UNIVERSITY OF KWAZULU-NATAL

A Gendered Approach to Migration Through the Prism of Human Trafficking in Armed Conflicts for Terrorism: The Women of the Islamic State

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Declaration of Originality

I, Vumile Mncibi declare that,

1. The research is my original research and that all information sourced from other researchers has been acknowledged.

2. This thesis has not been submitted for any degree or examination at any other university.

3. All data, pictures, graphs or other supportive information use in this thesis been acknowledged from the sourced researcher (s).

4. This thesis consists does not consist of other persons writing, and in the case where the words of another researcher was used, the words were either:

(a) re-written and paraphrased to generate general information towards the study and progressively referenced respectively.

(b) Where their exact words have been used, then their writing has been placed in italics and inside quotation marks, and referenced.

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Abstract

The 2012 Syrian war is a major contributory factor in the growing relationship between terrorism and human-trafficking, as practiced by extremist group known as the Islamic State (IS). Terrorism and human-trafficking are known to thrive as individual criminal platforms that play out as weapons of warfare in armed conflicts. However, this study identified a literature gap which prompted an inquiry into how these two platforms mutually interconnect in armed conflicts. This study particularly employed a gendered approach to understanding the roles of women in building the relationship between human trafficking and terrorism in highly patriarchal and religiously defined conflict terrorist groups, such as the Islamic State. Three interrelated theories underpinned this study. The theories include the "push and pull theory" of migration, the failed state theory, and the feminist theory, further covered by religiously defined feminist movements such as Islamic feminism and contextually to IS, jihad (i) feminism. The above theories interconnect to explain the outplays of power relations present in conflict-based terrorism in the Syrian war and IS, that has narrated the participation of women in migratory affiliated human-trafficking practices executed for purposes of terrorism. The results in this study demonstrated that the Syrian war has stood as a pivotal instrument in the institutionalising of terrorism in the country and its intensive evolution to recent practices of pseudo-state building trajectories carried out by IS. The study found that with counterterrorism trajectories quickly taking shape in the Syrian war, terrorist groups such as the IS also readapted to avoid annihilation. This caused IS to use more women as strategic frontline actors to ensure the organisation's survival. Women quickly became frontline, *cum*, sedentary actors used by IS to interject criminal platforms such as human-trafficking to aid the organisation recruit agents, generate revenue and sustain the organisation's survival and state-building initiatives amidst counterterrorism initiatives taking place in Syria. From these results, the study recommends that for groups such as IS to be conquered, counterterrorist initiatives should encompass holistic approaches that are both gendered and criminally inclusive, so that they can yield more effective results that accommodate the evolving practices of terrorist groups such as the Islamic State.

Abbreviations

IDP's-Internally Displaced Persons.

IOM-International Migration Organisation.

I.S. -Islamic State.

ISIL- Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant.

UNGA-United Nations General Assembly.

UNSC-United Nations Security Council.

NGO-Non-Governmental Organisation.

UNHROHC-United Nations Human Rights Office of the Higher Commissioner.

UNSC-CTED-United Nations Security Council-Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate.

UNHCR-United Nations Human Commissioner for Refugees.

US/ USA-United State United State/ United States of America.

ISIS- Islamic State of Iraq and Syria.

Key Terminology

Caliphate- an Arabic terminology for a semi-religious political system of governance in Islam, in which the territories of the Islamic empire is ruled by a supreme leader called a caliph (Islamic Chief or ruler).

Daesh/Diash- Arabic acronym derived from the phrase "al Dawlah al-Islameyah fi Ira wal-Sham. In literal terms it means "Islamic State in Iraq and Syria.

Hadiths-Record of traditional Islamic sayings of prophet Muhammad, revered and received as a major source of religious law and moral guidance.

Hijrah-Islamic terminology for migration into Islamic lands.

Jihad-A struggle or fight against the enemies of Islam/the spiritual struggle within oneself against sin.

Jizyah- Historically, represented a tax paid by non-Muslim to their Muslim leaders.

'Sabaya'- Islamic terminology used by IS to mean slave.

Sham/ Shaam/ Al-Sham-Arabic terminology for Syria.

Mujahideen/Mujɑhidūn-Arabic terminology for those engaged in jihad.

Muhajirah- Arabic terminology for female fighter.

Ummah-Arabic terminology for Muslim community.

Quran-A central Religious text of Islam, believed by Muslims to be a revelation from God.

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General Introduction

1.1.   Introduction and Background

This study examined the gendered nexus of human-trafficking and terrorism, driven by the conflict-terrorist group known as the Islamic State (IS) in Syria. The Mapping Militant Organisation (2021) notes that in the Syrian war, the transnational conflict-terrorist group, Islamic State, transitioned from a loosely structured terrorist entity in Iraq under Al-Qaeda, to an institutionalised theatre of terrorism. During the course of the Syrian war, the Islamic State managed to grow into a state-like structure on the back of the human-trafficking, pioneered through the abuse and use of women.

According to Hopwood (1998), Syria has always been a hot spot for power struggles in the Middle East, amongst indigenous and foreign groups, which recently re-emerged in the ongoing Syrian war. In the last decade, the Syrian war metamorphosed from an anti-regime protest movement (against the Assad regime) in 2011 to a full-fledged civil war in 2012, thereby constituting a huge destabilising force and security challenge in the Middle East region. (US State Department of State, 2012). It is therefore, crucial to note that there is an increasing diversification of armed state and non-state actors in the Syrian war. Particularly a prominent presence of conflict-terrorist actors such as the Islamic State that spread across Iraq and Syria, during the Syrian conflict.

From its liberation years, building up to engagements in the Arab warfare of the 1990s, Syria has a history of utilising and harbouring conflict terrorist actors such as the Muslim Brotherhood and Palestine Liberation Organisation in conflict situations (O'Bagy, 2012). Given this historical background, the country continues to experience many secular and religiously inspired conflict terrorist actors in the ongoing war, including the notorious Islamist conflict terrorist, the Islamic State. The Islamic State is an evolutionary conflict entity that evolved and grew from its predecessors and forefather, Al-Qaeda, after the 2002 war on terror in Afghanistan and Iraq (Kosanovich,2019), into a full-fledged pseudo-state on the rebel side of the Syrian war (Jasko et al, 2018).

Compared to preceding conflict-terrorist actors in Syria, the Islamic State's ability to shift locus from Iraq was even more evolutionary. The Islamic State infiltrated vacuum institutions and large territorial landscapes in Syria to conquer large amounts of territories and population

groups in an unprecedented state-building trajectory. According to the US Department of State (2019), the expansion of the Islamic State has been enabled by organised crimes such as human-trafficking being orchestrated through a highly gendered landscape of terrorism. Tickner (2002) identifies that this adaptation by IS was a response to the U.S and President Bush's post the 9/11 declaration of a global war on terrorism in the broader Arab world and Middle East region.

Tickner (2002) argues further that the push back against global terrorism that ensued after George Bush's declaration of war against global terrorism in 2002, observably triggered extremist Islamist groups to reconfigure themselves and their operations. This may also explain the assimilation of more women into frontline positions in their global and local terrorist operations for various strategic, operational, and survival reasons. Tickner (2002) also identifies that post 9/11 saw women increasingly becoming planners, plotters and executors of terrorism, as seen in extremist Islamist groups such as Al-Qaeda.

Tickner (2002) further outlines that the gendering of Al-Qaeda's organisational and operational structures-however within a highly patriarchal framework-may explain its sustained evolution, particularly in their warfare trajectories of 2003, 2006, 2007, 2011, and 2013 wars in Iraq and across the globe (Specia,2019). Especially amidst the counterterrorism initiatives that have thrived against extremist Islamist groups like itself; building up to the emergence of the Islamic State in the Syrian war in 2013. Cockayne and Walker (2016) explain that giving its background, the Islamic State has a history of exploitative practices towards women, including the assimilation of women into its organisation through human-trafficking. This was visibly so when IS implemented a blatant open policy of human-trafficking against women and girls, globally, regionally and locally, into its territories in Syria (and Iraq) (Cockayne and Walker, 2016).

The tactics of utilising human-trafficking in warfare situations is not new, neither is it exclusive to the Islamic State's practices in the Syrian war (Welch, 2017). According to the Amnesty International (2017/18), there are many other organised state and non-state actors, as well as global and local human-trafficking syndicates who engage in these criminal activities, both as financial generating mechanisms and weapons of war against opposing groups. However, the rapidly emerging nexus between human-trafficking and terrorism, as demonstrated by IS as a 'state building initiative', through the excessive exploitation of women and young girls, is a growing security threat that compromises the fight against terrorism (Welch, 2017).

The US Department of State (2019) illustrates that since 2015, the Islamic State in Syria has organised its ideology of terrorism around the conquest of territories and population groups in the Syrian war. It has been organised around institutionalised and organised sex slavery, forced marriages and pregnancies that are designated to populate its Islamic State. Strategically, the organisation has not just limited this to local conflict borne trafficking dynamics, but has extensively interwoven its institutional trafficking structures into global trafficking networks, to assimilate other women into its terrorist based human-trafficking endeavours (U.S Government Publishing Office, 2015). Therefore, this research examined the emergence of gendered terrorism, that feeds off organised criminal acts of human-trafficking. This study identified this global security issue is largely understudied. Thus, this study seeks to make contributions to the body of knowledge in this respect.

1.2. Key Terminology Identifications and Definitions: Armed Conflict, Human-Trafficking, Migration, Terrorism, Political Islam, ISIL, ISIS, IS, Daesh/Daish, Women.

1.2.1. Terminology and Definition of Armed Conflict.

This study has been contextualised from the anarchial environment in Syria, which is refute with different armed conflicts occuring simmulaneaously and parralel to each other in the overall Syrian war. According to Chelimo (2011) armed conflicts vary in *modus operandi* and scale. Therefore, clear parametres regarding what constitutes an armed conflict has been defined by many states and international governance bodies for various political reasons. Chelimo (2011) notes that there are three types of armed conflict that are recognised by states under international humanitarian law. These are international armed conflicts, internationalised armed conflicts and non-international armed conflicts. Chelimo (2011) identifies that from the Geneva Convention of 1949, commom article two of the international humanitarian law that is associated with the International Committee of the Red Cross, that an international conflict constitutes:

"all cases of declared war or of any armed conflict that may arise between two or more high contracting parties, even if the state of war is not recognized, the convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a high contracting party even if the said occupation meets with no armed resistance" (Geneva Convention, 1949).

The above definition of armed conflicts explains the nature of an international armed conflict to be present when there are two or more-armed state forces engaged in a conflict (Chelimo,2011). However, according to a study and perception of the Rulac Geneva Academy

project carried out on armed conflicts, international armed conflict has a supplementary definition. This definition entails an international armed conflict to be viewed as: "a military operation carried out against a non-states-armed force from the territory of another state, without the latter states consent, irrespective of whether or not the territorial state responds with armed force or whether there is a clash of armed forces of the states involved" (Rulac Geneva Academy,2021:para 3).The Rulac project does however note that this definition of an armed conflict does not exclude to acknowledge the presence of an armed conflict that may have similar characteristics and occur parallel an international armed conflict, but fit the criteria of a non-international armed conflict (Rulac Geneva Academy, 2021).

A new phenomenon in the conceptualisation of armed conflicts that has become recognised under international humanitarian law is the concept of an 'internationalised armed conflict'. According to Chelimo (2011), an internationalised armed conflict is an armed conflict that comprises of two armed forces fighting internally with a state but are supported by external states. This is a phenomenon that has mirrored the Syrian war with many states supporting either the regime and opposition side in the war.

Another framework of an armed conflict recognised is that of a non-international armed conflict. According to article 3 of the Geneva convention of 1949, a non-international armed conflict constitutes: "armed conflicts that are non-international in nature occurring in one of the high contracting parties" (Geneva Convention, 1949). This definition points to one armed force engaged in conflict not being governmental in nature. According to Chelimo (2011), this type of armed conflict does not entail riots, isolated and sporadic unorganised violence.

1.2.2. Terminology and Definition of Human-Trafficking.

The terminology of human-trafficking is germane to this study. There have been many definitions of human-trafficking definitions established by states and international organisations seeking to understand and combat the practices of human-trafficking. This study, in its migratory analysis of human-trafficking has mainly adhered to research on human-trafficking using the international definition of human-trafficking that is defined by Article 3 of the 2002 Palermo Protocol, which is the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime as:

"the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of receiving payments

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or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purposes of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs" (United Nations,2000:2).

Article 3 of the Palermo Protocol also acknowledges that any persons under the age of 18 that succumbs any of the defined practices defined as human-trafficking should automatically be considered a victim of trafficking (United Nations, 2000). Therefore, this study also acknowledges such victims of trafficking in the study regardless of the degree or manner of consent.

1.2.3. The Terminology and Definition of Migration.

Migration has historically been a part of human existence and is a complex and multidimensional practice (International Organisation for Migration, 2021). The practice of migration takes on many shapes and sizes under different environments and circumstances. Therefore, in this study a baseline definition of migration that covers international and local migration patterns is used. This definition encompasses identification with migration typologies such as regular migration, climate migration, forced migration, displacement, internal migration, international migration, irregular migration, labour migration (IOM,2021). Therefore, migration can be defined as: the movement of persons away from place of residence either across the border or within the borders of their residing state (IOM,2021).

This baseline definition of migration is germane in understanding irregular, illegal and often forced migration practices such as human-trafficking (IOM, 2021), that has taken a migratory approach in this study.

1.2.4. Terminology and Definition of Terrorism.

Terrorism is a complex phenomenon first termed from the phrase 'terror' and recognised as a political tactic during the French Revolution (1793-1794) (Rapport,2015). Currently, there is no single definition to terrorism. The term terrorism is usually a controversial term and is often projected from difference stand points by states, non-state entities and non-governmental organisations; sometimes seeking to pursue their own objectives through their particular perspectives of terrorism. Therefore, to embody the definition of terrorism that is applicable to this study, terrorism from a broad international definition of terrorism derived from the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 49/60 (adopted on December 1994) that is titled "Measures to eliminate International Terrorism", terrorism can be understood as:

"Criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular persons for political purposes are in any circumstance unjustifiable, whatever the considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or any other nature that may be invoked to justify them" (United Nations General Assembly, 1994).

For a definition that further resonates with domestic terrorism and further applicable to this study, terrorism can also be defined from the definition provided by the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1556 (2004) as constituting:

"criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act, which constitute offences within the scope of and as defined in the international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism" (United Nations Security Council, 2004:3).

In addition to the definitions of terrorism, it is important to define the conceptualisation of terrorism that applied to this study from a geographical stance, where, as seen with the Islamic State, terrorism can be conceptualised as encompassing a 'terrorism arena' or 'theatre of terrorism' where acts of terrorism are planned and executed from a particular geographical location (Global Terrorism Index,2017).

1.2.5. Terminology and Conceptualisation of Political Islam.

In this study, political Islam has been identified crucial in understanding the dynamics of Islam that have fostered the islamisation of the Syrian war, and thence the ideological pursuits of Islamist groups such as that of the Islamic State being pursued through the Syrian conflict. Political Islam is a product of the military crushing of Arab states by Israeli in the Arab wars of 1967 (Esposito,1997). These wars saw the end of a pan Arab agenda and revival of Islamic insurgency that began to challenge the regimes and more specifically the compatibility of western statehood models being used in the region (Knudsen,2003). According to Knusden (2003) ideologies of political ideology can be traced back to the Muslim Brotherhood (created in 1928 and still operative) that gave rise to the advocacy of Islam being used for political participation, social welfare, and reformations in Egypt. These ideologies were subsequently being adopted by Islamists in Syria's liberation movements and post liberation period (from the latter half of the 1920's onwards), which over the century would periodically see Islamists

fighting the regime for Syria to adopt Sharia laws in the running of the state (Abd-Allah,1983). Many regime-Islamist clashes would be because of the regime being deemed to be complacent with secularist, western influenced form of government (Knusden,2003:1).

Therefore, as defined by Hirschkind (1997:12), political Islam is simply the use of Islam to obtain political ends. As extended by Ayoob (2004:1), political Islam or 'Islamism' projects the usage of "Islam as a political ideology rather than a religious or theological construct". Political Islam is currently a concept that is inclusive to looking and understanding at the advocacy of Islamist groups to promote movements that seek to reshape the political landscape, and the societies of a state, into building an Islamic state through what they perceive be the correct was to govern the state using Islamic laws (Esposito,1997). However, scholars such as Hirsch (1997:12) argues that one of the problems with political Islam is that it tends to imply the need to extensively use Islamic traditions outside the correct religious domains it was originally meant for and historically occupied. Evidently in Muslim countries such as Syria, political Islam is said to challenge whether Islam and democracy are compatible with bringing about development (Knusden,2003). In Syria, political Islam has been used by Islamists through Islamist movements and more combative trajectories such as the jihad and Islamist terrorism to point to the components of state failure prevalent in the country and argue that Islam constitutes a better tool for the development and stability in the country (Esposito,1997). Such advocacy was also crucial in understanding the Islamic States capitalizations of the recent statehood breakdowns in Syria with outbreak of the Syrian war in its objectives to build an Islamic State governed by its own interpretation of Sharia law through terrorism.

1.2.6. Terminology and Definition of ISIL, ISIS, IS, Daesh/Daish.

This study was based on transnational terrorist organisation whose names has changed in the last decade, taking multiple names. The organisation in question has been named; the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) from 2013, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria from 2013/2014 to date, the Islamic State (IS) from 2014-to date, Daish (an Arabic translation from *Doulet al-Islāmiyyah fi al Iraq wa-Sham) and Deash* (Arabic acronym with multiple interpretations*) (Connable, Lander and Jackson, 2017:2). Whilst still located in Iraq before penetrating Syria in 2013 (Al-Tamimi, 2015:117), the Islamic State was called ISI (Islamic State in Iraq) in 2006. However, upon insertion into Syria in 2013, the organisation underwent the aforementioned name allocations to iterate its transnational presence in Iraq and Syria, *cum*, its ideological expansions to other countries considered to form part of the Levant; Cyrus, Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, Syria and Turkey.

However, this study identified the terrorist group under analysis as Islamic State or Caliphate (Arabic word for Islamic State), mainly to refrain from politicising the organisation and ensuring a scientifically objective approach to analysing the organisation is maintained. However, in doing so, the study does not condone or approve the organisation as a legitimate Islamic State. It mainly seeks to identify it by the contemporary name it has allocated itself and its ambitious aspirations to grow into a global Islamic State from Syria and Iraq through phenomenon's such human-trafficking practices (Connable et al, 2017). In chapter five comprising of the data analysis and discussion chapter, the study has further maintained to use the abbreviated of ISIS in direct quotes used for analysis purposes in order to refrain from altering the data used for analysis.

1.2.7. Terminology of Wom(a)en as Applied in the Study.

This study focused its analysis on the population groups called women, which according to a simple dictionary explanation of the term woman, refers to an adult female, and thence the term women standing as a plural representative of woman. However, the term woman is more diverse and highly contested than such a plain dictionary explanation, as who is considered a woman varies across legal, socio-cultural, economic and religious perceptions (Stryker, 2020). It also refers to a girl, a female child or adolescence depending on circumstances.

Therefore, this study particularly identified with the Islamic State's loose categorisation of the term woman to mean the groups of women under analysis in this study. The study may also incorporate young females as women, particularly those who embody femininity traits that the Islamic State projects or defines as women. This is even more applicable to the organisations trafficking practices and imposition of womanhood to young girls through forcing them into practices such as such as rape, forced marriages and pregnancies. The study did not identify the term women with population groups that are considered women in transgender groups, not by the researcher's choice, but by the Islamic State's refusal to accept such individuals from the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) groups who consider themselves as women in these categories (Feder, 2019).

1.3. Background and Research Problem.

Armed conflicts unravel a lot of security gaps within nations-states. In Syria, another malfunctioning statehood trajectory has pushed the country into a state of civil war, creating a conducive environment for terrorism to grow at the hands of conflict orientated terrorist actors such as the Islamic State. Philips (2012) elaborates that the Syrian war was triggered by the

Tunisian based Arab spring that swept across the Arab world and the Middle East in 2011, in an attempt to topple dictatorial regimes in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya. By the time the Arab Spring hit Syria at the end of 2011, the disproportionate response of excessive violence used by the Assad regime and its Alawi Shabiha militia groups towards the protesters in Syria, as well as Assad's refusal to step down from power, triggered insurgent armed opposition groups in the country and a consequent outbreak of civil war in March 2012 (Phillips, 2012).

Following the outbreak of conflict in the country, Syria was engulfed with foreign and local military armed groups, militia sects, and terrorist groups, which placed themselves firmly on either the regime or rebel side of the war (U.S Government Publishing Office, 2014). With Iran, Russia, China and foreign terrorist group such as Hezbollah becoming allies of the Syrian regime. Other foreign armed parties, including the U.S, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey, Kurdish and secularist parties, quickly joined the opposition in attempts to remove the Assad regime (The Clarion Project, 2017; European Asylum Support Office, 2019). However, Jenkins (2014) elaborates that even within the opposition, discontent by local groups, especially Islamist groups, began to rise against the involvement of the West in Syria. This sentiment resulted in the increased 'Islamisation' of the opposition in the Syrian war and a rise of extremist Islamist sentiments advocating to push the West out of the Middle East. Such extremist sentiments quickly drew in foreign extremist terrorist groups such as Jabhat al-Nusra, Al-Qaeda and IS into the Syrian war (Cepoi, 2013). They soon began to capitalise on the Syrian conflict to pursue their own territorial and ideological expansion trajectories (Clarion Project, 2017).

O' Bagy (2012) notes that as the opposition increasingly Islamized, it began to complicate the Syrian war because extremist Islamic groups such as Jabhat al-Nusra and Al-Qaeda and progressively, IS, quickly gained prominence in the opposition side of the conflict. IS also progressively rebelled against the Assad regime and counterpart opposition groups on the rebel side to conquer territories and promulgate extremist sentiments through different methods, including human-trafficking. However, as a rapid counterterrorism trajectory began to take root within the Syrian war in 2015, extremist groups especially IS - which had now broken off Al-Qaeda since 2014 - quickly began to turn to alternative methods to finance and sustain their existence in the volatile conditions emanating against them in the Syrian war. Cockayne and Walker (2016) note that the trafficking of women and young girls became the most favorable means for many extremist groups to survive on due to its strategic and financial benefits.

Cockayne and Walker (2016) agrees with Welch (2017) that many extremist terrorist groups linked up with congruent organised criminal gangs, lone wolf trafficking actors, and other armed groups that are actively involved in human-trafficking, to capitalise on the anarchical state and the surplus presence of conflict victims in Syria. The conflict victims include displaced persons and refugees, from whom women and young girls are sourced and trafficked to generate money. They are also used for prostitution, money laundering and drug trafficking activities.

Other practices such as forced marriages and sexual slavery have emerged in IS's theatre of terrorism in Syria, to promulgate the organisation's ideology (Welch, 2017: 168). However, unlike other counterpart extremist groups on the ground, the Islamic State's human-trafficking practices quickly took an extreme stance of institutionalising human-trafficking within its own captured territories as a state-building mechanism (Welch, 2017). The Islamic State then exploited foreign and local women to both sustain terrorism and execute an open state-building policy that thrives on human-trafficking (Cockayne and Walker, 2016).

1.4. Research Problems and Objectives: Broader Objectives to be Addressed.

According to the 2016 Global Trafficking in Persons Report, produced by the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime, conflict situations harbour a lot of enabling factors that bolster human-trafficking practices within them. During armed conflict, human-trafficking can take on different forms, including a mutated form of forced migration. Which in its mobile and immobile nature has increasingly been capitalised on by divergent conflict actors to recruit, generate financial means, and promote ideological objectives. Cockayne and Walker (2016) note that in Syria, since the outbreak of the Syrian war in 2012, human-trafficking has been channelled by divergent armed groups and even humanitarian personals, through many migratory landscapes for various divergent reasons. With the Syrian war birthing large streams of forced migration, the Islamic State was infatuated with large groups of vulnerable populations such as refugee streams and internal displacement flows that it could exploit in its human-trafficking practices. Religiously defined migration movements, such as the *hijrah*, have also constituted a migration platform that many jihadist groups and the Islamic State have fitted in their global trafficking networks (Inch, 2017).

Substantively, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Report (2017) recorded an estimated 6.6. Syrian refugees that fled Syria for neighbouring Turkey, Lebanon, Jordon, Egypt, and Iraq; some of which were trafficked along the way by armed groups, terrorist groups

and even humanitarian personals for personal and organisational purposes (UNHCR,2017:14). Progressing from these statistics, the UNHCR (2017:34) extensively notes the internally displaced person in Syria sat at an estimated 6.3. million, with more than half of these internally displaced persons constituting women and children. These women and children include large vulnerable and unprotected population groups that armed groups and capitalistic conflict-terrorist groups such as IS have used in their state-building endeavours in Syria. Additionally, Bakker and De Leede (2015) note that since the Syrian war started, an estimated 10-15 % of foreign fighters, including women, have migrated into Syria for conflict purposes. These migrants specifically undertook the religious journey of *hijrah* promulgated by IS for its supporters, only to find themselves trafficked by different conflict players and specifically the Islamic State.

Therefore, Cockayne and Walker (2016) highlight that the deteriorating rule of law and extremely porous borders, configured by the Syrian war have made human-trafficking networks and structures easy to implement in and across Syria. Cockayne and Walker (2016) further outlines that human-trafficking networks have been the backbone of IS's global, regional and local recruitment and trafficking networks and practices, especially of women and girls, which IS has used openly and excessively for various strategic reasons. In many cases, IS interwove some of its trafficking networks in other contingent forced migration flows, mentioned in the aforementioned. This was strategically done to dispose women from all walks of life into its trafficking networks, designated to further dispose them to IS human-trafficking structures in Syria.

Besenyö (2016) further explains that some migratory channels linked to the organisations trafficking networks have extensively been used by IS to coerce women to smuggle drugs, launder money and execute acts of terrorism for the organisation outside IS, and extensively so, the greater Middle East region through them.

1.5. Key Objectives and Questions to be Addressed.

The landscape of terrorism within and outside armed conflicts have evolved into a highly gendered phenomenon. Historically, both terrorism and human-trafficking have been perceived as male-dominated arenas to which women have fallen victim. The gender-blind approach has restricted a holistic understanding of how women have not only served as victims of either arena but have covertly been frontline participants in many divergent ways.

Herschinger (2014) explains that the gender-blind approach towards terrorism and human-trafficking has overlooked the strategic manner in which terrorist groups are rapidly reshaping themselves, by using women as frontline actors in making terrorism more globally fluid. The evasive nexus of terrorism and human-trafficking that terrorist organizations are exploring has been through the utilization and exploitation of women (Benetti, 2016). More so, the lack of a gender-based understanding has contributed to the ineffectiveness of counterterrorism initiatives. It has also limited the comprehension of human-trafficking and the use of women in its advancement.

This study, therefore, identifies that highly patriarchal organizations such as IS have resorted to gender-based approach of human-trafficking to sustain terrorism in the Syrian war. Women have irrefutably transcended undertaking traditional sedentary roles to sustain the longevity of terrorism. Volatile situations such as armed conflicts - as observed in the case of counterterrorism trajectories in the Syrian war - serve to both bolster and terminate the operations of terrorist groups. This study thus finds it imperative to unpack the evolution of terrorism in Syria, building up to its complex incorporation of women in oriented state building trajectories, as initiated by religiously extremist terrorist groups such as IS in Syria on the foundation of human-trafficking. Therefore, the key objectives of this study are to: (1) Identify the political roots of terrorism in Syria, (2) identify the voluntary and involuntary roles that female foreign terrorist fighters and Syrian women play in the evolution and development of terrorism within and outside Syria and IS, (3) and observe the manner in which female foreign terrorist fighters and Syrian women have facilitated human-trafficking operations in Syria, and supported terrorist networks globally, regionally and locally.

To further investigate the establishment of the gendered nexus of terrorism and human-trafficking that has emerged in Syria and by the agency of the Islamic State, this study further raises three pertinent questions:

1. How have women aided the evolution of terrorism in Syria?
2. What role have women played in bolstering the developing nexus between terrorism and human-trafficking in Syria? and
3. How have women engaged in human-trafficking operations to support the arena of terrorism in Syria?

1.6. Theoretical and Conceptual Framework.

This research is grounded by three interrelated theories that will guide the interrogation of the gendered terrorism-trafficking nexus that is prevalent in the Syrian war. The study makes use of the neoclassical push and pull theory of migration to understand the migratory composition of human-trafficking, *cum* the push and pull factors that the Islamic State made use of to assimilate women and young girls from global, regional and local platforms, into its organization. The study used the failed state theory to contextualize Syria's statehood malfunction and factors therein, which helped create a conducive environment for the development of the nexus between terrorism and human-trafficking. The theory also guided the examination of how conflict terrorists such as IS exploit women for their operational functionality.

The third theoretical approach that the study applied is feminism. In the context of this study, feminism is used to identify retrogressive environments that harbor detrimental practices and generally strip women of many of their rights (Beasley, 1999). Grami (2013) elaborates that conceptually, feminism is a philosophical and theoretical discourse that advocates for the equality of sexes in all political, economic, social and cultural spheres of life. Since its first wave in the nineteenth century, feminism has emerged, over the centuries, through divergent discourses and empirical movements. It seeks to challenge distorted power relations of patriarchal sentiments that ground social relations within many nation-states.

In religiously dominant countries, feminism has integrally infiltrated religious platforms to challenge women oppression that is justified on religious grounds. Such sentiments have been evident with the discourse of Islamic feminism, which emerged around the 1900s during the third wave of feminism in the broader Arab world and Middle East region (Grami,2013). It challenges many oppressive practices that have occurred against women in Muslim-dominant countries (Ahmad, 2015). Islamic Feminism essentially seeks to redefine Muslim women's identity within the cultural and religious parameters of Islam, during peacetime and conflict situations. In doing so, Islamic feminism delineated itself from broader Western feminist discourses and United Nations conventions of women's rights. Islamic feminism eminently focuses on defining the rights of Muslim women, including the rights that women have to engage in applicable conflicts such as the jihad, through the use of religious scriptures such as the Quran, Hadith, and other religious scriptures (Ahmad, 2015: 4).

Observably in Syria, a new radical stance of Islamic inspired feminism has emerged during the Syrian war, particularly on theatres of Jihad advocated for by the Islamic State is termed jihad (i) feminism' (Rhuk Ali, 2015). Rhuk Ali (2015) explains that 'jihad (i) Feminism' is an emerging strand of feminism that was pioneered by the women of the Islamic State on social media platforms. It paradoxically advances a perverse version of women emancipation by urging women to submit to the Islamic State's patriarchal culture. In essence, jihad (i) feminism argues that for women to obtain rights and a good life in the Islamic State, it is imperative for them to submit completely to the opposite sex. The 'jihad (i) feminism' narrative holds that women must be in total obedience to all orders given to them by their jihadist male counterparts in the Islamic State, in order to attain the respect and good life they aspire to have in the organisation. Rhuk Ali (2015) explains that 'jihad (i) feminism' advances a distorted narrative, of emancipation for the women of IS, by arguing that women who pursue frontline terrorist duties for the Islamic State such as suicide bombing embody the very elements that give them pride and dignity in the organisation. Yilmaz (2017) notes that such a narrative of 'jihad (i) feminism' has also been used to pursue a perverse form of emancipation that has advocated for women in the Islamic State to submit to oppressing other women through human-trafficking practices.

1.7. Method and Methodology.

This research made use of both qualitative and quantitative research approaches. By integrating both qualitative and quantitative methods, it employs a mixed research method approach. Due to the researcher's inability to physically travel to Syria for various reasons, including security reasons, the research was executed using secondary sources. The research was entirely desk-based, and secondary sources such as textbooks, academic journals, articles, YouTube videos, reports and newspaper articles were useful for generating data for the research. To maintain research quality and avoid the utilization of inappropriate or irrelevant secondary sources, the researcher applied Scott's (2001) criteria for evaluating the quality of secondary sources, which are (1) authenticity, (2) credibility, (3) representativeness and (4) meaning.

This dissertation first employed a quantitative analytical approach. It used statistical records to generate graphs, numerical tables and applicable formulae, patterns of terrorism, divergent forced and 'involuntary' migration flows. The statistical records also helped to elicit information on internal displacement patterns and refugee streams of males, females, and children, to frame the nature of population groups that have been susceptible to human-trafficking in IS's trafficking structures and practices in Syria. The study narrowed down to

chart movement patterns of women through relatively voluntary migration flows such as the *hijrah*, while paying attention to foreign women who have migrated into Syria to join different armed groups, especially IS. The study then proceeded to identify the dynamic nature of women that have fallen into IS's global, regional and local networks and structures of human-trafficking.

The qualitative aspect of this research undertook an exploratory analysis of the intangible factors such as ethnic and religious affiliations, social constructs and identity, statuses and norms and the overall culture of governance in Syria. These have been driving forces/motivations behind the disposition of international and local women into IS territories and human-trafficking networks and structures.

Therefore, to ensure that quality and ethically based research is executed, the fundamental principles guiding the trustworthiness of this research is grounded by ethical guidance for research, outlined by Eisner (1991), which include: (a) internal validity (credibility), (b) external validity (transferability), (c) reliability and (d) objectivity (Eisner,1991).

1.8. Limits to The Study.

The limitations of this study center around two prominent factors. Firstly, the restrictive desk-based manner in which the study was conducted. Secondly, the researcher excessively relied on secondary resources to collect both statistical and qualitative data. With the former, the researcher eminently faced the limitations of not being able to conduct research from first-hand experience due to the diverse security reasons associated with the nature of the research. Therefore, the researcher resorted to collecting data from secondary sources for this study. However, the distant manner in which the researcher executed the study had an advantage because the researcher was able to conduct the research in an objective manner that could not be compromised by the researcher's emotions, which may have been different if it was conducted first hand.

In using secondary sources, one limitation faced by the researcher was using information that was already compiled, considering the potential subjective perspectives of the authors. Another limitation faced by the research pertaining to secondary sources came with the collection of statistical data, which varied across different secondary sources, and fluctuated over the years. In context to other statistical data collected, the researcher further encountered challenges with being able to secure steady statistical records of forced migrations patterns such refugee streams and internal displacement patterns due to an overflow of persons, some of which could

not be captured fully by migration institutions on ground, due to the unfavorable environment in Syria. This was even more prevalent with forced migration patterns such as the trafficking of foreign and local women into IS and IS's structures in Syria, due to the covert nature of these migration flows. However, to counteract such limitations, the research used multiple sources to check statistical information against each other and selected statistical information that was relevant and best projected the realities of what was happening in Syria.

1.9. Ethics

As Showk and Parveen (2017) explained, the purpose of abiding by designated ethics in the process of research is to ensure that the researcher conducts responsible research. Therefore, it serves to ensure that the research conducted does not harm any persons, group, institution, or organization studied. Ethics in research entail prohibiting the researcher from using biased data either in its qualitative or quantitative form. It ensures that no published and unpublished material, data, methods or results are used by the researcher without the proper acknowledgement of its rightful owners (Showk and Parveen, 2017). This research, therefore, abided by all the required ethical processes needed to ensure that a fair and resourceful study was conducted and encountered no clashes or conflict between the researcher and the researched.

1.10. Structure of Study.

Chapter 1: Introduction.

Chapter one is an introductory chapter of the dissertation that describes and contextualises the gendered dynamics of terrorism in the ongoing Syrian war. It conceptualises and contextualises the evolution of terrorism in the Syrian war, building up to the establishment of complex terrorism groups such as IS and its interjection in organised crimes such as human-trafficking.

Chapter 2: Literature Review.

The second Chapter will constitute a literature review that reflects broader interconnected studies that have tried to understand the evolution of terrorism and religiously defined terrorism such as extremist Islamist terrorism within the context of warfare in Syria. The literature review chapter also tracks the integration of women to the arena of terrorism and progressively extremist religious terrorism, building up to the utility of women by terrorist groups in organised crime, such as that of human-trafficking practices carried out by ISIS in Syria.

Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework

Chapter three of the study encompass discussions on three interconnected theoretical approaches that ground the basis of the gender-based terrorism and human-trafficking nexus building in the Syrian war, and trafficking networks and structures in Syria. Using theories such as the push and pull theory, state failure theory, feminism and religious-based feminist trajectories such as Islamic feminism and jihad (i) feminism to understand the interjection of women and girls as victims and perpetrators of human-trafficking trajectories carried out for IS.

Chapter 4: Description of Methodology and Methods.

This chapter explains how the research was conducted and identifies the mixed research method in this study. Furthermore, it describes how data was collected, organised and represented to support the study. In addition, the chapter detailed the nature of the diverse secondary sources that the researcher used to undertake the study.

Chapter 5: Research Results and Analysis

In chapter five, the first half of the chapter tabulates and graphs statistical results of the patterns of terrorism, *cum*, IS's practices of terrorism as it unfolded in the Syrian war. Furthermore, it tabulates and graphs confluent conflict borne migration flows, *inter alia* internal displacement, refugee streams, and foreign female migration flows that have contributed towards the establishment of IS networks and practices of human-trafficking from 2012-2018. The second half of the chapter analyses how many female terrorists are operative in the Islamic State's terrorist and human-trafficking arena; listing the factors, motivations and prevalent practices that women engage in IS's human-trafficking networks and structures for terrorism.

Chapter 6: Discussion

Chapter six discusses the role of female terrorists who are operative in the Islamic states. Outlining their respective roles in ISIS and how they have contributed to the expansion of ISIS and ISIS ideology during its time in Syria; in the course of the Syrian war. This discussion, therefore, explores the varied motivations accompanying that have voluntarily and involuntarily put women and young girls in IS territory in Syria, to be used in the organisation's human-trafficking; instead of alternative armed units operating in Syria.

Chapter 7: Conclusion and Recommendations.

Chapter 7 is the last chapter of the study which gives a summative account of the dissertation. This final chapter outlines the qualitative and quantitative results extracted from the research, alongside the conclusion. Furthermore, it provides a gendered approach towards countering terrorism and even organised crimes. It further provides propositions on how to disrupt the emerging gendered nexus of terrorism and human-trafficking.

1.11. Conclusion

This chapter introduced how contemporary armed conflicts such as the Syrian war evolved to harbor dangerous conflict actors, such as non-state conflict terrorist actors represented by groups such as Jabhat al-Nusra, Al-Qaeda and now its offspring IS. Modern conflicts warfare such as the Syrian war don't just harbor these actors but extensively give them the ammunition to expand, capture territories and populations groups, resulting in the institutionalization of organized crimes such as human trafficking within their territories. The chapter further conceptualized germane terminology underpinning the study. Moreover, the chapter further gave a brief outline of how other factors, pertinently divergent platforms of forced migration flow as induced by the Syrian war, have bolstered global, regional, and local migratory human-trafficking networks and operations of terrorist groups such as IS. The chapter looked into the background of terrorism and conflict in Syria, and indicated the problems of the study. It also outlined the study's objectives and identified a gap -a need for gendered inclusive studies on terrorism and organized crimes, that fully captures the holistic dynamics of women as both victims and perpetrators of the growing nexus between terrorism and human-trafficking in conflict situations. It further highlighted a three-fold theoretical framework to investigate the gendered relationship between terrorism and human-trafficking, as established by IS in Syria. The chapter progressively outlined the methods, limitations and ethical issues surrounding the study, to guide how the research will be conducted. Progressing from this chapter, chapter two will therefore unpack the background and salient literature on which this study is grounded.

Chapter Two
Literature Review

2.1 Introduction.

This literature review chapter aims to contextualise this study in relation to other discourses on the contribution of armed conflicts to the evolution and growth of terrorism in Syria. It explores materials on how this phenomenon has become highly gendered in the twenty-first century. Therefore, this chapter tracks the progressive evolution of terrorism in the context of armed conflicts in Syria, and serves to pave a way to better understand how terrorism has evolved and become institutionalised in a complex gendered manner, at the hands of women in Syria. The chapter unpacks how women in designated terrorist groups such as the Islamic State have been used to reshape the landscape of terrorism. It further explores discussions on the involvement of the Islamic State in organised criminal activities such as human-trafficking, to sustain its existence within the volatile conditions of the Syrian war.

2.2. A General Overview of the Changing Landscape of Armed Conflicts.

Throughout history, armed conflicts have always been an integral part of human relations and a crucial political tool that humankind has used to craft out different political landscapes, across the globe. However, Mack (2007) notes that steering towards the end of the cold war (1947-1991) and transitioning into the twenty-first century, the arena of armed conflicts has undergone several identifiable paradigm shifts. The change in conflict dynamics has increasingly posed a great threat to the overall legitimacy of 'statehood' in many contemporarily conflict-ridden states and regions across the globe. Overall, Mack (2007) elaborates that armed conflicts have adopted a notable geographical reduction of armed conflicts. Moving from traditional international warfare, to more intrastate conflicts characterised by phenomena's such as civil wars, guerrilla warfare and insurgencies in the post-cold war period of warfare. Furthermore, many contemporary armed conflicts have morphed into a more civilian orientated and inclusive phenomena (Wenger and Mason 2008). Notably, more civilians are increasingly becoming key combatants, targets, and victims of warfare (Wenger and Mason, 2008).

Hopwood (1988) comparatively asserts that historical and contemporary patterns of warfare have changed. When looking at the nature of armed conflicts in conflict-ridden regions such as the Middle East, it is obvious that conventional military on military warfare that defined many

pre-cold-war warfare's such as the Arab-Israeli wars (1948-49, 1956, 1967, and 1973), has irrefutably changed. Evolving post, the cold war, from traditional international military-on-military armed conflicts to intrastate warfare, that is characterised by military to rebel based insurgent warfare. Such changes have been observed in the region with the Houthi Yemen Insurgency of 2004, and more recently, the military on civilian warfare projected to be prevalent in the Iraqi civil war of 2014-2017 (Amnesty International, 2017/18). Mason and Wegner (2008) argue that with this changing landscape of armed conflicts, a rapid diversification of conflict actors have integrally emerged alongside conventional military state actors. Highly technologically equipped non-state actors ranging from paramilitary, militia, militant, terrorist groups, and religious actors such as jihadist conflict actors have shown paramount presence in many armed conflicts in the last three decades. Mason and Wegner's (2008) concern with this developing landscape of armed conflicts is centred around an increasing presence of civilians such as civilian augmenters, refugee warriors, child soldiers and terrorist actors being visibly present in contemporary warfare's. These groups of people are inclusively forming key targeted actors of modern warfare and are also being absorbed into unconventional armed groups.

Mason and Wegner (2008) argue further that as the landscape of armed conflicts changes, so has warfare practices. The authors add that in extension to the aforementioned changes, contemporary armed conflicts have integrally shifted the locus of practice in their evolution. Mason and Wegner (2008) explain that many contemporary warfare's now manifest more on civilian platforms such as in homes, hospitals, churches, mosques, and schools. With more civilian fighters being pulled into the vortex of warfare, and thence being recruited, mobilised or victimised for combative reasons. Avis (2019) notes that such patterns have extensively given rise to new modes of warfare surfacing in armed conflicts. Similarly, conflict tactics such as guerrilla warfare, terrorism, and criminal violence, linked with organised human-trafficking, are becoming part and parcel of the emerging *modus operandi* of modern warfare (Avis, 2019). Such can undeniably be observed in the Syrian war, where civilians on the other spectrum of warfare practices have also become key victims/targets to the execution of these warfare practices in the country (Amnesty International, 2017/18).

According to Amnesty International (2017/18), since 2012, Syria has been trapped in a web of imbricative armed conflicts, characterised by civil war, insurgency, and terrorism. The process has been nothing short of a catastrophe for many international and local civilians on ground. Civilians have also been used by the Syrian regime, its affiliated groups and oppositional

parties as collateral damage, weapons, and tools of warfare (Amnesty International, 2017/18). Illustratively, the Amnesty International Report (2017/18: 351) outlines that since the onset of the Syrian war, civilians have become caught in the gruesome crossfire of the Syrian war. In the process, many civilians have become exposed to indiscriminate and direct attacks, ranging from but not limited to aerial and artillery bombings, torturing, false detention and arrests of civilian activists and systematic rapes on women and children, by the regime and its allies.

Sanchez (2016) illustrates that even on the opposition side of the Syrian war, armed groups within the opposition umbrella of the Free Syrian Army have used asymmetrical tactics of warfare such as guerrilla warfare in government held territories in their fight against the regime. Reportedly waging tactical guerrilla warfare of assassinations, armed raids on schools, hospitals, religious sites, and roadside bombings in cities occupied by the regime. (Sanchez, 2016). This has led to the killing, injuring and even recruiting of many civilians in their offensive path against the regime (Sanchez, 2016). Pinheiro (2017) notes that even on parallel religious theatres of conflict such as the jihadist theatres of conflict present in the Syrian war, many 'religio-nationalist' actors such as Ansar al-Din Front, extremist jihadist actors such as Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic State have been notorious for the bombing of civilians and civilian structures, alongside carrying out kidnappings, assassinations, systematic rape of young boys, girls and women. The Amnesty International (2017/18) also notes the actions taken by conflict-terrorist groups such as IS, in their execution of systematic displacement and genocidal human practices against civilians, in their military offences against the regime. These practices had become integral to their conquest of territories and population groups in cities such as in Raqqa, Aleppo and Idlib (Amnesty International, 2017/18).

Therefore, the Amnesty International (2017/18) notes that in contemporary armed conflicts such as the Syrian war, states' lapsing presence, unaccountability, *cum* their failure to protect civilians during wartime have created a fertile ground for notorious methodologies and asymmetrical modes of warfare. These lapses help terrorism to flourish and normalise in armed conflicts. The case of Syria shows how terror tactics such as plane hijackings, political assassinations, mass killings of civilians, genocides, civilian bombing, suicide bombing and even human trafficking, have become a huge and integral mode of modern warfare.

2.3. An Evolutionary Analysis of Terrorism in the Context of Armed Conflicts in Syria.

According to Abd-Allah (1983), the presence of terrorism in the context of an armed conflict, as witnessed in the current Syrian war, is not new, but has a long history in the state formation

trajectory of modern Syria since its liberation from colonial rule. Abd-Allah (1983) posits that on a more secular political frontier, terrorism-generally understood as the threat or use of illegal violence against civilians/wide audience for *inter alia* political aims- prominently interjected itself early in Syria's course of history as a resistance and liberation force in the anticolonial Syrian Revolt of 1925-1927. This pattern may explain the clinical mass killing of native civilians by its French protectorate (Weinberg, 2005). Hopwood (1988) extends that when Syria finally gained independence in 1946, a very unstable military dictatorship and successive *coup d'états* fashioned much of Syria's state formation processes and continued to mould terrorism as a military apparatus of the country.

Hopwood (1988) further explains that terror tactics such as political assassinations were recorded during the Syrian military coups of 1954, 1963 and 1966. These terror tactics were systematically used by many political and military leaders of the time against each other to eliminate competition and opposition counterparts, in order to climb the different ranks of government in the newly independent state (Hopwood, 1988). Therein, Hopwood (1988) does identify that such turbulent foundations of Syria may help explain the intersection of conflict and terrorist practices in the contemporary Syrian war. Which in Syria's history, flourished even more with the transition of Syria from a military run administration to a "democratic" administration in 1963.

Hopwood (1988) elaborates that since the watershed coup of 1963, that saw a transition from a military run state to a state run by a civilian government, Syria firmly embedded terrorism in its military apparatus by establishing a radical authoritarian policy and tool of governance known as the state of emergency degree no. 51 of 1963. This policy put in place a legal mechanism that would enable the regime, its military, *cum*, its police forces to use excessive violence and terror tactics on civilians anytime the Baath party perceived any kind of insurgency or attack to be present from within. Hopwood (1988) notes that the *modus operandi* of terror practices did not just apply to insurgency and warfare situations in Syria, but began to centrifugally disperse into the Middle East under a rigorously authoritarian system of foreign policy that emerged, following the rise of a dictator, Hafez Al-Assad, to power as the president of Syria in 1971 (Hopwood, 1988).

According to Sinai and Pollack (1979), during the presidential reign of Hafez Al-Assad (1971-2000), Syria now observably began to exert its authoritarianism to the broader Middle East through terrorism. Eminently using it at opportune times, usually wartime, to establish its

standing in the region. George (2003) illustrates by highlighting that during the course of the Lebanese war (1975-1990), through the assistance of the Selim el Hoss's Sunni administration, Syria was identified to pair up with proclaimed terrorist organisations such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Palestine, the Hamas and Lebanese Hezbollah; in its attempts to destabilise Lebanon in pursuit of its own territorial conquest agendas in the country. (George, 2003). In the Arab warfare's of the 1960s, Syria has also been well documented alongside other Arab states to create terrorist groups such as the *Al-Saiqa* and extensively used terrorist groups such as Hezbollah as proxy powers to counterbalance their military operations against Israeli (Hopwood, 1988).

2.3.1. The Dynamics of Terrorism in the Contemporary Syrian War.

Griffings (2018) corroborates the narrative above by asserting that the dynamism of terrorism currently playing itself out through foreign and local groups in the Syrian war, has historically been configured in Syria. Admittedly, terrorist groups such as Hezbollah stand as prominent proxy powers to the regime in the current Syrian war. The presence of such actors stretches beyond the narrow hyper-sensationalised narrative of the religious framework of Islamist terrorism framing jihadist theatres in the Syrian war. Jenkins (2013) notes that since the outbreak of the Syrian war in 2012, terrorism has been a very strategic tool utilised on many other secular and religious theatres in the Syrian war; ranging from the regime faction to insurgent nationalistic groups and secessionist groups on the opposition side of the conflict. For instance, Becker (2015) illustrates that on the regime side, since the first tactics of terror showed its face with the regimes excessive use of violence on the Syrian during the 2011 peaceful Arab Spring, terrorism on the regime side has intensified on many frontiers.

Becker (2015) further opines that one aspect of terrorism that has emerged on the regime side is the supplementary utility of terrorism as a military tool against the opposition. In more direct terms, the regime and many of its militia groups have executed many bombings, false arrests and kidnapping of civilians in opposition held territories to repress and push back the insurgency. Another utility of terrorist established by the regime in the Syrian war has been observed with the regime's partnership with renowned terrorist groups, such as Hezbollah, that have played a crucial role in supporting the regime with financial and military aid, *cum*, fighting alongside the course of the Syrian war. On a more strategic frontier, Becker (2015) maps the depth of terror utility of the regime with the extensive release of jihadist fighters from Syria's prison cells into the opposition, to carry out acts of terror on the opposition side to both

destabilise the opposition and delegitimise the opposition to the rest of the world (Becker, 2015).

Therefore, in emulating and masking some of the terrorist tactics that Syria has historically and contemporarily used in its modes of warfare, Jenkins (2013) identifies terrorism to have integrally become a prominent retaliatory mode of warfare used by the opposition in the Syrian war. Itani (2014) demonstrates that in the federation of divergent groups on the rebel side, many armed groups under the Free Syrian Army have used many terror tactics as strategic counterbalancing forces in their fight against the regime's strong military strength and external support. A case in point is the city of Douma, where in 2012, rebel groups captured and held hostage some military personals and their families, using them as human shields to deter attacks from the regime. The Amnesty International (2017/ 18) extensively made note of terror tactics being executed by the opposition in public places such as schools' and hospitals in government held territories such as in Idlib. Idlib has witnessed many systematic terror tactics such as kidnappings and rapes of young girls and women.

Chughtai (2019) notes that many other secularist secessionist groups, such as the Kurdish Democratic Union Party on the opposition of the Syrian war, have also used terror tactics to dually fight against the regime and IS, while it conquers territories for its own secessionist agendas in cities such *Ras al-Ayan*, and Aleppo (Chughtai, 2019). The Amnesty International (2017/18) further outlines that additional to the Syrian war, terrorism as an instrument of warfare has also found its way into the US-led counterterrorism trajectory that began taking root in 2015 in the Syrian war. For instance, an Amnesty International (2019) investigation categorically identified as "War in Raqqa" makes note of the terrorist tactics incorporated in the 2017 offensive U.S lead military attack, against IS in the city of Raqqa. It exposed many civilians to deadly artillery strikes and bombing of their homes and salient communal facilities in the city of Raqqa. According to Itani (2014), even on the diverse religious platform of extremist Islamic terrorism practiced in the contemporary Syrian war, terrorism has been configured in an accumulative manner in Syria, through a fallible authoritarian system/ mode of governance that the regime had crafted out in its state formation processes since independence.

2.4. The Evolutionary Link between Islam and Terrorism in Syria.

According to Bangura (2015), Islam as a religion has never equated to terrorism but has throughout Syria's history been used by divergent Islamist groups as a channel to justify acts

of terrorism. As currently witnessed on jihadist platforms prevalent in Syria (O'Bagy, 2012). Similarly, Jenkins (2014) notes that parallel to the diverse secular politically motivated forms of terrorism that have been present in the Syrian war, religiously defined terrorism has also had a notable presence in the Syrian war. Islamist inspired terrorism that has ranged from underreported forms of religiously inspired terrorism, such as Shia inspired terrorism ensued by groups such as Hezbollah on the regime side of the conflict, which has also been present in the opposition of the Syrian war. According to O'Bagy (2012), Islamist terrorism, particularly jihadist inspired terrorism that was dominant in the opposition, evolved with the continuity of the Syrian conflict to form an institutionalised tripartite theatre in the war. The growth of this religiously inspired theatre of terrorism in the Syrian war has institutionalised much like the secular fermentation of terrorism in Syria. It has emanated from a turbulent political history surrounding the state formation trajectory of modern Syria.

According to Abd-Allah (1983), Islamist terrorism in Syria's recent history first gained profound recognition with the founding of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood community in 1946.With religiously defined social reformation trajectories being advanced by the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt since it's inaugurated in 1928, Islamist inspired terrorism advanced by Sunni based groups such as the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood also began to emerged respectively in Syria during the country's liberation period in the 1940's and 1950's with similar objectives. Emerging congruent to secular forms of terrorism in Syria, as a 'liberation' and 'social reformation' tool, during the occurrence of the military coups of the liberation era in Syria (Abd Allah, 1983).

Abd-Allah (1983) argues that during the liberation and early post-liberation era of Syria, Islamist inspired terrorism was strategically used by the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood in their trajectory of armed struggles against the Syrian regime. It was intended to prevent the new ruling elite group in Syria from adopting Western secularist forms of governance because the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood perceived it to be a reminiscence of their colonial master's presence in Syria (Abd-Allah, 1983). In view of this context in history, terrorism was greatly used by the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood to challenge the authority of the established elites in the country into undertaking religiously defined social reformations in post-independent Syria; that would be shaped and guided by Sharia laws. Abd-Allah (1983) notes that during and after the liberation period of Syria, from the 1940s onwards, the Syrian Muslim brotherhood continued to express much of its resentment towards Western forms of secularism, expressed through acts of terrorism in the country. The organisation extensively waged different acts of

terrorism on Syrian civilians in cities, towns, and rural areas that the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood perceived to be complacent with Syria adopting secularist and Western friendly modes of governance. With moderate success in the 1950s, they were able to influence the Baath party in Syria to incorporate some Sharia laws in the constitution of the newly independent Syrian state (O'Bagy, 2012).

Abd-Allah (1983) thus elaborates that through the advocacy and militancy of both men and women, the Muslim Brotherhood thrived in the early days of independence in Syria, especially on its path to bringing about religiously defined social reformation in Syria. However, it was rapidly suppressed under the military dictatorship of Ash-Shishakli in 1952 (O' Bagy, 2012). O'Bagy (2012) argues further that during its great repression, spanning from the 1950s into 1960s, the Muslim Brotherhood remained dormant, but not decimated, in Syria. They emerged even stronger in the latter half of the 1960s, in preparation to launch its first official direct armed struggle of jihad, against the Syrian regime, marking the awakening of Islamist insurgencies of 1976-1982 (O'Bagy, 2012).

However, as O'Bagy (2012) notes, when the Muslim Brotherhood regained prominence in Syria in 1972, the group emerged even more extreme but divided into two prominent factions. One of them constituted a more moderate Damascus wing, led by Assam Attar in comparison. The other constituted a very extreme Aleppo-Hama wing, which emerged under the leadership of Abdel Fattah Abu Ghuddah, with a very extremely confrontational policy and militant approach against the regime. Carrafella et al (2016) explains that till this day, some ideological segments and aspirations of the latter radical wing of the Syrian Muslim brotherhood resonates throughout many contemporary Islamist terrorist groups such as Jabhat al-Nusra and IS in the Syrian conflict. Carrafella (2016) asserts that these aspirations are seen in the religiously defined trajectories of statehood and social reformation, that Jabhat al-Nusra, and in the extreme case-IS, are capitalistically trying to implant in Syria during the course of the Syrian War.

On the other hand, O'Bagy (2012) extensively notes that even on a more societal basis, the repercussions of the split of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood stands ever more prevalent within the population of Syria, especially in the North and North Western hemispheres of Syria. In comparison to other areas of the country, these regions in Syria forms the basis from which most Sunni-Jihadist militant and militia extremists, currently participating in the Syrian conflict

originate. According to O'Bagy (2012), it is also regions in Syria where many jihadist fighters absorbed in jihadist terrorist groups such as Jabhat al-Nusra and IS have been recruited from.

However, O'Bagy (2012) argues that the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood is not the only Islamist groups that has laid the foundations for the forthcoming groups such as the Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic State in Syria. O'Bagy (2012) explains that congruent to the Muslim Brotherhood, another prominent and influential jihadist group known as the *Talia al Muqatila* (alternatively known as the fighting Vanguard) staged many Islamist uprisings and armed struggles against the secularist practices of the Assad in the 1970s. Founded in the Syrian city of Hama and decentralised into small units in Aleppo and Damascus *cum* (Jordan), the fighting vanguard was a big defective armed wing of the Muslim Brotherhood that emanated from the 1972 split of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood. The fighting Vanguard rapidly grew during the 1970s, attracting most of its fighters from both the milder Damascus Wing and the Aleppo-Hamas Wing. The fighting Vanguard also harnessed financial and military resources from both factions of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood. Additionally, harnessing resources from divergent societal platforms such as affiliated mosques, that the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood had strong influential holds on, in preparation for its ultimate launch of the Islamist uprisings against the regime in 1976 (O'Bagy, 2012).

However, with the death of the Fighting Vanguard leader, Marwan Hadeed, who died during the onset of the Islamist uprising in 1976, the operations of the fighting Vanguard began to dwindle greatly in Syria. The death of Marwan Hadeed and the diminished state of the fighting Vanguard, forced it to operate undercover until the dawn of the 1980s where it launched its open war on the Assad's regime in 1982 (O'Bagy, 2012). Moreover, O'Bagy (2012) identifies that due to the decline in its military strength, the Fighting Vanguard was crushed by Syria's intelligence force (*Mukhabarat*)in an insurgency that became known as the 1982 Hamas massacre. However, the crushing of Islamist groups in Syria during the 1982 massacre was not the end of the radical Islamist insurgency in Syria (O'Bagy, 2012). Throughout the twentieth century, many descendants of Islamist groups laid dormant or became assimilated in other religio-nationalistic Islamist groups and radical Islamist groups across the Middle East and Europe. Lefebvre (2011) extensively notes that after the 1982 crackdown, some descendant fighters of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood and Fighting Vanguard have over the years even found solidarity with disenfranchised veteran Baathist fighters of Iraq after the 2003 US invasion. Some former members of the Fighting Vanguard further found solace in extremist

anti-regime Salafist jihadist groups such as Al-Qaeda in Iraq. A group that has also recently made its presence felt in the contemporary Syrian war.

Therefore, as argued by Itani (2014), there has been a historical development of Islamist terrorism in Syria. This has had great influence on the divergent dynamics of which religiously inspired acts of terrorism have been carried out by many prevalent Islamist groups today in the Syrian war. And as noted by the Syrian Study Group (2019) in their report titled "Jihadi Groups in Syria", beyond extremist groups such as Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and Hazb Islami al-Turkistani, Jabhat al-Nusra and IS, Islamist terrorism has been a product of other Islamist groups that have flourshed from the chaos in the country. Islamist religious-nationalist actors such a Harakat Hazam, Jaish al-Mujahedeen and moderate Islamist groups, such as Liwa al-Tawhid and Sunqour al-Sham have used the historical framework of Islamic terrorism created in the country to execute their own fight against the regime. They have mimicked some historical practices of terrorism being used as an insurgent tool to persuade the regime to incorporate Sharia laws in the country's constitution (Itani, 2014:3).

Therefore, Oosterveld and Bloem (2015) note that in the current Syrian war, the progressive perpetual statehood failures of the regime have alongside the aforementioned groups mutated the execution of Islamic inspired terrorism into an abstract theatre configured by the Islamic State. Syria's long history of failed statehood enabled capitalistic groups such as IS to draw upon the historical religio-political divisions in the country such as those created from the Muslim Brotherhood, *cum*, the current anarchical situations in Syria, to pursue its pseudo-state building trajectories in the country (Oosterveld and Bloem, 2017).

2.5. The Islamic State in Context to the Syrian War.

Oosterveld and Bloem (2017) argue that Syria's history of Islamist insurgencies demonstrates how many moderate and radical Islamist conflict actors such as the Islamic State, have attained an enabling platform to infiltrate, influence and even shape Syria's contemporary political landscape in the course of the current Syrian war. As Al-Tamimi (2015) explained, just like many Sunni Islamist groups in the broader Middle East and Syria, the Islamic State has a long history of opposing regime establishments in the Middle East. Evidently, according to Al-Tamimi (2015) the Islamic State's history of defiance to regimes can be tracked through its first establishment in Jordan in 1999 as *Jama at al Tawhid wal-Jihad*-in opposition to the Jordan state, and its assimilations into Al-Queda of Iraq in 2004, in opposition to the U. S's intervention against the Baathist regime. The Islamic State was also involved in the Majlis

Shura al Mujahideen (2006), post Zarqawi- Islamic State of Iraq in the sectarian Sunni-Shia conflict (2006-2008) that was triggered by an increase of Shiite dominance in the newly established parliament, after the US overthrew the Baathist regime in the 2003 invasion in Iraq. The Islamic State was active in the 2014-2017 Iraqi war against the Iraqi regime. Recently it transitioned into its anti-regime prominence in the Syrian war in the latter half of 2013 (Al-Tamimi, 2015: 117).

Al-Tamimi (2015) posits that comparative to most Islamist terrorist groups in the Syrian war, the Islamic State in Syria has distinguished and defined itself as more than just a terrorist group. The Islamic State has practically outgrown its counterpart conflict actors and predecessor (Al-Qaeda in Iraq), to morph into a fully-fledged proto-state. Additionally, it has configured a distinctive conflict theatre of jihad in the Syrian war, that observably comprises of an unfettered orientation to topple the Syrian regime and make way for the creation of its modern Islamic state (Al Tamimi, 2015), proclaimed to emulate the historical Islamic State governed by Prophet Muhammad during his reign (Hanif, 1994).

Gerges (2014), therefore contextualises that in Syria, the Islamic State created a peculiar jihadist movement in the Syrian war than its counterpart jihadist groups. It has pursued large territorial and population conquest trajectory, never done before by previous jihadist groups in Syria. Oosterveld and Bloem (2017) further outlines that extending from the Iraq convulsions (2014-2017) into Syria at the onset of the Syrian war in 2012, the Islamic State has-like no other groups before it- capitalised on the anarchical conditions in Syria, to establish its caliphate. It executed this by infiltrating the country's weak institutions and capturing vacuum territories such Palmyra, Damascus, Aleppo and Idlib Dayr az Zawr and Raqqa. It further created its operational headquarters in Raqqa, alongside population groups in these areas to populate its caliphate (Oosterveld and Bloem, 2017).

 Oosterveld and Bloem (2017) illustrates that like never before seen, the Islamic State has extensively and distinctively used the chaos of the Syrian war to establish a full 'state like' bureaucratic system in Syria, that consists of an operative state-run economy. It also had defined markets such as its antique and women sex slave markets in its conquered territories. Therefore, as defined by Ibrahim (2016), in the Islamic State's epitomised period (2014-2017), the stance of the Islamic State in Syria represented more than just another terror group that is making utility of terror tactics to disperse and promote their Islamic aspirations of subjecting the world to radical ideologies, *cum*, principals of Islam through the Syrian war. Scholars such

as Ibrahim (2016) perceived it to possibly be the final stage of jihadism. According to Bakker and Leede (2015), the revolutionary component of the Islamic State, comparative to other jihadist groups in Syria, has further been marked by the large magnitude of women, especially from the West, that the organisation that the organisation has recruited in its conflict theatre in Syria, in a manner that no group before it has managed to do so.

2.6. Women and Radical Islamic Terrorism in the Broader Middle East and Syria.

2.6.1. Women and Radical Islamic Terrorism in the Middle East and Syria Before 9/11.

According to Davis (2006), across most radical Islamist groups in the Middle East, terrorism pre-9/11, was traditionally a male dominant arena. Women were confined to victim or supportive roles within the arena. Often, the supportive roles women embodied in many terrorism groups therein, was defined by patriarchal and religious-cultural rules, coined from religious Islamist texts by terrorist leaders. Davis (2006) explains that pre-9/11, many terrorist groups ranging from the *inter alia* Muslim brotherhood, Al-Qaeda in Iraq, the Hamas, and the Palestinian Organisation, considered women to either be victims of terrorism and supportive behind the scene agents who help to drive radical Islamist terrorist agenda by:(1) dispersing radical ideology to fighters through designated education channels/tools, (2) produce/give birth to future terrorist fighters, and in the nurturing process groom these future fighters for terrorist activities, (3) maintain and keep watch over the private sphere. Many ideas of women in radical Islamist terrorism thence positioned them as sedentary actors in the Middle East and Syria, with the exception of some extremist terrorist groups such as the extremist Palestinian groups who has frequently used women in some frontline terrorism and particularly as suicide bombers.

2.6.2. Women and Radical Islamic Terrorism in the Broader Middle East and Syria Post 9/11.

According to Schraut and Weinhauer (2014), 9/11 was followed by a narrative of global counterterrorism, as seen in the 2003 global war on terrorism. Since then, terrorism has in reality, become a very gendered phenomenon. This has occurred more visibly in the broader Arab world and the Middle East, where terrorist groups have readapted themselves in response to global counterterrorism initiatives, to survive. However, Davis (2006) asserts that more often, due to the patriarchal connotations that have nominally become associated with the religion of Islam, radical Islamist groups engaged in terrorism are projected to be male dominated arenas. Consequently, women are perceived to only serve the arena of terrorism as supportive agents.

Davis (2006) argues that throughout history, some Islamic clerics have continued to denounce the participation of women in terrorism. Groups such as Al-Qaeda have been slow to acknowledge and incorporate women in frontline positions of terrorism, giving the impression that women do not belong in the frontline combative arena of terrorism. However, Davis (2006) highlights that after 9/11, there has been a paradigmatic shift in the involvement of women in more frontline radical Islamic terrorism in the broader Middle East region and Syria. Post 9/11, many Islamic clerics that denounced women on frontline positions in terrorism, have reverted to promote the utility of women by terrorist groups in frontline positions in attempts to create strategies in which Islamist groups that could evade global counterterrorism taking root against such groups in the Middle East region and Syria. Davis (2006) substantiates that in 2001 the Saudi Council officially permitted women to engage in terrorism for jihad purposes in the region. In 2002, a Hamas religious leader further condoned the utilisation of women as suicide bombers for the jihad trajectory; inciting the first female suicide bomber, Feem Shaiyshi, on behalf the Hamas organisation. Furthermore, in 2003, a Palestinian Islamic Jihad further announced more liberal approaches that allowed women to engage in frontline positions in terrorist organisations for the purpose of jihad. Likewise, in 2004, a leading Egyptian cleric and then dean of Studies at the University of Qatar, by the name of Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, issued a Fatwa (religious decree) approving women to become frontline actors in terrorism for the purpose of jihad (Davis, 2006:2-3). Such shifts in the promotion of women in frontline terrorism activities post 9/11has also become a visible phenomenon in Syria.

2.6.3. Women and Radical Islamic Terrorism in Contemporary Syria During the Contemporary Syrian War.

In the current Syrian war, operative Shiite terrorist groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood, Hezbollah have also restricted much of women's participation in frontline positions of terrorism, which has further raised controversy surrounding the roles of women in radical Islamic terrorism in many cases. However, Khelghat-Boost (2017) notes that throughout the cause of the Syrian war, Islamist jihadist groups such as Jaish al-Fatah, Jabhat Fateh al-Sham, and Jabhat al-Nusra and even the Islamic State, have quickly begun shattering the perceptions of women as passive participants in radical Islamic terrorism. Many of these Islamist groups have advocated for more women to take up divergent frontline positions in terrorist operations. Especially on the jihad insurgency imbricated on the Syrian war; where they stand to serve as strategic agents of the arena (Khelghat-Boost, 2017).

According to Davis (2006), women in terrorism, particularly in Islamist terrorism, have traditionally been presented as passive supportive agents who play restricted roles as mothers, sisters, and wives of terrorist fighters. They are essentially expected to be responsible for procreating the next generation of fighters, indoctrinating and preparing the upcoming generation of fighters for combat, taking care of the private spheres of the Muslim community, *cum*, fulfilling the needs of their male counterparts during the preparation processes for acts of terrorism (De Leede, 2018). However, De Leede (2018) notes that as more radical Islamist groups identify with the tactical value that women encompass, women have undeniably become more visible on the frontlines of radical Islamist groups. This perceived value has increased and promoted women in radical Islamist groups to further constitute political representatives, recruiters, plotters and perpetrators of terrorism and suicide bombings. Khelghat-Boost (2017), substantiates that in Syria, radical Islamist groups such as Jaish al Fatah, Jabhat Fateh al Sham, and Jabhat al-Nusra and even the Islamic State, have observably identified the tactical advantage that women have in their abilities to evade detection and accesses high-security zones within Syria, such as government held cities in Syria. This has motivated more women to in these Islamist groups to be used to organise and execute acts of terrorism against the regime in the regions under regime control in the country. In line with the tactical strategies that women have been identified with by many radical groups in Syria, women have also been used by many of the aforementioned groups as a front to shame other Muslim men and thence motivate them to make trips into Muslim lands in Syria to engage in these groups expressed practices of jihad. Therefore, as noted by Khelghat-Boost (2017) on certain theatres of Islamic terrorism in Syria, such as in IS, women are increasing operating fluidly within both private and public spheres (Gardner, 2015).

Considering the increasing agency of women in radical Islamist groups, Jacoby (2015) argues that there is still a divergence in the manner in which women assume agency in support of their organisation's ideology. Jacoby (2015) contends that frontline positions in radical Islamist groups in Syria, have more often been advocated for or advanced by foreign women who have been exposed to Western environments, or environments receptive to Western ideals such as feminism (Jacoby, 2015). Makanda, Mbambo & Mncibi (2018), highlights that this has seemingly created a feminist narrative for such women in extremist groups such as Jaish al-Fatah, Jabhat Fateh al- Sham, and Jabhat al-Nusra to be more prone to standing on their frontline of terrorism activities in Syria, than local Muslim women would (Khelghat-Boost, 2017).

Makanda et al (2018) asserts that many foreign women, especially those who have been exposed to Western ideals and influences have been more likely to be at liberty to pursue frontline terrorism activities than many regional and local women in these local extremist groups who have been raised under the conservative patriarchal culture prevalent in the broader Middle East region and Syria. Most of the originally from the Middle East and Syria may often be groomed by the patriarchal culture into submissiveness or complacency in terrorism. Thence, servicing the arena of terrorism behind the scenes through supportive roles such as being mothers, sisters and wives.

Khalil (2019) explains that such perplex relations have had a more paramount presence in the Islamic State, where most of the visible mujahedeens' (female fighters) of the Islamic State in frontline positions are foreign women, who have been exposed to feminist ideas, with few local women, such as the Syrian Nisreen Assad Ibrahim Bhaar, occasionally making their way to the frontlines of the organisations.

2.7. The Role of Women in the Islamic State.

According to Khalil (2019), unlike most operative extremist jihadist groups in Syria, the roles of women in IS have undeniably become more fluid and diverse as the Islamic State expanded and reiterated the roles of women in their trajectory of jihad, to be more obligatory than permissive in the circumstances. Khelghat-Boost (2017) maintains that although the overall agency of women in IS increased in their participation in the organisation's path of Jihad, much of the cultural orientation and construction of the Islamic State remained predominantly patriarchal in nature through its premier years (2014-2017). Scholars of Islamic feminism, such as Jacoby (2015), have rightfully argued the male dominant culture of IS in reference to the gendered segregated system of institutions that the organisation ran parallel to each other in the Islamic State during its prime operational years. During IS's operative years its male counterparts had a prime overview of how the regulation of women agency within these designated institutional sectors was facilitated.

Therefore, there has been numerous debates among scholars on the increasing agency of women in IS. Some Islamic feminist scholars such as Jacoby (2015) have identified the "emancipation" of women in IS by their integration into professional jobs that permitted many qualified women to become *inter alia* doctors, teachers and lawyers in the organisations. Scholars such as Spencer (2016) have further referred to the role that women have played as

police force operatives that reinforced order and sharia law in the organisation, as witnessed with the functions therein of the Al-Khansaa Brigade in the Islamic State.

In contrast, Winter (2015a) argues that as valid as the agency of women is in the Islamic State, it is crucial to note that women agency in the Islamic State have been grounded within an innately patriarchal system. Indeed, the Islamic State is governed by a reiterated male version of Shari law, that has perpetuated a gendered hierarchy in favour of men in the Islamic State, regardless of the type of women agency therein. According to Winter (2015a), the involvement of women was strategically designed to ensure that the ideological agenda of the Islamic State is promulgated and advanced. The IS apparently masked itself in a warped women "empowerment" cloak, that strategically made used of women so that the appeal for the Islamic State could remain legitimate for both men and women.

According to an argument raised by Khalil (2019), on a more combative front, women agency in IS has also been defined by their roles as propagandists, recruiters, planners and ultimately executers of terrorism in the name of the organisation. Evidently, such was seen with prominent recruiting women such as Sally Jones-Known as IS's white widow and Australian Zehra Duman, who integrally maintain the organisations global networks of women, alongside women who have facilitated acts of terrorism in Syria (Khalil, 2019). According to Spencer (2016) in addition to such roles, there have even been reports of IS women extending their roles beyond the arena of terrorism to interject and partake in organised criminal activities such as religiously defined human-trafficking. In this context many IS women were known to accompany their male counterparts to carry out house raids in Syria and Iraq to search for women and sex slaves that they could use to run brothels. Henceforth as noted by Kniep (2016) even on the battle field, women have allegedly been 'empowered', within a restrictive patriarchal framework that has seeks to place strict restrictions on the overall roles that women were allowed to engage in especially in the Islamic State territory and, on the combative frontier.

Winter (2015a) extensively argues that in reality, the women 'emancipation' and 'agency' that the Islamic State has narrated for women has been so distorted that it has integrally created a matriarchal structure/culture, where women are hierarchically categorised and strategically used within the patriarchal framework of the Islamic State to oppress other women. Spencer (2016) asserts that more often than not, jihadist wives of leading members of the Islamic State and the foreign female brides or 'jihadi girls', tend to hold higher positions. They also tend to

undertake more professional and frontline roles in the Islamic State. For women such as Nisreen Assad Ibrahim Bashar, who are married to IS's leadership member, their agency is argued to be promoted by marriage to an IS leader, regardless of their initial culture of submission, having been raised in a country that is innately patriarchal. Yilmaz (2017) notes that, in essence, the Islamic State has greatly capitalised on all these dynamics of women agency to further tap into other arenas that could help aid and sustain its existence. Yilmaz (2017) notes that human-trafficking is an emerging arena where women from IS's platform of terrorism, have been disposed and designated to continue their contributions towards the sustenance of terrorism and the terrorist ideology of the organisation.

2.8. The Trafficking Dynamics of Women and Girls in Conflict Zones for the Purpose of Terrorism: Syria in Context.

According to the 2018 Global Trafficking Report, the trafficking of women and girls in conflict situations by armed groups, has many strategic advantages for armed groups, particularly on the frontier of terrorism. Outlining from the context of the Syrian war, Cohen (2018) notes that since the outbreak of the Syrian war in 2012, the trafficking of women and young girls in the Syrian war has been rife, particularly for the purpose of terrorism. In Syria, human-trafficking has manifested on two prominent frontiers in the Syrian war. The 2019 U.S State Department's Trafficking in Person explains that on the one frontier, the trafficking of women and girls in Syria has been used by Syrian government forces, other pro-regime forces, opposition and conflict terrorist groups such as Jabhat al-Nusra and IS, as a terror tactic. With many women being used as weapons of war. On the other frontier, the trafficking of women and girls in Syria has also been used as an organised criminal platform in the Syrian war, which has been used to helped sustain different conflict theatres, including operative theatres of terrorism in the Syrian war, such as that of Jabhat al-Nusra and IS (USSD, 2019).

According to the 2015 U.S State Department's Trafficking in Persons Report, as a tactic of terrorism, trafficking instils fear and tears apart the social and defensive fabric of groups, whose territories are being conquered. The trafficking of women and girls, fundamentally for sexual and different servitude duties, has been used by most armed groups on both regime and opposition sides in the Syrian war. Trafficking of women and girls for the purpose of enslavement and rape has also been used by many armed groups as a terror tactic in Syria, to conquer, subjugate, and reduce the resistance of target population groups (MADRE, et al, 2014: 6).

The U.S State Department Trafficking in Persons Report (2015) extensively accounts in context that in support of their practices of armed conflict, human-trafficking as a terror tactic has also been used by regime, pro-regime and opposition forces, such as the Kurdish Democratic Union Party to therein recruitment female agents. The affected women are often coerced to propagate and advance a particular group's ideology. They also serve as military terrorist agents, who are designated to participate in the creation of weapons, such as bombs. The U.S State Department Trafficking in Persons Report (2015) extensively notes that in the broader Syrian war, such practices of female trafficking have also been used to recruit females to incentivise the recruitment of male fighters.

Besenyö (2017) notes that on the other frontier, the trafficking of women as an independent, organised criminal platform has also operated as an exclusive, but mutually beneficial platform for terrorism in the Syrian war. It has manifested in different ways as a means to finance terrorism. Besenyö (2017) notes that beyond the terror tactic element of human-trafficking, by state and non-state groups, the trafficking of women, particularly by non-state actors such as terrorists' groups, has surfaced even more prominent in the Syrian war as a huge business opportunity. Welch (2017) notes that trafficking has helped to finance terrorist activities and keep theatres of terrorism active in the Syrian war. Besenyö (2017) explains that many terrorist groups in Syria have capitalised on the absent rule of law in the country to extensively buy women and girls from smugglers and traffickers. Many terrorist groups in the country have often bought women to generate money by enslaving women and girls for sex work and prostitution. Many other trafficked women have been used alongside their trafficked male counterparts in terrorist groups to launder money, transport drugs within affiliated theatres of terrorism in the country, or to other affiliated bases of terrorism out of Syria (Besenyö, 2017).

However, according to the 2016 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Global Trafficking in Persons Report, women have not only just been victim centred agents of human-trafficking within terrorist groups, but have notably served as perpetrators of human-trafficking. Brown-Jackson (2019) suggests that in addition to being trafficked by either family members, male smugglers and terrorists, other trafficked women have fallen victim to female traffickers working with/ for terrorist groups. Jackson (2019) notes that many women are generally easier to trust and due to this idea have been used more by terrorist groups in the country to traffic and dispose other women into platforms of terrorism to sustain them. Such complex gendered dynamics of human-trafficking executed by women and against women- for and in the frontier

of terrorism- have best and profoundly manifested through a plethora of intertwined power relations in terrorist organisations such as the Islamic State (Malik, 2017).

2.9. The Trafficking Dynamics of Women in the Islamic State.

According to Binetti (2015), the dynamics of human-trafficking in IS, as in most conflict terrorist groups in Syria, has been complex. Extending beyond the common narrative of women constituting victims of human-trafficking, Binetti (2015) explains that in IS, a plethora of perverse power relations playing out in the organisation has also made women very prominent perpetrators and agents that are pulling in other women and girls into IS's human-trafficking structures in Syria (and Iraq). Jha (2015) explicates that beyond the women and young girls that have fallen victims to IS's human-trafficking structures in Syria (and Iraq) as forced wives, compelled labour and forced commercial sex workers, there has been a great literature gap in identifying with lone wolf women and girls who are working for IS to traffic other women and girls globally into IS. They include women who have "turned themselves over to IS, to facilitate the organisation's human-trafficking practices. For example, locally based women in the Islamic State's territories in Syria (and Iraq) have, throughout IS's operative years, been instructed to traffic women and girls from conflict zones into IS. Many other female traffickers of IS have also been assigned to watch over the women and young girls trafficked into in IS's trafficking structures (Fish, 2018).

Brown-Jackson (2019) therefore, clearly explicates that the prevalent patriarchal culture in IS tends to categorise all women within and outside its territories as second-class citizens. Which in essence culturally strips them of all rights and liberties. This second-class citizen status that women have innately held in IS has often resulted in their exposure and utility as commodities in the Islamic State's human-trafficking structures. Brown-Jackson (2019) therefore argues that in the same victims-based position that women are placed, many women perpetrators of human-trafficking who work for or are in affiliation with IS tend to fall under such categorisation, in spite of their degree of agency within the organisation. According to Fish (2018), the perverse gendered power relations in IS have advocated within its patriarchal framework, a warped form of feminism, known as jihad (i) feminism, has been behind the agency given to women in charge of the recruitment, facilitation and sustenance of the Islamic States human-trafficking networks globally. Foreign women in IS arguably held more frontline positions in the organisation's human-trafficking structures than local and regional women, who according to Fish (2018), have been groomed by their religion and patriarchal nature to have a more submissive attitude within the organisation operations.

According to Fish (2018), at the frontline of IS's human-trafficking structures, IS Brides (often referred to as 'jihadi –power girl (s)'/ and or jihadi brides and reinforces of IS have aided the human-trafficking structures of IS by creating global online recruitment networks, especially to target young vulnerable girls into the Islamic State. Shea and Farahnaz (2019) extends that like the notorious British IS recruiter known as Sally Jones, and Asqa Mohmood (Fish, 2018:8), many women affiliated with/ and working within IS, have extensively been noted to have facilitated the migration of women and young girls from all over the world into the Islamic State in Syria (and Iraq), only to get neglected by their IS affiliated female traffickers once in IS territories. Such recruitment of women into IS's human-trafficking structures to expand the organisation, has integrally been aided by family members of some women and girls who have deliberately trafficked their own girls, for different survival purposes (UNODC Global Report on Trafficking in Persons, 2018).

In other dynamics, Winter (2015a) suggests that in addition to women who recruit and keep trafficked women for IS, women in IS further undertake many roles in running the trafficking in IS territory in Syria. These have included things such as them raiding local houses and public buildings in search of women and young girls that would be forced into marriage, commercial sex work or sex slavery (Shea and Farahnaz,2019). A clear case in point brought forth by Shea and Farahnaz (2019) are women such as *Umm Sayyaf*, who was an Iraqi wife of an IS chief Financier, and was responsible of organisation of sabayas, also known as the 'sexual jihad' marriages for many kidnapped and abducted girls in IS. Women in IS have progressively been responsible for orchestrating for the sexual enslavement and systematic rape of young girls in IS, *cum*, being a part of the orchestration of the Islamic States sex slave market. Besenyö (2017) notes that in addition to such practices, women in IS have also been known train of other women and girls how to smuggle drugs or other things, into highly sensitive areas outside the country. Further guiding trafficked women how to set up terrorist bases for the organisation in high security places, such as in Europe (Besenyö, 2017).

Therefore, as argued by Fish (2018), in both the conflict-based trafficking practices executed by IS, and the internal institutionalised trafficking practices of the organisation occurring within the organisations, women and girls have under complex patriarchal outplays of power fell to victims and 'victimised' perpetrators of the organisations trafficking structures. Directly or indirectly sustaining the organisation's human-trafficking networks and structures. According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes Trafficking in Persons Report (2018), women in IS have done so through different mechanisms of their lives, spanning from

intimate sources such as family members who have to dispose of their own female family members into IS for survival purposes. It also includes other female family members such as *inter alia* mothers and aunts who have-under the authority of their jihadi male counterparts, family members, armed groups, and female armed groups in Syria-assisted in the trafficking of women and girls into IS territory in Syria for financial gain. Other participants in the trafficking network have included local lone wolf female traffickers, who are inspired by IS's ideology. According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes Global Report on Trafficking in Persons (2018), most of these trafficking practices have, in context to the conflict that has unfolded in Syria, been fostered and bolstered by different factors, especially migratory conflict borne platforms that IS's human-trafficking networks have partnered with and masked itself through to enable women and girls to be disposed into IS's institutional human-trafficking structures in Syria (and Iraq).

2.10. A Conflict Based Migratory Projection of the Trafficking Dynamics of Women in the Islamic State: Syria in Context.

According to Viano (2018), the environment of anarchy, the absent rule of law and excessive border permeability created by the Syrian war have made human-trafficking one of the most preferable and profitable migratory channels used by IS to recruit womenfolk to help sustain the existence of the organisation in Syria during the course of the conflict. As explicated by Viano (2018) throughout the course of the Syrian war, human-trafficking has-as an illicit forced migratory arena -been used by the organisation to dispose many naïve and vulnerable women and young girls from all over the world into its territories. Especially in Syria where they progressively fall victims to many exploitative practices. Besenyö (2017) identifies that since the onset of the Syrian war, human-trafficking has been used by IS as a migratory channel in three eminent ways. These encompass: (1) To dispose of female victims and female foreign fighters in IS territory, (2) to serve as a transit state for training or learning IS ideology for other female supporters and victims and lastly, (3) to deport female terrorists or supporters from its territories to execute IS inspired acts of terrorism, *cum*, set up bases of terrorism in other terrains outside the organisation's immediate territories in Syria (Besenyö, 2017).

In another outlook, the Amnesty International (2014) notes that many women and girls in IS have strategically used the very migratory tool of human-trafficking to escape organisation. However, as noted by Charpenel (2016), the migratory elements of human-trafficking practices affiliated with the women in IS has not been always been clear cut and linear. According to Cockayne and Walker (2016), the human-trafficking web of IS in Syria observably infiltrated

and even masked itself on many salient and conducive conflict borne migration flows. Making use of migration flows such as *inter alia* the *hijrah* (migration to Islamic lands), refugee streams and displacement movements to pull women and girls into its global, regional and local human-trafficking networks and structures.

Viano (2018) notes that some migratory practices that appeared to be "voluntary" migration practices, have for some foreign women and young girls, from global, regional and even local places in Syria, turned to trafficking practices. Viano (2018) explains that some women who had "voluntarily" undertaken the hijrah to Syria and IS lands in pursuit to engage in jihad have often found themselves trapped in IS's institutional trafficking practices within its territories in Syria. And have in the process had been exposed to a swathe of exploitative practices, such as being forced into sexual enslavement, forced marriages and systematic rape upon reaching the organisation (Viano, 2018).

 According to Rhuk Ali (2015), the deceptive narrative of *hijrah* that many Muslim women and young girls have been fed by IS online, and through diverse tools of IS's propaganda, such as the Daqib and its propaganda magazine, known as the Rumiyah, has constituted a subversive form of trafficking utilized on women and young girls. As noted by Mehlman-Orozco (2019), IS's practice of the *hijrah* holds no theological foundation and, in essence, stands as one amongst many migratory platforms eminently advanced by the organisation in a misleading manner, to deceptively recruit women into IS to service the organisations. In mimicking traditional trafficking styles, the *hijrah* movements advocated for by IS were designed to get women to migrate from their home countries into Syria and IS territory only to be subjected to many exploitative practices found in human-trafficking (Binetti, 2015).

On a more involuntary frontiers, Charpenel (2015) notes that since the outbreak of the Syrian war in 2012, the chaos in Syria has induced several forced migration platforms that IS has extensively used to imbricate its human-trafficking practices. Charpenel (2015) notes that one of the conflicts borne migratory streams that IS has capitalised on to traffic women from regionally has been refugee streams. The 2016 UNDOC Trafficking in Persons Report notes that due to the excessive vulnerability that many Syrian refugees have faced in neighbouring countries, the Islamic State has managed to partner with transitional criminal groups and small jihadist factions in Iraq, Lebanon and even Jordan, to traffic women and young girls from refugee camps in neighbouring countries into IS's territories for institutionalised labour and commercial sexual exploitation. They are often compounded with salient trafficking practices

such as contractual/temporary forced marriages used within the organisation to recruit other male fighters (Besenyö, 2017).

Cockayne and Walker (2016) further enlightens that IS territory has also served as a transit conflict theatre. It has further served as a theatre where many female refugees in neighbouring countries have also been noted to have passed through, either through the aid of criminal syndicates and even affiliated 'humanitarian personals', to be used to smuggle drugs out of IS into other jihadist conflict zone within the Syrian war. And to other external affiliated terrorist bases in the Middle East region and abroad. In other cases, human-trafficking has also served as a migratory conduit for refugee women girls that had unwillingly turned themselves into IS or had their family members turn them over to IS for survival and financial purposes (Besenyö, 2017). This group of women has often infiltrated the Syrian refugee system as refugees to divert into IS territories once in Syria (Cockayne and Walker, 2016).

Locally in Syria, the rife presence of internally displaced persons, borne from the Syrian War is another forced platform of migration that has given IS's trafficking networks in Syria a platform to thrive (Cockayne and Walker, 2016). Cockayne and Walker (2016) buttress further that the Syrian war created more internally displaced persons and vulnerable women than there are refugee camps in the country, which has opened up many women and girls from IDP's to being absorbed and abducted by IS fighters into their territories to be exploited in many different ways. According to the United General Assembly Trafficking in Persons Report (2016), in many cases, some displaced women and girls that trafficked themselves for survival purposes in Syria, ended up serving as agents of IS. Cockayne and Walker (2016) note that in other instances, internal displacement in Syria has extensively been induced by IS in territories it was conquering, such as in Raqqa. This would strategically and purposefully be done by IS to create large groups of female population groups that it would traffic, by virtue of their vulnerability, into its territories for diverse exploitative practices such as sexual enslavement, commercial forced labour and sex work.

2.11. Conclusion

In conclusion, chapter two unpacked the evolution of armed conflict and terrorism in the Syrian war, while paying close attention to the emergence of religiously inspired terrorism that gave birth to groups such as the Islamic State, in Syria. Progressively from section 2.5, the chapter reviewed the literature on the changing landscape of terrorism, especially highly patriarchal platforms of 'religiously' defined theatres of terrorism, such as that advocated for by the

Islamic State. From section 2.6, the chapter unpacked the role of women in terrorist theatres like the Islamic State and their specific roles in the arena of human-trafficking. From section 2.8 onwards the chapter progressively unpacked the dynamic power relations present in the human-trafficking of women in Syria. Section 2.10 then went on to unpack conflict born migratory platforms, emanating from the Syrian war, that have exacerbated and helped mask IS's human-trafficking networks of women locally and globally, into the organisation's institutional human-trafficking structures prevalent within its territories. The next chapter of the research seeks to ground the study through a theoretical framework.

Chapter Three
Theoretical Framework

3. 1. Introduction

This study is framed by three interrelated theories. The theories underpinning this study attempt to explain the developing relationship between human-trafficking and terrorism in the Syrian war, pertinently at the hands of women facilitators, supporters, and victims of the Islamic state. In responding to the problematics of this study, the research made use of the "push and pull model" of migration, failed state theory, and feminist theory, which has been complemented by the cultural feminist theories of Islamic feminism and jihad (i) feminism. Foundationally, this theoretical framework makes use of the 'push and pull theory' of migration -and its application to human-trafficking- to contour the multifaceted factors inducing both local *cum* international migratory compositions of human-trafficking structures feeding terrorism in warzones. Particular attention is paid to those human-trafficking structures that assist the operative existence of the Islamic State in Syria during the Syrian war. Furthermore, the 'push and pull theory' of migration herein used, identifies how salient interconnected migration networks with links or affiliation to the Islamic State's human-trafficking networks have further disposed many women, from different international, regional and local platforms, into the different ranks in its human-trafficking structures as both victims and forced participants (Binetti, 2015). Thereafter, the study introduces the failed state theory to contextualise the anarchical political climate framing the Syrian war, and how the terrorism and human-trafficking nexus was built up and buffered in the Islamic State by the political climate in the country.

Lastly, the study used the theory of feminism, and in its culturally specific forms, Islamic and jihad (i) feminism. These interconnected feminist theories seek to provide a context-based conceptual framework of the prominent gendered construction of modern Islamist terrorism. They further serve to conceptualise how women have come to emerge as a link fostering and sustaining the growing relationship between terrorism and human-trafficking, observed to take eminent hold in the Islamic State. In contemporary terrorism practices, the Islamic State has constituted amongst the most eminent contemporary terrorist group to have recruited the largest number of women into its organisation. Therefore, to understand the roles that women have played in IS, the theory of jihad (i) feminism, has been used in the study to conceptualise the

interaction of perplex power relations that have come to lure and further subjugate women to terrorism-particularly that advocated by Islamic State- through its human-trafficking structures. This feminist theory addresses the roles women play in IS in both their emancipatory and oppressive roles as facilitators, victims and perpetrators of the terrorist's group human-trafficking operations (Winter, 2015a).

3.2. The Traditional Theoretical Scope of the Push and Pull Theory of Migration.

According to King (2012), most conceptual models of human migration pay homage to Ravensteins primitive model of migration (King, 2012). This includes the "push and pull model" of migration. The "push and pull theory" of migration was first coined by Ravensteins from England in the 19th century. It's theoretical approach to migration emanates from Ravensteins work on the "laws of migration" (1885-1889). It centres on establishing causative factors that induce national and international human mobility that force people to leave their own countries of origin to reside in new places. At the core of most "push and pull models" of migration, is a prescription of probable factors perpetrating different typologies of human mobility. In most cases, these factors stem from structural objectives and conditions, which act as 'push' and 'pull' factors for human migration- in and out of any given country (Boswell, 2002:3).

At a foundational level, a 'push and pull model' developed by Averett Lee (1966) outlines that the onset of human migration processes is more often induced by the prevalence of negative political, economic, social and even environmental factors, prevailing in the country or place of origin. These negative factors are argued by Lee (1966) to serve as 'push' motivating factors for migrating out of country or place (local) of origin. These factors are in most cases characterised by *inter alia* political repression, economic crisis, low social status, ethnic discrimination, poor living conditions that push people out of their original environments to seek better livelihoods in other places of destination (Lee, 1966). Lee's models (1966) expands to argue that negative factors are in turn counteracted by progressive factors such as better jobs opportunities or income, political freedom, political stability, economic development and better living conditions in places of destination (Lee, 1966). These favourable conditions act as 'pull' factors for inward human migration to a place of destination. However, in line with Lee's (1996) model, it is crucial to acknowledge that the same negative factors found in the place of origin, can sometimes be found in the country of destination, but have different effects on the receiving countries, as a result of the social, political and economic conditions of the latter, working more favourably in the place of destination than in the place of origin (Lee, 1996).

Extensive research on the 'push and pull' conceptualisation of migration, further brings into acknowledgement the presence of intervening factors that can disrupt the interaction of push and pull factors driving the migration process of persons between the places of origin and destination. According to King (2012), these factors usually come in the form of physical and political barriers, and strict border controls, which can deflect, stagnate and even reverse original human migration processes. As King (2012) elaborates, intervening factors can also manifest as personal factors such as economic status, life-stages and personality. These factors play crucial roles in the micro-analysis tier of the 'push-pull' framework, explicating the dynamics of choice and factor behind the start of any migration process (King, 2012). Explanatory factors such as family ties, religion, ideology, ethnicity and gender, can also serve as influential factors in an individual's decision-making process to migrate or not to migrate from their countries of origin (or transit); irrespective of structural conditions of the environments and states they live in (Achenbach, 2017).

Another crucial aspect of the 'push-pull' framework of great relevance to this study is the gendered dimension of migration, introduced by Morokvasci (1984), which until the 1990's has been marginalised in many theories of migration including the 'push and pull' model of migration (Lee, 2007). The substratum of this macro feminist approach of 'push-pull' dynamics to human mobility argues that women are seldom ever compelled to migrate out of their countries of origin, due to gender divisions of labour in the work force, that marginalises women to undertake household or sedentary tasks, pertinently orientated for them to maintain the household, and restrict their migration (Piche, 2013). However, in cases where women have been motivated or 'pushed' by family or circumstances to migrate, women will mostly be 'pushed' to migrate to places where there may be better job opportunities. Even in these pulling places of destination, women still find themselves with relatively sedentary job opportunities than their male counterparts (Piche, 2003).

According to Piche (2003) this gendered approach to migration also gives a narrative for how some migration processes embroiled in discursive human mobility processes such as human-trafficking flows of women are determined by 'push' and 'pull' factors. Ramli (2015) notes that either through 'choice' or force, some women find themselves 'push' out of places of their states, or locally, communities of origins, and further pulled into trafficking networks and structures by similar factors identified to cause other forms of migration (Ramli, 2015).

3.3. Applying the Push and Pull Theory of Migration to Human-Trafficking.

As in conventional migration processes, Stanojoska and Petrevski (2012) notes that the theoretical 'push' and 'pull' heuristics of migration occurrences are applicable even to mutated migration processes such as human-trafficking, forming the basis of this study. However, as brought forth by Anderson (2014), it is crucial to note that human-trafficking does not always necessitate mobility or movement of any kind (national or international). In cases where it does take on divergent migratory characteristics, human-trafficking in its diversified mutated migratory form – predating to the notorious 16th-19th century transatlantic slave trade - does constitutes a covert, and more often, involuntary form of migration (Stanojoska and Petrevski, 2012:1). Therefore, from the 'push and pull' theoretical stance, human-trafficking in both its mobile (and immobile) form, is either directly or indirectly perpetrated by different political, economic, social, psychosocial and even environmental 'pull' and 'push' factors. Like other forms of migration, human-trafficking has 'push' factors stemming from both place of origin that correspond with the 'pull' factors present in place of destination (Shelley, 2010).

According to Stanojoska and Petrvoski (2012), in every country there are context-specific 'push' and 'pull' factors perpetrating both local and international human-trafficking structures. These factors often determine the different human trafficking patterns, flows and structure for each individual, within and across any particular country. Thereto, foundationally, on the 'push' continuum of the "push and pull" dyad, Stanojoska and Petrvoski (2012) frame that in most instances 'push' factors driving victims into (mobile) human-trafficking networks are usually-however not exclusively-found in developmentally stagnant and or regressing area's or countries. In most cases these factors manifest as local condition-based factors, which serve as embryotic havens for human-trafficking institutions to flourish from. Cameron and Newman (2008) pins that most 'push' factors perpetrating both local and international human-trafficking structures and thereto flows usually comprise of structural factors such as *inter alia;* lack employment of opportunities, economic imbalances of regions, poverty, natural disasters, corruption, ethnic discrimination, political instability, conflict, militarism, terrorism, *cum,* proximate factors characterised by a lax national and international regimes, poor law enforcement, corruption, innate organised criminal enterprise and border controls (Cameron and Newman , 2008: 21).

A more gendered narrative suggests that the 'push' factors inducing the epidemic gendered human trafficking structures and (out) flows to constitute things such as *inter alia* patriarchy, gender-based violence, feminisation of poverty and migration, toxic masculinity practices of

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warfare (Ebbe & Das, 2008; Territo and Kirkham, 2019). According to Stanojoska and Petrvoski (2012), most of these aforementioned 'push' factors tend to directly cause people, and particularly women and girls, to hand themselves over to different human-trafficking structures for 'safety' or 'survival' purposes. These factors do so by creating situations of vulnerability that 'push' people to migrate into different migratory platforms of trafficking that will give them an opportunity to escape their current living conditions. In more indirect forms, many of the aforementioned 'push' factors, extensively tend to harness large groups of vulnerable/and or unprotected persons within states, that can easily be directly 'pushed' into human-trafficking structures and flows by different mediating migration platforms. According to the Mixed Migration Platform (2017), the latter is usually attributed to salient dangerous platforms of irregular migration incorporative of phenomena's such as forced displacement, refugee migration streams and human smuggling- that may progressively lead victims right into the control of traffickers. Once in the control of traffickers, traffickers are able to dispose population groups from these migration platforms to different types of trafficking situations, ranging from labour to sexual exploitation practices in the places of destination (Mixed Migration Platform, 2017).

Feminist approaches to the 'push-pull' model extend to argues that such 'push' factors tend to exacerbate the exposure of women (and children) more to human-trafficking structures and outflows, in states where women are socially or culturally devaluated. As such, structural conditions tend to precipitate women and children to find themselves in situations where they are unprotected, marginalised or even neglected by their state and communities. They are often left vulnerable and susceptible to choosing dangerous mechanisms such as human-trafficking as migratory tools to leave their oppressive countries. The Global Report on the Trafficking of Persons (2016) extends that, sometimes under strenuous conditions of poverty, some young women and girls, are usually even encouraged by their own family (or community members) to embark on human-trafficking ventures that could possibly give them access to better livelihoods in the place of destination. The thought process behind such actions may possibly be the idea that once in a better livelihood, the trafficked girl or women will be able, in the long run, to help aid the family back home (Stanojoska and Petrvoski, 2012).

Contextually in Syria, Malik (2017) notes that since armed conflict broke out in the country, many 'push' factors have caused many population groups to fall into the trap of many trafficking networks carried out by different conflict players on ground. Cockayne and Walker (2016) argue that in the wake of *inter alia* increasing violence, infrastructural destruction and

collapse of the Syrian economy that has come with the outbreak of conflict in the country has played a huge role in 'pushing' many Syrian population groups into different human-trafficking settings and structures run by different humanitarian, peace keeping and irrefutably armed groups, inclusive to unconventional conflict (terrorist) actors such as Islamic State's. Cockayne and Walker (2016) note that for notorious conflict actors such as the Islamic State, the armed conflict has created factors such as absent border controls that has put many vulnerable groups in a position to be recruited through human-trafficking, into such groups. According to Besenyö (2016), many vulnerable population groups in Syria have found themselves being 'pushed' into human-trafficking ventures in order to operate business practices in other countries, and thence aid the organisations functionality (Besenyö, 2016). In many instances, factors such as the absent rule of law and lapsing border controls, have extensively enabled terrorist groups such as the Islamic State to traffic fighters from other affiliate armed and terrorist groups aboard into Syria to join the conflict.

Cockayne and Walker (2017) elucidate that the Syrian war in itself has extensively created large population group of extremely vulnerable persons such as widows, women, orphans and neglected children that have become susceptible to being kidnapped and/or coerced directly by I.S fighters into different human-trafficking networks and structures run by organisation in Syria (and Iraq). In the same light, the deteriorating living conditions in Syria have caused many desperate groups to even pledge themselves to terrorist conflict actors such as the Islamic State in leverage for personal gain, such as survival. Indirectly, there have been other salient conflict-born platforms such as forced displacement, refugee camps *cum* outflow streams and cross border human smuggling operations in Syria, that are riddled with traffickers (Rossman,2017). Traffickers in these platforms have capitalistically used these platforms to further dispose many "unwilling" or "unsuspecting" victims into both the organisations internal human-trafficking structures in Syria, and its business orchestrated human-trafficking operations outside of Syria and the Middle East region. (Mixed Migration Platform, 2017).

Taking a feminist stance, Lobasz (2009) adds that the overall second-class citizenry status women hold in the country, as a result of diverse conservative religiously patriarchal structures, has further caused many women to fall vulnerable to the Islamic States human-trafficking. Binetti (2015) explicates that since I.S took root in Syria in 2014, many young women and girls, falling victims to the Syrian conflict, have either found themselves at the epicentre of the Islamic States divergent warfare trajectories in Syria. Thence, in the processes, the women and girls have fallen victim to practices such as kidnapping into the organisation's human-

trafficking structures-from local or regional bordering states- to be sold to I.S. fighters (Rossman,2017).

However, this conflict and 'push' factors relationship in Syria has neither been linear nor confined to the anarchical environment of Syria. Internationally, there have been many foreign fighters, especially women and foreign female terrorist fighters, who have left their relatively politically stable countries - on the basis of sentiments about social exclusion, cultural and religious discrimination, or oppression in their countries of residence - to join the Islamic State (Pokalova,2019). For some, upon reaching the Islamic State, succumbed to the organisations female recruitment processes being executed through different human-trafficking channels in the country (Viano, 2018).From the aforementioned, it is evident that some environments containing a magnitude of negative factors, such as Syria, do not only have the capacity to simply 'push' victims into human-trafficking flows and structures, but integrally have just as much force to 'pull' many victims into human-trafficking structures and human-trafficking flows inflows operative within their terrains.

More often, victims of trafficking find themselves in trafficking situations in the process of searching for better livelihood elsewhere. Therefore, according to Cho (2015), 'pull' factors used by divergent traffickers to entice victims into human-trafficking, usually comprise of *inter alia* promises of higher wages, good job opportunities, political freedom and stability, cultural acceptance and gender liberty; at the place of destination (local or international). Rhuk Ali (2015) extends that more often, these 'pull', like the push factors, either manifest through physically coercive forces, or, subtly, through forces incorporative of divergent deceptive propaganda, which according to Binetti (2015), psychologically ferments that enticing appetite in victims to enter, either knowingly or unsuspectedly into trafficking situations. As feminist theorists would further argue, for women residing in retrogressively patriarchal states or societies, the search for promises of a better livelihood in an advertised place of destination, complemented by the probability of being in an environment that encompasses higher gender liberty and equality than in their countries of origin or residence, has been the bane behind the relatively higher global number of women, who are both willingly and unwillingly 'pushed' into trafficking structures and trafficking outflows from their country of origin (Viano, 2018).

In view of the above mosaic of 'push' factors perpetuating diverse human-trafficking flows and structures of different conflict players in Syria, especially that of the Islamic States herein analysed; many 'push' factors in the country have been complemented by a plethora of enticing

'pull' factors that lure many victims into its theatre of terrorism in Syria (and Iraq). Malik (2017) substantially explicates that locally, many vulnerable civilians in Syria have found themselves enticed by 'pull' factors into IS. For victims of the Syrian war, the Islamic State has made promises to provide many victims of the Syrian war with aid, protection from war, different rewards such as status and a sense of belonging, for becoming its member. Binetti (2012) adds that besides women being trafficked into the Islamic state through kidnapping and abduction, the promises of husbands and sisterhoods in I.S have played an integral role in psychologically radicalising and 'pulling' many women and young girls into different constituents of the Islamic State's human-trafficking structures. Internationally, Rukh Ali (2015) outlines that the backbone of the Islamic States human-trafficking mosaic has been executed through various deceptive platforms of propaganda dispersed on different media and social media platforms.

 Rhuk Ali (2015) notes that the same strategies of false propaganda have lured many men and young boys into different labour and other trafficking practices upon being promised wives and sex slaves. Many women from international, regional and local platforms been pulled into the Islamic States trafficking structures through false propaganda (Kniep,2016). The Islamic State often has often used a false pretext that women who migrate into IS are being given husbands, protections and a society of comprising of cultural and religious freedom. The Islamic State given many women incentive to migrate into Syria (and Iraq), only to be disposed into the ranks of different trafficking structures such as forced marriages, sexual enslavement and violence upon reaching I.S (Rhuk Ali, 2015). Strategically, IS has further utilised women to stand at the forefront of its propaganda dispersal. This visibly exacerbated the 'pull' factor of the organisation's propaganda strategy in its recruitment process. With young girls seeking to follow in the footsteps of their female martyr, seeing the operation of the more plausible and enticing to engage in (Yilmaz, 2017).

Therefore, from the aforementioned, it is evident that the Islamic State's human-trafficking structures have been perpetrated globally, regionally and locally by a plethora of different '' 'push' and 'pull' factors. These range of factors work in synergy with each other, from both place of origin and destinations, to lure victims into its human-trafficking structures of inter and intrastate trafficking flows. The 'push-pull' model of migration has been identified to account for factors behind the Islamic States' trafficking practices but has fallen short of fully explaining the context creating these factors in Syria. Thereto, in response to the theoretical shortcomings of the 'push and pull' module used herein; the study progressively uses to failed

state theory to identify with the first objective of the study- that seeks to establish the context behind the evolution of terrorism in Syria.

3.4. The Failed States Theory.

The theory of failed states, therein used in study, covers the primary objective of this study. It seeks to address how environments in political disarray like Syria, nourish terrorism. It further seeks to explain how states facing violent political turmoil create profit generating and recruiting criminal enterprises, such as human-trafficking, that are able to feed of terrorism countries faced by political instability. Therefore, as outlined by Rotberg (2003), the concept of state failure is a post-cold war conceptual. This theoretical framework first gained eminence after the cold war era, in response to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the consequent degenerating development of some of its dependent states in Africa, Asia, the Middle East Latin America and Oceania. As more former Soviet Union allied states in these regions teetered towards failure, policy and decision-makers in global politics; ranging from scholars such as Zartman, (1995), Gross (1996) to Rotberg (2002; 2003; 2004), began to categorise these states, specifically to identify the threat that these states could pose to political stability in the international system, post the cold war era. Therefore, the failed state theory purposely serves to address the specific procedural statehood (scale and institutional) failures of countries such as Syria under analysis in this study. It explicates how these statehood failures of the country have come to harbour global threats such as terrorism and human-trafficking. These global threats are explicated in context alongside other complementary negative conflict-borne platforms such as forced displacements and human smuggling that create large population groups of vulnerable persons, especially women and children, who can easily be disposed to human-traffic structures and trafficking flows, executed by notorious conflict-terrorist players such as the Islamic State in failed states such as Syria (Malik, 2017).

Therefore, as outline by Rotberg (2003), within the prevalent hierarchical categorisation of nation-states in the international system, the failed state is a polity positioned to function worse than strong and weak states, but better than states that have completely collapsed. According to Rotberg's (2003) analysis of the failed state, the failed state theory is a theoretical framework that seeks to explicate the characteristics and repercussions of polities that have institutionally malfunctioned to a point where they can no longer, or, are no longer willing to perform their fundamental duties as nation-states in the modern world. Theoretically, failed states are characteristically spotted by their failures to execute either some or all of their economic, political and social functionalities. As accounted for by Rotberg (2002), a state thus begins to

loom of failure when the greed of rulers overwhelms their responsibilities to maximise the overall wellbeing of its citizens. Such states generally fail to provide fundamental political and basic state survival goods and services such as security, the rule of law, political freedom and participation, basic service delivery, infrastructure for basic health and education to its citizens (Rotberg, 2004).

Similarly, Rotberg (2004:23) identifies that failing to provide for citizens is one of the characteristics of a failed state, which may give rise to insurgencies, communal discontent against the government, recurring and increasing political violence. In such circumstances, the state eventually loses the monopoly of violence within its borders. Rotberg (2004) outlines that once a state becomes fully consumed by failure at the hands of armed conflicts and political violence, its judicial and political systems become flawed by destruction and thereto seizes to exist as a result of very little to no state institutions that can sustain the rule of law. In addition, Rotberg (2002) notes that in a failed state, the implementation of the rule of law is replaced with the law of the jungle. Resulting in a plethora of phenomena such as the state losing authority over sections of its territory to predatory vigilante groups, guerrilla armed groups, warlords and terrorist organisations; that begin to pursue territorial conquest, and capture of state resources and populations groups in them. Shmids (2012) argues that in some cases, once land and resources are seized from the state, especially by terrorist and organised criminal syndicates, much of the captured resources are used to formally institutionalise their operations through pseudo-state structures. In most cases, terrorist and organised criminal actors will set up recruitment and training camps in the hosting failed state to assimilate their recruits, mostly for financially profitable criminal activities such as human-trafficking practices, that are driven by captured or vulnerable population groups, seeking to flee the conflict zones of their respective failed state (Schism, 2012).

Ergo, as noted by Rotberg (2002), another defining feature of a failed state is the increase of criminal violence within and even across its borders; as many failed states seize to maintain any control over their borders. More often, this may result in notorious actors such as terrorist organisations being able to operate permeably across its borders and engage in transnational border businesses such as human smuggling and trafficking of its fighters and businesses. According to Takey and Gvosdev (2002), the great negative factors of this permeability of borders is that notorious non-state groups such as criminal and terrorist organisations, can use this security gap, to form networks with their affiliates in other countries (Takey & Gvosdev, 2002).

More so, as extensively characterised by Rotberg (2002), once a state plunges into failure, the state itself becomes more criminal in its oppression towards its citizens. Sometimes, such states even inflict different practices of terrorism on citizens or make use of terrorist groups to inflict violence on its people, pertinently to pursue corruption ventures at a largely destructive scale, than states that have not yet reached failure. As explicated by Sung (2004), a failed state is notoriously known for looting whatever resources may still remain from its citizens. Sung (2004) notes that sometimes the failed state embodies such lawlessness, that in most cases they even purposely begin to waver most of their legal commitments to international laws, in order to harbour criminal gangs, armed, drug and human-trafficker's cartels, that operate so rapidly and blatantly in the cities, rural parts of the failed state, and across its borders. Sometimes such operations take place under the auspice and permission of its bureaucratic leaders, who will allow these operations to flourish for the financial benefits that they can linage from them (Sung,2004).

Takeyh and Gvosdev's (2002) state failure analysis, thus argues that in most cases, particularly in failed states, institutionalised criminal practices such as terrorism and human-trafficking can both be practiced intertwiningly by terrorist groups. This has been evident with the operations of terrorist groups such as IS. Takeyh and Gvosdev (2002) notes that at times these activities will be permitted by the ruling or elite factions, who enable these criminal structures to flourish with little counteracting response to them. At times, the ruling elites and leaders in failed states can allow criminal activities such as terrorism and human-trafficking to occur concurrently within their borders so that they can capitalised on the presence of terrorism or human-trafficking to inflict violence on its civilians. Some state leaders in failed polities can use terrorism and human-trafficking to oppress its citizens in order to pursue their own agendas of looting state resources. And sometimes state leaders in failed states can deliberately expose their civilians to human-trafficking structures, and sometimes even those run by terrorist groups in their borders; in order to create financial generating networks for themselves (Takeyh and Gvosdev, 2002).

Francis Fakuyama (2005) expounds that under such conditions of statehood failure, the overall loss of legitimacy of a failed state, specifically in the eyes of its citizens, becomes inevitable. According to Fakuyama (2005) this loss of legitimacy in statehood in most states, but severely so in failed states, becomes a crucial prerequisite that drives some population groups to pledge allegiance to criminal human-trafficking structures, which may be perpetrated by conflict actors such as terrorist groups. Fakuyama (2005) elaborates further that once a state has lost

total legitimacy and the general social contract binding citizens to their state is lost, the survival mechanism for some population groups who are unable to escape their failed state through migration (legal or illicit), is to pledge allegiance to terrorist and or criminal groups that run operations such as human smuggling and trafficking. Therefore, it is not uncommon, especially in conflict situations, to see lucrative business transactions take roots with terrorist groups who are willing to buy recruits from the trafficking organisers. Sometimes disillusioned civilians can also be directly be trafficked by unconventional conflict actors such as terrorist groups, who coerce them to pledge and engage in human-trafficking, and carry out money laundering and smuggling tasks for their organisations in different parts of the world (Besenyö, 2016).

Rotberg (2002) notes that in some failed states, terrorism and human-trafficking can even be supported by certains factions of the population for three particular reasons. Firstly, in some instances the presence of these criminal platforms can operate as a grievance based responsive mechanism from populations population groups seeking to fight a state system that is constantly serving to obstruct their acquisition of basic needs (Rotberg, 2002). Secondly, the support towards platforms of terrorism and human-trafficking in a failed state can serve as identity platforms that some citizens within the failed state may try to seek belonging from. Thirdly, for many disillusioned and vulnerable groups such as children and women, in a failed state, arena's such as terrorism become a safety net and survival strategy.

 Affirmatively, in the Syrian Arab Republic, since armed conflict broke out in 2012, the contestation of territories for service delivery between the state and divergent opposition groups has created a loophole for terrorism and terrorist groups such as the I.S. to institutionalise and create sub-state structures in the vacuums of unclaimed or governmentally marginalised territories in Syria (Jones, et al,2017). Jones et al (2017) illustrates that since its insertion in the Syrian war, IS had managed to claim and capture places such as Raqqa (where it located the capital for its so-called Caliphate) and other northern cities such as Aleppo, Dayr az-Zawr, alongside strategic towns in Syria, such as Dier az-Zour-known for its Euphrates river historic smuggling routes leading into al Qaum, Iraq- and the population groups therein, to establish the Islamic State. Jones et al (2017) argues further that the Islamic State in Syria has complexly thrived in the multifaceted chaos and lawlessness of a generationally corrupt and repressive government, that is further characterised by multi-ethnic and multi-sectarian violence of divergent groups, widespread infrastructural and material damage, as well as the neglected territories that have enabled the institutionalisation of its pseudo-state within Syria. Besenyö (2017) notes that in the mosaic of political anarchy in Syria, the wake of massive

refugee and IDP crisis, exacerbated with the Syrian war, has nurtured the widespread human-trafficking in Syria, as seen with the Islamic State, through direct population capture and propaganda. The organisation's business and market-oriented sex trafficking system that has been shaped by relentless patriarchy, and misleading religious definitions and commodification of vulnerable women and young girls (Besenyö, 2017).

The failed states theory does not really contour the essence of power relations that drive many women to fall into agency or victimhood categories in terrorism and human-trafficking during wartime. Especially by terrorist groups such as the Islamic State. Therefore, to fill the gender gap prescribing the power relations that entangle women into criminal platforms such as human-trafficking in, this research also utilises the feminist theory, for its complementary Islamist and jihadist feminist approaches, to frame how politically anarchical environments can work rapidly to retrogress the development of women and young girls, and motivate or drive the gendered evolution of terrorism, such as female trafficking by the IS.

3.5. Feminist Theory and Thought.

According to Offen (1988), feminism is a responsive movement to the oppression of women in different spheres of life under any contextual settings within a given polity. Feminism is therefore further responsive to regressing environments in failed states that can exacerbate/and or intensify the oppression and subordination of women. Although feminism appears to be a modern term, rising to prominence in the twentieth century, its first conceptual identifications and thoughts were spotted as far back as the latter half of the 1700s, with the emergence of the French word "*Feminisme*" attributed to Charles Fourier (Offen,1988:1). Feminism can further be attributed to the classic feminist works of pioneering feminist scholars such as Mary Wollstone (1792), Virginia Woolf, Olympe de Gouge, Theriogne de Meriour (Freedman,2001), and first French self-proclaimed feminist suffrage advocate, Hubertin Auclert, to name a few (Offen, 1988;126).

Throughout the evolution of the feminism discourse, feminist thoughts and theories have become so diverse in their approaches that they sometimes strongly contradict each other. This often hinders a neat definition of feminism from taking root (Freedman, 2001). Thereto, using a baseline understanding of feminist thoughts and theories, feminist theories-in their diversification-fundamentally converge to identify with the inferior position of women in society based on their sex. The core of feminism therefore argues, that the biological differences between males and women should not form the basis for men and women to share

different and unequal experiences, statuses in the societies, and overall, the states that they live in. Feminism progressively calls for the reorganisation of political, economic, social and cultural order within polities to reduce and eventually end the discrimination of women and bring about gender equality. Therefore, as extensively argued by Freedman (2001), the feminist theory and discourse holistically concerns itself with spotting the different practises and experiences of gender inequality and discrimination faced by women through structures and organisations such as families, marriages, economy, religion, politics, the arts and cultural productions, down till the very language that we speak (Lorber, 1997: 8). In their pursuit to establish equality of the sexes, feminist theories argue that since there are diverse and different structures that subject women to oppression and subordination, so should the liberation of women from such structures be diversified in discourse, strategy, methodology and mechanism, so as to be compatible enough to counteract the different types of oppression being dealt with. The goal therein is to liberate women and attain sustainable gender equality in all spheres of life (Beasley, 1999).

Throughout its three waves of discontinuities and continuities, the feminist discourse as a force embodied in political and social movements opposing any systems and practices that work retrogressively towards the liberty and development of women within a given polity; is responsive and retaliatory in many circumstances, even in failing states. (Offen, 1988). Therefore, in the contexts of a failed state, feminism is responsive in identifying and retaliating against the oppressive modes of governance that usually exist in male-dominated polities and the unequal distribution of goods and services that these polities may accord to women under the predominance of different influential patriarchal practices. Integrally, under such contexts, feminism begins by identifying greater gender-discriminatory phenomena such as different toxic masculine practices of warfare and/or gender-based violence that may exist in such polities (Phipps, 2021).

Offen (1988) notes that feminism and its theoretical and empirical discourses stretch beyond the narrative of simply seeking the equality of the sexes as it applies to 'women liberations'. But integrally entails spotting the dynamics of women oppression in different contextual settings, including conflict settings. Feminism identifies a need for context-specific mechanisms of liberation that can be established to reduce and move towards eradicating women's dynamic oppression by men (Phipps, 2021). Feminism also involves interrogating women oppression of other women, under the authority and guidance of men, that tends to occur in failing conflict-ridden states, where some women often take divergent male stances in

their different combative pursuits of warfare and may oppress other women in the process (Offen, 1988).

Paglia (2008) posits that while acknowledging the advocacy of women liberation and empowerment that feminism represents, it is crucial to note that discourses on feminism do not serve to empower women (individuals or groups) of any cultural or religious background to: (1) disregard their cultural norms or (2) become feminist martyrs to perverse feminist trajectories pioneered by many extreme women, who define their 'emancipation' and empowerment as radicalism. Furthermore, feminism does not promote women to join and actively support radical and ideologies, or lure other women (and men) into partaking in rebellious movements such as terrorism (Paglia, 2008). Tong (1981) argues that it is when feminism becomes politically, ideologically and even theologically radicalised that martyrdom constructs of feminism emerge as radical pursuits, which are intended to obliterate patriarchal systems and belief, through "revolutionary orientated violence" (Tong, 1981).

At the turn of the twenty first century, the relationship between feminism and radicalisation has come under great scrutiny especially in the Islamic world. Where Islamic feminism, in its cultural and religious pursuits has come under great scrutiny for serving as a "potential" tool of 'emancipation' driving the increasing radicalisation of women into radical Islamist groups. Since the emergence of Islamic feminism in the 1990's, this strand of feminism has been speculated to motivate women to join these zealous religious groups. And further recruit other women into radical Islamist platforms through channels such as human-trafficking. Therefore, to fully analyse these arguments and establish the true essence of Islamic feminism in context, the study progressively goes on to navigate the theory of Islamic feminism.

3.5.1. Islamic Feminism

According to Mojab (2001), Islamic feminism progressed from earlier secular feminist movements. It emerged in Muslim dominated countries as nation-based social movements in the latter half of the nineteenth century, transitioning into the earlier half of the twentieth century. The intellectual movement of Islamic feminism emerged as a parallel to the third wave of feminism affecting the West in the 1990s. It emanated as a response to the incompatibilities of secular feminist thoughts that bypassed religiously constructed systems of patriarchy that are present in many states in the larger Arab and Muslim world. Building up to its movement, Islamic feminism started showing its intellectual face with scholars such as sociologist Fatima Mernissi, who first challenged the authenticity of certain misogynistic hadiths attributed to the

prophet. In the 1900's Islamic feminism was thereafter pioneering by Islamic scholars such as Ziba Mir Hosseini, who pioneered gender issues in theological terms and undertook the textual re-interpretation of different Islamic text sources (Abdallah, 2010:2). Therefore, at the basis of all Islamic feminism discourses is the need to establish feminist thoughts and movements that would be compatible and responsive to attaining gender equality within the cultural and religious institutionalisation of Islam and its cultural practices. Which are predominantly-however not exclusively- practised in most Muslim-dominated countries in the broader Arab world and the Middle East (Ahmad,2015).

According to Ziba-Mir Hosseini (1996), the main departure of arguments that different approaches of Islamic feminism discourses bring to the table is that Islam in itself does not promote the oppression of women in any way. With the evolution of the movement, it has been redefined and reconstructed by conservative Islamic clerics who seek to adapt it to different patriarchal systems and keep women subordinate to men in all aspects of their life, especially in public spheres. One prominent Islamic feminist approach tracks its arguments to practical instances in history, where during the priesthood era of Prophet Muhammad (609-632 CE), Muslim women-unlike today in their segregation with men in mosques- were actually allowed to walk into mosques, alongside their male counterparts, to directly bring forth their grievances to the prophet (Ahmad, 2015).

Ziba Mir Hosseini's other Islamic feminist approaches track original and uncensored Islamic text sources such as the Quran and various Hadith (s), to extract and justify particulars in these sources that illustrate the equality Islam has always accorded women. Not only in the private sphere of life but also in the public sphere (Abdallah, 2010). Mir Hosseini (1996) notes that even Sharia law governing the lives of most Muslims should be looked at holistically and in its original form. Integrally, from a gendered perspective to identify the legal frameworks accrediting that women should be accorded equal rights alongside their male counterparts in the Muslim world (Mir Hosseini, 1996). In doing this, Islamic feminists look towards working within Islamic jurisprudence to use an interpretive methodology called an *ijtihad* to interpret Quranic principles that will help re-establish equal rights for women in Islam (Mirza, 2008:30). Therefore, Ahmad (2015) notes that in maintaining that women's rights and liberties have also been a product of Islam, Islamic feminism argues for scholars and activists of gender equality to return back to original religious scriptures and practices of the Islamic religion, to reclaim the innate rights women have always had in Islamic doctrines; both publicly and privately (Ahmad, 2015).

According to Cook (2005), Islamic feminism goes on to argue that combative cultural practices such as the jihad in Islam have always been gendered. Islamic feminism argues further that in contrast to popular belief that women are called into the jihad merely to undertake sedentary and supportive roles, Islam has always called upon both men and women equally to take up frontline roles to defend the Muslim communities, when there are any external threats to the Muslim community. Islamic feminism posits that, women in the combative arena have never needed the permission of men to enter a jihad. Explicitly, the combative discourse of Islamic feminism takes a firm stance in arguing that jihad has never been a privilege given to Muslim women by men. Islamic feminism notes that women are not only positioned to engage in a jihad when there is (1) a shortage of male fighters in the combative field as a result of their deaths or captivity by oppositional forces, (2) a commanding need for women to provide the male jihad fighters with the support when they demand, and (3) a need for women to study the Islamic religion outside the environment of combat so as to further educate and accumulate external support from Muslims residing in the most remote enclaves, for futuristic jihad trajectories. However, women have an equal right to engage with their male partners whenever there is a need to do so. Islamic feminists clearly explain that even in the priesthood era of Muhammad, jihad was a duty, an obligation that the prophet himself ordained to be undertaken by both women and men of the Muslim world to protect the *ummah* (Muslim community) (Cook,2005).

Therefore, on the basis of the aforementioned, a radical stance of combative Islamic feminism has seemingly emerged in jihads. Especially the increasing engagement of many women in jihadist forms of terrorism. In literal terms, jihad (i) feminism is the most contemporary and radical form of terrorism that has redefined 'emancipation' and liberation of Muslim women on the combative front. Jihad (i) feminism has been demonstrated through Muslim women's ability to execute and radically support different acts of political violence, peculiarly that of terrorism in the name of Islam. This has been visible in the latest wave of jihadism that is currently affecting many parts of the globe.

Therefore, as outlined, Islamic feminism essentially identifies itself with gender equality within the Muslim world and not necessarily empowering women for violence, except in circumstances where the Muslim community is in faced with external threats. The theoretical proposal that this dissertation thereafter takes encompasses conceptually understanding the latest wave of Islamic feminism - termed 'jihad (i) feminism'. This strand of feminism has become part and parcel of the latest wave of jihadism. It has motivated the radicalisation of

many women and girls to support, and facilitate their engagement in jihadist terrorist groups, especially conflict orientated terrorist actors such as the Islamic State (in Syria and Iraq) (Winter, 2015). Thereto, in specifically responding to the third objective of this study, which is to assess how women support and facilitates human-trafficking operations, especially of other women in support of terrorism; the propagandistic jihad (i) feminism movement of women, will form the next feminism strand analysed.

3.5.2. Jihad (i) Feminism.

Jihad (i) feminism - alternatively called jihadist feminism - is a radical conceptual discourse of feminism, referring to the dynamism of women emancipation espoused in contexts of warfare, where women are pursued to partake in a combative jihad. This branch of feminism was first spotted conceptually in an article written by Rukh Ali (2015:15) titled "ISIS and Propaganda: How IS Exploits Women". Jihad (i) feminism is a new extremist-based feminist discourse pioneered in the Islamic State by its women supporters. Some scholars of Islamic feminism would argue it to be a radical wave of feminism, that lies at a tangent to the broad understanding of feminism and its cultural partner, Islamic feminism. Therefore, instead of advocating for the liberation of women in conflict situations, jihad (i) feminism reverts to advocacy that perversely encourages young Muslim women and girls to aid, reinstate, and reinforce patriarchy in parastatal entities such as I.S in order to yield emancipation in other "subliminal ways" (Winter, 2015a).

In reality, jihad (i) feminism is a propagandistic front of feminism that has since its establishment in the Islamic state, thrived on different social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter. Zorpia, JustPastit, Instagram, WeChat, YouTube, Tumblr and countless social platforms (Winter, 2015a). It is promoted on the Islamic States media platform known as Al-Hayat in Iraq, under the authority of the media wing of I. S's all female military wing known as the Al-Khansaa Brigade, which advocates the ideologies that women in the Islamic State are required to abide by (Abdul-Alim, 2015).

According to Winter (2015a), jihad(i) feminism is subliminally a pro-patriarchal movement, that is embedded in reclusive jihadist terrorist groups, and uses armed conflicts (said to be interfered with in the Arab world and Middle East) to call for a re-establishment and re-modification of patriarchy in these regions. Winter (2015a) argues further that at a foundational level, the basis for the jihadist feminist movement is advocacy for Muslim women - who are accused of having fallen victims to Western cultures of liberty throwing Muslim communities

in influx - to revert back to their traditional practices of maintaining the private spheres of these communities through sedentary and supportive roles. And by doing so will reinstate stability back into the *ummah* (Muslim community*).

According to the jihad (i) feminism perspectives, women are projected as the backbone behind the re-instatement of stability in the private spheres of the *ummah*, which is as a power position. It purports women to have more power in the private spheres of communities that men cannot attain. This 'power' that women are alleged to have is according to the jihad(i) feminist discourse, a form of 'subliminal emancipation' that allows women to fully govern the private spheres of Muslim communities without/ or very little interference from men (Storey, 2016).

Abdul-Alim (2015) argues that the predispositions of jihadist feminism advocates for women to embrace a culture of 'submissiveness' within the territories of the Islamic State. On their given platforms in the private spheres, women in the Islamic State are literally encouraged very early in their teenage years to aspire towards marriage and motherhood and not towards degrees and careers. Abdul-Alim (2015) argues from a religious stance, that the sedentariness of a woman as a mother and wife is a divine paramount right given to women by God, that no other individual can take away. Building on this line of thought, jihad (i) feminism goes on to argue against Western civilisation and practices of women liberty, arguing that the equality of men and women that Western civilisation prescribes is Godless, as it pulls women away from their divine God-given right to be wives and mothers in society.

Even in its educational approach, jihad (i) feminism prescribes women to have a primary education that is adequate enough to sustain the private spheres of the Islamic State. Further arguing for women to only obtain education within the religious parameters of the *fiqah*-Islamic jurisprudence and understanding of the Sharia; so that they are is able to raise good Jihadist sons of the Islamic State and loyal girls that will be good supportive wives for their Jihadist partners (Abdul-Alim, 2015).Therefore, for women supporters of the jihad (i) feminism discourse, women in IS are not bound to the private spheres of the jihad to achieve male honour (*sharaf*), but are at liberty to do so by their own pursuits to attain women honor (*ird*) in their religious duties of jihad as loyal wives to their husbands, good mothers to their sons and supporters of their religious duties (Von knop, 2007: 410).

Therefore, in literal terms, jihad (i) feminism proposes that women have nothing to gain from competing with men on public spheres. This feminism theory asserts that the presence of women in public spheres, expose women to avoidable hardships such as gender discrimination

and sexual abuse in their engagements with men in public spheres (Abdul-Alim, 2015). Such a narrative of submissive culture plays itself out explicitly on the combative trajectory of jihad carried out by conflict terrorist group, especially in the Islamic State.

Therefore, Kniep (2016) notes that on the combative front of the jihad, jihad (I) feminism equates the self-sacrifice of women on the battlefields of Jihad and terrorism to 'emancipation'. The jihad (i) Feminism approach maintains that the honour of self-sacrifice that comes from the suicide terrorist missions undertaken by women during times of jihad combat emancipates the female suicide perpetrator from the ungodly practices of the world. It is believed that suicide terrorism introduces the female suicide perpetrator who has taken this journey (alone or with their counterpart) for the Islamic State, to a paradise of abundant life and liberty in heaven. According to Rukh Ali (2015), this emancipatory position stands plausible in the jihad (i) feminist approach that lauds women for aiding their male counterparts to carry out acts of terrorism. The self-sacrificing women are viewed to be 'liberated' enough to understand that aiding their counterparts to carry out acts of terrorism, amounts to setting the ummah free from perceived corrupt Western influences (Kniep, 2016).

Another narrative of Jihadist feminism that embraces the spirit of submissive culture as emancipatory is seen in the perverse theological basis of human-trafficking, peculiarly of women and young girls (Raben, 2018). The jihad (i) feminist approach to the theologically based trafficking that is practised in jihad purports the trafficking of women to be 'emancipatory'. Arguing that the trafficked women are drawn into the jihad to be protected from corrupt Western cultures that obstruct them from their feminine roles (Al-Dayel, Mumford and Bales, 2020). According to this jihadi feminist approach, trafficked women are 'liberated' from having to compete with men. These women are in jihadist platforms such as the Islamic State, to reinstate their 'femaleness' back and regain their divine rights as sedentary and supportive agents of society in the Islamic State (Al-Dayel et al, 2020).

Therefore, even for women who are initially captured in war, under Jihad (i) feminist sentiments, captured women are perceived to be protected in the private spheres of the Islamic State from the ungodliness and alleged corrupt ways of Western idea's, which influence women and strips them of their feminine divine rights as nurturers of the Muslim society. Winter (2015a) outlines that jihad (i) feminism, and its culture of submissiveness that acknowledges the human-trafficking of women into IS structures being lauded as valid, even by it women supporters. Interestingly, these women supporters of IS go as far as facilitating trafficking

activities for the Islamic State, especially from the many media platforms they are given authority over in the Islamic State. The women supporters of IS help to recruit other women, especially Muslim women and young girls from across the globe into the Islamic State. The recruits are coerced into forced marriages and other dehumanising sexual practices that are phrased as the 'sexual jihad', which reminds women of their second-class supportive standing in society (Rhuk Ali, 2015).

Contextually, in Syria (and Iraq), where IS has operated since the Islamic State official declaration in 2014, women have been at the forefront of IS propaganda. Which has been configured around a rhetoric narrative of sisterhood and paradise, orientated at getting women into the Islamic States. According to Rhuk Ali (2015) supported by Hole, Branford and Fernet (2015), the authors note that this strategic position of power given to women in IS, especially those framed as your muhajirah (female fighters), has been used by the Islamic State to lure other women into its territories. The Islamic State has mastered the strategy of putting women at the forefront of its propaganda agenda in order to playing on the many blind spots of masculinity and therefore use the involvement of women in their propaganda executions to shame Muslim men across the globe to join the Islamic State. IS therefore empowers women through its jihad (i) feminism agenda to further get men to make the journey to Syria and Iraq to join the Islam State. Another important factor that IS has identified with its empowerment of women, is the idea that the presence of women in its organisation creates a sense of viability in the ideologies of the Islamic State. IS identified using more women in its selected frontline positions gives the organisation a sense of legitimacy, especially to the female onlookers that had contemplated to join the organisation. However, Rhuk Ali (2015) notes that many women who had been deceived and lured into IS, through the organisation's propaganda of emancipation, have been shattered by the reality of devastation and exploitation that they actually face in the Islamic State.

Hole et al (2015) note that many women, both Muslim and non-Muslim, who initially undertook the jihad migration (*hijra*) from their countries, had joined the combative theatre in Syria with the intention to challenge the neo-orientalist perspectives of their countries about Islam. However, upon reaching the Islamic state, many women succumbed to brutal treatment from their male counterparts. Being subjected activities such as human-trafficking, sex slavery, and forced marriages. Some women that had joined IS were also subjected to gang rape by IS fighters, or in some cases, being burnt for refusing to subject themselves to the demands of their male counterparts and male leaders. More so, other female leaders, especially the female

terrorist fighters of the Al-Khansaa Brigade is recalled to have subjected many women to dehumanizing treatments, when given commands to do so by their male associates (Spencer, 2016). The leaders of the Al-Khansaa Brigade in IS had created its own policy to reinforce the Islamic States patriarchal culture in the Islamic State, and thence to further assist in subjecting many women in the Islamic State to different elements of human-trafficking in the country (Winter, 2015a).

Winter (2015) explains that even women of authority in the Islamic State, such as those in the Al-Khansaa Brigade - whom in their capacity to police the behaviour of women in the Islamic State - face the duty of sedentariness in leading other women on how to perform their supportive duties as second-class citizens of the Islamic State. Rhuk Ali (2015) brings to the surface that in most instances, even the female jihadi leaders in the Islamic state also succumb to brutal treatments such as forced marriages and sexual jihads, which they have encouraged their jihadi sisters to embrace and engage in, in the Islamic State. Yilmaz (2017) posits that the Islamic States' policy towards women, whether their female supporters, facilitators and perpetrators, in whatever dimension of 'emancipation' projected, is innately oppressive and barbaric towards women and girls.

3.6. Conclusion

This chapter synthesized a series of interconnected theories to create an analytical roadmap for this study. The theories were used complementarily to interrogate the involvement of women in human-trafficking operations in Islamic based jihadist terrorism, as executed by jihadist conflict terrorist actors such as the Islamic State. In identifying the factors that drive women into terrorist affiliated human-trafficking structures, the chapter applied the "push and pull theory' of migration to human-trafficking, to illustrate 'push and pull' factors that perpetrate human-trafficking structures, especially that of the Islamic State. during the Syrian war. The failed state theory gave context to the conditions of states in political anarchy and the characteristics of these states that enable them to manifest the developing nexus of human-trafficking and conflict (Walker and Cockayne, 2016). However, in its shortages, the theory of failing states has also received criticism for failing to conceptualise the effects of failed states on individuals residing in these territories, and the perplex power relations that have motivated women to be part of the Islamic State's human-trafficking structures, which necessitated the introduction of feminist theories.

The feminism theories in its secular and cultural forms of Islamic feminism, and more radically jihad (i) feminism, navigated complex power relations of femininity and masculinity that reside in armed conflicts, which subject women to different roles in trafficking structures of the Islamic State (Rukh Ai, 2015). By the end of the jihad feminism analysis, prominent scholars of the discourse such as Winter (2015) and Rhuk Ali (2015) had identified that the loyalty most women have to their male counterparts portrays the oppression and subordination of women in the Islamic State, who get subjected to different forms of brutality. Therefore, despite the critiques available on the aforementioned theories, the theories have applicably and appropriately given context to the interconnected landscapes of armed conflict, terrorism, and human-trafficking in relation to the Syria war. The dynamics of the interconnected landscapes enabled the Islamic State to execute its regional and global trafficking of women through direct or indirect (psychological) victimisation of women, and the use of propaganda that is dispersed by other jihadi women of the Caliphate (Cockayne and Walker, 2016). The successive chapter, chapter four, deals with the methodology that the study used to generate and analyse data, in an attempt to find answers to the research questions.

Chapter Four:
Research Methodology and Methods

4.1. Introductions

The conduct of research in social sciences is grounded upon two prominent research paradigms, which are qualitative and quantitative research. In other studies, these two research paradigms are utilised simultaneously, resulting in a third research paradigm referred to as a mixed research approach (Beazley, 2003). This research made use of both qualitative and quantitative methodologies and methods, which gave it a mixed research method. The study utilised a qualitative approach to extract intangible attributes, characteristics and categories that could not be quantified. In contrast, a quantitative research approach was employed to extract corroborative variables that supported the intangible attributes analysed in the research (Beasley, 2003). This chapter separately discusses the two synthesised research paradigms and accompanying designs used in this study, which gives it a mixed research approach. This chapter presents the research method, data collection methods, data analysis, source of data, trustworthiness and limitations identified within the study.

4.2. Mixed Research Paradigms (and Designs)

The mixed research approach is a typology of research that makes use of both qualitative and quantitative techniques, characteristics and paradigms within a single study. Ontologically, mixed research is very realistic and pragmatic in nature. It projects practical views of reality regarding circumstances and settings and further analyses how particular circumstances impact mankind in real life (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2003). Mixed research diverges into two major typologies known as mixed method research and the mixed model research. This study is thus based on the mixed model research. Tashakkori and Teddlie (2003) explain that the mixed model research is a relatively new approach to research that mixes both qualitative and quantitative approaches, methods of collecting or analysing collected data, either within a single phase of a research study or across two stages of a research study in progress. In this study, though most of the six chapters are eminently qualitative in nature, chapter five, which constitutes the data collection and analysis chapter, makes use of both methods. The study used quantitative methods to organise and interpret collected data, while descriptive qualitative methods described the relationship between terrorism, human-trafficking and conflict-induced migration within the context of the Syrian war.

4.2.1. The Quantitative Aspect of the Research.

In contrast to qualitative research, quantitative research is a research paradigm that is conclusive in its objective. Therefore, quantitative research tries to quantify a particular problem and further analyse how the prevalent set of quantitative results found are projected to a particular contextual setting *cum* population groups being studied. In this study, quantitative results utilised in chapter five (data analysis) analyses how different salient types of migration flows emanating from the Syrian conflict, inclusive to the practice of human-trafficking carried by IS, have congruently exacerbated the phenomena of human-trafficking in the country. Muijis (2004) further explains that quantitative research can further be used to quantify attitudes, opinions, behaviours and other defined variables from population groups studied by the researcher. This study further quantified different opinions and testimonies from qualitative sources, brought forth by escapees that have managed to get out of IS, to establish prominent themes and motives enshrined in IS's practice of human-trafficking in Syria.

The quantitative design of this study will thus be descriptive and explanatory in nature. Descriptive-quantitative research is research whereby the researcher uses quantitative data to describe the current status of a particular phenomenon or variable (Muijis, 2004). The explanatory aspect of a descriptive quantitative research paradigm thus takes the collected qualitative data and explains it qualitatively to obtain a sound understanding of the phenomena being quantified. In this study, a descriptive-explanatory quantitative design is thus utilised in the data analysis chapter (chapter five) to describe the patterns of terrorism in the country, extensively terrorist activities carried out by the Islamic State and trafficking-like patterns in Syria, *cum*, peculiar context-specific migration typologies such as internal displacement and refugee streams contributing to the increasing human-trafficking phenomena of the Islamic State in the country.

4.2.2. The Qualitative Aspect of the Study.

Qualitative research is characteristically descriptive in nature and involves revealing the ontology of specific circumstances, settings, processes and relationships (Denzin, 2000). Qualitative research investigates and reveals the breadth and depth of a particular phenomenon, to establish how particular situations impact human behaviour. (Denzin, 2000) The qualitative aspect of this study takes an in-depth analysis of the nature of armed conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic to reveal how the politically chaotic environment in the country has created a gap for terrorism to flourish and become institutionalised in the country. In retrospect to this, the study progressively goes on to use these contextual landscapes in Syria to look at how the imbricative

presence of conflict and terrorism in Syria have exposed specific gender groups (particularly women and girl children) to various forms of human-trafficking practices carried out by different capitalistic actors in the conflict, such as criminal syndicates, armed groups and terrorist organisations. Furthermore, the contextual situation of armed conflict in Syria has been a major catalyst behind the increased mobility of vulnerable population groups. These groups flee the crisis in the country through different mixed migration flows, which have exposed them to complex webs of human-trafficking practices (Mixed Migration Platform, 2017).

Moriarty (2001) extensively notes that qualitative research also looks into identifying intangible factors contributing to the nature of a particular setting or circumstance such as gender roles, ethnicity, identity, and religion, and social status in a study. Therefore, in this study, intangible contributory factors found in the Syria war such as patriarchal social norms, ethnic sectarianism, social standing, and religion (Islam) are identified to show how particular gender groups, especially women and children, *cum* minority groups, are targeted in various ways for human-trafficking practices. The culprits of these criminal practices include dominant Sunni Islamist groups and terrorist organisations that operate falsely under the religious banner of Islam (Charpenel, 2016). The qualitative aspect of this study also analyses how specific gender groups (mainly IS women migrants, women in forced displacement, and refugee streams) have deceptively been lured through different platforms into the human-trafficking operations of the Islamic State in Syria.

The qualitative design of this research will thus be exploratory in nature. According to Babbie and Mouton (2001), exploratory-qualitative research is conducted to understand understudied, new and emerging phenomena that have not been studied more clearly. The exploratory-descriptive design of this study is deemed appropriate for this particular study, giving the problem statement of this study. As indicated in section 1. 4 (problem statement), there is an emerging gendered development of terrorism propelling human-trafficking practices in Syria under the advocacy of IS, which the researcher identified as needing in-depth analysis to understand the evolving nature of terrorism, that propelled the researcher to incorporate a gendered orientated approach to human-trafficking operations.

4.3. Mixed Methods Research: Triangulation.

To maintain a cohesive analysis of this mixed method study, the researcher made use of the method of triangulation in data collection and data analysis processes. According to Williamson (2005), triangulation in research includes using more than one approach to

addressing a research question. The utility of triangulation in research also includes making use of two or more theoretical perspectives, data sources, and analysis methods in a single study to research a particular phenomenon, illustrating that triangulation in itself has various typologies. Williamson (2005) further explains that methodological triangulation includes the use of two or more sets of data collection using a single methodological approach such as qualitative sources to obtain both qualitative and quantitative data. Alternatively, methodological triangulation also includes making use of two different data collection methods, such as using qualitative and quantitative sources to retrieved data for research (Williamson, 2005). However, this study was desk-based and relied heavily on secondary sources such as internet sources, reports from different global, regional and local organisations, and various media platforms to understand the situation in Syria and the salient manifestation of terrorism as carried out by the Islamic State. The researcher saw it appropriate to further use triangulation strategies in data collection procedures to increase the credibility and validity of the study.

While many research methods have both strengths and weaknesses, the researcher identified triangulation to have more advantages in conducting this particular research. The use of triangulation enabled the researcher to illustrate a complete understanding of the phenomena being studied. Although many scholars have argued that using two ontologically and epistemologically different research paradigms and methods in a single study can yield a broad swathe of divergent outcomes, the researcher was able to identify the viability of using triangulation to compensate for the weakness of one method with the strength of the other, which greatly assisted with increasing the reliability and validity of the study (Trochim, 2002).

However, the researcher was also aware that triangulation also had many weaknesses. Triangulation can result in the researcher obtaining contradicting data and thence diverging data results from two or more different sources, which can be difficult to detangle in terms of interpreting the truth and falsity. However, amidst these disadvantages, the researcher identified that triangulation in data collection and analysis procedures can help the research demonstrate the corroboration or contradictions of the qualitative segments of the research with the quantitative data collected. Thence allowing the researcher to illustrate that terrorism has steadily increased in Syria during the Syrian War and has served as a major catalyst in the increasing rate of human-trafficking, by IS in the country. By using triangulation, the researcher was able to minimise any bias about the phenomena under study during data collection, analysis and interpretation. (Trochim, 2002).

4.4. Source of Data.

Social sciences research makes use of two sources of data collection. These are primary or secondary sources (Douglas, 2015). This research made use of secondary sources to collect both qualitative and quantitative data. Secondary sources such as government public service department, libraries, internet searches and censuses produce secondary data that the researcher used to conduct the research. Secondary data provided by these sources is data that has been collected, organised and sometimes analysed by someone else before being made available for use by the researcher conducting a particular study. In this research, all of the qualitative and quantitative data were sourced from the internet. Since the study was desktop-based, the researcher used organisational and government reports and databases, alongside internet-based resources such as YouTube videos and divergent news feed platforms, to collect sufficient data on the situation of terrorism, human-trafficking and migrations in Syria.

For the statistical data used in the quantitative analytical section of the study, sections 3.2 and 3.3. of chapter three, the main sources for the statistics collected were databases, news reports from divergent news outlets, and statistics projected by peer-reviewed journals and articles. In accounting for the overall impact of terrorism is Syria throughout the course of the Syrian war, the study used the terrorism database. Progressively, the source of data for most irregular and forced migrations patterns in Syria is analysed in section 3.2. of chapter three came from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. In addition, the source that accounted for the terrorist activities of the Islamic State came from the 2017 Rand Corporation. In the report titled "Roll back the Islamic State" and maps from a specific IS terrorist database portal titled the ERS Story Maps. Similarly, data on the operation of foreign women in the Islamic State, as well as local and international women who were directly trafficked by militants of the Islamic State, was derived from different news feed reports and outlet reports outlined in section 5.3.in table 5 and 6 of the Chapter.

The sources of data for the qualitative analysis of the study from section 5.4 onwards in chapter five came from YouTube videos. From section 5.4 onwards, the study used 20 YouTube videos as seen with an average length of 18.695 and a range of 46.01. These YouTube videos were complemented by published articles and journals from different research institutes and governmental reports on relevant themes that were captured in the thematic analysis (see table 4.6.2) of the study.

4.5. Data Collection

Data collection is a process whereby the researcher uses primary or secondary sources data to generate relevant data for the study being pursued. The analysis of data in the conduct of research is a process that requires the researcher to systematically extract and apply relevant information from the data collected to examine an identified phenomenon. Data analysis entails systematically applying statistical or logical technics in a study to describe, illustrate, compensate, recap and evaluate data collected, thus separating statistical and non-statistical data to find the convergence, corroboration or divergence of findings that will enable the researcher to answer the research question.

In collecting quantitative data for this research, the researcher systematically sourced statistical data from the Global terrorism database, the database of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and different newsfeed outlets. The researcher organised the statistical data into tables and graphs and systematically interpreted them. Given that the integrity of data analysis in research lies in the manner in which it was analysed, efforts were made to ensure the accurate and appropriate analysis of data collected. The researcher also analysed the data repetitively to recheck for consistency in the study.

The researcher also collected qualitative data for this study from 15 YouTube videos, varying from 3 minutes to 48 minutes as identified below in table 4.6.2., to extract key themes in the research. As shown in table 4.6.3 below, the researcher systematically identified key themes and key sub-themes found in the content analysis of the videos before progressing on to do thematic data analysis of the qualitative faction of the study.

4.6. Data Analysis.

In most cases, there is a thin line between data collection and data analysis, often resulting in the two processes working interdependently to each other. As noted by Kawulich (2004), in the data collection process, a degree of preliminary data analysis occurs to a restricted degree that thereafter necessitates a more thorough process of data analysis to occur. In this study, the data analysis process is dually executed. A descriptive data analysis method was used in the quantitative section of the study, and a thematic content analysis was used in addressing the qualitative section of this study.

4.6.1. Quantitative Analysis.

As previously established, the data analysis method used for assessing the quantitative aspect of this study was descriptive data analysis. According to Thompson (2009), a descriptive data

analysis ensues when there is rearranging and ordering of data to generate objective descriptions of a phenomenon. Thompson (2006) therefore established that descriptive data is primarily used to describe what is going on with the data collected and more often organised into defined data organisation systems such as tabulations and frequency graphs. In addressing the patterns of terrorism, irregular and forced forms of migration feeding into the Islamic State's human-trafficking structures, *cum*, the patterns of direct trafficking practices carried out by the Islamic State in and out of Syria. The researcher reorganised and tabulated all collected data, and presented the statistical data collected on bar graphs, from which a descriptive analysis would be derived from. Thereafter, the researcher interpreted each set of data on the bar graphs systematically to identify the patterns of each phenomenon as they unfolded throughout the course of the Syrian war. In addition, the researcher mapped the occurrence of these phenomena's in their proximity as some of the key contributory factors that have fostered the configuration of the Islamic State's human-trafficking trajectories in Syria.

4.6.2. Qualitative Analysis.

For the qualitative data analysis of this study, the researcher identified a thematic content analysis that was applicable in identifying key and relevant themes that assisted in addressing the identified gaps of this study. Maguire and Delahunt (2017) explain that the thematic data analysis process follows a set of steps that guides the researcher in their analysis process. In chronological order, Maguire and Delahunt (2017) identify these steps to comprise of; familiarising with data, generating codes from research, searching for themes, reviewing the themes, defining the themes, and doing a write-up.

The first step of executing thematic data analysis starts off with the process of familiarisation. According to Braun and Clarke (2006), the process of familiarisation with data requires researchers to be immersed in data until they understand the depth and breadth of the issue under research. The process of immersion requires a repetitive reading of the collected data in an active way that enables the identification of core meanings and patterns in the research. This process also allows the researcher to recheck the data collected for accuracy. In this study, the researcher was immersed in the data, starting from searching for relevant source bases that provided the researcher with appropriate data for the study, building upon the collected data and the themes that emerged, and then conducting a rigorous analysis.

Before the introduction of the themes that the researcher used for analysis, the researcher had already undertaken a previous study on the role of women in terrorism activities, especially in

Syria. From previous study the researcher has evolved the previous study to take a closer look at women in designated terrorist groups in Syria and their roles in sustaining organisations such as IS through activities such as human-trafficking in this study. Therefore, in extending the analysis of the research to a gendered construction of women's involvement in the Islamic State, the researcher's previous idea of how women serviced terrorist groups through covert mechanisms such as that of the human-trafficking operations enabled a quick familiarisation with the relevant data.

The second process of thematic analysis is data coding. According to Braun and Clarke (2006), it incorporates the production of codes that may come in the form of small phrases and keywords from the data, which are generally used to categorise data in a way that will allow a short synthesis of the data. While coding can be done manually or through a software programme, the coding process done in this research was manual. The researcher manually generated codes by listening to each YouTube video (see appendix A) and reading complementary literature that supported the videos. The researcher went on to write down keywords, important phrases and sentences on a clean piece of paper that was used to generate the themes and sub-themes that the researcher used in the next step of thematic data analysis.

Braun and Clarke (2006) explain further that, establishing a theme generally emanates from the compilation of the extracted codes into potential themes, which will capture important details about the data, specifically in relation to the research questions and problems. In this study the researcher tabulated ten possible themes and their corresponding sub-themes (please see table 4.6.2. below), that was used in addressing the research questions. After identifying the themes, the researcher went on to the next step of the thematic analysis, which comprises of reviewing the themes. Braun and Clarke (2006) explicate that reviewing the selected theme requires an analysis of the themes and their work in relation to the codes which were used to generate them and the entire data set. Thereafter, as executed in this study, a thematic map can be created to provide a story line explicating the nature of the data.

In this study, the researcher did a recheck of the identified themes and sub-themes tabulated against the codes and data generated, and for their personal evaluation process, manually drawing a roughly sketched thematic map on a piece of paper to review the themes tabulated below before moving on to the next step of thematic data analysis, identified as defining and naming themes. As Braun and Clarke (2006) expand, the process of naming a defining theme usually requires redefining the specifics of the themes and creating clear definitions for the

themes, which would create an overall storyline that assists in addressing the research question. In this study, the researcher redefined and reorganised themes to make clear sense of the terrorism landscape in Syria throughout the course of the Syrian war, specifically that of the Islamic State in context to its female-orientated trafficking practices. Lastly, the thematic analysis herein followed the last step of the analysis, which entails doing a write-up and production of the data analysed. As established by Braun and Clarke (2006), the last phase of thematic analysis requires a final review of the analysis and all selected abstracts, and relating them to the research question in order to produce a scholarly report. In the last phase of analysis in this study, the researcher evaluated all selected abstracts and their applicability to answering the research question before producing a report that would be reviewed for academic purposes.

Table 4.6.2. Thematic Analysis Table

Key Themes	Sub-Themes
1.Indirect Trafficking Practices of Women by the Islamic State	1. The Pull of the Islamic States Social Media Propaganda and Its Grassroots Strategies Therein. 2. Congruent Online Recruitment of the Islamic State. 3. 'Pushed' into the Islamic State by Circumstances.
2.Direct Trafficking Practices of Women by the Islamic State	1. Kidnappings, Abduction and Transfer of Women into the Islamic State
3.Detentiion in the Islamic State.	
4.Religion	1. Forced Conversion to Islam.
5 Forced Marriages	
6.Sex Slave Market	
7. Sexual Violence and Rape in the Islamic State.	
8. Forced Pregnancy in the Islamic State	
9. The Practices of Organ/ Tissue Trafficking of Female Sex Slaves in the Islamic State.	
10.Escape of Women from the Islamic State	

4.7. Data Limitations and Strengths.

The study encompasses some statistical data that seek to establish the relationship between terrorism, specifically dealing with the Islamic State's theatre of terrorism, and human-trafficking borne from the Syrian war. However, in the analysis process the researcher identified that discrepancies in data were present. Firstly, the covert and fluctuating nature of human-trafficking makes it statistically challenging to account for, given the reality of the

conflict unfolding on ground in Syria. Therefore, the variables attributed to the trafficking of women situation in Syria- as explicitly carried out by the Islamic State – is based on inconclusive fluctuating estimates that try to relate the trafficking of females to the rise in terrorist activities of the Islamic State in Syria (and Iraq) and other migration pattern of relevance to this study, the key migration patterns under statistical analysis in this research is conflict *cum* terrorism-induced forced (and or mixed) migration flows such as internal displacement, refugee streams and supportively female foreign fighters that have migrated into Syria to aid with the organisation recruit more female supporters into the Islamic State.

Hence, due to the erratic nature of migration flows such as internal displacement and refugee flows, this research is subjected to aggregated estimates from data sources such as the UNHCR, IMO and Danish Refugee Council; the supportive statistical data used here that may have some discrepancies as a result of the following. Firstly, massive migration flows of persons in these environments may overwhelm the movement tracking systems present at the time. Secondly, in some cases, IDP's and refugees may refuse to provide their information to tracking agencies where there is no help reciprocated to them. Thirdly, surrounding political pressures on tracking organisations responsible for the collection of this data may prevent the accurate reporting on IDP's and Refugees. Fourthly, some refugees move through irregular routes during conflict time for various different reasons, some illicit in nature, making it hard to track them. Similarly, some IDP's persons can be displaced in hard to reach areas, such as in mountain terrains, within a state, further making it hard to track all persons falling within this migration category (Sarzin, 2017).

Another problem in tracking these groups emerges with the inconsistencies of definitions of who constitutes a refugee and or displaced person, which can result in persons being tracked through incorrect systems that can produce different totals results that are not comparable. Statistical discrepancies were also present in fully tracking supportive migration patterns such as those of foreign (female) fighters-argued in this research to be responsible for additionally aiding the trafficking structures of the Islamic State. Data discrepancies were identified by the researcher to be able to arise from the clandestine and erratic nature of these migration patterns too (Global Migration Group, 2017).

Therefore, in the data collection process, the researcher acknowledges a shortage in data across all different migrant population groups and diaspora groups in Syria. The shortage of data contributes to the overall lack of information on gender and age in migration, which restricts a

proper gendered projection of these migration flows. However, to minimise these shortages of data in the research, the researcher compared the data collected from multiple sources by using the most appropriate data to project the reality of terrorism, female trafficking patterns, and interrelated migration flows that are employed by the Islamic State.

4.8. Ethics of the Study

In most instances, ethical clearance for undertaking research is issued by the institute where the study is conducted. In essence, ethical clearance has to be issued before a research study commences to ensure that the research is conducted responsibly and morally and will not inflict any harm on persons involved as participants in the study. In the case of this study, the University of KwaZulu Natal's higher degree committee issued the ethical clearance for this study. Given that this study was desktop-based, after reviewing the aims and methodology of the study, the university was able to determine that the study is ethically sound and will not inflict any harm on the persons involved in the study.

4.9. Overall Trustworthiness of the Study

The trustworthiness of a study in social sciences can be assessed by four criteria as described by Shenton (2004) and initially formulated by Lincoln and Guba (1958). These criteria are: (1) Credibility-with preference to internal validity, (2) Transferability-with preference to validity and generalisability, (3) Dependability- with preference to reliability and (4) Confirmability-with regards to objectivity (Shenton, 2004:64). This research thus stuck to these four criteria to increase its trustworthiness. Shenton (2004) explains that according to Lincoln and Guba (1985) the credibility of a research study is in line with how congruent the findings used in the study corroborate to reality and how accurately operational measures for the concepts used in the study have been applied by the researcher when carrying out the study. It further looks at the presentation of the study, and how a study is able to project a realistic image of the phenomena or population groups being studied (Shenton, 2004). With regards to transferability, the transferability of a study pertains the extent to which the study can be applied to other situations and populations group. The transferability of this research can be applied beyond Syria, in places such as Iraq, and Nigeria (using the case of Boko Haram).

To measure the dependability of the study, Lincoln and Guba (1985) proposed that the reliability of a study is identified by the ability of a phenomenon to be observed and replicated by more than one person, in the same context and methods, and still be able to produce similar results. Lastly, the confirmability of a study entails the reaffirmation that a study conducted in

not bias or saturated with the researcher's subjective views and thence when viewed in correspondence to the dependability of a study is objective enough to produce a widely accepted general view of a phenomena or population groups studied. In this respect, the objective nature of the study can be validated by the fact that researcher studied the phenomena of terrorism and human-trafficking in Syria from a distance and then had no affiliations or deep emotional attachment to the phenomena's studied in this research with allowed the researcher to objectively research and understand the circumstances of terrorism and human-trafficking in Syria.

4.10. Overall Limitations to the Study

In this particular study, given security and sensitivity issues pertaining to the study under research, the researcher could not interview or have any contact with any women or young girls who had escaped Syria or IS, or any female terrorists engaged in any of IS's operations, including terrorism. Quantitatively, the researcher encountered difficulties accessing human-trafficking databases due to the covert and under recorded trafficking situation in Syria. The researcher, therefore, used multiple statistical databases to trace the trends of human-trafficking of women and girls in Syria. As a result of these limitations, secondary sources of data were explored to conduct the research. However, this limitation of the research did not alter the credibility of the study. Conducting the research in this way enabled the researcher to be emotionally detached from the research and objectively reflected as accurately as possible the real situation of terrorism and trafficking women, young girls and children in the country.

4.11. Conclusion.

This chapter clearly highlighted the paradigms and designs of the qualitative and quantitative approaches used in social science research methodologies to explain the mixed nature of this research. It went on to describe how the method of triangulation helped to construct holistic research, based on the fusion of the two aforementioned researched paradigms. The chapter further went in-depth to identify the nature and the sources of data, secondary sources. It further explicated how the relevant data were extracted and analysed in this research. From there, the chapter discussed the four main criteria it abided by to ensure trustworthiness. Lastly, the chapter made notes of the limitations faced in the course of this study. The next chapter (chapter five) will present the results collected and analysed in this research.

Chapter Five

Analysis and Results

5.1. Introduction.

According to Lassalle (2016), the contemporary outbreak of armed conflict in Syria is a symptom of state failure. As a result, Syria has succumbed to many retrogressive elements, such as terrorism and rife transnational organized criminal activities such as human-trafficking. In 2014, the devolution of Syria's political landscape into a state of anarchy paved the way for conflict-terrorist groups such as the Islamic State to exercise a plethora of illicit activities within and across Syria's porous borders, and in its territorial bases in Syria (and Iraq) (Jones et al, 2017). The illicit practices include human-trafficking and the violation of women's rights and freedoms.

Therefore, this chapter serves to provide an analysis of the configuration of terrorism in the Syrian conflict and the development of terrorism and trafficking practices of the Islamic State in the country. The first half of this chapter contains the statistical analysis, spanning from section 5.2 to 5.4. It draws attention to the impact of terrorism in Syria that results from state failure and congruent migratory factors. These factors have aided the dynamic migratory networks in which the Islamic State's human-trafficking practices has been masked. The chapter went on to analyze the presence of terrorism, as executed by the Islamic State, and the repercussions of terrorism that have placed women in supportive and victim-based positions with regards to the IS human-trafficking structures.

From section 5.4. of the chapter, a qualitative analysis is provided on the Islamic States human-trafficking practices. In addition, the "push and pull" theoretical lens was applied to dissect the different global, regional and local networks that have disposed women into the organizations trafficking structures in Syria (and Iraq). The chapter also unpacked the power relations of women, against a backdrop of their roles in the IS trafficking structures to sustain it in the Syrian war. The feminist lens, specifically Islamic and jihad (i) feminist theoretical lenses, were also used in a complementary manner in this analysis.

5.2. Overview of Terrorism and its Impact (Integrally in Conflict-Borne Movements of Persons) in Syria.

Figure 1: Graph of Terrorism Index in Syria from 2012-2018.

Source: Data extracted from processed data found in the Terrorism Data Base graph: https://tradingeconomics.com/syria/terrorism-index.

According to Global Terrorism Database Codebook (2016), the data used to compile a terrorism index scale, used here in figure 1 above, is based on a rating system that ranges from 1-10. In essence, this scale is formulated to estimate the impact of terrorism within a specific country. The global terrorism database codebook (2016) explicates that the closer the variables measured are to 0 on the rating scale, as represented in the graph above, the less impactful terrorism is in the measured country. Conversely, the closer the variable measured is to 10, on the terrorism database scale, the more impactful terrorism is said to be in the measured country. Therefore, in Syria, the statistical projection of terrorism extracted from the 2019 Global Terrorism Index and represented above in figure 1 is based on the global terrorism codebook scale.

For a very long time preceding the prominent rise of terrorist actors such as the Islamic State, Syria has been amongst the highest terrorist affected countries in the world. According to the four editions of the global terrorism index first produced in 2014, Syria has globally been ranked among the top five countries most impacted by terrorism. In 2014, 2015 and 2016, the first three editions of the Global Terrorism Indexes (2014, 2015, 2016) ranked Syria the 5th highest country most impacted by terrorism, after Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Nigeria. In 2017, the 2017 Global Terrorism Index shows Syria moving up the ranks of the global terrorism impact scale, to take 4th place after Iraq, Afghanistan, and Nigeria. The 2018 Global Terrorism

Index illustrates that by the end of 2018, Syria's was still globally ranked the 4th highest country impacted by terrorism, following Iraq, Afghanistan and Nigeria. This global standing of the impact of terrorism in Syria has thereafter perquisite and closer analysis of terrorism in Syria, to pave the way for a better understanding of the contributions that prominent conflict terrorist groups, such as the Islamic State, that have contributed to the overall impact of terrorism in the country.

At the end of 2012, the impact of terrorism in Syria sits at a relatively high rating scale of 7.17 scale in the country. This scale of terrorism's impact in Syria observably follows the outbreak of the civil war in the first half of 2012. At the end of 2013, the impact of terrorism gradually increased by a 0.6 difference to sit at a 7.75 impact scale. The increase in terrorism impact can be ascribed to a corresponding increase in the intensity of the Syrian war, the increasing intervention of divergent international, regional and local state non-state actors who joined different theatres of the Syrian war. By the end of 2014, the impact of terrorism continued to increase, moving from an impact scale of 7.75, to an impact scale of 8.11. Much of the increase pertaining the increasing impact of terrorism during this period has been attributed to the insertion of conflict-terrorist groups, such as Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic State, on the opposition side of the Syrian war.

In 2015 and 2016, the impact of terrorism continues to steadily increase with the progression of the Syrian war, optimising in 2016 to reach an impact scale of 8.2. This increase correspondingly occurs with the progression and increasing intensity of the Syrian war. *Cum*, the progressive territorial and population capture by different conflict actors in the Syrian war, especially terrorist groups such as the Islamic State. By the end of 2017, progressing onto 2018, the impact of terrorism shows a decrease from an impact scale of 8.62 to that of 8.32. In most cases, this decrease in the impact of terrorism in the country has eminently been attributed to the increasing global counterterrorism coalitions that begin to take root and expand in the Syrian war against the Islamic State in 2016. Terrorism has irrefutably had an immense impact in Syria, one prominently identified impact of terrorism in Syria throughout the course of the Syrian war has been its contributory role to the presence of internal displacement under analysis below in figure 2.

Figure 2: Analysis of Internal Displacement in the Syrian Arab Republic from 2012-2018.

Source of Data for 2012-2017: Statistics Portal, 2019. Data taken from source comprising of processed data.

*Source of Data for 2018   *statistics derived from statistics portal and 2017 compiled with the 2018 UNHCR (1 094 873)*

In 2012, the presence of 2 016 500 people internally displaced in Syria was attributed to the 2011 Arab Spring and the pockets of political violence that began to emanate in the country from these uprisings, building up to the outbreak of the civil war in March 2012. Between 31 December 2012 and 31 December 2013, internal displacement sharply increases from 2 016 500 to 6 520 800 by a difference of 4 504 300. Much of the internal displacement between 2012 and 2013 followed the increasing violence and presence of terrorism that came with the intensification of the Syrian war. The increase in violence was consequent on the increasing presence of divergent international, regional and local state, *cum*, non-state conflict actors; who expanded violence into many highly civilian concentrated cities and towns across the country. Between the end of 2013 and 2014, internal displacement patterns continued to show a steady increase of internally displaced persons in Syria. The increase was from 6 520 800 to 7 632 500, with a difference of 1 111 700. This particular increase of internally displaced persons in Syria can be attributed to a few eminent factors. These factors, however not exclusive, include the progression and escalation of violence in the Syrian war and the insertion and expansion of prominent terrorist groups, such as the Islamic State in the Syrian war; who

in the course of the war have deliberately carried out systematic practices of displacement for the purpose of conquering territories and population groups in Syria.

Between 31 December 2014 and 31 December 2015, internal displacement is recorded to show a decrease of a difference of 1 075 038. Thereafter, it continued to experience a steady decline throughout 2016 and 2017. Much of this pattern of decline in internally displaced persons in Syria follows factors such as civilians fleeing Syria into neighbouring countries and some civilians converting and being absorbed into different fighting theatres in the conflict. By the end of 2018, internal displacement in Syria increased again by a difference of 1 094 873. Many new internal displacements emanated from a few eminent factors. These factors included the increasing violence that came with the counterterrorism trajectory against the Islamic State, the release of some homeless civilians from IS territory and the return of some civilians from neighbouring countries back into Syria.

Table 3: Refugee Applications in Syria by Persons Originating from Immediate Neighbouring Countries from 2012-2018.

	Iraq	Lebanon	Jordan	Turkey
2012	466	22	15	1
2013	398	61	78	3
2014	813	190	18	3
2015	3495	148	50	1
2016	8301	265	137	17
2017	9552	8	-	6
2018	4529	6	-	6

Figure 3: Refugee Applications in Syria by Persons Originating from Neighbouring Countries from 2012-2018.

Source: For Refugee Application from 2012-2018: http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/time_series.

Figure 3 represents the refugee applications in Syria from civilians emanating from neighbouring countries, who were either seeking refuge in Syria or using the refugee system in Syria to join different theatres in the Syrian conflict. The represented data in figure three has been selected from another set of data compiled by the United Nations Higher Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), which had also assisted a few persons for immediate neighbouring countries to apply for refuge in Syria. The represented data in figure 1, was more applicable for analysis, without dismissing the UNHCR records, on the basis that they comprehensively captured all refugee applications, including those refugee applications that were done extensively beyond the initial UNHCR regulatory system of refugees. These statistics are exclusive of Israeli, which had completely closed off its borders to Iraq and Syrian refugees and have a very little to non-existent persons seeking to enter the conflict zone in Syria.

In 2012, Iraq produced the highest number of refugees in Syria, with 466 noted refugee applications, followed by Lebanon with 22 applications, Jordan with 15, and lastly, Turkey with 1 recorded application. Comparative to other countries, most refugees in Iraq identifiably emanate from many previous political unrests that engulfed the country for most of the twenty-first century. What accounted for the high number of refugees from Iraq are 'civilians' who used the Syrian refugee systems to gain some form of legitimacy to reside in Syria. Some refugee applicants extensively used the Syrian refugee systems for the purpose of joining different conflict theatres in the Syrian war. These refugee applicants operate alongside

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refugees who were trafficked into Syria through the refugee system by divergent conflict actors on ground. In 2013, Iraq remained the highest refugee application producer in Syria, at a decreasing difference of 68, followed this time by Jordan at 78, Lebanon at 61 and lastly Turkey with an increased difference of 2, which has given it 3 recorded refugees in Syria. In 2014, the refugee applications in Syria from Iraqi civilians increased again by a difference of 415, correlating to the onset of the second civil war in Iraq, the expansion of the Islamic State from Iraq into Syria, and therein some Iraqi civilians probably mobilised as refugee warriors in Syria. In 2014, Iraqi refugee applications increased, followed by Lebanon at 190 with an increasing difference of 129 from the previous year, and then Jordan at a decreasing difference of 60 from the previous year to 18, whilst Turkey remains stagnant at 3. In 2015, Iraqi's refugee applications sharply increase in Syria by a 2682 difference compared to 2014, progressing the Iraqi war, the progression of the Syrian war, but more pertinently, the perpetual and rapid expansion of the Islamic State in Syria during this period. Refugee applications in Syria, 2015, are thereafter followed by persons emanating from Lebanon, which saw a low decreasing difference of 42 to place the refugee applications a 148, an increasing difference of 32 in Jordon, to place its refugee application in Syria at 50 and a decreasing difference of 2 in Turkey to place its applications 1.

In 2016, Iraq continued to contribute to the number of refugees in Syria more than double by an increased difference of 4806 from the previous year to reach 8301 refugee applications. The refugee applications from Iraq was followed by Lebanon, which saw an increasing difference of 117 in 2016 from the previous year, followed by Jordan, which also experiences an increase of 87 to give account to the 137 applications made by persons emanating from Jordan. Lastly, in 2016, Turkey also experienced a small but notable increase in persons applying for refugee status in Syria. In 2017, Iraq still stood prominent in the contribution of a steady increase with a difference of 1251 more applications, whilst Lebanon experienced a drop of 257 refugee applications to account for the 8 applications recorded in 2017, and Turkey significantly drops by a difference of 9 to reach 6 refuge applications, and non-existent records of applicants coming from Jordan accounted for. In 2017, Iraq experienced a significant drop of refugees, dropping from 9 552 to 4 529 at a difference of 5 023, followed by Lebanon with a very little decrease of refugees at a difference of 2, *cum*, a stagnant refugee count from persons emanating from Turkey. Between 2017 and 2018, persons seen to emanate from Jordon are close to non-existent and untraceable.

From the refugee patterns addressed, key points stand out. Though all immediate neighbouring countries show a fluctuating rate of refugee applications into Syria, Iraq's high contributions to the refugee streams from 2012 to 2018 reflect a few pivotal dilemmas. First, identifiably, Iraq contributes the most to the refugee streams and applications in Syria on the basis of its second civil war, which ran from 2014-2017. Secondly, compared to other fluctuating refugee rates in neighbouring countries, the increasing rates of refugees coming into Syria to seek refuge from Iraq, pertinently from 2014-2017, correlate with when the Islamic State was expanding from Iraq into Syria. A predicament thereto derived from these statistics and, Leender's (2009) study on refugee warriors and war refugees of Iraq in Syria, Jordan and Lebanon, deduce that there is a high probability that many refugee streams orientate towards Syria, especially from Iraq, were not only escorting genuine refugee seekers and applicants. But integrally persons and covert foreign fighters (both men and women), that were using Syria's refugee steams and systems to infiltrate different theatres of conflict in Syria as 'refugee warriors. Inclusively terrorist theatres therein, such as that of the Islamic State (Cockyne and walker,2016; Rossman,2017).

Therefore, according to Leeder's (2009) study, there have been some fighters who have used the refugee systems in Syria or have been trafficked through the refugee system in Syria to enter the country and diverge into terrorism. And thence the Islamic State (Cockayne and Walker, 2016). Lebanese refugee applicants trail after Iraq, especially during the epitomised period of the Syrian war between 2014 and 2016, there is a high probability that some refugee applicants in this cluster comprise of both genuine refugees, *cum*, civilians mainly using the refugee system in Syria, for alternative motives aforementioned with Iraqi refugees. Whilst others may even be trafficked through these streams by some humanitarian organisations, who in covert partnership with some armed groups are assisting them to gain refugee status in Syria for conflict purposes.

5.3. The Islamic State in Context

The following section scales down to address the terrorist activities of the Islamic State. And thereafter the activities of women in the Islamic State. Here the analysis of the Islamic State starts of by addressing the terrorist activities of the Islamic State, which comprise of many terroristic activities stemming from bombing civilian platforms in its territorial and population conquest in Syria and suicide missions by both its male and female combatants, to, its terror-based human-trafficking trajectories, eminently of women and young girls. In figure 5, the

analysis progresses to be grounded on the patterns of foreign women operative in the Islamic State. Figure 5 looks at the cluster of women that have "voluntarily" and "involuntarily" joined the Islamic State to take frontline, or sedentary roles. Some through divergent mechanisms of human-trafficking. Therefore, any of these foreign women who sit on the extreme spectrums of either being used as fighters or war booty of the Islamic State. Figure 5 also makes an analysis of women who have been made to operate fluidly between these two platforms. Lastly, Figure 6 portrays the number of women in the Islamic State that have directly been captured and trafficked by fighters of the Islamic State into Syria, to undertake divergent trafficking practices.

Table 4: Terrorist Activities of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria from 2014-2018.

Year	Terrorism Activities of the Islamic State in Iraq	Terrorist Activities of the Islamic State in Syria	Sources
2014	180	90	HH Janes, 2017
2015	100	160	HH Janes, 2017
2016	140	280	HH Janes, 2017
2017	172	18	ERS Story Maps
2018	47	25	ERS Story Maps

Figure 4: Estimated Number of Terrorist Activities of the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq from 2014-2018.

*Source for 2014-2016: I Janes, 2017. **RAND** RR1912-6.2*
Source for 2017-2018: https://storymaps.esri.com/stories/terrorist-attacks/

In 2014, the activities of terrorism of the Islamic State were most visible in Iraq, where the organisation's patterns of violence were aligned with its involvement in Iraq with the onset of the second Iraq civil war (2014-2017). That created IS to split from its parent organisation Al-Qaeda to officially declare its own Caliphate in Iraq. However, in the same year, the Islamic State's terrorist activities were also visible in Syria. Its fighting force was among the opposition in the Syrian war. By 2015, the Islamic States patterns ad activities of violence began to increase in Syria and decrease in Iraq, following the shifting centre of gravity of the organisation and thereto its transition into Syria. Where it was emerging as a prominent fighting force in the Syrian war. In 2016, IS terrorist activities reach its peak in Syria, in comparison to its steady increase in Iraq. Here, the attributes have been grounded by a few key factors, which are inclusive to the eminence of the rigorous terrorist attacks of revenge that the organisation began to carry out on its enemies, on both regime and opposition factions of the Syrian war. Mainly in retaliation to the coalition of a global counterterrorism coalitions, that had taken root against the organisation in the Syrian war, since 2015.

By the end of 2017, the Islamic State's terrorist activities showed a great decline in Syria by a difference of 262. Since 2016 there was an increase again in Iraq by a difference of 32 attacks. This pattern does seem to follow *inter alia*, the counterterrorism trajectory that identifiably has taken root in Syria, and has in the processes, caused the Islamic State to retreat back into Iraq, where its primal headquarters are located. In 2018, terrorist activities of the Islamic State decreased drastically in both Syria and Iraq with 47 attacks noted in Iraq, but even fewer attacks in Syria, which sits at 25 recorded attacks. Much of this decrease in the Islamic States terrorist activities follows the Islamic State defeat in both of its stronghold areas in Syria and Iraq by the counterterrorism initiatives against it in both countries. The counterterrorism activities against IS diminished its capacity to perpetrate large amounts of terrorist activities. The Rand Corporation (2017) validates that in Syria, the Islamic State has continued to try and launch terrorist attacks against its enemies as witnessed with its slight increase of activities from 2017-2018, but has had very little impact to re-establish itself again as a prominent fighting force, especially in Syria.

Table 5: Estimated Number of Foreign Female Terrorist Fighters and Supporters in the Islamic State Inclusive to those "Indirectly Trafficked into the Islamic State".

Year	Total Estimated Number of Female Foreign Terrorist Operating in the Islamic State's Territory in Syria	Sources
2014	4 300 (200 from the West)	Buner, 2014
2015	4 500 (550 from the west)	Washington Post
2016	4520(mean)	ODHR,2018
2017	4520 (mean)	ODHR,2018
2018	4761 (13%)	Statista, New York Times

Figure 5: Estimated Number of Foreign Female Terrorist Fighters and Supporters in the Islamic State.

The cluster of foreign women in the Islamic State, tracks the divergent category of foreign women (and young girls) in the Islamic State, some of whom were 'indirectly' trafficked into the organisation. As a supportive measure, data analysis on this cluster of women in the Islamic State employed article 9 of the Protocol to Prevent, Supress and Punish Trafficking and its principle of the 'non-criminalisation of trafficking victims', which entails the recognition of some victims of trafficking being 'imperfect victims of trafficking practices in the Islamic State' (Fish, 2019). Foreign women in this cluster either: (1) voluntary went to join the Islamic State to fight, but ended up in diverse trafficking situations upon reaching the Islamic State, and women who (2) willingly or forcefully accompanied their male counterparts to IS, but

ended up being subjected to at least one human-trafficking practice upon reaching the Islamic State. Integrally, this cluster of women entails some women who, through divergent deceptive mechanism of propaganda, were radicalised and groomed into migrating into the Islamic State, only to be subjected to a form of supportive act of trafficking upon reaching the Islamic State. Furthermore, identifying with the definition of the 2000 Promelro Protocol that any persons under the age of 18 stands as a presumptive victim of trafficking in any way that they were recruited, transported, transferred, harboured, or received for exploitation purposes. Women under the age of 18 were also analysed in the cluster of women trafficked by the Islamic State. A study by Fish (2016) that resonates with this study, prompts an inquiry to further acknowledge the independent agency that foreign women in terrorism activities have in carrying out trafficking practices for the Islamic State. Therefore, this study integrally acknowledges the presence of foreign women who have operated fluidly as either 'victims' and 'facilitators' of the different trafficking practices carried out by the organisation in Syria.

In 2014, the Islamic State officially declared its caliphate, pulling in an estimated number of 4 300 Women and young girls from over 100 different countries to join the Caliphate and undertake divergent frontline and supportive duties in both its voluntary and involuntary forms. In 2015, the estimated number of women in IS showed a slow increase as the Islamic State expanded into Syria in the conflicts and attracted more foreign (terrorist) fighters and supporters. Therein in 2015, more female foreign fighters are recorded to have come into IS on their own volition or accompanied their male counterparts. In 2016 and 2017, the number of foreign women continued to increase with the Islamic States presence in Syria. However, it was at a very slow rate, as a counterterrorism trajectory began to expand in Syria and deterred many women from coming into the Islamic State to work for it. Between 31 December 2017 to 31 December 2018, the estimated number of foreign women estimated to be in the Islamic State demonstrates an increase of a difference of 241, with many of these women stemming from women who are not so much new entrées into the almost non -existent IS territory in Syria; but more so women who were unreportable during the prime time of IS, and are now statistically recordable based on the rapid collapse of the organisation this year.

Table 6: Estimated Number of Women and Young Girls Directly Captured by the Islamic State for Trafficking Purposes from 2014-2018.

Year	Estimated number of Women and Young Girls Directly Captured for Trafficking Purposes by the Islamic State (Syria and Iraq) Territory	Sources
2014	3200	HRC, 2016
2015	5000	India Today News, 2015
2016	2000	Human Rights Watch, 2016
2017	2000-1800 (average used 1900)	New York Times
2018	1800	Foreign Policy, 2019

Figure 6: Estimated Number of Women and Young Girls Directly Captured by the Islamic State for Trafficking Purposes in the Islamic State From 2014-2018.

Source, Human Rights Watch 2016: https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/04/05/iraq-women-suffer-under-isis. Source for 2018: https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/05/02/a-broken-homecoming-isis-rape-yazidi/.

Figure 6 represents an estimated number of women that were directly trafficked by IS militant soldiers in their invasion in Syria and other small pockets of places in the region, especially neighbouring countries such as in Iraq. In 2014, figure 3 shows the estimated result of 3200 women and young girls from different minority groups that were captured by IS during its territorial conquest in Iraq and transported by IS fighters from Iraq to Syria to be sold into trafficking rings in Syria. In 2015, combined with the women transported from Iraq to Syria, the estimated number of women directly captured by the Islamic State for trafficking increased by an additional 1800 women and young girls directly captured by the Islamic State. The

women and girls were mainly trafficked from minority border communities separating Syria and Iraq during the organisation's rapid movement into Syria to engage in the Syrian war. In 2016, the estimated number of captured and enslaved women in the Islamic State's local human-trafficking structures declined, with the death of some women and the escape of other women from the organisation's territories, following the counterterrorism measures that took roots during the Syrian war. Between 2017 and 2018, the number of women trapped in the organisation's structures continued to decline from 1900 to 1800, as some women tried to escape from IS in the course of the counterterrorism trajectory against the organisation. The Global Trafficking Report (2016) notes however that some women have battled to leave former IS territory after the defeat of the organisation, in fear of being rejected and ostracised in their respective communities of origin for being a part of the Islamic State.

5.4. Section B: Dissecting the Human-Trafficking Structures of the Islamic State.

From the preceding quantitative analysis, it is obvious that there is a myriad of ways by which the Islamic State configured its human-trafficking networks, to 'pull' and 'push' women and young girls into human-trafficking in Syria. In the qualitative analysis that follows, an extensive analysis of some stressing 'push and pull factors', *cum*, complex outplay of power dynamics between the women and men of the Islamic State are addressed to dissect the operational functionality of the organisation's migratory human-trafficking networks and practices therein in Syria (and Iraq). The qualitative section of the study serves to culminate the analysis of the organisation's trafficking structures, from the preliminary indirect recruitment of women and girls through the use of online propaganda to direct recruitment practices carried out through coercive means such as kidnappings and abductions. Progressively, the chapter divulged some of the divergent practices of trafficking that women and young girls got exposed to in IS at the hands of their own female counterparts and male counterparts. Furthermore, it explored how some IS women managed to escape from the clutches of the organisation.

5.5. The 'Pull' of the Islamic State's Social Media Propaganda and its Grassroots Recruitment Strategies Therein.

According to Binetti (2015), globally, social media has been one of many prevalent digital media platforms that the Islamic State has used to disperse its propaganda for recruitment purposes. Binetti (2015) notes that throughout its prominence, IS fabricated many online female sensitive strategies to lure women and young girls into its territories in Syria (and Iraq). Pertinently to partake in divergent activities that were orientated to sustain its existence

throughout the course of the Syrian war. Including that of human-trafficking practices. Inch (2017) notes that in the online recruitment process, IS specialised in exploiting different social media platforms *inter alia* Telegram, Facebook, Twitter, Tumblr and JustPast to disperse its recruitment messages to women internationally and locally (Inch, 2017). Inch (2017) argues further that many international, *cum*, local women and girls were exposed to IS's social media platforms, and IS social media propaganda, served as a great tool in inciting potential recruits to convert to Islam and embark on the *hijrah* (migration into Islamic lands), into the Islamic State in Syria. According to Benetti (2015), in the trafficking context, IS social media was able to map out divergent global trafficking networks that would dispose some foreign women to the organisations *inter alia* structures and practices of trafficking practices in Syria (and Iraq). Inch (2017) extensively notes that more often, IS propagandists and recruiters stemmed from different parts of the globe, including Syria. They comprised of both men and women of different ages and backgrounds. However, Ingram (2016) notes that with IS identifying the validity and trustworthiness that comes with women, during IS's premiere time, the organisation extensively increased its capitalisation of women by spearheading women to be at the forefront of the online recruitment processes. Strategically, making use of other women to promulgate propaganda to potential female recruits, especially those that it targeted to lure into its *inter alia* trafficking networks, *cum*, structures and practices in Syria (and Iraq) (Benetti, 2015)

Through the aid of women, IS dispersed online recruitment propaganda through different mechanisms such as videos, audio-visuals, audios, pictures or public messages on women. The goal was to promote and glamorise different aspects of the Islamic State and its activities with an intent to 'pull' women into IS territory in Syria (Winter, 2015). Ingram (2016) enunciates that the 'pull' of women into IS centre around four crucial sentiments: (1) Ideology, (2) religious devotion (3), Duties in IS, (4), Martyrdom.

Substantially, in context to the ideological promotions of propaganda that IS utilises to lure women into IS, video 4 uncovers a pro-IS Ideological video posted on a Twitter account of a British female IS propagandist and recruiter who goes by the name *Umm Layth*, promoting IS ideology. In the propaganda video shown on *umm Layth's* Twitter account, the pro-IS women are clearly heard saying:

"We do not follow the ideology, any other ideology than the ideology of Islam [IS interpretation of Islam], we do not submit to the law of any country or any nation".

- Umm Layth, Female IS Supporters and Propagandists in London. Video 4.

Koerner (2016) explicates that more often in such propaganda video's, the ideological sentiments promoted herein, particularly by women, are two folded. Firstly, the use of women served to give validity to IS's ideological pursuit and stimulate a legitimate appeal that will incite potential targeted recruits to migrate into IS. Secondly, Koerner (2016) explains that the ideological claims made in such propaganda videos further served to denounce other countries, especially countries in the West, as being governed by 'immoral' man-made ideological rules. Thence propagating the idea that "true Muslims" are supposed to live in Islamic countries where Sharia law (IS's interpretations of Sharia laws) prevails (Koerner, 2016).

In other cases, IS propagandists will use social media platforms to share their strong religious beliefs online, which initially stood as another grooming and radicalising tool of IS propaganda that serves to incite the conversion of potential recruits to Islam, particularly IS's interpretation of Islam. Such can be seen in video 5 in a Telegram post by a French Female pro-IS propagandist who goes by the name Umm Amin and states:

"Pray so that Allah can blind our enemies and grant us martyrdom".

–Umm Amin, IS propagandist. Video 5.

Khalil (2019) extensively notes that in IS's recruitment propaganda strategies, IS has even gone to the extent of glamorising violence or a lifestyle of violence in Syria through the use of false propaganda-based imagery. Khalil (2019) explicates that the glamorised violence was usually female sensitive in nature and designated to incite the appetite amongst potential women recruits to take the initiative to join the Islamic State, where they will get an opportunity to truly fulfil their roles in the jihad as 'heroic Mujahideen's' of the Islamic State. In Video 6, terrorism expert Mia Bloom gives a description of the nature of the recruitment propaganda imagery that IS uses to lure its targets.

"What they [IS] say in English and what they say in Arabic is different. In English they may be promising women this very exciting lifestyle, we've seen a lot of online photos of this. I call it the "Chicks with Clips"; you'll see women in Hijabs with Ak47's slayed across a Toyota truck".

-Mia Bloom, Terrorist expert. Video 6.

Mia Bloom (2016) explains that such a portrayal of IS propaganda usually served to give the illusion to out lookers and potential targeted female recruits, that women in IS are fighting and engaging in heroic acts of jihad in IS. Whereas in reality, many of them are going to be convinced to become wives and salient supportive agents within the Islamic State, with the exception of a very few women who may be manipulated into carrying out acts such as suicide bombing.

Congruently, Khalil (2019) notes that in addition to the glamorisation of violence in IS's propaganda, IS extensively used propaganda online to sell a rhetoric lifestyle to potential recruits. Many women and girls found themselves duped into IS under false propaganda and rhetoric's that leads girls to believe that in IS, women are accorded a blissful life of luxury, marriage and supportive sisterhood amongst the jihadi wives/ brides. In video 13, a female IS captive escapee exposed the falsehood in the rhetoric of lifestyle that IS utilises, in its false online propaganda to lure women and young girls, via social media into IS.

"It's all lies, they promise them a nice house, servants and a car. But they lie again".

-Unnamed, for Security Reasons, Former IS Sex Slave and Escapee. Video 13.

In video 2, a young former IS recruit shares a similar personal account in an interview with a British journalist from Sky News on how IS's online propaganda managed to lure her into migration into IS lands in Syria.

"We have all read about ISIS propaganda from the internet, from Facebook, Tumblr and etc…And I have contact with people in Raqqa via, Tumblr do you know Tumblr? [Asks reporter], Jah I have contact with them, with one of them tell us on twitter about the beautiful things inside ISIS. And then I was afraid to see the video about the cutting of the head. And I thought maybe it's not from ISIS, maybe it's from the group, the other group that hates ISIS. So, when I was in Indonesia I just focus on the beautiful things inside ISIS".

–Unnamed, Former Indonesian IS Recruit. Video 2.

Therefore, as explicated by Inch (2017), it is irrefutable that at the core of IS propaganda is the intention, not only to radicalise women, but to groom women into migrating into IS to support the Islamic State. Inch (2017) also notes that IS propagandists will send indirect messages of propaganda to encourage women to go to IS, and disperse direct propaganda messages encouraging women to go to Syria. This was witnessed in Video 4, in a tweet posted by an IS propagandist.

"Go to Shaam for it is the best of Allah's lands on earth".

– Umm Usman, Female IS Propagandist Tweet. Video 4.

Or in a religious context, IS propaganda messages will direct promotions of a *hijrah* (migration to Islamic lands) to women and girls, which usually refers to making migration into IS territory in Syria (and Iraq). Such can be seen in video 3, in a female-oriented tweet disseminated by a pro-IS female propagandist and recruiter:

"Biggest tip to sisters: doesn't take detours, take the quickest route, don't play around with your Hijrah by staying longer than 1 day".

–Umm Layth, Twitter, British Female IS Propagandists. Video 3.

It can also be seen in Video 1, with a tweet sent by another IS propagandist.

"There's no excuse in making Hijrah and Jihad…crossing the border can still be easily done, without any problems".

-Umm Abbasa Al-Britani, British Female IS Propagandist. Video 1.

Inch (2017) notes that in some propaganda messages, IS's female propagandists will go on to glamorise how women will be serving the Islamic State after their *hijrah*. The propaganda sold a lifestyle and promises of romance in the form of marriage and uncontested important duties in the Islamic State as the producers of the next generation of jihadist. Such can be seen in Video 5 through an audio posted on telegram which states:

"May Allah bless you, sweetheart, hijrah is for the women too. She'll marry and have children; the children will enlarge the ummah. They will be the future Mujahideen. They will spread the word of Allah as the Allah Azza wa-aila [Allah the almighty].

- Unidentified, Female French Propagandist. Video 2.

And as extensively substantiated by Zakaria (2015; Para 5) drawing from and IS Propagandist and recruiters blog;

"Our role is even more important as women in Islam, since if we don't have sisters with the correct Aqedah [conviction] and understanding who are willing to sacrifice all their desires and give up their families and lives in the West in order to make Hijrah [migration] and please Allah, then who will raise the next generation of lions?"

Therefore, as outlined by Hoyle, Bradford and Fernet (2015), the dispersal of such propaganda by IS on social media platforms, has irrefutably served as a crucial grassroots recruitment strategy for IS. Hoyle et al (2015), deduces that in using propaganda to promote itself, IS has effectively capitalised on selling radicalising ideology, *cum,* a rhetoric of blissful lifestyle for women, to naïve women and girls from all over the globe to 'pull' them into IS in the caliphate. Many women have been 'pulled' into IS to support the functionality of the organisation through engaging in many divergent activities of the organisations (including trafficking), in both a victim-based and facilitative manner.

Hoyle et al (2015) extensively explicate that through its online propaganda, IS's female propagandists have spearheaded IS's false online propaganda to female recruits by painting an utopian mirage for women and young girls seeking things such as religious and identity belonging, religious acceptance, and marriages to lure them from their home countries into IS territories. Thence, as explicated by Binetti (2015), IS's propaganda has often capitalised on possible "push" factors present in the West, such as probable religious discriminations, lack of social acceptance and loneliness that some women may face in Western countries to get girls to make the *hijrah* (migration) into IS lands in Syria (and Iraq). Integrally, Winter (2015) adds that through glamorising violence online, IS propaganda created an appeal of heroism for women who take the initiative to come to IS to fights in the jihad. The narrative of heroism was another strategy to lure young women and girls into IS's theatres in Syria (and Iraq).

Therefore, in the context of human-trafficking dynamics covertly underplay in IS recruitment strategies, Fish (2019), notes that there is no clear way to verify all the trafficking claims of some women trafficked into IS, as some women who found themselves trafficked in organisation had been driven by nativity to migrate into IS through after being exposed to IS's false online propaganda. Fish (2019), explains that unfortunately for some women, after online recruitment, some women faced the life of being subjected to forced marriages, perpetual forced pregnancies, extreme domestic and sexual abuse and sex slavery migrating in IS territories in Syria. Many other women, especially foreign women that became jihadi brides, were coerced by IS patriarchal religious frameworks to aid and execute some of these practices upon other women in the Islamic State (Jha, 2019).

Benetti (2015) extensively notes that once in the Islamic State, many foreign women found themselves integrally being sold -alongside local captives- in IS's sex slave market, with others

being given to IS fighters as sexual gifts. For other women, especially foreign women, IS used some foreign women who encompassed feminist thinking, to enter conflict zones alongside their male counterparts. IS recruited and strategically manipulated these women to engage in acts such as suicide bombing in the name of IS (Makanda et al, 2018). Fish (2019), however, notes that many women's stories of falling into IS's global trafficking networks cannot be verified, according to article 9 of the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking and its principle of the 'non-criminalisation of trafficking victims; many of these foreign women in IS's territory in Syria therefore conceptually fell under what the protocol refers to as 'imperfect victims of trafficking' (Fish, 2019).

As extensively as argued by Binetti (2015), all women under the age of 18 that have been lured to IS have also be considered victims of trafficking. This can be argued with reference to the article 3 of the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime of 2000, which would rightfully call women under 18 victims of trafficking in IS. The protocol has often argued that persons under 18 are still young and immature. Therefore, in context to IS, women under 18 that had been lured to IS through propaganda would have to be considered victims of trafficking as they would not be considered to be of an age that allows them to make sound decisions in their migration to IS after online recruitment.

Therefore, delineating from IS's wrapped feminist promulgation of jihad (i) feminism, Huey and Paledeau (2016) notes that IS's permission to allow women to promulgate most of its online recruitment propaganda strategies has never been so much to empower women to take on more proactive roles in IS. But as alleged by Huey and Paledeau (2016), was always mainly orientated to utilise these women to help perpetuate its global recruitment trafficking networks and operations on a platform that consists of fewer gender limitations. Pertinently their engagement was to recruit other women into a vicious oppressive reality in IS.

5.5.1. Congruent Online Recruitments Strategies of the Islamic State.

Charpenel (2016) notes that more often, in contrast to the indirect recruitment strategies that IS and its propagandist used to lure women and young girls into IS through online false propaganda, the practical recruitment process between the recruited women and the recruiters was executed through divergent- and more intimate-relationships and dialogues online. The recruiters of the IS would give out more direct information to recruits on how they can make their way into IS territory in Syria (and Iraq). As extensively viewed by Rhuk Ali (2015) from

the jihad (i) feminist narrative, pioneered for women in IS, even in the recruitment process of IS trafficking dynamics, a mosaic of perplex power relations have played out rigorously in context.

Spencer (2016) notes in application to the jihad (i) feminism narrative that often, IS has extensively used women to spearhead many online recruitment processes. Observably herein too in online gender-neutral platforms. This can be seen in video 4, with women recruiters such as Sally Jones who have recruited young girls and aided them from the very beginning of their recruitment process by giving them advice to raise money for travel purposes, designated to get them into IS in Syria (and Iraq).

"Start saving for a plane ticket and don't tell anyone".

-Sally Jones, Islamic State Bride and Recruiter. Video 4.

Extensively in Video 4, another IS recruiter reverberates similar recruitment instructions to their targeted female recruiter online.

"You need ticket money…use your mum's bank cards to book".

-Identity Hidden, IS Online Recruiter, Video 4.

On another basis, IS female recruiters will use monetary means and promise of financial repatriation of travel money to recruits online to get women and girls to migrate into IS territory. Such was evidently the case of a young Indonesian girl who expresses in video 2, about being lured by the notorious online female recruiter of IS, known globally as "Sally Jones".

"Online, they promise to give a huge monthly salary and they will say they will pay your journey costs, for example from Jakarta, to Turkey, to Raqqa. Our money, they will pay back our money".

-Identity Hidden for Security Reasons, Young Under 18 Indonesian Recruit, Video 2.

Gant et al (2019) compounds that inclusive to assisting girls in raising money and finding their way to IS territories the Islamic State's online recruiters, especially the female recruiters, were further delegated the duty of divulging extensive information to its female recruiters on what to bring into the Islamic State to prepare them for life under IS. As additionally supported by Spencer (2016), IS female recruiters online usually specialised in telling women and girls what

clothing and equipment that they need to have in the Islamic State. Extending, that globally IS integrally had female recruiters who would infiltrated migration structures to help recruits get proper documentation papers to be able to migrate and make the *hijrah* to IS.

Binetti (2015) notes that IS's recruitment tactics mimic that of trafficking and, in instances of underage girls, 18 years and under, can be considered as human-trafficking. The IS's recruitment practices can be viewed as human-trafficking particularly in the context that once the recruiters had executed their mission to bring women and girls to IS they disappear and leave girls in IS where IS fighters subject them to different practices of trafficking. In video 2, a former Indonesian IS recruit supports respectively the disappearance of her recruiter -Sally Jones and her male counterpart once in I.S:

"There's a woman and a man in Tumblr…I have never met them in real life. Just know them in internet because after the internet [referencing to when she was in IS], *I lost all contact with them.*

-Identity Hidden, Young Under 18 Indonesian Recruit. Video 2.

According to feminist writers such as Jacoby (2015), even in such women on women power dynamics of recruitment that existed in IS, the IS women seemed to stand at the brink of feminist discourses in many respects in their agency to recruit other women into IS. Jacoby (2015) argues further that even the women recruiters in IS fell short in respect of attaining any equal status with male counterparts, who sent them to recruit or plan the recruitment process. As the women recruiters themselves were always under the hidden instructions of their male counterparts on how to execute activities such as the recruitment processes designed for its *inter alia* trafficking recruitment practices in Syria (and Iraq).

5.6. Recruitment into the Islamic State Through Family Ties.

According to Malik (2017), from a feminist perspective, in other indirect trafficking forms, women were irrefutably not always lured offline by their deceptive female counterparts. But were in other cases drawn into the Islamic State by their own male members, who constituted family members. Charpenel (2016) notes that more often, some male figures associated with IS would use their authority and the submission that their religion required women to adhere to, to lure their own women and wives from their home countries into IS; where they would thereafter abandon them and their children to fend for themselves, whilst they go off to war. In video 8, a former IS bride explicates how she was tricked into IS, allegedly by her brother who wanted to come to fight in IS.

"We were supposed to be on holiday with my brother in Turkey and we ended up in Syria. We don't know how it happened and since then we have been trying to escape but it has not been possible".

- Identity Hidden. Former Foreign IS Bride Held in Refugee Camp in Syria. Video 8.

In video 18, another Moroccan IS Bride talks about how she was duped by her Australian husband, whom she did not know had pledged to IS and was to move her from their residing country in Australia into IS.

"I see many women with kids and they are wearing black and I asked them what happening? Where are we going? And they told me Syria. I started to cry. I went to my husband and asked him, Khalim what is happening, why did you bring me here, He tell me Islam it's my surprise. I marry you to protect you from the enemy [West]".

-Islam Mitat, Former IS Bride, Video 18.

Extensively as witness in video 19, with a Spanish Former IS Bride who made a claim of being lured into IS by her husband on their trip in Turkey.

"Coming here was not my decision. I was tricked into coming to Syria, I knew nothing. I was going to Turkey, to a city in Turkey. My husband told me that it was a good city. The women wear the niqab [fully veiled clothes] like me, the children would grow well on the basic principles of Islam. That was what has appealed to me".

In video 7, an Australian former IS bride extensively explicates how she was also tricked into Syria by her husband.

"To cut a long story short, I was tricked by my husband. It started off a as a normal holiday, my husband had never left the country at the time so it was the first time he agreed to take me oversees. We went to Malaysia, to Dubai, to Lebanon. There were other people there and then there was a man there, and I just remember the man he said "run before they shoot".

-Mariam Dabboussy, Former Australian IS bride, Video 2.

Benetti (2015) explains that globally and regionally and even more so locally, congruent online recruitment at the hands of their own female counterparts, many women, unfortunately, fell victim to the trafficking structures of IS through close and intimate relatives. More often their male, counterparts would misuse their power to manipulate their wives into travelling to Syria. The trafficking dynamic of such recruitment strategies come peculiarly with the advent that

once in IS, many of the women who had come to IS in support of their husbands would find themselves abandoned, and forced to remarry other jihadist fighters, succumbing to extra practices such as sexual abuse and forced pregnancy in their give 'marriages'(Reprieve,2021).

5.7. 'Pushed' into the Islamic State by Circumstances.

According to the 2018 Global Trafficking Report, stretching beyond a visible hand of being recruited to IS's trafficking structure through interpersonal recruitment processes, it is crucial to note that some women and girls have also found themselves absorbed by pressing circumstances into IS trafficking structures in Syria. As explicated by Pokalova (2019) in the "push and pull" theoretical explanation of human-trafficking, some people and thence women in IS have 'involuntarily' been forced to migrate into IS territories and succumb to its practices of trafficking thereafter as a result of pressing issues that have pushed them out of their homes. Substantially in video 2, this has been the case of a young Indonesian girls who "unwillingly" became an IS bride for survival purposes, associated with her health and the health of her son.

"Because I am sick, I have to do surgery soon, and my money in Indonesia is not, not so hmm…and in ISIS all is free All medicine free. And we will get monthly salary because we are Muhajirah [foreign fighters]. They promise to us like that. They soon get me and my son to Mosul [ISIS headquarters in Iraq] to get all the surgery…my son now can walk, but his autism, no, is not better, and me I get surgery…jah that why I came".

-Identity Hidden for Security Reasons, IS recruit from Indonesia, Video 2.

Such similar sentiments have also emanated from another IS bride, in the video who succumbed to IS to work for the Islamic State, perpetuating the abuse of other women in the organisation and in other activities run by the organisation. Such as its associated with human-trafficking practices therein for financial means to survive.

"My husband was a martyr. I had no more money. I had no choice but to work for them. I started the paperwork to join. But they said first I needed training in Sharia law".

-Identity Hidden for Security Reasons, Former IS Bride. Video 2.

Therefore, as explicated in the Trafficking Report (2017) there have been many women in IS, who in complementary to falling victim to the oppressive practices of their husbands, find themselves in the presence of a failed state where the only means to survive is through joining notorious armed groups such as the Islamic State. And therefore, participate in their notorious activities as reinforcers of the organisation, particularly to make ends meet.

5.8. Direct Trafficking Practice of The Islamic State.

5.8.1. Kidnapping, Abductions and Transfer of Women and Girls into the Islamic State.

According to Malik (2017), at a more interpersonal level, beyond being deceived by their own pro-IS female counterparts, their trusted male counterparts or family members, many women and young girls found themselves in the Islamic States human-trafficking structures in Syria through being kidnapped or abducted from outside, or within borders of Syria. Henceforth, as explicated by the Global Trafficking Report (2016), in a failing state that was void of border control observations, cross border kidnapping and abduction of women and girls was amongst the most eminent direct migratory conduits of human-trafficking practices that IS successfully executed regionally and locally to dispose of women and young girls into its trafficking structures and divergent forms of exploitation within its territories in Syria (and Iraq). Especially in the cities that it was conquering, such as Mosul in Iraq, where IS had its first headquarters established and extensively, in Raqqa and Rabi'a in Syria (Charpenel, 2016).

According to Charpenel (2016), women and girls would be kidnapped or abducted internationally from their home countries by IS militants, from neighbouring countries pertinently from Iraq and Lebanon, *cum*, locally within Syria, to be hurled into a life of captivity and exploitations of many kinds in IS. As illustrated in video 16, not all women and girls were directly kidnapped by IS militants. In video 16, a former Yazidi sex slave explicates from a personal account that some women and girls, pertinently from minority groups, would be kidnapped from the Yazidi religious sect, and successively women from Christian minority groups. Women from these sects were mainly women that IS was trying to exterminate from its territories in Syria (and Iraq). Often girls would be held and kidnapped by other Arab armed groups working with IS, pertinently throughout the methods of false arrest, and thereafter progressively be handed over to the Islamic State for human-trafficking.

"When we arrived at a checkpoint, we were arrested there. This was mostly done to us by our Arab neighbours…. When IS came they handed us over to them".

-Ilham, 17 years old, Former Yazidi Female abductee of IS. Video 16.

In video 16, another former IS female sex slave shared the same experience of being abducted by Arab forces working with IS under the pretence being falsely arrested substantiates:

"Arabs arrested us at Sinone. Later we were handed over to ISIS. They took us to Syria".

As aforementioned and extensively noted by Malik (2017), regionally, IS had a complex trafficking syndicate comprising of other armed Arab groups or criminal networks that specifically dealt with the transferal of women and girls from their respective home towns into Syria. Mostly through IS headquarters in Mosul (Iraq), to first be prepared for shipment to Syria. In video 17, a snapshot into the mosaic regional trafficking networks of the Islamic State is divulged in a personal account of a trafficking scenario given by a former Christian IS survivor and sex slave. Whom in her account inclusively provides an idea of how many women and girls outside Syria, however in the region have integrally found themselves in the four walls of IS's human-trafficking structures in Syria.

"They said to us: you are slaves. I asked them: What do you mean, but I didn't get a reply, we didn't understand anything. After four days, an ISIS came and took the women who was with me to his house, she became his slave! Two days later, they handed me also to an ISIS agent with whom I stayed about a year and six months in Mosul. That is where they imposed decisions, where they decided that women slaves shouldn't stay in Iraq and should be moved to Syria…. They then sold me to a Saudi man who was in Raqqa [Syria] then".

-Ritta Habib, Christian ISIS Survivor, Video 17.

Other women, as seen in video 12, would violently be at gunpoint capture at the borders of neighbouring countries to be brought to I.S headquarters in Iraq before transferal to Syria.

"They took us to the Shbabik control point and pointed their guns to our heads".

- 'Úm Nareen', Former IS Captive and Sex Slave. Video 12.

Malik (2017) notes that with IS, kidnapping was irrefutably more than just a method that the Islamic State used to assimilate minority religious groups into the caliphate. Charpenel (2016) extensively elaborates that with the Islamic State, kidnappings were also a huge business venture that IS knitted into its organisation's human-trafficking structures and practices to get and use women and girls to generate more revenue for the organisation. At times IS would requested ransom demands from the families and even the states where the women and girls that they had kidnapped and/or abducted came from. (UNDOC Global Trafficking Report, 2016).

5.9. Detention in the Islamic State.

Malik (2017) notes that once disposed of in IS, either through 'voluntary' migration or salient involuntarily migratory means of becoming kidnapped or abducted from their homes, many women and girls progressively succumbed to captivity. Where many were held captive in different locations and IS structures, spanning from local schools to halls, guesthouses and even prisons in Syria to await different fates. Beyond Syria, the Islamic State would eminently hold its captive women and girls in different huge locations such as schools and church halls in its headquarters in Mosul (Iraqi) or Sinjar. The prettiest girls would then be prepared and sent to Syria to be sold in the organisation's sex slave market or sold into contract marriages with jihadist fighters.

As extensively noted by the Amnesty International (2014), women bound for IS trafficking structures in Syria were not always primarily held captive in Syria. The Amnesty International (2014) notes that beyond IS borders, in neighbouring countries, peculiarly in Iraq-where IS first headquarters was established-women and girls would be held captive there in local facilities such as schools and church halls, where they would first be separated from their families and male counterparts. The Amnesty International (2014), explains IS's headquarters in Iraq eminently served as a base where women and girls would be picked apart before the prettiest girls got sent to Syria to be sold in the organisation's sex slave market. Substantially, in video 20, a former IS sex slave captured and held by IS in Iraq before being sent to Syria to be sold as a sex slave explains:

"They surrounded our houses and our village.IS put us in the school. They took all our gold and jewellery. They separated the men, girls, the women and children. They took most of the men and killed them. Then they separated the women from the girls. Then they took us girls to Syria. They sold us amongst themselves and treated us very badly"

-Identity Hidden for Security Reasons, Former IS captive, Video 20.

In video 12, a former ISIS captive shares similar sentiments of captivity in IS held territory in Iraqi, before landing in Syria as a sex slave.

"They took me and my younger sister into a wedding hall in Sinjar, alongside other women before going to Syria".

-Barween, Former IS Captive and Sex Slave, Video 12.

The Human Rights Council (2017), that as in Iraq, when IS expanded its territorial bases in Syria in 2014, one of the first things they did upon seizing territory in IS was to capture local women and girls for different exploitative purposes. As seen in IS territory in Iraq women would be held together to be sold in a huge location such as in guesthouses. In video 9 a former female IS captive explains:

"When the war broke out the men of ISIS likes to gather all the women and make them stay in the guesthouse of the organisation"

-Identity Hidden for Security Reasons, IS Female Captive. Video 9.

According to the Human Rights Council (2017), some women and girls would extensively be held captive by IS owners in the presence of the fighter's family as concubines of their capturers. And even then, as illustrated by an IS captive in video 16, they succumbed to much physical, emotional and psychological abuse at the hands of their captors.

"At first I was locked into a house by myself. After my escape attempt my owner took me to his house where his family lived as well. I was locked up in there for two months".

-Ilham, 17-year-old Yezidi Female I.S. Captive. Video 16.

Therefore, as extensively elaborated by Reinl (2015), the first phase of IS's trafficking trajectory entailed holding women in large aforementioned rudimentary place of captivity, which merely served as decision-making platform for IS fighters. Reinl (2015) notes in many of the above locations, older women and men would often be taken away by IS fighters to be executed. Whilst younger men and boys, would be sent to IS's fighting training camp. For younger women and girls, the prettiest girls would thereafter undergo preparations such as forced conversion to Islam and progressively physical examinations, before being distributed to IS fighters. Thereafter, they would progressively be transported to Syria, to the organisation's sex slave market, tragically sometimes with other IS women assisting in facilitating the process (Human Rights Council, 2017).

5.10. Religion: Forced Conversion to Islam in the Islamic State.

According to Shea (2015), after disposition into the Islamic State's trafficking structures in Syria (and Iraq), many female victims of IS would first be forced to subordinately assimilate themselves into IS rule through being forced to convert to Islam. The 2014 United States Department of State Report on International Religious Freedom notes that more often, the practice of forced conversion to Islam was amongst the most prominent power tools that the

Islamic State used to give theological justifications to all its practices of exploitative oppression of women and young girls within its trafficking structures in Syria (and Iraq). Binetti (2015) explains that most foreign women and girls who had already made the *hijrah* (migration into Muslim lands) into IS were often already converts. However, they were still forced to relearn the religion of Islam accordingly to the Islamic State's twisted interpretation of Islam. Other women and girls kidnapped or abducted directly by IS militants from other religious minority groups such as the Christian and Yazidi groups would be transported to IS headquarters in Mosul, where they would be sent to an Islamic court to convert to Islam before being transported to Syria to be sold as *inter alia sex* slaves or contract forced into marriages (Human Rights Council, 2016).

Raben (2018) notes that locally in Syria, the principle of forced conversion to Islam applied with many women and young girls captured locally, who would also be sent to an Islamic State court in IS's headquarters in Syria in the city of Raqqa to be converted from their religion to Islam. Although as argued by Raben (2018), there were times IS claimed to accept its minority groups keeping their religious beliefs on the grounds that they paid taxes known as the *Jizya* to do so. Raben (2018) notes that often these taxes were null and void for the women and girls it kept as slaves, as more often, IS would use these taxes for salient activities whilst still forcing many of its female captives to convert to Islam.

Therefore, as substantially noted by a former Yazidi captive and sex slave in video 13, one of the first things IS did before sending girls into the market as sex slaves, or before giving them away to other fighters as sexual gifts, was to force them to abandon their religion and convert to Islam. Especially the Yazidi religion whom IS considered to be non-existent. And therefore, as expressed by a former Yazidi girl held captive by ISIS in video 13, the Yazidi religion was considered a by IS as a religion of heretics.

"The emirs said we had to become Muslim and we must get rid of our religion because we are infidels". And they said that our religion was unfit for human beings and only fit for animals".

> -Unnamed for Security Reasons, Former Yazidi Sex Slave of IS. Video 13.

As extensively expressed by the same Yazidi girl in the aforementioned video 13, women and girls would be forced to convert to Islam under the threat of receiving the death penalty for refusing to do so.

"They said that if we refuse to become Muslim, they would kill us".

In video 16, another former Yazidi that was abducted and sent to Syria to become sex slaves explains that in the process of being forced to convert to Islam, many captive women and girls in IS were therein forced by IS to learn the Quran off by heart.

"Even worse, I had to learn the Quran by heart. That was compulsory. Either you die or you learn it by heart".

In video 12, another former Yazidi sex slave explicates that often IS would extensively force its sex slaves to learn the religion through multiple prayer practices.

"They forced us to pray and convert to Islam, we were praying five times a day".

Raben (2018) notes that in comparison to other prevalent minority groups, often the brutality of forced conversion would be exercised more brutally in IS territory on women and young girls from the Yazidi, particularly since they did not recognise the Yazidi religion and it is not a 'religion of the book', when compared to Christianity that abides by the bible and other minority Muslim groups such as the Shia and Alawati sects that follow the Quran. An Islamic feminist writer Houston (2018) compounds through the Islamic feminist narrative that throughout IS, the practice of forced religious conversion was one amongst many another weapon of oppression that IS used to justify their acts of brutality against women. And eminently executed the practice of forced religious conversion upon its captive females to give false theological credibility to their actions of abuse and brutality upon women. According to Rhuk Ali (2015), IS also used its twisted practices of religion to brainwash their supportive female counterparts to integrally engage in aiding the perpetuation of its brutal treatment of women in its *inter alia* trafficking trajectories.

5.11. Forced Marriages in the Islamic State.

Projecting through the lens of jihad (i) feminism, Rhuk Ali (2015) argues that the practices of forced marriages in IS has been a huge practice of the Islamic States. It was strategy used by IS to subjugate and confine the activity of women in IS to the rules of men in the organisations- in this context through the women's male counterpart; their "husbands". Winter (2015a)

outlines that forced marriages are often executed within IS to keep women in a perpetual state of dependency upon their husbands. The value of women in IS was weighed by their marital status. Van Gorp (2019) notes that in most instances, aside from classical women who were victims of the Islamic State's human Trafficking practices, even women who sat on the supportive side of IS practices as IS supporters and reinforces of the Islamic States practices, also fell prey to many practices of forced marriages. Which for them was identifiably noted by Rhuk Ali (2015), to constitute a way in which IS reinstated and reinforced submissiveness into them as a reminder of their sedentary status as women in IS; regardless of the degree of agency they had or were given within the Islamic State. Therefore, as substantially explicated by a former Syrian IS bride in video 10, no women or girl, whether victim, supporter of the Islamic State was spared from succumbing to the practice of forced marriage.

"Women might be forced to marry, that is very common. Girls get asked to marry foreign fighters. That is common, women being chased down the street and being asked for marry".

-Identity Hidden d for Security Reasons, Former Syrian IS Bride. Video 10.

In an in interview with a BBC reporter, thirty miles from the Syrian Border, a former IS Bride who goes by the made-up name, Leila, substantially accounts from personal experience how civilian women in IS would randomly fall prey to practise of forced marriages at any time in IS.

"He saw my eyes while I was in the street, wearing a full cloak like this and with my face covered…He then came with marriage official and he forced me to go with him to his house".

The Human Rights Council (2017), extensively explicates that the practice of forced marriages in IS was far from being executed peacefully. According to the Human Rights Council (2017), in many cases any women and girl that was held captive in IS or lived "freely" as IS civilians would be forced into marriage in IS through being subjected to any forms of punishment an IS fighter deemed fit for them, if they refused to marry upon demand. The Human Rights Council (2017) extensively elaborates that often women and young girls would be abused, beaten and starved for days for refusing to marry their capturer or fighters that they were sold to. In video 15, a former IS sex slave accounts on how she was deprived of food by her IS capture for refusing to marry him:

"One of them took me to his house and locked me inside a room and told me because you are refusing to marry me, I won't give you food or water".

The Human Rights Council (2017) compounds that beyond IS's members personally capturing and forcing women and girls and to marry them, some women in IS extensively found themselves in forced marriages in IS through family members. Substantially, in video 14, a former IS bride that had been forced into marriage by her brother in the city of Raqqa in Syria, explains how family members-particularly male family members-soon began to capitalise on IS's perverse lust for women to sell their female family members into forced marriages in IS for "survival" and personal reasons. In video 14, the Former Syrian Bride claims to have been betrayed into IS practice of forced marriage in Syria through her own brother.

"I met my husband when he came to ask my brother for my hand. He already had two wives. One of them stayed in Belgium, she didn't want to come here with him. My family was in favour of my marriage for financial and religious reasons. But when I saw him I refused. He had a long beard and long hair. I refused but, they forced me".

-Identity Hidden for Security Reasons, Former Syrian IS Bride, Video 14.

As progressively analysed by Rhuk Ali (2015) through the jihad (i) feminist lens, within the Islamic States trafficking practices, IS perpetuated its utility of forced marriages to subjugate women to an oppressive lifestyle in the Islamic State through a diverse ventricle of different marriages. As noted by another former IS Bride in the city of Raqqa in video 14, the practice of forced marriages, known as a 'sexual jihad', where women who were considered slaves, prisoners or spoils of war, was another popular practiced of forced marriage practice that commenced in IS. And contrary to conventional marriage was integrally created to constitute another salient business venture that IS fighters used to generate operational revenues. As such marriages were often business orientated and where what Van Gorp (2017) called 'temporary contract marriages. These marriages often entailed women and girls being sold into marriage with an IS fighter.

"There were several kinds of marriages such as the sexual 'Jihad' or the 'sabayas' [female war prisoners]. The sabayas were sold to several men, Emirs or fighters. Sexual 'Jihad' on the other hand is marrying an emir or a fighter. The women think that later on that God will rewards her as if she had participated in Jihad, in fighting".

- Identity Hidden for Security Reasons, Former IS Bride, and Raqqa. Video 14.

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As extensively noted by the Human Rights Council (2017), once in IS, practices of forced marriages such as the sexual 'jihad' marriages, where not just advocated for by the male IS fighters. But integrally by female IS Brides (more often foreign brides). Whom according to the Human Rights Council (2017) would even go to the extent of going out to collect women and girls themselves and subjugate them to the practice of forced for their husbands or other jihadist fighters. In video 10 a former IS captive and sex slave reports.

"Sometimes wives of foreign fighters go into homes for girls of certain age, once they find them, they force them to marry a fighter".

-Unnamed for Security Reasons, Former Syrian Female IS Captive and Sex Slave, Video 10.

In video 14, another IS female bride who was active in Raqqa as a member of the organisations all female military wing known as the Al-Khansaa Brigade, extensively notes that even with business orientated marriages set up by IS such as the sexual 'jihad', women married to IS fighters, where also complacent with the practices of forced marriages. At times they even became active participants of these practices of marriage. Extensively organising, preparing girls and executing these practices of forced marriages within IS territories in Syria.

"There was a woman named Um Al Yaman. She oversaw all the marriage and 'sexual jihad' matters. She had the girl's names, ages, and physical description. She coordinated all this with the fighters and Emirs. The emirs preferred virgins".

-Identity Hidden for Security Reasons, Former Syrian IS Bride, Video 14.

Therefore, analytically reverberating from the dynamic outlays of power relations explicated by the Islamic States trajectory of jihad (i) feminism in Syria (and Iraq), Pierce (2014) further elaborates that beyond using forced marriage as another conduit to bolster the recruits of its male fighters and rewards its own fighters with wives; the execution of forced marriages by IS members further served to act in the Islamic State as a threat even against its own female fighters and female based policing forces. Pierce (2014) elaborates that in most cases, even IS female fighters were not necessarily in themselves "empowered" female agents of the Islamic State, regardless of their agency in IS but were themselves into forced marriages. Many of the female reinforcers in IS would be forced to executed such practices within the patriarchal rules and frameworks for women laid out by the organisation. As further explained by Malik (2017), some women would fall victim to becoming 'commodity wives', and would 'involuntarily' subject themselves as wives would be sold and traded into another marriage by their own

husbands, for retaliating against IS's rules or breaking any designated orders given to them (Pierce, 2014). Therefore, as outlined by Van Gorp (2017), many types of marriages in IS were irrefutably trafficking centred marriages. Especially the sexual 'jihad' and salient congruent marriages as women and girls would, in marriage, endure a plethora of abuse from their spouses. Enduring systematic rape by one temporary husband to another (Van Gorp, 2017).

5.12. The Sex Slave Market in the Islamic State.

The Human Rights Council (2016) outlines that, during the prime years of the Islamic States sex slave market, once women and young girls were trafficked and 'pulled' into the Islamic State, through different mechanisms of trafficking into Syria (or Iraq), many succumbed the fate of being disposed to the Islamic States' sex slave market. Where they were commodified and sold to either IS fighters, male civilians or individuals in the organisation to generate revenue for other operational functions of the organisation. Some women would be 'bartered' amongst IS fighters as fighting gifts. Raben (2018) explains that though the sex slave market was predominately made up of Yazidi women whom the IS prioritised as sex slaves, alongside Christian and other minority groups such as the Turkmen Shia, Binetti (2015) notes that even foreign women and young girls were not immune to falling prey to the organisation sex slave market. A sex slave market that video 15 illustrates to have been legally permitted and issued by the Islamic States Fatwa and research department.

"It is permissible to buy, sell or give as a gift female captives and slaves for they are merely property which can cause the (Muslim ummah) any harm or damage".

–IS Pamphlet, IS Fatwa and Research Department Document, Video 15.

In Video 15, an IS video released by the organisation extensively captures a validating phenomenon of sex slavery in IS, through the presence of jihadist fighters who are captured mocking and joking around about the women and girls that they will buy at the sex slave market. The video also shows IS fighters determining different prices and bargaining things that they are willing to trade as payment for women and girls at the sex slave market.

"Today is the sex slave market day. Today is the day where the verse [referring to the Quran] applies…: Except with their wives and their (captives) whom their right hand possess-for (then) they are not to be blamed. Today is distribution day God willing. Each one takes his share …. Whoever wants to sell his own slave I will buy her? And if you want to give her as a gift also I will take her. I will pay 3 banknotes [a banknote is about 100 dollars] …. Or I buy her for a pistol".

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Extensively, In video 12, a former IS sex slave who was sold and held captive in Syria gives a detailed account of the nature of the Islamic State's sex slave market, and its operational function in Syria (and Iraq), mainly in IS's headquarters that was located in the Syrian city of Raqqa.

"The sex slave market was a large building. There are many ISIS men sitting on chairs. They put us in a room and called us by our names one by one and removed our veils. They wrote down the names and price of each lady on a piece of paper, making us walk between the men who then can pick the lady that they want. If they wanted to buy us, they had to raise their hands and they would be given our name and price".

- 'Adool' Former IS Sex Slave, Video 12.

However, in 2014, Iraqi News published a document issued by the Islamic State, illustrating that regardless of the sporadic auction-like method that IS used during its prime to dispose of their sex slaves, initially, the organisation's sex slave market ran like most market systems would. It comprised of a fluid- pricing mechanism for the sale of its women in Syria (and Iraq). Abdelhki Mamoun (2014) further reported that though the prices for foreign women were not clearly set in the document, similar prices of local women went to foreign women disposed to the organisation's sex slave market. With a pricing control list illustrated in video 11, showing that the prices of many women and girls in IS was more often grounded, however not fixed, on the age groups of the women and girls it was sold.

"A [Yazidi or Christian] woman aged 40 to 50 years of age is for 50 000 dinars (or 43 US dollars). The rate of a [Yazidi or Christian], aged 30-40 years is 75 000 dinars (or 75 US dollars). The rate of a [Yazidi or Christian], ages 20-30 is for 100 000 dinars (or 86 US dollars). The rate of a (Yazidi or Christian), aged 10-20 years is for 150 000 (or 130 US dollars). A [Yazidi or Christian] child price, aged 1-9 is 200 000 dinars (or 175 US dollars)".

–IS, Sex Slave Price List, Video 11.

The Human Rights Council (2017) extensively notes that once sold to a jihadist fighter, the sold women used as sex slaves don't remain with one master but would get circled around jihadist fighters once their present owners get tired of them. In video 12, a former Islamic State sex slave extensively explicates personal experience, that in IS sex slave market, after their first sale from market women and girl would not only stay with one owner after being bought.

But were extensively shuffled and resold from one IS jihadist fighter to another every time a fighter was finished with their particular sex slave.

"A man brought me and another lady. He kept us for one month then he sold us. He did not feed us and continuously assaulted me…He was from Moroccan. After his harsh treatment, he sold me to a Syrian man who kept me for a month. I was then sold to a Brazilian man and he kept me for 18 days. He later sold me to another Moroccan. I was held captive for six to seven months in Syria".

-Identity Hidden for Security Reasons', Former IS Sex Slave, Video 12.

Bhattacharya (2016) notes that the Islamic States sex slave market was even run online, with women and girls being sold online through encrypted apps such as Telegram and Facebook. In video 17, a former Christian IS sex slave confirms that in a diabolically clever way, IS's perversely used the online platform to extensively legitimise its sex slave market in theological terms to out lookers.

"They have tried to convince people that they came to apply the religion of Allah and Sharia…so making a real market to sell people makes civilians look at them differently, that is why they made it online."

- 'Ritta Habib', Christian IS Survivor, Video 17

Bhattacharya (2016) elaborates that the Islamic States online system was extensively a platform where IS fighters could get extensively get updates on the prices of slaves and the type of slaves that were available for sale. In essence, it was a platform where IS could track its sex slaves and also market its slaves. In video 11, a list of IS marketing sales of sex slaves is uncovered on a WhatsApp group, where women, girls and some children are shown to have been numbered for sale purposes. In video 11, the list reads:

"The sex market is open for three days. Come if you want to buy. There is number 7, number 13, Number 17, number 5 with kids, Number 15 with kids, Number 14, she has 7 children, 6 are here. Number 1 with a child. Number 9 with 2 kids. Number 10. Alone. Number 4. Number 19 with kids. Number 6. Number 11 with kids. Number 3 with 2 kids. Number 8, alone".

-IS Market List of Slaves, WhatsApp, Video 11.

Winter (2015a) extensively illuminates from the jihad (i) feminist ideological outplay of power in IS, that often brides and female enforcers of IS were so brainwashed and entrapped in the

patriarchal mirage that IS had imposed upon them, to the point where they themselves ended up becoming complacent participants in the harbouring of sex slaves. In some instance, sex slaves would even be harboured in the family homes of the IS men that bought them in the presence of the female supporters, whilst waiting to be traded again. In video 17, a Christian IS survivor, substantial from personal experience, the manner in which IS sex slaves would be harboured by jihadist fighters in the presence of their wives, and even children, in the process of waiting to be sold on to the next fighter.

"After seven months they sold me to another man who was living with his wife and three children. I stayed with them about a year and three months".

- Ritta Habib, Christian IS Survivor, Video 17.

From the aforementioned, Yilmaz (2015) enlightens from a jihad (i) feminist approach that often in IS women, irrespectively of their agency, women in IS were always primarily perceived as sexual objects that could be disposed of and sold to the organisation's sex slave market. Yilmaz (2015) notes that for the complacent jihadi brides that perpetually turned a blind eye to their male counterpart's behaviour, the sex slave market became an institution that they too would be threatened with by their husbands or congruent male jihadist family members if they showed defiance against their authority. Even though their twisted religious scriptures outlining the type of women and girls that could be sold refused them husbands to sell their own wives. Rhuk Ali (2015) extensively notes that in being brainwashed by the theological basis that IS used to justify slavery practices and reinstate submissiveness in their own women, the sex slave market served a very crucial extensive tool that the Islamic State inclusively configured as part of its trafficking structures. It not only used the sex slave market to generate revenue from the market, but integrally, to perpetuate a vicious cycle of oppression of its own women in the organisation.

5.13. Sexual Violence (and Rape) In the Islamic State.

According to Charpenel (2016), sexual violence and extensively institutional rape has been a huge constituent and practice of the Islamic States human-trafficking structures in Syria (and Iraq). From a failed state theoretical narrative, Ahram (2016) notes that much like Syria has used sexual violence throughout its governance to attains and sustain ethno-sectarian hierarchies in Syria, IS has integrally adapted a mode of sexual violence in its state-building trajectories to attain an ethno-religious hierarchy upon the minority groups it has conquered in Syria (and Iraq). The Islamic State also carried out acts of sexual violence against women to

achieve genocidal objectives in the territories that IS was cleansing and purifying for the establishment of its Islamic State (The Combat Genocide Association, 2014).

From a feminist perspective, Ahram (2015:59) outlines that by drawing from power dynamics morale's explicated in the theoretical jihad (i) feminist approach, in its takeover in (Iraq) and progressively at the onset of the Syrian war, in Syria, IS eminently used sexual violence to subordinate and degraded other minority groups such as the Shiite, Alawati, Yazidi and Christians, *cum*, other minority groups to its hyper-masculine pseudo-state structures, through the oppression and dehumanisation of women and girls. Charpenel (2016) explains that within IS's framework of human-trafficking practices, different practices of sexual violence and extensively so, systematic practices of rape against women and girls in minority groups would often be the tool used to do so. Systematic rape against women and girls would also be a tactic that IS used to instil a perpetual state of fear amongst the conquered populations groups residing in its territories.

The Human Rights Council (2017) extensively explicates that in IS the practice of sexual violence was such as eminent part of the organisation's practices that many of its women and girls that would become subjected to sexual violence would undergo rigorous examinations by doctors or nurses for things such as pregnancy or virginity before being given to IS fighters as a gift to be raped. Or sent to the sex slave market, usually run fluidly in the city of Mosul in Iraqi and extensively in the Syrian city of Raqqa. Supportively, in video 13, a former IS captive and sex slave substantially accounts of the events that unfolded for many women in captivity in Syria (and Iraq), the women and girls that were held captive as sex slaves by IS would be prepared to undergo sexual violence and exploitation.

"A doctor and a nurse examined us and separated the virgins from the married women. They made any girls who was pregnancy like my friend miscarry. I realised that I was going to be raped that day".

-Identity Hidden for security reasons, Former IS Captive and Sex Slave, Video 13.

Foster and Minwalla (2018) note that for women or girls who were already too long in their pregnancy terms to abort their unborn babies, IS forcefully made them deliver early so that they could be sold in the sex slave market or given away to another fighter. In video 12 a former IS sex slave substantiates from observation.

"We suffered a lot, 14-year-old girls became pregnant and was forced to deliver the baby".

-'Adool', Former IS Sex Slave, Video 12.

Callimachus (2017) notes that with respect to the practices of forced abortions that IS executed on young girls, many female sex slaves of IS were observably forced to abort in order to maintain a constant supply of sex slaves to its fighters. Callimachus (2017) notes that for IS, pregnant women posed an extensive hindrance as they could not be sold or their price sale would be very little.

Esfandiari et al (2014) extensively explicate that in extension to such practices to prepare girls for sale in their sex slave market, the Islamic State integrally introduced practices of genital mutilations to prepare and allegedly 'preserve' women and girls, especially those that were virgins to be sold as a higher price to their husband fighters. Or sometimes to be sold at a higher price in the organisations the sex slave market (Esfandiari et al, 2014). Foster and Minwalla (2018) note that one of the most paramount practices of sexual violence that women and girls succumbed to once physically evaluated was the practice of rape. Often multiple gang rapes at the hands of jihadist fighter, substantially supported by a former IS sex slave victim in Video 13.

"We were raped up to five times day".

-Identity Hidden for Security Reasons, Former Yazidi Sex Slave, Video 13.

As extensively seen in video 13, another Yazidi survivor shares a similar story. Often the practice of rape was very brutal, with girls being tied up and beaten in the process.

"The guard tied my hands up and raped me".

–Identity Hidden for Security Reasons, Former Female Yazidi Sex Slave. Video 13.

Malik (2017) extensively notes that more often, rape, especially gang rape, was a tool that IS used to subjugate women and girls to fear so as to not escape. In video 13, a former Yazidi sex slave who had tried to escape recalls from personal experience that often, rape was in IS a corrective tool used to punish recaptured escapees.

"Salman told me to undress. He said I warned you not to escape now you will know your punishment. He let the six guards in, locked the door. They raped me brutally. I do not know how many times".

-Former IS Captive and Sex Slave, Video 13.

In video 12, an IS survivor further explicates that no women or young girls, irrespective of their age, was spared from IS brutal practices of rape. With girls as young as under 18 being sold/or given to older men as sexual gifts to get raped.

"They sold 11-year-old girls to men much older than their fathers, and they were torturing them with them".

- Identity for Security Reasons, Former IS Sex Slave, Video 12.

In video 13, another former IS shares similar sentiments from personal experience.

"The IS commanders are between 50 and 70 years old. I was fifteen when I was selected by a commander to be raped. He said younger girls are better than older ones".

- Identity Hidden for Security Reasons, Former IS Sex Slave, Video 13.

In video 12, 'Adool', a former IS sex slave, extensively explains that even young girls below the ages of 18 were, like older women who IS tied to try and control, not immune to the practice of being tied with cables and ropes before being raped.

"They tied and raped 10-year-old girls".

'-Adool', Former IS Sex Slave, Video 12.

Malik (2017) compounds that often the practices of sexual violence culminated in becoming a systematic and institutional part of IS's trafficking structures in IS territories. With women and girls being sold by IS's jihadist fighters as commodities to be raped and resold. Islamic feminist writer Zachariah (2015) makes that in IS systematic rape constituted another method that IS fighters used to generate revenue to continue the perpetuation of other operations of the organisation. In video 13, a former IS girl explicates from personal experience the brutality of the Islamic State systematic practices of rape in context:

"Abu Mohammed said that I had this girl when she was a virgin. I am bored of her now. I want another one. I was sold to Abu Abdullah who also raped me. He got bored of me after a few days. He sold me to Emad who also raped me. If I had not escaped he would have also sold me on as well".

-Identity Hidden for Security Reasons, Former IS Sex Slave, Video 13.

From an Islamic feminist approach, Zachariah (2015) extensively argues that sexual violence and rape not only serve to dispose of women and girls as war booty to jihadist fighters, but

integrally carried deeper outplay of power dynamics in IS that bonded IS fighters amongst themselves. According to Jha (2019) sexual violence and rape also constituted a psychological tool that IS strategically used to subjugate its own female fighters into a culture of fear so that they would remain loyal and subjected to their husbands or male counterparts. As Jha (2019) illustrates, women would be used by IS to extensively subjugate other women to oppression within the patriarchal culture that IS had laid out for its women. Furthermore, Ibrahim, the director of the Free Yezidi Foundation Group orientated to bring awareness to the situation of women and children from minority groups in IS territory within Syria and Iraq tells: "In some cases, [the wives] were the ones who made women shower and put on clean clothes and makeup before they were brought to the men to be raped" (Jha, 2019). Jha (2019) extensively shares what Ibrahim said via email from Washington, DC. "They were absolutely complicit, and they knew very well what they were doing" (Jha, 2019: par 16).

5.14. The Practice of Forced Pregnancy in the Islamic State.

El-Ghobashy (2018) notes that congruent to the practices of forced abortions that IS would instigate on women, as part of its initiatives to generate more jihadist fighters of the caliphate, women and young girls would also succumb to the underreported practice of forced pregnancies. That is illustrative, video 12 from a former IS sex slave.

"While in incarceration, I became pregnant, Abu Hadaifa told me I must keep the child. I took six pills to kill the baby, once he found out, I told him I didn't want to have his baby, so he beat me"

- 'Barween', Former IS Captive and Sex Slave, Video 12.

El- Ghosbashy (2018) elaborates that in IS, the practice of forced pregnancy was usually a perplexing phenomenon, considering the way in which IS perceived the pregnancy of wives. For IS brides and wives, forced pregnancy was seen as a norm and as a requirement of duties that IS wives had to perform to keep generating the next generation of jihadist fighters. However, El-Ghosbashy (2018) extensively notes that for the sex slaves, the practice of forced pregnancy was also a way in which IS executed its business ventures. El-Ghobashy (2018) reports that IS used forced pregnancy amongst its slaves to sell the children of the sex slave and as a way to further produce more slaves. Women and girls would be forced to get pregnant through practices such as rape, extensively to produce girl children who would grow up to be slaves that would replace their female parents (El-Ghobashy, 2018).

El-Ghobashy (2018) iterates from a feminist narrative, that even the execution of a forced pregnancy was such an institutional tool of oppression for women. El-Ghobashy (2018) notes that even the women who were delegated as 'midwives' to deliver babies were disrespected in their respective roles were seen as instruments to be used to deliver slave children. In an article that El Ghobashy (2018) wrote, a midwife of IS was forced to execute a practice of delivering a baby that was conceived through an act of forced pregnancy explicates: "They had no respect for the profession. I was like a prop, not a caregiver. I would attend the birth and they would toss me out" (El-Ghobashy, 2018; para 5). El-Ghobashy (2018) thence explicates that in more correct terms, women were objects even in the practice of forced pregnancy, that were used merely used to achieve their goal of "remaining and expanding the caliphate".

5.15. The Practices of Organ/ Tissue Trafficking of Female Sex Slaves in the Islamic State.

Hughes (2017) notes that amongst other practices of brutality that IS practices in Syria (and Iraqi), the trafficking of human organs and tissue organs was amongst another underreported practice of IS with carried two eminently duties. In one aspect of this trafficking platform, IS used trafficked human organs and tissues, that it has retrieved from dead war victims and even its own men and women for business purposes to generate revenue for its functionally. However, Purkayastha and Yousaf (2018) note that with respect to IS's targeted trafficking practices of women, an eminent and integrally underreported part of the organisations trafficking practices of female slaves was to forcefully extract blood for its wounded fighters. In video 12, a former ISIS Sex Slave substantially explicates:

"They force girls to donate blood to wounded IS fighter".

-Identity Hidden for Security Reasons, Former IS Sex Slave. Video 12.

Purkayastha and Yousaf (2018) extensively enlightened from a feminist perspective, that like most trafficking practices that IS has executed in Syria, the human body of female sex slaves in IS were perceived to be of low standards and violated as deemed fit to fulfil the needs of their own objectives in the caliphate.

5.16. The Escape of Women Captives from the Islamic State.

Amnesty International (2014) notes that many women and girls were evidently able to escape IS territories through different methods. Projecting on the nature of collapsed statehood in Syria, the Amnesty International (2014) illustrates that many women and girls were only able to escape IS territories and live to share their stories due to family members who would buy

them back or individuals of their communities that had personal ties to the abducted women. Other women would manage to escape through rescue missions of non-governmental organisations fighting for the rights of women in Syria. Such cases can be seen with a former IS sex slave who, in video 11, explains her return from IS after being bought back by her family members.

'My family bought me back for $10 000".

-Unnamed for Security Reasons, Former IS Sex Slave, Video 11.

Such cases can extensively be seen in video 15, with a brother of a young women whom was integrally held by IS in Syria.

"I can't do anything without money. We had 1700 dollars and borrowed another 700 dollars to bring back our sisters".

- Identity Hidden for Security Reasons, Family Relative of IS Female Captive, Video 15.

As extensively noted by the Amnesty International (2014), and substantiated in video 12 by an elder of the Yazidi community, many family members went to extensive lengths to raise funds to buy back the return of their female relatives held captive by IS.

"I paid $21 000 for the release of my cousins' wife until today I have not paid back the loans".

- 'Abu Said', Family Member of IS Captive, Video 12.

In other cases, women in IS would find themselves so Isolated in captivity, with little to no sight of help, that many resorted to ended up taking extensive matters of finding their own ways out IS. Such was illustratively identified with by a former IS sex slave in video 11:

"I had a phone. I didn't tell them it was my husband's. I said he was my cousin. My husband asked them to sell me to him. He said he'd pay a hefty sum. He paid $20 000.He paid for me and saved me".

- Identity Hidden for Security Reasons, Former IS Bride, Video 11.

The Amnesty (2014) notes that often, women and girls who took their escape into their own hands would capitalise on opportune moments to escape when left alone or unattended by their capturers. This was the case for a former IS sex slave who took the opportunity in Video 16.

"There were about 30 IS members at the base. Some were sleeping. When I noticed that I phoned my cousin in secret. Two of them were patrolling the roof. They were busy with their cell phones. My cousin explained the escape route to me. We crawled through the valley on our stomachs, dogs chased us.IS members with flashlights follows the dogs. We hid behind the trees, not until they went back, we continued to flee. We started to run like crazy".

- Perwin, 18 Years Old, Former IS Captive and Sex Slave, Video 16.

In video 16, Another IS captive shares a similar escape story.

"I jump over the wall without shoes, to the neighbours from there I was able to access the street. I came to a house and asked for help, but they didn't let me in."

- Ilham, 17 Years Old, Former IS Captive and Sex Slave, Video 16.

In context to the escape of women and girls in IS, Lassalle (2016) particularly looks beyond IS's oppression of women and girls, to draw attention to the notion of the irrefutable and unfettered state of failure that is prevalent in Syria. It not only devolved the country into a state of chaos where women could be vulnerable to all sorts of abuse under extremist groups such as ISIS, but more so to be in left and abandoned by their state, who were very lax in assisting them to escape ISIS captivity.

5.17. Conclusion.

In conclusion, it is important to note that the first section of this analysis chapter entailed statistical analysis on the symptoms of state failure, represented by the vast presence of terrorism and IS induced terrorism, throughout the duration of the Syrian war. Progressively within the statistical framework, the chapter explored the repercussions of terrorism in Syria by looking into different 'forced' migration conduits that the Islamic State has infiltrated and masked itself through to dispose of civilians, fighters and especially foreign and local women into its human trafficking structures in the country. Progressively, from section 5.4, the chapter undertook a qualitative analysis that extensively dissected other indirect and direct factors that have disposed women into IS trafficking structures in Syria. Extensively analysing the manner and outplays of power relations that feminists-and in the cultural context-Islamic and jihad (i) feminists have argued to have been behind the configuration and perpetration of the organisations trafficking structures in Syria (and Iraq). Therefore, in application to the respective theories, the qualitative section was extensively able to provide a preliminary

discussion of the sedentary status of women in IS and how this sedentary projection pushed them into a dark arena of trafficking in IS that will be discussed in the next chapter.

Chapter Six
Discussion of Findings

6.1. Introduction

This chapter builds upon the previous discussion in the analysis chapter of the research. The chapter identifies some historically constructed and contemporary political forces, *cum*, socio-economic contexts that have driven the diverse participation of women in the arena of terrorism in Syria. It discusses the involvement of women in terrorism in an attempt to address the first research question of the study: how have women aided the evolution of terrorism in Syria? The platform of terrorism in Syria will be narrated in a developmental manner that seeks to establish how terrorism has evolved and grew to the establishment of IS. Furthermore, the chapter will discuss how terrorism and human-trafficking have intersected in IS through the use of women in Syria. Therefore, this chapter will further address the second research question of the study which is: What role have women played in bolstering the developing nexus between terrorism and human-trafficking in Syria? Furthermore, this chapter engages with the nature and degree to which women have aided the developing nexus between terrorism and human-trafficking in Syria in attempts to answer the third research question. The third research inquires: How women have engaged in human-trafficking operations to support the arena of terrorism in Syria?

This chapter will accommodate the two prominent methods (quantitative and qualitative) that were used in the previous analysis chapter. The chapter unpacks the findings of the quantitative data that helped to track the presence of terrorism and the movements of people, particularly women, in the conflict situation in Syria. It assesses how these conflicts borne migration channels have fed IS's female driven human-trafficking operations, *cum*, structures in Syria. Progressively, discussions surrounding the qualitative data presentation were brought forth in this chapter from the analysis of videos in the previous chapter. It identifies the two prominent human-trafficking frameworks, mainly combat and institutional human-trafficking, that framed IS's warfare and state building trajectories in Syria.

The chapter unpacks how these human-trafficking practices of IS have been founded on the backbone of women and girls, who have constituted victims, 'passive and forced partners', *cum*, frontline actors in the organization's human-trafficking practices. This discussion section, therefore, seeks to knit together the mosaic practices of state failure in Syria that have driven

the large-scale presence and intersection of terrorism and human-trafficking practices carried out by the Islamic State in the country. Thence, surfing out from the Syrian war, how these practices, with the aid of women, have helped sustain the organization's arena of terrorism and ideology in Syria during the course of the Syrian war and even after its territorial defeat in 2019 (Vogelstein and Bigio, 2019).

6.2. Gendering the Islamic States Platform of Terrorism in Syria.

According to Ahram (2015), the assimilation of women into the Islamic State's theatre of terrorism in Syria, specifically through channels of human-trafficking, is an emerging puzzle in the evolving landscape of terrorism in the country. Makanda et al. (2018) explain that in the last two decades, post 9/11, terrorism in Syria has become a strategically gendered platform in the country. In the process of its evolution into a gendered phenomenon, it has taken advantage of drawing women into arenas of terrorism through covert and conducive platforms such as human-trafficking, pertinently used to avoid counterterrorism initiatives. Ahram (2015), therefore explains that the Syrian war and IS's behavior in the Syrian war have become a reflection of the country's existent functional state of failure and dysfunctional governance. A situation that has long stood on the backbone of terrorism and has now, over the years, become manipulated through the use and target of women to retain state repression of civilians. Ahram (2015) amplifies that the Islamic State's behavior of assimilating women into its platforms of terrorism illustrates the manner in which the Islamic State has been able to use women and young girls as collateral damage for warfare and tools for propaganda, financial accumulation, publicity agents and victims of the Islamic State. Abraham (2015) explains this has been done by IS in a mirative manner that reflects a longstanding behavior of the regime's attitude and embodiment of terrorism, sexual violence, and even human-trafficking practices in the country. According to Ahram (2015), the Syrian state has now merely become mimicked by the Islamic State in its state-building trajectories in the Syrian war.

Evidently, when tracking traits of terrorism through the Global Terrorism Index (2017), an eminent factor that has stood prominent in the increasing trends of warfare and insurgency-based terrorism in the country since the outbreak has been marked by a notable increase of women contributing towards the presence of terrorism in the country. Since its establishment in 2014, the Islamic State has arguably been at the forefront of both the spiking trends of terrorism and human-trafficking of women in Syria. Forcing women to engage in the organizations expressed path of jihad.

Rhuk Ali (2016) explains that from a stance of agency and under the rhetoric banner of jihad (i) feminism, women in the Islamic State have contributed immensely to the increasing trend of terrorism in the Syrian war as organizers, planners and sparsely, perpetrators of insurgency-based terrorism. Their activities have been evident on many enemy grounds, such in the province of Deir al-Zour and other territories, including *inter alia* Idlib, Baghuz and the eastern deserts of Homs (Human Rights Watch, 2014). Spencer (2016) concurs that as organizers for their male counterparts, women have mobilized supporters, organized funding, weapons, and coordinated strategies of attacks in the country. They also worked covertly for the government and other affiliated terrorist groups to pursue and legitimize their expressed trajectory and ideology of jihad in the Syrian conflict.

Makanda et al. (2018) notes that on the other end of the conundrum, the narrative of IS's contribution towards increasing terrorism in the country has also stemmed from the manner in which women and young girls have been victimized in various ways to pursue their ideology. Whilst women have had a paramount amount of agency in IS, many women have also been absorbed and caught in the crossfires of IS's trajectories as victims of the organization. The women in question range from international and local women, girls (and children) who have been killed as collateral damage in IS's territorial conquests; to women and girls who have been kidnapped, systematically raped and tortured, and held captive in IS territories. At its prime, IS harnessed much power found in the target of women to capture the regime's attention, distract its oppositions, capture territories in Syria, and forcefully drive forward its ideology in Syria and across the globe.

According to Schwedler (2015), in both agency and victimhood approaches of using women for their expressed jihad trajectories in Syria, a key aspect that has stood out in IS's ability to take root and configure its gendered theatre of terrorism in Syria has irrefutably been founded by the regimes absolute failure to meet its human obligations, extensively so during the Syrian war. Schwedler (2015) explains that this not only created a vacuum for groups such as IS to flourish and take root in the country, but also gave IS an opportunity to capitalize on the state's failures and anarchical environments to start off as an organization that firstly portrayed itself to meet the provision of basic human needs such as food, shelter and water to desperate population groups in Syria. Secondly, it was a means to gain access to territories and population groups in Syria, in which it could build its version of the Islamic State and further disseminate its ideology. Schwedler (2015) further explains that once the Islamic State was able to gain roots in Syria, IS was easily able to mimic the existent gendered orchestration of terrorism in

Syria through its observation from the regime and other armed forces. IS extensively targets women and young girls as strategic actors, which it could use to pursue its objectives and evade counterterrorism initiatives in the process. Benetti (2015) concurs that the aforementioned elements pulled the Islamic State into other criminal platforms such as human-trafficking. Particularly the trafficking of international and local women and girls (Welch, 2017), which IS has built its terrorist theatre on to accelerate and sustain its existence.

6.3. The Human-Trafficking Frameworks for the Women and Girls of the Islamic State in Syria.

From the findings and Welch's (2017) in-depth analysis of the Islamic States human-trafficking practices, the Islamic States trafficking framework for women and girls has been constructed in two specific trafficking frameworks. Both have strategically been orchestrated to feed off the volatile and anarchical environment, and its elements therein created by the Syrian war. These two frameworks have been identified by Welch (2017) as conflict-trafficking and institutional trafficking. Although they constitute slightly different elements/ and processes therein, they primarily serve to operate within the overall human-trafficking parameters, which is identified by the 2000 article 3, protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children as: (1) an act of recruitment, movement, harboring or receipt of a person, (2) through the means of force, fraud or coercion, (3) for the purpose of exploitation (Welch, 2017:167).

Welch (2017) identifies that the *modus operandi* of conflict related trafficking practices of the Islamic State is very dynamic and tends to target women and young girls from different backgrounds, ethnic and religious groups, including local and international women that fall within the religion of Islam. Benetti (2015) notes that with international women, especially Muslim women, this operation of human-trafficking specifically feeds on a plethora of vulnerabilities, *cum*, 'push' and 'pull' factors that absorb women and girls into the organizations trafficking networks and structures therein. Benetti (2015) notes that the entanglement of many Muslim women and girls (notably from the West) with IS's human-trafficking networks in conflict-based practices have often been associated with, but not limited to, 'push' factors such as propaganda, identity loss, social and religious marginalization, deception at the hands of family and friends, extreme ideological affiliation, and seldom poverty. For many foreign women, the 'pull' factors have centripetally been identified around factors such as propaganda, ideological appeal, identity establishment, and the possibility of social and religious acceptance in the Islamic State. However, the narrative for local women

has often been associated with more factors. In addition to the aforementioned factors, many local women and girls have also been 'pushed' into IS's conflict driven trafficking practices by poverty. Other factors include a search for livelihood and security, or being sold into IS human-trafficking networks and structures by other armed groups. The 'pull' factors comprise of factors such as the search for terrains to acquire food security and attaining other basic provisions such as shelter that have been destroyed by the war. In addition, being forced to become wives of IS fighters, sex slaves and war booty for IS fighters. Other trafficked women in IS have been strategically placed to run some of IS's operations and even its human-trafficking operations from outside and within IS territories in Syria.

Parallel to the overall conflict related trafficking framework of women and girls in IS, Welch (2017) dissects the institutional frameworks of human-trafficking as another crucial element of human-trafficking which has served as the backbone of the organization's development into a pseudo-state structure in Syria. Welch (2017) elaborates that contrary to conflict trafficking, the institutional trafficking framework is very strategic and specifically organized by the Islamic State to target minority ethnic and religious groups in the territories within the region that are being conquered by the organization. This human-trafficking venture has been the driving force behind the trafficking of Yazidi and Christian women and girls in territories conquered by IS in Syria (and Iraq) for the purpose of sex slavery. Around the institutional trafficking practices of IS, the organization set up institutional structures such as a well-established sex slave market, where the targeted women and girls from minority religious and ethnic groups in Syria would be sold as sex slaves and wives to IS fighters, with the primal intention of generating revenues and funds to run the organization (Besenyö, 2017).

Therefore, as extensively explained by Fish (2017), unlike the conflict-based trafficking structure, the institutional trafficking practices of the Islamic State against women and young girls was established to be grounded on a plethora of very systematic practices. These included practices such as the building of a sex slave market structure for selling captured and trafficked women from minority groups, systematic executions of rapes and sexual slavery for the targeted minority religious and non-believing groups within IS territories. Fish (2017) notes that, in essence, the institutional human-trafficking framework for women and girls in IS was often grounded by a well-defined system embedded in the practices and policy of ethnic and religious cleansing against women and girls from minority ethnic, religious groups and non-believers in IS captured territories. Especially women in minority population groups that IS purported to be diluting its religious and cultural practices.

Raben (2018) notes that such a human-trafficking structure has also been the backbone and driving factor behind the inauguration of different institutions, such as schools and churches that were set up to host and ideologically cleanse the women and girls that were captured by IS soldiers during their territorial conquest. It was a human-trafficking set-up that framed much of the creation of IS's literature and ideology, that were put together by both women and men. Through this trafficking framework, IS advocated for the forced religious conversion of captured women and girls, from their previous religious and ethnic practices to IS's radical religious ideology and practices, before they could be sent to the organization's sex slave market or sold (Raben, 2018; Welch, 2017). This structure of human-trafficking has eminently carried much, not all, of the weight that justified and defined the subjugation of women and girls to 'religiously defined' sex slavery and forced impregnations to breed future sex slaves and jihadist boys. As outlined by Raben (2018) and substantiated by Welch (2017), IS's institutional trafficking structure framed and justified the Islamic State's activities of carrying out the genocidal element of human-trafficking and the sex slavery of women and girls, particularly against non-believers to purify them from their religions or state of non-believe; regarded by the organization as "sinful" (Raben, 2018; Welch, 2017).

Therefore, as noted by Inch (2017), none of these two well-identified frameworks of human-trafficking, would have flourished without the network of dynamic migratory platforms that kept these human-trafficking frameworks operational. It is the migratory elements of human-trafficking that have prompted the need to identify the migratory based composition of human-trafficking that both 'pushed' and 'pulled' women and girls from all walks of life. The women were from different races, religions, and ethnicities who got entangled and disposed into IS's territory for exploitation in the organization (Inch, 2017).

6.4. Complementary Conflict -Borne Migration Platforms Feeding the Islamic States Gendered Trafficking Networks.

Human trafficking stands a mutated form of forced and often, however not always, takes an involuntary migration practice. It is a migratory platform that has been used rigorously by IS as a mechanism to dispose women and girls into IS's territories in Syria. However, Cockayne and Walker (2016) explain that IS's human-trafficking operations has not operated exclusively to other migration platforms. IS has balanced its migratory human-trafficking operations with other migration platforms in Syria. Particularly conducive-conflict borne migration platforms. Cockayne and Walker (2016), identified that IS has capitalized on migration practices, of *inter*

alia forced displacement, refugee flows and asylum seeking, in its human-trafficking operations of women and young girls.

6.4.1. The Role of Forced Displacement in The Islamic State's Migratory Trafficking Practices of Women in Syria.

Cockayne and Walker (2016) identified that one prominent migration platform that has fed, configured and exacerbated the capacity of migratory trafficking practices initiated by the Islamic State in Syria, specifically to dispose women and girls in their institutional trafficking structures in Syria, has been the practices/existence of forced displacement. Cockayne and Walker (2016), explicate that forced displacement created by both the Syrian conflict and strategically by IS in most territories it has advanced into in the country, has served its trafficking trajectories in many ways. From the stance of the Syrian war, Cockayne and Walker (2016) note that many women who have been displaced from their homes into a state of homelessness have fallen into the Islamic State's trafficking routines in many forms. In a position and state of homelessness, particularly after being removed from their homes, provinces, cities and communities, many women and girls have come across designated traffickers who promised to secure them with new livelihoods in IS. These women would often contacted by IS's human-trafficking recruitment agents implanted in different check points, border stations, refugee camps, market stations, who capitalize on the disillusionment of these women and girls to get them into IS territories in Syria (Human Rights Council, 2016). Often, as noted by the Human Rights Council (2016), many women who fell into IS's recruitment trap have met the fate of either being exploited for sexual servitude purposes, spanning from prostitution, to sex slavery and tools for rape. Other women have even been trafficked from displacement arenas to further be coerced to work for IS as planners, organizers and seldom perpetrators of terrorism for the organization.

The Human Rights Council (2016) also identifies that beyond the conflict-based displacement flows of women and girls feeding into the migratory composition of IS's human-trafficking platform, IS's self-instigated forced displacement practices have also played a role in constructing its migratory-based human-trafficking practices. The Human Rights Council (2016) explains that IS has also been known to deliberately invade territories in Syria, such as Raqqa and instigate their own practices of forced displacement to create an environment of anarchy that will be conducive to recruit women and girls for human-trafficking purposes. Such practices of IS displacement have also fed greatly into the refugee streams of international

women and girls, *cum*, transit refugee camps surfacing from such practices of IS (and the Syrian war) (Cockayne and Walker, 2016; Rossman,2017).

6.4.2. The Role of Refugee Streams in the Islamic State's Migratory Trafficking Practices of Women and Girls in Syria.

The trafficking nexus between refugee streams and human-trafficking is often two-fold and embedded eminently in the operation of IS's trafficking of women and girls to and from IS. Cockayne and Walker (2016) explain that, on the one hand, IS has made good use of trafficking female refugees, in such streams, for various beneficial reasons in the country. On the one hand, during its prime years, IS has managed to use refugee streams oriented out of Syria to export some of their own female terrorist supporters, perpetrators, drug mules out of IS territories. Mainly to *inter alia,* externally mobilize other terrorists for them and perpetrate affiliated acts of terrorism in other areas (Besenyö, 2017). Whilst, in the same manner, IS has also used some women and girls as drug mules to export other "business commodities", such as drugs and money laundering initiatives through these streams. Cockayne and Walker (2016) identified that with the vulnerability that many populations face in situations such as in Syria, it is also in such streams that many vulnerable women and girls have fallen into a state of vulnerability to be sold as wives and sex slaves to other external terrorist and criminal groups in the region and globally. The Amnesty International (2014) accounts that to escape the clutches of IS, other women and girls in Syria have even turned to trafficking routes in these streams to escape the clutches of IS.

On the other hand, as noted by the 2017 United States Department of States Trafficking in Persons Report, refugee streams and structures have also been targeted by IS designated to their disposition women either into IS territories or other platforms of exploitation contributing to the funding of IS. Schmid (2016) explains that at the prime of IS's operations, many refugee streams stemming from neighboring countries (mainly countries such as Iraqi and Lebanon, affected by their own internal political turmoil's) and oriented towards Syria have served as a ripe platform for IS agents to either kidnap or coerce women and girls into IS territories. On the basis of giving them new and different livelihoods. Refugee structures in Syria are also recalled by Schmid (2016) to embody many humanitarian personals, especially those working at refugee camps located on border points, to have also worked with IS syndicates to abduct or sell refugee women in their care back to IS fighters, who were looking for *inter alia* wives, temporary sexual partners, or covert drug carriers.

Besenyö (2016) explains that in other scenarios, undercover IS agents posing as humanitarian personnel's, have used such platforms to divert women from many different parts of Syria into IS territories in Syria for various exploitations practices. These IS agents would use refugee structures to secretly register women into IS territories; where they get subjected to various forms of exploitation. The exploitations encompassed *inter alia* sex slavery, prostitution, forced marriages, forced begging practices and forced domestic servitude (Rossman,2017). For the Islamic State, many refugee streams have operated in a smuggling-trafficking manner that has also serviced the migratory composition of women and girls in and out of IS for the organization. As Darden (2019: 5) identifies, such practices have also been a practice of not only male refugees, but female refugees who have used refugee camps and routines in the Middle East and in Syria as a point to lure and traffic other women into IS for exploitative purposes.

6.4.3. The Role of Smuggling in the Trafficking of Women and Girls by the Islamic State

Since the outbreak of the Syrian war, smuggling has been a huge migratory platform that, like most forced migration, has serviced IS, in its trafficking endeavors of women and girls in and out of its territories in Syria; in many beneficial ways (Besenyö, 2017). Smuggling for IS has in almost all cases, started off as a financial venture for the organization, particularly catering for women looking to join IS. In the smuggling channels are women that were being used to export IS goods (such as stolen artefacts) out of Syria, and ironically those wanting to escape the organization. However, in most cases, such a migration platform has often turned into a case of trafficking, with women and girls smuggled into and out of Syria, and facing various exploitative or entrapment situations upon arrival at destination points. In using the smuggling route out of IS, many women and girls trying to flee IS have been smuggled out by IS's agents, using them (like in refugee streams) as *inter alia* drug carriers and smugglers of stolen historical artefacts to finance the organization's operations in Syria (Al Bawaba News, 2017: Pauwels, 2016). In other cases, former IS agents falsely promising to assist female associates, friends, relatives and wives have also worked with other smuggling syndicates to get women and girls out of the IS's exploitation in Syria, only to subject them to other trafficking situations, by their smugglers seeking to retrieve smuggling debts in destination point.

Much has also been the fate of many women and girls (especially from the West) who have been deceived, through propaganda, family, and friends of IS to make the trip to IS territories in Syria (Henkel, 2014). According to Henkel (2014), many women have been smuggled into

IS in Syria with the hopes to be provided with better livelihoods, cultural acceptance; only to find themselves sold to *inter alia* IS's sex slave market, forced into marriage, domestic servitude, prostitution upon entering the organizations territories in Syria (Henkel, 2014). As Henkel (2014) further notes, IS has not been short of harvesting opportunities in many beneficial migration platforms, feeding off the anarchy caused by the Syrian war in the country and region to execute and dispose women and girls through covert and strategic trafficking practices.

6.5. The Islamic States Induced Migratory Human-Trafficking Platforms for Women and Girls.

As identified by Inch (2017), the disposition of women and young girls into the Islamic State, has been determined to be channeled through a plethora of migratory human-trafficking platforms at the global, regional and local level. Inch (2017) notes that these migratory channels of human-trafficking have configured the disposition of many foreign and local women from the organization's external human-trafficking networks, to its internal institutional state-building human-trafficking structures, within its territories in Syria. At the global level, the epicenter of such a migratory composition of IS's human-trafficking operations has been the religiously propaganda driven practice of *hijrah*. The *hijrah* is a migratory platform, which IS eminently made use of with the aid of false propaganda to coerce and manipulate many women and girls, especially Muslim women and girls, to forsake secularism in their home countries and join Islamic lands. Specifically, the Islamic lands of the so-called Islamic State in Syria (and Iraq). Women undertaking the *hijrah*, constituted a huge platform that aided IS women dispose IS many women to its exploitative practices in Syria. Beyond the narrative of *hijrah*, regionally and locally, serving as 'voluntary' migration platform which has led to the trafficking of women in IS hands. Furthermore, kidnapping, and abductions have also formed the core migratory element of human-trafficking, that disposed many women and girls into IS's institutional human-trafficking structures in Syria (and Iraq).

6.5.1. The Elements of Human-Trafficking in the "Voluntary" Religious-based *Hijrah* Practices Carried Out by the Women of the Islamic State.

As explained by the 2012 Counter Extremism Project backed by Ingram (2017), traditionally, the term *hijrah* was termed historically as an Islamic term that refers to the journey or 'migration' undertaken by the Islamic Prophet Muhammad from Mecca to Medina to engage in the Islamic wars termed the jihad. In the 7th century, the *hijrah* was also associated with individuals who would flee and migrate from Christian lands to join Islamic lands, alongside

individuals from extremists Kharijite sects who broke off the Sunni Muslim sects, to go and wage war and extremist terror campaigns against Islamic governments in the Middle East and North Africa. In the Islamic State today, the application of this historical practice has become ever more present in the way IS has manipulated the *hijrah* movement to recruit and lure women and girls from all corners of the globe into its global human-trafficking network for disposition into IS territory. Therefore, as identified by Ingram (2017), today IS's contemporary *hijrah* stands constitutes a migratory channel of human-trafficking practices used by IS against women and girls to dispose women into IS tterritories and institutional state-building human-trafficking structures in Syria. According to Fish (2017), in modern times IS has made the *hijrah* another migratory tool of trafficking women and girls into IS. Primarily through the deceptive propaganda it has been orchestrated the *hijrah* through that has caused many foreign women and girls across the globe to migrate into IS territories, only to be subjected to different practices of exploitation once reaching the Islamic State.

Fish (2019) does identify that though the hijrah in many cases is observed as a 'voluntary' migration process that many foreign women and girls have taken to join IS, it is embedded in a lot of human-trafficking elements that need to be identified. This will help to avoid a blanket grouping of all foreign women and girls that have been engaged in this practice as 'voluntary' participants of IS's human-trafficking. Fish (2019) notes that the *hijrah*, like all migration occurrences, is driven by 'push' and 'pull' factors, however in most cases for women, IS has grounded these factors on false propaganda. The core themes behind the propaganda of the *hijrah* have often been executed through online networks and social media platforms. Where women and girls are promised husband's, good livelihoods, religious enjoyments and fulfillments upon making the journey to IS territories in Syria. Sadly, most women have got to IS only to face the reality of being subjected to acts of exploitation such as being exposed to sex slavery, forced marriages, forced child bearings, forced abortion, and systematic rapes by IS fighters. Such an element of *hijrah* has largely been a gendered migration trajectory interweaved in the human-trafficking of IS against women and girls, on the basis that much of IS's false online propaganda has also been executed through other women and girls following the misleading jihad (i) feminism trajectory of IS, pioneered by the women in IS. The Islamic State has used the ability of women to obtain trustworthiness from their female recruits, in order to deceive other women and girls to make the *hijrah* and join IS.

On the same continuum, IS's contemporary practice of '*hijrah*' inclusively stands as a highly gendered migratory element of human-trafficking driven through false religious promises.

Such a case has been observed to have a magnitude of patriarchal teachings embedded in the religion of Islam, that the women and girls of IS have composed through IS scripts. They include the Diqab and Rumayah that has served as tools that many husbands and brothers whom covertly serve as IS agents have used in foreign countries to get their wives, sisters and nieces, to adhere to the call of jihad in Syria and make the '*hijrah*' to IS territories from their home countries; only to be neglected by their relatives upon reaching IS. Furthermore, other women would be handed over to other IS Jihadist fighters once in Syria to be subjected to horrendous practices of exploitation (Ingram, 2017). As Ingram (2017) notes the *hijrah* in itself is not traditionally a migratory element of human-trafficking, but its practice in IS has made it become so, given its composition through various elements of deception that have all been used by the organization to lure and recruit women and girls into IS territories.

Although there are arguments that women and girls who migrated to IS knew what they were doing when making the journey to IS, Fish (2019) calls upon much of this practice to possibly be viewed through the lenses of human-trafficking, specifically on two bases. This encompasses (1) Where the female recruits where under the age of 18, as identified by the 2000 article 3, protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children as, and secondly (2), where deception and fraud took center stage behind the undertaking of the '*hijrah*' into IS as identified with IS's false online propaganda spearheading the entire process. Under article 9 of the protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, victims who have fallen for IS's propaganda and made a *hijrah* to IS, thereafter, to face exploitation, could be identified after careful scrutiny, as 'imperfect victims' of human-trafficking (Fish, 2019).

6.5.2. Tracking the "Voluntary" Disposition of Women and Girls into the Islamic State's Human-Trafficking Networks and Structures. (Women Not Undertaking the Islamic State's Version of the *Hijrah*).

Binnetti (2015) also elaborates that beyond the *hijrah*, the trafficking of women and girls into IS, and also out of IS in service of the organization; has also embodied other complex 'voluntary' dynamic to it. Cockayne and Walker (2016), have resurfaced a phenomenon of women and young girls which have undergone a deliberate process of disposition themselves into IS's, using migratory human-trafficking channels and routines for various reasons that have spanned from survival to health reasons.

Cockayne and Walker (2016) explain that in IS's stronghold in Syria, there have been multiple women and girls who have not only subjected themselves to the trafficking structures of IS to

engage in the country's jihad, but also to obtain different medical, financial and food aid from the organization. However, Cockayne and Walker (2016) note that in most cases the practices of women turning themselves to trafficking networks in order to make their way to IS for survival reasons has not applied so much to women from the West. According to Cockayne and Walker (2016), most of such practices have surfaced from many women in lesser developed countries. More so, women from Muslim dominant countries in Northern Africa, the Asian-Pacific region and Sub-Sharan Africa. Whom in possibly trying to evade any security measures and prevalent threats of *inter alia*, poverty and destruction of state's health and congruent social welfare structures in their home countries country, have used IS's trafficking routines to access IS in order to obtain things such as medical and financial assistance, irrespective of the having acknowledgement that they may be subjected to face various forms of exploitation in exchange by the organization (Cockyne and Walker, 2016). Some women faced with such challenges have even been assist by their family members to get themselves trafficked into IS for survival purposes.

6.5.3. The Involuntary Movements of Women and Girls into the Islamic State's Human-trafficking structures: Cross Border and Interstate Kidnappings and Abductions of Women and Girls into the Islamic States Structures.

Scaling down to a more regional and local level, another gendered migratory element/channel of human-trafficking associated with IS had been observed by the Human Rights Council (2017) to be embedded in the cross border, *cum*, local kidnapping and abduction of women and girls from their home countries and cities into IS territory territories in Syria (and Iraq). Where they thereto succumb to different forms of exploitation. The Human Rights Council (2017) notes that since IS began enacting its institutional human-trafficking structures in Syria, well-organized kidnapping networks between terrorist groups in the Middle East groups, between organized criminal cartels and IS, and between armed groups and the Islamic State, have all flourished to service the transportation and disposition of many women and girls in the region and also in Syria into IS territory. The Human Rights Council (2017) enunciates that regionally, many agents and accomplices of IS have established structures and pseudo community structures in many different places across the Syrian border to receive, evaluate, and further pass on the kidnapped and abducted women and girls to IS territory to succumb exploitation ranging from *inter alia* sexual slavery, forced marriages, and forced pregnancies.

Malik (2017) and Charpenel (2016) identify that in transit location, particularly in territories held by IS between Iraq and Syria, many kidnapped women and girls of minority religious

groups such as the Christians and Yazidi's, have even faced the state of been held captive in transit structures along the border. In most transit destinations such as at the borders, women and girls would be separated from their family members, with women of old age faced with the possibility of being killed and those of age being forced to convert to IS's radical beliefs of Islam before being disposed of into IS's institutional human-trafficking structures in Syria.

Rhuk Ali (2015) agrees with Yilmaz (2017) that under the paradoxical ideology of IS's jihad feminism, the trajectory of women and girls being kidnapped and disposed into IS needs to be identified to not only be a phenomenon that has been spearheaded by patriarchal men against women, as well as IS women themselves, who often have paired up with other men and women working for organized criminal groups, terrorist groups, *cum* present militant groups. Fish (2018) extends to identify that the kidnapping of women, especially young girls and even girl children, has been a very big transporting mechanism of IS's human-trafficking operations that has allowed the organization to evade many high security places across and within Syria's borders. With IS female agent easily being able to pose as family relatives and peers of the kidnapped victims. (Mehlman-Orozco, 2019). As noted by Makanda et al (2018) such cross border kidnapping of women by IS's female agents was often spearheaded more by foreign women converts, who have joined IS and bear more advanced feminist ideologies. Female trafficking agents in IS have also, in many cases, been responsible for pulling in regional and local women as accomplices to either house or look after the kidnapped/ abducted victims; before they are dispersed to and subjected to different forms of exploitation practices raging from sexual slavery, systematic rape and forced marriages and forced prostitution in IS.

6.6. Conclusion.

In closing, this chapter has served to provide an analytical view regarding the structure and functionality of the Islamic States. This analysis started off by projecting an analytical view of the prevalent gendered dynamic in existence, assessing how these have been structured to innately perpetuate the subornation of women in the organization that makes them key victims of its human-trafficking theatres (Spencer, 2016). The chapter analyzed the different trafficking frameworks that IS had built and established to dispose women into their networks and territories. It focused on two prominent trafficking typologies, identified herein as conflict-based and institutional trafficking, that have formed the trafficking of women and girls from the context of the Syrian war (Welch, 2017). This analysis chapter further identified different conflict borne migration platforms such as forced displacement and refugee streams that have exacerbated the vulnerability for women and girls, regionally and locally in Syria (Cockayne

and Walker, 2016; Besenyö, 2016; Ingram, 2017). This chapter progressively looked at other existent migratory platforms, notably smuggling, that has further aided the female trafficking web of IS.

In the latter half of the chapter, the analysis focused on the different outplay of the voluntary and involuntary migration movement that women have undertaken to establish their disposition into IS trafficking structures in Syria. Globally, drawing on the religiously-defined migration platform known as the Hijrah to identify how important women globally were extensively 'pulled' into IS trafficking web and structures at the hands of different mechanisms of propaganda (Ingram, 2017). The chapter then scaled down to analyze more involuntary and coercive movements such as cross border abductions and kidnapping that have further formed another pivotal migratory channel in the trafficking conundrum of the Islamic State in Syria for many women and girls regionally and locally. Overall, the chapter analyzed the process, brutalities and forms of exploitation that women have faced at the hands of IS fighters and agents working for and with the organization.

Chapter Seven

Conclusion and Recommendation.

7.1. Conclusion.

This chapter represents the general conclusion of the research. The chapter is divided into two major parts. The first part will deal with a reflective conclusion on the development of terrorism in the country. Further reflecting on the diverse migrative human-trafficking undertakings orchestrated by the Islamic State against women and girls throughout its state-building initiatives in Syria, since its establishment in 2014. Therefore, this summative conclusion projects on the intensification and institutionalization of terrorism in Syria, which builds up to the complex terror-bases and proto-state that the Islamic State built in Syria, in the cause of the war.

This chapter further summarizes the mutations of terrorism in Syria. It further outlines IS's agenda and activities, to identify with the gendered human-trafficking practices that have emerged within the practices of this highly patriarchal and religious-defined terror organization. This chapter further projects on the enabling factors of the Syrian war, that made this mutation of terror activities in IS plausible. It thence identified how even amidst IS patriarchal sentiments, the Syrian war has enabled and incited IS to use women in its human-trafficking practices as frontline and sedentary agents, to advance its pseudo-state building process. The second part of this chapter will then comprise of the recommendations. The recommendations brought forth in this chapter will note conflict resolutions that address how evolving terrorism activities such as IS can be looked at during wartime. Further recommendations will be set out that support a re-evaluation of counterterrorism initiatives. The recommendations provided will advocate for the creation of innovative counterterrorism mechanisms in warfare situations that will holistically deal with gendered and organized transnational criminal operations such as human-trafficking, seen in IS's activities in its pattern of evolution.

The study identified that from a historical point of view, that terrorism had been a part of state-formation warfare, making it an age-long phenomenon. In the creation of modern Syria - during and post-colonial area – terrorism has been integral in the unstable state-formation processes of the country. In modern Syria, terrorism has also been pinned largely to clinical killings, executed throughout the successive state formation military coups of (1954,1963,1966)

(Hopwood, 1988). Therefore, the failed state theory narrated assisted to put in context how the feeble and unstable state formation process institutionalized ruling through terrorism in Syria, which was advanced by many coups responsible for the transition of political structures in the country from military state to "democratic" state with the rise of the Baath Party in 1963 (Hopwood, 1988). Th study further looked at how terrorism further institutionalized as a foreign policy, when it centrifugally spread into the Middle East Region, as a military apparatus of Syria, with the ascendency of Hafez Al-Assad as the leader of the Baath party in 1971.

Given the authoritarian system of governance that was driven by the Baath party, during Hafez-al Assad's regime, this study further identified the position of authoritarianism rule that Syria was undertaking in the larger Middle East to establish itself in the region during the ascendency of Hafez al Assad. With Syria opportunistically infiltrating the warfare trajectories of many different states in the region to do so. The study outlined how during the Arab wars of the 1960s, Syria created its own terrorist groups to fight and partner with. Similarly, the Lebanese civil war of 1971-1990 witnessed Syria creating multiple partnerships with terrorist groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah to destabilise the Lebanese government and pursue its own territorial conquest agenda in the country (George,2003). Such behavioral attributes of Syria in the region have been noted to contribute towards many practices of terrorism in the Syrian war, which includes: (1) the inappropriate institutionalization of terrorism as a weapon of war, in the Syrian war context, at the hands of both the regime and opposition groups, and (2) the presence of many terrorist groups having the leeway to act as "legitimate" conflict players in the Syrian war (O'Bagy, 2012). This historical background and gradual institutionalization of terrorism, have over the years, enabled (many) terrorist actors to become covert state actors who have amassed enough resources to evolve into complex pseudo-state entities, as demonstrated by IS in the Syrian war (Al Momani & Hazimeh, 2019;539).

7.2 The Parallel Religiously Defined Practices of activities of Terrorism in Syria.

The presence of religiously motivated terrorist groups such IS is evident that politically secular terrorism was not the only strand of terrorism integral to the state-formation process of modern Syria. As identified in the study, religiously defined and more prominently extremist Islamic movement in Syria, have historically played a huge role in the state formation conflicts of modern Syria (O'Bagy, 2013). Particularly in advocating to emerge as a form of liberation, and progressively, social reform tool (Abd-Allah, 1983; Cepoi, 2013). In Syria's recent history, Islamist terrorism was found to have gained profound recognition, considering the establishment of the Muslim Brotherhood in the country in 1942, and the insurgent movements

the Muslim brotherhood initiated during the liberation and post-liberation era of modern Syria (Abd-Allah, 1983). At the epicenter of the Islamist insurgency, the study identified that throughout the liberation based military coups in Syria, during the 1940s-1950s, Islamist insurgency from the Muslim Brotherhood and other affiliated parties were committed to ensuring the liberation of Syria from colonial rule. This background of struggles informed a new system of governance that prioritized governance by Sharia law (Abd-Allah, 1983).

In reinforcing this ideology of Sharia rule, the Muslim Brotherhood would go as far as executing practices of terrorism upon civilians in provinces and cities in Syria that were transitioning during the liberation era. Particularly this places that were still maintaining secularist forms of governance during the country's liberations period (Abd-Allah, 1983). The Muslim brotherhoods insurgencies were identified in the study to have been influential enough to see the Syrian state adopt some sharia law in their constitution post-independence. However, it did not influence the Syrian state laws beyond that point, leading up to the time where their insurgencies got suppressed under the dictatorship of Ash-Shishakli in 1952. After being repressed throughout the rest of the 1950s and 1960s, the re-emergence of the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1970s in preparation for the Islamist insurgencies of 1976-1982, set in motion a new wave of jihadism (Abd-Allah, 1983). Worth noting is that the original Muslim Brotherhood split into two groups in 1972, namely, the Damascus wing and an extreme Aleppo-Hama wing. By this time, another defective group of the Muslim Brotherhood known as the *Talia al Muqatalia* (Fighting Vanguard) had also emerged in preparation for the Islamist insurgencies (Abd-Allah, 1983).

The Islamist insurgencies in Syria seemed to be the pivotal point, given the manner in which the jihadist agenda expanded from the country. Many jihadist groups and especially the fighting Vanguard was crushed near the end of this insurgency in the 1982 Hamas Massacre, many Jihadist fighters fled the country after the massacre to assimilate into other disfranchised Islamist groups (Cepoi, 2013). The re-alliances, played a role in setting the agenda for remobilisation of the jihadist agenda, as evidently shown in the epic showdown of jihadist agenda in the 9/11 terrorist attack against the United States of America in 2001. The study found that the aforementioned historical narration of Islamic terrorism in the country has over the years influenced much of the presence and behavioural attributes that many contemporary extremist Islamist groups (including the IS) embody in the contemporary Syrian war (O'Bagy, 2012).

The Islamic State in Syria (and Iraq) is therefore noted in history by Al-Tamimi (2015) as an organization that has elements of jihadist fighters from the Syrian state, though its origins have often been pinned to the state of Jordan. Just like most jihadist groups, the IS, had the opportunity to manifest in the country as a result of the stumbling state formation process of modern Syria. The process can be said to have failed and plunged the country into a full-blown civil war (O'Bagy, 2012). IS evolved from the Jordan-based *Jama 'at al Tawhid wal-Jihad*, as an insurgent Islamic force against the Jordanian state. It progressed to pledge allegiance with Al-Qaeda in Iraqi in 2003-2006 against the Iraq state and the West (Al-Tamimi, 2015), and finally infiltrating Syria after its split from Al-Qaeda in 2013. IS, like most jihadist elements, has emerged as an opposition force against state regimes and, like most insurgent groups, has capitalised on political convulsions and anarchy in states to amass its pseudo-state (Al-Tamimi, 2015). However, preceding any jihadist actor and movement before it and its predecessor Al-Qaeda, IS is regarded by some as the jihadist movement that represents the final stage of the Jihadist agenda in the region. Eminently from a movement that was able to evolve in the Syrian war from a mere conflict actor to build a 'state-like' structure within the state of Syria (and Iraq) (Al-Tamimi, 2015). Another crucial element that has also held IS at the epitome of the jihadist agenda in Syria is the unprecedented magnitude of women it has drawn into its operations from across the globe. It is on a scale that has brought about the evolution of Islamist-based terrorism at the forefront of becoming an arena that actually embodies a highly gendered phenomenon (De Leede, 2018). The 9/11 terrorist attack and the subsequent counterterrorism proclamation by Former U.S. President George Bush in 2003 against Islamic groups in the Middle East set the stage for a reconfiguration of terrorist groups. Interestingly, IS's development throughout the twentieth century has surpassed its counterparts in reorganizing itself into a highly gendered terrorist group (Makanda et al, 2018).

7. 3. The Evolving Dynamics Between Gender and Terrorism in Syria

Historically, terrorism (including terrorism in Syria) has always been viewed and studied as a male-dominated arena (Makanda et al, 2018). In Syria, such a narrative has evidently gained prominence, given the predominant patriarchal culture that governs the overall social relations in the country (Thue, 2020). Throughout the aforementioned history of terrorism in the country, on both political and religiously defined platforms, women in terrorism have often been understood as actors that have merely stood to undertake sedentary and very passive roles in theatres of terrorism; merely supporting the advocacy of their male counterparts in their endeavors of terrorism (Spencer, 2016; Makanda et al, 2018). Nasser (2015) notes that as a tool

of warfare, women in Syria's history of conflict driven terrorism has therefore only been known to undertake two roles. These roles have included women (1) falling victim to conflict or insurgent acts of terrorism (Nasser, 2015) and (2) serving instrumental in supporting and upholding the ideology of terrorism insurgency for conflict actors occurring (Al-Dayel, and Mumford, 2020). However, in post 9/11, terrorism in Syria has surfaced as a rapidly growing gendered outplay, even in culturally patriarchal countries such as Syria (Makanda et al, 2018). Women are seen surpassing sedentary roles to plan and execute acts of terrorism in the name of political and religious ideologies (Al-Dayel and Mumford, 2020).

The contemporary Syrian war has exacerbated the involvement of women in terrorism. Women have been seen to be actively be involved in both the regime and opposition sides in the conflict (Makanda et al, 2018). On the regime side, records show that women in organized armed groups who are part of the Syrian army and affiliated groups have been responsible for planning and perpetrating acts of terrorism. Therefore, the study identified that the common representation of women as gentle, trustworthy and non-violent actors in wartime had served theatres of terrorism well, in the course of the Syrian war, as they have been used by terrorist groups in strategic ways (Makanda et al, 2018). Women in terrorism in the country have served the following roles: (1) victimized and exposed to terrorist attacks to push back insurgency and destabilize the opposition, (2) used and sent by the regime-sided forces, to infiltrate hard to reach places in the opposition and execute acts of terrorism (Nasser, 2015), (3) and in doing so legitimized the ideologies that justify the use of terrorism in the conflict by the regime. Such outplays of women in terrorism have also been a repertoire of warfare for women in theatres of terrorism on the opposition side of the conflict.

In retaliating and adapting to the repertoire of warfare, many armed groups such as militant, designated secular groups, and religiously motivated terrorist groups, also began using women in their organizations to carry out of conflict-related terrorism for strategic purposes. Secular and religiously defined opposition factions in the Syrian conflict have integrally adopted the mode of using women for the following strategic reasons: (1) victimizing women to retaliate against the regime and coerce the regime to give into their demands, (2) using women to orchestrate acts of terrorism in high security areas that are under the regime's control, and evade counterterrorism measures.

Therefore, well exceeding secular theatres of terrorism in the Syrian war, Islamist theatres, which predominant hold the reflection of being grounded in extremely patriarchal religious

sentiments, have also broken many conventional beliefs to emerge in a very gendered dimensions in the Syrian war (De Leede, 2018). The diverse religiously defined jihad insurgency that is prevalent within the opposition faction of the Syria war has - contrary to popular belief - seen women from international and local platforms embodying religiously influenced egalitarian ideologies, such as Islamic feminist sentiments. Women have been on the frontlines of the jihadist agenda to support, orchestrate, plan and execute terrorism against the regime and enemy groups within the opposition to promote the jihadist agenda (De Leede, 2018; Thue, 2020).

Therefore, aside from merely constituting weapons and shields of warfare in the jihadist agenda, women from international and local platforms in Syria have also served as strategic actors that have helped the jihadist agenda in terms of promoting the ideology (De Leede, 2018). They have been used in the jihadist agenda to infiltrate high security grounds under the regime and salient opposition groups, *cum*, evading and retaliating against counterterrorism groups trying to suppress the jihadist movement on ground (Makanda et al, 2018). This study further found out that it is under such engagement of both foreign and local women that extremist Islamist groups, such as IS, has capitalized on the utility of women to build the Islamic State in Syria.

De Leede (2018) outlines that with the rise of the jihadist agenda in Syria, the Islamic State emerged strong within the Syrian war in 2014, and evaded the opposition of the Syrian war with a strong presence and even stronger presence of a female (foreign and local) terrorist supporters and perpetrators. Female terrorist supporters played crucial roles in promoting the Islamic State's extreme ideology of challenging the regime and counterpart Islamist groups, to reinstate an Islamic State in Syria (Thue, 2020). Before IS's territorial defeat in 2017, IS advanced, within its patriarchal organization, pseudo-empowerment ideologies of feminism, identified in the study by the jihadist feminism agenda (Rhuk Ali, 2015; Makanda et al, 2018). Throughout its expansion in Syria, IS saw women partake in its state-building trajectories as both covert and frontline actors. The state-building trajectory of the Islamic State in Syria saw women serve as *inter alia* wives, sisters, aunts of jihadist fighters that maintained the everyday running of the social life in IS (Thue, 2020). In their sedentary roles, women further served as children producing instruments that would produce the next breath of jihadist fighters. Still upholding their sedentary status on the battle front, women were thought of to be more confined to supporting by preparing their husbands whilst in the battle and being victimized by IS as tools and shields of warfare against the regime and opposing groups (Yilmaz, 2017). However,

going beyond such passive roles allocated to women in IS, women empowered to positions of security force groups in IS such as the Al-Khansaa Brigade seemed to project a different narrative of women in IS (Spencer, 2016). Although still predominantly sedentary actors of IS, women have charted many frontline-like positions in IS. In most cases, the pseudo-empowered women of IS, especially foreign women with feminist ideals, have served as dominant actors in promoting IS's propaganda online to recruit other IS fighters and female martyrs to Syria (Kniep, 2016). In partnership and guidance under their male fighters, women in IS have been recorded to actively organize and plan terrorist attacks for their male counterparts, engage in military intelligence gathering, *cum,* infiltrate high security areas in the country to perform surveillance in territories where IS would retaliate (Thue, 2020). Though IS women actively carrying out the terrorist attacks in Syria and on the battle field has not been highlighted to be a prevalent phenomenon, women on the battlefield have assisted in accompanying and planning the execution of terrorism; alongside inspiring many other global attacks by women in the name of IS (Spencer, 2016). The dynamic utility of women in IS has progressively served another crucial arena in the terrorism agenda. Through women orchestrated terrorism, IS has managed to capitalize and expand on another criminal platform, which is human-trafficking (Benetti, 2015).

7.4. The Human-trafficking and Terrorism Nexus in Syria.

Though always present in Syria, the nexus between terrorism and human-trafficking in contemporary Syria has visibly been exacerbated by the Syrian war (Welch, 2017). Since the outbreak of the Syrian conflict, criminal activities such as human-trafficking paired up with terrorism in the following manner: (1) it has stood as a terror tactic for many regime-based and opposition armed groups in the country (2) served as a tool to achieve ideological and financial objectives for armed groups and integrally designated terrorism groups, and (3) in a complex migratory form, served as a recruitment tool for armed groups, especially terrorist organizations that have used this covert platform to recruit terrorist fighters into the Syrian war from global, regional and local platforms (Besenyö, 2016). Moreover, human-trafficking has boosted terrorism in Syria and helped to sustain extremist ideologies, generate revenues, and conquer displaced and naïve population groups. This beneficial usage of human-trafficking for terrorism and terrorist groups operations in Syria has served the need of IS to flourish under hostile counterterrorism initiatives by employing gendered instruments (trafficking of women and girls) in the Syrian war (Besenyö, 2016). Clearly, the involvement of women as victims

and perpetrators of trafficking and terrorism helped to prolong and sustain terrorism and terrorist groups operations in the Syrian conflict (Mehlman-Orozco, 2019).

7.4.1. A Gendered Perspective on the Human-Trafficking Operations in Syria.

Mehlman-Orozco (2019) submits that the role of women and girls in trafficking practices for the purpose of terrorism has now come under the great spotlight. Emphasizing that women and girls are integrally being trafficked by both regime and opposition forces in the Syrian war, for the strategic execution of terroristic activities. Standing as a covert platform and now becoming a more fluid and conducive buffer for terrorism against counterterrorism trajectories in the Syrian war, the use of women in human-trafficking practices carried out in theaters if terrorism has become a way through which financial and ideological objectives can be promoted and legitimised on theatres of terrorism executed by different conflict actors and extensively designated terrorist groups in the country (Nasser, 2015).

Nasser (2015) explains that on both regime and oppositional side, the trafficking of women has been identified as a terror tactic. Respectively, clashing opposition groups have trafficked and used women as weapons and shields of war (Nasser,2015). Once trafficked by some armed groups, some women have been used these armed groups as agents of terrorism. Often been promoted to execute acts of terrorism, such as *inter alia* bombings on behalf of their armed groups (not only designated terrorist groups) in the conflict. Henceforth, trafficked women have also serviced theatres of conflict-based theatres of terrorism executed by many armed groups in the conflict in the outplay of their military trajectories Nasser (2015) elucidates that women have been used by armed groups in the conflict to import weapons, such as explosives, associated with the acts of terrorism. According Besenyö (2016), the occurrence of women trafficking in the Syrian war by armed groups and especially for terrorist purposes, has created a blueprint to the way in which terrorist groups, such as the Islamic State have carried out their perplex activities of human-trafficking through the use of women to establish its Islamic State.

7.5. Gender Perspectives on the Trafficking of Women in the Islamic State.

At the pinnacle of the trafficking agenda, the Islamic State has stood as the prominent actor displaying the prevalent gendered nexus between human-trafficking and terrorism in Syria. They used very brutal and open policy of trafficking, orchestrated around the global and local trafficking and successive captivity of women and young girls in Syria (Cockayne and Walker, 2016). The Islamic State has utilized both conflict-based human-trafficking structures and its self-created institutional structures in its territorial spaces in Syria, to pursue its state-building

trajectories; with women and girls standing as both victims and planners of IS's human-trafficking practices (Welch, 2017). From a perpetrator stance within the conflict-trafficking lenses, women in criminal syndicates have worked strategically alongside their male counterparts (including their female counterparts) in IS to execute the trafficking of naive international female fighters who are seeking to join the Islamic States conflict theatre in the Syrian war (Besenyö, 2016). The IS also, recruited local women, forming part of *inter alia* women affected by the conflict; such as displaced women and female refugees (United Nations General Assembly, 2016:12).

Whilst within the organization's fluid institutional structures, women have further initiated their own practices against their vulnerable female counterparts, ranging from direct online recruitments to reinforce exploitative practices, forced marriages, sexual exploitation, forced pregnancies, and abortions. In addition, they prepared women's bodies to carry commodities such as drugs to locations outside IS and the country, as a means to generate revenue for the organization (Human Rights Council, 2017). According to Yilmaz (2017) from a victimhood stance, women and girls from drawn from international and local platforms through IS propaganda, alongside women trafficked by salient criminal syndicates working with IS, have fallen victim to a plethora of the aforementioned exploitative practices. During its prime operative years, the Islamic State had trafficked women and even some of its own female supporters to build and sustain the organizations existence in Syria throughout the course of the Syria war (Yilmaz, 2017).

However, as outlined by Besenyö (2016), the Islamic States operations of trafficking have been identified to have been carried out and crafted into other meticulous migratory forces. The organization has been able to composite and use other complementary migration platform in order to dispose women into its global trafficking web and successively into its trafficking structures in Syria for exploitation purposes aligned with their pseudo-state building initiatives (Besenyö, 2016).

7.6. A Gendered and Migratory Projection of the Islamic States's Trafficking Operations of Women and Girls.

Identifiably IS has made use of a vast range of migratory conduits to channel its trafficking networks and structures to dispose women into its organization in Syria. On a more international level, there has been a propaganda fueling of *hijrah* which IS regard in religious terms, as a 'holy migration' into Islamic lands. The *hijrah* narrative is one amongst other prominent migratory trafficking channels that has disposed women and girls into IS's structures

to become exploited. The exploitation of women by IS under the guise of *hijrah* is indeed an irony because the *hijrah* is supposed to represent migration into the Islamic lands of IS to enjoy religious practices and freedoms, and obtain a new liberating life (Kniep, 2016; Ingram, 2016). IS subliminally orchestrated this migration-based trajectory, through the help of rigorous online propaganda to lure many women and girls into IS territory (Mehlman-Orozco,2019). A phenomenon that further subjected many women and girls to various exploitative practices encompassing being forced to marry IS fighters, succumbing to different sexual exploitations, and forced labor practice.

In other cases, women convinced/ and or coerced by IS affiliated family members and 'friends' have often found themselves in horrendous trafficking practices in IS. Under the rhetoric of being required to honor their religious beliefs many women have honoured their family members and friends and made way to IS territory to defend the Muslim community by fighting/ standing alongside IS in their path of jihad (De Leede, 2018). However, upon reaching IS many women have involuntarily found themselves disposed in IS human-trafficking and subjected to various acts of sexual and labor exploitation after making their *hijrah* (Inch, 2017). Such trafficking inclined migration platforms created by IS became the reason some women and girls would make a hijrah into IS in what they regarded as a 'survival migration' trajectory to obtained essential services such as health care services, food aid services and even education services promised to them by IS (Mehlman-Orozco, 2019).

On a more regional and local level, the migratory conduits to IS's human-trafficking practices against women, have been more diversified, feeding more on conflict-affected civilian female groups (Cockayne and Walker, 2016). In addition to women and girls that have regionally and locally fallen into IS's *hijrah* propaganda, more 'involuntary' migratory conduits have stood prominent in disposing of women and girls into IS territory in Syria to be exploited (Mehlman-Orozco, 2019). Al-Dayel and Mumford (2020) explain that on a more 'involuntary' basis, abductions and cross border kidnapping of women by criminal syndicates working with the Islamic State and IS agents too, played a huge migratory conduit of human-trafficking that further set to dispose women into IS trafficking structures and practices of exploitation in Syria (Al-Dayel and Mumford, 2020). In the transferal of women in IS, a further defining aspect of the manner in which IS had created its gendered migratory platform of trafficking has been established by the extensive utility of women, that would be allocated to assist with the cross-border transferal of other women into IS to mitigate suspicions of trafficking in progress (Al-Dayel and Mumford, 2020).

Yilmaz (2017) further enunciated that the incorporation of women in their transferal processes of other women and girls into the Islamic States trafficking structures in Syria served the organization well in many aspects. As the trustworthiness of women and girls being accompanied by other women across state borders into IS served to mitigate suspicions of kidnapping/ and or abductions. Particularly in places where IS victims were being transferred through the relatively permeable yet monitored migration structures such as across designated border points between Iraq and Syria under IS rule (Al-Dayel and Mumford, 2020). Using women in kidnapping practices has further served strategic in enabling IS to carry out trafficking transferal process, thence giving the trafficked women and girls an illusionary sense of safety and comfort that they would be subjected to an area of destination in IS. Mehlman-Orozco (2019) supported by Al-Dayel and Mumford, (2020) outline that often the illusion entailed getting women to believe that they would be treated well in IS, whist, in reality, many would be subjected to a life filled with a swathe of exploitative practices Mehlman-Orozco, 2019; Al-Dayel and Mumford, 2020).

7.7. Recommendations

This study identified that the Syrian war was, in most cases, at the pinnacle of exacerbating the developing gendered nexus between terrorism and human-trafficking practices of the Islamic State in the country. Therefore, from the analysis of the study, this section provides recommendations that seek to address armed conflict which breathe or harbor practices such as terrorism and human-trafficking. Furthermore, this chapter will make recommendations on the distinct theatres of terrorism and human-trafficking in Syria, namely the Syrian war. This chapter does so in order to address the developing nexus between terrorism and human-trafficking executed by IS. This section will focus on bringing forth some recommendations that will highlight the necessity of gendering conflict, terrorism and trafficking in addressing the complex gender relations prevalent in these theatres. And how they have made it possible for the Islamic State to carry out its practices of human-trafficking, through the usage of women, for its pseudo-state building purposes (Benetti, 2015).

7.7.1 Gendering and Delegitimizing Singular Male-Centric Approaches to Understanding Armed Conflicts.

Alsaba and Kapilashrami (2016) attention to the notion that more often, discourses surrounding the outplay of armed conflicts can be male-centric in approach. And in doing so undermines/can blur understanding the manner in which women engage in armed conflicts as either victims, participants and forced participants of warfare trajectories and integrally

conflict-based terrorism trajectories that have surfaced in armed conflicts such as in the Syrian war; *cum*, designated theatres of terrorism created by entities such as the Islamic State in Syria. Alsaba and Kapilashrami (2016: 6) elaborates that often armed conflicts exacerbate gender inequalities, especially in highly patriarchal states such as Syria. And thence falling short of gendering the outplay of armed conflicts further overlooks the many tools of warfare ranging from patriarchal sentiments to religious inclined ideologies and sentiments that are manipulated and used in conflict-inclined terrorist trajectories to utilize women in the many aforementioned ways in conflict-based terrorism activities, including that of human-trafficking in order commonly used by conflict actors to meet different factional ends objectives through the armed conflict. Alsaba and Kapilashrami (2016) notes that further confining analysis of armed conflicts to a dominant male-centric approach further overlooks understanding the magnitude in which women and girls are exposed to/ and are subjected to be manipulated to the activities of prevalent conflict-terrorist actors; seeking to capitalize on state convulsions to promote their ideologies through the utility and abuse of naïve and vulnerable women and girls drawn into their web by the conflict for abuse and to abuse other women (Alsaba and Kapilashrami (2016).

Therefore, recommendations of this study further identify that gendering armed conflicts should serve as a prerequisite to undertaking gendered approaches towards conflict resolution strategies, particularly in highly patriarchal states such as Syria (Petzelberger, 2017). This will allow actors engaged in conflict resolutions initiatives to understand and properly dissect the perplex nature in which women are engaged and used as victims, volunteer as participants and or 'forced voluntary participants' actors in conflict activities associated with conflict-based terrorism and designated theatres of terrorism such as that of IS in associated practices of human-trafficking (Benetti, 2015); for protection and/ or persecution purposes of such womenfolk's engagements post the conflict period .

7.7.2. Gendering and Deconstructing Male-Centric Approaches to Understanding Terrorism.

The United Nations Security Council Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate (2019) notes that mainstream literature surrounding terrorism is a theatre that has often taken a male dominant approach. Such a narrative of terrorism often downplays the integration of women in different types of terrorism ranging from state-based, insurgency based and religiously defined outplays of terrorism that were prevalent and part of the Syrian war (United Nations Security Council Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate, 2019).Therefore, deconstructing male centric understandings of terrorism, by understanding such theatres of terrorism through a

gendered lens gives way to looking at women beyond the lenses of constituting mere victims of terrorism. And creates a wholistic understanding of the prevalent power dynamic prevalent in terrorism that position as either victims, planners and perpetrators of terrorism. Gendering theatres of terrorism in highly patriarchal states such as Syria, further aids dissect how predominantly male terrorist actors make use and further train women through different tools of patriarchally constructed radicalization ideologies (both religious and patriarchal), to partake in terrorism on the grounds of the many beneficial strategic frontier's women embody to male dominant groups (Nasser, 2015).

In another lens, gendering terrorism further brings to the forefront the need to look into power dynamics between women in theatres of terrorism. This explicitly displays how women within the arena of terrorism initiate their own practices of oppressing weaker women groups and manipulating them to engagements of terrorism or abuse them in trafficking practices, to achieve their own objectives of gaining ranks within their male dominated organizations, as further seen in IS (Mehlman-Orozco, 2019). Therefore, gendering the platforms of terrorism extensively aids with understanding how executions of terrorism through the use and victimization of women is extensively aiding the intersection of terrorist activities incorporative off human-trafficking outplays in theatres of terrorism exacerbated as a result of the conflicts, *cum* those exclusively like the Islamic State, deliberately carried out and institutionalized to pursue extreme ideological objectives (UNSC-CTED, 2019).

 Therefore, understanding terrorism from a gendered perspective is in retrospect a need, in order to construct wholistic counterterrorism trajectories that involve properly addressing the gender dynamics in terrorism. Gendered approaches to understanding terrorism assists to understand the roles women play in terrorism, the forces and influences that place them in certain roles (sedentary or frontline) with the terrorism arena, and how they can be prevented and criminally inclusive in addressing the developing nexus that terrorism is creating with human-trafficking through the use and abuse of women and young girls (UNSCTED, 2019).

7.7.3 Making Counterterrorism Trajectories Gendered and Criminally Inclusive.

Globally, United Nations member states are guided by Security council resolutions 1373 (2001) and 1624 (2005) to prevent the occurrence of terrorism within their state borders and across regions during both war and peacetime (UNSC, 2016:3-4). In acknowledging the need to prevent terrorism, Syria has also launched numerous counterterrorism military attacks in Syria against resilient terrorist actors such as IS. However, most attempts at compiling strategies and

making discourses around counterterrorism have been gender biased and criminally exclusive (UNSC-CTED, 2019).

Therefore, the study recommends that the effectiveness of counterterrorism discourse should eminently be embedded in gendering discourses surrounding counterterrorism and further making discourses surrounding terrorism inclusive of understanding the outplay of transitional criminal activities, such as human-trafficking in terrorism (Binnetti,2015). In doing so counterterrorism discourses mitigate getting counterterrorism practices wrong by drawing a focus on male terrorist-based activities that allows female terrorists to get away with their engagements in terrorism. Such counterterrorism approaches will serve to further addresses the criminal component of human-trafficking that is being interjected into terrorism by terrorist groups. Composing more gendered counterterrorism trajectories that are inclusive of criminal orientations can further aid with identifying women in terrorism that are hiding in the covert operations of human-trafficking during recession times of terrorism activities. This can thence prevent the resurgence of terrorism through such survivalist women covertly operating for terrorist groups and working in criminal human -trafficking platforms in many strategic ways to mobile resources and uphold an organizations ideology for future resurgence.

7.7.4. Increasing Gender Discourses Surrounding the Criminalization of Human-Trafficking Practices in Conflict and Terrorism Theatres.

As identified by Benetti (2015:4), the 2000 UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplemented by article 5 of the Palermo Protocol (UNHROHC, 2014: 1) has made big strides to protect victims of trafficking and persecute traffickers, in attempts to protect the internationally recognized human rights of trafficked victims. Furthermore, globally, many salient protocols have been enacted by member states of the United Nations to combat trafficking practices. However much trafficking practices executed in conflict situations and extensively those in theatres of terrorism born from conflict situations often go about unpunished. Therefore, states such as Syria that are engulfed in such human-trafficking practices should be attentive to bringing perpetrators of human-trafficking in such theatres to justice (UNGA, 2016). And in doing so should further draw closer attention to looking at identifying mechanisms that will be able to identify and persecute women perpetrators of such practices on conflict and terrorism as they are becoming key actors that are used on such platforms. There is a need to increase gender sensitive discourses around the prevention and criminalization of trafficking practices in conflict situations, and particularly in order to further understand the complex power relations that often subject

women to fall victim at the hand of male and female counterpart traffickers (UNGA, 2016:23; UNSC-CTED,2019). Identification of a clear line between trafficking women, trafficked women and those women coerced to traffic other women and girls in their engagements with theatres of terrorism for designated terrorist groups such as IS, can aid nation-states of the United Nations, members of the Arab League, the NGO donor committees working on the ground in Syria to devised proper mechanisms in their justice and security systems to prosecution perpetrators of trafficking under such situations (UNGA, 2016; Al Hallaq and Nasser, 2017).

7.7.5 Create Migratory-Based Anti-Trafficking Discourses and Initiatives that are Gender -Inclusive.

This study observed that the outplay of human-trafficking in itself has been a huge strategic migratory platform and has been executed through the availability of salient migratory platforms that have been created by the Syrian conflict Therefore, in order to counter human-trafficking from such a platform, it is crucial for nation-states to understand and created discourses that seek to understand the nature of migratory platforms prevalent within their state borders, the key migration routes flow operative their state borders in order to create strategic anti-trafficking detective strategies within such platforms (De Courcy Wheeler, 2016). In instances such as Syria, where there is conflict, identifications of key routes where forced migration flows such as refugee steams and key areas where displacements occurrences happen to stand as perquisites in order for nation-states to be able to create discourses and impact well equip migration agents that will be able to infiltrate such migration platforms and detect the trafficking practices that occur from such flows and serve as a platform for predatory conflict-terrorist actors such as the Islamic State to pick on vulnerable population groups, vulnerable women and children (De Courcy Wheeler, 2016).

In order to fully make such strategies and discourses in combatting human-trafficking in its migratory form effective, states need to undertake a gendered approach to fully understanding and executing anti-trafficking discourses and initiative (Benetti, 2015; UNGA, 2016). More often, the migration routes used and compiled in most trafficking practices from conflict-borne situations are often, however not exclusively, dominated by women and children. And thence creating awareness of such a gendered outplay of trafficking compositions and entanglement of human-trafficking movements with other congruent migration platforms feeding the arena can further aid in the creation of effective anti-trafficking strategies, through the aid of female migration specialists, civil society and NGO'S on ground (UNGA, 2016). Gendered sensitive

discourses surrounding anti-trafficking pursuits will can assist in the migration platforms infatuated with human-trafficking and further aid in rooting out women who are entangled as victims within the web of such migrations intertwined with human-trafficking networks and those women utilizing these very platforms to recruit women for armed group and conflict-based conflict actors (UNGA, 2016).

7.7.6 Creating Awareness of Mechanisms that Are Gender Inclusive to the Trafficking Women Globally and Especially from the West.

Global trafficking migratory flows such as the hijrah was formulated by IS through online propaganda. It has been another subversive migratory tool of human-trafficking that is intended to draw women and young girls into IS, for further exploitation (Benetti, 2015:6). *Hijrah*, as propagated by the IS, is not only politically motivated but religiously embellished for the purposes of trafficking and other sinister motives (U.S. Government Publishing Office, 2016). Therefore, in order to counter such practices, it is crucial for the United Nations and other states to create global awareness about such peculiar movements. In creating such awareness, it is important to ensure that the narratives are gendered and portray a holistic view of *hijrah* in the context of terrorist groups such as IS. Such awareness is required to unmask IS and its use of *hijrah* as a recruitment tool, through online propaganda, to pull women and girls into the trafficking practices in IS.

7.7.7. Using Social Media to Combat Global Recruitment Messages Used by the Islamic State to Facilitate the Hijrah.

Globally, women and young girls have been swept off their feet or lured into trafficking networks, created by terrorist groups, through social media platforms. Therefore, Benetti (2015) supports the use of counter radicalization messages in order to prevent the movement of women under false online recruitment strategies by terrorist actors. Knowing that IS has used online messages to entice women and young girls to make journeys such as the *hijrah*, the United Nations, members of the Middle East region can further utilize the same online social media platforms to counter IS radicalization messages. Such counters messages hold the potential to deter women, especially those from the West who are lured from their home countries, into trafficking in IS. (Saltman and Smith, 2015). In addition, Benetti (2015) further advices that the deletion of IS social media accounts will help to discourage the movements of foreign women from their home countries into the Islamic State. Therefore, deleting the social media accounts that the IS used to radicalize, manipulate, and coerce women and girls to

embark on the *hijrah* into IS, can mitigate the global network of trafficking that IS has promoted through its practices of the *hijrah*.

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Appendix A

Chapter Five Data Analysis Videos For Qualitative Analysis of Research

	Name of Video	Video Publication Date	Video Length	URL Address
1	The Full Story: ISIS Wives	2015	25 min 34 sec	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pH9V1Ro7-OE&t=513s.
2	Special Reports-Jihadi Brides	2017	8 min 50 sec	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wGom-2PR1uM
3	Terrorists Recruit Western Women Online	2014	2min 23 sec	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9wCYjmgBQw0&t=32s
4	ISIS Women Unveiled Female Recruiters of the Islamic State.	2016	46 min 12 sec	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZTq-AEB_3RM&t=782s
5	Exclusive Reporters-Jihad Sisters, French Women bound for ISIS.	2017	36 min 58 sec	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UyxgZkhJZSQ&t=1056s
6	The Role of Women in Terrorism.	2015	6 min 46 sec	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GeLh1ZVOV0c
7	Why former ISIS Bride, Mariam Dabboussy, Wants to come home	2019	10 min 39 sec	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7R9_Jc9k1sU&t=16s
8	Queens of ISIS-On the Trail of Women Lured to ISIS Territory from the UK and Elsewhere	2019	7 min 22 sec	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=p-9tw2JAZFI
9	ISIS Leaves Behind Children No One Wants	2017	6 min 58 sec	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SU24LRsEv8U&t=207s
10	Inside the Islamic State, Underage girls are in demand	2015	2 min 31 sec	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a9SiPFy0dnI&t=26s
11	Victims of ISIS-ISIS Victims Share their stories.	2015	48 min 24 sec	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fLm_7NFBleY&t=2203s
12	ISIS Sex-Slaves	2016	40 min 30 sec	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3A6-55TJNrI&t=1425s
13	Life as Sex Slave to ISIS Militant-Night News	2015	9 min 44 sec	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uHSseXtY4kM
14	Women of ISIL-Witness	2019	47 min 29 sec	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9zz5bjFhzdc
15	Yazidi Women: Slaves of the Caliphate.	2015	25 min 47 sec	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bO1r0s2mw1k&t=1077s

16	Yazidi Girls: Prisoners of ISIS	2017	13 min 35 sec	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Te6HOtiBcf8
17	The Christian Survivor of ISIS	2018	17 min 26 sec	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iTaBCkt1Z6g.
18	ISIS Brides, Aussie Baby: Part One. Should We Let Them call Australia Home?	2018	13 min 49 sec	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qEDjlF9wejQ.
19	Spanish ISIS Women Speak from Al Hol Camp	2019	5min 01 sec	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o-IMB28_TcE.
20	Raped and Sold: The Yazidi Women Who escaped ISIS Sex Slavery	2015	2 min 32 sec	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=txhnkLuN-k0