Paradiplomacy as a Capacity Building Strategy for Good Governance at the Local Level in South Africa

By

Osemoboh Regis Wilson

Student No: 213529250

Supervisor: Dr. Nolubabalo Magam

A Thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science, School of Social Sciences, College of Humanities, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg.

January 2023

Declaration

I, **Osemoboh Regis Wilson**, declare that:

The research reported in this thesis, except where otherwise showed is my original research.

I. This thesis has not been sent for any degree or examination at any other university.
II. This thesis does not contain other persons' data, pictures, graphs, or other information unless specifically acknowledged as being sourced from other persons.
III. This thesis does not contain other persons' writing unless specifically acknowledged as being sourced from other researchers. Where other written sources have been quoted, then:
IV. Their words have been re-written, but the general information attributed to them has been referenced.
V. Where their exact words have been used, then their writing has been placed in italics and inside quotation marks and referenced.
VI. This thesis does not contain text, graphics or tables copied and pasted from the Internet, unless specifically acknowledged, and the source being detailed in the thesis and in the reference's sections.

[redacted]

18/7/2023

Student Signature — Date

[redacted]

18 July 2023

Supervisor's Signature — Date

Dedication

For Faith “Shamama” Wey and Osemudiame Ryan Wilson. This is something worth aspiring to. In loving Memory of Arnaud “Fiston” Kayonga: it took a bit of time, but I finished it.

Acknowledgement

I am grateful to God Almighty, for life and for the strength and grace to pursue this. I could not have done this without the patient guidance of my supervisor Dr Nolubabalo Magam, I am grateful for your unwavering support and confidence in me. Yaya na Mandy Lami, Aunti Vero mama na, Baba Ose, Aibe and Theo, Aunty Beatrice Kayonga, thank you always for the unending love and support.

I am grateful to Halina Suwalowska, for the love on those dark days. Charles Nnaeme for always believing in what I could do. Ovett Nwosimir, Andrew Chilenga, Albano Troco, Lerato Phali, Yonella Maziko, Thube Shongwe. Banele KaMalandela, you came towards the end of the story and made your mark. To Mr. Warren Mkhize, for allowing me time off work to make sure this happens, thank you master! you were all part of the struggle, I am blessed to know you all. Uduak Ubon-Isreal and 'Eddidas' Ubon-Isreal, may man dem, thank you. To all those who took their time to participate in the interview, I am profoundly grateful for your contributions.

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

ANC – African National Congress

BBBEE- Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment

BRICS - Brazil Russia India China South Africa

CBC – Cross Border Cooperation

CoGTA – Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs

DA – Democratic Alliance

DAEA – Department of Agriculture and Environmental Affairs

DIRCO – Department of International Relations and Cooperation

DRC- Democratic Republic of Congo

EU- European Union

FDI- Foreign Direct Investment

FET- Further Education and Training

GDP – Gross Domestic Product

GPG- Gauteng Provincial Government

HE- His Excellency

HIV-Human Immunodeficiency Virus

ICCA- International Congress and Convention Association

IFP – Inkatha Freedom Party

IGR – Intergovernmental Relations

IR-International Relations

ITC- International Technology Corporation

KZN – KwaZulu-Natal

MDGs- Millennium Development Goals

MEC – Member of the Executive Council

MNCs- Multinational Corporations

MOUs – Memorandum of Understanding

NEPAD – New Partnership for Africa's Development

NCOP – National Council of Provinces

NPD- National Development Plan

ODA-Official Development Assistance

PFMA – Public Finance Management Act

PGDS – Provincial Growth and Development Strategy

RBIDZ- Richards Bay Industrial Development Zone

SADC- Southern African Development Community

SALGA- South African Local Government Association

SAPS- South African Police Service

SDF-Spatial Development Framework

SEZs – Special Economic Zones

SMMEs- Small, Medium, and Micro-sized Enterprises

SNGs – Sub-national Governments

TAFI- Travel Agency Federation of India

TIKZN – Trade and Investment KwaZulu-Natal

TKZN – Tourism KwaZulu-Natal

UN- United Nations

UNESCO – United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation

US- United States of America

List of tables

Abstract

Governance in South Africa is plagued with a lot of challenges. This study names inept capacity as a primary challenge of governance as it is linked to a panoply of malaise from corruption to underdevelopment. The aim of the study is to explore how building good governance capacity can become part of the multipronged long-term solution to local governments' distress. The argument is that capacity development for good governance at the local level should underpin reformation policies and efforts. Extensive evidence show that international organisations and donors provide support to developing countries in a manner that seeks to build institutional capacity and improve the quality of governance. As a manner of optimising such supports, this study makes a case that donors can collaborate with subnational entities to coproduce capacity and governance solutions tailored to the concerns of local communities through paradiplomacy. Paradiplomacy is global cooperation at a local level, with correlating positive impacts at a local level. Because of globalisation, supranational (e.g., The African Union, SADC, The European Union) authorities have emerged as crucial players in international relations; more so, territorial sovereignty gives way for more informal types of horizontal cooperation and structured interdependence between nation-states. Global problems have local impacts as such, but policies promulgated at supranational levels are often ineffective at the local level.

This study adopts a qualitative approach as it interviewed key respondents from the KwaZulu-Natal Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs (KZN-CoGTA) to explore workable solutions by making case for how best to address the issue of reduced or deficit capacity among government actors. Such a problem has given rise to a plethora of challenges when it come to the implementation and efficient execution of policies in South Africa. The study found that as the state ceases to be the only actor in public action, paradiplomacy presents itself as a tool for enhancing local intuitional capacity and concomitantly improve the quality of governance in South Africa.

Table of Contents

Chapter One: Introduction and Orientation of the study

1. Background and outline of research problem

Local government in South Africa battles with an array of governance challenges. From failed fiscus to failing at service delivery; local (here local qua provincial and all system ensconced under it) governance in South Africa is often described as being in "distress." Importantly, local government is one of the core pillars of the South African state-building project post-apartheid. A weakened state capacity because of factors ranging from corruption to fiscal mismanagement all contributes to local governments' distress. Equally, bad governance causes atrophy of local institutions, as evidenced in the oft violent service delivery protests experienced countrywide and the tenacious growth of unemployment, poverty, and inequality. The perturbing failure of local governance to reaffirm, points to a lack of capacity, a deficit contributing to the country's developmental challenges. The practice of good governance in South Africa (SA) remains elusive; despite about two decades of efforts and policy measures for promoting good governance practices. The Local Government: Municipal Systems Act, 2000 (Act No. 32 of 2000), Municipal Financial Management Act (2003) and even the office of the Auditor-General serve to ensure the practice of the democratic principles of accountability and transparency at all levels of government.

Parnell and Pieterse (2010), further affirm that capacity challenge is an underlying factor contributing to the 'distress' faced by local government in SA. Capacity challenge, according to them, exists because of an institutional lacuna that occurs at the local level in most post-colonial situations. In the post-colonial context, local government emerged as an addendum or rather a belated construction with incomplete administrative structures, limited fiscal powers and significantly, a deficit of human capacity. More so, in SA, the constitutional and structural transition post-1994 ushered in transformation. The transition and transformation did not, however, include capacity development. As such, while local government bears an important mandate – service delivery, it often lacks the capacity for it.

To find a long-term solution to local governments' distress, this study proposes that capacity development for good governance at the local level should underpin reformation policies and efforts. An array of literature show that international organisations and donors provide support to developing countries in a manner that seeks to build institutional

capacity and improve the quality of governance (Maman et al., 2018; Hayden, 2019). To optimise such supports, donors can collaborate with subnational entities to coproduce capacity and governance solutions tailored to the concerns of local communities through paradiplomacy.

Paradiplomacy is global cooperation at a local level, with correlating positive impacts at a local level. Because of globalisation, supranational (e.g., The African Union, SADC, The European Union) authorities have emerged as crucial players in international relations; more so, territorial sovereignty gives way for more informal types of horizontal cooperation and structured interdependence between nation-states. Global problems have local impacts as such, but policies promulgated at supranational levels are often ineffective at the local level.

In lieu of the reduced the capacity of government actors, Hayden (2019) similarly suggests that a significant dilemma that Africa faces with regards to governance is that there is a deficit of capacity needed for the implementation and efficient execution of policies. Moreso, since the state is no longer the only actor in public action (Nganje, 2014), paradiplomacy presents itself as a tool for enhancing local intuitional capacity and concomitantly improve the quality of governance in South Africa.

The term paradiplomacy was first introduced into academic literature by Ivo Duchacek (1986, 1990). Joenniemi & Serguinn (2014:20) describe it as an "aspect of worldwide globalisation and regionalisation, through which sub – and nonstate actors play an increasingly influential role in world politics." As such, through paradiplomacy, regions, cities, companies, NGOs, and so on, explore ways to establish relationship cross – and trans-border (CBC – TBC) to promote trade, investments, cooperation, and partnerships.

Against the preceding background, this study seeks to understand the need for provincial governments to shift their focus towards engaging in paradiplomacy to build local capacity. This position resonates with the supposition in Nganje (2014) that some degree of autonomy makes room for substate entities in South Africa to be catalysts and an integral part of the national development efforts. As such, this study additionally seeks to examine how paradiplomacy as development-oriented cooperation between actors at the sub-state level places subnational entities *in situ*, to promote good governance. Implicitly, paradiplomacy presents itself as an adequate and apt response to the diurnal governance challenges faced at the local level in South Africa. Hydén (2019) submits that to provide democracy aid to

African countries, there is a need for such support to be set within a purview that considers local context, historical and institutional factors. By implication, "changes in the aid relationship and the role of the donor, management approach, the knowledge base, and the time horizon of intended support for democracy. Donor presence and knowledge about the local context needs to increase, and more attention be given to independent situation analyses and scenarios" (:18).

Paradiplomacy as this study seeks to deploy it, ensconces some of the prescriptive ideas of good governance advanced by organisations like the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). In praxis, the developmental orientation of paradiplomacy in South Africa enables it to accommodate and present precise local governance needs. *A fortiori*, paradiplomacy is discussed as a strategy for building effective state institutions and concomitantly promote good governance, starting from the local level.

1.2 Preliminary literature study, and reasons for choosing topic

Meanings and applications of governance vary. Philologically, it has Greek, a verb *Kubernan* – meaning to steer a ship, Latin – *gubernare* and French – *gouverner* (Fukuyama, 2016). Governance also has a definitional morass. Juxtaposing Francis Fukuyama (2016) and Robert Rotberg's (2014) typology provides a careful balance of the concept and practice governance. Fukuyama (2016:90) describes governance: a) as international cooperation between substate entities, beyond the state system; this is borne out of globalisation which softens "territorial sovereignty to give way to "more informal types of horizontal cooperation"; b) as synonymous to public administration, "that is, effective implementation of state policy" (*ibid*).

Again, descriptions of "governance" are preceded by the adjective "good." As its axiom, and the essence of government is to promote the wellbeing of citizens. Internationally, consensus on good governance (GG), marry factors like operational institutions and processes, protection of human rights, promotion of human development, transparent and effective democratic process (Rothstein, 2019). More so, preventing conflict and providing security, encouraging, and enabling civic participation, combating corruption and the attainment of equitable economic and social results; are further tendered as the main constituents of GG. Bo Rothstein and Jan Teorell describe impartiality

– "the existence of sufficient capacity" – as a normative requirement of QoG. Similarly, Fukuyama (2016) suggests that the quality of Governance (QoG) can be assessed p*rocedurally* – the process of recruiting and promoting public servants based on merit or political patronage, and the level of technical expertise they are required to possess, and the overall level of ethics in bureaucratic procedure; and by measuring *Capacity* - the "level of education and professionalisation of government officials".

In Mary Grindle's (1997) typology, government should be capable of designing and implementing appropriate public policies. They should also have the administrative capacity to deliver resources equitably, transparently, and efficiently, and "respond efficaciously to the social welfare and economic claims of citizens" (:5). The preceding typology again expresses the view that governance is also a process, a process of decision making and decision implementation or no/poor implementation and the provision of services (Annan, 1999; IDEA, 2000; Fukuyama, 2016). As such, government in this regard has requisite capacity because decisions need implementation and the outcomes of such

decisions can be evaluated as weak or inadequate (Huther and Shah, 2005; Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi, 2004).

An awareness that global poverty is rooted in corruption and weak state capacity, drove interest in the topic of governance (Fukuyama, 2016:90). As such, Rotberg (2014) describes governance as performance, i.e., the capacity of governments for service delivery. An objective assessment of data, an examination of proxy results (e.g., life expectancy for the performance of a government in providing sound health outcomes, homicide numbers for safety, etc.) will demonstrate how effective or lack thereof, of government capacity for service delivery. Inherently, a lack of such capacity is *malum in se*, as it is attributed to negative consequences like state failure, and conflict among other things (Pillay & Kluvers, 2014).

According to Fukuyama (2016:90), in the developing world, "weak, incompetent, or non-existent governments have been and continue to be a source of severe difficulties." A further elucidation by Fukuyama affirms that the persistence of several health problems in sub-Saharan Africa points to a lack of capacity for managing health programmes or effectively implementing health policies, rather than a lack of will or resources. As Fukuyama (2016) again argues that, precisely, some necessary preconditions for the effective management of a health problem would include a "strong public-health infrastructure, public education, and knowledge about the epidemiology of the disease in specific regions". The foregoing specific consideration points to a broader issue of bureaucratic and administrative ineptitude; as to drive such an integrated management process requires state capacity and given a lack of such, "even if the resources were there, the institutional capacity to treat the disease is lacking in most countries in sub-Saharan Africa. Dealing with this epidemic thus requires helping afflicted countries develop the institutional capacity to use what resources they may acquire" (:91).

Further, neopatrimonialism is argued to be at the substrata of the democratic process in SA. Neopatrimonialism is cadre deployment, and it is the clientism that permeates the South African socio-political arena (Lodge, 2014). This precipitates the decline of institutional capacity (failure of state-owned enterprises like ESKOM, South African Airlines (SAA)) and adds to the 'burden' of the state. A case in point is the fact that out of the 257 municipalities and twenty-one municipal entities audited by the Auditor General for the 2017-2018 fiscal year in South Africa, only eighteen received clean audits

(Dorasamy, 2021). Such failed fiscal performance causes atrophy of local institutions, as shown in the oft violent service delivery protests experienced countrywide and the tenacious growth of unemployment, poverty, and inequality. The perturbing failure of local governance points to a lack of capacity; a deficit culpable for the country's developmental challenges (Naidoo & Ramphal, 2018).

Efforts to improve the quality of governance in South Africa must shift its focus on strengthening the mechanisms of democratic accountability and enhancing capacity. The plausibility is that Neopatrimonial politics compete for primacy as a practice that weakens governance and causes atrophy of intuitional capacity in South Africa (Beresford, 2015). In a Neopatrimonial system, "rulers maintain the outward facade of impersonal, modern government, but in reality, act as predators, using political power to extract resources for their benefit and that of their families". Such governments are ubiquitous in SSA, and neo-patrimonial politics is "one of the most important causes of poverty there" (Fukuyama, 2016:120); as it entrenches a culture of bureaucratic malfeasance and the correlating erosion of public sector capacity.

To assert, good governance is a *sine qua non* for development (Rothstein, 2015); it correlates with and determines the improvement of citizen welfare and socio-economic growth (Owoye & Bissessar, 2012). More so, underdevelopment is at the tether end of failed policies (Mingui-Pipidi, 2015); and this further points to some specific adverse outcomes of bad governance. There is an urgent need to improve the QoG in SA. Significantly, enhancing the capacity of public servants at all levels of government is requisite for the efficient implementation of existing policies (Bojisic- Djelilovic, Kostovicova & Rampton, 2014).

Enhancing institutional capacity, consequently, has become the prevalent method adopted for promoting QoG since the 1990s. Some notable challenges with such a trajectory include the ineffectiveness of the top-down approach utilised by such institutional reforms. More so, the imported (from the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, etc.) standard responses to predetermined problems have limited impact. Such an approach undermines local efforts to build state capacity (Ganahl, 2013). There is a lacuna of an optimal approach to achieve the level of institutional capacity required for QoG in South Africa, despite extant best practice policies and 'good fit' policies. This study argues that paradiplomacy provides a viable means for enhancing institutional capacity.

Paradiplomacy is described as "a terminology reminiscent of sports (Olympic and Paralympic games), the concept of paradiplomacy is used to distinguish international activities of subnational and nonstate actors that have limited capabilities and legal powers in the foreign policy sphere as compared to national governments" (Perti & Sergunin, 2014:19). It is a nascent concept and practice in South Africa, whereby provincial governments have active engagements with sub-state entities from other countries to promote socio-economic development (Geldenhys, 1998; Zondi, 2012; Nganje, 2014). Primarily, paradiplomacy in SA is driven by a need to source for financial investments for a province's development. According to Fritz Nganje (2014), since 1995, paradiplomacy has evolved to become a feature in South Africa's international relations. There is a recognition of the developmental value of paradiplomacy in the country.

Grävingholt, Leininger and von Haldenwang (2012) identify some of the keyways in which assistance for capacity building can be undertaken. Firstly, donors need to rank and sequence their activities in a manner that allows them to rank their different objectives strategically and successively. This will in an ostensive way ensure continuity of project or policies, develop, and engrain good governance practices. It will also likewise ensure the optimization of resources. Fundamentally, donors need to be flexible to coordinate their actions to meet specific contextual challenges. Equally, balmy cooperation between donors and local institutions should promote joint conflict analyses and political assessments to enhance the effectiveness of donor interventions.

All capacity building efforts should be cognizant of the need, the political architecture of a community and a further need to examine and understand the political processes through which capacity assistance can be offered as the success of any support depends on how these political factors are assessed.

Further, in the work of Karla Herning (2017), the necessity of understanding local political processes and milieu is because the political and social context of interventions are sensitive. Understanding such context is pertinent to the process of working closely with established local institutions (reformation process should grow organically from consultation with the people and should be set up by local authorities as opposed to donors or NGOs). Some findings have established that donor assistance or interventions often fail to address the "root causes" of a problem. They instead are quick to "employ flawed analytical concepts and do not account for the specific conditions of their political and social

environment. At the same time, many studies do not even pay lip service to domestic ownership, let alone evaluate interventions from this perspective" (Grävingholt et al., 2012:11).

Significantly, paradiplomacy can aid in establishing development partnerships that understand the context – local – specific problems as it pertains to governance challenges, it would also encourage dialogue and lead to an integrated approach that fosters greater responsibility for local capacities and local political idiosyncrasies. Significantly, paradiplomacy provides a space for specific solutions to specific problems; because it understands the political context and process needed to enhance local institutional capacity. As Joenniemi & Serguinn (2014), affirm, in most cases, paradiplomacy proves to be an efficient instrument for addressing local problems.

In South Africa, studies on paradiplomacy focus on the provenance, purview, and trajectory of paradiplomacy. Deon Geldenhys (1998) provides a historical analysis of paradiplomacy post- apartheid and accentuates the developmental potentials of the practice. Sphamandla Zondi (2012) lauds the developmental impact of paradiplomacy but was critical of its misalignment with the country's foreign policy. Fritz Nganje (2014) explores paradiplomacy from a developmental perspective and suggests that it should be an activity that aligns with the overall developmental route of the country's foreign policy and need-driven practice.

The scholars mentioned above delineate paradiplomacy as a practice that seeks to advance the national interest. Their analysis is limited; as it confines paradiplomacy to sourcing for financial investment, for local economic development. Such an approach shuns the capacity development potentials of paradiplomacy. *Propter hoc,* this study investigates paradiplomacy – the engagement of subnational entities in foreign relations as a theory and praxis for capacity building for good governance in South Africa. The utilisation of paradiplomacy as a strategy for capacity development would ensure that policies and efforts for promoting good governance are an inclusive process as paradiplomacy will enable substate entities to be intimately involved in the strategic planning and the decision-making processes. As such, paradiplomacy can help secure commitment to decisions and measures arrived at by all stakeholders.

This study will firstly contribute to understanding the evolving practice of paradiplomacy in South Africa and Africa by extension. Importantly, however, the study will make novel

contributions to understanding how paradiplomacy can be utilised for capacity development, particularly good governance capacity. The study's approach of interrogating the practice paradiplomacy as a capacity development strategy will contribute to the anecdotal 'teaching' a wo/man to fish, as opposed to making them mere recipients of fish.

1.3 Research problems and objectives: Key questions to be asked

- What are the current challenges to good governance in South Africa?
- What strategies and instruments are in place to promote paradiplomacy quantitatively (the number of international partnership and projects) and qualitatively (diversity of methods, forms, and concentration of international cooperation) in South Africa?
- How can paradiplomacy be utilised to enhance local institutional capacity for good governance at a provincial level in South Africa?

1.3.1 Research problems and objectives: Broader issues to be investigated:

The following broad objectives will direct the trajectory of the study:

- To understand the different challenges of good governance at the provincial level in South Africa.
- To assess the various qualitative and quantitative practice of paradiplomacy at the provincial level in South Africa; and
- To interrogate the utilisation of paradiplomacy as a strategy for capacity building for a government of quality at a provincial level in South Africa.

1.4 Principal theories upon which the research project will be constructed

It is pertinent to take into cognisance the fact that democracy has become a ubiquitous form of governance in Africa. Since the last three decades, the state in Africa has evolved, has gone through several reformations to achieve positive developmental outcomes (Hyden, 2019). In the past two decades governance reforms in Africa have thus emphasised capacity-building/capacity enhancement. This approach centres on the view that strong institutional capacity translates to the ability of a government to develop and implement

policies to achieve development.

Because of the above, this study utilises the State Building Theory as its frame for analysis. Central to the State Building Approach is the need to re (construct) the capacity of state institutions to enable the state to execute its functions efficiently. This theory is felicitous as it is underpinned by the notion that government as an institution can carry out its functions better or worse (Fukuyama, 2014; Sturges, 2018). Capacity development in the purview of this study goes beyond just improving the abilities and skills of individuals or restructuring state intuitions, to a "strategically coordinated" set of activities designed to strengthen the performance capabilities of individuals, institutions, and societies (Butera, 2014).

The predominant supposition that undergirds the state-building theory is the view that by strengthening democratic institutions, "good political and economic governance will ultimately lead to the attainment of the utilitarian principle of the greatest happiness for the greatest number" (Ewusi, 2014:2). Also, such a view has propelled and influenced the nature of foreign aid to African countries. Particularly, in the context of globalisation, the role of good governance becomes more pronounced as it is what will enable states to positively harness the benefits of globalisation. Fukuyama (2016) notes that, due to globalisation, traditional international cooperation – a centralised and hierarchical practice of states interacting with one another through formal mechanisms such as international law – is being complemented by new avenues of cooperation. Cooperation with subnational entities is one of such avenues that emerged from globalisation. In this case, states remain the main actors, but "actual cooperation is undertaken through horizontal and often informal linkages by subordinate agencies acting autonomously of hierarchical control" (:90).

Through such forms of horizontal cooperation, South Africa enjoys donor support. By adopting the state-building theory, this study seeks to understand how the use of paradiplomacy can gear such collaboration towards gaining technical assistance needed to assist with developing capacity as well as retaining it. Equally, "for capacity development to be sustainable and also contribute to sustainable development, the process must be owned and managed by the developing countries rather than their external partners… External partners should play only a supporting role allowing capacity development to be firmly rooted in a country's political economy" (Bojisic-Djelilovic, Kostovicova & Rampton, 2014:120).

At the level of praxis, a theory of paradiplomacy dovetails the State Building theory and as such, will be used in tandem with SBT. By deploying a theory of paradiplomacy, I engage with how "sub- and nonstate actors play an increasingly influential role in world politics. Regions, units of federations, cities, companies, NGOs, and so on seek ways to promote trade, investments, cooperation, and partnerships" (ibid). The theory of paradiplomacy provides a normative clarification on the practice of paradiplomacy. Through this theory, this study aims to engage with the underlying motives that give a thrust to substate entities' engagement in IR. More to the point, a theory of paradiplomacy will shed light on the strategies, mechanisms, legislation, and structures that support or facilitate the practice of IR by SNGs. Globalisation is often cited as a significant factor that drives paradiplomacy. Ontologically, Ivo Duchacek (1986; 1990) introduced the term, Andre Lecours (2008) similarly suggests that the origin of paradiplomacy can be traced to 'Western Industrialised Liberal Democracy'.

A deeper dive into the theory of paradiplomacy has enabled this study to sift through the distinct factors that promote the practice of paradiplomacy, its divergence and applicability in the South African context. As an incipient practice, there are certain grey areas in the study of and the practice of paradiplomacy. Magam (2018), for instance, suggests a gap and ambiguity around the legal parameters of the practice of paradiplomacy in South Africa. In affirming the need to harness the developmental potential of hyper globalisation and globalisation through paradiplomacy, Magam (2018) notes that such ambiguities may hamper progress. By drawing on existing knowledge, the study has provided insight on the ontology and evolution of, and by further dissecting the different levels and engagements of substate entities in IR in South Africa; the study seeks to establish how Paradiplomacy could be leveraged to build capacity for good governance at a local level – and proceed from the bottom to the top.

1.5 Research methodology and methods

This study aims to understand how, what, why and which ways paradiplomacy can be utilised to enhance local institutional capacity for a government of quality in South Africa. Guided by such, the study holds governance also to mean a decision-making process. As such, the research seeks to provide information relevant to decision-making, and to concomitantly influence the planning, implementation and evaluations of political programmes and measures in all areas of society. More so, as a budding practice, there is a

lot of grey literature on paradiplomacy, particularly its applicability for promoting good governance. The existing academic research on paradiplomacy has avoided an empirical approach, up till this point. An empirical approach is integral to this study's sense of how to best interrogate the topic of paradiplomacy and governance. As von Kardoff (2004) affirms that there is a growing need for scientifically underpinned proof of the efficacy and quality of services, policies, and political programmes.

Broadly, a research methodology refers to the underlying philosophy or the general principle that guides the trajectory of a study (Dawson, 2002). This study is a form of social inquiry, qualitative research is thus valuable in providing insight into social realities and how people make meaning of their lives and daily process. Atkinson (2010) describes qualitative research as one that allows the researcher to engage with or investigate social processes and interactions critically. More so, a qualitative approach is an iterative process that cumulates in elucidating, describing, and interpreting social attitudes and practices. In Dawson (2002) submission, qualitative research is a valuable methodology as far as it allows us to explore attitudes, behaviour, and experiences through an array of methods; with the goal of gaining an in-depth opinion from participants.

Dawson (2002) accentuates the supposition that "it is attitudes, behaviour and experiences which are important" (:14).

Equally important is the view that qualitative research pays attention to context. Underscoring the notion that experiences do not happen *ad abstracto,* it is influenced by time, values, location, and interests. According to Denzin and Lincoln (2009), a "qualitative research involves an interpretive, naturalistic approach to its subject matter; it attempts to make sense of, or to interpret, phenomena in terms of the meaning people bring to them". As such, the qualitative approach is open-ended in nature as it provides a flexible strategy for obtaining valuable data, based on a researcher's competence and nature of the study.

Again, the qualitative approach focuses on understanding ontology – origins and nature of social processes, epistemology – truth or what count as valuable knowledge. Against this background, this study's adoption of a qualitative approach is further influenced by the merit of the method as a tool for exploring and understanding real-life situations to generate more knowledge – theory (Meyers, 2009). The foregoing adds an empirical dimension to this study. In the sense that a qualitative empirical approach informed by this study's primary research on policy actors, and search for paradiplomacy grey literature should lead to the

development of and the fortification of a theory of paradiplomacy and capacity development.

1.6 Research methods

In the sense that it is an analysis or a process that integrates theory and action to merge scientific knowledge with extant situational knowledge and to address real problems together with the people of the system under inquiry (Patton, 2002). A case in point, governance as a practice is guided by a set good practices, ethics and codes of conduct which all precede and pre-figure the day-to-day process and practices of public servants. Through action research, this qualitative study seeks to identify and elucidate on actions that can improve the practice and process of governance and particularly, the effects of the action that was taken (Streubert & Carpenter, 2002). Good governance practices are tethered to a panoply of specific activities, objectives, and outcomes. By adopting an Action research design, the study aids in helping public workers, policy makers to improve good governance practices. As Brydon-Miller & Greenwood, 2006) see it, action research truly plays and a vital role in understanding the array of problems that faces an organisation. It is a research design deployed in real situations, rather than in contrived, experimental studies since its primary focus is on solving real problems (ibid).

Thus, study is a qualitative exploratory study. Drawing on Magam's (2018) approach it fuses other methodological tools widely employed in qualitative research. One of such methods includes a systematic review of the literature. Global, continental, and domestic literature and policy dossiers will be engaged with the aim to highlight their references to paradiplomacy and capacity development. Through the systematic review of literature, the goal is to obtain an overview of the range and types of uses of paradiplomacy.

This study is also a particular case in the sense that its data will be derived from interview of members of provincial government departments, particularly in KwaZulu-Natal. The utility of a case in this regard will enable this study to explain "the nuances of social phenomena and addressing specific mechanisms that produce, reproduce, change, or are otherwise related to the phenomena (Neuendorf, 2002:97).

1.6.1 Sampling

The study used purposive sampling method. The researcher through the supervisor's network approached twelve participants (middle to top management six women and six

men) from the Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs (COGTA) in Pietermaritzburg who have been described as knowledgeable on the topic "under study to build a sample that is specific to the needs of the study. The participants provided information that answered the research questions" (Magam, 2018:7).

To reiterate, other forms of data will be derived from other primary and secondary sources like documentation review (books, journal articles, newspaper articles, and internet sources), in- depth/semi-structured interviews (12 participants from COGTA), official documents and reports from provincial government departments, national Department of International Relations and Cooperation as well as official documents from a few foreign partners, these will include partnership agreements and MOUs. Due to the nature of the study being interpretive, data collection and analysis will occur simultaneously. Data will be analysed using Content analysis.

Content analysis here was deployed as an apt tool that will enable this study to make valid inference and interpretation of the data gather. As an exploratory qualitative study, the approach to content analysis adopted by this study utilises both inductive and deductive reasoning. Based on the inductive approach, the study will explore emerging themes and categories from the data through a careful examination and constant iteration of data and literature. On the deductive facet, concepts and variables from theory and previous studies will also be generated and measured against participants responses (Neuendorf, 2002:97).

1.7 Limitations of study

Several local government and municipal workers were contacted for interview. Everyone declined since the study has facets that speaks about corruption and bureaucratic ineptitude. There was thus a fear of being "implicated" because that is for them a very sensitive issue. As a result of that, the researcher made contact through supervisor's network, and the Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional accepted to host the study.

There are an array of procedures or steps that can be utilised for the interpretation of qualitative data. It could take the form of summarising the overall findings, making a comparison of the findings to extant literature, and grounding the discussion in the right theoretical framework. More, in some procedures it is required that researcher discusses a personal view of the findings, in addition to describing the limitations and making recommendations for future research. For this study, and in terms of overall findings, the question is simply, what lessons have been learnt about South Africa's governance challenges and what can be done to improve

it. One lesson learnt has been that the researcher's personal interpretation has been fortified and further nested in the understanding that the responses of participants and literature should as much as possible determine the course of research. It could also be a meaning derived from a comparison of the findings with information gleaned from the literature or theories. In this way, a lot of the research directly confirm all what the crux of what the study seeks to explore and shed light on.

As a study that addressed the issue of corruption and governance, such a phenomenon for many of my respondents it turns out was a 'sensitive' one. The description of such as sensitive topic could be because the respondents might not want to be implicated by their responses. Essentially, given that some of the participants of the study were worried that they may reveal information of a politically sensitive nature, they in my opinion provided guarded responses and this severely hampered the depth of analysis and the derivation of further recommendations. By keeping the analysis and discourse as broad as possible, the aim was to minimise whatever risk the research findings might pose to respondents.

1.7 Structure of dissertation:

Chapter One provides a broad outline and scope of the study. The introduction, the focus and the direction of the study are clearly articulated in this chapter. Additionally, the chapter also clarifies the research problem statement, research questions, and objectives of the research and the rationale of the research and the research methodology of the study.

Chapter Two engages in a review and a critical evaluation of literature on paradiplomacy, good governance and capacity development at the local level. The chapter importantly clarifies concepts and definitions that pertain to the study. It will also highlight gaps and generate literature from grey areas. This is particularly important as the practice of paradiplomacy in South Africa is still a new one, and there is a dearth of literature on it. **Chapter Three** presents the theory of State Building and its applicability as a frame for analysis. It further utilises the Theory of paradiplomacy in its unit of analysis. **Chapter Four**, a clear and exhaustive presentation of the methods, research design will be presented.

Chapter Five, interprets and elucidate on data. In **Chapter Six** the study presents and analyses its findings and discuss the link between paradiplomacy, capacity assistance and good governance. The chapter also presents a surmise of the major findings of the study, conclusions and recommendations for further studies are expressed in this chapter a general conclusion.

Chapter Two: Conceptual Clarification and Review of Literature

"Entities should not be multiplied beyond necessity" Occam's Razor

2.1 Introduction: Globalisation, Governance and Paradiplomacy

Another version of the Law of Parsimony goes like this, "when confronted with a lot of explanations, the simplest explanation is usually the right one." Before this study gets into rigorous, but coherent and cohesive assessment of its subject matter, it is of pertinence to state that the aim in this chapter is to firstly re-ascertain the challenges of governance as presented in extant literature. From then, the study will be able to parse out paradiplomacy – a form of governance and examine its potentiality for improving governance in South Africa. The major supposition is thus that paradiplomacy can be an adequate and preferable response to the many diurnal challenges of local governance in South Africa. Paradiplomacy can be an efficient and sustainable tool for solving the capacity challenges of local governance.

On the route of exploring the topic of paradiplomacy, the trajectory of analysis causes one to understand the role of globalisation in shaping paradiplomacy (Magam, 2018). Also, paradiplomacy can be understood as governance; in the sense that it is a mechanism that subnational entities and nonstate actors use to engage and interact with, particularly, subnational entities and nonstate actors from other countries. It is a form of diplomacy/international relations because such engagements happen within the purview of a country's foreign policy framework. The provinces of Kwazulu-Natal, Western Cape, and Gauteng despite their unique location and 'identities[1]' play a strategic role in making South Africa a desirable destination for holiday, for investment, and the 'gateway' to Africa (Nganje 2016b; Magam, 2018).

Again, the history of colonisation in Africa and the wave of democratisation, created a system of governance on the continent in the image and likeness of the erstwhile colonial 'masters' (Kidasheli, 1999). Inherently, the extant system of, structure and infrastructures of governance in Africa are a result of globalisation (Ryan, 2012). In the view of other different commentators, paradiplomacy has been regarded as network governance. The scholar Michael Keating (2000)

[1] KwaZulu-Natal is often described or identifies as the Kingdom of the Zulu; Gauteng is often described or identifies as an economic and entertainment hub.

describes paradiplomacy as an activity that enables substate entities to become key players in policy initiatives and promulgation. Even prior to Keating's (2000) articulation, James Rosenau (1988) had suggested that the 'worlds' of world politics or rather international relations is composed, respectively, of states and non-state actors.

This chapter begins with a broad exploration of governance and narrows the issue down to Africa and South Africa. Beginning from understanding the historical and theoretical values that underpin the extant system or practice of governance in Africa, the chapter will underscore both the structural and capacity challenges that local governance in faced with. This line of exploration begins by unpacking the conceptual description of governance that has become ubiquitous. So much so that it has influenced the structures and the field of international relations; that is the classical or realist view that underscore state behaviour in their analysis (Ryan, 2012). Conversely, the political economy approach considers "markets, social movements, nongovernmental organisations, gender, culture, and so on" (Lecours, 1998:92). Further, Andre Lecours (1998) suggests that in international relations, there is a limitation to understanding the conceptual categories of the two worlds as different; the conceptualisation should as such be all-encompassing. Reason being that regional governments have of late come to the fore as genuine international actors.

As a result, further on in the chapter, paradiplomacy is explored in-depth. Increasingly, subnational entities are engaging in international activities in different guises. Since through the practice of paradiplomacy, subnational entities are "negotiating and signing international agreements, developing representation abroad, conducting trade missions, seeking foreign investment, and entering bilateral and multilateral relations with states. Their action is no longer limited to the 'internal" (Lecours, 1998:93). There is an inherent necessity to understand this phenomenon thus and to explore its potentials for improving governance. The intuitive view is that this can become part of the arsenal of political approaches to development, where instead of just financial aid, efforts or engagements between subnational entities should also seek to embed good governance practices both at an institutional and political level (Clinton and Sridhar, 2017).

The argument is that indeed, provincial governance in South Africa is fraught with an array of capacity challenges (Mlambo et al, 2019). It is in this regard that paradiplomacy will be tabled as presenting itself as a tool for enhancing institutional capacity and concomitantly improve the quality of governance in South Africa both procedurally and normatively (Fukuyama, 2016;

Teorell, 2014). In sum, the review of literature seeks to establish paradiplomacy as a strategy for building local institutional capacity for good governance. In a significant way, Paradiplomacy presents itself as a tool for achieving the Sustainable Development Goal 17, which seeks to encourage global cooperation and partnership with localised impact for the attainment of the sustainable development goals by 2030. The United Nations believes that a "successful sustainable development agenda requires partnerships between governments, the private sector and civil society. These inclusive partnerships built upon principles and values, a shared vision, and shared goals that place people and the planet at the centre, are needed at the global, regional, national, and local level" (SGDs Tracker, 2021).

2.2 Understanding the Provenance of Governance through the State of Nature theory

At the centre of most contractarian views is the pivotal role self-interest plays. The understanding is that self-interest is not limited to the interests of an individual person, it includes "interests in the well-being of one's family and peer group" (Wilson, 2018, 2021). Critics call it greed. Economists call it utility maximization (Wang, Malhotra, & Murnighan, 2011:646). Irrespective of how it is branded, there is a divergence on the way individuals and societies channel self-interest (Rose-Ackerman, 1999:2). Inherently, the assumption is that people came together to create a state to sustain or to promote mutual advantage. As Voltaire suggests that our duty of an individual "consists of… how to procure for himself subsistence and accommodation and protect himself [sic] from evil;" that comprises the whole object and business of man [sic]" (Blaisdell, 2003:37). The foregoing view has its origins in the long-standing assumption that in nature the widespread practice was that of a mutual unprofitable state of war of "every person against every other person." The idea promoted here is that in a mutually unprofitable situation, societies form as "parties depart from the state of nature in order to gain a mutual benefit" (Nussbaum, 2007). Implicitly, the foregoing assumptions rely heavily on the truism that humans are primarily individualistic and therefore hold their personal interests (this would naturally include close kin) at heart, as they value self-preservation primarily.

John Locke goes further and makes a case for benevolent interests. Locke mostly makes a case for us to understand that the notion of mutual advantage goes beyond a desire for self-preservation to include an objective and often benevolent interest of others as part of the reason for social cooperation (Nussbaum, 2007). Similarly, Alubabari (2012) concurs with the foregoing when he argues that expediency and logic allow us to construe the modern state as

the product of "a covenant, a compact or Social Contract". In Thomas Hobbes, a similar approach is used to understand or describe the origins of social cooperation. In the sense that Hobbes renders a social contract theory that makes similar provision for the existence of benevolent interest by suggesting that under the state of nature, a state of perpetual conflict – life was precarious, and people driven by the fear of death and a need for cooperation for mutual, advantage entered a contract to achieve the above said end.

Beyond providing an explanation for the origins of modern cooperation, the social contract theorists also made a case for what can be describe as political legitimacy: who has the right to rule? Hobbes believes that in the social contract, individuals as part of giving up self-interest for mutual benefits, transfer or cede certain rights to a sovereign (Evers, 1976:187), who then acts as an agent for the collective to promote the good of those bound by the contract. This implies that there is a clear-cut description of the primary role of governance, which is to serve as a representative of the collective will of the people (*ibid*). In Allan Ryan's (2012:416-417) submission, the Hobbesian view of political legitimacy or the necessity of locating authority was influenced by the reality that

> Hobbes' life was deeply affected by two revolutions, one the civil war or the 1640s, the other the intellectual revolution associated with Galileo, Descartes, and English scientists such as Robert Hooke, William Harvey, and Robert Boyle. The first led him to think that any society I which there was a doubt over the location of authority and its extent was doomed to civil war; if it avoided it, it was only by good luck. *Leviathan* spelled out Hobbes' argument that the unity of a state consisted in the location of absolute or arbitrary legislative and executive authority in one person or body of persons; the sovereign (who might be one person, several persons, or the entire political community) possessed unlimited legal authority, and subjects were obliged to obey it in everything that did not threaten their lives…"

More, John Locke's "contract of government" presuppose that the people in addition to giving their mutual consent to the formation of society, also come together as members of one society, to choose their rulers to form their government with clearly defined roles, duties, and responsibilities. Rulers in this version of the social contract are similarly conferred with power, *ergo* legitimacy on fiduciary grounds and are requited as thus to be accountable to the people. The fact that Locke makes a case for both the contract that brings a state and government to

bear is quite relevant for this study. Both Hobbes and Locke's construction make a case for the legitimisation of a sovereign (government).

Despite some fundamental differences between the Hobbesian and Lockean social contract account, they both converge on the issue of tacit consent. "So, while the social contract sets up an absolute sovereign in Hobbes' theory, in Locke the social contract brings together the citizens so that they can delegate enforcement of the natural law to a trustee for the sake of convenience" (in Evers, 1976:189). Of worth to this study is how the Lockean version construes consent. "Consent is signified by the receipt or acceptance of benefits, whether this be travelling on the roads enjoying the government's protection or, more importantly, holding real estate under the government's protection. In fact, Locke makes the social contract for landholders a covenant which runs with the land so that the inheritor of a piece of real estate inherits the obligation to the government" (Evers, 1976:189). Government or a "sovereign political entity exists to secure the safety of its subjects, and it can do so only if everyone upholds its authority" (Ryan, 2012:420). Consent can be described in this instance as a case of political obligation and right.

The necessity of using the contractarian analysis as a part of this study is justifiable by Rawls (1971) view that the evolution of society/state is as a direct result of a search for a system of cooperation or partnership for mutual advantage between individuals. The underlying reality is that conflict between divergent individual interests and an identity of collective interests is an indication of such a construct. This notwithstanding, a consistent search for a just or moral way of satisfying these divergent and often conflicting personal and collective interests is a political necessity. Rawls (1971) as a result suggests that society should be a venture that cooperates to promote mutual advantage or gains. Therefore, the primary role of a social institution like the government is supposed to ensure just distribution of resources. Such a government in Rawls view should be able to see to it that the welfare and all benefits of society should be distributed in a way that enables the have nots of society to be as well off as they can be if they are granted equal opportunity in terms of education and employment.

John Rawls' political philosophical position proselytises a welfare government that promotes equality in terms of resources and opportunity for its citizens. Thus, it is necessary for government to intervene or play a key role in the economic activities of a country to ensure the said end (Rawls, 2001). More to it, Rawls' (1971) principle of justice hinges on the theory and practice of proper distribution of the benefits and burdens of social co-operation. In this

purview, individual or a group of individuals do not act inappropriately to gain more benefits than others. John Rawls' advancement of a welfare government would ensure that government plays a key role in the equitable distribution of resources.

According to Simmons (1999:999), individuals in the state of nature are in a state of complete and perfect freedom to act and dispose of their possessions and time as they deem fit, within the bounds of the laws of nature, without asking leave or dependency upon the will of any other person. For Morris, "the powers and privileges of our rulers… are conditional on their performance of their responsibilities. Rulers need to serve the interests of the governed" (1999: ix). A failure on the part of the government to serve the interests of the governed should be regarded as a breach of the social contract. Thus, a lack of or inept capacity has been cited as a cause of such failure in governance (Esquith, 1997).

2.3 Why Governance Matters: Exploring what lies beneath governance

The social contract theory has utility when we seek to provide elucidation on the need for the current complex socio-political arrangement of the world. Theoretically, social contract describes the origin of the state and offers explanation for political legitimacy, Allan Ryan (2012) exploring Rousseau's contractarian view suggests that the aim of the social contract is for it to serve as an expression of the general will or common interests of the people, not just the vested interests of specific individuals or group. In this regard, mismanagement, or lack of bureaucratic efficiency renders the social contract void (Esquith, 1997). The strength of the social contract theory as lens for understanding the origin of the state is prop by the supposition that adherents or proponents of this theory are also those who hold the principles of democratic governance with the highest regards (Ryan, 2012).

As is submitted in the social contract, the supposition is that the reason for advancing democracy as a tool for state governance is because most individuals have at least the capability "for making rational decisions about their own self-interest. Possessed of the right reason, they can judge the right and wrong of government actions, as measured by their own rationally defined needs" (Rodee et al, 1983:24). Key to this construct of rationality is the "assumption that the pursuit of self-interest will not bring men [sic] to the point of violent conflict between each other" (*ibid*). The expression of self-interest in the form of a narrow calculation of immediate personal gains as opposed to understanding self-interest to include "the long-run interests of generations of men and women, nothing less than the whole enterprise of a nation's development" (Rodee et al, 1983:27). In this regard, democracy – hence governance is a matter

of character just beyond the tool for public admin to include principles of justice and equity as necessary components of democracy. It is also a theory that encompass the understanding of democracy – governance as also as who has the legitimacy to rule – a rule based on the will of the people (Ryan, 2012).

In contemporary literature and from an abundance of evidence, there is an overwhelming consensus that governance in Africa is bad, more so in South Africa. Ben Toruk in 2015 shares the view that the causes and emergence of the current governance challenges can be traced to an extensive web of local and international factors. For instance, a strong case has been made that the collapse of the Berlin wall came with an exacerbation in the belief that there is a global imperative for reform of public services that must be embedded in market logics, with taunting references, to the 'dead hand of bureaucracy' (as opposed to Adam Smith's 'invisible hand of the market' which is alive and well (Newman & Clarke 2009:17).

As a point of departure, how is governance construed or used in this study? Now there is a necessity to find a working definition of governance for this study or to provide a clarification on our use of the term governance. Francis Fukuyama in 2016 suggests that the term "governance" does not have a settled definition. It is understood in three separate ways. There is one preponderating view which finds its roots in the neoliberal logic (state as a consequences of social contract) of government/governance as a means of safeguarding order and stability amongst individuals with different interests, to avoid denigration into chaos" (Haywood, 2007). This description of governance includes an implicit description of governance as a tool for steering state policies. Governance in this mode of construal is a tool for ensuring that all challenges to human livelihood are met. As Fukuyama (2016:89) would describe it, "governance as a synonym for public administration, that is, effective implementation of state policy."

Due to the ineptitude, malfeasance, maladministration, outright corruption, and malaise faced by the government of South Africa, one begins to question the independence of the different institution of governance and their susceptibility to abuse (Pillay 2021; Zondo commission, 2022) as such practice are incompatible with the principles of democratic governance. It is precisely because of such that the institutions of a state are tasked with a commitment to ensuring and promoting good governance, take the Principle of *Trias Politica*, for instance. Here, it is acknowledged that the separation of powers in the Republic is to ensure that problems are solved effectively, decisions are made efficiently, resources used optimally and

a vibrant and active public administrative arm (Coston, 1998: 481). As such, transparency, accountability, and public participation are all important characteristics of good governance as well, and they are all supposed to be maintained through current state structures (Graham, Amos, & Plumptree, 2003:8).

Globalisation ushered in a near 'unipolar' world and the ideology of governance in the zeitgeist of global cooperation. In Ben Turok's (2015:9) argument, governance has been infused with the neoliberal themes of regulating and economising the states. It is a meta narrative that "elevated the market to *master* with the state serving the master; in its extreme, the market (is supposed) to displace and replace the state. This grand narrative held that markets grow, states shrink, and international markets render nation-states vulnerable. The response of the state should then be to promote/facilitate/enable market delivery of (hitherto public) services via contracting out and privatising state assets." Another converse and equally interesting view describe governance as a combinatorial system that is founded on moral principles. In this view, governance is an aggregate of biological and cultural solutions to the problems of human cooperation (Curry et al, 2021).

Francis Fukuyama (2013) again defines governance as the ability to make and enforce rules and the capacity and ability to deliver welfare and services. For Mary Grindle, the argument is that governments should have the capacity to design and implement appropriate public policies, administer resources equitably, transparently, and efficiently, and respond efficaciously to the social welfare and economic claims of citizens (1997:5). Accordingly, there is an equally important view that describes governance as the process of decision making and decision implementation or non/poor implementation and the provision of services (Annan, 1999; IDEA, 2000; Fukuyama, 2013).

Writing about the Weberian standpoint on bureaucracy, Gordon Peake, and Miranda Forsyth (2022) suggest that at the turn of the 20th century when Max Weber wrote, his philosophical ideas influenced the emerging modern system of bureaucracy. According to these scholars, "Weber's ideal type of bureaucracy was a hierarchy in which adroit staff served public rather than private interests. They would be appointed based on merit. Personal preferences or peccadilloes would not impinge upon government decision-making. This Weberian ideal of public administration – high levels of specialisation, hierarchy, meritocracy, and adherence to written rules" (Peake & Forsyth, 2022:2). This view of or approach to governance has

essentially and over the years become the “copy-and-paste guide for creating bureaucratic systems all over the world” (*ibid*).

The above description of what governance is, ensconces the idea of decision implementation or non/poor implementation (Huther and Shah, 2005 Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2004;); often than not, most descriptions of the concept/practice of “governance” are always preceded by the adjective “good”, because the axiom is that at the core of governance is the promotion of wellbeing and improvement of citizens’ livelihoods. Consequently, “good governance, came to be seen as the necessary preconditions for social and economic development” (Beekers and Van Gool). Beekers and Van Gool (2012) tellingly note that good governance is a normative term that is “almost always described by what it is not”.

In the domain of social science and public administration, how we ought to think of governance courts a significant controversy or is usually a topic with diverging and a plethora of views. The UNDP (1997:2) describes governance as "the exercise of economic political and administrative authority to manage a country's affairs at all levels.” In the view of the World Bank (1994) governance is a process or an approach through which discretionary power is exercised for the purpose of efficiently and effectively managing a country's political, economic, and social capital for development. At the level of practice, governance also implies certain power dynamics come to play as it is a process through which different actors interact for decision-making, resources allocation, planning, and control over public institutions amongst other things. In this respect, governance is simply the process of governing. As it is an all-encompassing notion that refers to how factors like a state's human, political, and socio-economic resources and how it is channelled for the effective achievement of collective goals (Pierre and Peters 2000:1). This is to say, governance can be understood from what it aims to do, which is to manage the economy and society in a way that is transparent, sustainable, and effective. For Buescher and Dietz (2005:4), governance “consists of rule systems, of steering mechanisms through which authority is exercised to enable the governed to preserve their coherence and move towards desired goals.” Like the foregoing, there is the supposition that governance also means "traditions and institutions" through which authority in a country is exercised" (Kaufmann et al. 2009:5).

There is another view of governance as a space of “impartial, rule-driven and goal oriented bureaucratic action, while it’s opposite, bad governance encompasses political and governmental activities marked by private and limited group interests as well as favouritism”

(Beekers and Van Gool, 2012:3). Implicitly, the roles of a government or governance outcomes should include adequate capability and capacity, functional and operational institutions, transparency, efficient, effective democratic and political processes, and the protection, advancement of human rights and wellbeing; prevention of conflict, in addition to provision of security, civil society participation, combating corruption and the achievement of equitable economic and social outcomes (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Öberg and Melander 2005; Anderson and Tverdova 2003; Frey and Stutzer 2000; Helliwell 2003).

Another view in clarifying our understanding of or exploration of the topic of governance is found in one of the early works of Francis Fukuyama (2013) who proposes that by measuring the different perceptions or manifestations of it, we can fully grasp and describe what it is. For Fukuyama (2013), effective management of state resources, merit-based selection and promotions, freedom of speech and similar fundamental human rights are usually used as proxy terms when examining the Weberian understanding the quality of a state's bureaucracy, and by extension, the quality of government. In other submissions, governance is measured or evaluated based on its ability to be impartial. Bo Rothstein and Jan Teorell (2008) describe impartiality is one of the most significant and a substantial tool in measuring the quality of government.

Impartiality implies the existence of sufficient capacity (Rothstein and Teorell, 2008). Francis Fukuyama (2013) uses an analogous term when he makes a case for *Bureaucratic Autonomy.* This as a principle of good governance is crucial to the critical challenges faced by governance in South Africa, whose governance was recently described as one entrenched in state capture corruption (David-Barett, 2021). In this regard, Bureaucratic autonomy or the principle of impartiality matters as it helps us understand the degree of "autonomy possessed by the different components of a state (Fukuyama, 2013). Autonomy as Fukuyama (2013:10) describes it, is the way,

> the political principal issues mandates to the bureaucrats who act as its agent. No bureaucracy has the authority to define its own mandates, regardless of whether the regime is democratic or authoritarian. But there are a wide variety of ways in which mandates can be issued. Ideally, the principal should set a broad mandate to the agent, e.g., procurement of an advanced strike fighter. But the principal can also issue many other mandates as well regarding the way in which to carry out the broad mandate, such as purchasing a strike fighter using contractors that increase employment in

> Congressional districts X and Y, or through minority and women-owned businesses, or to achieve Z degree of performance desired by a rival service. In other cases, the principal can issue mandates regarding the bureaucracy's recruitment and promotion of personnel, requiring that they hire certain individuals, or else setting detailed rules for personnel management.

As a principle, and through a certain degree of autonomy or impartiality, public servants have the capacity to act objectively, the motif of action or the execution of their duties does not happen in a manner that equates to conflict of interest. Neither are their decisions, judgements, influenced by concerns like special relationships and or personal preferences. The value of such principle to good governance is again reaccentuated when Fukuyama (2013:10) purports that in some systems (South Africa is one of such systems) the mandates issued by government often and frequently overlap, and they sometimes are downright contradictory. As Wilson (2022) showed that a confusion of mandate and political interference are some of the challenges to governance, especially given the sound (in principle) anti-corruption architecture in South Africa. For Fukuyama (2013:10) in some political arrangements, different government arms, parastatals, or political authorities have equal powers with equal,

> legitimacy able to issue potentially contradictory mandates. State-owned utilities, for example, often have mandates to simultaneously do cost recovery, universal service to the poor, and efficient pricing to business clients, each promoted by a different part of the political system. These different mandates obviously cannot be simultaneously achieved and generate bureaucratic dysfunctionality. Amtrak could become a profitable and efficient railway if it were not under Congressional mandates to serve various low-volume rural communities. In China there are often duplicate functional agencies, one reporting through a chain of command that goes through national ministries, the other reporting to municipal or provincial governments; it is not always clear how conflicts between them are to be resolved.

Autonomy or impartiality is instrumental for good governance because it is an expression of a capacity or skill, particularly among public servants to treat all people with equally the same regard, irrespective of personal relationships and personal likes and dislikes. That is to say that public office holders should imbue the capacity and knowledge to be able to implement laws and policies, without taking into regard anything about the citizen/case that is neither stipulated nor coded beforehand specified in policies or legislations. More to the point, because of such

principles or a strong degree of autonomy, public policies and laws are sure to be executed objectively, in accordance with standard or stipulated benchmark (Cupit, 2000; Stomberg, 2000).

Again, Francis Fukuyama (2013) suggests that because of a strong degree of Bureaucratic *Autonomy*, governance or institutions of government are free of interference and not driven by personal interests or partisan consideration. This particularly is a strong indication of a government that is of quality because an autonomous bureaucracy enables the expression of discretion or independent judgment, and which is critically insulated from the influences of social actors, but also subservient to the society about larger goals (Fukuyama, 2013:10). The necessity of Bureaucratic Autonomy for emplacing good governance is underscored by the reasoning that a bureaucracy will low degree of autonomy becomes subordinate to the whims and wills of political principals or patrons, and this can certainly result in low performance level or bad audit. Fundamentally, governance performance indicators can score badly when "bureaucracies lose control over internal recruitment and promotion to the political authorities and are staffed entirely by political appointees. This is in effect what happens in clientelistic political systems" (Fukuyama, 2013:10).

What does the above imply when we explore the issue of governance in South Africa? Firstly, is the fact that through the principle of impartiality, legislations against say things like corruption – state capture, will be clear. That is, laws or measures to prevent such malfeasance among public servants or the public in fact will be clearly stipulated and the punishment for contravening it equally recorded. In addition to a clear articulation of these preventive laws, there will also be a need for implementation and or adjudication, and this is where an independent autonomous judiciary is pertinent. By implication, a judiciary with a positive degree of autonomy recognises the gravity of malfeasance and adopt a very firm stance of deterrence by meting out stiff fines or punishments (Fukuyama, 2013; 2016; Wilson, 2022).

There is an immense wealth of cognitive credence in Rothstein and Teorell, and Fukuyama's analysis; because of its procedural nature and the emphasis on autonomy such criteria of understanding governance in some cases require empirical validation. The foregoing notwithstanding, these authors' viewpoint expresses the nuances of this study because explicitly, there analysis strongly presents a case for measuring governance by looking at "a specific normative and behavioural criterion" (Rothstein and Teorell, 2008:167). High degree of Autonomy, and I*mpartiality* in the exercise of public authority for these scholars are the

specific normative and behavioural criteria of a government that is good. For instance, in some political systems, access to employment, public amenities (school, health care etc.) and political participation are based on equality and merits and are available to all. Through impartiality, we get a substantive variable in assessing the performance or quality of governance (Rothstein & Teorell, 2008).

There is a significant point to be equally made that the reason for us to imbue impartiality or bureaucratic autonomy into good governance practices or assessment is because "it would seem to be the case that the quality of government is the result of an interaction between capacity *and* autonomy. That is, autonomy can be a good or dreadful thing depending on how much underlying capacity a bureaucracy has. If an agency were full of incompetent, self-dealing political appointees, one would want to limit their discretion and subject them to clear rules" (Fukuyama, 2013:13).

Another factor to consider is this, it is the principle of democratic governance that government's relationship with her citizens should be regulated in two manners: through input that pertains how accessible bureaucrats are. The other is the output facet which is how authority is exercised (Fukuyama, 2013:16). As it pertains input, in this situation, access to power and the content of policies are "the most widely accepted basic regulatory principle is political equality… Political equality certainly implies impartial treatment on the input side of the system…. democracy in the form of political equality on the input side must be complemented with impartiality on the output side of the political system, that is, in the *exercise* of public authority" (Rothstein and Teorell, 2012:170). In a similar vein Kurer (2005:223) suggests that impartiality stipulates that "a state ought to treat equally those who deserve equally."

As part of the myriad of institutional approaches to good governance, Rothstein and Teorell's impartiality principle is felicitous for this thesis as there is convergence and affirmation that practices of good governance can be implemented by improving capacity of both bureaucrats and citizen. This view serves as an antidote to the description of the primary challenge of governance in South Africa as resulting from an abuse or misuse of public power for private gain. The institutional approach to good governance importantly underscores two variables which are of substance to this study. Given that one must hold a position of power (usually a public position, elected or employed), and given that such as evidence have shown are susceptible to abuse of this power when one partially benefits from such a position. It is

important thus for intuitions to be run by people with the right capacity, like the capacity for impartiality. For Kurer (2005:230) governance fails, is weak or described as corrupt when a holder of public office violates the impartiality principle to achieve private or partisan gain.

Such claim is also document in dossier by the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, which argues that the QoG or good governance can be assessed by the presence of some of these six core key principles like."

1. Participation: address the extent that all stakeholders' get involved in the process and institutions of governance.
2. Decency: speaks of the degree to which the making and enforcing of rules happen without harming or causing grievance to people.
3. Transparency: a key factor that assesses the degree of clarity and openness with which that has a bearing on the public good are made.
4. Accountability: another equally important measure that examines the extent to which political actors take responsibility or are responsible to society for their words, lack of and actions or inactions.
5. Fairness: the degree to which rules apply equally to everyone in society; and
6. Efficiency: the extent to which limited human and financial resources are applied without waste, delay, or corruption or without prejudicing future generations (UNECFE, 2008:13-14). In line with the institutional approach, the quality of governance in South Africa for instance, can be assessed by how its public sector functions based on a respect for principles like objectivity, transparency, participation and is accountability (ADC, 2011). Adhering to the foregoing principles, a plethora of measures put in place to evaluate the quality of governance assess factors like the presence of the rule of law rather than rule by law. How do the two differ? With regards to "rule by law," the description by George Orwell (1989) that because of rule by law, all animals can indeed be equal in principle (think of the universality of basic human rights encoded in constitutions for instance), but some animals are more equal than others, in principle (Orwell, 1989). Through rule by law, government officials use law and bureaucracy as an instrument of power. In a place where there is the "rule of law," government and the power wielded by them is constrained by the same laws that apply to everyone else. For Francis Fukuyama (2013), for several reasons, "rule by law overlaps with state quality, since we want states to operate by general, transparent, impartial, and predictable rules" (:3).

The institutional approach to quality of a government or governance also looks at *Procedural Measures***.** According to Francis Fukuyama the quality of governance can be assessed by measuring or through an autopsy of the procedures used in the selection of public servants. That is, we can assess the quality of government if we examine critical factors like how public servants are "recruited and promoted on the basis of merit or political patronage, what level of technical expertise they are required to possess, and the overall level of formality in bureaucratic procedure" (Fukuyama, 2013:5).

Because of (neo)patrimonial politics, it has again become essential that the characteristics of governance should be assessed by looking at the Capacity Measures, which is the "level of education and professionalisation of government officials." Fukuyama (2013) further clarifies that the challenge with procedural definitions of bureaucracy is that:

> the procedures, however defined, may not actually correlate with the positive outcomes expected from governments. We assume that a Weberian bureaucracy will produce better services than one that is highly discretionary and patrimonial; yet there may be circumstances where the latter's lack of rules results in faster and better tailored responses. Enforcement power is not part of Weber's definition; it is possible to have an impersonal, merit-based bureaucracy that nonetheless is extremely poor at getting things done. To say that a bureaucrat is selected based on "merit" does not define merit, nor does it explain whether the official's skills will be renewed considering changing conditions or technology (:6).

The above citation brings this thesis to a critical juncture at which it is necessary to apply the arguments so far to the – local, South African situation. Particularly how the procedure of cadre deployment needs to be done to ensure that comrades have adequate capacity and are deployed to positions that are apropos to knowledge, skill, and ability of said comrade. Political parties are critical to how well- or ill-equipped institutions of governance are; because it is assumed that there is a set standard used in the selection of candidates. In particular, the current ruling African National Congress (ANC) has played a dominant role in the trajectory and shaping the South African political history and institutions. This makes it necessary or the most appropriate case to unpack.

The ANC's procedure in selecting candidates happen in the form of Cadre Deployment. It thus becomes necessary to ask two critical questions:

- What are the criteria used by the ANC to select and deploy cadres?

- How has the ANC government fared so far using its system of cadre deployment?

Of the existing corpus of literature on ANC and by the ANC, there are no clear cut or detailed record of a set down criteria for cadre deployment. However, the practice of cadre deployment irrespective of its lack of clarity is indeed a part of the ANC's general goal of state capture (Chipkin, 2012). During the 1985 National Consultative Conference of the ANC, a consensus was reached and pronounced that the intention of the National Liberation Movement is behind the principle and practice of Cadre Deployment. The belief is that it is necessary for the ANC to have total control of the different instruments of the state; and this according to the resolution of the conference is sine qua non for the party to actualize its promise of poverty eradication and bridging the gap of inequality. That is, state capture was deemed necessary if the country is to actualise its developmental plans and the goal of social and economic transformation as promised by the ANC (Turok, 1999). Therefore, and the only way to achieve the foregoing goal is to deploy party loyalists to "all centres of power" (Netshitendzhe, 1996).

Furthermore, it was suggested that a database in which all ANC members and their different skills and specialisations should be set up, for competent cadres to be deployed suitably; and this can in principle be the only articulation of quality as a criterion. As such, the principle underlying the policy of cadre deployment from the standpoint of Joel Netshitendzhe had intended to promote competence and merits ahead of other criteria. However, in practice as we have seen since under different administrations, loyalty to part, ergo political patron is the most critical criterion. Due to this, it has become common in quotidian debate and scholarly space that some "comrades" are incompetent and lack the necessary quality required for governance[2]. According to the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC, 2012) the "ANC's deployment strategy systematically places loyalty ahead of merit and even of competence". Rather than setting criteria or standards for which cadres are to be selected and deployed, the ANC focuses more on loyalty in deploying the capacity needed to achieve its said aim of controlling the "different centres of power" (Twala, 2014).

At its incipience, cadre deployment was conceptualised and implemented because of the reality of apartheid. For Ivor Chipkin (2012) however, this was a sign that the ANC does not have a liberal conceptualisation of politics or of the State. To further prop his argument, Chipkin ascertains than his supposition is not just normative but deeply rooted in critical analysis. First,

[2] For instance, a recent audit by CoGTA found that over 298 of the 1 944 deployed councillors around KZN could not read or write and some did not possess any formal education (Ndou, 2022).

as part of the ANC's plans of overcoming the legacy of apartheid, it was necessary for the structure of the state to be transformed. As the ANC ascertain that a common future of the apartheid government was more than just the implementation of racist legislations, policies, and practices "but that the very structure of the state itself worked in tandem with white interests. The Apartheid State was a 'White State.' Against such a system, the project of democratising the State under the ANC has been associated with numerous efforts to Blacken it, where Blacken in this context has referred not only to a project of demographic change, but also to one of structural change" (Chipkin, 2012:13).

Undoubtedly, the ANC at the incipience of the practice was not misguided as they had to contend with things like "legacy contracts" and "ever green" contracts which were effectively apartheid system that stifled competition but not outrightly referred to as corrupt because one can argue that the capacity of bureaucrats under the system of apartheid was of quality. And this is understandable, the system was meant to benefit the whites only. As Fakude (2016), sees it, "the so-called state capture is nothing new in the South African political economy" and "the entire modern economy of South Africa is based on undue influence of business over politics and vice versa".

Sadly however, the arguments that support the merits of the cadre deployment especially by the ANC have only the principle of it to draw on as there is little in terms of results to justify the practice of it. The just released two parts (over 230 pages long per part) Judicial Commission of Inquiry into State Capture Report (Zondo Commission) by the current chief Justice Raymond Zondo provides an autopsy of how the practice of cadre deployment has left South Africa flirting with state failure. The nuances and the shades of governance challenges is not limited to the findings of the Zondo commission's report. Indeed, the two-part report squarely puts state capture at the heart of every of South Africa's challenges. It is not within the purview of this chapter to provide an analysis of the Zondo report, in chapters 3 and 6 however, the commission's report will come up in depth.

Fundamentally and irrespective of the ANC regime or faction in power, party loyalty is the most evident standard in the selection of cadres (Mandy De Waal, 2012, Zondo Commission, 2022). The pervasive view is that the policy of cadre deployment presents the ANC with the opportunity and enables it to emplace loyal party members at key state parastatals, irrespective of their capacity or capability to lead such SOE (Boysen, 2011, Zondo Commission 2022, Godinho and Hermanus, 2018). Godinho and Hermanus (2018) are of the opinion that a

description of state capture in the South African context simply from the purview of institutional corruption fails to take into consideration the complex nuances of governance in the country. This is because in transitional states like South Africa, post-apartheid, a policy like cadre deployment or state capture was with the sole intention of enabling the incipient ANC government to centralise its control of power so that it can achieve its aim of transformation with relative ease (Netshitendzhe, 19996; Turok, 1999; Godinho and Hermanus, 2018). However, one issue with such centralisation of power would be that it is susceptible to becoming a tool that certain individuals are able to control for the wrong ends like the fostering of patronage[3] and corruption[4] (SAIIA, 2011; De Waal, 2012; Hyslop, 2005).

More, Godinho and Hermanus (2018) suggest that the consensus among several scholars is to treat state capture as a sub-set of corruption, mostly construed from an institutionalist perspective as the *misuse of public office for private gain through influence over institution making* (Rose-Ackerman, 2008). The foregoing understanding or delineation of state capture according to Godinho and Hermanus (2022) is that it is problematic in in developing and transition contexts because:

- There is no dichotomy or the distinction between administrative malfeasance and state capture remain opaque.
- There is a dissonance in discourse as the moral parlance of state capture as the 'corruption of state institutions' become discordant in contexts where processes of state (re) (trans) formation in a post-apartheid country like South Africa are taking place.
- post-colonial African states have a serious challenge with conforming to the Weberian-rational ideal of what bureaucracy should look like.
- fails to take into cognisance queries and questions around the political and social legitimacy of existing institutions.
- the Weberian Public/private dichotomy proves false in contexts where prevailing political ideology or culture makes no such distinction.
- Public servants in low- and middle-income countries often face a sort of robin-hood dilemma.
- There can be a moral justification for malfeasance as an actor's or group of actors' commitment to furthering social or public interests, i.e., not private benefit.

[3] During the commission of inquiry, Judge Raymond Zondo, was acting chief justice. He is currently serving as the country's chief justice on appointment by President Cyril Ramaphosa.
[4] As seeing under the Zuma Administration.

- State capture invariably involves public and private actors (it takes two to tango).

The viewpoint above however meritorious and sound notwithstanding, there are numerous criticisms of the practice of cadre deployment, particularly its effectiveness and its overall success. Since the ANC government assumed power, in state owned enterprises, and in public "administration, where cadre deployment is widespread, and resulted in large numbers of incompetent people being appointed to positions for which they have neither the experience nor qualifications. This has resulted in serious problems" (Devenish, 2014:2). These problems take the shape of failure of administrative capacities at both local and provincial levels, near total collapse of critical SOEs, widespread and intensive service delivery protests, financial mismanagement, and corruption at massive scales all attributed to ineptitude and incompetence of deployed ANC cadres (De Waal, 2012Dintwe, 2012; Bruce, 2014; Twala, 2014; Van Vuuren, 2014).

In lieu of the forgoing, the importance of the level of education and the professionalisation of government officials is critical for a panoply of reasons. A case in point, another of the most widely utilised measure of capacity is extractive capacity, measured in terms of tax extraction. Tax extraction measures capacity in two ways: first, examines the capacity of a government to extract taxes; additionally, the capacity for a successful tax extraction should be followed by optimal use of the resources provided by the extracted taxes (like for service delivery and provision of welfare for citizens).

There is another significantly important way in which capacity measures of governance which is found in the example provided by Fukuyama (2013) when he suggests that in tracing the history of Central banks in the early 21st century across the developing world, we see that Central Banks in the 21st century are unbeatably better run than in the 1980s, prior to the debt crises in Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa. This success, Fukuyama attributes partly to "the significantly higher degree of professionalism in their staffing. A key aspect of state-building in the United States during the Progressive Era was the replacement of incompetent political patronage appointees with university-trained agronomists, engineers, and economists" (Fukuyama, 2013:9). Other factors considered by Fukuyama in the assessment of the QoG are *Output Measures* – here, the ability of a government to deliver basic social services like schools, public health services, public security, national defence, *inter alia* are evaluated (Fukuyama, 2013:8). The better and the more efficient a government can do this, the high its quality. The preceding argument is in tandem with the objective of this study and reiterates the

general importance of an exploratory analysis of how capacity particularly the educational capabilities of political candidates affect the quality of government and how that in turn can be linked to development (e.g., effectively, and efficiently managed SOEs) or the metastasis of bureaucratic malfeasance.

2.4 The challenges of governance in South Africa

A weighty emphasis is found in an extensive number of literature (Roes-Ackerman, 1999; 2004; Rose & Shin, 2001; Rubin, 2011; Bruce, 2014; Holt & Manning, 2014; Godinho & Hermanus, 2018; Meirotti & Masterson, 2018; Pillay, 2021, Zondo Commission, 2022) which suggest that corruption poses as the most critical challenge to governance in Africa. Usually, governance in Africa is described through euphonous terms like "neopatrimonialism, kleptocracy, prebendalist" (Elis, 1996; Carbone, 2007; Cameron, 2010; Lodge, 2014). In South Africa, State Capture is now the common parlance for malfeasance or corruption, perpetrated by people with power in positions of governance. Godinho and Hermanus (2018:9) describe the problem of state capture in their definition of it as,

> A political-economic project whereby public and private actors collude in establishing clandestine networks that cluster around state institutions to accumulate unchecked power, subverting the constitutional state. The state capture network seeks more than anything else to be beyond the reach of the law, accountable only unto itself, free to loot or oppress or extend patronage and favour. The systematic erosion of accountability made more insidious by the often-attendant appeals to social justice or transformation, between state capture networks and the rest of society is its definitive source of corruption. State capture is essentially corrupt because it seeks to cheat the social contract, however that contract may manifest in any given country, and however it is reflected in the constitution.

As a project, the process of state capture thus takes a significant amount of time and could be the result of certain political arrangements. Take the case of the Closed List Proportional Representation (CLPR) as practiced in South Africa and its links to party autocracy, erosion of accountability, the capture and eventual collapse of some state-owned enterprises. The supposition here is that some practices critical to the democratic process can inadvertently vitiate the quality of say governance. Take elections for instance, they are integral to every democratic process (Ryan, 2018). Elections present citizens in a democracy with the opportunity to choose leaders to represent their interests or allow citizens to make a positive

change by selecting better alternatives and the same process (when executed free and fairly) lends legitimacy to a regime (Reynolds, 1999; Kunicova & Rose-Ackerman, 2001; Harrison, 2002; Matlosa, 2002; Ryan, 2018). It is difficult to assess if the ANC's successive electoral victories (with diminishing majority nonetheless) is a sign that the people still believe in the party, or it could be a result of the non-plebiscite political arrangement.

Indeed, elections, provide citizens with the opportunity and the power to choose public servants and hold these representatives accountable for the decisions they make in office (Amtaika, 2014:1). It is also more than just a method of selection or replacement of leadership, the electoral process to restate defines the character and nature of a democratic regime (Reynolds, 1999). It has been tabled that "in a democracy, electoral voting rules and legislative processes interact with underlying political cleavages to affect opportunities for corruption" (Rose-Ackerman, 1999:127). The premise for the afore cited argument by Rose-Ackerman is the notion that in some political systems, "narrow interests" may drive the establishment of a national political party with considerable amount of support and pivotal influence, like we see in the ANC. More to it, under such systems, government is transformed or transitions into a source of private benefit, a system of patronage and illegal favours subsists and there is an exponential increase in the probability of public malfeasance (Rose-Ackerman, 1999:128). Malfeasance, state capture from this perspective grows or is endogenous to a political system. Accordingly, it can be ascertained that the practice of the CLPR (closed list proportional representation system) in South Africa's national and regional legislatures inadvertently creates a breeding ground for malfeasance.

To elucidate why the above is the case, under the CLPR system, a political party gets representation in the legislature based on the direct percentage of votes they receive in an election. As such, a vote is cast for a party and the vote total determines the number of seats a party wins in the legislature (Matlosa, 2002). For representation in the South African parliament under its CLPR system, the minimum for qualification into parliament is to have 0.5 % votes. That is, for every 0.5% of votes that a party gets, it is allocated one seat. In the National Parliament in SA, there are four hundred seats and each of the nine provincial legislatures is allotted between 30 and 90 seats, depending on the population of the province (Amtaika, 2014:4). The goal is that the PR system the South African system would be an inclusive political representation. That is, every interest group should be given a chance to be represented in the country's legislature; it should not just be a rule by the majority.

The proportional representation system is meritorious in lieu of the above because it makes sure that in a political system, there is space for the representation of the interests of diverse groups and the accommodation of opposing political cleavages. Under the PR system, voters are not confined to geographic electoral areas, they are driven by their views on the ideologies and manifestos of the different contesting political parties (Reynolds, 1999; Matlosa, 2002). More on its merit, the PR system is suitable for the plural heterogeneous society that South Africa is. The system enables and facilitates the participation of citizens from all races and occupations in the broad decision-making processes of the country, albeit through an indirect system. There is the affirmation that South Africa decided to adopt the proportional representation system because of the quest for representation in the new, post-apartheid political dispensation. The system was also proselytised in post-apartheid South Africa as it favoured inclusiveness. The objective was that system would be sensitive to and would help to unify the political interests that took shape before 1994 (Sibalukhulu, 2012).

A distinctive and yet problematic feature of the CLPR system is that votes are cast for parties and not for individuals. By implication, the opinions of the citizens do not really have a bearing on the candidate chosen by a party to eventually represent it. In CLPR system the leaders of a party decide on who makes the list and the citizens only need to concern themselves with voting for a party of their choice (Kunicova & Rose-Ackerman, 2001). Scholars like Amtaika, (2014) suggest that given that citizens are totally divorced from the process of directly selecting their representatives, the CLPR system is purported to bear the hallmark of autocracy. To affirm, Nompumelelo Sibalukhulu (2012) argues that "voters do not have the power to determine party lists, but instead vote for political parties, regardless of their dislike of certain individuals on the lists. In this arrangement, a party can put forward a criminal side by side with good men and women—knowing that voters have no choice" (Sibalukhulu, 2012).

As is the case with South Africa, an inadvertent outcome of the CLPR is that malfeasance of politicians becomes difficult to monitor in large (often national) districts, neither are voter able to exercise their power to request or make a change through the ballot. Since voters cast their votes for parties; there is a severance or a weakening of the link between individual politicians' re-election and their performance in office (Kunicova & Rose-Ackerman, 2001:2). A case in point is that despite the plethora pending cases against him, the former president Jacob Zuma was able to ascend to the top of the ANC. More so, in the forthcoming elective conference, and several candidates at the top of the ANC list for key positions are not without their scandals. The current president of the party and the country, has the Phala scandal pending; while former

health Minister Zweli Mkhize, described as a strong contender has been implicated in the Digital Vibes saga (Amashabalala, Matiwane & Madisa, 2022).

The way the South African system is designed is suggestive of a system that does not allow the people to fully express their will. Because of the way the system is structured, it is not "difficult for the will of the people to be usurped or subverted. Even if voters feel betrayed by the conduct of a parliamentarian, they are unable to remove such a person: he or she would stay on for as long as party bosses so dictate" (Sibalukhulu, 2012). One way to put it is that because of the way the system operates, people in power can get away with anything as far as the party bosses are pleased with them. For instance, the former president Jacob Zuma's capture of the state with the Gupta family would not have been possible if not for the way the south African system was designed. To reiterate, even prior to assuming power, the name Jacob Zuma had been mired in several cases of malfeasance or some sort of scandal (arms deal, Shaik scandal, rape allegations, etc). These facts did not affect his rise to power nor were they deleterious to his political career.

To concretise, back in 2014 before the elections that would be his last term, President Jacob Zuma was number one on the ANC national list. After his re-election as ANC president at Mangaung in December 2012, his position as the president of the country became guaranteed. This made him the most popular leader in the ANC, democratically elected by its structures. This was irrespective of the diverse ways in which the decisions and deployment under his administration was leading the country to the brink. It did not also matter how the rest of South Africa felt about him and his leadership of the country as his ascent to the top was part of the well-insulated ANC process. Of equal significance, is also the fact that the current Phala scandal will also not serve as an obstacle to current president Cyril Ramaphosa's position as the president of the party and the country. These examples are an accentuation of some of the demerits of the CLPR. Amongst other things, the CLPR system overemphasizes the role of the political party, especially in the compilation of the party's list of candidates. Also, through the compilation of candidate lists, the CLPR "entrenches and creates a culture where oligarchies within political parties are formed; as it is the party leadership that decides who tops the party list during elections (Godinho & Hermanus, 2018).

Furthermore, on how the CLPR inadvertently leads to malfeasance is made clear in the proposition that "elections serve as a monitoring device to hold politicians accountable. Different electoral rules vary in their monitoring capacity and hence create stronger or weaker

constraints on politicians" (Kunicova and Rose-Ackerman, 2001:5). Since politicians owe their positions (in a sense) to the party; the lines of accountability do not go directly to the voters. Rather, loyalty to party leaders leads to undermining the principles of accountability and transparency (Martin & Solomon, 2016). Assuredly, this is true of the South African situation, as "at the level of provincial and national government, there are no direct lines of political accountability between voters and parliamentarians. This is inherent in the design of the country's electoral system" (ibid). Adversely, in such a situation, the agenda of a political party does not always and necessarily reflect the will of the people; since the members of a legislature are accountable only to their parties, the will of the party – not the people – reigns supreme.

It is again reported that in South Africa, most political parties "employ some form of disguised autocracy." Here, the extent of the power wielded by party leaders allows them to select certain members into key positions or get them changed from key positions. Those given key positions are perceived as loyal and are usually rewarded with another position irrespective of their venality. One case amongst myriads of such is that of Bheki Cele, a former police commissioner who was fired from his post for allegations of corruption in a procurement scandal in 2012 (Hlongwane, 2012). Prior to the 2014 election, he made it to the top of the KwaZulu-Natal provincial list, "Cele also made a strong showing on the national-to-national list of leaders elected to go to Parliament, where he came third after ANC president Jacob Zuma and deputy president Cyril Ramaphosa" (*ibid*). His loyalty was rewarded as he served as Agricultural Minister and now, he is back and currently the police minister under the current ANC president Cyril Ramaphosa.

Substantial evidence attests to a demerit of a system like CLPR because it inadvertently creates a fertile ground on which malfeasance can metastasise. Because of the CLPR, politicians are disconnected from the voters, and this causes an erosion in accountability, lack of transparency and a democracy in which bureaucrats are not motivated to perform or do not have the capacity to perform. This further weakens the institutions of governance (*Persson et al*, 2001; Amtaika, 2014; Godinho & Hermanus, 2016; Saha & Sen, 2020) and makes the state susceptible to abuse or capture.

The engagement in a critical analysis of the CLPR system in this section was aimed at accentuating that a political system may be inadvertently promoting political malfeasance through the promotion of mediocrity or lack of capacity. The CLPR system embeds relationships of a patrimonial kind in the ANC led government (Lodge, 2014; Godinho &

Hermanus, 2018; Martins and Solomon, 2016). Neo-patrimonial indicators include the acquisition of business interests by leading politicians and their families, most notably the proliferation of the presidential family's business concerns as seen under the ANC presidency of Jacob Zuma. The current ANC president has the Phala scandal – pending.

The neopatrimonial theory resonates with our reality in SA and it is relevant in helping us understand the problem facing governance in South Africa as "the behaviour of ANC leaders and their followers is beginning to correspond to conventions associated with clientelistic organizations, in which specific public services and resources are offered to particular groups in exchange for political support" (Lodge, 2014:3). Accordingly, the CLPR as practiced in South Africa bequeaths a low of power to political patrons or leaders who in turn can manipulate such powers and use such to parlay for support. Under a neopatrimonial system, "patrons typically are office holders in state institutions who misuse public funds or office in order to stay in power" (Soest, 2006:7). The CLPR system enables promotion of undue influence by political patrons, and this usually takes the shape of political deployment.

Interestingly, some scholars suggest that there is also a socio-cultural aspect to the problem. Something that was there at the formation of the ANC as a liberation movement. Historically, the ANC evolved from "networks constituted through family, kinship, and childhood friendship certainly played a vital role in the formation of the ANC's founding elite. More arguably, such personalized networks continued thereafter to exercise profound influence" (Lodge, 2014:6). The problem with such a network of relationship was that it initiated the entrenchment of patrimonial politics in the ANC as there was an intertwining of personal and public concerns between these founding members and comrades. The result is that relationships of a patrimonial kind rather than merit became the requisite qualification for political appointment.

A line of argument underscores that the practice of CLPR ensconces relationships of a patrimonial kind in the ANC's leadership configuration and style of governance. The almost three decades of the ANC led governance in South Africa has been tainted with bureaucratic malfeasance as the party (a preponderance of its top cadres) have been associated with corruption, clientism, autocracy and all forms of administrative malfeasance (Tsheola, 2014:947). The ANC under the Presidency of Jacob Zuma has been described as one in which political power has become personalised and the top party leaders and leaders in different state-owned enterprises have become untouchables because of they enjoyed the protection of

powerful political patrons (Pillay, 2021; State Capture Report, 2022). More to it, there is further an institutional dimension to how such a process of personalisation of power is made possible or propped by a political system and structure that can insulate top party members because of their connection to a particular faction of the ANC and not based on their performance at the helm of their different positions (Paton, 2015; Pillay, 2021).

Again, a supposition affirms that "the ANC has through its self-selection of public administration demonstrated deep reverence for patronage and political manipulation" (cited in Tsheola, 2014:951). The CLPR system makes such perpetuation of patronage possible. For instance, the link between CLPR as practiced in South Africa and the fostering of Neopatrimonial politics can be further brought to light by an examination of how the distribution of benefits to a select group of individuals or any other such groupings in exchange for political support manifest itself (the Zondo Commission documents several instances). When the former ANC President Jacob Zuma assumed power, he was said to have placed "an array of acolytes in key positions, ranging from the cabinet and state-owned enterprises to the police and the national broadcaster, the SABC. Key individuals with a close relationship to Zuma are deployed as ministerial advisers in government departments. Their distinguishing feature is that they owe their loyalty to Zuma alone and use it to override government decisions and bypass the ANC (Paton, 2015). Another case in point, post July unrest and looting in the distinct parts of the country, several factors point to police failure to act decidedly in stemming the carnage (Erasmus, 2021), Mr Bheki Cele still serves as police minister post cabinet reshuffle, post 2021 riots. Given such example and from the forethought in Paton's position, it can be consensually validated that the ANC's neopatrimonial system of political administration or understanding of how power should be executed is consistently expressed in the guise of the policy of cadre deployment.

To surmise, the above paragraphs have established with a few critical examples that in its practice of cadre deployment the ANC – the ruling since 19994 – has not practice a system based on merit. Patronage or rather loyalty to political patrons is a key defining feature of most deployed cadres. According some scholars (Southall, 2007; Paton, 2015, Magam and Wilson, 2021) a common leitmotif and at the crux of the logic of neopatrimonial-esque ANC led government is that the ANC leadership understand and accepts political connections as business and economic prize and that in the end is what matters most as it supersedes things like the principles and practice of: accountability, merit, impartiality, fairness, public accountability, transparency, empowerment and effective use of resources.

Scholars over the years have tried to understand governance in Africa and several of such studies have suggested that the common features of neopatrimonial governments can be summed up with one underlying logic. Which is, that personal enrichment and aggrandizement is not a vice, it is a sort of value (Tapscott, 2017; Shoeberlain, 2020). The supposition from these scholars is that under neopatrimonial systems, arbitrary power is marshalled into selfish maximization of utility; and that is argued to be a prime motivation for public malfeasance. Because of such in such a system clientistic relationships are courted, nurtured, maintained, or assume a rational economic calculus. Hyslop (2005;786) affirms by accenting that the way the economic calculus works in the ANC led government is visible in government's polices post-apartheid, which has primarily operated as of reward system. Government policies and practices in a lot of instances encouraged rent-seeking activities especially in the case of some unqualified nuevo Black entrepreneurs who through the economic preferences they were given because of a whole gamut of policies, especially those "relating to the awarding of state contracting and corporate ownership." The Arms deal saga was one of such system of economic rewards that operated based on the logic of neopatrimonialism, so is the State Capture report. It is no fallacy that under the ANC led government senior party figures have become "increasingly comfortable with seeking material rewards for their past political contributions and old 'struggle' networks provided political connections that could be parlayed into economic leverage" (Hyslop, 2005:786). As a result of such policies and practices of loyalty for rewards, the climate where the lines between legal practice or forms of rent-seeking, malfeasance, overt corruption, and cronyism have become all together grey or blurred (*ibid*).

It is implied that in clientistic relationships, reciprocity matters, as it is based on an exchange of mutual but not necessarily equal benefits. The nature or form of exchange in this system happens in the form of gifts (from a patron) in return for loyalty (from the client) as a manner of ensuring the incumbency of an old patron or the ascendency of a new one. For Tom Lodge (2014) in analysing the challenges of governance in South Africa, there is an overt manifestation of neopatrimonial logic that permeates the political hierarchy within the ANC. Factionalism, alliance and re-alliance, and power scuffles over the years have become a feature of the ANC, more so before the 2022 December elective conference. It is uncommon to hear reports of top members of the ANC using proceeds gathered from the fruits of tenders to bolster their reserves in a bid to fund their leadership campaigns (Mlambo and Masuku, 2021). Lodge because of the foregoing has earlier on suggested that "when candidates for internal offices

need to mobilize support through such investments, clearly they are functioning in a milieu in which candidates are expected to reward their followers, in effect operating as patrons looking after their clients" (2014:13). For instance, in the 2007 Polokwane Conference, the deputy President Kgalema Motlanthe confirmed that buying the votes of branch delegates was 'rampant and pronounced' (*ibid*) It can also be emphasised that there is an economic dimension to the logic of neopatrimonialism.

2.4.1 Security of Tenure, ANC's Dominance, Malfeasance and State Capture

Aside from the arguments that the CLPR system in South Africa has ensured that a political party has become susceptible to a form of autocracy (Kalombo, 2005; Amtaika, 2014); another equally important challenge of governance is articulated in the concern that South Africa has been leaning towards a one-party state. This is because firstly, since the demise of apartheid in 1994, the ANC has been at the reins of power. From their first resounding majority victory in 1994 to maintaining a majority in most of the elections since 1994. The ANC has become a dominant party and player as it has so far retained more than 60% (until 2019 when they manage 57.5%) of the votes since the first inclusive democratic election in 1994. Not until recently, with the formation of parties like the EFF and the DA's attraction of some black voters, the successive victory enjoyed by the ANC general election, the inability to really bring culprits of malfeasance to book, the failure to perform efficiently in different governance or service delivery benchmark notwithstanding; the future defeat of the ANC at the polls has been described still as unlikely, and this has earned it the label of a dominant party (Pillay, 2021). The ANC vote statistics stand at: 62.65% in 1994; 66.35% in 1999; 69.68% in 2004; 65.9% in 2009, 62.15% in 2014 and 57.5% in 2014 (Southall, 2005; Bruce, 2014).

Aubrey Matshiqi (2012) shares the view that there is no strong history of political opposition in South Africa. Matshiqi attributes the lack of opposition to the ANC's dominance; which is both a result of overwhelming electoral support in deep rural areas, belief in the persecution of Zuma and the campaign story of the ANC as a liberation party has seen to it that the electoral system still privileges the interests of political parties over those of the ordinary citizens (Matshiqi, 2012; Bruce, 2014; Pillay, 2021). According to Mandy Rossouw elections in South Africa are events that happen every five years and the ANC unfailingly blows the "we won liberation for our people" horn (*ad misericordia*) to parley on the emotions of, to placate and attract voters (Rossouw 2009). For Robert Wieczorek, the forgoing is critical as he support the

claim by contributing the view that "since the ANC's rise to dominance in South Africa at the end of apartheid, elections have entirely been predictable" (Wieczorek, 2012:29).

The reason behind the brief exploration of ANC's current dominance in the South African political sphere is to accentuate it as a challenge to governance, as it weakens accountability, transparency, and effective and efficient service delivery. In more precise parlance, the issue here is that if a party is "so electorally powerful as to render it unlikely to be defeated in the foreseeable future" (Suttner, 2006:278), it can create a "security of tenure" and "too much security of tenure can further corrupt arrangements" (Rose-Ackerman, 1999:127). By implication, there is a need for political competition (since the fall from 60% and the possibility of not maintaining a majority in the next election, the ANC has 're-branded itself as it knows how, set up a commission of inquiry) encourages accountability and reduces the possibility of public venality. In a system that holds politicians accountable, in a system where bureaucrats know that they will face the wrath of the public (during elections) if they do not perform optimally or deliver on their promises, they will be shocked into action, and they will be more accountable and responsive to the interests of the voters (Reynolds, 1999; Bruce, 2014; Magam & Wilson 2020). The argument is that because the CLPR system has so long granted ANC its dominance, we have witnessed that in most cases, performance has not determined whether a party will get re-elected or not, as is the case with South Africa. As the electorate vote for a political party, the possibility of the politicians on the list getting re-elected hinges or is primarily dependant on their hierarchy in the ranking on the list, not on their performance in office. Since lists – as is commonly the case – are drawn up by party leaders, "the ranking will reflect criteria unrelated to competence in providing benefits to voters, such as party loyalty, or effort within the party (rather than in office). Then, the incentives to perform well are much weaker" (Persson *et al*, 2001:5).

Because of the ANC's near dominance in the South African political configuration, the impetus to perform is weaker and malfeasance and corruption becomes common place. Amongst other things, the possibility of looting the economy (as reported in the Zondo Commission) is one major demerit of having a dominant party in a country. This is because the negative outcomes of a dominant party increase the longer, they stay in power. The absence of competition may overtime and if not, eliminate the threat of losing power which affects the accountability of the incumbent political party or government. The is a result of the fact that "even if 'good governance' goals have dominated public policy in postcolonial polities in the last decades, their politics and public administration often continue to be marked by authoritarianism,

nepotism, and corruption – the very practices good governance policy was to eradicate (Beekers & van Gool, 2012).

Some cases in point:

1. **The Travel Gate Scandal of 2004:** this was a scandal that involved MPs who abused travel vouchers that were provided to them for the sole purpose of travelling to visit their constituencies. These MPs instead repurposed and utilised the vouchers for trips neither connected, nor remotely related to their official duties or work. The total cost accrued from this scandal was about R18million (in 2004). There were situations of malfeasance as it was found that some MPs were involved complicitly as they overlooked inflated claims by intermediaries who pocketed the excesses of the ballooned prices. A total of thirty people faced charges during the Travelgate affair. Seven of those included travel agents and twenty-one were siting MPs. Some five other MPs charged already plea-bargained (Mail and Guardian, 2006). During the height of these scandal, to express the fact or the reality that the ANC rather than individuals were the only culpable ones, some of the MPs implicated cried foul and made threats to let the cat out of the bag because they were certain that more senior members of the ANC were also involved in the scandal (*ibid*). Of the implicated MPs, a bulk came from the ANC. Despite the proposed disciplinary action promised by the ANC, some of these MPs found culpable still served as active members of the ANC and are still serving in different portfolios. In examining the way, the Travelgate scandal played out, scholars like Ndebele (2012), briefly comments that the prevalence of the contagion which corruption is, affects ANC's governance capacity in a myriad of ways that becomes a loop because due to the power political leaders and party patrons command, "the party consigns its own members to the purgatory of ethical anguish. The party then goes on to get Parliament, in which it is the majority, to write off R12 million in outstanding debt owed to it by members of Parliament who were implicated in the scandal, allowing them to steal from the public with impunity".
2. **Nkandlagate 2014 -15**: this was quite a scandal as it pertained the then incumbent ANC president, former president Jacob Zuma. Under Advocate Thuli Madonsela, the then Public Protector, findings where made which showed that the president had irregularly and unduly merited from a R246 million 'security upgrade' of his homestead in Nkandla; and he was instructed by the Public Protector to pay back some of the money. While the public protector's finding was out, another report suggested that "More: Upgrades at Nkandla in Pipeline: Police

Minister[5] clears Zuma," so read a new paper headline. The report suggested that the president was not required to pay back any money and was instead due for more upgrades in the Nkandla homestead in question. The then Police chief Nathi Nhleko's 50-page report contradicted the Public Protector Thuli Madonsela's finding that Zuma must pay for non-security upgrades at Nkandla. Nhleko's report and findings considered the former president Zuma's kraal, chicken run, visitors' centre swimming pool and Amphitheatre as critical security measures (Mkhwanazi, 2015:2). The report was detailed and made a convincing case for why it believed that more public money should go into the homestead. For instance, the report said, "the swimming pool at Nkandla was needed to ensure the security of the president as it served a critical fire-fighting purpose." This is because a demonstration by the then chief fire officer for Umhlathuze fire service gave enough evidence of how the suction pump could "draw sufficient water from the pool at the required speed, whereas the fire hydrant's lack of necessary water pressure was evident." (Mail and Guardian, 2015). The Nhleko report did spark a lot of public outrage and among opposition party members; but some key members of the ANC party then like the party's chief whip, "Stone Sizani, welcomed the report" (*ibid*).

3. **State Capture 2009-2019**

According to Maurice Dassah (2018), state capture came to the fore or became a major topic in South Africa in March 2016. This followed the dismissal of the then Minister of Finance, Nhlanhla Nene, on 09 December 2015. There is however a revelation from the 'Nenegate' scandal that points to poor understanding of state capture among politicians and the public. "The literature indicates that state capture lacks analytical clarity as there is no clear demarcation between legitimate political lobbying and state capture created by corruption" (:1). The concept or the term state capture came into use in the early 2000; when in their analysis of transitional economies, Hellman, Jones, and Kaufmann (two thousand) found that there are different aberrations to governance that can ensure in such transitional states. For these authors, the main challenge faced by states-in-transition is how best to redefine how a state interacts with firms, "but little attention has been paid to the flip side of the relationship: how firms influence the state - especially how they exert influence on and collude with public officials to extract advantages. Some firms in transition economies have been able to shape the rules of the game to their own advantage, at considerable social cost, creating what the authors call a capture economy in many countries" (2000:1). State capture becomes evident when public officials, and politicians who have been elected and are supposed to represent the collective

[5] Nathi Nhleko was appointed by President Jacob Zuma in May 2014

interest, "privately sell under-provided public goods, and a range of rent-generating advantages 'a la carte' to individual firms" (2000:1).

More, from the purview of political economy, one of the challenges faced by transition economies is the critical view that the path of transition is fraught with fear as "our understanding of the main obstacles in the path of transition has generally been guided by an image of the state as a 'grabbing hand' discriminating against firms with low bargaining power to maximise the private interests of politicians and bureaucrats" (ibid). For Slavica Uzelac (2003) state capture is just another manifestation or form of corruption. Albeit one where most transitional states are more susceptible to. The former ANC and the country's president Jacob Zuma have been at the centre of the quagmire. A quagmire because there are arguments that the way in which the former ANC leader was treated is tantamount to witch-hunting. Given that the current ANC leader and the president of the country Cyril Ramaphosa (currently under investigation for a robbery that happened on his Phala farm) was part of government under the Jacob Zuma Administration. To reiterate, the aim here is not to parse out the debates or the nuances of the state capture report. The goal is to present a simple and broad view of the fact that the governance failures in South Africa is more complex and nuanced. And as such, there is a need for more considered reflection rather than oversimplification of the situation. For instance, the SA situation is complex in the sense that, despite the over seventeen agencies tasked with fighting corruption in the country, there has been little to show in terms of prosecution of corrupt or inept politicians or bureaucrats. The problem is a problem of the ruling party, not just a problem of a single regime. To understand the challenge thus, will aid us to have a balanced but cohesive view of the challenges of governance in the country.

The above and several cases are an attestation to the way malfeasance manifests itself among the current ruling party, ANC. They also attest to the impunity with which top members of the ANC tend to operate with and the further immunity enjoyed by some top party brass or if you are at the helm of affairs, you are above persecution. The examples above encapsulate what Thomas Hobbes once observed that people:

> in all places and in all ages unjust actions have been authorised by the force and victories of those who have committed them; and that, potent men breaking through the cobweb laws of their country, the weaker sort and those that have failed in their enterprises have been esteemed the only criminals; have thereupon taken for principles and grounds of their reasoning that justice is but a vain word: that whatsoever a man

> can get by his own industry and hazard is his own: that the practice of all nations cannot be unjust: that examples of former times are good arguments of doing the like again; and many more of that kind: which being granted, no act in itself can be a crime, but must be made so, not by the law, but by the success of them that commit it (1909:227)

Fundamentally it is supposed that in a strong and competitive political environment, the stakes are high, and this reduces the likelihood of corruption (Rose-Ackerman, 197). That is to imply that in a competitive political system, the check for corruption is already in place (ibid). similarly, Brooks (2004) also makes a case for a competitive political arena. As a competitive political arena will see to it that political malfeasance is reduced, a healthy political competition will also promote a politics that focuses on the welfare of the people, such a system must ensure that the electorate have a chance to pick other alternatives and ensure that government is accountable and transparent. According to the scholar Susan Rose-Ackerman (1999), "operating against the possibility of high levels of malfeasance, however, is the likelihood that the public will favour a tough stance against corruption and money in politics. They will be better able to make their beliefs effective if the political scene is highly competitive – so that representatives have little freedom to act against the wishes of the electorate" (:129).

It is of import to ensure that a system has a healthy political competition. This can serve as one of the ways of promoting transparency and political accountability. For Adrian Leftwich, the democratic process should be "a process of institutionalising uncertainty," (Leftwich, 2002:198). Uncertainty is used in this regard to refer to a democratic process that does not allow room for any form of Rose-Ackerman's "too much security of tenure." The line of argument here is that in a democratic political system, there should be space for open competition for power, and no group should be certain of winning.

An important deduction that can be made is thus: in a competitive political environment where disclosure of or bringing a corrupt transaction by a politician to light can bring about political death. In such a setting, the drivers of or incidence to engage in malfeasance will be reduced across all spectra of the political system. In a situation where the reverse is the case, which is where politicians seem to get rewarded despite their actions, *ceteris paribus*, bad governance, state capture, and corruption is bound to increase (Rose-Ackerman, 1999; *Persson et al* 2001; Pillay, 2021). The notion is that the scourge of corruption in South Africa or in any country at all "is an indication of how the interests of citizens may come under threat as a result of the distortions that come with single party dominance, which the dishonest among us deliberately

confuse with a one-party state" (Matshiqi, 2012:8). As it is, the current political system allows for ANC's dominance, and we have evidence of how that has made people in power susceptible to abuse of it. Making the country a fertile ground for corruption in the process. As it is believed that "there would appear to be a correlation between corruption and longevity in power" (Bull & Newell, 2003:238).

The instances and magnitude of malfeasance and corruption have been increasing. In some cases, it seems too abrasive and all efforts of the current ruling party (from its unclear step aside rule) to fight malfeasance has proven only to be prosaic. The contention thus is that there are structures that support the perpetration of such, and it is not just a problem of a select few individual. That is, the problem of political corruption in South Africa is both structural and complex as it seems impossible for government to really bring anybody to book. Most cases are still dragging on in court, costing the state money. An intuitive logical elucidation would suggest that the South African state is either disinterested in or lacks the will to correct such an ill. The forgoing is supported by the view in Hellman et al (2000) that there are distinct causes and consequences of state capture, influence, and administrative corruption.

Large incumbent firms with formal ties to the state tend to inherit influence as a legacy of the past, and tend to enjoy more secure property, and contractual rights, and higher growth rates. To compete against these influential incumbents, new entrants turn to state capture as a strategic choice - not as a substitute for innovation, but to compensate for weaknesses in the legal, and regulatory framework. When the state under-provides the public goods needed for entry and competition, "captor" firms purchase directly from the state, such private benefits as secure property rights, and removal of obstacles to improved performance - but only in a capture economy. Consistent with empirical findings in previous research on petty corruption, administrative corruption - unlike both capture and influence - is not associated with specific benefits for the firm (2000:1).

The suggestion that the system of CLPR bequeaths a lot of power to political party cum party leaders causes a rift or rather creates a disconnection between the citizens and their leaders. This also affects the principles of democratic governance, which requires government to be accountability and transparent. Because politicians enjoy and are vested with a lot of powers; they have over the years structurally created a system which political leaders engage in munificence to foster patronage and loyalty by deploying loyal cadres. Again, the dominance of the ANC in the South African political sphere was indicted as a reason for the growth of

political malfeasance and the growth of corruption. Reason put forward in this regard is that a dominant party system creates a security of tenure and further enhances corrupt arrangements.

After years of exploration and years of trial and error, donor agencies, international development practitioners, policymakers, and reformers, are learning the difficult way that there is a direct correlation between addressing corruption, good governance, transparency, and the rule of law. In a 'captured state' more so. Consequently, any effort at reforming or transforming the state should shift "toward channelling firms' strategies in the direction of more legitimate forms of influence, involving societal "voice", transparency reform, political accountability, and economic competition, where state capture has distorted reform to create (or preserve) monopolistic structures, supported by powerful political interests, the challenge is particularly daunting". For Pillay (2021) the correlation between absence of – or minimising – corruption and good governance is strong. Therefore, some reformation or corruption control measures go hand in hand with measures that seek to reform or improve the quality or character of governance (Tanzi, 1998:31). Put simply, corruption control and reform of government are two sides of the same coin.

Again, there is the suggestion that to one way to fight corruption, is to use or shift the gear of reform agendas to promote "good governance" and democratic accountability in all strata of society, beginning from the heads of states and parties. For a "democratic systems of governance premised on commitments to accountability, openness and transparency are thought to create conditions that discourage corruption" (Camerer, 2009:51). Inherently, such measures work on the basic idea that a democracy ought to operate on the principles of freedom (of press, media, and other similar liberties) and fairness (elections *inter alia*), open competition (a healthy political opposition), an independent legislative and judicial arm, can aid in limiting "the scope and frequency of corruption than one that does not have them" (Camerer, 2009:52). The circumscription of political power through the above means is also essential in a democratic system as it brings about a shift in the balance of power between leaders – those perceived to be corrupt vs those perceived to be free of corruption – is going to occur, with the scales tilting in favour of a more open democratic governance. A primary driving force behind this change is an "information-rich" and more transparent environment; leaders are forced to give a fuller public accounting of themselves than ever before (Rose-Ackerman, 1996; Camerer, 2009; Pillay, 2020).

Further, how we understand or the popular narrative of our governance challenges (malfeasance, state capture can all be a synonym for corruption) should provide us with insight into how attempts can be made to control and address such challenges. Shah and Schacter (2004:40) suggest that that often than not, the failure of most anti-corruption measure is because of the adoption of a Procrustean or a "one size fits all approach." In order "for programmes to work, they must identify the type of corruption they are they are targeting and tackle the underlying, country-specific causes, or 'drivers' of dysfunctional governance" (*ibid,* 2004:40-41). To concretise, if we thus understand or trace the incipience of corruption as a causal effect of institutional failure, a focus on reforming institutions should be efficacious. As opposed to the current narrative of corruption as simply the fault of one of the ANC's regimes. This thesis construes the governance challenges from an institutional perspective, in the sense that corruption is the major challenge to governance in South Africa. The most prevalent form being political corruption happens because of ineptitude rather than malice.

Because of the above view, one way to improve governance is to put in measures that prohibit and control corruption with an underlying rationale for improving the "quality" of the cadres appointed to oversee the political and bureaucratic apparatus of the state. A similar supporting claim is found in Neild's (2002:12-13) suggestion that one effective way of controlling corruption is the "creation of career elites". This mechanism should be viewed as "an important means of achieving high standards in public service."

So far, a look into the dynamics of the challenges of governance or say the capture economy has permitted us to unbundle corruption into a meaningful, and measurable components. Shah and Schacter (2004:41) for instance describe a model that divides developing countries into three broad categories namely: ""high," "medium," and "low"— reflecting the incidence of corruption." The assumption is that countries with "high" corruption have a "low" quality of governance, those with "medium" corruption have "fair" governance, and those with "low" corruption have "good" governance." One thing that can be derived from such a model is the suggestion that that corruption can be construed to reveal a symptom of fundamental failure in governance, "the higher the incidence of corruption, the *less* an anticorruption strategy should include tactics that are narrowly targeted at corrupt behaviour and the *more* it should focus on the broad underlying features of the governance environment" (Shah & Schacter, 2004:41).

It is critical to highlight that because of the exigencies of political transition post-apartheid, there was a need for a shift in the bureaucratic character of the South African public and

political apparatuses. The foregoing exigencies in Naidoo's (2012:3) supposition were influenced by amongst other things, the necessity of promoting "economic development in a context of high levels of inherited social inequalities and poverty; and to significantly restructure and transform historically discredited political and administrative institutions." The ANC's ascent into power came after a long liberation struggle and as such, the party had an urgent need make good on their election promises; and in their view, only a radical transformation can lead to that.

The issue however is that the approach was very drastic, and it is accumulatively becoming a catastrophic approach as it has only birthed negative outcomes. Tom Lodge (2002) suggests that that post-apartheid, the approach of state capture was one of Bureaucratic Inflation. Bureaucratic inflation as deployed by Lodge describes a tripled growth in the size of civil service. Lodge credits this growth to a process of politically motivated and ethnically exclusive recruitment which was a calling card of the post-apartheid regime; like that of their preceding apartheid government. During SA's transition, the number of unskilled and under-qualified public servants increased, while white and over time skilled Black people have been decreasing. Basically, because of the capture approach, government or public service was haemorrhaging competent bureaucrats. Poignantly, this negative trend began at a time when public administration duties were becoming increasingly complicated, complex and require cognate skills, knowledge, and ability. With a declining professional cadre in public administration came deterioration in the pay scales. This "erosion of capacity" had an effect which is, that the consequence of the bureaucratic inflation is the creation of a fertile ground for rent seeking in the South African public administration. Some scholars in most cases have argued that the correlation between rent seeking behaviour and the growth of corruption is a direct one (Mauro, 1995; Hopkin, 1997; Rose-Ackerman, 1999; Rubin, 2011; Pillay, 2021). As corrupt transactions become the parameter through which political allegiances are formed and political power is monopolised.

Inferring from Tom Lodge's (2002) position, one can postulate on a series of post hoc correlations (in the sense of because of this, therefore that). One is this: "if an increase in the number of unskilled and under-qualified public servants can be held culpable for the growth of political and administrative malfeasance, the converse – a growth in the level of skilled and qualified public servants – should translate into administrative competence and political progression" (Wilson, 2022). According to Jo Silvester (2012), the promotion of or the utilisation of an employee selection criteria in the process of political recruitment can improve

the quality of a country's bureaucracy and this can translate into a government of quality and the process can be used as tool in combating political corruption/state capture and all forms of malfeasance.

2.5 Paradiplomacy as governance: A tool for global cooperation for localised impacts

There has been a recorded rise in the international relations of cities or subnational governments. This has effectually made SNGs influential actors in the global stage. Such international cooperation and networking have become mainstays in the developmental approach of SNGs. This is because a lot of engagement in such relationships have been geared towards strengthen trade and economic ties (Magam, 2018) irrespective of how such relationship are termed (cultural exchange etc.).

Post-apartheid South Africa allowed for a new constitution which called for a devolution of power. That in a way pronounced the constitutional impetus for SNGs to engage in IR (Magam, 2020). As such, since 1994, SNGs in South Africa have engaged in paradiplomacy as an initiative to harness the promises of globalisation and economic interdependence, to utilise such for their socio-economic development (Nganje, 2013). Because of this, the engagement in IR by SNGs has been described as a nuevo public administration and governance paradigm. As it enables SNGs/cities/provinces to use their unique identities as a niche to carve out opportunities for improving their welfare from the international stage by attracting business and investment opportunities (Magam, 2018; 2020). The subsequent subsections will explore in-depth literature on paradiplomacy and how it has emerged as a form of or a tool for governance (Chatterji & Saha, 2017).

2.5.1 Concepts and Contexts of Paradiplomacy

Over the years, scholarly efforts have sought to understand how sub-national governments (e.g., regions, cantons, cities, provinces, and municipalities) have become new key entrants into the domain of international relations to pursue different goals and interests. Admittedly, this was because the dominant perception is that diplomacy is the exclusive preserve of the sovereign state or a central government. Like Olympic and Paralympics, paradiplomacy goes hand in glove with diplomacy. It is indeed diplomacy, albeit engaged in by substate entities, in the world space. Because of this, it is important to situate the discourse of paradiplomacy within

the context and the approach towards diplomacy adopted by a country. Another merit of situating the discussion of paradiplomacy within a country's foreign policy is as Magam (2018) suggests that such an approach provides detailed perspectives or addresses the issue of the who and what that shapes paradiplomacy; and to a larger extent, such an approach makes it also easy to delineate the phenomenon that paradiplomacy is.

In Thomas Jackson's (2017) view, despite there not being a single bounded definition of paradiplomacy, it is used to describe the international activities and foreign diplomacy/policy capacities of substate political entities. It sometimes includes cities; it is however more commonly used in reference to regional governments. Jackson (2017) further suggests that the incipience or rather the phenomenon paradiplomacy started gaining traction in the 1980s when regions increasingly became more involved in international affairs. Some scholars like Aguirre (1999) similarly traced the genealogical provenance of the concept to the works Duchacek (1986, 1990) and Soldatos (1990). The works of the preceding authors have been said to be influential in,

> the coinage and development of the neologism and its eventual preference over Duchacek's original term "microdiplomacy." However, while paradiplomacy has emerged as a catchall term for the phenomenon, it remains a deeply contested classification. The use of the prefix "para" is itself contentious. It was adopted, in Duchacek's (1990, p. 32) words, because "… it has no derogatory sound, but 'para' expresses accurately what it is about: activities parallel to, often coordinated with, complementary to, and sometimes in conflict with centre-to-centre 'macro-diplomacy.'" Notwithstanding Duchacek's reasoning, the prefix does connote a form of subordination where regional activities resemble but are distinct from "official" practices of diplomacy which remain the preserve of the state (Jackson, 2017:2).

For Alexander Kuznetsov (2015), the reality of conceptualisation assists with a proper interpretation of the phenomenon that paradiplomacy is. The concept of paradiplomacy is universal in character; however, the contexts and the aims are different. In the sense that various kinds of subnational governments engage in international relations for several reasons (Magam, 2018). The concept of paradiplomacy in this supposition finds its locus at the cusp of international relations and comparative politics which are said to be the two major sub-

disciplines of Political Science. That is, the concept interrogates the extent to which the constituent units of a sovereign state:

> will want to assert for an autonomous role in the arena of international relations will depend on the constitutional structure of the state, that is, whether it is federal or unitary, the pattern of distribution of power between the central government and the units, whether the units are administrative entities, or they have socio-cultural identities with or without autonomy or self-determination claims. It will also depend on whether the international borders of the state are well determined or disputed and whether the people living in its constituent units have ethnic brethren across borders or in other states in the neighbourhood. Depending on such contexts as these, para-diplomacy as defined above will appear as an asset for or as a threat to the sovereign state (Chatterji & Saha, 2017:376).

To begin with, it is critical to underscore that the concept and practice of paradiplomacy falls within the purview of a country's foreign or international diplomacy policy. Broadly conceptualised, foreign policy is an amalgam of principles and practices that shape the order of interaction between a state vis-à-vis another or other states. Diplomacy is how countries work together to achieve their goals. Countries talk to each other and work out agreements. They also use other activities like writing official letters of partnership, cultural visits/meetings to interact and communicate mutual interest. The nation state has been the sole player in the field of international diplomacy. Again, diplomacy is described as a relationship between different countries and their leaders. It is how countries talk to each other and work out agreements or disagreements.

In line with the broad conceptualization of diplomacy as a government's strategy for interacting with other state and not non-state actors, Barston (1988:1) describes diplomacy as being concerned with "the management of relations between states and other actors"… or a means "by which states through their formal and other representative, as well as other actors, articulate, coordinate and secure particular or wider interests, using correspondence, private talks, exchanges of view, lobbying, visits… and other related activities". For Reynolds (1994:15), diplomacy refers to a "course of action or the range of actions, adopted in relation to situation or entities external to the actor."

According to Pigman (2010:19) in the classical notion of diplomacy, "who counted as diplomatic actor was inseparable from the idea of what counted as a nation state." As such, the

emphasis has been on sovereign states as diplomatic actors. In Pigman's (2010:19) conceptualisation, sovereignty is described from "the Westphalia system" as the ability of government to exercise effective control "over a territory and the people and the resources therein." While it is not in the scope of this study to deeply examine the debates around diplomacy and sovereignty, the crucial factor the study seeks to highlight is what Pigman (2010:19) himself emphasises that "the notion of sovereignty itself was evolving". Pigman's conceptualisation of sovereignty provides insight into the evolution of the phenomenon of paradiplomacy because one of the argument in Pigman is the view that despite the nation state being key actors in the field of diplomacy, we have noticed quite often and "in simplest terms, today we observe a much wider range of actors engaging in the representative and communicative activities of diplomacy: multilateral institutions of various sorts, such as the United Nations….even so-called 'eminent person diplomats such as Bon Jovi, Jimmy Carter and Nelson Mandela" (:19). This supposition accentuates the fact and reality that over time, the nation state has ceased to become the sole actor in the conduction of diplomacy.

The main objective of diplomacy or foreign policy is to guide a state to achieve a variety of goals and targets. Magam (2018) describe the fact that a state's foreign policy is usually guided *de facto* realist interests and as such, it can be said that each state has different goals which they seek to achieve, or which shapes the trajectory of their foreign policy. These divergent interests notwithstanding, there are certain goals which are universal or uniformly influence the trajectory or the core of the practice of foreign relations by all states i.e., Political independence and territorial integrity, economic wellbeing and, prestige and status of a nation. They have been divided into short term, middle term, and long-term objectives.

South Africa's foreign policy directive is articulated in the dossier titled: 'Building a Better World: The Diplomacy of Ubuntu.' The policy proposal aims to clarify and demarcate the trajectory and the aim of South Africa's foreign policy. Primary, the main objective or end of the country's foreign policy is to ensure that the country becomes a champion nation in the coming decades of the 21st century. As such, the directive is that international relations engagement should express and strengthen national identity; cultivate national pride and patriotism; address the injustices of our past, including those of race and gender; bridge the divides in our society to ensure social cohesion and stability; and grow the economy for the development and upliftment of our people (DIRCO, 2011:3).

Again, it is reported that South Africa's exceptional approach to global issues is expressed in the concept of Ubuntu. Ubuntu is a concept that underlies and informs the country's approach to "diplomacy and our shape vision of a better world for all" (Dirco, 2011:4). The indication here is thus a humane or humanistic approach to diplomacy, and at the crux of which is an engagement with other states for the sole purpose of promoting mutual development and wellbeing. Consequently, the DIRCO dossier underscores key areas of focus, which are: the African Agenda, South-South Co-operation, North-South Dialogue, Multilateral and Economic Diplomacy, and bilateral relations with individual countries. According to the dossier: "Remaining loyal to the constitutional principles that have inspired South Africa since 1994, our foreign policy is currently based on the primacy of the African continent and the Southern African Development Community; commitment to South-South cooperation; the centrality of multilateralism; consolidating relations with the North; and the strengthening of bilateral social, political, and economic relations" (2011:4-5).

The foregoing areas were deemed key because the country:

- Believes the region and Africa is of vital importance to its goals.
- Aims to work with countries of the South to address shared challenges of underdevelopment, poverty, and inequality.
- Seeks to promote global equity and social justice; work with countries of the North to develop a true and effective partnership for a better global order.
- Seeks to do its part in strengthening the multilateral system including transforming it to reflect the diversity of our nations, and ensure its centrality in global governance (DIRCO, 2011:4).

More, South Africa's foreign policy is said to be borne out of the realisation by South African leaders (post-apartheid) that it was quite beneficial to position South Africa as a global citizen – "not only to advance global normative goals but also to advance South Africa's national interest" (Smith, 2012:68). Similarly, it is also suggested that the goal of the South African foreign policy is to create a South African Development Agency. In so doing, the country intends to ensure that its developmental assistance is channelled "through a single agency, in order to have a record of assistance provided by all government departments responding to requests from counterparts in other countries in their areas of responsibility" (Wheeler, 2011). Overarchingly and to reiterate, the main driver of South Africa's foreign policy is national interest as the government seeks to "use development partnerships (the term 'foreign assistance' is considered politically incorrect) in a tactical manner to promote South Africa's

interests" (*ibid* 2011:3). "Foreign policy, being an extension of national policy and interests, is an important component in South Africa's strategy for development and social purposes" (DIRCO, 2011:10).

As an offshoot of diplomacy or foreign relations, paradiplomacy is a practice whereby subnational governments (states, provinces, cities, etc.) engage in international relations, particularly with partners with similar interest or shared goals (Magam, 2018). For Andre Lecours (2002) paradiplomacy is the international agency of subnational governments. According to Lecours (2002:93),

> The international relations of regions have the peculiarity of being an object of study for both comparative politics and international relations scholars (Philippart and Van Cutsem 1999: 789–808). Comparativists tend to see the subject matter in terms of the extension of domestic situations related to territorial division of power and cultural diversity while the international relations specialists situate it more within the context of a turbulent world order and the complications it entails for national foreign policy. Both groups of scholars view the parallel international action of state and regions, where the latter is partially autonomous but clearly secondary to the former, as an outcome of this conjunction between domestic, often federal dynamics and external turbulence. They have called this phenomenon paradiplomacy to reflect both the ideas of parallelism and subsidiarity.

In Chatterji and Saha (2017:375), paradiplomacy when compared with formal diplomacy, "means a process which enables the constituent units of a sovereign state, to conduct their own diplomatic engagement with another state or its constituent units for the pursuit of their own interests. This obviously introduces a new element in international relations thinking marking a paradigmatic shift from the Westphalian concept of sovereign states as exclusively responsible for the conduct of diplomacy and war." In Zondi (2012:42) paradiplomacy is described as an activity that allows subnational entities to play an "active and strategic role in the conduct of international relations, previously considered the preserve of national governments." Kiilo (2006), refers to it as "the activism of non-central governments on international arena". Again, paradiplomacy can be simply construed as "subnational governments' involvement in international relations through the establishment of formal and informal ties, be they permanent or ad hoc, with foreign public or private entities, with the

objective of promoting social, economic, cultural, or political dimensions of development (cited in Milano and Riberio, 2011:24).

More, the engagement in paradiplomacy by different governments happens for varied reasons. As such, it is important to understand context of the situation to better understand paradiplomacy. Alexander Kuznetsov in tracing the provenance of paradiplomacy suggests that the rise in subnational entities engagement in IR can be tied to changes in the global politics in the late 1970s. In a similar vein, Chatterji & Saha (2017) report that part of post-World War II reconstruction and development approach in Europe saw some local governments, especially those in France, interacting with the local governments in Germany through twinning agreements with a view to promoting peaceful coexistence. "These processes of cooperation and integration for European peace and development were soon reflected in international relations thinking when, in the 1970s, scholars such as Robert Jervis, John Burton, Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, picking up from the ideas of Ernst B. Haas and Karl W. Deutsch in earlier decades, began to enrich the pluralist approach as distinguished from the realist approach to the discipline" (:376). More, another feature of global politics was a shift to a more pluralistic approach to international relations. In the sense that a pluralistic approach "proposed to unshackle international relations from the straitjacket of the realist paradigm in which states were the only actors engaged in pursuing interest through power and argued for looking at international relations as featured by a multiplicity of actors with or without the quality of sovereignty but interacting in manifold ways promoting cooperation and development" (Chatterji & Saha, 2017:377).

Again, in Kuznetsov (2015), several factors that are said to be responsible for the incipience of the scholarly exploration of the role of sub-national governments in foreign affairs were also identified. For instance, because of the pluralist approach of the post-cold war according to Kuznetsov (2015:35), scholars started to "pay more attention to the complication of the perception of world politics. Global affairs became observed not only as a state centric system, but as an environment where transnational relations play a significant role." As such, the context of paradiplomacy can be traced to the changing environment in world politics which made subnational governments more involved in their individual country's foreign affairs.

A reasonable sequitur from an extensive literature point to the strong forces of globalisation in giving rise to paradiplomacy. To concretise, Magone (2006) for instance suggests that because of globalisation, nation states have become burdened with an array of challenges. These

challenges notwithstanding, globalisation also "simultaneously allowed the liberations of subnational authorities from centralized national state structures." In Chatterji and Saha (2017:377) the supposition is that "as the decade of the 1970s advanced, two important developments further strengthened the pluralist perspective: one was the assertion by ethnic groups within states for all kinds of rights including the right of self-determination and independence, and the second was the onset of the powerful process of globalisation". For Pluijm and Melissen (20077:7) globalisation is a formidable force in the emergence and proliferation of paradiplomacy because even though the role of the state in the conduction of diplomacy is quite substantial and vital, since the end of the second World War however, "actors other than the state have entered the diplomatic stage. These non-state actors could be divided into those with a non-territorial character, like NGOs and multinational corporations, and those with a territorial character like states in a federal system, regions, and cities."

The role of globalisation in the emergence and proliferation of paradiplomacy is essential because if we understand globalisation to mean the "dissemination, transmission and dispersal of goods, persons, images and ideas across national boundaries" (ibid: 8); the implication is that we can identify how issues of "domestic" and "foreign policy" overlap. According to Kuznetsov, (2015:35), because of globalisation, we see countries in the modern world face simultaneously the domestication of their foreign affairs and internalisation of their internal politics. A case in point, there are issues that have often been considered as the domain of the "low" politics (like fishing quotas, environmental standards, or education). And this is under the authority of regional and local authorities. But such issues easily became part of both domestic politics and international relations agendas. Other than the central problem of "war and peace" in international affairs, "low" politics issues acquired vital significance, and this transformation in the global political agenda gave another considerable push to the subnational governments to become players in international relations."

Furthermore, in Adam Grydehoj's (2014:11) analysis, paradiplomacy refers to "a political entity's extra-jurisdictional activity targeting foreign political entities". Andre Lecours (2008) in tandem notes that paradiplomacy is simply the process or act of regional governments developing international relations. It also describes the "foreign policy capacity" of sub-state entities a termed used in reference to their involvement, independent of their city state, in the international arena in quest of their own specific international interests. Paradiplomacy as an "extra-jurisdictional" activity that exceeds "a political entity's de jure jurisdictional capacity, representing a de facto expansion of the entity's powers" find resonance in the work of

Grydehoj who posits that the involvement of a subnational entity in the diplomatic process can be subsumed under a particular legal framework but not totally limited by this framework. Grydehoj's (2014:10) typology particularly specifies that a phenomenon qualifies as paradiplomatic if it addresses:

> Foreign political entities, i.e., must aim to influence subnational entities in other countries, foreign sovereign states, etc. When, for instance, a subnational entity exercises de facto powers to encourage economic development by participating in an international policy network or entering into a twinning agreement, this can be regarded as paradiplomatic activity since it targets foreign entities. When, in contrast, a subnational entity exercises de facto powers to encourage economic development by providing financial support to key business actors within its own territory, this cannot be regarded as paradiplomacy because the target of the activity is within the entity's authority (even if the methods being used are beyond the entity's de jure jurisdictional capacity).

In Noel Cornago the concept of paradiplomacy was augmented with the inclusion of the security dimension of the interactions of sub-governmental units. According to Cornago (1999), paradiplomacy is sub-state governments' involvement in international relationships by establishing formal and informal contacts, which could be permanent or ad hoc, with foreign public or private entities, with the goal of promoting socio-economic, cultural, or political issues, as well as any other foreign dimension of their own constitutional competences (Magam, 2018). From the array of definitions explored above, this study adopts the definition of paradiplomacy as the range of international interactions undertaken by sub-national governments (provinces, municipalities, and cities) for an array of reasons to achieve set goals and objectives.

One of the questions raised with the increased participation in IR by SNGs, is how such activities might be altering the traditional Westphalian state-centric system. Some commentators submit that the thrust of globalisation, particularly the wave of globalisation post the Cold War blurred the role of the central government as the only actor in international relations (Magone, 2006). World politics in the 21st century was influenced by forces that challenged the Westphalian state-centric view of international politics. Due to globalisation, so goes the assertion, transnational integration has jettisoned the notion that international politics should be the domain of a single actor – the nation-state. The domain of international politics

has evolved to involved multi-centric and a duplicity of players which has been creating "overlapping memberships" between state-centric and multi-centric actors (Rosenau, 1988).

Further still, Rosenau (2006) contends that the globalised "multi-centric world" is made of up of players or actors that are not bound by sovereignty. More, these actors have the freedom and capacity to compete, collaborate, interact and at times conflict with the state-centric world. The assertion is thus that subnational governments are part of these actors. In Duchacek's (1990) exploration, the involvement of subnational entities in international relations was highlighted as a growing trend as there has been a noticeable difference in the sense that in 1985, there were twenty-nine US states with fifty-five permanent offices in seventeen foreign countries, a decade or so earlier, in 1970 it was only four US states with such relations.

We find another important delineation of paradiplomacy in the analysis of Pluijm and Melissen's (2007), as they used the term "city diplomacy" in their definition of paradiplomacy. for these scholars, the role of cities in the process of international relations was worth mentioning as cities have become a new centre of diplomatic relationships. The reality that in 2007 for the first time in human history, more people live in urban areas than in rural areas makes such places or locations critical spaces in the diplomatic process. In Alexander Kuznetsov's (2015) typology, it is reported that there is a necessity for researchers and policy practitioners to have a comprehensive insight on the concept and practice of paradiplomacy. For this to happen, Kuznetsov (2015) proposed that six questions are necessary if we are to gain insight into the genesis and evolution of paradiplomacy. For Kuznetsov (2015) these are crucial questions required for the comprehensive analysis of paradiplomacy (2015:101). The following are the questions:

- What factors cause or influence the blooming of the paradiplomatic activities in a particular substate or region?
- What is the country specific legal parameters or guidelines of constituent diplomacy in the case of subnational entities examined?
- What motivates the government of an examined region to be involved in paradiplomacy/international affairs?
- In what ways have paradiplomacy been institutionalized in each place?
- How do central government react towards or view the paradiplomacy of its constituent entities?
- What are the consequences of paradiplomacy for the development of the whole nation? (Kuznetsov, 2015:100-101).

From a broad position, this study finds these questions quite useful in guiding its parsing out of literature on the evolution of paradiplomacy in South Africa. There is a dearth of literature of paradiplomacy in South Africa, by deploying the above questions the study will effectually transverse an array of debate to provide elucidation or answer the questions above. As Kuznetsov (2015) submits that in attending to the questions above, we can provide clear explanation of and clarification into when, why, and how subnational governments involve themselves in international relations.

To address the question of the (factors that influence) what causes or motivates paradiplomacy, Kuznetsov (2015) finds clarity in understanding the role of causality. That is to say that the reasons or motivations for the emergence of subnational government in the sphere of diplomacy can be attributed to a) "external/universal" factors (factors associated with globalisation) and with b) which are the "internal" or "domestic" causes of paradiplomacy. The first factor – glolablisation – has been touted as a critical and a particularly important "external/universal" factor in the evolution of paradiplomacy. Paquin and LaChapelle (2005) ascertain the role of globalisation in causing the emergence of economic competition between subnational actors other than the age long competition between sovereign states. In the view of these researchers, "international reorganization at the economic level has led to a new international division of labour: competition between sovereign powers for the acquisition of new territories has been replaced with competition between sub-government states and large metropolitan areas for the acquisition of shares in world markets (Paquin and LaChapelle, 2005:78).

In the above construal, globalisation and the concurrent need for economic growth and developmental need has been ascertained as factors that influence the emergence and the robust involvement of subnational entities in foreign diplomacy. As such, paradiplomacy can be construed as a "policy capacity" enjoyed by subnational actors in a world that is growing increasingly global (Magam, 2018). Pluijm and Melissen (2007:7) are in concurrence with the foregoing supposition when they present that because of a growing grey area in the international and national socio-economic spheres due to the forces of globalisation, and as such, subnational entities feel drawn or compelled to move with the times, by actively getting involved in foreign diplomacy. Take the international issue of the global climate catastrophe as an example, we see that such a reality or 'issue' has become a national one as floods and droughts threaten crops (in a country, but the effects are quite specific to regions see Magam 2022), while national issues like defence becomes international issues as nuclear weapons threatens countries around the world. The result of such is that there "is now motivation or

rather a space has been created for subnational entities and other non-state actors to get directly involved in taking active part in the economic, cultural, and political responsibility of the central state. Inferring, globalization influences the growth of paradiplomacy as it creates an opportunity or places a mandate on subnational entities to share in the "burden" of the state" (Magam, 2018:25).

Globalisation as a factor influencing subnational entities engagement in foreign diplomacy goes beyond economic and developmental reasons as we can see from the climate example to mean that such engagements might also be crucial for the survival of a region in a changing world. Since, the engagement in foreign relations by "SNGs (provincial, regional, state, municipal or city governments) have also evolved in intensity and sophistication, a trend that is reflected in the emergence of networks of SNGs attempting to influence global policy debates in areas such as sustainable development, aid effectiveness and global economic governance" (Nganje, 2014:89).

Another elucidation as to how globalisation is a critical (what) factor in encouraging the engagement in paradiplomacy is provided in the work of Magone (2006), who describes and attributes the emergence paradiplomacy to a process; a process by which subnational entities to cope with the rise of globalisation. Similarly, Milani and Ribeiro (2011) concur that because of globalisation, we experience "new modalities in the management of internationalisation processes being deployed by states, business, social players and also subnational political entities". For Paquin and LaChapelle (2005:80), globalisation has been instrumental in the emergence of and emplacing substate entities in the foreign diplomacy arena because regions and cities are increasingly offering unlimited "advantages that determine the issue of investment. They compete to acquire private investments and positioning of decision-making centres. This inventive competition promotes innovation, efficiency collective allegiance…"

Other corpus of literature that explore the topic of paradiplomacy from the purview of semi-autonomous (substate entities fighting for self-determination or autonomy) regions (see Paquin and LaChapelle, 2005; Lecours, 2008; Melissen and Criekemans, 2013; Grydehoj, 2014; Jackson, 2017) argue that globalisation influences the spread of paradiplomacy as the process of direct foreign diplomatic relationship becomes "a tool of cultural preservation and a vital tool in their quest for autonomy or recognition. The role played by globalisation is that it creates an entry point for these semi-autonomous or autonomy seeking regions by giving them a platform to express their identities to the rest of the world" (Magam, 2018:26). Essentially, due

to globalisation there has been a growing proliferation of supranational and international entities in the foreign diplomacy space and this has complicated the divisions of power or responsibilities as "both paradiplomacy and internally oriented expansions of jurisdictional capacity could prove worthwhile for a subnational entity seeking outright independence or greater self-determination, and both types of activities necessarily challenge higher-level entities' notions of the powers that the subnational entity possesses (Grydehoj, 2014:13).

For substate entities or regions seeking autonomy or in decentralised systems there is still a key role of globalisation in motivating the engagement in paradiplomacy. Take Melissen and Criekemans' (2013) view of paradiplomacy as a "tool for reterritorialization". In that due to the forces of globalisation, regions with unique identities find it necessary to promote a region's identity, language, and culture in an increasingly global village through direct diplomacy with other foreign entities. The assertion is thus that that "globalisation itself has economic, cultural and political dimensions… Culture may also be globalizing in some respects, but local and minority cultures are also reviving, and territory is seen increasingly as the basis on which to protect and develop them" (Keating, 1999:2).

To further underscore globalisation as giving the impetus for incipience and spread of paradiplomacy, there is an assumption that multinational industries or internationally renowned and successful conglomerates are mostly found or rather they frequently cluster or "concentrate in a city or region, and the bases for advantage are often intensely local while the national government has a role in upgrading industry, the role of state and local government is potentially as great or greater"(Porter, 1990:622). Another way to describe this is to draw from the words of Kuznetsov (2015) who suggests that because of the universal and absorbing nature of globalisation, "we can assume that the factor of globalisation has an impact on the flourishing of paradiplomacy everywhere across the world, but definitely the strength of this variable varies in degree for different regions" (:102). Effectually, the extent to which globalisation influences the evolution and the practice of paradiplomacy in different regions in the world may vary, it however remains a salient and pertinent variable. Put in another way, globalisation is indeed a force to be reckoned with when we explore the topic of paradiplomacy. Underneath that still is also the reality that the other external motivations, specific political, historical, cultural, economic, or other problems localised in a particular region are key determinants or factors that push subnational governments to go into IR (Magam, 2018).

There are other factors like inept capacity or inefficient distribution of resources by a central government, which are said to play a critical role in the development of paradiplomacy by subnational entities. In the case of federalised states for instance, the motivation for paradiplomacy is found in the reality that "subnational governments often have more experience, knowledge and resources for some types of international activities" (Kuznetsov, 2015). In a similar vein, Magone (2007) submits that "economic consciousness" logic, proselytize the suggestion that regional actors have both the capacity and resources to foster their developmental and welfare interests in the international scene without the need to rely on the central government. This view is in tandem with this study's trajectory as it particularly aims to explore the implications of or the retooling of paradiplomacy for building good governance in South Africa, albeit at a provincial or subnational level. The subsequent subsection will delineate the meaning of substate entities as is used in this study. As Magam (2018) suggests that it is pertinent to adopt a suitable term of reference for the context of one's study and focus area.

2.5.2 Who are Subnational Governments?

Substate entities, regional government or as in our case provincial government are all different terms used to describe sub-national governments, as opposed to a central government. In Magam (2018) the term is used in reference to "sub-national unit" or any other unit in the lower level of government is determined by the activities the unit is involved in. Take the case of the Czech Republic for instance, it is partitioned into regions and these regions have sub-national units. As some scholars suggest that an appropriate parlance is to describe "a sub-state unit formed by the microregion Znojemsko and Podyjí (area on both sides of the river Dyje) which is distinguished by substantial territorial integrity and which is in my opinion the most suitable type of a sub-state unit to help us understand our view of paradiplomacy" (Magam, 2018). Fundamentally, regions are usually a part of a sovereign state's (central government's) territory, with its unique set of natural and socio-economic elements and relations. The specific nature, position, structure, and integration degree forms a structure of the environment with its internal relations that differentiate this territory from the surrounding territorial units of the same sovereign state.

In the work of other scholars like Snyder (2001), the use of the term subnational unit is in reference to any entity found within a sovereign country and easily differentiated by their cultural, historical, ecological, and socio-economic features. Examples of such typology from

Snyder were drawn from Oaxaca, Guerrero, Chiapas, and Puebla in Southern Mexico as sub-national units, even the Cheran. The view is that one of the distinguishing ways to recognize or identify sub-national units are by their Indigenous populations, ecological, cultural, and socio-economic dimensions. Snyder's description reflects the system in Mexico, where there are no self-governing regions made up of sub-national units.

A 'Province' is described as a more apt and preferable term by the scholars Zhimin & Junbo (2009), who propose that a 'province' as a broad term that covers "all the provincial level units on the mainland: provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities" (Zhimin & Junbo, 2009:1). Furthermore, these scholars refer to the Chinese system of government in their bid to provide further elucidation. In China there thirty-three province-level divisions, which include twenty-two provinces, five autonomous regions (Guangxi Zhuang, Inner Mongolia, Ningxia Hui, Xinjiang Uyghur, and Tibet Autonomous Regions); four municipalities (Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, and Chongqing), and two special administrative regions (Hong Kong and Macau). For Zhimin and Junbo (2009), the entirety of these low government units is captured by the term and can be referred to as 'province'. As such, their definition of a province refers to a region as part of a province; nonetheless, the term 'region' is widely used to refer to the secondary entity of the central government.

Some other typologies describe a region as to be more widespread and contains subnational governments (Johns and Thorn, 2015). Such a description is particularly apt in the case of North America. In that the United States 'Great Lakes Region' is made up of subnational governments that include sates such as (New York, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Michigan, Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, and Pennsylvania) and other two Canadian Great Lakes provinces (Ontario and Quebec) (Johns and Thorn, 2015). In Sharafutdinova (2003), non-central units of government are termed as regions. Take the Tatarstan as a region for instance, it engages in international diplomacy, ergo paradiplomacy within the auspices of the authority of the central government. For Hocking (2013), both regional and local governments are descried as Non-Central Governments, while Kuznetsov (2015:22) argues that regions refer to both the territorial and administrative unit on the first level of authority after the central government in some federal and unitary state systems, like Ontario in Canada or Hokkaido in Japan. According to Kuznetsov (2015), in the field of political science,

> it is possible to construct a three-level pyramid based on scholarly perception of the concept "region." On the first bottom level, the term "region" labels geographical meta-

> entities like Asia, Latin America, Eurasia, North America or Europe; on the second level, "region" is perceived as geographically, historically, economically, linguistically or culturally united areas like Central Asia, Central and Eastern Europe, Great Lakes or Middle East; and on the top of the pattern is the postulation of a "region" as an administrative territorial unit of a state, like Tatarstan in Russia, Bavaria in Germany or Alberta in Canada (Kuznetsov, 2015:21).

Further still, Kuznetsov (2015) further supposes that analysis of a problem should determine the definition, or the meaning attributed to the concept "region". As such, the suggestion is that what is contained and the limits of definition hinges on how a study plans to explore the subject matter. Lecours for instance uses regions and subnational governments interchangeably. In Magam (2018; 2020; 2022) the term is broader and quite encompassing but influenced by the context of the study. content and the limits of the concept are derived from one's own study. More so, an extensive compilation of literature or scholars classifying, delineate or define a 'region' as it is apropos to their study. To reiterate, despite the plethora of delimitations, one denominator that rings through all these descriptions is the ascertaining of a region as the secondary sphere of the national/central government. It is in tandem with the foregoing that this study construes regions – as secondary entities of the central government or in a sovereign state.

2.6. Paradiplomacy in South Africa

The activities of substate entities from the Global North have dominated a preponderance of the literature on paradiplomacy (Lecours, 2008). As a result, critical scholars from Africa like Fritz Nganje (2014) accentuate the dearth of literature on SNGs in Africa as a major obstacle in shaping the trajectory and content of the practice among provincial governments in the Global South. For Requejo (2009) the issue was a that of a paucity of exhaustive and comprehensive analysis of the character of what substate entities purse by engaging in paradiplomacy. As a panacea, Requejo (2009:13) suggests that we dissect and identify the objectives of substate entities when they engage in IR and the results of such engagement. In South Africa the work of Geldenhuys (1998), Zondi (2012), Matshili (2013) and Nganje (2014) have been critical to addressing the paucity of analysis. One thing runs through the analysis of these scholars which is the fact that they explore the issue from a broader perspective of constituent diplomacy propped by an emphasis on South African provinces. Geldenhuys (1998) in a set of earlier studies post-1994 examined the foreign relations of all provinces. Zondi

(2012) adopted a nuanced approach as his analysis covered an array of substate entities from provinces to draw a link between the international relations of provinces and its alignment with national government' foreign policy trajectory. Magam (2018; 2020; 2021) provides invaluable literature on how interest and identities are pontificated by provinces to put their stamp in the international arena.

Provincial engagement in the international system consists of "political contacts with distant nations that bring non-central governments into contact not only with trade, industrial and cultural centres on other continents…but also with various branches or agencies of foreign national governments" (Duchacek, 1986:246-247). What is behind this practice in the Global South have been identified to include multidimensional factors like the climate catastrophe, rising unemployment, poverty and an ever-growing urban population which hampers the ability of provincial governments to fulfil their service delivery obligations by solely relying on internal fiscal allocations from the National Treasury. By engaging in paradiplomacy, provinces seek to attract trade and investment by marketing themselves as desirable destinations or unique cultures worthy of exploring and experiencing (Magam, 2018; Maphaka, 2020; Magam, 2021).

The practice of paradiplomacy in South Africa has not been smooth sailing as there are often conflicts between local government and national government because of inefficient coordination in the foreign policy space and have thus imperilled international diplomacy. These conflicts have been brought to light because of apparent contradictions caused by the actions of provinces with opposing government. Take the case of the City of Tshwane (CoT) and the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO). DIRCO oversees South Africa's national foreign policy decision-making while Tshwane is provincial municipality and an important foreign policy actor in low politics. The fact that an opposition party heads the metropolitan city, we saw crack or challenges to the country's foreign policy position in December 2016 when the former Tshwane Mayor Solly Msimanga of the Democratic Alliance (DA), went on an official visit to Taiwan in contravention of South Africa's position on One China. Msimanga was admonished by DIRCO and the governing African National Congress (ANC) for contravening the One-China policy which is the foundation of Pretoria's diplomatic ties with Beijing since the end of apartheid. Msimanga's response was that the express purpose of his visit was to explore trade and investment opportunities in Taiwan (Nganje and Letshele, 2020:230). Msimanga's trip to Taiwan was a

diplomatic faux pas that threatened SA's diplomatic ties with the Peoples Republic of China. This thrusted to the front the competence and the coordination of South Africa's foreign policy.

Different scholars have thus attributed the rise of subnational governments in the domain of IR to several factors. In more recent literature like in Magam's (2018; 2020; 2022) the search for development, improvement of citizens welfare and livelihood is at the centre of what drives substate entities to engage in paradiplomacy. For Lachapelle and Paquin (2005), the rise has been attributed to the challenges faced by nation-states in a globalised world; and paradiplomacy has become a tool for addressing such challenges. Several authors (Keating, 2000; Lecours, 2008; Jackson, 2017) similarly find a direct nexus between the rise in economic globalisation and the provenance of paradiplomacy. An equally strong suggestion found in the works of some of these authors is that there has been an exponential shift in role of the nation state because of economic globalisation; and as such, "competition between sovereign powers for the acquisition of new territories has been replaced with competition between sub-state governments and large metropolitan areas for the acquisition of shares in world markets" (Lachapelle & Paquin, 2005:78).

In the context of South Africa, one of the earliest works (post-Geldenhuys' seminal 1998 work) on paradiplomacy is found in Siphamandla Zondi (2012) and Fritz Nganje (2014). They similarly provide a conceptual clarification on paradiplomacy from the purview of development. That is that regional government's (especially in a country like South Africa), engagement in such international diplomatic activities dovetails the overall developmental course of the country's foreign policy. The motivation for paradiplomacy is primarily needs-based or is need-driven (Magam, 2018). Magam (2018) submits that the foregoing view marks a shift from a preponderance of early paradiplomacy literature that locate the "discussion of paradiplomacy on semi-autonomous regions, "developed" world and states with a well-developed paradiplomatic mechanisms. This reality makes it necessary for us to explore the phenomenon in Africa or in the developing world and in centralized states like South Africa as this is a gap that needs to be filled. This section's exploration of the phenomenon in South Africa seeks to do that" (:36).

What Zondi (2012), Nganje (2014) and Magam (2018, 2020) have established is that in centralised systems like South Africa, provincial government's engagement in the diplomatic process is not a threat to the central government's national policy, and it is far from being driven by desires for partition or self-determination. At the core, in South Africa,

paradiplomacy is a developmental phenomenon. Consequently, what gives impetus to provincial governments to engage in the diplomatic process is an ardent desire "to better their proverbial lot" (Magam, 2018:36). It can thus be ascertained that there is an economic leitmotif for paradiplomacy as a province's involvement in the diplomatic process is solely with goal of developing an international presence with the goal of reigning in foreign investment and investors, being a preferred or sort after holiday destination, luring multinational and international companies to the region with different incentives, and scouting new markets for exports.

Indeed, at the core of the concept of and practice of paradiplomacy as evidenced among South African municipalities (KZN, Western Cape and Gauteng are the most 'prolific') is the economic leitmotif. More, the developmental outlook of the understanding and practice of paradiplomacy has led to the practice assuming different forms and guises; but remains nonetheless particularly channelled towards exploring "economic and other opportunities; fact-finding and lessons-sharing exercises; investment promotion expos; or wide-ranging economic cooperation guided by twinning agreement. Often, these international engagements offer direct economic, political, and social benefits to the provinces and municipalities involved" (Zondi, 2012:42). For Magam (2018; 2020) such an approach can be described as an attestation to substate's entities capacity for engaging with the wider world and reaping the positive benefits of globalisation.

At another equally important end of the spectrum is also the fact that, because of globalisation, the issues faced by countries increased and this caused an overlap in the responsibilities of sub-state-actors. The argument goes that because of globalisation, were have had to contend with a panoply of challenges like climate change, climate and war refugees, migration and uneven or under-development. According to Magam (2018) because of such, it has become apparent that it was necessary to understand that challenges need both domestic and international attention, and this provided a reason for provincial governments to be actively involved in the scene of IR to address some of these challenges across borders. For Cohn and Smith (1996) the challenges of by globalisation have unsurprisingly increasingly made subnational governments (municipalities and provinces) engage in international activities.

Again, post-apartheid, the 1996 constitution of South Africa stipulated a devolution of powers. This was fitting with the zeitgeist of the times as governments world over were at that time in one way or another edging towards greater decentralisation as a way of devolving power and

sharing responsibilities with subsidiary authorities. As a shift that was part of the wave of democratisation and stronger market orientation (Bennett, 1990), several governments in the early 1990s, opted for a new strategy of decentralisation. As Magam (2018:38) suggested that the "expectation was to have a well-balanced socio-economic development through the distribution of resources and mobilising resources for better service delivery to citizens." For Campbell, (2004:3) "due to an affordable and easy to access international communication, local experiences have been made to "go global"; meaning that global perspectives and experiences from different regions have become increasingly available to local arenas". In Kuznetsov (2015) the rise of paradiplomacy has been explained because of the evolution of intergovernmental relations within states. This is another equally important fact to underscore; that is that we can unabashedly trace the incipience and spread of paradiplomacy to the dawn of inclusive democracy in South Africa, as Kuznetsov (2015:104) highlights that "last decades of the twentieth century allowed many societies around the world to start the political transformation from authoritarian or totalitarian systems to free regimes. Paradiplomacy in many ways means, by default, some degree of plurality in the decision- making process which is difficult to imagine in non- democratic regimes."

To surmise, as a way of preventing repetition of cogitation during elucidation, this study holds that a firm purview for exploring the concept and practice of paradiplomacy is to understand the critical role of globalisation, more so in South Africa. In its foreword, the Department of International Relations and Cooperation's (DIRCO) White Paper on South Africa's foreign policy, notes that the country "strives to promote its national interest in a complex and fast-changing world. The impact of these complexities and changes must be factored into the nation's work to achieve a better life for its people both at home and in a regional and continental context" (DIRCO, 2011:3). Further on in the document is also the acknowledgement that "the business of national interest cannot be the purview of the state alone, but it can encourage an enabling environment of dialogue and discourse among all stakeholders to interrogate policies and strategies, and their application in the best interests of the people" (ibid).

To put in the context of this study, in navigating the challenges of governance in South Africa, the state alone (ergo the National government) cannot be the only entity with the capacity or mandate for ensuring good governance. Paradiplomacy does allow provincial government some agency, and the line of argument advanced in this study is that such agency can be channelled towards developing good governance capacity. For instance, Magam (2018)

suggests that while national interest is a broad subject, one would expect that development and the welfare of citizens should be such national interest. In this regard, the role of government at any level is to ensure that there is a conducive environment that "will enable all stakeholders (NGO's, Multinationals and Sub-State entities) to develop ways of promoting and satisfying the interests of the people. It can thus be concluded that the provenance of paradiplomacy should be traced to the intention of the state to create an environment that would enable all stake holders to seek to promote and satisfy national interests" (:37).

Some other scholars have found the dawn of inclusive democracy post-apartheid as also key to the growth of paradiplomacy in South Africa (Zondi, 2012). According to Zondi, because of democratisation and the subsequent embrace of globalisation, topics or reality of state sovereignty got perforated. As such, states or national governments have ceased to be the only players in the international arena. Substate entities have over time entered the domain of international diplomacy and now enjoy key roles as important political and economic agents. For Zondi, "perforated sovereignty has enabled South African provinces and municipalities to deepen their engagements internationally" (Zondi, 2012:44).

More on the role of globalisation in providing an impetus for paradiplomacy in South Africa, earlier studies from Deon Geldenhuys (1998:15) paint a narrative of some of the predominant issues in international relations in the 1970s. During these times, the pressing concern, ergo the focus of national governments was the high politics of security and the new politics of resource optimisation during scarcity. By implication and because of globalisation so Geldenhuys (1998) argues, domestic interests were exposed to the impacts of international events. More, several national governments did not have the capacity for such resource optimisation and could not respond effectively to new challenges or come to the rescue of their sub-national units. Globalisation effectually made international issues local ones (Keating, 2000; Pliujm & Melissen, 2007; Lecours, 2008; Kuznetsov, 2015).

Since global events happening at a distant, affected subnational entities domestically. It became imperative for provincial governments to engage directly with external actors. For Geldenhuys, this is implicit of the reality that paradiplomacy is a reaction to a distant threat or opportunities. That is, because of globalisation, both national and provincial governments became aware of an array of challenges tethered to external forces like globalisation. "The aim of SNGs direct involvement in international relations can be understood as an attempt to diminish this threat and capitalize upon the perceived opportunities in order develop new skills and techniques

(Geldenhuys, 1998:16). The Western Cape province as a case in point engage in paradiplomacy by tailoring their provincial strategy to be in tandem with the country's foreign policy trajectory. But more, they highlight some of the threats and opportunities from globalisation and made a list of strengths (environmental, governance, infrastructure) that the province has and how that can be leveraged towards improving life in the province and the country at large. The argument is that since "provinces have had to adopt a novel approach to provincial economic growth coupled with socio-economic imperatives. The Western Cape Government has recognised the need for a differentiated approach particularly when dealing with international partners as it relates to promoting the province's comparative advantages – economic, social, and cultural" (Western Cape Government, 2014:9).

For Magam (2018:38)

> Inherently, the Western Cape seeks to promotes its socio-economic and cultural interests by placing emphasis on "on creating an enabling environment for economic growth at the regional level by using the Western Cape's comparative advantages." So, the Western Cape's and by extension, the involvement of most South African provinces in international relations can be viewed strictly as a response to their individual developmental needs and to foster economic growth or whatever opportunities that trends in globalization provides.

There is another view that in South Africa, there are "structural determinants of paradiplomacy at the national level that are situated primarily in the constitutional framework of the state. The distribution of powers in any given state plays a significant role in conditioning the international agency of its sub-national units" (Nganje, 2013:30). Magam (2021) also holds that that a provincial government in a centralised state like South Africa participates in the diplomatic process under the purview of the country's foreign policy and insofar as the constitutional stipulation of devolution of power. Magam's (2021) work provides an understanding that drives home the argument that because of the stipulations of decentralisation, there is a constitutional grounding of paradiplomacy, and in the South African case, it is part of the national developmental plan to grant a reasonable level of autonomy to provinces to pursue their developmental aims and at the same time to ensure that there is coordination with the central unit to ensure efficiency and effectiveness.

More on how the constitution stipulates the foreign relation competence of the provinces, some earlier literature (see Geldenhuys, 1998) report that despite the South African Constitution not mentioning the word federation, "the distribution of powers between South Africa's central and provincial governments displays unmistakable federal features". Historically, the different South African constitutions from 1910 till the till the adoption of the 1996 constitution had all made a case or granted a certain level of autonomy to the provinces, homelands [sic] or whatever the case might have been. For Geldenhuys (1998:5-6), the South African Constitution of 1996 does not recognise provinces as subjects of international law. "This fact, it could be argued, disqualifies them from entering treaties (meaning formal arrangements dealing with matters of gravity) with foreign parties. It is then not surprising that the Constitution makes no express provision for the provinces to enter into international agreements. Yet, according to the Department of Foreign Affairs, 'the provinces are not prohibited from entering contracts with other entities abroad, provided they have the legal competency to do so."

From Geldenhuys' analysis, it can be deduced that no explicit constitutional backing is provided for paradiplomacy in the 1996 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. There is however grey area, which is the concession made by the scholar that at a more intimate inspection of some of the competencies that the 1996 constitution grants provinces, some of those competencies and capacities are relevant for engaging in foreign diplomacy. In Schedule Four of the 1996 Constitution for instance,

> administration of indigenous forests; agriculture; animal control and diseases; cultural matters; disaster management; environment; health services; nature conservation; pollution control; tourism; and trade. It is not easy to identify similar matters in the schedule of exclusive provincial legislative competence; veterinary services, provincial planning, and provincial roads and traffic may affect relations with a neighbouring country… The provinces' involvement with those matters mentioned in Schedule Four is qualified by the Constitution's provisions on conflicts between national and provincial legislation (Section 146). National legislation that applies uniformly to the whole country takes precedence over provincial legislation if the former (a) deals with a matter that cannot be regulated effectively by provincial legislation; (b) is necessary for inter alia the maintenance of national security, of economic unity, and for the protection of the environment; and (c) aims at preventing various kinds of 'unreasonable action' by a province (Geldenhuys, 1998:6).

It makes for a compelling argument that in a manner of speaking, the 1996 South African constitution does grant certain concessions to provincial government that may have foreign policy relevance, the constitution still tows the line of the "international pattern of centralising foreign relations" (Geldenhuys, 1998:7). Other scholars like Nganje (2013) similarly contend that we can identify two forms of constitutional basis for SNGs involvement in foreign affairs. Firstly, this instance, "which is mostly discernible in unitary states and highly centralised federations, the international activities of SNGs are not directly sanctioned by the constitution" (:37). By extending this analysis to the South African situation, Nganje effectively underscores the supposition that the ambiguity regarding the role of provinces as agents of paradiplomacy in the South African 1996 constitution is not a cause for great concern. It is a sign of just a constitutional shortfall of explicitly or overtly permitting or denying provinces a role in external relations. What we witness is a growing number of provinces and departments engaging in IR despite no clear constitutional stipulation for it.

In South Africa we see departments in different provinces having different forms of engagements and in some situations isolated international agreements and partnerships with twining cities (cities, metropoles from countries that South Africa has diplomatic ties with). There is a need for such partnerships and agreements to be kept alive because of the positive outcomes as according to the Western Cape Government (2014:10), government departments overtime loose the capacity to engage "with a transversal strategic provincial approach and unable to adequately respond to global issues which affect the province. An agreed strategic approach, articulated in an IR strategy, along with a clear and coordinated communication plan, will ensure optimal outcomes in international engagements and agreements."

2.7 Conclusion

This chapter began with a broad conceptualisation of paradiplomacy as sub state entities' engagement in international relations. Inherent in this conceptualisation is a suggestion that a state is no longer the sole player in the field of international relations. Globalisation was underscored as a core driver of paradiplomacy. The argument therein is that through the forces of globalisation, the role of nation state as the sole actors in the international arena came under challenge. That is to say that through globalisation, a new form of economic competition between subnational actors other than the age long competition between sovereign states alone

emerged. Fundamentally, the accent is that globalisation serves both as a pull and push factor for sub regional entities to engage in the international relations. Other factors like nationalism, and a move for regional secession were also underscored as other factors that give a thrust to paradiplomacy around the world.

In the South African context, it was articulated that the engagement in international relations remains a prerogative of the central government, constitutional ambiguities, and the provision for power sharing in the constitution which was to enable subnational entities to promote their constituent development was accented as factors that shape paradiplomacy in the country. The argument put forward here is that subnational entities' engagement in international relations is done solely for developmental purposes. The next chapter outlines the theoretical framework upon which the study is rooted. It discusses in detail the theory that explains the phenomenon of this study.

Chapter Three: Understanding Capacity: Towards a State Building Theory and Theory of Paradiplomacy

3.1 Introduction

In this chapter, the key objective is to ground the study of paradiplomacy in a *theoretical* perspective that provides insight and could serve as the foundation for an overarching framework to enhance our understanding and parsing out paradiplomacy. More, the practice of paradiplomacy as Nganje (2014) ascertains, has been a feature of South Africa's foreign policy, post-apartheid, particularly since 1995. A reasonable sequitur is the argument that a practice that has such long history ought to be done in a guided manner; that is to say, there are indeed theoretical explanations for the practice of paradiplomacy. For Magam (2018; 2021), 'interests' as understood from the purview of constructivism, provides insights into the theoretical foundations for paradiplomacy. The argument presented here is that Constructivism as a theory provides a suitable lens for explaining paradiplomacy. That is because constructivism recognises the existence and importance of 'material factors' in tandem with acknowledging the significance of 'ideational factors. What is accentuated here is that state relationships are not solely about material incentives, they also inculcate reproduction and transformation-by intersubjective dynamics at both the domestic and systemic levels-of the identities and interests through which those incentives and worlds are created. The veracity of the foregoing is substantiated by the view that the interplay of interests and identities is articulated in the different paradiplomatic activities that different provinces in South Africa engage in (Magam, 2021).

Importantly, the goal of a theory of paradiplomacy here is to enable us to unpack the nuances that underpins the practice. The chapter also explores the State Building theory. The aim in so doing, is to understand and re-emphasise the role of strong democratic institutions, effective political and economic governance for the attainment of development, and the improvement of citizens livelihood and welfare. The State Building theory can be understood as ascertaining the fact that good governance is the only antidote to the malfeasance facing South Africa as identified in chapter two. The tone of argument is that strong institutions have a significant bearing on the trajectory or the impact of economic policies on economic growth and therefore the potential for achieving human welfare and security (Ewusi, 2014:4).

A weighty emphasis is placed on the view that strengthening institutions is an effective and efficient panacea for South Africa's governance challenges. As such, the need is to explore

concrete, effective and sustainable ways to strengthen institutional governance in South Africa, through the practice of paradiplomacy. This is pertinent because Michael Jana (2014) shares the view that without adequately addressing the challenge of governance in Africa, we will be faced with a further crisis, which are those that arise from the questioning of a government's (state's) legitimacy. As Jana (2014:20) sees it, the most common examination of the "legitimacy crisis of the state in Africa is based on the states' mediocre performance on political and economic fronts. The whole discourse on African 'weak,' 'impotent,' 'soft', 'prebendal', 'lame Leviathans', 'patrimonial', 'predatory', and 'Kleptocratic' states, forms the basis for the argument on poor state performance, hence the loss of legitimacy of most states in Africa". The chapter is succinct as it presents a direct engagement with theories to understand their links and value for the subject matter.

3.1.2 Delineating theory/theoretical framework

As a way of enhancing our understanding of the crucial role of a theoretical framework, this section begins with a broad exploration of what a theoretical framework is, its utility and value to the extant study. Denzin (1988) describes a theory as a set of ideas that identify and clarify the nexus or relationships that exist betwixt variables. It is further suggested that a theoretical framework "goes beyond the mere or bare reporting of an act, but describes and probes the intentions, motives, meanings, contexts, situations and circumstances of action" (Denzin, 1988: 39). For Magam (2018), a theoretical framework provides an outline of the general overview of a study. It also shapes the research questions as well as the data collection approach. A theoretical framework is pertinent for every qualitative research as it delineates the theoretical undertones of a particular research study. Its goal is to identify "and label the important variables that are relevant to the research problem. This enables the researcher to connect the dependent variables with the independent variables and if possible, elaborate any moderating variables. The process of selecting the most appropriate theory, which explains the context of the research, involves an analysis of the most relevant theories" (Magam, 2018:60).

Again, Gorgi Kriev (2022) suggests a theory has become an imperative in most qualitative research studies because a theory is essential for advancing knowledge. The underlying argument is that a theory has an array of instrumental functions for research. Firstly, as a set of assumptions, concepts, values, and practices that provides a foundation or a take off point for a study. In Anfara and Metz (2015) a theory in the context of a qualitative research serves as a compass to guide the trajectory and specific aims of a study. More, through the utilisation of a

theory, a research study defines key concepts and suppositions in research and further shows how these concepts and suppositions interact or are interrelated.

In sum, the utilities of a theoretical framework include but not limited to:

1. A theory or a theoretical framework provides a context/background/backdrop for a study. The aim of a theory is fundamental thus to anchor a study to the foundation of the disciplinary base (Anfara & Metz, 2015). That is a theory helps emplace research in the context of other studies and theories in the field or discipline.
2. A compass: through a theory, a research process is guided through the provision of certain truism, assumptions, ideas, and concepts. These ideas, assumptions and concepts are particularly critical in helping a researcher zoom on a focus and iteratively interpret data.
3. A theory is valuable for the coherence and depth of a study (Collins & Stockton, 2018). In the sense that it is instructive for developing research questions and instrumental in the development of hypotheses or questions to be cohesively answered by the study.
4. A theory also set the ground for data analysis. In the sense that it is a theory that enables a researcher to identify key themes, emerging patterns, and nuanced responses to draw in-depth knowledge and provide exhaustive but meaningful analysis (Anfara & Mertz, 2015).

Be it a rational theory, a scientific theory, or a conspiracy theory, the goal of all theories is the attempt to explain phenomena through the lenses of logic and to provide insight and gain understanding into a phenomenon. And in this regard, theories toe the line of narrative structures. Accordingly, the value or utility of theoretical frameworks hinges on its ability to provide opportunities for scholars to "discover their own voices, along with the intellectual resources to construct theories that seek to emancipate, rather than control" (Georges, 2005: 55). As such, an intricate relationship between the subjectivity of researcher (i.e., their beliefs and interpretations about the world) and the reflexivity of a researcher (i.e., their ability to see, know, and contemplate subjectivities). To parse out the role of the theory, it is necessary to be cognisant of the fact that the ability of a study to engage in a meta-examination is filtered by subjective beliefs about the world (Collins and Stockton, 2018).

Broadly thus, the utility of a theoretical framework or theory in research like this is to aid in the provision of clarity, focus the research trajectory and approach to ensure a grounding of the research in the existing corpus of work in the discipline or beyond the discipline, albeit, with relevance for the discipline. Walcott (1995:189) shares the view that a theory offers a useful way to harness the power of exhaustive analysis. "We can never 'prove' anything through

efforts at qualitative research. We can, however, disprove ideas by providing negative instances. Theory allows us to make better use of that power by inviting us to look at classes of events rather than only single instances."

3.2 The State Building Theory: Understanding the need for efficient and effective Government.

The situation or rather the reality of state capture, persistent loadshedding and the plethora of challenges facing South Africa, raises the question of state legitimacy. Increasingly, and because of persistent bureaucratic ineptitude and malfeasance, discourse on the political legitimacy of some African states have become a subject of critique. Legitimacy here refers to a government that is for the people and by the people in both the figurative and literal meaning of the word. As Michael Jana (2014:20) purports that,

> Most state institutions are said to have no historical connections to African culture and traditional institutions, hence provide little continuity and compatibility for African governance institutions and way of life. This is said to have led to a lack of political legitimacy of governance institutions, a situation that has compelled political leaders to seek alternative networks of political support, such as patrimonialism and official corruption, thereby diverting state resources that could have been used for developmental purposes. State fragility and developmental crisis in Africa is therefore linked to the legitimacy crisis of the state in Africa.

One of the most common ways of dissecting and understanding the legitimacy of the African state thus is to assess the state's performance on the political economy and citizen welfare fronts. In this regard, a government is legitimate when citizens view and believe that a certain government has the right to rule. "This involves the capacity of the system to engender and maintain the belief that the existing political institutions and arrangements are the most suitable ones for the society" (ibid, 22). In this mode of construal, a legitimate state is thus one with effective state institutions, public parastatals, and policies. For Bojicic-Dzelilovic et al (2014:2), the understanding is that "increasingly local governance failures have come to be perceived as sources of transnational insecurity, illustrated by criminal activity, terrorism and mass refugee and migration flows." That is why in a country like South Africa, a crisis of legitimacy is responsible for the metastasis of corruption and underdevelopment in the country. In the sense that most public officials, ergo minders of state institutions over time become

driven by economic and neopatrimonial concerns, which in turn engenders the belief that most public officials do not serve the interest of the people (Magam and Wilson, 2021).

Equally important is the view that the post-apartheid era in South Africa coincided with the growing wave of globalisation and development at the end of the 1990s up to the early 2000s. During this period, the issue or topic of state-building took centre stage. It became the go to approach for development and emplacing the dividends of democratic governance in Africa. The idea that predicates development and improved welfare is grounded on "the existence of functioning and effective political and economic institutions. Following the logic that the absence and/or weakness of liberal democratic institutions are the main drivers of underdevelopment and insecurity. Resulting in insecurity, often at times armed conflicts in the global era, mainstream scholarship has defined state-building as 'the creation of new governmental institutions and the strengthening of existing ones" (Bojicic-Dzelilovic et al, 2014:3).

The neoliberal supposition is thus that "state-building, nation-building and reconstruction represent overlapping and connected modalities in the international toolkit for the transformation of states and societies where issues of governance, statehood and frameworks of political community are seen to be reproductive of conflict and to represent a threat to security and regional and global order" (ibid: 4). Bojicic-Dzelilovic et al (2014) are further of the opinion that the foregoing is in tandem with arguments for an institutional understanding of an approach like state-building. In that, the focus of development or rather, all stakeholders and interested parties in the development of say a country should work on "putting in place institutional architecture across a broad spectrum encompassing representative democracy (e.g., elections; constitution, media, judiciary, rule of law), and a private market-based economy (e.g., private property, fiscal and monetary institutions, open competition rules)" (:4). Fundamental to this argument is the view that the concern and focus should be on propping up the institutional capacity of a state, staffed with competent and adequate human, material, and other resources. To enable them effectively and efficiently execute their duties of ensuring the functionality of key institutions, which according to Francis Fukuyama (2014:30) have become undermined by the combined legacies of conflict and *ancien régime* underdevelopment.

The institutionalist state-building approach dominated the state-building discourse for much of the 2000s. Earlier conceptualisation view "this process as an apolitical process of capacity building and evolved against the backdrop of the (European) nation state-building paradigm

and its pre-eminent concern with forging political community" (ibid). The issue however was that such a stylised approach to the state building process, which mimics the European experience seems to provide little to no guidance in the contemporary African context. It is important to clarify that the necessity of the State Building Theory to this thesis is because the study maintains that a thorough reckoning is required if South Africa is to shed the state capture/corruption reality. Significantly, for the efforts that have been put in place or that will be put in place to embed the thinking and practice of good governance among public servants need to be cognisant of all competing perspectives and prescriptions about the ways forward in the analysis of South African politics.

It is of paramount import to avoid the pitfall of suggesting a procrustean standard or approach towards state building (Myerson, 2012). In the sense that one must guard against defining any broad approach "for democratic state-building, as every nation is different, that there is no 'cookie-cutter' or 'one-size-fits-all' plan for political development. But the real experts on any nation's political culture are its politically active citizens, and they are not neutral observers, as they have a personal stake in maximizing the power of leaders with whom they are connected" (ibid, :2).

One important and apt perspective construes institutional building as a technical process of improvement in bureaucratic capacity. As such, different scholars emphasised different sets of priorities, which sometimes includes the number of resources required and the sequencing and pace of reforms – like where we begin to fix things (Ball 2001; Paris 2004; Wolff 2011). The approach is thus to pursue development through an array of differentially ranked, context-dependent processes. This usually includes the rehabilitation of physical infrastructure in cases where needed (the state building theory is usually deployed in the context of development and reconstruction in post-conflict states), designing new or capacitating already existing political institutions, improved security, macroeconomic stabilisation, social sector reform, reconciliation, and the psychosocial heeling of traumatised populations (a situation that speaks directly to the South African reality).

Arguments in favour of the State Building theory affirm its value for re-constituting state legitimacy and rebuilding the effectiveness of governance. One can thus amplify the view that a practical interpretation of the theory in South Africa would add substance to the oft lofty rhetoric and opaque measures that have come to be the hallmarks of reform agenda. Myerson (2012) for instance suggests that in one sense, the state building approach or theory can be

described as primarily an anti-malfeasance approach. Both anti-corruption measures and the State Building mandate seek to restore or establish government legitimacy through rebuilding society, physically and psychosocially. Efforts to such end fall under four broad areas of focus. They include:

1. security and public safety,
2. political leadership,
3. economic growth and
4. social integration.

For Fritz and Menocal (2007), this is a long-term vision or process with the singular goal of promoting social and economic harmony, and I dare say efficient and effective distribution of scarce resources. Malfeasance and inept bureaucracy make this endpoint elusive, however, by destroying citizens' belief in a fair peace and the notion of a government for and of the people. In this sense, Fritz, and Menocal's (2007:15) view of the State Building as "a process of constructing shared sense of identity and common destiny, usually in order to overcome ethnic, sectarian or communal differences and to counter alternative sources of identity and loyalty". It is a process which fits into the wider scope of addressing every aspect of societal function. State Capture and all forms of bureaucratic malaise and ineptitude are a direct contrast to this approach.

In the fragile context – "an environment characterised by fragile statehood, i.e., a state that "has weak capacity to carry out basic functions of governing a population … and lacks the ability to develop mutually constructive and reinforcing relations with society" (OECD 2011b: 21)– that South Africa has found itself, the result of such is a weakening of the mutual obligations – social contract – between the state and its citizens. The State Building theory is apt in addressing the governance challenges in the country, as the process is "an endogenous process to enhance capacity, institutions and legitimacy of the state driven by state–society relations." Hence it is "primarily a domestic process that involves local actors, which means that the role of international actors is necessarily limited" (OECD 2011b: 20). In a way, the foregoing thrust the fact or the agency of local actors (e.g., substate entities) as key role players in the developmental agenda.

Several critiques levelled against the state building theory particularly the classical liberal, realist, political economy, poststructuralist, and post-colonialists suggest that the approach is

neo-colonials in an array of overlapping ways. The supporting argument is that at first, scholars like Paris (2002) are of the opinion that it "represents a novel form of the old *mission civilisatrice* diffused by colonial powers in their encounters with societies in the Global East and South". For Richmond (2011:8-9) the secondly critique can be derived from the argument that the state building approach perpetuates and "continues to reproduce subjugation and disqualification of forms of local existence, self-government and community in the Global South through the imposition of a Eurocentric, top-down, rationalist, territorialised, Westphalian framework and model of statehood and state-society relations". In Chandler (2010:4-6, 45) and Woodward's (2009) view, the third reason for critiquing the state building approach and neo-colonial approach is because of the view that it is a representation of the dominance of Western states and their perception of the emergence of autonomous sovereign states in the Global South as fragile states who on the long run are likely to pose a threat to liberal order. For this school of thought, it is maintained that from the purview of international development, the ultimate end of state building is "the perpetual external regulation and proxy governance of sovereign states that are subject to constant monitoring and are always on the cusp of the potential intervention through making recourse to justificatory discourses and categories which judge such societies and states as dysfunctional or as failed states" (Chandler 2010, 4-6).

For Bojicic-Dzelilovic et al (2014:9) some of the effects of the state building approach from the standpoint of political economy and post-structuralism is a "a form of 'global riot control' in capitalism's encounter with the unstable and conflict-affected 'borderlands' of the Global South as it seeks a containment of forms of social life perceived as threatening to liberal order and existence". More argument tendered by these authors is that that liberal peace and the conflict dynamics in the global world order emerges from its periphery (ergo global south). As such, the world is doomed to a process of recurrence or repeating the same mistakes as far as the development framework in its current form is unable to produce anything other than "instability and further conflict due to the social disruption, unravelling and state-unbuilding that these interventions effect. In this way liberalism is reproductive of its own nemesis, a facet of international state- and nation-building that is manifest in many of the tensions, contradictions and paradoxes that haunt its engagement with conflict-affected spaces, and which are seen to produce recurrent failures in the construction of a viable social contract."

3.3 Paradiplomacy as a theory and practice for endogenous State Building

There have been significant scholarly advancements in the field of IR on parsing out the engagement of subnational entities in international relations, particularly in unitary states like South Africa. This is because the concept and practice are not only a privilege of states that operate on a federal system (Barros, 2010; Nganje, 2014; Magam, 2021). These progress and advancement in scholastic space and the practice of paradiplomacy has however not been clearly codified as Magam (2018:89) reports that "despite the progress that has been made in the study and practice of paradiplomacy, there is a certain elusiveness that surrounds the legal framework of paradiplomacy, especially in a unitary state like South Africa. Thus, it is essential to consider the legal framing of paradiplomacy to contextualise the legal parameters within which subnational governments engage in paradiplomacy." The assertion here is that the legal guideline of paradiplomacy must be codified somewhere because the practice and concept is immanent in a country's constitution in the sense that it is the constitution that stipulates the "principal features of the national political system design such as: the structure of a state, the system of distribution of power in a state, the rights and obligations of citizens" (Barros, 2010).

In the previous chapter, an exhaustive exploration of extant literature enabled us to establish some of the conceptual underpinnings of paradiplomacy. The next logical step in weaving the thread of cohesiveness is to establish what policies, legal and institutional frameworks that guide the theory and practice of paradiplomacy in South Africa. Given that the country's nine provinces have established themselves as actors in international relations. Accordingly, and in tandem with Magam's (2018; 2021) work, the aim here is to elucidate on how some legal flexibility in the constitution allows substate entities to enjoy international engagements.

3.3.1 South Africa's Socio-Political Architecture: Decentralisation and Paradiplomacy

The post-apartheid 1996 Constitution of South Africa's stipulates the distribution power. Which is a system that devolves power or decentralises government. This was in tune with the developmental zeitgeist of the times, as according to Fry (1998) there has been a growing move towards democratisation in the global south and this has been influenced by globalisation. The result is that economic relationships are becoming increasingly global, and power is devolving from central governments to non-central governments. The forces driving globalisation, are also stimulating decentralisation. Described as a system that works based on the "devolution of decision–making powers." The motif for decentralisation varies from state to state. In South Africa, the adoption of decentralisation (breaking four provinces into nine and most significantly establishing three spheres of government) was with the goal of promoting

democratic participation and ensuring the effective and efficient delivery of services as well as foster economic development and wellbeing for all (Jozana, 2000).

Again, Martinez-Vazquez (2011:2) argues along the lines that that some states adopt a decentralised system because they see it as a way of improving bureaucratic capacity by emplacing a more efficient and leaner public sector. “While others are disenchanted with the performance of planning and centralised policies. Others have the desire to achieve democratic ideals; others want to contain or to appease centrifugal forces, ethnic conflicts, and/or separatism, and to diffuse social and political tensions by allowing local cultural and political autonomy.” To extrapolate, the claim can thus be made that because of the array of ethnic and racial identities in SA, there is bound to be a plethora of interests and desires. As such, through decentralisation, the goal is to maintain the unique identity of each region or province to ensure “their constituent individuals, physical re-sources, and the shared beliefs and institutions in virtue of which individuals function as a ‘we’ can be tapped into, to drive development” (Wend, 1994:385). In other words, given that the reality of South Africa’s multi-racial and multicultural identity, decentralisation becomes a system of governance that allows and enables “these different racial and ethnic groups fully participate in the democratic process” (Magam, 2018).

Furthermore, there is a compelling reason to clarify in simple terms some of the reasons for decentralisation in South Africa. Scholars like Van Zyl (2003) suggest that the motive for decentralisation (described as fiscal federalism according to this author) in South Africa was to ensure efficient delivery of services and effective management of resources (Magam, 2018). The fiscal performance of a lot of provincial or substate government leaves a lot to be desired. Consequently, the supposition is that decentralisation was more of a political decision that was orchestrated for political gains, as part of the incoming ANC’s desire for capturing the state (Chipkin, 2012; Magam & Wilson, 2021). The underlying rationale is that through “decentralisation, the ruling party would have control over the national sphere of government; while opposition parties would have control over the other two spheres of government in the likelihood, they (the opposition) secure victory in provincial or local elections” (Magam, 2018:54).

There are other converse views in the works of scholars such as Burger (2001) to mention one. Who argues that decentralisation in South Africa was driven by fiscal consideration. That is to ensure that all spheres of government are ran with transparency and accountability. The leitmotif for why states decide to adopt decentralisation notwithstanding, decentralisation

impacts the economy of states "while governments do not generally decentralize to pursue greater macro stability and economic growth, decentralisation may impact upon these" (Martinez-Vazquez, 2011: 1).

The 1996 Constitution of South Africa makes provision for three spheres of government. They include the national, provincial, and local spheres of government. An important feature of this arrangement is that each sphere is distinctive, interdependent, and interrelated. In particular, the utilisation of the term sphere as opposed to tiers has been descried as an attempt to codify the belief that all these levels of government should be equal and there should be no hierarchical element in their interrelations (Van Zyl, 2003). In lieu of the foregoing, there is an affirmation that the 1996 Constitution clearly states and stipulates the equality of all spheres of government are equal, with none being more important than the other. To concretise, Burger (2001) categorically argues that the 1996 Constitution of South Africa does make a provision for the autonomy of subnational entities – provinces. This is clarified in the functions of provinces (Schedule 5 of the Constitution):

Table 1:Schedule 5 - Functional Areas of Exclusive Provincial Legislative Competence

Abattoirs and other animals' services
Ambulance Services
Archives (other than national archives)
Libraries other than national libraries
Liquor licenses
Museums (other than national museums)
Provincial planning
Provincial cultural matters

From Magam (2018:90)

To ensure that there is a clarity in their mandates, the national sphere of government takes care of matters considered to be of high importance. These would include defence, health, and education. The foregoing however suggests that provinces are far less autonomous than the 1996 Constitution stipulates. A case in point, in Section 44 of Chapter 4 of the 1996 South African Constitution it is stipulated that the National Assembly has the power to amend the Constitution and to pass legislation about any matter. This in a way puts the national government at the apogee of the three spheres of government. In Magam's (2018) argument,

the authority of the National Assemble to amend the constitution goes as far as the functional areas listed in Schedule 4 of the Constitution; at the exclusion of those listed in Schedule 5. Which stipulates that the National sphere of government the has the power to determine the involvement of provinces in Schedule 4 functional areas and can even intervene in Schedule 5 functional areas (Burger, 2003).

A supporting claim is made in Moeti and Khalo (2007) (see Steytler and Mettler, 2001) as they report that the 1996 South African Constitution, makes a provision "in Chapter 3 for the co-operative government, but at the same time sub-national government autonomy and authority are limited by sections 100 and 139….co-operative government implies decentralisation and federalism, whilst sections 100 and 139 imply centralised control and unitary government" (*ibid*: 133). All autonomy granted by the 1996 South African Constitution gives all three spheres of government, are still subject to the national priorities.

Table 2 Schedule 4: Functional Areas of Concurrent National and Provincial Legislative Competence

Administration of indigenous forests
Agriculture
Airports other than international and national airports
Animal control and diseases
Casinos, racing, gambling, and wagering (excluding lotteries and sports pools
Consumer Protection
Cultural Matters
Disaster Management
Education at all levels (excluding tertiary education)
Environment
Health Services
Housing
Indigenous law and customary law (subject to Chapter 12 of the Constitution)
Industrial promotion
Language policy and the regulation of official languages to the extent that the provisions of section 6 of the Constitution expressly confer upon the provincial legislature's legislative competence.

Media services directly controlled or provided by the provincial government, subject to section 192.
Nature conservation, excluding national parks, national botanical gardens, and marine resources.
Police to the extent that the provisions of Chapter 11 of the Constitution confer upon the provincial legislature's legislative competence.
Pollution Control
Population Development
Property Transfers Fees

Adapted from Magam (2018:91-92)

Again, the constitutionally entrenched distribution of powers between the national and provincial spheres has been likened to one that fosters an environment of a multi-level governance. As the authority and independence of the judiciary to decide jurisdictional disputes between these spheres ensures the promotion of accountability. The point is that like a multi-level governance approach, decentralisation is also characterised by some key words and concepts such as: "non-hierarchical, interdependent, deliberative as well as co-ordination, embeddedness and interest competition" (Kiilo, 2006:10)

Because of the neoliberal character of the South Africa 1996 Constitution, the provincial spheres of government have stretched their autonomy and the authority they enjoy to enacting their own constitutions (with imposed restrains). According to Magam (2018), to date, the Western Cape Province is the only province with its own constitution. The province of KwaZulu-Natal has attempted to draft its own constitution, but its constitution did not get the green light from the Constitutional court[67]. In Chapter 3 of the 1996 Constitution, the level of autonomy granted to all three spheres of government (national, provincial, and local) is stipulated in the quote that "in the Republic, government is constituted as national, provincial and local spheres of government which are distinctive, interdependent and interrelate". By

[6] Ajam and Aron (2007) suggest that the dissolution of the four provinces to the subsequent creation of nine provinces and three spheres of government, the 1996 Constitution of South Africa restructured a federal system into a unitary system. The submission of these authors is that fiscal relations is the only the major element of decentralisation in South Africa; they refer to this as a "fiscally decentralised system".

[7] According to Murray (2001) KwaZulu-Natal did not meet the following requirements: (i) was not to be 'inconsistent with a provision of the interim Constitution' but it could impose 'legislative and executive structures 'different from those provided for provinces in the interim Constitution and it could provide for traditional monarchs; (ii) had to be passed by a two-thirds majority of the provincial legislature; and (iii) could be of 'no force and effect' unless certified by the Constitutional Court (Murray, 2001: 482)

confirming that provinces have autonomy, the foregoing quote from the constitution also stipulates that provincial governments operate "under the conditions provided by the national parliament and at the same time Section 228 and 230 of the Constitution encourages provinces to raise their own revenue (taxes and loans) rather than depending entirely on funds allocated by the national government" (Magam, 2018:93).

Another way to show that the national sphere of government is still at the thick of things, is the fact that the provincial constitution remains subject to the "national constitution and must be approved by the Constitutional Court" (Magam, 2018). For Nganje (2013:69) we see the near autonomy of the provincial sphere of government as encoded in the 1996 South African Constitution in cases or under clauses where substate units have Constitutionally protected boundaries, powers, functions, and institutions. Secondly, there are exclusive and concurrent provincial legislative authorities at most functional areas, as stipulated. Thirdly, there is also the principle of cooperative governance at play, as the constitution mandates consultation, cooperation, coordination, and mutual assistance between all three spheres of government. Lastly, the National council of provinces should guarantee that provincial and local governments have access to national policy formulation (Magam, 2018)

In Southall (1998:17), we see an equally important argument that runs counter to the fiscal decentralisation discourse, as he suggests that South Africa's decentralisation is one with unitary character, in that it really centres a significant amount of power and authority on the national sphere of government. As Magam (2021) similarly suggest that indeed provincial government do enjoy some autonomy and power as is the case in decentralised systems. Provinces are fundamentally however primarily "agencies of implementation, they have extremely limited policy autonomy, and there is a substantial body of evidence accumulating that the central government is keen to keep them on a tight leash, especially financially" (Magam, 2018:94).

So far, the aim of this subsection has been to underscore that the leitmotif for decentralisation provides an instructive path to understanding the growth of paradiplomacy in South Africa. Particularly because there is a direct and causal link between decentralisation and the growth of paradiplomacy. The supposition undergirding the argument is that because of decentralisation, subnational entities got an impetus and a mandate that made them become active and key players in the global scene (Magone, 2008). Similarly, for Nganje (2014:2) it is assumed that the role of decentralisation in the incipience and growth of paradiplomacy as a

"development-oriented cooperation among actors at the sub-state level". The nuance here is that "that a growing understanding of the role a broad spectrum of actors play in the promotion of development cannot be ignored or excluded" (Magam, 2018:92).

There is indeed a direct connection or nexus between decentralisation and paradiplomacy; a point affirmed in the work of Aguirre (1999) when he retorts that the discuss on power devolution along the axis of decentralisation happens not only within real or domestic administrative politics or policies, but it has also extended to be a concern of foreign policy practitioners. As over time, we see that foreign policy have become increasingly more local, even when domestic policies have grown to be more international. Essentially, because of the falling borders between the domestic and foreign, we see an exponential increase in the number of substate entities taking up paradiplomacy.

Another argument in support of the link between decentralisation and paradiplomacy is found in Nganje's seminal work (2014) as he traces the genesis of a decentralised form of cooperation "to the intersection of two distinct but interrelated processes: efforts to improve the delivery and impact of official development assistance (ODA) on the one hand, and the evolution of the international relations of local governments on the other" (*ibid*, 3). To reiterate, in Nganje's (2014) argument, there is an interrelated and causal link between decentralisation and paradiplomacy. For Milani and Ribeiro (2011) the connection between decentralisation and paradiplomacy finds its place in the globalisation discourse. What they mean here is that because of globalisation (and the subsequent adoption or imposing of the Westphalian ideal of a state) the domain of international or global ceased to be an exclusive affair of central governments. The suggestion is that decentralisation did not come about as merely a form of power devolution; it is more of a necessity. "This view is couched in the idea that globalisation opens unprecedented breaches in power equations amongst states, sub state actors" (Magam, 2018:92).

By finding a nexus between globalisation, decentralisation and paradiplomacy, this study has effectually been able to establish the idea that advancements or the growth of globalisation (and its proselytising of devolution of powers) provided a thrust, a legal grounding and made it a necessity for subnational governments to increase their engagements in international relations. According to Kuznetsov (2015:1) there is undoubtedly a mutual interlink of global development goals and "their synergy brought forward the circumstances under which the decisions affecting the functioning of the political, economic, cultural and other spheres

become less dependent on national state regulations, but more forced by powers that bloomed tremendously in the last few decades on supranational and subnational (regional) levels".

Given that the developmental aim of decentralisation cannot be underemphasised, there is a divergent number of conceptualisations or understanding of the goal of decentralisation. Different scholars emphasise different aspect of or end of decentralisation. For some, despite the literature on decentralisation being rich and quite diversified, in the same breath, it is also easily confused, and the practice or concept provides a home to contradictory hypotheses; as a result, we know extraordinarily little definitively (Schneider, 2010). There is indeed a possibility of contradictory delineations of paradiplomacy because of divergent suppositions, there is concord however in each of these different conceptualizations of decentralisation. The accord is codified in the understandings of the central aim of decentralisation: which is to promote an effective public administrative arm and ensure the efficiency of government service provisions. Because of the foregoing we can thus adopt a practical definition of decentralisation that is apropos for the purposes of this study. Decentralisation is a process through which,

> powers, functions, responsibilities, and resources are transferred from central to local government and/or other decentralised entities. In practical terms, decentralisation is a process of striking a balance between the claims of the periphery and the demands of the centre. Decentralisation, when appropriately structured, provides an arrangement through which critical issues (such as those of national unity and indivisibility, how to safeguard national interests and ensure coordinated and even development, equity in the distribution of resources and local autonomy) can be recognized (United Nations 2009).

In the above definition of decentralisation by the UN, the devolution of power which is at the centre of the practice is emphasised. And the result of such a devolution of power is that provincial governments are given a leeway or a wiggle room to manoeuvre and exercise a certain level of autonomy as they go about achieving their developmental mandate in a coordinated fashion. In this regard Kincaid (1990:52) also lends his voice to this view when he suggests that unlike the foreign policy mandates of a central government, the objective of engaging in paradiplomacy by provinces does not include the representation of broad or general interests or to be comprehensive in coverage. Essentially,

> regions do not have sovereign governments able to lay down their definition of the "national interest" and to pursue it in a unified and coherent manner. Regions are complex entities containing a multiplicity of groups which may share common interests in some areas but be sharply divided on other issues. Even where there are strong devolved governments, they cannot simply lay down a line to be followed by all but must seek to bring together independent actors around specific programs and issues. They must fit their own activities into a world dominated by national governments and transnational organizations, which they can rarely challenge head on but must work around or with.

There is ample evidence that makes for a compelling argument on how decentralisation drives paradiplomacy. In South Africa, the allowance or mandate for provinces to seek and engage in activities – international diplomacy – for their development is codified in the 1996 South African Constitution in the guise of devolution of power. Decentralisation drives paradiplomacy as the practice creates a platform for provinces to tap into the benefits of globalisation in the international arena with the primary aim and goal of "promoting the wellbeing of their constituents. Fundamentally, decentralisation, be it administrative or fiscal, provides an incentive for sub regional governments to become key players in the international arena. It is of import to affirm that this engagement does not intend to impugn or interfere with a state's sovereignty. It is an activity that seeks to promote the interests of regions that would otherwise have been overlooked by a central government" (Magam, 2021:142). Good governance is equally critical towards such outcomes and as such, retooling paradiplomacy towards the goal of partnership for capacity, would ensure the enhancement of a robust and agile South Africa state. One that is initiative-taking rather than responsive.

3.4 Paradiplomacy in South Africa: The IR Competence of Provincial Governments

As it has been shown that decentralisation, a practice of power devolution from central governments to sub national units gave a rise to paradiplomacy. This is against the backdrop that a dominant discus, attributed to traditional theories of International Relations (see realism for instance) emphasised the authority and exclusivity of engagement in international relations as a critical character of state behaviour (Dahl, 1957; Mearsheimer, 2001). In this way, central governments over the eons have had a monopoly in the creation, participation, and implementation of foreign policy objectives. But there has been progressive engagement of Sub-State entities with an aim of promoting their economic and cultural interests.

Decentralisaiton came to the fore as a critical driver of the practice of paradiplomacy in South Africa. The argument to this end was derived from the conceptualisation of decentralisation as a collection of policy measures that devolve the administration and delivery of social services such as education, health, social welfare, or housing to lower spheres – substate entities – of governments. One thing that can be derived from this conception of decentralisation is that it categorically limits or constricts the competence or capacity of subnational entities to service delivery. Consequently, subnational entities can engage in paradiplomacy as far as it falls within the purview of promoting and enhancing their capabilities for service delivery.

One major inference from the above argument is that provinces in South Africa are forbidden from engaging in matters of high importance like engaging paradiplomacy to address issues like military or defence treaties. The supposition is that the provincial sphere of government enjoys a significant degree of autonomy with regards to legislating on a variety of issues that fall within the purview of their constitutional mandate (Magam, 2021). This autonomy enables and enhances their competence for engagement in paradiplomacy with a clearly articulated goal in mind. The result is that provinces welcomed the development and took "advantage of this permission to aggressively pursue international economic relations almost independently of supervision by national government" (Zondi, 2012:52).

Along similar lines, Matshili (2013) argues that provincial governments' competence or capacity for engaging in paradiplomacy is enhanced by an economic leitmotif. The suggestion inherent is that the demand of development in a globalised is enough incentive for subnational governments to engage in paradiplomacy. This view is suggestive of the fact that other forms of engagement in paradiplomacy that is not in tune with tone of promoting the development of a province falls outside the competence and the constitutional purview of such provincial government (Magam, 2018). One example that can be used to prop the foregoing viewpoint is that the 1996 Constitution of South Africa Chapter 3 (Section 41(1)) stipulates that the three spheres of government must "not assume any power or function except those conferred on them in terms of the constitution and also exercise their powers and perform their functions in a manner that does not encroach on the geographical, functional or institutional integrity of government in another sphere" (South African Constitution, 1996). This can also be understood to mean that there are no clearly stipulated parameters for provincial governments' engagement in paradiplomacy in the South African constitution, other than the insinuation that such engagements must be courted for the sole reason of promoting development and enhancing service delivery. In concurrence, Matshili (2013:34) suggests that at the onset of the

introduction of the 1996 constitution, provincial governments were given a range of powers that allowed them to act with a certain degree of autonomy. Despite these however, Matshili cautions that such powers cannot be equated with that of a federal system like the United States of America.

To accept that "there is a constitutional ambiguity that surrounds the extent and limit of provincial governments with regards to their engagement in international relations" (Magam, 2018:54), opens more avenue for exploration. To this end, Matshili (2013:42-43) shares the view that certain aspects of the constitution that can be interpreted as outrightly barring provincial governments from engaging in international relations[8]. The fact that such practices is waxing rather than waning because despite the provision in Schedule 4; provincial government persist in forging their path in the IR arena. What other factors could explain such, one wonders. Some other spontaneous questions include how provinces get around this and breach the separation of power. And if it could be because of the "elasticity of constitutional provision, implied roles, or jingoism on the part of provinces?" (Matshili,2013:42)

Magam (2021) suggests that one of the ways we can comprehend the constitutional grey areas when it comes to what the reach of provincial governments' competence or capacity for in engaging in international relations is this: it is a fact that in Schedule 5 of the constitution, the exclusive legislative powers of provinces are outlined. For Matshili (2013:43) this is important because the constitution does not include sectoral matters such as the climate catastrophe, powers around environmental protection "nature conservation, traffic regulation, crime prevention, movement of people, generation of energy, tourism, pest control, border control and trade and industry which may not only affect the specific province but also neighbouring countries, regions, and ultimately other parts of the world. Concurrent functions such as tourism, pest control and border control have significant implications for international relations."

Provinces under the stipulation of Schedule 5 can be viewed as initiative-taking agents as they "cannot watch a situation in tourism or pest and border control getting out of hand in their province and wait for national government to act. In the case of Limpopo, the province has not limited its innovation to situation control, but it has also connected with other states to attract FDI and market the province internationally. Provinces are being innovative and are in fact helping the national government by conducting some of its functions even though they do not

[8] See particularly Chapter 3 (Section 41(1)) of the South African Constitution.

have a clearly stated mandate in this regard" (Magam, 2018:52). In Geldenhuys (1998) the argument is that the constitution does not discouraged provinces from to engaging in international affairs, as along as such engagement in foreign relations by provinces are in tune with national government's foreign policy trajectory. That is the only condition for which provinces can expresses their agency and become critical actors in the international system. The issue however is that South African provinces are de facto subjects to constitutional limitations in addition to being inexperienced in conducting international affairs. This is since in most cases, very few national constitutions allow SNGs to play a free role or a role that goes beyond the remit of development at the international scene. In Section 231(1) of the South African Constitution, it is stated that the negotiating and signing of international agreements is the responsibility of the national executive (Sec.231, Act 108 of 1996)

In Nganje (2013:5) there is an interesting suggestion that another way to circumvent the constitutional ambiguity or confusion as per the capacity and competence of provinces for paradiplomacy, is to view the situation as one of "constitutional elasticity." This elasticity aligns the constitutional competence of SNGs in line with the logic of shared responsibility as per the demands of decentralisation. In some ways the constitution does places a limitation on provinces; provinces however because of globalisation and other external forces are forced to take on a role in international relations based on their domestic competence and to address issues that are particularly of direct interest to them. In agreement, Zondi (2012) opines that since the constitution does not explicitly give provinces their bounds when it comes to engaging in international relations; it can as such be assumed that any residual powers or functions not mentioned remains the competence of the national government (Magam, 2018). Still, provincial governments "have made their autonomy in this area *de facto*" (Zondi, 2012: 52).

Importantly, in South Africa the Municipal International Relations (MIR) framework of 1999 provides a clear guideline for how substate entities can engage in foreign affairs. In Section 2 of the white paper, changes in the global landscape have led local government all around the world to confront similar challenges. Challenges that are a direct result of globalisation and the changing socio-economic and technological landscape. Some of these challenges include:

- ✓ The growing internationalisation of economic, political, and cultural life.
- ✓ A swift and ever changing global economic landscape with major impacts on local economies and livelihoods.
- ✓ Changes in the political character of nations as we learn to accommodate the growing demand

for more substantive citizens' agency and participation in the political processes.

- ✓ Increase in information or network connectivity and the concomitant transformation of how people communication, interact and network.

The MIR document of 1999 contends that the above-mentioned trends "have been accompanied by a global move to decentralise government. Local government across the world has increasingly been given responsibility to address most of the (direct) service delivery functions as well as to manage their localities to ensure environmental, economic, and social sustainability" (1999:6).

3.5 Conclusion

Over the years, the use or resort to military force as a policy tool has declined and this has paved the way for other forms of engagement between actors in the international arna with the goal of increasing the probability of a mutually beneficial cooperation among states. One driving force of such is globalisation, in addition to the evolving international system have brought about an exponential increase in the relationship or cooperation between state, substate actors and non-state actors. Some that has being term the multiple channels of contact. Consequently, through these channels local and subnational governments have a vehicle for navigating and engaging in economic activities with their counterparts in a globalised economic world, for an array of reasons.

Underlying these new forms of cooperation are an array of policy tools and legal or constitutional frameworks. The precis of this chapter is thus that there are theoretical and practical precedence for promoting the sustenance of the system of 'Interdependence,' because over the years, cooperation between states and substate actors is influenced by their shared common interest. The outcome of encouraging and leveraging such cooperation at among a multiple channel of contacts is that it yields or in a way ensures stability in the international system. Due to the forces of globalization, there has been a dissolution of borders, the dilution of the cultural and economic frontier that existed between states. This made it possible for and enabled sub-national governments to pursue their economic interests across borders. In this view, the theory of paradiplomacy describes Globalisation as both a causal factor for paradiplomacy and a correlating factor. The argument to this end is that as international relations cease to be the sole responsibility of sovereign states, because of a plethora of external and internal forces, sub-national state entities are equipped through the powers of decentralistion to "compete for shares in the global markets and seek to attract investments;

this has led to multinational companies seeking to establish relations with sub-national governments. The relationship between MNCs and SNGs is overt as we see a frequent and growing concentration of international industries and clusters in a city or region" Magam (2018:86). Lastly, given the concentration of industries in cities, such spaces have also become advantageous for local governments and the responsibility of central governments is to guarantee (through policies, laws, and frameworks) that these industries grow and develop, meaning the role of the local government is greater in this regard.

Chapter Four: Research Methodology and Approach

4.1 Introduction

Most existing academic research on paradiplomacy have shunned an empirical approach up till this point. In this regard, an empirical approach forms an integral part of this study's sense of how to best examine the topic of paradiplomacy and governance. According to von Kardoff (2004) it is now a growing need for us to establish scientifically underpinned proof of the effectiveness, efficiency, efficacy and quality of services, policies, and political programmes.

The aim of a methodology to this end is to underly the philosophy or the general principle that guides the trajectory of a study (Dawson, 2002). This chapter provides a detailed elucidation of the research methodology utilised in this study. By this, I mean the method of inquiry or rather the choice of the design to base the study on, the type of data collection and how this data is analysed and is dispersed. Moreover, the chapter describes and discusses the possible ethical issues that were considered during the process of selecting participants. The argument is that a chapter on the research methodology is a critical aspect of every qualitative study, especially this because as "a broad sense of processes, principles, and procedures, by which we approach problems and seek answers. As in everything we make our assumptions, interests as well as goals influence which methodological procedure we choose to use" (Bogdam & Taylor, 1975:1).

In Schensul (2012), a research mmethodology refers to a set of approaches or procedures applicable when engaging in an empirical study. For Schensul (2012) methodology clarifies the procedures that allow the work of the researcher to be critiqued, adopted, and repeated by other researchers. It also refers to the different procedures that serve as a road map on what and how to choose the apt study sample (respondents), what kind of data to collect and how to analyse this data. Following this line of cogitation, Mouton, (1998:39) sees a close relationship between research questions, methodology and the procedure of and type of data collection; and this needs to be critically considered for a sound and robust research engagement. More, the problem sought to be addressed, questions and objectives of a research also guide the choice of a methodology (Mouton, 1998:39).

It is universally accepted that empirical inquiries or research is anchored to underlying philosophical assumptions about what constitutes 'valid' research and which research approach(es), or method(s) is/are appropriate for the development of knowledge about a

particular phenomenon. To conduct and engage in any critical inquiry, it is pertinent to know what these assumptions are.

The study adopts a qualitative research method. This approach is apt for the study because it allows for multi methods, it enables us to focus on the interpretation and an empirical approach to the subject of investigation. It also presents a platform for a study to examine phenomena in their natural setting and attempts to make sense of the phenomena. A qualitative research approach deploys an extensive range of inter-connected methods with the aim of getting comprehensive insight on the subject matter (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994:2).

4.2 Qualitative Research: What it is and its essential features

Another description is that of a research methodology (a qualitative approach in particular) as a tool for social inquiry as it is through it that we can gain insight into social realities and how people make meaning of their lives and daily processes. That is why Atkinson (2010) concurs that qualitative research enables and allows a study to engage with or investigate social processes and interactions critically. More so, given that a qualitative approach is an iterative process, it eventually cumulates in providing elucidation, description, and interpretation of social attitudes and practices. For Dawson (2002) the argument is that qualitative research is a valuable methodology in as much as it permits us to explore attitudes, behaviour, and experiences through using an array of tools with the aim of sourcing an in-depth opinion from participants. In Dawson (2002) there is an accentuation of the supposition that "it is attitudes, behaviours and experiences which are important" (:14). More to it, Uwe (2009:11) shares a similar view by opining that a qualitative research approach is "a new sensitivity to the empirical study of issues. Advocates of **postmodernism** have argued that the era of big narratives and theories is over. Locally, temporally, and situationally limited narratives are now required."

Equally important is the view that qualitative research pays attention to context. Underscoring the notion that experiences do not happen *ad abstracto,* it is influenced by time, values, location, and interests. According to Denzin and Lincoln (2009), a "qualitative research involves an interpretive, naturalistic approach to its subject matter; it attempts to make sense of, or to interpret, phenomena in terms of the meaning people bring to them". As such, the qualitative approach is open-ended in nature as it provides a flexible strategy for obtaining valuable data, based on a researcher's competence and nature of the study.

Again, the qualitative approach focuses on understanding ontology – origins and nature of social processes, epistemology – truth or what count as valuable knowledge. Against this background, this study's adoption of a qualitative approach is further influenced by the merit of the method as a tool for exploring and understanding real-life situations to generate more knowledge – theory (Meyers, 2009). For Uwe Flick (2009:12) "qualitative research is of specific relevance to the study of social relations, due to the fact of the pluralisation of life worlds." The foregoing accords an empirical dimension or substance to this study. In the sense that a qualitative empirical approach informed by this study's primary research on policy actors, and search for paradiplomacy grey literature should lead to the garnering, exploration and interpretation of data that is critical for the development of and the fortification of a theory of paradiplomacy and capacity development.

A qualitive research is further described as the process of collecting (through observation, interviews etc.) data and engaging in analysis of this data; and the emphasis here is on the utility of words rather than numbers to this end (Bryman, 2012:36). In Keyton (2011:58) the foregoing is said to make qualitative research to be the stark opposite of "quantitative research, qualitative researchers do not convert their observations or participants' observations into numerical form, nor do they separate or isolate part of the interaction from the whole." This in effect makes the goal of qualitative research about exploring participants experiences, perceptions and how they attach meaning to the institutions of or people in governance. As opposed to trying to get the number of people that believe in the legitimacy of a government.

More, there is further proposition that a qualitative research approach shines light on an inductive technique for understanding the relationship between theory and research. In this regard, the qualitative approach has instrumental value as an interpretive method that enables us to understand a phenomenon in its natural settings and capture the ever-changing reality and dynamics of social interactions (Bryman, 2012; Magam, 2018). Clark's (2004) elucidation outlines the view that qualitative research as an inquiry in which an investigator transvers key variables enroute their inquiry and analysis. What is important in Clark's (2004) typology is that through research, we can capture detailed responses of participants in words, expression, or images. A qualitive inquiry allows for the interpretation of the meaning of information as depicted from subjective observation. For Bryman, (2012:36), the assertion that this approach primarily and mostly emphasises words rather than quantification in the collection, interpretation, analysis, and presentation of data. There is the view inherent thus for Bryman that qualitative research emphasises an inductive approach to the relationship between theory

and research, and such an approach is primarily hinged on how individuals interpret their social world, and the embodiment of their perspective on social reality as a constantly shifting emergent property of individual creation.

Furthermore, in Flick (2009:14-17) it is outlined that the key features of a qualitative research are vastly different from that of quantitative research, it is always apt to delineate the essential features of a qualitative research. In agreement is Creswell and Creswell (2018:254) who report that "qualitative methods demonstrate a different approach to scholarly inquiry than methods of quantitative research. Although the processes are similar, qualitative methods rely on text and image data, have unique steps in data analysis, and draw on diverse designs." Given this, Flick (2009) postulates that the essential features of qualitative research include: an appropriate choice of methods and theories; awareness, knowledge of and analysis of a diversity of perspectives; researcher reflexivity as part of the process of knowledge production; and the variety of approaches and methods.

There is also the fact that qualitative research approach forms and overwhelming number of literatures on paradiplomacy, according to Magam, "an extensive corpus of scholastic inquiry are hinged on qualitative research approaches, like the use of comparative case studies and single case studies to explore the international relations of sub-national governments" (Magam, 2018). This study also adopts a qualitative research approach, guided by a particular case study of the Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs of the KwaZulu-Natal province.

4.2.1 Essential Features of Qualitative Research

1. **Appropriateness of Methods and Theories**

Primarily, in scientific disciplines, defining methodological standards are used as a benchmark for differentiation, particularly to differentiate from other disciplines or domains of inquiry. For instance, experiments can be utulised as a method in psychological inquiry or broad survey research and as a key method of sociology. Precisely, the point of establishing a scientific discipline is to refer to or use it as a reference point for exploring ideas that are tenable and worthy of empirical investigations. For Flick (2009:15) this in some situations brings about refraining from interrogating such "phenomena to which methods like experiment or surveys cannot be applied. Sometimes a clear identification and isolation of variables is not possible, so, they cannot be framed in an experimental design. Or, to keep away from phenomena which can be studied only in very few cases, what makes it difficult to study them in a big enough sample for a representative study, and for findings ready for generalisation."

Since the aim of this study like most other studies is less of a test of what is already known (e.g., theories already formulated in advance), but an attempt to discover and develop the new and empirically grounded approaches towards governance and development. In this case, a qualitative study makes it possible for the validity of this study "to assessed with reference to the object under study and does not exclusively follow abstract academic criteria of science as in quantitative research. Rather, qualitative research's central criteria depend on whether findings are grounded in empirical material or whether the methods are appropriately selected and applied, as well as the relevance of findings and the reflexivity of proceedings" (Flick, 2009:15)

2. Participants' Perspective and Diversity

The challenge of governance helps us to explore another feature of qualitative research. Which is that qualitative research is primarily concerned with attitudes, behaviour, and experiences. This happens through its commonly preferred methods of using interviews or focus groups discussion to garner an in-depth opinion from respondents. The main contention is that attitudes, behaviour, and experiences are important and quite critical to the research process (Creswell & Creswell, 2018). The qualitative research approach has an arsenal of several different methodologies.

In adding his voice to the argument Flick (2009) suggests that qualitative research tries to capture, understand, interpret, and present participants' knowledge and practices. In Strydom and Bezuidenhout (2018:175) the argument in support of subjective perspective is described in the line of argument that qualitative research seeks to understand 'whole world' experiences and as such, there is a focus on gathering data, particularly on "the depth of human experience, including all the personal and subjective peculiarities that are characteristic of individual experiences and meanings associated with a particular phenomenon".

3. Reflexivity of the Researcher and the Research

The iterative nature makes it reflexive research. This is because of the stipulation that a researcher communicate or interacts with "the field and its members as an explicit part of knowledge instead of deeming it an intervening variable. The subjectivity of the researcher *and* of those being studied becomes part of the research process. Researchers' reflections on their actions and observations in the field, their impressions, irritations, feelings, and so on, become data, forming part of the interpretation, and are documented in **research diaries** or context protocols" (Flick, 2009:16). Thus, the researcher in this line of reasoning is a key instrument

in the research process. According to Creswell and Creswell (2018) “Qualitative researchers collect data themselves through examining documents, observing behaviour, or interviewing participants. They may use a protocol—an instrument for recording data—but the researchers are the ones who gather the information and interpret it. They do not tend to use or rely on questionnaires or instruments developed by other researchers” (:258).

One of the challenges I encountered came in the form of what I would consider a closed or tamed response from my participants. As a result of that, the iterative process of data collection, interpretation and writing of the thesis, allowed me to focus in ensuring that the chapters on literature and theoretical frameworks, carry exhaustive analysis of the governance challenges in South Africa and how paradiplomacy can be key to addressing it.

As someone who has worked extensively, and studies, reviewed research, marked and graded a plethora of articles and has extensive freelance research experience on good governance, corruption and paradiplomacy in the context of Africa and South Africa in specific, I was quite aware that my topic in whatever shape or format could be interpreted as a probe into corruption, given the challenges facing institutional governance in South Africa. I was thus very careful not to or in some situation overly so, not allow my “learned” biases influence if and how I probed the study’s participants and to a greater extent, even my analysis too.

I find (Flick’s 2014) view quite felicitous as it views reflexivity in research as the process of critically examining a researcher’s biases, assumptions, and positionality in relation to the research topic. In this sense, as someone who feel a personal injury from the challenges of institutional failure (a case in point, I can (I have in fact) argue that my challenges at home affairs as s student for the past 13 years could either be because of corruption, bureaucratic ineptitude, or Afrophobia). The challenges or limitations of my study has been a direct result of me acknowledging and addressing the potential influence of my (extensive) background, beliefs, and experiences on the research process and findings. In this case, and in the context of studying good governance in Africa in South Africa and my use of a qualitative approach, my decision to act as a reflexive researcher have seen me actively engage in self-reflection and self-awareness throughout the research process. I have considered my position as a scholar of good governance and paradiplomacy and someone who has endured a grave many psychological and personal tortures from the challenges of failed institutions (from Nigeria to the challenges faced in SA now). This approach is not new to social science as is it a requirement of the process of reflexivity for the researcher to consider their own positionality, including their cultural background, personal experiences, and any preconceived notions they may hold about Africa or governance.

4. Variety of Approaches and Methods

Qualitative research utilises an array of diverse theoretical and methodological concepts and approach. In that several approaches with their attendant methods determines the discuss and the research practice. It ensconces subjective viewpoints as the take off point. "A second string of research studies the making and course of interactions, while a third seeks to reconstruct the structures of the social field and the latent meaning of practices. This variety of approaches results from different developmental lines in the history of qualitative research, which evolved partly in parallel and partly in sequence" (*ibid*). More, this approach allows for the synthesis of multiple sources of data. The argument is that in qualitative research, there is a natural propensity to gather multiple forms of data, like interviews, participant observations, documents reviews, and audio-visual information rather than rely on one sole source.

Importantly, all these are open-ended forms of data that makes space for the participants of a study to freely share their ideas without the constrains of predetermined scales or instruments. From then, qualitative research engages in review all the data, understand, or sense of it, and make them,

> it into codes and themes that cut across all the data sources. *Inductive and deductive data analysis:* Qualitative researchers typically work inductively, building patterns, categories, and themes from the bottom up by organizing the data into increasingly more abstract units of information. This inductive process illustrates working back and forth between the themes and the database until the researchers have established a comprehensive set of themes. Then deductively, the researchers look back at their data from the themes to determine if more evidence can support each theme or whether they need to gather additional information. Thus, while the process begins inductively, deductive thinking also plays a vital role as the analysis moves forward (Creswell and Creswell, 2018:258).

5. ***Natural setting***

In most qualitative research, researchers tend to gather data on-the field at the location (to provide context) where participants experience an issue under investigation or problem under study. The approach does not require researchers to bring individuals into a controlled or a contrived situation like in a lab. More, qualitative researchers are also not in the habit of typically send out instruments for individuals to complete. The reason is that there is an up-close information that can be garnered through talking directly to people and experiencing or

observing them "behave and act within their context is a major characteristic of qualitative research. In the natural setting, the researchers have face-to-face interaction, often extending over a prolonged period" (Creswell and Creswell, 2018:257).

6. *Wholistic account:*

The goal with most qualitative research is to map out or draw out a complete picture of the problem under investigation, the phenomenon under observation or issue under study. There is a resultant reporting on multiple perspectives, identification of the array of factors involved in a situation, and a sketch of the bigger picture that emerges. For Creswell and Creswell (2018), this bigger picture is not necessarily a straight "model of cause and effect but rather a model of multiple factors interacting in diverse ways. This picture, qualitative researchers would say, mirrors real life and the ways that events operate in the real world. A visual model of many facets of a process or a central phenomenon aid in establishing this holistic picture" (:259).

Another of the ways through which the qualitative approach provides a wholistic account is because it importantly also emphasises participants of a study's meanings. Throughout the course of a qualitative research, the researchers expend a significant amount of focus on learning and understanding the meaning and how the participants understand the problem or issue. This is in opposition to the possible subjective meaning that a researcher might bring to the research or that writers express in the literature. It is because of this that another advantage of the approach is *Emergent design,* as Creswell and Creswell (2018:258) see it,

> the research process for qualitative researchers is emergent. This means that the initial plan for research cannot be tightly prescribed, and some or all phases of the process may change or shift after the researcher enters the field and begins to collect data. For example, the questions may change, the forms of data collection may shift, and the individuals studied, and the sites visited may be modified. These shifts signal that the researchers are delving deeper and deeper into the topic or the phenomenon under study. The key idea behind qualitative research is to learn about the problem or issue from participants and to address the research to obtain that information.

4.3 Research Paradigm and Methods and design

Thomas Kuhn is credited with coining the term 'paradigm,' which is used to describe a "cluster of beliefs and dictates which for scientists in a particular discipline influence what should be studied, how research should be done, and how results should be interpreted" (Bryman, 2012:630). While this term was widely used and deployed in the discipline of natural sciences, it is nonetheless a critical part of social science research too. In this discipline, paradigms are

construed and held as research traditions or worldviews (du Plooy-Cilliers, 2018). More, it is suggested that social science research subscribed to a particular paradigm or ascribe to one because such enables them to determine "what questions are considered worthy of investigation and what processes are required for the answers to these questions to be acceptable" (ibid, :18).

In the work of scholars like Taylor et al (2007: 5), the view of paradigm is elucidated as one that allows for a broad eagle-eye view or perspective of a phenomenon. In a similar manner there is the conceptualisation in Weaver and Olson's (2006: 460) that alludes to the view that a paradigm explains how research ought to be hinged on or be affected and guided by a certain paradigm because, "paradigms are patterns of beliefs and practices that regulate inquiry within a discipline by providing lenses, frames and processes through which investigation is accomplished". There is a panoply of paradigms in existence, but the most common ones in social science research are the three dominant paradigms or traditions of Positivism, Interpretivism and Critical Realism (Maxwell, 2005; du Plooy-Cilliers, 2018). It is not within the purview of this study to exhaustively explore the different paradigms. Because of that, the analysis is limited to the Interpretivist paradigm/tradition, which this study ascribes to. As such, the Interpretivist position will be unpacked from their *epistemological, Ontological and Methodological* positions. A critical appraisal of the post-positivist view will however precede the foregoing.

4.3.2 Post Positivism

Post positivism stands in stark contrast or is a direct criticism of the positivist paradigm, in that it rejects the positivist position that a researcher should focus on being an independent observer of the social world. Kirby (2013:90) (see also Lenzer, 1998) suggest that the origin of positivist is understood to have been Auguste Comte.

> He was not only was he an empiricist in the foundationalist sense (all knowledge must have a 'secure foundation'), but he argued strongly for the 'positive method' (also known as the 'hypothetico-deductive method') as being the only way at arriving at knowledge. All forms of positivism (and there are a number including logical positivism and behaviourism, and variations of the two, have this as their origin. As the prefix suggests, postpositivism arose from these foundationalist positions to replace them. Indeed, it has been, for some time now, the understanding amongst most philosophers that (logical) positivism exists no longer.

In post positivism, the belief is that the idea, the reality and more so the identity of a researcher has a bearing or rather an influence on what they observe. And as such, it also has an impact on their research findings or how they conclude (McGlinchey, 2022). As such, we can see that the underlying philosophy for the postpositivist is still a cognitive approach to scientific inquiry, but one that ascertains knowledge to be something we develop or something that is an outcome of a dynamic process of observation and interpretation, rather than something that can simply or primarily being understood or discovered through objective and neutral observation. For Guba and Lincoln (2005) the postpositivist paradigm is pivoted within a critical realist ontology. That is why such a paradigm is purported to celebrate the existence "of reality independent of human consciousness, ascribes causal powers to human reasons and social structures, rejects relativism in social and scientific discourses, and reorients the social sciences towards its emancipatory goals." Accordingly, a defining character of postpositivism is the weighty focus on subjective experiences, perspectives, and interpretations, and on the role of values, beliefs, and power relations in shaping knowledge. Postpositivism in this way according to Philips and Burbules (2000) acknowledges the relativity of the 'light of reason' (that what appears reasonable to one person may not appear necessarily so to someone else). There is thus the recognition "that perception is theory laden as far as a researcher's background knowledge and experiences will affect his or her decisions around what to study, or what elements of the data to emphasise or publish. Even the selection of a statistical alpha level is open to subjective choice (and manipulation)" (Kirby, 2013:102).

From the preceding paragraph, there is a resultant view that in postpositivist research, the goal is not to find absolute truths, but to understand how different social actors and groups construct and understand their experiences and the world around them. Therefore, Guba and Lincoln (2005) suggest the idea of the objectivist epistemological underpinnings of postpositivism. The argument here is that "researchers are aware that objectivity is an ideal that can never be achieved, and as such, research is conducted with a heightened awareness of subjectivity with an understanding that, in part, 'reality' is a creation of the individuals involved in the research (there is distinction between subjectivity and bias and acknowledging objectivity whilst having a particular frame of reference)" (Kirby, 2013:99). There is a requirement to focus on the context and conditions in which knowledge is produced and the influence of social, cultural, and historical factors.

One of the key features of postpositivist research is its use of qualitative methods, such as interviews, participant observation, and content analysis, to understand and interpret human

experiences and behaviour. This allows for a more in-depth and nuanced understanding of social phenomena and the complexity of human behaviour. As Ryan (2006:18) suggests that there is a certain level of objectivity required of a postpositivist approach. This is an ability to "see the whole picture, to take a distanced view or an overview. But this kind of objectivity is different from "just the facts," devoid of context – it does not mean judging from nowhere it requires a fair degree of passion – especially passion for justice and the ability to subject one's own assumptions to scrutiny" (Kirby, 2013:100). For Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004:16) the suggestion is that researchers are embedded in communities, and they are as such not immune to such a critical social factor. As they "clearly have and are affected by their attitudes, values, and beliefs ... human beings can never be completely value free, and that values affect what we choose to investigate, what we see, and how we interpret what we see."

Postpositivist research also emphasises the importance of reflexivity, or the process of critically reflecting on one's own values, beliefs, and assumptions and how they may influence the research process and findings. As Denzin and Lincoln (2005:12) assert that one significant manner that researchers who do not work within the positivist or postpositivist traditions differ from those who do, "is that the former feel these more 'distanced' approaches silence 'too many voices. With the engagement of mixed methods, this need not be so, although it is acknowledged that this will be a limitation of research that employs solely quantitative methods of data collection and analysis, and whose methodology does not extend to more qualitative interpretation thereof." Overall, the postpositivist research paradigm offers a more nuanced and comprehensive understanding of social phenomena and recognises the role of subjectivity, power, and context in shaping knowledge.

4.3.2 Interpretivism: its epistemological, ontological, and methodological assumptions

The Interpretivist approach contrasts the Positivist (mostly adopted by quantitative studies) approach from an epistemological standpoint. In the sense that its origins can be traced to a response to the shortcomings of positivism. In Bryman (2004:13), interpretivism is said to contrast positivism which advocates for the utilisation of the exact processes or a scientific model to make social inquiries. For Interpretivism, given that the unit of analysis in social sciences differs from that of natural sciences, inquiries into human beings, how they interact, and their institutions requires a "research procedure that reflects this distinctiveness" (ibid).

According to du Plooy-Cilliers (2018:27), "interpretivism developed as a reason to the shortcomings and limitations of positivism, specifically in its application to the social

sciences." Further, Du Plooy-Cilliers (2018) share the view that the fulcrum of the idea on which interpretivism rests "is that people are fundamentally different from objects. Consequently, we cannot study human beings in the same way we study objects in the natural sciences, because unlike objects, human beings change all the time and the environment in which they find themselves constantly influences them" (*ibid*). More, given that the positivist approach which seeks to model social reality after the natural sciences, fails to take into cognisance the fact that unlike nature, the existence of social reality happens when lay members create and co-create this reality through meaningful interaction (Fuchs, 1992).

Again, due to its anti-positivist stands, interpretivism for instance ascertains that "it does not make sense to study people in laboratory settings, as people do not live in laboratories, and as they are always influenced by the things that are happening in their environment" (du Plooy-Cilliers, 2018:27). The foregoing runs counter to the positivist view that a 'naturalistic' tradition that should guide research must follow the principle or assumption that humans are a part of nature and in this regard, they can be observed or studied like objects using the same methodology (factual and statistical data). The sense here for the positivist is that all knowledge must be explored in an objective manner (King and Horrocks, 2010). For interpretivism, the assumption is that the social world is vastly different from the world of objects. As such, interpretivists aim to gain and present a detailed version of social settings, more so taking into cognisance that a social phenomenon experienced by the same group of people may yield different interpretations, understandings and meaning, depending on the person, or setting (*ibid*).

One can thus sum up the assertion from the interpretivist approach along the view that "in the social sciences in particular, researchers should study and describe meaningful social action. Thus, unlike the positivists who want to discover and explain causal relationships to predict and control nature and the behaviour of humans and animals alike, interpretivists only seek to understand human behaviour" (Du Plooy-Cilliers). Therefore, this study adopts a qualitative design with an interpretivist paradigm. The epistemological position of the approach further makes it felicitous. The epistemological assumption for interpretivists is that objective, everyone differently experiences external reality. The sense is that reality is a social construction which is dependent on the way or what meanings people ascribe to individual experiences of and interactions with others. More, the epistemological undertone of Interpretivism posit that we cannot separate ourselves from what we know. Accordingly, scholars like Guba and Lincoln (1994), similarly share the view that a researcher and the object

of the research are intertwine or rather connected by the strong strings of "who we are and how we understand the world is a central part of how we understand ourselves, others and the world" (Guba and Lincoln, 1994:89).

Further, Scotland (2012:11) is of the view that interpretive epistemology is subjective in that it is based on things that occur in real world or real-life phenomena. The argument is that the world does not exist in a silo, independently of our knowledge or our construction of it (Grix, 2004:83). Take the example in Crotty (1998:43) for instance, it is suggested using a tree, that we ought *"*to remind ourselves here that it is human beings who have constructed it as a tree, given it the name, and attributed to it the associations we make with trees". In a way, no tree is a tree until someone identifies and call it a tree. That meaning is not discovered; "it is constructed though the interaction between consciousness and the world. Consciousness is always consciousness of something (Crotty, 1998:44). To experience a world is to be a part of it, through our participation in our diurnal realities which simultaneously moulds and shapes how we encounter the word (Heron & Reason, 1997). Intentionality is thus the interaction between consciousness and phenomena (Scotland, 2012)

Another thing to consider when elucidating on the choice of interpretivism as an approach is hinged on the fact that the interpretivist approach factors in how socio-cultural phenomena comes to being through actors' interaction and meaning creation. In this way, the interpretive investigator or researcher acknowledges "that value of research is tied to the ability to describe and interpret a phenomenon in the world. Interpretation is a search for deep perspectives on events and for theoretical insights" (Pollard, 2002:37). As such, a researcher immerses and interact with the subject of their study to come to a better understanding of their behaviours and the meanings attributed to variables (Schensul, 2012). This approach can be said to further inform the choice of methodology, given that interpretive studies adopt qualitative research approach, and they are exploratory in nature.

Additionally, it is widely held that qualitative research can use an array of methods, because of its focus on exploring and interpreting the subject in their context. It offers an avenue "for the researcher to study things in their natural setting and attempts to make sense of the phenomena. Qualitative researchers also deploy a wide range of inter-connected methods with the aim to get a better fix on the subject matter at hand (Denzin & Lincoln, 1994:2). One can also describe qualitative research as "any type of research that produces findings not only arrived at by statistical procedures or other means of qualification" (Strauss & Corbin, 1998:10). In Creswell's (1986) view, a qualitative research approach is an "inquiry process of understanding

based on distinct methodological traditions of inquiry that explore a social or human problem" (:16). For du Plooy-Cilliers (2018:31) the interpretivist researchers' goal is to examine reality subjectively and because of this, they "use methods that are sensitive to the context and that will help them to gain and in-depth understanding."

The interpretivist also holds that truth is socially constructed (du Plooy-Cillers, 2018), in the sense that "the social world is what people perceive it to be. It is fluid and fragile and changes as people's beliefs change" (ibid). Therefore, the interpretivist approach tries to merge theory and action, scientific knowledge with extant situational knowledge and to address real problems together with the people of the system under inquiry (Patton, 2002). A case in point, governance as a practice is guided by a set good practices, ethics and codes of conduct which all precede and pre-figure the day-to-day process and practices of public servants. Thus, this qualitative study seeks to name and elucidate on actions that can improve the practice and process of governance and particularly, the effects of the action that was taken (Streubert & Carpenter, 2002). Good governance practices are tethered to a panoply of specific activities, objectives, and outcomes. By adopting this design, the study aids in helping public workers, policy makers to improve good governance practices. As Brydon-Miller & Greenwood, 2006) see it, action research truly plays and a key role in understanding the array of problems that faces an organisation. It is a research design deployed in real situations, rather than in contrived, experimental studies since its primary focus is on solving real problems (ibid).

Thus, study is a qualitative exploratory study. As Magam (2018) suggests that a qualitative interpretivist approach allows a study to fuse other methodological tools widely employed in qualitative research. One of such methods includes a systematic review (as we did in chapter 2) of the literature. Global, continental, and domestic literature and policy dossiers (chapter 3) will be engaged with the aim to highlight their references to paradiplomacy and capacity development. Through the systematic review of literature, the goal is to obtain an overview of the range and types of uses of paradiplomacy. This study is also a particular case in the sense that its data will be derived from interview of members of provincial government departments, particularly in KwaZulu-Natal. The utility of a case in this regard will enable this study to explain "the nuances of social phenomena and addressing specific mechanisms that produce, reproduce, change, or are otherwise related to the phenomena (Neuendorf, 2002:97). To further affirm the suitability of the choice of method, the submission in du Plooy-Cilliers (2018:30) resonates as it is stated that

“interpretivism embodies the view that social reality is in a constant state of flux and dependent on the way in which individuals experience reality internally. Since the aim of interpretivists is to gain an in-depth understanding of multiple realities, they depend on qualitative research. Qualitative research can be described as a research strategy that emphasises words rather than numbers (quantification) in the collection of and analysis of data.”

4.4 Study population and Sampling

For Burns and Grove (1993:779) a research population means all the suitable constituents of a study. These constituents are usually constituting of individuals, groups and sometimes objects. In Polit and Hungler (1999:37) there is a concurring view when reference is made to a population as an aggregate or totality of all the objects or members that conform to a set of required specifications. In other words, a research population refers to the number of individuals suitable for the study. In Pascoe (2018:132), a population is the totality of people in their groupings, entities, or social artefacts from which a study seeks to derive it information. “For instance, if the manager of a hotel wants to know what guests think of her or his hotel, she or she should choose to ask the people who would know best – guests at the hotel.” Accordingly, for this study the researcher targeted persons who provided in-depth information that responded to and served the purpose of the study. In this context, research participants are government officials (local and provincial) as well as scholars of governance and paradiplomacy in South Africa.

4.4.1 Sampling

In Bertram and Christiansen (2014), the importance of the sampling procedure is described thus, as a process of identifying, deciding, and choosing the most apt participants (given certain parameters, age, race, knowledge of subject matter and gender for instance), locations, particular processes, or behaviours to observe for a study. In a broadly sense, a sample is used in reference to the representative of a fraction of the total of population that a researcher observes and which allows them to derive both inductive and deductive data.

Sampling refers to the process of choosing a fraction of units, individuals, or objects from a larger populace. In Pascoe (2018:34) there is the submission that “when choosing a sample, it is unfortunately not as easy as just selecting whom or what we want to include in our sample. We need to narrow down our accessible population by carefully drawing a sample.” In this view, a sample is thus “a subset of a population that is considered to be representative of the entire population” (ibid, 34) There are two types of sampling methods in research known as

probability sampling and non-probability sampling. The value of sampling is that it allows a researcher or a study to select from a pre-set or predetermined portion, fraction of units, individuals, or objects out of a larger populace. Particularly in qualitative research designs, Creswell, and Creswell (2018) argue that sampling lets a research select individuals with requisite knowledge that is pertinent to the topic under investigation.

It is through a thorough sampling process that a researcher decides the population of a study; and this process is a core source of data for the study. Most qualitative research encounter several issues during the selection a sample for their study. Some of what is assessed includes how accessible the population to be studied (public bureaucrats/workers are the broad sample of this study) is, researcher's circumspection in deciding whom or what caliber of individuals can provide extensive knowledge pertinent to the phenomena being examined. Pascoe (2018) suggests that "an important aspect to keep in mind is that all the people or social artefacts in the population (sample size) should share at least one specific characteristic that relates to the research question" (:32). All these considerations come into play in affecting the choice and size of a sample. As such, the aim of selecting a suitable sample is to gather thorough information or knowledge about the subject matter or to learn much more about unique features of the subject matter as it pertains to research (Kumar, 2011:192).

The most common sampling processes are the Probability and non-probability sampling. Johnson and Christensen (2012:231) describe purposive sampling as a non-probability sampling method in which the researcher asks for persons, ergo population with specific characteristics to participate in a research study. A population refers to the "total group of people or entities [social artefacts] from whom information is required' (cited in Du Plooy-Cilliers, 2014:132). Thus, as it pertains to this subject matter, a population is a group of people or persons that possess the information a researcher requires for their study. In this sense, the study uses a purposive sampling method as this sampling method ensures that the participants of a study are selected "based on their potential to pride invaluable information and address research questions. These participants are knowledgeable on the topic under study and the researcher builds a sample that is specific to the needs of the study" (Magam, 2018:57). This sample is suitable for this kind of study because it is one of those that lends itself to research situations where we want to draw a sample that meets the parameters of the research.

4.4.2 Probability Sampling

In probability sampling, the reference is to "whether each unit (whether an individual or social artefact) in the population has an equal opportunity to be part of the sample. If there are 150 000

people in our population, we need to make sure that each one of them has the same chance of being included in the sample" (Pascoe, 2014:136).

4.4.3 Non-Probability Sampling

For non-probability sampling, participants or the selection of study population are deliberately and meticulously selected by the researcher. This is because according to Pascoe (2018), a non-probability approach is very apt "when it is nearly impossible to determine who the entire population is or when it is difficult to gain access[9] to the entire population" (:137). For Khan (2008), a sampling procedure that does not guarantee a non-zero chance for every unit of the population to be part of the sample is non-probability. The contention is that this procedure does not conform to a particular trend or format when selecting the population, any inclusion in the sample is based on the researcher's judgement and discretion. Inherently, what is also key in the non-probability sampling approach is that allows a researcher to carefully select a sample from a sample from an accessible population and "through those who can recommend other participants. The sample will still meet the population parameters for the study; the key thing however is that the sample will be selected using the researcher's judgment and the participants will as such are not randomly selected from a list" (Pascoe, 2018:137).

In simple terms, non-probability sampling is felicitous because it is convenient for a study that deals with an expansive population and there is not clarity on the number of "elements in a population or when the elements cannot be identified on an individual basis" (Magam, 2018:66). Despite the free reign that the non-probability sampling might seem to be, the selection procedure is nonetheless guided and highly dependent on certain conditions (clear and concise research questions and aims for instance) presented by the researcher or dictated by the nature of the study (Kumar, 2011: 206). An important value of non-probability sampling is inherent in the fact that it plays a role in preventing data saturation. As in "qualitative research, the emphasis is not so much on ensuring that the sample size is big enough to be representative of the entire population, but instead, on including enough participants in the sample so that the data saturation point is reached" (Pascoe, 2018:137).

More, Pascoe (2018:137) documents two crucial factors that comes in place when we want to draw a non-probability sample:

- It is a sample that is in line with the parameters (shared characteristics) of the research.

[9] The study despite is careful and purposive selection of participants, still came out blank because the issue of corruption and bureaucratic ineptitude was under light. As some respondent declined based on the fear of being "implicated".

- Where all individuals or social artefacts in the total population are not easy to access or known.

The non-probability sampling is further divided into the following methods: *Accidental sampling, Convenience sampling, Purposive sampling, Quota Sampling, Snowball sampling, and Volunteer sampling.*

For this study, a purposive non-probability sampling chosen as the most suitable for amongst other things, the reasons supplied above. Of all the categories, the use of purposive sampling found prop in the argument by Johnson and Christensen (2012:231), that a purposive sampling is a non-probability sampling method in which the researcher has the freedom to select and chose participants and solicits persons with specific characteristics to participate in a research study. For Neuman (1997:206), purposive sampling is proper for most qualitative studies because it allows the researcher the freedom to choose a case/s for a specific purpose the researcher has in mind. More, Creswell (1998), Creswell and Creswell (2018) opine that case study research in most instances are linked with inquiries of individuals; it is important to consider the fact however that 'cases' are not only unique to people but can be used to describe an investigation into an activity, event, a programme that is tied to time and specific locations (Stake, 1994).

For Pascoe (2018:142-143), "with purposive sampling, we purposefully choose the elements that we wish to include in our sample based on a set list of characteristics. We would look at our population and our research question and decide what characteristics from the population are important for the research. We would then carefully select a sample from the population that have these characteristics and we would disregard those that do not."

Essential also the purposive non-probability sampling method is the requirement that a researcher or a study select a case or cases that will generate diverse responses of the same 'subject matter' in an open-ended method of data collection (Sabornie, 2006). Other scholars like Given (2008) similar share the foregoing view in the submission that "embedded in the process of selecting a participant is the idea that who a person is and where that person is located within a group is essential, as opposed to other methods of research where people are viewed as essentially replaceable. Research participants are not equal, and the data gathered from a targeted participant has a chance of being more correct than that of a participant chosen randomly" (Magam, 2018:75). That is to say "the advantage of this method of sampling is that we can ensure that each element of our sample will aid our research, because each element fits with the population parameters of the study. If an element does not fit, we can disregard it" (Pascoe, 2018:143).

Against the above backdrop, an equal thing worthy of mentioning is that that qualitative research is often distinguished by small samples. The reason being that the aim is to gather informative and in-depth data, the quality of the data not the number is what is important. While small sample sizes are often criticised for their limited generalisability a single case study was in this regard "chosen to avoid generalisation of the information from a wider population. It paved way for an in-depth analysis of the reality of and the challenges of governance in KwaZulu-Natal, and how paradiplomacy in the province can be used for enhancing good governance in the province and the country.

The study used a purposive sampling method to recruit respondents. The researcher through the supervisor's network approached 12 participants (middle -4 participants from HR and Supply Chain – to top management – 1 director, 3 deputy directors – and the study maintained a gender parity of 6 women and 6 men) from the Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs (COGTA) in Pietermaritzburg who have been described as knowledgeable on the topic "under study to build a sample that is specific to the needs of the study. The participants supplied information that answered the research questions" (Magam, 2018:7). The consequence of such to reiterate is that participants of this study were selected because of their knowledgeability and potential to supply invaluable information and address the three primary research questions and objectives. The Department of Cooperative governance and traditional affairs plays a critical role in ensuring that the wheels of governance in the country run smoothly.

4.5 Data Collection Procedures

Given the primacy of the role of the researcher provides the ground on which to explore the issue of data collection. It is procedure that include outlining the boundaries or delimitation of a study through sampling and recruitment. More, information can be collected through "unstructured or semi-structured observations and interviews, documents, and visual materials; as well as establishing the protocol for recording information. Identify the purposefully selected sites or individuals for the proposed study. The idea behind qualitative research is to purposefully select participants or sites (or documents or visual material) that will best help the researcher understand the problem and the research question" (Creswell and Creswell, 2018:260). There is no implication or suggestion that random sampling or selection of many respondents and locations is typically found in quantitative research. According to Miles and Huberman (1994), A discussion of participants and the site might include four aspects should be considered when discussing study respondents and location.

a) the location (where the research will physically take place).

b) the participants/respondents (who will be observed or interviewed).
c) the events (this will address what will participants/respondents to be observed or interviewed be doing).
d) the process (the evolving nature of events undertaken by the actors within the setting).

A study like this requires one to elucidate on the strategies being utilised to recruit participants (or cases) for the study. As a challenging aspect of research, the approach is critical for the trustworthiness of a study (Koonin, 2018). More, it is also challenging because the study needs to indicate how appropriate participants are informed about the study and cite the actual recruitment messages sent to them. The procedure also requires the researcher to discuss ways (if there are) "to provide incentives for individuals to participate…. Comment on the number of participants and sites involved in the research. Aside from the small number that characterizes qualitative research, how many sites and participants should you have? First, there is no specific answer to this question; the literature contains a variety of perspectives Sample size depends on the qualitative design being used (e.g., ethnography, case study)" (Creswell and Creswell, 2018:260).

Given that in a lot of qualitative studies, researchers collect multiple forms of data and spend a considerable time in the natural setting gathering information. There are four basic types of typed of data collection and they have their merits and demerits or rather their strengths and limitations, as shown in Table 3.

Table 3 Qualitative Data Collection Types, Options, Advantages and Limitations

Data Collection Types	Options within types	Strengths/merits of the types	Limitations/Demerits of types
Observations	• Complete participant – researcher conceals role. • Observer as Participant – role of researcher is known. • Participant as	• Researcher has a first-hand experience with participants. • Researcher can record information as it occurs. • Unusual	• The presence of researchers in peoples' spaces may be considered intrusive. • Private situations may be observed that cannot be reported by the

	observer – observation role is secondary to participant role. • Complete observer – researcher observes without participating.	suspects can be noticed during observation. • Useful in exploring topics that are uncomfortable for participants to discuss.	research. • A researcher may lack the skills pertinent for attending and observations. • Certain participants (like children) may be difficult to observe or have rapport with.
Interviews	• Face-to-face – one-on-one, in person interview. • Telephone – researcher interviews by phone. • Focus group – researcher interviews participants in a group. • Email internet interview.	• Of value when participants are out of reach for direct observation. • Participants can provide historical information. • Allows researcher control over the line of questioning.	• Provides indirect information filtered through the views of interviewees. • Provides information in a designated place rather than the natural field setting. • Researcher's presence may lead to biased responses. • Not all people

			can articulate themselves or have the gift of insight.
Documents	• Public documents – minutes of minutes, newspapers, policy dossiers, white paper etc. • Private documents – journals, diaries, or letter.	• Enables a researcher to obtain the language and words of participants. • Can be accessed at a time convenient to the researcher – an unobtrusive source of information. • Represents data to which participants have given attention. • As written evidence, it saves the researcher the time and expense of transcribing.	• Not all people are equally articulate and perceptive. • May be protected information unavailable to public or restricted access. • Requires the researcher to search out the information in hard-to-find places. • Materials may be incomplete. • Documents may be inauthentic or not accurate.
Audio-Visual Digital Materials	• Photographs • Video tapes	• An unobtrusive	• May be difficult to

	• Art objects • Computer messages • Sounds • Films	method of collecting data. • Provides an opportunity for participants to directly share their reality. • It is creative in that it captures attention visually.	interpret. • May not be accessible publicly or privately. • The presence of an observer (e.g., photographer) may be disruptive and affect responses.

Adapted from Creswell and Creswell (2018:263)

Table 4 List of Qualitative Data collection Sources

Observations • **Can be conducted with the researcher as a participant or an observer.** • **Can be conducted by shifting from participant to observer (and vice versa)**
Interviews • **Can be conducted one-one in the same room, or via web-based or email platforms.** • **Focus groups interviews can be conducted in the same room, or via web-based or email platforms.**
Documents • **A journal or notes taken or kept during the study by the researcher or participants.** • **By examining personal documents like letters, emails, and private blogs.** • **Analysis of white papers, policy briefs, government gazettes, official documents, etc.**
Audio-visual and digital materials • **Photo elicitation – from asking participants to take pictures or photos.**

- **Videos or films of an individual in a social situation.**
- **Examine possessions or ritual objects.**
- **Photographic or video materials**
- **From online platforms like websites, twitter, Instagram etc.**

4.6. Data Collection methods for this study

Data for this study was derived from an array of primary and secondary sources. Some of which include documentation review (books, journal, articles, newspaper articles, and internet sources), in-depth/semi-structured interviews (12 participants), official documents and reports from provincial government departments, dossiers from and on the Department of Cooperative Governance and traditional Affairs, the national Department of International Relations, and Cooperation. Primary data collection took place between October 2022 and December 2022.

4.6.1. Semi-Structured interviews

Interviews are a useful tool for collecting primary data for several types of qualitative research. According to Strydom and Bezuidenhout (2018:188) interviews are a qualitative data collection too that allows a researcher to pose questions to "participants with the aim of learning more about their views, opinions, and beliefs about a specific phenomenon. Interviews are a form of conversations, with the primary aim of obtaining information based on open-ended questions." They are considered a valuable source of rich information and if conducted correctly they can enable a researcher to "interpret and understand the meanings of participants' direct or nuanced answers to specific questions" (ibid). There is also the assertion that they have utility in the verification of certain types of supposition. For instance, interviews are useful tools in a case where a study seeks to understand the subjective views of research participants or have an interest in learning how respondents link their beliefs to events or phenomena (Berg & Lune, 2012:115).

Through interviews a study gains a deeper understanding and clarity of the activities of the participants who form the study's population. As interviews allows a researcher to "ask a participant to clarify a point s/he is making and provide more detailed explanation of, for example, her view of a specific question that the research has asked" (Strydom and Bezuidenhout, 2018:188). In this way, another advantage of interviews is that it further places a researcher in a position to "ask more in-depth questions about the aspects that are of interest

and pertinence to the study, and it this that allows for more flexibility in the research process" (ibid).

In Bryman (2001) different forms of interviews are distinguished like structured, semi-structured and unstructured interviews. A further elucidation is provided in Strydom and Bezuidenhout (2018) who stratify interviews into formal interview, informal interview, and the standardized open-ended interview. Because of an array of best advantages for gathering an exhaustive amount of qualitative data, interviews are a tool often used qualitative researchers particularly semi-structured and unstructured interviews, as these interview tools/forms are flexible and do not confine or constrict by adopting a rigid structure (Edwards and Holland, 2013). These kinds for Kvale (1996:2) are critical in the "construction of knowledge."

As such, this study used a semi-structured interviews to allow the participants to respond freely and supply personal perspective on the topic of governance and its challenges. The adoption of a semi-structured interview a tool for data collection is propped by the tool's flexibility which makes it meritorious. The aim of the semi-structure is to provide a guideline or a purview for which the participants can navigate the topic with ease. The tool in such a way also allows for iteration and probing by the researcher to further and trace the real meaning behind the responses of the participant (Edwards and Holland, 2013).

The semi-structured interviews conducted for this study were guided by a list of eleven questions with a broad to narrow focus in sight. The use of an interview guide was in effect more like a compass to guide the feel of the process and allow it to be a fruitful interaction. The semi-structure gave the participants license to roam, but within the remit of the topic and this allowed the participants to supply varied opinions and responses. The researcher conducted semi-structured interviews with 10 (from the original proposed sample of 12) key informants of the study as it was mentioned earlier. All interviews were carried out in English telephonically (between October and December 2022) given the time constraint. However, the process went smoothly all the respondents were contacted about a year and half in advance. The choice of a Semi-structured interviews is because it is felicitous to an inquiry of this nature.

4.7. Qualitative Content Analysis

Data analysis for this study was done qualitatively. According to Philip Mayring (2004), "the goal of content analysis is the systematic examination of communicative material" (:266). Hsieh and Shannon (2005:1278) suggest that qualitative content analysis is research "method for the subjective interpretation of the content of text data through the systematic classification

process of coding and identifying themes or patterns." For Flick (2014:5), qualitative data analysis is the classification and elucidation of linguistic, visual, or textual materials to make,

> statements about implicit and explicit dimensions and structures of meaning-making in the material and what is represented in it. Meaning making can refer to subjective or social meanings. Qualitative data analysis also is applied to discover and describe issues in the field or structures and processes in routines and practices. Often, qualitative data analysis combines approaches of a rough analysis of the material (overviews, condensation, summaries) with approaches of a detailed analysis (elaboration of categories, hermeneutic interpretations or identified structures)

The view further is that qualitative content analysis also involves the systematic exegesis of "social artefacts to supply an in-depth understanding of, for example, media texts and their specific contexts. Unlike quantitative content analysis, qualitative content analysis does not involve the counting of words and codes; rather, the researcher finds subjective themes and patterns that may emerge from a particular text" (Strydom and Bezuidenhout, 2018:191). More, given that data analysis requires the researcher to make sense of the primary data obtained. The adoption of a qualitative content analysis allows for a deeper understanding of the data, analysing the same data using different methods and finally interpretation of the data (Creswell, 2003:190). A qualitative content analysis is effective because it embeds some critical ingredients that allows analysis of data to "be systematic, sequential, verifiable and continuous, it requires time, it is jeopardised by delay, it seeks to enlighten, it should entertain alternative explanations, it is improved by feedback, and it is a process of comparison" (Krueger and Casey, 2000:128).

In Babbie and Mouton (2001), the merit of qualitative content analysis is further discussed in the argument that the approach interrogates certain phrases within a wide range of text. It then proceeds to code and categorise data. Effectually, this approach has useful application on all sorts of data and are not singularly focused on a specific method of data collection. In Magam (2018:99) the view is that "coding (assign labels to data) is the most prominent way of analysing, if the data is from interviews, focus groups or observations." For Flick (2007:101) coding allows a researcher to show or understand the pattern in the raw data, as a steppingstone to an in-depth understanding of the issues, the context as well as the data itself (Flick, 2007:101). In Mayring's (2000) supposition, placing data into categories is the most important process of analyzing data and the qualitative content analysis understands and adopts this process. That is a process of interpreting data, whereby specific elements from the data are developed and segregated into themes, categories, and these categories are usually re-examined and reviewed as part of the process of data analyses.

Smith (1992:1) also shares the view that qualitative content analysis is "the scoring of messages for content and style for the purpose of assessing the characteristics or experiences of persons, groups or historical periods." In Zhang and Wildemuth (2009:319) a qualitative content analysis "pays attention to unique themes that illustrate the range of the meanings of the phenomenon rather than the statistical significance of the occurrence of particular texts." Furthermore, Zhand and Wildemuth (2009:309-311) provide a typology of eight steps that shape the process of qualitative content analysis. They are:

1. Prepare data.
2. Define the coding unit to be analysed.
3. Develop categories and a coding scheme or conceptual framework.
4. Text your coding scheme on a sample text.
5. Code all text.
6. Asses your coding consistency.
7. Draw conclusions form the coded data (interpret your data).
8. Report your methods and findings.

To surmise, there is a research tip, which urges researchers to construe qualitative data analysis as a process that requires the fulfilment of towing the line of some sequential steps, from the specific to the general, and involving multiple levels of analysis:

> Step 1. *Organize and prepare the data for analysis*. This involves transcribing interviews, optically scanning material, typing up field notes, cataloguing all the visual material, and sorting and arranging the data into several types depending on the sources of information. Step 2. *Read or look at all the data*. This first step provides a general sense of the information and an opportunity to reflect on its overall meaning. What general ideas are participants saying? What is the tone of the ideas? What is the impression of the overall depth, credibility, and use of the information? Sometimes qualitative researchers write notes in margins of transcripts or observational field notes or start recording general thoughts about the data at this stage. For visual data, a sketchbook of ideas can begin to take shape. Step 3. *Start coding all the data*. Coding is the process of organizing the data by bracketing chunks (or text or image segments) and writing a word representing a category in the margins. It involves taking text data or pictures gathered during data collection, segmenting sentences (or paragraphs) or images into categories, and marking those categories with a term, often derived from the actual language of the participant (called an *in vivo* term) (Creswell and Creswell, 2018:169).

4.8 Validity and Reliability

It is important to accentuate the fact that validation of findings happens as an iterative process during research. For Koonin (2018), the issue here is that the researcher needs to show how their study goes about to ensure or validate their proposed study's findings. More, Creswell

and Creswell (2018) suggest that it is critical for researchers to "convey the steps they will take in their studies to check for the accuracy and credibility of their findings. Validity does not carry the same connotations in qualitative research that it does in quantitative research; nor is it a companion to reliability (examining stability) or generalizability (the external validity of applying results to new settings, people, or samples)." For Koonin (2018: 258) since qualitative studies do not deploy numbers as evidence, "they use different criteria to determine the trustworthiness, or credibility, of research findings. Also, keep in mind that the aim of qualitative research is to promote understanding of a particular phenomenon within a specific context, and not to generalise the results to a broader population per say."

Again, the suggestion is that qualitative validity means that the researcher establishes the accuracy of the findings by utilising a particular process or certain procedures. On the other hand, when we speak of qualitative reliability, this is an indication that the researcher's approach is consistent across different researchers and spread across different projects (Gibbs, 2007). As such, validity has been lauded as one of the merits of qualitative research and it hinges on determining whether the findings are accurate from the standpoint of the researcher, the participant, or other readers of an account (Creswell & Miller, 2000). Accordingly, some of the terms used in qualitative literature to refer to validity include *trustworthiness, authenticity,* and *credibility* (Creswell & Miller, 2000), and it is a much-discussed topic (Lincoln, Lynham, & Guba, 2011).

Again, the use of *multiple validity procedures* provides a researcher with more tools to assert the accuracy of their findings. The secret to this is in identifying and discussing the one or more strategies, or tools available to check the accuracy of a research's findings. The suggestion from Creswell and Creswell (2018) is that a study or research,

> should actively incorporate validity strategies into their proposals. We recommend the use of multiple approaches, which should enhance the researcher's ability to assess the accuracy of findings as well as convince readers of that accuracy. There are eight primary strategies, organized from those used most frequently and easiest to implement to those used occasionally and more difficult to implement: *Triangulate* different data sources by examining evidence from the sources and using it to build a coherent justification for themes. If themes are established based on converging several sources of data or perspectives from participants, then this process can be claimed as adding to the validity of the study (:284).

Some other suggestions of ways to ensure trustworthiness is to utilise *member checking.* This process can be used to determine or ascertain the accuracy of the findings from a qualitative study "by taking the final report or specific descriptions or themes back to participants and

determining whether these participants feel that they are accurate. This does not mean taking back the raw transcripts to check for accuracy; instead, the researcher takes back parts of the polished or semi-polished product, such as the major findings, the themes, the case analysis, the grounded theory, the cultural description, and so forth. This procedure can involve conducting a follow-up interview with participants in the study and providing an opportunity for them to comment on the findings" (ibid).

Furthermore, Koonin (2018) suggests that "there is a move towards the use of different terminology to indicate validity and reliability in qualitative studies. The overarching term that is used for validity and reliability in qualitative research is *trustworthiness,* which is further divided into credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability" (:258).

1. *Credibility* pertains to how accurate a study has interpreted the data it collected from participants. The suggestion is that credibility of a study is proportional to times spent with participants or data. As Koonin (2018: 258) suggests that "credibility increased when the research spends extended periods of time with the participants to understand them better and gain insight into their lives. It also increased by making use of triangulation, where more than multiple sources are used to collect data." For Collis and Hussey (2003), credibility is suggested to increase when a study's findings are plausible from the participants' perspective. A case in point, a study about government workers should be an accurate description that these workers can find credible.
2. *Transferability* refers to how the findings of a study when applied in a comparable situation, will deliver related results. This will allow for the generalization of findings, from a research approach that is not traditionally "lend itself to generalized findings. In other words, it is the degree to which the results and analysis can be applied beyond a specific research project" (Koonin, 2018:259). That is to say that when the same study is carried out in another COGTA in a different province, one would likely arrive at similar or very close findings to this current study.
3. *Dependability* for Collis and Hussey (2003) is the quality of "the process of integration that takes place between data collection method, data analysis and the theory generated from the data" (:278).
4. *Confirmability* describes the extent or how well data collected for a study support the findings and interpretation of the research. It is a sign of "how well findings flow from the data. It requires the study to have described the research process fully to assist others in scrutinizing the research design. Others who look at the data must come to similar

conclusions as the study did" (Koonin, 2018:259).

Reliability has been described as the consistency and repeatability of research findings. In qualitative research like this one to establish reliability is a daunting task due to what Flick (2009) describes as the subjective approach of data collection and analysis. Some of the strategies methods used by this study or researcher to enhance reliability includes a strong level of triangulation of data between literature, theory, and practices. From the utilisation of diverse data sources, such as the semi structured interviews and document analysis, I find such an approach strengthens the reliability of my findings. A brief scanning of the thesis will exhibit how triangulation allowed me to corroborate information from an array of perspectives (the thesis has an over 60 pages long review of literature) and reduce the risk of my bias or misinterpretation. Another factor critical to guaranteeing reliability is to reiterate, my reflexivity as a researchers. This is basically me acknowledging that my experience as a researcher of good governance and paradiplomacy in Africa and as someone who has a personal experience with institutional failures, I have been very careful that in the trajectory of the study is not guided by such and this way, I am guaranteeing that the potential impact of my 'learned' preconceived notion does not affect data collection and analysis. By maintaining a reflexive approach, I believe I am enhancing the reliability of their interpretations.

As it pertains to validity, the accuracy and credibility of a research finding is crucial in qualitative studies like mine. My sampling technique which involved a careful and convenient selection of participants and sites that I believed ensured a representation of how institutional challenges arise in South Africa. My employment of purposive sampling and seeking maximum variation within the sample was to increase my study's validity. Again, in chapter two and three, there is a detailed analysis. The systematic analysis of qualitative data is essential for ensuring validity. The utilisation of an established analytical frameworks, such as thematic content analysis allowed me to organize and interpret data in a reliable and valid manner. More there is also the fact of transferability. By carefully describing the context and settings of my study, I ensure that readers can assess the transferability of findings to other contexts (ceteris paribus). By providing a practical place and a detailed contextual information, the aim was that my study would enhance its external validity.

4.9 Conclusion

The goal for this chapter has been to provide an illustration of the research methods and methodology. This is primarily the process of research, and it is as such crucial for a lot of factors, highlighted throughout the chapter. In the sense that it is from the method adopted that

a study can establish its validity and reliability. As Koonin (2018:260) would suggest that given that research is a process of inquiry, all the information collected must be valid and reliable. Because “if your research is not reliable and valid, it is not meaningful”. This has thus made data and the process of collecting them crucial in any empirical research project. The central questions when it comes to data follow logically from the view of how a research data is related or correlates to questions a study seeks to answer. It is the methodology or research design that guides the type of data that a study will use and how the researcher seeks to access to them. More it is the choice of research method that guides the critical examination of the data, and as such, allows research to examine a topic in depth. Data, of any kind, in this view are according of intrinsically critical to every research. In this chapter, a detailed exploration of the research method adopted was presented. The study’s focus on understanding an issue from the perspective of individuals whose reality are intertwined with the phenomenon under investigation led it to adopt a qualitative approach to data collection and analysis. From starting with a broad description of the method used in the research, the study underscores the fact that the choice of methodology is to allow incorporation of research questions, research objectives as well as the activities undertaken to collect and analysis data. The next Chapter presents an interpretation and analysis of data and present the study’s findings. The chapter also provides general conclusions to the study, provides recommendation for further studies.

Chapter Five: Data Presentation and Elucidation and interpretation

5.1 Introduction

In this chapter, the process of data – qualitative content analysis, is presented. This process or data analysis approach is said to a parsing out of the manifest and nuanced content of a body of communicated material (an interview transcript or book or film for instance) by classifying, tabulating, and evaluating some key symbols and themes to ascertain their meaning, context of usage and probable effect. In so doing, the chapter's goal is to present and critically engage with implicit and explicit qualitative data gathered from the use of semi-structured interviews of ten participants.

There are an array of procedures or steps that can be utilised for the interpretation of qualitative data. It could take the form of summarising the overall findings, making a comparison of the findings to extant literature, and grounding the discussion in the apt theoretical framework. More, in some procedures it is required that research discusses a personal view of the findings, in addition to stating limitations and making recommendations for future research. For this study, and in terms of overall findings, the question is simply, what lessons have been learnt that captures the essence of the central idea in a study (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). The lessons learnt could be the researcher's personal interpretation, nested in the understanding that the "inquirer brings to the study from a personal culture, history, and experiences. It could also be a meaning derived from a comparison of the findings with information gleaned from the literature or theories. In this way, authors suggest that the findings confirm past information or diverge from it. It can also suggest new questions that need to be asked questions raised by the data and analysis that the inquirer had not foreseen earlier in the study" (Creswell & Creswell, 2018:264).

The chapter adopts a *Conceptual Content Analysis* approach to guide its trajectory of parsing out data. This approach is apt because *Conceptual Content Analysis*, concerns itself with the frequency of the occurrence of a concept or term. In this way, the focus on explicit data initiates groundwork for credibility, transferability, and confirmability of the study. In the sense that the purpose of a conceptual approach to content analysis here is to ensure that by considering mostly explicit expressions, the study in so doing, considers only concepts and terms related to the phenomenon under investigation. As such, there is a reduction in bias that may arise from the influence of subjective view in parsing out latent concepts. Conceptual content analysis guarantees that the study can organise and elicit meaning from data gathered and further utilised for drawing practical examples and making further suggestions and recommendations.

To restate, the aim of this study has been to explore how paradiplomacy can be leveraged as tool for capacity building at the local level. To ensure a government of quality and thus serve to improve the quality of South Africa's bureaucracy for efficient and effective delivery of services for improved citizen livelihoods.

At the outset, the trajectory and the preview of the study was guided by the following questions:

- What are the current challenges to good governance in South Africa?
- What strategies and instruments are in place to promote paradiplomacy quantitatively (the number of international partnership and projects) and qualitatively (diversity of methods, forms, and concentration of international cooperation) in South Africa?
- How can paradiplomacy be utilised to enhance local institutional capacity for good governance at a provincial level in South Africa?

To fully address the above stated question and the study's objectives and aims, the chapter begins with a tabulation of the profiles of all the study's respondents. It then goes ahead to present a tabulation and analyses themes as they emerge from the responses of participants. Of equal importance is the trajectory of deriving themes from each research question. As such, each subsection addresses a research question as presented by the themes. More so, the chapter also pits the responses of participants with the study's exploration of extant themes from the array of literature reviewed and from the theories of paradiplomacy and state building. The study will be divided into three major sub-sections. In two of the sub-sections respectively, the research questions one and two, will be used as a guide for presenting and analysing findings.

Table 5 Respondents' Profiles

Name/Age/Sex/Race	Qualifications	Position and length of service
R1/ 50-59/ Male/A	Diploma in History	25 years – Traditional Affairs
R2/ 40-49/ Female/C	MA Policy Studies	15 years - Monitoring and Evaluation
R3/ 40-49/ Female/A	BSc Economics and Development Studies	20 years – Budget
R4/ 40-49/Male/A	PhD Political Science	18 years – Deputy Director

R5 / 40-49/ Female/A	Master's Public Administration	16 years – Deputy Director
R6/30-40/M/A	Master's Development Studies	11 years – Supply chain management (SCM)
R7/F/50-60/C	PhD Economics	28 years – Supply Chain (SCM)
R8/F/45/I	Diploma Human resource	15 years – Human resource
R9/F/38/I	Ph.D. supply chain	12 years – supply chain
R10/M/62/A	Ph.D. Mathematics	32 years – SCM (17 years) Monitoring and Evaluation (32 years)

All names are pseudonyms.

5.2.1 About the Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs (CoGTA)

The Ministry is said to be made up of the Department of Cooperative Governance and the Department of Traditional Affairs. Their operational parameters or mandate is codified in the 1996 Constitution of the Republic of Some Africa. Some of the key elements and Constitutional foundations the Ministry's mandate are as follows:

1. System of Cooperative Government (Chapter 3 of the Constitution)
2. Provinces (Chapter 6 of the Constitution)
3. Local Government (Chapter 7 of the Constitution)
4. Traditional Leaders (Chapter 12 of the Constitution)

In tandem with principles and spirt of Batho Pele which is at the core of SA's public service, CoGTA's values include:

- Commitment to public service.
- Integrity and dedication to fighting corruption.
- A hands-on approach to dealing with local challenges.
- Public participation and people centred approach.
- Professionalism and goal orientation.
- Passion to serve.
- Excellence and accountability.

Adherence to the above values seeks to emplace Local Government in a state required for them to be harbingers of development and wellbeing.

Vision: A functional and developmental local government system that delivers on its Constitutional and legislative mandates within a system of cooperative governance This Vision is in line with the objectives of Chapter 13 of the National Development Plan: '*Building a capable and developmental State'*

Mission: Our mission is to ensure that all municipalities perform their basic responsibilities and functions consistently by:

- ✓ Putting people and their concerns first.
- ✓ Supporting the delivery of municipal services to the right quality and standard.
- ✓ Promoting good governance, transparency, and accountability.
- ✓ Ensuring sound fiscal management and accounting; and
- ✓ Building institutional resilience and administrative capability.
- ✓ This mission is directly adopted from the 5 Pillars of the Back-to-Basics Campaign.

In a recent dossier titled: *Local Government, a Chronology of the past 21 Years*, by the Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs (CoGTA) makes a summary of the achievements, aches and challenges facing local government.

Table 6 Major Achievements and remaining challenges facing local governance in South Africa

	Achievements	Challenges
Governance & Institutional Arrangements	○ Wall to wall local government system. ○ Regular free and fair elections. ○ Most secondary cities and Metropolitan Municipalities work well.	▪ Duplication of structures. ▪ Dysfunctional district and local municipalities. ▪ Failure to devolve function where capacity exists. ▪ Communal areas fall outside local government

		authority.
Accountability & Participation	○ Extensive regulatory framework for public participation. ○ Ward councillor system provides a direct link to ward communities. ○ Municipal Public Accounts Committee established and provides effective oversight.	▪ Deteriorating audit outcomes. ▪ Compliance driven approach to participation. ▪ Ward committee system has been captured for patronage purposes. ▪ **Lack of effective partnerships around delivery**
Infrastructure Services	○ Massive improvements in access to basic services. ○ System of capital grants supports infrastructure roll-out. ○ City IDMS system is best practice.	▪ Widespread dissatisfaction with quality of services. ▪ Poor asset management, aging infrastructure with high electricity and water loses.
Social & Economic Transformation	○ Extensive regulatory framework for local planning. ○ Substantial investment in housing and public transport programmes.	▪ Replication of apartheid spatial patterns. ▪ Most LED strategies and agencies are ineffective. ▪ Lack of alignment between industrial decentralisation and municipal planning.

Capacity & Skills	○ Substantial investment in capacity building programmes and skills development. ○ Rapid transformation of municipal administrations including engineering staff.	▪ High vacancy rates in critical functions. ▪ Senior management instability and victimisation. ▪ Political interference in administration. ▪ Loss of experienced engineering staff.
Municipal Finances	○ Well-developed system of intergovernmental grants. ○ Redistribution and poverty targeting built into finances. ○ Best Practice MSCoA reforms being implemented.	▪ High proportion of municipalities in financial distress. ▪ Growing consumer debtors and debts owed to Eskom and Water Boards.

From the Department of Cooperative Governance's 2018 input to the DPME's 25 – years review of government

5.2 The Challenges of Good Governance in South Africa

In Chapter two of this study, it was highlighted that the link between bureaucratic ineptitude and the failure of public service deliver is a direct one. In that malfeasance as manifested in the form of state capture has effectually handed narrow interests groups the reigns of state-owned enterprises, who serve the interests of patrons and partisan interests. In neopatrimonial and capture states, leaders/political patrons parley power/influence over policy formation, for money and effectually hand over large swathes of the economy to private interests. In both the second and third chapters, the study exhaustively established that the challenge of state capture or corruption in South Africa has a lot to do with the quality of public servants. The experience of state capture – while driven by personal business interests – rests squarely on the belief that politicians are vulnerable to malfeasance. In this case, they might not be agents per say, but

that does not mean they are innocent (several courts of law have meticulously established the guilt of past and active SA politicians). It was as such pertinent to understand this situation from the purview of the study's respondents, a few questions were asked to elicit response on their position on the state of public service – an institution they are part of, that forms part of their diurnal reality.

All respondents did affirm that there is indeed a lot of efforts to promote or improve the capacity of public servants, particularly to provide them with skills on accountability and transparency. The course of the interview was shaped a lot by conversation about the spread of malfeasance. Something that all respondents have a gloomy outlook towards. One of the respondents for instance suggested that "the recent state capture report is nothing new, we have monitored and evaluated a lot of programmes and have recommended some to end, but nobody listens, it is like they set these departments up, just to keep some of us quiet" (R10, M&E).
Similarly, all three respondents who work in supply chain, underscore the fact that despite not being a financial institution they have found their lives at threat because of the reality of state capture. As one respondent suggests that government has not control, "can you imagine that in SCM now, we have a burglary and a biometric fingerprint reader. Only the CFO and the people that work in that unit are allowed access. Some of our colleagues in some other departments have been held at gun point and told to sign and approve tenders" (R6, SCM). This reality echoes the argument tendered in David Barret's (2021) work that in captured economies, how the boundaries between government and business are often blurred. Some would say the boundary between public and personal interest, and this most times happen deliberately. Because public office holders, political leaders, and people in power, parlay their control over parliament to influence laws and policies, promote cronyism through cadre deployment which gives them the power to appoint loyal comrades to SOEs and "government agencies to grant access to state assets or award contracts to favoured business allies. In return, these favoured businesspeople—which may include organized crime groups—provide support of various kinds to the government or the governing party. This ranges from favourable media coverage to campaign finance donations but could also include the use of violence to silence or intimidate political opposition, or the buying of votes from the electorate" (:8).
The respondents view of malfeasance is that it is widespread, and it permeates every aspect of government in the sense that, for Respondents R1, 3, 7 and 10 who are some of the longest serving public servants, this sentiment particularly rings true. According to one respondent, "we are so inundated with policies and frameworks, and I can guarantee you, somebody is

making a lot of money somewhere, because every time there is a new framework or policy document, it will mean meeting with different stakeholders, that will mean someone is getting a tender for catering or a tender for something so people can gather and familiarise themselves. I won't lie to you, a lot of those are not necessary" (R7, SCM). For respondent three, "the critical challenges include the natural challenge of proper departmental research, which is the lack of capacity to implement policies and measures. The department has no wherewithal of implementing researched evidential route to development, it must rely on the government which at times takes no note of research findings and policy implications."

For another respondent, the reality of the rot is that even activities that are geared towards preventing malfeasance, end up being another platform for money making for interests' groups. As it is reported that "there was a time, I remember, we were having challenges with councillors who could not read, and we had to get service providers to train them on how to read and write. To put in brief one service provider that was selected, came to the first day of training without any form of course note or outline. Just evidence of another comrade giving their family a tender." This again affirms findings from chapters 2 and 3 that malfeasance and ineptitude are mutually reinforcing, as Barret (2021) would suggest that some factors attest to the complexity of workings of a modern state capture network. These include the reality and or fact that:

- even in the exercise of its formal power, heavy reliance on outsourcing and public-private
- partnerships can mean that the state is not easy to distinguish from the private sector.
- there is not necessarily one 'captor;' and
- capture is not necessarily driven by actors outside the state.

Given that capture has become the operational term for malfeasance and corruption, one respondent's answer stands out, in that she is quite sure that,

> most politicians are thieves, there are those that have been caught and those that have not being caught. In the end, we the DGs and heads of department get thrown under the bus. Can I tell you how many of my colleagues have been pressured into signing things, only for them later to be the ones responsible. Does it not surprise you that despite the money we spent on digital consultants, we still haven't gone digital in a lot of critical aspects of our operations? (R10)

When probed to substantiate, with no intention to implicate herself, she refers me to a recent report that records the number of councillors[10] who could neither read nor write in any language, and in her opinion "even the comrades we make the policies for, can't read, or write. How do we expect them to implement?" (R10). To place this challenge in context, in **Chapter 7 of the Constitution on Local Government, Section 151(3)** the codified laws stipulate that "a municipality has the right to govern, on its own initiative, the local government affairs of its community, subject to national and provincial legislation as provided in the constitution". In this regard, to be effective in the public space, certain skills, abilities, and knowledge are required, in the sense that one must have certain basic capacities to be able to fill public office positions. As this study has established because of and the dearth of capacity can be traced to square pegs in round holes. In the sense that several lack the basic skills and knowledge needed for effective diurnal administration of the state's mechanisms. And this has effectually led to one poor decision after another, something that has left the country tethering on the brink of state failure.

A precis of the responses of the respondents on the challenges facing governance can thus articulated into the following points:

1. There are prominent levels of corruption, and the culmination of it was the state capture report. Because of the prevalence of corruption, public service workers ability and capacity to deliver services to citizens becomes severely hampered or eroded.
2. The exponential rise in poverty and the yawning gap of inequality can be blamed on the calibre of political leaders who have been held culpable for the inefficient services delivery since the rule of the ANC led government.
3. Political instability, factionalism has been identified as another clog in the wheel of development with one respondent describing South African Politics to be quite a dangerous ground to navigate, because "you never know which comrades toe you might be stepping on and sometimes you can get transferred from one department to other if they can't get rid of you, simply because you belong to this or that faction" (R7, SCM).
4. Service delivery: The government has faced challenges in delivering basic services such as housing, education, and healthcare to citizens, particularly in poor and rural areas.

[10] A provincial CoGTA skills audit carried out in 2022 found that 298 of KZN's 1 944 councillors do not have adequate writing and reading skills, and others have no formal education (Ndou, 2022).

5. Racial and ethnic divisions: South Africa has a diverse population with a history of racial and ethnic segregation, which has led to ongoing tensions and mistrust between diverse groups.

6. Political instability: There have been high turnover rates of political leaders and frequent changes of government policies, which has hindered long-term planning and decision making.

7. Political factions: The ANC party which has been in power since the end of apartheid has also been facing internal divisions, factions and power struggles which has led to political instability and poor governance.

8. Lack of capacity: Many government officials lack the skills and knowledge necessary to effectively govern, which has led to poor decision making and inefficiency.

5.3 Knowledge of concepts, theories, practices, and Capacity/Capability Challenges in public service and how to address it

Other questions poised to the respondents was to understand their knowledge of the concept or practice of paradiplomacy, an answer to which only four of the respondents have a clear knowledge of. Respondent ten for instance directed me to a recent MOU (singed in 2021) between the University of Kwazulu-Natal and the department. The partnership engagement is in recognition of UKZN as a technical partner. One that is emplaced to benefit significantly both the university and the province. The goal of the agreement is to establish a relationship between the department and the UKZN to:

- Coordinate activities that will enable dual benefit in information sharing and expertise.
- Monitor and evaluate the process of conducting research and generating knowledge.
- Optimise capacity building and improve efficacy in knowledge management and delivery of training.
- Reach an amicable and mutual achievement of the common goal of information generation and management.
- Agree on and stipulate areas within which information sharing, research and evaluation will be undertaken and improved in the future.
- Define the context and systems through which information will be shared and research results will be circulated.

Broadly, the MOU is geared towards improving the services that Cogta delivers to local government by conducting research, identifying, and establishing best practices and ensuring

collaboration on key matters and challenges facing local governance. It is a three-year agreement which commenced 1 August 2021 and valid to 31 March 2024. It provides a canopy under which both UKZN and CoGTA will share information, contribute to provide research and policy expertise on some critical areas, like the area building resilience in the face of the climate catastrophe, innovation and sustainable natural resource use, promotion of eco-agrotourism, improving food security, water security, and the water-energy-food-nexus.

> land access, rights, reform, and redistribution; water access, rights, reform, and redistribution; localisation of Sustainable Development Goals; support of spatial planning processes; vulnerability assessments, especially drought; disaster early warning systems; evaluation; local governance; and any other areas of mutual interest. The MOU also allows the UKZN to improve the learning experience of UKZN staff and students through opportunities to work on real-world projects; and opportunities to share expertise, enhance learning opportunities, and assist students to prepare for the transition from university to the work environment. Furthermore, the MOU creates a platform for both parties to learn from each other and build capacity by sharing processes and methods; collaborating on publications and conferences; undertaking research and pursuing further studies; and upskilling department staff through skills transfer (CoGTa, 2021).

The belief is that such and MOU is a watershed moment in the department's efforts to provide prop for the goals of Local Economic Development and the service delivery mandate of municipalities. "Through this partnership, we are sharpening our ability to provide specialised support to our municipalities through improved capacity which will assist to find practical solutions in the quest to grow the economy of our municipalities." That is why respondent ten believes that,

> the relationship between my department and municipalities in the past has been s based on mutual provision of opportunity for learning on development-related issues. It first started with identification of the comparative advantages of each partner. While my organization is established in development research including social development, electoral impact of social welfare, most western municipalities are renowned for their practical service provisioning that supports development in the city. In the light of strong nature of social welfare in most western welfare sates a study or staff exchange

> between the partners was an innovative way of encouraging learning for development best practices.

Indeed, some respondents not only know of the term and practice of paradiplomacy, but they also share the view that it is critical for capacity building as Respondent 7 retorts that,

> International partnership can aid in promoting good government practices. However, one must [sic] guard against copy and paste as well as imposition of policies in the name of funding and partnership. This requires critical engagement with the intentions of each partner. This is a unique feature of my department. It can help promote good governance practices. However, both partners must have a common definition of what constitutes good governance practices. Without this consensus it quite had not to characterize such engagement as parasitic instead of a symbiotic partnership of equal respect and dignity. Also, each partner must identify its comparative advantages and understand that of the partners, within this context, partnerships are bound to promote good governance practices that put people first before profit. The learning opportunity, the support system, and avenue to assess theories through practice are immeasurable gains from the partnership. This partnership saves cost, fastens implementation of research projects because partners benefit from and building on each other's existing knowledge and achievements.

The above echoes the fact that the department understands that some of its key objectives include, the formulation of strategic partnerships between the public and private sectors to create job opportunities, stimulate economic growth, improve evidence-based service delivery, skills transfer, knowledge sharing and capacity development in local governance.

Paradiplomacy as a tactic for development held a lot of importance for subnational units in South Africa, post-apartheid, and over years, the practice has required constitutional and policy legitimacy. Which have been addressed by the constitutional mandate of decentralisation and other white papers aimed at legitimising engagement in foreign policy by provincial governments. So far, this engagement has primary dovetailed the country's foreign policy stance and trajectory. This notwithstanding, we found some ambiguity and lack of robust engagement as a factor in the practice of paradiplomacy. Something that Magam (2018) similar encountered when she notes that There is a peculiar challenge with regards to the ambiguity of the constitutional ambits on how provincial governments in South Africa are allowed to engage in paradiplomacy. Despite this however, "the study was able to firmly show that *de jure*, the

South African Constitution of 1996 clearly stipulates that an engagement in international relations is a prerogative of the central government[11]. In the same vein however, there are sections of the South African 1996 constitution that are indicative of a lot of areas where the national and the provincial governments share competencies concurrently".

The view is thus that such ambiguities can forestall LED and progress in a myriad of ways, and as such, there should be clear guidelines for paradiplomacy in South Africa. In so doing, provincial governments are given a chance to pursue their development using a strategy that is in tandem with the country's overall goal and trajectory. So far, there has been no effort to streamline the paradiplomatic activities of provincial governments in South Africa.

Accordingly, the practice of paradiplomacy in South Africa and it impacts needs to be assessed its effectiveness in aiding the implementation of the National Developmental Plan. So far, it has been firmly argued that the aspirations of provincial governments and the national government often overlapped, bringing about several success stories. Both spheres of government are interested in promoting cross-border trade, attracting foreign direct investment and capacity, building connection cross-and trans-border through transportation infrastructure, making each city a gateway by easing visa requirements for the residents of countries with shared diplomatic ties, lending support to technological, agricultural, environmental projects, tourism, encouraging youth cooperation, through cultural and academic exchanges.

5.4 Conclusion

The aim of the chapter was to present and engage with data gathered from the semi structured interviews and themes and topics that emerged from data concur with findings in literature and theories reviewed. Paradiplomacy as a theory and practice of subnational governments' engagement in diplomacy, describes the how and the different policy and legal framework that guides such initiatives/engagements. This view in this study is that in South Africa, paradiplomacy can be instrumental in improving the quality of bureaucracy in the country and concomitantly improve the quality of government. The supposition is that my allowing – through robust policies and clear rules of engagement, provincial/substate entities can become initiative-taking in pursuing international cooperations which could bring about more

[11] Chapter 14 of the South African Constitution (231) "*The negotiating and signing of all international agreements is the responsibility of the national executive*".

development and an improvement in the capacity needed for efficient service delivery and improved citizen wellbeing.

All study respondents in this chapter understand the extend and the impacts of malfeasance, the culpability however seems to point to political leaders, those elected to help improve the welfare of the populace, who in turn either through a lack of competence or through active act of malfeasance engage in nefarious relationships, with terrible impacts and outcomes for the economy. This study thus also holds that in the context of South Africa, paradiplomacy's role in improving the quality of governance will happen when provincial and leaders at subnational level are able to comprehend the remits and extends of their rights as bequeathed by the 1996 Constitution. More with the right capacity, the supposition is that local economic development can be steered in the right direction, as we see, through paradiplomacy, there is an array of actors that open for subnational governments to engage with. By leveraging the impact of such relationships, substate entities can as thus, fulfil their constitutional mandate. More the impetus of paradiplomacy according to some scholars can be found in the inability of central governments to be able to efficiently govern all pockets and corners of a country. In this regard, paradiplomacy while it does not shift responsibility away from the central government, nonetheless allows substate entities to not rely solely on central governments but seek meaningful engagements that accentuates their unique cultural and geographical identities. In so doing, they can have a more localised and nuanced engagements with SNGs, and other MMNCs across the globe.

Chapter Six: Conclusions and recommendations

6.1 A precis of Chapters one to five

In chapter three, the state-building theory is a framework for understanding the process of state formation and the development of strong and effective states. It is based on the idea that states are the primary actors in international relations, and that the strength and effectiveness of a state is determined by its ability to maintain a monopoly on the legitimate use of force within its territory, provide public goods and services to its citizens, and extract resources from its citizens through taxation.

There are several major assumptions that underlie the state-building theory:

1. The state is the primary unit of analysis: The state-building theory focuses on the role of the state in shaping the political, economic, and social developments within a given territory. It assumes that the state is the primary actor in international relations and that its strength and effectiveness are important determinants of its ability to shape the domestic and international environment.

2. The state has a monopoly on the legitimate use of force: The state-building theory assumes that the state has a monopoly on the legitimate use of force within its territory. This means that the state has the exclusive right to use violence or coercion to maintain order and enforce laws.

3. The state provides public goods and services: The state-building theory assumes that the state has a responsibility to provide public goods and services to its citizens, such as education, healthcare, and infrastructure. The provision of these goods and services is seen as an important way for the state to build legitimacy and strengthen its power.

4. The state extracts resources from its citizens: The state-building theory assumes that the state extracts resources from its citizens through taxation and other means to fund its operations and provide public goods and services. The ability of the state to effectively extract resources is seen as a key indicator of its strength and effectiveness.

Overall, the state-building theory provides a framework for understanding the role of the state in shaping the domestic and international environment and the factors that determine the strength and effectiveness of a state. In chapter 3 also, the study discussed the theory of aradiplomacy as one that refers to the actions and initiatives taken by sub-national entities, such as provinces or municipalities, to engage in international relations and diplomacy. In the case

of South Africa, paradiplomacy could potentially help improve governance by allowing provinces and municipalities to take a more active role in international relations and cooperation, which could lead to the development of new economic and trade opportunities, as well as the sharing of best practices and ideas for governance.

In chapter four, the study engaged on a thorough and exhaustive analysis of the factors that guided the choice of the research approach and methodology. What was accentuated here is the fact that an approach such as qualitative content analysis adopted by the study allows for the analysis of qualitive data such as texts, images, and videos to identify patterns and themes. There is an array of advantages in utilising content analysis in a qualitative and they include inter alia:

1. It enables a study to analyse copious amounts of data, from transcripts of interviews to text from social media posts, which would be time-consuming and difficult to analyse manually.

2. It is apt for identifying patterns and themes in the data collected and this in turn assists a researcher to understand and elucidate on the meaning and significance of the data.

3. It is useful for testing hypotheses about the data, like if certain themes or patterns are present or absent in a corpus of collected data.

4. It is useful for validating the findings from other methods, such as interviews or surveys, by providing additional evidence to support or refute the findings.

5. It can be used to triangulate data from multiple sources, such as interviews and surveys, to provide a more comprehensive understanding of the research question.

In chapter 5 Paradiplomacy is further reaffirmed to be the actions and initiatives taken by subnational entities, such as provincial governments, regions or municipalities who engage in international relations and diplomacy. From the perspective of respondents and in triangulating literature, theory, and data, in the context of South Africa, paradiplomacy can is said to have the ability to aid in enhancing the quality of governance and aid in leading to local economic development. As the practice allows provincial or subnational entities to be proactive and play a more vibrant role in shaping foreign and domestic development policies and international relations, rather than relying solely on the national government to do so on their behalf. It was established that the outcome of such would be a more localized and nuanced engagement with other substate entities, municipalities and or regions, with the specific aim of improving the

wellbeing of their citizens. More, such an approach is bound to help promote the specific interests and strengths of individual provinces or regions. Additionally, by involving subnational entities in international relations, paradiplomacy can help to promote greater cooperation and coordination between various levels of government within South Africa, which can in turn lead to more effective and efficient governance. However, it is important to note that paradiplomacy is not a panacea and it is important to consider the potential challenges and limitations that may arise.

6.2 Recommendations

The intellectual premise for this study is that given that international relations and cross-border activity are no longer the sole field or domain of nation-states and national governments, there is a need to leverage such for good governance practice. This is since an array of actors from subnational governments to multinational companies to NGOs and epistemic communities have become critical players in civil society and in governing aspects of society and they possess capacities to plan and implement their own initiatives.

To attract foreign investors and provide local reform projects with national and international support, provincial government need to ensure that their regions are viewed as investment friendly, well governed, proper, and well ran public service sector and the availability of critical infrastructures and amenities. This is critical to overturn the image of South Africa, as a failing state. Through paradiplomacy, SNGs and actors at the local level can be seen as agents of creativity and innovation, particularly in response to their diurnal challenges, of which governance is one.

Accordingly, there are several ways to improve governance capacity in local governments in South Africa, through paradiplomacy, they include:

1. Training and capacity building for elected officials and civil servants to improve their technical, financial, and management skills.
2. Improving transparency and accountability mechanisms to ensure that local governments are accountable to their communities.
3. Strengthening the role of community-based organizations and civil society groups in local governance to ensure that the needs and priorities of marginalized groups are considered.
4. Enhancing the role of local government associations and networks to share best practices and promote cooperation and coordination among local governments.

5. Investing in information and communication technologies to improve communication and information sharing among local governments, and between local governments and their communities.

6. Reviewing and revising laws, regulations, and policies that affect local governance to ensure that they are aligned with best practices and international standards.

7. Enhancing the role of the media in promoting transparency and accountability in local governance.

8. Encouraging public-private partnerships to support service delivery and economic development at the local level.

6.3 Recommendations for further studies

It has been found that a clear shift is apparent in what motivates subnational units to engage in paradiplomacy. In South Africa, provincial government's engagement is solely for development. More because of decentralization provinces gained an impetus for paradiplomacy. Through decentralisation, the aim was to devolved power between the different spheres of government. The point being that decentralization is an integral aspect of the South African 1996 constitution. Some scholars like Van Zyl (2003) affirm that underlying decentralization in South Africa is a constitutional stipulation that all spheres of government should share power in a concurrent, equal, and interrelated manner. In other words, "in the Republic, government is constituted as national, provincial and local spheres of government which are distinctive, interdependent and interrelate." The conduct of paradiplomacy in South Africa has been critical to developing the country post-apartheid. Because of decentralisation and several white paper, engagement in international relations by substate entities in South Africa happens in an ordered fashion. Given that the activities are driven by pragmatic concerns and as such, can be leveraged to improve or address governance challenges. The goal is to emplace paradiplomacy as a common tool that can be used by both provincial governments and a practice to be encouraged by the national government. This is in lieu of the fact that over the years, provinces as actors in the international arena have managed to amass an arsenal "of specific methods of paradiplomacy for signing partnership agreement and MOUs. Such stratagem has become critical and the best guarantee of paradiplomacy's success. As such, further studies can be done to the following end:

1. Examining the effectiveness of paradiplomacy in promoting sustainable development and addressing global challenges such as climate change and poverty.

2. A comparative study of paradiplomacy practices in different regions or countries to identify best practices and successful models.
3. An analysis of the role of subnational governments in paradiplomacy, including their relationships with national governments and international organizations.
4. A case study of the role of paradiplomacy in resolving or managing cross-border disputes.
5. Study on the effectiveness of paradiplomacy in strengthening the participation of local communities in international relations and decision-making.
6. Study the impact of paradiplomacy in terms of economic development and trade.
7. Study the role of civil society organizations in paradiplomacy and their potential as actors in the international arena.
8. Study the role of paradiplomacy in promoting cultural exchange and understanding among nations.

6.4 Conclusion

Provincial governments in South Africa post-apartheid have been active – despite constitutional ambiguity – in the international arena. They have managed to exploit the grey constitutional area or rather capitalised on the mandate of decentralisation institutional to build a network. Albeit, a network that needs better coordination, clarity of mandate and mission, articulate guidelines to get rid of bottlenecks, bureaucratic procedures, parallelisms, and duplications. So far, given that South Africa as a unitary state does not suffer from the issue of self-agitation by provinces, paradiplomacy even more becomes a very positive and useful tool to be deployed in the fight against malfeasance, given each province, challenge is unique as much as it is a universal reality of the country. The study in triangulating that believes that paradiplomacy can be utulised to bring about further integration of the economic, financial, administrative, and cultural space for development and wellbeing in the country. The idea is that the growing international activity by subnational actors is bound to bring several positive changes. For instance, paradiplomacy is said to encourage the further democratisation – through capacity building for instance – South Africa. And the study utilised the State Building theory to establish and elucidate on this argument. Because of globalisation and geographic diffusion foreign governments, MNCs and NPOs, have made aid contributions that have been said to be critical for the democratic process in South Africa. As such, paradiplomacy, as a

form of devolution, has be critical in helping with encouraging a “bottom-up” approach model to governance with ensures lively and robust local participation in the processes of governance. More international cooperation has been extremely critical to several provinces in SA, especially remote rural parts that depend on a lot of NPOs for services like health care, education etc.

Given the assumptions of the state building theory has been affirmed during this study, the aim was to show that the theory retains its explanatory and analytic power and can be effectively used in paradiplomacy studies. Through paradiplomacy, provinces like KwaZulu-Natal have leverage their unique historical and cultural identity and have managed to utilize this positively for the development of the province (Magam, 2018, 20202, 2021). This finding supports the expectation in this study that the state building theory can be helpful in helping us explain and understand the challenges of governance. And as such, because of the promises and the assumptions of paradiplomacy, we are offered a means of problem solving with respect to South Africa’s diurnal governance challenge. Paradiplomacy has an important integrative and capacity development function. As this study’s analysis would affirm that not only does paradiplomacy offer opportunities for developing South Africa’s democracy, but also that paradiplomacy already has an infrastructure and positive results. This phenomenon as the study holds will undoubtedly be critical in South Africa’s future. Paradiplomacy has an array of benefits and one critical one is that fact that it can serve as a catalyst for successful capacity development, domestic reforms and emplacing good governance practice in the local sphere.

References

Allan, G. (2003). "A critique of using grounded theory research method." *The Electronic Journal of Business Research Methods*, 2(1): 1–10.

Alexander, H. A. (2006). "A view from somewhere: Explaining the paradigms of educational research." *Journal of Philosophy of Education*, 40(2): 205–221.

Amorim, A. and Martinot-Lagarde, P. (2013). "City-to-City and South-South and Triangular Cooperation." *Report prepared for the International Labour Organisation (ILO), Geneva*.

Bassey, M. (2001). "A solution to the problem of generalization in education research: Empirical findings and fuzzy predictions." *Oxford Review of Education,* 27(1): 5–22.

Bennett, C. (1992). "The lessons of learning: reconciling theories of policy learning and policy change." *Policy Sciences,* 25:275-294.

Bhagwati, J. (2004). *In Defense of Globalization*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Bojicic-Dzelilovic, V., Kostovicova, D. and Rampton, D. (2014). "State-building, nation-building and reconstruction." In: Kaldor, M. and Rangelov, L, (eds.). *The Handbook of Global Security Policy*. Malden: Wiley-Blackwell.

Bolger, J. (2000). Capacity development: Why, what, and how. *CD Occasional Series*. Ottawa: Canadian International Development Agency.

Browne, S. (Ed.). (2002). *Developing Capacity through Technical Cooperation: Country Experiences*. London: Earthscan Publications.

Bryman, A. (2012). *Social Research Methods. (4th Ed.).* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Buxbaum, G. (2014). *Unpacking Johannesburg's international city-to-city partnerships.* Unpublished master's Dissertation. Johannesburg: University of Witwatersrand.

Caicedo, J.D. (2017). *The role of cities in the foreign emerging powers: The case of Bogota, Colombia and Johannesburg, South Africa.* Unpublished PhD Thesis. Cape Town: University of Cape Town.

Collier, A. (1994). *Critical realism: An introduction to Roy Bhaskar's philosophy*. London: Verso.

Cornago, N. (2010). “On the Normalisation of Sub-State Diplomacy.” *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy*, 5(1):11-36.

Cowan, G. (2008). “Moving from monologue to dialogue to collaboration: The three layers of public diplomacy.” *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 616(1):10-30.

Criekemans, D. (2010). *Regional Sub-State Diplomacy Today.* Leiden: Brill.

Curtis, S. (2014). *The power of cities in international relations*. New York: Routledge.

Dahl, R. (1957). *The concept of power. Department of Political Sciences*. Yale University.

De Bruyn, G. (2021). The Tshwane Metropolitan Council: Multiparty and multiple coalitions, and imperilled governance. In: MISTRA (2021). Booysen, S (Ed.), *Marriages of Inconvenience: The politics of coalitions in South Africa.* Johannesburg. Mapungubwe Institute for Strategic Reflection.

De Villiers, J.C. (2005). *Strategic alliances between communities, with special reference to the twinning of South African provinces, cities, and towns with international partners.* Unpublished DPhil Thesis. Stellenbosch: Stellenbosch University.

De Villiers, J. C. (2009). “Success factors and the city-to-city partnership management process from strategy to alliance capability. *Habitat International*, 33(2):149-156.

Denzin, N. K. and Lincoln, Y.S (2005). *Introduction. In The Sage handbook of qualitative research*, Third Edition, eds. N. K. Denzin and Y. S. Lincoln, 1–32. London: Sage

Diab, W. (2010). *The role of Public Relations in the diplomatic sector: an empirical study on the offices of Arab and foreign embassies in Egypt*. PhD dissertation. The University of Qena.

Dorasamy, C. (2021). “With only 27 out of 257 South African municipalities getting a clean audit outcome, service delivery remains a pipe dream”. Available from <https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2021-08-29-with-only-27-out-of-257-south-african-municipalities-getting-a-clean-audit-outcome-service-delivery-remains-a-pipe-dream/>

Duchacek, I.D. 1986. *The territorial dimension of politics: Within, among and across nations.* Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press.

Duchacek, I. D. (1990). Perforated Sovereignties: Towards a Typology of New Actors in International Relations. In Michelmann, H. J. & Soldatos, P. (eds.), *Federalism and International Relations: The Role of Subnational Units*. Oxford: Clarendon Press: 1-33.

Dutta-Bergman, M.J. (2006). "US public diplomacy efforts in the Middle East: A critical cultural approach." *Journal of Communication Inquiry*, 30:102-124.

Erasmus, D. (2021). "July Riots: The media played a role in putting the 'fear of God in everybody' while police were outnumbered, Phoenix resident tells inquiry." Online Available from https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-11-16-media-played-role-in-putting-the-fear-of-god-into-everybody-while-police-were-outnumbered-phoenix-resident-tells-inquiry/. [Accessed 20 September 2022]

Esquith, S.L. (1997), "John Rawls and the recent history of public administration", *Journal of Management History (Archive)*, Vol. 3 No. 4, pp. 328-341.

Fan, S. X., Huang, X., Walker, M. & Bartram, T. 2019. Australia-China Sister Cities: Seizing Opportunities Together. *Australia-China Council Grant Report*. Sponsored by Australia China Council Grant (2018-2019), https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Shea_Fan2/publication/336716646_Australia-China_Sister_Cities_Seizing_Opportunities_Together/links/5daeaaef92851c577eb98168/Australia-China-Sister-Cities-Seizing-Opportunities-Together.pdf [Accessed 17 May 2020].

Farrington, C. (2011). "Putting good governance into practice III: measuring intrinsic and instrumental empowerment in local government context." *Progress in Development Studies*, 11(2):151–161.

Feng, Y. (2003). *Democracy, Governance, and Economic Performance: Theory and Evidence*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Fishbone, A. (2015). Municipal Foreign Affairs: A Study of the Offices of International Affairs in Europe and the USA, 2014-2015 Robert Bosch Foundation Fellow, https://www.boschalumni.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Fishbone-1.pdf [Accessed 21 August 2020].

Fitzpatrick, K. R. (2011). *US public diplomacy in a post 9/11 world: From messaging to mutuality*. Los Angeles: Figueroa Press.

Fitzpatrick, K. R., Fullerton, J. and Kendrick, A. (2013). "Public Relations and Public Diplomacy: Conceptual and Practical Connections." *Public Relations Journal*, 7(4):1-21.

Fukuyama, F. (2013). "Reflections on Chinese Governance." *Journal of Chinese Governance, 1(3):379-391*

Fukuyama, F. (2016). "Governance: What do We Know, and how do we know it? *Annual Review of Political Science*, 19: 89-105.

Geldenhuys, D. (1998). "The Foreign Relations of South Africa's Provinces." *SAIIA Reports,* Number 12: 1-60.

Girgis, M. (2007). "The Capacity-building paradox: Using friendship to build capacity in the south." *Development in Practice, 17*(3):353–66.

Grbich, C. (2012). *Qualitative Data Analysis: An Introduction*. London: Sage Publications.

Grindle, M. S. (2007). "Good Enough Governance Revisited." *Development Policy Review,* 25(5), 533–574.

Grunig, J. E. (2006). "Furnishing the edifice: Ongoing research on public relations as a strategic management function." *Journal of Public Relations Research*, 18(2):151-176.

Grunig, J. E. (2009). "Paradigms of global public relations in an age of digitalisation." *Prism*, 6(2):11.

Grunig, J. E. and Grunig, L. A. (2001). Two-way symmetrical public relations: past, present, and future. In Heath, R. L. (ed.), *Handbook of public relations*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage: 11-30.

Grydehøj, A., (2014). "Goals, Capabilities, and Instruments of Paradiplomacy by Subnational Jurisdictions." In Grydehøj, A. *et al*. (eds.), *Local Actions in a Global Context: Paradiplomacy by Subnational Jurisdictions* (pp. 10-20).

Haas, E.B. 1(968). *The uniting of Europe: political, social, and economic forces 1950-1957.* Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Hancke, R. (2009). *Intelligent Research Design: A Guide for Beginning Researchers in Social Science.* Oxford: University Press.

Harter, L. M. and Krone, K. J. (2001). "The Boundary-Spanning Role of a Cooperative Support Organization: Managing the Paradox of Stability and Change in Non-Traditional Organisations." *Journal of Applied Communication Research*, 29(3):248-277.

Hayden, S. (2019). Asylum for sale: Refugees say some U.N. workers demand bribes for resettlement. NBC News. https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/asylum-sale-refugees-say-some-u-n-workers- demand-bribes-n988351.

Haysom, N. (2001). 'Federal Features of South Africa's Constitution,' in Penelope, A and Ellmann, S. (eds.) *The Post -Apartheid Constitution: Perspectives on South Africa's Basic Law.* Johannesburg. Witwatersrand University Press. Pp. 504-524.

Healy, M. and Perry, C. (2000). "Comprehensive criteria to judge validity and reliability of qualitative research within the realism paradigm." *Qualitative Market Research: An International Journal*, 3(3): 118–126.

Henning, E. (2004). *Finding your way in qualitative research*. Pretoria: Van Schaik.

Hocking, B. (1993). *Localizing Foreign Policy: Non-Central Governments and Multilayered Diplomacy*. London: Macmillan.

Hope, K.R. (2015). "Capacity Development for Good Governance in Developing Countries: Some Lessons from the Field. *International Journal of Public Administration,* 32(8): 708-740.

Jacobsen, D. M. (2002). Building different bridges two: a case study of transformative professional development for student learning with technology. Paper presented at the 83rd Annual Meeting of the American Educational Research Association, New Orleans, Louisiana, 1-5 April, www.ucalgary.ca/~dmjacobs/aera/building_bridges_two.html [Accessed 13 March 2020].

Johnson, R. B. and Onwuegbuzie, J. A. (2004). "Mixed methods research: A research paradigm whose time has come. Educational Researcher 33(7): 14–26.

Johnson, R. B., Onwuegbuzie, J. A. and Turner, L.A (2007). "Toward a definition of mixed methods research. *Journal of Mixed Methods Research,* 1(2): 112–133.

Jönsson, C. and Hall, M. (2003). Communication: An Essential Aspect of Diplomacy. *International Studies Perspectives*, 4(2):195-210.

Josselin, D. and Wallace, W. (2001). *Non-state actors in world politics*. London: Palgrave.

Khidasheli, T. (1999). Federalism and Consociationalism: Prospects for Georgian State Reform. Assessed from http://poli.vub.ac.be/publi/orderbooks/federal/09khidasheli.pdf on 26 December 2020.

Kamande, S.W. (2017). *The rising challenges in the implementation of foreign policy: A case of sub-state diplomacy in Kenya.* Unpublished MA Dissertation. University of Nairobi.

Keohane, R.O. (1984). *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Keonane, M. L. and Mangena, F. (2017). "Ethics, Accountability and Democracy as Pillars of Good Governance: A Case Study of South Africa." *African Journal of Public Affairs,* 9(5): 61-73.

Kincaid, J. (1990). *"Constituent Diplomacy in Federal Polities and the Nation-State: Conflict and Co-Operation."* In: H.J Michaelmann and P. Soldatos (Eds.), Federalism and International Relations, pp. 54-76. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Kingsley, A. (2009). *Multilateral Diplomacy as an Instrument of global governance: The case of International Human Rights Bill of Human Rights.* Master's Dissertation. Pretoria: University of Pretoria.

Kirby, N. F. and Dempster, E. (2012). "The (re)construction of a philosophical and pedagogical position for the Foundation Programme at UKZN with particular reference to the biology module." *South African Journal of Higher Education,* 25(6): 1103–1124.

Kirby, N. F. (2013). "Getting to Grips with Postpositivism: The reality of a research Novice." *South African Journal of Higher Education,* 27(1): 93–110.

Krauss, S. E. (2005). "Research paradigms and meaning making: A primer." *The Qualitative Report*, 10(4): 758–770.

Kruckeberg, D. and Vujnovic, M. (2005). Public relations, not propaganda, for US public diplomacy in a post-9/11 world: Challenges and opportunities. *Journal of Communication Management*, 9(4):296-304.

Kuznetsov, A., 2015, *Theory and Practice of Paradiplomacy: Subnational Governments in International Affairs.* New York: Routledge.

Labuschagne, A., (2003). Qualitative research: Airy fairy or fundamental? *The Qualitative Report*, 8(1), Article 7. http://www.nova.edu/ssss/QR/QR8-1/labuschagne.html [Accessed 20 June 2020].

Lecours, A. (2002). 'Paradiplomacy: Reflections on the Foreign Policy and International Relations of Regions.' *International Negotiation.* Vol. 7, No. 1, 2002, 91-114.

Lecours, A. (2008). 'Political Issues of Paradiplomacy: Lesson from the Developed World.' D*iscussion Papers in Diplomacy,* No. 98. The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael.'

Lekaba, F.G. (2013). *An assessment of divisions among African states towards UN Security Council reform*. Unpublished Master's Dissertation. Mafikeng: Northwest University.

Letourneau, N. and Allen, N. (1999). "Postpositivistic critical multiplism: A beginning dialogue." *Journal of Advanced Nursing* 30(3): 623–630.

Magam, N. (2018). *Paradiplomacy in South Africa: The role of interest and identity in the international relations of KwaZulu-Natal.* Unpublished DPhil Thesis. Pietermaritzburg: University of KwaZulu-Natal.

_____ (2021). "Paradiplomacy in KwaZulu-Natal: Understanding Interests, Processes and Impacts." *Journal of African Foreign Affairs,* 8 (3):139-162.

Makgale, B. (2020). Power, politics, and ideology: Understanding councillors views on the tug of war in the City of Johannesburg. In: MISTRA. 2021. Booysen, S (Ed.), *Marriages of Inconvenience: The politics of coalitions in South Africa.* Johannesburg: Mapungubwe Institute for Strategic Reflection.

Maphaka, D. (2020). '*An Afrocentric critique of sub-state actor in South Africa's foreign policy: Case of Limpopo province.'* Africa's Public Service Delivery and Performance Review. 8 (1).

Matshili, V.E. (2013). *Sub-national Governments and foreign policy: The case of the Limpopo province in South Africa.* Unpublished MA Dissertation. Pretoria: University of South Africa.

Matveev, A.V. (2002). *The advantages of employing quantitative and qualitative methods in intercultural research: practical implications from the study of the perceptions of intercultural communication competence by American and Russian managers.* New York: USA. Available

at: http://www.russcomm.ru/eng/rca_biblio/m/matveev01_eng.shtml. Accessed on: 2022/03/27.

McGlinchey, S. (2022). *Foundations of International relations.* London: Bloomsbury.

Mearsheimer, J. (2001). *The tragedy of great power politics*. WW Norton and Company.

Melissen, J. (2005) . *The New Public Diplomacy: Soft power in international relations*. Palgrave. Macmillan.

Ministry for Provincial and Local Government. (1999). *Municipal International Relations: A Policy Framework for South Africa.*

Molepo, J.N. (2019). *International relations and local governance in South Africa. The case of the City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality.* Unpublished DTech Thesis: Pretoria. Tshwane University of Technology.

Morgenthau, H. (1949). *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Mouton, J. (1996). *Understanding social science research.* Pretoria: Van Schaik.

Naidoo, C. and Ramphal, R. R. (2018). "The Factors That Affect Public Participation for Effective Municipal Service Delivery: A Case of Ward Committees." *South African Journal of Industrial Engineering,* 29(4):82-93.

Ndou, C (2022). "KZN councillors want to be taught how to read and write." Online available from https://www.citizen.co.za/witness/news/kzn-councillors-want-to-be-taught-how-to-read-and-write/>.

Neuendorf, K.A. (2002). *The Content Analysis Guidebook*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

Neuman, W.L. (1997). *Social Research Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches.* Boston: Allyn and Bacon.

Nganje, F. (2013). Paradiplomacy: A comparative analysis of international relations of South Africa's Gauteng, Northwest, and Western Cape provinces. A thesis submitted in fulfilment of DLitt et Phil (Politics), Faculty of Humanities, University of Johannesburg.

Nganje, F. (2014). Paradiplomacy and the democratisation of foreign policy in South Africa. *South African Journal of International Affairs*, 21 (1), 89-107.

Nganje, F. (2016a). Historical Institutionalism and the Development of Sub-State Diplomacy in South Africa. *Journal for Contemporary History*, 41(1), 149-168.

Nganje, F. (2016b). Sub-state diplomacy and the foreign policy-development nexus in South Africa. *South African Journal of International Affairs*, 23(1) 1-20.

Nganje, F & Letshele, L. (2020). Challenges and opportunities for non-traditional diplomacy. In SAIIA (2020). Bradlow, D & Sidiropoulos, E (eds), *Values, Interests and Power: South African foreign policy in uncertain times.* Pretoria: Pretoria University Law Press (PULP).

Niemann, A. (2016). Theorizing Internal Security Cooperation in the European Union: A Neofunctionalist Perspective. In: Rhinard, M & Bossong, R (eds.), *Theorizing Internal Security in the European Union.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Niemann, A, Lefkofridi, Z & Schmitter, P. (2019). "Neofunctionalism." In: Wiener, A; Borzel, T & Risse, T (eds.): *European Integration Theory*. 3rd Edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.43-63.

Niewenhuis, J. (2007). *Introducing qualitative research*. In First Steps in Research, ed. K. Maree, 47–68. Pretoria: Van Schaik.

Nyaluke, D. (2014). "The African Basis of Democracy and Politics for the Common Good: A Critique of the Neopatrimonial Perspective." *Taiwan Journal of Democracy,* 10(2):141-164.

Nye, J., (2008). "Public Diplomacy and Soft Power." *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,* 616 (1):94-109.

Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (2006). *The Challenge of Capacity Development: Working Towards Good Practice*. Paris: OECD.

Patton, M.Q. (2002). *Qualitative Research and Evaluation Methods.* Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Pertti, J. and Sergunin, A. (2014). "Paradiplomacy as a Capacity-Building Strategy." *Problems of Post-Communism*, 61 (6):18-33.

Phillips, D. C. and Burbules, N. C (2000). *Postpositivism and educational research*. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.

Pillay, S. and Kluvers, R. (2014). "An Institutional Theory Perspective on Corruption: The Case of a Developing Democracy." *Financial Accountability and Management,* 30(1): 95-119.

Pillay, S. (2021). "Reducing corruption and bribery in Africa as a target of the sustainable development goals: applying indicators for assessing performance." *Corruption in Procurement- Antecedents, Practices, and Challenges* https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-63857-3_3

Republic of South Africa (1998). *White Paper on Local Government* (WPLG) of 1998. Pretoria: Government Printer.

Republic of South Africa (1999). *Municipal International Relations Policy Framework* (MIRPF) of 1999. Pretoria: Government Printer.

Requejo, F. 2010. Foreign policy of constituent units in a globalised world. In: Ferran Requejo (ed.), *Foreign policy of constituent units at the beginning of the 21st century.* Barcelona, Spain: Institut d'Estudis Autonomics.

Ronfeldt, D. and Arquilla, J. (2009). Noopolitik: A new paradigm for public diplomacy. In Snow, N. & Taylor, P. (eds.), *Public Diplomacy*. London: Routledge: 252-366.

Rose-Ackerman, S. (1999). *Corruption and Government, Causes, Consequences and Reforms.* Cambridge: University Press.

Rose-Ackerman, S. (2016). What Does "Governance" Mean? *Governance*, 30(1), 23–27.

Rosenau, J.N. (1988). 'Patterned Chaos in Global Life: Structure and Process in the Two Worlds of World Politics,' *International Political Science Review,* Vol. 9, No. 4, October 1988, 327-364.

Rotberg, R. (2014). "Good Governance means Performance and Results." *Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions,* 27(3): 511-518.

Rothstein, B. (2019). "Epistemic Democracy and the Quality of Government*." European Politics and Society,* 20(1):16-31.

Ryan, A. B. (2006). *Post-positivist approaches to research. In Researching and writing your thesis: A guide for postgraduate students*, eds. M. Antonesa, H. Fallon, A. B. Ryan, A. Ryan, and T. Walsh, 12–26. Maynooth: Maynooth Adult and Community Education. Available at: http://adulteducation.nuim.ie/documents/Thesis.pdf (accessed 30 June 2022).

Ryan, G. (2018). "Introduction to positivism, interpretivism and critical theory." *Nurse Researcher*, 25(4): 41–49.

Saldanha, C. (2006). Rethinking capacity development. *International Public Management Review*, *7*(2): 15–42.

Saleh, S. (2017). The role of Public Relations and Public Diplomacy in building Libyan relationships with Italy in the Gaddafi and post-Gaddafi era. Doctoral thesis, Northumbria University, UK.

Schacter, M. (2000). Monitoring and evaluation capacity development in sub- Saharan Africa: Lessons from experience in supporting sound governance. *ECD Working Paper Series Number 7*. Washington, DC: The World Bank.

Shaw, M. (2008). *International Law*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Schwella, E. (2016). *Federalism in South Africa: A complex context and continued challenges.* Leiden Leadership Centre: Leiden University, The Netherlands.

Shoeberlein, J (2020). National strategies for advancing good governance in Africa. Available from<https://knowledgehub.transparency.org/assets/uploads/kproducts/TI-Helpdesk 2020_National-Governance-Strategies-Africa-final.pdf>.

Signitzer, B. H. and Coombs, T. (1992). "Public relations and public diplomacy: Conceptual convergences." *Public Relations Review*, 18(2):137-147.

Smith, B. C. (2007). *Good Governance and Development*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Snow, N. and Taylor, P. (2009). *Public Diplomacy*. London: Routledge.

Soldatos, P. (1990). An Explanatory Framework for the Study of Federated States as Foreign-Policy Actors. In Michelmann, H. J. & Soldatos, P., *Federalism, and International Relations: The Role of Subnational Units*. Oxford: Clarendon Press: 34-53.

Starman, A. B. (2013). "The case study as a type of qualitative research." *Journal of Contemporary Educational Studies*, 64 (1):28-43.

Tapscott, C. (2017). “South Africa in the Twenty-First Century: Governance Challenges in the Struggle for Social Equity and Economic Growth.” *Chinese Political Science Review*, 2:69–84.

Tavares, R. (2016). *Paradiplomacy: Cities and States as Global Players*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Van der Pluijm, R. and Melissen, J. (2007). *City Diplomacy: The expanding role of cities in international politics*. Netherlands Institute of International Relations, Clingendael.

Van Rooyen, E. J. (2008). “Municipal International Relations in South African Local Government.” *African Journal of Public Affairs*, 2(1):15-24.

Van Wyk, J. (1997). The external relations of selected South African subnational governments: A preliminary assessment. *South African Journal of International Relations,* 5(2): 21-59.

Waltz, K. N. (1979). *Theory of International Politics*. Chicago: Waveland Press.

Wang, L., Malhotra, D. and Murnighan, J. K. (2011). “Economics Education and Greed.” *Academy of Management Learning & Education*, 10 (4): 643-660.

Yeung, H. W. (1997). “Critical realism and realist research in human geography: A method or a philosophy in search of a method?” *Progress in Human Geography*, 21(1): 51–74.

Yin, R. K. (2009). *Case study research: Design and methods*. 4th ed. Thousand Oaks: Sage.

Yun, S. (2006). “Toward public relations theory-based study of public diplomacy: evaluating the applicability of the excellence study.” *Journal of Public Relations Research,* 18(4):287-312.

Yu, C. H. (2005). “Misconceived relationships between logical positivism and quantitative research.” *Paper presented at Annual Meeting of the 2001 American Educational Research, Seattle, Canada.* Available at: http://www.creative-wisdom.com/computer/ sas/positivism.pdf (accessed 30 June 2022).

Zaharna, R. (2009). Mapping out a spectrum of public diplomacy initiatives: Information and relational communication frameworks. In Snow, N. & Taylor, P. (eds.), *Public Diplomacy*. London: Routledge: 86-100.

Zondi, S. (2012). “The International Relations of South African Provinces and Municipalities: An Appraisal of a Federated Diplomacy,” *South African Foreign Policy Review*, 1:42-64

Appendix I: Informed Consent Form

Appendices

Informed Consent Document

Dear Participant,

My name is Osemoboh Regis Wilson I am PhD candidate studying at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg Campus. The title of my research is: Paradiplomacy as a capacity building strategy for good governance at the local level in South Africa The aim of the study is to examine and interrogate the utilization of Paradiplomacy as a strategic tool for good governance. I am interested in interviewing you so as to share your experiences and observations on the subject matter.

Please note that:

- The information that you provide will be used for scholarly research only.
- Your participation is entirely voluntary. You have a choice to participate, not to participate or stop participating in the research. You will not be penalized for taking such an action.
- Your views in this interview will be presented anonymously. Neither your name nor identity will be disclosed in any form in the study.
- The interview will take about (*how long?*).
- The record as well as other items associated with the interview will be held in a password-protected file accessible only to myself and my supervisors. After a period of 5 years, in line with the rules of the university, it will be disposed by shredding and burning.
- If you agree to participate please sign the declaration attached to this statement (a separate sheet will be provided for signatures)

I can be contacted at:
Email: regisowilson@gmail.com
Cell: 0739949039
My supervisor is Dr N. Magam who is located at the School of Social Sciences, Pietermaritzburg Campus of the University of KwaZulu-Natal.
Contact details: email Magamn@ukzn.ac.za
Phone number: .....
The Humanities and Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee contact details are as follows: Ms Phumelele Ximba, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Research Office, Email: ximbap@ukzn.ac.za,Phone number +[redacted]

Thank you for your contribution to this research.

1

Appendix II: Gatekeepers Letter

KWAZULU-NATAL PROVINCE
COOPERATIVE GOVERNANCE AND TRADITIONAL AFFAIRS
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

DIRECTORATE: OFFICE OF THE CFO
Private Bag X9078 PIETERMARITZBURG, 3200
Natalia Building, 330 Langalibalele Street, Pietermaritzburg, 3200
Tel: 033 395 2487 Fax: 033 00 3000

Ethics Committee (HSSREC)
University of KwaZulu-Natal
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

PERMISSION TO CONDUCT PHD RESEARCH IN THE PROVINCIAL DEPARTMENT (COGTA)

This is to confirm that Osemoboh Regis Wilson (213529250), a Doctorate candidate from the University Of KwaZulu-Natal College Of Humanities (Pietermaritzburg Campus), has permission to conduct a qualitative study as part of his doctoral studies titled "Paradiplomacy as a Capacity Building Strategy for Good Governance at a Provincial Level in South Africa".

The aim of the study is to explore the different capacity development present in the municipal department. The permission to conduct the study is given subject to informed consent and voluntary participation of identified participants from the municipal department.

Yours Faithfully

[redacted]

Siphokazi Ndlovu
Advisor to the CFO
Date: 09/10/2022
Tel: 082 078 5057
Email: siphokazi.ndlovu@kzncogta.gov.za

Appendix III: Interview Schedule

Appendix A: Interview Guide

Preamble:

I would like to ask you some questions about your professional background, your education, and some of your professional experiences. I hope to use this information to aid in developing a concrete analysis on the issue of governance, local development and paradiplomacy in South Africa. The questions are supposed to guide you through what is required of you, and it will take about 35 minutes to fill out.

Section 1: Introduction

1. What position do you hold in your department and how long have you been working in this position?

Section 2: Knowledge of concept and terms and practices

2. Are you familiar with the concept or practice of paradiplomacy?

3. Are you cognisant of any partnership(s) between your department and another municipality in a different country?

4. What is the nature of your relationship with and how do you engage with such international partners?

5. How would you describe the value of such partnerships to your department/workplace?

Section 3: Critical Engagement

6. What would you say are some of the capacity challenges you encounter in your department?

Appendix IV: Ethics Letter

UNIVERSITY OF KWAZULU-NATAL
INYUVESI YAKWAZULU-NATALI

12 October 2022

Osemoboh Regis Wilson (213529250)
School Of Social Sciences
Pietermaritzburg Campus

Dear OR Wilson,

Protocol reference number: HSSREC/00004755/2022
Project title: Paradiplomacy as a capacity building strategy for good governance at a provincial level in South Africa
Degree: PhD

Approval Notification – Expedited Application

This letter serves to notify you that your application received on 30 August 2022 in connection with the above, was reviewed by the Humanities and Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee (HSSREC) and the protocol has been granted **FULL APPROVAL**.

- **Please note that the use of video recording and photographs is not allowed.**

Any alteration/s to the approved research protocol i.e. Questionnaire/Interview Schedule, Informed Consent Form, Title of the Project, Location of the Study, Research Approach and Methods must be reviewed and approved through the amendment/modification prior to its implementation. In case you have further queries, please quote the above reference number. PLEASE NOTE: Research data should be securely stored in the discipline/department for a period of 5 years.

This approval is valid until 12 October 2023.
To ensure uninterrupted approval of this study beyond the approval expiry date, a progress report must be submitted to the Research Office on the appropriate form 2 - 3 months before the expiry date. A close-out report to be submitted when study is finished.

HSSREC is registered with the South African National Research Ethics Council (REC-040414-040).

Yours sincerely,

[redacted]

Professor Dipane Hlalele (Chair)

/dd