

HEIDEGGER AND THE PROBLEM OF ALIENATION

by

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Submitted in part fulfilment  
of the requirements for the  
degree MASTER OF ARTS in the  
Department of PHILOSOPHY in  
the Faculty of Arts at the  
University of Durban-Westville.

DATE SUBMITTED: 31ST JANUARY, 1975.

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P R E F A C E

A great amount of literature exists on Heidegger's philosophical thought. But from a survey of the critical works, it appears that, often, critics judge Heidegger too much from their own philosophical perspective. This, unfortunately, leads to misunderstandings of Heidegger's real standpoint. In this thesis, we wish to make the attempt to assess Heidegger's concept of alienation which may be regarded as a key to his way of thinking, as objectively as possible, in the light of his philosophy as a whole.

The concept of alienation strikes at the root of what is called human nature. In attempting to come to terms with what constitutes alienation and authenticity, various theories have been put forward. From among these I choose the philosophico-anthropological approach to deal with the question "What is the essence of man?" or the question "Who am I?". In the light of the above, this thesis affords me an opportunity to investigate the various implications of the concept of alienation. For, in my view, Martin Heidegger's analysis of the nature of man and what constitutes authenticity provides an excellent springboard/...

excellent springboard from which to study critically the problem of alienation as it has appeared to different thinkers in different times.

Heidegger, in his philosophy, stands opposed to the traditional approach to truth in metaphysics, religion, and science, because of their neglect of Being and their preoccupation with beings. In his view, such a forgetfulness of Being, constitutes man's alienation. This thesis investigates critically Heidegger's conception of human nature and considers carefully what he regards as authenticity. In his anxiety over the destiny of man Heidegger writes : "Is 'being' only an empty word? Or are being and the asking of the question of being the crux of the spiritual history of the West? Is being merely the last cloudy streak of evaporating reality; is the only possible attitude for us to let it evaporate into complete indifference? Or is being the worthiest of all questions? Thus inquiring, we take the decisive step from an indifferent fact, from the supposed meaninglessness of the word 'being,' to the supremely problematic phenomenon that being necessarily discloses itself in our understanding. The seemingly unshakable bald fact so blindly trusted by metaphysics has been shaken." (1) Thus

Heidegger's preoccupation/...

Heidegger's preoccupation is with a question "which has dawned on Western thinking from the beginning as the one thing that has to be thought - Being." (2) Therefore, Philosophy is the authentic response to the appeal of Being which Heidegger in the beginning responded to in an ontological way. Man is man only as long as his Being-there discloses to him Being as such, through which he gains consciousness and authenticity.

This analysis, however, is conducted against the background of the realization that Heidegger is not only the child of tradition, but also the child of his own time, a time of operationalism, actionalism, and phenomenological analysis. It is from this experience of the world that he sees metaphysics (philosophy) and that he seeks to overcome the "reified" Being of metaphysics and gains its concept from an act or event, that is, the unconcealment of Being in man's Dasein. (3) It is shown that any such attempt at locating human authenticity is bound to be problematic and that Heidegger's intention to rehouse man in authentic Being does not overcome the dialectical relationship between das Sein and das Seiende. The dichotomies of Being and

Nothingness, Life/...

Nothingness, Life and Death, Existence and non-Existence, which are embedded in the process of man's Dasein as a Being-to-death remain and explain man's historical and contingent nature. The attempt to overcome man's natural contingency inevitably leads to man's alienation as would follow from Heidegger's characterization of man's authentic nature as a Being-to-death and as a humble "shepherd of Being". (4)

Heidegger's philosophy has been the subject of a great deal of positive and fruitful discussion, for example, by Professors Joseph Kockelmans, Walter Biemel, Werner Marx, and Father William Richardson. However, his philosophy has invited some harsh criticism. Professor Georges Gurvitch has said of Heidegger that he is "not an honest thinker". (5) Heidegger has been dismissed by the analytical thinkers who interpret him from the confined standpoint of their own philosophical method. He has been criticised for being meaningless and nonsensical. Professor John Passmore says: "A passage which Carnap quoted from Heidegger's What is Metaphysics? in order to illustrate the nonsensical character of metaphysics has assumed the status of a classical example. Certainly"/...

example. Certainly such sentences as 'Nihilation is neither an annihilation of what-is, nor does it spring from negation. ... Nothing annihilates itself' leave one with the impression that something has gone very wrong indeed." (6) This kind of criticism may appear to have some justification when the sentence is taken out of context like this, and is stated in isolation. However, the criticism must be rejected when the sentence is seen in its context where it is quite meaningful. Therefore, this thesis attempts to demonstrate critically, in terms of the concept of alienation, Heidegger's contribution to our understanding of human nature. Whether one accepts or rejects his contribution is quite another matter. That he has presented a penetrating analysis of human nature and has shown a tremendous concern over the destiny of mankind can hardly be denied.

This thesis also seeks to show that Heidegger's thinking on authenticity does not end with his Sein und Zeit as would appear from the manner in which Heidegger has been handled by some of his interpreters and critics. In a fairly biting criticism of Heidegger's writings, Professor Versenyi says: "the latest writings no longer even have this aim (of making man/...

making man authentic here and now); they not only fail to make man an authentic Being-in-the-world, they are altogether opposed to authenticity." (7)

In this thesis it is demonstrated by many references to Heidegger's latest writings that his motivation (of authenticating human existence) has remained the driving force of his thinking despite the "reversal of thinking", which Heidegger openly admits he made, but adding that it is only possible to understand his later writings if one constantly keeps in mind what he said in his earlier writings; and just as importantly his earlier writings received a deeper understanding when one keeps in mind his later writings. Professor John Macquarrie quite readily appreciates that Heidegger's focus of interest in philosophy is Being. But in saying that Heidegger's "philosophy is centered in Being rather than in human existence," (8) and in isolating Being from human existence in this way, Macquarrie has also neglected to make the necessary connection between the early and the later Heidegger meaningful. In this dissertation, it is shown that Heidegger's concern for the alienated condition of man and his finding a way to authenticity forms a continuous theme throughout his writings and so forms an important key to an understanding and an unravelling of his occasionally enigmatic thought as contained in/...



contained in his later, more mystical writings.

The body of this thesis provided us with the opportunity of studying at length aspects of Greek and nineteenth century philosophy, which formed a vital background to a study of the concept of alienation and of the thought of Heidegger. This dissertation also caused us to indulge our interest in the relationship between philosophy and literature. The latter part of this thesis deals with that relationship, giving special attention to poetry.

It is now my pleasant duty to acknowledge my debt to Professor G. A. Rauche (of the University of Durban-Westville) for attending to my philosophical education and development over the past few years and for the sound advice, comments, and suggestions he was ever so willing to provide whenever the occasion arose. The finest tribute I can pay Professor Rauche is to make reference to a few lines from Heidegger's own Was heisst Denken? In one of the lectures there, Heidegger says: "Teaching is more difficult than learning because what teaching calls for is this: to let learn. The real teacher, in fact, lets nothing else be learned than - learning." (9)

I also/...

I also wish to extend a special word of thanks to my dear wife who has had the unique position, not only of relieving me of any financial obligations, but also of engaging me in fruitfully enjoyable philosophical discussions.

The production of this thesis was assisted by many persons. I thank them all and single out for special mention Mrs. Theresa Venkatrathnam for typing the manuscript, Mr. R. R. Singh for typing the draft manuscript, and Mr. S. Maharaj for his general assistance. The financial assistance of the Human Sciences Research Council towards the costs of this research is hereby acknowledged. Opinions expressed or conclusions reached are those of the author and are not to be regarded as a reflection of the opinions and conclusions of the Human Sciences Research Council.

I conclude with a note on terminological use. Where there was no ambiguity in the translation of German words and expressions I have made use of the English words and expressions. However, wherever the translation involved/...



translation involved subtleties, I have retained the original German. I have standardized the various renderings of "das Seiende" (for example, essent, what-is) to "beings", in most cases.

"Das Sein" I have rendered as "Being". However, in quotations, these words have been rendered exactly as used by different authors.

Prem R. Singh.

Durban.

31st January, 1975.

Every humanism either is grounded in a metaphysics, or, in making of itself its own ground, becomes a metaphysics. Every determination of the essence of man which attempts to explain the things-that-are without first asking about the truth of Being is, whether it knows it or not, metaphysical.

Heidegger

/...

C H A P T E R    O N E

INTRODUCTION: THE CONCEPT OF ALIENATION

The problem of alienation as seen by Martin Heidegger can be traced back to a tradition which was initiated by Plato. The deepest meaning of truth resides, for Heidegger, in aletheia, i.e., disclosure or non-concealment. Any deviation from this conception of truth would, for Heidegger, constitute man's alienation. Heidegger, in his quest for authenticity, surveys the entire tradition of Western metaphysics, interpreting it in the light of his own conception of Being in his desire never to let beings conceal from man his authentic nature. It is for this reason that it is necessary to undertake an inquiry into the metaphysical theories of thinkers such as Plato, Aquinas, Descartes, Kant, Hegel, and Marx from the perspective that each of these theories represents an attempt to overcome the problem of alienation and establish human authenticity in terms of the specific circumstances of the time. It is also necessary to view each of these theories from the Heideggerian perspective, in order to show that, for Heidegger, these attempts have/...

attempts have not succeeded in overcoming the problem of alienation, since, in each case, truth as disclosed by Being, has been replaced by the truth of beings. By such a tendency, the problem of alienation has in fact been compounded, culminating in Hegel's Absolute Spirit. Heidegger's own thought, which we discuss in greater detail in subsequent chapters, attempts to recall man to his true nature and so put him back on the path to Being.

For Plato, the question of establishing the true meaning of human existence once again became especially pressing in the light of the disruptive upheavals that beset the Athenian polis in the fifth century B.C. War between the city-states, the military conquests of Philip and Alexander, and the see-saw of successive aristocratic and democratic governments gradually contributed to the decline of the city-state and of the culture that it had fostered. In philosophical terms, conflicting theories and increasing scepticism was undermining long established moral and religious traditions. In Plato's view, the possibility of a harmonious authentic life could only be resumed if the polis could once again be built up as an economic, social, and political unity. Within such a unity the individual could live authentically, guided by reason which  
governs not/...

governs not only his soul and the polis, but the cosmos as well. Plato's Republic is a mirror of such an integrated existence where harmony and stability are ensured by the "acceptance by each citizen of an allocation of function according to character and capacity". (10)

The Republic portrays an ideal state where justice, self-control, and wisdom are the stabilizing factors, where human needs are satisfied and man lives in line with reality. But this could only be achieved once the disruptive effects of class war (between the aristocrats and the democrats) and poor government were eliminated. For this, a co-operative effort was necessary. Plato envisages his ideal society as a harmonious balance between three classes - the philosopher kings who govern by virtue of their reason, the soldiers who defend the polis, and the artisans who produce life's necessities. The tripartite division of society corresponds to Plato's equally tripartite vision of the human soul. Just as harmony between the three classes in the state will result in justice, similarly, harmony between the rational, spirited, and appetitive elements of the soul results in a just, well integrated individual. The primacy of reason in/...

reason in the human soul enables man to live in line with the harmony of the cosmos and of the city-state.

Plato's social and political solution, therefore, cannot be separated from his metaphysical conception of the universe as being divided into a doxa world of appearance and a real world of Forms or Ideas. It is in this respect that, in Heidegger's view, Platonic metaphysics began the preoccupation of man with beings instead of Being that has beset the Western metaphysical tradition, culminating in Hegel's Absolute Spirit. "The Platonic separation of a world of Ideas and a world of opinion opened the gap between Being and being and destroyed the fundamental ontological inseparability of the Being of being."<sup>(11)</sup>

Despite Plato's utopian attempt to rescue man from the alienation of a disrupted social, political, intellectual, and metaphysical existence, man's alienation, in Heidegger's view, is actually escalated in Platonic theory by the transformation of the Ideas, especially the Idea of the Good (Being) from being a source of light or disclosure itself to that which is disclosed. Being is actually reduced to being. Truth as aletheia or non-concealment can still be ascribed to the/...

to the Platonic Forms or Ideas since Plato, in Heidegger's view, did conceive of them as being essentially "a source of light by reason of which, through participation, the "beings" of experience shine forth". (12) However, the Ideas, from representing truth as disclosure, are transformed into that which is seen through disclosure. Truth now takes on a new meaning, standing for "the proper viewing of the Ideas, the conformity...between the being that views and the Ideas (conceived as beings) that are viewed." (13)

In Heidegger's eyes, this marks the origin of the tradition in Western metaphysical thinking to reduce Being to beings.

This forgetfulness of Being goes hand in hand with "the creation of an anthropomorphic world of Ideas as the ostensible locus of truth, and so of value. A human interpretation of Being was mistaken for Being itself, an interpretation which removed significance from the world of actual human existence." (14) The reduction of truth from disclosure of Being to a mere relationship between the being who knows and the Ideas (beings) which are known, is for Heidegger, a disturbing trend. For Plato, the Idea of the Good or Agathon is that which renders all/...

renders all else not only intelligible but possible as well. "...it is the ground of the possibility of Being of all that is." (15) But to make the idea of the Good as that which makes disclosure possible is, for Heidegger, to subordinate truth or disclosure to the idea. By doing so Plato had "weakened the original character of truth. With the idea dominant over aletheia, the important factor in all our relations to beings is the right vision of the form ..., and man, in order to attain to truth, must be concerned, above all, with the correctness of his vision." (16)

The reduction of truth from disclosure to correct vision or perception is for Heidegger the "humanization" of truth. Truth no longer discloses things in their own nature. Instead man becomes "the criterion of all truth and Being... To make...man, the measure of all is 'humanism' and 'subjectivism' pure and simple. ... Plato's transformation of the essence of truth, Heidegger maintains, transformed philosophy. Truth having become a characteristic of the attitude and relation of the knower to the known, philosophy became a humanism: a restless circling around man in the attempt to secure his position in the midst of all. ... and the original meaning of truth as disclosure of Being was forgotten." (17)

For Heidegger,/...



For Heidegger, the metaphysics of Thomas Aquinas is similarly affected by the change in emphasis from Being to beings. But first we have to consider how the mediaeval explanation of reality arose. The failure of reason as an adequate instrument to cope with human needs and problems is related to the change in historical circumstances, more specifically, the breakdown of the Greek polis, that compact unity which had served as the foundation for an authentic economic, social, and political human existence. The accompanying decline of classical Greek culture also exposed, in the light of the changed circumstances, the inadequacy of human rationality as the ultimate means of achieving a meaningful existence. The self-sufficiency implied by a rational explanation of human life, for example, as in the Platonic vision of a harmonious existence, was belied by the actual sense of dislocation which was the result of the breakdown of the polis and the dispersion of culture within the increasing confines of the Roman Empire. The problem of alienation, despite the fact that it was not articulated in terms of the precise use of this concept, could not have been more pressing than in times of deep-seated change and upheaval.

Rational inquiry into the cosmos and man's place in it increasingly gave way to speculation about man's fate after death./...

after death. The question of supernatural reward and punishment, of salvation, became an important preoccupation and this demonstrated more clearly than other factors the inability of human reason to satisfy man adequately in his search for Truth. The dimension of truth had now widened dramatically to include the supernatural. Any explanation which took this into account would now be more acceptable to man in terms of his new needs. The Christian religion proved to be this explanation, despite the rival claims of neo-Platonism, Gnosticism, Epicureanism, etc.

The failure of reason had in a sense undermined man's belief in his own self-sufficiency in trying to arrive at Truth. His own effort had to be supplemented and even superseded by a transcendent source of explanation, that is, God, through revelation. Apart from his reason and even superior to it, as an instrument for the knowledge of truth, is man's conscious faith. Man as a rational being is now superseded by man as a fideistic being. Faith enables man to cope with the contradictions which confront him and which Greek philosophy could not rationalize away. Human reason was not to be rejected out of hand but should assume its true status and that is to assist man to understand the wisdom of the scriptures. This meant that

the tremendous/...

the tremendous value of Greek philosophy was not lost to civilized man but actually incorporated in the various doctrines of faith. The system of Thomas Aquinas, for example, is such an instance. Specifically, it can be seen as a reaction to the purely naturalistic philosophy of Aristotle and a desire to supplement and complete it by the addition of Christian faith on a rational foundation. An equally important concern for Thomas was his desire to obviate the threat of a split truth theory as it manifested itself in the thought of the Latin Averroists (Siger of Brabant). The theory that one truth is valid in philosophy and another truth is valid in theology was not acceptable to Thomas, for whom all truth comes from a single source, that is, God.

The Thomist view of authentic existence can be regarded in the light of the prevailing situation, as a successful combination of the various components of human life. It did not underestimate the powers of human reason, nor did it ignore the genuine human need for faith in a transcendent dimension, which need Greek philosophy had sought to satisfy by its attempt to blend rational man into the cosmos. We now discuss in a little more detail the nature of the Thomist theory.

For Thomas, meaning and direction are restored to human

life on/...

life on the basis of the belief that God is at the centre of existence. In fact, God is the being whose essence is to be, with no separation between his essence and existence. "According to Aquinas the most appropriate name for God is the name disclosed to Moses (Exodus 3,19), Qui est, He Who is. ... He is infinite existence or being itself." (18)

All finite things have their ground in the existence of God. This is made clear by the fact that if God withdrew his sustaining force, finite things would not be able to exist. So Thomas's constant preoccupation was with the question of why things exist at all, rather than there being nothing. His answer is linked to his conception of God as the cause and ground of all things. Finite substances only exist because God is the sustaining ground of their existence. God's wisdom and grace govern all things in the universe, including man, according to their specific ends. Man's ultimate end is that state of beatitude which stems from the mystical vision of God in heaven. Being endowed by God with reason, man can rationally and consciously choose ways of thinking and acting that were compatible with his achieving an authentic life. The highest development of man's rational potentialities exist solely/...

exist solely for the glory of God. Through rational reflection on God's creations, man can come to a knowledge of God. Knowledge and faith, philosophy and religion, then, do not work at crosspurposes, but in fact are supplementary in the act of directing man towards God.

Hegel later conceived of theology as finding its culmination in philosophy. For Aquinas, this order is reversed. Philosophy provides some knowledge of God but is unable to include God's self-revelation in Christ, for example. Only faith can provide such knowledge. So philosophy finds its consummation in theology. Being a rational and a free being, man can choose specific ways of conduct that enable him to reach God and hence achieve his ultimate goal, in other words, achieve his authenticity. "The God which Aquinas describes is not a deus ex machina, a pure product of reason, a metaphysical storehouse for Platonic Ideas. He is Infinite Life, and it is the divine life which gives a meaning to human life. For, God presents himself to man as the sole object worthy of his knowledge and love." (19) By his rational Christian faith, man can attain to a vision of God, thus satisfying at one stroke his rational as well as his spiritual needs.

In Heidegger's/...

In Heidegger's view, the Thomist position which had replaced Plato's Ideas with God, represents no real departure from the Platonic standpoint. The actus purus of Thomas replaces Aristotle's conception of energeia, and it is this "thingliest of things (Seiendste des Seienden), the pure intelligible light which makes things be and lets them be known." (20)

Professor Thomas Langan shows that, with such a conception of actus purus, truth becomes problematic.

"On the one hand, it becomes confused with the transcendental presence of the present, so that the godhead becomes truth itself made into a thing; on the other hand, since there remains the problem of explaining what it is for a human being to know, the truth of the human existent comes to be conceived as a conformity between the intellect and the things of creation." (21)

What Heidegger would find lacking in such a conception of truth is the failure to let things be seen from themselves.

The hold of the Church and Scholastic philosophy on man was gradually weakened by the developments in more modern times, for example, the invention of the printing press, the voyages of discovery, the invention of gunpowder, the rise of science, etc. These imbued man with a new confidence in himself as the measure of all things. As/...





things. As such, the meaning of Being undergoes a profound change with the advent of modern times (Neuzeit). The bond of faith that tied mediaeval man so firmly to interpreting truth in terms of theology gave way to interpreting it anthropocentrically in modern times, so that truth was not just conformity between knower and known, but became certitude. This process had already begun with Plato who had reduced truth as disclosure of Being to a relationship between knower and known (Ideas).

Whereas mediaeval man gained certitude through dogma, the lure of eternal bliss, and faith, for modern man " '...This is possible only to the extent that self-liberating man guarantees for himself the certitude of the knowable. ...' " (22) Certitude has now firmly become human certitude. "'man sets himself up as the measure of all criteria which measure and gauge (calculate) what can qualify as certain, i.e., as true, i.e., as real'." (23) The authority of the Church gave way to the authority of man, which authority Descartes proceeded to establish on the basis of his methodical doubt in order to establish an indubitable ground on which the edifice of human knowledge could be constructed. In the mathematical method he found the certainty on which he could model the rest of human knowledge.

The cogito/...

The cogito ergo sum, when he finally arrives at it, possesses the same degree of certainty that a mathematical proposition such as "A triangle has three angles" has.

"...man must decide for himself what for him is knowable, what is knowledge and what is certitude. It is the proper task of Descartes to elaborate the metaphysical ground of the new anthropocentric liberty by suggesting an answer to this triple question." (24) The cogito ergo sum forms for Descartes the unshakable basis on which he does this. Knowing ("I am") conforms with self-certitude, with known ("I am"). The cogito not only forms the ground of all certainty, but also is the condition for all other truths.

This change in the meaning of truth brought about a change in man's relation to the world. The cogito-sum, as the subject of truth, no longer lets beings show themselves as they are in themselves, but becomes a co-agitatio, an aggressive, grasping of beings. Beings receive their meaning from the domain of the subject-object polarity. They are either subjects or objects. Man is not man as such, but he is a subject who subjects the world to his will. Beings now receive their truth  
by being/...



by being objects to a subject. "Beings are submitted more and more to man's control, made victims of his calculations, his designs, his cultivation.

Scientific research becomes an indispensable form of the general conquest. This is the drive of technicity, whose origin may be found in Descartes." (25) In Heidegger's view, Descartes' Weltanschauung has embedded more firmly that deep sense of alienation which twentieth century man experiences. In his attempt at authenticating man, Descartes has turned him into a subject who in turn places values on things which become the basis of his relationship with them and with his fellowman. The truth of Being (that is, aletheia, or non-concealment) has no place in such a world-view.

For Immanuel Kant, the Cartesian investigation into the ground of certitude for human knowledge did not penetrate deep enough. Also, Descartes' rationalism, like the empiricism of Locke and Hume, limits the scope and depth of any inquiry into the foundation of human knowledge. Kant's own Weltanschauung sought to find a middle way between the extremes of rationalism and empiricism, since, in his view, man is a being who participates in both dimensions.

His inquiry/...

His inquiry into the limits of human reason led him to conclude that pure reason cannot give knowledge of God, Freedom, and Immortality, since, in terms of knowledge, man is necessarily limited to the phenomenal world. However, within the sphere of practical reason, he visualized a new ground for the possibility of metaphysics. The ideas of pure reason assume a practical significance - that of being the aim of human moral striving. Man's reason can free him from the bonds of nature and direct his will to be guided by the dictates of the moral law. With such a conception of man, Kant fulfilled one of the highest aims of the enlightenment, that is, man as a free, and autonomous being guided by his reason. With his combination of the realms of nature and freedom, and his vision of man as acting according to his reason, Kant hoped to overcome the extremes of rationalism and empiricism and provide man with an integrated foundation on the basis of which he could live and act authentically.

From Heidegger's point of view, however, the Kantian critique continues the polarity between knowing subject and known object that had begun early in the history of metaphysics and had reached one of its peaks in Descartes. Truth had been undergoing a process of gradual subjectivation

insofar as/...

insofar as the criteria governing knowledge of objects and hence truth itself is seen to reside in the subject who knows. The Being of things is not disclosed from their own being, but from the "subjective roots of the transcendental horizons of consciousness." (26) It is disclosed by an inquiry into "how the existent can bring to be a world of meaning, a world of time, a history in which 'things' can be with significance." (27) This is the significance of the Kantian critique - that it undertakes the most detailed investigation into "the rules governing the subject's placing (stellen) the representation (Vor-stellung) before (vor) himself." (28) The object is seen as totally dependent on the consciousness of the subject.

The mathematical thinking that Heidegger deplored in Descartes is true of Kant as well, in Heidegger's view. " '...The mathematical is that basic attitude to things in which we represent things to ourselves only as what they are already given...' Mathematical knowledge is, therefore, knowledge of the a priori, a 'knowledge about the fundamental presupposition of all knowledge'... a knowledge that 'lays its own foundations and grasps its limits in the process'". (29)

This kind/...

This kind of mathematical thinking transforms the subjective individual into the ground of all that can be and all that can be known. Even Being becomes an object to be known, conditioned by the same subjective criteria that govern all things, instead of being revealed as something unconditioned. For Heidegger, Kantian philosophy, even more so than Descartes', "makes man the measure of all things." (30) Kant's investigation of things is really an investigation of man. " '...The question: What is a thing? is the question: Who is man?' " (31) So, for Heidegger, "the critique of pure reason is humanism pure and simple: a circling around man as the absolute foundation and perfectly sufficient ground of all truth and Being." (32)

For Heidegger, the transcendental idealism of Kant is not sufficient. Kant is to be credited for the fact that he established human temporality and finiteness at the centre of "a new analysis of man as transcendental horizon." (33) But what Kant failed to complete, in Heidegger's view, is an existential determination of such a horizon. "...he stopped with a consideration of the transcendence that makes knowledge possible. He did not seek into the Being which is revealed historically within the/...

within the transcendental existence of Dasein. Kant made no effort to get beyond the metaphysical nature of man, by recalling the historical destiny made possible by the temporality of his transcendence. Thus, though Kant puts the form of Time at the center of knowledge, he has missed the truly temporal nature of Being itself." (34) This is the failure that Heidegger hoped to rectify by surpassing the Kantian Critique of Pure Reason with his own Sein und Zeit.

For Hegel, the Kantian attempt to find a new ground for metaphysics posed innumerable difficulties. Kant's distinction between the realms of phenomena and noumena, of appearance and thing-in-itself had resulted in a polarity between subject and object which in turn gave rise to several other bifurcations, for example, the separation of reason from desire, duty from inclination, intellect from feeling, and so on. In order to bridge these polarities and make life whole again, the Kantian gap between thought and being had to be bridged. This Hegel does by positing one universal structure of Being, namely, Absolute Spirit.

For Hegel/...

For Hegel, Life is the medium where contradictions (or discord or bifurcation - Entzweiung) which form the source of the need for philosophy, come about and are overcome in the "Whole", the "Universe", and in the "Infinite". It is Hegel's deep conviction that Reality in itself is estranged. In his Logic he wrote: "all things are contradictory in themselves". (35)

This estrangement and contradiction are reconciled through the healing power of Love (in his early writings) and of Reason (in his mature works). Universal Reason is the real ground of the world. Reason externalizes itself and this externalization manifests itself in science and history. For Hegel, the resultant external world which is subject to Reason, constitutes reality. Thus, what is reasonable is real, and what is real is reasonable. As the Truth, Spirit (Reason), in the dialectical process, goes through various stages - the mechanical, physical, and organic (in science); the oriental, classical, and the Christian (in history). The Hegelian triad of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis united the antithetical in the Concept where the tension between subject and object, finite and infinite, is overcome.

"The Pure Concept in its logical form is Truth, in its ontological form Being, in its ethical form Goodness,  
in its/...



in its aesthetic form Beauty, and in its religious form God." (36) Thus as Concept, Universal Reason comprehends everything. The dialectical process of the Spirit's self-emancipation and return to itself as Itself constitutes the history of the world which has a direct bearing on the spiritual development of man who "In the Christian culture of the 19th century, ... as the torch-bearer of the Absolute Spirit, in whose consciousness the self-emancipation of the Spirit manifested itself, had reached his greatest freedom". (37) As the Grossmensch (Jacob Hommes), man transcended his individuality through his rationality and merged with the Whole. Thus the State is an expression of man's rational will, and the individual is free when his own reasonable will merges with the general will.

Hegel saw the Prussian state as that arena where the individual could express his highest freedom. In rationalizing the status quo, Hegel rationalized the conflicts and contradictions that were present in his time. Hegel regarded Prussia as having superseded Napoleon as an instrument of freedom. In fact, the Prussian monarchy is the culmination of the Spirit on its march to freedom. Through his total concept of the Absolute Spirit Hegel missed actual and

contingent reality/...

contingent reality, thus giving rise to a new form of alienation.

"Through man's ability to arrive at the Pure Concept by abstraction, the coincidentia oppositorum is realised and reality and truth (which before had been separated in that the real world represented the self-estrangement of truth in the form of antithetical concepts) fall together."<sup>(38)</sup> In the pure concept, therefore, the principle of identity is fulfilled. Hegel's dialectical process of the Spirit's returning to itself unites the real world and the subject, thinking and being, and in so doing, overcomes man's actual situation, thus landing him in real alienation. Hegel's systematization has resulted in man's self-transcendence where the absolutization of the self represents the negation of actuality. Hegel's preconceived model leads man away from his authentic nature. Any such absolutization overcomes man's actual, historical, contingent nature. Hegel's dialectical method fails to give man's finitude its full meaning and throws him into a new form of alienation.

Heidegger himself/...



Heidegger himself sees in Hegel the culmination of traditional metaphysical thinking which constituted the Absolute from the world of existing things. In his attempt to authenticate Dasein (his word in Sein und Zeit for man), Heidegger would have us not be oblivious of Being as such and of the ontological difference (the difference between Being and beings). Heidegger sees any attempt at constituting Being as landing man in alienation and as an attempt to cheat time. In other words, any such constituted Absolute is an attempt to give finite being eternal time. Hegel's characterization of Being as substance and subject is inadequate for Heidegger in any attempt at an understanding of Being and the existential nature of man. That reality did not fit Hegel's system is borne out by actual events, including events in the field of philosophy, that is, the vehement controversy that was started on Hegel's thinking in the light of the problems and conflicts raised by it and in the light of the actual changing conditions of life.

Karl Marx, like Kierkegaard, Schopenhauer, Feuerbach, etc., objected to the contradiction between theory and reality that the Hegelian system had posed.

The abstraction/...

The abstraction of a purely idealist consciousness was a serious threat to the "real needs" of man which could only be based on a radical transformation of material reality. The ideal reality envisaged by Hegel had no bearing on the actual lives of the majority of people. As such, the Hegelian exhortation to blend one's will with that of the Spirit was leading man into the wilderness of alienation. In any case, Hegel's philosophy saw the culmination of a philosophical tradition that had begun from Descartes. The tradition could no longer continue in the same direction. In order to remain meaningful and relevant to man, philosophy would have to be transformed from a theoretical concern to a practical one. In this way, it would be brought in line with economics and politics, thus catering for the true needs of men.

With this transformation of the Hegelian speculative idealism into a theory where economic factors are the sole determinants of history, Marx hoped to rescue man from alienation and return him to an authentic existence, that is, an existence in line with the historical law. He envisaged his socialism as the means by which man could be freed from a long history of alienation./...

of alienation. Central to his vision of an authentic existence is his vision of man as a free and creative agent, one that is in control of his natural and social environment. In Marx's view, all other forms of alienation, for example, religious alienation, where the individual projects his energies into God, or political alienation stemming from Hegel's demand that the individual submit his will to that of the State, would only vanish if economic alienation were resolved.

The alienation of labour, in Marx's view, constitutes the essence of alienation. Only on the basis of free labour relations can man live a truly human, creative existence. "Labour as the bridge between subject and object eventually resolves all conflict and contradiction that still exist between man and his surroundings and between man and man. Labour, in Marx's philosophy, may be said to be of logical, epistemological, metaphysical, aesthetical and ethical significance." (39) Capitalism has organized relations in such a way that man is alienated from the products of his labour which become commodities to be sold at a profit by the capitalist owner. Such a separation further alienates man from his own self, since labour is not only a coercive activity that enriches the/...

enriches the capitalist, but in its true sense, is the ground for the possibility of human self-realization. A re-organization of labour relations under communism would create the proper condition for human existence, a state where man consciously and co-operatively controls his economic and social existence, the gap between private and social interests having vanished.

In the light of the changed circumstances in the late nineteenth century, (the rise of science and technology, the growth of industry, etc.), Marx's theory of how to overcome alienation and return man to authenticity appealed to those who, frustrated by Hegelianism, saw in Marx's philosophy, the possibility of deriving true values from a material and economic reality that was increasingly becoming more and more important. But in Heidegger's view, Marx's philosophy displays the same forgetfulness of Being that characterizes philosophy and metaphysics from the time of Plato. The Marxian ideal of man as an active subject in the world is a further instance of the technicity that had its origin in Descartes - the view of man as subject and controller of the objective world of things. The collective aspect/...

collective aspect of socialism does not eliminate the subjectivization of truth that Heidegger deplores. In fact, it further alienates man by merging the individual into the anonymity of das Man. Despite its different emphasis and starting point, Marxism remains for Heidegger, a humanism. Such a "humanization" of truth has resulted in the alienation of man.

The alienation of man, we stressed, Heidegger saw as arising from Plato's separation of the realm of Being from the realm of Time. The result of the separation was that man was now preoccupied with beings, rather than with Being as such, which became in traditional metaphysics that which is the most general, or that which is the supreme being. Heidegger sees in Hegel's Absolute Spirit the culmination of this preoccupation with beings, which forms the source of his Absolute. Positivistic scientism dissolved the individual into a set of functional relations. Hegel's idealism failed to cope with the realities of life. Scientism, which hoped to solve all man's problems, had its unbounded optimism shattered by the creation of more effective and more destructive war/...

destructive war weapons. Science has put in the hands of man the possibility of wiping out the entire human race. Thus, "The experience of anxiety revealed to man his self-estrangement and alienation from the world. It roused in him the need to re-examine the nature of his existence in the world and to reassess the relation in which he stood with the world. In other words, man, again, from the new existential situation in which he found himself, asked the old question about the authenticity of his existence." (40)

In framing his question about the authentic nature of man, Heidegger moved away from the theoretical constructions of the world by the theoreticians of metaphysics and science, and started from man's "very being-there." The objectification and reification of Being remains a reduction of the source of beings to an abstraction that is derived from beings. Such an abstraction remains a being, but Being as such is not a thing, but, for Heidegger, is the ground of all things. Such a ground, of course, is accessible to Dasein, for it is within the power of Dasein only, that the ontological difference (the real distinction between Being as such and beings) comes about. Thus, by "transcendence", Heidegger does not mean the being of beings, but "Being understood as the emergence of the difference/...



the difference between Being and beings; that this difference emerges with There-being's transcendence ('...we name this ground of the ontological difference... the transcendence of There-being')." (41) Hence, Heidegger begins his long journey by an analysis of Dasein.

To retrieve that which is authentic, Heidegger uses the method of phenomenology which takes a being from out of its hiddenness and lets it be seen from its unhiddenness, to let it reveal itself as it is. This, for Heidegger, would constitute the primary meaning of truth. Therefore, for him, ontology and phenomenology are not two separate disciplines, but one. In showing where Heidegger departed from Husserl's thinking, Professor Kockelman's says, "Heidegger made it clear that for him the stumbling blocks in Husserl's philosophy consisted in the transcendental reduction as 'bracketing of Being', in the 'reduction' of man to pure consciousness, and finally, in the 'reduction' of Being into Being-object-for." (42)

Heidegger's concept of alienation appears, in essence, to differ radically from all other conceptions of alienation. For example, Heidegger dissociated himself from/...

himself from the philosophies of life, of existence, and from Sartre's "existence precedes essence." In his Letter on Humanism, Heidegger tries to surpass the humanism and subjectivism of traditional metaphysics by showing that the structure in man which characterizes him as man is his relationship to Being, that is, he sees man as ek-sistence, that is, man stands out into the truth of Being. In so doing, but in keeping with the spirit of the age, when phenomenological description and hermeneutic analysis was the fashion, Heidegger sought to reduce metaphysics to the description of the experience of the metaphysical (Being) by man in his Dasein. In other words, in his attempt to overcome alienation, Heidegger seeks to abolish philosophy as theory and as constitutive metaphysics. Or else, he seeks to merge philosophy (metaphysics) with the event of Being unconcealing itself through man. The problems that emerge from Heidegger's attempt will be discussed later.

Notes/...



NOTES TO PREFACE AND CHAPTER ONE

1. HEIDEGGER, M. : An Introduction to Metaphysics, p.72.
2. BROCK, W. : Existence and Being, p.387.
3. "Dasein", Heidegger's word for man, is fully discussed in Chapter 4.
4. See HEIDEGGER, M. : Letter on Humanism.
5. WAHL, J. : A Short History of Existentialism, p.38.
6. PASSMORE, J. : A Hundred Years of Philosophy, p.477
7. VERSENYI, L. : Heidegger, Being, and Truth, pp. 186-187.
8. MACQUARRIE, J. : Existentialism, p.224.
9. HEIDEGGER, M. : What is called Thinking? p.15.
10. GUTHRIE, W.K.C. : The Greek Philosophers, p.85.
11. HEIDEGGER, M. : What is Philosophy? p.11.
12. RICHARDSON, W.J. : Heidegger Through Phenomenology to Thought, p.17.
13. Ibid.
14. /...

14. ROSEN, S. : Nihilism: A Philosophical Essay, p.195.
15. VERSÉNYI, L. : op. cit., p.58.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid., p.59.
18. COPLESTON, F.C. : Aquinas, p.140-141.
19. de WULF, M. : The System of Thomas Aquinas, p.150.
20. LANGAN, T. : The Meaning of Heidegger, p.162.
21. Ibid.
22. Quoted by RICHARDSON, W.J. : op. cit., p.322.
23. Quoted by VERSÉNYI, L. : op. cit., p.62.
24. RICHARDSON, W.J. : op. cit., p.322.
25. Ibid., p.326
26. HEIDEGGER, M. : Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, p.x.
27. Ibid., p.xi.
28. Ibid., p.x.
29. VERSÉNYI, L. : op. cit., p.64.
30. Ibid., p.67.

31. Quoted by  
VERSÉNYI, L. : op. cit., p.68.
32. VERSÉNYI, L. : op. cit., p.68.
33. LANGAN, T. : op. cit., p.72.
34. Ibid.
35. HEGEL, G.W.F. : Science of Logic,  
Volume 2, p.66.
36. RAUCHE, G.A. : The Problem of Truth and  
Reality in Grisebach's  
Thought, p.19
37. RAUCHE, G.A. : The Choice (Quo vadis,  
homo?), p.43.
38. RAUCHE, G.A. : The Problem of Truth and  
Reality in Grisebach's  
Thought, p.20.
39. RAUCHE, G.A. : Contemporary Philosophical  
Alternatives and the  
Crisis of Truth, p.xviii
40. Ibid, p.36
41. RICHARDSON, W.J. : op. cit., p.175
42. KOCKELMANS, J.J. : Phenomenology, p.274.

"What is true is the Whole..." (Hegel).

At every moment the whole of Hegel's thought is contained in any particular enunciation of it.

C H A P T E R     T W O

HEGEL'S METAPHYSICS AS AN EXAMPLE OF HOLZWEG.

Hegel's philosophy revolves around a group of concepts, at the centre of which are alienation and reconciliation, the different ways in which traditional logic and dialectical logic operate, Spirit, Self-consciousness, the State, Freedom, and Reason as the real ground of the world.

These concepts animate his philosophy, which wrestles with the problem of contradictions which Hegel sees in life. Life now becomes the medium whereby these contradictions arise and dissolve. In his Difference of the Fichtean and Schellingian System of Philosophy, Hegel writes: "When we consider more closely the particular form that a philosophy bears, we see how it springs on the one hand from the living originality of the spirit who in it has restored through himself the rent harmony and given form to it through his own deed; on the other hand, from the particular form of the bifurcation (Entzweiung) from which the system issues. Bifurcation (or discord) is the source of the need for philosophy..."<sup>(1)</sup>

This bifurcation/...

This bifurcation results in oppositions like the Whole and the Part, the Universe and the Particular Objects, the Infinite and the Finite, which can have "real" meaning only when united in the "Whole", the "Universe", and in the "Infinite" which is both the object of study of philosophy and philosophy itself. The complexity of the problem issues from the attempt to comprehend the all-embracing unity and to show how such unity is possible.

From the same work quoted above, Hegel says:  
"To sublimate such oppositions that have become fixed is the sole interest of reason. This interest does not mean that reason is against opposition and limitation in general; for necessary bifurcation is a factor of life which forms itself through eternal opposing, and totality is possible in the highest liveliness only through restoration out of the highest separation. Reason is only against the absolute fixation of bifurcation by the understanding. ..."(2)  
Here is a clear statement of the need for philosophy. However, it is a complete misrepresentation of Hegel to think that he saw the restoration of harmony as the ultimate end. This is only half the truth: there is the continual striving for harmony. The other half of the truth is that "bifurcation is a factor of life  
which forms/...

which forms itself through eternal opposing" (my emphasis). To clinch the argument we need only draw attention to the vital role that Hegel assigns to his idea of "Becoming" and "Infinity". We shall discuss these during the course of this chapter.

However, we could mention here that Hegel holds that there is an Absolute beginning and an Absolute end, but he adds the qualification that both are empty: the Absolute is always in the process of overcoming itself and passing into an other. Therefore, Hegel speaks of the Absolute in the sense of the eternal cycle of becoming, the eternal now. This cycle of the eternal now, taken as a concept, comprehends everything, for example, the infinite and the finite, the necessary and the contingent, form and matter, permanency and periodicity. In it all contradictions are merged (aufgehoben). As a concept which is comprehended in man's mind, the principle of identity has been fulfilled. Eberhard Grisebach draws attention to the point that such a dialectic remains constitutive, and, as such, leads to the alienation of man by blocking the path to real experience.

In his/...



In his Difference of the Fichtean and Schellingian System of Philosophy (his first real publication), Hegel draws attention to two presuppositions of philosophy. The first is the Absolute itself which Reason produces by liberating consciousness from any limitation. The second presupposition is the emergence of consciousness out of totality, in other words, bifurcation into being and not-being, into finitude and infinity. Thus, philosophy comes into existence out of the alienation of man. Hegel views in a positive light such alienation whose necessity is absolute. The original unity of all particulars is not a mystical truth, but is one that is given by logic, by reason. And, reason is the power that leads man to higher levels of reconciliation. The task that confronted Hegel was, not only to make his logic fluid and alive, but also to make it such that the living self could think itself in it. This logic is the "logic of life" or "the logic of Spirit".

The loss of unity and the alienation that goes with such a loss, naturally, result in the conflicts that characterize human experience, for example,

between man/...



between man and nature. The conflict sets up nature as an alien, hostile force that man must tame. The harmony and the unity that was lost gave rise to the alienation of man from nature. This conflict can be categorized in the genral form of the conflict between subject and object, which can be brought into harmony only by the most universal concept. Only a totality will issue the ultimate principle of knowledge which will recover the harmony that has been lost.

What emerges from all this is that Hegel's interest is not primarily historical, but, rather, extends to a deep philosophic concern. "The need for philosophy arises when the unifying power (die Macht der Vereinigung) has disappeared from the life of men, when the contradictions have lost their living interrelation and independence and assumed an independent form." (3) Philosophy is now confronted with the task of gaining a detailed analysis of the conflicts that confront man in reality and also to demonstrate their reconciliation, bearing in mind that all oppositions are resolved and yet preserved in Reason, which again points to an eternal opposing. However, in leading man to authentic existence and/...

existence and to freedom, we need to ask, with Professor Rauche, has not Hegel led man astray with his preconceived model. Any such model misrepresents the authentic nature of man by absolutizing one aspect to the detriment of the others, and to the whole being. Thus, the Hegelian model stands in conflict with the contingent individual.

The glaring chasm between subject and object, which problem Kant had bequeathed, was the butt of Hegel's criticism of Kant. In fact, Hegel rejected Kant's idealism because it set the existence of "things-in-themselves" apart from "phenomena". Even worse was that these "things" were completely unknowable and untouched by the human mind; which meant that they were untouched by reason - they were beyond the grasp of reason.

The implication of such a bifurcation was that Reason now becomes a purely static, subjective factor with no control over a fixed, objective structure of Reality: hence the split between Understanding and Sense, between Thought and Existence, between Subjectivity and Objectivity. Hegel was later to call this split "alienation" (Entfremdung) of mind, whereby thought is alienated from reality. This means that

truth is/...

truth is an ideal which exists in thought only, while the actual world exists separately and is outside its sphere of influence.

To state the matter in Hegelian terms, what Kant had done was to find his categories in the traditional classifications of judgements. They were well-defined, self-sufficient, final, timeless, and gave rise to the problem-ridden separation of duty from inclination, intellect from feeling, reason from desire. Hegel, on the other hand, did not see these concepts as self-sufficient, but, rather, as essentially interrelated, and it was his task "to make fixed thoughts fluid". (4)

Hegel sought to bridge the Kantian gulf between thought and being by positing one universal structure of Being which "comprehends" or "grasps" all the different stages of its existence. This task is performed by Reason which bridges the gulf between subject and object, thus restoring their unity. It is in this that Reason's reality consists: to make fixed thoughts fluid, when they can be called "Begriffe" (Concepts), which is closely related to "Begreifen" (to comprehend), another important term in Hegel's system, since it behoves philosophy to reach out and comprehend what/...

comprehend what has developed, or to grasp the truly real. The dialectics of the Concept make it possible for him to recognise true being in a particular thing or event (Dingheit), in which the universal gives itself its particular form (Gestalt).

In a way, we may say that, in the Hegelian system, concepts are derived, whereas traditional logic arranges accepted concepts in conformity with rules, whose validity consists in their propositions resulting in tautologies. Dialectical logic would not give rise to tautologies, since that which is given in sense, is already apprehended in consciousness. In other words, one cannot separate what is given in sense from the operation of the mind already performed upon it. Genuine concreteness consists in that concreteness which is grasped by the mind that has grasped the universal in the given particular. It is in this grasp that the truth is united to the object.

Here we come to the whole purpose of Hegel's logic: to grasp the object as it is in itself. This means that the dialectic does not exist apart from the object. In his Science of Logic Hegel says: "...it is the nature of the content and that alone which lives  
and stirs/...

and stirs in philosophic cognition, while it is this very reflection of the content which itself originates and determines the nature of philosophy." (5) The Concept divides itself into categories (definitions), and thinks itself in terms of them, because they constitute the opposites that are found in reality. The categories, which are derived from the Absolute, are linked together by the Absolute, and in so doing, the Absolute unfolds and exhibits its own content. Reality, which we saw to be antagonistic, separate into its being and its ought. The relation between the given and the possible, a very definite relation which is derived from the content of reality, points to the negation of the real's immediacy as its very essence. So, reality advances according to the possibilities that are manifest in it. In fact, that which is possible in a given reality is actually the condition of another reality. The validity of all given reality lies in their very possibility to create new forms of existence. Possibility is the essence of reality. It is not an arbitrary, speculative act that is imposed on it from the outside. A failure to recognise the essentially dynamic character of that which is real results in a dead objectivity which is an alien and untrue world. And yet, the object of philosophy is/...



philosophy is the world in its true form ("insight into the real state of the case" (6)), so that the truth that gives form to the very existence of things does not exist apart from the object, as is the case with formal logic.

Truth is not merely an epistemological process, but an ontological necessity. Such a thinking characterizes the difference between traditional logic and Hegelian logic. The difference is of crucial importance because the concern of philosophic truth is the existence of man. Philosophic truth cannot be put into one single proposition. "Philosophy, on the contrary, does not deal with a determination that is non-essential, but with a determination so far as it is an essential factor. The abstract or unreal is not its element and content, but the real, what is self-establishing, has life within itself, existence in its very notion. It is the process that creates its own moments in its course, and goes through them all; and the whole of this movement constitutes its positive content and its truth." (7) The categories, rules, and forms of Traditional Logic are considered false, as they conveniently leave out the contradictory nature of reality. The contradictions which are contained in reality give/...



reality give rise to a situation where the content of one category is unfolded by that of another. In other words, dialectical logic reveals one category as another ( $A = \text{not yet } A$ ). In fact, the idea of progress plays an important part in Hegelian logic. Every being has to overcome its negative tendencies and give rise to a new manifestation of being, thereby achieving its true form and content.

The structure and meaning of the propositions of traditional logic are quite different from the dynamic and active movement inherent in dialectical logic. The traditional proposition has a subject serving as a fixed base which has a predicate attached to it. These predicates, which are fixed "determinations", are "accidental" properties. Hegelian logic does not have such a fixed subject, but is one which is actively developing into its predicate. The subject turns into its predicate. The predicate is a form of the subject. Hegel uses the proposition "God is Being" to illustrate the working of dialectical logic. (8) In this proposition, "God" the subject, does not support "Being" the predicate; but rather, it is the Subject "God" that really passes into "Being". "Being" is not predicate as such, but the "essence" of God. God is not identical with/...

identical with Being, but becomes Being. Truth does not rest in the proposition, but it is just this whole dynamic process that represents the truth.

The significance of such a dialectic has far reaching implications. What Hegel has drawn attention to here is the separating of truth from concrete reality, of forms of thought from their content. The serious intention of the Hegelian dialectic now becomes apparent: to reflect the actual process of reality. In his pointed criticism of formal logic, Hegel writes in the Preface to his Phenomenology: "The pigeon-holing process of understanding retains for itself the necessity and the notion controlling the content, that which constitutes the concrete element, the actuality and living process of the subject-matter which it labels: or rather, understanding does not retain this for itself, on the contrary, understanding fails to know it. For if it had as much insight as that, it would surely show that it had. It is not even aware of the need for such insight; if it were, it would drop its schematizing process, or at least would no longer be satisfied to know by way of a mere table of contents. A table of contents is all that understanding gives, the content itself it does not furnish at all." (9)

While dialectical/...

While dialectical logic moves towards unifying theory and practice, traditional logic saw the truth in objects which are independent of the subject. While the attitude of the advocates of formal logic do point beyond a purely epistemological framework, but only in that they feel a sense of security in the knowledge that what they know and what they are handling are objective facts only, the problem for the adherents of dialectical logic, truly embraces ontological, religious, political and historical considerations. Dialectical logic must rescue man from the grip of the destructive alienation that the dead objectivity of formal logic has landed him in by pointing to the self-consciousness that it (dialectical logic) gives rise to.

The fulfilment of self-consciousness will show up the world as it essentially is. In other words, self-consciousness points to the truth of man himself and to the truth of his world: the Universal is pre-eminent over the particular. The particular, no matter in what form, can never embody the whole truth.

We may note here that the Hegelian logic goes beyond the very limits that Kant had drawn to confine  
any future/...

(10) Hegelian Logic is Ontology. Its basic concern is "What is the ground of being?" which question Western philosophy began with, and which occupies the centre of Heidegger's concern. Heidegger, of course, is not impressed with Hegel's attempt to reflect the actual process of reality. Heidegger rejects the Hegelian approach as still being involved with Being as substance and as subject. As such, these categories are not adequate for an understanding of the Being of man and things, since categories categorize the nature of things and are inappropriate for the existence of man which are characterized by existentialia.

As we have already established, the essence of the dialectic is in its constant movement, is in its state of flux. But the resultant new modes of being, the new manifestations, preserve in them their antecedents. The German language is fortunate in that it offers in the one word Aufhebung (Verb - aufheben; participle - aufgehoben), a distinct advantage over the English equivalents of superseding and preserving. On the words "Aufheben" and "das Aufgehobene (das Ideale)", Hegel himself has said no less than that it "is one of the most important concepts of philosophy, a basic determination which/...

determination which recurs practically everywhere. ... What sublimates itself does not thereby become nothing. Nothing is immediate; what is sublimated, on the other hand, is mediated; it is that which is not, but as a result, having issued from what had being; it is therefore still characterized by the determinateness from which it comes. Aufheben has in the (German) language a double meaning in that it signifies conserving, preserving, and at the same time also making cease, making an end. Even conserving includes the negative aspect that something is taken out of its immediacy, and thus out of an existence that is open to external influences, to be preserved.

- Thus what is aufgehoben is at the same time conserved and has merely lost its immediacy but is not for that reason annihilated." (11)

To pursue this line still further, we may draw closer attention to what Hegel says of dialectical philosophy. In his Logic, he writes that it is " 'not we who frame the notions,' " (12) but that their formation is an objective development which he only reproduces. Dialectical development can never be an activity that is imposed on the subject from the outside. "The method whereby, in philosophic science, the concept develops itself out of itself is expounded in logic and is here likewise presupposed/...



likewise presupposed. Its development is a purely immanent progress, the engendering of its determinations." (13) We may add here the observation that the universal is not something that is abstracted or separated from the world of things. That being the case, it now appears unreasonable to use Hegel's dialectic as a formal scientific method for making predictions for the future state of affairs, as Marx had done, and as history subsequently proved him to be wrong.

What Hegel did say was that "Contradiction is the root of all movement and life" and that "all things are contradictory in themselves". Contradiction is "the truth and essence of things." (14) There is nothing that exists that is true in the form in which it is given, but must advance to newer modes of being in order to realize its potentialities. However, any such negation does not displace the actual identity of the object. The potentialities of the objects or events are unfolded in their new forms which progress toward the truth.

It isn't as if there were two worlds - one finite and the other infinite; the finite being the created world, and the infinite being the world Beyond. There  
is only/...

is only this world where being is continuous with becoming, where the existence of every being has to be overcome because of its inherent potentialities, for another being which shows its own limitations. It is in such a movement that we must find the true meaning of finite and infinite. The finite must achieve its own determination by the activity of perishing. In fact, finitude is the essential character of the world. If the finite is to find its truth it must do so in its own finite existence. Truth does not exist in some beyond. Their finitude is their truth. So, in perishing they are actually developing their potentialities. The infinite makes it possible for the potentialities to realize themselves and so reach their true being. When the finite recognizes its negativity, it comes to know its truth, and so exists in its true form. The negative and the positive elements will no more oppose each other when the subject makes the negative a part of its own unity. Finite existents must become subjects for the purpose of fulfilling their potentialities, which are given in the Concept. Here we arrive at the truth of finitude: it consists in that identity of existence and Concept. Hegel, we may note, comes to his idea of infinity through the finite - the continuous perishing which points to the continuous negation of their finitude. Hegel says:

"the finite/...



"the finite in perishing, in this negation of its self, has reached its Being-in-Self, and therefore has here collapsed into itself. ... Thus it passes beyond itself only to collapse again into itself. This self-identity, or negation of negation, is affirmative Being, or the Other of the Finite, which is supposed to have the first negation as its determinateness; - this Other is the Infinite." (15)

When the relationship between Being and man is given its full weight, we find that the gap between Hegel's and Heidegger's conception of the relationship is quite irreconcilable. Hegel's conception of the relationship between man and Being implies that the finitude of man is overcome, for, man is the place where the Absolute comes to itself. But, on the other hand, Heidegger's conception of the relationship between man and Being establishes that both are finite. For Heidegger, the idea of infinity must be seen as the error of traditional metaphysical thinking. Being as such is finite because "Being is" only through an understanding of Being. Being is not within the "power of time" which results in Being being infinite (Hegel), but, rather, it is the case that time is within the "power of Being" insofar as time is the horizon for an understanding of/...

understanding of Being which becomes finite  
(Heidegger in Sein und Zeit).

Hegel attributes to the Understanding, which sees the finite only, the stubbornness of not allowing the negativity to show itself; to the Dialectics, the force of letting the inherent potentialities (antitheses) unfold; and to Reason, the power of comprehending these. If Hegel uses Dialectics (everything can be treated as an instance of dialectics) to point out and to overcome alienation, he uses Reason as a reconciling and integrating power.

The aim of Hegel's logic now becomes apparent. All dialectical tendencies must be exposed when we shall arrive at the truth, the reasonable, the philosophical result. But, absolute result or knowledge can only come into proper focus by showing up the inadequacies of our consciousness, which Hegel demonstrated by his dialectics. So, conscious experience now has to pass through its various forms until that stage has been reached where the conflict between subject and object would exist no longer. The phenomenal project that Hegel undertook was to show up the inadequacies of our Concepts in the past, and to bring the dialectical movement

up to/...

up to its present standpoint: the Prussian State.

Being, as we indicated earlier, is also a Concept, which is the form in which Hegel speaks of it in his Logic. Since the Logic concerns itself with Being, we now have a logic of Ontology and a logic of Metaphysics which expresses the genuine relationship of all of reality to each other. This points to what the Concept really is - it is Reality itself, or better still Life itself. The Reality, Being, has existence by being more than a mere category. It exists by preserving itself through its self-alienation. It does this by embracing nothing (Nichts). Being can only exist by passing into its opposite. Being is not Being without this negation or antagonism. Through this opposition and self-alienation, the timeless inactivity of the category Being is destroyed. Being, by this act of self-alienation, now comes into its own and expresses its essence: it has "no Determinate Being."<sup>(16)</sup> It exists by "the negation of every determination of Being."<sup>(17)</sup> It is the negation of all being. Such a negation would not have any determinate being. In other words, it is no thing - nothing, which Hegel arrives at by showing that in determining being (Sein) as something/...

as something (Seiendes) we use the same cupola "is" whose very definition we wish to grasp. Here we arrive at a deadlock because one cannot define being as something, since it is everything. Everything is, but being is not something. It is "pure indeterminateness and vacuity."<sup>(18)</sup> This indeterminate being posits the negation of being: the absence of all determination points to non-being. The nothing (Nichts) which results, of course, is a non-being being. Hegel overcomes such a state of affairs by using his dialectics. Both being and nothing are superseded and preserved by the more comprehensive Becoming. (Werden). Becoming preserves both their truths as each immediately disappears in its opposite.

However, just as Being and Nothing are superseded, so too, Becoming suspends itself when it actualizes itself in the world. In the process of actualization, Becoming becomes something, at least for a "moment."<sup>(19)</sup> The something contains both Being and Nothing in itself. "This unity of Being and Nothing, as being the primary truth, is, once and for all, the basis and the element of all that follows: therefore, besides Becoming itself, all further logical determinations... and in short all philosophical concepts, are examples of this unity."<sup>(20)</sup> Thus Hegel's logic demonstrates that/...

demonstrates that the unity of Being and Nothing is contained in the structure of all things. All the resultant syntheses, since they contain the power of negation, cannot help impelling the process forward, by starting it all over again.

The idea of becoming in the universe was explained by Aristotle in terms of the relationship between actuality and potentiality. Matter as such is not yet what it later becomes. It is potentially moving towards higher and higher forms. The aim of becoming is reached when matter reaches its true form (actuality). Motion or becoming is the realization of potentiality in matter.

The crucial difference between Aristotle and Hegel is that, for Aristotle, the ultimate cause of motion is itself something unmoved. In this Unmoved Mover the scale of being reaches its highest point. It is the one and final cause of all things. But unlike Hegel, Aristotle's Absolute is only the cause of becoming, not the process itself. On the other hand, Hegel's Absolute is cause and process. The one is the other. Aristotle's Absolute is detached from the world but initiates becoming through Eros (all things desire a life, as much as possible, like God's).

Aristotle's Unmoved/...



Aristotle's Unmoved Mover, like Hegel's Absolute Mind, is pure thought. But whereas Aristotle's Absolute exists in unchangeable self-contemplation (thought thinking of thought), Hegel's Absolute moves through the world by dialectical tensions and resolutions towards self-fulfilment. The Aristotelian dualism seems to be overcome by Hegel because of the specific conception he has of the Absolute. (21)

We may note that Hegel in attempting to define Being, (his Logic opens with a consideration of what Being is) found Nothing, and so found the negative character of Reality. Everything is only in so far as it comes into being and passes away. Dialectically speaking, Being is Becoming. Something that is not yet, comes into being and passes into not-being. Being (and Nothing) determine the content and development of Reality. The implications of such an interpretation have far reaching consequences for the problems of freedom, state, religion, to which we now turn our attention.

Hegel's views on Religion are determined by his idea of Becoming. His conception of God is of a "Becoming God". God as God, God as Being only, is an abstraction which/...

anstraction which arises from the formal, lifeless way of looking at things. God, in reality, is an active, spiritual being, whose essence consists in his unfolding. "Spirit, in so far as it is the Spirit of God, is not a spirit beyond the stars, beyond the world. On the contrary, God is present, omnipresent, and exists as Spirit in all spirits. God is a living God, who is acting and working." (22)

For Hegel, there is no conflict between the metaphysical and the rational. Hegel attempts to establish by rational analysis, the very thing that Kant had shown to be beyond the limits of Understanding. For Hegel, the existence of God in the world is a logical necessity. "...to thinking reason, God is not emptiness, but Spirit; and this characteristic of Spirit does not remain for it a word only, or a superficial characteristic; on the contrary, the nature of Spirit unfolds itself for rational thought,... Thus God is conceived of as making Himself an object to Himself, and further, the object remains in this distinction in identity with God; in it God loves Himself." (23)

Hegel's own approach to Religion shows a developmental tendency. He began with a bitter anti-ecclesiastical attitude which he dealt with under the title The/...



title The Positivity of the Christian Religion, where he attacks the development of Christianity into an authoritarian system. There seems little doubt that he was inspired by the beauty and the naturalness of Greek folk religion, and by the rational character of Kant's ethical teachings. The authoritarian, imposed, positive character of Christianity could only result in man's alienation since it reduces him to a state of servility.

Hegel then moves on to the "enlightened" attitude which he displays in his The Spirit of Christianity.<sup>(24)</sup> In a radical and noticeable shift of position, Christianity is no more the source of alienation (the Jewish religion replaces Christianity as the religion that dehumanizes man. The Jews become the example of an alienated people, since they adhere slavishly to an external authority which they call God). In a romantic picture, Hegel presents a pantheism of love as the essence of Christianity.

Finally, religion comes to be the pictorial or imaginative expression (the Father - the Essence; the Son - Self-conscious Being; the Holy Spirit - knowledge of the former in the latter) of the highest rational truth. This/...

truth. This imaginative representative of the truth, must be superseded and preserved by the self-conscious Spirit - the highest illumination of which is knowledge of the Absolute Spirit knowing itself.

Even though the religious roots of Hegelianism are deep, there is no doubt that he subordinates Religion to Philosophy. Whereas religious language is indirect, pictorial, and "presentational", that of the philosophic Absolute assumes the rational form of the dialectic. Hegel comes to such a rational conception of God as he does with all other concepts - through mediation. Each mediation is a stage in the progression toward an adequate conception of God. No one instance of mediation shows up the whole Concept because that particular mediation is determined. Therefore, it is a part of a higher concept that is being determined. Since God actualizes Himself in the concrete, and since the concrete is always in the process of becoming, God is a Becoming God. As an actual concept, the conception of God is never completed.

In his early writings Hegel saw life as having an original unity. However, this unity was an immature unity which because of its immaturity differentiates into various oppositions, such as man and nature, humanity and/...

humanity and divinity, subject and object. Such estrangements will continue to exist until life in the one finds life in the other, until the finite life rises to infinite life, until man shares in the life of God through love. The unifying power of love, rather than the objectifying and analytic power of thought is the answer to the separation of man from nature, of the finite from the infinite, and of subject from object. Religion is the answer, not philosophy.

These early views of Hegel do not change essentially from his later writings, for the immature unity that gave rise to the opposition between man and nature, now becomes the self-externalization of Spirit, which it later transcends by and through the activity of man. The Spirit develops as "the process of becoming an other to itself, i.e. an object for its own self, and in transcending this otherness." (25) Alienation is now overcome by philosophy, rather than by religion.

Richard Kroner in his introduction to Hegel's Early Theological Writings says: "Hegel's Pantheism of Love has all the characteristics of his future metaphysics. It aims at a reconciliation of opposites, tries to overcome one-sided rationalism, one-sided emotionalism, or/...

emotionalism, or one-sided empiricism. It is dialectical in its structure, although its method is not yet dialectical in the strict sense of the word." (26)

The task of restoring the original unity of all the differentiations of life, which was performed by love, is now performed, in his later writings, by Reason, which acts dialectically.

Hegel links up "World Spirit" (Weltgeist) with God through what he calls "comprehended history" (begriffene Geschichte) which recalls the Absolute Spirit as manifest in Reality, and so points to the knowledge of God. Such knowledge is necessary if the Spirit is to expose its dynamic character by the process of historically unfolding itself in and through the concrete.

We may note here the etymology of the word "Spirit". The German Geist, the Latin Spiritus, the Hebrew Ruach, and the Greek pneuma, "also means breath and wind, is essentially a moving force and the essence of life. Etymologically, it is also related to 'yeast' and 'geyser,' and conceptually it is associated with the notion of a ferment and an eruptive force." (27)

In his/...

In his Phanomenologie des Geistes, which Baillie translates as Phenomenology of Mind, Hegel has this to say of the Spirit, "The living substance, further, is that being which is truly subject, or, what is the same thing, is truly realized and actual (wirklich) solely in the process of positing itself, or in mediating with its own self its transitions from one state or position to the opposite. As subject it is pure and simple negativity, and just on that account a process of splitting up what is simple and undifferentiated,... True reality is merely this process of reinstating self-identity, of reflecting into its own self in and from its other, and is not an original and primal unity as such, not an immediate unity as such. It is the process of its own becoming, the circle which presupposes its end as its purpose, and has its end for its beginning; it becomes concrete and actual only by being carried out, and by the end it involves."<sup>(28)</sup> In the Lesser Logic, Hegel says that the highest stage in the self-consciousness of Spirit is the realization that it is the truth of everything. Of this truth which he calls Absolute Idea, he says: "The Idea in its process makes itself that illusion, and opposes an other to itself; its activity consists in overcoming this illusion."<sup>(29)</sup> Findlay adds:  
"In other/...

"In other words the imperfection of Teleology consists in the fact that it appears as a journey in which starting-point and end-point are the things of importance, while the journey itself derives its importance from them." (30)

Spirit becomes an object; it alienates itself into an other, and then overcomes this otherness returning to itself from that act of alienation. The movement we call experience,<sup>(31)</sup> and only when it becomes the property of consciousness can we speak of the possibility of its attaining its truth. In religious terms, God the Father becomes God the Son (something other for Himself). Such an externalization is superseded and preserved in the Holy Spirit.

Hegel sees the ultimate form of Spirit as Absolute Knowledge, which is Spirit knowing itself in the form of Spirit. In other words, Spirit is not merely the goal of its own activity, but it "is indistinguishable from that game itself." (32) When Spirit gains self-consciousness it will be conscious of all that it has ever thought. These, however, would be reflected as its own concepts, and not now as something other or foreign to itself. The reconciliation of Consciousness and self-consciousness/...





self-consciousness would now constitute Absolute Knowledge. All things that we are conscious of are an externalization or a presupposition of our thinking self-consciousness which will return to the Subject. The Subject, of course, is the Universalizing or Unifying Activity.

Where Hegel speaks of the necessity of Spirit alienating or externalizing itself only to return in truth to itself from this estrangement, Heidegger speaks of Being as aletheia ("the disclosure of Being"). Being is its self-disclosure. Heidegger sees man as alienating himself by becoming forgetful of Being through constantly losing himself in the world of das Man.

The contemplation of the Spirit in this world is the task of Reason which governs Reality, from its lowest level (nature) to its highest level (free, rational being who acts in self-consciousness of his potentialities.) In the true sense of the word, reality is no reality until it has become rational in itself. That which is real, for Hegel, is not what actually exists, but that which is in line with Reason. "What is rational is actual and what is actual is rational."(33) To illustrate this, the State is often used in what appears to be/...

to be the best example, but nevertheless, an often misunderstood one. The State can be called "Real" only when it is in line with "the given potentialities of men and permits their full development. Any preliminary form of the state is not yet reasonable, and, therefore, not yet real." (34)

This puts a completely different colouring to the picture Sir Karl Popper creates when he interprets Hegel as saying, "everything that is now real or actual exists by necessity, and must be reasonable as well as good. (Particularly good, as we shall see, is the actually existing Prussian state.)" (35) In his disparaging analysis of Hegel's philosophy, Popper inverts the basic Hegelian process by attributing to Hegel the belief that things are good because they succeed. What Hegel really believed was that things succeed because they are good. The operative thought in Hegel's "philosophy of State" is his idea of Freedom. The content of Reason is the same as that of History - the struggle for freedom, which at that point actualizes itself best in the Hereditary Monarchy of the Prussian State. That Hegel held the Prussian State in high respect, there is no doubt. That he did not see it as the idea of the State, his Philosophy of Right firmly establishes. In the Preface to that work Hegel says:

"Hence what/...

"Hence what matters is to recognize and know the substance which is immanent and the eternal which is present beneath the temporal and passing which appears. For the rational which is synonymous with the idea appears (by entering through its actuality into an outward existence) in a limitless wealth of forms, appearances and configurations, and thus encloses its kernel with a variegated rind. Consciousness at the outset lives in this rind, but the conception permeates it in search of the inner pulse which beats in the outer configurations. These endless manifold relations, this endless material and its regularities are not the subject of philosophy." (36)

The essence of both man and history is Spirit. The Phenomenology is the unfolding of the Spirit in terms of the history of man. Hegel's original title of the Phenomenology, "Science of the Experience of Consciousness," is important as Heidegger shows, and which he takes as the theme of his essay on Hegel which is entitled Hegel's Concept of Experience. Hegel's thesis is that of these experiences which consciousness gives, there can be "scientific knowledge." For, experience is none other than what constitutes Spirit through which Spirit becomes "aware of" or "conscious of" it. Hegel, in pursuance of this, uses the Phenomenology to demonstrate/...

to demonstrate the process by which Spirit, through its own experiential aspect, becomes conscious of itself. The various experiences and events represent various stages in the development of Spirit towards attaining Absolute Knowledge of it. "The goal, which is Absolute Knowledge of Spirit knowing itself as Spirit, finds its pathway in the recollection of spiritual forms (Geister) as they are in themselves and as they accomplish the organization of their spiritual kingdom. Their conservation, looked at from the side of their free existence appearing in the form of contingency, is History; looked at from the side of their intellectually comprehended organisation, it is the Science of the ways in which knowledge appears." (37)

Objects, as they appear in experience, will give phenomenal knowledge. It is the task of philosophy to illuminate the totality and comprehensive knowledge of Spirit that posits and reveals itself. Not until it achieves that goal, not until man is united with God, not until the gap between subject and object is bridged, will consciousness be anything, but an "unhappy consciousness." What Hegel calls natural consciousness is that stage of immediate or primitive sensation that is alienated from itself. It finds its truth in the  
  
form of/...

form of an object as opposed to the subject. This alienation is the force that pushes it along until "natural" and "spiritual" consciousness are reconciled. On its way to Spiritual consciousness, natural consciousness loses its own truth (of being merely natural consciousness). This "highway of despair" (38) that "natural consciousness" traverses points, however, to its salvation, and so to the salvation of man. It is not stretching a point, but expressing a truth, to suggest that Hegel, in his philosophy, attempts to construct man's authentic existence (by the act of self-realisation man fuses with the Absolute) and rescue him from his alienation. (39)

Change gives rise to something new. It is Hegel's contention that change is a progressive development, that there is a latent destiny, and a potentiality striving to realize itself. All particular conditions are overcome by the potentialities inherent in them in their effort to fulfil (or realize) themselves. For the self-conscious subject, being a historical being, the State represents the universal interest which makes it possible for the individual to fulfil himself. The universal manifests itself in various forms, each of which represents a stage in the life of the State. And so, essentially, there/...



essentially, there isn't a shift in such an outlook from Hegel's central theme: the dialectical relationship between Universal and Particular.

The power of the State is not an abstract power, but has its content in Universal History (Weltgeschichte). It is the right of World Spirit which is the Unconditional Absolute. (40) Thus it "is the universal Idea as a genus and as an absolute power over individual states - the mind which gives itself its actuality in the process of World-History." (41) States evolve to higher stages, which seems to me to be the true significance of the Hegelian triad, where he traces the course of freedom through the Orient, the Graeco-Roman world, to the Germanic nations of the Protestant north.

Thus the Hegelian foundation for the State is based on the reconciliation between individual and universal interests. "...its strength lies in the unity of its own universal end and aim with the particular interest of individuals,..." (42) Hegel believes that there is a rational order in the world and that man has the capacity to understand such an order. (43) The aim of such an order would/...



order would be to promote every individual's humanity and to make it possible for him to cultivate freely, art, religion, and philosophy. Hegel has an idealistic conception of the State. His conception of the State, however, differs from that conception which sees the state as an institution (Anstalt) that exercises commands and orders, that enforces the law. He conceives of the state in an essentially Aristotelian sense - the State is the highest community (the Polis) where any genuine freedom can be realized. Just as the Church provides the religious community where man can come to know God, the State provides the political community where man can come to realize his highest freedom. In such states the individual reconciles himself with the whole. His existence really comes into being through the power of the law. The common interest which it represents would see to his self-development. He finds his essence in the law and the law promotes his potentialities. Each individual can fulfil himself only as a member of a real community. Such a state is where, Hegel says: "A man counts as a man in virtue of his manhood alone, not because he is a Jew, Catholic, Protestant, German, Italian, &c." (44)

In view/...

In view of the above convictions and outlook, Hegel would thoroughly disapprove of the actions of a fanatic motivated by an objectionable ideology and would approve of the actions of, say, a person who has the courage of opposing Idi Amin in his attempt to secure freedom from such a dictator. Ernst Cassirer writes, "There is, however, a clear and unmistakeable difference between his (Hegel's) idealization of the power of the State and that sort of idolization that is characteristic of our modern totalitarian systems."<sup>(45)</sup> Hegel accepts only those power states that can guarantee the individual freedom and allow the development of his potentialities to the full. The Hegelian state is one that conforms to universally valid laws and to Reason. The law is the Shibboleth through which one catches out the enemy from the friend.

For Hegel, Napoleon was a world historical figure who carried out the ideals of the French Revolution. Napoleon reflects the higher knowledge and morality of history, and so was able to turn the achievements of the French Revolution into a social system that united individual freedom with Universal Reason, thus fulfilling the historical need of the time. It was for this that Hegel admired Napoleon who he saw as the soul of the world.

However, Individualism/...

However, Individualism led to the Terror of 1793, where each man's freedom destroyed any reasonable conception of society. "Community", in the positive Hegelian sense, was destroyed. Hence, we find the attempt to save the social system and oppose, in some measure, the rights of the individual. Marcuse, in an incisive analysis says: "...the socio-historical roots of this 'universalism,' showing that its base was the lack of a 'community' in individualist society. ... One might interpret his dialectic as the philosophic attempt to reconcile his ideals with an antagonistic social reality. ... Time and again the concrete social implications of the concept of universality break through his philosophic formulations, and the picture of an association of free individuals united in a common interest comes clearly to light." (46)

Marcuse points to the interpretation that the terror of anarchy was at the back of Hegel's insistence upon the connection between truth and universality which would exist in a true community. He says: "'True independence consists alone in the unity and in the interpretation of both the individuality and the universality with each other. The universal acquires through the individual its concrete existence, and the/...

and the subjectivity of the individual and particular discovers in the universal the unassailable basis and the most genuine form of its reality..." (47) In keeping with the points raised above, Hegel considered Hereditary Monarchy as the ideal form of government. The monarch represents the whole. He is not tainted by social antagonisms. For Hegel, hereditary monarchy was the Christian state that came into being with the German Reformation. And, he believed that the sovereignty of the State would preserve society (middle class society). Professor Rauche draws attention to Hegel rationalizing the status quo of the Prussian State, and so rationalizing the conflicts within Prussian society. (48) Since Hegel's system is a certain model which seeks to cope in a rational manner with the existing conflicts and problems of the age, he rationalizes the existing conflicts and problems in Prussia. In doing so, Hegel missed actuality and thus led man into alienation and unauthentic existence.

However, Hegel's belief is that freedom is not actual without the State. The State is the actualization of freedom as it alone is responsible for and makes possible the continual progress of Spirit: the  
actualization of/...

actualization of man's Spirit depends on the State. But, by elevating hereditary monarchy into an ideal state, what Hegel had done was to replace the idea of social contract with the idea of the State as an objective whole. The implication of such a situation is that State is separated from that very community of individuals that Hegel wished for. And since Hegel saw individuals as a material part of the State, the harmonious reconciliation of individual and state seems impossible, if not utopian, because that very individual, (because of his individuality), would always come into conflict with the State. This must have led Hegel to say that the individual can be sacrificed for the sake of the community. In his Philosophy of Right Hegel writes: "Whether the individual exists or not is indifferent to objective ethics, which alone is enduring, and the power through which the lives of individuals are ruled." (49)

Such a viewpoint is damning when one applies the self-same criteria and judgement that Hegel himself used - history. History, since Hegel, and especially in the twentieth century, bears testimony to the sacrifice of the individual for a principle, for some "eternal justice,... against whom the vain striving of the/...

of the individuals becomes only a fluctuating play." (50) Lenin wrote, "'One must be prepared for every sacrifice, to use if necessary every stratagem, ruse, illegal method, to be determined to conceal the truth, for the purpose of penetrating the labour unions and of accomplishing, despite everything, the communist task." (51) The reality and pain of being sacrificed for an eternal justice is certainly no fluctuating play.

In the final analysis, and in the face of such evidence documented above, it does appear that Hegel has seriously compromised his highest philosophic ideas in his criticism of civil society for a strong, powerful state wherein the individual will actualize his freedom, in becoming Universal.

Be that as it may, to come to a better appreciation of what freedom means for Hegel, we must take him on his own terms. This becomes doubly important when we consider that, for Hegel, the supreme mode of access to the Absolute was through freedom. Now Reason, we have stressed, exists through the process of its being made real; in other words, through its realization. And, all modes of being, Hegel emphasised, are modes of realization. Of such realizations, it is only man who  
knows what/...



knows what he is. And, only in this sense is he real. He alone understands the process of becoming. He alone understands potentiality and possesses knowledge of Concepts. Man exists as a potential that is continually actualizing itself, according to Reason: "We encounter here the most important category of reason, namely, freedom. Reason presupposes freedom, the power to act in accordance with knowledge of the truth, the power to shape reality in line with its potentialities. ... Freedom, in turn, presupposes reason, for it is comprehending knowledge, alone, that enables the subject to gain and to wield this power. The stone does not possess it; neither does the plant. Both lack comprehending knowledge and hence real subjectivity."<sup>(52)</sup> Such world historical figures as Alexander the Great, Caesar, Napoleon, carry out the universal task of advancing freedom, even though, in their particular existence, they may have been motivated by personal ambition. The advance they give to rational truth lifts them above their particular determinations. "The History of the world is none other than the progress of the consciousness of Freedom;..."<sup>(53)</sup>

Hegel links/...

Hegel links universal, freedom, and Spirit by concluding that the essence of the Universal is Spirit and the essence of Spirit is Freedom. The various forms or qualities of Spirit exist only through Freedom. The true subject of history (the Universal) is the realization of the self-consciousness of Freedom. The content of freedom comes from the knowledge of truth. This knowledge and self-consciousness make up the basis character of the subject. In other words, the truth about reality must be conceived as subject: The true form of objectivity is subjectivity. The Hegelian dialectic is at work, for, when all objects lose their independent objectivity, when they are comprehended by the subject, then perfect freedom is attained. The world as objective world is the form through which the subject gains self-realization. The subject takes all reality as its own and has no object but itself. It is only then that subject is free. For subject that has an external object, the object must be regarded as something foreign. Thought is perfect freedom, since it has no object but itself. In destroying reality and the permanence of what is, man's self-consciousness gains the Essence, the Concept, the Universal. These help  
man gain/...

man gain knowledge of the truth of things and not get taken in by the appearance of things - limited determinations that have not yet fully exposed the appearance of things.

Hegel also links Concept to Freedom. For, we showed how Hegel, in his Logic, saw Concept as the unity of the Universal and the Particular, and how Becoming overcomes dialectically the tension between Being and Nothing. Now, in the Philosophy of History, Hegel provides a historical account of the link between Concept and Freedom. The state provides the arena where the individual subject comes into union with the community ("whole"). The progress of thought, the comprehension of the Concept, is linked to the progress of freedom, which has three main stages. The Orient knew that only one man was free; in the Graeco-Roman world some men were free; and in the Germanic-Christian world all men are free. This last form of society is best expressed by Constitutional Monarchy.

Hegel believes that history is the story of the development of human freedom. But history is the story of the development of human freedom in terms  
of a /...

of a definite preconceived model, namely, the movement of the spirit, into which man is harmoniously blended. In other words, human freedom is subject to the self-emancipation of the Spirit. It is true that this spirit inhabits in man's consciousness as the mysterious subject - object being (Jacob Hommes), but the blending of every individual's mind with the spirit does suggest a Greater Man. This Greater Man, constituted at the expense of the contingent individual, is an abstraction.

However, Hegel says that when man as man knows that he is free, that he is not separated from the truth, then he will actualize his potentialities. "Thus, essence and existence are actually interrelated in philosophy, and the process of proving the truth there has to do with the existing object itself. The essence arises in the process of existence, and conversely, the process of existence is a 'return' to the essence." (54)

Hegel believes that his metaphysical conception of freedom is not governed by an external process, but is the very history of man. Freedom is the activation, the self-realization, the self-fulfilment of man's inner tendency. Hegel holds that it is not an imposed/...

an imposed truth but one that is inherent in man's very reality, whose potentiality he must consciously actualize.

The problem of such a system like Hegel's is that it is one experiential horizontal, taking us to the systematic science by way of the Weltgeist. Hegel at no time suggested or even faintly considered that his system was a model. Rather, he saw his as the model. So, regardless of whether Hegel would have approved or disapproved of what seems to be the Communist offensive (bringing the world under one roof or culture), Hegel must bear some responsibility for it, since the driving force or motive of the Hegelian system is unity, the Universal which is the expression of Universal Reason, and, by implication, cultural unity through the unifying power of dialectical philosophy.

Even though one may thoroughly disapprove of any plan to bring the whole world under one socio-political organization, one may ask whether such a scheme is feasible or desirable. There are geographical, cultural, religious, historical, etc., differences that make such a fusion into one all-embracing system/...

embracing system seem impossible. In any case, it is one fallible man's idea of what is the truth, and starting from such a premise, it seems unreasonable to absolutize any one approach and impose it on the rest of mankind. In a perceptive analysis, Professor Rauche asks the following pertinent questions, "And yet, what else was Hegel's blending of the individual with the state but an act of self-transcendence, i.e., an absolutization of the human self? Was it not man who, in his mind, formed the concept of absolute truth? And was not the conception of a historical logos, with which man could blend through his rational consciousness, an immanent truth? In other words, did not man know the movement of the historical logos, because he had himself constituted it by the dialectical method?" (55)

History exposed as unrealistic such metaphysical idealizations as the Truth, the Just, the Good, the Beautiful, the Real. In the face of man's inhumanity to man, in the face of conflicts that assumed nightmarish proportions, and in the face of Hegel's refusal to recognise the limits of human thinking

(which must/...



(which must be seen as a consequence of his search for the Universal, the Infinite, the Absolute), his conceptions could not hold their ground and were thus rejected as an excellent example of Holzweg. It is in the light of this whole tradition (the search for Being) that Heidegger's own approach to the problem of metaphysics must be seen. By rejecting any constitution of the Absolute from the position of man's finiteness, and , by depriving man of an absolute that provided him with his traditional values, Heidegger hoped to arrive at the ground of man's being, starting from Dasein's (Heidegger's term for human existence) very being in the world. Such an approach would really constitute, for him, man's authentic existence, unauthenticity being man's landing himself into alienation by any attempt to come to terms with the world through metaphysical constitutions.

We have already shown that, according to Hegel, the world process is governed by the unfolding of the Rational Logos. Reason is the ground of the world. We would like to put forward the suggestion that, given a lively imagination combined, as in Hegel's case, with erudite scholarship, one can construct an  
equally comprehensive/...

equally comprehensive system, devoted to explaining the world process as being governed by an irrational purpose. That this is so points to the sobering realization that Hegel's conception of the universe is a private, individual attempt at comprehending the universe - in other words, it does not represent The Truth, but a truth whose validity can and was challenged by his successors.

Judging from Hegel's conception of the status of his own philosophy, it appears to be a special kind of philosophic conceit for a philosopher to believe that his solution or vision is all-explanatory. Such a conception, if forced on the rest of mankind, can only lead to a further alienation, since it does not take into account that man is a multi-faceted being. So, a theory that sets out to rescue man from alienation, if absolutized, will result in an alienation that could be worse.

However, despite the criticisms that can be levelled against Hegel, an understanding of our times would be difficult, if not impossible without a

clear knowledge/...



clear knowledge of his philosophy. As Carl Friedrich puts it, "Marxism and Fascism, especially in its Italian form, no less than existentialism and pragmatism are clearly unthinkable without Hegel. This does not mean that they are Hegelian,... But it does mean that a knowledge of Hegel is perhaps more essential than that of any philosopher of the past for anyone who wishes to understand the intellectual crisis of our time." (56)

N O T E S

1. Quoted by KAUFMANN, W. : Hegel, p.74
2. Ibid.
3. Quoted by MARCUSE, H. : Reason and Revolution  
p.36.
4. The image of fluidity is important in Hegel.  
Note, for instance, the fairly frequent use  
of it in Hegel's Preface to his The Phenomenology  
of Mind.
5. HEGEL, G.W.F. : Science of Logic,  
Volume 1, p.36.
6. HEGEL, G.W.F. : Lectures on the  
Philosophy of Religion,  
Volume 1, p.200
7. HEGEL, G.W.F. : The Phenomenology of  
Mind, p.105
8. Ibid., p.121 ff.
9. Ibid., pp. 111-112.
10. See KANT, I. : Prolegomena to any  
Future Metaphysics.
11. Quoted by KAUFMANN, W. : op.cit., pp. 191-192.  
See also, HEGEL, G.W.F. : Science of Logic,  
Volume 1, pp.119-120.
12. Quoted by MARCUSE, H. : op.cit., p.158.
13. HEGEL, G.W.F. : Philosophy of Right,  
p.34
14. HEGEL, G.W.F. : Science of Logic,  
Volume 2, p.66, 67..

15. HEGEL, G.W.F. : Science of Logic,  
Volume 1, p.149.
16. HEGEL, G.W.F. : Science of Logic,  
Volume 2, p.16
17. HEGEL, G.W.F. : Science of Logic,  
Volume 1, p.394.
18. Ibid., p.94
19. "moment" - Hegel is fond of using this word,  
which occurs frequently in his writings.
20. Quoted by MARCUSE, H. : op.cit., p.130.
21. See G. A. RAUCHE'S chapter entitled "The Problem  
of Universals" in his A Student's Key to  
Ancient Greek Thought.
22. HEGEL, G.W.F. : Lectures on the  
Philosophy of Religion,  
Volume 1, p.33
23. Ibid., p.30
24. See HEGEL, G.W.F. : Early Theological  
Writings.
25. HEGEL, G.W.F. : The Phenomenology  
of Mind, p.96
26. HEGEL, G.W.F. : Early Theological  
Writings, p.12.
27. KAUFMANN, W. : op. cit., p.276.
28. HEGEL, G.W.F. : The Phenomenology  
of Mind, pp.80-81
29. Quoted by FINDLAY, J.N. : Hegel: A re-examination,  
p.252.
30. FINDLAY, J.N. : op. cit., p.252.

31. See HEIDEGGER, M. : Hegel's Concept of Experience.
32. FINDLAY, J.N. : op. cit., p.39
33. HEGEL, G.W.F. : Philosophy of Right.  
p.10.
34. MARCUSE, H. : op. cit., p.11.
35. POPPER, K. : The Open Society and its Enemies, Volume 2, p.41.
36. Translated by STERRETT and FRIEDRICH in the anthology edited by FRIEDRICH, C.J. : The Philosophy of Hegel, p.225.
37. HEGEL, G.W.F. : The Phenomenology of Mind, p.808
38. Ibid., p.135.
39. RAUCHE, G.A. : The Problem of Truth and Reality in Grisebach's Thought, pp. 18-20.
40. HEGEL, G.W.F. : Philosophy of Right, pp. 33-34
41. Ibid., p.160.
42. Ibid., p.161.
43. RAUCHE, G.A. : The Choice (Quo vadis, homo?), p.41.
44. HEGEL, G.W.F. : Philosophy of Right, p.134.
45. CASSIRER, E. : The Myth of the State, p.276.
46. MARCUSE, H. : op. cit., pp. 88-89.



47. Quoted by MARCUSSE, H. : op. cit., p.89.
48. RAUCHE, G.A. : The Choice (Quo vadis, homo?), p.44
49. Translated by STERRETT and FRIEDRICH in the anthology edited by FRIEDRICH, C.J. : The Philosophy of Hegel, p.261.
50. Ibid.
51. Lenin, quoted by CAMUS,A: The Rebel, p.193.
52. MARCUSE, H. : op. cit., p.9.
53. HEGEL, G.W.F. : The Philosophy of History, p.19.
54. MARCUSE, H. : op. cit., p.99
55. RAUCHE, G.A. : The Choice (Quo vadis, homo?), p.44
56. FRIEDRICH, C.J. (editor): The Philosophy of Hegel, p.lxi.

C H A P T E R   T H R E E

ALIENATION AND THE DECLINE OF CULTURE DURING THE  
NINETEENTH CENTURY AND THE FIRST HALF OF THE  
TWENTIETH CENTURY.

Hegel was the first to analyse the concept of alienation as such (in the Phenomenology of Spirit) in all its manifold implications, and his analysis bestowed philosophical respectability on the concept to such an extent that it became one of the key problems confronting Hegel's successors. Hegel's own understanding of alienation became the springboard for further discussions - either inviting radical opposition which, however, could not totally disentangle itself from Hegelian overtones; or agreement but with reservations or modifications. The problematic nature of the whole question of alienation is evident from the fertile, though often contradictory, discussions on the topic conducted in the several disciplines that Hegelian philosophy influenced.

We shall discuss the problem of alienation and the decline of culture in the nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth century in terms of

- (a) Religious Alienation: the serious problems  
facing religious/...

facing religious thinkers who were confronted by Hegel's significant pronouncements on Christianity and Philosophy, and the attempts to resolve these problems.

(b) Ideological Alienation: the attempt by Marx to define alienation in terms of an analysis of economic and social relations and the problems arising from these.

(c) Functionalistic Alienation: the attempt by classical and modern positivism with their unbounded optimism and confidence in the powers of science, to interpret reality purely in terms of functional relations and thus rescue man from the alienation of an abstract and speculative metaphysics.

The discussion of the above is necessary since the above mentioned types of alienation created the situation and the intellectual climate from which Heidegger conceived his philosophy in an attempt at overcoming man's alienation.

(a) Religious/...

(a) Religious Alienation.

In discussing religious alienation we propose to limit ourselves to the two main trends of natural religion on the one hand and unique revelation on the other. As a result of Hegel's mediation of Philosophy and Christianity, theological thinking was facing some of its acutest problems. Hegel, in his philosophical development, had accepted and rejected a number of positions concerning the relationship between Philosophy and Christianity. He finally came to the conclusion that religion was inadequate for achieving the unification of life, chiefly because of its tendency to distinguish between the real world and an otherworldly dimension. "What this meant theoretically to Hegel was that religion, by itself, does not have the power to realize the full potencies of life and bring them into a liberating synthesis." (1) Reconciliation of the conflicts of experience can only be achieved by Philosophy since "the principle of unification is supplied by a philosophical view of the totality of life." (2)

Religion, then, is only an intermediate stage in the dialectical journey of the Spirit and must be interpreted in terms of philosophical categories. All of Hegel's subsequent pronouncements on religion are now to/...

now to be viewed in the light of the primacy of philosophy. Hegel's theory of religion not only tried to overcome the earlier separation of religion from philosophy, but also began the steady erosion of the Christian belief in God as "wholly other", which development precipitated a number of interesting developments in theological thinking, for example, the growth of a so-called liberal theology (Strauss, Harnack, Troeltsch) as well as its subsequent replacement by a new awareness of the uniqueness of the Biblical message (Kierkegaard, Barth, Bultmann, etc.)

If, according to Hegel, religion is to be given its proper form in Hegel's reconciliation of it with philosophy - this has serious implications for traditional Christian doctrine. Hegel could not accept the idea that God is mysterious and impenetrable. God only appears to be "hidden" from the point of view of a limited perspective. His philosophy of religion claims to remove the veils of mystery from the divine being. God stands fully revealed. The historical Christ is no longer a unique personage, but merely an imaginative symbol which enabled man's mind to grasp "the ultimate truth that

Divinity and/...

Divinity and Humanity are one in essence, that the life of man is the life of God in temporal form, and that the two natures, the Divine and human, can only realize themselves through vital unity with each other". (3)

Similarly, the Crucifixion and Resurrection of Christ are also imaginative representations pointing to the fact that, viewed in the light of his finitude, man is subject to mortality and decay, "yet view him in the light of his unity with the Infinity, and straightway he rises and mounts to a lofty and positive participation in the pantheistic world-process." (4)

Hegel was actually the last philosopher to propose the unity of philosophy and theology. Thinkers who succeeded him insisted on the necessity of a distinction or separation in the interest of both philosophy and religion. Such thinkers made a break from the Hegelian tradition in two directions - one being a cultural-historical or more anthropological conception of Christianity, for example, as found in Strauss and Feuerbach, and the other which stressed the importance and uniqueness of the original message of

Christianity, as/...



Christianity, as represented by Kierkegaard.

To begin with the former trend - thinkers like Daub and Marheineke shared Hegel's intention to elevate faith to the realm of speculative understanding. But with a historical union of God and man, the problem arose of explaining the divinity of Christ and why one should have faith in him. Strauss was the one to show the impossibility of reconciling "logical pantheism and the New Testament message". (5) He demonstrated decisively in his Life of Jesus that Hegelian philosophy and Christian doctrine were not concerned with the same things. "Strauss now made it his business to prove that the Gospel narratives are a collection of myths gradually formed in the earliest Christian communities, a wreath of adoration woven round the Master's head by worshipping fancy." (6)

Strauss does not deny that the historical Jesus existed. His conception of the status of Jesus, quite apart from any considerations of Divinity, is that Jesus "was the first to perceive that God and man are one. Later this was perverted by the Church into the dogma that God and man are one - in Jesus Christ". (7)

Strauss' latest/...

Strauss' latest book Der alte und der neue Glaube sees him ending in materialism, under the influence of scientific positivism, moving away from the attempt to reconcile faith and idealism. "His 'new' faith is an ethics of 'modern' man, tinged with religion." (8) Christianity has been transformed into a humanism.

Feuerbach also began as a Hegelian but later rejected the Hegelian identity of philosophy and Christianity. For Feuerbach, that which Hegel elevated to the infinite in religion and philosophy, is nothing other than the finite which has been mystified. The true essence of Christianity as well as true philosophy should no longer begin with God or Absolute Spirit but with man. "For Feuerbach, this leads directly to the complete dissolving of religious and philosophical theology in the 'universal science' of anthropology. The Christian dogma of the Trinity and Hegel's dialectical trinity is replaced by the principle of the essential unity between I and Thou, between man and his fellow man." (9)

Like Nietzsche, Feuerbach felt that Christianity was no longer relevant in the light of new scientific and political developments. It was time for a new philosophy

which was/...

which was not Christian but was religious in so far as it celebrates man as divinity. As far as who Christ might have been, for Feuerbach, he was no more than "an idealized conglomerate of all the excellences admired by man". (10) Christ might have existed historically, but imaginative faith has embellished the facts of history. Strauss and Feuerbach once and for all eliminated the notion that "Christian faith and speculative philosophy are somehow identical in nature". (11)

The end of the nineteenth century saw the culmination in theology of the cultural-anthropological trend, despite the unease that such an approach caused. Harnack, for instance, tried to distinguish between the "faith of Jesus and the faith in Jesus", trying to show that "faith in Christ is a distorting development of the faith of Jesus". (12) The tendency was to gloss over the uniqueness of Christ in return for a demand for Christianity to adapt itself to modern man and his new circumstances. "The attempt of a mediation between Christianity and the contemporary outlook of man becomes obvious from Harnack's lectures." (13) (These lectures were delivered at the University of Berlin: 1899 - 1900)

With Ernst/...

With Ernst Troeltsch, however, liberalism in theology can be said to have reached its peak. Christianity is now seen not as the ultimate stage in human religious development but merely as one historical expression of revelation and redemption. Troeltsch's historical relativism, then, abandons the belief in the uniqueness of the New Testament message. His own philosophy attempts to reconcile the Christian conception of God with the Hegelian philosophy of Absolute Spirit. That is why he conceived the philosophy of history, culture, and religion as forming an integrated whole.

The ravages of the two world wars, the horrors of the concentration camps, the economic slump that caused great misery and suffering soon undermined the optimistic expectations of liberal theology. The attempt to reconcile Christian teaching with man's contemporary conditions in the hope of providing peace and prosperity to all men, gave way to a kind of despair that looked once again to the original message of the Gospel, quite apart from its accommodation to contemporary life. Thinkers like Karl Barth, under the influence of Kierkegaard, rejected the attempt to secularize and humanize Christianity. Liberal theologians had attempted to socialize the Gospel and  
create heaven/...

create heaven on earth, as well as to bridge the gap between man and God. Both, however, are doomed to failure. Belief in the world and in cultural achievements results in an arrogance that leads man to believe that he is self-sufficient. But man can never save himself. Neither can he bridge the gap between man and God, for God remains "wholly other".

The new theological trend stresses the weakness of the individual with regard to salvation, the "otherness" of God, and the chasm between man and God. The new theology returns to the truths of revelation as found in the Bible. Kierkegaard in his thinking embodies the main trends of this new theological orientation. The uniqueness of the individual's relation to God and a return to original Christianity is stressed by Kierkegaard. His influence on the representatives of the so-called dialectical theology (men like Barth, Bultmann, and Gogarten) is inescapable. These men represent a radical opposition to natural or cultural theology in favour of a return to the truths of revelation. Kierkegaard also rejected Hegel's mediation of Christianity and Philosophy. Like Feuerbach he hoped to rescue man from the alienation that such a mediation produces, but by a decisive leap into faith. The individual's personal decision to have  
a unique/...

a unique and solitary relationship with God is the only criterion for being a Christian. The absoluteness and objectivity of the Hegelian mediation ignores the individual subject. Kierkegaard replaces Hegel's objective historical Christianity with an existential conception of the nature of Christianity. The self-revelation of God is open to the individual in his faith, not to speculative reason. Hegel's identification of man with Divine Spirit is equally abhorrent to Kierkegaard because man only exists by the Will of God. Mackintosh says of Hegel's views on God: "Intellectually, it is on much too easy terms with the Divine". (14) Such a claim could never be made of Kierkegaard for whom man is a despairing sinner, utterly dependent on the grace of God.

Karl Barth admits that Kierkegaard influenced his own development. He believes, like Kierkegaard, that "man is made to serve God, not God to serve man". (15) Theological teaching is to be derived from revelation, not from human speculation. God is to be sought in what He has said, not in what man says. "Theology is... service of the Word of God. ... Its task is to scrutinize the proclamation of the Church relatively to its/...



to its agreement with the Revelation witnessed to in Holy Scripture, and to correct it where it has gone astray." (16)

In the person of Christ, the Eternal Word of God was made flesh. Barth's theology tries to fight the damages of humanism which tries to think of God in terms of man, or to know God by reason or mysticism, or to regard God as an aggregate of the best in human nature, and so on. He does his best to show that there is a living God who has spoken to man and whose Word must be observed for salvation. "His primary concern is to interpret faith itself, to let it show itself and speak for itself. His authentic intention is to exhibit the thought of the New Testament as such." (17)

Bultmann continues this line of thinking. Like Barth, he believes in the uniqueness of Christ, that God spoke through him. Without this belief Christianity will be no more than another philosophy of existence. Bultmann does not believe that one can now ignore talking about God and his activity and concentrate solely on talking about human existence. Like Barth, Bultmann agrees that the Word of God as revealed is the ground of Christian theology.

"...according to/...

"...according to the New Testament teaching, God has in Jesus Christ intervened in the human situation and restored to mankind the existentiell possibility, which had been lost through sin, of gaining his authentic being, that is to say, of becoming the child of God." (18) The function that Heidegger ascribes to conscience in returning man to Being, Bultmann assigns to the Word of God. "That function is to summon man out of his fallen existence and set him before his authentic possibility." (19)

Despite the religious overtones that one sometimes catches in Heidegger's quest for Being, he finds it impossible to accept the theological path as the way to Being. The God of religion is still caught up in the metaphysical tradition and as such is forgetful of or conceals Being. When, according to Heidegger, the individual travels the path to God, he is oblivious of Being, as he does not take note of the ontological difference, that is, that there is Being and that there is being.

(b) Ideological/...

(b) Ideological Alienation.

In discussing ideological alienation, we limit ourselves to Marx's ideological model, the model of the communist ideology. Hegel's attempt at total rational comprehension by means of the dialectical journey of the Absolute Spirit is rejected by Karl Marx as being responsible for the alienation of man. Such alienation is the consequence of urging man to blend his will with that of Spirit, with the result that he is content to live by the theoretical, the speculative, and the abstract, instead of facing the real events that determine man's history. In any event, the Hegelian synthesis, like other theoretical "solutions", serves to perpetuate the interests of those who already have power and ignores the needs of a fast growing proletariat. What is needed is a transformation of the status quo, not only a theoretical one but above all a practical one. This is the significance of Marx's eleventh thesis on Feuerbach. The philosophers have only interpreted the world. Marx's theory, then, prides itself on the fact that it merges with reality. Unlike Hegel's abstraction, which is speculative, Marx would have us believe that his view is scientific and takes account of the laws of history and caters for the needs and interests of the many - the proletariat. Hence, his belief that/...

belief that it cannot fail to eliminate the alienation of man.

The question of alienation, then, is one of the significant concerns of Marx. Erich Fromm, in fact, views Marx's philosophy to be, like existential philosophy, "a protest against man's alienation, his loss of himself and his transformation into a thing."<sup>(20)</sup> Fromm continues, "For Marx the history of mankind is a history of the increasing development of man, and at the same time of increasing alienation. His concept of socialism is the emancipation from alienation, the return of man to himself, his self-realization. Alienation (or "estrangement") means, for Marx, that man does not experience himself as the acting agent in his grasp of the world, but that the world (nature, others and he himself) remain alien to him. They stand above and against him as objects, even though they may be objects of his own creation. Alienation is essentially experiencing the world and oneself passively, receptively, as the subject separated from the object".<sup>(21)</sup> Therefore, central to Marx's conception of alienation is the question, "To what extent is man in control of his natural and social environment rather than being subject to forces beyond his control?/...

his control?" The question of man's self-realization , his being able to control his own destiny, is one of the significant concerns of Marx's writings.

Professor Joachim Israel <sup>(22)</sup> characterises Marx's analysis of alienation as revolving around three aspects:

(a) religious alienation which Marx discusses in connection with Feuerbach's critique of religion. Marx accepts Feuerbach's thesis that alienation can result from false self-evaluation, that is, man ascribes his best qualities to God and sees himself as wretched and sinful. Man, in fact, is alienated because he projects his positive essence into God. Marx, however, believes that alienation experienced in religion points to a more disturbing form of alienation - that found in the economic and social life. Man is made to feel so wretched in his economic and social life that he inevitably turns to religion for comfort. So the critique of religion must be superseded by a critical analysis of economic and social factors generally.

(b) political/...

(b) political alienation. Hegel had demanded from the individual the submission of his will to that of the state, which is a manifestation of Absolute Spirit. But this results in a conflict of duty in the individual between his private and social loyalties. Marx hoped that, under communism, where the state would have vanished, these two loyalties would coincide since the social order would not conflict with the individual's needs and desires.

(c) economic alienation which deals with the alienation of labour. The key to overcoming religious and political alienation lies in the overcoming of economic alienation since this is the ground of all other forms of alienation.

In Marx's view, then, the alienation of labour forms the crux of man's alienation. Alienation is actually the opposite of free and productive labour relations, since it is labour which constitutes human creative self-activity. In unalienated labour, man finds fulfilment as species-being. In fact, unalienated labour, and therefore unalienated man, is the goal of communism. By means of his labour, man "experiences himself as an active, conscious being, as an active subject as/...



subject as opposed to a passive object." Hegel had also believed that man is alienated if his labour is alienated. But this he felt was inevitable since, firstly, human needs are always ahead of available economic means to satisfy them. Secondly, when one expresses an idea in material terms, this unavoidably results in the separation of man from the product of his labour. Marx, though influenced by Hegel's view of alienation, is critical of Hegel's reasoning. In Marx's view, the tension between needs and resources, far from being inevitable, is the result of historical factors. Then, only when objects become commodities, that is, socially oppressive factors over man, does alienation result. So alienated labour is not an unavoidable phenomenon but a phenomenon of history.

Marx makes it quite clear that he is not opposed to the productive forces at man's disposal (modern technology for instance) to create the necessities of life. These do not constitute the origins of alienation. Rather, the manner of production and distribution of a specific social system, that is, capitalism, is the reason for alienation. Alienation can be overcome by a re-organisation of productive forces, by allowing the productive forces to pass from the hands of powerful and wealthy individuals to a  
form of/...

form of societal control. Only with human co-operation can society function in the interest of all men. This is because man is a species being with social powers and obligations. However, in a capitalist society there are a number of factors which result in alienated labour. For example, the production relations of capitalism forces division of labour on man (resulting in a gap between manual and intellectual work) which interferes with the freedom of the individual since he can neither control it nor escape from it. Private control or ownership of the means of production also leads to alienation since the products of human labour are not owned by those who actively produce them. The transformation of human labour into a commodity which can be sold in exchange for money is also a factor contributing to alienation. Man's labour no longer expresses his creative power but becomes a commodity. The objects of his labour are also commodities, since he does not own them and even has to buy them back from the capitalist owners. The alienation of labour, then, can be seen in terms of:

(a) the relation of the labourer to the objects of his labour, that is, the objects of man's labour become commodities which are sold at a profit by the capitalist bosses. The worker exchanges his product  
for money/...

for money. Greater productivity on the part of the worker does not lead to an increase in his own wealth but in the wealth and power of the capitalist. Man is, in fact, alienated from the products of his labour.

(b) the relation of worker to his own labour, that is, since labour expresses the possibility of human self-realization, the separation of the worker from the object of his labour results, in fact, in his alienation from himself, his authentic being. The control of his labour by another leads to his economic, psychological, and mental impoverishment. Instead of his labour expressing his personality and needs, it becomes a coercive activity. Reification is the final result, that is, the decline in value of all that is human, to be replaced by an overvaluing of things. Such a situation forces the individual into a role of passivity at the mercy of economic laws of capitalism.

Since alienation is the consequence of specific historical factors and since alienation of labour is the ground of all other forms of alienation, Marx felt that a re-organisation of labour relations points the way to the transcendence of alienation in a new

historical alternative/...

historical alternative, that is, communism. In his opinion, the contradictions of capitalist society are leading inevitably to its downfall. The mandate of the dialectic will pass unavoidably from the hands of the capitalists to the proletariat. Once it achieves political and economic power its task is to eliminate all elements of the capitalist order and this marks the period of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Once this has been done, the age of communism would have been reached. The first phase of socialism would find men still hankering after certain features of the old capitalist system, but in the second phase true communism can be achieved. The state would have vanished since there would now exist no need for its coercive powers. Only a few administrative functions would be retained to protect public interests.

In terms of labour relations, the proper condition for human nature would have been achieved, that being a situation where man rationally plans economic production and co-operatively controls social and economic life. Man is an active, creative agent, not the passive victim of life and controls society in terms of his rational conscious intentions. The freedom and dignity denied to the majority of men (the proletariat) would have been achieved. Man/...

achieved. Man would no longer be at the mercy either of his environment or his social and economic relations. Rather, he would be in control of them. The socialization of production frees man from the necessities imposed on him by nature and opens up the realm of freedom. Marx describes this stage in the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844.

"Communism is the positive abolition of private property, of human self-alienation, and thus the real appropriation of human nature through and for man. It is, therefore, the return of man to himself as a social, i.e., really human, being, a complete and conscious return which assimilates all the wealth of previous development. Communism as a fully-developed naturalism is humanism and as a fully-developed humanism is naturalism. It is the definitive resolution of the antagonism between man and nature, and between man and man. It is the true solution of the conflict between existence and essence, between objectification and self-affirmation, between freedom and necessity, between individual and species. It is the solution of the riddle of history and knows itself to be this solution." (23)

The finality as expressed here, especially in the last line, is belied by the fact that any one solution (in this instance the ideological solution) cannot be

regarded as/...

regarded as the final answer to the problem of alienation.

The fact that Marx identifies alienation as having its ground in the economic and social sphere and that, once labour relations are transformed in the communist utopia, such alienation will vanish, is a simplification that ignores the complexities of human alienation. Marx's reductionism overstresses the economic and points away from the fact that even in his proposed ideological utopia, the factor of alienation will not have been banished completely and that authentic existence would only have been achieved in terms of his theoretical presuppositions. In any case, the very "solution" he proposes may be the ground for new forms of alienation, for example, the danger of the loss of individualism within the socialized or collectivized society. Heidegger, as we show later in our thesis, abhors such a loss of the individual's uniqueness in his analysis of the concept das Man.

For Heidegger, the danger of Marxism (despite its humanism) is even more disturbing from the point of view that it "shares the same destiny as metaphysics.

For example/...



For example, when we are told that Marxist humanism experiences the alienation (Entfremdung) of modern man, this is but an ulterior form of Nietzschean nihilism, sc. the forgottenness of Being". (24) In spite of the fact that it attempts to restore to man his dignity, it still remains within the old metaphysical tradition in that the foundation of its "'interpretation of nature, history, the world,'" (25) is still beings, and not Being. "The essence of materialism, for Heidegger, lies not in the fact that it reduces all reality to matter but that it is only another form of technicity, sc. obliviousness to the ontological difference. The same may be said of all forms of nationalism, for that matter of internationalism - collectivism of any kind - for this is simply the subjectiveness of man taken as a totality. None of these forms of modern man's homelessness can be cured simply by a humanism of another sort. It is metaphysics (therefore humanism) itself which must be overcome." (26) It is this which Heidegger sets out to do.

(c) Functionalistic Alienation/...

(c) Functionalistic Alienation.

The precursors of nineteenth and early twentieth century positivism can be traced to the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. As early as this, science assumed a new status because of the discoveries of men like Galileo, Copernicus, Newton, and Kepler. Galileo, for instance, despite the pressures of tradition, was one of the first to interpret nature in a radically new way, in addition to championing the independence and supremacy of science in its own sphere, that is, physics. The naturalism he proposed explained the world in terms of natural and physical causes. The universe was conceived of as a gigantic machine, operating according to impersonal and mechanistic rules. It was, however, also rationally comprehensible and on the basis of comprehension, men could make predictions about it as well as control it. Professor Rauche observes: "The functionalist alternative for coping with the crisis of truth may be said to start with Galileo's approach of describing the motions of bodies in mathematical terms, thus turning the concept of essence from a concept of substantial causality into a concept of functional causality. Galileo changed the Aristotelian question: What is motion? into the question: How does motion occur?" (27)

In England/...

In England, Bacon and Hobbes stressed experience as the path to true knowledge. Men gradually become aware of the powers of science to transform human life. This fact is the origin of that optimism in the scientific method to bring nature under human control and create new freedoms for man. The empirical Weltanschauung found its counterpart in the rationalist reaction of thinkers like Descartes. Descartes sought, by means of his resolute method, the one indubitable proposition on which the rest of human knowledge could be based. This he discovered in the Cogito, an innate a priori principle. Locke, however, criticized this conception of innate ideas, stressing rather that the mind is a tabula rasa and that all knowledge comes from outside or from experience. The empirical and rational methods, despite their shortcomings, could not fail to influence all subsequent human thinking. Rauche writes: "While the rationalist approach was greatly conducive to the rise of classical metaphysics in the 19th century, the empirical approach gave impetus to the rapid development of the sciences and of positivist thinking." (28) Positivism was here to stay as an attractive intellectual position for those who decried the abstractions of speculative metaphysics and were confident that the scientific method was the only authentic way to discover the/...

discover the meaning of reality. S.I.M. du Plessis, using Parodi's definition of positivism, says that it is "the scorn of metaphysics, the worship of fact, experience and proof, an unreserved confidence in science, the extoling of the blessings of science." (29)

Nineteenth century or classical positivism displays this same supreme confidence in the scientific method to enable man to create a better life for himself, as opposed to speculative metaphysics, which was hopelessly arrested in its speculative abstractions. Comte's philosophy can be seen as the embodiment of classical positivism. It displays explicitly the great confidence in the scientific method together with the belief that the positivist era represents the highest development of man. It holds the view, like later positivist development as well, that the scientific method can free man not only from the severities of nature but also from the alienation of an abstract metaphysics that does little, if nothing, to advance human progress. "The sciences are regarded as instrumental to man's liberation from occultism, superstition, authoritarianism based on metaphysical grounds. The sciences are thus seen as instrumental to man's liberation from oppression, exploitation and injustice. The/...

The sciences assume so a moral function ; they carry man in the direction of an authentic existence, as seen by positivism." (30).

The failure of reason to establish an authentic life for man makes way for a positivist philosophy. In Comte's view, this development towards positivism is the consequence of a natural law which he discovers by applying the scientific method to history. Comte proposes the Law of the Three Stages. The first stage is the theological, where things are explained in terms of a supernatural origin. This was followed by the metaphysical stage, which is characterized by the quest for the essences of things. The stage of positivism, which is in line with scientific development, is the highest stage of man's development, surpassing the limitations of the theological and metaphysical stages. In the positivist stage, the functional knowledge provided by the sciences enables man to progress and improve himself. The positivist Weltanschauung discards the search for essence as fruitless. "At the new positive stage, all attempts to arrive at absolute knowledge, such as inner essences (i.e., all metaphysical enquiries), are abandoned as fruitless and meaningless. The question is no longer, why? but, how?

Laws of/...

Laws of nature are substituted for absolute cause. The aim now is the discovery of constant or invariable relations obtaining between facts. It is in this that the scientific method consists. We cannot know what light and electricity are in themselves, but we can know the conditions under which they occur and the general laws that govern them. To explain light is not to ascertain its essence by analytical judgement, but it means to bring it under the laws of motion. The question is not why is there light at all, but how or under what conditions does light occur." (31)

Positive knowledge is characterized by the fact that it is "real, useful, certain, indubitable and exact." (32)

Despite the rejection of metaphysical elements by Comte, he nevertheless sets up Humanity as the goal or focus of positive development. Such a religion of humanity reveals his inability to escape from the metaphysical to the scientific objectivism he really desired. Also, the absolutization of this method and the blind belief in unlimited progress aided by scientific knowledge holds great dangers from the point of view of new forms of human alienation.

The classical/...



The classical positivism of the nineteenth century is seen by Professor Rauche as having a strong influence on the cult of scientism and functionalism which manifests itself in the twentieth century. "This new creed is founded on the absolutization of the functionalist approach, which developed as a result of the rapid advance of technology as an ally of the sciences." (33) Such a development reflects once more the total faith in the scientific method to create a brave new world. Neo-positivism rejects all metaphysical and speculative endeavours as meaningless and even useless, considered in functional terms. Even the classical positivism of the nineteenth century with its obvious metaphysical overtones is dismissed. Traditional philosophy suffers from the paralysing affliction of speculating and theorizing. Philosophy must be cured of this tendency and restored to its real function, which is merely analytical and clarificatory.

In his Tractatus and his Philosophical Investigations Ludwig Wittgenstein clearly demonstrates the tendencies of such an approach. In his earlier book, the Tractatus, he sees the task of philosophy as recording the logical structure of the world by means of scientific language. This immediately rules out any  
metaphysical or/...



metaphysical or theoretical elements in philosophy. The world is a collection of facts and language is a reflection or a mirror of these atomic facts. "If our language can only record what is the case in either atomic or molecular propositions, it follows that these propositions are the truth-functions of our experience of the world. By making use of a meta-language, it should be possible to trace the functional relations of these propositions more accurately and, by this logical description through symbols, obtain a more accurate picture of the logical structure of the world." (34) Because he is embedded in the world, man can only hope to record in language that which is. He cannot get outside the world and theorize about it. Realization of this frees man from the frustrations of trying to find ultimate answers for ultimate questions. "Phenomena such as freedom, death, etc., do exist, but about these one cannot speak meaningfully since they belong to the realm of the ineffable. Traditional problems which have confronted philosophy are thus easily dissolved and even regarded as non-problems in terms of whether they can be rendered in verifiable propositions or not. Knowledge is limited to only what can be meaningfully described in the world. Even his own theorizing about the world and/...

world and about what constitutes meaningful language, Wittgenstein regarded as problematic, as a ladder to be thrown away after one has used it to climb up. By speculating on what constitutes meaningfulness, he is doing more than just recording natural events through the medium of language.

In the Philosophical Investigations, however, Wittgenstein rejects the logical positivism of his Tractatus because of the various problems involved in such a philosophical position. "There was still the dichotomy between scientific and ordinary language. And there was still speculation about the world, its structure, the limits of its logical space, etc. In addition, there was still left the realm of the ineffable." (35) Wittgenstein now believes that a more fruitful line of enquiry lies in the direction of investigating the usage of ordinary language. He proposes the idea of language games where different types of activities such as science, art, philosophy, poetry, etc., have their own specific linguistic conventions. So the language of the ordinary man differs from that of the poet, whose language in turn differs from that of the scientist, and so on. Words only assume meaningfulness with respect to their correct usage in a language game. The quality of human existence/...

human existence and the scope of the human experience is conveyed entirely through the medium of the appropriate language. "In the light of this, it becomes the task of philosophy to analyse the concepts of everyday language, to work out their functional meaning under various circumstances of life and to establish the truth-function of everyday propositions as expressing various kinds of human experience and activities." (36)

Such a functionalizing of language ensures that there is no longer any room for the meaningless theorizings and speculations of the past, which only resulted in the posing of insoluble problems. Professor Rauche asks "whether this dissolution of the human personality into a set of linguistic or propositional relations and the levelling of the human individual with the functional world by the analytical method has not led to another form of unauthenticity and alienation in regard to man's life and existence"? (37) The substitution of functional relations for essential questions does not really eliminate the important but problematic questions of human existence. Rather, it leads to the disturbing situation where such questions are blithely dismissed as non-problems, and the whole question of alienation is regarded/...

is regarded as having been satisfactorily settled in terms of the analytical method. The analytical thinkers, along the model of the language games, have compartmentalized human activities and assigned the solving of human problems to specific activities such as politics, psychology, sociology, etc.

Assuming that it were possible for the politician and for the sociologist to solve their particular problems, the baffling persistence of the problem of human alienation would still occupy man. In the light of this, Heidegger's analysis of human nature and his pointing out the way to authenticity can be regarded as quite significant areas of enquiry, because he raises once again, in a new way, the whole question of what is man. Such questions of essence do not disappear when they are dismissed by some functionalist thinker or another as superficial or nonsensical.

Heidegger was well aware of the dangers of scientism and functionalism. In his Introduction to Metaphysics he maintains that discussion of the "nothing" is only meaningless if one, unfortunately, "supposes that scientific thinking is the only authentic rigorous/...

authentic rigorous thought, and that it alone can and must be made into the standard of philosophical thinking." (38) For Heidegger, technè originally named the highest form of poiesis, the essence of which is aletheia (unconcealedness). Thus, the question of Technology is really linked directly to the question of the essence of man. Aletheia, poiesis, and technè have the most significant bearing on man since they bring to light what is hidden. As the becoming Unhidden of the Hidden, it would be a grave distortion to see technè as the knowledge or skill required to make things. In this distortion lies the root of man's raping of the good earth. "Technè does not in the least mean a kind of practical accomplishment. Much more appropriately, the word names a way of knowing. To know means to have seen, in the widest sense of seeing, i.e., grasping what is present as it is present". (39) Therefore, the scientific method could lead to the dehumanization of man and the despoliation of the earth. "No matter where and however deeply science investigates what-is (being) it will never find Being. All it encounters, always, is what-is, because its explanatory purpose makes it insist at the outset on what-is. But Being is not an existing quality of/...



quality of what-is, nor, unlike what-is, can Being be conceived and established objectively." (40)

In the calculative thinking or method of science, beings become objects and Being becomes objectivity. Since he deals with objects objectively, the scientist just does not experience Being, since Being is not a "quality" or "characteristic" that is present in the objects with which he is dealing, as is mass, motion, energy. The meaning-giving horizon from which the scientist works gives things the opportunity to show themselves only in their material properties as bodies that move in a "space-time continuum". The Heideggerian model, which presents his world-view, pictures the unity of the Fourfold (the Geviert - the heaven and the earth, the gods and men). "Contemporary man's technological 'things' bear his technological 'world' in their own distorted way - distorting man's earth, his heaven, his divinities, and, in the end, himself and his mortality." (41)

In the Gelassenheit also, Heidegger points out his misgivings about scientific thinking. This emerges from his distinction between meditative and calculative thinking. The optimism and confidence  
in the/...

in the powers of science is a reflection not of meditative thinking but of calculative thinking, because it overlooks the ground in which the powers of science and technology inhere. Science threatens man in his relationship to Being. The specialized, verifiable knowledge of science is a threat to thinking of a more fundamental kind, that is, to think Being which forms the foundation for "authentic" life. In Heidegger's view, the greatest danger is that "the approaching tide of technological revolution in the atomic age could so captivate, bewitch, dazzle and beguile man that calculative thinking may some day come to be accepted and practiced as the only way of thinking. ...Then man would have denied and thrown away his own special nature - that he is a meditative being. Therefore, the issue is the saving of man's essential nature." (42)

Science and technology, undoubtedly, possess positive advantages, but one must guard against being made subject to their total control. With the aid of science and technology, man creates tools which enable him to "humanize" nature to a greater and greater degree. But "if man shapes the world, the world also/...

world also shapes man. It is for this reason that the world, though the necessary condition of existence, can also constitute a threat to existence. Man can become subjugated to his own creations." (43) And, "As man extends his instrumental world, he tends to be drawn into it himself, to become a part of it and even a slave of it, and so to cease to 'exist' in the full sense, that is to say, as fully personal and fully human." (44)

Heidegger himself says, "It would be foolish to attack technology blindly ... We depend on technical devices... But suddenly and unaware we find ourselves so firmly shackled to these technical devices that we fall into bondage to them." (45) The proper attitude would be to use technical inventions but "also keep ourselves so free of them, that we may let go of them any time." (46) The idea of using things with the realization that they are not absolute but depend on something higher is for Heidegger, Gelassenheit or "releasement toward things." (47) He goes on to say, "I call the comportment which enables us to keep to the meaning hidden in technology, openness to the mystery. Releasement toward things and openness to the mystery belong/...

mystery belong together. They grant us the possibility of dwelling in the world in a totally different way. They promise us a new ground and foundation upon which we can stand and endure in the world of technology without being imperiled by it." (48)

It is hoped that, with the above, I have succeeded in establishing the necessary background to Heidegger's thought. In order to appreciate the depth of Heidegger's criticism of the traditional way of thinking in the religious, ideological, and scientific spheres of thinking, which were all dominated by beings rather than by Being, it is now necessary to proceed to an analysis of what Heidegger actually said about alienation and authenticity.

Notes/...

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I should like to get rid of tradition  
And to be completely original;  
This enterprize is, however, enormous.  
And leads to many sufferings.  
I would consider it the highest honour  
To be able to create myself, if I  
Were not, surprisingly,  
Myself the product of tradition.

Goethe.

C H A P T E R      F O U R

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE THOUGHT OF MARTIN HEIDEGGER

In our chapter dealing with Hegel, we examined critically the culmination of metaphysics in the concept of Absolute Spirit. We drew attention to Heidegger's criticism of Hegel's metaphysics, which he saw as a Holzweg. In our Introduction to the Thought of Martin Heidegger, it is our intention to set the background from which we would now find it more meaningful to launch into a detailed, critical analysis of his thought. Naturally, in keeping with the intention of this chapter we avoided going into the virtues and vices of his analysis of Plato, Kant, Nietzsche, etc.. Serious doubt has been cast by Professor Rauche and others (for example, Professor Stanley Rosen) on Heidegger's interpretation of Heraclitus' concept of logos and arche which he and the early Greek thinkers arrived at by starting from nature (das Seiende), something that Heidegger rejects.

Heidegger's single/...

Heidegger's single-minded<sup>(1)</sup> dedication and preoccupation is the question of Being (Sein). He opens his magnum opus with a quotation from Plato: "'For manifestly you have long been aware of what you mean when you use the expression 'being'. We, however, who used to think we understood it, have now become perplexed.'"<sup>(2)</sup> And so, it is not without significance that Aristotle says: "The question raised of old...the question that is raised today, that will be raised in all eternity and will ever baffle us, the question: ti to on - what is the Being of a being - is just the question: tis he ousia - what is the essence of a particular being."<sup>(3)</sup>

The importance of the Being-question and the justification of such a single-minded pursuit are revealed when we draw attention to the link Heidegger makes between the question of Being on the one hand, and the "spiritual decline of the earth"<sup>(4)</sup> and the subsequent "annihilation"<sup>(5)</sup> of his beloved Germany, of Europe, and of the world, on the other hand.

Heidegger is in complete agreement with Ernst Junger that the whole is at stake. "'The entire planet is/...

planet is at stake.'" (6) Therefore, in raising the question of Being, man is summoned to "a decision in history", (7) thereby drawing the question of authenticity to the heart of the matter. It is such deep-seated concern for the spiritual destiny of the world that motivates and animates Heidegger's thought.

Heidegger is troubled by the fact that nations are losing their receptivity to the spiritual energy which enables them to take note of such spiritual decline and to act accordingly. It is to such a situation that Heidegger dedicates his life, makes a free sacrifice to uphold the truth of Being. (8) "To see this danger and point it out, there must be mortals who reach sooner into the abyss." (9)

The cause of such abysmal darkness Heidegger attributes to the massive war, and its attendant consequences; to the total mobilization and global unification of every type of power (for example, social and technical), and the resultant assault on the individual from such an automatized world; and to a general feeling of emptiness. Heidegger summarizes the essential episodes of the darkening of the world as "the/...

as "the flight of the gods, the destruction of the earth, the standardization of man, the pre-eminence of the mediocre." (10) "Darkening of the world means emasculation of the spirit, the disintegration, the wasting away, repression, and misinterpretation of the spirit." (11)

From such a position of bleakness, the crucial importance of Being (Sein) becomes understandable. It is also quite understandable that should one be thrust against the question "What is Being?", one is naturally and justifiably perplexed. "Just what is Being?" - standing in such isolation, it does seem a foolish question, and its pursuit a useless pursuit. It is after much soul searching and skilful questioning that Heidegger asks: "And yet a question, the question : is 'being' a mere word and its meaning a vapor or is it the spiritual destiny of the Western world?" (12) With this question, Heidegger wishes to penetrate to the original ground of metaphysics. Therefore, he regards the question Leibniz asks in his Principes de la nature et de la grace as of singular importance: "Pourquoi il y a plutôt quelque chose que rien?" - "Why is there any being at all and not rather Nothing?" (13)

When we/...



When we ask these questions then the meaningfulness of the first one ("What is Being?") is revealed. These questions open up the ground for all authentic questioning. For Heidegger, philosophy becomes the asking of these questions. It is this thinking which distinguishes man from all other beings. We now see clearly the great emphasis Heidegger places on the distinction between Being and beings, and why Heidegger thinks that we are living in a world-night (Weltnacht). In our pursuit of beings we forgot Being - the pursuit culminating in the will to power. This will to power, Heidegger says, in his great study on Nietzsche, represents man's wish for "absolute rule over the earth," (14) for, his relation to beings is now a "mastering advance into world conquest and world rule." (15)

And yet, it is through Being that things come into the open. It is through Being that the horizon of knowledge, technique, action, civilization gain their foundation. Heidegger says that before the discovery of Being everything was embedded in a dark, unknown mystery. (16) The discovery of Being must, therefore, be regarded as the momentous event, "(for perpetual renewal in the past there has been, and in the present and future/..."

and future there must be, unless the proud edifice of knowledge becomes a Tower of Babel and man forgets the very foundations of his civilisation)". (17) Such a thinking of Being remains more sober than scientific technology, (18) and reminds mankind of its role and place in this world.

Germany, the "most metaphysical of nations", (19) must take up the challenge to comprehend our tradition more creatively by moving into the primordial realm of Being and so saving the world from total annihilation. By asking: "How does it stand with Being?" Heidegger hopes to repeat (wieder-holen) the beginning of our historical-spiritual existence, thereby transforming it creatively into a new beginning. Heidegger believes in the possibility of this, for, the momentous event is the fundamental event. "...the beginning must be begun again, more radically, with all the strangeness, darkness, insecurity that attend a true beginning." (20).

This, I wish to suggest, explains much of the dithyrambic mysteriousness which pervades his latest writings. Clarity, correctness of vision, and  
explicit details/...

explicit details are not what characterize true beginnings, which are rather concealed and mysterious. This insight of Heidegger's into the nature of true beginning and the kind of writing which must be used to describe such experiences, would seem to allay criticisms levelled against him, of being a windy mystic, in his last writings. A mystical experience can claim to be a state of "knowledge" which is yet incommunicable in language that is explicit. H.D.P. Lee, in his introduction to Plato's Republic, notes the same of Plato whose philosophical principles are expressed in the form of a myth. The poetical and allegorical are perhaps the most effective means of communicating mystical experiences.

Heidegger sees the essential ambivalence of the Greek on as the beginning of both metaphysics and Western thought. Taken as a noun on means "that which is" (being, Seiendes). Taken as a verbal adjective on names the process by which a being (the noun) "is" (Being, Sein). In grounding metaphysics, this essential ambivalence must take precedence over all other grounds, for, it names the difference between Sein and Seiendes, between Being and being. It names the ontological difference. Thus,

Heidegger can/...

Heidegger can say: "'...The forgottenness of Being is the forgottenness of the difference between Being and beings.'" (21)

Originally, Being and beings were in a state of fundamental ontological inseparability. The separation of Being from beings saw the birth of the traditional conception of metaphysics. In his Über den Humanismus Heidegger describes Being as both nearest and farthest from him - nearest, because Being creates the possibility for him to come into his own and into a relationship with other beings; farthest, because Being is not a being. Here we draw attention to one problem which Heidegger wished to overcome, namely, the ambiguity and ambivalence of the term on. Hence, the necessity to think Being neither as a Being in <sup>e</sup>general, nor as a supreme Being, but as the process of unconcealment. Right from the beginning this has been Heidegger's intention - to reveal Being, to draw it out of its concealment. (22)

It is from such an approach that we find an explanation for the revealing and concealing tension that exists in the relationship between Being and

beings that/...

characterizes their original unity. Being is the illumination that illuminates beings as beings, and yet, stays concealed in them. So, Being has it as that which gives beings the possibility to be and yet stays concealed in them. This concealed characteristic of Being in being, Heidegger understands as a "not" that draws together Being and beings, while simultaneously differentiating Being from beings. The "not" is very much a part of, an intrinsic component of, Being, which illuminates beings. This is what Heidegger means by the Being-process or the process of truth, i.e., aletheia, which he translates as "non-concealment" (unverborgen). (23) "Being as the process of non-concealment is that which permits beings to become non-concealed (positivity), although the process is so permeated by 'not' that Being itself remains concealed (negativity). To think Being in its truth, then, is to think it in terms of both positivity and negativity at once" (my emphasis). (24)

But, this has not always been so, for, in the classical interpretation, Being was thought apart from beings. This differentiation led to quasi-problems in metaphysics. The problem of philosophy now concerned itself/...



concerned itself with the idea of Being as substantial reality. Traditional analyses, says Heidegger, had gone astray when they discovered such characteristics of Being as substantiality, materiality, extendedness, side-by-sideness, and so forth.<sup>(25)</sup> These now become the horizon from which the original ontological problems were understood. Heidegger's thought is a reaction to philosophy being rooted in things. Being (Sein) is reified;<sup>(26)</sup> man is abandoned to beings (Seiendes). The attempt is made to know Being through beings. Being then comes to be that which is most general, or that which is the highest being - the Supreme being.

Heidegger regards the traditional characteristics of Being as inadequate for experiencing the uniquely human way of being. Man is not like a thing. His existence is quite different from that of a thing, for, his Being is manifest to him in advance as a relationship "in which and from which he directs himself toward..., relates himself to..., whatever specific beings he may meet." <sup>(27)</sup> Traditional metaphysics differentiates not only Being and beings, but also draws distinctions among beings themselves,<sup>in</sup> the sense of defining/...



of defining and classifying them according to their essence. Man is put into the class of living beings, the animal who speaks. Thus, the existence of man is understood from the totality of all existing things. In other words, "I am" is understood in exactly the same way as "is" is when applied to a thing. It is this undifferentiation that has landed man squarely in alienation. (28)

The further result of this is that the traditional problems of epistemology or the metaphysics of knowledge are rooted in such distorted understandings of the Being of man. (29) This distortion becomes the barrier which prevents man from the original involvement of Being in human nature. "If the question of Being is to have its own history made transparent, then this hardened tradition must be loosened up, and the concealments which it has brought about must be dissolved. We understand this task as one in which by taking the question of Being as our clue, we are to destroy the traditional content of ancient ontology until we arrive at those primordial experiences in which we achieved our first ways of determining the nature of Being - the ways which have guided us ever since." (30)

If he/...

If he is to overcome the tradition, Heidegger believes that he must know the tradition, by recalling the meaning of that Being encrusted in the tradition. He must show the distortion and perversion (the pseudos), and so, attempt the difficult "battle for the a-pseudes, the undistorted, unperverted." (31) The need to go back to historical roots stem from an awareness of the "extra-ordinary" and "revolutionary" nature of the task, rather than from a desire to revive and restore classical antiquity and uncreative imitation. His true desire is to rethink what is still present (32) today, by recovering creatively the Greek astonishment at Being, and the poetic experiences of the pre-Socratics as it concealed and revealed itself in physis, aletheia, and logos, among other Greek words. (33)

Heidegger argues further that if there is an alienation and a separation then what was separated "must have been rooted in an original bond between them." (34) It is his task to inquire into this essential bond and to show where along the way the alienation resulted. (35) Heidegger attributes this alienation to the translation of Greek words and experiences into/...

experiences into Latin, thereby separating ourselves from the original essence of Greek philosophy.

In fact, so seriously does Heidegger consider this appropriation that he sees concealed in the translation a "translation of Greek experience into a different way of thinking. Roman thought takes over the Greek words without a corresponding, equally authentic experience of what they say, without the Greek word." The rootlessness of Western thought begins with this translation."<sup>(36)</sup> The seriousness of this conclusion is further underlined when we take heed of Heidegger's consideration that the pre-Socratics dwelt in the experience of language. They were so closely united with Being that, in their poetic sayings, they opened up a treasure of truly meaningful relations.

It was the early Greeks who first raised the authentic question of Being, who first called Being physis. What, then, is physis? For the early Greeks, physis was an "originating", a "bringing out", an "ex-posing", a "blossoming", an "emerging", or a pro-ducing". "...in short, the realm of things that emerge and linger on. ...Physis is being

itself, by/...

itself, by virtue of which essents become and remain observable." (37) Physis has the sense of an occurrence that pro-duces or brings products to light. However, in the translation into Latin, physis loses its original Greek sense and now comes to mean "nature", or, rather, that which modern physics investigates. Instead of seeing the original Greek meaning of physis as the power to emerge and endure, we now see it as a mere primitive science.

The image of light is particularly important for an elucidation of our second important Greek word - aletheia, which is usually translated as truth. Heidegger retains this sense of the word; for, in the same breath that he speaks of the emerging into the light, he speaks of the truth of Being. Heidegger, in his essay On the Essence of Truth,<sup>(38)</sup> asks after the manner in which Being was first experienced by the early Greeks. The conclusion Heidegger comes to is that Being was experienced as a clearing. "The early Greeks experienced every presenting as a clearing or lighting. 'Presenting' (verbal) was 'clearing' (verbal)." (39)

"Clearing" becomes/...

"Clearing" becomes meaningful when thought verbally, and this has vast implications. For, the "clearing" is not something given. It is not a state, but a coming-forth that comes out of darkness. Heidegger sees the "'realms of darkness'" and the "'realm of light'", (40) as equal partners, maintaining a tension that characterizes our being in this world, which is a concealing and a clearing. If we take Hegel as an example of the traditional approach, then such a tension between light and dark does not really exist, for, in the final analysis, for Hegel, light must overcome darkness by virtue of reason.

Logos is the remaining word in our trilogy that comprises the occurrence of Being as a "presenting process." The Greek origins of the word show logos as a gathering that lays forth and lays open. (41) Logos, in the sense of presencing, presents itself as a setting-apart or as a strife, which, in the same sense as Aletheia, must always be maintained and never reconciled. Logos maintains itself creatively by this strife and mobility. For, immediately the strife ceases, the world turns away, Being retreats from being.

In recovering/...

In recovering the original meaning of logos, Heidegger quotes Heraclitus' eighth fragment: "Opposites move back and forth, the one to the other; from out of themselves they gather themselves." (42) He points out that the conflict of opposites is gathering, rooted in togetherness. This is logos. Logos and polemos are one. For contrast, Heidegger uses our everyday conception of Beauty. Beauty is what reposes and relaxes, is what is pleasing and pleasant. But, such a view of art, is a matter for pastry cooks. The Greeks saw Beauty as restraint, as a polemos, that, in a single work, gathers and maintains tension, just as life and death, day and night, winter and summer, peace and war, waking and sleeping, Dionysus and Hades are gathered and maintained in a single unification. (43)

The distortion of these original meanings was a gradual process, reaching its peak when physis was transformed to idea, logos to statement, and when correctness was given more prominence than unconcealment. As a result of this, Being solidified itself to one word ousia - in the sense of permanent presence. Heidegger states that with Plato truth passed over from its essential meaning of unconcealment, to/...



unconcealment, to that of conformity and correctness of vision, with the result that Being was reduced to being (eidos). We have already drawn attention to the point that Being cannot be apart from beings, but also that it manifests itself sufficiently as itself to allow us to distinguish it in its difference from beings. With regard to this decline, Heidegger asks: "Where does Plato's determination of presence as idea have its binding character from? With regard to what is Aristotle's interpretation of presencing as energeia binding?" (44)

Heidegger locates the answer wholly in the movement away from the Parmenidean experience of aletheia, which Heidegger now, in his latter writings, translates exclusively as unconcealment. "Unconcealment is, so to speak, the element in which Being and thinking and their belonging together exist." (45) Aletheia was named at the beginning of philosophy, but since Plato and Aristotle, philosophy, as metaphysics, thinks beings as such, onto-theologically. That which is most Beingful in a being is exalted to the Idea, the true Being, and original Being is degraded to what Plato calls mē on (what really should not be and really is not). (46)

Idea now/...

Idea now takes on the form of paradeigma (model). This means that what appears is now no longer physis (the merging power), but the emergence of the copy. The vital consequence of this, Heidegger says, is that the original disclosure of Being now comes to mean, as we have stressed, correctness of vision. Truth is now seen as a proper viewing of the Ideas. Truth is now the conformity between the subject (as the being that sees) and the object (as copies of the Ideas that are seen). Being loses its significance as the source of light and becomes that which is seen. Logos, as the gathering which was the event of unconcealment, now deteriorates into statement, as the place of truth, in the sense that it can be either true or false. Truth which was originally unconcealment, or the happening that was Being, now becomes a property of logos.

Method and logical reasoning grow in importance as that by which beings can be manipulated to serve the aims and calculations of man. The creation of such an anthropomorphic world of Ideas, became the warehouse not only of truth, but also of values. Such a humanization and reification of Being was mistaken  
for Being/...

for Being itself. Notwithstanding this, man himself is reified - he is a being among other beings; no more is he a unique existence whose Being is made manifest in a disclosing way to him as that which he alone possesses.

Aristotle also poses the question of metaphysics, ("what are beings as beings?"), in such a way that he, too, separates essence and existence, with the consequence that metaphysics, in its transcendence of beings to their Being (meta - ta - physika), attempts to pin down the permanently present (ousia). Heidegger maintains that this idea of substantiality <sup>(47)</sup> has not loosened its grip on Western philosophic thought. Heidegger sees his task as the attempt to recover the original meaning of Being as unconcealment.

Descartes, <sup>(48)</sup> continuing that tradition begun by Plato, further solidified the idea of man as the ground of truth. Heidegger contends that with the liberation of man from the clutches of the church, man replaces the God of Christianity and institutes himself as absolute subject, which he does by interpreting truth as certitude, human certitude. Faith in the

Christian God/...

Christian God was replaced by the cogito-sum, which became the ground for all other truths. Man decides what and how the world is to be an object of cognition. "'Descartes does not allow beings in the world to manifest their mode of Being on their own, but, by means of an idea of being... which is of undisclosed origin and undemonstrated justification, he prescribes to the world what it can 'really' be.'" (49)

The implication of this is that, not only has the essence of truth undergone a radical change, but also that relationship between man and world. The cogito-sum becomes the subject, and the cogitatio the object of the subject. When we consider that what is now true is that which is certifiable, then beings gain the possibility of their truth by entering into the subject-object world. They are either subjects or objects, with the result that beings cannot now show themselves as they are, but become objects for human manipulation and use or misuse. With such an outlook, Heidegger believes that philosophy is humanized and subjectivized, culminating in Hegel's Absolute Idealism (which we analysed in

Chapter Two/...

Chapter Two of our study).

In pursuing this line of thought from Plato to Hegel, Heidegger points to the rise of beings to the oblivion of Being. This obliviousness to the process of Being is what Heidegger sees as nihilism or metaphysics. (50) Nietzsche has not escaped the metaphysical circle, for, in trying to go beyond metaphysics, he uses categories that are still very metaphysical: "Being as a universal present-active subject (Will); truth-as-conformity-become-certitude." (51) And, in his Nietzsche study, Heidegger says: "Metaphysics is anthropomorphy - the shaping and viewing of the world in accordance with man's image." (52) As a consequence, we see the rise of modern technology. Nature is no more seen as that which sustains man, which he, in his dignity, cultivates in a harmony that discloses the meaning and truth of both man and nature. Instead, nature is seen as a provider of energy which is an exploitable commodity. The supreme result of our exclusive preoccupation with beings, (having forgotten Being), is the destruction of our beautiful earth. Under the domination of the will to power, nature is objectified. Such an objectification  
of nature/...

of nature replaces the genuine apprehension of Being. That thinking which sought a union with nature now attempts to dominate it.

Heidegger sees in the nihilism of Nietzsche, not the overcoming of metaphysics, but its consummation. "Nietzsche can not think the essence of nihilism (metaphysics) until he re-collects that Being is the process of emergent truth." (53) It is in this sense that Heidegger speaks of the overcoming of metaphysics and nihilism by thinking of Being as the process of aletheia out of which the ontological difference arises, thereby recovering the original sense of Being and giving to beings their true perspective. Thus, Heidegger's entire effort to overcome metaphysics has its source in the very structure of aletheia. By overcoming the tradition, we overcome our alienation and gain, in the sense of own (eigen), ourselves. Whether this is possible or not we shall discuss later. What is of importance now, is the significant links Heidegger makes with the overcoming of metaphysics, the essence of Being, and the question "Who is man?" Surely this is the crux of the problem. In his important essay, The Way Back into the Ground of Metaphysics,

Heidegger says:/...



Heidegger says: "When we think of the truth of Being, metaphysics is overcome." But "Such thinking...does not oppose and think against metaphysics either." (54) Therefore, in grounding metaphysics properly, Heidegger is attempting to open the ground for our being human. (55) What is at stake is nothing less than our humanity. We cannot stress sufficiently that we consider this the heart of any matter to which Heidegger devotes his intensely alive thought.

That this is not a matter for anthropology is obvious, for man cannot be studied in the way zoology studies animals. Man is linked with the question of Being. He is understood from and within the question of Being. Man, who is required by Being as the arena for its disclosure, gains his essence from the disclosure. And Being, of course, is not a thing. Neither is it a category, nor the essence of the totality of things. Being is the process of illumination, or clearing, or unconcealment taken together with the inseparable function of concealment, which "create" the world in the two-fold sense of revealing and concealing.

In advising/...

In advising a young student (Mr. Buchner) who asked Heidegger whence thinking about Being receives its directive, Heidegger opined that to think Being means "to respond to the appeal of its presence, in a response that stems from and releases itself toward the appeal. But this means to exist as a human being in an authentic relationship as mortal to other mortals, to earth and sky, to the divinities present or absent, to things and plants and animals; it means, to let each of these be - to let its presence in openness, in the full appropriateness of its nature - and to hold oneself open to its being, recognizing it and responding to it appropriately in one's own being, the way in which one oneself goes on, lives; and then, perhaps, in this ongoing life one may hear the call of the language that speaks of the being of all these beings and respond to it in a mortal language that speaks of what it hears." (56)

Heidegger draws his creativeness from his willingness "to stop, listen, hear, remember, and respond to the call that comes from Being." (57) For, the way to Being, as we have already demonstrated, is blocked by tradition. Thus, a method has to be found which will clear away these barriers and

preconceptions, and/...

preconceptions, and let a thing be just the being that it is. Only by thinking Being can we open our vision to the thingly in the thing. To illustrate more concretely the meaning of this we may use Heidegger's thinking on the world of art. (58) In its own particular way, the work of art opens up the Being of beings, by pointing to its truth. "In the art work, the truth of what is has set itself to work. Art is truth setting itself to work." (59) And, "The work as work in its presencing, is a setting forth, a making." (60) Heidegger says that in setting forth, "The work lets the earth be an earth." (61)

Heidegger says that it is the method of phenomenology that can recover that which is authentic, since it penetrates to the root of the matter. The original Greek "phenomenon", Heidegger defines as "that which shows itself in itself, the manifest", (62) and "logos", as "to make manifest what one is 'talking about' in one's discourse... it lets us see something from the very thing which the discourse is about." (63) When put together, phenomenology means "to let that which shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in which it/...

which it shows itself from itself," and Heidegger adds, "But here we are expressing nothing else than the maxim formulated above: 'To the things themselves!'" (64)

Thus, phenomenology does not decide the object of its study or its subject-matter. What phenomenology does is to reveal the how with which what is to be studied gets handled or brought "to show themselves." If Heidegger is to achieve his intention of laying bare Being itself, then he must do it in the right way, by first bringing forward beings themselves, but with the kind of access that essentially and genuinely belongs to them. This, Heidegger considers, is the only authentic point of departure on the way to Being. So, "Ontology and phenomenology are not two distinct philosophical disciplines among others. These terms characterize philosophy itself with regard to its object and its way of treating that object." (65) Without such a fundamental phenomenological attitude, the whole question of Being would not have been possible. For the actual point of departure referred to above, Heidegger takes the hermeneutic of man. The analysis and interpretation of human existence becomes the

"guiding-line/...

"guiding-line for all philosophical inquiry at the point where it arises and to which it returns." (66)

Among Heidegger's priorities are the use of the word "existence", and the adequacy of the word "man" in his thought. The word "existence", Heidegger reserves exclusively for man. Trees are, dogs are, even God is, but only man exists, for, he is in such a way that his Being is always already disclosed to him in an understanding way. Man is not something "Being-on-hand" (Vorhandenheit). Man's essence lies in his existence.

The word man, however, is inadequate because it gathers individuals and puts them into a class from which their essence is drawn. The point is that man is not like a sheep or a house. He is open to different ways of being himself. We have an alienated view of the individual when he is seen as a representative of the class man. What makes it possible for an individual to exist as a person is not his class, but his understanding of himself in his Being. This is the authentic view of the individual.

It is/...



It is for this reason that Heidegger dispenses with the word "man". The word he chooses to get at the authenticity of the individual is Dasein. The word not only points to the unsubstantial character of the individual, but also to a being whose "there" (or better still, whose "here" - Da) is always already disclosed. What distinguishes Dasein is that he exists in an understanding relation to his Being, in such a way that he exists as an "Understanding of Being." (67) Therefore, in being the "There" of Being, Dasein gives beings the possibility to be, and so liberates them from their state of concealment.

Thus, Dasein cannot be understood as a category of either substance or subject. With the new way of understanding, Dasein must be seen as an ability or a possibility to be, revealing its essential involvement with Being. Dasein designates "that which should first of all be experienced, and subsequently thought of, as a place - namely, the location of the truth of Being." (68) The "shelter" (unter-kunft) for Being reveals the intimate connection between Being and Dasein. (69) It is this unique privilege that distinguishes Dasein from all things:

... in his /...



in his being a Dasein lies his comprehension of Being. With this, Heidegger establishes the fundamental ontological character of Dasein.

The problem now becomes fascinating. For, when we consider that, in grounding metaphysics, we must ask the Being-question, we find inextricably linked, that, in the very posing of the question, the finitude of the questioner is betrayed. The status questionis for Kant is: "what are the conditions which render possible the ontological synthesis (transcendence) of finite reason?" but for Heidegger: "what is the relation between the radical finitude of man and the comprehension of Being as such?" (70) Therefore in asking, "What is Dasein?" we must answer that Dasein is transcendence, i.e., "a being in which the comprehending of Being comes-to-pass in a radically finite way." (71) Furthermore, transcendence is the underlying presupposition for the understanding of all our concern for beings. Through this radical finitude, Dasein opens up the horizon of Time.

And so, the choice of this incredibly beautiful word "Dasein" for the individual puts into clear focus the/...

focus the entire problem of alienation and authenticity. "...Dasein is its possibility, and it 'has' this possibility, but not just as a property (eigenschaftlich), as something present-at-hand would. And because Dasein is in each case essentially its own possibility, it can, in its very Being, 'choose' itself and win itself; it can also lose itself and never win itself". (72) Thus, the phenomenology of Sein und Zeit is very much involved with what Heidegger calls re-solve.

In his essay, The Way Back into the Ground of Metaphysics, Heidegger says: "As long as man remains the animal rationale he is also the animal metaphysicum." (73) In another essay, What is Metaphysics? he says: "While man exists there will be philosophising of some sort. Philosophy, as we call it, is the setting in motion of metaphysics; and in metaphysics philosophy comes to itself and sets about its explicit tasks. Philosophy is only set in motion by leaping with all its being, as only it can, into the ground-possibilities of being as a whole." (74)

What Heidegger/...

What Heidegger intended to do in his attempt to "overcome metaphysics" was to establish the real ground of metaphysics. Only then would it be possible for man to act authentically. By the "real ground of metaphysics", Heidegger really means to answer the question, "Why is there any being at all and not rather nothing?" or "What is Being?" The resultant thought, Heidegger hoped, would be the abolition of metaphysics as traditionally conceived. The question of whether Heidegger succeeds in his enterprise, and whether such an abolition is possible is examined later in this thesis.

In the meantime we note that Heidegger hoped that, with his return of metaphysics to its original ground, he might help bring about a transformation in human nature. His overcoming of metaphysics is really a recalling of Being itself. The thinking that Heidegger attempted in Sein und Zeit was a preparation for the overcoming of metaphysics by going beyond traditional understandings to the root of philosophy by "rejuvenating the hidden resources which it retains from a much older and more profound tradition", (75) which means that the implication of Heidegger's overcoming the tradition, is not its abolition, but/...

abolition, but appropriating it more originally by providing it with its ontological "'birth certificate'". (76) But, in all his criticisms of the tradition (because of its concealing ways), he engages in dialogues with past philosophers on the question of Being. Therefore, in continuing his own thinking on Being, he remains within the compass of Western Philosophy, giving due respect to him for his creative "retrieve" (Wiederholung) of the original experience of astonishment that the pre - Socratics felt, when they first asked: "What is what is?" It is to Heidegger's great credit that Western tradition continues in such richness in his thought.

"What philosophy essentially can and must be is this: a thinking that breaks the paths and opens the perspectives of the knowledge that sets the norms and hierarchies, of the knowledge in which and by which a people fulfills itself historically and culturally, the knowledge that kindles and necessitates all inquiries and thereby threatens all values." (77)

Notes/...

N O T E S

1. Heidegger believes that most great men are preoccupied with one great thought. See BROCK, W. : Existence and Being, p.247
2. HEIDEGGER, M. : Being and Time, p.19
3. MARX, W. : Heidegger and the Tradition, p. 3.
4. HEIDEGGER, M. : An Introduction to Metaphysics, p.31
5. Ibid., p.32.
6. HEIDEGGER, M. : The Question of Being, p.39
7. HEIDEGGER, M. : An Introduction to Metaphysics, p.37.
8. BROCK, W. : op. cit., p.247.
9. HEIDEGGER, M. : Poetry, Language, Thought, p. 117.
10. HEIDEGGER, M. : An Introduction to Metaphysics, p.37
11. Ibid. Heidegger defines spirit as "a fundamental, knowing resolve toward the essence of being." (Rektoratsrede, p.13)"  
HEIDEGGER, M. : An Introduction to Metaphysics, p.41.
12. Ibid., p.31.
13. KAUFMANN, W. : Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre, p.219  
(editor)
14. HEIDEGGER, M. : Nietzsche, Volume 2, p.166.
15. Ibid., p.171.

16. BROCK, W. : op. cit., p.237 ff.
17. Ibid., pp. 237-238.
18. HEIDEGGER, M. : On Time and Being, p.72.
19. HEIDEGGER, M. : An Introduction to Metaphysics, p.31.
20. Ibid., p.32.
21. Quoted by RICHARDSON, W.J. : Heidegger Through Phenomenology to Thought, pp.12-13.
22. Metaphysics, which concerns itself with beings as such, must be excluded from the experience of Being by reason of its very essence. See Heidegger's What is Metaphysics? and The Way Back into the Ground of Metaphysics.
23. HEIDEGGER, M. : Vom Wesen des Grundes, p.15.
24. RICHARDSON, W.J. : op. cit., p.9.
25. HEIDEGGER, M. : Being and Time, p.96.
26. Ibid., p.72.
27. KING, M. : Heidegger's Philosophy, p.94.
28. i.e., when man tries to understand his Being from the reality of a thing - See HEIDEGGER, M. : Being and Time, p.75
29. Ibid., p.86.
30. Ibid., p.44.
31. HEIDEGGER, M. : An Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 161.
32. Heidegger attaches more and more importance to the words presence and openness. In a remarkable essay called The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking, Heidegger asks whether the task of thinking, instead of Being and Time, should not now read Opening and Presence.



33. MARX, W. op. cit., xxii ff.
34. HEIDEGGER, M. : An Introduction to Metaphysics,  
p. 104.
35. Ibid., p.11.
36. HEIDEGGER, M. : Poetry, Language, Thought,  
p.23.
37. HEIDEGGER, M. : An Introduction to  
Metaphysics, p.12.
38. BROCK, W. : op. cit., pp.317-351.
39. MARX, W. : op. cit., p.146.
40. Ibid., p.147.
41. RICHARDSON, W.J.: op. cit., pp. 490-501.
42. HEIDEGGER, M. : An Introduction to Metaphysics,  
p. 111.
43. HEIDEGGER, M. : Vorträge und Aufsätze, p.221.
44. HEIDEGGER, M. : On Time and Being, p.68.
45. Ibid., p.69.
46. For a fuller account see HEIDEGGER, M. :  
An Introduction to Metaphysics, pp. 155 -156.
47. HEIDEGGER, M. : Being and Time, pp. 123-124.
48. See sections 19-21 of Heidegger's Being and Time.
49. HEIDEGGER, M. : Sein und Zeit, p.96/129.  
Quoted by  
VERSENYI, L. : Heidegger, Being, and Truth, p.63.
50. RICHARDSON, W.J.: op. cit., p.381.
51. Ibid., p.373.
52. HEIDEGGER, M. : Nietzsche, Volume 2, p.127.

53. RICHARDSON, W.J. : op. cit., p.381.
54. KAUFMANN, W. : op. cit., p.209.
55. HEIDEGGER, M. : An Introduction to Metaphysics, p.171.
56. HEIDEGGER, M. : Poetry, Language, Thought, p.x.
57. Ibid., p.xvi.
58. As found in Heidegger's essay, The Origin of the Work of Art.
59. HEIDEGGER, M. : Poetry, Language, Thought, p.39.
60. Ibid., p.45.
61. Ibid., p.46.
62. HEIDEGGER, M. : Being and Time, p.51.
63. Ibid., p.56.
64. Ibid., p.58.
65. Ibid., 62.
66. Ibid.
67. Ibid., p.32.
68. KAUFMANN, W. : op. cit., p.213.
69. HEIDEGGER, M. : Nietzsche, Volume 2, p.357.
70. RICHARDSON, W.J. : op. cit., p.33.
71. Ibid., p.40.

- 72. HEIDEGGER, M. : Being and Time, p. 68.
- 73. KAUFMANN, W. : op. cit., p. 209.
- 74. BROCK, W. : op. cit., pp. 379-380.
- 75. MARX, W. : op. cit., p. xx.
- 76. HEIDEGGER, M. : Being and Time, p. 44.
- 77. HEIDEGGER, M. : An Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 9.

We are too late for the gods and too  
early for Being. · Being's poem  
just begun, is man.

Heidegger.

C H A P T E R      F I V E

HEIDEGGER'S CONCEPT OF UNHOUSED MAN : ALIENATED MAN

(a) Man's Flight into "das Man" and the Problem of Authentic Existence as Revealed by such a Flight.

One of the fundamental issues that we raised in our last chapter was Heidegger's concern for who man is. The choice of the word "Dasein", we pointed out, was most apt when we consider that, in order to be what it is, Dasein must transcend to its "there", in other words, the world. Hence, Heidegger's Dasein analytic moves to a consideration of Dasein's being in the world. Such a disclosure of world is very much a part of and a movement towards our understanding of Being as such. The disclosure of world and the "there" of Dasein, through which Being manifests itself, are inseparable. Dasein and world exist in such a way that Dasein makes it possible for the other things in the world to be what they are.

Dasein, then, must be seen as the ontic-existentiell <sup>(1)</sup> condition creating the possibility for discovering beings that are Vorhandenheit and thus can "make themselves known as they are in themselves (in seinem An-sich)" <sup>(2)</sup> and as they are  
for the/...

for the use of Dasein (Zuhandenheit). Being in the world involves Dasein in being concerned with the world. Such a lighting up process (Lichtung) is not so much a property of Dasein, but rather its innermost constitution. "Dasein is its disclosedness."<sup>(3)</sup> This means that, without illumination, Dasein just would not be what it is. The disclosure of world and the "there" (illumination) of Dasein, in their togetherness, constitute what Heidegger calls Dasein's "Being-in-the-world."<sup>(4)</sup>

With such a disclosure of world, Being, too, is disclosed, which means that with the illumination of Dasein as Being-in-the-world, goes the comprehension of Being. By looking at man and world in this manner, for Heidegger, the primordial structure of Dasein's Being cannot be grasped by the traditional ontological categories. Man does not exist in such a way, that he has, by way of an appendage, a relationship with the world. Neither the environmentalist's, nor the biologist's, nor the geographer's, nor the psychologist's, explanation of man's relation to the world is adequate for Heidegger. Their explanations confine themselves to aspects which are ontic and remain trapped in the ontic, whereas Heidegger's thought emerges from the ontological structure of/...



structure of Dasein and world.

Man always exists as ~~a~~being already in the world. Heidegger sees world as "that 'wherein' a factual Dasein as such can be said to 'live'." (5) World as Spielraum,<sup>(6)</sup> is the place within which Dasein's potentialities confront him. When Dasein comes into existence, he comes to a knowledge of his existence. Simultaneously with this understanding is given the understanding that he is in a world, not in the spatial sense, but in the ontologico-existential sense. "Dasein is never 'proximally' an entity which is, so to speak, free from Being-in, but which sometimes has the inclination to take up a 'relationship' towards the world. Taking up relationships towards the world is possible only because Dasein, as Being-in-the-world, is as it is."<sup>(7)</sup>

The significance of Heidegger's pointing to our Being-in-the-world is that, in his conception of the world, he draws attention to the fact that the world's disclosure to man is part of Dasein's understanding of Being, so that, on the basis of this, we are to resolve the problem of alienation and authenticity. World, in opening meaning, opens truth, gives <sup>(8)</sup>

truth the/...

truth the possibility to be. In other words, world and truth are inextricably bound together with Dasein. Dasein, as Being-in-the-world, is equivalent to Dasein as Being-in-the-truth. (9)

The complexity of Heidegger's task lies in the point of departure for his analytic, that is, Man, but he has to be careful that he does not fall into the same trap that the philosophers of the past had fallen into. In fore-imaging the world, Heidegger must lay bare the essential structure of the world in such a way that both man and world appear as they are, that is, in their authentic character.

Professor Heinrich Ott recalls that Heidegger "once told me that there are three equiprimordial dimensions of thought : the relationship of man to himself, the relationship of man to his fellow men, and the relationship of man to the world. He added, 'my own thought moves along the third road.'" (10)

It is of profound importance to Dasein that the world is a threat to his existence, and that any knowledge of abstract theories concerning the world is really irrelevant. "Pure beholding, even if it were to penetrate to the innermost core of the Being of something/...

of something present-at-hand, could never discover anything like that which is threatening." (11)

The measure of success that Heidegger achieves, lies in the fact that he sees the radical finitude of Dasein as of singular significance. From such an outlook, it is now possible for him to authenticate Dasein, world, and their relationship. Heidegger sees "world" as a horizon within which Dasein comes into contact with instruments in a set of relationships which give them the possibility of gaining meaningfulness, thereby attaining its own Being, its authenticity. The ontological aspect of beings lies in their discoverability in an "owned" or a "disowned" way, i.e., Dasein creates the possibility for their being understood as the things they fundamentally are.

The existential-ontological structures in which the Being of the "there" manifests itself, Heidegger characterizes as Befindlichkeit (state of mind), Verstehen (Understanding), and Rede (Discourse). It is significant that Heidegger identifies these moments of disclosure as moments of truth.

Befindlichkeit Heidegger/...

Befindlichkeit Heidegger sees as finding oneself already in a world. Befindlichkeit points to that initial self-awareness of Dasein that it has been thrown(geworfen) into a world. Befindlichkeit is responsible for Dasein confronting the facticity of its "thereness". Its own Being is still to be achieved and here lies its significance for our problem, for, in the achieving, the problem of alienation and authenticity is resolved. The thrownness (Geworfenheit) <sup>(12)</sup> of Dasein, therefore, refers both to the fact that Dasein already is, and to the fact that Being has to be achieved.

It is remarkable that in this connection Heidegger isolates the individual to the exclusion of filial, parental, or, for that matter, phyletic affection. Yet, Heidegger could speak, in another context, of "the spiritual decline of the earth", <sup>(13)</sup> and of the fact that nations are losing their receptivity to that spirituality that could bring them back into the truth of Being. <sup>(14)</sup> That Dasein is "left to itself", and "has to be what it finds itself", and "has to fend for itself" is a distortion of the reality which is close to us - the individual does draw some comfort and care from him who is nearest. Man has found the need to organise himself into a society.

Therefore/...

Therefore, it is surprising that, while Heidegger recognises that Dasein's Being-in-the-world is also a Being-with-others, (15) and while he recognises that his own Dasein shares the world with other Daseins, (16) he fails to give consideration to the socializing and civilizing effect that contact with others does and must have to a lesser or greater degree. We wish to emphasize that Heidegger strays from his intention of providing a phenomenological hermeneutic of Dasein, which would have taken into account these effects, and we presume a larger variety of factors, when leading from Dasein's Being-in-the-world to Dasein's being absorbed in the world of its everyday concerns, thereby not being itself. (17)

Heidegger's characterization of Befindlichkeit as that part of Dasein's disclosure of thrownness, as the disclosure of Being-in-the-world, and as submission to that world which is disclosed, (18) is valid up to a point as many assumptions are. The fact that he says that Befindlichkeit is primordial, (19) gives his assumption no more priority than the basic assumption of Hegel, Marcuse, or Sartre. As we have already argued, far from Dasein being "disclosed to itself prior to all cognition and volition, and beyond their range of disclosure", (20) disclosure of the/...

of the world occurs simultaneously with Dasein's coming into the world, and that such a coming is not merely a thrownness, but that, with the coming, is given the comfort from which Dasein can and should draw strength without losing dignity and without continually falling captive to that power which more often than not robs him of his individuality.

For Heidegger, the illumination of the "there" is performed by Verstehen (Understanding), which functions as a project (Entwurf). That which is projected is Dasein itself as the ultimate point of reference. In Verstehen, Dasein projects the world which Heidegger understands as the totality of relationships. The total meaningful result of this is that Being itself is disclosed. (21) Thus Verstehen projects the transcendence of Dasein to Being by which Heidegger understands authenticity, as against the traditional preoccupation of gaining access to Being through beings. In other words, Heidegger considers Kant's "Intuition" and "thinking" as derivatives of understanding, and even Husserl's "'intuition of essences' ('Wesensschau') is grounded in existential understanding. We can decide about this kind of seeing only if we have obtained explicit conceptions

of Being/...



of Being and of the structure of Being, such as only phenomena in the phenomenological sense can become." (22)

At this stage of his thought the ontological significance of Verstehen lies in the fact that Dasein projects the horizon within which anything can be, or discloses for-the-sake-of-which it exists. (23) As long as Dasein is, Dasein will always understand itself in terms of its possibilities. The projection of its ownmost potentiality-for-Being characterizes the "thereness" of Dasein in its transcendence to Being.

Befindlichkeit and Verstehen are the two constitutive ways of being the "there" of Dasein, which are illuminated by Rede (Discourse). That Rede is not a property of an entity that is present-at-hand (vorhanden) but an existential way of being, belonging essentially to Dasein, points to the realization that, in illuminating the possibilities of Dasein, it serves to illuminate the fact that as Being-in-the-world, it is cleared (gelichtet) (24) in itself, in such a way that it itself is the clearing. Heidegger can now say with some justification that "Dasein is its disclosedness", from which it follows that in/...

that in his pursuit of Being, Heidegger will have to analyse Dasein in its everyday manner.

"Understanding can devote itself primarily to the disclosedness of the world; that is, Dasein can, proximally and for the most part, understand itself in terms of its world." (25) Now, the fundamental possibility of Dasein is its existence. (26) To illustrate this more concretely, we note that stones and tables do not have to be because they are not disclosed to themselves and so are not faced with any compulsion to be. But Dasein has to exist, he has to be, and the ultimate possibility of his existence is Death. Verstehen, in the sense that it discloses possibilities to Dasein, confronts Dasein with a demand that it has to carry out, its way of life being authentic or unauthentic, in its choosing. Thus Verstehen discloses Dasein in its existential-ontological nature. (27)

If we accept Heidegger's basic assumption - that the question of Being is the question - then his analysis of the existential Verstehen reveals the most satisfying part of the Dasein analytic. However, in terms of his intention,<sup>as</sup> he set it out in his long introduction to Sein und Zeit, we find that Heidegger, too, inspite/...

too, inspite of his phenomenological hermeneutic, remains within the same circle of humanization and subjectivization that he criticized the tradition for. For Heidegger, Verstehen projects the modes of Being of all beings in the world which makes the world at all possible. Dasein, in its ontological aspect, projects the horizon within which beings can be what they are. Thus, the ground of all phenomena is Dasein, and by implication, Being-in-the-world. In his phenomenological approach to phenomena, Heidegger fails to let that which shows itself in itself be seen from itself, for the simple reason that phenomena are in a non-understanding way while Dasein exists essentially in an understanding way. In reducing metaphysics to the description of the experience of Being from the basic position of Being-in-the-world, Heidegger cannot avoid separating man from world. In disclosing Being, Heidegger, though he claims not to start from das Seiende, as traditional philosophy had done, does not really move away from such a starting point, for, in shifting the accent, the dichotomy between Understanding and Non-understanding, Existence and Non-existence, remains. A way out of this dilemma would have been for Heidegger to have remained silent. That he has not done so attests to the incredible power that philosophy exercises. Heidegger's model of Being is but one solution offered/...

solution offered by a philosopher in a time of need. The fact that any solutions offered in regard to the problem of alienation and authenticity remain problematic and controversial draws our attention to the fact that right here in all this controversy lurks the clue which we shall have to work out fully, by the end of this dissertation.

In the meantime, it is important to note that Heidegger sees in Verstehen the appropriating of what is understood. In this appropriating he sees its capacity for getting interpreted, and so here, he latches onto the theme of language, of which he never lets go, for "this phenomenon has its roots in the existential constitution of Dasein's disclosedness. The existential-ontological foundation of language is discourse or talk."(28)

As the articulation of intelligibility, Rede illuminates the intelligibility of Being-in-the-world by way of language which, Heidegger says, maintains itself in the way of concernful Being-with-one-another. In this we locate the possibility for authenticity, for in poetical discourse, "the communication of the existential possibilities of one's state-of-mind can become an aim in itself, and  
this amounts/...

this amounts to a disclosing of existence." (29)

Therefore, as a mode of disclosure, Rede is as original as Befindlichkeit and Verstehen.

Heidegger now comes to some of his most important pronouncements: that Dasein has language, that Dasein is what it is because of language, and that Dasein is, in and through language. As Heidegger proceeds, we find that language becomes the most important single factor in his pursuit of Being. It is within this phenomenon that he will eventually have to resolve the problem of alienation and authenticity, and therein lurks the danger and the possibility for successfully overcoming alienation, or failing to overcome the alienation by constructing another model of Being.

Heidegger suggests that the items constitutive for discourse are its content and its communication: What the discourse is about and the communication which are not mere properties but existential characteristics rooted in the state of Dasein's Being, which give him the possibility of disclosing the world and Dasein itself. Rede lets something be seen in its Total Meaningfulness in existentiell situations. This Total Meaningfulness as originally projected by Verstehen is that part of a three-fold unity encompassed  
By Befindlichkeit,/...

by Befindlichkeit, Verstehen, and Rede;  
Befindlichkeit disclosing Dasein's thrownness and  
its relationship to other beings in the world, and  
Rede functioning as the articulation of the process  
of disclosure in the sense of its transcendence and  
of its finitude. Therefore, through his phenomenological  
hermeneutic of language, Heidegger hopes to expose  
that Total Meaningfulness revealed and concealed in  
language.

However, when Grammar looked for its foundation in  
the logic of Rede, it based itself not on the  
ontological disclosure of Being, but on the present-  
at-hand (Vorhanden) and thus became the science of  
language. Heidegger sees, as one of his essential  
motivations, the re-establishment of language on more  
primordial ontological foundations, through liberating  
Grammar by calling into account the existential  
structure of Rede, thereby tearing the truth out from  
its concealment; not by simply improving on what has  
been merely handed down, but by showing the  
ontological roots of Dasein. Heidegger says: "Whether  
it prospers or decays depends on the fate of this  
ontology"<sup>(30)</sup> of Dasein.

This ontology and the fact that language results  
from Dasein's/...



from Dasein's original thrownness in this world seems quite fair. When we analysed the existential Befindlichkeit, we pointed out that Dasein's disclosure of itself prior to any cognition and volition is an assumption. We find a similar assumption made when Heidegger speaks of Dasein's articulation of its meaning-giving projects as coming from an Understanding which is pre-linguistic. It is our contention that here is involved an impossible situation, as Understanding and Language are inextricably interwoven.

As we have stressed, Heidegger believes that it is through language that man is exposed to what is Open (Offene), as Being reveals itself to Dasein, and as non-Being hides and conceals the truth. The implication of this is that language does not function as a tool that man possesses in order to be able to communicate, but it is language that gives Dasein the possibility to stand within the truth of Being. (31) Therefore, it is only Dasein as such that can discover meaning in the world. In this way Heidegger establishes the inter-dependence of man and world. (32)

It now/...

It now behoves us to ask in what way the original understanding of Dasein reveals meaning. Heidegger provides the answer that it is through the fundamental mode in which Dasein ek-sists (i.e., stands out of itself), not in the sense of a subject-object relationship, but as co-existing with things in the world in the sense of practical concern with things and with other Daseins. (33) "A bare subject without a world, never 'is' proximally, nor is it ever given." (34) Descartes' Cogito ergo sum comes in for some heavy criticism from Heidegger for this very reason. Dasein's existence is but an existence-in-the-world. Existence is not merely like being a match in a box, but is an existent that is concerned with his existence. However, it is just this practical concern with things and with his fellowmen that lands the individual into alienation. In his pursuit after things and in his involvement with his fellowman, Dasein forgets his uniqueness. Dasein forgets that which enables him to be the Dasein that he is, that is, his understanding of Being.

It is to Heidegger's great credit that he proceeds with his analysis from just such an ordinary, everyday existence of/...

existence of Dasein. Only after having exposed Dasein's forgetfulness can he proceed with this fundamental pursuit of Being. Heidegger's task is now to explore the familiar and then, by distancing himself from such familiarity, drive himself to his uniqueness. Herein lies his second immediate task - to locate that which will give him access to his uniqueness. It now emerges that Heidegger, by gaining the Being of Dasein, hopes to reach Being itself. That Heidegger does provide such an access we shall examine in the second half of this chapter.

In the meantime, it suffices to point out that in his concept of das Man, Heidegger draws attention to the fact that Dasein understands itself proximally, and for the most part, in terms of its ontic preoccupations, having forgotten its ontological foundations. (35) In making use of such a situation, Heidegger points to Dasein's authentic self : to move away from the identity of subject and object to the genuine unity that Sorge (Concern) gives. (36) Dasein must see itself not as an "'I think'" but as an "'I think something'", (37) which points to its Being-in-the-world. Dasein is always in close contact with the things in the world. Therefore, Dasein is both existentiell and existential, ontic and ontological. When one in this union is

emphasized to/...

emphasized to the exclusion of the other, the result is the alienation of man. Authenticity can be achieved by delivering Dasein from the world of everydayness (Alltäglichkeit), not by severing itself completely from its essential relationship with other beings, but by recognising itself for what it is : Dasein is finite. In his finiteness each man is unique. He cannot change place with someone else. No one can carry his Being for him. But in his everydayness, he is not himself.

In his authentic relationship with beings, truth is disclosed as such, Being is illuminated, and non-concealment comes-to-pass through the "Thereness" of Da-sein. In his involvement with his everyday trivialities, Dasein forgets his finite transcendence to Being, the re-collection of which (Wieder-erinnerung) is now the task of Heidegger's fundamental ontology. It is from this everydayness that Heidegger recovers the ontological foundation of finite transcendence which he identifies as Time. This re-collection will now form the existential basis for all Dasein's existentiell activities, after Heidegger had extracted the existential dimension from

the existentiell/...

the existentiell by isolating from its ontic comportment with beings, that mood which will take us to the authentic, unique individual. The tremendous emphasis Heidegger places on this is revealed by his stating that, "by exhibiting the positive phenomenon of the closest everyday Being-in-the-world, we have made it possible to get an insight into the reason why an ontological Interpretation of this state of Being has been missing. This very state of Being, in its everyday kind of Being, is what proximally misses itself and covers itself up. ...there is ontologically a gap separating the selfsameness of the authentically existing Self from the identity of that "I" which maintains itself throughout its manifold Experiences." (38)

So, what Heidegger means by authenticity is to choose or to resolve (Entschliessen) to be one's ownmost potential self, alienation resulting from the failure to choose its ownmost potential self by losing its uniqueness in the everyday world. This constitutes its fallen (verfallen) state. Therefore, Heidegger can ask: "When Dasein is absorbed in the world of its concern- that is, at the same time, in its Being-with towards Others - it is not itself.

Who is/...

Who is it, then, who has taken over Being as everyday Being-with-one-another?" (39) Heidegger provides the answer that, "The 'who' is not this one, not that one, not oneself (man selbst), not some people (einige), and not the sum of them all. The 'who' is the neuter, the 'they' (das Man)." (40) This "they", which answers the question of the "who" of everyday Dasein, is the nobody to whom every Dasein surrenders himself in Being-among-one-another (untereinander). Das Man maintains its averageness by controlling and levelling down every way in which the world and Dasein itself gets interpreted.

Heidegger is careful to point out that this structure of disowning oneself is given with the structure of Verstehen (Understanding) which projects possibilities of Being. Verstehen does not exist in a vacuum. It is based on projects that determine how Dasein should relate to the world. In projecting itself into its self-disclosed possibilities, Dasein becomes what it is and gains its authenticity or loses itself in the world of das Man. Therefore Being-in-the-world is in itself seductive (versucherisch).

In being/...



In being tempted away from its ownmost self, whose authenticity lies in its uniqueness, Dasein becomes estranged (Entfremdung) from itself. Heidegger sees the fall as a whirl (Wirbel), as a "dragging away from" the authentic self and a "dragging toward and into" the public self. Heidegger's point is that Dasein does not exist in a static way, but is constantly on the alert to prevent itself from falling into forgetfulness, is always appropriating its own disclosure, is invariably struggling to disclose authenticity, is forever on the way to Being. Truth is not some objective state that one attains and remains in eternally. Truth is a constant struggle for that revelation that must be wrested from concealment. The Dasein who has discovered his authentic self is called upon by Heidegger to sacrifice himself to a creative repetition of the past possibilities (Wiederholung).

Verfallen, which is one of the ways in which man can-be-in-the-world, in the sense of disowning himself, is characterized by Gerede (Gossip), Neugier (Curiosity), and Zweideutigkeit (Ambiguity). By Gerede Heidegger refers to that average explanation of existence and world where any genuine understanding is/...

understanding is not attempted, but presupposed, in that Dasein understands everything without probing deeply into anything. In the falsification of speech, everyone moves on the same level of generality. The Public Good achieved belongs to everybody and nobody since all move within the world of commonly accepted interpretations, thereby disrooting Verstehen in such superficiality. By Neugier Heidegger refers to Dasein's greed for novelty which distracts it and in which it scatters itself. Dasein is interested in things merely to see what they look like, and not to understand what is seen. Its thinking is a calculative one discovering nothing, but exploiting whatever meaning someone else has given.<sup>(41)</sup> It is a perversity that replaces the genuine experience. Dasein tries to get his "kicks" not by participating in the real experience himself, but by talking about it. By Zweideutigkeit Heidegger refers to the difficulty experienced in distinguishing between what is revealed in Verstehen and what is concealed. The ontological difference as such is glossed over.

Dasein's alienation lies in his desire to see, learn, and do, through which he loses himself by being absorbed in the publicity of das Man. Another

significance of/...

significance of such an analysis points to the fact that distances <sup>(42)</sup> in time and space shrink. But, such an abolition of distance brings us no nearness. Heidegger can still persist in asking, "What in the thing is thingly? What is the thing in itself."<sup>(43)</sup> After the scientists have done with the thing by breaking it up into its constituent molecules, they still fail to "reach the thing in itself until our thinking has first reached the thing as a thing." <sup>(44)</sup>

Heidegger has declared often enough, and quite plainly, that in all his analyses of authenticity and unauthenticity, he is making no moral judgement about whether human nature is corrupt ("drunk with sin") or incorrupt, but is engaging in a phenomenological description of Dasein. To illustrate how seriously Heidegger believes that his approach is amoral, I quote but two references. "In relation to these phenomena, (the disclosures of das Man), it may not be superfluous to remark that our own Interpretation is purely ontological in its aims, and is far removed from any moralizing critique of everyday Dasein, and from the aspirations of a 'philosophy of culture'." <sup>(45)</sup> and "It follows that our existential-ontological Interpretation makes no ontical assertion about the 'corruption of human Nature'." <sup>(46)</sup> Such was Heidegger's intention.

However, the/...

However, the fact that he uses concepts like eigentlich, uneigentlich, verfallen, das Man, Schuld, Unschuld, Freiheit-zum-Tode, etc., conclusively point to the fact that Heidegger is myopic, to say the least. While Heidegger recognizes that most men live in a state of unauthenticity, in showing that man has a choice to exercise, he (Heidegger) is firmly on the side of authentic resolve which is gained by facing up to that extreme possibility of Dasein, that is, Death. In being fully conscious of its extremest possibility, Dasein will realize that the world of das Man is beset with traps that lead him away from his authentic resolution. (Entschlossenheit).

Having found authentic resolution from the analysis of das Man, Heidegger proceeds to point out that in Being-to-death, <sup>(47)</sup> Dasein's relationships with other Daseins are dissolved, and that Dasein is isolated upon itself. In such a situation it appears that all dialogue is not only meaningless, but is at an end. Surely, in this isolation it is the living Dasein that is destroyed, in that, in the "authentic movement" to death, Dasein is really moving towards nothing. The fact of death is very real and there is  
no point/...

no point in denying its seriousness. However, we cannot admit of the total dominant power that such an attitude must exercise. Gaining such an authentic existence has no real meaning and provides no real guide. In the face of such nothingness and in spite of the solemn truths that Heidegger illuminates, we suggest that Dasein can give his existence some meaning by entering into a more genuine dialogue with his fellowman on the basis of our real, historical situations. While we deny neither the value of Heidegger's investigations nor the seriousness of the results of his inquiry, we think it necessary to point out that my fellow Dasein and I share a common fate which surely points to the fact that there are other respects in which we are similar. Professor Versényi makes a similar point, but surprisingly says that Heidegger does not offer a way to authentic existence.<sup>(48)</sup> This seems to be an understatement for Heidegger is continually pointing out the way to authenticity. As we have already stated, authenticity lies in Heidegger's conceiving Dasein as the aletheia of Being. In Sein und Zeit, authenticity lies in resolutely recognizing that Dasein is a Being-to-death. In his later writings, Heidegger is at pains to point out that Dasein's rehousing lies in seeing his existence as ek-sistence.<sup>(49)</sup> In his Was heisst Denken?

Heidegger shows/...

Heidegger shows in lecture after lecture the kind of searching and questioning that is required so that one can be on the way to Being. How Professor Versényi could miss the intention of the Poet (Hölderlin) in his Sayings, and that of the Thinker (Heidegger) in his Thought, is a little astonishing.

However, the fact remains that as long as Dasein is alive, Dasein comes into contact and conflict with other Daseins. In fact, my fellow Dasein, as Professor Versényi rightly points out, is an important dimension of the projection of my own possibilities. That man more often than not falls into the world of das Man whose trivialities now preoccupy him is a fact. The past provides ample evidence of such fallen states, and considering that man is finite and fallible, no doubt, he will fall again in the future. Would not the dignity of man then arise from his examining this chaotic world we are thrown into, and out of this chaos, organizing a home for himself? This organizing activity could be the source and essence of his existence in the world. Out of such an attitude there would arise the implication that any utopian or  
final solution/...



final solution to the problem of man is unauthentic in the extreme, taking into account man's historical situation and man's limitations.

For Heidegger, the finitude of Dasein and the Nichts which discloses Dasein's finitude are not negative concepts. These open the horizon within which, not only Dasein himself, but also beings, derive their meaning. The original meaning comes from the mystery of that impossibility that closes all other possibilities. The freedom that results from heroically facing up to this truth reveals Dasein as it is and beings as they are, and so retaining the ontological distinction between Being and beings. In this splendid freedom Dasein exists authentically and uniquely, thereby recovering our true and original humanity. Through such a situation, Heidegger hopes to preserve the mystery of beings. No more will they be defiled. Instead, Dasein will hold beings as Holy (das Heilige). Heidegger is quite firm in pointing out that such a hold does in no way carry the implication that things will now be seen in a new, clean, fresh way. (50) This does not present a departure from the traditional "calculative" way of thinking.

The new/...

The new thought, the truly authentic, the originative element(das Anfängliche) can only issue from the freedom of Dasein. Calculative thinking always turns, in the end, to dominate man, for example, through technology. (51)

It is now time to ask whether such a view of man does not demand man's transformation. Is there to be a transformation of Dasein? Heidegger answers in the affirmative, for he requires that Dasein now become, in his authentic state, the lonely shepherd of Being, (52) Dasein's language being the house of Being. (More of this later.) However, the background of Heidegger's analysis of unauthentic existence is his perception, namely, the destruction of our humanity, our essential human relationships. Our unnecessary, wasteful consumption of the resources that the earth provides, the levelling that the mass media effect, the irresponsible meddling of the scientists with the very structure of cell and atom, cannot be lightly disregarded.

The attention Heidegger focuses on these and the eloquence with which he brings the problems to the fore attests to his great skill. The immensity of the  
problems presented/...

problems presented makes it necessary for us to examine carefully the dissolution of them. The uniqueness which characterizes each Dasein could give man the possibility to explore his individuality. In the very real danger of the individual being swamped by the levelling down process of das Man, there is naturally the need to reassert the individuality of the human being. But, in going to the other extreme, are we providing a genuine solution? Too much individuality is just as, if not more, harmful than an "impersonal collectivism." It is to Heidegger's credit that he draws attention to the impersonal, the mechanical, the dehumanizing, and to seek to rescue the individual from such a plight. But Heidegger remains stuck in the concept of individuality. It is an equally tiring position when tradition, custom, and habit are all thrown out as unauthentic.

While we have no intention of drawing attention away from the merit of Heidegger's attack on tradition, we wish to focus on the highly dangerous situation that can arise when conventional morality must give way to an authentic individual consciousness. To avoid confusion, we wish to point out that we certainly do not champion conventional morality because of the debilitating effect that would result, and readily admit the necessity/...

the necessity that such a morality be continually challenged. Therefore, seeing that Heidegger is not only the child of tradition, but also the child of his own times, and seeing that Heidegger himself affirms the being of others, is it not rather ineffectual to place so great an emphasis on individuality to the exclusion of the societal character of all human beings? Man is certainly not man without the others, which implies, and quite rightly, that the world is a common world. However, in appropriating this common world, man has often led man astray, and the idea of a society of human individuals has been betrayed. Heidegger has done a singular service in pointing out where humanity has gone wrong, and we can fully appreciate the background and the noble motives of the attempt to authenticate Dasein. But, as we have already asked: is a pure, individual existence desirable, if at all attainable? Is it existence in the first place? We often wonder whether the replacing of convention and tradition by the mystery of das Heilige presents the answer to our dilemma? Quite simply, can any man provide us with a final solution? ~~In his attempt to comprehend man, the world and its mysteries and so provide us with a final solution?~~ In his attempt to comprehend man, the world and its mysteries and so provide us with the means whereby we can live authentically, Heidegger provides a valuable and a unique dimension of human thought and striving, and so still remains within the tradition.

(b) Anxiety and Care as Key Concepts of Man's Authentic Existence.

In the previous section of this chapter we critically examined Heidegger's concept of "Unhoused Man" and the problem of authentic existence as revealed by man's flight into das Man. We saw that Heidegger's phenomenological analysis of Dasein revealed the existential-ontological structure of man as Befindlichkeit, Verstehen, and Rede. We have taken the liberty of moving away from normal practice by schematizing these in order to show more readily their implications, their interconnections, and their essential unity, which we felt would somehow be lost if written in successive paragraphs. In the following section our purpose is to examine in what manner "anxiety" and "care" constitute key concepts of describing the authentic nature of man's existence.

**SORGE**  
 UNITES THESE  
 IN THE  
 EK-STATIC  
 UNITY OF  
 PAST, FUTURE  
 AND PRESENT.  
 TIME  
 IS THE HORIZON  
 THAT MUST BE  
 REACHED BEFORE  
 ASKING THE  
 QUESTION OF  
 BEING.

SORGE MAKES  
 ONTOLOGICAL  
 ANXIETY  
 POSSIBLE  
 FOR DASEIN.

**ANGST**  
 DASEIN IS  
 CONFRONTED  
 WITH  
 RESPONSIBILITY  
 TO GRASP HIS  
 AUTHENTIC  
 BEING.

REVEALS  
 DASEIN'S  
 FINITENESS


**DEATH.**  
 DASEIN'S PROJECT IS  
 TERMINATED BY DEATH. THIS  
 REALITY IS HIS FATE. IT IS THE  
 EXTREME POSSIBILITY OF THE  
 SHEER IMPOSSIBILITY OF BEING  
 ANYMORE. DEATH CLOSES ALL  
 OTHER POSSIBILITIES. WHAT DASEIN  
 IS ANXIOUS OF IS ITS VERY  
 BEING-IN-THE-WORLD WHICH IS  
 FINITE. THEREFORE DEATH IN  
 REVEALING THE ESSENTIAL  
 STRUCTURE OF DASEIN'S WHOLE  
 EXISTENCE, GIVES DASEIN THE  
 POSSIBILITY FOR AUTHENTIC  
 EXISTENCE. DEATH FREES  
 DASEIN FROM ANY DOMINANCE  
 THAT THINGS MAY EXERCISE  
 FOR ANY PROJECT THAT  
 DASEIN MAY ENGAGE IN,  
 WILL BECOME MEANINGFUL  
 OR MEANINGLESS WHEN  
 SEEN FROM THE END OF  
 ITS EXISTENCE. WHEN SEEN  
 FROM THE POSITION OF SUCH  
 AWESOME NOTHINGNESS,  
 DASEIN WILL NO MORE  
 SCATTER HIS BEING IN THE  
 TRIVIALITIES OF DAS MAN,  
 BUT WOULD ENGAGE HIS  
 AUTHENTICITY: HIS OWN  
 TRUE FREEDOM. THIS IS  
 THE SOLEMN TRUTH OF  
 HIS EXISTENCE.

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Heidegger states the formal existential-ontological structure of Sorge (Care) as follows: "the Being of Dasein means ahead-of-itself-Being-already-in-(the-world) as Being-alongside (entities encountered within-the-world)." (53) The "ahead-of-itself" points to the ontological character of the existence of Dasein, which is always reaching out beyond itself, relating to his innermost ability to be. The self of which Sorge is ahead, is always the scattered self of das Man. "Being-in-the-world" we showed as Dasein's thrownness. "Already" reveals Dasein's impotence to undo the fact that Dasein already is. "Being-alongside-beings" always points to Dasein scattering himself in his preoccupation with beings.

By Sorge, Heidegger therefore means that we are forever looking beyond the present while conditioned by our past. The present is the place for our future preoccupations and past conditionings. As a result of his Dasein analytic, Heidegger arrives at Sorge which means Time, and Time is the horizon from which the question and the authenticity of Being can be settled. Unauthentic time, Heidegger sees as a sequence of indefinite "nows" (Jetztfolge). The future is the now that is not yet, the past is the now that was and is no longer, and the present is the now that is before me.

Dasein, however ,/...



Dasein, however, is not a thing, but as transcendence, he exists as an anticipatory-drive-towards-Being. The structure of Dasein's transcendence, therefore, reveals that Dasein's authentic existence consists in the coming (Future) of Being to a self<sup>that</sup> already is (Past), revealing the Being of beings with which he is now concerned (Present). Such a fundamental unity Heidegger calls Temporality, (54) making possible the unity of Sorge, which discloses Dasein's Being-towards-authenticity. (The three constituent movements or directions he calls the three ecstases.) "Temporality reveals itself as the meaning of authentic care." (55)

Everytime the word Sorge is used, Heidegger hopes to awaken the individual to the truth of Being as revealed by either the poet or the thinker, the poet in his poem, naming the Holy, the thinker care-fully listening to the voice of Being and pronouncing the Holy. As such, Dasein is rescued from the anonymity of das Man. The call of conscience, which comes from Dasein itself, reveals Dasein's potentiality for Being. This leads Heidegger to analyse that which the call of conscience makes Dasein understand. The call of conscience draws Dasein to its Guilt (Schuld) or Debt, which is a

fundamental part/...

fundamental part of Sorge. Heidegger makes full use of the double meaning contained in this German word: Schuld means both to be guilty and to be in debt, to be owing. Only by recognizing his guilt can Dasein come to choose himself in the existential sense. Dasein's responsibility and authenticity lies in understanding the call of conscience, and acting according to the chosen potentialities of Being, since Sorge points to the basic structure of his own existence. Thus the call of conscience saves Dasein from alienation by pointing to his freedom to choose himself and not lose himself in the das Man.

Dasein, through Sorge, takes hold of reality as the projection of the world horizon, and because it does so from the position of its finitude, comes to a knowledge of its own nothingness which is revealed by Angst (Anxiety), by its Grundbefindlichkeit (fundamental or basic mood). Through this mood Heidegger lays bare the possibilities for Dasein coming to an authentic knowledge of itself.

In such an achievement, Dasein needs Being. For Dasein, this need is its unique concern. Heidegger asks:

"Is there/...



"Is there in Dasein an understanding state-of-mind in which Dasein has been disclosed to itself in some distinctive way?" (56) and he answers in the affirmative, finding such a state-of-mind in Angst (Anxiety). Anxiety is quite different from fear, for fear is always "fear of ..." Such a threat comes from a definite direction. But what is it that anxiety is anxious about? Heidegger answers that anxiety is anxious about nothing - it is anxious about no-being in particular. It is anxious about non-being, not an absolute nothing, but one grounded in "something" in the sense that Angst discloses place itself : world. In disclosing the nothing, Angst gives things the possibility of showing themselves as things and not as nothing : no-thing. Any particular thing can be seen as the thing it is only when the totality of things has been revealed.

It is now possible for Heidegger to ask what Dasein is anxious for. Dasein, he says, is anxious for itself, cut off from all contact with others, left completely to itself in this world. We clearly discern here the problem of authenticity: Dasein is anxious for itself in its drive-toward-Being. Angst reveals Dasein's anxiety about and anxiety for the disclosure of its authentic self, in its transcendence to Being. Angst disturbs Dasein/...

disturbs Dasein from the false sense of security given by das Man. Angst reveals the total insignificance of things. The dwelling place of the ontic is not Dasein's true abode (Unheimlichkeit) (57) Dasein, Heidegger says, takes flight from the not-at-homeness in the face of the uncanniness that lies in Dasein as a thrown Being-in-the-world. "From an existential-ontological point of view, the 'not-at-homeness' must be conceived as the more primordial phenomenon." (58) This not is of fundamental importance to the understanding of Being and so to human existence. In revealing the NOT, what Angst actually reveals is Dasein's finiteness and, in a sense, his impotence. This NOT is revealed to each one alone as arising from his very Being-in-the-world.

Angst, as a single concrete experience of Dasein, discloses the Being of Dasein and brings Dasein face to face with his Being by revealing a threat to his existence. Heidegger strikes home the truth that Dasein's Being cannot be found in judgements and propositions on objects to be anxious about. Angst reveals the stark truth that man is a thrown Being-in-the-world. It is his very Being-in-the-world that anxiety/...



that anxiety is anxious about. (59) Heidegger advances the view that because of such a state of affairs, the world offers no comfort. In fact, "The 'world' can offer nothing". (60) Angst draws Dasein away from the public 'explanations of das Man in the way of disownment (Uneigentlichkeit) and "individualizes" him by genuinely freeing him for being his own self as a possibility. Heidegger here points to the profound importance of Angst: It brings Dasein before the finite freedom of his Being-in-the-world. Different moods may reveal different possibilities of Dasein, but, says Heidegger, it is Angst, and only Angst, that brings Dasein before itself as a single, human individual.

In drawing Dasein together again from the dispersal caused by das Man, Angst reveals Dasein as a whole "in an impassioned FREEDOM TOWARDS DEATH - a freedom which has been released from the Illusions of the 'they', and which is factual, certain of itself, and anxious." (61) and that in Angst, "Dasein finds itself face to face with the 'nothing' of the possible impossibility of its existence." (62) Death gives Dasein the possibility for authenticity. Death "is eigentlich ('authentic') because it is eigen ('my own')." (63) Only after Angst has revealed the  
fundamental structure/...

fundamental structure of Dasein, can we hope to live an authentic existence and thereby solve the Being-question and so overcome metaphysics as understood in the traditional sense.

In revealing Dasein's essential finitude, freedom challenges the individual to Being and to be himself. In this lies the pre-eminence of Dasein. Dasein creates the space for the light of Being. Dasein opens the horizon of time, creating the distance from which beings can be genuinely understood. Animals and plants are in a sense dissolved in living, but Dasein reaches out beyond the living. The finitude of life is disclosed to him. On the basis of such a disclosure it is possible for him to understand his own Being, as well as the Being of other persons and things. Dasein is always a transcendence. "Understanding of Being is itself a definite characteristic of Dasein's Being. Dasein is ontically distinctive in that it is ontological." (64)

For Heidegger, the authentic (eigentlich) means the recovering of Dasein from its trivialities and bringing it before its original possibilities which, later, . Heidegger sees as finding expression in the "poetic".

In an/...

In an authentic existence, Dasein would relate to things in a creative, original way, disclosing Dasein's existence-in-truth.

However, is listening, hearing and hearkening (Horchen) to the voice of Being adequate enough when the concern of Dasein is not only with the very authenticity of man as such, but also with the very world itself, which gives man his support and sustenance? What is there to distinguish the true call from the false one? Heidegger is optimistic in his claim that each one of us can hear or can be taught to hear the call of Being. We find it difficult to accept such an equalization of all mankind and hold the view that the poet is a rare human being, possessed of rare insights, and that those who can catch the message or the Saying of the poet are equally rare individuals. It is a myth, and probably a hangover of the democratic myth underlying a school education, that everyone, even if only with a little help, can understand the poet. The truth is that only a few get a glimpse of what the few great poets in their greatest moments only "hint" at.

There is no doubt that the brilliant eloquence and the power with which Heidegger expresses his concerns

in so/...

in so many of his books, essays, and dialogues would reach those sensitive human beings who have the capacity of responding to him and that there are those who can respond to his incredibly penetrating analyses of the poems of Hölderlin, Angelus Silesius, Sophocles, Stefan George, and a few others. Most probably, in their own way, these poets have felt the keen sense of alienation that Heidegger is troubled by. In carrying on a dialogue with those poets, and I suppose, with the few that rise above the mass today, and in view of his damning exposures of das Man in his Sein und Zeit, has not Heidegger created a brand new dichotomy - that between the poet and thinker who live in the proximity of Being, and so, within reach of authenticity, and the public (das Man) who wallow in their trivialities?

The call of conscience, which arises from nothing and can give no knowledge of how man can save himself and the world, but merely calls up Dasein's ownmost potentiality for Being, makes us wonder whether just such a call to authenticity, in view of Dasein's condition in the world of das Man, is strong enough against the power of the politician and the business tycoon, in spite of how unauthentic their life style might be in the eyes of Heidegger. Heidegger admits often enough that no standard can/...

standard can be arrived at whereby Dasein could come to a decision of how to answer the call to authenticity. All Heidegger could teach is the art of questioning more originally, and of grasping or gathering the meanings of words in their truly origina<sup>ti</sup>ve element (das Anfängliche). When presented like this, no doubt, the picture is pessimistic, and when we find that page after page of questioning ends only in despair, we ask in all seriousness, whether one could work out the whole question of authentic human existence on only Angst and Nichts, notwithstanding all the value they hold for the fundamental question of Being; or whether we should not take into account man in a larger variety of factors, which could form a firmer foundation for accommodating the uniqueness of the human individual more thoroughly. In isolating Angst as Dasein's Grundbefindlichkeit, Heidegger has robbed himself of the possibility of appreciating the contingency of the human individual and so of ever coming to terms with a question that has always troubled some men : Who am I?

Notes/...

N O T E S

1. Ontic-existential characterizes beings, and not Being. Ontic being refers to anything that exists in any way, but not characterized by a concern for Being. Ontological-existential refers to the disclosure of the existentiality of Dasein in its concern for its own Being. Ontological truth, therefore, refers to the disclosure of Being as it happens in, through, and with Dasein in its Concern.
2. HEIDEGGER, M. : Being and Time, p.120
3. Ibid., p.171.
4. Heidegger hyphenates this expression to point to their essential inseparability. "The compound expression 'Being-in-the-world' indicates in the very way we have coined it, that it stands for a unitary phenomenon. This primary datum must be seen as a whole."  
HEIDEGGER, M. : Being and Time, p.78.
5. Ibid., p.93.
6. MACQUARRIE, J. : An Existentialist Theology, p.37.
7. HEIDEGGER, M. : Being and Time, p.84
8. The significance and meaning of this word will be explored fully when we deal with the expression "es gibt" later in this thesis.
9. HEIDEGGER, M. : Being and Time, p.263
10. KOCKELMANS, J.J. : On Heidegger and Language, (editor) p. 190.
11. HEIDEGGER, M. : Being and Time, p.177.
12. Ibid., pp.172-174.



13. HEIDEGGER, M. : An Introduction to Metaphysics, p.31.
14. BROCK, W. : Existence and Being, p.247.
15. See Section 26 of Heidegger's Being and Time.
16. HEIDEGGER, M. : Being and Time, p.155
17. Ibid., p. 163 ff.
18. Ibid., pp. 175-177.
19. Ibid., pp.171 - 172,176.
20. Ibid., p.175.
21. Ibid., pp.187-188.
22. Ibid., p.187.
23. Ibid., p.182.
24. Ibid., p.171. (See also Heidegger's Letter on Humanism.)
25. HEIDEGGER, M. : Being and Time, p.186
26. Ibid., p.67.
27. In this respect, Dasein is related to, and concerned for its own Being.
28. HEIDEGGER, M. : Being and Time, p.203:
29. Ibid., p.205
30. Ibid., p.209.
31. See Heidegger's The Origin of the Work of Art.
32. HEIDEGGER, M. : Being and Time, p.78 ff.
33. Ibid., p.86.
34. Ibid., p.152.

35. See note 1 above.
36. HEIDEGGER, M. : Being and Time, pp. 364-370.
37. Ibid., p. 367, 368.
38. Ibid., p. 168.
39. Ibid., p. 163.
40. Ibid., p. 164.
41. Contrast the originaive thinking of the poets whose understanding illuminates by shedding new light on whatever it thinks on.
42. Heidegger elaborates on this by referring to man's preoccupation with speed. Man is building faster trains, faster jets, etc.. The growth of plants, which remains hidden throughout the seasons, is now exhibited publicly, on film, in a minute. See HEIDEGGER, M.: Poetry, Language, and Thought, p. 165 ff.
43. Ibid., p. 167.
44. Ibid., p. 168.
45. HEIDEGGER, M. : Being and Time, pp. 210-211.
46. Ibid., p. 224.
47. See HEIDEGGER, M. : Being and Time, Division Two, Chapters I and II.
48. See the latter half of Versényi's book, Heidegger, Being, and Truth.
49. This concept will be elaborated on and examined critically in Chapter 6 of this thesis.
50. See Heidegger's essays in Holzwege.
51. See Heidegger's Memorial Address presented in Messkirch.

52. See Heidegger's Letter on Humanism.
53. HEIDEGGER, M. : Being and Time, p.237.
54. Ibid., Section 65.
55. Ibid., p.374.
56. Ibid., p.226.
57. Heidegger again makes full use of the subtlety of this German word. Unheimlichkeit carries the meanings of both "uncanny" and "unhomely", "not-being-at-home".
58. HEIDEGGER, M. : Being and Time, p.234.
59. Ibid., p.231.
60. Ibid., p.232.
61. Ibid., p.311.
62. Ibid., p.310.
63. EDWARDS, P. : The Encyclopaedia of  
(Editor) Philosophy, Volume 3, p.460.
64. HEIDEGGER, M. : Being and Time, p.32.

How? When? and Where? - The gods remain silent!  
Then stick to Because, and ask not about Why?

Goethe.

When through a rent in the rain-clouded  
sky a ray of the sun suddenly glides  
over the gloom of the meadows....

We never come to thoughts. They come  
to us.

That is the proper hour of discourse.

Discourse cheers us to companionable  
reflection. Such reflection neither  
parades polemical opinions nor does it  
tolerate complaisant agreement. The sail  
of thinking keeps trimmed hard to the  
wind of the matter.

From such companionship a few perhaps  
may rise to be journeymen in the  
craft of thinking. So that one of them,  
unforeseen, may become a master.

Heidegger.

C H A P T E R   S I X

THE REHOUSING OF MAN : HEIDEGGER'S CONCEPT OF AUTHENTICITY

(a) Dasein as a Being-to-death or a Being-to-nothing.

In our Introduction to the Thought of Martin Heidegger, we showed how Heidegger established the reciprocal relationship between Dasein and Being. We noted with interest that there was a gradual shift in emphasis from Dasein to Being itself. We shall analyse Being as such in the next sections of this chapter. Dasein, the place for the disclosure of Being, is finite in the sense that it is potentiality-to-death. The implication of such a characterization is that Being, because of the place of its emergence into truth, is also finite. In this reciprocity, the finitude of Being in its emergence into truth becomes the ground for the finitude of Dasein and not the other way round as was the case in traditional metaphysics. Heidegger's point is that emergence (of Being and of Dasein) is finite emergence.

The meaningfulness of the thought contained in the expression "forgottenness of Being" (Seinsvergessenheit)

gains a/...

gains a lucidity that was not before possible. The fact is that the forgottenness of Being is at times caused by the withdrawal of Being; at other times the forgottenness of Being results from Dasein being absorbed by das Man. If Heidegger characterizes Dasein as finite, it is because Being, in its own finite character, dominates Dasein. In disclosing Being, Dasein also discloses non-Being. Put in another way, we may say that Dasein is the place where the tension between Being and non-Being is played out, Dasein naturally being powerless over either Being or non-Being. Dasein just has-to-be-open for both.

If the question of authenticity is to be raised at all, then Heidegger has to raise the question of the wholeness of man, or else his question is invalid. In Dasein's movement toward an end, Heidegger locates how man can be a whole. Dasein's Being-to-death is disclosed ontologically on the basis of the fundamental mood (Angst) which revealed a threat to his existence. Death cannot be seen merely as an ending in the sense of fulfilment, or as a ceasing, in the sense that the rain has stopped, but as a Being-towards-the-end. Death is an essential part of the structure of Dasein.

"Death is/...



"Death is something that stands before us - something impending." (1) "Death is Dasein's ownmost possibility. Being towards this possibility discloses to Dasein its ownmost potentiality-for-Being, in which its very Being is the issue." (2)

Dasein, in the ontic preoccupations that engaged its interests in the world of das Man, forgets the authenticating nature of Death and so becomes forgetful of Being, and so leads an unauthentic existence. As an ontological disposition, Angst pulls Dasein out of das Man, and reveals to him the authentic path by disclosing the non-Being of the world and his own drive towards Being. In running forward in thought to Death, Dasein can detach itself from the unauthentic way of living. This unauthenticity conceals from the individual his own Being-towards-death. The fact that people die (man stirbt) creates a kind of affected superiority that estranges Dasein from its ownmost potentiality for Being.

Having exposed the unauthentic attitude of Dasein to Death, Heidegger now asks in what way Dasein can understand its own Death authentically, and behave accordingly. If only Dasein understands that this is what it is, then no more would it flee from the

definitiveness of/...

definitiveness of Death, but would accept Death as constitutive of its finitude and would therefore free itself "for accepting this." (3) Herein lies the invitation to Dasein to either gain its authenticity or to lose itself. The significance Heidegger attaches to such a choice is of primary importance and he names it Resolve (Entschlossenheit).

In gaining authenticity, Dasein is free. So, authenticity manifests an ontic and an ontological dimension: ontically Dasein is authentic when it chooses to "hearken" to the voice of conscience that reveals to Dasein its guilt, which comes from its finitude, the choosing of which Heidegger calls Resolve; ontologically Dasein is authentic when it comprehends its innermost potentiality as advancing towards Death. The unity of the authentic ontic and ontological dimensions Heidegger characterizes as "advancing resolve." Such an advancing resolve is a liberation and in such a liberation is unveiled Dasein's Being-to-death, which it must accept if it is to flee das Man. Authenticity, therefore, consists in the profundity of Dasein's freedom, that is, in Dasein's openness towards Death.

As we have pointed out in our previous chapter, in linking openness and freedom, Heidegger is letting truth be.

Heidegger isolates/...

Heidegger isolates "resolve" as the most authentic form of openness, and says that in choosing death as the most authentic resolution, the most original form of truth is disclosed. However, it is our contention that once again, in revealing the authentic nature of human existence, Heidegger cannot say any more than that, in resolution, Dasein is authentic, for the simple reason that when we are involved with contingent individuals, no adequate explanation can be given to the problem who man is. The answer to that question must of necessity be left open.

Death no doubt closes off and makes Dasein a whole; but can we then draw any genuine content from this for the living individual? If, as Heidegger suggests, we heroically choose to be a Being-to-death, in order to fulfil ourselves authentically, to relate to others and to things meaningfully, then we suggest that by this looking at ourselves, others, and beings from the perspective of the end of our existence, we do not really fulfil ourselves, but rather, deprive ourselves of the privilege of being alive.

It is our contention that in this attitude lies the more authentic and meaningful perspective for the human individual.

The unauthenticity/...

The unauthenticity and the triteness of das Man must be balanced by the achievements and the excellences of man, and by the richness and variety of life. The merit of Heidegger's thought lies in his incredibly penetrating analysis of how Dasein's uniqueness is destroyed by das Man. In authentically resolving to be a Being-to-death, has not Heidegger also destroyed the uniqueness (Jemeinigkeit) of the individual and led man into a further alienation?

While it is true that no one can die my death for me, we must admit that, in the final analysis, death is a leveller. (4) Therefore, we suggest that life and living gives Dasein his individuality and uniqueness and that it is death that levels Dasein. It is Dasein's Being-in-the-world that gives Dasein the possibility to be unique and it is Dasein's Being-to-death that takes away the individual and his uniqueness. Rather than be confined by Being-to-death to an isolation that ends all dialogue, Dasein could get to know its self and its surroundings by a more meaningful engagement of these on terms that increase the awareness of ourselves and of the various possibilities of life.

However, this does not detract from the value or significance of Heidegger's acute insight and persistent concern with/...

concern with the very real problem of death and nothingness and their connection with his main pre-occupation - the question of Being. That man is finite is not because he is not an eternal being, but because there is disclosed to him in advance a not through which he can understand Being. The not, naturally, needs Dasein as the place where it itself can be manifest. It is on such an analysis that Heidegger rejects any ontology based on a pure consciousness or on a "pure I". The not, Heidegger finds, necessary, to say again and again, is not a nihil negativum of logic, but that which "gives" Dasein as the pure and simple other of itself which of course is no thing. Nothing is not an object.

Heidegger is often accused of being a nihilist and he is continually at pains to point out that it is this very nihilism that he wishes to overcome. Heidegger characterizes Nihilism as arising from man's exploitation of beings to the neglect of the question of Being, that is, when he forgets the ontological difference. "To forget being and cultivate only the essent - that is nihilism." (5) Heidegger clearly attributes to nihilism the will to power and the rise of technology. In order to overcome nihilism, humanism, and subjectivism, Heidegger puts it to us that we must take the/...

take the first step by asking the Being-question in any one of its many forms, for example, "What is Being?", "Why is there any being at all and not rather nothing?", "What is what-is?"

The essence of nothing, then, lies in its bringing Dasein before Being as such. In reaching beyond beings to Being, Dasein as transcendence, is the place-holder of nothing. Heidegger now drives the point home that in its finitude which rests on the nothing, and in consequence, in its understanding of Being, Dasein can experience "... the wonder of all wonders : that beings are. ...," (6) Only in the nothingness of Dasein can beings-in-totality reveal themselves. (7) Nothing is the horizon within which beings are encountered.

In his skilful search after the nothing, (8) Heidegger finds that our moods bring us face to face with the totality of things in the world. These moods (of joy, of boredom) hide the nothing that Heidegger seeks. But there is one mood that reveals nothing itself - Angst which we examined in our previous chapter. In fear, we pointed out, we are afraid of something. But it is impossible to define what anxiety is anxious of. "The only thing that remains and overwhelms us whilst what/...



whilst what-is slips away, is this 'nothing'. Dread reveals Nothing." (9)

This nothingness creates the condition whereby we may see being as it is in its "original overtness (Offenheit): that it 'is' and is not Nothing." (10)

It is nothing that brings Dasein face to face with beings as such. It is now apparent why Heidegger places the maximum emphasis on the nothing: if we are to relate authentically to beings and to be an authentic being ourselves, then beings must reveal themselves as the things they are. It is now also possible for Heidegger to reveal the authentic nature of freedom; for, "Without the original manifest character of Nothing there is no self-hood and no freedom. Here we have the answer to our question about Nothing. Nothing is neither an object nor anything that 'is' at all. Nothing occurs neither by itself, nor 'apart from' what-is, as a sort of adjunct. Nothing is that which makes the revelation of what-is as such possible for our human existence. Nothing not merely provides the conceptual opposite of what-is, but is also an original part of essence (Wesen)." (11)

Dasein as a being that is projected into the nothing (Hineingehaltenheit in das Nichts) is a "being beyond"

(Hinaussein) beings/...

(Hinaussein) beings. Transcendence is its authentic nature. Dasein is a transcendence to Being. If Dasein genuinely understands this, then he will not alienate himself by falling prey to beings and so losing himself in the world of beings. It is nothing that gives man the possibility to see things as they actually are. "'Man is the seat-holder for nothingness.'" (12) As such, nothingness gives Dasein the opportunity to move from a state of unauthenticity to authenticity.

Heidegger holds the view that classical metaphysics went wrong when it derived nothingness from negation. Nothingness does not come about through the act of negation, but, rather, it is negation that arises through the act of nothingness. It is in the Being (Sein) of what-is (Seiendes) "that the nihilation of Nothing (das Nichten des Nichts) occurs." (13) Nothing, therefore, has the character of an activity. Nothing nothings. Only now can man see things in their essential being, in their true nature. When seen from such a nothingness, then things appear or stand out as they actually are. From this it follows that Dasein can come into the power and ability to grasp reality as it is, and not as it has been handed to him in a distorted state. Only now is it possible for him to gain authenticity/...

gain authenticity. So, far from being an abstract concept, nothingness gives Dasein the possibility for authenticity. Through such authentic behaviour, Dasein transcends to Being.

Traditional metaphysics conceived nothingness as merely the negation of what is, but for Heidegger, nothing, just as much as Being, belongs to the ground of beings. Heidegger says: "Metaphysics is an enquiry over and above what-is, with a view to winning it back again as such and in totality for our understanding." (14)

Therefore, we may say that Heidegger attempts, through Being and Nothingness, to comprehend the totality of things in the world on the basis of which comprehension, man can live authentically. The philosophical dilemma clearly delineated by Kant obtains. In the Kantian view, the conflict between human finiteness and Weltanschauungen which aims to explain reality in a total or comprehensive way is inevitable. So, Heidegger's attempt to attain authenticity on the basis of such a comprehensive Weltanschauung is defeated by human reality in respect of its finiteness, which is the very quality that Heidegger had emphasised.

In his/...

In his later writings, Heidegger attempts to solve this dilemma of the inability of man to comprehend totally, by his famous Kehre (Reversal) where Being now comprehends and man ek-sists, or stands out into Being.

(b) Heidegger's/...

(b) Heidegger's Kehre des Denkens or the Reversal of Thinking.

Heidegger, in his Sein und Zeit, attempted to ground metaphysics properly through his Dasein analytic. By showing man in his true relationship to Being, Heidegger intended to expose man as he is, thereby giving him the possibility for an authentic existence. Such a thinking, as important, necessary, and preparatory <sup>(15)</sup> as it may be, remains metaphysical. It is now necessary, thought Heidegger, to adopt a new point of departure as given by Being itself.

In his pursuit after the sense of Being, Heidegger characterized truth as Aletheia (non-concealment). Forgetfulness is the withdrawal of Being into concealment and remembering, which, for Heidegger would be the same as re-trieving (Wiederholung), that is, an attaining to the non-concealed. The re-fetching or re-trieving of the authentic self would result in beings being revealed as they are. The significance of the Greek word Aletheia (non-concealment) is that it reveals Ousia (The Being of beings; presence). Heidegger says: "The disquieting, ever watchful question about Being under the guise of Presence (Present) developed into the question about Being in terms of its time-character."<sup>(16)</sup>

With this/...

With this development, it became clear that the traditional conception of time was no longer adequate for asking the question concerning the time-character of Presence, for the traditional characterization of time was a sequence of "nows", which, as we showed in our last chapter, is a distortion of authentic time. Authentic time is temporality as it reveals the ecstatic unity of past, present, and future. To avoid the Aristotelian "now", Presence replaces the present. Heidegger took the future to be the primary ecstasis of time.

In recovering the original significance of the nature of Being, the traditional metaphysical approach, as we showed in our chapter three, failed to cope adequately with the question of Being, because of the dichotomy that Plato set in motion by separating the world of Being (Ideas) and the world of Time (Becoming, Existence, Opinion). Therefore, in putting aside these traditional conceptions, Heidegger, following a phenomenological hermeneutic of man, intends coming to an authentic understanding of man in his relationship to Being, and after establishing man's authentic nature finds it now possible to arrive at a comprehension of Being as such, and as it reveals itself to man. Having exposed Dasein's nature as a Being-to-death or a

Being-to/...



Being-to-nothing, Heidegger now tries to avoid any subjective interferences in order that Being may present itself as it is.

Sein und Zeit, as Heidegger published it, contained two divisions of a projected six. On this point Heidegger himself says: "The adequate reproduction of and participation in this other thinking that leaves subjectivity behind is indeed rendered difficult by the fact that when Being and Time was published, the third Division of the first Part, entitled 'Time and Being' was held back. ... The Division in question was held back because thinking failed in adequately articulating this turn, and did not achieve its goal by means of the language of metaphysics." (17) In reply to William Richardson's letter, Heidegger says: "The thinking of the reversal is is a change in my thought." (18) However, he points out that his basic standpoint is not altered, nor has he abandoned the fundamental issues of Sein und Zeit.

Heidegger says that he did not invent the reversal and that instead of endlessly gossiping about the reversal, he would rather that the people engage themselves in the play of the whole, that is, "Being and Time" and "Time and Being", in which titles the reversal is

inherent. However/...

inherent. However, it is this that accounts for the highly experimental and possibly dangerous nature of the lecture called Time and Being that Heidegger gave in January, 1962, and the seminar conducted on that lecture in September of the same year.

The danger lies in the fact that the audience had to engage themselves in "an answering prepared by questions".<sup>(19)</sup> This in itself presents a difficulty in that the participants are asked to accept a prepared questioning. More serious is that the participants had now to experience on the basis of what was prepared that "which cannot be openly brought to light", and that which is by its very nature "inaccessible to communicative statements."<sup>(20)</sup> At the very heart of the assumption, does there not lurk the idea that the participants are on the same level as Heidegger? There is then, either a levelling of the participants where an equalization just does not exist because of their very individuality, or we are exposed to various individual "experiences" and since they are not on the same level as Heidegger's, these experiences must be held as invalid. More about this dilemma will be said later.

Heidegger says/...

Heidegger says that Being is determined by the horizon of Time, when, for Time, the lighting-up of the self-concealing process of coming-to-Presence (Answesen), is substituted. Now the process of presenc-ing Being is "inherent in the lighting-up of self-concealment (Time). (The) lighting-up of self-concealment (Time) brings forth the process of presenc-ing (Being)." <sup>(21)</sup> This reciprocal bearing, says Heidegger, rests in a mutual ap-propriation which he calls event (Ereignis), <sup>(22)</sup> the significance of which is that the Es (It) of Ereignis is the ultimate Source of what is. Time opens up the horizon which creates the authentic condition for Dasein and Being to be appropriated genuinely to each other.

Towards working out what Appropriation fully implies, we need to note that, in Sein und Zeit, Heidegger showed, through his analysis of Being-to-death, Dasein's temporality and the fundamental nature of future as the primary ecstasis of time. However, in his essay Time and Being, Heidegger attempts to show Being itself in its temporal character, thereby avoiding the metaphysical by saying "something about the attempt to think Being without regard to its being grounded in terms of beings ." <sup>(23)</sup> We shall discuss this issue a little later in this thesis. In the meantime, we note that thought/...

that thought is required to undergo a change, and this movement, Heidegger says, corresponds with the reversal. This means that the Kehre fulfils the question of Being raised in Sein und Zeit. "This fulfillment likewise furnishes for the first time an adequate characterisation of There-being, sc. of the essence of man (as) thought in terms of the truth of Being as such." (24)

Heidegger, in the letter referred to above, warns William Richardson that, "The distinction you make between Heidegger I and II is justified only on the condition that this is kept constantly in mind : only by way of what Heidegger I has thought does one gain access to what is to-be-thought by Heidegger II. But (the thought of) Heidegger I becomes possible only if it is contained in Heidegger II." (25)

Heidegger characterizes the shift in emphasis by saying that it is not that there are principally men, but principally there is Being. In this shift of emphasis Heidegger by-passes humanism and subjectivism. This position enables Heidegger to arrive at the authentic nature of man and put aside the traditional characterization of what man's essential nature is. As such, the existentia of tradition is replaced by the ontological priority/...

ontological priority of ek-sistence, that is, Dasein is open to Being and stands within the light of Being. In other words, Dasein is a transcendence, that is, he stands outside of himself. Dasein comes-to-presence in the throwing of Being as the "There" of Being. (26) "...This 'Being' of the There, and only this, has the fundamental structure of ek-sistence, sc. of taking a stance ecstatically within the truth of Being. ..." (27)

From this Heidegger draws the conclusion that Being is the relation that sustains ek-sistence in its existential presence, thereby preserving the truth of Being as it itself in-sists in beings. Dasein ek-sists as subjects, that is, he stands out towards the things in the world and he is the originator of meaning in the world, but only because of Being in the sense that truth is not really the creation of Dasein, but is the self-disclosure of Being. With such an exposure of truth, Dasein pulls out of the "night of darkness" a little intelligibility which finds expression in Dasein's "praxis". Words, of themselves, are meaningless, but can only come to a fullness in, say, a work of art, in a poem, or in a game.

As we have already emphasized, with the Kehre comes  
the re-interpretation/...



the re-interpretation of the nature of man.

Ek-sistence expresses its essential character as possession. Being possesses Dasein for the disclosure of its truth. All thinking which emphasizes the power of man must give way to seeing man as the humble "shepherd of Being". (28) Where Sein und Zeit said that only insofar as Dasein is, there is Being, this is now to be understood as Dasein is the There where the lighting-process comes-to-pass, but only on the basis of, and only because of Being which e-mits itself among beings. Thus the lighting-up process through which beings become what they are, takes place in the There of Being. The lighting-up process is, of course, Being itself.

We may legitimately ask: "Where in all this lies the character of authenticity?" Authenticity lies in the appropriating of man by Being itself in that movement by which Being throws out its There in the midst of beings. In this throw is contained the call to Dasein who must let non-concealment take place. In listening to this call, Dasein resolves itself authentically. If the essential nature of Being is non-concealment, then it is through thought that Being expresses itself.

"...through thought Being comes to (expression in) language. ..." (29) Man does not now use language to reach Being./...



reach Being. It is Being that uses language to disclose itself to man who must respond to it. Dasein must lodge in the house of Being and by staying there authentically, bring Being to self-fulfilment.

"',...Thought pays heed to the lighting-up process (that is) Being, insofar as it encloses its own utterance of Being in language, as (if this were) the lodging of ek-sistence. ...'" (30) Language no more takes on the form of articulate saying. It is now the "silent saying" of Being which Dasein must listen to and which now forms the new thought.

Heidegger hopes to expose the essence of man and so respond to the present need of philosophy. Heidegger says: "Not only have the gods and the god fled, but the divine radiance has become extinguished in the world's history. The time of the world's night is the destitute time, because it becomes ever more destitute." (31) In these times, the poet has the weighty task of uttering the Holy, that is, the mystery of Being. To these poets then, the essence of poetry becomes a critical questioning that moves on the way to the disclosure of that which must be unconcealed. "Because these more venturesome ones venture Being itself and therefore dare to venture into language, the province of Being, they are the sayers." (32)

They "sing/...

They "sing the healing whole in the midst of the unholy." (33)

Through this soundless saying, and therefore, through the authentic exercise of language, Heidegger hopes to give a non-human interpretation to man, world, and things. Aletheia as non-concealment is non-human. The essential nature of man must now be seen in a special relation to Being, that is, as belonging to Being. In work after work, Heidegger hopes to reconstruct this relationship, for example, in his interpretation of poems and works of art. Any hearing of the call, which is the only way in which world and thing can achieve their truth, of necessity, implies a hearer. Try as he might, Heidegger cannot hope to arrive at a non-human Saying, for he is a human being, unless of course it is God that sends the message. But, then, Heidegger would criticize that as being metaphysical, hence unauthentic.

In his essay The Origin of the Work of Art, Heidegger asks: "What is at work in the work of art?" Heidegger answers that in the work of art it is truth that is at work, for what it does is that it discloses the essence of an entire world; for example, van Gogh's painting of a pair of boots gathers together in that

work the/...

work the entire world of the peasant. What the work of art does is to bring into presence the Being of what-is. "The art work opens up in its own way the Being of beings. This opening up, i.e., this deconcealing, i.e., the truth of beings, happens in the work." (34) Although truth happens in and through Dasein, it is not Dasein that brings it about. Truth occurs of its own accord. In fact, Heidegger goes so far as to say that truth uses Dasein for its self-disclosure, untruth being Silence, Hiddenness, or Darkness. Truth, as the light of Being, gets rid of Darkness in whatever form it (Truth) cares to express itself through Dasein.

To arrive at a deeper meaning of "gathering", we need to examine what Heidegger calls Geviert (the Fourfold), that is, Heaven and Earth, Men and Gods. In their interplay, they constitute the world in a unity that is governed by Language. Language cannot be seen as a tool or as an external power that man uses to appropriate the world. Language cannot be separated from the Fourfold, for, being the original gathering (Versammlung), it gives Dasein the "is" whose deepest understanding gives man the possibility for authenticity. In his neglect of the Fourfold, man exploits the materials of the earth in a most uncreative way. The

rise of/...

rise of technology has seen the decline of the creative in man. But the poet, in being poetical, captures the essence of the Fourfold in a creative way when Dasein would live authentically. Heidegger, in his essay Poetically man dwells, quoting from Holderlin's last poem says that "the life of man" is a "dwelling life." Heidegger believes that the poet who can see the "world" in its "activity" (in other words, the "world worlds") gathers the Fourfold together in a "play", or a dance rhythm of the appropriating and belonging together of the four neighbourhoods (Gegenden). These constitute together what Heidegger calls the Holy (das Heilige), which must, of course, never be seen either as a thing or as the Divine Being. As an example of the gathering of the Fourfold we make use of the following summary: "Only 'essential thinking' experiences how, in the gift of the pour of water, the earth in its dark slumber in the stones of the spring is gathered with the heavens, the dispenser of rain and dew. Or it experiences in the gift of the pour of wine how the nurturing earth gathers itself with the heavens, which through its sunlight brought the vine to blossom. The pour of the gift of water and wine at the same time always includes in its gathering the one 'for whom' such an outpouring is made. As a 'libation,' it is originally given as a sacrifice and offering 'for the divine ones/...

divine ones,' i.e., for the sphere of the 'holy' in which the divinity shows or hides itself. As a 'draught,' the gift of the pour is for the 'mortals'; it livens 'their leisure and cheers their conviviality'." (35)

Where, in his early writings, Heidegger was concerned over man's unauthentic use of language in his "clever talking, writing, and broadcasting of spoken words", he now concentrates on the relationship between man, language and the nature of things. "Man acts as though he were the shaper and master of language, while in fact language remains the master of man. Perhaps it is before all else man's subversion of this relation of dominance that drives his nature into alienation. That we retain a concern for care in speaking is all to the good, but is of no help to us as long as language still serves us even then only as a means of expression." (36)

Man is man only when he is devoted to the address of language who uses him to show, to let appear, to free things, world, etc., so that they may be what they are, that is, things as things, world as world, beings as beings, and the horizon of beings as the horizon of beings. Man is no more the producer and the user of language. He is the receiver. It is now the case that

"Language speaks/...



"Language speaks" and gives man the gift of space, future, freedom and so the possibility for authenticity. Man's privileged duty is to humbly accept these gifts as they are and to hold them Holy. This profound ability of language exists because this is its essence, and the essence of Dasein would then be to be a lodger in the house of Being.<sup>(37)</sup> Quite clearly it now emerges that the function of language is to let Being be itself; in this activity Dasein has a privileged access to Being through his ek-static nature. Therefore, his nature is to be the guardian or the protector of Being. Where, in Sein und Zeit, authenticity was achieved by Resolve, it is now achieved by Thought through which Being reaches fullness, in the sense that it lets Being be by responding to the demand that it (Being) places on him.

It is essentially because of this letting-be activity that it is at all possible to talk of the authentic nature of freedom. The "'letting-be' exposes itself (setzt sich aus) to what-is-as-such and brings all behaviour into the open (versetzt ins Offene). 'Letting-be', i.e. freedom, is in its own self 'exposing' (aus-setzend) and 'ex-sistent' (ek-sistent)."<sup>(38)</sup> Freedom is certainly no licence to do/...



to do as you please and what you please. Freedom, for Heidegger, is taking part in the unconcealedness of what-is-as-such (das Seiende als ein solches). The true nature of freedom, on the basis of which Dasein is able to ek-sist, is contained in Da-sein. "Ek-sistence, grounded in truth as freedom, is nothing less than exposition into the revealed nature of what-is-as-such." (39) Heidegger says that only when Dasein is understood as the letting-be of what-is, is freedom not conceived in a humanistic way. Freedom possesses man and gives him a unique relationship with the totality of things. Veritas est adaequatio intellectus et rei as the formula for truth must be abandoned. Truth is the disclosure of what-is, and Dasein is Dasein by virtue of his ek-sistence. "The 'ex-position' of man into the realm of what-is, which he is 'un-covering', makes civilisation and history possible and with them all the potentialities of historic humanity." (40)

But, in Heidegger's attempt to give truth and freedom a non-human meaning, we need to ask whether such an interpretation is possible, considering that man is a finite, historical being. Since he is inside this constitutive act, truth and freedom, no matter what form they take, must remain his unique version, if it is unique./...



is unique. In Heidegger's rigorous critical standards and in his unique conception of truth lies his merit. But it is also to the credit of Western tradition that he has had the necessary dialogue and the opportunity to pursue his particular line of thought for so long.

Heidegger says: "the nature of man is released to that-which-regions and used by it accordingly, for this reason alone - that man of himself had no power over truth and it remains independent of him. Truth's nature can come forth independently of man only because the nature of man (or releasement to what-which-regions) is used by that-which-regions in regioning both with respect to man and to sustain determining. Evidently truth's independence from man is a relation to human nature, a relation which rests on the regioning of human nature into that-which-regions."<sup>(41)</sup> (For the purpose of clarifying the meaning of this difficult passage, we may, for "that-which-regions", read "Being" and for "regioning", we may read "opening".) Heidegger sees the essence of man as that which is used by truth, and in "abiding in his origin" man is drawn "to what is noble in his nature."<sup>(42)</sup> However, we hold the view that such a position is just as alienating of man's authentic nature as when man uses things indiscriminately. The

"presentiment of/...

"presentiment of the noble mind" lies, for us, in man's using things with respect. If we are to speak of authenticity and of authentic nature, then the nature of truth and freedom are to be found in man's relationship to his fellowman and in his discriminate use of things. Truth and freedom are humanized, but if we are to give the contingent and finite nature of man their fullest meaning, then this seems to be the best basis on which to arrive at a workable conception of truth and freedom, rather than attempting a non-human or a non-metaphysical meaning of truth and freedom. In a sense, the new alienation of man, in Heidegger's case, must be ascribed to the identification of man's authentic existence with Being as an event, i.e., unconcealment (aletheia), in man's being-there. With Heidegger, it may be said that the principle of identity is realized or fulfilled in his idea of Geviert (the Fourfold). The Geviert indicates man's dwelling. It is the space or "Ort" of his dwelling. It is the link which shows him as being suspended between heaven and earth, gods and men, finite and infinite, Sein and Seiendes.

In his attempt to be non-metaphysical, the union of the intentions of the phenomenological and the hermeneutic procedure must be seen as resulting in the bracketing of/...

bracketing of the entire tradition from Plato to Nietzsche, as characterized by Heidegger, and in seeing reduction as going back into the true ground and essence of metaphysics. The phenomenological method, therefore, becomes the way that issues from beyond the human, in other words, the way now lies within the power of Being, and not within the subjectivity of human existence. The hermeneutical procedure, too, undergoes a reversal. Language, the transmitter of tradition must no longer be seen as the articulatory vehicle that man uses to reach Being. Language now becomes the Soundless Saying of the Holy, that is, the mystery of Being, to which man listens.

In his book Unterwegs zur Sprache, Heidegger derives the origin of the word hermeneutics from the Greek hermeneuein. Hermes, the divine messenger, brought the message of destiny. "hermeneuein is that exposition which brings tidings because it can listen to a message. Such exposition becomes an interpretation of what has been said earlier by the poets who, according to Socrates in Plato's Ion (534 e)... 'are interpreters of the gods.'" So, "hermeneutics means not just the interpretation but, even before it, the bearing of message and tidings."<sup>(43)</sup> and as such names the essence of man. The only way for man to realize his authentic nature is/...

nature is for him to listen to the message.

In Sein und Zeit, Heidegger saw man as a Being-in-the-world who, as a being that is thrown into the world and left there to his own resources, is in a state of abandonment (Verlassenheit). In the reversal man must be seen in a state of abandonment or "releasement" (Gelassenheit), releasing oneself to Being by renouncing our wilfulness and waiting for Being to reveal itself to us. Heidegger quotes Angelus Silesius' poem on the rose:

The rose is without why; it blooms because it blooms,  
It cares not for itself, asks not if it's seen.

and he says: "'The unuttered point of the poem - and this is what is all important - is that in the most hidden recesses of his Being man is truly only when in his own way he is as the rose - without why.'" (44)

To be without why (the groundless ground) is to be open to the Mystery that will offer Itself to us. Searching for the Ground must give way to the silence of the Gods, the Groundless (Ab-grund) Silence of Being that gives no answer, but is present only as an abiding that man has to endure. "Every question posed to the matter of thinking, every inquiry for its nature, is already borne up by the grant of what is to come into question. Therefore/...

Therefore the proper bearing of the thinking which is needed now is to listen to the grant, not to ask questions." (45) But surely such a state of acceptance of the gift of Being is the abandonment of man as a critical being? To ask with Professor Rauche, in abandoning the "why?" has not man abandoned the quest for his authentic nature?

(c) The Problem/...



(c) The Problem of Sein and das Seiende.

The problem of Sein and das Seiende is the problem of metaphysics, which began when Plato separated the realm of Being and the realm of Time (Becoming, Existence). In attempting to overcome such a metaphysics, (Heidegger saw the entire tradition from Plato to Nietzsche as metaphysical, each historical period being an epoch of metaphysics from which the authentic meaning of Being was withdrawn) he attempts to arrive at a non-metaphysical meaning of Being, thereby showing Being in its fullness. However, such an attempt to overcome metaphysics is, in our opinion, Heidegger's model or world-view. Reflection on the relationship between das Sein and das Seiende shows that metaphysics as reflective theory cannot really be abolished, no matter which way Heidegger turns.

The original impetus of Heidegger's particular conception of Being, as we have already shown, was his objection against the reification of Being. Being is not a thing, it is not any thing. An abstraction or a reification is, as it has its source in things. For Heidegger, Sein is the source of light, meaning, and intelligibility which illuminates the world through  
man's thinking/...

man's thinking and through the language of the poet. "We want to say something about the attempt to think Being without regard to its being grounded in terms of beings. The attempt to think Being without beings becomes necessary because otherwise, it seems to me, there is no longer any possibility of explicitly bringing into view the Being of what is today all over the earth, let alone of adequately determining the relation of man to what has been called 'Being' up to now." (46) Heidegger exposes the inadequacies of the traditional conceptions of Being and Time by drawing attention to the fact that Being is not a thing, therefore nothing temporal, but determined by time as presence; Time, too, is not a thing, but remains constant in its passing away without being something temporal. (47) Therefore, when time is calculated as a sequence of now-points, it fails to see the original dimension (48) of time which in the interplay of past, present, and future opens up the very heart of time. Such a true extending, Heidegger calls the fourth dimension of time in which the unity of true time consists. The "nearing nearness" or "nearhood" (Nahheit) which we saw as having close associations with the Geviert (the Fourfold), is the giving in "It gives time", the usual rendering of which is "There is time."

The significance/...

The significance of "it gives time" and its connection with Being itself emerges when we note that true time "could be discovered as the 'It' that gives Being, i.e., gives presence." (49) Therefore, when we say "It gives Being" ("There is Being") the "It" appears as true time. Heidegger firmly points out that "It" does not equal time in order that we can now say "Time gives Being." It is really the case that time "remains the gift of an 'It gives' whose giving preserves the realm in which presence is extended." (50) The point of this is that Heidegger wants to leave the "It" open. In other words, it must remain undetermined and mysterious, but yet point to the finitude of Being itself, so that Being as presence, and time as the realm of the open, belong together. This "belonging together" Heidegger calls Ereignis (51) or the Appropriating Event. As far as any determining of the "It" of "It gives Being" and "It gives Time" goes, we must let the "It" remain as Appropriation.

In asking what is Appropriation, we are asking after the essence, in other words, how it (Appropriation) becomes present. The danger inherent here is, that, in seeing Appropriation as Being, we are continuing the tradition of metaphysics which saw Being in terms of beings, at various times, as idea,

as energeia/...

as energeia, as actualitas, as will. On the other hand, it is correct to say that Being belongs to Appropriation. Appropriation is not a species of Being, but "(Insofar as the destiny of Being lies in the extending of time, and time, together with Being, lies in Appropriation, Appropriating makes manifest its peculiar property, that Appropriation withdraws what is most fully its own from boundless unconcealment. Thought in terms of Appropriating, this means : in that sense it expropriates itself to itself. Expropriation belongs to Appropriation as such. By this expropriation, Appropriation does not abandon itself - rather, it preserves what is its own." (52)

In Appropriation lies the clue not only to the problem of Sein and das Seiende, but also to the problem of alienation. For, Appropriation brings man into his own as that being who perceives Being within true time, on the basis of which, beings themselves are properly appropriated and not exploited. Thus, in perceiving and receiving, man gains the distinction of being human, but only if he sees Appropriation as an appropriating and not as something that is, when we shall again fall into the metaphysical trap. In arriving at the idea of Appropriation, hence at authenticity, Heidegger hopes to have avoided :

metaphysics and/...

metaphysics and not overcome it, for, even in the attempt to overcome metaphysics, a regard for it remains. "To think Being without beings means : to think Being without regard to metaphysics. Yet a regard for metaphysics still prevails even in the intention to overcome metaphysics. Therefore, our task is to cease all overcoming, and leave metaphysics to itself. If overcoming remains necessary, it concerns that thinking that explicitly enters Appropriation in order to say It in terms of It about It." (53)

However, to mention but one similarity to Wittgenstein we need to note that Heidegger in his Time and Being wrote: "Our task is unceasingly to overcome the obstacles that tend to render such saying (of It in terms of It about It) inadequate. The saying of Appropriation in the form of a lecture remains itself an obstacle of this kind. The lecture has spoken merely in propositional statements." (54)

We find in Wittgenstein's Tractatus: "My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way : anyone who understands me eventually recognises them as nonsensical, when he has used them - as steps - to climb up beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it.) He must transcend these/...



transcend these propositions, and then he will see the world aright." (55)

Heidegger finds in meditative thinking the transcending of propositions, or as he would have it, saying or experiencing in a non-propositional way. Once he has clarified the meaning of Being on the basis of his Dasein analytic, he would have to repeat the whole process more originally. In other words, the foundation is no foundation and in the attempt to be non-metaphysical he tries, through meditative thinking, to get at Being directly. In this sense, the essence of man involves the process of travelling the path to Being directly, which involves an openness that Heidegger names Gelassenheit. As to what man is open to, we have already drawn attention. Man is open to the given. "Meditative thinking characterizes man's true nature, his being, as openness in which he is partly identified with the given. Man becomes partly identified with the given by opening to it as, in turn, the given opens to him." (56)

Heidegger calls the given which man is open to, the Region. In order to overcome obstacles, that is, speaking in propositional statements, Heidegger says that, "Releasement comes out of that-which-regions because in/...



because in releasement man stays released to that-which-regions and, indeed, through this itself. He is released to it in his being, insofar as he originally belongs to it. He belongs to it insofar as he is appropriated initially to that-which-regions and, indeed, through this itself. ...Out of the experience of and in relation to just such waiting upon the opening of that-which-regions, waiting came to be spoken of as releasement."<sup>(57)</sup> And so Heidegger says that we must do nothing but wait. This waiting is, of course, what he means by non-propositional or non-metaphysical. But this waiting upon, even though Heidegger pointedly distinguishes it from waiting for,<sup>(58)</sup> remains humanistic. For, it is he (Heidegger) who tells us that Being or Region, or whatever he may call it, releases man to ek-sist as the shepherd of Being, which is his authentic nature. Therefore, it becomes necessary for us to ask whether Heidegger overcomes metaphysics and subjectivity by transforming Being into Appropriation?

However, when we consider what Appropriation appropriates, we have an inkling of just how significant Appropriation is to man and Being. For, says Heidegger, in Appropriation man and Being belong together.

In this/...

In this belonging together the finitude of both man and Being is revealed. He conceives of this finitude apart from infinity. How finitude is to be thought of as such, in its self, as an end or a limit has to remain a mystery, inspite of Heidegger's transforming Being to Appropriation. If Heidegger can say in his essay The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking that there is no light, no brightness without the "opening" and that even darkness needs it, then, regardless of his intention, he should recognise that, to speak of finitude apart from infinity, to think Being without beings, must, as such, remain an impossible task and that his philosophizing would therefore remain well within the fold of metaphysics.

Heidegger quotes Stefan George's poem The Word and subsequently, over and over gain, the last line of that poem:

Where word breaks off no thing may be.

He then draws the conclusion that "It is only the word at our disposal which endows the thing with Being." (59) That this is of crucial importance to our problem of Sein and das Seiende is revealed a few lines later when Heidegger asks: "What does Being mean here, that it appears like an endowment which is dedicated to the thing from the word?" Heidegger provides the answer that  
it is/...

it is the word that makes a thing a thing and it is the poet who has experienced that it is the word that makes a thing what it is, and so lets it be present. "The word avows itself to the poet as that which holds and sustains a thing in its being." (60)

Where word breaks off no thing may be.

In other words, the word, in keeping with Heidegger's central idea of aletheia (which is named at the beginning of philosophy), allows the thing to reveal itself in the gathering that brings what presences to its presence. As such, Word, or Being, or Saying, allows beings to appear in their "it is". Logos, Being, Saying, Appropriation, as equivalents, say the same thing : beings are a gift that they themselves grant. The point of it all is that, "The dialogue of thinking of poetry aims to call forth the nature of language, so that mortals may learn again to live within language." (61) Thus the question of authenticity, even in his latest writings, remains the root of the question of Being.

The relationship between word and thing naturally points to the relationship between language and thing. Poetry is called into the neighbourliness of thinking when the attempt is made to undergo an experience with language. Heidegger leaves undiscussed as to what happens to the/...

to the thing when, often enough, we fail to receive that particular grant of Being by being temporarily incapacitated through a slip of the mind. We readily see the point of Heidegger's attempt at authenticating Language, Being, and beings. But does it now mean that there is a thing for the poet and that this same thing is not a thing for the lesser mortals who have had an experience, but could not bring it to proper articulation? Is it any more authentic for the poet because he can articulate his experience with language or any less for the ordinary man because he cannot?

To continue with Heidegger's handling of the problem of das Sein and das Seiende, his analysis concerning the technical and scientific calculations corrupting and degenerating the way to authenticity is well taken. There is a need on the part of man to respond more seriously to the challenges that result from his being here on this earth. However, Heidegger's answer to the challenge presents a one-sidedness that could possibly be more dangerous than the existing situation which arose out of man having to live with his fellowman. It is this situation that we must never stray too far from in our attempt to authenticate human existence. Marvellous and exciting as the path Heidegger has travelled may be,

his fundamental/...

his fundamental ontology (inspite of his having abandoned this term) ends in the same land of absolutes as Hegel's Spirit, Fichte's Ego or Marx's economic principle.

For Heidegger, language is the house of Being and as such affords us a clue to undergoing an experience with language. He sees the nature of language as the granting of its essential being which then means that the being of language becomes the language of Being. We can see why Heidegger places so much weight on this, for, in the language of Being dwells the Being of anything that is. What Heidegger calls the guide-word:

The being of language :  
The language of being. (62)

saves mankind from the traditional way of conceiving language as the tool that man possesses for communication. The true experience of language is a Saying, that is, a Showing. This points to the change of meaning that the nature of truth has undergone. Language loses its original meaning of Showing, Revealing, Unconcealing, and now comes to mean something that designates or something that represents.

Heidegger recognises that because we are human beings we remain within the Being of language and cannot step  
out of/...



out of it. Language uses man, and Appropriation is the making of the way for Saying to come into language. "This way-making puts language (the essence of language) as language (Saying) into language (into the sounded word)." (63) In this, our relationship to things is touched upon. Therefore, the Saying of man, which, of course, must always be an answering, must remain "relational", and this is the transformation that man must undergo.

"The moving force in Showing of Saying is Owning." (64) The Owning, Heidegger calls Appropriation, which opens the clearing in which beings can be what they are. However, the Appropriation must be seen as being more than a mere occurrence or event. It must be seen as the gift given by Saying which gives things when we say : "There is ..." Heidegger resolves not only the problem of Sein and das Seiende but also the problem of authenticity, for, Appropriation appropriates or owns (eigen) and Heidegger takes full advantage of the fact that the German word for authenticity is Eigentlichkeit and the word for "appropriating event" is Ereignis.

By conceiving Being as Appropriation, Heidegger hopes to give it a non-metaphysical meaning, for, in the relationship between man and Being, Heidegger says that  
the relationship /...



the relationship is more important than that which is related. Therefore, reference to the realm of Being must give way to reference to the relationship between man and Being. Heidegger sees in the "Es Gibt" the possibility of man's achieving his authenticity. Man standing within "presence" receives the presencing as a gift given by the "Es" or "Es gibt." Man is now duty-bound to show that he has received the gift when he lets things appear as they are. In not accepting the gift, the position is that not only is Being shut off, but more importantly, man is no longer man.

Despite the criticism we have levelled against Heidegger on various fundamental issues, we acknowledge once more his incisive questioning and his relentless pursuit after the mystery of Being. For Heidegger, the primary concern of thought is the question of the ontological difference, that is, the difference between Being and beings. However, such a thought moves in a circle and to break into the circle is to see the difference as the difference. This circle is what Grisebach has called the cycle of the self as it is found in any constructed theory. Being is only because of beings; beings are what they are only because of Being. To give other examples, the essence of art is to  
be found/...

be found in the work of art, but the work of art is what it is only because of the essence of art. Similarly, truth is to be found in what is true, but what is true is true because of truth. Heidegger tries to break into the circle by seeing the ground of the ontological difference in Dasein's transcendence. Into this, Heidegger draws the essence of truth which he says, of necessity, must be bifurcated into its ontic and ontological aspects. Then Dasein behaves towards beings on its understanding of Being, and the ability to see the ontological difference must have its roots in the essence of man. Therefore, the ground of the ontological difference is the transcendence of Dasein. The ontological difference emerges only through man's ability to distinguish between Being and beings. This ability Heidegger identifies with man's transcendence. Heidegger never tires of pointing out that Being is not identical with the beingness of beings, or what is most general in beings. Being is the emergence of the ontological difference, that is, the difference between Being and beings, and we now note that what Heidegger meant by the expression "to think Being without beings"; was that Being must not be constituted from beings as was done in traditional metaphysics. Man, in dealing with beings, must therefore function as the medium through whom they break out into unconcealment through the same power that/...

power that dominates himself. The fact remains, however, that man is a being and by constituting man as transcendence, Heidegger does not get away from the position that his Being is a model. It is he, as a human being, who has constituted it. Not even the antiquated spelling of Sein as Seyn would save him from the humanization. Richardson finds a corresponding spelling in Anglo-Saxon for Heidegger's Seyn. The translation is Beon.<sup>(65)</sup> "It is at once both a hidden light and a 'luminous hiding' within beings. All this is familiar. What is new is that by reason precisely of this 'luminous hiding' that Being is designated as Beon, and Beon is intended to suggest the 'difference that holds sway between Being and beings, sc. the ontological difference as such. This helps to see the entire problematic of revealment-concealment in Being is nothing more than the problem of the 'not' which constitutes the ontological difference as such. '...Because a luminous hiding (sc. the 'not' of the ontological difference) belongs to Beon, Beon shines forth in the light of a concealing withdrawal. The name of this lighting-process is (aletheia)."<sup>(66)</sup> Thus, Heidegger is very much preoccupied with the ontological difference and the relationship between Being and beings is explicitly named. "That a thing is" and "How it is" is now given its fullest meaning for

Heidegger, when/...

Heidegger, when we see being as the object of presentation and Being as that through which the object comes to presence. If we do not see the matter like this, Heidegger claims that we are existing unauthentically.

(Then we come across the peculiar ~~sein~~ (67) in his attempt at overcoming the alienating, and so arriving at once, at a non-human understanding of Being by locating the place of the unity of the Fourfold, that is, the earth and sky, gods and man. Thus, the crossing out is not anything negative, but something positive, in that it gives "world".)

Even if we go along with Heidegger and accept that the poet, as a receiver of the gift of Being, can save mankind, then we need to ask how much faith can the rest of mankind place on the poet. Dwelling poetically on this earth is but one aspect of life, albeit a terribly important one. But in the wake of natural disasters, how worthy is the singing of the poet compared to the spontaneous rising to the occasion by the ordinary man and by his ordinary institutions. There is a need for the common man in his common preoccupations, just as much as there is a need for the poet to dwell poetically.

Heidegger, as/...

Heidegger, as we have stressed in our previous chapters, was concerned that man had alienated himself by forgetting the ontological difference and so, being oblivious to Being itself in his preoccupation with beings, man forgets that it is Being itself that brings these into non-concealment. Such a concern led Heidegger to pose the Being-question in order to arrive at the ground of Being, or better still, and as it is now possible for us to say, to arrive at the groundless ground which would be quite non-metaphysical. Through the long process of questioning, Heidegger now came to see the original meaning of language in which Being becomes word and thing. The articulation of Being opens up and becomes what Heidegger calls "world", and so we have the articulation "world worlds" and not "world is", or "time times" and not "time is", or "space spaces" and not "space is" and so on. Therefore, for Heidegger, Being opens up the totality of beings as they are and as they are not (Sein und Nichtsein). What this means is that, "Being as the process of non-concealment is that which permits beings to become non-concealed (positivity), although the process is so permeated by 'not' that Being itself remains concealed (negativity). To think Being in its truth, then, is to think it in terms of both positivity and negativity at once." (68)

In overcoming/...



In overcoming the "reified" Being of metaphysics we need to ask with Professor G. A. Rauche (69) and Professor Walter Schulz whether Heidegger, in shifting basic starting points, has overcome metaphysics. In the shift, Heidegger claims not to start from das Seiende in the construction of Being, but that Being speaks through man and in doing so, causes the world of the Seiende to come into existence. As Professor Rauche consistently points out, though the accent has shifted, the dialectical relationship between das Sein and das Seiende remains, giving rise to all the dichotomies of Being and Nothingness, Life and Death, Existence and Non-Existence, which are embedded in the process of man's Dasein as a Being-to-death or a Being-to-nothing, and which explain man's periodicity and historicity.



N O T E S

1. HEIDEGGER, M. : Being and Time, p.294.
2. Ibid., p.307.
3. Ibid., p.308.
4. See James Shirley's poem called Death the Leveller.
5. HEIDEGGER, M. : An Introduction to Metaphysics, p.169.
6. Quoted by RICHARDSON, W.J. in his Heidegger Through Phenomenology to Thought, p.477.
7. BROCK, W. : Existence and Being, p.377
8. See HEIDEGGER'S essay, What is Metaphysics?
9. BROCK, W. : op. cit., p.366.
10. Ibid., p.369.
11. Ibid., p.370.
12. HEIDEGGER, M. : The Question of Being, p.97.
13. BROCK, W. : op. cit., p.370.
14. Ibid., p.375.
15. HEIDEGGER, M. : Being and Time, p.38.
16. RICHARDSON, W.J. : op. cit., p.xii.
17. Quoted in the Introduction to  
HEIDEGGER, M. : Discourse on Thinking, p.18.
18. RICHARDSON, W.J. : op. cit., p.xvi.
19. HEIDEGGER, M. : On Time and Being, p.25.
20. Ibid., p.26.

21. RICHARDSON, W.J. : op. cit., p.xx.
22. KOCKELMAN'S, J.J. : On Heidegger and Language,  
p.189 ff.
23. HEIDEGGER, M. : On Time and Being, p.2.
24. RICHARDSON, W.J. : op. cit., p.xx.
25. Ibid., p.xxii.
26. Ibid., p.536.
27. Quoted by RICHARDSON, W.J.: op. cit., p.536.
28. See HEIDEGGER'S Letter on Humanism.
29. Quoted by RICHARDSON, W.J.: op. cit., p.543.
30. Ibid., p.544.
31. HEIDEGGER, M. : Poetry, Language, Thought,  
p.91.
32. Ibid., p.137.
33. Ibid., p.140.
34. Ibid., p.39.
35. MARX, W. : Heidegger and the Tradition,  
p.195.
36. HEIDEGGER, M. : Poetry, Language, Thought,  
p.146.
37. See HEIDEGGER'S Letter on Humanism.
38. BROCK, M. : op. cit., p.334.
39. Ibid., p.335.
40. Ibid., p.168.
41. HEIDEGGER, M. : Discourse on Thinking, p.84.

ANDERSON and FREUND translate die Gegnet as  
"that-which-regions", while RICHARDSON translates  
it as/...

it as "expanse". Anderson and Freund, in their footnote to their translation of HEIDEGGER's Gelassenheit, say: "Heidegger uses an old variant of Gegend as the word for the region; die Gegnet - a word that still occurs in spoken German although only in South German dialects. Since an analogous variant is not available for the English counterpart, die Gegnet has been rendered in the text by the phrase that-which-regions. That-which-regions reflects a movement attributed by Heidegger to die Gegnet and further emphasized by his use of the verb gegenen (to region)." From HEIDEGGER'S Discourse on Thinking, p.66.

42. HEIDEGGER, M. : Discourse on Thinking, p.85.
  43. HEIDEGGER, M. : On the Way to Language, p.29.
  44. Quoted by  
VERSENYI, L. : Heidegger, Being, and Truth,  
p.150.
- The two lines of the poem are translated in the same work, p.149.
45. HEIDEGGER, M. : On the Way to Language, p.75.
  46. HEIDEGGER, M. : On Time and Being, p.2.
  47. Ibid., p.3.
  48. "Dimension, we repeat, is here thought not only as the area of possible measurement, but rather as reaching throughout, as giving and opening up." From HEIDEGGER'S On Time and Being, p.15.
  49. HEIDEGGER, M. : On Time and Being, p.17.
  50. Ibid.
  51. We suggest that the most acceptable translation of Ereignis, as Heidegger uses it, is "Appropriating Event".
  52. HEIDEGGER, M. : On Time and Being, pp.22-23.
  53. Ibid., p.24.
  54. Ibid.

55. WITTGENSTEIN, L. : Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, p.151.
56. HEIDEGGER, M. : Discourse on Thinking, pp.28-29.
57. Ibid., pp.73-74.
58. "Waiting for" refers to waiting for something that we like or want. It is a human activity. By "waiting upon", Heidegger means that we wait without wanting anything. One just waits. In other words, "waiting upon" refers to that which is beyond man. "The different prepositions are intended to refer in the case of 'for' to subjective human expectations of some sort, but in the case of 'upon' to what is, if given, a gift."  
HEIDEGGER, M. : Discourse on Thinking, p.23.
59. HEIDEGGER, M. : On the Way to Language, p.141.
60. Ibid., pp.65-66.
61. Ibid., p.161.
62. Ibid., p.94.
63. Ibid., p.130.
64. Ibid., p.127.
65. RICHARDSON, W.J. : op. cit., p.554.
66. Ibid., p.565.
67. Ibid., p.596.
68. Ibid., p.9.
69. See G.A. RAUCHE'S : The Choice (Quo vadis, homo?) and Contemporary Philosophical Alternatives and the Crisis of Truth.

All our heart's courage is the  
echoing response to the  
first call of Being which  
gathers our thinking into the  
play of the world.

In thinking all things  
become solitary and slow.

Patience nurtures magnanimity.

He who thinks greatly must  
err greatly.

Heidegger.

C H A P T E R   S E V E N

CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF HEIDEGGER'S ANSWER TO THE  
PROBLEM OF ALIENATION

In assessing the achievements of Heidegger, we start from the basis that his is a genuine inquiry into the enigma of human existence and an evaluation of the human individual. In the course of this thesis, we have critically evaluated Heidegger's thought and have discovered the profundity and depth of his analysis of human existence. More so than many other philosophers, he has drawn attention to the fact that, if man wishes to live authentically, he must begin from the existential-ontological perspective. As a consequence, his painstakingly detailed analyses of concepts like Dasein, Being-in-the-world, Being-to-death or Being-to-nothing, the reversal of thinking from existence to ek-sistence, the Fourfold (Geviert) and the "Appropriating Event" (Ereignis) have ensured that these existential elements have been given a philosophical significance that can no longer be ignored by philosophers who claim to provide an insight into human authenticity. Thinkers like Sartre and Bultmann, for example, though they may disagree with Heidegger on many crucial points, will not dispute his influence on their philosophic thought.

The power/...





The power of philosophy lies in its ability to raise old problems in new ways, taking into consideration the new and changed circumstances of life. Its power is also directly linked to the capacity inherent in many, to question continually and reassess the thought of the particular philosopher. Thus, Heidegger provides the opportunity for a profound intellectual activity, creating the arena for discussion and dialogue of meaningful thought. That his thought is provocative and controversial is legendary and is evident from the diverse interpretations and criticisms of his philosophy to which we have already drawn attention. Heidegger has set in motion a new mode of philosophical thinking. However, we see his ontology and epistemology as interconnected. Unlike Sartre, for whom existence precedes essence, Heidegger holds that existence presupposes Being and that to know Being is to know human nature, whose basis is its understanding of Being. Therefore, for Heidegger, the question of Being is of fundamental importance and preoccupies his every intellectual effort.

In An Introduction to Metaphysics, Heidegger has written: "...when a boxer is regarded as a nation's great man; when mass meetings attended by millions are looked on as a triumph - then, yes then, through all this turmoil  
a question/...

a question still haunts us like a specter :  
What for? - Whither? - And what then?" (1) When,  
today, we find that people even can trouble themselves  
to the extent of bottling and canning air and other  
people actually buying this canned and bottled air,  
and when birthday parties are held for soap powders,  
then the conclusion is that something, somewhere, has  
gone very wrong indeed for people to behave in this way.  
Technè, Poiesis, and Aletheia have had their authentic  
meaning submerged by the mass, with the result that  
man is cut off from his true nature, which he receives  
from his relationship to Being. Thus, one can appreciate  
Heidegger's concern over the spiritual decline of the  
earth and his looking to the German nation ("the most  
metaphysical of nations" (2)) to "move itself and  
thereby the history of the West beyond the center of  
their future 'happening' and into the primordial realm  
of the powers of being." (3) Heidegger further adds  
that, "we have related the question of being to the  
destiny of Europe, where the destiny of the earth is  
being decided - while our own historic being-there proves  
to be the center for Europe itself." (4)

Metaphysics, when it came to actuality, proved to be  
a disappointment. In his book, The Choice, Professor  
Rauche observes: "Heidegger recognized the metaphysical  
constitution of/...

constitution of the world as an act of human consciousness and thus as an immanent truth. Man's attempt to dispose of the absolute by rational constitution must be regarded as having failed, because the act of constitution was a finite act."<sup>(5)</sup> Positivist scientism failed to fulfil its optimism and hope for the creation of a better world when the sciences released the destructive power that presented a very definite threat to human existence. Thus, the "danger of losing the last bit of spiritual energy that makes it possible to see the decline... and to appraise it as such"<sup>(6)</sup> became the most pressing problem to thinkers like Heidegger who began his search for authenticity by a massive re-examination, beginning with man's very being-there. Martin Heidegger's efforts at locating the problem and providing the challenge that man has to accept, has stimulated and kept alive, as we have already indicated, for more than a generation, individuals and groups of people who have found, in Heidegger, a worthy partner in a necessary dialogue.

The Heideggerian model, in stressing certain existentials, raises a number of problems of varying importance. Thinkers like Fritz-Joachim von Rintelen, Otto Friedrich Bollnow, and Fritz Heinemann have attempted to/...

attempted to deal with the more important of these. We now consider the most significant problems raised by Heidegger's thought as dealt with by these thinkers and as arising from my own critical analysis of Heidegger's philosophy. Heidegger, using the method of phenomenology, analyses the uniqueness of man on the basis that man cannot be described in the traditional categories that were applied to things. Heidegger's existentialia (basic moods or the ways in which it is possible for man to be) enables us to appreciate the depth of the concept "alienation" and its importance for Heidegger. Heidegger shows that existence, Being, and Time are inextricably interwoven. Time is the horizon for an understanding of Being. The significance of Heidegger's thought lies in the fact that he locates the meaning of Being in Sorge (Care) and Temporality; not in Value. More primordial (ursprünglicher) than man is the finiteness of Dasein in him. Since Being itself is finite in its essence,<sup>(7)</sup> the Nothing is the horizon from which an understanding of human existence is possible. Therefore, for Heidegger, the world of things is without meaning and without value. The "nothing mediates no value that would give meaning to its content; and this is the decisive, indispensable condition that would justify the effort. Nothing as being constitutes precisely finiteness as finiteness." There/...

finiteness."<sup>(8)</sup> There is nothing beyond that would give man any dignity or value beyond his human existence here on this earth, and since man, in essence and as a whole, is a Being-to-death or a Being-to-nothing, the question of values as such, according to Heidegger, cannot even arise. Hence, Heidegger maintains that his is a descriptive analysis that is devoid of any moralizing.<sup>(9)</sup> But we pointed out in our Chapter 5 that, despite his intentions, his use of concepts such as "freedom-to-death", "authenticity and unauthenticity", "to be one's self", "free for the world", etc., causes his philosophy to be inherently value-laden. Fritz-Joachim von Rintelen agrees with Heidegger that alienation, self-deception, and homelessness are caused by our surrender to the subjectivity of the rational will, but he deplores Heidegger's going to the other extreme of emphasizing the negativity of existence.

von Rintelen makes an impressive point when he says that, in emphasizing this negativity of existence, whatever is positive and of value must, of necessity, disappear ontologically. If the ground of the world and of man is the nothing, and if human existence is nothing but an act between finiteness and nothingness, then, in this fearful mood, everything is in question.

von Rintelen/...



von Rintelen makes the following penetrating comment:  
"Fundamentally, however, its only possible content is an empty gesture that seeks release in dynamism." (10) Recent acts of terrorism, hi-jacking, kidnapping, etc., show what happens when humanitarian values are completely disregarded. Existentialism, which von Rintelen sees as a philosophy finiteness, hopes to establish a higher level in its demand on existence. Changing categories to existentialia does not alter the fact that they are empty of content. The "'philosophy of finiteness' usually results in a fundamentally unbalanced type of person... . If a man of this sort embarks on a higher activity he can only become an 'apostle without a mission', because his call remains ultimately devoid of form and content." (11)  
If the content is empty then truth has been deprived of its meaning. The sphere of "being attuned" (Gestimmtsein) is a flimsy replacement, as is attested by Heidegger's own travelling along the false path when he briefly embraced National Socialism and misled, for a time, the German youth, in his exhortations to them, during those troubled times.

In answer to the philosophy of finiteness and its negativity of existence, von Rintelen says: "In our own view, existence is the inmost nucleus of our

'value-person' /...



'value-person' (Wertperson) whose possibilities are to be realized with our full co-operation. The affirmation of our own self-being frees us from external alienation. We must affirm our own self as given to us and, despite its defects, must develop its possibilities as much as in us lies."<sup>(12)</sup> It is man's great gift that he can create values, and this is what distinguishes him from other beings. As the contents of value, von Rintelen sees the following, among others : greater perfection, health, beauty, nobility, purity, joy and love. The significance of these lies in the degree to which they can be fulfilled in concrete reality. Retaining the idea of increase, no aspect can sufficiently "exhaust the content of a real idea of value."<sup>(13)</sup> von Rintelen wants to give more power to what he calls "Spirit". He sees Spirit as the "non-sensory interior reality which gives all ontic being its actual, orderly objective meaning; its essential form and dignity. ... Thus Spirit is the ultimate, decisive, even though not the only power, whose superior forces can often be obstinately and destructively opposed by the blind dynamic of inferior orders."<sup>(14)</sup> His concern extends to restoring confidence in it, and, insofar as it establishes the ontological and ethical aspects of life, it helps overcome man's alienation, which, for him can only be resolved in/...

resolved in a "transcendent, absolute value."<sup>(15)</sup>  
von Rintelen sees Value as pointing beyond the finite.  
Through the idea of Value, man reaches "the threshold  
of transcendence",<sup>(16)</sup> when alienation is overcome  
through the "intentionally directed Spirit".<sup>(17)</sup> Thus,  
"value, person and love are completely fulfilled only  
in authentic metaphysical transcendence." <sup>(18)</sup>

While we have a tremendous amount of sympathy for  
such a view, we find that the replacing of the negative  
existentialia with the positive ones of joy, love,  
faith, etc., do not solve the problem of man's  
alienation. In overcoming the finite Being of  
Heidegger through his idea of Spirit, von Rintelen has  
not put man on the threshold of authenticity, for, he  
has overcome man's actuality, his contingency and  
his finiteness.

Otto Friedrich Bollnow, too, points to Heidegger's  
overemphasis of negative existentialia (moods) as  
against the positive ones of say, joy and happiness,  
peace and contentment, song and dance. Bollnow would  
have the existential attitudes of heroic defiance and  
firm resolution which are so pronounced in Heidegger's  
thought balanced by hope, confidence and gratitude.  
"These latter values carry man, so to speak, in the  
midst of/...

midst of all change, becoming, historicity and finiteness and provide him with a firm basis.

For Bollnow, man, in his being-there, is not merely a passive, suffering and experiencing being, but rather an active and creative one. There are not only times of crisis, but there are quiet times as well."<sup>(19)</sup>

For Bollnow, the positive experience of human existence has, not only ontological significance, but also an ethical one, for, through love, the fellow human being is brought back into the presence of the individual. In joy, happiness, dance and the festive mood, the individual is transported to another world, and finite time is transcended at that moment, thus merging the self with the Absolute. Therefore, Bollnow, in returning man to the world as his home, and in not seeing the future as only menacing, locates man's authentic existence in man's metaphysical experience.

In this connection, Professor Rauche makes the following critical observation: "Bollnow's anthropological approach of penetrating to the whole and, in this way, healing man and the world cannot be overlooked. But did he not overlook the controversial element in human activities?"<sup>(20)</sup> Professor Rauche shows that Bollnow has overlooked the problematic nature of human truth. Bollnow's neue Geborgenheit (a new sense of security)

is as/...

is as much an assumption as is Heidegger's conception of man as the ek-sistence of Being, (that is, man standing out into the truth of Being). "...if all constituted human truths are controversial, neither existential philosophy nor Bollnow's philosophy of life can possibly have overcome the crisis of truth. Both alternatives for dealing with the crisis are developed in a particular existential situation, i.e., under specific circumstances. ...neither of them can possibly have guided man to live an authentic life; for each alternative sees the authentic nature of human existence in a different way, in accordance with its respective constituted world-view." (21)

Fritz Heinemann calls Heidegger an anti-thinker (a Gegendenker), "a philosopher who formulates his doctrine in opposition to preceding thinkers." (22) When we examine Heidegger's interpretation of the great thinkers in the history of philosophy, then Heinemann's point needs to be noted. In Heidegger's defence, however, due regard must be given to his intention, that is, of not letting Being be subjectively transformed into an object. But, then, in return, it is necessary to ask whether one can overcome subjectivity. Heinemann says, "The tendency is clear, but seems to derive from a misunderstanding. It is like an attempt to jump over one's own/...

one's own shadow. It is quite impossible to escape what he calls subjectivity; and in fact, instead of escaping it, he gets still deeper into it. Therefore, in spite of his enormous effort to the contrary, he belongs to the metaphysics of essences as well as to the history of subjectivism." (23)

In his lecture, Time and Being, Heidegger tries, in his attempt to overcome philosophy, to think Being without beings. Regardless of our paying attention to the basis on which he attempts to do this, we must fully agree with Heinemann that, in the final analysis, Heidegger does separate the natura naturans (creative nature) from the natura naturata (created nature). Heinemann asks: "Does it really make sense to reflect continuously on one's own existence on the one hand, and on Being on the other, in order to find out in the end what we knew from the beginning, that both are elusive?" (24) He suggests that instead of merely being caught up in the realm of possibilities, it is more realistic to attempt a redistribution of being, meaning, and value.

Heidegger, as anti-thinker, also rejects logic. Heinemann says that Heidegger's interpretation of logos follows from a misuse of etymology. While the derivation of "logic"/...



of "logic" is from "logos", his rejection of all logic for a conception of logos as the more original revelation of the truth of Being cannot be upheld. "This whole argumentation is based on an overvaluation of the word logos... . One cannot escape logic. If there is to be a metaphysics at all, it cannot be without logical foundations." <sup>(25)</sup> Heinemann makes a very significant point when he says that Heidegger's attack on logic fails because logical negation and ontological not-being are two different problems, and so, operating on different levels. However, Heinemann is quick to point out that "Heidegger is quite right, the ontological problem of not-being cannot be reduced to a merely linguistic or logical problem. It may be possible to get rid of such propositions as 'Pegasus is not' with the help of Russell's theory of descriptions, but the hard fact of death remains and cannot be eliminated by the most sophisticated linguistic analysis. At any moment we are faced with the possibility of not-being." <sup>(26)</sup>

Another problem which I find of pressing importance concerns Heidegger's thinking on language. Heidegger has said, often enough, that the poet can best say the truth concerning the Whole and the Holy. By listening to the "soundless saying", the poet and thinker form a world. This/...



world. This world constitutes Heidegger's model for authentic existence. However, while in Sein und Zeit unauthenticity was clearly demarcated and Verfallenheit well defined, in his later writings, Heidegger "wanted to point directly at a matter which in accordance with its very nature is inaccessible to communicative statements." (27) We find no need to question the interplay within the Fourfold; but, concerning the question of authentic Being and how human nature can be brought to authenticity as found in his later writings, we ask for those criteria which might help man decide on and respond appropriately to that which addresses itself to man in "soundless saying". For poets and thinkers the soundless saying of Being may constitute an adequate path to authenticity. But since Heidegger's concern is with the whole of mankind, there was a need for him to provide specific criteria which would enable man to distinguish between authenticity and unauthenticity, between truth and error. If, as we have maintained throughout this thesis, the contingency, historicity, and finiteness of man are given their full weight by Heidegger, then it is obvious that these criteria are lacking in his philosophy.

Following the Heideggerian path to authenticity seriously compromises the individual's contingent character and/...

character and his responsibility for his actions (since there are no rules and since the individual is on the threshold of authenticity). In similar fashion, Heidegger's writings ignore "the problems of sin, freedom of the will, divine grace, the efforts to conform with divine providence, as well as the problems of the responsible struggle with temptation and with the moral decision, which still determine Western man today in secularized form. Heidegger's later writings do not deal with everyday men but with creative men." (28)

Thus, the Heideggerian model that is to replace a tradition of alienation, represents only a part of the Truth. The model as such cannot cope with the Whole and the Holy. In emphasizing the Unknowable and the Mysterious, Heidegger's thought, in these times of need, is certainly no model of clarity. Heidegger "could give no rules for either the realm of theory or the realm of practice with regard to how to distinguish between a truth in which error and sham dominate and a truth which these 'equal partners' have not disguised. Furthermore, in the place of the moral commandments which - according to Heidegger - have evidently been overcome and dismissed, forethinking has arrived at no standard which can decide whether a specific interpretation or action is 'good' or not." (29)

We note/...

We note that Heidegger makes an important point when he shows how, under the power of traditional metaphysics, the good earth is despoiled, and that, "to dwell poetically on the earth means 'to receive the benediction of the earth, to become acclimated in the law of this reception, in order to guard the 'mystery' of Being.'" (30) Thus, in dwelling poetically, man dwells among his "things" in their fourfold unity (earth and heaven, men and gods), when things and men are what they are. Language "shows" or "lets things appear" as they are. It is just this definition of language that we question. Is language confined to letting things appear and disclosing the hidden? In other words, for Heidegger, the sole truth of language is the saying of the truth of Being. From this ontological perspective, expressions of language which are not the saying of the truth of Being, are unauthentic. However, such a view of language stems from the fact that Heidegger reduces everything to Being as the source of authenticity. Recognizing that life consists of numerous dimensions, we maintain that, by reducing authenticity to the ontological dimension only, the other equally important dimensions, for example, the historical, the practical, the ethical, the economic and the political, are devalued in the sense that Heidegger wishes to locate the authentic source of all these dimensions in/...

dimensions in Being, which is his underlying assumption.

Heidegger's stress on the ontological has affected his view of language in the sense that he reduces its essence to the saying of the truth of Being. In our view, language can claim, quite legitimately, all these other dimensions of human existence that we have indicated above. It is also possible for language to increase our awareness of life and the possibilities of life in all its complexities. An even more important view of language, in my opinion, is the fact that it enables man to formulate theories and hypotheses which are continually widening the horizon of truth in terms of the changing circumstances of life. Such a view of language is, naturally, in line with the contingent and dynamic aspect of life. Since the circumstances of life are always changing, new theories are always being proposed to cope with new situations. Heidegger, however, who sees life as being "conditioned" by Being, sees language as also being "conditioned" by Being. As the "house of Being", language says the truth of Being. Thus, for Heidegger, the question: How should man act in order to be authentic? is answered purely in terms of an "alert, but passive" expectancy of Being to reveal itself to man./...

to man. "We are to do nothing but wait." (31)

The question following from the one asked above:

What can man say in order to be authentic? is seen in terms of saying the truth of Being. Such a view reduces both human action and language to the ontological dimension. "There can be no metaphysical freedom without political, social, or economic freedom; on the other hand, these concrete freedoms exist only by virtue of metaphysical freedom. Either reality, in and for itself, is destructive.

Heidegger has shown the way to a new humanism rooted in the Being of being, but this humanism must relate itself to the structure of human freedom worked out in the political, social, and economic framework." (32)

Notes/...



N O T E S

1. HEIDEGGER, M. : An Introduction to Metaphysics, p.31.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., p.32.
4. Ibid., p.35.
5. RAUCHE, G.A. : The Choice (Quo vadis, homo?), p.75
6. HEIDEGGER, M. : An Introduction to Metaphysics, p.31.
7. See HEIDEGGER'S essay What is Metaphysics?
8. VON RINTELEN, F. : Beyond Existentialism, pp. 48-49.
9. HEIDEGGER, M. : Being and Time, p.211, 224.
10. VON RINTELEN, F. : op. cit., p.45.
11. Ibid., p.95.
12. Ibid., p.112.
13. Ibid., p.231.
14. Ibid., pp. 255-256.
15. Ibid., p.234.
16. Ibid., p.236.
17. Ibid., p.254.
18. Ibid., p.255.
19. RAUCHE, G.A. : Contemporary Philosophical Alternatives and the Crisis of Truth, p.49.
20. Ibid., p.53.
21. Ibid., pp.54-55.



22. HEINEMANN, F.H. : Existentialism and the Modern Predicament, p.94.
23. Ibid., pp. 95-96.
24. Ibid., p.187.
25. Ibid., p.97.
26. Ibid., p.98.
27. HEIDEGGER, M. : On Time and Being, p.26.
28. MARX, W. : Heidegger and the Tradition, p.250.
29. Ibid., p.248.
30. Ibid., p.238.
31. HEIDEGGER, M. : Discourse on Thinking, p.62
32. In the Introduction to  
HEIDEGGER, M. : What is Philosophy, p.15.

They (metaphysical problems) are insoluble in principle, i.e., from the point of view of the finite understanding. They cannot be analysed into a finite number of propositions or concepts. But this does not imply that they cannot be discussed at all and that they do not allow of any tentative solution whatever. True metaphysical problems cannot be eliminated. One may try to discard them, but nevertheless they reappear, even within science, e.g. the mind-body problem in psychology. The problems of existentialism are alive because they are metaphysical.

Heinemann.

C H A P T E R     E I G H T

CONCLUSION.

Karl Löwith has captured most aptly the essence of Heidegger's thought, the depth of his concern, and the significance of his influence in the following passage : "Heidegger has managed to give new standards to a whole generation of students, to convince them that 'logic' and 'reason' (Vernunft) have to be dissolved 'in a whirlwind of a more fundamental kind of questioning', that ethics, civilization and humaneness (Humanität) ... are no serious concern of ours, that man is not the animal rationale, but an ecstatic 'shepherd of Being', and that all theoretical imagination and technological construction, on which scientific thought is said to be based, represent the fall of subjectivity which becomes a prey of its corresponding objectivity and of absolute 'objectification' (Vergegenständlichung)". (1)

The thought of Martin Heidegger can only be fully understood if seen as a reaction to the failure of classical metaphysics and scientism to lead man to authenticity. It must also be seen against the background of the mood brought about by the world wars. In other words, Heidegger/...

words, Heidegger's model cannot be separated from the need and from the times out of which it arose. "If material possessions are lost in an instant, if friends and relatives are killed every day, the only thing left is oneself, one's own existence." (2)

It is therefore understandable that existential philosophy begins with an analysis of human existence. The old belief in the dependence on a Supreme Being, who created the world and who could be understood only by way of analogy, gave way to a belief that man himself could solve the problem of the cosmos (through mathematics, mechanics, sense-experience, measuring nature, and through the subjectivity of the individual ego). Thus, the world of the beyond, with its "false longings", gave way to the world of the individual. The breakdown of traditional cultural and moral values heightened the individual's existential dilemma. Metaphysics as a constitutive and speculative act remained theoretical only, and so alienated man from reality. The attempt to cheat time resulted in a forgetfulness of Being (Seinsvergessenheit). Science and Technology further eroded man's individuality and posed a threat to his existence. Existentialist thought was a reaction to the failure of Philosophy and Science to lead man to an authentic existence.

In his/...

In his attempt to rehouse man in Being, Heidegger began by phenomenologically analysing man's very Being-in-the-world. Heidegger wishes to recall man to his authentic nature, which is to be the "shepherd of Being" or the manifestation of Being. Thus, any attempt to constitute Being from the world on the part of man leads to his alienation. Man cannot comprehend Being but is on the way to Being. Professor Rauche in the manuscript of his latest book, which he kindly made available to me, says: "With the existentialist method of answering the question of truth and solving the problem of man's authentic existence, therefore, the abdication of philosophy consists in the attempt to exchange the theoretical constitution and conception of the world in philosophy and the sciences for the functional act of self-creation in the midst of nothing." (3)

As we have already emphasized in our last chapter, the individual's act of self-creation in the face of nothing lacks a content that could give his self-creation meaning. In any case, Heidegger's constitutive act of self-creation is "his attempt to constitute man's existence as the manifestation of Being by the dialectical method, (and) is a philosophical act in the classical sense of the word." (4)

Using the/...

Using the method of phenomenology, Heidegger hopes to replace Philosophy with "Fundamental Ontology". But in doing so, has he overcome alienation, or has he caused man to give up his right to his authentic being and so renounce his claim to freedom? Freedom, Heidegger so rightly said, is not a characteristic or a quality that man also possesses. Freedom is the source of man's existence. But the danger of creating new alienation lies in Heidegger's identifying man's authentic existence (freedom) with Being as an event or a process. This lends man's authentic existence a transcendent character, which is at the same time really transcendental, (that is, conceived as a relationship between Sein and das Seiende) and thus, an immanent idea. "...the methodological constitution of individual existence is no less an act of absolute self-transcendence than is the constitution of the Absolute from the world in classical metaphysics, except that, in existentialism, the Absolute is won negatively, i.e., it is regarded as transcendent or as an opus externum. If, however, the existentialist approach constitutes another act of self-transcendence and, as such, describes another cycle of the self, it constitutes another philosophical theory." (5)

In his attempt to overcome alienation, Heidegger  
would have/...





would have philosophy (metaphysics) abolished as constitutive theory. But his reflection on the relationship between das Sein and das Seiende shows that philosophy as theory cannot be abolished. (despite his intentions), since it is the dialectical construction of this relationship in a certain way that causes Heidegger's model of the man-world relationship to be one among others, for example, Sartre, ~~Wittgenstein~~ Wittgenstein, Bollnow. It is through this construction of the model in a rational and consistent way that man is fused with Being and the principle of identity has been fulfilled. Heidegger's model achieves man's authenticity only in Heidegger's imagination and falls short of bringing man in line with reality in that it fails to give due emphasis to the contingent and controversial nature of man, which must, of necessity, survive, and so confirm itself in the act of self-realization that takes place in many various ways in ever new forms, as life's circumstances change. This is the reason why human thinking and human culture are for ever in a state of becoming. The attempt to overcome such a state naturally leads to a new alienation of man's true nature. This, however, can be said of all human theorizing on the problem of alienation and authenticity. "Neither Hegel's return of the Mind to itself, nor Marx's proletarian revolution, nor/...

revolution, nor Kierkegaard's repetition understood as a restitution of the status pristinus, nor Marcel's absolute hope which does not leave room for any sort of despair, offer a definitive solution of the problem, for in spite of them alienation remains." (6)

Heidegger's attempt at the overcoming of philosophy as theory (which fails since this attempt takes place in terms of theory), means that the autonomy of the individual must give way to his being a tool or a function. As we have already emphasized, in the case of Heidegger, the free, creative being must now be seen as an agent or a manifestation of Being. In the negativity of existence, the human individual as a creative being is reduced to a Being-to-death and a Being-to-nothing. Such a reduction robs the individual of his uniqueness. Therefore the attempt at overcoming philosophy as theory must be seen as an attempt to overcome man as a reflective being. Philosophy is reduced to a descriptive activity and replaced by a phenomenological account of human existence (Dasein) and an analysis of various basic existentialia (moods). Heidegger characterizes theory and theorizing as an idle speculative activity that man indulges in when he forgets Being. Man can only free himself from metaphysics and the will-to-power, if  
he thinks/...

he thinks Being only. But the nature of the human individual is such that he responds to the changing circumstances of life, to new situations, and to new theories. Heidegger's conception of man's position in the world is itself one such theory based on an assumption, namely, the assumption of an underlying Being as the source of the world and man's activities in the world. Heidegger, therefore, exchanges philosophy for his theory of existence, which he constructs by way of a method that best suits what he wants to say. Thus philosophy remains. "...it is the permanent tension between man's reasoning and man's striving that prevents man from comprehending the Absolute, that man's methods and theories remain controversial and problematic and are therefore always transcended by the controversial relation into which they inevitably enter with other theories." (7)

The thread of continuity with the past which sustains, nourishes, and enriches the present and which can be creatively used for establishing the ground for future possibilities, cannot be cut and replaced by a descriptive ontology only. Such an ontology cannot do justice to life as a whole. No matter how sophisticated the science of ontology can become, the subtlety of life remains. Life is both a blessing and a problem and we could say that, in a way, Heidegger, too, recognizes and/...

recognizes and admits this when he attempts to give up the words phenomenology, hermeneutics, and ontology, in his most recent writings. However, in the final analysis, it must be asked: "Does the question of Being have a priority over all other questions? If so, is Heidegger's assurance authority enough? Or is it more reasonable to suggest that it is more likely that human problems are various, even in their origins, and that probably the best solution, not the final one, for there is no such thing, is the one that takes into account a variety of interrelated factors?" So, a political solution may satisfy certain political problems, but these must be seen in relation to and balanced by an appreciation of, say, certain social considerations, and so on. Thus the idea of an Absolutely Free Individual is a myth, and a dangerous one at that. The individual man of existentialism is no real (in the sense of actual) man, but the man of Being or the Nothing. As such, he is isolated from society, from its problems and frustrations, and from his fellow human being who conceives, in the first place, the very ideas of humanity. A real content can only arise out of a fruitful dialogue between man and his fellowman. When it comes to the crunch, the "windy mysticism" of Heidegger's latest writings, his analysis of works of art and poetry, though/...

poetry, though fascinating and illuminating, his conceptions of truth and Being, though they present an enticing road to what he sees as an authentic existence, must be regarded as having failed when the test of reality is given its full measure. Heidegger's preoccupation with Being is just as alienating as is the preoccupation with beings for which he criticized traditional philosophy.

Heidegger's road to authenticity endangers human individuality and poses a real threat to the life of the community. Not only does Heidegger's model require the transformation of the nature of the human being, but also that of society when the individual will see things in their essential fourfoldness. Even if we grant that the nature of the individual must be transformed, Heidegger fails (because he is oblivious of actuality) to provide a reasonably workable programme whereby his concern over the destiny of the alienated can be brought to fruition. The complex and multifaceted nature of man would not admit an ontological solution of man's problems only, if it is at all possible to overcome them. Could that be an explanation of why Heidegger would want a transformation of man's essential nature, of why he would want metaphysics overcome? Is it not nearer the truth to say that man's

individuality and/...



individuality and contingency, his critical and reflective nature, preclude the possibility of overcoming metaphysics or the problem of alienation in general? Professor Rauche aptly sums up the problem of alienation and authenticity when he says: "The other man, because of the different structure of his truth-perspective, is man's permanent stumbling block on the way to reaching the Truth. At the same time, however, the other man is man's incentive for continuing his quest for truth. For it is the common experience of the crisis of truth (by which experience they are separated) that causes man and his fellowman to enter into a dialogue with one another concerning the question of truth, authentic existence and freedom." (8)

Notes/...



N O T E S

1. Quoted by HEINEMANN, F.H.: Existentialism and the Modern Predicament, p. 216.
2. VON RINTELEN, F. : Beyond Existentialism, p. 9.
3. RAUCHE, G.A. : The Abdication of Philosophy=  
The Abdication of Man, p. 91.
4. Ibid., p. 94.
5. Ibid., p. 95.
6. HEINEMANN, F.H. : op. cit., p. 173.
7. RAUCHE, G.A. : op. cit., p. 151.
8. Ibid., p. 105.

S U M M A R Y

This dissertation investigated the problem of alienation with special reference to Heidegger. Man's actual experience as a contingent being was taken as the criterion of his authentic existence, and alienation was seen as the attempt to overcome natural controversy by theory. The various methodological forms of human self-realization in or self-projection into the world, reflect man's true nature as a finite, historical, and contingent being. Because of the controversial relationship in which truth-perspectives stand to one another, the conflict experienced thereby is the very ground of man's authentic existence. Authentic existence is thus an existence in the midst of contingent life, one in reference to the other man. In the light of the above definitions, we examined the models presented by Plato, Aquinas, Descartes, Kant, Hegel, and Marx, showing the condition under which each arose and the method under which each was developed. We examined how successfully the model coped with the situation in which it was conceived, and what new problems it created.

Heidegger's own response to traditional classical metaphysics was that it was the root-cause of man's  
alienation and/...

alienation and the spiritual decline of the earth. Thus the motivation of Heidegger's thought was to authenticate human existence. Heidegger locates in Being the spiritual destiny of the Western world. By returning man to Being he hopes to save him from the Weltnacht. Thus the question, "Why is there any Being at all and not rather nothing?" is for Heidegger the foundation of Western civilization.

Heidegger sees the origin of the problem of alienation in Plato's separation of the realm of Being from the realm of Time, finally resulting in the separation of Being and beings. Being is now constituted from beings, but Being as such, (which is the possibility for beings showing themselves as they are) is forgotten. Being (Sein) is reduced to beings. In returning man to Being, Heidegger, using the method of phenomenology, begins with an analysis of Dasein. The thesis critically examines Heidegger's conception of man's flight into das Man and the problem of authentic existence as revealed by such a flight. "Anxiety" and "Care" constitute key concepts in describing the authentic nature of man's existence : Dasein is a Being-to-death or a Being-to-nothing. Having grounded metaphysics properly, Heidegger shows his true relationship to Being. Dasein is an ek-sistent being, i.e., he stands out into the truth of Being/...

of Being. Truth (Aletheia) is the unconcealment of Being in and through Dasein. Being as such is not a thing, but the process by which finite things emerge from concealment.

In critically examining Heidegger's conception of alienation and authenticity, we attempted to show the importance and relevancy of his approach in terms of the historical circumstances of his time. But, we also drew attention to certain serious problems that arose from his approach: the over-emphasis of negative existentialia, the danger of operationalism, the question of values and experiential content, the rejection of logic, the problem of reductionism and the extent to which the Heideggerian model coped with the real, human needs. Our final conclusion is that, inspite of the relevancy and justifiability of his attempt to authenticate human existence, Heidegger ultimately failed to do so. Therefore, the problem of a new alienation, i.e., a new form of absolute self-transcendence, in terms of a new method, arises.

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