

**An Investigation into Educator Perceptions of the
Implementation of the Rationalization and Redeployment
Policy in KwaZulu Natal, South Africa: The Port
Shepstone/Harding District as a case study**

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ABSTRACT

Much has been said about rationalization and redeployment in socio-economic and political circles in South Africa, with many of the associated problems inherited from the apartheid government. These problems included, but were not limited to, the following: lack of learner support materials (textbooks, desks), insufficient and overcrowded classrooms, libraries and laboratories and human resources (insufficient trained teachers, especially in mathematics and science in townships and rural schools of South Africa). These problems have proved detrimental to effective teaching and learning and have created almost impossible working conditions for the majority of teachers.

In order to comply with the Constitution of the country and the culture of human rights, the achievement of equity in the education sector of South Africa became a central component of attempts to restructure education in post- apartheid South Africa. It remains one of the most pressing issues in the politics of educational reform.

To address years of imbalance in education, a number of policies were created and implemented. One such policy was the rationalization and redeployment of teachers from advantaged schools to previously disadvantaged schools. This policy was the principal mechanism for achieving equity, both between and within provinces. The pupil- to- teacher ratio is one of the key indices of unequal *per capita* expenditure in schools in different communities as well as an important determinant of quality in South African education. It is a good policy on paper, but the implementation thereof has not been easy. Many obstacles have been encountered in the process of implementation. These include: (i) lack of a comprehensive teacher database which clearly indicates the number of teachers to be redeployed, (ii) lack of clear and concise information for the general public – absence of effective channels of information distribution and communication, (iii) lack of motivation to co-operate for those who would be directly affected, (iv) lack of decentralised decision making- processes, (v) the financial constraints experienced by the provinces of South Africa during the process of implementation.

Regardless of the support policies enjoy from authorities, many policies do not receive the support of the public, especially if they require unpopular action – a situation that applies to the redeployment of teachers in South Africa. The involvement in and acceptance of the policy by all stakeholders is crucial.

Research instruments such as face-to-face interviews were used to gather the data presented in this research. Interviews were conducted to gain insight into the perceptions of teachers of the rationalization and redeployment policy in selected schools in the Port Shepstone/ Harding district. The research explored the contradictions and consequences that underpinned the rationalization and redeployment of teachers in KwaZulu- Natal.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

APEK - Association of Professional Educators of KwaZulu- Natal.

SAOU - Suid- Afrikaanse Onderwysers Unie

NATU - National Teachers' Union.

NAPTOSA - National Professional Teachers of South Africa

SASA - South African Schools Act

ELRC - Education Labour Relations Council

SGB - School Governing Body

SMT - School Management Team (includes heads of departments, deputy principal and principal in a school)

SLB - Street Level Bureaucrats

PTT - Provincial Task Team

IPTT - Inter-Provincial Task Team

R and R - Rationalisation and Redeployment of Educators

PAM Document - Personnel Administration Measures

LIST OF DEFINITIONS

Educator - any person who teaches, educates or trains other persons at an education auxiliary or support services provided by or in the education department, but does not include any officer or employee as defined in section (1) of the Public Service Act, 1994 (proclamation 103 of 1994). Educator also means a person currently employed in a provincial education department or the department of education within the meaning of educator, as defined in the act above.

Under-qualified educator - a person holding a teaching post in an establishment who is in possession of a professional education qualification evaluated as less than REQV 13. This category includes teachers who received two years of professional training or less, with or without grade 12.

Unqualified educator - a person holding a teaching post in an establishment and who has not received any formal professional training as an educator.

Employee - an educator as defined in the Employment of Educators Act of 1998.

Employer - an employer as defined in the Employment of Educators Act of 1998. The Department of Education is the employer.

Principal - the head of an institution. It also means an educator appointed or acting as the Head of the school.

Council - the Education Labour Relations Council.

Council of Education Minister - the Council of Education Ministers established by the national Education Policy Act, 1996 (Act 27 of 1996).

School - a pre-primary; secondary school; public school or an independent school that enrolls learners in one or more grades from zero to grade 12.

Province - a region of South Africa as established by Section 124 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa.

“Great Trek”- the massive movement of learners from “disadvantaged” schools (township, rural areas, informal settlements) into affluent English or Afrikaans medium schools, as per requirements of the South African Schools Act (SASA) Act 84 of 1995.

Learner - any person receiving education or who is obliged to receive education in terms of Act 84 of 1995.

PAM Document - the Personnel Administration Measures. This document prescribes the job description and responsibilities of educators, heads of departments, deputy principals and principal in a school.

Disadvantaged schools - These types of schools are state schools which may be situated in a deep rural or township area and serve a disadvantaged community. They are poorly resourced in terms of learner support materials such as textbooks, stationary, desks, physical infrastructure, laboratory and laboratory equipment and well resourced libraries. They may also lack sanitation and running water. The classrooms in most of these schools are overcrowded, making effective teaching and learning difficult for the teachers and learners. They lack qualified teachers in specific learning areas such as mathematics or English, offer a narrow curriculum (may offer general subjects and maths and science to very few learners while the majority of the learners may follow a general stream of subjects). These schools generally have a lower standard of education when compared to advantaged schools.

Advantaged schools - These types of schools may be private, public, or independent. They are largely located in urban areas or in the city centre. They are well resourced in

terms of learner support materials such as laboratories, a well resourced library, text books and operate under generally favourable conditions. What adds mostly to their status is that they are able to attract parents who are in a position to pay higher school fees. They offer a broad curricular stream (maths and science, commercial subjects, social science subjects, technical subjects and computer science) keeping in line with global education trends. They have smaller classes and are in a position to offer individual attention to learners because of an increased number of teaching and non teaching staff.

Ghost teachers - This refers to teachers who do not physically work in a school and yet exist on departmental records. They have an identity number, personnel number, evidence of a qualifications and functioning bank accounts for salary deposits. This ghost teacher receives a monthly salary and all related benefits. Normally the employer finds out after years that such a teacher does not exist. The prevalence of ghost teachers was discovered when the Department of Education and Culture in KwaZulu Natal embarked on a "head count" process in the late 1990's aimed specifically at unearthing the corruption that existed.

Ghost schools - This refers to a school reported to exist but is in fact a fabrication. In some cases the school had once existed but was closed down as a result of either lack of learners, violence and intimidation of teachers, or problems with a particular farmer (in the case where the school was on a farming land). These ghost schools continue to receive benefits from the Department of Education.

Ghost learners - This refers to learners appearing on school administration systems who do not actually exist. Ghost learners are mostly created during the beginning of the year when snap surveys and annual surveys are conducted by the Department of Education. School principals and the school management team fabricate learners to prevent perceived surplus educators being redeployed, or school management downsized.

Post provisioning norm now called post provisioning model (PPM) -This refers to a model used to allocate posts to schools throughout the country. Provinces use models suited to their particular circumstances.

PART ONE: A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Since the government of national unity came into power in 1994, it had to create a variety of policies to address the problems inherited from the apartheid government. These policies, in all areas of government, have to respond to a particular set of conditions and address them with a view to the future. While these policies have the potential to bring South Africa's education system on a par with the first world countries, the ultimate test for the new policies is whether they reflect, and are consistent with, the Constitution and emerging human rights culture in South Africa. This research will present a theoretical background to various aspects of policy, discuss the process of the rationalization and redeployment of educators, and explore how "street - level bureaucrats", that is educators, viewed the process.

1. Defining public policy

Many authors have attempted to define policy. According to Hogwood and Gunn (1984:13), it is important to bear in mind that the meaning of policy has several interpretations, depending on the context in which the word is being used. There is a useful definition of policy. According to them, policy may refer to a "general field of activity such as a company's economic policy, or schools' admission policy. Policy could also refer to a desired state of affairs" (ibid), such as affirmative action policy, which seeks to ensure that there is representivity of previously disadvantaged groups in the work place. It may also refer to specific proposals, such as the proposal to provide travel allowances for mathematics and science teachers who are redeployed to deep rural areas of South Africa.

These views of policy tend to be static, because they do not embrace the idea of policy as a process which is formed through a complex interaction of societal dynamics, including history, decision-making and power, and human behaviour which shape its eventual outcome.

Turner and Hulme (1997:58) have this to say about policy:

"We regard policy as a process. This gives policy a historical dimension and alerts us to different foci (e.g. policy- making and policy implementation) during that process. Policy is also about decisions and a series of decisions and decisions are about power. Sometimes such decisions of power may be revealed in the capacity not to act, the 'non- decision'. Policy is also purposive behaviour, although officially stated decisions may mask other intentions, and rationalisation about policy initiatives and outcomes may come after decisions have been made and actions taken. Finally, human agents construct policy and we need to understand their behaviour. For this we need to appreciate that these agents have multiple, often conflicting and sometimes changing political goals, and that they may enter and exit the policy process at different stages" (Turner and Hulmer 1997: 58).

Policy sets the parameters within which acceptable and functional actions are taken, in order to achieve a particular objective or set of objectives. It should not be seen as a discrete set of events which link together in a linear fashion, but rather influence one another, resulting in a set of guidelines and decisions appropriate to the situation. The definition of *public* policy needs to include the fact that policy is made by a public or government institution, as opposed to a private or corporate institution. Public policy deals with policies made in order to benefit society in general.

The guiding framework for all public policy is the Constitution of South Africa (1996). The Bill of Rights, thus, spells out the necessity for the quality of life of all citizens to be improved through the provision of basic services, such as water. The Constitution (1996) also outlines that it is a basic human right to have access to education. This broad framework would need to translate into a more particular policy framework at the grassroots level, where the practicalities of such service delivery are developed.

According to Dowding (1997: 47), people react to policy in different ways. Some may resist a policy if they feel that their needs are not met by that policy and if they feel excluded from the decision.

Finally, policy, at least in its positive form, is based on law and is authoritative. Members of the public usually accept as legitimate the fact that taxes must be paid by all employees earning above the R36 000 tax bracket in South Africa. Speed limits must be obeyed, unless motorists want to risk heavy fines, suspended sentences or jail. Anderson (1984: 214) says that some public policies may be violated even though they are authoritative; such as a national call by the Department of Transport for an Arrive Alive campaign to reduce deaths on South African roads. Some motorists will still break the law and drive above the stipulated speed limit. Being “authoritative” is a necessary but not sufficient condition for effective public policy.

For Colebatch (1998:112), policy refers to more than simple decisions taken by political leaders. To describe something as policy is to give it significance. Colebatch gives some examples to clarify his point on the definition of policy. On the one hand, to say that it is policy that all children should remain at school until the end of Grade 12 is more meaningful than saying it is the preference of the teachers or parents. At the same time, the term “policy” seems to have a small - scale application, as can be noticed when officials describe routine practice as policy. On the other hand, when a university administrator says to a caller “I cannot deal with such an important matter over the phone: university policy strictly stipulates that all complaints of such magnitude must be in writing” (Colbatch 1998:112), the term “policy” is being used to protect the administrator from having to justify his or her action, or even face a disciplinary hearing.

Thus, a policy includes not only the decision to adopt a law or make a rule on a topic, but also the subsequent decisions that are intended to enforce or implement the law or rule, as has been shown by the two examples above.

Public policies in modern political systems do not, by and large, just happen. They are instead designed to accomplish specific goals or produce definite results, although these are not always achieved. Reasons can be attributed to time management, lack of information, budgetary constraints, resignations of key people, expertise in the field and

loosely stated goals that may not be clearly understood. Such problems may be an obstacle to implementation.

Policy can be regarded as the laws or regulations governments or a group of people can use to control certain situations. It can be used as a guideline for controlling the use of available resources and addressing various imbalances of the past. The aim of the rationalisation and redeployment of teachers in South Africa, for example, was to bring about equity in education. This means that governments had to concentrate on shifting resources from richer to poorer provinces and, within provinces, from White, Indian and Coloured education to Black education.

Policy is not, then, an easily defined term, as it tends to depend on who uses the term and for what purpose. Public policy in most cases is in line with an organisation's vision, mission and objectives. For this reason it is important for people, companies, institutions, governments and any other body or structure to have clear policy guidelines for clients to know how the structure intends to do its business, relate to other structures and its clients. Public policies are then made to control and regulate certain situations and behaviour.

1.1 Classification of policies

To classify something, is to separate it from other things and give it significance. For the purposes of the present study, four different types of policy are given.

This is done in order to give the rationalization and redeployment policy some relevance within the broader context of policy. Anderson (1984:421) and Hill (1997:13) offer the following classifications of policy: regulatory, distributive, self-regulatory and redistributive policies.

1.1 (a) Regulatory policies

The nature of regulatory policies is aimed at restricting, controlling or limiting the activities and behaviour of groups and individuals. The goals of these types of policies are to either control or to prescribe behaviour to protect the general public. Slogans can also be used to control the behaviour of individuals, for example 'Arrive Alive', 'Road Safety' or 'Zero Tolerance'. The high price motorists pay for speeding on South African roads is a way of forcing people to adhere to a certain policy, in this case, that of the Department of Transport.

1.1 (b) Distributive policies

These types of policies focus mainly on the distribution of goods and services, or benefits to groups or individuals. For instance, the national Department of Social Development has launched child support and foster care grants. The policy is referred to as the Social Assistance Act, of 1997, for needy children and child headed households, as a result of the AIDS epidemic. Distributive policies make use of public money to assist particular groups or communities.

1.1 (c) Self-Regulatory policies

The main focus of these policies is to protect and promote specific group interests. Examples of this type of policy are policies made by the University of KwaZulu- Natal on the administration of students, the South African Medical and Dental Council, or the South African Council of Educators (SACE), in order to regulate these institutions or professions.

Members had to adhere to a strict ethical code of conduct in carrying out their daily duties. Members of the public can also report certain malpractices, such as corruption, abuse or negligence, to these various bodies.

1.1 (d) Redistributive policies

A redistributive policy is what this research will focus on. These policies deal with the reallocation or redistribution of resources or benefits among groups or individuals previously marginalized or disadvantaged. These types of policies are usually difficult to put in place, because of the reluctance amongst the more privileged groups to redistribute resources. Examples are 'Affirmative Action', 'Gender Equity' and the reallocation of resources to previously disadvantaged communities; these may be human or physical resources (Anderson 1984:428; Hill 1997: 16).

1.2 Role-players influencing policy formation

Role -players in policy formation are of great importance in this study, because as sound as a policy may be from a theoretical perspective, unless it has role- players who understand clearly the value of the policy, its use is limited.

Kingdon (1995:145) argues that policy formation can be considered to be a set of processes, including at least the setting of the agenda, the specification of alternatives from which a choice is to be made, an authoritative choice among specified alternatives (as in a legislative vote or a presidential decision) and the implementation of the decision. What it means is that in policy formation the success of one part in the process does not mean the success of the other (Kingdon 1995:149).

This section aims to illustrate the different actors involved in the policy- making process and the influence each has on it. Some actors are inside government, such as government Ministers and parliamentarians, and others are outside government, such as teachers' unions, trade unions, community based organisations, non governmental organisations. Here the issue of power comes to the fore, as actors push for their particular issues to be considered on the governments' agenda and thus ultimately shape the nature of the policy.

Between policy-makers and ordinary citizens, many other specialised participants play roles differing from one system to the other. These include interest group leaders, party workers, journalists and other opinion leaders and officials of towns or other subordinate units of government. There are also political parties, which might play an influential role in the shaping of policy. They may do so by opposing policies formulated by the ruling party in order to get their own ideas on the agenda. Such moves are seen when major decisions are taken, such as before the budget speech and during elections in a country. In some cases the ruling or dominant party may alter its decisions on particular policies. Even though not all issues can be placed within a framework of party conflict, the most central ones can, such as the rationalisation and redeployment policy of educators in South Africa. For the most part, the most consistent, if not always the most directly involved players in the policy game, are political parties.

Public policy-makers use a wide variety of sources in making policy decisions. Dunn (1994) says this type of information includes journalistic reports; advice provided by lobbyists and interests groups; conversations with staff, colleagues and other policy-makers; correspondence and comments from citizens and constituents; books and periodicals; faxed messages, text messages; electronic messages or telephone calls from the sources of each of these types of information. According to Dunn (1994), in a democratic policy-making process, policy-makers considering a range of policy alternatives will need two types of information to shape their policy decision. Firstly, they need 'political information,' consisting of information about the ethical, ideological and political considerations of the policy alternatives. Secondly, they need 'policy information', describing and explaining how the policy alternatives under consideration will actually operate. Policy knowledge is explained as a body of human knowledge available to assist policy-makers in their understanding of the causes and consequences of the inputs of government and the subsequent societal impact. Without this kind of information, then, it is difficult for policy-makers in a democratic society to make sound legitimate decisions that have a high probability of succeeding.

Further to the interest groups, academics, researchers and consultants are the next most important set of non-governmental actors. Often, parliamentary committees and administrative agencies call on the expertise of researchers and analysts in hearings, meetings and advisory panels (Kingdon 1995:164).

Other participants in the policy making process are the media. According to Dye (1972), the power of the media often tries setting the government agenda for decision-making. This means that the issues which receive greatest attention in the media are more likely to be viewed as important by the general public. Anderson (1984) agrees with Dye (1972) on the issue of the media. In Anderson's terms, the media has a role to play in shaping public opinion in the direction of a particular agency by revealing and making public actions, for or against them. For instance, the Department of Health in South Africa and its position on HIV/ AIDS and Nevirapine has been publicly discussed in the media. Publicity of this nature is important for the Department of Health to gain a sense of public opinion on the matter. Mass action by the public against a particular issue helps to send clear directives to government to pay attention to detail regarding a particular policy.

Anderson (1984) says that the courts also play an important role in the formation of policy. They review the cases brought before them and have the power to facilitate or dismiss a policy through their decisions, as was the case of Grove Primary School in Cape Town which will be discussed.

Finally, according to Turner and Hulme (1990), human agents are important in policy formation. These policy role-players have multiple, often conflicting, goals and may enter and exit the policy process at different stages. Grindle and Thomas (1991) agree with Turner and Hulme (1990) that policy-makers are not purely autonomous actors. The policy-makers operate within multiple interlocking contexts that shape their interpretations of the problems they wish to address, highlighting certain policy choices and making some policy options impossible to follow through.

The next discussion will look briefly at policy implementation, some of the difficulties it encounters and the crucial role of “street- level bureaucrats” in this process.

1.3 Policy implementation

Implementation of policy is often a highly political process. It is an arena in which government and other role players with interests in the policy engage in negotiations over the goals of the policy and conflict over the allocation of resources. Howlett and Ramesh (1995) support Grindle and Thomas’ (1991) argument, when they concur that policy implementation is the most challenging and crucial aspect of the policy cycle. They state that this is where the policy will be applied and tested for suitability. In essence, this is where theory is put into practice.

Bureaucracy or the administrative branch of government plays a major role in implementation. It is the stage at which all the planning, deliberations and the decisions will be implemented.

They state that policy implementation is affected by its social, economic, technological and political contexts. However, changes in social conditions might affect the interpretation of the problems, as well as the manner in which the program is implemented. Public support for, or rejection of, a policy can also affect the implementation of policies. The implementation of all policies requires material, financial, managerial, bureaucratic, informational, technical and political resources and capacity.

In many countries, as Grindle & Thomas (1991) point out, there is a justifiable assumption that when policies are made they will be implemented with consequences recognisably similar to those intended by the policy makers. In reality, this view is highly flawed, as Pressman and Wildavsky’s (1973) research on the Oakland Project for the unemployed in California, illustrates. Pressman and Wildavsky’s research on the project indicated that there were many different decision-making points at which the policy which had been had initiated by the central government in an effort to assist the

unemployed, faltered. Their research found that the delays in implementation were caused by differing ideas of what was needed for successful implementation of the project; lack of continuity because of personnel change; objections to the implementation methods and the perception of too many bureaucratic checks and balances.

South Africa faces similar implementation challenges. Several media reports, such as the newspaper article entitled Delivery Delayed, in the *Sunday Tribune*, 12 September 2001, suggests that delayed implementation can be caused by factors such as corruption, mismanagement of funds, poor financial planning and delayed sharing of information.

Groups that feel they have not been consulted on a particular policy may contest policy implementation. The following example illustrates this point. A developer needs a piece of land (which has been earmarked for a community clinic) belonging to the local tribal authority. The nearest hospital is 55km from this tribal authority and the intended clinic is vitally important for the community. The tribal authority has all rights to this land and can make decisions over its use. No development can take place without the chief's knowledge. Without consultation with the community and the tribal authority, the developer decides to develop a game reserve. The local community may contest the implementation of such a policy in a variety of ways, such as looting the material for the development of such a game reserve or poaching the animals. Clearly implementation should not have taken place without the knowledge of the beneficiaries.

Pressman and Wildavsky describe implementation as "the process of interaction between the settings of goals and the actions geared to achieve them" (1973:145). This means that policy implementation is shaped, moulded and governed by countless participants and perspectives. Furthermore, they said that implementation is essentially an ability to forge links in a causal chain, so as to put policy into effect. Policy implementation will become less and less effective as the links among all the various agencies involved in carrying it for implementation break.

In Anderson's (1997:214) view, the concept of implementation is about the policy initiative and goals established during policy formulation. Those goals are transformed into programmes, procedures and regulations. The main concern for implementers, states Anderson, is the allocation of scarce resources in the most efficient and effective manner to disadvantaged communities, a point illustrated by the study. The literature on policy implementation shows that it is a particularly difficult task to accomplish. Parsons qualifies this point by suggesting that, the reason could be that the "redistribution of scarce resources fails to reach target communities" (1995:461).

The need for information among all stakeholders is important in the implementation process. For implementation to have favourable results its goals have to be defined and understood, resources made available and controlled and the channels of communication must be effective. If these are lacking the desired intentions of policy implementation will not be successful.

According to Linder & Peters, "the way in which the implementation problem is perceived, and what one does about it, depends on the perspective being applied" (1987:37). From a vertical perspective, implementation means that authorised decisions at the top coincide exactly with outcomes at the bottom. The focus here is on achieving policy goals. In the horizontal perspective, implementation is an exercise in collective bargaining or negotiations, something that will be illustrated by the present case study. This perspective recognizes that policy implementation is an ongoing process and that the participants have their own agendas and preconceived ideas and therefore their own distinct perspective on any policy issue.

1.4 Policy implementation approaches

There are a number of approaches available to policy implementers when deciding how to implement a particular policy. Howlette and Ramesh (1995) offer two approaches to policy implementation.

1.4.1 The top-down approach

The top-down approach starts with the decisions of a government which are then carried out by administrators. It demands that regulations must not be broken. Howlette and Ramesh argue that the “top-down approach provides clear directives for implementation of policies” (1995:41). It assumes that people will do as they are told and follow clear directives and goals. However, it is not so simple and in reality, directives are often unclear and contradictory.

The shortfall of the top-down approach is that it places emphasis on senior decision-makers, who are actually often marginal participants in the implementation process, compared to lower level officials (termed by Lipsky as “street -level bureaucrats” (1980:13-15)) and members of the public.

1.4.2 The bottom-up approach

The advocates for the bottom-up approach are of the opinion that policy implementation should focus on “street-level bureaucrats” as they have daily interaction with the general public. Anderson (1984) agrees, commenting that the bottom-up approach embraces many aspects of society such as public and private actors. In the bottom-up approach communities are encouraged to initiate programmes that will be of benefit to them and promote sustainable development.

The most significant aspect of the bottom up approach is that it directs attention to the formal and informal relationships constituting the policy networks involved in making and implementing policies. Howlette and Ramesh point out that the bottom-up approach to the study of implementation “deflects attention away from policy decisions, and back towards policy problems, thus extending the study to all private and public actors and institutions involved in the problem” (1995:41).

This next section will determine where “street-level bureaucrats” fit into the policy implementation process. These “street-level bureaucrats” are important in this study because they are involved in implementing policy and are, in effect, defining policy through their interaction with clients.

1.5 The role of street -level bureaucrats in implementing policies

In a democratic society, people in positions of power (such as cabinet ministers) are generally voted into these positions. These individuals form a government and make legitimate policies that will benefit society at large. However, government officials need additional support to ensure that policies are implemented. This is the role of the “street-level bureaucrat”.

Lipsky elaborates on the meaning of “street-level bureaucrat” when he says “street -level bureaucrats are public service workers who interact directly with citizens in the course of their jobs and who exercise substantial discretion in their day-to-day duties” (1980:13). Discretion in this context means “street-level bureaucrats” will make unplanned, on the spot decisions as a strategy to cope with their daily duties. This discretion does not mean that “street-level bureaucrats” are not restricted by policy or rules.

Lipsky is of the opinion that “administrator and community norms, values and belief systems shape policy choices by the street- level bureaucrats” (1980:16). Examples of “street-level bureaucrats” are teachers, police officers and other law enforcement personnel, social workers, judges, public health workers, nurses, public lawyers, court officers, and many other public employees who give access to government programmes and provide services within them.

The policy-making roles of “street-level bureaucrats” are based on two interlinked facets of the policy. Firstly, they have a relatively high degree of discretion and, secondly, a relative independence from organisational authority.

These “street-level bureaucrats” apply rules selectively. This means that if policy is contradictory or ambiguous, they will do what they think is best for the situation at hand. Often this is because “street-level bureaucrats” work under difficult circumstances, lack adequate resources to carry out their daily responsibilities, and end up prioritising their efforts.

Further to this, “street-level bureaucrats” often work in situations too complicated to reduce to stipulated policy or rules. Take, for example, policemen. They cannot carry with them instructions on how to interact with citizens, especially in hostile situations. In fact, they would not endanger themselves in potentially dangerous encounters such as in a gang-ridden and violent area. When gangs fight, police are seldom at the scene of the crime, even though one of their duties is to promote peace in communities and to uphold law and order. Likewise, teachers may not understand outcomes-based education, but will teach what they think is more appropriate, instead of religiously following stipulated policy guidelines.

“Street-level bureaucrats” work in situations that often require responses (feed-back) on the human dimensions of situations. They are required to be vigilant, observant and sensitive when applying judgements, which are not reducible to programmed formats. Teachers are expected to perceive the unique potential of children; each child is an individual and children cannot be treated as a collective. Nurses in a hospital are expected to be sympathetic to their patients. It may not be appropriate for a nurse to shout a diagnosis down a corridor, especially in sensitive cases. Discretion thus remains a characteristic of many public service jobs. Government officials and political office-bearers do not have the time or the expertise to attend to all the details of a policy.

Indirectly, “street-level bureaucrats” can indirectly shape policy. Here the public perceptions, values, attitudes and behaviours can play an important role. De Green (1993) gives the example of when a city establishes zoning regulations for the use of land within its boundaries. The mayor and the city council are setting public policy that restricts the rights of individual landowners in favour of the broader welfare rights of the community.

According to Anderson (1984), “street-level bureaucrats” perform most of the day-to-day work of government; their actions affect citizens more regularly and directly than those of other governmental bodies. They have leeway or opportunity to choose among alternatives in carrying out policies under their jurisdiction, are the intermediaries between political office bearers and society and are also charged with the responsibility of carrying out government mandates.

Lipsky points out that “street-level bureaucrats” often work in a “hostile environment” (1980:16). The reasons for this include the failure on the part of government to deliver essential services. This causes conflict and friction between the “street-level bureaucrats” and the citizens. This conflict results in the general public forming negative perceptions about “street-level bureaucrats”.

Thus, agenda setting, policy-making and the implementation thereof is not as easy as is sometimes the perception. This presentation of policy theory has attempted to illustrate that successful policy-making and implementation relies strongly on a variety of influences and contexts.

PART TWO: THE STUDY

2. Methodology

The implementation of the rationalization and redeployment policy of educators in KwaZulu Natal affected many stakeholders: educators, principals, school governing bodies, learners and local communities. This section presents the research methodology which was used to determine the impact the rationalization and redeployment policy had on the educators of the Harding/Port Shepstone District.

2.1 Methods of data collection

The perceptions educators had toward the implementation of the rationalization and redeployment policy were gathered through direct observation, analysing related documentation and publications, conducting face to face interviews (using a tape recorder to capture the information), and holding informal discussions with key informants.

2.2 Primary and secondary data

The research used primary sources such newspapers (such as *The Teacher* and the *Natal Witness*) and relevant Department of Education documents. Interestingly there has been little written on rationalization and redeployment in book form but much of the current debates were unearthed through journal articles and papers published predominantly by the University of the Witwatersrand Education Policy Unit.

2.3 Interviews

The primary tool used to generate data was semi structured face to face interviews. A major advantage of this is its adaptability. By definition, interviews are a form of data collection encounter in which one person (interviewee) asks questions from another person (respondent) (Babbie,1998:4). Terre Blanch and Kelly refer to interviewing as “a more natural form of interacting with people than making them fill out a form or questionnaire, do a test or perform some experimental task” (1999:128). Interviews are regarded as one of the major forms of data collection in qualitative research. In theory

there are a number of interviewing techniques. These include personal or face-to-face interviews, focus group interviews and telephone interviews. In this case face-to-face interviews were conducted as they were the most appropriate way to gather educators' perceptions and attitudes on the policy implementation of rationalization and redeployment. Face-to-face interviews, as suggested by Powell (1997) are relatively expensive, but produce a better response rate than a questionnaire.

Schumann and Presser (1990) point out that the types of questions should reflect generic features of the topic under discussion. In this case, eighteen questions in the interview guide were designed to elicit the information. These had to be appropriate for the level of comprehension for the group being studied and questions were kept short and simple. The interview questions used in this research were open-ended, to give the respondents leeway to elaborate effectively and to express their own experiences of the policy under discussion. Open-ended interviews also avoid suggesting or imposing answers that respondents may not have considered.

Based on the guidelines offered by Schumann and Presser (1990) the interview focused on the educators' backgrounds and training, their views on the policy and the impact the policy had had on their professional and personal life. These background factors were considered by the researcher to be important in capturing the perceptions of the educators because many were very concerned and seriously affected by the redeployment policy. Interviewees were given an opportunity to comment on their experiences of the effect the policy had on education. It was important for the researcher to consider the voices of educators because they carry the exact tone and feelings that are conveyed by the researcher to fully understand the perceptions of the policy of rationalization and redeployment. It was for this reason that the researcher used interviewing as a dominant technique of data gathering.

Borg and Gall (1979) indicate that the interview as a research tool does have definite limitations although it has some important advantages over other data collection tools. They state that its adaptability gained through the interaction between the interviewer and

the respondent may lead to subjectivity and possible bias. This bias may result from aspects such as the eagerness of the respondent to please the interviewer, or to seek out answers that support certain pre-conceived notions.

Another disadvantage of the interview is that it is time- consuming and therefore the number of subjects from whom data can be obtained is limited. This is overcome by having a limited sample in the research as was the case in this study. The present study interviewed 24 respondents, six SADTU site stewards, six principals and twelve educators. The sample of 24 respondents was chosen because the study was limited to the six schools in the Harding/ Port Shepstone region.

2.4 Tape recorder and audio tapes

A tape recorder and audio tapes were used to record the interviews which were later transcribed for analysis. The use of a tape recorder was necessary because the study involved extensive interviewing as a major form of data collection and it was helpful to the researcher to capture all the necessary information without interruptions which can disrupt the effectiveness of communication between the interviewer and the interviewee (as may be the case with note taking) (Thomas, 1996). All in all, eight audio tapes were used, corresponding with the 24 respondents interviewed.

2.5 Research population and sample size

Powell defines a population as “a group that is of interest to the researcher and which has at least one character differentiating it from another group” (1993:68). According to Stephen and Hornsby (1995), the population sampled can be limited and defined by certain factors. The population in this study was confined to the Harding/Port Shepstone District educators.

Six schools were selected, three historically advantaged and three historically disadvantaged. These schools were chosen because of their varying access to resources. These schools were also chosen because their perception and attitudes toward the policy were different. The choice of educators was based on whether they were redeployed from

their previous school to a school they did not “want”. In short, educators in the sample were affected by the policy in one way or another.

While the present government has built a number of solid school buildings around the country (especially in rural areas) in recent years, the general situation is still chronic. Classrooms remain overcrowded, desks are insufficient, playing fields inadequate, windows broken, toilets unusable, textbooks unavailable, libraries and laboratories and many teaching aids used in modern education, are seldom available.

Given the stark comparison between advantaged and disadvantaged schools, the researcher saw value in using schools from both sides of the spectrum in this study. The entire research population included six school principals, six SADTU site stewards and twelve educators, two from each school. Reasoning for the choice of interviewee is detailed below.

Principal: An interview with the principal was deemed important, since it is his responsibility to appraise his staff-members and consequently implement the rationalization and redeployment of educators at his/her school. Principals were not, however, part of the initial discussions in the Education Labor Relations Council around the formation of this policy. Their task was simply that of implementer. The daunting task that faced principals was to identify the educators who were “surplus to requirements” at a given school. This ultimately resulted in the loss of educators from their school.

The South African Democratic Teachers’ Union (SADTU) representative:

The rationale for choosing the SADTU site steward was that SADTU operated from a national level and information (and related tasks) cascaded down to provinces. Each province is responsible for its regional structures, with each region having a number of branches which work closely with schools. It is in these branches that the steward is located, while interacting with principals and governing body members to ensure that a policy such as rationalization and redeployment is being implemented smoothly.

Secondly SADTU was one of the parties consulted during the rationalization and redeployment policy discussions, making them one of the key role players.

This representative was identified to participate in this study because it was the Union's mandate to lobby teachers and encourage them to see the importance of the policy of rationalization and redeployment of educators. This was done through mass meetings, workshops, conferences and seminars they attended at regional or provincial level. It was the duty of the site steward to explain the policy to educators at branch level and at school level. It was also the mandate of the Union to ensure procedural fairness and ensure that educators were not victimized during the process.

Twelve educators

The educators were selected depending on whether they were directly affected by the rationalization and redeployment policy or whether they were recently appointed educators who could offer a newcomer's perspective of the policy. The educators who were of interest to the researcher were those who were redeployed to schools when declared "in excess" at their present school. The other educators who were of interest to the researcher were chosen on the basis that they were redeployed to schools that were in need of their expertise. This meant their redeployment did not result in another educator having to leave the school they were being deployed to.

2.6 The research setting

The advantaged schools involved in this study were situated in areas with good roads, making them easily accessible. These schools were situated more particularly in Marburg and Port Shepstone. The disadvantaged schools were located in the areas around Harding and in rural areas. The roads to these schools were nearly impossible to navigate - particularly during the rainy season. Given these access constraints the attempted visits to these schools outnumbered those to the advantaged schools. The distance between the three disadvantaged schools in this study varied from 20 to 55km from the town of

Harding and about 75km from Port Shepstone. In the advantaged schools the distance varied from 5 to 15km from the city of Port Shepstone.

The contrast between the advantaged and disadvantaged schools was stark. Two of the three disadvantaged schools were surrounded by litter and mud houses indicated a level of poverty. There were many street vendors selling at the school gates to the learners and the educators. The school buildings looked bleak and old. Inside, the furniture (tables and chairs clustered together) indicated an over crowded classroom. A type writer was available for the principal who shared his office with his two heads of department (HODs). One of the schools had 12 educators (including the principal) and 601 learners. This figure roughly translates to a ratio of 1:55. That is 55 learners per educator.

The third school was slightly better off. At the entrance of the school there was a green vegetable garden, some shrubs, hedges and small trees. There was a soccer field and a netball field - the only two sports the learners were exposed to at the school. The school building was old but well maintained. The school had 19 educators, three heads of department, one deputy principal, one principal and 785 learners. This figure translates to a ratio of 1:34, which means one educator per 34 learners.

In the Port Shepstone area, in schools which are classified as ex-model c schools, the situation was distinctly different. The learners in these schools are exposed to different sporting codes and a wide curriculum. There were video rooms or film rooms for subjects such as history mainly. There was a school clerk, a librarian, a sick bay and a typist. Each school management team members (principal, deputy principal and HODs) has an office to work from. The class rooms were well equipped with essentials such as teaching aids on the walls and overhead projectors. The schools had tuck shops run by the SGB. There was a security guard at the main gate who took the particulars of the vehicle and the name of the driver before a parking bay was allocated. This situation showed that the school took security very seriously. The physical infrastructure of the schools was good so were the sporting grounds. In one of the schools the researcher was welcomed by one of the governing body members. A room that looked like a board room or conference

room was allocated to the researcher by the principal of the school to conduct the interviews.

The two different contexts presented above is an illustration of the impact of the unequal distribution of resources within the education system in South Africa based on the past racial discrimination in South Africa.

2.7 Data analysis

Mouton (1996) argues that data analysis helps the researcher to identify patterns and themes in the data thereby drawing certain conclusions from it.

The tape-recorded data were transcribed in preparation for the analysis process. The transcripts were read thoroughly in order to discover codes and emerging themes around which to categorize the data. This was done to check for incomplete and unnecessary data and to facilitate and organize the data into sensible packages of information.

Interviews for each school were summarized. The main themes of the educator interviews were used to analyze the data. The responses were summarized under each interview schedule and the responses from all the interviewees (principals, SADTU site steward, and the two educators) from each school were summarized, to create a portrait of each school. The responses were also summarized according to advantaged and disadvantaged school. The responses from all six schools were compared.

In qualitative research, data should be closely related to results. The following codes were used to analyze the data.

- (a) How well do educators know the transformation policy issues in education?
- (b) To what extent did the rationalization and redeployment policy affect the working relations between educators and the school management team, between educator and education, between educators and learners and between educators and governing body members, at affected schools?
- (c) To what extent did the policy affect the educators' lives ?

(d) What were the similarities and differences in educator perceptions in the six schools under discussion?

2.8 Design of the study

The purpose of this study was to determine the impact the policy of rationalization and redeployment had on the educators of the Harding/Port Shepstone District. The reason for selecting this area was media attention given to the high number of teachers who were redeployed to Harding from Durban and Port Shepstone, despite refusing to comply with the process. This was largely because Harding was plagued by party political violence. There was also the fear that the Shobashobane massacre which took place on Christmas day in 1995 might repeat itself. Further to these reasons the travelling costs for educators getting to these schools was high and educators did not feel safe in these areas.

2.9 Fieldwork difficulties

A number of difficulties were identified during the course of this research. In some schools, especially the former KwaZulu government schools, the appointments for interviews were hindered by annual cultural activities, which take place in the winter season. The activities included traditional dances, virginity testing (especially for girls), wedding dances, poetry and warrior dances for boys. This led to a rescheduling of interviews, which caused a significant time delay.

Given the geographical landscape of the province; schools in the Harding/ Port Shepstone district are far apart. This meant that if the interview was cancelled on a particular day, the researcher had to make another trip of between 45 and 80km to get to an alternate school. This meant that only one school per day could be interviewed. Schools commonly forgot to inform teachers of the interview or the principal was at a meeting and his deputy refused the researcher access to the school, on the basis that he had not been informed.

Some of the problems were weather- related, with heavy rains preventing access to the rural schools. In one school the researcher was denied access because she was dressed “inappropriately” (slacks instead of a long skirt or dress). In the name of ‘culture’ and

respect for the elders in that community, she had to abide by the rules of the community because she was relying on the participation of the school.

PART THREE:

BACKGROUND TO THE RATIONALIZATION AND REDEPLOYMENT POLICY PROCESS

The process of rationalization and redeployment started as early as 1996, with what was known as Resolution Three of 1996. According to Garson (2000), this resolution claimed that moving teachers around would redress the wrongs in education. According to Govender *et al.* (1997), the principle of rationalization and redeployment of teachers was the result of the application of uniform teacher to pupil ratios in all schools, as a way of achieving equity both within and between provinces. Rationalization agreements were reached in September 1995, and again in May 1996 by the Education Labour Relations Council (ELRC), a major policy-making body consisting of national and provincial education departments, as well as the major teacher organisations. The agreements involved the setting of national teacher to pupil ratios of 1:40 in primary schools and 1:35 in secondary schools.

These ratios were to serve as guidelines for provincial departments to determine provisional salary scales for teachers in schools. In order to reduce the number of 'excess' teachers, attractive severance packages were offered. Those teachers who chose this option would not again be allowed to work in the public sector and the state retained the right to reject or approve applications for the severance packages. The cost of these packages was very high (about R600 million), and amount the President hoped to raise from foreign governments (*The Citizen*, 18 May 1996; *The Star*, 17 February 1997).

According to the media, severance packages cost R1000 million - about R66 332 per educator, which was far more than the estimated R 600 million. A financial crisis quickly arose when foreign governments did not provide the R600 million needed. Provinces were forced to use pension, leave and other funds to pay educators. The situation was

further exacerbated because many of those choosing voluntary severance packages were medium and senior level teachers and principals, who were eligible for generous retirement packages.

In April 1996 agreement was reached between government and teacher unions. The contents of this agreement consisted of a three year Conditions of Service Adjustment Package for Educators. This agreement provided procedures for rightsizing of the Public Service and the achievement of equal pupil to teacher ratios within and between provinces. The teacher salary boost included in this agreement meant that provinces had no money left for learner support material (stationery, textbooks).

Schools appointed new temporary teachers to fill key posts, while those teachers declared “supernumerary” waited at home to be redeployed or employed. A situation arose where new temporary teachers and those waiting on redeployment lists, were being paid simultaneously. Confusion increased as the Department of Education became increasingly overburdened and the salary bill grew even bigger. This situation led to poor schools becoming poorer. Provinces ran into more debt and educational publishers started retrenching staff, as orders for textbooks ceased.

Even though KwaZulu-Natal had the largest Department of Education in South Africa, the redeployment of teachers dragged on for more than three years. When redeployment did occur, teachers were sent to schools in rural areas and black townships where, according to Vally (1998), there existed minimal resources: limited, under-trained staff; poor quality of learning materials; shortages of classrooms; lack of laboratories and libraries.

Besides these problems, schools were attempting to discourage rote learning, autocratic teaching, authoritarian management styles, outdated syllabi and antiquated forms of assessment and evaluation. The education system in South Africa has been plagued by lack of human and physical resources and over-crowded classrooms in rural and township

schools. The hope invested in the policy of rationalization and redeployment to rectify historically imbalances began to fade.

3. Legislative Context

Policies and programmes introduced by the Ministry of Education since 1994 have aimed to transform the national system of education and training. During this period, teacher education has begun to take a new shape; issues of teacher redeployment and rationalization, retrenchment, appraisal, development, support and salaries were being raised and discussed at length by various bodies. According to Mokgalane and Vally, “teacher organizations, the state as the employer and other non-governmental organisations interested in teacher education have taken a strong lead in debating and discussing these issues” (1996:6).

According to Chisholm and Vally, some people (teachers themselves) have unfortunately viewed the issue of teacher redeployment as “synonymous with teacher retrenchment” (1996:2). SADTU officials and site stewards in schools convinced teachers not to view redeployment as retrenchment; teachers should rather see redeployment as a mechanism used to bring about equity in education. Nevertheless, the teacher’ fears were apparently justified when media reports claimed that many teachers would loose their jobs. Nevertheless, SADTU pleaded with its members that the agreements in the ELRC were about redistributing teaching posts and not as it appeared to teachers, of cutting the number of teacher posts.

According to the Teacher Education Audit (1996), the allocation of teachers to schools varied greatly in the former Apartheid education departments. White, Coloured and Indian schools were greatly advantaged, given their teacher to pupil ratio of 1:27, compared to that of Blacks, which was 1:43 at the primary level. Here teachers, parents and pupils had to deal with massive overcrowding and high teacher to learner ratios. Schools in the former homelands were no different to Black South African schools. There is some acknowledgement, however, that pupil to teacher ratios are, in fact, higher than this.

External pressure and demands have proven important motivators for change within education in South Africa. The business community, in particular, has become vocal and articulate in its call for fundamental change in this sector. Research conducted by the Human Sciences Research Council (1995) has confirmed that subjects such as mathematics, science, computer literacy, accounting and English are a matter of great concern in many rural and township schools of South Africa and many educators teaching these subjects need substantial retraining.

As educators respond to these external pressures, it becomes clear that schools cannot accomplish their mission without the active support of the community at large, including parents, business and governmental agencies. Guthrie summarizes this call for greater integration of services, particularly between education and social services. He states that "schools have an obligation to perform and give what is best for their learners" (1991:79). For schools to achieve their best, they need the co-operation of parents, the community and the business community.

A uniform, equitable approach to the redeployment of teachers was needed, as well as a fair way of dealing with the teachers who would be affected by such rationalization (Department of Education Annual Report 1999:41). Many Resolutions were introduced to restructure education, the most important being Resolution 3 of 1996.

3.1 Key Issues in Resolution 3 of 1996

Since September 1995 a number of strategies and resolutions had been proposed in the Education Labour Relations Council, a major policy-making body consisting of the national and provincial education departments, as well as the major teacher unions. The major proposals put forward at this council included pupil to teacher ratios, rationalisation of education and closure of colleges, redeployment of teachers and introduction of new salary scales (Chisholm and Vally, 1996). The main objective of these discussions was to achieve equity in education over a five-year period. In the first financial year (1995/1996), 15% of the education budget was to be shifted from better-

funded provinces such as Gauteng and the Western Cape, and 20% in the second financial year. Poorly funded provinces such as Limpopo and the Eastern Cape would thus be given some relief. All primary schools that had over 40 learners and secondary schools with over 35 pupils were required to reduce their class sizes, while schools with fewer learners than the minimum ratio were required to increase their class sizes. In 1996 the Education Labour Relations Council agreed on a Three Year Conditions of Service Adjustment Package for Educators which provided procedures for rightsizing of the public service.

The first step toward redeployment of teachers was an attractive voluntary package to allow teachers willing to leave the profession to do so without an option of future employment, as was discussed in the previous section. The second step was the compulsory transfer of excess teachers. 'Rightsizing' committees, consisting of representatives from the Education Department, school governance committees, teachers and teacher union members, were established to make recommendations about which teachers were in excess. Preferences regarding where teachers would like to be redeployed were considered. Provincial and national redeployment task teams were established to compile a database of excess teachers and to facilitate their transfer. The Resolution 3 of 1996 further explored education rationalisation and the improvement of service conditions for education, as already mentioned. The national teacher to learner ratios was set at 1:40 in primary schools and 1:35 in secondary schools. This was to be phased in over a five -year period. The Resolution stated unequivocally that:

- No teacher would be retrenched;
- "Excess" educators would be redeployed;
- Equity and redress would be reached by increasing the budget and personnel of under-resourced provinces;

Teachers would be trained (and retrained) and bursaries would be made available for this purpose. Government, together with teacher unions, agreed that inflation-related increases would be introduced based on savings made through rationalization and incentives. As Government clearly stated, education would be "right-sized" and not "down-sized". This meant that the estimated 360 000 educator posts would be retained.

The principles that underpinned the agreement were sound, as they sought to bring about education transformation (Human Resource Management Circular No. 51 of 1998).

According to Garson (1996), teacher salaries were given a healthy hike under the provision of Resolution 3 of 1996. In so doing government hoped it would correct the past imbalances in education. The problem was that some provinces were plagued by maladministration, corruption and inefficiency. Provision of learner support materials (stationery and textbooks) was neglected. Many parents fled the state system for private schools and mushrooming independent schools.

3.2 The outcomes of the implementation of Resolution 3 of 1996

A number of problems arose during this process due, in large part, huge severance packages granted to every teacher who applied for them, leaving little funding for learner support materials such as textbooks. As a result, the Department of Education lost the best teachers (particularly mathematics and science teachers), principals, deputies, and heads of department.

There were differing degrees of 'readiness' in provinces in terms of redeployment. Because of this lack of readiness, some provinces were unable to receive redeployed teachers. Chisholm and Vally (1996) mention that the statistics provided to the Inter-Provincial Task Team (IPTT) on teacher vacancies, as well as the number of posts that could be created, were inaccurate. This inaccuracy arose because of the problem of ghost teachers as well as consolidating different education departments into one department. These were the two main issues which created a problem to identify teachers for redeployment. The issue of ghost teachers made it impossible for the department to know the exact number of teachers on the payroll to be redeployed. Such inaccuracies contributed to financial constraints as the process of redeploying teachers took longer than initially anticipated. The training programmes agreed upon in the Education Labour Relations Council (ELRC) were not put in place to cater for the teachers who might not be redeployed, and there were funding constraints, which made it extremely difficult to effectively implement the policy.

The major teacher unions such as The National Professional Teachers of South Africa (NAPTOSA) accused the national and provincial education departments of creating chaos in schools. There was growing discontent among teachers on the ground and pressure was mounting on union leaders. The Western Cape Parents' Teachers and Students Forum ultimately opposed the redeployment policy, the Grove Primary School case discussed below offers an illustration of this opposition.

According to *The Teacher* (10 February 1997), SADTU threatened mass action. The Union argued that the government paid out severance packages without a clear plan. For SADTU this meant that the reduction of educator numbers meant retrenchment. SADTU pointed out that the agreements reached in the ELRC were about redistributing teaching posts and not downscaling the number of posts. SADTU and NAPTOSA revealed that fact that middle management in the Western Cape, Gauteng and KwaZulu-Natal education departments had carried out redeployment process unilaterally. SADTU feared that the absence of the labour relations council in negotiating redeployment created the possibility of teacher victimisation. The *Cape Times* (13 February 1997) reported that teacher unions were unhappy about how the severance packages were approved. Unions argued that there was no reliable database to ascertain the number of teachers nationally, provincially and locally, or their profiles in terms of experience and subjects taught. This was a particular problem for many provinces, because most teachers who left the system were offering mathematics and science subjects - leaving a wide gap in the system. Another obstacle to the redeployment process was the 1995 audit on teacher demands, which SADTU challenged as being unreliable. There were allegations that provinces paid 'ghost' teachers and had 'ghost' schools on their databases; this meant that the number of teachers might have been inflated. This prompted the Department of Education to conduct the head count process of teachers and learners alluded to earlier, at the beginning of 1998.

Teachers in Model C schools pointed out that they accepted the need for equity and redeployment, but that the plan was implemented too speedily and did not give schools a

chance to adjust and adapt properly to the loss of teachers. They thus requested more time to negotiate and absorb the changes (*The Cape Times* 22 May 1996). *The Financial Mail* and *Business Day* of (6 May 1996) reported that the immediate result of the insecurity created by policies for teacher redeployment had been the mushrooming of private schools. The problems experienced during the implementation of Resolution 3 set the stage for further negotiations in 1997.

The education department has, over the past eight years, introduced excellent policies aimed at redress. While these policies have the potential to bring the South African education system on a par with first world countries, these policies will be meaningless if pupils and teachers are not in the classroom.

3.3 The role of the Grove Primary School in the implementation of the rationalization and redeployment process in South Africa

The rationalisation process was further hindered by the Grove Primary School case in the Western Cape. A group of school governing body (SGB) members strongly contested the redeployment policy. The governance of every public school is vested in its governing body. As Davidoff and Lazarus state, “in South Africa, the SGB is the legal body responsible for the development of overall school policy (including language policy and a code of conduct), the vision and mission of the school, financial management and fund raising, as well as making recommendations about appointments at the school” (2002:177). The functions of the SGB are included at this point to illustrate the motivation behind the Grove Primary School’s Governing Body action. It is important to note that Grove Primary School is a well-known school, with many government ministers sending their children to the school. Grove Primary School strongly contested the rationalisation policy claiming that it had legal rights to appoint the teachers that it wished, due to the powers it had been given by the South African Schools’ Act (SASA) of 1997. They further claimed that the rationalisation process restricted these powers, since the school was forced to accept teachers from the redeployment list. This statement stirred uproar in many schools, especially in the affluent schools, because, according to

Peter Buckland of National Business Initiative (NBI), the educators' Employment Act (EEA) affecting former Model C schools gave them the right to choose which educators to employ. To redeploy teachers in these schools meant amending the legislation as well.

The school threatened legal action, firstly on the basis that a SGB had an unfettered right to choose any suitable teacher for appointment, whether that teacher was on the excess list or not. The principals and SGB members argued that such appointments failed to give an accurate portrayal of a candidate's true picture and worth and, secondly, the court declared the redeployment policy illegal in terms of a loophole in the South African Schools' Act (SASA) of 1997. The loophole allowed the special status of Model C schools' hiring rights to continue until new, lesser recruitment powers under the Act for all school Governing Bodies came into play (*Mail & Guardian* 10-14 July 1997). The matter went to judgement in the Cape High Court, which ruled against the Minister of Education and the Education Labour Relations Council (ELRC) May 1996.

The court action put Grove Primary School at the forefront of a battle between the rights of individual SGB members and the Ministry of Education (*Mail & Guardian* 10-13 June 1997:8). The case received national attention, affected education as a whole and put a halt to the rationalisation process. According to media reports, the Ministry of Education blamed the redeployment fiasco on Grove Primary School (*The Teacher* January 1998:3). Consequently, the Minister of Education, Professor Sibusiso Bengu, held the provinces responsible for the disastrous outcome of the redeployment process. The Minister claimed that if all the provinces had had a uniform teacher: pupil ratio, the Grove Primary School situation would not have taken place. However, the initial formula (according to the agreement reached in the ELRC) was 1:30, nationally. Provinces contested this formula on the basis that each province per capita income was different and thus wanted to put their own policies in place according to the financial resources they had. For example, KwaZulu Natal (which is the biggest Department of Education in the country) opted for a teacher: pupil ratio of 1:38. These differing ratios between provinces created uncertainty and industrial action which slowed down the progress of the redeployment process.

The rationalization and redeployment process was supposed to redress imbalances in teaching resources among schools in provinces. However, due to the ruling of the Cape High Court, Resolution 3 of 1996 was rendered inoperable and the process of rationalisation and redeployment was put on hold in all provinces (*Business Times* of 12 September 1999).

By the end of 1997 the situation surrounding the rationalisation policy issue had become worse. Government issued a statement in the Education Labour Relations Council (ELRC) in December 1997 saying that it had abandoned Resolution 3 of 1996 and indicated that it would table a proposal on teacher retrenchment rather than redeployment.

Permanent teachers feared for their jobs and temporary teachers (employed after July 1996) had particular cause for concern. Towards the end of 1997, due to financial constraints experienced in provinces, the contracts of temporary teachers were threatened and some were terminated. Nationally, 43000 teacher jobs were in jeopardy. SADTU pointed out that retrenchment of temporary teachers was a recipe for disaster in schools. Negotiations between government and the major teacher unions continued into early 1998, without any clear solution to the problem.

Collective bargaining was resumed countrywide. There were a series of setbacks in many provinces. These included government decentralising its resources and giving provinces a greater say in these matters. *The Teacher* (January 1998:3) reported that this move by government clearly showed that it had abandoned its redeployment strategy and the mess now lay in the laps of the provinces. This prompted the SADTU's secretary general, Thulas Nxesi, to say, "We are heading for a major showdown, its chaos. It is (redeployment) being implemented without a clear plan. Provincial Departments had no right statistics so they (employer) don't know where people should be redeployed to or how many teaches they've got. We're not ready to continue the debate on rationalisation.

The only solution is to go back to the drawing board" (*Mail & Guardian* 10-13 January 1997).

At the beginning of 1998, the state of education in South African was in a state of crisis. Unions declared disputes with the Education Department. The then Minister of Education, Professor Sibusiso Bengu, with the support of the Council of Education Ministers, took unilateral decisions without consulting Unions and published new regulations to take the rationalization and redeployment process forward. Teacher unions threatened a national strike with SADTU and other teacher unions, joining forces. Lack of proper consultation prompted high school learners in KwaZulu-Natal to go on strike, demanding clarity on the rationalisation and redeployment and fearing that the process would have a negative impact on their matriculation examination. They also feared losing their teachers through redeployment (*The Natal Witness*, 8 June 1999). The Minister called for urgent negotiations. During these negotiations three major agreements were signed in Cape Town in June 1998, between Minister Bengu and the major teacher unions and the national strike was called off.

The agreements provided that:

- * The Minister determines national norms and standards for teacher provisioning
- * The educator personnel are to be redeployed equitably
- * An agreed process for the determination and redeployment of educators declared in excess, and consultation and negotiations on these three points, were to be undertaken centrally.

In general, however, teachers criticised the policy because it was perceived to have been poorly implemented. Teacher morale in schools was recognized as being very low. The *Natal Witness* (11 March 1999) reported that some educators in and around the province were resisting their moves and those who had moved were being rejected by the governing bodies of their new schools. Some had been mugged and threatened. Temporary teachers, in particular, were feeling threatened by the newly redeployed teachers.

According to the *Financial Mail* and *Business Day* both dated 6 May (1996), one immediate consequence of the insecurity generated by the policy had been the mushrooming of private schools. These schools defeated the objectives of the redeployment of teachers, because teachers in former Model C schools could not be redeployed to disadvantaged areas of the country. Black parents sent their children to Model C schools, given the unstable nature of education in disadvantaged areas. This movement coined the term 'great trek', referring to the rapid influx of learners into these schools. Previous Coloured schools and teachers felt the policy destroyed the high quality schools built up against the odds under apartheid.

The rationalisation and redeployment policy was not a popular policy, as Motala (1996), Govender *et al.* (1997) and Chisholm (1998) reiterate. Ultimately, the policy was abandoned a year into the implementation process. Although it aimed to save money for the Education Ministry, it cost billions of rands, affected cost-saving efforts and was largely resisted by the intended beneficiaries.

PART FOUR: FINDINGS

The data gathered from the interview process is presented below according to the dominant, recurring themes that emerged.

A) Teacher to learner ratios

Responses from advantaged schools.

Seven out of the nine respondents expressed fears of overcrowded classrooms and teaching and learning disruptions. They also raised concerns over falling standards as a result of bigger classes. The school governing bodies did not respond well to the expression of these concerns. One educator said “...I know that government means well, but our schools have a vision about the future. Since teaching from 1980, never did I have more than 25 pupils in my class; this business of having big numbers is crazy. How am I expected to teach 50 or more pupils offering maths? (Pause) no, this is not on. This government does not know what it wants...I tell you the parents are not happy at all because they don't want their children to be packed in one class...this is not what they pay for...I think I will leave teaching and join my family business...” (Interview 23 July: 2003).

The above statement demonstrated how despondent the respondent has become as a result of apparent falling standards in the education department. The issue at stake is for the government to apply preventative measures to ensure that teacher: learner ratio is balanced. The disadvantage of a teacher having more than 50 learners is that slow learners may drop behind in the learning areas. If classes are also smaller more teachers could be employed on a permanent basis. Fortunately for these schools, most could afford

to employ additional educators via their school governing bodies, however these posts have fewer benefits and are sometimes paid less than their government-employed colleagues.

On the same issue of ratios, the SADTU representative had a different view. He responded saying *"...equity is important in our schools for the sake of fairness, but you see my view on the matter is different. I have been to rural schools like Bobhoyi, I know what the class numbers are there and I know the problems teachers are facing, teachers from these schools (referring to advantaged schools) will not survive for a day. As a site steward I know that the numbers at my school are good and teachers will not be redeployed but will have to cope with the big numbers of learners who commute from disadvantaged areas daily. I mean they also need a good education..."* (Interview 20 July: 2003). The respondent was referring to the 'great trek' of learners from rural areas into former Model C schools. The interpretation of the above shows that the black parents have lost confidence in black teachers and schools and this is evidenced in the 'great trek' of black learners into ex- model C schools.

Prestine (1993) explained that principals must play instrumental leadership roles in their schools. They must be the driving force behind positive change in schools. Reform such as redeployment is often accompanied by role ambiguity or overload and loss of a sense of identity for principals. Supporting what Prestine had said, a principal from an advantaged school was concerned with the teacher: learner ratios at his school: *"I have an excess of 60 learners in grade 10 in one class. But I am in my so-called post-provisioning norm. I am the only English- medium high school serving three English medium- schools, plus I have my own grade 7 and I am a combined school. If I turn down the learners because of floor space (overcrowding) and few teachers, I am reported to the Human Rights Commission and the Department for racism and discrimination based on colour. If I take all the learners, which I could, (pause)...the Department will not give me extra educators because my teacher to learner ratio is what they want. The same parents will again complain that their children are not sardines. They cannot be in overcrowded classrooms. How do you explain 1040 learners to 28 teachers from grade R to 12? How can you run a school like that? The Department looks at the physical infrastructure of the*

school and decides it is advantaged. The school cannot afford these fees. As you can see the majority of learners are black and coloured and not from this area. Many buildings are white elephants in the school such as the woodwork building because there is no teacher. Blacks are bussed into the area and white learners are bussed out" (Interview 23 July: 2003).

This scenario demonstrates an apparent lack of confidence in the administration by white parents who choose to transfer their children to private schools. While the Education Department seeks to bring change in schools, not all parents have accepted change and cooperated with the school authorities. In advantaged schools it is clear that redeployment of teachers was not well received by teachers and parents alike. Principals felt betrayed by changes made by the Ministry of Education, feeling caught between the Ministry of Education and the community they serve.

Responses from disadvantaged schools

In disadvantaged schools the researcher found expressions of hope, primarily as teachers expected to benefit from the new ratios, revised budgets allocations and a new curriculum. Seven out of the nine respondents were excited about the teacher to learner ratios and said that reduced class size will improve the quality of learning and teaching in their schools. As one teachers said, *"Yes, the ratios are a good move, because many teachers will be able to have time for other curricular activities such as marking projects, portfolios and preparing lessons correctly...I also think the stress levels will be reduced somehow. Yebo, it will be very nice to have a manageable class number and hopefully the drop out rate will also become less(WHY?) because I had 85 learners in my class; I had problems getting all their names, I new the majority but not all which is not such a nice thing for a teacher. When the class is too big, other learners just do their own thing because they are bored you don't have time to handle them; ...ya, I'm sure this will help us. I also think it will help temporary teachers like me to get a permanent post, hopefully" (Interview, 20 July: 2003).*

The respondent demonstrated that he understood the principles underlying the redeployment exercise. It shows that the implementation of the policy was long over-due in disadvantaged schools. In this case the respondent also seemed to understand the implications of the policy and was confident the policy would impact positively on the changes brought about by the Department of Education.

Two out of the six principals, as well as three out of the six educators who were interviewed from disadvantaged schools were optimistic that the redeployment policy. This was especially in terms of the teacher to learner ratios. They also felt that redeployment had positive results on their curricular needs. They were able to offer streams in commerce and science. In many rural and township schools, mathematics, science and commercial subjects are highly sought after, so educators offering them are in demand.

The SADTU site steward said *"teacher to learner ratios will improve the standard of teaching in our schools already deeply stressed by overcrowding... this is time for delivery, I really don't understand what the big deal is about people so scared of the new transformation of schools"* (Interview 23 July:2003). Bringing about successful change would ultimately require a positive reception from teachers however the fear of loss of jobs and intimidation during implementation of the policy remained a reality.

Eight out of the nine respondents interviewed agreed that this policy was long overdue. They were hopeful that the policy would reduce the number of learners to a manageable size. The current situation in these schools, especially when it comes to class size, leaves much to be desired. Further to this educators know the socio-economic situation of schools in rural areas. The roads are bad, classrooms are falling apart, learner support materials are inadequate, and there is no water and sanitation facilities, no accommodation for educators. Also, other public servants such as the nurses and the police have state houses built for them and security is granted by the government. It is for these reasons that redeployment was met with a degree of resistance.

B) Fear of moving to rural areas

Respondents in advantaged schools

In these schools seven out of the nine respondents interviewed criticized redeployment on the basis that the timing was not appropriate. Many educators were redeployed in the third term of the school calendar. This disrupted learning and made educators feel uncertain about their work. One educator said *"We were fortunate that none of us was redeployed, but we had one educator redeployed to our school. She was so upset and just kept to herself. She felt out of place and she got to our school in August. I mean by that time we are revising the syllabi. What did the Department expect her to do here? I mean the learners were also just aloof, the school governing body, you could see that there was some tension...I felt sorry for her. I know what it feels like to be redeployed. I was redeployed from Pietermaritzburg. I fitted in well because I knew two other ladies at the school. But the poor teacher was stressed and after the third term vacation she did not come back..."* (Interview, 20 July 2003).

One aspect of change is that the timing should be good. Educators need to be prepared adequately before they could be transferred. Another aspect is that when redeployment does not take into account the teachers welfare such as marriage, this whole exercise defeats the purpose of family values which the government stands for. It was clear that the educator felt like a scapegoat in a strange environment. It seems that if the teacher was redeployed at the beginning of the school year she could have fitted in well in the new environment, because she would have had time to digest the whole process and prepared herself well. But when educators feel that they are "dumped" in schools, they get depressed and demoralised as illustrated by the respondent's argument. It seems that the policy-makers did not consider the "human factor" in the planning stages.

The respondents in these schools have openly resisted the redeployment policy. One of the main reasons was the impact which redeployment had on family life, especially for female educators. Six out of the nine respondents interviewed complained that government expected them to go to remote rural schools with no basic infrastructure, dilapidated classrooms, no roads, no water, and no electricity. Further to this argument was the issue of safety and security in rural township schools. The educators had not been

to these schools personally, but had learnt about them from learners who commute from these areas into their schools, various media reports, their domestic worker or gardener. To confirm this statement one male educator said ...*"The areas government want us to teach in are danger zones because of political instability in rural areas. There are no reallocation incentives. We are teachers, not migrant workers. We can't just pick up our roots and leave. We are married people and it seems that factor was not considered when this policy was put in place. This is government's problem, always pushing teachers around. We are not going to take this lying down, look at what happened to Mr Karanji, the poor man was redeployed to the Bobhoyi area, the first day, the very first day the scumbags in the area broke into his car, stole his cellphone and stabbed him in the arm. It is not safe...even the police are afraid of that area"* (Interview 20 July: 2003).

The government should have implemented basic infrastructure in rural areas to make them attractive to educators prior to redeployment. Incentives such as hardship allowances could have been implemented in view of proposed changes. These factors should be the motivating factors for teachers to work in rural areas. There is fear of the unknown. Educators held preconceived ideas about rural and urban areas. This being said while many areas are not safe, post 1994 the government did everything in its power to curb party political violence in these areas. Given our historical background in South Africa, it is not surprising that educators were fearful.

Respondents in disadvantaged schools

Some of the respondents in these schools were sceptical of redeployment. According to them, it was not done with a clear plan. To support this statement a female teacher had this to say about redeployment: *"I am the only teacher offering biology in my school, but because I was not the principal's favourite person I was chosen for redeployment. There were six teachers who majored in Zulu, why were they not redeployed? It is not a fair process. The community did not treat me well, either. Because my home was very far, I was obliged to rent a room near the school. One afternoon I came from school and my room was broken into and all my belongings gone. This happened twice. The tsotsis harassed me and intimidated me until I left the area. Even the teachers themselves were*

not sympathetic nor were the governing body members. I was redeployed in the third term. I remember how I cried. I have two small children and am the sole breadwinner. I can only go home over weekends. It's a hard life" (Interview 23 July: 2003).

This statement shows the difficulties educators faced daily during the redeployment procedure. It must be governments mandate to implement incentives. The respondent sounded very demoralised and angry. If a teacher is demoralised she does not perform her best. It also showed that principals were having a tough time between letting some teachers leave the school and choosing who should stay. The educator felt intimidated, because it appears that the principle applied at her school was "last in, first out" at the expense of curricular needs. It does make sense to redeploy an educator with a scarce learning area, because the department will not give the school a teacher of that learning area again. This "last in, first out" was applied in many schools because it was easy and quick. This principle simply means that the educator who was employed last in the department not the school will be the first to go. Many principals applied this principle to save their friends. Sometimes principals were also intimidated by community members who wanted to keep educators at schools even they did not possess the appropriate background. An educator who majored in isiZulu will not be in a position to teach a science subject. Such discrepancies took place when union site stewards were not on site. They were mandated to be the watch dogs and to ensure that the redeployment process was done in a fair manner in schools. For poorer schools the effects of rationalization have sometimes been disastrous. Long serving educators have retained their jobs, often at the expense of better educators or those qualified to teach maths, science and biology.

These sentiments above are echoed by the statement of the SADTU site steward when she said the *"union's role is to ensure that redeployment is not used as a punitive measure to punish teachers. But the union can only intervene once such matters have been brought to our attention. I was part of a task team in this area and know for a fact that some principals had their own agendas when it came to redeploying teachers. There was a case of a principal; I will not give you his name, who rejected a redeployed teacher because the governing body put pressure on him to employ a teacher from the community who did not offer maths. He was teaching Zulu, I mean, really, how can someone who*

teaches Zulu be in a position to teach maths? When the superintendent forced the teacher on the school the principal gave him a tough time. It took the department a year before a teacher could be redeployed to the school, after the maths teacher left” (Interview 20: July 2003).

What the findings revealed was that the redeployed teachers felt rejected by the employer. In many cases they were rejected because of the manner in which they arrived. In most cases their presence at the school meant that someone was effectively retrenched. Principals looked at redeployment with great apprehension, because at some schools it was used as a punitive measure to get rid of problem teachers. One stressed and angry redeployed educator said *“Being redeployed to a school where someone else had been redeployed, one is never at peace. The community; teachers; learners reject you. But at least, where there was a shortage of teachers anyway, you feel a bit welcome because your presence does not mean someone had to be retrenched” (interview 4 July 2003).*

The policy-makers should also take into account that the community know what they want for their children. When they feel an educator was imposed on them they responded negatively.

C) Fear of retrenchment

Respondents in advantaged schools

According to Sikes (1992), educators are in a rather strange position, of being simultaneously both the subject and object of change. Educators are required to change themselves and meet specifications laid down by policy-makers who neither know them nor the contexts in which they work. It was important that when the redeployment policy was implemented extensive consultation between all stakeholders was made in order to ensure there were no misunderstandings.

Seven respondents out of the nine interviewed said that redeployment of teachers was poorly implemented. Fears of retrenchments were real, largely because Resolution 3 of 1996 and Resolution 6 of 1998 clearly stated that teachers who refused to be redeployed must consider themselves retrenched. They were relieved to discover, however, that

redeployment helped them gain learners. They did not have problems of enrolment, as many black learners enrolled at former Model C schools. The initial rationale of redeployment was an equal redistribution of education resources including educators. Government was hopeful that the educators in former model C schools whose expertises were needed would be redeployed to rural schools. The admission policy into former Model C schools increased the number of black learners significantly. The reason was that according to the South African Schools' Act of 1997, Black learners were admitted without the screening process defeating the process at the same time, the 'great trek'. A situation arose whereby instead of former Model C schools losing learners, they gained more learners. The irony is that the staff compositions in these schools remain White while the learners in the majority are Black. The statements made above are echoed by what the following principal had to say about redeployment during the interview:

"As you saw during our break time, many of our teachers are white but our learners are black. We don't have a problem with numbers so my teachers cannot be retrenched or redeployed to other schools" (interview 4 July 2003).

Respondents in disadvantaged schools

Respondents in the disadvantaged areas were very concerned about the dwindling numbers of learners in their schools. One of the respondents said *"Black schools should not have a problem with numbers. Unfortunately there are many factors contributing to this fact. The faction fights in various communities; land restitution; unemployment learners moving to relatives in Durban; child-headed households as a result of HIV/AIDS, high drop-out numbers in schools; high teenage pregnancy rates in all grades at high school and the migration of black learners into former Model C schools because these schools are better resourced in terms of learner support materials these are just some of the contributory factors causing low enrolment in disadvantaged schools. Because of the low numbers in disadvantaged schools many teachers had to be redeployed to other areas."*(Interview 28 July: 2003).

There are many issues that contribute to low enrolment in disadvantaged schools compounded by the better facilities offered to learners in the well resourced schools.

A principal interviewed on the issue of fear of retrenchment, felt *"you feel worthless when you have to declare an educator in excess you find situations where educators gang up on the management of the school instigated by unions, especially that SADTU. This is the time when you are continuously ill, feeling disillusioned and powerless and, if you are diabetic like myself, you are often told by doctors to take it easy. How can you take it easy when your staff members blame you for chasing their friends away? You feel stressed, the staff room politics are running high and the tension is so intense you can cut it with a knife; it's chaos I tell you..."* (Interview 23 July 2003).

The principals feel powerless and felt that the Department of Education should have undertaken this process themselves in order to reduce tension in schools. Principals were not part of the negotiations in the ELRC chamber. Their job was to appraise the educators and implement the policy at schools. Principal after principal spoke out strongly against the policy, which they believe has been poorly managed. Many principals have spent months locked in paperwork battles with department officials in a bid to save their classrooms from being left without educators. Chisholm and Vally (1996) pointed out that lack of communication and clarity on both the goals and the mechanisms of redeployment had led to considerable confusion and anger in schools. Initially, popular perceptions were that, as far as disadvantaged schools were concerned, the policy meant giving schools some relief in terms of ratios and creating more teaching posts. However, the excitement about the policy turned into disappointment, as one principal said:

"We were told to implement it by government as one of its initiatives. As a matter of fact, I delayed and delayed the process...and finally made that decision. My reservations? Is this going to be something that is going to positively do something and have some long-term results or is this another of these morning dew policies that will come out with the present government and be gone again when the sun comes out? What angers me most about this policy is that the work is dumped on the laps of principals. The Department has a human resource section; they can engage in such issues and take the tensions out of schools, because it uses principals to carry out its human resource exercise. This creates

low morale in schools and this is very terrible. You know, in full view of the staff members you have to say Mr So- and- So, sorry this school does not need your services any more. These are the days I just feel like locking myself up and not come to school. This is also the time when high absenteeism at schools are reported because of stress, feeling down and really not knowing what the future entails” (Interview 23 July:2003).

These are the concerns that teachers and principals often voiced about redeployment. Some principals and educators resisted the adoption of the policy. In some instances, they were already operating other policies such as outcomes-based education (OBE). In other instances they resented the legislation that directed them to implement redeployment in schools, as this policy created a lot of tension, depression, anxiety and poor performance among educators in schools.

Educators’ responses to change are almost never uniform within a school, much less within a district or region. In order to understand support for, and resistance to, the adoption of educational change, it is essential that policy- makers pay attention to the social, historical and economic context in which these decisions are made. Individuals formulate perspectives that are driven by societal context and their interaction with externally developed reform models accounts for the tensions and ambiguities that we find in the redeployment process.

PART FIVE: DISCUSSION

Educational change, as alluded to by Sikes, has its origins in various factors such as “global economic trends, historical events, different political parties coming into power, change in government social and cultural development or technological advances” (1992:37).

Fullan claims that “the twenty first century is a time of global competitiveness, and global transformation in education” (1997:83). Given this, “of all the institutions in

society, education is the only one that potentially has the promise of fundamentally contributing to its goal of global competitiveness” (ibid).

With this global perspective in mind, there is value in exploring how rationalization and redeployment processes have unfolded in contexts other than South Africa. Thus, encounters with this policy in Guinea Bissau and Namibia will be presented. The reason behind this choice of examples is that they share common histories. Each is a developing country with a history of colonialism, human rights abuses, are young democracies and are undergoing educational transformation to narrow the gap between rich and poor schools.

5.1 Teacher redeployment in Guinea Bissau

The government of Guinea Bissau approach to rationalization and redeployment was to utilize print media such as newspapers, circulars and magazines as well as mass radio using and television, to advertise and promote the policy. The formation of the policy involved certain parent teacher associations, non governmental organizations and local authorities – all of whom became fully involved in information and awareness campaigns conducted at the grassroots level (USIAD Report 1995). Local authorities were involved because of their role in mobilizing rural communities who faced a lack of teachers. Donor funds from the World Bank and USAID helped to make implementation funds available. An increased number of teachers were trained at the pre-university level to prepare them for eventual redeployment to rural areas.

However, given an illiteracy rate in Guinea Bissau of 41%, the feeling is that the redeployment policy was not well received or appreciated by the communities in the rural areas because some parts of rural Guinea did not receive or understand the information. This means that although radio in Guinea has a great listenership, people were ignorant of the process. Many felt the policy was highly politicised.

According to statistics by Conde (1995:3), an expert on education issues in Africa, there were at least seven thousand teachers at pre-university level on the pay-roll for two

thousand five hundred available classroom jobs. In ratio terms, this implies that there were about three teachers available per class in rural Guinea. It further implies a degree of corruption – especially with the prevalence of ghost teachers (Conde, 1995).

A real set back for the process was that government did not consult teacher unions and other political parties in the initial stage of the policy plan. This resulted in the teachers' reaction being negative. They felt like scapegoats and victimized by a policy imposed upon them by government officials (Conde, 1995).

This was viewed as the biggest mistake of the government of Guinea Bissau. Unions play an important role to mobilize teachers and make them feel part of teacher redeployment and transformation and leaving them out of the process resulted in a lack of teacher buy-in. As Sow (1992) argues, the exclusion of teacher unions from the initial plan for redeployment defeated the whole policy and demonstrated conflict of interests.

One of the lessons learned from the Guinea situation was that it had good objectives for teacher redeployment. However, it should be noted that the policy did not succeed because of the flaws in system. Stakeholders such as teacher unions were not consulted on the matter of redeployment. As a result unions were sceptical and questioned the credibility of the policy. There was corruption in the system which led to unequal distribution of resources, such as ghost teachers. The positive aspect was the massive campaigns through print and mass media to sensitise communities on teacher redeployment policy. Lack of credibility on the part of the spokesperson led to a vote of no confidence in the educational administrators by the community. This could be attributed to corruption

5.2 Teacher redeployment in Namibia

In a somewhat different approach, the Namibian Ministry of Basic Education, Sport and Culture involved the school boards to decide which teachers they wanted, removing tensions out of schools. This being said, Maletsky (2003) an editor on education issues in Namibia, says teacher redeployment policy backfired badly. The Ministry of Education

Sport and Culture involved Namibia National Teachers' Union (NANTU) as the main bargaining union on teacher salaries and excluded The Teacher' Union of Namibia (TUN) from the negotiations. This sparked some reaction from Mr Kapenda, the president of the National Union of Namibian Workers the umbrella body of all unions in Namibia and TUN president Mr Jansen who both expressed some disappointment on the part of government to negotiate in bad faith. They also expressed concern over the lack of consultation before the decision on redeployment and staffing norms was implemented.

This dispute put education in Namibia into disarray. The two unions threatened legal action, delaying the redeployment process. The main concerns for Kapenda and Jansen were the staffing norms implemented without consultation. Maletsky (2003) asserts that the two leaders' anger and frustration was justified because staffing norms are central to the redeployment policy. As was the case in other countries, there was a fear that redeployment would result in job losses. As *The Namibian* reported, "Redeployment should create more teaching jobs not scale them down" (*Namibian* 21 January 2003:3).

The policy of teacher redeployment in Namibia was well intentioned, wishing to reach a balance between poor and rich schools. However, the mechanism applied caused problems for stakeholders especially teacher unions and teachers who were not sure of job security. The inclusion of the teacher unions in negotiations could have had a positive impact on the policy. Negotiations take time but can have positive results and can avoid unnecessary legal action between all stakeholders. This point is demonstrated by the TUN president who said "*We need to wait and see how they (government) deal with the teachers and then start with the action. The Public Service Act says the government has the right to transfer its employees but the Labour Act requires consultation*" (Maletsky 2001:1).

Concerted effort was made by Guinea Bissau, Namibia and South Africa to restructure their Education Ministries. To achieve this objective they all instituted a policy of redeployment amongst their teachers. However it was not a smooth process in any of the cases. For Guinea Bissau and Namibia, many of their problems arose when major

stakeholders were left out of the decision making process. The problems experienced by South Africa included no reliable database system to determine the exact number of teachers to be redeployed. South Africa, like Guinea Bissau, had ghost teachers who manipulated the system and obstructed the redeployment process. In all three countries redeployment was a highly politicised process, as the involvement of teacher unions indicates.

CONCLUSION

The main purpose of this study was to investigate educator perceptions of the policy implementation of rationalization and redeployment. Interviews were held with various participants from both urban and rural areas in and around Port Shepstone and Harding, to determine if their perceptions were consistent with the general feelings toward rationalisation and redeployment. Investigating the same policy in two other countries has highlighted some of the same difficulties encountered in the South African context.

What emerged was that discussion of rationalization and redeployment raised anger, fear, disappointment and uncertainty among educators. The following main points in this discussion were: teacher to learner ratios; fear of moving to rural areas; fear of retrenchment; specific aspects of Resolution 3 of 1996 and Resolution 6 of 1998; the reaction of SGB's to the policy implementation challenges; and the reaction or the involvement by the Unions.

The policy of rationalization and redeployment was well intentioned by the South African Department of Education. As the policy theory reiterated, a good policy needs to involve all the stakeholders in order to ensure successful implementation. In the South African case, there were debates, discussions and bargaining sessions dedicated to the policy the Education Labour Relations Council. The issue of teacher to pupil ratios was used as the measuring stick to equalize education, with teachers being trained and retrained to ensure equity. The agreements reached between teacher unions and the employer would hopefully narrow the gap between the advantaged and disadvantaged schools. Redeployment had helped many teachers who were redeployed to achieve growth in

teaching as many teachers were promoted to senior positions within rural schools. Further to this, many schools in rural and township were able to introduce science and commercial streams in their schools - a big boost for rural communities.

However, there were serious obstacles to successful implementation. To start with the department did not have a convincing database system to know how many teachers it had. Early retirement packages were granted to teachers with high demand subjects such as mathematics and science. Sadly, the Education Department realised that the implementation of the early retirement had drained them of vital skills and expertise (Provincial Review Report, 1997). Most of the senior educators who were close to retiring age took the package. In many instances they were members of the school management team. Compounding the problem was that the department did not have a reliable database of educators to be redeployed to rural and township areas. Such situations created a healthy environment for ghost teachers. Thus, financial problems plagued the system.

Areas where teachers had to be redeployed had no basic infrastructure. Government had no rural allowance and reallocation costs for teachers to be redeployed to make it attractive for them. Additional problems unfolded as redeployment took place at the beginning of the third term. This created problems as teachers were busy with revision and preparing for year end examination. Teacher unions threatened mass action and accused the government of negotiating in bad faith. Many teachers in the former model C schools opted for early retirement packages and opened their own independent schools around the country. These were the same teachers who government hoped they would transfer their skills to needy areas. Thus, the success of the policy of redeployment is not immediately obvious given that many former model C schools are still advantaged and disadvantaged schools are still disadvantaged.

Conflicting ideologies are often the source of educator's divergent responses to such change. For example, educators' who find that their ideologies are consistent with the proposed restructuring often support it, whereas those who find their ideologies are

inconsistent with it may actively or passively resist the change (Bailey, 2000). For Huberman (1989) and Datnow (2000), policy and response to reform education can also correlate with teachers' personal characteristics, such as age or career stage, gender, or race and culture. Much of this was revealed in the different responses to redeployment expressed by teachers at "advantaged" and "disadvantaged" schools.

Some of the steps to the long road of restructuring education in South Africa have been presented. The aim of this research has been to examine critically recent changes in South Africa's educational system, with special reference to the rationalization and redeployment policy. It appears that this process of restructuring will not be met with unanimous agreement among all stakeholders. Policy makers should be prepared to build a context for discussion and a capacity to implement the change. Whether the change is teacher-driven or government-mandated, everyone will not be in agreement with adoption, nor welcome the pressure to change. The success of change will weigh heavily on a school system's ability to communicate and negotiate concerns among all those involved.

Decades of injustice in Education cannot be corrected by a single policy over a period of two to five years. A policy such as rationalization and redeployment needed to be implemented gradually, with support systems put in place before implementation could take place. Given the policy theory presented in the first part of this research, it becomes apparent that many aspects of policy formation and implementation were not approached ideally in the case of rationalization and deployment in the South African context. Nonetheless, the move to address educational inequalities in this context offers hope that the process is recognized as necessary and that the government will continue in its endeavour to improved education for all South Africans.

Appendix A

16 June 2003

The Principal

Dear-----

REFERENCE: REQUEST TO INTERVIEW EDUCATORS AT YOUR SCHOOL.

I am a student at the University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg. In partial fulfilment of the requirements for a Masters of Social Science (Policy and Development Studies), I have to do a research on Educator perceptions of the implementation of the rationalization and redeployment policy in KwaZulu -Natal. I would like to ask for permission to interview the principal and three other educators in your school to determine their position on the policy. These interviews will be conducted when it is convenient for the school so that there will be no interference with the school lessons. I would appreciate it if you can accommodate me on the 2003 at a time that is suitable for you.

Thank you

Yours sincerely

TN Tshabalala

Appendix- B

These questions serve as an interview guide for educators in the selected schools.

1. What is your understanding of the rationalization and redeployment policy?
2. Did you or your representative participate in the drafting of the policy on rationalization and redeployment? Explain how.
3. The policy of rationalization and redeployment was to ensure equity and redress in education. What is your opinion?
4. After the implementation of the rationalization and redeployment policy, what do you make of the objectives?
5. What was the course for rationalization and redeployment affecting African schools mostly?
6. What procedure was used in identifying excess educators?
7. In your opinion, was this procedure done fairly? Please explain.
8. What influence did the redeployment of educators have on your curriculum?
9. Do you think redeployment is over now? What reasons can you give?
10. Do you think rationalization and redeployment has created equity in education?
11. What effect did rationalization and redeployment have on teacher morale?
12. What role did the unions play in the redeployment of educators?

In the case where I happen to interview redeployed educators, I will ask follow -up questions:

1. How did redeployment affect your life?
2. What was the reaction of the educators and learners at your releasing school?
3. What was the attitude of educators and learners at your receiving school?
4. Did the employer pay for relocation costs?
5. Why were you reluctant to go to that particular school?
6. What do you think government should do to make outlying (rural) schools attractive to educators?

Questions for the school manager/principal

1. As a school manager, what were your concerns (worries) about the policy of redeployment?
2. How did you feel when you had to tell your excess educators to go?
3. How did the policy affect your curricular needs?
4. What challenges did you encounter when implementing redeployment at your school?
5. How did you respond to these challenges?
6. In your opinion, did the policy achieve its objectives?
7. What were the loopholes in the policy?
8. What was the rationale behind the rationalization and redeployment policy?
9. If you were part of the policy-making process at national level, what would you have done differently to best enhance the policy of rationalization and redeployment at South African schools?

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