religious and cultural aspects of the community. For areas like Guruve, the religious aspects of the community is closely related to natural resource management and land (see section 3.2.1.1). In some areas the resident chief or headmen within the ward are ex -officio members of the WWC.

3.2.3.2 Integration of CAMPFIRE Structures within the Established Institutional Structures

In the concept document (Martin, 1986), the new CAMPFIRE institutions are supposed to be sub-committees of the WARDCOs and VIDCOs. For the study area they act as independent bodies usually due to ineffective WARDCOs and VIDCOs or due to conflicts. The WWC is a sub-committee of District Wildlife Committee. They act as natural resource conservation committees at Ward and village level and as economic institutions in the distribution and use of benefits from wildlife utilization. These committees are involved in law enforcement, planning and budgeting as well as the monitoring of Ward projects. The extent to which these local committees are empowered to decide how to allocate the wildlife benefits is questionable.

District Wildlife Committees have co-opted members of NGOs working within the district in NRM. As a progression from the original CAMPFIRE project document (Martin, 1986), there are several NGOs and government organizations offering technical, research and capacity building assistance to RDCs with Appropriate Authority. These organizations have formed a coalition known as the CAMPFIRE Collaborative Group (CCG). This coalition is an attempt to bridge the gap and lack of communication between government departments and NGOs (Olthof, 1995; Metcalfe, 1994). Feedback is provided through technical meetings and DWC meetings.

In the next section leadership in local institutional structures and the role it plays in the functioning and structuring of these institutions will be evaluated. The selection of leaders and characteristics of leaders within the study area -Kanyurira Ward will be described.

CHAPTER 4

4. CHARACTERISTICS OF LEADERS IN LOCAL INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES

4.1 INTRODUCTION

The dictionary of social sciences (Gould and Kolb, 1964:380) defines leadership as denoting "the occupancy of a status and the active performance of a role that mobilizes more or less organized collective and voluntary effort towards the attainment of shared goals and objectives". Leadership is seen as "a relation that exists between people in a social situation, and that people who are leaders in one situation may not necessarily be leaders in another situation" (Stogdill, 1948 quoted in Gould and Kolb, 1964:380). In this sense, leadership entails four elements namely: (a) role[21] performance, (b) whose influence (status)[22], (c) is central with regard to (d) collective action.

Leadership is necessary in all institutions for various tasks such as reaching agreement on goals, devising strategies, motivating others, resolving conflict and overseeing implementation (Uphoff, 1986: 201). According to Uphoff (1986) leadership depends on the attitudes and actions of the followers and on the "leaders". Leadership entails taking up responsibility and then exercising it. Leadership is therefore influenced by the expectations of the followers and individual traits or characteristics of leaders.

Within the institutional structures in development and NRM, characteristics of leaders affect the outcome of any project initiated through their role performance with regard to collective action which is a feature of CBNRM programmes. For the institutional structures outlined in Chapter 3, the leadership positions will be evaluated, the selection criteria and obligations of leaders in prominent positions described.

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[21] Generally used to represent the behaviour expected of the occupant of a given position or status, characterized by certain typical actions and qualities. Role consists of the expectations of other people to what is appropriate for the occupant of a given position and the conduct of the person assigned to or elected to enter a given position (Sills, 1968)

[22] What people believe one to be based on the beliefs and expectations of the various social/community members. In this context status is evaluated by esteem, respect and prestige as granted by the society (Zelditch, 1968)

4.2   CHARACTERISTICS OF COMMUNITY LEADERS

Within each community there is a pool of leaders with various leadership skills waiting to be harnessed and developed (Uphoff, 1986: 202). Thus, when leaders are selected, the community has characters which they expect for each leadership position and it is the obligation of the leader to fulfil these expectations. These expectations change with time due to influence from the wider political, economic and social environment (Esman and Uphoff, 1984).

The Oxford dictionary (Pollard and Liebeck, 1994) defines a characteristic as "the moral nature of a person" and as "that which forms all those qualities that make a person, a group or thing all that he/she, it is and is different from others". Based on this, expected characteristics of leaders also include the moral aspect. This is defined by some as setting a good example (ZIMTRUST, 1985:19). It embodies the social, cultural and behavioral norms of the group/community. The leaders as members of the group, have a role to play as defined by the community's norms of what is expected of leaders in a particular position. In choosing leaders the community uses these norms to identify people with characteristics which enable them to take up leadership responsibility and exercise it. These individual characteristics of leaders will be considered in the following sections for previous and present leaders of Kanyurira Ward.

4.3   CHARACTERISTICS OF LEADERS IN KANYURIRA WARD

Characteristics of leaders at Ward level only will be considered based on the definition of the community along spatial lines. The working definition for community[23], in this study is within a limited territorial area which is the ward. To allow for comparison with community perceptions of leaders, focus will be on community leaders. Given that communities interact more with community leaders than district leaders, views on community leaders are more likely to be accurate than for district leaders.

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[23]Community is taken as a subgroup/ collectivity of actors sharing a limited territorial area as a base for carrying out the greatest share of their daily activities (Gould and Kolb, 1964:114) which in the context of Zimbabwe may be the ward, though for wildlife there are no territorial limits

4.3.1 Pre -independence Period

From the late 19th Century until 1980, the traditional leaders operated under the colonial government. As from 1965, a community development approach was taken by the government of the day. This approach relied on the co-operation of chiefs, headmen and kraal heads through the Native Councils Act, 1937 and the African Councils Act, 1957 (Thomas, 1995). The Tribal Trust Land Authorities Act of 1967 and the Land Tenure Act of 1969 restored the right to allocate land to traditional leaders. These laws allowed the colonial government to lower administration costs by working through traditional leaders. Hence from the 1960s until 1980, the traditional leaders had regained their credibility through the legal framework (Thomas, 1995).

Traditional leaders were seen as custodians of the land and people (Spierenburg, 1995). Their role was to maintain the community unity and well being (Pokhrel and Willet, 1996). Any decision made was for the preservation of the whole. Hence characteristics of the chiefs, headmen and kraal heads had to foster this maintenance of communal harmony. To ensure that this happened, the Shona chiefs, headmen and kraal heads had advisors who would assist them. The concept of the traditional leaders holding the land in trust not only for the living but for the dead and future generations (Gelfand, 1965; Ayittey, 1991) ensured that leaders had an inward looking perspective in their role performance. Traditional leaders were a symbol of the community's unity. Within the Shona culture which is patriarchal (Holleman, 1969) community leaders are males though there can be female spiritual leaders such as spirit mediums (Gelfand, 1965; Spierenburg, 1995).

Chief

The chief was seen as the "father" of the tribe and the owner of the land, as he held it in trust for the past, present and future members of the tribe (Spierenburg, 1995; Gelfand, 1965). Although the land legally belonged to the tribe, people referred to the land as belonging to the chief (Olivier 1969 cited in Ayittey, 1991). His role was to take care of all the natural resources, land and people. Traditionally the Shona chief was the guardian of the fundamental values of life and well being (Ayittey, 1991:118). He also acted as the religious leader of the tribe. The chief presided over the Chief's Court which was the final court of appeal, before colonization. In times of want or disasters people within the chieftaincy could go to the chief for food and protection. The expected characteristics were of a person who could fulfill these obligations and

was from one of the royal families. The chief was not only accountable to his subjects but also to the ancestors of the land. This acted as a check in preventing over domination or exploitation of the position by any leader. Currently with the erosion of the traditional leadership's authentic authority, the checks and balances have also been eroded (Strum, 1994).

Headman

The headman's position was hereditary and the headman is of the chief's lineage (Holleman, 1969:12). As the community representative, his major responsibility was to uphold the communal rights, protect the interests of the community against unlawful use of the territory by ward members or outsiders (Holleman, 1969:13). The headman also settled disputes and legal conflicts within his jurisdiction. Based on his roles the headman was expected to be wise and unbiased in his dealings. Everyone within the community could express their mind through the headman's court. In any major decisions the headman like the chief could call his subjects to "express their mind" (Ayittey, 1991). The headman could mobilize the ward for any collective action required (such as government public works and labour for the chiefs fields as a sign of allegiance) through the council of advisors from the kraal heads (see Figure 1).

Kraal heads

The kraal head is usually the most senior member of a particular extended family (clan). He owes allegiance to the headman who gave him land. The kraal heads are seen as the "owners of the people" (Kanyurira kraal heads, group discussion, 1997). They interact with the people on a daily basis. Problems which people encounter are referred to the kraal heads. In its hearings the Land Tenure Commission (1994) came across this concept of the kraal heads as being more in touch with people and are therefore more respected than the new institutions. This however can be area specific. Other case studies have also shown that kraal heads work closely with people and command more respect and allegiance (Blunt and Warren, 1996; Pokhrel and Willet, 1996). Kraal heads are central in the decision making and collective action of the community through their land allocation authority. Historically, if there was land shortage, the kraal head after deciding with household members of the clan would ask for more land from the headman or move to new territory as a clan (Holleman, 1969).

People respect and trust traditional leaders on the basis of the knowledge and authority they

have to make decisions which benefit the whole community (Blunt and Warren, 1996). Traditional leaders were also respected as their office was linked to divine power in some societies (e g the Tswana). Studies in Ghana and Nepal have shown that this community respect and deference to traditional leaders authority can act as powerful vehicles for development if captured early and included in project initiation and the following phases of the project (Blunt and Warren, 1996; Pokhrel and Willet, 1996).

4.3.2 Post Independence Period

4.3.2.1   The New Political Order

Independence in Zimbabwe in 1980 ushered in a new political order with the major objective of creating a "democratic, egalitarian and socialist society" (Government of Zimbabwe, 1982). To achieve this objective, a policy of decentralization so as to increase local communities' involvement in planning and development was pursued (Thomas, 1995). To what extent this policy was implemented is subject to debate. The Prime Minister's Directive of 1984 outlined the institutional framework for development in Zimbabwe. New institutional structures (see Figure 2) based on the grassroots bottom-up rationale were introduced to promote community participation. The introduction of these new political leadership institutions in Zimbabwe from national to village level (DDCO, WARDCO, VIDCO) soon after independence greatly eroded the authentic power and authority of the traditional leaders (Thomas, 1995; Hasler, 1995; Government of Zimbabwe, 1994). A similar situation arose in Nepal with the erosion of the indigenous *Panchayat* (Pohkrel and Willet, 1996). Traditional leadership was inward looking (towards the community) and been dedicated to the fostering of social, economic, cultural and spiritual well being and harmony of the community (Pokhrel and Willet, 1996). The new leadership was required to be outward looking while fostering the social and economic well being of the community.

4.3.2.2   Roles and functions of the modern-political leadership Institutions in rural development

The new institutional structures (DDCOs, WARDCOs, VIDCOs) were based on political affiliation and acted as local government administrative structures. Their apparent role was to foster community participation, and to enforce the strength of the new government through politically controlled development. Given the historical absence of local administrative

structures outside urban centres, there was no immediate universal understanding and participation from people (Thomas, 1995).

As Thomas (1995) observed the new structures are without community acceptance, they are "ineffective messengers in a largely top-down process imposed upon rural communities" and with little or no resources to enable them to function. This is more so for the VIDCOs whose functions are not clear to those in leadership and to those who elected them (Thomas, 1995). In practice, VIDCOs have no *modus operandi* which allows them to have regular elections or other characteristics of democratic governance (Land Tenure Commission Report, 1994). The new institutional structures did not have a resource base and were therefore dependent on local government for them to function. Thus the role of central government became more dominant at community level, local leadership became outward looking and more political. This resulted in the erosion of leaders' commitment to the community's well being.

4.3.2.3 Challenges to the Modern-political leadership

The new leadership structure has failed to involve communities in collective action effectively. It does not play a central role in decision making at community level since people in communal areas still refer problems to the traditional leaders (Land Tenure Commission Report, 1994). Hence the new leadership does not have the status to facilitate community involvement. This has been worsened by the general political apathy within the country. There are no incentives to the community associated with these local institutions (WARDCOs, VIDCOs). Incentives are an important variable in reflecting the degree of control which the leadership of an organization can have on the membership (Esman and Uphoff, 1984) as they can be used as sanctions and rewards. In this regard, the influence and centrality of WARDCO and VIDCO leadership in collective decision making and action within communities are minimal.

Traditional leadership is recognized as the authentic local authority over natural resources and land, although the political leadership exercises greater control over the administrative and development activities in rural areas (Land Tenure Commission Report, 1994). In this regard, government policies played a major role in undermining the power and autonomy of both traditional and new leadership institutions (Little, 1994) by eroding traditional authority while failing to provide an enabling environment for the new institutional structures to be effective

(through training, mode of operation and clear definition of roles and responsibilities within the overall institutional structure).

There is no clear demarcation between the political and administrative roles and functions within the post independence institutional structures. Due to this reason, the existing development structures are subordinated and overridden by the more powerful political and traditional organizations (Land Tenure Commission Report, 1994). The development structures for community involvement in these cases therefore remain ineffective, weak and are ignored.

The WARDCOs and VIDCOs are political structures and vehicles of the local government administration. Leaders within these local organizations serve a dual purpose of acting as community representatives to local government and fostering government and political interests at community level. This is a difficult position for community leaders as shown by an incident recorded in Box 1 below.

Box 1: The dilemma faced by modern-political community leaders in Kanyurira

The ward councillor asked a question to the RDC official, "We want to know what the council's position is concerning the tractor that the ward bought" and the Council official answered, "Who is council, Mr. Chenjerai? You want to dissociate yourself from the council when amongst the people? Anyway to answer your question.."

(Kanyurira Ward General Meeting, 12 September 1997).

4.3.2.4   Post Independence Leadership characteristics in Kanyurira Ward

For a person to be elected into leadership within the WARDCO and VIDCO in line with the Rural District Councils Act, 1988 (part v), one had to be enrolled on the voter's role of the ward and be ordinarily resident in the council. Age and education were not a consideration. Specifically for the study area, the prominent positions are the WARDCO chairperson (who is the Ward Councillor), the WARDCO secretary and the VIDCO chairpersons. There are three VIDCOs within Kanyurira Ward (see Map 2). Table 3 shows the individual characteristics of the leaders who have occupied these positions since 1980. Community perceptions of educational status and age were used to analyze the characteristics of leaders as shown in Table 1 and 2 respectively. This was done so as to allow comparison with community perceptions of

characteristics of leaders in section 4.4

Table 1: Perceptions of the Kanyurira Community (n=41) concerning educational levels

Educational Level	Characteristic	Category
Illiterate	Uneducated	1
Grade 1-2 (long back)	Uneducated	2
Grade 3-4 current	Uneducated	3
Grade 5-7 current	Educated	4
Form 2-4	Very well educated	5

Table 2: Perceptions of the Kanyurira Community concerning age

Age Grade	Characteristics
Young People *(vadiki)*	18-30 years, can be single or married
Mature people *(vakuru)*	Greater than 30 years, married with two or more children, one who experienced pre-CAMPFIRE problems with wildlife, one who experienced the liberation struggle for Zimbabwe
Old people *(chembere)*	Fifty years and above

These characteristics and age grades in Table 2 were obtained by asking key informants within the ward and confirm the age categories which Cutshall (1989) identified in a socio-economic survey of the Kanyurira community.

Table 3: Characteristics of Individual leaders in Kanyurira WARDCOs and VIDCOs :1980-1997

Position	Family Name	Age	Education	Year	Constituency
Ward Councillor	Chaukura	Old	Uneducated (2)	1987	Kanyurira Ward
Ward Councillor	Chenjerai	Old	Uneducated (2)	1988-1997	Kanyurira Ward
WADCO secretary	Kanjengo	Mature	Uneducated (2)	1988-1997	Kanyurira Ward
VIDCO chairperson	Fakero	Young	Uneducated (3)	1990-1997	Chamapango Village
VIDCO chairperson	Mapfundematsva	Old	Uneducated (1)	1990-1997	Kanungwe Village
VIDCO chairperson	Gunyungu	Young	Educated (4)	1997	Mkanga Village

Table 3 shows that six people have been in the VIDCO and WARDCO leadership. Of these, three were old, one mature and two young people. Only one person within these leadership institutions was educated. Little change has occurred in the composition of the structures due to their minimal functioning in the ward. From Table 3 age seems to have been an important characteristic with all but 2 of the prominent positions occupied by old or mature people. Within the traditional leadership, leaders occupy their positions for life (Holleman, 1969; Pokhrel and Willet, 1996; Gelfand, 1965). This is a trend which might be difficult for communities to abandon as shown in Table 3 that some people have been in the leadership position for over a decade, although there is evidence that in two of the three villages young people have been elected.

Other characteristics which are universally expected of leaders are accountability to their constituency (Uphoff, 1986) and authority, which is sanctioned by the community (Pokhrel and Willet, 1996). This seems to be lacking for the WARDCOS and VIDCOS in Kanyurira Ward. Characteristics are determined by the community which makes up the followers. Within the Zimbabwean context age is a consideration since the Shona culture has a rank of lineage which is respected (Holleman, 1969). In the Latin culture it is assumed that leaders have to be very

dominant and decisive, but other studies (Womack, 1968 in Uphoff, 1986) show that *machismo* was not as significant as steadfastness and loyalty in gaining support from the followers (Uphoff, 1986). In the Korean Saemaul Undong a modern political structure, education, income and social status were not considered. Anyone over 20 years, could be leader (Uphoff, 1986).

4.4   LEADERSHIP AND CAMPFIRE

4.4.1   Structure of leadership Institutions in CAMPFIRE

New leadership structures which were introduced at the inception of CAMPFIRE are the Ward Wildlife Committee (WWC) and Village Wildlife Committees. These structures were established in line with the CAMPFIRE objective of,

> *"Providing the appropriate institutions, under which resources can be legitimately managed and exploited by the resident communities for their own direct benefit"*,
>
> (Martin, 1986: iv).

To achieve this objective an administrative structure would be set up in which communities would form Natural Resource Co-operatives on a voluntary basis. These Natural Resource Co-operatives became the Ward Wildlife Committees. Their responsibility is to manage natural resources and financial benefits from natural resource utilization within the ward. In line with this WWC should consist of VIDCO chairpersons and secretaries with the Ward councillor as the chairperson or as an ex-officio member.

CAMPFIRE institutional structures at community level are both political and economic in character. In areas where the local government administrative structures are weak and inefficient or due to conflict (Thomas, 1995), the WWC operates more as an economic unit, than a political institution. Due to their economic component, the CAMPFIRE community institutions have gained rapid recognition from the community, though this may not necessarily imply legitimacy or acceptance. By incorporating the cultural and spiritual values of the communities through inclusion of the traditional leaders in their decision making and planning process, these new institutions are gaining community acceptance more than the WARDCOs (Hasler, 1995; Thomas, 1995).

4.4.1.1   Characteristics and roles of leadership in Kanyurira

Within CAMPFIRE, the Ward Wildlife Committee has positions which are considered more powerful than others. These are the chairperson and vice, treasurer, secretary and councillor[24]. With the involvement of traditional leaders in the planning and decision making process in CAMPFIRE, the headman has become an important figure within the WWC as well. The role of the headman in Kanyurira ward is enhanced as he is seen as the local initiator of CAMPFIRE. The headman commands more respect than other leadership in rallying community support and action. Box 2 below illustrates this.

Box 2 : Traditional leaders as community mobilizers: the case of Headman Kanyurira

The Kanyurira clinic was nearing completion, but wildlife funds to pay casual labourers had run out. Work remaining was to clear the debris and rubble. The RDC sent a message that the clinic should be completed so that it can be opened. The councillor and the WWC tried to rally people to volunteer for work to no avail. When the headman came, he went around the ward with his messenger rallying people through rebukes. The next day people turned up to complete the work with the headman supervising them.

Pers. Observations, 1995/96

For characteristics of leaders in CAMPFIRE, all positions will be considered with reference to the study area. The individual characteristics are outlined in Table 4a, with reference to the educational levels and age in Tables (1) and (2) respectively.

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[24] For the study area specifically. CAMPFIRE documents stress the importance of the secretary as he/she runs the day to day business and supervision of community NRM workers (ZIMTRUST, 1985:5)

Table 4a: Characteristics of leaders in CAMPFIRE in Kanyurira Ward: 1989-1997

Position	Family Name[25]	Years in Office	Age	Education	Reasons for leaving office
WWC chairperson	A	1990-1992	Old	Uneducated (2)	Community dissatisfaction
	B	1992-1995	Young	Very educated (5)	Resigned for a more permanent job
	C	1995-1997	Young	Very educated (5)	Allegations of financial mismanagement
	D	1997	Old	Uneducated (1)	Still in office
Vice Chair person	E	1990-1992	Old	Uneducated (2)	Community dissatisfaction
	F	1995-1997	Young	Educated (4)	Allegations of financial mismanagement
	A	1997	Old	Uneducated (2)	Still in office
Treasurer	G	1990-1992	Mature	Uneducated (3)	Community dissatisfaction
	H	1992-1995	Young	Very educated (5)	Ill health
	I	1995-1997	Young	Very educated (5)	Allegations of financial mismanagement
	J	1997	Young	Very educated (5)	Current
Secretary	K	1990-1992	Mature	Uneducated (2)	Community dissatisfaction
	C	1992-1995	Young	Very educated (5)	Elected chairperson
	L	1995-1997	Young	Educated (4)	Allegations of financial mismanagement
	M	1997	Young	Educated (4)	Still in office

---

[25] Letters of the alphabet used instead of actual family names to preserve anonymity of the respondents

Table 4a: Continued

Position	Family Name	Years in Office	Age	Education	Reasons for leaving office
Vice Secretary	L	1992-1995	Young	Educated (4)	Elected secretary
	N	1995-1997	Young	Very educated (5)	Allegations of financial mismanagement
	O	1997	Young	Very educated (5)	Still in office
Committee Members	P	1990-1992	Mature	Uneducated (1)	Community dissatisfaction
	Q	1990-1992	Old	Uneducated (1)	Community dissatisfaction
	R	1992-1997	Mature	Uneducated (2)	Allegations of financial mismanagement
	S (Doma ethnic group)	1992	Young	Uneducated (1)	Chosen as the community's RDC game guard
	T	1995-1997	Mature	Uneducated (2)	Allegations of financial mismanagement
	U	1997	Young	Educated (4)	Still in office
	V (Doma ethnic group)	1997	Young	Uneducated (1)	Still in office

4.4.1.2   Summary of characteristics of leaders in CAMPFIRE in Kanyurira Ward

The breakdown of all the people who have been in the leadership positions is shown in Table 4b. From Table 4b, the majority people who have been in CAMPFIRE leadership are young (14), of Korekore origin (20) and 12 are uneducated compared to eight who are very educated. To see the trend of changes in the characteristics of leaders in CAMPFIRE, a summary of the composition of the Ward Wildlife Committees since 1990 is shown in Table 5.

Table 4b: Summary of characteristics of CAMPFIRE leaders in Kanyurira

Category	Number
Young	14
Mature	5
Old	5
Educated	5
very educated	8
uneducated	12
Ethnicity	
Korekore	20
Doma	2
Newcomers/vauyi	0

Table 5: Changes in Leadership Composition 1990-1997 within CAMPFIRE in Kanyurira

Characteristic	1990-1992	1992-1995	1995-1997	1997
Young	0	4	6	5
Mature	3	2	2	0
Old	3	0	0	2
Very educated	0	2	4	2
Educated	0	1	2	2
Uneducated	6	2	2	3
Other ethnic group	1	0	0	1

The total number of people who have been in leadership in CAMPFIRE since 1990 are 22, with 4 people occupying office for two or more terms. From Table 5, it is evident that, there has been an increase in the number of people who are educated (educated and very educated) from 1992, with 1995-1997 having the highest number of leaders who were educated (educated=6) and young (young=6). Two of the uneducated in 1995-1997 are the same who are mature. The 1995-1997 WWC leadership was removed from office due to allegations of misappropriation of community funds of approximately Z\$228 000 (Mashonaland Guardian Telegraph, 1997). Community perceptions attribute this to the high number of young and educated people within the concerned WWC, and lack of community feedback (Pers. Observations, 1997). The 1997 CAMPFIRE leadership consists of five young and two old leaders who according to the view of some community members (informal conversations, 1997), will act as a balance and check within the leadership. Ethnic composition did not change with only two people from the Doma ethnic group occupying leadership positions since 1990. These changes in leadership composition raise the issue of monitoring leaders and how this influences characteristics of leaders expected by the community and external agencies involved with the community.

4.4.1.3   Role Performance of Leaders in CAMPFIRE

Leaders in NRM at community level (WWC, VWC) are expected by the higher level leadership (Rural District Council, DWC, DNP&WLM, NRB, DA, etc.), (see Fig. 3) to manage and lead community development activities. Each of the higher tier leadership has its own expectation of the local leadership based on their organization's goals and objectives in rural development and CAMPFIRE.

The organizations with a conservation objective such as the NRB and DNP&WLM, expect the role of the WWC to be that of monitoring community utilization of natural resources and to ensure sustainable management of these resources. For the DNP&WLM, this involves anti-poaching patrols and problem animal reporting activities as part of wildlife management. In line with this management the department expects the WWC to act as the financial monitor of the community ensuring equitable decision making and distribution of the revenues from wildlife utilization (MET, 1992).

The NRB expects the role of the WWC to be that of monitoring and teaching people on the use of all other natural resources (including trees, water, grass, soil etc.). Hence the NRB expects the WWC to ensure that there are no wild fires, rampant cutting of trees including transportation from the ward, illegal harvesting of wild fruits for commercial purposes, no stream bank cultivation and water poisoning. This is in line with the NRB conservation mandate. At the same time it is indirectly the mandate of the WWC since they are legitimized by the Ministry of Environment and Tourism through the Natural Resources Act 1941 and the amended District Councils Act (1980) which encompasses all natural resources including wildlife. The initial CAMPFIRE document (Martin, 1986) also stated that the Natural Resource Co-operatives would manage all natural resources.

The DA and Rural District Council executives as local (district) representatives of the Ministry of Local Government, Rural and Urban Development (MLGRUD), expect the WWC to lead the community in allocation of wildlife revenue towards improved social services such as,

> *"schools, clinics, infrastructural projects like water, grinding mills etc, or by paying cash dividends when it is felt extremely necessary. Councils (RDC) must assist the producer communities in identifying projects that address their felt need so that this source of new wealth is not put to waste"*, (Government of Zimbabwe, undated, quoted in Thomas, 1995).

Hence RDCs ensure that their role in relation to the community and its leadership fosters the fulfilment of the stated objective. Thus WWC leadership is expected to ensure that the community makes decisions for infrastructural development projects.

Yet the community's expectations of the role of the WWC as leaders in CAMPFIRE is to

address and attend to community needs as they arise since the money is available. As one of the interviewees in Kanyurira ward stated, "We want to start income generating projects such as gardening, because CAMPFIRE will not always be here. Wildlife will run out eventually" (Saraoga Mbisvi, Pers. Comm., 1997)[26]. This statement is supported by Crane (1991), in a study of Kanyurira, in which he states that people in the ward see CAMPFIRE as a way of enhancing their agricultural production through tractors, since agriculture is perceived as having a longer term potential. This shows that people's attitude to a natural resource and how its managed is determined by their perception on the security of tenure (property rights). Hence the expected role of the community leaders is determined by the property rights. To the Kanyurira community CAMPFIRE is not about empowering the individual, institutional capacity building or conserving natural resources, but a new hope for developing the area (Crane, 1991). People know that they do not own wildlife and as such they cannot rely on it for long term income. Rather, they see CAMPFIRE as a means to an end. This is reflected in what they expect from the leaders.

The leaders themselves have a role which they perceive themselves as playing and this shapes the functioning of the WWC as an institution. All these expectations determine whether leaders will be seen as fulfilling their role performance or not as well as the support offered to the leaders to fulfil this role.

4.4.1.4 Centrality of leadership in collective Action in Kanyurira

Within the natural resource management context for the ward, the headman, councillor and the WWC as leadership have a central influence in the decision making within the community. Their centrality is at two levels namely, (a) the authority to initiate action for the community and (b) influence on the decisions made by the community.

For (a), initiation for collective action is through the collective decision making which is the community assembly (general meeting) where people then decide once the proposals have been put to them. For (b) influence on community decisions is based on the status which the community grants to these leadership positions (see section 4.1). Status differentiation within the group is correlated to the participation role through evaluation of performance by members. If the community sees a leader as being good, they give that leader more opportunities to contribute to the discussion before a consensus is reached. Their contribution is favorably evaluated due to their status (Zelditch, 1968). In this regard they are likely to influence others in collective decision making.

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[26]Saraoga Mbisvi, Kanyurira villager, Kanyurira Ward, Zimbabwe.

Kraal heads and VIDCO chairpersons rarely call meetings within the ward, since the Kanyurira community is small enough in terms of population and geographical boundaries for everyone to be able to attend ward general meetings. The WWC's centrality and influence in decision making can be attributed to the monetary benefits associated with the institution. For the councillor, the central role within the community is based on his representation of the community at RDC and on the authority conferred to him as a representative of local government. The headman's centrality in decision making is based on his status as the traditional authority who is seen as the owner of the land (see Appendix 5). Conflict between personalities can arise if the leaders have the same status and play an equally central role. This is the case in Kanyurira between the headman and the councillor as shown in Appendix 5.

4.4.1.5 Changes in characteristics of leaders

The change in characteristics of leaders in CAMPFIRE from uneducated and old, to young, mature and educated could have been a reaction to the changes in the expectations of the external environment. This includes NGOs and government agencies working with the community. According to Mr Zisani (Pers. Comm., 1997)[27], the council policy in leadership selection is to advise the community to elect leaders who can be easily trained (in financial accounting and bookkeeping) and who can read and write even in the vernacular language. This is to enable the leaders to take down notes in council meetings and workshops and there after give correct feedback to the community. Part of the role of the CAMPFIRE leadership is to educate or inform community members about CAMPFIRE through feedback from District Wildlife Committee meetings (ZIMTRUST, 1985). This view of the RDC could have influenced the change in leadership composition. Crane (1991:64) also captured the emphasis on formal education from RDC officials in an interview with Mr Gwatura (Chief Executive Officer, 1991), who stated that, "you can't teach conservation awareness to a person that is not educated". Leaders need political, organizational and technical skills to be effective (locally and outside). These skills are usually underdeveloped for historically isolated communities such as Kanyurira due to low levels of education and inexperience in dealing with formal institutions.

From the Kanyurira community's perceptions this change came as a result of an influx of young and educated members of the community who had been away at the inception of the programme and from a realization that the old and uneducated were failing to keep financial records.

A change in the characteristics of leaders which was observed during the field research was that leaders had become more assertive and outspoken in dealing with the RDC. This was in comparison to a survey carried out by Crane (1991) in the ward in which 55.8 percent of those

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[27]Mr B Zisani, Guruve Rural District Council Acting Chief Executive Officer, Guruve, Zimbabwe.

interviewed stated that the community could not change council decisions. The Headman's response was, "we don't have any powers, if we refuse we will be arrested" and that the council would refuse future developments in the ward (Crane, 1991: 36; 42). Considering the history of the conflictive relationship between the ward and government departments over wildlife poaching and where to settle, the headman's sentiments are understandable.

Six years later, the situation has changed, as shown by the prevailing situation in the ward. People settled outside the electric game fence without informing the RDC. When the DA and other council officials queried with the media also highlighting what was going on in Masoka, the headman with assistance from the ex-WWC members, reacted by calling a Ward meeting to which several NGOs and government departments were invited (see Appendix 6). The aim of the meeting was for the headman to clear his name and for whoever had been spreading rumours about the Ward to rectify their mistakes. In a related incident, facilitators from ZIMTRUST and the RDC came to assist the Ward in quota setting (this is an annual event). The headman asked them to leave and "set quota in Guruve" as wildlife does not belong to the community but the RDC (T. Dzomba, Pers. Comm., 1997)[28]. This incident shows that community leadership in Kanyurira is becoming more outspoken and confident in dealing with external challenges.

Generally the RDC policy is to encourage infrastructural development and not income generating projects. On all major community projects (including purchase of capital assets), the RDC has to be informed and give its approval. The 1992-1995 WWC committee purchased a tractor, the 1995-1997 leadership purchased a grinding mill, a video, generator and a second hand tractor without informing the council. Their argument was that it is their money and CAMPFIRE principles state that they should use it as the community sees fit. These developments show a change in the ward leadership relationship with the RDC. This is an offshoot of the CAMPFIRE concept of empowering local communities. Martin (1994) sees this as the creation of a new and dynamic system where rural communities are empowered to demand accountability and challenge the status quo. The bureaucratic which is being challenged does not however take this easily as it means further devolution of control not only over natural resources but over financial resources which they perceive as bringing in much needed income.

4.4.2 Conclusion

Introduction of new modern-political institutions within the communal areas, has resulted in changes within the existing traditional leadership. By comparison, the local status of the

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[28]T. Dzomba, Community Based Facilitator (CBF), Kanyurira ward, Zimbabwe

traditional leadership has been enhanced, though their official status has diminished. The CAMPFIRE related leadership (WWC, VWC) has to a greater extent gained authenticity at community level, due to the economic incentives associated with the leadership. Changes in the characteristics of leaders within the CAMPFIRE leadership institutions have emerged as a reaction by the community to adjust to the demands placed on leaders by the external economic and political environment.

From the above sections characteristics of leaders as they exist within the study area have been outlined. The next section considers the community's perceptions of characteristics of leaders through their selection criteria for leaders and the monitoring through evaluation of those in the CAMPFIRE leadership. This approach is based on the premise that leadership is not an individual capability, but consists of the leaders and followers (Uphoff, 1986). What the followers perceive as being leadership qualities has a bearing on the support and adherence they give to the leadership in question.

4.5 COMMUNITY PERCEPTIONS ON CHARACTERISTICS OF LEADERS
4.5.1 Introduction

Social perception is defined as "the effects of the observer's needs and expectations on his/her judgement of the physical variables" (Sills, 1968). Perceptions depend on the nature of the observer, which is influenced by social and cultural norms. In this regard the community is the observer and the leaders are the observed. Based on this premise, the community affects the structure and functioning of community leadership institutions through their perceptions of what characteristics a leader should have. These perceptions are shown in the selection of leaders in which communities participate.

Participation is affected by factors such as the heterogeneity of the community, social norms and bureaucratic capacity (Esman and Uphoff, 1984). Though project planners are advised to organize participation details of who participates, how and to what extend in the project design, execution and monitoring (Cernea, 1985: 357), the community has a greater say on who participates, how and to what extend through their impact on leadership selection, monitoring, evaluation and legitimacy and collective decision making in the election of leaders. In the new democratic modern-political local leadership institutions communities can play a greater role in determining the caliber of people in leadership as well as how they will perform. Historically communities had a say in who was to govern them from the royal family as they could refuse a leader if he failed to meet the community's expectations of the role performance of a leader (Ayittey, 1991).

Leaders in CAMPFIRE are subject to great scrutiny and suspicion since they deal with community finances. Historically, traditional leaders did not handle the public finances, but they usually had a treasurer, who was monitored by a council of elders (Ayittey, 1991). By granting the leadership rewards through sitting allowances the authenticity of the leaders' commitment to the community's well being has been undermined. Hence communities do not see them as having their welfare at heart but being interested in the rewards. Thus, their perceptions on characteristics of leaders tend to focus more on the monetary issues than anything else as the following sections will show.

4.5.2 Analysis of Selection Criteria Apparent in Kanyurira

The Kanyurira community has been electing leaders in the post independence and CAMPFIRE periods. Leaders are selected by individuals using some certain criterion which was captured by asking the community members, what they consider when choosing leaders within CAMPFIRE. This question focused on the WWC since the WARDCO, VIDCO and VWC are not truly functional within the ward as they are overshadowed by the WWC. Table 6, below shows the responses.

Table 6: Current Leadership Selection Criteria of the Kanyurira Community

Characteristic	Number of responses	%
Individual Behaviour	32	28
Educational Status	29	26
Age	19	17
Campfire Project Member	13	12
Past history	9	8
Intelligence	8	7
Knowledge about CAMPFIRE	1	1
Ability to listen to people and give feedback	1	<1
Kinship ties	1	<1
Total	113	101

Sample size =41, with multiple responses

4.5.2.1 Individual Behaviour

From Table 6, the characteristic which the community perceives as being the most important is individual behaviour with 32 of those interviewed mentioning it. This is moral behaviour or conduct as seen by what constitutes behaviour to the community as shown in Table 7. Table 7 is an aggregation of the responses given by respondents relating to moral behaviour. Shona

culture believes that a person's behaviour gives a good idea of his make up and character, hence the high consideration given to individual behaviour in leadership selection (Gelfand, 1965).

Table 7: Kanyurira Community Perceptions of what constitutes Behaviour

One's way of thinking and talking
Someone who is slow to get angry
Someone who can be corrected
One's behaviour after drinking
Someone who listens to people
A good person
One's relations with others

Table 7 shows that for the community, the qualities which are expected of modern political leaders are closely parallel with characteristics expected in traditional leaders (see section 4.3.1). In this regard the community is still concerned with the preservation of unity and harmony.

The Kanyurira community has an existing pool of people who have a record of good behaviour and leadership. As one villager Mr. P Rukure stated, "We want someone we know their behaviour as a leader". The Kanyurira Ward Wildlife Constitution under Membership (see Appendix 4), states that if one was born in the ward and left to work in another area, on their return to Kanyurira they have to spend five years within the ward before being admitted into CAMPFIRE. This gives people time to study their behaviour. The importance of an individual's conduct or behaviour is important within the Shona culture. Qualities which are important and highly valued include honesty, kindness, love and consideration towards others (Gelfand, 1965). Character traits which are disapproved of culturally include telling lies and rumours, jealousy, greediness and inconsiderateness, hatred and spreading scandals (Gelfand, 1965). Based on their cultural norms /human nature the Kanyurira community has incorporated these characteristic traits in selecting leaders.

Other factors which are related to the individual behaviour involve one's past history mentioned by 9 of the respondents, intelligence which is defined as "knowledge about life" and not "book knowledge", knowledge about CAMPFIRE which is related to one's participation and contributions during Ward meetings as stated in the ward constitutional by-laws.

4.5.2.2 Ethnicity

In Kanyurira the Ward Wildlife Constitution under the Membership clause excludes people along ethnic lines. Of those interviewed 13 people (Table 6) mentioned that being a

CAMPFIRE member is one characteristic of leaders, since respondents did not mention ethnicity *per se* as a consideration. The community criteria for CAMPFIRE membership is shown in Appendix 7. Thus anyone settling in the Ward from other districts does not get financial benefits (i.e household cash dividends) from CAMPFIRE and cannot be elected into leadership positions.

Within CAMPFIRE, studies by Madzudzo and Dzingirai (1995) in Binga District show that the programme has created a potential for tension and conflict over resource use along ethnic lines. In Binga only the Tonga people who are taken to be the local people are involved in CAMPFIRE (decision making, management and benefits). Other ethnic groups in the area (Ndebele and Shona) are excluded as they are taken to be newcomers. These new comers own cattle and are more prosperous than the Tonga. Though CAMPFIRE aims at community participation, in some cases "participation" is defined along ethnic lines. Other ethnic groups (immigrants) in Kanyurira ward such as the Karanga and Malawians are not selected into leadership, do not get household cash dividends as benefits and are not allowed to participate in NRM through election of leaders or discussions at general meetings.

4.5.2.3   Kinship

Harris (1982) quoted in Mosse (1995: 147) defines a community as " the unity of a group of kinsmen who together constituted a locally dominant caste". This definition is within the Asian context but can be applied equally to the Kanyurira case study. Only one of the respondents mentioned kinship ties as one characteristic which is considered when selecting leaders. This is surprising given the unwritten[29] by-law of the Ward Wildlife constitution which stipulates that there should not be two people of the same family within the same CAMPFIRE leadership institution (committee). During field studies it was observed that this unwritten law is mentioned when people carry out elections for the WWC and CAMPFIRE related development committees. Thus, kinship is considered in leadership selection. Kinship is also seen as an appropriation unit hence the limitation on the number of people from the same family in any committee. The small percentage obtained could be attributed to the fact that selecting only one member per family within each committee was perceived by the respondents not to be of significance.

In trying to validate the findings in Table 6, respondents were asked for the families which they

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[29]During Ward general meetings when arguments arise, to give authenticity to one's arguments people say its in the Constitution though its not written in the constitution. It was observed during the period 1995-96 that there are several such unwritten by-laws which have become accepted as part of the constitution. This shows the need for continual updating of the governing rules, which the community cannot do without input from the RDC officials

considered to be prominent in leadership positions and families with large populations. Six families emerged from the survey. The number of households in the Ward belonging to each of these six families was expressed as a percentage of the total households in the ward (see Table 8a). The number and percentage of respondents mentioning each family as having the greatest number of people are shown in Table 8b. Families which respondents mentioned as being prominent in leadership positions within the ward are shown in Table 9.

Table 8a: Large families in Kanyurira

Family Name	Number of Households	% of total (150) H.H. in ward
Dzomba	20	13
Chaukura	18	12
Chenjerai (Kofi)	11	7
Chisunga	11	7
Fakero	9	6
Zengeretsi	8	5
Other families	73	49
TOTAL	150	100

Table 8b: Large families in Kanyurira Ward as perceived by the community

Family Name	Number of responses	%
Dzomba	35	28
Chaukura	28	22
Chisunga	21	17
Chenjerai	20	16
Fakero	14	11
Zengeretsi	8	6
Total	126	100

Sample size =41, with multiple responses

From tables 8a, the Dzomba family has the highest number of people followed by the Chaukura and Chenjerai as third. This differs from the community perceptions slightly in that the Chisunga are considered to have more people than the Chenjerai family. The reason could be that the Chisunga family is more prominent and therefore easily mentioned by the respondents.

Table 9: Perceptions of which families are prominent in leadership positions in Kanyurira

Family Name	Number of responses	%
Chisunga	24	>24
Dzomba	23	>23
Chenjerai	20	>20
Chaukura	18	>18
Fakero	8	8
Zengeretsi	6	6
Total	99	99

Sample size =41, with multiple responses

The Chisunga family is perceived as being most prominent in leadership positions within the ward as mentioned by 24 of the respondents. The reason could be attributed to the fact that Chisunga family of the chieftaincy and people perceive a leader as someone like a chief hence the perceived prominence of the chief's family by the respondents. The Dzomba family is second followed by Chenjerai.

The reason given for the prominence in leadership of the families in Table 9 was that the families are large and have a high probability of being chosen due to the democratic collective decision making process. These families have been in the area a for long time and are inter-related. They therefore get support from the extended family members and are elected into leadership positions. Before a leadership selection general meeting people campaign and select possible candidates by kinship. The incident recorded in Box 3 shows this kinship selection and support for leaders.

Box 3: Influence of kinship on leadership selection

During the elections for a new Ward Wildlife Committee (WWC) held on 23 July 1997 in Kanyurira, people were asked to stand behind the person of their choice. One member of the Dzomba family cried out, "*Kuseri kwababa*" meaning, "Go behind the father" as a way of rallying members of the Dzomba family to support the Dzomba candidate. The Dzomba family member got the highest votes.

T. Dzomba, Pers. Comm., 1997)

Though only one person mentioned kinship as impacting on the characteristics of leaders, the above incident shows that there is influence on the leadership institutions structure and functioning. One reason for failing to capture this in the survey interviews could be that kinship

is part of the cultural norm of the community such that it is not consciously considered when selecting leaders.

4.5.2.4. Educational level

New NRM programmes with monetary benefits to the community require accountability, democratic decision making and collective action on the part of leaders. This places new demands on leaders which may challenge existing leadership styles within the community (Mosse, 1995). The challenge is for both the leaders and the community which has to select people with characteristics to meet these demands on leaders. Changes in the composition of leadership (see Table 5) within the study area is one indication of trying to meet these challenges.

Within the Kanyurira community education (see Table 1 for educational level) is considered as an important criterion in selecting leaders and was mentioned by 25 percent of the interviewees (see Table 7). From field observations there are positions within the WWC for which a specific educational level is required. The secretary and treasurer should be able to read and write in both Shona (the vernacular language) and English and be conversant with numbers. From 1992 to 1997 WWC treasurers have been people within the "very well educated (5) category and the secretaries have been within the educated (4) and very educated categories (see Table 1 and Table 2). The selection of the 1995-1997 and 1997 treasurers as recorded in boxes 4 and 5 show how the community considers educational levels.

Box 4: **Kanyurira community consideration of educational levels in selecting leaders**

1995-1997 Treasurer: The treasurer was first elected by the community as the chairperson of the WWC. However the Headman with support from the WWC asked the new chairperson to take up the office of the treasurer since he had done accounts and bookkeeping at secondary school level. (Field observations, 1995/96)

Box 5: **Selection of a ward wildlife committee treasurer: the case of Kanyurira 1997**

1997 Treasurer: Before the general meeting people were discussing who should take which position within the WWC. During the elections when I was nominated some people said I did not qualify since there already was one member of my family (Dzomba) in the WWC. The community however decided to overlook this by-law on the basis that I had done accounts and bookkeeping and was a Christian[30]. Hence I was selected as the treasurer.

Tapera Dzomba, 1997: WWC Treasurer in Kanyurira Ward

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[30]Being a Christian to the community is considered to embody the good moral behaviour which is highly considered (see Table 7) as a criterion for leadership selection.

4.5.2.5   Age

People in leadership are expected to have authority and acceptance from the community. In most communities, one's age is associated with the level of responsibility. There is a belief that the older one is the more responsible and wiser they become. Ayittey (1991), shows that in the indigenous Nigerian social systems, the older males were the ones tasked with the governance, legislation and adjudication with the oldest or most senior males playing an advisory function, while younger people had no community leadership responsibilities. Age as a characteristic of leaders is related to responsible behaviour.

The Kanyurira community considers age as an important criterion for leaders. From the survey, 19 of those interviewed mentioned that age was a consideration (see Table 6). Only one person did not consider age. From the composition of leaders (see Table 4b) in CAMPFIRE only five old people have been in leadership compared with 15 young and 7 mature people since 1990..The first WWC did not have any young person. Changes came later with the realization that there was need for educated leaders and the younger people who could read and write. Older people are however taken as being more responsible and wise. As a result old and mature people are chosen as a check and balance on the younger people who are not as responsible as evidenced by the composition of the 1997 WWC members. The reason for having two old people within the committee was that they would curb the young ones (T. Dzomba, Pers. Comm., 1997).

4.5.3   Legitimacy

The legitimacy of democratically elected leaders should come from their constituency (Thomas, 1995). Leadership institutions can be formal or informal. Formal leadership institutions get their authority and demarcation of their roles from a recognition by government through a statutory instrument. Informal leadership institutions are those whose authority is not recognized by any statutory instrument and their role is defined by the demands of the people they serve. The legitimacy of any effective leadership institution has to be recognized and accepted by both the state and the community being led (Thomas, 1995).

Any new leadership has to achieve community acceptance or legitimacy for it to attain its set objectives. Failure to get community legitimacy can result in the leadership institution becoming irrelevant. Community legitimacy comes when people understand the function of the leadership institution (Thomas, 1995), perceive it as being effective (fulfilling the role performance expected of leaders) and of benefit to the community.

New leadership institutions introduced through external initiative may fail to gain community legitimacy. If the new institution is perceived as challenging existing local institutions and

leadership, it could be marginalized by lack of support (Mosse, 1995). The institution becomes confined to a minority (which may be those in leadership only) and dependence on external support increases.

For leadership in CAMPFIRE (WWC, VWC), their external legitimacy is formal through the amended Parks and Wildlife Act 1975 in 1982 and the Rural District Councils Act 1988. However the communities which elected them have their own perceptions on the legitimacy of these leadership institutions. Table 10 shows the perceptions of the Kanyurira community on what entitles legitimacy and how new leadership institutions gain acceptance within the Ward.

Table 10: What the Kanyurira Community perceives as giving the CAMPFIRE leadership legitimacy within the Ward

Reason	No. of responses	%
Perceived effectiveness in work performance	17	39
Frequency of feedback to the community	4	9
Leaders' response to community requests*	4	9
Financial accountability	3	7
No rumours of financial mismanagement*	2	5
Sticking to plans drafted with the community*	2	5
Involving the community in decision making*	2	5
Comparison with previous leadership	2	5
Leaders' conduct when in office	2	5
Individual committee members with a respected status in the community	2	5
No leadership is ever accepted as doing well hence the frequent changes in leaders	2	5
Frequency of commuting in and out of the ward to the RDC*	1	2
Through the headman and councillor who are respected by the community	1	2

Sample size =41, multiple responses possible   * see footnote[31]

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[31]These are ways of monitoring the leadership which have been tested by the community over the last 5-6 years. If leaders frequently commute to the RDC offices in Guruve (some 175 km away), if they do not respond quickly to community requests, change plans without involving the community (e.g buying assets such as a VCR and generator) and there are rumours emanating from outside the ward of financial mismanagement the conclusion is that in all likelihood the leadership is embezzling community funds.

From Table 10, the most important consideration in community legitimation of the CAMPFIRE leadership (WWC) is the perceived effectiveness[32] in carrying out the expected leadership roles. This was mentioned by 17 of those interviewed. Frequency of feedback to the community through general meetings was mentioned by 4 people. Financial accountability through the annual general meeting was mentioned by 3 of the respondents. Only one person mentioned that of the WWC. The frequent changes in leadership though part of the democratic process and instituted within the community constitution was seen as a way of showing that no leadership was ever accepted as being permanent in the community. This view was aptly expressed by one respondent who said, "No leader is ever acknowledged as doing well. Being elected into leadership is as if one has tied a milestone around one's neck", (Mrs M Fakero, Pers. Comm.,1997)[33]. Legitimacy of the WWC was derived from the office of the chief who is an ex-officio member

Leadership institutions gain acceptance and become institutionalized by acquiring a "special status and legitimacy for having satisfied people's needs and having met their normative expectations over time" (Uphoff, 1986). For the community acceptance is through the fulfilment of community goals, the expected role of a leader and the status ascribed to that leadership institutions and the leaders within it. The Kanyurira community gives legitimacy to the CAMPFIRE leadership by monitoring and evaluating the individual leaders. This is in contrast to the formal and external legitimacy whereby leadership institutions gain legitimacy by their coming into existence through an arm of the state without considering their performance.

External environment affects the legitimacy of leadership institutions within the community. Within the external environment are the higher leadership levels within the institutional structure in which CAMPFIRE operates. If each level of the institutional structure fails to provide the support which it should to the community leadership institutions, it becomes difficult for the lower level leadership to be effective. The local government (RDC) is supposed to provide training for local NRM leaders so that they budget and plan projects using the RDC format. This should be done for each new leadership (WWC). However, due to logistical problems, new leadership rarely receives training and has to work on their own initiatives. For treasurers of the WWC, this hinders their accountability and effectiveness. In processing community cash dividends delays at the RDC, implies that the leadership loses credibility with the community

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[32]Within the Kanyurira community this is assessed by the way in which the leadership is monitoring community NRM workers (game scouts, fence monitors, casual labourers), how quickly these workers are paid and by ensuring that the community gets its cash dividends early in the year -around March/April

[33]Mrs M. Fakero, Kanyurira villager, Kanyurira Ward, Zimbabwe.

(Pers. Observations., 1995/96). The most important support which community leadership institutions in CAMPFIRE needed and still require is an enabling environment for them to fulfil their role of representing and educating the communities that they lead (ZIMTRUST, 1985).

4.5.4 Importance of the role and status of leaders in achieving CAMPFIRE's objectives

The community's perceptions on what characteristics a leader should have, illustrates their understanding of the role and status of a leader. Perceptions of the community on what the goal of CAMPFIRE is and how this can be achieved at the local level can be determined from what they expect from certain leadership positions within the CAMPFIRE organizational structure.

In any NRM programme, the community's perceptions affect and are affected by external agencies interacting with the community. These external agencies are government and NGOs, who have their own expectations of the role and status of the local organizations and the leadership positions within them. These expectations are based on their understanding of the goal of the NRM programme. However, in many cases the expectations of the local people of their leaders are different from those of the external agencies. Those within the leadership also have their own understanding of their role, status and might have a different set of objectives to achieve the set goals of the NRM programme. These different perceptions stretch the leaders, as they have to fulfil several roles at the same time. Failure to fulfil these roles as perceived by any one of the actors (external and internal), implies that the leaders can easily lose credibility with the community and lose vital support from external agencies.

From this analysis it is important for the effective role performance of leaders that the different actors in the institutional structure in which any NRM programme is initiated are clear on three issues namely:

(i)   What their own roles are, what the roles of lower and higher levels within the structure are

(ii)   Which status (leadership position)within the institutional structure (hierarchy) can best achieve certain objectives of the programme

(iii)   What are the goals/ objectives of the programme

These three issues can be used as a framework to analyze the vertical and horizontal structuring within the institutional hierarchy in CAMPFIRE as a way of assessing the strengths and weaknesses of leaders. This analysis is important as it affects how the programme functions in the end.

4.5.5 Discussion and conclusions

Moral behaviour is considered highly within community selection criteria for leaders. The moral behaviour of a leader is more important than formal qualifications. This selection criteria of the community has bearings on the introduction of new initiatives such as CAMPFIRE which emphasize on technical skills of leaders for accountability (IIED, 1994; CDCS, 1996; ZIMTRUST, 1985). Community members consider the moral behaviour, thus, people with the technical skills within the community may not be selected if they are considered to be of low moral caliber.

How educational levels or literacy affects the performance of leaders is an unclear area. A study on local leadership organizations in developing countries by the Kandyan Peasantry Commission (Uphoff and Wanigaratne, 1982 discussed in Esman and Uphoff, 1984:83) showed that good performance depended on or was highly influenced by the literacy levels. This however was contested by a study of various local organizations by Esman and Uphoff (1984) showing that though literacy was a favorable character for good leadership performance, it is not significant in any way as there are many local organizations which have succeeded in largely illiterate communities. Based on this one cannot generalize that educational levels play a greater role in leadership effectiveness in NRM than other leadership characteristics. This however is contrary to the view expressed by officials within the CAMPFIRE initiative, who advocate for leaders who are educated to be selected. This is in line with the bureaucratic service delivery mode whereby it is easier for the administrative officials to continue with their formalistic way of planning, budgeting and implementing (Esman and Uphoff, 1984) other than simplifying the strategy so as to accommodate community leaders, who may not have the desired educational levels but represent the interests of the community.

CAMPFIRE, has to some extent affected the community's perceptions of characteristics of leaders. Previously the community lived in a near self contained situation with little interaction and interference from external agencies (Nabane, 1997). Now the community has been thrust into a monetarised economy which is rapidly changing. They have to deal with the new responsibility of being accountable for money from wildlife. The leaders have to operate not only within the community but in the wider economy. New leaders have to be outward looking for the survival of the community. Leaders need to be ambitious so that they aspire to get influence and recognition in the wider environment such as the RDC and NGOs which affects the community. Hence it is difficult for the community to reconcile this new leadership which is outward looking and spends time travelling outside the ward for meetings when they are used to traditional leaders who were inward looking and had a community only world view. In this regard, tensions arise as leaders in performing their duties are taken by the community to be misusing community funds by travelling too much, or holding too many meetings. In the competitive economic environment

in which the community now has to operate leaders need to be literate.

The changes in the characteristics of leaders and community selection criteria (see Table 5 and 6) show the transition which the community is going through and the adaptations they have to make. The wider environment demands that leaders be innovative and ready to accept new changes so as to keep abreast with the changing economic and political environment. Young people are more open to new things while the older ones are conservative. Innovativeness to the community is seen in some instances as being irresponsible. Hence, the young innovative leaders end up losing community support, while gaining external approval. The older and mature leaders gain community support but fail to truly represent and articulate the community's needs. In this regard, the community and the leaders have to come up with a system in which the community's expectations from leaders are such that they are not detrimental to the community's survival within the wider economy.

A case in point is the WWC (1995-1997), which had all young people. Two of these went on a trip to America, where they represented the community and thereafter were invited to represent the district at the CITES[34] meeting (held in Zimbabwe in June 1997). Exposure to new ideas and new way of doing things puts these leaders in a different status to the community (Seymour, 1994). As the leaders understand more what appropriate authority is and what should be rightly the community's management and benefit sharing authority, it becomes difficult for them to convey these perceptions to the community and older people who are content with receiving money. Thus the new leaders have to exert themselves to meet the demands of the external environment to bargain for what rightly belongs to the community (such as cash dividends, the right to select their own project), while at the same time accommodating the community's perceptions of the role of a leader (staying in the ward and fulfilling all the community's requests). Leaders who understand the policies which govern the NRM programme and know what is legal, find it difficult to then deal with communities who do not share the same knowledge. In this respect the community in a way pulls the leaders down, instead of supporting them so that the common good of the community can be achieved.

One reason for this conflict is that the community having been isolated and more or less self-contained with little influence from the external economy and political arena, now has all of a sudden to content with external forces pushing down on the community while sucking it up into the wider economy (Gray, 1991). For the community to survive there have to be leaders who will represent the community fully within the wider context. For leaders to do this it is necessary for them to have been exposed to the wider economy and how it functions (Esman and Uphoff,

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[34]Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species

1984). Usually the younger people within the community who are educated can meet this challenge.

Another issue is that even if the young people are excluded from leadership, they are a force to be reckoned with within any community. Young people constitute the greater proportion of the population (Crane, 1991), they are educated, they have little chances of employment and to them CBNRM programmes such as CAMPFIRE with cash and employment benefits are an exciting opportunity which has to be maximized. This is seen within Kanyurira in that the young people want to embark on income generating projects using CAMPFIRE money so as to get employment but the older people are against it (see Appendix 6). Young people want entertainment such as football, video films, but to the older people this is unnecessary. Hence internal tensions increase based on generational differences (Strum, 1994).

It is important for intervening agencies to consider these internal dynamics. Training and community awareness in natural resource management not only has to focus on the leaders but the wider community. This will enable skills (technical, financial and managerial) and understanding to be passed onto the wider community (Esman and Uphoff, 1984). Members can then monitor the leaders objectively, while giving them the necessary support to fulfil external obligations which benefit the community.

Having skills within the ordinary community at large will act as a check against leaders becoming dictatorial, due to lack of information on the part of the community (Esman and Uphoff, 1984; Seymour, 1994). If the community is uninformed, decisions detrimental to itself are made and leaders become frustrated as they maybe better informed on the results of the community decision.

The Kanyurira WWC leadership (1995-1997) had realized the existence of the information or skills gap between the leadership and the community (see Appendix 8). Hence meetings had been planned to impart some of the skills learnt so that there would not be antagonism in community decision making. Ignorance creates suspicion and antagonism on the part of followers. For the sustenance of CBNRM programmes such as CAMPFIRE, it is important for community leaders and external agencies working with communities to empower the wider local community for informed decision making which considers other external actors within the programme.

CHAPTER 5

5.   COSTS AND BENEFITS ASSOCIATED WITH LEADERSHIP

5.1   INTRODUCTION

Analysis of peasant farm households decision making shows that farmers make decisions based on the likely increase or loss in household income (Ellis, 1988). This analogue can be used within NRM, given that it is within a communal area set up. Selection amongst alternatives is determined by the balance between costs and benefits, thus for CBNRM to succeed it must produce real economic alternatives with clear benefits to the community and individual as an incentive for commitment to NRM (Fieldmann, 1994; Murphree, 1994). Logically the selected alternative is where the benefits to the individual or group outweigh the costs. CBNRM programmes attempt to create a choice domain (assign rights and duties) to local communities so that they behave in a certain way in respect to natural resources (Fieldmann, 1994). Duties and rights are not only defined for the whole community but to categories within the community such as leadership and followers. How the costs and benefits are distributed within the community presents a specific choice domain, which results in a particular behaviour in relation to the natural resource management initiative and its local leadership. Decisions to use natural resources in a particular way are based on the assessment of costs and benefits (Ashley, Barnes, Brown and Jones, 1997; Uphoff, 1986). The questions asked are "is it worth the effort?", and, "is a different use better?", as a way of making a comparison of the trade offs. Costs and benefits faced by the community (resource users) are influenced by government prices and policies and the institutional framework in which the CPR management operates.

In the African context, before white settlement and technological advances, it was costly in terms of time, danger to life for local people to control wildlife. White settlement brought the wheel, firearms, greater human mobility, increasing populations, spreading agriculture and a moneyed economy (Child, 1995). Technological advances such as firearms, made it less costly (in terms of time, effort and danger) to control wildlife. However for communities, the costs were higher through the creation of protected areas which displaced them from areas of high productivity, land tenure laws which were introduced and wildlife laws enacted which made it illegal for local people to use firearms, or traps for hunting (Child, 1995). People were thus, forced to accept a situation in which costs outweighed the benefits. As this is contrary to rational human reaction, there was little support for these new management systems. As a result tensions and hostilities continued to exist between people, government NRM agencies (i.e. DNP&WLM) and wildlife. Local people continued to bear the cost of living with wildlife through crop raids, and attacks.

Before CAMPFIRE, costs borne by the local people living with wildlife were crop raids and animal attacks. The benefits were hunting game for consumption at will even though illegally with an additional higher cost of being jailed or fined if caught. The concept of CAMPFIRE is

that people derive benefits from wildlife utilization as compensation for the cost of living with wildlife (IIED, 1994). Thus CAMPFIRE sets out to restore a balance between costs and benefits in a modern economy where there is new technology (e g solar powered electric fencing, safari hunting) to assist in wildlife management, and where income is central to survival and progress.

A feature of the new moneyed economy is that groups external to those who obtain direct benefits and who bear the direct costs, influence the selection of options (Gray, 1991). For these external agencies benefits are commonly drawn without a share of the costs e .g establishment of national parks and game reserves for biodiversity conservation to benefit government in terms of foreign exchange earnings and an existence value for people in the North (Western and Wright, 1994; Bromley, 1994). Initiatives such as CAMPFIRE set out to promote a situation where all beneficiaries bear a share of the costs. Within CAMPFIRE the concept of costs and benefits operate on the basis that these must be evenly distributed among members for common property management of natural resources to be successful (IIED, 1994:40). The monetary economy facilitates this.

 The complexity of the situation, where individual and local obligations are significantly affected by district and national (even international e.g. CITES) imperatives is such that leadership is required to bring order and provide continuity for the community.

Leadership brings benefits and costs to the individual. The quality of leadership is critical to the perceived equitable apportionment of costs and benefits. People in leadership are the focal point within their communities. For them to gain legitimacy as leaders, the membership (followers) has to perceive that there is equitable distribution of the costs and benefits within the group to followers and leaders alike. The leader-member interaction is a crucial process in the functioning of community based developmental initiatives (Esman and Uphoff, 1984).The leaders also have to be satisfied that the benefits that they get are compensation enough for any loss that they might incur. Thus for any enterprise involving collective action (decision making), there has to be an incentive (punishments and rewards) for leaders to be accountable and efficient in carrying out their roles and for the followers to adhere to the rules of the group (Esman and Uphoff, 1984). In collective enterprises such as the management of common pool resources, the group/ community of legitimate users establish rules on use and penalties for breaking the rules (Ostrom, 1990).

Esman and Uphoff (1984) state that if leaders are elected from the same social and economic strata as the followers there may be an incentive for them to enrich themselves at the expense of the other members. Since leaders are also taken as members of the community, how they perceive benefits that they get is important.

Within collective action enterprises there are transaction costs[35] borne by the group as a whole and by some individuals (North, 1990). In CBNRM initiatives in which the environmental factors of the community (such as location from the administrative centre) impact on the functioning of local organizations (Esman and Uphoff, 1984), these transaction costs are usually borne by the leaders. This impacts on their willingness to work. In selecting leaders and working with local organizations it is important for local government or any agency implementing NRM initiatives to determine with the community whether leaders will work for free or be compensated. Leaders who serve without pay gain legitimacy based on public service motivation (Uphoff, 1986).

At the inception of CAMPFIRE, leaders in the WWC and VWC were to work on a voluntary basis and would only be paid if they made trips outside the wards (ZIMTRUST, 1985). However, with time the programme has come to be more about managing wildlife revenues than wildlife itself due to the increased interests which leaders at local level (ward) and district level (RDC) have in wildlife revenues (Murombedzi, 1992 cited in Olthof, 1995). Leaders now get sitting allowances for committee meetings. The proportion of community wildlife revenue going to the committee, (WWC) allowance has become a point of contention in communities involved in CAMPFIRE (Anon.,1996).

Costs and benefits faced by the leaders and followers in CAMPFIRE with reference to Kanyurira Ward will be evaluated by considering the perceptions of the leaders, community and newcomers on the benefits and costs to leadership. How the community perceives benefits and costs to leaders, affects the support given to leaders and the commitment of the community to the programme. Commitment to the programme is seen by the community demanding accountability from the leaders. If there are no benefits to leaders, it may result in leaders becoming corrupt and misusing community funds.

5.2   COSTS AND BENEFITS TO LEADERSHIP IN KANYURIRA WARD
5.2.1 Leaders' Perceptions
Persons who had been and are in leadership within CAMPFIRE (i.e., WWC) were asked "What costs and benefits are associated with leadership". Table 11 and 12 show the responses for the benefits and costs respectively.

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[35] Includes the cost of measuring the value of what is being exchanged, costs of protecting rights and policing enforcement as well as the cost of information (North, 1990: 27).

5.2.1.1   Benefits to community leaders in CAMPFIRE

Table 11: CAMPFIRE leaders' (n=22) perceptions on benefits

Benefit	None	Allowances	Trips	Knowledge	Fringe benefits	Exposure	Personal improvement
No. of Responses	2	12	1	3	1	2	1
% of sample	9	55	5	14	5	9	5

When the WWC members hold committee meetings, or attend a workshop within the ward they are entitled to a minimal amount of money which was agreed upon with the community at the beginning of that financial year. This is referred to as the sitting allowance. Committee members travelling outside the ward on wildlife management business get subsistence and travel allowances. The community allocates money for committee expenses during their budget setting meeting. If the committee runs out of the allocated amount before the year is out they can call for a general meeting and request an advance from the following year's budget.

From Table 11, sitting, subsistence and travel allowances are the most commonly perceived benefit with 12 of those interviewed mentioning these. These benefits are stipulated in the Ward Wildlife Constitution (see Appendix 4). The WWC leadership can increase these allowances without community approval. Such unapproved increments in leaders' benefits creates tensions within the community. Appendix 9 shows the sitting allowances for the various meetings and workshops within the ward and the travel and subsistence rates set by the 1995/97 WWC without the community approval.

Knowledge from workshops conducted by NGOs and the RDC within and outside the ward is perceived as a benefit by 3 of those interviewed. This knowledge includes financial accounting and managerial skills. Interaction with people of higher status (educational, political and economic) through ward visits, dealing with NGOs, politicians and government agencies gave the leaders much experience in the wider external environment. This was termed as exposure by the leadership and mentioned by 2 of the respondents as a benefit. As a way of gaining community support and commitment to NRM, trips to other districts and countries carrying out CBNRM, are arranged for leaders by the RDC and NGOs involved with the community. This was seen as a benefit by one of the leaders interviewed. Fringe benefits included leaders placing themselves on the top of household lists within the ward such that when community cash dividends were called out they would be the first or when meat rations from the hunting operations were distributed the leaders' households got the largest and best portions at the

beginning. Personal improvement was mentioned by a person who used to be very quiet and reserved before getting into leadership, but dealing with people and high ranking government officials gave him more self confidence. Two of the respondents mentioned that there were no benefits associated with leadership in CAMPFIRE at community level.

5.2.1.2 Costs to community leaders in CAMPFIRE

Table 12 below, shows the leaders' perceptions on the costs which they incurred while in leadership.

Table 12: CAMPFIRE leaders'(n=21) perceptions on costs

Costs	None	Time for household activities	Loss of opportunity in CAMPFIRE employment	Loss of Dignity	Community's Monitoring System	working for nothing
No. of responses	4	10	1	1	4	1
% of sample	19	48	5	5	20	5

Time for household activities is taken as the time foregone in mostly agricultural related activities by people in leadership. This was mentioned by 10 of the CAMPFIRE leaders interviewed. The community uses changes in the leader's economic status before and when in leadership as a monitoring system. Thus if a leader embarks on capital intensive projects such as house construction, opening a retailing business or buying other large assets, he is accused of embezzling community finances. This community perception was a cost to leaders in that one had to set aside any major plans until after their term of office (though the same comments may still be made, their impact is less when one is no longer in office). This was mentioned by 4 of the respondents. Surprisingly 4 people mentioned that there were no costs. Being in leadership and getting allowances on top of the cash dividends is compensation enough is a possible reason for this response. People who mentioned that there are no costs are those who occupied positions within the WWC which did not involve travelling outside the ward and were not on the forefront in decision making such as committee members and vice secretaries. Interestingly these same people gain community sympathy in cases where the WWC is accused of embezzling funds.

The Ward Wildlife constitution stipulates that one can only occupy one post at a time within CAMPFIRE (see Appendix 4). An unwritten by-law within the ward constitution is that people in leadership cannot be employed in other CAMPFIRE related jobs such as weed clearing along the fence and other casual CAMPFIRE employment. This is done to ensure equitable distribution

of benefits and opportunities to a wider section of the community. Five percent of people in leadership mentioned this as a cost. Other costs mentioned included loss of one's dignity when falsely accused of embezzling community funds. At the beginning of CAMPFIRE, leaders in WWC worked on a voluntary basis. The respondent who mentioned that leaders worked for nothing has been in leadership since 1992, and left formal employment at the request of the community as they needed someone who could translate for them when dealing with NGOs (who usually had English-speaking personnel). He has also worked with NGOs over the same period of time. Thus "working for nothing" was a loaded statement which showed the frustration of having worked for the community for so long and achieving much but at the end all is not considered by the community.

5.3 KANYURIRA COMMUNITY PERCEPTIONS ON COSTS AND BENEFITS TO CAMPFIRE LEADERS AND THE COMMUNITY

The community as the followers have their own way of perceiving the benefits to the leaders. How the community perceives the distribution of costs and benefits between the leaders and the community determines the extent to which the leaders will have authentic authority within the community. Hence the leaders have a central position in which they affect and influence collective action of the community directly and indirectly. Distribution of costs and benefits is one such indirect way. According to the CAMPFIRE concept leaders are supposed to set a good example to the community (ZIMTRUST, 1985).

5.3.1 Community perceptions on costs and benefits to CAMPFIRE leaders

A sample of the community was asked what the benefits and costs to leaders within CAMPFIRE. Table 13 and 14 show the results.

Table 13: Kanyurira Community's perceptions (n=41) on benefits to people in CAMPFIRE leadership

Benefit	No. of Responses	%
Allowances	28	68
Knowledge through NGO workshops	4	10
Get first preferences on meat and dividends household list[36]	2	5
Not clear	2	5
Some kraal heads get allowances if attend WWC meetings	1	2
Get away with law breaking	1	2
None	1	2
No responses	2	5
Total	41	100

Sample size =41, multiple responses possible

Of those interviewed, 28 mentioned allowances as a benefit to leaders. The community conception is that leaders are getting more than the rest of the community through the allowances as they increase the amounts per meeting and trip without informing the community (see Appendix 9). If committee members make many trips outside the ward, the general belief is that they want to claim more allowances. Other benefits included knowledge through workshops and tours (mentioned by 10 percent), having first preferences on the household meat and dividends lists and breaking community NRM laws without being punished. Getting away with law breaking was mentioned in line with the purchase of shot guns by a number of the leaders, who were involved in hunting permitted animals within the ward. This however became a benefit since only the leaders knew which animals could be shot without one being arrested. Previously the ward constitution (unwritten by-law) made it illegal for one to shoot birds such as doves, but now leaders where shooting wild guinea fowl, and wild pig with the explanation that this was allowed as a problem animal control measure within one's field. Only one person mentioned that there were no benefits for people in leadership. Those who said they were not clear and the 2 non responses were people who generally do not attend Ward general meetings and are from the *vauyi* sub group.

Table 14 shows the Kanyurira community perceptions on the costs to people in leadership structures involved in CAMPFIRE.

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[36]The Kanyurira ward has a list of all households in the ward and this is used to call out people in the distribution of meat from hunting operations and in cash dividend distribution

Table 14: **Kanyurira Community's (n=41) perceptions on costs to people in CAMPFIRE leadership**

Cost	No. of responses	%
Time lost for household and agricultural activities	13	32
None as allowances are adequate compensation	12	29
None otherwise would not be in leadership	5	12
Incur costs because of own stupidity	4	10
Personal reputation	2	5
Not clear as not attend CAMPFIRE meetings	2	5
Threat of witchcraft, criticism	1	>2
Traditional leaders (kraal heads/ spirit medium) work for nothing	1	>2
If one WWC member makes a mistake, all are removed from office	1	>2
Total	41	99

Sample size =41, multiple responses possible

On costs to leaders 13 of those interviewed were of the perception that leaders lost time for agricultural and household activities as the allowances were not adequate compensation. For leaders in positions involving a lot of travelling the perception was that the money they got as subsistence and travelling allowances did not benefit them as it was used while outside the ward and could not be counted as supplementary income to the household. Twelve percent of the respondents mentioned that there were no costs otherwise people would not be in leadership. Another perception was that leaders incur costs because of their own stupidity (meaning lack of planning and responsibility). This was mentioned by 4 of the respondents. As one respondent aptly put it, *"kuruza kuda kwemutungamiri"* meaning "incurring cost in leadership is by choice", (J Chenjerai, Pers. Comm., 1997)[37]. An old man mentioned that, " a leader incurs costs because of his own stupidity" (J Meki, Pers. Comm., 1997)[38].

Damage to one's personal reputation was a cost mentioned by 2 of the respondents. This is closely related to the response that if one member of the WWC leadership makes a mistake (financial) all would be removed from office. Hence for the case of the 1995/97 WWC which was removed from office on allegations of financial mismanagement only three people were said to be responsible but the whole committee was removed. This response might have been given

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[37]J. Chenjerai, Kanyurira kraal head, Kanyurira Ward, Zimbabwe

[38]J. Meki, Village kraal head, Kanyurira ward, Zimbabwe

in line with the prevailing situation at the time within the ward where members of the 1995/97 WWC were under police investigations.

Other costs mentioned were that traditional leaders though involved did not get anything. This was mentioned by an old respondent in comparison with the pre-independence situation. "Kraal heads used to collect taxes, and then they would get some money for travelling to the District Commissioner's office. Nowadays they don't get anything though they are involved in WWC work", (Mrs Zengeretsi, Pers. Comm.,1997)[39]. For the kraal heads only a few would be called to WWC meetings once a year and that is when they got allowances. Leaders within WWC were criticized and scolded by the community to their face, suspected and accused of stealing money, threatened with witchcraft if they tried to go against the community's wishes. Witchcraft is used as a cultural norm to prevent one member of the community becoming too well off as they may then oppress others (Gelfand, 1965; Holleman, 1969). The following incident shows that negative cultural checks may play a role in leadership performance. Only one interviewee who has recently come into the ward mentioned it. Box 6 illustrates how threat of witchcraft may play a role in leadership functioning within the ward and is a personal cost which leaders as members of the community have to deal with.

Box 6: Influence of negative cultural deterrents on community leadership

The WWC budgeted that each household would get Z$400 since there had been a bumper harvest. This would enable them to buy a minibus for the community. Two months later on the community dividend sharing ceremony it was surprising to see people receiving Z$1000 per household and the minibus foregone. When the NRM facilitator asked the chairperson of the WWC why they changed the budget the answer was, "You don't know the people in this area, they are bad". Kanyurira Field Notes 1995

5.3.2 Perceptions on the costs and benefits to community members

These perceptions on costs and benefits to leaders were compared with perceptions on costs and benefits to the community. Tables 15 and 16 show the results obtained from asking a sample of the community what the costs and benefits were to members of the community who adhered to the NRM rules within the ward.

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[39]Mrs L. Zengeretsi, Kanyurira villager, Kanyurira ward, Zimbabwe

Table 15: Kanyurira community perceptions on costs to the community in CAMPFIRE

Cost	No. of responses	%
None	12	29
Leadership unaccountability	4	10
None compared to before CAMPFIRE	4	10
Crop raids by wildlife	3	7
No hunting at will for meat	2	>5
Budgeting for things which do not materialize	2	>5
Lack of planning	1	2
Non members do not get dividends and leadership positions	1	2
Widows, orphans get half the cash dividends	1	2
Difficult to define the costs	1	2
No responses	10	24
Total	41	98

Sample N=41, multiple responses possible

Table 15 shows that 12 of the respondents do not see any costs for the community. Compared to the situation before CAMPFIRE, there are no costs at all to those who adhere to NRM rules as mentioned by 4 of the respondents. In the pre-CAMPFIRE situation crop raids where a direct cost borne by the individual, while CAMPFIRE costs do not impact greatly on individual income as was previously case. Four of the respondents were of the perception that the community incurred costs through leadership unaccountability. This included leaders misappropriating funds and increasing committee allowances without informing the community. Seven percent mentioned raids by wildlife as a cost to the community since there was no compensation apart from the cash dividends. Interestingly 2 mentioned that limited hunting through the rules of CAMPFIRE was a cost. This is interesting since saying such a statement would previously have been associated with poaching. Other costs included budgeting for things which do not materialize and lack of planning on the part of the community mentioned by 2 and 1 of the respondents respectively. These are closely related to leadership unaccountability since the community plans and budgets for projects together with the leaders and failure to implement these projects is attributed to leaders mismanaging funds through overuse or buying things which were not planned for. Other costs mentioned were for non members who do not get cash dividends or positions in leadership. Widows and orphans get half the amount of cash dividends. These were mentioned by one person. From field observations, the fence which is synonymous with CAMPFIRE is now perceived as a major cost and hindrance to community agricultural

development. This can be attributed to the prevailing disenchantment with leaders and the RDC due to people being prevented from moving outside the fenced settlement area. Twenty four percent did not respond.

Table 16 shows community perceptions on benefits to the community for adhering to NRM rules in the ward.

Table 16: Perceptions of the Kanyurira community on benefits from CAMPFIRE

Benefit	No. of responses	%
Cash dividends	28	46
Meat rations from hunting operations	14	23
Vauyi (newcomers) get meat, soil, PAC, use of natural resources (trees, water)	6	10
Infrastructural development	4	7
None	3	5
Possibility of being elected into leadership if no criminal record	3	5
Casual employment	1	<2
Use of natural resources (trees)	1	<2
Same benefits with people who do not obey the NRM rules	1	<2
Total	61	102

Sample size n=41, multiple responses possible

From the study 28 of those interviewed mentioned household cash dividends as a benefit. Meat rations from hunting operations were mentioned by 14 of the respondents. Only 3 people mentioned that there were no benefits in CAMPFIRE for the community. This is larger than one would expect. Possible reasons could be the prevailing disenchantment with leaders arising from the mismanagement of community funds at the time of the field research. Infrastructural development which includes projects and drought alleviation through CAMPFIRE money were mentioned by 4 of the respondents. Six people mentioned that the *vauyi*/newcomers get some benefits such as meat rations. This was in response to encouragement to clarify the status of benefits to this category within the community since they were excluded from the cash dividends. The possibility of being elected into leadership was taken by 3 people as a benefit for obeying NRM rules within the ward. Casual employment from CAMPFIRE was mentioned by one person only as a benefit. This is surprising given that most people within the ward get some employment at different times of the year for casual work in CAMPFIRE related jobs. The reason for the low

response could be that at the time of the survey there were no casual jobs since it was the dry season and most CAMPFIRE casual work is during the wet months of the year. Use of natural resources such as trees, was perceived by one person as a benefit. Only one person mentioned that the benefits were the same for either obeying or not obeying the NRM rules. This was based on the perception that even if one breaks the NRM rules within the ward they still get meat rations though they will be exempted from the cash dividends, depending on the severity of the offense.

5.4 DISCUSSION

From the economic principle that people are involved in enterprise in which the benefits outweigh the costs (Bromley, 1994) it would seem that, for the community, NRM can be sustainable in the long run if this perception prevails. If the costs borne by leaders and those borne by the community are compared, the leaders seem to bear most of the costs. Costs borne by the leaders are at a personal level as they involve loss in time and potential household income from agriculture. The loss on the part of the community involves either lost opportunity for community projects or supplementary income from CAMPFIRE for non members. Leadership is essential for the success of any collective action enterprise as managers and facilitators of the decision making process within the community (Esman and Uphoff, 1984).

There has to be a balance between costs and benefits for leaders for effective role performance (Esman and Uphoff, 1984). Leaders as representatives of the community in the external environment, have to operate in two environments. In the external environment community leaders face opposition from officials, have to present and argue their case as well as bargaining for community benefits (Esman and Uphoff, 1984). This involves adopting new leadership skills and roles which may be contrary to the leadership norm within the community (Mosse, 1995). Thus leaders within Kanyurira are faced with a situation in which spending time away from the ward, is taken as an indication of fits such as cash dividends and lose touch with the external authorities which will be disadvantageous to the community.

One has however, to bear in mind that perceptions on costs and benefits within CAMPFIRE have been coloured by the increased values of money within the community due to assimilation into the wider monetary economy. Perceptions also may express the fear that leaders will misappropriate funds. This fear has to be addressed by clarity to the community of leadership rights so that people will continue to be involved in the management of natural resources through collective decision making in the community. Esman and Uphoff decision making system. Since leaders are dependent on members for the success of the programme, mismatch in costs and benefit distribution may result in the NRM programme failing as people are no longer interested. This is more of a threat to CAMPFIRE which is a programme focused on wildlife management

operating in an environment in which most of the people are agriculturally dependent and see CAMPFIRE as a source of supplementary income (Crane, 1991). The relation between money and mistrust of leaders is seen within the ward in that kraal heads who are not involved in handling money within the ward, are more respected. Uphoff (1986), observed that leaders who serve without pay gain legitimacy based on public service motivation. Thus, legitimacy is affected by the distribution of costs and benefits within the community.

Leaders' perceptions of the benefits and costs is also coloured by the monetary economy and the amount of exposure and knowledge they gain in relation to the rest of the community. As leaders are assimilated into the wider economic and political environment through increased interaction with outsiders (even attending international conferences), they aspire for more (Seymour, 1994). Their perceptions on the rewards offered by the community (allowances for Kanyurira) change as other things such as external prestige, trips and acclaim become more important. As leaders gain more skills (financial and technical), their perceptions also change. Thus for Kanyurira leaders now took into account the increases in the costs of living outside the ward and increased their sitting, travel and subsistence allowances (see Appendix 9). Leaders also have to keep up with external peers and this may result in the living expenses of leaders going up hence their accountability to the community is undermined as they use more of the available funds than the community budgeted for them. External agencies have an impact on the costs and benefits borne by the leaders and the community. By increasing the number of meetings, workshops and trips within and outside the ward with leaders, the time spent by leaders in wildlife management increase. This increases the amount of allowances which the leaders claim resulting in more than was budgeted for. Hence, a discrepancy arises between the community and leaders with external agencies reaping the benefits in the form of objectives achieved and information for research. The community bears the costs as disproportionate allocation of community funds to leaders.

In this regard it is important for any external agent interacting with the community to understand the community perceptions of costs and benefits. This will prevent a possible increase in conflict between leaders and community thus jeopardizing the community initiative.

A point of interest in the costs to leaders is that the community monitoring system is seen as cost. This may imply two things. Either that the (i) community is using some criteria based on the traditional leadership role performance or (ii) the leaders are prone to misusing community funds and do not want to be monitored. For (i) this is based on the argument put forward by Ayittey (1991) that traditionally, leaders were not involved in financial management. In some cultures they were not even supposed to know how much they had since they held the finances in trust for the community. Within the Zimbabwean context land was held in trust by the leaders and symbolized the community's finances. This is in contrast to the modern monitoring system which

involves the community and leaders having duties and rights to uphold. The leaders have a duty to be accountable to the community and the community has a right to demand accountability.

If costs and benefits are perceived to be the same for adhering and not adhering to NRM rules, this may be an indication that the sanctions and rewards within the community and the CBNRM programme are not clearly demarcated and /or enforced.

Given this conflictive situation it is important that the perceptions of the community on the benefits and costs to leaders and the community be understood. This will help to address any misconceptions on benefits and costs to leaders rising from failure of the community to adjust to the new leadership norm evolving within the community due to their involvement in the new political and economic order which requires that leaders be ambitious and more outward looking (Seymour, 1994).

5.5   COSTS FROM COLLECTIVE DECISION MAKING
Factors impacting on Kanyurira Community decisions within CAMPFIRE

Decision making within common pool resource management is based on collective decision making. This is to ensure that the appropriators have a part in drafting and changing any rule pertaining to the use of common pool resources (Ostrom, 1990). Collective decision making can be a cost to the community if a consensus is not reached due to conflicting interests and views.

The decision making structure in CAMPFIRE at ward level is by committee (executive) and by assembly of all the members (ward general meeting). Before implementing major decisions the committee (WWC) has to get approval from the community to proceed. Failure to implement these decisions by the WWC is taken as performance ineffectiveness by the community (see section 4.4). To identify sources of transaction costs to the community through hindrances encountered in carrying out decisions, groups/organizations impacting on WWC and community decisions are shown in Tables 17 and 18.

Table 17: Groups impacting on community decisions in Kanyurira ward

Group	No of responses	%
Ward Wildlife Committee	13	26
Young Generation[40]	11	22
Rural District Council	8	16
Councillor	6	12
Kraal heads	5	10
Headman	3	6
Non Governmental Organizations	2	4
(Vauyi) New comers	2	4
Total	50	100

Sample size=41, multiple responses possible

Table 17 shows the various groups which impact on community decisions. Their impact may be positive or negative and have bearing on the collective decision making process within the ward. The WWC as the leadership within CAMPFIRE in the ward impact greatly on all decisions made by the community (mentioned by 13 people). Young people within the ward (18-30 years) affect the decisions made by the community. Since decision making within the community is by community assembly through a general meeting, other groups use it as a forum for political advancement and status (Mosse, 1995). The RDC impacts on community decisions in that they have the final say on most community decisions pertaining to NRM. As one villager mentioned, "The people and area belong to the council", (Kanyurira Villager, 1997). Thus the success and failure of community to implement NRM decisions is affected by various groups and these are costs of transaction which are borne by the community.

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[40] It is noted that young generation is not a group but a category. However in the perceptions of people interviewed it is seen as a group and will be used as such in this study.

Table 18: Groups impacting on WWC decisions in Kanyurira Ward

Group	No of responses	%
Young Generation	8	20
Ward Wildlife Committee	7	17
Community	6	15
Councillor	6	15
Headman	4	10
Rural District Council	4	10
Non governmental organizations	1	<2
None	1	<2
Non responses	4	10
Total	41	101

From Table 18, the decisions made by the WWC are disrupted due to criticism from the young people (mentioned by 8 of the respondents) at general meeting which in the end sways the majority against the WWC decisions. This is not necessarily a bad aspect as it ensures that the WWC has to be accountable and does not get away with any thing. Internal conflict within the WWC causes most of the decisions made not to be implemented. This was mentioned by 7 of the respondents. According to the WWC members interviewed internal conflict arose over personal clashes and domination of the WWC by members of one clan/family who supported each other (see Appendix 10). The community impacts on WWC decisions in that it has the final say through collective decision making at a general meeting. In this respect, no decision can be carried out without the community's consensus. The impact of community and councillor on WWC decisions were mentioned by 6 of the respondents. Rural District Council and the headman were mentioned by 4 of the respondents as impacting on WWC decisions. The headman's impact is through his office as the "owner of the land". Since the RDC is the appropriate authority it is accountable to the DNP&WLM in as far as wildlife management is concerned so they greatly affect all NRM decisions and revenue utilization by the community through the WWC.

Due to the good reputation which the non governmental organizations involved with the community enjoy, their impact was not deemed to be great as it was positive and did not in anyway affect community decisions. This is seen in the constantly mentioned statement, "*Vanotipa mazano anovaka nekutiyeuchidza*" meaning, "they give us constructive ideas and remind us".

5.6 CONCLUSION

From the analysis of costs and benefits within the Kanyurira community CAMPFIRE can be sustainable since the community perception is that benefits override costs as compared to the pre-CAMPFIRE situation. Leaders within CAMPFIRE have a high potential of working effectively since they do get some form of remuneration, unlike in some local organizations where leadership is voluntary (Esman and Uphoff, 1984).

It is important to consider categories such as the young generation, headman, councillor and the WWC in the evaluation of CAMPFIRE as they impact on decisions made within the community. Rural District Council impact shows the tensions which exist between the council and ward as the people at ward level view the centre (local government) with suspicion (Crane, 1991;) New institutional structures which are introduced within communities end up serving multiple purposes beyond stated aims (Mosse, 1995). The WWC, through the ward general meeting (as a participatory decision making mechanism) has become a vehicle of political ambition, context of leadership conflict (Councillor and headman) and a bridgehead for status change. The resulting social dynamics impact on the outcome of the participatory NRM effort.

CHAPTER 6

6. **STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES, OPPORTUNITIES AND THREATS TO LEADERSHIP**

6.1 INTRODUCTION

The preceding chapters have shown the perceptions of leadership of the community leaders, the community (as the followers) and the external agencies working with the community. This chapter seeks to draw together these different perceptions into an analysis of leadership with respect to CAMPFIRE. The approach taken for this analysis will be to consider the strengths and weaknesses of leadership in CAMPFIRE which are internal and the opportunities and threats which are external. This approach will be used because leaders and followers within communal areas, have a limited world view, due to the recent and limited integration into the wider economic and political environment. Analysis of the threats and opportunities to leaders gives a clearer understanding of some of the costs, benefits to leaders as perceived by the community and leaders and changes within the selection criteria of the community (chapters 4 and 5) in the wider context in which CAMPFIRE operates. Consideration of community perceptions alone would provide a limited analysis of leadership within CAMPFIRE.

6.2 STRENGTH AND WEAKNESSES OF LEADERSHIP WITHIN CAMPFIRE IN KANYURIRA WARD

Strengths and weaknesses are internal characteristics of an individual or an organization (such as the WWC). The strengths and weaknesses of the leadership within the institutional structures shown in Figure 2 and 3 will be analyzed. Focus will be on the local (community) leadership, namely, chief, headman, kraal head, and the modern political leadership institutions (WARDCO, VIDCO, WWC, VWC). Table 19 shows the strengths and weaknesses as interpreted from the study of leadership within CAMPFIRE. The criteria used are legal (formal) and community legitimacy (status).

Table 19: Strengths and weaknesses of community leadership within CAMPFIRE

Leadership	Strengths	Weaknesses
Chief	Respected by the local community. Taken as the custodian of land and natural resources Formal legitimation through the Chiefs and Headmen Act 1982, with allowances from government and payment of chiefs' messengers by the government	Lack of clarity on the role in NRM Only taken as dealing with issues pertaining to customary law and these are not defined Most of the chiefs are old and interested in money and status rather than conservation. Susceptible to unscrupulous NGOs and other external actors
Headman	Respected by the local community and other local organizations within the ward Cultural and traditional leadership with community legitimation and expected by the community to act as their monitor in financial issues within NRM in the new WWC Encourages community participation through the use of ward council of kraal heads and easily accessible to all members of the community Formal legitimation through the Chiefs and headmen Act 1982, with allowances from government	No formal legitimacy within natural resource management Though the Chiefs and Headmen Act (1982, 1997) mentions that the headman assists the chief in carrying out duties and functions pertaining to the office of a chief, these duties are not specified and this has resulted in conflict of duties/roles with the new local government administrative leadership such as Ward councillors Breakdown in communication with the kraal heads in CAMPFIRE as the headman is a co-opted member of the WWC, therefore tends to support the WWC due to the monetary gains associated with the organization to the detriment of the common good (breakdown of traditional community participation mechanism)

Leadership	Strengths	Weaknesses
Kraal heads	Close interaction with local people Respected and legitimate local authority at community level.	No formal legitimation -the Chiefs and Headman Act does not recognize the kraal heads. In effect officially the kraal heads are non existent. Difficult for the kraal heads to be involved in NRM if the VWCs are not functional Conflict over land allocation and NRM management with the new local government administrative structures (VWCs)
District Administrator	Has executive authority over the RDC	Not held accountable by the local people as only accountable to the Minister who appointed him/her
WARDCO	Formally legitimized by the Prime Minister's Directive 1982 and the RDC Act 1988.	Originated with external initiative -government. Little/ no community legitimacy Has no resources to function as dependent on local government for finances. Promotes political leadership Little or no leadership training

Leadership	Strengths	Weaknesses
VIDCO	Formal legitimation through the Prime Minister's Directive 1982 and the RDC Act 1988	External legitimation with little or no community legitimation Little /no clear demarcation of duties and role within the community No resources to function Conflict with kraal heads over land allocation duties Usurped the role of traditional leaders in land allocation
Ward Councillor	Formal legitimation through the RDC Act 1988 Democratically elected every four years. Accountable to the constituency (ward). Community acceptance based on individual performance during term of office	Role conflict as both council and ward representative In some areas there's conflict with the headman or chief over land allocation and community decisions since both offices have community acceptance More outward looking (political orientation) which may cause decisions to be made which do not foster community cohesiveness Too many roles (ward representative, council representative, WARDCO chairperson, WWC chairperson or ex-officio, VIDCO chairperson or secretary in some cases)

Leadership	Strengths	Weaknesses
WWC	Formal legitimation through the RDC Act 1988. Based on community participation through ward general meetings in decision making Community acceptance due to the economic gains associated with the organization Incorporates traditional leadership in decision making through the headman as ex-officio and the kraal heads during budget planning (for Kanyurira Ward) Democratic elections held every two years(for Kanyurira Ward) High potential for survival as long as CAMPFIRE or similar programmes are functional Own resources from wildlife revenue to carry out local NRM Financial, managerial accountability to the community and the RDC	Little /no representation of other groups who are taken as nonmembers of CAMPFIRE along ethnic lines though they are stakeholders in NRM. Main focus of NGO and RDC training creating an information gap with the community Too many roles Status based on economic incentives and not on own merit Conflict with WARDCO in some areas over use of money and ward plans Not an autonomous unit so need to follow RDC procedures in project planning and implementation Responsibility to manage with little authority to affect resource use Not directly involved in the management of other natural resources such as land which impact on wildlife and natural resource management

6.3   OPPORTUNITIES AND THREATS TO LEADERSHIP IN CAMPFIRE

Communities do not exist in isolation and cannot act alone. For local natural resource management to be effective it must be linked to the wider network of power and policy (Strum, 1994). This places the community in a constantly changing environment which affects their decisions directly and indirectly, thus presenting a wide array of opportunities and threats to the community and its leadership. Opportunities and threats for leadership in CAMPFIRE are shown in Table 20.

Table 20: Opportunities and threats for leadership in CAMPFIRE

Leadership	Opportunities	Threats
Chief	Through the formal legitimacy endorsed by the Chiefs and Headmen Act 1982, this can be strengthened such that they play a role at higher levels of administration, national level, through the council of chiefs and their parliamentary representatives. This will enable chiefs to have input in policy formulation so that grassroots needs and aspirations are considered. CAMPFIRE as a programme targeted on rural communities involvement stands to gain	Decreasing status within the community/society as traditional values are eroded and status now based on educational levels, knowledge and economic achievements thus creating tensions with the new leadership Deals with issues pertaining to customary law which are not specified so open to any interpretation and may thus undermine the roles of chiefs in NRM issues and land-as seen by fact that RDC authorities do not perceive customary law as including land allocation Danger of the office becoming irrelevant due to overlaps in duties with RDC and wider jurisdiction with little means of maintaining the community's support. In most areas the role of Chiefs in NRM taken as spiritual (i.e deal with issues of tradition through the *mhondoros*) and in areas where traditional religious practices are dying down the chiefs have no significant role to play Used by some local authority and NGOs to rubber stamp community projects so as to get community approval thus CAMPFIRE may become a community project with the chief's approval but little /no community approval.

Table 20 Continued

Leadership	Opportunities	Threats
Headman	Operate within a recognized geographical jurisdiction (ward) so has higher chances of being involved in community initiatives (CAMPFIRE) than the chief. Already receiving allowances from government, so in areas where rewards to leaders in NRM are becoming an area of conflict, these can fill in the gap. Provide continuity within local NRM skills as they are co-opted into NRM committees (WWC) Community acceptance can be used to get status and money within the CAMPFIRE programme	Possible threats from new local organizations such as WARDCO and WWC in the role played in community programmes. Increase in community heterogeneity due to in migration may result in lose of authentic respect and authority based on traditional (kinship) ties. This may impact negatively on CAMPFIRE since the programme is more likely to succeed in areas in which communities are closely knit

Table 20 Continued

Leadership	Opportunities	Threats
Kraal heads	Community legitimacy and gravitation towards kraal heads due to failure of WARCO and VIDCO provide an opportunity for the kraal heads to have greater role and power in land and NRM administration. Recognition of the *de facto* roles of the kraal heads (land allocation, conflict resolution, collection of taxes for council and leadership in community projects can be utilized and legitimized thus enabling them full involvement in CAMPFIRE Due to close proximity and interaction with the community have a higher opportunity to be key in further devolution of power and participation to the lowest accountable local unit (household and individual). With in-migration and increases in the heterogeneity of communities, kraal heads have a higher chance of maintaining their traditional respect within the new community due to their involvement in land allocation, and welfare concern for the community (drought relief distribution). Thus they can be involved in resolving likely NR use conflicts due to differences in focal economic activities of the new and original residents (wildlife and cattle)	Possible to be stripped of all remaining community ordained authority through the new structures such as VWC and VIDCO. Interest in money may discredit the leaders with the community hence lose legitimacy.

Table 20 Continued

Leadership	Opportunities	Threats
WARDCO	Can play a role in the wider forum as a link to organizations and government to influence policies which impact on communities within NRM	Autonomy curtailed by dependence on the RDC for financial resources. Subordination highly probable due to official sanctioning related to political party. Covers too wide a jurisdiction which may render government by collective agreement and control through peer pressure ineffective. Thus, the role of the organization in CBNRM within a common property regime may become dysfunctional
VIDCO	Involvement in wildlife management provides resources for the leadership to be functional (training and finances through the WWC).	Absolution highly probable due to de-participation and lack of a specific code of operation. Subject to political and individual hijacking for political advances since there's no democratic way of selecting or monitoring leaders.
Ward Councillor	High chances of individual political advancement in the external environment Strengthening position by taking role in the District Wildlife Committee administrative structures.	Too much reliance on the district centre (RDC) and pressure from the centre to adhere to local government policies may result in alienation and lack of accountability and representation of the constituency needs
Village Wildlife Committee	Potential for greater involvement as the lowest officially recognized accountable unit in CAMPFIRE	Becoming dysfunctional due to being overshadowed by the WWC and VIDCO, with competition from the kraal heads

Table 20 Continued

Leadership	Opportunities	Threats
Ward Wildlife Committee	Due to interaction and training gained through involvement with NGOs and RDC, leaders are in position to lobby for support for the community in changing the autonomy status of the ward. Based on the principle of the original CAMPFIRE document in which there would be community co-operatives with share members, the WWC is in a position to become an autonomous economic unit once skills and ability to manage has been proved. This is feasible for wards with small populations and high wildlife populations	Focus of external agencies on training leaders in technical and financial skills without ensuring feedback can create a local leadership elite which is not in touch with the community needs but having wider external approval, thus undermining the objective of the CBNRM programme to involve communities in decision making. Liable to corruption due to the high sums of money involved and the distance from the monitoring centre, which is aggravated by the lack of local administrative centre to enforce accountability. Existence dependant on the economic viability of CAMPFIRE which is influenced by unstable international hunting markets. Bias of CAMPFIRE towards wildlife limits the scaling up of the structure into areas with no wildlife High leadership turnover may result in failure to build up an authentic NRM capacity within the community

6.4   DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

The principle in democratically electing leaders is that the communities create the leaders (Esman and Uphoff, 1984). Communities are therefore urged to elect leaders at a general meeting (for WARDCOs, VIDCOs, WWCs and VWCs). Usually the most prominent people within the community are chosen (Esman and Uphoff, 1984). Once these leaders have been elected, they become the channel of communication between the government agencies and NGOs. These leaders are trained and given authority and responsibility to manage community resources. The more training these leaders get, the greater the distance between the community and leaders. Thus an unequal power relation is created by creating a new leadership institution which "represents" the community.

Development practitioners find it easier to work with a small group within the community such as the leaders. In effect the concept of participation is defeated as only the leaders are participating (Murphree, 1994). This is more so in a situation where the community cannot demand accountability from its leadership. Thus training of leaders should be with membership involvement so as to enhance the existing leadership pool (capacity) within the community and to empower the community to demand accountability. People can only truly monitor their leaders if they are clear on the goals of the programmes, the rights and duties of the leadership. Within CAMPFIRE local government and NGO support to leaders has been through formal training in financial management (bookkeeping), NRM management (through PARs, game scouts, PAC and quota setting). This information has not, in many situations been passed onto the community. Hence the objectives of the community and those of the programmes may be totally different. There is need for further devolution of authority to local people (not leadership) so as to empower them to monitor and evaluate their leadership based on the same objectives, understanding of the leaders' assigned roles and status within the programmes

Traditional leadership (headman and kraal heads) have community legitimacy which has persisted in different economic and political orders. The Land Tenure Commission Report (1994) shows that people in the communal areas of Zimbabwe have gravitated towards traditional leaders in issues pertaining to land, and natural resource management. Land in the communal areas is held under traditional freehold tenure which gives rights of use to the family. Most people in the communal areas would want government to restore the role and powers of traditional leaders in land and NRM administration (Land Tenure Commission Report, 1994).

Given this state of affairs and the need for community participation as a vehicle of CBNRM, it is important that the opportunity which traditional leaders especially kraal heads present for further

devolution of power and community involvement be considered by local government and other agencies involved in CAMPFIRE and other community-based initiatives within the country.

Though the Chiefs and Headmen Act recognizes the role of the chief and headmen it does not recognize the kraal heads yet they still perform many functions. These functions include land allocation, conflicts resolution, collection of taxes for council and leadership in community projects (Land Tenure Commission Report, 1994). Hence the *de facto* roles of the kraal heads if fully utilized and legitimized can be an opportunity to have them involved in CAMPFIRE fully. These kraal heads already have experience local leadership and have not only community acceptance but even government and other external agencies as kraal heads are perceived as being more reliable. Given that when people have problems they first go to the kraal heads these are more likely to still retain the community's welfare at heart. In other words the traditional leadership is still not politicized and hence can be assumed to be more accountable and likely to deliver the goods. Chiefs and headmen already get an allowance from local government. To address, the issue of rewards for leaders in CAMPFIRE (committee allowances), these leaders can act as community representatives in issues pertaining to NRM, thus cutting the proportion of community revenues spent on leadership allowances.

Given the numerous calls to include traditional leadership in community-based development initiatives, it is important not to take this as the panacea of sustainable community development initiatives. Traditional leadership like any other leadership has its own weaknesses. Traditional leadership is hereditary and terms of office is for life (Holleman, 1969; Gelfand, 1965). Due to these two reasons, there is no room to remove corrupt and inefficient leaders. Though checks and balances exist within the traditional leadership structures in the form of a council of advisors known as *dare* (Holleman, 1969), these have been weakened by the erosion of the authority and responsibility of traditional leaders.

The authority to affect resource use and hence the source of income for management activities is still controlled by the centre (Rural District Council and DNP&WLM). Communities are given the impression that they have the authority to decide who gets the lease on the safari operations within the communal areas. In reality it is the RDC which has been given appropriate authority, and hence negotiates the leasing contracts. Communities manage the natural resources which the Safari Operator utilizes for revenue, yet the communities' needs/opinions are not considered fully in the granting of the lease. This situation creates a potential for conflict between the community, council and the safari operator. Once the lease has been given, the safari operator interacts with the

community on a daily basis by sharing the same natural resources with them. If the spatial definition of community is taken, the safari operator is in effect part of the community. Yet the safari operator is accountable to the council only through revenue at the end of the hunting season. Situations have arisen where the community's management activities were in direct conflict to the safari operator's operations (when the community through the WWC is carrying out early burning as a fire management activity while the safari operator was carrying out hunting expeditions).

This situation can be re-addressed by the involvement of local leaders such as the chief, councillor in the higher tier decision making bodies such as the DWC. This will enable the aspirations and expectations of the communal area people to be addressed in policy formulation related to NRM. Chiefs have a council of chiefs and parliamentary representatives who can tabulate community needs within CAMPFIRE at national levels. Councillors can greatly influence the RDC policy towards further devolution of NRM power and authority to the community through the DWC and DDCO since councillors are members. In most districts the CAMPFIRE wards are in the minority and therefore their representatives fail to secure full support from other non CAMPFIRE wards within the same RDC jurisdiction.

CHAPTER 7

7. CONCLUSIONS

The sustainability of CBNRM programmes depends on the legitimacy, accountability and perceived effectiveness of local leadership, and the cost-benefit distribution within the community. Findings of this study show that within the Kanyurira ward, there exists formal and informal leadership which the community perceives differently. Changes occurring within the institutional structures in the country from pre-independence to CAMPFIRE periods have resulted in the present overlaps in roles, functions and structures of community leadership in the communal areas of Zimbabwe.

The traditional and informal leadership structures within the community have local legitimacy, and outside legitimacy. New leadership (WARDCO, VIDCO) has external and formal legitimacy but almost no community legitimacy and institutionalization. Informal and traditional leadership such as the chief, headman and kraal head have persisted over time and still has community legitimacy and support. The dysfunctional VIDCOs and WARDCOs have enhanced the kraal heads local status. Farther creation of new community leadership institutions such as the WWC and VWC in CAMPFIRE has resulted in overlaps, role conflicts and tensions at local level. This is more so in that most of the leadership operates on the same hierarchal level and have the same constituency. The WWC, WARDCO and headman have the same constituency and deal with the same community issues. However not only the community determines the authenticity of these leaders but also the higher level leadership within the institutional hierarchy in which they occur. Failure of the higher tier leadership to fulfil their roles and offer management support reduces the community leadership effectiveness in fulfilling the expected leadership role performance.

Community legitimacy of any leadership institution is based on the community's evaluation of the leaders' role performance in fulfilling community needs over time. The new CAMPFIRE structures have gained acceptance and legitimacy mainly due to the monetary benefits with which they are associated.

Social differentiation exists within the community, with emerging categories of generational, educational level, kinship, ethnicity and leadership positions. The introduction of CBNRM programmes has exacerbated these different categories through the collective decision making system. At general meetings which are the community's collective decision making forums, these categories have an impact on community decisions, especially leadership selection.

Different categories and groups within the community have different perceptions of the CBNRM

programme which are expressed in their expectations from the community leadership. The young and educated people within the community perceive CAMPFIRE as an opportunity to enhance their social and economic status through employment, funding for income generating projects, wider exposure and involvement in the external environment. They also aspire for positions within the CAMPFIRE leadership. The older generation on the other hand is interested in the income directly derived from CAMPFIRE. These differences in expectations and aspirations from CAMPFIRE or any CBNRM programme means that there are different leadership role and status expectations within the community.

Involvement of leaders in the external environment and limited community understanding of the new leadership roles (both internal and external) creates problems for leaders. Failure of the community's monitoring and evaluation criteria of leaders to incorporate the changes in the leadership roles becomes a hindrance to effective leadership.

The community is in a transitional stage with leaders and the community adjusting to changes due to the increased monetary value of resources within the ward and external influences. The increases in the number of external agencies working with the community leadership in NRM, has resulted in a shifting of the accountability criterion within the community. This has produced a mismatch between the community perceptions of the leadership role, status and influence and the perceptions of the agencies working with the community. Leadership changes have occurred due to demands and pressure from the external environment on the community. Therefore, the selection criteria has had to change from considering old and uneducated people to young and educated people in leadership.

Community leadership has become assertive in dealing with external agencies. With involvement in the monetarised and commercialization of natural resources, costs and benefits exist for the leaders and community. Perceptions on the costs and benefits differ for the community, leaders and external agencies. This creates tensions and suspicions as there is no sound, approved and uniform monitoring and an evaluation criterion for leaders in CAMPFIRE. Thus failure by any of the actors to understand the role of other actors results in conflictive expectations. Each of the higher tier leadership and external agencies have their own expectations of the role of local leadership. These expectations are based on the organizations' goals and objectives in rural development and CAMPFIRE. Based on these expectations, an evaluation and monitoring criteria for community leadership which is different from that of the community is used. This further creates conflict and difficulties for the community leadership in carrying out their expected leadership role.

The commercialization of natural resources through CAMPFIRE has influenced community perceptions of leaders based on the distribution of costs and benefits between the community and the leaders. Costs in community decision making and the management of CAMPFIRE within the ward is shouldered by the leaders who have to pay individual costs and receive individual benefits. In comparison the wider community derives group benefits and costs. Opportunities for political advancement and knowledge enhancement which are open to the leaders through the CAMPFIRE initiative have a potential to widen the gap between leaders and the community and enhance chances for corruption in leaders. The widening gap between leaders and community can make the leaders irrelevant though they may continue to have external legitimacy and approval. Community empowerment through leadership training is important, but should also be accompanied by further empowering the wider community so that they can demand accountability from its leaders. The community can then be involved in the evaluation of CAMPFIRE and similar community development initiatives, so that the community's perceptions on leadership-community cost and benefit distributions are considered. This is crucial in a programme such as CAMPFIRE whose objective is to cause equitable distribution of costs and benefits within CBNRM.

By considering the community legitimacy and selection criteria for leaders implementing agencies and community leaders within the community can fulfil the community's expected role performance. It is only as leaders fulfil the community leadership role performance that they gain legitimacy. New leadership may have official legitimacy and approval, based on NGOs and government agencies expectations of the role and status of this leadership. If this does not conform with the community's expectations of the roles and status then that leadership will not gain community acceptance, thus defeating the whole purpose of having introduced it in the first place.

The community and external agencies use different selection and legitimation criterion for NRM leadership. The community uses individual behaviour, age (preferring older people) and ethnicity and kinship in selecting leaders. External agencies on the other hand consider education and technical skills. Community legitimation is based on evaluating the leaders in office. The evaluation parameters are; frequency of movement in and out of the ward, response to community requests, community involvement in decision making, individual leadership conduct, status of individual leaders and financial accountability (through frequency of feedback and that there are no rumours of financial misuse from the RDC). The external evaluation is based on financial accountability through financial records, technical skills and performance

New Directions

From the study new directions for the sustainability of CAMPFIRE are necessary. Based on the community perceptions of tenure or proprietorship in CAMPFIRE, the programme rests on a weak footing. If people perceive that the natural resources are not theirs and that they do not really have the authority to decide in NRM, they will not be fully involved and the long term sustainability of the programme remains uncertain. The RDC as it has the appropriate authority should consider granting a *de facto* long term appropriation to communities. This may eventually become total private (communal) ownership in the long term once the institutional structures to initiate this are in place.

The RDCs are the Appropriate Authorities in CAMPFIRE. In this regard they hold the managerial and use decision making power and authority. Communities within CAMPFIRE are merely management units. There is need for further devolution to the lowest accountable unit. In this regard the kraal heads provide a legitimate and institutionalized vehicle for lower level community participation in community-based initiatives. The kraal heads already have an effective *de facto* role which can be utilized.

From the findings of the study failure by the higher level leadership to provide management support to the community leadership is detrimental to the leadership and the programme. This is due to the community's evaluation of leaders performance in terms of their delivering and fulfilling community needs. Failure and delays by the RDC to train WWC leadership results in ineffectiveness and the blame and the community and leaders bear costs. Delays at the RDC in processing community CAMPFIRE revenues results in the community leadership (WWC) losing credibility with the community. Once this happens it becomes difficult for the leaders to maintain their authority and power with the community to enforce conformity to the NRM by laws.

Focussing training on leadership creates a community elite and discrepancies in the distribution of benefits since leaders end up receiving more money as sitting allowances in the number of workshops (training and research) and number of visitors received within the ward.

In the training there is need for skills within the wider community so that the community can objectively monitor and evaluate the leadership role performance. This will enable the community to make informed decisions since CBNRM is hinged on collective decision making. Uninformed decisions can cost the community in the long term and act as a disincentive to continue with sustainable NRM programmes as CAMPFIRE. There is need for research on the importance of community information in collective decision making. Training the wider community is costly, yet

there is need to come up with some acceptable level of empowering the community for informed decision making.

Changes in the role of leaders due to their involvement in the wider economy needs to be considered and understood by the community and external agencies. Communities can only understand the role of leaders if it is explained to them. The new leadership has to be outward looking and ambitious to fulfil the demands of the external environment.

External agencies can easily continue to work with defunct community leadership and still achieve technical objectives while failing to enhance community participation, benefits and institutional capacity. Technical objectives are achieved in the short term but may not be sustainable in the long term. There is need for implementing agencies within CAMPFIRE to be in touch with leaders and the community so that objectives of CAMPFIRE of benefitting and including the lowest accountable unit which is the household and individual are achieved. In this regard kraal heads have the potential to become vehicles of this lower level participation as they are closely and daily in contact with the community. How further devolution of management control and authority will be structured and delivered is important so that it does not impose costs on the leaders individually, with the community and external agencies (higher level leadership and NGOs) receiving the benefits without bearing the corresponding costs.

Observations made in this study on leadership, although they were in a particular ward within the CAMPFIRE context, they probably have wider relevance in other CBNRM interventions such as ADMADE[41] in Zambia.

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[41]Administrative Management Design (ADMADE) which is a co-management programme between communities and state conservation agencies in Zambia

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1

Community Respondents List

	Family Name	Age	Educational level	Membership	Sex
1.	Chisunga	old	None	Y	M
2.	Chisunga	old	None	Y	M
3.	Chisunga	Young	None	N	F
4.	Chisunga	Young	Grade 7	Y	M
5.	Chisunga	Young	Grade 7	N	M
6.	Chisunga	Old	None	Y	F
7.	Fakero	Old	None	Y	M
8.	Fakero	Old	None	Y	M
9.	Fakero	Young	Form 4	Y	M
10.	Fakero	Young	Grade 7	Y	M
11.	Fakero	Young	Grade 7	Y	M
12.	Chaukura	Young	Grade 7	Y	F
13.	Chaukura	Old	None	Y	M
14.	Chaukura	Old	None	Y	F
15.	Chaukura	Young	Grade 7	Y	M
16.	Chaukura	Old	Grade 2	Y	M
17.	Chaukura	Young	None	Y	M
18.	Chenjerai	Young	Grade 7	Y	M
19.	Chenjerai	Old	None	Y	M
20.	Chenjerai	Old	None	Y	M
21.	Chenjerai	Young	None	N	F

No.	Family Name	Age	Educational level	Membership	Sex
22.	Chenjerai	Old	None	Y	F
23.	Chenjerai	Young	Form 4	Y	M
24.	Zengeretsi	Old	None	N	M
25.	Zengeretsi	Old	None	Y	F
26.	Zengeretsi	Old	Read and Write	Y	M
27.	Zengeretsi	Young	Grade 7	N	M
28.	Zengeretsi	Young	Grade 6	Y	F
29.	Zengeretsi	Young	Grade 5	N	F
30.	Dzomba	Old	None	Y	M
31.	Dzomba	Old	None	Y	F
32.	Dzomba	Old	None	Y	M
33.	Dzomba	Young	Form 4	N	M
34.	Dzomba	Young	Grade 7	N	F
35.	Dzomba	Young	Grade 7	Y	M
36.	Shonhiwa-(newcomer)	Old	None	N	F
37.	Shonhiwa-(newcomer)	Young	Grade 7	N	M
38.	Shonhiwa-(newcomer)	Old	None	N	F
39.	Shonhiwa-(newcomer)	Young	None	N	F
40.	Shenjere-(newcomer)	Young	Educated	N	M
41.	Aidi -(newcomer)	Old	None	N	M

Key: F -Female, M-Male, N-not a CAMPFIRE member, Y-CAMPFIRE member

APPENDIX 2

Questionnaire administered to Ward Wildlife Committee Members (Current and Previous members)

Questionnaire administered to people currently and previously in Wildlife Committee in Kanyurira Ward -Guruve Zimbabwe

A. Time

1a)   How much time did/do you spend in NRM related work

	Duration
Daily (hours)	
Weekly (days)	
Monthly (weeks or days)	

1b) Is this:

(i).   Too little   ☐

(ii).   Adequate   ☐

(iii).   Too much   ☐

2). Does this in any way affect your other activities ?

YES ☐   NO ☐

2b). If YES, How?

....

....

....

3) How many meetings did you/do you attend for:

	Weekly	Monthly	Yearly
Ward Wildlife Committee			
Rural district Council			
NGO (specify)			
Other (Specify)			

4a) How many workshops or tours do/did you attend for NRM at:

Place	Number of Workshops attended per year		
	1995	1996	1997
Kanyurira Ward			
Mushumbi			
Guruve			
Harare			
Other (specify)			

4b) Which was the most rewarding to you as a leader?

Place	Rating of Workshops		
	1995	1996	1997
Kanyurira Ward			
Mushumbi			
Guruve			
Harare			
Other (specify)			

4c) Why?

....

....

....

B.   Decision making

5)How do you make decisions pertaining to NRM?

....
....
....
....
....

6a) Are these decisions carried out?

YES ☐   NO ☐

6b) If No, what hinders the carrying out of these decisions?

....
....
....
....

7) What makes it difficult to carry out your duties at:

a) Kanyurira Ward

....
....
....

b) Outside the Ward

....
....
....

8) Which organizations/ groups impact on decisions made by:

a) the Ward Wildlife Committee

Organization/Group	Impact

b) the Kanyurira Community

Organization/Group	Impact

9a) Is there conflict between your office (as a leader) and position as a member of the community

YES ☐　　　　　　NO ☐

9b) If YES, how?

....
....
....

10a) Which age group do you mostly work with?

Below 18 years ☐

18-30 years ☐

30-50 years ☐

Greater than 50 years ☐

10b) Why?

....
....
....
....

C.   Benefits

11) How long would /did you want to be in office

Less 2 years ☐

2 years ☐

3-5 years ☐

Greater 5 years ☐

12) Why did you get into leadership?

....
....
....
....
....

APPENDIX 3a: Group Discussion with kraal heads

Historically how were decisions made

How has this changed

Which is a better system

How can the new and old decision making systems be merged

APPENDIX 3b
Structured Interviews: Basic Questions

Leadership Selection:

What is your definition of a leader in NRM

What are the rules governing NRM

Are you aware of the constitution? Do you consider this when you selecting a leader?

What has been the trend in leadership selection since 1987-1997

What has contributed to these changes

What other factors apart from the constitution do you think influences leadership selection

How was the current committee selected

What do you consider when selecting a leader

Adherence:

What are the benefits from adhering to the NRM rules

What are the benefits from following and supporting NRM leadership

Which type of leadership do you find easier to support / work with in NRM

What are the costs from adhering to NRM rules

What are the costs from following and supporting NRM leadership

How are these costs and benefits distributed within the community (who bears the coasts/ which part of the community)

Are there changes that you would want to see in this distribution

What are the costs to those in leadership as far as NRM is concerned

What are the benefits

Legitimacy:

What makes you accept leadership (All)

How long does it take for people to accept leadership

Who legitimizes new leadership institutions : community or outsiders

Other issues:

What influences NRM programmes

What major issues/ factors have influenced NRM since 1987-1997

What progress/ development have you realized since you got involved in NRM programme

Should we say leadership has led to these developments or else there has been some assistance from:

a) outsiders

b) other

How have these outsiders helped you

Do you think your leaders would maintain the skills gained in leadership if outsiders leave you

What else would you expect from your leadership considering that its a new NRM leadership, apart from what you have so far seen in them.

Decision implementation

How long does it take to implement decisions

Why is it like that

Why are some decisions not carried out

Own leadership selection criteria (changes over the last 10 years)

What do you consider when selecting leaders in CAMPFIRE (Previous and current)

Kinship:

Which are the dominant families in terms of numbers

Which families are found in most leadership positions? What is the reason for this

APPENDIX 4
Kanyurira Ward Wildlife Constitution (translated from Shona Language)

Aims of the by-laws:
1.   To conserve natural resources in the Ward
2.   To conserve natural resources for their respective utilization
3.   To be able to use the money that we get from natural resources wisely
4.   To be able to preserve and the history of natural resources in the area.
5.   The WWC will call Ward meetings at which the community will be briefed and updated on CAMPFIRE issues (financial feedback)

Inside the fence
1.   When wild animals get inside the fence, they should be driven out of it. The animals are such as buffaloes and elephants because they are problem animals and are threat to people and crops.
2.   The community should dig wells for wild animals to have access to water when dams outside the fence dry up.
3.   In future the community can expand the fence boundary so as to accommodate more people in respect of land.
4.   The plan for the fence extension is in place and the targeted area is Nyanhanga.
5.   Trees should not be cut for no user for no apparent reason.
6.   It is an offence to cut off trees for no apparent reason. If one is found guilty of this offence, one will be charged for this by the Ward Wildlife Committee.

Fish
We are allowed to catch fish using fishing rods and by using free hands. When fish is on the point of death because of lack of water in the river, the people are allowed to get the fish for food.

How are we going to get money?
1.   By selling our wild animals to clients (safari hunting).
2.   By killing our wild animals so as to sell the meat among ourselves.
3.   By building chalets to be rented out to people visiting the Ward.

Utilization of money generated.

1.   The money is to be used for different projects that will be beneficial to the people (infrastructural development).

2.   The border line of Masoka residential area starts from Manongora East and ends at the road that comes from Hunting Camp West, leading to the mountains.

3.   We work under the control of the government which is in harmony with the Council

Membership in CAMPFIRE

1.   Anybody with a National registration card with the Guruve District code 71 and has been approved by the Wildlife Committee.

2.   Anybody who is good (responsible) and has been involved in CAMPFIRE activities.

3.   Anybody who can conserve natural resources.

4.   Anybody who attends community development meetings regularly.

5.   A person who is interested in the conservation of natural resources.

6.   A person who abides by the conservation by laws for five years.

7.   A person who has stayed for five years in Masoka and whose National registration certificate is marked 71.

8.   The person must be somebody who is married.

9.   Somebody who has changed his or her citizenship for Guruve district.

Qualifications for approval

A person who lives at Masoka and abides by the rules of conservation of natural resources.

Dismissal for members

1.   Anybody who commits an offence four times must be dismissed.

2.   Anybody who commits a serious offence must be dismissed immediately

What should be done by the members

1.   Members should abide by the Ward constitutional by-laws.

2.   Members must attend meetings regularly to keep informed about the dismissal of some of the members.

Methods of inviting people to attend meetings

1. The Ward Wildlife Chairman and the Secretary may send the message of invitation to the members of the community through school children.
2. They may also write letters of invitation and send them to the members of the community through the VIDCO Chairman.
3. Inviting the people to attend a meeting should be done in seven days in advance.
4. A letter of invitation should confirm the nature of the meeting, the kind of people to attend the meeting, time, venue and it must also confirm the person who replaces the Chairman and Vice Chairman in the absence of both of them.
5. In the absence of the Chairman and the Vice Chairman, the Secretary should replace the Chairman and the Vice Secretary must work as the Secretary.

Quorum

If half of the people in the Ward are present at the set venue the meeting will proceed. If the number is less than half, a meeting will be called three times and on the third announcement the meeting will proceed with the people who are present even if they are less than half.

Vote

Voting will be done by lifting up hands at community meeting. In the event of a tie, the presiding officer will cast his own vote.

Minutes

Minutes should be written properly. They should indicate the number of people who were present and those who called the meeting.

Purposes of General Meeting

General meetings inform the people about developments or changes that may have taken place. When the constitutional by-laws are to be changed, the members of the community must be informed and involved.

Special General Meeting

People are invited to attend the meeting through school children. The number of people in attendance should be a quarter of the Ward for the meeting to proceed. If the number is less, the meeting should proceed and the proceedings later given to the whole community as a report.

Duties of the Secretary

1. To put into writing all the activities
2. To keep a record of Committee activities
3. To invite people to community and committee meetings
4. To keep the membership register

Duties of the Chairman

1. To be in chair all the meetings attended. In his absence, the Vice Chairman must replace him. The Chairman should prepare agendas of the forthcoming meetings.

Treasurer

1. To keep money by banking it. All counting for the money is done by him.

Village game scouts

To conserve natural resources.

To protect natural resources from poaching and misuse

To remove wire snares and arrest poachers

Give wildlife reports to the wildlife committee.

The Grounds on which Committee members are dismissed

1. Failure to keep records of meetings
2. Committing offences
3. Going mad or being ill for a long time

Money Withdrawals from Ward Account:

1. Chairman
2. Secretary
3. Treasurer
4. Money is withdrawn by three people
5. The Committee members must be paid allowances when they work for the community.

How do we spend our money?

We withdraw some money from our bank account so as to establish some projects that serve the interests of the community. The community is also given some money in form of dividends and the money comes from this bank account. This is done so that the community can appreciate the concept of CAMPFIRE.

Making Constitutional by-laws

The community should be notified seven days in advance about the intention of making or amending the constitutional by-laws.

Qualifications for new CAMPFIRE members

1.   Five years of living at Masoka
2.   Adherence to the constitutional by-laws in conservation
3.   The Committee must be notified about his or her plans to become a member of the project.

The Ward Constitution

Ward Wildlife Committee should have a copy as well as the WADCO and the Headman.

Disqualification from CAMPFIRE membership

1.   Anybody found guilty of catching wild animals
2.   Anybody found guilty of catching fish using nets
3.   Anybody found guilty of cutting down trees for no sound reason.

If a person is found in possession of a wild animal they will be convicted in the criminal courts of the land. After serving the jail sentence, they should pay for the offence. If they refuse their membership will be suspended for five years.

The Ward financial year

Our year starts from September and ends in August the following year.

Records and Register

Record of minutes of community and committee meetings
Register of membership.

APPENDIX 5

Leadership Respected and Reasons: a community perspective

Position	Number of Responses
Chief/headman	21
Spirit medium	17
Councillor	10
Sabhuku	8
WWC	5
Development committees	2
Zanu (PF)	2
All (1-5)	1

Reasons for respecting these leadership institutions:

1.   Chief

The chief is taken as the owner of the area as he holds it in trust for the people and allocates land to the kraal heads. He is also taken as a father head and most people call him "sekuru" meaning "grandfather" and some say he is the "owner of the people". Due to this he maintains harmony in the community. This was observed at a recent community meeting in which the headman called with the aim of building up the community's cohesiveness and oneness which was being destroyed due to several rumours in the management of NRM finances. In most community decisions the chief's decision is final if there is disagreement within the community.

Other reasons given were that the chief works hand in hand with the spirit medium. The chief has never disrupted community decisions as he is perceived as having the community's interests at heart. The chief produces tangible results unlike other leadership within the ward. Other respondents mentioned that the chief brings feedback from the Rural District Council to the people through his meetings with the District Administrator and has good interaction with the community.

2.   Spirit Medium

The whole area is taken as belonging to the spirit medium and he works hand in hand with the chief in the governance of the area. Another reason given was that he never disrupts community decisions and produces tangible results.

3.   Councillor

He is taken as the representative of the people to the RDC as well as the RDC representative at Ward level. Reasons given for this office being respected include:

Carries people's problems to the RDC and brings feedback from the RDC

Has higher authority than other offices within the Ward

Does not disrupt community decisions

4.   Kraal heads/sabhukus

These are clan heads and work hand in hand with the chief. They are respected due to this and are taken as the owners of the people. Other reasons include:

- the sabhukus do not get any money
- they give feedback and have good interaction with people
- they are taken as "baba" or "fathers" to their families hence it is easier to speak with them with no fear or threats

5.   Ward Wildlife Committee

This is the natural resource management committee within the Ward managing resources and financial proceeds from the utilization of these resources. This committee is elected every tow years. Reasons given for it being respected include:

- the committee is easier to work with and listens to people's complaints
- they are perceived as giving money hence people respond quickly to any meeting called by this institution
- the committee can be removed from office if mismanaging finances or not working well. This makes it easier to work with them unlike other institutions such as chief, sabhuku and spirit medium who hold office for life

6.   Development Committees.

These include project committees who get money from the WWC such as the school, tractor, clinic, women's club, soccer club. No reasons were given for their respected status.

7.   Zanu(PF)

The party is not functional in the Ward, but the reason given for it being respected is that the current government and the party are one, so respect accorded to the government is the same as the respect given to the party as an organization.

Acceptance of new leadership institutions:

Leadership institutions within the Ward are categorized into two namely:

      1.   Traditional leadership -headman, sabhukus, spirit medium

      2.   Modern leadership -WWC, development committees, Councillor, RDC reps

The traditional leadership is recognized and accepted by the people since they are used to them and its part of their cultural heritage. New institutions being introduced into the area have to be accepted by the community for them to be fully functional and effective. From the responses given the following were given as reasons for accepting these leadership institutions:

- Community understanding of the role of the institution through explanations given irrespective of who is giving the explanations. This reason was given by 17 of the interviewees.
- The perceived benefits from the introduction of the institution
- Previously accepted new institutions with the hope that the area which was very remote may be developed
- Government rules (e.g. Councillor) so can not go against the government
- Introduced by the RDC or by other organizations with approval from the RDC such as NGOs'
- Final acceptance comes with the tangible results/benefits to the community as a result of that office (e.g. Councillor facilitated the building of the first classroom block in the Ward)

APPENDIX 6

Letter of Invitation sent to CAMPFIRE actors by Headman Kanyurira

APPENDIX 7
Kanyurira Community Definition of CAMPFIRE membership

A CAMPFIRE project member is:

1. A person who was born in Masoka and was in the area at the inception of the project
2. A person with national registration district number 71
3. A young person who has been married for two years
4. If someone was born in Masoka but was away for some time, they should spend five years before becoming a member
5. A resident of the area that is of Korekore or Dema descent
6. Someone who supports the project through attendance and participation at General meetings

APPENDIX 8
CAMPFIRE review Report by Kanyurira Ward Wildlife Committee   1995/96

Masoka Annual CAMPFIRE project Review Report
Introduction
CAMPFIRE is a programme which has effectively transformed the life of the people of Masoka culturally and economically. For instance, a number of development projects have been identified and implemented and some other projects are underway. The programme caters for conservation activities for the natural resources within and around Masoka ward - which have earned the community some money since 1986 up to date. The CAMPFIRE project year commences every March. The current report is from March 1996 to March 1997. The project is managed by a Ward Wildlife Committee which oversees all activities on conservation and use of the resources. The committee is made up of nine members with the chief and councillor inclusive. The following table shows the proposed projects and their status

OUTPUTS

Planned Projects	Status	Problems	Solution	Comment
Bus or lorry	Not bought	Budget not accepted by the community	To be budgeted for 1997/98	Community chose lorry
Bigger tractor	Not bought	Wildlife revenue too small	Discussions to be held with the community	
Supermarket	Not built, budgeted for in 1995	Money used for drought relief	Discussion to be held with community on current thoughts	
3 guns	One gun bought	Money not adequate . Problem in getting proper caliber	Opt for shotguns and budget more money	
Dividends	None	More members than budgeted for as had planned to cut down on amount per household	Balance obtained from people receiving ½ the dividend amount e g widows and widowers	People realizing mistake of opting for more money
Wildlife office renovations	Not done	Money used for other unbudgeted items	To be budgeted in 1997	Realized other items to be budgeted for in 1997
Clinic Project -Water -Electricity -Fencing	-Piped water in place -Quotations for installation of electricity -Fencing not done	-Money inadequate -Water tank not built, polythene tanks bought instead -Clinic committee not effective	Discussions to be held with community and budget for 1997 -Re-elect an efficient clinic committee	Water serving clinic and community

Chalets for photographic safari	Not done	Wildlife revenue in adequate	Obtained funding from USAID for 1997 if approved	Should be done urgently
Training WWC in Project Management	Done, Financial training in October 1996	Course was short Course came too late in the year so WWC were inefficient	New WWC members be trained before getting into office	
Wildlife Officer	Not Done	Money inadequate	Budget for 1997	
Guest House	Site selected Feasibility study done Project plan done	Not budgeted for and no community approval	Discussions with community and budget for 1997	
Quota setting	Done	No quota set for cropping (meat)		
Early Burning	Not done though planned for. Done by the safari operator alone	Communication breakdown with safari operator	To be planned and budgeted for 1997	
Water Survey	Done by Game guards	Reports submitted to WWC not read so not aware of this	Each WWC ember to be assigned to manege workers and activities	
Animal population counts (transects)	Done	No transport to cover large area so not able to walk in the early hours as it should be	Buy bikes Hire tractor	More transects to Chituhwi per month at most 3
Patrol (local)	Done	None		
Larger area patrols	Not done	No transport No camping kits	Budget and buy camping kit Hire tractor	

Monitoring safari operator	Did one in June and July	Local monitors not accepted by safari operator Only RDC monitors recognized by the RDC and safari operator	WWC and IDO to discuss so that Game guards can monitor Monitors to liaise with WWC on hunt return records	
Fence repairs	Done	New poles not installed -no transport	Plan and budget for new poles in 1997	
Fence monitors report	Done	None		
Game guards report	Done	None		
Budget	Not yet done	None	To be done in December 1996	
Budget review	Done	Half yearly review -too spaced so failed to quickly identify problems	Financial training done Monthly reports to WWC	
Paying workers	Done	Confusion a RDC on financial status	Revenue from roan antelopes used	Made mistake in allocating wages to other uses
Fence maintenance materials	Done	Some materials not available locally	Improvision made	
Worker's uniforms	Done partly	No proper feedback t staff	Will give feedback	

Ward General meetings 1)Ward budget general meeting	Done			More general meetings to be held
Annual General Meeting	Not Done		To be done after WWC meeting	
Tree conservation	Done	None		
Problem Animal Control	Done	Slow response from National Parks In accessibility	Plan budget and buy radio communications -Discuss with RDC to get radios from Ingwe safaris Send game guards members for training	

Conclusion

The WWC is having problems of some projects not getting support form the community. It was found that the community rejects some of the proposed projects due to lack of knowledge of their importance. So awareness meetings will be conducted at VIDCO level to educate the community on the importance of other projects. We look forward to improving wherever we might have failed in the forthcoming project year

APPENDIX 9

Rates for Ward Wildlife Committee allowances 1996/97

Item:	Amount in Z$	Distance from Kanyurira
Committee Meeting sitting Allowance	50.00	
Disturbance Allowances	20.00	
Travel and Subsistence allowances:		
Masoka -Guruve	700.00	135km
Masoka-Mvurwi	720.00	
Masoka -Harare	800.00	325km
Masoka-Chinhoyi	800.00	
Masoka-Bindura	800.00	
Masoka-Mhangura	820.00	
Masoka-Mushumbi	400.00	
Masoka-Kanyemba	300.00	
Masoka-Mahuwe	400.00	
Masoka-Zambia	160.00	
Workshops	100.00	irrespective

(Source: Kanyurira WWC minutes 7 April 1997, Kanyurira)

APPENDIX 10

Hindrances to effective role performance for people in leadership in Kanyurira: WWC members' perceptions

- Some elements within the community
- Shortage of funds
- Conflict from higher authority such as Councillor. and H/man while in Guruve resulting in community agreements being changed
- Failure of some WWC members to carry out their duties
- Disagreements and conflicts within the WWC especially on duties and roles
- Some elements within community failed to see the value of some aspects of WWC duties such as writing minutes
- Lack of attendance of general meetings' by community so the WWC fails to carry out decisions
- IDO slow to organize training workshops so the WWC had to rely on own knowledge
- Comments about the WWC from the community
- Conflict within the WWC especially interference from ex-officiis and top WWC members
- Problems of collective decision making as some people could be bribed?
- Lack of understanding from within the community
- Decisions made without the community participation because people do not come for General meetings'
- None
- Educational status(lack of education) of some WWC members might cause them to disregard ideas resulting in conflict
- The community "*vabereki*" come with ideas with total disregard of the constitutional by-laws and the logistics
- Lack of feedback to the community, therefore there is a knowledge gap between the community and the WWC
- Belief/perception by some ex-officiis that the community may not accept some ideas which are beneficial to them, so end up not involving the community in the decision making process
- Lack of cooperation and communication within the WWC, with 2 or 3 people dominating