THE CONFLUENCE OF REGIONALISM, STATE FUNCTIONALISM AND PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: PERSPECTIVES FROM BOTSWANA, MALAWI AND SOUTH AFRICA

By

McBride Peter Nkwanitsi Nkhalamba

212560864

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DEDICATION

I dedicate this work to every African those whose purpose in life is to work towards the creation of an Africa with a singular political and socio-economic system, in which every African enjoys the opportunity of a dignified and prosperous existence.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I am eternally grateful to the relentless moral and intellectual guidance of my supervisor Dr Fayth Ruffin, who spent many hours giving me critical insights into my topic of study, sharing with me her academic journeys, and walking me through the academic traditions which define doctoral studies. Dr Ruffin's personal journey also brought immense inspiration and motivation to this work.

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Glory be to God.

GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS

AAPAM	African Association of Public Administration and Management
ADB	Asian Development Bank
AfDB	African Development Bank
ADMARC	Agricultural Development and Marketing Corporation
APRM	African Peer Review Mechanism
AU	African Union
CDC	Centre for Disease Control
CET	Common External Tariff
CPF	Conflict Prevention Framework
CPIA	Country Policy and Institutional Assessment
CONSAS	Constellation of Southern African States
CU	Customs Union
DBSA	Development Bank of Southern Africa
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EDF	European Development Fund
EU	European Union
ERD	The European Report on Development
FIP	Finance and Investment Protocol
FSI	Fragile States Index
FTA	Free Trade Area
HAART	Highly anti-retroviral therapy
I.C.H. S	International Committee of Historical Sciences
IPE	International Political Economy
IR	International Relations
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
MCP	Malawi Congress Party
MAP	Millennium Partnership for the African Recovery Programme
MIS	Multi-Indicator Systems
MIT	Multi-Inter-Transdisciplinary
NDP	National Development Plan
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NPA	National Plan of Action
NPC	National Planning Commission
NGO	Non-governmental Organisation
PPIAF	Public Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility
PPP	Public Private Partnerships

REIS	Regional Economic Integration Support Programme
RI	Regional Integration
RIE	Regional Integration Evaluation
RIDMP	Regional Infrastructure Development Master Plan
RISP	Regional Indicative Strategic Plan
SACU	Southern African Customs Union
SADC	Southern Africa Development Community
SADCC	Southern Africa Development Community Conference
SF	State Fragility
SFS	State Functionalism
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
OECD	Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development
TEI	Total Economic Integration
TRO	Trans-national Regional Organization
UK	United Kingdom
UDF	United Democratic Front
UN	United Nations
UNECA	United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
US	United States

ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the politico-administrative efficacy of regional integration (RI) and statecraft in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) with implications for public private partnership (PPP) development. Through comparative case studies of Botswana, Malawi and South Africa, one aim, inter alia is to determine the degree to which SADC RI accounts for any relationship between RI, state fragility or state functionalism and PPPs. The units of analysis are the three countries embedded with individual multi-sector stakeholders. The multi-inter-trans-disciplinary approach employs a sequential transformative multi-method qualitative research design underpinned by philosophical worldviews of interpretivism, pragmatism, critical theory and post-positivism. Primary qualitative data are drawn from interviewees in the three countries across multi-sector organisations while secondary qualitative data stem from literature and policy documents. Secondary quantitative data are drawn from a variety of global indices, including the State Fragility Index, the Country Policy Institutional Assessment, and the Global Competitive Index and analysed for trends across the SADC fifteen-member countries. Qualitative data are analysed through content, textual and discourse analysis whereas quantitative indicators from indices are analysed afresh through SPSS, considering parameters related to the study.

The study found that an ideological deficit in perceptions, architecture and measures of politico-administrative dimensions of RI, state fragility or functionalism and PPPs limits SADC's role in advancing the synergy between these dimensions. Findings challenge the incoherencies derived from the predominance of Eurocentric and trans-Atlantic theory, particularly westernised notions of state fragility that seem to pre-empt emergence of endogenously-driven state functionalism to facilitate RI. Results show how new modes of theoretical perspectives and discourses help to deconstruct, redefine and endogenously establish functional polities that fit the governance context of the current political-economy of the SADC region and its stride toward RI. The thesis submits new conceptual formulations and theoretical propositions on RI and African statecraft, including introduction of the endogenously-driven concept of 'Afristate functionalism' that promotes epistemological pluralism.

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1.0 CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY

1.1 Introduction

This chapter is a summary of the key features and dimensions of the study. It summarises the limitations of the literature about the inquiry and provides key arguments that necessitated this study. Specifically, the chapter problematizes the ontology and epistemology of ideologies and architecture governing the confluence between regionalism and state-craft in Southern Africa. The chapter outlines the research objectives and questions, nature and scope of the inquiry, and the scholarly significance and rationale for the study. Accordingly, the chapter also outlines the research methodology, its underlying assumptions and its limitations. Owing to the multi-dimensional and multi-inter-transdisciplinary (MIT-disciplinary) nature of the inquiry, the chapter also presents definitions that are key to understanding the epistemology and practice governing regional integration (RI), statecraft and public private partnerships (PPPs). Finally, the chapter presents an outline of the organisation of the thesis, with brief descriptions of the purpose and content of the subsequent chapters.

1.2 Background to the Research Problem

This section highlights regionalism, the assessment of RI and the concept of SF (SF) in turn.

1.2.1 Regionalism

Globally, the rationale for regionalism has been constructed on the need to create functional states, while simultaneously striving to transcend the nation state and create supra-national institutions. Various scholars conceptualise regionalism and the supranational institutions that may emerge differently. For example, Togba (2015, p. 9) defines regionalism as “the process of building multilateral institutions to enhance political, security, and economic interaction among states”, while Kesside (2012, p. 3) defines regionalism as “efforts by a group of nations to enhance their economic, political, social, or cultural interaction”. A region, which is the case study in this thesis, has been defined as “a group of countries which has created a legal framework of cooperation; covers an extensive economic relationship; has the intention that it will be of indefinite duration; and has the possibility foreseen that the region will evolve or change” (Haftel, 2013, p. 11).

The first problem of interest to this study is conceptual; it involves definitional biases and incoherencies, emerging from various ideological and theoretical inclinations. In correspondence

with the orientation of this thesis, the researcher refers to the problematic conceptualisations as exogenous ideological or influences on the architecture of RI and statecraft. To illustrate, the researcher departs from the constructs of Lombaerde and Langenhove (2013, p. 60), who characterises regions as a dichotomy of core and periphery. Within this dichotomy, three structurally varying forms of regions, which include the core regions on one end, intermediate regions in between them and peripheral on the other end. (Lombaerde and Langenhove, 2013, p. 80). Within this conceptual framework, core regions are characterised by political stability and economic dynamism. The main purpose of these regions is to assert control over the world outside their spheres of influence. The second, intermediate regions, closely linked to the former are candidates for incorporation into a core region upon full conformity to the characteristics of political stability and economic dynamism.

As defined by Bürcher, Habersetzer and Mayer (2015, p. 12), the final type of peripheral regions, are in contrast, politically unstable and economically stagnant. Melber (2002, p. 7) argues that these regions must systematically stop a process of marginalisation, weak and futile regional arrangements. The entirety of these regions places greater importance on security and developmental regionalism, rather than on setting up free trade areas. Both continental Africa and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) are classified as peripheral. In this respect, Melber (2002, p. 8) introduces an aspect of regional power to the peripheral region. This is collaborated by other scholars who argued that, "The peripheral regions are peripheral because they are stagnant, turbulent and war prone. The only way for these regions to become less peripheral is to become more regionalised, i.e. to increase their levels of regionness" (Tanaka and Inoguchi 1996, p7).

In Kramarz's (2013, p. 58) conceptualisation, increasing the level of regionness by integrating the peripheral regions into the core region is to characterise the integrated region as geographical unit, a social system, an organised cooperation, and as a civil society. Once the peripheral and core integrate into a unit, regional performance is influenced by a "distinct identity, actor capability, legitimacy and structure of decision-making." Otherwise the power of the periphery rests only in the ability and capacity to create chaos. This often necessitates foreign intervention.

To discern the concept of a region it is imperative to examine the drivers leading to creation of a region, also referred to as enablers. A major fundamental enabler to the creation of regions is common interest. In this regard, the researcher turns to the question of the motivation of states to participate. Warleigh-Lack, Robinson and Rosamond, (2011, p. 7) identify five key aspects that determine regionalism and herein therefore referred to as 'enablers'. These aspects are geographical closeness, population size, economic size, political congruency, common

background and a sense of community. This thesis supposes that these aspects are not in themselves conceptually problematic as parameters for enabling RI, but their problematic expression in the case of Southern Africa stems from exogenous ideological influences.

The first aspect is geographical contiguity. This encompasses the advantages derived from sharing a land mass, a climate and ease of trade. The second enabler asserts WarLeigh-Lack *et al*. (2011, p. 8), is the population of the country in its entirety; the significance of this lies in the influence and power on the type of structures chosen as well as its feasibility and durability. It is imperative to note the importance placed on the influence and position as compared to other states and the international relations (IR) multi-lateral institutions: there is safety in numbers. This assertion is collaborated by Hastiadi (2011, p. 18) who highlights that at a global level "big population serves well not only for the demand for the goods from trade but also as supply of labour for the industrialization process. Population creates sustainable paths toward regionalism." Hastiadi further discusses the contested relationship between population and the volume of trade and points out that despite the elusive conclusion, population is a key factor in the creation of common interest.

WarLeigh-Lack *et al*. (2011, p. 20), offer a third aspect, 'economic size', particularly "differences in size will be the resulting differences in the share of trade in the economy, and probably also a different importance of tariffs in government revenue". This difference, these scholars assert, "influences attitudes to the region: its importance to each member country, but also the fiscal costs of forming a region" (WarLeigh-Lack *et al*, 2011, p. 20). The fourth aspect is the 'common background' and sense of community which are regarded as pertinent in the creation of common interest. The socio-cultural or political historical linkages can create a sense of common identity and aspiration. Common experiences such as colonialism or European imperialism in the case of Southern Africa, translate into a 'common background' despite differences in the specific colonial administration and experience across countries.

The fifth and last aspect, according to WarLeigh-Lack *et al.* (2011, p. 20), is political congruency, which is defined as states sharing the principles of a useful trade policy as well as the need to have the administrative competence to implement it (Ibid.).

This thesis submits that for Southern Africa four of the five aspects, namely: the current geographical contiguity, political congruency, common background and sense of community, and population size of states, emerge from European Imperialism outcomes of the 1884 -1885 Berlin Conference. According to Craven (2015, p. 43),

> "Berlin was nothing other than a 'monstrous blunder' erasing the pre-colonial reality of native sovereignty - contriving the unnatural division of Africa, ignoring, in the process, all ethnic, tribal or national interests" (Craven 2015, p. 43).

Having highlighted that four of the five enablers driving states to join regional bodies are direct outcomes of the 1884-85 Berlin Conference, the researcher pays attention to the fifth, and most disproportionately significant aspect of 'economic size', which is also the most profoundly impacted aspect. Not only is economics arguably the primary motive behind colonialism and neo-colonialism, it continues to be the primary motive behind resilient foreign intervention in Africa. In this regard, the researcher examines economic integration theories of regionalism.

According to regionalism theory, economic integration has several forms. The first form, market integration, entails degrees of integration in linear progression. These may take the form of the Free Trade Area (FTA). A FTA is the removal of tariffs among states in a regional bloc, but a country is at liberty to retain a tariff regime of its own for non-members. The second form is the Customs Union (CU), which is an arrangement where a FTA is maintained among member States but for non-member States, they impose a Common External Tariff (CET) (Hartzenberg, 2011, p. 2). The third form is the Common Market arrangement, where the CU co-exists and is implemented concurrently with the free-flowing factors of production such as capital and labour. The Economic Union is the fourth form and it is characterized by the harmonisation of monetary and fiscal policies. The last form in the progression is referred to as Total Economic Integration (TEI), comprising of a common market and a unified monetary and fiscal policy regime. (Hartzenberg, 2011, p. 2).

With reference to market integration theory, Gauto (2012), asserts that the RI through trade creation and diversion brings about welfare gains. Trade creation occurs in the form of a move from a "high-cost, less efficient regional producer to a low-cost, more efficient regional producer. Trade diversion, on the other hand is when a least cost supplier from the rest of the world is replaced by a Regional Trade Agreement (RTA) member country benefitting from tariff-free trade" (Gauto, 2012, p. 3).

For the past two decades, market integration has been the dominant form of regionalism. This form is actively promoted by the WB and western trained economists as the panacea for Africa's development challenges. The WB argues that market integration has beneficial outcomes that include increased production arising from comparative advantage driven specialisation. and economics of scale. In addition, improvement in factors such as technological advancement and increased capital flows both in quantity and quality have proved to be beneficial. For the WB,

market integration has been advanced as the logical precursor to any form of RI. For several decades, the institutionalisation of RI has been top priority in the continent. “Closer trade links with neighbouring countries promise to stabilize food markets, enhance profitable exchanges in light manufactures, reduce consumer prices, and help develop regional production networks” (Walkenhorst, 2013, p. 1).

In 2008, the WB reported that: “integrating via the markets first and engaging in formal trade agreements later seem to be the better economic and trade policy sequence. One reason this is the case is because this sequence can enhance the internal bargaining power of the outward-looking trade interests first, which may tilt the implementation of the formal regional trade agreement to be more market-friendly” (Panagiotopoulos, 2012, p. 12-14).

The literature search, however, does not reveal any evidence of endogenous ideological or theoretical propositions on economic integration theory. A great body of literature exists on the pre-eminence of colonialism, neo-liberalism and the Washington Consensus in the architecture of global, regional and national economies Berttochi and Guerzoni (2012), Bevir (2011, Evans (2010). There is, however, little evidence of debate on the intentional and calculated imposition of such ideology on regional economic integration in Southern Africa.

Recently, a reaction to market integration has led to the creation of another resilient regionalism theory; development integration. Development integration theory asserts, “The objective of integration is economic and social development, and it is therefore linked with development theories” (Sakyl, 2014, p. 5). According to the theory, “development integration requires more state intervention in market mechanisms unlike the case with market integration. States must first and foremost make a political commitment to integration, since such commitment is seen as laying the foundation for cooperation” (Ibid.). Political commitment will enable States to drive towards policy implementation that tackles problems that arise because of the unequal distribution of benefits. In his assessment argues that lack of political will and commitment are some of the major drivers of market integration failure (Sakyl, 2014, p. 5).

Therefore, it can be said that the goal of development integration according to this theory is to provide a redress for the uneven distribution of benefits, and by so doing, the implementation of policies takes a compensatory and remedial nature. An example of such a compensatory mechanism is that of exclusive fiscal compensation through allocation of financial resources from Member States that benefit from RI to those that do not.

This has, however, been noted to have inherent challenges. According to Mupangavanhu (2013, p. 44), the challenges emanate because of structural issues. Mupangavanhu states that: “Although

designed to correct the problems of market integration, development integration has proven more difficult to implement (than market integration), particularly because of the problems arising from the implementation of compensatory and corrective measures, and the fact that it requires more political commitment and support from Member States" (Mupangavanhu, 2013, p. 44).

Doidge (2011), opens avenues requiring further interrogation in vying for endogenous formulations of regionalism. According to Doidge (2011), the challenges above can be resolved by "linking the 'old' regionalism to Structuralist and Dependency views of the IPE and the causes of under-development, to the neoliberal counter-revolution in development thinking" (Doidge, 2011, pp. 18-33). Developmental regionalism, Doidge (2011) asserts, is an evolving notion subject to the economic and political context within which states operate.

The final form of regionalism theory according to Kinyua (2015, p. 3), is defined as a process through which a community of nation states voluntarily and in various degrees, access each other's markets and establish mechanisms and techniques that minimize conflicts and maximize internal and external economic, political, social and cultural benefits of their interaction. Kinyua (2015) points out the difference between regional and market integration by stating that:

> While formal institutions are necessary to oversee the linear progression of the various phases of integration, RI does not necessarily require formal institutional structures, nor is there necessarily a linear progression of integration. In the case of the latter, integration is assessed by the amount of economic, political, social and cultural interaction that transpires between Member States. It does not require all Member States to share these activities simultaneously Kinyua (2015, p. 4).

Although presented as a variant of regionalism, RI is largely considered as encompassing all the above forms. It is imperative to note that the rationale of the theory of RI has its foundation on two main assertions, namely, the economic and political justifications. The economic rationale is based on the concept of regional trade competitiveness and a reduction in transaction costs, while the political rationale is nested on the ideas of democratic convergence. To this end, one of the criteria for states to form part of a regional body compels them to be democratic to remain members and partake in regional affairs and activities. Furthermore, the political rationale theory posits that integration has the propensity to increase security at both national and regional levels through enforceable treaties.

A review of available literature suggests glaring deficiencies in endogenously conceived ideologies of regionalism. Rather, the broad framework for regionalism in the literature firmly

reflects the bias towards the economic dimensions of RI and thus RI remains synonymous with economic integration. (Ngila, 2013, p. 3).

In addition to the five aspects purported by WarLeigh-Lack *et al.* (2011, pp. 7-20), and in more specific terms, the condition of political institutions is arguably the most pertinent enabler, and a key dimension of the politico-administrative focus in this thesis. In the argument of Hettne and Söderbaum (2006, p. 15), "the stage of development of political institutions may be an additional factor. Specifically, institutions for regulating trade, choosing policies, and settling disputes at the regional level, implicitly assume that mechanisms (institutions and processes) exist at the country level, to implement the regional decisions" (Soderbaum, 2006, p. 16). The question of 'mechanism at country level', concerns the condition of State institutions the condition of political institutions within the state, and their intricate relationship to regionalism.

It is for this reason that the notion of SF is paramount to the study. SF as a concept has its origins in the discipline of political science but has recently entered the economic development discourse and debate. Mainstream global institutions such as the WB and the IMF characterise state failure as: limited capacity to provide basic services; inability of a state to meet critical needs; fragile governance; an environment of nonstop extreme poverty; inability to protect national borders and territories; and a high propensity of the State to enter conflict and civil war. The key measures of these characteristics include the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) and the Fragile States Index (FSI), both of which will be elaborated on in later chapters.

Of equal academic interest to the study is the assertion by Ngila (2013, p. 3), that "institutional development of regions among developing countries may be different from that among developed, moving in parallel with, and occasionally leading, domestic institutions, rather than being built on them". This assertion assumes therefore that in the case of Southern Africa regional institutions are likely to lead the evolution of domestic institutions and not the *vice versa*. This argument evokes the question as to what extent has the regional influenced the national and *vice versa*?

In answering the above question, it is necessary to revert to the concept of supranational institutions, mentioned earlier. Supranational institutions remain the most likely, if not most feasible form of governing entity for regionalism. Tillman (2015, p. 9) submits that supranational governance otherwise referred to as supranationalism, defines a system in which centralized government structures, those constituted at a supranational level, possess jurisdiction over specific policy domains within the territory comprised by the Member States. In the case of the SADC this determination has not been reached. Tillman (2015, p.10), further submits that to

exercise this power and control, supranational entities must have the ability and capacity to control all agents/actors within their sphere of influence. This means that within the framework of supranational governance, Member States must essentially cede sovereignty, or parts of their sovereignty to the supranational body. This Tillman (2015, p. 11), argues, necessarily involves allowing the supranational institution to possess jurisdiction over certain policy domains. In subsequent chapters, 'ceding sovereignty' will be referred to as 'depth of integration' or 'surrender of sovereignty'.

In examining this supposition for Southern Africa, this thesis submits that exogenous conceptualisations of sovereignty and their manifestations in supranational institutions are fundamentally consequential. These conceptualisations factor the confluence between state and region, and evaluation of regionalism.

The literature on the confluence reveals and confirms the endogenous ideological deficit in conceptualisation of regionalism among scholars and analysts. Scholars such as Fagbayibo (2013, pp. 46-48), posit symptoms of the ideological deficit as challenges facing supranational institutions in Africa. Fagbayibo (2013) argues that in the case of Africa, supranationalism (supranational institutions) faces six common challenges: democratic deficit, political instability, skewed distribution of benefits and hegemonic threats, crowded integration space, non-implementation of key initiatives and weak institutional machinery. Insufficient attention is paid in literature to the ideological foundations of the challenges in continental Africa, nor is there evidence of effort in endogenously driven ideation.

Finally, it is necessary to highlight the epistemological challenges driven by the absence of instructive endogenous perspectives in the contemporary evolution of the concepts of regionalism. Specifically, absenteeism in the conversation regarding the difference between old and new regionalism is of interest. According to Andrew-Speed (2011, p. 35), the difference is "the unidimensionality of the old and the multidimensionality of the new, resulting in a greater variety of state-led regional arrangements and non-state or hybrid regional arrangements, networks and governance mechanisms".

Equally absent are endogenous conceptualisations in other categories of regionalism, such as the formal and informal regionalism paradigms long ago advanced by Bach (1999) and more recently contended by Shamvu (2014, p. 172). The contention is that:

> "The first, formal regionalism, is represented by institutional forms of cooperation or integration, and is defined as 'the aggregation and fusion into broader units of existing territories or fields of intervention'. The second is network regionalism,

> which is represented by trans-state actors and "results in the exploitation of dysfunctions and disparities generated by existing boundaries, with debilitating effects on state territorial control" (Shamvu, 2014, p. 172).

From this elucidation, Shamvu (2014) concludes that regionalism may be considered formal when adopted and driven by formal institutions of states, or informal resulting from a spontaneous process led by non-state actors, such as trans-frontier traders (Shamvu, 2014, p. 173).

The reader may question why this study considers the conceptual challenges on regionalism relevant to Southern Africa in particular? This is because the regionalism discourse tends to omit analogies on the dynamics that call for deconstruction of exogenously driven historical and neo-colonial asymmetries embedded in the Southern Africa's foundation and conceptualisation of regionalism. Southern Africa, a region whose geopolitical logic emerged from imperial Europe, reconfiguring state relations and integration are an imperative. This reconfiguration obtains to both the formal and informal domains of regionalism, and the literature lacks sufficient evidence of any such reflection. Whilst the focus here is on Southern African, the same enquiries are also called for in other African regions if the continent is going to uplift itself and largely from within on its own merit.

The efforts towards integration and cooperation remain predominantly exogenously-driven, informed by Eurocentric ideology and occurring within a colonial geopolitical logic and neo-colonial IPE. This is problematic and may be contributing to slow or lack of progress in RI.

The literature search identifies three predominant exogenous theories driving regionalism: federalism, inter-governmentalism and neo-functionalism. The study also identified the Westaphalia state as a main architectural framework within which statecraft in Southern Africa is exercised. It is the pre-eminence of these theories and state constructs that this thesis advances as the major challenges facing RI integration and creation of functional states in Southern Africa.

1.2.2 Assessing Regional Integration

Although the parameters for evaluating RI from many authors and across many regions remain largely common, they are often predominantly economic and/or security-oriented. The frameworks often dwell on five core dimensions of economic integration: namely: "monetary union; customs and borders; intra-regional investment; joint infrastructure and knowledge cooperation." Notably, limited attention is paid to other politico-administrative dimensions beyond security. Shediac, Khanna, Rahim, Samman, (2011, p. 1) institutions such as the African Development Bank (AfDB), The Asian Development Bank (ADB), the United Nations Economic

Commission for Africa (UNECA), the WB, the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the European Union (EU), the African Union (AU), the SADC, and various Policy Research Centres and Universities, have proposed several RI assessment frameworks.

Of these frameworks, arguably one of the most profoundly inclusive and comprehensive is that developed by Estrada and Park (2010) and Bandeviča and Salputra (2012, p. 23) called RI Evaluation. Regional Integration Evaluation (RIE) methodology, "is based on the four dimensions of development –economic, political, social and technological" (Ibid). The framework employs the "measure of a region's development level in the economic, political, social and technological spheres (the Regional Development Index X_i), which incorporates the development levels of all regional countries as well as differences among the regional countries" (Bandeviča & Salputra, 2012, p. 23). The developed framework aims to address the challenge posed by most theoretical and research methodology underpinnings of RI that base their narrow perspectives on a single discipline, usually economics.

Estrada and Park (2010, p. 120), posit that, "the central idea or assertion behind the RIE methodology is that regional development promotes RI. That is, the higher the development level of a region, the more likely it is that the countries of the region will experience closer integration with each other". Estrada and Park further argue that, "the development level of a region, in turn, depends on the domestic development level of each country in the region" (Estrada and Park, 2010, p. 120). This assertion contests the popular proposition that economic integration, is the exclusive catalyst for RI.

Estrada and Park (2010, p. 108), insist that "while the idea that regional development is beneficial for RI is hardly new, the RIE methodology differs from the existing literature in that it is based on a more comprehensive definition of development beyond economic development". Estrada and Park acknowledge that while "a high level of regional economic development is certainly conducive for integration since it allows for more trade, investment and other economic interaction among its member countries. However, it is equally clear that a high level of development in non-economic spheres is also conducive for integration" (Estrada and Park, 2010, p. 108). The RIE methodology, Estrada and Park (2010, p. 108) point out, "can provide more accurate and comprehensive guidance for both policymakers and researchers about the feasibility and desirability of RI initiatives than traditional methodologies. This is because the methodology recognises that both economic and non-economic factors driving RI unlike traditional methodologies which tend to focus narrowly on economic motivations" (Ibid.).

The research approach in this thesis is framed within three dimensions of RI. The first is geographic scope, which is the number of countries involved in a regional arrangement, also referred to as variable geometry. The second is substantive coverage, which is the breadth of sector or activity coverage that includes trade, labour movement, and macro and sector level policies. The third dimension is level of integration, which measures the degree to which a State is willing and prepared to surrender its sovereignty; that is from a basic level of coordination/cooperation or an advanced level of deep integration (Kritzinger-van Niekerk, 2005, p. 4)). All three dimensions are comprehensively provided for within the RIE framework. Specific determinants of these processes have however been deliberated upon in a range of Africanist literature including Togba, (2015) and Asante, (1997).

To evaluate the depth of integration for instance, it is worth examining Togba's (2015) three critical dimensions of state and regionalism. The first assertion is that regionalism advances by way of contested processes, in which sovereignty is ceded by Member States over prolonged periods of engagements in a variety of areas, particularly the state function of economic co-operation. The second assertion is that regionalism emerges from strong States with extensive knowledge and experience in benefitting from sovereignty. The third and final assertion is that the "leadership of strong states (often hegemonic leaders) is frequently pertinent in setting the rules that jumpstart regionalism" (Togba, 2015, p. 9).

This thesis examines and evaluates the nature of this contestation, the claim that strong states that have harnessed gains from sovereignty are the key to the success of regional groupings and the role of a hegemonic power in the dynamic of regionalism. To round out this section on regionalism and assessment of regionalism is the next discussion on SF as part of the background of the research problem.

1.2.3 State Fragility

As mentioned above, SF as a concept has its origins in the discipline of political science, but has recently entered the economic development discourse and debate. According to Bertocchi and Guerzoni (2011, p. 2), SF is associated with the following various characteristics of state failure: the lack of capacity to provide basic services; inability of the State to meet critical requirements and functions; presence of fragile governance; a constant circumstance of extreme poverty; inability to protect national borders and territories, and a high propensity of the State to enter conflict and civil war. It is important to note here that the methodologies used in determining unstable and weak governance, and the inability to provide basic services, require an epistemological assessment.

In determining SF, the dominant and orthodox parameters employed in the study are the CPIA and the Fragile States Index (FSI). The CPIA is an index rating used by the WB and the OECD, to define SF as well as assess national policies and institutional mechanisms. In addition, the CPIA ratings are centred on the functionality of a State, recognising the fundamental element that a State is directly responsible for and controls the jurisdiction within its borders. The CPIA index ratings do not focus on processes and outcomes that are not under a country's control. The index categorises the main internal responsibilities of a state into four equally weighted clusters: "economic management; structural policies; social inclusion policies, and equity and public-sector management and institutions. (World Bank, 2015. p. 3)

In 2005, the Fund for Peace developed the second measure of FSI by using twelve indicators to measure individual state vulnerability to collapse or conflict. These indicators are broad and take into consideration 'State Failure Risk Elements' such as "extensive corruption and criminal behaviour, inability to collect tax, large scale involuntary dislocation of the population, sharp economic decline, group-based inequality, institutionalized persecution or discrimination, severe demographic pressures and brain drain." (Van Veen, 2011, pp. 2-25).

Like RI, SF is a complex concept because of disputes around definitions, assessment indicators, origins, theoretical underpinnings and its causes. In assessing the historical background of SF in Sub-Saharan Africa, there appears to be a relationship between RI and SF. The European Report on Development (2009, pp. 50-52) states that the root cause of fragility in Africa is colonialism, but that however, fragility is deeply entrenched in the regional characteristics of the continent, and this makes it hard to develop institutions conducive to legitimate and effective states (European Development Report, 2009, p. 52). Furthermore, the report presents four characteristics of state formation in Africa which lead to SF:

> "the first is their artificial character – the creation of colonial states introduced an element unrelated to the social, institutional and cultural characteristics of the colonised territories; the second is the extractive nature – the structure of State institutions was designed to transfer resources to the colonial power, not to foster local development; the third is their inherent extraversion – the state established tight economic links with the colonial power, in a relationship of political dependence, the fourth relates to indirect rule – a system of colonial administration initiated in the British Empire" (The European Report on Development 2009, pp. 51).

Despite consensus on the role of colonialism in state formation in Africa, interestingly exogenous concepts and definitions continue to dominate the discourse. Nay (2012, p. 3) submits that the

global interest in SF partly results from public research grants awarded by the United States and British governments in the early 2000s. Nay (2012, p. 3) highlights that the influence of these two governments on the normative work of international organizations such as OECD and the WB has been a powerful factor in the development of the literature on SF. Evidence of the predominance of exogenous Eurocentric influences on the concept of SF is found in the title of the 2009 European Report on Development (ERD). The sub-title, 'Forging a New European Approach', reveals the orientation of mainstream interests regarding SF in Africa.

In the case of Bertocchi (2011, p. 3), for instance, the objective of inquiry has been to experiment with alternative definitions of fragility and to assess the usefulness of the fragility criterion for forecasting growth and allocating aid.

The ERD further posits an argument that does not attempt to soften the debate on the relevance of colonialism and its influence in institutional development of post-colonial States in Africa. The report attempts to position the argument in a much broader perspective by asserting that the Scramble for Africa was not in isolation, there were institutions in place. Colonial States in the forms and designs during the era of colonialism interacted with preexisting institutions of the colonised States. In support of this argument, Wallace (1997, p. 23) characterises the nation state as an artificial construct, an ideal type heavily dependent upon the historical experience of Britain and France. Given that the nation-state in Southern Africa emerged out of this construct, this then raises questions as to whether current statecraft offers a viable form upon which effective RI in Southern Africa can occur, and depending on the answer, whether such a relationship has any implications for PPPs?

In concluding, it is necessary to highlight that there is a variation in the measurement of SF in terms of background and concepts; in other words, there is a difference in their core rationale. On the one hand, some employ a futures approach of determining risks associated with state failure. On the other hand, others employ a system of assessing the State's current moment of stateness (Fabra Mata & Ziaja, 2009, p. 2).

In the final analysis, the interplay between political and economic integration remains intricate. This relationship is expressed in the degree to which the state and market influence and drive RI. It remains contested and aligned to ideology. This ideological footprint in the debate is sufficiently pronounced in Lawrence's (1997, p. 19) comparison between old and new regionalism, and two decades later, continues to linger. He observed that import substitution versus export orientation; planned allocation of resources versus market allocation of resources; government led versus private firm led; mainly industrial products versus all goods, services and investment; are the key

defining features of the contrast between old and new regionalism respectively (Hosny, 2013, p. 139). The old is defined by predominance of the state and the new by predominance of the market. These shifts correspond with ideological shifts in the role of the state and thus connote the intimate and intricate relationship between regionalism and statecraft. While orthodox governance paradigms are explored in Chapter Two, Chapter Three interrogates the ideological foundations driving the shift towards a market dominated conceptualisation of regionalism. The researcher examines this shift through an interrogation of the 'Administrative State'. The narrowed problem statement which, like the broader version in section 1.2, emerged from the literature reviewed in Chapter Two and Chapter Three is next presented.

1.3 Problem Statement for the Study

The research problem is that regionalism and statecraft in Southern Africa face politico-administrative challenges from a common legacy that is exogenous in origin and domestic in their agency. Authors such as Lee (2003) state that SADCC (Southern African Development Coordination Conference), is a western creation, arguing that its formation was highly controlled by western governments and international financial institutions through financial support to the organization. Others also argue that the OAU, from which SADC emerged and is affiliated, also came to an imminent end at the climax of the Cold War. According to Blake (2005, p. 576), African states became involved in client states with ideological allegiances split between the dominant western capitalist and eastern socialist/communist hemispheres.

Similarly, regarding statecraft in southern Africa, it is argued that the founding fathers inherited exogenous models. Specifically, the domestic institutions they adopted were often inappropriate and were faced with having to govern states that existed territorially and legally but which, once the euphoria of independence had passed, faced problems of maintaining a legitimate central authority and, often, a lack of state capacity (Griffiths, 2013, p. 782-786).

This is problematic because, consequently, statecraft in the region does not seem to facilitate RI sufficiently nor does regionalism enhance statecraft. These outcomes appear to be further compounded by the unfounded claims of the relationship between political and economic integration, and the complexities seem to inhibit PPPs for development. The articulation and consideration of this relationship is arguably problematic when we consider the incoherent ideological framework within which it is conceived. There exists limited evidence of a holistic approach to examine the implications of such ideological incoherencies on the architecture of and confluence between RI and statecraft. This thesis posits that these incoherencies adversely impact

on the creation of effective national and regional polities, state craft and supranational institutions as well as sustainable PPPs for development. Literature suggests that there is limited interrogation of the common role of exogenous ideology and legacies on the politico-administrative confluence of regionalism and state-craft in Southern African. This is a void that this study seeks to help fill by an effort to address the research problem.

1.4 Breadth and Depth of Investigation

The broader investigation in this research covers the areas of global and regional political and economic governance relative to established relationships amongst states. Regional governance is a major component of global governance emerging from studies of RI which has become integral to the study of IR. The predominance of international relations as a discipline studying relations among states transcends RI. It occurs within the framework of global governance and bears on both regionalism and statecraft. Additionally, in recent decades the rise of non-state actors and new institutional arrangements such as PPPs transcend orthodox IR theory. The emergent theories include post-internationalism theory. Ferguson and Mansbach's (2007, p. 531) historical account of post-international theory stipulates that the theory emerged in reaction to discontent with the deficiencies and misrepresentations in established realist and neorealist theories, most notably, its state-centric view of the world. Thus, post-international theory contends that while sovereign states and their international relations remain important, the state-centric world conceived by traditional theories has never fully existed and is unlikely to exist (Ferguson and Mansbach, 2007, p. 531).

In a broad sense, this study seeks to deconstruct the post-international view of state-centricism and multi-centricism in international relations discourse. These have been defined early on by Rosenau (1990, p. 97) as two interactive worlds, the first a state-centric world with national actors as major, and second, a multi-centric world of diverse and comparatively equal actors. A multi-centric perspective is particularly relevant in the understanding of the confluence between RI and statecraft. It also informs the analysis of PPPs, particularly the role of private actors in the national and regional space. In the same regard, the study also examines the centrality of global non-state governance institutions and their affiliates in this confluence. Of particular interest are 'ideological clans' – networks of global institutions that subscribe to the trans-Atlantic partnership as one such a clan advanced by such institutions as the WB and UN.

The second broad issue being studied concerns the challenges pertaining to the application of international relations theory to RI in Southern Africa. This research thus investigates claims that international relations theory has its origins in theory derived from the interests and experiences

of Western Europe. The knowledge and ideas of international relations theory originate almost completely from the West and are heavily linked to scholars and thinkers from the Global North, who in their discourse are seen by some scholars to at time misconstrue or ignore scholars from the Global South. Mgonja (2009. p. 28) Thus, most work and knowledge produced in the field of IR represent a predominantly Eurocentric viewpoint and this tends to mystify the ways and manners in which States and the current world systems are juxtaposed politically, socially and economically (Moloi, 2012, pp.170-220).

Typical westernised IR views include: the theory of realism by Thucydides' which posits that the relations among States is centred on might rather than right; John Locke (1632-1704), Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) and Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) writings of European enlightenment that propelled liberalism theory. All these philosophers posit an underlying assumption that the possibilities of cooperation increase over time, as the world continues to industrialise and modernise. Finally, the idealist theory saw the emergence of Edward Carr and Hans Morgenthau (1974), as well as debates on the idealist theory (Sterling-Folker, 2006). Both Carr and Morgenthau subsequently dismissed such theory as an "unsystematic and value-driven idealist" approach.

Scholars such as Seth (2011) and Matin (2013) have indicated to the possibility of IR theory and practice being anchored in post-colonialism theories. Some of these scholars allude to Marxist theories which places importance on the opposing discourse historically, economic and material phenomena from a perspective of a form of class society, suggesting that the debate on theory itself constitutes the conduct of international relations Babik (2013. p501). Thus, within post-colonial theory, the debates raised in and by this study are in themselves an ontology of international relations.

An interrogation of international relations theories is thus critical to the examination of the intersection between RI, SF (or functionalism) and PPPs development in Southern Africa. An ideologically dispassionate examination of global governance and regional governance theories may shed light on the feasibility of theoretical frameworks that can be useful in examining the Southern Africa region. (Nolte, 2011, p. 52). There may be a need to consider shifting the discourse away from a focus on characteristics of SF and instead an inquiry into what amounts to state functionalism in the Southern African context.

The study is a MIT-disciplinary investigation that entails at least international relations, public administration, political science, economics and history. The study satisfies four critical levels of a MIT-disciplinary study as advanced by Stock, P, Burton, R (2011. p. 6) First, the study

involves multiple disciplines as explained above, and second it involves stakeholders in the research process. Third, it is conducted within the framework of knowledge sharing that transcends disciplines and fourth is that it is thematically based and aims to deepen the discourse at the confluence of RI, statecraft and PPPs.

1.5 Purpose of the Study

The study seeks to help create endogenous knowledge instrumental to the understanding and establishment of functional relationships between regionalism and statecraft, with dividends for development in Southern Africa, as catalysed through PPPs. The study responds to the deficiencies and unavailability of endogenous knowledge needed to inform the enhancement ofa productive relationship between regionalism and the state. This study is thus necessitated by the assertion that, despite extensive literature on regional interation and the state, the literature posits the linear model of integration as the norm with scant interrogation of its origin. In this recognition, Hartzenburg (2011, p. 7) highlights that, what is at issue, however, is whether the linear model of regional integration currently, defining the African integration paradigm, makes sense for the continent.

Additionally, despite extensive literature on globalization and its effects on national policies, the literature investigating regional integration's impact on national social policies for instance, is comparatively underdeveloped. (Madeira, 2014, p. 1)

To create the knowledge functional to the relationship, the study among others examines the factors influencing the depth of integration, a concept that refers to the degree to which a country is willing to surrender its sovereignty in pursuit of regionalism. For instance, prior studies indicate that of 171 countries, only 86 refer to regionalism in their national constitutions. And for Africa of 47 countries, only 25 refer to regionalism in their national constitutions. (Lombarde and Rodríguez, 2014).

To create the endogenous knowledge productive and instrumental to the understanding and establishment of a functional architecture for enhancing regional integration and state functionalism, and considering the research problem, certain research objectives and research questions were drawn which are next articulated.

1.6 Research Objectives and Research Questions

1.6.1 Research objectives

The objectives below indicate the specific type and scope of knowledge which the study considers instrumental to the understanding of the confluence between regional integration, state functionalism and public private partnerships. The objectives define the study's aim to create the aforementioned instrumental knowledge on RI, SF and PPP through an examination, interrogation and investigation of the ideological and architectural dimensions of the three aspects. In this regard the objectives thus seek to focus the study on how both the ideological influences and and architectural character affect the functionality of the relationship between RI, SF and PPPs.

1.6.1.1 To examine the politico-administrative efficacy of the current SADC architecture in delivery of the desired outcomes of the RI agenda.

1.6.1.2 To describe the theoretical influences of the Trans-Atlantic Alliance on the architecture of Southern African RI.

1.6.1.3 To interrogate the influence that the exogenous nature of state development in Southern Africa has had on SF or state functionalism.

1.6.1.4 To investigate the position of non-state actors, namely PPPs, in the architecture of RI in Southern Africa.

1.6.1.5 To explore the degree to which the SADC RI framework considers any relationship between SF or state functionalism and PPPs development.

1.6.2 Research questions

The research questions were developed within the framework of a qualitative exploratory study. It is important to understand how the research questions were conceived. The questions were primarily drawn to include four types of exploratory questions Yin (2009, p. 20) The first type is 'definitional' which seeks to determine the nature of a phenomenon as well as its defining features. The second type of question seeks answers that are 'descriptive'. This means discovering not just the kinds or varieties of a phenomenon but also specific characteristics or aspects of such phenomenon and how a particular phenomenon relates or does not relate to other phenomena. In this case the confluence between statecraft, regionalism and implications for PPPs should be described. The third type of exploratory questions are concerned with 'deconstruction' of a phenomenon. This type is designed to assess assumptions that have been made by existing

research and whose social or political interests are served by both the ongoing construction and deconstruction of the phenomenon under study. The first three types of questions for exploratory research are consistent with the constructivist ontological and epistemological paradigms that underpin this study. Finally, the fourth type of exploratory questions are 'interpretive' in nature. These questions seek to answer why a certain phenomenon seems to have come about, how it has unfolded over time and what changes led to what other changes as well as what appears to work under a given set of circumstances to achieve an aim in view? In other words, this final type of question examines issues of critical/action such as what is wrong (or right) about the phenomenon and how could it be made better? This type of exploration is consistent with the interpretivist and pragmatic ontological and epistemological underpinnings of this study.

Accordingly, the study structured this exploratory inquiry along the questions below:

1.6.2.1 To what extent is the theoretical paradigm employed in the architecture of SADC's RI agenda practicable and productive in guiding SADC's set objectives?

1.6.2.2 To what extent has the socio-political and politico-administrative aspects of the Southern African RI framework been influenced by the dynamic of SF or state functionalism?

1.6.2.3 How does the SADC RI agenda address interactive links (if any) between SF or functionalism and public–private partnerships in the region?

A synopsis of the need for this study is next presented.

1.6.3 Alignment of the research objectives and questions

The study is driven by five objectives and three questions guiding the inquiry into findings that will inform the objectives and satisfy the purpose of the study. The first question examines the effect of the theoretical influences on the architecture and efficacy of RI. The question inquires into the origins of the theory and the purported predominance of trans-Atlantic influences expressed in the problem statement and literature review. In interrogating the exogenous nature of statecraft, the second question inquires after how the politico-administrative aspects of regional integration have been influenced by the exogenous notion of 'state fragility'. The third and final question inquires on how regional integration has facilitated linkages between statecraft and PPPs. The findings from this question informs objectives four and five which seek to understand the role of non-state actors in this dynamic and determine the degree to which the SADC RI framework facilitates positive linkages between RI, SF and PPPs.

Table 1 - 1 Relationship between the research objectives and questions

Research Objectives	Research Questions
1. To examine the politico-administrative efficacy of the current SADC architecture in delivery of the desired outcomes of the regional integration agenda.	1. To what extent is the theoretical paradigm employed in the architecture of SADC's regional integration agenda practicable and productive in guiding SADC's set objectives?
2. To describe the theoretical influences of the Trans-Atlantic Alliance on the architecture of southern African regional integration.	
3. To interrogate the influence that the exogenous nature of state development in southern Africa has had on state fragility or state functionalism.	2. To what extent has the socio-political and politico-administrative aspects of the southern African regional integration framework been influenced by the dynamic of state fragility or state functionalism?
4. To investigate the position of non-state actors, namely PPPs, in the architecture of regional integration in southern Africa.	3. How does the SADC regional integration agenda address interactive links (if any) between state fragility or functionalism and public–private partnerships in the region?
5. To explore the degree to which the SADC regional integration framework considers any relationship between state fragility or state functionalism and public private partnership development.	

1.7 Significance of and Rationale for the Research

Regional integration, SF and PPPs development each independently comprise a major topic of interest and inquiry and have been extensively studied individually. There is also extensive literature on the confluence between RI and state craft alone Hartzenberg, T, (2011) and Estrada, and Park, (2010), RI and development alone, and statecraft and PPPs alone Graham, Onishi and Schmidt, (2012) and Zou, Kumaraswamy, Chung and Wong, (2014). The literature search did not seem to disclose evidence of an empirical inquiry into a confluence between the trilogy of RI, SF (or functionalism) and PPPs development. As consequential concepts and processes, with implications for Pan-Africanism and development in Southern Africa, a study of the confluence of these three phenomena is imperative. This study seeks to contribute to the creation of scholarship on the subject regarding this trilogy. It specifically seeks to create an endogenous based understanding of the relationship among the three concepts and its implications for Southern Africa from a MIT-disciplinary standpoint. The significance of this research is founded upon the ability of the findings to add value to the limited scholarly treatment of the treatment of the subject from an endogenously driven transdisciplinary perspective. If a study of this nature is not undertaken, the repercussions of the research problem earlier discussed would persist.

As to the rationale for the study, this is centred on the necessity to illustrate possible negative effects of exogenous ideological influences and the endogenous ideological deficit, on the architecture and efficacy of RI, statecraft and PPPs. Literature on RI and statecraft remains dominated by European constructions and arguments. The domestic historical and contemporary interests and perspectives are often discounted, a deficiency which this study seeks to overcome. Further, the definitions and measures for all three concepts in the study derive from exogenously conceived notions, concepts and frameworks that are arguably incoherent with endogenous realities. Finally, an exploration and interpretation of alternative conceptualisations with the potential to minimise incoherencies and improve the complementarity between RI, statecraft and PPPs is needed. An overview of the research methodology employed is discussed next.

1.8 Overview of Research Methodology

The overview presents a statement of the philosophical worldviews guiding the study, and the research design and methods.

1.8.1 Philosophical paradigms

The predominant philosophical paradigms or worldviews governing the study are constructivism, interpretivism and pragmatism. As subsequently discussed in section 4.3, on the one hand, interpretivism and constructivism are used in conjunction with each other. Not unlike interpretivists, constructivists purport an intersubjective social reality (Wright, 2014, p. 98). Interpretivists ascribe to such social realities being nuanced and that the understanding and interpretation of events, experiences and social structures are shaped by participant perceptions and values as well as the values and aims of the researcher (Rubin & Babbie, 2010, p. 37; Vosloo, 2014, p. 307). In other words, constructivists are more concerned with deconstructing and reconstructing reality and knowledge production while interpretivists focus on how such reconstructions and knowledge are interpreted.

On the one hand, pragmatism questions issues such as "what is, what might be; an orientation towards a prospective, not yet realised world." To this end, pragmatism involves problem-solving (Hookway, 2013, p. 1). For pragmatists, like constructivists and interpretivists, there are multiple truths assigned to a given situation. However, pragmatists believe that truth is what works, it suits a purpose and has the capacity to enable action (Akira, 2014, p. 4).

The epistemological and ontological underpinnings are based on the assumption that the ideation of RI, statecraft and PPP development derive from intersubjective, nuanced multiple realities of

endogenous and exogenous actors. The truth of what works in Southern Africa remains elusive and this study seeks to capture deeper meanings for future application.

In addition, as indicated in section 1.4, this is a MIT-disciplinary inquiry into the implications of the relationship between Southern African RI and state-craft for PPPs. The focus is on the transdisciplinary component of MIT to address the complexity of the research problem (Stock and Burton, 2011). All three-key dimensions of the study; RI, SF or functionalism (which is tantamount to statecraft) and PPPs development are topics pivotal to the study of international relations, public administration, economics, policy sciences, political science and history. The methodological implications of the MIT-disciplinary approach is further explored in in Chapter Four. In summary, however, the researcher considered this MIT-disciplinary approach in both the choice of research paradigms and design.

These choices are consistent with the study's primary aim, which is to explore the thinking and dynamics behind the politico-administrative arrangements driving RI, SF or functionalism and PPPs development in Southern Africa. The idea is to provide evidence-based recommendations for improvement of the politico-administrative state and Southern African regionalisation.

1.8.2 Research design

The research design is comprised of a sequential multi-method qualitative approach in a case study framework. Both the constructivist/interpretivist and pragmatist paradigms were applied to this multi-method qualitative research, allowing the inquiry to draw liberally from the quantitative and qualitative designs in implementation of the research (Cameron, 2011, p. 96). The approach involved the collection of qualitative primary and secondary data as well as quantitative secondary data, analysing them separately, and then comparing the results to (1) generate a more holistic view that addresses the research problem, objectives and questions; and (2) to determine if the findings from multi-methods confirm or disconfirm each other. Hence, the researcher drew from qualitative and quantitative designs to execute the study (Cameron, 2011, p. 96). However, the quantitative component is derived from a variety of pre-existing indices and statistics subject to a fresh analysis for this study it light of the research problem and the research objectives. The data analysis processes through use of the indices is discussed in sections 4.9.3.1 and 4.9.3.2 with the results spread out over the various case study chapters.

Perceptible as a design or a strategy, the case study approach was used. The case study approach included an examination of the validity of propositions which assert that ideological and architectural coherence between politico-administrative (regionalism) and economic

(regionalisation) dimensions of RI can improve state craft in SADC, with implications for PPP development.

The case context is the Southern African region. The units of analysis are the countries of Botswana, Malawi and South Africa. The subunits of analysis are the individuals from the public, private and non-governmental organisation sectors in the three countries who participated in the study. The propositions in this case study are derived from the research questions, and the issues underlying the study derive from the implications of the confluence between RI, statecraft and PPPs. In alignment with the worldviews, the researcher opted to employ the embedded multiple case study design, with the entrenched case study design taking an empirical inquiry that is descriptive in nature.

This approach required this study to illuminate the character, situation, as well as dynamic of the confluence between regionalism and statecraft, and its implications for PPPs from the perception of multi-sector stakeholders across three countries in the Southern African region. These characteristics of a case study embedded with multiple units of analysis which are further embedded with subunits of analysis resonates with the interpretivist/constructivist and pragmatist worldviews. Scholz (2011, p. 25) suggests that "a case is faceted or embedded in a conceptual grid which allows one to identify key components of human and environmental systems" The elements of the human and environmental systems identified in the study are encapsulated in the ideology, architecture and conduct of statecraft and regionalism in Southern Africa.

1.8.3 Research strategy

The strategy employed was a case study strategy in combination with the sequential transformative strategy (Creswell, 2009, pp. 215-216). As a strategy, the case study approach, is concerned with how the study will be executed, including identification of units of analysis. The embedded case study empirical strategy of inquiry, was considered appropriate for its focus on descriptive, exploratory and explanatory analysis. The study sought to explore and describe the features, context, and dynamic of the confluence between regionalism and statecraft, and its implications for PPPs from the perception of multi-sector stakeholders across three countries in the Southern African region. Again, this means that the case study is embedded with multiple units of analysis which are further embedded with subunits of analysis as above indicated (Yazan, 2015, p. 140).

The sequential transformative strategy allows the use of either the qualitative or quantitative method to be used first. It seeks to employ the methods that will best serve the theoretical perspective, giving voice to diverse perspectives from literature and participants and yielding a better understanding of phenomena or processes that are changing while being studied (Terell, 2010). As a strategy, case study inquiry "seeks to cope with the technically distinctive situation in which there will be many more variables of interest than data points, and as one result, relies on multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to converge in a triangulating fashion" Yin, (2014. p. 109).

1.8.4 Data collection

As previously indicated, the study is composed of both primary and secondary qualitative data as well as secondary quantitative data, collected between April 2013 and April 2015. The data collection tool for the qualitative primary was a semi-structured interview guide which was used across multi-sector stakeholder segments in Botswana, Malawi and South Africa. This was done to capture perceptions and interpretations of respondents. Both pragmatist and interpretivist philosophies guided the process of primary data generation. The secondary data collection employed both qualitative and quantitative mode of data collection. Qualitative secondary data were obtained from historical research, literature, documents and archives. In other words, a comprehensive desk review of research reports, academic journals, books, institutional reports, treaties and protocols of these institutions and Member States was undertaken. As to the quantitative secondary data, these were drawn from indices created by the WB and accessible on the CPIA Africa (http://datatopics.worldbank.org/cpia/). The latter is explained in sections 4.6.2 and 4.9.3.

1.8.5 Sampling strategy

The researcher employed a basic multi-method sampling strategy of stratified purposive sampling. The research divided the 15 SADC states into two strata; middle income and low-income countries. A small number of cases were then selected based on non-probability purposive sampling techniques. Further, as discussed in Chapter Four, this sampling strategy allows for discovery and description in detail of characteristics that are similar or different across states and sectors which are the units of analysis. This sampling strategy is also compliant with the embedded transformative research strategy presented above. The sampling strategy for the secondary quantitative data followed a similar multi-method sampling strategy of stratified purposive sampling but directed toward the indices and statistics useful for configuring the

phenomena under study with respect to (1) the SADC countries to provide a case context and (2) the three countries that served as units of analysis.

1.8.6 Data analysis

The researcher chose the combination of techniques befitting their inquiry. For the qualitative component (both primary and secondary) the analysis was undertaken using textual analysis and discourse analysis. Hence, the explanatory data comprised conclusions from analysis of secondary data collected by various actors and primary data collected by the researcher.

The study analysed two sets of quantitative secondary data from a number of indices developed by global and regional governance organisations. One data set analysed was the Southern Africa fifteen country quantitative secondary data and the other was the three-country case study qualitative primary data. Accordingly, the analytical framework parameters for SF (CPIA and FSI) and PPPs (EoDB and GCI) quantitative secondary data variables were analysed using SPSS. This is further discussed in section 4.9.3. Emerging trends and patterns were thereafter triangulated with the qualitative data findings.

1.8.7 Ethical considerations

The study followed ethical protocols including obtaining ethical clearance from the University of KwaZulu-Natal. All respondents were notified prior of the purpose and nature of the study. Informed consent was also obtained before each interview was conducted. Interviewees were made aware that they could withdraw from participation in the study at any time. Ethical considerations are further discussed in Chapter Four.

1.8.8 Limitations of the research

The study was confronted with a variety of limitations, including methodology. These limitations were most pronounced with regard to quantitative data on RI and SF. There was a very low response rate to the self-administered questionnaire distributed. After countless attempts to secure completed surveys, the researcher shifted the study from a concurrent mixed method study to a sequential multi-method qualitative case study. The study then drew upon quantitative secondary data from global and regional governance organisations such as the WB and International Monetary Fund (IMF). To mitigate this methodological limitation, the researcher designed parameters that fit the research problem and, after downloading relevant regional and country data sets, analysed the data afresh using statistical software in ways that are relevant to the research

objectives and questions. This is extensively detailed in section 4.9.3. Other limitations are discussed in section 4.12.

1.9 Underlying Assumptions of the Study

To comprehend the importance of internal socio-political and politico-administrative considerations in the dynamic between RI, SF and PPPs, the study will be grounded on three assumptions. The first is that enhancing RI promotes coherence in national economic policy and ensures region-wide standardization of state institutional arrangements. Further, it is assumed that the resultant standardization reduces transaction costs for both domestic and foreign investors and improves predictability, thereby creating conducive investment climates. The assumption also asserts that effective RI compels Member States to comply with a set of minimum standards and this translates to a change in climate as Member States grow stable, predictable and reliable, reducing SF and promoting mutually beneficial PPPs.

The second assumption is that SF, particularly weak State institutions in Southern Africa have their origins in the political and economic history of colonialism and that the present IPE context compounds the problem through inappropriate regulatory regimes and mischaracterization of challenges facing the state. Progress in addressing SF has been inhibited by problems of conceptualization, definition and measurement.

The third assumption is that private actors, particularly investors, are unwilling to venture into partnerships with fragile states with weak State institutions. This lack of confidence affects the development of PPPs. Investors and entrepreneurs are reluctant to deal with high liability and unpredictable partners such as fragile states. It is the assertion of this study that weak State institutions are high liability partners who yield low gains. These assumptions are more specifically borne out in Table 3-1. There are certain operational definitions that persist in this study and are presented next.

1.10. Operational Definitions

1.10.1. Afristate Intrafunctionalism: this is a new term arising from this study and constructed by the researcher. It means the characterisation and evaluation of statecraft from a positive epistemology that focuses on the catalytic characteristics and dimensions of the efficacy of an African state.

1.10.2. Economic integration and interdependence: removing barriers to trade, investment and human mobility (negative integration) and the creation of common, market-regulating rules (positive integration) which produces a continuous increase in the interdependence of Member States. This increase is not only absolute and general for the trans-national regional organization (TRO) but is also the case for all its MSs. The distribution of this increase will not accrue primarily to a single MS or a set of 'hegemonic' MSs within the TRO. The increase will be distinctively regional - greater among MSs than between them and non-MSs (Schmitter & Lefkofridi, 2015, p. 5).

1.10.3. Endogenous Regionalism – Refers to an endogenous state-led process arising from internal conditions specific to each region in question. (Söderbaum & Granit, 2014, p.14).

1.10.4. Exogenous Regionalism – Refers to the application of trans-Atlantic influences and the three European theories of RI; federalism, inter-governmentalism and neo-functionalism to African RI agendas (Michel, 2012, pp.17-27).

1.10.5. Federalism is defined as a system of consolidating past autonomous, or independent territorial units to constitute a new form of union based upon principles that, broadly speaking, can be summarized in the dictum 'unity in diversity (Michel, 2012, p.18).

1.10.6. Intergovernmentalism has its foundation on between-government cooperation and declares the Member States as the main actors in the process. It is those states' preferences and decisions that are primary and important and decisive when deciding on polities. The governments have a strong and autonomous position in this approach, and bargain intensively to get their interests (Fabbrini, 2013, p. 1008).

1.10.7. Neo-functionalism: the theory of neo-functionalism is a "compromise between the full integration, which lies in the political unifying of the states, and the will of the states for preserving their sovereignty and independence. Also, that compromise is done between the concept of the nation state, and the concept of integration, as a process of forming supranational level of governance" (Ilievki, 2015, p. 6).

1.10.8. Pan-Africanism: a movement, a conviction, a belief and an ideology for the reconstruction of the psyche, the mind, the being and the essence of a black African man and woman (Oloruntoba, 2015, p.6).

1.10.9. Political Integration: the construction of a community, with politics as its contents, through establishing same frame of rules, creating common institutions with the power of decision-making, and projecting an identity of the integrated community (instead of previous existing identities of the political units). The main point in this integrating activity is the process of delegating the autonomy of the political units to the newly formed political community. (Ilievki, 2015, pp. 2-3).

1.10.10. Public Private Partnership: a contractual agreement formed between public and private sector partners, which allow more private sector participation than is traditional. The agreements usually involve a government agency contracting with a private company to renovate, construct, operate, maintain, and/or manage a facility or system. While the public sector usually retains ownership in the facility or system, the private party will be given additional decision rights in determining how the project or task will be completed. PPPs are not the same as privatisation in that both public sponsors and private providers function as partners throughout project development and delivery, and in certain instances operations and maintenance (Bauxbum & Ortin, 2009, p. 391).

1.10.11. Rational choice institutionalism: places importance on the actions of actors and their pursuance of their individual preferences within the context of institutional rules. Rational choice institutionalists are interested in the way in which the preferences of actors in the integration process change because of changes in the institutional rules (Hatton, 2011, p.2).

1.10.12. Regional integration: processes through which nation states voluntarily and to varying degrees share their markets and establish mechanisms and techniques that minimise conflicts and maximize internal and external economic, political, social and cultural benefits so their interaction (Ncube, 2015, pp.3-4).

1.10.13. State fragility: various manifestation of government and state malfunctioning manifest in: the inability to provide basic services and meet vital needs, unstable and weak governance, a persistent condition of extreme poverty, lack of territorial control and high propensity to conflict and civil war (Bertocchi & Guerzoni, 2011).

1.10.14. State functionalism: an equilibrium in the efficacy of statecraft, characterised by empirical sovereignty, sufficient capacity to provide basic services, integrity of public

institutions, state legitimacy, inclusive economic growth, security and ability to protect national borders and territories. (Pick, 2011., Jackson, 1990).

1.10.15. Supranationalism: exemplifies the following, but not limited, core elements: decisional autonomy (in particular the rule of the voting majority as opposed to consensus), the binding effect of the laws of international organisations (where Member States are precluded from enacting contradictory laws), the institutional autonomy of an organisation from its Member States, and the direct binding effect of laws emanating from regional organisations on natural and legal persons in Member States (Fagbayibo, 2010, p.33).

1.10.16. The Westphalian State: state unit out of an order that emerged after the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, which ended the Thirty Years' War and the war between Spain and the Netherlands. It implies an interstate system made up of sovereign territorial states. Within their borders live citizens whose obligations and rights are defined by citizenship and their allegiance to the state. Outside, in the so-called 'anarchical world', these rights and obligations do not apply. The identical nature of the security of citizens and the security of the state is taken for granted (Söderbaum & Granit, 2014, p.16).

1.10.17. Trans-Atlantic Alliance: the political and social relationship between Western Europe and the United States that the 1941 Atlantic Charter institutionalized, and which has been continuously updated (Ghez, 2011, p. 2). It is anchored in three pillars; military, economic and 'power over opinion'. Importantly, the economic, foundations of the alliance were laid by the Bretton Woods system.

1.11 Organization of the Thesis

Including this introductory chapter, this thesis contains ten chapters.

Chapter Two examines the orthodox paradigms of global and regional governance. The chapter establishes the origins and character of relationships between globalisation, governance, regionalism and international relations theory. The chapter also presents the major debates on the genesis of the state in Africa and the limitations arising from the imposition of the U.S sponsored cultivation of administrative states.

Chapter Three presents the theoretical underpinning of the study. It defines the way these theories shaped the researcher's cognition of the ontology and epistemology of RI, SF, state functionalism

and PPPs. Additionally, the chapter also outlines the limitations of these theories regarding the development of the three foundational concepts in this thesis namely: RI, SF and PPPs.

Chapter Four is the methodology section of the study. It discusses the theories explicated in Chapter Three and the research philosophy underlining the study. This analysis informs and is followed by a description and a rationale for as well as applications of the various components of research. These include the research design, strategies of inquiry, data collection, sampling, data quality control and data analysis. In this chapter, the case study propositions are linked to data analysis. Chapter Four also highlights multi-faceted triangulation, ethical considerations and limitations of the study.

Chapter Five presents the broad context within which the case studies in this study are located; the Southern Africa region. It presents a historiography of the RI process in Southern Africa, examines the nature of regional and continental bodies that have emerged from and govern the process. Finally, the chapter presents the conceptual basis for investigating the correlational relationship and/or causal relationship between ranges of variables constituting various governance indices. The rationale is a statement of the assumptions governing the relationship between variables examined in the quantitative analysis of the confluence between RI, FS and PPPs.

Chapters Six, Seven and Eight present the background, findings and analysis of the three-country units of analysis: of Botswana, Malawi and South Africa. The chapters discuss state formation, economy, politico-administrative, and the foreign relations context within which the analysis of the study propositions was made. The chapters also present the qualitative findings and the specific and individual country analysis of the findings presented along the case study propositions.

Chapter Nine discusses conclusions from the cross-case analysis of the country findings. It presents outputs from analysis of the supposed (as in the case study supposition) correlations and causal relationships among politico-administrative (SF) and PPP proxy variables (business environment). The chapter offers conclusions on the validity of the suppositions that are derived from the literature review and qualitative and quantitative findings.

Chapter Ten, the final chapter is a culmination of arguments and proposals conceived in tandem with the objective to create endogenously driven and pragmatic concepts of regionalism and statecraft favourable to the development of PPPs in Southern Africa.

1.12 Summary of the Chapter

This chapter laid the foundation for the study by delineating the research problem, research questions and research objectives. The chapter illustrated the wide and broad definitions and measures that currently dominate the literature on RI, its relationship to SF and PPPs. The chapter highlighted the major thrust of the inquiry which in specific terms seeks to examine the significance of ideology on the architecture of state and regional polities and the implications for PPPs. The chapter also outlined the IPE historical and contemporary dimensions pertaining thereto. In addition, an overview of the research methodology employed was provided as were underlying assumptions, operational definitions and chapter inventory. Having established the ideological and architectural dilemmas and questions driving the study, further inquiry into the mainstream and exogenous conceptualisations of global and regional governance. This discussion unfolds in Chapter Two.

2.0 CHAPTER TWO: ORTHODOX PARADIGMS OF GLOBAL AND REGIONAL GOVERNANCE

2.1 Introduction

This chapter explores the historical and contemporary traditional ideologies shaping international relations, regionalism and public governance. It outlines the relevant major debates around the orthodox theoretical propositions and their attendant deficiencies. The chapter is dominated by analyses of debates on IR theory and its relationship to globalisation, regionalism and governance. Due inference is made to the chronological evolution of IR theory, historical reflections that informed its origins and the contemporary dominance of positivism and post-positivist epistemologies. Accordingly, the chapter presents the researcher's conceptualisation of the implications of these traditional/orthodox paradigms, on state craft and RI. In locating these implications within the national polity, the researcher examines various notions of sovereignty, alluding to the centrality of the concept when examining the depth of integration by states in a union. Finally, the chapter introduces the concept of the administrative state as a dominant American statecraft ideology shaping modern democracies.

2.2 Globalisation and Regionalisation

An examination of exogenous ideological influence on regionalism and statecraft in Southern Africa necessitates an inquiry into the role of global governance and globalisation. The first, global governance, is a particularly relevant notion in that it is considered to encompass the universal tenets under which all other political communities are expected to subscribe to. Global governance is thus defined as "any purposeful activity intended to "control" or influence someone else that either occurs in the arena occupied by nations or, occurring at other levels, projecting influence into that arena (Finkelstein, 1995. p. 368). Global governance is also defined as "governing, without sovereign authority, relationships that transcend national frontiers. Global governance is doing internationally what governments do at home" (Finkelstein, 1995. p. 369). Such definitions confer a subordinate position to regionalism and may instigate an inquiry into the influence of global governance on regionalism. This subordination is enabled by two major perceived benefits of joining international organisations. According to Abbott and Snidal (1998, p. 4), centralization and independence are the two key reasons why states join international organisations and, in this instance, allow to subject themselves to a global governance regime. On one hand, centralization refers to the collective activities through a concrete and stable organisation structure and supportive administrative apparatus. Such a mechanism increases

efficiency and the ability to effect understandings, the environment and interests of states. Independence on the other hand, refers to the ability to act with autonomy within defined spheres and the capacity to operate as a neutral in managing interstate disputes and conflicts. (Abbot and Snidal, 1998. p. 5). These benefits and value of international organisations, is congruent to the realist view of the state in IR. A perspective arguably exogenous to southern Africa but one that underlines the logic of international organisations.

Globalisation is the single most resilient feature of IPE in modern history. Two prominent scholars of international relations Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye (2000, p. 105) have defined globalisation as "a state of the world involving networks of interdependence at multi-continental distances" The linkages, Keohane and Nye (2000, p. 105) argue, happens by the movement of goods and capital, people, information, ideas, and environmentally such as in acid rain, or biologically through pathogens and related substances.

However, while Keohane and Nye (2000, p. 117) treat globalisation as a continually prevalent phenomenon, sociologists such as Justin Rosenberg (2005) and Naim (2002) claim that the "age of globalisation is unexpectedly over" (McGrew, 2014, p. 226). Rosenberg (2005) extends this argument citing that international developments have rendered globalisation irrelevant as a term of reference. Rosenberg (2005) notes that current events such as:

> The stymieing of the Kyoto Protocol, the crippling of the International Criminal Court, and the multiple crises of the international organizations (UN, NATO, EU) in the run-up to the second Iraq war have been dominated by the very opposite process: a vigorous re-assertion of great power national interests. And the talk is therefore now more and more of unilateralism and even empire, and less and less of 'multilateralism' and global governance" (Rosenberg, 2005, p. 42).

This argument is made against an understanding of globalisation as, the opening up of the world to a whole new phenomenon of inter-connectedness, multiple systems of 'global governance' which transcend the apex of international politics. The result of this new form is widening of economic liberalization, emergence of improved and better ICTs, the increased importance of international organizations, and the re-emergence of transnational human rights agenda (Westway, 2012, p. 63)

If Rosenberg's (2005) claims are common observations on the question of globalisation, then the suggestion that regionalism is a distinguishable and reactionary process to that of globalisation warrants a discussion.

Within the community of international relations, the relationship between globalisation and regionalisation has been extensively deliberated and studied by affiliates of the Commission of History of International Relations. Commission of History of International Relations was set up in 1981 by academics and acknowledged as an internal body by the International Committee of Historical Sciences (I.C.H.S.). "The Commission is devoted to fostering and enhancing the widest scientific collaboration among historians of 'international life' as understood in its widest sense" (Husnuoglu & Altinel, 2012, p. 130). At its 2000 session on Globalisation, Regionalisation and the History of International Relations Canavero, Pizzetti, and Valentre (2000) remarked that:

> "It is a very widespread notion that in recent times the world has been going through an ever-more marked process of "globalisation." At the same time, it has been observed, there is a parallel, marked movement towards "regionalisation": "regions" in this context are to be seen either as internal divisions within existing states, or as larger areas than present states, extended on a more or less continental scale" (Canavero, Pizzetti, and Valentre, 2000)
>
> This helps historicize regionalism. During the 1981 CHIR, session, a variety of perspectives was shared. Husnuoglu & Altinel, (2012, p. 130). argue that "globalisation leaves aside market economies, dismantles national states and institutions, cloning production systems by the rupture of any relation between 'culture and production systems', and that, finally, it de-territorialises the basic existence of the communities". Husnuoglu & Altinel, (2012, p. 130) conclude that "the construction of process of RI rooted in the meso-region dimension appears to be the best alternative to globalisation and the adequate answer to the new demands on internationalisation in the 21st century". According to Husnuoglu and Altinel, regionalisation is the natural antidote to the challenges of globalisation (Ibid).

For Africa, "two trends currently characterise international economic relations. On the one hand, there are processes of globalisation, that is, an increasing integration of relatively free factor markets by international trade, financial, information and culture flows. On the other hand, within the broader tendency of world-wide trade liberalisation, there is a renewed interest in economic regionalism and the formation of trade blocs" (Husnuoglu and Altinel, 2012, p. 130). These scholars further argue that:

> The African continent is largely by-passed by the first trend. Although generally forced to adopt more liberal trade regimes by structural adjustment policies, Africa was largely excluded from the dynamism of recent globalization and thus it is confronted by an even more dramatic marginalization in world trade. However, it seems that Africa is fully participating in the second trend in world economies, that is, in regionalization.

According to Husnuoglu and Altinel's (2012, p. 131) linear characterisation of the relationship between globalisation and regionalisation, the latter is a subsequent phase of the earlier one.

At a more profound conceptual level, the discourse on globalisation and regionalisation has raised questions about the integrity of notions such as the nation state and the acclaimed centrality of nation states in global politics. Ferguson submits that how "we view the state today as more or less viable depends significantly on how 'the state' is to be defined and what states we are considering. Many social scientists are increasingly inclined to treat 'nation' separately from 'state', and many hold that 'states' existed long before Westphalia and the modern concept of sovereignty" (Ferguson and Mansbach, 2012, p. 8). Ferguson (2000, p. 28) raises the question, what exactly does the concept of sovereignty involve? absolute authority, control of selected domains, or simply a claim or claims to authority? Ferguson and Mansbach (2012, p. 13) invite scholars of "global politics to think of the world as 'political space' – 'polities' and consider that politics transcends territory". Here the researcher notes Ferguson and Mansbach's (2012) negation of sovereignty as a relevant concept in the dynamic of global politics.

Ferguson and Mansbach (2012, p. 42) discuss "the extent to which these processes have existed since ancient times". In the view of these scholars, "political space has always been inhabited by a variety of polities/authorities that layer, overlap, interact, and nest" (Ibid., p. 42). Ferguson and Mansbach (2012, p. 5) add that "many types of polities like empires, regional polities (kingdoms), cities, artificial kinship groups like tribes or ethnic nations, firms, and families have persisted (as types) across the centuries, while the sovereign state assumed centre stage only in a relatively brief Westphalian era in Europe". In the 21st century, the issue of politics as a global phenomenon is to some extent unprecedented. Moreover, modern-day global politics have some complexities that somehow has similarities with human history other than that of the state-centric period. With this line of thinking, "the geo-apolitical world map becomes increasingly complex and, arguably, much more accurate than the familiar one of neat sovereign-state boxes, helping to place the contemporary discussions about globalization and regionalization in context" (Ferguson and Mansbach, 2012, p. 18).

There are however, practitioners and academics who now seek to establish mutually accommodative perspectives. For example, Zajontz (2013, p. 36) opines that "determining how regionalism and globalization can coexist and be conduits for, rather than hindrances to, growth and development in Africa" is the most pertinent aspect of this relationship. Zajontz (2013, p. 38) calls this relationship the "weave-world of regionalisation and globalisation."

The relationship between globalisation and regionalism as "two articulated within the same larger process of global structural transformation, the outcome of which depends on a dialectical rather than linear development" (in Zajontz, 2013, p.35). Zajontz argues that "the relative strength of the contending social forces involved in the two processes deeply affect the stability of the Westphalian state system; and therefore, they at the same time contribute to both disorder and, possibly, a future world order" (Zajontz, 2013, p. 40). Zajontz therefore sees the two processes as part of one process, both with profound bearing on the state. Within this discourse, Zajontz (2013, pp. 13-14) introduces the notion of globalism that he defines as "programmatic globalization, the vision of a borderless world". The force behind globalism according to Zajontz (2013, pp. 13-14) is an economic imperative; "the growth of a world market, increasingly penetrating and dominating the 'national' economies, which in the process are bound to lose some of their 'nationness'". Globalism, Zanjontz (2013, pp. 13-14) argues, therefore "means dominance of the world market over structures of local production, as well as the increasing prevalence of Western-type consumerism".

In the case of Africa, globalism has been explicitly expressed within the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) RI framework. In his examination of NEPAD, Olympio (2013) states that "NEPAD defines a strengthening of African regional markets as a stepping stone to greater integration into the global economy, and not as a goal in itself" (Olympio, 2013, pp. 501-502). Furthermore, Olympio (2013, p. 501) highlights that NEPAD does not take cognisance of RI as a fundamental need for Africa; this he posits "is neither defined by liberalisation nor market mechanisms, but which nurtures first and foremost a policy, an institutional and instrumental framework which will allow the regional market to function." Olympio (2013, p.502) then proceeds to assert that "NEPAD claims that its agenda is 'based on national and regional priorities and development plans' that ought to be prepared through participatory processes involving the people" and yet there is no visible evidence of occurrence.

In contrast, Zajontz (2013, p. 20) submits that the pre-eminence of the market in globalism, the same of which is manifest in the case of NEPAD as argued by Olympio (2013, pp. 501-502) above has necessitated the emergence of a new form of regionalism. Zajontz argues that the dominance of world market structures characterised by western-type consumerism can lead to the emergence of "a political will to halt or to reverse the process of globalisation, in order to safeguard some degree of territorial control and cultural diversity. One way of achieving such a change could be through the New Regionalism" (Zajontz, 2013, p. 20).

New regionalism assertions advanced by scholars such as Hettne and Melber (2002) have exogenous ideological foundations informed by American and European experiences. Melber

(2002, p. 26) and Hettne (2016: xviii-xxxii) present five characteristics of new regionalism; 1) multi-polarity; 2) state initiated; 3) open regionalism; 4) multidimensionality and 5) extra nation state. Each is discussed in turn.

The first aspect of 'multi-polarity' refers to the new world order context based on multi-polar power centricism replacing the old bipolar Cold War order and the subsequent American hegemony, which is in apparent decline. New regionalism is evolving within this new world order context and thus has a distinctly new alignment from the old hegemonic regionalism. The second characteristic 'state-initiated' regionalism refers to the shift in the origins from a top-down superpower driven formation to a spontaneous intra-regional organic formation. Hetnne (1996, p. 5) argue that this aspect renders regionalism as "one way of coping with global transformation, since most states lack the capacity and the means to manage such a task on the national level". The characteristics 'open regionalism', refers to the changing policy preference towards an open regional working towards integration into the global, enhancing compatibility with an interdependent world economy. This contrasts with the old regionalism that was predominantly invested in protectionism often underlined by nationalism and sovereignty. There exists however, a dichotomy within this aspect in that the notion of preferential treatment of members is still considered essential. Hetnne (1996, p. 10) question how the difference between the fundamentals of multi-lateralism and the larger independent regionalist unease are balanced.

The fourth characteristic 'multidimensionality' refers to the expanding breadth of integration moving from singular objectives such as security or economic based alone to comprehensive regional frameworks encompassing several issues such as climate change, social policy, immigration and others. The fifth and last characteristic 'extra nation state' refers to the growing inclusion of non-state actors who function at various levels within the global system in determining regionalism. There is in new regionalism a clear shift from an exclusive focus on relations between states to a broader agency. Leslie (2002, p. 21) conclude that "the new regionalism includes economic, political, social and cultural aspects, and goes far beyond free trade, and that rather, the political ambition of establishing regional coherence and regional identity seems to be of primary importance" (Ibid.). These scholars further submit that this new regionalism can to some extent be related to globalisation, and thus it cannot be seen through the sole lens of a single region. Rather, it should be defined as a world order concept, since any process of regionalisation in any part of the world has systemic repercussions on other regions. Leslie (2002, p. 21) suggest that globalisation as defined by the new world order and its power structure will be determined by and yield distinct types of regions borne out of 'new regionalism'.

New regionalism could be viewed and interpreted from an African endogenously driven perspective with certain adaptations that fit the African context. One of the purported significant aspects of this study, is that it aims to transform elements of the RI agenda, yielding indigenous, pragmatic politico-administrative forms with potentially higher political and socio-economic returns to the people in the region. But more pertinently, this study seeks to pursue this aim by generating endogenous alternatives. It is the individual and particular character or type of 'new regionalism' conceived from a measured endogenous consideration of new regionalism aspects that this study seeks to uncover to inform the case of Southern Africa. A pertinent aspect of the contribution to the knowledge of this study is therefore a different concept of new regionalism that is embedded in endogenous experience and interpretation. It is envisaged that such a reformulation would redefine the fine aspects of new regionalism and/or introduce additional aspects. Such a new regionalism should be constructed and interpreted against the historical foundations and IR and regionalism and the relationship of these concepts to African trajectories or the lack thereof.

2.3 Historical Foundations of International Relations and Regionalism

Having examined the relationship between globalisation and regionalism, the researcher necessarily interrogates the theoretical genesis and influences driving these phenomena. Both regionalism and globalisation occur within the dynamic of interstate dealings and thus accordingly concern relations between states. The discipline that governs such relationship in their entirety has been termed, international relations. Here the researcher notes the deliberate focus on the nation (international) versus state (interstate). International Relations is a relatively new discipline in the social sciences. "As an autonomous field of study in political science, (IR) is a twentieth century invention that began on the margins of the broader study of politics" (Levine, 2012, p. 277). Jackson and Sørensen (2016, p. 4) "emphasize that "the IR field is interdisciplinary, relating international politics to economics, history, sociology, and other disciplines". The confirmation of this interdisciplinary nature according to these two scholars is the fact that "IR is typically divided into other subfields such as international relations theory, international security, international law and organisation, and IPE" (Ibid.). It is critical to highlight that this interdisciplinary character and its unique orchestration of various disciplines makes it scientifically imperative for this study to adopt a multi-inter-transdisciplinary approach. As will be elaborated in Chapter Four, this character necessitates the consideration of interpretivist research paradigms.

Historically, since the inception of IR as a discipline in the aftermath of the First World War, it has been highly challenged with questions raised about its subject matter, the aims of its study, appropriate methodologies, the study of the international phenomena, and epistemological questions such as how its knowledge ought to be generated (Burchill, Linklater, Devetak, Donnelly, Nardin, Paterson, Reus-Smit, and True, 2013, pp. 1-10).

According to Moloi (2016, p. 243) "the idea of a discipline called International Relations conveys a notion of a field of knowledge whose scope and constituency is international – about and constructed by peoples all over the world". Recently, "almost all (if not the entire) literature of this academic discipline is a typical platform wherein the Eurocentric driven 'master- narratives' have become consolidated, as the norm". Moloi (2016, p. 243) asserts that since IR emerged as a separate discipline at the University of Wales (in 1919), it has failed to take into consideration view points from the Global South. The same omissions are true of the Far East. Among these realities are the colonial legacy and the neo-colonial IPE (Ibid.).

Assertions about the obsolete nature of conventional and critical IR to the Southern African experience, have been advanced by Smith, Owens and Baylis (2013, pp. 6-7), Mgonja and Makombe (2007); Qin (2007) and Tickner and Blaney (2013, pp. 1-2). Generally, these scholars submit the view that IR by itself is a legacy of colonialism and/or imperialism, and as such the discipline fails, in turn, to address all forms of colonial legacies. The word 'colonialism' is used with due regard to the suggestion that as a discourse, westerners have the prerogative to examine other cultures and therefore generate power-based knowledge that can be "deployed against the very subjects of inquiry" (Tickner & Blaney, 2013, pp. 1-2). In conformity with this suggestion, Tickner and Blaney (2013, pp.1-2) further argue that "IR as a discipline does not assess the quality of cultural interactions and differences that shape and are shaped by the changing structures and processes of the international system".

Because of the domination by American and European scholarship, IR has "methodological problems associated with the international knowledge-power confluence which must be confronted to overcome Eurocentricity and *'decolonise'* the discipline, so as to stop privileging marginalised perspectives on the basis of normative commitments" (Mimaki, 2011, pp.112-117).

In his paper to the 2004 Annual Conference of the International Association for Critical Realism at Cambridge University, Mimaki 2011, pp. 112-117) argued that:

> Critical social inquiry should retain a commitment to objectivity, taking the form of explanatory critique, which exposes the flaws in dominant ideologies through providing

> more adequate accounts of the global historical constitution of social realities throughout the world". (Mimaki, 2011, pp.112-117).

To historicise IR, Mimaki (2011 pp. 112-117) cites other prominent IR scholars such as Holsti (1985) who collaborate this bias stating that most of the investigation in the field has been dominated by the American and British intellectual condominium. Mimaki (2011 p. 116) emphasises that addressing the problem of 'American and British intellectual condominium' includes confronting remaining underlying questions concerned with power, knowledge production, the idea of truth, the meaning of critical, and "the role of ideas in the reproduction of unequal relations of social power". Mimaki (2011 p. 116) adds that in answering these questions, "we find a glaring manifestation of the reproduction of global inequalities in the discipline of IR when we consider who produces much of the published work in IR". This thesis seeks to provide alternatives approaches in the reproduction of IR knowledge, and therefore, contribute to the elimination of privileged forms generated by the American and British intellectual condominium, herein referred to as the Trans-Atlantic Alliance.

According to Zajontz (2013, pp.45-47) "Eurocentrism tends to view its object as lacking in a capacity to comprehend their own history as a step in taking the initiative to making it. In this sense, eurocentrism mutilates the experience of both the West and of the rest, mythologizing the former and caricaturing the latter". In the case of Southern Africa, the South African Apartheid regime and colonial administrations, reflect such caricature.

The problem of Eurocentricity on the political economy of Southern Africa remains one of the major areas of interest in this inquiry and cannot be overemphasised. Subsequent chapters on the architecture of SADC demonstrate how Eurocentric theory; neo-functionalism, intergovernmentalism and federalism, considered within linear RI model, continues to drive the agenda. These privileged conceptualisations colonise definitions and measurements, affecting the evaluation of the relationships between RI, statecraft and PPPs. The bias towards economic analysis notwithstanding, these exogenously conceived notions, concepts and frameworks (Eurocentric – of the American and British intellectual condominium discount the pertinent African domestic, endogenous, historical and socio-political dimensions or experience. As Landau (2012, p.298) insists, the discounting of the domestic, endogenous dimensions, has itself evolved into an industry and this is significantly evident with Africanists – scholars of Africa using non-African epistemologies. Landau (2012, p. 298) states:

> "The marginality of African knowledge is evident even in scholarly communication networks that call themselves Africanist. Overseen by gatekeepers located in well-

> endowed universities, the Africanist intellectual system, which is firmly rooted in a Western epistemological order and an academic culture driven by a ruthless ethos of 'publish or perish', and consisting of multinational publishing houses, university presses, journals, peer-review networks, citation and bibliographic conventions, has little room for the alien views, voices, and visions emanating from Africa itself. On this scholarly treadmill, Africa appears nothing more than a research object to verify faddish theories that emerge with predictable regularity in the channel-surfing intellectualism of Northern academies" (Landau, 2012, p. 298).

To remedy these epistemological anomalies there is a need for commitment to objectivity in social inquiry, and this implies both the possibility of, and a responsibility for, an 'epistemological internationalism' (Mimaki, 2012, pp. 112-117). Similarly, Collier (2003) argues that it is important to escape from the bias of one's own subjectivity and one's own historical place, to present a more adequate and comprehensive account of reality through social inquiry. Thus, a criticism of dominant ideologies which misrepresent the world and serve narrow interests is necessary. All these misrepresentations characterise Eurocentricity. As Mimaki (2012, p. 112-117) further submits, the problem of Eurocentricity in international relations is not straightforward or easy to overcome, the different perspectives and underlying assumptions require different solutions. Mimaki (2012, p 113) highlights that it is therefore helpful to reflect systematically on underlying questions of method in social inquiry, before embarking on the moment of substantive critique and reconstruction of a 'decolonised' non-Eurocentric knowledge of the world.

The interest of this study in the 'known' history of IR, therefore, is the pursuit of 'epistemological internationalism', and this necessarily involves examining how its absence has propagated the paradigm of westernised IR in Southern Africa regionalism.

Albeit his Eurocentric character, the researcher examines the historicism of IR as currently manifested. Griffiths (2011, p. 9) echos Armstrong's (1995) submission that IR "developed as a distinct discipline both as a response to events like the two World Wars and the Cold War and because there were certain phenomena – war, diplomacy, strategy, international law, the balance of power, the numerous ramifications of sovereignty – that were inadequately, or not at all, treated elsewhere in the social sciences"..

However, Griffiths (2011, pp. 9-10) goes on to argue that today, in the twenty-first century, war is no longer the main justification for IR to be a separate discipline, required to provide a hierarchy of issues that need to be studied under it. Griffiths (2011, p. 10) adds that there is a wider range

of issues today that demands attention and an increase of worldviews is as a result of a rise in the number of issues that each worldview seeks to privilege. Worldview, as defined by Griffiths (2011, p. 2), "is a broad interpretation of the world and an application of this view to the way in which we judge and evaluate activities and structures that shape the world".

When examining these worldviews according to Griffiths (2011, p. 2), it is necessary to have a deliberate focus on specific problems and issues they seek to privilege, which can be definitively identified with specific schools of thought. Specifically, Griffiths (2011, pp. 3-4) contends that:

> Thus, for realists, war between states remains the central problem. For liberal internationalists, the unequal distribution of political freedom for individuals is the problem. For Marxists, the central issue is the injustice of global capitalism and the stratification of class on a global scale. For critical theorists, it is the needless suffering caused not just by capitalism but also by other dynamics of modernity at the global level. Constructivists focus less on substantive issues than the broader problem of how changes in states' identities and interests can shift the culture of IR from one of conflict to one of cooperation. Members of the 'English School' are broadly united by a shared concern with the history, dynamics, and future of something called 'international society'. Feminists are inspired by the ideal of gender equality and outraged by the global consequences of what they regard as the gendered character of the modern sovereign state. Post-structuralists are interested in the processes and practices that make it possible to even conceive of the domain of 'international relations' as a distinct field of political practice. Finally, post-colonial theorists are interested in the stories, identities, and forms of political emancipation available to the marginalized members of the global South" (Griffiths, 2011, pp. 3-4).

Although this study borrows from all the above perspectives and theories in mapping out the history of IR, for purposes of indigenisation, the researcher dwells instead on post-colonialism because of its congruency with a transdisciplinary stance Pan-Africanism. The underlying post-colonial assumption according to Tickner and Blaney (2013, pp.1-2) stipulates that today's world is nested in inequality, and the cause of this is the division between the Global North and the Global South.

Post-colonial scholars, Tickner and Blaney (2013, pp.1-2) contend, "regard the way in which the west paved its passage to the orient and the rest of the world as based on mystified truths". In summary, Tickner and Blaney (2013, pp. 2) submit that modernism and modernity are two facets of post-colonial theory which are inherent in the colonial institutionalisation process project of

domination. This is an important feature of postcolonialism, as it aims to unwrap all the legacies of both colonialism and imperialism, in ensuring the transformation of international order, as well as associated notions of community, society and morality (Ibid.). This order in IR has been characterised as:

> "An intellectual and policy agenda that, in the last quarter of the twentieth century, still resonates with cultural, political, and gendered privilege and narrowly conceived images of global reality. Its critical status, consequently, is related to a discursive regime of exclusion, silence, and intolerance that, as "International Relations", reduces a complex and turbulent world to a patterned and rigidly ordered framework of understanding, derived from a particular representation of post-Renaissance European historical experience, articulated in orthodox Anglo-American philosophical terms" (Tickner & Blaney, 2013, pp. 1-2).

From a postcolonial perspective, a critique of the Eurocentric nature and character of IR discipline as argued by Tickner and Blaney (2013), assert that, regardless of the emphasis of these concerns by postcolonial scholarship, criticism of Eurocentrism remains largely ignored in IR discourse, and IR scholars must appreciate that, as internationalists, it is implausible to claim universality while excluding most parts of the world. These scholars conclude that in examining the history of IR, we must appreciate that the universally applicable categories claimed by the West are their own regional ideas which are often accepted as universal truths because of the West's economic and military power status (Ibid., pp. 1-20). These ideological deficiencies provoke the study of IR from an African epistemological perspective since African epistemologies differ substantively and procedurally from westernised epistemologies (Ruffin, 2017, p. 2). This will begin to address the historical misconception and traditions in the IR discipline.

2.4 International Relations and Governance

A comprehensive treatment of the relationship between international relations and governance has been undertaken by Joseph (2012, p. 128). While assessing some of the wide approaches to governance in IR, Joseph (2012, p. 128) challenges the past dominant position of IR frameworks that are strongly linked to the study of the subject with a realist position; in order words, nation states' desire to compete and contest each other is the sole dynamic of global politics. After acknowledging the primacy of globalisation in the analysis of, IR, Levi-Faur, (2012, p. 688) submits that "IR is about more than the zero-sum contests of nation states. It involves a range of

other actors – international organisations, non-governmental bodies (NGOs), public-private agencies, and indeed, at the broadest level, civil society" (2012, p. 128). The complexities in this operating environment mean that one nation may not be the sole influence and that there may be a need to factor governance without government. In this regard, on the one hand, Levi-Faur (2012, p. 688) submits three pertinent considerations in this relationship between IR and governance. Firstly, globalisation gives rise to the complexity and ambiguity in governance processes. Secondly, there are multiple actors and institutions involved in global governance and finally nation states have adapted due to the influence of global governance.

On the other hand, Graf (2013, p. 2-3) raises three main issues regarding power and relationships in governance: "firstly, state power in the context of globalisation and global governance; second, the fairness of the global architecture of governance; and third, the hegemony of Anglo-American ideology, principally neoliberalism, over globalisation".

Taken together, Levi-Faur's (2012, p. 689) considertations and Graf's (2013, p. 2-3) issues turn on the question of the role of the state in a global era that includes participation of non-state actors as indicated by Rogers (2016, p. 44); Ferguson and Mansbach (2012, p. 42; 2007, p. 531) as well as other scholars earlier discussed. As to the role of the state in global governance, Levi-Faur, (2012, p. 10) first posits this as whether the state is coming to an end or that western neoliberalism has come to dominate global governance. Weiss, Seyle and Coolidge (2013, p. 5) contribute to this debate by arguing that the increasing diversity of actors on the global stage and shifts in ways they interact and behave means that the study of IR increasingly appears to be handled externally and away from the conventional realist model. Most notable in this assertion is Piersen (2013, p. 153-155) who challenges the need "to conceptualise how states are embedded in increasingly transnational social structures and how key socio-economic constituencies of non-state actors are integrated into the institutional processes of states within the IPE (IPE) approach".

Of relevance to Graf's (2013, p. 2-3) notions about state power, globalisation and global governance, are the assertions made by Amoore (2011, p. 16) on the impact of globalisation on IR and governance. Amoore (2011, p. 16) argues that previously, nation states primarily competed for territory and resources, but the dynamics have changed and now nations primarily compete for markets, with which Mathews (2012, p. 284) agrees. Economic interests and policy now integrate with political and security interest leading states to become more willing to share power with non-state, international and multi-national actors. Similarly, Strange (1995, p. 55 page) argues that "consequently tacit premises about the state as the most important unit of analysis, in that much of Western social science, is obsolescent, if not yet quite out-of-date". With this Mair (2014, p. 58) concurs. Arguably, the state is one of many other actors in IR and global governance,

including non-state actors. Therefore, in this study states are units of analysis, but non-state actors are among the subunits of analysis.

The decline of state-centrism is collaborated by current direction of IR scholarship, which claims that states are now more open to non-state actor influences than previous systems. For example, Archibugi, Koenig-Archibugi, Marchetti, (2011, p. 31-35) and Erkilla (2012 p.?) argue that nation-states now have had to rethink how to apply systems of governance and administration to accommodate other actors in managing joint state affairs. Erkilla (2012) also highlights the significance of other social actors that have been ignored in realism and neorealism literature.

In contrast, Drezner (2007, p.254), brings in a different dimension to the debate, that of the position of state power in the scholarly investigation of IR. This scholar contends that, "despite globalisation, states, particularly the United States (U.S.) and member states of the European Union, still dominate international regulatory regimes so much so that the goals and policies of these regimes are driven by the domestic interests of the great powers". International economic, financial and political governance systems are therefore inherently defined by Trans-Atlantic interests. Hence, institutions such as the UN, WB, IMF, the World Economic Forum, Freedom House, Fund for Peace, Transparency International, Standard and Poor's, Finch, Moody's Investor Services, the World Trade Organisation, the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Dispute, have all arguably been defined by realist theory.

Damro (2012, p. 690) concludes therefore that, "governance is driven by power and not the search for a consensus among all state and non-state players". Damro's (2012, p. 690) observation is that "when discussing state power in relation to global governance it is essential to remember that some states are considerably more powerful than others". (.

Literature shows that the value of state-centrism in IR is controversial as is the role of the state in global governance. Therefore, it is unclear whether the state remains the single most significant actor in the dynamic of global governance from an IR realist theory perspective (Baylis, Smith, and Owens, 2013). Rather, other IR theories such as institutionalism, constructivism (Applefield, Huber, and Moallem, 2001) and postcolonial approaches (Matin, 2013) contest realism and neorealism (Griffiths, 2007). Perhaps the extent to which a predominance of realism theory exists also serves to legitimise the Westphalian state, which also persists in post-colonial Africa. By declaring the state (as conceived by the 17th century Europe), as the central actor in dealings across and within continents, all other polities are relegated secondary considerations. With the pre-eminence of the Westphalian state and the concomitant predominance of realism IR theory such scholars as Rogers (2016, p. 44); Ferguson and Mansbach (2012, pp. 5, 13; 2007, p. 531); Rosenau

(1990, p. 97) have disagreed over time. Nevertheless, power relations, whether such relations are between states or among and between states and non-state actors, remain central to the epistemology of IR.

An examination of the question of state power *vis-à-vis* globalisation and IR, calls for attention to the hegemony of neoliberalism and the effect it has had on perceptions of state power. So, while the standing of state power is a key tenet, current global trends negate its complete effect. On the one hand, Holton (2011) points to four aspects supposedly undermine the nation state:

> First is capitalism (global, transnational, post-industrial, informational, consumerist, neoliberal and restructured); second new global limits (environmental and population threats), too broad and menacing to be handled by the nation state alone; third, identity politics and new social movements, using new technology, have increased the salience of diverse local and transnational identities at the expense of both national identities and those broad class identities which were previously handled by the nation state alone; and fourth, post-nuclearism which undermines state sovereignty and 'hard geopolitics' since mass mobilisation warfare that underpinned much of modern state expansion is now irrational (2011, pp. 121-123).

On the other hand, Holton, argues that, "the state continues not only to be relevant, but central, to the processes of globalisation and global governance" (2011, p. 121). Holton (2011, pp. 122-123) further argues that "State institutions, both domestic and geopolitical still have causal efficacy because they do provide the necessary conditions for social existence, especially the regulation of those aspects of social life that are distinctively territorially centred". In Southern Africa, this assertion is relevant and will be discussed later in the thesis.

Additionally, Sassen (2015, p.163) supports Holton's (2011, pp. 121-123) later argument employing the East Asia experience in illustrating possible "positive connection between 'high state-ness' and success in a globalising economy". Sassen (2015, p. 163) points out that "private transnational actors, however pre-eminent, need competent, capable states to achieve their goals and preserve their returns". Sassen (2015, p. 163) further submits that, "While globalisation does make it harder for states to exercise economic initiative, it also increases both the potential returns from effective state action and the costs of incompetence". In the final analysis, it appears that "despite the apparent hegemony of the neoliberal ideology which by many accounts downplays the centrality of the state in global governance, there is growing support for the notion that governance involves positive sum relationships between the state and other non-state actors, both from the market and civil society" (Sassen, 2015, p. 163). Hence, the role of the state in global

governance is perceived has having different degrees of meanings and significance as shown by the various scholars discussed thus far. Thinking about the earlier discussion in section 2.2 and Levi-Faur (2012, p. 588) points that globalisation has infused complexity and ambiguity into governance processes, to which states have had to adapt, suggests that the role of the state in global governance is necessary but not sufficient for world order.

The assertions by Sassen (2015, p. 163) however, do not discount the influence of neoliberal ideology on global governance. As Maloi submits, "the processes of globalisation, which serve as the essential context for global governance, are underpinned by the hegemony of the Anglo-American ideology, principally neoliberalism" Graff (2013, pp. 104-107). This submission returns the discussion to issues raised by Graff (2013, p. 2-3), about "the fairness of the global architecture of governance" and "the hegemony of Anglo-American ideology, principally neoliberalism, over globalisation". These two issues are interdependent in that, arguably the Trans-Atlantic Alliance affects the fairness or unfairness of the global architecture of governance. In other words, if regions such as Southern Africa are perceived as peripheral to core states and ordered in accordance with westernised practices promoted by the Trans-Atlantic Alliance through neoliberalism, how can the global architecture of governance be fair? Is globalisation the essential context or catalyst for global governance or are they mutually competing processes and what are the implications for global South countries? Gray and Murphy (2015, pp. 1-10) question the potential of global governance in altering the 'western bias' also referred to as the 'northern bias'. These are matters with which this study is likewise concerned despite the unresolved conceptual and dominant normative debates that abound.

Finally, within the normative debates are the propositions made by Payne, (2005), who offers a framework for broadening global governance that cautions against the utopian pursuit of world government and suggests expanding the G7/8 format to include China, India, Brazil, South Africa and others. Payne (2005) continues to insist that this expanded group should frame the membership of the United Nations (UN) Security Council. Payne (2005) insists that the IMF and the WB need to reform and bring balance to voting powers and procedures, just as the World Trade Organisation must ensure that its processes are stronger and underlined by a spirit of consensus decision-making.

These questions of enlarging the G7/8 format, UN Security Council membership and voting procedures of global governance institutions, raises questions of governance and democracy which is next discussed.

2.5 Governance and Democratisation

The past thirty (30) years have witnessed a rapid transformation in governance from other political systems towards democracy. From the mid-1980s to early 1990s, governance has been qualified as "good governance" a term that, according to western governments, is exclusively synonymous with democratisation. Taylor-Gooby (2012, p. 372) argues that "democratisation presents the other great force for change in our world". These scholars draw attention to the fact that in 1974 democracy was not as predominant as it is now with less thirty (30) percent of nations in the world could be termed as democratic. By 1994, the number had increased to sixty (60) percent and by the beginning of the 21st century, the number had significantly increased (Edwards, Halligan, Horrigan, and Nicoll, 2012, pp.11-24).

Recently, some attention in academic circles has been given to the quality of this democratisation process. This has prompted new areas of study on the authenticity of the political developments that have given rise to these changes. For example, according Carothers' (2011, p. 6) observations, "the challenge is that western governments largely interpret democratization as multiparty politics, and there is wide scepticism whether this is either adequate or even appropriate to the needs of the host countries." Africa has featured in many of these debates, where, as a consequence, there has been an artificial representation of democratic governance in many of these African states. An example is given of "the skilful manner in which authoritarian regimes in countries like Ethiopia transformed themselves into dominant parties within façade type multi-party systems" (Ibid.). This perception has led Shelly (2012, p.475) to conclude that, "Multi-Partyism without concomitant social and ideological pluralism would ensure only a farcical democracy".

The Southern African region has not been spared from these rapid transformations in the way states approach governance. This study is interested in these new trends of governance regarding the examination of analytical and conceptual frameworks and perspectives.

As Edwards *et al.* (2012, pp. 11-24) argue, "one reason for growing interest in governance is precisely because established institutional forms of governance appear under challenge, and new forms of governance appear to be emerging." Jamil, Askvik and Dhakal (2013, pp. 226-227) argue that "the contribution of governance perspective to theory is not at the level of causal analysis and nor does it offer new narrative theory, it is in its capacity to provide a framework for understanding changing processes of governing" (Ibid.). These scholars further argue that, the "processes of governance then demand to be understood analytically and empirically as a set of practices, rather than through the lens of a 'wish-list' of principles to be followed." To expound

on this argument, Amdam (2010, pp.1805-1819) presents five propositions that he submits are key to understanding governance. The same comprise the analytical framework of this study.

The five propositions are i) institutional governance; ii) governance as a discipline; iii) governance as interdependence of powers iv) interaction between autonomies; v) the informal power factor. Each is discussed in brief below to outline the precincts upon which the governance framework of this study is derived.

First, comes the framework of institutional governance. "Governance refers to a set of institutions and actors that are drawn from but also beyond government. The message here is to challenge constitutional and formal understanding of systems of government. Increased involvement of private and voluntary sectors in service delivery and strategic decision making" (i.e. contracting out and PPPs) (Amdam, 2010, p 1809). This means that responsibilities formerly exclusive to government have extended to new domains. Amdam (2010, p.1815) validates this perspective with a conclusion from a United Kingdom (UK) study of attitudes towards the objectives, structures and basis of local governance conducted by Miller and Dickson (1996).

Second, there is governance as a discipline. Governance as a discipline seeks to identify the vagueness of margins and responsibilities for solving socio-economic issues in a multi-jurisdictional set up (Admam 2010, p.1814). It addresses the nuances often found in the diffusion and avoidance of responsibility, and the creation of scapegoats, often by policy makers onto private providers. The message here is that governance alters the established status quo in the stability between the state and civil society. Governance as a discipline thus, examines the utility of the welfare state, the balance between rights and responsibilities of the beneficiary and concerns regarding "social capital and the social underpinnings necessary to effective economic and political performance" (Joseph, 2012, p. 139).

Third, governance concerns power interdependence. Hence, governance studies clarify the identities and dynamics in power interdependence between institutions and other actors involved in collective action. It addresses unintended consequences for government arising from commitment to one another between organizations seeking collective action, exchange of resources and negotiations on common purpose, and influences on the rules of the game and context within which the exchange occurs. Governance mediates the challenge that no one entity can command unchallenged even when it dominates a process of exchange Holsti K. (2016, p. 163). It seeks to identify resolutions to the tension between authoritative action and the dependence on compliance and action of others by government as it seeks to privatise its civil responsibilities.

The fourth, there is the precinct of handling the interaction among and between autonomous actors. This assessment of governance lies in the comprehension of roles and responsibilities of actors that are autonomous and self-governed. It addresses the difficulties in identifying issues of accountability within the pursuit of partnerships based on self-governing functions or issue-based groupings (networks). Specifically, it clarifies on the accountability deficit that emerges from member dissatisfaction or exclusion of actors from the network. Jamil *et al*. (2013, pp. 226-227) employ the term regimes to describe the self-governing network characteristics as being stable and having an informal coordination basis and access to institutional resources. Establishing viable regimes is the ultimate act of power in the context of governance. In IR regimes refer to a system of roles and norms agreed upon by states to govern their behaviour in various political contexts and specific areas. In concluding on this governance perspective, Jamil *et al.* (2013) asserts that 'regimes' are the response to governing without government. These arguments have profound implications for questions around states' willingness to surrender sovereignty and depth of integration in terms of regionalism.

Finally, there is the component of informal power. This means that the inquest into governance takes cognisance of the ability of actors to perform tasks; not because of the power of government to command or use its authority. Rather, it elucidates on the informal power dimension. This perspective asserts that governance is designing our institutions in a way that recognizes both the potential and limitations of human knowledge and understanding (Stocker, 1998, p. 26). It addresses the challenge of retooling government and public institutions by proposing some institution design principles. According to Provozin, (2016, p. 6), these design principles must ensure that institutions are: revisable, robust, responsive to complex motivations, defendable to the public and sufficiently variable to encourage innovation. These institutions are capable of a sustainable life but also capable of evolution, learning and adaptation.

This inquiry employs these five propositions in examining and challenging governance orthodoxy. Thus, the perspectives above provide a basis for interrogating governance as a changing dynamic with complex relationships and outcomes, particularly in an African regional context and in a MIT-disciplinary way.

Edwards *et al*. (2012, p. 35) go on to explain that the emergence of governance theory from the early 1990s onwards has been one of the core developments in public administration and more broadly, for that part of political science orientated towards the study of policy-making. Governance became a concept of great interest following two developments over the last three decades: the first being the "extent and degree of globalisation and the second being the triumph of democratic ideals through the spread of basic institutions of democracy" (Edwards *et al.* (2012,

p. 26). In other words, public governance subsumes public administration, public management and public policy-making in global, national and subnational contexts.

In a subsequent section public governance will be discussed in relation to regionalism. For now, with precepts of governance in mind, the discussion turns to the interaction between governance and democratisation

Toward the end of section 2.4, Payne (2008, p. 527) raised questions of democratic governance. The normative debate interrogates how the world works and whether there are ways in which it can work better. Central to this question is the possibility of democratising global governance, a proposition which appears directly opposed to realism worldview. The challenge of who would bear the authority during the process of reordering the world into a democratised global governance regime comes to mind. For instance, in the case of the G8 its greatest weakness as an agency of 'global governance' is its lack of legitimacy. The same questions that often plague discussions on the evolution of the nation state come into play here as well.

The conceptualisation of a global structure for collective governance is complicated by what Stiglitz and Kaldor (2013, p. 358) call "the difficulties of problem-solving at the global level". These scholars cite competing mandates of major global institutions, their lack of capacity to act, their inability to arrive at collective solutions, their accountability deficiencies and the massive scale of power imbalance between actors as major problems (Ibid.). The consequences of competing mandates are further discussed in case study chapters where the researcher examines the coherence of various global indices on political and economic governance.

Also raising concerns about democratised global governance, Szewczyk (2012, p. 463) comments on the structure of the UN:

> The General Assembly membership while also not chosen in free and fair global elections, does represent nearly the entire world. Its resolutions, however even when enacted on designated important issues by the required two-thirds of the 193 members can reflect a small minority of only 11.85% of the global population. In any case, the Assembly has no binding power over the Security Council, moreover, nor is it consulted by the Council. This has given rise to various suggestions to address the Council's lack of a democratic basis" (Szewczyk 2012, p. 463).

Szewczyk's (2012, p. 463) submission demonstrates the point of a "democratic deficit" in global governance. According to Azman (2011, p. 244) historically, the notion of a democratic deficit was introduced by David Marquand to describe weaknesses in the democratic legitimacy of the

European Community institutions in the 1970s. In this context, Azman (2011, p. 248) defines legitimacy as recognition of political system by the citizens. The broader definition of democratic deficit offered by Beetham, Carvalho, Landman, and Weir (2008, p. 81), refers to the substantive and systematic failure to meet international standards of good practice in one or more aspects of a country's democratic life.

This study interrogates the question of democratic deficit in global governance and democratisation from a legitimacy perspective, in the subsequent case-study chapters, when it examines respondents' views on the origins of the so called 'international standards of good governance'. According to Payne (2008, p. 527) political legitimacy of any international organization or set of international arrangements is defined by the following three aspects. First, inclusiveness, referring to wider and more meaningful participation of relevant groups in decision making processes. Second, rule-governance, referring to policy making and implementation underlined by transparency, specific, clear and agreed-upon rules with defined rule interpretation processes. Finally, a fair return, which ensures equitable sharing of liabilities and benefits from cooperative efforts across all those who comply.

It could be that the relationship between public governance and regionalisation could have a positive influence on democratised global governance. That proposition is beyond the contours of this doctoral research. At any rate, the next section examines the relationship between public governance and regionalisation before specifically discussing the administrative state.

2.6 Public Governance and Regionalisation

As earlier indicated, governance occurs across various geographical scales including global, supranational (regional), national and sub-national (provincial, state, local, sublocal). In this section, the researcher examines the concepts, thinking and trends that have informed governance theory. This includes examining the origins and multiple perspectives that define governance with inference and reference to the politico-administrative framework of regionalism and statecraft. The discussion then proceeds to identify the best suited frame of perspectives needed for an analysis of the role and effect of governance in the confluence between RI, SF and PPPs.

The understanding of public governance relative to the dynamic of regionalisation is consequential to this study. It informs analyses aimed at meeting two research objectives pertaining to the creation of new knowledge. First, the understanding of governance helps to deconstruct exogenously driven meanings and create endogenous knowledge systems and/or paradigms on the confluence of RI, SF and PPPs. Secondly, understanding governance allows

one to recognise the transforming elements of the RI agenda, yielding endogenous and pragmatic politico-administrative forms with potentially higher political and socio-economic returns. Such secondary evidence is subsequently tested during the analysis of primary data in the case study chapters.

Drawing from the twentieth century, the Commission on Global Governance (1995, p. 4) defines governance as an aggregation of ways individual and institutional actors, public and private, manage their common affairs. Governance is thus, a continuous process through which competing and diverse interests can find accommodation and cooperation. These processes are guided by formal institutions, and regimes to enforce compliance, as well as informal arrangements agreed to or perceive to be in the interest of the concerned individuals and institutions. At the global level, governance commonly refers to intergovernmental relationships, but is increasingly understood as also involving nongovernmental organisations, citizens' movements, multinational corporations and the global market. Interacting with these are global mass media of dramatically enlarged influence Commission on Global Governance (1995, p. 7).

Given this broad and supposedly encompassing definition, the word 'governance' appears in diverse academic disciplines (Gibson, 2011, p. 2). Each discipline sometimes acts as if it owns the word 'governance' and has no need to engage with the others. Gibson (2011, p. 2) elaborates on this characterisation of the treatment of governance by academia. He submits that "the theoretical roots of governance are various; institutional economists, international relations, organizational studies, development studies, political science, public administration and Foucauldian theorists" (Gibson, 2011, p. 2).

Gibson asserts "academic work on governance is eclectic and relatively disjointed" (Gibson, 2011, p. 2). Bevir (2012, p. 2) adds that, "Too little attention is given to ways of making sense of the whole literature on governance". Consequently, there has been limited cross-fertilisation of the various notions of governance from a multi-disciplinary[1], multi-jurisdictional[2] and multi-stakeholder[3] perspective. Others have argued that governance can be determinately defined.

[1]Theories and practices of governing and the dilemmas to which they give rise as studied in diverse academic disciplines including development studies, economics, geography, international relations, planning, political science, public administration, and sociology. (Gibson (2011)

[2]Patterns of governance combine people and institutions across different policy sectors and different levels of government (local, regional, national, and international). Gibson (2011)

[3]An increasing range and variety of stakeholders resulting into the emergence and active promotion of new practices and institutional designs, including public–private partnerships and collaborative governance. Gibson (2011).

According to Edwards, *et al*. (2012, p. 11), "governance is about the rules of collective decision-making in settings where there is a plurality of actors or organisations and where no formal control system can dictate the terms of the relationship between these actors and organisations". As Chhotray and Stoker (2009, p. 6) assert, "in studying governance we are interested in both the formal arrangements that exist to structure decision-making and the more informal practices, conventions and customs".

Chhotray and Stoker (2009, p. 7) go on to explain that state that "the emergence of governance theory from the early 1990s onwards has been one of the core developments in public administration and more broadly, for that part of political science orientated towards the study of policy-making".

Various scholars have undertaken an extensive analysis of the relationship between governance and regionalism. Africa scholars such as Nolte (2011, p. 52) and Kotzè (2012, p. 81) distinguish four types of governance, which he defines by function and beneficiary.

The first and most recognisable type is public governance, which is defined as serving the interest of a certain population in a variety of concerned issue areas (Nolte, 2011 p. 52). The second type is 'private governance', which he describes as "generated by and for a specific group of actors and is concerned with a restricted range of self-interested issues". Among the types of public or private governance are two forms; 'formal and informal governance'; the former associated with legislations and policies and the latter with mutual perceptions and agreements among others, Nolte (2011, p. 52). From the above definition types and forms, Söderbaum (2004) concludes then that 'regional governance' or governance in the context of regionalism, can therefore be defined as "spheres of authority at the regional level of human activity, that amount to systems of rule – formal or informal –public or private, in which goals are pursued through the exercise of control" Soderbaum (2004, p. 419).

This definition embodies the politico-administrative dimension of RI, state functionalism and PPPs development. For instance, in a public governance study, the concept of governance must be duly examined in the context of how states politically govern their citizens (statecraft) and administer government programmes (public administration). Among the spheres of authority that make up systems of governance where the exercise of power and control are imperative, the public sphere remains the most dominant. Within the public administration domain, national governments and their affiliate public institutions at regional and international level remain the dominant sphere. To understand public governance therefore we must interrogate the version

most relevant to public administration. According to Kull (2014: 25), there are five versions of governance that are relevant to the study of public administration.

The first version defines governance through mainstream characterisation of 'good governance' defined as "creating an effective political framework conducive to private economic actions, stable regimes, the rule of law, efficient state administration adapted to the roles that governments can actually perform and strong civil society independent of the state" (Kull, 2014, p. 25). The latter statement implies that good governance involves the creation of a concrete distinction between a state with limited authority and an autonomous market economy and civil society. While this is feasible at the nation-state level, it may present serious challenges at a regional level. This version can assist in analysing the politico-administrative aspects of state functionalism as operationalised for this study in Chapter One, section 1.10.

The second version is conceived in recognition of the limitations of the nation state and the importance of regional institutions or regionalism. Governance is thus defined as "the recognition of the possibility of 'governance without government', of international regimes and the growth of private governmental practices and the 'retreat of the state'. Inter-state agreements and common commercial governmental practices (like arbitration) are cited as methods of governance" in this version (Kull, 2014, p. 25). The significance of this version is further highlighted in the assertion that "that democracy is threatened with being confined to the national level where it is no longer effective in controlling the full agenda of issues that ought to be within the scope of democratic decisions" (Kull, 2014, p. 25). This version can assist in analysing the politico-administrative aspects of RI.

The third version is that of 'corporate governance' which refers to the pursuit of improvements in the "accountability and transparency of the actions of management, but without fundamentally altering the basic structure of firms in which indifferent shareholders are the principal beneficiaries of the company" (Kull, 2014, p. 25). Hirst (2012, p. 128) however, proceeds to caution that "corporate governance as it is presently conducted has no way of either accommodating or protecting politically, the interests of stakeholders, other than shareholders" (Hirst, 2012, pp.129). This version can assist in analysing the politico-administrative aspects of PPPs development.

The fourth version is that of governance as a characteristic of the new public management system and is manifest in government policy. The first issue is said to arise "from the privatisation of publicly owned industries and public services, and the consequent need for regulating service providers to ensure service quality and compliance with contractual terms" Hirst (2012, p. 129).

The second issue is said to result from "the introduction of commercial practices and management styles within the public sector, devolving services to agencies that are self-managing within overall policy guidelines and service targets" Hirst (2012, p. 129). This version delves into the dealings and partnership between the state and private actors.

The fifth version is that which attracts a broad array of stakeholders such as trade unions, companies, non-governmental organisations, private persons and entities, and community-based entities. According to Hirst (2012, p.132), this version, which is termed negotiated social governance, operates "through networks, partnerships and deliberative forums that have evolved following the demise of more centralised, hierarchal corporatist representation" (Hirst, 2012, p.?). This version assists in the analysis of the socio-cultural dynamics in the confluence between RI, SF and PPPs.

Although Kull (2014, p. 24) presents several definitions of governance from a public administration perspective, in this study the researcher isolates formulation by the African Association of Public Administration and Management (AAPAM). It defines governance as "the totality of how people organise and manage the way they co-exist with one another in a mutually beneficial way. It is about institutionalising appropriate combinations of culture, structures and mode of behaviour that society needs for effective co-existence" (AAPAM Report, 2000).

Here the researcher isolates and applies this definition for for this study because of its explicit mention of three terms. These three terms are (1) effective coexistence, (2) institutionalising appropriate combinations, and (3) organisation and management. It is within these notions that the researcher employs and rationalises the five governance perspectives presented by Amdam (2010, pp.) in section 2.5 and the five governance versions of Kull (2014, p. 25) in this section 2.6. With the foregoing sections of this chapter as in mind, this final section of Chapter Two specifically examines the concept of the administrative state as it relates to regionalism.

2.7 The Administrative State and Regionalism

The domination of global and international affairs by the U.S. after World War II, and its relentless campaign to universalise liberal democracy calls for a curious examination of the administrative state. Arguably, liberal democracy in the U.S. is embodied in the political state we refer to as the administrative state. To understand the underpinning and nature of the administrative state, it is important to interrogate its intellectual origins. This means examining the theory that best enhances our understanding of it and the historical experiences that shaped the present form of the administrative state. A scientific inquiry of the origins, experiences and

form of the state has been undertaken by Farazmand (2012, p. 499) who frames his analysis within a characterisation of the relationship between those that govern and the governed. This relationship was studied by the third president of the U.S. Thomas Jefferson, a main author of the Declaration of Independence. As Jefferson states:

> Men by their constitutions are naturally divided into two parties. Firstly, those who fear and distrust the people, and wish to draw all powers from them into the hands of the higher classes. Secondly, those who identify themselves with the people, have confidence in them, cherish and consider them as the most honest and safe, although not the wisest depository of the public interests (Farazmand, 2012, p. 499).

Farazmand (2012, p. 500. elaborates on this so-called natural division of individuals into two parties using organisation theory. Farazmand (2012, p. 500) proceeds to state the intellectual origins in specific historical experiences, asserting that, "the American administrative state developed during an era of intense questioning of the relationship between church and state, between sacerdotium and regnum" (Ibid.). This scholar further submits that the form of the American administrative state also reflects opinions regarding a good form of the relationship between the state and the individual, and that said relationship became pronounced as the U.S. an independent nation. These assertions prompt the academic questions that the inquiry of this study seeks to answer relative to Southern Africa. Namely, what dominated the discourses of the 'founding fathers' of Southern African states, during the pre-colonial and colonial eras and how do these discourses differ in post-independence and multi-party democratic periods?

Organisation theory being our point of departure in examining the intellectual origins of the administrative state, it is important to highlight at this point the basis for relevance of any organisation theory. Farazmand (2012, p.501) then presents two views critical in the construction or understanding of any organisation theory. These are the view of humanity, on the one hand and the view of society on the other hand (Ibid.).

In reference to Jefferson's contentions, Farazmand (2012, p. 501) explains that the first view, that of humanity has its foundation in the belief in humanity: "what makes one behave as one does". Similar to the Jeffersonian characterisation of humanity, Farazmand (2012, p.502) submits that "in a dichotomous sense, humanity may be viewed as either creatures differentiated from other creatures, and thus distinguished from them, by our ability to reason; or as creatures whose reason is subordinate to desire".

The first assertion in this view characterises humans are rational creatures and the second assertion insist that the predominant power in human beings is not reason, but a longing. A

longing for safety and security, control, egotistical and self-centredness which tends to overpower the voice of reason and as a result hinders our ability for self-discovery of one's interests. Farazmand argues that, "this view of the dominant force in humanity, reason or desire, becomes the first factor in a framework to evaluate various contributions to organization theory" (Ibid.).

The second view critical to understanding organisation theory, that of society, also bears a similar dichotomy – that between individualism and communalism. The first dimension is put forth by scholars who place importance on the individual as an independent actor. This is the individualistic perspective. The second dimension however discounts the importance on the individual, and posits that individuals have more impact as part of a group; the communal perspective Farazmand (2012, p. 505). These two views of humanity and society form the foundational assumptions of any organisation theory.

A combination of the views above provides four distinct possible outcomes that comprise the organisation theory framework. These are (1) marketplace, (2) protectorate, (3) responsive commonwealth, and (4) directed commonwealth. Farazmand (2012) explains, with the assistance of Daniel Elazar's (1972) contentions that the marketplace outcome puts weight on the person that reason has dominated. In the marketplace perspective, the individual is expected to behave rationally. The individual is cooperative and possesses knowledge and awareness of selflessness. To this end, the individual becomes an invaluable asset and the community in which the individual resides is judged based on its relationship to the individual. Among the most influential proponents of this view in the US experience is the Englishman John Locke, author of the Second Treatises of Government whose work influenced Thomas Jefferson. In similar vein to Jefferson, Alexander Hamilton opined that the most qualified to work within the administrative state were those with reason. Furthermore, Hamilton argued that in certain instances most individuals, if they undergo capacity building and training can perform better- a similar opinion taken by Andrew Jackson Rosenbloom (2006).

The second is protectorate and puts the desires of individuals at the forefront. This perspective was not popular in discourse in pre-independent America. According to Argyle (2006), Niccolo Machiavelli was among the first that conceptualised this idea and Argyle stated in his arguments that desire is a dominant element of an individual. Machiavelli in his writings on governance based on the individual and his desires did not acknowledge that human beings are "governed by natural law determined through reason." In contrast to the liberal ideas of colonial America, Machiavelli whose writings came centuries earlier argued, "there is no inherent purpose in the state. Any direction it may receive must be imposed upon it by the ruler and this ruler must understand human nature and manipulate it to rule effectively" (Ibid). It is plausible that these

views may have found accommodation within imperial Britain and American Post-World War II global hegemony.

The third, which is a responsive commonwealth, emphasises a society where the dominant force is reason. The westernised perspective of 'reason' originated from the ancient Greeks, with its key disciple being Aristotle. However, Aristotle, Plato and others 'borrowed' their lines of thinking from the ancient Egyptian Mysteries System but did so without retaining the holism of African epistemologies (Nabudere, 2011, p. 17). Aristotle's version argues that "people are social creatures defined by their ability to reason and that we are seekers of the good community; we strive for justice, for ourselves and for others" (Ibid.). Argyle (2006) further argued that "we seek moral perfection, even though we have thus far fallen short, yet, even falling short, we succeed through striving for the good community.".

The proponent of this view in the United States colonial experience was John Wise, whose writings in 1717 did not acknowledge arguments put forth by Cotton (1665) and Winthrop (1645) regarding the connection between the governed and governors. Winthrop (1645) in his "Little Speech on Liberty", states that the responsibility of the governed and governors as "the covenant between you and us is the oath you have taken of us, which is to this purpose: that we shall govern you and judge your causes by the rules of God's laws and our own, according to our best skill." Wise (1717) had argued that civil government, "must...be acknowledged to be the effect of human free–compacts and not divine institution: it is the produce of man's reason". Farazamnd (2012, p. 508), states that "Wise was influenced by the growing natural law school of thought, a school that tended to stress the Lockean view of the individual. Although Wise continued to emphasise the communal nature of society, other thinkers began to stress the individual as the key".

Finally, the fourth directed commonwealth places importance on a society that has desire as a dominant force. This perspective has its origins with Plato (360 BCE, p.132) , who proposed that the nation has to be governed by a few upper-class citizens, with reason at its core. Plato (360 BCE, p. 20) further argued that although the few may be reluctant to rule, they would be compelled to do so in order to avoid the punishment of being ruled by someone inferior to them. The argument gained currency with the church where it concurred with its beliefs and designs. It was within this perspective that the notion of" sacerdotium and regnum was borne (two governments in a single Christian society)" Oakley (2012, p. 300). In other words, this transforms to the notion of civic society leading in temporal matters while the church leads in ecclesiastic matters. The noble objective of this alliance was to safeguard against man's evil and corrupt, sinful nature, borne by Adam in the Christian Bible, King James Version. This thinking is rampant in colonial and post-colonial trans-Atlantic dealings with Africa.

Accordingly, “both church and state were to be controlled by those few in society with the capability of understanding God’s purpose. Society was to be a directed commonwealth” Argyle (1994). This perspective is which is best explained by Thomas Hobbes thrived on the vices brought about by civil strife in England and sparked a puritan revolution. Moreover, as Huntington (1981, p.160)) argues, “England underwent a Puritan revolution without creating a Puritan society; America created a Puritan society without undergoing a Puritan revolution”. Leading this view of society and government in the United States were John Cotton (insert year of birth and death) and John Winthrop (insert year of birth and death). In colonial United States, both civil and religious authorities ought to be in a compact for the good of the commonwealth. Rejecting the ideas of religious freedoms, Cotton (1655) had argued that without reasons, God cannot permit two religions in one nation.

Although Farazmand confines his historical and empirical accounts to the United States’ experiences of the administrative state, the four perspectives can be broadly applied to the examination of the behaviour of a state and the nature of its politico-administration. Founders of the United States descended from Great Britain and that link was never broken. Rather, it continues to manifest itself in the Trans-Atlantic Alliance in international affairs. The hierarchical and bureaucratic state was common to both nations. Argyle (year, p.?) concludes, “Thus public administration was directed from the top. Civil ministers were to enforce the will of God, as interpreted by an elite. All aspects of community life were under the watchful eye of the state, and rules and regulations were strictly enforced in order to enable the citizens to live in accordance to God’s laws” (Ibid.). For instance, as explicitly revealed on the United States Dollar note – In God we Trust.

The researcher hence recognises that role of the state in regionalism can differ depending on the historical and intellectual influences pertaining. Nevertheless, the administrative state remains instrumental to the conception and evolution of post-World War II regionalism. Both the directed commonwealth and responsive commonwealth perspectives provide for agency of the administrative state in organising the broader framework within which collective organisational and societal interests are pursued. The state bears the primary responsibility for organising the framework and orchestrating its conduct.

The nation state, which embodies the administrative state, was established with the primary objective of ensuring that there is an administrative framework within which the affairs of society are managed, be it temporal or ecclesiastic as was the case in colonial America and imperial Europe.

According to Mitrea (2004, 2016, p. 45):

> For the past two centuries or so, the territorially consolidated, centralized, sovereign state has been the dominant paradigm in western political thought and western mainstream political science. It constituted the ideal of the well-ordered, western, modern political community. It was the model which any political community that strove toward modernity was expected to embrace.

It was this ideal form of the state that governed imperial Europe and authored the colonial administration. This influenced the form of the post-colonial governments and has in history that is more recent factored the archetype multi-party democratic state.

In this study, however the Researcher analyses the modern state examining its characteristic as it evolved within the experiences of the west and in Africa where it has arguably had the most profound influence, with said influence being diametrically opposed to pre-colonial African ways of knowing.

Moreover, Duran (2015, pp. 46-47) presents four concepts that define the modern state; a) "The Territorial State and the Unitary Sovereign Will; b) The Territorial State as a Homogeneous Nation state; c) Democratization and Popular Sovereignty; and d) The Global Spread of the Idea of the Nation state."

The first concept of territory and unitary sovereignty is fundamental in defining authority and the position of government in relation to the citizen. In the pre-modern European state, power and control was between the political realm, religious institutions and individuals – which includes "emperors, kings, princes and nobility, bishops, abbots and the papacy, guilds and cities, agrarian landlords, and 'bourgeois' merchants and artisans". This is akin to Ferguson and Mansbach's (2012, p. 5) argument about the longevity of polities and the more recent briefness of the Westphalian moment. In the modern state, however, in seeking to address the problem of contentious overlapping jurisdictions, we see the creation of a centralised state legitimised by the theory of sovereignty. The theory asserts "the supremacy of the government of any state over the people, resources, and, ultimately, over all other authorities within the territory it controls" Mansbach (2012, p. 6).

This idea has characterised the state since the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648 categorically defining the modern territorial state "as a differentiated ensemble of governmental institutions, offices, and personnel that claims the exclusive power of authoritative political rule-making for a population within a continuous territory that has a clear, internationally recognized boundary" (Duran, 2015,

pp. 46-47). In conclusion Duran (2015, p. 260) sums up the concept stating that "governing by the sovereign was aimed at bringing about the artful combination of space, people, and resources in territorialised containments". This concept necessitated the reordering of African societies by the west, obliterating African ways of knowing constitutional democracy in pre-colonial times – particularly consensus democracy as opposed to liberal democracy (Williams, 1974, p. 172 & 173). The westernised imposition that destroyed and tried to reconstruct African states in its own likeness contributed to gross limitations by infusing the aspect of exclusive power of authoritative political rule making. Such imposition was necessary for colonisation and imperialism but against the grain of African peoples who were accustomed to holistic approaches and unity of socio-economic, politico-administrative, socio-cultural and spiritual unity of the nature of reality and ways of knowing. Westernised IPE influences continue to have a great bearing on this aspect within Southern Africa nation states.

Largely cultivated in the 19th century, the concept of "the territorial state as the homogenous nation state" is a considerably more difficult proposition in the context of the nation state in Africa. In pre-colonial Africa, territorial borders were porous and regional networks prominent. Even contemporarily, Duran (2015, pp. 46-47) "the idea that legitimate government could only be based upon the principle of national self-determination and that, at least ideally, state and nation ought to be identical with one another" is an elusive possibility. The concept is underlined by nationalism: political nationalism and the nationalisation of culture in the formation of a national-societal identity. Cultural homogenisation underlined this effort as states pursued unique national identities. In the case of supra-national government, homogeneity is a difficult proposition.

The modern (westernised) nation state's success over the past 200 years or so was solely dependent on its assertion for the provision of safety and security, creating an identity, as well as for the economic welfare of its citizens being accepted by the people. Duran (2015, p. 47) further submits that "through the monopolization of coercion domestically in the form of police forces, and externally through military forces, states aimed to enforce order and authority internally, uphold national interests vis-à-vis other states externally, and ensure the safety and security of their citizens more generally". Guarantee by coercion begs the question: how homogenous were or are nation states and how universal is the consensus on national interest? Coercion was needed to manage intrusive social and economic regulatory measures needed to create a homogenous nation, particularly where one nation dominates or colonises another nation.

The third concept of democratisation and popular sovereignty emerges from the behaviour of social groups who in an effort to advance their objectives sought to capture and influence State

institutions. Accordingly, sovereignty was “transferred from the monarchical ruler to the people who are defined as the sum of legally equal citizens. Within this understanding, Duran (2015, p. 47) states that “the ‘subjects’ of the state constituted themselves as ‘citizens’ on whose sovereignty as a collective the power and legitimacy of the state was claimed to rest”. This is allegedly a key tenet of liberal or majoritarian democracy.

Two ideas are said to define popular sovereignty: liberalism and nationalism. Duran (2015, p. 56) concludes by asserting that “popular sovereignty’ is premised upon the acceptance of this dual notion of self-determination: the capacity of the individual to govern herself or himself and the capacity of individuals as citizens to govern themselves as a political community. Democratic rule is therefore only exercised in the sovereign, territorially consolidated nation state”. The implications of this concept for RI are profound and will be examined in detail later.

The fourth concept, which was manifest “in the 20th century, refers to the global diffusion of the idea of the nation state as an institutionalised global norm and the extensive global legitimation of the sovereign state as a primary feature of the world system. This spread of the nation state norm beyond its European homeland was less a matter of cultural diffusion and more the result of coercive imposition by hegemonic western powers as an integral part of colonialism and imperialism reaching back to the age of discovery” Axtman (2004, p. 271)

The post-colonial state and that enshrined in the UN Charter are based on the ideal of the European nation state. Success in the idea flow of the nation state however presented challenges for the universalisation of sovereignty. International Political Economy dictates meant the notion had to be differentially applied. Robert H. Jackson who for purposes of accommodating practical dilemmas, separated “negative” and "positive” sovereignty Maley (2013, p. 287). From a legal perspective negative sovereignty means that a state enjoys rights of non-intervention and other international immunities. Positive sovereignty on the other hand includes negative sovereignty, as well as the capacity and ability to provide political goods for its citizens. In specific terms, Jackson states, “the means which enables states to take advantage of their independence usually indicated by able and responsible rulers and productive and allegiant citizens” (Maley, 2013, pp. 287-288). Maley continues to state that:

> “Jackson argued that, due to a shift in international norms after the Second World War, many of the newly founded states in the era of decolonisation attained statehood not because of any evidence of capacity to rule (empirical statehood), but through juridical qualifications (juridical statehood). These quasi-states are deficient and defective as apparatuses of power. Their sovereignty is derived not internally from empirical

> statehood but externally from the states-system, whose members have evidently decided and are resolved that these jurisdictions should not disappear. The quasi-state is upheld by an external covenant among sovereign states" Maley, 2013, p. 288).

In summation Robert H. Jackson concludes that, States having "sovereign right to ultimate authority and control does not automatically imply that they have an ability to exercise it and that the history of state formation can be considered the protracted efforts of rulers and their staff to translate juridical sovereignty into empirical sovereignty" Axtman (2004, p. 274.

This notion of the quasi-state which is what the notion of positive and negative sovereignty created is further diluted by yet another notion of internal and external sovereignty. These notions are defined by sources of legitimacy: constitutional legitimacy (internal) and the right to non-interference by other states including subjugation to non-consented norms (external). The variations in the concept of sovereignty remain the single most important governance challenge within and among states. A thorough treatment of this aspect has been made in subsequent chapters.

Taken, this subsection has shown the rise of the modern administrative state largely through the workings of the Trans-Atlantic alliance. It has interrogated the differences between African and westernised epistemologies and laid a foundation for unravelling how notions of sovereignty and state-centric approaches to regionalism can be deconstructed, reconstructed and interpreted for the benefit of Southern African regionalism.

In empirical terms the relationship between sovereignty and regionalism in Southern Africa manifests within the notion and principle of subsidiarity. According to Moller (2005, p. 3), the principle of subsidiarity dates back, inter alia to the papal encyclicals Rerum Novarum (Leo XIII, 1891) and Quadragesimo Anno (Pius XI, 1931). And according to the latter, the principle stipulates that a community of a higher order should not interfere in the internal life of a community of a lower order, depriving the latter of its functions, but rather should support it in case of need and help to co-ordinate its activity with the activities of the rest of society, always with a view to the common good. It is based on this principle that both the degree and scope of integration for member states within SADC, are mediated. Or in ore specific terms, the principle from which member states exercise their choice of the degree of sovereignty they are willing to surrender.

2.8 Summary of the Chapter

The chapter established the IPE context within which the dominant IR theory, statecraft and regionalism has been conceived and evolved. It highlights the key historical and contemporary considerations, and trans-Atlantic experiences that have influenced the theory and politico-administrative architecture of the state and regionalism (RI) after World War II. In analysing the state f, the chapter also discussed the notions of and established the relationships between colonialism, globalisation and sovereignty. This chapter highlighted the contrasts between westernised epistemologies and African epistemologies. An understanding of the context provided is key in the formulation of measures and parameters for the assessment of a present-day confluence between RI, SF or state functionalism and PPPs. The foundation of orthodox paradigms of global and regional governance is necessary for deconstructing and reconstructing such paradigms from an African endogenously generated MIT-disciplinary perspective. The chapter provides the context within which a nuanced and specific examination of the confluence among and between RI, SF or state functionalism and PPPs can be undertaken for Southern Africa. This is the subject of the next chapter.

3.0 CHAPTER THREE: THEORIES FOUNDATIONAL TO THE STUDY

3.1 Introduction

This chapter examines theories of RI, SF and PPPs. It outlines the appeal of the theories for the study; the rationale for their choice and criticisms of the theories regarding the aims of the study. The chapter presents evidence of the epistemological relativism pertaining to the theories. Literature suggests that orthodox theory was primarily conceived to define RI in Europe and SF as conceived by trans-Atlantic institutions. The chapter also presents, as a proposition, two theories applicable to and significant for understanding PPPs. Of critical relevance to the study are the measures that define each concept and their underlying assumptions which is shown in the analytical framework. These measures also provide the conceptual basis for Chapter Four on methodology. Finally, the chapter provides an exploratory analysis of evidence on the convergence of the literature on the three concepts of RI, SF and PPPs.

3.2 Regional Integration

3.2.1 Introduction

The conceptual frameworks on RI theory and their main constructs are extensive and contested. They derive from European, South American and Asian experiences: however, their key tenets are predominantly informed by the European experience. Although there are several diverse conceptual frameworks, RI theories reflect profound ideation similarities.

3.2.2 The theory of regional integration

The most relevant theoretical proposition for understanding RI within a political administrative framework is that of regionalism advanced by Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Mhlanga (2013, p. 314) and defined as "efforts by a group of nations to enhance their economic, political, social, or cultural interaction". The theory defines RI as "a process by which a group of nation states voluntarily and in various degrees, have access to each other's markets and establish mechanisms and techniques that minimize conflicts and maximize internal and external economic, political, social and cultural benefits of their interaction" (Ndlovu-Gatsheni & Mhlanga, 2013, p. 314). Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Mhlanga stress that "while formal institutions are necessary to oversee the linear progression of the various phases of integration, RI does not necessarily require formal institutional structures, nor is there necessarily a linear progression of integration." They further

assert that "in the case of the latter, integration is assessed by the amount of economic, political, social and cultural interaction that transpires between Member States but does not require all Member States to share these activities simultaneously" (Ibid.).

The second equally pertinent orthodox theory is that of 'security community' authored by Deutsch (1968). Deutsch's security community theory focuses on two models of integration, namely, the amalgamated communities and the pluralistic communities. The former amalgamated communities model supports the formation of one regional centre, from the combination of different States, and at the core of this model, is a supranational entity. The pluralistic communities model in contrast advocates for independent States with a respect for sovereignty, but with agreement on the collective for critical decisions that affect all States. In this integration model, force is used to solve disputes. Both models are state-centric and derive from the European experience.

Three theories arguably dominate the discourse on European RI, federalism, intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism. The predominant influence of the European Union on RI in Southern Africa, the SADC, warrants some level of interrogation of these theories. This predominant influence has in the current decade been mechanised through the European Union "Regional Economic Integration Support Programme" (REIS) 2010 - 2015, with €20 million funding from the 10th European Development Fund (EDF), purportedly to promoting equal sustainable economic growth and poverty reduction in SADC. The 11th EDF programme support to SADC pledged at €90 million is scheduled to run from 2015 – 2020 (European Commission, 2015).

The first Eurocentric dominant theory of RI, federalism, is based on the concept of federation which "is derived from the Latin *foedus* meaning pact, alliance, covenant or arrangement entered into voluntarily and implying a degree of mutual trust and duration" (Dosenrode, 2010, p.9). "A federation is thus an institutional arrangement, taking the form of a sovereign state, and distinguished from other such states solely by the fact that its central government incorporates regional units in its decision procedure on some constitutionally entrenched basis" (Ibid.). According to Dosenrode (2010), "federalism theory, on the contrary, attempts to explain, based on analysis, how federations emerge and how they are organized and are functioning and should not have a normative bend."

The second Eurocentric dominant theory of integration relevant to the reorientation of the integration process in Southern Africa is liberal intergovernmentalism (Spolaore, 2013, p.8). Tal's (2015, pp 30) views the theory of liberal intergovernmentalism as the key point of reference in

the study of integration, regarding grand bargains or big decisions. In explaining his position on the theory, fTal's (2015, pp 30) uses the separate phases of the European Union (national preference formation, interstate bargaining and institutional choice) as a foundation for liberal intergovernmentalism. This theory is also closely aligned to this study. The three stages of European integration all encompass both regional and national levels considerations made by independent States and regional institutions. Intergovernmentalism, like community security theories and regionalism, deemphasises the agency of the private actors.

The third Eurocentric theory of RI of note in the case of Southern Africa is neofunctionalism. The theory of neofunctionalism is "making a compromise between the full integration, which lies in the political unifying of the states, and the will of the states for preserving their sovereignty and independence. Also, that compromise is achieved between the concept of the nation state, and the concept of integration, as a process of forming supranational level of governance" (Ilievki, 2015, p.6).

In addition to the theories authored by scholars, RI has also been defined by regional institutions themselves. Often from an interest-based perspective, institutions such as the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) consider any union between territories and legal entities as RI. According to NEPAD, Southern Africa's RI processes date can be traced to the 29th of June 1910, when the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) was formed with a membership of South Africa, Basutoland (present day Lesotho), Swaziland and Bechuanaland (present day Botswana). It is worth noting at that in 1910 only two countries, the UK and South Africa were involved in the negotiations, which effectively rendered SACU an imposing institution (The New Southern African Customs Union Agreement, 2003). After SACU, NEPAD also claims that "the second significant RI process in the region was the Central African Federation of 1953 to 1963" (Reynolds, 2013, p. 178). Such assertions raise the following questions: is presence and agency of a legitimate state a central aspect of regionalism? Should we consider colonial territory integration processes RI?

In addressing these questions, critics of both the state and RI in Africa, insist that the fundamental challenges with RI theory are grounded in the anomalies between reality and theories of international relations and state which are based on western experience.

Saurugger (2013, pp. 36-37), in trying to locate an explanation for RI, posits that the post-positivist neo-functionalism theory of Haas (2004) was the initial attempt to explain RI. He further states that Haas sought after strengthening the functionalism position as well as challenging the two leading mainstreams of the IR discipline. According to Saurugger (2013, p. 37), Haas's theory

places emphasis mainly on the roles of two sets of non-state actors who are dynamic in forging integration; these are social movements and concerned associations that are at the regional level, and the organization's secretariat. It is the prerogative of Member States to determine the terms and conditions of an initial agreement as well as endeavour to regulate ensuing events. However, Member States are not exclusively guaranteed the opportunity of determining the course, degree, and pace of change. By negating the centrality of the state in RI, Haas validates the arguments that colonial geopolitical territorial formations should be considered as units of RI.

Deutsch's (1968) security community theory is useful in understanding the extent of RI in Southern Africa. This theory focuses on two models of integration namely, the amalgamated communities and the pluralistic communities. The former amalgamated communities model supports the formation of one regional centre, from the combination of different States, and at the core of this model, is a supranational entity. The latter pluralistic communities model, however advocates for independent States with a respect for sovereignty but with agreement on the collective for critical decisions that affect all States. In this integration model, force is used to solve disputes. Aspects of this theory are also applicable to Southern Africa.

Summation of the above arguments leads to the imminent conclusion that RI frameworks should be region-specific. This understanding has been well encapsulated in Mahmood Mamdani (1995), as follows:

> "A careful scholar from any part of the world, when studying a society other than their own, must ensure they do not assume that theoretical categories deriving from some particular historically specific process of social change can automatically be applied to the analysis of a different society with its own history; still less should the categories referring to historically specific social forms developed in one society be used as a norm with which to compare and, implicitly or explicitly, evaluate historically specific social forms of another society. Yet these are standard methodological procedures in Western social inquiry. The researcher should endeavour to find out as much as possible about the historical production and current conditions in that society from a variety of sources – by consulting people in that society, by reading literature of that society, local newspapers, and, importantly of course, by reading work produced by that society's intellectuals. This seems so obvious as not to be worth mentioning; yet it is surprising, for example, how many Western Africanist scholars appear to pay little attention to the work of African intellectuals" (Mamdani, 1995, p. 609).

Other arguments put forth by Estrada and Park assert that "research on RI has engendered a wide range of theories, models and methodologies. Most of the existing theories, models and research methodologies on RI are based on the perspectives of a single discipline, most often economics" (Estrada & Park, 2010, p. 107). Estrada and Park posit that there is a bias towards comprehending the single most pertinent challenge to a full examination of RI processes. To this end, Estrada and Park (2010) developed an evaluation framework to analyse RI processes. The framework which they called RI Evaluation Framework (RIE), has an advantage over traditional methodologies used for assessing the viability and attractiveness of RI initiatives, and provides precise and complete direction for policymakers and researchers. The RIE model recognises that the motives and effects of RI are economic and non-economic. Furthermore, RIE is based on four indices which are "the Global Political Development Index (X_1), Global Social Development Index (X_2), Global Economic Development Index (X_3) and Global Technological Development Index" (X_4) (Estrada & Park, 2010, p.5).

3.2.3 The appeal of regional integration theories for this research

The applicability and attractiveness of the RI theories to this study is in their adaptability. Of particular appeal and relevance to this study is the theory of regionalism. Within the general theory of regionalism, there are varieties of characterisations that appeal to this study. The old and new regionalism characterisation by Andrew-Speed posits that "the unidimensionality of the old and the multidimensionality of the new" (Andrew-Speed, 2011, p. 35). This provides the study with a temporal appreciation of the evolution of the theory and concept. Another dimension of relevance is the formal and informal regionalism advanced by Mupangavanhu (2013), which stipulates that "regionalism may be formal by way of being adopted and driven by formal institutions of states, or informal resulting from a spontaneous process led by non-state actors, such as trans-frontier traders" (Mupangavanhu, 2013, p. 44). The formal is also referred to as network regionalism represented by trans-state actors which is the result of the exploitation of dysfunctions and disparities generated by existing boundaries, with debilitating effects on state territorial control. These characterisations are true in the case of Southern Africa, which has culturally and socially 'artificial boundaries' imposed by a colonial history.

Another complimentary theory is intergovernmentalism, which operates at two levels and involve national (individual States) and regional (institutions) considerations. Like both regionalism and the community security theories, intergovernmentalism also fails to include the private actor as an agency, without due recognition that the private actor interests factor into PPPs.

Equally applicable to this research with reference to SADC is Deutsch's above-discussed theory of the amalgamated communities' model that focuses on the formation of one regional centre,

from the combination of different States, and at the core of this model, is a supranational entity (Deutsch, 1968). Deutsch's 'pluralistic communities' advocate for independent States with a respect for sovereignty but an agreement on the collective for critical decisions that affect all States. In this integration model, force is used to solve disputes also has a similar appeal.

3.2.4. Criticism of the theories

Criticisms of RI theories are extensive. The multiplicity of the various theoretical propositions being advanced all reflect profound euro-centricity in their epistemology. Additionally, according to Chingono and Nakana (2009, p. 379), the foremost conceptual challenges concern the notion of region itself. In their argument, Chingono and Nakana reason that there are historical and cultural contexts and connotations that hinder a region from being a clearly defined entity. Furthermore, various characteristics that regions can be defined by include "geography, economic interaction, institutional or governmental jurisdiction, and social and cultural characteristics." Chingono and Nakanastate that:

> In a sense trying to define integration is like asking blind men to describe an elephant; each one will come up with a different definition, depending on the part of the elephant they are holding, and that there is neither a clear definition of integration nor consensus on its substantive content and form, let alone agreement on paradigms that should inform it (Chigono & Nakana, 2009, p.397)

In Southern Africa, it is the observation of the Researcher that literature on these theories, does not provide evidence of an interrogation of how conceptual challenges can influence regionalism, process and outcome. More pertinently, it appears that over the past decade the literature does not provide sufficient evidence of African endogenously driven conceptualisation or even neologism. SF is next discussed.

3.3 State Fragility

3.3.1 Introduction

As has been discussed above, SF as a concept has its origins in the discipline of political science but has recently entered the economic development discourse and debate. According to Bertocchi and Guerzoni, (2011, p. 2), SF is associated with the following various characteristics of state failure: the lack of capacity to provide basic services; inability of the State to meet critical requirements; fragile governance; a continued state of extreme poverty; inability to protect national borders and territories, and a high propensity of the State to enter conflict and civil war.

Since its introduction, two institutions have dominated the discourse, conceptualisation and its assessment. These are the WB and the Fund for Peace. Consequently, the two most widely used parameters for determining SF are: CPIA and FSI. In determining SF, the dominant and orthodox parameter employed in Southern Africa are the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) and the Fragile States Index (FSI). The CPIA is an index rating used by the WB and OECD, to define SF as well as assess national policies and institutional arrangements. The CPIA ratings focus on the main elements that a country is directly responsible for and controls, rather than on elements and outcomes such as growth rates that are influenced by external factors. These main internal responsibilities are grouped into four equally weighted clusters: economic management; structural policies; social inclusion policies and equity and public-sector management and institutions. The FSI is also a measure of fragility. This study however now seeks to establish the ideological/theoretical influences shaping these notions and indices. The researcher drew upon CPIA and FSI secondary statistics to reset parameters as disclosed in section 4.9.3 to analyse the data afresh as shown in Chapter Nine, the cross-country data presentation, analysis and findings. Next the theory of SF is discussed.

3.3.2 The theory of state fragility

Although there have been advances in conceptualising and measuring SF within the public policy domain there has been less than warranted attention in terms of theory that governs the phenomenon. This assertion is substantiated by leading scholars in the field, Bertocchi and Guerzoni (2012), who asserts that there is not yet a theory that determines fragility.

Although this is the case, significant effort can be found in a theoretical framework developed by Besley and Persson (2011). They contend that fragility is defined using two main pathologies: "i) state ineffectiveness in enforcing contracts, protecting property, providing public goods and raising revenues, and ii) political violence either in the form of repression or civil conflict" (Besley & Persson 2011, p. 3). In their theoretical framework, Besley and Persson state that a "government is given a level of fiscal capacity defined as the ability to tax, and a level of legal capacity that is the ability to support markets." These scholars submit that "governments can make three kinds of investments: (i) in scale capacity; (ii) in legal capacity, and (iii) in violence, the latter as a means of holding on to power" (Ibid.). In addition to this, Besley and Persson also submit that "opposition groups can also invest in violence if they choose to, and do so in order to acquire power" (Ibid).

It is within this theoretical model that they characterise "an ineffective state as one which has made few investments in fiscal and legal capacity and 'a violent state' as one where the

government and opposition invest in violence to maintain or acquire political power" (Besley & Persson, 2011, p. 3). They further assert that "'common interest' to provide public goods, fostered either by circumstances or cohesive political institutions, can eliminate both of these problems, and that it is when State institutions are non-cohesive that either pathology may emerge" (Ibid).

According to Besley and Persson, the primary interest of the model is to explore the conditions for the emergence of these pathologies and uncover the roots of SF. It seeks to ascertain what is internal and external, as well as bring clarity to what can be classified as a symptom and a cause. "The main output of the theoretical model, they insist, is a matrix of parameter ranges defining the roots of different state pathologies" (Besley and Persson, 2011, p. 3). It is a mathematical model that employs sociometrical and econometric methods.

The propositions made in the theoretical framework by Besley and Persson (2011) have a profound bearing on two key state theories; the theory of force and the theory of contract, both of which have been substantively articulated in Bluntschli (2015, pp.238-239).

Besley and Persson's (2011, p. 3) two pathologies can both be explored within these two narratives. The pathology of state ineffectiveness pertains to failure of the state to meet its responsibilities of providing security and other essential social and economic services. State ineffectiveness is a manifestation of breach of contract and can thus be explored within the theory of contract. The pathology of political violence thrives on the use of violence; thus, the theory of force finds relevance in this narrative.

As Bluntschli (2015, p. 238) submits, the theory of force asserts that violence is inherent in the making of the state. The theory asserts that, "without force a state can neither come into being nor continue" (Bluntschli, 2015, pp. 238-239). The theory stipulates that "force is required within as well as without" and "the basic tenant of the theory is therefore that the state was born in force, that one person or a small group claimed control over an area and forced all within it to submit to that person's or group's rule. It is when that rule was established, that all the basic elements of the state which are; population, territory, sovereignty, and the government became attainable" (Ibid.). Bluntschli further submits that "where force has produced firm and enduring results, it seeks and commonly obtains a connection with right, that is, a recognition and purification by means of right. Without right the might of the stronger is brutal" (Bluntschli, 2015, p. 239).

Another theory that arguably explains SF is the theory of contract also presented by Bluntschli (2015, pp. 240-244) as a major theory of state. The theory, also referred to as social contract theory is said to have developed in reaction to the 'divine right theory' by seventeenth and eighteenth-century philosophers, such as Thomas Hobbes (5th April 1588 – 4th December 1679),

James Harrington (7th January 1611 - 11th September 1677), John Locke (29th August 1632 – 28th October 1704) and Jean Jacques Rousseau (28th June 1712 - 2nd July 1778). The theory asserts that men developed government and identified rulers to secure order in the chaos that characterises the natural world. The contract is essentially an agreement to cooperate with each other and follow a set of rules that bring order and safety to their lives. According to the theory, the power to govern obtains from decisions made freely by people, not handed down by God. It was this theory that inspired the American and French revolutions of 1765 - 1783 and 1789 –1799 respectively.

3.3.3 Appeal of state fragility theory for this research

To a justifiable extent, the theory of force explains the origin and development of the state because war and conquest have gone a long way in building of states across all ages. The theory brings to the forefront the fact that 'might' or force is indispensable to the state. In addition to the fact that force through war and conquest have played an important part in the establishment of states, the whole fabric of social order and maintenance of internal peace and external safety are intricately factored with existence of adequate force. Today, most states regardless of economic status, spend more on the maintenance of defence forces and security than any other sector. Inherently therefore, the obligation and submission of an individual to the state are backed by coercive force. Its appeal to the study is that it can assist to explain why within SADC the politico-security agenda to sustain state integrity has taken precedence over the socio-economic agenda. It is hypothesised by this theory that the relatively early stages of states in the region arguably renders them as infant states in the formative stage. Moreover, as the theory of force asserts, it is at the formation stage that the significance of force is pronounced to consolidate power in state formation.

Within specific reference to theoretical framework guiding policy, reference is made to the European Report on Development (2009) which propounds the notion that colonialism is a significant cause of SF. It highlights relevance of colonialism and its influence in institutional development of post-colonial States in Africa. The report attempts to position the argument in a much broader perspective by asserting that the Scramble for Africa (1880-1900) occurred with the presence of institutions. Colonial States in the forms and designs during the era of colonialism interacted with preexisting institutions of the colonised states. The colonial determinant school is supported by Gowan and Anderson (1997, p. 30), who contend with “the nation state is an artificial construct, an ideal type heavily dependent upon the historical experience of only two of Western Europe’s states: Britain and France.” To this end, it can be said that the ‘modern’ African state is thus a product of colonialism.

In an extension to the above debate, Bertocchi (2011) presents a further possibility for a SF theory. He asserts that "fragility relates to more deeply rooted regional characteristics, which have made and still make it hard to follow a path of institutional development conducive to legitimate and effective states" (Bertocchi, 2011, p. 11).

Both the 'colonial' and 'regional characteristics' hypotheses and concepts appeal to this study for their attempt to explain the challenges stemming from the genesis of the state and the enduring legacy of colonialism on state characteristics at a regional scale. The concepts anchor the confluence between SF and RI.

3.3.4 Criticism of the theory

Force is arguably an essential element of the state for the purposes of defending its existence. It is both necessary for the maintenance of internal law, order and deterring existential threats from external aggression. Force is indispensable to the state. It is however inconclusive that force is the sole determinant in creation of the state. The theory of force, as observed more than a century ago by Leacock (1906, p?), "errs in magnifying what has been only one factor in the evolution of society into the sole controlling aspect." In conclusion, the state based on mere brute force can continue its existence (1906) for a temporary period but ultimately it will be found that something other than force is necessary to ensure the continuance of the state (Leacock, 1906).

Regarding the theory of contract, academic criticisms indicate that it is equally deficient in explaining the origins, continuance and effectiveness of the state. The criticisms have been well argued by Bluntschli (2015) who submits that the evidence of history is opposed to these theoretical considerations. This scholar points out that at the time when the principle of social contract was widely acceptable as it had employed mainly its influence; clear facts were against it. The people, as Bluntschli (2015, p.241 notes, were fragmented into "free and equal citizens". and contends that even in the primary assemblies, the majority were mainly left unchecked to carry out their will with the minority unable to contest. Bluntschli, 2015, p. 241 suggests that in the case of constituent assemblies which were "regarded as a selection and a representation of all the citizens, and had as its appointed task to agree upon a constitution, the form of procedure was of a decision of one united body, rather than of a contract between a number of individuals, where the majority, as an organ of the whole, was exercising an authority which was often an intolerable tyranny".

About the negations, Bluntschli proposes that this is rooted in historical inconsistencies, and the "theory may be disproved not only by history but by logical criticism" (Ibid.). Specifically, Bluntschli, 2015, p. 241 argues that:

> The theory assumes the freedom and the equality of the individuals who conclude the contract; but political freedom, which is here presupposed, is only conceivable in the state, and not outside it. Man, has indeed the aptitude for this freedom just as he has the impulse to and the need for the state, but his freedom can never be realised, except in the organic freedom of the state'. Further, if the individuals were only equal, a state could never come into being, for it implies as a necessary condition political inequality, without which there is neither ruler nor ruled (Bluntschli, 2015, p. 241).

The main error, Bluntschli (2015, p. 242) insists, "lies in representing individuals as contracting, and that if individuals make contracts, private rights are created, but not public rights. What belongs to the individuals as such? Is it private property, individual possessions? However, contracts cannot have political character unless there is already a community above the individuals: a contract, if political, does not deal with the private good of individual, but with the public good of the community" (Bluntschli, 2015, p. 242)

Therein lies the challenge of use of these theories for the study. The elusive comprehensive definition of the state and its loci in human society creates an epistemological obscurity. The concept being central to the confluence being investigated, implies that the conclusions of the study may at best be propositional and suggestive in terms of the African state – unless and until new theories and concepts are created underpinned by African epistemologies.

3.4 State functionalism

3.4.1 Introduction

In transitioning from the orthodox characterisation and problematization of the state in Africa, the study migrates from a focus on the notion of SF to a focus on state functionalism. Having already defined in descriptive terms the modern state, with details in subsequent chapters, here the researcher presents an overview of the theory of functionalism as it relates to the experience of creation of the state, and the effectiveness of the state in Africa. The theory state functionalism as propounded by the researcher is distinct from the regional functionalism and neofunctionalism as advanced by (Ilievki, 2015, p. 6). According to Yakkaldevi (2014, p. 1), the "functionalist perspective seeks to explain social institutions as collective means to meet individual and social needs." Yakkaldevi (2014, p. 7) argues that "in the functionalist perspective, societies are considered to function like organisms, with social institutions" which work in synergy just as the organs do to maintain and reproduce societies. Functionalists further argue that institutions come

about and persist because they play a function in society, promoting stability and integration (Yakkaldevi, 2014, p. 1).

State functionalism however, borrows from regional-oriented functionalism theory despite criticisms that it fails to account for social change and individual agency; and for attributing human-like needs to society. State functionalism is not congruent with regional-oriented functionalism for this discussion. Rather, it combines tenets from regional-oriented functionalism, behaviouralism and state-oriented pragmatism to focus on positive epistemologies of statecraft.

This study advances the theoretical proposition of state functionalism an equilibrium in the efficacy of statecraft, characterised by empirical sovereignty, sufficient capacity to provide basic services, integrity of public institutions, state legitimacy, inclusive economic growth, security and ability to protect national borders and territories. (Pick, 2011, p. 5)

For purposes of this study, the state is defined as a territorial political community for which there is some form of independent organised government, whose relations with its subjects are to some extent stable and include respective responsibilities. A defined territory and a written legal system are considered key aspects of such a community Pick (2011, p. 5). It follows from the above that a functional state would be defined as a stable political community which fulfils the responsibilities enshrined in a legitimate constitution.

This study therefore, seeks to re-locate the narrative beyond the traditional exogenous focus on SF to the endogenous conceptualisation of state functionalism.

3.4.2 Theory governing functionalism

The above criticism of SF theory necessitated the migration from the term SF to state functionalism. The premise for this migration therefore is the inherent paradox of the notion of SF, which when examined from the two pathologies analogy of Besley and Person (2011, p. 3) is not particular to any political community, but that all political communities are inherently fragile. The creation, maintenance and functions of any political community should thus be primarily aimed at maintaining a political equilibrium necessary for stability. Thus, renders all political communities as inherently fragile, requiring consistent negotiation, mediation and legitimization. In the case of the modern state, these functions are exercised by an executive, legislature and judiciary within the framework of a legal system and a specific territorial jurisdiction. These institutions serve to manage that fragility.

In shifting the orientation of the study from problematisation of polities, statecraft and RI, the researcher focused on the aspect of functionalism as opposed to fragility. However, functionalism

has meanings beyond those mentioned above in terms of regional-oriented functionalism and state-oriented functionalism. The other meanings include perceiving functionalism as a component of ideas (Sato 2011, p.1) as well as a sociological approach to structural functionalism (Maryanski and Turner 1992). An understanding of 'function' is therefore critical, and a relevant perspective in this regard is offered by Sato (2011, p. 1), who submits that "functionalism is to be seen as formed from an amalgam of component ideas". Citing three scholars, Parsons, Merton and Luhmann, Sato presents seven component ideas of function.

"The first, Component idea One - Cause and Effect; Component idea Two - Component idea Two: Part–Whole idea; Component idea Three: Necessary condition idea; Component idea Four: Positive value idea; Component idea Five: Interaction idea, that states of an actor depend on the states of another actor; Component idea Six: Constant relation idea: that interaction may be, constant or inconstant; Component idea Seven: Functional requirement idea, that a constant type of interactive relations has a specific effect on the system, without which the system cannot maintain itself; Component idea Eight: Functional equivalence idea, that function and variable do not share a one-to-one correspondence; Component idea Nine: Multiple values for the whole idea, that consequence of each effect makes for/lessens/is indifferent to the adaptation or adjustment of the system, and Component idea Ten: Meaning idea, that selecting a part out of the whole from a specific viewpoint is inevitable in functional analysis. This selection must precede the identification of causality and, therefore, be value-oriented" (Sato, 2011, p. 2). These ten aspects of function are embedded in the theoretical propositions of structural functionalism.

Structural functionalism considers "society as a structure with interrelated parts designed to meet the biological and social needs of individuals who make up that society. It is the oldest of the main theories of sociology. In fact, its origins began before sociology emerged as a formal discipline. It grew out of the writings of English philosopher and biologist Herbert Spencer (1820-1903) who likened society to a human body. Spenser argues that just as the various organs in the body work together to keep the entire system functioning and regulated, the various parts of society work together to keep the entire society functioning and regulated (Spencer, 1898). By parts of society, Spencer was referring to such social institutions as the economy, political systems, healthcare, education, media, and religion. Spencer continued the analogy by pointing out that societies evolve just as the bodies of humans and other animals do" (Maryanski and Turner 1992).

3.4.3 Appeal of the structural functionalism theory for this research

Of relevance to this research is Talcott Parson's (1951) structural functionalism perspective which focused "on the structures of society and their relationship to each other. Parsons summarized

how order or equilibrium was maintained among the various elements considered to be mutually supportive and tending toward a dynamic equilibrium. Parsons presented four functional imperatives that are necessary for the survival of all systems: adaptation – a system must adapt to its environment; goal attainment – ability to define its goals and set strategies to meet them; integration – component parts must interrelate mutually; and latency" (Archibong, 2014, p. 11). This research recognises that these imperatives are pertinent in understanding state functionalism in Southern Africa and congruent to the propositions that; states necessarily need to adapt to the imperatives of their historical and contemporary realities; states must be able to set and define goals in pursuit of adaptation, which prompts the question of endogenous ideology and architecture, and that states must ensure each part is harmoniously interrelated.

A similarly appealing perspective of the theory is presented by Robert Merton (1957) who criticised some of the positions of Parsons and submits that "all standardized social and cultural beliefs and practices are functional for society as well as for individuals in society". This Merton (year at least) argues, "implies that the various parts of the social system must show a high level of integration; he contends that not all the standardized part of society have positive functions and not all structures are indispensable part of the working whole" (Ibid).

3.4.4 Criticisms of the theory of functionalism

Structural functionalists have been critiqued because they cannot effectively manage social change processes. Archibong (2014, p. 5) states that "the theory in which all the elements of the society are reinforcing one another; further the system as a whole fails to show how these elements can also contribute to change. Another criticism lies in the fact that the theory is unable to deal effectively with conflict. They tended to overemphasize harmonious relationships and therefore see conflict and disorder as destructive and occurring outside the framework of society." It follows then that "functionalism is a rather weak and inadequate method; in addition, that it is vague and ambiguous, which is traceable to their dealing with an abstract social system instead of real society" (Archibong, 2014, p. 6)

Moreover, another criticism expressed with this theory is that there is "a conservative bias, this is attributable to what it ignores (changes, history) and focus only on normative order of society. The conservative orientation is passiveness of individual action where people are seen as constrained by cultural and social forces. According to the critiques, human beings are as much engaged in using social system as in being used by them." (Eisentadt, 1989, p. 60). Having

discussed theories of RI, SF and state functionalism, the next section explores theories of PPP. These theories help get at the confluence between RI, SF or state functionalism and PPPs.

3.5 Public Private Partnerships

3.5.1 Introduction

Literature on PPP theory dates back decades but coherent theory began to emerge in the early to mid-1990s. As with RI and SF, PPP also faces definitional and conceptual challenges. According to Graham (2011), "researchers often debate a suitable and all-encompassing definition of what PPPs are". Graham (2011) mentions Van Ham and Koppenjan (2005, p. 4), who conceptualise PPPs as the "cooperation of some sort of durability between public and private actors in which they jointly develop products and share risks, costs and resources which relate to these products or services" (Graham, 2011). Graham also presents a unique definition of PPPs by Grimsey and Lewis (2004, pp.1-18), who define it as a "risk-sharing relationship based on the shared aspiration between the public sector, the private sector and one or more partners from the voluntary sectors to deliver a publicly agreed outcome and or public service" (Graham, 2011). The notion of risk sharing underlines this latter definition as researchers are not in agreement in the conceptualisation of PPPs.

From an endogenous Pan-African perspective it is imperative to emphasise that PPPs ought to symbolise for Southern Africa and arguably for Africa, a model of state-corporation collaboration that is based on mutual and common interests relevant to the citizens of the region. The appeal of PPPs for the study is in that they offer an ideological and operational framework within which the historical and contemporary asymmetries between private actors and the state in Southern Africa can be reimagined.

3.5.2 The theories governing public private partnerships

The theories governing PPPs are based largely on two main theories: agency and transactional cost theory (Shapiro, 2005). Agency theory originates from the economics discipline in the early 1970s (Ross, 1973; Jensen and Meckling, 1976), but over the years has been used in other academic disciplines (business and management), scholarly works (specialised academic and applied practitioner journals) and corporate settings (business press, and corporate proxy statements; Niska (2015, p. 31). According to Niska (2015, p. 31) this multiple usage of PPPs signified a new 'zeitgeist' approach as well as the commonly established logic of corporate governance.

"Agency theory is concerned with resolving two problems that can occur in an agency relationship. The first is the agency problem that arises when a) the desire and goals of the agent and principal conflict, and b) it is difficult or expensive for the principal to verify what the agent is actually doing" (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 61). The second is related to risks and this happens when the principal and agent have divergent perspectives towards risk. It thus becomes a problem when the principal and agent have varying preferences.

Eisenhardt (1989, p. 64) highlights that the structure of agency can be applied to "a variety of settings ranging from macro-level issues such as regulatory policy to micro-level phenomenon such as impression management and other forms" of expression of self-interest. These dynamics are as central to PPPs in so far as the state, the private actor and various agents in the equation are concerned. Due to the contract governing the relationship between the principal and the agent, the theory focuses on establishing the main competent contract that oversees this relationship based on a set of assumptions from both parties. PPPs are governed by contracts and multi-layered agreements. The private actor in a PPP can arguably be considered the agent, while government remains the principal.

It is important to mention that this study is primarily concerned with the positivist agency theory stream, the other being the principal-agent stream of the agency theory. Unlike the principal-agent stream that is predominantly abstract and mathematical, the positivist stream is concerned with the governance mechanisms that solve the agency problem. Thus, it seeks to elucidate a response to the question "why certain contractual relationships arise?" (Jensen, 1983, p. 326). Positivist researchers are therefore focused on identifying situations of conflicting interests between the principal and agent and describing governance mechanisms that limit the agent's self-serving behaviour. In the case of PPPs, the state is an agent of the citizen, while the private actor is an agent of the state. The two propositions advanced by Jensen (1983, p. 322) regarding governance mechanisms are; (1) an outcome-based contract and (2) establishing comprehensive information systems. The former, it is argued, aligns the interest of the principal and agent, while the latter ensures that the agent cannot operate in their unwarranted self-interest because the principal is information blind.

The preference for outcome-based contracts over behaviour-based contracts on the part of the principal is in the ability to transfer risk to the agent. As may be appreciated, there are other determinants of outcomes such as government policy, economic climate, business competition and technology shifts that may or may not be accounted for accurately in an outcome-based contract. In conclusion, agency theory illustrates the imperative of "incentives and self-interest in public institutions" (Jensen, 1983, p. 338). The theory's foremost contributions are firstly its

treatment of information that in public governance is a function of transparency and accountability. “Information systems” in the context of public governance directly refers to monitoring mechanisms established by the executive and legislative oversight. Secondly, the theory contributes as it entails elements of risk implications which are underlined by uncertain outcomes “coupled with differences to accept risk according to Jensen should influence contracts between principal and agent” (Jensen, 1983, p. 367).

The second PPP theory is the transaction cost theory, with its origins from Ronald H. Coase (1930), whose seminal paper posits that the transaction cost theory is demonstrated in the attempt by parties that are in a two-fold exchange, the terms of their exchange on the one hand and execution of the transaction on the other hand.

Other complementing theories of PPP emerge from Marxist scholarship. In contextualising the study within the politico-administrative frame, and the Southern Africa experience, the perspective of David Harvey on PPPs renders a relevant narrative. Harvey comments on PPPs as an unfair bargain that privatises profits and socialises losses (Harvey, 2012, p. 699). In other words, when there are profits, they go to the private sector, and when there are losses, they go to the taxpayers. Harvey contests the notion of PPPs as a win-win arrangement (Ibid.). This proposition is of particular interest to the study for its collaboration with Pan-African assertions on the exploitative nature of venture capitalism in colonial and post-colonial African states.

3.5.3 The appeal of public private partnerships theory for this research

For Southern Africa the relationship between the state and private actors is a delicate and contentious one. The challenge facing many Southern African states from the literature is one of technical expertise in the areas of legal and financial instruments or contracts, particularly where the private actors are foreign multinationals. More pertinently, it is the challenge of the autonomy and integrity of the state *vis-à-vis* the dominance of multinational and transnational corporations, foreign capital, IFI influence and domestic ‘white capital’. PPPs are predisposed to these dynamics and the agency and transactional cost theories allow for exploration of the underlying conflicts in interest, method and liability between the state and private actors. This study uses both elements of the agency theory paradigm and the transaction cost theory to examine the character of PPPs in Southern Africa as shown in the case study chapters. It examines the potential role of international actors and agencies in degrading the state and upgrading capital through ‘interested’ measures of state functionalism and economic competitiveness.

3.5.4 Criticism of the theory

The agency theory and the transaction cost theory, while considered versatile in their analysis of public-private contracts, have deficiencies in guiding the political economy analysis of the same. The theories ignore the ideological and theoretical assumptions of the state and private actor, often employed in international relations discourse (Burchill *et al*. 2013, p. 29). The next section sets forth the analytical framework that sets the pace and parameters for RI, SF or state functionalism and PPPs.

3.6 Analytical Framework

The analytical framework presents a summation of the logic from which the parameters defining the concepts of RI, SF and PPPs are derived. The measures, parameters that were employed in the development of the assessment tools used to examine the confluence between RI, SF PPPs in the study, all conform to the logic in Table 3.1 below.

Table 3 - 1: Analytical framework - parameters defining the concepts

Propositions and underlying assumptions of the conceptual framework	**Parameters defining the concepts**
Regional Integration 1. Enhancing RI promotes coherence in national economic policy, political systems and ensures region-wide standardisation of institutional arrangements. 2. Enhanced RI framework is grounded on an effective enforcement mechanism. 3. Standardization from RI reduces transaction costs for investors and improves predictability of investment climate. 4. This strengthens State institutions, reduces SF and promotes mutually beneficial PPPs.	1. "Geographic scope**:** illustrating the number of countries involved in an arrangement (variable geometry)," 2. "Substantive coverage**:** breadth that is the sector or activity coverage (trade, labour mobility, macro-policies, sector policies, etc.)," 3. "Depth of integration: a measure of the degree of sovereignty a country is ready to surrender, that is from simple coordination or cooperation to deep integration". Source: Estrada, Park. 2010. Best, E. 1997. Kritzinger-van Niekerk, L. (2005)
State Fragility 1. Weak State institutions have their origins in the political and economic history of colonialism and problems associated with the Westphalia state. 2. Present IPE context contributes to chronic SF. 3. Progress in addressing SF has been inhibited by problems of conceptualization, definition and measurement. 4. Governments have low equity in PPPs because if they are classified as fragile states weak State institutions. They have little leverage or bargaining power.	1. Structural and economic factors. These include poverty, low incomes, economic decline, violent conflict, presence of armed insurgents. Also refers to lack of natural resource wealth, proximity of geography to bad states and demographic stress, including urbanization. 2. Political and institutional factors, which include crises in state legitimacy and authority, bad governance as manifest in repression of political competition, weak state institutions, succession and reform crises in mostly authoritarian states, and state predatory and patrimonial politics. 3. Social factors include inequality, severe identity fragmentation, social exclusion, and lack of social cohesion, including lack of social capital and weak civil society. 4. International factors include the legacy of colonialism, international political economy asymmetries, and global economic shocks, especially on food prices. Source: Hart, T., Hadley, S. and Welham. 2015, p. 4. Bertocchi and Guerzoni. 2012.
Public Private Partnerships 1. Private Actors are unwilling to venture into fragile states - partners with weak State institutions. This affects the development of PPPs in Southern Africa. 2. Weak partners bring higher liability to a joint venture or enterprise. 3. Improved state functionalism provides a predictable and productive environment.	1. Legal and regulatory framework. 2. Institutional framework. 3. Operational maturity. 4. Investment Climate. 5. Financial facilities. a. Legal framework and enforcement; b. Institutional capacity and PPP strategy; c. Revenue and cost estimations; d. Comprehension of financial and economic analysis; e. Appropriateness of risk sharing; f. Competitiveness of procurement; g. Public resistance (willingness to pay - assessment). Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited (2015)

This analytical framework details construction of RI, SF and PPPs as a foundation for interpreting the concepts in the researcher's efforts toward achieving the research objectives and answering the research questions. The final section of this second literature review chapters shows a convergence of the literature regarding both literature review chapters. This convergence leads to the construction of the conceptual framework that guided the study.

3.7 Convergence of the Literature and Formulation of the Conceptual Framework

For too long, these three concepts, RI, SF, and PPPs, have largely been treated independently; while each concept may have been discussed somewhere with one of the others, scant attention has been paid to the confluence between the three. There appears to be little evidence of attention on the same in the context of Southern Africa. Even less literature seems to deal with the confluence between the three within framework of endogenous formulations.

The little attention paid to the three concepts has translated into a bias in academic literature towards the economic rationale and dimensions of RI. This bias. seen through a politico-administrative perspective has rendered itself into pre-existing treatment of the three concepts. Furthermore, scholarly work on RI and the state is largely subjugated by the economic rationale arguments, while Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is the argument put forth for the relationship between statecraft and PPPs. Given the above, this study seeks to overcome the deficiency of the relationship between RI and the state, and RI and PPPs, being dominated by a national historical and politico-administrative dimensions.

It is imperative to note that in most studies, the conceptualisation and evaluation of the state tends to focus on exogenously conceived notions, concepts and frameworks that are arguably incongruent with the endogenous realities. According to Richmond (2013, p. 305), the view that endogenous state formation processes indicate a teleological process of development towards Westphalian sovereignty, following a Weberian perspective, has been translated into a dominant, realist concern with security and territory. This perspective, Richmond (2013. P.306) insists, has a vice-like grip over international relations. It also underpins exogenous liberal peacebuilding and neoliberal state building policies.

Thom-Otuya (2014, p. 353-365) posits "that the lack of clarity and consensus on the guiding paradigm for RI; and how to achieve it is perhaps one of the key explanatory factors for limited progress. They insist that RI is both a process and outcome."

However, a premium is placed on the character and effectiveness on the process agent. For instance, in Southern Africa, the process agent is the state and statecraft is the effectiveness used

in the process. Therefore, in determining the success rate of the RI process among states, coherence in statecraft is employed. As discussed above, states in Sub-Saharan Africa took their institutional design and structure from the colonial system, and this is no different in the SADC region, where states are of a Eurocentric and exogenously-driven nature. However, this is to some extent, inconsistent with the past realities and current politico-economic interests of SADC.

RI as an outcome in SADC has largely been defined along economic outcomes, with a lack of attention paid to the political. Within the Southern Africa region, the issue of sovereignty is dominant in treaties and protocols, which is a contradiction to RI under the neo-liberal theory. Thus, it can be argued that this sovereignty protectionism effectively preserves the neo-colonial order. Emphasis on nationalistic sovereignty entrenches balkanisation and preserves the neo-colonial geopolitics that privileges imperial Europe and private actors outside the region. It preserves historical asymmetries of economic and political power.

The confluence between RI, the state and PPPs are dynamic to understand because from an endogenous perspective, it can assist with deconstruction of exogenously driven meanings and enhance the formation of endogenously driven investigation. This has the propensity to take the form of a more realistic RI agenda with the opportunity to yield endogenous politico-administrative knowledge systems that might result in higher returns to the SADC region.

In analysing the literature on RI, there is a gap as it fails to explore how colonial governing systems, the role of the Christianity intervention in the incumbent socio-political order and the role of venture capitalism has influenced the formation of independent states from an ideological perspective. It also does not explore how this legacy of European intervention has influenced the RI setup in the SADC region. The literature is also devoid of critical analysis and examination of the dominant measures employed by mainstream regional economic bodies. It is imperative to note that although there are debates on RI in relation to the theoretical implications, there is a paucity of literature that illuminates on the relevance and effectiveness of the measures of success in RI in relation to SF and PPPs. This is particularly pronounced in the African context, whose experience is variegated with marked political economy asymmetries. The intersection of the three paradigms of RI, SF (the desirable being state stability/functionalism) and PPPs is presented in Figure 3 – 1: Conceptual Framework.

Finally, there is a lack of substantive studies on the interrelationships of private interest (capital) in PPPs on public interest (public administration and the policy formulation). Literature on FDI, foreign venture capitalism in PPPs is preoccupied with the conditions governments must create to ensure success of PPPs. The unidirectional interest in supporting PPPs presumes that the state

in Southern Africa is inherently configured to fail and that to deliver its mandate it must 'partner' with private actors with no direct and formal accountabilities to the electorate.

3.6.1 Confluence of regional integration and state fragility

An analysis of the literature above indicates that states operate in two domains: the internal sphere comprising the domestic politics and national economy and the external sphere within which the state navigates the imperatives of the IPE. It is within the external sphere that the state, functional or fragile, chooses to join a regional block and configures the depth and nature of its involvement. Thus, the same parameters employed in the measure of fragility such as the CPIA, can be employed to determine the depth and nature of integration, particularly when we examine sectoral policies.

Verdier (2010, p. 2)) provides an authoritative analysis on the confluence between RI and SF in Africa. In his paper, which discusses the way "RI processes may contribute to state building and promote exit from fragility for countries characterised by weak State institutions", he illustrates a simple "conceptual framework to discuss the effects of external and RI on fragile states and analyses the policy trade-offs that may arise in such contexts". Furthermore, he argues that "although much of the literature on country fragility and state-building takes a country-level, state-centred approach and emphasises the problem of failures in the three dimensions of security, public services provision and legitimacy, countries do not operate in isolation and that regional drivers of fragility may be important elements of the problem".). The analysis presented above is however limited in that it confines the interface between the state and regional entity to diplomatic connections, military alliances and economic agreements as they relate to the top tier of the state, and trade flows as they relate to the lower tier (Verdier, 2010, p.3). Further, the application of economic theory of trade openness to fragility as presented by Vedier is based on conservative assumptions of the nature of conflict and makes the conclusion that trade openness relates to fragility in two dimensions: i) trade interdependence limits the incentive to use military force in interstate relations, as it increases the opportunity cost of wars, and ii) asymmetric economic interdependence could induce frictions and disputes across countries, and thus lead to negative consequences (Verdier, 2010, p. 7).

A much broader characterization of the relationship between RI and SF is offered by Alibewa (2012) who asserts that "the security environment in West Africa is characterized by fragility and unpredictability, and these threats flow from diverse sources: trafficking in drugs and weapons; poor management of the region's natural resource endowments; vulnerabilities associated with the region's geographical location; demographic configuration; environmental factors; and in

recent times, the regression in the progress earlier attained in the area of democracy and good governance. Ajibewa (2012, p. 65 -75) argues that 'the transformation of these risks into active insecurity is fuelled by the interplay between internal governance processes, power relations flowing from geostrategic interests, and the capacity or incapacity of the regional security system to respond to the challenge". In his conclusion, Ajibewa (2012) discusses the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF) as a Response to Fragility in West African States adopted by the ECOWAS Mediation and Security Council in January 2008.

In both theory and practice, the literature suggests that there is a convergence and confluence between RI and SF. This thesis however sought to examine the likely symbiotic nature of such a relationship. One in which the regionalism and regionalisation builds states, and one in which states enhance RI in a non-linear, cyclic fashion.

3.6.2 Confluence of state fragility and public private partnerships

A summation of the literature review presented above supports the hypothesis that the relationship between SF and PPPs is institutionally and politically intricate. SF refers to the limited institutional capacity of the state and the related impacts on its ability to secure its territory, collect tax, provide social and economic services, administer justice and maintain its sovereignty. The implications of this condition of the state on PPPs emanates from the limited institutional capacity, and the inability to secure territory and administer justice. These are among the key dimensions critical to the implementation of successful PPPs. Competent personnel, enabling policy environment, financial capacity, enabling macro-economic environment are general and necessary success factors affected by SF. These factors also affect project specific factors such as: Appropriate risk allocation and risk sharing between public and private partners; and project technical feasibility. In contrast, successful PPPs can galvanise state capacities and reduce fertility.

The convergence of the relationship between SF and PPPs is suitably expressed in the philosophy and actions of several donors including the WB. According to the Public Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility (PPIAF) a multi-donor trust fund supported by the WB "fragile states lag far behind the developing world and generally require more development assistance, as they are characterized by the negative impacts of conflict or natural disasters, which often leave infrastructure service provision underfunded, and in many cases, damaged or destroyed, but furthermore, the private sector is often hesitant to invest because of the heightened risks inherent in fragile states" (PPIAF, 2015).

The confluence between these two exogenous concepts of the state and its relationship to the private actor culminates in the mandate of the PPIAF. Created in 1999, the PPIAF acts “as a catalyst to increase private sector participation in emerging markets. It provides technical assistance to governments to support the creation of a sound enabling environment for the provision of basic infrastructure services by the private sector.” Thus, specifically in this regard, the PPIAF is said to specialize “in creating enabling environments for PPPs (PPPs) in basic infrastructure sectors allowing the PPIAF to work effectively in fragile states willing to tackle the challenges associated with increasing institutional capacity and sector reforms needed to attract private sector participation”.

The confluence is further illustrated in Besada (2013, p. 31), background research paper on Doing Business in Fragile States, in which she asserts that an assessment of the business environment using the parameters employed in the Ease of Doing Business framework is critical for success of PPPs in fragile states.

3.6.3 Confluence of public private partnerships and regional integration

The relationship between PPPs and RI in Southern Africa is consummated in the Southern Africa Development Community, 2015–2020 Regional Indicative Strategic Plan (RISDP). The literature on SADC and its regional public infrastructure Initiatives highlight PPPs as the preferred vehicle in the delivery of regional economic agendas. In its statement of modalities for delivery, the SADC Regional Infrastructure Development Master Plan states that” public financing of infrastructure, continues to face challenges owing to fiscal limitations and competing needs from other urgent socio-economic sectors, and that in order to address this challenge, the RIDMP advocates the adoption of joint PPPs participation in regional infrastructure development (RISDP, 2012, p. 79). This policy position has been informed by a variety of both academic and practitioner literatures. The foremost proponents of this relationship in the literature are the WB and the OECD. Both have been inspired by neoliberal market ideologies advanced by the trans-Atlantic alliance. The African Development Bank for instance has in its strategy pronouncements stated that PPPs in infrastructure are key for Africa’s competitiveness.

The SADC RISDP emphasis on infrastructure as key to sustained high economic growth is collaborated by Ncube WB (2013) who asserts that it is imperative that planning for both national and regional infrastructure projects is coupled with the requisite legal and regulatory framework that will allow for increased involvement of the private sector in infrastructure development on a PPPs model. Improved infrastructure investment in Africa is crucial for the continent’s competitiveness and productivity; and contributes to spatial-inclusion and reducing spatial inequalities," (Ncube, WB, 2013).

Literature on the SADC community from a thesis by Nyali (2014). An Analysis of the Role of Public - Private Partnerships in RI Initiatives in Southern Africa', examined the extent to which the current legal framework and practices in SADC allow for participation of the private sector in PPPs. The analysis concluded that ultimately the private sector is the primary beneficiary of a successful RI agenda as its stands to benefit most from having access to larger markets at the shortest possible time and at the least cost (Nyali, 2014, p. 64).

Chapter Two, the first literature review chapter highlights orthodox paradigms of global and regional governance as a context for this second literature chapter about theories foundational to the study. Taken together, both literature review chapters cover a variety of disciplines and different concepts, theories and policies that transcend disciplines; hence the transdisciplinary nature of this study. Considering these factors, a conceptual framework was selected as next discussed.

3.6.4 Conceptual framework

The convergence of the literature resulted into the construction of a conceptual framework which illustrates the interface between the concepts and their underlining assumptions and the global and regional context in which these are embedded. Figure 3.1- Conceptual Framework, presents the said conceptualisation of relationships between RI, SF or state functionalism and PPPs. It is a culmination of the various arguments, assertions and propositions submitted in the literature review chapters.

Figure 3 - 1: Conceptual Framework



Source: Tanyanyiwa and Hakuna, (2014); Bertocchi and Guerzoni, (2011).

The literature does not, however, present concepts that are the inverse of SF. This begs the question as to the interest and purpose of the concept of SF as a normative condition. Nevertheless, this study begins to interrogate alternative views such as the focus on a desirable outcome that could be termed, state functionalism as opposed to a disabling outcome such as SF. Therefore 'state functionalism' is included in the conceptual framework, to begin to deconstruct and reconstruct as well as reinterpret African statecraft.

3.7 Summary of the chapter

The chapter illustrated and presented evidence of the theoretical influences that have shaped the thinking on RI, SF or state functionalism and PPPs in a regional context. In other words, the study is questions the influence of RI on SF or functionalism relative to PPPs. It highlights the relevance of various theories from across different disciplines and their limitations. Of critical significance to the study is the glaring gap in endogenous thought, propositions or neologism. The chapter also presents the mainstream measures of the three concepts; RI, SF and PPPs. These measures assist

to further define the conceptual and theoretical dimensions and provide a skeletal basis for the development of items of inquiry for the study, as well as new theoretical propositions to govern RI and state functionalism that promotes PPPs. The next chapter discusses the research methodology guiding the study.

4.0 CHAPTER FOUR: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

4.1 Introduction

This chapter defines the underlying paradigms and philosophical assumptions pertaining to the research methods employed in the study. It discusses traditional research paradigms, and the appropriateness of mixed methods approach and the constructivist, interpretivist and pragmatist worldviews for the study. Attention is paid to the relevance of these paradigms for the creation of knowledge on the confluence between RI, SF and PPPs; or the confluence between RI, state functionalism and PPPs. Accordingly, thereafter, the chapter proceeds to discuss the attendant research design, the strategy for inquiry, sampling techniques, data collection tools, data quality control and data analysis. The chapter discusses the key variables for the study; their description and measures. In addition, multi-faceted triangulation is considered as well as ethical considerations and study limitations.

4.2 Scientific and Governance Research

Here the study highlights the definitional variations, owing to the distinctions in purpose but similarities in methodology, between social research, scientific research and governance research.

On one hand scientific research has been defined as the "systematic, controlled, empirical, and critical investigation of natural phenomena guided by theory and hypotheses about the presumed relations among such phenomena." (Kerlinger, 1986, p. 326). Research has also been defined as the "process of collecting, analysing, and interpreting data to understand a phenomenon", this process is "systematic in that defining the objective, managing the data, and communicating the findings occur within established frameworks and in accordance with existing guidelines" (Williams, 2007 p. 66).

Scientific research is considered either theoretical and/or empirical. Theoretical research can be said to be concerned with the development of abstract concepts relating to "a natural or social phenomenon and relationships between those concepts, while empirical research is concerned with testing the theoretical concepts and relationships to see how well they reflect our observations of reality, with the goal of ultimately building better theories" (Bhattacherjee, 2012, p. 5).

Bhattacherjee (2012) further submits that scientific inquiry is conducted through two forms, inductive and deductive. In the first, inductive research, the researcher's goal is to induce

theoretical concepts and patterns from observed data. The second, deductive research, the goal of the researcher is to test theoretical concepts and patterns using new empirical data. Accordingly, inductive research is also referred to as theory-building research, and deductive research is theory-testing research.

These two broad forms of scientific inquiry, relate to three groups of research projects: exploratory, descriptive, and explanatory. The first, exploratory research, is often employed in new areas of inquiry, in which the researcher seeks to scope out the magnitude of a phenomenon, problem, or behaviour, or to generate initial ideas about that phenomenon. Exploratory research can also be used to test the feasibility of undertaking a more extensive study on that phenomenon (Bhattacherjee, 2012 p. 6). The goal of descriptive research, in contrast, is to use scientific method to generate meticulous observations and detailed documentation of a phenomenon of interest. The third and final, explanatory research, seeks to construct explanations of observed phenomena, problems, or behaviours. The difference between the first two types of research projects is that they aim to assess what, where and when of a phenomenon, whereas explanatory research seeks answers to why and how questions. To this end, explanatory research seeks to connect the dots in research, by identifying causal factors and outcomes of the target phenomenon" (Bhattacherjee, 2012, p. 6)

Social research on the other hand, may be defined as a scientific undertaking which by means of logical and systematized techniques aims to discover new facts or verify and test old facts , analyse their sequences , inter- relationships and casual explanation which were derived within an appropriate theoretical frame of reference , develop new scientific tools , concepts and theories which would facilitate reliable and valid study of human behaviour. (Pandey and Pandey, 2015, p. 9)

But while defining scientific research and social research, is traditionally the task of the academia, defining governance research attracts equal attention from both academics and practitioners. In terms of purpose, practitioners are of the predominant view that governance research must primarily serve to analyse and inform governance for influencing its practice. Such arguments assert that research endeavours must have as their aim "concrete outcomes in terms of influencing or changing behaviour and policy perspectives as part of the positive transformation of society" (Matlosa, 2005, p. 1). In this paradigm, governance is defined 'the art and the process of governing', also referred to by the UNDP as 'the exercise of political, economic and administrative authority necessary to manage a nation's affairs…and a process by which decisions are made and implemented or not implemented. In the context of government and statecraft,

therefore, governance is the process by which public institutions conduct public affairs and manage public resources" (OECD, 2006. P. 147).

These variations in definitions notwithstanding, both scientific research and social science research, including governance research, are based on either and/or theories and observations (Bhattacherjee, 2012, p. 3). This being the case, both operate at two levels: a theoretical level and an empirical level. The theoretical level is concerned with developing abstract concepts about a natural or social phenomenon and relationships between those concepts (i.e., build "theories"), while the empirical level is concerned with testing the theoretical concepts and relationships to see how well they reflect our observations of reality, with the goal of ultimately building better theories. (Bhattacherjee, 2012, p. 3)

Accordingly, as Sudhakar (2015. p. 2) explains, all the different research methodologies are therefore effectively used in both scientific and social science research. Methodologies such as conceptual research, empirical research, model research methodology, experimental research, formal methodologies, build research methodology, process research methodology and simulation method. The echelon distinguishing aspect for research therefore is the philosophical underpinnings of the ontology and epistemology of a study.

4.3 Ontological and Epistemological Underpinnings

For purposes of this study, on the one hand ontology is defined as an inquiry into the nature of reality, as in what constitutes reality? On the other hand, epistemology is defined as an inquiry to the nature of knowledge, its sources and limits, and how knowledge can be produced and supported with arguments for (Eriksson & Kovalainen, 2015, p. 14).

4.3.1 Ontology and the research methodology

In constructing the ontology of the study, the Researcher examines four metatheory; i) constructivism, ii) interpretivism, iii) pragmatism, iv) post-positivism, and v) critical theory.

From a research perspective, therefore, positivists assert that inquiry should be based upon scientific observation and empirical inquiry, not philosophical speculation, and further asserts that natural and human sciences share common logical and methodological principles, dealing with facts and not with values (Gray, 2012, p. 21). The teleology of this philosophy is that it provides, according to its proponents, the premise for the framing of general laws and explanations for predictions. It is also known as realism.

The second metatheory, post positivism, also referred to as critical realism also espouses a system in which there is belief in social reality; however, it also takes cognisance that this certainty is hampered by human shortcomings. In other words, there is an apprehendable social reality, but it is not absolute. Finally, the third metatheory, interpretivism, whose teleology is enabling understanding and reconstruction of realities, is a belief in "multiple constructed realities that are integral to the social contexts that create them". Also, referred to as the anti-positivist paradigm, interpretivism is said to have evolved in reaction to positivism. It is commonly linked to constructivism because of its emphasis on the individual's ability to create meaning. According to Sotland (2012, p. 10), the interpretivist paradigm in contrast, was heavily influenced by hermeneutics, the study of meaning and interpretation of historical texts. I was also influenced by phenomenology.

Hermeneutics is therefore, the foundation upon which the interpretivist paradigm was established. The interpretivist metatheory therefore argues that reality is not a fixed notion and that it is time and context bound. Changing times and context therefore affect reality. In summation, this research finds concurrence with the position of Maftoon (2012, p. 41). The major ontological assumptions pertaining to interpretivism or constructivism are that:

i) "Reality is indirectly constructed based on individual interpretation and is subjective";
ii) "People interpret and make their own meaning of events";
iii) "Events are distinctive and cannot be generalised";
iv) "There are multiple perspectives on one incident"; and
v) "Causation in social sciences is determined by interpreted meaning and symbols". Maftoon (2012, p. 41)

The ontological perspective underlining this research is interpretivism which is linked to constructivism. Interpretivism permits the examination of assumptions about the construct of statecraft, governance and the nature of its elements, both of which are the subject of this investigation.

4.3.2 Epistemology and research methodology

The Researcher now examines the epistemology of the research methodology, the ways of knowing, the constitution of knowledge, and the character of the relationship between the

researcher and the researched. In the post-positivism research metatheory, a modified dualist perspective exists, based on the recognition that "independence is not possible, considers objectivity as the goal and is demonstrated by external verification". Post-positivist research metatheory epistemology is anchored in objectivism, but the post-positivist perspective recognises that neither objectivity nor dualism are absolute.

In contrast, the research metatheory epistemology of interpretivism, also referred to as constructivism, is transactional. Interpretivist epistemologies generally are case-oriented rather than variable-oriented" (Ragin, 1987). In this paradigm, as Lor surmises, the focus is on the phenomenon or case, as unique, complex and detailed (Lor, 2011, p. 11). This is in contrast with post-positivist epistemologies which often view reality in terms of variables due to a perceived need to operationalise concepts for purposes of measurement, collecting quantitative data, and the testing of hypotheses. This reductionist approach leads to simplification and loss of detail, and it is based on this epistemological distinction between interpretivism and positivism that the researcher opted for a case study approach.

As Pickard (2013, p. 17) submits, "the results of the investigation are produced by the interaction between the subject and the investigator, both of whom are simultaneously changed by this interaction, so that the knowledge that results from the process is not universally valid but contextual and restricted to the particular time of the interaction". According to Lor (2011, p 4), basing his views on the inspirations by Guba and Lincoln (1984, pp. 110-111) interpretivism can be characterised into two sub-paradigms; i) critical theory and ii) constructivism. Specifically, on the one hand, in critical theory there is an "inevitable, value-laden link between the investigator and the object of the investigation, which influences the findings, thereby, blurring the line between ontology and epistemology". In constructivism on the other hand, the "investigator and the object of the investigation are interactively linked, and the findings are developed or created during the investigation through the interaction of a particular investigator and a particular object or group". Both sub-paradigms of interpretivism are of interest to the study, as shown in section 4.3.4. Sections 4.3.3 to 4.3.5 further explore post-positivism, constructivism, interpretivism and pragmatism, following which the way in which these worldviews converged to undertake this MIT-disciplinary study is presented.

4.4 How the Philosophical World Views informed the Methodology

4.4.1 Interpretivism

Interpretivism is centred on "exploring the complexity of social phenomena with a view to gaining understanding. The purpose of research in interpretivism is understanding and interpreting events, experiences and social structures, as well as the values people attach to these phenomena" (Rubin

& Babbie, 2010, p.37). With interpretivists, it is the belief that "social reality is subjective and nuanced, because it is shaped by the perceptions of the participants, as well as the values and aims of the researcher". (Vosloo, 2014, p. 307).

The interpretivist paradigm can also be referred to as the "constructivist paradigm" because it is "rooted in the fact that realities are multiple and socially constructed. Interpretivists adopt a relativist ontology, where a single phenomenon can have multiple interpretations and there is no basic process by which truth can be determined. They aim to get a deeper understanding of the phenomenon and its complexity in its unique context, not to generalize to a whole population". (Riyami, 2015, p. 413). According to Corter, Esche, Chassapis, Ma, and Nickerson (2011, p. 2057), the term constructivism derived from the constructivist Jean Piaget, whose constructivism theory of learning articulates mechanisms by which knowledge is internalized by learners. Whereas Bruner (1966) posits discovery learning as constructionist. Other terms submitted by Corter *et al*. (2011) which also refer to constructivist views of learning relevant to the methodology of this study are: generative learning by Kind (2013, p. 4); and situated learning and authentic instruction by Beishuizen (2011, p. 9).

Constructivism is a "research paradigm that denies the existence of objective reality, asserting instead that reality is a social construction and that there potentially exists as many constructions as there are individuals" (Wahyuni, 2012, p. 69-80). It is therefore an "epistemological view of knowledge acquisition that emphasises knowledge construction rather than knowledge transmission and the recording of information conveyed by others" (Corter *et al*., 2011, p. 2057). Within this view then, Corter *et al*. (2011, p. 2057) submit that "the role of the learner is conceived as one of building and transforming knowledge. In interrogating, what it means to construct knowledge, they assert that within constructivism there are different notions of the nature of knowledge and the knowledge construction process". Corter *et al*. (2011, p. 2057), identify three types of constructivism:

2. The first is exogenous constructivism which asserts that there exists an external reality which is reconstructed as knowledge is being formed;
3. The second is endogenous constructivism, also referred to as cognitive construction, asserts that individual knowledge construction is stimulated by internal cognitive conflict as learners strive to resolve mental imbalances, and resolve the meaning of experiences and phenomena that are discrepant from their existing schema; Corter *et al*. (2011, p. 2057) and

4. The third is dialectical constructivism which views the origin of knowledge construction as being the social intersection of people, interactions that involve sharing, comparing and debating among learners and mentors.

The three basic principles of interpretivism are: i) the social world that is constructed and given meaning subjectively by people. "Human beings are subjects that have consciousness, or a mind; while human behaviour is affected by knowledge of the social world, which exists only in relation to human beings; ii) the researcher is part of what is observed; and iii) research is driven by interests". (Vosloo, 2014, p. 308).

Interpretive researchers assert that reality comprises of people's subjective experiences of the external world, and thus, they are likely to adopt an inter-subjective epistemology and the ontological belief that reality is socially constructed. According to Antwi and Hamza (2015, p. 218) interpretivists believe there is no single correct path or method to knowledge.

In summary, the interpretive paradigm is interested in understanding the world as it occurs from subjective experiences of individuals, who use meaning oriented methodologies as opposed to measurement. Such methodologies include interviews or participant observation, which rely on subjective relationships between the researcher and subjects. Thus, interpretive research does not predefine dependent and independent variables, but considers the complexities of human judgement of emerging situations (Kaplan and Maxwell, 1994). The interpretive approach, therefore, aims at explaining the subjective reasons and meanings behind social action.

4.4.1.1 How interpretivism shaped the study

Interpretivism was identified as suitable for the study primarily due to its emphasis on the "relation between researcher and practitioner, specifically the principle of interaction between the researchers and subjects". Of relevance for the study in regard to this "principle is the interaction between researcher and researched subjects during data generation". The researched subjects also referred to herein as respondents were regarded as interpreters and co-producers of the data. Each responder had a unique perspective of both the structural and cultural phenomenon driving the relationship between RI, state functionalism and PPPs development.

The study aimed at generating empirical data and within the interpretivism philosophy. Empirical data generation is considered as a process of socially constructed meanings by both the researchers and respondents. Kelliher (2011, p. 127) notes that, "principle is exclusively concerned with the interaction between researcher and respondent (practitioners) during the

generation of empirical data" where the line of inquiry pursued is both personal and official interpretations of the research topic. There were no correct or incorrect theories about the research topics during the data generation although it was recognized that there are interesting and less interesting ways of conceiving the issues. Since interpretivism considers knowledge as understanding, whose purpose should be of interest to its audiences, the inquiry during data collection encouraged the localization and particularization of issues within the respondents' specific context or perceived reality. This was critical because the researcher works closely to the practice field and engages in the studied practices. As Venkatesh, Brown and Bala (2013, p. 27) state, "the researcher can never assume a value-neutral stance."

This worldview is particularly relevant to the integrated research approach employed in the study. As indicated in Chapter One, the study employed a multi-inter-transdisciplinary approach which from a methodological perspective, considers various levels of integration and cooperation among and across disciplines, and among and across academic and non-academic communities. Pragmatism is discussed next, followed by the convergence of the philosophical worldviews as delineated in section 4.3.6.

4.4.2 Pragmatism/Pragmaticism

Pragmatism is a utilitarian philosophy that posits that utility is the test of truth and reality. (. According to Hookway (2013, p. 1) "pragmatism, a relatively old philosophy that has seen recent revival, was founded by American philosophers Charles Pierce (1839–1914), William James (1842–1910) and John Dewey (1859– 1952) at the beginning of the twentieth century to help American society face the many problems it was confronting at the time." Akira (2014, p.4) states and asserts that "an ideology is true only if it works,particularly in promoting equity, freedom and justice) and generates practical consequences for society, thus pragmatists focus not on whether a proposition fits a particular ontology, but whether it suits a purpose and is capable of creating action".

Akria's assertions are underlined by the submissions of Creswell (2014) who posits that "pragmatism is not committed to any one system of philosophy and reality." According to Goldkuhl (2012, p. 10), there are three types of pragmatism; functional pragmatism, which views knowledge as a basis for action; "referential pragmatism which is a claim to let actors, actions, action-objects, activities and practices become the primary studied objects (knowledge about actions); and methodological pragmatism is concerned with how knowledge is created". It is the second type that specifically concerns the approach to this research. It postulates that "pragmatism accepts things and events as existing independent of any observers, but at the same time

emphasizes reason and thought as originators of elements in the external world" (Goldkhul, 2012, p. 10).

4.4.5.1 How pragmatism shaped the approach to this research

The study purpose and methodology were both greatly influenced by the pragmatist worldview. First in articulating the purpose of the study, the researcher sought to create knowledge 'instrumental to the relationship between regionalism and statecraft. Thus, the purpose of the study conforms to the 'functional pragmatist' view that knowledge must inherently be a basis for action. The focus on the architecture of regional and national public institutions is derived from the same perspective. The study was also substantially shaped by the 'methodological pragmatist' worldview in that it focuses on how knowledge is created. In particular, how ideas and knowledge on regional integration theory, international relations theory, statecraft and the relationships between these concepts is created. Consequently, within this world view the study sought to, inductively, generate theoretical propositions on the same.

Additionally, the choice of pragmatism as a research worldview for the study is grounded in assertions by Goldkuhl (2012) who presents Dewey's concept of inquiry as being at the core of how pragmatism is applied in research. Dewey (1930) defines the concept of inquiry as "the controlled or directed transformation of an indeterminate situation into one that is so determinate in its constituents, distinctions and relations as to convert the elements of original situation into a unified whole" (Dewey, 1930, p. 108). The concept is further defined by Goldkuhl (2011, p. 15) as "a natural part of life aimed at improving our condition by adaptation accommodations in the world" Accordingly, Goldkuhl (2012) concludes that, "this means that an inquiry is an investigation into some part of reality with the purpose of creating knowledge for a controlled change of this part of the reality" (Goldkuhl, 2012, p. 7). This concept underlines the multimethod research design which is two near independent research projects, each rigorously generating unique perspective qualitatively and quantitatively. The perspectives which are thereafter triangulated to create a single research outcome. Within each of the near independent research, are instances of indeterminate situations that are transformed into a determinate constituent that construct a unified whole. Each of the two unified wholes from the near independent projects, are then considered indeterminate situations and later together comprise the unified whole for the research.

Though other notable scholars such as Pleasants (2003). Heiskala (2011, p. 241) have criticised Dewey's (1938) inquiry notion for not making a definitive distinction between science and non-science. Such criticism notwithstanding this study opted to derive value from the philosophy

basing on Dewey's (1938) summation of the inquiry notion of pragmatism as the "systematisation of human beings' natural efforts to improve their situation. That is, any inquiry should be rooted in ordinary initiatives for human betterment and not as a distinctly separate occurrence or undertaking". In the case of regional integration and statecraft in southern Africa, the purported goal is the betterment of the lives of citizens in the SADC community. The creation of an endogenous understanding, characterisation and architecture being pursued in this study directly derives from this objective of inquiry, human betterment.

4.4.3 Post-Positivism

The first metatheory, post-positivism, emerged out of positivism which is understood to be a philosophy that refers to reality, often the object of scientific inquiry, is real and apprehensible. It is a "belief in a tangible social reality existing independently of those 'creating' the reality. Positivists further assert that a social reality can exist just as a natural reality" (Pickard, 2013, p. 14). Post-positivists hold a deterministic philosophy in which causes probably determine effects or outcomes. Thus, the problems studied by post-positivists reflect the need to identify and assess the causes that influence outcomes, such as found in experiments. It is also reductionistic in that the intent is to reduce the ideas into a small, discrete set of ideas to test, such as the variables that comprise hypotheses and research questions (Creswell, 2008, p. 7)

The term positivism, also referred to as a scientific paradigm was introduced by the French philosopher and author of positivism, Auguste Comte, who believed that reality is observable. Njoroge (2011, p. 871) claims that "Comte's position was to lead to a general doctrine of positivism which held that all genuine knowledge is based on sense experience and can be advanced only by means of observation and experiment". Since then Aristotle's deductive reasoning, Galelio's scientific method, Vienna Circle's logical reasoning, Francis Bacon's inductive reasoning and Karl Popper's post positivism have defined the paradigm.

The assertion is therefore that frustrations with the 'strictly empirical nature' of positivist philosophy led to the development of post-positivism, also referred to as postmodernism, during the mid-late 20th century. Post-positivists argue that one can make reasonable inferences about a phenomenon by combining empirical observations with logical reasoning. (Bhattacherjee, 2012, p. 18). Thus, Post-positivists view science as probabilistic, based on a variety of contingencies, and thus, often seek to explore these contingencies to better understand social reality. This position, however, has since translated into two branches of post-positivists; i) subjectivists, who view the world as a subjective construction of our subjective minds rather than as an objective reality, and ii) critical realists, who believe that there is an external reality that is independent of

a person's thinking but we can never know such reality with any degree of certainty (Bhattacherjee, 2012, p. 18).

4.3.6.1 How Post-positivism shaped the approach to this study

Post-positivism was central in shaping the approach to the quantitative research sub-project which tested the correlation between various politico-administrative and economic variables of indices and measures developed by various international organisations. The philosophy permitted the researcher to consider and make scientifically reasonable inferences to the relationship between these variables, based on the empirical secondary data from other organisations and logical extrapolations applied during the data analysis. The empirical observations having already been undertaken by other researchers, the study subjected the data to a secondary analysis based on the study objective and made logical conclusions regarding the relationship between the various variables (indices and measures). In this endeavor, the post-positivist branch of critical realism predominated the approach. Its appeal to this study, therefore, is that post-positivism does not reject quantitative methodology, but attempt to harness it within a more complex research design. Post-positivism is more cautious concerning strong and one-sided interpretations and restrained regarding the too extensive or obsessive use of quantitative data and method. (Adam, 2014, p. 5). For this study, the appeal emanates from the aspect of critical theory as dialectical thinking, which addresses the concern with empiricism and positivism, that they have the capability or ability to describe but not understand. And further, the difficulty with interpretative social sciences, which have the competence to comprehend but not to critique the limits or boundaries of understanding. It is this dialectical movement which gives rise to the need for critical theory to shift the bases of both empirical and interpretative knowledge. The objective of this study to create endogenous knowledge on regionalism and statecraft is underlined by this dialectical thinking.

4.4.4 Critical Theory

Critical theory, is a metatheory whose central tenet 'self-awareness' as a theory, is regarded as critical. This is reflected in the synthesis of various traditions of modern theories including historical materialism, German idealism, psychoanalysis and modernism. Critical theorists are influenced intellectually by Karl Marx. Many critical theorists drew from his analysis of human inequality and his normative goal of eliminating exploitation. (Patrascu and Ahmad. 2015. p. 389). Marx's central argument is that men make their history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given, and transmitted from the past.

Within IR, critical theory as a Para-Marxist movement, refers to a set of Marxists-inspired critical analyses of international theory and practice. The critical international theory that culminates from this rendering to IR, also observes an intimate connection between cognitive processes and social life. (Patrascu and Ahmad. 2015. p. 392). Robert Cox is widely regarded as the father of critical theory of International Relations (IR), following the publication of his seminal article in Millennium: Journal of International Studies in 1981 (Moolakkattu, 2009, p. 439). There are two schools of critical theory, namely, the one inspired by Antonio Gramsci and Hokheimer which focuses on production and issues related to 'redistributory struggles', and the other influenced by Habermas and his theory of communicative action which focuses on issues relating to identity and community. (Moolakkattu, 2009, p. 440). Cox is considered a prominent proponent of the first school.

4.4.4.1 How critical theory shaped the approach to this study

In both the research design as multimethod and in undertaking the analysis in particular, the researcher observed the aspect of the theory that renders it 'critical' – self-awareness in the context of the focus of both schools of critical theory. The first school which focuses on issues of production and struggles for redistribution provided the framework for the political economy analysis of economic integration. It was employed in the examination of the linear model as based on the experience of a given community which authored the IPE paradigm in the interest of the transfer of and concentration of wealth in the west. The second school, which focuses on identity and community, was employed in the analysis of the conceptualisation and evolution of regionalism in southern Africa as an exogenous project, which continues to consider communities and identities along the geopolitical prescription of colonialism. Of specific relevance to the study was Cox's integrated rendering of critical theory which weaves together historical materialism and a historicist understanding of social class, institutions and ideas, applying these to the post-1973 period. According to Cox, critical political economy must seek to develop a 'historical mode of thought', capable of understanding the actors and structures found in a period of history. (Moolakkattu, 2009, p. 441). The use of critical theory also permits the use of an analytical lens used by Gramscian influenced scholars who are primarily concerned with political economy. The 'Gramscian turn' in IR provides a way to conceptualize a world order free of the constraints of state-centric approaches and the interstate relations they focus upon, while explicitly acknowledging their importance (Moolakkattu, 2009, p. 445).

The Robert Cox's neo-Gramscian school of thought, therefore, applies Gramscian ideas on a larger scale, that of the global world, theory is of critical nature, examining the reasons behind the emergence of new world orders and subsequently how institutions, norms, ideas or practices

come into being, and what driving forces could have the potential to transform the prevailing order. Of equal relevance to this study, is the theory's rendering of hegemony, described as a combination of coercion and consent which is more than just an imposition of some new world view, but a creation of common sense which spreads within a system including both dominant and subordinate social forces. (Dirzauskaite and Ilinca, 2017, p. 31)

4.4.5 Convergence of the philosophical worldviews for this study

Multimethod research can be understood through three different aspects. First is in relation to the "increasing diversity of techniques, centred in the conventional qualitative tradition. Second is the growing number of interconnections between qualitative and quantitative research tools. And third, is the relationship to interpretative and constructivist approaches" (Brady and Collier, 2008. p. 780). Interpretivism is the analysis of phenomenon, be it political, economic, social or cultural, that is centred on the interpretation such phenomenon possesses for the individuals involved. The goal is to enhance the perspectives of the actor, emic or actor-centeredness, and not those of the etic, observer-centeredness. The constructivist approach in disciplines such as IR, focuses on how political economy is socially constituted or constructed by the actors. These approaches concur that effectively analysing of the social mantra of the political economy is interpretative. Some researchers maintain that it is possible to adopt a clear knowledge of the subject matter of political economy, without the use of different method Others also argue that a "rigorous understanding of interpretivism and constructivism raises such distinctive questions of epistemology and ontology that the contribution of these approaches is lost if they are subsumed within a conventional framework, including the framework of standard qualitative methods". Multimethod research therefore allows for a productive resolution to the debate over these alternatives. It is a productive designation for the spectrum of methodological concerns. The study also employs a pragmatic research approach. From a conceptual perspective, pragmatism is a school of thought that regards the function of thought as a tool for prediction, action, and problem solving, which does not describe, represent, or mirror reality. Pragmatism is an interplay between knowledge and action for change. It is considered appropriate for research because it allows for innovation and intervention. (Goldkuhl, 2012, p. 2)

The study primarily employs and recognises the apparent differences in epistemological and methodological orientations between constructivism, interpretivism, pragmatism and post-positivism. The key character of interpretive knowledge is the understanding that knowledge is interesting in itself; but knowledge stressed in pragmatism, and constructive becomes "useful for action and change" (Goldkuhl, 2012, p. 142). While knowledge in post-positivism is deemed as

an objective reality with multiple interpretations. A summary of the differences is presented below in Table 4.1.

Table 4: 1 - Application of the worldviews to the research methodology

Aspect	Interpretivism	Pragmatism	Post-positivism	Critical Theory
Epistemology	Inductive	Inductive	Deductive	Deductive
Ontology	Idealism/Relativism— reality composed from objective and subjective meaning as determined by stakeholders in the setting	knowledge consists of warranted assertions that result from taking action and experiencing the outcomes	Realism— observational data are the foundation of knowledge; objective reality can be understood & measured	Reactionism— reality shaped by values of those who control power & resources
Epistemology	Gather all facts (data) first, infer theory that matches precisely those facts; allow new theoretical understanding to emerge from the data	Commitment to the evaluation of the adequacy of concepts and beliefs through the empirical test of practice – utility	Hypotheses testing,	Understand historical forces, evolution of meanings, material practices, & inequalities
Rationale for use in this Study	Help accurately understand what is occurring in this particular situation; describe actors view-point & significance	To to replace an older way of thinking about the differences between approaches to research by treating those differences as social contexts for inquiry as a form of social action, rather than as abstract philosophical systems	To explain & predict; discover generalizable laws & universal - truth	Emancipatory- to uncover hidden interests & contradictions; critique, transformation
Data Type	Qualitative Primary and Secondary	Qualitative Primary	Quantitative Secondary	Qualitative Secondary
Research Strategy	Case Study	Case Study	Non-experimental Quantitative Descriptive and Exploratory	Case Study

Source: Morgan (2014, p. 1048). Sudhakar (2015). Gay and Weaver (2011. p. 30)

NB: "Multimethod" involves combining any different methods while" mixed methods" more specifically focuses on combining qualitative and quantitative methods

Historically and methodologically, "pragmatism is associated with inquiry as the main type of investigation while interpretivism has field study as the main type of investigation" (Klein and Myers, 1999). In interpretivism, there is the idea that "data generation is conducted through interpretation while in pragmatism data is generated through and used in both assessment and

intervention" (Mead 1938). In this case, the role of the researcher in pragmatism is thus to "promote change while in interpretivism the researcher is engaged in understanding".

Goldkuhl (2012) notes that although there are epistemological differences between interpretivism and pragmatism, notwithstanding "there are common ontological assumptions behind both pragmatism and interpretivism which can be summarized as: meaningful action based in evolutionary social interaction" (Goldkuhl, 2012, p. 142). This convergence is expressed within a "research school that fuses the pragmatic and interpretive together. This is the sociological school of symbolic interactionism" (SI) whose tradition is said to have emerged from the philosophy of American pragmatism driven largely by the work of G H Mead (1934). Symbolic interactionism was elaborated most profoundly by Goldkuhl (2012, p. 142) who described three foundational premises for symbolic interactionism. These were: "Human beings act toward things based on meanings that the things have for them":

i) "The meaning of such things is derived from, or arises out of, the social interaction that one has with one's fellows"; and
ii) "These meanings are handled in, and modified through, an interpretive process used by the person in dealing with the thing he encounters"

This study's research philosophy is grounded in this integrated paradigm of symbolic interactionism framing the approach to an inquiry of the following:

i) What meanings the different respondents derive from the politico-administrative dimensions of RI, SF and PPPs;
ii) The extent to which these meanings have been shaped by interaction with various actors; and
iii) How these meanings have been modified within the respondents' individual context?

The study's primary aim is to explore the thinking, dynamics and examine the politico-administrative arrangements driving RI, state functionalism and PPPs development in Southern Africa. Such an understanding of inquiry is pertinent to the goal to create knowledge in the interest of change and improvement. Dewey (1931) further argues that "pragmatism has an interest not only for what is, but also for what might be; an orientation towards a prospective, not yet realised world". The primary effect of choice of this philosophical worldview for the study derives from its "instrumental view on knowledge; that it is used in action for making a purposeful difference in practice". According to Goldkuhl, the concern "is not only limited to prescriptions for means,

but also the normative knowledge of purposes and values" (Goldkuhl, 2012, p. 8). The interactionism between constructivism/interpretivism and pragmatism is consistent with MIT-disciplinary studies. The illustration in Table 4-2 summarises the various levels.

Table: 4 - 2: Levels of multi-inter-trans-disciplinary

	Synthesise new disciplines and theory		Problem solving focus	Iterative research process	Involve multiple disciplines	Involve stakeholders in research process	Knowledge sharing between disciplines	Thematically based	Research coordinated	Research integrated	Cross-epistemological boundaries	Follows pluralist methodology	Involves implementation of results as part of process
Multidisciplinarity					■		■	■				■	
		■	■						■				
Interdisciplinarity	■	■	■	■		■	■	■	■	■	■		
		■			■							■	
Transdisciplinarity	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	
		■											■

Source: Stock and Burton (2011 p.1101)

In reading Table 4-2, the filled boxes indicate a consensus that the type of integrated research (Y axis) includes the component (X axis) and the empty boxes indicate that there is a consensus that the type of integrated research does not include the component. Finally, the half-full boxes indicate that there is some degree of contention/consensus as to whether this component is necessary or not, rendering either generally acceptable. Although the interactionism between constructivism/interpretivism and pragmatism is the predominant philosophical worldview, it is worth mentioning that post-positivism comes to the forefront regarding the collection and analysis of qualitative secondary data. In other words, there is an apprehendable objective reality drawn from the use of data largely from the WB and Fund for Peace, that reality is neither absolute nor stagnant. With the ontological and epistemological context in mind, subsequent sections focus on methodological approaches.

4.5 Research Design

A research design can be defined as the rational series of relationships between the empirical data to a study's initial research questions and, ultimately, to its conclusions. "A research design is thus, a plan and structure of investigation used to obtain answers to research questions"

(Kerlinger, 1986). Research design also enables researchers to "answer research questions as validly, objectively, accurately and economically as possible" (Dista, 2004, p. 763). Others define research designs as types of "inquiry within qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods approaches that provide specific direction for procedures in a research study". (Creswell, 2014. p. 295).

4.5.1 Types of research designs

There are three generic types of research designs; qualitative, quantitative and mixed method and/or multimethod. Qualitative research, on the one hand, is an inquiry process of understanding based on a methodological tradition of inquiry that explores a problem, which enables construction of a complex, holistic picture. It includes, analyses of words, reports detailed views of respondents and conducts the study in a natural setting. Quantitative research on the other hand, usually involves many variables and few cases. (Ibid.). Quantitative research design seeks objectivity and assumes that there is a "reality to be observed, and that 'rational' researchers studying the same phenomenon will basically agree on its existence and its characteristics". Quantitative research designs also seek to allow the researcher to remain as "neutral or value-free as they can and attempts to avoid human bias whenever possible". Quantitative research design therefore seeks to allow the researcher to "study the phenomena that are of interest to them from a distance". (Antwi & Hamza, 2015, p. 221).

There are profound differences between qualitative and quantitative research designs. "Differences in philosophical perspectives in each paradigm combined with the aims of a study, to a large extent, determine the focus, approach and mode of enquiry which, in turn, determine the structural aspects of a study design". (Kumar, 2011, pp. 104-106). Qualitative research is "aligned with the exploratory scientific method, used to describe what is locally observable and where needed to generate new hypotheses and theories". It is mainly utilised when there is limited knowledge about a topic or phenomenon, as well as when a researcher endeavours to learn additionally on the topic. Qualitative research is therefore used to "understand people's experiences and to express their perspectives". (Antwi & Hamza, 2015, p. 220). The main focus in qualitative research is to understand, explain, explore, discover and clarify situations, feelings, perceptions, attitudes, values, beliefs and experiences of a group of people. The study designs are therefore often based on deductive rather than inductive logic, are flexible and emergent in nature, and are often non-linear and non-sequential in their operationalisation.

It is also important note that in qualitative research, the "distinction between research designs and methods of data collection is often less clear, whereas in quantitative research designs there is far greater clarity and distinction between designs and methods of data collection" Tashakkori & Teddlie (2003), p. 107. In summary, qualitative research often manifests overlaps between designs and data collection method. For example, designs in-depth interviews, is a design as well as a method of data collection and so are oral history and participant observation (ibid). Table 4-3 depicts some of the distinctions between qualitative and quantitative research.

Quantitative research approach on the other hand, is mainly linked to positive scientific method with attention on theory and hypothesis testing. In quantitative research, it is imperative to declare a hypothesis and test it against empirical data. Thus, "in quantitative research, the measurement and classification requirements of the information that is gathered demand that study designs are more structured, rigid, fixed and predetermined in their use to ensure accuracy in measurement and classification". (Kumar, 2011, pp. 105).

Table: 4 - 3: Quantitative and qualitative research design distinguished

Orientation	**Quantitative Design**	**Qualitative Design**
Assumption (s) about the world	There is a single reality measurable by an instrument	There are multiple realities
Research Purpose	Seeks to establish relationships between measured variables.	Seeks to understanding a social situation from participants' perspectives.
Aim	To describe to compare and to attribute	Understand the meaning study participants give to the events, situations, actions and experiences; Understand the context of participants' actions and the influences. Understand the process by which events and actions take place. Develop causal explanations. Identify unanticipated phenomena and influences and generate new grounded theories about them.
Research methods and processes	Deductive in nature; Procedures are established and hypothesis is formulated before research can begin;	Inductive in nature, flexible, with changing strategies. The design emerges as data are collected and hypothesis is not needed to begin research.
Researcher's Role	The researcher is an objective observer who does not participates in or influence what is being studied.	The researcher is immersed and participates in the research and social setting
Generalisability	Applies principle of universality and context-free generalizations to findings	Generates detailed context-based transferability. Though findings are not generalizable, theoretical generalisations may emerge

Sources: Creswell, (2014).

This study was originally conceived as a mixed-method study, however, due to the exceptionally low response rate to self-administered questionnaires sent to respondents across Botswana, Malawi and South Africa, from which the study was to obtain its quantitative data, the study design shifted to a multimethod design, as discussed next.

4.5.2 Multimethod research design

Tashakkori and Teddlie (2003, p. 11) stipulate that multimethod design varies from mixed method design in that it involves qualitative and quantitative projects that are relatively complete on their own but are later triangulated to form essential components of one research. Multimethod design has the distinct feature of using various methods under the same research paradigm or tradition. (Byrne and Humble, 2007, p. 2)

In specific terms, multimethod design is the "conduct of two or more research methods, each conducted rigorously and complete in one project. The results are then triangulated to form a complete whole". (Esteves and Pastor, 2004. p. 70). The two main important aspects of multi-method research design are (i) multidimensionality; and (ii) the various types of activities that are required under the research process. There are two design types of multimethod research, and these are: concurrent and sequential. The two designs are further qualified by 8 combinations as presented in Table 4-4. (Esteves and Pastor, 2004, p. 71)

Table: 4 - 4: Multi-method research design combinations

Design Type	**Combination**
Concurrent	Qual+Qual = Qualitatively-Driven, Qualitative Concurrent Design. Quan+Quan = A Quantitatively-Driven, Quantitative Concurrent Design. Qual+Quan = A Qualitatively-Driven, Qualitative and Quantitative Concurrent Design. Quan+Qual = A Quantitatively-Driven, Quantitative and Qualitative Concurrent Design
Sequential	Qual/Qual = A Qualitative-Driven Project Followed by a Second Qualitative Project. Quan/Quan = A Quantitative-Driven Project Followed by a Second Quantitative Project. Qual/Quan = A Qualitative-Driven Project Followed by a Second Quantitative Project. Quan/Qual = A Quantitative –Driven Project Followed by a Second Qualitative Project.

Source: Esteves and Pastor (2004, p. 70)

According Creswell (2014, p. 269) "the key assumption of this approach is that both qualitative and quantitative data provide different types of information often detailed views of participants qualitatively and scores on instruments quantitatively, and together they yield results that should be the same".

The value of multi-method research is not in its purported ability to mitigate the weaknesses of individual methods and bring out a closer approximation to the truth than any single method research can offer. Rather, its value lies in the role multimethod studies can play in expanding the scope for cross-cultural communication among researchers trained in different types of a methods. This is because the different types of a given method have distinctive payoffs and limitations. For this purpose, a discipline would not require further proliferation of multi-method skill sets, only

opportunities for collaboration among scholars, each proficient in each type of method and fully cognizant of the foundational assumptions upon which a certain type of method is predicated on (Ahmed, 2012, p. 948).

4.5.3 Case study design

Generally, a case study has been defined as an empirical inquiry that "investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clear" (Yin, 2009, p. 18). A case study can be seen as a research design or a strategy of inquiry.

As a design, "case research can be carried out taking a positivist or an interpretive stance, can take a deductive or an inductive approach, can use qualitative and quantitative methods, and can investigate one or multiple cases. Case study research can be highly structured, positivist, deductive investigation of multiple cases; it can also be an unstructured, interpretive, inductive investigation of one case; lastly, it can be anything in between these two extremes in almost any combination" (Cavaye, 1996, pp. 227-228).

Having conceptualised design as an essential clear series that connects the empirical data to a study's initial research questions and, ultimately, to its conclusions, Yin (2002. p. 20) presents four types of case study designs. These are; "single holistic design, single embedded design, multiple holistic design and multiple embedded design. The holistic designs require one unit of analysis, whereas embedded designs require multiple units of analysis" (Yazzan, 2015 p. 140).

Common to all these designs are five components of a case study design. These include i) a study's questions; ii) its propositions, if any; iii) its units of analysis; iv) the logic linking the data to the propositions; and iv) the criteria for interpreting the findings (Yin, 2003, p. 20). The study's questions are indicated in Chapter one and the four components of the case study design are discussed in context in section 4.5. For the purposes of this study, a case study is deemed both a research design and a strategy of inquiry.

4.5.4 Application of the research design to the study

A sequential multimethod research design was employed in the study. The design considers three principles of multimethod research and applied the same in the research design as follows. The first principle is that of identifying the theoretical drive of the research study. This study employed the inductive frame owing to its objective to discover the conceptual origins of RI, SF and PPPs, including their understanding and application. It also used the inductive frame to begin to discover

how state functionalism in an African context could appear. The design allowed for the generation of qualitative primary data and qualitative secondary data as a near complete and independent research project. The design also allowed for the use of deductive research methods, which enabled the researcher to test the theoretical assertions regarding the confluence between SF or state functionalism and PPPs. This generated the quantitative secondary data as an near independent. (Esteves, Pastor, 2004, p. 70). The outcomes of each near independent research project were then triangulated.

The second principle is that the researcher needs to develop overt awareness of the dominance of each method used in the study. This requires that each approach be duly recognised but within the appreciation of one dominant approach. The use of desk review or literature review in the collection and analyses of secondary quantitative data, as a near independent research was duly recognised. The third and final principle is that of respect for methodological integrity. It is important that each approach be accorded all the elements needed to render it credible and of scientific rigor.

For the generation of qualitative data, the multimethod research design integrates the case study approach into the research design. The case study as a strategy of inquiry is explored in the next section.

4.6 Strategies of Inquiry

Saunders (2008, pp. 600) define research strategy as "the general plan of how the researcher will go about answering the research questions". Similarly, Bryman (2008) states that research strategy is "a general orientation to the conduct of research" (Bryman, 2008, p. 698; Wedawatta 2010, P.3). An appropriate research strategy is selected based on "research questions and objectives, the extent of existing knowledge on the subject area to be researched, the amount of time and resources available, and the philosophical underpinnings" of the researcher. A research strategy should be selected based on three conditions; the type of research question, the extent of control an investigator has over actual behavioural events, and the degree of focus on contemporary or historical events. (Wedawatta, 2010. p 3). Further, according to Wedawatta (2010, p. 10) a research strategy should usually have; a) goal: something it can be used for; b) procedure: steps to follow to achieve results; c) a set of techniques involved in the procedures.

4.6.1 Types of research strategies for the study

There are several strategies that fall under each of the four research designs presented earlier, namely quantitative, qualitative, multimethod and mixed method research designs. The strategies discussed here are case study, transformative sequential strategy and non-experimental strategy (in this case, using quantitative secondary data). As indicated earlier, a case study can be perceived both as a design and a strategy (Yin, 2009, p. 14).

Case study research strategy is an all-encompassing method, with a design logic that incorporates specific approaches to data collection and data analysis. The components of a case study as discussed in section 4.4.3 apply irrespective of whether a case study is perceived as a design or a strategy. Yin (2003, p. 13) argues that in this regard, the case study is neither a data collection technique nor merely a design feature alone but a comprehensive research strategy. Other qualitative research strategies include ethnography, narrative research, phenomenology, and grounded theory which are not discussed here. The flexibility of case study strategy makes it useful for transformative sequential multimethod qualitative research as applied in this study and justified in section 4.5.3.1. For multimethod and mixed-method research designs, data are generally collected concurrently or sequentially. Whether the data collection is concurrent or sequential is a strategy of inquiry to be determined in light of the research problem, research objectives and questions as well as theoretical perspectives. For this study, a sequential transformative strategy was applied as explained and justified in section 4.5.3.2.

Just as certain research strategies of inquiry are aligned with qualitative research designs, the same is true for certain research strategies being congruent with quantitative research designs. Regarding quantitative research, Belli (2008, p. 60) submits that the two major strategies are: experimental and non-experimental. First, experimental research strategy is a systematic and scientific approach to research in which the researcher manipulates one or more variables, and controls and measures any change in other variables. Secondly, non-experimental strategy "involves variables that are not manipulated by the researcher and instead are studied as they exist". Belli (2008, p. 60) goes on to explain that many variables commonly used is social science reason are not easily manipulated.

Table: 4 - 5: Selected purpose on non-experimental strategies

Non-experimental research strategies	Purposes
Descriptive nonexperimental research strategy	Describe or document phenomenon or its characteristics, including the status quo
	Conduct a needs assessment in an area of interest
Predictive non-experimental research strategy	Predict some variable of interest (criterion) using information from other variables (predictors).
	Develop a proper set of predictors for a given variable
Explanatory non-experimental research strategy	Explain how or why some phenomenon works or operates or does not work or operate.
	Test a theory about the phenomenon

Source: Adapted by researcher from Belli, (2008, p. 65)

Non-experimental research as depicted in Table 4-5 generally, "lacks the manipulation of an independent variable, random assignment of participants to conditions or orders of conditions, or both" (Belli, 2008, p.??). In this study, both descriptive nonexperimental research strategy and explanatory non-experimental research strategy were applied as discussed in section 4.5.3.3.

4.6.2 Application of research strategies to the study

A research design should be carried out through certain strategies of inquiry. A multimethod design is different from a mixed methods design. It involves qualitative and quantitative projects that are relatively complete on their own, and then used together to form essential components of one research study. Thus, each component of the study is planned and conducted to answer a sub-question, and the results of the research triangulated to form a comprehensive whole (Esteves and Pastor, 2004, p. 2). The three strategies used to execute the study were case study, sequential transformative and quantitative non-experimental strategies. The application of each is discussed in turn.

4.5.3.1 Case study strategy

According to Yin (2009, p. 1) “case studies are the preferred strategy when ‘how’ or ‘why’ questions are being posed, when the investigator has little control over events, and when the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within some real-life context”. Such ‘explanatory’ case studies according to Yin (2009), can also be complemented by two other types-"exploratory" and "descriptive" case studies”. In his earlier publishing, Yin (1994, p. 12) indicated that most social science textbooks fail to consider the case study as a formal research strategy and tended to consider the case study as the exploratory stage of some other type of research strategy.

In support of case study as a strategy, Yin (2003, p. 12) argues that case study strategy, allows the use of multiple sources of data collection and analysis, allowing the researcher to address the research objectives and answer the research questions satisfactorily. Yin (2003) concludes that “it is this ability to accommodate different research techniques, both qualitative and quantitative, is a salient feature of case study research”

Theoretical propositions are useful when the case study strategy is applied. In line with the conceptual framework, the propositions for this case study are:

1. An endogenous conceptualisation of state functionalism can enhance the effectiveness of the politico-administrative architecture of RI and state craft in Southern Africa.
2. RI has the potential of enhancing the role of state craft in PPPs development in Southern Africa.
3. The exogenous theoretical paradigms that define RI in Southern Africa are marginal in their relevance and pragmatism.

How these propositions are linked to data is discussed in the sections on data collection (section 4.6) and data analysis (section 4.9).

The case context for this research is the SADC, as defined by its Member States and not the regional institution which is the SADC Secretariat. The case study units of analysis in this research are the three SADC member countries of Botswana, Malawi and South Africa. The significance of the state or country as a unit of analysis is inherent in its genesis and function. The post-colonial state in Southern Africa is materially an extension of western European statecraft and architect; the Westphalia nation-state model. The researcher determined and interpreted the state or country as a unit of analysis in the study primarily for this reason. The state was also considered a unit of analysis in respect of its custodial role as the authority behind statecraft. Moreover, the state or country was identified owing to its exclusive anchorage of PPPs in a given country. Finally, the state as a unit of analysis would be useful in determining the contours of

state functionalism in an African context. Multi-sector stakeholders are embedded sub-units of analysis across the three countries.

The rationale for the selection of the three countries is summarised in Table 4 -6. In examining the case study propositions earlier noted, the researcher identified four key sectors within the countries as critical variables for each country. These are likewise shown in Table 4-4.

Table: 4 - 6: Case study unit and sub-unit of analysis

Study Units of Analysis		
Units (Sub) of Analysis	**Description**	**Rationale for Inclusion**
Country	SADC member Countries. These are in two categories. Middle income and low income. And within each category there are two political history classifications. Former colony and former protectorate.	The state is key entity in the RI process and the legal entity with which regional bodies and private actor partner.
Multi-sector organisations	Governmental, private sector, civil society and regional organisations involved in regionalisation.	Individuals employed by the multi-sectors embedded in the country units of analysis allow for a more nuanced inquiry (private and public sectors)

Source: Researcher Compilation

Table 4-6 shows the types of multi-sector organisations selected from which individual participants were drawn. The national government was included for its overarching function of state administration, responsible for all executive decisions, formulation and implementation of government policy. Such policy concerns both regional and national state affairs. The private sector was specifically included for its pivotal role in the design and implementation of PPP ventures or initiatives. The private sector in the study only comprised firms engaged in PPPs. The third sector, non-governmental, civil society was included for its broad participation in governance, whose participation is also integral to governance assessments. Further, civil society formations participate in a range of RI processes. The fourth and last sector is the non-governmental, regional organisation. This sector was included for its unique regional character and regional mandate, often recognised by Member States. Moreover, the third and fourth sectors are included because international relations and global affairs are moving beyond state-centrism to include non-state actors. Individuals employed by these multi-sector organisations are seen as subunits of analysis embedded in the country units of analysis.

The application of the sequential transformative strategy to complement the case study strategy is discussed next.

4.5.3.2 Sequential transformative strategy

From the outset, the research design contemplated a 'transformative' strategy (Creswell, 2009, p. 15) through its research objectives and theoretical perspectives of interrogating the exogenous nature of state development in Southern Africa and describing the influences of the Trans-Atlantic Alliance of statecraft and RI architecture for purposes of deconstruction and reconstruction of pragmatic architecture. Examining the politico-administrative efficacy of the current SADC architecture in delivering RI is likewise part of a transformation agenda as envisaged by the original mixed-method research design. A low response rate to the proposed self-administered questionnaire necessitated a change from a mixed method study to a multimethod study. A multimethod qualitative research design, not unlike a mixed-method research design has two overarching strategies in terms of how data are collected: sequential and concurrent (Esteves and Pastor, 2004, p. 70). This study was designed from the outset to be executed by a transformative concurrent strategy for mixed methods research. The "concurrent transformative approach is guided by the researcher's use of a specific theoretical perspective as well as the concurrent collection of both quantitative and qualitative data" (Creswell, 2009, p. 216). However, just as the research design was changed from mixed method to multimethod, so was the research strategy of inquiry changed from transformative concurrent to transformative sequential research strategy.

4.5.3.3 Quantitative non-experimental explanatory

Of interest to the study is the non-experimental research as it entails statistical bond between two variables without manipulating an independent variable, or randomly assigning participants to conditions. The form of non-experimental employed in the study is the "correlational research which the researcher measures two variables of interest" without controlling "extraneous variables, and then assesses the relationship between them" (Belli, 2008, p. 19).

The third research strategy employed in the study is a combination of descriptive nonexperimental research strategy and the quantitative explanatory non-experimental strategy. The former allows a description of the status quo and documentation of how SF is considered by the Trans-Atlantic Alliance. On the one hand, the latter uses secondary data to to deductively explain how SF is conceptualised, (later referred to in the inverse as state functionalism), and from whence measures of CPIA and FSI originate. It also helps reveal impacts on PPPs and the origin and predominance of measures for EoDB and GCI. The aim is to test whether the theoretical assertion that a fragile state, as defined by mainstream institutions, influences regional economic integration or benefits from it. Further testing entails whether the public institutions of a fragile state are incapable of

undertaking a joint venture with private sector actors within the framework of PPPs, and whether this translates to less FDI (Foreign Direct Investment) and FDA (Foreign Development Assistance). On the other hand, the inductive dimension of the strategy examined the coherence of theories of RI, SF and PPPs to policy implementation in the Southern Africa context. The combined non-experimental strategies examined whether the case study theoretical propositions as well as theories propounded in Chapter Two are supported in practice through policy choices in investment.

To undertake such analyses as explained above, the researcher then employs various elements of exploratory, causal and explanatory types of case studies as implemented in the three-country case study. The explanatory elements are employed for their quality in adjudicating between rival theories; the causal for their quality of investigating causal relationship between concepts; and the exploratory for their quality in examining parameters. The quantitative research strategy examined secondary quantitative date generated by the WB, Fund for Peace and World Economic Forum.

The strategy for inquiry thus aimed at interrogating the theoretical assertion that SF and country competitiveness are correlated phenomenon, with consequences for PPPs. The explanation for these assertions of causal relationships were obtained from primary qualitative data yet complemented by quantitative secondary data. The outcome of these combined non-experimental strategies is a grounded assessment of the relevance and efficacy of the parameters used by mainstream institutions. Presented below is a consolidation of how the research philosophical worldview, design and strategy related.

Table: 4 - 7: Application of the worldviews to the multimethod research methodology

Aspect	Interpretivism	Pragmatism	Post-positivism	Critical Theory
Epistemology	Inductive	Inductive	Deductive	Deductive
Ontology	Idealism/Relativism— reality composed from objective and subjective meaning as determined by stakeholders in the setting	knowledge consists of warranted assertions that result from acting and experiencing the outcomes	Realism— observational data are the foundation of knowledge; objective reality can be understood & measured	Reactionism— reality shaped by values of those who control power & resources
Epistemology	Gather all facts (data) first, infer theory that matches precisely those facts; allow new theoretical understanding to emerge from the data	Commitment to the evaluation of the adequacy of concepts and beliefs through the empirical test of practice – utility	Hypotheses testing,	Understand historical forces, evolution of meanings, material practices, & inequalities
Rationale for use in this Study	Help accurately understand what is occurring in this particular situation; describe actors view-point & significance	To replace an older way of thinking about the differences between approaches to research by treating those differences as social contexts for inquiry as a form of social action, rather than as abstract philosophical systems	To explain & predict; discover generalizable laws & universal —truth	Emancipatory- to uncover hidden interests & contradictions; critique, transformation
Data Type	Qualitative Primary and Secondary	Qualitative Primary	Quantitative Secondary	Qualitative Secondary
Research Strategy	Case Study	Case Study	Non-experimental Quantitative Descriptive and Exploratory	Case Study

Source: Morgan (2014, p. 1048). Sudhakar (2015). Gay and Weaver (2011. p. 30)

NB: Multimethods" involves combining any different methods while" mixed methods" more specifically focuses on combining qualitative and quantitative methods

4.7 Data Collection

The origins of multimethod data collection can be traced to the historic concept of the multimethod, multi-trait idea from Campbell and Fiske (1959), who felt that a psychological trait could best be understood by gathering different forms of data (Creswell, 2013, p. 269). Accordingly, a variety of data collection tools are used in the data collection phase that are either specifically suited to one or more research strategies. Data collection tools, are also classified into two generic categories; quantitative tools and qualitative tools.

Quantitative research tools include surveys, experiments, observation, and content analysis. These tools include collecting numbers, seeking breadth from many participants and sites, emphasizing generalizability, reproducibility, control, and having pre-determined processes and procedures. Tools for qualitative data collection include observation, in-depth interviews, focus group discussions; documents and archives, and historical research. These tools collect words and images, seek depth from fewer participants and settings, emphasize unique perspectives of individuals, and use iterative procedures. Finally, the tools for mixed methods data collection include mixed tools from both qualitative and quantitative tools. (Creswell, Clark, 2007. p. 52.).

4.7.1 Qualitative data collection

The study employed both primary and secondary data. The first category, primary data was qualitative while secondary data was both qualitative and quantitative. Data collection was undertaken between 2012 and 2013, across three countries and several institutions. At the onset of the study, two instruments were designed for primary data collection, aimed at collecting both qualitative and quantitative data. The instruments were; i) a Question Guide for In-Depth Interviews which was to collect qualitative data (Appendix Three) to collect qualitative data; and ii) Self-Administered Questionnaire (Appendix Three) to collect quantitative data. Other sources of evidence used in the study include documentary analysis and historical research to collect both secondary qualitative and secondary quantitative data.

4.6.1.1 Qualitative primary data collection

The data collection tools mentioned above pertain to the implementation of a case study, which is by design essentially "extensive and draws from multiple sources such as direct or participant observations, interviews, archival records or documents, physical artefacts, and audio-visual materials. The researcher must spend time on-site interacting with the people studied". (Williams, 2007, p. 65).

The study however conducted semi-structured in-depth interviews of various stakeholder from the sectors in Table 4-5 to capture their perceptions and interpretations of the three concepts; RI, state functionalism and PPP as well as other factors. Table 4-5 shows the master list of respondents, including the date and place of interviews.

Table 4 – 8: List of respondents

Country	Sector	Organisation	Respondent Code	Date and place of interview
Botswana	Multi-lateral	SADC PPP Network, Gabarone	BoML-ED-PPP	02-08-2013, Gaborone
Botswana	CSO	Botswana Institute for Development Policy Analysis	BoCS-SRF-BID	02-08-2013, Gaborone
Botswana	Multi-lateral	SADC PPP Network	BoAA - PPP	03 -08-2013
Botswana	Donor	Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ)	BoDn-SA-GIZ	02-08-2013, Gaborone
Botswana	Govt/Pvt	Botswana Chamber of Mines Debtswana Diamond Company	BoGv-CEO-BCM	16-07-2013, Gaborone
Botswana	Govt/Pvt	Tati Nickel Mining Company Botswana Power Corporation	BoGvPv-MD-BPC	21-07-2013, Gaborone
Botswana	Multi-lateral	SADC, Gabarone	BoML-SPR-SDC	21-02-2014, Gaborone
Botswana	CSO	SADC-CNGO. Southern Africa Cross-Border Association, Gabarone	BoCS-RC-SDCNGO	06-01-2015, Johannesburg
Malawi	CSO	Malawi Economic Justice Network, Lilongwe	MwCS-ED-MEJ	16-04-2013, Lilongwe, Malawi
Malawi	CSO	Citizens for Justice, Lilongwe	MwCS-ED-CFJ	18-01-2015, Lilongwe, Malawi
Malawi	CSO	Gender Justice, Norwegian Church Aid, Lilongwe	MwCS-PM-NCA	11-12-2014, Lilongwe, Malawi
Malawi	Pvt	Globe Metals and Mining Company	MwPv-FD-GMM	27-01-2015, Lilongwe, Malawi
Malawi	Govt	Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Lilongwe	MwGv-PFSO-MFA	9-04-2013, Lilongwe, Malawi
Malawi	Govt	Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Lilongwe	MwGv-FSO-MFA	28-12-2014, Lilongwe, Malawi
Malawi	Govt	Malawi Human Rights Commission, Economic and Social Cultural Rights, Lilongwe	MwGv-D-MHR	02-01-2015, Lilongwe, Malawi
Malawi	Govt	Malawi PPPs Commission, Blantyre	MwGv-PO-MPPP	11-03-2014, Blantyre, Malawi
South Africa	CSO	FINMARK Trust (Former SADC Executive Secretary)	SACS-ED-FIN	13-01-2015, Johannesburg
South Africa	CSO	Afrobarometer Capacity Building Programme	SACS-OM-AFB	06-01-2015, Cape Town
South Africa	CSO	Southern Africa Trust	SACS-LM-SAT	06-01-2015, Midrand
South Africa	Govt	South African Planning Commission	H-gv-PC	13-01-2015, Midrand
South Africa	CSO	The Southern Africa Trust	JR-CSO-RSA	16-04-2015-Johannesburg

The in-depth interviews provided a wealth of perceptions on both their understanding of the concepts and manifestation of the concepts in public policy and state affairs. Equally important were their perceptions on the political economy of RI and PPPs. All interviews were recorded, and the audio recordings of interviews were transcribed into print for analysis.

The primary qualitative data collection was guided by pragmatist and interpretivism philosophies, allowing the respondents to create meanings and knowledge of the concepts and trends from their individualised context. The researcher encouraged respondents to provide their personal

perception to allow for triangulation with the literature review at the analysis stage. To this end, the Key Informant Interview Guide, referred above as the Question Guide comprised open-ended questions. The instrument is attached as Appendix 3: In-Depth Interview Question Guide.

4.6.1.2 Qualitative secondary data collection

The qualitative secondary data collection is key to the study in that it provides the critical theoretical information and evidence of practice in all three domains of the confluence; RI, SF and PPPs. All qualitative secondary data were collected through documents and archives, and historical research. The process was predominantly through library search, internet e-journal search and collection of institutional documents. These included research and institutional reports, treaties and protocols, special studies, books and academic journals. A checklist for all types of documents to be collected was developed. The qualitative data that comprises the literature review was thus generated from this method.

4.7.2 Quantitative secondary data collection

During the data collection phase, and as indicated earlier, the concurrent transformative mixed-method strategy was replaced with a sequential transformative multimethod qualitative strategy. This was primarily due to the low return rate of less than 5% for the self-administered questionnaire. The initial study design had provided for the collection of quantitative primary data using a self-administered questionnaire which included scoring and ranking items.

An examination of selected post-in-depth interview respondent evaluations revealed that there is great discomfort in ranking and scoring countries on governance. Respondents indicated that ranking and scoring is feasible in anonymous perception surveys and not self-administered surveys to which individual respondents were identified by the respondent institutions – their employer.

The low return rate meant that the quantitative findings would be deficient in both reliability and validity. Having already determined the availability of secondary quantitative data on SF and PPPs as manifest in national economy competitiveness and business environment, the researcher expanded the collection of quantitative secondary data. For example, the indices used to collect data are subsequently explained in section 4.9.3. There, the section on quantitative secondary data analysis expounds on the use of the indices upon which the data collection was based. All the secondary data were obtained from the online databases and reports of the WB and Fund for Peace.

4.8 Sampling

Sampling is defined as the process of determining and selecting a portion of a given population, in one's research area. The sampling process cascades from a target population to a sampling population to a sampling size of the latter. Sampling, therefore, is the process of selecting a few (a sample) from a broader group (the sampling population). Unlike quantitative studies where sampling is concerned with representativeness of a larger group and an estimation or prediction of the prevalence of an unknown piece of information, situation or outcome; qualitative studies are concerned with knowledge-holders and avoidance of saturation of a sampling population. In any event, a sample is a subgroup of the population in which one is interested (Kumar, 2011, p. 177).

To undertake sampling, an appropriate unit of analysis is necessarily determined and it refers to the primary empirical object, individual, group or an organisation that a researcher wants to study. As a general guide, the definition of the unit of analysis is related to the way the initial research questions have been defined" (Yin, 2014, p. 22). More pertinently, "a unit of analysis should be accurately described for the conceptual and methodological operationalization of the research. An inappropriate unit of analysis may influence the researcher to choose erroneous tools, distorting the results and confounding the conclusions of the research. In social sciences, the units of analysis primarily investigated are individuals, groups, organizations and social artefacts" (Dista, 2004, p. 263). These units may include "single holistic design, single embedded design, multiple holistic design and multiple embedded design. Holistic designs require one unit of analysis, whereas embedded designs require multiple units of analysis". (Yazan, 2015, p. 140).

4.8.1 Sampling strategy

The main aim in qualitative enquiries is to explore the diversity. Thus, a sample size for a qualitative study is less in number than in a quantitative study. If carefully selected, diversity can be extensively and accurately described based on information obtained even from one individual. Sampling strategies are generally either probability (where a wider range of respondents have a chance to participate) or nonprobability (where the choice of respondents is more selective). Nevertheless, nonprobability sampling techniques such as purposive, judgemental, expert, accidental and snowball, and can be used in qualitative or quantitative research but with two differences. For instance, in quantitative research, data is collected from a larger number of people when generalisation of findings is desired, whereas in qualitative research, a sample size is fewer in number since there is no aim to generalise findings to a broader population. Secondly, while quantitative researchers are generally guided by the desire to select a random sample, in

qualitative research the judgement of the researcher is key in determining who is likely to provide the most useful information (Kumar, 2011, P. 193).

In qualitative studies, the scientific rigor and integrity of the research is not incumbent upon the representativeness of the sample to the population as is the case in quantitative studies. Scientific rigor and integrity of the research, is about the character and quality of the 'knowledge holder' subject and data quality control. The purposive sampling is done because of the knowledge held by these people considering the research problem, research objectives and research questions.

4.8.2 Application to the study

As a case study of a regional phenomenon, this study is situated in the dynamic of intergovernmental and international relations. The traditional target population equivalent in a case study of regionalism are countries within the region, the same are considered as units of analysis. The target population in this study is therefore SADC Member States, with 15 states as the sampling frame. A SADC Member State is defined as any country that has ratified the SADC Treaty. Of those 15 countries, Botswana, Malawi and South Africa were selected because of their varied histories and characteristics. Botswana was selected because of its history as a protectorate and not colony, but also owing to its economic success and political stability. Malawi was chosen because of its colonial history, age of the state and its small economy. Lastly, South Africa was selected due to its hegemonic status, size of the economy and diverse population.

Table 4-10 shows the sample size of the three countries as units of analysis along with the embedded subunits of analysis which are individuals in the organisations shown in Table 4-10.

Table 4 – 9: Sample size and units of analysis

Sector	**Country**			**Total**
	Botswana	**Malawi**	**South Africa**	
Regional Organisations	3	0	3	6
Government/SOEs	3	4	1	8
Non-Governmental organisations/CSO	1	3	0	4
Private Sector	1	1	0	2
Total	8	8	4	20

As Table 4 – 9 reflects the sample size for this study were twenty (20) individuals who underwent in-depth, semi-structured interviews. This was explained in section 4.6.1. In studying the case context and the units and subunits of analysis, the implications revolve around the confluence between RI, statecraft and PPPs. Yet within the country units of analysis are embedded subunits of analysis, which are the individuals from the various multisector

organisations who participated in the study (Yin, 2014, p. 68). A description of how data quality control was applied follows.

4.9 Data Quality Control

Mixed methods and multimethod research designs are either a culmination, amalgamation, integration, synthesis or pairing of multiple methods – be they quantitative or qualitative methods. It follows then that data quality control in multimethod research essentially borrows from the nature of method employed. Considering the differences in methods, it therefore also follows that establishing a common method for data quality control is a challenge. There are two common aspects of data quality control for any research project; reliability and validity. However, the application of these depends on the nature of the methods of data collection and analysis.

As highlighted by de Guzman, Das, and Das (2013, p. 166), "the concepts of reliability and validity are viewed differently by qualitative researchers who strongly consider these concepts defined in quantitative terms as inadequate". In quantitative research, reliability is concerned with, inter alia, whether the result is replicable, whereas validity refers to the question of whether the means of measurement are accurate, and the instruments are measuring what they are intended to measure. However, these definitions in quantitative terms may not apply to the qualitative research paradigm. The question of replicability of results does not necessarily concern qualitative researchers, but rather, precision, credibility, and transferability matter, all of which provide the lens for evaluating the findings of qualitative research (Leung, 2015, p. 325). Thus, about data quality control in the context of reliability and validity, the two research approaches or perspectives are essentially different paradigms. (Leung, 2015, p. 325).

Data qualitative control for qualitative research is discussed next and followed by quantitative data quality control before a description of the data quality control steps undertaken in this study.

4.9.1 Qualitative data quality control

The data quality from qualitative research design is incumbent upon the trustworthiness of the findings and their generalisability. Four critical dimensions define this aspect. According to Lincoln and Guba (1985) 'trustworthiness' involves establishing; (i) credibility this is like internal validity in positivist research, confidence in the 'truth' of the findings; (ii) transferability, demonstrating that the findings have applicability in other contexts. This refers to external validity and generalizability in the positivist paradigm; (iii) dependability refers to reliability in the positivist approach and seeks to show that the findings are consistent and replicable; (iv) confirmability refers to objectivity and is the degree of neutrality or the extent to which the

findings of a study are shaped by the respondents and not researcher's bias, motivation, or interest. (Pandey and Patnaik, 2014, p. 5747). Each are discussed in turn, including an indication of how components of data quality control were addressed in this study.

4.8.1.1 Credibility

Credibility refers to the accuracy or credibility of the findings. It can also be described as a "truth formulating process" between the researcher and the informants. The aim is to demonstrate that the inquiry was conducted in a way which ensures the subject was accurately described. (Estves and Pastor, 2004, p. 78). In ensuring credibility, the study undertook extended engagement with both the literature and selected respondents, and triangulated data from various sources – government, private sector, civil society and regional institutions dealing with regionalism, statecraft and PPPs.

4.8.1.2 Transferability

Transferability as a means of establishing credibility: Qualitative inquiries are often specific, and the findings are applicable for an environment or a small group of individuals, it is extremely difficult to demonstrate that the findings and conclusions are applicable to other situations and populations. This may also involve what is termed, Thick Description, described by Lincoln and Guba (1985) as a way of achieving a type of external validity. By describing a phenomenon in sufficient detail, one can begin to evaluate the extent to which the conclusions drawn are transferable to other times, settings, situations, and people (ibid).

4.8.1.3 Dependability

Dependability refers to the stability of data over time and seeks to account for dynamic changes in the phenomenon under study or the study design itself. (Esteves and Pastor, 2004, p. 79). The need to ensure stability of the data over time is critical particularly for the primary qualitative findings on regionalism and statecraft, PPPs. To enhance the dependability of the study findings, the researcher provided for possible dynamic changes in the phenomenon of study, design, or methodology by first choosing a multimethod design that would allow for the use of several methodologies. As indicated earlier, the changes in the research design introduced after the inquiry had commenced, was a means of enhancing dependability. The same diligence was applied in the case of the shift from quantitative primary data to quantitative secondary data. Finally, the conceptual framework for the inquiry presents assumptions and conditions for each phenomenon being researched, to which end the researcher collected data on possible changes in

occurrence and trends from relevant institutions. Chapter Five on the Southern Africa region describes the possible changes. It must be highlighted that dependability is difficult to predict in a changing social world, and the researcher attempts to account for changing conditions in the phenomenon chosen for study as well as changes in the design created by increasingly refined understanding of the setting (Esteves and Pastor, 2004, p. 79).

4.8.1.4 Confirmability

Confirmability refers to the extent to which others can confirm the findings to ensure that the results reflect the understandings and experiences from observed participants, rather than the researcher's own preferences. (Wahyuni and Dina, 2012, p. 77). This is also referred to as a replacement for the quantitative concept of objectivity. To this end all the qualitative primary data is duly coded to reflect the country, sector, institution and individual from which it was sourced. It can thus be tracked to its source. Similarly, the logic employed in interpretation of the data is appended, demonstrating the relationship between the research objectives, research questions, research tools and the parameters of the three concepts in the study. The presentation of the findings from the case study thus has a clear logic between item of inquiry, finding and interpretation.

4.9.2 Quantitative data quality control

The three key attributes of reliability in quantitative research are thus: i) the first is homogeneity, also referred to as internal consistency, it is the extent to which all the items on a scale measure one construct; ii) the second is stability, the consistency of results using an instrument with repeated testing; iii) the third and final attribute is equivalence, which refers to the consistency among responses of multiple users of an instrument, or among alternate forms of an instrument (Heale &Twycross, 2015, p. 67).

Reliability in quantitative research thus, relates to three aspects: i) the degree to which a measurement, given repeatedly, remains the same; ii) the stability of a measurement over time; and iii) the similarity of measurements within a given period. In this regard, the centrality of the measurement instrument is paramount. To ensure reliability, the Researcher used the software SPSS and an analytical framework with universally recognized parameters of each concept.

Validity in quantitative research refers to four aspects; content validity; construct validity; criterion validity; and statistical content validity. Content validity refers to whether the instrument used in the research adequately covers all the content relevant to a variable. It addresses the

question does the instrument cover the entire domain related to the variable, or construct it was designed to measure? Criterion validity refers to the extent to which all items on the research instrument or scale measure the same variables. (Heale and Twycross, 2015, p. 66). In contrast, On the other hand, construct validity refers to the hypothesis that determines which data is to be gathered and how it is to be gathered? Quantitative researchers actively pursue the interplay between construct and data to validate their investigation, usually by the application of a test or other process (Guzman et al, 2013, p. 164).

For example, to ensure the use of correct operational measures for the concepts being investigated and interrogated in this study, a desktop review of the key notions and concepts governing the study was undertaken. This determined the theories and operational parameters that underline the concepts. An analytical framework was developed to describe the relationships and determinants being studied. The analytical framework linked the three concepts of RI, SF and PPPs, and the assumptions on economic and political integration, as discussed in section 3.6 and shown in Table 3-6. This was then reduced to a conceptual framework to guide the student as highlighted in section 3.6.4 and depicted in Figure 3-8 The questions and question items on the Interview Guides (Appendix One) and Self-Administered Questionnaire (Appendix Three) were derived from these parameters. The design of these instruments was therefore accordingly aligned to the logic of these parameters.

Finally, and according to (Bhattacherjee (2012, p.37) the validity of a statistical conclusion validity examines the extent to which conclusions derived using a statistical procedure are valid, and whether the right statistical method was used to test the hypotheses, or whether the variables used meet the assumptions of that statistical test. This means variables such as sample size or distributional requirements. It is important to highlight that because interpretive research designs do not employ statistical testing, statistical conclusion validity is not applicable for such analysis.

4.10 Data Analysis

Data analysis is defined as the "process of systematically applying statistical and/or logical techniques to describe and illustrate, condense and recap, and evaluate data". According to Shamoo and Resnik (2003, p. 88), various analytic procedures provide a way of drawing inductive inferences from data and distinguishing the signal (the phenomenon of interest) from the noise (statistical fluctuations) present in the data".

4.10.1 Epistemological considerations

Determining the choice of data analysis strategy and methods in this study essentially demands that we revisit the debate on the epistemological orientation of leading case study scholars. The choice of case study data analysis method should essentially emerge from the philosophical worldview to which the study is aligned – interpretivism and pragmatism. Thus, the differing perspectives which are held by three prominent case study methodologists: Robert K. Yin's Case Study Research: Design and Methods (2002), Sharan B. Merriam's Qualitative Research and Case Study Applications in Education (1998), and Robert E. Stake's the Art of Case Study Research (1995), on the utilization of case study method, are key to the choice of data analysis methods. (Yazan, 2015, p. 134).

Although Yin (2003) does not explicitly articulate his epistemological orientation in his text, the way he approaches case study or research in general and the aspects he emphasizes, suggest a philosophical inclination towards the positivistic tradition. Yin (2003, p. 19) submits that, a case study researcher should "maximize four conditions related to design quality: construct validity, internal validity, external validity, and reliability. He emphasises that how investigators deal with these aspects of data quality control and analysis is highly crucial in every step of the case study research.

Yazan (2015, p. 137) discusses the epistemologies of constructivism and existentialism (non-determinism) and submits that unlike positivism, best orient and inform the qualitative case study research since most contemporary qualitative researchers hold that knowledge is constructed rather than discovered. In this regard, qualitative case study researchers are conceived as interpreters, and gatherers of interpretations which require them to report their rendition or construction of the constructed reality or knowledge that they gather through their investigation. The qualitative researcher should therefore expect another level of reality or knowledge construction to also occur on the side of the readers of their report. This perspective is pertinent to his argument that there are multiple perspectives or views of the case that need to be represented, but there is no way to establish, beyond contention, the best view". (Yazan, 2015, p. 137).

The epistemology that underlines this qualitative case study, therefore, is constructivism/interpretivism. This perspective asserts that the key philosophical assumption upon which all types of qualitative research are based is the view that reality is constructed by individuals interacting with their social worlds. Thus, reality is not an objective entity, but rather, there are multiple interpretations of reality. It is based on this philosophical assumption, that the

primary interest of qualitative researchers is to understand the meaning or knowledge constructed by people (Yazan, 2015, p. 136).

4.9.2 Qualitative data analysis

Pertinent to this study is an appreciation of case study analysis and the use of textual analysis. In this regard, the epistemological stances of the three long-standing methodologists discussed earlier by Yazan (2015, p. 134): Merriam (1998), Yin (2002) and Stake (1995), seem to have impacted their approach to data analysis in case study. These scholars offer divergent suggestions regarding the analysis of case study data, based on their dissimilarities in conceiving reality (ontology) and knowledge (epistemology). On the one hand, Yin's defines data analysis as examining, categorizing, tabulating, testing, and recombining both quantitative and qualitative evidence to address the initial propositions of a study. (Yazan, 2015, p. 144). On the other hand, Stake defines data analysis as a matter of giving meaning to first impressions as well as to final compilations. In Stake's view, data analysis essentially means taking our impressions, our observations apart. Stake (1995) describes two strategic ways to analyse data. The first strategy is termed categorical aggregation and the second is direct interpretation, presenting the two as general strategies to handle case study data. Stake (1995) however submits that each researcher needs, through experience and reflection, to find the forms of analysis that work for him or her. Finally, Stake's orientation is collaborated by Merriam (1998) who expounds on Stake's brief mention of simultaneous data collection and analysis and explains why and how data can/should be collected and analysed simultaneously. Meriam (1998) also highlights that this is a key attribute of qualitative research design which distinguishes it from the positivist research epistemology.

In tandem with the philosophical worldview guiding this study, the choice of data analysis methods for qualitative data, is inclined towards the thinking of Stake (1995) and Merriam (1998). The submission that the researcher chose the combination of techniques befitting their inquiry. was analysed to determine if respondent perceptions and secondary documentary evidence confirm or disconfirm the influence of statecraft on the level and degree of RI process and outcomes. The data collected were descriptive, consistent with the definition of parameters, concepts and notions employed by various institutions in the assessment of Member States' politico-administrative and economic governance or compliance with international obligations. The exploratory data examined the evolution of ideas and systems in the region, either in response to or because of various internal and external influences. The explanatory data comprised conclusions from analysis of secondary data collected by various actors and the researcher. The

qualitative analysis employed textual analysis and techniques that generate analytical generalisation during case study analysis. The latter is discussed first.

4.9.2.1 Case study data analysis

In analyzing the case study findings, one considers the logic that connects the data to the propositions and employs the method of analytical or theoretical generalisation. This means using previously developed theory as the template with which to compare the empirical results of the case study. It is important to highlight that the analytical generalisations include propositions and assertions of orthodox theory (as discussed in chapters two and three), as well as the propositions and assertions made in contestation of the theories (such as the case study propositions for this study found in section 4.5.3.1 and new theoretical propositions delineated in the final chapter). The orthodox theories informed the analytical framework (Table 3-1) and the conceptual framework (Figure 3-1), that is, the various relationships and notions governing the confluence between RI, SF and PPP.

The new theoretical propositions presented in Chapter 10 results from an analysis of contestations between empirical findings from this study and the orthodox and foundational theories that led to the development of both the analytical framework and conceptual frameworks. Thus, the logic behind the new theoretical propositions is derived from assertions in and contestations of the meanings underlying the original analytical and conceptual frameworks. Analysis of empirical evidence deduced and induced through guidance by both the analytical and conceptual frameworks led to new theoretical propositions. It is this process that generates different analytical generalisations that could be applicable to other SADC countries or other African regions.

4.9.2.2 Textual Analysis

Textual analysis is essentially a systematic effort requiring meticulous organisation of data and tools. To this end there are four ways of applying the method and four broad approaches to consider: the word space model, narrative analysis, rhetoric analysis and discourse analysis. While the first two are more convenient for a structuralist perspective, the last two are more convenient for an interpretive perspective. (Bauer, Bicquelet & Suerdem, 2014, p. 25).

Table 4 – 10: Approaches in textual analysis

Text Analysis Approach	**Description**
Word Space Model	This approach offers statistical-based analysis of vocabularies and semantic networks arising from spatial associations of words, and shows how text can be classified based on elemental or structural similarities
Narrative Analysis	This approach focuses on the ways in which people represent themselves and their worlds to position themselves in the social space and to construct identity. Since the narratives are socially constructed, they provide important clues about the social, historical context and the cultural locations of their producers. Narrative analysis can be both structural and interpretive
Rhetoric Analysis	This approach employs the principles of rhetoric to examine the interactions between a text, an author, and an audience. The approach uses Frame Analysis which aims to extract the basic cognitive processes that guide the perception and representation of reality underlining a text.
Discourse Analysis	Critical discourse analysis (CDA), on the other hand focuses on how social power is exploited, how domination and inequalities are enacted, reproduced, and resisted by text and talk in the social and political context.

Source: Bauer, Bicquelet & Suerdem (2014)

Text analysis can arguably be understood from a continuum of between the two methodical poles of 'decoding' and 'deconstruction'. In social sciences, text analysis aims to explain the life and world realities within which the text is embedded to open the perspective of the author as delineated by his/her social and cultural context, and to draw attention to the structural aspects of everyday practices and meaning patterns. (Bauer *et al*, (2014). The role of a text analyst as a reader should therefore not assume the role of "judge, teacher, analyst, confessor, or decoder" role. This is as such because to analyse a text is also to produce it. (Ibid)

According to Bauer, Bicquelet and Suerdem, (2014) text analysis in qualitative research is grounded on the principles as defined by Flick *et al*. (2004, p. 7). The first principle is that social reality is understood as a shared product which makes sense to the members of a community. The second is that sense is not a fact to be discovered, but an unfolding reflexive process. The third principle is that 'objective' circumstances are relevant to a life and world through subjective meanings. Finally, the principle that the communicative nature of social reality permits the reconstruction of constructions of social reality to become the starting point for research.

4.9.2.3 Application to the study

Case study data analysis as well as principles of textual analysis are relevant for this study. The researcher sought to situate the interpretation of concepts and their purported implications for Southern Africa, within the subjective reality of the respondents: government officials, international diplomats, industry captains and civil society actors. In specific reference to the third

principle of objectivity, the study provided for multiple perspectives on both the interpretations by respondents and on the meanings pertaining to the various theories or concepts driving the study. The analysis spans the entire spectrum of decoding and deconstructing ideas. The study recognizes the diversity, fluidity and complexity from which the individual world-life meanings are derived. To cater for this aspect multiple themes were included and examined through triangulation for relevance with existing themes.

In this study, narrative analysis and discourse analysis approaches of text analysis were predominant in the data analysis of the qualitative primary data, evidence and respondent responses.

The textual analysis assisted in determining the role of ideological and theoretical perspectives in conception, design and implementation of the RI agenda. A similar analysis was undertaken to determine the role of ideology in state formation and at a policy level in determining the adoption and form of PPPs. Accordingly, conclusions were made regarding outcomes to determine whether they are intentional and unintentional. The analysis also examined the extent to which key actors; state and non-state; public and private conceive and understand the character of the state and its implications for RI and PPPs. This analysis assisted in identifying factors for predicting state behaviour and that of private actors within the dynamic of RI and development of PPPs.

Understanding the nature of the confluence between RI, SF and PPPs required the use a textual analysis and a qualitative content analysis technique to ascertain the perceptions and actualities pertaining to the dynamic. The multimethod approach ensured that at a qualitative level, the disparities in perception arising from incoherencies at a theoretical level could be compared with the quantitative findings on the same.

4.10.2 Quantitative secondary data analysis

Over the last few decades, social science research has become increasingly reliant on large sets of secondary data, which has increased in both number and availability. In this study, owing to the phenomenon under investigation, the volume of quantitative data required is necessarily vast. Secondary analysis is an empirical exercise that applies the same basic research principles as studies utilizing primary data and has steps to be followed just as any research method. (Johnston, 2014, p. 619)

Analysis of secondary data involves analysing data collected by a researcher other than the analysis and includes any data that are examined to answer a research question other than the question(s) for which the data were initially collected (Vartanian, 2010, p. 3). The use of

secondary data allowed the researcher access to international and cross-historical data, from tens of institutions globally, that would have otherwise taken several years and a huge budget to collect.

Although the constructs may be operationally defined by a single survey item or a subset of test items, this can lead to reliability and validity concern, however the data are open to recalibration and further analysis.

4.9.3.1 Application of quantitative data parameters

The quantitative data are comprised of five data sets relating to each of the three dimensions of the study: RI; SF; and PPPs. For presentation, the data sets were classified into two categories: SF measures and PPP success measures.

The specific data sets employed in the study are derived from the institutional database of three organisations; the Fund for Peace, the WB and the World Economic Forum. The institutions were identified on the following criteria; i) availability of extensive global data; ii) reliability, validity and availability of up-to-date data; iii) claims of universal methodology. The last being a key question in the study – are the concepts and parameters 'Africa-Compliant'

The specific data is the Fragile States Index (FSI) by Fund for Peace which provides scores for SF; the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) by the WB which provides measures on policy and institutions from which SF and PPP environment can be assessed; the Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) by the World Economic Forum which assesses a country's politico-administrative and economic environment for driving business competitiveness; the WB Ease of Doing Business (EoDB) indicators which assess the business environment relative to country politico-administrative context; and the WB Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) Data.

The rationale for use of these data sources is in four dimensions; universality and comparability; accessibility and consistency; ideological coherence with Westphalia state paradigm; and the methodology used in calibrating the indices. Universality and comparability refers to the global use of the parameters and possibility of comparison with data on the same from other regions. Accessibility and consistency refers to the availability of the data and its consistency of measures that allows for a trend analysis. Ideological coherence with the Westphalia state refers to the use of categories and notions consistent with the Westphalia characterization of the state as being examined in this study. Finally, derivation methodology refers to the degree of scientific integrity through which the scores, indices and ranks are derived. These have been described in Appendix Eight: Description of Quantitative Secondary Data Indices.

The rationale for the comparative analysis is presented below to expound on the understanding of the relationships between the three study concepts of RI, SF (inversely characterized in the later chapters of the study as state functionalism) and PPPs as an outcome of competitiveness of national economies and the business environment.

Table 4 – 11: Description of variables and rationale for cross-analysis

ID	Variables	Rationale and Assumptions
1.	CPIA v GCI v Doing Business v FDI	The WB CPIA measures the integrity and effectiveness of state policy, institutions and processes. It is a key measure of the condition of politico-administrative efficacy of a country. On this premise, it was selected as an independent variable with an effect on a country's economic and business environment competitiveness, and consequently the volume of foreign direct investment. The business environment and FDI are proxies for private sector interest in PPPs. The CPIA is a proxy for SF, with a poorer score indicating greater fragility and inversely. Though its primary purpose is to determine receptivity and implications for development financing, the measure is directly correlated to measures of fragility.
2.	FSI v GCI v Doing Business v FDI	The FSI is a universal measure of fragility as defined by mainstream global institutions. Though its primary purpose is to forecast and determine the probability, occurrence and degree of conflict, the FSI examines various politico-administrative aspects integral to the condition and functioning of the state. In this study, the FSI is an independent variable for its presumed influence on capital and business as well as state relations.
3.	CPIA govt effectiveness v GCI	The dimension of government effectiveness was isolated for its direct correspondence with state functionalism.
4.	CPIA rule of law v GCI	The rule of law is a direct outcome of a political system and administrative efficacy both of which derive and impact on state functionalism.
5.	CPIA political stability v GCI	Political stability results primarily from coherence between political ideology, the political system, state effectiveness and the rule of "just and relevant" law.
6.	CPIA colonial history v GCI	Colonial history is a profound and fundamental determinant of the character of State institutions and path dependence. In this study path dependence extends from a perspective within political science in that initial decisions and conditions almost irreversibly affect subsequent decisions or occurrences which ultimately produces an outcome which can be estimated[4]. These aspects affect competitiveness and hence PPP receptivity
7.	CPIA investment v GCI	Investment speaks to the levels and quality of capital and technological input into an economy and this reflects investor confidence that is a direct outcome of perceptions or an assessment of predictability, stability and potential for profitability. These are parameters congruent to PPP success factors. The same factors pertaining to PPPs correspond to competitiveness.

[4]Path dependence has to mean, if it is to mean anything, that once a country or region has started down a track, the costs of reversal are very high. There will be other choice points, but the entrenchments of certain institutional arrangements obstruct an easy reversal of the initial choice." http://govthesis.site.wesleyan.edu/research/methods-and-analysis/analyzing-qualitative-data/path-dependence/ +

8.	CPIA GDP v GCI	GDP is a common measure of the state of an economy's aggregate growth that results from and influences the politico-administrative integrity of the state. This has a direct relationship with competitiveness.
9.	CPIA fragility status v GCI	Fragility status has a direct bearing and reveals the condition of the state weighed and examined against
10.	CPIA v Doing Business' registering property	The efficiency and integrity through which businesses are registered is a derivate of and an influence on the condition of a country's institutions and policies. The relationship is inherently indivertible.
11	CPIA v Doing Business' paying taxes	One of the foundational characteristics and hence measure of a state is its ability to collect tax. Tax rates are also a key consideration for investors. Thus, both aspects tax collection as a reflection of state integrity and tax rates as a reflection of the business environment relate to PPP success.
12.	CPIA v Doing Business' trading across boarders	Trading across borders increases, as regions become more integrated and intra-regional trade grows and decreases with protectionism and sovereignty driven nationalism. Trading across borders is thus a direct measure of RI and politico-administrative coherence. The relationship with CPIA is profound
13.	CPIA v Doing Business' enforcing contracts	A core and fundamental role of the state is the administration of justice that is realised through the rule of 'just' law. Effective contract enforcement has a bearing on investor confidence. It thus has a bearing on the estimation of dividends in a PPP project and consequently the opportunities of a state to enter into such arrangements. Accordingly, this capability corresponds to the character/ condition of State institutions and policies as defined in the CPIA.
14.	CPIA v Doing Business' protecting minority investors	Protection of minority investors is an important aspect in PPP ventures with the state as a majority investor in the sense that it as a monopoly over the shaping of the sector, industry and business regulatory environment.
15.	CPIA government effectiveness v FDI	FDI directly responds to government effectiveness in respect of the state's ability to undertake and guarantee protection of property under the law, predictability of markets, political stability and a degree of macro-economic stability. It has also been established that colonial history owing to its influence on language and historical economic relations may also influence the source and character of FDI. There is also a supposed direct relationship between investment climate and FDI. The better the investment, the higher the probability of an increase in FDI. Finally, as referred to earlier political stability underlines all three dimensions of the study including specific aspect such as FDI.
16.	CPIA rule of law v FDI	
17.	CPIA political stability v FDI	
18.	CPIA colonial history v FDI	
19.	CPIA investment v FDI	
20.	CPIA GDP v FDI	
21.	CPIA fragility status v FDI	
22.	FSI' legitimacy v GCI	Legitimacy of the state perceived or actual has a direct relationship with competitiveness. Credit ratings and security as relates to political stability are often factored by legitimacy.
23.	FSI public service v GCI	The efficiency of the public service relates to the efficiency of public institutions and the quality of policies. These have a bearing on the ease of doing business that in turn factors competitiveness.
24.	FSI human rights v GCI	Human rights have become a measure of ethical business and have implications for multinational investors.

26.	FSI security apparatus v GCI	The security apparatus is a direct function of a functional state and directly relates to protection of private property as well as operational costs for investors. Poor security apparatus can translate to higher security costs and insurance premiums for instance. These directly relates to GCI Pillars 1: Institutions and 2: Infrastructure.
27.	FSI legitimacy v Doing Business	Legitimacy has a direct bearing on political stability and can affect government efficiency and consequently security.
28.	FSI public service v Doing Business	Public service is a direct outcome of the effectiveness of the state. It relates to the capacity of the civil service to deliver efficient high quality services needed by business to operate competitively from registration to repatriation of profits.
29.	FSI human rights v Doing Business	Human rights are universal principles that are supposed to influence investors' choice of destination.
30.	FSI security apparatus v Doing Business	The condition and effectiveness of the security apparatus is a direct outcome of a functional state. It relates to protection of private property as well as operational costs for investors. Specifically, the trading across borders parameter can be directly impacted on.
31.	FSI legitimacy v FDI	Among the determinants of investment climate are sovereign credit ratings that also employ governance parameters such as political risk[5]. These measures are particularly relevant for PPP feasibility assessment.
32.	FSI public service v FDI	The integrity and efficiency of public service has a direct bearing on both the probability of FDI inflows, the efficacy of FDI ventures and PPPs within the equation of risk sharing. The traditional fragility measures assess the degree of pressures on the state to undertake and provide critical social and economic services – failure of which characterises fragility.
33.	FSI human rights v FDI	Human rights, universal principles and standards that supposedly influence investors' choice of destination. Operating in countries with poor human rights can be potentially damaging to corporations and erode competitiveness in major markets. Human rights is a measure of fragility and FDI is a major PPP
34.	FSI security apparatus v FDI	The security apparatus is a direct function of a functional state and directly relates to protection of private property as well as operational costs for investors. Poor security apparatus can translate to higher security costs and insurance premiums for instance. Functional security apparatus attracts FDI as it guarantees protection of private property among others.

Sources: Messner *et al.* (2015). The World Bank (2015) World Economic Forum (2015)

4.9.3.2 Quantitative data analysis tools and processes

The application of the above disclosed parameters led to the use of SPSS software and the following of certain quantitative secondary data analysis processes which are next discussed.

[5]Cultural and institutional risks spring from ownership structure, human resource norms, religious heritage, nepotism and corruption, intellectual property rights, and protectionism. The study was concerned with country-specific risk and macro-risk.

4.9.3.2a. Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) Analytics

SPSS is a Windows-based comprehensive program for analysing. SPSS can process large amounts of data, take any type of file and use them to generate any type of reports. SPSS can therefore generate tabulated reports, charts, and plots of distributions and trends, descriptive statistics, and complex statistical analysis. The package has SPSS has scores of statistical and mathematical functions, scores statistical procedures, and a very flexible data handling capability.

4.9.3.3b Quantitative secondary data analysis processes

Before the analysis was conducted, the researcher familiarised himself with the original studies and data. The outcome of the familiarisation undertaking was reported in Section 4.9.3.1, Table 4-9, which presents a summary of the secondary data parameters. Specifically, the researcher reviewed all the data parameters, transferred all the data of potential interest into a new database file, adjusted the data for missing data, and where necessary recoded variables or created new ones. The study analysed descriptive statistics and no regression models were used. The researcher collected descriptive statistics considering the variables, downloaded the database from the websites of the WB, World Economic Forum and Fund for Peace. The data were then analysed using SPSS not to determine statistically significant relationships (inferential) but to describe the variables pertaining to the 15 countries. The choice of secondary quantitative data was in accordance with the fieldwork occurrences; there was a low return rate for primary quantitative data surveys.

Cross analysis was central to undertaking the analysis of secondary data. The researcher imported data in Excel spreadsheets into SPSS for analysis of relationships between several variables in the survey data (pivot table/graph) or sometimes known as contingency table/graph and chi-independence square. Using the data collected and formatted the study used cross analysis to answer whether there is a significant relationship between state functionalism (FSI and CPIA) and PPPs (EoDB, FDI and GCI) parameters. SPSS was used to run an automated test of the data in the spreadsheet and for independence and thereafter created graphs using the following formula. The results are based on the difference between what is observed in the data and what would be expected if there was truly no relationship between the variables (Teknoma, 2017).

As indicated above various global indices have been employed by orthodox and mainstream governance institutions as measures of SF, state functionalism and national economic competitiveness within and across state. An analysis of the formula, application and outcomes from these indices was undertaken to determine their political and statistical integrity.

As indicated in the preceding section, the qualitative analysis, the study established the relationship between SF, RI and political ideology. This relationship is significant to the study for its relevance to the politico-administrative framework. In social science terms, this framework refers to all that relates to both politics and administration of the state. "Political" refers to methodology and activities associated with running a government or an organization in terms of accountability. From an unaccountable perspective, political refers to political maneuvers or diplomacy between people, groups, or organizations, especially involving power, influence or conflict. Administration in this context refers to both the act of administering; government or public affairs; the service rendered, or duties assumed, in conducting affairs; the conducting of any office or employment; direction, as well as to a body that administers; the executive part of government; the persons collectively who are entrusted with the execution of laws and policies.

The study subjected these relationships and other considerations to a quantitative analysis but with a focus on the overall relationship between fragility measures (as defined by the WB CPIA and Fund for Peace FSI) and PPP success measures (as defined by the WB Ease of Doing Business and the World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Index). An analysis of regional data on the same provided the conclusions on RI.

Table 4 – 12: Types of measures for indices

1. Description of Measures – Aggregate		
Index	**Measure**	**Range / Countries**
CPIA	Score/Rank	1=low to 6=high 1=best and 95=worst
FSI	score	1=very sustainable to 10= very high alert
FSI	rank	1=very sustainable, 178= Very fragile
Ease of doing Business	rank	1=high to 189 low
FDI	amount	Million USD
Global Competitive Index	score	1=low to 7=high
Global Competitive Index	rank	1=better and 154 =worse

Sources: Messner *et al.* 2015; The World Bank, 2015; Schwab, 2015.

The quantitative secondary data analysis was on the three study countries for case study and the 15 SADC countries for regional cross-analysis. Accordingly, RI and SF variables were analysed through the 15 country SADC data, while the case analysis was for Botswana, Malawi and South Africa. The three study countries were chosen for reasons disclosed in section 4.5.3.1.

The major limitations of the quantitative analysis stem from the inherent design and formula for deriving the indices employed in the study, as well as the unavailability of complete data sets. The inherent limitations in the use of the Indices stems from the character of an Index. According to Bruggemann and Carlsen (2011, p. 2) ranking based on a Multi-Indicator Systems (MIS) cannot

be directly performed, and as in many ranking methods an aggregation of these indicators is performed, by for example, determining the weighted sum of indicator values of each object. Although a one-dimensional scale after aggregation such as a simple addition of the single indicators and ranking is easy and straightforward, there are consequences. Firstly, even in the best-case scenario, some valuable information is lost. But even more pertinently such a simple addition of the indicator values may lead to quite erroneous conclusions as high score(s) in certain indicator(s) may be leveled off by low scores in other indicator(s). This levelling off may occur without considering that these indicators point towards quite different topics albeit expressing the same ranking aim. This general problem applies to varying degrees, to all multi-criteria decision tools, and is called 'the degree of compensation'. This study recognizes this limitation for all indices employed in the quantitative analysis.

In the specific case of the Fragility States Index, Bruggemann and Carlsen (2011, p. 1) argue that "The FSI is based on twelve individual contextual different indicators, subsequently transformed into a single composite indicator, by simple addition of the single indicator values". These scholars highlight that "such an operation leaves space for compensation effects, where one or more indicators level out the effect of others. Hence, a comparison between the single states, in a total of 178, based on their mutual FSI ranking has its limitations as the comparisons are made based on the composite indicator" (Bruggemann and Carlsen, 2011, p. 1).

The use of a sequential multi-method qualitative research design, which included primary and secondary qualitative data as well as secondary quantitative data, enabled the researcher to triangulate the results from the various data collection tools. Triangulation is discussed next.

4.11 Multi-faceted Triangulation

Triangulation has a variety of uses. Generally, it is a means of establishing credibility for a study. It also deepens empirical inquiry to produce greater understanding. There are four types of triangulation pertinent to qualitative research: i) methods triangulation which involves checking the consistency of findings generated by different data collection methods. In mixed methods research design, qualitative and quantitative data elucidate complementary aspects of the same phenomenon. Data divergence in findings provide critical insights to the researcher; ii) triangulation of sources examines the consistency of different data sources from within the same method. It focuses on different points in time, different sectors (public and private) and people with different viewpoints; iii) analyst triangulation uses multiple observers and analysts to review findings. This allows for correction of selective perceptions and illumination of blind spots in an interpretive analysis. Also, it allows for multiple ways of seeing the data; finally, consider, iv)

theory or perspective triangulation which uses multiple theoretical perspectives to examine and interpret the data. (Pandey and Patnaik 2014, p. 5748).

In this study, the second and fourth types were applied. As to methodological triangulation, throughout case study Chapters Five to Nine, results from different qualitative methods are compared to determine where results converge or diverge. Regarding the fourth type of triangulation, the study employed both theoretical and perspective triangulation. On the one hand, theoretical triangulation was used in Chapters Two and Three to begin to understand the meanings and secondary evidence that has led to constructions and interpretations of RI, SF and PPPs. On the other hand, there are multiple ontological and epistemological perspectives underlying the research, namely: constructivism, interpretivism and pragmatism. These theoretical and philosophical underpinnings are juxtaposed against data in the case study chapters.
There are certain ethical considerations employed in the study which follow this section.

4.12 Ethical Considerations

According to Edelstein, Hersen and Thase (2013, p. 161), present several approaches for examining ethics and values, but submit that deontological and teleological, are the two philosophical approaches most relevant to student research ethics. On the one hand, the deontological approach is aimed at protecting participants from harm, regardless of the potential benefit. While on the other hand, teleological philosophies emphasize the consequences from actions, and dealing with the moral dimensions of the behaviour as determined totally by the consequences of the behaviour.

Accordingly, in this study, certain ethical precautions were undertaken during this study. Governance research remains a delicate topic particularly for respondents in government, and in some cases even for non-state respondents. First, the researcher followed ethical protocols of the University of KwaZulu-Natal. The ethical clearance letter is attached as Appendix Six. Once ethical clearance was granted, due ethical process in both data collection and analysis was observed. All respondents were informed in advance of the purpose and nature of the study. Consent was also obtained before each interview or provision of a questionnaire. The consent form for interviews is attached as Appendix Six and the form for the self-administered questionnaire as Appendix Six. Interviewees were advised that they could withdraw from the study at any time. Their anonymity and confidentiality were protected by use of codes as shown in Table 4-5. Employment positions could not be disclosed because this would be traceable to individual participants. During data analysis, the researcher was particularly careful to protect the meanings that study participants attached to their respective responses.

4.13 Limitations of the Study

The study was confronted with a variety of limitations including methodological, time and resources. The methodological limitations were most pronounced regarding quantitative data on RI and SF. Unfortunately, there was a low response rate to the planned self-administered questionnaires distributed by the researcher. Therefore, the study had to rely on secondary data collected and maintained by global governance organisations such as the WB, the Fund for Peace and the World Economic Forum. Where necessary the data was triangulated with that of other global governance organisations. However, the relevance and accuracy of the quantitative empirical data available from these global and regional governance organisations present a limitation for the study. The data is generated from mainstream global and regional institutions whose ideological orientation are the very paradigms being queried in the study.

In other words, these are the very institutions that generate the exogenous concepts and measures which were problematised in this study. Furthermore, the methods and formula employed in the generation of the said data from global and regional governance organisations serve the limited interests and specific objectives often incongruent to endogenous interests for which the outcomes must necessarily serve. This means that the study mined and employed descriptive statistics as opposed to the inferential statistics that were desired from the outset. Consequently, there is no regression modelling and instead, the study utilised descriptive statistics, downloaded from various database of the selected institutions. However, those data were analysed afresh using SPSS not to determine statistically significant relationships (inferential) but to describe the variables pertaining to the 15 countries at a regional level, and three at a case study level. Nevertheless, the quantitative secondary data proved useful and were interrogated in relation to the in-depth interviews of participants from multi-sector organisations across the three countries.

Since the proposed concurrent mixed method study could not be undertaken, the researcher changed the contours of the research design to a transformative sequential multi-method qualitative study. Although this was unexpected it did not prevent the researcher from moving forward to achieve the research objectives, answer the research questions and address the research problem. The results of the interview data were used to interrogate the results of secondary quantitative data which was analysed anew. The parameters of the secondary quantitative data are explained in a way that determines and operationalises appropriate variables that allowed inquiry into whether the secondary data supports or contravenes results of the qualitative interviews. The underlying ontology and epistemology and the conceptual framework helped overcome the methodological limitations.

As to time and resources, the researcher moved from Malawi to South Africa during the study and changed employment positions twice. Each employment position created greater time demands for professional obligations and less time to dedicate to the study. Further, the researcher studied as a single parent of three young children for one year of the study when the spouse was working in Asia. Lastly, dedicated funding for the study was unavailable.

4.14 Summary of the Chapter

The chapter presented the philosophical foundations of the research methodology and the design logic pertaining as summarised in Table 4-13 below.

Table 4 – 13: Summary of methodology

Illustration of the Research Methodology			
	Research Aspect	**Choice for the Study**	**Rationale & Application**
Research Philosoph	**Paradigms/ Worldviews**	Interpretivism Pragmatism Post-positivism	The need to borrow from multiple methodologies and the epistemological need to locate the interpretation and analysis of phenomenon in the perceptions of the respondents.
Research Methodology	**Design**	Multimethod	The complexity of the study as a multi-inter-transdisciplinary social science necessitates the use of a design that allows the use any relevant and scientifically credible approach at any stage of the inquiry. The design is necessarily pragmatic in that regard.
	Strategy	Case Study & Quantitative non-experimental descriptive and explanatory	Case study allowed for an in-depth analysis of the nature and character of the phenomenon, while the quantitative non-experimental allowed for the analysis of secondary quantitative data without manipulation of existing variables.
	Data Collection	Mixed Tools Content Analysis In-Depth Interview Secondary Survey Results Documents & Archives	Multiple approaches and tools used provide flexibility to obtain data of various types, forms and in different contexts.
	Sampling Strategy	Purposive Sampling	Convenience and purposive sampling were used recognising that in predominantly qualitative research the sample size hinges on knowledge holders rather than representativeness of a population.
	Data Quality Control	Trustworthiness – Credibility (Triangulation) Content & Construct validity	The principal approach for data quality control to determine trustworthy of qualitative data was triangulation. Data quality control for secondary quantitative data was done using SPSS.
	Data Presentation & Analysis	Multimethod Primary and Secondary Qualitative and Secondary Quantitative	Used a Textual Analysis strategy and SPPS Data Analytics both applied to the conceptual framework.

Source: Ernest, (1994); Scotland, (2012); Venkatesh, Brown, and Bala (2013); Byrne and Humble (2007); Creswell, (2014); Creswell, (2009); Morse, (2003); Stock and Burton, (2011).

In addition, this chapter also highlighted the study limitations and implementation challenges the necessitated a shift in the methodology, particularly for primary data. The considerations presented in the chapter were key in directing the interpretation and analysis of the findings. The next chapter is the first of four case study chapters. The next chapter focuses on the regional context and therefore discusses the features and characteristics of RI, state functionalism and PPPs in Southern Africa. It outlines the history of the regional institutions and presents results from the regional quantitative secondary data analysis.

5.0 CHAPTER FIVE: THE SOUTHERN AFRICA REGION

5.1 Introduction

This chapter examines the history of RI in Africa from the late 18th Century to date. The period was specifically isolated with respect to the Researcher's choice to characterise RI as a state centric dynamic and thus in the case of Southern Africa to dwell on the period from which this dynamic occurred among states. Equally pertinent in the chapter is the brief historiography of the ideological dilemmas that have affected the evolution of the concept of RI in the region. This sets the context for subsequent case study chapters. The chapter then examines the key influences on RI and thereafter presents brief biographies of key regional institutions that have driven these processes. Finally, the chapter examines state functionalism, SF and the Westphalian model as it manifests in Southern Africa and the evolution of PPPs in the region, using quantitative secondary data analysed afresh to present graphs and tables.

5.2 Southern Africa regional integration historiography

From a conventional international relations theory perspective, the history of RI in Southern Africa dates to the 19th century. Chronologically, the first institutionalised effort at integration in the region was the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) which has its origins between 1889 and 1893 but was officially formed in 1910 Southern Africa Customs Union.

The theory of customs unions can be traced back to the publication of Viner's pioneering work in 1950 (Cooper and Massell, 1965), but the history of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) goes back to more than six decades earlier, in 1889, when the Cape of Good Hope, a British Colony, and the Orange Free State, a Boer Republic, established the world's first customs union - the Customs Union Convention (CUC). According to Ngalawa (2014, p. 145) "the CUC was extended to cover the British territories of Bechuanaland (Botswana) and Basutoland (Lesotho) in 1893, Swaziland in 1903, and the Union of South Africa in 1910, before a renegotiated agreement of 1969 led to the adoption of the name SACU in 1970". The theory demonstrates that a customs union can result in either trade creation or trade diversion. Trade creation being a shift from high-cost domestic production to lower cost production in a partner country, while trade diversion involves a shift from a low-cost external producer to a higher-cost producer in a partner country (Ngalawa, 2014, p. 148). This suggests therefore that the inception of regional integration in Southern Africa was driven by economic logic. This proposition is further collaborated by the

developments during the same period, the corporate-led process from 1890-1923 of the development of the British South African Company (BSAC). This expansion resulted from, and was influenced by, infrastructure development in Southern Africa such as the railway network around that same period.

Following the railway line driven expansion, workers' unions were formed around the mines as more Blacks were recruited to work in the Rand Mines. One such union was the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association (WNLA), which was formed as early as 1898 to recruit labour from Southern Africa (then Basutoland, Swaziland, South-West Africa, Bechuanaland, Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia, Nyasaland, Angola, Moçambique and extending as far north as the Belgian Congo and Tanganyika) (Van de berg and Bhorat, 1999, p. 4).

After this milestone in a region-wide concerted dynamic, various South African governments from 1911 to 1963 attempted to include the British protectorates into a regional entity. These territories are present day Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. A successful creation of a federal protectorate occurred with the Central African Federation of the Rhodesia and Nyasaland settler project between 1953 and 1963 (Fagbayibo, 2013, p. 33).

A decade later, the Rand Monetary Area was formed in 1974 in pursuit of market integration. From the negotiation agreement in 1986 it was decided to change the name to a Common Monetary Area (CMA). In 1992 after Namibia gained its independence from apartheid South Africa, the CMA was renamed the Multilateral Monetary Area (MMA) (Khamfula, 2006, p. 173).

Prior to 1992, the apartheid regime led by Vorster and P. W. Botha from 1977, initiated a Constellation of Southern African States (CONSAS), but until regional grouping of nations ended when Zimbabwe gained independence in 1980, led by the Zimbabwe African National Union. This was the last attempt at a settler led federation. However, the CONSAS is still considered a hegemonic project, a "political scheme within which increased South African economic penetration of neighbouring states was to be used as an instrument for making them more dependent on the South African economy thereby reducing their capability in supporting liberation movements in the region and security was a central aspect of this project"

CONSAS was later replaced by another stillborn enterprise, the Association of Southern African States (ASAS), in 1995. However, prior to ASAS, there was the enduring alliance of the Front-Line States (FLS) (Sarkin, 2009, p. 29), which began in the early 1970s as a cooperation between independent Member States in Southern Africa, excluding Namibia and South Africa. Namibia's independence marked the end of the European settler population empirical project in Southern

Africa, whose methods was the coerced economic driven integration of neighbouring territories (Britannica McKenna, 2011, p. 53).

In 1980, the Southern Africa Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) was established by nine Southern African countries: Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The main objectives were; to reduce dependence on apartheid South Africa; undertake impactful national and regional projects; mobilise Member States' resources, in the quest for collective self-reliance, and secure international understanding and support (Southern Africa Development Community Treaty, 1992, p. 5).

The Heads of State and Government of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference in August 1992, in Windhoek, Namibia, signed a Declaration and Treaty for the formation of the Southern African Development Community, which in 1993 developed into the SADC as an institution.

This histography, and, the Customs Union Theory (Viver, 1950), challenges the mainstream theories such as Deutsch's (1968) security community theory, federalism (Dosenrode, 2010, p. 9), liberal intergovernmentalism (Spolaore, 2013, p. 8) and neofunctionalism (Ilievki, 2015, p. 6) discussed earlier. While all theories are based on state centric configurations, the Customs Union theory is predominated by an exclusive economic logic, unlike the others which propose political and social dimensions.

5.3 Southern Africa Development Community (SADC)

The origins of SADC (the Community for the Development of Southern Africa) remains controversial, as on the one hand authors such as Lee (2003) state that SADCC (Southern African Development Coordination Conference), is a western creation, According to Moma (2012, p. 102). On the other hand, researchers like Mandaza and Tostensen (1994) consider that SADCC was created by the states of Southern Africa based on their own collective experiences of cooperation as Frontline States. These included the member countries of the political alliance created in the 1970s against the white minority regimes in Southern Africa.

Moma's (2012) arguments are of relevance to this study because he explores and advances the idea that "SADCC is a result of a constructivist articulation, by states in Southern Africa, of their experience of regional cooperation and western contribution" (Moma, 2012, p. 104). This point of view, based on financial and financial elements is later confirmed when Lee (2003) states that if international support was drawn, the organisation would not survive. Mandaza and Tostensen (2003) dwell on the formal influences basing their arguments on political reasons.

Thus, on the one hand, Lee's (2003) evidence for the exogenous influence wasis that formation was highly controlled by western governments and international financial institutions through financial support to the organization. And on the other hand, Mandaza and Tostensen (1994) present five aspects in support of endogenous influences. These are: geography, social and cultural context, colonial experience, alliance amongst Front Line States and their view of the apartheid regime in South Africa as a common enemy. These factors are purported to have contributed to the foundation of Southern Africa's distinct personality and identity, which supported political solidarity and then economic cooperation.

But while Mandaza and Tostensen (1994) employ official documentation as evidence, Lee's evidence is an interview with Daniel Ndela, a Zimbabwean consultant who according to Moma's account, reconstructs a series of (not always official) meetings between leaders from the countries in Southern Africa and David Anderson, the Managing Director of the Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation. In other words, Lee (2003) purports that these meetings, which contributed to the design of SADCC.

From a constructivist view, Moma (2012, p. 104) supportsed the endogenous origins and argues that, "like the formation of ethnic and national identities, the regional identity is dependent on historical context; and like nations and ethnicities, regional formations possess a subjective quality and can consequently be seen asbe 'imagined communities". In this perspective 'continuity' and 'adaptation' are the key elements of the analysis. Within the notion of 'adaptation', Moma (2012, p. 107) introduces the argument of creative adaptation that goes beyond the dichotomy between internal and external factors in the creation of SADC. He insists that, adaptation presupposes the intervention - in this case coordination or synthesis - of internal and external factors. This he concludes implies the reference to existing models of regionalism and the innovation of actors who adapt the models they adopt.

5.3.1 Structure of political governance

It is necessary to bring attention to the political governance arrangements that drive SADC. Understanding these arrangements allows explanation of the limitations and unexploited opportunities upon which fundamental politico-administrative reforms can be based or hindered.

i) SADC Summit

The SADC Summit is "responsible for the overall policy direction and control of functions of the Community, ultimately making it the supreme policy-making institution of SADC. It is made up of all SADC Member States' Heads of States or Government and is managed on a Troika system

that comprises the current SADC Summit Chairperson, the incoming Chairperson (the Deputy at the time), and the immediate previous Chairperson" (Southern African Development Community, 201, p. 7).

The Troika System vests authority in this group of three leaders for expeditious decision-making on behalf of SADC Member State representatives. Prior to this, these decisions were made at scheduled policy meetings. In its assessment, this governing system has proven to be very effective from its inception in August 1999. It is imperative to understand that the Troika system operates at the highest decision-making body of the Heads of States "Summit, the Organ, the Council of Ministers, and the Standing Committee of Senior Officials". The Heads of State and Government Summit occurs once a year in the months of August/September (SADC, 2002).

ii) Summit Troika of the Organ

"The SADC Organ on Politics Defence and Security Cooperation is managed on a Troika basis and is responsible for promoting peace and security in the SADC region. It is mandated to steer and provide Member States with direction regarding matters that threaten peace, security and stability in the region. It is coordinated at the level of Summit, consisting of a Chairperson, Incoming Chairperson and Outgoing Chairperson, and reports to the SADC Summit Chairperson" (Southern African Development Community, 2013, p. 32).

"The SADC Summit and the Organ Troika are mutually exclusive, and the Chairperson of the Organ does not simultaneously hold the chair of Summit. Like the Summit chair, the Organ chair rotates on an annual basis. The Organ structure, operations and functions are regulated by the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation". (Southern African Development Community, 2013, p. 29).

These governance mechanisms are exclusively state-driven and managed. They are predominantly informed by the public and civil servants in Member States who liaise with counterparts seconded to the secretariat, making the processes a culmination and replication of SADC Member States national governments' interests and traditions.

SADC was conceived alongside the Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern Africa (PTA) that was formally inaugurated in 1982 and transformed it into the Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) in 1993 (Hartzenberg, 2011, p. 6). However, like many of the regional efforts on continent, these bodies intertwine and overlap with other sub-regional bodies and agendas.

5.4 Influences on regional integration in Southern Africa

To understand the influences on RI in Southern Africa, it is imperative to examine the ideological and theoretical frameworks within which these influences have been defined. To put these frames into perspective, an introduction of two forms of RI as advanced by Moma (2012, p.108-111) come to mind. Firstly, regionalisation as economic integration with a focus on economic dimensions and secondly regionalism as political integration that focuses on politics and cooperation among states. Although this study is predominantly concerned with regionalism, attention is also given to regionalisation in the analysis of influences on RI for two reasons. The first is that in political economy analyses, the two are an essentially indivisible phenomenon. The economy is both a factor and product of politics just as the inverse is true. The second reason is that regionalisation is essential in examining the confluence of the relationship between RI, SF and PPPs. Governments enter into partnerships with private actors to benefit from efficient economies in delivery of public services as well as to facilitate private sector development (Roehrich, Lewis, George (2014, p. 114) at a regional level these dynamics occur within both regionalism and regionalisation.

Varieties of interests necessitate that nation states pursue regionalism and regionalisation. Accordingly, each of these aspects advances a set of propositions about the needs for and benefits of pursuing either or both. The framework for regionalism advances the proposition that RI reduces political instability through the collaborative pursuit of common interest Mapuva & Muyengwa-Mapuva (2014, p. 5). Further, it proposes that integration reduces insecurity and armed conflicts as well as human rights infringements and xenophobia, both at the state and regional level. However, the framework for regionalisation advances the proposition that RI leads to reduced transaction costs; the effective transfer of technology; improved national welfare; increased donor confidence; reduced foreign interference, and the development of productive economic partnerships. It is within this interest-based framework that influences can be determined and evaluated (Estrada, 2010, p. 114).

It is a logical proposition to argue therefore that states pursue regionalism in the interests of improved regional and national security and entrenching democratic culture and human rights. Similarly, it can also be argued that states pursue regionalisation to lower business transaction costs; enhance technology transfer into their economies; improve welfare from economic dividends; improve the productivity of economic partnerships with the private sector, and in the case of aid dependent states, increase donor confidence and reduce the space for their interference in internal affairs.

It follows, therefore, that an analysis of the influences on RI would accordingly derive from the frameworks on regionalism and regionalisation. In the case of Southern Africa, the fifteen SADC Member States share common interests as well as a set of idiosyncratic interests for each member. A preliminary assessment of the study countries of Botswana, Malawi, and South Africa indicates that the membership of all three countries has been influenced by both regionalism and regionalisation but to varying degrees and for varying reasons. The influence of certain aspect of regionalism and regionalisation are pronounced in one country and less so in another. Accordingly, it is also true that the significance of these aspects has changed and varied in time.

For instance, the pursuit of security, democracy and human rights is defined in the SADC Protocol on Politics, Defence And Security that was agreed upon on the 28th of June 1996 in Gaborone, Botswana and the SADC Mutual Defence Pact of 2003. The protocol explicitly mentions the need for a common foreign policy on matters of mutual concern, and a call to advance the same on international fora. This provision notwithstanding, the 2012 elections in Zimbabwe illustrated clear dissension amongst members on the verdict advanced by SADC. SADC Election Observation Mission to The Republic of Zimbabwe (2013). The region took a common stand that was explicitly communicated in international fora but Botswana defaulted from the position, arguably because of its gross economic reliance on western investors whose governments were opposed to the outcome of the election (Mutimukulu, The Herald, 2014).

The Herald (Harare), Zimbabwe posted an article titled “Botswana Breaks Ranks with AU, SADC” authored by Makomborero Mutimukulu on 26 January 2014. The article reported, “Botswana President Seretse Khama Ian Khama has broken ranks with SADC and the rest of Africa, saying his country will not participate in future SADC election observer missions claiming that there were irregularities in Zimbabwe’s polls last year”. The article further reported that President Seretse had ignored the AU and insisting that current presidents and heads of state should be taken to the International Criminal Court (ICC). This, according to Mutimukulu (2014) was in reaction to a resolution passed in the previous year by the AU that no “sitting African head of state should be taken to the court” (Ethiopian Foreign Minister Tedros Adhanom, 2014. It is stated that the Botswana leader declared that his country would not partake in regional election monitoring activities because Zimbabwe was let “off the hook” by SADC following its election crisis (All Africa, 2014). It is observed that Botswana’s position disregards the history of the formation and evolution of SADC from SADCC. The original purpose of the grouping was the Non-aligned Movement states to fight and diminish the hegemonic and imperialist influence of external forces that included apartheid South Africa.

Seemingly, Botswana's reliance of Debswana was a critical factor in the President's position. Debswana is the largest mining operation in the country and an equal partnership organisation between the Botswana government and De Beers of South Africa. Mr Nicky Oppenheimer, who is "Chairman of the De Beers Group, has served on the Debswana Board since January 1980 and was its Chairman from January 1998 to March 2007. The Chairmanship of the Debswana Board rotates between a nominee of the Botswana Government and Delibes Holdings Limited every two calendar years. Delibes Holdings Limited is the De Beers entity that holds 50% of the shareholding in Debswana. Mr Oppenheimer was then also Chairman of Namdeb, the 50/50 diamond mining joint venture between De Beers and the Government of Namibia and a Non-Executive Director of Anglo American plc" (Debswana, 2014, p. ??). The government of Botswana was later persuaded to abandon its call for new elections at the SADC meeting in Lilongwe 2012. Botswana's behaviour can ably be explained through a broader framework of the regionalism. Moma (2012, p. 105) presents a plural perspective of regionalism arguing that regionalism is the product of actions standardised, on the one hand, by internal regional dynamics and, on the other, by external pressures, such as globalisation, instability and security.

The relationship between regionalism and regionalisation is thus intricate, with shifts in context influencing the form and composition of the regional organisation. A similar case in point is the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) group. The rationale behind an existing organisation may change and factors that were fundamental to their creation may become irrelevant. According to Peou (2015, p. 5), the ASEAN was originally created to provide security to its members in the face of a then increasing threat from the expansion of Communism in Indochina. That motivation has long disappeared and indeed ASEAN membership now includes its former foes. What was primarily an organization for common security became a RI Area (Peou, 2015, p. 1).

The Botswana case calls into question the influence of regionalisation interests. Botswana abandoned the thirteen SADC Member States in favour of a pro-western position owing to its economic interests. Yet regionalisation argues that one of the greatest influences on RI is market integration, maximising economic benefits of cooperating with one another. Nevertheless, do states in Southern Africa, within and among themselves, find meaning in economic integration? Draper, Freytag, Al Doyaili (2012). consider this question. They note "Sub-Saharan African countries mainly trade with western countries from which inward investment is primarily sourced also consider that in recent years there has been diversification towards emerging markets, especially China" (Draper *et al.*, 2012, p. 1). Given these immense regional exports, Draper *et al* (2012) submit, there "are undifferentiated commodities that are generally not needed in regional supply-chains owing to the serious underdevelopment of manufacturing industry. It is therefore

not surprising to find that aggregate levels of intra-regional trade in Africa remain the lowest in the world at around 12%" (Draper *et al.,* 2012, p. 1).

In the specific case of SADC, intra-regional trade "increased from US$ 11.6 billion in 2000 to US$ 29 billion in 2008. This was driven mainly by the region's shift in sourcing imports from Europe to South Africa following the end of apartheid and the launching of the SADC FTA. However, intra-regional trade has been declining since 2003" (African Development Bank, 2013). According to Mbekeani (2013, p, 11), it "contracted from 22% of total trade in 2002 to less than 15% in 2008".

These trends necessarily raise the question of whether the states in the region see reduction of transaction costs and technology transfer as attainable and therefore sufficient motivation to seek integration. The three other purported interests of improved welfare, improved PPPs and greater donor confidence can arguably be attained by engagement and cooperation outside the region. This raises the next question of whether states in Southern Africa have made the deliberate and pronounced policy to focus on ultra-regional economic cooperation as opposed to intra-regional economic integration. If the former pertains, it follows then that regionalisation interests can be considered a minor influence on RI in Southern Africa.

A more nuanced comparative analysis of interests, motivations and influences among countries in the region indicates that South Africa as a regional hegemony stands to gain the most from regionalisation under the current circumstances. South Africa is therefore comparatively more likely to exert influence on other members and is itself subject to a variety of influences driving regionalisation.

Regional affairs in Southern Africa present epistemological dilemmas and are subject to various historical and contemporary issues which are next discussed.

5.4.1 Epistemological Dilemmas

Beyond and within the broad regionalism and regionalisation discourse, other scholars have presented the challenge of determining the influences on RI in Southern Africa as an epistemological one. In this regard, according to Söderbaum (2016, p. 7) "failure to adequately understand regionalism in Southern Africa and Africa more broadly is caused by the overwhelming dominance of orthodox and Eurocentric theories and conceptualizations of RI, whereby progress in RI is primarily defined in terms of European Union-style institutionalization". In this study, we define Eurocentrism as the combined "mentality prevalent within the varying countries comprising geographical Europe of European cultural superiority".

Within the same notion, Hasmath (2011 p.207) describes eurocentrism not only as "a tool for generalizing and constructing those individuals and cultures thought of as outside Europe", but as:

> A historically sedimented mode of subjectivity: The Eurocentric construction of the world is a defining factor in the European Subject's sense of self- the paradigmatic European subject being the bourgeois male" (Hasmath (2011, p. 207).

Hasmath (2011, p. 208) argues however, that post-colonial immigration has challenged the historical image of the European subject as the white, bourgeois male. This argument will also be explored.

According to Draper (2013, p. 131) "European RI regime was constructed based on three ideological foundations designed to promote pacification: democracy or, Republican Liberalism; commerce and trade or, Commercial Liberalism; and institutions or, Regulatory liberalism". Söderbaum (2016, p. 7) insists however, that it if from such a perspective, that regionalism in Southern Africa is usually considered primitive, weak or even as an outright failure. Soderbaum (2016) argues that "there are certain forms of regionalism in Southern Africa that are both sophisticated and successful" to at least those actors in control. To analyse the influences on RI in Southern Africa within the framework of the European integration framework would be limiting.

This assertion suggests that to determine and define the influences on RI in Southern Africa, one must be willing to understand regionalism beyond the orthodox Eurocentric characterisation that has dominated the analysis. It is essential to challenge the Eurocentric prescriptions on institutionalisation of RI and the other formalisation processes derived from the European experience. A robust examination of the influences on RI in Southern Africa must transcend the Eurocentric benchmarks that qualify or disqualify effective regionalism. It is for this reason that this study examines the influences as they pertain to the epistemological foundations of state formation and the profound and dynamic inter-relatedness of this endogenous Southern Africa experience to RI. This dynamic is significantly consequential for a variety of spheres including the development of PPPs.

5.4.2 Historical Influences

The predominant historical influence on RI in Southern Africa is arguably Pan-Africanism. Within this proposition, two competing perspectives are recognised. According to Kumah-Abiwu (2013, p .126), there are two "general approaches to Pan-Africanism, namely Afrocentric and

Eurocentric conceptions. The Afrocentric conception is used to explain and evaluate the position that the struggle for self-assertion in Africa dates back in time to the era before Christ whereas, the Eurocentric position conceive Pan-Africanism as a direct response to European slavery and colonialism". This was the Afrocentric conception advanced by Natanmbu (1998) and the Eurocentric by Londsdale (1968).

To elaborate, the submissions by Natanmbu (1998) and Londsdale (1968) that contend that the Afrocentric perspective is embedded in the "history of Pan-Africanism from 3200 B.C. when Pharaoh Aha united the upper and the lower Nile to form a united country to be able to resist foreign aggression and invasion" (Kumah-Abiwu, 2013, pp. 126-127). The assertion is that this is arguably the conceptual beginnings of Pan-Africanism. The Afrocentric perspective attempts to define Pan-African nationalism. Accordingly, we understand this concept within the context of the fight against external control. This as Natanmbu (1998) states, is the recurring argument for political integration in Africa, and concludes by defining Pan-African Nationalism as "the national, unified struggle and resistance of African peoples against all forms of foreign aggression and invasion. The primary goal purportedly being the total liberation and unification of all Africans and people of African descent under African communalism" (Ibid.). Kumah-Abiwu (2013, p. 125) presents the "history of Pan-African nationalism as originating from 3200 B.C. when the unification of Africans took place in Egypt through to revolutionary Pan-African Nationalism against slavery between the fifteenth and nineteenth century. This progressed to the intellectual, geopolitical, scientific, and cultural Pan-African Nationalism of the twentieth century culminating in the proposal of the United States of Africa".

The Eurocentric perspective can be classified accordingly along the avenues of "political, cultural, geographical, and racial" with its standing position that feelings of "solidarity among Africans birthed the idea of Pan-Africanism" Kumah-Abiwu (2013, p. 125). Criticisms of the two perspectives have been explored within the relevant sections below.

In the context of Southern Africa, the influence of Pan-Africanism is evident in the agenda of the precursor to SADC, the Southern Africa Development Community Conference (SADCC). A detailed account of the Pan-African agenda of the frontline states that conceived SADDC is presented in subsequent sections. The predominance of this influence is confined hereto the origins of SADC.

Some have argued that the origins are exclusively intra-regional and not Pan-African but characterise the broader influences as sub-regional factors driven by IPE imperatives. According to Zajontz (2013, p. 31), "while the pan-African perspective and the idea of continental

regionalization can be seen at least as a rhetorical framework for some of the regional schemes in Southern Africa, the main factors behind the regionalization efforts taking place during the past 35 years are of a sub-regional nature. Some sub-regional factors have also been linked to forces at the global level, especially the superpower competition during the cold war period".

Odén (1996, p. 3), submits that "since the Sharpeville massacre in 1960, regional development in Southern Africa has been strongly affected by the conflict between apartheid South Africa and the rest of the region under decolonization or independence development". Odén however does not make the distinction between regionalism and regionalisation. Note that the use of regionalisation here encompasses both regionalism and regionalisation as defined earlier. Odén (1996, p. 3) states that from a regional point of view, this period can be sub-divided into three:

"The decolonisation period**:** Ending in 1980 with the independence of Zimbabwe changed the region, as apartheid's geographical buffer zone further contracted. Regionalisation prior to and until the end of this period was mainly motivated by settler or colonial power interests" (in Zajontz, 2013, p. 31). Zajontz states that this period effectively "ended with the independence of Angola and Mozambique in 1975 but with the independence of Zimbabwe, the South African plans to create a Constellation of Southern African States had to be abandoned" (Ibid.). It is important to mention here that after Zimbabwe's independence, the apartheid regime strategy became one of confrontation and destabilisation, which is why 1980 is a better cut-off point due to that changing regional behaviour of the apartheid regime from that time Oden (1996, p. 14).

South Africa's Hegemonic Instability**: "**The 1980-90 period of South African destabilisation of the region and South Africa's increased international isolation. Regionalisation efforts were mainly looked upon as instruments in the main regional conflict" (Odén, 1996, p. 3), and were thus either a means to the entrenchment of South Africa's hegemony or a means to advancing the agenda of the Frontline States.

Regionalisation**:** The period from 1992 to date characterised by gradual transformation, opening renewed regionalization efforts and readmission of South Africa into the community for the first time since decolonization. South Africa was now a legitimate part of the region and this coincided with the changes in global political economy, including the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the cold war. This rendered market economics and multi-party politics as unchallenged international agendas. This meant that the on-going marginalisation of Sub-Saharan Africa, including Southern Africa, in the global economy continued (Oden, 1996, p. 3).

In the last phase of historical influences, the framework for the sub-regional development and integration agenda has been affected greatly by changes at the global level. Reduced external

interest on regionalism has shifted the balance towards regionalisation whose most dominant externally driven paradigm is economic liberalisation – in the form of structural adjustment programmes. Regionalisation has also strengthened the vertical links between individual countries in the region and the North (Oden, 1996, p. 3). The extent to which these links precede intra-regional linkages can be deduced from trade data but is beyond the scope of this thesis.

5.4.3 Contemporary Influences

An examination of the contemporary influences on RI in Southern Africa essentially dwells on regionalization. According to Zajontz and Leysens (2015, p. 310), "the shift within SADC's priorities and ideological posture must be understood with reference to the coinciding shifts in the global economy following the end of the Cold War and the consolidation of neoliberalism as a global agenda and the regional geopolitical transformations that followed the end of South Africa's apartheid state". Evans (2010, p. 103) submits that the shifts that followed in the global political economy have been instrumental in transforming the formal agenda of regionalism in Southern Africa, and further argues that, the adoption of neoliberal orthodoxy in the region has engendered multiple micro-regional processes that have complicated the prospects for the successful regionalism.

The adoption of neo-liberal orthodoxy has resulted into disjuncture and contradiction that has become endemic to SADC regionalism. In summation, Zajontz and Leysens (2015, p. 12), argue that "the exogenous pressures of the global political economy, which have shaped contemporary SADC regionalism, have produced informal, bottom-up regional forces, which, when left outside of the formal regional consideration (either intentionally or unintentionally), have the potential of fostering regional disintegration rather than integration" (Zajontz & Leysens, p. 12.).

The basic argument being advanced in support of this assertion is that the adoption of neo-liberalism led to catastrophic structural adjustment programmes which have resulted into either inhibited expansion or shrinking of the formal economic sector and inability of the state to provide social services. These dynamics, it is argued, have pushed citizens into the informal economy and led to mass migration to economic hubs particularly South Africa. Informal cross-border trade and labour migration has with, and into, South Africa necessitated the introduction of strict border and immigration controls. This, according to Evans (2010, p.122), can lead to disintegration.

5.5 Selected Continental, Regional, Sub-regional Groupings and Initiatives

Here the Researcher examines key continental and regional institutions that have a bearing on the politico-administrative framework of regionalism and regionalisation in Southern Africa.

5.5.1 The African Union (AU)

According to the African Union (2016, p. 3):

> "The historical foundations of the African Union originated in the Union of African States, a short-lasting union of 3 West African States (Wapmuk, 2009, p. 646). In subsequent attempts to unite Africa, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was established on May 25, 1963; it remained the collective voice for the continent until 2002. The intended purpose of the OAU was to promote the unity and solidarity of the African States in a time of independence movements. The OAU also aimed to ensure that all Africans enjoyed human rights, raise the living standards of all Africans, and settle arguments and disputes between members. In the Charter of the Organization of African Unity, adopted in 1963 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, African States committed to work together to coordinate and intensify their cooperation and efforts to achieve a better life for the peoples of Africa. (Wapmuk, 2009, p. 651). However, the initial 32 independent Member States of the OAU were regarded as a bureaucratic talking shop with little power. The OAU struggled to enforce its decisions and its lack of an army made it difficult to intervene in civil wars and countries struggling with colonialism. The policy of non-interference in the affairs of Member States also restricted the OAU in achieving its goals".

It was very daunting and difficult to reach a consensus within the OAU. The Francophone colonies most importantly "the pro-capitalists and pro-Socialist factions during the Cold War, all had their agendas and made it very difficult to reach an agreement on what had to be done" (Belete, 2012, p. 7). Despite these difficulties, the OAU made some inroads in generating unity and coordinated efforts on issues of common concern for the continent. (Ibid.). An example was the Coordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa which was set up to ensure complete liberation of colonialism and apartheid in the continent. (African Union, 2016). According to Makunyi, (2015, p. 7), the buzz of a United States of Africa in the 1990s, was the brainchild of of Muammar al-Qaddafi.

Under al-Qaddafi, in Sirte, Libya, the OAU decided to rebrand the organisation and name it the African Union (African Union, 2016). The Sirte Declaration was later followed by a legal normative document, the Constitutive Act of the African Union, which "that entered into force in 2001" (Constitutive Act of the African Union, 2000, p. 11). The Lusaka Summit, Zambia, brought forth an implementation plan for the newly constituted AU (African Union, 2016). Following on from Lusaka, the AU was officially launched on July 9, 2002, in Durban, South Africa by president of the Republic of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki Oxfam International (2012, p. 8). "The AU was formed in hopes of further improving the objectives to secure Africa's democracy, human rights, sustainable economy, and ending the intra-African conflict that has plagued the continent" (Oxfam International, 2012, p. 8).

The Constitutive Act of the African Union (2000) outlines within its objectives a clear agenda for regionalism and regionalisation. It stipulates in Objective 3 that it will strive to: "Accelerate the political and socio-economic integration of the continent; in Objective 4: Promote and defend African common positions on issues of interest to the continent and its peoples; in Objective 10: Promote sustainable development at the economic, social and cultural levels as well as the integration of African economies; in Objective 11: Promote cooperation in all fields of human activity to raise the living standards of African peoples; and in Objective 12: Coordinate and harmonize policies between existing and future Regional Economic Communities for the gradual attainment of the objectives of the Union."

Despite the explicit mention in the objectives of the Union that it will pursue both regionalism and regionalisation, none of the 18 principles upon which the union is based, explicitly define parameters or pronounce the pursuit of regionalisation/economic integration. The principles seem to emphasise respect for sovereignty. The emphasis on sovereignty reflects the liberation and political independence interests that necessitated the formation of the union. It is however ironic in that the most profound interest is the preservation of sovereignty which according to Farmer (2012, p. 93), is a notion that "emerged from Western political thought, but has been adopted by states all over the world as a means of identifying political jurisdiction". Farmer presents three types of sovereignty as defined by Makinda and Okumu (2008). The first "is juridical sovereignty and it is obtained by states through recognition in the international society". This type infers that the international community can confer or withdraw it. The second type is "empirical sovereignty and it is based on the understanding that states have the right and ability to control the people, resources and all activities within their borders". The third and final type is popular sovereignty, and this is based "on the normative claim that all human beings ought to receive the same basic rights and a state's authority is earned through respecting and protecting these rights" (Farmer, 2012, p. 95)

i) “Principles of the African Union Constitutive Act”;
ii) “Sovereign equality and interdependence among Member States of the Union”;
iii) “Respect of borders existing on achievement of independence”;
iv) “Participation of the African peoples in the activities of the Union”;
v) “Establishment of a common defence policy for the African Continent”;
vi) “Peaceful resolution of conflicts among Member States of the Union through such appropriate means as may be decided upon by the Assembly”;
vii) “Prohibition of the use of force or threat to use force among Member States of the Union”;
viii) “Non-interference by any Member State in the internal affairs of another”;
ix) “The right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity”;
x) “Peaceful co-existence of Member States and their right to live in peace and security”;
xi) “The right of Member States to request intervention from the Union to restore peace and security”;
xii) “Promotion of self-reliance within the framework of the Union”;
xiii) “Promotion of gender equality”;
xiv) “Respect for democratic principles, human rights, the rule of law and good
xv) Governance”;
xvi) “Promotion of social justice to ensure balanced economic development”;
xvii) “Respect for the sanctity of human life, condemnation and rejection of impunity and political assassination, acts of terrorism and subversive activities”;
xviii) “Condemnation and rejection of unconstitutional changes of governments” (Constitutive Act of the African Union, 2000, p. 4).

It is important to highlight that the definitional and conceptual differences over the notion of sovereignty is as old as Pan-Africanism, from the OAU through to the AU itself. Farmer (2012, p. 94) frames the debate on Pan-Africanism during the formation of the OAU into two groups: The Casablanca and Monrovia group. The Casablanca group led by Kwame Nkhruma, “upheld the notion that political unity was the most important issue to be considered for the development of an independent Africa”. This group demanded the formation of a “United States of Africa" (Farmer, 2012, p. 96) under which sovereignty would be pooled. Farmer submits that the Monrovia group, which had more than twice the countries, “was equally concerned with the need for African cooperation, but they were more concerned with the protection and preservation of sovereignty” (Ibid.).

It is argued in conclusion therefore that the “structure and the ideological framework of the OAU reflected the politics of the continent at that time” (Farmer, 2012, p. 100). The Monrovia group advocates of Empirical sovereignty won, and their position is profoundly reflected in the 18 principles above, which as argued earlier, have a bias towards regionalism and sovereignty.

The OAU came to an imminent end at the climax of the Cold War. According to Blake (2005, p. 576), African countries became "involved in client states with ideological allegiances split between the dominant western capitalist and eastern socialist/communist hemispheres". Eventually, in September 1999, a decision to dismantle and transform the OAU was made in July 2000, the Constitutive Act, the legal document outlining the institutional design and purpose of the AU, had been signed by all interested states" (Oxfam International, 2012, p. 4).

On the pertinent question of sovereignty, unlike the OAU, the AU in the Constitutive Act of the African Union (2000) iterated that "sovereignty is not an inalienable privilege that every state deserves, but rather that it is a responsibility which when a government fails to meet it", can be denied. This is covered in Section 4: Article (h), which gives the right of the Union to "intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity" (African Union, 2012, p. ??).

The African Union has therefore employed the notion of popular sovereignty migrating from the Imperial sovereignty that characterized the OAU and early phase of Pan-Africanism. This suggests that, in terms of SADC regionalism, the guiding principle for determining the degree of integration is imperial sovereignty as ushered by colonial geopolitics.

5.5.2 The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM)

The APRM, launched in 2003 is an innovative voluntary African-owned assessment mechanism established in line with NEPAD in 2003. "It was designed to improve governance in Africa through inclusive public assessments of national issues and peer learning among states" (Grudz, 2014). The APRM review process is in five stages, "including a participatory national self-assessment, a peer review conducted by heads of state and preparation of a National Plan of Action" (NPoA) (Bolaji-Adio, 2015, p.11).

The APRM is premised on the core principles of technical competence, credibility and freedom from political manipulation, and its primary purpose is to "foster the adoption of policies, standards and practices that lead to political stability, high economic growth, sustainable development and accelerated sub-regional and continental economic integration through sharing of experiences and reinforcement of successful and best practice, including identifying deficiencies and assessing the needs for capacity building" (Grudz, 2014).

The main aim of the APRM to "foster the adoption of policies, standards and practices that lead to political stability, high economic growth, sustainable development and accelerated sub-regional and continental economic integration through sharing of experiences and reinforcement

of successful and best practice, including identifying deficiencies, and assessing the needs for capacity building of participating countries" (APRM, 2003, p.3).

Its stated outcomes are to enhance level of governance in Africa through the following: "identification of deficiencies and remedial measures; attainment of socio-economic and other development-related goals; achievement of excellence or 'best practices' and acquiring peer recognition of competence or excellence; improvement of the quality of governance in other participating countries through peer learning and sharing of experiences; conformity to acceptable established international and African standards, and accelerated RI through the achievement of common practices and standards".

All stated outcomes have direct implications for state-craft and the last for regionalism. The APRM has however been criticised for its ineffectiveness in ensuring implementation of National Plan of Actions. As a voluntary inter-government, self-assessment mechanism, there have been assertions that by allowing states to assess their own political problems the process opens the dilemma that states will fail to answer correctly or in full, either because they do not wish to divulge some political tensions or failures or because they themselves cannot see them (Bullen, 2011, p. 4).

As mentioned above, since its inception, the APRM has emerged in African governance discourse as one of the most innovative initiative of the 21st century. Masterson (2007), postulates that "the APRM is based on models of state governance review such as the model used to review economic governance practices by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). He argues that, whilst existing models of peer review undoubtedly influenced the thinking behind the design and functions of the APRM, and probably resonate strongly with donors within the OECD, the African version of this type of peer review has significant departures and additions to the OECD model." The APRM has grown beyond its focus and scope to "include a comprehensive review of a country's political, economic, corporate and socio-developmental institutions, policies and practices". (Masterson, 2007, p. 2).

The APRM is therefore arguably the only organic and endogenous African supranational governance institution. Conceived in 2003 as a programme of NEPAD, the APRM seeks to consolidate democracy and sound economic development on the continent. Through the APRM, African heads of state and government committed to work in unity and rebuild the continent. . In addition, African leaders pledged to "promote peace and stability, democracy, sound economic management and people-centred development, and to hold each other accountable in terms of the agreement outlined in the Programme". (Grudz, 2015, p.10).

The endogenous character of the mechanism derives from the fact that it involves a process of "self-assessment", and voluntary in nature. The mechanism assesses four thematic areas; "democracy and political governance; economic governance; corporate governance; and socio-economic management". Chiefly, the APRM process is nested on the notion of identifying successes, analysing problems and proposals of remedies through a NPOA.

5.5.3 New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD)

NEPAD is an amalgamation of two action plans for the promotion of economic regeneration of Africa. "The first is the Millennium Partnership for the African Recovery Programme (MAP), led by the former President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, in conjunction with former President Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria and President Abdelaziz Bouteflika of Algeria and the OMEGA Plan for Africa developed by President Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal" Melber (2002, p. 7) . As aforementioned at the OAU Extraordinary Summit in Sirte, Libya, in 2001, the Heads of State and Governments agreed that both plans should be joined. In the same year, 2001 at the African Union Summit, African Heads of States adopted as the regional framework for Africa's development, NEPAD. The Framework was African owned and managed initiative that "embodies the vision and aspirations of African Governments, and their peoples" Melber (2002, p. 1), for development. To date, NEPAD remains the fulcrum for United Nations system economic development support to the continent.

According to Melber (2002, p. 7), prior to the launch of NEPAD, the ruling elites had not shared this new initiative with citizens in the various social formations in Africa. These elites led by Thabo Mbeki, the then President of South Africa, had consulted widely with the global north political elites, such as Tony Blair, and had represented a draft version of NEPAD (New African Initiative) to G8 leaders at their meeting in Genoa in July 2001.

There are other suggestions about the influences of NEPAD. Taylor (2005, p. 8) summarises NEPAD as "a deal in which African leaders will hold each other accountable and will practice good governance and, in return, the west will commit itself to aiding Africa's renaissance and development" Taylor further asserts that "NEPAD is a reaction to and stems from an environment in which the west has seemingly disengaged from the continent now that the bi-polar world has ended and from a globalizing world that appears to be leaving Africa behind" (Ibid.). The broader context, Taylor (2005, p. 11) argues, is "the diminishing influence of African leaders internationally due to the end of the cold war, eroding norms of sovereignty, dwindling western concern with Africa's poverty, a vacuum of ideological visions and the growing power of external

multinational corporations, non-governmental organizations, crime syndicates and western media – CNN and BBC"

In putting NEPAD in its place, Taylor (year and page) insists "NEPAD operates from the essential premises that the industrialized nations, many of them former colonialists, have dodged their historical responsibility towards Africa." Taylor (2005) goes on to argue that "problematically, this grants outsiders the role of 'rescuing' the continent from its perceived malaise, with internal actors (very much restricted to local elites) playing a supporting role at best" (Ibid.).

5.5.3.1 The NEPAD framework

The NEPAD Framework (hereinafter referred to as Framework) seeks to "eradicate poverty in Africa by placing African countries, both individually and collectively, on a path of sustainable growth and development" but no explicit definitions of these terms are provided in the document (NEPAD Framework, 2003). The Framework specifically seeks to put a stop to the "marginalisation of Africa in the globalisation process and enhance its full and beneficial integration into the global economy" (NEPAD Framework, 2003). Special attention is paid to the acceleration of the empowerment of women on the continent.

The Framework is guided by eight overarching principles, most of which are governance and organisation oriented. The principles govern top executive and political leadership and society. The principles are not definitive enough and do not define "African ownership." These principles are:

i) Good governance as a basic requirement for peace, security and sustainable political and socio-economic development;
ii) African ownership and leadership, as well as broad and deep participation by all sectors of society;
iii) Banking on local resources, anchoring the development of Africa on its resources and resourcefulness of its people;
iv) Continental Partnerships between and amongst African peoples;
v) Acceleration of regional and continental integration;
vi) Building the competitiveness of African countries and the continent (which is vague as a principle);
vii) Reconfiguring international partnership that changes the unequal relationship between Africa and the developed world;
viii) Linking NEPAD to the Millennium Development Goals and other agreed global development goals and targets." (NEPAD, 2003)

To achieve the stated objectives, NEPAD has prioritised selected actions. The Framework outlines the need to establish conditions for sustainable development. Sustainable development requires investment in capacity development, supporting policy reformulation and enhancing agricultural investment. Furthermore, it also "requires human development with a focus on health, education, science and technology and skills development. Other priority areas are building and improving infrastructure including Information and Communication Technology (ICT), energy, transport, water and sanitation. NEPAD also promotes the diversification of production and exports particularly with respect to agro-industries, manufacturing, mining, mineral beneficiation and tourism; and accelerating intra-African trade and improving access to markets of developed countries" (NEPAD, 2012). The organisation emphasises that these conditions can only be achieved by ensuring improved peace and security; democracy and good, political, economic and corporate governance; and improved regional co-operation and integration.

Key to the success of the initiative is the availability of adequate resources. NEPAD argues that it will ensure availability by "increasing domestic savings and investments; improving management of public revenue and expenditure; improving Africa's share in global trade; attracting foreign direct investment; and increasing capital flows through further debt reduction and increase Official Development Assistance (ODA) flows". The Framework is supported by certain outcomes as next discussed.

5.5.3.2 Outcomes of the NEPAD framework

The following are the stated desired outcomes outlined in the NEPAD framework:

i) "Africa becomes more effective in conflict prevention and the establishment of enduring peace on the continent;
ii) Africa adopts and implements principles of democracy and good political economic and corporate governance, and the protection of human rights becomes further entrenched in every African country;
iii) Africa develops and implements effective poverty eradication programmes and accelerates the pace of achieving set African development goals, particularly human development;
iv) Africa achieves increased levels of domestic savings, as well as investments, both domestic and foreign;
v) Increased levels of ODA to the continent are achieved and its effective utilization maximized;

vi) Africa achieves desired capacity for policy development, coordination and negotiation in the international arena, to ensure its beneficial engagement in the global economy, especially on trade and market access issues:
vii) RI is further accelerated and higher levels of sustainable economic growth in Africa is achieved;
viii) Genuine partnerships are established between Africa and the developed countries based on mutual respect and accountability.

The outcomes stipulated in the NEPAD Framework derive substantively from the economic logic of RI. They are constructed on the assumptions that certain conditions and catalysts will have been attained through regionalism and regionalization. These assumptions operate at both the level of statecraft and RI. The centrality of NEPAD to the attainment of economic integration, as a driver and as a beneficiary is prominent. Statecraft is central to RI. This point is explored in the next section.

5.6 State functionalism, fragility and the Westphalian model in Southern Africa

An inquiry into state functionalism necessitates the deconstruction of notions of the westernised nation state, the modern state and the role of these types of statecraft in perpetuating the concept of fragile states in Africa. A significant basis for the definition of fragility are parameters and elements that characterise the modern state as conceived by the Trans-Atlantic community. According to Griffiths (2013, p. 779), "the early development of the modern state occurred in Western Europe, followed by later episodes of state formation in the nineteenth century culminating in several new states gaining recognition after World War I, during the period of decolonization following World War II and, more recently, following the end of the Cold War" (2013, p. 779). Within this assertion, Griffiths states that the modern state development in a gradual process whereby "rulers in the core areas of Western Europe slowly gained centralised control over the means of violence and of revenue collection", as a result the nations of England, France and Spain were created. The first of these two interconnected processes are said to have begun with monarchs wrestling secular authority from the Catholic Church and the Holy Roman Empire disarming the nobility (Griffiths, 2013, p. 779). He also refers to Rae (2007), who argues on the centrality of violence and force in that "in time this consolidation of control of the means of violence would lead to the development of standing national armies, rather than the earlier reliance on mercenaries" (Griffiths, 2013, p. 779) – the synonym for territorial integrity in contemporary public administration. He further reasons on the prominence of the second aspect of the modern state by arguing that "as monarchs extended their rule, they were able to better

organize the second aspect of control, the routine extraction of funds from their populations" (Griffiths, 2013, p. 779-782).

According to this logic, the extraction of funds, (or taxation) was an imperative for both territorial integrity and economic development, a social contract that has characterised the legitimacy of state authority to date. Rae (2007), substantiates these assertions citing Braudel (1972), Tilly (1985) and Wallerstein (1974), by stating that "this was something that they needed to do to fund the wars in which they were often engaged and it also played an important role in the economic development of states as feudalism gave way to capitalism" (Griffiths, 2013, p. 783). It is of utmost significance and relevance to note that the classic Eurocentric and arguably "Eurogenic" [6] definition of the modern state is of "a centralized political authority that claims legitimate control over the means of violence within a clearly demarcated physical territory and over a defined population" (Griffith, 2013, p. 736).

This challenge is true in many parts of the world to varying degrees. This challenge particularly emerged across the African continent with the UN's enactment of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) 1960. That resolution provides in pertinent part:

"Under the Declaration of the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (UN General Assembly 1960), it was asserted that all peoples have the right to independence and that this should take effect immediately without reference to whether a country was 'ready' in social, political or economic terms" (United Nations: General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) 1960). "Cast in terms of a human rights claim, the declaration emphasized the injustices suffered under colonial rule and thus legitimated immediate sovereign independence" (Griffiths, 2013, p. 779-781).

The major issue for the post-colonial state in Africa however was particularly peculiar in its nature and has been most accurately characterised by Jackson (1990). He points out that:

> While it is hard to generalize about such a large number of states, these state builders faced a number of different tasks under very different conditions to those faced by early state builders. They inherited domestic institutions that were often inappropriate and were faced with having to govern states that existed territorially and legally but which, once

[6]Originating from western European experience and European interpretation of that experience(Giulaume, 2010).

the euphoria of independence had passed, faced problems of maintaining a legitimate central authority and, often, a lack of state capacity (Griffiths, 2013, p. 782-786).

The challenge of state building therefore, is intricately related to the introduction of the Westphalia nation-state model in Africa. The State institutions and their governing philosophies and systems were and remain fundamentally contradictory to the African epistemology of statecraft and intra-communal cooperation. Both NEPAD and the APRM were conceived within the framework of the Westphalia nation-state model, as frameworks for enhancing PPPs and statecraft respectively (Sager, 2011, p. 158).

5.7 Results and Discussion of Quantitative Secondary Data Analysis at Regional Level

The regional level results from the quantitative secondary data seek to respond to the research question on how the SADC RI agenda addresses interactive links (if any) between SF or state functionalism and PPPs. This examination is undertaken through an analysis of the relationship between two sets of indices – the politico administrative indices (CPIA and FSI) and the PPP-related indices (EoDB and GCI). This results also inform research objective 5 which explores the degree to which SADC framework considers any relationship between SF and PPPs.

The regional level results are an aggregation of a quantitative analysis of data for fifteen states within the SADC region. The discussion presented is an analysis of the confluence between statecraft and PPPs considered from a regional perspective. The discussion involves a preliminary triangulation of the analysis against the secondary qualitative data. For accurate comparability, and to provide for missing data in country ranking or score, basic formulas for adjusting the data were applied in addition to data adjustment made in SPSS. The FSI (120 countries total rank) has been multiplied by a factor of 1.5 to allow for comparability with the EoDB and the EoDB and GCI (180 countries total rank) the GCI has been multiplied by a factor of 0.67 to allow for comparability with FSI (120 countries total rank).

5.7.1 The Indices and Regional Aggregates

A variety of indices with varied orientations have emerged shaping our thoughts and perceptions about states, the economy, government and politics in the international system. These indices termed governance indices have played an important role in the global construction of the concepts such as fragile states, economic freedom and government effectiveness. For fragile states they include the; Fund for Peace's Fragile State Index (FSI), Bertelsmann Transformation Index

(BTI), Country Indicator for Foreign Policy Fragility Index (CIFP), Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG), World Bank's Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) rating, World Governance Indicator's Political Stability and Absence of Violence (WGI PS&AV) George Mason University's State Fragility Index (SFI) and the Brookings Index of State Weakness in Developing World (ISW). Those for the economy include the Global Competitive Index (GCI), Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and the Index of Economic Freedom (IEF). Economic freedom according to the Heritage Foundation, the refers to the fundamental right of every human to control his or her own labour and property. An individual's freedom to work, produce, consume, and invest in any way they please, and a society in which government allows labour, capital, and goods to move freely, without coercion or constraints on liberty beyond the extent necessary to protect and maintain liberty itself (Miller, Kim and Roberts, 2018, p. 10)

The findings from the literature review of the secondary quantitative data indicate that these governance measurements (indices) in the case of Africa, are more perception-based indicators than facts-based indicators. The two reasons behind this pattern are that, the data required to construct facts-based indicators are often unavailable or unreliable for developing countries; and that there appears to be much more demand for perception-based indicators from donors, business investors and policymakers. (UNECA, 2016, p. 59). Thus, much of the analysis is based on perceptions, considerable caution should be exercised in cross-country comparisons, since the political, social and economic environments differs significantly from one country to another. Perception-based elements provide a picture of the state of governance in each country only as perceived by the citizens of each country at the time of the research. (UNECA, 2016, p. 58).

Additionally, this bias is owed to the proposition that all governance indicators are attempts at approximating some unobserved broad dimensions of governance and that such an undertaking is inevitably beset with difficulties. First and foremost is the evident problem associated with quantifying perceptions. This is coupled with the ontological dilemma and fact that perceptions do not necessarily represent objective reality. (UNECA, 2016, p. 58).

The analysis of the above variables (Indices) in this study, is primarily based on the notion of political economy for its theoretical eclecticism. The analytical approach involves a comparative institutional analysis, describing institutions and the way they structure interactions in the political sphere or between economic and political actors. (Besley, 2004, p. 11). For purposes of this study political economy analysis refers to '…how power and resources are distributed and contested in

different contexts, and provides insights into underlying interests, incentives, rules and institutions.' (Haider and Rao, 2010, p. 4).

At a regional level, this being the case, RI viewed from a lens of either regionalisation or regionalism (Moma 2012, p. 108-111), renders the relationship between a member country's policy and institutional integrity and the competitiveness of its economy, a hypothetical correlation. Good public institutions and policies should logically improve business and investment climate. Figure 5-1 shows that such a relationship is manifest in countries with both data sets available but does not conclude or discuss the scientific logic establishing a cause and effect relationship.

Figure 5 - 1: Regional Aggregate CPIA vs GCI



Source: WB (2015); Fund for Peace (2015)

As Figure 5-1 depicts, there is a discernible general convergence in patterns between the CPIA score and the GCI scores. Simply put, the country's policies and state of its public institutions in these countries has a bearing on its competitiveness.

It is important to note that six of the SADC countries had no CPIA score (Botswana, Mauritius, Seychelles, Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland). The conclusions therefore omit over 45% of countries in the region two of which are case study countries. At a regional level, the relationship appears evidently more elusive when we examine the standard deviation. There is greater convergence in score on CPIA than there is on GCI. This suggests greater politico-administrative convergence among SADC countries, and lesser economic convergence. In regional integration terms, there appears to be greater political integration than economic integration. This challenges

regionalism theory and the EU Linear Model of Integration which asserts that economic integration precedes political integration. (Jawoodeen, 2010, p. 7).

For countries like Zambia, Tanzania, Mozambique, Malawi, Madagascar, Lesotho and Angola, there is a clear correlation in the scores, signifying the relationship between CPIA and GCI in these countries. As illustrated in Figure 5-1, the GCI for Zimbabwe is reported at 3.5, a significantly better score for competitiveness than its CPIA of 2.5. The standard deviation for CPIA is 9.1 and that of GCI is 41.9. But this result, may be attributable to the missing data and not actual divergence of the GCI score among countries considered in other statistical terms. This clear correlation between SF and PPPs in the findings however may not be attributed to the SADC Framework. The primary PPP Strategy in the SADC RISDP however recognises the significance of this relationship. It stipulates under PPP Policies, Strategies and Regulatory Frameworks; Member States need to develop and implement policies and strategies on PPPs and market these toward key stakeholders including potential investors. Member States need to create legislative frameworks conducive for the development of PPPs, and a transparent regulatory framework on PPPs is essential including the pricing of services and exit regulations (SADC, 2012, p. 78, 79). A major limitation of the study in exploring the provisions in the SADC framework, was the lack of SADC reports on the state of policy development and implementation regarding PPPs.

5.7.2 Policy, public institutions and business

The ease of doing business as an aspect of the integrity of public administration, institutions and management, the researcher examines the functionality of the state through the CPIA. The confluence between selected measures of the condition of policy and public institutions (proxy for SF or functionalism), and implications for the business environment as measured by EoDB (proxy for PPP success factors). Turning to the Ease of Doing Business variable of Protecting Minority Investors is considered, as shown in Figure 5-2.

Figure 5 - 2: Regional CPIA vs Ease of Doing Business



The findings presented in Figure 5 – 2 indicate that in a PPP, the minority investor would be the private actor and the party with controlling equity would be the state. This is assumed because of the leverage of the state as a government. Additionally, the parameter of minority investor within the EoDB index applies to private actors alone. The CPIA, represents the quality of the politico-administrative environment, within which a PPP operates. A weak CPIA may suggest poor capacity of the state to protect minority investors in a PPP venture. But it may also suggest the state is incapable of securing fair and equitable agreements with private investors – be it majority or minority investors.

Results for protection of minority investors indicate that South Africa and Mauritius all rank high and position 1 and 2 in the region, followed by Angola (3), DRC (4), Zimbabwe (5), Lesotho and Mozambique (6), Seychelles (7), Malawi (8), Tanzania (9), Swaziland and Zambia (10) and Botswana at 11. The challenge however is that the character of minority investors is not defined to reflect the size and complexity of the business- small, medium and big business.

The trends vary across the entire region. Although Angola and the DRC have poorer CPIA, ratings they have comparatively higher scores on protecting minority rights. These are only second to Mauritius and South Africa, both which have relatively robust economies. Despite being a relatively successful economy in the region, Botswana had the lowest score in protecting minority investors probably owing to its highly centralised economy and preference for attracting and partnering with big business. The findings suggest that the linear model of economic integration may be deficient in explaining RI in southern Africa. Other factors such as resource endowment and degree of industrialisation in an economy must be considered. An examination of FDI theory

may be necessary to explain the incoherencies between attainment of linear integration stages, the CPIA score and the EoDB. As Marszt (2014, p. 87) concludes in his examination of theoretical relationships between economic integration and FDI, "the impact of economic integration on FDI is very complex and it is almost impossible to isolate the effects of integration, another obstacle being their typically indirect character".

Such factors as immense mineral wealth, may be in play, arguably, taking precedence over the condition of State institutions. This proposition is further validated in the case of Zimbabwe where despite public pronouncement on nationalisation and land reform, and related events still placed it better than Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania and Zambia. The date had a standard deviation of 57.9 for ease of doing business (which had missing data/values) but a mere 9.1 for CPIA which did not have missing data.

5.7.3 SF and national economy competitiveness.

The relationship between SF and PPPs can also be expressed in the assessment of the relationship between the FSI and GCI. The FSI includes parameters such as 'legitimacy' of the state perceived or actual, which may have a direct relationship with competitiveness of a national economy on the global investment market. Credit ratings and security as relates to political stability may factored by legitimacy. FSI also measures the integrity and efficiency of the public service which is also key for competitiveness (GCI). The efficiency of the public service relates to the efficiency of public institutions and the quality of policies. FSI aspect of human rights also relates to GCI. Human rights have become a specific agenda for the analysts of fragile states. It is supposed that a deterioration in human rights may affect the attitude of investors, FDI, and thus, competitiveness. Finally, FSI aspect of security apparatus is key for competitiveness because it has implications for protection of private property and operational costs for investors. Poor security apparatus can translate to higher security costs and insurance premiums for instance. The table below and narrative, presents a comparative analysis general relationship between the two indices.

Figure 5 - 3: Regional FSI vs GCI



Ideally, the lower the fragility, the higher the GCI and *vice versa*. The rationale for the comparison was that fragile states are unlikely to be considered competitive and as such there must be a relationship between FSI and GCI in the performance of countries. The rationale for examining the relationship between the two variables was that PPPs are unlikely to thrive in a low competitive economy and a fragile state.

The ranking of a state or an economy can vary with time due to either positive or negative changes in the conditions of countries other than the subject country. Accordingly, the study only examined single year ratings and rankings. The general trend indicates that there is a discernible relationship between FSI and GCI. It is plausible to conclude therefore that in aggregate terms at a regional level, less fragile states are considered more competitive destinations for investment. In the region, Botswana, Mauritius, South Africa and Zambia are relatively more competitive and reflect a greater coherence in rank between GCI and FSI. But although, the result suggest that macro-economic and legislative environment assessments are integral to the quality of politico-administration, traditional definitions do not reflect the same. Bertocchi, (2011, p. 2), for instance, defines state fragility with the following characteristics: the lack of capacity to provide basic services; inability of the State to meet critical needs; unstable and weak governance; a continuous condition of extreme poverty; inability to protect national borders and territories and a high propensity of the State to enter conflict and civil war. It appears that there is limited reference to economic dimensions.

It should be noted that the ideological persuasions of the institutions that publish these indices, of the trans-Atlantic community, introduces a bias in the selection and definition of parameters that

comprise the indices. For instance, because FSI considers threats and risk as integral to its estimation of fragility, in Southern Africa the ranks for FSI are poorer than the ranks for CPIA whose primary goal is to inform development financing decisions. The World Economic Forum whose purported mission is commitment to enhancing "the state of the world" through PPPs and engaging with the foremost political, business and other leaders of society to shape global, regional and industry agendas, is effectively dominated by powerful global corporate interests. These interests characterise fragility and competitiveness in neo-liberal understanding of macro-economic stability. As Mgonja (2009. p. 28) submits, the knowledge and ideas of international relations theory originate almost completely from the West and are heavily linked to scholars and thinkers from the Global North, who in their discourse are seen by some scholars to at times misconstrue or ignore scholars from the Global South.

The Fund for Peace in contrast, purports that it promotes "sustainable security through research, training and education, engagement of civil society, building bridges across diverse sectors, and developing innovative technologies and tools for policy makers" (Fund For Peace, 2012). It therefore uses a right-based and security lens to fragility. Both institutions employ conceptual and ideological frameworks that predominantly serve specific exogenous interests. This study is preoccupied with the relevance and efficacy of these measures as universal parameters. The incoherencies in the findings reflect either a case of flawed measurement or unfounded assumptions about relationships between statecraft and economies. It is further plausible to suggest that there is limited endogenous dimension to the parameters, method and outcome.

5.7.4 SF and private interest in PPP

The FSI aspect of legitimacy is key for business as it has a direct bearing on political stability and can affect government efficiency and consequently security. The FSI aspect of public service is directly related to the effectiveness of the state, and it relates to the capacity of the civil service to deliver efficient high-quality services needed by business to operate competitively. This includes the entire spectrum of business facilitation services, from registration to repatriation of profits. Equally relevant is the FSI aspect of human rights which is defined by universal principles and international standards that influence investors' choice of destination. Finally, is the FSI aspect of security apparatus v Doing Business.

The condition and effectiveness of the security apparatus is a direct outcome of a functional state. It relates to protection of private property as well as operational costs for investors. Specifically, the trading across borders parameter can be directly impacted on.

The Ease of Doing Business parameter, bears the same dimensions that are considered as PPP success factor. Their relationship to parameters of SF is a key dimension of the confluence in this study. The Figures 5 – 4 and 5 - 5 below, and their respective narrative examines this relationship.

Figure 5 - 4: Regional FSI vs GCI V EoDB



Although the general pattern suggests that there is a relationship of greater positivity between GCI and the Ease of Doing Business, but much less significant between GCI, EoDB and FSI. However, although countries had better ranks on ease of doing business, they had poorer ranks in competitiveness. This is due to poor scores on a variety of other variables that factor competitiveness such as skills and technology. This suggests the possibility of a disconnect between a country's macroeconomic environment and microeconomic environment. According to the PPP success factor assertion, both dimensions are critical for successful PPPs. In the case of PPP for infrastructure, Shi *et al* (2016, p. 5) suggests that these success factors should be categorised into the following five groups, government's ability and characteristic, private sector's characteristics, the public's characteristics, cooperative environment and process's characteristic.

In selected cases such as Mauritius, the country registered high scores for both EoDB and GCI. It may be plausible to argue therefore that the country has a higher PPP Success index. However, such a conclusion discounts a variety of other factors. Additionally, the parameters defining competitiveness consider the interests of foreign investors from the geographical west. A review of the indices must therefore duly consider the distinction made by Marstz (2014, p. 83), on types of FDI inflows: i) intraregional; and ii) flows to region from non-member countries.

From a pragmatist perspective, both the construct of the indices and its interpretation, can be considered deficient. There are multiple truths assigned to a given situation, in this case the

context of Southern Africa, and truth is what works, suits the particular purpose and has the capacity to enable action (Akira, 2014, p. 4). Thus, for southern Africa, a predominant exporter of primary goods, endogenous indices would necessarily have to considered aspects such as level of industrialisation, geographical proximity and growth potential.

In summary, the findings indicate that the regional economic integration dimensions do not comprise effective measures, sufficient for the assessment of PPPs. This suggests a disconnect between regional economic integration and PPP development.

5.7.5 Fragility and business

As with the rationale provided for Figure 5 – 4 above Figure 5 – 5 below on the relationship between fragility (FSI) and business (EoDB) examines the relationship between SF and PPPs as it manifests at a regional level.

Figure 5 - 5: Regional FSI vs EoDB



All SADC countries except the Lesotho Mauritius and South Africa, showed a discernible pattern and relationship between FSI and Ease of Doing Business. An assessment of the adjusted ranking scale indicates a negative correlation. With Lesotho as an outlier, Mauritius and South Africa are leading economies in the region and thus their ranks on Ease of Doing Business, which is arguably synonymous to the profitability for foreign capital, is greater than the FSI rank in real terms. It is plausible to submit therefore that there is a significant positive relationship between statecraft (fragility or functionalism) and PPPs, but none between RI and PPPs.

5.7.6 SF and FDI in PPPs

The FSI public service parameter is key for any foreign direct investor. The integrity and efficiency of public service has a direct bearing on the operational and transactional costs of investors. Both the probability of FDI inflows and the efficacy of FDI ventures, including those in PPPs, operate within an equation of risk sharing. To a foreign investor, the partner with whom risk is shared is the government. The traditional fragility measures assess the degree of pressures on the state to undertake and provide critical administrative and economic services – failure of which characterises fragility. Similarly, the FSI human rights parameter based on universal principles and standards, supposedly influence investors' choice of destination. It is assumed that foreign investors will shun operating in countries with poor human rights as this can be potentially damaging to the reputation and markets of corporations. Human rights is a measure of fragility and for southern Africa FDI is a major factor in PPP. As in the case of the GCI and EoDB, the FSI security apparatus aspect is also directly related to protection of private property as well as operational costs for investors. Poor security apparatus can translate to higher security costs and insurance premiums for instance.

Figure 5 - 6: Regional FSI vs FDI



The relationship between FSI and FDI cannot be accurately determined in a year's period because decisions to withhold and withdraw investments take time and have legal contractual implications. However, the study examined the annual FDI inflows as a measure of investor confidence and a proxy for determining the viability of PPP ventures. The findings suggest that FDI inflows do not correspond with fragility as defined in the FSI. The findings indicate that there are multiple considerations and factors for FDI beyond FSI. This indicates that, unlike EoDB

where statecraft and business showed a positive correlation, there is much less significant relationship between statecraft and FDI.

5.7.7 Country policies, governance and competitiveness

The CPIA is one of the WB's key parameters for assessing a country's government institutions and key in the four tire criteria is government effectiveness. The study examined the dimension of government effectiveness and isolated it for its direct bearing on SF. The CPIA was purposefully identified to test the assertion that international development agencies and official development assistance agencies consider its conclusions credible and relevant to their determination of national capacity to benefit from support. The CPIA aspect of the 'rule of law' is of interest owing to its direct bearing on outcomes of a political system and administrative efficacy, both of which derive and impact on the state's competitiveness.

Figure 5 - 7: Regional GCI vs CPIA (Property Rights & Rule Based Governance)



In the nine SADC countries for which there was no missing data, there is a discernible positive relationship between property rights and Rule based governance and GCI, signalling coherence between the political-administrative parameters and the economic competitiveness measures.

5.7.8 Investment Climate and Competitiveness

The CPIA parameter of investment climate is of interest to the study for its relevance to the question of whether country investment policies have a bearing on the degree of investor confidence. The CPIA investment parameter speaks to the levels and quality of capital and technological input into an economy. It bears on the perceptions and assessment of predictability,

stability and potential for profitability. These are parameters congruent to PPP success factors. The analysis presents the relationship of the CPIA and GCI as it manifests at a regional level.

Figure 5 - 8: Regional CPIA (Business Regulation) vs GCI



A positive correlation is observed between the CPIA public sector institutions and the GCI business environment. The results suggest that business regulatory environment is factored by the condition of State institutions and policy as defined in the CPIA. Except for Angola and Zimbabwe, all countries in the region demonstrate this relationship. As in Figure 7 Above, the results suggest that the CPIA as a limited and 'narrow interest' tool, primarily conceived to inform aid effectiveness, the tool employs the same basis and measures employed by private interest when determining the competitiveness of a business environment. While it is true that the functionality of State institutions has a bearing on the competitiveness of an economy, the question is to what extent does a polity influence this relationship? The findings on the business regulatory environment and GCI, support the Agency Theory's first problem arising from conflict between the desire and goals of the agent and principal, and difficulty or high costs for the principal to verify the activities of the agent (Eisenhardt, 1989). An effective business regulatory environment is incumbent upon effective agents.

In states where the government philosophy is inclined towards a minimalist state and less intervention of the state in the economy/market, the degree is likely to differ from that of a country defined as a developmental state where the government intervenes significantly on the economy/market. This proposition brings into question the debate between regulation and deregulation as argued by proponents of the minimalist state.

5.7.9 Public economic management and competitiveness

Having questioned the CPIA dimensions of business regulatory environment, and the attendant theoretical aspects of the welfare state, minimalist state and intervention in the market. The study examines the quality of public administration in regard to macro-economic management. As in Figure 5 – 8, above, the GCI is a proxy for PPP success factors.

Figure 5 - 9: Regional CPIA (Quality of Public Admin) vs GCI



Another key dimension of the CPIA index is the 'quality of public administration', and as in the protection of private property and business environment, this dimension directly affects investor confidence and the competitiveness of an economy. The findings suggest no significant relationship between macroeconomic management and GCI. For instance, Mozambique has a higher macroeconomic management score to Malawi, but a comparable score on GCI.

As in earlier assessments of the relationship between CPIA variables and GCI, the positive relationship is based on the same philosophical tenets and interests of the WB and the World Economic Forum. This CPIA dimension conforms to the WB definition of the state and the GCI to the World Economic Forum characterisation of a competitive economy, both based on the liberal state and neo-liberalism. Thus, the degree of liberalisation, a trans-Atlantic ideological preference, may be responsible for Mozambique's low GCI score owing to its socialist policy inclination.

Results also indicate that for all countries except Zimbabwe, the CPIA, economic management score was higher than the GCI. This suggests that economic competitiveness may be factored by variables that are outside the measure of economic management as defined by the CPIA. These findings further suggest ideologically driven complexities, which may challenge the proposition that there exists a significant relationship between statecraft and PPP success.

5.7.10 Rule of law and competitiveness

As indicated earlier, the CPIA governance parameters, that of the rule-based governance and protection of property rights were also examined to assess whether there is coherence in the conclusions or a scientifically sound relationship.

Figure 5 - 10: Regional CPIA (Property rights & rule-based Governance) vs GCI



The CPIA rule of law and public-sector integrity, both registered varied relationship to GCI. In mineral rich economies, such as Angola, the GCI score was better than the CPIA, as was the case in Mauritius, Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe. However, Lesotho, Malawi and Tanzania have greater CPIA scores than their respective GCI scores.

This strongly suggests that the integrity of the public sector and rule of law, have a variable bearing on economic competitiveness, suggesting that other dimensions and parameters are weighted greater in determining the quality of GCI.

5.7.11 Public Institutions and Contract Enforcement

A core and fundamental role of the state is the administration of justice. This is attained through the rule of 'just' law, enforced through regulatory authorities, the judiciary, state security agencies and state correctional services. Effective contract enforcement is key for investor confidence. For PPPs such aspects bear on the estimation of royalties and dividends, user fees and willingness to invest in asset intensive ventures. Accordingly, the capability of the state in enforcing contracts reflects the character/ condition of State institutions and policies (CPIA). This study examined these trends, and the findings for the occurrence or absence of such relationships.

Figure 5 - 11: Regional CPIA vs EoDB (Contract Enforcement)



A major function of the justice system and capacity and integrity of the judiciary, contract enforcement is a key and major precondition for PPPs. It has been argued by the WB and other mainstream western led International Financial Institutions and Development Agencies that the condition of the state as assessed by the CPIA is key to the ability of the state to enforce contracts.

The results indicate that there is no positive, negative or discernible relationship between the CPIA (policies and institutions) and contract enforcement. An exploration of other politico-administrative factors may be necessary to determine the extent to which the political system, culture and conduct of politics bears on contract enforcement. As will be demonstrated in chapters 5, 6 and 7, these findings also contradict the assertions made by respondents as evident in the qualitative data, that the integrity of the State institutions and policy has a bearing on contract enforcement.

5.7.12 State Legitimacy and competitiveness

Legitimacy of the state perceived or actual has a direct relationship with competitiveness. Credit ratings and security as relates to political stability are often factored by legitimacy. State legitimacy has been contested in this study, owing to its exogenous characterisations and bias towards the European experience. That notwithstanding the study undertook an assessment of the probable relationship between legitimacy and economic competitiveness.

Figure 5 - 12: Regional GCI vs FSI (State Legitimacy)



The study also isolated the pertinent fragility measure of "state legitimacy" to examine whether it bears on the competitiveness of an economy. The results suggest that although state legitimacy is a factor, there are other factors to consider. The overemphasis on state legitimacy as an important factor in investment decisions and economic competitiveness is, however not supported by the finding. The same conclusion can be applied to the competitiveness of autocratic and authoritarian regimes with thriving economies. The relationship between the politico-administrative dimension of state legitimacy and economic competitiveness should therefore be considered from a different perspective. An examination this logic may further challenge the assertion that statecraft has an influence on PPPs.

5.8 Summary of the Chapter

The chapter presented a historiography and evolution of all key regional institutions on the continent, including the SADC Secretariat. It highlighted the variations in origins and interests, as well as the key instruments within which the architecture of these institutions is defined. These accounts are thereafter factored into the discussion of the results of the secondary quantitative regional data, which clearly suggest a profound discordance between SF and PPPs. The regional data in the chapter underscores the exogenous interests and foundations driving regionalism and regionalisation in Southern Africa.

The secondary quantitative data analysis however, did not indicate any catalytic relationship between SF and PPP related indices, the GCI and the EODB. The literature also supports these findings regarding the scientific integrity of the measures. Economic and political governance measures are problematic indices. The CPIA for instance centres on the fact that the ratings are focused on policies and institutions and excludes outcomes. The assessment also does not generally recognize the process of change in governance. It is undeniable that since the assessment ratings are generated for resource allocation by the World Bank and the African Development Bank, the adopted methodologies tend to be biased towards their respective understanding of what constitutes good policies and institutions (UNECA, 2016, p. 58). For the GCI, the meaninglessness of putting together countries and economies, which have varying socioeconomic contexts, and which are at different development stages, in one basket to rank their performance is problematic. Affiliates are hesitant about relying on the assessment of this index to make governance-related decisions. Although it assesses several aspects related to governance, such as public trust in institutions, judicial independence and corruption, these are limited measures of governance. even objective-based assessments such as the Global Competitiveness Index are ideologically biased towards business. The premise of the index is that a favourable business environment is essential to economic growth and development. The index points out that the ranking is based on relative positioning, thus one country movement on the list is not necessarily due to changes in the country but rather in other countries – in other words, if one country cannot keep-up with the pace of changes in other countries it falls behind in the ranks, even if it is registering positive changes. the Global Competitiveness Index is designed to assist in pushing the Washington Consensus and not Africa's development agenda, it fails to tell the full story on governance. (UNECA, 2016, p. 58). The same applies to the IIAG which relies exclusively on secondary data without triangulating with expert-based assessments to get a better picture of what the state of governance is in a given African country.

It is plausible to surmise, therefore, that the treatment of these indices in establishing regional trends, ranking and patterns should recognise the problematic aspect of aggregating country-level differentiations into scientifically credible comparative analyses.

6.0 CHAPTER SIX: CASE STUDY OF BOTSWANA DATA PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

6.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the historical and contemporary socio-political context of Botswana. It summarises the politico-administrative and political economic aspects of Botswana from its founding, state formation to its foreign policy. The chapter also presents a brief analysis of the key political and economic characteristics of Botswana which distinguish it as a state and member of SADC. Of greater substantive value addition to the study are the case study results from Botswana which provide details of the perceptions of respondents to the in-depth-interviews. The results provide insights into the ideological and policy orientation of Botswana. Further, the chapter examines the confluence between SF, RI and PPPs as it manifests in Botswana, against the literature review presented earlier.

6.1.1 The Context of Botswana

Botswana was purposefully and conveniently selected as a case study country for its notable profile and characteristics as a young state in the region. It is the only country in the region that has technically never been colonised and a purported success story. Its unique advantages notwithstanding, Botswana has demonstrated a productive governance culture and economic management. Further Botswana has a unique politico-administrative framework unlike that of any country in the region. In non-academic lingua, Botswana is the only country in the region with an endogenous politico-administrative structure and therefore endogenous legislature that does not conform to the structure of the traditional Westminster model popular in the region. This characteristic renders it particularly well suited for purposes of this study.

Map 6 - 1: Botswana in Southern Africa



Source:http://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/map/botswana-map.htm

Botswana, a population of about 2.021 million is situated at the "Southern part of Central Africa with a total area of 581,730 sq km. The land boundary stretches nearly 4,013 km with no costal line since the country is locked by land. As Figure 6-1 shows, Botswana borders Namibia, Zimbabwe and South Africa" (Focus: Africa, 2012). It is comprised of 10 provinces.

6.2 State Formation

There is historical exceptionalism that separates Botswana from other countries in the region. The term Batswana is used to refer to all citizens of Botswana and refers to the country's major ethnic group, which has its origins from South Africa. This group migrated during the Zulu wars of the early 1880s. Though the population of Botswana is composed of many different ethnicities, 79% of the people are Tswana (World Fact Book, 2015). The Tswana led the formation of the post-protectorate Botswana with eight states, and as Robinson argues, "It is the organization of the Tswana states which mostly accounts for the relatively homogenous nature of society" (Robinson, 2013, p. 187). This homogeneity has helped to unify the nation state and arguably allows it to make decisions timely

As a state, a Royal Decree by the British Monarch declared Botswana a British Protectorate in March 1885. With this proclamation, most parts of the country were included into the British colony of South Africa as British Bechuanaland. The motive behind Britain's declaration of 'protectorate status' over the land of the Tswana was to thwart the possibility of South African Boers merging with the Germans in South-West Africa (Namibia) and disrupting British commercial interests in the interior of central and southern Africa. (Makgala, 2004, p. 280)

The British established the Protectorate at the behest of two paramount chiefs, Khama and Setshele who were seeking protection from the Boer imminent plans to expand northwards from South Africa (Sarkin and Cook, 2009, p. 460). Nevertheless, the attempted incorporation of Botswana into the Union of South Africa was perceived to be a threat to the protectorate and this only ease when Botswana gained self-rule in 1965.

The attempt Union of South Africa's to include the country into its territory was legally binding due to the 1908 Act of Union, which created the provision that the Union should grow by integrating other territories such as Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland. But, this act of incorporation needed the permission of other British protectorates- Lesotho and Swaziland. Nevertheless, Britain has never adopted a non-possumus attitude towards the project for transfer of these territories to the Union. (Dundas, Ashton, 1952), p. 30)

Throughout its colonial history, many leaders of South Africa such as Hertzog and Verwoerd, pursued an inclusion policy. This continued up to independence when the communities of Tati,

Tuli Block and Ghanzi wanted to be included as part of South Africa. However, their requests were denied by chiefs and local nationalists leading the independence movement.

There is vast amount historical information detailing the dissent between Botswana and the colonialists. It can be stated that "Batswana Chiefs had always wanted to protect their power from the colonial government even though the logic of colonial rule dictated that they should rule according to the whims and wishes of the British government. This conflict was in many respects the root of the struggle for independence" (Government of Botswana, 2007). As it became apparent that the British were reducing the powers of the traditional rulers, the chiefs started to voice out their opinions and in 1930, they demanded self-rule. The Crown denounced the demands of the chiefs with the assertion that Botswana was not a stage ready for independence. It has been recorded that in a heated debate on the issue, Kgosi Bathoen II demanded of British Commissioner in Botswana, "Who will say the time is now ripe and who is it that will determine that we are now capable of ruling this country?" (Saunders, 2008, p. 3)

Despite the above, determinations, the northern territory, (as Botswana was known then) remained under direct administration, while the southern territory was incorporated into Cape Colony; the former southern territory today forms part of the Northwest province of the Republic of South Africa. Because of this incorporation, there is a large majority of Setswana-speaking people who currently reside in South Africa. Despite pressure from apartheid South Africa, inhabitants of the Bechuanaland Protectorate (now Botswana), Basutoland (now Lesotho), and Swaziland in 1909 requested Britain's guarantees that the three nations would not form part of the proposed Union of South Africa. Furthermore, British expansion in the region, coupled with their administrative system of indirect rule through tribal governments saw the formation of two advisory councils in 1920, representing Africans and the Europeans respectively. In 1934, the British issued various proclamations which regularised tribal rule and powers of the chiefs. Similarly, in 1951, there was the formation of an European-African advisory council and finally in 1961, the Botswana constitution established a consultative legislative council.

Following the wave of independence in Africa in the 1960s, the British started the process of transfer to self-rule in Botswana in June 1964 by accepting proposals for democratic self-government. The headquarters of the new government was transferred to the newly established Gaborone in 1965, from Mafikeng in South Africa. Botswana drafted their constitution in 1965, and subsequently had their first general elections. Following the 1965 elections, Botswana became an independent nation in September 1966, with Seretse Khama, a leader in the fight for independence as well as an heir to traditional rule of the Bangwato, as the first President of the

newly independent nation. Seretse Khama was re-elected as president twice more before his death in 1980.

Thus, the "driving force at independence was the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) and its leader, Seretse Khama, who emerged as the leaders of the new Botswana after displacing nationalist movements led by the Pan-African Botswana People's Party" (Hillbom, 2015, pp. 79-82). The BDP has since taken a relatively "disciplined, developmentally focussed approach in creating an independent Botswana state" (Ibid.). The BDP achieved authority over the other parties because of "Seretse Khama's status as a hereditary chief to one of the largest Tswana tribes" (Robinson, 2009), as well as through working with the legislature to pursue development goals (Hillblom, 2015, p. 79). Furthermore, the electoral system was designed to include certain members of the public into parliament. With the rise to power, the BDP became the de facto rulers of Botswana, thereby eliminating the control of the chieftaincy system of rule. Nevertheless, the chiefs were incorporated into the new Botswana under their own legislature, the House of Chiefs. With their power gone, the chiefs were now "responsible for the allocation of resources" (Ibid.). The claim to power by the BDP portrays that "a relatively undisturbed protectorate state and the inheritance of Tswana culture by post-protectorate elites merged to create a disciplined and inclusive independent state with basic democratic principles" (Ibid.).

It can be stated that Botswana since it gained independence in 1966 has to a large extent witnessed relative good governance. The nation is a multi-party democracy and has conducted elections freely with no violence. Furthermore, there is "respect for the rule of law and the Judiciary is relatively independent from the influence of the Executive and Legislative branches of Government" (Ibid).

The presidency was passed on to then Vice-president, Ketumile Masire, who elected President in 1984 and re-elected in 1989 and 1994 respectively, and later to President Festus Mogae, who assumed power after former President Masire who retired in 1998. The current president, H.E. Lt. General Seretse Khama Ian Khama is serving his second and last term after being re-elected in October 2014.

"Botswana has no apparent challenges with stateness and the state's monopoly on the use of force is unhindered" (Stiftung, 2016). Since independence, Botswana has relatively been a stable country partly because the BDP being the only party to have ruled the country since 1965. In the 2014 general elections, the BDP "secured the lowest popular vote percentage in its history at 47 %" (Stiftung, 2016).

The influence of the British protectorate politico-administration on Botswana's state development and government is less profound and unlike most countries in the continent. "Unlike the majority of other African countries, Botswana was not a colony in the true sense of the word, but rather a British protectorate state. As a result, Botswana avoided full colonisation, which enabled the preservation and inheritance of Tswana state culture by the post-protectorate state elites" (Hillbom, 2012, pp. 2-20). In addition, Botswana became a homogenous ethnic society as most of the states are purely Tswana, thus it allowed for the promotion of a common Batswana identity (Hillbom, 2012, p. 2-20). This oneness in identity paved the way for the leaders to set up credible institutions that did not conflict with other regional ones, a stark difference from other states in Africa (Robinson, 2009). These situations benefitted Botswana and allowed the nation to consolidate power and develop with limited external interference.

It is imperative to note that the Tswana state culture plays an important role in the successful development of the country. According to Hillbom (2012, pp. 2-10), "the Tswana developed a state with relatively limited chiefs and with a political structure that could integrate other groups, such as the Kalanga, into the state via wards". A local method of decision-making known as a kgotla, (where anyone can speak to settle problems and differences) was very instrumental for the tribal chiefs (Hillbom, 2015, p. 79). Furthermore, "Tswana state culture viewed economic accumulation as a worthy state function; thus, functional institutions were established to allow for the creation and maintenance of new wealth" (Hillbom, 2015, p. 79). "Tswana institutions such as these provided the framework for new state elites to emerge from the established endogenous state" (Hillbom, 2012, pp. 2-20).

6.3 Overview of the Economy

With regards to the economy, Botswana has been one of the few success stories on the African continent. At the end of the 20th century, the country's economy was ranked the 20th poorest nation in the world. By 2015, however, Botswana was one of Africa's rich non-oil producing countries with one of the world's highest economic growth rates since independence in 1966. It is reputed to have prudent "fiscal discipline and sound economic management. Botswana has transformed itself from being one of the poorest countries in the world with a per capita income equivalent to US$ 80 in 1966, to a country with a per capita GDP of $15,751.9 in 2014" (Bank, 2014).

The National Development Plan of Botswana stresses the importance of "self-reliance as a foundational principle of government policy". It maintains a "strong balance of payments and foreign exchange reserve position. Export earnings and growth have been largely driven by the

diamond mining industry that accounts for almost 60% of the GDP and 70-80% of the export earnings" (Bashir, 2013) as well as the agriculture, financial and tourism sectors. Botswana remains relatively less corrupt and relatively peaceful. Botswana is unique in the African continent because the discovery of natural resources there has not triggered political instability and conflicts, unlike some other resource-rich African nations. Instead, "the government has invested in infrastructure, education and health" (Seidler, 2012, p. 22). The state has successfully used the country's natural resource wealth to pursue a developmental path by investing in education, infrastructure, and human capital. As Hillbom (2015, p. 77) observes, "Botswana's resource dependent development presents only the pre-conditions to actual modern development". Overall, tax revenue as a percentage of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2010 was 23, 6% (Stiftung, 2016). Currently, Botswana can be classified as a welfare state as it provides its citizens with some socio-economic services. The Government of Botswana contribute about 80% to the country's HIV/AIDS programme costs and "provides free highly anti-retroviral therapy (HAART) and voluntary counselling and testing to the public" (Stiftung, 2007).

With regards to education, the number of primary and secondary schools has increased hundred-fold. At independence, only three secondary schools were present in the country but by 2015, the number had reached over 300. On the educational front, all "children born in Botswana are guaranteed 10 years of free education and no citizen of Botswana is more than 18 miles from a health care facility" (Government of Botswana, 2016).

Botswana's economic success is arguably attributed to good and accountable leadership, and prudent management of resources, specifically, revenue earned from diamond exports. The government insists that its fiscal and monetary policies are "designed towards maintaining growth with social justice" (Government of Botswana, 2016).

With regards to doing business, Botswana is a good environment for business. According to international credit rating agencies Moody's and Standards and Poor, Botswana have been awarded a credit rating of A. The Economist Intelligence Unit (2014) reports that the government is "committed to the continued development of a sound infrastructure to support its residents and citizens and to maintain a democratic, open and non-racial society and recognises the importance of free enterprise and a market-orientated economy to achieve these goals." For Botswana to be developed, it has to undergo a process of industrialisation and provide goods and services for the local and international markets.

With this socio-economic growth and development, Botswana can be considered a "middle-income country and at middle levels of inequality, grievances are sufficient to motivate the

disenfranchised to mobilize, but not threatening enough to invite repression" (Haggard & Kaufmann, 2012, p. 497). Therefore, it can be stated that given Botswana's level of economic development, it is not a fragile state and its democracy could be expected to endure into the future.

Botswana's economic success is largely owed to Debswana, the business mining partnership between the "Botswana government and De Beers of South Africa. De Beers is one of Africa's success PPP ventures.

6.4 Politico-administrative Structure

Within the framework of the Westphalia state archetype and western liberal democratic ethos, Botswana is often regarded as an economic and political success story for Africa. Since 1966, as mentioned, Botswana has had regular scheduled elections, the latest occurring on October 2014. Mainstream organisations characterise Botswana's democracy variously. For instance, the CIA World Fact Book categorises it as a "parliamentary republic, whereas Freedom House designates Botswana as an electoral democracy". The Economist's Intelligence Unit places countries "within one of four types of regimes: full democracies, flawed democracies, hybrid regimes and authoritarian regimes". The ranking for the 2014 democracy index for Botswana was the 4th place of the "flawed democracy" category. "Flawed democracies are countries that often have free and fair elections and largely respect basic civil liberties" (Fund for Peace, 2012). However so, they exhibit notable "weaknesses in other aspects of democracy including problems in governance, an underdeveloped political culture and low levels of political participation" and infringements on media freedom (Economist Intelligence Unit Democracy Index, 2014)[7].

It is imperative to note that most fundamental democratic components are present in Botswana. For example, "regularly held elections have occurred since independence that have been deemed free, fair, and open by the international community"[8]. This assertion is made with due recognition that there is no political institution that could legitimately claim the status of an authentic representative of humankind (Koskenniemi, 2011).

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[7] "The Economist Intelligence Unit's democracy index is based on five categories: electoral process and pluralism; civil liberties; the functioning of government; political participation and political culture" (Economist's Intelligence Unit's Democracy Index, 2014).

[8] International community here used as a synonym to the notion of *Civitas Maxima* which is an expression of, or perhaps a metaphor for, the ideals of universalism, community, and solidarity beyond political divisions, the ideal of humanity united into one.

Botswana's democracy has also been deemed effective in "protecting civil liberties, such as a free press (newspapers and magazines) and freedom of association" (EIU, 2008). Furthermore, this is collaborated by Freedom House, "which gives Botswana a Political Rights Score of 2 and a Civil Liberties Score of 2 for an overall Status as Free. Additionally, academic and religious freedoms are also respected, and the courts generally operate free of political interference" (Freedom House, 2009). Even though this is the case, there have been questions about Botswana's ruling political regime and the country's quality of democracy over the past decade. A common critique is that the country has only one political party, the BDP, has ruled the country since independence. Kabanda (2014, p. 9) states that "given the absence of alternations of political leadership, Africa's premier democracy has yet to demonstrate its ability to withstand the challenges of genuine political change". Despite claims of press freedom, the government claims a monopoly of airwaves. According to the Economist's Intelligence Unit's Democracy Index (2014) Botswana is classified as a "flawed democracy" because of a limited exercise of democratic values of political participation and political culture. Academics such as Bodilenyane (2013, p. 189) have declared "Botswana a minimalist democracy, with voter turnout less than 50% and characterised by high-handed presidentialism". "The President is the personification of the state. In law, the President is Head of the Executive, Commander-In-Chief of the armed forces of the Republic, and an integral part of the legislature. The President has the power to dissolve parliament, select or dismiss the Vice-president, ministers and assistant ministers, and has the prerogative of mercy. In international affairs, the President as the Head of State has the power to declare war and sign peace treaties and to recognise foreign states and governments" (Government of Botswana, 2007).

"The President normally acts on the advice of the Cabinet of Ministers, which are selected by him from Members of Parliament. There are ten ministers and three assistant Ministers who run ministries and departments of government. Cabinet Ministers, as Members of Parliament, participate in Parliamentary debate, but are normally bound by the ethic of collective responsibility. Ministers are also responsible to the National Assembly but the President may appoint or dismiss ministers without consulting the National Assembly or Cabinet" (Government of Botswana, 2007).

There is however little debate regarding the political regime being a democracy. Determining the country's level of democracy depends on what democratic principles are being discussed. Therefore, the conclusions are based on the western liberal democratic values and Westphalia state archetype. Erdmann, (2013, p. 67) "explains how all these democratic and non-democratic elements fit together in Botswana describing the country as an elite democracy, one that presupposes competition and allows for opposition, at the same time as it contains and controls

them." However, the opposition is not a "negligible force in terms of electoral support, and its continued containment is not guaranteed by the liberal system" (SPECIPIO framework, 2009, p. 3).

It is further claimed by western institutions that Botswana became economically successful because it built strong and accountable State institutions. "Botswana's institutions benefited from the institutional structures established in the Tswana traditions in which powers of traditional leaders are limited by custom and law" (World Fact Book, p. 2016). These structures created a system of checks and balances on politicians, which enabled conflicts to be resolved effectively. Interestingly, the US Department of State (2016) claims that "the inherited Tswana institutions, in addition to, the parliamentary system adapted as a legacy of being a British protectorate provided the basis of good governance in independent Botswana." The constitution of Botswana provides "the institutions of a multi-party democratic system including regularly scheduled free and fair elections, a legislative branch whose members are elected into office, an executive branch, and an independent judicial structure of government." Specifically, the Constitution (1996) provides for the following:

> Head of State: The President is the Head of State, Head of Government and the Commander in Chief of the armed forces. The President is elected by the National Assembly after each parliamentary election. The President is restricted to two terms of office and all presidential candidates must be over 30 years of age and receive at least 1 000 nominations.
>
> Executive: Executive power lies with the President who exercises it through the Vice-President and the Cabinet; these are all appointed by the President.
>
> Legislature: Legislative Power is vested in parliament, consisting of the President and the National Assembly, acting in certain cases after consultation with the House of Chiefs. The National Assembly has 61 elected seats; 57 members directly elected by universal adult suffrage, together with four members who are elected by the National Assembly from a list of candidates submitted by the President. The President and the Attorney General are exofficio members of the Assembly and the life of the Assembly is five years. The House of Chiefs (advisory body) comprises the Chiefs of the eight principle tribes of Botswana, four members elected by sub-chiefdoms and three specially elected members.
>
> Judiciary: The court system comprises a High Court, a Court of Appeal and magistrates' courts. The Chief Justice and the President of the Court of Appeal are appointed by the President, while judges are appointed by the President on the advice of the Judicial

Service Commission. Judges are removable by the President for incompetence or misbehaviour only on the advice of a special tribunal.

Many academics, particularly those from the west attribute the success of Botswana's democracy in part to British protectorate influences with its attendant introduction of the Westphalia state and English Common Law. This claim has been contested in Pan-African literature.

Botswana's legislature is characterised as a "weak bicameral legislature consisting of two houses: The National Assembly and House of Chiefs. The National Assembly, the legislature's lower house, is the primary legislative body. It consists of 57 directly elected members from single-member districts, 4 members chosen by the directly elected members, and 3 ex-officio members: The President, the Speaker, and the Attorney-General. The directly elected members are elected to serve a 5-year term. The House of Chiefs, the legislature's upper house, was recently expanded from 15 to 35 members to allow more regional representation. It consists of one member representing each of the eight principal subgroups of the Batswana tribes, 5 members chosen by the president, and 22 members elected from designated regions" (Constitution of Botswana). This configuration of the Botswana Legislature is uncommon in the region.

"Similar to the elected member of the National Assembly, the 22 elected members of the House of Chiefs are elected to serve a 5-year term. The eight members representing the Batswana tribes are members for life. The House of Chiefs, a largely symbolic establishment, lacks legislative powers and serves as a consultative body to the National Assembly on issues regarding native law, customs and land. They may also deliberate on constitutional amendments".

"Parliament is obliged to act in consultation with the House of Chiefs. The President is a member of the National Assembly and has the power to address, summon or dissolve it anytime. The ex-officio members remain members of the House of Chiefs for as long as they continue to perform their chiefly functions. Membership of elected and specially elected members is renewed every five years following the dissolution of Parliament, which comes after every five years, while that of ex-officio members is permanent in the House".

"There is no definite schedule of the meetings of the House of Chiefs. The time and place of convening is determined by the Chairman of the House. The House of Chiefs however, sits whenever the Government or the National Assembly has referred a bill to it or whenever it has important business to transact, or at least once a year".

The executive branch consists of a president and cabinet. The president serves as the head of state and government and is chosen by the National Assembly after each countrywide legislative

election. He or she serves a 5-year term concurrent with the legislative members. The president is limited to serving no more than two full terms in office and the cabinet consists of a vice-president, ministers, and assistant ministers. Cabinet members are selected by the president from the members of the National Assembly (World Fact Book, 2016). “The president cannot veto legislation put forth by the National Assembly but can delay for up to six months” (Botswana Constitution, 1996).

“The judiciary acts as an independent body that interprets and administers the constitution and other laws for the protection of individual rights and freedoms. It consists of a High Court, a Court of Appeal, and magistrates’ courts. The President appoints the Chief Justice and the President of the Court of Appeal, and the President with consultation from the Judicial Service Commission appoints judges. In instances of misconduct or incompetence, a judge can be removed by the President, but only after consultation with a special tribunal” (EISA, 2007). “Customary disputes are handled using tribal courts with a village assembly structure, or Kgotla, in which traditional chiefs serve as court presidents”.

Others have argued that the formation of a one-party cabinet allows for effective policy formulation and implementation. However, the First Past the Post (FPTP) electoral system if often criticised for not allowing minority interests to be represented in government; an effect of the system’s winner-take-all nature. As a result, the number of parliament seats won by a party is often not an accurate reflection of the percentage of the popular vote the party received (EISA, 2007).

These discrepancies are viewed as preventing opposition groups and the interests they represent from being heard in national government thus diluting their influence on policies.

6.5 Foreign Relations

According to Motsamai (2015, p. 3), Botswana’s foreign policy has been based on eight tenets outlined in a statement made by its first president, Sir Seretse Khama. These are; i) democracy, the joint pursuit of democratic ideals with neighbors; ii) development, driven by a focus on attracting development assistance and FDI, supporting initiatives that promoted a more equitable world trading system and protecting Botswana’s infant industries; iii) African unity and non-alignment by diversifying relations with many countries: iv) self-reliance by reducing excessive dependence on external aid, and forging closer bilateral, regional and SouthSouth relations; v) good neighbourliness in SADC and peaceful coexistence with South Africa; vi) peaceful resolution of conflicts; vii) territorial integrity; and viii) respect for the sovereignty of all nations.

It is important to highlight however that, Botswana's history as a British protectorate that was never traditionally colonised, has profound influence on its current political system. Since 1966, Botswana has been subject to a variety of global and regional influences. Its dependency on diamond exports and the need to import almost all its consumables, has made economic liberalisation imperative (EIU, 2008). Because of the country's partnership with the De Beers, most of the country's diamond exports are sold on the United Kingdom market. To address this dependence on a single natural resource, Botswana has pursued policies of diversification and value addition and beneficiation of its mining industry. In addition, and in support this agenda, in 2008 Botswana agreed with De Beers to move the processing and marketing of diamonds from London to Gaborone (US Department of State, 2009).

"Evidence of Botswana's liberal democratic and neoliberal economic success is in its intimate relationship with the United States that considers the country a "model of stability for the rest of Africa. Botswana has received support from various US agencies including the U.S. Peace Corps, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Centre for Disease Control" (US Department of State, 2009). It can be stated that the "relationships with De Beers and the United States are critical for Botswana's economy".

Botswana has regional level relationship with SACU and SADC. SACU as mentioned above is comprised of Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, and Swaziland. Founded in 1910, it is world's oldest customs union. SACU has expanded its trade agreements with other countries around the world since 2004, providing additional points of trade for Botswana (SADC, 2016).

In addition, Botswana is a part of SADC. "The SADC trade protocol provides that SADC Member States shall accord each other most favours nation treatment on goods traded between them. This covers import and export duties, non-tariff barriers as well as quantitative import and export restrictions. This means that goods originating from Botswana and destined for any of SADC Member States will on arrival at country of destination benefit from reduced rates, exemption from non-tariff barriers and reduced quantitative restriction" (SADC, 2016).

Botswana is also involved in the Free and Preferential "trade agreement that accords goods originating from either of the trading partners to enjoy some preferential treatment in the form tariff concessions. Goods that meet a minimum 25% local content, as per this trade agreement, exempted from payment of customs duty. Excise duty and local taxes will be due and payable when applicable".

6.6 Results and Discussion

6.6.1 Introduction

Of the three case study countries, Botswana provides the most instructive insightful on RI and PPPs development. Two key findings characterise the results. The first finding is Botswana's unique private sector orientation and economic integration focus with which the respondents evaluated the confluence. For instance, one respondent discussed the influence of regional integration in terms of the ability of SADC to enforce compliance [BoGv-CEO-BCM]. The perspectives rendered derive from theories of state and regional integration. The second finding is the sparse attention to state fragility and functionalism. This suggests that political interests are subordinate to economic interests and supports the political economy propositions in which politics serves economic interests. The bias towards economic agendas over the politico-administrative, may be owed to Botswana's relative political stability (Sarkin, Cook, 2010, p. 456). Due to its unique demographic; a small population of predominantly one ethnicity, and the domination of one party, founded in 1960 first as the Bechuanaland Democratic Party (BDP) and later as the Botswana Democratic Party in 1962, the country enjoys political stability.

6.6.2 Qualitative primary data analysis and findings on the confluence

The Botswana inquiry examined all three research questions. First, the extent to which the theoretical paradigm employed in the architecture of SADC's RI agenda practicable and productive in guiding SADC's set objectives. Second, the extent to which the socio-political and politico-administrative aspects of the Southern African RI framework been influenced by the dynamic of SF or state functionalism. Thirdly, the sufficiency of the SADC RI agenda in addressing interactive links between SF or functionalism and public–private partnerships in the region.

This examination of the nature of the relationship between the statecraft (as expressed in the condition of institutions of the state) and RI architecture, as it affects PPPs is referred to as the confluence in this study. Thus, the inquiry focused on perceptions on the effect of the politico-administrative framework on; i) coherence in national economic policy; ii) coherence in political systems, and standardization of institutional arrangements in southern Africa. The question regarding the relationship between the state and RI architecture were also considered through an inquiry into opinions on the role of national governments in driving and/or responding to regional agendas.

The Botswana country-case findings suggest a predominant perception of RI as a positive dynamic, feasible and yielding if implemented appropriately. The definition of appropriately rendered was one of adherence to the linear model of regional integration. The findings also suggest a strong conviction that regional political integration; implementation of good and beneficial regional policies and developing the capacity of national governments to implement them, are crucial for the prosperity of Southern African. Respondents emphasised that "relevant regional integration policies and focus on capacity of the state to implement such policies, should be highlighted from the onset" [BoGv-CEO-BCM], them [BoML-ED-PPP].

The Botswana country-case findings however reaffirm that the focus on liberation as a founding goal of SADC, and which underlined the regional integration project in southern Africa had shifted. The contemporary understanding of the primary purpose of SADC, is economic integration which respondents emphasised, takes precedence over political integration. The economic benefits of integration were repeated, citing regional transport infrastructure as an example and the argument that fewer complexities at the borders would enhance regional market integration. Further, that countries within the region, would therefore need to invest in common goals to cooperate more effectively and efficiently despite political differences. [BoGov-CEO-BCM], [BoCS-SRF-BID]. These assertions reaffirm Botswana's unique focus on economic integration. This subordination of politics on the regional platform is evident, as indicated in Chapter 5, in President Khama's decision on the Zimbabwe elections of 2012, was a political decision guided by economic interests in direct contradiction to the official position of SADC on the matter (Motsamai, 2015, pp 10 – 11).

Botswana respondents also argued that there is currently a lack of coherence of political systems as SADC itself is not politically or institutionally able to keep member countries in check and ensure adherence to commendable practices in the region [BoGov-CEO-BCM]. The respondent highlighted poor political cohesion and unity of purpose and action among SADC states as a significant impediment. The conclusion support Bertocchi's (2012, p. 7) regarding colonisation and the imposition of varying political systems by western European as a SF factor.

While recognising South Africa as a regional hegemony, Botswana respondents also emphasised the impotence of SADC as a regional institution, citing its limitations in addressing policy non-compliance by Member States. To address this gap, respondents argued, SADC must pursue the agenda to standardize institutional arrangements and summon non-compliance, stating that, "SADC does not have that capacity to discipline members" [BoGv-CEO-BCM], [BoCS-SRF-BID], [BoGvPv-MD-BPC].

To enhance its influence therefore, the SADC institutional framework will need to be revised to ensure that SADC has the legal and institutional means to sanction (not including military interventions) Member States that do not act in a manner that promotes the overall goals of the region. [BoGv-CEO-BCM]. Respondents also highlighted the precedence that national values and priorities have over regional values and commitments. [BoGv-CEO-BCM]., [BoGvPv-MD-BPC]. These assertions appear to contradict the security communities' theory of regional integration, which argues that common and collective benefits of integration, are the primary drivers of integration. Additionally, emphasis was placed on the need for consistency in the actions taken by SADC, noting that currently the actions of SADC are not appropriately or evenly applied. They cite the case of political unrest and elections in Madagascar and Zimbabwe. RI presupposes improvements towards political stability and democracy, free trade of goods and services, and free movement of labour: all of which would lead to the creation of a customs union and a monetary union needed to spur economic growth [BoDn-SA-GIZ]. The goal of RI according to Botswana respondents is economic benefit.

Thus, in the opinion of the respondents, indicates that states have greater power than the SADC organisation and can therefore influence its agenda and form, while absconding from their commitment, obligations and norms to the body with no penal consequences. It is plausible to apply the theoretical tenets of Empirical sovereignty as presented by Justice H. Jackson (Scheipers, 2009).

According to a respondent who works with a major PPP, the challenge with policy coherence also stems from the arrangements which see the SADC PPP network falling under two SADC instruments; the Finance and Investment Protocol (FIP) as well as the TIF (Trade and Investment Finance) [BoML-ED-PPP]. This leaves two sets of incoherent regional protocols to adhere to.

The respondent emphasised the need for SADC to establish one set of protocols in every sphere, similar, for instance, to the approach of the Canadian Ministry of Finance, where the Free Trade Agreement is implemented in such a way that each province of the country has equal banking laws [BoML-ED-PPP]. Known as the equals approach, this process ensures that there are no hindrances to investment from the US and South America due to compliance requirements based on different set of laws in different provinces. Respondents emphasised that such arrangements require political will and institutional capacity to implement. 'The key factors here are political will, the right policies, the right protocols and the ability to implement them [BoML-ED-PPP]. The concerns over varied legislation regimes are manifest of the gross incoherence in policy within SADC as a regional institution and across SADC Member States. These incoherencies suggest a general non-adherence to the traditional economic integration model. No references

were made to any of the form of regionalism theory of economic integration: such market integration, which is the linear progression of degrees of integration (Free-Trade Area), customs Union (CU), where an FTA is maintained among Member States but for non-Member States and, they impose a Common External Tariff (CET) imposed. Nor was there reference from respondents to common market arrangements, where the CU is retained together with the free flow of the factors of production such as capital and labour, economic union characterized by the harmonisation of monetary and fiscal policies and Total Economic Integration (TEI), comprising of a common market and a unified monetary and fiscal policy regime. (Hartzenberg, 2011, p. 2).

Consistent reference was also made to economic policy and the challenges of national level adherence, compliance or even willingness to adopt. Respondents made assertions that the anchor of successful economic policy delivery is the political administration. [BoML-ED-PPP]. They observed that national economic policy was supposed to be guided by several protocols that have been enacted within the SADC framework, the first being on trade (SADC, 1996) and the second on finance and investments. The aim of this protocol is to identify and establish the convergence of macro-economic policies, look at the financial markets, the financial services market, and the harmonisation of sector investment policies as well as the governance of central banks (SADC, 2006, p. 15). To a certain extent, this starts from a political administration that assists with coherence at the policy level.

However, respondents expressed low confidence in the polity's willingness to meet its regional commitment, repeatedly citing national sovereignty as a key factor, stating that coming to political systems, in as much as democracy is preached by all, there is no denying that most countries in SADC place their own political sovereignty above regional and common interests [BoGvPv-MD-BPC]. These tendencies according to Tillman (2015, p. 11) are unyielding to regionalism because member States must essentially cede sovereignty, or parts of their sovereignty to the supranational body, allowing the supranational institution to possess jurisdiction over certain policy domains.

It was argued that RI is pronounced at the regional political level: however, at the national political level such agreements have limited influence" [BoAA-PPP]. This is owed to the fact that the provisions of the Protocol on the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (OPDSC) grant considerable bargaining power to individual Member States with respect to the adoption of policies (Notshulwana, 2015, p. 171). This provision contradicts regional integration theory assertions on depth of integration, first form as Togba (2015, p. 9) that regionalism advances by way of contested processes, in which sovereignty is ceded by Member States over prolonged periods of engagements in a variety of areas. It however supports Togba's second assertion that

regionalism emerges from strong States with extensive knowledge and experience in benefitting from sovereignty.

In examining the role of standardisation of institutional arrangements in RI, the study inquired on the state of various regional institutions. An example of institutions established due to the declaration of a protocol by SADC is the Anti-Corruption Commission, promoting the establishment of the Commissions in member countries that did not have such commissions after SADC declared the protocol to combat corruption (Article 11. SADC, 2001). It was also highlighted that most countries do not have standardisation authorities or governing bodies for the protocol. However, respondents argued that "given the SADC PPP units now, most countries are scheduled to establish their own units and therefore institutional enhancement should occur". RI therefore contributes to coherence in institutional arrangements in this way [BoAA-PPP].. This assertion suggests that at an institutional level, RI can influence the politico-administrative architecture of member States.

Respondents also reported that in theory, improving the political and administrative frameworks of RI should promote coherence as it encourages Member States as they are making trade policies, for example, to look at the SADC, WTO, SACO or COMESA frameworks and agendas. [BoAA-PPP], [BoGv-CEO-BCM]. Reference was made to the case of the adoption of the Finance and Investment Protocols during which Member States enquired about the implementation status of the protocol. SADC thereafter commissioned and conducted a baseline study, allowing Member States to appreciate what had not yet been implemented and to prioritise it [BoDn-SA-GIZ].

Respondents also rendered on the notion of dividends on collaboration, examining whether SF has influence on regional agendas, "countries working together to tackle various goods collectively due to RI is definitely resourceful" [BoGvPv-MD-BPC]. The case of Botswana's collaboration with neighbouring countries to provide water and electricity was made. The collaboration sought to provide these utilities to outlying regions in the border areas in the north and south in communities that would normally have to wait for a long time if they were to depend on national development plans to reach them. These arrangements support the RI theory of intergovernmentalism which stipulates that governments have a strong and autonomous position in this approach, and bargain intensively to get their interests (Fabbrini, 2013, p. 1008)

Collaboration for development also leads to countries learning from each other's political systems in terms of their approaches to development. Although both the SADC Treaty and SADC Trade Protocol do not make sufficient reference to economic integration, these details are clearly articulated in the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP). SADCC has engaged

in cross-border, sector-specific projects such as regional development corridors and the Southern African Power Pool (Hartzenberg, 2011, p. 5). The end goal, according to the respondent was that this would result in best practices cross-pollination of ideas and their adoption [BoGvPv-MD-BPC]. Respondent did not expound on the challenges facing the cross-pollination of ideas, the ideological differences or indifference. And this trend remains prevalent throughout the case study.

As earlier indicated, the relationship between SF, or effectiveness, and RI is treated within the context of mutual economic benefits and aggregate gains among states. It is not examined in terms of ideological or policy coherence

Respondents also examined the question of whether RI framework has an effective enforcement mechanism for ensuring compliance and dealing with default. An enforcement mechanism is considered as necessary to the ability of regional institutions to influence state and thereby achieve coherence [BoCS-SRF-BID]. It was argued that the two public domains, the state and regional institutions have a jurisdictional relationship that allows one or the other to enforce commitments and obligations, as well as sanction default, but that this relationship has not occurred [BoCS-SRF-BID]. As presented earlier, the conclusions about the enforceability of regional commitments at state level was deemed elusive. Sovereignty, though referred to often by respondents, was never defined, nor was it discussed in relation to regional judicial and legislative institutions. The entities responsible for enforcement and sanctioning default by Member States. Hartzenberg, (2011, p. 18) submits that "concerns about a deeper RI agenda include a focus on the sovereignty of states and the perceived loss of sovereignty that such a deeper integration agenda involves". This speaks directly to the question of the ability of regional institutions to influence states and depth of integration.

In the case of Botswana, respondents insisted that the State-REC relationship understandably appears tilted in favour of the State. Countries tend to look after their own interests first before those of the region, which suggests that the RI framework does not have an effective mechanism for ensuring compliance[BoCS-SRF-BID]. An assertion that statecraft precedes regionalism. Agreements are made but are seldom implemented at state level. The respondent cited the Southern Africa Power Pool (SAPP) as a prime example, where countries that produce power in excess are encouraged to approach countries in the region that have a capacity deficit and offer to sell the surplus. It is true there is a shortage of power in the SADC region but it is also true that the region possesses the means to generate more power, but these arrangements are hindered by lack of implementation [BoGv-CEO-BCM].

It is clear from these assertions that respondents consider SADC as largely impotent in member States' affairs, and that this has been effectively collaborated by literature on SADC and sovereignty. Ntshulwana (2015, p. 115) examines whether state policy choices or preferences modify and/or evolve sovereignty in the direction of convergence and/or divergence in the region and concludes as follows. That the intersection of state sovereignty and RI, ought to be understood from the constructivist notion of co-determination and co-constitution, and the underlining agent -structure problems. As Waltz (1979, p. 74) argues, the constructivist approach to co-constitution, by contrast, suggests that the actions of states contribute to the creation of the institutions and norms of international life, and these institutions and norms contribute to defining, socializing and influencing states. Both the institutions and the actors can be redefined in the process (Hurd, 2008, p. 304). Although some responses showed that it is correct and rather succinct to say that the RI framework has an effective enforcement mechanism for ensuring compliance and dealing with default, there was no demonstration of evidence of use [BoCS-SRF-BID].

Botswana respondents also emphasised that in as much there is RI on paper compliance with this concept is not practised. It is very difficult to get governments to cooperate with each other to fast track and implement projects to improve power, transport and water for example, and as a result, projects are on hold for up to five years at a time [BoML-ED-PPP]. According to Ntshulwana (2015, p. 210), such stalemate emanates from the challenge of reconciling the ideas of a sovereign state and RI. On one hand, the sovereign state as the indivisible right to defend its existence and survival, but also it has a singular right to the determination of its fate within its territory. On the other hand, the process of RI as notions or aspirations towards the extension of sovereignty to allow for the sharing resources and territory of one country for the benefit of the collective regional community.

The above assertions by Ntshulwana (2015) and respondents [BoCS-SRF-BID] & [BoML-ED-PPP], refer to the intricate relationship between RI and statecraft on PPPs, and the efficacy of regional and national level PPPs in the context of non-compliance with regional commitments in the absence of sanctions.

One viewpoint for this was that the mechanism of enforcement – particularly for PPP ventures – does not include sanctioning governments that do not act according to agreements. Respondent indicated that" excuses used to delay these projects are often centred on protocol issues and catering to politicians: the very individuals who are elected to represent and cater to the people. The result is criminal as it denies economic and social and economic development in the region" [BoML-ED-PPP].

A particularly, significant example was that of a decision from the Ministers of Finance Retreat held in 2013 in Maputo. SADC Ministers undertook a decision to establish a common currency, to be fully functioning by 2018. A few years later, the deadline has been pushed to 2028. (Central Bank of Lesotho, 2013, p. 6). The respondent further argued that, although, one can argue that a lesson can be learned from the EU experience with a common currency, the EU has also not properly enforced its strategies (policies), as can be seen by inflation targets and debt to GDP. Greece, Spain and Portugal have about 3 to 4 times the allowable debt to GDP ratio, the first two countries being insolvent. It makes one wonder how Greece could even get as bad as 155-160% when this was picked up by the European Central Bank [BoML-ED-PPP]. The respondent qualified their conclusion with this comparative case from the EU, on the assumption that the two RI models have significant convergences.

Respondents also argued that there is a lack of an effective non-compliance intervention mechanism within the RI framework [BoDn-SA-GIZ]. The findings strongly suggest that SADC has limited depth of integration owing to the unwillingness to surrender sovereignty. This further suggests that the assertion of comparability between the EU RI model and SADC RI, or the feasibility of the EU linear model of integration in southern Africa, is yet to be confirmed. Instead, the findings support the assertions of Kinyua (2015, p. 4), that integration should primarily be assessed by the amount of economic, political, social and cultural interaction that transpires between Member States. And that it does not require all Member States to share these activities simultaneously. This further suggests that the endogenous characterisation of RI are significantly more explanatory of the dynamic in southern Africa, than exogenous theory.

The EU RI model feasibility challenge for southern Africa is supported by the case of the SADC Finance and Investment Protocol (FIP)[9] as a key example stating that one of the targets within the FIP is to harmonize macro-economic policies…within that agenda there is an agreement on Debt to GDP Ratio[10]. An inflation target range of 3-6% was also agreed upon, yet there will always be countries that fail to meet the target [BoAA – PPP]. Arguing further that, while Europe imposes penalties for default, the SADC region is yet to enact mechanisms for non-compliance. Looking at the progress report on the FIP for instance, nobody questions countries as to why members

[9] The FIP was signed by all 14 Member States on 18th August 2006. It entered into force on 16th April 2010 following the ratification by nine Member States. The benchmark for entering into force is 9.3 countries having ratified.

[10]FIP goals are governed by macroeconomic convergence targets of Debt to GDP Ratio. Member States are advised to maintain a public debt-to-GDP ratio of no greater than 60%. http://www.sadc.int/themes/economic-development/macro-economic-convergence/public-debt/ [accessed 19-12-2015]

have missed their deadlines, which means there is no mechanism to enforce compliance in the region [BoAA-PPP]. It is plausible to suggest, therefore, that the dynamic in SADC, collaborates the post-colonial theorist who are interested in the stories, identities, and forms of political emancipation available to the marginalized members of the global South" (Griffiths, 2011, pp. 3-4). This effectively renders RI in southern Africa adherent to post-colonial theory, owing to the quest for national identity and sovereignty, and the liberation politics that gave birth to SADC.

The affinity for sovereignty was further supported by the negation of enforcement mechanism, citing the NTB[11] online mechanism where companies are supposed to report non-tariff barriers as an example (UNCTAD, 2014, p. 13). They stressed that although companies report barriers often, governments never resolve the issues with no consequences for this default. Granted however, that efforts are only being made to monitor the finance and gender protocols, and trade recently added to the list to measure and advance compliance. Finally, the respondents argued that legally, Member States within the region have a "brother/sister" relationship and are thus reluctant to take each other to court for non-compliance [BoDn-SA-GIZ]. According to the SADC Treaty (1992), the only substantive sanctions levelled against Member States are regarding default on payment of membership contribution. The Treaty States in Chapter Thirteen - Sanctions, Withdrawal And Dissolution - Article 33 Sanctions that; "Sanctions may be imposed against any Member State that: a. persistently fails, without good reason, to fulfil obligations assumed under this Treaty; b. implements policies which undermine the principles and objectives of SADC; or c. is in arrears in the payment of contributions to SADC, for reasons other than those caused by natural calamity or exceptional circumstances that gravely affect its economy, and has not secured the dispensation of the Summit". Paragraph 3 of Article 33, then stipulates provisions detailing the nature of sanctions pertaining to the degree of default in payment of membership contribution. No sanctions are outlined for default or breach of values, norms or non-compliance with ratified protocols.

Botswana respondents emphasised that the limited effect of RI on statecraft stems from the challenge of non-observance of norms and non-compliance to rules, and the absence of a mechanism to sanction such default by member states. The results indicate that, states routinely assume that when they decide to collaborate, their governments will have common approaches to dealing with development challenges. [BoGvPv-MD-BPC]. The idea is that maybe they will have

[11]The online NTBs reporting, monitoring and eliminating mechanism, incorporates concrete timelines for the removal of NTBs, has been developed to support the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), East African Community (EAC) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in their effort to integrate the economies of their Member States into a single enlarged market through the grand Tripartite Free Trade Area (FTA). The mechanism enables stakeholders to report and monitor the resolution of barriers encountered as they conduct their business in the COMESA, EAC and SADC regions

common norms that they will adopt between themselves…maybe the issue may not be necessarily enforcement *per se*, but whether there is a common understanding and desire to collaborate and willingly do things in a manner that is consistent with whatever agreements is questionable [BoGvPv-MD-BPC].

Conclusions about an enforcement mechanism showed a consensus of doubt. As one respondent observed:

> "If there is indeed any enforcement mechanism for enforcing resolutions that countries agree on, it would make sense that there are some agreed upon norms to be observed and adhered to otherwise the collaborative framework would not be effective. Whether or not this currently really exists remains unanswered, although there are regularly reports of heads of states coming together to address the agenda of SADC, which shows that this collaborative framework is taken seriously enough to conform to the norms that have been agreed upon between themselves" [BoGvPv-MD-BPC].

The study also inquired as to whether membership to SADC had strengthened State institutions and reduced SF. One of the key questions in the study sought to establish the nature of the relationship between the state and RI, and the dynamic of influences that pertain to this relationship. A non-state sector respondent from the Botswana argued that membership to SADC has strengthened the institutions in the DRC and Angola which would have otherwise remained weak. These States, were said to have gained a lot from being SADC members, becoming stronger and more formidable in terms of decision-making and so on. Such progress as less political fighting and smoother transitions in the right direction [BoGv-CEO-BCM].

Others argued that it is difficult to pinpoint exactly how belonging to SADC has led to stronger State institutions. But rather, the stronger states have grown stronger and that the improvements in the weaker states cannot entirely be attributed to SADC membership [BoCS-SRF-BID]. National governments are becoming more confident and learning how to operate better, partly due to international pressure and policy transfer. Noticeable examples given were those belonging to the WTO which was argued forced states to adopt certain transparent trade regimes or to set up regulatory authorities, not necessarily because of SADC. If Member States tick the box for SADC, it is well and good, but it will be a bit disingenuous to attribute progress largely to SADC. An example, is the case of Angola, whose discovery of oil is a driver of national stability, needed to attractive investors. Yet if one looks at Namibia and South Africa, these are countries were said to have always shined in the region, but SADC membership is not a factor for their advancement [BoCS-SRF-BID].

Another example given was that of Malawi which is said to have always been a stable country despite once being governed once by the Banda dictatorship. Respondents argued that there was fragility during the dictatorship regime but is long gone. This trans-Atlantic characterisation of fragility as political unrest was challenged, highlighting that one can never equate people expressing their democratic right to free speech to fragility. The term being controversial and difficult to define. An example of South Africans tendency to make noise greater than people in Botswana, and Malawi do, confirms that political unrest can be cultural and not a symptom of fragility. Zimbabweans too are like Batswana, very acquiescing....so SF is not easy to define" [BoCS-SRF-BID]. The pragmatist worldview employed in the case study methodology sought to provide for these cultural contextual epistemologies. As Scholz (2011, p. 25) suggests that "a case is faceted or embedded in a conceptual grid which allows one to identify key components of human and environmental systems.

There is however a marked difference in opinions between national civil society and those in the regional networks regarding the role of SADC. Those in regional networks assert that 'to an extent, SADC membership has strengthened State institutions, as is the case where institutional capacity has been strengthened by international cooperating partners such as JICA, GIZ and the WB. [BoCS-RC-SDCNGO]. The Collaborative Africa Budget Reform Initiative (CABRI) for instance, is one such committee designed to inform SADC Member State institutions over a medium expenditure framework, this is the best practice on how to set up a capital budget in countries, being disseminated throughout the SADC region. But governments' ability to adequately budget may or may not be an advantage depending on the environment, although it may strengthen institutions to some degree. The political will, such as that demonstrated by Swaziland on PPPs and institutional arrangements, to allow private sector investment to flow in the region, is also important.

Ministers of Finance had converged in Maputo and developed a SADC PPP unit that is "a regional framework for policies, institutional arrangements and legal frameworks to say, if you want to do successful PPP in the region, this is the framework that you need to adopt" [BoML-ED-PPP]. Countries can therefore approach SADC for assistance in developing their own PPP policies and SADC being neutral, means that each country receives assistance in developing and making the best investments that they can. There are many spin-offs that can come from a PPP, as other protocols are also strengthened from the results of the PPP. The case of PPPs as an anchor and driver of policy convergence and strengthening of statecraft is made. But as Marstz (2014, p. 87) submits, the impact of economic integration on FDI, a proxy for PPP success, is very complex and it is almost impossible to isolate the effects of integration, another obstacle being their typically indirect character. The effect of PPPs on integration, thus require a more profound study.

While there may not be an enforcement mechanism, there is increased opportunity to learn from other members and improve, as working within the regional frame encourages countries to take experience from other countries and share it with others. One respondent suggested that countries can learn from, and be empowered by, successful PPP projects such as South Africa's Gautrain [BoAA-PPP]. However, it is difficult to have coherence where there are no joint economic, finance and investment ventures among Member States. Respondents indicated that there are about 5, 6, or 7 ongoing initiatives supporting Member States in building their PPP institutions. Up until 2010, no one seemed to be concerned with PPPs until ministers of finance asked for them. All there was at the time was the SADC Banking Association's Network approach supported by Canadians for only run for 2 or 3 years [BoDn-SA-GIZ]. It is plausible therefore to conclude that while there is no evidence of the effect of RI on PPPs, the findings suggest that PPPs can drive RI.

Despite the lack of an enforcement mechanism, respondents highlighted behavioural instances noting that:

> Within SADC, the tendency seems to be that when you have certain political and social circumstances evident in one of the Member States, other Member States take an interest and seem to be concerned about ensuring that whatever environment exists in any one of their Member States is conducive to development and peace and stability. It is fundamental to Member States that there is peace, stability and development happening in other SADC member countries. Countries often intervene politically or otherwise in order to promote these elements and it is in this way that SADC membership has strengthened State institutions and reduces SF [BoGvPv-MD-BPC]. The claim that RI has an influence on statecraft was thus collaborated by the qualitative findings.

The findings also presented a new paradigm for SF, that weak State institutions are a primarily result of poor political leadership. Whether a country is poor or rich, what matters is the leadership [BoGv-CEO-BCM]. These arguments centred on the quality and calibre of the political and bureaucratic elite. Respondents submitted that "weak State institutions are a result of actions by local elites that lack transparency and accountability with the attendant lack of consequences for their actions, in addition to the global factor" [BoCS-SRF-BID]. For example, if there is no demand for Botswana's coal, the country's next biggest export, because of India and China not growing fast enough to consume it, the country will be sitting on unused coal if not for the global police officer called America that keeps everyone in check. Global norms and occurrences have an influence on weak State institutions [BoCS-SRF-BID]. Respondents expressed greater confidence in western intervention and not RI as central to strengthening State institutions.

Arguments that lack of capacity and policy continuity owing to elections leads to weak State institutions were also made. Specifically, assertions that "the moment a government changes, everything has to change and follow the new policies and even the build-up experience that has been accumulated over time cannot be adequately utilized" [BoAA-PPP]. Electoral democracies are implicated in this view paradigm of SF, which surmises that change of government spells policy discontinuity and this is the cause of weak State institutions.

The most ideologically profound perspectives questioned the origins of the state and the burden of transition from colonial states to politically independent states. A significant number of respondents gave specific examples. One pointed out that:

> "the origin of the state itself must be considered – state formation. For instance, initially there were states in the region which later formed colonies. Thereafter, institutions had to be built once they established a formal democracy. South Africa as an example, had good State institutions under apartheid but they only served white people and with the establishment of democracy; the government was suddenly faced with having to serve 40 million people as opposed to 4 ½ million people. The State institutions under apartheid were therefore sufficient for what they were built and designed to cater for. The government that came into power after did not know how to govern, many individuals who had institutional knowledge of government left and this led to poor government at national, provincial and local levels unable to provide power and water to the people. Therefore, weak State institutions can be attributed first to capacity, as well as institutional knowledge [BoML-ED-PPP].

This assertion collaborates the European Report on Development (2009, p. 50) which states that the root cause of fragility in Africa is colonialism; however, fragility is deeply entrenched in the regional characteristics of the continent "which have made – and still make – it hard to follow a path of institutional development conducive to legitimate and effective states.

Respondents also highlighted political interference, as manifest in the politicisation of the civil service) as a cause of weak State institutions. Though not defined, the proposition made is that there is an erosion of public sector capacity due to interference by politicians, nepotism and cronyism. As one respondent put it:

There is also the problem of political interference whereby individuals in the public sector who are very good at their jobs are often removed for no good reason, making the ability of institutions to remain capacitated deteriorate. There needs to be a system in place where politicians that come into office do not interfere with public servants. There needs to be trust within our institutions

where people of opposing political views can work together and offer each other the best advice to implement the other's policies, as was the case in Canada when a labour government was unexpectedly elected as opposed to the conservative government [BoML-ED-PPP].

It is important to highlight that capacity decline in the public sector was ranked as a major cause of weak State institutions. Specifically, the unavailability of qualified human capital to make decisions and policies, and an ineffective education system that perpetuated the lack of capacity. Respondents also repeatedly mentioned poor leadership as a cause and result of weak State institutions [BoDn-SA-GIZ].

The most novel perspective given in Botswana was that of economic factors. "From an economic point of view, strong State institutions can be attributed to exports and export strategies that lift the countries out of poverty and strengthen the institutions" [BoDn-SA-GIZ]. The respondent highlighted poverty as a cause of weak institutions. This linear analogy of poverty as a cause of weak institutions, and not the *vice versa* is a neo-classic view of poverty as the cause of all problems, not the result.

Another neo-liberal perspective of the cause of weak institutions, lack of freedoms and democracy is also presented. In broad terms, weak State institutions stem from political environments where there is less freedom, less democracy in the way things are done, less transparency. Some of these situations perhaps derive their origins themselves from the old colonial environments that may have existed in these countries." [BoGvPv-MD-BPC].

To this effect, respondents assert, that in Southern Africa, "one could argue that this is something people in the region have chosen, or in other cases was inherited after transitioning to less or non-democratic regimes that were not accountable to the people. These environments, societies and institutions are therefore in need of change and transformation into more transparent, democratic and accountable environments" [BoGvPv-MD-BPC].

Such assertions warrant attention to the overarching question refers to the relationship between IPE context and SF. That is, does the IPE factor systemic and architectural aspects that aggravate SF in Southern Africa? A respondent reported that there was indeed a relationship between IPE and SF. If the international economy is poor after coming out of a recession, for example, no country that depends on its exports and so on can be formidable and strong if the international market cannot absorb those exports. The country and its financial economy become fragile, as there is a causal relationship [BoGv-CEO-BCM]. Here the relationship is provided as economic, specifically, the impact of global markets on local economies and the relationship to SF.

But the significance of the above relationship is challenged by arguments regarding the integrity of the notion of SF itself:

> In as much as there is a relationship between IPE and SF, it also depends on co-fragility of all the variables. Fragility is a questionable concept. One cannot straightforwardly conclude that global politics, global economy and global society cause SF. It is however true that what happens at the global scale does affect what happens at the local scale [BoCS-SRF-BID]. These assertions have been collaborated by the findings in the chapter 5 – CPIA and GCI which revealed that there is greater convergence in score on CPIA than there is on GCI. This means that countries in the region have greater comparability on public policies and the condition of State institutions but no comparable convergence on competitiveness of their economies.

The case for global economic shocks as a key IPE determinant of fragility was repeatedly mentioned. One of the key areas in this topic is that of the so-called liquidity for the investments in infrastructure projects. After the key crisis in 2007, banks became more willing to give loans at affordable rates in 2009, and there was to be an increase of 2 to 3 basis points on a 15 to 20-year loan - and where an individual country owes a billion dollars, that would be a huge amount of money. The markets believed that states were no longer able to guarantee loans, the cost of capital went up and so developing nations that depend on such capital to drive their infrastructure would be denied loans. Further, respondents highlighted that due to the relationship the EU had with many developing nations as trading partners, their trade balances, current accounts and currencies were affected. The developing states experienced political instability because of these economic hardships.

A respondent summarised this to state, "the world is economically connected. Although the states exhibit unequal stages of development and economic advancement, unprecedented incidents and political intervention in one area can affect the world economy. As a region, SADC needs to increase open trade, create trade blocks and be able to compete" [BoML-ED-PPP].

There is a clear understanding of the interconnectedness of the global economy to the dynamic of RI in Southern Africa. Other analogies claim that globalisation has ensured that what occurs in the west has effects on our local economies. Political unrest in the EU, for example would lead to the weakening of the Euro and countries trading with the Euro would suffer economically. There is interconnectedness between the global and national economies and a relationship between the IPE and the stability or fragility of the state [BoAA-PPP]. As Ferguson and Mansbach (2012, p. 13) suggest, scholars of global politics should think of the world as 'political space' – 'polities'

and consider that politics transcends territory, negating sovereignty as a relevant concept in the dynamic of global politics.

A particularly enduring perspective from Botswana was that of the role of foreign government influences and interferences on statecraft. This occurs when external governments actively support fragile states by propping up the leadership that keeps the state fragile, for their own interests. This, the respondent argued, is in addition to economic realities that are also at play that keep the colluding leadership in power at the expense of positive statecraft [BoDn-SA-GIZ].

The claim asserts that interference by external governments directly contradicts the notion of the unequivocal eminence of sovereignty. This dynamic, according to Axtman (2004, p. 274) suggests that southern African countries derive their sovereignty predominantly from constitutional legitimacy (internally), but have no external sovereignty due to their inability to secure the right to non-interference by other states including subjugation to non-consented norms. Despite this condition, the ontology of sovereignty within SADC remains generic.

The perception relayed is that many nations today have been exposed to some sort of external pressure, either because of whatever history the states have experienced, or because of whatever economic condition they happen to be in, including resources they happen to possess. It was reported that most of these pressures, however, "seem to be selfish interest by external parties who want to have some control or influence the politics of the country because of the resources that exist within that country or some other benefits which those external forces wish to have" [BoGvPv-MD-BPC]. In addressing the question of the relationship between SF and IPE, including regionalism and globalisation, one respondent argued that "depending on the magnitude of these pressures and the situation and circumstances in a country, weak institutions may or may not arise in response to external actors determined to keep the state weak. Internal decision-making plays a part as well, but not as heavily as the aforementioned external factors" [BoGvPv-MD-BPC].

An example is given of the DRC, which according to the respondent "has encountered such external pressures due to the economic resources available in the country. There have also been some weak internal institutions that have been kept so by parties that have created influences within the country that result in weak institutions" [BoGvPv-MD-BPC].

An equally profound question is one concerning the nature and form of structural and economic factors that affect state stability. One factor that stood out was the financial health of a government, financial security within the state, said to be as critical as political stability, and some democracy [BoGv-CEO-BCM]. Here state stability is directly associated with the financial

position of the state and condition of the economy. Economically, low foreign direct investment for instance would be a factor affecting state stability. FDI is a source of job creation and capital injection into the economy, and using the case of Zimbabwe, due to policies of nationalisation, investors are a bit averse to take their capital to the country. Zimbabwe's liberation politics still underline its Marxist ideology policy orientation. From the onset of Zimbabwe's independence, one of the duties of the Western patrons was to make sure the radical Marxist ideologies that had been imbibed by the liberation forces, and that advocated the total smashing of the colonially constructed state and the building of a new socialist republic, did not materialise (Ndlovo-Gatsheni, 2011, p. 60). These ideologies still prevail.

In a trickle-down effect, there is a "high unemployment rate and high levels of brain drain. People who are educated and supposed to be high contributors to the economy are leaving Zimbabwe for greener pastures" [BoAA-PPP]. The respondent argued that structurally, using Zimbabwe as a case study again, the existence of a coalition government was a bit appealing and would have led to power sharing and stability as opposed to the whole government being run by ZANU-PF. It would be easier under such a government to enact policies that might not contribute to stability[BoAA-PPP]. In summation, the account presented by the respondent introduces a new probable parameter as cause of SF, that of economic ideology. Thus, in addition to colonial history as a cause for SF, the political and economic ideologies that were employed by African states in fighting colonialism, can be a pertinent cause of SF itself. This calls for a deeper interrogation of the relationship between state formation and SF.

Respondents also located the structural and economic influences of SF outside the domestic sphere to investor confidence. It all depends on how a state fits in the world economy and the role it plays. Countries with a better economic status such as those with a high manufacturing base and those that attract wealth and investors because of solid infrastructure for instance, have stronger stability. [BoGv-CEO-BCM]. Economic performance and size was thus regarded a key factor.

Specific mention of the prospect of a Regional Development Fund[12], highlighted the focus on economic integration for Botswana. The Fund would be established in SADC from Member State contributions. This Fund, according to the respondent, is expected to generate another US$10 to US$12 billion. However, not every state has been able to contribute [BoML-ED-PPP]. In this respect however, the Seychelles, indicated that it would not be able to raise the small amount they

[12] In 2012, the SADC Council of Ministers approved the establishment of a Regional Development Fund to finance infrastructure development with a subscribed capital of US$1.2 Billion.

were required to contribute, and because of their economic difficulties and SADC conceded to the waiver. Similarly, Lesotho and Swaziland also cannot simply make all the investment commitments in the infrastructure they need, unlike countries like Mauritius, Angola and South Africa. The idea of RI, should therefore consider some of these structural inequalities [BoML-ED-PPP].

On the structural and economic determinants of fragility, non-state respondent made specific mention of the adoption of the European model of integration in SADC. The respondent argued that "Botswana used a central European state model of development, in which a state has a strong middle class, that supports the governance system. This maintains the stability of the state versus having a majority of national assets in the hands of very few people while a large part of the population remains in poverty[BoDn-SA-GIZ]. To expand on this relationship, a respondent stressed, "in terms of structural and economic factors, there is foreign ownership of resources, the kind of growth states experience in the mining industry and so on versus industrialisation. Companies within a country after a time of protection often begin to expand and cross the boarders" [BoDn-SA-GIZ]. The locus of the structural and economic determinants of SF, according to the respondent, is in the foreign control of resources. This is considered a fragility factor.

Another theory and assertions advanced by respondents claim that the custodians of State institutions are interested in maintaining weak public institutions because they serve their private interests. The argument advanced was that institutions tend to be weak when accompanying factors such as corruption are in place to weaken the environment. [BoGvPv-MD-BPC]. Further, the respondent argued that the very guardians of the institutions established to strengthen the state benefit from their weakness and therefore, in a sense, the battle is lost before it has even begun. Corruption will occur whether the potential for good economic performance is present or not.

> "If being poor was synonymous with corruption, there would have been endless corruption in this country; there was not. Now 40 years down the road, we are a middle-income country, we are still being rated high in terms of the level of control on matters of corruption, and Botswana stills ranks quite well compared to other countries in Africa on the corruption index" [BoGvPv-MD-BPC].

The conclusion regarding corruption and fragility was thereafter summed up as follows. "It is not so much what is or is not there in terms of economic potential and capacity. It is the extent to which historically, social factors come into play and how people handle their conditions

economically speaking, which results in a good or poor or weaker institution" [BoGvPv-MD-BPC].

The above assertions are supported by the Fund for Peace, FSI parameter seven, that of state legitimacy; this parameter recognises that corruption and lack of representativeness in the government directly undermines the social contract. It examines pressures and measures related to state legitimacy such as corruption, government effectiveness, political participation, electoral process, level of democracy, illicit economy, protests and demonstrations and power struggles. (Messner, 2014, p. 10)

The respondents also argued that the way in which Botswana's cultural and social development is handled has resulted in very robust institutions, and additional institutions continue to be created to ensure that corruption is detected and addressed vigorously, by a judiciary system which is corruption free. "The political system consists of free democratic accountable law makers that account to the people so they can make laws and enforce laws that ensure that those institutions that are set up work as service" [BoGvPv-MD-BPC]. Thus, the state of the economy and the related structural arrangements is only one factor, a strong cultural and social frame within which they exist is equally important.

Although there has been specific reference to the political and institutional dimensions of fragility in earlier responses, an inquiry was made concerning the specific political and institutional factors that affect fragility. A question was asked as to what these factors are. The primary factors given were political stability factors that include electing people into public office and exercising good governance [BoGv-CEO-BCM]. Other respondents repeated the factor of institutional capacity as key [BoML-ED-PPP], while some simply highlighted that the two; political and institutional, go together [BoDn-SA-GIZ]. These conclusions support the FSI index measures which include: corruption and criminality, inability to collect tax, large scale involuntary dislocation of the population, sharp economic decline, group-based inequality, institutionalized persecution or discrimination, severe demographic pressures and brain drain. (Van Veen, 2011, pp. 2-25)

Respondents also discussed the relationship, or lack thereof, between SF and PPPs. Specific areas of inquiry included the extent to which the guidelines and provisions of the SADC regional framework had been adopted by Member States and standardized. The conceptual framework of the study, proposes that adoption and standardization have a bearing on the attractiveness of Member States economies for FDI and ultimately, PPPs.

The results however, indicate divergent perspectives on the status of adoption and standardization. Some respondents argued that only a select few of policies have been adopted and that there are

SADC offices spread out across the region to help facilitate the implementation of SADC principles. While some respondent characterised the spread of SADC institutions, the headquarters in Botswana, the financial section in Namibia, and two other sections in Zimbabwe and South Africa as problematic. Respondent further highlighted that, however, when it came to specific instances of adoption and standardization, there were variances. For example, the targeted agreement of 30% female parliamentarians to empower women has yet to be achieved. Some countries have managed to achieve these policies and others such as Malawi and South Africa, are actively trying to increase the number of women in these leadership positions [BoGv-CEO-BCM].

The guidelines and provisions of the SADC framework have been adopted and standardized by Member States to a little extent. They argued that when standardisation is mentioned, it should be the case that what you see in Botswana is the same as in Zimbabwe, Malawi, Mozambique and Swaziland. [BoCS-SRF-BID]. A common example is the case of different driving licences, "Some are credit card sized while others were in booklet form. Some can be read by a machine while others cannot [BoCS-SRF-BID]. This was a statement in testimony to the fact that the fundamentals of a community such as identification documents are yet to be standardised.

The observation about the lack of common standards was collaborated by other respondents who argued that this was because some of the targets and guidelines require capital or funding to achieve.

Some Member States can reach these levels whereas as others such as Swaziland, Lesotho and Malawi need assistance and rely on raising funds often through loans to meet these targets. There are differences in economic capacities within the region and a one-size-fits-all policy may not work. A balance is needed between the stronger and the weaker economies, which is why the overall adoption of the SADC framework has been uneven. To expect otherwise would be too ambitious [BoAA-PPP]. The application of the principle of variable geometry pertains in this instance. The approach implies that all member states are bound only by provisions originally set out in the founding act, while rules and acts adopted to implement statutory provisions bind only the willing states which have given their consent and then have ratified or incorporated them. (Tino, 2014, p. 143).

There are however contrary assertions from the international community which is predominantly comprised of European agencies. Some argued that with respect to protocol implementation, the region has performed well especially on the finance and investment protocol. Citing the trade protocols, it was highlighted that trade audits reveal the extent to which the protocol has been

implemented. [BoDn-SA-GIZ] As of 2013, the baseline report indicated that 60% of trade protocols have been implemented and this was considered quite impressive. It was also reported that these facts on trade for instance are inconsistent with the bad press SADC is always getting with reports about how it is an insignificant organisation in Southern Africa, an unjustifiable [BoDn-SA-GIZ]. From an economic integration perspective SADC has arguably moved significantly towards the first form, that of market integration and the establishment of a FTA. (Hartzenberg, 2011, p. 2). SADC has however not moved towards the other forms of market integration and this is reflected in the GCI score variations in Chapter 5.

The Botswana international community also submitted that it might not be prudent to focus on what is viewed as big economic integration agendas such as the customs union and common markets. These agendas reportedly take time (up to 50 to 60 years) to achieve and SADC should not be judged based on their success at this point. "The customs union was established in 2012 but there is a lot of coordination and harmonisation that needs to be done before full integration can be achieved. About 25% of the FIP commitments are buzz[13] principles. There are investment treaties that are not even SADC specific, meaning that it is a matter of creating a platform for integration. Perhaps someday …" [BoDn-SA-GIZ].

This view was echoed by South Africa respondent who also submitted that SADC is often judged by the big economic integration agenda because in-as-much as it takes 50 years to achieve these things, these are ideas that were brought up still 50 years ago and are being repeated to this day. Nkhruma came up with an African agenda in 1963 during the time of the OAU; ideas which were being repeated 50 years later in what is now being called the AU's Agenda 2063, a visionary document aimed to be realised in yet another 50 years' time. This is the problem with Africa. Too many ideas on paper, not enough action to implement them. JR-CSO-RSA].

> "As a region, and as a continent, we will always be judged for not being able to achieve what we said we would achieve if it is the same thing every 50 years. Our western counterparts are not guilty of the same and look where they are now. It is true that big ideas take time to put in place but excuses should not continuously be made as to why they did not occur. Rather, solutions should be put forward as to how this can be avoided so that we are singing a different song in 50 years' time. To say, "maybe one day" is not good enough" [JR-CSO-RSA].

[13] Referring to ambitious, sexy and low-efficacy goals that often serve to excite the immediate interests.

The reference to ‘western counterparts’ suggests strong inclination to emulate the experiences of the Trans-Atlantic community, and although not explicitly mentioned, the responses demonstrate an entrenched preference for western thought and models. It is plausible therefore to suggest that there is considerable influence of exogenous theory on regionalism in southern Africa, from both the prevailing policy and institutional architecture, and ideological orientation. This study sought to contribute to the elimination of these privileged forms of IR knowledge generated by the American and British intellectual condominium. (Mimaki, 2011 p. 116).

About the benefits of RI to the economy, and whether implementation of the SADC treaty has reduced transaction costs for investors, the study did not quantitatively determine the impact from the quantitative analysis. However, Botswana respondents indicated that Botswana has made efforts to reduce transaction costs for investors, but that as a region, SADC is a long way off. This was reportedly due high transport costs which factor transactional costs. A case in point was in-land transportation costs. Respondents lamented that countries in the region are not interested to in intra-regional business, yet businesses from former colonies are welcomed with open arms. They seem to prefer to do business with their former colonial masters over other states in the region. two-way relationship between African countries and their metropoles, whereby primary commodities were exported and manufactured products imported. (UNCTAD, 2008, p. 3). The legacy of raw material exports created in the colonial period explains this trend, not as a preference, but as an economic logic imperative. Intra-regional trade is affected by the production of similar raw materials for exports.

These historical asymmetries ushered by colonialism now characterise the contemporary political economy of the region. The retention of political geopolitics, borders, institutions and legal frameworks, has affected the evolution of a free trade areas and market integration. The findings highlight the challenge of prohibitive in-land transport costs “If it costs $10 to ship a container from China to Durban, it then costs $100 to get it to Kinshasa from Durban. Crossing the border takes two weeks” [BoGv-CEO-BCM]. According to the Cross-Border Road Transport Agency. (2014, p. 47) the typical charge for a stationary truck is between US$200 to US$400 a day (which is not excessive for the in the COMESA-EAC-SADC region). But if the truck takes 3 days to clear a border an additional cost of US$600 to US$1,200 will be incurred. Similarly, it costs between US$5,000 to US$8,000 to ship a 20 feet container from Durban to Lusaka, compared to only US$1,500 to ship the same container from Japan to Durban[BoGv-CEO-BCM].

Though the challenge of reduced transaction costs was emphasised, respondents did not mention the role of exogenous ideological influences at play from colonialism to present political

economy. For instance, the effect of transaction costs on investment such as labour migration costs, has also been factored by similar influences.

The case of place of origin of investor, is a key example of the ideological influences. “If investors come from other regions of the world, they are required to carry visas whereas some investors within the region are not required to do so. “It is a question of the national government, the bilateral arrangements it has with whatever place of origin of the would-be investor and the jurisdiction of the origins of this investor. These add to regulatory costs and to the cost of investment” [BoCS-SRF-BID]. The basis for the varied treatment of investors based on country of origin was never expounded upon.

Similar examples of transaction costs were illustrated with regard with movement of goods. In relation to trade facilitation. These costs are dependent on the destination of the goods were going because there are no standardised road usage fees. Some countries charge fees while others do not. Botswana for instance, does not charge for road usage fees, which is why it is a favourite transit route for many [BoCS-SRF-BID]. In this instance, it appears that SADC has not sufficiently interrogated the ideological basis and economic logic of national policies that impose transaction costs on transportation of goods to landlocked countries.

However, respondents who work directly with the private sector, argued that SADC had not reduced transaction costs for investors significantly. [BoCS-SRF-BID]. Reference was made to a meeting of the International Project Finance Association (IFPA) was given, at which the private sector seeks project finance deals. The meeting considered SADC as an ideal place for investment, even after considering European markets. The IFPA were looking at SADC, the Middle East, central and southern America and Eastern Europe, regions where PPPs showed growing relevance to economic transformation and economic and social infrastructure development. [BoCS-SRF-BID].

The conclusion was that it is not only the treaty that is responsible for reducing transaction costs: other parts of the equation involve the harmonisation and preparation of projects that the private sector can bid on. This is vital and yet there is no capacity to prepare the infrastructure projects that need to be bid on. As a result, when the private sector comes into the region, it is met with an array of all kinds of costs to add on for them to understand what the government has not been able to undertake. Winning a bid therefore means sitting with a risk, they are not initially aware that they have [BoML-ED-PPP].

Respondents further argued that transaction costs are also influenced by the political environment and bankability of the projects. This involves identifying the risks, understanding the financial

models, knowing of user fees, knowing of users' willingness to pay and whether they can afford to. [BoML-ED-PPP]. "If a few projects are successful, then in turn there could be more compliance with set policies that may subsequently be included in the policy framework. This was in recognition that sometimes projects take off before policies are put in place, and at other times policies are all already in place" [BoML-ED-PPP]. The Botswana international community insisted that theoretically, this should be the case but practically, this may not always be the reality [BoDn-SA-GIZ].

Predictability[14] in an economy is a key factor for investors. It allows for greater accuracy in financial and economic planning. The question asked was whether the SADC treaty has improved predictability of investment climate in Member States? In response to this question, respondents first queried as to whether SADC is an economic community. Respondents noted that previously, Member States in SADC never identified together as one region. However, today as SADC, the region has been able to attract considerable investment in SADC primarily because of its formation, "SADC now counts as an investment destination in the world" [BoGv-CEO-BCM]. Arguments to the contrary, claimed that the SADC Treaty had not improved predictability of an investment climate in Member States. And that this is true in comparison to the SACU Member States, where amongst themselves there is predictability and transparency. As one respondent pointed out, "In SADC … there is no free trade and there are joint memberships of FTAs, some belonging to SADC and others to EAC. The investment climate is evolving yes, but it has yet to lead to anything concrete" [BoCS-SRF-BID].

The most evidence of exogenous influences on regionalism in southern Africa is derived from responses regarding predictability for investors and the SADC Treaty. Reference was made to the WB EoDB ratings. Respondents indicated that there is a forum of Investment Promotion Agencies that is linked to the World Investment Promotion Agencies (WIPA) where the object is to improve the investment climate. The Forum uses the WB, Ease of Doing Business Index to determine how easy it is for an investor to establish a business within a given location. The conclusion was that the impact of the SADC treaty on investment climate was variable. Several SADC countries on the WB Ease of Doing Business Index score poorly. Only South Africa, Zambia and Mauritius are among those countries that are coming up, attempting to improve a climate that is predictable to investors. Some countries offer high risk to investors (political risk included), such as those

[14] In simple terms predictability in an economy refers to the assurances in society that basic goods and services will be provided. In investment terms it refers to assurances that an economic jurisdiction has laws and policies, systems and practices that safeguard stability of its currency value and cost of doing business.

that have enacted nationalism policies (Zimbabwe is a case in point) [BoAA-PPP]. These assertions are collaborated in earlier chapters (Chapter 5. Figures: 5 – 4 and 5 – 5).

The responses did not however, negate the value of the Treaty for investment in the region. One respondent stated, “The treaty itself has the right principles within itself to actually improve the predictability of the investment climate. Nevertheless, if you look at the actual performance on the ground, there is varying performance among countries as mentioned. There are reformers and countries that are still lagging” [BoAA-PPP]. The SADC treaty can only assist investors coming into SADC. These trends are owed to poor policy coherence and variations in statecraft.

“If the infrastructure plans of the countries that are collaborating within SADC are aligned…if investors can see governments collaborating on provisions such as power supplies to the region, they will have greater confidence to invest anywhere within SADC, because there is basic supporting framework to provide the basic infrastructural resources needed to enable their investment[BoGvPv-MD-BPC]. Respondent concluded that “otherwise, without the treaty, investors would be hesitant to come into the region, uncertain as to whether the basic requirements needed for their investments to happen are going to be there. Now at least on a broad level, the planning aspirations and frameworks for the region are known” [BoGvPv-MD-BPC].

Regarding the politico-administrative dividends of RI accruing from the benefits of membership to SADC, the study investigated whether respondents perceived membership to SADC as having strengthened State institutions and reduced SF.

The results were varied. Some argued that the benefits were geographically varied in that "SADC membership has strengthened a couple of states and their institutions who previously would not have been believed to be headed in that direction. States have gained a lot from being members by becoming stronger and more formidable in terms of decision-making and so on. Examples of such states are DRC and Angola. Respondents asserted that these states now have less political fighting and smoother transitions towards the right direction” [BoGv-CEO-BCM]. Such analogies should however make political economy considerations regarding variable geometry, colonial history and the age of member states

Other respondents characterised the relationship between membership to SADC and improved statecraft as elusive, “it is difficult to pinpoint exactly how belonging to SADC has led to stronger State institutions. Rather, the stronger states have grown stronger, with weaker states showing some improvements. These trends however, cannot entirely be attributed to SADC membership. National governments are becoming more confident and learning how to operate better, partly due to international pressure from outside the continent and policy transfer” [BoCS-SRF-BID].

To further the above assertions, respondents indicated that "belonging to the WTO forces states to adopt certain transparent trade regimes or to set up regulatory authorities, not necessarily because of SADC. But the same regimes can also tick the box for SADC and attributing these changes to SADC may be a bit disingenuous. For instance, in a country like Angola, the discovery of oil is a push for the nation to become more stable to be attractive to would-be investors. Yet if you look at Namibia and South Africa, these are countries that have always shone in the region and can only really improve on what they have. SADC membership is not a factor for their advancement" [BoCS-SRF-BID]. Respondents failed to mention the feasibility and significance of common regional positions and legislation in improving investment outcomes for member states.

The case of Malawi was also highlighted, with respondent arguing that "Malawi has always been stably governed despite there once being a dictatorship under former President Kamuzu Banda, and that the fragility that once existed due to that regime is long gone. [BoCS-SRF-BID]. The characterisation of autocracy as fragility remains untested, though the notion has been propagated by the west as empirically valid. Some respondents challenged the assertion noting that "on the other hand, one should not characterise people expressing their democratic right to free speech as a symptom of fragility, particularly because fragility is difficult to define and controversial. For instance, "South Africans know how to make noise, a lot more than people in Botswana or Malawi. Zimbabweans are like Batswana, very acquiescing, so SF is not easy to define along the lines of political protest" [BoCS-SRF-BID].

The contradictions and lack of clarity about the notion and concept of SF expressed by respondents, and the apparent lack of a consensus, has been evident throughout the Botswana country-case. The same conceptual obscurities are evident in the respondents' understanding of the causes of fragility. The differences notwithstanding, respondents still aligned their analysis with exogenous conceptualisations of fragility. The above case corroborates the two main pathologies of fragility theory, the first being state ineffectiveness in enforcing contracts, protecting property, providing public goods and raising revenues, and the second political violence either in the form of repression or civil conflict (Besley & Persson 2011, p. 3)

On the contrary, and supposedly owing to self-interest and better understanding, Botswana's regional actors expressed greater confidence in the value of country membership in SADC [BoDn-SA-GIZ], [BoCS-RC-SDCNGO]. Respondents reported that to an extent, SADC membership has strengthened State institutions, as has been seen where international cooperating partners such as JICA, GIZ and the WB have strengthened national capacity. The Collaborative Africa Budget Reform Initiative (CABRI), is an example of a committee that was established to

inform the architecture of SADC Member States' public institutions medium-term expenditure frameworks, based on best practice for setting up a capital budgets in the countries. This agenda is reportedly being advanced throughout the SADC region. For a government, the ability to adequately budget strengthens institutions to a significant degree [BoML-ED-PPP]. This perspective collaborates the researcher's choice of the CPIA as a measure of fragility or functionalism. The CPIA fourth cluster: public-sector management and institutions." WB (2015. p. 3), assesses among others, public finance management which is the domain of CABRI.

Respondents however, made no reference to the ideological influences, or exogenous institutions responsible for framing these notions and standards. Financial integrity is a resource governance aspect and as such a pertinent politico-administrative dimensions of SF and RI. It is therefore plausible to suggest that in the context of SADC, public financial management is a key factor of fragility and it warrants greater attention. It is also a key aspect of the integrity of public institutions and state accountability, both of which are have a significant bearing on the success of PPPs. Within the Five Category PPP Success Factors presented by (Shi, Chong, Liu, Ye, 2016, p. 5), public finance is provided for under areas one: Government's ability and characteristic, which includes; reasonable government supervision, government willingness, clear cooperation department, government's capabilities of fulfilling the contract and government's capabilities of administrative execution.

To understand the phenomenon on the confluence between RI, SF and PPPs, we examine Botswana's perspectives on the role of PPPs in delivery of SADC RI agenda, and the influence of RI on development of PPPs. In this regard, respondents reported that in 2012, the SADC Ministers of Finance in Maputo, Mozambique, agreed to establish a SADC PPPs Unit which is a regional framework for policies, institutional arrangements and legal frameworks to guide successful PPPs in the region. (SADC, 2012, p. 3). Under the framework, SADC member States can approach SADC for assistance in developing their own PPP Units, and SADC being a neutral actor, means that each country receives assistance in developing and determining the best PPP investment option available [BoML-ED-PPP]. There are many spin-offs from implementing the common PPP Framework. It strengthens other protocols and this is already evident is some cases [BoML-ED-PPP]. PPPs are thus considered as pivotal and catalytic to both RI and SF, both in terms of convergence of standards, and development of regional infrastructure needed to broaden and deepen integration.

The findings strongly suggest that for most Botswana respondents, the value of SADC, and regional integration, is predominantly economic. Respondents argued that working within the regional frame encourages countries to take experiences from other countries and share them with

others. Countries learn from and are empowered by successful PPP projects such as the South Africa Gautrain [BoAA-PPP]. However, there is currently no cross-border PPP infrastructure in SADC, but efforts can be made in directing attention towards the Maputo corridor for instance. A lot of cross border PPP projects are yet to materialise" [BoDn-SA-GIZ]. The SADC PPP network is reportedly contributing to actual infrastructural projects, building the foundation to get these projects implemented. There are also on-going initiatives supporting Member States in building the relevant PPP institutions. It was reported that before 2010, no Member States were concerned with PPPs until the Ministers of Finance tabled the matter. At the time, only the SADC Banking Association's network supported by the Canadian government for 2 or 3 years existed. [BoDn-SA-GIZ].

The findings and the characterisation of the confluence and benefits by Botswana respondents appears to suggest the inverse of the proposition in this thesis. The study sought to interrogate the implications of the relationship between RI and SF on PPPs. The findings suggest that PPPs have greater influence on RI and SF than is the case in the inverse. In specific terms however, the PPP regional projects do not appear aligned with the economic integration logic. Such projects should have ideally been passed to augment the various stages and forms of economic integration.

Next the study explores the value of membership to SADC for mutually beneficial PPPs in Member States and whether joint PPPs were considered valuable. Responses indicated that there is a sense of mutual benefit from regional PPPs. [BoDn-SA-GIZ]. There has been more regional cooperation between neighbouring states, South Africa's President, for example, has visited Botswana to encourage cooperation in business, particularly in the mining sector[BoGv-CEO-BCM]. Botswana and Zambia have identified common problems at their borders and went on to build a bridge to replace the Ferry transporting trucks across the Zambezi. Namibia has offered the landlocked countries Zambia, Zimbabwe and Botswana land at their sea shore for construction of ports. This is regional cooperation [BoGv-CEO-BCM]. These developments signify an appetite for regional PPP projects and a shared sense of mutual benefit. The challenge as highlighted by respondents, was disaggregating PPP investment in the region. Some argued that there is no such a thing as regional PPPs stating;

> "Interstate infrastructure partnerships are not PPPs. Building a bridge between Zimbabwe, Zambia and Botswana over the Zambezi is not a PPP. It is difficult to define a PPP at regional level and how it is operationalized? The decision to invest is often based on several considerations and not necessarily the fact that a state is a member of SADC. Even SADC Member States compete between themselves for investments whether it's through PPPs or just outright FDI. We can never be sure whether a project was started

> because of membership to SADC or because a Member State has provided for lower tariff rates, lower labour costs, and lower electricity and so on to potential investors," [BoCS-SRF-BID].

Respondent also highlighted the multi-varied nature of investment decisions stating the case of Botswana, where there is political stability, lower tax rates and cheap electricity. On the other hand, Angola might have something else they can bring to the table. Choosing to invest in a country is therefore not a decision largely influenced by membership to SADC, otherwise South Africa wouldn't be the unquestioned industrial giant that it is. This topic is a dangerous one to tread on" [BoCS-SRF-BID]. The respondent argued that membership to SADC is the least of investor considerations, nor is it a factor in developing joint PPPs among states. The role of South Africa as a hegemony was also noted.

There are not enough cross border PPPs in the region and this is a problem. For some, there is reluctance due to people being weary of South Africa's dominance as it acts in many ways (not militarily but economically) to exercise imperial power. Many South African companies where economic dominance can be seen, particularly financial institutions, are spearheaded by finance. If PPPs were to be structured properly, they will be mutually beneficial because of the development of north-south corridors, the opening of trade routes (which will benefit our industries and policies), and services for economic gain (which banks will partly fund). However, currently, the main obstacle for complete integration is not the other developing nations; it is South Africa [BoCS-SRF-BID]. South Africa's hegemonic tendencies were thus highlighted as part-cause of the poor pace of integration.

The call for improving cross-border trade as a prerequisite or step towards establishing common and mutually beneficial dealings between states was equally emphasised. The suggestion was that robust cross-border trade was a stimulus for economic growth. [BoML-ED-PPP] "It would be nice to see border post crossing, where individuals carry goods across that have an economic cost to the nations. Botswana imports 80% of all its goods and services from South Africa, but exports 80% of its beef to South Africa, which is quite amazing. Imagine if we opened up the toppling border and goods and stuff could flow through, and that can all be done through PPPs because it's actually through IT systems and then you have to build a bit of infrastructure to allow for that?" [BoML-ED-PPP]. The intra-SADC trade-balance is tilted in favour of South Africa. It is important to consider therefore, that Member States benefit disproportionately from regional economic integration and that the degree of benefit is largely factored by the level of national economic development.

Others, however argued to the contrary, citing specific plans of intent to establish regional PPPs were already existent. There was an observation that "There are a couple of cross border projects within the region, such as the SADC region infrastructure master plan. Others are in the tourism sector, where transport corridors benefit three or more countries. This is the essence of the PPP network; a project should be able to benefits more than one country which is the priority. Currently, there are a couple of road networks and transport corridors; Swaziland, South Africa and Mozambique are currently working on a railway system to transport coal from South Africa to the coast in Mozambique. Being a member of SADC has enabled Member States to benefit from, and promote, cross-border PPPs" [BoAA-PPP].

These assertions were affirmed by non-state actors who submitted that it is easy to see that the joint national developmental initiatives that are often launched have some private participation or aspect to them, based on observations of what has transpired or is transpiring within those Member States that are part of them. These developments include infrastructure development such as railways and roads, with a willingness by governments to let the private sector take leading roles in providing them within the framework or within the economic arrangements between the parties involved. It is prudent to argue that it would not be as easy and convenient for private sector companies to embark on these PPPs across boundaries if SADC did not exist as a framework within which to do so [BoGvPv-MD-BPC]. SADC is thus a bankable framework within which regional PPPs can be developed.

The study also inquired into the extent to which government and its institutions are integrated into SADC. This is referred to as the breadth and depth of integration and is measured by sector. Respondents claimed that the Botswana government has integrated its policies into the SADC framework in the areas of mining, transport, finance, public infrastructure and communication. The most contentious sector for integration was reported to be the labour sector. A respondent noted that "it is a bit more difficult to talk about labour integration because it is not only about the movement of persons, but rather about free labour. However, any person can be employed in Botswana" [BoGv-CEO-BCM]. These claims that any person can be employed in Botswana is yet to be verified.

Regarding public infrastructure, the bridge between Botswana and Zambia, and the optic fibre cable that runs from Namibia through to Botswana are examples of country buy-in into the regional frameworks, related policies. [BoGv-CEO-BCM].

There was further concurrence on the conclusions regarding breadth of involvement by several respondents "...the links between Botswana and Namibia in terms of common agendas around

providing rail transport to enable development of both countries. Mozambique and Zimbabwe also benefit from regional transport, rail transportation, and developments in Botswana's coal. There does seem to be this collaborative environment that has enabled that" [BoGvPv-MD-BPC].

Despite assertions that there are challenges in the labour sector by some respondents, others argued that there are also considerable labour movements between countries in SADC. An example given was that "in Botswana there is certainly much involvement of citizens of other countries as local skills have been in short supply for many years. There are large movements of people out of SADC into Botswana for mining activity, and similarly in recent years, we have seen Botswana's citizens migrating to other countries in the region to sell their labour in the same sort of market. There is also evidence of a flow of labour and skills within the region and although it is a work in progress, there is more that still needs to be done to ensure its continuity (progress) [BoGvPv-MD-BPC].

In the examination of the confluence, the case study probed the influence of PPPs on the stability of the state. Some respondent reported one private actor should not dominate all government PPP projects, otherwise it becomes a monopoly and uncompetitive [BoGv-CEO-BCM]. Some respondents mentioned that there might be a relationship between PPPs and state stability or fragility with respect to corporate influence. They argued that normally businesses are averse to influence the government openly. They speculate that, "sometimes Anglo-American or Debtswana could have influences on the governments of Zimbabwe or Botswana, but most of it is really covert because businesses do not openly lobby. This results in cases of Presidents refusing to retire because of businesses behind them" [BoCS-SRF-BID]. Some respondents concluded that PPPs, especially FDIs may be a stabilizing factor, though covertly: "…if there are many projects attracting FDI, that is another positive way of enhancing stability" [BoML-ED-PPP]. In this study, FDI is considered a proxy for PPP viability. Respondents offered no credible rationale for the claim that FDI enhances fragility. The argument that PPPs reduce debt in government balance sheet is also unsubstantiated. The argument that because the indebtedness of the private sector in a PPP is not counted on the government sovereign debt, reducing public debt in books is also deficient. [BoAA-PPP]. These arguments introduce the quest of the effect of debt management on state stability. The proposition being, huge debt increases fragility, while less debt reduces fragility. From this perspective, respondents argued that "the impact of PPPs is on investment.

At a regional level, one of the selection criteria for potential PPP projects is to channel business to countries that have a very poor business environment and do not get private investors or operators. Countries are therefore compelled to attain a certain level of business-friendliness to

be eligible for PPPs. A comparative assessment of Zimbabwe and South Africa indicates that there are far less PPPs in Zimbabwe as there are in South Africa, despite assurance of investment security by both States. This is because the preconditions of stability are not there in Zimbabwe" [BoDn-SA-GIZ].

As one respondent summed up, private sector willingness to participate in PPPs is driven by fairly robust institutions and a working and sound justice system. Private investors need assurance that there are laws, legal frameworks and law enforcement systems that can protect their interests. A reliable legal system is not assuring if the law enforcement system is weak, unreliable or corrupt free. PPPs success is therefore incumbent upon stability of the State: strong and reliable State institutions" [BoGvPv-MD-BPC]. PPPs may thus be considered a major factor in enhancing or inhibiting SF. To ensure State stability, a country must attainment the PPP Success criteria of i) government capability and ii) characteristics; and public characteristics (Shi, Chong, Liu, Ye, 2016, p. 5). In this regard, the pursuit of these characteristics may be considered a stabilising factor.

In the final analysis, the study examines the extent to which the theoretical paradigm employed in the architecture of SADC's RI agenda are practicable and productive in guiding SADC's set objectives? Specifically, the study interrogated how the ideology and thinking behind SADC affects or influences its ability to meet its set objectives? The inquiry also sought to establish whether there is a relationship between the politico- administrative framework of RI on one hand and national institutions and systems on the other. The key interest in this respect is whether the SADC politico-administrative framework promotes coherence in national economic policy, coherence in political systems; and region-wide standardization of institutional arrangements.

No conclusive perspectives were however offered about the coherence of national and regional frameworks *per se*. Observation offered about regional political integration, implementation of good and beneficial regional policies; and the capacity of national governments to implement them, suggest great incoherencies. For instance, respondent highlighted the need for less red tape at the borders, emphasising that this would translate into economic gains, that countries within the region need to have common goals to cooperate more effectively and efficiently despite political differences [BoGv-CEO-BCM]. These assertions however, were devoid of theoretical debates and inclinations.

There was a divergent set of views with reference to convergence of political values and systems. However, the theme that emerged again was the lack of coherence and application to standard theoretical models. A very salient point made by a respondent that captured the overall sentiment

was: “In as much as democracy is preached by all, there is no denying that every country prefers to have its own political sovereignty with as little external interference as possible. Therefore, RI may be ideal at the political level. However, in practical terms for political systems at the national level, conformity to regional standards may not be readily adhered to” [BoAA-PPP]. While this challenge persists however, establishment of the SADC PPP Unit has encouraged many countries to establish national PPP units, thereby enhancing institutional coherence in transparency and accountability of public institutions. It is in such instances that SADC has arguably that RI contributes to enhancing coherence in institutional arrangements. [BoAA-PPP].

6.7 Summary of the Chapter

This section presented a summary of the key findings from Botswana. It highlights the unique perspectives and context within which the findings were generated. The findings suggest considerable indifference to the impact of the admittedly exogenous theoretical influences on SF, PPP or RI as anticipated. The Chapter reveals a bias towards economic integration as evidenced by a focus on protocols such as the FIP and policy convergence initiatives in macro-economic management.

The chapter also reveals that Botswana situates its experiences remotely to the Pan-African project. Reading from the history of Botswana’s state formation, it is plausible to suggests that the absence of Pan-African analogies in the findings can be traced back to Botswana’s state formation history. Botswana was never regarded as a colony and as such drew mild attention from pan-African liberation activists. The findings also reveal Botswana’s quasi-isolationist position within SADC, evident in its broad adoption of exogenous SF models. The chapter also reveal a State-centric orientation in the treatment of the confluence. This is evident in the assertions that states necessarily exercise greater leverage and power in the confluence, signalling a strong ideological inclination towards state-centricism and the positivist view of international relations represented in realist theory.

The findings dispute the logic espoused in theories of RI as drivers of integration, particularly Deutsch’s security community theory of integration namely, the amalgamated communities and the pluralistic communities. Instead, the findings confirm the predominance of IR theories of realism, that the state is paramount and that all other dynamics are subject to the autonomous interests of the state’s pursuit.

In more specific terms, the findings reveal that for Botswana, the relationship between statecraft (or SF) and RI is anchored in the context of economic interests and optimal gains for states. It is

underlined and preceded by economic interest (regionalism) over political interests (regionalisation).

The findings show that Botswana respondents collaboratively argue that the primary mandate of SADC is to promote regional economic integration through policy coherence and standardised institutional arrangements. There was little reference to political integration.

7.0 CHAPTER SEVEN: CASE STUDY OF MALAWI DATA PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

7.1 Introduction

This chapter includes presents a summary of the economic, political and socio-cultural history of Malawi as it relates to governance. It outlines the key milestones in Malawi's state formation and the political choices and experiences that have influenced formation of the state and its public policies. The chapter also discusses Malawi's foreign policy and its comparatively unique character in SADC. The chapter highlights the implication of Malawi's political orientation and policies, on relations with its neighbours. The results from the Malawi country-case are also discussed in this chapter, examining the epistemological underpinnings of the respondent perceptions. Finally, the chapter offers a summary of the arguments on the confluence between Sf, RI and PPPs.

7.1.1 The Context of Malawi

Malawi borders Mozambique, Zambia, and Tanzania. Located in southeast Africa, Lake Malawi creates a natural border that covers the country's eastern region. Figure 7-2 shows a map of Malawi.

Map 7 - 1: Malawi in Southern Africa



Source: *http://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/map/malawi_map.htm*

As Figure 7-2 depicts, Malawi, a country situated within the north-south Rift Valley and is flanked by mountain ranges and high plateau areas. According to the WB (2015), Malawi's total population of was about 16.8 million in 2015, rising 337% from 3.5 million in 1960. Malawi therefore represents 0.22% of the world population. Given the high fertility rate, the population is projected to reach 26 million in 2030.

7.2 State Formation

According to Juwayayi (2011, pp. 361-371), the archaeological data and chronological framework proposed by one of the foremost scholars of Malawian history, Schoffeleers (1972) shows that present-day Malawi is the territory formerly referred to as the Maravi Kingdom. The first Chewa settlers, Schoffeleers states, arrived at Mankhamba, the kingdom's seat of power, at "least two to three centuries before the establishment of the Maravi state in the fifteenth century AD". Historically, Schoffeleers indicated that later expansion of the state in the sixteenth century, was driven and related to "coastal trading activities that became more pronounced when Portuguese and Arab traders began to infiltrate the East African inland" (Schoffeleers, 1972a).

The Maravi state system, however, was developed in what is called the second period of the kingdom. According to Schoffeleers (1972), this period spans from the beginning of the fifteenth century to the early seventeenth century AD. At about the middle of this era, the region experienced the arrival of the Portuguese. The Portuguese upon their arrival made an immense impact on events in the area from the sixteenth century onwards. According to Schoffeleers (1972), this was the third period and classical Maravi era, which he dates from 1600 to 1750 AD. He submits that expansion of the Maravi state system, which had started in the previous century, continued during this period. This he dated from 1750 to 1892, when the kingdom extended from the southern Lake Malawi area to the Zambezi valley" (Schoffeleers 1987). Schoffeleers indicated that it was characterised by "foreign intrusions and the final decline of the Maravi states" (Schoffeleers, 1973, p. 47). According to Schoffeleers there was the impression that the "foreign intrusions were a factor in the decline of the Maravi state. This period ends with the colonisation by the British of the territory, that they called Nyasaland".

The first Briton to arrive was in 1859 by the name of David Livingstone, a Scottish imperialist emissary, commonly referred to as explorer and missionary. He was the first European to reach the shores of Lake Malawi and with time, more settlers migrated into the area. "In 1873, two Scottish Presbyterian missionary societies built missions in the area and more missionaries

followed. Thereafter, British merchants arrived to sell goods in the region and in 1883, Britain sent Captain Foote to act as Consul" (Ng'oma, 2010, p. 88).

In 1889, the British established the "Shire Highlands Protectorate and in 1891, most of Malawi evolved into the British Central African Protectorate" with Harry Johnston as its first Commissioner. It was during this time that missionaries introduced Christianity (Abale-Phiri, 2011, p. 42).

The territory was named renamed Nyasaland in 1907, and the same year, the British established a legislative council. Commissioner Alfred Sharpe, who had replaced Harry Johnston, was made Governor and he retired in 1910. When the First World War broke out in 1914, Germans from Tanzania invaded Nyasaland (Malawi) but were repelled. During the same period in January 1915, John Chilembwe, an American trained Reverend, led a rebellion in the south of the country in response to the harsh working conditions that the local population experienced. The rebellion was quickly crushed.

Between 1915 and the early 1940s, Malawi remained relatively calm but in 1944, just before the end of the Second World War, the local population formed the Nyasaland African Congress. Although Africans served the administration in various capacities (there were about 30,000 Malawians who were part of the Kings African Rifles armed forces). It was only in 1949 that Malawians were allowed to be in government.

"In 1953, the British joined Northern Rhodesia (Zambia), Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and Nyasaland (Malawi) into a single unit called the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland" (Abale-Phiri, 2011, p. 55).

The local population protested this political development and it was because of this protest that an effective nationalist movement emerged. From its inception and between the two World Wars, nationalism gathered momentum in Africa. In the case of Malawi, nationalism changed trajectory under Kamuzu Banda, who had returned after decades studying and practising medicine in the United States and United Kingdom. "In 1958, Dr Hasting Banda became head of the African Congress, which was renamed the Malawi Congress Party (MCP) in 1959. After periodic protests and civil disobedience against the British administration, the government declared a state of emergency and Banda was imprisoned" (Abale-Phiri, 2011, pp. 55-56).

In 1961, after years of unrest, an election called by the British and the "Malawian Congress Party won elections to the legislative council. In 1962, the British agreed to make Malawi independent. The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland was dissolved in 1963 and Malawi became

independent on 6 July 1964" (Lambert, 2017). Two years later 6th July 1966, Malawi became a republic and Dr Banda was elected President. According to Lambert (2017), "Malawi's 1966 constitution established a one-party state under the MCP." In 1971, Aleke Banda his then protégé, sponsored a call to designate Dr Banda, President for life.

As in all former colonies, Dr Banda allowed former colonialists to retain considerable influence in the country and maintained warm relations with the white minority government of South Africa, a political posture that was unpopular in a region where colonialism and apartheid were still in existence. (Lambert (2017, pp. 58-61)

From independence in 1966, the "MCP government became a conservative, pro-Western regime, supported by a bicameral National Assembly whose members were elected within the single-party system" (McKenna, 2011, pp. 106-109). After independence, and unlike many of the neighbouring countries, Dr Banda adopted an economic policy that has been characterised as 'Pragmatic Unilateral Capitalism'. The policy was underlined by four principles: i) realistic and feasible targeting; ii) gradual Africanisation; iii) highly disciplined civil service; and iv) unilateral decision-making processes. (Kayuni, 2011, p. 122) "During this phase, the annual average real growth rate exceeded 5 percent and over the whole period GDP per capita more than doubled" (Booth, Cammack, Harrigan, Kanyongolo, Mataure & Ngwira, N. 2006, p. 4).

The Banda administration developed and improved the transport and communication systems, especially the road and railway networks. The government emphasised cash crop production and food security. The estate sector, which produced tobacco, tea, and sugar, thrived, but smallholder production was not as successful. This was mainly because of the low prices offered by the Agricultural Development and Marketing Corporation (ADMARC), the state-owned agri-marketing board, which had the monopoly on marketing smallholder farm produce. In addition, the cost of fertiliser, all of which was imported and monopolised by ADMARC, rendered smallholder agriculture expensive (Ng'oma, p. 1570).

For more than 10 years from 1964 to 1979, the Malawi economy expanded from an average annual GDP growth rate of 4.6% to 5.8%. This was however followed by a rapid decline caused by a confluence of external factors to a annual GDP growth rate of 0.6% in 1994 (Kayuni, 2011, p. 117). In 1980, to improve the country's economic situation and broaden regional ties, Malawi joined the Southern African Development Coordination Conference, and later the Southern African Development Community. This union was mostly black majority-ruled countries that challenged the prominence of the then "white minority-ruled South Africa to reduce their dependence on that country (Kayuni, 2011, p. 126). Even though the community was at odds with

Banda's refusal to sever formal diplomatic ties with the apartheid regime in South Africa, nevertheless it had membership."

The first serious challenge to Banda's rule came in 1992. "A pastoral letter authored by all eight Catholic bishops in Malawi was read on 8th March 1992, in every Catholic Church in the country" (Said and Singini, 2014, p. 11). The letter expressed "concern at, among other things, the poor state of human rights, poverty, political repression, censorship, and their effects on family life" According to Siad and Singini (2014, p. 11) "the overcrowding of schools, inadequate healthcare, lack of freedom and the lack of a fair justice system." From the publication of this letter, for the first time in 30 years, the public demonstrated against government throughout the "country and many development partners suspended aid for six months, citing Malawi's poor human rights record" (Abale-Phiri, 2011, pp. 60-61).

This act served to galvanise underground opposition groups to challenge and voice out for multiparty democracy. Other entities such as the exiled groups also joined the campaign for political reform. Furthermore, Malawi also experienced external pressures from the international community as they withheld financial aid and applied similar sanctions. By 1992, Malawi witnessed the rise of two opposition parties, the Alliance for Democracy and the United Democratic Front (UDF), who challenged the Banda administration with calls for reforms. Banda finally agreed to hold a national referendum. Patel, Tambulasi, Molande, Mpesi, (2007, p. 9) posits that "advocates for change won an overwhelming victory, and in May 1994, the first free elections in more than 30 years took place. Banda was defeated by Bakili Muluzi of the UDF by a substantial margin, and the UDF won most seats in the National Assembly". After the defeat, Banda was kept as the leader of his party until his death in November 1997 (Patel *et al* 2007, p. 36)

Bakili Muluzi of the UDF won the country's second multiparty elections since 1964, in May 1994, bringing an end to Banda's 30-year rule. He was re-elected to second term in 1999, and his government was faced with immense cases of corruption. There was no political or economic ideological awareness or commitment. The rhetoric was human rights and development defined in broad terms (Patel *et al* 2007, p. 36).

According to McKenna (2011, pp. 106-109), "Muluzi was a glad-handing politician but lacked the skill and discipline of Dr Banda and represented what came to be called MCP Team B, a cadre of unqualified struggling business persons, many of whom had been senior MCP politicians who had been side-lined by Banda's right-hand man, John Tembo in the later Banda years". "Without

the accountability mechanisms of a well-developed democracy, neo-patrimonial logic dominated" McKenna, 2011, pp. 106-109).

McKenna (2011) argues that "initially, Muluzi had followed donor advice and relied on advisors who prioritised development, but within a few years he had surrounded himself with politicians with personal interests and short-term gains". These groups of politicians embezzled government resources, and financial to control the country. Corruption was very rampant in the country with most public officials partaking in the embezzlement.[15] This "disregard for old regulations reached the point where public servants were afraid to implement them. Informants now say it was a period when people had "too much freedom" and acquired rights without responsibility".[16]

Muluzi handed over the presidency in May 2004, to Bingu wa Mutharika, who was a trained economist and a companion of Muluzi. After passing away while in office in 2012, Vice-president Joyce Banda took office and in 2014 lost to Peter Arthur Mutharika, the brother to Bingu Mutharika.

7.3 Overview of the Economy

In 2016, Malawi's GDP growth was estimated to be 2.5% and the GDP per Capita was $494. 41 (WB, 2017). This was attributed to the increase of mobile phone services and the services sector particularly information and communication which registered 9% growth (Mwanakatwe & Bhatia, 2016.) As a major source of income, Tobacco trade also contributed 55% to the country's income (Mwanakatwe & Bhatia, 2016). However, the economy is predominantly agriculture, which contributes significantly a third of the GDP, and accounts for 80% of labour force and 80% of the exports (WB, 2017). In 2015, because of floods and dry spell, agricultural production was reduced by 30% and it impacted on the wholesale, retail, and manufacturing sector. This also had a significant effect on the growing population.

At the beginning of 2015, inflation was estimated to be 21.2% above the government target of 16.4%; this was fostered by rising food price and depreciation of the Kwacha by 49% against the $US (Mwanakatwe & Bhatia, 2016). The balance of trade deficit was 315 24.80 Malawian Kwacha and (Mwanakatwe & Bhatia, 2016). Malawi trades with Germany, Belgium, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, South Africa, China, Zambia and US, its trade balance with the EU is Euro 150

[15]"For instance, in Ndirande, water committees were staffed by UDF loyalists who benefited from new, donor-built water infrastructure by selling water but not paying funds over to the Water Board, which felt it could not complain". See Cammack and Kanyongolo (2010: 5-6).

[16]"For instance, when Muluzi and his Young Democrats encouraged urbanisation, town planning officials were unable to impose regulations managing it; squatter settlements proliferated". See Cammack and Kanyongolo (2010: 6).

million and with SADC IS Euro -45 568 million. It appears that inadequate fiscal adjustment widened the fiscal deficit beyond forecast driving up net domestic borrowing, inflation and interest rates. Inflation then rose to 24.9% in December 2015 (AfDB, 2016). In addition, shortfalls were evident in the external financing due to a continued suspension of budget support, lower domestic revenue and expensive overruns on wage and salaries and on interest payments.

In Malawi, like any other country, state owned enterprises (SOEs)are there to deliver service to the public. It has been noted that the SOEs in the sector of agriculture, education and health sector spend more on research and development than local private sector. SOEs in the country work for public good and are not profit-oriented.

In 201,1 the government of Malawi established the PPP policy to accelerate economic growth, improve quality of life and reduce poverty. A PPP Commission was setup in the office of the president to provide guidelines and best practices and assist sector ministries develop their PPP within the SADC Framework of the SADC PPP Network. Malawi's economic growth and development strategy also supports the development and strengthening of PPPs. The PPP investment in the country is in the energy, telecommunication, transport, tourism, public utilities, health and education sectors. The country has collaborated with the WB on a Regional Communications Infrastructure Project to improve quality, availability, affordability of communications services in the country.

Malawi's consumption of minerals has not been significant on the global nor regional level. However, in 2013 Malawi accounted for 2% of world Uranium production (Yager, 2013, p. 29.1). Most of the mining Operations are privately owned, and the country does not have a well-developed mining industry. However, the "government has embarked on an economic empowerment program aimed at promoting and supporting small scale mining areas of import, substitution and value adding services such as gemstone cutting and polishing, gypsum mining and lime production using coal" (Paling, 2007, p. 1).

Malawi's Ease of Doing Business ranking improved to 141 in 2015 from 144 in 2014. In 2016, it dropped to 144 again out of 189 countries (Bank Group, 2016, p. 2). According to the WB, this improvement is owed to public financial reform to improve accountability and transparency in the management of public funds. The government had introduced public sector reform with emphasis on public financial management, performance management and decentralisation. These politico-administrative reforms had helped curb cumbersome licensing and regulatory procedures and led to an improved score on the Ease of Doing Business Index. This case demonstrates the proximate relationship between improved policy (as expressed in the CPIA), and the EoDB score.

Malawi is also a member of both SADC and COMESA and has ratified most of the protocols and signed the Tripartite Free Trade Area Zone. The country has also removed most non-tariff barriers, reduced tariffs on most SADC imports and agreed on tariff phase down with South Africa. This facilitates the movement of goods and services in the region without great cost and complex regulatory measures (Cross Border Road Transport Agency, 2016, p. 8).

As a landlocked country, Malawi relies on its neighbours for accessing ports and international markets which are costly; however, with the help of the Africa Development Bank, it is implementing the Nacala Road Corridor Project with Zambia and Mozambique. This development will create value chain and stimulate economic growth thereby fostering RI with other countries in the region. measures (Cross Border Road Transport Agency, 2016, p. 47 & 48).

In 2016/2017, Malawi's fiscal position was under pressure with an estimated deficit of 4.1 % of GDP "during the 2016/2017 fiscal year. This was compounded by the loss of budget support from donors" (Economic Monitor, 2016, p. 2). In the wake of the external financing shortfalls, domestic financing has increased consequently driving up public debt which stood at an estimated US$ 2.59 billion (equivalent to 69.6% of GDP) in 2014. This translated into annual debt service costs are now at a value equivalent to 5.3% of GDP (IMF, 2015, p. 2). According to the WB report (2016), with Malawi facing significant economic challenges in 2015, a key priority for the government was to take steps to restore macroeconomic stability and rebuild confidence in the economy. The report did not mention of other politico-administrative reforms that relate to SF.

The same can be observed in the first economic report which focused on economic and structural development issues in Malawi, the Malawi Economic Monitor (2016, p. 1) noted that the country's fiscal position was under pressure following the loss of budget support and decreased confidence in the government after the theft of millions of dollars by the Joyce Banda led People's Party government, is referred to as 'Cashgate' (National Audit Office, Malawi Government, 2013, p. 20).

7.4 Politico-Administrative Structures

Malawi's political system is classified as a Constitutional Democracy. "On 17 May 1995 the Malawi National Assembly adopted a democratic constitution, effectively replacing Malawi's original constitution of 1966 and the provisional constitution of 1994. Malawi's Constitution was thus enacted in 1994 and became law in 1995 (SDNP, 1996).

The constitution of the Republic of Malawi pronounces the country a sovereign state with rights and obligations under the Law of Nations. (Constitution of the Republic of Malawi, Chapter One, Article One.)

> The Law of nations modifies the intercourse of independent commonwealths in peace, and prescribes limits to their hostilities in war. It prescribes, that in peace nations should do each other as much good, and in time of war as little harm as may be possible without injuring their own proper real interests. The laws of nations, in short, establish that principle and rule of conduct which should prevent the strongest nation from abusing its power, and induce it to act justly and generously towards other states, upon the broad principle, that true happiness, whether of a single individual or of several, can only result from each adopting conduct influenced by a sincere desire to increase the general welfare of all mankind (De Vattel: 1793, p. 677)

State sovereignty is thus guaranteed in the Malawi Constitution as a foundational feature.. In its formal aspects, state sovereignty is understood as equality of all sovereign states under international law, while in its substantive aspects it relates to the competencies of the state both internationally and domestically. The latter sense can be understood as the manner in which it defines and exercises authority, both legal and political, within its boundaries (Soko, 2014).

It is this provision Chapter One Article One, in Malawi's Constitution, that governs and situates its engagement in international affairs. Like most post-1990 constitutions in the region, the Malawi Constitution attends to the substantive aspect of sovereignty; competence of the state, through the following provisions. The first is the doctrine of "separate status, function and duty of the executive. The Malawi Republican Constitution states that, the executive shall be responsible for the initiation of policies and legislation and for the implementation of all laws which embody the of the executive express wishes of the people of Malawi and which promote the principles of the Constitution" (Constitution of the Republic of Malawi, 1996). The second is the function and duty of the legislature, which when enacting laws should reflect in its deliberations the interests of all the people of Malawi and further the values explicit or implicit in the Constitution. Finally, the separate status, function and duty of the judiciary mandated with the responsibility of interpreting, protecting and enforcing the Constitution and all laws, in accordance with the Constitution in an independent and impartial manner, and with regard only to legally relevant facts and the prescriptions of law (Constitution of the Republic of Malawi, 1996).

The constitution also provides for a President, who is limited to serving no more than two five-year terms, and a vice-president, all of whom are elected by universal suffrage. There is universal suffrage for citizens aged 18 and older. The Constitution also provides for the appointment of a second vice president from a party outside government. The President serves as head of state and government. The cabinet is appointed by the president. The legislature, the National Assembly, is unicameral: its members also are elected by universal suffrage and serve five-year terms (Nkhata, 2010, p. 133)

It is important to highlight that although the 1995 constitution had provided for the creation of an upper legislative chamber, it was not established by the targeted completion date in 1999. A proposal to cancel plans for the creation of such a chamber was passed by the National Assembly in 2001 (Nkhata, 2010, p. 137).

Malawi is divided into four categories of administrative subdivisions: district, city, municipality, and town. These are governed by assemblies. Each assembly has a political arm and a technical arm. Efforts have been undertaken to strengthen local governments by giving them more financial autonomy from the central government" Constitution of the Republic of Malawi, Chapter 12) .). The extent of this autonomy remains insufficient.

7.5 Foreign Relations

The Foreign Policy of the Government of Malawi concludes by stipulating that "the foreign policy espouses a shift of emphasis from 'traditional diplomacy' to 'development diplomacy" (Foreign Affairs, 2011, Article 6.2). It further stipulates that 'in this "respect, in addition to promoting good political relations with other countries and promoting a good image of the country internationally, the emphasis shall be on the promotion of foreign direct investment, trade tourism and foreign aid to Malawi" (Government of Malawi, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2010, Article 6.2).

The policy states that it shall pursue relations with states in all regions of the world but does not provide a qualification criterion. The official foreign policy therefore presents no distinction in the treatment of regions or governments. But Malawi's history in the region and beyond indicates clear biases towards western states and capitalism. Historically, the most profound confirmation of this bias in presented by (Hajat, 2014, p. 2) who asserts that "Kamuzu Banda's foreign policy was premised upon realism in striving for the economic security of Malawi. Hajat (2014, p. 3) adds that Dr Banda described his approach as discretional alignment and neutralism, but despite pronouncements that his foreign policy was driven by economic benefit to Malawi, he had "flatly refused to accept any assistance from communist countries – no matter how soft the terms and conditions they offered". The example given is of Malawi's exclusion from the Tazara railway,

which was built by the People's Republic of China, connecting Dar es Salaam (Tanzania) to Lusaka (Zambia). This was because of linkages with communist China. The connection to this railway line would have provided Malawi with another link to the sea, which would have proved vital with the subsequent destabilisation of the single rail link through Mozambique.

Although the official position of the government has shifted towards broader and eastern relations, recent studies by Afro-Barometer (2015) still show a pro-western inclination in the public. The key finding indicates that "South Africa (cited by 31% of respondents) leads countries that Malawians look up to as a model for their development path, followed by the United States (24%), China (17%), and the United Kingdom (10%)" (Afrobarometer, 2015). The report states that the factors contributing most to a positive image of China in Malawi are the quality or cost of its products (28%), its investments in infrastructure development (24%), and its business investments (20%) (Afrobarometer, 2015). This reflects Malawi's state of relations with China and their implications.

The report also indicates that "A significant proportion of Malawians say they don't know whether international organisations such as the SADC (43%), African Union (44%), and COMESA (47%) are of help to their country". The considerable uncertainty for Pan-African organisations is reflected in the official foreign policy which fails to mention Pan-Africanism as a principle.

It is important to highlight that Malawi's pro-western foreign policy has had implications for its relations with neighbours such as Mozambique, a former Portuguese colony and socialist state. According to Lalbahadur (2013, p. 1), the difficulties originated with Malawi's support for the opposition guerrilla movement, the *Resistência Nacional Moçambicana*, during the Mozambican civil war of the late 1970s and early 1980s. Lalbahadur (2013, p. 1), asserts that "the distrust of the *Frente de Libertação de Moçambique*, the ruling party for the Malawian government was further fuelled by suspicions about the latter's alleged involvement in the death of Mozambican President Samora Machel, in 1986, but that since then relations improved when Malawi played a constructive role in brokering the Rome General Peace Accord in 1992, which paved the way for a peaceful transition to democracy in Mozambique". The paper however proceeds to mention the Caloca border disputes and the fallout over the Shire-Zambezi Waterway Scheme as evidence of continued strained relationship (Lalbahadur, 2013, p. 3)

Similar border disputes have been experienced with Tanzania over Lake Malawi, in which Tanzania has claimed a part of the Lake. This according to Maluwa (2016, p. 371) is despite early determination and advise of the Tanganyika Attorney General on December 15, 1959 which states

that, following consultations with the British Colonial Office: “It was the opinion of the legal advisers to the Secretary of State for the Colonies that the southern boundary of Tanganyika lies along the Eastern, Northern and Western shores of Lake Tanganyika and that therefore not a part of the Lake lies within the boundaries of Tanganyika.

It is fair therefore to conclude that Malawi’s foreign relations are driven largely by western interests, the same powers whose colonial geo-politics renders Malawi a landlocked country. There has been no substantive change in Malawi’s foreign policy since Dr Kamuzu Banda made the pronouncement summarised as below at the Meeting of Non-Aligned States held in Lusaka in 1970.

On 12 September 1970, Dr. Hastings Banda, President of Malawi, commented that the proposals of the Lusaka Conference showed aligned attitudes and not an unaligned position. The proposals showed an aligned position against Western powers - the United States, the United Kingdom, West Germany, and France - as opposed to Russia and China. This was not non-aligned. Russia and Communist China were selling arms to Africa, too, and the murder of Africans was happening in the Sudan, but not a word was said about this in Lusaka (South Africa Institute of International Affairs, 1979,). The President said that the conference in Lusaka was not non-aligned but was in fact aligned against the West. He rejected certain resolutions from Lusaka as being malicious and untrue. He said people outside Africa should not be misled by the nonsense passed as resolutions at the conference. (South Africa Institute of International Affairs, 1971, p. 46).

7.6 Results and Discussion

7.6.1 Introduction

The findings on Malawi reflect the country’s unique history in the region. Malawi is not a founding state of SADC, and had been considered isolated because of its policies towards apartheid South Africa. Findings reveal that Malawians generally see no connection between SADC and reducing SF. Respondent highlighted that fragility is exclusively domestic driven and locally fermented. They argued that SADC Member States compete among themselves and this affects the entire purported goal of SADC. Findings confirm that Malawi places national interest before regional, and asserts this to be true for all members. In addition to discounting the probability of coherence among states, respondents also indicated that the constantly evolving, shifting and restructuring of ministries, departments and other public offices interferes with the

adoption of regional goals or architecture. Finally, Malawi as is the case with Botswana, confirms that market integration, underlined by trade liberalisation, takes precedence over all else. Respondents also emphasised that the lack of an enforcement or sanctioning mechanism diminishes the influence of region over state.

7.6.2 Qualitative primary data analysis and findings on the confluence

Malawi's respondent views on the relationship between the politico-administrative aspects of the Southern Africa RI framework and SF were as varied as those from Botswana but less divergent. There was a notably less understanding of RI and much lower confidence in the benefits of RI. This could be attributed to the history of Malawi in the region as a non-socialist pariah post-colonial state with diplomatic ties to apartheid South Africa. Malawi was not one of the founding nations of SADCC. This history of Malawi regarding the non-aligned states and the establishment of SADC, may have had a bearing on Malawi's sense of belonging to the community.

Malawian respondents did not argue for a direct correlation between improving the political and administrative framework of RI and promoting coherence in the national economic policy, political systems, and establishing region-wide standardization of institutional arrangements. Instead respondents argued that it is not automatic that coherence will occur, highlighting that RI may be the right concept for countries to adopt, but this has been a complex process that has not been as easy for some countries as it has been for others" [MwCS-ED-MEJ]. "Countries vary in economic urgency, economic structures, productive economic growth, and have different competitive and comparative advantages" [MwCS-ED-MEJ]. Respondents also argued that the intra-regional variations in geography and economy, and the tendency to compete often makes collaboration and adherence to common standards difficult. These response suggest that there is a perception of fragility at regional level.

On one hand Malawian civil society argued that the factors driving coherence and standardization are interests around mineral wealth deposits and access to the sea, yet these have not been sufficiently studied. More research needs to be done to determine the specific needs and concerns of the various countries to know how best to add value to the aspirations of RI. [MwCS-ED-MEJ]. As a landlocked country, these arguments suggest that the value of RI for Malawi is in its potential to curb the challenges it faces as a landlocked country.

On the other hand, Government respondents argued in favour of coherence as stipulated in the SADC framework, supporting the multi-sectoral nature of the process of domesticating SADC protocols in Malawi. As an example, the following example was presented: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs secures natural resources, the Ministry of Transport coordinates infrastructure

and services, the Ministry of Trade handles trade industry and finance, the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security coordinates food and natural resources and the Ministry of Economic Planning deals with human and social development. Under each of these sectors there are institutions that provide the coordinating sector with information" [MwGv-PFSO-MFA].

Response to the inquiry into the involvement and engagement of non-state actors and the private sector, indicated that the degree of private actor involvement in regional policy domestication processes, and the relationship with PPPs is critical. Respondents highlighted that in the case of Malawi "non-state actors and private sector participate in the development of the SADC protocol meetings that are held beforehand at country level to prepare Malawi's position before the protocol is concluded. In this way, upon conclusion of the SADC protocol, the private sector in Malawi would have made an input to its development and would be aware of the implications for Malawi to be able to implement it" [MwGv-PFSO-MFA]. These findings support the conceptualization of new regionalism offered by Andrew-Speed (2011, p. 35), which defines new regionalism as "a multidimensional dynamic resulting in a greater variety of state-led regional arrangements, and non-state or hybrid regional arrangements, networks and governance mechanisms".

An example of this dynamic in Malawi is the case of the development of the SADC Protocol on Trade and a Protocol on Finance and Investment (FIP), which the Ministry of Trade was the only coordinating entity but once the protocol was adopted, coordination shifted to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at a later stage (2009-2011), followed by the Ministry of Economic Planning and Development before coming back to the Ministry of Trade [MwGv-PFSO-MFA]. This case demonstrates the far reaching institutional and sectoral impact that a single regional instrument can have on synergy within a State.

The response also suggests that there is engagement of non-state actors in the pre and intra-protocol development process, but that there is limited or no engagement in the domestication and implementation phases. This case informs Objective Four of the study; 4. To investigate the position of non-state actors, namely PPPs, in the architecture of RI in Southern Africa. Further, the shifting institutional mandate and arrangements within the country, render it difficult to ascertain responsibilities and accountabilities, but more importantly, makes it difficult to determine the policy framework within which a protocol is domesticated and implemented[MwGv-PFSO-MFA]. It is plausible therefore to conclude that in the case of Malawi, statecraft as manifest in constant reorganisation and restructuring of public institutions, presents challenges for domestication of regional protocols, and consequently coherence between

national and regional policy. This conclusion calls into question the impact of regular elections on statecraft.

Respondents also reported that although, the government has a structure(s) for coordination with SADC, as stipulated in the SADC treaty, "...there is a requirement for all state to have a SADC national contact or a SADC national committee. Such a committee should comprise several technical committees, national steering committees, ministerial committees and others that focus on monitoring and implementation of the SADC Treaty and protocols. However, such arrangements are absent in Malawi and almost all other Member States" [MwGv-PFSO-MFA]. The lack of effective national structures creates deficiencies in the continuum of the politico-administrative framework on States and the region. The same may also suggest either a lack of political interest in regionalism or limited public institutional capacities, the latter being an aspect of SF. As discussed in the case of Botswana, all the above perspectives collaborate the FSI and CPIA approach to SF. No reference is made to the exogenous epistemology and ontology of statecraft manifest in Malawi.

Malawian respondents' views on the effectiveness of RI framework enforcement mechanism for ensuring compliance were equally negative. Respondents argued that "there are grey areas and probably the reason why RI is still not considered as being a clear-cut issue, but rather more of a concept on paper than something that is practically possible. [MwCS-ED-MEJ] There remain grey areas on the issues of enforcement. Members can default or act in a manner contrary to the Treaty or protocols they signed up to, and know there will be no consequences [MwCS-ED-MEJ]. It is important to highlight here that the SADC Treaty provision for sanctions, only applies to cases of default in payment of Member State contributions.

Thus, some member States purposefully ignore the RI framework because they have much more to benefit from doing so. Therefore, in order for RI to work, there is a need for a clear rationale on what a Member State can benefit [MwCS-ED-MEJ]. These conclusions may assume that there is clarity by member states on the benefits of RI, in a region preoccupied with liberation politics and sovereignty. Respondents from the government however, indicated that "there are different institutional arrangements in all Member States and SADC has not come up with a framework that defines a universal institutional arrangement which Member States should adopt in order ably and effectively implement the SADC integration agenda. Government respondents indicated that although Member States (countries) are at different levels of development, the commitments required of each Member State are similar. The framework for developing the SADC protocols is governed by the principle of 'viable geometry' which provides for the option of countries to

implement the protocols when ready and have other Member States will follow suit at a later stage. However, this system is not being implemented" [MwGv-PFSO-MFA].

As in the case of Botswana, Malawi respondents made reference to practices in other international, multilateral agencies, arguing that:

> "SADC is different from the World Trade Organisation for example, where least developed countries are given preferential treatment to say that in this sector, for instance, in trade related intellectual property rights, they should not implement certain commitments. But in SADC, all Member States are treated equally. Malawi, for example, in implementing the SADC protocol, was expected to liberalise its trade regime by 2008 but was unable to do so because of revenue implications. However, the country was pressured by other Member States to start implementing the reforms in 2011/2012 because they argued that they had opened up their markets to Malawi's products and Malawi should reciprocate" [MwGv-PFSO-MFA]. These arguments disapprove of common regional policies.

The trade liberalisation case of Malawi presented above highlights the implementation challenges of applying the principles of equality among members, sovereignty and variable geometry when it comes to economic protocols. According to the respondent, Malawi has since liberalised 100% for imports coming from all SADC Member States except South Africa, which has 86% of its imports trading under this arrangement. [MwGv-PFSO-MFA].

Government respondent also mentioned that by May 2012, at a SADC trade negotiation forum, Malawi was expected to indicate or provide a timeline as to how the remaining tariff for South Africa was going to be liberalised. It was clear, from the respondents' point of view that countries are asked to undertake common actions, regardless of differences in economic development. [MwGv-PFSO-MFA] insisted that a little more leeway could be given only for South Africa and a longer term can be requested for liberalising on South African products. The case of Mozambique was also made, stating that it is one SADC member country that has liberalised 100% for all Member States except South Africa and was required to do so in 2015 [MwGv-PFSO-MFA]. Evidently, the question of standardization and coherence within the region is challenged by the varied implications these blanket prerequisites have on selected member States. It is reasonable therefore to suggest that the differences in SF are a major cause of the lack of coherence in the policy and architecture among member States.

Thus, respondents repeated that there was no evidence that membership to SADC had strengthened State institutions and reduced SF. The only institution in Malawi that has arguably

been strengthened due to membership in SADC is the Malawi Investment Trade Centre which evolved out of a merger between the Malawi Investment Promotion Agency (MIPA) and the Malawi Export Promotion Council (MEPC) [MwGv-PFSO-MFA]. Respondents argued that the merger itself was not necessarily motivated by Malawi's commitments to SADC but was rather doing away with duplication as the two institutions established with the same mandate and needed to be managed within one umbrella to improve coordination.

Malawi government respondents indicated that despite the merger there has been very little improvement and thus no strengthening of trade *per se*,

> "...for instance, there is trade imbalance between Mozambique and Malawi as was indicated after a business forum was held during the Mozambique President's state visit to Malawi in 2012. Mozambique had been at war for quite some time, over 10 years, while Malawi was in a peaceful state. Yet, Mozambique has since sprung back into development mode and is now progressing better than Malawi. The trade imbalance between Malawi and its neighbours has thus not improved with the formation of the Malawi Investment Trade Centre" [MwGv-PFSO-MFA].

According to the Ministry of Finance (2012), Malawi's exports to Mozambique amounted to USD 20 million while imports from Mozambique amounted USD 205 million. This trade imbalance, it was argued should not be there as Malawi's Investment Trade Centre was supposed to ensure that Malawi becomes more competitive, improve investment and assist producers to improve on their exports by giving them opportunities to access markets in Mozambique" [MwGv-PFSO-MFA]. These assertions derive from regional integration theory of reduced transactional costs.

Other examples mentioned, of failure to capitalise on regional economic cooperation outside SADC, included that of trade with Kenya. It was mentioned that "...during a state visit, Kenya's outgoing President, Mwai Kibaki, challenged Malawi, committing that Kenya would import from Malawi 20 thousand tonnes of beans. Despite this preferential market facility, Malawi failed to produce just five thousand tonnes of beans [MwGv-PFSO-MFA]. Government respondents also mentioned that "the institutions in Malawi, the private sector and the government, have an interface problem. Perhaps Malawi has got a weak private sector because all this information is relayed to the private sector through the Chamber of Commerce, and through the Malawi Investment Trade Centre, but it seems like Malawi has got a challenge on those areas" [MwGv-PFSO-MFA]. The cases presented in the Malawi findings presents new theoretical dimensions of SF, RI and PPPs, all of which are intricately related to statecraft. The interface between the public sector and the private sector was reportedly dysfunctional.

The Malawi country-case strongly suggests that the condition of State institutions as defined by CPIA parameters, is as pertinent as regional trade protocols in the development of regional trade, and consequently regional economic integration as are. The evidence provided in the case of the Malawi Investment and Trade Centre, also strongly suggests that ratification and/or domestication of SADC protocols has marginal influence on the condition or capacities of institutions and therefore SF in Member States. On this basis, therefore, it is plausible to conclude that according to the Malawi country case findings, statecraft: SF or State functionalism, appears to be the independent variable in the confluence between RI, Sf and PPPs. This is predicated on the centrality of State institutions in all these aspects.

As concerns the study question on the effectiveness of the state, the researcher inquired about the origins of SF and weak State institutions. Malawi respondents argued that "there has been some debate about Malawi being considerably underdeveloped after almost 49 years of independence, that there are different factors and origins of weak states institutions. As in the case of Botswana, respondents introduced the dimension of "transformative leadership" and argued that it played a critical role in the integrity and functioning of state institutions "because whichever way one looks at it, leadership should inspire or have a vision or agenda to inspire citizens to subscribe to a particular vision. It is then up to citizens to work towards the achievement of that vision" [MwCS-ED-MEJS]. Respondents further argued that "the current type of leadership that is locked up in short-term electoral and political cycles of 3 to 5 years, are just about votes and the next elections, and not necessarily the broader vision. This short-termism mindset is embedded in the political system and to a larger extent, drives the system" [MwCS-ED-MEJS].

These arguments, despite being presented with no reference to the ontology and epistemology of statecraft in southern Africa, confirm that the Westphalia nation-state model, the linear model of RI and their related theories, remain unquestioned and uncontested. These findings can also be explained through the regionalism theory of liberal inter-governmentalism, which involves national preference formation, interstate bargaining and institutional choice (Tal, 2015, p. 30). However, the theory discounts and excludes private actor as an agency. The respondents locate the drivers of the confluence in challenges of leadership, and not the architecture of State institutions.

In addition to leadership, the findings further suggest that respondents consider the current democratic political system as a significant cause of SF because it encourages short-termism. This suggestion was supported by the assertion that "in terms of governance, people, or the political society, we need to look at political parties because that is where the leadership is coming from. Political parties try to put in place specific agendas and individuals to lead and drive agendas, and

who are supposed to try and be responsive to the needs and aspirations of the people". [MwCS-ED-MEJS]. Further that "whatever happens in the political society determines the type of leadership that goes out and champions the government business and everything else stems from there; the economic society, the sort of policies a country has, and whether they are responsive to the people's needs and civil societies, how effectively all these aspects are managed, the legislature, and finally, what sort of characters it is made up of [MwCS-ED-MEJS].

The centrality of the political system at country level, appears to be of significant consequence to the effectiveness and integrity of public institutions. This strengthens the case for a more nuanced interrogation of the coherence of political ideologies and political systems in the region. Such an inquiry would examine among others the implications of multiple regimes of political systems within SADC. As civil society argued "the political system effectively encompasses all the spheres of governance; the bureaucracy, the bureaucratic systems, the civil service, the public sector. If these spheres are dominated by half-baked politicians, and depending on how narrow minded they are, the impact goes a long way, ensuring that a country does not make any progress or headway in as far as vision for everyone else in the country is concerned" [MwCS-ED-MEJS].

For Malawian respondents' the relationship between the IPE context and SF is intricate. They argued that as a member of a global village, Malawi still receives a 'big chunk' of support to its economy from the international community. And as such whatever happens in that space has an impact on the national economic level [MwGv-PFSO-MFA], [MwCS-ED-MEJS]. The emphasis on official development financing assistance and external shocks to the economy, contrasts with Botswana, which did not refer to development financing as a major factor, but instead dwelled on the relationship between IPE and the private sector driven national economy.

The pre-eminence of colonial and neo-colonial political economy over regionalism was also highlighted by Malawi respondent, with specific reference to trade. Arguing that, "Malawi's products are more aligned to the European markets because of its history as a former colony of Britain. Most of the country's products therefore, are traded on the European market, and not with other SADC Member States, which is why there has been the introduction of intra-regional trade programmes to encourage SADC Member States to trade with each other and COMESA members to trade within the block" [MwGv-PFSO-MFA]. It may be necessary when further developing regionalism theories and measures of RI, to consider the ratio between extra-regional trade (with non-regional members) and intra-regional trade (with regional members), as a key parameter in the assessment of the depth of integration.

The findings also suggest a significant relationship between regional economic integration as qualified by intra-regional trade, and SF as qualified by colonial history. The case of trade with former colonies and poor intra-regional trade suggests that fragility driven by neo-colonial political economy, remains a key factor in depth of integration in the region. This is collaborated by SF studies conducted by Bertocchi *et al* (2012, p. 7) who submits that "in order to investigate the historical determinants of fragility we exploit the information on colonization by introducing a number of colonial variables". Bertiocchi *et al* (2012, p. 7) partly confirms the relationship between SF and regional economic integration by concluding that "contrary to common perception, colonial history exerts a very marginal contribution to the determination of todays' fragility, with British colonies as the only significant variable.

Among the recent cases of colonial and neo-colonial IPE influences on SF, is that of foreign development assistance to Malawi during the Bingu Mutharika administration in 2012, "support to government programmes like transport was suspended as was general budget support. So, there is a connection I think between SF and IPE" [MwGv-PFSO-MFA]. Based on this case and general trends on budget support, it may be plausible to suggest that SF in Malawi has a significant relationship with IPE, due to the country's huge dependency on external official development assistance.

Respondents further highlighted that, Malawi is an Agri-based economy, and so the issue is what the country has to offer the rest of the world, and what the global village want from us versus what we want from the global village. "Fragility comes largely from these structural issues and from having a predominantly Agri-based economy, which mainly offers tobacco, a cash crop that is facing an anti-smoking lobby" [MwGv-PFSO-MFA]. From the Malawi findings, there appears to be a strong suggestion that the politico-administrative framework for RI and statecraft is only relevant when evaluated against its efficacy for effective economic management. The findings tend to locate the source of fragility in the condition of the economy as factored by various elements.

The Malawi country-case also inquired into the linkages between RI and PPPs. The question sought to establish the extent to which default on treaty and protocols among Member States was sanctioned. The proposition in this study, asserts that if SADC sanctioned its members, it would create greater predictability and certainty in the business environment, and consequently improve the probability for the success of PPPs across the region. The specific question inquired as to whether respondent thought that the SADC RI framework has an effective enforcement mechanism for ensuring compliance and dealing with default?'

The respondents assert that there are grey areas on the issues of enforcement, arguing that in SADC "members can default or act in a manner that is contrary to the Treaty or regional commitments, and that nothing will happen to them" [MwCS-ED-MEJ]. Similar assertions were advanced in examining the extent to which the guidelines and provisions of the SADC framework have been adopted by Member States and standardized. Malawi non-state actors indicated that they are still trying to understand the SADC framework from a layman's point of view. And that, for it all to make sense to citizens, Member States and other stakeholders must do enough to domesticate the framework [MwCS-ED-MEJS]. To substantiate these necessity, they argued that "normally there are structures such as the SADC trade negotiation forum, where these issues are discussed and reported to the committee of ministers of trade. There is, however, no enforcement mechanism under SADC, apart from persuasion under the structures: the SADC negotiation forum as well as the committee of ministries of trade and senior officials who are trade experts. It is along those structures that countries are persuaded to open up but as a country you have an advantage when you have a leader who can defend your positions." [MwGv-PFSO-MFA]. In the case of Malawi however, the country has been 'defending' its position from 2008. The issue of the SADC tribunal, whereby some countries argued that trade disputes should be settled under that framework, is another example of the available avenues for negotiating for the exemption from adoption of guidelines and provisions. At the time of this study, the SADC tribunal had been suspended [MwGv-PFSO-MFA].

An equally pertinent question regarding the relationship between RI and PPPs inquired into whether the SADC treaty had reduced transaction costs for investors in Malawi. In response, it was argued that "this remains an ideal to strive for. Although there are other factors at play in terms of doing business, the environment in Malawi with or without SADC treaties is yet to address the sort of issues people expect to improve" [MwCS-ED-MEJS].

Arguments highlighting the challenges of the relationship between RI and PPPs were also advanced, isolating specific protocols whose aims were to reduce transactional costs. The respondents defined the procedural challenges facing adoption of the protocols: "In terms of integration, this is implemented based on protocols so it seems that the first thing that needs to be done in order to implement a protocol for instance, is that it be ratified by two or three Member States before coming into force and then implementation. The priority was in the SADC protocol on trade and that was the first to be implemented. The second SADC protocol is on finance and investment, and this is the protocol that addressed the issues of transactional costs and improving the investment climate in SADC Member States" [MwGv-PFSO-MFA]. These protocols relate directly to the theoretical propositions on PPP success factors discussed earlier, that of

government capability characteristics, and public characteristics (Shi, Chong, Liu, Ye, 2016, p. 5)

However, although the protocol on Finance and Investment was ratified in 2011, and implementation had started in 2012, the benefits from SADC protocol arrangements in Malawi are yet to be realised. The conclusion from government was that "reducing the cost of doing business in Malawi normally relies on the WB and the U.S government support. The SADC protocols have not been of real benefit" [MwGv-PFSO-MFA]. It is thus, plausible to suggest that, owing to the size and weakness of the economy, Malawi gravitates towards compliance with trans-Atlantic institutions and governments, more than it does with SADC regional commitments. For instance, Malawi has been current with its membership contributions to the United Nations, but has not been current with its contributions to the African Union. These findings indicate that there is greater influence on the state from the trans-Atlantic community, than there is from the region and its institutions.

Malawi government respondents also argued that "to some extent, the SADC treaty has improved predictability of investment climate in Member States because other investors out of the region first consider what the region is looking like. They make references to the protocols in the SADC region and have been attracted to come and invest. However, when they go to individual countries in the region, they are confronted with a mixed picture [MwGv-PFSO-MFA] [MwGv-FSO-MFA]. Civil society also echoed the pre-eminence of the national over the regional, citing that "the national environments and processes, matter more than the regional SADC" [MwCS-ED-MEJS]. Thus, respondents located the most pertinent factors for reducing transactional costs at the national level, arguing that it is the national that matters, with legally binding and consequential mandates. In other words, the national level government, the state, is the only actor in the equation with power. This is the state-centric perspective advanced by realism theory of international relations, which views the relations between nations as based on might rather than right; John Locke (1632-1704), Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) and Immanuel Kant's (1724-1804). It is important to highlight however that the application of realist theory in the Malawi context, should necessarily recognise the considerable degree of the country's self-proclaimed powerlessness in the IPE.

An inquiry into whether membership to SADC promotes mutually beneficial PPPs in Member States, revealed that, for Malawi this has not been the case, "regional projects that transcend the borders of one country should ideally promote PPPs, but Malawi is yet to participate in such regional projects including those driven by SADC" [MwCS-ED-MEJS]. There are some projects already in the pipeline such as railways or the Shire-Zambezi World Inland Port, which requires

a lot of collaboration and cooperation between the Malawian and Mozambican governments. [MwGv-PO-MPPP], But as the country foreign relations literature indicates, the two countries are yet to iron out their historical differences arising from the unresolved colonial geopolitics of artificial borders.

To further these regional projects, SADC established a Project Preparation and Development Facility under the Development (PPDF) Bank of South Africa to support Member States prepare projects for funding. To date, however, Malawi has not benefitted from the facility or any SADC PPP arrangement. This study could not establish why Malawi has failed to benefit from a regional facility such as the SADC - PPDF. The researcher suggests that this is owing to Malawi's quasi-pariah status within the grouping.

A prominent PPP case with significant bearing on SF, is the Kayerekera Uranium Mining by Paladin Africa and the government of Malawi: "there were views that Malawi was getting a raw deal when an agreement was entered into with Paladin Africa to start extracting uranium from Kayerekera in the north of the country. From the onset, there were claims that Malawi was not going to benefit fairly from the venture. However, "despite being a member of SADC, it was uncertain whether or not SADC had the expertise or mechanisms in place to assist Member States with negotiations or development of appropriate mining legislation" [MwGv-PFSO-MFA] [MwCS-ED-CFJ]. Recently, Malawi's state president visited Botswana, a country with reportedly progressive mining policies in their diamond industry, and sought the assistance of the Botswana government on investments in mining. The president also recently (in 2013) launched a mechanism regarding good governance and mining through the WB or the European Union. According to the respondent, at this point the benefits from SADC, were uncertain. After the mistakes made in the Kayerekera Uranium Mine case, the country is now trying to introduce better policies which can be extended to other areas of mineral resources" [MwGv-PFSO-MFA]. In the case of Malawi, therefore, it can be concluded that SADC did not play a role and has still not played a role in its most important mining venture. This suggests that the SADC protocols currently in effect have not had any effect on the development of national industry and PPPs.

The case also provides objective reference on the extent to which the government of Malawi has been integrated into SADC, also referred to as the breadth and depth of integration. Although the government of Malawi is into SADC in the area of trade, public infrastructure, agriculture, communications and security sectors, respondents did not provide evidence of SADC protocols taking precedence over sovereign national policy interests. Respondents emphasised that in terms of trade, much more that can be done. There are aspects of free movement, production, supply and demand that still need to be addressed even though there are already some efforts that are

helping to improve trade from SADC. Public infrastructure such as power, the interconnector and other elements, must also be considered. Regarding agriculture, SADC is yet to resolve the issue of the movement of goods and trade in commodities. [MwCS-ED-MEJS] [MwGv-PFSO-MFA].

The sectors mentioned, which respondents indicated had not benefitted from SADC, and thus rendering Malawi with low depth of integration, in the mining, finance, education, health and tourism sectors: "there has not yet been an established link that shows that the SADC education agenda could have a bearing on Malawi's own education system, and similarly, the tourism sector has really only been marginally influenced by SADC" [MwCS-ED-MEJS].

These findings appear to support the post-colonial theory of the metropole and peripheral, with Europe at the centre of the architecture of the mining industry, which has underline the political economy of mining in southern Africa for centuries. Considering the centrality of the mining industry to southern Africa, it is paradoxical that the very industry that financed the colonisation of the region, has remained unaltered in a region rife with pan-African and liberation rhetoric. The collective indifference of SADC Member States evident in the lack of a regional mining legislation framework, needed to reverse decades of European domination of the sector, is revealing. It suggests that the politico-administrative architecture of SADC remains largely, directly or indirectly, subject to IPE dictates of the trans-Atlantic community that authored it.

SADC has over 24 protocols in various areas such as tourism, trade, finance and investment, ICTs, movement of persons, broadcasting and mining. Respondent from government highlighted that 'because Malawi is an agricultural based economy and a landlocked country, the focus areas for the government are mainly infrastructure and services. Infrastructure is needed to connect to the ocean and services such as energy are facing challenges that in turn affect development of the agricultural sector [MwGv-PFSO-MFA]. These were said to be priorities for the country, although the implementation of SADC protocol have failed to support these goals. . "the main challenge in this aspect are exports from South Africa. Infrastructure is therefore a major priority".

On inquiring on the extent to which the theoretical paradigm employed in the architecture of SADC's RI agenda was practicable and productive in guiding SADC's set objectives, the Malawi country-case suggests that there is a general disinterest and limited understanding of the role ideology and theory in policy architecture. Responses dwelt on the issues of corruption and economic concepts of RI. There was no mention of the theoretical origins of the politico-administrative framework or arrangements within which these dynamics are managed. Respondents stressed that there were many issues the country was unable to control or arrest such

as crime and corruption, both of which depleted financial resources from government systems and caused them to be unable to implement government programmes.

Other respondents also argued that, "the concept of RI for Malawi, has revenue implications, for instance if Malawi liberalises so much under the SADC programme and the government denied resources to implement social programmes by its traditional partners, the country will be unable to resource its public social systems and the state may collapse" [MwGv-PFSO-MFA]. Again, respondents highlighted that external resources are very critical for Malawi, "this was evident in the period 2011-2012, when the government of Bingu Mutharika was denied assistance, allegedly due to western governments' concerns over human rights and dictatorial tendencies. The result was that Malawi faced a fuel and forex crises and was unable to function properly. If this situation had continued, the country would have ground to a halt" [MwGv-PFSO-MFA]. There was no mention of the theoretical origins of regional economic or political integration. Instead respondents dwelled on the manifestations and implications of the absence of regional frameworks on the national economy.

Given the 2012 experience of the near collapse of the Malawi economy, one respondent summed up the role of SADC in dealing with the Malawi 2012 economic crisis as follows: "…it was evident that, if SADC, for instance, was a little bit effective, it would have been able to assist Malawi in that kind of situation. The problem with SADC is that it also has its own challenges in that it cannot "…assist countries that face fragility status." [MwGv-PFSO-MFA].

7.7 Summary of the Chapter

The findings on Malawi reveal an entrenched trans-Atlantic epistemological influence on the conceptualisation of RI and SF. Similar influences have also been observed in the architecture of SADC protocols and institutional arrangements. Malawi respondents explained and explored the discordance between the politico-administrative architecture of the state and that of the region, arguing that this emanates from deficiencies in the political system: political parties and political leadership.

Despite repeated probes, none of the respondents considered the epistemology or ontology of statecraft and regionalism as relevant to the confluence between RI, SF and PPPs. The concepts are presently defined were treated as normative. The findings on Malawi also reveal that both the founding of the state and the current politico-administrative orientation were predominantly influenced by the ideological inclinations of one man – The founding President of the Republic Dr Hastings Kamuzu Banda and his philosophy of 'pragmatic liberal capitalism'. There was no evidence of deliberate ideology formation in the post-colonial state beyond Banda's

pronouncements. The findings seem to suggest that Malawi has normalised and internalised these exogenous conceptualisations of statecraft and RI as normative.

There was no expression of intent to re-examine the ideological foundations of the politico-administrative architecture of the state or RI. Instead, the findings suggest there is significant propensity to entrench the existing politico-administrative architecture. In collaborating this assertion, Hajat (2014), submits that Malawi's foreign policy is predominantly 'Anglophilic'.

The study also reveals a resilient conviction by Malawians, that economic and political development, are only attainable through conformity with the state model espoused by the trans-Atlantic community. In this respect, Malawian respondents argued that, SADC is a largely sterile institution, unable to intervene in political and economic crises. And further that, regionalism in Southern Africa largely benefits South Africa, the de facto regional hegemon.

8.0 CHAPTER EIGHT: CASE STUDYOF SOUTH AFRICA DATA PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

8.1 Introduction

This chapter highlight the politico-administrative character of South Africa, from the colonial period to the establishment of a minority governed Republic, through to the introduction of democracyin 1994 to post-apartheid South Africa. The chapter outlines the key political economy determinants of the country's politico-administrative framework, and their implications for statecraft and relations with SADC. The chapter also presents the findings, and an analysis, of the confluence between SF, RI and PPPs as it manifests in South Africa. In this regard, the Chapter also discusses the distinctions between South Africa and the other case-countries. Further, presented in the chapter, are occasional references and inferences to the epistemology of contradictions between orthodox concepts of the statecraft and regionalism.

8.1.1 The Context of South Africa

South Africa, a country that is situated at the southern tip of Africa, is "1, 233,404 km² in size and is edged on three sides by nearly 3, 000km of coastline, with the Indian Ocean to the east and the Atlantic Ocean to the west. Figure 8-1 presents a map of South Africa.

Map 8 - 1: South Africa in Southern Africa

Source: http://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/map/south_africa_map.htm

Figure 8-1 depicts that South Africa is bordered in the north by Namibia, Botswana, Zimbabwe and Mozambique, and encloses two independent states, the kingdoms of Lesotho and Swaziland" (Jones, 2004). South Africa is a multi-racial nation, with a predominantly native African population. Of the 55 653 654 South Africans, 44 891 603 are native (also referred to as black), 4 516 691 are of European descent (also referred to as white), 1 375 834 are of Asian descent (also referred to as Indian) and 4 869 526 are of mixed race (also referred to as coloured). (Statistics South Africa, 2016, p. 21).

From 1948, South Africa was a constitutional apartheid state, governed by an autocratic minority of European descent. The three cornerstones of upon which the infamous apartheid system was built were the; i) the Population Registration Act of 1950, ii) the Group Areas Act of 1950, and iii) the Immorality Act of 1957. To this day, a race classification system partly inherited from the apartheid framework, determines the population categories. Thus, the current official classification of 'black' groups includes, Tswana, Ndebele, Venda, Pedi, Tsonga, Swati, Sesotho, Xhosa and Zulu (Union of South Africa, House of Assembly, 1950, p. 275).

8.2 State Formation

Formation of the Westphalia nation-state in South Africa has its origins in the disruption and destruction of Chiefdoms by the British and Dutch. The British occupied the Cape Colony at the turn of the 19th century. During the Napoleonic Wars, the Cape passed first to the British (1795–1803), then to the Batavian Republic (1803–06), and back to the British in 1806 (Britanicca, 2011, p. 32). The colonial project as Eldredge (2014, p. 26) in South Africa exclusively sought to establish "an economic system that served the interests of the metropole at the expense of the endogenous people. The system was based on extraction of minerals. (Gumede, 2011, p. 5). A culmination of the colonial project was the establishment of a settler colony which officially legislated apartheid in 1948 (Obermeyer, 2016, p. 26), racialism a state policy, which led to acute pauperisation, exploitation and disenfranchisement of the African majority by a minority of European descent. The apartheid government employed various strategies and policies which ensured that the minority of European descent assumed and maintained control of the economy, enjoyed better living conditions and prepared for a more meaningful future than the any other races" (Gumede, 2011, p. 5).

Apartheid, a word meaning 'the state of being apart', literally 'apart-hood', was a system of racial segregation in South Africa enforced through legislation by the National Party (NP), the governing party from 1948 to 1994 (Thomas, 2008, p. 8). Under this system, Africans and other minority groups had various freedom and rights curtailed such as freedom of association to maintain what was termed *Afrikaner* minority rule. For many years, historical explanation of

racial separation was dominated by the assumption that its main agents were the Dutch-speaking descendants of the earlier settlers, the *Boers* or *Afrikaners*. Though their origins were diverse (including French and German immigrants and some admixture with slaves), a broad Afrikaner identity was gradually constructed from the late nineteenth century (Beinart and Dubow, 1995, p. 26). Apartheid began after the Second World War and was being implemented by the Afrikaner-dominated National Party and Broderbund organisations. The *Afrikaner* ideology was further enforced in South West Africa, until the country gained independence as Namibia in 1990. The term is currently used in reference to forms of systematic segregation, established by the state authority in a country, against the social and civil rights of a certain group of citizens, due to ethnic prejudices. When Daniel François Malan (1874 - 1959) spoke about apartheid in parliament for the first time
in 1944, he maintained that " apartheid was a positive and non-repressive system which was based on the Afrikaners' divine calling and their historically privileged destiny to convert the
heathen to Christianity without diluting their national and cultural identity. This policy, Malan maintained, could only be implemented if society remained split along the traditional racial divisions that had been practised for 300 years since the origins of European settlement. (Obermeyer, 2016, p. 10). Apartheid effectively came into effect after World War II in 1948 following the National Party victory in the general election. The decadent racist policy was rto underline the formation of the state in South Africa until 1994 when the majority government effectively began to unmake its constitutional basis.

To effect this racist ideology, laws to separate the population of European descent from Africans were introduced. Early separation was formalized and reinforced by colonial laws such as the Natives' Land Act of 1913, which reserved nearly 90 percent of the land in South Africa for a tiny minority white population Findley and Ogbu, (2011, p. 1). Legislation was introduced that classified inhabitants into four racial groups: Black, White, Coloured and Indian. The last two of which were divided into several sub-classifications. Residential areas were also segregated accordingly (Union of South Africa, House of Assembly, 1950, p. 275).

From 1960 to 1983, an estimated number of 3.5 million non-white South Africans were forcibly evicted from their homes and placed in segregated neighbourhoods (The Presidency. Republic of South Africa (2014, p. 4). This mass mobilization was one of the largest forced movements of people in modern history, which can only be compared to Nazi Germany's racial settlement ideology (Hitler, 1925, p. 114).

To curtail legal and effective redress of these racist laws, African, and other political parties and organisations whose membership was not of European descent, were banned. First under the Suppression of Communism Act, No. 44 of 1950, and later through a series of amendment in 1951, 1954, and yearly from 1962 to 1968. (Mussa, 2015, p. 52)

These racists policies were to culminate into the Bantu Homelands Citizenship Act, Act No 26 of 1970. Under this law, Africans were denied South African citizenship by the minority government of inhabitants of European descent, who had designated themselves as African 'Afrikaner'. Instead, Africans were designated citizens of one of ten self-governing bantustans (homelands), a term "which suggests the artificiality of configuring geographical regions so as to correspond to supposed 'tribal' divisions" (Beinart, Dubow, 1995, p. 16)

For over three decades from 1960-1980s, following the enactment of the Natives Resettlement Act No. 19 of 1954 and other racist legislation, (Jibril, 2015, p. 63), the Afrikaner government embarked on a policy of forcibly resettling and moving Africans to the designated homelands. This force movement was aimed at 'slum' clearance, removal of populations that were not of European descent from urban areas, "African labour tenants on farms owned by individuals of European descent, the inhabitants of (African-owned land surrounded by European-descendants farms), and the families of workers living in townships close to the homelands.

The goal was to establish laws and reorganise space to counteract the survival of Africans (referred to as 'blacks') in urban centers (Jibril, 2015, p. 63)" With this policy called the Natives Resettlement Act, in place, for instance, inhabitants of mixed race from the the Western Cape were transferred to the Transkei and Ciskei homelands. One of the most widely publicised mass mobilization occurred in the "1950s in Johannesburg, when 60,000 people were moved to the new township of Soweto" (Findley and Ogbu, 2011). The formation of the modern South African State thus occurred through a racist policy of systematic displacement and disenfranchisement of Africans, tantamount to the creation a stateless majority.

Forced removals and resettlement underlined the condition of the majority Africans under apartheid. For example, the suburb of Sophia town was destroyed by bulldozers, with a new a new white suburb named *Triomf* (Triumph) was built in its place (Meredith, 2010, p. 95). Non-white residents of Sophia town were not the only inhabitants to experience forced removal and destruction as other regions experienced the same. During the years of Apartheid rule, close to 600,000 Coloured, Indian and Chinese people were moved from "Cato Manor (Mkhumbane) in Durban, and District Six in Cape Town to new government designated areas" (Walton et al, 2011, pp. 103-105). The minority racist Afrikaner government also segregated access to and quality of

education and medical care. Public spaces and services were racially segregated, often providing inferior services to all other groups except those of European descent.

The advent of a Nation-State formation in South Africa remains debatable. According to (Pick, 2011, p. 3), the establishment of a nation state entails the transfer of legitimacy from a ruler not accountable to those he ruled, to one accountable to the nation. Following the introduction of the Population Housing Act. 30 of 1950 however, a minority of European descent categorised the population of South Africa into communities of supposed seven different origins. These categories included, the Khoisan people considered the first inhabitants;, Bantu peoples who arrived in tribal groups from about 500 CE from north-west Africa;, Afrikaner farmers (Dutch, German, Huguenot and others) and their descendants who arrived from late 17th century from Europe,; people of mixed race (called Coloureds),; the British (mainly in finance, industry, and the professions) who came after British colonial control was established in the Cape in 1815;, Indian plantation workers brought in from 1860 and their descendants;, and Chinese workers brought in from about 1900 and their descendants. (Pick, 2011, p. 75)

It is this classification, which also artificially separates African Khoisans from Bantus, that has rendered the formation of a single nation state particularly difficult. The first state was a militant Zulu state established from 1816, and the second was the Afrikaner who trekked north from Europe about 1835, and who were effectively ended by expansion of British colonial control over the whole country. The Zulu state was defeated in 1879 and the Boer republics were defeated in two wars ending in 1902. This was followed by a racist state borne out of an agreement between the British and Afrikaners, realised through establishment in 1910 of the Union of South Africa (Pick, 2011, p. 75)

The inherent flaw in the socio-political and economic logic of apartheid, resulted into significant internal resistance and violence. As mentioned above, from the 1950s, opposition parties were banned, and anti-apartheid leaders and activists were imprisoned due to series of popular uprisings and protests that they carried out. As these unrests and protests spread, the security apparatus of the Afrikaner government responded with repression and violence. This attracted a “long arms and trade embargo against South Africa” and the subsequent sanctions on South Africa by the international community, which hindered the apartheid government’s ability to maintain the regime and forced reforms” (Tim, 2011, pp. 234-235).

But these window-dressing apartheid-era reforms which were implemented in the 1980s failed to quell the growing national and international opposition to the apartheid regime. To this end in 1990, the National Party under President Frederik Willem de Klerk began negotiations to end

apartheid. (Thomas, 2008, p. 8) The first step taken by de Klerk towards dismantling the apartheid regime was the release of several political prisoners in October 1989. Although apartheid official ended in 1991, "with repeal of the last of the remaining apartheid laws, non-whites were not allowed to vote until 1993 and the end of political apartheid is widely regarded as arising from the 1994 democratic general elections. Consequently, multi-racial democratic elections were held in 1994 and the African National Congress (ANC) under Nelson Mandela led the first republican democratic government" (Thomas, 2008, p. 8).

8.3 Overview of the Economy

As at 2015, South Africa was the second largest, and most diversified and industrialised economy in Africa. South Africa has consistently registered economic growth for more than a decade, apart from 2009 when the economy contracted. Average per capita incomes and access to education have grown across racial groups, notably for Africans (Africa Economic Outlook, 2015).

Nonetheless, South Africa remains a racially unequal society with respect to wealth, income distribution, access to jobs, social services, and utilities. (Statistics South Africa, 2012). There are also significant regional, rural-urban, and intra-racial disparities. The African population live in poverty, and average per capita incomes are one-sixth of the historically privileged minority of European descent, although this disparity has gradually declined. Africans are also disproportionately unemployed, at a rate of 36% in 2011, compared to 5.9% for populations of European descent, and have relatively less access to education, although black education rates are steadily increasing (Statistics South Africa, 2012).

The Government of South Africa has created an extensive but inadequate social welfare system that provides a variety of social grants and transfers (including child grants). The system reaches over 16 million of the 55 million population, and this expenditure constitutes 3.4% of GDP (National Treasury 2014, p. 89). At first glance South Africa appears to fit the description of a transfer welfare state, however, the country also spends a significant amount on education and health care, with 6.9% and 4.1% of GDP respectively having been budgeted for the 2014/5 fiscal year (National Treasury, 2014, p. 87). There are debates about South Africa, as a social investment state. But the Low social services quality and limited returns undermine prospects of South Africa's becoming a proper social investment state (Burger, 2014, p. 6). In effect, it can be stated that by default South Africa has evolved into a 'transfer welfare state'.

Since 1994 South Africa has made great socio-economic strides, but popular expectations and demands for change remain high. There are far more schools, housing, and utilities now available,

to the African population, who make up 79% of the population. As the population group, most disadvantaged by apartheid, they remain the most impoverished population and although its access to education has grown substantially, and incomes have risen, the gap with populations of European descent remains is massive. A resilient legacy of the apartheid era has kept the quality of school education for Africans poor. South Africa is gradually integrating but it remains a divided society, socio-economically, spatially, but most of all racially. There are sharp rural-urban divides, and poor urban areas are often located at a distance from jobs, infrastructure, and public services (Cook, 2013, p. 7).

To date, infrastructure in predominantly African areas is poor, inadequate, and under-maintained. Spatial divides still stifle inclusive development. The poor often reside far from where they work. Integrated urban and rural-urban planning investments are needed. (Cook, 2013, p. 7).

South Africa's "private sector accounts for two-thirds of fixed capital formation. The bulk of the investments target mechanisation and efficiency gains, expanding productive capacity, but limit employment opportunities in a low growth environment. South African companies have significant cash reserves but report low confidence in both the current business cycle and political environment. The government replaced a number of bilateral investment treaties with general legislation with the intention of creating a level playing field for domestic and foreign investors. A much-debated proposal for a new mining law that would have included export restrictions was proposed in 2013" (Cook, 2013, pp. 12-13)

In the 2014 WB Doing Business Report, South Africa was ranked 41st out of 189 countries. Only two countries in Africa, Mauritius and Rwanda were ranked higher. With regards to cross-border trade, South Africa was ranked ranking 106thout of 189, but was 24th in terms of ease of paying taxes. Other doing business indicators rated South Africa highly in areas of investor protection (10th globally and 1st in the Southern African).

In 2013, the South African Department of Trade and Industry "introduced a new Business Licensing Bill repealing the Business Act of 1991 and aiming to establish national norms and simplify procedures for obtaining business licences. The bill calls for businesses to obtain licences from local municipalities, a stipulation that is a cause of concern for some, who point out that the limited capacities and high levels of red tape amongst local governments may create further challenges for businesses" (Africa Economic Outlook, 2015, p. 8).

However, private sector competition remains fragile. "The 2013/14 Global Competitiveness Report ranked South Africa 45th out of 148 countries in terms of the intensity of local competition, and 8th for the effectiveness of its anti-monopoly policy. The report also stated that the six most

problematic factors for doing business in South Africa are: i) an inadequately educated labour force; ii) restrictive labour regulations; iii) inefficient government bureaucracy; iv) corruption; v) a poor work ethic in the national labour force, and vi) inadequate infrastructure" (Africa Economic Outlook, 2015, p. 8).

Despite being among the biggest and most industrialised economy in Africa, South Africa has one of the highest unemployment rates on the continent at 25%. "Tensions have emerged in the tripartite alliance between the ANC, COSATU and the South African Communist Party (SACP). In December 2013, the president signed the employment tax incentive bill into law amid stiff opposition from the trade unions. Unemployment continues to exert great pressure on politics and the labour movements continue to fragment, as seen in the mining sector" (Cook, 2013, p. 13)

South Africa is also integrated into several global value chains (GVCs), particularly in the automobile, mining, finance and agriculture industries, As Africa's second largest economy and an important regional hub, South Africa increasingly capitalises on regional value chains, especially in retail, finance and telecommunications. In the automobile value chain, South Africa serves as an assembly hub for Africa and for right-hand steering. Some of the models produced in South Africa are also exported to the US market (Business Partner, 2014). This regional reach has a profound bearing on its international relations.

The large assembly presence has also come to attract component manufacturers too that produce parts alongside the automobile plants. These component and car manufacturers are large international firms that own the core elements of the value chain all the way from research and development through assembly, marketing, distribution and after-sales services. Consequently, many intermediary products are imported for assembling in South Africa. Experience working with the local assembly lines has enabled local firms to become exporters of several components, and catalytic converters and leather seats have been prominent in the recent past. South Africa's automotive industry accounts for more than 6% of its GDP and 12% of its manufacturing exports (Business Partner, 2014).

8.4 Politico-Administrative Structures

"South Africa's first majority and democratic government inherited a fragmented, unaccountable and racially divided governance system, with massive debt and consisting of homeland administrations, national and provincial administrations, and separate administrations for certain racial groups. By design, the homeland administrations were poorly organised and resourced,by marginal lands with low production capacity, were unable to develop local economies and were dependent on the apartheid state for funding. (The Presidency, 2014, p. 4). Those municipalities

that were well capacitated were mostly in the urban areas and served the needs of the minority government.

In 1994, these balkanised apartheid-era institutions had to be amalgamated into a single democratic, non-racial system (The Presidency, 2014, p. 20). A new Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996), Chapters six and seven, establishes national, provincial and local spheres of government, which are distinctive, interdependent and interrelated, and are required to work together within the framework of cooperative governance.

As the supreme law of the republic, any law or conduct inconsistent with it is invalid and the obligations that it imposes must be fulfilled. All laws passed by Parliament or any other legislative body, provincial or a municipality, must meet the stringent requirements that are laid down in it. According to the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, South Africa is a single sovereign, democratic state with the division of power between legislative, executive and judicial authorities, under the *trias politica* principle (Government of South Africa, DPSA, 2003).

Since the first universal suffrage elections in 1994, the governing African National Congress (ANC) has held a large majority in the National Assembly which elects the State President, and as a result, the ANC has controlled the executive branch since 1994. The ANC customarily nominates its party president to serve as national president, with some exceptions (Cook, 2013, p. 13). While the ANC is the dominant party in South Africa, it faces a growing number of opposition parties.

Ideologically, the ANC espouses the creation of a democratic developmental state and proclaims that is it is dedicated to ending the divisive, deep- rooted, enduring social inequalities created by the white minority apartheid regime (African National Congress, 2014, p. 5). The ANC also proclaims to pursue social unity and equal access to rights, opportunities, land, and other resources, including through affirmative action and redistribution. It seeks to attain these ends by creating a developmental state built on a mixed economy combining state and other forms of collective ownership with private property and a market-based system. (African National Congress, 2014, p. 5). The ANC often supports social democratic-leaning development policies, and many of its political documents are steeped in leftist political doctrine, but ANC-led state policy-makers often advocate pragmatic, market-based approaches (African National Congress, 2014, p. 5). The ANC governs in a tripartite alliance with the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the South African Communist Party (SACP). Under the alliance, which guides ANC policy, COSATU and SACP are independent entities, but their members nominate

political candidates through the ANC, hold ANC leadership posts, and help shape ANC policies (Cook, 2013, p. 13).

The second-largest party in parliament, the Democratic Alliance (DA), "was formed as a mechanism to challenge ANC dominance. In subsequent elections at various levels of government, the DA gradually increased its electoral strength and in 2009 won a majority in the provincial legislature of the Western Cape" (Cook, 2013, p. 13). In 2010, "another opposition party, the Independent Democrats, announced that it would merge with the DA. The DA has a substantial white and coloured support base but has faced challenges in attracting broad black support" (Cook, 2013, p. 6).

In July 2013, Julius Malema, a former ANC Youth League president was expelled by the party for breaking party rules together with allied ANC dissidents and others, and launched a new party, the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF). The party is not seen as a "major short-term challenger to the ANC but may appeal to and gradually draw support from significant labour, jobless youth, and other constituencies which feel disenfranchised by or alienated from the ANC, or which seek the kinds of radical nationalist economic policy changes the EFF supports" (Economic Freedom Fighters, 2013).

8.5 Foreign Relations

It is important to first interrogate the ideas that have and continue to shape South Africa's Foreign Policy. According to Hadebe (2015, p. 73) the ideas that are currently shaping foreign policy-making in the South African context are powerful and are ideas of the African Renaissance. Radebe (2015) claims that post -1994 South Africa's foreign policy is by any measure and all means, Africa-oriented, but acknowledges that this position was not adopted immediately after 1994. It took time before South Africa took this direction, shifting from the pre-1994 South African foreign policy of hostility towards Africa.

From the onset, owing to its racist orientation, the South Africa apartheid state had adopted a hostile foreign policy stance towards African countries, particularly those that comprised the frontline of resistance against the oppressive apartheid system, particularly those countries such as Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Lesotho, Swaziland, Zimbabwe and Zambia. At the time, Namibia was occupied and served as a base for attacks into these countries, invading Angola on several occasions, and carrying out frequent military attacks against neighbouring countries. In addition, the Apartheid state organised and provided arms and training to militant opposition groups in these countries, thus fuelling civil wars and destabilisation, particularly in Angola and Mozambique. In addition to the use of military force, South Africa also employed economic

blockades to undermine and weaken the neighbouring states, as a means of limiting their ability to support the struggle against apartheid. (The Presidency, 2014, p. 6)

South Africa's hostile foreign policy posture towards Africa, endured because of its economic value to Britain and the US. As Thomson (2008, p. 10) submits, the first significant economic contacts between Americans and the Cape Colony occurred when American ships began transporting slaves from Madagascar in the 1680s. The crews welcomed the Dutch East India Company for their repair and victualling facilities at Cape Town. These relations reached significant level with the discovery of diamonds at Kimberley in 1860. US Companies played a pivotal role in the South African mineral revolution.

However, comprehensive U.S. transnational company investments in South Africa took off during the 1920s and 1930s. The American automotive and petroleum industries formed the front of this new economic penetration. By 1920, the Union of South Africa represented the fifth largest export market for the U.S. automotive industry. Ford South Africa was formed in 1923, with its own assembly plant in Port Elizabeth, followed by General Motors in 1926, and the Firestone Tire Company arrived in the 1930s (Thomson, 2008, p. 10).

Thus, above all else, the profits that U.S. business could extract from the South African economy and the number of top U.S. firms that enjoyed operating in this environment became a major consideration for administrations formulating foreign policy towards South Africa. But following events and pressures influencing decision makers in Washington DC during the mid-1980s can be grouped into three spheres. The South African context, the township uprisings, and forces emanating from the U.S. civil rights movements and domestic antiapartheid movement, and the actions of the U.S. Congress. (Thomson, 2008, p. 130)

Internationally, South Africa had become a pariah state, with the United Nations General Assembly condemnation of South Africa's racial discrimination as 'reprehensible and repugnant to human dignity' by a vote of 95 to 1. The country was isolated diplomatically and excluded from almost all multilateral institutions. South Africa was also economically isolated through more than a decade of effective sanctions and disinvestment, with about 90 percent of South Africa's merchandise exports subjected to restrictions on trade and sanctions (The Presidency, 2014, p. 7)

Consequently, on 21 August 1989, the OAU issued the Harare Declaration, which reiterated its view that apartheid was an obstacle to justice, human dignity, peace, stability and development of Africa. The declaration demanded that all necessary measures to be taken to bring a speedy

end to the apartheid system and tabled a framework for negotiation towards a democratic South Africa. (The Presidency, 2014, p. 7). The policy of hostility towards African states had failed.

It is worth noting that, the evolution of U.S posture towards South Africa, supports the assertions of liberal-pluralist theorists that foreign policy is not exclusive to the inter-state domain, but rather bridges the divide between the domestic and international spheres of policy. The experience also confirms assertions by constructivism theorists, who contend that foreign policy behaviour is often determined primarily by domestic politics (Spies, 2009, p. 268).

In the post-apartheid era, South Africa's Medium Term Strategic Framework (MTSF) 2009 - 2014, priority eight stipulates that South Africa will pursue African advancement and enhanced international cooperation through five objectives. The first is continued prioritisation of the African continent, inter alia with reference to the establishment of SADPA, and second the improvement of political and economic integration of the Southern African Development Community (SADC). The third is by strengthening of South-South relations, formation of strategic relations with the global North and fourth strengthening of political and economic relations, with specific reference to the need for enhanced economic diplomacy. The fifth is participation in the global system of governance to ensure that the developmental objectives of the developing world are addressed. (Spies, 2009, p. 277)

The most pertinent foreign policy pronouncement by south Africa in respect of this study, is that made by the government in what it ironically terms 'White Paper' on South Africa's Foreign Policy. For a country that has just emerged out of white minority rule, the colour classification of foreign policy appears to suggest there remains significant ideological influences on its public policy. The paper stipulates that the integration of SADC remains critical for the economic development of the region and for South Africa's global competitiveness, and recognises the role of regional economic cooperation and integration in the development of regional industries economies of scale. These developments are required to enhance competitiveness as a platform to participate in the global economy (Department of International Relations and Cooperation, 2011, p. 22)

SADC's relevance to South Africa is further stipulated in the following pronouncements. First, that SADC will advance a developmental integrated agenda in southern Africa that combines trade integration, infrastructure development and sectoral policy coordination that will correct imbalances in current relations. Second, that SADC will work to ensure that the region must be allowed to determine its own RI agenda and pace, without external interference. Third, that South Africa will continue to place particular focus on cross-border infrastructure development, in

collaboration with other development partners. Finally, that the strengthening of governance and institutional capacity within SADC remains an urgent and essential requirement to ensure the economic viability of the region (Department of International Relations and Cooperation, 2011, p. 22). The overarching and primary interest of South Africa in SADC and its relations with its neighbours remains that of regionalization or economic integration. The assertion that SADC is poised to correct the historical and contemporary IPE asymmetries in trade, directly contradicts the commonly held perspective that South Africa assumes the character of a regional hegemony, capitalising on the leverage attained during the apartheid era.

> "SADC's integrated development efforts, including its free trade area (FTA) introduced in 2008 (but still a work in progress in 2013), have led to the removal of trade barriers and the increased movement of goods, people, and capital across borders. However, the economic dominance of South Africa, which accounts for over 80% of SADC's trade, and Tshwane's inconsistency in its efforts to develop the sub-region, have exacerbated the economic polarisation of Southern Africa. SACU has not created a single cross-border project in its more than 100 years of existence. (Adebajo & Paterson, 2012, pp. 2-3)

South Africa's foreign policy interests in economic cooperation and integration, reflects an outward-looking economy, with about 90 percent of its trade conducted beyond the sub-region. Since 1994, South Africa has pursued deeper integration into the world economy, joining the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) grouping in 2011, and supporting the creation of a tripartite FTA between SADC, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the East African Community (EAC) in 2014. South Africa has aggressively promoted deals with external trade blocs. Questions have been raised about the relative benefits that may accrue to South Africa rather than its neighbours from these new arrangements. (Adebajo & Paterson, 2012, pp. 2-3)

In addition, South Africa has also championed infrastructure building in the sub-region through DBSA and Industrial Development Corporation (IDC). The DBSA has supported sub-regional energy, telecommunications, and transport infrastructure projects, and promotes exports and economic diversification in mining, tourism, manufacturing, and agri-business. However, the DBSA has been criticised for not consulting sufficiently within the sub-region (Adebajo & Paterson, 2012, pp. 2-3). A character that confirms South Africa's hegemonic posture in the region.

8.6 Results and Discussion

8.6.1 Introduction

The South African respondents' answers to the interviews were characteristic of the state of politics in the country. As evidenced in the literature review, the official position of the government of the Republic of South Africa, considers RI a foreign policy matter that should therefore reside in the Directorate of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO). The Respondents first argued that it is difficult to determine and assess the nature and scope of the relationship between regional institutions and South Africa as a state [JR-CSO-RSA]. There was no suggestion that SADC or any state in the region would influence the thinking or architecture of the South African state. The arguments dwelled on the functioning and dysfunction of the state as it pertains to internal domestic dynamics [H-gv-PC].

8.6.2 Qualitative primary data analysis and findings on the confluence

The analysis of findings from South Africa indicate a bias towards foreign policy and public service narratives. Respondents situate the issues of RI in foreign policy and those of SF in public service administration.

The South African foreign policy, explicitly pronounces the importance of SADC to both its national economic agenda and regional economic development. The first key finding concerns the surrender of sovereignty to SADC as manifest in an enforcement mechanism. This is advanced as a precondition for integration by western theorists, and is referred to in this study as depth of integration. The inquiry on South Africa, as a hegemony, reveals that South African respondents perceive the establishment of a SADC enforcement mechanisms as irrelevant. South Africa does mention the SADC Tribunal but from a different perspective [SACS-LM-SAT]:

The need for an enforcement mechanism as one respondent put it, requires the SADC tribunal, as a mechanism with such a mandate and capability. But it would find it difficult to exercise its authority because South Africa is so powerful, so strong, every time they speak, it would be from a position of power". [SACS-ED-FIN].

Respondents further mentioned that until an enforcement mechanism needs to be put in place and everybody should agree to it and everybody else needs to be held accountable. Accountability is vital because you can always resort back to your national positions. So, you need to get people to accept the need to recede some sovereignty and if states give away some of their sovereignty, the mechanism may be able to work. [SACS-ED-FIN]. This position suggests respondents are aware

of the accountability deficit arising from the lack of an enforcement mechanism, and further that they demand one.

An inquiry into the adoption of SADC guidelines and convergence of Member States towards a regional standard, suggests that, in the case of South Africa, some standards have been adopted at the political level, and are accepted and implemented. But some are adopted at a mere rhetorical level. Despite the adoption, however, there is still dysfunctionality at technical level because there are overlaps between SACU and SADC. For example, there are infrastructure initiatives that work better in SADC, than they do in SACU. SACU which has been in existence for more than 100 years, has worked well at political level, but not always at implementation [SACS-ED-FIN]. It is important to highlight here that the origins of SACU derive from the South Africa apartheid state logic.

The respondent highlighted however that all remained to be seen at the April 2014 meeting on the RISPD. According to the respondent, SACU is treated like a family and one tends to take families for granted, whereas SADC is treated as friends and we have to work at that.[H-gv-PC] It was also stressed that with SACU the standards are different, members ignore their practices and undemocratic regimes like Swaziland because they are considered family. A particularly interesting proposal that relates to the development of regional infrastructure and has the potential for developing regional PPPs was that of use of technology for integration. South Africa indicated that, to ensure compliance with standards across the region, ideally, the technological systems that are already in use must be integrated and synchronised, so the systems from different countries can speak to each other in the same technological language. Instead, what we currently have are computers in Harare that don't even speak to the computers in Johannesburg. [SACS-ED-FIN] The region needs functional technological integration. Respondents also indicated that When globalization started in the early 1990s we said it has to be a functional globalization, and so functional integration is necessary to ensure compliance. Respondents also argued that when we (in SADC) talk of infrastructure; we basically refer to road infrastructure; border posts for example, administration systems, warehousing and customs clearing. [JR-CSO-RSA] [SACS-ED-FIN] The arguments in favour of the logic reduced transactional costs from regional economic integration underlined South Africa's response to the question regarding common standards. The apparent lack of reference to the political economy of South Africa in the region reflects a disconnect between the economin logic of RI and the political realities. This raises new questions about RI in southern Africa. Questions such as, does the SADC RISDP sufficienty provide for the interface and intricate relationship between political and economic integration?

Some respondents also expounded on the benefits of reduced transactional costs due to membership in SADC, they cited implications for investment, but added that in addition to creating better brand marketing, countries in the region must first fix public institutions on the inside, strengthen them, and ensure that they are manned by productive personnel. In response to the question of whether membership of SADC has any meaning for PPPs, Some South African respondents argued that "there is greater value in SACU than SADC because of the common customs union: if a country invests in SADC, it has a larger market because of internal marketing and internal trade but it's easier in SACU because of the customs union" [SACS-ED-FIN].The respondent suggested that what is needed is to track private investors, as PPPs work better in a customs union than they would in SADC. The respondent emphasized the need to examine why things work in SADC and why things work in SACU and see how we can make them work better [SACS-ED-FIN].

The study also confirmed that South Africa's posture in the SADC region, remains hegemonic and that of the dominant regional economy. Some respondents indicated that they want South African companies to invest in the region as PPPs, but that the difficulty faced, however, is getting companies to source goods locally, in the regional markets. [H-gv-PC] Example of potential corporations given include, Checkers (a retailer) investing in Malawi but ships tomatoes from South Africa, while there are tomato farmers in Malawi. Although the respondent highlighted that local sourcing is key if RI is to work, the emphasis was on getting South African corporations to invest in the region, and not vice versa. . [H-gv-PC]. The example given suggests that there is a need to create a balance between efficient PPPs and the creation of markets across the entire spectrum of local business.

Finally, respondents also introduced the dimension of ethics for PPPs at a regional level, and this resonated with centuries-old malpractice of South African corporations. One respondent observed that the South African government has found it challenging to regulate how companies operate in the region. "Getting to tell these companies to develop regional economies, using local resources and services has been difficult: "…you can't open a pizza factory in Windhoek, Namibia, so you are based in Cape Town and you open a branch in Namibia, but you ship your pizza dough from Cape Town, …. that's the kind of ethic we're talking about, develop the regional economy by using the local economies" [RSA-Gov-PC].

In this regard, respondents concluded that there are policies on document, but there no political agreement, except a rhetorical agreement. The technical work remains undone. The challenge of coherence between Department for International Relations and Cooperation(DIRCO) and the National Planning Commission (NPC) is also a major factor in these weaknesses. [RSA-Gov-PC]

Of note is the issue of the capacity of the NPC, which was reportedly compromised. It is short-staffed with 25 commissioners working internally in the Presidency and one Secretary. It was mentioned that at some point, the NPC was supposed to have a staff of 60, but in 2014, there were no more than 25, 8 or 9 being administrators. The NPC, the planning commission, is made up of 25 commissioners from outside the secretariat, and these are part time positions. The South African government is also said to have was appointed a minister but NPC has abolished the ministry. It is now under the Department of Performance, Monitoring And Evaluation, the DPMP is now department of planning, Monitoring and evaluation, under Jeff Radebe at the timea minister. The secretariat which did the work for the NPC operates as the planning branch. The NPC also has no funding [RSA-gv-PC]. This dysfunctionality in the NPC suggest that the disconnect between the political integration and economic integration observed earlier, is also a result of the deficiencies in the institutional arrangements.

The study also inquired into perceptions on whether government policies in South Africa have actually been influenced by SADC, and the extent to which they think South Africa is integrated. Responses indicated that South Africa is fully integrated in the areas of foreign policy, trade and investment and the financial sector. it was also mentioned that the transport sector, communications and labour sectors are fully integrated. Some respondents, however, cautioned that, in the areas of foreign policy, the integration is at rhetorical level and political level, but not technical level. [RSA-Gov-PC]. In terms of depth and scope of integration, it appears that South Africa is the most integrated country in SADC. But the study could not establish the exact depth as a result of South Africa's hegemonic influence on RISDP, or a cooperation driven regional policy? The earlier, hegemonic influence, raises new questions, is the depth and scope of integration a function of the degree of the Member State's influence on the regional body. Further inquiry into this proposition is needed.

The depth and scope of integration may be reliable and valid proxies for examining a country's readiness to surrender its sovereignty. Thus, the researcher also inquired into the degree of sovereignty South Africa was additionally ready to surrender. The response given was, "it would be very low in sectors such as, labour and migration, in particular the area of free movement of people" [RSA-Gov-PC]. The reasons given for for South Africa's willingness to surrender sovereignty in this sector, are said to be political and ideological. That during the liberation fight, many South Africans took asylum and went for guerrilla training in the region. And so it occurs logically that the ANC government would be willing to migrant populations, be it economic or political refugees [RSA-Gov-PC]. . The response suggests that as earlier indicated, there is a disconnect in the conceptualisation of economic and political integration among South Africa respondents [RSA-Gov-PC], [SACS-OM-AFB]. There was no reference to the benefit of

exporting skilled labour to the region as a reason for readiness to surrender sovereignty, in regard to the specific aspect of free movement of labour. The orientation was attracting labour, no different from the apartheid state policy. These assertions also suggest a disconnect with pan-africanism ideology.

The respondent highlighted that although there is willingness to surrender sovereignty on migration and movement of people, the pattern has been that at the higher skills level South Africa is not attracting skills, but at lower skills level, the country gets people coming in all the time. The implication is that South Africa has a huge influx of low-skilled immigrants from the region "I think we've opened up, so you create tension there and then xenophobia comes in, …that kind of stuff." [H-gv-PC] They highlighted that "at the level where we need experts, we get very few people. So, at the highest skill level we attract very few people from the region, but at the lower skill level we get a lot of people" [H-gv-PC]. Again, it is likely that these trends have been influenced by the history of labour migration in South Africa. It wa, however, also mentioned that South Africa is yet to harness the skilled labour already available in the country: "…this guy has a Masters degree in engineering from Zimbabwe, and he's a gardener in Pretoria east. You know he doesn't have the right papers, he doesn't have a visa, so he ends up in the bag of the unemployed doing meager tasks, because he didn't come through legal channels, and he just walked. But we need him at high level, we need engineers"[H-gv-PC]. The example confirms the institutional disconnect as alluded to earlier in the case of the NPA and DIRCO. This phenomenon also raises another pertinent question for the relationship between statecraft and RI – does the coherence of national institutions have a bearing on a country's level of benefit from RI. This may require an assessment of the relationship between the CPIA and national labour and unemployment parameters. It may also motivate for a revision of the CPIA to allow for a comprehensive provision on the coherence and synergy between State institutions.

The respondent further observed, "… we have a very bad attitude, you know there's this thing, people from Somalia come here and they start small business, they work hard, people come here from region and they work hard. Then South Africans say they've come here to take our jobs. They're not taking your jobs, they're entrepreneurs, they come here and they start small businesses and people don't want that, you know, so it's a difficult issue, it's really tough. There was a Somali shopkeeper and a South African shopkeeper, the Somali shopkeeper stayed open for 18hrs, the South African shopkeeper; closed at 5. So, people from the region come to work hard" [H-gv-PC]. Such assertions also suggest that the RI project in SADC remains a state-centric affair, with marginal participation of the public or grassroots civil society. Sovereignty as defined by nationalism, which occasionally translates into xenophobia may be a consequence of the

disconnect between the polity and the public when it comes to RI. This raises questions on the relationship between pan-africanism and nationhood.

As the respondent put it: “South Africans believe we fought very hard for our liberation and we’re not about to give it away (apparently to fellow Africans). Part of that is also because we don’t want others to tell us how to run our country, it’s an attitude problem, we deserve to run our country, and we’re not going to let anybody run our country” [RSA-gv-PC].

As to the origins of RI, one respondent suggested that it is an agenda of key people in the US and what also brings us together as Africans, our collective position against colonialism, we had a common enemy, the early Pan-African and resistance and common identity against colonialism and then the OAU movement. [SACS-OM-AFB] [RSA-gv-PC] . The responses suggest that there are multiple factors and interest from which the idea of RI originated from. As in the other country cases, the respondents did not interrogate the epistemology of RI.

Similarly, as in other study countries, the question on the origins of SF, specifically the origins of weak State institutions, attracted non-committal responses. “the answer depends on who is answering the question. You get some white people who think that Africa is just a basket-case so for them (an endogenous) black government is necessarily bad and necessarily wrong. That’s just racist. How then do you objectively determine whether a state is failing?” [H-gv-PC].

Respondents expressed that the problem with the notion of SF is that it’s a discourse that emanated in Washington…. “so as far as I can tell, as a political economist, there are so many failing states, because when you measure or when you evaluate state failure, you look at: is there policing system in place, is there public administration? When you talk about state failure, what do you mean? You look at institutions, judiciary, public works? You need to look at all those things. For instance, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), has three centres of power: there’s Kinshasa, there’s the area on the border (Kisangani), and there’s the mining area (Katanga) so there are different power centers and where do you start to say failure is, where would you look at? [SACS-OM-AFB] I think this is also a problem in South Africa, where if you have democracy you have the President. If you insult the President, they say you’re insulting South Africa, you insult the liberation movement. So essentially, what they do now is a criticism of the whole country. So we have a military, you look at the defense review, they have stock piles of ammunition that no longer work. You have the police force which people no longer trust, it’s out there. You have the Presidency, public authority, the administration that people no longer trust. The only thing that people trust are courts, our traditional and our constitutional and the public protector. Public services are delivered but there are breaks in the postal services, water supply, there are breaks in

the electricity supply. But I get broadband in my home, in the past year it's been there. So we need to look at what exactly is state fragility" [RSA-gv-PC].

In inquiring on the relationship between the IPE and fragility in South Africa, and the form and extent to which it exists in the region, respondents provided peculiar perspectives. "If you drive from Johannesburg to Pretoria, for example, you see these cranes on the side of the road, construction cranes and you think, (they seem) to be building new things, so you think there are constructions, they are doing well and you think, government…, they are not doing so well. And you think to yourself because of corruption people are trusting the stateless and the private sector more even though there is corruption in the private sector. But we've got this thing in our community we're almost tolerant of government and my argument about this in this country is, and I say this, corruption is not our problem, but disability of government". [H-gv-PC]

Some respondents indicated that the IPE has a bearing on SF: – investors will minimise risk by funding projects they feel secure. Countries like Tanzania and Angola are increasingly becoming economically attractive because of this [SACS-LM-SAT]. The argument advanced is that because of this disability of government, the private sector though corrupt, has gained prominence in South Africa.

The respondent gave the example of the national health service, the case of a hospital in Eastern Cape. According to an MNet, Carte Blanche documentary, he referred to, to the Mnet team visited a hospital in Eastern Cape and found nothing, but when the team then went to the private sector, they met donors who had donated new buildings to the community for a hospital which has got the best theatres and technology, a private sector facility. [H-gv-PC]

> Government respondents submitted that South Africa has created what can be termed parallel systems in which the state is substituted by private sector, "you say oh, the state doesn't provide postal services, post office is corrupt, it doesn't work, and we create a private post bank. Public hospitals are there, but when public hospitals don't work, let's go to private hospitals. So, the rich can afford to use private post office, but the poor will rely on the post office. So, we create parallel systems, and what happens is that we are effectively criminalizing poverty. When you come out of the gate of the community, the guys sit outside by the road for jobs, they can't come in the community gate, and they're outside. If they come in there they get busted, but they're poor, they're hungry and they need jobs, but they can't come inside the building and walk, they have to wait for jobs. So, if I need private postal services, I can get it; if I need private cleaning services, I can get it, but poor people rely on the state, they can't get this. [H-gv-PC] We created parallel

> systems. I mean there's one mall I went to in Pretoria called Lynwood Ridge. To get into it, you drive your car into a boom gate, you get a ticket to park your car, then you go up the escalator, and there are nice restaurants, kitchen stores, fountains. But I could only get here because I have a car, I drive into the basement and I go forward to pay for the parking. Then you look over the wall and you see outside people standing, they can't come in because they don't have the money, so then again - the parallel systems - and this is what we're doing ourselves, we're creating parallel systems, part of which is criminalizing poverty [H-gv-PC].

It was clear from the understanding of the respondent that SF is manifest in the dysfunctionality of State institutions and failure to provide necessary public services for all including the poor. The CPIA indicators on equity of public resource use, social protection and labour, quality of public administration and transparency, accountability and corruption in the Public Sector, all relate to the capacity of the state to provide public services. (WB, 2015, p. 4). Similarly, the FSI indicators on public service, human rights and rule of law and security apparatus, also refer to capacity of the government or state to provide public services. It is therefore plausible to suggest that the failure to provide public services is a key measure of SF (Messner,2015, p. 10).

When probed about the origins of fragility, respondent argued that political factors are key in for South Africa, repeatedly mentioning the rapid pace of transformation from 1994. In support of this claim, reference was made to the work of a local academic, "there is a very interesting book, it's a thin book by a Stellenbosch Economic Professor, called "Lost in Transformation." (Terreblanche, 2012). The book asserts that in the rush to transform South Africa shed a lot of institutional practices. examples of which include, towns in rural areas and local government, that are not delivering. There were pre-1994, essentially, town plans, town projects, town engineers, several planners had to transform that. Staff had 20 to 30 years of town planning, but after 1994, they have been forced to retire or they've been kicked out and need to be replaced. So, then we (the ANC government) come in. I am not saying we're incompetent, but we're in experienced. So, in that rush, a lot of the problems occur; quality of service delivery is at local government level declines, and citizens protest. That is why I say fragility is political" [H-gv-PC].

According to the respondent, the political and institutional factors driving fragility in South Africa have their origins in post-apartheid South Africa's ill-measured 'transformation projects. The respondent however, added that the transformation agenda is constitutional. The constitution talks about the injustices of the past and the need to have a more representative government demographic. This is part of the black economic empowerment. These are all the laws that are applied, and so the transition is legal, perfectly legal, it's in our constitution and it earns a moral

right in our government" [H-gv-PC]. It is plausible therefore to suggest that colonial history, as advanced by Bertocchi and Guerzoni (2010, p. 4) is a major aspect of SF in Southern Africa. In the case of South Africa, the transition from what is effectively a colonial government, appears to be the cause of defective and incapacitated institutions which can be considered fragile. In particular, the aspect of transition management as expressed in the phrase ill-measured political projects.

In addition to the dimension of colonial history as a factor in the ill-managed transition as a cause of SF argument, the respondent also mentioned poor capacity of State institutions resulting from poor record management.

> Respondent indicated that "during the colonial period, because the British were so particular with records, they kept excellent archives, similarly during the apartheid period, because the government were so obsessed with control, archives were exceptional. Today, however, our archive system in South Africa has collapsed, and there is reckless record keeping". [RSA-Gov-PC]. This claim was repeated with emphasis, "I think lack of proper archiving and record-keeping contributes to our SF… but we don't have experienced and qualified archivists and record keeping managers. [RSA-Gov-PC]

The issue, as was later expounded, is the diversity requirements under policy instruments such as the Black Empowerment Code, which the respondent argued, "presents a challenge in developing government capability and in turn reducing fragility…in the presidency, we hear things like there are many Indians or Indians are doing too well, so we're assimilating culturally. Companies do that too, private sector, it's not just the state, so it becomes now a norm" [H-gv-PC] The respondent questioned whether evaluation of skills is provided for in the BBBE framework, which is legislated in the No. 53 of 2003, Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act, which provide for skills development under Section two on objectives of the Act.

Companies that get government business are 'required' to have black shareholders. The respondent argued that in the post-apartheid South African public service "skills don't matter, education doesn't matter, and experience doesn't matter. But the thing is as soon as you say it you're either a racist or anti-transformation or your counter revolutionary, you know, there are these stereotypes" [H-gv-PC]. These conclusions discount the legacy of apartheid which goes back to the mid-1900, when laws such as the Population Registration Act of 1950 and the Group Areas Act of 1950 were introduced to specifically disadvantage African populations. Race relations and affirmative action are a direct result of colonial history. The finding challenges Bertocchi's assertions that "Contrary to common perception, colonial history exerts a very

marginal contribution to the determination of todays' fragility, with British colonies as the only significant variable" (Bertocchi, 2010, p. 7). Furthermore, the colonial history variable has deficiencies. The variable examines the potential impact of the colonial heritage on development and institutions through two parallel strands. The first strand examines the impact of identity of the colonizer, while the second analyses the impact of environmental conditions in the colonies. (Bertocchi, 2010, p. 14). But nowhere in the literature does Bertocchi mention race or racism as a key sub-variable of colonial history. Instead, Bertocchi uses the politically correct term of 'settler morality' to encompass the racist and immoral practices of European colonisation. In the case of southern Africa, such characterisations are inadequate in defining the variable of colonial history. At the center of the colonial project was the immoral ideology of racism, which decades later, now manifests prominently, and calls for profound transformation in statecraft.

On the other hand the FSI considered racism as a 'State Failure Risk Elements' provided for under group-based inequality and institutionalized persecution or discrimination. (Van Veen, 2011, p. 2). The Index also examines the effect of factionalism and patronage through indicators on legacy of vengeance, seeking group grievance or group paranoia, and uneven economic development along group lines. Both indicators have been confirmed as relevant by the South Africa country case.

The study also interrogated South African respondents on the origins of PPPs as a model or an approach, questioning whether there is a PPP South African PPP model, where the model was conceived, and where it came from. Was it adopted incidentally or deliberately? The respondents indicated that the adoption of PPPs is deliberate and also part of the transition: "A very good example is actually DIRCO. If you go to OR Tambo building, it is just the most beautiful building, it is run very well. So DIRCO is a very good example and it came from…, my understanding is that the model came from Ministry of Finance, Treasury, from Trevor Manuel (South Africa Minister of Finance 1996-2009), so it came as part of the transition it was a necessary condition" [RSA-Gov-PC]. No indication as to the specific elements of the transition were mentioned.

According to the respondents, South Africa's PPPs are part of the liberal capitalist constitutional democracy. This statement was made in conjunction with the mention of race inequality and affirmative action.

In addressing the relationship between PPPs and SF, it was highlighted that some African states were born into failure, state failure, such as the DRC, which was then Zaire. They referred to a book by Herman Giliomee, who said around 1986,87, the Afrikaner Finance Minister approached the Foreign Affairs Minister and told him that, were very close to collapse and we could not

continue, "So there were signs of state failure then – due to apartheid sanction. And then in 1992, I wrote a piece, I was a columnist, on how the apartheid state was coming apart, the state was falling apart. Corruption… misallocation of funds and maladministration, insecurity and injustice. This was SF." [RSA-Gov-PC]. The aspects and elements mentioned as origins, measures and manifestations of SF in South Africa largely conform to the Fund for Peace, FSI.

When probed whether Trevor Manuel authored the PPPs, and modelling how treasury, the private sector and the state partnered, the respondent agreed and expounded on the OR Tambo building PPP case: "…they have an interesting arrangement essentially, that the private sector runs the building, the maintenance, the restaurants, janitorial services, security services, all that, and it functions" [RSA-Gov-PC]. OR Tambo is a public facility. Thus, the respondent argued that the success of PPPs is highly dependent on the public-sector leadership. In the case of the OR Tambo PPP, the leadership of Trevor Manuel. The PPP Success factors in the literature does not specifically mention public sector leadership as a factor. Instead, the literature focuses on the public sector institutional dimensions (EIU, 2015, p. 7-8)

The characterisation of PPPs by some respondents reflect a common conviction by South Africa that that PPPs primarily benefit the government and the public. Selected literature defines PPPs as a risk-sharing relationship based on common goals between the public sector, the private sector and other partners to deliver a publicly agreed outcome or public services (Graham, 2011, p. 3). Although the literature asserts that PPPs meet both public and private actors' interests, a South African government respondent argued that "the private sector cushions the state, and that the private sector is a factor in stabilizing the state? [RSA-Gov-PC]. Further asserting that the private sector currently has a minimal effect on the state, only because it is not significantly widely spread, and that if the private sector was widely spread it would cushion the state significantly.

With regard to the value for money of PPPs, and the associated public interest, and in particular, the manner in which the agreements are structured and risk, one respondent argued as follows:

In concluding the respondent indicated that there has been progress in the delivery of provision of public social services. But this progress was not aligned to the introduction of PPPs. It may be prudent to further examine the possibility of applying the PPP success factors and attaining similar outcomes using policy instruments, current or new. This inquiry resonates with the United Nations, PPPs are defined as 'voluntary and collaborative relationships between various parties, both state and non-state, in which all participants agree to work together to achieve a common purpose or undertake a specific task and to share risks and responsibilities, resources and benefits' (UN General Assembly 2005, p. 4).

8.7 Summary of the Chapter

The chapter presented a summary of the perceptions on orthodox regionalism, hegemony and the confluence between regionalism and statecraft. The findings from South Africa strongly suggest an orientation toward realist theories of RI and orthodox theories of hegemony. The arguments that South African Customs Union (SACU) has greater relevance for South Africa than SADC, suggests that South Africa's engagement in the region, is predominantly conducted within the architecture of the Apartheid state. SACU is a body borne out of the Apartheid South Africa geopolitical logic. South Africa's reported dominant logic and motivation for integration into the region was economic. The chapter demonstrated that for South Africa, economic integration takes precedence over political integration. Specifically, one respondent urged that the preoccupation of SADC should be technological and infrastructure integration for trade facilitation. Further arguing that the mutual benefits and regional economic agendas are restricted by the poor and underdeveloped industrial capacities of states in the region. Such limitations, it was argued have inhibited the creation of value chains. The posture of South Africa in the region, although not hostile and confrontational, is hegemonic with the behaviour of the metropole.

The findings on the confluence also suggest South Africa is unwilling to surrender the needed measure of sovereignty to SADC or any foreign grouping or entity. The findings show that South Africa sees RI as having insignificant influence on statecraft. South Africa admitted to being a regional power, findings suggest a strong unwillingness to influence other SADC Member States because of sensitivities about the history of the apartheid state and relations with states in the region. The concept of RI is considered exogenous, and that it was conceived by the African diaspora. It is only later that the OAU adopted the policy. Findings also firmly indicate that for South Africa the concept of fragility is subjective and context specific. This reaffirms the choice of the philosophy for the study, that of pragmatism.

9.0 CHAPTER NINE: CROSS-COUNTRY DATA PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

9.1 Introduction

This chapter presents a cross-country analysis of the findings, highlighting arguments on the existence or non-existence of a confluence between RI, SF or state functionalism and PPPs. It presents key outcomes from the analysis and triangulation of qualitative primary data, along with qualitative primary and quantitative secondary data across the three study-countres. Using qualitative primary and secondary data, the chapter analyses findings on the scope and nature of relationships between RI, SF or functionalism and PPPs. This is followed by a discussion of potential explanations of the confluence, or lack thereof, at state and regional level. Reference is made to the relevant theoretical and methodological dimensions of the finding. In the final analysis, the chapter presents multi-faceted triangulation summaries in tabular format, to allow the reader to consolidate the conclusions on the confluence against the objectives and questions of the study. These include triangulation by theoretical and paradigmatic frames, and methodological efficacy.

9.2 Results and discussion of cross-country findings from qualitative data

Findings from the three country-case study confirm that states undertake to varying degrees, commitments on regional agendas, improvements in statecraft and development of PPPS.

9.2.1 The Politico-Administrative Efficacy of SADC

An examination of findings on the politico-administrative efficacy of the current SADC architecture to deliver on the RI agenda, show serious gaps emerging from five key area: a persistent ideological indifference, state sovereignty, predominance of economic integration agendas over political integration, external influences and an absence of enforcement mechanisms.

The findings confirm that RI in southern Africa, faces challenges in creation of an endogenous politico-administrative ideology and related architecture. The primary qualitative data confirm that respondents in the region are indifferent to the ideologies that have defined RI, though they acknowledge the origins of the current model as Europe. The study also revealed that the

Eurocentric ideologies of the state and regional governance are considered normative. Respondents from all countries did not express reservations on the origins of the ideas and notions; rather they debated the implications of the different approaches used to operationalise them. There was admittedly a sense of helplessness about deconstructing and recasting the theoretical and ideological foundations of the nation state and regional governance. Respondents highlighted that the issue or non-issuance of the IMF Letter of Comfort can either prevent of trigger fragility in a country. Compliance to western democratic ethos and liberalism was considered imperative and necessary. Efforts at reconstructing the ideological premise of the state and regional governance therefore have no contemporary motivation or premise.

Although SADC was founded by the Frontline States with the main aim of liberating the last pockets of Southern Africa from colonial government, the post-apartheid evolution of SADC has places emphasis on economic integration (Moma, 2012, p. 2). The three country-cases of Botswana, Malawi and South Africa present arguments on the economic rationale of integration but question the feasibility of yielding political integration. The challenges facing the politico-administrative efficacy of RI agendas is underlined by the collective and unquestioned sanctity of sovereignty. According to South Africa, this is the prize of liberation and should be guarded. This sanctity discounts the incoherencies of the legacy of colonial geopolitics, from which these state borders emerged. Sovereignty remains a major determinant of efficacy, despite clear evidence that the notion is based on the Eurocentric concept of the nation-state known as the Westphalia nation-state, and based on the neo-colonial geopolitics of boundaries set by colonial Europe. Regardless of the centrality of sovereignty to the creation of SADC, it remains exogenously defined. Although, political independence and sovereignty are the foundational tenets of SADC polities, the study found is no evidence of their endogenous origins. Nor is there evidence of a nuanced and graduated understanding of the notion of sovereignty in the region (SADC Treaty, Chapter 3. Article 4).

Of significance in the findings on the confluence is the normalisation of ideological indifference and the epistemological premise of current statecraft in the region, herein referred to as politico-administrative agnotology. Respondents argued the merits and demerits of statecraft and regionalism in Southern Africa without mention of their origins, and where probed, without contesting their relevance for the region. As Kabanda (2014, p. 9) asserts, respondents found resonance with arguments and claims that the challenge of statecraft and regionalism in the region is predominantly owed to political leadership and lack of enforcement mechanism [BoGv-CEO-BCM] [BoDn-SA-GIZ]. Few alluded to the historical and contemporary incoherencies between the ‘prescribed’ architecture and the socio-political context. Yet leadership is not a key measure of state effectiveness or fragility.

The institutional culture that has propagated the governance norms that determine the current politico-administrative framework of the state and RI is arguably agnotological. The politico-administrative framework remains exogenous and colonised. There is a need for a framework that provides a functional endogenous RI archetype.

The essays assembled in Agnotology strive to prove just that that ignorance is often much more than a void of knowledge: it is the outcome of cultural and political struggles. Arguing that ignorance has a history and a political geography all its own, the authors outline why there are issues people are unwilling to know, and present the example of the tobacco industry slogan, 'doubt is our product' (Proctor and Schiebinger, 2008, p. 305).

The authors acknowledge that the causes of ignorance are multiple and diverse. Ignorance can be brought about by neglect, forgetfulness, myopia, extinction, secrecy, or suppression, but to facilitate this discussion, Proctor and Schiebinger (2008, p. 306) divide ignorance into three broad categories. The first is ignorance as native state, second is ignorance as lost realm, and third being ignorance as a deliberately engineered and strategic ploy. By defining and discussing the different qualities of each category, the authors demonstrate that ignorance can be the result of pure innocence, pure deceit, and everything in between. Agnotology is the study of culturally induced ignorance. Proctor and Schiebinger (2008) and it refocuses questions about how we know, epistemology, to include questions about what we do not know, and why not?

The study provides compelling evidence of agnotology in respondents' perceptions and conceptualisations of statecraft and regionalism. In all three-case study countries most respondents held the thinking, particularly the rational and logic of the ideas that drive state functionalism or regionalism as normative. The findings also reveal a disinterest in or unawareness of any ideological or theoretical influences. The exclusive preoccupation with conformity to the current exogenously determined architectural and structural dimensions of statecraft and regionalism, arguably results from an epistemological indifference to the origins of notion of fragility.

A major architectural challenge facing RI in Southern Africa evident in the findings, is the problem of "undefined sovereignty.". As presented by Keohane (2002, p. 744) "the conception that a state must have control of its external policies and can be free of external authority is an essentially European invention dating from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries". He submits that for over 300 years' external sovereignty has been associated with political success. This is the current thinking in both the African Union and SADC. But Keohane (2002, p. 744) argues

that: “a major historical accomplishment of the EU is that it has ended this association between sovereignty and success by institutionalising a conception of limited and pooled sovereignty”.

Article 4 of the SADC Treaty: Principles, stipulates that SADC and its Member States shall act in accordance with the following principles: (a) sovereign equality of all Member States.” The SADC Treaty, however, does not elaborate on the notion of ‘sovereign equality’ beyond the provisions of non-interference in the domestic affairs of Member States, one state one vote and voluntary ratification of protocols.

A scientific determination of efficacy of the politico-administrative arrangements in SADC regarding delivery on its mandate an examination of performance on the six key outcomes of SADC is required (SADC, 2004, p. 4). Such an examination evaluates the following; growth and poverty alleviation; support to the socially disadvantaged; propagation of common political values, systems and institutions; peace and security; self-sustaining development based on self-reliance and inter-dependence of members; complementarity between national and regional strategies and programmes; sustainable utilisation of natural resources and environmental protection and; strengthened and consolidated historical, social and cultural affinities. (SADC, 2004, p. 4)

The second outcome, propagation of common political values, systems and institutions, is of primary relevance to efficacy of the politico-administrative aspects of SADC. The study findings, however, indicate instruments and commitment for attainment of these outcomes are not enforceable. They are optional, and SADC lacks the mechanism to pursue compliance by Member States. This study did not evaluate attainment of the outcomes. It examined the perceived efficacy of the institutional and political arrangements towards attaining these outcomes, and found the national institutions which are key for efficacy, weak and varied across the region. According to Dr Mhlongo (2015), SADC unlike Europe and Asia, SADC has no monitoring mechanism. He argues that to focus on SADC National Committees is unproductive. Negating the national structures.

Additionally, according to Dr Thembinkosi Mhlongo, Deputy Executive Secretary of the SADC Secretariat, an assessment of efficacy is elusive because of the consistently shifting goal posts by the various stakeholders. In contrast to Golaszinski (2015, 1-13), Mhlongo (2015) submits that there are no alternative tested models for RI and that is the reason why SADC uses the ‘Linear Model’ of RI. But Mhlongo further argues that, within this pursuit of linear integration, SADC is replete with unfinished projects. He characterises this as follows;

> "We chase a rabbit, before we catch the rabbit, a gazelle comes along, we drop the rabbit and chase the gazelle. Before we catch the gazelle, a buffalo comes along. We drop the gazelle and chase the buffalo. We started with SADC and before the SADC came to fruition along came the Tripartite Free Trade Area (TFTA). We are now in pursuit of the TFTA". (Mhlongo, 2015, SADC).

The study finds that the obscurities about sovereignty have inhibited conversation about what an Afrogenic, Afrocentric and endogenous politico-administrative framework for RI in Southern Africa. The conversation regarding sovereignty is also equally mute at national level. The study revealed gross disinterest in regionalism and regionalisation at the level of governments, though there appears to be greater interest at the level of ordinary citizens. These perceptions hinder the creation of a regional economy; value chains, intra-regional trade and regional infrastructure projects. Governments continue to invest in distinguished legislation and economic arrangements, contrary to the preconditions for economic convergence needed to foster PPPs of scale. The remnant of socialist ideology also hinders the creation of PPPs, as states undertake to grow state-owned enterprises, and transnational corporations avoid partnering with the state.

9.2.2 Theoretical and Ideological influences on Southern African RI

In understanding the theoretical influences of the Trans-Atlantic Alliance on the architecture of RI in Southern Africa, the Researcher locates the analysis within the paradigm of shared identities in inter-governmental agencies. The institutional architecture and political character of such entities is often the sum of its members. The influence of the nation state on the political ideology of regional bodies is anchored in the inalienable dynamic of states' influence on the regional entity. The proposition made here is that regional inter-governmental agencies provide the space and mechanism within and through which ideology permeates from the national to the regional. The logical expectation is that after negotiation and compromise, the resultant coalesced thinking, values and philosophy, are voluntarily and progressively adopted by Member States. But this proposition has challenges, particularly in the case of southern Africa (Hartzenberg, 2011, p. 19)

However, regional institutions are contested spaces, with a select few powerful Member States, regional hegemons and pivotal states, and the ideologies that tend to dominate are seldom a culmination of negotiated positions. Consequently, the character of regional institutions is largely defined by the ideological orientation of the hegemon.

In the case of Southern Africa, the contender for a hegemon and/or pivotal state is South Africa. Its intricate political relationships with other states in the region, history of trade in both goods

and services and size of the economy, gives it a dominant position. Further, South Africa's asymmetrical trade relations with the rest of the region provides it with exceptional leverage in the SADC community (Tella and Ogunnubi, 2014, p. 148). Traditional "real politik" logic suggests that SADC would therefore be driven by the theoretical and ideological preferences of South Africa. Admittedly, throughout the study, both South African and non-south African respondents alluded to this proposition.

The findings however, diverge from the proposition that South Africa exudes an ideological hegemony in the region. Rather, the findings indicate that South Africa's hegemony is underlined by economic dominance, and that attention to the ideological or architectural aspects of regionalism, is largely in cases where they bear on trade. South Africa is restrained by two challenges. The first is internal to South Africa and it concerns the legitimacy deficit and gross inequality prevailing in the country. The second is external to South Africa and is herein referred to as colonial path dependency.

The first, "legitimacy deficit", derives from the fact that South Africa's recent political history remains largely unresolved outside South Africa. While it is generally understood that the current black majority government has not inherited the moral liabilities of the white minority apartheid regime, it must be appreciated that any explicit attempts to dominate other Member States in the region, be they "actual" or "perceived", are still regarded as Afrikaner imperialism. A view that South Africa has previously acted as an imperialist "malevolent hegemonic power (Hadebe, 2015, p. 101). South Africa must also consider the central role that states within the region played in the anti-apartheid struggle and this may at times place a socio-political debt burden on its conscience. This is coupled in recent history by the emergence of violent xenophobia (Tella and Ogunnubi, 2014, p. 159)

The other dimension of the first challenge is South Africa's unresolved domestic socio-economic inequalities. The anti-apartheid movement was driven by a predominantly Marxist ideology, although others contend that the "historical compromise" that preserved white economic privilege essentially contradicted Marxism. As argued by South African respondents, the leadership and management of civil service, state affiliated bodies and state-owned enterprises are dominated by veteran party cohorts with Marxist and socialist ideals. [H-gv-PC]. These cohorts have little interest in foreign policy and regional dominance, except where they serve narrow corporate interests. These interests address the need for increased state tax revenue, mostly from corporate taxes, which in turn finance redistribution policies and affirmative action [H-gv-PC]..

The liberation promises of the ANC Freedom Charter, specifically the economic aspects, remain largely unmet. Quoting from the Freedom Charter, it stipulates that The People Shall Share in the Country's Wealth! That, "The national wealth of our country, the heritage of South Africans, shall be restored to the people; The mineral wealth beneath the soil, the WBs and monopoly industry shall be transferred to the ownership of the people as a whole; All other industry and trade shall be controlled to assist the wellbeing of the people; All people shall have equal rights to trade where they choose, to manufacture and to enter all trades, crafts and professions" (Congress of the People, 1955).

The Marxist underpinnings in the economic propositions in the Charter call for particular attention to redistributive policies at a domestic level and protectionist policies at a regional level. Both curtail South Africa's state capability for optimal use of soft and hard economic power. It is an ironic proposition therefore, that South Africa would have an ideology, supposedly Marxist, to export to the region when in fact its own transition to political pluralism was sponsored by states in the region who had already embraced Marxist ideology (Shapiro and Tebeau, 2011, p. 96). An ideology the post-1994 state is yet to rationalise within the conext of capitalism. It is inconceivable therefore that South Africa would have a distinct ideology to export to the region.

The second challenge is external to South Africa. The most enduring political legacy in the region is that of colonialism, which to date still defines the geopolitics and politico-administrative architecture of states in the region (Soderbaum, 2004, p. 141). Relations with former European colonial states continue to inform and direct domestic policy, often through bilateral and multi-lateral arrangements. This is arguably the most pertinent barrier to South Africa's ideological hegemony in the region: the continued and uncontested influence of former European imperial nationas in the region (Soderbaum, 2004, p. 66).

A majority of the states within the region remain fundamentally dependent on European official financing assistance and markets. Malawi respondents collaborated this assertion, citing that during the Bingu Mutharika administration, support to government programmes and budget support was suspended demonstrating a connection between SF and IPE. [MwGv-PFSO-MFA]. Additionally, the EU has heavily influenced the architecture of regionalism in Africa (Pirozzi and Godsater, 2007, p. 8). It is plausible to suggest that the EU's influence, curtails and diminishes South Africa's leverage as a regional power. Similarly, it was argued that even at the level of the state, Botswana used a central European model of how to function, where if a state has a strong middle class, that class essentially supports the governance system. [BoDn-SA-GIZ].

The most profound evidence of this influence is the European Union's intervention in the SADC secretariat, the Economic Partnership Agreements and the routine assessments and ranking of states compliance with American and European governance standards, passed as Universal. Speaking at a seminar on Region Building and Peace-building in Southern Africa on 19th September 2015, Dr Ulrich Golaszinski Head of Friedrich Ebert Stiftung defined the experience of the SADC as follows: "…most efforts in regional building tend to follow a global RI script, one that starts with economic integration – free trade, then a monetary union to a governance framework with regional parliament and a judiciary" (Golaszinski, 2015, p. 1-13). Golaszinski then proceeded to ask the question "who wrote the script?", and submitted that "it appears that this is a European Union driven RI project" ; - the "script" is based on the European experience and the Westphalia state model. Golaszinski also argued that for RI to succeed it must be an institutional choice by Member States. But in the case of Southern Africa RI, SADC appears to have "downloaded" a model as opposed to choosing from a menu of options so it can customise the process to its reality.

Golaszinski (2012, p. 1-13) argues that this model is based on the "normative character" of RI and has gross deficiencies of political economy analysis (Ibid.). The result is that leaders enter cooperation agreements, and treaties and protocols whose implementation is sporadic at best. The failures discredit all actors involved. A typical example cited is the "quest" for a regional SADC parliament which the executive is disinterested.

While it is true that ideologically, trans-Atlantic constructs of liberal democracy and Marxist socialism have predominated pan-African liberation political discourse, it is also true as alluded to earlier, that the European thinking on institutionalism continues to shape RI in post-colonial Southern Africa. The absence of an endogenous political ideology presents a void within which these exogenous constructs thrive. This is not unlike Asia and South America.

Institutionally, owing to the unregulated subscription to and adoption of the European Union normative model of linear RI, SADC is a pseudo-replica of the European Union model, but without the safeguards of substantive policy convergence and 'pooled sovereignty'. The linear model is described as a sequential process and allows for incremental changes and linear progress and gives members the discretion to proceed at their own pace (Makungu, 2015, p. 14).

The verdict regarding the efficacy and feasibility of a Eurocentric linear model of integration in Southern Africa, is supported by Golaszinski (2015) and affirmed by Mhlongo (2015). This is best summarized by McCarthy (2008, p. 2) who posits: "while the European model remains relevant for the African experience, the European experience does not necessarily support the

SADC plan of integration and the proposed timetable." McCarthy outlines his position on the architectural efficacy of the current linear model of RI as follows: "the linear model is likely to benefit members if the member economies are at a particular stage of development and diversification. The weaker the economies, the greater the chances of trade diversion. An anchor economy is needed – a hegemony (Makungu, 2015, p. 14). The findings from the three-country case study support this assertion. There is a significant difference in the GCI and EoDB ranking between Botswana, Malawi and South Africa (Figure 9 - 6: EoDB V PPP Factors).

The efficacy of the linear model of integration in the African context is thus challenged on the basis that the limited level of economic development, the lack of diversification of individual economies, poor mobility of labour, focus on primary commodities and non-tariff barriers, hamper inter and intra-regional trade and sustain dependency on Europe (Ibid).

In summary, the politico-administrative character of the nation state in Southern Africa, from which the character of SADC is derived, is modelled on the Westphalia state and has evolved within Eurocentric Marxism and liberal capitalism. The unresolved institutional dilemmas of the Eurocentric post-colonial state continue to influence the architecture of all public institutions in the region; consequently, the architecture of regionalism and regionalization in Southern Africa.

The findings from the study attest to this overbearing influence of trans-Atlantic ideologies and the corresponding deficiencies in both interest and existence of endogenous influences. None of the respondents in the study alluded to or suggested that there can be an alternative model of RI. Thus, despite knowledge of the challenges with the current Eurocentric Linear model, no alternative discourse was offered.

The findings in the study confirm the logic advanced by the epistemological assertions of symbolic interactionism, that different societies interpret phenomenon based on their specific context interaction. Goldkuhl (2012, p. 142). In summary, thus far, the perceptions regarding regionalism and statecraft differ significantly from Botswana, to Malawi and South Africa. The specific aspects of IPE which respondents argued to have an impact on SF also varies from one country to another, based on history and structure of the economy. Botswana considers statecraft from the perspective of a developmental state, a state-led economy driven by partnerships with international business and common market trade. The question of coherence and relevance therefore was not considered of primary interest for the country, which defines itself differently from its neighbours in various regards. Further, the findings do not reflect dissonance with IPE. [BoGov-CEO-BCM]. It is plausible to conclude that Botswana subscribes to the idealist theory of international relations. Malawi on the other hand highlights the predominance of IPE on

statecraft at both international and regional level. Respondents highlight the overbearing impact of regional trade and geopolitical arrangements, and overreliance of foreign development financing, as major influences on its statecraft. Malawi considers the establishment of a SADC enforcement mechanism as necessary for mitigating the impact of non-compliance by dominant Member States on the country. This is unlike Botswana which evokes the need based on establishing a coherent regional market." [MwCS-ED-MEJ]. Malawi's perceptions and assertions are predominantly owed to its colonial legacy which rendered it a land-locked country, with no industry. In recent history, Malawi's supposed non-socialist inclination, alleged alignment with the minority apartheid government in South Africa and allegations of support to Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO) during the Mozambican civil war (1977 – 1992), resulted into considerable ostracising (Lalbahadur, 2013, p. 1). It is therefore plausible to suggest that Malawi subscribes to the realist theory of international relations in which states act in the self-interest for power. Finally, South Africa whose history is much more intricately entwined with IPE interests and architecture of the trans-Atlantic community, and the last bastion of constitutional apartheid on the continent, is essentially non-committal to any particular lobal model or theory. Its quasi welfare state and liberal capitalist economic dichotomy renders it so. (Burger, 2014, p. 6).

9.2.3 SF-Functionalism in the Confluence

The study has confirmed that the weak State institutions in the region have their origins in the political and economic history of colonialism and problems associated with the Westphalia state. The study revealed that countries in the region are preoccupied with sovereignty and placing historical relations with former colonial powers before regional partners. Malawi respondents highlighted the influence of the IMFs Letter of Comfort on national policy and availability of resources to the state. Botswana mentioned the historical role of the IPE on global markets, production as a factor in the fragility or stability of the state. South Africa mentioned the implications of apartheid and the resultant transformation agenda on the capacity of the state and consequently fragility of the state. The effects of colonialism and the IPE context on SF, was ably demonstrated. There was, however, no evidence of a concerted effort at regional level to address these challenges, except in recent times on the Industrialisation Strategy.

The study findings also confirm that progress in addressing SF has effectively been compromised by problems of conceptualization, definition and measurement. Respondents from all three case study countries defined fragility differently: Malawi as failure to retain external development financing [MwCS-ED-MEJ]; Botswana as the inability of a state to rein in corruption and guarantee

economic progress [BoGv-CEO-BCM]; and South Africa as the inability of the state to provide essential public services [H-gv-PC].

The literature review confirmed that structural and economic factors; Poverty, low income and economic decline, violent conflict, presence of armed insurgents, natural resource wealth/lack of natural resource wealth, geography and demographic stress, all contribute to fragility (Mcloughlin, 2012, p. 16). It also confirmed that political and institutional factors such as a crises of state legitimacy and authority, bad governance, the Westphalia (formal) institutions, and neo-patrimonial politics as indicated by South Africa, also impact on fragility. The findings clearly highlight that social factors such as inequalities, severe identity fragmentation, social exclusion, gender inequality and poor social cohesion, are equally relevant factors. Finally, throughout the study respondents emphasized the centrality, and on occasion, the predominance of exogenous factors such as the legacy of colonialism, IPE and global economic shocks as pertinent influences of SF.

In the final analysis, however, the findings, as corroborated by Olokoshi (1996), negate the notion of SF on the premise that all political communities are inherently fragile, hence the universal need for the state. In considering this proposition, the researcher introduced the pragmatist notion of state functionalism, which dwells on the catalytic characteristics of the state as opposed to its deficiencies or inhibiting characteristics. This proposition and notion, is derived from the premise that all states, regardless of age or political system, are in a transition. Thus, all states are subject to a cycle of politico-administrative shifts which renders selected aspects of its architecture and functions, evolutionary. This theoretical proposition posits that all evolutionary processes have dysfunctional elements, and it is these dysfunctionalities referred to in this study as fragility.

The above theoretical proposition, therefore, suggests that state functionalism, as preferred discourse to SF, is essentially defined by a focus on state characteristics that enhance public institutions; political legitimacy; sound economic infrastructure & programmes; social cohesion and protection; security, and symmetrical IPE relationships. Further scientific inquiry into the validity and applicability of this theoretical proposition is required.

SF though variedly defined in this study has three assumptions against which the researcher interrogates its confluence with RI and PPPs. The first is that weak State institutions have their origins in the political and economic history of colonialism and the problems associated with the Westphalia nation-state model. These assumptions were supported by the findings.. The post-colonial statecraft in Southern Africa remains a clone of the colonial state. The second is that the IPE propagates historical asymmetries by rendering universal standards that are exclusively

derived from the transAtlantic community experience. This bias also underlines the relationship between statecraft and regionalism in Southern Africa, and is a major driver of chronic SF. The third and final assumption is conceptual, and claims that progress in addressing fragility has been inhibited by problems of conceptualization, definition and measurement. There is no endogenous common conceptualization of fragility among states in the region. Each state retains the prerogative to define fragility in its context.

Poverty is a dominant discourse in Africa and southern Africa in particular. The conventional dimensions of fragility include; poverty, state legitimacy, public service and external intervention.

Botswana respondent argued that external interventions is driven largely by external shocks from global market volatility, but did not mention failure of the state to meet its international obligations. [BoGv-CEO-BCM]. Malawi correspondents, however, collaborated the FSI characterisation of failure to provide social services as a source of fragility. [MwCS-ED-MEJS]. These distinctions in the understanding of external intervention, and consequently the causes of fragility among southern Africa states, confirms that a relevant and applicable endogenous concept is yet to be conceived. Such a concept must essentially be defined by epistemological pluralism considerations.

9.2.4 Public Private Partnerships in the Confluence

The confluence between PPPs on one hand and SF and RI on the other, has profound implications for the overall study conclusion. The focus of inquiry in the study, examines the implications of the ontology and epistemology of statecraft (SF) and RI on PPPs development in Southern Africa. The findings indicate profound variations in definition and implementation in the three country-cases. In Malawi, "PPP means a contract in which a Contracting Authority partners with a Partner to build, expand, improve, or develop infrastructure or service in which the Contracting Authority and private sector partner contribute one or more of know-how, financial support, facilities, logistical support, operational management, investment or other input required for the successful deployment of a product or service, and for which the private sector partner is compensated in accordance with a pre-agreed plan, typically in relation to the risk assumed and the value of the result to be achieved" (Government of the Republic of Malawi, The PPP Act, Part I, Preliminary, No. 27 of 2011, p. 25).

In Botswana, PPPs involves a contractual arrangement between a governmental institution and a private party whereby the private sector party provides public infrastructure and/or infrastructure related services and where the provision of such infrastructure and/or infrastructure related

services is operates under the following: measurable output specifications, a payment mechanism that provides payment only on delivery of services at required standards, a transfer of financial and operational risks with consequential financial effects and demonstrates value for money to Government.

Whereas the Malawi definition emphasises the compensation of the private actor, the Botswana definition on the other hand has emphasis on the responsibilities of the private actor. This variation in the characterisation of primary purpose. These distinctions were however not reflected in the analysis. Respondents did not discuss the relationship between public and private actors. Thus, with specific reference to Botswana, the study established that state stability does affect the willingness of private actors to venture into PPPs. But there was no conclusive evidence to suggest that SF is a key consideration for investors. The study findings confirm this conclusion. As the results below will demonstrate, states classified as fragile, were simultaneously scored as highly economically competitive and business friendly. SF scores and ranking has had minimal bearing on the development of PPPs in Southern Africa. The trend is historic dating back to the pre-colonial and colonial period. As Green (1976, p. 4) submits in his work, the Integration of Africa into the World Capitalist System, penetration of the continent had several features: i) the slave trade had shattered some African societies, strengthened and warped others and generally reduced the level of productive forces; ii) the aftermath of the decline (or post-1800 abolition) of the slave trade had further altered African political and society power and production patterns and iii) the sale of arms had significantly improved the relative position of the purchasers (whether in their own society or vis a vis others).

The economic rationale for regional economic integration and improved statecraft is that both reduce transaction costs, improve competitiveness and the business environment. The study propositions posit that these conditions are necessary for the development of PPPs. The proposition further asserts that SF provides weak negotiating power, monitoring and oversight of private actors by government. This has potential for exploitative agreements. It is on the basis of this proposition that the significance of the study is argued. Specifically, the study examines the efficacy of conceptualisation and current architecture of statecraft and RI for PPP development in southern Africa.

The Figure 9 – 6 below presents a cross-country comparison of the EoDB in the case study countries. The lower the country rank the better the score in the five aspects examined. The first is registering property which measures the efficiency of transferring property (procedure, time and cost) and the quality of land administration. The second is paying taxes which measures all taxes and contributions that are government mandated and that apply to a standardized business

and have an impact in its financial statements. The third is trading across borders and it records the time and cost associated with the logistical process of exporting and importing goods, associated with three sets of procedures—documentary compliance, border compliance and domestic transport. The fourth is enforcing contracts and it measures the quality of judicial process - the time and cost for resolving a commercial dispute through a local first-instance court. Finally, is the protecting minority investors parameter which measures the protection of investors from conflict of interest.

The three-country cases studies from the case study, provide evidence of a profound understanding of the conditions and environment needed in order to undertake successful PPPs, in all three countries. The SADC framework has provisions especially in the areas of trade and infrastructure, that provide avenues for both regional and national level PPPs (SADC, RISDP, 2004, p. 93). Accordingly, a PPP Unit is being established by SADC to facilitate regional PPPs. Specific mention was made of the protocols on trade, finance and investments, as part of the regional architectural provisions for PPPs[BoML-ED-PPP] . Support to PPPs at a regional level is operationalized through the Development Bank (DBSA) managed Project Preparation and Development Facility and the African Development Bank (AfDB) (Development Bank of South Africa, 2017, p. 6). The latter is said to have made mediocre investments in Southern Africa.

Regardless, the most informative accounts of the relationship between RI, SF and PPPs were discussed within the framework of failed states. The failed state analogy in this study, refers to the notion that a state is inherently fragile if it fails to deliver public services. This study derives from the proposition that PPPs are a means to enabling states to deliver such services (Botlhale, 2016, p. 10). In this context, inability to implement PPPs not only signals failure of the state to create conducive conditions for private investors to seek PPPs, but it also suggests that the state is fragile or predisposed to fragility.

The study revealed that there are architectural and policy challenges in the RI framework that limit the capacity of SADC to enforceng compliance to regional commitments. These include the decisions on policy convergence to promote coherence and the standardization of institutional arrangements. The study also confirmed the centrality of sovereignty as a factor for depth of integration. Although others in the study mentioned cases of reduced fragility in countries like the DRC and Angola, they argued that the reduction in fertility was owed to factors other than the ability of SADC to enforce compliance [BoGv-CEO-BCM], [BoML-ED-PPP], [BoCS-SRF-BID].

The SADC framework was considered grossly deficient as an enforcement mechanism. The predominant perspective however reveals that the enforcement/sanctioning mechanisms of trans-Atlantic actors, are more effective than those of SADC. SADC is considered politically impotent as a tool for enforcing Member States' compliance to commitments.

9.2.5 Regional integration in the Confluence

The study reveals that there are possibilities that an enhanced RI framework would promote coherence in national economic policy, political systems and ensure region-wide standardization of institutional arrangements. These possibilities are further suggested by the theoretical literature and confirmed in the qualitative findings in the case study. There is, however, little evidence of a reliable correlation between RI and state craft and its implications for PPPs in the quantitative findings.

There are cases in the financial services and infrastructure sectors, and within the macro-economic convergence agenda of SADC, that confirm these possibilities. Member States in the region have progressively adopted protocols and ratified them in this regard. The role of SADC in driving policy coherence and standardization of institutional arrangements has therefore been established as effective. Countries in the region have subscribed to macro-economic convergence benchmarks and standards set at regional level.

The challenge however has been that the RI framework has no sanctioning or enforcement mechanism for non-compliance.

Considering that the degree of integration in SADC is relatively low in comparison to other regions in Africa, it is unattainable at this point to determine whether standardization of institutional arrangements through a RI agenda has reduced transaction costs for investors, or whether they have improved predictability of investment climate. Instead as reported by respondents from Botswana and South Africa, in-land transportation costs remain a barrier for trade despite SADC pronouncements to improve intra-regional trade.. The region has countries 'landlocked' by the political economy interests of Imperial Europe. Yet there has been no discussion about the possibility of improved access to the sea. Reducing inter-state and inter-corporation transactional costs as per the rational for economic integration, requires the collective effort among Member States. This effort must among others involve concessional surrender of sovereignty. A review of responses indicate that none of the countries in the case studies was prepared to surrender the degree of sovereignty necessary to achieve broad yielding economic integration [H-gv-PC] [BoCS-SRF-BID]. Additionally, Farmer (2012, p. 93), assert that the

national identities prescribed by colonial history, have become more dominant than the ethnic identities which are transnational. Both Sovereignty, along territories defined by colonialism, and ethnic identities, are a legacy of colonialism. Although in other regions it has been proven that RI reduces transactional costs, these outcomes are yet to be realised in Southern Africa [BoML-ED-PPP].

The findings of the study did not confirm that RI has strengthened State institutions or reduced SF. The study confirms that there is a broad understanding of the potential benefits of RI, but that deficiencies in Pan-African discourse necessary to collective interests and the absence of enforcement mechanisms, renders Member States potentially rogue. Sovereignty remains a pivotal aspect of RI architecture. The study also revealed that sovereignty, however, defined is considered a measure of the integrity of the state [BoCS-SRF-BID] & [BoML-ED-PPP] [MwGv-PFSO-MFA]. South Africa, for instance argued that the 'provision of public services' as a key tenet of the state is also a measure of fragility in itself. And that failure to meet this obligation or duty is tantamount to fragility. It follows then that if RI has not yielded gains in improving the provision of services by the state, then it has an insignificant bearing on SF.

RI was also considered a catalyst for the development of PPPs at a regional and national level. The proposition investigated in the study examined the role of RI in fostering and promoting mutually beneficial PPPs. The findings confirm that there are regional frameworks, plans and PPP projects in both the pipeline and being implemented. These are as indicated, in the areas of infrastructure; energy, communications and transport.

Geographically all 15 states are members of SADC, and over 75% of these states have subscribed to the Treaty, protocols and policies of SADC, the RISDP. The most integrated sectors are those of trade, finance, labour, communications and transport. It can therefore be argued that there has been 100% scope of integration and 75% have formally registered their intent to deepen their integration. The greatest challenge as alluded to earlier is in the depth of integration. This is a measure of the degree of sovereignty a country is ready to surrender. The findings indicate that few Member States are keen on surrendering a significant degree of sovereignty for any measure of common regional good[MwCS-ED-MEJS] [MwGv-PFSO-MFA] [BoML-ED-PPP]. The most influential states remain opposed to deeper integration.

Finally, the qualitative primary results from the case study however, challenge the relevance of positivist philosophy to the study of complex phenomenon such as statecraft and the confluence with regional integration. As expressed in chapter 4, the worldview governing the study is

constructivism, and this is on the merits that it provides for; understanding, multiple participant meanings, social and historical construction and theory generation (Creswell, 2009, p. 8)

9.3 Results and discussion of cross-country findings from quantitative secondary data

The findings are results of an analysis of the relationships between variables discussed in the qualitative findings section and weighs the respondent assertions against the empirical analysis of the secondary data. The analysis evaluates the propositions and parameters presented in the theoretical framework, against the quantitative secondary data on SF, RI and PPPs Indices.

The discussion challenges the premise upon which these measures are conceived including their integrity and relevance for an endogenous appreciation of the paradigms as they apply to this study.

The SF theoretical framework for the study was based on four propositions. The first is that weak State institutions have their origins in the political and economic history of colonialism and problems associated with the adoption of the Westphalia state. Bertocchi and Guerzoni (2012). The second proposition is that the present IPE context contributes to chronic SF. The third is that progress in addressing SF has been inhibited by problems of conceptualization, definition and measurement. The fourth asserts that governments have low equity in PPPs when classified as fragile states (with weak State institutions), and tend to have limited leverage of bargaining power. (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2015)

The specific measures used to assess these propositions were categorised into four. The first category was structural and economic factors: poverty, low income and economic decline, violent conflict, presence of armed insurgents, natural resource wealth/lack of natural resource wealth, geography as qualified by bad neighbours, and demographic stress including urbanization. The second category of measures is political and institutional factors, which examines crises of state legitimacy and authority, bad governance, repression of political competition, weak institutions, succession and reform crises, predation and neo-patrimonial politics. The third category was social factors as defined by horizontal inequalities, severe identity fragmentation, social exclusion, gender inequality, lack of social cohesion such as lack of social capital, weak civil society. The final category, international factors, examines legacy of colonialism, IPE, and global economic shocks, including food prices (The World Bank, 2015).

Table 9 -5 below, presents the relationships, or lack of between poverty and traditional measures of fragility. However, indicate that respondents do not consider poverty as an element of fragility.

The Figure 9 – 5 Below presents the scores for the four dimensions of fragility in the FSI: poverty, state legitimacy, public service and external interventions. Of the four dimensions, external intervention was the most cited cause by Botswana and Malawi, while public service, driven by poverty was the most cited by South Africa.

Figure 9 - 1: FSI Poverty V State Legitimacy V Public Service V External Interventions - Cross-Country Case



The comparative analysis of the FSI four dimension for the three-country case study, examines the scores for each dimension. The Fragile States Index scores are interpreted with the understanding that the lower the score, the better. Thus, a reduced score indicates an improvement, just as a higher score indicates greater instability (Fund for Peace, 2015, p. 3). The first-dimension poverty and economic decline is under the category of economic indicators. It focuses on the patrimonial ideology of the ability of the state to provide for its citizens, thereby minimising conflict between the 'haves' and 'have nots' (Fund for Peace, 2015, p. 17). Despite a high score connoting high levels of poverty, Malawi respondents did not mention poverty as a cause of fragility. This conceptual incoherence between FSI and perceptions on fragility from Malawi can be explained by the simple fact that Malawi is one of the most peaceful countries in Africa despite high levels of poverty and inequality. However, the separation between poverty and economic decline and uneven economic decline is artificial. It is the later from which class conflict emanates.

On the dimension of state legitimacy Botswana registered higher legitimacy than Malawi and South Africa. The two aspects of ccorruption and lack of representativeness in the government,

directly undermines social contract, and this underlines the state legitimacy dimension of the FSI. (Fund for Peace, 2015, p. 17). It is worth mention that as an exogenously conceived index, the FSI does not recognize and therefore assess state legitimacy from a citizen's perception of cultural, historical and current relevance of the political system and State institutions. The assumption is that present statecraft in southern Africa is suitable and legitimate, in spite of apartheid and the colonial legacy. There is a real need to have an endogenous reconceptualization of state legitimacy.

The FSI defines public service as the ability of the state to provide social services such as health and education. Of the three country-cases, only South Africa emphasized the relationship between public services and fragility. The data however indicates that Malawi has the poorest public service. This measure is collaborated in the CPIA.

Finally, the FSI dimension of external intervention, like state legitimacy is categorised under political and military indicators. The dimension is underlined by failure of the state to meet its international or domestic obligations, resulting in external actors intervening to provide services or to manipulate internal affairs (Fund for Peace, 2015, p. 17). The Botswana country-case ranked external intervention as a key factor in fragility. But the characterisation and form of external intervention differs significantly from that of the FSI.

As discussed in the sections above on the specific parameters of the indices analysed, these measures correspond with the mainstream analytical frameworks of analysis defined earlier in the section on Rationale for Selection of the Indices.

The PPPs theoretical framework for the study is based on two propositions. The first is that private actors are unwilling to venture into fragile states that are traditionally considered rife with weak State institutions affecting the costs of doing business and consequently the viability of PPPs in Southern Africa. This is based on the assumption that weak partners or – weak states bring higher liability to a joint venture or enterprise. The second proposition was that reduced SF (or improved statecraft provides a predictable and a conducive business climate. The measures for these propositions,, were integrity of public institution and public institution parameters, related to government effectiveness and public service. They comprised the availability of a legal framework and its enforcement; institutional capacity and availability of a national PPP strategy; accuracy and completeness of revenue and cost estimations; comprehension of financial and economic analysis; appropriateness of risk sharing; competitiveness of procurement; and public resistance versus willingness to pay (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2015).

Presented below are a series of outputs and analysis on the interplay and interface between SF (as expressed through CPIA and FSI) and PPPs (as expressed through Ease of Doing Business and GCI).

Figure 9 - 2: Cross-Country FSI (Public Service) V GCI



The results indicate that FSI and GCI have an equilibrium score. The higher the FSI for Public Service - the lower the GCI and for countries such as Botswana and South Africa with an FSI of 4.5 – 5, the GCI is approximately 4. Public Services reflect the condition of public institutions and vibrancy of the economy; thus poor public services are likely to inhibit competitiveness. The finding support assertions that the FSI indices, despite the bias towards security and political stability dimensions, the indices has a significance correlation with the GCI than does CPIA which focuses on State institutions and policy for aid effectiveness.

It is plausible from the findings therefore, to suggest that the Global Competitiveness Index is primarily formulated to the interests of foreign direct investor interests and not domestic investor interests. The findings strongly indicate, that foreign investors are primarily interested in security and political stability and not the condition of State institutions or public policy. This may be unlike domestic investors who are more concerned with the integrity of institutions. The finding indicates that the GCI is accordingly inclined towards the foreign investor as it has a higher degree of sensitivity to FSI than it has to CPIA. Accordingly, the illustration below in Figure 9 – 2: GCO Vs FSI, similarly affirms the proposition of a relationship between SF and economic competitiveness which in this study is a proxy for PPP Success and thus PPP development. The figure below specifically addresses the specific aspect of security apparatus.

The literature on PPP success factors does not specify security as a category or key element for success of PPPs. (Zou, Kumaraswamy, Chung, and Wong, 2014). For instance, in PPPs for infrastructure, the key factors are categorised into five areas: government's ability and characteristic, private sector's characteristics, the public's characteristics, cooperative

environment and process's characteristic (Shi, Chong, Liu and Ye, 2016, p. 5). These categories have been further subdivided into 29 elements as presented in Table: 9 – 1 below.

Table - 9: 1: Categorisation of PPP Success Factors

Government's ability and characteristic	**Private sector's characteristics (Firm's)**
Reasonable supervision Willingness Clear cooperation department Capabilities of fulfilling the contract Capabilities of administrative execution	Capabilities of fulfilling the contract Financial abilities Information disclosure reasonably and timely PPP project experience Profit expectations
The public's characteristics	**Cooperative environment**
Public opinion Public satisfaction The level of public recognition	Stable macro-economic environment Sound economic policy Complete PPP guidelines Government financial guarantee Political support Available financial and capital market Favourable legal framework
Process's characteristic	
Clear project scope definition and documentation Standardization procedure for PPP projects Project complexity Concession period Appropriate risk allocation Effective management for cost, time and quality Reasonable pricing Contract management Policies and terms for asset transfer	
Source: Shi *et al*, 2016, p. 4	

With GCI as a proxy for PPP success, the study examined its relationship with one of the region's greatest challenges for decades, security. The analysis examined the relationship between integrity of the security apparatus and economic competitiveness. Table 9 – 2 below highlights the findings.

Figure 9 - 3: Cross-Country GCI V FSI (Security Apparatus)



The capability and integrity of security apparatus is a dimension of national security which directly impacts on protection of private property and the state's ability to prosecute and enforce contracts. The conclusion made by Shi (2016, p. 15) regarding the state-side factors, was that "there is some evidence to suggest that the current role of government in PPP is more of a regulator than that of a partner, in the case of China's PPP projects".

In the case of South Africa, the weakness in the state security apparatus has no significant impact on its GCI. The emergence of private security firms may explain the high GCI score despite the poor security apparatus score. As Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2007, p. 1) states, "In recent years, specialised private companies have proliferated and expanded within the global security arena. They offer military and police services that were previously the preserve of the state". This also raises questios on the viability of PPPs in the security sector. Thus far PPPs have largely been implemented in the public sector.

From a methodological perspective, however, the GCI score may have benefitted from the 'degree of compensation' which as earlier discussed compensates the aggregate value of an indices through higher scores in variables that may not be related to the low score variables which are unrelated to the higher score one. Degree of compensation in this study thus refers to when low values on some attributes are compensated for by high values on other attributes, and this is factored by variability of the parameters under measurement. The higher the variability among the parameters, the smaller the compensation. (Koele and Westenberg, 1995, p. 398). In the case of South Africa, this suggests that its low security apparatus-related score as a factor of GCI, has

been compensated by much higher scores in other parameters of the GCI. Parameters with low variability.

A similar analysis is made in regard to the relevance of SF to protection of minority investors, who in PPPs are arguably, the private sector. Minority in this instance refers to the party with lesser liability for outcomes and not necessarily the party with lower equity.

Figure 9 - 4: Cross -Country FSI V EoDB (protecting minorities)



South Africa has a very high score for protecting minority investors. In 2016 South Africa was ranked at 24, Botswana at 76 and Malawi at 96 (The WB). This could be owed to the independence of the judiciary, policies such as BEE and other affirmative action policies and a more comprehensive regulatory framework. It could be suggested that the historical support the private sector by the state, as a peripheral to the metropole Europe, is a plausible factor. Thus, despite being considered quite fragile in regard to the failure to provide social services, South Africa has some of the world best protected minority investors. It is important to highlight that of significance is the nature of fragility, and not the aggregate score. Other elements of fragility have greater relevance that others. Thus although a country may be ranked as having higher fragility than another, it may be more economically competitive because its high fragility could be a result of higher scores in less relevant values with low variability. Resulting in higher degree of compensation.

This finding also collaborates, earlier assertions that endogenous interest must take precedence over exogenous one. In the case of protection of minorities, South Africa is driven by domestic pressures to address historical and contemporary inequalities regardless of the condition of its public institutions. Similar conclusions can be made regarding legitimacy of the state, a dimension strictly defined by liberal democratic tenets.

Figure 9 - 5: Cross-Country FSI (State Legitimacy) V GCI



Despite all three study countries having comparable state legitimacy, with moderate variations, Malawi being slightly higher, seconded by South Africa and finally by Botswana. South Africa has disproportionally high FDI when compared to Botswana and Malawi. This suggests that there are other pertinent factors at play. As a proxy for the success of PPPs, deduced from the 'investor confidence' notion, and the economic logic for integration, the study proposition asserts that FDI is subject to perceptions of state legitimacy. This affirms assertions made earlier regarding the insignificance of state legitimacy to investors. These trends were also observed in the analysis for human rights and FDI, public service and FDI as well as security apparatus and FDI.

As indicated earlier, this study established CPIA and FSI as proxy measures for SF, and o and GCI, as measures for PPP development. The study examined the disparities and similarities between the three study countries to assess the whether the ideological persuasions and special interests of the proponents of fragility as a factor in investment in PPPs, can be supported by the evidence from the quantitative secondary data analysis of the relationship between the politico-administrative (CPIA and FSI) and PPP success drivers.

Figure 9 - 6: EoDB V PPP Factors



The results can be used to extrapolate the degree of policy convergence and regional economic integration and capacity of State institutions. Of the three countries, Malawi had a better rank for registering property, with Botswana ranking the poorest. This result may also indicate the degree of economic liberalisation. For the paying taxes parameter, South Africa was ranked significantly higher than Botswana and Malawi, although the later was significantly better. There is insignificant difference in trading across border scores for Malawi and South Africa, but Botswana was ranked very poorly. There are considerable variations on enforcing contracts across the three study countries with Botswana being the poorest ranked. Finally, regarding minority investors. Similarly, all three case study countries differed significantly in rank, but Botswana had the poorest rank. The findings challenge popular assumptions that political stability and national economic growth are key for competitiveness and attracting business. Botswana had poorer rank in all the parameters, possibly due to stringent central command economic policy orientation. Despite these poor rankings, Botswana remains a more attractive destination for investors than does Malawi. Other factors are in play. RI has appears to have a greater bearing on PPP development in comparison to SF. Although the study revealed that dealings for PPPs are located at national level, the significance of fragility to the process is comparatively lower than that of RI.

However, as per the Figure 9 – 7 examines the proposition that RI has the potential of enhancing the role of statecraft in PPPs development in Southern Africa. The findings reveal the direct relationship between statecraft as measured by FSI and PPPs as measured by GCI.

Figure 9 - 7: Cross-Country FSI V GCI



A low GCI score reflects poor competitiveness which in this study is a proxy for conditions unfavourable to establishment of PPPs. The higher FSI score on the other hand reflects greater SF which in this study is defined by failing State institutions and capacity of the state to provide administrative, social and economic services. The conclusion for the three study countries indicates that in comparison, Malawi with a higher FSI (fragility), also registered a lower GCI (poor competitiveness) than Botswana and South Africa, both of whom had lower FSI (fragility). The findings suggest that there a discernible negative correlation between FSI and GCI, indicating that the higher the Fragility, the lower the competitiveness.

The analysis of the quantitative secondary data strongly suggests that the world views guiding the design and implementation of the CPIA and the FSI indices are embedded in the deterministic philosophy of postpositivist. The use of numeric measures of observation in studying the behaviour of states or governments, based on theories developed from what the researcher terms, trans-Atlantic experiences, confirms this bias. The methodologies for developing and applying the indices are based on the four key dimensions of post positivism: determination, reductionism, empirical observation and measurement, and theory verification. (Creswell, 2009, p. 6). While these indices allow for the application of scores and rankings among, as a means of reducing the data to definitive conclusion, the approach discounts the need to consider multiple meanings.

9.4 Triangulation of Sources of Evidence and Multiple Theoretical and Paradigmatic Perspectives

Presented below in matrices 9.4.1 and 9.4.2 are the theoretical and methodological triangulation respectively.

Table 9 – 4: Theoretical triangulation

Theoretical Triangulation considering research objectives									
Research objectives	Botswana			Malawi			South Africa		
	Qualitative primary data	Secondary data		Qualitative primary data	Secondary data		Qualitative primary data	Secondary data	
		Quantitative	Qualitative		Quantitative	Qualitative		Quantitative	Qualitative
Politico-admini-strative efficacy of SADC	State-centricity and IR theory of realism applied to analyse state formation, economic policy and respondent perspectives. Securities community theory. Theoretically relevant with potential for gains but no enforcement	Degree of compensation concept used in analysis of indices. Linear model of integration – political and economic integration theories used in analysing regional data. Data not definitively conclusive of regional patters and thus efficacy of RI	Supranational institution and the ceding and surrender of sovereignty. Sovereignty as an efficacy factors. Westphalia sovereignty. Unitary sovereignty. Popular sovereignty. Negative and positive sovereignty (Empirical and Juridical). Literature confirms state-centricity and Euro-centricity ideologies and	Hegemonic theory. RSA dominance. Neofunction-alism. Effective RI agenda but poor national institutional capacity to pursue. Theory on RI should have national public capacity as integral.	Degree of compensation concept used in analysis of indices. Linear model of integration – political and economic integration theories used in analysing regional data. No assessment of the depth of integration but some evidence of impact on scope of integration. Theories disregard	Supra-national organisation. Regional hegemony.	Economic integration theory. Hegemonic theory.	Degree of compen-sation concept used in analysis of indices. Linear model of integration – political and economic integration theories used in analysing regional data	Marxist theory and post-colonialism.

			inhibitive to RI efficacy.		sequence of RI parameters.				
Theoretical influences of Trans-Atlantic Alliance on Southern African regional integration	Findings indicate inclination towards theories of intergovern-mentalism Findings support the Pluralistic Communities model which emphasises sovereignty	EU Linear Integration Model. Economic integration theory.	EU linear integration Trans-Atlantic exogenous RI Theories of amalgamated and pluralistic communities. Federalism, intergovern-mentalism and neo-functionalism. Afrocentric RI theory of network regionalism.	Findings suggest influence of EU linear model of integration. Findings support the Pluralistic Communities model which emphasise sovereignty	N/A	Theory of the State	Findings support neo-functionalis m theory. Hegemonic stability theory		Marxist theory and post-colonialism
Influence of exogenous nature of state development on African statecraft	Theory of Force and social contract theory. Post-colonialism. Besley and Persson State pathologies theory as applied to the FSI and CPIA.	N/A	Westphalia nation-state. Post-colonialism. Neo-colonialism. Marxism State Fragility	Neo-colonialism. Realism.	N/A	Endogenous Pragmatic unilateral capitalism. Hegemonic theory.	Marxist theory	NA	Developmen tal state. Social contract theory
Position of public-private partnerships in the architecture of regional	Economic Integration Theory. Transaction theory. Agency	EU Linear Integration Model	Agency theory and transaction cost theory – principal agent and positivist stream	IR theory of Realism – competing state interests. IPE World Systems	EU Linear integration model	Economic Integration Theory Hegemony Theory	EU Linear Integration Model	EU Linear integration model	Hegemony theory

integration in Southern Africa	theory. Post-colonialism								
SADC's consideration of relationship between SF or state functionalism and PPP development	Bertocchi Colonial and Regional Characteristics theory. Regional economic integration. Securities Community theory	Economic integration. Economic liberalisation	EU linear model of integration. Minimalist state and the Westphalia nation-state	Bertocchi Colonial and Regional Characteristics theory. Regional economic integration	Economic integration. Economic liberalisation	EU linear model of integration. Minimalist state and the Westphalia nation-state	Economic integration. Economic liberalisation	Hegemony theory Economic integration	EU linear model of integration. Minimalist state and the Westphalia nation-state

Table: 9 - 5 Methodological triangulation

Methodological Triangulation considering Research Questions									
Research Questions	Botswana			Malawi			South Africa		
	Qualitative primary data	Secondary data		Qualitative primary data	Secondary data		Qualitative primary data	Secondary data	
		Quantitative	Qualitative data		Quantitative	Qualitative		Quantitative	Qualitative
To what extent is the theoretical paradigm employed in the architecture of SADC's RI agenda practicable and productive in guiding SADC's set objectives?	In-depth Interview with government, non-state and civil society suggest conformity and subscription to the EU linear model of integration	N/A	Literature review on various theories of RI and the state. Botswana has no ideological inclination o regional integration but has adhered to the orthodox logic of economic integration.	In-depth Interview with government, non-state and civil society Indicate an ideological indifference. Models and assumptions were not questioned	N/A	Literature review indicates that Malawi has historically been considered a a pariah due to anti-socialist and relations with apartheid South Africa and has not benefitted.	In-depth Interview with government, non-state and civil society Strongly suggest an inclination towards economic integration, and has benefitted	N/A	Literature review suggests that South Africa's ideologies influence the architecture especially in the area of economic integration
To what extent has the socio-political and politico-administrative aspects of the southern African RI	In-depth interviews reported that there has been influenced by the dynamic of SF. Due to weak state states	N/A	The literature review on regional integration for Botswana reveal a reluctance to join the Union of South Africa. Also reveals marginal interest in	In-depth interviews suggest a strong recognition of the relationship between RI	N/A	Literature review reveals a disconnect in post-colonial statecraft and regionalisation in Malawi. Poor economy	In-depth interviews provided perceptions that South Africa guards against RI	N/A	Literature review suggests South Africa finds the value of RI in its role to

framework been influenced by the dynamic of SF or state functionalism?	outside the region have reportedly driven the agenda. The effect of IPE. Botswana also reported that RI has assisted address SF in the DRC and Angola		SADC. Suggest that as a good economy with low SF and little dependency on regional markets – there is marginal investment in RI. Also highlighted sterility of RI (SADC) in addressing sanction-driven economic crisis in Malawi. IPE factor.	and SF. Malawi cited SADC protocols and committees, and national reforms in trade institutions as evidence. Also highlighted the negative impact of sovereignty on RI.		heightened dependency on RSA and Mozambique minority governments, and limited participation in SADCC. Lone capitalist statecraft isolated post-colonial state from direct liberation movements who drove RI. SADC (RI) implementation is multi-sectoral.	influences in defence to its 'hard earned' independence. A view that RI diminishes sovereignty.		bolster national economy through regional markets. RI is considered a foreign affairs domain.
How does the SADC RI agenda address interactive links (if any) between SF or functionalism and public–private partnerships in the region?	In-depth interviews reports provided no assertions from Botswana of the effect of RI on the relationship between SF and PPPs. Instead reports indicated leadership as a critical factor. The findings	Statistical data analysis of existing data on state fragility-related parameters and PPP related parameters suggest the relationships unique to each country at	Literature review also provides no evidence of the influence of RI on the SF & PPP development. Botswana's relatively successful PPPs were driven by state policies that are distinguishable from those across the region. A unique democratic	In-depth interview reports confine the role of RI in statecraft and the economy to trade development. PPP Commission was a response to IPE factor, the World	Statistical data analysis on regional trends provide no attributable patterns of linkages between RI and SF and PPPs. Scores and rankings show significant	Literature review reveals a significant disconnect between Malawi scores and ranking on Sf and PPPs and actual PPP projects. RI agenda project are confined to transport corridors and	In-depth interview findings indicate a strong relationship between SF and PPPs, driven by domestic factors, not RI. PPPs considered key to	Statistical data analysis findings confirm the marginal role of RI in the confluence, but indicate a significant relationship between SF and PPPs –	Literature review presents evidence of major PPP ventures in management of public utilities and provision of social services, at national and decentralised

	from primary data disconfirm the confluence between RI and SF- PPPs.	national level. Findings indicate inconsistent relationship across the region, strongly negating the role of RI in the relationship between SF & PPPs	governance model that integrates traditional political institutions into the legislature, creating stability, can be considered a key factor in investor confidence and successful PPPs. Government policy on PPPs is pro-equitable dividends.	Bank. Not an RI agenda. Malawi's failed historic PPP failed was never supported by RI. No members offered political or technical support. SADC framework offers no model legislation.	relationship between SF and PPP related elements. But actual outcomes are non-existent.	ICT for intra-regional trade, not national PPPs. Government policy on PPP is pro-private actor.	reducing SF considered to be driven by poor public services. Confluence between SF and PPPs was reportedly significant, and that between RI and SF or PPP as non-existent	as represented by proxy indices.	levels. PPPs are intricately related to governance, and thus statecraft and/or SF. Absence of PPP results in poor pubic services which causes instability and SF inturn.

9.5 Summary of the Chapter

The chapter focused on the specific interface of the three concepts as they manifest in the three-case country study and a regional level. The chapter presented an analysis of the confluence of the three concepts, RI, SF or state functionalism and PPPs from a theoretical and architectural dimension. The analysis in the chapter confirms that inter-relatedness of the three concepts as phenomena, and further provides evidence of how the assumptions outlined in the study conceptual framework manifest in the region. Essentially, the chapter summarised the rationale for transitioning from SF to state functionalism. The chapter therefore sets the background upon which the theoretical constructs and propositions are made in Chapter Ten.

10. CHAPTER TEN: SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

10.1 Introduction

This chapter presents a summation of the conclusions from each of the thesis chapters highlighting the substantive discussion and the contribution of each chapter to the objectives of the study. A concise but novel dimension of each chapter is presented in preamble to the overall summarisation of the findings and their implications for both policy and new knowledge. In this chapter the Researcher also presents a summary of the key findings by study objective, describing the confluence from the outcomes of the triangulation of all data types. Finally, the chapter presents new formulations for understanding and addressing the challenges and exogenously driven epistemological dilemmas confronted by the study. In the final analysis, the chapter submits epistemological propositions of the influence and character of politico administration in Southern Africa.

10.2 Recapitulation of Research Objectives and Research Questions

The country case studies summarised above have been considered within the mainstream and orthodox theories of RI, statecraft and PPPs. The literature review presents these theories and their resultant architecture in state craft and RI as exogenous, although this characterisation is elusive in the qualitative findings of the case studies. In recapitulating the research objectives however, the Researcher situates the arguments within the possibility of an endogenous alternative. In particular, the analysis seeks to explore the possibility of an alternative endogenous theory and institutional architecture for Southern Africa. The specific aspects of endogeneity are directed by and derived from the research objectives and questions, presented below in a recapitulation of their match with the research objectives. Details of the relationship was presented in Chapter One.

Table 10 - 1: Matching Research Objectives and Questions

Item	Research Objectives	Research Questions
1.	To examine the politico-administrative efficacy of the current SADC architecture in delivery of the desired outcomes of the RI agenda.	To what extent is the theoretical paradigm employed in the architecture of SADC's RI agenda practicable and productive in guiding SADC's set objectives?
2.	To describe the theoretical influences of the Trans-Atlantic Alliance on the architecture of southern African RI.	
3.	To interrogate the influence that the exogenous nature of state development in southern Africa has had on SF or state functionalism.	To what extent has the socio-political and politico-administrative aspects of the southern African RI framework been influenced by the dynamic of SF or state functionalism?
4.	To investigate the position of non-state actors, namely PPPs, in the architecture of RI in southern Africa.	How does the SADC RI agenda address interactive links (if any) between SF or functionalism and public–private partnerships in the region?
5.	To explore the degree to which the SADC RI framework considers any relationship between SF or state functionalism and PPPs development.	

10.2 Summary of Chapters

The summary of chapters highlights issues and findings contained in Chapters One to Nine. It summarises how each chapter contributed to achieving specific research objectives and research questions.

10.2.1 Chapter One: Introduction to the study

The chapter introduced the study by first defining the problem which the Researcher sought to address. It outlined the rationale for the study, research objectives, research questions and the methodology the researcher employed in the inquiry. The chapter also presented a preliminary ontological and epistemological perspective on the ideological and architectural dilemmas of the three key concepts in the study. These are RI, state functionalism and PPPs. Orthodox definitions of the concepts are also presented in the chapter. The chapter presented an introduction to the essence of each research objective and question as would be interrogated and discussed in Chapter's Two to Nine.

10.2.2 Chapter Two: Orthodox paradigms of global and regional governance

This chapter established the IPE context within which the dominant IR theory, statecraft and regionalism have been conceived and evolved in mainstream academia and practice. It

highlighted the historical and contemporary orientation of the paradigms, whose epistemology derived from the 'trans-Atlantic' experiences. The chapter demonstrated the predominance of post-World War Two trans-Atlantic thought, which has influenced the theory and politico-administrative architecture of both the state and regionalism (RI). In this regard, the chapter addressed research objectives two: To interrogate the influence that the exogenous nature of state development in southern Africa has had on SF or state functionalism, and objective three: To describe the theoretical influences of the Trans-Atlantic Alliance on the architecture of Southern African RI. In particular, the chapter answers the question: 'To what extent is the theoretical paradigm employed in the architecture of SADC, practicable and productive in guiding the pursuit of SADC's objectives?

The chapter also discussed the notions of and established the relationships between colonialism, globalisation and sovereignty, which are key in the formulation of measures and parameters for the study of the confluence between RI, state functionalism and PPPs. The chapter therefore provided the basis upon which an interrogation of the theoretical influences on the confluence was undertaken.

10.2.3 Chapter Three: Theories foundational to the study

This chapter presented a nuanced account of the ontology and epistemology of RI, SF, PPPs and state functionalism. It examined the popular theories on the concepts and isolated those that appear to best inform the discussion in the study. The chapter made assertions on the the specific theoretical influences that have shaped the thinking on RI, SF or state functionalism and PPPs in Southern Africa. The chapter also examined the rationale for choice of specific theories and their appeal to the study from a multi-disciplinary and constructivist approach.

The discussion responded to research objectives two; to interrogate the influence that the exogenous nature of state development in southern Africa has had on SF or state functionalism; and three; to describe the theoretical influences of the Trans-Atlantic Alliance on the architecture of Southern African RI. In responding to these objectives, the chapter answered question three: to what extent is the theoretical paradigm employed in the architecture of SADC's RI agenda practicable and productive in guiding SADC's set objectives?

The chapter also presented the orthodox measures of the three concepts and examined theory relevant to a new conceptual proposition relevant to the study, state functionalism.

10.2.4 Chapter Four: Research methodology

The methodology chapter presented the philosophical foundations of the research methodology and the design logic pertaining. These were the constructivist, interpretivist and pragmatist worldviews. The chapter also made brief inference to the reflectivist worldview. A discussion of the research design, strategy, sampling, data collection, data quality control and data analysis methods for the qualitative primary data, qualitative secondary data and quantitative secondary data, wasalso presented in this chapter. A detailed outline of the case study approach and its application, together with the non-experimental quantitative approach were offered. To situate the analysis within the frame of the confluence, each parameter of the indices that was analysed from the quantitative secondary data was described and the rationale for cross-analysis of the variables is also presented. Underlining the chapter is a detailed logic of the choice to employ a multi-method research design and its appropriateness in respect of the philosophical worldviews. The chapter elaborated how the inquiry enabled the researcher to respond to all the study objectives and questions.

10.2.5 Chapter Five: The Southern African region

This chapter discussed the case study context and findings. It described and analysed the historiography and evolution of key regional institutions in Africa, and highlighted their varied origins and interests. The chapter briefly described the key instruments and features that define the architecture of RI, state functionalism and PPPs in the southern Africa region. The chapter discussed the epistemological dilemmas that characterise these institutions and phenomenon, and examined the efficacy of the exogenously driven thinking and architecture on regionalism, statecraft and PPPs, through an analysis of the results of the quantitative secondary regional data. The chapter thus responded to the study objectives one: -to examine the politico-administrative efficacy of the current SADC architecture in delivery of the RI agenda desired outcomes; two - To interrogate the influence that the exogenous nature of state development in southern Africa has had on SF or state functionalism; three - to describe the theoretical influences of the Trans-Atlantic Alliance on the architecture of southern African RI; and five -to explore the degree to which the SADC RI framework considers any relationship between SF or state functionalism and PPPs development. Thus, the chapter contributes to all three study questions.

10.2.6 Chapter Six: Case Study of Botswana: Data presentation, analysis and findings

This chapter discussed the background and context of Botswana, and the findings from the case study. Botswana was selected as a country case study for its characteristics as a relatively young state in the region, and a middle-income country which has never been formally colonised. The

chapter outlined the state formation experiences of Botswana. Unlike the majority of other African countries, Botswana was not a colony in the true sense of the word, but rather a British protectorate state. As a result, Botswana avoided full colonisation, which enabled the preservation and inheritance of Tswana state culture by the post-protectorate state elites (Hillbom, 2012, pp. 2-20). The chapter also highlights the unique orientation of state formation which is arguably inclusive and espouses a state culture in which economic accumulation is considered a worthy state function, establishing institutions to allow for the creation and maintenance of new wealth (Hillbom, 2015, p. 79. The chapter emphasised Botswana's economic success driven by a one-party system with a National Development Plan that foregrounds self-reliance as a foundational principle of government policy. The chapter also discussed Botswana's politico-administrative challenges which render it a flawed democracy. According to the Economist Intelligence Unit (2015), flawed democracies are countries that often have free and fair elections and largely respect basic civil liberties. However, they exhibit notable weaknesses in other aspects of democracy such as governance, an underdeveloped political culture and poor political participation and infringements on media freedom. The chapter also highlighted the critical aspect that Botswana's foreign policy is non-aligned and indifferent to the popular liberation agenda, that Botswana is largely driven by economic interests. The Chapter contributes to objectives two: To interrogate the influence that the exogenous nature of state development in southern Africa has had on SF or state functionalism; Four: To investigate the position of non-state actors, namely PPPs, in the architecture of RI in Southern Africa; and five: To explore the degree to which the SADC RI framework considers any relationship between SF or state functionalism and PPPs development.

10.2.7 Chapter Seven: Case Study of Malawi: Data presentation, analysis and findings

The chapter discussed Malawi's historical and contemporary context. It was chosen for its unique history and characteristics as a state that emerged out of an ancient kingdom of the Maravi and was later colonised by Britain to become part of the Federation of Nyasaland and Rhodesia. The chapter highlighted the relatively insignificant role of Malawi in the colonial era as a labour reserve, and later in post-independence Malawi as a non-socialist, pro-western state. Attaining independence in 1964: this period of Malawi's dynamic democracy ushered in five presidents and four political parties into government. The chapter also discussed the predominantly agrarian and rural population, which impacts on a poorly performing economy, with a high donor dependency. The chapter demonstrated that Malawi has undertaken various economic policy reforms and introduced public institutions such as the PPP commission and other accountability institution. Emphasis on Malawi's challenging foreign policy and relations was also outlined in the chapter. As a small and landlocked country Malawi found it imperative to deal with the white minority government in South Africa and was later accused of aiding RENAMO in Mozambique. Malawi's

foreign policy and relations therefore have been pro-west. The chapter describes Malawi's current international challenges, from the Tanzania-led dispute of Lake Malawi to the challenge of developing the Shire- Zambezi waterway to which Mozambique is vehemently opposed to.

The chapter contributed to objectives; two: To interrogate the influence that the exogenous nature of state development in Southern Africa has had on SF or state functionalism; four: To investigate the position of non-state actors, namely PPPs, in the architecture of RI in Southern Africa; and five: To explore the degree to which the SADC RI framework considers any relationship between SF or state functionalism and PPPs development.

10.2.8 Chapter Eight: Case study of South Africa: Data presentation, analysis and findings

This chapter discussed South Africa's state formation, economy and foreign relations. The chapter accordingly discussed the founding of a democratic state in 1994, and the history of apartheid dating back to 1948. The chapter discussed the unique state formation experiences of South Africa, highlighting the challenges of race relations, gross economic inequality, international state terrorism of the apartheid regime and the role of the international community in sustaining apartheid. The chapter also presented the unique demographic of South Africa and its role as a regional hegemon owing to its economy. An analysis of South Africa's peculiar economy was also presented in this chapter, highlighting the racial differences in economic opportunities and employment, and the establishment of a welfare state to address these inequities. The chapter delved into the unique 'dual economy' feature of South Africa, characterised by a part of the economy intimately linked to the global economic circuit through international value chains, and another part a peasant subsistence economy.

Of significant relevance is the chapter's analysis of South Africa in regional politics and trade as mediated through regionalism and foreign policy? The chapter discussed the complexities of South Africa's membership to the BRICS, SADC, the TFA and SACU, all of which the chapter demonstrates entrenches its hegemonic role.

This chapter significantly contributed to objectives; two: To interrogate the influence that the exogenous nature of state development in southern Africa has had on SF or state functionalism; four: To investigate the position of non-state actors, namely PPPs, in the architecture of RI in Southern Africa; and five: To explore the degree to which the SADC RI framework considers any relationship between SF or state functionalism and PPPs development.

10.2.9 Chapter Nine: Cross-country: Data presentation, analysis and findings

The chapter discussed the interface and relationship between the three study concepts as they manifest in the three-case country study and a regional level. The chapter analysed the validity of assumptions regarding the causal-effect relationships between RI, SF and PPPs, in both theoretical and architectural terms. Essentially, the chapter also summarised the rationale for transitioning from SF to state functionalism, setting the background upon which the new theoretical constructs and propositions can be made. The chapter contributed to all the five study objectives and addressed the three study questions, consolidating the analysis from previous chapters on theoretical influences on the study concepts, efficacy of statecraft and regionalism architecture, the confluence of the study concepts. In the final analysis, the chapter submitted possible explanations for the varied perceptions from respondents.

10.3 Summary of Findings and Conclusions

This section shows how each research objective and research question was addressed in the study. It highlights the extent to which the philosophical worldviews informed the analysis of findings and their attainment of study objectives and response to the study questions. The section also summarises the outcomes from the application of the study conceptual and analytical frameworks.

10.3.1 Objective One: Examining the politico-administrative efficacy of SADC architecture for the attainment of desired outcomes on RI agenda

The conceptual framework defines politico-administrative efficacy in regionalism as arrangements that ensure that Member States of a regional body satisfy three critical aspects: full geographical scope; ii) substantive coverage, and iii) depth of integration as follows. First is that all Member States in a specific geography join the body, which is referred to as geographic scope. This is illustrated by the number of countries involved in an arrangement. The second is the breadth of sectors or activity coverage of Member States, and adoption of common standards on in the treaty (trade, labour mobility, macro-policies, sector policies, etc.). This is called substantive coverage. Third, is the degree of sovereignty a country is ready to surrender, that is from simple coordination or cooperation to deep integration. This is measured by the extent to which a Member State has adopted and implemented regional policies.

The conceptual framework also defines desired outcomes of RI as convergence and coherence in national economic policy and governance systems, and region-wide standardisation of institutional arrangements. Further, among the key outcomes are effective enforcement mechanism and reduced transaction costs that improves predictability of investor climate. The

implications of such outcomes in the case of this study are strengthened State institutions or reduced SF and mutually beneficial PPPs.

In examining the findings and drawing conclusions regarding the politico-administrative efficacy of SADC, these aspects guide the analysis. Although the philosophical worldview guiding the study does not align with the realist and idealist IR theories, or positivism, an analysis of these aspects demands a state-centric approach. This is because the development of the conceptual framework was guided by orthodox IR theory. Only the assumptions however, were informed by the pragmatist worldview and were thus non-committal.

Having highlighted the state-centricity of the analysis, the Researcher examined two critical dimension of statecraft which impact on regionalism: sovereignty and lack of enforcement mechanisms which led to the following findings and conclusions:

a. Undefined sovereignty and unsanctioned default

Two aspects underline the key findings in response to this objective of establishing the efficacy of SADC: willingness to surrender sovereignty and an enforcement mechanism for defaulting Member States. The two aspects are particularly pertinent considering the diverse linguistic and historical variations of states in the region.

The findings in the study first confirm that SADC has attained geographical scope and substantive coverage but is unable to effectively implement regional agendas due to the unwillingness of Member States to surrender their sovereignty. In both the literature review in Chapters three and five; the Southern Africa region, and the three country-case studies of Botswana, Malawi and South Africa, the resistance to surrendering a degree of sovereignty was highlighted. Most importantly, SADC has not institutionalised an enforcement mechanism to deter, manage or mitigate members in default. South Africa, for instance intimated that its sovereignty cannot be subject to the collective interest of other Member States. Sovereignty occupies Member States and its protection is enshrined in both the African Union and SADC Treaties.

In the case of South Africa, the findings indicate that South Africa is unwilling to surrender any measure of sovereignty to SADC or any foreign grouping or entity. The findings show that South Africa does not see RI as having influence of statecraft.

The conclusion on the finding is that these arguments, not-withstanding SADC countries and SADC are yet to examine the possibility of recognising varied forms sovereignty, and their implications for RI. The inspiration to forge endogenous conceptualisations of sovereignty can

be found in examining the categories of sovereignty authored presented by Robert Jackson. Following the end of the Second World War, Jackson was faced with the challenge of reconciling the sanctity of sovereignty of nations and the need to occupy the Axis powers. To this end, he authored the categories: Empirical, Juridical and Popular sovereignty. SADC should consider the possibility of such authorship based on its unique experiences.

b. Lack of enforcement mechanism

Similar conclusions are highlighted for an enforcement mechanism. In the case of Botswana, for instance, respondents insisted that the state-REC relationship understandably appears tilted in favour of state power. Countries tend to look after their own interests first before those of the region, which suggests that the RI framework does not have an effective mechanism for ensuring compliance. Agreements are made but are seldom implemented at state level. The respondents cited the Southern Africa Power Pool (SAPP) as a prime example, where countries that produce power in excess are encouraged to approach countries in the region that are have a capacity deficit and offer to sell the surplus. It is true there is a shortage of power in the SADC region

In conclusion, the findings suggest that a redefinition of the concept of RI and realignment with the architecture of RI in the specific context of southern Africa is needed. Southern Africa is a region with the youngest states on the continent, most of which are still undergoing basic nation and state formation processes. It is imperative to establish arrangements that accommodate such diversity. It is plausible therefore to conclude from the findings, that there is no definitive endogenous theoretical paradigm informing the architecture of SADC. The theoretical paradigms that currently inform the architecture have conflicting ideological and conceptual precincts that are in conflict with the historical and contextual realities of Southern Africa.

Of interest to the conclusions are assertions made by some scholars are offered in the literature review. They assert that '"While formal institutions are necessary to oversee the linear progression of the various phases of integration, RI does not necessarily require formal institutional structures, nor is there necessarily a linear progression of integration. In the case of the latter, integration is assessed by the amount of economic, political, social and cultural interaction that transpires between Member States. It does not require all Member States to share these activities simultaneously" (Kinyua, 2015, p.3-4). He discounts the relevance of formal institutions of regionalism. The alternatives are however poorly argued, and it appears little research exists in support of such propositions.

To consider the efficacy of a non-institutional architecture of RI, the Researcher examined the integrity of the soft architecture; treaty, convention, policies and minimum standards. The findings from the respondents however indicate that 'there is a need for SADC to establish one set of protocols in every sphere, similar for instance, to the approach of Canada's Ministry of Finance, where the Free Trade Agreement is implemented in such a way that each province of the country has equal banking laws. Known as the equals approach, this process ensures that there are no hindrances to investment from the US and South America due to compliance requirements based on different set of laws in different provinces". Respondents emphasised that such arrangements require political will and institutional capacity to implement. 'The key factors here are political will, the right policies, the right protocols and the ability to implement them [BoML-ED-PPP].

It is therefore plausible from the findings to conclude that the soft architecture of RI also suffers from the incoherencies and non-committal attitudes of Member States, and further, that no scientific determination of the ideological influences and conceptual origins of the prevailing RI model, has ever been undertaken.

Mhlongo proposes that national arrangements should instead focus on National Planning agencies or commissions and parliaments; institutions that have the mandate to implement and translate the SADC Regional Indicative Strategic Plan (RISDP) and overall mandate at national level". The proposal clearly suggests that SADC has grossly limited influence of statecraft in Southern Africa because it lacks the structural arrangements to do so.

The challenge with this proposition however is that whereas RI demands "pooled sovereignty", SADC Member States are still preoccupied with "national sovereignty". According to Ahrens and Diez (2015, pp. 341-348). "terms such as power and sovereignty are subject to political struggle and thus change through history. Sovereignty is such a notion and since its invention in sixteenth century Europe it has taken a number of denotations and connotations." The notion is affected by attitude and the policy language applied.

10.3.2 Objective Two: Describing the theoretical influences of the Trans-Atlantic Alliance on the architecture of Southern African RI

The study found that the most predominant influence on the architecture of Southern Africa is the European Union, a grouping of states formed from a negotiated compromise entered after three major conflicts. The first is the 30-year war from 1618-1648 which culminated into the Westphalia Treaty, the second is the first World War of 1914-1918 which culminated into the Treaty of Versailles, and the third is the second World War of 1939-1945 which led to the creation

of the United Nations, the Bretton Woods Institutions, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and later over a period of half a century the European Union. These treaties and institutions emerged from period of conflict. In contrast, the state and institutions in Africa emerged after the defeat of colonialism and Imperialism. Despite this distinction in the experiences that led to the creation of these states and supranational institutions, there are no discernible differences in the conceptual or architectural forms.

The findings from the primary qualitative data (case studies), secondary qualitative data (literature review), and the quantitative secondary data, confirm that the predominant theoretical influences and politico-administrative architecture forms in Southern Africa, are exogenously driven. Of particular interest is the Eurocentric conceptualisation of the state and regionalism. The findings particularly in the qualitative secondary and quantitative secondary data, indicate that both the political and economic orientation are based on exogenous interests.

Additionally, turning to the qualitative secondary data analysed, an examination of the parameters and measures that define RI all reflect an exogenous bias towards the contextual realities in Europe. An example of such a parameter is that of the 'depth of integration'. The parameter measures the degree of sovereignty a country is willing to surrender. It is concluded that, in the context of Southern Africa, sovereignty is viewed congruently with liberation and independence from colonialism. In this regard, the more relevant measure would have been one that allows Member States to determine the degree of politico-administrative convergence, a process and outcome that seeks to negate the predominance of one colonial system of government or statecraft, to a negotiated endogenous architecture of RI. Such a goal has no exogenous anchorage as a concept, or RI parameter, specifically because it serves no external interests. On the contrary, such a notion or measure would negate the orthodoxy and normative assertions about RI.

The findings in the qualitative secondary data further present a nuanced analysis of exogenous conceptual influences on regionalism. The Researcher highlights orthodox IR theory of realism and idealism to RI theories of security community, federalism, intergovernmentalism, and neofunctionalism. These theories which are state-centric, and their application to state and regional governance, rely on the use of force and sanctions. This is evident in the securities community theory which has two types: amalgamated communities and the pluralistic communities. The theory claims its pluralistic type recognises sovereignty but at the same time legitimises the use of force.

In answering the question on the extent to which the theoretical paradigm employed in the architecture of the SADC has guided the delivery of SADC RI agenda, the Researcher highlights

the challenge of evaluating regionalism. It is concluded that an assessment of the extent to which the RI agenda has been delivered must accordingly consider the incongruences between conceptualisation and architecture of SADC on the one hand, and the aspirations of Member States on the other. As indicated earlier, the parameters and measures being exogenous, do not adequately assist in mapping progress beyond adoption of treaties, conventions and protocols. It is further concluded that the disregard for conceptions of sovereignty all contribute to the challenge of poor policy convergence, and low region-wide standardization. The bias evidently is in the focus on economic integration, which from the qualitative primary findings (case study) appears to confine the debate to trade, market integration, and technology infrastructure for development.

10.3.3 Objective Three: Interrogating the influence of exogenously driven Southern African state development on SF or state functionalism.

The logic presented in the conceptual framework driving the study, asserts that weak State institutions have their origins in the political and economic history of colonialism and problems associated with the Westphalia nation-state model. The framework also holds the claim that the present IPE context contributes to chronic SF. The study found that such fragility derives in part from the asymmetrical arrangements that characterise the relationship between African states and former colonial powers. The conceptual framework that guided the study led to the study's finding that progress in addressing fragility has been inhibited by problems of conceptualization, definition and measurement. Another finding regarding the confluence of RI, SF and PPPs is that governments seem to have limited leverage and low equity in PPPs, or fail to attract PPPs if classified as fragile states. Hence, the relationship between SF and PPP is primarily anchored in the logic that the condition of State institutions is pertinent to the success of PPPs.

The findings in both the qualitative primary data from the case study and the qualitative secondary data from the literature review suggest that there is a predominantly exogenous epistemological and ontological derived from the colonial and neo-colonial interventions in Southern Africa. The secondary qualitative data findings indicate that the foundational theories guiding the creation of the state in Southern Africa and the politico-administrative framework within which it exists and operate, are all guided by the European experience and the thinking of post-World War II trans-Atlantic institutions.

The literature review defines the challenge of exogenously driven statecraft from the theoretical and architectural perspectives.

10.3.3.1 Negative epistemology of the African State

The characterisation of the African state in European and American academia is arguably an extension of the negative epistemological archetype which was conceived in the colonial era to legitimise European intervention in Africa. The problematisation of African polities and African statecraft is manifest in the mainstream African governance narrative. This Afropessimist negative paradigm is defined by three aspects; decontextualisation; form fixation; and linearity. The first decontextualisation involves the deliberate disregard and negation of unique contextual realities such as the complex identity politics of nation-building. This challenge creates difficulties is establishing a coherent state. The second, form fixation refers to prejudicial assumption that the African state is fixated in a single, politico-cultural prototype, defined by disregard for established laws and corruption. The third, linearity refers to the application of orthodox state formation models which assert that states evolve in a linear manner and are unable to evolve to the next stage before satisfying the requirements of one stage. Similar logic is applied to regionalism in SADC. This negative epistemology of African statecraft justifies the focus on fragility and failure.

The most resilient and profound exogenous influence on state development therefore, is the narrative of SF itself. As a concept SF is concerned with the inhibitors of the state and its application to African states, including southern Africa. The concept connotes the orientation of western institutions towards African statecraft, evident in the persistent narrative of negative statecraft, which focuses on fragility and failure. The secondary qualitative data revealed this orientation in SF theory.

It is concluded that the qualitative secondary data reveals an entrenched exogenous negative epistemology of the African state that has diverted the discussion from the positive evolutionary dimensions of the state to the negative characteristics of a transitional state. It is further concluded that a reorientation of state development is essential in relocating the narrative from a negative epistemology focusing on inhibitors to a positive epistemology focusing on catalysts. The goal of state functionalism as conceptualised in this study, is to achieve the catalytic characteristics internally, considering historical cultural, economic and politico-administrative contexts. Such a contextual approach would be better suited for expressing sovereignty in a way that facilitates endogenously driven RI.

10.3.3.2 Politico-administrative agnotology

A more resilient exogenous influence on the state in southern Africa was observed from the persistent epistemological indifference to the origins of state ideology and architecture.

Respondents treated the ideological foundations of the state and its politico-administrative architecture as normative. The findings indicate that the preoccupation of political actors in Southern Africa regarding the state is centred on the degree to which the political class and bureaucrats conform to prescribed institutions, systems and principles. No attention was paid to the question of coherence and appropriateness of such concepts and architecture to southern Africa. The study found, based on primary qualitative data that such a phenomenon seems to be enculturated ignorance about the origins and relevance of the modern state. This line of thinking, that is acceptance of exogenously driven forms of statecraft and regionalism, is broadly institutionalised and corroborated by various other public institutions whose mandate is on the state. The consistency with which respondents from various countries ignored the question of origins of the concepts and exogenous influences on the architecture of regionalism and statecraft suggests a region-wide phenomenon. The findings indicate a bias against any would-be internal influences of statecraft in favour of statecraft that is derived exogenously yet a desire for national and regional development.

It is concluded that the epistemology of the agnotology emanates from the political economy history of the region. It is further concluded that exogenously driven statecraft; SF or state functionalism, are incompatible with the expectations of political actors and society on the one hand, and the politico-administrative form of the state on the other.

10.3.4 Objective four: Investigating the position of non-state actors, namely PPPs, in the architecture of RI in southern Africa

The findings did not present any evidence of the role of non-state actors in the architecture of PPPs. The data and findings for this objective were from the qualitative primary data and qualitative secondary data. PPPs in the study were examined as qualitative secondary data, which presented information on the key regional institutions (the SADC PPP Network). The literature review and the qualitative primary data both do not provide evidence of profound participation of non-state actors in the creation and evolution of SADC as a regional institution. The findings, however, indicate there is involvement of non-state actors in the development of the regional policy framework, the soft dimension of RI.

In concluding, therefore, the researcher asserts that owing to the history of the creation of SADC which is anchored in the decision of states in the non-aligned movement whose aim was to liberate southern Africa from Imperialism. From the onset, the involvement of non-state actors was essentially disregarded. The trend has continued throughout the evolution of SADC from SADCC to SADC, and more recently as a member of the Tripartite Free Trade Agreement. The marginal

involvement of non-state actors is most pronounced in the public sphere non-state actors, bit less so with private sector non-state actors. The glaring gap of non-state actor involvement is apparent. A pertinent finding in respect of this objective however is the existence of PPP Network, which consists of one representative from every SADC country.

The conceptual framework identified seven key preconditions as pertinent to PPP development. These are existence of a legal framework and contract enforcement mechanisms; sufficient public institutional capacity and a national PPP strategy; appropriate risk sharing provisions; competitive procurement policy and practice; little to no public resistance to public cost recovery; and the ability to accurately project revenue and cost estimates. The study found no evidence of efforts to routinely monitor the attainment of these conditions at either a regional or state level. The quantitative secondary data, however, provided rankings and scores of SADC Member States on six of the seven aspect, in the EoDB and GCI data. Regardless, there was no evidence that such findings are employed in the design of regional PPP policy or the mandates of relevant SADC Committees. The institutional architecture of SADC and its policy framework are derived from the logic of linear integration as espoused by the EU. In this respect the Researcher concludes that the accommodation of PPP is provided for at certain stages of integration, and with limited scope.

10.3.5 Objective five: Exploring whether the SADC RI framework considers any relationship between SF or state functionalism and PPPs development

The findings of the study indicate that there is a disconnection between the African academia and practitioners in the understanding of the conceptual dimensions and origins of the three notions of RI, SF and PPPs. The study also revealed a general disinterest in the conceptual and ideological underpinnings of the three notions among practitioners. Apart from non-state actors, respondents from the public and private sector treated the notions are norms, though a few submitted that these notions have their origins in the trans-Atlantic policy influences. In the study, the perspectives of the academia were obtained through secondary research and those of practitioners through primary research.

It is important to highlight that in contrast to academia, practitioners treated the notions as norms and made no suggestions contesting the orthodox such as; international relations theories of realism and idealism; the rationale and form of the Westphalia state; the conventional notions of a fragile state; or the PPPs as rolling back of the state. Instead, the practitioners stressed the unexploited opportunities the region must pursue to realise optimal dividends from complying with the prescribed instrumentation of the various notions as conceived by the trans-Atlantic polity.

It is concluded that this disconnect between the academia and practitioners, policy makers and politicians, could count as the most profound cause of the disconnect between the three concepts of RI, SF or state functionalism and PPPs. The assertion holds that to examine the interface of the concepts, it is essential to understand both its ideology and architecture. In the case of Southern Africa, the faint linkages between academia and practitioners hinder scientific consideration. Each concept must first be deconstructed and examined as a phenomenon, to establish an understanding of the specific elements of the concepts to undertake a comprehensive examination of their interface.

Findings from the study show that a consideration of the relationship between SADC RI, SF and PPPs is made profoundly in selected SADC protocols. The SADC Protocol on Trade, Protocol on Finance and Investment (FIP) and the SADC Protocol on defence, all attend to the collective defence, economic and financial interests by advancing standards for states to adopt and implement. Inherent in the creation of the protocols is the understanding that SF presents a risk to investors (PPP) and security (PPPs and state functionalism). The Researcher attended to these relationships in the conceptual framework through the assertion that state functionalism is primarily qualified by the following aspects: the preservation of public order and stable institutions, political legitimacy, sound economic infrastructure and programmes, present social cohesion and protection. Equally pertinent are the aspects of providing security and productive international economy linkages. Noting that these aspects impact on regionalism and PPPs, prompts the question: how does the SADC agenda address the interactive linkages among the three concepts? Yet, the findings indicate that the interaction is implicitly fostered through a variety of regional policy instruments as goals each independent but related. Some of the purported interfaces are occasionally reflected in the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDIP). There is no evidence, however, of deliberate and intelligent configuration of the dimensions that relate to the RI, statecraft and PPPs. This is despite the provision of a Strategy Planning Unit within the SADC Secretariat.

It is therefore concluded that the absence of evidence of any form of disciplined and formal cross-sectoral collaboration indicates that the RI framework includes all three concepts but independent of each other. The framework is devoid of deliberate policy provisions, or the structural arrangements needed to rationalise the interface between RI, statecraft and PPPs. SADC Sectoral Committees such as the Macro-Economic Convergence Committee are established on sectoral specific mandates and goals, with little or no interface with committees that impact or are impacted by its outcomes. Such arrangements reflect the characterisation of RI by most members as a foreign affairs or external affairs domain, whose linkages with statecraft should be managed on a case by case basis. Such an approach unintentionally negates the need for a regional common

position on a variety of issues, including trade and investment. Such common positions provide an avenue for rationalising the linkages and interface of the three-study aspect, but more importantly provide leverage for attaining the desired RI outcomes.

The quantitative secondary data showed, in contrast to the primary data, that there is a relationship between the three concepts as measured by a variety of tools from several institutions, mostly non-African institutions. The outcomes from these assessments are often used in the determination of financial assistance, development financing, investments and economic corporation.

It is concluded that there is no evidence from the findings however that SADC as a regional institution seeks to collect and analyse its own data, for purposes such as those suggested by the non-African institutions above. Such efforts could necessitate and enable the institution to improve the linkages and interface between the three concepts, and derive much more intelligence analysis therefrom.

10.4 Policy Implications

The policy implications that emerged from this study revolve around four aspects. There are (1) sovereignty, (2) Afristate Intrafunctionalism, (3) states' rankings and sanctions and specialised PPPs. These are discussed in turn.

10.4.1 Sovereignty

Throughout the study respondents argued the importance and implications of sovereignty on regionalism. The study also found that SADC, and therefore RI in Southern Africa, had not defined sovereignty or discussed its exact characterisation at a regional level. An important dimension of improving regionalism is to define sovereignty, and its implications for Member States. A better-defined character of the state is critical for improving regionalism. Such a process would involve a similar undertaking at the level of the African Union. Just as Justice Richard Jackson had created classes of sovereignty to accommodate the political designs of the Allied Powers, SADC can undertake the same to provide for the shifts in the aims of the institution and developments in regional and IPE.

10.4.2 From Fragility to Intrafunctionalism

This study makes a theoretical proposition which seeks to shift the focus from a negative epistemology of SF or state failure to the positive epistemology of state functionalism. Such a

policy shift will necessarily demand that the focus of governance analysis be on the enabling as opposed to the disabling dimensions of good governance. The policy would abandon the fragile and failed state narrative which measures the degree of failure and fragility and adopt a functional state narrative which measures the degree of success and integrity. By focusing on the enabling dimensions of good governance, also referred to in the study as catalytic characteristics of the state, the policy would encourage the region to accordingly increase its investment in the productive sectors, as opposed to the mitigation and relief sectors. These policies were introduced to correct historical asymmetries, but few states have successfully graduated from them. Botswana is one of the states in the region that has successfully adopted the positive epistemology of statecraft which predominantly invests in the catalytic dimensions of statecraft. A similar conclusion is made about Rwanda, whose policy and strategy, is private sector-led development. A policy distinguishable from the predominant poverty-reduction strategies. The Researcher further highlights, that such a policy shift would be directly significant for RI with regard to investments in regional value chains and production networks. It would be equally important for statecraft as argued above, and would directly impact on the development of PPPs, increasing investment in the economically relevant sectors of energy, transport and communications, as opposed to the current bias towards PPPs in the social sectors.

10.4.3 States' rankings and sanctions

The qualitative primary findings point to the lack of a regional policy enforcement mechanism as a major deficiency in the politico-administrative architecture of SADC and that this has a direct bearing on efficacy and capability to realise outcomes. Although the findings suggest a link between sovereignty and lack of an enforcement mechanism, the challenge can be in another policy dimension of SADC. This is the absence of region-wide standardised technological infrastructure platforms within which sanctions or fines can be levied on non-compliant members. The current penalty merely withdraws voting rights on matters which the state in default would suffer no consequences for non-compliance. The Researcher proposes a policy that provides for a comprehensive and credible state rating system which allows states to objectively conclude on the performance and attainment of regional commitments, as well as adherence to regional standards. Such outcomes are necessary for the application of fair sanctions, penalties and/or fines. It is important that the measures for such a rating and ranking system be considered legitimate and scientifically credible. The quantitative secondary data findings suggest that the measures currently in use by exogenous institutions were conceived to serve specific often narrow institutional interests. An endogenously conceived rating and ranking system would address this challenge and provide a basis for establishing an effective enforcement mechanism. The conceptual framework guiding this study presents three key parameters for assessing RI:

geographical scope, substantive coverage; and depth of integration. As indicated in earlier sections, the primary measure for depth of integration is 'willingness to surrender sovereignty'. The Researcher argues that the parameter is inadequate in that it does not locate responsibility on the collective, the regional institutions. Such responsibility would be the enforcement mechanism, essentially demanding that the measure for depth of integration include existence of systems and a policy to sanction default.

10.5 Recommendations and New Knowledge Emerging from the Study

The recommendations presented herein derive from the findings and analysis of the case study chapters 6, 7, 8, the cross-country findings and data analysis in chapter 9 and sections 10.1 to 10.4 of chapter 10. The section presents preliminary recommendations on the ontology ad epistemology of the three study concepts: RI, state functionalism and PPPs.

The first recommendation speaks to the need to improve understanding of the governance value chains by examining the theoretical and architecture of regional bodies, the state and the instruments that define their agendas. It is also prudent to develop an understanding of their *modus operand* for attainment of goals. A re-imagining and recasting of these concepts into context appropriate, relevant paradigms, is necessary.

The second recommendation is to promote a positive epistemology of the state in the academia and Southern Africa policy community. This recommendation invites academics and practitioners to begin to integrate and mainstream the notion, concept, theoretical proposition of state functionalism.

The third recommendation is to develop or introduce regional institutions with the mandate to undertake assessments of Member States in governance rating and ranking. Such institutions must be granted the mandate to sanction and mobilise sanctions where needed.

The most consequential finding of the study refers to the centrality of SF in defining the condition of the state in Southern Africa. The ideological orientation and narrative dwells on the inhibitors of the state. Scholars of SF conceptualise and monitor the characteristics of a failing state or fragile state. This orientation and inclination underlined the qualitative data findings in which respondents' analyses primarily focused on how governments and SADC can address the detrimental and negative characteristics. The narrative as the study reveals, is exogenously conceived and driven. The leading scholars and institutions of SF and failed states are exclusively western. Particular and specific reference is made to the African state in the study of this phenomenon. A culmination of this inclination is the Fragile States Index and studies by Berticolli

on SF in Africa. A further result of this narrative is also seen in the seminal works of leading African Scholars such as Franz Fanon's (1961) *The Wretched of the Earth* and Walter Rodney's (1972) *How Europe underdeveloped Africa*.

A distinction in the characterisation emerges when the analyses seek to inform the choices of non-African states of the characteristics pertinent to political and economic governance. Key examples in this regard are the Global Competitiveness Index and the Ease of Doings Business Index. Both are crafted to focus on the positive drivers of competitiveness and business and not the negative aspects as is the case with SF.

This study thus submits that pivotal to the enhancement of both regionalism and statecraft is a reorientation of the conceptual framework to a positive narrative of the state and a reconfiguration of the attendant parameters. The theory of State functionalism is proposed in service of this orientation, which necessarily seeks to locate the narrative in the positive catalytic aspects of the state as opposed to the negative inhibitive aspects. It appears from the literature review and findings that no such orientation has been scientifically pursued in the disciplines of political science and international relations. This further expounds on the application of interpretivism and constructivist philosophical worldviews.

The qualitative findings reveal inherent incoherencies between the conceptualisation of RI, state functionalism and PPPs, and the historical and contemporary political economy of Southern Africa. The literature review and findings from the primary qualitative data and secondary quantitative analysis are profoundly devoid of endogenous thought. Accordingly, the study finds the architecture of statecraft and regionalism considerably unyielding in their facilitation of PPPs in southern Africa. In responding to this deficiency, and as espoused in the research worldview, pragmatism and interpretivist, the Researcher advances three theoretical propositions based on selected theory construction criteria. These are uniqueness, parsimony, conservation, generalizability, fecundity, internal consistency, empirical riskiness, and abstraction (Gay & Merritt, 2011).

The study recognises that criteria for 'good' theory reflects *priori* commitment to certain presuppositional assumptions about what constitutes knowledge, reality, the nature of being or existence, values, and other basic philosophical questions. (Gay & Merritt, 2011. p24). Epistemology, metaphysics, ontology and axiology respectively. The theoretical propositions in this study are guided by the theory taxonomy of inductive-synthesis, also referred to as constructivism or interpretive theory, both of which are the philosophical world views guiding the study.

According to Moore (2011, p. 6) the first aspect generality concerns the breadth of the scope of the explanation, that is, the phenomenon the theory seeks to explain. Generality refers to the questions of how many different phenomena can the theory account for and how broader general is the explanation of the theory? Moore (2011, p. 6) asserts that, a general theory is one that is intended to apply to all relevant cases, those that have been observed and those that could be observed. Generality is thus considered an indispensable characteristic of theory. In the nomological view of a theory, an explanation interprets an event or a tendency as a specific instance of universal laws, and if the laws are not universal, then there is no solid foundation for the explanation. The explanation itself then requires explanation, and that explanation requires explanation, and so on. The phenomenon can therefore not be explained until it is understood as a necessary consequence of laws recognized as universally true (Coppedge, 2002, p. 3).

The second aspect is post-diction which refers to the effort to explain past events. The aspects is built upon the premise that causal hypotheses produce expectations about causal relations among variables. To test those expectations, we need to treat them as post-dictions and weigh them against relevant evidence. If the evidence is consistent with the hypothesis, then the theory is considered useful for explaining the phenomenon under investigation. If the evidence is not consistent, then the theory in its present constitution is not considered useful for explaining the phenomenon under investigation (Coppedge, 2002, p. 3).

The third and final aspect of theory considered in this study is that of hypothetical yield, which concerns the number of hypotheses the theory yields beyond the issue under investigation. The quality asserts that the more hypotheses a theory produces, the more phenomena it can account for, and more is better. In simple terms, the aspect prompts the question, how many hypotheses can the theory produce? (Coppedge, 2002, p. 4)

10.5.1 Geoliberationism - A theoretical proposition for RI

As indicated earlier, the study found that the most predominant influence on the architecture of Southern Africa is the European Union, a grouping of states formed from a negotiated compromise entered after three major conflicts. The quantitative secondary data, confirm that the predominant theoretical influences and politico-administrative architecture forms in Southern Africa, are exogenously driven. The qualitative findings present a compelling case of a region with a neo-colonial geo-political formation. Continental and regional institutions such as the African Union and SADC both espouse the goal of liberation and self-determination. The findings indicate undefined sovereignty and unsanctioned default. These two aspects underline the key findings in response to this objective of establishing the efficacy of SADC: willingness to

surrender sovereignty and an enforcement mechanism for defaulting Member States. Respondents in all three case study countries referred to the centrality of sovereignty as an impediment to regionalism. Southern Africa is divided by a geo-political formula that emerged from the Berlin Conference of 1878. The study notes that although SADC Member State have all been liberated as states or nations, it is liberation attained within the same colonial boundaries drawn at the Berlin Conference of 1878.

The triumph of liberation struggle against colonialism can therefore be reasonable regarded as partial in the sense that the 'free' states of the AU and SADC are still 'trapped' within the neo-colonial geopolitics that European powers established. These colonial geopolitical formations were entrenched in the founding documents of the OAU. First and foremost, in the OAU's resolution principle of respect of borders existing on achievement of independence adopted by the OAU, as Resolution AHG/Res. 16 (I) in 1964 at the first session of the Conference of African Heads of State and Government held in Cairo, Egypt the "Cairo Resolution. Secondly, in the Constitutive Act of the African Union objectives under Article 3 (b) and 4 (b), which stipulate that the OAU shall defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of its Member States; and respect of borders existing on achievement of independence.
This thesis therefore submits that an endogenous theory of RI in Southern Africa should essentially embody a decolonisation project and consider RI as a negation of neo-colonialism as expressed through geographical or territorial boundaries.

Geoliberationism posits that complete and meaningful liberation of the southern Africa region can only be necessarily attained by the negation of boundaries created by colonialisation. This hypothesis is consistent with the assertion that a key strategy of the colonial project was divide and rule, and that its success was the creation of incoherent states.

The RI theory of Geoliberationism should be considered on the recognition that RI is acritical undertaking in the liberation of Africa from the politico-administrative architecture of colonialism. The theory posits that the persistent and enduring control of the post-colonial state in Africa by former colonial powers would be curtailed by the negation of current neo-colonial geopolitical arrangements, as ordered by the logic of the Westphalia nation-state.

The history of the formation of the Southern Africa Development Community Conference, the objectives of the non-aligned movement, and the centrality of empirical sovereignty in Southern Africa states, necessitates the creation of a new theory of RI. The literature review confirmed that the dominant driver of RI and statehood in Southern Africa was liberation from colonial rule. In

this regard, it is plausible to assert that the ideological foundation and architecture of RI warrant the theory - 'Geoliberationism'.

The theory asserts that RI in Southern Africa is essentially an expression of the struggle for political and economic liberation from historical and contemporary political economy asymmetries. It further asserts that such asymmetries were enabled by the creation of geopolitical arrangements that served colonialism. Additionally, Geoliberalism derives from the psychology theory of self-determination which asserts that the collective psyche of any polity is the sum of individual psyche. In this regard, the universal, innate and psychological needs that underline the theory of self-determination- competence; autonomy and relatedness- should also logically manifest in the collective psyche of a community. According to Deci and Ryan (2008, p. 1), self-determination theory (SDT) addresses such basic issues as personality development, self-regulation, universal psychological needs, life goals and aspirations, energy and vitality, non-conscious processes, the relations of culture to motivation, and the impact of social environments on motivation, affect, behaviour, and wellbeing. The collective manifestation of self-determination theory is embedded in three of the five aspects which arguably enable regionalism; political congruency; common background and a sense of community. (WarLeigh-Lack *et al*. (2011, p. 7)

10.5.2 Afristate intrafunctionalism

The findings from the secondary quantitative which examined the measures and characterisation of state fragility, the parameters used to measure state fragility. The definition and measures place emphasis on the dysfunctionalities of the state as opposed to the functional aspects. This is a western characterisation of Africa as a dysfunctional continent and is also supported by the literature review. As indicated earlier, the characterisation of the African state in European and American academia is arguably an extension of the negative epistemological archetype which was conceived in the colonial era to legitimise European intervention in Africa. The problematisation of African polities and African statecraft is manifest in the mainstream African governance narrative. This afro-pessimist negative paradigm is defined by three aspects; decontextualisation; form fixation; and linearity. This study makes a theoretical proposition which seeks to shift the focus from a negative epistemology of SF or state failure to the positive epistemology of state functionalism. The logic presented in the conceptual framework driving the study, asserts that weak State institutions have their origins in the political and economic history of colonialism and problems associated with the Westphalia nation-state model. The study's finding that progress in addressing fragility has been inhibited by problems of conceptualization, definition and measurement. This study makes a theoretical proposition which

seeks to shift the focus from a negative epistemology of SF or state failure to the positive epistemology of state functionalism.

Afristate intrafunctionalism is conceptualised as a theoretical proposition that shifts from a focus on the characteristics and manifestation of the negative epistemology of African statecraft, referred to in mainstream political, IR and public administration disciplines as SF or state failure. Rather, Afristate intrafunctionalism is concerned with an epistemological outlook of the African state on its own merit and not against an endogenously yardstick. The study considered the reimagining and reconceptualization of the state in Africa in Chapter Three where it examines the alternative and binary of state functionalism. In customising this theoretical proposition, the study introduces a more accurate characterisation of the positive epistemology which it terms, Afristate intrafunctionalism that is less associated with binary-like constructions and more concerned with holistic outlooks. In broad terms, Afristate refers to the African state and intrafunctionalism refers to the internal functioning of the state. The prefix 'intra' is critical to the proposition because it serves to make the distinction with functionalism and neo-functionalism. Both existing theories of functionalism and neo-functionalism seek to explain phenomenon outside the state and between states. Intrafunctionalism, on the other hand, seeks to explain the internal functioning of the state. The theoretical proposition is grounded in the reflectivist and constructivist theories.

The peculiar context of Southern Africa as a region, characterised by racial diversity, young states and huge natural resource endowment has a profound bearing on the politico-administrative and politico-cultural. The region though considered a block has states at different levels of political and economic development. South Africa and Zimbabwe, prominent members in the block are still in the immediate post-independence liberation political mode. Most of the states in the region fluctuate between economic stability and volatility. The region has the highest rates of extreme poverty, with over 40% of the population poor. According to Bertocchi (2011, p. 11), a fragile state has various malfunctions which include the inability to provide basic services and meet vital needs, unstable and weak governance, a persistent condition of extreme poverty, lack of territorial control and high propensity to conflict and civil war. In the case of Southern Africa, 12 of the 25 states bear two or more of these characteristics and it is in this regard that the study proposes the theoretical proposition of afristate intrafunctionalism.

A positive epistemology of African statecraft is conceived on its own merit, not in opposition to SF.

This being the case an endogenous Afrocentric conceptualization and measure of a state's status would be based on a weighed and varied scale that takes into consideration the age and history of

nations is needed. Such a scale must essentially factor in a 'sovereignty affinity' index. It must be a composite measure of the perceptions and policy practices through which a country's appetite for sovereignty can be measured.

This is based on the finding that in the case of Southern Africa a state's politico-administrative and economic status is arguably intricately related to sovereignty. The establishment of SADC was motivated by political liberation agendas. Although countries in the region inherited the Westphalia nation state model and colonial geopolitical boundaries, sovereignty is perceived as a primary aspect of the integrity of the state. Preservation of sovereignty is considered a perquisite for all other considerations. The willingness to surrender sovereignty to the region is the single most pertinent success factor for regionalization and regionalism in southern Africa. The ability to integrate and realise dividends from the region is directly related to sovereignty. In the current global political economy dispensation, the inability to integrate limits state capability thereby increasing fragility.

As alluded to earlier, in considering the primacy of sovereignty in the determination of SF, it is necessary to have a nuanced and pragmatic definition of sovereignty itself. The region must consider the various categories and isolate aspects that resonate with the historical, contemporary and future interests of states in the region.

In pursuit of more coherent and effective regionalization, the study recommends that a conceptual framework be developed at a regional level, governed by the principles of i) reflexivist and collective liability ii) mandatory subscription by Member States and iii) recognition of state evolution. Reflexive and collective liability for the consequences of actions of a sovereign on other states once a category is assigned. Mandatory subscription of all Member States to the agreed concept and its demands, is recognition of state evolution by all Member States on the understanding that a country can migrate from one category to another based on its context or changing circumstances.

This will ensure that countries in the region share a common understanding of sovereignty, but one that is multi-dimensional, encompassing variations based on age and condition of states, and recognised by all members. The archetype of such sovereignty allows all Member States to operate within defined engagement parameters that directly relate to specific aspects of RI. This means that there will be several categories of sovereignty and depending on the ascertained category for a country, that member will have certain entitlements and liabilities within the regional government.

To this end, it is necessary that the various sovereignty categories be defined a regime of entitlements, liabilities. Criteria are to be established for classifying the concept and assigning entitlements.

From an ideological perspective and endogenous ethos, this arrangement accommodates diversity, provides space for self-determination and allows countries to model their interaction with other states based on their lived realities and ideals, and agreed notions. It is not a rigid externally prescribed standard of sovereignty.

The defining measure for all categories of sovereignty will be the degree of behavioural impact of a Member State on the region's collective socio-economic and political interests. Defining sovereignty will assist establish a functional 'Amalgamated Sovereignty' for SADC. Such a sovereign would require surrender of selected national foreign policy domains.

It is necessary therefore, as a final stage in the evolution of the concept to establish an 'amalgamated sovereign'. This would be a regional sovereign in which the functional elements of all sovereign categories are embodied and legally recognised by members and non-members as inalienable characteristics and entitlements of all states in the amalgamated sovereign. States within the amalgamated sovereign surrender their national sovereign rights and attendant obligations, progressively as necessary, in specific areas, to the amalgamated sovereign. The underlying ideology of pan-Africanism as shared destiny would be defined within the amalgamated sovereign. Among the most prominent features of an amalgamated sovereign would be the pre-eminence of transnational and regional interests over the national.

This amalgamated sovereign once assented and ratified, would be mandatory for all members and legally consequential. Unlike the case of the EU where national legislature enjoys the prerogative to override EU parliamentary decisions, as was evidently attempted by the Greece Referendum on bailout (Bourus & Walker, 2015). The obligations under an amalgamated sovereignty take legal and political precedence over national sovereignty in those areas ratified.

10.5.3 Specialised Regional PPP Agency

The qualitative primary study findings indicate that PPPs feature as a prominent policy instrument in the region, but despite this being the case, SADC is yet to establish a specialised agency or organ. SADC recognises the importance of PPP through the SADC PPP Network. It is recommended that an organ or specialised agency be established. Such an agency would undertake corporate and economic governance assessments specific to investment and PPPs, as well as provide technical advisory and negotiation services to Member States.

10.6 Significance of Findings to the Body of Knowledge

The primary significance of the study findings is a contribution to the emerging MIT-disciplinary body of knowledge in regionalisation, international relations, political science and public governance. The specific area to which the study contributes significantly is the topical discipline of the supranational statecraft and evolution of the state in Africa. The specific and novel contribution of the study is the deconstruction and re-construction of the concept(s) on the effectiveness of the state. The study examined the negative epistemology of SF and presented theoretical and policy propositions that relocate and interpret the character of the African state away from a focus on inhibitive characteristics to a focus on catalytic characteristics that are more emancipatory in nature. This shift has implications for governance parameters and public investment policies, prioritising investment in the drivers of growth over mitigation of failures. A great deal of research is required in this area to popularise this new epistemology of the state in Africa.

The study also contributes to the body of knowledge on PPPs, highlighting the need to re-examine the incoherencies between the purported success factors and the related politico-administrative dimensions as manifest in RI and statecraft. Deriving from the findings and the literature search, the extent to which the trilogy of these concepts has been taken further adds value to the limited scholarly treatment of the subject.

Finally, the study pioneers an exploration of alternative multiple and transdisciplinary conceptualisations with the potential to minimise incoherencies and improve the complementarity between RI, statecraft and PPPs in African countries.

10.7 Visions of Future Research

This study interrogated the epistemology, ontology and interface of the three concepts of RI, SF or state functionalism and PPP as these pertain to African statecraft. Future research could investigate factors affecting the choices of states to challenge or adopt exogenously driven models of statecraft. A nuanced investigation into the political economy of the post-colonial state in RI would also yield new knowledge on re-educating the polities in the region.

This study demonstrates that while each concept and phenomena discussed deserves further independent inquiry, additional MIT-disciplinary studies inquiry into the concepts and architecture of African statecraft would be useful and could be designed from a variety of angles.

For example, future research should focus not just on the interface between regional and national public institutions but also on the pragmatic contours of what works well for the African state in a global political and knowledge economy underpinned by a networked society

Moreover, future research can draw upon the questions raised in this study to inform hypotheses and conceptual frameworks for studies on reconfiguring supranational and national statecraft. Among the most compelling questions are those seeking to understand the thinking and behaviour of political actors and the character of the polity in southern Africa. In addition, conceptualisation of African epistemologies as contours for shaping regional and continental discourse requires scholarly attention.

10.8 Chapter Summary

This chapter discussed in summary, the focus and relevance of each chapter in the thesis to the objectives of the study. It highlighted the contribution that the literature review made in conception of the study, the influences on and implementation of the methodology as well as the broad and pertinent findings for each of the country cases. The subsequent chapters which examine the cross-country findings and how they reveal the assertions or disconfirm claims on the confluence of the three concepts, are also summaries in this chapter. The chapter accordingly summarised how each objective has been addressed. The foremost contribution of this chapter is the presentation pertaining to each objective, as discussed in individual chapters, but more pertinently by demonstrating the scientific research value of examining individual phenomenon through its interaction with other phenomenon, the confluence, in a multi-method research.

Two new theoretical propositions borne from the findings and analysis were discussed in this chapter, defining their characteristics, dimensions and epistemological suitability to the southern Africa region.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX ONE: Key Informant Interview Question Guide

Study: **RI and State functionalism in the Development of PPPs in Southern Africa**

KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEW – QUESTION GUIDE

Instructions: -

There are no right or wrong answers. This question guide seeks your personal opinion and where permissible the official position of your organization, company or institution. You are required to indicate and distinguish the responses by mentioning if it is a personal view of that of your organization, company or institution.

Note that your responses will be treated with the confidentiality they deserve if you require so. Please indicate which responses are to be treated as confidential and BoAA.

NB: You can refer to the glossary of terms provided only if you do not have your own concept of the issues.

SECTION 1:

A. Regional Integration

1. Do you think that improving the political and administrative framework of RI promotes:

    a. Coherence in national economic policy?
    b. Coherence in political systems?
    c. Region-wide standardisation of institutional arrangements?

2. Do you think that the RI framework has an effective enforcement mechanism for ensuring compliance and dealing with default?

3. To what extent have the guidelines and provisions of the SADC framework been adopted by Member States and standardised?

4. Has the SADC treaty reduced transaction costs for investors?

5. Has the SADC treaty improved predictability of investment climate in Member States?

6. Has membership to SADC strengthened State institutions and reduced SF?

7. Has membership to SADC promoted mutually beneficial PPPs in Member States?

8. To what extent has your government or institution integrated into SADC? The breadth and depth of integration by the sectors are presented below.

    Where possible please provide examples/evidence in relevant column.

For Governments and NGOs

Country:			
Sector/Policy	**Partly Integrated** (signed protocol)	**Integrated** (Domesticated in policy)	**Completely Integrated** (domesticated and institutionalised)
Foreign Policy			
Trade & Investment Policy			
Financial Sector			
Mining			
Transport			
Infrastructure Development			
Communications			
Labour			

9. What measure of the degree of sovereignty South Africa is ready to surrender to SADC?

Measure Surrendered	In Which Sectors	Reason or Evidence	Implications
Low (<10%)			
Medium (20-40%)			
High (50-80%)			

10. Where in your opinion did the idea and proposed arrangements of RI in SADC originated from? Explain.

B. State Fragility

1. What are the origins of weak State institutions?
2. Is there a relationship between IPE context and SF?
3. Is there a conceptual or definition challenge in SF?
4. Is there a problem of measurement of SF?
5. What drives the level of government equity in PPPs?
6. What are the structural and economic factors affecting state stability?
7. Are there political and institutional factors, what are they?
8. Where in your opinion did the idea and concept of SF originated from? Explain.

C. Public Private Partnership Aspects

1. What is the origin of the PPP Model? Where did it come from?
2. Is the PPP Model of development compatible with African experience and reality?
3. What is the impact of PPPs on the stability of the state?

4. Is government getting the value-for-money in the PPPs?
5. Are Private Actors/Investors getting the value-for-money in the PPPs?
6. Do PPPs sufficiently serve Public interest? If yes/no, why?
7. Do PPP agreement provide for stringent performance management?
8. Do PPP agreements provide for optimal risk allocation across actors and operational areas?
9. Do PPPs have effective project governance frameworks/mechanism?
10. Does government have effective and efficient contract management arrangements?

APPENDIX TWO: Self-administered Questionnaire

Respondent ID: _____

Respondent Institution:_____

Respondent Name (optional) : _____

Respondent Designation/Position:_____

Date:_____

SELF-ADMINISTERED QUESTION GUIDE

The University of KwaZulu-Natal is undertaking a doctoral research in public governance focusing on RI, State functionalism and PPPs development in Southern Africa. The study seeks to determine whether the architecture of RI in Southern Africa sufficiently provides for the creation and sustenance of functional nation state within which PPPs can thrive? Specifically, the objectives of the study are;

1. To describe the theoretical influences of the Trans-Atlantic Alliance on the architecture of Southern African RI;
2. To examine the politico-administrative efficacy of the current SADC RI agenda with specific reference to generating desired politico-administrative outcomes;
3. To explore the degree to which the SADC RI framework takes into account any relationship between SF and PPPs development;
4. To investigate the position of non-state actors in the architecture of RI in Southern Africa

Your organisation has been identified as a major player in (insert relevant country)'s Governance sphere with direct bearing on state functionalism, RI and PPPs development.

In this regard we would like to request for your participation through this questionnaire. Complete the Questionnaire will take 60 minutes. The items are not sensitive and confidential but you are at liberty to demand that your responses be treated as confidential by ticking the box below

Treat as Confidential ☐

If you agree please complete and sign the Consent Form attached which must be returned with the completed Form.

I. Origin of Ideas

1. Where did the ideas of SF (unstable government), RI (cooperation and unification of states) come from?
   _____
   _____
2. Where did the idea of government partnering with the private sector in development come from?
   _____
   _____
3. Who benefits the most from these ideas being implemented?
   _____
   _____

A. SF

1. What do you understand by SF?

   _____
   _____
   _____

2. What do you think are the causes of SF?

Score each item for relevance to the country context 1(Not relevant) 2(Partly Relevant 3(relevant) 4(Very Relevant 5 (Extremely Irrelevant)

SF – Study Country Scores and Relevance Perception			
Item	**Fragility Aspect** (Causes)	**Descriptive Response** (please provide an explanation for your score)	**Relevance Score**
1.	Mounting (population) Demographic Pressures		
2.	Massive Movement of Refugees or Internally Displaced Persons		
3.	Legacy of Vengeance-Seeking Group Grievance or Group Paranoia		
4.	Chronic and Sustained Human Flight (brain drain)		
5.	Uneven Economic Development along Group Lines		
6.	Sharp and/or Severe Economic Decline		
7.	Criminalization and/or Delegitimisation of the State		
8.	Progressive Deterioration of Public Services		
9.	Suspension or Arbitrary Application of the Rule of Law and Widespread Violation of Human Rights		
10.	Security Apparatus Operates as a "State Within a State"		
11.	Rise of Factionalized Elites		
12.	Intervention of Other States or External Political Actors		

Source: Fund for Peace			

Other Causes:

_____

_____

3. Which of the above (SF) causes or aspects do you think affect RI processes?

_____

_____

4. Which of the above (SF) aspects do you think are affected by RI?

_____

_____

5. Which of the above aspects do you think are affected by government partnerships with private sector?

_____

_____

Which of the above aspect affect government partnership development with private sector?

_____

_____

B. RI

1. What do you understand by RI?

_____

_____

What do you think are the drivers of RI?

_____

_____

The scale is 1 (yes) or 0 (no) if the factor applies to the country.
Score each item for relevance to the Country setting 1(Very relevant) 5 (Extremely Irrelevant)

RI – Study Country Scores and Relevance Perception			
Item	**Political Factor**	**Descriptive Response** (please provide an explanation for your score)	**Relevance Score**
	P.1. External factors		
1	P.1.1. Colonization (country)		
2	P.1.2. Group negotiation power		
3	P.1.3. Foreign policy influences		
4.1	P.1.4.1. Regional		
4.2	P.1.4.2. Global		
5	P.1.5. Negotiation style		

	P.2. Internal factors		
6	P.2.1. International organizations support		
7	P.2.3. Political regime		
8	P.2.4. Legislative background		
9	P.2.5. Internal security		
10	P.2.6. Human rights		
11	P.2.7. Border problems (integrity)		
12	P.2.8. Political stability		
13	P.2.9. Political structure and public administration		
14	P.2.10. Army size		
15	P.2.11. Bureaucracy level		
Source: Estrada, Multi-dimensional RIE Framework			

4. Which of the above (RI) factors affect SF processes?

_____
_____

5. Which of the above (RI) factors are affected by SF?

_____
_____

6. Which of the above (RI) aspects are affected by PPPs?

_____
_____

7. Which of the above (RI) aspect affect PPPs development?

_____
_____

c. PPPs Management

1. What do you understand by PPPs?

2. What do you think are the RI related factors of successful Private public partnership? Please fill in table below after your written response

The scale is 1 (yes) or 0 (no) if the factor applies to the country.
Score each item for relevance to the Country/Regional setting
1(Very relevant)
5 (Extremely irrelevant).

PPPs Development

Item	**PPP Success Factor**	**Descriptive Response** (please provide an explanation for your score)	**Relevance Score**

1.	**Organisational arrangement** with defined responsibilities and roles for departments and individuals		
2.	**Risk Sharing** - Partnership in which there is a sharing of risks and responsibilities		
3.	**Sound legislative and regulatory framework**. The appropriate corporate and commercial laws in place to support private investment.		
4.	**ExistenceofDedicated PPP units in government** as knowledge centres and using this to drive service innovation. Separate functions (or analysis, evaluation, administration and oversight of PPPs)[17].		
5.	"**Value for money**" or "performance" audits carried out on sectors and PPPs by external auditors.		
6.	**Governments use of ongoing benchmarking** to ensure continuing value for money from existing projects.		
7.	**Bidding process is competitive**, applying proper procurement procedures, and that public sector entities are permitted and encouraged to bid.		
8.	**Accountability to public values** are considered at all times to avoid loss of confidence in the democratic process.		
9.	**PPP contract are sufficiently flexible** to take account of any new targets and future monitoring and reporting		

[17]Vinning and Boardman (2008)

	requirements that may develop over the lifetime of the project.		
10.	**Local level authorities regulate private contractors** do not "cherry pick" only the most attractive neighbourhoods or projects.		
11.	**GovernmentExpertise** - clear on financial terms of the deal and establishes realistic timelines for completion prior to private sector investment, the.		
12.	**Participation** -Local authorities promote user forums and feedback mechanisms.		
13.	**Risk Assessments** - Detailed assessment of the value of risks transferred to the private sector conducted. Assessment of the impact of the project on other sectors conducted.		
14.	**Barriers to private sector** - Government has removed regulatory barriers that once restricted private firms from delivering a service. Lowering the cost to provide a service (i.e., by lowering taxes),		

3. Does RI affect the ability of the state to meet the PPP management requirements above?

_____
_____
_____
___

4. Does SF affect the aspects of managing PPPs?

_____
_____

UNIVERSITY OF KWAZULU NATAL

School of Management, IT and Governance (MIG)

College of Law and Management Studies

Programme: Doctor of Administration

Researcher: McBride Peter Nkwanitsi Nkhalamba (+27 619 045 642)

Supervisor: Dr. F A Ruffin (+27 76 8 11 9595)

Research Office: Ms P Ximba +27 312 603 587

Dear Respondent,

I, McBride Peter Nkhalamba, a Doctoral student with the School Of Management, IT and Governance (MIG), College of Law and Management Studies at the University of KwaZulu-Natal invites you to participate in a doctoral research project on;

'RI and State functionalism in the Development of PPPs in Southern Africa'

The research seeks:

1. To describe the theoretical influences of the Trans-Atlantic Alliance on the architecture of Southern African RI.

2. To examine the politico-administrative efficacy of the current SADC RI agenda with specific reference to generating desired politico-administrative outcomes.

3. To explore the degree to which the SADC RI framework takes into account any relationship between SF and PPPs development.

4. To investigate the position of non-state actors in the architecture of RI in Southern Africa.

Your participation in this project is voluntary and follows your prior authorization for me to conduct the research using a self-administered questionnaire. Please note that your organization is free to withdraw from the project at any time should you see it fit.

Further note that there will be no monetary or material reward for your participation in this research project. The Researcher and the University of KwaZulu Natal will ensure strict confidentiality and anonymity of your responses and records where demanded or required.

If you have any questions or concerns about your participation in this research please contact me or my supervisor at the numbers listed above.

Finally, I would like to that you for taking an interest in the research.

Sincerely

Investigator's signature Date_____

APPENDIX THREE: Data Collection Tools Alignment with Research Questions, Research Objectives and Analytical Framework

SECTION AND QUESTION GUIDE		
Self- Administered Questionnaire	I = Ideological Origins A = SF B = RI C = PPPs	Example: B.2 means question 2. in section B. of questionnaire. In the self-administered questionnaire that inquiry is on RI
Interview Guide	A = RI B = SF C = PPPs Aspects	

1. RESEARCH QUESTIONS ALIGNMENT WITH DATA COLLECTION TOOLS

Research Question	**Self-Administered Question Items**	**Interview Guide Question Items**
To what extent has the socio-political and politico-administrative aspects of the Southern Africa RI framework been influenced by the dynamic of SF?	I.1 Where did the ideas of SF (unstable government), RI (cooperation and unification of states) come from? A.1 What do you understand by SF? A.2 What do you think are the causes of SF? A.3 Which of the above (SF aspects) causes or aspects do you think affect RI processes? A.4 Which of the above aspects do you think are affected by RI? B.2 What do you think are the drivers of RI? B.4 Which of the above factors affect SF processes? B.5 Which of the above factors are affected by SF? C.3 Does RI affect the ability of the state to meet the PPP management requirements above?	A.1 Do you think that improving the political and administrative framework of RI promotes A.2 Do you think that the RI framework has an effective enforcement mechanism for ensuring compliance and dealing with default A.6 Has membership to SADC strengthened State institutions and reduced SF B.1 What are the origins of weak State institutions? B.2 Is there a relationship between IPE context and SF B.6 What are the structural and economic factors affecting state stability? B.7 Are there political and institutional factors, what are they?
How does the SADC RI agenda address interactive links (if any) between SF and public–private partnerships in the region?	A.2 What do you think are the causes of SF? A.4 Which of the above (SF) aspects do you think are affected by RI? B. 1 1. What do you understand by RI?	A.2 Do you think that the RI framework has an effective enforcement mechanism for ensuring compliance and dealing with default

	B.2 What do you think are the drivers of RI? B.4 Which of the above factors affect SF processes? B.5 Which of the above (RI) factors are affected by SF? B.6 Which of the above (RI) aspects are affected by PPPs? B.7 Which of the above aspect affect PPPs development C.1 What do you understand by PPPs? C.2 What do you think are the RI related factors of successful Private public partnership? C.3 Does RI affect the ability of the state to meet the PPP management requirements above? C.4 Does SF affect the aspects of managing PPPs?	A.3 To what extent have the guidelines and provisions of the SADC framework been adopted by Member States and standardized A.4 Has the SADC treaty reduced transaction costs for investors A.5 Has the SADC treaty improved predictability of investment climate in Member States A.6 Has membership to SADC strengthened State institutions and reduced SF A.7 Has membership to SADC promotes mutually beneficial PPPs in Member States. A.8 To what extent has your government or institution integrated into SADC B.2 Is there a relationship between IPE context and SF? C.3 What is the impact of PPPs on the stability of the state
To what extent is the theoretical paradigm employed in the architecture of SADC's RI agenda practicable and productive in guiding SADC's set objectives?	I.1 Where did the ideas of SF (unstable government), RI (cooperation and unification of states) come from? I.2 Where did the idea of government partnering with the private sector in development come from? I.3 Who benefits the most from these ideas being implemented? B.1 What do you understand by RI?	A.1 Do you think that improving the political and administrative framework of RI promotes. A.10 Where in your opinion did the idea and proposed arrangements of RI in SADC originated from? Explain

2. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES ALIGNMENT WITH DATA COLLECTION TOOLS

Research Objectives	**Self- Administered Question Items**	**Interview Guide Question Items**
To describe the theoretical influences of the Trans-Atlantic Alliance on the architecture of Southern African RI	I.1 Where did the ideas of SF (unstable government), RI (cooperation and unification of states) come from? I.3 Who benefits the most from these ideas being implemented? B.1 What do you understand by RI? B.2 What do you think are the drivers of RI?	A.1 Do you think that improving the political and administrative framework of RI promotes. A.10 Where in your opinion did the idea and proposed arrangements of RI in SADC originated from? Explain
To examine the politico-administrative efficacy of the current SADC RI agenda with specific reference to generating desired politico-administrative outcomes	A.3 Which of the above (SF) causes or aspects do you think affect RI processes? A.4 Which of the above (SF) aspects do you think are affected by RI? B.1 What do you understand by RI? B.2 What do you think are the drivers of RI? B.4 Which of the above (RI) factors affect SF processes? B.5 Which of the above (RI) factors are affected by SF? B.6 Which of the above (RI) aspects are affected by PPPs? B.7 Which of the above (RI) aspect affect PPPs development?	A.2 Do you think that the RI framework has an effective enforcement mechanism for ensuring compliance and dealing with default A.3 To what extent have the guidelines and provisions of the SADC framework been adopted by Member States and standardized A.4 Has the SADC treaty reduced transaction costs for investors A.5 Has the SADC treaty improved predictability of investment climate in Member States A.6 Has membership to SADC strengthened State institutions and reduced SF

	C.2 What do you think are the RI related factors of successful Private public partnership? C.3 Does RI affect the ability of the state to meet the PPP management requirements above?	A.8 To what extent has your government or institution integrated SADC policy A.9 What measure of the degree of sovereignty (Country X) is ready to surrender to SADC
To explore the degree to which the SADC RI framework takes into account any relationship between SF and PPPs development	Uses exclusive Secondary Data substantiated by specific references made in response to questions A.3 and A4 and B.1 to B.7.	A.2 Do you think that the RI framework has an effective enforcement mechanism for ensuring compliance and dealing with default A.3 To what extent have the guidelines and provisions of the SADC framework been adopted by Member States and standardized A.4 Has the SADC treaty reduced transaction costs for investors A.5 Has the SADC treaty improved predictability of investment climate in Member States A.6 Has membership to SADC strengthened State institutions and reduced SF A.7 Has membership to SADC promotes mutually beneficial PPPs in Member States. A.8 To what extent has your government or institution integrated into SADC B.2 Is there a relationship between IPE context and SF

		B.6 What are the structural and economic factors affecting state stability? B.7 Are there political and institutional factors, what are they? C.2Is the PPP Model of development compatible with African experience and reality? C.3 What is the impact of PPPs on the stability of the state C.6 Do PPPs sufficiently serve Public interest? if yes/no why
To investigate the position of non-state actors in the architecture of RI in Southern Africa	Uses exclusive Secondary Data substantiated by specific references made in response to questions B.1 to B.7	No specific items. Relevant examples from responses to any of the question items will be employed in the analysis

ALIGNMENT OF THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK WITH DATA COLLECTION TOOLS

RI		
Aspect	**Self-Administered Question Items**	**Interview Guide Question Items**
4. Geographic scope**:** illustrating the number of countries involved in an arrangement (variable geometry),	Other Sources	Other Sources
5. Substantive coverage**:** breadth that is the sector or activity coverage (trade, labor mobility, macro-policies, sector policies, etc.),	Other Sources	A.1 Do you think that improving the political and administrative framework of RI promotes A.3 To what extent have the guidelines and provisions of the SADC framework been adopted by Member States and standardized A.4 Has the SADC treaty reduced transaction costs for investors A.5 Has the SADC treaty improved predictability of investment climate in Member States A.6 Has membership to SADC strengthened State institutions and reduced SF A.7 Has membership to SADC promotes mutually beneficial PPPs in Member States. A.8 To what extent has your government or institution integrated into SADC.
6. Depth of integration: a measure of the degree of sovereignty a country is ready to surrender, that is from simple coordination or cooperation to deep integration	Other Sources	A.8 To what extent has your government or institution integrated into SADC Policy A.9 What measure of the degree of sovereignty (Country X) is ready to surrender to SADC?

SF		
Aspect	**Self-Administered Question Items**	**Interview Guide Question Items**
9 Structural and economic factors: Poverty, low income and economic decline, violent conflict, presence of armed insurgents, natural resource wealth/lack of natural resource wealth, geography ('bad neighbors'), demographic stress (including urbanization).	A.2 What do you think are the causes of SF?	B.1 What are the origins of weak State institutions? B.2 Is there a relationship between IPE context and SF B.3 Is there a conceptual or definition challenge in SF? B.4 Is there a problem of measurement of SF? B.6 What are the structural and economic factors affecting state stability? B.7 Are there political and institutional factors, what are they?
10 Political and institutional factors: Crises of state legitimacy and authority, bad governance, repression of political competition, weak Westphalia (formal) institutions, succession and reform crises in authoritarian states, state predation, neo-patrimonial politics.		
11 Social factors: Horizontal inequalities, severe identity fragmentation, social exclusion, gender		

inequality, lack of social cohesion such as lack of social capital, weak civil society.		
12 International factors: Legacy of colonialism, IPE, global economic shocks (including food prices)		

PPPS		
Aspect	**Self-Administered Question Items**	**Interview Guide Question Items**
6. Legal framework and enforcement	C.2 What do you think are the RI related factors of successful Private public partnership?	C.1 What is the origin of the PPP Model? Where did it come from? C.2 Is the PPP Model of development compatible with African experience and reality? C.3 What is the impact of PPPs on the stability of the state C.4 Is government getting the value-for-money in the PPPs C.5 Are Private Actors/Investors getting the value-for-money in the PPPs C.6 Do PPPs sufficiently serve Public interest? if yes/no why C.7 Do PPP agreement provide for stringent performance management, C.8 Do PPP agreements provide for optimal risk allocation across actors and operational areas? C.9 Do PPPs have effective project governance frameworks/mechanism? C.10 Does government have effective and efficient contract management arrangements?
7. Institutional capacity and PPP strategy		
8. Revenue and cost estimations		
9. Comprehension of financial and economic analysis		
10. Appropriateness of risk sharing		
11. Competitiveness of procurement		
12. Public resistance (willingness to pay - assessment).		

APPENDIX FOUR: PPP Success Factor Indicators

PPP SUCCESS INDICATOR DEFINITIONS

Source: Evaluating the environment for public–private partnerships in Africa Appendix. The 2015 Infrascope. © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2015. http://www.eiu.com/Handlers/WhitepaperHandler.ashx?fi=Africa-Infrascope-2015.pdf&mode=wp&campaignid=AfricaInfrascope2015

1.Legal and regulatory framework

1.1 Consistency and quality of PPP regulations:

"How consistent are PPP laws and regulations for national-level PPP projects? Do regulations establish clear requirements and oversight mechanisms for project implementation (project preparation, bidding, contract awards, construction and operation)? Must risk be allocated to different parties according to ability to manage them? Is there a clear system for compensating the private sector for acts of authority that change sector-specific economic conditions not foreseen during bidding?" Also considers whether regulations avoid open-ended compensation rights for changes in financial equilibrium, so that the state only assumes explicitly written commercial contractual contingent liabilities.

1.2 Effective PPP selection and decision-making:

"Do regulations establish efficient planning frameworks and proper accounting of contingent liabilities? Have regulators determined appropriate project planning and cost-benefit analysis techniques to ensure that a PPP is the optimal project financing and service-provision option? Does the Budget Office systematically measure contingent contractual liabilities and account for delayed investment payments in a way consistent with public investment accounting?"

1.3 Fairness/openness of bids and contract changes:

"Do regulations for national-level concession projects unfairly favour certain project bidders and operators over others? Do regulations require and establish competitive bidding (that is, use of objective criteria during the selection process, requiring the publishing of necessary bidding documents, contracts and changes in contracts)? Do regulations require bidding for any significant, additional work necessary? Is a system established for independent oversight of such renegotiation procedures and conditions?"

1.4 Dispute-resolution mechanisms:

"Are there fair and transparent mechanisms for resolving controversies between the state and the operator? Does the law provide technically adequate and efficient conciliation schemes? Must arbitration rulings proceed according to law and to contracts, without lengthy appeals?"

2.Institutional framework

2.1 Quality of institutional design

This indicator evaluates the existence and role of various agencies necessary for proper project oversight and planning at the federal level, such as a PPP board at ministerial level, a State Contracting Agency and a PPP Advisory Agency and a Regulatory Agency for the enforcement of project standards. It also considers the oversight role and involvement of government budget and planning offices.

2.2 PPP contract, hold-up and expropriation risk:

"Does the judiciary enforce property rights and arbitration rulings? Does the judiciary uphold contracts related to cost recovery? Can investors appeal against rulings by regulators, expedite contract transfer for project exit and obtain fair compensation for early termination?" Also considers whether the state has an expedite mechanism for replacing failed operators to protect creditors' rights.

3.Operational maturity

3.1 Public capacity to plan and oversee PPPs

"Are the public capabilities robust for planning, design/engineering, environmental assessment, oversight of national-level project service standards and conflict resolution? And do government officials have expertise in project financing, risk evaluation and contract design? Do financial authorities employ proper accounting practices when considering fiscal and contingent liabilities? Do they have a reputation for designing contracts that reduce post-bid opportunism?"

3.2 Methods and criteria for awarding projects:

"What is the track record of federal agencies for using competitive bidding and objective economic factors as the primary consideration in final project and contract awards? Are incentive-efficient schemes used for allocating projects (for example, in toll road projects, using net present value of revenue with contract periods of variable length)?"

3.3 Regulators' risk-allocation record

"Has the allocation of risk between the state and the private sector been successful for national-level projects in recent years? How effective has the use of guarantees and performance bonds been for project-risk diversification?"

3.4 Experience with transport, water and electricity projects

This indicator draws on information from the WB's Private Participation in Infrastructure (PPI) database on the number of concession projects that reached financial closure in the past ten years and observations made by researchers in-country.

3.5 Quality of transport, water and electricity projects

This indicator draws on the distress and failure rates of transport, water and electricity concession projects over the past ten years from the WB's PPI database and observations made by researchers in-country.

4. Investment Climate

4.1 Political distortion

Evaluates the level of political distortion affecting the country's private sector. Each country's score is a weighted average of The Economist Intelligence Unit's political stability and government policy effectiveness risk scores and the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index.

4.2 Business environment

Evaluates the quality of the general business environment for infrastructure projects. Each country's score is a weighted average of The Economist Intelligence Unit's market opportunities and macroeconomic risk scores.

4.3 Political will

This indicator evaluates the level of political consensus, or will, to engage private parties in concessions (PPPs) and to provide favourable implementation frameworks across the electricity industry and water/sanitation and transport sectors.

5. Financial facilities

5.1 Government payment risk

"Does the government regularly fulfil obligations for PPP contracts or use liquidity-guarantee schemes to reduce non-payment risk?" Also considers The Economist Intelligence Unit's sovereign debt risk ratings.

5.2 Capital market for private infrastructure finance

"How available and reliable are long-term debt instruments for infrastructure financing? Is there a developed insurance and pension market with useful products for infrastructure risk reduction? Are interest-rate or exchange-rate hedging instruments available?"

5.3 Marketable debt

"Is there a liquid, deep, local-currency-denominated, fixed-rate, medium term (five years +) bond market in marketable debt (that is, debt that is traded freely)?"

5.4 Government support for low-income users and infrastructure affordability

“Does the government provide subsidies that allow low-income users better access to electricity, water and transport services?”

5.5 Subnational adjustment

This indicator evaluates whether infrastructure concessions can be carried out at a regional, state or municipal level, and the relative success and consistency of these

APPENDIX FIVE: Consent Form and Consent Letter

CONSENT FORM

Title of Study: RI and State Functionalism in The Development Of PPPs In Southern Africa

Investigators:

Name:	McBride Nkhalamba	**Position**	Researcher	**Email:**	212560864@stu.ukzn.ac.za
Name:	Dr Fayth Ruffin	**Position**	Supervisor	**Email:**	ruffin@ukzn.ac.za

Introduction

The study is an inquiry into the confluence between RI, state functionalism and PPPs development in Southern Africa. Specifically, the study seeks to determine whether the architecture of RI in Southern Africa sufficiently provides for the creation and sustenance of functional state within which PPPs (PPP) can thrive? And in the inverse it seeks to establish the role of state functionalism in driving RI and the resultant effect on PPP

You were selected as a potential participant because you a major player in the Southern Africa governance arena - Malawi, Zimbabwe and South Africa. Recognizing that your work has direct implications for state functionalism and by extension PPPs development in the region, your participation is invaluable

I ask that you read this form and ask any questions that you may have before agreeing to be in the study.

Purpose of Study

The study seeks to help create knowledge instrumental to the understanding and establishment of functional relationships between statecraft and regionalism, with dividends for PPPs in Southern Africa

Study Objectives

1. To examine the politico-administrative efficacy of the current SADC architecture in delivery of the desired outcomes of the RI agenda.
2. To describe the theoretical influences of the Trans-Atlantic Alliance on the architecture of Southern African RI.
3. To interrogate the influence that the exogenous nature of state development in Southern Africa has had on SF or state functionalism.
4. To investigate the position of non-state actors, namely PPPs, in the architecture of RI in Southern Africa.
5. To explore the degree to which the SADC RI framework considers any relationship between SF or state functionalism and PPPs development.

Confidentiality

The records of this study will be kept strictly confidential and all electronic information linked to the identity of respondents will be coded and secured using a password protected file. We will not include any information in the final thesis that would make it possible to identify you.

Voluntary Participation

The decision to participate in this study is voluntary and personal.You are free to refuse to participate in the study at any time during the process. You have the right to request the interviewer not to use any of your interview material or to ask the researcher not to use any of your submitted responses from the Self-Administered Questionnaire.

Questions and Report Concerns

You have the right to ask questions about this research study and to have those questions answered by me before, during or after the research. If you have any further questions about the study, feel free to contact me, McBride Nkhalamba at mcbride.nkhalamba@fulbrightmail.org at any time you find fit to do so

Consent

By appending your signature below you confirm that you have decided to participate in the research for this study as a respondent, without any form of compensation, and that you have read and understood the information provided above.

Respondent (print name): _____

Subject's Signature: _____ Date: _____

Researcher Signature: _____ Date: _____

LETTER OF CONSENT TO ENLIST INTITUTION AS A RESEARCH RESPONDENT

Dear Madam/Sir

PERMISSION TO UNDERTAKE A PUBLIC GOVERNANCE STUDY WITH THE ……..

This letter seeks your written permission to include the ..... in a study on public governance in Malawi and Southern Africa. My name is McBride Nkhalamba and I am a Doctoral Researcher with The University of KwaZulu-Natal in Durban, South Africa.

The study is an inquiry into the confluence between RI, state functionalism and PPPs development in Southern Africa.

Specifically, the study seeks to determine whether the architecture of RI in Southern Africa sufficiently provides for the creation and sustenance of functional state within which PPPs (PPP) can thrive? And in the inverse it seeks to establish the role of state functionalism in driving RI and the resultant effect on PPP. The field study is scheduled from **……..**and **……**

If you agree to participate you will be engaged as follows;

Completion of a Self-Administered Questionnaire

Discussions through a Key Informant Interview with your governance expert(s)

..... is a major player in the Southern Africa governance. Recognizing that your work has implications for state functionalism and by extension PPPs development in the region, your participation is invaluable.

I trust you will grant the permission and participate in the study and has accordingly attached a brief of the study.

Should there be a need for further details please do not hesitate to contact me..

I can be reached on +265 999153433 and emails; mcbride.nkhalamba@fulbrightmail.org or 212560864@stu.ukzn.ac.za

I look forward to your participation and support.

Yours faithfully

McBride P. Nkhalamba

APPENDIX SIX: Description of Quantitative Secondary Data Indices

Fund for Peace (2015) Fragile State Index (FSI)

The Fragile States Index is an annual ranking of 178 nations based on their levels of stability and the pressures they face. It comprises 12 key political, social and economic indicators and approximately 100 sub-indicators that include under each key indicator the following:

1. The first indicator is demographic pressures; this parameter examines pressures on the population such as disease and natural disasters make it difficult for the government to protect its citizens or demonstrate a lack of capacity or will. It includes pressures and measures related to natural disasters, disease, environment, pollution, food scarcity, malnutrition, water scarcity, population growth, youth bulge and mortality.

2. The second indicator is refugees and internally displaced persons; examines pressures associated with population displacement. It is understood that these pressures strain public services and has the potential to pose a security threat. It includes pressures and measures related to refugees and IDPs, displacement, refugee camps, IDP camps, and disease related to displacement, refugees per capita, IDPs per capita and capacity to absorb.

3. The third indicator is uneven economic development; this examines ethnic, religious, or regional disparities recognisant that governments tend to be uneven in their commitment to the social contract. It includes pressures and measures related to GINI coefficient, Income Share of Highest 10%, Income Share of Lowest 10%, Rural v. Urban distribution of services, improved service access and slum population.

4. The fourth indicator is that of group grievance; this parameter examines the state's ability to provide security when tension and violence exists between groups. It includes pressures and measures related to group grievance, discrimination, powerlessness, ethnic violence, communal violence, sectarian violence and religious violence.

5. The fifth indicator is that of human flight and brain drain. This examines the dynamic of emigration and the human capital vacuum created when there is little opportunity. Those with resources also often leave before, or just as, conflict erupts. It includes pressures and measures related to migration per capita, human capital and emigration of educated citizens.

6. The sixth indicator is poverty and economic decline; this parameter recognises that poverty and economic decline strain the ability of the state to fulfil its mandate to its citizens and that this failure can create friction between “haves” and “have nots.” It includes pressures and measures related to economic deficit, government debt, unemployment, youth employment, purchasing power, GDP per capita, GDP growth and inflation.

7. The seventh is that of state legitimacy; this parameter recognises that corruption and lack of representativeness in the government directly undermines the social contract. It includes pressures and measures related to state legitimacy, corruption, government effectiveness, political participation, electoral process, level of democracy, illicit economy, protests and demonstrations and power struggles.

8. The eighth is public service. This parameter examines the provision of public services such as health, education, and sanitation services that are key roles of the state. It includes pressures and measures related to public services, policing, criminality, education provision, literacy, water and sanitation, infrastructure, healthcare quality, telephony, internet access, energy reliability and roads.

9. The ninth indicator is that of human rights and the rule of law. The parameter is based on the logic that when human rights are violated or unevenly protected, the state is considered as having failed in its primary responsibility. This includes pressures and measures related to press freedom, civil liberties, political freedoms, human trafficking, political prisoners, incarceration, religious persecution, torture and executions.

10. The tenth is security apparatus; recognising that the security apparatus should have a monopoly on use of legitimate force, this parameter is based on the premise that the social contract is weakened when competing groups negate state security. It includes pressures and measures related to security apparatus, internal conflict, small arms proliferation, riots and protests, fatalities from conflict, military coups, rebel activity, militancy, and bombings.

11. The eleventh indicator is that of factionalised elites; the parameter examines the effects of “local and national leaders engaged in deadlock and brinksmanship for political gain”. This includes pressures and measures related to factions of elites, power struggles, political defections, flawed elections and political competition.

12. Finally the twelfth and final indicator is that of external intervention; this parameter examines the dynamic of “when the state fails to meet its international or domestic obligations, and

external actors may intervene to provide services or to manipulate internal affairs. It includes pressures and measures related to foreign assistance, presence of peacekeepers, presence of UN Missions, foreign military intervention, sanctions and credit rating".

The FSI is based on a comprehensive social science methodology and data from three primary sources that is triangulated and subjected to critical review to obtain final scores. A variety of "documents are analyzed every year by applying highly specialized search parameters and scores that are apportioned for every country based on the twelve key political, social and economic indicators which include over 100 sub-indicators". A software performs content analysis on this collected information and "through sophisticated search parameters and algorithms, the CAST software separates the relevant data from the irrelevant. Guided by twelve primary social, economic and political indicators (each split into an average of 14 sub-indicators), the CAST software analyzes the collected information using specialized search terms that flag relevant items. Using various algorithms, this analysis is then converted into a score representing the significance of each of the various pressures for a given country. The content analysis is further triangulated with two other key aspects of the overall assessment process: quantitative analysis and qualitative inputs based on major events in the countries examined". The scores produced by The Fund for Peace's software are then compared with a comprehensive set of vital statistics—as well as human analysis—to ensure that the software has not misinterpreted the raw data. The strength of the analysis is in the methodological rigor and the systematic integration of a wide range of data sources (Fund for Peace, 2015).

The FSI and the Study

The study isolated aspects of the Fragile States Index that are relevant to PPPs development. It examined indicators that have a bearing and/or an effect on the success of PPPs. The study also paid specific attention to parameters that result from or are influenced by political ideology. These four are; legitimacy of the state; public service; human rights and the rule of law and security apparatus.

Legitimacy of the state

The FSI established this parameter on the understanding that corruption and lack of representativeness in the government directly undermines the social contract. In measuring this the indicator assesses pressures and measures that relate to corruption, government effectiveness, political participation, electoral process, level of democracy, illicit economy, protests and demonstrations and power struggles. It is plausible to conclude that corruption has a bearing on public and private investor perception of legitimacy of an administration. Consequently, this perception has a bearing on obligation to comply with state. Similarly, government effectiveness also affects perceptions of public and private actors. The legitimacy of an ineffective government is often in question. Government effectiveness essentially

refers to the ability of a government administration to execute and deliver on the mandate for which it is elected and for which the state is established. Other parameters are directly related to the question of representation; political participation, electoral process, level of democracy and power struggles. Finally, there are parameters related to state weakness and maladministration such as, illicit economy, protests and demonstrations.

Public service

This parameter examines the provision of public services such as health, education, and sanitation services in recognition that these comprise the key roles of the state. The unavailability and inaccessibility of services and provision of poor quality services characterizes the negative while the opposite is the desirable. The indicator includes pressures and measures related to policing, education provision, literacy, water and sanitation, infrastructure, healthcare quality, telephony, internet access, energy reliability and roads. These aspects are congruently related to the business-operating environment in that they affect the conditions and circumstances of employees.

Human rights and the Rule of law

Human rights and the Rule of law is a centrally pertinent indicator particular in its rule of law dimension. The parameter is based on the logic that when human rights are violated or unevenly protected, the state is considered as having failed in its primary responsibility. More relevant, the indicator examines the quality, efficacy and application of the rule of law, which in the context of this study has a bearing on transaction costs for both business and public actors, and has a bearing on predictability. The indicator examines pressures and measures related to press freedom, civil liberties, political freedoms, human trafficking, political prisoners, incarceration, religious persecution, torture and executions. These dimensions have a direct bearing on state functionalism and business environment.

Security Apparatus

The fourth indicator selected for the study is that of security apparatus. It is recognised that the security apparatus should have a monopoly on use of legitimate force; this parameter is based on the premise that the social contract is weakened when competing groups negate state security. Additionally, private investors are particular about security and its relationship to the cost of doing business and security of assets. The indicator examines pressures and measures related to the security apparatus, internal conflict, small arms proliferation, riots and protests, fatalities from conflict, military coups, rebel activity, militancy and bombings.

The WB Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA)

The Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) assesses the quality of a country's present policy and institutional framework. The WB initiated country assessments in the late 1970s to help guide the allocation of IDA lending resources. The CPIA consists of a set of criteria representing the different policy and institutional dimensions of an effective poverty reduction and growth strategy. In 1998, the criteria were substantially revised and expanded for coverage to include governance and social policies.

"The CPIA index consists of 16 criteria grouped in four equally weighted clusters. These clusters are of economic management, structural policies, policies for social inclusion and equity, and public sector management and institutions. For each of the 16 criteria, countries are rated on a scale of 1 (low) to 6 (high). The scores depend on the level of performance in a given year assessed against the criteria rather than on changes in performance compared to the previous year. The ratings depend on actual policies and performance, rather than on promises or intentions. In some cases, measures such as the passage of specific legislation can represent an important action that deserves consideration. However, the manner in which such actions should be factored into the ratings is carefully assessed, because in the end it is the implementation of legislation that determines the extent of its impact."

Cluster B: Structural Policies - Indicator 6: Business Regulatory Environment

"This criterion assesses the extent to which the legal, regulatory, and policy environment helps or hinders private business in investing, creating jobs, and becoming more productive. The emphasis is on direct regulations of business activity and regulation of goods and factor markets. Three sub-components are measured: (a) regulations affecting entry, exit, and competition; (b) regulations of ongoing business operations; and (c) regulations of factor markets (labor and land). Other areas pertinent to the business environment are covered in other criteria. These are macroeconomic aspects, trade factors, access to credit, issues concerning the legal framework on property and contract rights, the functioning of the judicial system and labor markets."

Cluster D: Public Sector Management and Institutions – Indicator 12**:** Property Rights and Rule-Based Governance

"This criterion assesses the extent to which economic activity is facilitated by an effective legal system and rule-based governance structure in which property and contract rights are reliably respected and enforced. Each of three dimensions should be rated separately: (a) legal framework for secure property and contract rights, including predictability and impartiality of laws and regulations; (b) quality of the legal and judicial system, as measured by independence, accessibility, legitimacy, efficiency,

transparency, and integrity of the courts and other relevant dispute resolution mechanisms; and (c) crime and violence as an impediment to economic activity and citizen security."

Cluster D: Public Sector Management and Institutions - Indicator 15:Quality of Public Administration

"This criterion covers the core administration defined as the civilian central government (and sub-national governments, to the extent that their size or policy responsibilities are significant) excluding health and education personnel, and police. The criterion assesses the functioning of the core administration in three areas: (a) managing its own operations; (b) ensuring quality in policy implementation and regulatory management; and (c) coordinating the larger public sector Human Resources Management regime outside the core administration (de-concentrated and arms-length bodies and subsidiary governments)."

Cluster D: Public Sector Management and Institutions – Indicator 16:Transparency, Accountability and Corruption in The Public Sector

"This criterion assesses the extent to which the executive, legislators, and other high-level officials can be held accountable for their use of funds, administrative decisions, and results obtained. Accountability is generally enhanced by transparency in decision-making, access to relevant and timely information, public and media scrutiny and by institutional checks (e.g., inspector general, ombudsman, or independent audit) on the authority of the chief executive. The criterion covers four dimensions:

The accountability of the executive and other top officials to effective oversight institutions;

a. Access of civil society to timely and reliable information on public affairs and public policies, including fiscal information (on public expenditures, revenues, and large contract awards);
b. State capture by narrow vested interests; and
c. Integrity in the management of public resources, including aid and natural resource revenues.

The CPIA and the Study

The four indicator clusters in the CPIA are grouped as follows: Cluster A is on Economic Management and it includes indicators for 1. Monetary and Exchange Rate Policies; 2. Fiscal Policy; 3. Debt Policy and Management. Cluster B covers Structural Policies and includes indicators for: 4. Trade; 5. Financial Sector; and 6 Business Regulatory Environment, The third Cluster C covers Policies for Social Inclusion or Equity. These include indicators for 7. Gender Equality; 8. Equity of Public Resource Use; 9. Building Human Resources; 10. Social Protection and Labour; and 11. Policies and Institutions for Environmental Sustainability. The fourth and final Cluster D is on Public Sector Management and

Institutions and it includes indicators for 12. Property Rights and Rule-based Governance; 13. Quality of Budgetary and Financial Management; 14. Efficiency of Revenue Mobilization; 15. Quality of Public Administration; and 16. Transparency, Accountability, and Corruption in the Public Sector.

This study however selected and analyzed indicators from two clusters. These are Cluster B on structural policies under which the business regulatory environment is located. The study also selected the fourth Cluster D on public sector management and institutions. Three sub-indicators were analyzed and these were property rights and rule-based governance, quality of public administration, transparency, accountability, and corruption in the public sector.

The study analyses the 2014 data on CPIA for SADC Countries and the three study countries. The data is obtained from two politico-administrative relevant clusters and four indicators.

Bank (2015) Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)

The economic rationale for RI is commonly premised on two key aspects of transaction cost reduction and the creation of a common market. In order to achieve these two economic integration outcomes a relevant politico-administrative framework must be established. In this regard and for purposes of this study, the FDI index is a measure of the politico-administrative integrity of national and regional governments. It was assumed that when all other factors were held constant, the FDI would be greater in countries with a better politico-administration as opposed to one without. The study also included external trade and services as another proxy measure for regionalization (economic integration).

Based on this economic integration logic, the study isolated six parameters which were; trade openness, infrastructure development, macroeconomic stability, political stability, return to investment and size of host market. It is important to mention that all the explanatory variables except the political stability are from the WB, 2012 World Development Indicators. The study isolated these variables/measures on the causal logic premise of previous studies conducted by Mijiyawa (2012).

As Bank parameters, the parameters have effectively been informed by a liberal neo-classic and neo-Washington consensus ideological framework. A key feature of each parameter according to Mijiyawa (2012) is that they are “controllable factors” defined as factors that can be influenced by governments or policy makers in order to attract more FDI to their countries.

Trade openness. The rationale for this variable is when a country receives market-seeking FDI, such as when foreign firms aimed at serving local market, limited trade openness may result into reduced FDI inflows. This logic is based on “tariff jumping” theory, which argues that multinational firms that seek

to serve local markets may decide to set up subsidiaries in the host country when it is difficult to import their products into that country. The logic further argues that in contrast, multinational firms that are engaged in export-oriented activities may prefer to locate in a more open economy, since trade protectionism may increase transaction costs; thereby, reducing economic competitiveness and exports. It is argued therefore that the effect of trade openness on FDI inflows is considerably ambiguous. That necessitated the elimination of this variable as an FDI inflows factor in this study.

Infrastructure Development. Several studies by the WB have highlighted the role of physical infrastructure in economic growth and development. Authors have also found a positive effect of infrastructure on FDI (Kinda, 2010). It is thus argued that beyond its direct effect on economic growth, good infrastructure may also affect economic growth by increasing the productivity and stimulating foreign or domestic investment.

Macroeconomic stability**.** Mijiyawa (2012) argues that macroeconomic stability is generally cited as one of the factors that Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) consider when deciding to locate in developing countries. High inflation rate is a sign of macroeconomic instability and a source of uncertainty in the economy. It has the potential to create an uncertain economic environment and making it difficult for economic agents to extract correct signals from relative prices. By creating an uncertain economic environment, high inflation rates reduce the expected returns to investment and so the volume of investment. Braga de Macedo et al. (2009) assessed the determinants of Chinese direct investment in Africa and compared the same with those of global FDI and found that macroeconomic stability, measured by low inflation rate, is positively correlated with Chinese and global FDI in Africa.

Political Stability. Political instability can exact prohibitive costs for investment and a country's economy. A country's level of political stability is thus one factor that firms consider when making decision for the location and the amount of investment. Specifically, political instability fosters uncertainty when it induces change of policy makers and economic policies. When political regimes change, often new administrations repudiate and nullify former contracts with foreign firms and the risk of expropriation increases leading to reduction in the volume of FDI. In extreme cases, political instability in the form of civil war destroys physical infrastructure and erodes human capital therefore diminishing the productivity of investment.

Return to investment. FDI ventures seek profits and thus FDI gravitates to economies with a higher return to capital. This fundamental notwithstanding, measures of this variable in Africa is problematic, because most economies on the continent are yet to have well-functioning capital markets, making it difficult to measure the return on capital.

Size of host countries' domestic markets. Countries with larger domestic markets are likely to attract more FDI, especially when FDI inflows aim at serving the domestic market. A positive link between the size of domestic market and FDI inflows is thus a plausible expectation. Mijiyawa (2012) uses a country's population size as a proxy for domestic market.

The WB (2016) Ease of Doing Business (EoDB)

Doing Business measures regulations affecting 11 areas of the life of a business. These are; starting a business, dealing with construction permits, getting electricity, registering property, getting credit, protecting minority investors, paying taxes, trading across borders, enforcing contracts, resolving insolvency and labor market regulation.

Doing Business provides quantitative measures of business regulation in the 11 regulatory areas that are central to how the private sector functions, based on the basis that government action to create a sound, predictable regulatory environment is central to whether or not economies perform well and whether that performance is sustainable in the long run. The Index is developed on the assumption that regulation can aid to correct and prevent traditional types of market failures, and can be used as an intervention when market transactions have led to socially unacceptable outcomes such as improper wealth distribution and inequality. The focus is on government as an institution capable of designing and enforcing regulation to help ensure a level playing field for citizens and economic actors within a society. (Bank, Doing Business, 2017.p v)

Registering Property

Doing Business records the full sequence of procedures necessary for a business. This requires that the buyer purchase property from another business (the seller) and to transfer the property title to the buyer's name so that the buyer can use the property for expanding his or her business, use the property as collateral in taking new loans or, if necessary, sell the property to another business. It also measures the time and cost to complete each of these procedures. The indicator measures the two dimensions of the Efficiency of Transferring Property (procedure, time and cost) and Quality of Land Administration.

The second dimension was introduced in 2016 to measure the quality of the land administration system in an economy. The quality of land administration index has four dimensions: reliability of infrastructure, transparency of information, geographic coverage and land dispute resolution.

Paying Taxes

Paying Taxes records the taxes and mandatory contributions that a medium-size company must pay in a given year as well as the administrative burden of paying taxes and contributions. Taxes and contributions measured include the profit or corporate income tax, social contributions and labor taxes paid by the employer, property taxes, property transfer taxes, dividend tax, capital gains tax, financial transactions tax, waste collection taxes, vehicle and road taxes, and any other small taxes or fees.

The indicator measures all taxes and contributions that are government mandated and that apply to a standardized business and have an impact in its financial statements. Thus, Doing Business reportedly goes beyond the traditional definition of a tax that, for the purposes of government national accounts, means taxes include only compulsory, unrequited payments to government. Doing Business departs from this definition because it measures imposed charges that affect business accounts, not government accounts.

One main difference relates to labor contributions. The Doing Business measure includes government-mandated contributions paid by the employer to a requited private pension fund or workers' insurance fund. The indicator generally excludes value added taxes (provided they are not irrecoverable) because they do not affect the accounting profits of the business and are not reflected in the income statement. Value added tax are, however, only included for the purpose of the compliance measures (time and payments), because they add to the burden of complying with the tax system

Trading Across Borders

The Trading Across Boardersindicator records the time and cost associated with the logistical process of exporting and importing goods. In 2016 Doing Business measures included the time and cost (excluding tariffs) associated with three sets of procedures—documentary compliance, border compliance and domestic transport—within the overall process of exporting or importing a shipment of goods.

Documentary compliance measures the time and cost for the overall cost and complexity of compliance with documentary requirements than does the number of documents required. The time and cost for documentary compliance includes the time and cost for;

i. Obtaining documents (such as time spent undergoing inspections to obtain a certificate of conformity or certificate of origin);
ii. Preparing documents (such as time spent gathering information to complete the customs declaration or certificate of origin);

iii. Processing documents (such as time spent waiting for the relevant authority to issue a phytosanitary certificate);
iv. Presenting documents (such as time spent showing a customs declaration to road police or showing a port terminal receipt to port authorities);
v. Submitting documents (such as time spent submitting a customs declaration to the customs agency in person or electronically).

Documentary compliance also captures the time and cost associated with compliance with the documentary procedures of all government agencies in the origin economy, the destination economy and any transit economies. The aim is to measure the total burden of preparing the bundle of documents that will enable completion of the international trade for the product.

Border compliance measures the total time and cost for clearance and inspections by customs and all other government agencies for the specified product. These estimates account for inspections related to health, safety, phytosanitary standards, conformity and the like, and thus capture the efficiency of agencies that require and conduct these additional inspections. Border compliance captures the time and cost associated with compliance with the economy's customs regulations and with regulations relating to other inspections that are mandatory in order for the shipment to cross the economy's border, as well as the time and cost for handling that takes place at its port or border. The time and cost for this segment include time and cost for obtaining, preparing and submitting documents during port or border handling, customs clearance and inspection procedures. The border compliance time and cost for an economy do not include the time and cost for compliance with the regulations of any other economy.

Domestic transport measures the time and cost for domestic transport. These measures are affected by many external factors—such as the geography and topography of the transit territory, road capacity and general infrastructure, proximity to the nearest port or border, and the location of warehouses where the traded goods are stored—and so are not directly influenced by an economy's trade policies and reforms. Domestic transport captures the time and cost associated with transporting the shipment from a warehouse in the largest business city of the economy to the most widely used seaport, airport or land border of the economy. This set of procedures captures the time for (and cost of) the actual transport; any traffic delays and road police checks; as well as time spent on loading or unloading at the warehouse or border. The time included in this segment includes time spent on obtaining, preparing and submitting documents during the transport process

Enforcing Contracts

Enforcing contracts measures the time and cost for resolving a commercial dispute through a local first-instance court. In 2016, a new measure was introduced of the quality of judicial processes index, which evaluates whether each economy has adopted a series of good practices that promote quality and efficiency in the court system. The quality of judicial processes index measures whether each economy has adopted a series of good practices in its court system in four areas: court structure and proceedings, case management, court automation and alternative dispute resolution.

Court structure and proceedings measures whether a country has a specialised commercial court or a section dedicated solely to hearing commercial cases is in place. This could include a small claims court or a fast-track procedure for small claims is in place; whether plaintiffs can obtain pretrial attachment of the defendant's movable assets if they fear the assets may be moved out of the jurisdiction or otherwise dissipated; and whether cases are assigned randomly and automatically to judges throughout the competent court.

Case management measures whether any of the applicable laws or regulations on civil procedure contain time standards for at least three of the following key court events: (i) service of process; (ii) first hearing; (iii) filing of the statement of defense; (iv) completion of the evidence period; and (v) submission of the final judgment. It measures whether there are any laws regulating the maximum number of adjournments or continuances that can be granted, whether adjournments are limited by law to unforeseen and exceptional circumstances and whether these rules are respected in more than 50% of cases. In addition, it measures whether there are any performance measurement reports that can be generated about the competent court to monitor the court's performance, to monitor the progress of cases through the court and to ensure compliance with established time standards. It also measures whether a pretrial conference is among the case management techniques used before the competent court and at least three of the following issues are discussed during the pretrial conference:

i. Scheduling (including the time frame for filing motions and other documents with the court);
ii. Case complexity and projected length of trial;
iii. Possibility of settlement or alternative dispute resolution;
iv. Exchange of witness lists;
v. Evidence;
vi. Jurisdiction and other procedural issues; and
vii. The narrowing down of contentious issues.

Other measurements include whether judges within the competent court can use an electronic case management system for at least four of the following purposes:

i. To access laws, regulations and case law;
ii. To automatically generate a hearing schedule for all cases on their docket;

iii. To send notifications (for example, e-mails) To lawyers;
iv. To track the status of a case on their docket;
v. To view and manage case documents (briefs, motions);
vi. To assist in writing judgments;
vii. To semi-automatically generate court orders; and
viii. To view court orders and judgments in a particular case;

and whether lawyers can use an electronic case management system for at least four of the following purposes:

i. To access laws, regulations and case law;
ii. To access forms to be submitted to the court;
iii. To receive notifications (for example, e-mails);
iv. To track the status of a case;
v. To view and manage case documents (briefs, motions);
vi. To file briefs and documents with the court; and
vii. To view court orders and decisions in a particular case.

Court automation measures whether the initial complaint can be filed electronically through a dedicated platform (not e-mail or fax) within the relevant court. It also measures whether court fees can be paid electronically, either through a dedicated platform or through online banking; and whether judgments rendered by local courts are made available to the public through publication in official gazettes, in newspapers or on the internet.

Finally, dispute resolution measures six aspects of:

i. Whether domestic commercial arbitration is governed by a consolidated law or consolidated chapter or section of the applicable code of civil procedure encompassing substantially all its aspects;
ii. Whether there are any commercial disputes—aside from those dealing with public order, public policy, bankruptcy, consumer rights, employment issues or intellectual property—that cannot be submitted to arbitration;
iii. Whether valid arbitration clauses or agreements are enforced by local courts in more than 50% of cases;
iv. Whether voluntary mediation, conciliation or both are a recognised way of resolving commercial disputes;
v. whether voluntary mediation, conciliation or both are governed by a consolidated law or consolidated chapter or section of the applicable code of civil procedure encompassing substantially all their aspects; and

vi. Whether there are any financial incentives for parties to attempt mediation or conciliation (for example, if mediation or conciliation is successful, a refund of court filing fees, an income tax credit or the like).

Protecting Minority Investors

Protecting minority investorsmeasures the protection of minority investors from conflicts of interest through one set of indicators and shareholders' rights in corporate governance through another. Collected data is based on securities regulations, company laws, civil procedure codes and court rules of evidence.

The first indicator, Protection of Shareholders from Conflicts of Interest measures the extent of conflict of interest. The regulation index measures the protection of shareholders against directors' misuse of corporate assets for personal gain by distinguishing three dimensions of regulation that address conflicts of interest: transparency of related-party transactions (extent of disclosure index); shareholders' ability to sue and hold directors liable for self-dealing (extent of director liability index); and access to evidence and allocation of legal expenses in shareholder litigation (ease of shareholder suits index).

Specifically, the indicator assesses the following:

i. Strength of minority investor protection;
ii. Extent of shareholder governance;
iii. Extent of corporate transparency;
iv. Extent of ownership and control;
v. Extent of shareholder rights;
vi. Shareholders' rights in corporate governance;
vii. Extent of conflict of interest regulation;
viii. Ease of shareholder suits;
ix. Extent of director liability;
x. Extent of disclosure.

World Economic Forum (2016) Global Competitive Index (GCI)

Reportedly, The Global Competitiveness Report 2015-2016 assesses the competitiveness landscape of 140 economies, providing insight into the drivers of their productivity and prosperity. The Index defines competitiveness as the set of institutions, policies, and factors that determine the level of productivity of a country. The level of productivity determines the level of prosperity that can be reached by an economy. It also determines the rates of return obtained by investments in an economy. The rate of

return in turn is the fundamental driver of an economy's growth rates. The index has twelve indicators categorized as pillars.

Pillars one to four are classified as basic requirements for competitiveness while pillars five to ten are classified as enhancers. The last two pillars eleven and twelve are classified as sophistication and innovation. The primary interest of the study however was the basic requirements category.

Pillar One: Institutions

The institutional environment is determined by the legal and administrative framework within which individuals, firms, and governments interact to generate wealth. The importance of a sound and fair institutional environment has become all the more apparent during the recent economic and financial crisis and is especially crucial for further solidifying the fragile recovery, given the increasing role played by the state at the international level and for the economies of many countries.

The quality of institutions has a strong bearing on competitiveness and growth. It influences investment decisions and the organization of production and plays a key role in the ways in which societies distribute the benefits and bear the costs of implementing development strategies and policies. The measure also includes government attitudes toward markets and freedoms and the efficiency of its operations that are deemed equally important. It measures excessive bureaucracy and red tape, overregulation, corruption, dishonesty in dealing with public contracts, lack of transparency and trustworthiness, inability to provide appropriate services for the business sector and political dependence of the judicial system impose significant economic costs to businesses.

Pillar Two: Infrastructure

Based on the premise that extensive and efficient infrastructure is critical for ensuring the effective functioning of the economy, as it is an important factor in determining the location of economic activity and the kinds of activities or sectors that can develop within a country. Well-developed infrastructure reduces the effect of distance between regions, integrating the national market and connecting it at low cost to markets in other countries and regions.

Pillar Three: Macroeconomic Management

The Macroeconomic Management pillar is premised on the recognition that the stability of the macroeconomic environment is important for business and therefore significant for the overall competitiveness of a country. Further, although it is certainly true that macroeconomic stability alone cannot increase the productivity of a nation, it is also recognized that macroeconomic disarray harms the economy.

The other pillars from four to twelve include; health and primary education; higher education and training; goods market efficiency; labour market efficiency; financial market development; technological readiness; market size; business sophistication; and finally innovation.

APPENDIX SEVEN: Ethical Clearance Letter

UNIVERSITY OF KWAZULU-NATAL
INYUVESI YAKWAZULU-NATALI

11 December 2012

Mr MPN Nkhalamba 212560864
School of Management, IT and Governance
Westville Campus

Dear Mr Nkhalamba

Protocol reference number: HSS/1312/012D
Project title: Regional Integration and State Functionalism in the Development of Public-Private Partnerships in Southern Africa

EXPEDITED APPROVAL

I wish to inform you that your application has been granted Full Approval through an expedited review process.

Any alteration/s to the approved research protocol i.e. Questionnaire/Interview Schedule, Informed Consent Form, Title of the Project, Location of the Study, Research Approach and Methods must be reviewed and approved through the amendment/modification prior to its implementation. In case you have further queries, please quote the above reference number. Please note: Research data should be securely stored in the school/department for a period of 5 years.

I take this opportunity of wishing you everything of the best with your study.

Yours faithfully

[redacted]

Professor Steven Collings (Chair)

/pm

cc Supervisor: Dr Fayth Ruffin
cc Academic leader: Professor KK Govender
cc School Admin.: Ms Hlengiwe Ngcobo

Professor S Collings (Chair)
Humanities & Social Sc Research Ethics Committee
Westville Campus, Govan Mbeki Building
Postal Address: Private Bag X54001, Durban, 4000, South Africa
Telephone: +27 (0)31 260 3587/8350 **Facsimile:** +27 (0)31 260 4609 **Email:** ximbap@ukzn.ac.za / snymanm@ukzn.ac.za
Founding Campuses: Edgewood Howard College Medical School Pietermaritzburg Westville

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Regional Integration Thesis 212560864

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