

**Civil Society Advocacy and Results Measurement: A Case
Study of the Save Zimbabwe Campaign**

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A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy (Development Studies) to the School of Built
Environment and Development Studies, University of KwaZulu-Natal.

Durban, March 2018

Abstract

This thesis critically examines attempts by civil society organisations (CSOs) working in the area of democracy advocacy in Zimbabwe to account to international donors in the context of a repressive political environment. The thesis examines how CSOs cope and adapt to the demand for results in international development, particularly upward accountability and the use of accountability mechanisms thereof. The study instrumentally uses the case study of the Save Zimbabwe Campaign (SZC), a democracy advocacy initiative that took place in Zimbabwe from 2006 to 2009, to explore how democracy advocacy results were measured and how requirements of upward accountability affect the organisational behaviour of CSOs. Through the deployment of accountability theory complemented by Foucault's approach to discourse and power/knowledge framework, this thesis argues that results measurement is part of the dominant discourse in the field of international development and thereby constitutes a "discursive practice". The discourse of results measurement is premised on "evidence of change" and the logical connection between interventions and outcomes. This is despite the fact that some results, especially of democracy advocacy based on mass mobilization of activists may take some time to gestate. However, this discourse is not free from judgmental values (subjectivities) of the social actors involved and is characterised by the exercise of power. As CSOs and donors interact through different communication typologies, perceptions and biases about the projects and implementation capacities inevitably form. These ultimately affect how results from advocacy initiatives are measured. The accountability requirements consequently affect the already asymmetric relationship between CSOs and donors as CSOs cope with and adapt to the upward accountability through improvisation and a combination of partial and reluctant compliance as a survival strategy. The thesis is based on a qualitative study and data was gathered through document analysis and semi-structured interviews. Findings contribute to the field of upward accountability particularly with regards to CSOs involved in democracy advocacy based on mass mobilisation of activists and how they become accountable to donors within a politically repressive environment. The thesis also contributes to an understanding of how CSO - donor relations are shaped by accountability mechanisms and practices. The findings will be of interest to those

involved in civil society and advocacy studies, development practitioners, donors and evaluators of development interventions.

DECLARATION - PLAGIARISM

I, TAENZANISWA KENNEDY MUGOCHI, declare that

1. The research reported in this thesis, except where otherwise indicated, is my original research.
2. This thesis has not been submitted for any degree or examination at any other university.
3. This thesis does not contain other persons' data, pictures, graphs or other information, unless specifically acknowledged as being sourced from other persons.
4. This thesis does not contain other persons' writings, unless specifically acknowledged as being sourced from other researchers. Where other written sources have been quoted, then:
 - i. Their words have been re-written but the general information attributed to them has been referenced
 - ii. Where their exact words have been used, then their writing has been placed in italics and inside quotation marks, and referenced.
5. This thesis does not contain text, graphics or tables copied and pasted from the Internet, unless specifically acknowledged, and the source being detailed in the thesis and in the References sections.

Signed

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Acknowledgements

I want to acknowledge and appreciate a number of people for their contribution to the success of this thesis.

I am forever indebted to my Supervisor and academic mentor Dr Shauna Mottiar for patiently guiding me through the various stages of the study. Thank you so much for meticulously going through the various drafts and providing very wise feedback. Also thank you for all the encouragement during the low moments of this journey. I also acknowledge with appreciation Professor Patrick Bond for his guidance and constructive feedback during the formative stages of this study.

I also want to acknowledge the Zimbabwe Christian Alliance (ZCA) for allowing me access to their organisational documents. Many thanks go to the former and current staff members at the ZCA for their kind assistance. This study would not have been possible without your kind assistance. I am equally grateful to my friends and colleagues, thank you for your encouragement and constructive engagement on this topic.

I want to thank my family for their forbearance. Special and heartfelt thanks to my wife Caroline for bearing the parental burden while I concentrated on the studies. Thank you for being there for me and for your encouragement during the difficult moments of this journey. I love you. I want to thank my son Tadiwanashe and my daughter Hannah (who became part of us along the journey) for your patience with me.

Last but not least, I want to thank my wider family for the encouragement and support. Special thanks go to my parents Susan Mugochi and the late Edward Mugochi, for sacrificially contributing to my upbringing and education. I am, because of you!

Thank you God for the guidance and protection. You made the journey possible.

This thesis is dedicated to the brave men and women of Zimbabwe who work tirelessly to ensure a democratic society and that the citizens of Zimbabwe are treated with dignity. Another prosperous Zimbabwe is possible!

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Acronyms and Abbreviations

ADF	African Development Fund
AIDS	Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
AIPPA	Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act
CCJP	Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DFID	Department for International Development
ESAP	Economic Structural Adjustment Programme
FDA	Foreign Development Assistance
GNU	Government of National Unity
HIV	Human Immunodeficiency Virus
IDRC	International Development Research Centre
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organisation
LFA	Logical Framework Approach
LFM	Logical Framework Matrix
LRF	Legal Resources Foundation

MfDR	Management for Development Results
MBO	Management by Objectives
MDC	Movement for Democratic Change
MISA	Media Institute of Southern Africa
MSC	Most Significant Change
NCA	National Constitutional Assembly
NGDO	Non Governmental Development Organisation
NGO	Non-governmental Organisation
NOVIB	Nederlandse Organisatie voor Internationale Bijstand (Netherlands Organization for International Development Cooperation)
ODA	Overseas Development Aid
OECD	Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development
OM	Operation Murambatsvina
ORAP	Organisation of Rural Associations for Progress
PLM	Programme Logic Model
POSA	Public Order and Security Act
RBA	Results Based Aid

RBM	Results Based Management
SADC	Southern Africa Development Community
SZC	Save Zimbabwe Campaign
ToC	Theory of Change
UKZN	University of KwaZulu-Natal
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
ZANU-PF	Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front
ZCA	Zimbabwe Christian Alliance
ZCTU	Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions
ZHRF	Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum
ZINASU	Zimbabwe National Students Union
ZLHR	Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights
ZNLWVA	Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association
ZPP	Zimbabwe Peace Project

CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

1.1 Chapter introduction

This opening chapter lays the foundation of the thesis by framing the study, introducing the research aim, motivation and objectives that guided the study. It goes on to state the research questions and the rationale behind the study. The chapter ends with a section on how the thesis is organised, providing brief descriptions of each chapter.

1.2 Framing the thesis

This thesis explores in detail, attempts by civil society organisations (CSOs) working in the area of democracy advocacy in Zimbabwe to be accountable to international donors¹ in the context of a repressive political environment. The thesis carefully examines how CSOs cope and adapt to the demand for results in international development, particularly upward accountability and the use of accountability mechanisms thereof. It seeks to contribute to an understanding of organisational upward accountability particularly measuring results of democracy advocacy initiatives that are dependent on mass mobilisation of activists in a politically repressive environment.

CSOs by virtue of them receiving funding from donors are often required to periodically report back to them. This quest to satisfy upward accountability requirements is done in the context of the interminable debate on aid effectiveness and a global rise in demand for results of development initiatives. The thesis explores this by examining CSOs in Zimbabwe that were involved in advocating for the restoration of democracy, human rights and legitimate government under the Save Zimbabwe Campaign (SZC) project from 2006 to 2009. The campaign, launched on

¹ Foreign donors and international donors are used interchangeably in thesis as they mean one and the same thing.

² This thesis refers to three different scholars who share the same surname – Moyo. These are Dambisa

29 July 2006, was an initiative of a coalition of civil society organisations, churches and political formations in Zimbabwe that were “...united to resolve the multifaceted crisis in Zimbabwe through peaceful means,” (SZC Project Document, 2006). The campaign activities involved mainly mass mobilisation of activists to demand democracy reforms mainly through protests. The campaign took place within a politically repressive environment.

The study that produced this thesis was motivated by the desire to understand the dynamics involved between CSOs in Zimbabwe and international donors in measuring results of advocacy initiatives and how CSOs respond to the various demands for accountability from international donors. These advocacy initiatives are among other strategies that CSOs employ in a bid to influence government policy and legislation. In the case of SZC, the advocacy strategy was meant to consolidate democracy in Zimbabwe. The study sought to understand the mismatch between the theory, represented by the various accountability mechanisms, normally used by international donors in measuring development results on one hand and the praxis used by CSOs in demonstrating results from democracy advocacy initiatives on the other hand.

While the challenges of upward accountability have been fairly covered in past studies, this study examines these challenges and complexities within the context of democracy advocacy that includes mass mobilisation of activists in a politically repressive environment. Most studies of organisational accountability focus on the different types of accountability based on to whom the organisations are accountable. For instance, in their study on performance and accountability of non-governmental organisations (NGOs), Edwards and Hulme (1996b) explore accountability giving reference to how individuals and organisations report to recognised authority. Studies by Fowler (1996), Najam (1996) and O’ Dwyer and Unerman (2008) also point to the hierarchical nature of accountability between NGOs, a critical component of civil society and donors. In these studies, NGOs provide an account to their donors on how they have spent the funds and also the outcomes of their activities. Some studies go further to examine what Ebrahim (2003:815) calls mechanisms of accountability such as reports and disclosure statements, assessments and evaluations, self-regulation and social audits. These mechanisms are ways in which organisations are accountable to

their stakeholders mostly in the written version. These accountability studies and mechanisms will be explored in greater detail in chapter three of this thesis focus on accountability theory.

While the challenges associated with upward accountability of CSOs have been reported in the growing body of literature on organisational accountability as indicated above, no major study has carefully examined accountability challenges of CSOs in Zimbabwe with a particular focus on one key strategy used by CSOs – that of democracy advocacy that involves mass mobilisation of activists. This is despite the increased funding by international donors to CSOs in Zimbabwe who are involved in democracy advocacy and the exponential growth in the number of CSOs working in the area of democracy, good governance and human rights since the year 2000. A study closer to Zimbabwe that provides some insights into the contribution of CSOs to democratization particularly influencing government policy and legislation (advocacy) in Africa as well as exploring CSO - donor relations, is that of Robinson and Friedman (2005). Although Zimbabwe was not part of the study as the focus was Ghana, South Africa and Uganda, the study provides evaluative insights into the role of CSOs in the area of democratization and how foreign funding affects CSOs. However, the study did not explore the processes of upward accountability and how these processes affect the organizational behaviour of CSOs.

This study contributes to the understanding of the disjuncture between current notions of civil society advocacy based on technical work to influence legislation and policy as practiced in Western countries and democracy advocacy that is based on mobilisation of activists in mostly politically unstable contexts in Africa. This is in line with assertions by Robinson and Friedman (2005:7) who argue that “Civil society in Africa assumes a different character from that in most Western liberal democracies, reflecting underlying social economic conditions and particular historical and political circumstances of individual countries”.

Since the late 1990s, external donors prefer to channel their financial support to aid democracy in Africa through CSOs (Robinson and Friedman 2005). Edwards and Hulme (1996:6) argue that the increased funding to NGOs, that are a critical component of civil society, is part of the promotion of the “New Policy Agenda” by

bilateral and multilateral donor agencies who sought to finance NGOs and grassroots organisations on the grounds of their economic efficiency and contribution to good governance. The New Policy Agenda was pursued after the end of the Cold War in 1989. Although the strength of CSOs in developing countries differ, proponents of channelling development aid through CSOs often cite efficiency, less bureaucracy, lack of corruption and better representation and articulation of the needs of people as reasons to prefer CSOs over states. Preference of these CSOs as main vehicles of channelling development aid coincided with the proliferation of CSOs particularly NGOs. According to Debiel and Stich (2005:9), the rise in NGOs post 1980s is because of the neo-liberal development model that viewed the state with suspicion therefore favouring support to NGOs to take over the welfare services initially conducted by the state.

1.3 Background and research aims

Funding that CSOs receive from international donors is part of foreign aid, which is also referred to as Overseas Development Aid (ODA). Easterly cited in Gukurume (2012:2) defines foreign aid as “voluntary transfer of resources from one country to another, given at least partly with the objective of benefiting the recipient country”. According to Williamson (2009:1), the purpose of foreign aid is to promote economic and human development. It should be noted that there are different types of aid with different objectives. In its mapping of aid, World Vision Australia (2015) distinguishes between three types of foreign aid which are bilateral aid, non-government aid and multilateral aid. Bilateral aid is assistance given by a government directly to the government of another country. Non-government aid (NGO aid) is assistance provided by NGOs. These NGOs raise funds through public donations from individuals and businesses. They sometimes tap into overseas development budgets of their governments. NGO aid works in three broad areas, which are:

- a. Humanitarian relief work in response to major disasters where funds are provided for emergency food, water and shelter.
- b. Long-term community development work to empower poor communities to find solutions to problems affecting them.

- c. Advocacy and education work to influence business and government policy affecting the poor.

Multilateral aid is assistance provided by governments to international organisations such as the United Nations (UN), World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF). These organisations seek among other things to reduce poverty in developing countries.

Makumbe (1998) and Masunungure (2011) concur that most of the funding for CSOs in Zimbabwe comes from international donors. Chakawarika (2011:22) confirms this assertion by concluding that all NGOs whether national or international are dependent on sources of external funding however this might vary. Scholars such as Sabatini (2002), Tatar (2006) have studied different funding approaches on democracy work in Latin America and Romania respectively. Sabatini (2002) concludes that foreign funding for local CSOs in developing countries has a potential of delinking those CSOs from the broader political and party systems. Tatar (2006) also acknowledges the effect foreign funding has on local CSOs and pointed to the mixed effect of this type of funding model for civil society. He states that:

...international assistance enhances the capacity of NGOs to mobilize advocacy coalitions and this in turn increases the effectiveness of their participation in influencing policymaking. But on the other hand, democracy assistance programs have a rather paradoxical effect by impeding NGOs' civic engagement with their domestic constituencies. Hence, international assistance has a mixed impact on the contribution of civil society to the consolidation of democracy: it fosters advocacy groups' "link-up" to the governmental decision-makers while in the same time it hinders their "link-down" to ordinary people (Tatar, 2006:7).

While acknowledging the potential "perverse effects" of donor funding, Robinson and Friedman (2005) also observes that in some instances, donor funding may not necessarily compromise the objectives of CSOs. They conclude that:

But dependence on foreign aid does not always produce deleterious effects, especially when used effectively and strategically by recipient organisations. Nor does foreign aid necessarily compromise their objectives, limit their

credibility or skew their agendas as civil society organisations employ institutional devices to maintain their independence and legitimacy. The research demonstrates that foreign aid can play a benign and supportive role to the political efficacy of recipient organisations, but only if organisations are able to make effective use of funding and the domestic environment is conducive to influence” (Robinson and Friedman, 2005:38).

It is however important to note that external funding to local CSOs has also produced mixed results in the quest for advancing democracy in Zimbabwe. Scholars (Mapuva, 2010; Moyo, Sachikonye and Raftopoulos, 1998) have come to agree that this funding model presents a set of challenges that often results in an unequal relationship between international donors and CSOs and may lead to possible manipulation of the latter. Scholars such as Edwards and Hulme (1996a) have also argued that international donor funding may create opportunistic NGOs. These are organisations that will be started ostensibly to acquire funding from international donors while some organisations adjust their projects in order to attract this type of funding. Furthermore, reliance on international donor funding may lead to a threat on sustainability as projects often discontinue in the absence of international donor funds or changing priorities of international donors.

As CSOs are employing various ways to influence policies and practices on human rights, democracy and good governance in Zimbabwe, globally, a debate around aid effectiveness has been raging for some years now. In exploring the debates surrounding the effectiveness of foreign aid, Williamson (2009) notes that there are two theoretical positions that have been advanced. On one hand, there is the Public Interest Theory which argues that foreign aid is necessary to fill in the financing or investment gap and this will in turn lift countries out of a so called poverty trap. Scholars such as Sachs (2005) support this line of thinking by arguing that prudent investment in development of poor countries could lead to economic growth that will lead to these countries improving their economic status. In line with this thinking, Sachs (2005) and other Scholars such as Burnside (1997) make a plea for more funding for international development. Burnside (1997) in Gukurume (2012:7) cites countries such as South Africa, Botswana and Egypt as examples of success stories of foreign aid in Africa.

On the other hand, The Public Choice Perspective argues that foreign aid is ineffective and possibly damaging to recipient countries. Scholars such as Easterly (2006; 2007b) and Dambisa Moyo (2009) fiercely argue that foreign aid has not worked at all. Easterly (2007) cited in Williamson (2009:2) posits that “\$568 billion in today’s dollars flowed into Africa over the past 42 years, yet per capita growth of the median African nation has been close to zero. The top quarter of aid recipients...received 17 percent of their GDP in aid over those 42 years, yet also had near-zero per capita growth. Successful cases of development happening due to a large inflow of aid and technical assistance have been hard to find...” This scenario of lack of real growth and development in poor countries despite huge investments in foreign aid, has led Dambisa Moyo (2009) to dismiss foreign aid as a fallacy by calling it “Dead Aid”. Sogge (2002) is also sceptical of foreign aid. He argues that even the compassionate forms of aid such as feeding the hungry can have dramatic and sometimes negative effects on those it seeks to help. He gives examples of how food aid has changed Africa’s diets and how it has created dependence on expensive foreign diets such as bread. He argues that most of the food, wheat for instance, is produced outside of Africa and that food aid was as a result of surplus production in North America. Sogge (2002) further suggests that political and economic interests of donors or lender countries usually influence decision making on who gets foreign aid and how.

However, these debates on aid effectiveness seem to be driven by economists who largely employ quantitative approaches development thereby relate to foreign aid in so far as it relates to enhancing economic growth. This thesis focuses on the foreign development aid that is extended to CSOs in developing countries to assist them to embark on advocacy and influencing policy on human rights, democracy and good governance. This type of aid is usually difficult to quantify, as it may not be part of the “Official Development Assistance (ODA)”.

In order to account for development results, development management practices based on frameworks and approaches such a Results Based Management (RBM) have been formulated (Vähämäki et al. 2011:12). United Nations Development Group (2010:7) defines RBM as “management strategy by which all actors on the ground contribute directly or indirectly to achieve a set of development results, ensure that

their processes, products and services contribute to the achievement of desired results (outputs, outcomes and goals)". From this definition, there is a strong suggestion that all stakeholders in the development sector work tirelessly to achieve results. This thesis will demonstrate that this assumed desirability of development results by all stakeholders will sometimes lead to tensions among stakeholders emanating from the different interpretations of these results by different social actors.

The strong push for results has led to development practitioners and evaluators to formulate different mechanisms and frameworks that are aimed at measuring results of projects and programmes implemented by development practitioners such as CSOs. The development sector has witnessed the introduction of programme logic models (PLM). These models set out the steps needed to reach the higher-level outcomes for programme, organization or other interventions. These models challenge those planning the interventions to prove logic and connections between the problem that the project seeks to solve, the proposed activities to solve the identified problem and the anticipated outcomes. These models are referred to in development literature using different terminologies such as the logical framework. They are also commonly referred to as the *logframe*, outcome models and strategy maps.. As Gasper (2000:17) notes, "the logical framework has become an enormously widely employed tool in project planning and management, especially but not only in development aid work. It is now used by nearly all aid funding agencies, and therefore by thousands of client organizations around the world". The use of the logical framework also extends to Zimbabwe.

However, it should be noted that not all results from CSO interventions are easy to measure. The complexity of the strategy and activities implemented by CSOs has a bearing on how the subsequent results are measured. While the accountability requirements extend to all activities implemented by CSO, results from activities such as democracy advocacy are difficult to measure. Roche (1999) summarises the challenges of measuring advocacy initiatives by stating that:

A large proportion of advocacy work is long-term; it may lack dramatic moments when it is possible to say that a significant change has occurred. Policy change is often incremental and slow, and implementation lags significantly behind legislative change. Although there may be exceptions to

this, particularly in single-issue campaigns, the relationship between these 'victories' and long-term policy change is complex and difficult to untangle (Roche, 1999:193).

The challenges associated with measuring advocacy initiatives presented in the findings section of this thesis. Although the demand for results by donors cuts across most of the CSO interventions that are financed by donors, social and political changes emanating from democracy advocacy presents a specific set of challenges when subjected to donor evaluations. The challenge of results that are not easily demonstrable creates potential tension between donors funding the projects on the one hand with , demand results measured according to prescribed tools and frameworks, and CSOs on the other hand that are involved in advocacy initiatives, which are complex in their nature and impact. This tension, for instance, was contained in the statements attributed to one Western diplomat in an article entitled “Pro-Democracy NGOs Wasted our Money” published in the *New Zimbabwean Online Newspaper* on 1 July 2016. In the article, the Western diplomat is quoted to have said the following, “You can see that there has been no, or very little change in the democracy situation in the country despite the civil society having been well resourced financially”. (*New Zimbabwean*: 1 July 2016). CSOs in Zimbabwe have reacted with shock to such criticisms particularly from international donors whom they had considered allies for years. An earlier example was an article written by Pius Wakatama in *The Standard Newspaper* entitled “The EU must recall Ambassador Dell’ Ariccia,” published on 29 June 2014, where the quoted EU representative stated that there was no crisis in Zimbabwe - this was totally contrary to the CSO position, which the EU had supported all along.

The term advocacy result, in this thesis, denotes social and political change that is born out of advocacy interventions by CSOs. A number of operational definitions of development results have been advanced in development theory and practice. The UNDP for instance describes results as “describable or measurable change in the state that is derived from a cause-and-effect relationship” (UNDG, 2011:10). The Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) defines result as “the output, outcome or impact (intended or unintended, positive/or negative of a development intervention,” (OECD DAC

2002:33). and the overall thrust is on outcomes. The European Union defines results slightly differently by stating that they are "...the specific dimension of well-being and progress for people that motivates policy action, i.e. what is intended to be changed, with the contribution of the interventions designed" European Union (2015:4). While the UNDP and OECD looks at outputs, outcomes and impact as constituting different layers of results in development, the EU does not consider outputs as results as such. They are considered as direct products of programmes and are intended to contribute to results EU (2015:5). To underline the importance attached to development results, most donors demand a results framework as part of the proposal for funding. The Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) of the World Bank defines a results framework as "...an explicit articulation (graphic display, matrix or summary) of the different levels, or chains of results expected from a particular intervention – project, programme or development strategy" (IEG 2012:7). According to the IEG (2012), the results specified in the results framework typically comprise the long-term objectives (often referred to as "outcomes" or "impact") and the intermediate outcomes and outputs that proceed, and lead to, these desired long-term objectives. Consequently, results frameworks capture the essential elements of the "logical and expected cause-effect relationships among inputs, outputs, intermediate results or outcomes and impact".


The concept of results in development is closely linked to two other concepts, which are "performance measurement" and "programme evaluation." Performance measurement is generally defined as "regular measurement of outcomes and results, which generates reliable data on the effectiveness and efficiency of programmes" According to The Government Accountability Office (GAO) of the United States, performance measurement is an "on-going monitoring and reporting of programme accomplishments, particularly progress toward pre-established goals." The process of measurement is both qualitative and quantitative.

Evaluation is defined as by the United Nations (2005) as "An assessment, as systematic and impartial as possible, of an activity, project, programme, strategy, policy, topic, theme, sector, operational area, institutional performance, etc. It focuses on expected and achieved accomplishments, examining the results chain, processes, contextual factors of causality, in order to understand achievements or the lack

thereof. It aims at determining the relevance, impact, effectiveness and sustainability of the interventions and contributions of the organizations” (UNEG Norms for Evaluation in the UN System, 2005: 5). While performance measurement encompasses assessment of progress and impact during the different stages of programme implementation, evaluation of a programme usually takes place at the end of the programme implementation. Thus, while both performance measurement and evaluation seek to achieve similar ends, the major difference is the regularity of the processes. Performance measurement becomes an on-going process while evaluation is usually scheduled mid-way through the programme (mid-term evaluation) or at the end of the programme (summative).

Logic based results chains are usually depicted in literature in a linear way. Below is a simple results chain that depicts activities, outputs, outcomes and impact.


Figure 1. Logic based results chain



Source: Author’s own construction of results chain based on general literature

The basis for a *logframe* is when the results chain moves upwards

Figure 2. The relationship between the logframe and results chain



Source: Author's own construction of relationship between results chain and the logframe

However, despite the minimum variations and debates to these definitions of results in development practice, the underlying aspect of the definitions of development results provided above is “change that follows a development intervention”. Although this change can be negative, development projects ought to be managed in a manner that ensures delivery of positive change.

This study takes note of other studies and debates around CSOs effectiveness and accountability processes especially to beneficiaries in what is commonly referred to in literature as downward accountability. However, this study chose to focus on the relatively understudied area of upward accountability by CSOs that are involved in democracy advocacy in Zimbabwe and operating in a politically repressive environment. This was done with a view of understanding how CSOs in Zimbabwe cope and adapt to the accountability requirements from international donors. This understanding will lead to improved development aid and democratisation processes in Zimbabwe.

In light of the above background, the aim of the study was to critically examine how CSOs involved in democracy advocacy satisfied the upward accountability requirements during the SZC. This was done with a view of understanding the pragmatic approaches, challenges and complexities that CSOs experience in a bid to

satisfy the accountability requirements. This is in order to contribute to a deeper understanding of relations between CSOs and international donors with regards to approaches used in the evaluation of advocacy results.

1.4 Research objectives

This thesis was informed by the following three objectives:

1. To examine the challenges and complexities faced by CSOs involved in the SZC in demonstrating results of advocacy initiatives
2. To review the underlying power dynamics embedded in international donor - CSO relations
3. To contribute to a deeper understanding of measurement of democracy advocacy results in the context of a politically repressive environment in Zimbabwe

The above stated objectives were achieved through a careful examination of the accountability processes and the interaction between CSOs that were involved with the SZC from 2006 to 2009 and the international donors that funded most of the activities under the SZC. The process of achieving the above stated objectives will be discussed in detail in chapter 4 of this thesis that deals with the methodology.

1.5 Research questions

In order to achieve the stated objectives, the central research question of the study was:

How do CSOs in Zimbabwe, involved in democracy advocacy and operating in a politically repressive environment, become accountable to their international donors and how does this affect their organisational behaviour.

In answering the main research question, the following sub questions guided the study. These are:

1. How were results from the SZC advocacy initiative communicated to stakeholders, especially international donors?

2. What tools and criteria did both CSOs and international donors use to measure results particularly of democracy advocacy initiatives?
3. What were the challenges and complexities experienced by CSOs in demonstrating results of advocacy initiatives?
4. Did CSOs and international donors involved with the SZC have the same understanding of what constitutes results of advocacy initiatives?
5. How can results on democracy advocacy initiatives by CSOs in Zimbabwe be best measured?

The study focuses on the SZC that took place between 2006 and 2009 in Zimbabwe. This is a period that was characterised by increased state repression of citizens and a shrinking space for CSOs involved in democracy and good governance work. CSOs such as Zimbabwe Peace Project (ZPP), Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum and Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights (ZLHR) documented and published periodic reports of gross human rights, state sponsored persecution of human rights defenders, harassment and torture of some CSO leaders during the period under review. During that period, state – civil society relations were highly fructuous and based on suspicion. Writing during the period of the campaign, Muloongo, (2007:17) notes that “the Zimbabwean state has become anti-CSO that it is legislating and enforcing regulations that restrain the operations of CSOs and is resorting to intimidation tactics”. There were also frosty relations between the government and most international donors that are the main financiers of CSOs in Zimbabwe. Some senior government officials and state media often accused international donors especially those from Western countries as working towards “regime change” (in reference to plans to unconstitutionally remove the ZANU-PF government from power). In his studies on foreign aid and Zimbabwe, Gukurume (2012:16) posits that “ZANU-PF has criticized most donor agencies of using their economic muscle to champion regime change in Zimbabwe, hence the relationship between ZANU-PF and International donor agencies has been characterised by perpetual conflicts and controversy”. Van Donge and Leenstra (2013) confirm the frosty relations by stating that, “in Zimbabwe, recent relations between international donors and government have gradually become characterized by a breach in trust”.

1.6 Rationale

The rationale for this study is embedded in three interrelated civil and political developments that took place from 2000 to 2009 in Zimbabwe. These are: firstly, the increased support by international donors to CSOs working on human rights democracy and good governance. International donors, according to scholars such as Van Donge and Leenstra (2013), have played a major role in financing democracy advocacy work in Zimbabwe through CSOs. The SZC (2006 – 2009) is one of many initiatives that received funding from international donors (SZC Project Document, 2006).

Secondly, according to those who were part of the campaign, the SZC is heralded as an initiative that brought together various democracy stakeholders to push the state to adopt democratic reforms ahead of the 2008 elections. This was in the context of the split within the main opposition party the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) then, and a majority win by ZANU-PF during the 2005 elections. Furthermore, this period was characterised by increased repression by the state characterised by “anti-people” policies such as *Operation Murambatsvina* of May 2005 and increased persecution of dissenting CSOs.

Thirdly, the SZC is widely regarded by many CSO leaders involved in the campaign as an initiative that ushered in a relatively democratic election in the first round of harmonised elections in 2008 and the intervention of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) into the civic and political matters in Zimbabwe. The SADC mediation is widely seen as the one that facilitated the formation of the Government of National Unity (GNU) that was consummated in February 2009. The GNU is credited with stabilising the political and economic situation in Zimbabwe from 2009 to 2013. This campaign was funded by international donors through a funding model that will be elaborated in the subsequent sections of this thesis.

However, despite the importance of the SZC in terms of its intentions and objectives, the social and political context it operated under and the claims of its results in enhancing democracy in Zimbabwe, there has been no study that has critically examined the challenges and complexities experienced by CSOs in their quest to become accountable to donors and how this process affected the relationship of the

two parties. Many past and recent civil society studies in Zimbabwe have largely been informed by the traditional state – society relations. According to Seller (2010), state-society relations are a field of focus on the interactions and interdependency between the state and society. DFID (2010: 15) expands this definition by stating that state – society relations are “interactions between state institutions and societal groups to negotiate how public authority is exercised and how it can be influenced by people. They are focused on issues such as defining the mutual rights and obligations of state and society, negotiating how public resources should be allocated and establishing different modes of representation and accountability”.

Dorman (2001), for instance, studied the changing relationship between the state and society in the post-colonial Zimbabwe. She challenges the traditional approach to NGO - State relations based on state - society conflict. She concluded that state-society relations must be understood not only in terms of the state’s use of coercion but construction of consent. Jonathan Moyo J (1993) looked at how the state sought to co-opt civil society soon after independence in 1980. He posits that this co-option led to the slow growth of civil society in Zimbabwe in the early years after independence. Sachikonye (1995) reinforces Jonathan Moyo’s position by stating that the state in Zimbabwe used legislative powers to stifle the potential of social movements, labour and NGOs soon after independence. McCandless (2009), concludes that social movements and civic organisations in Zimbabwe face two strategic dilemmas when it comes to state - CSO relations. The first dilemma is how social movement and civic organisations should prioritise political and economic rights in efforts to bring about transformative change. This dilemma is within the context of land reform programme in Zimbabwe. The second dilemma noted by McCandless (2009) is whether and how to work with government and donors given their political, economic and social agenda. This dilemma is in the context of democratisation in Zimbabwe.

However, despite the various studies on civil society in Zimbabwe mainly being informed by the state – society approach, there is no comprehensive study that has focused on the CSOs upward accountability considering democracy advocacy that involves mass mobilisation of activists in a politically repressive environment. This study, therefore, sought to understand the processes and mechanisms of evaluating

democracy advocacy work that both CSOs and donors go through with reference to the SZC.

This study apart from enhancing knowledge regarding challenges associated with evaluating democracy advocacy campaigns, contributes to a deeper understanding of how CSOs operating in politically difficult circumstances become accountable to donors and how these processes shape the already asymmetric relations between CSOs and international donors in Zimbabwe. It exposes the struggles of CSOs to meet upward accountability requirements and the power dynamics that characterise the relationship between CSOs and international donors especially in the quest to determine what is considered “success” following a programme intervention in international development. Though limited to measurement of democracy advocacy results in politically repressive contexts, this study may be of interest to other settings especially where CSOs rely heavily on external donor funding to carry out their work.

1.7 Data collection methods

The research was based on qualitative research methodology. Cresswell (1998:15) defines qualitative research as “... an inquiry process of understanding based on distinct methodological traditions of inquiry that explore a social or human problem. The researcher builds a complex, holistic picture, analyses words, reports detailed views of informants, and conducts the study in a natural setting. Qualitative research methodology was chosen as it allowed me to have an in-depth study of the relationship between CSOs and international donors. In reference to the flexibility of qualitative research methodology, Yin (2011:6) observes that “the allure of qualitative research is that it enables you to conduct in-depth studies about a broad array of topics, including your favourites, in plain and everyday terms”.

Fieldwork was conducted from August 2014 to April 2015 in Zimbabwe. Data was gathered through 29 purposively sampled semi-structured interviews. Interviewees included those who were involved with the SZC and other key CSO leaders. A number of donor representatives were interviewed. The document analysis method was used to gather data about the SZC and about how the campaign was planned including communication with donors concerning the progress of the campaign and articulation of results. Data was analysed using qualitative data analysis techniques of

applying codes and themes. The research design and methodology will be discussed in detail in chapter 4 of this thesis.

1.8 Limitations of the study

This study broadly looks at the upward accountability process of CSOs involved in democracy advocacy in Zimbabwe and how the accountability processes affect the organisational behaviour of CSOs. While due care was taken to ensure a comprehensive and in-depth examination of this topic, there are some limitations to the extent of the study and hence the findings.

Firstly, the study is limited to CSOs in Zimbabwe particularly those who were involved with the SZC and the donors who funded activities under this campaign. Furthermore, the 29 interviews conducted focused on CSO leaders and staff involved who mainly operated in Harare (28) and only one in Bulawayo. While the study may be of interest to those involved in CSO advocacy in general, findings from this study are not representative of the full spectrum of CSOs in Zimbabwe. Furthermore, only donors who were involved with the SZC were interviewed. However, limiting the study to those involved with the SZC can provide a deeper understanding of the processes of upward accountability of democracy advocacy initiatives in Zimbabwe. This is so because many CSOs that were involved with the SZC are still operating in Zimbabwe and continue to be involved with other democracy advocacy initiatives.

Secondly, while all efforts were made to ensure that relevant documents concerning this campaign were reviewed, it should be noted that there are some documents that were missing in the project files. The missing documents, though not many, point to some of the practical challenges associated with evaluation of democracy advocacy initiatives in a politically sensitive context such as Zimbabwe. Some of the documents could not be located because of how files were archived by the ZCA and some because they were not produced, as they were deemed politically sensitive. Thus findings for this study are limited to the documents that were analysed.

Thirdly, while there are several dimensions to the concept of accountability, this study specifically focused on upward accountability, thus the relationship between CSO and donors who provide funding for their projects and programmes. Although CSOs report to multiple stakeholders such as beneficiaries (downward accountability) and

other CSOs and staff members (horizontal and internal accountability), this study chose to focus on the relatively understudied upward accountability between CSOs and international donors in Zimbabwe. There is therefore opportunity for further studies on other forms of accountability in Zimbabwe.

Lastly, whereas CSOs employ a number of strategies in the course of their work such as capacity building (trainings), education (awareness raising), humanitarian (relief work), this study is limited to the strategy of advocacy (policy influence). However, some of the findings can be applied through inference to the general relations between CSOs and international donors in the context of results measurement.

1.9 Organisation of dissertation

Following Chapter 1, which provided the foundation of this thesis by providing the background, research aims, research objectives research questions, rationale and data collection methods, Chapter 2 reviews literature on concept of civil society, its origins and current usage. This chapter also explores definitional issues of concepts such results measurement and democracy advocacy. The chapter further reviews literature on the role of civil society in Zimbabwe and particularly its role in advocating for democracy. Furthermore, the development and evolving role of civil society in Zimbabwe and its relationship with the state is examined. The chapter also considers the relationship between civil society and church related groups and the relationship between civil society and donors.

Chapter 3 discusses the theoretical approaches that guided this study. The research was informed by the accountability theory that was supported by Michel Foucault's approach to discourse. The chapter looks at the types of accountability mechanisms. Furthermore, it explores how discourse is important in understanding the mechanisms of accountability and their application. The two theoretical perspectives will be explored in so far as they relate to literature on results measurement in development practice as well as on Zimbabwean CSOs and donor relations.

Chapter 4 details the methodology and data collection methods used during the study. The chapter looks at research paradigms and discusses the interpretivist paradigm that informed this research. Furthermore, the chapter discusses the data gathering experiences and how the data was analysed.

Chapter 5 presents a background to the SZC. In this chapter, the structure, objectives and the rollout of the campaign are discussed. The campaign is presented in detail, situating it within the broader civil society democracy advocacy initiatives in Zimbabwe.

Chapter 6 presents and analyses data on how CSOs involved with the SZC met the upward accountability requirements in the face of unfavourable operating environment. In this chapter, arguments pointing to asymmetric relationship between CSOs and donors are advanced. Furthermore, the chapter presents the unsustainability of the current CSO funding model in Zimbabwe.

Chapter 7 further presents and analyses data on results measurement. The chapter presents ways in which CSOs navigate the accountability requirements within the context of an asymmetric relationship between CSOs and donors. The Chapter explores the role of communication in upward accountability. Results of democracy advocacy are in the “eyes of the stakeholder”. The praxis of development is that there are unwritten yet expected results in democracy advocacy. There are challenges of attributing results of democracy related projects (Prerogative vs. contribution approach to democracy advocacy results). Furthermore, the reluctance to embrace the principle of donor accountability by some CSOs could be because of how the evaluation tools and frameworks are developed and a dichotomy between technocrats and activists.

Chapter 8 concludes the thesis and outlines the significance of the study. It deals with how the study has extended knowledge of evaluating democracy advocacy of CSOs. The chapter summarises the themes that emerged from the study. The limitations of the study and potential direction for future research are presented in this chapter.

CHAPTER TWO

Review of literature

2.1 Introduction

This chapter explores literature and definitional issues of concepts such as civil society, results measurement and democracy advocacy. The chapter situates the concept of civil society through three versions, which are the activist version, the liberal version and the post-modern version. The chapter further looks at the conceptualisation of civil society from an Afrocentric point of view and looks further into the role it plays in democracy consolidation.

This chapter also focuses on arguments concerning the existence of civil society in Africa. It goes on to consider the role of civil society in Zimbabwe and particularly its role in advocating for democracy. Furthermore, the development and evolving role of civil society in Zimbabwe and its relationship with the state is explored. The chapter also considers the relationship between civil society and church related groups and the relationship between civil society and donors.

2.2 The elusive meaning of civil society

As this thesis explores the attempts by democracy advocacy CSOs in Zimbabwe to be accountable to donors, it is imperative to pay attention to the concept of civil society and how CSOs operate. A careful consideration of the concept of civil society will allow an examination of the role civil society plays especially concerning democracy advocacy. Furthermore, it facilitates an understanding of how CSOs interact with their stakeholders such as international donors to whom they seek to be accountable. A deeper understanding of the concept of civil society assists in determining its mandate and goals in society and subsequently lays a proper foundation of how CSOs can be evaluated.

This section, therefore, considers civil society as a concept examining academic debates on its origin, evolution over time and current usage. The section will further

examine the link between NGOs and civil society. NGOs are a critical component of civil society, especially in modern Zimbabwe.

The concept of civil society has been defined variously in literature. Different scholars have subjected the concept of civil society to academic scholarship at different epochs. Van Rooy (1998:7) affirms this status by stating that "civil society has wandered its way through the academic world on a torturous path. Ideas have been attached and detached, origins have been ascribed and divorced, social meaning has been generated and debunked". This notion of debate among scholars on the concept of civil society is also reiterated by Malena and Heinrich (2007:338) who contend that "since Aristotle, political thinkers have debated, disputed and failed to reach consensus regarding the nature and meaning of civil society". This section will explore some of the major debates on this concept by providing a historical background of the concept and how it has come to be understood and used in the modern era and the context of Zimbabwe.

The concept of civil society has a long history. According to Van Rooy (1998),

The term civil society has a long history in political philosophy and its definition has been altered with Roman, Lockean, Hegelian, Marxist and Gramscian interpretations long before it was resurrected in the 1990s (Van Rooy, 1998:7).

However, Kaldor (2003:6) notes that the usage of the term in the early modern era was in the seventeenth and eighteenth century. During this period, Hegel, who according to Kaldor (2003:7) was the first to use the term outside the state, conceptualized civil society as the "realm of difference, intermediate between the family and the state". Hegel conceptualised civil society as part of state regulation of society. Van Rooy (1998:10) states that Hegel "argued that it was necessary for the state to harmonise competing interests in society. For him [Hegel], the state was the protector, suggesting that civil society could not remain civil unless it is ordered politically, subjected to higher surveillance of the State".

Marx and Engels later advanced the concept of civil society. Theorising after Hegel, Marx and Engels, who promoted Hegel's idea of civil society through the adoption of the term "bourgeois society", however, differed with Hegel by contending that the state was subordinate to civil society. Gramsci saw civil society lying between "coercive relations of the state and the economic sphere of production".

Though the concept of civil society has a long history, most modern era civil society scholars assert that it became prominent again in the 1980s. Malena and Henrich (2007: 338) note "the term civil society entered the development lexicon in the 1980s and by mid 1990s had risen to a buzzword status". The prominence given to the term, was according to Edwards (2014) occasioned by:

...a number of factors which include the fall of communism and the attendant democratic openings, dissatisfaction with the economic and political models of the past, a yearning of togetherness in the world that seems to be increasingly insecure and the rapid increase in the number of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) on the global stage (Edwards, 2014:2).

In understanding the contemporary usage of the term civil society, this research benefitted heavily from the work of Kaldor (2003) who distinguished three different versions to the usage of the term civil society in the contemporary era. These are the activist, neo-liberal and postmodern versions.

The activist version, which influenced movements in Latin America and Eastern Europe, heavily borrows from Gramsci's postulations on civil society. It views civil society as "the realm outside political parties where individuals and groups aimed at democratizing the state, to re-distribute power, rather than to capture power in a traditional sense" Kaldor (2003). Spurk (2008:3) sees a contrast to how Karl Marx viewed civil society and concludes that unlike Marx, Gramsci "saw civil society as part of the superstructure in addition to the state, but with different function: the state served as the arena of force and coercion for capitalist domination, and civil society as the field through which values and meanings were established, debated and contested and thus producing non-coercive consent for the system". Gramsci saw civil society as a contested arena, where ideological hegemony can be exercised by the state.

Conceptualising civil society in this manner led to social movements that worked on “creating public spaces where individuals can act and communicate freely, independent of both the state and capitalism”.

The liberal version, in which theorists such as Alexander de Tocqueville, Samuel Huntington and Robert Putman can be situated, is predicated on the premise that “liberal democracy within the capitalist society requires a vibrant and autonomous civil society and an effective state capable of balancing the demands of interest groups”. This version views civil society as “the realm of organizing social life, that is voluntary, self-generating, largely self-supporting, autonomous from the state, bound by a legal order or set of shared rules” (Diamond, 1994:5). According to de Tocqueville, emphasis should be placed on independent associations as civil society. According to Spurk (2008:3), de Tocqueville “saw these associations as schools of democracy in which democratic thinking, attitudes and behaviour are learned, with the aim to protect and defend individual rights against potentially authoritarian regimes and tyrannical majorities in society”. This version is linked with “associationalism” and the ideas of a “third sector” outside of state and market. According to this version, “NGOs, non-profit organizations (NPOs), charities and voluntary associations are more flexible and innovative than the state. They can substitute for the state, in providing social services, for example; they can check abuses of the state and poor governmental practises; and they can call corporations to account”. Consequently this version influenced many Western donors in the 1990s.

The third version, which Kaldor (2003) refers to as the “postmodern” version, dismisses both the activist and neo-liberal notions of civil society as Western discourse. The version, supported by anthropologists from relativist positions and scholars such as Hann and Dunn (1996) and Mamdani (1996), argue that “civil society, in the sense of individual rights and voluntary associations, never extended much beyond a few capital cities”. In fact, the version argues that forms of “traditional and non-traditional organisations based on kinship and religion that remain autonomous from the state and offer alternative sites of power or autonomous spaces” existed which are different from the modern conceptualisation of civil society based on both the activist and liberal versions.

In aiding our understanding of civil society, Henrich (2001) notes that current literature “conceptualizes civil society either as an arena in society, distinct from market and usually the family, where collective action in associations and through other forms of engagement takes place or as the sector composed of voluntary non-profit organisations”.

However, in later postulations, Malena and Henrich (2007:338) caution against conceptualising civil society in terms that are “operationally relevant”. They note that by doing so, this will result in many programmes tending to treat civil society as a set of organisations. This will lead “some erroneously equating civil society with NGOs, non-profit and voluntary organisations”.

It is important nevertheless to consider how the civil society concept has been viewed and used within the Zimbabwean context. In this regard, this research took the approach by Kaldor (2003). She maintains that "civil society has to include all the groupings that are included in the different versions — the relatively passive ‘third sector’ of the neo-liberal version, the ‘social movements’ of the activist version, as well as the ‘neo-traditional groupings’ of the post-modern version" (Kaldor, 2003:11). This approach was taken in view of the role that the different categories of civil society have played in the democratisation agenda in Zimbabwe. Furthermore, an inclusive approach to the concept of civil society will assist in determining how they function differently particularly how they fund their operations which will affect issues of accountability.

Having taken the approach above of including different actors within civil society, this research adopted Kaldor’s (2003) categorization of the different types of civil society actors. The four types, which overlap, are: social movements – primarily made up of activists and involved with protests and demonstrations; non-governmental organisations (NGOs) – mostly run by professional staff and involved in issues of service delivery and advocacy; Social organisations – mainly workers, farmers and local communities and involved in service provision and lobbying; national and religious groups – composed of mainly newly urbanised groups and peasants involved in mobilisation through media, religious organisations and sometimes violence.

Table 1: Civil society actors

	Social movements	NGOs	Social Organisations	Nationalists and religious groups
Mission	Emancipation of the poor and excluded	Development and humanitarian relief	Protection and promotion of members' interests	Empowerment of national and religious groups
Activities	Protests, demonstrations, mediatique events	Service provision and advocacy	Service provision, lobbying	Mobilization through media, religious organizations, and sometimes violence
Social Composition	Activists, committed individuals, students	Professional staff	Workers, farmers, employers, local communities, displaced persons	Newly urbanized groups, peasants
Forms of organisation	Loose horizontal coalitions, network	Ranges from bureaucratic and corporate to small- scale and informal	Ranges from vertical and hierarchical to informal networks	Vertical and hierarchical although can involve networks of tightly organized cells, charismatic leadership

Source: Kaldor (2003)

As NGOs are critical to the understanding of civil society particularly in Zimbabwe, this research adopted the definition of NGOs provided by Edwards (2000) who defines NGOs as:

a subset of civic organisations, defined by the fact that they are formally registered with government, receive a significant proportion of their income from voluntary contributions... and are governed by a board of trustees rather than the elected representatives of a constituency (Edwards, 2000:7).

Edwards (2000:7), further postulates that “if civil society were an iceberg, then NGOs would be among the more noticeable of the peaks above the waterline, leaving the great bulk of community groups, informal associations, political parties and social networks sitting silently (but not passively) below”. This observation affirms the fact that NGOs are critical actors of civil society.

Nevertheless, NGOs are not without critics. They have been criticised for being far removed from the beneficiaries they claim to represent. As NGOs become bureaucratised, the tendency will be that they will spend a lot of money on salaries and administration costs instead of the actual programmes. Banks et al. (2014) also warn on the narrow focus on NGOs by donors, which stifles the potential of civil society to facilitate development. They argue that "Although recognizing the need for a vibrant civil society, the donor community's narrow emphasis on NGOs and 'results' has curtailed its effectiveness when it comes to facilitating transformative development" (Banks et al., 2014:708). While acknowledging the role of civil society in democratisation process in Africa, Monga (1996) is also critical of African NGOs. While focusing on francophone Africa, he observes and concludes that:

The multiplication of human rights groups in Africa has not necessarily meant a better cataloguing of violations and abuses. The assorted organizations often appear to be structures of power in the hands of certain individuals who are more concerned with personal advancement than with public investigation. None of these groups have published precise, verified information on the violent incidents that have shaken the continent in recent years (Monga, 1996:100).

Another insightful study on how NGOs work in Africa was done by Shivji (2007). While Shivji's reflections were based on NGOs in Tanzania, some of the conclusions are applicable to African NGOs in general. In his critique of NGOs, Shivji (2007: 54)

concludes that firstly, most “NGOs are top-down organisations led by the elite” and that the majority of these NGOs are urban based. Secondly these NGOs are not a constituency or a set of membership based organisations. Even with a membership, it is largely made up of the elite. According to Shivji (2007) this therefore limits the accountability of NGOs to a small group of people. He goes on to state that NGOs end up being more accountable to the donors, who fund their activities, than to their members. This observation by Shivji is critical for this thesis as the focus is on understanding the challenges and complexities associated with upward accountability of CSOs. Thirdly, NGOs are funded by and rely almost exclusively on foreign funding. Again this conclusion is important for this study as the heavy reliance on foreign funding by CSOs puts them at a disadvantaged position when it comes to negotiating accountability processes and mechanisms with donors. This is the basis for an asymmetric relationship between CSOs and donors. In light of this funding arrangement, Shivji (2007:54) states that this is one of the single limitations of NGOs as it confirms the saying “ He who pays the piper calls the tune”.

Following the categorisation of civil society actors by Kaldor (2003) mentioned above, the SZC was composed of different civil society actors. This composition will be demonstrated in chapter five of this thesis that provides an account on how the campaign was organized and structured.

2.3 Civil society and democracy advocacy

Writing from what can be argued as the liberal conceptualization of civil society, Robinson and Friedman (2005) affirm that civil society has the potential to make a positive contribution to democracy in Africa. This assumption, according to Robinson and Friedman (2005) originates from both “theoretical expectations of the democratic potential of organized associational activity and actual role of CSOs in democratic transitions”. This view is widely shared by what Encarnacion (2000:10) calls *neo-Tocquevillians* such as Robert Putman (1990) and Larry Diamond (1994).

Despite the popularity of the liberal conceptualisation of civil society as a vehicle for democracy, there are other scholars such as Encarnacion (2000) who dismiss it as flawed. They argue against the universalization of civil society as different contexts

present different challenges thereby requiring different interventions. This has led to scholars such as Lewis (2002) and Harneit-Sievers (2005) to question the transferability of the civil society concept to non-Western countries. They argue that because countries have different levels of economic development and democracy, this makes the civil society concept template from Western countries difficult to apply in its entirety.

The activities of NGOs, a significant category of actors within civil society, can be classified broadly under “advocacy” and “service provision”. Kaldor (2003:16) notes that “service provision includes relief in emergencies, primary health care, non-formal education, housing and legal services among others. Advocacy includes lobbying as well as public mobilization and campaigning around particular issues”. Using the extended functional approach, Spurk (2008:18) provides seven main functions of civil society. These are: protection of citizens especially protection of life, freedom and property against attacks and despotism by the state or other authorities, monitoring accountability, advocacy and public communication, socialisation, building community, intermediation and facilitation between citizens and the state and service delivery particularly when the state is weak. He highlights advocacy as an important function of civil society declaring that:

An important task of civil society is in its ability to articulate interests – especially of marginalised groups – and to create channels of communication in order to bring them to the public agenda, thus raising public awareness and facilitating debate. In development cooperation, this Habermasian function is mainly described as advocacy (Spurk, 2008:18).

Although the term advocacy is a buzzword and a commonly employed strategy by CSOs, its meaning varies depending on the sector. Most CSOs have tended to provide a functional meaning to the term advocacy, and this is contained in mostly operational manuals, handbooks and guides on ‘how to’ do advocacy. For instance, in its *Advocacy Tools and Guidelines Handbook*, Care International, a Humanitarian International NGO, defines advocacy as “the deliberate process of influencing those who make policy decisions” (Care International, 2001:2).

Another definition is provided by the *Code of Good Practice for NGOs responding to HIV/AIDS*. It defines advocacy as:

A method and process of influencing decision-makers and public perception about an issue of concern, and mobilizing community action to achieve social change, including legislative and policy reform, to address the concern (Code of Good Practice for NGOs responding to HIV/AIDS, 2004:50).

Cohen et al. (2001) provide a comprehensive definition of advocacy as: "the pursuit of influencing outcomes—including public policy and resource allocation decisions within political, economic, and social systems and institutions—that directly affect people's lives"(Cohen, 2001).

Furthermore, Cohen posits that advocacy constitutes organised efforts and actions that use the instruments of democracy to strengthen democratic processes. These instruments can include elections, lobbying, mass mobilisation, civil disobedience, negotiations, bargaining, and court actions. Efforts and actions are designed to persuade and influence those who hold governmental, political and economic power so that they will formulate, adopt and implement public policy in ways that consider those with less conventional political power and fewer economic resources.

A number of aspects are worth considering with regards the conceptualisation of advocacy above. Firstly, advocacy uses different "instruments of democracy". This means that advocacy is more of a strategy for CSOs depending on content and objectives to be met, A CSO can then choose different instruments such as mass mobilisation, civil disobedience or negotiations to employ.

Secondly advocacy initiatives are designed to "persuade and influence those who hold power". This requires skills and power on the part of those involved with advocacy. While viewing power as a positive force for individual and collective capacity to act for change, according to VeneKlasen and Miller (2002:55) there are four ways in which power expresses itself. These are "Power over," "Power with", "Power to" and "Power within". "Power over" has negative associations for people. It involves force, coercion and abuse. In the context of this study, this is the power that the government

holds and CSOs are attempting to influence. Power with involves finding common ground among different interests and building collective strength. From an advocacy point of view, this is critical as there is strength in numbers. This was vital during the SZC as it brought together different pro-democracy stakeholders. Power to refers to a unique potential of every person to shape his or her life in the world. Power to has to do with a person's sense of self-worth and self-knowledge. Both "power to" and "power within" are important for advocacy as activism is based on individual agency that will culminate in collective voices.

Thirdly, the definition of advocacy provided above notes that "advocacy has a purposeful result". The anticipated result is "to change societies institutions as well as the power relations..." This is critical in the sense that advocacy is undertaken in order to achieve a result. With reference to SZC, advocacy results are at the heart of this study. How the SZC results were measured and how that process affects the relationship between CSOs and international donors, will be expanded on in subsequent sections of this thesis.

One area of possible confusion in advocacy literature is the relationship between advocacy and campaigns. In his summary of how both terms are treated in literature, Chandler (2010:2) suggests three views. Firstly, advocacy and campaigning are seen as synonymous terms, both being umbrella terms for all forms of influence (including, for example lobbying and public campaigns). For instance, in its advocacy and campaigning course, Save the Children, an international NGO, posits that "A campaign is a set of advocacy, communications and mobilisation of activities... that influence norms, policies and practices to achieve long lasting change..." (Save the Children/The Open University Session 1).

Secondly, advocacy and campaigning are seen as broadly the same, with the difference being that advocacy is viewed as more reactive and direct while campaigning is viewed as more planned and proactive and involving multiple channels of influence.

Thirdly, advocacy is seen as relating to engagement with government and intergovernmental policy processes. Campaigning on the other hand is equated to

generating support and pressure from public audience. This approach is commonly referred to as “public campaigning”.

However, this thesis is in line with Chandler’s thinking that advocacy and campaigns should be treated as synonymous “both being umbrella terms for all forms of influencing including lobbying and public campaigns” (Chandler 2010:2). While the CSOs leaders included the word campaign in the title to the project “Save Zimbabwe Campaign”, the campaign carried all the hallmarks of advocacy as it sought to influence policy changes particularly with regards democracy, good governance and human rights through targeting government and other regional bodies such as SADC and the African Union (AU).

Many CSOs use the term advocacy and lobby interchangeably. However, there are some scholars such as Smucker (2005) who restrict the use of the term lobbying to the legal domain. According to Smucker (2005:232) “the legal definition of lobbying usually involves attempting to influence legislation. Advocacy covers a much broader range of activities that might or might not include lobbying”. Lobbying involves advocacy but advocacy does not necessary involve lobbying.

While identifying campaigning and lobbying as two main areas for advocacy strategy, Obondoh (2008) lists some of the activities involved in the main areas. These activities are reproduced below.

Table 2: Activities for campaigning and lobbying

Campaigning	Lobbying
• Social mobilization, Awareness & sensitization	• Policy dialogue
• Behind-the-scenes machinations	• Boardroom negotiations & tradeoffs
• Mass action e.g. demonstrations, boycotts, vigils, picketing, processions	• Partnerships, Cooperation & collaboration
• Public rallies/forums	• Policy analysis and briefs
• Picketing, boycotts & strikes	• Role models & good practice
• Community & social mobilization	• Case studies

• Research and information dissemination or sharing	• Leveraging change through resources by supporting processes
• Media campaigns, public forums, civic education {IEC}	• Information packaging and policy drafting
	• Education, training and persuasion
	• Use of allies e.g. donors to leverage change
	• Use of innovations and good examples

Source: Obondoh (2008)

According to Casey (2011:7), advocacy includes many aspects and is associated with several terms. These terms and activities include activism, advising, campaigning, commenting, consulting, engagement, giving voice, providing input, lobbying, negotiating, organizing, policy work, political action, and social action. All these terms are all used to describe attempts to directly influence change. He goes on to note that many of these activities can be mapped along a continuum from confrontation to cooperation. For instance, demonstrations, boycotts, or critical media coverage place non-profits in direct conflict with government decision makers. This was the case with SZC. While participation in an advisory committee, responding to requests for information, or participating in the development of new service delivery models involve partnership and coproduction with government.

Each advocacy initiative therefore has to make strategic decisions about which advocacy strategies to pursue. This is usually based both on the political and administrative context of the issue being addressed and the organization's own - theory of change and its beliefs on the best strategies for influencing decisions Casey (2011:10).

For effective and successful advocacy, several steps, techniques and strategies are employed. These include identifying and framing the issue, collecting information, mobilising interested people networking, forming alliances, forming and sustaining coalitions, planning campaigns, involving the media, building pressure on the

legislature, establishing contacts within the systems. As shall be demonstrated in the subsequent chapter, the SZC employed a number of these techniques and strategies. Nevertheless, some of the techniques and strategies were not possible given the political and social context of the SZC.

Kelly (2000:6) postulates that "much advocacy work is undertaken in coalitions and alliances of organisations". This coalition approach comes out of a realization that the "issues of concern", which are the subject of advocacy, may be much bigger and therefore require the capacities of more than one organization to undertake. The SZC operated under this understanding as it included a diverse range of actors drawn from civil society and political parties. At the launch of the SZC, 29 CSOs appended their names to the Charter that spelled out the aspirations and objectives of the campaign. Subsequent to the institutionalisation of the SZC, these organisations formed a General Council (GC) that would oversee the activities of the campaign. Below the GC, eight major CSOs in Zimbabwe formed the taskforce and also chaired different sub thematic committees. The full structure of the SZC will be discussed in detail in chapter five of this thesis. While coalitions and alliances are critical for advocacy, they however complicate the evaluation of advocacy initiatives such as SZC. This aspect will be dealt with in the findings section of this thesis.

Issues of legitimacy are usually associated with scholarship on civil society advocacy. According to Kelly (2002:6) "legitimacy is considered an asset in campaigning and advocacy work that can change according to the performance of the organization and because of changes in the external context". This aspect is important when applied to civil society organisations in Zimbabwe that are funded mainly by foreign donors. Questions always arise as to whose "voice" or constituency they represent and whose interests they advance. Choudry (2013) also highlights the dilemma and tensions involved after the professionalization and institutionalisation of social action in what he terms *NGOisation*. This leads to NGOs accounting more to the donors – upward accountability and less to their constituencies. By studying NGOs in Tanzania, Green (2014) also shares this view. She observed that participatory development has led, overwhelmingly, to the bureaucratisation of "participation". She further argues that participatory development has become bureaucratized, formalised though a cadre of people trained to do it: the logical frameworks (or "log frames"), need for consensus

and rules for participation. Green (2014) also exposes how NGOs learn to write proposals in order to acquire resources for themselves. She observes that the people who do this writing are paid; they follow the donor rules and forms – and they are usually not from the villages where they create these organisations.

As will be discussed in the subsequent sections, the Zimbabwean government has over the years, viewed CSOs involved in democracy advocacy work and funded externally with much suspicion. This view is buttressed by Bratton (1989) cited in Edwards and Hulme (1996:8), who state that “NGOs which depend on external funding are more likely to be ignored as ‘illegitimate’ by their own government’s policy debates”. This aspect has a significant bearing on the success of democracy advocacy initiatives, as it will ultimately affect results measurement of these interventions.

This thesis was guided by two common tenets of advocacy that are apparent in the literature. These are: that advocacy is about influencing policy change and that it has a transformative agenda. This thesis further notes that advocacy is a strategy rather than a product. Thus advocacy involves a number of components ranging from planning to execution. All the components are critical to the success of the advocacy initiative and above all, to the evaluation of the advocacy initiative.

2.4 Results measurement discourse and accountability in development practice

2.4.1 Public sector reforms and results focus

The global demand for accountability, especially for organisations that use public funds gained prominence in the 1990s. The majority of OECD countries, who are the major donors for civil society organisations in the South, underwent significant public sector reforms. According to the DAC Working Party on Aid Evaluation Report of 2000, these reforms were in response to economic, social and political pressures. These pressures included budget deficits, lack of public confidence in government, growing demand for better accountability for achieving results with taxpayers' money. This development led to public sector reforms buttressed by legislations like *Government Performance and Results Act of 1993* in the United States of America and the White Paper published in 1995 by the British government titled *Better*

Accounting for Taxpayers' Money. These reforms consequently led to a closer focus on performance issues. According to DAC (2000:7), *accountability-for-results* is “when performance information is used to external audiences. When performance information is used in internal management processes with the aim of improving performance and achieving better results, this is often referred to as *managing-for-results*”. Therefore performance and results are intricately linked. This is critical for CSOs in order for them to gain both public and donor confidence. On one hand, without public confidence, CSOs suffer from legitimacy problems. While on the other hand, without donor confidence, the likelihood of continued funding is severely threatened.

International development aid in Zimbabwe has been informed by both economic and political developments. Several factors gave rise to the economic crises period in Zimbabwe. These include, the failure of Economic Structural Adjustment Programmes (ESAP), the crash of the Zimbabwe dollar on 14 November 1997 commonly referred to as “Black Friday”. The crash was caused by unbudgeted payment of gratuities to war veterans of the liberation struggle. This led to the massive depreciation of the Zimbabwe dollar. Political factors included the disputed 2000 elections marred by high levels of political violence and a controversial and violent fast track land reform programme. According to the Kanyenze *et al.*/Labour Economic Development Research Institute Zimbabwe (LEDRIZ) (2011:41), it is against this background that the relationship between Zimbabwe and its development partners deteriorated to the degree that Zimbabwe earned itself a high-risk profile (pariah status)”. Thus most bilateral and multilateral donors suspended official development aid to Zimbabwe. Instead, development aid was channelled mostly through non-state actors such as CSOs. According to Gukurume (2012), the relationship between most aid agencies and government has been volatile since 2000. At some point in 2002, the government suspended the operations of several aid agencies with the intention of regulating the activities of these agencies. This scenario resulted, on one hand, in a strengthening of the relationship between CSOs in Zimbabwe and international donors. On the other hand, there has been mistrust between government and most CSOs in Zimbabwe particularly those involved in pro-democracy work. This mistrust has by extension, led to a frosty relationship between government and most international donors who fund CSOs in Zimbabwe.

Results measurement in international development is part of managing for results. The process involves "systematically gathering and analysing information to understand whether institutions, policies and programmes are effectively and efficiently producing the expected results – and how improvements can be made for future performance" (OECD, 2014:15).

Results measurement of development initiatives is a deliberate exercise that is done in a systematic way. OECD (2014) concludes that:

To measure results, development practitioners create a system that gathers information on how a project, programme or policy intervention is progressing. Practitioners identify and formulate in clear, measurable terms the expected results or intended effects to be achieved, looking at the political, social, environmental and economic factors that can influence their fulfilment. A results chain is developed which sets out the cause-and-effect sequence: from resources, through activities, towards achieving the desired change or result. A monitoring system is also established to track progress towards the expected change, as well as an evaluation system to explain these progresses (OECD, 2014:18).

It is important to note that the definition of results from OECD, from which most international donors who provide funding to CSO in Zimbabwe come from, places emphasis on two aspects. Firstly, results should be anticipated at the planning stages of the project or programme. These results are formulated ahead of the intervention including ways to measure them. Secondly, the results chain is formulated using the cause-and-effect approach. It is anticipated that all the consequences or outcomes of the intervention are directly linked to the activities undertaken as part of that intervention. As shall be demonstrated later, this cause-and-effect approach, unfortunately, is problematic in evaluating democracy advocacy initiatives because of the role played by both extenuating and external effects that the advocacy initiative may experience.

The public sector reforms mentioned above that took place in the 1990s had two legacies. Firstly, they put more pressure on the governments to focus on performance and results. Secondly and more importantly to this study, they had a profound influence on the various accountability tools and frameworks. Some of these tools and frameworks are still in use today.

This thesis puts forward an argument that the current debate on aid effectiveness and emphasis on development results has its roots in public accountability. The thinking of results in management can be traced back to Peter Drucker's 1960s writings where he popularized management approaches such as Management By Objectives (MBO) sometimes referred to as management by results. In his seminal work *The Age of Discontinuity* of 1969, Drucker asserts that "we know that we have to measure results. We also know that with the exception of business, we do not know how to measure results in most organisations". Drucker (1990) further asserts that the "ultimate objective of 'non-profit' agencies is changed human beings". This in its very nature poses challenges on how you capture results of such a change. The challenge of accounting for results for organisations that are non-profit oriented is noted by scholars such as Edwards and Hulme who state that:

There are few agreed performance standards available to NGOs in this realm, beyond probity and quantifiable impact indicators in certain types of NGO activities such as service provision and economic development. Neither is there any obvious "bottom" line against which progress can be measured (Edwards and Hulme, 2013:11).

It can, therefore, be concluded that despite the strong push to measure results of development initiatives, there is acknowledgment in the literature that this is not always optimal particularly with projects linked to social and political change. In his study of all the DAC members, Crawford and Kearton (2001: iv) note that "evaluating democracy and governance (DG) assistance poses considerable challenges, however, notably the establishment of linkages between DG assistance and political change" (Crawford and Kearton, 2001:iv). Guthrie et al (2005) argue that because of the challenges associated with measuring the impact of policy and advocacy work,

foundations such as the California Endowment have been reluctant to fund work in that area. This thesis will demonstrate these challenges by examining the SZC.

2.5 Current tools and approaches in development evaluation

The rise in the demand for accountability together with the public sector reforms in OECD countries in the 1990s resulted in the development of tools and approaches currently being used to measure results in international development practice. This led, for instance, in the development of logic models such as Logical Framework that was mainly used in the public sector in the 1970s. Gasper (2000) notes the widespread use of the logical framework by stating that it “has become an enormously widely employed tool in project planning and management, especially but not only in development aid work. It is now used by nearly all aid funding agencies, and therefore by thousands of client organizations around the world. In most cases use is obligatory” Gasper (2000:1).

The Logical Framework can be regarded as both an approach and as a project planning and management tool. Jensen (2010:2) defines the Logical Framework Approach (LFA) as “a project design methodology that provides a systematic structure for identifying, planning and managing projects”. The approach involves problem analysis, stakeholder analysis, developing a hierarchy of objectives and selecting a preferred implementation strategy. Jensen (2010) notes that it was developed in the United States principally for the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and had been adopted worldwide by many major donors. From a tool perspective, the product of the logical analytical approach is the matrix (the *logframe*), which summarises what the project intends to do and how, what the key assumptions are, and how outputs and outcomes will be monitored and evaluated. The *logframe* is defined by Ebrahim (2003:817) as “a matrix in which a project’s objectives and expected results are clearly identified, along with a list of indicators that are to be used in measuring and verifying progress towards achieving their objectives and results”.

While the LFA is widely used in development practice, it has major shortcomings. While it can be credited with demonstration of causalities during project planning, the

simplistic approach to sometimes-complex projects that are linked to social and political change has been the major criticism of the *logframe*. Although still in use today, other approaches are also being used in development practice.

As more and more funds are channelled towards improving the lives of people living in the developing world through the international development assistance system, more and more questions are being asked concerning the extent to which this objective is being realised. Citizens in the Western countries, who are the major contributors of development aid through being taxed by their governments, are increasingly asking questions regarding the effectiveness of development aid. This has consequently put pressure on aid recipients such as NGOs and governments in the developing world to demonstrate results of projects funded by Western donors. This has further led to global conferences and initiatives such as The Monterrey Declaration of 2002, the Paris Declaration of 2004 and the Accra High Level Forum for Aid Effectiveness held in 2008, which having aimed at responding to this growing need. According to Mcloughlin and Walton (2012:5), The Monterrey Declaration of 2002 acted as a major impulse towards results-based monitoring and evaluation and the promotion of aid based on the development of measures of effectiveness and results. At this meeting, the international development community agreed that it would be important to provide more financing for development.

The subsequent International Roundtable on Measuring, Monitoring, and Managing for Results (2002) convened by the World Bank in 2002 focused on Managing for Development (MfDR). At this meeting, the focus was on efforts of countries and development agencies to “manage for results”. At the second International Roundtable on Measuring, Monitoring, and Managing for Results held in Marrakesh, Morocco in 2004, more than 60 representatives of partner countries met with representatives of bilateral and multilateral development agencies to discuss the challenges of managing for development results (MfDR). Furthermore, the international development community agree on the following five issues: Focus the Dialogue on Results at all phases; Align, programming, monitoring and evaluation with results; Keep measurement and reporting simple; Manage for not by results; Use result information for learning and decision making.

As results of some of these international developments, major development organisations such as the World Bank (2004), UNDP (2009) and DFID (2013) have developed results monitoring tools and frameworks in a bid to evaluate development projects effectively. Mcloughlin and Walton (2012) have put together a comprehensive and most recent guide on monitoring and evaluation tools and approaches. It attempts to categorise different development thematic areas in which these assessment tools can be used. This comprehensive guide summarises different result measurement tools and frameworks that are being used in development practice. The prominent ones are:

The Most Significant Change (MSC) – “is a qualitative and participatory form of monitoring and evaluation based on the collection and systematic selection of stories of reported changes from development activities. The technique was developed by Rick Davies in the mid-1990s to meet the challenges associated with monitoring and evaluating a complex participatory rural development” (Serrat, 2009:1). The technique does not make use of pre-defined indicators, especially ones that have to be counted and measured.

Outcome Mapping – this is an approach developed by the International Development Research Centre (IDRC in Canada). The personnel working on the project is involved in the process of identifying the desired change and ways to achieve that change. “Results are measured by the changes in behaviour, actions and relationships of those individuals, groups or organisations with whom the initiative is working directly and seeking to influence” Smutylo (2005) quoted in Jones and Hearn (2009:1).

Theory of Change (ToC) – This is “a rigorous yet participatory process whereby groups and stakeholders in a planning process articulate their long-term goals and identify the conditions they believe have to unfold for those goals to be met. These conditions are modelled as desired outcomes, arranged graphically in a causal framework” (Taplin and Clarke 2012:1). The ToC can be both a planning and issue-framing tool and a monitoring and evaluation tool.

Value for Money – This is an approach used largely by the Department for International Development (DFID) that seeks to maximise the impact of each pound spent to improve poor people’s lives. The approach puts emphasis on articulation of results to be achieved and the costs. It focuses on economy, efficiency, effectiveness and strength of links in the chain” (DIFD 2011:3).

It should be noted that the above listed tools and approaches were developed after the *logframe*. This was, to a larger extent, in acknowledgement of the limitations associated with the *logframe* approach in effectively measuring results of complex initiatives. However, they all still remain logic based.

While the comprehensive guide by McLoughlin and Walton (2012), provides a good basis of understanding the different tools and frameworks used to measure results in development, it far fell short of exploring the challenges associated with each tool or framework. Furthermore, the guide does not explore the historical contexts that led to the development of these tools and frameworks.

Although there is considerable literature on CSO – donor relationship, especially on upward accountability, literature that is specific to results measurement of democracy advocacy initiatives that take place in a politically repressive environment, is limited. There have been attempts in previous studies to highlight the challenges and complexities associated with evaluating advocacy. The recent studies available are that of Hirschmann (2002), Kelly (2002), Guthrie et al. (2005) and Teles and Schmitt (2011). After her research of Australian organisations, Kelly (2002:13) concludes that "There are no simple methods for measuring performance in NGO work, especially in the area of advocacy and research for policy change. She recommends that “It is also essential that NGOs learn from the experience of others to date and ensure that they are tracking the variables at both organisational and program levels which appear to be key to the effective undertaking of advocacy and research work”.

Hirschmann (2002) points to attempts to develop a tool to measure advocacy in Zimbabwe in the early 2000s. In noting the challenges associated with monitoring the process of advocacy without using quantitative indicators to the impact of policymaking, the USAID developed the *Advocacy Index*. This index, according to

Hirschmann (2002:22) was operationalized in Zimbabwe through the USAID partner PACT in 2000. The *Advocacy Index* primarily functions through the setting up of a six-member panel from diverse backgrounds that will have a final word on evaluating advocacy work of CSOs through scoring.

While the efforts to introduce an *Advocacy Index* tool are plausible, there are however visible challenges that emerge of how the Index can be implemented successfully and sustainably. These challenges include identifying a panel of informed but non-partisan or independent experts in a small country like Zimbabwe. The second challenge is that the Index lacked conflict resolution mechanisms. Furthermore, it was costly to implement the indicator. Perhaps this explains why the *Advocacy Index* was not adopted as a viable tool for measurement of advocacy. The reasons for its non-adoption will be explored fully in a later data presentation and analysis chapter.

Guthrie et al. (2005:7) affirm challenges associated with trying to use some of the above-mentioned traditional approaches to evaluate initiatives such as advocacy. This is because of factors such as complexity of the initiative that may involve many stakeholders. This complexity is compounded by the role of external forces affecting the advocacy effort such as the political situation. Many advocacy initiatives take place over a relatively extended period of time and those managing the initiative have to change tactics as a response to changes in the operating environment and targets. Attribution challenges also affect advocacy, as it will be difficult to easily connect the change to a particular initiative given the role of external factors that affect the advocacy initiative. Guthrie et al. (2005) concluded by recommending a prospective approach to the evaluation of public policy and advocacy. Unlike the retrospective approach that evaluates what has been planned in the past, “a prospective evaluation sets out goals for a project at the outset and measures how well the project is moving toward those goals throughout the project’s life” (Guthrie et al. 2005:14). This approach is however still to be tested.

Teles and Schmitt (2011:31) noted the inappropriateness of “scientific approaches” to evaluating advocacy and conclude by stating that “advocacy evaluation is, instead, a craft, one in which tacit knowledge, skill and networks are more useful than the application of a rigid methodology. It is an exercise in trained judgment”.

While both the efforts above have managed to highlight why it is challenging to evaluate public policy and advocacy, they did not consider a crucial aspect of how the issue of results may be a subject to different interpretations by the various stakeholders mainly external donors and implementing CSOs. They did not interrogate the issue of power dynamics between donors and CSOs especially in the context of CSOs that receive their funding from Western donors. This gap is what this study seeks to interrogate.

2.6 Is there a civil society in Africa?

This section explores the debate concerning civil society in Africa in general and Zimbabwe in particular. It also discusses the role, if any, played by Zimbabwe civil society in fostering democracy in Zimbabwe. This discussion is a precursor to the detailed account of the SZC in chapter five.

The departure for most studies on civil society focusing on Africa is the debate on whether civil society exists in Africa. This debate has led to scholars such as John Makumbe to title his 1998 article aptly *Is there Civil Society In Africa?* Mahmood Mamdani, (1995:604) correspondingly is also sceptical about the existence of civil society in Africa when he asks the question “to what extent can we talk of the existence of civil society in contemporary African countries”. Consequently, scholarly arguments have been advanced to both support and critique the existence of civil society in Africa. This has taken place from Western and non-Western conceptualisations.

On one hand, there are the “sceptics” who doubt the existence of civil society in Africa in any form. On the other hand, there are the “believers” who argue the existence of civil society in Africa. Bereketeab (2009:35), for instance, contends that the “orthodox Eurocentric approach to understanding civil society doubts the existence of a civil society sphere in Africa”. He further asserts that the view of civil society from a Western spatio-temporal epistemology and historical experience has led to scholars such as Chabal and Dalaz (1999:30) concluding that “there is as yet no evidence of a functional operating civil society in Africa” (Chabal and Dalaz, 1999:

35). Reference is also made to scholars such as Sogge (1997) and Maina (1998) in Lewis (2002) who doubt the relevance of civil society as a concept in Africa.

The “believers” category is comprised of two sub-categories. There are scholars who argue that the problem is not whether civil society exists or not in Africa but how it is conceptualised. Other scholars however believe that the Western concept of civil society is applicable to the African context. The first subset of “believers” is illustrated by Hearn (2001) who has pointed to ‘conceptual confusion’ when it comes to scholarship on civil society in Africa and has critiqued the term based on theoretical clarity, how it can be applied contextually and whether it plays any role ideologically. Comaroff and Commaroff (1999) in Obadare (2011:185) caution against concluding the existence of civil society in Africa based on how the concept came into existence. They cite, for example, African associational life that is dominated by ascription (as opposed to voluntary groups) and conclude that this is incongruous with the ideal of civil society in Western theory. They argue that, civil society existed in pre-colonial Africa as well as in modern times but in a different version compared to the one conceptualised by the Western construction. Monga (1996) observes that “African peoples have been trying for decades to challenge authoritarianism, but their patterns of behaviour could not be captured by the classical tools used by social scientists”.

For these scholars mentioned above, there existed some form of civil society in Africa well before colonialism. Makumbe (1998: 306), for instance, while agreeing that civil society existed before colonialism in Africa, notes that "the colonial governments throughout Africa destroyed most of the civic groups and organisations that existed prior to the advent of colonial rule". He however quickly qualifies that "this is not to say African tradition included or supported civil society as currently defined in the modern world" (Makumbe 1998: 306).

Other scholars such as Magure (2009) reinforce this notion of the existence of civil society prior to colonialism. He points to the existence of village-based voluntary associations that operated through kinship based *Work Parties* called *Nhimbe* prior to colonialism (Magure, 2009:40). He further argues that these associational voluntary groups continued to exist even during colonialism and after. According to

Raftopoulos and Phimister (1997:55), organised civil society organisation emerged particularly in the form of urban-based labour unions opposing "state control of Africans in urban areas" during colonialism in Zimbabwe. Ranger (1992) notes the existence of peasant associational life during the colonial period. He argues that this associational life manifesting itself in *Peasant Parties* or *Peasant Associations* later found its way into the urban setting through burial societies for instance. Associational life for Africans in towns during the first decades of colonial rule appeared to be temporary and ephemeral because of the period spent by migrant workers in the early urban settlements (Raftopoulos, 2000). This state of affairs, however, changed as the number of urban Africans increased.

In his examination of the relevance of the idea of civil society to Africa, David Lewis concludes that:

Civil Society is not a new term, nor is it one which has uniquely contemporary relevance. The control of public space and the exercise of power either to include or exclude sections of the population as citizens or non-citizens has long been a component of colonial history. Although such phenomena may not previously have been understood in relation to civil society, they may now be usefully analysed as precursors to what is currently meant by the term (Lewis, 2002: 582).

The above arguments point to the existence of civil society in both the pre and colonial era in Africa and Zimbabwe in particular. It can further be argued that expressions of civil society existed then and continue to exist if not according to the contemporary usage of the term.

The second subset of "believers" argue that civil society exists in Africa today and point to its role in development and particularly democracy transition and consolidation. Bratton (1994:1) concludes that "there is *prima facie* evidence of a nascent civil society in certain African countries". He argues that at first glance it appears as if there is little evidence of organisations between the political space and the household. This is not the case as because if one looks closely, there is evidence of civil society in the form of cultural and religious institutions that express collective

identities. He however cautions that “there is need ensure a localised application of the idea through taking into account distinctiveness”.

While partially doubting the capacity of African civil society to consolidate and sustain democracy in the current post-colonial era, Makumbe (1998:310) concludes that “there certainly exists an African civil society which is actively seeking to raise the living standards of citizens as well as to promote and protect their rights of interests”. While supporting the existence of a distinct civil society in Africa, scholars such as Obadare (2011) argue that there is no need to replace the conceptualisation of civil society when studying civil society in Africa. Instead, they argue for the expansion of the conceptualisation to include the institutions and phenomena that are part of African societies, which are not necessarily visible as formal associations.

Each of the arguments presented above contributes to the understanding of the application and relevance of civil society in Africa. This thesis follows in the footsteps of scholars who argue that civil society, though not in the current usage of the term, existed before and during the colonial era in Africa. As a result, it warrants the attention of academia to understand its role in society.

2.7 Civil society and democracy

After establishing the existence of civil society in Africa, the next task is to establish if it plays any role in the domain of democracy transition and consolidation. This section explores the role of civil society in the different stages that a country experiences during a transition into democracy.

Just like civil society, democracy is another concept that has been defined differently in the literature. Held (1996) traces the historical origins of the term democracy to ancient Greek society. He states that “democracy means a form of government in which, in contradistinction to monarchies and aristocracies, the people rule” (Held, 1996:1). He however problematizes the ‘rule by the people’ by distinguishing direct democracy marked by participation and representative democracy characterised by elected officials. Hyland (1995) sees democracy as both a system of government and also as a set of ideals. He argues that:

Democracy in classical Athens, for example, despite certain features that we could nowadays consider totally undemocratic, such as the exclusion from political life of about 85 percent of the total population, was both as a system of government and as a set of ideals similar in certain general respects to what I will claim should be our modern concept of democracy, (Hyland 1995: 37).

In viewing democracy from a political system's angle, Diamond (1997) brings in the concept of accountability. He argues that democracy "is also a political system in which government must be held accountable to the people, and in which mechanisms must exist for making it responsive to their passions, preferences and interests" (Diamond, 1997:2). This thinking by Diamond points to a vital role that civil society can play especially in a liberal democracy. He summed up the centrality of civil society in the democratisation agenda by arguing that:

Democracy, in particular, a healthy liberal democracy, also requires a public that is organised for democracy, socialised to its norms and values, and committed not just to its myriad narrow interests but to a larger, common, 'civic' end. Such a civic public is only possible with a vibrant civil society, (Diamond, 1997:5).

According to Sachikonye (1997), civil society has been part of the democracy and development agenda in Africa. He notes that:

In sub-Saharan Africa, the concept of civil society has, therefore, been at the centre of debates relating to democracy and development. Thus, renewed intent has been directly connected to the participation of civil society organisations – such as labour unions, chambers of commerce, churches, mass media and student movements, among others, in the contest for a democratic opening up of autocratic political systems (Sachikonye, 1997).

Bratton (1994:10) expands the knowledge of civil society and democracy by stating that "the roles that civil society plays vary according to the stage of the political transition process". He distinguishes at least four stages that a regime transitioning to

democracy follows: pre-transition, liberalisation, transition, and consolidation. During the pre-transition stage – "Authoritarian governments routinely emasculate political society by banning political parties and controlling elections. In response, political nonconformists, who can no longer operate openly, take refuge in the occupational associations and religious and educational organisations of civil society" (Bratton, 1994: 10). This means that civil society plays an important role in filling the gap of opposition political parties.

The second stage is the "liberalisation" stage. During this stage "protest is galvanised not only by denunciations of elite corruption but also by calls for multiparty democracy. Civil society comes to be dominated by loose social movements with an ill-defined reform agenda that focus almost exclusively on the ouster of incumbents" (Bratton, 1994:10). Although the focus will mainly be on changing political leadership, civil society plays an important role, sometimes in the background.

The third stage, "transition", is characterised by elections and civil society plays an important role during this stage. According to Bratton (1994: 10), "From this moment onward, and especially following the announcement of competitive elections, the initiative in the democratisation shifts back from civil society into a reconstituted political society. Opposition politicians come out of hiding in civil society, or international exile, and rush to form political parties through which to mount a bid for state power".

Civil society plays a prominent role during the last stage, "consolidation". At this stage, Bratton (1994) concludes "The institutions of civil society have a crucial role to play in the consolidation of democracy. At the deepest levels of political culture, civic institutions include the political norms and values that underpin the rules of democratic competition. Democracy depends upon attachments among citizens to a matrix of civil liberties which they are willing to defend against encroachment by the executors of state power" (Bratton, 1994:11). Thus from the above argument, civil society plays a role during all the stages of democratic transition. However, the role varies according to the stage of transition.

Scholars from a liberal persuasion largely promote the nexus between civil society and democratisation. According to Kuperus (1999b:660), "civil society organisations are critical instruments for democratic change and consolidation because they can function as continuous instruments of political participation and mobilisation". Scholars from mainly the liberal conceptualization of civil society, point to the relevance of civil society as both aiding and consolidating democracy. A strong civil society is often viewed as a necessary condition for establishing a democratic state. Scholars who argue that civil society is an important actor in democratisation point to developments in Eastern Europe and Latin America during the 1980s. Habib and Kotze (2002:3) note that a wide array of non-state actors played an important role in the democratisation of several authoritarian regimes most notably in Africa, Eastern Europe and Latin America. Claiming a revival of the concept of civil society in academic discourse leading to the glorification of the idea of civil society.

As a result of this role played by non-state actors during the "third wave of democratisation" referred to by Huntington, Habib and Kotze (2002:4) conclude that "civil society in developing countries was allocated the task of promoting democracy and engaging with the shrinking state. This was partly unavoidable since civil society had been significantly legitimised as a result of the strong influence of people's power in the third wave of democracies".

However, the liberal approach to civil society and democracy mentioned above is contrary to the radical Gramscian postulations that regard civil society as a contested terrain used by the state to manufacture 'consent to maintain hegemony'. The liberal view is also challenged by African scholars such as Mamdani (1993) who challenges the liberal approach to the role of civil society in democratisation by questioning the effectiveness of civil society in Africa. He argues that civil society organisations in Africa are undermined by "their lack of peasant base and consequently their limited liberal agenda" (Mamdani, 1993:47).

In analysing civil society in Zimbabwe, both the liberal and activist/critical theoretical influences are apparent. The liberal influences are mainly from the strong belief that civil society is critical to the expansion of democracy. Most international donors support this position. The influence from the activist/critical view manifests itself in

the belief that CSOs in Zimbabwe are anti –state and provide spaces for the building of a counter-hegemonic force. In fighting this hegemony, civil society may remove the undemocratic regime in the same way as events in Eastern Europe in the 1970s and Latin America in the 1980s. Despite the different approaches used to understand CSOs in Zimbabwe, this thesis acknowledges the role that it has played in the different stages of the democratisation agenda in Zimbabwe.

2.8 Civil Society and the quest for democracy in Zimbabwe

Civil society in Zimbabwe has played a critical role in advocating for human rights democracy and good governance. Scholars such as J². Moyo (1993), Sachikonye (1995), Makumbe, S. Moyo and Raftopoulos (2000), Kagoro (2003,2005) and Magure (2009) have in one way or another, acknowledged the role played by civil society in Zimbabwe in advancing the democratisation agenda.

The role played by civil society also extends to other aspects of development such as human, social and economic development. However, it should be noted that the development of civil society in Zimbabwe both pre and post independence, has not been without challenges. Measures ranging from a restricted operating environment, co-option by the state and lack of funding have all militated against the growth of civil society in Zimbabwe (J. Moyo, 1993; Kagoro, 2003; 2005; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2002). In analysing how the state sought to weaken civil society, J. Moyo (1993) points to efforts by the ZANU-PF government taking advantage of weak civil society soon after independence in 1980 by claiming that the ruling party was the sole legitimate representative of the people. In doing so, J. Moyo (1993:7) posits that “ZANU-PF took maximum advantage of an under-developed civil society by claiming that ZANU-PF was the sole legitimate representative of the people. Under the guise of this claim, the party declared itself to be the umbrella organization of all social movements and went about destroying civil society associations in the name of ‘the revolution’”. This argument by J Moyo (1993) is reinforced by Bratton (1994)

² This thesis refers to three different scholars who share the same surname – Moyo. These are Dambisa Moyo, Jonathan Moyo and Sam Moyo. For the avoidance of confusion, the initials of the scholars will be used to distinguish the views of these scholars when referred to. This is a slight variation to the APA rules of in-text referencing.

who argues that “After independence, African ruling elites gave top priority to state sovereignty and national security and sought to bring about ‘departicipation’ ” (Bratton, 1994:5). Although they invested heavily in the construction of one-party and military regimes, elites were not always successful at discouraging autonomous organisations from taking root in civil society. Some leaders ‘managed’ this by incorporating them under the wing of governing parties; others banned them entirely. But, in many places, voluntary associations proved too strong to be subordinated and survived as an alternative institutional framework to officialdom” (Bratton 1994:5).

While arguing along the same lines as J Moyo’s (1993) and Bratton (1994), scholars such as Ranger (1992) and Nhema (2002) trace this weakening of civil society by the State to the pre-independence era. African civil society was reportedly weak because of a combination of factors emanating from how it was excluded during the colonial era and co-opted or demobilised after independence (Nhema, 2002:157). Using the state-civil society relations approach, the author concludes that:

For black civil society in particular, the combination of exclusionary policies in the settler colonial period and the co-optive policies of the independent government resulted in the failure to provide a firm basis for the aggregation of private interests (Nhema, 2002:157).

The post-independence civil society in Zimbabwe evolved in phases. S. Moyo and Makumbe (2000:3-6) identified four phases since 1980. The first phase is what they termed Welfare Phase. This took place towards the end of 1979 to 1981. This phase centred on the inception of independence in 1980. During this phase, civil society was concerned with education and welfare. This phase was characterised by organisations such as the Association of Women's Clubs. Chiroro (2013:120) notes that "during this phase, labour also formed a core element of civil society, and a relationship of common interest developed with the state". However as the subsequent sections will show, the relationship between labour and the state later changed in the 1990s.

The second phase, from 1982 to 1986, was characterised by the growth of income-generating productive oriented organisations. Existing NGOs also shifted their attention to the "income generating" projects which included sewing, market

gardening and poultry to mention but just a few. Organisations such as the Organisation of Rural Associations for Progress (ORAP) and the Organisation of Collective Co-operatives in Zimbabwe were part of this phase.

The third phase from 1987 to 1990 witnessed the "new generation of young, technical, skilled people who began service organisations". This phase also witnessed the growth of human rights based organisations such as the Legal Resources Foundation as well as HIV and AIDS-related organisations. According to S. Moyo and Makumbe (2002:5), "this new wave of service NGOs began networking around donor International Non-Governmental Organisations such as NOVIB and ADF".

The fourth phase witnessed the emergence of organisations that dealt with the challenges brought about by the government led Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP). In describing this phase, Chiroro (2013) for instance describes the shift in focus for organisations such Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) and Catholic Commission for Peace and Justice (CCJP). She states that:

This phase led to a shift in focus towards policy and advocacy. Many NGOs focused on relief work during the 1992 drought, and the negative impacts of retrenchment and high inflation...from 1995 onwards, most CSOs, notably the ZCTU and the church-related organizations such as the CCJP, in alliance with the international donor community- began focusing on governance; human rights and democracy processes, campaigning specifically for a level playing field during elections, (Chiroro 2013:121).

The changing nature of civil society in Zimbabwe as highlighted in the different stages of its development affirms some of the Gramscian postulations about civil society. For instance, the fourth stage is characterised by civil society that had a different ideology concerning the political and economic approach that the Zimbabwe government was pursuing. The social and political and political arena was characterised by the state seeking to maintain hegemony on one hand, and civil society contesting it on the other hand.

2.9 Civil society and the “crisis in Zimbabwe” period

Although S. Moyo, Makumbe and Raftopoulos (2003) noted four phases in the development of civil society in Zimbabwe, it is my submission that post 2000, Zimbabwe saw an additional phase that shaped the development of civil society in Zimbabwe. This is the “crisis in Zimbabwe” phase that resulted on one hand, in the mushrooming of more confrontational CSOs dealing with civil and political issues, and on the other hand, the government responding with a heavy-handed approach to civic activities. This is a phase between the years 2000 and 2008.

Unlike the fourth stage that is characterised by civil society working towards policy and advocacy on issues such as bad economic policies and poor governance, the fifth stage saw CSOs having to deal with new issues such as the fast track land reform, political violence and gross human rights violations. This witnessed the birth of powerful coalitions such as the National Constitutional Assembly who successfully campaigned for a No Vote in the 2000 constitutional referendum. Other coalitions included the Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition with a membership of more than 100 CSOs dealing with civil and political crises and the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum that dealt with providing support to victims of torture and gross human rights violations while also researching and documenting cases of political violence. This period also coincided with the birth of formidable opposition party the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC).

Scholars such as Raftopoulos and Sachikonye (2001), Bond and Manyanya (2003), Moore (2003), Ranger (2003), S. Moyo and Yeros (2005), Primorac and Chan (2007) have documented the political and economic crisis in the late 1990s and early 2000 in Zimbabwe. However, causes of the Zimbabwe crisis between 2000 and 2008 are contested. Different scholars have offered varying causes of the crisis. For example, S. Moyo and Yeros (2005) argue that national sovereignty and redistributive justice is central to the crisis. They argue that the dispute in Zimbabwe arose from the quest for nationalistic approaches by the ruling ZANU-PF to chart its own affairs since Zimbabwe is a sovereign nation. Furthermore, Zimbabwe sought to correct the colonial imbalances to land ownership through land redistribution. In attempting this,

Zimbabwe faced both internal resistance through opposition parties and prodemocracy CSOs. This led to internal crisis and international isolation.

On the other hand, Raftopoulos (2004), More (2003) and Phimister (2004) are of the view that political and economic governance, transparency and accountability are central to the crisis. This category of scholars, point to issues of mismanagement of the economy, corruption and failure to uphold human rights in the late 1990s and early 2000s as the causes of both civil strife and economic meltdown in Zimbabwe. They further argue the link between bad economic policies that led to a poorly performing economy and the breakdown in the rule of law, consequently led to international isolation.

These different vantage points concerning the Zimbabwe crisis have evoked different responses from CSOs in Zimbabwe. Chiroro (2013:118) argues that since 1997, Zimbabwe civil society has been divided into two categories. There is one group that uphold the international human rights agenda. This group is generally aligned with the opposition political parties. The other group, which believes in redistributive justice and nationalism, has aligned their agendas with that of the ruling party ZANU-PF. The group advocates for radical social and economic change –especially in relation to the ownership of land. This group includes organisations such as Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association (ZNLWVA), Zimbabwe Liberators and War Collaborators, Zimbabwe Political Detainees and Restricttees Association including the Youth militia.

In relation to these divisions within civil society in Zimbabwe, Ncube (2010) points to the inherent methodological challenges in studying civil society in Zimbabwe. The challenge is based on the conceptualization of civil society from neo-liberal frameworks that took root in the 1990s. Civil Society in Zimbabwe is therefore viewed as mostly NGOs who oppose the state. Using Gramscian lenses, Ncube (2010) concludes that there is a hegemonic tension between CSOs aligned to the ruling party ZANU-PF and those that align with the opposition party MDC. However, most foreign donors have aligned themselves with the latter.

As will be shown in the subsequent sections, the SZC, a civil society led multi-stakeholder initiative, was conceptualised and executed in response to this multifaceted crisis in Zimbabwe between 2006 and 2008. It took place during what Brian Raftopoulos referred to as the “Crisis in Zimbabwe” period. He notes that:

The crisis became manifest in multiple ways: confrontations over land property rights; contestations over the history and meanings of nationalism and citizenship; the emergency of critical civil society groupings campaigning around trade union, human rights and constitutional questions; the restructuring of the state in more authoritarian forms; the broader pan-African and anti-imperialist meaning of the Zimbabwean struggles in Zimbabwe... (Raftopoulos, 2009:201).

It is important to mention that most CSOs supported under the SZC followed a liberal conceptualisation of the crisis in Zimbabwe and were influenced by the view that the crisis was as a result of bad political and economic policies. Chiroro (2013:123) asserts that “Zimbabwe civil society, in general, has viewed the crisis as a result of the repressive and violent nature of the ruling ZANU-PF and its violations of human rights”.

However, there are those who seek to expand the origins of the crisis in Zimbabwe. For instance, Kagoro (2003:4) traces the roots of the crisis to both pre and post-independence developments and policies. Writing in 2003, Brian Kagoro, the then Coordinator of Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, an umbrella CSO coordinating the response to the political crisis, postulates that:

The current crisis in Zimbabwe is therefore a confluence of a four interlinking themes: land and food security; governance and citizenship; civil society and democratisation; and regional and international interventions (Kagoro, 2003:5).

This notion is reinforced by Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2003:124) who contends that “the Zimbabwe crisis is basically that of legitimacy, governance, economy decadency as well as humanitarian crisis. The “crisis in Zimbabwe” phase was characterised by “a

significant growth in advocacy groups, and this changed the tempo of civil society “engagement with the state” Chiroro: 2013:121). She posits that:

A vibrant and confrontational civil society thus quickly developed between 1997 (and 1999) emerging within an environment of weakening law and order, a decaying state, the absence of any viable political party through which to oppose government (Chiroro, 2013:121).

This view is consistent with the Gramscian thinking of civil society being the arena in which state hegemony is challenged.

From the above argument, the “crisis in Zimbabwe” period from 2000 to 2008 shaped the growth of civil society in Zimbabwe in a way that led to a hostile relationship between the state and civil society. It is during this period that the SZC, the case study, of this thesis was active.

2.10 State - civil society relations in Zimbabwe

This section explores the state – civil society relations especially in the post independence era in Zimbabwe. Although the number of CSOs grew during both colonial and post-colonial era, they did not enjoy good relations with the state. Kagoro (2003:23) asserts that the "relations between the state and civil society in Zimbabwe have always been contentious". Several documented episodes of conflict between the government and civil society and the subsequent restrictions and repressive measures crafted by the state, alludes to a frosty relationship between the state and civil society in Zimbabwe.

Just after the attainment of independence in 1980, the new government sought to pacify civil society through co-option approaches (J. Moyo, 1993; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2002). As the government was implementing developmental policies, civil society sought to complement government in these endeavours. The government evoked sentiments based on reconciliation, nation building and national unity to entrench CSO support for its policies. These sentiments were efforts by the government to heal a society that had gone for years under a racist segregation policy and experienced a

brutal liberation war. Thus upon take over by a black majority government led by ZANU-PF, sentiments such as national healing, reconciliation and nation building and unity were not only necessary to be pursued but became difficult for CSOs not to support. Furthermore labour, a critical component of civil society, enjoyed cordial relations with the state.

As a result of the failure by the state to deal with issues such as corruption and adoption of economic policies that affected the wellbeing of the workers and society in general, civil society began to be critical towards the state. During this period, “civil society groups which had hitherto confined themselves to complementing the state’s development project of the 1980s gradually became more assertive” (Muzondidya, 2009:194). This resulted in civil society, mostly labour and student bodies, using confrontational approaches such as strikes. “By the late 1980s, the government of Zimbabwe came under increasing pressure from the labour movement, students and dissenting members of the middle class to democratise its functions” (Raftopoulos, 2000:30). This marked the beginning of the deterioration of the state-civil society relations in the post independence era in Zimbabwe. In the year 1989, several spontaneous strikes by brewery workers, railway artisans, shunters, junior doctors and telecommunications technicians erupted. These strikes took place between June and September. The government responded with restrictive measures such as arrests and harassment of CSO leaders. For instance, Morgan Tsvangirai, the then leader of ZCTU was arrested together with student leaders after issuing a statement in support of the University of Zimbabwe students strike on October 4 of 1989. This confrontational approach, which Kagoro refers to as the ‘radicalisation of ZCTU’, was to follow in the subsequent years leading to the formation of a vibrant opposition party – the MDC. Thus civil society particularly the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA), ZCTU (labour) and ZINASU (Students’ movement) incubated the MDC party. This development has caused problems, especially for civil society, as the government constantly questions its independence from the opposition party. As will be shown in the subsequent sections, the SZC was also affected by the all too often conflation of CSOs with opposition political parties.

This thesis takes the view that the crises that took place during the period of the SZC are as a result of both bad political and economic policies. The government responded

to the dissenting voices in ways that further strained the relations between itself and civil society. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2003:123) postulates that:

Attempts were made to castrate the ZCTU and students through the introduction of Labour Relations Amendment Act of 1992 and the University Amendment Act of 1990. These two instruments were meant to limit the autonomy and assertiveness of the workers and the students in the political landscape of the 90s.

The amendments to the Labour Relations Act of 1985 that were done in 1992 was to enable the flexibility required to deal with a liberalised economy and its effects such as unemployment. However, some of the amendments weakened labour unions. One important change brought by the amendment to the Labour Relations Act of 1992 was the abolition of principle of “one industry one union or employees association”. This resulted in the fragmentation of trade unions and formation of splinter union thereby effectively wakening the unions. The University Amendment Act of 1990 is blamed as a piece of legislation that curtailed student activism at the only university then in Zimbabwe – University of Zimbabwe. This followed a series of crippling anti corruption demonstrations towards in 1989 and 1990.

As the economic effects of Economic Structural Adjustment Programme began to take a toll on workers, public unrest and strikes increased. According to Muzondidya (2009:194), ‘the public-sector strike of June 1996 was the largest strike organised by civil servants in post-independence Zimbabwe. Students also supported the eight-week strike by civil servants. An important element of the Zimbabwe crisis was the rapid decline of the economy which according to Raftopoulos (2009:202) “was characterised, by among other things: steep declines in industrial and agricultural productivity, historic levels of hyperinflation, *informalisation* of labour, use of multi-currency system for economic transactions, displacements and critical erosion of livelihoods”.

Since the early 2000s the civil and political environment in Zimbabwe was characterised by a culture of confrontations. This was a result of many factors that include a poor performing economy and the state responding violently against any

form of dissent. The confrontations increased with the ruling party ZANU-PF losing support as manifested by its defeat in a constitutional reform referendum and losing support for the first time in urban centres during the 2000 elections. This confrontational approach also extended to government and NGO relations. Writing in the early 2000s, Raftopoulos (2000:21) asserts that “the change in the state-NGO relations can be seen in the greater willingness of sections in the NGO community to develop a confrontational approach in their dealings with the Zimbabwean government”.

In January 1998, a broad coalition of CSOs, trade unions and church groups formally launched the NCA. At its inception, the NCA had 150 organisations and about 10 000 individual members (Chiroro, 2013). According to LesBas (2006:425) "from the beginning, the NCA spoke a public language of apolitical, non-partisan, narrow-minded interest in constitutional reform, but the leadership and many of the organisational members had a much more far-reaching campaign in mind". "By the time the MDC was formally launched in September 1999, the constitutional reform movement had created the space and built a base of support for the new opposition party" (LesBas, 2006:426). These attempts to form a broad-based movement to oppose the ruling regime of the ZANU-PF government were a precursor to latter campaigns such as SZC.

2.11 Religious based civil society organisations

This thesis subscribes to the notion of church/faith-based groups as being part of civil society in general. However, in recognition of the role that the church has played in the democratisation agenda in Zimbabwe and the fact that SZC was led by a church based group, the section below will focus at the growth and contribution of these groups to the democratisation agenda in Zimbabwe.

The growth of civil society in both colonial and post-colonial Zimbabwe was parallel with the growth of church-based organisations. According to Raftopoulos (2000:27), these church-based organisations were concerned with "both welfare activities and the promotion of ecumenical dialogue". He further notes that:

During the 1960s and 1970s, several church-related institutions were formed to respond to the racist policies of the Rhodesian government. In 1966 the Christian Council was formed to coordinate Christian work among the youth, as well as to deal with broader urban and township issues. These activities were expanded to include support for detainees/restrictees and their families during the intensified war years. Similarly, Christian Care was founded in 1967 to deal with problems of detainees. The more radical Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace (CCJP) was founded in 1972 and became increasingly involved in documenting human rights abuses of the Rhodesian security forces (Raftopoulos, 2000:27).

As will be shown in Chapter 5 that describes the SZC, the strategic importance of church-based organisations to the democratisation agenda in Zimbabwe continued during the post-independence era including the SZC. The fact that the SZC was largely coordinated by a church-based organisation, the Zimbabwe Christian Alliance, attests to the continued strategic importance of church-based organisations even during the crisis in Zimbabwe.

Kaperus (1992:652) notes that “religious groups in South Africa and Zimbabwe have played a key role in achieving and sustaining democracy”. In her examination of how religious associations in South Africa and Zimbabwe contributed to the building of democracy, she states that:

Churches and religious groups as a whole represent a distinctive strand within civil society; although conclusions drawn from their role cannot necessarily be generalised to other civil society organisations such as professional association, they provide one of the most encouraging signs of an invigorated civil society in the development world (Kuperus, 1999:652).

While the church, in general, has largely remained neutral to issues of human rights, democracy and good governance by choosing to respect the doctrine of separation of church and state practised in Zimbabwe, critical voices have found their way through church-related organisations. These organisations have been an integral part of civil society in Zimbabwe. Apart from playing welfare related and ecumenical roles, they

were also involved in in democracy advocacy in both pre and post-independent Zimbabwe. For instance, the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace (CCJP), formed in 1972 under the auspices of the Rhodesian Catholic Bishops Conference, opposed the atrocities of white rule. After the attainment of independence in 1980, CCJP working with the Legal Resources Foundation (LRF), published in 1997, a highly critical report entitled *Breaking the Silence* that implicated the top leadership in government for sanctioning the atrocities in Matabeleland and Midlands Provinces. CCJP and the Zimbabwe Council of Churches (founded in 1964) contributed to the formation of NCA, a broad-based CSO that campaigned vigorously for a "people-centred" new constitution in Zimbabwe.

The connection between the church, through church-based organisations and civil society, was both prominent and strategic in pre and post independence Zimbabwe. Church related activities have taken place in Zimbabwe with minimum disruption from the government. This arrangement has been exploited by church-based organisations as an avenue to be critical of government without inviting the same wrath as civil society organisations. For example, the notorious POSA that is often evoked by the state to refuse CSOs and the opposition freedom of assembly and the right to protest does not apply to churches.

2.12 Civil society funding in Zimbabwe: The salience of donor funding to civil society organisations

The majority of CSOs in Zimbabwe receive much of their funding from Western donors (Stewart, 1997; Makumbe, 1998; S. Moyo, 2000; Habib and Kotze, 2002; Masunungure, 2011). This funding arrangement is premised on various factors that include both a perceived efficiency of NGOs and the confluence of value systems between donors and NGOs. According to Makumbe (1998b: 314), "the majority of these donor agencies claim to pursue objectives that are targeted at strengthening African or local NGOs or civil society. Thus foreign donor agencies provide local NGOs with much-needed resources - including finance and technical expertise - to enable the latter eventually to become self-reliant and effective members of local civil society". Stewart (1997) quoted in S. Moyo, Makumbe and Raftopoulos (2000:ix) state that "two of the most cited reasons for focusing expenditure on NGOs are the

qualities possessed by NGOs in their own right and what NGOs can do as part of civil society”. NGOs are regarded as efficient agents, through which development assistance can be channelled from Western donors to developing countries. The government, on the other hand, is regarded as inefficient, bureaucratic and in some instances corrupt in the receipt and administration of funds.

However, Makumbe (1998b: 311) debunks this glorification of NGOs by pointing out some of the weaknesses of civil society. He states that "another major weakness of civil society in Africa is that some of the civic groups are themselves sadly undemocratic in both their organisational structures and their operations”. Other criticisms of NGOs range from issues of legitimacy, inefficiency and heavy reliance on foreign funding. Lewis and Wallace (2000:x) point out that sometimes NGOs are viewed as vehicles for privatising foreign assistance making it less accountable to either government authorities or local people because of lack of clear governance structures for NGOs that promote accountability. Criticism of NGOs goes beyond those in service provision to those in advocacy. Reimann (2005) adds:

In the area of democracy promotion, for example, advocacy NGOs have been criticised for failing to live up to the expectations of international donors and although civil society aid has been successful in stimulating a surge in the number of groups promoting democracy, this increase in the number of groups promoting democracy has not necessarily led to vibrant, flourishing and independent Tocquevillian civil society as envisioned by Western donors, Reimann (2005:43).

However, despite these criticisms, Western donors still channel significant amounts of funding to NGOs, especially in the developing world. In Zimbabwe, “NGOs receive funds from a wide range of international Non-Governmental Organisations (INGOs), as well as from bilateral and multilateral donors. INGOs have been consistently important source of funding to local NGOs” (Moyo, 2000:69). Donor funding is mainly provided in the form of grants that CSOs have to account for during and post project implementation. Funding is directed towards a range of thematic areas ranging from human rights violations documentation, democracy advocacy and lobby, women’s rights, children’s rights and environmental issues to mention a few.

Although NGOs in other countries can be financed through sources such as private sector funding, government grants and self-generated funding by CSOs, these options are very limited for civil society in Zimbabwe. Reasons range from a poor performing economy to mistrust between government and civil society. Thus civil society in Zimbabwe has little choice but to be reliant on Western donors for funding. Magure (2014:148) concludes that “As a matter of fact, it is recognised that Zimbabwe’s lack of financial resources pushes civil society towards seeking foreign funding”.

The heavy reliance on external funds, according to Wallace (1997), has a possibility of damaging relationships between donors and NGOs. Fowler (1997) and Van Rooy (1998), both cited in Wallace (1997), reinforce the fact that the lack of alternative sources of funding by African NGOs may result in donors setting their own conditions on their aid.

This funding arrangement, to an extent, has caused CSOs in Zimbabwe to be treated with scepticism by the government and they have been perceived as working in partnership with international donors to “effect regime change” (The Herald, 7 August 2013). Helliker (2012) strengthens this argument by stating that “at the same time NGOs in Africa (both foreign and indigenous) are regularly appraised critically as mere instruments of global donors that seek to challenge states deemed undemocratic”.

In their examination of civil society in South Africa, Habib and Kotze argue that:

The reality is that donors wield enormous power over the political and economic development and direction of recipient organisations and countries. They also regularly change their funding priorities and, in many instances, these decisions are made by wealthy and influential board members, in far away boardrooms, in rich countries. Donors can, in essence, decide which CSOs are to live and which are to die, and, in the process, consciously or unconsciously, transplant their own values and worldviews on the recipients of aid (Habib and Kotze, 2002:19).

Despite the threats posed by the heavy reliance on external donor funding by CSOs, Makumbe agrees with Diamond that it is still vital for CSOs to receive external funding for their operations. In support of continued financial support to civil society, Diamond argues that:

Financially, African civic and development organisations desperately need help. It is easy to argue in principle that civil society organisations should be, or eventually become, self-supporting, that dependence on international donors is not much better than dependence on the state. But the fact is, many of the most important and democratically promising civil society groups in Africa—those engaged in election and human rights monitoring, civic education, policy-oriented research, institutional rethinking, the political empowerment of women, and campaigns for political reform—simply could not exist today without foreign funding, and will probably be dependent on it for many years to come (Diamond in Makumbe 1998b: 316).

As has been established above, though not a desirable arrangement, CSOs in Zimbabwe are heavily reliant on funds from Western donors to sustain their operations and programmes. This funding arrangement may cause a strain on the relationship between CSOs and donors. This strain may come as a result of manipulation of CSOs by donors. However, equally important, this strain may be as a result of the high demand for donor upward accountability. This is compounded by the use of accountability mechanisms that are not compatible with initiatives undertaken by Zimbabwean CSOs such as democracy advocacy.

2.13 Conclusion

This chapter has surveyed literature on civil society, advocacy, results measurement in international development theory and practice and the relationship between CSOs in Zimbabwe and international donors.

This chapter has also argued that civil society is an idea or concept that dates back to the pre-enlightenment period and the meaning of the concept is contested. The modern usage of the concept can be understood through the three versions. These are

the activist, liberal and post-modern versions. The chapter also outlines the different actors of civil society and argues that NGOs are critical actors within civil society. This chapter has argued that civil society exists in Africa, Zimbabwe included. It existed before and during the colonial period, albeit, not in the current usage of the term. Civil society has played an important role in Zimbabwe both pre and post independence. The state has however sought to impede the growth and work of civil society both pre and post independence in Zimbabwe.

At the attainment of independence in 1980, the Zimbabwe government controlled civil society in a paternalistic manner by evoking "nation building" and "national reconciliation" sentiments. Labour, an important segment of civil society, enjoyed cordial working relations with the state just after independence. This relationship, together with that of other CSOs including student bodies changed towards the end of the first decade of independence. CSOs became more critical towards the state. The 1990s witnessed a more militant civil society with a rise in strikes and demonstrations. Labour and student bodies were highly critical of the state and demanded more beyond labour and student issues. For instance, they demanded expansion of democratic space, campaigned against corruption and government's inability to act on it. They also opposed economic policies such as Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) that brought suffering to workers and the population at large. Church-related groups played an integral role in the quest for democracy during the pre and post independence periods in Zimbabwe. The role of church-based organisations was displayed even during the SZC when the ZCA, was chosen to chair and coordinate the campaign.

This chapter has also argued that although it is an undesirable arrangement, CSOs in Zimbabwe are heavily reliant on Western donor funding. This arrangement is as a result of limited opportunities for funding in other funding models such as government, the private sector and self-financing. Western donors also funded SZC. This chapter has explored the definitional issues associated with the term advocacy, one important civil society strategy and argues that it is a complex initiative and that results from it are not easily measurable.

The chapter looked at literature on results measurement in development. The global rise in demand for development results is anchored in the principle of accountability. As a result of this demand, several tools, frameworks and approaches have been developed and are used to measure these results. The logic based tools such as the *logframe* are commonly used in development practice and evaluation processes. However, there is a gap in literature as there are no major studies that explore adequately the use of these tools, frameworks and approaches by CSOs particularly those involved in advocacy and donors who usually fund these initiatives.

CHAPTER THREE

Theoretical Framework

3.1 Introduction

This chapter explores the theoretical perspectives that guided this study. The study was informed by the Accountability theory and complemented by Michel Foucault's conceptualisation of discourse and power/knowledge framework. I explored these two theoretical perspectives in so far as they relate to results measurement in development practice as well as to Zimbabwean CSOs and donor relations. On one hand, accountability theory assists in understanding the principle behind 'why' CSOs report to donor organisations. On the other hand, Foucault's conceptualisation of discourse and power/knowledge framework assists in the examination of 'how' CSOs and donors use accountability mechanisms such as results tools and frameworks.

3.2 Conceptualising accountability

The theoretical framework on accountability is drawn from emerging literature on NGO accountability. According to Walsh (2014:92), scholars or researchers on NGO accountability are categorised in three ways. The first category constitutes those authors who are theoretical. These authors are largely academics that focus on theories and concepts. In their studies new theories and concepts are sometimes constructed. The second category is for those authors who are engaged in policy. This group is a mixture of academics and development practitioners. The literature in this category is usually narrative, providing context, dealing with problems with accountability and providing recommendations. Sometimes they come up with new policies and accountability mechanisms. The third category focuses on empirical studies. In this category, there are development practitioners. Studies in this category attempt to improve accountability issues. The focus is on accountability to intended beneficiaries.

In conceptualising accountability, all three categories will be considered in building a case for the accountability theory and rationale for this study. Walsh (2014) posits that the common thread in all three categories listed above is the view that accountability in NGOs is skewed toward donors and away from beneficiaries. Despite this conclusion, there is no comprehensive study undertaken to examine the challenges associated with this upward accountability for initiatives such as CSO advocacy.

The concept of accountability has become axiomatic in development policy and practice. Lindberg (2013:1) traces the concept of accountability to both political science and financial accounting. In political science, he refers to John Locke's theory of representative democracy premised on the fact that accountability takes place when the governed are separated from the governors. He further points out that in accounting, the concept of accounting is limited in scope focusing mainly on "financial prudence and accounting in accordance with regulations and institutions" (Lindberg, 2013:1). Nevertheless, despite the seemingly different historical origins of the term "accountability", the "principle of delegating some authority, evaluating performance and imposing sanctions is essentially the same" Lindberg (213:1). Chisolm (1995) brings another historical dimension to the concept of accountability by examining the concept from a legal point of view. In this regard, legal accounting is considered as "either an obligation to meet prescribed standards of behaviour or an obligation to disclose information about one's action even in the absence of a prescribed standard" (Chisolm, 1995:143). Thus an entity or actor can be held legally accountable for their actions.

Recent studies by scholars such as Edwards and Hulme (1996b), Fox and Brown (1998) Ebrahim (2003), Kaldor (2003), Cribb (2005) Leen (2006), Cronin and O'Reagan (2002), Najam (2006) Awuah-Werekoh (2014) on organisational behaviour and the relationship between non-profit organisations and their stakeholders, deploy the accountability theory. The term accountability has assumed different meanings in both literature and development practice. For instance, according to Lloyd *et al.* (2007:11) accountability is "the processes through which an organization makes a commitment to respond to and balance the needs of stakeholders in its decision-making processes and activities, and delivers against this commitment". While for

Edwards and Hulme (1996b: 967), accountability is viewed as “the means by which individuals and organisations report to a recognised authority (authorities) and are held responsible for their actions”. They further note that accountability has an external dimension in terms of “an obligation to meet prescribed standards of behaviour” and an internal one motivated by “felt responsibilities expressed through individual action and organisational mission”. Fox and Brown (1998:12) provide a simplified definition of accountability by stating that it is “the process of holding actors responsible for their actions”. At its most basic, accountability refers to “the process of giving an account or being answerable or capable of being accounted for” (Alkin and Christie 2013:14). Consequently, “accountability concerns a relationship between A and B, where A is accountable to B if they must explain their actions to B, and could be adversely affected by B if B doesn’t like the account” (Goetz and Jenkins, 2002:5). Lindberg (2009:8) expands this relationship posing that all types of accountability are characterised by the following:

- a. An agent or institution that is to give an account (A for agent). In this thesis, A would be the CSO;
- b. An area, responsibilities, or domain subject to accountability (D for domain);
- c. An agent or institution to which A is to give account (P for principal). In this study P would be the international donor;
- d. The right of P to require A to inform and explain/justify decisions with regard to D; and
- e. The right of P to sanction A if A fails to inform and/or explain/justify decisions with regard to D.

Hence from the definitions above, accountability is characterised by the aspect of being held accountable for actions and answerability of organisations to stakeholders. In this study, accountability was used to explore the relationship between CSOs in Zimbabwe and the international donors paying particular attention to how CSOs report to their donors.

3.2.1 Accountability in development

The concept of accountability is applied in two ways in development literature and practice. Firstly, it is used alongside the concept of transparency in public sector management where programmes are designed to build the capacity of citizens to hold public or elected officials accountable for their actions and policies. This is what Newell and Bellour (2002) call “political accountability”. They argue that “traditional notions of political accountability are derived from the responsibilities of delegating individuals in public office to carry out specific tasks on behalf of citizens” (Newell and Bellour, 2002:7). On the other hand, accountability is used within the framework of development organisations such as NGOs and how they are answerable to stakeholders such as donors and beneficiaries. In this regard, the OECD provides a working definition by stating that:

Accountability in development may refer to the obligations of partners to act according to clearly defined responsibilities, roles and performance expectations, often with respect to the prudent use of resources. For evaluators, it connotes the responsibility to provide accurate, fair and credible monitoring reports and performance assessments. For public sector managers and policy-makers, accountability is to taxpayers/citizens (OECD, 2002:15).

In specifying the role of accountability to Non-Governmental Development Organisations (NGDOs), Naidoo (2003) contends that NGDO accountability is about how those who are affected by an organisation can influence strategy and are involved in shaping how results and impacts are measured and communicated.

It should be noted that the term accountability in this thesis is used differently from political accountability theory that seeks to hold elected public officials and state institutions from answering to the citizens or electorate, the focus is on the relationship between CSOs and donors. This is so because results measurement in development practice, often referred to as social evaluation, is rooted in the global rise in demand for accountability in the international development community. Christie and Alkin (2013) note that accountability is the central principle for evaluations of many development initiatives. Monitoring and Evaluation of development projects are

therefore seen as both serving to fulfil accountability by demonstrating proper use of public funds and further supports learning by the contribution of knowledge about outcomes of a development intervention.

The accountability theory is a “relationship theory”. I used this theory in line with the main aim of the study of exploring the accountability relationship between CSOs in Zimbabwe that were involved with the SZC and the external donors who provided funding for democracy advocacy work such as carried out by the SZC.

3.2.2 Types of accountability

Literature on organisational accountability distinguishes between upward, horizontal and downward accountability. The target to which the organisations report to, largely defines the type of accountability. While focusing on accountability of NGOs, Najam (1996a) argues that NGOs report to multiple actors, which are categorised as patrons, clients and themselves. NGO-Patron accountability focuses mainly on the funders of projects such as donors and government. Edward and Hulme (1996b) call this “upward accountability”. NGO-client accountability is about the relationship to beneficiaries. These can be direct beneficiaries such as those served by the NGO or indirect beneficiaries such as communities affected by the programmes or projects of the NGO. This is what Edward and Hulme (1996b) call “downward accountability”. The third category concerns the NGOs themselves. According to Ebrahim (2003:814), “this internal accountability includes an NGO's responsibility to its mission and staff, which includes decision-makers as well as field-level implementers”. In this category, the NGO evaluates itself in terms of how it is meeting its intended mission and it is answerable to its staff that implements its projects or programmes as well as other NGOs in the same sector.

Further to the above types of accountability, Alkin (1972) in Alkin and Christie (2013) complements this by categorising accountability based on the purpose of accountability. These are *goal accountability* - which examines whether reasonable and appropriate goals have been established. This is a primary responsibility of governing boards and upper levels of management; *process accountability* - reflects whether sensible and proper procedures for accomplishing those goals have been

established and implemented and *outcome accountability* - the extent to which established goals have been achieved. “The major thrust of project evaluations is outcome accountability” (Alkin and Christie, 2004:14). This categorisation of accountability manifests itself in development literature in various forms. For instance, "process accountability is referred to as procedural or functional accountability while outcome responsibility is referred to as external, strategic and sometimes political accountability" (Edwards, 2013:5).

3.2.3 Accountability mechanisms

NGOs, a critical actor within civil society, respond to accountability demands through tools and processes (Ebrahim 2003a). “In basic terms, accountability tools refer to discrete devices or techniques used to achieve accountability. They are often applied over a limited period of time, can be tangibly documented, and can be repeated” (Ebrahim ,2003:815). These tools include narrative and financial reports, performance assessments, evaluations and audits. Accountability processes, on the other hand emphasise “...a course of action rather than a distinct end result, in which the means are important in and of themselves”. Ebrahim 2003:815), further states that “process mechanisms, such as participation and self-regulation are generally more broad and multifaceted than tools, while also being less tangible and time-bound, although each may utilize a set of tools (such as participatory rural appraisal) for achieving accountability”.

Ebrahim (2003a) goes on to list five broad mechanisms for accountability. These are, disclosure statements and reports, performance assessment and evaluation, participation, social auditing and self-regulation.

Table 3. Accountability mechanisms

Accountability mechanisms	Examples	Accountability to whom?
Disclosure statements and reports	Legally mandated reports, quarterly and annual progress reports on achievements resulting	Upwards to donors and oversight agencies

	from funded projects, financial audits	
Performance assessment and evaluation	Internal and external evaluation reports. These can be both mid-term and summative.	Upward to donors and oversight agencies
Participation	Public meetings or hearings, surveys, community involvement through providing labour	Downwards to NGOs to NGO beneficiaries
Social auditing	Self-assessment reports on social performance and ethical behaviour of and NGO, newsletters	To NGOs themselves
Self-regulation	NGO codes and standards for self-regulation	Of NGOs themselves as a sector

Source: Adapted from Ebrahim (2003a)

As shall be demonstrated in subsequent sections of this thesis, some of the mechanisms above were used by CSOs in Zimbabwe to communicate results of the SZC.

3.2.4 How Accountability theory has been used in NGO studies

While there are several studies by scholars such as Edwards & Hulme (1996), Ebrahim (2003a), Naidoo (2003), Unerman and O'Dwyer (2009) and Jacobs and Wilford (2010) that have sought to employ some aspects of the NGO accountability when studying NGOs, in this section I chose to focus on two recent studies done in Ghana and Uganda by Awuah-Werekoh and Walsh respectively. I chose these two studies because they are relatively recent having been concluded in 2014 and furthermore, they were conducted in African countries that, to an extent, share some similarities with my country of study - Zimbabwe.

Awuah-Werekoh (2014) studied accountability systems dimensions of an NGO in Ghana. While focusing on accountability of NGOs, Awuah-Werekoh (2014) also applied the New Institutions Theory. His findings were that the dominant accountability systems in the NGO studies are upward oriented towards the donors. Generally downward accountability is not given much prominence by NGOs in Ghana. While affirming that attention is on upward accountability, the study lacked details on how the relationship between donors and CSOs is constituted. This gap is what this study seeks to address.

Walsh (2014) also explored NGO accountability in Uganda through an examination of Action Aid's efforts to improve downward accountability through the use of its Accountability Learning and Planning System (ALPS). In her findings, there is a great disjuncture between intentions of Action Aid to improve downward accountability and the actual outcomes. The disjuncture emanates from the potential benefit the NGO can reap when it appears to be addressing issues of downward accountability. On the other hand, there are practical challenges associated with the practice. While this study focused on efforts for an NGO in Uganda to achieve downward accountability, issues of upward accountability emerged. However, no attention on the relationship and practical challenges associated with demonstrating this accountability is given in this particular study.

3.2.5 How accountability theory was used in this study

Having chosen to focus on accountability from an organisational management approach looking at the relationship between CSOs in Zimbabwe and international donors, the accountability theory was used in two ways. Firstly, I sought to understand the relationship between the CSOs in Zimbabwe and international donors that fund their activities with specific reference to the SZC. Thus specific research questions that examined accountability processes of CSOs and relating to the relationship between CSOs and donors were formulated. Furthermore, these questions were part of the research questions on the interview guide and were posed to interviewees. Secondly, in my data analysis, I specifically developed themes and codes that relate to how CSOs are answerable to donors. The main codes and themes focused on a key component of accountability, which is "answerability". Furthermore,

these codes and themes focused on accountability systems, and mechanisms used by CSOs in general when interacting with donors and challenges associated with those systems and mechanisms. I also had specific codes and themes on accountability with reference to the SZC.

3.3 Foucault's conceptualisation of discourse and power/knowledge framework

In as much as accountability theory assists in the exploration of the relationship between CSOs and donor organisations, it however fails to explore the limitations of the accountability mechanisms that are used by CSOs in their quest to communicate results of their work. The accountability theory, according to Kolker and Kulldorff (2013) has its roots in relational theories such as the agency theory. It addresses the "principal-agent problem" and stakeholder theory as it factors in the problem associated with CSOs reporting to multiple stakeholders. Since my study focused on relationships, I tried to use the agency theory in the initial stages of formulating my study. I however abandoned it as it focused solely on the relationship between CSOs and donors upward accountability without looking into the challenges associated with the accountability mechanism. This challenge led me to combine the accountability theory with Foucault's conceptualisation of discourse and power/knowledge framework.

This section sets out the key concepts of discourse from the understanding of Michel Foucault. The section explains the appropriateness of this theoretical approach and how it was applied in the study of CSOs – donor relations within the framework of results measurement. The Foucauldian approach to discourse and power/knowledge framework was chosen, as it is best suited to explain the evolution of the development results discourse in international development. Furthermore, the theory was used to explore the accountability mechanisms. The theory allows exploration of power dynamics between the social actors such as external donors and CSOs as they use the various results frameworks in the course of their work.

This thesis is predicated upon the fact that results tools and frameworks are part of discourse used in international development. Therefore a discourse approach to understanding results measurement and the social actors involved is essential.

3.3.1 Defining discourse through Foucault's lenses

Foucault's approach to discourse is derived from several of his writings. These include *The Order of Discourse* (1991), his works on *Archaeology of Knowledge* (2002) and the *Discipline and Punishment* (1979). Foucault (2002) main emphasis is on the operational nature of discourse. Thus the focus of discourse is not just statements, but systems and practices that encompass all units of communication.

I now realise that I could not define the statement as a unit of a linguistic type...but that I was dealing with an enunciative function that involved various units (these may sometimes be sentences, sometimes propositions; but they are sometimes made up of fragments of sentences, series or tables of signs, a set of propositions or equivalent formulations); and, instead of giving 'meaning' to these units, this function relates them to a field of objects; instead of providing them with a subject, it opens up for them a number of possible subjective positions... (Foucault, 2002: 119).

Foucault describes discourse as "practice that systematically form the objects of which they speak' (Foucault 2002:54). He sees discourse as ways of constituting knowledge, together with the social practices, forms of subjectivity and power relations, which exist permanently in such knowledge, and relations between them. Discourses are more than ways of thinking and producing meaning. They constitute the "nature" of the body, unconscious and conscious mind and emotional life of the subjects they seek to govern (Weedon, 1987:108).

Hall (1997:44) argues "discourse, according to Foucault, is not merely used as a linguistic concept as has been its usage in the modern era but was understood as "language and practice". He further points out that Foucault understood discourse as "statements which provide language for talking about - a way of representing the knowledge about - a particular topic at a particular historical moment". Thompson (2010) summarises that a Foucauldian notion of discourse holds that, discourse is a culturally constructed representation of reality. It is not an exact copy. It constructs knowledge and thus governs, through the production of categories of knowledge and assemblages of texts, what it is possible to talk about and what is not (the taken for

granted rules of inclusion/exclusion). As such, discourse re/produces both power and knowledge simultaneously. Consequently, it defines subjects framing and positioning who it is possible to be and what it is possible to do.

In light of the above, it is important to note three key issues emerging on how Foucault views discourse. Firstly, discourse is viewed as “a way of representing knowledge”. This is critical in this thesis in the sense that what constitutes results of development interventions, especially from advocacy – is a representation of knowledge at that particular time. Through the use of semi-structured interviews, different actors involved with the SZC gave varied responses on the success, or lack thereof, of the campaign. This knowledge on whether the campaign was successful or not, was represented differently by different actors.

Secondly, discourse is a culturally constructed representative of reality. In the context of result measurement, the evaluation processes are negotiated arrangements in development practice that are mitigated by cultural and social biases of those evaluating the projects and programmes. Unfortunately the current results measurement tools and approaches seek to drive stakeholders towards one reality. This scenario is a potential point of conflict between CSOs (implementers) on one hand and donors (funders and evaluators) on the other hand.

Thirdly, discourse reproduces power and knowledge. As will be discussed later, the continuous use of results measurement tools and approaches deemed inappropriate by CSOs perpetuates the power dynamics that are inherent in the CSO-donor relationship.

Discourse, therefore, is a social phenomenon and the meaning of words and usage are fluid over time. Therefore, this study is informed by the view that evaluation tools and frameworks used by international donors and CSOs in the measurement of results are firmly embedded in the development results discourse. According to Foucault (as cited in Stoddart 2007:203) “truth” is produced out of social relations and that political relations of power are “the very ground on which the subject, the domains of knowledge, and the relations with truth are formed”. This, in other words, means that what is true is established. The actors involved in the international development

system create truth or knowledge about development results. The current results measurement frameworks and approaches should, therefore, be viewed as “established truth” emanating from the daily interactions of CSOs and donors.

3.3.2 Discourse and power

Discourse and power are interconnected. Foucault moves away from the analysis of actors in the use of power as an “instrument of coercion but towards an understanding that power is everywhere, diffused and embodied in discourse, knowledge and regimes of truth” (Foucault 1991: Rabinow1991). According to Foucault (1998:63), “power is ‘everywhere’ and ‘comes from everywhere’ so in this sense is neither an agency nor a structure”. This notion also allows explorations of power not just from the systems or usual anticipated power holders, but also from unlikely wielders of power. This understanding of power allowed me to approach the research “open minded” as I explored all possible sources of power influencing the result tools and frameworks within the international development system. The “legitimacy” though demonstrated use of the results measurement frameworks by stakeholders such as external donors and CSOs gives credence to the fact that “it is through discourse that power is negotiated”.

Consequently, the programme evaluation discourse as used by many external donors to evaluate projects such as advocacy initiatives of CSOs is not devoid of power dynamics and can be subjected to different interpretations by both foreign donors and CSOs in Zimbabwe. These power dynamics may result in different conclusions on whether advocacy initiatives have produced the anticipated results.

3.3.3 Knowledge, discourse and power on results measurement in international development

Furthermore, the relationship between external donors and CSOs in Zimbabwe is mainly governed and expressed through project management documents such as proposals, contracts, narrative reports and project evaluation reports. Correspondingly, the Foucauldian approach to discourse, power and knowledge, helps in the understanding of “truth” concerning the relationship between the external donors and CSOs in Zimbabwe through the review of these project documents.

As will be demonstrated in the subsequent chapters on findings, the Foucauldian approach to discourse, power and knowledge is useful in that the “success” or “failure” of a development intervention can be examined in terms of:

Who holds the power to determine or certify if a project has been successful or not among the actors involved in the development interventions. Furthermore, the Foucauldian approach can help in examining the results measurement tools and process particularly the nuanced aspects of power inherent in these tools and processes.

In line with this theoretical perspective, it will be argued that the tools, frameworks and systems of measuring results of development interventions are not devoid of power. The lexicon on results measurement such as "monitoring and evaluation" and its interpretation by the different stakeholders, points to underlying power dynamics among the actors involved.

The evolving discourse and practice on results measurement in development practice, as again shall be demonstrated in the subsequent sections of this dissertation, is an attestation that knowledge on development practice is not static. Knowledge in international development changes over time and its creation and perpetuation is buttressed by power dynamics among the stakeholders involved.

Although Foucault’s approach to discourse and power is critical to the understanding of the approaches and tools of evaluating results as well as power relationships between external donors and CSOs as expressed through sources such as project documents, it has one major weakness. In a difficult environment such as the one that was obtaining in Zimbabwe at the time of the SZC, critical information may not have been captured in project documents as a security precaution. Crucial decisions about the campaigning may have been arrived at "off the record". This is usually the practice with CSOs working in complex and politically sensitive settings. This shortcoming was however addressed in this research through semi-structured interviews with key informants. By interviewing those who were involved with the

SZC, I sought to fill the information gap that may have arisen as a result of limited documentation about the SZC.

3.3.4 How Foucault's concepts of discourse, power and knowledge has been used in NGO studies

The use of Foucault in civil society studies has been limited. According to Pyykkonen (2015) most studies on civil society that use Foucault's theoretical perspectives focus on "modern governmentalities particularly in relation to technologies of (neo) liberal government". Other studies have focused on gender and resistance.

Foucault's concepts have been used sparsely in international development studies. In a classical that examines how the development industry in Lesotho works, James Feguson (1994) uses an anthropological approach grounded in the work of Foucault. He analyses the institutional framework within which development projects are crafted and the nature of "development discourse", revealing how it is that, despite all the "expertise" that goes into formulating development projects, they nonetheless often demonstrate a startling ignorance of the historical and political realities of the locale they propose to help.

No major study on civil society has combined the two theoretical perspectives of Accountability theory and Foucault's conceptualisation of discourse and power/knowledge framework with regards to upward accountability and CSO - donor relationships. The use of Foucault's conceptualisation of discourse and power/knowledge framework as a complementary theoretical approach recognises the gap in literature on NGO accountability. This gap is that most studies focus on the accountability mechanisms without exploring the challenges associated with CSOs in their quest for upward accountability and power dynamics inherent in the CSO-donor relationship. FDA allows an examination of the current accountability mechanisms and processes that are often neglected in NGO accountability studies. A Foucauldian approach is helpful in revealing that a discursive object such as "upward accountability" is produced as "truth" over time. Thus, the practice and process of upward accountability consequently becomes a "discursive practice."

3.3.5 How Foucault's conceptualisation of discourse and power/knowledge framework was used in this thesis

Through the Foucault's conceptualisation of discourse and power/knowledge framework, I came to appreciate that knowledge is not static but evolves over time. Furthermore, different meanings are attached and interpreted differently by different actors. This understanding helped me to explore how the discourses on results measurement in development practice and literature have evolved over time and constitute the "regime of truth". Foucault's conceptualisation of discourse and power/knowledge assisted me in analysing the "subjectivity" aspect of development work in general and results measurement in particular. I also examined the asymmetric relationship between CSOs and donors through the "polymorphous approach to power" as spelt out by Foucault. Using the Foucault's conceptualisation of discourse and power/knowledge lenses, I analysed the data collected through semi-structured interviews and project documents associated with SZC. The data analysis technics are expanded in chapter four that deals with research methodology under the section on data analysis (section 4.7). It should be noted however that because of the sensitivities related to a democracy advocacy campaign such as SZC and a hostile government, not everything relating to the campaign was documented. Nevertheless, this is where Foucault's conceptualisation of discourse came in handy as it acknowledges that discourse is more than just the text. Thus discourse on results measurement includes both text and practice by CSOs and donors as expressed in the structured interviews that were conducted during the fieldwork. These documents included minutes of planning and review meetings, correspondences between ZCA and the intermediary INGO, communication between the international donor and the INGO and project narrative reports. In closely analysing these documents, I looked for themes and codes associated with some of Foucault's concepts on "subjectivity", "regime of practice" and "power and knowledge". These themes and codes were applied in the various documents analysed. I also examined the language used by donors in their communication with the intermediary INGO in providing feedback following submission of proposals and feedback. Furthermore, through interviewing key stakeholders, I sought to understand the meanings (subjective truths) attached to various aspects of the results measurement frameworks and approaches.

3.4 Conclusion

This chapter has explained the theoretical perspectives that guided this thesis. These are the Accountability theory and the Foucault's conceptualisation of discourse and power/knowledge framework. While the accountability theory focuses on the "why" CSOs are accountable, the FDA examines "how" they do so. Furthermore, Foucault's conceptualisation of discourse and power/knowledge framework explores the power dynamic embedded in the accountability mechanisms. The strong demand for results measurement in development practice is integrated into the desire to achieve accountability. This demand for accountability has been on the rise globally. This chapter has described the primary accountability mechanisms currently being used in development practice. For this study, Foucault's conceptualisation of discourse and power/knowledge framework was used to explore the accountability mechanisms used by both CSOs and international donors.

CHAPTER FOUR

Research Methodology

4.1 Introduction

This chapter outlines the methodology used for this study. Blackie (1993:7) defines methodology as “the analysis of how research should or does proceed. It includes discussions of how theories are generated and tested – what kind of logic is used, what criteria it satisfies, what theories look like and how particular theoretical perspectives can be related to particular research problems”. Thus this chapter will discuss how the research was conducted including the theoretical underpinnings of the research approach and the data collection methods used. Furthermore, the chapter discusses the techniques used to analyse data and research validity issues. The chapter ends with a reflection on how my professional background may have affected the study and the measures taken to mitigate this.

4.2 Research design

The research design is the framework for conducting the research programme. It links the research question(s) and the fieldwork (Blanche et al. 2006). According to Richards and Morse (2013:88), “Research design is created by the researcher, is moulded (rather than dictated) by the method, and is responsive to the context and the participants. Creating research design involves seeing the project at different levels. Once you have located your project methodologically, you need to design the pacing of processes and strategies to be used, and at the same time you need to see the project as a whole”. Decisions about research paradigm, methodology and data gathering methods are part of the research design. In light of the foregoing, this study is based on the qualitative research design. This influenced me to use interpretivist research paradigm, the case study approach and data gathering tools such as semi-structured interviews and document analysis. My choice for qualitative research design was motivated by the topic of my study, which sought to understand the relationship between CSOs in Zimbabwe and international donors concerning results measurement of democracy advocacy. This design allowed me to take an in-depth inquiry through interacting with respondents who were involved with the SZC. This

design was also influenced by the Foucauldian Approach to discourse, which looks at power relations in society and places emphasis on interpreting meaning from different social actors in their everyday interaction.

4.3 Research paradigm

A research paradigm is “a basic set of beliefs that guides action” (Guba: 1990:17). Punch (1998:28) provides an elaborate definition of a paradigm by stating that “it is a set of assumptions about the social world and about what constitutes proper techniques and topics for inquiry... a broad term encompassing elements of epistemology, theory and philosophy, along with methods”. Grix (2010:79) posits that there are three broad paradigms in the philosophy of social and human sciences: these are positivist, post-positivist and interpretivist positions. He however notes that the interpretivist paradigm is also part of the post-positivist and that it is an umbrella term for specific approaches to social inquiry. According to Thompson (1995) positivism is an approach to research based on a belief in universal laws and insistence on objectivity and neutrality. However, Grix (2010) notes that many research methodology authors focus on the two broad paradigms – positivist and interpretivist. He explains that;

The reason why so many authors chose to outline positivism and interpretivism - and thereby leave out a whole host of social research between binary poles – is because they can be seen as opposites: positivists seek objectivity while interpretivists believe in subjectivity; positivists tend to model their research on the natural sciences while interpretivists believe there is a clear distinction to be made between the natural and the social world and therefore we need a methodology and methods of gathering data that are more in tune with the subjects we are studying (Grix, 2010:83).

Yin (2011:311) states that positivism is of “the view that natural science and hence social sciences are based on universal truths with the role of researcher being to uncover such truths”. In this vein, Holloway and Wheeler (2002:4) reinforce that positivists follow the natural science approach by testing theories and hypotheses. They note that “one of the tracks of this type of research is the quest for objectivity

and distance between the researcher and those studied so that biases can be avoided” Holloway and Wheeler (2002:5).

One major criticism of positivism is that the “researcher treats perceptions of the social world as objective or absolute and neglects everyday subjective interpretations and the context of the research” (Holloway and Wheeler 2002:5).

The interpretivist paradigm is different from the positivist paradigm in that it views knowledge and understanding as relativistic, and not absolute. According to the interpretivist paradigm, “the world is socially constructed through the interaction of individuals and the separation of ‘fact’ and ‘value’ is not clear-cut as the positivist claim” (Grix, 2010:84). Following this reasoning, this study was based on an interpretivist research paradigm. This was in light of the major criticism of positivism and the fact that it is best suited for natural sciences.

International development as a practice, takes place within a social context where social actors such as CSOs and donors cooperate to achieve desired goals. The interpretivist research paradigm helps in understanding the meanings attached to actions and processes from the social actors involved particularly in the area of result measurement. As Holloway and Wheeler (2002:8) posit, Experiences of people are essentially context bound, that is, they cannot be free from time and location or the mind of the human factor. Unlike other paradigms, interpretivism allows the researcher to understand meanings and interprets social actions and practices. Furthermore, power dynamics that are inherent between CSOs and international donors are better understood from an interpretivist research persuasion. The relationship between CSOs and international donors is a relationship of social actors. These social actors interact in a complex and ever-changing manner. Thus to understand this complex relationship, an interpretivist approach was required. Furthermore, as has been discussed in the previous chapter, one of the theoretical approaches that guided this study is Michel Foucault’s Discourse Approach. This theoretical approach places greater attention on discourse, meaning and interpretation. In light of this, it then follows that an interpretivist approach was best for this study.

In line with the interpretive research paradigm described above, this study follows a qualitative research methodology. Denzin and Lincoln (2005) define qualitative research as:

... a situated activity that locates the observer in the world. It consists of a set of interpretive, material practices that makes the world visible. These practices transform the world. They turn the world into a series of representations, including field notes, interviews, conversations, photographs, recordings, and memos to the self. At this level, qualitative research involves an interpretive, naturalistic approach to the world. This means that qualitative researchers study things in their natural settings, attempting to make sense of, or to interpret phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to them (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005: 3).

According to Miles and Huberman (1994:6), one of the characteristics of qualitative research is that “the researcher attempts to capture the perceptions of local actors ‘from the inside’ through the process of deep attentiveness, of empathetic understanding and suspending or ‘bracketing’ preconceptions about the topics under discussion”. Qualitative techniques are therefore useful to understand CSO results approaches and management. According to Creswell (2003:19), “qualitative research method is best suited to the study of the meaning and purpose of human action because knowledge claims are derived from varied, constructed and interprets of research participants”.

The qualitative research method is however not without criticism. Unlike the quantitative research method, it is often accused of being too subjective, difficult to replicate and generalise and lacking transparency (Bryman 2012:404). However, qualitative research methodology is credited for being rich in data as the researcher is closer to the participant. The researcher is able to interpret the hidden meanings behind phenomena and above all “the perspective of those being studied – what they see as important and significant – provides the hint of orientation” (Bryman, 2012: 408). Hence the richness of qualitative research method tends to overshadow the weaknesses associated with this method.

4.4 Case study approach

This research is a case study of how CSOs that were involved in democracy advocacy satisfied the requirements of donor's accountability with reference to one major democracy advocacy initiative, SZC, which took place from 2006 to 2009. The case study focuses on how upward accountability was exercised in a politically repressive environment from 2006 to 2009 in Zimbabwe. The case study also examines how the processes of upward accountability affect organisational behaviour of CSOs. This case study assists those involved in development practice and programme evaluation, particularly democracy advocacy, to consider practical challenges and complexities that CSOs face in their quest to satisfy demands for upward accountability.

Stake (1988:23) defines a case study as “a bounded system, emphasizing the unity and wholeness of that system, but confining the attention to those aspects that are relevant to the research problem at the time”. Gerring (2007:20) adds that it is “the intensive study of a single case”. According to Punch (1994:150), the case study is more of a strategy than a method. In this regard, Punch quotes Goode and Hatt in Punch (1994:150) who state that a case study is “a way of organising social data so as to preserve the unitary character of the social object being studied. Punch (1998:150), states that “in keeping with the other approaches in qualitative research, the case study aims to understand the case in its natural settings, recognising its complexity and its context”.

Stake (1994) differentiates between three case study types. The intrinsic case study is when the study is undertaken because the researcher wants to gain an in-depth understanding of the case. The instrumental is where a particular case is examined to give insight into an issue, or refine a theory. The case is used to understand more than what is obvious to the observer. The collective case study is where the instrumental case study includes other cases, in order to learn about a general condition.

In light of the above differentiation, this study uses the instrumental case study approach. It is important to note, therefore, that this study was not about the SZC as such. The campaign was used as a case study in order to explore the relationship between CSOs and international donors on evaluation of advocacy results. The SZC was chosen as the case study as it helps in answering the main research question of

the study. Furthermore, the case study was chosen for two primary reasons. Firstly, it is a “bounded unit” in that it took place over a defined period of three years and the campaign took place in one geographical location of Zimbabwe. Secondly, data about the campaign could be accessed through official documents and interviewing those who were involved. The research took place about five years after the campaign. This meant that documents concerning the campaign could still be accessed. Furthermore, the majority of those who were involved with the campaign were available to be interviewed and their memories of the campaign were still solid. This accessibility of information through both organisational documents and interviewing those involved with the SZC led to me to choose the SZC as a case for this study.

The case study approach is not without shortcomings. One major criticism of the case study approach is its lack of generalizability. The results from a case study research are often difficult to generalise to a wider population. They are specific to that case. Furthermore, Flyvberg (2004:428) argues that over and above the lack of generalizability from a single case, the case study approach has a “bias towards verification, that is, a tendency to confirm the researcher’s preconceived notions”. The fact that the researcher selects which case to study, it already brings in subjectivity to the study. However despite these shortcomings, the case study approach to research remains rich particularly for qualitative research, as phenomenon can be studied within the boundaries of its settings. Furthermore, inferences can be drawn that can be applied to somewhat similar settings or phenomena under study.

4.5 Data collection

This section explains how data was collected for this study. Data for this study was collected primarily through semi-structured interviews and document analysis. The section further describes challenges experienced during data collection.

4.5.1 Semi-structured interviews

Semi-structured interviews, according to Bryman (2012:212) “typically refers to a context in which the interviewer has a series of questions that are in the general form of an interview schedule but is able to vary the sequence of questions”. This method was chosen as it helps the researcher to understand more about the phenomenon under

study. It is also because the method allows the interviewer to probe further if needed yet remains within the confines of the topic under study.

Furthermore, I chose the semi-structured interview a complementary method to the other data collection method of document analysis. A weakness of document analysis methodology, especially for phenomenon that is sensitive and taking place in politically closed and repressive contexts, is that some information is deliberately not documented. During the period when the SZC was conducted, CSOs in Zimbabwe were very careful in what they documented. The vulnerability of CSOs in Zimbabwe during that time was because of attacks and persecution of pro-democracy CSOs by the government. Furthermore, pro-democracy CSOs would not want their strategies revealed or pre-empted to state security agents by careless document management system. This is a primary technique that most CSOs adopted in Zimbabwe during the period of the SZC as a way to buffer themselves from potential harassment by state officials. Thus to close this potential information gap, semi-structured interviews were chosen as a data collection method.

A total of 29 semi-structured interviews were conducted in Harare and Bulawayo between August 2014 and April 2015. The informants were selected through purposive sampling. This is a non-probability form of selecting units for study. Bryman (2012:418) notes that “the goal of purposive sampling is to sample cases/participants in a strategic way so that those sampled are relevant to the research questions to be posed”. Yin (2011:88) affirms that, “the goal of selecting the specific study units is to have those that will yield the most relevant and plentiful data”. However, Kuzel (1992) in Yin (2011:88) cautions that there is need to ensure that units that are purposively sampled include contrary evidence or views. This is to avoid potential bias in one’s study. To avoid this potential bias, key informants who held critical and different views within civil society Zimbabwe were included in the sample. Furthermore, a few representatives from international donor community were interviewed. This is despite the fact that this study sought to understand the issues largely from the perspective of CSOs.

I interviewed 23 key informants drawn from those who were involved with the SZC and current CSO leaders whose organisations were involved with the campaign. Those interviewed include key staff members who worked for the coordinating

organisation of the SZC and some from organisations that were part of the campaign through task forces. Given the sensitive nature of the topic, those interviewed requested confidentiality and therefore their identities will not be revealed in this thesis. Further interviews were conducted with 6 key informants from the donor community. These informants had worked or were working for donor agencies that funded democracy work in Zimbabwe by the time of the study. Again, the identities of these representatives will not be revealed in this thesis. This is in line with the request from the interviewees not to do so.

These interviews were conducted mainly in the offices of the interviewees or in places of their convenience. Each interview lasted between 45 minutes and 1 hour. Due care was taken to ensure that the context was conducive for the interviews to take place. An initial target of 35 interviews was planned. This was however reduced to 29 after a “data saturation” state was reached - the interview process stopped yielding new data. To facilitate the interview process, two interview schedules were developed. One was administered to key informants from CSO representatives and the other was administered to key informants from the international donor community. I personally conducted all 29 interviews. This allowed me an opportunity to probe further in the event of any unclear issues raised by the respondents. Furthermore, it helped me to understand the SZC better and also the CSO – donor relations. Written informed consent was sought before all the interviews were conducted.

All research respondents voluntarily agreed to participate in the study. I took time before the interview to explain fully what the study was all about, the interview process including confidentiality assurances. This aspect helped in setting up a rapport as respondents opened up on discussing some critical issues especially on democracy advocacy in Zimbabwe and CSO – donor relations.

4.5.2 Document analysis

Document analysis, is defined by Bowen (2009:1) as “a systematic procedure for reviewing and evaluating documents – both printed and electronic (computer-based and internet-transmitted)”. Bryman (2001) further qualifies document analysis by stating that the method involves material that can be read, has not been produced for the purposes of social research, is preserved so that it can be analysed, and is relevant

to the concerns of the social researcher. I chose document analysis as a method as most correspondence between CSOs and donors is captured in project documents that include project proposals, minutes of planning meetings and other communication types that involve donor's reports and report assessments. Furthermore, document analysis relates well with the other theoretical framework that is discourse based. The choice of using Foucault's concepts such as "subjectivity" in this thesis empowers the researcher to fully explore the subjective meanings that social actors employ. This enriches the study. In order to ensure the credibility of data gathered for this study using this method, Bryman (2001:370) provides criteria for assessing the quality of documents. The criteria includes firstly authenticity – there is need to check if documents are genuine and of unquestionable origin. In this regard, most documents gathered and analysed for this study had official signatures and reference numbers. Secondly, the documents have to be credible. There is need to ensure that they are free from error or distortion. To satisfy this criterion, I crosschecked some of the information in documents with respondents who were involved in generating these documents.

Although the SZC involved a number of CSOs, it was however largely coordinated by one organisation, the Zimbabwe Christian Alliance (ZCA). This organisation was given the coordination mandate at the launch of the campaign on 29 July 2006. The mandate included fundraising and donor liaison. Thus document analysis concentrated on documents collected from ZCA and from the intermediary donor organisation. ZCA had maintained a hard copy file where they had kept most of the important documents about the project. I went through the file to look for the most relevant documents for analysis. The criterion for document selection was based on two aspects. These are: (i) documents that provided the most relevant information concerning results of the project and (ii) communication between ZCA and donors that points to the relationship of these two social actors. The following documents³ were reviewed:

- a. Project documents such as project proposals, strategic plans, contracts, project narrative reports and evaluation reports

³ Redacted copies of these documents have been included in this thesis as annexes

- b. Communication between CSOs and donors mostly in the form of letters
- c. Minutes of project meetings
- d. Media articles that had a bearing on impact of the project

A major advantage of document analysis as a data collection method is that while the documents require some interpretation by the researcher, they remove a level of the bias potentially associated with the interview method. What is stated in the document remains as is. The researcher cannot add or remove parts of the information. His or her job is to interpret and analyse the information.

4.6 Data gathering experiences

The data collection process was not without challenges. The repressive operating environment in Zimbabwe, particularly the “criminalisation” of some aspects of work of CSOs working in the field of democracy by the government has led to “outsiders” not being trusted with organisational information. Access to organisational information such as on SZC does not come easily. CSO leaders may not be willing to provide information to “strangers” without certain assurances and levels of trust. However through negotiation and providing adequate information about my study, interviews were secured with most CSOs leaders identified in the sample.

However, securing interviews with key informants from the international donor community was a challenge. Unlike informants from CSOs who operate in less bureaucratic settings, international donors have strict protocols on who provides information to outsiders and in what form. This challenge delayed setting up appointments with some donors, as they had to satisfy various protocols concerning my request for an academic interview.

Negotiating access to SZC documents was likewise challenging. This was because of two practical reasons. The first one being that most CSOs have strict policies concerning access to documents especially by outsiders. Secondly, the research was taking place five years after the project had closed. Thus most of the project files had been archived. In fact, the documents had been moved from ZCA used to operate from to a different location in a different town. I was eventually granted access to the

SZC documents through a written letter and the intermediary donor organisation through which the SZC funds were channelled.

4.7 Data analysis

Interpretive techniques were used in analysing the data collected. The analysis involved coding, looking for patterns and themes from data collected through semi-structured interviews and documents analysed. All interviews were recorded and the audio files were transcribed. Each interview transcript was given a code depending on the date it was conducted.

I had anticipated using computer based qualitative data analysis such as Nvivo to analyse data. This proved to be a challenge despite me receiving Nvivo training at UKZN in early 2014. I reverted to the traditional approach of listening and re-listening of audio recordings from interviews, going through transcribed interviews sheets and going through all pertinent documents about the campaign in order to establish codes and themes.

After collecting data in the form of documents associated with SZC and from interviews of those who were involved with the Campaign, I employed data analysis techniques associated with qualitative data to both interview transcripts and documents gathered. The data analysis process involved three stages.

Firstly, I developed codes that I used when I was reading and re-reading the interview transcripts and the documents highlighted in the previous section of this chapter that deals with document analysis (section 4.5.2). Yin (2011: 308) describes coding as “the assignment of simple words or short phrases to capture the meaning of a larger portion of (the original) textual or visual data.” In this regard, I assigned simple words in the margins of each interview transcript and selected document. These words and phrases were mainly based on research questions.

Secondly, I developed basic themes from the codes. I had to go through the codes developed in the first stage repeatedly and group them to according to common, salient and significant themes.

Thirdly, I organised the basic themes into large and overarching themes. According to Yin (2011:308), Discourse Analysis is “an approach to qualitative research that considers language to represent the construction of social reality, especially within the social context of what is said, rather than assuming language only to represent what a person is thinking.” To be consistent with Foucauldian Discourse Analysis (FDA), I subjected the identified global themes to further analysis using the theoretical assumptions of Michel Foucault’s such as “discourse”, “regimes of practice”, “structured knowledge/truth” and “knowledge and power”. This involved a three-step analysis

Below is an example of how data was analysed using the Foucauldian Discourse Analysis using the three stages listed above.

Table 4: Example of data analysis process

Codes	Basic themes	Global themes (analysed according to Foucault’s concepts)
Expression of: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Change • Results • Objectives • Achievements • Success 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Accountability mechanism • Articulation of promise/deliverable • Technical language/donor jargon • Accountability Chain 	<p>Regime of practice: Use of logic based results framework such as <i>logframe</i></p> <p>Structured Knowledge: Development intervention should result in positive and demonstrable change</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Compliance • Approval/non approval of report 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Adaptation mechanism • Coping strategy by CSOs • Relationship between 	<p>Power: Reinforcement of asymmetric relationship</p>

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Correspondence • Power • Perception • Bias • Meetings 	CSOs and donors	between CSOs and donors
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Meetings • Reports • Feedback 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Communication typologies • Perceptions and biases 	Discourse and power: How different typologies of communication affect result measurement.

Source: Example of Data Analysis Framework used by the author following the FDA

4.8 Research validity

Although some authors have argued that issues of validity, reliability and rigor pertains mainly to quantitative methodology rather than qualitative methodology, on the contrary, it is possible and important to achieve these aspects in qualitative research. Golafshani (2003:604) states that “reliability and validity are conceptualized as trustworthiness, rigor and quality in qualitative paradigm”. Thus the focus should be on whether the data gathered can be trusted. According to Bryman (2012:390), ‘trustworthiness is made up of four criteria, each of which has an equivalent criterion on quantitative research:

Credibility, which parallels internal validity

Transferability, which parallels external validity

Dependability, which parallels reliability

Confirmability, which parallels objectivity’

Credibility in qualitative research is achieved mainly through a process of responded validation and triangulation. ‘Triangulation entails using more than one method or source of data in the study of social phenomena’ (Bryman, 2012:392). To achieve credibility, this study crosschecked data gathered from documents reviewed with

semi-structured interviews with key informants. These key informants included those who were involved with the SZC and current key CSO leaders in Zimbabwe.

4.9 Ethical considerations

When dealing with a research that involves people especially in politically sensitive contexts, it is inevitable that one pays attention to ethical issues. According to Babbie and Mouton (2006:521), it is important that researchers give due attention to ethics during data collection since “social research involves intrusion into people’s lives requiring respondents to “reveal personal information and views”. Furthermore, research should not be done in such a way that endangers both the respondents and organisations they are from.

In the context of this research, I considered and employed a number of measures. Firstly, I sought organisational permission to conduct the research at two levels. I sought permission from the ZCA who coordinated the campaign. This was necessary since I was going to review organisational documents relating to ZCA and how the SZC was planned and rolled out. Permission to do so was granted in writing. I also sought permission from the intermediary donor organisation that funded the campaign. This is for the same reasons mentioned above. Permission was also granted in writing.

Secondly, participants I interviewed participated voluntarily. They were not coerced into this study. I explained fully what the study was about and that they were free to withdraw from the interview process at any time they so wished.

Thirdly, I guaranteed confidentiality of information provided by respondents. Furthermore, the respondents and the international donors will not be revealed in this study. This is to prevent any possible backlash from those who may hold different political views about the strategies towards democratisation interventions conducted by CSOs and international donors in Zimbabwe.

4.10 Reflexivity

A social researcher is influenced by different social factors when conducting research. According to Hammersley and Atkinson 2007:15), “the orientations of researchers

will be shaped by their socio-historical location, including the values and interests that these locations confer upon them”. The primary reason I embarked on this study was to explore the topic of civil society advocacy and results measurement having worked for both a civil society organisation in Zimbabwe and for an international organisation that provides funding to civil society organisations in Southern Africa. Working for these two organisations provided me with an understanding of how both civil society organisations and donor organisations work. Having worked for both a CSO and INGO that provides funding to civil society in Southern Africa, I have come to appreciate that both seek to achieve the same objectives of uplifting the social economic and political situation of citizens. However, the same objectives are in most cases interpreted differently because of the different strategies they employ. This difference in interpretation may cause tensions and conflicts between the two sectors.

It should be noted however that my experience of working for both sectors, if not unchecked, might lead to unintended biases. In order to minimise these biases, I ensured that I maintained a high professional and academic standard during both data collections and its analysis. This meant following correct procedures of doing research. For instance, seeking written permission to access project documents, properly briefing my respondents about the nature of the study before interviews and upholding confidentiality and integrity throughout the research process. Furthermore, aligning to data gathered during the interviews and organisational documents reviewed and not allowing my personal opinion to carry over during the study.

4.11 Conclusion

This chapter has outlined the methodology that was used for this study. The study was informed by the interpretivist research paradigm. This research paradigm was chosen as it was fit for the topic under study. Unlike the positivist research paradigm that seeks to understand phenomena from an objective and external position normally fit for natural sciences, the interpretivist research paradigm seeks to interpret phenomena through interpretation of the social phenomena. In line with the interpretivist research paradigm, the study was based on qualitative method.

For this study, data was gathered through the use of semi-structured interviews. 29 CSOs leaders and a few representatives from the donor community were interviewed. Two interview guides were prepared and used, one for the CSOs leaders and the other

for representatives from the donor community. The study also analysed documents concerning the campaign. These were mainly project documents prepared by the ZCA and correspondences between ZCA and the donors.

Data was consequently analysed through interpretive data analysis techniques that are consistent with qualitative research methods. This chapter has also discussed ethical considerations that were factored during the study. These included issues of confidentiality and voluntary participation of interviewees. Lastly the chapter reflected on issues of *positionality* concerning how I ensured that my professional background did not affect the study.

CHAPTER FIVE

The Save Zimbabwe Campaign

5.1 Introduction

This chapter presents a background to the SZC. In this chapter, the origins of the campaign, its purpose, objectives, and structure and how its activities were undertaken are presented in detail, situating it within the broader civil society democracy advocacy initiatives in Zimbabwe. The SZC is discussed paying attention to the social, economic and political context in which it was undertaken.

5.2 The Save Zimbabwe Campaign - “the only show in town”

This section will discuss in detail the objectives of the SZC, how it was organised and how the campaign was implemented.


The SZC was a civil society led broad-based initiative that took place in Zimbabwe between 2006 and 2008/9. It occurred at the height of shrinking political spaces in the country, and a clampdown of civic space and liberties. According to Chiroro (2013:124), the SZC sought to “mobilise regional and international solidarity to increase pressure on ZANU-PF when all avenues to resolve the Zimbabwean crisis appeared closed”. It can be argued that the activities of the SZC especially the brutal disruption of a planned “prayer rally” on 11 March 2007, consequently led to the formal intervention of SADC to resolve the Zimbabwe crisis.

The idea of a unified civic response to the growing crisis in Zimbabwe was muted in early 2006 by civil society being led by church-related organisations. The campaign was officially launched on 29 July 2006 in Harare. The invitations to the convention that gave birth to SZC were extended to all political parties in Zimbabwe including the ruling ZANU-PF (SZC project document, 2007). However, ZANU-PF did not take part in the launch or in the subsequent campaign activities. The launch of the campaign brought renewed hope particularly to democratic activists and some sections of Zimbabwean society. The public show of diverse CSOs, political parties putting aside their differences, especially the two MDC formations, to seek ways to

resolve the Zimbabwean civil and political crisis was formidable. This was ahead of the planned Harmonised Elections in 2008.

5.2.1 The Zimbabwe Democracy Charter

At the launch of the SZC, a charter called the Zimbabwe Democracy Charter detailing the aspirations and objectives of the campaign was presented and endorsed by all stakeholders present. Below is a reproduction of the preamble to the Charter.



Source: Preamble to the Zimbabwe Democracy Charter, 29 July 2006

The Charter is significant as it lays the foundation of the advocacy campaign. It forms the broad basis for checking if the anticipated results of the campaign were achieved. The Charter was divided into three sections.

The first section was the preamble and its opening statement is worth noting. The preamble begins with a statement “We, the people of Zimbabwe...”. This opening statement referring to the people of Zimbabwe sought to authenticate the “drivers” of this campaign as the people of Zimbabwe. This was against a background of the

Government of Zimbabwe dismissing several CSO led initiatives as “foreign” inspired or sponsored. Hence, the opening statement of the preamble sought to preempt this accusation by stating that the contents and issues raised in the Charter were genuinely from the people of Zimbabwe. Furthermore, in the opening statement, the problem that the Campaign sought to address was unequivocally articulated as recognising “the depth of our current democratic crisis and the harm that has been caused to our society”. This is critical in that apart from recognising the failure of democracy in Zimbabwe, there was also recognition that this problem was harmful to the society, raising the need for action.

The preamble further stated the “intention of action” by pledging to “reverse the social fragmentation and economic disarray that has cast such a long and dark shadow over the basic dignity of our people...” The intention of the organisations involved were further outlined:

... we commit ourselves to the new struggle for freedom, justice and democracy; to eliminate the current misery and mistrust, and the sense of betrayal; to enable the women, men and children of Zimbabwe to experience a changed political dispensation; and to entrench a culture of openness and accountability in public affairs (Zimbabwe Democracy Charter, 2006).

Having noted some of the ideals of the liberation struggle against colonialism and subjugation in injustices in Zimbabwe, of importance to the Charter is the acknowledgment that some of these ideals are yet to be realised in Zimbabwe. This is critical in the sense that most CSOs in Zimbabwe especially those that work in the area of democracy have been accused of not cherishing the ideals of the liberation struggle. Furthermore, the ZANU-PF government has been accused by some of its critics of seeking to monopolise the liberation narrative. Therefore, the drafters of the Charter were tactful by acknowledging the liberation war. While acknowledging the liberation struggle, the mentioning of the fact that some of the ideals of the liberation struggle are yet to be realised, was a direct attack aimed at the ZANU-PF led government that has for years enjoyed the title of liberation party. To deny that the ideals of the liberation struggle are yet to be fully achieved was to potentially set a

scene for confrontation between CSOs leading the SZC and the ZANU-PF led government.

The second section of the Charter outlines the “fundamental principles” of the campaign. These fundamental principles included issues of democracy rooted in sovereign status. While acknowledging the sovereign status of Zimbabwe, the Charter warns against abuse of this status by referencing solidarities that the country had enjoyed through interaction with other regional and international bodies such as the African Union. It also gave reference to international law and universal human rights. This aspect was critical in that it laid the foundation for the call for other regional and international players to assist in solving the Zimbabwe crisis. The ZANU-PF led government had over the years argued that Zimbabwe was a sovereign state and hence would not require any form of interference from outsiders.

The other principles espoused in this section were on equality and non-discrimination. These aspects were equally important as civil and political space during the time of SZC was dominated by policies such as the Fast Track Land Reform, which was deemed discriminatory on the basis of race. The discriminatory nature of the Fast Track Land report was later confirmed by the SADC Tribunal in its ruling against the Zimbabwe government. Hence, the aspect of equality and discrimination required to be addressed.

The third and last section of the Charter focused on 10 specific pledges that the campaign was going to undertake. The 10 pledges were divided into categories, which are Socio-Economic Justice, Social Cohesion and Safeguards to Protect Democracy. Strong demands were mentioned in the last category and related to “strong and independent institutions that can represent and balance the interests of all our people”, power was never to be centralised to the point where it was abused and lastly there was a demand that “elections to public office, including parliament, must be conducted in accordance with international and regional standards, fully free and fair”.

While the Charter was comprehensive in its demand and analysis of the operating civil and political environment, it did not spell out the modalities of how the

campaign was going to be implemented. However, the Charter formed the basis for understanding the original thinking behind the SZC. This is critical when it subsequently comes to the evaluation of the campaign.

However, the inclusion of political parties, though understandable, later proved a challenge to the campaign. It was not possible to exclude political parties from the campaign especially opposition parties. This is because, firstly, political parties had the power to mobilise the critical masses. For an effective advocacy campaign, the power of numbers is important. Political parties had demonstrated in previous elections their ability to mobilise these numbers. Secondly, there were shared interests between the CSOs working in the area of democracy, good governance and human rights and the opposition political parties such as the MDC. The MDC since its formation in 1999 had been fighting for most of the demands similar to that of the SZC. Hence, opposition political parties especially the MDC became natural allies for this campaign. However, this inclusion of political parties later proved to be a challenge for the campaign. Those opposing the campaign, mainly from the ZANU-PF led government, raised issues of its legitimacy. The campaign was quickly dismissed by the government as a covert initiative bent on advancing a political agenda to remove it from power under the guise of civic activism. Furthermore, a crisis of expectations arose. Various stakeholders, particularly political parties, had different expectations of the campaign. This also caused power struggles during the campaign. These struggles reached their peak when one of the political parties (MDC led by Professor Arthur Mutambara) withdrew from the campaign. The party cited the fact that the leaders of the SZC favoured another MDC formation led by Morgan Tsvangirai. These divergent expectations, as will be argued in the data presentation chapters six and seven, make the evaluation of the results of the SZC a challenge.

While studying civil society in South Africa, Habib and Kotze (2002:3) posit that “the configuration and evolution of this civil space is of course determined by the political socio-economic milieu within which it is located”. This study applied this principle in understanding civil society in Zimbabwe during the SZC. Consequently, the following section will briefly discuss the socio-economic and political context of the SZC.

5.2.2 Legislative obstacles for CSOs

The SZC became active despite the weakening of civil society in a number of ways. A number of repressive pieces of legislation were in operation during the implementation of the SZC, a case in point being the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) of 2002. This Act stifled information dissemination and muzzled the media and curtailed the practice of journalism through some of its sections that provided for the arrest of journalists and prosecution of media institutions for allegations of breaching access to information as well as privacy protection in reporting. Through this Act, a number of independent newspapers such as the *Daily News* were banned. Furthermore, scores of independent journalists were arrested. However, according to Ruhanya (2014) no single journalist was convicted using this law, hence substantiating the argument that the law was only meant to frustrate the work of independent journalists.

The Public Order and Security Act (POSA) of 2002, was yet another piece of legislation that sought to stifle freedom of association through its restriction of civil and political meetings. According to Section 2 of the Act, a meeting is interpreted as “a meeting held for the purpose of the discussion of matters of public interest or for the purpose of the expression of views on such matters”. This is a broad interpretation that has serious consequences for civic meetings. The Act also clearly puts the responsibility and potential penalty on the organiser. This organiser is usually the CSO. Section 23 of the Act interprets the organiser by stating that in relation to a public gathering, the organiser means every person who or organisation or association which executes or assists in executing the arrangements for or promotes the holding of the public gathering. The burden of notifying the police is therefore given to the “organiser”.

Section 24 of the Act clearly spells out that “the organiser of a public gathering shall give at least four clear days’ written notice of the holding of the gathering to the regulating authority for the area in which the gathering is to be held. Although the Act in sec 24 subsections 2a, b and c provides reasons for the notice such as providing the police enough time to ensure public safety and security during the demonstrations. However in many instances the police have been accused of applying this act in a

partisan manner. This has led to several of the opposition party and civil society meetings being banned by the police under this Act. In the case of the SZC, the police banned the meetings. The policy ban was however overturned by the High court application by CSOs who organised the prayer rally.

Although the law required notification of the police ahead of any civil and political meeting, the police usually misconstrued it to mean that anyone who wanted to convene a meeting needed to seek permission from them first and foremost. In the selective application of this law, the police banned most civil society and opposition party meetings. For the 11 March 2007 prayer rally, the police banned the meeting upon notification by the organisers. The court later reversed this ban when the CSOs challenged the ban in the courts.

Likewise the proposed Non-Governmental Organisations Bill (2004), although not signed into law, sought to place more restrictions on the work of NGOs through measures such as mandatory registration, restrictions on foreign funding and powers vested with the minister to withdraw the operating licences of NGOs. If this law had passed, it would have significantly stifled the operation of CSOs.

Civil society actors also faced intimidation, violence and torture between 2000 and 2005. AIPPA and POSA were pieces of legislation that were crafted during the “crisis in Zimbabwe” period. It is believed that the two Acts were used to suppress the activities of CSOs and a highly critical private media as selectively applied by the government. Although the NGO Bill of 2004 was never assented to by the President into law, its intentions of controlling the activities of NGOs was felt in other subsequent pieces of legislation.

5.2.3 Political context

The campaign took place during a period that seemed hopeless for most democracy advocacy stakeholders. Stakeholders and citizens, who had invested their hope in the opposition party the MDC launching a formidable force to unseat ZANU-PF from power, had their hopes shattered following the results of the parliamentary elections in March 2005. During these elections, ZANU-PF had won 78 seats against 41 won

by the opposition MDC. This is out of a total of 120 contested seats. This was before the appointment of 20 members of parliament who would be appointed by the President and 10 elected by the traditional Chiefs, who mostly supported ZANU-PF. In essence, ZANU-PF had regained its lost two-thirds majority in Parliament. This marked a decline in performance by the opposition from the previous June 2000 parliamentary elections where the MDC gained 57 seats against ZANU-PF's 62 seats (African Elections Database Website). This was compounded by the split of the MDC in October 2005 over a disagreement concerning participation in elections for the re-established Senate that were scheduled to take place in November of that year.

5.2.4 Social context

On a social and civic front, the government of Zimbabwe had launched a campaign in May 2005, called *Operation Murambatsvina (OM)* (translated to mean drive out the filth) and officially known as Operation Restore Order. This exercise by government disproportionately affected the urban areas. This disproportionate effect gave credence to the claims that the operation was meant to punish opposition party supporters who were concentrated mainly in the urban areas. Local civil society and the international community condemned OM because of its inhuman approach. According to Raftopoulos (2009:221), several reasons could be advanced as to why the government undertook this operation. Chief among them was to punish the urban electorate who had voted largely for the opposition as proved by the voting trends in the previous three elections (2000 Parliamentary, 2002 Presidential and 2005 Parliamentary). Another reason was the need for government to decongest the urban suburbs through adhering to strict urban planning that usually drives the poor out of towns. Whatever the reasons for conducting the operation, most people lost their form of shelter and economic opportunities as a result of this campaign. According to a UN *Report of the Fact-Finding Mission to Zimbabwe to assess the Scope and Impact of Operation Murambatsvina* (2005:7), an estimated 700 000 people were directly affected by this operation and about 1, 7 million indirectly affected through loss of income as their wares and informal selling stalls were destroyed by the government. Furthermore, a number of households lost accommodation as their informal dwellings were destroyed. Following the international outcry over OM, the UN appointed Anna Kajumulo Tibaijuka, a Special Envoy on human settlements to undertake

investigations. She later released a report condemning the government for the insensitive and inhuman manner in which the operation had been conducted. In light of these developments together with a clampdown on civil liberties by the state, the role of civil society in defending citizens' rights became all-important during the time of SZC.

5.2.5 Economic context

The economic situation in Zimbabwe was likewise fast deteriorating. It was characterised by hyperinflation and the unemployment rate was ever increasing. The poor performing economy left many people vulnerable and desperate. The political and civic space had shrunk because of the government's approach of crafting and enforcing measures that stifle civil liberties. The above narrative shows a country going through a crisis period. Consequently, the SZC was an attempt by civil society to respond accordingly. On 5 March 2007, almost a year into the campaign and shortly before the 11 March "prayer rally," the International Crisis Group (ICG) issued a bleak assessment of the economy. Quoting various respected sources and data; ICG (2007:2) stated the following:

The economy declined by 40 per cent between 1998 and 2006, and unemployment is now 80 per cent. Gross domestic product (GDP) fell 5.1 per cent in 2006 and is expected to sink a further 4.7 per cent in 2007. Zimbabwe has gone from having the second largest GDP in SADC to the tenth of thirteen. Already leading the world in inflation – the official figure is 1,593 per cent annually – a recent International Monetary Fund (IMF) study predicted the rate could soar to 4,279 per cent by year's end. Output has declined in all sectors. Cross-border traders have become the saviours of local retailers by supplying basic commodities following the collapse of local manufacturing. The increase of mineral smuggling into South Africa is hinted at by the contradiction between official statistics showing a 57 per cent decrease in gold production from 1999 to 2006 and the insistence of gold producers that the amount mined has stayed constant. An energy shortage is likely to accelerate collapse of the formal sector.

The discussion of the operating environment above provides an opportunity to reflect on the practical challenges that CSOs operating in such an environment face and the effect it has on the upward accountability. It becomes apparent that CSOs that were involved with the SZC faced a number of practical challenges largely influenced by the operating environment. The sum total of these challenges may differentiate CSOs operating in a political and economically restricted space to those operating in more conducive environment particularly in the West. Yet, the demand for accountability and the mechanisms may fail to appreciate it as much of the funding will be coming from international donors. For instance, a poor performing economy leads to restricted opportunities to fundraise locally for CSOs. This consequently leads to CSOs to rely heavily on funding from international donors and the attendant upward accountability. Furthermore, a hostile attitude from the government restricts what CSOs can document during programme implementation. This will later present challenges when it comes to satisfying upward accountability requirements that are usually depended on data captured consistently.

5.2.6 The SZC – whose idea?

The incubator of the SZC remains contested in civil society. The contestations around the originator (s) of the SZC idea are not surprising given the political environment at that time which was characterised by repression and persecution of opposition members. Two main explanations on how the campaign began prevail. One theory, advanced mostly by CSOs is that the initiative was ostensibly a brainchild of CSOs that sought to unite all pro-democratic stakeholders including political parties to fight for the expansion of democratic space and civic liberties in Zimbabwe. This will also see the different MDC factions working together to achieve this goal. This theory seems to be supported by the fact that the leader of the opposition party then Morgan Tsvangirai acknowledged and praised the efforts of civil society in organising the convention and efforts towards democratisation.

In his public address at the Convention on 29 July 2006, Morgan Tsvangirai, President of the MDC at the SZC Convention said:

May I open my address by thanking civil society and the people of Zimbabwe

for staying the course against all odds, civil society has never wavered on matters of principle. You are with the people, as always. The record speaks for itself. In colonial times, it was the church, student movements and trade unions that spearheaded the struggle for freedom. After Independence, the people remained vigilant, constantly demanding their democratic space (Excerpt from Speech by Morgan Tsvangirai at the Convention, 29 July 2006).

From his address at the convention, the MDC president acknowledged that the SZC was a brainchild of civil society. He also gave reference to the role that civil society in Zimbabwe had played over the years to the struggle for freedom.

A second theory is that the SZC was purely a creation of a MDC faction led by Morgan Tsvangirai that sought to rally all stakeholders in an attempt to dethrone ZANU-PF from power. This is after failed attempts in the 2000 preliminary elections, the 2002 presidential elections and the 2005 parliamentary elections. Thus the campaign was purely a political campaign disguised as a civic campaign. This was in light of the targeted persecution that the opposition had been enduring. Sceptics of CSOs and ZANU-PF government mainly support this theory. Even with those who support this theory, there is however, some consensus that civil society gave the campaign the requisite prominence and impetus to do what the campaign was able to do.

Despite these contestations on the origins of the SZC, there seems to be agreement by most pro-democratic actors in Zimbabwe that "it was an idea whose time had come" (Interview 10, Harare, 22 October 2014). Furthermore, it is imperative to understand that CSOs in Zimbabwe played a significant role during this campaign. This is so because all public meetings and prayer rallies were organised by CSOs such as the ZCA and the Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition. The state consistently persecuted and arrested CSO leaders who were involved in the planning and organising of the campaign. Where opposition parties attended the public meetings, it was at the invitation of the CSOs who were organising the campaign. Accordingly, this study sought to understand these challenges from the perspective of the CSOs involved.

Although extreme efforts were made during the study to understand the emergence of this campaign during the data-gathering period, the study will not seek to advance one theory over the other, as this would be a major distraction from the main objective. The study explored how the campaign was organised and how it sought to advance its objectives; and more essentially, how the results of the campaign were measured within the context of development results measurement discourse.

Among its objectives, the SZC campaigned for constitutional reforms and the adoption of minimum standards for free and fair elections ahead of the 2008 harmonised elections in Zimbabwe. The turning point of the SZC was its "prayer rally" that was blocked by the police who unleashed violence on the campaign members on 11 March 2007. The heavy handed response by the police on this day resulted in the SADC initiated dialogue to which the then South African President, Thabo Mbeki, was mandated to mediate Zimbabwean talks between the main political parties. Chiroro (2013) acknowledges the role played by the ZCA in organising the rally that led to the 11 March 2007 violence. She states that:

A crackdown on the protest prayer rally organised by the (Christian) Alliance on 11 March 2007 not only displayed the brutal force by the police against the opposition figures but also sent shockwaves across the world, putting the Zimbabwean governance crisis squarely on the agenda and leading to international condemnation and a call by SADC for an emergency meeting on the crisis Chiroro (2013:124).

The SZC came to public attention following a convention organised by the Zimbabwe Christian Alliance held on 29 July 2006 in Harare. The Zimbabwe Christian Alliance (ZCA) formed in 2006, grew out of several initiatives by the several faith-based organisations like the Churches in Bulawayo, Mutare, Hwange, the Zimbabwe National Pastors Conference (ZNPC), the Ecumenical Support Services (ESS). A total of 26 organisations with more than 500 participants attended the meeting (ZCA, project document, 2007). At the convention, the ZCA was given the mandate to both chair and coordinate the SZC. The idea of giving the coordinating role to the ZCA was a clever strategy. This was to try and minimise disruptions to activities of the campaign given how the government had used POSA to disrupt civil activities that

they deemed undesirable or a threat to the ruling ZANU-PF government. Furthermore, by effectively allowing a Christian based organisation to be the face of the campaign could have been a strategy to gain public sympathy and following. This is in the context of CSOs in Zimbabwe failing to mobilise the masses in the similar fashion as in the later 1990s and early 2000s. As has been shown in previous sections, the church-related organisations played an important role to the transition to democracy in Zimbabwe, in the case of SZC, the church became an avenue for mobilising the citizens.

The initial aspirations and vision of the SZC are captured in one of the early project documents as follows:

SZC, having been created, as its name suggests, to bring Zimbabwe out of the current political, socio-economic crises, is in need of a central campaign that galvanises the populace to seek new energies and in resisting the ruling ZANU-PF's dictatorship. The mooted of a central campaign is not in order to belittle the efforts and action undertaken thus far by civil society players. It is done in order to augment and unify the increasingly disparate resistance actions that have been undertaken albeit bravely but singularly, (We Will Vote in 2008 Campaign Document, SZC, 2007).

However, as will be demonstrated in the next chapter, this vision and its objectives were changed in various project documents that were submitted to donors. These discrepancies in the understanding of the intentions of the campaign were also, in some instances, manifest in the different responses from the interviews with those who took part in the campaign.

The strategy of the SZC was to engage in activities that would put pressure on the government of Zimbabwe to ultimately change its policies and conduct in order to restore democracy in the country. This is closely in line with the definitions of advocacy considered in the previous sections of this thesis. The first two focus areas of the Campaign, Public Mobilisation and Media and Information Management, were formulated ostensibly to support its main focus area of Advocacy and Lobbying.

According to one of the SZC Proposals, (May 2007), the objectives under Advocacy and Lobbying were defined as follows:

- Create and maintain a local, regional and international awareness of Zimbabwe's crisis
- Lobby regional and international organisations and governments to influence relevant authorities into conceding to solve the crisis in Zimbabwe
- Lobby the South African government and its power support systems to positively influence the mediation process

It is evident from the above excerpt that the campaign operated from the premise that the "Zimbabwe crisis" required intervention of both regional and international bodies. Apart from mobilising local support concerning the crisis and making it known to the regional and international community, there were clear ambitions of lobbying regional and international governments to be part of the solution to the Zimbabwe crisis. The South African government was singled out as one of the main targets for the campaign. This was strategic in two ways. The then President of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki had been appointed to become the mediator of the Zimbabwe crisis. Secondly, because of its economic muscle, South Africa was considered a country that would exert pressure on the ZANU-PF led government in Zimbabwe to comply with the calls for civil and political reforms.

5.2.7 SZC Structure

After its launch in July 2006, the SZC quickly established structures that were meant to effectively execute the mandate of the campaign. The General Council (GC) was established as the highest policymaking body. It comprised the leadership of participating civil organisations and political parties. The GC was chaired by the ZCA. Below the GC was the Task Force. This was the executive arm of the campaign and was composed of 5 task-oriented entities. It was said to be the implementing organ of the campaign. Political parties were barred from participating in the Task Force (SZC proposal document of 2007). The Task Force membership, which was chaired by the Zimbabwe Christian Alliance (ZCA), was formulated around 5 major thematic areas as shown below:

Table 4: SZC thematic areas

Thematic area	Organisation (s) chairing the thematic area
Advocacy (regional and international)	Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition and Bulawayo Agenda
Mass mobilisation	Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Union (ZCTU) and Zimbabwe National Students Movement (ZINASU)
Resource and legal mobilisation	Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights (ZLHR) and ZCA
Information	Media Institute for Southern Africa (MISA)
Constitution	National Constitutional Assembly

Source: SZC Project Document

The Task Force was composed of highly respected CSOs who ranged from labour, students and professional bodies. Members such as the ZCTU, NCA and ZINASU had demonstrated capacity to mobilise the citizens in the past. Furthermore, these three members had a long history of fighting for democracy and human rights and were instrumental in the formation of the MDC in 1999. The Task Force was guided by the values and principles of the Zimbabwe Democracy Charter that was presented to the Save Zimbabwe Convention (SZC proposal, July 2007).

Below the task force, there were the democratic reform sub-committees. Each thematic area had five subcommittees that were drawn from the membership of the GC. The decisions and deliberations of sub-committees were to feed into the Task Force.

Some of the thematic committees met and deliberated on issues that fell under their thematic area but still related to the SZC. Depending on the thematic committee and the organisation chairing it, the attendance in some of them was really good. This is based on the various attendance lists that formed part of the documentation for the SZC. Based on an analysis of attendance lists for some of the meetings conducted during the campaign, it should be noted however that despite what seems to be an impressive set up of the SZC structure, the participation of some members of this structure was erratic for various reasons. This rendered a mismatch between the

envisaged structure and its terms of reference on one hand, and the actual participating members during the different phases of the implementation of the campaign on the other hand. This mismatch between limited attendances to structural meetings of some of the thematic sub committees as opposed to the relatively high turnout in the actual activities of the campaign is not surprising. It confirms the dichotomy between structural CSO planning meetings that are formal, which is different to activities that seek to mobilise citizens. On one hand, there are often differences in approaches concerning the implementation of a campaign such as the SZC yet on the other hand, citizens became united as the campaign gave them hope for a better Zimbabwe.

5.2.8 SZC – the three broad blocs

Recent scholarship on Zimbabwe civil society and democracy in Zimbabwe mostly mention events on 11 March 2007 as the watershed moment for the SZC. Not much is mentioned about the campaign before and after this date. This is understandable given the nature of most campaigns where public activities and events acquire the limelight. This study however sought to review the entire campaign.

The activities of the SZC can be classified into three broad categories. The first category is the convention and launch on 29 July 2006 to just before the 11 March 2007 prayer rally, which was violently disrupted by the police. From the public launch of the campaign at the convention in July 2006, not much took place in the form of public activities. It should be noted however that despite this lull in public activities, the campaign continued. Given the security threats to CSOs however careful planning was required before major public events.

The second category comprises events on the 11 March 2007 aborted "prayer rally" and the activities that took place after that. The aborted prayer rally was organised by both the ZCA and the Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition (CZC). The police had been given notice of the meeting and had banned the meeting. However, the organisers chose to proceed on the basis that it was a prayer meeting, which was not supposed to be affected by the provisions of POSA. On the day, activists, having been mobilised by the organisers, gathered at Zimbabwe Grounds in a high-density suburb of Harare.

Zimbabwe Grounds is a common place of civil mobilisation, which has its roots in the liberation war in Zimbabwe. As the crowd started gathering for the prayer event focused on democratic reforms and economic improvements, police violently intercepted the meeting. In its March 2007 edition of its Monthly Political Violence Report, The Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum⁴ reports the event as follows:

Opposition political party leaders, supporters, civil society activists, church leaders and scores of the general Zimbabwean public were brutalised and arrested for converging at Zimbabwe Grounds in Highfields for an intended prayer meeting. A number of the victims on that fateful day were incarcerated in police stations dotted across Harare. Furthermore, the ZRP shot and killed one Gift Tandari, a NCA member, allegedly for being the 'ring-leader' in the running battles that ensued between the police and the people intending to have the prayer meeting.

Graphic images depicting police brutality following the 11 March 2007 "prayer rally" caught the attention of many people both locally and outside of the country concerning the alarming level of violence and police brutality.

In the photo below, severely assaulted civil society and opposition party leaders were leaving the courtroom on 13 March 2007.

⁴ The Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum is a coalition of human rights organisations with a particular mandate of documenting cases of politically motivated violence and torture in Zimbabwe



Source: Photo courtesy of Desmond Kwande—AFP/Getty Images

The graphic pictures of police brutality were mostly by foreign press. At that time, no independent daily newspapers were in circulation due to restrictive media laws. Images of brutalised CSO leaders such as Lovemore Madhuku of NCA and opposition leaders like the late Morgan Tsvangirai circulated widely online. The government-controlled daily newspapers were quick to dismiss the event and sought to criminalise and politicise the significant event. The *Herald* Newspaper reported:

One person was shot dead by police and three police officers severely injured during an attack by MDC thugs, while opposition faction leaders Morgan Tsvangirai and Arthur Mutambara were arrested for inciting people to engage in violence. Other opposition leaders picked up were the Tsvangirai faction secretary general Tendai Biti, organising secretary Elias Mudzuri, Grace Kwinje, Sekai Holland and Job Sikhala, the latter aligned to the Mutambara faction, (The *Herald* Newspaper, 12 March 2007).

Several civil society and opposition party leaders were arrested. A number of disturbing bloody images of activists after being brutalised by the police were circulated across the world via online media. The event led SADC to convene an emergency meeting in Arusha, Tanzania to respond to the growing security situation in Zimbabwe. The SADC meeting condemned the violent nature of police action at the meeting and appointed Thabo Mbeki, then President of South Africa, to facilitate dialogue between the ZANU-PF government and opposition parties. This act alone is viewed as an advocacy breakthrough given the fact that SADC had refused to publicly acknowledge that there was a civil and political problem in Zimbabwe that required its attention. This category of events also extends to activities during the political mediation up to the March and June 2008 runoff elections.

After the 11 March 2007 meeting; the SZC gained the attention of donors. From the project documents reviewed, the organisers of the SZC, armed with a “demonstrable result”, started seeking financial support from Western donors through official proposals requesting funding to support its campaigns. Most of the projects referred to the 11 March 2007 events. The project documents began to take on a formal format and were formulated according to various templates and frameworks palatable to donor funding frameworks.

When the formal SADC mediated talks between political parties started, it became evident that CSOs were excluded. The ZCA and some CSO leaders tried to lobby SADC to be included in the negotiations but they were unsuccessful. SADC made it clear that the talks were for political parties only. The ZCA even sent a delegation of CSO leaders visiting different SADC heads of states to try and make their case to be represented in the talks, but they were not successful. Despite this setback, the SZC continued to highlight the democratic deficits in Zimbabwe through press statements and reports that sought to influence the negotiations. Focus was now on “campaigning for a new democratic free and fair elections in 2008 under a new constitution” rather than broad democratic reforms that characterised the campaign before the 11 March 2007 events.

The third category of SZC activities consists of activities that took place following the 2008 elections. During this period, the MDC, an important ally of the Campaign, had

made inroads into parliament following the 2008 elections. For the first time, ZANU-PF had lost its majority in Parliament, and the opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai had defeated Robert Mugabe in the presidential elections but fell short of garnering the 50% plus one vote required for him to be declared the winner. This forced a presidential election run-off that he later withdrew from following an onslaught of violence by ZANU-PF supporters targeting MDC supporters. Formal talks for a government of National Unity started between ZANU-PF and the two MDC formations. At that point, the SZC became more and more sidelined from the public political discourse in Zimbabwe as more focus was on the negotiation between the political parties to form a joint government. Although it continued to receive funding from Western donors, its activities were no longer as prominent as they were during the 11 March 2007 events. The campaign lost impetus in 2009 because of the formation of a Government of National Unity (GNU).

5.2.9 Struggles within a struggle

It is important to note that although various stakeholders worked together to achieve the objectives of the campaign, there were various power dynamics within the movement. The marriage between CSOs and opposition parties was not smooth sailing. Exactly a year after the campaign was launched, one of the opposition party formations, MDC led by professor Arthur Mutambara left the campaign. This followed accusations of the campaign organisers favouring the other MDC formation led by Morgan Tsvangirai. The dispute arose following the fact that Tsvangirai was the one leading all the diplomatic engagement delegations.

According to the Studio 7, a news programme run by Voice of America (VoA) from outside of Zimbabwe:

A spokesman for the Save Zimbabwe Campaign said Wednesday that the coalition of organizations opposing the government of President Robert Mugabe regrets the exit from its ranks of the opposition faction led by Arthur Mutambara, but said that the organization will continue its efforts to "liberate" Zimbabweans without him. Mutambara announced Saturday that his Movement for Democratic Change faction was withdrawing from the Save

Zimbabwe Campaign, accusing the coalition of civic, church and political groups of favouring his rival, MDC founder Morgan Tsvangirai (Studio 7, Voice of America, 1 August 2007).

Although the spokesman for the SZC announced that the campaign would proceed without the other MDC formation, it points to power struggles that were taking place within the advocacy campaign. This is not surprising given the differences of opinions and in strategies by the different actors within an advocacy campaign. Developments such as these, complicates most democracy advocacy initiatives. This complexity will subsequently affect how the results of democracy advocacy campaigns are evaluated.

5.2.10 SZC - a successful campaign?

From the discussion above, it is tempting to conclude that the SZC was a highly successful campaign that is worth canonising for future reference. It should be born in mind however that the narrative of the SZC presented above is drawn from perspectives of CSOs. Views of other critical actors such as affected citizens and politicians are lacking in this narrative.

There are strong suggestions that it is only the CSOs involved in an advocacy campaign such as SZC that can effectively assess the success of the campaign. However, this approach can be problematic because of natural biases that may arise in the process of assessment. The CSOs involved may seek self-aggrandizement instead of objectively assessing the results of the campaign.

One approach of checking if an intervention has made a difference in the lives of intended beneficiaries is the use of the Counterfactual Approach. This approach is "the situation or condition which hypothetically may prevail for individuals, organisations or groups where there is no development intervention" (Mackay, 2007:138)). It can be argued that the debilitating socio-economic situation at the time, combined with anti-citizen policies such as OM, may have caused a "protest vote" that led to ZANU-PF losing its majority in parliament for the first time.

Without taking anything away from the brave men and women who were part of the CSOs who organised and executed the SZC, it is my submission that it is difficult to ascertain the success or lack thereof of the SZC. This is so because of the challenges associated with measurement of results of a complex democracy advocacy initiative. However, its contribution to the democratisation agenda of Zimbabwe cannot be questioned. In fact, the contestations concerning a proper verdict on its success is what was at the heart of this research. The success or failure of a development intervention is viewed in light of prescribed results capturing tools and frameworks. As will be shown in the next two chapters, these tools and frameworks are however inadequate to capture complex civil society led development interventions such as democracy advocacy.

It is the central argument of this study that democracy advocacy initiatives such as the SZC are complex and therefore results from these interventions cannot be measured using the simplistic approaches to results measurement. Current efforts to measure results of democracy advocacy are understood within the “development results discourse”. In line with Foucault’s notions on discourse, results discourse should not be viewed as power or value judgment free.

As has been argued in chapter two of this thesis, for advocacy to be effective, several steps, techniques and strategies ought to be taken during both planning and implementation of the campaign. These include identifying and framing the issue, collecting information, mobilising interested people networking, forming alliances, forming and sustaining coalitions, planning campaigns, involving the media, building pressure on the legislature, establishing contacts within the systems. Although each campaign and context is different, it is important to consider how the SZC fared with regards to these steps, techniques and strategies for effective advocacy. The section below provides a summary of assessment on how the SZC fared in light of the steps, techniques and strategies for an effective advocacy.

a. Identifying and framing the issue

Based on the Charter presented at the lunch and the goals and objectives of the SZC as spelt out in the project proposal and project documents, the SZC did well to

articulate and frame the campaign. The title of the campaign was “catchy” and summarised what the advocacy initiative was about.

b. Collecting information

The well written and detailed Charter at the launch of the campaign on 29 July 2006, points to the fact the organisers had done a good job in collecting information about the crisis in Zimbabwe and the possible solutions to it. However, there is no evidence on how the campaign had collected vital information in terms of the key influential people in parliament, governments and on the SADC region that would be the target for lobby efforts. Thus the campaign resorted to “advocacy from the outside” which is less effective save for raising awareness and finding sympathy.

c. Mobilising interested people and networking

The campaign did well in mobilising like-minded citizens who were mainly activists. However, these citizens were largely urban based and most citizens in the rural areas could not identify with the campaign.

d. Forming alliances

The SZC brought together partners such as CSOs, churches, and political parties, which was highly commendable. Some of the partners historically did not work together. Although this later proved to be challenge when evaluating the results of the advocacy initiative due to different backgrounds and interests of the partners.

e. Forming and sustaining coalitions

Appointing a coordinating organisation, the ZCA, was strategic to ensure that the activities of the campaign are sustained. Furthermore, securing funding from donors meant that the activities of the campaign are carried out as planned. However, it can be argued that both appointing a coordinating organisation and securing donor funding may have killed the spirit of activism. As the campaign became more institutionalised and bureaucratised, it alienated some of its members and focus was on donor/upward accountability at the expense of other stakeholders.

f. Planning campaigns

The formation of a Task Force and thematic sub-committees ensured that the campaign benefited from good planning. Furthermore, appointing a coordinating organisation, the ZCA, was strategic to ensure smooth planning and execution of the activities of the campaign. The coordinating organisation was tasked with planning the whole campaign activities.

g. Involving the media

This was a difficult task for the campaign because of media restrictions in Zimbabwe at the time of the campaign. State owned media was not interested in covering the activities of the campaign. In fact a few activities of the campaign such as the aborted prayer rally on 11 March 2007 was covered in bad light by the state aligned media. There were no independent daily newspapers operating in Zimbabwe at that time. Coverage was limited to online newspapers mainly operating outside of Zimbabwe.

h. Building pressure on the legislature

The SZC failed dismally in this aspect. Although it can be argued that given the fact that ZANU-PF had two thirds majority in parliament (and MPs often vote along political lines) therefore limiting the effectiveness of the opposition in parliament, there was no engagement strategy or ways to circumvent the challenges associated with this. This aspect is critical for any campaign that seeks to influence policy and legislative changes.

i. Establishing contacts within the systems

As above, this aspect is critical for influencing policy changes. There was no strategy on trying to engage with some functions of government on this aspect. What comes closer to engaging contacts within was the invitation letter sent out to the ruling party ZANU-PF at the launch of the campaign. ZANU-PF did not attend and no further engagement was made. This non-engagement contrasted sharply with the other initiative called *The Zimbabwe we want: towards a national vision for Zimbabwe*. This initiative was based on a document called the “National Vision Discussion Document” (NVDD). Three church bodies that are: Zimbabwe Catholics Bishops Conference (ZCBC), Evangelical Fellowship of Zimbabwe (EFZ) and Zimbabwe Council of Churches led the initiative. The aim of the initiative was similar in nature

with those of the SZC. The NVDD was published on 15 September 2006 (two weeks after the launch of the SZC) and was launched by President Mugabe at the national day of prayer. It recognised the political and economic challenges that the country was going through and sought to create platforms for debate across the country on the possible solutions. However, the difference between *the Zimbabwe we want* and the SZC was the fact the former engaged with the ZANU-PF government while the later was more confrontational in its approach.

5.3 Conclusion

This chapter has provided background to the SZC. It looked at how the campaign started, the different strategies it took and some of the challenges it faced. The SZC arose out of a need to address a number of socio-economic and political crises that affected Zimbabwe from 2000 to 2008. The SZC brought together different stakeholders such as CSOs, churches and opposition political parties. At the launch of the campaign on 29 July 2006, a Zimbabwe Democracy Charter was drawn up and agreed by the parties present. The Charter was well written and articulated the crisis in Zimbabwe, its courses and suggested solutions. The Charter became the basis for the campaign.

While the Campaign started largely as voluntary activism, the campaign became institutionalised post the 11 March 2007 aborted prayer rally. At this prayer rally the police dispersed the gathered activists and citizens in a brutal manner that caught the attention of the world. This event brought to the attention of many both locally and internationally the intentions of this campaign. The SADC responded through holding an extra ordinary meeting in Dar es Salam and appointed the then President of South Africa Thabo Mbeki to be the mediator in trying to solve the civil and political crisis in Zimbabwe.

Concerning the steps, techniques and strategies used for an effective campaign, the SZC fared well in some aspects particularly those related to planning and framing the issue and network building. However the campaign did not perform well in aspects that relate to influencing key decision makers such as the legislature.

The results of the campaign are however contestable. The contestability of the outcomes of the campaign is, according to the central theme of this study, part of the challenges that affect complex democracy advocacy initiatives such as the SZC. The next two chapters will more closely consider these complexities.

CHAPTER SIX

Results measurement of democracy advocacy – navigating a complex process

6.1 Introduction

This first of my data chapters presents the main findings from my fieldwork. The first three sub research questions are addressed in this chapter. These questions are:

- How were the results from the SZC advocacy initiative communicated to stakeholders, especially international donors?
- What tools and criteria did both CSOs and international donors to measure results particularly for democracy advocacy initiatives?
- What were the challenges and complexities experienced by CSOs in demonstrating results from advocacy initiatives?

Data presented and analysed in this chapter is from the 23 interviews with CSO leaders and six representatives from the international donor community. The thesis sought to understand the accountability processes from the perspective of CSOs donors that were directly involved with the SZC.. The majority of CSO leaders interviewed were involved, with varying levels of intensity, with the SZC. Data in these chapters is also drawn from the various project documents mainly from the ZCA, the main coordinating organisation of the SZC and the intermediary INGO that was the conduit of funds to the ZCA. In this chapter, I present the funding model of the SZC and the results accountability approach used during the campaign.

Two main findings are the focus of this chapter. Firstly, results of the SZC were communicated to international donors in a limited and less satisfactory manner. This was because of the practical limitations associated with demonstrating results of complex advocacy initiatives. From the findings, it was noted that while accounting for results of democracy advocacy initiatives such as the SZC is both complex and challenging, however the principle and practice of upward accountability remains necessary and appreciated in development practice.

The second finding is that despite noting serious shortcomings associated with the current accountability tools and frameworks especially assessing advocacy, CSOs in Zimbabwe that receive funding from international donors continue to use these tools and frameworks to evaluate democracy advocacy. This dissonance created by the continued use of tools and frameworks they are highly critical of is part of the organisational survival strategy for most CSOs. Owing to the reliance on external funding from donors, CSOs fear that lack of compliance with donor-prescribed results tools and frameworks will subsequently lead to the withdrawal of funding. This also points to power dynamics between donors and CSOs in Zimbabwe. Reluctant compliance or grudgingly acceptance of the accountability mechanisms is a coping strategy by CSO to deal with the asymmetric relationship between CSOs and donors.

6.2 SZC funding model

This section presents in brief, the funding model of the SZC. It should be noted however that it is difficult to ascertain the accurate funding levels of the whole campaign. This is because of how the campaign was implemented. Since the SZC was implemented by a loose coalition, members received funding from international donors to implement their general activities that may include some aspects of the SZC. Thus to ascertain from all the members on how much they received was going to be major challenge given the fact that information concerning project funding particularly on democracy initiatives in Zimbabwe is highly restricted by CSOs and therefore not readily available. However, for this study, reference to the level of funding will only refer to that which was received by ZCA. This was made possible as I had permission to access all their project documents.

From the SZC project documents and the interviews conducted during the research, the SZC relied to a larger extent on international donor funding for both its operations and activities. Following the categorization of the SZC into phases as discussed in the previous chapter, the financing of its activities followed mainly two phases. These are from inception (29 July 2006) up to the aborted “prayer rally” (11 March 2007); and the period after the “prayer rally” up to the 2008 elections. International donors financed the activities using a two-pronged approach. Firstly, the participating SZC member organisations received funding separately and in their individual capacities

from different international donors. As the main rallying point for the SZC was on democracy advocacy, most CSOs involved with the campaign were already receiving funding from different international donors for the individual work of their organisations. According to excerpts of a donor meeting held on 16 May 2007 to coordinate responses to the ZCA proposal about the Campaign, the SZC member organisations received funding separately and in their individual organisational capacities. Six major international donors attended the meeting. In the minutes, it is stated that:

The donors agree that the submitted proposal had many overlaps with SZC member organisations...donors were already funding SZC members in their various thematic areas and these have comparative advantage regarding accountability and experience in the thematic areas (minutes of donor coordination meeting held on 16 May, 2007).

Minutes of a donors meeting held at [redacted] to discuss Save Zimbabwe Campaign Proposal.
16 May 2007: 09:00 - 1100hrs

Present: [redacted] (2) (1) (3) (4)

The purpose of the meeting was to:

- comment on the proposal that was submitted by CAZ
- sound donors for possible commitments

The meeting was a follow up to the meeting that was held at [redacted] on 6 May 2006 at which CAZ made a presentation to the donors. The SZC campaign theme is "we will vote in 2008 under a new democratic constitution".

Comments on proposal

- The donors agreed that the submitted proposal had a lot of overlaps with SZC member organisations. For instance: elections are done by [redacted] constitution by [redacted] advocacy and lobbying by [redacted]. Donors are already funding SZC member organisations such as the [redacted]. There would need to consider areas where SZC had comparative advantage for instance the involvement in the Mbeki initiative.
- Social welfare did not fit in the proposal.
- The budget is also confusing. [redacted] for the running costs and salaries of CAZ. SZC is the project of CAZ and as such it will be the managing organisation. [redacted] also provided funding to CAZ.
- Experience so far had shown that there was a wide gap between the expectations on what is planned and what is carried out and this has to do with both the political environment and the capacity of CAZ/SZC. SZC had planned a series of prayer meetings and these have not been carried out giving doubts to donors of SZC's a reliability as an implementer. SZC should therefore limit its activities to those which can achieve the greatest impact maintaining that it is a campaign. Donors felt that SZC might not be in a position to absorb the funds. } report part
- SZC should decide on their core business. What can they do best? The mandate of SZC is coordination and communication of united activities. There will be no need for SZC to act as a financier of organisations by getting all the funds in a basket and deciding on which organisation gets what. Besides the lack of capacity, this will increase conflicts among members.
- It was noted that donors were already funding SZC member organisations in the various thematic areas and these have comparative advantage in terms of accountability and experience in the thematic area. However there was need for SZC to take up issues that could not be implemented by member organisation for instance: in the case of elections there was need for public mobilisation on voter registration for youths; campaign on the issuing of Identity cards and fundamental electoral reforms.

Source: Minutes of donors meeting on SZC

The above excerpts of minutes from deliberations from the international donors confirm that CSOs that were part of the campaign received funding from different donors to execute various projects associated with democracy advocacy in general. These CSOs received funding through the "Call for Proposal" mechanism. Funding was received after CSOs had submitted project proposals to donors and contracts

between CSOs and internal donors would be entered into. The minutes cited above shed some light on CSO donor interactions. This will be discussed in the next chapter (section 7.2.1).

Accordingly, most organisations who were part of the SZC such as Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, whose core mandate was to coordinate CSOs dealing broadly with the civil and political crisis in Zimbabwe, were receiving funding for their main activities related to the campaign. This was separate to the other funding that was provided to the ZCA. In light of this, many organisations had to adjust their existing funding budgets and activities to be in line with the broad objectives of the SZC. This funding arrangement existed from the inception of the SZC (29 July 2006) up to 11 March 2007.

Secondly, the main coordinating organisation, ZCA applied to international donors for funding ostensibly to finance the activities and coordination of SZC. This is in the period of the post-aborted “prayer rally” of 11 March 2007. An embassy of a European country based in Zimbabwe provided the main grant to SZC. For ethical reasons, the name of the donor will not be revealed. This is to protect the donor in light of the hostile relationship that sometimes exists between the government of Zimbabwe and international donors mostly from the Western countries. In this thesis, the embassy will be referred to as “embassy donor”. In light of the perceived high risk of channelling the funds directly to ZCA and the fact that the organization was relatively new and therefore could not have sufficient financial accountability systems, it was deemed necessary that the funds be channelled through an established International Non – Governmental Organisation (INGO) that works in the area of international development. This funding arrangement is common in international development and the main organisation providing the funds is commonly referred to as the “back donor”. This is in light of the minimum or no interaction between the implementing organisation and the organisation providing the funds. This arrangement leads to a two-layer mechanism of accountability where the intermediary organisation receives funding from the “back donor” and reports to them on progress. In the same vein, the intermediary organisation provides funding to the recipient organisation, such as ZCA and receives reports in return. To solicit for funding for

the SZC activities, ZCA wrote a consolidated proposal that included a set of activities to coordinate the campaign, which included a corresponding budget.

According to the contract between the “embassy donor” and the intermediary INGO signed on 10 October 2007, a total of USD 135 125 was approved to fund the activities of the campaign. This was for 12 months running from October 2007 to September 2008. The grant period was later extended by a further six months because of the low spending levels by the implementing organisation ZCA. The INGO would manage the grant in such a way that ZCA would be given funding periodically and the ZCA had to report to the INGO in return. The intermediary donor organisation released further funding upon approval of narrative and financial reports.

It should be noted that a consolidated proposal focusing on the activities of the SZC was written and circulated to possible international donors, mainly from the Western countries. This was done soon after the 11 March 2007 aborted “prayer rally”. The 11 March 2007 event seemed to have given the campaign a much-needed impetus and publicity. The constant reference to the 11 March 2007 event as contained in several SZC documents, point to the importance attached to the event of that day by the organisers of SZC. For instance, in the background section of the main project proposal submitted to donors, it is stated that:

SZC has successfully coordinated civic society and political formations as evidenced by events of 11 March 2007. On this day, the police violently broke up a prayer meeting at Zimbabwe Grounds in the suburb of Highfields, in the capital Harare. This raised a regional and international outcry. SADC responded in Dar es Salaam by mandating South Africa to facilitate talks immediately to resolve the crisis. The African Union (AU) condemned the violent reaction of the Zimbabwean government (Excerpt from ZCA project proposal to international donors).

It is clear from the excerpt above that the sense of triumph associated with the 11 March 2007 events was evident in the fundraising document sent to donors. This was, to a larger extent, regarded as the potential of what the campaign could achieve if more funds were injected into it. As shall be argued in the next chapter (section

7.6), this manner of promises on the potential of the project, consequently influences the assessment of democracy advocacy.

Contracts governed the relationship between the “embassy donor,” the INGO (intermediary organisation) and the ZCA (main coordinating body of the campaign). Apart from detailing the funds to be availed for the project, the contracts spelt out the obligations and responsibilities of both the donor and the implementing organisation. It is critical to note that the contract went beyond mentioning the obligations and responsibilities of both parties into detailing the expected results. For instance, the contract between the embassy donor and the intermediary organisation states that:

The activities being subsidised shall be implemented under the responsibility of the grant recipient in the manner described in the above-mentioned application, consisting of an activity plan, budget and liquidity forecast... Within two months of the end of the first six months of the project’s duration, the other party should submit a narrative and financial report on the previous six months... The narrative report shall include an overview of the activities and objectives referred to in the activity plan, and an explanation of any discrepancies (Excerpt from a contract between back donor and intermediary INGO, 10 October, 2007).

From the above excerpt of the contract between the back donor and INGO, a couple of important issues are worth noting. Firstly, the donor prescribed the accountability mechanism. In this regard, the accounting was going to be in the form of reports that were to be submitted after each period of 6 months. There is no evidence of consultation with the implementing partner on the method and mechanism of accountability. Secondly, the implementing partner was supposed to report based on expected results. Thus results were important to the donor. This reinforces not only the asymmetric relationship between the CSOs and the donors, but a “discursive practice” in the Foucauldian sense where a system of demonstrating development results is practiced over and over. The activity plan mentioned in the contract contained a list of activities such as prayer rallies and advocacy trips, particularly in SADC region.

6.3 Approaches to results monitoring and evaluation for CSOs in Zimbabwe

This section briefly explains the approaches that are being used by CSOs in Zimbabwe for monitoring and evaluation of development results. During the SZC most CSOs involved with the SZC had developed good relationships with international donors. With the exception of churches that fundraise mostly from local congregants, international donors fund CSOs in Zimbabwe. The CSOs had developed systems of tapping funding from donors through project proposals and in return report to donors through the use of accountability mechanisms such as narrative reports and project updates and briefs.

As a result of the long-established relationship between CSOs and donors in Zimbabwe, most CSOs developed an appreciation for donor accountability principles and tools. Most respondents professed working knowledge of the various donor accountability mechanisms and approaches used to capture and report on results of development interventions. Most respondents when asked about the accountability mechanisms they know and have used, mentioned tools and approaches such as Results Based Management, Logical Framework, Success Stories Technics and the Theory of Change Approach among others. It can be concluded that because of the long historical dealings between CSOs in Zimbabwe and donors, the former had come to appreciate not only the accountability mechanisms used in monitoring and evaluating development projects but also the accountability principle behind these mechanisms and approaches. The principle being that one needs to give an account of how they have used the funds and the results emanating from activities. This is so given the fact that one would have used public funds for such activities. This principle, seemingly plausible, becomes a “regime of truth” from a Foucauldian perspective to the extent of influencing standard organisation practice of CSOs. The appreciation of this principle is manifest in most CSOs in Zimbabwe adopting results measurement processes such as monitoring and evaluation (M&E). Some CSOs apart from investing in the M&E skills, have gone to the extent of hiring specialised staff in the field of M&E and some even opening M&E units in their organisations. Proposals submitted to donors usually contain a results framework in the form of an M&E plan. In this manner, a “regime of practice” is established and reinforced.

It is, however, important to note that most respondents, while appreciating the principle of accountability in international development, were of the view that current mechanisms of accountability processes being used are largely imposed by the donors. The respondents continued to use these mechanisms, albeit, reluctantly. This grudging acceptance rather than an overwhelming endorsement of upward accountability mechanisms can be viewed as a coping strategy by CSOs to manage the asymmetric relationship between them and the donors.

6.4 SZC results framework

This section discusses the accountability mechanisms and processes of the SZC. Current trends in development practice are such that CSOs seeking financial support to donors would write a proposal and include a Results Framework. Nevertheless, despite an appreciation of a results accountability mechanism by CSOs in development practice, the ZCA did not have a robust Results Framework in the form of an M&E plan for the SZC. The *logframe* and the work plan that formed part of the proposal submitted to donors, came close to a results plan. In the *logframe*, anticipated results of the campaign were partially stated. However, there was no mechanism of continually assessing progress through a rigorous data collection for the duration of the campaign. When asked about the tools that were used to assess, evaluate and report on the results of the SZC, a former senior employee of ZCA that coordinated and chaired the campaign said:

Because our funding was channelled through one donor (in reference to the intermediary INGO), the requirement was that we prepare project proposals. We also did reports which were a form of monitoring progress...but I think the challenge was that because of the height at which the crisis was at that time, to be honest, it became very difficult to set a proper monitoring and evaluation system and to focus on office work. It was more of fieldwork. Most times people were worried about security around documentation. The police would raid our offices and most of the people we worked with would say “look, we cannot keep documents, minutes and other things in the office because once you were caught, it became almost criminal to be involved with the campaign”. Therefore, you find that documentation was very thin because

of that. The level of confidentiality and limiting documentation became very necessary as a result of the security situation. The tools that ordinarily are used in project evaluation were almost suspended (Interview 7, Bulawayo, 21 August, 2014).

It is evident from the response that firstly the CSO regarded the preparation of a project proposal as a requirement by the donor. As shall be demonstrated later in chapter seven (section 7.9.1), this required proposal was later submitted to the donor based on the logic model. Secondly, the reports mentioned affirm the accountability mechanism and process between CSOs and donors. Even in a limited and less satisfactory manner, focus was on upward accountability. This was rightfully so because of the donor requirements as stipulated in the contract. Failure to honour the contractual obligations would have led to ZCA losing further funding for the campaign. There was no reference to how the implementing organisation was going to report to other stakeholders such as citizens (downward accountability) or other CSOs (horizontal accountability). Thirdly the operating environment did not allow for the setting up of a robust monitoring and evaluation system. This points to limitations associated with current accountability mechanisms and processes that sometimes fail to appreciate that democracy advocacy normally takes place in a setting that may require flexibility in documenting results. In the case of SZC, security of personnel and the need to implement activities of the campaign, took priority over an effective results framework for the campaign. An effective results framework would require staff to update the information regularly. Thus, unlike CSOs involved in democracy advocacy in a politically permissive environment, CSOs operating in politically repressive environments will struggle to be accountable to donors especially if their activities rely on mass mobilisation of activists. This is so because the current accountability mechanisms are more suited towards stable political environments and less confrontational advocacy.

Another civil society leader, who was one of the leading figures of ZCA, also confirmed the lack of proper mechanisms to monitor and evaluate the results of SZC. When asked about the tools used to evaluate the campaign he said:

I am not aware of any particular tools that were used except that we had clear objectives and we fundraised on the basis of those objectives. We were able to get support and we implemented our activities according to those objectives; as far as we are concerned, we are satisfied that we were able to fulfil the expressed desires of the objectives that were listed. I am not aware of any process where we have been talking to donors after the SZC about whether we were successful or not. I do not know how donors evaluated our reports (Interview 26, Harare, 28 March, 2015).

The lack of a proper results framework and system points to a mismatch between theory and practice. The fact that ZCA would agree to a contract that clearly spelt out the anticipated results of the campaign yet do not put a mechanism or framework to capture the results of the campaign points to this mismatch. In theory, and in the proposal, a *logframe* was used to plan for the anticipated results of the campaign. Ordinarily, results frameworks and systems will build around the *logframe* that the organisation would have submitted to the donor. This is so because in the *logframe*, expected results and objectively verifiable indicators of such results are articulated. The *logframe* is accompanied by a work plan that details the steps required for achieving the anticipated results. However, despite these plans (*logframe* and work plan), in practice they did not work out accordingly. This is because of circumstances that were not anticipated at the time of conceptualising the project. Although the *logframe* as a planning tool often has sections dealing with assumptions and risks associated with the proposed project or programme, these are inadequate to deal with on-going political developments that may require project adaptation.

Democracy advocacy is a strategy rather than an activity. Within the advocacy strategy a number of activities such as lobbying and campaigning are employed. The strategy builds up progressively because of constant changes in the operating environment. Such changes, unfortunately, are not easily captured or foreseen by logic based accountability mechanisms such as a *logframes*. This limitation points to the inadequacy of the accountability mechanism for results of advocacy especially those based on logic models. According to a leading CSO leader who worked at Crisis in Zimbabwe coalition during the SZC, the fact that donors did not visit the

organisation after the campaign to assess the project meant that they were satisfied with its outcome. He said:

I think the funding partners were largely satisfied. I was at the Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition and I did not see any assessment team coming to do any assessment. Because in terms of the objectives of the campaign, which was also to have a free and fair election, I think we witnessed it so I think it was self-evident that what they largely wanted prevailed in terms of the conduct of the election. I also think even the opening up of the democratic space; for the first time we had a democratic Parliament in which the opposition actually had for the first time in the history of Zimbabwe an opposition Speaker of Parliament which was never there. So we could see both quantitatively they could measure and qualitatively their objectives in practice to say there has been a qualitative change in local government, there has been qualitative change in Parliament where people started to have robust debates and ZANU-PF having the opposition in Parliament. I think they saw it and thought that their money was used properly (Interview 5, Harare, 19 August, 2014).

The response above, points to an important nuance in results measurement that is the role of perceptions and assumptions. This is over and above the written procedures, systems and mechanisms. Despite citing the changes in political context and connecting these changes directly to SZC, interviewee 5 used perceptions and assumptions to certify that the campaign was successful. The interviewee cited reasons such as “donors did not visit the organisation post implementation”, which therefore meant that donors were satisfied with the results of the project. These assumptions and perceptions could be inaccurate in that the donors may have not visited the organisation because of other reasons. The role of perceptions and biases in programme evaluation will be addressed in the next chapter (section 7.2.1) of this thesis.

6.5 Democracy advocacy results are in the “eyes of the stakeholder”

This section explains the reasons why different respondents could not agree on whether the SZC was successful or not. This was done with a view of exposing the

practical and theoretical challenges associated with results measurement of democracy advocacy particularly in a politically repressive environment.

One major challenge of accounting for the results of the SZC lies in the fact that the campaign had different phases. The pre 11 March 2007 phase was characterised by a loose membership of CSOs and less formal coordination of the campaign. Participation of the member organisations was based on common values of the democratisation agenda. Although member organisations received funding from international donors separately, it was their choice to set aside resources to participate and contribute to the campaign. This period was largely characterised by “sacrificial activism” as some of those who were involved in the initial phases used their personal resources. The level of upward accountability during this period was lower as compared to the period when SZC became institutionalised. This is consistent with arguments from scholars such as Choudry (2013) and Shivji (2007) who respectively argue that tensions emerge after the professionalization and institutionalisation of social action in a process described as *NGOisation* and that NGOs become accountable to donors more than their constituencies.

In contrast, the post 11 March 2007 period saw the SZC being more formalised through the leadership of ZCA. The ZCA developed and circulated project proposals specifically on SZC to international donors. The technical lexicon associated with proposal writing such as outputs, outcomes and indicators was used. Donors became more interested in the affairs of the campaign. The campaign mutated from “voluntary activism” based on values and sacrifice into “sponsored activism” based on financial resources. With these different phases, the main challenge is that different stakeholders associate themselves according to the different phases of the campaign. Accordingly, activist type stakeholders align themselves to the pre 11 March 2007 period, while the ZCA secretariat and most donors identify more with the post 11 March 2007 period. The different phases thus present challenges when evaluating the full results of the campaign because of a conceptualisation and planning deficit. In the absence of clear criteria for assessing the impact of the campaign, each stakeholder is bound to come up with their verdict depending on their level association with the campaign. In other words, the results became contestable as they are in the “eyes of

the stakeholder”. Different stakeholders may come to different conclusions depending on their set of interests and vantage point to the campaign.

A critical question on whether the SZC was successful or not and why was posed to the respondents. The purpose of this question was to try and ascertain the tools and frameworks that the different respondents were using in order to come up with their verdict concerning the results the campaign. From the responses provided, a number of issues pertaining to the evaluation of democracy advocacy became apparent.

The responses fall in two categories. There are those who regarded the campaign as highly successful and those who had reservations about the direct impact of the campaign. Only a few respondents contended that the campaign was unequivocally successful. For instance, a prominent CSO leader said:

The SZC was a campaign that was established by people who clearly understood that this is not an organisation; it is just a campaign that has a clear timeframe. It was not going to be forever and if you follow the activities of this campaign it led to the establishment of the Government of National Unity (GNU), and that was how it ended. So the GNU was a creation of the SZC and that is how it ended, and we are satisfied with that ending (Interview 26, Harare, 28 March, 2015).

This CSO leader pointed to political realities such as the consummation of the GNU as an indicator of success directly linked to the SZC. This is however contrary to the fact that the SZC did not have the GNU as a direct objective and anticipated result.

When asked if the objectives of the campaign as per the project documents submitted to donors at the point of fundraising were met, He said:

I think that was achieved; the new Constitution is a product of the Inclusive Government. We got it, it was not a process that was managed by the Save Zimbabwe Campaign but it was definitely a result of the actions of the Save Zimbabwe Campaign. Democratisation of the situation was also achieved; we made a little progress during the time of the Inclusive Government that was

also because of the SZC. What happened after the period of the Inclusive Government is something that is completely different but at least I think we were in the right direction (Interview 26, Harare, 28 March, 2015).

The former Chairperson of the ZCA, echoed more radical and political sentiments in his evaluation of the campaign by saying:

The opposition won outright (in reference to the MDC winning the first round of presidential elections) even though they were not allowed to take power. When I die, in my grave, I would say we worked hard and a democratic party won but was not given the opportunity to rule (Interview 17, Harare, 23 December, 2014).

The above sentiments in reference to the success of the campaign based on the political outcomes such as the GNU, new constitution of Zimbabwe and ZANU-PF losing the parliamentary majority for the first time in post independence Zimbabwe, ignites serious debates around the contribution and impact of the campaign. Other CSO leaders challenge these connections as spurious. It is my submission that the challenges of failing to properly connect an advocacy campaign to political outcomes is as a result of fixation with logic based models of planning and evaluating development projects. The discourse of results measurement is premised on “evidence of change” and the logical connection between interventions and outcomes. This is despite the fact that some results, especially of democracy advocacy based on mass mobilization of activists may take some time to gestate.

Truth and subjectivity is a major theme in Foucault's work, in particular in the context of its relationship with power, knowledge and the subject. He argues that truth is an event that takes place in history. It is something that “happens”, and is produced by various techniques (the 'technology' of truth) rather than something that already exists and is simply waiting to be discovered. Foucault defines “regimes of truth” as the historically specific mechanisms, which produce discourses, which function as true in particular times and places. Thus truth according to Foucault is produced for that moment and therefore subjective. The challenges associated with results measurement of democracy advocacy are connected to the subjectivity of truth according to

Foucault's framework. In the case of SZC, the lack of consensus by the activists as to the success of the campaign, points to the subjective nature of results measurement.

6.6 Results – a battle between perceptions and assumptions

Despite the challenges associated with capturing results of advocacy initiatives, it is however imperative to note that there have been attempts to develop and use a results monitoring tool particularly for advocacy initiatives in Zimbabwe. This emerged during the interview with a senior officer who works for an international donor organisation that provides funding to CSOs in Zimbabwe. The officer said:

As an institution, we have our own advocacy (results measuring) tool, which we have been using since 2001/2002 thereabouts called the *Advocacy Index*. It is an evaluation tool, monitoring tool and a reporting tool. Therefore, it is 3 in 1. Where you have some indicators, which relate to advocacy, we look at how an organisation identifies an issue. How they share that information, how they even mobilise the people to rally behind it. How they do their power analysis. How they come up with alternative positions and eventually how they do the follow-on processes to see that if ever there is an alternative position which was presented in the portfolio committees. We used to work through Parliament portfolio committees and track it through the *Hansard* and everything the discussion in Parliament, the motions whether their issues are taken through and eventually the policies which come through and the Bills. We would track whether their input is actually coming through those Bills and the policies, which are actually passed by the Ministries. So for us, our success was measured by the evidence. If you see the partners articulating evidently that they were able to meet with this portfolio committee and presented this it validates the position. Then three weeks after that the Minister pronounced this in the Newspaper talking about this policy and the next thing is a Bill, which comes into play, and we were able to pick some of our input which was there then for us that is success. Therefore, for us it was very easy because this tool is evidence-based. Thus if there is no evidence you have not done anything (Interview 9, Harare, 15 October, 2015).

It is however important to note that even from the donors' point of view, they also experienced challenges in evaluating the SZC campaign. This challenge of evaluating the campaign was not shared with the implementing organisations. When asked as to why they faced the challenge of evaluating the campaign yet they had a tool such as the *Advocacy Index*, the donor representative cited the cumbersome process involved with applying the *Advocacy Index*. Furthermore, various donors who may have different systems of evaluating projects also funded the campaign either through individual organisations or through ZCA. This created a challenge about whose results tracking systems could be used during the SZC. When asked about whether the *Advocacy Index* was used to evaluate the SZC, the donor representative said:

For us that time we could not employ the *Advocacy Index* on the Save Zimbabwe Campaign, we were supporting this organisation (ZCA) but we know there were other donors who were supporting this organisation. Given the political terrain at that time, it was not easy because it is a very intensive kind of thing where you need to document; have some people collecting the evidence that is required, and so forth. The assessment is a four levels- self-assessment, (our organisation) assessment, (back) donor's assessment and then we have an independent panel that does the final assessment. For our scoring, we usually take the panel's scoring which then will be the binding score of whatever an organisation performed against its advocacy objectives and it used to work very well, I think we discontinued it some 2 to 3 years ago (Interview 9, Harare, 15 October, 2014).

The response from the donor representative above casts a spotlight on the practical challenges associated with evaluating results of a democracy advocacy initiative. Even the *Advocacy Index*, a mechanism developed ostensibly to evaluate advocacy initiatives in Zimbabwe could not be used to evaluate the SZC. Thus, an efficient and effective mechanism to collect data and determine if the objectives of the campaign were met was largely absent during the SZC. There was no system and process of checking if the campaign was making a difference in Zimbabwe. However, in a number of instances and in an unstructured manner, progress about the campaign was checked through update meetings with different stakeholders and narrative reports to

the donors. The lack of a robust mechanism to establish results of the campaign, apart from short-term and intermittent progress check meetings, points to the practical challenges of measuring results from democracy advocacy initiatives. These challenges include the fact that CSOs involved in advocacy are usually funded by a number of different donors. These different donors may also utilise different results measurement systems. Furthermore, the external operating environment such as the political situation may be a cause of threats to the campaign, which may make it difficult to implement an efficient and effective results measurement system. This is exacerbated by the fact that not enough is done to develop a point of convergence around key results (a few of them) and how to measure them for the campaign even if there are multiple donors with their own accountability templates, these would be secondary but there should be agreement on the key results which they are all motivated by for them to decide to invest in the campaign.

However, the majority of respondents provided mixed and sometimes contradictory views about the success of the campaign. When they said the campaign was successful, they would say so with a qualification. Those who argued that the campaign was a success pointed to a number of positive political developments that ensued after the campaign as directly connected to the efforts of the campaign. Three major aspects cited as outcomes associated with the campaign emerged:

a. Multi-stakeholder approach

The coming together of various “pro-democracy actors” to participate in the campaign is viewed by some activists as indicative of the success of the campaign. This is against a background of a fragmented civil society with CSOs who usually struggled to collaborate with each other and a split within the major opposition party the MDC then. This led to analysts like Makumbe (2007) to conclude that SZC was at that point, “the only show in town” as it united several and strategic pro-democracy activists and organisations.

b. Relatively free and fair 29 March elections

The relatively free and fair 29 March 2008 elections when ZANU-PF lost its majority in parliament, its presidential candidate (President Robert Mugabe) failed to garner a

majority win and trailed the opposition candidate in the first round of presidential elections. This was the first time that the ruling party ZANU-PF lost its majority in parliament since 1980. The fact that these elections took place in March 2008, about two years after the launch of the SZC, led to the drawing of direct linkages between the electoral outcomes and the campaign.

c. International response to the crisis

The condemnation by many international bodies of ZANU-PF government following the brutalisation of civil and political activists by the police during the SZC arranged 11 March 2007 “prayer rally”. This was followed by, the extraordinary summit on the Zimbabwean crisis held in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania on 28 and 29 March 2007, and the subsequent appointment of the then President of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki to mediate the Zimbabwean crisis. This was viewed as a major breakthrough of the campaign. Prior to the mediation and SZC, CSOs had tried to lobby regional bodies such as SADC and AU to intervene in order to solve the political crisis in Zimbabwe. The fact that this eventually happened after a SZC activity (11 March 2007 “prayer rally”), also lead to drawing a direct causality between SZC efforts and the outcome of the SADC intervention.

When asked about whether the campaign was successful or not, the former Advocacy and Information Officer at Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition gave mixed outcomes of the campaign. She states that "for me I think it was successful, or maybe I have two answers to it, a yes and a no". According to her, the campaign was successful because it led to the intervention of SADC after the disrupted 11 March 2007 prayer rally. This was a huge breakthrough given the fact that SADC had previously denied that Zimbabwe was in a political crisis. She was however quick to point to the failure of the campaign saying:

Where we failed, as a campaign is once the mediation process started, the momentum died. In terms of actually making sure that the values and demands that the campaign was trying to achieve were achieved once the mediation process started (Interview 1, Harare, 1 August, 2014).

A leading media freedom activist, who worked for a CSO that chaired the information thematic area of the campaign, also exhibited this mixed response to the question. He noted that overall the campaign failed to realize its objectives. When asked about the success of the SZC he said:

The SZC did not meet its objectives in terms of the funding it received; it did not as it was short-lived. The SZC was very short-lived; in fact, it was haphazard in the sense that it was a campaign, which was intermittent, but in the final analysis, it was not a successful campaign. I do not know what the real objectives were in terms of the proposals but in terms of the social, political impact, no it was not a success. Because the government overreacted, to SZC at one particular rally and beat up people and that brought attention of SADC (Interview 3, Harare, 16 August, 2014).

He further notes that what is normally viewed as a success of the SZC was in fact the unintentional results. He said:

Its advocacy angle became a success not necessarily of its own intention but on the basis of the reaction of the government. The government beat up people, tortured members of the SZC and that beating up, there was media publicity as a result, and then SADC met in Tanzania- Dar es Salaam. In this regard, it was a success (Interview 3, 16 August, 2014).

The evidence above points to misleading conclusions that often characterise complex development initiatives such as democracy advocacy when they are evaluated. In the case of the SZC, some CSO leaders and activists regard the much-heralded event that triggered the SADC intervention, (11 March 2007 “prayer rally” and the violence that ensued) as an unintended result of the campaign. However, this view can equally be contested in that although police brutality was not anticipated, the “prayer rally” was planned by the SZC. Consequently, challenges of attribution affect the effective results measurement in democracy advocacy as is in this case.

The mixed responses concerning the results of the SZC point to the fact that the campaign did not employ a robust mechanism to properly account for the results of

the campaign. Furthermore, it suggests a deficiency in results measurement mechanisms and processes that can adequately anticipate and capture results of advocacy initiatives such as the SZC. Results measurement in democracy advocacy is riddled with perceptual conclusions and varies depending on the stakeholder involved, the timing of the assessment and interests of the stakeholder. The evidence from SZC demonstrates that the assessment of an advocacy initiative varies depending on which stakeholder you ask. This is because different stakeholders have different interests and perceptions and therefore differ in conclusions.

6.7 Unwritten but expected results in democracy advocacy

This section deals with the complexity of measuring democracy advocacy. The complexity arises from unstated but expected results by donors. These are an extension of the perceptions and biases and different interests that the implementing organisations and donors have.

A major challenge affecting results measurement of democracy advocacy is the contradiction between unstated but expected results as opposed to the stated results in project documents. This scenario seems to obtain particularly when implementing politically sensitive projects such as SZC in a security challenging setting. For security reasons, project documents submitted to funding partners may be carefully worded to clearly demonstrate that the project is non-partisan. However, when donors fund these projects, they may have “covert agendas” and in that manner hope for certain outcomes of projects that cannot be stated in project documents. These include regime change expectations with expected outcomes such as a change in government. These expectations however, cannot be explicitly stated in a project document. This discrepancy further leads to different expectations. Further problems arise when an evaluation of project results is undertaken by those who may have had a different expectation to the outcomes of the projects with those who implemented it.

The “unstated but expected” goals and results vary depending on who is involved. For instance, all the SZC documents reviewed referred to the non-partisan nature of the campaign and made no reference to political activities especially designed to remove the incumbent government. However, various stakeholders had a different expectation

of the outcomes of the campaign. For instance one of the leading academics and CSO leaders then, the late John Makumbe, wrote about what he thought the campaign should focus on. In a newspaper article to commemorate the first year of the formation of the SZC, he stated that:

Save Zimbabwe Campaign (SZC) celebrates its first anniversary this week amid more rather than less problems for the nation. What with increased regime brutality against civic and opposition leaders, empty shelves in the shops, increased power and water cuts and the general impoverishment of the people, the Campaign has its work cut out to dethrone the dictator (in reference to President Robert Mugabe). The SZC is now even more relevant to the Zimbabwe crisis than it was when it was formed. Frankly, it is the only show in town, and has to be urged to continue its work in spite of some of its component members feeling fatigued. Then there are those that view the SZC as a convenient tool that they can use for their own sectional purposes. The Campaign must strenuously resist such elements and stay the course...The Campaign needs to engage in more rather than less incidents of confrontation with the dictator. A situation such as the one obtaining now is not healthy at all... The dictator is currently under the illusion that he has managed to quell the trouble that his regime faced in March 2007. The dictator feels triumphant, well, almost. This false self-confidence must be wiped off the dictator's face as quickly as possible if the hope of the people of this country is to be sustained. The dictator must find the SZC activists operating in all the areas that he decides to employ to fool the people of this bankrupt nation (Excerpt from *The Zimbabwean* newspaper published on 9 August, 2007).

This excerpt above exposes two critical aspects about the SZC. Firstly, the political agendas or perceived political objectives of the campaign by some of those who were involved are exposed. These objectives are different from the ones recorded in the proposals and other project documents. It also differs from the expectation of the leader of SZC as stated in the excerpt above.

The unstated results are not just on the side of donors; those who implemented the campaign also mentioned them. When asked about the overall objectives of the

campaign, a former programme officer responsible for the SZC but based at Crisis in Zimbabwe (another coordinating CSO that assisted with SZC but in the background) pointed to the existence of stated and unstated objectives of democracy advocacy initiatives. He noted that the SZC had unstated objectives of creating a platform that united civil society, which he termed the progressive movement. Rather than this being viewed as a strategy alone to advance the goals of the campaign, it should be noted that uniting the different pro-democracy actors including the two MDC factions ahead of the 2008 elections was a goal on its own for the SZC. It was however not stated explicitly in any of the project documents. This aspect was only revealed during the interviews with those who were involved with the campaign especially when it was mentioned as a direct success of the SZC.

This then presents a challenge when evaluating the results of the campaign. These aspects are not captured in project documents such as proposals and *logframes*. The level of importance allocated to these aspects can depend on stakeholder reviewing it. Such that when one assesses the impact of a democracy advocacy, one may deduce different conclusions depending on the vantage point of the stakeholder. This then lead this thesis to conclude that the success or lack thereof of a democracy advocacy campaign is indeed “in the eyes of the stakeholder”.

Secondly, it also exposes the fact that there may have been other stakeholders who were part of the campaign “for their own purposes...” There was a veiled attack on some of the stakeholders who are accused of not collaborating well with other stakeholders or were part of the Campaign to achieve their own selfish goals.

6.8 Limitations of the logic based accountability mechanism

A major issue that became evident during the interviews was the inadequacy of the logic based accountability mechanism to fully capture the results of advocacy. When asked about the effectiveness of the *logframe* in planning and capturing the results of advocacy initiatives, a CSO leader who was involved with the SZC stated that.

If I can be honest, sometimes when you are coming up with the log-frames especially for these highly political kind of projects, sometimes it is really

difficult to put out the indicators that you would want to see. I think you realise that we also had political parties in the SZC and to some extent there was this regime change kind of talk in terms of the end game. It (regime change) became an indicator for some of the actors. So while the programme document can speak to a democratic Zimbabwe. A democratic Zimbabwe to a CSO and a democratic Zimbabwe to a political party are different. A democratic Zimbabwe to a political party is when they are in government. As long as they are outside of government, it is not a democratic Zimbabwe. However for CSOs we can have benchmarks to say maybe we need a government that respects the rule of law, upholding human rights, government that provides social and economic services to its citizens. So to be able to capture that in a log-frame, it can be very challenging to an extent that you may have a set of indicators that are on the log-frame but another set of indicators that are in the minds of individuals or as they are working towards a goal, they may have their own goals which could be the reasons why civil society was left out of the mediation process (Interview 1, Harare, 1 August, 2014).

There is an element that the freely expressed views of CSO leaders concerning accountability mechanisms are contrary to the views these leaders communicate to the international donors. The fact that the respondents wanted to give “an honest response” exposes this contradiction. Furthermore, the interviewee above exposes the differences in the anticipated “end game” by different stakeholders.

While the CSO leader in the interviews above mentions terms such as *logframe* and indicators that are consistent with results measurement lexicon, there is a difference in how success is referred to. While the donor lexicon may refer to overall success of the intervention as “impact” – the CSO leader interviewed above referred to it as the “endgame”. He also referred to what is commonly known in donor jargon as “indicators” as “benchmarks”. This difference in use of terminology has a bearing with regards how results are measured. This aspect will be discussed in detail in the next chapter (section 7.3).

The logic based accountability mechanism forces CSOs to look at change in a limited manner that is usually quantifiable. A human rights lawyer who has worked for both civil society in Zimbabwe and for a funding agency, expressed the following sentiments:

It becomes very problematic if you want then to measure your success and achievements but you might still want to go back to the written because it's what still exists and it is the project document. But the way many project documents are structured based on historical experience, are very much inadequate in telling our story and what we have and have not achieved. They are not structured in telling the nuances that happen in the communities, the very low level kind of achievements. This is why many groups are looking at statistical and quantitative approaches to measuring impact will have difficulties in telling a qualitative approach/achievements because they are not used to that. They have just been used to the numbers game to say if you throw these numbers everyone will have a problem (Interview 6, Harare, 20 August, 2014).

The continued use of logical based models despite the apparent challenges cited by CSOs is based on convenience and the penchant to use quantifiable data. It is difficult to measure qualitatively. Other mechanisms that measure results qualitatively such as the Success Stories Approach (SSA) require a lot of time and resources. Unlike quantitative based reporting, the SSA involves production of “comprehensive stories” on what is regarded as successes of the project. The stories are compiled with the input of both development workers and beneficiaries. Hence a lot of time and resources are required to produce these “success stories”.

The difference in expectations also extends to stakeholders such as beneficiaries during downward accountability. The human rights lawyer stated that:

... what does change mean for you as civil society, what does change mean for you as the communities that you are working with, do they actually resonate to the change that you are talking about or your change and my change are two different things and I've learnt this overtime that with some of

the work that I have done, going out in the field you know speaking to people in the communities they would say no you are talking about change, for me change is not necessarily what you define, what are you defining as change; your change is Mugabe out Tsvangirai (opposition party leader) in, my change is my kids have they gone to school, have they been able to get food, that for me is change before I even move to that high level (Interview 6, Harare, 20 August, 2014).

Although the focus of this study was on upward accountability, the response above also points to how sometimes CSO led campaigns may alienate the general citizens. Expectations of change by different CSOs maybe different to what citizens expect. This scenario is consistent with conclusions in organisational accountability literature on how CSOs report more to donors after going through the process of bureaucratisation. With time, CSOs become less representative and consultative of citizens. Subconsciously, all efforts will be to keep good relations with donors for the sake of continued funding. This can be deemed pragmatic for the sake or organisational survival. With limited sources of funding, no donor funding may result in closure of the organisation.

Measuring results from a democracy advocacy particularly in a politically sensitive context is a serious challenge. This is so because of the limitations to how much information one can share about the campaign. While sharing information widely to all stakeholders may be desirable in order for stakeholders to have a common understanding of the campaign, this may actually endanger the campaign. Extensive sharing information may pre-empt strategies or lead to arrest and harassment of those involved. This limited sharing of information may lead to different stakeholders to base their evaluations on inaccurate or inadequate information and arrive at different conclusions concerning the results of democracy advocacy.

6.9 Challenges of measuring democracy advocacy results

This section presents the challenges associated with measuring democracy advocacy results. While it is important to ensure that CSOs especially those receiving donor funds account to donors on how they have used the funds and the results achieved as a result of their interventions, there are several challenges that were raised by

respondents. These challenges include constraints of time, the multi-actor nature of democracy advocacy, attitudes towards results monitoring tools and the operating environment.

6.9.1 Timing in democracy advocacy results measurement

From the information provided by respondents, it became apparent that for a proper evaluation of any democracy advocacy initiative, timing of the evaluation is critical. The fact that I conducted this research in 2014, five years after the SZC, gave the respondents a proper timeframe to connect the objective of the campaign with the political outcomes such as the SADC mediation, the 2008 elections, the Government of National Unity (GNU), the new Constitution – all regarded as outcomes of the SZC by some CSOs. Democracy advocacy is strongly linked to political developments and accountability. Political processes take time for results to be realised. The same conclusions were not going to be arrived at if the evaluation of the campaign was done shortly after the campaign in 2009. Connecting the objectives and the activities of the campaign with political outcomes was going to be difficult as some of the political developments were still underway. This reinforces the fact that development interventions, especially those that involve advocacy, can yield results but these results may be realised long after the intervention and in most instances after the closure of the project.

The current project approach to development practice impedes the adoption of a long-term approach to evaluation. It is characterised by short time-bound interventions and results are expected to be reported through mechanisms such as narrative reports. Sometimes project evaluations are conducted but usually it will be shortly after the project has ended. In the case of SZC, the final project report including the results of the Campaign was expected within two months after the project end date. Critical outcomes may be missed under this approach as some results take time to be realised. It is my submission that in light of the above observation, this thesis advances the argument that it is still possible to measure the impact of democracy advocacy initiatives conducted by CSOs. However, for the results measurement to be effective, it should take place after a minimum period of five years after the completion of the campaign. This way, the evaluation process is in a position to consider different

political developments that usually follow an electoral cycle and test possible linkages to the democracy advocacy initiative. This would minimise spurious correlations.

6.9.2 The multi-stakeholder approach of democracy advocacy

Although democracy advocacy is best achieved through the working together of different actors, as was the set up during the SZC. This multi-stakeholder approach presents a huge challenge when accounting for results. The fact that there are different stakeholders, who may have different interests and expectations, exposes the initiative and its results to varying interpretations. Demonstration of results under this set up becomes difficult. In the case of SZC, this challenge was highlighted by a senior CSO leader who said:

I think the problem that we have, unfortunately, is that we did not have a conversation that we entered into with donors in terms of how we were going to evaluate this activity. It was definitely a campaign in as far as those who were involved in shaping this intervention are concerned. The campaign had a timeframe, but donors were coming into this campaign supporting particular projects so you would have various donors putting money into the campaign but they are not looking at what the campaign should achieve in total. So different aspects of this campaign would be supported by different donors. So it was up to us to say what is it that we want to do that needed support and what objectives do we have that were agreed upon (Interview 26, Harare, 2015).

The SZC was a sum total of activities implemented by the individual organisations and those implemented collectively through the coordination of the ZCA. Aggregating the outcome of these activities and agreeing to these outcomes may pose a serious challenge. Thus the problem with different stakeholders involved is not just between CSOs and donors; it also extends to differences among CSOs themselves. This further reinforced by the senior CSO leader who said:

It is not an easy process where you are bringing together various civil society organisations. You are talking about students, you are talking about lawyers, and you are talking about workers. All have their own way of doing things...

also look at the political parties with their own interests and so forth. Some of them wanted to control the process and wanting to gain some limelight out of the process so it was not an easy process to manage because it sometimes has conflicting interests (Interview 26, Harare, 2015).

A leading human rights lawyer who worked for both civil society and the donor community supports the view above. He argued that the challenge is not in the results measurement tools themselves, but a relational issue among the stakeholders. It manifests itself through a failure to agree or share the anticipated results of project among stakeholders:

I think they (results measurement tools and frameworks) are very much applicable; the challenge that I think faced by such a project is that from inception there probably was no shared understanding of what the impact was going to be (Interview 6, Harare, 20 August, 2014).

When asked why there was no shared understanding of the impact, he said:

I think it was both; limited understanding in so far as you are bringing in together different actors whose interests might be very sectoral or thematic. Furthermore, you are bringing in different actors whose interests might be political or otherwise. You had political parties as part of this campaign who were interested in using this platform for political objectives whereas some of civil society were interested in using the platform for a very civil objective which was not in any way political; political the sense of the outcome is MDC in power. I would imagine for those that designed the program, because I was not part of that it was very difficult to say what will be used as a tool of measurement for our impact or achievement (Interview 6, Harare, 20 August, 2014).

Thus different social actors involved with the democracy advocacy initiative may have different interests emanating from the sector they represent. He further points to the challenge of trying to come up with evaluation tools retrospectively:

Doing that retrospectively becomes difficult because your standard of measure might not necessarily be shared and what you might use as probably your indicators or baseline of measurement to say this is the impact will be a little bit controversial and controverted by others because of the fact that there was no shared understanding (Interview 6, Harare, 20 August, 2014).

It becomes evident that the greatest asset in any democracy advocacy that of *multistakeholderism*, becomes a stumbling block to effective evaluation of the democracy advocacy campaign such as SZC. Different stakeholders bring different interests and expectations to the campaign. These differences invariably lead to different conclusions concerning the results of the advocacy initiative.

One option to the challenge of multi stakeholder approach would be to limit the number of stakeholders involved with the campaign. This however presents another dilemma as most successful democracy advocacy relies on the “power of numbers”. Power holders usually give in to demands when the number of those making noise about an issue or issues is bigger.

6.9.3 Measuring tools viewed as driven by international donors

While appreciating the value and principle of accounting for results for any development intervention including democracy advocacy, many respondents felt that the final tools and approaches being used in project and programme evaluation were largely donor driven. There was a general view by CSOs nevertheless that went beyond just the SZC. This view was that most results measurement tools come in the form of templates such as *logframes* and there was very little room to negotiate beyond the set template. Responses from the interviews suggest that CSOs use these tools because they know their funding is dependent on them. At the same time however there is a clear consensus that the tools are inadequate in that they do not cover the actual outcomes achieved. In the case of SZC, the tools were inappropriate as they lacked flexibility associated with complex civil society advocacy initiatives conducted in a highly fluid political environment. The limited flexibility will be demonstrated in the next chapter (section 7.9.1 and 7.9.2), a section that analyses the *logframe* that was used comparing it with the results of the campaign. The problem of donor-driven tools was expressed by a senior CSO leader who said:

The problem has been you have somebody flying in from the United States of America, from Washington D.C and they believe a tool that they have used in Washington, D.C. or somewhere else where they have been supporting should be cut and pasted in Zimbabwe. Furthermore, you cannot tell that person (international donor) anything else because they believe that they are the best; their tools are the best. It is not for lack of experience or lack of development of custom-made tools locally; it is for the disregard of local initiatives by the donors. I speak on this matter with authority as somebody who has been working in civil society for many years. Some of the donors will look at civil society with contempt. They think these guys know nothing; you need money, we are going to give you the money and we want you to use this money this way. You will measure the effectiveness of your project this way. This is how you are going to develop a *logframe*. If it does not cater for this and that, that *logframe* is not really a *logframe* (Interview 23, Harare, 15 March, 2015).

The view above apart from confirming the notion of donor driven tools and assessment frameworks, also exposes the North –South divide in development practice. The North is often associated with superiority complexes on how development should be conducted.

Furthermore, there is confirmation of findings in most NGO accountability studies on the fact that most NGOs are accountable to donors (upward accountability) rather than to beneficiaries (downward accountability) and their sector (horizontal).

6.9.4 Uncertainty of advocacy

Another complexity of measuring results of democracy advocacy is the uncertainty of advocacy initiatives themselves. With the SZC, new political developments such as the violence by the police against citizens on 11 March 2007 and the death of an activist on that day as well as the subsequent arrest of CSO leaders, were not anticipated at the time conceptualising. Unlike other civil society strategies such as capacity building through trainings and education through awareness-raising, the processes and outcomes of advocacy are unpredictable. Even with the SZC, it can be concluded that the much-heralded 11 March 2007 aborted prayer rally, even took the

organisers by surprise. All that the campaign had planned for that event was a gathering of activists to be addressed by key CSO and political leaders.

Another turn of events was the MDC formations joining the negotiations. This to a larger extent weakened the campaign as the mass mobilising capacity normally associated with political parties in Zimbabwe was weakened. Although the SADC mediated negotiations resulted in the formation of the GNU, it can be equally argued that the demands of the campaign, as envisioned at the conceptualising stage, were not fully realised. In his emphasis of the fact that the 11 March events were not planned in the manner they turned out to be, a media freedom activist said:

I don't think the rally was intended to have people beaten up and contextually I don't know if the donor cared, there is no context with these tools- that's the major challenge and the contingency element requires the direct approval of the donor. So the organisation is actually the will of the person who gave them the money but with the anticipation that once you meet all the requirements there will be another cycle of funds (Interview 3, Harare, 16 August, 2014).

The above points to the fallacy concerning the relationship between CSOs and donors on democracy advocacy. In this regard, there are averments to the effect that donors do not care about the means but the ends of the SZC. Thus donors only cared about the final outcomes and not how they were realised. Furthermore, it exposes the power dynamics embedded within the CSO-donor relationship. Any changes to the implementation plan usually require direct approval by the donor.

Furthermore, when CSOs tried to be part of the SADC mediated negotiations to ensure that their issues were addressed during the negotiations, they were completely excluded. They had to resort to advocacy and lobbying as “outsiders” by way of issuing public statement on what they think the negotiations should address. This aspect of “advocacy as outsiders” meant that the CSO leaders had to change tactics and these changes were not foreseen at the time of conceptualising the campaign. Another CSO leader who also has experience working for the donor community further highlighted the uncertainty and lack of proper planning:

In this instance in the SZC, I think it was done on the go. Things were evolving as issues emerged and people were perfecting and trying to polish their interventions on the move. So there was no reflection to say okay this is where we want to go and this is how we are going to go about it. So for ordinary democracy and governance projects, it is possible but the challenge I think in this context is for far too long measurement of success (Interview 6, Harare, 20 August, 2015).

The uncertainty of advocacy initiatives makes it difficult to account properly for results of democracy advocacy and accurately attribute them to the campaign itself. The uncertainty and unpredictability that characterised the SZC is the nature of most democracy advocacy initiatives. Events and processes do not usually follow a linear pattern in terms of planned activities and outcomes. This uncertainty poses a major challenge especially when logic based models are used in the final evaluation. Clear linkages and causalities may be difficult to attain.

6.9.5 Technocracy vs. activism - Anyone who could throw a stone

A major concern expressed by respondents on results monitoring and evaluation tools is the fact that the tools are in most instances, sophisticated and technical. These findings relate to the general use of these tools in development practice by CSOs in Zimbabwe. The general feeling was the entire results evaluation discourse is replete with technical jargon that often confuses CSOs but is well understood by bureaucrats within the donor community. This is compounded by the fact that activists who may have little appreciation of these tools and lack the requisite capacity to apply the “donor driven” tools work for most CSOs. This scenario results in the ambivalent or indifferent approach to these tools and frameworks. According to a former information and advocacy officer involved with a CSO that was very active during SZC, “Technocrats, who are donors in the case, are the ones who developed these tools and sometimes they develop them outside of the people who are supposed to be using them” (Interview 1, Harare, 8 August, 2014). Another CSO leader further elaborates this aspect:

I think the issues that we have is that most of these civil society organisations are activist in nature and they may not have the required personnel to do that kind of stuff. So whereas they may not be averse to having that kind of assessment, they may not have the capacity to do so which means that CSOs also need capacity building in terms of training their staff to appreciate all these tools of assessment. They may not know, they may not be averse so I think when they do their reports and those things are not seen or they are not answered adequately. It is not because they do not want but it is because they do not have the skills to do that. This is because in a crisis-ridden country such as Zimbabwe during the period of the Save Zimbabwe Campaign, anyone who could throw a stone, anyone who could say something against ZANU-PF and could just mobilise people to oppose this regime was relevant. Anyone who could do something that could make people aware of the oppression that was taking place in the country was useful and could be funded. However, when it comes to the issues of financial accountability, they had no training in accounting; they had no training in all those things such as management. Therefore, when donors fund these things, they should also put aside resources to train recipients of their money on how to handle it and do a skills training for them to make sure that they understand all aspects that you are talking about (Interview 5, Harare, 19 August, 2014).

Another leading media freedom advocate who was part of SZC reinforced this view:

To some extent civil society struggles to come to terms with what they are doing and the effect that it has. I know that it has taken me a long time to actually think, well we have had an effect here. We have failed to note the difference and actually explain it to our donors...Many of us are just enthusiastic amateurs...I am not an organisational development manager. I am a journalist. So the first thing and the only thing I try to do is communicate with the people. Now I have to report back to some other organisation to say this is how I have been communicating and these are the indicators (Interview 15, Harare, 18 December, 2014).

It is evident from the above two interviewees (5 and 15) that the current accountability tools are regarded as technical and sophisticated beyond the general comprehension of the majority of CSO staff. This aspect points to a dichotomy between activists (CSOs) and technocrats (donors). This is despite the fact that in the majority of cases, these two parties will be working to achieve the same ultimate goals.

However, this notion of the tools being regarded as technical and beyond the capacity of CSO leaders is strongly rebutted by a former student leader and currently monitoring and evaluation specialist working for a donor agency in Zimbabwe. In refuting this claim, he said:

Some of them (CSO leaders) are not mere activists they are technocrat-activists. They are executive activists. I was an activist myself when I was a student leader. I did Political Science and Administration at the University of Zimbabwe. I learnt how to develop a *logframe* in my second year, how to present a results framework, what is an indicator and a target and the difference between the two. How do you develop a good indicator, clear objectives and adequate measurable data? I did that when I was still at university. When I became a technocrat, the results are there for everyone to see in the quality of proposals. We have so many activists in civil society who are also strong in terms of technocratic competencies. How can someone, for instance, be able to draft a legal paper with well-written head of arguments if you are not a technocrat? So it is just an excuse...some of the civil society leaders have gone to some universities in United Kingdom, South Africa and Netherlands. They have Masters degrees and they did research methods...passing with flying colours...Therefore it is just laziness...maybe we need to conduct a study that we have this group of brilliant people but who are failing to deliver in terms of articulating their results (Interview 25, Harare, 25 March, 2015).

The contesting views between CSOs leaders and international donors concerning the tools used for evaluation have existed for some time in development practice. This is based on the fact that different sectors will have different interests in a project or

initiative. However, despite these differences in approaches to the tools, CSOs continue to use the tools. This is because of the dependency on donor funds. With these contestations, the evaluation of democracy advocacy becomes challenging.

Results measurement frameworks and tools are not an “exact science”. They evolve over time. This means that CSOs have to keep abreast with new tools through capacity building. More importantly, there is a need for customization of tools to suit local context and co-creation when it comes to developing these tools.

6.9.6 Security and documentation

It is standard practice that results measurement for any development intervention thrives on good data management and record keeping. Documentation may start from the pre-intervention to check the state of affairs before intervening. This is commonly referred to as baseline research in monitoring and evaluation. All activities should be recorded well and information kept where it is safe and easily accessible by the project team. In this manner, it will become possible to track progress and measure impact when you compare what was realised against what the situation was before the intervention. However, when a democracy advocacy initiative is conducted in a security-constrained environment such as the one that was obtaining in Zimbabwe during the SZC, processes of documenting project data becomes difficult. Consequently with little or no record of what activities took place and achievements during the project period, it becomes difficult to measure results of democracy advocacy initiatives. Missing data included the number of participants to most meetings of the campaign, or who participated in the strategic planning. Despite the existence of critical documents like the project proposal and strategy documents and donor reports, communications between donors and SZC, which took place outside the official letters, was missing. The gaps in information that usually characterises democracy advocacy campaigns, makes it difficult to connect intentions of the campaign to the political outcomes. This sometimes led to spurious connections between activities of the campaign and the political outcomes thereby inaccurately concluding that the advocacy campaign has achieved its intended goals.

6.9.7 Challenges of sustaining an advocacy initiative

It is difficult to achieve a sustained approach and momentum in democracy advocacy. This is not only because of the hindrances such as the repressive operating environment like the one obtaining during the SZC, but also because of the multi-actor approach of the campaign. Where many actors are involved, each actor may have their own interests to take care of and may withdraw from the overall campaign once they think their interests have been satisfied. As was the case with the SZC, when the opposition parties were invited to the negotiating table during the SADC mediation, they withdrew from the campaign. It appeared their interests had been realised. This puts pressure on the remaining stakeholders to achieve the overall advocacy goals. In the case of SZC, the remaining CSOs continued advocating for democratic reforms and good governance without other stakeholders such as the main opposition parties.

As campaigns are issue based, they are time bound. They usually end when the issue is addressed. However, running an advocacy campaign such as SZC is complex and challenging. The complexity brought about by both the multidimensionality and unpredictability of advocacy demands that actors have to constantly re-strategise. This is because they have to constantly react to unanticipated social and political developments. This was demonstrated by ZCA who sought project realignment and budget adjustments from the donor in light of changes to the project because of the shifts in political terrain. This makes tracking of outcomes a huge challenge. Events do not always happen in a linear model such that one can track the results following a set of implemented activities. Neither do situations remain fixed in planning models such as logical frameworks.

The exclusion of CSOs from the official SADC mediation process, which is lampooned by most CSOs involved with the SZC, attests to the fact that the goals by political parties especially the MDC formations could have been different to those of CSOs. Therefore, trying to account for results under these circumstances becomes difficult.

6.10 Conclusion

This chapter presented data from fieldwork. From the data presented, the SZC, received its funding from international donors. This funding became structured soon after the 11 March 2007 aborted “prayer rally” and was channelled to ZCA through an intermediary INGO. Member organisations of the campaign continued to receive their funding from international donors separately from the main coordinating organisation. Funding was received after submission of funding proposal and reporting mechanisms were incorporated into the contracts governing the relationship between the main donor, intermediary organisation, and the implementing organisation. By the time the SZC was initiated, CSOs in Zimbabwe had developed an appreciation of the different results frameworks and the principle behind them. However, most respondents were of the view that the current results tools, especially the logic based ones, were inadequate to capture results of democracy advocacy initiatives. They felt that donors, in order to serve their own interests, prescribed these tools.

The SZC did not have a robust mechanism to monitor and document its results. The success of the campaign is contestable. The contestability of the outcome of the campaign emanates from the various challenges associated with advocacy initiatives such as the SZC. Because of different phases to the campaign, the involvement of a multiplicity of actors including international donors, it becomes difficult to account properly for the results of the campaign. Each stakeholder, including international donors, had different anticipated results of the outcomes including ways to evaluate the campaign. The situation is compounded by other factors such as the adverse political situation that made it difficult to document activities of the campaign properly.

This chapter has argued that by their nature, advocacy initiatives such as the SZC are complicated. This is because of factors such as involvement of a multiplicity of actors and unpredictable processes and outcomes. The complexity of advocacy interventions will consequently affect the way results are tracked and presented to stakeholders such as international donors.

The next chapter will examine in detail how CSOs in Zimbabwe involved in democracy advocacy cope with and adapt to the demands of upward accountability in the context of different typologies of communications. It will further explore ways in which the results tools and approaches, especially for advocacy initiatives, can be improved.

CHAPTER SEVEN

CSOs in Zimbabwe and international donors – the salience of communication in upward accountability

7.1 Introduction

This chapter is the second and final chapter on data presentation and analysis. This chapter deals with how CSOs, in their quest to become accountable to donors, navigate the already asymmetric relationship between them and the donors. In exploring this, I sought to understand if a common understanding existed between CSOs in Zimbabwe and donors in terms of what constitutes results of advocacy initiatives. I also examined the role of discourse, especially the types of communication used by CSOs during their interaction with donors and the effect it has on results measurement. I used Foucault's theoretical approach to discourse and power/knowledge framework to explore the types of communication used by CSO when they interact with international donors.

Having established in the previous chapter that measurement of results of democracy advocacy is a complex but necessary process in development practice, this chapter further explores ways in which tools to measure the impact of democracy advocacy initiatives can be improved. This chapter relied heavily on the SZC project documents. The documents include project proposals, narrative reports and minutes of meetings. Data was also drawn from interviews with CSO leaders and selected donor representatives.

Three main findings are presented in this chapter. Firstly, the accountability requirements place a huge burden on the already asymmetrical relationship between CSOs and donors. Donors usually assume a privileged position of power within the relationship because they provide financial resources to CSOs that do not have alternative sources of funding. To cope with this asymmetrical relationship, CSOs resort to adaptive behaviour through a combination of reluctant compliance and compromise.

Secondly, discourse, especially communication and the donor lexicon, plays a critical role in the evaluation of advocacy initiatives. During the interaction between CSOs and donors, different types of communication are used and inadvertently, they have an effect on results measurement.

The third major finding presented in this chapter is that despite the challenges associated with measuring results of advocacy initiatives, results accountability is still a necessary and desirable practice in development. The major question will then relate to what kind of effective upward accountability mechanisms (new regime of practice) should be developed and used.

7.2 Democracy advocacy in Zimbabwe – who calls the shots?

In order to understand how CSOs pragmatically satisfy the upward accountability requirements, it is important to briefly consider the relationship between CSOs and donors in Zimbabwe. It focuses particularly on the power dynamics between the two groups. This section explores how development of the relationship between CSOs focused on in this study and donors, how it becomes asymmetric and how is and how it is managed within the context of upward accountability.

The relationship between CSOs and donors is critical to understanding the challenges and complexity of measuring the results of advocacy initiatives. The relationship building between CSOs and donors can be analysed from three broad categories. These categories are: initiation, implementation and closure phases⁵.

7.2.1 Initiation phase

The relationship between CSOs and donors in Zimbabwe is initially based on shared values, norms and principles. These values, norms and principles range from democratic values such as citizen participation and consultations, equal opportunity and freedom of choice to human rights norms such as human dignity and freedoms. The deficiency of these values, norms and principles in some developing countries such as Zimbabwe, become “issues of concern” for citizens and governments,

⁵ These categories are adapted from Project Life Cycle phases.

particularly from the developed countries. These “issues of concern” may also affect citizens in the developing countries. This will result in the formation of CSOs such as the ZCA that work on these issues. However, most CSOs in developing countries lack resources to adequately advocate for “issues of concern” to be addressed. In the case of SZC, the “issues of concern” related to democracy, good governance and the respect and promotion of human rights.

Most times, democracy and good governance funding from international donors is theme based and tied to their values and norms. Donors, through various processes such as mapping exercises, context analysis and strategic planning, accentuate these values that they believe their funding should best support. It should also be noted that some donors are influenced by their foreign policies. Foreign policy considerations usually affect bilateral aid provided by embassies and to lesser extent development agencies. Under this arrangement of shared values and norms based on the “issues of concern”, donors fund organisations that share their values and projects that seek to promote these values.

Donors utilise instruments such as “Calls for Proposals” to solicit projects and programmes that they can fund. In most cases, donors spell out the thematic areas to be funded and other terms and conditions of the funding and processes required during the application process. These “Calls for Proposals” are usually published in newspapers or shared online on platforms such as websites of donors. Interested CSOs will apply for funding trying to match the thematic areas espoused in the “Call for Proposals”. However, there are instances in which CSOs approach donors soliciting funding outside the system of ‘Calls for Proposals’. Nevertheless, there will still be a process of matching the donor thematic areas with the projects that the organisations will be pitching for possible funding. CSOs who were part of the SZC but funded separately to the ZCA activities, utilised the different “Calls for Proposals” mechanism to solicit funding. However, for the coordination of the SZC through the ZCA, funding was secured through donor interaction. The ZCA still had to submit a project proposal though.

Minutes of a donors meeting held at [redacted] to discuss Save Zimbabwe Campaign Proposal.
16 May 2007: 09:00 - 1100hrs

Present: [redacted] (2) (1) (3) (4)

The purpose of the meeting was to:

- comment on the proposal that was submitted by CAZ
- sound donors for possible commitments

The meeting was a follow up to the meeting that was held at [redacted] on 6 May 2006 at which CAZ made a presentation to the donors. The SZC campaign theme is "we will vote in 2008 under a new democratic constitution".

Comments on proposal

- The donors agreed that the submitted proposal had a lot of overlaps with SZC member organisations. For instance: elections are done by [redacted] constitution by [redacted] advocacy and lobbying by [redacted]. Donors are already funding SZC member organisations such as the [redacted]. There would need to consider areas where SZC had comparative advantage for instance the involvement in the Mbeki initiative.
- Social welfare did not fit in the proposal.
- The budget is also confusing. [redacted] for the running costs and salaries of CAZ. SZC is the project of CAZ and as such it will be the managing organisation. [redacted] also provided funding to CAZ.
- Experience so far had shown that there was a wide gap between the expectations on what is planned and what is carried out and this has to do with both the political environment and the capacity of CAZ/SZC. SZC had planned a series of prayer meetings and these have not been carried out giving doubts to donors of SZC's a reliability as an implementer. SZC should therefore limit its activities to those which can achieve the greatest impact maintaining that it is a campaign. Donors felt that SZC might not be in a position to absorb the funds. } report part
- SZC should decide on their core business. What can they do best? The mandate of SZC is coordination and communication of united activities. There will be no need for SZC to act as a financier of organisations by getting all the funds in a basket and deciding on which organisation gets what. Besides the lack of capacity, this will increase conflicts among members.
- It was noted that donors were already funding SZC member organisations in the various thematic areas and these have comparative advantage in terms of accountability and experience in the thematic area. However there was need for SZC to take up issues that could not be implemented by member organisation for instance: in the case of elections there was need for public mobilisation on voter registration for youths; campaign on the issuing of Identity cards and fundamental electoral reforms.

Source: Minutes of donors Meeting on SZC

The excerpt of donors meeting above are loaded with how donors exercise their power over CSOs, in this case ZCA. There are no indications of ZCA being given the right of reply or to proactively defend some of the contents of the proposal. It appears donors would assess the proposal based on their own understanding of the needs and expectations.

While the system of funding based on shared values, norms and principles seems a plausible approach for connecting local CSOs and international donors, it sometimes comes with a political risk and presents a complexity in situations where there is no common agreement and acceptability of certain values. There are cases when international donors have been accused of trying to impose Western value systems, including political systems in a manner akin to imperialism. This has been the case in Zimbabwe where the ZANU-PF government often dismisses various principles of democracy, good governance and human rights as alien to Zimbabwe society. CSOs in Zimbabwe working in the area of democracy, good governance and human rights are often vilified for sharing the same value system as donors mainly from Western countries. Many labels such as “agents of regime change,” “stooges of the West” and “foot soldiers of hostile governments” who are bent on destabilising the country, have been attributed to various CSOs in Zimbabwe. Newspaper headlines such as “*Government Closes in on NGOs*”, *Financial Gazette*, 30 May 2013; “*Mpofu accuses NGOs of Regime Change Agenda*,” *Newsday*, 13 June, 2011; “*ZANU-PF Government Won’t Tolerate NGOs with Regime Change Agenda*,” *VOA*, 21 October 2013, confirm the thinking by ZANU-PF government that CSOs are working unconstitutionally to remove the government. This sentiment was widespread during the time of SZC. In reference to the work of CSOs and Western donors, the then ZANU-PF chairperson, John Nkomo said “they are creating an unAfrican culture, giving money to people to remove their leaders. They are fronts for regime change who have no real purpose and reason to be in the country” (*The Herald Newspaper* 2007: 2).

The type of labelling mentioned above is usually formulated to discredit the work of CSOs in Zimbabwe whose programmes may result in exposing the gross human rights perpetrated by the state. During the SZC for instance, the ZANU-PF government rejected calls from most CSOs for the return of the rule of law and respect of human rights. Soon after the 11 March 2007 violent repression of dissenting citizen voices, the police issued two reports entitled “*Opposition Forces in Zimbabwe: A Trail of Violence*” (the first report) and “*Opposition Forces in Zimbabwe: The Naked Truth, Volume 2*” (the second report). In these reports, the police accused various Western countries of working in collaboration with CSOs in Zimbabwe to render the country ungovernable. There was no mention of human

rights violations by the government in the reports. In fact, the reports denied the accusations of police brutality in Zimbabwe, as were the claims by CSOs. The two reports from the police accused CSOs and opposition political parties as the main perpetrators of political violence.

Although many international donors have good intentions in what they fund, there were some concerns that some donors may indeed be involved in covert operations. This points to the fact that not all donors keep to the “issues of concern” when providing funding to CSOs in developing countries. Some donors may have “covert agendas”. During the interviews, a CSO leader who has a long track record of working for democracy and good governance in Zimbabwe dating back to the 1990s admitted that in some instances, there may be implied complicity of CSOs to work towards “regime change”. He linked this to the unfortunate strategy by most CSOs to work in partnership with the main opposition political party and those donors would still support these organisations though. He said:

I think it is fair to say that the government's perspective increasingly became that civics were involved in regime change agenda of a particular kind. Civics are always interested in regimes that are in the way regime works (in reference to issues of democracy, good governance and social service delivery to citizens etc.), but this explicitly became political regime change and that was to remove ZANU-PF (Interview 11, Harare, 23 October, 2014).

He further argued that:

Civics are dissimulating and dishonest if they do not accept that many of these institutions that were created by the civics had that implicit goal (of “regime change”). Government quite rightly saw these forces ... as the bringing of all these civics to support the MDC in a very explicitly process. That was very unfortunate (Interview 11, Harare, 23 October, 2014).

Accordingly, accusations and speculations that some elements of CSOs were working towards effecting regime change have dominated the civil and political discussions in Zimbabwe. The accusations, raised mostly by the ZANU-PF government have been around since the formation of a strong opposition party MDC in 1999. The “regime

change agenda” has dominated the Zimbabwean political narrative since the formation of the MDC. Although accusations of seeking regime change have been extended to CSOs funded by international donors they have also been directed at international donors themselves. A CSO leader, who was working as an regional advocacy officer during the SZC said:

Donors also had their own intentions. They wanted to see a certain change. I will be honest that donors in one way or another wanted the government of ZANU-PF to be removed. That was at the back of their heads. At many occasions, civil society was being pushed to be partisan to the extent that you needed even to resist. When you resisted you could not be funded. However, the 31st of July (2013) election results created to me a normalcy in terms of the interactions between donors and civil society. Everyone became sober to say I think we need to focus on democratic change than removal of a particular government (Interview 18, Harare, 23 December, 2014).

These perceptions and accusations of a covert regime change agenda cause problems for civil society and international donors, especially when accounting for results of funded projects and programmes and the consequent assessment of projects by international donors. As has been argued in the previous chapter, there is the creation of “expected but unwritten results” in the minds of donors. This “hide and seek” relationship between CSOs and foreign donors may consequently lead to tensions and strained relationships between the two, particularly when it comes to the evaluation of democracy advocacy initiatives.

Nevertheless, most CSOs working in this field are guided by values such as democracy, good governance, respect and protection of human rights and human dignity. It should be noted however that there could be sometimes blurred lines between some of these values and what is referred to as “regime change”. This is because strong democratic culture and institutions may form the strong basis for democratic change of government. It is most often the case that CSOs in Zimbabwe pursue these values diligently despite the vilification and sometimes persecution and harassment by the state. For example, organisations such as the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum and the Zimbabwe Peace Project have recorded many cases of

state-sponsored persecution of CSO leaders in Zimbabwe. The persecutions range from threats, disappearances and arrests using trumped up charges. This persecution has been widely interpreted as a carefully orchestrated plan by the state to frustrate CSOs that are critical of the ZANU-PF government.

During the ZSC, the main coordinating organisation (ZCA) did not respond to the “Call for Proposals” instruments when soliciting funding. The organisation used the method of approaching “likeminded” donors to pitch its ideas about the campaign. This was later followed by a submission of proposals that formed a basis to start a relationship with donors. This initial approach by ZCA to donors showed that the CSO was concerned with the political and economic developments in Zimbabwe, had mobilised other likeminded CSOs and had what is thought were solutions and solicited for funding from donors. Donors mostly from the West had demonstrated a penchant for funding, among other issues, democracy related activities conducted by CSOs.

This process demonstrated that on one hand, CSOs possessed the skills and ideas on how the situation in Zimbabwe could be solved. On the other hand, donors were concerned with the situation but also had the financial resources required enabling CSOs to act. At this stage there seems to be no hierarchical relationship between CSOs and donors. The relationship was based on mutual respect for each other. This was to change later with time as the relationship moved to subsequent stages.

What is critical to note was that at this stage, ZCA had first promoted the idea to donors without any formal written proposal. It could have been that at this stage biases and perceptions about what the campaign and what it could achieve may have formed in the minds of donors. Eventually, ZCA wrote a project proposal detailing the campaign, how it was going to be conducted and the anticipated results. Thus there was a shift from informal (promoting an idea of campaign to prospective donors) to the formal (written project proposal). As will be demonstrated in the subsequent sections, this shift between the informal and the formal interaction between CSOs and donors affects the effective evaluation of democracy advocacy initiatives.

7.2.2 Implementation phase

Initially, when the relationship between CSOs and donors is established, in many but not all times, through a shared value system, other factors come into effect. Two major factors characterise the implementation phase. These are funds and capacity to implement projects. For projects to be implemented, they require funding. This is what the donors provide. On the other hand, for projects to be executed, they require the capacity of CSOs in the form of technical expertise, staff and networks to carry out the proposed activities. Theoretically, this forms a mutual partnership as each stakeholder brings something to the table. It should be noted however that funding gradually replaces the value system as the “glue” holding together the relationship between CSOs and international donors. Without funding, the relationship between CSOs and donors would not be as strong as compared to when funding is provided to CSOs.

In practice, this partnership, based on funding, also presents challenges for CSOs in Zimbabwe for two primary reasons. Firstly, the ZANU-PF government has viewed funding to CSOs by Western donors with scepticism. This is seen as a natural progression from an adoption of a foreign value system, as has been argued in the previous section, to the further sponsoring of projects that are inimical to the interests of the Zimbabwean government. This thinking has led the government of Zimbabwe, among other things, to try and control funding to CSOs in Zimbabwe through efforts such as enactment of legislations such as the Non-Governmental Organisations Bill of 2004.

The second major problem is the fact that most CSOs rely on donor funding without alternatives to finance their activities. Sources of alternative funding will be from local public donations by citizens and the business community. Alternative sources of funding would come from economic activities that generate income that can be invested into these social initiatives. Furthermore, members paying subscriptions could constitute an alternative source of funding. It is important to note that given the poor state of the economy in Zimbabwe at the time of SZC, it would have been very difficult to pursue these other sources of alternative funding to the one provided by international donors. Thus, the reliance on international donor funding leaves them in

a vulnerable position, as they are negotiating from a weaker position. As the relationship between CSOs and donors hinge on money, this has implications on results measurement. A CSO leader, who is a staunch advocate for media freedom in Zimbabwe accused donors of deviating from being “supporters of change” to actually being the “drivers of change”. He said:

To begin with, donor organisations were really helpful. They listened to us. They supported what we suggested to them. I have noticed in recent months and perhaps the last two years that there has been a dramatic change in the way they deal with things. Yes there has been a shortage of money but I don't see how shortage of money would turn them into drivers of agendas rather than supporters of agendas. Yes they can say we have money for democracy and good governance, that is fine because that is what we are all fighting for but then they all say that we need to focus on this particular thing and when that fails, they say we need you to be innovative...is this a test? Why can't they say this is the sort of thing we can give you support for or we agree with your ideas. How can we give you more support? Often they look and think that they are not getting value for money because the indicators do not provide sufficient evidence that there is change, (Interview 15, Harare, 18 December, 2014).

A consequence of an unequal relationship between CSOs and international donors based funding manifests itself though agenda setting. From the responses provided, there was a general feeling that because donors are the funders, they also set the agenda on what CSOs should work on. The tensions between CSOs and international donors extend beyond accountability mechanisms and processes to issues of agenda setting and control. This is as a result of reliance on donor funding by CSOs. CSOs become an extension of the international donor community. Unfortunately, CSOs are unable to challenge this shift by doors from “supporting the agenda” to “agenda setting”. There are deep-seated fears by CSOs that if one challenges donors or expresses different views from that of donors, they will risk losing future funding.

When asked about the relationship between CSOs and donors, he said:

Right now we feel completely driven around by donors. (They say) we don't like you, we like you, we don't like you. It is so unequal. They give some organisations support for their institutions and they won't give support to others. They make sadly silly accounting demands on us (Interview 15, Harare, 23 December, 2014).

A leading activist who has worked within civil society and also in the donor community amplified the power dynamics between CSOs and donors. When asked if the relationship between CSOs in Zimbabwe and donors who fund their projects is a relationship of equals, he said:

No, that utopia is not here. There is definitely a power dynamic. I think funders have maybe a disproportionate power on the table and it is maybe because of the near, if not total, dependence that civil society has on donor funding so I think it is important for us to be clear about the type of civil society we are talking about. If you are to look at your civil society back in the day when you had strong residents' organizations who everyone would give their \$5 or something like that, we still have some actually now but they are not prominent; I have an association in my area, we pay \$5 per year so we do not really have to depend on external funding; if we are to ever partner with a donor it is not like for our survival, it is to get maybe some projects going and stuff but right now you have a situation where there is total dependence. If you do not get that grant you will shut down, you are not also rooted in your constituency for the most part and they are not contributing to sustaining this project so your accountability is again to the funders and you do not have their support to be able to balance the power equation. So for the most part I would say that there are unhealthy power dynamics that you see between civil society and donor institutions (Interview 21, Harare, 12 January, 2015).

While referring to the challenges of over dependency on donor funding by CSOs in Zimbabwe, the interviewee (21) points to the possibility of alternative funding for CSOs. This funding is based on membership contributions. There can be a hybrid model of funding where funding received from international donors can only come in

to support projects and programmes. While the core funding to keep the CSO running is from its members.

The funding model proposed by the respondent above, will definitely empower the CSOs as they will be able to set their own agenda without interference from donors. Furthermore, this will shift the accountability process to focus on beneficiaries. Thus downward accountability will be enhanced greatly. It should however be noted that not all CSOs would benefit from such as funding model as some CSOs do not have a membership that can pay through subscriptions.

The domination of money when it comes to CSO donor relations overshadows any genuine partnership between the two. When asked about the relationship between CSOs in Zimbabwe and international donors, a CSO leader who leads a human rights coalition in Zimbabwe accused the CSOs of not leveraging their skills in negotiating for equal treatment by donors. He said:

I would love it to be a relationship of mutual respect and of equals. There are attempts by some (international donors) who have that kind of mutual respect but for one reason or another because the donor controls the finances I am afraid it can never be a relationship of equals. So the challenge is the NGOs are not able, in my view, to leverage, to use their skills to leverage the relationship so that it can become a relationship of equals. It is not only about the skills actually; it is also a fact that the donors need us. Without the NGOs that they are supporting/ working with, they may not be where they are and doing what they are doing but very few NGOs are able to appreciate that. So it is not something that I will blame on the donor; the inequality is something that arises out of our failure as NGOs to appreciate that we have something that we bring to the table. When we think that the relationship is all about money, then it ceases to be a relationship of equals and there ceases to be mutual respect that is why I kept talking about funding partner instead of donor (Interview 23, Harare, 15 March, 2015).

The view expressed above provides a different perspective into the power dynamics between CSOs and international donors. Using the conceptualisation of how power

manifests itself according to VeneKlasen and Miller (2002), it can be concluded that the power from donors may be expressed as “power over”. However CSOs are not completely powerless. They may also hold power that may express itself as “power to” and “power within”. While CSOs in Zimbabwe are heavily reliant on donor funding, they also have organisational agency that enables them to either resist or comply with the donor prescriptions. Furthermore, CSOs have skills, implementation knowledge, networks that donors do not have. This should be better leveraged when it comes to negotiating with donors.

While acknowledging the asymmetric relationship between CSOs and donors, this does not mean that CSOs are completely powerless within the relationship. The fact that some of the requirements such as production of results framework prior to receiving funding were not insisted on and the suspension of the use of *Advocacy Index* by one of the key donors, point to how CSOs and other social actors and processes affected the relationship between CSOs and donors. This is in line with Foucault’s concept of “capillaries of power” where power manifests itself in other stakeholders and processes rather than just in systems and structures. Although not with same proportions of powers as the one wielded by donors, the fact that donors adjusted their requirements and procedures in the case of SZC, confirms the fact that other stakeholders such as SCOs were not completely powerless. A combination of factors such as the political environment and the fact that there were not many options of stakeholders to work with on a project such as SZC, meant the “dilution” of the power of donors.

The source of power for donors is derived from the fact that they provide the money for projects. Although in theory, both parties need each other, in practice, the party who has the money assumes a superior position. There is a disproportionate number of CSOs and donors in Zimbabwe such that CSOs have to compete for funding from donors. In their quest for survival, CSOs often lose their bargaining power. They fear that donors may opt to work with the next willing CSO if they do not agree with their terms. These power dynamics will consequently affect the measurement of results from initiatives such as advocacy as they will be assessed largely from the perspective of the one who wields more power, the donor in this instance.

It should however be noted that the power dynamics between CSOs and donors do not usually play out in this overt manner. They are inherently subtle. Furthermore, not all donors abuse their privileged positions of power. Some donors genuinely partner with CSOs to advance the agreed good causes. This, however, does not take away the fact that they still retain a privileged position of power in their relationship with CSOs.

7.2.3 The closure phase

This critical stage of the relationship between CSOs and donors is characterised by the demonstration of results by CSOs and donors assessing if results were adequately achieved. This process is where most accountability mechanisms come into play. CSOs seek to demonstrate these results in a number of ways that include submission of narrative reports that are assessed by donors, summative project evaluations that may involve external stakeholders and project site visits by donors. Project site visit sometimes perform a validation function. It may involve donors interacting with the beneficiaries of the project. As will be demonstrated in subsequent sections, the ZCA submitted its project narrative report through the intermediary organisation to the international donor. The report contained the results from funded projects from the viewpoint of the implementing organisation. However, this type of arrangement creates two viewpoints – the implementer’s viewpoint and the funder’s viewpoint. Conflict arises when the funder and the implementer do not agree on the reported results of the project because of their different viewpoints.

7.3 Common understanding of democracy advocacy results

This section examines whether CSOs in Zimbabwe and donors who support their work have the same understanding when it comes to what constitutes results concerning advocacy initiatives. I used data from interviews with both CSOs and donor representatives in establishing the extent of a common understanding.

From the data collected during the interviews, there is evidence that CSOs and donors have a common understanding of what constitutes results of advocacy initiatives. As has been argued in the previous chapter, the long relationship between CSOs and donors in Zimbabwe dating back to the 1980s has seen CSOs adapting to the jargon and understanding prevalent in project management by donors. Donors could have

through the various capacity building programmes contributed to this. For instance, when the *Advocacy Index* was developed in Zimbabwe, several CSOs were trained on its usage. Apart from building the capacity of CSOs to implement projects effectively, several pieces of training on monitoring and evaluation have been conducted by donors for CSOs. Most international donors such as DFID, USAID and UNDP have produced manuals on monitoring and evaluations (M&E) of projects. These manuals explain the different concepts on M&E and how the processes are conducted.

From the evidence, gathered, CSOs share the same understanding concerning what results are in development theory and practice. This understanding is consistent with the definition that is used by donors provided in Chapter One of viewing them as “a describable or measurable change in the state that is derived from a cause-and-effect relationship” (UNDP, 2010:10). However, it became apparent during the interviews that although the same understanding of results from advocacy initiatives existed between the two stakeholders, in practice it is expressed differently. For CSO, results are expressed in simplified language that is largely “a description of what changed” following a development intervention. This is different for donors who express this “change” in technical terms. The table below provides different terms provided by CSOs and donors in describing results.

It should be noted that most donors are of the view that results can be achieved at the three levels. These are *outputs* (within the “sphere of control” of the implementing organisation (s), as *outcomes* (within the “sphere of influence” of implementing organisations and as *impact* (within the “sphere of society-wide concern”). However, some donors are of the view that results are only attainable as outcomes and impact and not as outputs.

Table 5: Expressions of development results - CSOs vs. donors

CSOs description of results
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Achievement • Successes • The end game

- Post-intervention changes

Donors description of results (according to OECD/DAC definitions)

- Outputs (The products and services which result from the completion of activities within a development intervention).
- Outcomes (The intended or achieved short-term and medium-term effects of an intervention's outputs, usually requiring the collective effort of partners. Outcomes represent changes in development conditions, which occur between the completion of outputs and the achievement of impact).
- Impact (Positive and long-term negative effects on identifiable population groups produced by a development intervention, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended. These effects can be economic, socio-cultural, institutional, environmental, technological or of other types).

Source: Authors own configuration based on field interviews

The table above summarises on one hand how development results are referred to by CSOs. This is in general descriptive language. On the other hand, the table summarises how donors describe results. This is usually based on technical jargon.

7.4 Navigating through the structured knowledge of results measurement

From the SZC documents, it was evident that CSOs try as much as possible to formulate the “anticipated change” using the technical jargon from donors. CSO leaders interviewed expressed the challenges associated with this technical jargon, especially the different meanings that are sometimes attached to the various terms used by donors. However, they feel they are not in a position to challenge donors about this as they often negotiate from a weaker position. This compliance, which is to a larger extent based on the unequal relationship between CSOs and donors, serves to perpetuate this inequality.

The confusion emanating from donor jargon was demonstrated by a leading CSO leader who said:

The much fundamental question (after being funded by donor) is, did you get a result? That is complicated because it depends so much on how the project or programme would have been negotiated. I think in the beginning what constituted an output for some years was considered an impact. 60 workshops on human rights this year and then we will say but those 60 workshops had 100 (participants) in it... so that is 6000 people in Zimbabwe who know about human rights. Then the donor would come and say how do you know that. Then the trouble starts (Interview 11, Harare, 23 October, 2014).

He argues that the results accountability changes over time and is sometimes confusing. He pointed out that:

... we have to distinguish between inputs and outputs. There is confusion. I have been at this for a long time, but I still get confused. For instance is a workshop an input or output. I think it can be an input...you are putting something in. What was the output? Were the 60 people who went to a workshop and signed a form to say that was the best workshop they ever went to. We feel more empowered after going through the workshop. However, it's not impact. That gets very difficult (Interview 11, Harare, 23 October 2014).

The difference in terminology, though not affecting the broad understanding of the results of advocacy initiatives, sometimes becomes confounding in terms of how results are presented in project documents such as narrative reports to donors. On one hand, CSOs have to navigate through the donor jargon in their quest to demonstrate results, especially in written reports. On the other hand, donors have to weave through the documents submitted by CSOs in order to establish the results. In this way, as shall be argued in the concluding chapter, effective evaluating of advocacy initiatives becomes somewhat of an art for both CSOs and donors.

Given the fact that a common understanding existed between CSOs and donors on what generally constitute advocacy results, the challenge then is on the presentation and interpretation of these results. It is about how we “observe” “see” “recognise” change when it takes place and how it is attributed to an advocacy initiative. The interpretation of results, as shall be argued in the subsequent sections, is affected by a

number of factors chief among them donor lexicons and communication types used by CSOs during their interaction with donors.

7.5 Is democracy advocacy lost in discourse?

This section explores the role of discourse in advocacy results measurement. Two major aspects of discourse, communication and donor lexicon are reviewed. These two aspects are explored within the confines of the relationship and interactions between CSOs and donors in Zimbabwe.

The section also examines the effect of communication between CSOs and donors on results measurement. In unpacking the communication and lexicon between CSOs and donors, I focused on SZC documents and data from the fieldwork interviews.

Communication plays a critical role in the relationship between CSOs and donors in Zimbabwe. Communication takes place in various forms. Discourse encompasses all forms of communication. According to Carpenter et al. (2010), communication can be categorised into three basic types. These are verbal, written and non-verbal. Verbal communication is characterised by talking and listening to a person to understand their meaning. Written communication is characterised by reading to understand the meaning. In non-verbal communication, one observes a person or action and infers the meaning.

From the SZC documents analysed and interviews conducted with key people who were involved with the SZC, it is manifest that all the three types of communication were used during the campaign and furthermore, they are still being used between CSOs and donors in Zimbabwe. From the analysis, it also becomes evident that all the three categories of communication have a bearing on the measurement of results.

7.5.1 Verbal communication

Verbal communication occurs when CSOs leaders pose their ideas about the projects they are implementing. Donors also discuss priorities they are funding and ask more questions concerning possible areas of intervention. These discussions take place both formally and informally. Informally, through impromptu meetings at functions that

bring both parties together. It is through networking that donor representatives may get an appreciation of projects that are being implemented by CSOs. These networking platforms create opportunities for resourceful CSOs leaders to showcase their projects and more importantly, to fundraise for these projects. Verbal communication can also take place formally on rare occasions where the subject matter is so sensitive that discussions of the proceedings cannot be recorded in the form of minutes. These discussions can take place in formal settings such as offices or outside offices. The main advantage of this type of communication is that both parties have an opportunity to ask for clarity during the exchanges. Furthermore, “sensitive” projects can be discussed “off the record”. However, the major weakness is that undocumented conversations are difficult to trace or prove.

7.5.2 Written communication

Written communication is a major type of communication between CSOs representatives and donor representatives. This type of communication is characterised by written project documents such as project proposals, minutes of meetings, project contracts, project reports submitted to donors, correspondence between CSOs and donors in the form of emails and letters. Most of the written communication is formal and can be archived for future reference. The major advantage of this type of communication is that there is a record that can be referred to by both parties if needed. Even if people working for CSOs or donors change, as they usually do, those who replace them can review and follow the projects easily as they are documented. The major disadvantage is that not all essential aspects of a project can be put into writing. This may be the case for politically sensitive projects such as the SZC. Furthermore, different meanings may be attached to different aspects of the project especially when technical language is used.

However, the process of compiling project documents such as proposals is not free of power dynamics. In the case of SZC, the coordinating organisation went through a process of revising the initial proposal five times before it was eventually approved by the donors. Although this may appear to be a negotiated process, this is not usually the case as the note from the donor below suggest.

2. Key elements: justifying the decision

CA, on behalf of SZC submitted a budget for SZC to the Embassy on 19 April 2007 and at the request of CA [REDACTED] organized a donor meeting on 6 May 2007. At this meeting a full SZC proposal was presented and copies of the proposal were distributed to donors (see minutes of 7 May 2007). This was followed by a separate donors meeting held on 16 May 2007 at the Embassy (see minutes) in order to discuss comments on the proposal. At this meeting the Embassy was mandated to engage CA to come up with a proposal incorporating the donor's comments. A draft proposal was submitted to the Embassy on 31 May 2007 for which the Embassy made comments on 4 June 2007. CA subsequently submitted a revised draft proposal on 7 June 2007 which was distributed to all the donors. On 5 July 2007 the Embassy had a meeting with SZC members and this was followed by another donors meeting on 6 July 2007 to discuss the proposal of 4 June 2007. The donors agreed that there was need for SZC to prioritize its activities which would subsequently lower the budget. [REDACTED] was again tasked to assist SZC to come up with an acceptable budget based on their priorities, a fifth submission was made on 16 July 2007 and the final proposal was submitted on 26 July 2007.

Save Zimbabwe campaign is a coalition of civil society organizations, churches and political parties in Zimbabwe who are united to solve the socio-economic and political crisis in Zimbabwe through peaceful means. It is also a platform for coordination and communication of the activities aimed at solving the crisis in Zimbabwe. SZC will raise the awareness on the need for a people driven constitution as well as the minimum standard to be met for free and fair elections. The project

Source: Document used by the back donor to assess and justify the decision to award ZCA the grant

A brief note summarising the process and justification to award the grant to ZCA, sheds more light concerning the interactions between ZCA and the donors. ZCA had to revise the proposal several times until it fitted the donor requirements. The fact that ZCA revised the proposal five times, according to the brief note cited earlier, demonstrates the coping strategy of CSOs of compliance.

7.5.3 Non-verbal communication

Non-verbal communication relies mainly on observation. A number of CSO leaders who believe that SZC was a highly successful campaign refer to the graphic scenes of police brutality that took place on 11 March 2007 during the aborted prayer rally. These scenes, and the subsequent SADC mediated inter-party dialogue in Zimbabwe, according to them, did not require producing elaborate reports to donors but served a purpose of convincing all stakeholders of the outcomes of the campaign.

This type of communication has an advantage of observable evidence of the outcome of an advocacy campaign. The major weakness is that more often, the observed actions or experiences, if not documented, are of little use to those who were not present during the action. Furthermore, different individuals or groups may interpret observed action of individual experiences differently.

Most frameworks for results measurement particularly those that use a scientific⁶ approach are evidence dependent. Thus robust documentation is required for one to make sound judgement during project and programme evaluation. Depending on the project, documentation may not be feasible especially for politically sensitive advocacy initiatives.

Therefore a discourse approach to results measurement is required. The discourse approach allows one to analyse the interactions between CSOs and donors beyond the widely used written forms of communication. It allows one to attach meaning given to processes and actions and more importantly allows a critical analysis of the effect the different types of communication have on results measurement.

The type of communication used by CSOs during their interaction with donors has an effect on how project results are assessed. Both CSOs and donors may not be aware of these inherent effects associated with the communication type. Attainment of actual project results may be a fact, but the assessment of projects to validate the results becomes a subjective process as it is affected by a number of factors, which are hidden to both CSOs and donors.

From the data gathered and analysed, all three types of communication were used during the SZC and they affected results measurement of advocacy projects in different ways. For instance, during the first phase of the SZC (from the inception of the campaign on 29 July 2006 to 11 March 2007), key CSOs leaders met both formally and informally with donor representatives to inform them about the campaign and also to fundraise for the campaign. The discussions during these

⁶ The word scientific is used here to denote systematic and evidence-based approach rather than its usage in hard or natural sciences

meetings are not documented but conversations between CSO leaders and donors were taking place during this period. As has been explained earlier on, ZCA did not apply for funding directly through the “Call for Proposal” mechanism, but received funding for the campaign through promoting the concept of the campaign to likeminded international donors.

With the progression of time, the communication type moved from the verbal to written. The SZC documents reveal that there was written communication between the ZCA secretariat, intermediary organisation and donors. This was in the form of project proposals, letters and emails. In these documents, the SZC was outlined and how the results were going to be achieved was presented in a logical framework. As shall be shown in the proposal excerpts in section 7.9.1, this written communication allows one to follow the objectives and proposed deliverables of the campaign as articulated in the proposal.

The results measurement for the SZC was affected by non-verbal communication in two major ways. The 11 March 2007 aborted “prayer rally” is often cited as one major turning point of the campaign. Most respondents, who argue that the campaign was highly successful, often point to events that took place on this day and the subsequent events such as SADC mediation, inter-party dialogue and the formation of Government of National Unity. This is despite the fact that these events were not anticipated as direct results of the campaign at the time of formulating the SZC. Hence reference to these observable events, which were linked to the SZC by the CSOs and some international donors point to the role of non-verbal communication in development practice. The second way is that the political developments post the 11 March 2007, created a perception that the SZC could achieve more in terms of democracy consolidation in Zimbabwe. Out of a period of state-sponsored repression and a sudden massive protest by CSOs and activists, led to the thinking that it was a beginning of a series of massive uprisings that would consequently lead to changes in the political domain. The manner in which SADC and the international community intervened after the 11 March 2007, gave international donors renewed hope built on the assumption that providing more funding for CSO activities would bring democratic changes to Zimbabwe. The non-verbal communication, inadvertently, fed into the perception and biases of donors in terms of the potential of the campaign.

This aspect manifested itself through constant reference to 11 March 2007 in the proposal submitted by ZCA and the subsequent injection of funds by donors into the campaign.

The context, in which the advocacy campaign takes place, is a major source of perceptions and biases supplied through non-verbal communication. Most Western donors, who directly and indirectly funded the SZC activities, are largely influenced by the potential and role of civil society in the quest of democratising states, as was the case in Eastern Europe. This experience and knowledge could have subconsciously fed into perceptions and biases of what the campaign could achieve in Zimbabwe. Furthermore, the title of the campaign itself “Save Zimbabwe Campaign” could have conjured messianic images of CSOs about to save the people of Zimbabwe from severe oppression, despotic rule and democratic deficits through the ushering of freedoms and liberties. The problem arises when these expectations, although not formally written or promised, are not met. An advocacy initiative, such as SZC may be deemed not to have achieved intended results, depending on the assessor when this mismatch between anticipated results that are influenced by context and the actual outcomes of the campaign.

7.6 Promises and deliverables

This section deals with how the relationship between CSOs and donors gravitate from values towards funding. When the relationship between CSOs and donors is anchored on money, it is reduced to that of a “customer” and a “service provider”. The customer, being the donor in this instance, “pays” for a service through funding an initiative such as SZC. The CSO promises certain deliverables by way of project results.

During promotion of projects and programmes to prospective donors through both verbal and written communications, the CSO on one hand consciously and subconsciously promises to deliver on projects once they are funded. On the other hand, donors expect deliverables once they fund a project and programmes. This transactional arrangement is often outlined in contracts, though in measured development language such as “expected outcomes” and “impact”.

As projects such as SZC are implemented, factors such as political developments, which are non-verbal, experiential and circumstantial, also affect the perceptions of donors on what the project should deliver. This in some cases lead to biases. In the case of SZC, this aspect is demonstrated by the events of 11 March 2007, which created an impression that the campaign was going to be a game changer concerning the democratisation of Zimbabwe. The sudden spark created by the aborted “prayer rally” of 11 March 2007, could have led to some donors anticipating results above and beyond commitments in the project documents.

Problems often arise when there is a mismatch between the “promise” and what is eventually “delivered”. This usually happens because of two main reasons. Firstly, CSOs may “over promise” and when they deliver on what is practically possible, it will appear as if they have under delivered. Secondly, a CSO may deliver, but the donor will be expecting more due to perceptions created by non-verbal communication. Donors may even use other methods to try and validate the results being presented by CSOs. In instances such as these, the donor may conclude that the intended results were not achieved. This often creates tensions between CSOs and international donors. This may sometimes lead to termination of contracts. When asked about what happens when donors conclude that the intended results were not realised by CSOs, a Senior officer with a donor agency in Zimbabwe said:

I know we have instances like that where we would discontinue our support for that organization because all the time you have issues with their results especially the indicator data where they have may be community initiatives/ dialogues and they give you these high figures and we tried to do some program audit around what they were doing, it was very difficult, we would pick some issues- we just stopped supporting them (Interview 9, Harare, 15 October 2014).


Thus the difference in approaches of CSOs and international donors on results measurement in development practice, can progress from tensions between the two parties to the actual cutting of funding and subsequent termination of a relationship. Hence, when CSOs comply with the use of the accountability mechanisms that they sometimes deem not effective, they will be fully cognisant of the fact that

noncompliance and nonconformity to donor requirements will result in loss of funding.

7.7 CSO-donor communication flow and results link model

In light of the above findings, it is my submission that the communication type between CSOs and donors has a huge bearing to how results of development initiatives such as democracy advocacy are evaluated. This finding is a modest contribution to knowledge on the important role that discourse plays in the exercise of upward accountability for CSOs involved in democracy advocacy and operating in a politically repressive environment. Below is a model, that I have termed *CSO-Donor Communication Flow and Results Link Model*. The Model summarises the relationship between CSOs and donors in terms of how results are subsequently assessed by the donor. While written communication in the form of proposals and narrative reports forms the core of assessing whether intended results have been achieved, the model, which is limited to the upward accountability, shows how assessment of results is affected by other forms of communication such as verbal and nonverbal. These other types of communications subconsciously, feed into perceptions about the project in terms of its intended goals. This subsequently affects the assessment of projects and results by donors.

Figure. 3 CSO-donor communication flow and results link model



Source: Author’s own construction of the CSO – donor communication flow during interactions and its effect on results assessment by donors

7.7.1 Explaining the CSO-donor communication flow and results link model

The flow of communication between the CSO (left side) and donor (right side) is mediated by first the different communication typologies (verbal, written and non-verbal). Secondly, the types of communications have intermediate effects that will consequently affect the assessment of results of development initiatives.

In order to seek funding from donors, CSOs develop coherent projects and programmes they will spend the funds on. The development of these projects and programmes is influenced by the context. Informed by the context

All the three types of communication have an intermediate effect of making promises and creating expectations on one hand, and on the other hand, contribution towards the perceptions and biases about the project.

The written project proposal remains an official type of communication between the CSO and the donor. Apart from the problem and interventions that the project or programme seeks to solve, the proposal also details the anticipated results. In some

way, the CSO pledges to work on achieving these results if given funds by donors. The proposal and the *promised results* also forms the main basis for assessing if the promised results have been achieved at the end of the project or programme.

However, verbal and non-verbal communication also plays an indirect role in how results are assessed by donors. The verbal and non-verbal types of communication affect the perceptions and may cause biases on the part of the donor. This usually happen subconsciously.

This model seeks to highlight the salience of all the communication typologies and their effect of assessment of results of development interventions such as democracy advocacy. The model calls for both CSOs and donors to be cognisant of this unintended consequence of communication particularly on results measurement. With knowledge and appreciation of this model, the tensions that often arise between CSOs and donors around results measurement may be reduced. While appreciating the potential perceptions and biases, both parties should check for these perceptions and biases at various stages on their interaction. Both CSOs. This will ultimately lead to both parties working together to achieve the goal of solving the “issues of concern” with minimum distractions.

7.8 The “cop and accused” relationship

During the implementation and closure stages, sometimes the relationship between CSOs and donors may be marked by suspicion. After disagreements on project results, donors may sometimes view CSOs with suspicion and as untrustworthy partners. This may be caused by both real and perceived failure to deliver on promised results and other malpractices such as fraud and misappropriation of funds by CSOs in the past. When asked about the relationship between donors particularly on results measurement, one donor representative equated the relationship between CSOs and donors as one of a “cop and the accused”. He said “when it then comes to monitoring the impact it then becomes a cop and guilty until proven innocent kind of arrangement” (Interview 9, Harare, 12 January 2015). So in this scenario, the CSOs bear the “burden of proof” that they have achieved results from the funding provided. This lack of trust compounds the challenges of presenting results from complex initiatives such as advocacy as the premise of a partnership may be based on mistrust.

The mistrust sometimes may be as a result of projects that were not implemented well in the past or even cases of fraud and misappropriation of funds. However, legitimate these concerns may be, they stand in the way of a genuine partnership between CSOs and donors.

7.9 Donor jargon

This section explores further the role the donor lexicon plays in results measurement. The results measurement field is replete with technical language that often confuses both partners and donors. Sometimes implementing CSOs confuse terms such as output, outcome and impact. As has been shown in table 2, CSOs and donors express development results differently. It should be noted that this difference is not just with regards development results, but extends to other processes of the project management field. In order to explore these differences, I examined the project documents of ZCA that related to the SZC. I also examined the documents of the intermediary organisation, particularly correspondence between the main donor, intermediary organisation and ZCA.

In order to solicit for funding, ZCA prepared a proposal that explained the campaign and detailed the strategies and activities to be undertaken. This main proposal became the reference point by donors who sought to fund the campaign. It should be noted that this proposal was written during phase two of the campaign, post the 11 March 2007 aborted prayer rally. During the second phase, the objectives of the SZC were revised slightly. This could have been in response to the changing operating environment and a need to ensure relevancy and sharper objectives. However, the constant adaptations of objectives of the campaign to suit current political environment confirm how complex advocacy is.

7.10 Results accountability chain – from project proposal to assessment on narrative reports

This section looks at three phases in the results accountability chain. These are (i) the proposal stage, (ii) the submission of a narrative report and (iii) the report assessment. The section examines how results were formulated in the main proposal submitted by

ZCA to donors, how they were presented in the narrative form after implementation and how the donor assessed the report.

7.9.1 Results at proposal stage – the articulation of “promises”

Although, other types of communication are critical in CSO donor interaction, the main communication preferred by donors is written communication. Projects and programmes may be pitched in various ways but for processing funding, usually donors rely on a submitted project proposal. Although there are many templates preferred by different donors, the main elements of a project proposal include the following:

- a. Background - this part usually provides the operating environment and the problem or issue that the project seeks to address
- b. The goals and objectives - these are the intentions or what the project seeks to achieve
- c. Strategies and activities - suggested ways to solve the problem highlighted and how. It includes the focus areas and timeframes
- d. Anticipated results - these are the anticipated changes following the interventions
- e. Risks and proposed strategies to mitigate the anticipated risks
- f. A budget - resources required and how they are allocated per the different activities

Hence the project proposal becomes a central in the implementation of the project, as it will be the source of guidance. Both implementers and donors constantly refer to the proposal. If the implementing organisation wants to adjust any aspects of the proposal especially intended results, the organisation has to seek permission from the donor and if granted, the amendments are documented and filed accordingly.

The SZC proposal submitted by ZCA was divided into four main areas as illustrated in the table below. The areas of intervention were categorised into four focus areas.

Table 6: SZC main focus areas

Focus Area	Description
A	Public Mobilisation Coordination of Campaign Activities

B	Media and Information Management
C	Local, Regional and International Advocacy/Lobbying
D	Management and Coordination of the SZC

Source: Adapted from the SZC proposal

There was also a fifth focus area that focused on the post-March 2008 elections period. There were no activities for this Focus Area as campaign activities in this context were unpredictable. It was reserved for unforeseen eventualities in response to the changes in the political events such as elections.

Focus area A consisted of activities such as the holding of Music Festivals, Theatre performances and Public Meetings. Furthermore, Provincial and District Prayer Meetings were to be conducted under this Focus Area. These activities were meant to mobilise the citizens through building awareness on the crisis that was taking place in Zimbabwe during that period. Furthermore, the activities sought to bring together, in a coordinated way, the activities of the different CSOs in Zimbabwe who were working to achieve the same goals in the area of democracy, good governance and human rights.

Focus area B was critical to the campaign as it sought to generate and amplify information about the campaign. One major activity under this focus area was to publicise all of the activities of SZC under the "We Demand A New Constitution before 2008 Elections". This activity was premised on the assumption that a new democratic constitution was a prerequisite for a free and fair elections that were scheduled for 2008.

Although all the focus areas were interrelated, I paid more attention to activities under focus area C in light of the focus of this thesis on civil society advocacy and results measurement.

Under focus area C, the proposal listed three main objectives:

It is expected that there shall be an intensification of regional SZC advocacy activities. The major focus shall be the regional SDAC organisations and the Southern Africa Civil Society organisations. The model for this advocacy

campaign shall be with solidarity as the key phrase. The emphasis of the Save Zimbabwe Campaign will be on SADC countries and the Africa Union. This stems from the possible change in perception of SADC and the Africa Union after the March 11. Greater emphasis shall be placed on South Africa as the chosen SADC mediator. This work is taking place against the background of activities that are currently being undertaken by member organisations (Excerpt from the SZC proposal submitted by ZCA to donors).

Focus area D looked at how the SZC would be coordinated. This included the General Council meetings, Task Force meetings as well as sub-committee meetings.

Although a robust and effective results framework for the campaign was not crafted during the campaign, the anticipated “promised” results of the campaign were partially addressed in the form of *logframe*. The attempt to have a results framework in the form of a *logframe* was not that successful as the *logframe* addressed the planning aspect of the campaign and not how the articulated results were going to be measured. The table below shows how the intended results of the campaign were formulated and presented in the proposal submitted by ZCA to donors for funding.

Table 7: Formulation of intended results

Medium	Quantity	Targeted Population	Distribution Format	Expected Outcome
Activities such as ‘regional and international trips’ were listed under this column	The number of activities were listed here	To whom the activity was targeted to e.g. ‘authorities in the region who are in direct involvement with the Zimbabwe crisis’	Here the strategy was articulated e.g. ‘SZC leaders to form a strategic delegation’.	The result of the activity was listed in this column e.g. ‘strategic awareness and solidarity in resolving the Zimbabwean crisis’

Source: Adapted from the SZC proposal

Fig. 3 Advocacy and Lobbying

Medium	Quantity	Targeted population	Distribution Format	Expected Outcome.
Regional trips	2	Authorities in the region who are in direct involvement with the Zimbabwean crisis	1 SZC leader to team up with selected task force leaders to form a strategic delegation	Strategic awareness and solidarity in resolving the Zimbabwean crisis as civil society
International trips	2	International authorities in the region who are in direct involvement with the Zimbabwean crisis	1 SZC leader to team up with selected task force leaders to form a strategic delegation	Strategic awareness and solidarity in resolving the Zimbabwean crisis as civil society
Consultative meetings with individual stakeholders within Zimbabwe.	10	SZC leaders	Transport, Accommodation & food.	
Workshops	2	SZC think-tank as appointed to prepare lobby documents in line with other CSOs	SZC leadership meets from time to time when it is necessary to strategically prepare lobby documents e.g. position papers on specific processes	Lobby documents that outline alternative policy frameworks that civil society has agreed to under the SZC

Source: results articulation for SZC advocacy and Lobbying

From the table and excerpt above, there is evidence that there was a struggle to confine the campaign and present it in a logical process using the project tool such as the *logframe* to donors. The unclear headings such as “medium” and “distribution format” and the content of those columns, points to a clear case of a project-writing tool that was not fit for the purpose. The language contained in some of the headings refers more to business plans fit for profit making entities rather than for CSOs. There is no evidence that ZCA was provided with a template from the donor in coming up with the proposal. However, through submissions of proposals to different donors for unrelated projects in the past, it could be that the organisation sought to use “the tools associated with best practices of proposal writing”. In this regard, attempts were made to use a logical approach in formulating the same aspects of the proposal but the template used here did not relate to non-profit entities such as ZCA. The adaptation by ZCA to use the *logframe* approach in formulating the anticipated results of the Campaign reinforces the power that donors have. This power, according to Foucault, is expressed through language and practice.

7.9.2 Results at the narrative report stage – the articulation of “deliverables”

In a bid to assess if the funded project is on track or has achieved the intended results, donors ask for narrative report(s). Depending on the funded project or programme and

its duration, donors may request mid – term reports and / or final reports. They are usually in the narrative form summarising how the project and programme was implemented. It should be noted that narrative reports are usually accompanied by financial reports, which in some cases are certified by external financial auditors. The financial reports give an account of how the funds were spent. However, it is in the narrative reports that the results of the project are presented.

Donors may institute results validation mechanisms such as monitoring visits or may commission summative project evaluations usually carried out by an independent assessor. Nevertheless, the final narrative report is the main document compiled by the implementing organisation that gives a description of how the project was executed and the results achieved.

In light of the accountability process mentioned above, the ZCA produced a narrative report that was provided to both the intermediary and back donor. This was as per the contractual agreement. In the opening section of the final narrative report, the ZCA provided a summary of the operating environment and the likely effect this operating environment has on the campaign. According to the report:

This project was undertaken in fast changing unpredictable context characterised by daunting challenges on all critical fronts: socio-cultural, economic, political and legal environment (Excerpt from the narrative report submitted to donor, 2008).

Although the report pointed to the sudden changes in the operating political environment, it attempted to follow rigid and logical approaches to project reporting. It attempted to match the listed objectives and activities in the proposal with actual outcomes. There were many gaps in the report as much of the detail pertaining to the campaign was missing. The table below, adapted from the narrative report, shows how results were presented in the report to donors.

Table 8: Presentation of results in narrative report

Objective	Indicator of success	Activities	Date of implementation
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<p>This section contained a mixture of objectives provided in the proposal and some not provided in the proposal but related. There were 10 objectives under this section in the report</p>	<p>What observable changes that attest that indeed results were achieved? Some of these indicators were formulated during proposal writing. There was a mismatch between some indicators and activities in the report.</p>	<p>Activities that were undertaken during the project duration were reported under this column. These were reported against the objectives provided in the first column</p>	<p>The date on which the activities took place was noted here. There were some activities that didn't have a date against them</p>
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Source: Adapted from the ZCA narrative report submitted to the donor on 24 July 2008

more discreet arrangements because the environment in Zimbabwe has become difficult to operate in. The elusive internal operating environment has created a situation where the organization has to continuously redefine its position and.

Major highlights and Achievements (Oct.2007-April 2008)

Objective	Indicator of Success	Activities	Dates for implementation
<p>To effectively coordinate SZC campaign activities and lobby for elections to be held in 2008 under a new Constitution, as well as raise awareness amongst the people, of their right to vote</p>	<p>Mobilization prayer rallies held</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Weekly sectoral task force meetings A mobilization rally was held in Gweru at Mkoba stadium. At least 500 people attended the meeting. Key Political figures including [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] attended the meeting 	<p>Ongoing</p> <p>October 2007</p>

SAVE ZIMBABWE CAMPAIGN REPORT 07-08

3

Source: Excerpt from the narrative report submitted by ZCA

From a general perspective, the SZC narrative report submitted to donors after 12 months of funding did not give an adequate account of the intended (promised) results of the campaign. The reports focused on processes and activities of the campaign. The

approach and template of trying to match the intended objectives and the achieved results (logic based approach) did not provide any clue about the overall success or lack thereof of the SZC. It only assessed whether the project was on track. What it achieved perhaps was a process evaluating how the SZC activities were being implemented. This is rightfully so, because projects are time bound, in this case, funded initially for 12 months. However, the initial 12 months funded for SZC activities was part of a bigger campaign according to the different phases described in chapter 5. Thus the use of this approach in reporting a complex campaign becomes restrictive as no meaningful conclusions about the success of the advocacy initiative are arrived at. Other components of the campaign such as the provision of legal and medical assistance to victims of police brutality were not adequately reported on in the SZC documents simply because they were conducted by different organisations to ZCA. This is despite the fact that these other organisations were part of the campaign. The report focused exclusively on what ZCA did.

The manner in which the results of the campaign were reported, using the logic approach, could easily have led an assessor to conclude that the campaign was unsuccessful. Other critical but nuanced aspects of the campaign, possibly outside the sphere of control of ZCA, could not be reported on using the rigid logical approach to reporting projects. This notion is in line with Foucault's notion of how the social world, expressed by discourse, is affected by various sources of power.

For instance, regional advocacy by CSO leaders was a critical aspect of the campaign. However, this was not recorded in the report. Some key CSO leaders interviewed confirmed that a number of advocacy missions were undertaken both regionally and internationally yet there was no mention of these activities and the outcomes of these missions in the narrative report submitted by ZCA to donors. Although members of SZC undertook some of the missions independently, it was expected that the ZCA would refer to some of these missions in its report. This is because ZCA had the full mandate of coordinating the campaign given to it at the launch of SZC on 29 July 2006. The absence of reporting on that aspect of the campaign is not an oversight on the part ZCA, but an indication of the trap and limitations of using logic based tools to report on social phenomena. The tools limited ZCA's reporting on activities that it undertook itself and in a given time period. Other stakeholders to the campaign and

outside the reporting period, though critical to the campaign, undertook these excluded aspects. It is my submission that an effective evaluation of an advocacy initiative such as SZC required a sector wide process.

7.9.3 Results at report assessment stage – donor’s verdict

After receiving the narrative report(s) donors assess the reports using different results measurement tools and approaches. From the SZC contract, it was made clear that during reporting, the donor expected the CSO to report against the planned objectives and activities. By inference when donors assess reports submitted by CSOs, they expect them to answer the question “did the project/programme meet its intended results and if not why?”

Figure 4: Narrative report assessment letter

File

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Harare

Date August 25, 2008
Our ref. 08.79.PRD.16072
Page 1/2
Encl.
Re [Redacted] Activity 16072
Cc

Contact [Redacted]
Tel. [Redacted]
Fax [Redacted]

Dear [Redacted]

Reference is made to the above grant agreement dated 10 October 2007. Reference is also made to the narrative and financial reports for the first half of the project duration which were received at the Embassy on 24 July 2008.

The Embassy requires the following clarifications before the reports can be approved.

Financial report

- The budget presented needs to follow the approved original format.
- The reporting duration should cover the period up to 14 April and not May 2008.
- Please include the ZWD exchange rates that were used.
- The interest that accrued from the [Redacted] contribution should be included as part of the income.
- Could you kindly explain how the payments are made between [Redacted] and SZC?
- Which other donors are funding this activity, for how much and for which budget lines?
- The project exhibits very low expenditure levels and if this persists in the last half of the project duration (also taking into account the current NGO ban), we are afraid that the project might not need the remaining funds still at the Embassy.

TO	DATE
FROM	
REF No.	082608
ROUTING	[Redacted]

Narrative report

The report does not provide sufficient information for instance it is difficult to deduce what was planned and what activities were implemented.

The narrative report mentions humanitarian assistance, but this was not part of the approved budget. Please note that any changes with regards to the implementation of the project requires prior approval from this Embassy (refer to section 3 of the grant agreement).


Although a number of activities are mentioned in the table on page 3 to 4 of the narrative report, there is no relation to the financial report.

The report is too general and the Embassy needs more information on for instance the objective, the outcome and follow up done on workshops? It would also help to have a sample of the messages on flyers? How many flyers were distributed and where? What was the impact? What was done with the reports that were collected by the information centre? Where was the information centre set up, for how long and which organisations participated? How was the media campaign carried out? etc

The main problem encountered seems to be the shift in the political landscape which has affected the implementation of this project, hence your suggestion to realign the activity to be more relevant in the current context. It should however be taken into account that humanitarian assistance does not fit under the objectives of this activity and therefore will not be approved by the Embassy.

The Embassy would appreciate to receive the revised work plan and budget for the remainder of the project period as well as the revised financial and narrative reports by 5 September 2008.

Yours sincerely

A large black rectangular redaction box covers the signature area. Below it, two horizontal black bars redact the name and title of the sender.

Source: Excerpt from narrative report assessment letter by donor, 25 August 2008.

The ZCA through the intermediary organisation yielded to the request from the narrative report assessment letter and provided a revised report. In the revised report, the ZCA addressed the issues raised.


A number of observations can be noted and conclusions drawn from the narrative report assessment letter presented above.

- a) Donors seek results of projects to be matched with what was initially planned. This is how they assess progress or achievements. In the case of the campaign, ZCA did not provide sufficient information with a clear assessment of success on what was planned against the implemented activities.
- b) The power wielded by the donor is exhibited. The donor disallowed results of ‘humanitarian assistance’ as it was not in the approved budget. It is critical to note that some of the unintended results of police brutality led to some of the activists and their families requiring humanitarian assistance. In this regard, ZCA practically responded to this need. Unfortunately, this result and the spending associated with it was disallowed by the donor.
- c) There is reference to technical jargon. For instance, reference is given to terms such as objectives, outcomes and impact. No effort was made to ensure that ZCA had a common understanding on what was meant by these technical terms. Perhaps it was assumed that they should know since they were part of civil society and may have received donor funding in the past.
- d) Evidence based reporting. Donors require evidence that certain activities have been implemented and in what way. In this regard, the donor requested samples of the messages on flyers
- e) A mixture of both quantitative and qualitative based results. In this letter, questions such as “how many flyers produced and distributed?” “What was done with the reports and how was the media campaign carried out?” Meant that the donor wanted both quantitative and qualitative data.
- f) An impact is important to donors. Despite the fact that it was only 12 months into implementing the project, the donor wanted to know the impact of the action.

The narrative report assessment letter sent to the intermediary organisation and the ZCA, provides an insight into the power the donor has when it comes to results measurement. From a Foucauldian perspective, discourse is produced to govern some

social groups. In the case of the SZC, the power of donors is embedded in the results measurement discourse and the various results accountability mechanisms and processes. Thus, donors to a larger extent, govern the development sector.

Figure 5: Narrative report approval letter



Source: Excerpt from the assessment of the narrative report, 18 October 2008.

The embassy eventually approved the report. The main difference between the original report submitted and the revised was mainly in compliance with the request for more information and presentation in the format required. There was no process of validation of results claimed in the report in the form of donors seeking more information from other sources. The report was approved as it had provided information about the project and in a reporting framework acceptable to the donor. In other words, a satisfactory version of events according to the implementing partner – ZCA, had been provided.

It is important to note from the assessment letter that the donor has the power to reject results that were not part of the proposal and also that it did not fit under the objective of the facility through which the SZC was funded. For instance, though humanitarian assistance was provided to those in need by the SZC, it was deemed an ineligible cost, as it was not part of the proposal. ZCA considered the result of humanitarian

intervention as prominent hence being mentioned in this narrative report. However, the donor did not see the value in this type of result as it “fell outside of the agreed contract and budget”. ZCA could not challenge this. The organisations simply complied. Again this is an example of a potential source of conflict based on different perspectives between the CSOs and donor. It further points to the power dynamics inherent in the relationship between the two. The power to approve or disapprove a narrative report is vested with the donor. Thus CSOs, such as ZCA have to ensure that they satisfy the donor requirement for the reports to be approved to ensure continued funding of the projects.

It is my submission that the struggle by ZCA to logically and consistently articulate the campaign in written documents is not a reflection of the lack of direction of the campaign, but a confirmation of the fact that current tools of presenting and assessing advocacy results are severely ineffective. They rely heavily on written communication, which is limited in expressing some aspects of the advocacy initiatives, which are often nuanced in reality. This is also compounded by the donor lexicon, which in many instances confuses the CSOs.

Foucault’s analysis of institutionalised practices (regime of practice) is important in the understanding of the subjectivity that is inherent within upward accountability mechanisms and processes. While Foucault (1984) analysed institutionalised practices concerning sexuality, the analysis can be extended to institutionalised practices in general and result measurement in particular. The different accountability mechanisms and practices highlighted throughout this thesis can be equated to the “discursive practice” as postulated by Foucault. Discursive practice refers to a historically and culturally specific set of rules for organizing and producing different forms of knowledge. It is not a matter of external determinations being imposed on people's thought, rather it is a matter of rules which, a bit like the grammar of a language, allow certain statements to be made. In this regard, the international development framework imposes rules and regulations that govern the conduct of both CSOs and donors. The regulations and conduct manifests in use of proposals, monitoring and evaluation frameworks and various accountability mechanisms developed over time. Thus, both CSOs and donors as “subjectivities” operate within this discursive practice. It is in this regard that CSOs comply with upward the

requirements of upward accountability such as use of *logframes* donor reports as is in the case of SZC.

7.10 How can measurement of advocacy be improved?

This section looks at ways in which results measurement of advocacy can be improved. During my field interviews, my last question to interviewees focused on ways in which results measurement can be improved. Data from the interviews and the glaring inadequacies emanating from the documents analysed informed this section.

The section is divided into two parts. The first part looks at the improvement of results measurement through examination of the current tools used - especially the language inherent in these tools. The second part looks at improving results measurement from the perspective of CSO – donor relations.

7.10.1 Non-scientific approaches to results measurement

The evaluation of advocacy initiatives using scientific and logic based approaches and frameworks, as was the case with, SZC's reports, is very restricted and ineffective. The scientifically based approaches are based on positivistic intentions of trying to establish objective evidence of results. While this approach may work for other development initiatives, it is ineffective in accounting for results of complex social phenomena such as advocacy initiatives. Logic based approaches attempt to link an intended result (objective), an intervention (activity) and an achieved result. However, advocacy initiatives are quite complex and simplistic cause and effect relationships cannot be deduced easily. It is imperative that both CSOs and donors adopt non-scientific approaches when evaluating advocacy initiatives. In fact, it may start with CSOs avoiding the use of logic frameworks for any advocacy initiatives during project formulation.

There have been attempts in the recent past to consider other approaches that are flexible and qualitative. Most CSO leaders who were interviewed showed a preference for non-logic based tools. However, the challenge is that most major donors are still prescriptive on the use of *logframes* at the project proposal

formulation stages. This will force CSOs to report on results from this limited approach.

7.10.2 Simplification of jargon

The technical terms used by donors have a huge bearing on results measurement. CSOs may have a different understanding of the terms used by donors in formulating results and accounting for them. This technical donor lexicon causes confusion, particularly during an assessment. CSOs and donors ought to develop a common understanding of results formulation and measurement at the various stages of the project lifecycle. This can be achieved through simplification of results measurement jargon. Furthermore, it should be recognised that each project and each implementing organisation is different. Thus, CSOs and donors should jointly develop results accountability mechanisms that are unique to the project being funded. Some CSO leaders proposed this during the interviews.

7.10.3 Taking context into consideration

The context in which a project is implemented is critical when assessing results. The context especially the political context affects results, particularly of democracy advocacy. The problem addressed by the project may change or the situation may deteriorate. For instance, during the SZC, one activist died and several were injured and displaced. ZCA provided humanitarian assistance to those affected. However, the donor did not approve of this result.

The use of rigid tools that lack appreciation of context may lead to evaluators misinterpreting results provided in CSO reports.

A senior officer who had worked for civil society but was now working for an organisation that provides funding to civil society in selected African countries said:

Again it is important to be contextual; our human rights and democracy civil society here emerges in an environment where activists were literally endangered species; it required a lot of secrecy and a lot of the need-to-know basis so there is sort of information boxes and to an extent that ended up

promoting a certain culture where the right hand does not know what the left hand is doing even amongst funders you don't know what the other funder has done wrong, what other conversations your partner is involved in because it was more like a high security, quite sensitive work. I think that's why we are really far behind in that regard and the era that we are in now I would like to believe is hence a bit of opening that would allow us to say okay how can we have greater transparency even in funding (Interview 21, Harare, 12 January 2015).

7.10.4 Genuine partnership and trust

A major aspect that affects results measurement is the relationship between CSOs and donors. This relationship should be based on mutual respect and the avoidance of donors assuming a position of power simply because they are funding the project. The relationship ought to be based on value systems, and mechanisms to protect it from being reduced to a funding relationship alone. It should be built on real partnerships as articulated by Fowler (2002) in order to solve human social developmental challenges recognising that each partner contributes in different ways but to the same goal. Fowler (2000a) asserts that "authentic partnerships require a joint commitment to long-term interaction, shared responsibility towards achieving common goals, reciprocal obligations equally, mutually and a balancing of power in relationships" (Fowler 2000a: 2).

Furthermore, a genuine partnership will remove notions of "expected but unwritten" results that ultimately affect how democracy advocacy is evaluated. Donors will respect civil society and not exploit their vulnerability caused by lack of funding by pushing them to agendas not desirable to CSOs. On the other hand, civil society organisations will respect that much of the funding provided by donors is public funding and ought to be accounted for.

7.10.5 Acknowledgement of biases created that affect results measurement

During the interaction of CSOs and donors before and during project implementation, biases and perceptions are formed. Both parties may be completely oblivious to this fact but this may have serious consequences when it comes to results assessment. Both CSO representatives, especially those who write the narrative reports and the

donors who assess them have a human agency that is affected by the operating environment. It is important that these perceptions and biases are reduced through an open dialogue between the funders of the project and its implementers. In the case of SZC, interaction with donors was at different levels. At the highest level, donors will interact with high-level CSO representatives.

Thus the suggestion by CSOs to influence accountability mechanisms and processes can be seen as attempts to bring in a new “discursive practice”. The difference between the old and problematic discursive practice and the proposed new one perhaps is that the later acknowledges the asymmetric relationship between CSOs and donors. The new practice will try and address the shortcomings of the current accountability mechanisms but more importantly, manage the asymmetric relationship between CSOs and donors in development practice.

7.11 Conclusion

This chapter has explored how CSOs involved with the SZC dealt with the asymmetric relationship between them and the donors within the context of upward accountability. The central argument presented in this chapter is that both the asymmetric relationship between CSOs and donors as well as results discourse are critical to result measurement in development practice. The relationship between CSOs and donors initially forms through matching of value systems. However, money becomes central to the relationship and an imbalance is created. Donors, by virtue of providing the funding, which they can withhold, assume a superior position in the relationship. On the other hand, CSOs, by virtue of relying on donors and lacking alternative sources of funding, are vulnerable and assume a vulnerable and subservient position within the relationship. A case in point is the disapproval of activities outside the agreed parameters such as humanitarian intervention conducted by ZCA. This setup affects results measurement in that CSOs, have to “please” the donors in providing an account of results attained after the project. In as much as CSOs provide and account for results based on the version of the implementer mainly through narrative reports, it is ultimately the donor, from their perspective and using their frameworks and tools, who decide whether or not results were achieved.

As CSOs and donors interact using different types of communication, perceptions and biases of projects are created subconsciously. This sometimes leads to instances where donors interpret results differently. Discourse plays a critical role in both formulations of results by CSOs during proposal writing and how donors consequently assess them. Although all the three types of communication affect CSO donor interactions, the current project tools such as proposals and assessment guides rely heavily on written communication. This presents a challenge for projects such as SZC that may not fit into the logical tools currently being used.

CHAPTER EIGHT

Concluding remarks

8.1 Introduction

The main aim of this thesis was to investigate how CSOs involved in democracy advocacy that depends on mass mobilisation of activists become accountable to donors while operating in a politically repressive environment. The thesis focused on a civil society led advocacy initiative called the Save Zimbabwe Campaign that took place from 2006 to 2009. In doing this, the study that informed this thesis sought to understand how CSOs cope with and adapt to the upward accountability requirements of international donors. In trying to understand the upward accountability challenges experienced by CSOs in Zimbabwe, the accountability theory was used. The accountability theory, which is an organisational relationship theory, helped in exploring why CSOs have to provide an “account” to donors. The theory also assisted in understanding why there is a surge in demand for results of development initiatives from donors.

The accountability theory was complemented by Michel Foucault’s theoretical approach to discourse and power/knowledge framework. While the accountability theory helped in explaining the "why" of accountability, Foucault’s theoretical approach to discourse and power/knowledge framework assisted in understanding the "how" of upward accountability. Furthermore, the framework assisted in exposing the power dynamics between the CSOs and donors in Zimbabwe. Most studies on upward donor accountability fail to fully explore the challenges associated with the mechanisms of accountability. In seeking to explore these challenges, Foucault’s theoretical approach to discourse and power/knowledge framework helped in examining the accountability mechanisms often used by CSOs in demonstrating results from advocacy initiatives.

This thesis sought to understand the challenges and complexities associated with upward accountability of CSOs in Zimbabwe. In this regard, data was gathered through interviews with key CSO representatives and donors, who were involved in varying degrees with the SZC. For a richer understanding of how the ZSC was set up,

implemented and how its results were demonstrated, SZC documents were also analysed. These were organisational documents, which also included correspondences between the main coordinating organisation ZCA and the intermediary organisation through which the funds for the campaign were channelled.

In framing this thesis, literature on NGO accountability and how it relates to development results was explored. Also, literature on civil society was explored looking at the historical origins of the concept, how it has evolved over the years and its modern usage. I surveyed literature on advocacy especially conducted by CSOs and its relationship with campaigns and lobbying. I further explored how civil society in Africa, particularly in Zimbabwe has helped in the consolidation of democracy. I also provided a detailed account of the SZC, situating it within the broader discourse of democracy consolidation in Zimbabwe.

In this concluding chapter, I summarise the main findings and the central argument of the thesis. This chapter also deals with the contribution my findings have to the general body of knowledge. I further propose areas of future studies in the area of results measurement and CSO – donor relations.

8.2 Key findings

This thesis, while providing new insights concerning the coping strategies and adaptive behaviour of CSOs in their quest to satisfy upward accountability requirements, has, first and foremost, affirmed a number of theoretical perspectives and long-held academic positions. Firstly, the concept of civil society has a long history with different epochs contributing to its understanding. Through the literature review, this thesis has affirmed that civil society is an “idea” rather than a “thing”. The idea of civil society has a long history that dates back to the pre-enlightenment era. However, the usage of the term both in academic literature and in development practice has various meanings attributed to it. While acknowledging the different approaches to civil society and the different definitions that may come with each approach, this thesis looked at civil society largely from a liberal notion. The liberal notion was compatible with the central research focus of the study that examined the relationship of CSOs in Zimbabwe and its donors concerning measurement of advocacy results. Foreign donors mainly from the Western countries funded the

majority of civil society organisations in Zimbabwe, especially those involved in the SZC.

The usage of the concept of civil society in Zimbabwe today has suffered from political polarisation affecting the country. According to Ncube (2010), there is a hegemonic tension between civil society aligned to the ruling party ZANU-PF and civil society aligned to opposition parties mainly the MDC. As Western donors tend to identify more with the values espoused by CSOs aligned to the opposition political parties, this has led to these CSOs receiving more funding from donors and their exponential growth. Hence, the concept of civil society in Zimbabwe is usually misconstrued to mean NGOs that are in opposition to the ZANU-PF government.

Secondly, the existence of civil society in Africa can be confirmed before, during and post the colonial period. However, the nature and form of African civil society cannot be exactly the same as the Western conceptualisation and the current usage of the term. More importantly, literature supports the fact that CSOs played a role in the promotion of democracy during colonialism in Africa. Furthermore, there is strong evidence on how several CSOs are helping in democracy consolidation in the postcolonial era in Africa.

Thirdly, the demand for results by donors who fund most CSOs is anchored in the global rise in demand for accountability. The last two decades have witnessed a rise in demand for development results. A number of high-level international meetings focusing on aid effectiveness and some directly on development results, have taken place in the last two decades. Financial resources to fund operations and activities of CSOs in development in countries such as Zimbabwe are largely provided by international donors from the western countries. This is because of the liberal thinking by many donors regarding CSOs as agents of development and therefore channelling financial assistance through them rather than through the state. CSO funding models are limited and most CSOs in Zimbabwe rely on foreign donors to fund their operations and activities. Among many stakeholders that CSOs deal with, donors are critical to CSOs in that they provide the much-needed financial resources. However, because of this heavy reliance on donor funding, this thesis posits that the donor as a stakeholder, becomes a “super stakeholder” as resources can be withheld or terminated threatening the existence of the CSOs. While this asymmetrical

relationship has been dealt with elsewhere in literature, this thesis highlights that the management of this relationship is critical.

This thesis has affirmed and acknowledged the key role that CSOs in Zimbabwe have played in democracy consolidation over the years. The SZC, a largely advocacy initiative is regarded as a significant CSO initiative in the recent past to have brought together a number of key pro-democracy actors in Zimbabwe. As a democracy advocacy initiative, the SZC was meant to raise awareness on the diminishing civil and political space and the deteriorating economic situation in Zimbabwe. The SZC, through a number of initiatives placed pressure on the government to reform. The campaign also targeted key regional stakeholders such as SADC and AU to intervene in the Zimbabwean situation. Although the organisers of SZC and some CSOs in Zimbabwe regard the campaign as being the precursor to the formation of the GNU consummated in February 2009, its implementation was not as smooth sailing. The campaign took place in an environment where the state was intolerant of CSOs particularly those working on civil and political issues. The fact that CSOs received funding from Western donors normally deemed hostile by the Zimbabwean government and the fact that the major opposition political party then MDC, was also part of the campaign compounded state – civil society relations. Furthermore, varied stakeholders ultimately presented a challenge in the measurement of results of the campaign as interest and perceptions were also varied. This is despite the seemingly common goal of "uniting to resolve the multifaceted crisis in Zimbabwe through peaceful means".

8.3 Challenges of measuring democracy advocacy results

A major finding of this thesis is that measurement of advocacy initiatives for the purposes of results accountability is both challenging and complex. The challenges and complexities emanate from a number of factors that are summarised below:

Firstly, there are practical limitations associated with demonstrating advocacy results especially in a politically challenging environment. These limitations emanate mainly from the fact that democracy advocacy is a complex and challenging initiative in itself. Advocacy ought to be understood as a “strategy” rather than an activity. In this way, advocacy involves several activities and in many instances, many stakeholders.

As has been demonstrated by this thesis, the SZC involved a number of different activities that were conducted from 2006 to 2009. Furthermore, several stakeholders within civil society and opposition political parties were involved. These stakeholders, because of different backgrounds and varied interests, may have different approaches to the advocacy strategy.

The complexity mentioned above is compounded by the fact that democracy advocacy campaigns usually take a considerable amount of time and that the external operating environment affects the campaign in various ways. Thus, CSOs involved in democracy advocacy have to deploy “adaptive management” strategies to accomplish their goals. Although the overall goal of the campaign remains unchanged, necessary adjustments have to be taken by those managing the advocacy initiative in response to changes in both the internal and external operating environment. This constant reactionary change during the implementation of the project adds to this complexity. These factors complicate advocacy.

Another challenge is that in trying to account for democracy advocacy results, one will be trying to measure change within the social and political sphere. The major goal of a democracy advocacy initiative is to effect positive social and political change. This change, however, does not follow a simple linear progression. In this way, tracking the results of these initiatives also becomes a complex task. This is compounded by the current logic based accountability mechanisms that seek a cause-and-effect relationship to evaluation of development interventions.

Effective and efficient results measurement is dependent on solid planning before and during the implementation of any initiative in development. It also requires very good data and data collection systems. A good data collection system ensures that information about how the project or programme is progressing is captured accurately and periodically. The current methods of assessing whether intended results of advocacy initiatives have been achieved are mostly evidence based and data-reliant. It is not always possible to collect data in a robust manner that is palatable to the current monitoring and evaluation frameworks. It is often the case that most democracy advocacy initiatives take place in politically restricted contexts that do not allow information about the project to be systematically recorded. In the case of the SZC, security for both personnel working on the campaign and project data was paramount.

CSOs involved in the SZC captured data in a very restricted way. This is different from other development interventions whereby project information can be captured in an extensive way and shared widely to stakeholders. This limited data collection and data systems complicate the measurement of results.

Finally, from the findings, it was noted that while accounting for results of democracy advocacy initiatives such as the SZC is both complex and challenging; it however remains a necessary principle and process in development practice. This is based on the understanding of "accountability as a virtue" – the desired value that should be pursued by all organisations especially those financed through public funds.

In light of the above, this thesis offers suggestions (new regimes of practice according to Foucault) on how the current tools and frameworks can be improved to capture results of democracy advocacy accurately and effectively. These suggestions include first and foremost acknowledging the complexity of democracy advocacy itself. With this complexity in mind, results assessment tools and frameworks should be inclusive in approach. All stakeholders should be involved in the results formulation and consequent assessment. The verdict of results achievement should be consensus-based. The assessment of results should factor in both the dynamic internal and external actors associated with social and political change. Other validation mechanisms for example involving beneficiaries such as citizens in this instance should be part of the results measurement approach. Simplification of results measurement jargon is an important step that can improve the current tools and frameworks being used for results measurement.

Having examined the accountability mechanisms and process used to measure democracy advocacy results particularly for the SZC, it is my submission that these mechanisms were inadequate and in most cases not fit for the purpose. Tools and frameworks such as logical frameworks and narrative reports, which were used during the SZC, restrict social and political change to matrixes and trying to capture this change in a limited narrative manner may result in inaccurate conclusions about the success of the advocacy initiative. Certain nuances of the project, which may be critical in determining the results of the project, are excluded. The tools that were used focused largely on the logic of planning and achievement. Unlike in other less challenging development interventions such as infrastructure development, there is no

“absolute unit of measurement” for results of advocacy. The current accountability mechanisms mistakenly, try to measure democracy advocacy as something measurable in an objective and simplistic way. Given these challenges, CSOs involved in democracy advocacy will resort to reluctant compliance and compromise as a way of managing the asymmetric relationship between them and the donors.

However, despite these apparent shortcomings of the current accountability mechanisms and processes, CSOs involved in development work and with projects financed by international donors, continue to use them. This conflicting organisational behaviour is part of the organizational survival strategy. Owing to the heavy reliance on external funding from donors, CSOs fear that lack of compliance with the donor-prescribed accountability mechanisms will lead to the withdrawal of funding. This also points to power dynamics between donors and CSOs in Zimbabwe.

The relationship between CSOs in Zimbabwe and their donors is essential to advance the goal of democracy consolidation. CSOs, on one hand, bring on board implementation experience with their knowledge of the local social and political environment and legitimacy to articulate issues on behalf of citizens. On the other hand, international donors bring on board funding required by CSOs to effectively carry out their work as well as technical expertise based on donors having a global perspective to some of the challenges. The asymmetrical relationship between CSOs and donors has been confirmed by this thesis. Although the relationship between CSOs and donors forms initially through the confluence of desired values such as democracy by both parties, funding brings hierarchy to the partnership. Donors usually assume a privileged position of power in the relationship because they provide the financial resources to CSOs who do not have alternative sources of funding. With this privileged position of power, donors usually prescribe the project management tools and templates to be used during the different phases of project lifecycle such as initiation, planning, execution and closure.

As has been shown in this thesis, the power assumed by donors manifests itself in various ways especially through approving or disapproving project narrative reports submitted by implementing CSOs. This means that donors, using their tools and frameworks, officially certify whether desired results of a project have been achieved or not. The current results frameworks are skewed in the favour of donors. They rely

on the implementers (CSOs) providing information according to their assessment of what the results are. Donors, also assess the information provided, sometimes applying validation techniques, and at the close of the funding cycle, give a “verdict” on results achieved.

Another critical point that this thesis sought to highlight is the salience of communication in results measurement. Communication and donor lexicon plays a critical role in the evaluation of advocacy initiatives. During the interaction between CSOs and donors, different types of communication are used and subconsciously, they have an effect on results measurement. The different typologies of communication feed into the biases and perceptions of both the anticipated results of projects being implemented by CSOs and the capabilities of these CSOs to achieve the desired results. These biases and perceptions sometimes obscure an effective assessment of whether desired results have been achieved or not.

The results frameworks and lexicon are not static. The evolution of results discourse can be traced to the different epochs when various mechanisms and processes were introduced in development practice. The fact that new result tools such as RBM, *logframe* and Success Stories Approach are introduced in development practice attest to the ever-changing field of results measurement in development studies. These changes may have an effect of stakeholders interpreting the mechanisms differently. A careful examination of the different terms used related to results using the SZC documents and corroborating this with field interviews from mainly CSOs leaders in Zimbabwe concluded that the quest to produce results is inherent to both international donors and CSOs. International donors because of the need to account for “what the funding has achieved” and from the CSOs to demonstrate that they are making an impact. However, the results measurement discourse may stand in between a common understanding between different stakeholders such as CSOs and international donors. Good intentions are lost in discourse.

8.4 The art of evaluating advocacy

In light of the above-mentioned findings, this thesis concludes that effective evaluation of democracy advocacy is an art rather than an exact science. The multiple

challenges experienced by democracy advocacy CSOs in order to be accountable to donors, is rooted by the practical difficulties of mixing politics (advocacy) and science (results measurement). The international development practice should treat these aspects separately. This requires some wisdom and skill on the part of those involved in assessing the projects for results. Several factors have to be considered before a determination is made on whether the project has achieved its intended results.

The pressure to demonstrate results for any development intervention including advocacy is likely to dominate the development theory and practice for some time to come. In fact, the pressure is bound to increase as financiers of international projects demand more information concerning the achievements of the projects they have funded. This is also linked to the increased call for transparency and accountability discourse globally. CSOs are not spared in the growing demand for transparency and accountability.

8.5 Key contributions of the study

Findings contained in this thesis contribute modestly to the body of knowledge in revealing how CSOs involved in democracy advocacy that relies on mass mobilisation of activists such as the SZC, resort to adaptive behaviours in order to be accountable to donors. Further to highlighting the complexity of democracy advocacy and the subsequent challenges associated with demonstrating its results by CSOs and assessment by donors, this thesis calls for a rethink in the use of logic-based frameworks when it comes to evaluating advocacy. Results measurement discourse and the process of evaluating development results is not power neutral. In most cases, results measurement tools and frameworks are usually developed at the request of international donors and are shared with development partners such as CSOs for their usage. Furthermore, by the fact that donors control the "purse strings", they assume a privileged position of power.

Findings from this thesis point to a need for a re-formation of results measurement tools and frameworks that are fit for the purpose when it comes to evaluating democracy advocacy. This should be a collective responsibility undertaken by all development practitioners. There is a need to view and approach the relationship

between CSOs and international donors in the spirit of true partnership. Funding should not be the basis for international donors to assume a privileged position of power whether consciously or subconsciously.

Furthermore, ownership of result measurement tools and frameworks is important. The involvement of all stakeholders in the design and development of results accountability mechanisms and processes will enhance the effectiveness of results measurement in development practice. This should happen upfront as the campaign is being designed and even if there are multiple stakeholders/implementing partners, an effort must be made to establish convergence on the top one or two or three key results on which all agree they are contributing as players in the campaign in addition to what they may be achieving as results at their individual institutional level.

Another radical proposition is that CSOs themselves develop tools and frameworks. This however requires confidence and capacity to be able to do this and then present them to funding partners as the tools to be used in results measurement. In light of this, there is need for investment in capacity building of CSO practitioners to enable them to understand enough the theory and practice around results measurement and be able to synthesise from their vast experiences knowledge that enables them to design and produce tools and frameworks to measure the results of their won work. The “new regime of practice” to measure development results will be based on experience gained over the years in implementing projects and the interaction with donors. The tools and frameworks would be shared with all stakeholders including donors to have a common understanding of how they can be used. This way, ownership and active usage of these tools and frameworks by CSOs will significantly improve.

Democracy advocacy initiatives should strive to ensure that all critical stakeholders agree on anticipated results (end game of the initiative) during the planning phase. However, some initiatives begin spontaneously and grow into larger campaigns with time. In this case, if international donors choose to support these campaigns, they should seek to understand the objectives of the campaign and be sensitive enough not to impose their agendas and ways of working.

8.6 Potential direction for future research

This thesis focused primarily on upward accountability by CSOs involved in democracy advocacy, however, certain aspects require further research. Firstly, how can CSOs derive power from their experience gained over the years i.e. knowledge of the local context and legitimacy of representation for membership based CSOs to match the power of international donors. Secondly, although the funding options for CSO activities in Zimbabwe are limited, there is a need to research other possible funding models such as membership subscriptions and local philanthropy. This obviously will be matched with different modalities of achieving accountabilities. Lastly, since democracy advocacy is intended to benefit citizens in general, there is a need to study beneficiary or citizen-based accountability mechanisms.

Appendix 1

Interview Schedule for key informants (Heads of organizations and key staff that were involved in the coordination and implementation of SZC; Key CSO leaders)

Title of Study

Civil Society and Impact Assessment: The Case of Save Zimbabwe Campaign

Introduction

I am a PhD student at the School of Built Environment and Development Studies, University of KwaZulu-Natal. My research topic is ‘Civil Society Advocacy and Impact Assessment: A Case Study of the Save Zimbabwe Campaign’.

I have brought a consent form that provides my student details and that of my supervisor.

(Ask the respondent to go through the consent form and if happy with its contents sign it).

I have also brought a digital voice recorder to record the interview. This is to ensure that I record your responses as accurate as possible.

(Ask respondent if they are comfortable in being recorded. Also give assurances that the interview recording and the transcription thereof are confidential records and will be used for academic purposes)

(Also give assurances on anonymity of respondents in the study)

Section 1: Background Information

1.1 I would like to know more about your background.

Prompts:

- Can you briefly tell me about your professional background and your current work?

Section 2: Participation/involvement with the Save Zimbabwe Campaign

2.1 Describe to me how you were involved with the Save Zimbabwe Campaign?

Prompts:

- To what extent were you involved with the day to day operations of the SZC?
- Were you involved with donor engagements through meetings or project management documents such as proposals and reports?

2.2 Are you aware of the difference between advocacy strategy and other strategies used by CSOs to achieve their intended objectives?

2.3 As someone who took part in the SZC, do you think the campaign was successful and why?

Section 3: Save Zimbabwe Campaign and its evaluation

3.1 I would like find out more about the tools used to evaluate advocacy initiatives.

What tools and approaches are used to evaluate projects and programmes?

3.2 To what extent do we know if the Save Zimbabwe Campaign was successful or not?

3.3 What tools or approaches were used to evaluate the SZC?

Prompts:

- Are these tools different from those used in project evaluation in general?
- Do you think these tools are adequate to measure advocacy initiatives?

Section 5: CSOs -donor relations

5.1 I would like to find out about the CSO – international donor relations in Zimbabwe. Do you think there are challenges that CSOs face in demonstrating results particular of advocacy initiatives to international donors?

Prompt:

If any can you give examples with reference to SZC

5.2 Do you think CSOs and international donors have the same understanding when it comes to evaluation advocacy projects such as SZC?

Section 6: How to improve results measurement of democracy advocacy initiatives

6.1 Is results measurement in development practice necessary/ important and why?

Prompt:

If yes, how can it be done?

How can performance on democracy advocacy initiatives by CSOs in Zimbabwe such as the SZC be best measured by both CSOs and international donors?

Appendix 2

Interview Schedule for key informants (key donor representatives including those who directly funded the SZC)

Title of Study

Civil Society and Impact Assessment: The Case of Save Zimbabwe Campaign

Introduction

I am a PhD student at the School of Built Environment and Development Studies, University of KwaZulu-Natal. My research topic is ‘Civil Society Advocacy and Impact Assessment: A Case Study of the Save Zimbabwe Campaign’.

I have brought a consent form that provides my student details and that of my supervisor.

(Ask the respondent to go through the consent form and if happy with its contents sign it).

I have also brought a digital voice recorder to record the interview. This is to ensure that I record your responses as accurate as possible.

(Ask respondent if they are comfortable in being recorded. Also give assurances that the interview recording and the transcription thereof are confidential records and will be used for academic purposes)

(Also give assurances on anonymity of respondents in the study)

Section 1: Background Information

1.2 I would like to know more about your background.

Prompts:

- Can you briefly tell me about your professional background and your current work?

Section 2: Participation/involvement with the Save Zimbabwe Campaign

2.1 Describe to me how your organisation was involved with the Save Zimbabwe Campaign?

Prompts:

- To what extent was your organisation involved with SZC campaign?
- Funding,
- Technical support etc.
- CSO engagements through meetings or project management documents such as proposals and reports?

2.2 Are you aware of the difference between advocacy strategy and other strategies used by CSOs to achieve their intended objectives?

2.3 As an organisation that was involved with the SZC, do you think the campaign was successful and why? *(Skip if organisation was not involved with SZC)*

Section 3: Save Zimbabwe Campaign and its evaluation

3.2 I would like find out more about the tools used to evaluate advocacy initiatives. What tools and approaches does your organisation use to evaluate projects and programmes?

3.2 To what extent do we know if the Save Zimbabwe Campaign was successful or not? *(Skip if organisation was not involved with SZC)*

3.3 What tools or approaches were used to evaluate the SZC? *(Skip if organisation was not involved with SZC)*

3.4 Are these tools different from those used in project evaluation in general?

3.5 Do you think these tools are adequate to measure advocacy initiatives?

Section 5: CSOs -donor relations

5.1 I would like to find out about the CSO – international donor relations in Zimbabwe.

Are you aware of any challenges that CSOs face in demonstrating results particular of advocacy initiatives to international donors?

Prompt:

If any can you give examples

5.2 Do you think CSOs and international donors have the same understanding when it comes to evaluation advocacy projects such as SZC?

Section 6: How to improve results measurement of democracy advocacy initiatives

6.1 Is results measurement in development practice necessary/ important and why?

Prompt:

If yes, how can it be done?

How can performance on democracy advocacy initiatives by CSOs in Zimbabwe such as the SZC be best measured by both CSOs and international donors.

Appendix 3

Informed Consent Form

(To be read out by researcher before the beginning of the interview. One copy of the form to be left with the respondent; one copy to be signed by the respondent and kept by the researcher.)

Dear Research Participant,

My name is Taenzaniswa Kennedy Mugochi (student number 213573308). I am a PhD student with the School of Built Environment and Development Studies (SBEDS) at the University of KwaZulu-Natal in South Africa. I am working on my thesis entitled 'Civil Society Advocacy and Impact Assessment: A Case Study of the Save Zimbabwe Campaign'.

The aim of the study is to critically analyse the evaluation approaches used on the internationally funded Save Zimbabwe Campaign (SZC) in order to contribute to a deeper understanding of relations between international donors and Civil Society Organisations with regards to approaches used in advocacy evaluation.

You have been identified to take part in this study because you or your organization was involvement in the Save Zimbabwe Campaign itself.

In this study, you will be expected to respond to a number questions contained in my interview schedule. The interview time will be about one (1) hour.

My supervisor is Dr. Shauna Mottiar based at the School of Built Environment and Development Studies at University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, South Africa. Her email address is mottiar@ukzn.ac.za

Should you have any questions my contact details are:

Cell: 00263772932859. Email: samugochi@gmail.com or 213573308@ukzn.ac.za.

Please take note that that:

- your participation is entirely voluntary;
- you are free to refuse to answer any question;
- you are free to withdraw at any time.

The interview will be kept strictly confidential and will be available only to members of the research team. Excerpts from the interview may be made part of the final research report. Do you give your consent for: *(please tick one of the options below)*

Your name, position and organisation, or	
Your position and organisation, or	
Your organisation or type of organisation <i>(please specify)</i> , or	
None of the above	

to be used in the research findings?

Please sign the declaration below to show that you have read the contents.

I ----- (full names)
hereby confirm that I understand the contents of this document and the nature of the research project, and I consent to participating in the research project.

I understand that I am at liberty to withdraw from the project at any time, should I so desire.

I hereby provide YES NO consent to:
Audio-record my YES NO interview

SIGNATURE OF PARTICIPANT ----- DATE-----

Write your address below if you wish to receive a copy of the final thesis:

Save Zimbabwe Campaign

**“We Demand A New
Constitution before 2008
Elections”**

Project Proposal

Submitted by
Christian Alliance,
83 Central Avenue,
Harare.

1.0 Introduction.

Save Zimbabwe Campaign [SZC] is a coalition of civil society organizations, churches and political formations in Zimbabwe who are united to resolve the multi faceted crisis in Zimbabwe through peaceful means. SZC proposes to undertake a nationwide campaign to ensure that the people of Zimbabwe are not deprived of their constitutional right to participate in free and fair elections in 2008. The campaign incorporates the urgent need for constitutional reform before 2008 as well as the adoption of minimum standards for free and fair elections before the elections are held. The proposed activities within this proposal were agreed to by members of the Save Zimbabwe Campaign. This particular campaign shall have the title, "We Demand A New Constitution Before 2008 Elections." The premise of this campaign theme is that the people of Zimbabwe should not be denied their right to regularly choose leaders of their choice, as well the right to democratically decide the constitutional framework they wish to be ruled under. Although political parties are members, the SZC is ultimately a civil society campaign whose membership aims to include all Zimbabweans.

This Save Zimbabwe Campaign proposal is submitted, on behalf of Save Zimbabwe, by Zimbabwe Christian Alliance (ZCA), which chairs and coordinates the SZC.

1.1 Structure of SZC

General Council

The General Council is the policy making body. It is composed of leadership of participating civic organizations and political parties. The general council is chaired and coordinated by ZCA.

Task force

The task force is the Executive arm of the campaign and is composed of 5 task oriented entities. It is the implementing organ of the broad alliance in the campaign. Its members are drawn from civic organizations and does not include political parties. Political parties

cannot be members to the task force. The task force membership is concentrated around 5 major thematic areas namely:

- Advocacy (regional and international) – chaired by Crisis and Bulawayo Agenda
- Mass mobilization – chaired by ZCTU and ZINASU
- Resource and legal mobilization – chaired by ZLHR and ZCA
- Information – chaired by MISA
- Constitution – chaired by NCA

The task force is chaired by CA

Task Force Sub-Committees

- There are 5 sub-committees working under the above 5 major thematic areas, i.e. a sub committee for each area. These are composed of member organisations drawn from the General Council.
- The decisions and deliberations of sub-committees shall feed into the Task Force.
- It is proposed that the sub- committee be represented at national, provincial and district levels for the purposes of involving the majority of Zimbabweans to participate.

The Task Force Terms of Reference

The shared values and principles guiding the taskforce shall be those reflected in the Zimbabwe Democracy Charter which was presented to Save Zimbabwe Convention. The task force shall implement all resolutions of the General Council of the Save Zimbabwe Campaign as the Executive arm of the campaign.

2.0 BACKGROUND

Zimbabwe Christian Alliance grew out of the several prophetic initiatives by the several faith-based organizations like the Churches in Bulawayo, Mutare, Hwange, Zimbabwe National Pastors Conference (ZNPC), the Ecumenical Support Services (ESS) and others. These initiatives were all aimed at addressing the root cause of the crisis in Zimbabwe which they identified as bad governance. These got together and united as the Zimbabwe Christian Alliance (ZCA).

Zimbabwe Christian Alliance organized a convention on 29 July 2006 which brought together Civic Society Organizations, political parties and churches. ZANU PF, was also invited but did not participate. A total of 26 organizations with more than 500 participants attended the meeting. Out of this convention, Save Zimbabwe Campaign (SZC) was born as a broad coalition of civil society organizations, churches, and political parties in Zimbabwe that are united to fight the deepening political, social and economic crisis in Zimbabwe from a common front. ZCA was mandated to chair and coordinate SZC as a neutral apolitical organisation.

SZC is a platform that offers a collective voice to CSOs and churches in fighting the deepening socio-economic and political crisis in Zimbabwe. These bodies have a shared responsibility in working out the solutions to the crisis. SZC has successfully coordinated civic society and political formations as evidenced by the events of 11 March 2007. On this day, the police violently broke up a prayer meeting at Zimbabwe Grounds, Highfields, Harare. This raised regional and international outcry. SADC responded in Dar er Salam by mandating South Africa to immediately facilitate talks to resolve crisis. Africa Union (AU) condemned the violent reaction of the Zimbabwean government thereof.

This proposal represents the attempt by civil society, churches, students and member political parties to effectively coordinate activities under SZC under the chairmanship of ZCA.

SZC Strategy

In order to realize its goals, SZC will:

- ✦ Engage in dialogue on strategic issues of common concern and express views that seek to address these common concerns.
- ✦ Hold monthly meetings of the General Council that will assess Campaign progress from time to time and strategise on dynamics of the environment, where appropriate.
- ✦ Hold weekly coordination Task Force meetings for the implementation of activities with agreed activities being implemented.
- ✦ Foster a common understanding on the principles of diversity, mutual respect, responsibility and transparency for the sole purpose of working together and saving Zimbabwe.

The Save Zimbabwe Campaign is a project which seeks to initially achieve set goals within a time frame of the next 12 months. The Campaign is aimed at popularizing the fact that the people of Zimbabwe will participate in the 2008 harmonized presidential, senatorial parliamentary and local government elections, provided that there is a new democratic Constitution and is a level playing field for the holding of free and fair elections. The campaign is aimed at compelling the government to agree to the need for major constitutional reforms. SZC demands a level playing field under which free and fair elections can be held.

SZC will raise awareness on the need for a people driven Constitution and the minimum standards to be met before the polls in 2008. The project compliments and enhances the activities that are being carried out by member organizations in the field of human rights and good governance. *(Refer to the attached list the end.)* This proposal is cogniscant of the experiance and accountability of member organizations in their areas of particular focus and their comparative advantage will therefore add value to the collective efforts and activities planned. The SZC will thus concentrate on coordination and

communication within the Save Zimbabwe Campaign membership and also provide a common position on contentious national issues.

The Save Zimbabwe Campaign is a broad based process whose membership and participation is not confined to the organizations which participated in the initial convention on 29 July 2006. The campaign seeks the participation of all progressive forces in the solution of the Zimbabwean crisis. The SZC does not seek to duplicate the activities and programmes being carried out by member organizations. Rather, it serves to fill the gaps that may exist and coordinates activities in order to avoid duplication.

The first prayer meeting which was organized in Harare on March 11 2007 and could not be held because government unleashed unmitigated violence which saw more than 600 people injured and arrested. A prayer meeting in Bulawayo was held successfully. Other prayer meetings are scheduled for Mutare, Gweru and Masvingo and other towns. The prayer meetings are a major source of information and means of mobilisation given the restrictions imposed by on rallies by POSA.

Currently, the Save Zimbabwe campaign has come up with a position paper on the ongoing Mbeki mediation. This was adopted by the General Council at a meeting held on 30th May 2005. The paper will be popularized and taken to all the relevant SADC countries and South Africa to influence the dialogue process.

3.0 Outline of the proposal.

This proposal is divided into 4 areas for purposes of precise clarity. They focus on different areas of high impact activities, and the budget for the project is included at the end. The SZC focuses on issues that go beyond the theme of this proposal, and a 5th area is included for the purpose of indicating such continuity. This 5th area is not included in the current budget as it is not possible to anticipate some implications at this point. The activity based areas are:

Focus Area A: Public Mobilisation Coordination of Campaign Activities; Focus Area B: Media and information Management, Focus Area C: Local, Regional and International Advocacy / Lobbying, Focus Area D: Management and Coordination of the SZC; Focus Area E: Beyond March 2008

The proposal largely entails filling the existing gaps in advocacy and lobbying and exploring alternative means and methods of mobilisation of the people, without duplicating activities of member organizations or other civic groups.

3.1 Description of the project

The purpose of this project is for SZC to launch a campaign entitled “We Demand A New Constitution before 2008 Elections”. The premise of this campaign theme is that the people of Zimbabwe should not be denied the right to regularly choose leaders of their choice as well as the right to democratically decide on the constitutional framework they wish to be ruled under.

3.1.2 Goal

The establishment of a unified non-partisan, democratic space for the achievement of a free, peaceful and prosperous Zimbabwe.

3.1.3 Strategy

SZC will launch a campaign entitled “We Demand a New Constitution before 2008 Elections”. The goal and strategy of the campaign is to open up democratic space within which dialogue and negotiation, with all stakeholders, can take place so that Zimbabweans can together map out the road to free Zimbabwe. Democratic space can be opened by:

- a) Repealing of repressive legislation AIPPA, POSA etc
- b) Engaging in all inclusive processes of drafting a new constitution which will be acceptable to all Zimbabweans as a whole, i.e. engaging civil society in all national processes

- c) Scheduling free and fair general and presidential elections observed by both local and international observers.

SZC through the Task Force will carry out public mobilization through the media and churches, as well as regional and international advocacy and lobbying on the theme of the Campaign.

3.1.4 Specific objectives;

- To effectively chair and coordinate a unified non-partisan democratic front for the facilitation of resolving the crisis in Zimbabwe.
- To create publicity on the activities of the campaign to its members locally, regionally and internationally.

4.0 Focus Areas

4.1 Focus Area A: Public Mobilisation.

It is envisaged that within this focus area, there shall be the holding of Music Festivals, Theatres and Public Meetings. It is expected that there shall be at least one (1) SZC major activities nationally per month.

Activities: Coordination of public meetings, as well as music and theatre festivals.

NB. Refer to Fig 1 below for specific details on the activities.

Fig 1. Public Mobilisation Activities.

Activity	Frequency In the 12 months	Responsible Committee(s)	Resources required
Music and Theatre Festivals	3	Media and Mobilisation	Artists, royalties, venues, video and still cameras, flyers, T-shirts, caps, arm bands,
Provincial and District Prayer Meetings	12	Mobilisation and Advocacy.	Transport and accommodation of mobilization team. Flyers, posters & venue booking

4.2 DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE PROGRAMMES.

Public Mobilisation: The flyers, T-shirts, footballs, caps, posters, calendars will be distributed at the prayer meetings and festivals. These materials will carry the Save Zimbabwe Campaign message theme. Messages will also encourage people, especially the youth, to register as voters.

The following issues are to be included at the prayer meetings and festivals activities that are going to be carried out.

- Campaign for electoral reforms to be underpinned in the Constitution
- Campaign for the adherence to the SADC principles and guidelines to free and fair elections which call for among other things, full participation of all citizens in the political process, freedom of association and access to state media by all political parties.
- Campaign for de-politicization of food distribution
- Campaign for access to identity cards and voters registration of youths in all provinces.
- Campaign for elimination in violence and intimidation of civil society and all other Zimbabweans
- Campaign for the opening up of the democratic space through the repeal of POSA and AIPPA and other repressive legislations
- Campaign for the independence of the electoral supervisory bodies
- Campaign for Zimbabweans in the Diaspora to be allowed to exercise their voting rights
- Campaign for stakeholders to have access to the voters roll
- Campaign for elections to be observed by international as well as domestic observers

Prayer Meetings. Prayer meetings have become the most feasible way to reach the grassroots and these shall be organized by the Task Force under the Christian Alliance's local churches. The meetings shall take the form of sermons where members of the Task

Force will give solidarity and prophetic messages highlighting the above campaign message. 12 prayer meetings shall take place. Prayer meetings will be held as follows:

Mutare	July	2007
Gweru	August	2007
Marondera	September	2007
Masvingo	September	2007
Bindura	October	2007
Gwanda	November	2007
Chegututu	December	2007
Hwange	December	2007
Harare	January	2008
Bulawayo	January	2008

These prayer meetings are scheduled in strategically selected provincial capitals. Adverts will be put in the newspapers and flyers distributed ahead of the activities. Room is created for 2 additional venues above in line with the dynamics of events. Accordingly the above lists reflects 10 areas rather than 12 for such flexibility.

Sub-committees of the Task Force will implement prayer meetings. Meetings will be held in widespread locations to ensure that many different people are reached. It is expected that at least 200 members will attend each prayer meeting.

SZC is aware that the members are carrying out grassroots civic education and accordingly will only intervene where the members have been challenged to reach out to general population.

The activities will ensure that women, youths, farm workers, rural population and the urban poor are included as these are subject to manipulation by some agents. The implementation of the Campaign will be spearheaded by the Task Force.

However it should be noted that in the event that the Government of Zimbabwe agrees to the leveling of the playing field, people of Zimbabwe could vote and then engage government on constitutional reform afterwards.

Arts festivals (music & theatre)

The music and theatre festivals shall be the responsibility of the information sub-committees. Renowned artists will be asked to perform 3 major shows. These activities are targeting the youth. The strategy of these festivals is that the performances, particularly by the major artists, will not be political to avoid the closure of that space. Flyers and the paraphernalia will be distributed at the festivals while a register is kept of the people who attend, for further advocacy and follow up. The theatre artists normally give satirical pieces which will lead to discussions of the play thereby opening room for the discussion on the themes of the plays and the general challenges, social and economic conditions obtaining in Zimbabwe. The festivals shall take place on important national and international dates where possible.

5.2 Focus Area B:

Media and Information Management.

5.2.1. Objectives:

- ✦ To publicize all of Save Zimbabwe Campaigns activities under the “We Demand A New Constitution Before 2008 Elections.
- ✦ To integrate all of the focus areas of SZC into one media strategy where the production of media materials will be undertaken with the collaboration of SZC task force.
- ✦ To amplify and publicize the activities of member organizations which dovetail into the Save Zimbabwe Campaign activities.

The media campaign is the most vital aspect of the Save Zimbabwe Campaign. This is because the Save Zimbabwe campaign should promote the highest level of awareness and

mobilisation of the people towards the 2008 elections. The campaign shall therefore seek to publicize the activities of member organizations in their various activities, filling the gaps that are left by other organizations. It is anticipated that SZC will launch an ostensible media strategy on the campaign. Task Force shall implement this through media committee, i.e. the production of a press and communications procedure protocol, the linkage of all activities to the media committee and as a result thereof, the production of posters, flyers, music albums, T-shirts, music/theater festivals and radio/television adverts.

The media strategy will also entail that all other committees of SZC feed into their activities with the assistance of the media and information committee. It is anticipated that over the 12 month campaign period, at least 5 000 T-shirts will have been produced, 1 million flyers distributed, varied campaign paraphernalia (such as pens, badges, caps, head scarves, arm bands etc), festivals held at major rallying points, and radio / television campaign adverts as detailed under Public Mobilisation. 1 500 copies of a SZC newsletter will be produced after every 2 months and distributed to members and the general public.

NB. Refer to fig 2 below for specific details.

Fig. 2. Media and Information Management.

Medium	Quantity	Targeted population	Distribution Format	Expected Outcome.
T-shirts	5 000	Youth, rural population, unregistered voters,	At music concerts, meetings of member organizations,	Increased awareness. Registration as voters.
Flyers	1 million	All registered and unregistered voters both rural and urban.	meetings. Music concerts, Postage to targeted rural and urban individuals. Rural buses raids.	Increased awareness, Increased voter registration.
Pens	1 million	Students and the youth who are eligible to vote.	Schools colleges and universities.	Increased awareness and registration of the youth.
Caps and head scarves	500 000	Youth, rural and urban, farm workers, informal traders, students	Farms, Music concerts, church services, funerals, sport activities,	
Arm bands	1 million	Youth, students, workers, sports people, rural and urban voters.	Shopping centers, rural growth points and schools,	
Badges	1 million	Youth, students, eligible voters, rural and urban voters.	Schools and colleges and universities, concerts, public meetings, sporting events	Increased publicity Increased voter registration.
Posters	200	Workers, students, women and youth.	Poster raids at shopping centers, churches, high density suburbs, schools.	Increased awareness,
Newspaper adverts	24 newspaper adverts	Readers of local newspapers.	Adverts in the Independent, Financial Gazette, The Standard and Zimbabwean	Increased awareness of the Save Zimbabwe Activities,
Website		People with access, including those in the Diaspora.	Internet	updated information on the SZC programme events
Newsletter	9 000	Membership and general public	At meetings and through SZC membership structures	Increased awareness and participation

The SZC intends to go on an extensive media campaign. These radio / television stations have a wider listenership and viewership of Zimbabweans at home, regionally and internationally for Zimbabweans in Diaspora. This overcomes the problem of the state monopoly of radio and television. The adverts will campaign for a democratic Constitution in Zimbabwe and also encourage all Zimbabweans to register to vote. These adverts shall intensify towards the elections.

Newspaper adverts.

The Save Zimbabwe campaign shall have fortnightly adverts in the independent media. The adverts will appeal to various age groups and social classes of people to register to vote. The adverts shall be used to campaign for the new Constitution and the need for minimum conditions ahead of the elections.

Website.

The website shall be the most informative face of the campaign as it shall carry information and the activities of the campaign to locally, regionally and internationally.

The SZC Newsletter

SZC will produce and distribute a newsletter after every 2 months in order to keep its membership informed about its activities. These letters will also be distributed to the general public at meetings and through Campaign membership structures.

6.3. Focus Area C: Advocacy and Lobbying.

6.3.1 Objectives:

- ✦ Create and maintain a local, regional and international awareness of Zimbabwe's crisis.
- ✦ Lobby regional and international organizations and governments to influence relevant authorities into conceding to solve the crisis in Zimbabwe.
- ✦ Lobby the South African government and its power support systems to positively influence the mediation process.

It is expected that there shall be an intensification of regional SZC Advocacy activities. The major focus shall be the regional SADC organisations and Southern Africa Civil Society organizations. The model for this advocacy campaign shall be with solidarity as the key phrase. The emphasis of the Save Zimbabwe Campaign will be on SADC countries and the African Union. This stems from the possible change in the perception of the SADC and African Union after the March 11. Greater emphasis shall be placed on South Africa as the chosen SADC mediator. This work is taking place against the background of activities that are currently being undertaken by member organizations.

6.3.2 Activities: Preparation of lobby documents that outline alternative policy frameworks that civil society has agreed to under the SZC, to link up with regional and international civil society organizations in their causes in order to accentuate the solidarity component in the struggle for a peaceful and prosperous Zimbabwe.

NB. Refer to fig 3 below for specific details.

Fig. 3 Advocacy and Lobbying

Medium	Quantity	Targeted population	Distribution Format	Expected Outcome.
Regional trips	2	Authorities in the region who are in direct involvement with the Zimbabwean crisis	1 SZC leader to team up with selected task force leaders to form a strategic delegation	Strategic awareness and solidarity in resolving the Zimbabwean crisis as civil society
International trips	2	International authorities in the region who are in direct involvement with the Zimbabwean crisis	1 SZC leader to team up with selected task force leaders to form a strategic delegation	Strategic awareness and solidarity in resolving the Zimbabwean crisis as civil society
Consultative meetings with individual stakeholders within Zimbabwe.	10	SZC leaders	Transport, Accommodation & food.	
Workshops	2	SZC think-tank as appointed to prepare lobby documents in line with other CSOs	SZC leadership meets from time to time when it is necessary to strategically prepare lobby documents e.g. position papers on specific processes	Lobby documents that outline alternative policy frameworks that civil society has agreed to under the SZC

Delegates who are selected for such trips will be from member organizations with their own budgets for such travel, whilst a senior member of the SZC secretariat shall require resources from this project. Such trips shall be necessitated by challenges resulting from developments in the crisis. It will be necessary for SZC General Council to workshop on certain issues and prepare strategic lobbying material ahead of such trips in order for the campaign to maintain its one collective voice at all times.

7.0 Focus Area D: Management and Coordination of the Save Zimbabwe Campaign.

Meeting	Frequency	Anticipated Number in attendance/meeting
General Council meetings	12	50
Task force	54	8
Task Force Sub-Committee meetings	60 (5 Task Force committees, each with a sub-committee that meets monthly i.e.)	50 (5 x 10 sub-committee members)
Consultancy	On a need basis, SZC shall source professional input and service where there may be capacity gaps within the process.	

a) Coordination Meetings of the General Council, Task Force and Task Force Sub-Committees

The General Council will meet monthly to share information and review the progress in the implementation of campaign activities. 12 meetings for 50 people are expected in the duration of the campaign

The Task Force will meet weekly hence 54 meetings for 8 people are expected in the duration of the campaign. They discuss implementation of programme activities as mandated by the General Council, and agree on how each area will feed into the other.

The Task Force Sub-Committees are an extension of the Task Force Committee and they are localized in the field at provincial and district levels. Each of the 5 Task Force theme areas of operation has a 10 member sub-committee whose members are based in different parts of the country. They meet at least once a month to plan ahead of activities in their province / district and identify relevant strategies, as well as share information on progress of the Campaign.

Task Force and General Council Meetings.

General Council and Task Force meetings shall take place monthly and weekly respectively. The task force is the implementation arm of the Save Zimbabwe Campaign and as such, must meet often. The meetings of the task force shall discuss the activities of member organizations and identify gaps which will then inform the coordinated efforts of the Save Zimbabwe Campaign for implementation. The general council meetings are a monthly event which provides member organizations a platform to reflect and strategise on the activities of the Campaign. The General Council is the policy making body that mandates the Task Force to implement its agreed activities.

b) Strengthening of the SZC secretariat

The SZC secretariat will employ a national programme officer (already provided for), information officer, secretary/administrative assistant and a driver for the duration for the campaign.

In addition the rented office will be equipped with 2 desk top computers, 2 printers, a photocopier/fax, desks, a fax machine, a shredder as well as 2 vehicles. The vehicles will become property of ZCA after the expiry of the campaign. A broad band internet facility is also required for the day to day operations and much needed communication for the campaign.

c)Target group

The activities are expected to target the grassroots, electorate and citizens of Zimbabwe, women, youth, churches, media, regional bodies in particular SADC, AU, regional church bodies and civic society bodies.

8.0 FOCUS AREA E: Beyond March 2008

The SZC recognises that the current environment does not provide a clear prediction of what could transpire with regards to the forthcoming elections that are scheduled for March 2008. Whilst the Campaign demands a new Constitution before 2008, it is not yet clear on what the outcome of the present SADC dialogue initiative will be. However, for continuity, the SZC identifies the need for certain activities regardless of what will actually happen.

Activities:

1. Hold an all stakeholders convention to carry out a post mortem on what will have transpired.
2. Hold a strategic planning workshop to map a way forward on the basis of the convention
3. Call a General Council meeting to sell the strategic plan for implementation

There are a number of possible scenarios that could arise, and these include:

- a) Elections going ahead with or without a new Constitution, or
- b) Rescheduling to 2010 as indicated in the past.

In the event of the latter, it would be necessary for SZC to carefully plan programmes to live the 2-year extension.

It is not immediately possible to anticipate financial implications for this phase because that will be dependant on what will have happened. Accordingly, that part of the programme is not included in the budget for this proposal as there might be a need to re-strategise.

SZC continues to strategies in line with the dynamics of the environment and this indicates the need for flexibility in terms of activities detailed in this project.

9.0 Budget: See Annex B.

10.0 Feasibility Analysis.

The SZC programme is highly feasible despite the prevailing economic crisis and political repression.

10.1.1 Threats to the project.

The prevailing economic climate makes the project highly suspect to the inflationary environment. The other challenge which the programme faces is the enforcement of POSA. This therefore entails that the public meetings planned may only take place with the permission of the police. The other risk which threatens the proposed activities is the polarization of the political climate in both the rural and urban areas particularly towards elections.

10.1.2 Solutions to the threats.

To address the threats outlined above the proposal intends to put in place the following measures. The Save Zimbabwe Campaign is taking place against the background of other

programmes being undertaken by member organizations. The Campaign therefore shall exploit the structures of member organizations like the NCA ,ZCTU, ZCA ,Crisis and other member organizations in the implementation of the programmes outlined above. To overcome the challenge faced by the closure of broadcasting space through the Broadcasting Act the proposal intends to use independent regional radio stations which have a wide listenership in Zimbabwe. The campaign shall also use the courts in challenging refusal by the police to offer clearance for the meetings.

Fig. 3 Advocacy and Lobbying

Medium	Quantity	Targeted population	Distribution Format	Expected Outcome.
Regional trips	2	Authorities in the region who are in direct involvement with the Zimbabwean crisis	1 SZC leader to team up with selected task force leaders to form a strategic delegation	Strategic awareness and solidarity in resolving the Zimbabwean crisis as civil society
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Consultative meetings with individual stakeholders within Zimbabwe.	10	SZC leaders	Transport, Accommodation & food.	
Workshops	2	SZC think-tank as appointed to prepare lobby documents in line with other CSOs	SZC leadership meets from time to time when it is necessary to strategically prepare lobby documents e.g. position papers on specific processes	Lobby documents that outline alternative policy frameworks that civil society has agreed to under the SZC

Save Zimbabwe Campaign

Task Force Strategic Planning Workshop

Date: 7th August 2007

Venue: [REDACTED]

Purpose

The purpose of this workshop is to provide members of the Task Force a forum to strategically revisit the SZC Plan of Activities in line with the dynamics of the operating environment, and produce:

1. A practicable 12-month calendar of events that reflects involvement of each of the task force committees
2. A draft budget for the 12 month period for each area of operation as represented at task force level (each task force committee to submit their finalised budget by deadline agreed upon at the workshop)
3. A proposed standard agenda for the monthly SZC General Council Meetings, with a report back component for task force (report to be presented each month – format?)
4. Task Force
 - a. A clear structure of task force committees and sub-committees with names of representatives and their substitutes – organogram of each committee down to provincial levels.
 - b. Redefined Terms of Reference for each of the task force committees, and their sub-committees in line with the program
 - c. Key Result Areas to be used for evaluating progress in future

Background

It was agreed at the last Save Zimbabwe Campaign General Council meeting that in view of dynamics of the political and socio economic environment in Zimbabwe, there is need to assess progress on the campaign and fortify its relevance.

A compact plan of activities covering the period from January 2007 to March 2008 was presented at the beginning of 2007 and approved by the General Council for implementation at the meeting. The workshop shall focus on this plan to assess progress, achievements and challenges encountered in the implementation process, in order to re-strategise on the way forward. Activities shall be in line with proposals which were submitted for funding.

Whilst proposals were prepared and submitted for consideration to various donors for resource mobilisation, the SZC is yet to receive resources specifically for the campaign. In the meantime, part of the program was resourced through Zimbabwe Christian Alliance (ZCA), [REDACTED] amongst other member organisations.

Save Zimbabwe Campaign

Current Program of Activities

Ongoing Campaign Activities

- Hoot for Freedom
- Local, Regional and International Advocacy and Lobbying (including ACHPR hearings, AU Summit and NGO Forum)
- Production and distribution of campaign material
- Publicity – media strategy
- Social welfare activities – *carried out in line with event incidents*
- Continual assessment of the political violence situation
- Campaign against constitutional amendments
- National outreach
- Protest activities
- Voter Education lined with the need for Constitutional Reform
- Inspection of Voter's Roll for forthcoming elections
- Demonstrations
- Strategic positioning of the campaign in preparation for March 2008 elections
- Continual publicity of national voters' roll
- Production and examination of media items on previous elections
- Campaign for elections in the Diaspora
- Pressure on all fronts – parliament, the streets, Diaspora, region and international community

Specific Campaign Events

- Prayer Meetings
- Music and theatre festivals – Bulawayo, Harare, Gweru, Masvingo, Mutare, Victoria Falls
- Local, Regional and International Advocacy and Lobbying trips
 - Attend ACHPR hearings and NGO Forum
- Strategic planning workshops
- June 16 commemorations – held in Mutare
- Launch alternative draft Constitution for consideration in a consultative process

Outstanding Activities

- "We the People" Public Petition
- Inspect Voter's roll for Government and National Elections
- Voter Education lined to the need for a democratic Constitution
- Re-package NCA draft Constitution and publicize it - NCA
- Protest plan – impromptu and decentralised
- Engagement of Diaspora – Website being set up (discussion forum on website?)
- Establishment of alternative Harare City Council, in preparation for urban council elections – CHRA
- Assessment of drought situation in Zimbabwe for identification of intervention points and strategies
- Alternative Policies / Legislation – planning meeting; publicise
- Analysis of urban council elections voter s rolls and electoral mechanisms
- Africa Day commemoration
- Heroes and Sheroes day celebrations outlining a clear vision and expectations of the army from the people of Zimbabwe

- [REDACTED]
- Intensification of the media blitz
- Christmas wish list campaign, including voting under a democratic dispensation in March 2008

March 2008

- Vote
- Review Campaign
- Revise theme and / or title if necessary

Failed Activities

- Alternative 21st February Movement
- Monitor Chiredzi by-election as if it were a national one
- Easter Salvation Campaign Planning: meetings, demonstrations, prayers
- Parallel Independence Day celebration
- Workers' Day Rally
- Commemoration of Operation *Murambatsvina*

File

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Harare

Date August 25, 2008
 Our ref. 08.79.PRD.16072
 Page 1/2
 Encl.
 Re [Redacted] Activity 16072
 Cc

Contact [Redacted]
 Tel. [Redacted]
 Fax [Redacted]

Dear [Redacted]

Reference is made to the above grant agreement dated 10 October 2007. Reference is also made to the narrative and financial reports for the first half of the project duration which were received at the Embassy on 24 July 2008.

The Embassy requires the following clarifications before the reports can be approved.

Financial report

- The budget presented needs to follow the approved original format.
- The reporting duration should cover the period up to 14 April and not May 2008.
- Please include the ZWD exchange rates that were used.
- The interest that accrued from the [Redacted] contribution should be included as part of the income.
- Could you kindly explain how the payments are made between [Redacted] and SZC?
- Which other donors are funding this activity, for how much and for which budget lines?
- The project exhibits very low expenditure levels and if this persists in the last half of the project duration (also taking into account the current NGO ban), we are afraid that the project might not need the remaining funds still at the Embassy.

NO. OF COPIES	DATE
RECEIVED	3 AUG 2008
REF. No.	082608
ROUTING	[Redacted]

Narrative report

The report does not provide sufficient information for instance it is difficult to deduce what was planned and what activities were implemented.

The narrative report mentions humanitarian assistance, but this was not part of the approved budget. Please note that any changes with regards to the implementation of the project requires prior approval from this Embassy (refer to section 3 of the grant agreement).


Although a number of activities are mentioned in the table on page 3 to 4 of the narrative report, there is no relation to the financial report.

The report is too general and the Embassy needs more information on for instance the objective, the outcome and follow up done on workshops? It would also help to have a sample of the messages on flyers? How many flyers were distributed and where? What was the impact? What was done with the reports that were collected by the information centre? Where was the information centre set up, for how long and which organisations participated? How was the media campaign carried out? etc

The main problem encountered seems to be the shift in the political landscape which has affected the implementation of this project, hence your suggestion to realign the activity to be more relevant in the current context. It should however be taken into account that humanitarian assistance does not fit under the objectives of this activity and therefore will not be approved by the Embassy.

The Embassy would appreciate to receive the revised work plan and budget for the remainder of the project period as well as the revised financial and narrative reports by 5 September 2008.

Yours sincerely

A large black rectangular redaction box covers the signature area. Below it, two horizontal black bars redact the name and title of the signatory.

1. Requested decision

Approval is requested for the Embassy to sign a contribution agreement with Christian Alliance (CA) in support of the Save Zimbabwe Campaign (SZC). The main aim of the proposal is to launch a campaign called "We demand a new constitution before 2008 Elections" which is aimed at raising the awareness of Zimbabweans on the need for a constitutional reform before 2008 elections as well as the need for the adoption of minimum standards for free and fair elections before elections are held. The total cost of the activity is USD501, 236.-. The Embassy will contribute a maximum of USD125, 000. - which has been earmarked for the procurement of capital equipment (excluding the cars), production of flyers, task force meetings and part contribution to the administration costs by CA. Other funding partners who will contribute to the basket include; [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] released). Previously [REDACTED] has made a payment [REDACTED] to CA to support the core costs of providing the SZC secretariat in 2007. [REDACTED] is of the opinion that CA/SZC is playing a vital role in 1/ stimulating the churches to oppose abuses of good governance 2/ bringing together elements of civil society which have been disparate 3/ coordinating civil society's input into the Mbeki mediation. As a result [REDACTED] played a part in encouraging other donors to fund some other parts of the SZC proposal. The duration of the activity will be from 1 September 2007 to 31 August 2008.

2. Key elements: justifying the decision

CA, on behalf of SZC submitted a budget for SZC to the Embassy on 19 April 2007 and at the request of CA, [REDACTED] organized a donor meeting on 6 May 2007. At this meeting a full SZC proposal was presented and copies of the proposal were distributed to donors (see minutes of 7 May 2007). This was followed by a separate donors meeting held on 16 May 2007 at the Embassy (see minutes) in order to discuss comments on the proposal. At this meeting the Embassy was mandated to engage CA to come up with a proposal incorporating the donor's comments. A draft proposal was submitted to the Embassy on 31 May 2007 for which the Embassy made comments on 4 June 2007. CA subsequently submitted a revised draft proposal on 7 June 2007 which was distributed to all the donors. On 5 July 2007 the Embassy had a meeting with SZC members and this was followed by another donors meeting on 6 July 2007 to discuss the proposal of 4 June 2007. The donors agreed that there was need for SZC to prioritize its activities which would subsequently lower the budget. [REDACTED] was again tasked to assist SZC to come up with an acceptable budget based on their priorities, a fifth submission was made on 16 July 2007 and the final proposal was submitted on 26 July 2007.

Save Zimbabwe campaign is a coalition of civil society organizations, churches and political parties in Zimbabwe who are united to solve the socio-economic and political crisis in Zimbabwe through peaceful means. It is also a platform for coordination and communication of the activities aimed at solving the crisis in Zimbabwe. SZC will raise the awareness on the need for a people driven constitution as well as the minimum standard to be met for free and fair elections. The project

complements the activities of its member organizations in the field of human rights and good governance. SZC will concentrate on coordination and communication within the SZC membership and will also provide a common position on national issues. The messages will be communicated through the prayer meetings that will be held in churches. The first meeting was held in Harare (refer to page 6 of proposal) and so far the Bulawayo and Mutare meetings have been held successfully. SZC will also stage music festivals that will be used to attract the youth. Posters, flyers, t-shirts etc will be distributed at these meetings. SZC has spearheaded and will continue to participate in raising the concerns of CSO in the SADC led initiative in which Mbeki has been appointed as the mediator.

The proposal is in line with the [REDACTED] (the file). CA was chosen as the chair to SZC since it is seen as a neutral and impartial body that could facilitate the negotiations to deal with the crisis in Zimbabwe. The church has a comparative advantage to intervene in the Zimbabwean situation in that it still enjoys the freedom of association away from POSA as well as the advantage of a grassroots constituency. It is noted that the activities of SZC are complimentary to the activities of its individual members. SZC intends to use the churches to reach out to the majority of Zimbabweans who are mostly Christians.

In the current proposal, SZC will hold 12 provincial prayer meetings, 3 music festivals, distribute 5000 T-shirts, and campaign paraphernalia, flight TV and radio adverts, hold 12 general council meetings, 54 task force meetings and 60 sub committee meetings. In addition SZC will engage in 4 regional lobby and advocacy meetings in particular reference to the Mbeki initiative as part of the CSO group.

Page

Save Zimbabwe Campaign

Report Summary
for
ZCA Executive Committee Meeting

- Task Force Workshop held at Pandhari Lodge in August 2007
 - Individual representatives of task force member organisations redefined their roles, encouraging greater involvement in their various mandates
 - Sub committees to be reactivated, engaged and strengthened
 - The 2007 activity plan that was submitted in January 2007 was revised in line with budgetary adjustments and overall developments in the environment affecting the campaign. Attached revised version was agreed upon, and circulated at the GC on 12th September 2007. This now covers the period from September to March 2008
- SZC Proposal submitted to donors through [REDACTED]
 - Follow ups show that the funding for [REDACTED] shall be channelled through [REDACTED] who may call representatives for a meeting before disbursement. In the meantime their embassy has given the green light for funds to be released in line with their identified budget lines.
 - Other donors involved indicated preference to deal directly with SZC / CA rather than to basket fund
- The Gweru prayer meeting went well – no significant incidents and no casualties.
 - There was a tremendous amount of effort from state operatives to block the success of the event despite having given prior clearance for it to go ahead. It was also a learning / eye opening process for all involved
 - Member organisations will in future mobilise their constituencies directly, from preparatory stages of SZC
 - It is encouraging that they see the campaign as a force to reckon with, they know SZC is there and it can cause a shift or more, so they are on the alert – they have since embarked on a *Heal Zimbabwe Campaign* which we must take care not to be confused with to the country
- General Council
 - **Recommendation for 2 meetings was made, i.e. civic society and political parties. Reason being the report given on talks by opposition parties. These should be held on Tuesday 18th September 2007. They say some positive developments came from the current dialogue process, and they wish to share with CA in confidence. CA to come up with own position in this regard.**
 - Big question for SZC at present is how to deal with the election issue Vs the demand for a new Constitution
 - The GC membership list has been revised to compose of only 2 top leaders of each member organisation. Accordingly future invitations shall be done through physical delivery of letters.
- [REDACTED] has allowed SZC to use their premises as the venue for GC meetings for as long as desired. This has assisted significantly in controlling costs.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Date October 10, 2007
Our ref. 07.131.PRD.16072
Page 1/8
Encl.
Re [REDACTED]
Cc [REDACTED]

Contact [REDACTED]
Tel. [REDACTED]
Fax [REDACTED]

Save Zimbabwe Camapign - Activity 16072

Dear [REDACTED]

With reference to your request dated 1 October 2007 for a grant for the funding of Christain Alliance's activity on Save Zimbabwe Campaign, I am happy to be able to tell you that your request has been approved by the Embassy.

Underneath you will find the formal ministerial decision on your request. This decision is a unilateral legal act by the Minister. The grant is awarded on the basis of your application. On the basis of this document, the [REDACTED] will disburse as soon as possible the first tranche of USD108,100.- to your USD bank account. This first tranche represents 80% of the total contribution by the Netherlands Embassy of a maximum of USD135,125.-.

DECISION OF
Ref. no. 16072

[REDACTED] ('the Minister'),

[REDACTED]

CONSIDERING

that [REDACTED] hereafter "the grant recipient", established and with offices at 20 Phillips Avenue, Harare, submitted an application for a grant in the amount of USD135,125.- by letter dated 1 October 2007.

HAVING REGARD TO

section 2 of the [REDACTED] (Grants) Framework Act
and
articles 2.4 and 7.1 of the [REDACTED] Grant Regulations,

HAS DECIDED

to award the grant recipient a grant for the programme to support [REDACTED] as described in the above-mentioned letter dated 1 October 2007.

The grant shall not exceed USD135,125.-.

The grant has been allocated activity no. 16072 in the Minister's records.

The following obligations are attached to the grant:

1. The activities being subsidised shall be implemented under the responsibility of the grant recipient in the manner described in the above-mentioned application, consisting of an activity plan, a budget and a liquidity forecast. The activity plan, the budget and the liquidity forecast are appended to this decision together with the above-mentioned application as Appendix 1.




2. The grant period shall run from 15 October 2007 to 14 October 2008.
3. Any changes in the manner of implementation of the activity subsidised or in the budget shall be submitted in writing to the Minister for approval in advance. If the Minister does not propose any adjustments within 8 weeks of the submission of the changes, they shall be deemed to have been approved.
4. Within two months of the end of the first six months of the project's duration, the other party should submit to the Minister a narrative and financial report on the previous six months. The first reporting period shall be from 15 October 2007 to 14 April 2008.

The narrative report shall include an overview of the activities and objectives referred to in the activity plan, and an explanation of any discrepancies.

The financial report shall include an overview of the other party's estimated and actual revenue and expenditure, where relevant to the activities for which the contribution was awarded, and an overview of advance payments made by the Minister. Each budget item must be accompanied by a separate explanatory note.

5. The funds shall be transferred in advance to a maximum of 80% of the total contribution of USD135,125.- (one hundred and thirty five thousand one hundred and twenty five united states dollars). The first instalment of USD108,100.- shall be paid within four weeks of receipt of the countersigned agreement and a request for payment.

The last instalment shall be paid after the definitive amount of the contribution has been determined, as referred to in article 7.



Instalments shall be transferred to a separate interest-bearing USD bank account kept for this purpose by the other party. On request, the project will also submit an overview which indicates exchange rates received.

The last instalment shall be paid after the definitive amount of the grant has been determined.

6. Within three months of the end of the grant period the grant recipient shall request that the definitive amount of the grant be determined on the basis of an activities report and a financial statement.

The activities report shall indicate the extent to which and the way in which the activity plan was implemented in the form of an overview of the nature and scale of the activities and the results achieved.

The financial statement shall show how the grant and any interest accrued on it was spent and shall provide the information necessary for the determination of the grant. The financial statement shall be laid out in the same way as the budget.

7. After receipt of the request referred to in article 6, the Minister shall determine the definitive amount of the grant within 13 weeks. On this basis, accounts shall be settled with the grant recipient. Funds made available by the Minister which remain unspent after determination of the definitive amount shall be repaid immediately and unconditionally to the Minister.

8. The grant recipient is responsible for maintaining sound management procedures and keeping proper accounts. Any agreements with third parties regarding the implementation of the subsidised activities shall be laid down in writing.

9. The Minister shall be entitled to make use, free of charge, for the purpose of stimulating knowledge and raising awareness and insight in constitutional reform processes in developing countries, of all documents and other products produced in connection with the present grant to which the grant recipient may have intellectual property rights. Where appropriate, the grant recipient shall issue the necessary licences to the [REDACTED] free of charge and shall incorporate a clause to this end in any legal arrangements with third parties.
10. If the Minister is of the opinion that the specific way in which the activity plan is implemented or changes in circumstances have led to a situation in which the financing of an activity is incompatible with the Netherlands Government's foreign policy, he shall propose consultations with the grant recipient. On the basis of such consultations, the Minister may give further written instructions regarding the implementation of the activity plan.

In implementing the activity plan the grant recipient shall take account of the fact that the [REDACTED] may be held responsible under international law for such implementation. With this in mind, the grant recipient shall refrain from supporting activities whose aim is to undermine the political autonomy of a state or to bring down a lawful government by unlawful means. Whether the one or the other is lawful or unlawful shall be determined not only by the views of the government of the country in question, but also in accordance with international standards.

11. All items procured from the grant awarded by the Minister shall be assigned at the end of the grant period to a relevant purpose. The grant recipient shall submit proposals on this matter to the Minister for approval and shall account for the disposal of the items in its final report.

12. The Minister may inspect or instruct others to inspect the activities carried out pursuant to this decision, including the grant recipient's reports and financial accounts. The grant recipient shall render every assistance to the official or officials appointed by the Minister to carry out such an inspection and shall allow them access to the documents relating to the grant. The costs of any such inspection shall be borne by the Minister.
13. The Minister may withdraw or amend the decision awarding the grant or determining the definitive amount of the grant, reduce the grant, suspend the transfer of instalments or demand repayment of all or part of the funds already transferred if the grant recipient fails to fulfil its obligations under this decision or fails to fulfil them on time, fails to follow the instructions given by the Minister as referred to in article 10 of this decision, uses the funds for a purpose other than that for which the Minister made them available or if a third party has provided cofinancing without the Minister's knowledge, the consequences of which for the budget have not been approved.
14. The grant recipient shall not offer to third parties or seek or accept from or be promised by third parties, for himself or for any other party, any gift, remuneration, compensation or benefit of any kind whatsoever, which could be interpreted as an illegal or corrupt practice. Such practices may provide grounds for the withdrawal of this decision or part thereof.
15. The Minister shall withdraw or amend the decision awarding the grant or determining the definitive amount only after consultation with the grant recipient. Accounts shall then be settled on the basis of the costs properly incurred and taking into account any financial commitments for the future that have reasonably been entered into pursuant to the decision. A reduction in the

amount determined shall also take place only after consultation with the grant recipient.

16. For the purposes of this decision the following persons shall be responsible for liaison:

on behalf of the Minister
recipient

[Redacted]
[Redacted]

on behalf of the grant

[Redacted]
[Redacted]

Unless this decision expressly stipulates otherwise, all correspondence relating to this decision shall be in English and addressed to the above persons.


Yours sincerely,

[Redacted signature block]


For the Minister for [Redacted]

postal address

[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted] Harare
[Redacted]
[Redacted]



Within six weeks after this decision is sent, a written objection may be lodged with the Minister for [REDACTED]. Under section 6:5 of the General Administrative Law Act, the notice of objection must be signed and dated and include the name and address of the person submitting it, a description of the decision against which the objection is being lodged and the grounds on which it is based. Where possible a copy of the contested decision should be enclosed.



[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Date October 10, 2007
Our ref. 07.131.PRD.16072
Page 1/8
Encl.
Re [REDACTED]
Cc [REDACTED]

Contact [REDACTED]
Tel. [REDACTED]
Fax [REDACTED]

Save Zimbabwe Camapign - Activity 16072

Dear [REDACTED]

With reference to your request dated 1 October 2007 for a grant for the funding of Christain Alliance's activity on Save Zimbabwe Campaign, I am happy to be able to tell you that your request has been approved by the Embassy.

Underneath you will find the formal ministerial decision on your request. This decision is a unilateral legal act by the Minister. The grant is awarded on the basis of your application. On the basis of this document, the [REDACTED] will disburse as soon as possible the first tranche of USD108,100.- to your USD bank account. This first tranche represents 80% of the total contribution by the Netherlands Embassy of a maximum of USD135,125.-.

DECISION OF
Ref. no. 16072

[REDACTED] ('the Minister'),

[REDACTED]

CONSIDERING

that [REDACTED] hereafter "the grant recipient", established and with offices at 20 Phillips Avenue, Harare, submitted an application for a grant in the amount of USD135,125.- by letter dated 1 October 2007.

HAVING REGARD TO

section 2 of the [REDACTED] (Grants) Framework Act
and
articles 2.4 and 7.1 of the [REDACTED] Grant Regulations,

HAS DECIDED

to award the grant recipient a grant for the programme to support [REDACTED] as described in the above-mentioned letter dated 1 October 2007.

The grant shall not exceed USD135,125.-.

The grant has been allocated activity no. 16072 in the Minister's records.

The following obligations are attached to the grant:

1. The activities being subsidised shall be implemented under the responsibility of the grant recipient in the manner described in the above-mentioned application, consisting of an activity plan, a budget and a liquidity forecast. The activity plan, the budget and the liquidity forecast are appended to this decision together with the above-mentioned application as Appendix 1.




2. The grant period shall run from 15 October 2007 to 14 October 2008.
3. Any changes in the manner of implementation of the activity subsidised or in the budget shall be submitted in writing to the Minister for approval in advance. If the Minister does not propose any adjustments within 8 weeks of the submission of the changes, they shall be deemed to have been approved.
4. Within two months of the end of the first six months of the project's duration, the other party should submit to the Minister a narrative and financial report on the previous six months. The first reporting period shall be from 15 October 2007 to 14 April 2008.

The narrative report shall include an overview of the activities and objectives referred to in the activity plan, and an explanation of any discrepancies.

The financial report shall include an overview of the other party's estimated and actual revenue and expenditure, where relevant to the activities for which the contribution was awarded, and an overview of advance payments made by the Minister. Each budget item must be accompanied by a separate explanatory note.

5. The funds shall be transferred in advance to a maximum of 80% of the total contribution of USD135,125.- (one hundred and thirty five thousand one hundred and twenty five united states dollars). The first instalment of USD108,100.- shall be paid within four weeks of receipt of the countersigned agreement and a request for payment.

The last instalment shall be paid after the definitive amount of the contribution has been determined, as referred to in article 7.



Instalments shall be transferred to a separate interest-bearing USD bank account kept for this purpose by the other party. On request, the project will also submit an overview which indicates exchange rates received.

The last instalment shall be paid after the definitive amount of the grant has been determined.


6. Within three months of the end of the grant period the grant recipient shall request that the definitive amount of the grant be determined on the basis of an activities report and a financial statement.

The activities report shall indicate the extent to which and the way in which the activity plan was implemented in the form of an overview of the nature and scale of the activities and the results achieved.

The financial statement shall show how the grant and any interest accrued on it was spent and shall provide the information necessary for the determination of the grant. The financial statement shall be laid out in the same way as the budget.

7. After receipt of the request referred to in article 6, the Minister shall determine the definitive amount of the grant within 13 weeks. On this basis, accounts shall be settled with the grant recipient. Funds made available by the Minister which remain unspent after determination of the definitive amount shall be repaid immediately and unconditionally to the Minister.

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
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SAVE ZIMBABWE CAMPAIGN



TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:

Save Zimbabwe Campaign is a broad alliance of civic society, political parties and church groups initiated to bring a peaceful resolution to the Zimbabwean crisis. The broad campaign brought together political parties and the major civic groups that include Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions, National Constitutional Assembly, Crisis Coalition, Zimbabwe National Students Union, Christian Alliance and Bulawayo Agenda.

Zimbabwe Christian Alliance was tasked to co-ordinate and chair the campaign. The main goal of the campaign in 2007 to 2008 was to ensure that free and fair elections would be conducted under a people-driven constitution. The campaign engaged in mass mobilization, networking campaign member's activities and massive publicity programs.

For mobilization, the campaign organized prayer meetings, a media campaign that involved a publicity blitz using pamphlets, posters, and a website. This report outlines the major activities of the campaign and successes, challenges, opportunities and threats identified in the project.

The aim of the Project

To campaign for "Free and fair elections under a new constitution in 2008".

Objectives

1. To form a common front for all democratic forces to campaign for elections to be held under a new constitution
2. To publicise and network activities of campaign members
3. To provide a platform for civic leaders to network and share strategies
4. To set up an efficient and effective secretariat to service the campaign

TIME FRAME

This report covers the period of six months from October 2007 to April 2008.

Contextual Analysis

This project was undertaken in a fast changing unpredictable context characterized by daunting challenges on all critical fronts: socio-cultural, economic, political and legal environments.

The historic Save Zimbabwe Campaign March 11 prayer event that led to SADC initiated talks changed the operational environment. The government clamped down more on the civic society groups and churches and narrowed space for democratic participation.

The Public Order and Security Act (POSA) made it increasingly difficult for civic groups to organize themselves and mobilize at various levels. While the Access to Information and Private Protection Act (AIPPA) - restricted media access to the public and criminalized information sharing.

The economic meltdown exacerbated the suffering of the people of Zimbabwe faced by acute shortages of basic goods and services; cross-border trading in South Africa and Botswana has become an essential lifeline for traders and consumers alike.

- An estimated 80% of the Zimbabwean economically active population is now unemployed;
- Price controls aimed at stemming hyper-inflation (estimated to exceed 10 000 000%) have devastated businesses and a number of manufacturing companies have closed down and dismissed workers.
- Fuel shortages and transport problems remain chronic across the country and many transport operators have withdrawn their services in the light of continued arrests of operators for overcharging.
- Educational and health services are in crisis because of shortages of food and medicines and the mass exodus of skilled personnel to neighbouring countries and the UK.
- Unemployment now exceeds 85% and this has increased real poverty resulting in Zimbabwe having one of the lowest life expectancies in the world i.e.34 years for women and 37 years for men.
- The collapse of the provision of basic services such as electricity and water is causing acute difficulties and health problems with widespread reports of dysentery and diarrhoea in the high density suburbs of Bulawayo and Harare and the first cases of cholera have since been reported.
- There has been a serious decline in productivity in all sectors (and agriculture in particular which has fallen by 80% since 1998) which has caused the economy to contract by 40% in less than a decade (and is expected to shrink by a further 5% by the end of this year).
- This has resulted in a shortage of foreign currency and food insecurity throughout the country which has played into the hands of an 'elite' leadership who are

individually benefiting enormously from the current crisis and have no desire to see any change to the status quo in Zimbabwe.

IMPACT OF THE ENVIRONMENT ON CAMPAIGN:

- The Public Order and Security Act (POSA) is at times heavily applied to the extent that the campaign is not able to effectively conduct the its collective activities.
- The inflationary rates are unpredictable to the extent that the proposed budgets at times fail to commensurate with proposed activities
- Shortage of basic needs like water, fuel and electricity has affected the campaign's efficiency in the delivery of programmes which continue to be disrupted from time to time.
- There have been incidents of indirect threats and state-sponsored attacks on leaders and activists of the campaign as well as its co-ordinators
- The increased number of human rights violations combines with adverse socio-economic conditions to cause rapid changes in the context. This requires consistent reorientation of programmes to make them more responsive and relevant to the needs of its target groups. In essence, the prevailing environment precludes the implementation of project activities and processes within the parameters set by their original mandates.
- More significantly, the organization has been forced to re-align their activities to more discreet arrangements because the environment in Zimbabwe has become difficult to operate in. The elusive internal operating environment has created a situation where the organization has to continuously redefine its position and.

Major highlights and Achievements (Oct.2007-April 2008)

Objective	Indicator of Success	Activities	Dates for implementation
To effectively coordinate SZC campaign activities and lobby for elections to be held in 2008 under a new Constitution, as well a raise awareness amongst the people, of their right to vote	Mobilization prayer rallies held	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Weekly sectoral task force meetings • A mobilization rally was held in Gweru at Mkoba stadium. At least 500 people attended the meeting. Key Political figures including Lovemore Madhuku of the National Constitutional Assembly, Vice President of the Movement for Democratic Change, Mrs.Thokozani Khuphe attended the meeting 	Ongoing October 2007

To form a common front and provide a platform for democratic forces in the campaign to consolidate efforts	Increased number of key leaders attending SZC general council meetings from civic, political and church societies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Six General council meetings were held between October and April 2008 each was attended by more than 35 leaders who formed a quorum for the policy making body 	Oct.07 - Apr.08
To establish functional coordinating offices for the secretariat	Weekly task force meetings and ongoing consultative meetings	Purchase of capital equipment	Bulk of capital equipment was purchased by January 2008
To network activities of campaign members	Participating in civic society network meetings Collective civic statement released on CA18	SZC participated and contributed in organizing the Civil Society all stakeholders' conference held in Bulawayo on the 2 nd October 2007, as well as the People's Convention held in Harare in February 2008 at the Rainbow Towers.	ongoing
To reach the general public / electorate with campaign messages, and engage them at all levels	Designing and production of campaign messages—flyers (400 000 flyers)	Campaign inserted adverts on the elections in the media	Up to April 2008
To monitor the political environment prevailing during the election period	Set up an election Information and Liaison centre at the Harare Holiday Inn from a week before 29.03.08 elections to 2 weeks after	Creation of a facility for collection of information on the environment surrounding the harmonized elections -briefing meetings with SZC members and partners	

		-collection of information / reports on political environment and its impact on harmonized elections	
To commemorate March 11 and strengthen as well as spread the spirit of solidarity	Arranged 2 prayer meetings in Byo City Hall and Harare Zimbabwe Grounds – blocked by police Ran a March 11 Newspaper supplement in the Standard and Independent newspapers	Collection of information for the newspaper supplement from members Organizing commemorative meetings	March 08
Running adverts for elections	Ran Weekly adverts in the Standard and Independent newspapers	Creation and publishing of adverts on elections	March
Responding to victims of political violence post March 29 elections	Provision of accommodation, food and travel expenses	Provide emergency humanitarian assistance to victims of political violence/fuel to transport victims and food	April

Project Highlights

The major focus of Save Zimbabwe Campaign was to consolidate campaign members different programs into a coherent campaign aimed at opening up democratic space.

This involved publicity through the flyers and general council and task force networking meeting.

However, the shift in the political landscape during the elections period, caused SZC to change focus and, re-align some of its funding e.g. the setting up of an election information liaison centre, which was not in the original plan. Post election violence also brought in new demands for the campaign to cater for displaced assaulted victims of political violence.

In terms of funding SZC has a grant that is administered through HIVOS, who allowed the campaign to re-align funding to cover critical pre-election events as narrated below.

General Council Meetings

The GC continued to give direction to SZC and the beginning of 2008 emphasized need for focus on the forthcoming harmonized elections and proposed that an information liaison centre be set up.

Election Awareness “Go Out and Vote Campaign”

Pre election period:

The information and liaison centre was set to monitor the political environment through the compilation of information from various members participating in the elections, through out the country. The centre was also a hub that provided space for meetings, briefings and consultations with stakeholders. Some of the key consultations were with members who were directly involved in the elections.

The day to day briefings provided vital information for members to strategize and release relevant news briefings and press statements. Had pre-election adverts mobilizing, and urging people to go and vote almost every week in the independent media

Media Campaign

The Save Zimbabwe Campaign Media Campaign focused on general issues that affect Zimbabwe and will be done as a joint initiative.

3. Campaign Goal:

The participation of the majority of eligible voters.

4. Objectives:

The objectives of the Campaign in the period covered by this report were:

a) Pre Election

- To provide a non-partisan platform for all stakeholder collaboration in campaigning for Citizen participation in the elections.
- To increase awareness on the need to go and vote by highlighting national issues like water, freedom of expression, high cost of living.
- To promote overall voter preparedness through civil society organisations, maximising on their existing structures at all levels and mobilizing for effective voter participation from civil society

5. Proposed Activities:

- a) Pre and Post Election Media Campaign
- b) Prayer Meetings
- c) Stakeholder briefings

d) Coordination activities, i.e. Task Force and General Council

6. **Target Groups:**

a) Pre and Post Election Media Campaign

- Civil society stakeholders including youth and women organisations
- Political parties
- Potential voters

7. **Gender Analysis:**

The crisis in Zimbabwe has affected women most, and the effects on women have been at two levels as follows:

- I. Political Violence
- II. Economic Instability

Political Violence

The political tensions arising, particularly towards elections, have resulted in women suffering as a direct result of political violence. This violence is often directed at families and communities perceived to be in the opposition where family members are maimed, or property is destroyed. It is women who often bear the brand of this violence.

Economic Instability

Economic instability has increased unemployment levels. This has had the effect of forcing women to become cross border traders and street vendors. This happens as women try to cope with pressures and demands to ensure that their families are sustained. Such a situation increases the burden on women who automatically take on additional responsibilities as bread winners. The harassment of these traders by authorities on the pretext that they are illegal traders is simply an indication of lack of democracy in our country.

Strategies

It is the belief of the SZC that the participation of women in determining the direction to take in opening the democratic space is key to the successful implementation of campaign strategies. Save Zimbabwe Campaign has a vibrant unit known as Women Alliance, which is the vehicle through which mobilisation women and other community members (by women) from the different sectors of society to participate in the democratic movement happens.

8. **Expected Outcomes:**

- A visible people driven campaign for real free and fair elections
- Development of a strong non-partisan broad based media campaign.
- Development and packaging of media messages
- Creation of opportunities for the maximum utilisation of progressive media by sectoral activities involved in the Save Zimbabwe Campaign.

9. **Organisational Capacity:**

The Save Zimbabwe Campaign is structured as follows:

General Council

The General Council is the policy making body. It is composed of leadership of participating civic organizations and political parties. The general council is chaired and coordinated by ZCA.

Task force

The task force is the Executive arm of the campaign and is composed of 5 task oriented entities. It is the implementing organ of the broad alliance in the campaign. Its members are drawn from civic organizations and unlike the General Council, does not include political parties. Political parties cannot be members to the task force. The task force membership is concentrated around 5 major thematic areas namely:

- Advocacy (regional and international) – chaired by Crisis Coalition and Bulawayo Agenda
- Mass mobilization – chaired by ZCTU and ZINASU
- Resource and legal mobilization – chaired by ZLHR and ZCA
- Information – chaired by MISA
- Constitution – chaired by NCA

The task force is chaired by CA

Task Force Sub-Committees

- There are 5 sub-committees working under the above 5 major thematic areas, i.e. a sub committee for each area. These are composed of member organisations drawn from the General Council.
- The decisions and deliberations of sub-committees shall feed into the Task Force.
- It is proposed that the sub- committee be represented at national, provincial and district levels for the purposes of involving the majority of Zimbabweans to participate.

The Task Force Terms of Reference

The shared values and principles guiding the taskforce are those reflected in the Zimbabwe Democracy Charter which was presented to Save Zimbabwe Convention. The task force implements resolutions of the General Council of the Save Zimbabwe Campaign as the Executive arm of the campaign.

March 11 commemoration

A year after the March 11 2007 event, the SZC general council met in February 2008 and resolved that the event be commemorated at its original venue-Zimbabwe Grounds in Highfields and in Bulawayo outside the Large City Hall, concurrently. This was blocked by the police, taken to the courts by ZLHR and the application was dismissed.

SZC then alternatively commemorated in the following manner:

- Ran a 9 page newspaper supplement- Independent and Standard where 15 members participated.
- there was an evening forum to discuss impact of March 11 organized by some of the SZC members

Polling day

- Monitored reports that were received from colleagues in the field for merging into the overall edition
- Made physical visits to some of the polling stations to assess the environment
- Organized evening briefing and consultations

Post election

The delay by the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission to announce the election results brought unanticipated dynamics to the post 29 March election scenario.

- The tabulated results as displayed by ZEC were announced by ZESN after SZC membership made a plea to its board and pledged to stand with them.
- SZC released a press statement calling for immediate release of the results
- SZC convened many meetings that included four critical consultations with membership directly involved in the elections to share information that would determine the direction of the campaign
- SZC organized the prayer meeting in Harare which was attended by more than 3 000 people who included recently elected MPs . This was held under the flagship of Zimbabwe Christian Alliance

Current challenges for the campaign

- Impact of Government action on functioning of civil society, i.e. violence unleashed by the government and ZANU PF has targeted SZC members and their operations have been crippled. Accordingly there is a growing number of political violence victims seeking assistance from the Campaign
- Security needs in the form of safe accommodation for campaign drivers continue to emerged
- Re-alignment of the campaign in the current context-means that there is need to provide shelter and transportation for the victims
- Membership of Political Parties in the SZC has become a source of concern for some within the Campaign, resulting from the Amendment 18 issue
- Parallel and competing initiatives / programs have been emerging as civic organizations battle to maintain their individual relevance in the process, with the rapidly changing environment
- Question of “future of SZC” in members’ minds in terms of future options for strategic positioning versus emerging scenarios and uncertainty of transitional process and duration.

High lights of Primary Achievements the SZC to date

- i. Brought more cohesion and coordination within civil society groups (members)
- ii. Provided more space for consultation, information sharing, planning e.g. General Council meetings
- iii. Assisted civil society to become more “self-organising”
- iv. March 11 2007 raised profile of democratic movement
- v. 29 March Information and Liaison Centre – base for coordinated election monitoring activities with ongoing exchange of information. All the member ship of SZC participated in the Information centre where they were daily updates before the March 29 elections and after.

- vi. Civic society was briefed by political formation representatives who were directly involved in the elections, it was also a platform where voter tabulation information was passed on to all the membership.
- vii. Provided a platform for consistent strategic consultation with Political Players
- viii. Contributed towards building a culture of mutual respect within civil society and broader Democratic Movement
- ix. Provided a more coordinated platform that partners could relate to, with improved clarity on the various roles played by members of civil society
- x. Elevated voice on concerns of civil society (electorate) into SADC / Government discussions, civil society more recognised as a force to reckon with
- xi. Contributed towards building Regional Awareness

Identified Possible National Scenarios

- 1) "Low Road" State of Emergency / Civil War / Ongoing Turmoil
- 2) "Stuck" Stalemate...protracted on-off negotiations
- 3) "High Road" Transitional Agreement:
 - Political progress
 - Economic Planning
 - Social Development
 - National Reconciliation and Development
 - Truth and Justice Commission

Implications of 1; 2; and 3 for SZC and individual member organisations?

Possible Scenarios for SZC (Interim Planning) – in no specific order

- 1. "Idol mode" Wait and see
 - Impact of current government crackdown

- Uncertainty of transitional process and duration
- GC last met in first week of June
- Currently no SZC activity
- No clear program / plan going forward
- Limited communication / coordination etc
- Ad hoc individual communication
- SZC Coordinator neutralised (in refuge)

2. "Park and Drive" Strategically

- Tactical / strategic "parking and driving"
- Essentially goes into "park mode"
- No active new programming...long term view
- Emerging developments (e.g. low road or "stuck" scenario will determine short term tactical and strategic action...

3. "Scrap"

Made its contribution

- A scenario to consider at the Convention
- GC to decide if SZC has served its purpose and achieved its goal
- Convention to wind up and bring "closure" if so desired, and establish future channels / relationships

4. "Panel Beat"

Re-launch...(active)

- In the event of "Scenario 1" (Low Road) of National Scenarios, i.e. struggle. On the other hand "Scenario 3" (High Road) would be desirable to result in National Reconciliation, Reconstruction and Development
- Prepare Scenario 3 Concept / draft proposal for such an eventuality
- Establish working group to explore "Scenario 3" options

5. "Replace"

Heal / Build Zimbabwe Campaign (e.g. National Reconciliation)

Determined by developments in the Political Environment:- impact and emerging demands

Proposed Short Term Activities

A. "Tactical Mode"

- Membership consultative meetings Ongoing
- Briefings with Political Parties and other stakeholders Ongoing
- Media Campaign Ongoing

B. Stakeholder Review Convention

- 2-day convention in Bulawayo 1st week November 2008
- Critical review and analysis - GC 2nd week November 2008
- Forward Planning – working group (WG) 3rd week November 2008

C. High Road Options

- Draft Concept Paper for WG / Task Force (Reconstruction and Development) immediately for 3rd week Nov 08

The focus of a High Road eventuality could lead to a 3-year roll out on National Reconciliation, Reconstruction and Development. Reviewed annually, this could possibly look at the following program support areas:

- i. Political / Constitutional
- ii. Economic
- iii. National Reconciliation / Social Cohesion
- iv. Community Transformation and Development

The critical roles for the SZC broad coalition in this eventuality would be:

- a) Strategic Consultations
- b) Strategic Events
- c) Supporting and building civil society capacity
- d) Resource learning and sharing

BUDGET:

attached

File

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Harare

Date August 25, 2008
 Our ref. 08.79.PRD.16072
 Page 1/2
 Encl.
 Re [Redacted] Activity 16072
 Cc

Contact [Redacted]
 Tel. [Redacted]
 Fax [Redacted]

Dear [Redacted]

Reference is made to the above grant agreement dated 10 October 2007. Reference is also made to the narrative and financial reports for the first half of the project duration which were received at the Embassy on 24 July 2008.

The Embassy requires the following clarifications before the reports can be approved.

Financial report

- The budget presented needs to follow the approved original format.
- The reporting duration should cover the period up to 14 April and not May 2008.
- Please include the ZWD exchange rates that were used.
- The interest that accrued from the [Redacted] contribution should be included as part of the income.
- Could you kindly explain how the payments are made between [Redacted] and SZC?
- Which other donors are funding this activity, for how much and for which budget lines?
- The project exhibits very low expenditure levels and if this persists in the last half of the project duration (also taking into account the current NGO ban), we are afraid that the project might not need the remaining funds still at the Embassy.

NO. OF COPIES	DATE
RECEIVED	3 AUG 2008
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Narrative report

The report does not provide sufficient information for instance it is difficult to deduce what was planned and what activities were implemented.

The narrative report mentions humanitarian assistance, but this was not part of the approved budget. Please note that any changes with regards to the implementation of the project requires prior approval from this Embassy (refer to section 3 of the grant agreement).


Although a number of activities are mentioned in the table on page 3 to 4 of the narrative report, there is no relation to the financial report.

The report is too general and the Embassy needs more information on for instance the objective, the outcome and follow up done on workshops? It would also help to have a sample of the messages on flyers? How many flyers were distributed and where? What was the impact? What was done with the reports that were collected by the information centre? Where was the information centre set up, for how long and which organisations participated? How was the media campaign carried out? etc

The main problem encountered seems to be the shift in the political landscape which has affected the implementation of this project, hence your suggestion to realign the activity to be more relevant in the current context. It should however be taken into account that humanitarian assistance does not fit under the objectives of this activity and therefore will not be approved by the Embassy.

The Embassy would appreciate to receive the revised work plan and budget for the remainder of the project period as well as the revised financial and narrative reports by 5 September 2008.

Yours sincerely



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