

**CORRUPTION AND PATRONAGE IN POST-COLONIAL SUB-SAHARAN  
AFRICA: AN AFROCENTRIC ETHICAL CRITIQUE**

**By**

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## **ABSTRACT**

Corruption has become one of the worrying plagues that affect political and socio-economic conditions of nations globally. Sub-Saharan Africa is one of the regions that is adversely affected by the effects of this menace. Even though corruption has attracted a lot of scholarship in the region, less attention has been paid to the role of political patronage and entitlement ethos on corruption prevalence. As a result, this thesis argues that the symbiotic relationship between political patronage and a strong sense of entitlement by politicians leads to endemic corruption in the region. The study adopts conceptual analysis method whereby corruption, patronage and entitlement are critically analysed. These concepts are analysed in the context of the struggle politics that characterised the transition from colonialism to post-colonialism and entitlement ethos portrayed by the national liberation movements that became governments.

In order to establish the influence of patronage and entitlement on corruption, the study addresses various concerns. The key concerns include ascertaining the role of political patronage towards pervasive corruption in the governments of post-colonial sub-Saharan African countries, the metamorphosis of corrupt culture by the ruling liberation parties into entitlement ethos and the determination of the role that African ethics can play towards proffering a tenable and contextually relevant basis for critiquing corruption in the region. To respond to these concerns, the study established a conceptual interface between corruption and patronage. The study also traced how corruption became a corollary of weak colonial governments' institutions, which were later inherited by independent governments. The study argues that from a monopolistic sense of legitimacy that characterised national liberation movements' the political culture of entitlement has led to endemic corruption. Governments of former liberation movements have exhibited these characteristics through their dictatorial, predatory and entitlement political culture as a means of preserving their purported exclusive right to rule.

In the light of the above observations, it is concluded that the manner in which political patronage and entitlement ethos were exercised by the national liberation movements that became governments have led to endemic corruption. African ethics is therefore adopted as the relevant critical tool upon which corruption and the ethos of entitlement in the sub-Saharan African region are critiqued. Based on its contextual relevance and ability to prioritize the wellbeing of the community above individual self-interest, African ethics has a potential to

provide a tenable basis for anti-corruption discourse in the region and thus inform effective anti-corruption strategies.

## **KEY TERMS**

African Ethics, Ethics, Clientelism, Colonialism, Corruption, Entitlement, Liberation Credentials, National Liberation Movement, Neo-colonialism, Patronage, Political Patronage, Post-colonialism, sub-Saharan Africa, *Ubuntu*.

## **DEDICATION**

I dedicate this study to the Glory of the Source of existence from which mine proceeds.

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

|         |   |
|---------|---|
| ACA     | Anti-Corruption Authority/Agency  |
| ANC     | African National Congress   |
| BEE     | Black Economic Empowerment  |
| CPI     | Corruption perception Index   |
| CPP     | Convention People's Party   |
| DA      | Democratic Alliance   |
| EAC     | East African Community  |
| EU      | European Union  |
| FDI     | Foreign Direct Investment   |
| FRELIMO | <i>Frente de Libertação de Moçambique</i> (Mozambique Liberation Front) |
| GDP     | Gross Domestic Product  |
| HDI     | Human Development Index   |
| HDR     | Human Development Report  |
| IMF     | International Monetary Fund   |
| KANU    | Kenya African National Union  |
| LCD     | Less Developed Country  |
| LHC     | Lancaster House Constitution  |
| MDC     | Movement for Democratic Change  |
| MMD     | Movement for Multi-party Democracy                                      |
| MNC     | Multinational Company   |
| MP      | Member of Parliament  |

|         |   |
|---------|---|
| MPLA    | <i>Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola</i> (The People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola) |
| NFP     | Nigeria Police Force  |
| NLM     | National Liberation Movement  |
| NGO     | Non-governmental Organisation   |
| OECD    | Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)  |
| PS      | Principal Secretary   |
| SAP     | Structural Adjustment Programme   |
| SWAPO   | South West African People's Organisation  |
| TI      | Transparency International  |
| UN      | United Nations  |
| UNDP    | United Nations Development Programme  |
| ZANU    | Zimbabwe African National Union   |
| ZANU-PF | Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front   |

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## **CHAPTER ONE: GENERAL INTRODUCTION**

### **1.1 Background to the Research Problem**

Pervasiveness of corruption is acknowledged as a global problem though some parts of the world are more affected by this phenomenon than others. African countries below the Sahara are some of those that are severely affected by corruption and are perennially grappling to come up with mechanisms to eliminate its prevalence. The way corruption has been conceptualized and dealt with in sub-Saharan Africa has largely been influenced by the principal-agent model of combating corruption. This model puts more emphasis on effective accountability mechanisms whereby the principals in the public service have to hold the agents accountable in order to deter corrupt practices. It is on the basis of this approach that corruption discourse in sub-Saharan Africa is underpinned by the assumption that it is an abuse of public office for private gain. Mbaku (1996: 99) endeavours to unveil how corruption permeates the public sector systems in Africa through venal public officials who abuse the powers vested in their offices as a way of increasing their remuneration.

However, the nexus between corruption, patronage and entitlement ethos in postcolonial sub-Saharan African countries has not been critically explored. It is this relationship that the researcher takes interest in with a view to establish how it engenders endemic corruption in sub-Saharan African countries. Critical analysis of this relationship ought to establish how client-patron relationship in the political setting often leads to entitlement ethos whereby the ruling political leaders and their parties advance exclusivist political participation under the claim that they are the only ones who have got the legitimacy to rule. Even though political patronage is deemed an essential instrument used by political parties in order to enjoy optimal control over the public policy (Sorauf, 1959: 116), when it is mainstreamed into an environment that lacks robust systems it leads to discriminatory practices mirrored in a strong sense of entitlement by political patrons and their clients. It is on this basis that I intend to demonstrate that pervasive corruption in governments in sub-Saharan Africa has its roots in cultural and political practices that are mainly carried out through patronage, which is often exacerbated by a political attitude of a strong sense of entitlement.

With particular reference to the liberation movements, especially those found in the Southern Africa, that became governments after the demise of the colonial era, I argue that soon after their ascendancy into government leadership these movements betrayed the promises that they made during the struggle for independence. Against what they have suffered for, they emerged as neoliberal and capitalist political elites in pursuit of wealth under their unwavering legitimacy to rule (Melber, 2009, Melber, 2002, Asiimwe, 2013). Thus, these political elites employed political patronage to place their allies into key positions of their governments' institutions without following the competency-based logic. They also indulged in explicitly corrupt activities as means of amassing wealth for themselves (Asiimwe, 2013: 131). It is from their entitlement claim to rule that they do not accommodate any form of opposition to political power. This practice has positioned them to be political monopolists, with absolute powers on their state resources, institutions and opportunities.

Some evidence about the prevalence of corruption in sub-Saharan Africa is provided in the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) by Transparency International (TI), which shows four sub-Saharan countries (Botswana 61%, Seychelles 60%, Rwanda 55% and Namibia 51%) scoring above 50%, where 100% portrays a clean country and 0% portrays a very corrupt country (Transparency International, 2017). The rest of sub-Saharan African countries scored below 50%, thus depicting the region to be the one mostly affected by corruption globally. Endemic corruption in the region points to a reality that corruption is entangled in the prevailing social fabric and governance dynamics. This becomes the case because corruption cannot be endemic in an environment where the society abhors it and government policies effectively denounce it, thus making it hard for the public officials to harbour it.

Rife corruption in sub-Saharan Africa is also structurally based. The existing structures of the sub-Saharan governments, which were inherited from the colonial regimes, continue to perpetuate corruption in diverse forms. According to Mulinge and Lesetedi (1998: 15) the colonizers systematically used material inducements to lure the chiefs and administrators to collaborate in their projects that were meant to dominate and exploit the natives. This approach degenerated into the divide and rule strategy and it worked for the colonizers because the natives who resisted colonial rule were destined to face the wrath of the favoured clique. What is

surprising is that even sub-Saharan post-colonial regimes did not replace weak government institutions that they inherited from their erstwhile leaders with robust and contextually relevant institutions.

On the other hand, corruption prevalence in sub-Saharan Africa attracted various initiatives that have been in place for more than two decades to help the region overcome this phenomenon. The majority, if not all, of these initiatives were driven by international financial institutions, mainly the World Bank and the International Monetary Foundation (IMF) as well as the international Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs). Anti-corruption approaches advanced by these organisations did not pay much attention to corruption as a cultural phenomenon since they only focused on the principal-agent model of combating corruption. This oversight rendered their anti-corruption initiatives irrelevant to the sub-Saharan context. Consequently, their success towards reducing corruption prevalence was insignificant (Persson *et al*, 2010: 2; De Sousa, 2009: 11).

It is from the failure of imported anti-corruption approaches in the sub-Saharan African countries that I argue that the influence of patron-client relationship in corrupt practices has been overlooked. I also argue that corruption is a cultural phenomenon and as such there is no one-size-fits-all remedy for it in different contexts. Thus, the anti-corruption approaches anchored in the principal-agent corruption model (Klitgaard, 1988) are inherently deficient towards deterring corruption prevalence in high context cultures such as those found in sub-Saharan Africa. The issue of contextually detached approach in fighting against corruption is made clear by De Graff (2007: 39) who asserts that “[t]he more we know about the causes of corruption, the better we can decide which policy instruments to use to combat corruption.” De Graff continues to contend that “we need more contextual corruption research; many current studies lack contingency” (De Graff, 2007: 39). This observation points to the futility of anti-corruption strategies that ignore the context within which corruption is taking place.

In the face of corruption hardships in sub-Saharan Africa, I turn to African ethics, anchored in *Ubuntu*, as a tenable approach to critique corrupt practices by emphasizing contextually appealing moral values to Africans in the region. The value of African ethics towards

engendering a plausible ethical approach in the sub-Saharan African context is premised on the critique of corruption as a moral problem. On the basis of corruption being a moral problem, anti-corruption approaches ought to be undergirded by contextually relevant moral values. The significance of this study lies in a clear understanding and application of contextually meaningful moral values that will lead to informed classification of certain practices as corrupt and others as not. In this way, we will avoid an imported and detached blanket approach to anti-corruption. This approach will also enable anti-corruption agencies in the region to come up with contextual discourse that will meaningfully engage Africans in all spheres of life. It is also worth noting that since corruption and its adverse effects have plagued the sub-Saharan region, there has never been any comprehensive study that aims to make African ethics a tenable approach underpinning anti-corruption approaches in the region. As already indicated, this study will be confined to sub-Saharan African countries because of their strong sense of belonging and relatedness mirrored in their communal way of life. However, as I shall explain in detail in chapter six, this should not be misconstrued to mean that the sub-Saharan African countries share the same culture. There are overtly different cultures in the region, but there are also common values in these cultures, hence warranting the African ethical approach to critique corruption.

## **1.2 Literature Review**

It is noted from the beginning that there are different schools of thought on corruption discourse. The two prominent schools of thought analyse corruption from the developmental and cultural perspectives. Under the former, corruption emergence was first attributed to a country's stage of development (Montinola and Jackman, 2002:148). It is from this perspective that around the 1960s corruption was deemed to be entangled in the process of modernisation and thus was deemed to characterise the maturation process in developing countries (Pillay, 2004:589, Huntington, 1968:59). Huntington justifies corruption as a corollary of modernization on three premises. Firstly, modernization involves change in the value system of a society, thereby leading to corruption as conflict takes place between modern and traditional values; secondly, modernization brings with it new sources of wealth and power which are not well defined and integrated into the society; lastly, modernization encourages corruption through overburdening the political system with many operations and demanding high output (Huntington, 1968: 59-61).

It is from the modernization perspective of corruption that the revisionists approach took the centre stage. Revisionists maintain the thesis that corruption should not be discredited purely on unfounded moral and uncritical analysis. Leff (1964: 10-11) justifies the utility of corruption by arguing, among others, on how it can improve efficiency and help entrepreneurs to circumvent incapacitating government policies. By giving a pragmatic approach to corruption, the revisionists argue that it is impossible to avoid corruption. It is on similar basis that corruption, mainly through the payment of bribes, is referred to as a lubricant that makes government machinery to operate efficiently, thus becoming an impetus to economic growth (Tella, 2013: 51). In environments where the revisionists approach to corruption prevails, corruption is mainstreamed into service delivery processes as a justified practice.

Against the revisionist view, the moralists advance the argument that corruption is inimical to economic and development (Bardhan, 1997: 1327-8, Awojobi, 2014: 3). From the exponents of a moralist view, corruption is construed as corrosive in different sectors. Among many insidious effects of corruption on development, the common ones seem to be the decreased private investment and increased government expenditure (Awojobi, 2014: 3). Investors' trust vanishes where bribes are solicited even before they can establish their companies or during the operations of such companies. Government expenditure soars in situations where project budgets are deliberately mismanaged and budgets inflated in order to benefit the officers in charge. In the conviction that corruption is corrosive, Paolo Mauro gives the following empirically informed justification:

I find that corruption lowers private investment, thereby reducing economic growth, even in subsamples of countries in which bureaucratic regulations are very cumbersome. The negative association between corruption and investment, as well as growth, is significant, both in a statistical and in an economic sense. For example, if Bangladesh were to improve the integrity and efficiency of its bureaucracy to the level of that of Uruguay (this corresponds to a one-standard-deviation increase in the bureaucratic efficiency index introduced in the next section), its investment rate would rise by almost five percentage points, and its yearly GDP growth rate would rise by over half a percentage point (Mauro, 1995: 683).

This quotation presents corruption as an unsustainable means of conducting business and operating government machinery. It is also considered a leading causal factor towards a reduced government budget on education and health, while also threatening tax collections and hampering foreign direct investment (FDI) because it operates as illicit tax (Economakis et al, 2010: 15).

On the other hand, the cultural approach emphasises how corruption becomes an off-shoot of cultural practices. This is explained by Montinola and Jackman who argue that “corruption stems from social norms that emphasize gift-giving and loyalty to family or clan, rather than the rule of law” (Montinola and Jackman, 2002: 148). Under the influence of cultural and traditional values, some activities that are purported to be universally corrupt are justified as being worthy of pursuit. It is against this background that cultural relativism gained a more crucial role as an appropriate theory to be employed when dealing with corruption discourse.

Different views expressed by the two schools of thought on corruption conspicuously stand out. Some activities that are classified as corrupt under the developmental approach can be condoned under the cultural approach. Employing one’s cronies in the public sector is deemed corrupt and counterproductive under the moralist perspective while it may be encouraged as promoting good relations anchored in trust under the cultural perspective.

Patronage-client relations are integral to the cultural approach to corruption. Despite its origin from the primitive peasantry communities and its wide usage in social anthropology discipline (Weingrod, 1968: 377), patronage is also used in politics to denote asymmetrical relations between a political leader or a party and the supporters. Weingrod sheds more clarity on the implication of this relationship under a political purview by positing that:

In patronage, the transactor (patron) has the power to give some benefit which the respondent (client) desires... Examples of this would be the improvement of a road near the respondent's house, or the employment of the respondent (or his relative) in an office over which the (patron) has control. The number and extent of such benefits naturally vary with the power of the (patron); but even the most influential is unlikely to please everyone who comes to him... He must therefore husband these

direct patronage transactions so that they produce linkages with key people who can bring followers with them (Weingrod, 1968: 377).

As a political tool that consolidates a political party and sustains a leader at the helm of government, patronage becomes a reliable political currency. As a result, political patronage is widely used by politicians across the globe, in both established and crawling democracies. This also suggests that it leads to different political outcomes, depending on the democratic maturity of a country.

The Liberation movements that became governments in post-colonial sub-Saharan Africa relied on political patronage in many ways. They used patronage to make placements in key and strategic government institutions. For example, political patronage became instrumental under the African National Congress (ANC)-led government in South Africa and was epitomised by cronyism in the allocation of jobs and other government opportunities (Southall, 2014b: 343). Instrumentality of political patronage is epitomised in its ability to enhance political elites' leverage on key institutions of government so that they enjoy unrestricted powers within their states. The employment of political patronage in post-colonial sub-Saharan Africa coincided with complex politics of liberation movements that ushered in authoritative regimes led by the liberation parties. Southall chronicles manifestations of authoritative and dictatorial rule by liberation parties that became governments in Southern Africa by arguing that "from the moment of taking power, liberation movements have used their domination of the political arena in a manner which often belies the commitment to constitutional democracy and which significantly shifts the balance of powers in favour of the executive," (Southall, 2014a: 86). The centralisation of power to executive by the ruling liberation parties was a political tact intended to thwart any form of opposition. Suttner (2014a: 4) posits that the authoritative and undemocratic traits of liberation parties are attributable to their struggle process, which was not about nurturing democratic principles but specifically focussed on overcoming colonialism. This also explains why there were various deficits on governance by these parties when they formed governments. Suttner also highlights that liberation movements considered attainment of power as an end in itself not as a means to promoting more democratic and participatory societies. On this shortfall, Suttner asserts that:

Another feature that may characterise liberation movements is their conception of power and transition. It is a model partly influenced by Marxism-Leninism, but may exist without that influence. It sees acquisition of power as the decisive and sometimes final moment when liberation is achieved. As Nkrumah put it, 'Seek ye first the political kingdom, and all else will follow'. The various liberation movements, pursuing armed struggle or peaceful handovers, all focused on a moment when power would be transferred (Suttner, 2014a: 7).

Equating power acquisition from their erstwhile colonial masters with liberation was proved to be inherently deficient towards delivering good governance to the citizens. Against this background, Southall (2014b: 334) contends that although these parties have successfully replaced the colonial and apartheid regimes, they have not honoured their promise of procuring a genuine national liberation. Although their role is quite significant in ending colonialism, these liberation movements failed to deliver on their promised programmes. Their underperformance was also catalysed by corruption which was gradually creeping in.

In an attempt to conceptualize corruption in postcolonial sub-Saharan Africa, academics in the region and beyond have produced a plethora of literature on corruption, but research uptake towards informing policy direction on curbing corruption is still wanting. It is from expressed dismay on poor performance on politics and socio-economic factors that Moyo (2009) asks the following rhetoric questions:

Why is it that Africa alone among the continents of the world seems to be locked into a cycle of dysfunction? Why is it that out of all the continents in the world Africa seems unable to convincingly get its foot on the economic ladder? Why in a recent survey did seven out of the top ten 'failed states' hail from that continent? Are Africa's people universally more incapable? Are its leaders genetically more venal, more ruthless, and more corrupt? Are its policy makers more innately feckless? What is it about Africa that holds it back, which seems to render it incapable of joining the rest of the globe in the twenty-first century? (Moyo, 2009: 187).

Although these questions attract various responses, I argue that most of Africa's grieves are attributable to the venality and corruption of her leaders. Despite the fact that Moyo blames this Continent's setbacks to foreign aid, I argue that it is in the fifth question from the list that most of African countries' problems ensue. African political leaders opt for patronage-client relationship

and nepotistic favours as reliable conduits towards seizing and maintaining themselves in the positions of power. It is from this kind of segregating relationship that political leader's clients have leverage to state resources and opportunities. As it is, this kind of relationship entrenches institutionalized corruption because clients are favoured against fellow citizens who may be in possession of requisite competencies needed to advance the programmes of the government of the day.

The emerging political elite from liberation parties started to yield to the influence of neo-liberal agenda and transformed themselves into capitalist bourgeoisies driven by wealth accumulation ethos, while their fellow citizens faced utter poverty (Southall, 2014b: 334). The political elites' insatiable desire for wealth was advanced through claimed entitlement legitimacy under which they considered themselves irreplaceable by virtue of purported embodiment of national unity. By relating their struggle history, these politicians claimed legitimacy to rule and as such, all opposed views to their policies were deemed unlawful and immoral (Southall, 2013: 6). This strategy became the basis of the entitlement ethos by emerging political elites in post-colonial sub-Saharan African countries. The statements like "ANC [the African National Congress] will rule until Jesus Christ returns" by former President of South Africa, Jacob Zuma (Prince Mashele, 2008), and "as clear as day follows night...ZANU-PF [the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front] will rule in Zimbabwe forever. There is no other party besides ours that will rule this country," by former President of Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe (Muvingi, 2008: 86), are claims of legitimacy that undergird entitlement by political elites.

Frantz Fanon is one prominent scholar who presented revolution betrayal by liberation movements and their elites in categorical terms. With reference to their hunger for riches and their lack of capacity as characterising their regimes, Fanon argues that:

The national middle class which takes over power at the end of the colonial regime is an underdeveloped middle class. It has practically no economic power, and in any case it is in no way commensurate with the bourgeoisie of the mother country which it hopes to replace. In its narcissism, the national middle class is easily convinced that it can advantageously replace the middle class of the mother country (Fanon, 1974: 122).

It is from the emergence of the neo-liberal and capitalist traits by the political elites in the sub-Saharan African region that they prioritised wealth accumulation above the socialist ideals that they preached during the struggle. It is upon such ideals that they based the notion of national unity, which became one of the appealing symbols that brought people together to support liberation parties. It is from the betrayed liberation ideals in the region that this study seeks to contribute to the extant literature by arguing that political patronage became a reliable sustenance instrument that metamorphosed into the politics of entitlement by the political elites in the region. It is from the overtly expressed political entitlement statements and sometimes from covert political practices that excluded the majority of the citizens that corruption crept in and prevailed.

### **1.3 Research Objectives**

This study is intended to investigate the nexus between corruption and political patronage in post-colonial governments in sub-Saharan Africa. It therefore seeks to establish how patronage became instrumental for the post-independent political leaders to secure their power and how the corrupt culture emerging from liberation movements that became governments escalated into entitlement ethos. Premised on this broad purpose, the study is specifically intended to meet the following objectives (and adequately respond to the related research questions):

- a) To ascertain the role of political patronage towards pervasive corruption in post-colonial sub-Saharan African governments.
- b) To establish how the corrupt culture of the ruling liberation parties metamorphosed into entitlement ethos.
- c) To establish how African ethics can proffer a tenable and contextually relevant basis for critiquing corruption in sub-Saharan Africa.

### **1.4 Research Questions**

- a) How has political patronage contributed towards pervasive corruption in post-colonial sub-Saharan African governments?

- b) How does the corrupt culture by the ruling liberation parties transmute into entitlement ethos?
- c) What role can African ethics play to proffer a tenable and contextually relevant basis for critiquing corruption in sub-Saharan Africa?

### **1.5 Theoretical Framework**

This section of the thesis is dedicated to explain the major theories that will form the basis of the arguments and discussions that are raised in the study. According to Adom *et al*, “[t]he theoretical framework guides and should resonate with every aspect of the research process from the definition of the problem, literature survey, methodology, presentation and discussion of the findings as well as the conclusions that are drawn” (Adom *et al*, 2018: 438). Thus, a theoretical framework guides and informs almost every section of a research in order to maintain coherence throughout. Garver identifies three characteristics of the best theory as “explanatory, integrative, and heuristic” (Garver, 2008: 63). Under a good choice of theories, that meet the three characteristics, a researcher has a leverage to advance more logically appealing arguments and to ultimately draw informed inferences and recommendations.

This study is conducted under the auspices of the four theories namely, cultural relativism, patronage, entitlement and African ethics. The choice of these theories is based on their ability to point out that in as much as there are common values across human societies, there are still conspicuous different value systems peculiar to each society; this negates a tendency to give a universalised worldview to reality. The study largely adopts cultural relativism as a major theory because social ills such as corruption can be meaningfully dealt with within the context which they are manifested. However, patronage theory is also important towards ascertaining dyadic relations that characterise relationships between politicians and their clients in the sub-continent. Also, entitlement theory will play a significant towards informing the discussion on how political leaders claim their exclusivist legitimacy to govern. The fact that I will critique corruption under the African ethics lens implies a possibility of substantial differences between western worldview and African worldview on ethics. The latter has just undergone a refinery process, if it is not still undergoing the process, with African philosophers and ethicists taking the lead. This also alludes to the fact that cultural relativism plays a crucial role in the conceptualisation of ethics across different societies and regions.

### 1.5.1 Cultural Relativism

That we are shaped by culture and become products of culture cannot be countered on rational basis. Culture is so powerful that we consciously, at times unconsciously, subscribe to its value systems. Thus, we are perpetually touched and moulded by our cultures. In attesting to the vital role of culture in our lives, Son (2001: 9) remarks that “[c]ulture is what we collectively create at the same time, what we are determined by; we are our own masters at the same time slaves of our own creations.” It is also important to note that even if we feel so content with our cultural values and practices we should not misconstrue them to be universally applicable (*Ibid*). Above all, it is wrong to impose one’s cultural practices on others. Each culture should be understood as constituting an intact social worldview that transmits its values from generation to generation through enculturation (Brown, 2008: 364).

The differences in cultural practices are also overtly displayed in different beliefs and moral standards. However, this should be misunderstood to imply that there are no universally binding values. For instance, the concept ‘murder’ is universally wrong and cannot be morally justified under different moral value systems. There are also a number of human experiences that reflect that some reality is perceived similarly and this is justified by the feelings such as shame, which imply that human beings do not want to be humiliated but enjoy being recognized (Lazari-Pawłowska, 1970: 578). However, it is important to note that things that make people feel shameful or lead to their recognition may vary according to societies. Ulin (2007: 805) gives a more plausible and ethical account of cultural relativism that “[w]hile the emphasis on ethical relativism as descriptive is the "factual" association of values with particular cultures, ethical relativism as prescriptive asserts that we cannot determine which values across cultures are superior because all values are relative to particular cultures.” This implies that even when certain values are commonly upheld, there is no legitimate superior culture that should enjoy the monopoly of prescribing values to other cultures because values are relative to each culture. It is also important to underscore that even in dealing with social ills such as corruption it is not morally justifiable to impose one’s values on other cultures, because this risks initiating interventions that are destined to fail. This also makes it imperative that the advancement of the global initiatives such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Millennium Development

Goals, and currently the Sustainable Development Goals should take into profound considerations the cultural differences existing between the United Nations (UN) Members States. Although it sounds ideal to have universally applicable values and to push towards global governance, the differences between societies obstinately resist and cannot just be overlooked. In fact, the idea of dismantling these differences is not feasible, at least for the foreseeable future.

### 1.5.2 Patronage-client Theory

This theory postulates dyadic and asymmetrical relations between the members of a society. Those who enjoy relative plenty and represent the affluent members of a society become patrons of those impoverished members, who in turn become the clients. It is purported that the concept patronage was first explored by social anthropologists as implying relationships of persons in different classes which are characterised by inequality (Weingrod, 1968: 378). Weingrod goes on to posit that “landowners are the classic instance of the "patron", while the peasants who rent their land are the typical anthropological "clients” (Weingrod, 1968: 378). The bond is strengthened by a patron’s capacity to supply and protect the clients, while the clients ought to reciprocate by their submissiveness and disposal to the patron. Both of them, the patron and the client, exchange mutually valued services (Bearfield, 2009: 67).

By virtue of emphasising asymmetrical but yet reciprocal relationship, the concept patronage also became instrumental in politics. Political patronage attracted a lot of scholarly attention, thereby overshadowing its primary meaning in social anthropology. As a political currency, political patronage is used to induce voters to support a political party (Wilson, 1961: 371). It is also commonly practised through political clientelism whereby employment in the government departments and public sector as a whole is treated as a preserve for the ruling political party members. Still following the same calculus of rewarding the ruling political party strongholds and its members, concerted effort is taken to make the members primary beneficiaries of developmental projects. As such, political patronage becomes prone to abuse by politicians in sub-Saharan Africa. It becomes a springboard of different forms of corruption, as some patron-based favours are carried out only to reward the clients without considering merit, competence or capacity.

### 1.5.3 Entitlement

Entitlement is one of the theories that ought to be critically discussed as corruption in sub-Saharan African countries is systemically orchestrated under its auspices. According to Paul Harvey and Mark Martinko (2009: 459) entitlement refers to a phenomenon in which individuals are adamant that they deserve preferential rewards and treatment without considering any performance achievement. The theory of entitlement is advanced by Robert Nozick under the three approaches that focus on acquisition of holdings, just transfer of holdings, and rectification (Davis, 1976: 836). The underlying factor in Nozick entitlement theory is that one is entitled to property if it was acquired through just means; entitlement is also due if there had been fair and just transfer of property; lastly, rectification may be necessary in cases where acquisition or transfer of property did not follow just procedures (Davis, 1976: 836). Although Nozick's account of entitlement encountered a lot of criticism, he endeavoured to provide absolute conditions upon which entitlement can be justly claimed.

Another observation under the entitlement theory is that people are convinced that they deserve certain benefits or treatment solely by virtue of being members of a particular group or society. Rosenthal and Pittinsky (2006: 620) posit that this approach can lead to a strong sense of entitlement, thus promoting corruption and self-centeredness among the leaders. Such leaders always consider themselves deserving some compensation and rewards and want their demands to be met at all cost.

A sense of entitlement by some war veterans and other citizens who underwent the struggle of ousting colonialism in sub-Sahara often becomes so extreme that entitlement claimants only focus on accumulating wealth from their countries' resources for themselves and their cronies without regard to their fellow citizens. Rosenthal and Pittinsk (2006: 620) warn that an extreme sense of entitlement can easily degenerate into narcissism, thereby leading entitlement claimants to advance selfish demands that are exclusively aimed at benefiting themselves. It also suggests that entitlement directly engenders and perpetuates corruption in the public sector. Self-aggrandizement becomes all that matters and is pursued at all costs.

#### 1.5.4 African Ethics

The major arguments of this thesis are based on African ethics which in turn is based on commonly encountered and upheld values representing the sub-Saharan ethical thought, which considers relationality as a fundamental basis of morality (Metz, 2012b: 388). This view on African ethics is also shared by Prozesky (2009: 4) that African ethics stems from moral traditions of black African cultures below the Sahara. In the light of these assertions, it is reasonable to argue African ethics has the capacity to provide a morally plausible basis upon which the contextually relevant anti-corruption reforms can be established.

African traditions are many and vary materially. Notwithstanding clear differences between African traditions, there are noticeable commonalities in African value systems. The shared value systems are manifested through reverence of human-centered values such as compassion, dignity and harmony (Nausbaum, 2009: 100-101). The concept *Ubuntu* is deemed to encapsulate all the values that underpin African ethics. Cletus Andoh insightfully captures this concept that: “[t]he philosophy of Ubuntu is basically an indigenous philosophy of social existence that defines the relationship that ought to obtain between members of the society. The distinguishing features of this philosophy are its welfarism, altruism, universalism ...” (Andoh, 2016). In the same way, Ramose (1998: 231) asserts that Ubuntu affirms humanness through recognition of the humanity of others from which harmonious relations take root.

It is on the basis of mutual reciprocity and cordial relations between community members that corruption in all sectors can be meaningfully abhorred. Socialization of community members into African ethics values being espoused by *Ubuntu* would instill in all citizens, especially those who are entrusted with the responsibility to serve others in different sectors that entrusted responsibility ought to be exercised for the welfare of all, not only for the office-bearers or their cronies. In light of the potential that *Ubuntu* displays towards combating corruption, Dumisa and Amao (2015: 98) argue that it is imperative to instill participatory democracy throughout government tiers in order to enable optimal and meaningful participation in rooting out corruption. Their argument is that without a concerted effort and strategic reinvigoration of *Ubuntu* to inform the operations geared to combat corruption, an appeal to *Ubuntu* remains a rhetoric undertaking (Dumisa and Amao, 2015: 98). By virtue of embracing contextual moral

values to sub-Saharan African societies, African ethics has the potential to avert emerging social ills in the region.

## **1.6 Research Methodology**

This study is carried out within the discipline of philosophy and is therefore influenced by mental pursuit under the guidance of logical arguments (Jenkins, 106). In particular, the study employs a conceptual analysis method whereby the concept ‘corruption’ is critically analyzed in relation to political patronage and entitlement ethos. As a method of inquiry, conceptual analysis is intended to clarify, identify, and give specific meaning to words (Baldwin and Rose, 2009: 781). It is also important to note that concepts keep evolving and thus derive meaning in their specific context (Baldwin and Rose, 2009: 781). An inquiry into the meaning of corruption finds adequate explanation in the context within which the phenomenon is manifested.

The study relies on historical analysis by tracing how corruption has evolved through different epochs from the colonial regimes into the post-colonial era. Colonial masters intentionally created weak and pliable government institutions that were meant to serve their interests. The same government institutions were inherited unaltered by the African post-colonial leaders because they became sustainable conduits of corrupt and illicit benefits for political leaders and their allies. As a result, institutionalized corruption permeated the sub-Saharan African governments and the public sector as a whole.

A critical review of the literature on corruption also forms part of the research approach in the study. This is mainly reflected in the analysis of corruption and its conceptual interface with patronage and entitlement. It is from the review of the literature that it was established how political patronage leads to corruption in sub-Saharan Africa as the political leaders of the ruling parties claim a winner-takes-all.

## **1.7 Outline of the Study**

This section presents the structure of the study, which highlights how the eight chapters will unfold. **Chapter One** sets the tone for the whole study by providing the background on how corruption evolved from the colonial regime into the post-colonial era where it is perpetuated

through political patronage and entitlement ethos. It also presents a critical review of the literature on corruption with the view to position corruption discourse throughout the study. Research objectives and questions also form an integral part of the chapter and give the study a specific focus. Major theories that are deployed in the research are also presented with a view to inform the arguments raised. The chapter also presents the research methodology.

**Chapter Two** provides a conceptual analysis of the interface between corruption and patronage. This chapter begins with the corruption-definition conundrum and gives the definitions of corruption from etymological, public official and ethics perspectives. Cultural-relativism is also explored with a view to negate a universalised conceptualization of corruption. The chapter also conceptually analyses patronage from how it has evolved from the social anthropology perspective into a widely used political perspective. It is from the political perspective that the influence of patronage on corruption is discussed.

**Chapter Three** is intended to ascertain the prevalence of corruption and political patronage in the sub-Saharan African countries. It is after acknowledging the incapacitating prevalence of corruption in the region that the chapter establishes its root causes. The role of weak government institutions, some of which were inherited from the colonial regime, is identified as the key contributor to invasive political and bureaucratic corruption within the governments of the countries below the Sahara. As such, the chapter also considers the influence of neo-colonialism on corruption. The role of political patronage on rampant corruption in the region is critical part of the chapter. Besides being a reliable political currency, political patronage in the region encourages corruption as political leaders employ it under different forms such as nepotistic distribution of state resources and opportunities to their supporters. Ultimately, those who benefit from transactions that are based on political patronage claim entitlement to such benefits. Although the chapter makes a provision on circumstances that entitlement can be permissible, when the politicians extremely claim it corruption inevitably becomes entrenched.

In order to make a strong case why corruption is bad and ought to be combated, there should be justification on how insidious is its effects on people's wellbeing. **Chapter Four** unveils the effects of corruption under four categories, namely; developmental, economic, political and

social. An attempt has been taken to back the effects of corruption under these categories with empirical evidence drawn from different countries in the region.

**Chapter Five** is intended to deal with the emerging political culture from corruption and political patronage. It unfolds how liberation parties that led their governments after attaining independence from the colonisers started to develop dictatorial characteristics. It also discusses how these leaders sustained their regimes through clientele appointments into key institutions of their governments and through a prebendal system. The emergence of predatory politics and incessant political conflicts are discussed as the offspring of political corruption.

Metamorphosis of corrupt political culture into entitlement ethos is critically discussed in **Chapter Six**. The crux of the discussion is on the legitimacy claim by the liberation movements that became governments after independence that they are the only ones who have the necessary credentials to govern. As such they did neither accommodate any opposition parties nor any dissenting views from their policies. This is the reason why debilitating political elitism dominated the politics in the region. The chapter also presents how the ruling elites employed cunning means through preaching socialist and nationalist politics while they practiced crude capitalism through wealth accumulation.

The thesis unreservedly acknowledges pervasiveness of corruption across the sub-Saharan region. This is the reason why political patronage and its escalation into entitlement ethos are identified as major contributors to corruption prevalence. **Chapter Seven** presents arguments for African ethics as a morally viable approach that ought to underpin corruption critique in the region. This chapter explains African ethics and justifies the primacy of *Ubuntu* in its approach. I also appraise political patronage and claims for entitlement from African ethics perspective.

**Chapter Eight** presents the concluding remarks for the whole study. I first give the summary of all the chapters by emphasizing the key arguments and issues that each chapter raised. The recommendations made are mainly deduced from the argued role of political patronage and claimed entitlement by liberation parties to pervasive corruption in the region. Advocacy for people-centered governance is recommended as ideal because it empowers and enables all citizens to actively participate in governance issues other than being a prerogative of a particular class who claim to be only legitimate occupants. In order to realise an inclusive government,

African ethics ought to play its role through reinvigoration of the values it espouses. In the same manner, it is recommended that anti-corruption approaches in the region should be essentially based on the principle of inclusivity in order to enable all the citizens to be strategic partners in the fight against corruption. This chapter concludes by highlighting the importance of procuring political will for all these recommendations to be realised. In as much as the ruling political leaders and their allies often become perpetrators of grand corruption scandals in the region, it is important that anti-corruption strategies are effectively designed to take them on board as viable means of soliciting these leaders' commitment to abate corruption prevalence.

## **CHAPTER TWO: CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS OF THE INTERFACE BETWEEN CORRUPTION AND PATRONAGE**

### **2.1 Introduction**

In order to ascertain the meaning of the concept corruption in context it is critical to establish how it is conceived in relation to other concepts. This approach is vital because abstract and complex concepts such as corruption do not warrant a universalized approach that solely proceeds from one's vantage point, but they also need to be dealt with in a particular context in which they are manifested. Justification on the primacy of context in conceptual analysis is given by Murove who argues for comparative ethics that "it [comparative ethics] should be based on the understanding that there are diverse modes of living and experiencing reality in the world, and that there is no one single reality on its own that can encapsulate the totality of human experience" (Murove, 2009: 15). It is deducible from Murove's argument that corruption and all similar social ills that inevitably transgress moral values cannot be dealt with under a single and universalised moral outlook.

Corruption has a symbiotic relationship with other socio-economic and political concepts through which it is manifested and sustained. In the post-colonial sub-Saharan Africa, corruption is largely carried out through political patronage (Arriola, 2009: 1339, Cammack, 2007: 599). Political patronage is characterized by patron-client relations between a political leader and political supporters. The corruption phenomenon is so pervasive that every country and society has experienced its bitter effects. It continues to ruin developmental projects and retard the growth of the economies. The magnitude of corruption prevalence has also led to different initiatives aimed at curbing it from various sectors. Conversely, corruption continues to soar in the face of these initiatives. Persistent prevalence of corruption is a clear indication that the phenomenon is not yet lucidly conceptualised in various contexts. In this way, Olowu's (1993: 227) observation still holds water that persistent incidences of corruption in Africa stem from a problem that more focus is on combating the phenomenon rather than first seeking to understand it. This observation refers to an attempt to conceptualise corruption as a pivotal undertaking and a necessary herald towards more informed strategies to control its prevalence. The importance of understanding the problem before devising its solutions is also emphasised by Pundeh (1995: 48) that "[p]olicy makers and politicians have too often viewed corruption as a

problem of flawed personalities rather than the outcome of complex social and structural defects. This faulty explanation suggests why past efforts have been ineffective”. It is from a comprehensive appreciation of a problem that logical and effective solutions will emerge. Treating corruption as a problem that is solely related to flawed personalities rather than giving it a wider perspective will always lead to defective solutions that fail to control it.

In order to embark on a meaningful discourse on corruption, the chapter starts with a crucial task of defining it from etymological, public official and ethics perspectives. The chapter goes on to critically discuss corruption from the cultural relativism perspective. The argument advanced under cultural relativism is that corruption is a cultural phenomenon and can be adequately dealt with in a specific cultural context. Patronage is traced from its anthropological underpinnings and how it evolved into a political practice that embodies corrupt activities. The relationship between patronage and neopatrimonialism is discussed in order to establish similarities and dissimilarities between these concepts. As a result, political patronage is discussed as an essential concept through which corrupt practices are carried out and manifested.

## **2.2 Defining Corruption**

The corruption definition conundrum is dominated by imposed definitions that are intended to be universally accepted and this has turned out to be unrealistic approach. There has been a tendency to give semi-dogmatic and seemingly universalised definitions of corruption. This approach on corruption fails to take into consideration that there is currently no unified theory to explain this phenomenon because of its complex nature and the causes leading to its prevalence (Akbar and Vujić, 2014:192). A similar observation is raised by Jiang (2017: 11) that due to corruption complexity there has been a number of definitions with some being too broad and therefore serving no purpose while others are very exclusive and are only applicable to selected few corrupt cases.

The dominant definitions of corruption emerged from the public sector. These definitions confine corruption to a phenomenon taking place between government departments and the clients seeking services. In addition, pervasive corruption taking place between government

agents and the public is common and the focus on corruption becomes myopic as if corruption only takes place in the public sector, while the reality is that corruption spares no sector.

As a clear indication that corruption cannot be defined from a single vantage point, some scholars avoid to define it at all while others refer to different areas from which different definitions of corruption can emerge. Heidenheimer and Johnston (2002:7-9) have identified three definition categories under which corruption is defined. These include are the public office, the market and public interest. Under public office a public officer intentionally abuses the power of the office in order to benefit. Market-centred definitions are purported to have been formulated under ambiguous norms regulating public officeholders. As a result, they consider public offices entrusted to them as a business to maximise their income (Heidenheimer and Johnston, 2002:8). The definitions that focus on public interest are largely premised on the negative consequences of corruption in the public sector. Egbue (2006:84) posits that corruption is mostly encountered in instances where public interests are subordinated to personal gain by those who have been entrusted with power. A more comprehensive definition of corruption that is underpinned by philosophical and moral claims is given by Osoba as:

[A] form of anti-social behaviour by an individual or social group which confers unjust or fraudulent benefits on its perpetrators, is inconsistent with the established legal norms and prevailing moral ethos of the land and is likely to subvert or diminish the capacity of the legitimate authorities to provide fully for the material and spiritual wellbeing of all members of society in a just and equitable manner (Osoba, 1996: 372).

Even though this definition can be considered inclusive enough to depict corruption as a global phenomenon and to address how it is manifested, the greatest challenge is that conceptualisation of corruption drastically differs between regions, countries and societies. This is the reason why Osoba (1996: 372) contends that like all social phenomena, corruption can only be meaningfully conceptualised in its social context. The exercise of exporting corruption definition and anticorruption strategies to other regions, countries and societies may not only become unintelligible but is also likely to lead to futile initiatives towards combating this phenomenon. Contextually detached definitions and strategies to control corruption will not help to abate its

prevalence. It is on this basis that defining corruption from an etymological perspective is deemed vital.

### 2.2.1 Etymological meaning of Corruption

In order to arrive at the primary meaning of the term corruption, it is important to trace it from its origins because this will shed more light on how the concept has evolved up to the contemporary era where it has become one of the most complex and elusive concepts. The etymological definition of corruption stems from the Latin adjective *corruptus* which means spoiled, broken or destroyed (Hogdson and Jiang, 2007: 1044). The related noun is *corruptio* which refers to bribery and corruption and also to a state of physical or moral decay (Ittner, 2009:18). From its primary meaning, the word corruption signifies a level of deterioration of an object from its original state. Corruption spoils and deforms an entity from its original state. Ochulor and Bassey (2010: 469) posit that corruption implies loss of purity and integrity. It is for this reason that when corruption is used to refer to human behaviour, more concern is put on how behaviour has deteriorated and derailed from the rubrics that ought to govern human conduct.

The etymological definition of corruption sets a clear tone for conceptualising corruption in its multifaceted nature. It also becomes comprehensible that a course of action that follows when an object or behaviour are corrupted is to restore them to their original state. A wide usage of the concept corruption has been more related to human behaviour than objects destroyed from their original state. Corruption is a concept that is commonly used to refer to the degenerated human behaviour which fails to execute the duties as they ought to be.

### 2.2.2 Public Officials' Definition of Corruption

A widely used definition of corruption focuses on public officials conduct in the process of discharging their duties on behalf of government. Nye (1967) is one of the renowned proponents of public office definition of corruption by defining it as “behaviour which deviates from the formal duties of public role because of private regarding (personal, close family, private clique) pecuniary or status gains” (Nye, 1967: 419). This definition became very popular and was adopted by a number of scholars and international organisations. It was intended to cover different forms of corruption that are taking place in the public domain, which also include

incidences of political corruption. This definition was widely acknowledged and corruption was considered a problem that is more dominant in the public sector until some dissenting views were aired about the deficiency of this definition.

Criticism on public officials' centred definition of corruption is underpinned by different perspectives that range from lack of uniformity on standards and rules that govern officials' conduct in different countries to the environment under which officials discharge their duties (Kpundeh, 1995: 43-44). What remains clear is that if public officials in different countries function in different environments where standards of operation and legal frameworks differ, the universalised definition will be limited in certain instances. Due to varied standards and laws, public officials' actions that are justified in a particular environment might be deemed corrupt in a different setting. Corruption definitional problem highlights the importance of approaching corruption problem from the context within which it is manifested.

Besides problems posed by different standards and legal frameworks, public officials' definition of corruption is criticised for covering a very limited scope. This is because corruption is not confined to the public sector, but far extends to different sectors. In fact, corruption spares no sector because where human dishonesty emerges corruption is likely to take place. As a way of building from a public-centred-definition, corruption can be referred to as a moral decay that is demonstrated in the abuse of powers bestowed on them through the offices that they occupy, the ranks that they hold or the responsibilities that they are entrusted with. The pervasiveness of corruption as a moral decay that leads individuals and groups to deviate from established standards of operation is encountered in all countries and all sectors. It is for this reason that a corruption definition that is based on the public official abuse of power for personal gain is not only narrow but is also obviously exclusive. It also ignores how corruption phenomenon is perceived and dealt with in diverse cultural orientations. The varying prevalence levels of corruption in all countries, whether rich or poor, dictatorships or democracies, socialists or capitalists render corruption a complex concept that cannot be approached from a single worldview (McLaughlin, 2013:85).

### 2.2.3 Ethics Definition of Corruption

Since every corrupt activity fundamentally breaches ethical principle(s), it is important to define corruption from an ethical perspective. Anders and Nuijten (2007) contest the public sector centred definition of corruption by saying “[t]here is more to corruption than the mere transgression of rules governing the conduct of public officials. The word may also refer to the individual feeling of moral depravity and perversion or to the moral decay of whole societies,” (Anders and Nuijten, 2007: 1). The implication is that corruption is primarily a moral issue and creeps in when individuals lose a moral compass. It is vital, therefore, to define corruption from the ethics perspective. Such definition accords well with the interest of this thesis, which is to determine how African ethics can become a reliable instrument to critique corruption in sub-Saharan Africa.

A more comprehensive ethics definition of corruption is given by Ochulor and Bassey (2010: 470) as a human act that goes against existing moral standards that are universally accepted or guide conduct of a particular society. As a consequence of one’s ulterior motive, a corrupt act proceeds from a person’s deliberate effort under a conscious mind that such an act encroaches established moral standards. An ethical view on corruption also portrays how corruption ensues from unscrupulous human conduct. From the various definitions of corruption there is unavoidable issue that corruption perpetrators always employ unethical means to get what they want, and that this practice leads to the loss of integrity and denouncement of a virtuous life (Osei-Hwedie and Osei-Hwedie, 2000: 42). Even if corruption is not carried out for personal gain, against what the public office definition of corruption suggests, corruption invariably taints integrity and defies a virtuous conduct.

### **2.3 Corruption from the Perspective of Cultural Relativism**

The concept relativism has always been a subject of a critical discourse in various domains, especially in epistemology and ethics. In particular, relativists argue that moral truth can be approached relatively to certain facts that are associated with a particular culture or societal standards (Kim and Wreen, 2003: 448). The moral outlook that is advanced by relativists negates the universalised approach to reality and morality. Different cultures and societies have created their own standards which guide their conduct while also becoming a basis upon which they

judge their behaviour. This implies that what is morally wrong in a particular culture may not be wrong in another culture.

The theory of cultural relativism is seen as one of the overt influencers on how corruption is conceptualised and dealt with in a society, a country, a region or a continent where a relative majority subscribe to the same value systems. Human acts are classified as corrupt on the basis of cultural context and the commonly shared moral values. Cultural relativism grounds morality in deeply ingrained cultural values that have turned into basic tenets that perennially define constituents of human welfare (McDonald, 2010: 453). Since value systems are different across cultures, morality significantly differs according to cultures. The long standing ethical argument between universalism and cultural relativism seems to yield no positive results because proponents of each consider these ethical views to be mutually exclusive (McDonald 2010:456). Above all, the proponents of these mutually exclusive views consider their approaches absolute, with no alternative for areas of convergence.

Since the phenomenon of corruption should be understood in the context of prevailing morality, it is important to be competent on moral principles and values espoused in a given society. McDonald (2010: 446) raises a significant question at the core of the theory of ethical relativity whether “moral principles apply universally, or are all values and ethical judgements relative to their context, particularly time and cultural contexts?” A relativist holds that moral principles, values and ethical judgements are only applicable to a particular time and cultural context. Conversely, it is argued that cultural relativism fails to reckon the innate drives that control human behaviour, which are also the basis of determining what is morally good or bad (Brown, 2008:370).

On the other hand, the universalists’ approach presents morality as a natural phenomenon rather than a cultural one since human beings have been endowed with innate psychological drives from which a sense of morality ensues. Even though the exponents of absolutism or universalism maintain that morality should be approached from the same vantage point, they do not satisfactorily establish why the value systems widely differ across societies and groups. Failure to explain the existing differences on value systems across the cultures by the proponents of universalism makes it an untenable approach on morality. It would be absurd therefore to use a

universalised approach when dealing with corruption and how it should be combated. Above the differences presented by relativism is the assertion that there can never be universal commonalities that override differences inherent in relativism because “rightness” and “wrongness” of human acts are meaningless if they are detached from the context within which they take place (McDonald, 2010: 448). This negates the absolutist view on universal moral standards since the determinants of morally good act, among others, will be an individual or cultural beliefs and the context within which a decision is to be made. According to a relativist it can never be plausible to maintain that certain human acts are morally wrong or right across the cultures.

As a cultural phenomenon, corruption is conceptualised and approached differently in various cultures. Dion (2010:246) indicates that in high context cultures such as Japan, Italy, Spain and Turkey the practice of giving gifts is normal and something highly encouraged in a society, while in low context cultures such as the United States of America (USA), Germany and Switzerland giving gifts is not only optional but can be considered as bribes if it takes place in a business context. Hooker (2009: 252-254) argues that what is corrupt in the west may be acceptable elsewhere, or what is not corrupt in the west may be corrupt elsewhere. Hooker also contends that what is considered corrupt both in the west and elsewhere might be based on different views (2009: 252-254). An award of a tender to a close friend in the west is considered corrupt because it thwarts transparency in the process. Transparency is considered a hallmark of awarding a tender in a fair and professional manner in the west. On the contrary, a close relationship is considered as the basis of trust upon which transactions such as awarding a tender can be based. This implies that in high context cultures it is not wrong to award a tender to a crony. This renders corruption a social construct that can be appropriately approached from evidently opposing social perspectives (Dion, 2010: 246). What becomes clear under cultural relativism is that a practice that is morally right in a particular cultural context can be labelled corrupt in another. This suggests that even the approaches to combat corruption should be informed by a culturally contextual value system. It is from a contextual approach that the influence of practices such as patronage will be considered.

## **2.4 Conceptual Analysis of Patronage**

The manner in which corruption is orchestrated in different contexts is systematic and follows clearly established patterns. As it will be discussed later, the existence of these clearly discernible patterns also contributes towards sustaining and making corruption endemic in governance processes. A patron-client relationship is one of the common systems that have been used as a conduit of reciprocity between the patrons and the clients, whereby the patrons give material support and/or security to clients who, in turn, give loyalty to the patrons.

In order to establish a reliable conceptualization of patronage and therefore avoid its conventional assumptions (Bearfield, 2009:64), it is important to understand how the relationship between patrons and clients used to be conducted. The concept of patronage is primarily analyzed in an anthropological discipline whereby it is attributed to peasant societies and considered analogous to the concept of the “big man” who provides for others (Weingrod, 1968:377). Due to lack of resources, peasants attach themselves to powerful patrons who would provide the basic necessities of life (Theobald, 1983:137, Abercrombie and Hill, 1976:420). The extreme circumstances espoused under anthropological conception of patronage refer to a condition whereby patrons had a legally upper hand and were endowed with political and ritual rights, unlike their clients who had to seek the mediation of the patrons to enjoy the same rights (Weingrod, 1968:378). This used to be the original meaning of patron-client relationship to signify how those who are free extended the benefits of their freedom to those who were not free through an asymmetrical and vertical kind of relationship.

Anticipated reciprocity in a relationship between a patron and a client represents the hallmark of patronage under the anthropological analysis. Although there is overt inequality between a patron and a client, they both need each other. The patrons use material inducements and security as rewards to clients while clients are expected to return the favour by being loyal to the patrons (Bearfield, 2009:67). The interdependence nature of their relationship makes it possible for both parties to create a strong bond in their relationship. Although the relationship is essentially based on reciprocity, the benefits between the patron and the client are not equal and have the potential to perpetuate an asymmetrical relationship. It is possible for patrons to sustainably enjoy the superior status while their clients remain inferior. For a patron to enjoy his influence, he should

live in a very unequal society in order to discretionally distribute surplus among the clients (Abercrombie and Hill, 1976:416). Theobald (1983:142) quotes Gilsenan's statement against a patron-client relationship that "what is withheld is more important than what is granted." This virtually implies that the patrons are the major beneficiaries in the relationship. In patronage, the superior class strives to maintain their domination over the inferior (Theobald, 1983:142). This kind of relationship has been manifested in different tribes and nations. For example, in North-western Nigeria, the relations between the *masu sarauta*, who were the ruling class, and the *talakawa*, who were the commoners, are largely influenced by patronage-clientage system (Tibenderana, 1989:72). Their relationship was characterized by both social and political inequality, with *masu sarauta* enjoying dominance over the *talakawa* (Tibenderana, 1989:72). In this way, patronage is void of good intention towards elevating the clients from the peasantry status to become landlords.

Under the anthropological analysis of patronage, it is also made clear that patronage is not primarily dependent on cultural factors, but emerges out of particular structural situations characterized by acute differences in access to resources (Abercrombie and Hill, 1976:421). It is reasonable to aver that patronage is maintained through hierarchical relations that promote asymmetrical access to resources. The exchange that takes place between the client and the patron should be well known because it is a basis of legitimate expectation between the two parties. For example, if the clients' needs are particularly material as is the case in the need for food or shelter, the clients would expect the patron to meet such needs. Consequently, the patron would expect the clients to reciprocate through reasonable and agreed behaviour that benefits the patron. Failure to honour agreed factors of exchange by any party or both parties radically disturbs the relationship and might lead to a patron terminating the relationship if he/she feels that he/she is wronged or if a client seeking another patron feels that the patron has breached the expectations.

#### 2.4.1 Analysis of Patronage from a Political Perspective

Although anthropological patronage and political patronage have some analogous approaches, which are demonstrated by the ability of a patron to sponsor the needs of a client, while a client is expected to demonstrate some degree of loyalty to the patron, there are some dissimilarities in

the two approaches (Sayari, 2014: 2-3). The literature on political patronage largely presents it as a transaction taking place between the voters and political parties. Unlike in the anthropological approach, where persons of unequal economic status in the same society share some interests and engage in hierarchical and asymmetrical relations in order to realize their objectives, political patronage is mainly about the means in which political party leaders distribute state opportunities to their clients in exchange for electoral support (Weingrod, 1968:379). Political patronage is considered a vital means through which the distribution of resources is carried out by political officeholders in exchange for political support (Auyero et al, 2009:3). The ruling class grants a number of benefits in the form of projects, tenders, offices and other gains to clients who are expected to reciprocate by loyalty, which is objectified through the votes that the patrons need in order to retain political power (Omobowale and Olutayo, 2007:426). The symbiotic relationship between a patron and a client in political patronage is strengthened and motivated by a patron's power in a political office; that power is only attained through the loyal votes of the clients. As long as the patron gives some benefits to the clients and the clients reciprocate by voting for the patron into political office, their relationship is bound to remain intact.

There are some distinctions drawn on this kind of sponsored relationships between the patrons and their clients. Van de Walle (2007:3) emphasizes the importance of understanding the differences between elite clientelism and mass clientelism. The former is characterized by its confinement to political elites who are allocated key public offices or awarded lucrative tenders so that they have direct access to state resources. Political elites would also be allocated public offices as a compensation for the costs that they incur during the campaign period. Conversely, mass clientelism is based on the utilization of state resources to give jobs and services to mass political party loyalists (Van de Walle, 2007:3).

Based on economic assessment, elite clientelism is presented as an economically viable alternative, especially in weak states such as those which are found in sub-Saharan Africa. It also entails a sense of representation whereby political party followers derive contentment in the appointment to key public office of a person that they are closely related to or who comes from their tribe (Bearfield, 2009:65). Due to resource constraints, most of the economies in sub-Saharan Africa cannot effectively sustain mass clientelism because it is not economically

feasible to reward all political party supporters. The sub-Saharan leaders that attempt mass clientelism in order to attain stability for their regimes have to endure severe economic stress (Arriola, 2009:1345). This is because their economies are too small to provide employment and other related benefits to the multitude of political party supporters.

On the other hand, political patronage can also be said to transcend material gains between a patron and a client as the practice involves mutual commitment to a shared political ideology or philosophy (Bearfield, 2009:67). Under this approach, the focus is not so much on manipulating the relationship between a patron and client to ones benefit, but on maintaining the ideology or philosophy upon which the relationship rests. If either a patron or a client is driven more by the benefits accruing from the relationship, he/she is considered an immoral partner under this worldview of political patronage.

#### 2.4.2 Functions of Political Patronage

In the process of explaining the nature of political patronage it is also important to clearly ascertain its functions and how they are perceived. There are contrasting views on the utility of political patronage. Some people consider it still relevant and ubiquitous towards firmly sustaining the key tenets of democracy, while others deem it as an impediment to development and effective service delivery. Of the four key functions of patronage by Wilson (1961:371), I find three to be most relevant to political patronage. The first one, which presents the function of patronage as a boss's ability to induce his ward leaders in order to obtain their support and obey his orders (Wilson, 1961:371), is more inclined towards anthropological patronage since its major focus is on how the boss exercises his authority in order to earn obedience from the ward leaders and the rest of the ward members. From the second function to the fourth, as they are presented below, the emphasis is on how the boss induces elective office-holders, precinct captains and voters in order to secure political support. Wilson maintains that:

... Patronage is a means whereby the boss induces elective office-holders to surrender to him all or part of their legally vested discretionary powers. A condition of their nomination for elective office is that they permit the machine (that is, the boss) to dispense the jobs and favors they will acquire upon election. ... Patronage is used to induce precinct captains to work for the machine by getting out the vote and dispensing

favors to voters. ... Patronage, finally, is used to induce at least some voters to support the machine. Often these favors are not directly exchanged for votes. Rather, many voters support the party of their precinct captains in hope of future reward, or to deter possible reprisals, or simply to maintain good relations with a potentially useful and certainly powerful organization (Wilson, 1961:371).

These three functions are intended to sustain a relationship between a political patron and a client for the purpose of securing political power. Their focus is on elite clientelism because political elites are entrusted with the key public offices so that they may return the favours to the political leadership. This means that such political elites use legal and discretionary powers bestowed on them by virtue of their offices as a reciprocal gesture for the advantage of the political system that has helped them to occupy the key public offices.

As a political currency that purchases the support of the electorates, Sorauf (1960:28-29) identifies six functions of patronage. One of them, promotion of intra-party cohesion, is found to be unique. This view is also shared by Ndletyana, Makhalemele and Mathekga (2013:28) that political patronage is useful towards enticing the dissident leaders to maintain party cohesion and intactness even in the absence of a convincing ideology. Maintaining unity and vibrancy within the party is indispensable for luring more support that is needed for sustaining the ruling party in political power. However, Sorauf contends that for patronage to thwart factions and weld the opposing blocs within the party into a unified whole, it should be manipulated by a skilful and prudent leader (1960:29). Inherent benefits in patronage can shrewdly be used by a political leader to end any differences between warring party members through distribution or redistribution of resources and benefits. The implication is that failure to skilfully handle patronage can perpetuate divisions and defections within the party.

In support of political patronage, Turn (1937:24) argues that it is a natural inclination for leaders to work with loyal and trustworthy supporters therefore it is not surprising that political leaders would feel comfortable when working with members of their party who demonstrate unreserved commitment, support and loyalty. It is on the same basis that Turn (1937:34) justifies political patronage appointments as likely to promote efficiency in the public service and curb bureaucratic sabotage. The gist of this argument is that if political leaders fail to put their loyal followers in strategic positions in the public sector, they are likely to encounter resistance from

the bureaucrats, thus creating a situation that is most likely to derail their policies. However, it requires a very competent leader to monitor and supervise people's work because some of them might be driven by an extreme sense of entitlement and thus only apply minimal effort to their work.

In the light of the above discussion, it can be inferred that patronage is indispensable strategy aimed at guaranteeing that the ruling political party will always remain strong and effective. However, such an inference would be premised on a number of assumptions, which need to be carefully explored in order to avoid intuitive speculations about the value of political patronage. Sorauf (1959:117-124) discusses five common assumptions about the utility of patronage within a party. The assumptions include the ability of the parties to administer patronage, the necessity of patronage for effective parties, the vitality of patronage as a reward or an incentive, the single use of or purpose of patronage and the nature of the party that uses patronage. On each of these assumptions, Sorauf (1959) observes that there is a limited understanding by political party leaders about the functions of patronage; therefore they render these assumptions untenable towards making patronage a universally indispensable panacea for party success. It is not in all the circumstances that parties thrive on patronage. Some party members have achieved and have higher prospects than what the patronage system can offer. However, by highlighting some deficiencies on these assumptions, Sorauf does not portray political patronage as a futile exercise within a party, but warns against its misconception and abuse.

#### 2.4.3 The Relationship between Political Patronage and Neopatrimonialism

There is a wide tendency to refer to political patronage and neopatrimonialism as interchangeable concepts. This is the reason why these concepts are often treated as some form of corruption, as demonstrated by Varraich when he referred to corruption as an umbrella concept that depicts "the relationship by family resemblance categories such as clientelism, patronage, patrimonialism..." (Varraich,2014: 3). Due to the various definitions, explanations and contexts attributed to neopatrimonialism, the concept has virtually lost its analytical utility (Pitcher, Moran and Johnston, 2009:130). The common usage of the term neopatrimonialism has significantly shifted from its original meaning. An example of a shift from the original meaning is presented by Arriola (2009:1343) by referring to neopatrimonialism as being similar to the

patron-client relationship, which influences political and economic life in African countries. The relationship between neopatrimonialism and political patronage can also be deduced from Bratton and van Duijn's (1997:61) analysis when referring to the former as a mechanism utilized by the ruler to attain political stability for the regime through a distribution of favours to the loyalists, while the latter depicts an essential relationship that exists between a political patron and a client.

The origin of a patrimonial rule is traced back to the writings of the German sociologist Max Weber (O'Neil, 2007:2; Erdmann and Engel, 2006:7), who established three ideal types of domination within the society as being legal, traditional and charismatic. It is from the traditional domination that patrimonialism emerged. Weber (1978:227) contends that under the traditional domination "obedience is owed not to enacted rules but to the person who occupies a position of authority by tradition or who has been chosen for it by the traditional master." This approach explains why in the patrimonialism system all the executive powers are centred solely on the leader to execute major policy decisions without dissent. In extreme circumstances, power and decision making in patrimonial states take place outside the formal governance structures where the 'big men' and their cronies are motivated by personal interests rather than improving the wellbeing of the citizens (Cammack, 2007: 600). This implies that those who have financial or influential powers can influence the political leader to informally surrender some executive powers to them in order to make decisions on resources or on any other key government functions that would benefit them.

Some scholars argue that there is a pervasive misreading and application of Weber's patrimonialism and, consequently, neopatrimonialism in Africa. Pitcher, Moran and Johnston, (2009:126) assert that Weber (1978) did not treat patrimonialism as a synonym for corruption or bad governance, but considered it as a specific form of authority and the basis of legitimacy. Just as the patron-client relationship is emphasised, Weber's patrimonialism and the resultant neopatrimonialism would incorporate reciprocity as an essential feature that defines the nature of the relationship between the ruler and the ruled (Pitcher, Moran and Johnston, 2009:127). The governed are expected to demonstrate utmost compliance to the dictates laid down by the leader.

The transition from patrimonialism to neopatrimonialism is explored by different scholars and various deductions are drawn, with some of them arguing that there is a clear distinction between these concepts. Erdmann and Engel (2006:18) observed that under patrimonialism the ruler can exercise unrestricted personal powers over the ruled and therefore leading to no distinction between the private and the public domain. On the other hand, in neopatrimonialism the ruler is cognizant of the difference between the private and public spheres. The issue that is emphasized in neopatrimonialism is not whether the ruler observes the formal structures and rules laid down but that there exists legal-rational bureaucracy (Erdmann and Engel, 2006:18). This view is also augmented by Pitcher, Moran and Johnston that:

many social scientists add the modifier *neo* to *patrimonialism* to distinguish what they regard as a modern variant of Weber's ideal type - one in which a veneer of rational-legal authority has been imposed by colonialism, yet a personalistic or "patrimonial" logic characterized by patronage, clientelism, and corruption is said to prevail – just as it is assumed to have done in the past (Pitcher *et al.*, [all authors] 2009:130).

An attempt to give patrimonialism a rationalized approach under neopatrimonialism in itself does not deter old patrimonialism traits where power is confined to the ruler. Premised on the relationship between the ruler and the ruled there seem to be some remnants of the patrimonialism system, whereby some operations are still executed according to the demands of the ruler. The nature of the relationship between the ruler and the subjects is characterized by the subjects' absolute allegiance to the ruler and the ruler's ability to protect the subjects. This is the reason why it becomes possible for political patronage to be the contributory factor for corruption.

## **2.5 The Influence of Political Patronage on Corruption**

One of the greatest concerns is to establish whether political patronage is a catalyst for corruption in sub-Saharan African governments and if so, how this system affects good governance and retards development in the region. Some scholars consider preferential treatment in the distribution of the benefits, resources and appointments of public officials on the basis of political patronage to be against the principle of merit-based system, thus engendering systemic corruption. Against this background, Varriach maintains that:


Patronage and corruption overlap, however this overlap is of different types. Patronage can at times “lead” to corruption while at other times it in itself is corruption. As a starting point, the concept of party patronage is not as penetrating as corruption; it is done in the open and not under the table as most corruption deals are. However, the overlap into corruption is obvious when these appointments are done “for the purpose of providing private kickbacks” or more so “in return for bribes” (Varriach, 2014: 19).

The point being raised above is that patronage can be instrumental for a politician to achieve a political mileage through the deployment of loyal members who embrace and advance the interests of a political party. However, a common phenomenon in sub-Saharan countries is that patronage invariably leads to corruption because state resources are at the disposal of the ruling political parties under very weak government systems. The introduction of a merit-based system, as a counter to the appointment of public officials on the basis of politically motivated patron-client relations was, among others, intended to enable the officials’ incumbency in the public service to transcend the tenure of a political party which is in charge of the government (Roback, 1992:329). This was purported to be instrumental in keeping the machinery of the government effective even in situations where a governing political party is rocked by conflicts and factions. The inception of politics-administration dichotomy debate by Wilson (1887) was intended to bring about a paradigm shift in the engagement of bureaucrats as career servants who are motivated, above anything else, by professional standards that govern their professions and public administration. The inference that can be drawn from this argument is that bureaucrats are supposed to be recruited on the basis of merit, which ought to be entirely underpinned by professional competence. In a situation where political patronage influences almost every appointment in the public sector, the looming risk would be losing professionalism through bureaucracy. Since such partisan bureaucracies are deliberately fashioned by politicians in order to minimize the possibilities of being held accountable, Cammack argues that:

[I]t would be a mistake to assume that these politicians do not understand that an efficient, independent (from political pressure) and meritocratic state bureaucracy is needed to implement national development policies. The point is, such a bureaucracy would be less pliable and politically reliable and more likely to expose malfeasance. So it is no accident that neopatrimonial states are burdened by bureaucracies whose appointments are made according to tests of loyalty, and which

ineffectively account for public funds siphoned off to spend on political projects (Cammack, 2007: 601-602).

The literature on political patronage in sub-Saharan Africa presents it as a springboard of corruption in the region (van de Walle, 2003:311; Arriola, 2009:1344; van de Walle, 2007:11; Ndletyana, Makhalemele, Mathekga, 2013:7). Ndletyana *et al* (2013: 7) argue that the prevailing political system in the continent does not prioritise growth and development of states instead scarce resources are diverted to cater for the needs of a few individuals who are instrumental in mobilizing political support. As a result, African economies constantly grow weaker and render the citizens prone to numerous plights and key among them is abject poverty. Hicken (2011:303) posits that political patronage can encourage corruption through various means such as illegitimate buying of votes, creation of a culture of impunity, which goes with disempowering the citizens to hold public officials accountable and pressure on politicians to opt for corrupt means to accumulate more resources needed to facilitate an exchange between political loyalty by clients. Godfrey and Yu (2015: 54) argue that it is important for the sub-Saharan countries to understand how political patronage is a by-product of colonial regimes in the region and how it has evolved to fuel pervasive corruption. The diagram below encapsulates the argument on how corruption is perceived to be a product of colonial legacy, which became more visible under patronage and weak institutions.



Patronage driven corruption undermining the fight against poverty (Godfrey and Yu, 2015:58)

Under the argument that weak government institutions lead to corruption, the colonial administrations in Africa were notoriously known for their divide and rule strategy, whereby some locals were favoured against their fellow citizens. Ssali (2016:2) makes reference to pre-independent Zimbabwe and the white settlers in Kenya to depict how the British colonizers in these countries used to distribute resources and other benefits on the basis of who showed loyalty

and support to their policies. This practice was replicated by the postcolonial African leaders through perpetuation of client-patron relations as an effective means to garner political support.

Sub-Saharan African countries continue to experience enormous corruption as a consequence of political patronage. On acknowledging rife corruption as a result of patron-client relations in Senegal, Fatton (1986:63) indicates that the Senegalese Government has clearly demonstrated reluctance to control political patronage, even though it became obvious that patronage retarded administrative efficacy and economic performance, simply because the leaders continued to benefit from the system. The greatest problem with political patronage in Africa is that the clients, the political party supporters, are deprived of the capacity to interrogate their political party ideologies and to hold political leaders accountable on whether their deliverables are congruent with the promises that they made. Mati (2010:50) makes a similar observation on Kabila's regime that complicated patronage relations more than party ideology, informed recruitment of public officials in key positions in public administration in DRC. What matters most is what is in stock for the clients for having demonstrated loyalty and ensuring that their political party stays in power. In most cases, the clients, especially the elites, do not give priority to projects and programmes that enhance the wellbeing of the citizens, but find themselves trapped in nurturing reciprocal relations between them and the patrons so that patronage remains a strong political currency. The same problem is highlighted by Ssali when citing the following Ugandan case:

The 1986 revolution that brought the incumbent Yoweri Museveni and the National Resistance Movement to power had promised so much regarding security, individual freedoms, equality and sustainable development across the ethnic and political divide. After almost three decades in power, the goal of remaining in power even longer has superseded all these concerns. The central government and all its arms of power are firmly under the control of the President and his ruling party (Ssali, 2016: 1).

This shows that it has been easy for political leaders in sub-Saharan Africa to opt for patronage as a non-coercive strategy to secure power and to abandon their core responsibilities such as obtaining freedom and pursuing the developmental agenda for their people. The elites that are deployed at the key public offices are entrusted to facilitate the distribution of resources and

other favours which include jobs, tenders or services to deserving clients. Thus, higher-level bureaucrats pursue political agenda of their parties through allocation of public expenditure, goods and services in a manner that attracts and rewards loyalty so that political leadership can retain government's incumbency (Mwenda and Tangri, 2005: 455). Since the criterion used to distribute the resources and benefits largely depends on patron-client relations within a party, factors such as quality, especially in awarding tenders, and fairness in the distribution of resources are ignored. This situation becomes a source of endemic corruption in Africa mainly because political leaders create a desperate state whereby people from all sectors are made to believe that success can only be attained if they overtly or covertly support a political party or political parties that form government. This explains why it is a common phenomenon in the African context to have companies that monopolize certain lucrative tenders. When their affiliated political party wins elections and seizes government powers such companies do not only become certain about being awarded lucrative tenders, but they also influence decisions on development policy direction so that they can secure their benefits from the system. Camack (2007:600) attests to this arrangement by showing that in governments where neopatrimonialism dominates, real power and decision-making do not reside within the government, but are in the hands of 'big men' and their cronies who constantly seek to advance their interest at all costs.

In order to ensure that the ruling party conquers competition by all possible means, the opposition parties' leaders and members are intimidated in a number of ways through arrests without warrants, physical attacks and threats (Camack, 2007:604). This becomes possible in the African context because the majority of political leaders who emerge victorious subscribe to a 'winner-takes-all' strategy, and want to control all the key mechanisms of power including wealth and resources (Annan, 1998:4). Annan continues to highlight that these leaders confine all powers to their offices and this is mobilized by a centralised and a personalised nature of their governance systems (1998:4). It is under such governance systems that accountability and transparency are ignored, thus leading to sponsored crimes against the rule of law and violation of human rights (Camack, 2007:604). The ZANU-PF, under the leadership of Robert Mugabe, displayed a similar behaviour when it turned land and mineral resources into a political capital that sustained it in power against its arch-rival, the Movement for Democratic Change-Tsvangirai (MDC-T), which had limited or no material rewards to give to its supporters

(Alexander and McGregor, 2013:758). When it became evident that ZANU-PF would lose power in 2008, it opted for partisan redistribution of land from the whites to the blacks and the major beneficiaries were members of the military and ZANU-PF elites, while the rest of the Zimbabweans were materially induced to show loyalty to the ruling party (Alexander and McGregor, 2013:758-759). Zaire, under President Mobutu, presents almost a similar incident, where state revenues were siphoned in order to maintain patronage networks that sustained him in power (Mati, 2010:49). Mati refers to *Banque Du Zaire* annual report of 1992 to show that due to corruption and patronage that were socially accepted as the bases of Congolese political tradition, Mobutu's regime only spent ten percent (10%) of the total budget on both education and health sectors in 1982, and in 1992 the spending on these two sectors had been reduced to zero (2010:143). The reduction of budget spending in critical sectors such as education and health clearly reveal that a country is in crisis. One of Mobutu's leadership downfalls was uncontrolled expansion of patronage at the expense of fundamental services to the nation. It becomes more worrying if those in power are not willing to let go of the reins of the government simply because they sustain themselves in power through diversion of funds and other resources from developmental projects to benefit their allies and cronies.

Nzongola-Ntalaja (2002:153) outlines five instruments that Mobutu used to secure power. These are "security forces, the party, money, external sources of support, and the ideological manipulation of popular aspirations and loyalties." Mobutu's leverage on his party and illicit profits obtained from selling of resources such as diamonds, gold, copper, uranium and many other resources that the Country is endowed with were used to expand his patronage and procure more loyal clients. The unrestricted powers that Mobutu possessed led to a rampant corruption among the bureaucrats and the members of the military who were always at the forefront in the transactions involving natural resources. However, as was the case anywhere in the world, despots such as Mobutu, who survived on corruption and complex patronage networks, face harsh ousts from power as it happened to him in 1997.

Despite political patronage influence on endemic corruption, it remains a critical political instrument towards establishing and maintaining relations within the political parties. It still serves as a basis upon which decisions are made in the distribution of benefits and resources

within governments. It is almost impossible to come across a political environment that is free from complex and complicated patronage networks. This is because the relations within political parties are cemented by the strong loyalty existing between the leadership and the followers. Political patronage becomes a valuable currency used to purchase the much needed loyalty of the voters. While prevalence of political patronage is hailed as being instrumental towards bringing political cohesion and being in congruence with the democratic principles in other regions, historical events presented show that in sub-Saharan Africa it has catalyzed corruption in various ways.

## **2.6 Conclusion**

The fundamental concern in this chapter was to present a conceptual analysis of the interface between corruption and patronage. The overarching concern here was to demonstrate that patronage, especially under political perspective, can easily lead to corrupt practices. The chapter started by defining corruption from various perspectives. Accordingly, corruption was defined from its etymological, public officials and ethics' perspectives. This was intended to demonstrate that there is no single and adequate definition of this phenomenon. It is for this reason that cultural relativism was also discussed as a justification that a conceptual analysis of corruption can be meaningfully approached from the context it is manifested other relying on imported and at dictated approaches.

The chapter also presented the conceptual analysis of patronage. It considered how the concept evolved from a dyadic and reciprocal relationship between the patrons and clients. The relationship is also asymmetrical, with the patrons having the upper hand and providing for the basic needs of their clients. The clients reciprocate the supply from their patrons with loyalty and obedience. On the other hand, political patronage refers to the relationship between a political leader or party and the electorates. In this case, reciprocity is characterised by a political leader distribution of government opportunities to his or her allies who elect him or her into a position of power. It was on the same basis that similarities and dissimilarities between political patronage and neopatrimonialism were determined with a view to ascertain how these two concepts have been conceptualised. As it could be expected, political patronage is invariably prone to corruption. This is because in a quest for power, political leaders and their parties

misappropriate state resources and opportunities in favour of their political allies and cronies. Espoused political patronage functions highlight its importance towards consolidating a political leader in a position of power.

The last part of the chapter focussed on the influence that political patronage has on corruption prevalence. It was argued that politicians become preoccupied with a relentless urge to protect their positions of power in government. This makes it possible for them to turn to political patronage in order to lure support from the electorates through bias distribution of state resources and opportunities. What becomes more worrying is that some opportunities are distributed to members who do not possess requisite competencies to advance the business of government. It is from the same view that some examples were drawn from sub-Saharan context on how political patronage led pervasive corruption in some countries.

## **CHAPTER THREE: CORRUPTION AND PATRONAGE IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA**

### **3.1 Introduction**

In the preceding chapter I have demonstrated that corruption is ontologically related to patronage. Even though patron-client relationship does not always lead to corruption, it becomes prone to corruption. As indicated in the analysis of patronage from the political perspective, the systemic corruption within governments takes place under the sponsorship of political patronage. This becomes possible due to the seemingly insatiable lust for power by the majority of the politicians. As it has been the case in some of the sub-Saharan African countries, the post-colonial leaders have resorted to political patronage as an effective strategy through which they attract support from the citizens. Due to the reciprocal nature of this relationship, the politicians in this part of Africa unfairly and corruptly distribute government opportunities to their followers.

The pervasiveness of corruption within governments in the sub-Saharan African countries is a topical issue in many scholarly works (Warf, 2017: 20). Although there are many causes towards the prevalence of corruption in the region, the informal and dyadic networks between the politicians and their supporters have significantly contributed in the facilitation of corrupt transactions and consequently such practices render political patronage a catalyst to endemic corruption.

This chapter attempts to establish the causes of corruption within the governments in the sub-Saharan African countries. It is in this quest, that the entrenchment of corruption is traced from the colonial era into the postcolonial governments in the region (Mulinge and Lesetedi, 2002. Mulinge and Lesetedi, 1998. Osoba, 1996,). The chapter establishes that corruption was a consequence of colonial rule strategy of divide and rule which was aimed at countering any possible resistance from the colonised. The favoured clique enjoyed illicit and corrupt financial support from the colonial masters. Since the postcolonial leaders did replace the weak government institutions they inherited from their erstwhile masters, they continued to corruptly benefit from the system. It is on this basis that neo-colonialism influence on corruption is discussed. Political corruption and bureaucratic corruption are also explored in this chapter. This is because political corruption often encourages bureaucratic corruption. The chapter as well

explores the role of political patronage as a precursor to a sense of entitlement from which corrupt practices such as nepotism and elections' rigging ensue.

### **3.2 Causes for the Prevalence of Corruption in sub-Saharan African Governments**

It is widely acknowledged that Africa, especially the sub-Saharan region is severely affected by corruption (Simplice, 2014: 906, Warf, 2017: 20, De Maria, 2009:359). Some of the common incidences depicting high prevalence of corruption in sub-Saharan African countries include customs officials who take bribes, rigged elections and donations that end up in the corrupt pockets of the public officials (De Maria, 2009: 359). Lawal (2007: 1) attributes high prevalence of corruption to countries that have weak institutions, such as weak legislature and judiciary. In such countries there is a high reliance on political patronage epitomized by the preferential treatment of some citizens against others. It also implies that such countries experience low observance of the law. Due to high context nature of the majority of cultures found in the sub-Saharan Africa, extensive relationships permeate systems and influence decision making in all sectors, especially the public sector. It is common in the African context that a person can secure a job not because of merit but solely based on political patronage. If not controlled, the influence of relationships, especially patron-client relationships, can undermine laws and policies that ought to be upheld.

As a counter to the prevalence of corruption, many countries in the sub-Saharan Africa have embarked on various anti-corruption programmes. However, many of the intervention programmes geared towards controlling corruption remain unsuccessful. The ACAs across the continent failed to yield anticipated results. Simplice (2014: 907) indicates that many African states have ratified the treaties, promulgated the laws, adopted the policies and established institutions on the fight against corruption but all of them are still lacking as corruption continues to rock development agenda and economic performance of these states. The universalised policies embraced by the countries and international organisations have not yielded desired results in the fight against corruption (Simplice, 2014: 907). This failure is owed to a simple fact that the policies, laws and anti-corruption agencies are fashioned by the West and international organisations that overlooked how corruption is perceived and takes place in the majority of cultures in the sub-Saharan Africa.

Endemic corruption in postcolonial sub-Saharan countries is also traced back from the colonial era, which is blamed for destroying the indigenous governance systems in Africa. Mulinge and Lesetedi (2002: 52) argue that pervasive corruption in sub-Saharan Africa is largely a legacy associated with the colonial system. The African states' independence was supposed to mark an era of sustainable peace and economic development that would benefit all citizens. However, most of the leaders that succeeded the colonisers did not facilitate for effective development of institutional arrangements (Mbaku, 2007:4). The dominant approach in the development of governments' apparatus was top-down, which advanced the interests of the elites against the interests of the majority. It is this approach which is purported to have attracted corrupt activities as the elites were encouraged to invest in rent seeking and sought other exclusive opportunities that were gained at the detriment of the majority of the citizens (Mbaku, 2007:4). Thus, the colonisers did not facilitate for an inclusive economic system in sub-Saharan Africa, but left hierarchical systems that promoted asymmetrical access to wealth. Those who occupied powerful public offices had access to national resources and exploited opportunities at their disposal to amass themselves with resources at the expense of the welfare of their nations.

What also continues to exacerbate corruption prevalence is that most of the anticorruption strategies employed in sub-Saharan Africa are shaped by the international organisations such as the World Bank, IMF, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and transparency international (TI). Ahluwalia makes the following assertion about the superior attitude of the West on setting the development agenda for Africa:

The inability of the African state to deliver 'development' has meant that it is no longer permitted to engage in activities which a normal state would perform. Rather these functions have been usurped, and the African state today is entrapped within a discourse of power whereby foreign institutions and agencies map out its future. In this new configuration, it is the World Bank, the IMF and a host of non-government organizations which determine and dictate fundamental policy. They are in many respects, the new 'colonial administrators' (Ahluwalia, 2012: 54).

The influence from these organisations has misdirected the corruption discourse in African context. Above all, this influence has led Africans to lose focus in tracing corruption as a vestige of colonial system that is replicated by the governments' structures of the post-colonial sub-

Saharan Africa. Mulinge and Lesetedi (1998: 17) argue that there has never been an effort to comprehend the historical causes of the prevalence of corruption in sub-Saharan Africa. Focus has always been limited to African bureaucracies, private businesses and individuals without delving into historically rooted causes that can be traced back to colonial governance systems (Mulinge and Lesetedi, 1998: 17; Osoba, 1996:373; Egbue, 2006:85). The political system that the colonisers left in Africa is authoritarian by nature and does not prioritize the interests of the citizens. This problem also engendered lack of accountability for the post-colonial regimes.

Yeh (2011: 630) presents the argument of African political economists which posits that colonial administrators dismantled traditional checks and balances so that power can be confined to themselves, few local chiefs and the elites who went through the colonial education system. It is through this preferential treatment of few representatives of the society that corruption was easily perpetuated in sub-Saharan countries. Osoba (1996:373) observed that the authoritarian governance approach by the colonisers (the British), forced most of Nigerians to menial roles in farming, trading and bureaucracy, which never imparted substantial skills that would enable the locals to independently engage on sustainable projects. The transition of power from the colonisers to the locals during the decolonisation period was engineered by the colonisers in such a manner that they still had access to the resources and government institutions of African states. In Zimbabwe, the Lancaster House Constitution (LHC) of 1979, which was still prompted by the interests of the colonisers to deter rapid nationalisation of fundamental constituents of the economy such as land and mines, is a clear testimony of how the colonisers wanted to maintain their grip on post independent governments in Africa (Makumbe, 1994:49-50). This implies that the colonialists still had direct influence on governance processes of the African states. Conversely, the newly elected local leaders used the already existing government institutions to amass wealth for themselves while the majority of the people were left to struggle for basic necessities of life. The ruling elites in Africa were soon aware that they needed to harness both their economic and political power in order to reward themselves and their African allies (Yeh, 2011: 630). This engendered a centralised power system that suppressed accountability and transparency mechanisms and thus enabling its beneficiaries to have an exclusive access to personal accumulation of wealth.

The public officials who had a direct influence on public policy created policies that would enable them to benefit from state resources. As it used to be the case in Lesotho, the ministers and the principal secretaries (PSs) were at some point allowed to purchase the official cars they have been using after five years and three years respectively at the ridiculous prices far below the market value. Thus, policies and laws were created to justify government transactions that would be ethically deemed corrupt.

Against the arguments that seek to attribute the pervasiveness of corruption in the sub-Saharan Africa to colonial system, Dion (2010:240) labels them “colonialists’ presence syndrome”. Dion (2010:240) argues that it is absurd to attribute the prevalence of corruption in a country to colonialism while the colonisers have long left such countries. According to this argument, perpetuation of corruption should be blamed on government and society for failing to combat corrupt activities. However, I consider this argument to be missing the point on how corruption became deeply ingrained in the governments’ structures that were left for postcolonial leaders through deftness of the colonisers to continue exercising power and authority on their erstwhile colonies even after they have long left. Above all, the colonial era was marked by absolute subordination of the African countries to the colonial masters, whereby colonised Africans experienced maximum exploitation and destruction of their cultural and value system (Ukavwe, 2014:4). The intensity of colonial system had far reaching and complex effects that could not be wished away in a short period of time. It becomes even more difficult to deal with such effects when they are tactically entrenched into the governments systems.

Mulinge and Lesetedi (2002: 54-55) give a three pronged source for the origins of corruption in sub-Saharan African countries. They argued that corruption became structurally imbedded in colonial governments’ structures as a result of introducing monetary economies in sub-Saharan Africa (Mulinge and Lesetedi, 2002: 54). The genesis of monetary economies in the region brought about a paradigm shift in the economic lives of the Africans because they started using money as a basic means of exchange on commodities. The Africans started to undertake jobs as dictated by the colonial masters so that they can earn money for their survival. It is from the introduction of the monetary system that corruption became imbedded and sustained in

government structures since those who occupied powerful positions exploited the means at their disposal to accumulate more income.

It is after the shift to the monetary economic system in the sub-Saharan Africa that compulsory cash taxations in different forms were introduced with the aim of meeting different administrative costs (Mulinge and Lesetedi, 2002: 54). In order to raise money for various taxes, many Africans were exploited as cheap labour in the labour market. It was mostly the manner, not the introduction of taxes, in which taxes were collected that prompted corrupt practices, whereby the collection was entrusted to the local leaders, especially the chiefs, who were allowed to retain a certain percentage of the amount collected (Osoba, 1996: 374; Mulinge and Lesetedi, 2002: 54-55). The involvement of the local leaders in tax collection distorted the value system in Africa, especially the practice of gift giving, which in pre-colonial era was a genuine act of sharing, was being turned into property accumulation method by the leaders (Mulinge and Lesetedi, 1998:19). As a means of accruing more property from the people, the leaders abused their privilege to collect taxes and subdued their subjects as means for gaining more gifts.

The third source which Mulinge and Lesetedi attribute to the genesis of corruption in sub-Saharan countries is the British policy of divide and rule which was used to subdue the colonised (1998:19). This was tactically introduced to create animosity between the tribes whereby one tribe would be favoured by the colonisers while others were despised with the aim of attracting loyalty from the favoured tribe so that a sense of unity between the tribes can be destroyed (Mulinge and Lesetedi, 1998:19). The divide and rule strategy was practiced by colonizers across sub-Saharan Africa; in North Nyasa District, which is now Malawi, the Ngonde peoples enjoyed the favour of the colonisers against other tribes, the Baganda in Uganda, the Tutsi in Rwanda, the Ibo in Nigeria and the Shona in a country now called Zimbabwe (Mulinge and Lesetedi, 1998:19-20). The favoured groups became the primary beneficiaries of the colonisers' governments and this created imbalanced relations between the tribes. The divide and rule strategy thus became a conduit of corruption in many African countries as the disadvantaged groups had to struggle to get basic services from their advantaged counterparts. The persistent style of governance that portrayed the colonisers' traits, which was also known as neo-colonialism, also perpetuated corruption in the region.

### **3.3 The influence of Neo-colonialism on Corruption**

The attainment of independence by the sub-Saharan African countries did not mean that the colonisers ceased to have interests in the region. Because of the economic benefits they derived from the region, they devised the means of having an influence in their erstwhile colonies' governance processes. Stoneman and Suckling give a compelling reason that "[a]n imperial power that loses colonies from which it had previously been extracting economic benefits will naturally seek to continue the process by other means" (Stoneman and Suckling, 1987: 516). This is also echoed by Graham Huggan that "[t]he withdrawal of the colonisers from their erstwhile colonial territories is by no means adequate for the settling of old scores" (Huggan, 1992: 19-20). The interests of colonisers in their colonies' resources did not come to an end with the declaration of their withdrawal from their colonies. In this way, neo-colonialism is the perpetuation of the colonisers' interests, which is epitomised in governance strategies that still allow them to have a great influence on how their former colonies are governed. Such an influence becomes more vivid when former colonisers continue to meddle in political and economic processes of their yester colonies. It is also important to note that neo-colonialism powers do not only come from original colonial powers but are also wielded by some powerful countries due to anticipated benefits (Bray, 1993: 334). For example, United States of America is often blamed for neo-colonialism practises in countries that it did colonise (Bray, 1993: 334).

Interest in Africa's resources and raw minerals has led the former colonies to persuade to their advantage the economic and political policies of their erstwhile colonies. It is a common phenomenon that raw minerals like diamond, gold, crude oil and copper that are harvested in Africa are purchased at the ridiculously low prices but are sold at exorbitant prices after the refinery process in Western countries. Under the guise of respect for sovereignty, which resulted from attainment of independence, the African countries were made to believe that they have gained freedom and will be self-determined states. However, their former colonisers sought and obtained the means of influencing these countries. Thus, ex-colonies were not helped to be politically and economically independent, but were left to operate within the infrastructure that promoted neo-colonialism (Blaut, 1973: 23). Plethora of interventions in a form of prescriptions from the former colonisers denied African countries to exercise their discretion on what they think can work for their economies and politics.

Unchanged education system after the demise of colonial regimes in sub-Saharan Africa became very instrumental in the entrenchment of colonial education system. Lack of political will by African leaders to critically review inherited education system left the colonisers' systems and curricula intact and operational. Without changed education system that addresses the contextual needs of sub-Saharan African countries, the former colonisers found it easy to exercise significant level of influence in these countries. Neo-colonial vestiges in education system are many and continue to be encountered in administrative processes, curricula, and most importantly in language which is the basic medium of instruction throughout the learning process. Since education plays an indispensable role in the development of a person and thus of a country, failure to continually subject it to a critical review has inevitable negative impact on development.

Without perpetuating the often rebuked tendency of blaming contemporary African plights to colonialism, its vestiges continue to surface in governance problems that African states invariably encounter and this reflects a detrimental colonial legacy in the Continent. Mulinge and Lesetedi give an account of how core elements of colonialism were carried into neo-colonialism in sub-Saharan Africa by contending that:

To guarantee a smooth transition to neo-colonialism (the second phase of colonialism), the colonialists established economic, social and political structures that would continue to safeguard their interests long after they relinquished direct control of the colonies. Essentially, this involved the transfer of economic, social and political institutions that had been established by the colonialists during the period of (direct) colonial rule; but the transition was organised purposely to usher in the next phase of colonialism, which is neo-colonialism (Mulinge and Lesetedi, 2002: 20).

Manifestations of neo-colonialism in sub-Saharan African countries are many and are encountered through different interventions that are purported to help African countries out of socioeconomic and political crises. For more than three decades the Western countries have demonstrated keen interest to help the African countries, especially the region below the Sahara, to combat endemic corruption that is destabilising the countries in the region. However, the nobility of their interventions is invariably soiled the inclination to introduce anti-corruption policies that meet their interests not Africans' (De Maria, 2012: 218). Corruption interventions

that heavily rely on Western approaches have not helped sub-Saharan African countries to win a battle against corruption. Instead, corruption offences continue to escalate at the alarming rate.

The neo-colonialism traces in corruption interventions led by the Western countries in the region have become overt in the imposition of anti-corruption approaches and stratagems. Western countries have also exported their key tenets of corruption discourse to sub-Saharan Africa. As it has been the case, the principal-agent model of corruption that largely underpins corruption discourse in the Western countries has been widely used to inform anticorruption policies and legislations in sub-Saharan Africa. De Maria (2012: 223) succinctly captures it that “when Western governments commit anti-corruption resources to Africa they commit similar resources and do similar things”. In this observation, De Maria unveils absurdity of dictating anti-corruption approaches that are hostile to cultural context. However, with the conditions tied to the Western orthodoxy on anti-corruption strategies, sub-Saharan African countries have limited alternatives to avoid them. In 1997 Kenya became a good example of a country that suffered from the consequences of harsh conditions by the World Bank and IMF, whereby not having anti-corruption authority was one of the key reasons why IMF withheld \$220 Million worth of aid (De Maria, 2012: 223). This compelled Kenya to create Kenyan Anti-Corruption Authority as per the dictates of World Bank and IMF. From the face value it can be said that Kenya was beginning to be compliant to the conditions set by these international financial institutions, but for anti-corruption approaches to be effective they need a profound consideration of the context within which corruption is experienced. Being a cultural and social phenomenon, corruption cannot be combated through imposed programmes that reflect some level ignorance on how corruption is entangled in the social and moral fabric of the natives.

### **3.4 Emergence of Political Corruption**

The outlined transition from colonial administration to independent sub-Saharan African states clearly depicts a number of problems that led to the structurally sustained corruption in post-colonial governments. The ploy by the colonisers to strategically remain in charge of governments’ administration during colonial and post-colonial eras was achieved through material inducements to local leaders and those who were part of political elites. Substantial benefits that the local leaders, mainly the chiefs and members of political elite, enjoyed towards

demise of colonialism and immediately at the dawn of independent regimes in Africa led to the entrenchment of political corruption. This happened as a result of political leaders who monopolised inherent benefits in government institutions and thus devised strategies that helped them to sustainably remain in power. The sub-Saharan African independence leaders failed to adopt the bottom-up approach in the engagement of the citizens in institutional reforms, which would pave a way in the creation of a comprehensive wealth that is anchored in the involvement of the natives as part of the development agenda (Mbaku, 2010:2). These leaders went to the extent of clinging to power at the expense of the wellbeing, peace and prosperity of their own citizens.

One of the major problems that affect the systematic study of political corruption is the lack of an appropriate definition (Ogundiya, 2009:282). Many definitions have been given on political corruption, but they seem inadequate towards a cogent definition of the phenomenon. Other than giving a definition of corruption, Ebbe maintains that political corruption includes activities such as:

politician taking bribes or kickbacks before a contract is awarded, before a position is filled, taking an action or failing to take an action because of *quid pro quo*, doing an illegal act to gain an advantage, converting national treasury assets into one's personal assets, embezzling state property by a cover up, and committing graft with impunity. A *quid pro quo* can be in the form of sexual favours in order to give a woman a job or a contract (Ebbe, 2005:100).

Even though there can be other activities that are not listed by Ebbe such as indulging in corruption just for self-gratification, the mentioned activities widely cover common activities through which political corruption is manifested. All of the mentioned activities clearly demonstrate the abuse of power by the office bearer in order to realize particular benefits. Rose-Ackerman (1997) argues that corruption by public office bearers is common at the interface of public sector and private sector especially in those instances where the public office bearer is required to exercise discretionary powers on the benefits or costs to the private sector. Unrestrained discretionary powers of public office bearer often lead to solicitation of bribes because private companies want to realize substantial profits accruing from minimal costs. Amundsen (1999: 3-4), on the other hand, contends that political corruption becomes rife where

accountability between the governors and the governed is deliberately weakened and the legal bases upon which corrupt activities are evaluated are subjected to downright encroachment by the rulers. In such a scenario, politicians in power make unilateral decisions on socio-economic policies so that such policies favour them in order to benefit directly from the public coffers.

The majority of post-independent African political leaders have been involved in political corruption, which was manifested in accumulation of wealth and distribution of benefits to cronies and political affiliates. Some of such leaders include Mobutu Sese Seko, a long time tyrant of Zaire, renamed Democratic Republic of Congo, (1967-1997), who accumulated a wealth amounting to five billion USA dollars, and Daniel Arap Moi of Kenya, who was also accused of multimillion dollars scandals in the massive cash subsidies for fictitious exports of gold and diamonds (Warf, 2017:20). All the regions of sub-Saharan Africa; Western Africa, Central Africa, Eastern Africa and Southern Africa, experienced disheartening corruption that affected almost every sector. Jean Bedel Bokassa of the Central African Republic, who came to power in 1965, consistently looted from the public coffers, exercised absolute powers over his fellow citizens and declared himself an emperor (Iheukwumere and Iheukwumere, 2003:225). While he indulged himself in riches and self aggrandisement, the rest of the citizens continued to suffer under abject poverty. Such leaders shunned fair, transparent and democratic elections and captured critical governments' institutions such as the judiciary and the military. Hijacking of these critical institutions would ensure a prolonged reign even amid politically flawed processes. Iheukwumere and Iheukwumere (2003:225-48) also make reference to a number of leaders across sub-Saharan Africa who came immediately after the rule by the colonial masters and indicate that none of them was spared from corruption that rocked their countries and therefore leaving the majority of their fellow citizens to grapple with severe poverty. These leaders first emerged as heroes who liberated their people from authoritarian and exploitative regime of the colonisers but it did not take them long before they demonstrate the same traits that characterised the colonisers. It is for this reason that Khalil Timamy postulates that:

When colonialism ended, African leaders stepped into the shoes of the departed foreign rulers, inheriting the institutions of alienation, and often behaving in ways not too dissimilar from their erstwhile masters. It soon became apparent that, in essence, the change from a colonial

administration to an African one was merely a change of guard, as the new leaders rapidly began to misuse and misappropriate public assets. Consequently, to the wider masses, the state did not shed its image as a force apart, but continued to display exclusive features of a colonial type, as the new leaders entrenched a culture of fraudulence and public embezzlement (Timamy, 2005:385).

Failure by postcolonial African leaders to combat segregating and exploitative laws inherited from the colonisers thwarted hope people had attached to independence. It also continued to create confusion in their value system as they had to be politically affiliated in order to obtain mundane services from government departments. Members of government opposition parties were subjected to overt frustrating processes towards obtaining services in government departments.

#### 3.4.1 Political Corruption and Weak Government Institutions

An effective government is a product of effective institutions. Thus, when government institutions such as the judiciary and the legislature are ineffective, the accountability and justice systems in a country will be negatively impacted. It is the responsibility of government to ensure that its institutions are well capacitated so that they can discharge their duties meticulously. Alence (2004: 163) contends that “democratic institutions contribute to ‘developmental governance’ in sub-Saharan Africa, in forms such as coherent policy formulation, effective public administration, and limited corruption.” Functional and effective democratic institutions become an impetus for government to achieve its goals. Contrarily, ineffective government institutions lead to social ills such as corruption.

Pervasiveness of corruption in postcolonial sub-Saharan countries is attributed to weak government institutions. Most of the immediate post-colonial leaders in Africa inherited weak government institutions and these leaders ironically relied on these institutions in order to stay in power. It is on this basis that the offices of such leaders enjoy constitutional supremacy and thus can legitimately exercise absolute control over all government institutions. In this way, the president has the legal powers to influence who should be in the leadership position of all government institutions. Concentration of power in one office inevitably compromises the

importance of checks and balances in governance and this creates a permissive environment for corruption.

At some instances political elites that succeeded the colonisers collaborated with the latter in the exclusive exercise of creating new constitutions that would ensure indirect influence of the colonisers in the economic, political and administrative issues (Mulinge and Lesetedi, 1998:22). The constitutions created with the help of the colonisers gave the emerging political elites a platform to engage in corrupt activities with impunity simply because the government powers are virtually vested in one office of the president who can influence the institutions to his/her advantage. The permissive nature of these constitutions is more reflected in their failure to specify terms that one could occupy the presidency office and this led to the leaders who declared themselves as presidents for life (Mulinge and Lesetedi, 2002:58).

Reference can be made to the Nigerian Constitution of 1999 and the Lesotho Constitution of 1993, which concentrate the powers of governance on the president and the prime minister respectively. The Constitution of Lesotho affords the prime minister unilateral powers to appoint and dismiss those who lead other institutions of government. With the return of democratic governance in Nigeria in 1991, the president the President Olusegun Obasanjo-led government was expected engage the citizens in the process of democratic constitution making, but this did not take place, instead Obasanjo continued under the military-crafted constitution which allowed the executive branch of the government to exercise substantial influence on the judiciary especially through controlling its budget (Mbaku, 2008:443). It is not easy to impeach or sack corrupt and unprofessional members of the judiciary if they have strong allegiance to the president. This is because such members of the judiciary sometimes burnt the guiding principles and values of their profession in order to advance the interests of the rulers. Mbaku (2008:437) asserts that since independence, majority of African states have not subjected their judiciary to necessary reforms and the presidents still enjoy the power to appoint and dismiss judiciary officers. The capture of the judiciary by the executive does not only render judiciary ineffective, but invariably reduces it to an instrument solely serving the interest of politicians.

If the judiciary's autonomy is diminished due to its subservience to the executive, all those who have dissenting views from the executive are unlikely to be administered justice by such a judiciary. As a result, accountability mechanisms become shaky therefore enabling elite politicians to unlawfully and corruptly enrich themselves and their affiliates with state resources. Cranenburgh (2010:448-449) argues that many African political systems promote imbalanced power concentration between the arms of government, especially between the executive and the legislature, which is a reality exhibited in the strong veto power that African presidents possess. The powers vested in the office of the president in many of African countries, weaken the role of other institutions such as the judiciary and the legislature. The legislature's oversight role on the operations of the executive becomes ineffective if the balance of power between the executive and the legislature tilts in favour of the executive with clear manoeuvres to fuse rather than separate their powers (Cranenburgh, 2010:449). Compromising the oversight role of the legislature weakens the accountability system and gives room to the executive to exercise excess powers that may often breed instances of abuse.

The leaders who possess this excess power go to the extent of materially inducing organisations such as the military and the police in order to thwart any threats that might threaten their stability (Mbaku, 2008:436). This can be reflected in the ridiculously escalated budgets of these organisations and procurement of extra ammunition as a move to intimidate those who might raise dissenting views from the practices of the ruling political leaders. Some benefits go into the pockets of security agencies' leaders and members of these agencies who actively demonstrate support to government.

Not only can the emergence of political corruption be traced to the imperial rule by the colonisers, but it can also be deduced that the colonial legacy played a role in the sustenance of political corruption in independent African countries. Iheukwumere and Iheukwumere (2003:54) argue that the fact that African countries despots such as Mobutu Sese Seko and Sani Abacha found a safe haven for the billions of dollars they looted from their countries in western institutions is a clear indication that their corruption was condoned by the West. These dictators laundered billions of dollars from their countries into the western financial institutions while their populace was faced with severe poverty. It may be posited that if the same despots were

required to rigorously account for the monies they invested in western banks that could have abated their looting (Iheukwumere and Iheukwumere, 2003:55). Failure to make African leaders account for the huge sums they invest in the western countries financial institutions is tantamount to encouraging them to loot from the public purse.

### **3.5 Bureaucratic Corruption in post-Colonial sub-Saharan Africa**

Political corruption is intertwined with bureaucratic corruption in sub-Saharan Africa. This is mainly because the technocrats are utilized to transact corrupt activities on behalf of the politicians. Since corruption is so contagious, some technocrats have also considered it as an opportunity through which they can benefit. Being in charge of administrative machinery of governments, technocrats are conversant with the operations of government and this gives them leverage to identify weak areas that they can use for their advantage. This leads to the inference that where there is pervasive political corruption, bureaucratic corruption is likely to become rampant. The underlying reason for this situation is that the failure by government machinery to operate properly creates an enabling environment for corrupt practices to take place (De Graaf, 2007:51). If the organisational culture is permissive in the public sector, bureaucrats will struggle to find value in shunning corruption. Similarly, if for bureaucrats to survive they have to be absolutely subservient to corrupt politicians they will hardly find value in maintaining professional standards.

Mulinge and Lestedi (2002:58) demonstrate a link between political and bureaucratic corruption, where under the former favouritism and nepotism determine who gets hired, fired, promoted or awarded a government tender. Bureaucrats who have benefited from the corrupt political system are in turn expected to be loyal and demonstrate strong allegiance to corrupt political leaders by carrying out their agenda through manipulation of government administrative systems. This explains why partisan civil service is encountered across the sub-Saharan countries. Politically affiliated civil servants are prone to breach professional standards of service delivery due to the expectation to prioritise politicians' agenda above their professional duties. Under partisan public service the citizens often find themselves at the receiving end of disservice from the civil servants

Due to weak and permissive constitutions, politicians in Africa find it easier to post their allies and cronies in key government institutions. Yeh (2011: 631) posits that recruitment of the bureaucrats that was spearheaded by immediate post-colonial leaders in sub-Saharan Africa was politically influenced in order to capture every major institution of government including the civil service. Through this strategic move, the ruling class' objective was to avert obstacles in the execution of their agenda. Yeh (2011:632) indicates that in the majority of African countries, corruption has reached devastating levels because the institutions such as the police and the judiciary, which are entrusted to be the custodians of accountability systems, are pervaded by corruption themselves. Under this situation the citizens lose trust from government institutions and resort to corruption as a normal and justified means of procuring services.

Besides being a product of a direct influence of political corruption, bureaucratic corruption in sub-Saharan countries is as well linked to high context culture. A high sense of communitarian relations is widely acknowledged as the pivotal trait that characterises cultures across sub-Saharan Africa. An individual in African context ought to conform to the communitarian precepts and patterns of conduct in order to secure an identity with the community. It is on this basis that an individual's fortune should be enjoyed by all members of the community. Few members of the community who occupy key posts in the public sector are expected to use their positions not only in favour of the immediate and extended members of their family, but to include even the members of the community. It is a common expectation in African cultures that a successful member of the family has a duty to extend his/her success even to the unknown relatives. Kinship is therefore one of the primary determinants in deciding who should get a job or be awarded with any lucrative opportunity in government (Mbaku, 1996:104; Werlin, 1972:253; Timamy, 2005:385).

Even though nepotism and favouritism are considered grave offenses in western bureaucratic conduct, giving a job to a member of a family in sub-Saharan context is considered to be socially compulsory (Werlin, 1972:253). Overburdening public officers with the duty to extend the influence of their office for the benefit of relatives and members of their community can easily lead to infringement of precepts that govern conduct in the public service. This means that public officials are expected to favour their relatives, cronies and community members even under illicit

circumstances. It is proper therefore to establish how corruption in sub-Saharan Africa interfaces with political patronage and the ethic of entitlement.

### **3.6 Political Patronage in sub-Saharan Africa**

As elsewhere in the world, political patronage is ubiquitous in sub-Saharan Africa. It is a commonly preferred relationship within a polity, which is intended to sustain political leaders at the helm of governments. Mwenda and Tangri (2005:449) observed that post-independence African leaders have employed different means to sustain themselves on power, but have mostly opted for a system of state patronage as the most practical one to entice people to elect them into power.

The use of political patronage varies according to different contexts in both developing and developed countries. Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith (2002:1) posit that all nations operate through formal and informal governance systems. The former is enshrined in constitutions and all relevant legal frameworks that are laid down and are in harmony with the constitutions, while the latter is based on unstructured and unwritten ways of decision making in conducting the machinery of government (Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith, 2002:1). It is often when the informal systems dominate the formal ones that we experience malpractices like corruption. For example, even though preference of relatives when hiring is socially condoned in many societies under the adage that ‘charity begins at home’, it compromises merit-based system and breaches recruitment procedures (McCourt, 2000:6-7). On the other hand, it is almost impossible to have a society that solely relies on formal governance systems and thus fathom annihilation of informal governance systems, because as societies evolve informal governance systems evolve too and are adapted to new circumstances (Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith, 2002:2). This explains why patronage has evolved from the primitive and peasantry societies to play a relevant role towards advancing the contemporary politicians.

The major problem is encountered when the informal governance systems dominate the formal ones. Since there are no standards governing conduct under the informal governance systems, it is possible to leave everything at the discretion of a political leader. Van de Walle (2007:1) posits that most scholars agree that the political climate in African countries is largely

underpinned by informal institutions known as “big man politics”, “personal rule”, “politics of the belly”, or neopatrimonialism. All these terms are coined to connote a kind of governance system that primarily benefits the politician through sustenance of his or her dominance over the populace. As such, they are against the key tenets of democratic principle, which have as their key focus the empowerment and wellbeing of the people.

When attesting to the prevalence of political patronage in Africa, Tangri (1999:7) indicates that it does not only inform governance paradigms in Africa, but has also been influential on economic management in the Continent since independence. Most of the post-colonial regimes in Africa have relied on patronage as a vital strategy through which prolonged government incumbency can be attained. The desire to occupy political office became a major priority in the sub-Saharan Africa and this has always been a cause for fierce struggle. Those who seize political power adopt various means of sustaining themselves at the powerful positions. This includes resorting to authoritarian means and later to patronage as a non-coercive form, which is characterized by distribution of benefits and resources through preferential treatment in favour of those who support the political leader (Tangri, 1999:10; Arriola, 2009:1339). Since independence, the prevalence of political patronage in sub-Saharan Africa constantly intensified and drastically stifled economic performance.

As a strategy to thwart the possibility of being deposed, political leaders in Africa can use state resources to facilitate what Arriola (2009:1340) called intra-elite accommodation whereby the political leader enlarges the size of the cabinet to include members who might destabilise government. A similar practice was portrayed by President Museveni of Uganda, whom after realizing that to win the elections over ethnically diverse electorates was not guaranteed accommodated the interests of powerful elites in his regime and significantly incentivised them so that they could not counter his political strategies (Godfrey and Yu, 2015:59). Although political patronage brings about further financial stress to the country, the leaders find it a viable option because it procures relative stability for their regimes. Another conspicuous example of African leaders manipulating patronage powers at their disposal is when Daniel Arap Moi sustained his Kenyan presidency in the early 1980s through restriction of active participation in political activities by usurping the control of Kenya African National Union (KANU) and

sacking those members who had been loyal to his predecessors (Arriola, 2009:1345). This scenario epitomises how political patronage engenders a sense of absolute entitlement to government powers.

### **3.7 Political Patronage as an Antecedent to a Sense of Entitlement**

Political patronage is often discussed in relation to a strong sense of entitlement whereby those who have endured liberation struggle from the colonisers become convinced that they are entitled to best opportunities when their political parties or allies emerge victorious and seize government powers. Yuchtman-Yaar (1982) defines entitlement as “the amount of reward that a person perceives he or she deserves to receive in a certain situation.” What a person perceives he or she deserves may not be proportionate to his or her contribution and this renders entitlement a difficult concept to deal with. Harvey and Martinko (2009:459) clarify this problem further by referring to psychological entitlement as “the phenomenon in which individuals consistently believe that they deserve preferential rewards and treatment, often with little consideration of actual qualities or performance levels.” One of the philosophical approaches to entitlement is linking it to justice by arguing that persons are entitled to themselves and the objects they acquire through specified means and their liberty to use such objects as they choose as long as they do not infringe upon the rights of others (Paul, 1990:564, Goldman, 1976:823). On this approach, Goldman (1976:823) makes reference to entitlement and distributive justice theory of Albert Nozick that social distribution is just if it is based on legitimate acquisitions and transfers, which implies that their acquisition does not involve transgression of others’ rights or leave them in a destitute situation. Goldman gives four sources for pure entitlement theory to an individual as follows:

Persons are entitled to those rewards of their socially productive efforts which others are willing to pay. Second, we will admit that they are entitled to what they can freely appropriate even when this does not result in benefits to others, as long as their appropriation does not directly worsen the lot of others. Third, if persons are entitled to their holdings, they seem entitled to control their further distribution, to spend or give them as they like, e.g., on entertainment or to their children. It seems, finally, that the recipients must then be entitled to the assets if the givers were truly allowed to disburse them as they pleased (Goldman, 1976: 824).

Under Nozick entitlement theory, the state has a very limited role on distribution of property or opportunities because individuals should rely on their capacity to acquire property. Thus, a state cannot embark on redistribution initiatives because that would be violating the rights of proprietors. Nozick maintains that in cases whereby economic production and exchange have left some members of the society at a disadvantaged position, it is not the role of government to intervene through coercive measures but that should be left to the discretion of the affluent to freely engage in charitable projects that meet the basic needs of the disadvantaged (Nayak, 1989: 2). This libertarian view on property entitlement is augmented under capitalist economic worldview through promotion of individual accumulation for self and personal gratification (Derber, 1978:27). Individual capabilities are meant to be maximized for an individual success without interference by government. If a person acquires property through legitimate means, he or she is entitled to accumulate as much as possible.

The above conceptualization of entitlement is individualistic in nature and assumes that ideally all human beings start their lives from equal setting, which is rarely the case. There are a lot of injustices in the world which invariably dictate to others to lead their lives starting from a very disadvantaged background. It is against this background that concerted efforts are taken through equity programmes to bring the disadvantaged at par with their advantaged counterparts. However, it is impossible to accurately redress the evils of the past and put all people at the same level and standard. It is also unfeasible to redress political ills of the past without having some side effects on those who were favoured by unjust system.

The transition from colonialism to independence in sub-Saharan Africa is characterized by severe struggle by Africans in an attempt to liberate themselves from their colonizers. However, Dorman (2006:1087) argues that majority of African countries; especially those that attained independence from late 1950s to late 1960s attained it through peaceful means. The implication is that no African country can really claim that it attained independence solely based on its military might, but as it was the case in Zimbabwe in 1980, Namibia in 1990, and South Africa in 1994 their success came as a result of both 'bush war' and international pressure that led to the removal of settler rule (Dorman, 2006:1087). This is not meant to undermine the role of war veterans in the arms struggle to liberate their African countries, but emphasizes that if it was not

due to amalgamation of efforts ‘bush wars’ alone would have met little success. This makes even more sense under the consideration of scarcity of resources that war veterans had to grapple with. Notwithstanding the support in a form of weapons that liberation movements received from those countries that were against colonisation, it was not possible for the oppressed Africans in sub-Saharan Africa to conquer their colonizers who had direct access to the resources and possessed sophisticated war machinery. However, Africans’ struggle for liberation, which was carried out in the form of negotiations and confrontation, through taking up arms, was vital for attracting international attention and intervention.

The transition from colonial rule to independent African states went through a number of hurdles. One of the conspicuous challenges that independent African states have to deal with is the phenomenon of entitlement. There were those who spearheaded the struggle for liberation and in the process many lives were lost. With the transfer of power from the colonizers to the locals there emerged a more challenging demand concerning the distribution of benefits and opportunities. The legitimate expectation from those who bore a heavy brunt of the liberation struggle was that they deserved priority from opportunities that are under direct control of their governments. This engendered a strong sense of entitlement, which could not only be confined to those who were involved in the struggle, but also seemed hereditarily extended and thus becoming so contagious that it could even be claimed by relatives and acquaintances of the war veterans. Muvingi (2008:79) makes reference to Zimbabwean case of President Robert Mugabe’s political ploy to stay in power by capitalizing on anti-colonial messages that depicted ZANU-PF under his leadership as the only means through which ideal liberation can be attained and thus inculcating to the Zimbabweans a liberation-based entitlement discourse that justifies him and his party to be at the helm of government. On the other hand, as a clear indication that those who were involved in liberation struggle developed a strong sense of entitlement, war veterans in Zimbabwe threatened revolt against Robert Mugabe, who avoided insurgency through hefty financial intervention that led to each war veteran being paid a sum of Z\$50,000 and a monthly pension of Z\$2,000 (Muvingi, 2008:80).

The greatest and perpetual challenge has always been related to scarcity of benefits and opportunities, since not all those who are entitled or claim it can benefit from government. It is

often the case that many people with minimal contribution in the struggle process or who are only related in many respects to those who confronted harsh realities of struggle become obsessed about entitlement. Irrational sense of entitlement leads to entitlement disorder, which is manifested in relentless desire to dominate and get prime opportunities in every undertaking (Hall, 2004:562). There is a generic attitude among political leaders in postcolonial sub-Saharan Africa that a “winner-takes-all” (Annan, 1998:4). In such a situation, majority of the beneficiaries from government resources and opportunities will be some of political leader’s party members and close allies.

### 3.7.1 Justification for a Moderate Approach to Entitlement

Entitlement claimants make a case that the hardships they endured ought to attract some form of a compensation post the struggle period. In clarifying distinct approaches between ‘impartialists’ and ‘partialists’ in the allocation of goods, such as civil service jobs and contracts for private companies, Metz (2009:335) shows that ‘impartialists’ maintain that a state should only opt for a course of action only intended for the sake of the public as a whole, while ‘partialists’ condone certain favours carried out in the public service for certain individuals at the obvious expense of the general public. Under ‘impartialists’ perspective there would be no justification for war veterans in the liberation struggle to be preferentially treated against their fellow citizens because its strong stance is that all should be impartially treated. In the western moral tradition, this view would be supported by deontology moral theory which dictates that a morally good act ought to proceed from a profound sense of duty without focusing on the consequences that are likely to ensue from an act. Since ‘partialists’ favour some individuals at the foreseeable expense of the public, and also breach the principle of fairness and merit-based system, they are deemed morally wrong under deontology theory. This implies that there can be no valid justification for entitlement under the deontology moral theory.

Rejection of entitlement as an immoral concept that is not worthy of pursuit under any circumstances would mean that the war veterans that led the liberation struggle in different African countries and many Africans who were discriminated under the colonial regimes cannot legitimately claim preferential treatment in the allocation of opportunities by their governments. In the absence of a cogent and appealing argument for entitlement, all those who endured

injustices and sufferings in order to bring an end to colonial regime do not deserve any reward. Against this view, Metz (2009:344) argues that all inherent opportunities to the government ought to benefit the public as a whole and their distribution should be fairly conducted with the exception of cases where individuals have unreservedly sacrificed their lives in the liberation struggle and in cases where some citizens were discriminated and disadvantaged. Metz (2009:344) refers to 'moderate partialism' as a justified form of preferential treatment that rests between strong 'partialism' and 'impartialism'. Justification presented on behalf of 'moderate partialism' is that:

Friendly relationships include a desire to show gratitude to those who have worked for the benefit of others. A person who is able but not willing to thank someone who has sacrificed his life for others is not properly identifying with that person or exhibiting good will. Ingratitude reveals a person to consider that some people exist to serve others, which a friendly relationship would, of course, exclude. An ethic that values friendly relationships therefore requires the state to recognize those who have made great sacrifices for it and the general public. That might mean giving some preference to veterans when awarding government contracts and jobs. 'Some' is the key word here, for all decisions should still be based largely on what would be good for the public as a whole. Those selected for a contract or job should, of course, be appropriately qualified (Metz, 2009:349).

The argument raised is that preferential treatment of people who sacrificed for the benefit of the public is deemed ethical under African ethics outlook because it is a demonstration of gratitude and a clear gesture of identifying with those who have borne harsh experiences of struggle. Preferentially treating them is in itself appreciation of their effort and a confirmation of their worth as esteemed citizens of their respective countries. Also, those who were disadvantaged under the colonial regime also deserve preferential treatment as an attempt to redress the past injustices that subjected them to subhuman treatment.

### 3.7.2 Strong Sense of Entitlement as a source of Corruption

An inflated sense of entitlement leads to high expectation to receive some attention and special treatment from others (Miller and Konopaske, 2014:810). It is when the ruling political parties instil in their war veterans and some of their supporters who were discriminatorily treated under colonial regimes that they deserve better opportunities than anyone in their countries that

irrational sense of entitlement emerges. It inculcates in them a strong belief that they deserve best opportunities in the form of jobs in the public sector and government contracts. While it is a morally good thing to show gratitude to those who have sacrificed their lives for the sake of liberation, as it is argued under a moderate approach to entitlement, it is not morally permissible to be too exclusive as this has a capacity to perpetuate and magnify the hardships that the citizens encountered under the colonial regime. A fact that ought to be highlighted in this regard is that the struggle for liberation was anchored on divergent political liberation ideologies and this turned out to be a springboard of conflicting liberation perspectives within African countries. It became a common phenomenon after the demise of colonialism that only one political party or movement would emerge victorious thereby forming a government, those who shared different political ideologies from the ruling party were largely excluded in the preferential treatment. This became the practice despite their significant contribution in the liberation struggle. Dorman (2006:1085) succinctly captures exclusivist approach in the allocation of opportunities by indicating that colonial state was deemed the centre of power and this was inherited by the postcolonial state, which blocked opposition from playing its entrusted role in the provision of checks and balances in governance. All opportunities were confined to government and their distribution was at the discretion of politically appointed officials for politically affiliated individuals. Under prolonged struggle for liberation hierarchies are developed, hardships and brutalities are experienced and all of these are likely to engender undemocratic tendencies such as power obsession by leaders, increased authoritarian rule and exclusivist politics (Dorman, 2006:1086). Those who are given best or better opportunities are the ones whom the leader considers to have demonstrated commitment and loyalty during the liberation struggle.

Extreme sense of entitlement was also portrayed in the Zimbabwean political and economic crisis under the leadership of Robert Mugabe. Massive institutionalized corruption that took place under his leadership was orchestrated by the political elites. Muvingi (2008:79) points out that ZANU-PF reign under the leadership of Mugabe deployed both repressive and consensual power strategies in a complementary fashion. Under the latter, terror and instruments of power are unleashed to silence the dissenters while under the former effort is taken to intelligibly nudge people about the need to pursue liberation ideals, which are made real under the developmental agenda. Eventually it became obvious that cabinet ministers' greed and corruption that were

evident in grabbing of land in Commercial Land Resettlement Scheme coupled with government ineptitude left Mugabe with no option other than repressive power strategy as the only viable tool that can keep himself and his party in power (Muvingi, 2008:79). Those ministers could not engage in accountable and transparent politics because they were driven by entitlement ethos, which were deeply rooted in participation in liberation struggle. The opportunity to serve as ministers turned out to be time for self-aggrandizement pursued under the justification of being in possession of struggle credentials. Greed and avarice for wealth became key features that defined war veterans as they accumulated essential resources like land and diamonds. The emerging worldview that was anchored in Self-enrichment defied the logic that underpinned the liberation struggle process, which purported struggle to be undertaken for emancipation of all marginalized natives from the dominion of the colonizers. It was absurd to concentrate all better opportunities to a particular group of people. Above all, unrestricted sense of entitlement perpetuated institutionalized corruption as veterans and elite politicians enjoyed virtually an exclusive access to a wide range of resources.

### 3.7.3 Nepotism as a Consequence of a Strong Sense of Entitlement

Sub-Saharan African states did not put in place economically friendly compensatory mechanisms for their war veterans. This is why selective, unfair and unstructured compensation strategies were largely meant to benefit those who fall within close circles and networks of political elites. Thus, the allocation of opportunities by politicians was subjected to a lot of abuse as some war veterans were significantly rewarded while many citizens were left to scramble for the crumbs falling from a bigger pie. Unfair compensatory strategies led to expressions of dissatisfaction and threatened stability of newly formed independent governments. On the other hand, political elites' monopoly to distribute government opportunities led to nepotism and favours extended to their cronies and tribesmen and tribeswomen.

The serious danger posed by nepotism and favouritism in the award of government opportunities is reduced trust from government by the citizens. Nyukorong (2014:39) refers to Ghana's corruption cases that were manifested through nepotism especially in the form of "whom you know", which unveil that unless one is known or does not know someone through family, religious, tribal or political ties there are slim chances of being recommended for employment.

As it could be expected, those who are recipients of unmerited favours feel obliged to demonstrate loyalty at all costs to their masters. It is not surprising, therefore, to find out that such favours end up impeding economic development, promoting public sector corruption and thus making it difficult to reform the systems (Kopecký *et al*, 217:417). Skewed distribution of resources and government opportunities on the basis of familial or patron-client relationships has dire consequences on government systems. It renders government systems pliable so as to suit the interests of those who occupy public offices.

### **3.8 Conclusion**

This chapter was intended to ascertain the prevalence of corruption and patronage in governments within the sub-Saharan African region. The chapter acknowledges that corruption is pervasive in the region and this is premised on different experiences of its manifestations across the sub-continent. The causes of corruption were traced from the colonial regime and particularly from some of the strategies that the colonial masters employed to subdue the natives. From the colonial strategy of divide and rule, some citizens received favours from the colonisers while others did not. This was meant to create animosity among the native groups so as to weaken their solidarity lest they revolt against the colonisers. As a result, those who were favoured deemed themselves superior to their counterparts and thus corruptly benefited from the system. The practice of divide and rule ingrained corruption in the region because the favoured clique started to protect their interests at the expense of their fellow citizens.

I also argued that neo-colonialism as perpetuation of some colonial tendencies has continued to encourage corrupt practices by some of the sub-Saharan African leaders. A particular reference is made to the role of weak institutions such as the constitutions that were inherited from the colonisers towards encouraging institutionalised corruption within governments (Mulinge and Lesetedi, 1998). I argued that weak institutions lead to the prevalence of political and bureaucratic corruption. The ubiquity of political patronage in the region is established. Other than being an instrument used to garner political support, political patronage has also become a conduit of corruption within the sub-Saharan African governments. This happens as leaders seek to attract support by distributing state resources and opportunities to their supporters. It is from the extreme end of political patronage that a strong sense of entitlement to political power

ensues, thus exacerbating endemic corruption. After establishing the relationship between corruption and patronage in the region, it is reasonable for the subsequent chapter to exclusively focus on the effects of corruption.

## **CHAPTER FOUR: REPERCUSSIONS OF CORRUPTION**

### **4.1 Introduction**

Without evident adverse effects, corruption would have not drawn much of the global attention and would probably remain an exclusively a moral problem as opposed to its contemporary interdisciplinary attraction. Besides being morally wrong in itself, the evilness of corruption is evidenced by its effects. Corruption has dire cultural effects, which are manifested in the lack of cohesion within a community. It is from the overt and deleterious effects of corruption that emerges a profound appreciation of initiatives aimed to combat it. Empirical literature shows that there is a negative relationship between corruption prevalence and economic prosperity within different countries (Ahmad, Ullah and Arfeen, 2012: 278). The multifaceted effects of corruption are spread across sub-Saharan Africa and continue to undermine cultural values.

In order to make a strong case why informed and contextually relevant anti-corruption is imperative in sub-Saharan Africa, I cluster the effects of corruption under four categories namely developmental, economic, political, and social. These categories virtually touch on all vital aspects of human life, especially the importance of maintaining communal relations. However, I should note just at the beginning of the chapter that even though I attempt to cluster these effects under the said categories, these categories are faintly demarcated, thus rendering some corruption effects to be common denominators in more than one category, while some effects feature under all four categories. This is owed to the fact that these categories are not mutually exclusive.

Social effects of corruption have dreadful impact on cultural values in high context cultures such as those found in the sub-Saharan Africa. The strife to promote the welfare of all community members is undermined by corruption effects which clearly depict prioritization of certain individuals' interests at the detriment of the majority of community members. On political sphere, corruption betrays the value of trust which ought to be an essential link between the

politicians and the electorates. There are a lot ramifications ensuing from a lost trust between politicians and the electorates. One of them is that the citizens cease to find value in being compliant to different legal frameworks. Since trust is a social value, the social aspect gets negatively affected too. Not only trust is prone to effects of corruption but a myriad of social values are jeopardized by this phenomenon.

Classification of corruption effects under development takes into consideration the complexity of the concept development. This concept is not precisely defined because many scholars attribute different variables to development. Also, there is no consensus on development indicators in different contexts. Nevertheless, a broad conception of development has to do with improved welfare of the people in general. This means that if corruption adversely affects the welfare of the people it has negative effects on development. There are also evidential bases for asserting that corruption has detrimental effects on development. Equally, corruption effects on economic performance are meant to demonstrate how corruption retards economic prosperity right from the micro to the macro levels. Most of those who bear the brunt of the retarded economic performance due to corruption are the poor within our communities. Due to damning corruption effects that taint a country's integrity, the investors get discouraged to invest in corrupt countries and this translates into significant economic loss.

#### **4.2 Social and Cultural Costs of Corruption**

The ubiquitous nature of corruption makes it one of the complex concepts to deal with, more specially in academic circles and governance processes by public policy practitioners. Corruption phenomenon also borders with many aspects of human life and is inevitably the product of human social relations. Under normal circumstances, every society is based upon a social organisation, which is mirrored in a smooth operation of its social systems (Clammer, 2013:114). Effective social systems play a fundamental role towards creating harmonious relations upon which human life thrives beyond just mundane routines and thus engaging one into more intellectually challenging activities. On the other hand, corruption is one of the indicators that reflects ineffective and dysfunctional social system because it fundamentally emerges from social disorganizations that are typified by narcissist conduct (Clammer, 2013:114). Under effective social systems society embraces a set of values as integral to its culture. However, it is

when such values are devalued and forced to degenerate into individualistic and egoistic interests that systemic ill such as corruption surface. It is obvious, therefore, that when social systems become loose and fail to bring harmony and cohesion within a society they will engender undesired results. This implies that corruption becomes a serious menace to cultural values, which also threatens to undermine vital systems that sustain cohesion in society. For example, it is a fallacy for one to claim that he/she identifies with the rest of the community members while also indulging in corrupt transactions that segregate against the same members.

A wave of corruption in sub-Saharan African societies has led to the breach of cultural norms and values. Barr and Serra (2010: 862) posit that cultural values play a crucial role in justifying and guiding how social institutions ought to operate so that they become a basis upon which acts are selected and evaluated. As yardsticks of human conduct, cultural values should be effectively transmitted from generation to generation in order to maintain order and solidarity within societies. It is against the cultural values and also disrespect for the interests of less powerful members of the society that some people may get unmerited material gain or any form of benefit just because they occupy powerful positions (Licht, Goldschmidt and Schwartz, 2007: 665). Every corrupt act has dire consequences upon cultural norms and values. Corruption undermines relationality within society as some members unfairly benefit from public structures to the detriment of their fellow citizens.

The pervasiveness of political patronage in post-independent sub-Saharan African countries has led to different forms of corruption that are mainly encountered in the public sector. The dyadic relations orchestrated under political patronage frequently lead to unfair distribution of government opportunities. This practice disturbs social harmony because some members of a society enjoy government favours by virtue of their political affiliation, while others are left to suffer. Berman (1998: 306) observed that even after concerted efforts on political reform and multi-party elections, the evils of patronage, corruption and tribalism held back progress in Africa. In particular, patronage networks become a basis for corrupt practices in struggling economies such as those found in sub-Saharan Africa (Kopecký, 2011: 713). Inevitable effects of pervasive political patronage networks are scanty programmes on improving social welfare of the citizens and reduced access to public goods.

The skewed approach that confines corruption debate exclusively to economic and political spheres constantly remains wanting and does not adequately address the effects of corruption on people's lives and their rights (Pearson, 2013:221). In order to understand corruption as a social process we have to understand what transpires between the individuals who actively participate in this social phenomenon. This is because "corrupt transactions occur between actors as the result of social interaction. For corrupt transactions to occur there must be communication between two or more individuals" (Pearson, 2013:221). To be an accomplice in corruption a person goes through a conscious process of renouncing some of the key values upon which a purposeful and meaningful life ought to rest. It is in rare cases that corruption cases involve only one person, in many cases, especially in grand corruption, it becomes a product of a syndicate whose members are nudged by selfish interests so as to be ultimate beneficiaries of corrupt transactions. It is obvious therefore that corruption robs society of its moral fiber, which is indispensable for sustaining social cohesion.

Some scholars have maintained that when those who tenaciously subscribe to the espoused societal values get disservice from their governments they will definitely breach their social values if doing so helps them to access basic services. Contravention of the social value systems is common in the public service in sub-Saharan Africa. It is perpetuated by public servants through abuse of their positions in order to advance their individualistic desires at the expense of community service and moral order (Hosea, 2014:385). It becomes even worse to learn that those who accumulate wealth through corrupt means are often celebrated by society for what they have achieved. Corrupt individuals are therefore construed as the primary perpetrators who are aggravating the scourge of corruption (Nwabuzor, 2005:128). In this way, corruption veils fundamental societal values.

The erosion of primary societal values by corruption in sub-Saharan Africa does not only destabilize sustainability of governments but also hampers their efficiency. The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (2014:2) puts it more emphatically that corruption plays a greater role towards reduced efficiency and increased inequality in the country. All these negative effects happen regardless of idealized norms that all are equal and deserve humane

treatment from their governments. Members of society continue to experience unequal access to government services while others get preferential treatment by virtue of being family members, or belonging to the same clan, ethnic group, political party, region, or religion with a public official (Heilman and Ndumbaro, 2002:2). Unequal treatment of the citizens is one of the primary causes of reduced citizens' trust on government institutions. The study conducted by Lavallée *et al* (2008:) on corruption and trust in political institutions in sub-Saharan Africa infers from a wide range of household surveys conducted in eighteen (18) sub-Saharan African countries that “efficient grease” theory, which purports corruption as strengthening citizens trust, because it enables them access the services that would otherwise be almost impossible to obtain, to be fallacious because of widely experienced and perceived adverse effects of corruption within the subcontinent. On the other hand, Daniel Egiegba Agbiboa captures it lucidly that “corruption deviates from the search for the Good Society and, instead, emboldens social pathologies” (Agbiboa, 2012b:123). As Agbiboa contends, corruption prevalence becomes a springboard of many social problems like inequality and poor service delivery.

The burden of corrupt transactions weighs heavily on the poor as they remain perpetually marginalized due to lack of capacity to pay for bribes to access basic public services. Due to power distance, which is one of the defining features of governance in poor countries, national resources and benefits are mainly accessed by the rich and the well-connected members of society, thus magnifying the plight of the poor who cannot afford primary services like health care and education (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2014:3). Such repercussions of corruption are mirrored in citizens' frustrations and loss of trust from government, which escalate into lack of patriotism. The citizens also become indifferent to government programmes. Loss of citizens' interest in their government business is as well reflected by their exodus to other countries in search of better living standards, and this has become more conspicuous through high brain drainage among the academics. The loss of human capital has serious consequences for a developing country because of the high training costs. It also implies that a country loses great ideas that would bring about innovations to solve contemporary problems.

Corruption effects on sub-Saharan societies seem to be worse and this renders corruption control a complex undertaking in the region. This is because a viable approach towards the control of corruption should entail tackling key elements in society, such as restoring derailed value systems and some key factors in culture. Even after more than two decades since the introduction of a structural approach on controlling corruption, which is underpinned by the principal-agent model, there is still no significant progress in sub-Saharan African countries. The structural approach seems to be wanting because it ignores interrelated structures between the various agents, while also overlooking the socioeconomic context in which corrupt operations occur (López and Santos, 2014:698). It is when individuals interact that corruption can ensue and this is more influenced by culture, shared values and social networks (López and Santos, 2014:698).

Deleterious effects of corruption within the political sphere of sub-Saharan African countries also stem from the fact that some corrupt activities are systemic and condoned in some cultures found in the region. This happens as a result of recurrence of such activities to a point that society deems them as a normal way of doing things.

#### **4.3 Effects of Corruption on Politics**

The massive launch of anticorruption campaigns which became common after the cold war blamed spread of corruption, especially in the African continent, to authoritarian regimes under one party state. Authoritarian regimes were also despised as source of bad governance that inhibited development. Democracy was thought to be a panacea for corruption and related problems as it was expected to improve competence in governance and bring about effective checks and balances. Democratic values were expected to be invariably reflected in the democratic electoral processes, which cannot be diligently executed without protection of civil liberties and freedom of speech (Boswell and Rose-Ackerman, 1996:83). The benefits of a fully-fledged democratic dispensation are purported to be ideally realised when the principal (government) and the agent (public official) professionally interact and the agent carries the principal's mandate under rationed discretion, effective accountability mechanisms and reduced state power (Xin and Rudel, 2004:298). What is being posited from this view is that when the agents exercise their duties under unrestricted discretion, limited accountability and uncontrolled monopoly corruption is bound to be rife. This is because it creates a permissive environment

where officials have a room to perform different transactions under minimal or no accountability measures. It follows therefore to infer that political corruption is a consequence of unregulated exercise of political power, which is entirely characterized by deliberately dishonest acts by a political agent for private end or for the benefit of affiliates (Lodge, 1998:158). Politically corrupt practices mainly involve government institutions such as legislatures, courts, bureaucracies and statutory entities such as quasi government enterprises or commissions (Lodge, 1998:158). All these institutions can play a key role towards advancing institutionalized corruption and creating fuzzy situations that render corruption practices almost untraceable. Involvement of the legislature in corrupt transactions is for the purpose of manipulating legal frameworks, which is demonstrated through arbitrary interpretation of the laws in order for politicians to carry out corrupt transactions with impunity. The courts are critical for acquitting politicians who have been involved in grand corruption activities or can also be instrumental in the indefinite postponement of such cases.

On the other hand, involvement of bureaucracies is meant to task willing bureaucrats placed at strategic positions to play a front role in corrupt transactions because they are the ones who have hands-on and therefore responsible for day-to-day operations in the public sector. Quasi government enterprises in sub-Saharan Africa have largely been deliberately designed prone to corruption so that they can serve as a conduit for extra cash for politicians. Tangri and Mwenda (2001:117) give Ugandan account of corruption in the privatization process pursued by regime politicians and their cronies in the 1990s and how it soiled the country's outstanding reputation as one of Africa's leading economic reformers. In one of the grave four corrupt divestiture processes obtained from the evidence given at the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into the closure of banks. In the light of the above example, Tangri and Mwenda observed that:

In 1996 bids were requested for the purchase of 51 percent of the shares of Uganda Grain Milling Corporation (UGMC), one of the few parastatals that had been regularly making a profit during the previous five years. Unga Ltd, a Kenyan firm, made the highest bid with an offer of US\$5.3 million. Caleb's International, a Ugandan firm in which President Museveni's brother, Salim Saleh (real name Caleb Akandwanaho), had a controlling interest, made the second highest bid of US\$5 million. The lowest of the bids submitted by five companies in all came from the recently established Ugandan firm, Greenland Investments

(GIL), which offered US\$3 million. In November 1996 Caleb's International won the bid for majority ownership of UGMC. Within minutes it resold its shares to GIL which now became the majority shareholder. This resale was clearly in violation of the sales agreement signed with the Ministry of Finance, but highly placed officials within the government remained silent. Official disclosure of purchase price, buyer, and resale was misleading and inadequate. Clearly, the speed of the transfer of ownership suggested a pre-arranged deal. Salim Saleh was considered to have made a profit of at least US\$400,000 on the deal as well as acquiring a stake in GIL (Tangri and Mwenda, 2001:123).

From the above observation it becomes clear that political corruption has a capacity to manipulate economic and developmental reform processes in order to benefit a political leader and his or her allies. The premeditated corrupt act of giving majority shares to Caleb's International and subsequent selling of its shares to Greenland Investments contravened the sales agreement and distorted transparency and impartiality in the transaction. This observation also makes a clear assertion that without political will corruption will remain an intractable problem to many sub-Saharan African countries.

The costs of political corruption also differ according to prevailing political climate. A comprehensive view on the costs of corruption on politics is that it distorts democratic institutions, substitutes public interest with private interest, undermines the rule of law, and downplays some of the key democratic tenets such as equality before the law and transparency (Szeftel, 1998:227). In addition, political corruption harms a fundamental democratic principle that governments are accountable to their citizens, a fact without which bad governments ensue (Mwangi, 2008:277, Kelly, 2014:26). When political leaders pursue their egoistic interests at the expense of public interest and the common good, the citizens become dismayed and consider such leadership illegitimate. On emphasizing how political corruption jeopardizes the rule of law Nwabuzor (2005:127-128) indicates that since it (rule of law) is one of the key tenets of governance that is adversely affected by political corruption, potential investors get discouraged because they will not risk investing in an environment where they can easily lose their investments.

Since political corruption is pervasive in sub-Saharan Africa, it is impossible to come across any sub-Saharan African country that does not grapple with its deleterious effects. Ebbe (2005:99)

confirms the severe effects of political corruption in Africa by asserting that the primary motive of many African politicians has always been to “loot the treasury of the nation by all means. Many have succeeded and some have perished in the quest.” A similar observation to this assertion is that whenever political leaders and high ranking bureaucrats become acutely corrupt they ultimately personalize public treasury in order to unaccountably benefit from the public coffers (Smith, 1997:58). These alarming observations are based on a myriad of corruption cases that involve politicians, especially political leaders, in many countries in the region. In order to seize optimal powers, political leaders also go to the extent of using their advantage to capture government, which is epitomised in the absolute control of government institutions by a political leader. This also leads to the manipulation of government distributive powers in order for political leaders to enrich themselves and their allies (Agbiboa, 2012:335). Once government is captured, public policy and strategic decisions will be controlled outside its realm by those who attached strong strings to the benefits they give to political leaders. Mwangi (2008:278) gives a logically compelling account of how corrupt political financing adversely impacted Kenya’s democracy and governance. He contends that because of blown out party financing in Kenya, Kenyan politics was turned into “a market place where positions go to highest bidder, making elections a money issue and locking out worthwhile contenders who can add value” (Mwangi, 2008:278). Similarly, Mbao gives clear incidences on political corruption manifestations in Zambia by stating that:

Corruption in the political sphere in Zambia includes: cases of abuse of public resources by the ruling party, the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy, during election campaigns; government leaders making donations to schools, community projects, community-based organisations and faith-based groups during election campaigns, thus garnering political support by prying on the poverty of the people (Mbao, 2011: 262).

What becomes clear from the observations made by Mwangi and Mbao is that corruption during the elections process is vital for politicians because it paves the way towards unlimited access to state resources. The prevalence of political corruption in sub-Saharan African countries is also sustained by political leaders who abuse government powers to keep themselves at the helm of government. These leaders often resort to material inducements of corruption in order to make up for expired ideological bond that used to lure electorates’ commitment to their political party

(Alam, 1989:452). The immediate benefits accrued from material inducements are loyalty from the party members and voting a political leader back into power. However, attempts to buy electorates' loyalty can become insignificant if government continually fails to deliver on its core mandate. This is because even if people's poverty plight makes them subservient to a political leader and also forces them to succumb to material inducements in exchange for votes, they can still independently gauge government performance on economy and development. In this way, political corruption and ineptitude destroy government capacity and threaten its legitimacy (Nwabuzor, 2005:130; Mwangi, 2008:277). It is possible for the citizens to become uncooperative and stop supporting government projects if such projects do not address citizens' immediate problems. Under extreme circumstances, when material inducements cannot attract citizens' support anymore, some sub-Saharan political leaders' tame political uproars that express dissatisfaction about government performance through enactment of laws that make any form of opposition treasonable offence (Agbibo, 2012:335). When the political climate degenerates to this level, any form of criticism on government underperformance made on different platforms, especially the media is deemed a serious offense. Indeed, many political and civil rights activists in the region have been incarcerated for raising their voices against their governments' malpractices, which leave many citizens struggling to acquire basic needs in their lives.

Political corruption has adverse influence on almost all sectors of human life. This follows from the nature of politics itself, which affects human development in all dimensions. Sub-Saharan African countries still have to work very hard to devise appropriate strategies on combating corruption. The first and essential step towards successful war against corruption is to have optimal political will because the fight against corruption will not be successful as long as contemporary political practices do not accommodate anti-corruption strategies. It needs to be realised that corruption has a negative impact on economic development.

#### **4.4 Effects of Corruption on Development**

Development has become a very elusive concept, which cannot be incisively discussed and defined outside a context-specific setting. There are various variables that scholars refer to as underpinning development. In appreciating the complexity of development, Agbibo (2012:329)

asserts that it has evolved from its primary concern with industrialisation and increasing gross domestic product (GDP) to include more complex variables like quality of life, human empowerment and good governance. Albeit, a wide appreciation and common reference to these variables as ideal ingredients of development, their relevance still remain vague in poor countries. This is because what matters most for people in poor countries is just a means of survival. Lawal (2007:3) also acknowledges that development is an ambiguous term by making reference to a number of development indicators like increased human skills and abilities, food security, increased employment rate, reduced income inequality, prevalence of social justice and an enabling environment for the members of the society to realise their full potential.

The problem stems from the universally accepted meaning of the terms ‘quality of life’, ‘human empowerment’ and ‘good governance’ because they are understood differently in different contexts. The term ‘development’ is often encountered in economic discourses as meaning the progress that a country experiences towards reasonable income, increased levels of employment and improved welfare (Papi, 1960:90). Without limiting the variables that underpin development to the enumerated three above, their approaches convey how a country is performing towards improving the lives of its citizens. Omission or underperformance in one of them has a potential to bring misery upon citizens and thus significantly retarding development. From a number of factors that are presented as underpinning the concept development, it is cogent to infer that elusive though it is, its overarching concern is sustainable improvement of human welfare in all spheres of social existence.

There are global initiatives aimed at determining countries’ performance towards improving the wellbeing of their citizens. The Human Development Report (HDR) (2016) published by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) attempts to comprehensively present data on all countries’ performance on different aspects such as gender equality, health, employment and human security. The crucial component of this report is on Human Development Index (HDI) which rates country’s performance on three areas namely longevity, education and income. The HDI has classified countries performance into four major categories (very high human development, high human development, medium human development and low human development) according to how they are performing in all these three areas. From these

classifications, there is no sub-Saharan African country featuring in the very high human development and there are only two countries (Seychelles and Mauritius) rated under high human development. Out of forty-one (41) countries classified under low human development, thirty-four (34) of them are in the sub-Saharan Africa (Human Development Report, 2016:198-201). This implies that sub-Saharan African countries constitute almost eighty-three percent (83%) of countries classified under low development index globally. The worrying development level of most of African countries presented in this report suggests that concerted effort should be taken to identify and put at bay all factors holding back development in the region.

From these different perspectives on development, it can be deduced that this concept is susceptible to a number of ills that affect governance. This is because development can only be achieved through competently executed good plans of government. Development within a country does not just happen but is earned through meticulous and constant discharge of duty by all those who are entrusted with various governance responsibilities. Failure to execute government duties as they ought to impede development and inevitably brings misery to many citizens, especially the poor.

There exists a universal claim that corruption deters development in many respects. This hypothesis is sometimes advanced without empirical evidence. On this issue, Alam (1989:443) states that empirical accounts of corruption on how it affects development are hard to obtain due to its clandestine nature. According to Ganahl, “Corruption only rarely occurs in the light of day or in the eyes of the public. It is a largely backroom affair – or under the table, behind the back, out of sight” (Ganahl, 2014:56). Due to intrinsic secrecy, corruption remains a complex phenomenon that cannot only be left in the hands of moralists who consider it to be evil in itself not essentially because of its negative consequences (Ganahl, 2014:56). Méon and Sekkat (2005:71) augment this view by asserting that “the moral judgment on corruption may bias the understanding of its economic consequence”. It is vital therefore that there should be evidence that portrays corruption to be bad such as the effects it has on investors for being forced to pay bribes (Ganahl, 2014:55). On exploring corruption-development-nexus, Tella (2013:50) highlights that fierce debate on whether corruptions deters or promotes development led to two schools of thoughts namely moralists and revisionists. The former argues that there is a negative

relationship between corruption and economic development because corruption adds extra costs on business and also renders decision-making process uncertain, while the latter considers corruption as a catalyst for economic growth because it greases the wheels of development through paying bribes in order to circumvent red tape and tedious processes in the public sector (Tella, 2013:50). The similar view is raised by Lumumba (2011:9) that there were circumstances under which corruption was deemed justified, but even under such circumstances negative externalities ensued. Since development is based on measurable indicators like the quality of life by the citizens and good governance, the cost-benefit analysis of corruption is imperative to determine its utility or corrosiveness.

Since indulgence in corruption by political leaders and public officials derails their focus from pursuing what is in the best interests of their people, it drastically affects development. Agbiboa (2012:326) argues that “[t]here is a nexus between corruption and underdevelopment...” This is the case because by being involved in corrupt activities public officials abuse their office for personal gain and in the process the rest of the citizens pay the price. Corrupt politicians and bureaucrats can also escalate a country’s debts through increased borrowings that finance bogus projects (Agbiboa, 2010:488). Additionally, increased debts have a negative impact on development especially if they are not meant to finance well-thought-out capital projects. Nwabuzor (2005:129) gives four pronged effects of corruption on development which include reduced Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) as investors deem corruption to be unnecessary extra expenditure, discouraged donor aid due to fear by donors that donated funds might end up in the private accounts of the corrupt bureaucrats or politicians, and investing government funds in projects that bureaucrats can easily get some kickbacks. Sometimes selfish decisions that are meant to benefit public officials and suppliers are taken through prioritization of setting up unnecessary infrastructures, which often turn into “white elephants”, at the expense of building schools and clinics (Kaufmann, 1997:117-118, Biliamoune-Lutz and Ndikumana, 2008:400). An example is given on how public officials and politicians can prioritise projects that will benefit themselves financially through illicit collection of bribes about the commission of four incinerators in Lagos, Nigeria, which none of them effectively operated (Kaufmann, 1997:118). By referring to a corruption story on Guardian Newspaper of 13<sup>th</sup> February 2004, Nwabuzor

(2005:129) makes a strong case on how corrosive and costly corruption can be when the stadium in Abuja, Nigeria, far exceeded its estimated cost of \$10million by more than 300%.

Without attributing developmental deficiency across sub-Saharan Africa solely to insidiousness of corruption, as there are more factors to this effect, corruption becomes an outlier due to its elusiveness and contagiousness. Sub-Saharan African countries feature high among the countries that are perceived to be very corrupt, with only insignificant number of countries from the region being classified as the least corrupt country (Konadu-Agyemang and Shabaya, 2005:131). Corruption in sub-Saharan region has also undermined different governments initiatives thus rendering African states hopeless and governments' policies ineffectual (Konadu-Agyemang and Shabaya, 2005:131). Clear incidences where corruption negatively affects developmental project are commonly encountered in the public sector. The perpetrators are mostly driven by narrow and selfish ends. Kaufmann posits that:

Corruption is negatively associated with developmental objectives everywhere. Opportunistic bureaucrats and politicians who try to maximize their take without regard for the impact of such perdition on the 'size of the overall pie' may account for the particularly adverse impact corruption has in some countries in Africa...(Kaufmann, 1997:120).

There is considerable concurrence between scholars and practitioners that corruption, especially its pervasiveness in the public sector, has become a severe developmental obstacle (Kaufmann, 1997:120). It is when the essential services are given less priority in order to advance major programs that consume substantial capital with a view to receive bribes by the bureaucrats that the poor loose primary services which are their basic means of survival (Lumumba, 2011:10). Above all, when it has become a norm that companies and service providers contracted by government have to give bribes in almost every transaction, they are likely to compromise quality of their work or services in order to recoup the costs they incurred in paying bribes. This situation becomes worse when corruption is decentralised, unlike when it is centralised, because there are several collection points for bribes. It implies that a company or a service provider may have to pay at different points in order to secure a job and catalyze a transaction process as it goes through different stages.

Sub-Saharan Africa is a typical region bewildered by the effects of corruption and thus leading to insignificant progress on development. This happens despite plenty of resources the region has and the paradox has always been that sub-Saharan African countries that have a lot of natural resources are the ones with high corruption rate and also notorious for bad governance. Agbiboa gives a vivid picture of how corruption robbed Nigeria and left it on the verge of collapse by referring to the following data:

Despite its huge oil wealth - it is the world's eighth largest oil producer - Nigeria remains a largely poor country. Roughly 70% of her population still ekes out a living on less than \$1 a day, life expectancy is at an abysmal 47 years, and the country ranked 159 out of 177 states on the United Nations Human Development Index in 2006 (Agbiboa, 2012:325).

Virtually all these Nigerian's woes portrayed in data are attributed to corruption and ineptitude of the political elites. Similar developmental hurdles are experienced in many sub-Saharan African countries. Agbiboa (2010:475) states that almost all African states continue to experience appreciable decline in development despite plenty of natural resources they have. Even though most of these African countries obtained independence in the 1960s, they continue to grapple with pervasive underdevelopment ills mirrored in flimsy infrastructure, weak education systems, poor health systems and abject poverty, all of them being largely perpetuated by corrupt and incompetent leadership in the region. Nwabuzor (2005:121) also attests to the insidiousness of corruption by referring to the findings of the World Bank study of 2002, which unveiled that the World spends almost \$1 trillion on bribes annually, which is equivalent to three percent (3%) of the World GDP, while for countries like Nigeria and Kenya bribes account for between eight percent (8%) and twelve percent (12%) of their GDP. It is beyond doubt that corruption has some huge costs on the economy.

#### **4.5 Costs of Corruption on the Economy**

It is vital to explore how corruption affects the economic performance of sub-Saharan African countries. Deductions derived from extant literature and data on economic costs of corruption in sub-Saharan Africa should objectively determine the costs of corruption. It is often the case that

corruption effects on development also have economic bearing. This is due to development-economy nexus. The symbiotic relationship between development and economy is based on the self-evident truth that improved economy in a country is the fundamental basis for development. In this way, it is unintelligible to expect enhanced development without focusing on better economic policies.

The scholarly research on corruption was initially common in sociology, political science, history, public administration and criminal law, before economists could systematically study its long-term effects on economic performance from the 1980s (Ahmad *et al*, 2012:277). Circumstances that lead to high corruption prevalence in a country include weak institutions, political instability and inefficient bureaucracy (Ahmad *et al*, 2012:277). Much of the attention from sociology debate on the costs of corruption is more inclined towards the negative effects of corruption on the economy, with the emphasis that they are very pervasive in less developed countries (LCDs). Urein (2012:143) contends that corruption drastically affects the economy of developing countries through abuse of limited budgets that should finance developmental projects such as building vibrant industries, hospitals, schools and other infrastructures as they are misdirected into senior public officials accounts through outright embezzlement, misappropriation or kickbacks. Corrupt politicians spent their countries' limited budgets on fighter aircraft and ammunition than on investing on quality education, even though the latter has more sustainable economic outcomes than the former (Ampratwum, 2008:79). A clearer picture on the economic effects of corruption in one of the sub-Saharan African countries is presented by Mbao (2011:262) through outlining how Zambian economic life was adversely affected by petty to grand corruption by the politically connected individuals and government officials from the National Treasury and Ministry of Finance. Mbao (2011:262-263) discloses that Zambia experienced grand corruption when the former President, Chiluba, and the former Chief of Zambia Intelligence and Security Services, Xavier Chungu, embezzled an estimated \$52 million from the public coffers, and part of that amount was deposited in some of Chiluba's allies and family members accounts.

From a practical perspective, when the costs of corruption outweigh its benefits to the populace it becomes justifiable to gear up efforts towards averting corruption. The fact that only few citizens benefit from corrupt economic activities while the majority's economic status is worsened by the

same activities makes a strong case against corruption. Nwabuzor (2005:128-129) argues that corruption imposes heavy and unbearable economic burden on the poor as they pay substantial fractions of their incomes through bribes in order to get basic service. This also means that the poor will find it hard to breakthrough their poverty circles as they are forced to spend the little they have on bribes.

On the other hand, arguments for economic benefits of corruption cannot just be ruled out based on hunch. There ought to be empirical justification that objectifies corruption to be economically hazardous. Nye (1967:419) indicates that there can be economic benefits of corruption based on three major ways. It can be instrumental towards capital formation where private capital is limited; it can also help in cutting red tape, thus improving efficiency; and it provides incentives in entrepreneurship so that even entrepreneurs from minority or disadvantaged groups can meaningfully contribute in political decisions and thus provide their skills (ibid). Bardhan (1997:1322) also presents circumstances such as the pre-existing policy induced distortions, which have negative effects on government efficiency, to provide justification for engaging in corrupt transactions. In this way, corruption helps to avoid induced policy inefficiencies that thwart optimal economic performance. At the face value, when this argument is raised in the context of sub-Saharan Africa, where some policies inhibit industrial performance, it seems logically sound and cogent, but falls short of sustainable economic performance in many respects. Divergence of public resources from building robust economy for a country has far reaching consequences. In a case of new innovators, they find themselves at the mercy of rent seeking public officials because by virtue of being new in the innovation industry they are expected to obtain permits and licenses from government and this makes them to lose interest in some innovations that could provide real solutions to economic hurdles (Bardhan, 1997:1328). This implies that several induced barriers in business processes limit economic freedom and thus lead to corruption. When addressing this issue, Nwabuzor (2005:125) argues that “Economic freedom in developing nations is often circumscribed by frequent changes in government policy and by the imposition of stringent constraints often without consultation and discussion with industries affected.” It is the imposition of stifling economic policies by government that often paves way for corruption thus discouraging innovators to explore different alternatives that would lead to new innovations. In relation to this problem Alma observes that:

The indiscriminate use of direct interventions in the economy, the persistence and proliferation of discretionary instruments, the sluggishness of bureaucratic procedures hampered by layers of decision-making, the wasteful uncertainties surrounding government policies, the often unchecked expansion of public employment, the interminable delays in administration of justice and similar pathologies of life in many developing countries must now be seen at least in part as creations of corrupt governing elites (Alma, 1989:448).

This situation inevitably encourages monopoly as the few entrepreneurs who have succeeded to penetrate the market turn the market into their own turf and become gatekeepers controlling who should be allowed to join them at their own discretion. It also leads to low quality products and services because of minimal compliance levels to accountability systems.

In order to realise a vibrant economy, all sectors in a country should be efficient and productive. For both private sector and public sector machineries to be effective and productive they ought to be operated by competent human capital and this can become a reality if the recruitment system is fair and based on merit. The economic costs of biased recruitment lead to collapse of organisations and inefficient public sector. Urein (2012:1) explores how corruption influences the recruitment system in the public sector and succinctly indicates that “allocation of job or responsibilities are not based on merit or potentials but rather on who has the resources and willingness to grease the palms of those in charge.” Besides bribing those entrusted with recruiting employees for their organisations, another phenomenal recruitment anomaly is perpetuated under nepotistic relations, which is very common in sub-Saharan Africa due to high context cultures. Otaluka (2017:21) clearly indicates that the nepotism approach that is underpinned by strong partialism primarily advocates for favouring and preferring family members in the allocation of government opportunities and resources without regard to the general public interests. Organisations encounter economic effects resulting from employing people on the basis of relations and cronyism through training expenses incurred in order to improve competency levels of such employees, while also having to deal with direct consequences ensuing from their incompetence, which have a negative impact on overall organisational performance. Nepotism and other unwarranted preferential treatment during recruitment in the public sector in sub-Saharan African countries lead to underperformance by public sector. Indiscriminate recruitment of public officials based on nepotism and other favours

also leads to overwhelmingly increased wage bill as many people seek formal employment from government.

#### 4.5.1 Effects of Corruption on Foreign Direct Investment

FDI is considered one of the critical economic indicators that determine how a country is economically fairing. Optimal FDI flows in a country are considered to be one the economic indicators that show that a country is economically performing well. The importance of FDI is, among others, attributed to its contribution to global economy which was estimated at \$2 trillion in 1990 and hiked to \$19.1 trillion in 2010 (Melo and Quinn, 2015:33). The significance of FDI on a country's economic performance is premised on its ability to impart new skills, bring new technology, promote innovation and improve management efficiency of host countries (Hossain, 2016:256; Abdulai, 2007:2). Anyanwu and Yameogo (2015:3) assert that "in African countries, in particular, besides being a critical source of long-term capital for investment in infrastructure and other developmental initiatives, FDI can be a catalyst for economic diversification, helping these economies move beyond overdependence on natural resources." Thus, it is a reliable basis of economic independence in a country through, among others, improving human resource competences. Abdulaai (2007:2) makes it clear that majority of countries in sub-Saharan Africa whose economies have not been experiencing growth for a long time, need to create an enabling climate for investment and particularly FDI in order to improve economic growth. On the other hand, companies that invest in different countries also expect to significantly benefit from host countries in various ways like reduced costs of production; market-seeking by opening new markets in host countries; and efficiency-seeking through operating from a few countries in order to serve a wider market (Kandiero and Chitiga, 2006:356). This implies that multinational companies (MNCs) and host countries should be driven by mutual benefit in their transactions. It is only when FDI impacts positively on a host country's economy and MNCs enjoy sustained profits resulting from enabling policies by a host country that FDI can be deemed objectively valuable.

There are several factors that determine FDI flows in a region and a country, which include policy direction on investment, economic and political stability, and non-policy factors such as corruption and market size. Kolnes (2016:11) highlights that literature on FDI determinants

identifies three major factors as crucial for optimal FDI flows being “the size of potential market, the costs associated with investing and hiring, and the stability and effectiveness of the government and the national economy.” What matters most in sub-Saharan African context, is the stability and effectiveness of the government because it is when the government is not stable and not effective that corruption ensues and thus becoming one of the greatest impediments to FDI flows in the region. It has been accepted as an imperative for African countries to work on attracting FDI in order to improve their economic performance. However, Kandiero and Chitiga (2006:355) have identified some of the major factors leading to scanty FDI flows in Africa being high prevalence of corruption, bad governance and poor infrastructure. This simply implies that if the climate remains hostile to investors there will be limited FDI prospects.

The main focus in this section is to ascertain how corruption limits FDI flows in sub-Saharan Africa, hence negatively affecting economic performance. Both empirical and theoretical literatures point to the divergent views on the impact of corruption on FDI; with some arguing that it plays a positive role while others maintain that it discourages FDI flows. The common argument raised on the utility of corruption towards attracting more FDI in a country is that it helps MNCs to avoid red tape and several inefficiencies resulting from weak regulations and policies in host countries. Unethical MNCs can take advantage of corrupt investment climate to minimize their costs by initiating bribes to bureaucrats on lucrative business opportunities. On this issue, Asiedu and Freeman (2009:5) show that the negative effects of corruption on MNCs can be neutralized in situations whereby the firms bribe the public officials in order to secure lucrative government contracts, buy raw material at subsidized prices, access credit at the reduced market interest rates, and bribe tax collectors in order to pay reduced tariffs. Jalil (2016:268) purports to give evidence based observation on a few Asian, African and Latin America countries that corruption positively impacts FDI inflows especially when poor governance prevails and when government regulations and control are too rigid. It is upon the same rationale that Abotsi and Iyavarakul (2015:265) argue that since corruption cannot be completely eradicated, the best African leaders can do is to reduce it to a tolerable level for investors.

Conversely, there are those who strongly argue that corruption is bad for FDI by all means. Their argument is premised on the conviction that a relatively corrupt-free environment boosts investors confidence and reduces unnecessary costs of doing business (Azam and Ahmad, 2013:3466; Hossain, 2016:268). Above all, even if the apologists are adamant that corruption plays a positive role for MNCs to evade inefficient processes there is no reason to believing that businessmen will not use payoffs to manipulate good business laws and procedures because “although some corrupt deals may circumvent inefficient rules, others will circumvent efficient ones” (Boswell and Rose-Ackerman, 1996:83). In the light of these contrasting views, I maintain that even if corrupt environment may appear enticing for FDI flows, it cannot help a MNC to enjoy sustainable profits because corruption adversely affects the reputation of a company which is vital for a company to operate in different countries and contest for business contracts under international financial institutions.

Some of the instant effects of corruption on FDI include creation of bottlenecks in business processes, high prevalence of uncertainty, increased costs of doing business, and creation of distortions through preferential treatment of some companies that are aided to access profitable markets (Habib and Zurawicki, 2002:292). Mutual benefit between a MNC and a host country can also be disturbed by a difference in corruption prevalence between the host and home countries (*Ibid*). If there is high corruption prevalence in a host country, as opposed to a home country, a MNC might struggle to effectively execute corrupt transactions. By being involved in corrupt transactions MNCs also risk being prosecuted and ruining their reputation because there is no assurance that bribing bureaucrats spares them from the possibility of being litigated. If MNCs are found guilty they can be heavily fined and debarred from participating in contracts that are under the supervision of international financial institutions such as World Bank and IMF (Ohlsson, 2007:8). Once a MNC is prosecuted and fined it becomes very costly, and at times impossible, for these companies to recover from ruined reputation.

As I alluded to above, corruption also taints the image of a country since potential investors develop a negative perception about corrupt countries. Adverse effects of corruption on investment emanate from increased fees that investors have to pay due to bribes solicited by bureaucrats in order to issue investment licenses (Ampratwum, 2008:79). If corruption goes

uncontrolled it has the capacity to destroy service delivery since public officials will demand bribes from mundane services they ought to render to the public. Ampratwum also posits that: “Corruption reduces the effectiveness of industrial policies and encourages businesses to operate in the unofficial sector in violation of tax and regulatory laws. Foreign direct investment (FDI) is discouraged by high corruption levels. Corruption acts like a tax on FDI” (Ampratwum, 2008:80).

Even though corruption profoundly involves secrecy between those who are involved in immoral and illicit transactions its effects eventually become evident in the dwindling developmental and frail economic performance of a country. This justifies the importance of building and safeguarding a reputable image for a country in order to make it an investment destination.

#### **4.6 Conclusion**

The aim of this chapter was to contribute to the logical flow of the study by elucidating corruption effects. It was proper that after discussing the factors that sustain corruption in sub-Saharan Africa in chapter two to go further and establish the effects of corruption. Clustering the effects of corruption into four categories was a clear move to present the multifaceted effects of this phenomenon and how it affects the fundamental features of human life. This proves that corruption affects human prospects and retards potentiality.

The first point that the chapter discussed is corruption effects on social and cultural spheres. The overarching proposition is that corruption takes place through people’s social relations. It is in rare circumstances that corruption becomes a solitary undertaking: there are two or more individuals collaborating in corrupt transactions. Thus, corruption primarily makes people to renounce essential cultural values needed towards building social cohesion. It influences people to prioritize their individualistic and egoistic interests above the common good.

Similarly, corruption costs on politics are also many and vary on the basis of existing political climate (Szeftel, 1998). They include distortion of good governance principles such as transparency and accountability. In their pursuit of self-interest, corrupt political leaders use their countries resources and opportunities as material inducements to attract enough votes in order to

sustain themselves in power. It becomes apparent that those who do not subscribe to a leader's political ideology have to endure his/her hostility through deprivation of opportunities. One vital observation made under this category is that political corruption has a capacity to corrupt all government institutions and the entire public sector. This is possible because government under corrupt leadership captures essential institutions such as the judiciary and the parliament, which in principle should be autonomous. Political leaders find it possible to capture government institutions because of weak legal frameworks, which also enable them to exercise their discretion in budget allocations.

Apart from those who argue that there is no negative relationship between corruption and development because corruption reduces unnecessary hurdles emerging from unnecessary bureaucracies and unfriendly business laws, I argued that corruption has adverse effects on development. Ridiculous escalation of development projects budgets in order to cater for exorbitant kickbacks, either demanded by public officers or initiated by companies, is very costly on development. This practice does not only affect the budget system but threatens the implementation of these projects. Closely related to effects of corruption on development, are corruption costs on economy. An attempt to compute the cost of corruption on countries' GDP clearly indicates that corruption is very corrosive on economy. The act of a customs officer who accepts a bribe in order to relax tax laws is just one of the vivid examples portraying how corruption weakens economies. Premised on empirical incidences of corruption that are taking place across the sub-Saharan region, it is cogent to affirm that corrupt practices pursued under political patronage networks have adverse effects on the wellbeing of the people and the region as a whole. It is vital therefore for Chapter Five to explore the political culture that is engendered by corruption and patronage in the region.

## **CHAPTER FIVE: POLITICAL CULTURE EMERGING FROM CORRUPTION AND PATRONAGE**

### **5.1 Introduction**

The effects of corruption that are discussed in the previous chapter become recurrent in the region due to the political culture that promotes corruption. There are various aspects that shape the political culture in every setting such as the changes that are taking place within a society, a country, a region or even within the global context. These aspects deserve to be approached with caution and shrewdness. This is because they are integral components of human life, which ought to be harnessed towards the promotion of people's welfare. However, the toxic remnants of colonialism and neo-colonialism in the sub-Saharan African countries have engendered a harmful political culture that is sustained through corruption and patronage.

Even though the struggle against the colonial domination by the liberation movements below the Sahara culminated in the obtainment of independence, statecraft under the liberation parties was punctuated by serious deficiencies, some of which did not emerge from the lack of capacity but were a reflection of political leaders' unscrupulous conduct in a quest to sustain themselves and their political parties. Sara Rich Dorman highlights an important issue when she said that "[i]n those cases where insurgencies or armed liberation movements took control of states, one competing claim became dominant, and shaped post-liberation politics" (Dorman, 2006: 1085). This observation suggests that those who replaced the colonial rule did not entertain any alternative political views, especially those dissenting from what they deemed to be founding principles of their liberation ideology. Since these leaders have started to enjoy access to state resources and the benefits accruing from being at the helm of their governments, they resorted to corruption and patronage as a means to lure political support and crush any form of opposition.

In this chapter, I will start by addressing political culture of corruption with specific reference to how it is manifested in the sub-Saharan Africa. This also involves the definition of political culture and its distinctive attributes. Since independence, political leaders subdued all government institutions under their control and exercised unlimited access to state resources (Szeftel, 200: 430). These were used to enhance the powers of a liberation party and therefore to safeguard its interests. It is from this perspective that institutionalisation of corruption under

dictatorial political leadership will be discussed to unfold how unlimited powers and access to resources led to political patronage and clientelism. I also argue that clientelism-based placements in governments have been very instrumental to buttress despots' regimes in the region. It will be argued that clientelism-based placements degenerate into prebendalism as the clients placed at key public offices appropriate such offices for their own benefit. As this situation presents downward spiral of institutionalised corruption, predominance of predatory politics in the region will also be discussed under a particular emphasis that other than advancing the wellbeing of their people political leaders predate them. The last issue the chapter discusses is a political culture characterised by persistent conflicts that emerge from poor governance by dictatorial and corrupt leadership.

## **5.2 Political Culture in sub-Saharan Africa**

The purpose of politics is to serve the interests of people through promotion of a common good. David Hoekema argues that “political life without common ideals or a compelling vision of the future loses its vitality and descends into a predatory struggle” (Hoekema (2013: 121). Carefully adopted policies of governments should reflect political goals of those who control public policy. In as much as politics is concerned about how power should be wielded in the distribution of scarce resources that have to meet unlimited human needs, the fundamental goal should be to promote the wellbeing of the people.

However, given that human beings are rational and can have divergent interpretations of reality; politics inevitably becomes a conflict-ridden terrain. It is from the obvious different and competing views that Andrew Heywood (2013: 2) refers to politics as entirely entangled to the phenomena of conflict and cooperation. A similar view is shared by Richards (1978: 1) that politics is based on the existing human disagreements about their aims and objectives. However, Richards argues that the resolution in conflicting and competing policies can only come through acquisition of power, which will enable a particular policy prevail over others (1978: 1). Although conflict and cooperation are mutually exclusive concepts they are integral to politics. Even though conflicts certainly emerge from competing different human needs and interests, there should invariably be a concerted effort to work together and incorporate different views as a viable means of maintaining order within a polity because good policies can thrive where there

is some political stability. This is the reason why politics can also be deemed as a search for conflict resolution (Heywood, 2013: 2).

Political culture is a highly contested concept that has attracted different definitions (Gendzel, 1997: 226). Dennis Kavanagh refers to political culture as “the overall distribution of citizens’ orientations to political objects” (Kavanagh, 1972: 11). Kavanagh elaborates on this definition by positing that where orientations expose citizens to all political objects there is likelihood of high participation in politics, while where the citizens are limitedly exposed the contrary is the case (Kavanagh, 1972: 11). By virtue of being shaped by rationality, emotions, attitudes as well as exposure to political objects by politically active citizens, a vibrant political culture ought to be established on contextually meaningful values. This would enable informed and optimal participation in political activities by the citizens. Political culture in post-colonial sub-Saharan African countries represents a conglomeration of different experiences that range from colonial dominance and how post-independent political leaders sustained themselves at the helm of their governments. It is not surprising therefore that even in the twenty-first century colonized mind is reflected in barren political discourse prevailing among African political leaders (Lauer, 2007: 289). Above all, patronage-driven corruption has ostensibly influenced the conduct of political leaders in the sub-continent where they preserve their right to govern by employing their clients in key positions in public institutions. The struggle against colonization started to yield some results from the late 1950’s throughout 1960’s, with only few countries like Zimbabwe and South Africa lagging behind. The expectation was that with the dawn of independence the people will be emancipated from political and economic bondage and therefore enjoy freedoms that the struggle for liberation had promised. Conversely, political corruption culture under the auspices of political patronage became so pervasive across the region thus undermining the promises the liberation movements made on procuring freedom for the populace.

### 5.2.1 Institutionalization of Corruption in Governments

One of the observable traits of political culture that emerged from political patronage in post-colonial sub-Saharan African countries is the institutionalization of corruption. That corruption is a serious bane in sub-Saharan Africa has been acknowledged from the beginning of this study. The underlying factor for endemic corruption in the region is that it has permeated fundamental

systems and institutions that by their very nature ought to negate corrupt practices. Pervasiveness of corruption in the sub-continent is perpetuated by its utility to political leaders as a reliable means of accessing resources. It enables the leaders to distribute resources to their followers, while also inducing more citizens to succumb to their leadership.

Institutionalized corruption gives a political leader leverage to control all key government institutions. Lessig (2013: 553) gives an elaborate definition of institutional corruption as “a systemic and strategic influence which is legal, or even currently ethical, that undermines the institution’s effectiveness by diverting it from its purpose or weakening its ability to achieve its purpose.” In a deliberate effort to exercise absolute powers on government’s operations, political leaders promulgate permissive laws and adopt weak policies that will enable them wield power and authority at their whim. As a result, government systems are bent to accommodate decisions that help a leader achieve a political mileage. Aluko (2002: 393) posits that institutionalization of corruption adversely affect the value-system and social norms that maintain order and cohesion. In the prevalence of devalued systems and degenerated social norms what is likely to emerge is a society that is characterized by inequities and injustices. Additionally, moral decadence will also creep in to annihilate social order. Akindele provides a wide range of institutionalized corruption detrimental effects on Nigerian culture which include:

Corrupt ascendancy to political leadership thro-ugh election rigging, annulment of election, son of the soil philosophy, politics of expediency, doctrine of ten percenters, judicial fractionalization of human beings, political self-aggrandizement, political Hitlerism (that is, rule by force) as a safety-valve for retention of power, replacement of “we-feeling” by “Me-feeling”, contractor-controlled political machinery, uncurtailed lust for wealth, giving and receiving of kick-backs for government contracts (done or undone), police insistence on taking bribes as a precondition for performing their duties and, bureaucrats’ indulgence in the act of falsifying accounts, false declaration of assets, false declaration of age, falsification and forgery of certificate, perjurious inclination, violation of oaths of office, payment of money for governments’ job not done, politically motivated assassinations of opponents, deliberate poison of political figures and opponents, and, manipulation of transition programme, gerrymandering/tinkering with constituencies, avoidance of taxes, entrenchment of black-market syndromes, manipulation of foreign exchange, import license frauds, pen robbery or looting of the public treasury, creation of “ghost-workers” (Akindele, 2005: 12-13).

Although the list of corrupt activities goes on, all of the above mentioned resultant effects of corruption breed a culture that anchors social ethos in subjective perspective, where an individual, especially a political leader cannot diligently and professionally execute duties, but invariably prioritizes what is beneficial to him or her. African political leaders have sustained their corrupt transactions through constant weakening of their governments' institutions so that accountability can be reduced to the lowest level (Owoye and Bissessar, 2012: 1). This implies that things that matter most like service delivery and distribution of national resources are approached from a political leader's vantage point or that of his or her political party. Even some gestures purported to advance the welfare of the citizens are driven by individualistic ulterior motives. It is on the basis of excessive powers that political leaders have that government ceases to be an instrument of the state but is altered to be an instrument of corruption for sustenance of a political leader (Akindele, 2005: 13 ). Corruption enables political leaders, their cronies and parties to have access to financial power, which escalates into discretionary political power affording them an opportunity to enjoy dominance over a political spectrum within a state (Khalil Timamy, 2005: 383). Selfish orientations of political leaders in sub-Saharan Africa easily lead to constitutions' amendments just to accommodate their greed and insatiable lust for power. This explains why dictatorial political leadership became one of the defining features of political culture that surfaced from political corruption.

### **5.3 Dictatorial Political Leadership**

Against what the majority of sub-Saharan Africans had hoped for after the demise of colonial rule, democratic dispensation was short-lived and replaced by an authoritarian rule (Healey and Robinson, 1994: 12). Other than overt employment of corrupt means, political leaders in Africa use other approaches to sustain themselves at the leadership of their governments. Employment of carrot-and-stick approach also features high. When it is convenient they purchase loyalty of their supporters and seduce those who dissent their political ideologies by promising them material gain. However, to those who obstinately resist their political maneuvers they face leaders' wrath through intimidation by security agencies or witch-hunt litigations leveled against them. Some African despots persecuted the leaders of opposition parties and their supporters. These leaders also prioritized "strengthening and extension of centralised administrative structures, and highly personalistic forms of rule using eclectic brands of legitimizing doctrines,"

(Healey and Robinson, 1994: 15). All this is intended to silence opposing views so that a political leader and his or her party can enjoy unopposed reign. These approaches have been very common among the post-independent political leaders and explain why despotism prevailed in sub-Saharan African countries.

Dictatorial style of leadership in sub-Saharan Africa is a by-product of politically corrupt culture which abuses power to protect the interests of a leader and his or her allies. This kind of leadership style surfaced among post-independent political leaders. Carol Lancaster gives a following comprehensive view on how dictatorship regimes became an offshoot of corrupt political leaders:

Typically, the ruling party declared itself the sole legal political party, and those opposition groups that the party did not co-opt were banned or harassed out of existence. The independence of the judiciary, too, was often compromised as presidents appointed and fired magistrates at will. The government augmented its control by nationalizing the media or by placing it under strict controls. Along with the centralization of political power came the concentration of economic power in the government's hands and the imposition of state controls on trade and investment activities, on the prices of agricultural products, and on the cost and allocation of credit and foreign exchange. Where governments took on a strongly socialist tinge, as in the cases of Benin, Congo, Guinea, Mozambique, Somalia, or Tanzania, they often nationalized private enterprises outright. Others controlled economic life through a variety of laws and regulations (Lancaster, 1991: 149).

What immediately comes to one's mind is the motive for political leaders to exert government's absolute control on all sectors of human life. Absolute subjugation of socio-economic and political activities under the office of a political leader has drastic implications on keeping checks and balances mechanisms effective. As the adage unveils that *power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely*, confining all state powers in a political office has inevitable dire consequences to all sectors. One of the major economic setbacks resulting from economies that are overly regulated by government is misallocation of resources (Mbaku, 1992: 446). Political leaders allocate most of the resources in programmes that advance their ulterior interests even though such programmes do not have positive prospects towards positive and sustainable impact on the lives of the populace. Some African leaders embark on undemocratic practices like

misappropriation of the funds to meet the interests of their clients as a means of gaining more popularity among the electorates. What matters most to them is not championing good public policies, but camouflaging unsustainable ones as if they are all what people really need. This is the reason why in the extreme wielding of political powers some African despots suspended democratic dispensation under the pseudo and illogical justification to protect the security of their tender independent and vulnerable states from multipronged instabilities (Lancaster, 1991: 149). Wealth accumulation by despots like Mobutu Sese Seko, whose wealth was purported to be equal half of the national debt of then Zaire (Hacker, 1991: 51), is prompted by deliberate encroachment of the systems that are designed to regulate political leaders' powers. In a pursuit of enjoying uncontrolled access to state resources, political leaders often succumb to a temptation of immorally and illegally exercising absolute powers.

A Malawian case under the thirty-three years of dictatorial rule by Hastings Kamuzu Banda also sheds more light on the symbiotic relationship between corrupt political culture and dictatorship. It unveils that the ability to unaccountably use state resources leads to pervasive corruption and eventually to dictatorship. Banda's three decades of dictatorial rule is considered one of the most brutal, corrupt, predatory and violent political era in the subcontinent, which was influenced by a ridiculous claim that everything belongs to Kamuzu Banda (Tambulasi and Kayuni 2009: 429). It is argued that due to Banda's avarice conduct, extortion also became rife whereby the citizens were forced to give money and other material gifts to the president (Tambulasi and Kayuni 2009: 429). The rationale for all this was that nobody should be perceived as enjoying more economic prosperity than the president. Weird though this may sound, it is peculiar conduct that typifies extreme traits of African dictators. Alongside this strange leadership, it can be argued that its characteristics reflect its degeneration into totalitarian rule.

Even after one-party system and military regimes, there seems to be some evident traces of dictatorial leadership style among recent and contemporary sub-Saharan Africa political leaders. In explaining corrupt and dictatorial leadership of Senegalese president, Abdoulaye Wade who served from 2000 to 2012, Abdul Ly (2010: 6) observed that Wade regime maliciously confiscated fundamental freedoms through intimidation and arrests of journalists and intellectuals. In an attempt to silence any opposing views that would hinder him to exercise his

autocratic powers, he presented gifts to some influential leaders, while he manipulated his cabinet through frequent reshuffling of the ministers so that they could not establish themselves in the sectors they are charged to oversee (Ly, 2010: 6-7). A major reason prompting these dictatorial tendencies is an unquenchable desire to remain in power so that a leader can unaccountably benefit from the state and its resources. The most appalling phenomenon is that such political leaders want to occupy their positions for life, which often leads to political turmoil escalating into coups.

Since despots still need their stronghold bases as a justification that they still have command on majority of the citizens, they rely on skewed distribution of state resources and government opportunities to those who clearly demonstrate their support. Such supporters play a strategic role to defend inherently flawed government policies, while on the other hand mobilize support to the leader and a political party. In critiquing the organisation of Malawian women who dance at political rallies, national celebrations, during the arrival and departures of the presidents, while also singing songs that criticize their parties' opponents, Lisa Gilman (2001: 43) posits that "these women serve as political tools for their parties: symbols, advertisers, voters, boosters of morale, and mobilizers of support." As an evident gesture of transacting support, political leaders give these women monetary and other material gifts to lure them to become zealous supporters of their political parties (Gilman, 2001: 44). This explains why inequitable distribution of opportunities and resources has been an instrumental tool used by African despots to cling on power.

### 5.3.1 Clientelism as Sustenance Mechanism by Despots

As I have highlighted, political dictators in Africa heavily relied on different inducements mechanisms to entice the electorates. Under clientelistic approach, they alter between material gifts, distributing government opportunities (mainly through giving employment to their supporters) and directing developmental projects to areas that are political leaders' strongholds. Clientelism has therefore become a very useful means of consolidating support in African politics. Leonard Wantchekon defines clientelism in political context as "transactions between politicians and citizens whereby material favors are offered in return for political support at the polls" wantchekon (2003: 400). Being a political instrument, it also reflects "personalistic,

materialistic, and opportunistic character of African politics” (Berman, 1998: 305). It is one of the most appealing political maneuvers that are intended to convince the supporters that their immediate necessities are taken care of thereby warranting their zealous support to the political leader. Wantchekon (2003: 399) makes a comprehensive observation that African leaders, whether self-appointed or democratically elected, rely on clientelism through distribution of favours to those members of the society who pledge political support to the leader.

There are divergent views concerning the value of clientelism as a kind of relationship that brings together two unequal partners (Omobowale, 2008: 204). It is considered to perpetuate inequalities within societies while on the other hand is a necessary means through which the poor and the disadvantaged can access basic necessities. Oskar Kurer (1993: 260) posits that clients can either receive benefits in a form of pork-barrel or patronage benefits, whereby the former consists of collective benefits like building new schools and erecting infrastructure, while the latter is concerned about benefits directed to an individual like being appointed to serve in the public service. In examining the utility of clientelism as a political instrument intended to procure support, it should be noted that clientelism cannot just be wished away in politics because even more established democracies still reflect clientelistic tendencies. For political leaders who do not cherish sustainable policies, but only focus on tactful strategies of winning the elections will find it hard to commit themselves to developmental programmes (Robison and Verdier, 2013: 261). This suggests that the utility of clientelism depends in the hands of a political leader; it can serve to procure political support that a political leader needs to be in charge of public policy in order to implement developmental projects, or it can be abused only as a tool to seize political power.

The most worrying aspect of clientelism in sub-Saharan African politics is that it has been overly abused as a segregation tool that divides those who support and those who are against a political leader. Also, it has been used as a dyadic relationship through which illicit and corrupt favours channeled. This is the reason why in sub-Saharan context clientelism is synonymous with corruption and all its adverse effects. In the sub-continent, Clientelism has played a role as a means of capital accumulation for those who have access to state resources, while also being a basis for class formation within societies (Szeftel, 2000: 430). Those who control resources

employ clientelistic stratagems to maintain their positions by making their supporters survive on handouts. On this issue, Rebecca Weitz-Shapiro (2012: 568) argues that clientelism becomes more instrumental where poverty prevails, while in relatively affluent societies it turns out not to be a viable political tact to attract support. For societies that do not struggle for basic necessities all they need from a political is sustainable policies that have real impact on improving efficiency in service delivery and thus enhancing the entire economy. It becomes clear that political clientelism is not always motivated by good intention to emancipate the electorates from destitution, but is more influenced by its instrumentality as means to secure support for a political leader.

One of the interesting issues to be determined is why clientelism became so pervasive in sub-Saharan Africa. Clientelism has become widespread in the region and this has been the case right from the immediate post-independent leaders and continues to be employed by the contemporary political leaders. This also tacitly indicates its perceived reliability towards attracting political support. As it is widely acknowledged, clientelism mostly prevails in societies that are characterized by low productivity and high inequality (Seffer, 2015:199, Wantchekon, 2003: 400). Since asymmetrical relations play a critical in the interdependence nature of clientelism, this kind of relationship survives on the basis of inequality. As it happens in sub-Saharan Africa, political despots preserve their positions through constant supply of basic commodities to their clients. Lindberg (2003: 124) discloses that African members of parliament (MPs) go to the extent of paying for school fees, electricity and water bills, funeral costs and giving some cash to their clients as a testimony that a 'big man' will provide for their basic needs. A similar observation is made by Lindberg (2010: 120) that MPs in Africa engage in personalized assistance that directly benefits their constituents and this can also be extended to benefit chiefs and staunch members of a political party. However noble clientelistic acts can be claimed, they are not proven to have a positive influence on sustainable policies in order to augment the living standards of the citizens as a whole. Instead, they are only intended to galvanize reciprocal relations between an MP and his or her clients. Thus, clients are rarely introduced to self-sustenance projects so that they can always look up to their political leaders for the provision of basic necessities.

In most of the countries where clientelism dominates, the private sector is highly controlled through stringent policies that retard its growth so that it cannot emerge as a competing sector in terms of employment opportunities. Companies that become successful are largely those corrupt political leaders have interest in them through investments or as a source of funding for political activities that are intended to draw more political support. Besides that, the interface between government and private sector is characterized by debilitating corruption, which often discourages vital transactions essential for the existence of the latter. This behaviour has as well led to dubious political parties' funding by business community in the region. Opaque transactions in political parties' funding have become a problem that not only affects democratic principles, but even threatens the stability of government as the funders turn to operate the government machinery. Huge sums of money deposited into the ruling political parties' accounts have become a source of unfair competition. It has become a common cause that by virtue of controlling political apparatus, the ruling political parties in Africa monopolize the political terrain and attract funding from either big companies or affluent individuals, which also make these parties to be accountable to their funders not to the electorates (Eme and Anyadike, 2014: 22). The promises made during parties' financing processes often lead to corruption at the grand scale, while in some very unfortunate instances the funders literally capture the state and its operations.

### 5.3.2 Patron-client based Appointments in the Public Sector

It is a global phenomenon that political leaders prefer to work with people they are comfortable around them. This also gives them assurance that their policies will be well implemented without any sabotage. There is a wide belief, from established to crawling democracies, that it is best to appoint the people that belong to ones political party and thus sharing the same political ideology and vision. It also comes naturally that people trust those who share the same worldview with them. Patron-client based appointments are therefore considered imperative for a political leader to realise his or her promises to the citizens. However, indiscriminate influence of political clientelism in public sector appointments can retard efficiency in the provision of fundamental services.

Absolute powers by political leaders in sub-Saharan Africa have seemed incompatible with democratic principles and values. This assertion is objectified in the susceptibility of governments' institutions where these political leaders have placed their clients at their helm. The appointment of officials heading vital institutions such as the judiciary and security remains a political leader's prerogative in many African countries. As it is, these leaders have absolute powers to appoint and dismiss head of government institutions. This has a great potential to infringe on essential principles like separation of powers in governance. Robert Cameron (2003: 54) makes reference to the interim appointment policy of Democratic Alliance (DA), which is a political party governing the Western Cape Province in the Republic of South Africa, as clearly bringing up dichotomy between positions that should filled on the basis of bureaucratic best practices and those that are politically sensitive hence warranting appointment by a politician. Justification for political appointments in this policy is two pronged; strategic management and communication, whereby the incumbents are not only required to possess necessary competencies, but above all should demonstrate a political will to pursue the policy direction of the ruling party (Cameron, 2003: 54). This policy was criticized on many fronts, some of which was that it is likely to lead into a lot of ramifications like engendering political patronage. Colonnelli *et al* (2018: 1) assert that government performance is determined by the quality of its employees. In as much as patron-client based appointments may be considered ideal towards minimizing sabotage in the implementation of government policies, government success also depends on the quality of the employees that political leadership has placed on strategic positions. Like what Junyan Jiang (2018: 983) posits on the importance of fostering mutual trust between patrons and clients through prioritization of long-term cooperation and shunning short-term opportunistic behaviours, patron-based appointments can only help political leaders achieve sustainable development only if they have placed competent employees at the right positions. However, the political system in sub-Saharan Africa is characterized by opportunistic and self-aggrandizement habits. A political winner seizes all powers and ebbs opposition to insignificant level.

Appointment of a politically active figure in the public sector does not only serve as a reward for loyalty, but is also intended to make government resources available so that he or she can easily reach out to many potential clients. In as much as incumbency in the public sector will have

more direct benefit in terms of remuneration to the client, the expectation is that he or she will also be more efficient in serving the interest of the political leader and the party. On the other hand, it serves as evidence that loyalty to a political leader pays off thus luring more clients to demonstrate unreserved commitment in enhancing leader's popularity. The leader can also place a client to a strategic position in a bid to conceal questionable transactions that are meant for personal enrichment (Kopecký, 2011: 717). All these possible reasons underpinning appointment of a client in the public sector reflect high possibility of perpetuating political corruption. This unfolds why political leaders in sub-Saharan Africa overly relied on patron-client based appointments as an instrumental system to protect themselves against opposing views.

### 5.3.3 Prebendalism in sub-Saharan African Political Culture

Closely related to patron-client based appointments in the public sector is the emergence of prebendalism in the political culture in sub-Saharan Africa. Richard Joseph is considered to be the one who first used prebendalism as a political concept in his book entitled *Democracy and prebendal politics in Nigeria: the rise and fall of Second Republic*, first published in 1987. The origin of the term preband is given by The Catholic Encyclopedia as “the right of the member of a chapter to his share in the revenues of the cathedral; also the share to which he is entitled,” (<http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/12371a.htm>). Joseph (2014: 1) used the concept to elucidate how it best portrays Nigerian polity in the fierce struggle to control and exploit public policy. It implies that public office bearer can use the office to advance his or her narrow selfish interests. The concept is applicable where prominent supporters of the party are awarded lucrative tenders so that they can distribute their wealth to less fortunate members of a political party (Joseph, 2014: 1). National resources are distributed in favour of ruling political party supporters so that fortune may be seen only through the lens of supporting a ruling party. Under one of the key observations in the conceptualization of prebendalism, Joseph highlights the following:

To understand prebendalism, it is necessary to grasp what is a prebend. The dividing line is when the officeholder is able to appropriate the office, that is, convert it into his or her piece of the state. In contemporary Nigeria, and other peripheral capitalist countries, there is a short time-horizon in which resources accruing to the office can be diverted for personal and related uses, or for the capital accumulation it facilitates (Joseph, 2013: 264).

As an attempt to appeal to the citizens and the polity that a political leader is not abusing state resources to advance his or her political interests, the elites are employed into strategic government institutions so that they can have access to resources. To augment this point, van de Walle (2007: 4) argues that prebendalism is mostly preferred by political leaders whose countries have limited financial power as it is the case with majority of African countries who have very low GDP and is largely conducted through illegal means. Posting political elites at the high government office has a significant role towards helping a political leader to achieve a political mileage. Such a public officer is expected to appropriate the powers of the office for his or her own benefit, but also for the benefit of his or her political party. It is understandable that prebendalism has a great potential to create a venal environment thereby leading to endemic corruption. Olly Owen (2013: 148) discloses how the appointment of security officers in Nigeria was informed by prebendalist logic. With particular reference to appointment to the senior positions within the Nigeria Police Force (NPF), Owen (2013: 149-150) indicates that NPF has a personnel of over 370,000 and its budget is one of the largest within Government departments, which makes political leaders have interest in their appointments and operations. On this basis, the commissioner of police of a state or area commander can pursue narrow political interests through provision of security or not providing security to certain political groups (Owen, 2013: 150). Such a discretionary application of the law gives room to a politically appointed or inclined officer to promote the political interests of a particular group to the detriment of others. Since it is impractical to reward almost every loyal member of a political party, turning a public office into prebend best advances the personal interests of political elites while also pursuing the interests of a political party.

It is from a misconstrued conception that characterized public office as a prebend in sub-Saharan Africa that its incumbency was reduced to a source of self enrichment and a basis for consolidation of political party's interests. This implies that such officials enjoy ultra power in the operation of government machinery, which has bearing on fundamental decision making that symbolizes policy direction of government. Assessment by Uguwani and Nwokedi (2015: 20) that under prebendal system those who occupy political office go to the extent of budgeting for nonexistent projects, authorize purchasing of flashy cars, finance their exorbitant lifestyle from

the public coffers, while also paying back to those who appointed them, evidently points to the proneness of the system to corruption. This conduct also reflects political opportunism, which is epitomized by relentless effort to exercise ones political influence at all costs (Okoli and Orinya, 2014: 1480). Out of self-interest, such officers stop pursuing projects that solely prioritize improving the wellbeing of the citizenry. Only those projects that will benefit them and their allies are implemented.

The segregating nature of prebendal system means that there are many citizens whose needs are left unattended. The implication of channeling state resources to only meet insatiable needs of those who occupy political office and their close allies is that there are many citizens who have to grapple with poverty and its ramifications. It also suggests that the citizens who do not fall within the political appointees' allies circles lack a formal platform to critique policies under these officers custodianship. David Pratten (2013: 243) elucidates on the precariousness of prebendal system under its politics of exclusion. Greater part of the argument is that there will be social unrest if resources are enjoyed by a particular segment of the society. Though the system can be claimed instrumental by political opportunism exponents, it is likely to breed political conflicts because it survives on political exclusivism.

#### **5.4 Emergence of Predatory Politics**

At the most desperate level, when anti-developmental systems that are characterized by clientelism and prebendalism cannot sustain the operations of dictatorial kind of governance in the region, predatory politics emerged. The harsh means of maximizing government revenue and extorting money from the citizens became the only option for sustaining machinery of government. Boaz Moselle and Benjamin Polak (2001: 28) refer to a predatory state as a “state whose rulers’ aim is to maximize their take, not the wellbeing of the people.” This kind of state can survive on a number maneuvers that are intended to maximize state’s collection. Since the citizens are the ones who bear the brunt of such predatory government policies, it becomes unsustainable form of government that also leads to uncertainties and insecurities. Shumba (2016: 3) gives more of a context-specific characteristics of predatory politics as they became manifest in Zimbabwean politics through the conduct of the post-independent ruling clique. The three characteristics are “(1) party and military dominance in the state; (2) state-business

relations shaped by domination and capture; and (3) state-society relations shaped by violence and patronage,” (Shumba, 2016: 3). Although applied in a specific context, these characteristics are largely applicable on the experiences of predatory politics in sub-Saharan African context.

Under the axiom that *you cannot eat your cake and have it*, it can be argued that a political system that sacrifices developmental policies for narrow political gain also risks reducing the size of their economy. As I have argued, corrupt sub-Saharan despots sustain themselves, among others, through clientelism and prebendalism systems, which do not have positive impact on developing and improving the welfare of the citizens. Instead, these systems dig deep from the exchequer thereby deviating resources that ought to be utilized for developmental projects. It is not an anomaly for states that have degenerated to a predatory state in the sub-continent to under budget for sectors like education and health, or deviate budgets that have been allocated for these in order to resolve their political hurdles. This justifies an observation that politics without shared ideals and vision sinks into a predatory struggle to control public policy (Hoekema, 2013: 122). Even where good economic policies are conceived, they inevitably collapse when good governance principles are not entrenched and domesticated. Without concerted effort by the political leaders to transform their political landscape, development would only be idealized in policies that only end in paper work.

A gloomy picture painted by predatory politics portrays how countries go down the deterioration ladder from weak, fragile and failed state. An inference drawn from sub-Saharan perspective is that even if predatory politics can portray signs of relative sustainability, it certainly collapses or engenders acute political instability. It follows, therefore, to aver that predatory politics has substantially contributed to pervasive political unrest that has engulfed the African continent. This proceeds from adversarial nature of predatory politics that begets predatory societies, which Larry Diamond has lucidly asserted in the following damning remarks:

In such states, the behavior of elites is cynical and opportunistic. If there are competitive elections, they become a bloody zero-sum struggle in which everything is at stake and no one can afford to lose. Ordinary people are not truly citizens but clients of powerful local bosses, who are themselves the clients of still more powerful patrons. Stark inequalities in power and status create vertical chains of dependency, secured by

patronage, coercion, and demagogic electoral appeals to ethnic pride and prejudice. Public policies and programs do not really matter, since rulers have few intentions of delivering on them anyway. Officials feed on the state, and the powerful prey on the weak. The purpose of government is not to generate public goods, such as roads, schools, clinics, and sewer systems. Instead, it is to produce private goods for officials, their families, and their cronies, (Diamond, 2008: 43).

The shelving of the development agenda and replacing it by narcissistic projects characterize predatory politics. Against this observation, a fundamental question would be why corrupt political dictators snub policies that are intended to boost the economic performance of their countries? Although there cannot be a definite and comprehensive answer to this question, Robinson (1999: 3) argues that such policies affect the wielding of political power within a society. It is in the best interest of corrupt leader not to introduce an inclusive economic policy lest he or she risks losing grip on public policy and position as a patron to be looked up for in the distribution of government opportunities to the allies. Flow of developmental projects empowers the citizens through broadening economic avenues that accommodate more than just an elite clique. It also liberalizes the citizens' minds to compete on more appealing economic policies they deem viable towards promoting their welfare. In an effort to thwart any possible competition and resilience from the society, corrupt leaders embark on segregating developmental policies.

When predatory politics prevail, not only do people maneuver the systems, but clear looting instances become very common. Perpetrators know that impunity is granted, especially to those who support a despot. Almost similar to the rule of the jungle, society's value system gets decayed and political actors employ any means that help them accumulate wealth. Even worse, political dictators rig elections, silence members of the opposition and assassinate candidates who threaten to challenge their positions (Diamond, 2008: 43). Under these dire circumstances those who are not the beneficiaries opt to revolt as the only practical remedy to free themselves from political predators. This is the reason why fierce political conflicts characterize politics in sub-Saharan Africa.

## **5.5 Prevalence of Political Conflicts**

Political conflict is found in almost every political system. This is because conflict is inherent in human nature and it becomes more inevitable when two or more people interact with a view to achieve an identified objective. Quincy Wright (1951: 193-4) gives the etymological definition of the word conflict as being derived from the Latin word *confligere*, which means to strike together, and the term may be used to refer to “inconsistencies in the motions, sentiments, purposes, or claims of entities, and sometimes to the processes of resolving these inconsistencies.” On the basis of this explanation, it becomes impossible for interpersonal space to be free from conflict. Also inferring from inescapable intrapersonal conflict experiences, it becomes oblivious that conflict characterizes human interactions.

The greatest concern is when political conflict is engendered by political actors’ greed and avarice as it is re reflected among the political dictators in sub-Saharan Africa. In an ideal situation, political conflict should provide a theater where the feasibility of political ideologies is being tested, but these conflicts have turned out to be the bane of development that escalates into the conception of economically barren policies. When public policies fail to promote economic wellbeing of the citizens, conflict over scarce resources will sprout. Other than struggle for prestige and status, scarcity of resources is deemed one of the significant catalysts of conflict (Bartos and Wehr, 2002: 12). However, even where there is plenty of resources conflict is likely to ensue if they are mismanaged. The common phrase “the natural resource curse” (Van der Ploeg, 2010:367, Diamond and Mosbacher, 2013: 87) is used mostly in relation to how African governments mismanage endowed natural resources thereby turning them into a basis for conflict. Notwithstanding the attempted deconstruction of natural resource curse theory under the rationale that there are many variables leading to political conflict in the continent, most of the resource rich countries like the Democratic Republic of Congo and Nigeria have not taken economic advantage of their resources to improve the livelihoods of their citizens. It is from unjust and corrupt distribution of benefits accruing from natural resources that fierce conflicts are fueled.

Of the four predictors (Economic Development, Social Fractionalization, Domestic Governance and Trade Openness) that Volker Krause and Susumu Suzuki (2005: 162-165) posit to explain the persistence of debilitating political instability, I would like to focus on economic development and domestic governance. There is a positive relationship between striving for economic prosperity in a country, which is carried out in the equitable distribution of resources and equal access to opportunities, and reduced incidents of fierce political conflicts. When societies have a fair share from the national cake there will be reduced internal conflicts (Krause and Suzuki, 2005: 162). Closely linked to economic development is domestic governance variable. Since every good policy prospers or falls under the quality of governance, political conflicts also degenerate into civil wars because of poor governance. It takes a stable domestic governance to sustain the economy from which equitable distribution of resources becomes possible. Consolidated form of domestic governance is vital towards averting political conflicts at the national level (Hegre *et al* 2001: 33). Under corrupt political leadership economic prospects decline and governance systems become shaky. This happens as leaders lose sight of common ideals that nurture and sustain robust polity.

As one of the characteristic features defining political culture that is emerging from political corruption under the sponsorship of patronage, political conflicts continue to ravage many countries in sub-Saharan Africa. The process from political conflict to civil war is outlined by Kirwin and Cho (2009: 2) that civil war does not just spontaneously break but is heralded by incidences of political violence that if not neutralized are consolidated into insurgent groups which will eventually precipitate civil war. They refer to the Cote d'Ivoire case as a typical one embodying the process whereby there were first instances of armed rebellions followed by political violence and ultimately the emergence of armed insurgencies. There are overwhelming numbers of casualties emerging from civil wars and the confrontations between security agencies and protesting citizens. In awful circumstances where organized insurgents groups emerge to confront the military, more fatalities and displacements of the citizens are experienced. Abdalla Bujra (2002: 1) gives a summative observation on how political conflicts have shaped the political culture in sub-Saharan Africa that between the 1960s and 1990s there were almost eighty (80) undemocratic changes of governments in forty-eight (48) sub-Saharan African

countries, while the period after the dawn of new millennium is still marked by frequent political conflicts and inconsistencies.

Pervasiveness of political conflicts gives African politics a distasteful culture that is epitomized by denying the electorates some of their fundamental democratic rights. One of these rights is to elect and remove leaders (Bratton, 1997: 69). Even under absolute and seemingly sustainably autocratic rule, the citizenry quest for a just and fair political environment will be visible either in covert instances of disapproving their regime's policies or in overt statements that denounce government practices. Being self-determined by nature, human beings do not settle under oppressive regimes that forestall their potential, but always seek emancipation mechanisms. In this way, perpetuation of undemocratic and corrupt forms of governance risks escalating political conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa.

## **5.6 Conclusion**

This chapter presented the political culture emerging from corruption and patronage. The crux of the argument is that political culture resulting from corruption and patronage consistently remained distasteful and harmful to polities found in sub-Saharan Africa. In order to substantiate this argument, I identified the key features of this culture and therefore propounding how each sprouts and lead to adverse effects. I have demonstrated that in their pursuit for absolute powers, the liberation parties that became governments subdued their governments' institutions under their direct control so that they can use their political leverage to sway the operations of such institutions towards the realisation of their political mileage. It is from the usurpation of these institutions' powers and autonomy that institutionalised corruption crept in.

The deterioration of political culture into explicit instances of dictatorship was also discussed. This takes place as the ruling political party induces terror to all dissenting voices to its political outlook (Lancaster, 1991: 149). Consequently, the electorates were expected to subscribe to the political stance of a liberation party as a doctrine that promotes national unity. Accordingly, those who diverted from the party's ideology were labeled the proponents of the colonisers. As I have established, the African despots employed political clientelism to place their loyalists to key public offices in government thus enabling them to exert absolute power across the public sector.

Prebendalism was discussed as a consequence of nepotistic placements in the public sector, whereby such officers capture public offices for their own interests. Under the prevalence of such a culture service delivery suffers and the citizens become the victims of disservice. It is under this perspective that I also explored predatory feature of political culture in the region. By deviating and abusing resources that would otherwise be used to erect developmental projects, political despots impoverish their citizens. For that reason, the citizens will have limited means of survival, which will lead to incessant conflicts, some led by organised insurgents.

The subsequent chapter builds on the discussed characteristics of a political culture emerging from corruption and patronage. It will focus on transmutation of this culture into entitlement ethos reflected by liberation parties and the exclusivist claimants by war veterans that by virtue of their liberation credentials they are entitled to govern and access state resources and opportunities.

## **CHAPTER SIX: METAMORPHOSIS OF CORRUPT CULTURE INTO ENTITLEMENT ETHOS**

### **6.1 Introduction**

Incidences of entitlement ethos emerged at an early stage of independent states in sub-Saharan Africa. The transition of liberation movements from struggle against colonial domination to government is marked by contrasting experiences. While these movements were hailed to be an embodiment of hope for their people, they have also remained wanting on the art of statecraft, which became common among the NLMs in Southern Africa. There are different causes purported to be attributable to their deficiencies and key among them is that liberation movements emerged from undemocratic circumstances and were thus sustained through undemocratic means (Melber, 2009: 451, Suttner, 2004: 762). Their new role of heading their countries' governments still bore significant characteristics of their struggle. Undemocratic and authoritative governance style of these movements became so pervasive and imbedded in many governments in the region. This is the reason why opposition parties are deemed as traitors and remain perpetually subjugated.

The overarching claims that governance is exclusively a preserve of those who confronted the oppressive rule of a colonial regime clearly indicate that the liberators are now becoming the perpetrators (Melber, 2009: 452). This sense of political entitlement serves different purposes for the benefit of the claimants. It first indoctrinates the populace to consider a liberation movement as the only legitimate political party that has all the necessary credentials to govern. Thus, there is no alternative political party that can usher freedom for the people except the ruling liberation movement. Also, political entitlement is meant to secure the interests of the politicians. It is from the protection of their political interests that these politicians start to embrace neo-liberal economic approach and distribute the favours to their allies and cronies on nepotistic basis.

This chapter starts by explaining entitlement politics and how such a political ethos has emerged in sub-Saharan Africa under the salient claims for political monopoly that are usually made by some of the political leaders of the ruling liberation political leaders. I also present the liberation paradox inherent in entitlement politics as liberation movements seek to prioritise preservation of

their political power above freedom and equality for the citizens. The crux of the argument here is that these movements fail to deliver ideal democratic liberties to their people because of being caught up in the pursuance of absolute powers to govern their countries. It is from this view that I explain how the prevalence of debilitating political elitism ensued. These political cliques sustain themselves through crude neo-liberal principles that eventually degenerated into institutionalised corruption. I also expose the repugnancy of preaching socialism as a founding political ideology for these movements, while their leaders were overtly displaying capitalist style of accumulating wealth. The chapter ends with the elucidation of the insidiousness of entitlement and segregational politics as the causal factors to state capture corruption, poverty and related ills.

## **6.2 Entitlement Politics**

Sub-Saharan African countries' independence ushered in a new leadership clique that is characterized by liberation credentials. Struggles borne in pursuit of independent and liberated states from the erstwhile colonial masters were deemed an entry requirement into leadership role by African politicians. The use of entitlement discourse was undergirded by exclusivist politics that only those who have liberation credentials can assume offices of responsibility and therefore accordingly wield power (Muvingi, 2008: 86, Brooks, 2004: 4). Under the claim for entitlement, it became clear that there was no space for dissenting views because the immediate independent political leaders wanted to exercise absolute powers. Even though there were incidences of internal dissenting voices they were deemed as opposing the will of the people (Gumede, 2017: 12). Opposition members were seen as the disciples of the colonizers who are in a mission to advance the policies of their masters. This led to a virtual ban of opposition parties whose role was reduced to just mild debates with no significant impact on policy direction.

One of the greatest challenges that the independent governments led by war veterans confronted was managing the transition from liberation politics to inclusive and developmental politics. The abstractness of governance poses complex challenges that demand competence and political flexibility. Successful project of obtaining independence does not necessarily impart governance competences to war veterans and this is reflected in a myriad of political challenges that sub-Saharan African countries have experienced and still continue to grapple with. A repressive entitlement dogma by war veterans does not help to emancipate the citizens from socio-

economic and political ills but only culminates in the pursuit of power for its sake, if not to solely serve the interests of the leaders and their allies. Christopher Clapham makes the following observation about legacies of liberation:

Leaders especially are deeply affected by taking their movement through to ultimate triumph, and readily assume a sense not only of the rightness of their cause, but of their entitlement to the power that follows. Power is not for them the result simply of a popular vote that may be reversed in a later election, still less of a coup d'état that has to be justified in some way or other, but is instead the culmination of a lifetime mission. It is very hard indeed for them to recognise that anyone else could have any equivalent right to rule, while for the movement as a whole its record in the struggle confers – in the minds of former fighters – a virtually permanent claim on state power: those who did not participate in their struggle, including those who were too young to have had any chance of doing so, are expected to take second place to veterans (Clapham, 2012: 6).

By advancing the entitlement philosophy, the national liberation movements (NLMs) indoctrinated the nation that they are the only ones who can deliver their freedom, and as such opposing the NLM is tantamount to disapproving the objectives of the nation. This approach is lucidly reflected in the NLM 'Model' by Raymond Suttner (2004: 760), which unfolds that many of the African parties that govern African states started as liberation movements. The model depicts a NLM as embodying the interests of the nation. This is entailed in the inclusive slogans used like the one by the Convention People's Party of Ghana (CPP), which says 'CPP is Ghana, Ghana is CPP'; the slogan by Kenya African National Union (KANU) that referred to the party as both the mother and father of the nation, which is derived from its native origin as 'Kenya African National Union Ni Mama Na Baba'; and a slogan by South West African People's Organisation (SWAPO) of Namibia which says 'SWAPO is the nation, the nation is SWAPO' (Suttner, 2004: 760). These slogans are carefully constructed to intrigue a spirit of solidarity thereby inflicting profound sense of guilt to those who might hold a different opinion from the NLMs masterminds. As they suggest, to stand against the NLM is tantamount to being against the interests of the Nation.

The transition of NLMs from struggle to the formation of governments led to extremely powerful and unaccountable governments and a few instances justify this observation. One of the

distinctive features of these governments is the prevalence of political leaders' interests over national interests. Good (2003: 4-5) refers to some cases like how the former president of Namibia and then the leader of SWAPO, Sam Nujoma, pushed for an amendment of the constitution to suit his desire to serve for a third term. Similarly, after the twenty-seven (27) year rule of former Zambian president, Kenneth Kaunda, the 1991 elections led to the landslide victory by Fredrick Chiluba of the Movement for Multi-party Democracy (MMD), who first emerged as a democratic president under MMD's opposition to undemocratic policies like 'president-for-life', but towards the verge of his second term sought to swindle the constitution in order to serve a third term albeit unsuccessful due to resistance from different sectors (Good, 2003: 5). This trend of liberation leaders who do not want to vacate the presidential office, evidently uphold their philosophy of being irreplaceable. Against the presidential term limits that were enshrined in the constitutions of a number of African countries as an explicit expression of migrating from personal rule to democracy (Khadiagala in Wahiu, Lappin and Khadiagala, 2017: 35), many presidents from revolutionary movements have struggled to confine their terms to at least two consecutively. Adeolu Durotoye (2016: 40) discloses that since 1990 more than eleven (11) leaders in Africa have attempted to prolong their presidential tenure through amendment of the constitution to relax the term limits. While it is deemed rational and moral that political leaders should uphold their countries' constitutions, the benefits accruing from a presidential portfolio or being a leader of government seem to outweigh the conventional and democratic value system that underlie term limits for many sub-Saharan African leaders. Being confronted with mammoth and seemingly mutually exclusive tasks of nation-building and establishing strong basis of power, these leaders confine the executive powers to their office while also giving more autonomy to their parties and their governments (Johnson, 2003: 201). On this basis, there is a thin line of demarcation between a party and government. This is the reason why it became very easy for the liberation parties to degenerate into narcissist elites (Johnson, 2003: 201), who prey on state resources and opportunities.

Another strategy used to pave way for entitlement politics is through reiteration of the ordeals that were encountered by the war veterans during the struggle for freedom. This is what October (2015: 24) referred to as "liberation movements [adapting] history to suit their needs." The employed tact of repeating the endured sufferings is intended to make the struggle ever present

in order to appeal to the citizens' conscience not to forget that their freedom was earned through the sacrifices borne by their liberators. While it is true that many Africans below the Sahara were inhumanly treated, with some being killed and others migrating from their countries under the colonial regime, it is not justifiable to claim entitlement of government leadership at the expense of citizens' right to participate in governance systems. A good history is the one that helps the citizens not to repeat the evils of the past, but to rectify them as they forge a way forward into a brighter future. History about the struggles endured in the process of procuring freedom for sub-Saharan African countries should be transmitted from generation to generation, but not as means to capture governments by those who purport to bear liberation credentials. Dunn and Shaw (2005: 58-59) refer to some performances such as renaming of the state, producing a new national flag and introducing a new currency as affirmations of consolidated state. Even though, these performances are noble and legitimate as a means of expressing power by the natives, as opposed to foreigners, they were also abused to create reverberating memories on how liberation was attained so that it can be deemed implausible to think of any government leadership other than by those who delivered citizens' liberation (Dansereau, 2003: 24). Consequently, the majority of the citizens believe that there is no alternative political party or leadership that can legitimately govern their countries other than those who confronted colonial domination (October, 2015: 25). This belief engendered homogeneity in political outlook and therefore discouraging any potential resistance from the policies by the governments led by NLMs.

On the other hand, the challenge of migrating from military type of leadership to managing state machinery led to various ramifications. Public administration transition from the colonial regimes to independent regimes in Africa was supposed to be efficiently managed in order to realize independence promises. This is premised on the operations of public administration, which virtually influence the performance of all sectors in a country. If public administration is not well conducted, the socio-economic wellbeing of the people becomes negatively affected and serious plights like corruption, poverty and social fragmentation become imminent. The segregational attitude that classified the citizens as friends and foes by independent countries in sub-Saharan Africa did not accommodate alternative wisdom in the operation of their governments' machinery (Melber, 2009: 454). This had dire consequences on service delivery thus threatening to reduce citizens' trust on their governments.

From the exclusive notion of power by war veterans as only a turf for those who have borne the brunt of liberation struggle, the cherished ideals that characterized their struggle for freedom become bleak. It also implies intolerance for any opposing political views, which ought to be crushed by all possible means (Clapham, 2012: 6). Thus, liberation credentials beget ultimate and infinite sense of entitlement to power. Hegemonic claims made by some political leaders such as Robert Mugabe that the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) will not be allowed to rule Zimbabwe, and the statement to the war veterans and peasants by former Mugabe's Vice President, Simon Muzenda, at the ZANU-PF rally in 2000 that their unconditional loyalty to the party should enable them to vote even for a baboon if it represents ZANU-PF (Muvingi, 2008: 86), just reflect how intense a sense of entitlement for political power can be. It is failure to accommodate different political ideologies that NLMs established themselves as oligarchies that cannot hand over power to an alternative leader.

The uncompromising entitlement statements advanced by war veterans prove themselves to be democratically wanting. They also had immanent unsustainable traits that seem to converge on attainment of independence as if it is an end in itself. Citizens' expectations far reach beyond the attainment of independence to include creation of an environment that enables realization of one's full measure of potential. NLMs success to end colonial domination and their ascendancy into power was deemed a sacrosanct achievement that ought not to be resisted by any possible source of power (Southall, 2013: 6). As I have highlighted, this approach was the source of many pathologies that post-colonial governments have been criticized for in sub-Saharan Africa. Above all, these governments do not entertain criticism as a means improving their systems.

### 6.2.1 Entitlement Politics under a Liberation Paradox in NLMs-led Governments

Notwithstanding various changes that have taken place sub-Saharan African politics, there is sizable number of NLM-led governments in the region. A profound claim for entitlement by the NLM-led governments negates the liberation ideals that are vital for a democratic dispensation. Against the expectations of the citizens, the NLMs ushered in repressive regimes that subscribed to the incessant logic of suppression as opposed to embracing democracy (Southall, 2003: 31). Explicit strategies to retain the power to govern were by no means meant to surrender the reins of power to any other source. The post-independent reforms reflect the ambition to consolidate

and sustain NLMs as the only ones that can credibly lead governments. Sarah Rich Dorman concisely captures this attitude by making the following assertion: “The leaders of post-liberation states are caught up in their reluctance to hand over power to another generation, especially if this risks the election of parties whose legitimating myths are not framed around the liberation of the state. It is no coincidence that Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Uganda have been caught up in debates about the limit of the presidential term” (Dorman, 2006: 1095).

In order to reduce opposition parties’ role their existence was acutely criticized as engendering factionalism and destabilization of governments that have just won independence for their countries (Dorman, 2006: 1089, Sutner, 2004: 764). The absorption, or in some cases obliteration of opposition parties by NLMs is a clear indication that there was no room for contrasting ideas on governance processes. It also means that new governments wanted to freely operate without any opposing views. As it could be anticipated, the subjugation of opposition parties translates into accountability mechanisms being profoundly compromised. The ramifications of ineffective opposition in democratic form of governance are many and notably affect human freedom and liberty. This means that the democratic right of the citizens to actively participate in governance processes gets squashed. Atrocious killings of people in the Matebeleland that took place only in the first decade of Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) rule and the infringement of human rights by SWAPO (Melber, 2009: 4530) really demonstrate that citizens’ rights are secondary to unremitting lust to lead government by NLMs.

The irony of the claimed independence by African states is entailed in the recurrence of the colonial evils under the post-independent leaders. These leaders eventually succumb to exclusivist political maneuvers that maintain their positions and the welfare of their comrades. Against this approach, Melber (2002: 162) argues that regime transition from colonialism to independent states can be described as “from controlled change to changed control.” Joseph Adebayo (2018: 145) advances the similar view by asserting that it did not take long after the attainment of independence that African leaders started depicting similar forms of subjugation that were prevalent under the colonial regime. In fact, some wonder whether there is a difference between their regimes and colonial regimes, which they have toiled to overcome (Melber, 2009: 453). One of the compelling reasons why these rulers emulated the colonizers is that they found

no other option to retain power other than inducing terror and segregation as viable strategies. Deployment of war veterans to frustrate the opposition's campaigns (Raftopoulos 2003: 219) epitomizes the lengths that independent leaders would go to secure their power. The rulers first consider their survival as the prime goal, which would enable the realization of other goals through creation of a monopolistic state, among others (Clapham, 1996: 5). Through creation of a monopolistic state they can siphon state resources for their own benefit. Empowering the citizens through enjoyment of liberties enshrined in democratic dispensation was considered impractical exercise that risks transferring power into the wrong hands. The calculus emerging from these power-obsessed leaders is that their entitlement to political leadership and protection thereof is a priority. Not even developmental projects can outweigh their preoccupation to protect their positions at government's helm, which is construed as their reserved privilege. On preconceived legitimacy of NLMs, Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni quotes ZANU-PF National Chairperson, Simon Khaya Moyo, address to the 11<sup>th</sup> ZANU-PF National People's Conference held in Mutare in December 2010 that:

No liberation movement will ever be replaced by people coming from nowhere. This applies to ZANU-PF in Zimbabwe, ANC in South Africa, FRELIMO [*Frente de Libertação de Moçambique*] in Mozambique, SWAPO in Namibia, MPLA [*Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola*] in Angola and Chama Cha Mapinduzi in Tanzania. We are not just neighbours with South Africa. We share a common liberation history, culture and values. Any of us who are not part of this revolutionary journey should think again because the train will not wait for anyone (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2011:5).

Against this political entitlement rhetoric, there are identified obstacles purported to impede maturation of democracy in sub-Saharan African countries. Incompatibility of democracy package as a solution to all problems with the traditional governance arrangements led to confusion and stalemate and thus jeopardizing cohesion within these states. Also, a transition from colonial masters' rule to the independence governments is marked by serious deficits that compromised social transformation as a necessary basis upon which democracy can flourish (Ottaway, 1997: 11). In order to address these challenges, the onus was upon the post-independent leaders to pave way for working governance systems that would embrace the welfare of the entire citizenry. Against this background, the competences of the liberation

movements' leaders remained wanting in their new role to create and implement public policies that give impetus to economic performance. Instead, these leaders continued with their authoritarian and militaristic style of leadership that sought to use state resource to consolidate their organisation. This explains why liberation parties' leaders established a strong basis for entitlement politics that monopolized government power as means of consolidating their positions and their movements. In order to achieve this objective, liberation movements and their leaders exploited political elitism as a dependable mechanism through which their entitlement to govern can be preserved.

### **6.3 Preponderance of Debilitating Political Elitism**

Since the introduction of liberal and westernized type of democracy in sub-Saharan Africa, political elitism is considered a consolidating factor to this type of regime. This is construed to justify political elitism as a precondition for thriving democratic rule (Mbecke, 2017: 86, Osei, 2015: 531, Lopez, 2013: 1, Kifordu, 2011: 17). For one to be a member of the elite class he or she has to fulfill some of its defining features, with the pronounced ones being estimable capacity, personality and skill (Lopez, 2013: 2). This also explains why the contemporary elite theory refers to elites as primarily those members of the society who have access to resources, who occupy strategic positions and who control the networks of influence (Yamokoski and Dubrow, 2008: 319, Kifordu, 2011: 20). Based on this approach, democracy started to be treated as the preserve for esteemed and enlightened members of the society. Jack Walker presents the underlying assumptions of elitist theory as follows:

At the heart of the elitist theory is a clear presumption of the average citizen's inadequacies. As a consequence, democratic systems must rely on the wisdom [*sic*], loyalty and skill of their political leaders, not on the population at large. The political system is divided into two groups: the *elite*, or the "political entrepreneurs,"... who possess ideological commitments and manipulative skills; and the *citizens at large*, the masses, or the "apolitical clay"... of the system, a much larger class of passive, inert followers who have little knowledge of public affairs and even less interest (Walker, 1966: 286).

These assumptions accord well with the notion of elite inevitability, which counters the argument of political liberalism and Marxism on the premise that both democracy, as the people's centred

form of governance, and socialism, as an egalitarian form of governance, were impossible to achieve because society by its nature is elite driven (Lopez, 2013: 2). As the basis of democracy and therefore of governance, elite theory has an influence on various political dynamics such as “regime types, regime changes, liberation, stateness, secularization, and many other political phenomena” (Lopez, 2013: 1). By depicting the significance of having enlightened and powerful class as the only one eligible for operating government systems, elitism is presented as an inherently exclusivist approach on government leadership candidature. In the same way, this distinct class of elites is the one operating the political system of post-colonial governments in sub-Saharan Africa.

Predominance of political elitism in sub-Saharan Africa is deeply rooted in the political approach by liberation parties that succeeded the colonial administration. Messay Kebede (2003: 167) contends that African elitism is mainly based on the entitlement to leadership by virtue of possessing modern education. To a great extent, this led to a degeneration of African conception of elitism to the acquisition of wealth and possession of western education, which the rest of the citizens do not have (Manghezi, 1976: 73). As a consequence, such elites emulate western style of life (Manghezi, 1976: 73). Unfortunately, it did not take long for the liberation parties in Africa to be caught up in this kind elitism trap, which later transmuted them into kleptocracies. Against this unscrupulous conduct, Good (2003: 11) argues that albeit the existence of elites of wealth, status and education in our societies, there ought to be robust and vibrant mechanisms in place to deter these elites from manipulating political systems to their advantage. However, in a quest to avert any possible form of opposition, the leaders of liberation movements created elite cliques to be deployed in strategic administration positions. Their deployment may be interpreted as a symbol of appreciation for the role they have played during the liberation struggle or helping, through various means, their liberation movement to seize government leadership, but most importantly they are tasked to perpetuate perceived entitlement to power by their organizations. In this way, majority of emerging sub-Saharan African elites were driven by their egoistic interests that were expressed in the monopolization of government powers by their political parties (Good, 2003: 7). From the two exclusive perspectives of political elitism, being liberal pluralist, which emphasizes distribution of power among the elites while upholding the inevitability of change over time and the critical elite perspective, which is undergirded by

confinement of power to the elites through overt resistance to change, limited openness and inclusiveness (Kifordu, 2011: 17), the latter seems best epitomizing political elitism in sub-Saharan Africa. The political elites become instrumental in expanding and extending the powers of their political party in order to subdue any opposition.

One of the greatest setbacks in African politics was the metamorphosis of war veterans into narcissistic elites who claimed entitlement to state resources and key government opportunities. For these politicians the concept of national interest is reduced to their subjective interpretation (Melber, 2013: 279), which can never be construed to mean anything other than prioritising their legitimacy to rule and securing best opportunities for themselves and their allies. This rendered their struggle for liberation ironical as they later, upon occupying their governments' leadership positions, betrayed the same values and principles they risked their lives for. On demonstrating the gravity of this psychic dislocation even by those who were at the vanguard in order to end colonialism, Samba Diop (2012: 230) posits that “[t]hrough supposedly free ‘independent’, Africa is still trapped in the neocolonial net, set up by the departing colonials but maintained and serviced by Africa’s new comprador bourgeoisie.” It is from the similar view that Kebede (2003: 168) argues that African elitism is encapsulated in the native rulers’ acting and thinking in a manner that is similar to their erstwhile colonial masters. The paradox presented by this scenario is that it did not take long for those who confronted colonialism and its ills to transform themselves into aloof elites that perpetuated segregational economic policies and thus furthering social fragmentation. This contrasts with a more open system, where the political elite ought to embody representative characteristics of a society other than being solely persuaded by egoistic interests (Kifordu, 2011: 20). It also renders citizens into passive spectators, other than active players, on governance issues that directly affect their welfare.

The elites from the liberation parties also grabbed well-nigh all lucrative business opportunities. This avarice tendency was disguised through affirmative action policies, which were initially presented as an inclusive means of ensuring equitable distribution of wealth through redressing the injustices of the past. From this practice it became clear that the ruling elite were not prepared to share and evenly redistribute their states’ resources and opportunities. Against this backdrop, Adam *et al* (1998: 1-2) make reference to ANC-led government, which has been in

charge since South Africa attained democracy in 1994, that ANC stalwarts started to exhibit insatiable appetite for riches, just like the whites who amassed wealth under their monopolistic political setting. Contrary to the socialist state they preached during their struggle against the *apartheid* regime, these stalwarts soon yielded to the neo-liberal and capitalist policies that favoured the elites while many poor South Africans continued to encounter fierce effects of utter poverty (Adam et al, 1998: 2). By invading possible means of survival borne by their governments without regard to their fellow citizens, war veterans render a liberation struggle only beneficial to themselves and their cronies. This is also reflected in the liberation parties' failure to lead citizens into economic emancipation. The barrenness of these parties' economic policies can be fundamentally attributed to their scanty or only superficial involvement of the citizens. Consequently, people become very detached from such policies, while the elites channel economic opportunities for their own benefit.

#### 6.3.1 Preservation of Entitlement Ethos through Socialist Rhetoric

The founding principles of the liberation movements were premised upon collective ideological approaches that were meant to revive social cohesion in all fronts. Southall (2019: 4) highlights that the liberation movements were characterized by nationalist consciousness which transformed into nationalist parties in pursuit of the common good and liberation of their countries from the dominion of the colonizers. It is on the same basis that most of the NLMs adopted socialism as their leading economic and philosophic outlook (Southall, 2019: 13). The rationale was to preserve the communitarian values that express humanism in African context and unite Africans in their societies. When referring to those African leaders who understand and diligently employ socialism, Kwame Nkrumah (1967: 1) contends that their "aim is to remould African society in the socialist direction; to reconsider African society in such a manner that the humanism of traditional African life re-asserts itself in a modern technical community." Also, Nkrumah makes an informed criticism against a facile approach to 'African Socialism', which is presented in an idealized form as a classless society (Nkrumah, 1967: 2). In this way, socialism as undergirding the political ideology of liberation parties in Africa was intended to give rise to the policies that promote egalitarianism so as to loosen all constraints that have limited the potential of Africans under the colonial rule. Thus, it is an encroachment of nationalist and socialist spirit when Angola's oil-generated wealth was only enjoyed by a few powerful

politicians from MPLA (Melber, 2013: 278). When national resources are not harnessed to alleviate poverty of the citizens, but instead are used to build strong basis for liberation parties and their leadership, independence remains wanting in value and significance.

Even though the liberation parties preached socialism before they became governments, it did not take them long before their members gave in to neo-liberal capitalism systems as a means of preserving their entitlement to government opportunities. Melber (2013: 274) notes that against the promises of the revolutionary struggle, there was an emergence of self-righteous entitlement culture displayed by the political elites. Despite labelling their governments as socialists, their desire for self-enrichment overshadowed their founding political ideology. The Mobutu's nationalisation of all Zaire's foreign assets in 1973 as political tact of distributing them to his allies (Moore, 2001: 919) represents how, having imbibed the ethos of free market, the liberation movements leaders started to yield to the temptation of crude neo-liberalism and capitalism. Sagie Narsiah (2002: 29) identifies three characteristics neo-liberalism as fiscal austerity, deregulation and privatisation. Under these characteristics the role and influence of state are reduced so that private sector can assume some of the services that used to be rendered under the ambit government (Narsiah, 2002: 29). The political elites' quest for self-aggrandizement also coincided with the structural adjustment programmes (SAPs), which were initiated and led by the Bretton Woods sisters. The rationale for SAPs was "to encourage trade liberalisation, which involves the removal of import controls and other quantitative restrictions as well as a unification and general reduction in the structure of tariffs," (Demery, 1994: 31-32). As a result, SAPs were shoved into sub-Saharan countries under the ideology that more open economies attract higher growth rate (Demery, 1994: 32). However, these adjustment policies were met with mixed reactions, while on the other hand were reduced to pliable instruments that served political leaders' interests, which is one of the main reasons why these policies failed to reignite economic performance of many countries in the region.

The claimed pre-eminence to state power by the ruling NLMs buttressed their members' sense of entitlement as gatekeepers in almost all sectors (Southall, 2019: 13). From this unrestricted access to state power and well-nigh all related opportunities, the liberation parties' stalwarts distributed favours at their own discretion. The exorbitant cost of filming Namibia's first Head of

State and leader of SWAPO, Nujoma, autobiography, which was largely financed from public coffers, is one of the examples depicting how nationalist focus started to be downplayed by liberation movements (Melber, 2013: 277). Such entitlement practices led to the emergence of political bourgeoisie that is largely characterized by its exploitative manoeuvres in pursuit of wealth. With specific reference to how political elitism sprout from the NLMs-led governments in Zimbabwe, South Africa and Namibia, Southall posits that:

state power was utilized (via strategies of BEE [Black Economic Empowerment], indigenization, and so on) to promote black entry into the bastions of white capital, with the latter responding eagerly by throwing largesse at an emergent class of party-aligned black capitalists in order to forge a productive relationship with the new political elite; such an emergent alliance was destined to promote local variants of “crony capitalism”, whilst generally marginalizing independent African capitalists who lacked or abjured direct links to the party (Southall, 2014: 94)

While I concede that the NLMs-led governments were confronted with an intractable task of governance under complex circumstances, which majority of them have their origin from the colonial rule, their authoritative and exclusivist approaches mirrored in the inequitable redistributive policies led to more complications. Their redistributive policies under affirmative action end up not serving the interests of ordinary citizens, but largely being treated as a preserve for the emerging black capitalists. For example, Tangri and Southall (2008: 709) highlight that BEE was swayed to promote business interests of the emerging few black business magnets whom some have served at the upper echelons of the ANC structures. Besides their advocacy at the conception stage as being targeted to economically boost the previously disadvantaged groups within a polity, these policies are ultimately abused in favour of a few politically connected elites.

#### **6.4 Insidiousness of Entitlement Politics and Segregation**

The far-reaching effects of entitlement politics did not only create bourgeoisie groups driven by absolute materialistic outlook, but also institutionalised segregational politics that categorises people into different classes. Those who have successfully claimed entitlement sustain themselves through resources’ allocation and distribution of their governments’ opportunities to

those who promise them unwavering subservience. It is deducible that from this exclusivist and elitist style of governance and statecraft, institutionalised corruption creeps in through mobilisation of resources in order to induce supporters to sustain their benefactors. This Machiavellian politics, underpinned by the end justifies the means principle (Okoli and Orinya, 2014: 1478), is only aimed at preserving political positions in government. For this kind of politicians, victory over the polls becomes an end in itself, not a means to embrace democratic values that ought to translate into enjoyment of fundamental liberties by citizenry. It is for this reason that elite political leaders in sub-Saharan Africa envisaged enlarged public sector base as a viable strategy through which they can exert their political leverage on a wide range of economic areas (Odubajo and Alabi, 2014: 123). Despite the inevitable setbacks resulting from this inherently flawed art of statecraft (since this leadership is obsessed with power and the benefits accruing thereto) they overlooked the importance of empowering all sectors of economy. As these leaders confined relatively all economic operations under their jurisdiction, inefficiency crept in and affected economic output of their countries.

The loss of sense of communal responsibility became one of the defining features of the political elites. Even when their predatory policies perpetuated pauperisation of their populace, they did not abandon them but instead replaced them with more lethal ones. Zimbabwe presents a good case on how her policies gradually lost value until they degenerated into predatory politics (Raftopoulos, 2003: 226). The land grabbing issue, which went full-blown through the seizure of the whites' farms in 2000 and their allocation to the political elites and their cronies (Good, 2003: 10), was a political ploy by Mugabe to regain electorates' trust ahead of the parliamentary elections in June 2000 (Raftopoulos, 2003: 230). It is not surprising that the major beneficiary of this dubious redistributive policy were ZANU-PF Ministers and high ranking security agencies officials (Good, 2003: 10). In describing these devouring elite's tendencies, Ljubiša Mitrović contends that:

It is a tycoon group ruthlessly led by its interests. It posits its own interests over general social ones. It is not national in character and is socially irresponsible. It is a blind servant of foreign capital, ruthless in the exploitaitaion [sic] of the domestic workforce and dictatorial in relation to its fellow countrymen. Its homeland is where its interests are. It is the agent of the mega capital in the function of global economy.... Its god is

the god Mammon, the capital. Its aim is to amass capital, and it puts profit above individuals. It is a predatory class of the nouveau riche and often bon vivant and parasitic upstarts. It is a peculiar jet-set of bandit economy (Mitrović, 2010: 5).

As Mitrović presents the ethos of neo-liberal capitalist elites above, in a hunger for wealth and power most of the political elites in sub-Saharan Africa claim entitlement to political power at all costs. This explains why political corruption has become a springboard of different types of corruption in the region. Institutionalising corruption became reliable mechanisms for political elites to secure their interests (Clapham, 2012: 11). For those who do not share the same political views with the elite are labelled traitors who do not deserve to benefit from state opportunities. Government employment opportunities are treated as a reserved domain for those who actively show support to the ruling political party or parties. In such situations nepotistic statements in favour of the elite's exponents are publicly expressed. Rhetoric political statements are advanced by demagogue political elite to justify this euphemised corruption. At the extreme end of this justified corruption is a yearning by the ruling elite to capture the key institutions of government. This happens as the ruling class exploit available opportunities to reduce the possibilities of being opposed that may lead to the vacation of political office (Grzymala-Busse, 2008: 640). It is on this basis that Grzymala-Busse defines elite state capture as "the appropriation of state resources by political actors for their own ends: either private or political benefit" (Grzymala-Busse, 2008: 640). State capture phenomenon has been a common phenomenon among the ruling political elite in sub-Saharan Africa, with the most recent allegations that attracted global attention involving the controversial relationship between the former President of South Africa, Jacob Zuma and the Gupta family (Martin and Solomon, 2016: 21). Among many of the manifestations of state capture under President Zuma's tenure include questionable placements on key state institutions which followed the logic of political loyalty other than competency (Martin and Solomon, 2016: 24). Being a consequence of entitlement and elite politics, state capture is entirely sustained through pervasive corruption.

## **6.5 Conclusion**

In this chapter I have delineated how a sense of entitlement ensued from politicians in sub-Saharan Africa. As a consequence of corrupt political culture, political leaders in many of the

NLMs-led governments in the region employed political entitlement to advance their exclusivist political interest. Justification put forth by these politicians is that only those who have liberation credentials can legitimately lead their governments and therefore deliver the promises made during the struggle for independence to the people. In this way, rightful participation in politics and government leadership is treated as a confined purview of the liberation movements. This exclusive approach warrants the leaders of NLMs-led governments incontestable powers on state resources and institutions. These leaders can distribute their state resources at their whim so long as it helps them achieve their political mileage.

I have also argued how institutionalisation of corruption becomes rife when political leaders exercise their political entitlement in prioritising those projects that help them safeguard their power to govern as opposed to empowering the citizens. The legitimisation of suppression of organisations under the pretext of protecting national unity by the NLMs-led governments (Suttner, 2004: 764) has engendered a doctrine that government leadership is a turf for a liberation party that succeeded colonial regime since it has become an ideal embodiment of the citizens' aspirations. This was augmented by preponderance political elitism whereby the war veterans transformed themselves into elite camps that are mostly driven by materialistic ambitions. Such cliques also act as gatekeepers determining those who are eligible to join them and access state resources. As such, the political elites became preoccupied with fending for themselves to the detriment of the wellbeing of their fellow citizens.

I also presented the masquerading of empowerment economic policies as inclusive, while they mostly benefit the political elite to be a strategy intended to push the ordinary citizens to the periphery of economic activities taking place in their countries. Reference to BEE in South Africa and Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act in Zimbabwe were treated as typical examples of such policies. From the politics of entitlement and segregation emerge many social ills with the most pronounced one being corruption in its diverse forms. This is the reason why I emphasised the insidiousness of state capture in sub-Saharan Africa as an orchestrated grand corruption under the auspices of political elite that usurps the independence and autonomy of governments' institutions.

This chapter showed how corruption eventually transmutes into entitlement ethos. The next chapter offers an Afrocentric ethical critique of corruption as it is experienced in sub-Saharan Africa. The following chapter will draw from those features of African ethics which are deemed to be critical tools against corruption in all its manifestations.

## CHAPTER SEVEN: A CRITIQUE OF CORRUPTION AND PATRONAGE FROM AN AFRICAN ETHICS PERSPECTIVE

### 7.1 Introduction

This chapter focuses on the significance of African ethics towards bringing about contextually meaningful approach on anticorruption programmes in sub-Saharan Africa. Justification for the significance of African ethics is based on the assumption that corruption has become a morally corrosive issue in sub-Saharan Africa. It is on these grounds that corruption remains ethically unacceptable because it erodes the social foundation for the common good. African ethics is based on the common values depicted by the black Africans below the Sahara desert (Prozesky, 2009: 4). I argue that African ethics is a viable option to undergird contextually meaningful anti-corruption discourse and initiatives to control corruption phenomenon, which is so pervasive in sub-Saharan Africa. This argument is premised on the fact that an attempt to redress immoral behaviour should invoke morally relevant values as a reliable redress mechanism. Without recourse to such values, various interventions cannot bring enduring resolutions to the problem.

There is consensus among the exponents of African ethics that it is based on *Ubuntu* as a concept denoting, among others, harmonious relations, interdependency among community members, and treating others humanely. *Ubuntu* is perceived the same across the sub-continent, with only different words pointing to the same reality. This is despite diverse cultural backgrounds that the region is richly endowed with. Being the kernel of African ethics, *Ubuntu* gained reinvigoration under African academics, especially ethicists, who vindicated it as a moral theory in search of global recognition (Metz, 2007, Prozesky, 2009).

The chapter starts by acknowledging the contextual relevance of African ethics in sub-Saharan Africa. This chapter also focuses on the attributes of African ethics. It is on the bases of such attributes, especially those espoused by *Ubuntu*, that Political patronage, ethic of entitlement, political corruption, and bureaucratic corruption are critiqued. The overarching argument in this chapter rests on how African ethics, being anchored in *Ubuntu*, can engender a promising approach towards effectively arresting corruption and its effects in sub-Saharan Africa.

## **7.2 Contextual relevance of African ethics in sub-Saharan Africa**

Recourse to African ethics in this thesis is not intended to provide its exhaustive vindication or to argue that African ethics contemporarily provides better solutions to the puzzling global ethical challenges. Moral problems in sub-Saharan Africa continue to preoccupy many African ethicists in the region and beyond. However, the existence of African ethics as depicting the sub-Saharan African ethics worldview cannot be disputed because refuting its existence would be tantamount to arguing that the Africans, especially the sub-Saharan Africans, are deprived a sense of good and bad and therefore are incapable of forging an ethically coherent worldview under which their conduct can be judged. The intention is to show that African ethics can provide contextually meaningful and relevant approach on fighting and combating corruption in the region other than tested and failed approaches from the West, which are propounded by international financial institutions and international NGOs.

As I have echoed throughout this thesis, in the face of several initiatives to reduce high corruption prevalence in the region, virtually all the initiatives seem to have met little success, and this constitutes the greatest concern. This also suggests that sub-Saharan African governments and their societies should take the fight against corruption as a priority since this menace incapacitates governments and social systems. The effects of corruption were clustered in chapter four, and all of them continue to spiral out of control to ruin the potential of African countries. The African leaders and their societies should concertededly find contextually meaningful and relevant remedies to this problem because corruption can best be understood and dealt with within the context it is manifested. Before arguing how African ethics has a potential to undergird meaningful anti-corruption approach in sub-Saharan African countries, it is first imperative to explain African ethics and its key tenets.

### **7.2.1 Explaining African Ethics**

What should be first noted before delving into the explanation of African ethics is that the values and principles espoused by this ethical worldview cannot be cogently argued to be exclusively applicable to sub-Saharan African societies only. It is the case that moral values and principles enshrined in African ethics are also found in other ethical theories and are practiced in other societies beyond the subcontinent. A French philosopher, Jean-Paul Sartre (2003: 436) lucidly

emphasised the importance of relationality and belonging in what he refers to as being-for-others. In the similar manner, relationality and mutually shared humanity dominate African ethics discourse with *Ubuntu* being the centrepiece.

African ethics consists of amalgamation of moral values common to the black people in sub-Saharan societies. This view is well captured by Prozesky (2009: 4) that “the term ‘African ethics’ ...refers to the moral traditions embedded in the many and various cultures of sub-Saharan Africa, the moral traditions of black African cultures.” A similar view is also shared by Metz (2007: 321) that “[African Ethics refers to] values associated with the largely black and Bantu-speaking peoples residing in the sub-Saharan part of the continent, thereby excluding Islamic Arabs in North Africa and white Afrikaners in South Africa, among others.” However, the identification of similar moral traditions that have stood the test of time and survived several odds under the ethnocentric tendencies of the colonizers in sub-Saharan Africa does not suggest that the region is constituted of absolutely homogenous cultures and beliefs. Of course, there are drastic and conspicuous different cultural practices among and between different societies and tribes in the region. This reality can well be observed when different tribes perform their traditional rites and rituals in different ceremonies or just in their mundane activities. Nevertheless, there are certain substantial values common across the moral traditions in sub-Saharan Africa. It is on the convergence of certain substantial elements of moral traditions upon which African ethics is based. On asserting the existence of shared important values in the region Sharma indicates that:

It may be stated ... that despite some dissenting voices, most thinkers and scholars - be it Kwame Nkrumah, Kwame Gyekye, Julius Nyerere and others – agree that the majority of peoples inhabiting Africa south of the Sahara share metaphysical and cultural values, and beliefs at a core fundamental level, even though their external ritualistic manifestation may differ from tribe to tribe. With all socio-economic patterns and rituals there remains, at a fundamental level, a world view that connects Africa (Sharma, 2013: 114).

What is deduced from the above quotation is that even if not all Africans in the region may subscribe to such metaphysical and cultural values, and beliefs, there exists a set of values upon which a reliable African ethic worldview is based. Dolamo (2013: 1) posits that common values

that were shared by Africans were not annihilated, but survived different hardships brought by slavery, colonialism and globalization. Orobator (2011: 4) identifies life and community as two themes that primarily underpin the focus of African ethics. Life should be preserved in its diverse manifestations and forms. Life has inherent duties to its bearers prescribing how they should conduct themselves so that it is always promoted (Orobator, 2011: 4). An immoral act is the one that does not respect and promote life. On the value of community as a basis of African ethics, Orobator asserts that “[in] African ethics, community defines the space where the moral agent is located, and his or her actions are assessed for their moral rectitude vis-à-vis other members of the community” (2011: 5). It can be inferred that since life is not lived in isolation but in communion with others, life can be well lived and preserved where there is communal harmony. What is vital is for the people to identify with their communities by embracing values that sustain communal harmony since this is the price of being human (Dolamo, 2013: 1). The implication is that African ethics consists of active role played by each member of the community to contribute towards maintaining cohesion of his/her community. It is therefore considered a grave offence (immoral) for an individual to perpetrate actions that disturb communal harmony. On this basis, African ethics’ focus is on strong linkages that bond community members and thus rendering their unity indissoluble (Murove, 2009: 27). Murove gives a comprehensive view on how the ethical act should not only be confined to the present, but should incorporate the past into the present as a reliable means of preserving and providing the future generations with ethically appealing memories (Murove, 2009: 27) .

Centrality of relatedness in African ethics is premised on the fact that a person thrives when he or she relates well with others. This is the reason why the primary moral duty of a person is to maintain communal harmony because through it all members thrive. It is in this context where the phrase ‘to be is to belong’ is fully expressed. The concept of relatedness as underpinning African ethics in sub-Saharan context is widely considered to be absolutely expressed under *Ubuntu*.

### 7.2.2 African Ethics anchored in *Ubuntu*

As I have indicated above, relatedness plays a primary role in African ethics worldview, and vital attributes of relatedness find full expression in *Ubuntu*. I should note that the primacy of

*Ubuntu* in African ethics has attracted sizeable scholarship in Africa and beyond. It has also attracted assenting and dissenting views alike. Metz (2011: 533-534) addresses three common criticisms levelled against *Ubuntu*. First criticism refers to *Ubuntu* as a term used in Nguni and related languages such as Sotho and Shona to be vague. It is also criticised for its extreme collectivist view, which is purported to negate individual liberties. Lastly, it is criticised for its irrelevance for contemporary sub-Saharan African societies that have become so complex. All these criticisms suggested the irrelevance of *Ubuntu* as a distinctive feature of sub-Saharan Africans' moral worldview. Against these criticisms, Metz (2011: 536) argues that it is upon a contemporary South African to give a meaningful interpretation of *Ubuntu* and its potential towards ushering a contextual discourse on morality.

The primary meaning of the term *Ubuntu* is from many African languages in South Africa. *Ubuntu* is from IsiNguni and in Sesotho it is *Botho* (Munyaka and Motlhabi, 2009: 63). The concept *Ubuntu/Botho* finds its full meaning in the aphorism that “[*m*]otho ke motho ka batho is a Sotho proverb found in almost all the indigenous languages of Africa. It means that to be human is to affirm ones humanity by recognizing the humanity of others and, on that basis establish humane relations with them” (Ramose, 2015: 70). Another *Ubuntu* aphorism is given by Mbiti, a Kenyan philosopher and theologian, who summed *Ubuntu* thus: “I am because we are, and since we are, therefore, I am” (Mbiti, 1970: 141). This affirms that the quality of being human is attained through reciprocal and mutual affirmation of humanity by all members of the community. Similarly, Samkange posits that *Ubuntu* can be best expressed under the following three maxims:

1. *Ubuntu* asserts that to be human is to affirm one's humanity by recognizing the humanity of others and on that basis establish respectful human relations with them.
2. *Ubuntu* maintains that if and when one is faced with a decisive choice between wealth and the preservation of the life of another human being, then one should opt for the preservation of the life of the other person.
3. *Ubuntu* is a principle deeply embedded in the traditional African philosophy which maintains that the King owes his status including all the powers associated with it, to the will of the people under him. (Samkange , 1980: 42).

All that is espoused by the above maxims on *Ubuntu* seem to converge on one point that humanity is an indispensable factor that should be valued above wealth and prestige. Inclusive valuing of humanity implies that every member of a community is deemed pricelessly valuable. The mutual affirmation of humanity by community members will inevitably negate selfishness, biasness and jealousy and promote peaceful cohabitation for all members of the community. It will also create an enabling environment where all members realize the full measure of their potential for the wellbeing of their community. A community that subscribes to *Ubuntu* as its moral compass implants in its members that each person equally has responsibility to oneself, fellow community members and the community as whole. Etieyibo (2017: 142) clearly and succinctly explains this approach that the essence of *Ubuntu* rests on the personhood of an individual who is directly tied to the shared communal way of life.

Unlike other moral theories, especially western moral theories, that prioritize individualism in morality, *Ubuntu* considers community as the absolute measure determining the ‘rightness’ and ‘wrongness’ of human conduct. The importance of *Ubuntu* in the prioritization of community has its roots from the indigenous African Philosophy that considers a valuable life to be the one that meaningfully contributes to the sustenance of the community (Mangena, 2012: 11). It is from the community that one finds the true meaning of life and how it ought to be lived. Thus, it is in communing with others that one’s skills, attitudes and conduct are refined. Murove (2009: 28) gives relevant analogies that typify *Ubuntu*, which are derived from natural sciences such as physics and ecology: in physics, it is observed that subatomic particles are meaningless without their relationality, while in ecology it is discovered that living organisms in an environment properly evolve on the basis of their relationality. The purpose of bringing these examples was simply to demonstrate that reality is interconnected and nothing exists on its own. This becomes more real under human interrelatedness in communities and how different potentialities are actualized through interaction with others. In African context, a human life finds meaning through dependence and interdependence within a community. Mangena (2012: 10) argues that interaction, dependence and interdependence become meaningful because of the capacity of the dialogue that prioritizes communal rationality. In more precise words, Mangena refers to communal rationality as “that kind of rationality where the opinions of the group take centre stage compared to the opinions of the individual, as it is characteristic of the normative moral

theories such as virtue theories, utilitarian theories and Kantian theories” (*Ibid*). It can be safely inferred that since wisdom resides in a community as a product of concerted efforts by all members, while also being a result of the experiences of the past, all problems and anxieties of the members find solutions within the community.

Another profound reflection on *Ubuntu* is given by Desmond Mpilo Tutu, emeritus Anglican Church Archbishop of South Africa and Nobel Peace Prize winner. He considers *Ubuntu* as the inextricable web that binds humanity together and affirms the conscious participation of each member of the community for the common good (Tutu, 1999: 31). He also refers to *Ubuntu* as only realizable under social harmony, which he considers to be *summum bonum* - the greatest good-(Tutu, 1999: 31). By attaching highest value to social harmony, Tutu carefully warns that there is nothing a community can attain and sustain without harmonized efforts that attract optimal contribution of all members. It is safe to conclude that construing harmony in this manner makes it a necessary ingredient of success for all organizations regardless of their size. Without harmony, which also implies relationality, individuals in a community remain independent elements that selfishly pounce on any opportunity for self-aggrandizement.

It is important to note that the kind of relationality espoused under *Ubuntu* transcends familial lineage relations to include all constituents of a community. It covers even ‘strangers’ who were initially not part of the community either by birth or through the socialization process. Such people are incorporated into the community and given new names because they share in the common humanity with the rest of the community members (Munyaka and Motlhabi, 2009: 69). They become oriented into the community so that they can meaningfully partake in communal activities. This also explains the nature of a community in African context, which is not merely understood as a collection of individuals without a purpose, but a group of persons who come together sharing common interests, goals and values (Munyaka and Motlhabi, 2009: 69). A notion of community underscored by *Ubuntu* is different from passengers who happen to board the same bus or a train with different interests, goals and values. Indeed, passengers in a bus or a train board and disembark at different places because their destinations are different. By virtue of being in the same bus or train does not imply that the passengers share a particular ideology other than using them (a bus or a train) as a means of transport to their various destinations.

Furthermore, *Ubuntu* amalgamates different moral values with a view to adequately provide answers and solutions to moral problems that invariably confront a community. *Ubuntu's* capacity to subsume different moral values is also vital towards inculcating these values in the order of their priority to the community members through different stages of their maturity.

Letseka (2014) juxtaposes John Rawls' most esteemed approach to 'Justice as fairness' with *Ubuntu*. Letseka contends that as Rawls' justice as fairness incisively asserts that justice can ideally be realized in a fair environment, *Ubuntu* also has a great potential to usher in 'justice as fairness' (2014: 545). He supports his view by making reference to how forums on key governance issues were conducted in sub-Saharan Africa, which clearly depict that all members had equal opportunity to suggest and argue for a right course of action they deemed to be in the best interest of the community (Letseka, 2014: 548). The process of creating an equal opportunity, regardless of status one occupies in a community, so that all members can freely air their views tacitly indicates that their justice system depended on a fair environment. The purpose of focusing on justice as one of the primary values is premised upon its importance towards maintaining harmony in a community. Without vibrant justice system, which is built on equal recognition of all members of the community, members would find hard to commune and thus maintain communal web. When elaborating further on *Ubuntu* as promoting justice within a community, Letseka shrewdly asserts that:

*Ubuntu* as fair African communal justice is only attainable if communality, interdependence, open public discussion, broad based consultation and the need for consensus on issues of moral disagreement, commitment to 'social contract theory' as a guiding principle for politics and governance, [exist] as the core values of society. (Letseka, 2014: 549).

On a similar note, humanness as propounded under *Ubuntu* only becomes real when every member of a community is afforded an opportunity to meaningfully contribute. This boils down to an environment characterized by respect for all members, where the dignity of a person is wholly embraced.

For former South African judge, Justice Mokgoro, *Ubuntu* is concerned about values such as compassion, unity, respect and human dignity (1998: 3). According to Mokgoro, these values clustered in *Ubuntu* convey communal morality expressed through co-operation for the interests of all members. Letseka (2000: 179-180) adds to the list of values that *Ubuntu* envelops kindness, generosity, compassion, benevolence and courtesy. It seems apparent that the list of values that *Ubuntu* embodies can continue, but what is more important to note is that of all the values, mentioned and not, they play a vital role in building and strengthening harmony within a community. The disturbance of one or some of these values by an individual or some members of community is likely to affect communal harmony and order. This view is shared by Okoro (2015: 6) by considering *Ubuntu* to underpin African jurisprudence, whereby a crime committed by one member to another does not only affect the two but transcends them to affect the entire community members. The implication is that all members of a community have a responsibility to look for the wellbeing of another, since no one exists on his/her own.

As I pointed out when introducing African ethics that its attributes should not be misconstrued to be solely confined to Africa, as similar attributes can characterize the ‘moral philosophies’ of other societies beyond sub-Saharan Africa, it follows that even *Ubuntu* as constituting the fundamental basis of African ethics cannot be exclusively confined to the region. Dalamo (2013: 1) makes this point that “although the concept of *Botho/Ubuntu* is as old as humanity itself, and by no means confined to Africa only, the popularity of the notion as such was brought into sharper focus as post-independent African states started to reflect on their historical past, colonisation and the prospects for nation-building, as well as the creation of prosperity.” Even in societies that subscribe to atomized notion of morality such as deontology, teleology and virtue ethics, it is possible to encounter the key tenets of *Ubuntu*. Dalamo refers to a wide call on reclaiming relationality by other societies beyond Africa that:

There is a general complaint internationally about this malaise. In Korea, for example, they complain about the erosion of *sansaeing* (conviviality) and in the Philippines the youth are accused of ignoring *kapwa-tao*, which in Tagalog means “as human beings we must respect one another because we need one another”. Even in the West people are starting to hanker after those good old days when neighbours, relatives and friends would rally around one another in times of happiness and sadness (Dalamo, 2013: 2).

Relationality naturally proceeds from a human being as a basis of intact and vibrant community. Relationality also attains fruition when there is mutuality among all the members of the community. Moral outlook that entirely ignores all the attributes of *Ubuntu* is inconceivable. It is the case that some attributes of *Ubuntu* are encountered in the three discussed western moral theories. *Ubuntu* cannot thrive if members of the community are not virtuous, are not compelled to act by a profound sense of duty, and do not aim at the best results for the wellbeing of the community. In this way, African ethics cannot be meaningfully conceptualized without *Ubuntu*. The difference between the Western approach on morality and the *Ubuntu* approach will be discussed later. At this point, it is vital to explain how corruption as a moral issue is appraised under *Ubuntu* and its key tenets.

### **7.3 Corruption as an Ethical Problem**

As I have alluded to the defiance of ethical principles by corruption under conceptualising corruption, I strongly argue that corruption is an ethical problem. The fundamental premise undergirding this argument is that each corrupt activity obviously breaches established ethical values and principles. Bayley (1966: 720) also states that “it is important to note that a person may be corrupt who does not in fact commit a violation of duty.” Bayley’s observation brings up an important issue that corruption should first be treated as a moral issue because established legal frameworks are likely to have deficiencies that can encourage employees to indulge in corruption without encroachment of any law. An ethical approach to corruption primarily presupposes a universally accepted claim that a conscious human act can be judged as morally good or bad. If corrupt activities go against established moral and legal frameworks then corruption is bad and does not worth pursued. Ochulor and Bassey capture corruption as moral issue very well when they assert that:

‘Man’ [*sic*] is a moral being. His actions, when done out of deliberation and volition carry with them a moral status that make them either good or bad, depending on whether these actions conform to the natural law or the human positive laws, which have a universal applicability. Corruption as a human act, done by a morally responsible agent carries with it a moral guilt, because it goes contrary to established moral standards accepted generally or by a particular society. The question of corruption then assumes a status

of philosophical importance, first because it proceeds from the metaphysical nature of man as a being imbued with rationality and freedom. In other words, it proceeds from man as a moral agent. Corruption, because of its social effects hits at the very foundation of the human being seen as a 'homo socialis' – social being. It threatens the very life of man in the society. For man, to be is to be social, being human is to be social. (Ochulor and Bassey, 2010: 470).

What is being advanced above is that the essence of morality lies in how one conducts himself/herself in relation to others and society as whole. An individual as a moral being has a responsibility to cultivate moral traits, but such traits find full expression in their potential to promote cohesion within a community. As a moral agent, a human being strives to model his/her conduct to conform to the precepts laid down by the society. Thus, human traits that fail to promote the wellbeing of the societal or community members are deemed immoral. This fact is elaborately captured by Metz (2012: 100) in his work of contrasting ethics in Africa and in Aristotle that virtues are precisely meant to enhance people's social life. Virtues are moral standards that an individual learn in the process of socialization in order to guide his/her conduct towards others in the maintenance of cordial relations within a society.

Since corruption transgresses virtues it also disturbs community's cohesion. The fundamental premise for this inference is that corruption is not undertaken for the wellbeing of all members of the community. Because of its clandestine nature, it involves only few or a certain syndicate group who are driven by ulterior motives other than the welfare of their community members.

If corruption is primarily an ethical problem, the necessary remedies to reduce its prevalence, or ideally to eradicate it, should be sought by ethicist(s) who are cognizant of how it manifests itself in a particular context, working in unison with all members of the community. This is because corruption primarily taints the moral standards of a community, which should guide courses of action in service delivery and thus hold the community intact (Hosea, 2014: 385). The work of reclaiming lost moral standards that have degenerated into overt and prevalent acts of corruption can cogently take place within the same context through revival of the same assaulted and ignored moral values. This exercise should be inclusive in an ideal sense because morality should not be treated as a monopoly of the elites or certain few individuals who claim to be

knowledgeable about it. Every morally conscious member of a community knows what is right and wrong for the community and is also aware of the vices that disturb communal harmony.

### 7.3.1 Corruption as a Threat to Communal Harmony

Maintenance of harmony in a community is considered a greatest good because all the subjects of a community can meaningfully partake if they harmoniously relate. Thus, harmony is an enabler that unleashes community members' potential. Without vibrant relations, community members become anxious and therefore fail to turn their community to an appropriate theatre where they can explore and sharpen their talents for the benefit of all members. Since by indulging in corruption its perpetrators breach communal ideology, which is so vital for maintaining cohesion within the community, corruption becomes immoral and constitutes one of the greatest social ills. Corruption negates harmony within a community and thus becomes an anti-*Ubuntu* engagement. On the similar point, Ocholor and Bassey (2010: 469) affirm that “there is a universal agreement to the fact that corruption itself is an anti-social behaviour that portends danger to the cohesive fabric that holds a society together and to the integral growth and development of any society.” The implication is that if corruption is perpetuated it has the capacity to fragment the society through creation of warring advantaged and disadvantaged groups. The advantaged group would be the one that has affinity with the leader(s) and therefore having access to several benefits, while the disadvantaged group would be deprived of such benefits. This culminates at the stage where community members cease to mutually affirm their humanity, but start basing their relations on material benefits derived from being a member of a particular circle of friends.

The irony is that even though *Ubuntu* domiciles in sub-Saharan African countries, majority of these countries have fallen prey to corruption in its diverse forms. It is in sub-Saharan African communities that we are experiencing injustices and several inequities through biased distribution of resources and opportunities. This is possible because corruption impedes the community from pursuing the general welfare of all the members (Agbibo, 2012: 123). When some community members are materially induced and become more influenced by what an individual gains and not what is in the best interest of all community members, the general welfare of all members ceases to be a priority and gets replaced by egoistic inclinations. It also becomes apparent that corruption distorts relationality, which is an indispensable factor that

preserves community's intactness and helps members to cordially relate. As I appraise both political patronage and entitlement from African ethics perspective below, this appraisal is engendered by the fact that corruption prevalence in sub-Saharan Africa is among others sponsored by these concepts.

#### **7.4 Appraisal of Political Patronage from African Ethics' Perspective**

Ubiquity of political patronage in different political settings was acknowledged in chapter three. It was also argued that in some environments political patronage exists without drastically affecting efficiency of government machinery, while in some environments it impedes efficiency. It is in the latter case that many sub-Saharan African countries are caught up. The fact that many African political leaders sustain themselves in power through patronage cannot be disputed (Arriola, 2009: 1339, Mwenda and Tangri, 2005: 449). Skewed distribution of national resources and opportunities among the citizens under overt practice of patron-client relationship is very common in sub-Saharan African countries. This has been construed as a reliable strategy to retain power by political leaders in the region. It is for this reason that Cammack (2007: 600) argues that policy direction on development and governance becomes subservient to the overriding goal, which is power retention.

As an instrument of power attainment and retention, Patron-client relationship in politics is inherently segregational because it disregards citizens outside the leaders' clients' circles. In order to ensure that they win loyalty of their clients, African political leaders channel the national resources and many other inducement mechanisms at their disposal to procure clients' loyalty. This practice became vivid in the regimes led by great despots in the region such as Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire, Kamuzu Banda of Malawi, and Francisco Macias Nguema of Equatorial Guinea, to mention a few. Just taking one example of Mobutu, among many disheartening things he did was to treat opposition with utter hostility as a reliable means to subdue any resistance (Iheukwumere and Iheukwumere, 2003: 23). Surprisingly, this practice is still encountered in different countries in contemporary sub-Saharan Africa. Under extreme developments of patron-client relationships, administrative and governance agenda is influenced by 'big men' outside government establishment (Cammack, 2007: 600). When governance agenda on key policies is being controlled by individuals outside government structures, then we should know that the

dyadic relationship between politicians and ‘big men’ has degenerated into a state capture. It is at this level that the laws and the policies are designed to suit the interests of the prominent few individuals who have strong ties with political elites in government. Such prominent figures also enjoy the monopoly of benefiting from lucrative government tenders while also being used as conduits through which embezzled governments’ funds are channeled. As I have indicated, turning government opportunities into a monopoly for few or chosen individuals it will inevitably leave some citizens’ basic needs unattended.

The way political patronage is being utilized as a feasible political transaction to secure votes by many African political leaders fouls in many respects the principles of African ethics presented under *Ubuntu*. The evident divisive approach in political patronage implies that some community members stand to benefit from the relationship while others are condemned to lose. If a patron political leader successfully seizes government powers, his/her clients benefit in a number of ways like being employed in the public sector or wherever the political leader enjoys leverage. The clients are also prioritized in economic and developmental opportunities. As I have alluded, community cohesion cannot be possible under such a divisive approach by political patronage. By considering African ethics to be particularly concerned about fundamentally relational and reciprocal ties between members of a community (Metz and Miller, 2016: 1); it becomes apparent that political patronage undermines such relationality and reciprocity within a community. It is not possible for community members to harmoniously relate and humanely reciprocate if they get uneven treatment from their ruler. The act of favouring others and ‘despising’ some affects essential values upon which a community is established.

Against a potential inquisition whether African ethics and democracy are mutually exclusive, because it is in the nature of democracy to lure electorates support, the answer would be that an ideal democratic political leader who subscribes to African ethics principles as encapsulated in *Ubuntu* is the one who outcompetes his/her competitors on the basis of advancing the policies that benefit his/her community and all its members. And in precise terms, this means that African ethics and democracy are not mutually exclusive and can well cohabit for the benefit of all. Mahao makes reference to sound traditional governance philosophy undergirding chieftainship among the Basotho that:

Democratic accountability in African jurisprudence was embedded in the constitutional principle '*morena ke morena ka batho*'. Translated to mean that the chief is the chief by the grace of the people ... the principle in fact means far more. It speaks to the participatory nature of governance which renders it inherently democratic and accountable to the governed (Mahao, 2010: 321).

The participatory nature of governance in pre-colonial sub-Saharan Africa was carefully designed through collective wisdom, which was human centered. It was very clear by then that people will have divergent views on various governance issues, and this was considered valuable because it is from different views that a real resolution becomes possible. A contemporary political leader in sub-Saharan Africa, who subscribes to African ethics principles and values, would not only channel opportunities to his/her clients, but would equitably extent opportunities to all citizens and engage all to seek sustainable resolutions to vexing governance problems.

Political patronage segregates and stratifies the citizens into those who deserve opportunities and those who do not deserve them. This impedes mutual recognition of humanity among community members. Since *Ubuntu* is all about a sincere acknowledgement that we share in common humanity and we are bound together by the same humanity, it is dehumanizing to exclude other citizens from opportunities. The very act of prioritizing other citizens that are considered to be clients to the detriment of those who are deemed not clients creates an exclusive approach to politics and therefore falls outside the scope of *Ubuntu*. Political patronage also fails to accord some people respect, dignity, and value they deserve as members of a community. Etieyibo asserts that "*Ubuntu's* idea of humanity being bound together or of your humanity being interwoven with my humanity is best understood by paying attention to the African ontology which is articulated across many societies in sub-Sahara Africa and which is holistic and communitarian" ( 2017b: 318). This ideal notion of *Ubuntu* cannot be realized if some members are denied equal access in the distribution of resources and opportunities. Those who are segregated also have their dignity tainted since their humanity is not given equal stature with those who are treated as patrons' clients. On *Ubuntu* as a basis of a person's dignity, Mahao gives an African jurisprudence perspective of human dignity by arguing that:

For jurisprudence to take human dignity seriously, it must come with the fact that dignity is indivisible. A human being cannot have dignity anchored in civil rights and simultaneously live in material wretchedness of deprivation and destitution. If dignity draws from inner and external self-worth, the reality of civil and socio-economic rights must, without qualification, be its bedrock. African jurisprudence adopts this integrated approach to human dignity. It is anchored in a philosophy that professes human dignity to encapsulate physical, spiritual, cultural and material wellness. From this perspective, political and civil rights are inseparable from socio-economic and collective rights - together they make the totality and indivisibility of human dignity. The maxim *motho ke ka batho* (freely translated to mean a person owes his/her social being to other social beings) is the epistemological framework within which dignity is conceptualised. This maxim is the bedrock of a homocentric, sustainable, resilient social and ecological equilibrium (Mahao, 2010: 326).

In sub-Saharan context the notion of human dignity is anchored in *Ubuntu*, whereby community members take it as their duty to preserve the dignity of fellow members, especially at the hour of need when community members grapple with basic necessities of life that risk undermining their dignity. The onus primarily lies with the community leader to ensure that civil rights are upheld and no community member is subjected to a condition of ‘material wretchedness of deprivation and destitution’ as Mahao has plausibly asserted above. It is only when these ideals prevail and are observed that *Ubuntu*’s notion of interwoven humanity - bringing all community members to share in a common humanity- becomes real. It is from this perspective that political patronage is deemed unethical under African ethics lens because it prioritizes some citizens’ interests that are treated as clients at the expense of those who are not clients. It also portrays a very bad picture of leadership that thrives through divide and rule approach by advantaging others while leaving some disadvantaged. As such, it is also important to assess a sense of entitlement from African ethics perspective.

### **7.5 Assessing Political Entitlement Ethos from African Ethics Perspective**

Unlike political patronage where a political leader induces clients materially or through other opportunities in exchange for clients’ loyalty to vote for such a leader, entitlement springs from a conviction that an individual or a group deserves a preferential treatment because of their contribution in combating unwanted situation or due to endured hostile treatment in the past. Lewis and Smithson (2005: 1457) refer to a sense of entitlement as “a concept used to denote a

set of beliefs and feelings about rights and entitlements, or legitimate expectations, based on what is perceived to be fair and equitable.” This perception of entitlement is also applicable to what majority of sub-Saharan Africans expressed after obtaining independence from their colonial masters. Independence in the region was not a given, but was earned through many hardships and sacrifices borne by then oppressed Africans in the region. After gaining independence, varied sense of entitlement emerged as some people claimed to have played a pivotal role towards independence attainment for their countries and nations. The prevailed logic seemed to compel that those who considered themselves having borne more brunt of the liberation struggle process and its cruelties were entitled to lion’s share in various opportunities within their states. This is testified by the emerging political elites who sought to establish a hegemonic monopoly on power through advancement of entitlement discourse that benefits. They contend that that it was through the struggles they have endured that independence was obtained and thus thwarted the injustices and biasness of colonial regime (Muvingi, 2008: 79). With this redefined notion of entitlement, I seek to establish whether entitlement can be justified under African ethics lens.

As I argued in chapter three on how an absolute sense of entitlement can lead to corruption, if the ethic of entitlement is pursued at the detriment of some members of a community it becomes unethical under African ethics scrutiny. That would mean that those who purport to be entitled use available alternatives to seize opportunities without regard to the welfare of other citizens. Since African ethics transcends merely treating others courteously, to involve profound appreciation of the worth of other members of a community (Prozesky, 2009: 9), it is unethical to pursue a course of action that is likely to leave fellow citizens worse off. Thus, entitlement as undergirding redistribution policy can be ethically permissible if the motive is to redress the past injustices and is not intended to make other members of a community worse off.

It follows from the nature of redistribution policies or redressing the injustices of the past that they will have some unwanted effects on some citizens, especially those who were not the victims of the past injustices. I concur with Metz (2009: 344) on his argument, which comes as mid solution against strong partialism and impartialism. Metz argues that it is ethically justifiable to give preferential treatment to those who sacrificed on behalf others as demonstration of

gratitude for being selfless and facing cruelty in its extreme forms in pursuit of the common good (2009: 349). He continues to raise a relationally based argument that those who reject their preferential treatment fail to identify themselves with such heroes and heroines (*Ibid*). They fail to identify with them because by rejecting that they should be given some preference implies that those heroes and heroines are merely treated as instruments used to attain the common good. Without reciprocating their selfless effort by giving them some preferential treatment on state opportunities also implies that we breach the notion mutual recognition, which should emerge through acknowledgement of one's contribution in the maintenance of community cohesion and wellbeing.

Based on Metz's notion of moderate partialism, I find it plausible that entitlement can be condoned to benefit those who sacrificed for the sake of others. Also inferring from Lewis and Smithson part of their definition of entitlement as "legitimate expectations, based on what is perceived to be fair and equitable" (2005: 1457), those who have been denied opportunities because of the injustices of the past feel legitimately entitled to opportunities that would put them at par with those who were not affected by such injustices. It is only under the above argued circumstances that I deem entitlement permissible under African ethics. Otherwise, if an extreme sense of entitlement is left to be a basis for distribution of resources and allocation of benefits in the public sector it can degenerate into a springboard for political and bureaucratic corruption as it is discussed below.

## **7.6 Appraising Political Corruption from African Ethics Viewpoint**

Ubiquity of political corruption has become so evident in sub-Saharan African countries to the extent that the argument portraying it as one of the greatest menaces in the region cannot be countered on logical grounds. Political elites in the region resort to corruption as a viable means of accumulating wealth that is necessary to sustain their tenure in office. Amundsen (1999: 3) posits that political corruption is manifested "when the politicians and state agents, who are entitled to make and enforce the laws in the name of the people, are themselves corrupt. Political corruption is when political decision-makers use the political power they are armed with, to sustain their power, status and wealth." Being imbued with entitlement for powerful positions within their states, corrupt politicians abuse their power to illicitly amass themselves and their

cronies with wealth from state resources. In order to thwart any possible traces of the funds directly misappropriated from the public coffers, corrupt African leaders relied mostly on European banks to lauder such funds (Markovska and Adams, 2015: 169). Under extreme circumstances some of these corrupt leaders end up accumulating wealth far above their countries. This portrays how venomous political corruption can be in its heightened level. Such prevalence of political corruption also undermines various moral values.

Based on utility approach, there are some arguments that portray corruption to be preferable. Such arguments render corruption useful in relaxing stringent bureaucratic process that are time consuming and not making business sense. However, every corrupt transaction contravenes legal frameworks that articulate procedures and guide transactions' processes. Above all, corruption breaches various moral principles and values. The fact that corrupt transactions are covertly executed shows that they do not attract public approval.

From African ethics perspective, political corruption is conceived unethical from many fronts. Among others, it undermines community's cohesion and relationality among the community members. Political corruption also undercuts democratic principles such as equality before the law, political freedom and rule of law. Being solely motivated to sustain themselves on powerful positions, while majority of the citizens are left to grapple with utter poverty and squalor, corrupt politicians cease to treat their fellow citizens as valuable members of their nations that are equally called to contribute in the maintenance of cohesion and tranquility for their communities. Such politicians also fail to uphold a sense of shared humanity because corrupt politicians leave many citizens in destitute situation. By embezzling the public funds, corrupt politicians fail to identify themselves with the citizens they impoverish. Tschaepe shows the importance of mutually shared humanity and identifying oneself with others and with the whole community as a reliable developmental process for a person to come into a fully developed being by asserting that:

In order for the person to come into being, there must be a community in which this may occur. Communication is a necessary process that facilitates human organisms to develop into persons within communities. In order to sustain lines of communication and the ensuing development

of personhood, harmony and solidarity are required. Harmony provides the community with stability from which persons may develop. Solidarity provides the community with identity that contributes to the identification of the person as a person. These two qualities of action – promoting harmony and promoting solidarity – are the conditions necessary for an action to be moral from the standpoint of the *Ubuntu* ethic...(Tschaepe 2013: 54).

A politically corrupt environment negates harmony and solidarity, which are so crucial for community stability and identity respectively, as Tschaepe contends above. The populace also loses trust from government since it feels betrayed by corrupt politicians. The values that bind the community together and promote a shared ethic of humanity and identity also become directly encroached and therefore threatening to atomize a community into disaggregated members with no sense of relationality. From all this, it becomes clear that corruption undermines the key tenets of African ethics and has a potential to affect all the bureaucratic processes.

### **7.7 Critical Review of Bureaucratic Corruption under African Ethics**

Public service in sub-Saharan Africa has become a haven for corruption to flourish. This happens despite previous and ongoing several initiatives to curb the prevalence of corruption in the public domain. Anti-corruption initiatives have spread throughout the region and the bulk of responsibility is currently lying with the ACAs. However, the efficiency of these agencies continues to be severely undermined by incapacitating intrusion of political leadership in their operations. Political leaders manage to control the operations of these agencies through enactment of laws that give them leverage on the agencies. Since political corruption symbiotically exists with bureaucratic corruption, as some corrupt transactions become a joint venture between political leaders and public officials, the prevalence of political corruption easily translates into endemic bureaucratic corruption.

Just like how political corruption infringes upon the fundamental African ethics values as espoused by Ubuntu, bureaucratic corruption also has dire effects. Acute effects of corruption are borne by the poor in communities who cannot afford basic services that have turned to be on sale. Bayley shows the harmful effects of corruption by maintaining that:

A corrupt act represents a failure to achieve the objectives government sought when it established criteria for decisions of various classes. To the extent that the objectives sought were worthwhile, corrupt acts exact a cost in non-achievement. For example, if the objective in hiring government employees is the obtaining of efficiency and ability in carrying out official tasks, then corruption in appointments produces inefficiency and waste. If the issuing of permits for domestic enterprises is designed to insure that scarce resources go to projects enjoying the highest priority in terms of facilitating long-run economic development, then corruption exacts a cost by inhibiting over-all economic development (Bayley, 1966: 725).

From Bayley's outlined effects of corruption on development and efficiency in service delivery, it is clear that corruption obstructs fair process in recruitment of public officials; awarding of government tenders; and provision of services to the citizens. The effects of the above obstructed processes directly affect the citizens who, unfortunately, cannot survive without services entrusted to public officials.

An inference drawn from corrupt practices by the bureaucrats is that they all fail to promote cordial relations within communities in the region. As Bayley indicates that corrupt recruitment system in the public sector inevitably retards efficiency of government machinery, it also creates divisions among the citizens who are employed through corrupt means and those who are not employed yet they meet employment requirements. In the same vein, different normative values such as "caring, sharing, respect for others, compassion, altruism, kindness, generosity, and courtesy", (Letseka, 2013: 340) that *Ubuntu* encompasses fade away in the prevalence of bureaucratic corruption.

It is contradictory for a public official to maintain that he/she subscribes to *Ubuntu* and its values but continues to solicit bribes from fellow citizens for provision of services that ought to be freely rendered. Negotiation of bribes and recruiting people in government departments on the basis of received kickbacks is a clear reflection that the public official does not acknowledge the mutually shared humanity with the recipients of his/her service and therefore fails to accord them humane treatment.

## **7.8 African Ethics' Potential to Proffer a Contextually Relevant Approach in the Fight against Corruption in sub-Saharan Africa**

After discussing African ethics and showing how it is entirely anchored in *Ubuntu*, I find it cogent to assert that the contemporary global ethics discourse cannot meaningfully take place without making reference to it. The various strides made by African philosophers and ethicists in sub-Saharan Africa and beyond have resulted into a profoundly intelligible literature on African ethics, which provided a distinct ethical worldview from the Western ethics outlook. This also translated into sub-Saharan Africa experiencing a conceptual recovery on morality in the past two decades based on transcendental moral values of *Ubuntu* that are also instrumental in shaping inclusive and all embracing communities in sub-Saharan Africa. In his book entitled 'African Moral Consciousness', Munyadzi Felix Murove (2016) advocates for a space for African ethics in the contemporary world. He undertakes this initiative with a view to highlight invaluableness of African ethics among many African societies in the context of modernization.

However, I should note that even though there have been visible and far reaching intellectual engagements on vindicating and refining African ethics as a plausible sub-Saharan moral outlook, very little has been achieved on mainstreaming African values espoused in African ethics to deter plethora of social ills that beset the region. This lacuna between values advocated by African ethics and prevalence of various social ills can only be filled through concerted effort by basing mitigating policies and strategies on these values and ensuring that there is optimal compliance by all. Among these social ills, corruption prominently stands out and continues to weaken the moral fiber of many societies in the region while also breeding inequities in the distribution of national resources and opportunities. Abject poverty, which is so pervasive in the region, is largely owed to dysfunctional governments' institutions that retard service delivery and thus creating different avenues for corruption to prosper in different sectors, but mostly in the public sector. This is indicative of the moral void by those who have been entrusted with responsibility at various levels in the public sector and other sectors.

The reason for arguing that corruption in all its facets primarily calls for an ethically underpinned remedy is provided by Ochulor and Bassey (2010: 466) that "...the prevalence of corruption betrays a latent decay in our ethical values and orientation." This shows that every corrupt

activity contravenes ethical value(s). By asserting that the values enshrined in African ethics seem to largely fail to take precedence in the formulation and implementation of policies and strategies that are meant to fight and combat corruption does not suggest that these values have become meaningless or obsolete in the region. Neither do I suggest that these values are no longer radiated in African societies' way of life. These values have survived the odds of colonialism, which were characterized by subjugation of sub-Saharan Africans and frequent ethnocentric tendencies. They have also survived the ordeals from post-colonial political leaders who ignored them to emulate their erstwhile leaders by adopting weak government institutions that would keep them at the helm of government. Mahao's perspective is that "African systems had not yet been touched by colonialism, which corrupted, alienated and re-crafted the indigenous institutions to suit its own interest" (Mahao, 2010: 319). Survival of these values explains why African philosophers and ethicists have embarked on a successful venture to invoke them under *Ubuntu* as an umbrella concept. The reason is not because these values belong in the past, but because they continue to be lived, though under a virtually confused and complex environment. It is the responsibility of African philosophers and ethicists in collaboration with all the prepared minds in the region to work on modalities of mainstreaming ethics in different areas so that it can resolve various peoples' plights that are constantly surfacing.

The *Ubuntu*-anchored approach on fighting and combating corruption in sub-Saharan Africa would require every member of a community to desist from indulging in impurities that have a potential to disturb harmony within a community. Sharma shows how contagious the evil performed by a member of a community can be by explaining that:

In the legal system guided by the ethical codes encapsulated in the terms *onipa*, *iwe* or *ubuntu* (and similar terms in other sub-Saharan languages), often translated as humanness, crimes committed by one individual on another extend far beyond the two individuals concerned. They have far reaching implications for the people among whom the perpetrator as well as the victim come from. *Ubuntu* (also termed *Uhnu* in some southern African languages) jurisprudence supports remedies and punishments that tend to bring people together and restore the social and material balance which may have been disturbed by the act. (Sharma, 2013: 121).

As a means of guarding a community against ills such as corruption, a collective action by community members would inform strategies and approaches that best address this malady. The importance of collective action epitomized by *Ubuntu* is lucidly presented by Mahao (2010: 325) in his argument for African perspective of jurisprudence that “open popular participation itself [is] a powerful self-executing accountability and control mechanism. Self-interest [has] no place in such an open decision-making environment.” When anti-corruption discourse is given a priority within our communities in the region, and all members freely participate in the development of anti-corruption strategies, ownership will be optimal and all will strive to shun corruption and its costs. This would also go a long way on empowering the citizens to actively denounce and report incidences of corruption.

Since corruption fails to promote the community’s welfare, all the subjects in the community would have a clear mandate to fight it through well coordinated strategies adopted and owned by all members. The starting point would be defining corruption within their context followed by identification of acts classified under corruption. This approach would drastically differ from the semi-dogmatic approach under the principal-agent model where accountability follows hierarchical order with the principal possessing the superior powers to hold the agent accountable. An inference deducible from principal-agent model is that those members of a community that do not occupy any recognized portfolio within their community’s hierarchy would not have capacity to extend accountability mechanisms to their superiors.

Another factor that weakens principal-agent anti-corruption approach in the face of African ethics is that it “[assumes] that the interests of principal and agent diverge, that there is informational asymmetry to the advantage of the agent, but that the principal can prescribe the pay-off rules in their relationship” (Groenendijk, 1997: 208). One of the renowned proponents of the principal-agent model on fighting corruption, Robert Klitgaard (1988: 22) asserts that the agent is employed to help the principal achieve objectives and goals. However, this does not rule out that the agent might be driven by his/her own private interests that deviate from the principal’s vision. Klitgaard shows that corruption ensues as result of an agent betraying the principal’s interests (*Ibid*). The assumption that corruption emerges from a client’s disloyalty to the principal cannot be universally applicable since the principal and the agent can cooperate in

the execution of corrupt transactions. It is often the case that corruption in the public sector is so well orchestrated that top officials court junior officials in charge of operational costs so that they reciprocate corrupt opportunities. Their opportunistic relationship can also be strengthened by the fact that the junior officials are conversant with the day-to-day operational transactions and can easily manipulate them, while top officials can deliberately relax accountability system to allow junior officials to freely perform such dubious transactions. In this way, moderating monopoly of bureaucrats and limiting their discretionary powers while also improving accountability systems in the public service is still wanting as reliable and efficient anti-corruption approach in the public sector if the process leaves out the community members. Involvement of the community is crucial because members can provide vital information on corrupt activities using different effective platforms. For all this to happen there ought to be optimal harmony within a community and trust between government and the citizens should not be betrayed.

Since multiple initiatives to combat corruption were globally rolled out, with the African continent being the greatest target, the overarching approach has always been prescribed by the international community and was delivered under the logic of principal-agent theory (Persson *et al*, 2010: 6). As a result of implementing principal-agent based interventions, there were several restructuring processes and enactments and amendments of the laws in African countries to accommodate prescribed corruption remedies geared towards moderating and monitoring agents' monopoly and discretion while also enhancing accountability mechanisms. However, these efforts never succeeded in abating the prevalence of corruption. The high context culture, which is characteristic of the societies found in sub-Saharan Africa, makes corruption in the region to be systemic and therefore becoming entangled within deeply entrenched relations that are expressed in diverse forms such as patronage and entitlement. A call for moral revolution based on contextually relevant communal values with a view to empower citizens to freely and safely act against corrupt activities is imperative.

As a herald on how African ethics can be mainstreamed to inform anti-corruption approaches in sub-Saharan Africa, it is vitally important to establish how political patronage and entitlement are appraised under African ethics values. The fundamental reason for bringing these two

concepts under African ethics' critique is due to their contribution to high prevalence of corruption in sub-Saharan Africa, as it was discussed in chapter three.

## **7.9 Conclusion**

The purpose of this chapter was to critically assess how corruption as a moral problem that has severely pervaded the sub-Saharan African countries and their societies can be reduced through tenable and contextually relevant approaches that are informed by African ethics. I started by arguing that corruption is primarily a moral issue with a view to justify the importance of basing anti-corruption approaches and initiatives on relevant ethical values. The primary focus was to show that African ethics has an immense potential to inform appropriate anticorruption programmes in sub-Saharan Africa. This is the reason why African ethics being anchored in *Ubuntu* was discussed in detail.

I argued that due to inclusive nature of African ethics anti-corruption programmes informed by African ethics influence would acutely differ from the ones sponsored by western moral theories. Anticorruption approaches based on African ethics would also differ from the prevailing principal-agent model of anti-corruption, because under the former the onus of fighting and combating corruption would be on all community members unlike the under the latter where accountability system is superiorly exercised by the principal over the agent as a means of curbing corruption. The chapter also presented how anti-corruption approaches and initiatives based on principal-agent model have dismally failed to reduce corruption prevalence in sub-Saharan African countries. Among the problems that lead to the failure of this model is that the model assumes that when the accountability mechanisms are effective hence enabling the principal to hold the agent accountable, corruption will be reduced. The model seems to undermine the contagiousness of corruption, since both the principal and the agent can cooperate to execute corrupt transactions that directly or indirectly benefit them. It is from the identification of this deficiency in principal-agent model of corruption that a more inclusive approach –that equally involves all members of a community- is identified as a tenable approach and contextually appropriate for sub-Saharan Africa.

It is on the basis of the attributes of African ethics as clearly encompassed in *Ubuntu* that political patronage; entitlement; political corruption; and bureaucratic corruption were critiqued. Political patronage and entitlement were indentified in chapter three as springboards of both political and bureaucratic corruption. Remmer (2007: 363) states in categorical terms that the practice of political patronage has dire effects to the political environment and some of these results include politicized bureaucracies, corruption, electoral manipulation, ethnic voting, and fragile political institutions. All of these outlined effects of political patronage have a direct linkage to corruption. Thus political patronage breeds political corruption and bureaucratic corruption. This is the reason why where political patronage prevails there is likelihood of politicized bureaucracy, ethnic voting and weak political institutions, just to mention a few.

Similarly, an extreme sense of entitlement was shown to be a source of corruption because those who claim entitlement want to be major beneficiaries in lucrative opportunities within their states. I deemed it vital therefore to critique both political corruption and entitlement under African ethics perspective. Political corruption and entitlement were also appraised under African ethics perspective in order to critically assess how they breach the values enshrined in African ethics. It is from their critique under African ethics that they were all found to be against sustenance of communal harmony; humane treatment of all members of the community; and mutually shared humanity and identity. It is from the rejection of political patronage, exclusive entitlement claims by political elites, political corruption, and bureaucratic corruption as ethically flawed under African ethics values that I argued for African ethics as having an immense capacity to proffer and contextually effective anti-corruption programmes in the region.

## **CHAPTER EIGHT: SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

### **8.1 Introduction**

In this chapter I present the recommendations and occlusions of the study. The conclusions are made on the basis of the arguments raised in this study. I have acknowledged throughout this study that corruption in sub-Saharan Africa is pervasive and that if the political the leaders and leaders in all the sectors in the region do not collaborate with the citizens to seek sustainable solutions to this chronic menace corruption will totally render government institutions dysfunctional and also perpetuate stagnation in economic performance and development. The recommendations spring from the general view that depicts the importance of basing anti-corruption discourse in sub-Saharan Africa on African ethics values.

In order to pave the way for the conclusions and recommendations, the chapter first gives a summary of the entire research study succinctly capturing the main arguments of each chapter. The role of political patronage and entitlement ethos towards endemic corruption in sub-Saharan Africa is underscored. Their influence leads to the recommendation that African ethics values are plausible and contextually meaningful towards informing corruption discourse in the region. Appreciation of the African ethics values will also make it imperative for the citizens to be empowered so that they become strategic partners in the fight against corruption. This chapter will identify two main conclusions, the first of which is the continuation of political patronage and a sense of entitlement to engender institutionalized corruption in the governments of the sub-Saharan African countries. The second conclusion is that the sponsored and detached anti-corruption approaches to the sub-Saharan context have not been successful in abating corruption, hence the need to turn to African ethics values as being feasible and contextually meaningful towards curbing corruption in the region.

### **8.2 Summary**

This section is intended to outline the purpose of the study and to show how it unfolded through the eight chapters. It re-states the problem that prompted this research study. This section also determines whether this thesis has attained its primary goal, which is to show that political

patronage and a strong sense of entitlement advanced by the NLMs-led governments continue to engender endemic corruption in post-colonial sub-Saharan African countries.

After establishing a conceptual interface between corruption and patronage, the study argues that if government operations are overly influenced by political patronage and a strong sense of entitlement they are likely to engender evasive corruption in the public domain. It also contends that on the basis of corruption repercussions and a political culture emerging from political patronage, entitlement politics becomes common in the sub-continent. An intense sense of entitlement is buttressed by the nationalist and socialist philosophic point of view by the NLMs that became governments. This is why Suttner (2004a: 5) asserted that NLMs considered themselves the only organisations that represent the needs of their nations and who can legitimately become the government and pursue the struggle for liberation, while other organisations can only play an ancillary role. Based on the same calculus, opposition was not tolerated and was thus crushed to its lowest ebb. The victory claimed by the liberation movements that became the governments after the demise of colonial rule, led to their establishment as irreplaceable political parties purported to embody social cohesion and aspirations of the electorates. It is from this exclusivist sense of entitlement that liberation parties' elites claim priority in accessing the resources of the countries and the best opportunities from their governments. It is from these entitlement claims espoused by NLMs political elites that invasive corruption becomes possible in many countries below the Sahara.

This study comprises eight chapters. Chapter One set the tone for the whole study by providing a background on how corruption manifests itself in sub-Saharan African countries through political patronage and entitlement ethos and how it continues to undermine several interventions aimed at keeping it at bay. It is from this observation that the problem for this study ensued. This problem is magnified by the fact that political elites in the region still sustain themselves through patron-client based appointments in government departments and exclude those who do not subscribe to their political outlook. These politicians still consider themselves as being the only ones who can legitimately lead their governments. It is from this entitlement obsession that they approach statecraft from monopolistic perspective thus seeking to benefit themselves and their allies. The chapter presents the preliminary literature review, which discusses different schools

of thought on corruption. Cultural and developmental approaches to corruption are discussed in this regard. The moralists and revisionist arguments on corruption are explored. The chapter also presents the research objectives and related research questions, which give the study a precise focus. Theoretical framework constituted an integral part of the chapter. Four theories, namely cultural relativism, patron-client, entitlement and African ethics are discussed as being critical in informing the arguments raised throughout the study. The methodology becomes another crucial part of the chapter that provides strategies to be followed when conducting this study. The conceptual analysis and historical analysis become two prominent methods that were deployed in the study.

In order to coherently proceed to the crux of the arguments, Chapter Two focused on unpacking the conceptual interface between corruption and patronage. Particular focus here was to establish how political patronage, mainly under clientelistic appointments and favours becomes an enabler to endemic corruption. The chapter started by venturing into corruption definition conundrum with the purpose of identifying tenable definitions to be used in the study. The definitions were considered from the etymological sense to a broader sense, based on how corruption is comprehended in different fields of knowledge and how it is manifested in different sectors. The section on corruption from the cultural relativism perspective was premised on the assertion that corruption is a cultural phenomenon and thus should be dealt with on the basis of how it emerges in a contextually unique setting. It is upon this assertion that it is deemed incoherent to adopt a 'one size fits all' strategy on fighting and combating corruption. Each anti-corruption strategy ought to be informed by the cultural dynamics of the context which it is designed to be implemented.

The chapter traced patronage from its anthropological usage, which was common among the peasant communities who were sponsored by a 'big man' who provided for their basic necessities of life. The chapter also traced evolution of patronage concept from its anthropological usage to its current political and common understanding, which refers to a political leader or a party as a patron who provides for his or her followers, also known as the clients. It is from the asymmetrical nature of the patron-client relationship that corrupt activities are condoned such as favours that are unfairly and corruptly obtained.

The key focus in Chapter Three was to establish the prevalence of corruption and political patronage in sub-Saharan Africa. The chapter traced the causes of endemic corruption in the region from the colonial era and how it became a product of weak government institutions. As such, corruption becomes structurally based. The failure by the post-colonial political leaders to replace the weak government institutions they inherited from their erstwhile colonial leaders created a permissive environment for corruption to prevail. It is from a similar view that the neo-colonialism influence on corruption was explored.

Insidiousness of bureaucratic corruption in sub-Saharan African governments was also discussed. This was engendered by the observation that endemic political corruption leads to bureaucratic corruption. The chapter also discussed the prevalence of political patronage in sub-Saharan African governments and how it encourages corruption in the region. In a pursuit for power, political leaders reward their clients by posting them into strategic positions, irrespective of their competences as long as they condone everything that the political leaders say or propose. Government tenders that ought to be meticulously awarded as the means of ensuring quality in the provision of procured services are turned into a turf for clients who benefit from these tenders *albeit* not meeting the basic requirements. These practices clearly reflect the common means through which corruption is encountered in the region. The chapter also considered the role of political patronage as an antecedent of a sense of entitlement by political leaders and their allies. It is from a strong sense entitlement that political leaders and their allies claim legitimacy to lead their governments and therefore have access to state resources and opportunities. It is argued that a strong sense of entitlement leads to endemic corruption because its claimants exercise absolute powers. This is the reason why entitlement transmutes into nepotistic practices in government.

In order to give cogently appealing reasons why I consider corruption to be corrosive in the sub-Saharan African countries, I had to identify the various effects of corruption. Chapter Four presented various effects of corruption clustered under the four themes, namely developmental, economic, political and social. Besides arguing that corruption is primarily unethical because it infringes upon some of the established ethical values in different cultural backgrounds, presenting the effects of corruption is backed by evidence and clearly shows how pernicious

corruption can be. It is also proper to indicate that some incidences of corruption may have effects that cut across the developmental, economic, political and social themes. Even though development is considered a very complex concept, corruption is deemed to adversely affect developmental initiatives through the deliberate acts of the political leaders, the political appointees and the bureaucrats who inflate the costs of developmental projects so that the surplus funds can end up in the accounts of these officials.

Against the views of the people who maintain that corruption is developmentally viable because it relaxes the unnecessary bureaucratic processes that are likely to hinder developmental projects, I argued that corruption is costly to development because it taints the reputation of a country, which leads to declined support on developmental projects. Corruption further has dire economic effects because corrupt officials directly benefit from the public coffers at the expense of the multitudes of the citizens who cannot access basic services. Another economic cost of corruption is that the countries which are perceived to be very corrupt cease to be the investment destinations because investors are cognizant of the fact that doing business in a corrupt environment is likely to incur more costs above the legitimate charges. On the other hand, the political costs of corruption include the erosion of trust from the political leaders by the electorate. This mistrust results from the abuse of the government institutions such as the legislature and the military, which are turned into the instruments that serve selfish and myopic interests of the politicians. The effects of corruption on the social life of the citizens are many and varied, but the severe one is that corruption breaches the fundamental moral values that shape the societies and thus lead to inequalities among the citizens.

Chapter Five focused on the political culture ensuing from corruption and political patronage. The intention of the researcher was to demonstrate that as corruption permeates all the key institutions of the governments, it arrests the domestic politics and engenders a debilitating culture. Under such a culture, what preoccupies the ruling politicians is to use all the possible means to sustain themselves in power. It was established that the governments in sub-Saharan Africa have institutionalised corruption by corrupting key government institutions that by their very nature ought to promote the integrity of their governments. As a result, despotic leadership spreads throughout the region as despots induce terror over the citizens. The threat does not only

discourage participatory democracy but it also brings about serious setbacks to the economy because dictators prefer centralised and overly-regulated economies (Mbaku, 1992).

Similarly, the despots rely on clientelism as an instrument to reward their loyalists through the various means. In addition, places the leaders' allies in strategic positions in government. Besides being a compensation strategy for the benefit of the clients, clientelism-based placements are mainly intended to advance political leverage of the leader and the party on almost all the government departments. This means that a political leader can use these departments to advance his or her political mileage. The placements do not only subscribe to the logic of the competence-based placements, but they also prioritise the candidates' loyalty to the leader as a qualifying factor. As a result, prebendalism also becomes one of the characteristics of a political culture emerging from corruption and political patronage. The ability of the officeholder to appropriate the office and use it for his or her own benefit (Joseph, 2013) means that those who are solely placed in office because of their political affiliation are likely to abuse the public offices they occupy for their own benefit or turn them into their political party constituencies. Consequently, predatory politics become a prominent feature resulting from a corrupt political culture. This is where political leaders are more preoccupied about how they derive maximum utility from the government, as opposed to how they enhance the welfare of the citizens. The chapter ended with the argument that under the prevalence of all these features that characterise political culture emerging from corruption and patronage in sub-Saharan Africa, persistent political conflicts occur when conflicting interests between the electorates and the politicians spiral out of control.

Chapter Six was specifically intended to establish how the corrupt political culture transmutes into the entitlement ethos. This occurs mainly because those who have managed to occupy leadership of their governments claim legitimacy to rule to the exclusion of other aspirants. Therefore the study deems vital to ascertain the origin of entitlement politics in the sub-Saharan region. As such, entitlement in politics is traced from the liberation struggle and the transition from the colonial rule into independent governments. Those who confronted the hostility of the colonial rule, especially the war veterans, declared that only those who have liberation credentials can rule and accordingly wield government powers (Muvingi, 2008). Although the

liberation parties preached the importance of human liberties, they betray the principles and values that they fought for. This is why I refer to the NLMs as chief exponents of the entitlement politics; shortly after becoming the governments they become obsessed with power and are not prepared to relinquish it to any alternative political movement or party.

The emergence of political elite cliques from the NLMs that become the governments clearly indicate that lucrative opportunities and access to state resources start to be treated as a preserved turf for the ruling class and their allies. This is epitomised in the implementation of policies such as indigenisation and BEE, which are initially presented as positively targeting the previously disadvantaged citizens, but exclusively benefit a few political elites who manage to tame the citizens through preaching nationalist and socialist politics, while themselves subscribe to crude neo-liberal and capitalist principles of accumulating wealth. It is from this perspective, that I also demonstrate the insidiousness of entitlement and segregational politics in the region.

Under Chapter Seven I critique the anti-corruption approaches that are used in sub-Saharan Africa from the African ethics perspective. In this chapter I argued that the anti-corruption approaches that pervaded the region under the sponsorship of the international community, international financial institutions (mainly the World Bank and IMF) and the international NGOs did not have a significant impact on the reduction of corruption prevalence in the region. This is evidenced by various corruption incidences that continue to rock the countries in the region and therefore diminish their capacity to efficiently and responsively render the expected services to their citizens.

Recourse to the African ethics as having the capacity to proffer an ethically contextual and relevant approach towards curbing corruption is based on the tenable premise that corruption is primarily a moral problem. Thus, a sustainable and reliable approach towards dealing with this menace ought to be based on sound and contextually relevant moral values. I further argued that African ethics, being anchored in *Ubuntu*, has the potential to proffer meaningful and relevant approach in the fight against corruption in sub-Saharan Africa. By virtue of espousing community cantered values, *Ubuntu* guards against practices that threaten community cohesion.

This chapter also critiqued, from African ethics perspective, political patronage and an extreme sense of entitlement as springboards of institutionalized corruption in region governments. Lastly, political corruption and bureaucratic corruption were appraised from the African ethics perspective with the view of envisaging how to overcome them through reawakening and adopting some relevant moral values.

### **8.3 Recommendations**

This purpose of this section is to present the study recommendations. It outlines the ways through which corruption discourse in sub-Saharan Africa can be approached from a more contextually meaningful approach by ascertaining how corruption becomes embedded in government institutions. The recommendations are made as a result of different arguments raised that point to one reality that corruption is rife in the region and continues to undermine the potential of the African societies. Corruption also renders life unliveable to the poorest members of the community who cannot afford to offer kickbacks in order to get the basic services. It is apparent that the problem of corruption in the region continues to amplify at an alarming rate, hence the requirement for the people in all sectors to come together and forge contextually relevant remedies. This approach will significantly differ from the western-origin corruption panacea that was imposed in the region for more than two decades but yielded insignificant results.

The recommendations suggested here are inclined towards ascertaining contextually informed causes of endemic corruption in the region and may lead to informed discourse on corruption in the region and thereafter propose effective anti-corruption remedies. This reality is also echoed by De Maria (2009: 363) that “[t]he indisputable reality of cultural variance requires ‘corruption’ to remain permanently the subject of disputation over what moral standards should apply to bearers of public trust and duty.” This observation rejects as misleading any purported universal approach in dealing with corruption due to the fact that corruption is a cultural phenomenon that is manifested and perceived differently in different cultures. As I proceed to suggest the recommendations deduced from the arguments that are raised in this study, it should be underscored that the solutions to culturally entangled and complex problems such as corruption

cannot be a monopoly of a certain group or organisation but require an inclusive engagement of the members of the society who are conversant with their values and their way of life.

### 8.3.1 Entitlement Politics should be Replaced by Participatory Democracy

I have argued that the political elites from the ruling NLMs have sustained themselves in power through exclusivist entitlement claims that are justified by being in possession of liberation credentials. As it could be anticipated, even those people who are co-opted into governments without having been at the battlefield against colonialism also claim some entitlement. This exclusivist approach disempowers the citizens and subjects them to passive spectators on governance issues.

In order to overcome entitlement politics, participatory democracy should be introduced and embraced. This is recommended as a viable solution because this kind of democracy is not foreign in sub-Saharan Africa. Mahao (2010: 325) attests that a participatory form of governance, which negates self-interest, was practiced in many African societies. The revival of participatory democracy may shun entitlement politics and unleash the potential of the citizens to meaningfully partake in their countries politics and thus contribute to shaping effective and sustainable policies. This may also play a significant role in combating corruption because if the citizens actively participate in their domestic politics they can also hold their leaders accountable. Similarly, cultural impurities such as dictatorship, predatory politics and prebendalism, which emerge from corrupt culture, can be reduced.

Even though there are a few cases under which entitlement can be condoned, it should not be used to disadvantage others. As I advanced an argument for moderate entitlement, where those who have sacrificed their lives for the liberation of many may be justifiably given best opportunities as an expression of identifying with them, entitlement remains morally wrong if it perpetuates inequalities and miseries to the citizens.

### 8.3.2 Appropriate Employment of Political Patronage

The value of political patronage cannot be underestimated. This is why patronage is omnipresent in different political arrangements; it is present in both established and struggling democracies.

Thus, its value as a reliable political currency is globally accepted. However, political patronage can be incapacitating if it is not shrewdly employed. For example, if politicians merely place their allies in the key positions in government without considering their competences, this bias may inevitably retard the efficiency of the government and, in turn, ripple the effects on the performance of government as a whole. The same is the case if tenders are awarded to cronies or political allies without a thorough recourse to capacity and competence.

I propose an appropriate employment of political patronage. This suggests that albeit people are employed to key positions in government or awarded tenders, their capacity to diligently execute their tasks should be a determining factor. In this way, they add value to the operations of government and help it to realise value for money. This also suggests that those who have been employed to the key positions or awarded tenders will be closely monitored and their performance periodically evaluated.

### 8.3.3 The Significance of an Inclusive Approach in Dealing with Corruption

It is in rare cases that corruption only becomes a business of an individual; it is commonly carried out under carefully orchestrated patterns of behaviour that involve syndicates. Since it emerges as a contagious and complex phenomenon that follows different patterns, it cannot be successfully dealt with under a certain rubric that dictates how it should be approached universally. The complexity of corruption is intensified when it becomes entangled in the social fabric of the citizens. The tenable approach under this complex situation cannot be based on individualistic strategies but should be based on the appropriate values that appeal to all the members of the society: those who perpetrate corrupt activities and those who are affected by such activities.

Inclusivity implies bringing the citizens from different sectors together to define corruption as they perceive it and identify the activities that should be classified as corrupt. This would be helpful towards avoiding a blanket approach advanced by the international community and international financial institutions. An inclusive approach will be helpful towards creating a contextually meaningful corruption discourse and avoiding erroneous classification of certain practices as corrupt although they would otherwise not be classified as corrupt because they do

not breach the contextual values. As Metz (2009: 336) argued in favour of moderate partialism, that it is permissible under the African ethics that a person who had struggled for the sake of fellow citizens can be given preferential treatment. This practice would be treated as favouritism under the western moral outlook, hence constituting a corrupt practice. This simply shows how divergent moral outlooks are. It is inappropriate therefore to impose one's moral outlook on others.

An inclusive approach is also indispensable in informing a national policy direction on combating corruption, which may be translatable into anti-corruption programmes and projects at the national level. When the citizens are consulted and are encouraged to partake in resolving problems that beset them, the level of trust between themselves and their government becomes enhanced and they own the resolutions. In this way, home-grown accountability mechanisms will be easily implemented and monitored. It is through involving the citizens that they will find value in fighting corruption and appreciate how bad it is to be an accomplice in corrupt transactions.

#### 8.3.4 The Primacy of African Ethics in Fighting and Combating Corruption

I have echoed that corruption is a moral problem because every corrupt activity infringes upon some moral value(s). It is on this basis that I argue that every initiative aimed at fighting and combating corruption ought to be informed by the relevant moral value(s). The kernel of this argument is that a meaningful approach to a social ill that undermines moral values ought to be addressed through the revival of the same values. This is because surrendering to the pressure that undermines these values, and looking for 'quick fix' solutions only perpetuates and magnifies the problem. This argument is equally applicable to the sub-Saharan African countries. A genuine search for enduring remedy for corruption in the region makes it imperative that there should be a profound recourse to the values that are undermined by corruption with a view to reviving and mainstreaming them in all the sectors.

In the sub-Saharan African context, corruption is deemed unethical primarily because it threatens community cohesion by impeding mutually shared humanity, which is realized through the humane treatment of all community members. Consequently, by being driven by selfish ends,

corruption perpetrators fail to identify with fellow community members. Humane treatment and consideration of fellow citizens, which is anchored in the African ethics, is incisively presented by Ramose (2009: 423) that “[m]utual care for one another as human beings precedes concern for the accumulation and safeguarding of wealth as an end in itself.” It is the very principle of mutual care that corrupt individuals and syndicates breach. It is fallacious to maintain that we mutually share in the same humanity with others or claim to care for others while we enrich ourselves from the benefits that ought to be equitably distributed to all the citizens. It will take every citizen to have an appreciation of African ethics values in order to experience some degree of success in the fight against corruption in the region. However, it is imperative for all those who have been entrusted to exercise responsibility on behalf of the citizens in different sectors and acting at various capacities to demonstrate competence on African ethics values. It is only when they are influenced by these values that they will adopt the policies that prioritize cohesion within their countries and shy away from indulging in egoistic practices that do add value in the lives of their fellow citizens.

#### 8.3.5 Reinvigoration of African Ethics Values

In order to overcome corruption and its effects, sub-Saharan African countries should as well embark on programmes that are intended to rekindle an appreciation of African ethics values, which are deeply rooted in *Ubuntu*. The choice of prefixed words such as ‘reinvigoration’ and ‘rekindle’ is a deliberate one because the values referred to under the African ethics have never stopped making sense in the sub-Saharan African context; hence all that is needed is their reawakening so that they claim back their rightful role in the lives and affairs of the Africans below the Sahara.

I have indicated in Chapter Seven that *Ubuntu* encapsulates many values. The values such as compassion, reciprocity, dignity, harmony, humanity and others constitute the kernel of *Ubuntu* (Letseka, 2013: 339). If the citizens wholly subscribed to these values, they would treat each other courteously. To give an example, those who occupy the public offices would not misappropriate the public funds designated for the national developmental projects for their own benefit, because doing so goes against honesty in particular.

The greatest challenge that this recommendation brings up concerns the strategies which the countries should adopt in an endeavour to breathe life into the African ethics values. This challenge is intensified by the contemporarily spread sense of self-interest that has endemically engendered selfishness that is characterised in the accumulation of wealth. The capitalist economic system, which advocates that an individual can enjoy maximum utility of all justified opportunities for self-enrichment, has also significantly contributed to the prevalence of a selfish approach in the accumulation of material things. In the wake of all this, a more vexing concern is whether African ethics values can neutralize the prevailing egoistic practices from which corruption ensues. More to this problem, there is a generic belief that when resolutions are mapped out solutions will ensue. However, it is vitally important that even after mapping out the resolutions for a social problem there should be a concerted effort to plan how they are going to be meticulously implemented. In order for African ethics values to permeate the governance and social structures they should be supported by the leadership in African countries. Leadership support should be reflected in the designation of substantial resources in order to robustly drive programmes that are intended to revive these values and mainstream them in all the sectors.

#### 8.3.6 African Ethics Values should Inform the Operations of Anti-corruption Agencies

The bulk of the responsibility to deal with corruption in sub-Saharan African countries lies with anti-corruption agencies (ACAs). Even though, because of various reasons, these organizations have not been successful in their mandate, they continue to meekly operate. Besides being deliberately under-resourced as a strategy to keep them subservient to political leaders, due to their Western-origin and means of operation their approaches remain aloof to the sub-Saharan African countries context. They are more influenced by what De Maria (2009: 358) calls a 'conceptual orthodox' approach to corruption which is spread under the Western outlook to corruption. It is not surprising that the ACAs in sub-Saharan Africa still base their anti-corruption approaches on a deficient principal-agent model of corruption. This problem depicts the difficulty confronting these agencies by remaining trapped in the Western conceptual orthodox on corruption. It is not possible for these agencies to redeem themselves from this situation; their meaningful role will ensue from the redefined mandate that is underpinned by the contextual conception of corruption, which prioritizes the African ethics values' indispensability in combating corruption. Such a locally appropriate approach to corruption will result from a

thorough and genuine corruption discourse which is based on a wide consultation with the citizens from different sectors. It is from the consultation with the citizens who are affected by insidious effects of corruption and are conversant with how it becomes a culturally embedded phenomenon that ACAs can be given a new facelift that is informed by the local values.

The citizens may also be in a better position to propose different and effectively deterrent forms of punishment to corruption perpetrators than a routine one that follows a prosecutorial process and finally fining the perpetrator. This often takes a long time before a verdict is given. The fact the ACAs are deliberately under-resourced and do not have the requisite powers enshrined in the law enabling them to assiduously execute their mandate is indicative of the lack of public opinion right from the conception and creation of these agencies almost across the sub-Saharan region. The citizens will not find any reason for the existence of these agencies if they are not given enough powers and resources to combat corruption.

#### 8.3.7 Strengthening Weak Government Institutions and Enhancing their Coordination

The government as the apex organisation in a state, its ministries, departments and agencies should operate in unison. For this to happen, government institutions ought not to operate in silos but need to effectively interact with each other. Any government institution that ineptly conducts its business will inevitably have unwanted effects on others. Eizenstat *et al* (2005: 143) clearly assert that “[any policy], no matter how well conceived, depends on adequate government institutions to implement it.” What is implied in this assertion is that although a policy may be sound and well written if the government institutions that are custodians of such a policy are incompetent it will not reach fruition.

In order to overcome pervasive corruption in sub-Saharan African countries, it is important that government institutions are continually strengthened as a means of empowering them to deliver the desired results amid a rapidly changing environment. It is also important to synergize the operations of these institutions in order to break the incapacitating silo attitude. It is often the case that ACAs in sub-Saharan Africa do not have prosecutorial powers and have to rely on the national prosecutor for corruption cases to reach finality. Whenever this situation prevails, an ACA relies on the efficiency of another institution and it does not have the jurisdiction to compel

such an institution to treat corruption cases with urgency. This pertinent example shows how ACAs' operations in the region are frustrated by limited powers that they possess in dealing with corruption cases.

It is crucial that all the institutions that have a stake in fighting and combating corruption be adequately resourced and their coordination be enhanced. While this recommendation might seem to be restricted only to the technical institutions such as ACAs, the Judiciary and the Police, the issue of coordination should not be narrowly perceived, but should be widely unrolled to every government department and to all the sectors in a country because fighting corruption is everybody's business.

When the institutions, especially the ACAs, are strengthened, they will ably deal with corruption cases as they manifest themselves without being influenced by the culprit status. It is when the incumbents in government institutions are empowered to professionally discharge their duty without fear of reprisal that they can realize measurable success in tackling corruption. As I have argued that political patronage and entitlement claims are major catalysts of institutionalized corruption in sub-Saharan Africa, these factors survive under weak government institutions. Strengthening them will enable them to be professionally governed and therefore to avoid being swayed to accommodate biased interests of the politicians which are solely aimed to achieve political mileage instead of promoting the common good.

#### 8.3.8 Empowering the Citizens in the Fight Against Corruption

Any strategy to combat corruption would remain wanting without the involvement of the citizens from the grassroots level. The citizens are either accomplices or victims in both grand and petty corruption taking place within their vicinity. They are either directly effecting or being affected by corruption. This means that it takes willing citizens to be accomplices in corrupt transactions. For this reason, empowering the citizens in the fight against corruption is not an option but something that ought to be diligently carried out in an effort to wage a successful war against corruption. Empowering the citizens will also include educating them on corruption content and how they can become vigilant and effective partners in combating it.

Where the citizens become the victims of corruption they directly bear the brunt of inefficient service delivery or being denied the basic services for failing to give kickbacks to those entrusted with responsibility to give the services. In this way, the citizens have an experience of how some forms of corruption are conducted. Some citizens have an experience of how they are lured to partake in grand corruption. Although such corrupt activities are covertly executed, some citizens are convinced that they are wrong in many respects and would cooperate to avert them under genuine and meaningful programmes. For this to happen, Paul (1997: 1353) posits that empowering the citizens in the fight against corruption necessarily should involve educating the citizens about their rights and entitlements, which should be exercised in monitoring and freely raising the alarm on corruption and related incidences that depict the abuse of power.

If the citizens are empowered to contribute directly to combating corruption in their countries, it will also send a positive message to them that they are not left as spectators but are expected to become aware that their countries cannot successfully reduce corruption without their contribution. However, the environment should be enabling for the citizens to optimally partake in combating corruption. This means that political leadership in sub-Saharan Africa has a crucial role to play in creating an enabling environment for the citizens to freely monitor and raise an alarm on corrupt activities without fear of being victimized. Above all, the citizens' participation in fighting corruption should be motivated by African ethics values such as national cohesion, human dignity, and a humane treatment of all the citizens whom corruption undermines. It is on this basis that I recommend the procurement of political will below.

#### 8.3.9 Procuring Political Will

For all the above recommendations to be effectively implemented, political leadership should demonstrate absolute commitment. Political leaders in charge of government have the powers to make meaningful contributions to the lives of the citizens through the adoption of the policies that improve the socio-economic landscape. Contrarily, political leaders can also be the sources of different plights in their countries. It is for this reason that a country's performance in different sectors reflects the quality of its political leadership. It may be reasoned to be a self-defeating exercise to advocate for a political will in the fight against corruption in sub-Saharan Africa countries while the leaders are held responsible for looting the resources and maintaining

themselves in power through violence and bribery as well as through overtly demonstrating lack of principled and ethical leadership (Agbiboa, 2010: 475). Regardless of the prevailing debilitating circumstances, political leaders in the region cannot be jettisoned in the fight against corruption. Their multipronged role in fighting social ills such as corruption cannot be meaningfully substituted. For example, they play a critical role in the enactment of the laws and approval of resources designated to fight corruption. This makes it imperative that political leaders be persuaded to understand their role in the fight against corruption. This role cannot be delegated to any leadership.

As I have argued, the efforts to combat corruption cannot be fruitful unless there is demonstrable political will to effectively and efficiently implement anti-corruption strategies. Brinkerhoff (1999: 3) contends that the political will is an overt commitment displayed by elected or appointed leaders. The political will to combat corruption can be procured when there are home-grown initiatives by government leadership that demonstrate the commitment to overcome corruption (Kukutschka 2015: 5). Without such initiatives which indicate the political will, success in the fight against corruption will remain meagre. This puts more responsibility to reduce corruption prevalence in sub-Saharan African countries on political leadership. Political leaders that seize government power in the region should transcend mere political rhetoric on combating corruption and invite all the sectors in their countries to effectively take part in the joint venture of fighting against corruption.

## **8.4 Conclusions**

In this section I highlight the major conclusions of the study. They are drawn from the study major arguments, which established that corruption is still one of the persistent problems that undermine development, hence engendering different plights for the Africans inhabiting countries below the Sahara Desert.

### **8.4.1 Political Patronage and Entitlement Politics Engender Corruption**

What I deduced as one of the major conclusions of this study is that corruption remains a serious problem in the sub-Saharan African countries. Even though one of the arguments advanced under literature review presents the revisionists' view on corruption as unavoidable practice that

is necessary for economic growth (Leff 1964: 10, Tella, 2013: 51), this view is countered by the moralist view that corruption retards the economic performance of a country. This conclusion is based on the negative impact of corruption on development, which becomes mostly encountered in reduced investment rate (Awojobi, 2014: 3). It is also a cause for various calamities that have plagued the region, subsequently leaving many Africans to grapple with utter poverty. In relation to this deduction, I also infer that political patronage and entitlement claims by political elites have been the impetuses of endemic corruption in the public sector. As I have argued, political patronage has been deployed by politicians throughout the region as an instrumental tool ensuring that the clients, that is the electorate remains faithful to the political patron in the form of the political party or the political leader. Political patronage engenders corruption mainly through giving the political leader's clients employment or opportunities such as tenders without following the logic of competence. This also obstructs fair and equitable distribution of such opportunities.

On the other hand, entitlement claims by the political cliques in charge of governments in the region continue to perpetuate corruption in its different forms and scales. Although I have given the justification or why those who suffered in order to obtain freedom for their fellow citizens as deserving preferential treatment, if such claims are not controlled and shrewdly exercised, they spiral out of control, thus leading to institutionalized corruption in governments. In addition, claims by the NLMs members and the emerging political elites that there is no legitimate alternative leadership does not only deprive citizens their right to participate in politics, but they also lead to invasive corruption in the public domain.

#### 8.4.2 African Ethics' Critique of Corruption is Promissory

While acknowledgement on multifaceted and elusive nature of corruption is echoed throughout the thesis, critiquing corruption from the African ethics perspective has the potential to proffer contextually meaningful corruption discourse in the region. This assertion is based on the primacy of corruption as a moral issue and the ability of the African ethics to provide contextually relevant moral values to counter its prevalence. Failure by the ACAs to arrest corruption in sub-Saharan Africa implies that there is a need for a more concerted effort by local leaders to mainstream the relevant values in the fight against this phenomenon.

The relevance of the African ethics values is considered from its contextual basis. As I have argued about the values espoused by the African ethics, they can be easily assimilated and implemented. This is because they are lived experiences in many societies in the region. That the African societies below the Sahara still depict a high regard for communal relationship and persons dignity of a person (which find their absolute expression in a community) is still a reality. If African leaders can cultivate these values and mainstream them in building social cohesion programmes, corruption prevalence can be significantly reduced.

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