



**SCHOOL OF APPLIED HUMAN SCIENCES, COLLEGE OF
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**Mugabeism and factionalisation of journalism: interrogating the state of print media
journalism in Zimbabwe (2014-2017)**

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DEDICATION

For my late father Runesu Mavodza, this thesis is for you. Immortality is thy name! I vividly remember picking your weekly wage every Friday at some dusty cement factory in Matabeleland South. It was \$79 a week! The place was Colleen Bawn - A small mining area between Gwanda and West Nicholson. Clouded in dust from cement, which later claimed your lungs, you privately urged me to pursue studies as long as I lived. For my children Brendon, Clara and Quinton, I pray you follow my footsteps one day. Patience Chigariro, my lovely wife, thank you for everything. Your nights were terribly lonely as I ploughed into books! To my big brother Benedict and rest of my siblings – our bond is ‘rough diamond’ strong – let it be for generations to come.

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ACRONYMS

ZANU-PF - Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front

ZAPU - Zimbabwe African People's Union

FROLIZI -Front for Liberation of Zimbabwe

MDC- Movement for Democratic Change

ZMNG- Zimbabwe Mirror Newspaper Group

ZIMPAPERS - Zimbabwe Newspapers Company

ABSTRACT

This qualitative study investigated how ZANU-PF factionalism cascaded into *The Herald*, *Daily News* and *NewsDay* newsrooms and “factionalised” the newspapers’ reportage of Robert Mugabe’s succession in the period between 2014 and 2017. The period marks the height of ZANU-PF factionalism after independence. In the context of this study, “factionalisation” of journalism infers adoption of either of the ZANU-PF factions contending to succeed Robert Mugabe by journalists in their reportage of the intraparty schisms promoting the ideological aspirations of one group over the other. There were two factions at any given moment in ZANU-PF angling to succeed Mugabe owing to his old age. ZANU-PF has experienced episodes of factionalism since its formation as a break away party in 1963 from Joshua Nkomo’s ZAPU. The study is guided by Mugabeism as its main theoretical lens supported by the Critical Political Economy of the media model. It sought to establish how *The Herald*, *Daily News* and *NewsDay* reported ZANU-PF factionalism between 2014 and 2017. Further, the study examined how ZANU-PF factionalism permeated newsrooms and corrupted newspapers’ narratives on Mugabe’s succession. The study also highlights the implications of Mugabeism on *The Herald*, *Daily News* and *NewsDay*’s reportage of ZANU-PF factionalism during the period under review. Whereas this study adds to the growing body of knowledge on the media and politics, research into implications of ZANU-PF factionalism on political journalism are still nascent. Further, this study’s uniqueness is in its deployment of Mugabeism – a theory domiciled in political science and history – in media studies to account for journalistic process that informed or were influenced by Mugabe’s succession matrix. Use of the Mugabeism model is also a response to growing calls to decolonise, decentre and dewesternise media studies through deployment of indigenous theories to account for developments in the global south. Data was gathered through in-depth face-to-face interviews with purposively selected journalists at *The Herald*, *Daily News* and *NewsDay* and via Qualitative Content Analysis. The study established that ZANU-PF factionalism permeated into daily newspaper newsrooms in Zimbabwe leading to the “factionalisation” of journalism. Journalists adopted either of the factions angling to succeed Mugabe and aligned their reportage to the respective interests in an editorial disposition devoid of impartiality and factuality. In some instances, journalists were motivated by material inducements to adopt and promote factional positions. It is also this study’s finding that through rhetoric Mugabe provided cues to journalists at both state-controlled and privately owned newspapers on how to report on his

own succession. As a result, ZANU-PF factionalism compartmentalised journalism by allowing or denying ruling party politicians a platform for expression depending on which faction they belonged. Newsrooms were turned into war zones as journalists became enemies in a battle to protect interests of factions they editorially adopted.

CHAPTER1:

1.0 INTRODUCTION

THE Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) has experienced recurring episodes of factionalism for decades occasioned by lack of consensus over the leadership of the party. If anything, Zimbabwe's governing party is a product of factionalism. It was formed in 1963 after Robert Mugabe and Ndabaningi Sithole broke away from Joshua Nkomo's Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) to form the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU). This followed disagreements over the execution of the liberation war. Factionalism occurs when party members fight over decision making positions leading to the formation of subgroups whose affiliates share common identity and goals (Zariski, 1960; Basira, 2019; Sartori, 2005; Ceron, 2019). In its over four decades in existence, ZANU-PF has battled factionalism even during liberation war. The Nhari rebellion in 1974, the Workers/Vashandi insurrection (1976), formation of the FROLIZI (1971), death of ZANU chairperson Herbert Chitepo (1975) and of Josiah Tongogara on the cusp of Zimbabwe's independence in (1979) are some of the incidents reflecting the brutal factional wars characteristic of ZANU-PF during the colonial era. Attainment of independence in 1980 failed to end ZANU-PF factionalism with cracks emerging in the governing elite in the first decade of majority rule (Sithole and Makumbe, 1997:134).

Robert Mugabe's dismissal of ZANU-PF secretary general Edgar Tekere in 1987 following policy disagreements, politburo member Eddison Zvobgo's call in 1995 for "re-democratisation of the Zimbabwean constitution" by restricting Robert Mugabe's executive powers and Dzikamai Mavhaire's 1998 "Mugabe must resign" remarks in parliament, pointed to a ruling party at war with itself. The Tsholotsho Declaration of 2004 which intended to position Emmerson Mnangagwa for the vice presidency, the rise of Joice Mujuru to the vice presidency the same year and her fall and dismissal from ZANU-PF 2014, and the elevation of Mnangagwa to the vice president in 2015, his demotion and dismissal in 2017, are hallmarks of ZANU-PF factionalism after Zimbabwe's independence. There is consensus among scholars that Robert Mugabe "engineered" ZANU-PF factionalism as a political survival philosophy – keeping his foes at war while denying them an opportunity to coalesce and topple him from the presidency (Chikukwa, 2004; Tekere, 2006; Msindo, 2014, Hove, 2019, Musanga, 2022). This phenomenon has been christened Mugabeism (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009; 2015), a concept that seeks a nuanced understanding into how Robert Mugabe sustained his rule over the years

Deploying Mugabeism as its main theoretical lenses, this qualitative study examines how ZANU-PF factionalism cascaded into newsrooms at *The Herald*, *Daily News* and *NewsDay* between 2014 and 2017 bastardizing news generation processes and ultimately narratives on Robert Mugabe's succession. This period marks the height of ZANU-PF factionalism in independent Zimbabwe as Mugabe's old age spurred jostling for his position by his ZANU-PF allies, Joice Mujuru and Emmerson Mnangagwa. In the context of this study, factionalisation of journalism intimates adoption by journalists of either of the ZANU-PF factions contending to succeed President Robert Mugabe advancing its interests in violation of basic journalism tenets exhorting impartiality in news reports.

1.1 Background of the study

The media in Zimbabwe have suffered political polarisation for decades, a development traceable to the colonial era when the press advanced the interests of white colonial settlers at the expense of Africans by virtue of its political economy (Gale, 1962, Rusike, 1990; Saunders, 1991). Such editorial bias persisted in independent Zimbabwe after the formation in 1999 of the country's main opposition party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), which posed serious threats to ZANU-PF's reign. The divisions manifesting in national politics cascaded into the media especially after the establishment of a vibrant privately-owned newspaper, *Daily News*, which challenged the state controlled media empire's pro-ZANU-PF and anti-MDC narratives. The privately owned press epitomised by the *Daily News* pursued oppositional journalism whereas the state controlled *The Herald* indulged in patriotic journalism (Ranger, 2005, Ruhanya, 2014; Chibwe, 2016). Patriotic journalism blindly supported the Mugabe administration's policies including the controversial land redistribution programme and ZANU-PF's abrasive foreign policy, which saw Zimbabwe withdrawing from the Commonwealth and embracing the Look East Policy anchored on establishing and strengthening relations with Asia while drifting away from Europe and the United States of America. This was after Europe and America imposed sanctions on Zimbabwe following the land reform programme which sought equity in land ownership between blacks and whites in the southern African nation. Oppositional journalism practiced by the *Daily News* and other privately owned newspapers offered the MDC and Non-Governmental Organisations a platform for expression and was widely viewed within Mugabe's government as seeking regime change (Ruhanya, 2014).

It is within this historical context that this study investigates how ZANU-PF factionalism may have permeated the media and corrupted narratives on Robert Mugabe's succession using *The*

Herald, Daily News and *NewsDay* as its case study. Since politics - be it intraparty or interparty - tends to structure and shape media narratives in Zimbabwe on political issues, the study investigates the influence of ZANU-PF factionalism on the selected newspapers' reportage of Robert Mugabe's succession. Alternatively, the study explores how Mugabeism influenced *The Herald, Daily News* and *NewsDay's* narratives on ZANU-PF factionalism between 2014 and 2017. These comprised Zimbabwe's main daily newspapers when the study was conducted.

Therefore, this study investigates the state of political journalism at Zimbabwe's daily newspapers as factionalism ravaged ZANU-PF over Mugabe's successor. Mugabe's old age and over stay in power saw the emergence of two factions angling to succeed him initially pitting Vice President Joice Mujuru against then Defence Minister Emmerson Mnangagwa (Mandaza, 2014; Tendi, 2016; Maodza, 2017; Chuma et al, 2020). Senior ZANU-PF officials coalesced around either Mujuru or Mnangagwa. Mugabe dismissed Mujuru from ZANU-PF and government after the ruling party's December 2014 elective congress. Media reports suggested Mujuru had intended to contest Mugabe at the congress (Mandaza, 2014). Mnangagwa succeeded Mujuru as vice president after congress while Phelekezela Mphoko was appointed second vice president.

The leadership changes failed to tame ZANU-PF factionalism. Two factions emerged again this time pitting Mnangagwa's Team Lacoste faction against the Grace Mugabe aligned Generation 40 (G40). The G40 comprised of a younger generation of ZANU-PF politicians who appeared to derive their power from Grace Mugabe. (Masiya and Maringira 2017). Grace Mugabe had been controversially elevated to the powerful ZANU-PF Women's League secretary position in 2014. Reports suggested Grace Mugabe had joined the race to succeed her husband. She publicly denied the claim. The Mnangagwa faction, known as Team Lacoste, reportedly comprised ZANU-PF politicians Oppah Muchinguri-Kashiri, Patrick Chinamasa, Joram Gumbo, Christopher Mushohwe, Josiah Hungwe, and Christopher Mutsvangwa, among others. It had the backing of the army and veterans of Zimbabwe's liberation war. The G40 reportedly boasted of 'young turks' Jonathan Moyo, Saviour Kasukuwere, Patrick Zhuwao, Walter Mzembe and Makhosini Hlongwane, among others. It had no liberation war credentials like the Mnangagwa faction. Vice President Mphoko also reportedly belonged to G40. The Mujuru faction reportedly comprised of ZANU-PF old guard Didymus Mutasa, Rugare Gumbo, Dzikamai Mavhaire and Sydney Sekeramayi. The researcher posits that ZANU-PF factionalism compounded challenges for a Zimbabwean press which had long suffered political polarisation (Gale, 1962; Saunders, 1991; Mukasa, 2003; Ruhanya, 2014). Whereas there is a

corpus of scholarship on media polarisation in Zimbabwe (Saunders, 1991; Mukasa, 2003; Ndlela, 2003; Chuma, 2008; Chiumbu and Moyo 2009), studies on the influence of ZANU-PF factionalism on the press are very nascent. This study exposes how ZANU-PF factionalism cascaded into mainstream media and “factionalised” narratives on Mugabe’s succession between 2014 and 2017 leading to what the researcher terms the “factionalisation” of journalism. That the press indulged in ZANU-PF factionalism during the period under review is confirmed by Robert Mugabe’s public humiliation of Information Minister Jonathan Moyo at the burial of Zimbabwe’s first black Minister of Information, Nathan Shamuyarira, in 2014. In a fit of rage, Mugabe blasted Moyo for using the media to fan factionalism in ZANU-PF. Rebuking Moyo, Mugabe claimed:

I am saying this in light of what is happening now where you have our Minister of Information (Moyo) wanting to pit people one against each other. You don’t do things like that.

(Reuters 06 June 2014)

1.2 Objectives of the Study

ZANU PF factional fissures experienced between 2014 and 2017 provide an important entry point to understand how Mugabeism permeated newsfication processes in Zimbabwe’s mainstream media. When the study was conducted Zimbabwe had three main national daily newspapers, *The Herald*, *Daily News* and *NewsDay*. *The Herald* was a state-controlled broadsheet while the *Daily News* and *NewsDay* were privately owned. Further, the research exposes the influence of Mugabeism on newspaper narratives about ZANU-PF factionalism. Mugabeism is a philosophy that seeks a nuanced understanding into how Robert Mugabe sustained his rule uninterruptedly for nearly four decades. In the context of this study, Mugabeism is confined to governance through calculative factionalism or division-ism. This study seeks to:

- Establish how *The Herald*, *Daily News* and *NewsDay* reported on ZANU-PF factionalism between 2014 and 2017.
- Explore how ZANU-PF factionalism influenced newspaper narratives on Mugabe’s succession
- Explore the implications of Mugabeism on news production routines

The study answers the following questions, which also constitute the key objectives of this thesis:

- How did *The Herald*, *Daily News* and *NewsDay* report on ZANU-PF factionalism between 2014 and 2017?
- To what extent did Mugabeism shape and structure newsfication processes at the selected newspapers.
- What were the implications of Mugabeism on *The Herald*, *Daily News* and *NewsDay*'s reportage of ZANU-PF factionalism?

1.3 Justification of the study

The Zimbabwe media landscape is an over studied terrain. There is a corpus of scholarship on the press and politics in Zimbabwe (Gale, 1962; Rusike, 1990; Saunders, 1991; Mukasa, 2003; Ndlela, 2003; Ranger, 2005; Chuma, 2008; Ruhanya, 2014; Chibuwe, 2016). However, existing scholarship tends to deploy Eurocentric models such as the political economy, sociology of journalism, framing, agenda setting, and the principal agent theoretical frameworks in their pursuit of a nuanced understanding of the complexities around the media and politics in Zimbabwe. Whereas studies on the media and ZANU-PF factionalism are still very nascent (Maodza, 2017, Gadzikwa, 2017, Chuma et al, 2020), they habitually deploy Eurocentric theoretical lenses to account for socio-political and economic developments in the global south. For example, in a study on ZANU-PF factionalism and the media, Maodza (2017) mobilises the political economy of the media theory to account for why a state controlled newspaper *The Herald* selectively scandalised politicians in the Joice Mujuru faction in its narratives on Robert Mugabe's succession and concludes that journalism was "factionalised" with the newspaper representing the interests of whichever faction in charge of the Ministry of Information at any given moment. The ministry oversees the operations of Zimpapers, the publishers of *The Herald*. On their part, Chuma et al (2020) deploy Napoleon's principal agent model in an investigation that sought to establish how another state controlled newspaper, *Chronicle*, reported on Mugabe's succession. They agree with Maodza (2017) that how these newspapers reported on ZANU-PF factionalism was informed by which faction was in charge of the ministry.

This study is a departure from existing scholarship in many ways. Firstly, whereas Maodza (2017) and Chuma et al (2020) are confined to examining the influence of ZANU-PF factionalism on state controlled media, the current research extends the scope by investigating

its influence on privately owned newspapers *Daily News* and *NewsDay*. Secondly, the study is unique and significant as it deploys Mugabeism, a theory domiciled within the political science and history domains to interpret journalistic processes at *The Herald*, *Daily News* and *NewsDay*. Thirdly, this research responds to calls to decolonise media studies through its application of Mugabeism - a theory from the global south - to account for journalistic processes and in this case, the Zimbabwean press' negotiation of ZANU-PF factionalism. The decolonial alternative exposes limitations of "western epistemic rationality by thinking otherwise" and by challenging the belief "in one system of knowledge" (Mignolo, 2011:xii). The decolonial call "proceeds from the prospective assumption that locus of enunciation shall be decentred from its modern or colonial configurations" (Mignolo, 2011:xv) while Moyo (2020:2) also emphasizes the need to "decentre the act of theory building from the West and create a possibility for a new trans-epistemic knowledge paradigm". It is in this context that a study on ZANU-PF factionalism and the media mobilises Mugabeism to account for journalistic processes at state-controlled and independent press in Zimbabwe.

The study is confined to the period 2014 to 2017 as it marked the height of ZANU-PF factionalism since Zimbabwe's independence. The incessant fights were attributable to Mugabe's old age as his lieutenants brawled over who succeeded him. The study is also restricted to Zimbabwe's daily newspapers – *The Herald*, *Daily News* and *NewsDay*. *The Herald* is a state-controlled newspaper whose editorial policy is supportive of the ZANU-PF government. The *Daily News* and *NewsDay* are privately owned newspapers driven by different editorial policies.

1.4 Research Methodology: A qualitative approach to studying ZANU-PF factionalism and the media

This study deploys the qualitative research approach as it is concerned with describing how *The Herald*, *Daily News* and *NewsDay* reported on ZANU-PF factionalism. It also explores and interprets how Mugabeism shaped the news generation processes at the selected newspapers during the period 2014 and 2017. The researcher purposefully settled for this period as it marks the height of ZANU-PF factionalism in independent Zimbabwe. Whereas factional fights are not a new phenomenon in ZANU-PF, this study considers that the period 2014 to 2017 ranks as the most fractious in the history of Zimbabwe's ruling party after independence as Robert Mugabe's long-time allies fought over who succeeded him. In the brutal internal ZANU-PF factional fights, some of Mugabe's wartime allies, among them his

deputy and Zimbabwe's first female vice president, Joice Mujuru, and later on Emmerson Mnangagwa – the octogenarian leader's long-time foot soldier and feared lieutenant – were dismissed from the ruling party.

This study employs the qualitative research approach as the methodology captures individual aspects of human experiences (Polit and Beck 2004:16; Streutbert and Carpenter 1999:15). The study captures the experiences of journalists at the selected media on how they, among things, sourced and processed news on ZANU-PF factionalism during the period under study. Ncube (2014:9) asserts that the qualitative approach “involves taking people's subjective experiences seriously as the essence of what is real for them, making sense of people's experiences by interacting with them and carefully listening to what they say”. In his adoption of the qualitative research approach, the researcher is convinced that the quantitative methodology relies exclusively on quantitative methods and fails when issues under study are subjective to interpretation of participants. The quantitative methodology is qualified for assessment of numerical constructs but fail to account for human experiences. The researcher deploys purposive sampling in the selection of journalists at *The Herald*, *Daily News* and *NewsDay* for in-depth face-to-face interviews. Eight political journalists participated in the study by virtue of them having generated stories on ZANU-PF factionalism during the period under review. The study also utilises archival research to gather stories on ZANU-PF factionalism published by *The Herald*, *Daily News* and *NewsDay* between 2014 and 2017 for Critical Discourse Analysis. Conceptual Content Analysis is also deployed as a data gathering instrument.

1.5 Case-studying *The Herald*, *Daily News* and *NewsDay*'s reportage of ZANU-PF factionalism

A research design is a procedure for collecting, analysing, interpreting and reporting in research (Creswell and Plano Clark, 2007:58). This research adopts a multiple case study design as it focuses on three distinct newspapers, *The Herald*, *Daily News* and *NewsDay*. It explores, describes and explains how the selected newspapers reported on ZANU-PF factionalism in the context of Mugabeism. Case studying *The Herald*, *Daily News* and *NewsDay* is natural and unproblematic, as these comprise Zimbabwe's main daily circulating newspapers when this study was conducted. The newspapers are published by different proprietors and ride on distinct political values and ideologies. The *Chronicle* was the only other daily newspaper circulating in Zimbabwe when this study was conducted but is not studied as it is a government controlled newspaper published by Zimpapers and sharing the same editorial policy as *The*

Herald. *The Herald* is a government-controlled newspaper. The *Daily News* and *NewsDay* are privately owned and do not suffer direct state interference in their editorial operations. Inasmuch as they are privately owned, they are distinct as the *NewsDay* proprietor (Trevor Ncube) enjoyed cordial political relations with the now president, Emmerson Mnangagwa, in the period soon after Robert Mugabe was removed from power through a military coup. President Mnangagwa appointed Ncube to the Presidential Advisory Council (PAC) on 30 January 2019, a position he quit in March 2022. The PAC's chief mandate included proffering ideas on key reforms and improving Zimbabwe's investment climate in line with President Mnangagwa's vision to turn the country into a middle-income economy by 2030. Ncube's association with PAC offers valuable insights into the operations of the *NewsDay* even before Mugabe's fall.

Zainal (2007:1) asserts that a case study is a popular method in qualitative research applicable when a holistic and in-depth investigation is necessary as it enables a researcher "to closely monitor the data within a specific context". Case studies enable researchers to "explore and investigate contemporary real-time phenomenon through detailed contextual analysis of a limited number of events or conditions and their relationship" (Zainal, 2007:1-2). Yin (1984:23) acknowledges this observation and asserts that case studies provide "an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real life context". Whereas there are two types of case study designs – a single and multiple case designs – with the former confined to a single occurrence and the latter to multiple sources, this study adopts a multiple case study design. Such multiplicity lies in the study's focus on three sources of evidence – *The Herald*, *Daily News* and *NewsDay* – whose selection for academic scrutiny is justified by their uniform publication frequency and distinct ownership structures. A comparative analysis of their reportage of ZANU-PF factionalism during the period under review helps expose the similarities and dissimilarities in their negotiation of the ruling party wrangles and the extent they exposed Mugabeism's divisive predisposition, which manifested in news production processes at the selected media.

There are various categories of case studies ranging from exploratory, descriptive, and explanatory to interpretive and evaluative approaches. For this study, the researcher makes use of the exploratory, descriptive and explanatory designs. The descriptive design describes a phenomenon under study and attends to the what, when, where and how of the research problem. In this study, the researcher's focus is on how Mugabe bred factionalism in ZANU-

PF, which schism cascaded into both state controlled and privately owned newspapers in Zimbabwe during a specific period – 2014 to 2017. The study offers a thick description of how *The Herald*, *Daily News* and *NewsDay* editorialised the ruling party divisions. Descriptive research helps picture a situation. It accounts for how journalists at the selected newspapers sourced, processed and packaged news on ZANU-PF factionalism. While descriptive research is best suited for new research areas like this current study, which focuses on the influence of Mugabeism on news production processes, Punch (2005) asserts that descriptive studies fail to explain why an event happened. To attend to this deficiency, the study adopts the explanatory research design.

Grey (2014) observes that explanatory studies attempt to ask the ‘why’ and ‘how’ questions, and identifies reasons why a certain phenomenon occurred. After describing how ZANU-PF factionalism cascaded into daily newspaper newsrooms in Zimbabwe during the period under review, the study investigates why such a development happened. State controlled media in Zimbabwe like *The Herald* suffer state interference in their operations. There are, however, no obvious reasons as to why *The Herald* ritually scandalised certain senior ZANU-PF politicians whenever there was talk of Robert Mugabe’s succession. Equally, it is yet to be established why the privately owned media as represented by the *Daily News* and *NewsDay*, actively partook in ZANU-PF factionalism – an oddity this study dissects.

The exploratory design, as noted by Yin (1984), helps explore any phenomenon in the data or sources of interest to the researcher. For this study, such a design aid the researcher in seeking answers as to why journalists at the selected newspapers made use of certain sources when reporting on ZANU-PF factionalism at the expense of the other or equally to examine prominence given to factions by the selected newspapers by way of placement on front pages. Thus, this study is a multiple case study in the sense that it focuses on three specific newspapers – *The Herald*, *Daily News* and *NewsDay* – and is not a generalisation of the media’s coverage of ZANU-PF factionalism. It is rather a specialised study. The case study designs have many merits. These include the fact that “examination of data is conducted within the context of its use” (Yin 1984 cited by Zainal, 2007:04). There is, however, risk of the researcher allowing, “Biased views to influence the direction of the findings and conclusions” (Yin, 1984:21). In the context of this study, however, such risks are minimal as the newspapers under study make up Zimbabwe’s only dailies. The other newspapers in circulation are weeklies that traditionally do not break news but are largely analytical in editorial approach. This research, therefore, is

an instrumental multiple case study focused on examining how daily newspapers in Zimbabwe reported on ZANU-PF factionalism at its peak between 2014 and 2017 illuminating the extent to which Mugabeism accounted for such editorial posture.

1.6 Locating the study within the decolonial paradigm

This study is theoretically steeped within the decolonial topography. Its exclusivity lies in its deployment of Mugabeism – as a model from the Global South – to account for journalistic processes and in this case, the Zimbabwean press’ negotiation of ZANU-PF factionalism. Apart from this epistemic disobedience, this study borrows Mugabeism, a theory domiciled within the political science and history domains, to interpret news production processes at *The Herald*, *Daily News* and *NewsDay*.

Decolonial studies have their roots in Latin America with Maldonado-Torres (2018:113) observing that it is “a post and transcontinental turn with its principal basis in Americas but not limited to this region” and further suggests the concept refers “to various intellectual and theoretical projects only partially from Latin America”. For Mignolo (2011: xii), the decolonial alternative exposes limitations of “western epistemic rationality by thinking ‘otherwise’” and through challenging “the belief in one system of knowledge”. The decolonial turn dismisses the belief in western modernity as the sole model applicable globally and strives to transform research “from the grip of Eurocentric, western centric, and monocultural universalism to a more progressive cultural politics of a multicultural, inclusive, emancipatory theory and pedagogy” (Moyo, 2020:2). Mignolo (2011: xv) argues that the “decolonial option proceeds from the prospective assumption that locus of enunciation shall be decentred from its modern or colonial configurations” just as Moyo (2020:2) underscores the need to “decentre the act of theory building from the West and create a possibility for a new trans-epistemic knowledge paradigm”. Decolonial studies resist “dominance of Western universalism as a locus of enunciation” and create “a possibility for a new trans-epistemic knowledge paradigm born out of the dialogue between Southern and Northern epistemologies” (Moyo, 2020:3).

The decolonial option “proposes that decolonisation should not be seen only as the search for independence or for achieving sovereignty, but rather as a project whose objective consists in expanding the practices and forms of decolonial thought and action to try and shape a new world in which many worlds fit” (Maldonado-Torres (2018:113). The decolonial turn,

therefore, is a major shift in epistemological orientation and “signals importance of space and geopolitics in the formation of hierarchies of thought and rejects the tendency to limit critical responses to dominant European thought...” (Maldonado- Torres, 2018:114).

The decolonial turn is also influenced by the need for an “intellectual movement” inspired by “a multicultural approach to theory” (Moyo, 2020: 3). Eurocentric scholarship degrades decolonial discourses when in actuality such erudition is a “reconstruction of alternate counter hegemonic geo-cultural and epistemic centres for media theory building in the Global South” (Moyo, 2020:4). Curran and Park (2020) reinforce this viewpoint and argue that decolonial terrain challenges universalistic approaches to media studies since “the universe is changing in a way that makes this narrowness transparently absurd” while Funez-Flores (2022:1) insists that decolonial studies must ground their theorisation “in alternative sites of knowledge production”. Likewise, Gluck (2015) bemoans the continued deployment of “western approaches with little localised adaptation or integration of local frameworks” and advocates an epistemic shift from Eurocentric approaches in research. Decolonial studies, consequently, call for “an analytical perspective that reflects a decentred, dynamic contemporary world” (Waisbord and Mellado, 2014:363). African academics must “reorient their intellectual work against Eurocentrism, foreign imposed categories and ontology” (Gluck, 2015:2).

It is in this context that this study deploys Mugabeism as an indigenous theory to account for the Zimbabwean press’ reportage of ZANU-PF factionalism in the period under review (2014-2017). The deployment of Mugabeism as this study’s main theoretical lens is a timely response to calls from the Global South to incorporate “views from Africa and “offer new ways of thinking about issues that tend to be overlooked or conceptualised differently on dominant academic circles” (Milton and Mano, 2021:258). For Milton and Mano (2021:257-258), “it should be possible ...in what concerns Africa to have an African-centred approach to knowledge production...and to use whatever concepts and research tools they deem most appropriate in studying Africa...Context, after all, does matter”. Thus, decolonial studies advocate recognition of “other sources of knowledge as important” (Milton and Mano, 2021:257). Citing Nyamnjoh (2020) and Harrison (2016), Milton and Mano (2021: 264) emphasise “theorisation inspired by experiences in and of the Global South”, and insist that such an approach, “disavows notions of intellectual inferiority”. The decolonial alternative yearns for epistemological inclusivity. It speaks to “the theoretical, artistic and practical

relevance of a wide variety of positions in multiple geographical regions and fields of enquiry” (Maldonado-Torres, 2018:111).

In deploying Mugabeism as a theory driving this study, the researcher notes that western theories on news production such as Breed (1955)’s sociology of journalism and the media Critical Political Economy models are inadequate in accounting for *The Herald*, *Daily News* and *NewsDay*’s editorial disposition insofar as Robert Mugabe’s succession and ZANU-PF factionalism is concerned. Breed (1955) suggests that media houses socialise and condition journalists into knowing the wanted and unwanted stories without their superiors actively superintending over them. This theory assumes that incentives, sanctions and observing the editorial behaviour of senior staffers in the newsroom guides journalists into knowing acceptable and unacceptable news stories. Breed (1955)’s theory sheds light into the operations of the newsroom but is inadequate in explaining, for example, why journalists at *The Herald* may have defied the newspaper’s longstanding editorial position when it systematically scandalised ZANU-PF senior politicians as then Vice President Joice Mujuru and senior members of her faction.

The researcher insists that the deployment of Mugabeism in this study is not out of academic revulsion for Eurocentric epistemologies but, if anything, reinforcing this study is a Western model – the Critical Political Economy of the media theory. The Critical Political Economy of the media theory accounts for that which Mugabeism theory struggles theoretically to satisfactorily anchor. For instance, the Critical Political Economy of the media theory cannot fully account for why *The Herald* systematically and routinely scandalised some ZANU-PF politicians at any given moment while celebrating their rivals as factionalism riddled the ruling party. A key assumption of the political economy of the media theory is that media owners determine (news) content and considering the ZANU-PF government has absolute control over Zimpapers (Rusike, 1990, Saunders, 1991, 1999) – publishers of *The Herald* – it is unimaginable how a newspaper under the ruling party’s control systematically undermined its unity.

Equally, the privately owned press – *Daily News* and *NewsDay*’s editorial disposition in the context of ZANU-PF factionalism – is also understandable through Mugabeism theoretical lens. The privately owned press has historically practised oppositional journalism (Ranger 2005; Chuma, 2005; Ruhanya, 2014) – a journalism anchored on editorial dislike for Robert

Mugabe's ZANU-PF characteristic in its rigid blatant campaign for regime change (Chari, 2007; Chibwe, 2020). Of interest to this study insofar as the *Daily News* and *NewsDay* reported on ZANU-PF factionalism and Mugabe's succession, is the extent to which these newspapers – either consciously or unconsciously – took sides with either of the warring factions and the degree they played into Mugabe's politics of factionalism.

Whereas anti-decolonial scholarship dismisses the epistemic turn as “project of false alternatives”, Moyo, (2020:8) insists decolonial studies are a “space for reflexive cultural and philosophical self-validation...self-re-humanisation, self-rewriting, and self-emancipation against the increasingly subtle and invisible forms of colonisation”. Milton and Mano (2021: 259) reinforce this viewpoint when they urge for the adoption “of new frames of understanding within media and communication that are better informed by the experiences of Africans within the context of Global South, using our marginality as a vantage point”. The decolonial alternative is an emancipatory model driven by the belief that Western theory cannot reign over other contextually superior indigenous epistemologies. This justifies this study's deployment of Mugabeism as a decolonial option influencing media reportage of intraparty factionalism. In deploying Mugabeism as a model guiding this study, the researcher shares Moyo's (2020: 6) viewpoint that “knowledge is never universal but perspectival and thus wrought in social and historical contingency”. Deployment of Mugabeism in this thesis amplifies calls from the Global South to de-imperialise, de-westernise and democratise epistemology while cautious of the risk of “balkanising scholarship at the expense of a more cosmopolitan approach” (Gluck, 2015). The researcher is also alive to the dangers of “cultural essentialism” or “ethnicism, nationalism, indigeneity” (Moyo, 2020:14). Decolonial discourse must not mean Europhobia. It must never be de-westernisation for the sake of it (Maliki, 2002) and “it would be a mistake to assume that Western models cannot explain non-Western situation, and only indigenous models could” (Gluck, 2015:4). Maldonado-Torres (2018:114) emphasizes this point and insists that the decolonial turn must never be translated to mean “a philosophical nationalism” or “an expression of non-European continental spaces over and against Europe” or just “as a form of ethno-philosophy”.

Some scholars (Sandoval, 2000; Chasi and Rodney-Gumede, 2016) have advocated dialogue between Eurocentric and Afrocentric epistemologies – what they term ‘coalitional consciousness’. Their argument is premised on the notion that ‘a mixture in the appropriation of ideas, knowledge and theories is necessary as it reflects the reality of surviving as a minority

or the other...mixing is the methodology of surviving for the oppressed” (Sandoval, 2000 cited by Milton and Mano, 2021:268). Chasi and Rodney-Gumede (2016:2) support this positionality when they speak of “legitimizing the ‘smashing and grabbing’ of usable and valuable insights from anywhere while viably calling for the construction and elaboration of conceptual schema that are locally relevant” (cited in Milton and Mano, 2021:268). This explains the study’s dual theoretical approach – Mugabeism and Critical Political Economy of the media – in its attempt to comprehend the press’ editorial behaviour during a period when the ruling ZANU-PF party experienced intense factionalism over who succeeded Robert Mugabe, its iconic leader.

1.7 Self reflexivity - researcher’s reporter identity

Reflexivity is “critical self-reflection on how the researcher’s background, assumptions, positioning and behaviour impact on the research process” (Finlay and Gouch, 2008: ix). According to Tomkins and Eatough (2013) cited by Kelly et al (2017:2), reflexivity is when “researchers tap into the raw stuff of personal experience as lived and felt”. Bourdieu (1993) observes that, “for being part of what we are researching, we become automatically entangled with the subject and object of our research” and are thus “confronted with the paradox of being inside and outside of our research object at the same time” (Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992). There is, therefore, a critical need for the researcher to declare his or her involvement in that which he or she is studying and clearly outline how such an entanglement – beneficial as it may seem – does not negatively influence the direction of the study. In the case of this study, the researcher is not only a former journalist for one of the newspapers under study – *The Herald* – but is also an ex-news editor for the paper. The researcher joined *The Herald* at its headquarters in Harare on October 1, 2007 as its political and parliamentary correspondent before rising to becoming its assistant news editor responsible for investigations and later its news editor. Earlier in 2003, the researcher had joined *The Herald* as a student on work related learning.

On completion of work related learning, the researcher joined the Ibbo Mandaza owned Zimbabwe Mirror Newspaper Group (ZMNG) as a journalist at *Daily Mirror*. Although the ZMNG pursued a middle of the road editorial policy, it was associated with ZANU-PF and critical of the main opposition the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) led by Morgan Tsvangirai. Mandaza is a former senior civil servant in Robert Mugabe’s government having worked as Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Manpower Planning and Development during the first decade of Zimbabwe’s independence. This explains the ZMNG’s pro-ZANU-

PF editorial stance despite its effort to hide its bias behind the so-called middle of the road editorial policy. It is significant to note that when reporting on ZANU-PF factionalism, whose signs were apparent in early 2000, Mandaza's the ZMNG newspaper stable including the *Daily Mirror*, exhibited editorial sympathy for Joice Mujuru led faction and reported against the Emmerson Mnangagwa camp (Ureke, 2016). The researcher's experience with factional journalism is traceable to the ZMNG with Ureke (2016) suggesting that the closure of the newspaper stable – which involved a covert takeover by the Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) – was a result of its involvement in ZANU-PF factionalism.

After the fall of the ZMNG, the researcher re-joined *The Herald* on October 1, 2007 as its political and parliamentary correspondent. The political environment in Zimbabwe at the time was highly polarised. The economy was imploding. Zimbabweans were balkanised between Robert Mugabe's ruling ZANU-PF and Morgan Tsvangirai's opposition MDC. The researcher was among a crop of senior political journalists at *The Herald* who generated stories that editorially supported the ZANU-PF government while castigating the MDC. The polarisation that manifested in national politics cascaded into the national media corrupting the noble profession. It is under such a highly polarised political environment that journalists at state owned and controlled media houses such as the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation (ZBC) and Zimpapers (publishers of *The Herald*) practised what became known as patriotic journalism whereas those at privately owned newspapers indulged in oppositional or adversarial journalism (Ranger, 2005). Oppositional journalism advocated regime change and was sympathetic to the MDC. Patriotic journalism unquestionably praised government and its policies such as the land reform, black economic empowerment programmes and Mugabe's abrasive anti-West foreign policy. As one of the senior political reporters at *The Herald* at the time, the researcher naturally generated stories that supported the Mugabe regime and were critical of Morgan Tsvangirai and the MDC. The researcher was also in the employment of *The Herald* when ZANU-PF and the MDC formations coalesced into a government of national unity between 2008 and 2013.

In 2013, Zimbabwe held its harmonised presidential, parliamentary and municipal elections in which Mugabe beat his main rival, Tsvangirai, after winning over two-thirds majority in a plebiscite dismissed as rigged by the MDC. The post 2013 national elections, which ended the government of national unity, witnessed a resurgence of intense factionalism within ZANU-PF over who succeeded Mugabe. Two factions emerged– the Emmerson Mnangagwa camp

against the Joice Mujuru cabal. These factional fissures cascaded into *The Herald* newsroom. Again, by virtue of his position at *The Herald* as a senior reporter, the researcher found himself entangled in ZANU-PF factionalism through the political stories he generated.

The period 2013 to 2017 was headlined by Mugabe's elevation of his wife, Grace, to the leadership of the ZANU-PF women's league, the dismissal of Joice Mujuru from the vice presidency and ZANU-PF and her replacement by Emmerson Mnangagwa. Mugabe's controversial countrywide youth interface rallies, a platform he used to publicly discredit his ZANU-PF rivals, cabinet reshuffles which witnessed frequent changes at the Ministry of Information, the alleged poisoning of Mnangagwa, and his dismissal from ZANU-PF before his subsequent return after the toppling of Mugabe by the army, are some of the highlights of factionalism in ZANU-PF.

During all these developments, the researcher was an integral part of *The Herald* newsroom and was elevated from senior reporter to assistant news editor and later, news editor. When one is a news editor at a state controlled newspaper such as *The Herald*, their position brings them closer to the Minister of Information and senior civil servants in that portfolio. While the researcher enjoyed cordial relations with Ministers of Information appointed by Mugabe at every epoch, his relations with George Charamba (then secretary for information and presidential spokesperson) were more solid. Whereas Mugabe constantly reshuffled his information ministers, Charamba always retained his position as both Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Information and Mugabe spokesperson and naturally had more editorial control over *The Herald* than whoever was minister. This explains the relations between the researcher and Charamba. It created a problem for the researcher as then Charamba was associated with the Mnangagwa faction. This was problematic especially after Mugabe reassigned Jonathan Moyo from the Information Ministry where he was minister and shipped him to the Ministry of Higher and Tertiary Education, Science and Technology Development with Mugabe replacing him Christopher Mushohwe, deemed a pro-Mnangagwa politician.

Two factions emerged after the dismissal of Joice Mujuru and her faction members from ZANU-PF. These were the Mnangagwa's Team Lacoste faction and the Grace Mugabe aligned G40 camp. The fact that Charamba was associated with the Mnangagwa faction against the G40 camp reportedly fronted by Grace Mugabe meant that *The Herald* – as a newspaper whose editorial disposition is strongly influenced by the Ministry of Information and Publicity, took a pro-Mnangagwa stance in its reportage of ZANU-PF factionalism while undermining the

rival G40 camp. This naturally created problems for the researcher, firstly as an assistant news editor and later as a news editor for *The Herald*. Those within ZANU-PF, who felt scandalised by *The Herald*, viewed the researcher and other senior political journalists in the newsroom as aligned to Charamba and consequently Mnangagwa's faction, and hostile to the G40 camp.

The researcher resigned from *The Herald* in 2019 to join academia as a lecturer in the media department at the Midlands State University. The resignation followed President Emmerson Mnangagwa's appointment of Monica Mutsvangwa as the new Information Minister and the reassignment of Charamba from that ministry. The changes in the Ministry of Information, which saw Nick Mangwana replacing Charamba as Secretary had ramifications at *The Herald* where its editor Caesar Zvayi resigned after Mutsvangwa and Mangwana had demoted him. The acting editor for *The Herald* Tichaona Zindoga controversially demoted the researcher from news editor to a bureau chief for Manicaland Province. Zindoga was very close to Nick Mangwana. Other senior reporters in the newsroom suspected of being Charamba's associates were assigned new workstations in provinces as bureau chiefs.

Media reports suggest two factions had again emerged in ZANU-PF pitting Mnangagwa against his deputy Constantino Chiwenga. Chiwenga is a retired army general behind the military coup that toppled Mugabe and replaced him with Mnangagwa. The media reports implied that Charamba was a Chiwenga ally. This meant purging of all reporters at *The Herald* deemed Charamba's associates and by extension, Chiwenga's sympathisers including the researcher.

This brief background is important in locating the researcher in the context of ZANU-PF factionalism and *The Herald*. The researcher is convinced his first hand experiences at *The Herald* on ZANU-PF factionalism and its manifestation in the newsroom, provide important hitherto hidden insights into the extent journalism at the state controlled newspaper got bastardised and factionalised owing to the vicious and relentless fights in the ruling party over leadership positions. As the researcher conducted this study, ZANU-PF was preparing for its 2022 congress. Again, media reports in Zimbabwe were pointing to the rift between Mnangagwa and Chiwenga over the presidency. Cognisant of the risk of bias associated with auto-ethnographic studies, the researcher deploys alternative data gathering instruments such as in-depth face-to-face interviews with purposively selected political journalists at *The Herald* and archival research while also subjecting stories on ZANU-PF factionalism to Qualitative

Content Analysis. Data is analysed through Critical Discourse Analysis to identify emerging discourses on Mugabe's succession.

1.8 An auto-ethnographic appreciation of *The Herald's* reportage of ZANU-PF factionalism

The researcher is a former journalist and news manager at *The Herald*, having worked for the newspaper in various capacities for 13 years. The study explores how Zimbabwe's daily newspapers – *The Herald*, *Daily News* and *NewsDay* – reported on ZANU-PF factionalism. It is important to note from the onset that the researcher, as a former journalist and news editor for *The Herald*, auto-ethnographically reflects on how the newspaper generated articles on the ruling party fissures. This study does not extend this auto-ethnographic approach to the examination of the privately owned *Daily News* and *NewsDay's* reportage of ZANU-PF factionalism as the researcher never at any point in his journalism career work for the two dailies. The researcher does not rely exclusively on auto-ethnography but utilises other methodologies such as face-to-face interviews and archival research to help address issues of bias associated with ethnographic studies.

“Auto-ethnographic writing can be highly personal accounts that draw upon the experience of the researcher for the purpose of extending sociological understanding” (Sparks, 2000:21 in Denshire, 2014:831). Auto-ethnographic traditions hinge on ‘commitment to first-hand and exploration of a particular social or cultural setting on the basis of participant observation’. It speaks to what Glense and Peshkin (1992) term ‘examining own backyard, documenting own experiences and those of contemporaries and consequently creating a text imbued with their emotional responses to cultural phenomena’. Peseta (2005) in Denshire (2014:837 - 838) posits that as a data gathering tool ‘auto-ethnography opens the door for those of us interested in offering accounts of professional practice that are committed to acknowledging human-ness to work’ as ‘without these intimate and detailed evocations of life and professional practice, our knowledge of those worlds would be severely diminished’. The researcher offers intimate reflections on journalistic practices at the state controlled *The Herald* in the middle of vicious and internecine intra-ZANU-PF factionalism. Auto-ethnographic writing, observes Uotinen (2011) cited in Denshire (2014:845), ‘can excavate those practices that have become invisible because of their ordinariness or repetitiveness’.

The researcher held different positions at *The Herald* from senior reporter, assistant news editor (responsible for investigations) to news editor at a time factionalism riddled ZANU-PF. During the period 2014 to 2017, the researcher was initially an assistant news editor before his promotion to news editor position. A news editor is the first gatekeeper in the news generation chain who accepts or rejects story ideas from journalists. The news editor also edits all news stories generated by journalists before submitting them to the editor for further scrutiny. The researcher naturally brings out insider perspectives on the news gathering and writing processes at the state controlled newspaper as he is well acquainted with the news production processes at *The Herald* and his narratives on the subject under study draw from first hand experiences. Bruyn (1966) argues that a phenomenon can only be studied by persons who were part of the phenomenon and one has to experience the phenomenon and its context to understand it fully. The researcher's ethnographic reflections centre on how *The Herald* reported on purposively selected key ZANU-PF events that manifested factionalism. These are the ZANU-PF December 2014 elective congress at which President Mugabe dismissed his deputy Joice Mujuru and the elevation of Emmerson Mnangagwa to the vice presidency and his fall. The researcher therefore reflexively recaptures news production processes that informed *The Herald's* reportage of ZANU-PF factionalism between 2014 and 2017.

In so doing, the researcher is cognisant of Holt (2003)'s exhortation for auto-ethnographers to be conscious of the risks of 'using the self as the only source of data' and flagging the bias inherent in single narrative accounts. This explains the study's fusion of auto-ethnography with in-depth face-to-face interviews and archival research. Denshire (2014:844) argues that such pairing of data gathering instruments help 'displace the self as the primary site of experience and meaning'. The researcher is also alive to the different approaches to auto-ethnography including the evocative and analytical paradigms. Evocative auto-ethnography emphasizes what Denshire (2014) terms the 'centrality of the personal' while the analytical approach hinges on objectivity. Key features of analytic auto-ethnography, as cited by Anderson (2006:378), entail analytic reflexivity, narrative visibility of the researcher and dialogue with informants beyond the self. Evocative and analytic auto-ethnography are blended to give unbiased accounts of news production processes at *The Herald* riding on the researcher's personal experiences while also dialoguing with political journalists responsible for generation of stories on Mugabe's succession. This helps share lived experiences and avert the bias associated with evocative auto-ethnography. Ellis (2000) and Pratt (1999) encourage auto-ethnographers 'to

share their accounts with others who are involved in the text and to open the space for others to speak back’

1.9 From the horse’s mouth: In-depth face-to-face interviews with journalists at *The Herald*, *Daily News* and *NewsDay*

Data for this study was gathered through face-to-face interviews with journalists at *The Herald*, *Daily News* and *NewsDay*. These journalists were purposively selected for interviews in their capacity as senior political correspondents at the selected newspapers and generated stories on ZANU-PF factionalism during the period under review. Whereas the researcher had intended to interview 14 journalists comprising political reporters and editors at *The Herald*, *Daily News* and *NewsDay* by virtue of their roles in news production processes, only eight agreed. The majority of those who refused cited, among other excuses, the sensitivity of the study. Discussion on ZANU-PF factionalism is a sensitive issue especially for journalists working for the state controlled media houses as *The Herald*. The researcher also discovered that some journalists at privately owned newspapers such as the *Daily News* were also reluctant to discuss ZANU-PF succession issues following claims of the newspaper’s capture by the State through third parties aligned to ZANU-PF. The interviews were restricted to political journalists as interviewing reporters covering other beats as health, education, agriculture or sports would not have aided a study focused on ZANU-PF factionalism in any way.

The researcher interviewed four political reporters at the state-controlled *The Herald* who generated articles on ZANU-PF factionalism between 2014 and 2017. Only one refused after initially demanding to see the research questions before the interview and the request had been granted. The editor for *The Herald* during the period under review also agreed to a face-to-face interview on several occasions only to backtrack when everything was set without giving any reasons. The researcher also interviewed two senior political journalists at *Daily News* but their editor refused. The intention was also to interview other two political correspondents at the privately owned newspaper – Gift Phiri and Lloyd Mbiba – but they died before consummation of this study. Phiri, who had risen to become the *Daily News* Assistant Editor, died in April 2020. Mbiba died in January 2021. The researcher is, however, confident that data gathered from the journalists interviewed open new insights into the *Daily News*’ involvement in ZANU-PF factionalism and the extent such indulgence corrupted political journalism. Two senior political journalists at *NewsDay* were also interviewed as they

generated articles on ZANU-PF factionalism during the period under review. The third political reporter turned down a request for interviews as they now work for a state controlled media house and would not risk jeopardising relations with the new employer. The *NewsDay* editor was constantly evasive when the researcher sought an interview suggesting they were uncomfortable with the subject of the study.

The researcher deployed purposive sampling, also known as judgmental or purposeful sampling, in the selection of the journalists for in-depth face-to-face interviews. Purposive sampling is widely used in qualitative research as it identifies information-rich cases for study (Patton, 2002). With purposive sampling, researchers use their own judgment to select research participants specifically knowledgeable about a phenomenon. The study relied on purposive sampling in the selection of journalists for interviews since they were directly responsible for production of stories on ZANU-PF factionalism as political reporters. Those whose newsroom beats were not aligned to the study's interests such as journalists reporting municipal, agriculture, health, mining and education – were automatically excluded from the participant list.

1.10 Qualitative Content Analysis - the conceptual approach

Data for the study was also gathered through qualitative content analysis (Marying 2002 and Schreier 2012). The technique is a procedure aimed at objectively describing, “what is said on a given subject in a given time” (Lasswell, Lerner and Pool, 1952: 34). It is largely concerned with “who says what and to what effect” (Lasswell 1948 in Reese, 1996:12). In the context of this study, the intention was to interrogate the reportage of ZANU-PF factionalism by *The Herald Daily News* and *NewsDay* through Mugabeism philosophy. The study further examined responses from the carefully selected participants from the newspapers under study to elicit data relating to how Mugabeism permeated into news production and context of production in Zimbabwe.

The application of content analysis helped the researcher to identify “specific characteristics within text” (Stone, Dunphy, Smith and Oqilvie, 1996) with Nueman (1997:272) suggesting that this method enables the gathering and analysis “of content of a text”. “Content” implies words, ideas or even themes resident in the text. It is important, however, to note that qualitative content analysis relies on the researcher's reading and interpretation of a text. This implies that this method is subjective as it relies on researcher interpretations. Subjectivity is curable through triangulation of data gathering methods and this explains why this study also deployed

in-depth face-to-face interviews with political reporters at *The Herald*, *Daily News* and *NewsDay* to counter the limitations of content analysis. Among other things, qualitative content analysis aids in picking binaries in texts and how they are used while also dissecting the tone qualities and context within which a text was generated.

This study deploys conceptual content analysis. It allows selection of a concept and identification of its presence in a text (Huckin, 2003). In deploying conceptual content analysis, the researcher sought to establish how *The Herald*, *Daily News* and *NewsDay* reported on ZANU-PF factionalism. Further, the intention was to explore how ZANU-PF factionalism influenced newspaper narratives on Mugabe's succession while tracking how Mugabeism may have had a bearing on reportage of ruling party fissures by Zimbabwe's main daily newspapers under study. While there are number of procedures in qualitative content analysis, the study relies on the deductive approach. The deductive analysis derives from a general position or broad theory and streamlines to a specific observation. The general position is the assumption by the study of journalism having been factionalised and influenced by Mugabeism during the period under review. Using the broad position, conceptual content analysis explores occurrences and the frequency of a concept in texts through use of manifest analysis.

This study sought to establish how the newspapers reported on ZANU-PF factionalism. The first step was to establish the preferred news sources in stories on ZANU-PF fissures, what agenda they advocated and the extent journalists promoted biased reportage through use of terms or phrases that manifestly undermined one faction over the other. This is because conceptual analysis as a technique sought to understand usage of certain words or phrases in the newspapers under study. For example, if in its reportage of the ZANU-PF 2014 elective congress at which Joice Mujuru intended to contest Mugabe for the presidency, *The Herald* made use of negative terms or phrases to describe the former such as "corrupt", "witch", "ambitious" and "ungrateful"- such characterisation imply that Mujuru was unfit to succeed Mugabe. Equally, where *The Herald* used words and phrases describing Mnangagwa as "veteran of liberation war", "Mugabe's confidant", among other such "positive" characterisations, this study found that the newspaper was positioning him to succeed Mugabe.

1.11 Analysis and Discussion of Findings

Data gathered for this study is analysed through Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). CDA accounts for the role of language, language use, discourse and communicative events in the production of dominance and inequality (van Dijk et al 2006; McGregor 2010). It exposes

issues hidden in texts by taking “a particular interest in relation between language and power” and is concerned with analysing “opaque as well as transparent structural relationship of dominance, discrimination, power and control as manifested in language” (Wodak and Meyer, 2001:1-2). CDA exposes social inequality as expressed, constituted and legitimised by language or discourse. Language, as noted by Habermas (1977:259), becomes “a medium of domination ...and serves to legitimise relations of power. From this Habermasian argument, language is ideological. Wodak and Meyer (2001:2) argue that a critical assessment of discourse cannot be done in isolation. Rather, it must be cognisant of social processes as well as structures responsible for the generation of text. This supposition is confirmed by Fairclough and Kress (1993:2) when they assert that CDA speaks to the “concept of power, the concept of history, and the concept of ideology”. Consequently, discourse is structured by dominance, and is “historically produced and interpreted” (Wodak and Meyer, 2001:3). Significant to note as well is the fact that “the effects of power and ideology in the production of meaning are obscured ...” (Wodak and Meyer, 2001:5). CDA pays attention to texts, their production and interpretation and their relation to societal impulses and structures (Wodak, 2001:5). Fowler (1991, 1996), as cited by Wodak (2001:6), posits that CDA “uncovers linguistic structures of power in texts....and that systematic grammatical devices function in establishing, manipulating and naturalising social hierarchies”. It is from this line of thinking that the mass media is considered “a site of power” and “a site of struggle”

CDA also speaks to the “concept of power, the concept of history, and the concept of ideology” and is alive to the fact that “discourse is structured by dominance”, “every discourse is historically produced and interpreted, and that dominance structures are legitimated by ideologies of powerful groups” (Wodak and Meyer, 2001:3). CDA pays attention to texts, their production and interpretation and their relation to societal impulses and structures (Wodak, 2001:5). This devalues the claim that the media are neutral and disinterested storytellers. Wodak and Meyer (2001) reinforce Michel Foucault’s assertion that discourse is an instrument of power and of social construction of reality. Critical theories as CDA aim at enlightenment and emancipation. They not only seek to describe and explain but to “root out a particular kind of delusion”. It demystifies discourses by deciphering ideologies...and texts are often sites of struggle in that they show traces of differing discourses and ideologies contending and struggling for dominance” (Wodak and Meyer, 2001:10). It is clear, therefore, that language and power are at the heart of CDA as aptly captured by Wodak and Meyer (2001).

Language indexes power, expresses power, is involved where there is contention over and a challenge to power. Power does not derive from language, but language can be used to challenge power, to subvert it, to alter descriptions of power in the short and long term (Wodak and Meyer (p.10)

CDA is interested in exposing ways through which language is utilised in expression and manipulation of power. It considers all factors that influence generation and interpretation of a text including culture, society and ideology (Wodak and Meyer, 2001:15). In this study, Critical Discourse Analysis is utilised to examine stories published by *The Herald*, *Daily News* and *NewsDay* on ZANU-PF factionalism and Mugabe's succession. The idea is to analyse discourses emanating from the newspapers' coverage of the ruling party factionalism and expose their factional biases and the extent such editorial dispositions were influenced by Mugabeism or furthered its political goals consciously or unconsciously. Critical Discourse Analysis exposes social inequalities and it is within this study's interest to explore how political journalism at *The Herald*, *Daily News* and *NewsDay* was corrupted to favour factional interests and for whose benefit in the ZANU-PF succession matrix. This is also achievable through examining the nature of language deployed by the selected newspapers in their reportage of ZANU-PF factionalism. From a Critical Discourse Analysis perspective and as indicated already by Wodak and Meyer (2001), language is a medium of domination. It legitimates power relations. Critical Discourse Analysis exposes the power behind the texts generated by *The Herald*, *Daily News* and *NewsDay* on ZANU-PF factionalism and Mugabe's succession. Such power (forces) could be emanating from the newspapers' political economy or borrowing from Mugabeism's inherent divisive tendencies.

There are three dominant approaches to the study of discourse, according to Heracleous, 2006; Heracleous and Barret, 2001, Heracleous and Hendry, 2000). These are the interpretive, functional and critical approaches. This study deploys the interpretive and critical approaches. Interpretive approaches view discourse as communication action constructive of both the social and organizational realities. In the case of my study, the researcher is alive to the fact that *The Herald*, *Daily News* and *NewsDay* do not operate in a vacuum as their editorial content is influenced by both social issues and the political economy of the media (ownership and control having an effect on news generation). Critical approaches – a Marxian concept – conceptualize power knowledge relationships as constitutive of subjects' identities and of organizational and societal structures of domination (Heracleous, 2006).

1.12 Delimitation of the study

This study is confined to examining how Zimbabwe's daily newspapers, *The Herald*, *Daily News* and *NewsDay* reported on ZANU-PF factionalism between 2014 to 2017. The period marked the height of ZANU-PF factionalism as factions within the ruling party jostled to succeed Mugabe spurred by his old age. Focus was specifically on how the selected newspapers reported on two key ZANU-PF events that manifested factionalism. These were the ZANU-PF December 2014 elective congress at which President Robert Mugabe dismissed his deputy Joice Mujuru from the party and government. Mujuru reportedly intended to contest Mugabe for the presidency. The congress also witnessed the rise of Emmerson Mnangangwa to the vice president replacing Mujuru before his dismissal in 2017 from party and government. The study is limited to analyzing front-page stories and editorial commentaries generated by the newspapers on ZANU-PF factionalism in the run-up to the 2014 congress, during and after the assembly. Placement of stories on front page not only gives them prominence but also signals the extent to which editors consider them important (Erbring, 1980; Dickerson, 1985; Huh, 1993) while an editorial commentary reflects the mind of the newspaper about an issue (Dempsey, 1987; Eilders, 1997; Cundy, 1989). It is on this basis that the study was restricted to examining front-page articles and editorial commentaries on ZANU-PF factionalism. It is also confined to examining the influence of Mugabeism on news production processes at *The Herald*, *Daily News* and *NewsDay* during the period under review. While Mugabeism is broad, its application in this study is restricted to governance through intraparty factionalism or divisionism (Chikuhwa, 2004; Tekere, 2006; Msindo, 2014; Hove, 2019; Musanga, 2022; Masiya and Maringira, 2017).

1.13 Limitation of the study

Scholarship on the influence of ZANU-PF factionalism on the media is thin. Worse, there are no studies as yet deploying Mugabeism as theoretical lenses in journalism studies. This meant the study suffered challenges associated with breaking new ground - limited scholarship to review. Prior to this thesis, scholarship on Mugabeism was confined to the political science and history domain with no application in media studies. The researcher also encountered challenges in data gathering when editors at *The Herald*, *Daily News* and *NewsDay* were reluctant to partake in the study owing to sensitivity of the subject under review. Data for the study was therefore limited to interviewing senior political journalists at the selected newspapers responsible for the generation of stories on Mugabe's succession from whom unique insights were harvested. This opened new academic avenues into the study of intraparty factionalism and the media. The researcher also relied on archival research as a data gathering

instrument with stories gathered subjected to Critical Discourse Analysis Discourse Historical Approach to map the discourses generated and the forces behind their erection.

1.14 Thesis structure

This thesis comprises eight chapters. Chapter One introduces the study and justifies its rationale while also outlining the research methods and methodology. Chapter Two thematically reviews and contextualises literature on intraparty factionalism drawing from other countries and regions to show that the problem is ubiquitous. Chapter Three reviews scholarship on Mugabeism and traces the challenge of factionalism in ZANU-PF right from its formation as a breakaway from ZAPU in 1963 up to 2017 when Robert Mugabe was removed from power through a coup. Chapter Four presents the theories driving the study - Mugabeism and the Critical Political Economy. Mugabeism is a theory imported from politics and history domain to account for journalistic processes at the height of ZANU-PF factionalism (2014 - 2017). Its deployment in this study is a response to global calls to decolonise media studies by viewing things African from an African perspective and locus of enunciation. The thesis has three data and findings chapters. Chapter Five presents and discusses data specifically gathered through face-to-face interviews with journalists at *The Herald*, *Daily News* and *NewsDay*. This is deliberate. The researcher wanted to avoid drowning the voices of journalists on how they participated in ZANU-PF factionalism and the consequences for journalism of their involvement in the intraparty schisms. Chapters Six and Seven presents findings from subjecting stories on ZANU-PF factionalism generated by *The Herald*, *Daily News* and *NewsDay* to Critical Discourse Analysis Discourse Historical Approach (CDA-DHA) to identify discourses emerging from the articles and the agenda set. Chapter 8 concludes the study and flags areas for further research.

1.15 Conclusion

Scholarship on the press and ZANU-PF factionalism is still nascent. Worse still, there is scarcity of literature examining the implications of Mugabeism on political journalism, and specifically on Zimbabwe daily newspapers' reportage of ruling party factionalism. This chapter examined how ZANU-PF factionalism witnessed between 2014 and 2017 cascaded into newsrooms at *The Herald*, *Daily News* and *NewsDay* bastardising and corrupting news production processes. It located the implications of Mugabeism on the three newspapers' construction of ZANU-PF factionalism. Mugabeism is a model imported from political science and history to account for journalistic processes at the height of ZANU-PF factionalism.

CHAPTER 2

2.0 DEFINING AND CONTEXTUALISING PARTY FACTIONALISM, A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE

This chapter defines and contextualises party factionalism. It derives from the viewpoint that whereas ZANU-PF suffered perennial problems of intraparty factionalism right from its formation in 1963 as a breakaway party from ZAPU, the phenomenon is global. It is not reducible to Robert Mugabe's ZANU-PF. The chapter takes a snapshot of incidents of party factionalism globally especially in Europe, America and Africa as a confirmation that the phenomenon is ubiquitous.

2.1 Defining Party factionalism

Basira (2019:113) defines party factionalism as “a clash of interests among members of a political party who are struggling over control of decision-making machinery of the party and other resources that could confer benefits on themselves”. Party factionalism occurs, “when members of the same political party pursue incompatible political goals or try to influence a decision-making process of the party to their advantage” (Momodu and Matudi, 2013: 3 cited in Basiru, 2019:113). Whereas factionalism is a process of a group emerging inside a larger group, a faction is “any intraparty combination, clique, or grouping whose members share a sense of common identity and common purpose and are organised to act collectively as a distinct bloc within the party to achieve their goals” (Zariski, 1960:33). There is consensus among scholars that factionalism is not a new phenomenon. Factions “are a feature of all political parties and the nature of a party is in the nature of its factions” (Sartori (2005: 65). If anything, Leiserson (1968) cited in Ceron (2019:10) views a party as “a coalition of factions” and insists that “the party is not a monolithic actor” as members may hold heterogeneous policy, interests, and personal career ambitions that do not combine naturally with that of other members”. There were fierce contestations and fights within the leadership ZANU-PF over who succeeded its long-time leader, Robert Mugabe. Such fighting saw the emergence of factions as members differed on the preferred successor. Under such a scenario and as confirmed by Key (1949:16), party members with shared views tend to coalesce marking the genesis of factions within the parent party. Key (1949:16) opines that a faction is “any combination, a clique, or grouping of voters and political leaders who unite at a particular time in support of a candidate” while Muller-Rommel (1982:14) suggests that a faction “arises in the struggle for power and represents a division on details of application”. These scholars

capture precisely the intraparty schisms that characterised ZANU-PF during the period 2014 to 2017 but fall short of locating how the media negotiated such intra-party factional fighting, a domain this study attends using Mugabeism as its theoretical lens. Mugabeism in the context of this study is a system of governance that enabled elongation of Robert Mugabe's state and party presidency. Mugabe led Zimbabwe for 37 years. The interest of this thesis is in establishing how Mugabe instrumentalised the selected newspapers in his power retention matrix and with what implications for journalism in Zimbabwe.

It is significant to note that scholars on party factionalism (Carty, 2004; Sartori, 2005; Mukwedeya, 2015; Sarakinsky and Fakir, 2015) are largely concerned about the causes of such internal schisms and the implications of factionalism on the affected political parties and its ramifications on national peace and security, government policy formulation and democracy. There is as already indicated, scarcity of scholarship examining the implications of Mugabeism on the Zimbabwean press's reportage of ZANU-PF factionalism especially towards the end of Robert Mugabe's rule. This study fills the academic lacuna by interrogating the extent to which Mugabeism might have influenced the manner in which Zimbabwe's daily newspapers – *The Herald*, *Daily News* and *NewsDay* – negotiated the intraparty factionalism that especially dominated ZANU-PF towards the end of Mugabe's rule. The study is limited to the period 2014 to 2017 as it marked the height of ZANU-PF factionalism, which culminated in Robert Mugabe relinquishing power in November 2017.

2.2 The universality of party factionalism

Factionalism is an omnipresent occurrence in political formations. It is not reducible to Zimbabwe and Robert Mugabe's ZANU-PF. Harmel et al (1995:7) share this perspective when they posit that factionalism is "a fact of life within most political parties" while Squintani (2016:875) suggests, "factions are ubiquitous". The life of a party, argues Sartori (2005:65-93), "is in the nature of its factions...factions, tendencies and groupings are a feature of all political parties". Heller (2008:2) contends, "political parties are driven by the spirit of factions". In this section, the researcher briefly case studies European and African party factionalism to illustrate the globality of the phenomenon. In Southern Africa, the African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa is case studied by virtue of its political links with ZANU-PF and its geographical proximity and influence on Zimbabwe politics. Also studied is People's Democratic Party (PDP) by virtue of the Nigeria being an African former British colony as Zimbabwe. This follows the argument that post-colonial African governments sustain their hegemony through divide and rule as learned from colonial regimes. This divide

and rule strategy was appropriated and incorporated into intra-party politics by some African ruling parties including Robert Mugabe's ZANU-PF.

2.3 A glance into European party factionalism

Party factionalism is as old as party formation itself, and has its origins in some of European and American oldest democracies. This is confirmed by Ceron (2019:2), "historically between 19th and the early 20th century, two of the world's oldest democracies – the United States and the United Kingdom, were affected by factional rivalries leading to party splits". Ceron (2019:2) traces factionalism in the US to 1828 observing, "Both the Democratic and the Republican Party were created by factions of the dissolved Democratic Party and the Liberal Party were hit by the breakaways of dissident factions". This is a reference to the Peelites faction breaking ranks with the Tories in 1846 and the Liberal Unionist Party's break away from the Liberals in 1886. Significant to note is the fact that European factionalism was largely occasioned by policy disagreements and this manifested with the formation of socialist political parties. Factional contentions within Socialist parties were a result of ideological incongruence over supporting state involvement in the economy or allowing market forces to be in charge.

However, Ceron (2019:2) argues that the problem of party factionalism is not "merely a thing of the past" and cites the recent "Brexit" and how it fractionised the United Kingdom's Conservative Party between 2016 and 2018. The "debate on Brexit is inherently linked with intra-party divisions ...UK politics highlights the existence of wide heterogeneity in both the labour and Conservative party" (Ceron, 2019:2). If anything, that factionalism is integral in British politics is also confirmed by how the Conservative legislators were divided in parliament in 2016 during the referendum campaign, splitting again during negotiations on the Theresa May's cabinet roadmap for Brexit in 2018. In mid-2022, Prime Minister Boris Johnson's Conservative Party experienced internal strife that saw 50 ministers resigning over the premier's "poor" governance (Falk, 2022) Johnson resultantly and reluctantly stepped down amid a chain of scandals from "partygate" to his involvement in the Russia-Ukrainian war, which generated an economic crisis at home evidenced by a sharp increase in energy prices. Equally, whereas Liz Truss's six weeks stay as British Prime in 2022 is blamed on her poor economic policies, colloquially referred as "Trussonomics" by the media, it is also attributable to factionalism within the Conservative Party (Loanes, 2022, Ball, 2022).

Elsewhere, in Germany in 2018 the ruling Christian Democratic Party leader Angela Merkel resigned abruptly following strong opposition from a faction in the party over her handling of the European migrant crises while in Italy in 2013 there was a conflict between liberal democratic and social democratic factions in centre left parties. “Later such strife reached a peak when the centrist Matteo Renzi became party leader in 2013 and for the sake of enhancing policy cohesion...started to neglect requests of internal minorities and repeatedly imposed the whip” (Ceron, 2019:4).

While this study is not about taxonomies of factions, the researcher insists this is a necessary detour as a discussion on ZANU-PF factionalism and its ramification on the media is only adequate when explored within the global context. This demystifies the notion that party factionalism is an Africa political curse responsible for the many problems Africa faces today. It is “a wide spread phenomenon” (Ceron 2019:6) Party factionalism is American as it is European and African but that does not mean that it is flawless. Party factionalism has negative implications for democracy in a nation inasmuch as it affects political and economic stability. If poorly managed party factionalism has disastrous consequences on national peace and efforts at entrenching democracy especially in developing countries as Zimbabwe. Existing studies (Sartori, 2005; Sarakinsky and Fakir, 2015; Mukwedeya, 2015; Ceron, 2019) are concerned about the dearth of scholarship on party factionalism and largely focus on the taxonomies of factions and their implications on democracy and national stability. This study unlike existing scholarship scrutinises the ramifications of party factionalism on the media in Zimbabwe. Deploying Mugabeism as its guiding theory, it investigates the extent ZANU-PF factionalism cascaded into the selected newsroom at *The Herald*, *Daily News* and *Newsday* and the way it corrupted the press’s reportage of Mugabe’s succession.

2.4 Party factionalism in selected African ruling parties, ANC and PDP

The section briefly captures incidents of factionalism in other ruling political parties in Africa using South Africa’s African National Congress (ANC) and the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) as case studies. The goal is to confirm that party factionalism is commonplace in African political parties and is not confined to Zimbabwe’s ZANU-PF and Mugabe.

2.5 Factionalism within the ANC

Factionalism within the ANC is traceable to its formation as the party was an amalgamation of people from different constituencies (Bonner, 2012:2; Mukwedeya, 2015:121). Historic incidents of factionalism in the ANC include the dismissal of its leader Josiah Gumede in 1930 after his visit of the Soviet Union saw him appropriating Soviet principles and doctrines – a

change rejected by conservatives in the party (Holland, 1989:46). Pixley Ka Isaka Seme replaced Gumede as the ANC president but this further fractionalised the party. A faction associated with Gumede broke away from the ANC to form the Independent ANC (Jolobe, 2012). The divisions within the ANC in colonial South Africa were driven by ideological differences on how to achieve independence. They were those within the ANC who advocated adoption of a confrontational approach towards the oppressive apartheid regime while another faction favoured a moderate approach (Lissoni, 2008). Another divisive moment in ANC was the issue of opening up the party to all racial groups (Ellis 2013:74) with Africanists as Robert Sobukwe advocating exclusion of whites, Indians and Coloureds in the party. Consequently, in 1959, Sobukwe broke away from the ANC to form the Pan African Congress (PAC). The issue of opening the ANC to all races therefore divided the party leadership with some veterans including Oliver Tambo embracing the idea while an Africanist faction led by Tennyson Makiwane were opposed. The Makiwane cabal was later expelled from the ANC for pursuing “disruptive factionalist activities” (Ellis 2013:74). The period 1979 to 1980 witnessed another bout of factionalism within the ANC when a faction comprising socialists attempted to persuade the party into socialism. The socialists were expelled from the ANC. They formed the Marxist Workers’ Tendency of the African National Congress (Friedman, 2012:18).

ANC continued to experience factional instability even after leading South Africa to independence in 1994. Signs of factionalism were first evident in 1996 after government’s introduction of a neo-liberal economic blueprint, which replaced the Reconstruction and Development Programme. COSATU and SACP opposed the move arguing it was a detour from the National Democratic Revolution (Bond, 2000) with Pillay (2006:167) observing that “this strained the relationship between the ruling ANC and the other two members of its tripartite alliance”. Mathekga (2008) suggests that the factional tensions that manifested in the ANC in the first two years of independence under Nelson Mandela worsened when Mbeki took over. Mbeki’s market-oriented policies earned him factional hate and the divisions worsened after he dismissed Zuma in 2005. “The ANC then became fragmented into two identifiable groups commonly referred to by the media as ‘communist’ and nationalist factions with Zuma associated with the former and Mbeki the latter” (Mukwedeya, 2015:124). Zuma’s victory at the Polokwane congress saw him purging all Mbeki loyalists. According to Nicoll (2011), this further strained the ANC as the pro-Mbeki faction broke away from the ANC to form the Congress of the People (COPE) in December 2008. Factionalism continued within the ANC even after the fall of Jacob Zuma and the coming in of Cyril Ramaphosa. This is acknowledged

by Booyesen (2018:7) who notes that the ANC “had become a site of a factional struggle” for control of the party between what she terms “Zumaists, who were associated with former presidential incumbent Jacob Zuma and his associate Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, and Cyril Ramaphosa faction that emerged narrowly victorious at the 2017 elective conference”.

The ANC, just like the PDP of Nigeria and Zimbabwe’s ruling ZANU-PF party, has a long history of intra-party factionalism. There are moments in ANC history when factionalism became so explosive and virulent. Mukwedeya (2015:117) argues that factionalism “became a defining characteristic of the African National Congress intra-party politics during the lead up to and after the 2007 Polokwane national elective congress” as “the party was sharply divided along factional lines, leading to the vicious contestation for the leadership of the party”. What precipitated the factional fighting within the ANC was a decision by then president, Thabo Mbeki, in September 2005 to dismiss his deputy Jacob Zuma. This followed the conviction of a Zuma ally Schabir Shaik of corruption and fraud by the Durban High Court. Two factions emerged as forces within the ANC who felt alienated by Mbeki coalesced under Zuma. The factional battles within the ANC were also attributable to the party’s adoption of what Rossow (2012:12) describes as “neo-liberal policies embodied by the introduction of the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) programme in 1996 deemed a betrayal of the National Democratic Revolution (NDR)”. The Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the South African Communist Party (SACP) – affiliated to the ANC – were strongly opposed to GEAR causing factional schisms. This is also confirmed by Lodge (2004:11), who notes that the decision by the Mbeki administration to privatise state enterprises ignited factionalism within ANC as calls from COSATU and SACP for Mbeki to serve only one presidential term grew louder. In this instance, it is clear that ideological or policy differences ruptured the ANC. There were, however, other causes of factionalism in the ANC. “Aside from ideological concerns, the ANC’s internal life is complicated by ...factionalism, or rivalries between supporters of particular personalities” (Lodge, 2004:33). Elements in the ANC opposed to Mbeki coalesced under Zuma. They backed Zuma at the Polokwane congress, which saw Mbeki losing power to his former deputy. As is characteristic of factionalism, on gaining power Zuma purged Mbeki supporters across provinces, districts, and municipalities. The fall of Jacob Zuma and the rise of Cyril Ramaphosa to the presidency is also littered with factionalism and these divisions were ongoing when this study was conducted.

2.6 Factionalism within Nigeria's PDP

Established on 19 August 1998, Nigeria's ruling PDP suffered intense intra-party factionalism blamed on a number of factors. Aleyomi (2013:281) attributes the internal conflicts to imposition of candidates and warns that, "Intra-party democracy is central to the maintenance of orderly society in any democracies". Aleyomi (2013:281) blames party factionalism in Nigerian political parties to their failure "to adopt an open system that will not only allow members of the party to participate in decision making but also give them constrained opportunity to contest in elections under the party's platform" arguing that such discord "is poisonous and has resulted in party wrangling". Aleyomi (2013), who focuses on the causes of party factionalism in Nigeria, argues that lack of a clear ideology in the PDP inflamed factionalism in the party inasmuch as the ethnicisation of politics, a high jack by party funders as well as poor leadership contributed. Ethnicisation of politics speaks to what Marshall et al (2012:4) terms polarisation, which often "reveals that some groups are excluded and, intentionally or unintentionally, discriminated against". This view is acknowledged by Marshall and Jagers (2006:26) when they suggest, "factional politics is parochial and ethnic based...based on political factions that regularly compete for political influence in order to promote particularist agendas and favour group members to the detriment of the common, secular or cross-cutting agendas". Amadasu and Amadasu (2003:120) also acknowledge the intense factionalism within the PDP and reflect that it was "an organisation riddled with internal schisms, brigandage and subterfuge"

2.7 Synopsis of ZANU-PF factionalism

Mangani (2018:2) observes that ZANU-PF factionalism in independent Zimbabwe first manifested in the period between 1980 and 1990 driven by lack of ideological/philosophical consensus within the party. Mugabe pushed the concept of one-party state; a position strongly opposed by his close associates, among them Edgar Tekere and Enos Nkala. This fractionalised ZANU-PF in the first decade of independence. Of these ideological differences within ZANU-PF, Mangani (2018:3) argues that "nationalist leadership appeared to have mimicked the former colonial master as evidenced by ZANU-PF's attempt to produce a coherent socialist state and one-party philosophy", adding that, "some of the senior leadership sought the establishment of one-party state in Zimbabwe through the decimation of ZAPU." Thus, early signs of ZANU-PF factionalism largely drew from ideological and philosophical disagreements within the ruling party. Besides the fissures over Mugabe's one-party philosophy, Mangani (2018:4) also insists that "ZANU-PF factionalism in Zimbabwe's first decade of independence initially manifested over Mugabe's reconciliation policies towards the

white community and his reconciliatory approach towards (Joshua) Nkomo” – a policy position again vehemently opposed by some of his wartime allies Tekere and Nkala. Doran (2017) acknowledges this point of friction and suggests that, “issues around a negotiated revolution and ZANU’s policy towards ZAPU saw divisions emerging between Tekere and Mugabe”. Mangani (2018:4) reinforces this point reiterating that, “These divisions found expression in the public space and at one time posters circulated in the capital Harare lauding ‘Comrade Tekere as the defender of the revolution’ while castigating Mugabe as ‘Puppet Mugabe the sell-out’.” Tekere and Nkala “represented a leftist and ultra-conservative faction that sought to construct an image of Mugabe based on moderatism and sell-out logic” (Mangani, 2018:4). This explains why after independence Tekere and Nkala toiled with the idea of forming a splinter political party under the moniker “Super ZANU” with Doran (2017:225) proclaiming that Tekere and Nkala favoured a radical approach as opposed to Mugabe’s moderatism.

What Mangani (2018) is highlighting is what Ceron (2019) terms ideological factions/factionalism – intra-party divisions occasioned by the failure to agree on ideological or policy directions among party leadership. Carty (2004) confirms this position asserting that lack of consensus within a party over a policy position causes factionalism, as was the case of Mugabe’s reconciliation policy which some of his long-time wartime allies vigorously opposed. Equally, Mugabe’s women’s quota policy – which saw Joice Mujuru elevated to the vice presidency in 2004 ahead of the popular Emmerson Mnangagwa – only but deepened factionalism within the ruling ZANU-PF. Ideological factions are a universal phenomenon as shown later in this chapter and have often led to the splitting of political parties. Intra-party elections are yet another cause of party factionalism (Sartori, 2005) especially in countries where the party leader has overstayed in the position, as was the case with Robert Mugabe – who at 93 still wanted to remain ZANU-PF’s first secretary and national president. Fearing that their leader could retire, resign or die in office senior ZANU-PF officials started jostling for his position as early as 2004 as confirmed by what has become known as the Tsholotsho Declaration (Moyo, 2004; Coltart, 2018; Hove, 2019) right up to the December 2014 congress that saw Mugabe dismissing Joice Mujuru from government and the party. The study examines this subject at length later in a chapter on the genesis and history of ZANU-PF factionalism. Suffice to say at this moment that Mugabe’s overstay as party and national president created pockets of resistance to his leadership from his long-time allies majority of whom he fought the Chimurenga war. For example, in 2002 a senior ZANU-PF politician Eddison Zvobgo – frustrated by Mugabe’s overstay in office publicly equated the veteran leader to a madman –

“The mentality of a madman, who when given a baton in a race, flees with it into the mountains instead of passing it on” (Mandaza, 2007:41). That the issue of leadership positions caused factionalism in ZANU-PF in post 2000 is confirmed by death of Mugabe’s deputy, Vice President Simon Muzenda in 2003, when the ruling party was rocked by intense jostling over who replaced him. Among the aspirants was former Zimbabwe Defence Forces commander Vitalis Zvinavashe, who when overlooked by Mugabe, publicly dismissed his rule as disastrous (Mangani, 2018:8). Zvinavashe belonged to the Mnangagwa faction, a faction opposed to Joice Mujuru’s ascendancy to the vice presidency – meaning there were two factions within ZANU-PF then. The factionalism – which became laced with ethnic discourses – eventually manifested with the Tsholotsho factional convention – which saw a ZANU-PF cabal aligned to Emmerson Mnangagwa converging to call for, among other things, a non-Zezuru vice president. Mugabe was a Zezuru while Mnangagwa is of Karanga origin. The Tsholotsho Declaration advocated for Mnangagwa’s elevation to vice presidency. The idea was to position Mnangagwa to succeed Mugabe in 2008. It also advocated for the elevation of Patrick Chinamasa (Manyika origin) to ZANU-PF chair position; Jonathan Moyo (Ndebele) secretary for administration.

According to Coltart (2018), seven out of ZANU-PF’s 10 provinces endorsed the proposal “on the basis of ethnic politics – Karanga, Manyika, Ndebele, versus Zezurus and Mugabe”. This means that besides the issue of party leadership positions inflaming ZANU-PF factionalism, ethnicity became yet another driving force as confirmed by the Tsholotsho Declaration’s demand for ethnic balance in the top echelons of the ruling party. Mugabe reacted to the Tsholotsho Declaration by elevating Joice Mujuru to the vice presidency even though ZANU-PF provinces had voted for Mnangagwa. He demoted Mnangagwa from his positions as Justice Minister and Speaker of Parliament to a “less influential ministry (Rural Amenities) and this showed how shrewd a politician Mugabe had been in playing one side against the other in ZANU-PF” (Mangani, 2018:10). That Mujuru was unceremoniously dismissed from the vice presidency when she had reportedly amassed support within ZANU-PF to contest Mugabe at the ruling party 2014 elective congress, confirms the extent to which issue of leadership positions and elections fuel factionalism in political parties (Lodge, 2004; Sarakinsky and Fakir, 2015; Basiru, 2019; Ceron, 2019). Mnangagwa replaced Mujuru as the first vice president. Phelekhezela Mphoko was appointed the second vice presidency on a Ndebele ticket. This, however, failed to end factionalism within ZANU-PF. Inspired by Mugabe’s old age – two factions emerged – Mnangagwa’s Team Lacoste versus ZANU-PF’s young Turks running

under the moniker Generation 40 or simply G40. Mugabe's wife, Grace, was suspected to be the force behind the G40 member – whose other compatriots included Jonathan Moyo, Saviour Kasukuwere, Patrick Zhuwao, Walter Mzembi, among other 'young' ZANU-PF politicians, frustrated by the old guard as epitomised by Mnangagwa, who boosted liberation struggle credentials. The dismissal of Mujuru did not end ZANU-PF fissures and the researcher suggests that Mugabe's overstay in the presidential office despite old age – aggravated factionalism in the ruling party. This reinforces the argument that intra-party schisms are a result of jostling by senior politicians for leadership positions.

In the context of ZANU-PF factionalism, it is more so considering the fact the elevation of Mnangagwa following Mujuru's dismissal only but sparked another bout factional strife with G40 seeking to depose Mnangagwa as a potential Mugabe successor. Tables only turned in November 2017 when the military forced Mugabe to resign paving the way for Mnangagwa's presidency. Nevertheless, that too seems failing to stem factionalism in ZANU-PF with media reports (Matenga, 2021; Bwanya, 2022) suggesting that Vice President Constantino Chiwenga, a retired ZDF commander, who engineered Mugabe's fall, is angling to succeed Mnangagwa leading to factional instability in the ruling party. Unlike ideological factions – the current fissures in ZANU-PF seem more like factions of convenience – there are no signs of ideological differences between the incumbent (Mnangagwa) and that of the aspirant (Chiwenga). Besides intra-party factionalism, emanating from ideological incongruence and patronage, failure to pursue interest groups' requests also causes factional friction within a political party.

2.8 Conclusion

This chapter defined and contextualised intra-party factionalism in the context of the fissures that dominated ZANU-PF towards the end of Robert Mugabe's rule. It briefly scanned cases of factionalism in other countries to show that intra-party divisions are not confined to Robert Mugabe's ZANU-PF. Among cases studied are South Africa's ruling ANC and the PDP of Nigeria by virtue of the former sharing close political relations with ZANU-PF while Nigeria is a former British colony as Zimbabwe. It emerged that factionalism is global and ubiquitous.

CHAPTER 3

3.0 MUGABEISM AND HISTORICITY OF ZANU-PF FACTIONALISM

This chapter reviews existing scholarship on Mugabeism, noting its expression as politics of survival, pan-Africanism and black economic emancipation. Factionalism is also broadly defined in this section and its genealogy in the Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) traced and contextualized for the benefit of those not familiar with its historicity. Suffice to state that ZANU-PF is a product of factionalism within the liberation movement as evidenced by ZAPU 1963 split that saw Robert Mugabe and Ndabaningi Sithole forming ZANU.

3.1 Mugabeism defined

Mugabeism is a term credited to Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009) who defines the phenomenon as an assemblage of political controversies, political behaviour, political ideas, utterances, rhetoric and actions that have crystallised around Robert Mugabe's political life in Zimbabwe. It is 'a brand of nationalism deeply interpellated by colonial culture of politics of intolerance, militarism, tribalism and violence (Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009b:1145). Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2015) also characterises Mugabeism as 'well thought intellectual ways of understanding Mugabe' – how he was produced historically and politically' adding that it is a 'populist phenomenon ...marked by ideological simplicity, emptiness, vagueness, imprecision, and multi-class character' (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009:1141). For Rusere (2015:8), Mugabeism is the style of politics that has characterised Robert Mugabe's leadership over the years. It is characterised by an emphasis on self-determination and apparent opposition to anything Western and has resulted in a leadership culture that is not meritocratic but highly personalised. Rusere (2015) also suggests that Mugabeism is a sophisticated response to imperialism and colonialism. Mugabeism is, therefore, a complex phenomenon and "there is no simple explanation of Mugabe...Western politicians, who have sought one or assumed one, have been left floundering in the wake of his complexities and complex stratagems" (Chan, 2019: 214).

Mpofu (2022:52) suggests that Mugabeism is 'a complex and contradictory cache of ideological beliefs and political behaviours that are informed by the behaviours and discourses that find residence and depth in Mugabe'. Helliker and Murisa (2020) citing Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2015) endorse this characterisation and assert that Mugabeism is the 'modes of rule, set of state practices and official discursive narratives prominent in Mugabe's era'. Consequently,

Mugabeism is ‘the plurality of the personal, political and philosophical being of Robert Mugabe’ (Sabao et al, 2021: xxi).

This study rides on the belief that no matter its variant nature, Mugabeism is a power retention philosophy – a view strongly supported by a number of scholars including Moyo (2015) and Moore (2015). Significant to state from the onset is the fact that inasmuch as it draws from Robert Mugabe, Mugabeism is not reducible or confinable to his bibliography/hagiography. It is a political system which has outlived Mugabe (Ndlovu Gatsheni and Ruhanya, 2020; Mpofu, 2022) with Chan (2019:217) boldly asserting that, “those coming after him (Mugabe) would be from the party he moulded. Its authoritarian nature would be unchanged. The party would be as Mugabe had crafted it and left it...” By this assertion, Chan (2019: xiii) confirms that Mugabeism is ‘a policy at work’ and ‘there is a pattern to it’. In viewing Mugabeism as a system and a policy at work following an established pattern, the researcher acknowledges it is worth scientific interrogation to establish how it has survived and evolved over the years.

But unlike other studies that have looked at Mugabeism from the perspective of pan-Africanism or anti-neo-colonialism, and politics of black economic empowerment, this study deploys Mugabeism as a theoretical lens in media and journalism studies. Specifically, the study seeks to establish how Mugabeism influenced political news generation at Zimbabwe’s main daily newspapers – *The Herald*, *Daily News* and *NewsDay* – at the height of ZANU-PF factionalism (period 2014-2017). This study is unique in that it examines Mugabeism from a political journalism perspective. There is no scholarship yet deploying Mugabeism theoretical lens in journalism studies.

3.2 Mugabeism as politics of survival

Mugabeism is politics of survival and a power retention scheme (Chan, 2019; Hove, 2019; Mpofu, 2022; Moyo, 2015; Moore, 2015; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009, 2015; Rusere, 2015). Robert Mugabe sustained his ZANU-PF and state power through various Machiavellian means, or what Dussel (2003:131) terms, ‘the corrupted political’ in which power is understood as a thing, an object at hand, or a well bound package that has to be conquered, taken and retained by all means necessary’ and ‘in which the state exists to preserve itself by conquering and retaining power’. It is in this ‘Dusselian’ context that Mugabe retained and sustained his party and state power through such means as politics of patronage and plunder, politics of intra-party factionalism, militarisation of state institutions, and through politics of violence unleashed at political foes.

3.3 Mugabeism as politics of patronage and plunder

As politics of patronage and plunder, Mwatwara and Mujere (in Gatsheni-Ndlovu 2015:180) suggest that Mugabeism is a complex power retention scheme in which Mugabe tolerated and condoned corruption by his ZANU-PF allies in government to buy their political favour. Mugabe instrumentalised and weaponised corruption by politicians in his ZANU-PF government with Mwatwara and Mujere (2015:180) noting that such tolerance was ‘part of an intricate power retention matrix’ as the late Zimbabwean leader would later blackmail ‘his compromised comrades to support his political ambitions’ or face criminal prosecution and public humiliation. Only politicians who were corrupt and politically ambitious – threatening Mugabe’s power – were subjected to interrogation and political annihilation. Examples of such victims include former vice presidents Joice Mujuru and Emmerson Mnangagwa (now Zimbabwean president), who were publicly humiliated at political rallies by Mugabe and his wife Grace on suspicion of harbouring presidential ambitions. Otherwise, several cases of corruption by ZANU-PF officials and cabinet ministers from as early as Zimbabwe’s first decade of independence were swept under the carpet by Mugabe even though he publicly condemned graft and threatened to decisively deal with the scourge largely responsible for Zimbabwe’s ‘economic crisis.

The corruption cases included the Willowvale Motor Industries scandal, popularly known as the Willowgate, in which Mugabe’s cabinet ministers bought luxurious vehicles from the state-owned enterprise at subsidised prices and sold them on the market at inflated prices. The war veterans’ compensation fund scandal, multiple farm ownership by ZANU-PF elites, and the multi-million dollars farm mechanisation programme in which farming implements were extended to ruling ZANU-PF elites as loans and were never repaid. These were part of a series of corruption cases that happened under Mugabe’s presidency. Mugabe took no action as part of the grand strategy to buy political loyalty from ZANU-PF politicians – instrumentalisation of corruption – with Msindo (2016:161) also suggesting that, ‘he (Mugabe) knew their weaknesses and secrets, which he could use against them should they become difficult’. In fact, as early as 1984, Mugabe had ensured the generation of the ZANU-PF Leadership Code aimed at fighting corruption by restricting property and business ownership by ruling party elites. Saunders (1991:73-74) observes that “the code was never enforced by the party...despite repeated statements by President Mugabe about imminent efforts to root out ‘daylight robbers’ from within the party, it is clear that the avaricious behaviour of senior party members grew

steadily in the 1980s”. Failure by Mugabe to activate the code speaks to the strategic instrumentalisation of corruption.

Such immoral power retention strategy is also confirmed by Mpofu (2022: 58), who citing the 2007 – 2008 US\$200 million farm mechanisation scuttlebutt, asserts that “despite a plethora of scandals involving corruption at national parastatalsvery few political elites involved in corrupt activities were punished during the Mugabe dispensation”. The farm mechanisation scandal is also acknowledged by Magaisa (2020) as well as the looting of diamonds worth US\$15 billion by ZANU-PF politicians and the military. It is in this context that Mugabeism is considered politics of cronyism, patronage and corruption, with Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2015) asserting that this explains why “a network of politically connected and predatory elite comprising ruling ZANU-PF officials, their families and friends whose agenda was wealth accumulation regardless of the effect of the avarice to public service provision”, coalesced around Mugabe. Such a patronage system, as buttressed by Mpofu (2022:61), “was key to ZANU-PF’s hegemonic strategy” and “wealth accumulation is depicted as a product of and machinery of centralising power and political agency in the formation and sustenance of an oligarchy”. Moyo (2015:62) observes that as a power-retention philosophy, “Mugabe deployed a constellation of Gramscian and Foucauldian power strategies of coercion and persuasion... to hold on to state power”. This speaks to Mugabe’s deliberate tolerance of grand corruption by allies in his ZANU-PF government as part of in Gramscian terminology, “power strategies of persuasion” while punishing those aiming at the presidency, in what could as well be termed “power strategies of coercion”.

3.4 Mugabeism as politics of factionalism

Existing scholarship (Chikukwa, 2004; Tekere, 2006; Mhanda, 2011, Msindo, 2014; Hove, 2019; Musanga, 2022; Masiya and Maringira, 2017) also confirms that Mugabe fanned and sustained ZANU-PF factionalism as part of his political survival philosophy. Mugabeism deployed Rhodesian tactics of divide and rule (factionalism) confirming Ndlovu-Gatsheni’ (2015)’s assertion that as a colonial subject and product, Mugabe perfected the art of repression and failed to undo that which he fought against during the liberation struggle. Hove (2019:203) posits that Mugabe exploited ZANU-PF factions and believed he could manage the factional infighting in a way ‘such that none of the contending groups would become too powerful to topple him’, adding that in fact, ‘Mugabe was both a creation and beneficiary of factionalism from the wider nationalist movement and within his party, both before and after independence’. This assertion suggests that ZANU-PF factionalism has its roots in the liberation struggle

(Chan, 2019; Sithole, 1999; Chung, 2006; Tekere, 2006; Mhanda, 2011, Msindo, 2016). Since ZANU factionalism predates Mugabe's assumption of leadership of the guerrilla war and the ZANU-PF government after independence, the researcher subscribes to the view that as a beneficiary of intra-party divisionism, Mugabe perfected the art of intra-party factionalism.

Hove (2019) is not alone in associating Mugabeism with politics of factionalism with Musanga (2022:189) suggesting that, 'Mugabe's leadership had been sustained fundamentally by his propensity to breed and manipulate factions to abate internal opposition in ZANU-PF and government'. Masiya and Maringira (2017:10) reinforce this argument adding that, 'any faction that aligns itself with President Mugabe has tended to eventually dominate albeit temporarily'. Reacting to Mugabe's removal from power through a military assisted operation in November 2017, Musanga (2022: 189) reiterates that Mugabe tactically engineered factionalism in ZANU-PF as political survival philosophy and sarcastically states that, 'the factionalism which Mugabe had helped create and sustained his rule for over four decades...devoured the life of its creator and benefactor'. Msindo (2016:148) also makes a similar observation:

Robert Mugabe is a product and beneficiary of the politics of factionalism within the broader nationalist movement and in his own party before and after independence. Because Mugabe rose to power within the context of factional power struggles in ZANU, his leadership has been sustained chiefly by the tendency to generate and manipulate factions to weaken internal dissent in ZANU-PF and government. As Mugabe has advanced in years, the major factor sustaining him in power is the enmity of factions within the party, which makes it difficult for them to unite and challenge him.

Masiya and Maringira (2017) further observe that Mugabe even deployed the politics of intra-party factionalism in the conferment of national hero's status on 'dead comrades' fully cognisant of what the granting or denial of such honour meant to those who fought for Zimbabwe's independence. In confirming this instrumentalisation of heroism, Masiya and Maringira (2017:6) argue that, 'War heroism in ZANU-PF mutates and has been used in the party's factional fight'. Mugabe would go as far as delegitimising and peripherising the contribution to the liberation struggle by senior ZANU-PF politicians who showed interest in his presidential position and elevate their status on account of unquestionable loyalty to him. Examples of such victims include Mugabe's long-time allies – former vice presidents Joice Mujuru and Emmerson Mnangangwa, former ZANU-PF secretary for administration Didymus

Mutasa and former Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association chair Jabulani Sibanda. When Mutasa lost Mugabe's favour for belonging to the Mujuru faction, Mugabe publicly disparaged him as a sell-out and branded him 'an agent of the British South African police special branch'. Mujuru's contribution to the liberation struggle was also deconstructed while Mnangagwa was portrayed as nothing further than Mugabe's personal assistant during the struggle. As for Jabulani Sibanda, Masiya and Maringira (2017:18) note that:

Jabulani Sibanda remained untouchable, a hero and a darling of ZANU-PF and the President. However, once believed that he belonged to a wrong faction led by Vice President Mujuru, he began to receive his own dose of vilifications and his contribution and loyalty to ZANU-PF over the years was cancelled.

Masiya and Maringira (2017:4) examine how the liberation hero status 'is conveniently used in the party's (ZANU-PF) factional fights' by Mugabe. They conclude that, 'as a result of intensifying factionalism in ZANU-PF, one now needs to be intimately connected to a dominant ZANU-PF faction in order to be recognised as a hero in addition to having a presence in the bush war'. Thus, Masiya and Maringira (2017:5) are concerned with 'how the hero status of an individual is constructed within ZANU-PF through the narrative of the liberation war, but more importantly explore the ways in which such status 'mutates over time'. This granting or denial of liberation struggle glory by Mugabe to political allies in a carrot and stick fashion is a subject confirmed by Chikukwa (2004) and Mhanda (2011). They concur that Mugabe denied other liberation struggle fighters their place in history and on the national heroes' acre because they did not belong to his type of politics. Names that quickly come to mind include ZANU's first president Ndabaningi Sithole, James Chikerema, Wilfred Mhanda, Henry Hamaziripi and Margaret Dongo. Masiya and Maringira (2017:5) argue, however, that 'those who later joined ZANU-PF had their hero' status restored'. Prime among such beneficiaries was the late Zimbabwean vice president Joshua Nkomo, later crowned in the popular image as 'father Zimbabwe' despite wearing the sell-out and dissident tag in the 1980s (citing Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009).

Again, this is confirmation of Mugabeism borrowing the Gramscian notion of coercion and persuasion – denying hero status to deserving former liberation fighters (coercion) and granting those believing in his politics (persuasion). Masiya and Maringira (2017:5) conclude that, 'ZANU-PF and president Mugabe's view of heroes has always been driven by the zeal to fulfil their own political agendas and to remain in power. However, vicious intra-party factional

fighters within ZANU-PF have grown in the last decade and have seen similar strategy being applied to members or group of members who have fallen out of favour with the establishment within ZANU-PF’.

Tekere (2006) also alludes to Mugabe’s politics of factionalism reminiscing on its manifestation during the liberation war and remaining his trademark political philosophy after independence. According to Tekere (2006), Mugabe surrounded himself with some senior ZANU-PF politician and ex-wartime war generals like Solomon Mujuru whose loyalty he did not doubt while repudiating long-time allies deemed a threat his throne. Msindo (2016: 161) confirms this claim, ‘Mugabe surrounded himself with people whose future in the party depended on their absolute loyalty to him’. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2006) also notes that ZANU-PF factionalism ‘pre-dated 1980’ (independence) citing Sithole (1999).

3.5 Mugabeism as militarisation of the state

There is a corpus of literature as well on how Mugabe militarised state institutions as part of a power retention scheme (Maroleng, 2005a; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2006; Chitiyo, 2009; Mandaza, 2016; Moyo, 2016; Hove, 2017; Ruhanya, 2018; Magaisa, 2021; Mandaza, 2021; Ruhanya 2021). Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2006:1) unpacks ‘the dynamics of the connections between the nationalist government of Zimbabwe and the armed forces, which have translated into serious politicisation of the security sector and heavy militarisation of politics of the country’ and bemoans how the army was ‘misused by Mugabe in a power game’. Moyo (2016) points to the army’s involvement in Zimbabwean politics in the context of what he terms ‘military commercialisation’. Moyo (2016) insists that ‘contrary to the official version, ZANU-PF led government provides predatory commercial opportunities for the military officials, through secondment to state enterprises and parastatals, to increase their loyalty in ensuring regime survival in the face of mounting challenge from the opposition political society since the tail end of the 1990s’. In seconding the military to state enterprises and institutions, the ZANU-PF government cites their discipline and dedication to duty as opposed to civilians. Ruhanya (2018) also discusses Mugabe’s militarisation of government institutions including state media but from the perspective and context of state capture arguing instead that it is the military that captured these institutions. In an article published by the *Zimbabwe Independent* (a privately-owned newspapers) on 17 November 2018, Ruhanya (2018) notes that, ‘A cursory look of the military infrastructure within the state media shows that in 2009, eight senior security sector members were appointed by the then Information Ministry into media-related boards’. Ruhanya (2018) further points to the ‘pervasive presence’ of the military in other parastatals

and across the bureaucracy and concludes that, ‘Mugabe unwittingly constructed a defacto military state led by a de jure civilian authority under his authoritarian tutelage’.

This view is buttressed by Mandaza (2021), who asserts that the Zimbabwean crisis emanates from the strong belief within ZANU-PF itself that its power and continued rule is dependent on the strength of the military security machinery concluding that ZANU-PF has forestalled political change in Zimbabwe ‘through the dominant role of the military-security machinery’. Writing in the *Zimbabwe Independent* earlier on 18 April 2016, Mandaza again alluded to the ‘alliance between the comprador bourgeois class and sections of the security forces around the state over the last two decades’. Magaisa (2021) concurs observing that senior army officials ‘have a direct link with ZANU-PF’ pointing to the luxury afforded them by the Mugabe regime in a sea of majority poverty – ‘they live comfortably in guarded mansions, they have drivers and they are involved in business activities such as farming and mining. They are the biggest beneficiaries of government programmes such as Command Agriculture, Baccosi and farm mechanisation...They are directly involved in ZANU-PF politics...’ Like Ruhanya (2018), Magaisa (2021) uses the term state capture rather than its militarisation.

3.6 Mugabeism as politics of violence and intolerance

As a power retention philosophy, Mugabeism also survives on the politics of violence and intolerance (Kriger, 2003; Ranger, 2003; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003, 2012; 2015; Chan, 2019; Sadomba, 2011, Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Benyera, 2015; Moyo, 2016). In confirming Mugabe’s utilisation of violence as a means to safeguarding and ring fencing state power, Ndlovu and Benyera (2015:10) argue that the Zimbabwean politics ‘has been underpinned by a perennial paradigm of war that is articulated in terms of a series of Zvimurenga (First Chimurenga, Second Chimurenga and Third Chimurenga)...This paradigm of war has inscribed conflicts and violence’ and this paradigm of war ‘exists as central Leitmotif of political practice’. By tracing political violence to the advent of colonialism, Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Benyera, 2015:11) seem to support characterisation by Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2015) of Mugabe as a colonial subject and product perfecting the colonial instruments and architecture of repression, the basis against which he fought colonialism. Zimbabwe and Mugabe’s ‘paradigm of war’ is analysable episodically. The liberation war as exercise of political violence and intolerance, Matabeleland Gukurahundi episode, Hondo yeminda (Fast track land reform programme) and the post 2000 violent national power struggles pitting the governing ZANU-PF party against the Morgan Tsvangirai led Movement for Democratic Change are hallmarks of Mugabeism’s adoption of violence as a means to power and an instrument for its retention.

For Chan (2019), Mugabeism in its Maoist or Stalinist manifestations deployed violence and ruthlessness whenever its power was under threat from political rivals be they from within or outside his ruling ZANU-PF party. Mugabeism ‘seems to have some need to suppress and reorder what reputation they (Mugabe’s opponents) have ...and moves to ruthlessness in both moments of challenge and in memory of challenge... Mugabe’s ‘rise to the leadership (of ZANU) was crafted by deceit and treacheries,’ Chan (2019: xiii).

He (Mugabe) was ruthless. He supplanted (Ndabaningi) Sithole as the head of the then ZANU; there are question marks over the death of nationalist leader Herbert Chitepo, with the help of Rex Nhongo (Solomon Mujuru), he supplanted the Zimbabwean guerrilla leadership in exile in Mozambique; there are question marks over the death of liberation General Tongogara; and there are finally latter-day question marks over the death of Solomon Mujuru (Chan 2019:233).

There is also consensus among some scholars (Sadomba, 2011; Moyo, 2016; Ruhanya, 2018.) that the militarisation of state institutions and establishment of National Youth Services (cum ZANU-PF militia) by Mugabe was an act of violence. The army became not only an extension of the ruling party but also a vehicle of state-sponsored violence especially during national elections.

Existing scholarship (Maroleng, 2005a; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2006, 2009, 2015; Chitiyo, 2009; Moyo, 2015; Moore, 2015; Rusere, 2015; Mandaza, 2016; Moyo, 2016; Hove, 2017; Ruhanya, 2018; Chan, 2019; Magaisa, 2021; Mandaza, 2021; Ruhanya, 2021; Mpofo, 2022) examines Mugabe’s political survival philosophy as politics of patronage and plunder, politics of intra-party factionalism, militarisation of the state, and politics of violence and intolerance. There is, however, a deficiency of literature interrogating the manifestation of Mugabeism in political journalism in the press. This study addresses this omission as it is concerned with highlighting the influence of Mugabeism in news production processes at both the state controlled and the privately owned daily newspapers in Zimbabwe at the height of ZANU-PF factionalism. Put in other words, this research is concerned with locating elements of Mugabeism in the generation of political news content by the daily newspapers in Zimbabwe in the period 2014 – 2017 when there was intense infighting and jostling for Mugabe’s position in ZANU-PF owing to his old age and failure to manage his succession.

In examining Mugabeism in the context of political journalism and news production cultures, the researcher is cognisant of the fact that Mugabeism cannot be reduced to Mugabe the person

but is a political system or network at work (Chan, 2019; Helliker and Murisa, 2020; Mpfu, 2022; Helliker and Murisa in Musanga, 2022). This explains why scholars such as Mpfu (2022: 54) cannot separate Mugabeism from what he terms ‘Zanuism’. For Mpfu (2022), it is impossible to talk of Mugabeism without inferring ‘Zanuism’ or ‘Zanuism’ without inferring Mugabeism. Mpfu (2022:54) notes that Zanuism is ‘a twin concept of Mugabeism in Zimbabwean politics,’ adding that:

They (Mugabe and Zanu-PF) act in concert, producing toxic hegemony that thrives on patronage system. Zanuism is a cache of behaviours, attitudes, conduct, relations, and rationalities that define the party’s sense of entitlement on the simple basis of its liberation struggle history. Zanuism allows the conflation of the party and the state.

Also in marrying Mugabeism to Zanuism or Zanuism to Mugabeism, Mpfu (2022) emphasizes the fact that Mugabeism inasmuch as it derives from Robert Mugabe, is a networked political philosophy resident in ZANU-PF, the party. This also explains why Mpfu (2022:55-63) speaks of ‘Mugabe’s machinery of hegemony’ and of Mugabe as ‘a political and moral institution...a toxic system whose entrenchment in ZANU-PF has ensured the continuity of what is broadly called Mugabeism’. Supposition of Mugabeism as a networked political system not reducible to the individual is buttressed by Helliker and Murisa in Musanga (2022:194), who argue that ‘the modes, set of state practices and official discursive narratives prominent in Mugabe era are not reducible to Robert Mugabe the person as they are firmly embedded within ZANU-PF organisationally’. They add that, ‘ZANU-PF no longer has Mugabe at the helm but Mugabe through Mugabeism still reigns from the grave’.

The researcher is also fully cognisant of the fact that as a political philosophy and strategy or a system of hegemony (Mpfu (2022), Mugabeism operates through third parties (Chan, 2019). In rising to the leadership of ZANU and its military wing, ZANLA, during the liberation war, Mugabe roped in Solomon Mujuru (Tekere, 2006), and in dismantling the commercial farmers’ financial support for Zimbabwe’s main opposition party, the MDC, Mugabe unleashed war veterans on white owned farms in 2000 (Chan, 2019). To consolidate his waning power, Mugabe militarised the state as highlighted earlier in this section. It is in this context that the study investigates how the Mugabe machinery influenced political news generation at the selected newspapers in Zimbabwe at the height of ZANU-PF factionalism – what the researcher terms manifestation of Mugabeism in print journalism. If Mugabeism operated in many forms and formats in non-media fields as adequately iterated by existing scholarship, this study is

persuaded of its active influence in the practice of political journalism at the selected newspapers as factionalism ripped ZANU-PF apart. There are no studies yet dedicated to locating the influence or manifestation of Mugabeism in political journalism in Zimbabwe especially at the height of ZANU-PF factionalism. This not only makes this research unique but contributes new knowledge on the implications of ruling party factionalism on the media in Zimbabwe.

3.7 Mugabeism as pan-Africanism and black empowerment

Scholarship on Mugabeism has expanded to examine its expression as Pan-Africanism and black economic empowerment (Elochukwu, 2009; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2015; Rusere, 2015; Mararike, 2018; Mpofu, 2020; Chirimuuta and Jongore, 2021; Mahomva 2021; Sabao, 2021; Mpofu, 2021). However, there are no studies interrogating how, as the presumed champion of pan-Africanism, Mugabe influenced generation of political news content by the press in Zimbabwe between 2014 and 2017 that repudiated, rebutted and repulsed the very foundations of Pan-Africanism. The period cited marks the height of ZANU-PF factionalism. Pan-Africanism by its very nature advocates African goodwill and togetherness. Inasmuch as it acknowledges and appreciates existing scholarship juxtaposing Mugabeism to Pan-Africanism, this study contends that such literature is thin on discussing the implications of Mugabeism on the emergence of a ‘factionalised’ political journalism form in daily newspapers in Zimbabwe. The researcher asserts that operating as a ‘machinery of hegemony’ (Mpofu, 2022) or as ‘a policy’ (Chan, 2019), Mugabeism undermined the very essence and foundation of African unity at the political party level (ZANU-PF) by either actively promoting or condoning the emergence of a factionalised political journalism that inflamed disunity among hitherto political comrades. Therefore, this study is an attempt at locating and positioning Robert Mugabe’s involvement – directly or indirectly (as machinery of hegemony) – in production of ‘factionalised’ political news texts on the ZANU-PF succession saga in the period between 2014 and 2017. This period as already highlighted, marked the height of ZANU-PF factional fighting. Equally, a study interrogating the implications of Mugabeism on political journalism in Zimbabwe unavoidably extends to probing the extent to which the so-called privately owned media are indeed private insofar as news generation is concerned. Put in other words, this study is unique in the sense that in interrogating the influence of Mugabeism on news production processes not only at the state controlled *The Herald* but also at privately owned *Daily News* and *NewsDay*, it rethinks the notion of ‘how private are privately-owned media’ insofar as news generation is concerned. This study notes that while it is on record that *The Herald* is

controlled by government, it would be interesting to unpack the extent to which Mugabeism influenced new production cultures at privately owned newspapers, *Daily News* and *NewsDay*, which by virtue of their private ownership are deemed free from editorial manipulation by the state.

This investigation therefore deviates from (Elochukwu, 2009; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2015; Rusere, 2015; Mararike, 2018; Mpofu, 2020; Mahomva 2021; Sabao, 2021; Mpofu, 2021; Chirimuuta and Jongore, 2021) whose evaluation of Mugabeism ends with their unanimous confirmation that it is ‘controversial’ Pan-Africanism without extending their analysis to its influence on journalistic practices and news production processes. In his assessment of Mugabeism as pan-Africanism, Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2015:4) contends that Mugabeism is ‘a construction and political production of African anti-colonial nationalism’ whose political rhetoric ‘is steeped in popular decolonial politics and further observes that Mugabe’s political practice ‘is far from democratic, tolerant and peaceful’. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2015:4) posits that Mugabe’s pan Africanism and anti-colonial rhetoric ‘is yet to escalate to a genuine decolonial agenda that transforms the colonial structures of power’. Concurring with Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2015), Rusere (2015) suggests Mugabeism is politics of ‘the anti-colonial’ while Elochukwu (2009:50) associates Mugabe’s Pan-Africanism with Africa’s relations with the North (Western nations).

Mugabeism is a philosophical consideration of the involvement and propensities of African leaders such as Robert Mugabe in Africa’s relationship with the rest of the world, especially the West...Those who seek accommodation for Mugabe think he incarnates a resurgent spirit of African irredentism, that he personifies a desirable Africa effort to roll back the frontiers of neo-colonialism, that his land reform cannot be dismissed as one unfortunate abstract that can be disengaged from the polemics over Africa’s relationship with neo-colonialist sovereigns and forces (p.50).

Elochukwu (2009) opines that Mugabe becomes a ‘necessary example in Africa’s politics as far as her relationship with the rest of the world is concerned’. He is, however, quick to note that opponents of Mugabe view Mugabeism as an obsession with power retention. They treat Mugabe as ‘a tyrant who has become imprisoned by illusions of grandeur and indispensability’. The researcher is of the view that the assumption by Elochukwu (2009) fails to interrogate how Mugabe manipulated media narratives on ZANU-PF factionalism. For Mararike (2018), Mugabeism means black economic empowerment and seeks a common vision of life for Africans – economic emancipation and freedom through post-colonial projects as the agrarian

revolution. This study notes that while scholarship on Mugabeism adopted a multi-pronged approach to cover politics, pan-Africanism, black empowerment, corruption to mention but a few – there are no studies yet examining the influence of Mugabeism on political journalism in Zimbabwe.

This study treats Mugabeism as ‘divide and rule’ politics in which Robert Mugabe calculatedly and covertly stokes and nurtures factionalism in ZANU-PF by setting up his potential successors against each other and in the political melee tighten his grip on power. As indicated in the problem statement, studies on the influence of Mugabeism on journalism in Zimbabwe are relevant and timely as they contribute to ongoing academic debate on the need to decolonise mass media studies in Africa. Researcher contends that a one size fits all theoretical approach, exemplified by the political economy of the media theory, fails to cater for certain phenomenological developments like the editorial positioning of daily newspapers in Zimbabwe at the height of ZANU-PF factionalism and local factors influencing such editorial stance.

3.8 Genealogy of ZANU-PF factionalism

Although ZANU-PF experienced fierce factional fights that culminated in Robert Mugabe relinquishing power under duress in November 2017, factionalism in the ruling party is traceable to its formation. This section gives a brief genealogy of ZANU-PF factionalism, which not only dates back to its formation in 1963 but also characterised the liberation war and cascaded into independent Zimbabwe eventually leading to the fall of Mugabe in November 2017 via a coup engineered by his long-time ally Emmerson Mnangagwa. Key moments of ZANU-PF factionalism captured in this study include the split of ZAPU in 1963 – which gave birth to ZANU, the Nhari Rebellion, and the murder of ZANU chair Herbert Chitepo. The formation of FROLIZI, the Vashandi/Workers incident and its violent suppression, and the formation of the Patriotic Front by Mugabe and Nkomo and its collapse is also reflective of the endemic factional battles within Zimbabwe’s liberation movement. Tongogara’s death, the 1980 ZANU elections and Mugabe’s victory, and the dismissal of Edgar Tekere from ZANU-PF in 1987 further expose the extent to which factionalism has dominated the ruling party over the years. The post 2000 ZANU-PF factions (Joice Mujuru versus Emmerson Mnangagwa), the fall of Mujuru and rise of Mnangagwa, emergence of Mnangagwa faction and Grace Mugabe affiliated Generation 40 camp, the fall of Mugabe and Mnangagwa’s assumption of the presidency, are events riddled with factionalism.

3.9 The ZAPU split and formation of ZANU

In its recapture of ZANU-PF factionalism, this study largely draws from Masipula Sithole (2015) book, 'Zimbabwe: Struggles within the struggle' although it also makes reference to Sithole and Makumbe (1997), Chung (2006), Tekere (2006), Msindo (2016) and Mangani (2020). According to Sithole (2015), in-fights within liberation movements as ZANU-PF are 'a fact of political life and a part of the dynamic of human organisation'. Sithole (2015) traces ZANU-PF factionalism to 1963 when ZAPU leader Joshua Nkomo suspended other nationalist leaders from the party, who included Ndabaningi Sithole, Robert Mugabe and Leopold Takawira. Nkomo later expelled the Sithole and Mugabe faction from ZAPU after they attempted to suspend him from the party. This saw the Sithole/Mugabe camp breaking away from ZAPU and forming ZANU on 8 August 1963 with Sithole (2015) stating that, 'the open struggle within the Zimbabwe struggle began with the split in ZAPU in July 1963 leading to the formation of ZANU on August 8 of the same year'. This is an account shared by Msindo (2016) and Mangani (2020). In forming ZANU, the Ndabaningi Sithole and Robert Mugabe faction accused Nkomo of preferring a negotiated political settlement with the Ian Smith's Rhodesian regime instead of executing the liberation war. The Sithole/Mugabe camp was also unhappy with Nkomo's decision to lead the war from his base in exile (Zambia) and not in the battlefield. Nkomo immediately formed the People's Caretaker Council (PCC) following the separation.

Factional fights were to dominate ZAPU as well following the incarceration of Nkomo by the Smith regime and the assumption of presidency, on acting basis, by James Chikerema. Two factions immediately emerged in ZAPU – one led by Chikerema and the other by Jason Moyo – and these divisions were along ethnic and tribal lines. The Chikerema camp in ZAPU was largely Shona while Moyo's comprised the Ndebele and Kalanga. Equally, ZANU experienced its own share of political upheavals at the time with Ndabaningi Sithole and Robert Mugabe battling for control of the party. This culminated in the emergence of the Sithole camp and Mugabe faction within ZANU. Those that aligned with Mugabe accused Sithole of selling out to the Smith regime while in prison in a bid to buy his freedom. There were also ethnic and tribal connotations in the fall-out within ZANU – Mugabe was a Zezuru and Sithole a Manyika (Sithole, 2015; Chung, 2006; Tekere, 2007).

3.10 Nhari Rebellion and the murder of Chitepo

Another key liberation struggle moment reflective of ZANU factionalism was the Nhari Rebellion of 1974. A group of ZANU fighters displeased with what they felt was poor

management of the war by the Dare reChimurenga (War Council) and the High Command coalesced around Thomas Nhari (a provincial military commander). They captured Josiah Tongogara (ZANLA Chief of Defence) and other senior ZANU leaders based in Zambia accusing them corruption, neglect and mismanagement of the war (Sithole, 2015; Chung, 2006, Tekere, 2007). The Dare reChimurenga's chief mandate was spearheading the war from exile (Zambia) after the banning of ZANU in 1964. Herbert Chitepo chaired the Dare reChimurenga. The Nhari faction was later arrested and executed by the Tongogara camp in a development that saw the military taking over the leadership of the struggle from the Dare reChimurenga (civilian leadership of the war). Of the Nhari Rebellion, Chung (2006: 89-90) alludes that it was an attempt by 'the war weary junior officers in both the Rhodesian army and in ZANLA to take over leadership of their respective organisations and end the war'. ZANU factional battles were to intensify when the Tongogara camp (dominated by Karangas) associated the Nhari rebellion with Herbert Chitepo (the ZANU chairman and a Manyika) leading to the murder of Chitepo. Sithole (2015), citing a report by an international commission instituted by the then Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda to investigate Chitepo's murder and comprising 13 countries, observes that "members of the Dare and the High Command decided on the '15th March', to kill Chitepo". The report also castigated Tongogara as "a man possessed of inordinate ambitions". Sithole (2015) further contends that the Dare reChimurenga always experienced ethno-regionalism (factionalism based on the fighters' region of origin) with the Manyika and Karangas dominating the Zezurus and Ndebele elements in ZANU leadership. Chung (2006:92) is convinced that the Nhari Rebellion had a divisive bearing in ZANU beyond the liberation war, "the rebellion was to divide ZANU and ZANLA further, and its repercussions were to echo in ZANU and Zimbabwe itself decades later".

3.11 The Workers/Vashandi incident and its violent suppression

The murder of Chitepo culminated in the arrest and detention of Tongogara, other members of the Dare reChimurenga and High Command by Zambian authorities creating a leadership vacuum within ZANU and ZANLA. A group, known as the Vashandi/Workers led by Wilfred Mhanda emerged to fill the vacuum. Chung (2006:173) asserts that the Vashandi/Workers were heavily divided 'with the majority of the young guerrillas under Wilfred Mhanda against any form of dialogue with Robert Mugabe or old nationalists'. The Vashandi/Workers's reign ended with the release of Tongogara and the old military command from Zambian prisons. The Vashandi/Workers 'were immobilised in a ruthless military exercise by Tongogara' (Chung 2006:173). Sithole (2015:188) also confirms this violent containment of the Vashandi/Workers

faction, "...about 300 cadres were murdered in Tete province of Mozambique in an effort to impose Mugabe's leadership of ZANU and to reinstate Tongogara in the position of Chief of Defence of ZANLA forces".

3.12 FROLIZI: 'a Zezuru Front'

The formation of FROLIZI by disgruntled ZAPU and ZANU elements also speaks to the extent to which liberation movements and the war itself was heavily factionalised. FROLIZI was a product of ethnic-induced division within both ZANU and ZAPU as noted by Sithole (2015:145-146).

The Karanga and Manyika dominated ZANU leadership almost always at par in strength. After the 1971 Biannual Review Conference, ZANU Zezuru leaders in exile left the party to join Chikerema in the formation of FROLIZI... Launching of FROLIZI was a direct result of the factional fights in ZAPU in 1969 and 1970. It was also a result of a split in ZANU in exile in 1971'

FROLIZI itself was an ethnic creation dominated by Zezurus deservedly earning the moniker 'Zezuru Front'. Formation of FROLIZI on 1 October 1971 by the Zezurus left a bi-polarised ZANU Dare reChimurenga as the Karanga and Manyika shared and consolidated leadership positions within the party. Chung (2006:87) argues FROLIZI was 'a tribal formation of Zezurus, whose aim was their tribe's domination of the liberation movement'.

3.13 Mugabe and Nkomo's Patriotic Front marriage of convenience

The formation of an alliance, the Patriotic Front (PF), by Mugabe and Nkomo in 1976 is also indicative of the extent to which factionalism permeated ZANU and ZAPU. PF was formed after Joshua Nkomo's failed talks with the Smith regime for a political settlement and followed the turbulence within ZANU. Chung (2006:179) points to a rift between 'Henry Hamadziripi and Robert Mugabe on one hand and Hamadziripi and Tongogara on the other'. She suggests that the political enmity between Mugabe and Hamadziripi was traceable to the formation of ZANU in 1963 when Hamadziripi engineered the victory of Ndabaningi Sithole over Robert Mugabe during elections meant to choose the leader of ZANU following the split with ZAPU. The PF was also formed to 'present a common stand at the proposed Geneva Conference on Rhodesia' hence Sithole (2015:186) constantly refers to 'the Mugabe faction in the PF' and 'the Nkomo faction in the PF'. The fact that the PF contested the 1980 elections separately despite commitment by both its leaders Mugabe and Nkomo to unity – is an acknowledgement

of the extent to which liberation movements and the struggle for Zimbabwe's independence itself was saddled and riddled by factionalism.

3.14 Death of Tongogara: an act of ZANU factionalism

Also significant to note in the context of ZANU factionalism is death of ZANLA chief of defence, Josiah Tongogara, in a car accident on the cusp of Zimbabwe's independence in December 1979. Tongogara was amenable to a joint ZANU and ZAPU contest of the 1980 elections, a proposition Mugabe opposed. There is general belief that those opposed to ZANU-ZAPU unity at the 1980 polls, among them Mugabe, are likely liable for Tongogara's death. Msindo (2014:156) makes similar insinuations:

It is unclear who actually killed Tongogara, but it is suspected that Tongogara's accident came amidst serious infighting in ZANU over the control of the army therefore Tongogara's death left Mugabe without an open challenge, giving him absolute control of the army and the party.

It is arguable therefore that intense factionalism – largely driven by the desire for power among individual nationalists – characterised Zimbabwe's liberation war and Mugabeism draws its political dexterity from this historic disunity. Msindo (2014:149) -150) makes a similar observation when he states that, "Leadership challenges in the nationalist movement since the mid-1960s created conditions for factional power struggles that shaped Mugabe and the ZANU's way of doing politics". 'Mugabe emerged as the president of ZANU in 1976 mainly because of his ability to seize opportunity presented to him amid increased factionalism and intrigue within ZANU in the 1970s...Mugabe's career is part of this politics of violence, nationalist propaganda and factionalism' Msindo (2014:150).

3.15 Early signs of ZANU-PF factionalism post-1980

ZANU-PF factionalism did not end with the end of the liberation war. Sithole and Makumbe (1997:134) contend that 'by the end of the 1980s, ZANU-PF had begun to experience cracks in elite cohesion...opening up space for the opposition in the 1990s'. These fractions were first evidenced by Edgar Tekere's dismissal from ZANU-PF for opposing Mugabe's long cherished dream to establish a one-party-state in Zimbabwe. Tekere – the former ZANU secretary general and a close Mugabe wartime ally – is no small man in the annals of Zimbabwe struggle for independence. His dismissal from ZANU-PF signalled early signs of factionalism or what Mangani (2020) terms 'elite conflict' occasioned by democratic centralism in the ruling party.

Of the genesis of ZANU-PF factionalism in post-colonial Zimbabwe, Sithole and Makumbe (1997:134) observe:

The hitherto mammoth and monolithic party begun to show cracks in the latter part of the 1980s. Edgar Tekere, the outspoken secretary general of ZANU-PF, was the first leader to be expelled from the party in 1987 when he became increasingly vocal in his criticism of the party. He founded ZUM in 1989, the first party to be formed in nine years of independence.

They also point to the decision by a then ZANU-PF legislator Margaret Dongo to contest the 1995 parliamentary elections as an independent candidate in defiance of the party as symptomatic of factionalism. Prominent ZANU-PF politburo member Eddison Zvobgo's November 1995 call for the 're-democratisation of the Zimbabwe constitution particularly aspects pertaining to the powers of the executive president (Sithole and Makumbe (1997:135) also constituted early signs of factionalism within ZANU-PF. These factional fights cascaded into ZANU-PF provincial structures. In Masvingo, for example, the Eddison Zvobgo/Dzikamai Mavhaire faction battled it out with the Josaya Hungwe/Simon Muzenda camp while in Mashonaland West it was the Nathan Shamuyarira camp up against the Swithun Mombeshora faction. According to Campagnon (2010:18) and Msindo (2016:162), Mugabe appeared the chief architect of the factional fights within ZANU-PF. When Mavhaire – a member of the Zvobgo faction in Masvingo – publicly urged Mugabe to retire in 1998, Mugabe responded by suspending not only Mavhaire from ZANU-PF but demoted all members of the Zvobgo faction in government while promoting politicians in the rival Hungwe/Muzenda camp. 'Mavhaire compatriot Zvobgo was removed from Cabinet and replaced by Samuel Mumbengegwi of the rival faction' with Msindo (2016:162) observing, 'Mugabe's future lies on keeping factions busy against one another as curtailing factionalism will only create possibilities for these factions to unite against him'.

3.16 The post-2000 ZANU-PF factionalism

The death of two rival faction leaders – Simon Muzenda and Eddison Zvobgo – did not end ZANU-PF factionalism. Two bigger factions emerged featuring Emmerson Mnangagwa against Joice Mujuru. The Mnangagwa and Mujuru factions have been angling for Mugabe's position since early 2000. In a bid to bolster its presidential aspirations, the Mnangagwa faction secretly organised the November 2004 Tsholotsho retreat. Held at Dinyane School, the meeting was designed to position Mnangagwa for the vice presidency ahead of Joice Mujuru in the hope

of him succeeding Mugabe. According to Msindo (2014:165), citing Moyo (2009) and Muleya (2006), the Tsholotsho meeting ‘was a culmination of political scheming that has been happening since 2000 and was necessitated by the need to realign leadership so that ZANU-PF would be better positioned to win the forthcoming elections’. It was also convened to elbow Joice Mujuru out of the presidential race, enhancing in the process, Mnangagwa’s ascendancy. Joice Mujuru and her faction enjoyed firm support from her husband Solomon Mujuru and long-time ZANU-PF heavy weights Didymus Mutasa, Rugare Gumbo, Dzikamai Mavhaire.

Playing a central role in convening the Tsholotsho rendezvous by the Mnangagwa faction was then Minister of Information and Publicity, Jonathan Moyo, a political scientist. In an article in 2017 titled ‘Tsholotsho Declaration of November 2004: the untold story’ that was published in the local media, Jonathan Moyo confirms the meeting sought to address principles around the nomination and election of candidates to the ZANU-PF presidium. In the article, published by Bulawayo 24 on 16 October 2017, Jonathan Moyo declares:

The (Tsholotsho) meeting reviewed the party’s constitution and various resolutions by the key organs of the party on the procedures for nominating and electing the top four leaders of the party...It became clear from the deliberations of this meeting and the outcome of the vote that Emmerson Mnangagwa would be elected as one of the two vice-presidents and second secretaries and would be poised to succeed Mugabe.

In a development confirming deep-seated factionalism within ZANU-PF, Moyo (2017) notes that the rival Mujuru faction later convened its own meeting at Beatrice in Mashonaland East province ‘of some ZANU-PF politicians and technocrats linked to Solomon Mujuru’s camp and elements from the three provinces – Mashonaland Central, Harare and Mashonaland East – that voted against the principles of the Tsholotsho Declaration...’. adding that, ‘the specific purpose of this Beatrice meeting was to throw spanners into the works of the decisions by the provincial chairmen and provincial governors on the application of the principles that later defined the Tsholotsho Declaration in order to scuttle what was seen as the impending inevitable election of Mnangagwa, which would break the Zezuru ethnic monopoly of presidential power’. This was a reincarnation of the ethnic factional wars that ridded ZANU and ZAPU during the liberation war. It was at the Beatrice meeting that the Mujuru camp anointed Joice Mujuru as Mugabe’s heir apparent (Moyo, 2017). The Beatrice meeting killed two birds with one stone – by blocking the application of the principles of the Tsholotsho Declaration and elbowing Mnangagwa out of the presidential race. Significant to highlight is

the fact that the seven other provinces backing Mnangagwa via the Tsholotsho Declaration were non-Zezuru and comprised the Karanga, Manyika and Ndebele tribes.

3.17 Beginning of the end of Mugabe's reign

Mugabe reacted to the Tsholotsho Declaration by dismissing Jonathan Moyo from ZANU-PF and government. He also 'moved quickly to weaken the Mnangagwa faction by demoting Mnangagwa from the ZANU-PF secretary for administration position replacing him with Didymus Mutasa of the Mujuru faction,' Msindo (2014:165). Mnangagwa also became a non-constituency Member Parliament. Mugabe further ensured that Mnangagwa ceded the speaker of parliament position to John Nkomo. Equally punished by Mugabe were participants to the Tsholotsho meeting such as Patrick Chinamasa, who briefly lost his Justice Minister portfolio in cabinet while the six provincial chairmen, who had backed Mnangagwa's ascendancy were purged by Mugabe on allegations of 'supporting a coup'.

Mujuru and her faction would suffer the same fate towards the ZANU-PF December 2014 elective congress. Uneasy over the pace Mujuru was gaining political support, Mugabe initiated processes that would lead to her expulsion from ZANU-PF and government having roped in the Mnangagwa faction in the scheme of things. This marked the beginning of the end of Mujuru and her faction. She was dismissed from both ZANU-PF and government at the ZANU-PF 2014 congress – and Mnangagwa succeeded her. But the vanquishing of the Mujuru faction did not end ZANU-PF factionalism. The post-2014 period witnessed the emergence of two factions – one running under the moniker G40 and reportedly comprising Mugabe, his wife Grace, and a group of 'young' politicians that included Jonathan Moyo, Saviour Kasukuwere and Walter Mzembe. The other faction, Team Lacoste, was reportedly led by Mnangagwa. It comprised the ZANU-PF old guard and enjoyed the support of the military and war veterans (Hove, 2019; Mandaza, 2014; Nyambi, 2016). The vicious fights between the Mnangagwa's Team Lacoste faction and Grace Mugabe's G40 culminated in the dismissal of Mugabe from power through a military coup in November 2017. The coup saw Mnangagwa, dismissed from ZANU-PF and government by Mugabe in 2017, returning from exile in South Africa and taking over power.

It is within this historicised context on ZANU-PF factionalism that this study investigates how factionalism shaped media narratives on Robert Mugabe's succession during the period 2014 to 2017. Inspiring the study is recognition by the researcher of the poverty of scholarship

interrogating the manifestations of Mugabeism in political journalism and the implications of ZANU-PF factionalism on media reportage of Mugabe's succession.

3.18 The media and ZANU-PF factionalism

Existing scholarship on the media and ZANU-PF factionalism (Maodza, 2017; Mungwari, 2017) has either deployed the framing or political economy of the media theoretical lens to account for the press's coverage of Mugabe's succession while Chuma et al (2020) employed the principal-agent model to account for the *Chronicle's* reportage of the ruling party fissures. In his deployment of the political economy of the media theory, Maodza (2017) rethinks the legitimacy of the model in accounting for *The Herald's* scandalisation of some ZANU-PF bigwigs in the run up to its December 2014 elective congress cognisant of the fact that the state controlled newspaper is a pliant mouthpiece of the ruling party (Rusike, 1990; Saunders, 1991). It is within this theoretical context that Maodza (2017) questions the legitimacy of the political economy of the media theory especially its general assumption that media proprietors easily determine news content. The assumption is that the ZANU-PF government – through its Ministry of Information – is responsible for what *The Herald* publishes and cannot agree to the publication of stories undermining the authority and public standing of its members especially those in the presidium as then vice president Joice Mujuru and politburo members who belonged to her faction. For Chuma et al (2020), the principal-agent theory better explains the state controlled *Chronicle's* mediation of ZANU-PF factionalism. The then Minister of Information (Jonathan Moyo is presented by Chuma et al (2020) as the principal whereas *Chronicle's* editor Mduduzi Mathuthu and his team of political reporters, are the minister's agents. How the *Chronicle* reported on Mugabe succession is attributed to the principal – and if *Chronicle* systematically scandalised members of a certain faction in ZANU-PF while valorising their rivals in the other camp – the Minister of Information is naturally responsible by virtue of him being the principal. This explains why Maodza (2017) and Chuma et al (2020) concur that factionalised journalism, which emerged with the emergence of ZANU-PF factionalism, saw political journalism at Zimpapers publications – *The Herald* and *Chronicle* – becoming subordinate to any faction that the Information Minister belonged at any given moment. Unlike Maodza (2017) and Chuma et al (2020), Mungwari (2017) deploys the framing theory to examine how the newspapers covered ZANU-PF factionalism but fails to expose the forces behind adoption of such frames.

The researcher also acknowledges the contribution by Maodza (2017), Mungwari (2017) and Chuma et al (2020) to the study of ZANU-PF factionalism and the media but is concerned by

lack of scholarship specifically attending to the influence of Mugabeism on daily newspaper narratives on Mugabe's succession. Inasmuch as Chuma et al (2020) make use of the principal-agent theory to push the notion that the Minister of Information, as the principal and journalists as his agents, was responsible for the generation of 'factionalised' reportage on Mugabe's succession, they fail to note that the Minister of Information was equally accountable to his own principal - Mugabe. The researcher contends that inasmuch as journalists at state controlled media were answerable to the Information Minister as their principal, the Minister of Information must have been answerable to Mugabe. Mugabe, as the president, appointed cabinet ministers including the Minister of Information from politicians in his ruling ZANU-PF party and is naturally the Information Minister's principal.

Application of Chuma et al (2020)'s principal-agent theoretical lens to such a context therefore mean that Mugabe as the Information Minister's principal was responsible for the discourses on ZANU-PF factionalism that emanated from the state controlled newspapers such as *The Herald* and *Chronicle*. This suggests an influence of Mugabeism on political journalism, an area existing scholarship rarely examines. The researcher also contends that Maodza (2017) and Chuma et al (2020) are only concerned about how the state-controlled media negotiated ZANU-PF factionalism without paying similar attention on the privately owned newspapers – the *Daily News* and *NewsDay*. This study takes a global approach by interrogating the influences of Mugabeism on daily newspapers' reportage of the ZANU-PF succession conundrum during the period 2014 to 2017. It is within this context that this study examines how ZANU-PF factionalism may have permeated into newsrooms and "factionalised" reportage on Mugabe's succession. In other words, the implication of this reasoning sought to interrogate how news production context and context of production were put to test.

3.19 The Patriotic and oppositional journalism binaries

In examining the intersection of Mugabeism and the practice of political journalism in the press, the researcher is alive to the fact that existing scholarship on print journalism in Zimbabwe has mainly focused on the binaries of patriotic versus oppositional journalism – media polarisation. This polarisation of the press is historic and dates back to colonial Zimbabwe when political journalism tended to be aligned either to the interests of the colonial regime or of black nationalists fighting for independence. The political economy of the media in colonial Zimbabwe influenced the polarisation of the press and there is a corpus of scholarship suggesting that the colonial press served the interests of the settler regime (Gale, 1962; Windrich, 1981; Rusike, 1990; Saunders, 1991) by virtue of them being owned or

controlled by white settler capital. While acknowledging the significance of early scholarship on media polarisation, this study does not intend to historicize it. Rather, the researcher notes that the post colonial ZANU-PF government of Robert Mugabe inherited a highly polarised media infrastructure (Saunders, 1991), which it perfected in the post 2000 period following the emergence on the Zimbabwean political scene of a vibrant opposition political party, the Movement for Democratic Change. The binaries of patriotic and oppositional journalism also followed ZANU-PF government's controversial fast track land reform programme – which saw the press editorially aligning or misaligning with the agrarian reforms.

The term patriotic journalism was deployed by Ranger (2005) to describe the form of journalism that characterised the Zimbabwean media landscape in the period 2000-2005 when Jonathan Moyo was Information Minister in Mugabe's cabinet. Branding Moyo 'the epitome of patriotic journalism', Ranger (2005:16) suggests that 'in this journalism, Zimbabweans are divided into patriots and traitors; the rest of the world is divided into supporters and imperialists'. Such journalism is narrow and divisive and is a 'great orchestration of propaganda (Ranger 2005:4). The state owned and controlled media houses, as represented by the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation and the Zimpapers newspaper stable, practiced patriotic journalism by blindly editorially supporting the ZANU-PF government and its programmes including the controversial land reform and Mugabe's abrasive foreign policy. Further, the ZBC and Zimpapers ritually categorised the opposition MDC and Non-Governmental Organisations not only as Western stooges and Trojan horses – a charge occasionally used by ZANU-PF – but also as enemies of the state and the Zimbabwean people. Ranger (2005) makes an important observation by suggesting that Mugabe was the brains behind patriotic journalism and Jonathan Moyo was merely his foot soldier.

(Jonathan) Moyo was not the whole either of patriotic history or patriotic journalism. Their animating ideas, after all, spring from Mugabe himself. We shall have to see how the state media develop post Moyo (Ranger, 2005:16).

The fact that the dismissal of Jonathan Moyo from the ZANU-PF government by Mugabe following the Tsholotsho succession saga did no end the practice of patriotic journalism at the ZBC and Zimpapers, maybe confirmation that Mugabe was accountable from onset for the emergence of this journalism form in Zimbabwe. While this study is not about patriotic journalism, the researcher draws parallels between this journalism form and the factional journalism, which emerged at the height of ZANU-PF factionalism. If Mugabe initiated

patriotic journalism at state owned and controlled media at the beginning of the Zimbabwean crisis (2000-2005) can the veteran leader be discounted from the emergence of the equally destructive factional journalism that characterised the press a decade later? Factional journalism unlike patriotic journalism, which globally targeted perceived ZANU-PF opponents – was directed at Mugabe’s ruling party allies deemed eyeing the presidency. The study is cognisant of the fact that while the state controlled and owned media practiced patriotic journalism, the privately owned press epitomised by the *Daily News* – engaged in ‘oppositional journalism’ (Waldahl, 2004; Ranger, 2005; Chuma, 2008; Ruhanya, 2014; Mungwari, 2017; Chibuwe, 2021) – an anti-Robert Mugabe and ZANU-PF kind of journalism that advocated regime change. It is not within the realm of this study to examine oppositional journalism save to highlight that it was ‘an offspring of a society at political crossroads...where the press became one of the most visible sites of control of the state’ Chuma (2008).

3.20 Conclusion

The chapter captured the historicity of ZANU-PF factionalism right from its formation to the period under study (2014-2017). This was designed to give the study enough background and adequately inform that current research. It would have been erroneous engaging ZANU-PF factionalism without tracing its origin and addressing its current state. It also briefly discussed Mugabeism specifically capturing its various forms of manifestation. The next chapter presents the theoretical framework upon which the study is grounded.

CHAPTER 4

4.0 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Two theoretical lenses guide this study, the primary one being ‘Mugabeism’. The second theoretical lens is Critical Political Economy of the Media. The concept of Mugabeism is traceable to Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2006; 2009b; 2015), who defines the phenomenon as ‘well thought intellectual ways of understanding Mugabe’ (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2015). As a theory, Mugabeism is concerned with understanding Robert Mugabe’s political life – how he was produced politically as a colonial and post-colonial subject. Mugabeism is an attempt at seeking a nuanced understanding of how Mugabe sustained his rule for almost four decades. Mugabe’s hold on power ended in November 2017 following a military coup that saw him replaced by his long-time ally, Emmerson Mnangagwa. In deploying Mugabeism as a concept informing this study, the researcher is cognisant of calls from the global south on the need to decolonise academic research by viewing African issues from an African perspective drawing from our experiences as Africans.

The study acknowledges the value of early theories on news production such as Breed (1955)’s sociology of journalism concept but contends that it is inadequate in accounting for the nature of journalism that emerged at Zimbabwe’s main daily newspapers, *The Herald*, *Daily News* and *NewsDay* at the height of ZANU-PF factionalism. The sociology of news production theory as enunciated by Breed (1955) is a model that examines the operations of the newsroom and suggests that how media houses socialize journalists condition them into knowing the wanted and unwanted stories without anyone actively guiding them. Put in others words, such factors as aspiration of promotion, sanctions and even institutional authority, motivate journalists into respecting the editorial policy. The researcher deploys Mugabeism as an indigenous theory informing the practice of political journalism at *The Herald Daily News* and *NewsDay* during the period of the study.

Existing scholarship (Chikuhwa, 2004; Tekere, 2007; Mhiripiri, 2009; Mhanda, 2011; Msindo, 2014; Mlambo 2015; Hove, 2019) deploys Mugabeism theoretical lenses to try and understand Robert Mugabe’s anti-imperialism and anti-neo-colonialism disposition, Pan-Africanism posture, political nativism, politics of factionalism, governance by violence, militarisation of the state, patrimonialism, politics of patronage, plunder and clientelism. There are, however, no studies investigating the manifestation of Mugabeism in political journalism in Zimbabwe.

Utilisation of the Mugabeism model has so far been confined to political science and history. This thesis adopts Mugabeism theoretical lenses to focus specifically on the media in general and the emergence of ‘factional journalism’ at *The Herald*, *Daily News* and *NewsDay* in particular. The thesis is not just confined to how Mugabe controlled media narratives on his succession but explores how the construction of political news in the selected newspapers is trapped in a web of culture known as Mugabeism.

The Critical Political Economy of the media theory also guides this study insofar as it accounts for the influence of media owners and funders on the practice of political journalism at *The Herald*, *Daily News*, and *NewsDay*. It is the general assumption of this concept that those who own the means of production, including cultural industries as the media, at very least influence news content. The Critical Political Economy of the media theory seeks to account for *The Herald*, *Daily News* and *NewsDay*’s editorial disposition as factionalism ravaged ZANU-PF. It helps locate the influence of media ownership on editorial content – how *The Herald*, *Daily News* and *NewsDay* were influenced by their ownership structures in their reportage of ZANU-PF factionalism. *The Herald* is a state-controlled newspaper. It has historically existed to serve the hegemonic interests of Mugabe and ZANU-PF ever since government acquired shareholding in Zimpapers (publishers of *The Herald*) in 1981 following attainment of independence in 1980 and not only ‘Africanised’ the media house but also put in place systems safeguarding its national authority (Rusike, 1990; Saunders, 1991; 1999; Ranger, 2005).

The *Daily News* and *NewsDay*, on the other hand, are privately owned dailies that are renowned for their anti-ZANU-PF political journalism – or what scholars including (Chuma, 2004; Ranger, 2005, Ruhanya, 2014) term ‘oppositional or adversarial journalism’. The Critical Political Economy of the media theory is equally deployed to try and comprehend the forces behind the *Daily News* and *NewsDay*’s editorial approach to ZANU-PF factionalism. Historically, the *Daily News* and *NewsDay* have a reputation for criticising the ZANU-PF government. It is of interest to this study to establish from a Critical Political Economy perspective how these privately owned newspapers reported on ruling party factionalism and Mugabe’s succession.

4.1 Exploring media coverage of ZANU-PF factionalism through Mugabeism theoretical lenses

As the principle exponent of the Mugabeism concept, Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009b, 2012, and 2015) deploys the term to describe ‘a nationalist matrix of power that is underpinned by party-state and party nation constructions, and is held hostage by those who claim to have

liberated Zimbabwe from colonialism'. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2015:4) suggests that Mugabeism is a theory that seeks a nuanced understanding of 'how Mugabe as an individual was produced historically and politically' and observes that 'Mugabe is a product of colonial and nationalist histories'. Mugabeism is a theory that seeks to understand Mugabe's political philosophies, policies and ideology (Sabao et al 2021: XIX). Underpinning the Mugabeism philosophy is Robert Mugabe's 'pursuit of power' and 'preoccupation with consolidating the grip on power' (Moore, 2015:32).

How Mugabe pursued and consolidated power constitute the basic tenets of Mugabeism as a theory. The following are the main pillars of Mugabeism as a concept that accounts for Robert Mugabe's long presidential incumbency – politics of factionalism, governance by violence, militarisation of the state, redistributive politics or political nativism (black empowerment), politics of patronage, plunder and clientelism, and anti-imperialism and neo-colonialism. The researcher observes that existing scholarship (Chikuhwa, 2004; Tekere, 2007; Mhiripiri, 2009; Mhanda, 2011; Msindo, 2014; Mlambo 2015; Hove, 2019) deploy Mugabeism theoretical lenses to try and understand Robert Mugabe's anti-imperialism and anti-neo-colonialism disposition, Pan-Africanism stance, political nativism, (black empowerment), politics of factionalism, governance by violence, militarisation of the state, patrimonialism, politics of patronage, politics of plunder and clientelism. There is, however, scarcity of scholarship deploying Mugabeism as theoretical lenses in the study of political journalism in Zimbabwe.

This study deploys Mugabeism theoretical lenses to account for the press' coverage of ZANU-PF factionalism in the period 2014 to 2017, using *The Herald*, *Daily News* and *NewsDay* as its case studies. Politics of factionalism - a significant tenet of Mugabeism - is important in our understanding of how Robert Mugabe influenced media narratives on ZANU-Factionalism. The period 2014 to 2017 marks the height of ZANU-PF factionalism as camps within the ruling party fought over who succeeded, Robert Mugabe, in power since Zimbabwe's independence from the British settler regime in 1980. In deploying Mugabeism as theoretical lenses, the researcher argues that whereas this model unpacks expression of Mugabeism in political science and history, there are no studies yet employing this model in media and journalism studies. As a first in this respect – using Mugabeism as a model in journalism studies – this thesis is an investigation into how *The Herald*, *Daily News* and *NewsDay* reported on ZANU-PF factionalism towards the end of Robert Mugabe's rule. Guided by theoretical assumption that Mugabeism is politics of factionalism or calculated divisionism, the study observes that inasmuch as existing scholarship (Chikuhwa, 2004; Tekere, 2007; Mhanda, 2011; Msindo,

2014; Hove 2019) deploys Mugabeism theoretical lenses to unpack ZANU-PF factionalism, they are silent on how Robert Mugabe instrumentalised the media to serve his factional agenda in ZANU-PF. Alternatively, it fails to investigate the extent to which Mugabe and his network of influencers in government, operating as a system, appropriated the media for factional ends. Scholars of Mugabeism including Hove (2019:203) argue that Mugabe skillfully exploited and managed ZANU-PF factions to further his desire to remain in power despite old age.

When he was toppled in 2017 aged 93, Mugabe was the world's oldest president. The major tenet of Mugabeism, therefore, is governance through factionalism be it within ZANU-PF as 'party factionalism' or nationally as political nativism in which Zimbabweans are compartmentalised into patriots or sell-outs, 'us' and 'them' (Ranger, 2005). This deliberate divisive Mugabeism principle is confirmed by Hove (2019:203) in his assertion that Mugabe fanned factionalism within ZANU-PF in the belief that "none of the contending groups would become too powerful to topple him". Musanga (2022:189) reinforces this view when he asserts that Mugabe's leadership was fundamentally sustained courtesy of "his propensity to breed and manipulate factions to abate opposition in ZANU-PF and government". For Masiya and Maringira (2017:10), "any faction that aligns itself with President Mugabe has tended to eventually dominate albeit temporarily". Msindo (2014:148) cements this view:

... His (Mugabe) leadership has been sustained chiefly by the tendency to generate and manipulate factions to weaken internal dissent in ZANU-PF and government. As Mugabe has advanced in years, the major factor sustaining him in power is the enmity of factions within the party, which makes it difficult for them to unite and challenge him.

This study concurs with the view that Mugabeism is politics of factionalism driven entirely by Robert Mugabe's ambition to consolidate power over ZANU-PF and the state. However, the researcher observes that inasmuch as Mugabeism is a divide and rule political philosophy as confirmed by existing scholarship, there are no studies exposing the nexus between Mugabeism (as politics of factionalism) and the practice of political journalism in Zimbabwe. The concern of this study is on how Robert Mugabe strategically used the media – both state-controlled and privately owned – to fan factionalism in ZANU-PF with negative repercussions for political journalism in Zimbabwe as evidenced by the emergence of a 'factionalised' journalism form in which the media not only adopted factions in the ruling party but also became active 'factional' players.

In trying to expose the nexus between Mugabe, ZANU-PF factionalism and the media (*The Herald, Daily News* and *NewsDay*), the researcher is cognisant that as a political philosophy Mugabeism operates through third parties (Mhiripiri, 2009; Tekere, 2007; Chan, 2019; Mpofo, 2022). Mugabe's unleashing of war veterans on commercial white owned farms in 2000 in what was dubbed fast-track land reform programme initiated when his rule was under threat from the newly formed MDC, is one such confirmation of Mugabeism operating through third parties. War veterans became Mugabe's 'political paratroopers' in the service of his hegemonic ambitions. Demobilising the white commercial farmers believed to be sponsoring the MDC meant deactivating a political threat (Mlambo, 2015). Further, the establishment of the National Youth Service within the same period as well as the involvement of the military in Zimbabwean politics (in support of ZANU-PF) also speak to Mugabeism as rule through third parties.

In that context, this study contends that Mugabeism, as factionalism finding expression via third parties, influenced the press's negotiation of ZANU-PF factionalism and Robert Mugabe's succession. Through Mugabeism theoretical lenses, this study seeks to establish how Mugabe – acting as a system of hegemony – tactically involved the press (*The Herald, Daily News* and *NewsDay*) in ZANU-PF factionalism as part of a broad agenda to safeguard his party and state presidency. Put differently, the Mugabeism model sheds light into how the selected daily newspapers in Zimbabwe systematically indulged in factional journalism by editorially pitching rival ZANU-PF camps against each other becoming enablers of Mugabe's politics of factionalism. As a theory informing this study, therefore, Mugabeism helps explore how *The Herald, Daily News* and *NewsDay*'s construction of ZANU-PF factionalism is influenced by Mugabe's politics of factionalism and divisionism.

In adopting Mugabeism as a theory informing this study, the researcher is mindful of nascent scholarship on the media and ZANU-PF factionalism (Maodza, 2017; Chuma et al 2020). Chuma et al (2020)'s study rides on Philip Napoli's principal agent theory in its analysis of the state-controlled *Chronicle*'s coverage of ZANU-PF factionalism – for which the Minister of Information (then Jonathan Moyo) is presented as the principal and journalists at the newspaper as his agents – who adopt an editorial position supportive of the minister's factional interests. This study contends that inasmuch as the principal-agent theory is valuable in its assessment of the press coverage of ZANU-PF factionalism, it fails to recognise the reality that the Minister of Information also had Mugabe as his principal. This viewpoint disqualifies adoption of the principal-agent theory as sole lenses accounting for emergence of factional journalism at state-controlled media like *The Herald* hence the deployment of Mugabeism as theoretical lenses

informing this study. Mugabe exercised politics of patrimonialism in which he prevailed across all facets of ZANU-PF and government (Mhiripiri, 2009). Consequently, it is academically risky to assume that a Minister of Information appointed by Mugabe could cause publication of stories in the state-controlled press offending ZANU-PF and its presidium, as did Jonathan Moyo, without Mugabe's blessings – albeit covertly.

Maodza (2017), on the other hand, investigates the nexus between the media and ZANU-PF factionalism from a political economy of the media theoretical positioning and with a specific focus on *The Herald*. Maodza (2017) rethinks the relevance and applicability of the political economy of the media theory in accounting for *The Herald's* coverage of ZANU-PF factionalism by highlighting how the newspaper systematically scandalised ruling party politicians hitherto it celebrated and valorised by virtue of Mugabe's party having control of Zimpapers since Zimbabwe's independence in 1980. Maodza (2017) questions the logic of the political economy of the media theory in the context of the newspaper editorially scandalising its presumed proprietors in violation of the basic assumptions by political economy of the media theorists that those that own or fund the media ensure that content generated positively serves their interests always.

Mugabeism theoretical lenses consequently illuminates on how Mugabe, acting through third parties or 'paratroopers' as Jonathan Moyo, influenced the state-controlled media into editorially attacking rivals in ZANU-PF feared to have amassed enough political capital to topple him. The Mugabeism theory also helps in examining how the Minister of Information socialised journalists and editors at *The Herald* into editorially scandalising ZANU-PF faction leaders deemed a threat to Mugabe's presidency while valorising politicians considered to be in the right faction. Thus, through the Mugabeism theory, this study is able to account for not only key ministerial appointments by Robert Mugabe such as Jonathan Moyo's post 2013 (Information Minister) but the editorship of *The Herald* as well as analysing news production processes that caused generation of factionalised political editorial content at the state-controlled media. Using this theory, the study unpacks the newsgathering and writing cultures at the selected newspapers – how political journalism was influenced and shaped by Mugabeism as politics of factionalism.

Locating the *Daily News* and *NewsDay's* editorial positioning insofar as ZANU-PF factionalism is concerned is also enlightening. The privately owned newspapers seemed to editorially sympathise with Joice Mujuru and her faction (Gadzikwa, 2017) and this played

well into Robert Mugabe's politics of factionalism. It is in this context that this study attempts to locate the influence of Mugabeism in the press's mediation of ZANU-PF factionalism. Also significant to note is how *The Herald* turned against Jonathan Moyo and fellow politicians in the G40 faction following his reassignment by Mugabe from the Information Ministry to that of Higher and Tertiary Education, Science and Technology Development by Mugabe (Maodza, 2017, Ndou, 2019). The G40 faction was a ZANU-PF camp reportedly aligned to Mugabe and his wife, Grace, against then vice president Emmerson Mnangagwa's Lacoste camp.

It is equally important to study how the *Daily News* and *NewsDay* editorially accommodated the Grace Mugabe aligned G40 faction at the expense of Emmerson Mnangagwa's Team Lacoste faction. The *Daily News*' editorial accommodation of Jonathan Moyo and the G40 was despite the fact that a decade ago as Minister of Information the same politician had caused the newspaper's closure through enactment of draconian media laws. That *The Herald* turned against the G40 faction members, who included a hitherto very powerful Jonathan Moyo, Saviour Kasukuwere (as ZANU-PF national political commissar) and other politically influential members of that faction under Robert Mugabe's watch is suggestive of how the veteran Zimbabwean leader deliberately ostracised members of the G40 faction whose power and political ambition now threatened his rule. It is in this political context that this study deploys Mugabeism theoretical lenses to try and get a nuanced understanding of the press' chameleonic editorial disposition insofar as ZANU-PF factionalism and Mugabe's succession is concerned. Could the press have appropriated Robert Mugabe's factionalism/divisionism tenets in its coverage of his succession? Was this political bias manifesting in the press coincidental or manifestation of Mugabeism in political journalism? Important to examine as well is how G40 politicians, including Jonathan Moyo, editorially banished by *The Herald*, found a ready platform in the *Daily News* and *NewsDay* to launch counter narratives against Mnangagwa's Team Lacoste camp. As this happened, Mugabe became a disinterested spectator – as ZANU-PF factions turned the state and privately-owned media into launch pads for verbal attacks against each other with negative political repercussions for the ruling party.

The Mugabeism model informs political news production processes at the *Daily News* and *NewsDay* at the height of ZANU-PF factionalism as well – by exposing their political news sourcing rituals and the forces behind them. As newspapers free from ZANU-PF and state interference in their editorial operations, the study assumes that the *Daily News* and *NewsDay* were better positioned to professionally and disinterestedly report on Mugabe's succession. That the *Daily News* afforded the G40 faction a platform to launch verbal political raids at

Team Lacoste faction is suggestive of a privately owned newspaper dancing to Mugabe's politics of factionalism. This is largely possible as Mugabe did little to stop ZANU-PF politicians like Jonathan Moyo, Saviour Kasukuwere and Patrick Zhuwao from using the *Daily News* – a newspaper he hitherto considered 'a front for regime change and enemy of the state' – from attacking Mnangagwa's Team Lacoste faction. In fact, Mugabe did little if anything at all to stop factions in ZANU-PF from using state- controlled and privately owned media (*The Herald*, *Daily News* and *NewsDay*) to fan divisions despite threat such political behaviour by his feuding lieutenants posed on the survival of the ruling party itself. Thus, while illuminating on implications of Mugabeism on newsgathering cultures, sourcing as well as media policies during the period under review – this study is also a timely response to the decoloniality call as it utilises organic theoretical concepts of the global south to reflect on issues of the south.

4.2 Examining the media's reportage of ZANU-PF factionalism from a Critical Political Economy of the media perspective

That the media serve the interests of their proprietors and funders is a core argument of the Critical Political Economy of the media theory. This study also deploys Critical Political Economy of the media theoretical lenses in its investigation of how the selected newspapers – *The Herald*, *Daily News* and *NewsDay* – which constitute Zimbabwe's major dailies, reported on ZANU-PF factionalism. *The Herald* is the flagship of Zimbabwe's oldest and largest integrated media house, Zimpapers, formerly the Rhodesia Printing and Publishing Company (RPP) before Zimbabwe's independence in 1980. Zimpapers has historically served the interests of the governing party – the Rhodesian Front in colonial times as the Rhodesia Printing and Publishing Company, and the ZANU-PF administration after independence in 1980 as Zimpapers. Equally, the privately owned *Daily News*'s establishment coincided with the formation of Zimbabwe's main opposition party after independence, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) led by Morgan Tsvangirai in 1999. The newspaper has not hidden its support for the MDC and all regime change seeking agencies in the civil society prompting some scholars (Chuma, 2004; Ranger, 2005; Ruhanya, 2016) to posit that inasmuch as *The Herald* practiced 'patriotic journalism', the *Daily News* and other privately owned newspapers as *NewsDay* practiced 'oppositional journalism'. It is in this context that this study employs the Critical Political Economy of the media theory to locate *The Herald*, *Daily News* and *NewsDay*'s editorial posture as factionalism rocked ZANU-PF.

Hardy (2014: xiii) observes that 'a focus on the media political economy illuminates the forces shaping media institutions, and what they produce, and shines a light on the media's

relationship to power, and the media's wider role in society'. The political economy theory largely focuses on media production and the context within which it occurs. The theory draws from Karl Marx's critique of capitalism – which is concerned with interrogating the production, distribution and consumption of scarce resources. It rides on the notion that those who own the means of production (ruling class) determine what gets produced/consumed or 'how mankind arranges to allocate scarce resources with a view to satisfying certain needs and not others' (Smith 1776:161).

There are various political economy strands, according to Hardy (2014) and these include classical political economy pioneered by such scholars as Adam Smith, David Ricardo, James Mill and Jeremy Bentham, who were primarily interested in capitalism as a system for production, distribution, exchange and consumption of wealth. The Marxian political economy is yet another constituent by Marx and Engels and adds a class analysis in its critique of capitalism. Positive political economy of the Chicago School is another political economy version hypothesized by scholars as Ronald Coase, Richard Posner, George Stigler and Gary Becker. It is opposed to Marxism and promotes a narrow approach supportive of acquisitive behavior of the few. Then there is the Critical Political Economy, which focuses on uneven distribution of power and is critical of 'arrangements whereby such inequalities are sustained and reproduced' (Hardy, 2014). It draws largely from Marxism and is dedicated to analyzing capitalism – forces and relations of production, divisions and struggles with the social class.

Critical Political Economy is strongly associated with Critical Theory and consequently with the Frankfurt School, which is an extension of the Marxist theory. The Critical Political Economy rests on the central claim that different ways of organizing and financing communications have implications for the range and nature of media content (Hardy 2014:08). The theory assumes that goods produced by the media are at once economic and cultural; considers the relationship of media and communication systems to wider forces and processes in society, seeks to answer questions such as – whose voices and concerns get to be heard in the media. How are people, ideas and values, represented in media discourses? What is it that affected how this occurs? In the context of this study and through qualitative content analysis of stories published by *The Herald*, *Daily News* and *NewsDay* on ZANU-PF factionalism, the Critical Political Economy model helps understand why the selected newspapers primed voices of one faction over the other or systematically excluded them and the possible reasons behind such editorial disposition.

In the case of *The Herald*, it is known that the newspaper is controlled by the ZANU-PF government through the Ministry of Information and is a good example structurally of how those in power determine content at media houses they own or control as suggested by Critical Political Economists. Equally, the Critical Political Economy model accounts for the *Daily News* and *NewsDay*'s reportage of ZANU-PF factionalism considering their private ownership and judging by their previous editorial relations with the ruling party in which the newspapers were often viewed as enemies of the state. The *Daily News* and *NewsDay*'s editorial dislike of ZANU-PF and pro-MDC stance was also evident in the articles it published about the ruling party.

According to Hardy (2014:09), Critical Political Economy connects media studies 'to broader patterns of social existence... and examines how the political and economic organization of media industries affect the production and circulation of meaning and connects to the distribution of symbolic and material resources that enable people to understand, communicate and act in the world'. The Critical Political Economy theory advocates a thorough investigation into how the media operate in relation to issues of ownership, finance and support mechanism and how government policies and those of other organisations influence media content. It exposes the structural influences of the media – advertising, finance, political, cultural and social influences on media institutions. Kellner (2009:96) suggests that 'to understand any specific media form requires addressing how it is produced and distributed in a given society and how it is situated in relation to the dominant social structure'. For Murdock and Golding (2005:61), Critical Political Economy approaches 'are holistic in seeing the economy as interrelated with political, social and cultural life rather than as a separate domain' and 'engage with basic moral questions of justice, equity and public good'. Thus, Critical Political Economy is hinged on the claim that understanding 'production' is necessary in order to fully understand media 'content' and audiences, 'different ways of organizing and financing communication have implications for the range and nature of media content (Hardy 2014). Golding and Murdock (1977) support this supposition when they note that 'it is only by situating cultural products within the nexus of material interests which circumscribe their creation and distribution that their range and content can be fully explained.' Critical Political Economy theory 'sets out to show how different ways of financing and organizing cultural production have traceable consequences for the range of discourses, representation and communicative resources in the public domain' (Murdock and Golding, 2005:60). Murdock and Golding (1979:210) insist that "To understand the production of meaning requires not only analysis of

how ideology is inscribed in texts and readings but grasping the general economic dynamics of media production and the determination they exert” (Murdock and Golding,1979:210).

A key focus for the Critical Political Economy is to examine how the media and communication serve to sustain the interests of the wealth and powerful. Media are connected to the ways in which power is sustained through meanings. Mosco (2009:96) argues that critical scholarship must examine both iterations of ideology and must be alert to signs of conflict, contestations and contradiction of meanings (Mosco, 2009:96). In the case of the media and ZANU-PF factionalism, the Critical Political Economy model helps expose contradictions in *The Herald's* scandalization of some senior ZANU-PF politicians at the height of the ruling party's factional battles contradicting the basic tenet of this theory that those who own or control the media unproblematically determine content, which content they ensure serves their interests. *The Herald* cannot undermine the authority and legitimacy of top ZANU-PF officials including its then vice president (Joice Mujuru) and members aligned to her faction without such editorial posture attracting the gaze of Critical Political Economy of the media analysts.

Further, the Critical Political Economy of the media model aids in understanding how Robert Mugabe's cabinet reshuffles - which saw constant changes of ministers in the Ministry of Information - could have influenced *The Herald's* narratives on ZANU-PF factionalism depending on which factions the appointee (minister) belonged at any given time. Zimpapers, the publishers of *The Herald*, has always suffered official and unofficial interference from the minister/ministry in its editorial operations. The Critical political economists (Hardy, 2014; Golding and Murdock, 1977) insist that in order to understand media content, it is important to appreciate the forces behind the production of news content. How *The Herald*, *Daily News* and *NewsDay* reported on ZANU-PF factionalism between 2014 and 2017 is informed by their political economy, and in particular proprietor influence - which influence may directly emanate from ownership or through agents.

In the same vein, the *Daily News* and *NewsDay* – as oppositional in their editorial disposition towards ZANU-PF– cannot adopt any of the ZANU-PF factions contending to succeed Mugabe without inviting interrogation from Critical Political Economists as to the forces informing their editorial alignment. Hardy (2014:13) notes that Critical Political Economy's principal effort is ‘to trace relationships and consequences of the organization of communication – how do the media relate to power sources in society? Whose interests are represented? Who has access to communication resources and what can they do with them? To answer such questions,

the Critical Political Economy model underscores the need to interrogate the forces and interests shaping media and conditions of production (Hardy 2014: 14). The Critical Political Economy model is concerned about examining the structural factors that influence the production of media content (McChesney 2004a:43). Murdock (2003:17) posits that a deeper analysis into “the dynamics that are currently reshaping professional production of public culture is an essential first step to understanding the symbolic textures of everyday life’. For Babe (2009:13), ‘political economy is the scholarly discourse studying power relations affecting the production, distribution and consumption of wealth, income and resources including information and communication’. Through the Critical Political Economy theoretical lenses, this study exposes ‘the structural factors’ that influenced *The Herald*, *Daily News* and *NewsDay*’ reportage of ZANU-PF factionalism.

The Critical Political Economy model, according to Babe (2009), helps locate lines of media control from influences of ownership, advertisers to government. There is a consensus among Critical Political Economists that there is lack of equality in distribution of communicatory power. Individuals who have control over the media exclude those without in a self-serving political game. In the case of this study, the researcher strives to capture the discourses generated by *The Herald*, *Daily News* and *NewsDay* on ZANU-PF factionalism and the extent to which such narratives could have promoted or demoted either of the factions as wrangles within the ruling party over who succeeded Mugabe reached unprecedented levels. Such an investigation is impossible without utilizing the Critical Political Economy theoretical lenses to illuminate on the forces behind the generation of texts and discourses around Mugabe’s succession and ZANU-PF factionalism as captured by Babe (2009:31) in his suggestion that there are elements among the elites who dominate the media ‘as a prerequisite to attaining and maintaining political-economic power’. The Critical Political Economy Theory assumes there is a marked lack of equality in the distribution of communicatory power, an emphasis on the oppression, manipulation, and control through the media by the elite, notion of domination of media as a prerequisite to attaining and maintaining political-economic power, media as devices for influencing consciousness and limiting resistance (Babe, 2009:31).

Neo-Marxist Frankfurt scholar, Theodor Adorno, also reinforces these assumptions when he suggests that the media are inextricably entangled with structures of political-economic power. The main concern of media Critical Political Economists is premised on ‘allocation of resources within capitalist societies and ‘through studies of ownership and control, political economists document and analyse relations of power, class systems and other structural

inequalities and even goes beyond mapping lines of control over media by the powerful in society (Wasko, 2014:260). Critical studies as Critical Political Economy, underscore ‘historical, materialist analysis of contradictory process in real world (Fuchs, 2016: 524). According to Hans Magnus Enzenberger (1974:10) – in a view shared by other Critical Political Economy theorists – the media “wants to sell existing order” and ‘every social system’s communications policy serves the controlling class interests in perpetuating that system”. The media are conceived as ideological apparatus (Garnham, 2004:94) under the control of politically and economically powerful elite who sanction the publishable and unpublishable, say-able and unsayable.

It is in this context that this study employs the Critical Political Economy of the media model to gain a nuanced understanding of the media’s editorial involvement in ZANU-PF factionalism. The intention is to establish the extent to which Mugabe or factions wrestling to succeed the veteran leader may have influenced narratives on ZANU-PF factionalism and the consequences of such influences on journalism. *The Herald* is a ZANU-PF propaganda mouthpiece and exists to serve the interests of the ruling party (Rusike, 1990; Saunders, 1999). *The Daily News* and *NewsDay* are considered regime change advocate practicing ‘oppositional journalism’ (Chuma, 2004; Ranger, 2005. Ruhanya, 2014). In deploying the Critical Political Economy perspective, the researcher is cognisant of the fact that this model has been criticized for ‘for engaging in economic reductionism by concentrating on economic factors which they presume determine the cultural effects of the media without inquiring into the ideological and interactive practices of the audiences’ (Robins and Webster in Base 2009:5). This explains why besides this model the study engages Mugabeism as a supportive theory informing this research. This is tactical. Where the Critical Political Economy perspective is restricted by its rigidity – reducing everything to the economy – Mugabeism goes beyond such structural limitations by providing theoretical frames within which to comprehend the media’s negotiation of Robert Mugabe’s succession and ZANU-PF factionalism. Mugabeism is an indigenous theory. The model takes stock of Mugabe’s political behavior and how such calculated conduct, driven by an insatiable desire for power, informs *The Herald*, *Daily News* and *NewsDay*’s reportage of ZANU-PF factionalism and manifests as honest media texts.

4.3 Conclusion

This chapter presented theories guiding the study. Mugabeism - a model deriving from political science and history - is the main theory informing the thesis supported by the Critical Political Economy of the media framework. As a model from the global south, Mugabeism responds to

calls to decolonise media studies by ensuring African contemporary issues are gleaned through indigenous lens. The study therefore is a response to calls to decentre and de-westernise knowledge production. The next chapter presents the findings of the study. There are three data chapters deriving from interviews with political journalists at *The Herald*, *Daily News* and *NewsDay*. The other two data chapters emanate from subjection of stories generated by the *Daily News* and *NewsDay* to Critical Discourse Analysis to extract discourses emanating from the texts.

CHAPTER 5

5.0 BRIBERY, FACTION ADOPTION AND “FACTIONALISED” JOURNALISM

This chapter presents the findings of the study extracted from that data gathered strictly from interviews with selected journalists at *The Herald*, *Daily News* and *NewsDay* newspapers. The researcher deliberately captured the journalists’ experiences at length to permit them ‘open the window’ to illustrate the extent ZANU-PF factionalism permeated the newsrooms and factionalised journalism. Whereas some critics may find this kind of presentation tedious, it provided valuable insights into the factionalisation of journalism in the Zimbabwean press, occasioned by Robert Mugabe’s chaotic succession intrigues. The study sought to establish the extent to which ZANU-PF factionalism may have cascaded into daily newspaper newsrooms in Zimbabwe between 2013 and 2017, “factionalising” journalism in the process. Factionalisation of journalism, in the context of this study, is when journalists adopted either of the ZANU-PF factions contending to succeed Robert Mugabe with their editorial configuration not only betraying their fractional political alignment but also influencing how they reported on the ruling party fissures. Factional journalism, a product of adoption of factions by journalists, is a consciously unethical biased journalism that pushes the agenda of one faction at the expense of the other when reporting on intra-party schisms. This kind of journalism ‘oiled’ Robert Mugabe’s intra-party politics of divisionism by camping in factions.

5.1 Factionalisation of journalism at privately owned press: journalists “greased” to adopt factions

Whereas political journalism in Zimbabwe has long suffered political polarisation in which the media either sided with the ruling ZANU-PF and condemned opposition political parties or sided with the opposition and editorially fought ZANU-PF, the period under study experienced a new form of journalism – factional journalism. In their reportage of ZANU-PF factionalism, journalists working for both state-controlled and privately owned newspapers in Zimbabwe and in particular, *The Herald*, *Daily News* and *NewsDay*, consciously adopted either of the factions contending to succeed Mugabe. It is this study’s finding that while journalists working for *The Herald* were under pressure from the Minister of Information to advance the interests of whichever faction he or she belonged (Maodza, 2017; Chuma et al, 2020), some of their counterparts at the privately-owned press – presumably better placed to report on Mugabe’s succession without bias – freely became factional functionaries.

These journalists were materially rewarded for editorially endorsing and advocating the agenda of factions to the detriment of journalism. What emerged from their involvement in ZANU-PF factionalism is a bastardized political reportage purposefully factional. In interviews with the selected journalists, the researcher – among other things – sought to establish their appreciation of ZANU-PF factionalism and its influence news sourcing rituals. The discussions also centred on forces behind the editorial positions that journalists adopted in their reportage of ZANU-PF factionalism while exposing the extent to which ZANU-PF factionalism permeated into newsrooms and the consequences of such intrusion on journalism. The interviews harvested intelligence on the implications of ZANU-PF intra-party contestations on plurality and diversity of opinion in the press. The impact of ZANU-PF factionalism on journalist-source relations and newsroom cohesion were some of the issues that emerged from the interviews with the selected political journalists, among other things relevant to this study.

It emerged from the interviews with journalists at *Daily News* and *NewsDay* that they actively participated in ZANU-PF factionalism as their peers at *The Herald* – but for different reasons – and throwing the basic journalism tenets out throw the window. A prominent former *Daily News* political journalist referred herein as Participant A, shared their experiences on editorial involvement in ZANU-PF factionalism for reasons including financial and material benefit. In the run up to the ZANU-PF December 2014 elective congress at which Vice President Joice Mujuru reportedly intended to contest Mugabe for the presidency, Participant A adopted the Mujuru faction and actively propagated its agenda in the *Daily News* through generation of news articles portraying her as the only option for Zimbabwe after the incumbent.

Factionalism played more in the private press compared to state media because I think the idea was given that *The Herald* is government aligned and government controlled, somehow there was fear to say if we abuse *The Herald* to the extreme (sic), if one of the factions wins it would be difficult – they would be a backlash. So, let us use the private press. I remember very well attending a very high-level meeting with the then deputy chief secretary in president office (name withheld) and another very senior politician aligned to Mujuru camp, who is now a Zimbabwean ambassador in Europe, and I was the only journalist from the private press. There is no one from the state media and the like – the idea at the meeting was “go and sell this idea to the people, if we give it to the state media it would be killed but you guys can do it for us”. This is where comes in the idea of the economy of the press. ZANU-PF had money. So, to buy even up to the editors in the private press, it was easy than to buy those in the state media.

(Researcher interview with Participant A, 17 August 2023, Harare).

The remarks by Participant A expose the extent to which ZANU-PF factionalism permeated the *Daily News* newsroom and influenced established news generation protocols. What Participant A recounts as having happened when they played the “esteemed guest” at a private Mujuru faction caucus is beyond the normative as traditionally, it is the state controlled press that has been entrenched in ZANU-PF factionalism (Maodza, 2017; Gadzikwa, 2017; Chuma et al 2020). In this context, the *Daily News* was entrenched in ZANU-PF factionalism by supporting the Mujuru faction. Historically, the relations between ZANU-PF and the *Daily News* have been dominated by utter hostilities in which its reporters were ritually harassed, arrested and its printing press in Harare bombed on two separate occasions by suspected government agents in 2001 (Mukasa, 2003, Ruhanya, 2014) as retribution for indulging in oppositional politics through its exercise of oppositional journalism.

ZANU-PF considered the *Daily News* an epitome of adversarial/oppositional journalism that sought illegal regime change (Ranger, 2005; Chuma, 2008; Ruhanya, 2014; Chibuwe, 2016). The fact that ZANU-PF officials cited by Participant A, covertly “caucused” with a journalist from *Daily News* to discuss Mugabe’s succession is suggestive of the reporter’s capture by a section of the fractious governing elite to serve a factional agenda. Participant A confirms this capture when they state that at the Mujuru faction meeting they were told, “Go and sell this idea to the people”. Normatively, journalists unbiasedly report facts and do not “sell” ideologies. “Go and sell this idea to the people,” sounds blatantly a command than normative exchange of information between a news source and a journalist. It implies that the Mujuru faction had the reporter under its control. This raises controversy over the circumstances under which Participant A became a Mujuru faction editorial servant and suggests material capture. Traditionally ZANU-PF politicians have relied on *The Herald* for such a service, and not the “oppositional privately owned press”. The journalist also proved a willing participant in ZANU-PF factionalism yet traditionally the *Daily News*’ editorial stance did not promote ZANU-PF politics at any level ever since its establishment. If anything, the newspaper sought the collapse of Robert Mugabe’s regime and the assumption of power by the Morgan Tsvangirai led MDC (Ruhanya, 2014).

Participant A confirmed material capture by the Mujuru camp when they claimed to have been given “a farm” courtesy of their editorial relations with the faction. This happened as Mujuru battled Mnangagwa for Mugabe’s position. The allotment of farmland influenced how

Participant A reported on ZANU-PF factionalism and Mugabe's succession. The farm is in Beatrice – about 60km outside Harare – and within the vicinity of Joice Mujuru's Ruzambo farm.

The (influences) also came in in terms of material relations for me. I have a small business interest in Marirangwe in Beatrice area – that is where Mujuru hails from. So, those relations also came into play. I have business interest there... a farm, a small plot (farm). Those are the things that really came into play as well. Relations with people like Silvester Nguni, who was a minister in Mujuru's office. My relations with quite a number of business people who were close to Mujuru – Butau, you talk of Simbaneuta Mudarikwa, Ray Kaukonde and Tirivanhu Those relations shaped how we reported on ZANU-PF factionalism.

(Participant A, interview with Researcher, 17 August 2023, Harare).

It is significant to note that during Robert Mugabe's rule such benefits as farmland were mainly a preserve for his ZANU-PF allies and journalists working for the state owned and controlled media as recognition for committing to patriotic journalism. A number of senior journalists at the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation and Zimpapers were allocated farms during the fast-track agrarian reforms, which sought to address inequities in land ownership between black Zimbabweans and white commercial farmers. Mugabe's government treated journalists working for the privately owned press as the *Daily News* as enemies of the state and minions of imperialistic Europe fronted by former coloniser, Britain, advocating regime change and Zimbabwe's re-colonisation (Ranger, 2005). They were discounted from ZANU-PF's black empowerment programmes as farm allocations.

This brief background is important insofar as it illuminates the circumstances around the Mujuru camp's allotment of farmland to Participant A at the height of ZANU-PF factionalism. It confirms suspicion that Participant A was a valuable asset to the Mujuru faction whose agenda they advocated through the *Daily News* while editorially repulsing the rival Mnangagwa group. It is also important to assess the allocation of farmland to Participant A from a Mugabeism philosophical perspective – deployment of politics of patronage (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2015; Msindo, 2016; Mpofu, 2016) as a system of capturing and retaining political support from allies and enemies within ZANU-PF. Patronage is an exercise of granting favour in order to access some benefits in return. The Mujuru camp facilitated allocation of farmland

to Participant A as a means to capture their editorial support drawing lessons from Mugabe's patronage system. Through deployment of Mugabe's patronage system, the Mujuru faction entrapped Participant A and ensured the journalist became its faction's editorial servant.

The fact that Participant A "was influenced" by their business relations with the Mujuru faction flags the extent the journalist was captured and adopted a faction in the reportage of Mugabe's succession. It also smells of yellow journalism – a journalism that fails to treat news ethically and fairly. The *Daily News* ought to have reported on ZANU-PF factionalism fairly in fulfillment of its editorial slogan, "Telling it like it is". That was achievable only had the newspaper afforded rival ZANU-PF factions equal editorial attention. It failed to deliver on this score when its reporters as Participant A deliberately adopted the Mujuru faction and published negatively about the Mnangagwa camp.

Participant A justified their adoption of the Mujuru faction at the expense of Mnangagwa's camp by emphasizing, "The idea was to try and reform ZANU-PF. Mujuru seemed like a reformist in ZANU-PF". The journalist believed that Mnangagwa was 'anti-business, a Chinese protégé, and tough guy". This suggests that besides being "corrupted" to adopt a faction, the journalist's personal beliefs – assuming these were not influenced by the Mujuru faction whose ideologies they supported – to some extent also influenced their reportage of ZANU-PF succession politics. The journalist explicitly exposes their involvement in ZANU-PF factionalism when they state, "the idea was to try and reform ZANU-PF". This violates the basic journalism tenet that exhorts "disinterested objectivity" (Sigelman, 1973; Meyer, 1989; Schudson, 1990; Rich, 2000, Wein, 2012) in news reports and further exposes the levels journalism at *Daily News* got factionalised when its reporters assumed factions.

Participant A reveals their editorial flirtation with the Mujuru faction cost him sources in the Mnangagwa camp, who considered them a rival's spy. The snub only served to cement Participant A's pro-Mujuru and anti-Mnangagwa reportage. The journalist stuck to Mujuru aligned news sources, who advanced an anti-Mnangagwa succession narrative. This exposed the *Daily News* as a legitimization and delegitimation tool in ZANU-PF succession matrix in contravention of basic journalism principles that urge impartiality in news reports and exposed its factional editorial disposition.

So, if you aligned yourself with a certain source, he or she will give you a narrative that advanced the interest of their faction. If you talk to people who are aligned to the Joice Mujuru faction... they will tell you about political

victories they would have scored inside the ZANU-PF boardroom. So, it really influenced in terms of the output of the stories. Most of the stories that were coming out were one-sided unless if you get a reporter who speaks to both factions and it was very rare because once one faction identifies you with another faction, they never wanted to talk to you. Their fear was that you could be a transmitter of information (spy) from one camp to another camp.

(Participant A interview with researcher, 17 August, 2023, Harare).

Participant A's reportage of ZANU-PF factionalism, therefore, is influenced by his choice of news sources – which sources are resident in the Mujuru faction. This confirms assertions by scholars (Schlesinger, 1978; Golding and Elliot, 1979; Manning, 2001) that news exposes the ideological interests of sources at any given moment. Grace Mugabe is on record claiming she had received intelligence that some journalists working for the privately owned press and in particular for *Daily News* were on the Mujuru faction payroll with specific orders to generate stories promoting her takeover of power from Mugabe. Grace Mugabe made the allegations while addressing a ZANU-PF rally at Rudhaka Stadium, Marondera, in Mashonaland East province in 2014. The public remarks seem to validate claims by Participant A that they were materially rewarded by the Mujuru camp to advance its succession agenda through favourable reportage.

We could go out to attend (Mujuru faction) private meetings that were attended by people like Mutasa, Jabulani Sibanda and even people like Rutanhira there in Mashonaland Central, people like Dickson Mafios, talk of Temba Mliswa then. We would go all out to attend those issues. Grace Mugabe would pick information from Mugabe's security and intelligence. So, when she attacked us (journalists) at Rudhaka Stadium in Marondera, that is when she also attacked Ray Kaukonde (Mashonaland East provincial chair and a Mujuru close ally). That made us appreciate that for us as journalists we have to defend ourselves and defend our positions. Journalism became factionalised and even the output it was no longer about the story but defending the territory on its own. Defending your package. Journalism became factionalised and we also became at some point enemies within the journalism sector.

(Participant A interview with researcher, 17 August, 2023, Harare).

From Participant A's responses, it is clear that the journalist had adopted the Mujuru faction. This is evidenced by the reporter's attendance of the faction's private meetings meant for its

senior politicians and their reference to “defending the package” and “defending our positions”. By package, the journalist meant the material benefits that came with being in the Mujuru camp while in “defending our position” they referred to safeguarding the Mujuru faction’s ideologies, interests and political aspirations. Again, this suggests manifestation and furtherance of Mugabe’s patronage political system, borrowed by the Mujuru camp and applied in journalistic processes. In this instance, the faction lured Participant A by allocating him farmland to earn positive coverage at the expense of the rival Mnangagwa faction.

Mugabe dismissed Joice Mujuru and politicians belonging to her faction from ZANU-PF and government soon after the December 2014 elective congress in a move the ZANU-PF leader claimed nipped factionalism in the bud. Emmerson Mnangagwa replaced Joice Mujuru as vice president while Phelekhezela Mphoko was appointed second vice president. Mugabe’s government had two vice presidents as he sought to strike ethnic balance in his cabinet between the Shona and Ndebele tribal groups. Members of the Mnangagwa faction earned governmental positions following the purging by Mugabe of Mujuru’s associates in government and ZANU-PF. This development was largely anticipated to extinguish the factional wars ravaging ZANU-PF. It failed. Two factions emerged. The Grace Mugabe aligned G40 and Mnangagwa’s Team Lacoste. Mnangagwa’s Team Lacoste reportedly enjoyed support of the military, war veterans and the ZANU-PF old guard while Robert Mugabe was strongly believed to be behind Grace Mugabe’s G40, which comprised of younger politicians christened “Young Turks” by local media. The G40 faction members included political scientist and former Information Minister Jonathan Moyo, cabinet ministers Saviour Kasukuwere, Walter Mzembe, Patrick Zhuwao and Makhosini Hlongwane.

This second phase of ZANU-PF factionalism after 2014 cascaded into the press as with the first. The *Daily News* as did other daily newspapers editorially aligned with either of the factions contending to inherit Mugabe’s presidency with Participant A indulging with the G40 now that Mujuru had fallen. In an interview with the researcher, Participant A, a then lead writer at *Daily News*, claims the G40 lured journalists with monetary and non-monetary enticements turning them into factional functionaries. Journalism was corrupted. The sacred basic journalism principle anchored on news as nothing but facts, was consciously violated.

There were also financial incentives to it. What would happen is G40 would bring money for you to sustain their agenda and for a journalist who is not empowered a USD\$100 note is too much. However, a journalist who is empowered would be able to

say, look, give me information without any financial incentives so that tomorrow when I am hitting you back, I have no moral obligation to you. The idea was moral obligations. But this guy helped me yesterday with lunch? You know the monies that were being dished out are nothing out of this world. It was just an ordinary US\$100, US\$50 or even USD\$20 for lunch.

(Participant A interview with researcher, 17 August, 2023, Harare)

From Participant A's claims, it would seem ZANU-PF factions – first the Mujuru camp and now the G40 group – had mastered Robert Mugabe's politics of patronage. Participant A confirms this when they allege that the G40 materially captured journalists at the newspaper to ensure its ideologies were promoted against those of its rival, Mnangagwa's Team Lacoste. This manifested in the generation of stories biased against Mnangagwa's Team Lacoste faction whereas the G40 benefited positive coverage by virtue of the group being the news source for the *Daily News* – it shaped the newspaper's narrative on Mugabe's succession.

Participant A also benefitted residential urban housing land from editorially aligning with the G40 and reveals to the researcher, "I have land that I got from (name withheld) because of these things". The reporter claims besides corrupting journalism, ZANU-PF factionalism cultivated political hate among journalists in the *Daily News* newsroom. Journalists were compartmentalized along the rival ruling party factions – G40 and Team Lacoste – with disastrous consequences for journalism, which reflected the divisions in the stories generated. Participant A reckons the *Daily News* transformed into a factionalised newsroom of fear in which journalists sharpened factional swords against each other.

There were times in the newsroom you would never leave your cup of tea fearing that this person who supported this other faction would poison me. It became so personal. So personal to some of us journalists and now I look back and laugh at it.

(Participant A interview with researcher, 17 August, 2023, Harare).

Participant A alleged editors at *Daily News* were also entrenched in ZANU-PF factions for varying reasons, "they (editors) had taken vested interest in these factions. Editor (name withheld) would side with G40. We also had another editor (name withheld) who was on the side of Mnangagwa. Then came another editor who was clearly a Mnangagwa person". The reporter claimed the editor who supported the G40 did so on the promise of a better job at state controlled *The Herald* in the event G40 prevailed over the Mnangagwa faction by succeeding

Mugabe, adding, “he (editor) ensured that he hammered Team Lacoste and delivers that media coverage for G40”. On his part, Participant A revealed, “personally as a journalist I supported G40 and preached the gospel – the anti-Mnangagwa gospel”.

Another *Daily News* political journalist herein identified as Participant B corroborated Participant A’s claims and revealed that editors at the newspaper adopted either of rival ZANU-PF factions and factionalised the newsroom and news production rituals in the process. How the *Daily News* reported on ZANU-PF factionalism reflected the editors’ factional alignment at any given moment in the tumultuous ruling party fissures.

ZANU-PF is a mammoth political party in the country and normally when it factionalises, almost all institutions are factionalised. Pertaining to newspapers, they also tend to get factional. You will agree with me that at editorial level, being political animals that we are, it also tends to get factional. One editor might side with a faction of ZANU-PF. What comes out of the paper depends on which editor is on duty. So, during the time of Mugabe, specifically 2013 to 2017, the Lacoste faction and the other camp (G40), you will recall at *Daily News* the editor at that time was Stanley Gama and the deputy editor was the current editor in chief Guthrie Munyuki. These two gentlemen were actually political figures. They actually took a stance. A clear stance you could actually see that most of the content was pro-G40.

(Participant B interview with researcher, 15 September 2023, Harare).

Participant B corroborates Participant A’s claim that the *Daily News* adopted the G40 faction in post-Joice Mujuru ZANU-PF. This was because their editors had aligned with that faction and socialised reporters into editorially adopting the G40 whose agenda they promoted against Mnangagwa’s Team Lacoste interests. Participant B confirmed this position when in an interview with the researcher they asserted, “A good reporter knows what the editor wants” and further claimed, “It was not out of conviction that I wrote the stories that I wrote”.

The journalist (Participant B) also claimed that socialization into factional reporting by editors negatively impacted on news production processes such as news sourcing as the reporter ended up “interacting more with those people (G40) because that is what the editor wants and you know this is the story that will carry the day”. This means biased news sourcing. Biased news sourcing when reporting intra-party factionalism technically factionalises journalism by affording one faction a platform for expression while denying the other similar editorial privilege. This again is confirmed by Participant B when they claimed that “knowing what the

editor wanted, we could not talk to the Lacoste guys a lot...we interacted more with the G40 side than Lacoste and the basic rule of journalism was discarded". What Participant B emphasizes is the critical role sources play in shaping narratives because journalism is an interaction between journalists and sources (Schudson 1981; Hess, 1984, Shoemaker, 1996). Sources influence narratives. It is a basic journalism tenet to strive for balance in articles especially when reporting a conflict. Participant B further revealed that because the *Daily News* was biased in favour of G40, the Team Lacoste faction no longer wanted to engage the newspaper on anything that pertained to news generation either as sources of information or even responding to any allegations raised by the rival G40 faction. The journalist claimed Team Lacoste "would actually point it at you that you are a G40 journalist".

Editors at *Daily News* would also dismiss news articles on the ZANU-PF fissures that they deemed unfavourable to their adopted faction (G40) on flimsy non-journalistic grounds. Participant B disclosed in one such incident they protested the decision by the editor to "kill" a story deemed favourable to Mnangagwa's Team Lacoste faction.

I had problems with the deputy editor because when he wanted to dismiss my story instead of telling me that because it is not "factionally" correct, he told me there is no story. I would try to argue that no, this is a story. The moment I win the argument that this is a story, he will turn up and say the story offends the newspaper's commercial interests. However, consciously I knew that this story is not passing the test purely on the basis that it is not "factionally" correct.

(Participant B interview with researcher, 15 September 2023, Harare).

Confirming Participant A's claims on the extent ZANU-PF factionalism permeated the *Daily News* newsroom, Participant B alleged editors were involved in editorially fanning factionalism at the newspaper.

What happened during that period Kudzai Chipanga and Tyson (Kasukuwere) were my deep throat sources especially about the goings on in ZANU-PF Politburo. One day another editor (name withheld) went to report (to Team Lacoste) that the people who are leaking stories on ZANU-PF are Kudzai and Tyson (G40 politicians). They are giving our reporters information (on goings on in ZANU-PF) to the extent that when there was a ZANU-PF conference in Victoria Falls ZANU-PF politicians were refusing to talk to us. The matter actually escalated and there were some brief demotions because

we were discussed at politburo. Newsroom was seriously “factionalised”. Colleagues would steal diaries and alert factions and that is what I am exactly telling you.

(Participant B interview with researcher, 15 September 2023, Harare).

Chipanga was the ZANU-PF secretary for youths at the time, a powerful position in the ruling party organogram at the height of ZANU-PF factionalism. The youth league was very active in ZANU-PF factionalism to such an extent Robert Mugabe arranged what he termed “Youth Interface Rallies” across the country where he interacted with youths and sought their support in keeping at bay allies seeking to succeed him. Participant B claimed the journalist-source relations that existed between Chipanga and him were damaged after the *Daily News* editor alerted Team Lacoste on how the youthful ZANU-PF politician leaked anti-Mnangagwa stories to the privately owned newspaper. The journalist-editor relations were also strained as Participant B no longer trusted the latter with information in fear of exposing their sources. In journalism, it is a taboo to reveal news sources. However, editors at times demand to know the sources if the article concerned is too sensitive. They do so after giving reporters assurance of keeping the identity of the source a secret.

Participant B alleged the fact that the editor disclosed his sources to Team Lacoste exposed the *Daily News*’ involvement in ZANU-PF factionalism. This frustrated reporters as Participant B who “would have loved a situation where I would have reported about factionalism in a very balanced manner because I was enjoying how it played out”. Journalistic agency was denied. Further, non-factional reportage of ZANU-PF factionalism by the *Daily News* would have fully accounted for its motto, “Telling it as it is” and demystified suspicions of media capture.

That (*Daily News* capture) is the sad reality on the ground. Of course, you are talking about a certain period but it is actually a sad reality that is existing even up to now. At editorial level, the editor is greased so he will sanction stories. It cascades down but you see when it cascades down the reporter is actually being given *mafufu* (leftovers). You would be given US\$20 for lunch but you know exactly that at the very apex (editor) a lot of money has been given and at the apex the G40 prevailed.

(Participant B interview with researcher, 15 September 2023, Harare).

The claims of material capture of journalists by ZANU-PF factions is a problem confirmed earlier by Participant A, a beneficiary of such corrupt tendencies. The *Daily News* had earlier editorially supported the Joice Mujuru faction at a time when she battled the Emmerson

Mnangagwa camp with Participant B also confirming, “It was Mujuru whom we supported as a newspaper” – a position also earlier indicated by Participant A. Again, the *Daily News*’ adoption of the Mujuru faction derived from the editor’s factional alignment with Participant B insisting, “Newspapers are made at the editorial level as everything we do as reporters has to please the editor...what you end up doing is to think like the editor”. Participant B revealed such a journalism environment occasioned by ZANU-PF factionalism denied journalists – who know the basic journalism tenets – space for professional expression.

Journalists know the basic tenets of journalism. I know what is good journalism and bad journalism but in practice do I have the room to practice good journalism? What was toxic was at the top (editor) because it really did affect us as reporters. You see, when you write a story because it has been sanctioned by that editor, you then are given a faction. You are given a faction that the editor supported. Ours was a difficult situation such that when retrenchment came some of journalists fell victims like Lloyd Mbiba, Tendai Kamhungira. *Taingonzi vanhu va Gama* (we were associated with a faction the editor supported), so when Gama (G40) left we fell victims.

(Participant B interview with researcher, 15 September 2023, Harare).

From Participant B’s overtures, it is clear that ZANU-PF factionalism cascaded into the *Daily News* newsroom as also confirmed by Participant A in a manner that not only factionalised its reportage but also exposed its journalists to harm inasmuch as it offended the newsroom relations.

The adoption of factions by the daily press extended to another privately owned newspaper, *NewsDay*, whose journalists also confirm the *Daily News* reporters’ claims that monetary and non-monetary resources extended to journalists by ZANU-PF factions created factions in the newsroom. The newsroom factions replicated those in ZANU-PF at any given moment. This, however, does not rule out the fact that other factors including journalists’ beliefs on who ought to have succeeded Mugabe also influenced their reportage of ZANU-PF factionalism. In journalism, several factors influence choices of news frames deployed by journalists inasmuch as it exposes the forces behind such adoptions. What emerged from the interviews with *NewsDay* reporters largely substantiated the *Daily News* journalists’ assertions of capture of journalism by warring ZANU-PF factions.

In a wide-ranging face-to-face interview with the researcher, a former prominent *NewsDay* political reporter – identified as Participant C in this study to hide their identity – reminisced

on how ZANU-PF factions desperate to undo each other in the media materially captured journalists and knotted them to factional interests. This, the journalist indicated, not only “factionalised” reportage of ZANU-PF succession politics but nurtured yellow journalism further impurifying political journalism in Zimbabwe, which for years suffered from inter-party political polarisation. When asked how ZANU-PF factions captured journalists at *NewsDay*, Participant C, responded:

In some cases, materially. In fact, in most cases materially, where you innocently call a source for a story and then that source has informants in the newsroom. The informant would call him and say *Mudhara* (old man) there are negative stories being generated here about you. Then *Mudhara iyeye* (the old man) would do something for the informant to such an extent that the informant would take you to them and he would say this is the guy writing about you and then they would try influence the narrative. Then the material things happen. It became quite a challenge.

(Participant C interview with researcher, 17 August 2023, Harare).

Participant C raises a new angle to the capture and subsequent factionalisation of journalism at privately owned press where some journalists were not merely ZANU-PF faction agents but even spied on colleagues in the newsroom exposing them to political harm. They went as far as “bribing” on behalf of their faction journalists deemed hostile to its agenda as noted by Participant C when he claims, “the informant would take you to them and he would say this is the guy writing about you”. Also telling is the ductility of the journalist, who agrees to be taken to a faction to be ‘bribed’ into embracing its agenda and narrative on ZANU-PF factionalism. Participant C blames everything on poor remuneration asserting that, “journalists have a challenge when it comes to their remuneration so a lot of stories would be sacrificed just to get something from the politicians and in the newsroom people would go to extremes to please their sources who had become their paymasters”.

According to Participant C, the rival ZANU-PF factions were so desperate to get a voice in the privately owned press as *NewsDay* and deployed every trick in the book to get it thereby corrupting and factionalising journalism. In some instances, journalists at the state-controlled *The Herald* would, on behalf of factions they supported, recruit their counterparts at the privately owned press to editorially endorse their factional ideals in yet another show of the influence of ZANU-PF factionalism on political journalism in Zimbabwe.

Every faction wanted a voice in the newspaper so they would do anything for them to be heard. I would give you a personal example where someone (journalist) from *The Herald* phoned me to say there is this politician who is under attack for allegedly saying Grace Mugabe is dull and we don't want her and so on. So, I got a phone call from that guy and he said I just need a paragraph to say my side of the story because *The Herald* is blocking me. They are attacking me but there are not giving me right of reply. I just ran a story with him speaking responding to what *The Herald* has been writing about him. The guy was happy because his voice was heard and he cleared the air and now that person became a very close ally of Grace Mugabe after story. He was happy and he became a very close comrade (friend of the reporter). He would also give me information about factionalism. So, factionalism in ZANU-PF played a key role or is still playing a key role in promoting yellow journalism. But I am not saying what I did was yellow journalism.

(Participant C interview with researcher, 17 August 2023, Harare).

Participant C's claims above reveal a complicated network across newsrooms that became a covert vehicle for the furtherance of ideals of either of the ZANU-PF factions competing to succeed Mugabe. Participant C also revealed that ZANU-PF factions dangled material resources to journalists at privately owned press in a bid to win favourable reportage. The journalist reminisced:

One day when Tyson (Saviour Kasukuwere) was Minister of Local Government, he had a press conference and on seeing me he asked – do you have a residential stand (property)? I responded, I do not have residential land minister. He invited me to his office and offered 2000 square metres of land in Mt Pleasant (affluent Harare suburb). I remember the stand was worth over USD\$11 000. Another journalist who was at the same meeting took the stand. She was from the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Services. I did not pursue the matter but others benefitted. When I look back, I regret spanning the offer.

(Participant C interview with researcher, 17 August 2023, Harare).

When Kasukuwere reportedly made the offer to the journalist, the G40 consistently received negative coverage in the state-controlled newspaper, *The Herald*. This was the period when the G40 was battling Mnangagwa's Team Lacoste to succeed Mugabe. Another G40 kingpin, Jonathan Moyo, had been reshuffled from the Ministry of Information, Publicity and

Broadcasting Services by Mugabe, who publicly complained that as minister presiding over the vast state-controlled media empire, the political scientist used his position to fan factionalism in ZANU-PF. Moyo's reign as information minister saw *The Herald* and other state-controlled media houses scandalizing Joice Mujuru and her faction.

Tables turned after Mugabe shifted Moyo from the information ministry to the higher, tertiary education and technology development portfolio in a cabinet reshuffle in 2013. The cabinet reshuffle saw *The Herald* consistently scandalizing Moyo and the G40 faction without affording them right of reply in line with basic journalism tenets. This forced the G40 to turn to the privately owned media and digital media platforms as Twitter to defend themselves (Ndou, 2019). This brief background is necessary. It contextualises Kasukuwere's alleged attempt at materially capturing the prominent *NewsDay* political journalist, Participant C, by offering them an unsolicited residential property in Mt Pleasant.

What is consistently emerging from interviews with journalists at privately owned newspapers is how ZANU-PF factions resorted to politics of patronage in capturing reporters and ensuring positive editorial coverage. One basic tenet of Mugabeism suggests that Robert Mugabe deployed politics of patronage to secure support from ZANU-PF allies and foes. Mugabe's long stay in power is partly attributable to his ability to secure support through a system of patronage that reigned in his allies and foes. Mugabe's lieutenants across factions deployed the same mechanism in capturing the press and in so doing factionalised it. This explains why for example a whole *Daily News* editor would expose his journalists to harm by revealing their sources to the Mnangagwa's faction as earlier highlighted by Participant B.

ZANU-PF factionalism also complicated news production processes at *NewsDay*. Most affected was news sourcing as politicians snubbed reporters they associated with a rival faction. This corroborates earlier claims by journalists at *Daily News* (Participant A and Participant B) when they disclosed how the Mnangagwa faction refused to talk to them on suspicion that the journalists were moles for a rival factions. Participant C encountered same hurdles and revealed that a prominent G40 politician occasionally refused them interviews as he suspected the reporter associated with Mnangagwa's Team Lacoste faction. While Participant C dismissed accusations that they were aligned to the Mnangagwa faction at a time Mujuru targeted Mugabe's position, the journalist attributed the bias in his stories to sources they associated. The sources were biased in favour of the Mnangagwa faction and against the Mujuru camp "because of the sources I had or the people who were willing to give me information then"

insisting, “Mujuru was on the quiet side. She was attacked but she never publicly responded, which was a minus on journalists who survive on information. So, we relied on information from a vocal faction and Mujuru’s people denied us also their voice. So, we ran with what we had. We ran with people who wanted to talk”.

The *NewsDay* newsroom was also colossally divided along factional lines, a situation which engulfed the *Daily News* as earlier confirmed by its journalists. Journalists became ZANU-PF factional commissars whose entanglement in ruling party schisms manifested in the nature of stories they generated as observed by Participant C.

There was a problem because key factional elements within ZANU-PF sought of captured journalists. The newsroom was deeply divided along factional lines to an extent that any story you would suggest in a diary meeting (editor-reporters’ round table story idea caucus), the next thing you will get a call from an involved factional element, you know, commenting about the story that you are working on, which is yet to be published. So, it became very toxic in the newsroom and the people we dubbed our sources then would give information on factional basis because they wanted you to push an agenda. They would leak information from meetings but surfing information to give you what they want to prop up their factions. Journalism was factionalised to an extent that journalists became actors in ZANU-PF factional fights. So, news coverage was heavily factionalised during that time.

(Participant C interview with researcher, 17 August 2023, Harare).

Because of factionalism within ZANU-PF, Participant C indicated that at times journalists who were pro-Mnangagwa and anti-Grace Mugabe’s G40 would deliberately twist remarks made by the former First Lady at public gatherings such as political rallies. According to Participant C, pro-Mnangagwa journalists at *NewsDay* would risk it at times and deliberately twist the negative remarks made against Mnangagwa by the Mugabes in favour of their faction.

Grace would say whatever she would want to say (at rallies) but the story now would be influenced by another faction. To say, she may have said this but this is what we are saying. So, you find that a story from Grace would be twisted to suit the agenda of a certain faction. And a story from another faction if G40 journalist was writing the story, will twist it to suit a certain narrative so news coverage became biased in favour of factions during that time.

(Participant C interview with researcher, 17 August 2023, Harare).

On the implications of ZANU-PF factionalism on plurality and diversity of political voices in the *NewsDay*, Participant C claimed since the newsroom was factionalised along ZANU-PF lines, each journalist editorial spoke for his or her faction through the stories they generated. This accidentally guaranteed plurality and diversity of political voices as captured by Participant C who insisted:

I am saying we had almost the same number of journalists in the newsroom who were aligned to Grace's Mugabe's G40 and those aligned to the Mnangagwa faction, the Lacoste faction. So, you would find that on a Monday you would write a story attacking Mnangagwa, for example. Then on Tuesday, the Lacoste journalists in the newsroom would write a story maybe responding to your Monday story or something like that. So, that, although negative, created some bit of balance to say we now had voices from all the involved and interested factions.

(Participant C interview with researcher, 17 August 2023, Harare).

Although affiliated to the Mnangagwa faction by virtue of associating with sources in that group, Participant C claimed at times fear influenced how they reported on ZANU-PF factionalism. Robert Mugabe was a feared politician and at times the remarks he made at public events on ZANU-PF factionalism shaped and structured reportage of his own succession even at the privately owned *NewsDay*. Participant C confirmed this when they claimed, "During the Mugabe days there was an element of fear" and "as journalists we wanted to be on the safer side. We tried to be cautious. We would deal with whatever Mugabe and Grace would have said at a rally". Fear is an integral component of Mugabeism. Mugabe individually or working as a system instilled fear among his opponents – be they in opposition politics or within his ZANU-PF. For example, Zimbabwe's land reform programme, which witnessed forceful seizures of commercial white farmers' farms, saw the deployment of violence as a means to attain a goal in a move characteristic of Mugabeism.

Participant C noted that in some instances the First Lady Grace Mugabe confronted "journalists publicly to say you journalists from the private media you are writing negative things, you are being influenced. You write negatively about me" before privately giving them some niceties as rice.

And we saw journalists going to get some packets of rice at State House. They were given 50kgs of rice and so on. So, there was an element of fear. Mugabe was untouchable and when Grace came into the picture journalists wanted to be cautious when dealing with her stories. It goes back to the issue of factionalism in newsrooms.

(Participant C interview with researcher, 17 August 2023, Harare).

Journalists' personal belief on who ought to succeed Mugabe among the feuding ZANU-PF faction to a lesser extent also shaped how they reported on the ruling party succession politics with Participant C revealing that as a Zimbabwean citizen they were against Grace Mugabe succeeding her husband, Robert Mugabe, as that would have smacked of a Mugabe dynasty. Initially, when Mujuru battled Mnangagwa in the race to succeed Mugabe, the journalist confessed to aligning with Mnangagwa, who then enjoyed Grace Mugabe's support. This followed the elevation of Grace Mugabe to the ZANU-PF women's league secretary position in 2013.

We ran with that story – Grace and Mnangagwa alliance but immediately after that we realized that Grace was now then attacking Mnangagwa so it shifted the editorial thrust. Firstly, we ran stories that seemed to justify Grace's anger towards the Mnangagwa faction but later we realized maybe that they could be a sinister agenda, which now was Grace wanting to take over from Mugabe who was in his 90s. So, the storyline changed to say Grace wants to take over from Mugabe. Most of the stories we ran were now negative to say we cannot have a bedroom coup. I personally wrote the story. It was headlined, "No to bedroom coup". We now started writing condemning a possible bedroom coup.

(Participant C interview with researcher, 17 August 2023, Harare)

A former senior *NewsDay* news manager, identified as Participant D for the purposes of this study, also confirmed ZANU-PF factionalism cascaded into the privately-owned newspaper's newsroom and not only corrupted reportage of Mugabe's succession story but bifurcated journalists along the ruling party factional faulty lines. The news manager also claimed journalists were financially captured by ZANU-PF factions to editorially advance their succession related agendas through the generation of political stories that sided with one faction at the expense of the other. Journalism was highly polarized in favour of either of the factions contending to succeed Mugabe – it was factionalised.

The factions were not confined to reporters but editors were big into factions. I will give you an example. We had this editor (name withheld) who fronted the Mnangagwa faction together with some reporters, who were so close to him. The editor would kill every story that portrayed the G40 faction in good light. He would simply poke holes in the stories like, your story is not balanced. You write another story tomorrow and again, he would dismiss it as biased.

(Participant D interview with researcher, 22 August 2023, Harare).

Whereas the prerogative on which story to publish rests with the editor after consideration of the newspaper's editorial policy and weighing news values, Participant D's fears of the editor dabbling in ZANU-PF factionalism seem to hold water especially considering their rank within the *NewsDay* newsroom. Suffice to indicate that Participant D is no ordinary journalist but a veteran gatekeeper in their own right with years of journalism experience.

Participant D – who confessed, “Having a soft spot for the G40” – claimed the editor and Mnangagwa's Team Lacoste faction journalists regularly met at a Harare hotel to brainstorm on how to “attack” the rival G40 cabal.

They would hold private meetings at Ambassador Hotel (central Harare) where they shared ideas on propping up Mnangagwa. This manifested in the stories they wrote, choice of adjectives and demonizing Mnangagwa's opponents, you could pick their bias. As a news manager I would pick it that this language being used is supporting Mnangagwa but had no power to change anything since the editor was involved in it.

(Participant D interview with researcher, 22 August 2023, Harare).

Participant D's overtures again flag the historical normative private press-ZANU-PF relations earlier enunciated. The private press as *NewsDay* has historically had an abrasive relationship with ZANU-PF. The fact that the relations had not mended when this study was conducted yet the *NewsDay* journalists reportedly privately engaged Mnangagwa's Team Lacoste to strategise on Mugabe's succession suggests factionalisation of news production pathways and consequently journalism. Largely so as the meetings were not related to news sourcing but involvement in ZANU-PF schisms on behalf of a faction. This explains why the *NewsDay* journalists' editorial support for Mnangagwa's Team Lacoste reportedly came with financial incentives with politicians in that camp pampering reporters who promoted its ideals as claimed by Participant D.

The Lacoste camp was liquid. I know a lot of reporters like (name withheld) who benefited financially from supporting Mnangagwa. He always had money and would boast about it. At one time, I remember his car had a breakdown and I escorted him to a Mnangagwa strong ally in Harare where he was given money to service it. The reporter was based in the (name withheld) province and travelled to Harare from where I escorted him to the Mnangagwa faction politician, Larry Mavhima. The other two reporters (names withheld) held private meetings with Team Lacoste where they were paid to editorially support the cause of that faction. They would meet every week at Ambassador hotel where they strategized.

(Participant D interview with researcher, 22 August 2023, Harare).

Whereas Participant D accused colleagues of indulging in ZANU-PF factionalism for many reasons including financial and material gain, journalists in the same newsroom including Participant A – who worked for *NewsDay* before joining the *Daily News* – claimed the same news manager was a staunch G40 functionary often “greased” to editorially promote its agenda on Mugabe’s succession matrix. This allegation sounded palpable after Participant D himself claimed in an interview with the researcher to have “a soft spot for G40”. The news manager justified their capture by the G40 by claiming, “I had soft spot for G40 because I always considered Team Lacoste as an aggressive group that would be very difficult to remove from power. I didn’t like ZANU-PF but I just felt removing ZANU-PF through G40 would be easy because this group had a loose relationship with the army so after the takeover (from Mugabe) they would be easy to remove even using the ballot. Obviously, if you take a position, the way someone reports here and there reflects biases”. The news manager would occasionally derive financially rewards from their association with the G40 faction in a move that saw them considered a spy by the rival Mnangagwa Team Lacoste camp. This, Participant D confirmed, in an interview with the researcher but without fully admitting they were captured by the G40 opting to say it was incidental.

One day I met Kasukuwere at a fuel station and he gave me US\$100 to fill my vehicle. Kasukuwere was famous among journalists for being stingy. So, when I got to the newsroom, I announced that Kasukuwere had given me US\$100 but then a pro-Mnangagwa faction reporter (name withheld) took the information to Mnangagwa faction, who in the ZANU-PF politburo raised the matter saying I was being paid by G40 to scandalize him and his allies. I was then branded a G40 activist on payroll to

decampaign the Mnangagwa faction. I suspected it was (name of reporter withheld), who had informed the Mnangagwa camp about the US\$100 issue and it was overblown.

(Participant D interview with researcher, 22 August 2023, Harare).

Participant D ought to have turned down Kasukuwere's fuel offer especially considering not only their rank in the *NewsDay* newsroom (news manager) but also the timing of the gift – amidst ZANU-PF factional instabilities. Basic journalism ethics dissuade such disposition especially considering that Kasukuwere had offered another journalist working for the same newspaper a residential property. This diminishes Participant D's claim that this was an innocent "gift" not aimed at enticing editorial loyalty but exposes an effort by the G40 through Kasukuwere at systematically capturing journalists for political capital. So deeply factionalised was the *NewsDay* newsroom as journalists adopted rival factions with Participant D claiming, "there was potential journalists could kill each other over factions". Whereas this chapter is not interested in examining the stories on ZANU-PF factionalism generated by these selected political reporters – shelving this task for the next section – it is given that a factionalised newsroom portends factionalised journalism – and this spells doom for professionalism in the practice political journalism in Zimbabwe. At *NewsDay*, the newsroom literary became a battlefield as journalists bidding rival factions to succeed Mugabe turned bitter enemies as captured by Participant D.

The working environment was toxic to the extent of spying on each other on behalf of certain factions. A good example, you would during diary meetings suggest a story and it would be recorded down. A story about Mnangagwa having done something bad but then before I even write the story someone would alert the Mnangagwa faction. You would be phoned by members of that faction saying we know what you are writing about us, you are against us and we know that you hate us. Then as a reporter, I would ask myself who leaked this information to the Mnangagwa faction?

(Participant D interview with researcher, 22 August 2023, Harare).

What is emerging from the interviews with journalists at *Daily News* and *NewsDay* suggests that the manifestation of ZANU-PF factionalism in news production – widely confined to the state controlled media by existing scholarship (Maodza, 2017, Gadzikwa, 2017, Chuma et al, 2020) – extended to the privately owned press. Journalists adopted factions or factions captured journalists for political capital. Such compartmentalization of journalism fed into Mugabe's political survival strategy, which hinged on promoting factionalism in ZANU-PF as a means

to extending his rule (Chikukwa, 2004; Mhanda, 2011, Msindo, 2014; Hove, 2019; Musanga, 2022; Masiya and Maringira, 2017). What remains unanswered though is whether the privately owned press was aware that adopting factions only served to promote Robert Mugabe's political survival agenda – setting allies against each other while consolidating own rule is typical of Mugabeism format.

5.2 Factionalisation of Journalism at state-controlled press (*The Herald*): “We got cues from Mugabe”

Whereas data gathered from journalists at the privately owned press points to conscious material and ideological capture of reporters by either of the ZANU-PF factions contending to succeed Robert Mugabe, it was different scenario at state-controlled, *The Herald*. Some journalists “unwillingly” adopted whichever faction Robert Mugabe seemed aligned. From Mugabe's public speeches on ZANU-PF factionalism – issued either directly or indirectly through his wife Grace and politicians in the G40 faction – journalists were cued on whom to ‘editorially annihilate’ or ‘spare the editorial rod’.

The study captured the voices of four senior political reporters at *The Herald* purposively selected by virtue of them having generated stories on Mugabe's succession during the period under review. In face-to-face in-depth interviews, the journalists opened new insights into the extent ZANU-PF factionalism corrupted journalism at *The Herald*. What emerges from the interactions with the journalists suggests that while many factors may have informed their positions including their beliefs, aspirations, and news-sourcing cultures, Mugabe tactically shaped their editorial disposition through rhetoric. Mugabe generated the rhetoric directly or activated his “system” to ensure his position insofar as it pertained to ZANU-PF succession, triumphed over any other. The ‘system’ herein referred included ‘paratroopers’ as his wife, Grace, and those associated with Robert Mugabe at any given moment. It also entailed an unwritten straitjacketed policy at *The Herald* not to gatekeep whatever the president says even when outrageously and ingeniously false. “His word is Bible truth” as one senior political reporter at *The Herald* put it during the interviews for this study.

5.3 We were Mugabe's editorial ‘paratroopers’ – Journalists

A senior political journalist at *The Herald* during the period of the study, claimed that whereas they personally preferred the Joice Mujuru led faction to succeed Mugabe in place of the Emmerson Mnangagwa headed group, the ‘system’ was programmed such that Mugabe prevailed and reporters were left with no alternative narrative.

Can we say actively participated in ZANU-PF factionalism or knowingly? Knowingly because we were doing our job. But to say which faction, it was going to be difficult because we only published negative stories about any particular faction once that faction was denounced by the president. Denyane, we attacked it. Mujuru's Gamatox, we attacked it. G40 we attacked it. Even Mnangagwa we attacked him to some extent. It was just a culture. A protocol within *The Herald* that you write whatever Mugabe says. You would not want to cross the president for you to survive at *The Herald*. I cannot say it is something that we wanted. It was the culture that was there.

(Participant E interview with researcher, 22 August 2023, Harare).

The above remarks by Participant E suggests that *The Herald* insulated Robert Mugabe from negative publicity by virtue of him being the president. By extension, it also meant those politicians closely aligned to Mugabe and his wife Grace at any given moment were entitled to similar editorial privileges. This explains why at some point Grace Mugabe publicly castigated Robert Mugabe's spokesperson and then Secretary for Information, Media and Broadcasting Services George Charamba at a political rally in Chinhoyi for allegedly influencing *The Herald's* negative reportage of G40 faction members as Jonathan Moyo (Muzulu, 2017). As a former news editor at *The Herald*, the researcher confirms Participant E's assertions. *The Herald* would scandalize other ZANU-PF politicians but it was a taboo to undermine Robert Mugabe in stories. The tradition was protect Mugabe always.

In fact, such editorial privileges initially extended to the entire presidium – Mugabe, his deputies and even the party chairperson – before the advent of factionalism. Later with *The Herald* deeply immersed in ZANU-PF factionalism, only Mugabe and his wife Grace were protected from negative journalism. Such an editorial culture nurtured factionalised reportage of Mugabe's succession and ZANU-PF factionalism. It guaranteed Mugabe positive reportage while exposing the other faction to negativity – a negativity most of the times prompted by Mugabe and his wife Grace – fully cognisant of the fact that those condemned could not use the same platform (*The Herald*) to fight back.

Participant E claimed they were people within Mugabe's government who influenced the editorial narratives on ZANU-PF factionalism in his favour. These characters would, "tell you don't write a prominent story about Mnangagwa. Why are you not writing about Grace Mugabe?" It became a duty for *The Herald* journalists to fight in Robert Mugabe's corner by attacking those deemed 'eyeing' the presidency. Participant E revealed that, "the first thing that

we had to do was to protect the president” adding, “So, when the Denyane meeting was exposed, we reported against it. Soon after that we started having Weevils and Gamatox and we were fighting against the Gamatox up to a time Mujuru, was fired”. What emerges from Participant E’s remarks is the extent to which Mugabeism worked as a system at times operational through third parties. This is a hallmark of Mugabeism as observed by existing scholarship (Chan, 2019; Helliker and Murisa, 2020; Mpofu, 2022). It accounts for why Participant E revealed that some characters in the ZANU-PF government covertly told journalists “do not write a prominent story about Mnangagwa” when Mugabe could have directly issued the order through formal channels.

Our mandate was to write whatever Mugabe said. What other story would you write if he is attacking his deputy, who is still a member of the party and a member of his cabinet, his vice president? When he accuses her of engaging in black magic rituals to topple him? We were in a system that said ‘what Mugabe said is the word’. Remember if you cover Mugabe, it becomes the front-page story. That was the policy at *The Herald*. So, anyone who is attacked by Mugabe whether they are in the system or anything, whether he or she is justifiably rebuked, or he just insulted the person, we would use that to attack the person.

(Participant E interview with researcher, 10 August 2023, Harare).

As a senior political journalist, Participant E generated a number of stories attacking Joice Mujuru and her faction, which emanated from Mugabe’s public remarks at political gatherings. The journalist reckons “Mugabe survived on dividing people” and “used to mobilise people to abuse Mujuru” remarking that as journalists at *The Herald* “we were under instruction to write whatever Mugabe said so his influence was everywhere...His word was the Bible truth”. Participant E insists that whereas it is a basic journalism tenet to balance news articles especially when allegations are levelled against anyone, journalists at *The Herald* never bothered to seek Joice Mujuru’s reactions when Robert Mugabe and his wife Grace publicly raised serious allegations against her including corruption, fraud and witchcraft towards the ZANU-PF December 2014 elective congress. The journalist insisted, “There was no need to seek her comment as that amounted to challenging or doubting the president”. Participant E also claimed Joice Mujuru enabled the generation of stories biased against her faction when she opted for silence – not publicly dismissing the false reports raised by Mugabe and regurgitated by *The Herald*.

Mujuru also made it easy. Mujuru just went under. She did not do anything else after those attacks. She did not respond to anything. As journalists, we were in a tight spot. It was very difficult. Would you want to verify what Mugabe has said? Why would you do that?

(Participant E interview with researcher, 10 August 2023, Harare)

This uneven reportage enabled by restricting access to the media by Mugabe's rivals is suggestive of the extent to which the former president – working individually and as a system – ensured promotion of another faction's agenda by denying ZANU-PF presidential aspirants a platform to be heard without openly instructing *The Herald* on what to publish. Consequently, journalists as Participant E were instrumentalised to generate stories on ZANU-PF factionalism biased in favour of Mugabe's hegemonic aspirations. This speaks to factionalisation of journalism in which Mugabe is representative of *The Herald's* political economy at the exclusion of ZANU-PF as polity. Everything is coalesced around safeguarding Mugabe's political interests even at intraparty level. *The Herald's* editorial policy has indicated its “support for the government of the day” for years but in its reportage of ZANU-PF factionalism, the regime was collapsed to mean Robert Mugabe's intraparty hegemonic interests.

ZANU-PF factionalism also complicated news production processes at *The Herald* with Participant E observing that contending camps refused to entertain journalists at the state-controlled newspaper who they deemed served the interests of a rival faction. Traditionally, ZANU-PF politicians refused to engage journalists from the privately owned press as *Daily News* and *NewsDay*, and this characterized the patriotic versus adversarial journalism of the early 2000. Journalists working for the privately owned press were dubbed “enemies of the state” while their counterparts at state-controlled media were “patriots” and “comrades” in the eyes of the state. The refusal by either of the ZANU-PF factions to entertain journalists from *The Herald* at any given moment complicated gathering of news on Mugabe's succession and further aided construction of ‘factionalised’ stories. In some instances, factions threatened physical harm on journalists who habitually harmed their interests while promoting those of a rival camp as confirmed by Participant E.

I had an incident at Chaminuka in Mt Darwin. ED (Mnangagwa) came to address a field day (agriculture event). At the end of the occasion, Saviour Kasukuwere pulled me aside and said you are one of them (factional journalists). Where do you get the things

you write at *The Herald*? Go and tell your editor Caesar Zvayi that if he wants to fight us there will be a seismic fight. To protect myself, I told Kasukuwere that I was not the one writing the stories (that antagonized G40 faction). I felt threatened. I later told the editor (Caesar Zvayi) what had transpired in Mt Darwin. Zvayi went on Facebook and confronted Kasukuwere there. He told Kasukuwere if he wanted to fight him, he was ready to fight him as well.

Participant E interview with researcher, 10 August 2023, Harare).

The following day (25 May 2023) *The Herald* published a lead story headlined, “Kasukuwere defiant, attacks *The Herald*”. In the story, Kasukuwere threatens Participant D, “We know of course that some of you are on an agenda, a factional agenda. I am not scared. I am not a pushover. I am not Joice Mujuru... So I just want to make it very clear to you, *Herald*. No. Stop this nonsense!” The G40 aligned politician branded *The Herald* a national security threat for “fomenting problems in the party” (ZANU-PF). It is clear from Kasukuwere’s eruption that he was aware that during the Mnangagwa-Mujuru factional conflict, *The Herald* played a central role in emasculating the latter through ‘factionalised’ reportage. He risked similar predicament. Zvayi would on several occasions fight Kasukuwere on Facebook. On March 29, 2017, Zvayi demanded that Kasukuwere apologise for abusing *The Herald*’s political reporter Felex Share whom the politician had threatened physical harm for constantly abusing him in the newspaper. Normatively, journalists at state-controlled media as *The Herald* treat ZANU-PF politicians as their superiors whom they do not fight, worse publicly. The fact that Zvayi publicly challenged Kasukuwere exposes the extent ZANU-PF factionalism had permeated *The Herald* and disrupted established editorial customs.

The Herald’s dabbling in ZANU-PF factionalism complicated news sourcing for its journalists. In one such incident, Participant E was tasked by the editor (Zvayi) to prepare a story from claims by Jonathan Moyo that General Constantino Chiwenga had hired him to work on his PhD. Chiwenga was a PhD student at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa. This was after Moyo had posted the claims on his twitter handle. Moyo – who refused to grant Participant E an interview over the case – posted the journalist’s questions on his twitter handle. The problem was not just in Moyo posting the questions on his twitter handle. Participant E had indicated in an email to Moyo that they were working under “duress” from the editor as the journalist sought to cover his back fearing a G40 faction backlash. Moyo deliberately made public what Participant E considered private communication and posted, “So these stupid

journalists at *The Herald* want a comment from me about Chiwenga’s thesis, where have they been all along?” The editor punished Participant E for confiding in Moyo that he was “being forced” to write the article that portrayed the former information minister negatively.

I lost two positions (promotions) over that incident. I was supposed to be head of news and current affairs at Zimpapers radio division and Caesar Zvayi refused. I was also set to be deputy business editor. Zvayi refused again. Then suddenly he asked me to go back to the news desk after having moved to the features desk earlier. I contested the decision demanding that it be communicated officially. Zvayi came to me and said if you do not want, go home and never return here.

Participant E interview with researcher, 10 August 2023, Harare).

It is clear from the above scenario that ZANU-PF factionalism not only factionalised the news generation processes but also created enmity within *The Herald* newsroom with repercussions for journalists as Participant E. *The Herald* newsroom replicated the factionalism manifesting in ZANU-PF. Moyo’s branding *The Herald* journalists “stupid” also speaks volumes about the extent ZANU-PF factionalism had destroyed relations between the newspaper and some ruling party politicians. This was unprecedented since the advent of patriotic journalism. *The Herald* journalists had always been loyal servants of ZANU-PF politicians and this accounts for why the newspaper is referred as the ruling party mouthpiece.

The researcher confirms the harm caused by ZANU-PF factionalism on news sourcing. Politicians from G40 faction refused to entertain some political reporters at *The Herald* on the basis that their reports on ZANU-PF factionalism were always biased in favour of the Mnangagwa Team Lacoste camp. Whereas the G40 may have assumed it was tactical to snub the “factional journalists”, it only heightened biased reports against its members when generating stories that scandalised them. This exacerbated the problem of factional journalism at *The Herald*. The researcher confirms an incident when Saviour Kasukuwere – a prominent G40 politician – turned down an interview by some political journalists at *The Herald* whom the politician claimed were “Mnangagwa’s people” and gave a condition that “non-Mnangagwa” journalists interview him instead. As a result, *The Herald* ended up with a story biased against Kasukuwere. In another incident, another G40 politician, Jonathan Moyo, refused to respond to written questions from a senior political reporter but proceeded to post the journalist’s inquiries on his twitter handle in a bid to embarrass the reporter as earlier alluded.

Another senior journalist at *The Herald* herein referred as Participant F, also revealed that certain characters within Mugabe's government secretly influenced how they reported on ZANU-PF succession politics and in so doing aligned reporters to a faction in a manner that corrupted their newsgathering and reportage. Although the journalist was uncomfortable mentioning names, the researcher reveals the official as George Charamba who actively influenced *The Herald's* reportage of Mugabe's succession – officially as Secretary for Information – and privately as a news source. Charamba also silently gave *The Herald* journalists a cue on how to report on Mugabe's succession through his *Saturday Herald* column under the pseudonym Nathaniel Manheru. Charamba was active especially during the Mnangagwa-G40 factional wars. This was after Mugabe had moved Jonathan Moyo from the Ministry of Information, Media and Broadcasting Services and appointed him minister of Higher and Tertiary Education, Science and Technology Development. This gave Charamba a leeway to influence generation of anti-G40 stories in *The Herald* while promoting positive coverage for the Mnangagwa faction. Earlier as Information Minister, Jonathan Moyo had also actively influenced *The Herald's* reportage on Joice Mujuru. So active was Moyo that the former minister would visit *The Herald* office along George Silundika Avenue and Second Street in Harare to give instructions to both reporters and editors. This ended when Mugabe reshuffled his cabinet, a development that saw Charamba assuming active influence over *The Herald's* reportage of Mugabe's succession but on the side of Mnangagwa's Team Lacoste.

The researcher recalls an incident when during a ZANU-PF central committee meeting in Harare, Jonathan Moyo gave him a dossier that exposed alleged corrupt activities by politicians in Mnangagwa's faction. Unbeknown to the researcher, Charamba had seen the transaction. Charamba quickly drove the researcher to his Munhumutapa offices. Once at the offices, Charamba personally photocopied the documents after which he ordered the researcher to ignore the story without any explanation or justification save to say, "If Jonathan Moyo bothers you over this dossier refer him to me". Suffice to say the dossier exposed corruption within Zimbabwe's mining sector. When the story failed to appear in *The Herald* edition following day, Moyo phoned the researcher fuming, "I know Charamba ordered you against writing the story". That marked the death of the source-journalist relations between Moyo and the researcher built over the years when the former was information minister. Moyo – who as minister of information – had enjoyed good working relations with the researcher – suspected the journalist of being "a Mnangagwa mole" thereafter not worth relating.

The timing of Mugabe's cabinet reshuffle was also telling. Mugabe moved Jonathan Moyo from the Ministry of Information, Media and Broadcasting Services in 2015 and appointed him Minister of Higher and Tertiary Education, Science and Technology Development. He had been appointed to the information portfolio in 2013 when Joice Mujuru was highly tipped to succeed Mugabe. As information minister, Moyo used the vast state -controlled media empire – *The Herald* included – to scandalize Joice Mujuru. *The Herald* went into an anti-Joice Mujuru editorial overdrive with Moyo playing both news source and gatekeeper at the newspaper. Mugabe simply watched as *The Herald* scandalized his deputy – in an unprecedented editorial disposition.

While he would at times rebuke Moyo for using *The Herald* to fan factionalism (Maodza, 2017), towards the ZANU-PF December elective congress at which Mujuru reportedly intended to challenge Mugabe, the ruling party leader routinely publicly condemned his deputy accusing her of corruption, witchcraft and plot to assassinate the president without providing any evidence. *The Herald* would draw from such presidential rhetoric to attack Mujuru to any extent of question her contribution to Zimbabwe's liberation struggle. Following the dismissal of Mujuru, Jonathan Moyo confirmed in an interview with the BBC's Stephen Sackur during a programme *Hardtalk* that the allegations against the former vice president were mere "political banter" (Mambo, 2015).

No, that is political banter... Well the fact of the matter is this is a statement coming from the run-up to our congress and it is a fact that there were quiet some serious allegations which were not created by the First Lady, but they were all over the place in the body politic. And it was very important to have a courageous person in the form of the First Lady (Grace Mugabe) to speak to that issue.

(Elias Mambo, *The Zimbabwe Independent*, May 22, 2015)

Two important issues arise from the Sackur-Moyo interview – which all confirm Mugabe's influence in generation of anti-Mujuru narratives at *The Herald* ahead of the ZANU-PF 2014 elective congress. Mugabe and his wife deliberately scandalized Joice Mujuru to disqualify her from the presidential race at congress. To achieve this goal, they activated Jonathan Moyo who deployed *The Herald*. *The Herald* then deliberately scandalized Mujuru through negative journalism highly factional and cleared the way for Mugabe to dismiss his deputy. Moyo was only withdrawn from the information ministry after the dismissal of Mujuru and her faction from ZANU-PF and government.

The interview with Participant F also revealed that some journalists aligned to Mnangagwa's Team Lacoste faction read through Mugabe's effort to influence *The Herald's* reportage on ZANU-PF factionalism through public rhetoric. Participant F confirmed trying to undermine such an attempt by twisting whatever Mugabe would have spoken if it reflected badly on the Mnangagwa faction.

Robert Mugabe and Grace Mugabe used to make political statements at rallies – some very powerful statements for that matter – but in terms of our reportage, speaking for myself, I was not influenced much by those statements because what they were saying in the public was not in line with what those I was aligning myself to were also interested in.

(Participant F interview with researcher, 5 August 2023, Harare).

It would appear *The Herald* editor (Caesar Zvayi) was privately ordered to withdraw Participant F from covering ZANU-PF political issues. The researcher, then news manager at *The Herald*, reminisces getting an instruction from Zvayi to ensure that Participant F “does not report on issues pertaining to ZANU-PF factionalism as “he is corrupted”. Zvayi would not give further details on what that meant. However, from what Participant F revealed in an interview with the researcher, it would seem the editor was unhappy with the journalist's blatant bias towards the Mnangagwa faction, which rattled Mugabe – whose reputation the newspaper ought to have protected – and the G40 politicians. This obviously exposed the editor to Mugabe and G40's wrath hence the decision to withdraw Participant F from reporting on ZANU-PF politics. What emerges here is the fact that the lack of consensus within ZANU-PF on who succeeded Mugabe – which situation was created by Mugabe himself – resulted in lack of editorial consensus within *The Herald* newsroom itself on how to report on his succession without seemingly being biased against either of the factions. The factionalism playing in ZANU-PF, scripted by Mugabe himself as a political survival strategy, played in *The Herald* newsroom manifesting as factionalised news articles.

This explains why Participant F claimed they would “find a way of twisting” Mugabe's statements at political rallies to ensure they aligned with the aspirations of the Mnangagwa faction whose ideals the journalist shared. In so doing, journalists as Participant F ended up editorially aligned to Mnangagwa's Team Lacoste group whose agenda they advocated in the news articles with the journalist stating in the interview, “No wonder why at some point you

find out that some of us were then aligned to a certain faction to say these are Lacoste journalists”. This saw G40 politicians refusing to entertain Participant F on any issues.

It goes back to the issue I highlighted earlier to say because of the polarization that had encrypted *The Herald*, the factionalism also spilled into the newsroom. People were factionalised. The journalists themselves were factionalised to say this one is for G40. This other one is for Lacoste. So, if Kasukuwere knows that it’s me who is doing the story obviously he knew that I was not going to do a positive story about him. So, at the first instance he will refuse to do an interview with me.

(Participant F interview with researcher, 5 August 2023, Harare).

Whereas earlier on Participant F had scandalized Joice Mujuru, the journalist believes ZANU-PF factionalism reached crescendo during the G40 and Mnangagwa’s Team Lacoste era. Mujuru was weak in terms of her media strategy and Participant F reckons that Zimbabwe’s first female vice president was “shipped out of the system quietly”. Although *The Herald* generated articles scandalizing Joice Mujuru, Participant F argues that, “there was not much confrontation between her and reporters because she accepted her fate as it were so there was nothing much that we really wrote about Mujuru although we regurgitated what the president said about her”. Participant F contends how they reported the factionalism that dominated ZANU-PF prior to Mujuru’s expulsion was informed by the agenda set by Mugabe and those aligned to him. The agenda did not emanate from the newsroom with Participant F submitting that ZANU-PF “would set an agenda against an individual and once the agenda has been set, as journalist we then start to look for stories that are negative about that particular personality”

Therefore, everyone in *The Herald* set up knows that Mujuru had lost favour with the system and anyone can attack her. There was nothing that would stop a reporter to look for any other negative stories outside the public statements that were made by politicians about her. I remember people then started digging about her war credentials. I remember one other evening when we went to interview this guy, who then claimed that Mujuru never downed a helicopter during the liberation war. Those were stories that we were just trying to look around outside the public statements by Mugabe because we knew that Mujuru had already lost favour with the system.

(Participant F interview with researcher 5 August 2023, Harare).

Participant F claimed as reporters they never bothered to seek a comment from Mujuru on the allegations that Mugabe regularly raised against her because it was a taboo to verify presidential pronouncements at *The Herald*. Mugabe, therefore, set a cue for *The Herald* reporters on how to report on Mujuru in the run up to the ZANU-PF December 2014 elective congress fully cognisant that systems were in place at the newspaper denying a counter narrative. Participant F reinforces this position when they posit that it was against *The Herald* editorial policy “to seek a comment especially when the president says something then you want a second opinion about what the president has said”. This exposes Mugabe’s exclusionist tendencies actioned through nativist unwritten media policies that forbade verifying presidential pronouncements even when journalism tenets exhorted balance in journalism narratives. Participant E insisted that signals on how to structure ZANU-PF succession stories in *The Herald* not only came from Robert Mugabe but from the system he had set.

A cue was not necessarily from Mugabe as an individual but from the system that he had set both in government and at party level. Mujuru was not attacked first and foremost by Mugabe himself. They were other characters who started to attack Mujuru trying to build a case against her. So, it was the entire system per say. Of course, it was Mugabe system but the cue was not directly coming from him as an individual but the system that he had created.

(Participant F interview with researcher, 5 August 2023, Harare)

Journalists at *The Herald* would still align with either of the factions for various reasons including perceived assurances of job security at a time when the ZANU-PF government, which oversees Zimpapers operations, was torn between camps. Journalists as Participant F aligned with the Mnangagwa faction, which they believed well positioned to succeed Mugabe than the G40. They got such assurances from factional elements in the ZANU-PF government aligned to Mnangagwa whose narrative they promoted through the articles they generated.

They were characters within the system that we would say so and so is powerful and so if I align myself with this person, I know I am safe in my reportage. So, definitely forces were actually those personalities within government that we normally follow when writing our stories.

(Participant F interview with researcher, 5 August 2023, Harare)

It is also clear from Participant F's responses that inasmuch as factional elements within the feuding ZANU-PF government influenced how they reported on the ruling party succession related fissures, in some instances it was out of their own volition. Participant F insists that journalists would "say so and so is powerful" and consciously align with them. Interestingly, ZANU-PF politicians coalesced around powerful figures in the party they anticipated would succeed Mugabe in a manner Participant F captured but from a factional journalism perspective. The alignment manifested in stories generated which pushed the ideals of a faction. The journalist maintained that they partook in ZANU-PF factionalism, "We actively participated in ZANU-PF factionalism. Actively participated in terms of how we reported about it. Like I earlier said, I would twist Mugabe's public statements to suit the way I think those I am aligned would be happy with". The journalist claimed in some occasions powerful factional forces would deny his stories space in *The Herald*.

However, inasmuch as we would do that you would find that on the other hand, I remember very well during 2017 when I wrote a story after General Chiwenga did (held) a press conference at KG6 (army barrack). I wrote a story which I thought was a potential Page 1 story but the powers that be made sure that story was not published at all. The following day that is when ZBC was captured (by the army to mark Mugabe's fall). So, inasmuch as I wanted to push for that story as an active participant in the factionalism that was happening in ZANU-PF, there were some other powers that were beyond me which thought they can even suppress the story and the story never saw the light of the day.

(Participant F interview with researcher, 5 August 2023, Harare).

The story Participant F refers pertains a press conference by the then Commander of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces, General Constantino Chiwenga at which he announced that the army, "will not hesitate to step in ZANU-PF politics" as factionalism in the ruling party was fast becoming a national security threat. Participant F claims the story was "killed" following a phone call from Munhumutapa (Mugabe's office) to the editor (Zvayi) demanding he drops the article. Chiwenga was aligned to Mnangagwa faction when he addressed the press conference. The researcher confirms that the story caused headaches for the gatekeepers at *The Herald*. At one moment, it was placed on front page before it was dropped completely following phones calls to the editor from Mugabe's office, which warned the story was a veiled coup threat.

So, inasmuch as I wanted to push that narrative but there were other forces, the powers above us who thought that was not going to augur well with their plans in terms of how they want the succession story to pan out.

(Participant F interview with researcher, 5 August 2023, Harare).

In another separate incident, Participant F generated a news article in which then Vice President Emmerson Mnangagwa for the first time revealed that his enemies within ZANU-PF had attempted to kill him through food poisoning. The story caused a pandemonium within *The Herald* newsroom (according to Participant F) as it was loaded with succession related political intimations. It was buried in the newspaper inside pages.

It then so happened that on that particular day Grace Mugabe was also officiating at the launch of the Empower Bank at Rainbow Towers. Grace Mugabe lambasted Mnangagwa at that launch saying who is Mnangagwa? A person who has just been given a job by my husband, who is he? She called him names. On the other side of town, Mnangagwa also issued his statement acknowledging that indeed he was poisoned at Shuvai Mahofa's memorial service. He accused his enemies in ZANU-PF of trying to eliminate him. There was a crisis that day on which story then should become the lead story, the one by Mnangagwa or the one by Grace Mugabe? The story by Grace Mugabe was then used as the lead story. Mnangagwa story, I remember it was buried on page 5 or 7, a small story on a page corner.

(Participant F interview with researcher, 5 August 2023, Harare).

From a news values perspective, the Mnangagwa story deserved placement on *The Herald's* front page by virtue of the vice president being the second in command after Robert Mugabe. When a vice president confirms an attempt on his life by colleagues in the ruling party, such news naturally attract audience interest. Burial of such of a story in the newspaper's inside pages is tantamount to denying it prominence. Such editorial decisions are attributable to intraparty factionalism devouring ZANU-PF permeating into news production processes. This is especially so when another story quoting Grace Mugabe of the G40 faction – castigating Mnangagwa for allegedly feigning food poisoning – replaces such an article. Further, the fact that ZANU-PF factions assigned reporters at *The Herald* camps informed by the kind of stories they occasionally generated, worsened the situation. Participant F revealed that G40 politicians knew he was aligned to Team Lacoste, a position that further reinforced their anti-G40 editorial

sentiments and cultivated his pro-Mnangagwa editorial disposition as a political survival strategy.

Ordinarily we were already put in a certain camp so it was not going to help matters to say I want so and so (to succeed Mugabe), where you really know that you are not wanted in that other faction. We were labelled “Lacoste reporters” and so from that instance ordinarily we wanted Mnangagwa to take over from Mugabe.

(Participant F interview with researcher, 5 August 2023, Harare).

In retaliation, the G40 faction would refuse to talk to the “Lacoste reporters” whom they viewed as Mnangagwa functionaries and this complicated news generation protocols as sourcing. *The Herald* newsroom itself became a warzone as different reporters rooted for contending factions to the detriment of journalism.

The reporters in the newsroom itself were also trying to push agendas of their own factions so for you to then talk of integrity, professionalism and accurate reporting – it was something else. Everything you would lay your hands on you would want to make sure that it is pushing the agenda of the faction that you are supporting. So, it had become so biased and so polarized to the extent that the reportage was actually confusing the public. People were now being fed with factionalised news not factual news.

(Participant F interview with researcher, 5 August 2023, Harare).

Robert Mugabe’s dismissal of Emmerson Mnangagwa from ZANU-PF and vice presidency further exposed the levels of factionalism in *The Herald* newsroom as captured by Participant F. Journalists associated with Mnangagwa’s Team Lacoste faction were orphaned, marooned and ostracized by the ‘victorious’ G40 faction – though the victory was short-lived. Participant F captures the situation prevailing then highlighting its implications on journalism.

So, in terms of reporting about Mnangagwa (dismissal from ZANU-PF) at that particular time inasmuch as we were very sympathetic to Mnangagwa, we just went back into our shells and just look things from the terraces. Even if your go on google and check the stories that we wrote after Mnangagwa was expelled from ZANU-PF and after he had skipped the border, we were just playing hide and seek with the system because that system then had its own people whom they preferred to write their stories ahead of us. We were relegated to back benchers. We did not write much on that so I

do not know how best I can explain it but when Mnangagwa was expelled, our involvement in writing stories was minimal.

(Participant F interview with researcher, 5 August 2023, Harare).

This again suggests the bifurcation of *The Herald* newsroom along ZANU-PF factional faulty lines, a situation reminiscent of how journalists at the privately owned press consciously embedded in ruling party factions to the detriment of journalism in Zimbabwe. Participant F claimed that as “Lacoste journalists” at *The Herald*, they were denied a role in the generation of articles on Mnangagwa after his fall as G40 politicians were privy to their rival factional configuration insisting, “They (G40) knew that we were not going to write in a manner which really impresses them” (Participant F).

According to another senior political journalist at *The Herald*, herein identified as Participant G, Robert Mugabe influenced reports on ZANU-PF factionalism although other factors were also at play such as the editor and the Minister of Information’s factional alignment. Participant G was among the few reporters tasked by the editor to constantly report on ZANU-PF factionalism and the intraparty instabilities occasioned by Mugabe’s succession. Mugabe’s public speeches attacking Vice President Joice Mujuru gave journalists a ‘silent’ signal to target her for editorial abuse without any adherence to basic journalism tenets.

It (Mugabe rhetoric) definitely influenced our reportage because Mugabe was all-powerful and the wife had gained so much prominence and control in terms of how the party was going to handle the issue of succession. Our editors and the minister belonged to the faction that was against Gamatox (Mujuru faction), it really gave us the confidence to continue writing negative articles about Mujuru and what Mugabe and Grace were saying at the rallies (political gatherings) further cemented our comfort knowing that we were on the side of Mugabe and his faction. Definitely, we got a cue on who to report negatively from Mugabe himself

(Participant G interview with researcher, 05 August 2023, Harare)

Participant G claimed at times the then Minister of Information, Jonathan Moyo, would bypass protocol and give instructions to *The Herald* political reporters directly on how he expected them to report on ZANU-PF factionalism and Mugabe’s succession forgoing the editor. This happened as the Joice Mujuru faction was reportedly battling the Emmerson Mnangagwa camp over Mugabe’s succession in the run up to the ruling party’s December 2014 elective congress.

Mujuru reportedly intended to contest Mugabe for the presidency at the congress, an anticipation that saw *The Herald's* anti-Mujuru exposure running overdrive.

Sometimes we got calls from the minister – then Jonathan Moyo – he obviously would have picked intelligence about the people who belonged to the Mujuru faction and at times, it did not necessarily mean the person was a politician. Even someone who was in the parastatals. Jonathan Moyo would say so and so who is in the parastatals, for instance the then CEO for ZESA Josh Chifamba, was using ZESA (government owned electricity supply company) to fund Mujuru faction. We would then write articles attacking Chifamba even though he was not a politician. We were also doing the same on anyone suspected of belonging to Mujuru faction. We would get story ideas to attack them.

(Participant G interview with researcher, 05 August 2023, Harare).

On one occasion, the Minister of Information invited Participant F to a press conference organised to discredit Joice Mujuru's contribution to Zimbabwe's liberation struggle.

There is a woman who was at the Ministry (information). She was invited to the Ministry of Information and she was saying Mujuru did not down the chopper, it was me. All along, we were told Mujuru downed a helicopter. Now here is someone, who just appeared and they were at the Ministry of Information and they were given the platform to talk to the state-controlled media saying Mujuru did not down the chopper in fact it was her who had done it and the article came out stating categorically that Mujuru did not down a chopper.

(Participant G interview with researcher, 05 August 2023, Harare).

Joice Mujuru is credited for downing a Rhodesian helicopter during Zimbabwe's liberation war – in an incident marking her historic contribution to the struggle. But from Participant G's remarks it would seem the Minister of Information (Jonathan Moyo) sought to deliberately downplay Mujuru's contribution through *The Herald*, and the newspaper published the article headlined, "Mujuru stole my picture: war veteran", in which – a hitherto unknown – Linda Mangwende was credited for downing the enemy helicopter using an AK47. In Zimbabwean politics, especially within ZANU-PF, a politician stature and hero/heroine status is weighted against their contribution to the liberation war (Chikuhwa, 2004; Mhanda, 2011; Mpofu, 2017; Masiya and Maringira, 2018). One gains political capital when a contribution to the country's

liberation war is not in doubt. To further an anti-Mujuru editorial plot, journalists also selectively sourced news from ZANU-PF politicians opposed to the then vice president and brazenly generated a factional narrative in support of Mugabe and his associates. Mnangagwa then had joined hands with Grace Mugabe to fight Mujuru in the run up to the ZANU-PF 2014 congress.

Mugabe and his wife's public attacks on Mujuru informed our sourcing and the people we were quoting in our stories. When looking for comments on a particular issue, we would look for people aligned to the Mugabe faction. So, we would see that we would quote the likes of Ignatius Chombo, Sydney Sekeramayi, Saviour Kasukuwere, Jonathan Moyos, Sandi Moyo and Sarah Mahoko (anti-Mujuru and pro-Mugabe politicians). Those are the people that we were quoting based on what was being said because the unwritten rule was that we do not gatekeep what the president says. So whatever Mugabe said, we would always write.

Participant G interview with researcher, 05 August 2023, Harare).

Therefore, how Participant G reported on ZANU-PF factionalism towards the ZANU-PF 2014 congress was informed by what they termed "Mugabe's factional aspirations". The journalist claimed that the moment they identified faces associated with the Mujuru faction, they became prime targets for editorial abuse and scandalization, adding, "The way we engaged them for stories was not always to put them in the right picture. We would always find ways of portraying them negatively and that is one of the ways ZANU-PF factionalism influenced our work as journalists".

If we wanted to attack Gamatox (Mujuru faction), we knew the sources to talk to particularly then it was the Weevils. It was called the Weevils – the Jonathan Moyos of this world, the Kasukuweres, and then other young people from the youths (ZANU-PF Youth Wing) who were the forefront of attacking the Gamatox. Those were our sources for stories because every time you got a story that attacked someone senior in Mujuru faction it was bound to make it to the front page as one of the main stories. So, it was always a way of trying to find a way to portray Gamatox in the negative.

Participant G interview with researcher, 05 August 2023, Harare).

Journalists easily generated anti-Mujuru stories as they were encouraged by the editor and the Minister of Information as confirmed by Participant G, "the leadership of the paper and the

ministry in charge belonged to the other faction (pro-Mugabe) and you had to write stories aligned to the views of those who were in charge of the paper”. The journalists’ negative reportage of Mujuru was emboldened by their belief that they had “cover in Mugabe as he was no longer publicly supporting Mujuru” (Participant G). Participant G also argued that the mere fact that journalists were attacking Mujuru daily without Mugabe rebuking them suggested they were doing a splendid job.

We believed that Mugabe was behind the attacks. We did not have access to him directly. By virtue of having a minister in charge of a state-controlled newspaper, and having the articles published almost on a daily basis without any repercussions against either the minister or the editor, kind of gave us that comfort to believe that what we were doing we would not face any repercussions.

(Participant G interview with researcher, 05 August 2023, Harare).

Journalists as Participant G also treated Grace Mugabe’s anti-Mujuru vitriol in equal measure as they would Robert Mugabe’s remarks on ZANU-PF factionalism as they believed the then First Lady was merely passing to the media “Mugabe’s views as he was shy to say them publicly against his longtime allies” (Participant G). As highlighted by other journalists already, Participant G claimed the Mujuru faction somehow catalyzed *The Herald*’s negative publicity when they disengaged its journalists. Participant G alleged, “The Mujuru faction treated us as factional players”.

They read the paper and knew that the paper was always attacking them and accusing them of leading a faction. They were aware that we worked for *The Herald*, which attacked them. Ordinarily they believed that we were factional journalists... We would try to hear their side of the story but they would not respond to our inquiries. We found ourselves in that state because of the framing of our stories at *The Herald*.

Participant G interview with researcher, 05 August 2023, Harare).

The remarks by Participant G above expose the extent ZANU-PF factionalism not only corrupted but also handicapped news sourcing at *The Herald* in the run up to the ruling party’s December 2014 elective congress. It is clear that the Mujuru faction saw no value in entertaining *The Herald* journalists for biasedly indulging in ZANU-PF factionalism on the side of Mugabe and coincidentally Mnangagwa reneging on a basic journalism tenet exhorting impartiality in any news report. Yet if anything, some journalists at *The Herald* deliberately

falsified information to promote the interests of a faction they were affiliated. Participant G endorses this position when he asserts, “we would start with allegations (against Mujuru) for about 90 percent and just give 10 percent for the other side to dispute”. From Participant G’s indication, 90 percent of issues raised in any anti-Mujuru article were “fabricated” with the 10 percent reserved for her comment serving as a window dressing exercise in service of the normative right of reply journalism principle. Participant G reinforced this position insisting, “We did put effort to get their side but obviously not to trash the story’s framing but just to give some semblance of fairness without necessarily being fair”.

It was two episodes of factional reporting. You recall that we did not stay long after Mujuru had been purged for us to start covering the other factionalism again (Mnangagwa versus G40). Journalism was factionalised but what I can say is, coverage did not influence factionalism. No. It is the factionalism that influenced the coverage. The media did not cause people to be factional. It just reflected what was happening. The media did not have power in terms of how succession was supposed to be done. We were just covering but the real game or the real decision making of how the succession was going to be done obviously we were aware that it would be beyond newspaper headlines.

(Participant G interview with researcher, 05 August 2023, Harare).

Participant G insisted, however, that the agenda for *The Herald*, which they were socialised into as journalists, was “to attack the other faction...Mugabe was untouchable so whoever was seen to be against him (Mugabe) was being attacked”. Repeated editorial attack on selected ZANU-PF bigwigs socialised journalists as Participant G to engage in factional journalism at times for the fun of it. It became a culture which they enjoyed rehearsing with Participant G confirming:

We kept writing these articles and getting more sources around it. So somehow, I would say it did influence our coverage of Mujuru and as a person I would say, I just enjoyed the opportunity to attack someone very senior without any repercussions. It is what gave me gratification. For instance, attacking Mutasa (state security minister) who was untouchable. Attacking him without any repercussions kind of gives you some gratification of some sort.

(Participant G interview with researcher, 05 August 2023, Harare).

This probably explains why journalists would easily shift from supporting a faction today and wake up attacking it as was the case with the Mnangagwa faction before and after his expulsion from ZANU-PF and government by Mugabe towards the end of 2017. *The Herald* solidly supported the Mnangagwa faction against the G40 towards the end of Robert Mugabe's rule in a development that saw its reporters branded "Lacoste journalists" as earlier highlighted by Participant E. After singing praises for the Mnangagwa faction, Participant G like his counterpart Participant E, admits that it was difficult to attack Mnangagwa at first having been accustomed to eulogising him but they had no option as "we could not avoid covering what the president said". If Mugabe verbally abused Mnangagwa his remarks echoed in *The Herald* even though its journalists as Participant G "were taken aback because we thought the issue had been settled after the purging of Mujuru".

There is consensus among political reporters at *The Herald* that a dominant ZANU-PF faction at any given moment would shape the newspaper's reportage of the ruling party factionalism. Significant to observe, however, is the fact that such a faction appeared to draw its strength from close association with Mugabe. A senior political reporter at *The Herald* herein identified as Participant H buttressed this viewpoint when they highlighted that in reporting ZANU-PF factionalism, "prominence was conferred to the perceived dominant faction".

We would tour the line of the perceived dominant faction. In other words, we would try as much as possible to cater for the interests of that dominant or perceived dominant faction. Generally, as an institution, we tour a certain line, a line that projects the views of a dominant faction and in so doing or by extension, journalism became factionalised

(Participant H interview with researcher, 05 August 2023, Harare).

This, Participant H insisted, explains why at the height of the Mnangagwa-Mujuru factional battles in the run up to the December 2014 congress, *The Herald* sided with the former who had combined forces with Mugabe to derail the latter's presidential ambition. According to Participant H, journalists at *The Herald* consciously decided to "desist from writing stories that appeared to prop her (Mujuru) up" adding, "stories that reflects her in bad light were the major stories that we would write". Participant H corroborated earlier claims by his counterparts that journalists "got a cue on how to report about Joice Mujuru and faction from Mugabe" through his public pronouncements on the vice president. It became normal for journalists at *The Herald* to "attack Mujuru and get away with impunity".

I think the only way that they (Mujuru faction) tried to fight back on our stories was to litigate. There was some litigation but most of them did not pursue the cases. I remember Ray Kaukonde at one point sued as well. When they probably realised that it (editorial attacks) had the blessings of the president (Mugabe), they did not pursue it.

(Participant H interview with researcher, 05 August 2023, Harare).

How *The Herald* journalists reported on the ZANU-PF fissures was not out rightly of their making with Participant H insisting, “we played what I would call or what someone in sociology would call a functionalist role, which whoever was in that office (as a journalist) would play it the same manner we did. Playing mainly a functionalist role.” The factionalism cleaving ZANU-PF apart undermined newsgathering and reporting with Participant H recounting how journalists would get conflicting instructions from ruling party officials on how to report on important party meetings as the politburo.

You would get conflicting instructions about how to handle a single story. One faction would give this kind of instruction while the other will give a different one. One example as an experience we went through, we covered the Politburo. Factionalism was beginning to rear its ugly head and (George) Charamba emerges from the Politburo and says no from what was being discussed there it won't be fair for you to interview Rugare Gumbo (ZANU-PF secretary for information). Why don't you doorstep the president (Mugabe) to get an objective picture of what transpired in politburo. You won't get it from Rugare Gumbo because his faction was a subject of attack (in Politburo) so why don't you doorstep the president? That was the instruction we got from Charamba.

While that is happening, Rugare Gumbo emerges from Politburo and shouts media where are you I want to give a briefing? We could not go to Rugare Gumbo because we were waiting. Our fear was that if we go there the president may come out and leave (the venue) without interviewing him. So, we ignored him (Gumbo). So, the president comes, we tried to interview him. He flatly refuses saying you know the protocol. Go to Rugare Gumbo. By the time we went to Rugare Gumbo, he was livid. Very angry with us. He refused. So, that day we had no story. You get conflicting instructions so much that it becomes a problem on which instruction to follow like in that case.

(Participant H interview with researcher, 05 August 2023, Harare).

Mugabe's dismissal of Mnangagwa from ZANU-PF and the vice presidency towards end of 2017 complicated the situation for political journalists at *The Herald*. Hitherto socialized to generate news articles that scandalized Mujuru and celebrated Mnangagwa – who had joined hands with Mugabe to depose of Zimbabwe's first female vice president in the run up to the December 2014 congress – the journalists were now expected to attack him. Journalists as Participant H claim “psychological scars” emanating from the ever-changing narratives on Mugabe's succession they were expected to master and advance at any given moment.

The first complication is that your conscience begin pricking you that what I am now writing lacks consistence. The other day I was attacking the other side (G40) and exalting Mnangagwa and I am now doing the opposite. First challenge you go through is that of conscience pricking you and the absence of consistence. I can say it was a difficult period to attack Mnangagwa but at the end of the day we just say mine is to play like what I said, a functionalist role, that it has to be done but under difficult circumstances. It also soiled one's reputation as a journalist (indulge in factional journalism). It is wrong. It is not grounded on any journalistic principles other than other than politics of ownership.

(Participant H interview with researcher, 05 August 2023, Harare).

Participant H claims as journalists while initially they were not cued by Mugabe to generate articles scandalizing Mnangagwa, they definitely got the signals from a “system” he established for that purpose. How journalists generated content smear campaigning Mnangagwa was influenced by public remarks emanating from Grace Mugabe and politicians belonging to the G40 faction as Jonathan Moyo and Saviour Kasukuwere. Participant H claims, “we would draw from people who were associated with Mugabe as Grace Mugabe, Jonathan Moyo and Saviour Kasukuwere and (Robert) Mugabe would later publicly endorse those positions”.

5.5 Conclusion

It is clear from interviews with political journalists who generated stories on ZANU-PF factionalism during the period under study that the ruling party schism extended into the mainstream press in a manner that distorted journalistic practices birthing what the researcher terms “factionalised journalism” or resulting in the factionalisation of journalism. At the *Daily News* and *NewsDay*, ZANU-PF factions materially influenced journalists to pursue factional interests through generation of narratives that condemned a rival faction. The editors – who play gatekeeper role – were active factional functionaries in a development that destroyed

newsroom relations and failed to promote plurality and diversity of opinions in the reportage of Mugabe's succession. The same scenario prevailed at the state controlled *The Herald*. Journalists bifurcated along ZANU-PF factional faulty lines in an unprecedented editorial disposition that only confirmed the extent journalism was factionalised. Robert Mugabe shaped and structured narratives on his succession by *The Herald* through rhetoric inasmuch as some journalists attempted pursuing an alternative narration. Journalists easily adopted factions or were swallowed by them owing to poor remuneration across newsrooms. They became pliable factional functionaries who disobeyed normative journalism principles pivoted on news as nothing but facts.

CHAPTER 6

6.0 FACTIONALISED JOURNALISM AT *THE HERALD*: LEGITIMATION AND DELEGITIMATION OF FACTIONS

Findings in this chapter are from that data strictly gathered from analysing stories on ZANU-PF factionalism generated by *The Herald*. The data demonstrates how ZANU-PF factionalism influenced news production cultures as sourcing and shaped narratives on Mugabe's succession. The preceding chapter derived from interviews with political journalists at *The Herald*. These articles are now subjected to Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) to expose discourses resident in them and the forces behind their generation. The study deploys the Critical Discourse Analysis-Discourse Historical Approach strand (CDA-DHA) as CDA is broad. The DHA belongs to Critical Discourse Studies (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001, 2009, Wodak, 2011, 2013). The stories analysed are mainly those published in the run up to the ZANU-PF December 2014 elective congress where Joice Mujuru reportedly intended to contest Robert Mugabe for the presidency and those generated by *The Herald* after Emmerson Mnangagwa's appointment as vice president up to his dismissal.

Critical Discourse Studies (CDS) examines language use and exposes its appropriation and instrumentalisation by powerful forces in society. It "denaturalises the role discourse play in the (re)production of non-inclusive and nonegalitarian structures and challenges the social conditions in which they are embedded" (Wodak, 2015:1). CDS locates the role of discourse in the generation of social inequality. "Power relations are legitimised or delegitimised through discourses" via means including "regulation of access to certain public spheres" (Wodak, 2015:4-5). Texts become sites of social struggle habitually manifesting "traces of differing ideological fights for dominance and hegemony". The CDA-DHA embraces an interdisciplinary approach and is a problem oriented analytical tool justifying its use in the study.

6.1 The anti-Joice Mujuru editorial crusade

The study established that *The Herald* broke its normative tradition of valorising ZANU-PF, its leadership and policies in compliance with patriotic journalism (Ranger, 2005) for which the state controlled media are famous when it relentless exhibited an anti-Joice Mujuru editorial disposition. The anti-Mujuru crusades were highly propagandistic inasmuch as they were bluntly factional.

Between 2014 and 2015, the newspaper generated 74 articles on Joice Mujuru. Of these 49 were published towards the ZANU-PF December elective congress between October and December 2014. The stories are subjected to CDA-DHA to decipher the discourses they promoted and to establish the forces behind their generation. Words, language and discourse are not neutral (Wodak, 2003). Through the CDA-DHA, this chapter unpacks the ways in which linguistic practices deployed by *The Herald* (re)produced ideology and demystifies the hegemony resident in the discourses. Language is a means to gain and sustain power inasmuch as “power relations are legitimised and delegitimised in discourses” (Wodak, 2015:4). This section of the study demonstrates the extent to which *The Herald* delegitimised Joice Mujuru as a potential Mugabe successor consequently factionalising journalism. In this context, factionalisation of journalism translates to delegitimation of a ZANU-PF faction contending to succeed Mugabe while legitimating the other – saliently or silently via deliberate omission.

In a front-page story published on 18 October 2014 headlined, “Mujuru linked to Mavambo, Divisive parties formed in VP’s house...Condone graft, factionalism”, *The Herald* was cued by First Lady, Grace Mugabe, to scandalise Mujuru in a manner that sought to disqualify her from succeeding Robert Mugabe. The article derives from Grace Mugabe’s public address at a political rally in Marondera at which she accused Joice Mujuru of associating with Zimbabwe’s main opposition party the MDC and of having helped form another opposition party Mavambo/Kusile/Dawn led by former ZANU-PF politician and Finance Minister Simba Makoni. Mavambo was an offshoot of ZANU-PF. The story portrays Mujuru as a sell-out nicodemously doubling in opposition politics. The same story depicts the MDC as a foreign funded political party:

“Launched on September 11, 1999 when the British Political Parties, Labour, the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats came together under Westminster Foundation for Democracy to fund a political party to unseat ZANU-PF in the wake of the implementation of the fast-track land reform programme”.

The Herald deliberately gives this background to amplify Mujuru’s alleged chameleonic and treacherous political disposition. Since Zimbabwe’s independence in 1980, Joice Mujuru was celebrated as a hero of the liberation struggle whose heroic contribution was epitomised by her downing of a Rhodesian army helicopter using an AK-47 rifle.

The same article also accuses Joice Mujuru of having played a pivotal role in the formation of yet another opposition party Mavambo led by Simba Makoni on the eve of Zimbabwe's 2008 harmonised elections. The story claimed:

“The project (Mavambo) nearly cost ZANU-PF power through the self-defeating *Bhora musango* strategy that saw some ZANU-PF leaders tell supporters to vote for a ZANU-PF councillor, national assembly member and senator then Simba Makoni for president”.

It further blamed Joice Mujuru for the 2008 presidential election stalemate:

“The divisive strategy saw President Mugabe trail MDC leader Mr Morgan Tsvangirai in the first round of the presidential contest before ZANU-PF reconstituted itself outside its structures to deliver a crushing victory in the run up”.

Two issues emerge from this story. It solidifies portrayal of Mujuru as an unapologetic sell-out of a vice president within the ranks of a liberation movement (ZANU-PF) – whose behaviour undermines the core values of the revolutionary party that brought independence to Zimbabwe. Glaringly, the story is also silent on the reason why Mugabe lost the first round of the 2008 presidential election to Tsvangirai. Factionalism blamed on Mugabe's old age (then 84) ravaged ZANU-PF as allies – Mujuru and Mnangagwa – battled each other over who succeeded him – cost ZANU-PF at the polls. Further, it is also interesting to note that *The Herald* inventively attributes Mugabe's 2008 election re-run victory to “ZANU-PF reconstituting itself outside its structures to deliver a crushing victory in the run up”. This implies that ZANU-PF was forced to “reconstitute” itself outside its structures” because treacherous characters as Joice Mujuru worked to ensure its downfall rather than promote its victory.

The Herald is silent on how during the 2008 election re-run Mugabe resorted to violence by deploying the military and ZANU-PF militia across Zimbabwe forcing his main challenger Tsvangirai to boycott the polls and seek refuge in neighbouring Botswana. Mugabe then ran a one-man race at the end of which ‘he pronounced himself winner’. *The Herald* backgrounds the story in a manner designed to create an impression of a gigantic sell-out in Joice Mujuru who it strips off liberation war hero status. It is a delegitimation editorial disposition devoid of journalistic tenets of factuality and impartiality. Mujuru is denied the right of reply in line with basic journalism principles. Journalists interviewed in the preceding chapter claimed it was a taboo for *The Herald* to verify the authenticity of presidential remarks. For *The Herald* political journalists, Grace Mugabe was an extension of Robert Mugabe and her remarks – no matter

how fabricated – were insulated from editorial validation. Affording one faction a voice and denying the other same privilege in a factionalised political environment that characterised ZANU-PF at the time factionalises journalism.

The story also quotes Grace Mugabe accusing Joice Mujuru of corruption and abuse of office “involving illicit diamond deals, extorting shareholding in companies...and undermining the authority of the president”. The article described Mujuru as having a “propensity for graft”. It is important to understand the context within which *The Herald* generated the allegations against Joice Mujuru. Firstly, the allegations were raised when Zimbabwe was in the midst of economic challenges. Secondly, ZANU-PF was experiencing factional instabilities threatening its own survival. The CDA-DHA approach emphasizes consideration and understanding of the context within which discourses and texts are generated (Wodak, 2015) flagging their potential instrumentalisation in the “othering” of rivals. In scandalising Joice Mujuru without granting her right of reply, *The Herald* deploys what van Leeuwen (2007) terms a moral analogism delegitimation strategy. Moral analogism works through legitimation or delegitimation of discourses via a moral value system. *The Herald* instrumentalises discourse on Joice Mujuru in a manner that frames her as violator of accepted moral standards. This does not augur well with Joice Mujuru’s lofty position as vice president.

The Herald’s use of terms as “divisive”, propensity for graft” and condones graft” to describe Joice Mujuru and linking her to the looting of Zimbabwean diamonds, qualify as an attempt at soiling her moral standing. Mugabe is on record revealing that Zimbabwe lost US\$15 billion in diamond revenue due to corruption (Noyes, 2020). Grace Mugabe’s claim that Joice Mujuru was involved in “illicit diamond deals” blindly regurgitated by *The Herald*, exposes the agenda behind such discourse – image tarnishing for political capital. It further reveals the extent that *The Herald* indulged in factionalised reporting especially considering its deliberate failure to grant Joice Mujuru right of reply in line with the normative journalism values. It is also significant to note that the two journalists who wrote the story – Farirai Machivenyika and Felex Share – are no ordinary reporters. They hold degrees in media, English and communication studies, respectively. This suggests wilful participation in setting an anti-Joice Mujuru agenda to some extent through publication of a bluntly biased news article that trumpeted serious allegations against a sitting vice president.

Another article generated by the same reporters, quoting the same source (Grace Mugabe), headlined “Mujuru sordid deals revealed” (24 October 2014), pushed the same agenda by

instrumentalising the corruption discourse to discredit then vice president. The choice of words in the headline itself exposes the agenda of this one-sided single-sourced article. The word “sordid” suggests immoral or dishonourable conduct while in Zimbabwean colloquial context the term “deals” is expressive of dirty agreements. What even makes the story more factional is the fact that the source, Grace Mugabe, belonged to the Robert Mugabe/Emmerson Mnangagwa loose pact, which sought to block Joice Mujuru’s ascendancy to the presidency. The article further exposes its agenda when it bluntly states that, “The First Lady Amai Grace Mugabe said because of corrupt tendencies and gross incompetency, Vice President Joice Mujuru was not fit to succeed President Mugabe”. Disqualifying Mujuru meant Mugabe had no main challenger at congress as Emmerson Mnangagwa – her rival – had been co-opted by Mugabe in fighting the Joice Mujuru faction. The article describes Joice Mujuru as harbouring “unbridled ambition” – a term suggesting an insatiable desire for power – and emanating from Grace Mugabe whose husband Robert Mugabe (84) had been in power for 34 years by 2014. The article repeatedly demands Mujuru to resign owing to her alleged dirty character, “...Despite unbridled ambition... Mujuru had risen beyond her capabilities and should now vacate office”. Quoting Grace Mugabe, *The Herald* stated:

We know her (Mujuru) capabilities and we know those who can reach President Mugabe’s levels and she is not one of them. From my own assessment, I do not think she is fit to lead this country. One, she survives on extortion and does not want to work for herself. Two, she wants to grab power from the President illegally. Three, all minerals you (Mujuru) declare that they are yours and four, you are incompetent.

(*The Herald*, 24 October 2014)

This qualifies as another effort by *The Herald* at employing moral analogism as a delegitimizing instrument through its portrayal of Joice Mujuru as lacking presidential qualities as Mugabe, an extortionist, lazy, usurper of power, and as a greedy character amassing Zimbabwe’s minerals for personal enrichment. Using Grace Mugabe as its sole source, *The Herald* repeats its claims that Mujuru was a British and American agent on a mission to destroy ZANU-PF from within as “she is someone without principles...she was given money...Have you ever seen the President (Mugabe) doing that...” In contrasting the character of Joice Mujuru to that of Robert Mugabe, Grace Mugabe and *The Herald* deploy what Glazer et al (2019) term personal authorisation as a legitimization and delegitimizing instrument albeit for factional gain. As a strategy, personal authorisation legitimates through positive description of

character – and in the article, *The Herald's* juxtaposition of Joice Mujuru to Robert Mugabe is designed to celebrate the latter as a “spotlessly clean” leader unlike the former who is depicted as corrupt and not worth the presidency. *The Herald* citing Grace Mugabe proceeds to ask, “Is this how a person with ambition to lead Zimbabwe behave?” – A question exposing the agenda behind the attacks on Mujuru. It becomes clear that the attacks on Mujuru were aimed at discrediting her presidential potential ahead of an elective congress at which she reportedly intended to contest Mugabe. What makes this narration factional is its “othering” of another presidential aspirant (Mujuru) while exalting the other (Mugabe).

The Herald's culpability and complicity in ZANU-PF factionalism showed in its failure to verify the allegations Grace Mugabe raised against Joice Mujuru when it was clear these were motivated by the former's desire to elbow her out of the presidential race. As serious as the charges were, it is unusual that the newspaper simply regurgitated them without following accepted journalism norms. Through its one-sided news sourcing strategy, *The Herald* allowed Grace Mugabe to give a biased narrative on who ought to have succeeded Mugabe – a narrative that disqualifies Mujuru on seemingly trumped up charges. News media as *The Herald* are obligated to be truthful, fair, objective and accurate (McQuail, 1994:124). Further, *The Herald* gives saliency to Grace Mugabe's anti-Mujuru narrative through its placement of the article on front page.

The Herald intensified its pressure on Mujuru in a story headlined, “Resign instead, say analysts” (17 October 2014). The story purporting to quote independent political analysts, grants Christopher Mutsvangwa – a known Mnangagwa faction politician – pleading with Joice Mujuru to step down to save her image and legacy in the face of allegation of corruption. In the story, Mutsvangwa describes Joice Mujuru's political career as “melting like a pebble of ice in hot October sun” and imploring her to resign, as “Any other person with an iota of decency and integrity would have smelled the coffee and do the only right thing, which is to resign”. Mutsvangwa claimed the allegations against Joice Mujuru had “shredded her war credentials to shards”.

The newspaper also quotes another “political analyst” Dr Charity Manyeruke advising Joice Mujuru to resign to protect the little of her reputation left saying, “A good citizen will simply call it a day and live with dignity when implicated especially by a high office holder”. Use of the words “do the right thing” is persuasive inasmuch it is coercive. Through usage of such terms, *The Herald* resorted to legitimation through erecting altruistic discourses. The political

analysts sounded “selfless” in their request for Mujuru to resign to save her legacy. Robert (2019) suggests that altruistic legitimisation exude sympathy just as the article imploring Mujuru to step down gave an impression that it was doing her a favour when in reality it was factional – openly biased in favour of the Mugabe/Mnangagwa pact. It was equally coercive as it implied Mujuru’s failure to resign amounted to political indecency. Mutsvangwa’s equating of Mujuru’s career to a “pebble melting in October sun” sounded a reminder for Mujuru to resign before it was too late and protect her legacy yet in reality it was an attempt at ridding Mugabe of any threat posed by his deputy at congress.

The story juxtaposes Mujuru to Mugabe whom the newspaper describes as “the popularly elected President...” *The Herald* strategically relegates reactions by ZANU-PF spokesperson Rugare Gumbo – a Mujuru faction ally – to the basement of the article. It restricts the reactions to a sentence, “...What we know is that all issues of the party are discussed in the politburo”. Relegating Gumbo’s comment to the last sentence of the story may not be accidental. It seemed aimed at diminishing its value in order not to undermine the weight of the allegations raised against Mujuru. Again, *The Herald* denied Mujuru the right of reply by not seeking her reaction to the allegations. Normatively, had it sought Mujuru’s comment without success for whatever reason, the newspaper would have highlighted this by indicating, “Efforts to get a comment from Mujuru were fruitless”. Ordinarily and from an ethical journalism perspective, it is not feasible to publish a story raising such serious allegations without engaging the accused person under the right of reply principle. This only confirms *The Herald*’s indulgence in factionalised journalism through its deliberate biased news sourcing strategy, which generates biased narratives beneficial to one faction at the expense of the other and confirms Wodak (2015:4)’s assertion that “power relations are legitimised or delegitimised in discourses”.

The Herald – again relying on Grace Mugabe as its only source – and not affording Mujuru right of reply – generated another highly factionalised headline article, “First Lady Repeats call for Mujuru’s resignation” (18 November 2014). Significant to note is that the story was generated a fortnight before the ZANU-PF 6th national congress at which Mujuru reportedly planned to contest Mugabe for the presidency. Wodak (2015) emphasizes context when demystifying discourse. In the article, Grace Mugabe is quoted claiming to be in possession of video in which Mujuru denigrated Mugabe as “too old and being forced to remain in office by a greedy wife”. The story further referenced Grace Mugabe insisting that Mujuru should “leave office forthwith as she was not going to survive the elective congress next month...The writing is on the wall in bold print saying we no longer want you”. In regurgitating Grace Mugabe’s

remarks, *The Herald* weaponised fear (legitimation through fear) in a bid to force Mujuru to resign than allow her to contest Mugabe. The newspaper also resorted to legitimation through altruistic discourse when it quotes Grace Mugabe declaring, “If she (Mujuru) wants respect she should tender her resignation today because there is more to come (allegations). I am only telling you the periphery. We give you honour for fighting in the war...” It is as if Grace Mugabe is doing Mujuru a favour in asking her to step down. Important to detect as well is how *The Herald* interchangeably deployed persuasive and coercive language in its pursuit to force Mujuru to resign when it quoted Grace Mugabe threatening, “Don’t force us (to dismiss Mujuru); “crooks and thieves are not tolerated”. The newspaper also captured Grace Mugabe describing President Mugabe’s elevation of Joice Mujuru as vice president in 2004 as “a mistake” and urging him “to now correct the mistake”. Mujuru is reduced to “a calamity” with *The Herald* again juxtaposing her to Mugabe who is celebrated as “a protagonist and grandmaster” and dismissing those vying for the presidency as “fantasizing”.

What is discernible from this article is *The Herald*’s bias in favour of Mugabe whom it portrays as irreplaceable. It explains why Mujuru’s interest in the presidency is dismissed as “fantasy”. Deployment of the term “fantasy” by the newspaper implies Mugabe’s presidential position was not open for contest. This makes utopian Mujuru’s alleged desire to succeed Mugabe. Adoption of such an editorial disposition legitimises one faction while delegitimising the other. Othering rivals in politics equates to factionalism. This suggests that *The Herald* was complicit in ZANU-PF factionalism as it editorially promoted the interests of one faction at the expense of the other when normatively it ought to have impartially reported on Mugabe’s succession. The newspaper indulged in factional journalism through generation of discourses legitimating Mugabe while delegitimizing Mujuru as his potential successor. *The Herald* is known for “othering” ZANU-PF rivals as the MDC when reporting national politics and normatively praise singing ruling party politicians in Mujuru’s leadership position.

The newspaper further published another headline story through the same reporter (Felex Share) quoting the same source (Grace Mugabe), “Students back resignation call”. In the article, “thousands of students from tertiary institutions” reportedly gave Mujuru three days “to do the honourable thing of resigning” based on the corruption charges levelled against her. The story blamed Mujuru for the difficulties faced by students in tertiary institutions.

We are struggling in our institutions yet some of our leaders are busy destroying the country through corrupt tendencies. We no longer want her (Mujuru) to be in leadership position.

(*The Herald*, 18 October 2014)

A similar delegitimizing frame is used in the article, which through use of altruistic discourses, urged Mujuru to resign as the only “honourable” thing left for her. The story amplified the allegations of corruption against Mujuru and blamed her for “destroying the country”. It is deliberately silent on how Mugabe’s economic policies as the land reform, indigenisation of foreign owned companies and tolerance of corruption by allies in ZANU-PF were largely responsible for Zimbabwe’s collapse. This is a key legitimation/delegitimation technique deployed by *The Herald* to secure a negative image for Mujuru ahead of the December 2014 congress by selectively choosing what to give salience and what to hide from public glare (Van Dijk, 1993, Goodrich, 2018). Significant to understand also is how *The Herald* deployed the propagandistic principle of repetition to achieve its goal. It recurrently framed Mujuru as corrupt, persuasively and coercively asks her to step down to safeguard the little of her legacy left or risk being forcibly removed from office – *Kana zvichiita kuti tibate pfuti, tinodzibata* (if it means resorting to guns to force her quit, then we will do it).

With Joice Mujuru reluctant to resign and time ticking towards the elective congress, *The Herald* amplified its generation of anti-Joice Mujuru stories as shown in Table 6.1 below.

Table 6. 1: Stories The Herald published towards and immediately after the ZANU-PF December 2014 congress.

Publication date (DD/MM/YY)	Story title	Reporter name	Page	Sources
20/2/14	President raps faction leaders	Tendai Mugabe senior reporter	Front page	Single source
14/4/14	Mujuru denies leading a faction	Herbert Zharare political editor	Inside page	Single source
13/9/14	President Mugabe is my faction, says VP Mujuru	Elita Chikwati Agriculture reporter	Inside page	Single source

11/10/14	Count me out of factions – Amai	Cletus Mushanawani Senior Reporter	Front Page	Single source
14/10/14	First Lady tears into VP aspirants	Bulawayo Bureau	First Page	Single source
17/10/14	Resign instead, says analysts	<i>Herald</i> Reporters	Front page	Single source
17/10/14	Apologise or face the boot, VP told	Felex Share and Farirai Machivenyika (Senior Reporters)	Front page	Single source
18/10/14	Mujuru linked to Mavambo, MDC ...Divisive parties formed in VP's house...condones graft, factionalism	Farirai Machivenyika and Felex Share	Front page	Single source
21/10/14	Opposition rallies behind Mujuru	<i>Herald</i> Reporter	Front page	Biased sourcing
22/10/14	First Lady snubs VP Mujuru	<i>Herald</i> Reporters	Front page	Single source
24/10/14	Mujuru Sordid deals revealed	Farirai Machivenyika and Felex Share	Front Page	Single source
28/10/14	Jabu confesses to VP Mujuru deals as he confirms extortion	Zvamaida Murwira Senior Reporter	Front page	Single source

29/10/14	President speaks on ZANU-PF war...slams tussle for power...chides over overambitious minnow	Felex Share Senior Reporter	Front page	Single source
30/10/14	Mujuru in \$1 million scandal...receives illegal cash payments...elbows out, exiles investor	<i>Herald</i> Reporters	Front page	Single source
30/10/14	ZANU-PF factionalism: Can the mischief be cured	Reason Wavawarova	Inside page	Opinionated
31/10/14	VP Mujuru on the ropes	Lloyd Gumbo Senior Reporter	Front page	Single source
31/10/14	Congress will deal with sinners	Mugabe speech transcribed word for word	Front Page	Single source
01/11/14	Analysts hail President	<i>Herald</i> Reporter	Front page	Biased sourcing
05/11/14	Mujuru for cops not commission	<i>Herald</i> Reporter	Front page	Single source
05/11/14	Irony of International Travel shops letter	Herald Reporter	Inside pages	Single source
08/11/14	There are now rebels	Daniel Nemukuyu Senior Reporter	Centre page	Single source

10/11/14	Scenarios for ZANU-PF Congress	Qhubani Moyo Guest writer	Centre Page	Opinionated
12/11/14	Gumbo confirms plot to oust President	Farirai Machivenyika Senior Reporter	Front Page	Single source
18/11/14	First Lady Repeats call for Mujuru's resignation	Felex Share Senior Reporter	Front Page	Single source
18/11/14	Students back resignation call	Felex Share Senior Reporter	Front Page	Single source
18/11/14	Mujuru, <i>Daily News</i> gang up on <i>The Herald</i>	<i>Herald</i> Reporter	Front Page	Single source
19/11/14	A man can be VP: Amai Mugabe	Lloyd Gumbo Senior Reporter	Front Page	Single source
19/11/14	Youths to bar renegades from congress	Innocent Ruwende and Abel Zhakata	Front Page	Single source
20/11/14	Under fire Mujuru brews shocker	<i>Herald</i> Reporter	Front Page	Single source
22/11/14	VP Mujuru expelled herself	Lovemore Mataire	Front Page	Single source
26/11/14	Home district shuts door on Mujuru	<i>Herald</i> Reporters	Front Page	Single source

29/11/14	VP Mujuru in \$4 million scandal	Lloyd Gumbo Senior Reporter	Front Page	Single source
4/12/14	5 Things 2014 revealed about VP Mujuru	Tichaona Zindoga Political editor	Centre Page (Opinion)	Opinionated
01/12/14	So near yet so far for Mujuru	Caesar Zvayi Editor	Editorial comment	Opinionated
01/12/14	ZANU-PF congress: Shape up or ship out	Itai M.P Choto Correspondent	Centre Page Opinion	Opinionated
01/12/14	Packed week for ZANU-PF	Tendai Mugabe Senior Reporter	Front Page	Single source
02/12/14	VP Mujuru stole my picture: War veteran	Lloyd Gumbo Senior Report	Front Page	Single source
02/12/14	President hints on congress surprises	Tendai Mugabe Senior Reporter	Front Page	Single source
02/12/14	More heavyweights face expulsion	<i>Herald</i> Reporters	Front Page	Single source
02/12/14	Mutasa ill	<i>Herald</i> Reporter	Front Page	Single source

03/12/14	Mujuru misses congress	Farirai Machivenyika Senior Reporter	Front Page	Single source
03/12/14	Congress more than a ZANU-PF event	Caesar Zvayi Editor	Editorial Comment	Opinionated
04/12/14	President on assassination: Mujuru engaged MDC, n'angas	Farirai Machivenyika Senior Reporter	Front Page	Single source
05/12/14	Mujuru faces jail: President	Takunda Maodza Assistant News Editor	Front Page	Single source
05/12/14	Carnival mood at ZANU-PF national people's congress	Lincoln Towindo and Itai Mazire	Front Page	Single source
06/12/14	MDC confirms Mujuru Alliance	<i>Herald</i> Reporter	Front Page	Biased sourcing
06/12/14	Congress to end factionalism says President Mugabe	Mduduzi Mathuthu <i>Chronicle</i> editor	Front Page	Single source
08/12/14	Congress, what the doctor ordered	Caesar Zvayi Editor	Centre Page	Opinionated
09/12/14	Mujuru plot, the Wikileaks Footprints	Farirai Machivenyika	Front Page	Single source

		Senior Reporter		
15/12/14	ZANU-PF halts suspensions	<i>Herald</i> Reporters	Front Page	Single source
10/12/14	Mujuru pleads innocence	Ndunduzo Tshuma Senior Reporter	Front Page	Single source
20/12/14	Mujuru faces imminent arrest	<i>Herald</i> Reporter	Front Page	Single source
23/01/15	President blasts Mutasa	Tendai Mugabe Senior Reporter	Front Page	Single source
24/12/15	Top detectives to probe Mujuru	<i>Herald</i> Reporters	Front Page	Single source
30/12/14	Mujuru probe: cops get vital data	<i>Herald</i> Reporter	Front Page	Single source
22/01/15	Mujuru game plan exposed	<i>Herald</i> Reporter	Front Page	Single source
19/01/15	Mujuru rapped for hypocrisy	<i>Herald</i> Reporter	Front Page	Biased sourcing
16/03/15	Expel Mujuru, says ZANU-PF chairman	Farirai Machivenyika	Front Page	Single source

		Senior Reporter		
07/04/15	Mujuru putchists vindicate expulsion	Lovemore Mataire and Susan Nyabunze	Front Page	Single source
03/04/15	ZANU-PF expels Joice Mujuru...Slew of allegations cited	Farirai Machivenyika Senior Reporter	Front Page	Single source
25/06/15	Mujuru is the new Humpty Dumpty	Tichaona Zindoga Political Editor	Inside Page: Opinion	Opinionated
11/02/17	Mujuru nee Mugari is only fit for housework	Senzo Mpfu	Front Page	Opinionated
11/02/17	Bhasikiti blasts Mujuru	Lloyd Gumbo Senior Reporter	Front Page	Single sourced
15/10/15	I don't lead a faction: First Lady	Felex Share Senior Reporter	Front Page	Single source
15/10/15	President the sole centre of power: Mphoko	Felex Share Senior Reporter	Front Page	Single source
17/03/17	The day Joice Mujuru became Runaida Mugari	Joram Nyathi Deputy Editor	Opinion Inside Page	Opinionated

Figure 1 above illustrates the extent to which *The Herald* factionalised journalism. The newspaper's adoption of an anti-Joice Mujuru faction editorial stance was especially noticeable in the run up to the December 2014 elective congress. Whereas *The Herald* generated 74 stories

on Joice Mujuru in 2014 – none portraying her positively – the newspaper ramped up its anti-Mujuru faction stance in the last three months towards the congress. It generated 35 articles between November and December 2014. The congress began on 3 December 2014 as captured in the table above. Of interest to note is how the majority of the single-sourced anti-Mujuru stories were given saliency through placement on *The Herald* front page. Placement of stories on newspaper front pages not only gives them prominence but also signals the extent to which editors consider them important (Erbring, 1980; Dickerson, 1985; Huh, 1993).

In an article headlined, “Apologise or face the boot, VP told” (17 October, 2014) *The Herald* quotes First Lady Grace Mugabe “cataloguing a list of corruption allegations” against Joice Mujuru and demanding that she approaches President Mugabe and “ask for forgiveness or risk being dumped because the President is fed up with her divisive activities”. Usage of the word “catalogue” by *The Herald* implies that Joice Mujuru had committed various acts of corruption and ought to apologise to Mugabe or risk “being dumped”. Dumped is associated with throwing rubbish away or being dropped carelessly. This sounds an attempt by *The Herald* and Grace Mugabe to use legitimation through fear – in particular moral analogism – to coerce Mujuru to beg Mugabe for an apology. Mujuru was portrayed as a “dirty” vice president indulging in various acts of corruption, which can only be forgiven by Mugabe or else.

Mugabe is portrayed as if a “supernatural being” for which sinners like Mujuru ought to seek forgiveness. Interestingly as well to note, which suggests that the allegations raised against Mujuru may have been fake, is an allusion by Grace Mugabe that “the President is fed up with her divisive activities”. It suggests that Mujuru was being crucified for harbouring an ambition to succeed Mugabe and the allegations raised were merely a smokescreen. The story given prominence through placement on *The Herald’s* front page, again failed to give Mujuru the right of reply. This automatically factionalises the article biased against Mujuru for Mugabe’s advantage. The story also alluded to Grace Mugabe referring to the factionalism demon having “originated in Mashonaland Central, home to VP Mujuru before spreading to other provinces”. Such a statement suggested that Mujuru birthed factionalism in ZANU-PF yet the ruling party has been battling internal instabilities over leadership positions since its formation in 1963. If anything, ZANU-PF is a product of factionalism as illustrated in the literature review chapter.

In yet another front-page single-sourced story headlined “VP Mujuru on the ropes” (31 October 2014), *The Herald* deployed similar editorial techniques to delegitimise Mujuru and her faction while propping up Mugabe. Quoting Robert Mugabe, the article suggested, “Mujuru was left

on the ropes” after the president publicly accused her deputy of fanning factionalism in ZANU-PF and trying to depose the president unconstitutionally”. The usage of the term “depose” by the newspaper implied Mujuru was of violent disposition and wanted to remove Mugabe from power by force. Perceived Mujuru faction members including Ray Kaukonde and Temba Mliswa are accused of “supporting Mujuru’s bid to “subvert the president’s authority” after the pair objected to Grace Mugabe’s rise to the ZANU-PF women’s league secretary position. The term “subvert” implied Mujuru undermined authority of the president suggesting she was a bad character.

The story regurgitates a litany of charges against Mujuru including involvement in illicit diamond deals as a way of reminding Zimbabweans that she was unfit for the office of the president. Another perceived Mujuru ally, war veterans leader Jabulani Sibanda – who also opposed Grace Mugabe’s ascendancy equating it to a bedroom coup – was described as “possessed by the spirit of Beelzebub”. In theology, Beelzebub is equivalent to Satan while in Hebrew it means “lord of filth”. It equally means “chief spirit of evil”. *The Herald* denies the politician a voice to react to the accusations. The deliberate omission generates a highly factionalised article violating basic journalism tenets of fairness, impartiality and factuality. The story intentionally legitimises Mugabe while delegitimising his perceived rival – Joice Mujuru – ahead of the elective congress.

In some instances, *The Herald* journalists showed signs of amnesia – deliberate and tactical forgetfulness exposing their factional disposition in the process. This is illustrated by two stories the newspaper generated within a week, and a few days before the elective ZANU-PF December 2014 congress. On 29 November 2014, *The Herald* generated a headline story “Youths to bar renegades from congress”.

War veterans and youths yesterday said they will block, from attending congress, Vice President Joice Mujuru and senior ZANU-PF officials implicated in a plot to depose President Mugabe

(*The Herald* 29 November 2014)

The article cites war veterans leader Christopher Mutsvangwa declaring that it was “untenable that people who have been plotting against the President, people who wanted to topple him, people who even had the idea of assassinating the President are allowed at the congress”. Mujuru faction members are labelled “rebels” with Mutsvangwa declaring that war veterans were “totally behind President Mugabe as the sole candidate for presidency...” While *The*

Herald through Mutsvangwa deployed moral analogism again as a delegitimising instrument by portraying Mujuru as a potential murderer allegedly plotting to kill not just an ordinary citizen but also a sitting president (Mugabe), the same newspaper generated a front-page story, headlined “Mujuru misses congress’s opening day”.

Vice President Joice Mujuru yesterday failed to attend the opening day of ZANU-PF’s 6th National People’s Congress that kicked off with the sitting of the politburo at the party’s headquarters. It is the second time in as many weeks that the embattled vice president has missed the politburo

(*The Herald* 03 December 2014)

The Herald’s use of the term “failed to attend” implied Joice Mujuru willingly absconded the meeting when in reality ZANU-PF had threatened to unleash war veterans and youths to block her. In the past, ZANU-PF has deployed war veterans and youths against perceived opponents. Reference to Mujuru and her faction as “renegades” equated them to sell-outs not worth positions in a revolutionary ZANU-PF party. Thus, *The Herald* deployed synthetic personalisation delegitimation strategy (Fairclough, 2001), which uses “commonsensical” language as “failed to attend” to make it sound as if it was normal for “renegades” to shy away from prestigious events as congress out of shame. This strategy rides on the seemingly commonsensical meaning of language yet it inherently hides its ideologically manipulative nature of intent. Also through use of synthetic personalisation as a legitimation tactic, *The Herald* quoted Mutsvangwa asserting, “we are totally behind President Mugabe as the sole candidate for presidency...we want the authority of the president to be reasserted as the sole centre of power in ZANU-PF”. This is an attempt at framing Robert Mugabe as the sole rightful leader for ZANU-PF while “othering” Joice Mujuru and her faction. It is also evidence of instrumental appropriation of language by *The Herald* in “othering” perceived Mugabe opponents – Mujuru – suggesting that factional journalism worked through some kind of nativism.

On the eve of the elective congress, *The Herald* published a headline story that sought to downplay Joice Mujuru’s contribution to Zimbabwe’s liberation war. Headlined, “VP Mujuru stole my picture: war veteran” (02 December 2014). Congress begun on 3 December 2014. It dismissed a long held view that Mujuru downed a Rhodesian Defence Forces helicopter during the liberation struggle. The act was considered heroic in Zimbabwe based on it having been

committed by a young female fighter Joice Mujuru using an AK47 and not modern air defence systems.

Vice President Joice Mujuru and her hangers-on misled the country when they claimed that she downed a helicopter at the height of the liberation struggle as she was nowhere near Murehwa (scene of the shooting) when the incident happened.

(*The Herald* 3 December 2014)

The story attributed the downing of the helicopter to some little-known villager, Linda Mangwende. Mangwende claimed responsibility for the downing of the helicopter and accused Mujuru of stealing a picture of her soon after the act. This meant Mujuru lied to Zimbabweans all along when she attributed the downing of the helicopter to herself. Contribution to the liberation war is a celebrated achievement in Zimbabwe and especially in ZANU-PF. It is a yardstick separating national heroes from commoners (Chikukwa, 2004; Mpofu, 2017; Masiya and Maringira, 2018). Three issues arise from *The Herald* story. It is an attempt by *The Herald* at rewriting history by downplaying Mujuru's contribution to Zimbabwe's liberation struggle – partly a basis upon which Robert Mugabe appointed her vice president in 2004. Although *The Herald* generated the story from a press conference organised by the Ministry of Information, which oversees its editorial operations, the newspaper was complicit in rewriting Mujuru's history and factionalising journalism when it failed to verify the allegations raised by Mangwende. It gave a one-sided narration that seemed intentionally and deliberately biased against Mujuru. From a CDA-DHA perspective, *The Herald* sought to delegitimise Mujuru's liberation war credentials on the eve of an elective congress probably to elbow her out of the race. Secondly, the story presents Mujuru as a thief – who stole a picture. It is not about just stealing a picture but riding upon it to “claim fame” and positions of authority. This does not bode well with Mujuru especially in the context of her eyeing the presidency by unseating Mugabe whom *The Herald* frames as “spotlessly clean”. Thirdly, the timing of publication of the story – a day before the elective congress – seems a last minute attempt at swaying positive public opinion and support from Mujuru to Mugabe. *The Herald* became a pliable tool weaponised in delegitimising Mujuru through factionalised reportage.

6.2 Factionalised commentary: Mujuru “a dwarf in giant robes”

In journalism, an editorial or commentary reflects the mind of a newspaper about an issue of public interest. Through editorials or commentary, newspapers express their positions on issues that editors consider of public interest (Eilders, 1997:2). Commentaries have potential to

influence public opinion and attitudes (Dempsey, 1987; Cundy, 1989). This justifies why in this section, the study subjects a few selected editorials generated by *The Herald* immediately before and after the ZANU-PF congress to Critical Discourse Analysis to demystify discourses resident in them and flag the agenda set. Whereas *The Herald* published several comments during the period under study, the few analysed showed symptoms of editorial factionalism. These are, “So near yet so far for Mujuru” (1 December, 2014), “Congress more than a ZANU-PF event” (3 December 2014) and “Congress, what the doctor ordered” (8 December 2014).

The commentary “So near yet so far for Mujuru” was generated a day before the ZANU-PF elective congress. Significant to note is that well before consummation of the internal elections, the editorial already envisages a ZANU-PF leadership without Mujuru with the editor proclaiming, “ZANU-PF 6th national people’s congress is expected to usher in a new leadership that will be seized with ensuring accelerated implementation of Zim-Asset”. The editorial comment was generated on 3 December 2014 before Mujuru’s dismissal from ZANU-PF and the vice presidency. Mugabe only sacked Mujuru on 3 April 2015. This exposes *The Herald’s* attempt at setting an agenda against Mujuru with factional connotations for journalism.

Missing from the party will be the cabal aligned to Vice President Joice Mujuru that used the cover of Zim-Asset to go around Zimbabwe on factional business with the aim of deposing President Mugabe at all cost, stopping at nothing, even assassination.

(*The Herald* 03 December 2014)

There is tactical use of language for factional ends. Wodak (2015:4) urges the need to “demystify the hegemony of specific discourses by deciphering the underlying ideologies”. *The Herald’s* choice of the word “cabal” in the same commentary implies that the Mujuru faction was “a secret evil grouping pursuing a wicked agenda”. Deployment of the word “cabal” criminalises what is ordinarily political manoeuvring. The comment sustained the discourse that Mujuru was not presidential material and as such ineligible to succeed Mugabe. Further, the editorial blamed Mujuru for Mugabe administration’s failure to implement Zim-Asset. Zim-Asset is an economic blueprint launched in 2013 to turnaround a Zimbabwean economy buttered by sanctions and maladministration. On top of regurgitating allegations against Mujuru, the editorial attacked the person of vice president by framing her as inane. Unintelligent in the sense that Mujuru failed to understudy Robert Mugabe for the 10 years she deputised him and failed to fit in the shoes of her predecessors. The use of words “failed to

understudy Mugabe” inferred that the president was incomparably intelligent leader worth emulation.

Despite having been preceded by towering luminaries like Dr Joshua Nkomo, Dr Simon Muzenda, Cde Joseph Msipa and Dr John Landa Nkomo, VP Mujuru remained the proverbial dwarf in giant robes as she has learnt nothing from them.

(*The Herald* 03 December 2014)

“Dwarf in giant robes” depicts Mujuru as small a figure for the office of the president while portraying Mugabe as the giant befitting the robes. The same commentary suggests that Mujuru is not even fit for the vice presidency – a position she occupies already – when it claims, “she has learnt nothing from towering luminaries” as Nkomo, Muzenda and Msipa. This suggests that in terms of leadership aptitude Mujuru was incomparable to the three former late vice presidents.

In “Congress, what the doctor ordered”, *The Herald* designated Mujuru and her faction as “detractors” without a “listening post in the councils of ZANU-PF”. The commentary envisaged an end to ZANU-PF factionalism owing to the dismissal of Mujuru and the emergency of “the party as team ZANU-PF”. This again is an effort at exclusively blaming the Mujuru faction for the ZANU-PF fissures. In reality, ZANU-PF factionalism – as graphically depicted in the literature review section – is not a new phenomenon but is traceable to its formation in 1963. *The Herald’s* silence on the Emmerson Mnangagwa faction in the commentary is also very telling in the context of Mujuru having battled the former since early 2000 in the race to succeed Mugabe. The Tsholotsho Declaration is reflective of how in post-2000 ZANU-PF factionalism was a battle between Mujuru and Mnangagwa in which the former prevailed over the latter when Mugabe appointed her vice president in 2004. The declaration sought to position Mnangagwa for the vice presidency and prepare him to succeed Mugabe instead of Mujuru. In opting for silence instead of exposing Mnangagwa as a factionalist as Mujuru, *The Herald* deployed concealment as a legitimisation strategy (van Dijk, 1993; Goodrich, 2018). The same commentary also presents Mugabe as “keen on delivering for the people” whereas Mujuru is projected as an obstacle to the realisation of such mission. This seemed an attempt by *The Herald* at employing altruistic discourses to promote Mugabe’s image as a “selfless” leader ready to deliver a better Zimbabwe for every citizen.

The editorial, “Congress more than a ZANU-PF event” celebrated the pending dismissal of Joice Mujuru and politicians belonging to her faction from the ruling party. It derived from Robert Mugabe’s speech at the congress that appeared to seal Mujuru’s fate.

The clean-up in ZANU-PF has seen the revolutionary party finally deal with internal saboteurs who nearly sent the revolution off kilter in 2008 is welcome and should be welcomed by all progressive people. ZANU-PF, as the ruling party, not only forms but informs government. It thus follows that a ZANU-PF with bad apples translates to bad apples in government, similarly a cleaned-out ZANU-PF translates to a focused government that can deliver for the people.

(*The Herald* 3 December 2014).

Assignment of the words “clean-up” implied that a ZANU-PF comprising the Mujuru faction was dirty and deserved tidying. *The Herald* also portrayed the Mujuru faction as “saboteurs” who “nearly sent the revolution off kilter in 2008”. The MDC’s Morgan Tsvangirai defeated Mugabe in the 2008 elections but failed to garner enough votes to secure the presidency forcing a re-run. Mugabe controversially won the re-run after unleashing violence on MDC supporters. Whereas Eilders (1997) asserts on the legitimacy of free expression in editorials, *The Herald* commentaries are highly factional as they intently legitimate one faction while delegitimizing its rival. Such biased weaponisation of language factionalises journalism. It confirms the assertion that texts are a site of social struggle exhibiting ideological fights for dominance and hegemony (Wodak, 2015:4).

It is important to note that Jonathan Moyo was Minister of Information when *The Herald* embarked on an anti-Mujuru editorial campaign under President Mugabe’s watch. The ministry superintends *The Herald’s* political editorials (Rusike, 1990, Saunders, 1999). Attacks on Mujuru ended only after Mugabe dismissed his deputy from ZANU-PF and government. In an interview with the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC)’s Stephen Sackur during a programme *Hardtalk* in the aftermath of Mujuru’s fall, Jonathan Moyo labelled allegations *The Herald* raised against Mujuru mere “political banter” typical of any polity undergoing internal electoral processes. Mnangagwa succeeded Mujuru as vice president at the 2014 congress in a cabinet reshuffle that also saw Mugabe redeploying Jonathan Moyo to the Ministry of Higher and Tertiary Education, Science and Technology Development. These changes failed to end ZANU-PF factionalism as earlier envisioned by *The Herald* in its factionalised commentaries.

It worsened with the emergence of Mnangagwa's Team Lacoste faction against Grace Mugabe's G40.

6.3 Mnangagwa's ascendancy and Reconfigured factionalism narratives

The fall of Joice Mujuru and the rise of Emmerson Mnangagwa to the vice presidency, witnessed a drastic change in *The Herald's* narratives on ZANU-PF factionalism. Mugabe's dismissal of Joice Mujuru did not end ZANU-PF factionalism as anticipated. Two factions emerged pitting Emmerson Mnangagwa's Team Lacoste against the Grace Mugabe aligned Generation 40 (G40). The study illustrates how *The Herald* adopted an anti-G40 editorial disposition to the advantage of Mnangagwa's Team Lacoste, which the newspaper silently propped up. Since it was a taboo for *The Herald* to undermine Mugabe and by extension Grace Mugabe as confirmed by reporters in the preceding chapter, the newspaper targeted other G40 kingpins for negative reportage. Grace Mugabe was widely believed to lead the G40, which was composed of "young" ZANU-PF politicians. The prominent G40 politicians *The Herald* mainly targeted for negative reportage included Jonathan Moyo, Saviour Kasukuwere and Patrick Zhuwao. The newspaper generated 41 articles on Jonathan Moyo, 24 on Saviour Kasukuwere and 11 on Patrick Zhuwao – 76 in total – and none of them portrayed the trio positively. Jonathan Moyo was the most prominent G40 politician after Grace Mugabe and this probably explains why *The Herald* subjected him to intensified editorial abuse despite the politician having served as the immediate information minister, who presided over Zimpapers publishers of *The Herald*.

6.4 The anti-G40 editorial operation

In a manner evocative of how it reported on Joice Mujuru, *The Herald* subjected the G40 faction to negative reportage in violation of basic journalism principles of factuality and impartiality. Conversely, the newspaper was silent on the Mnangagwa Team Lacoste camp's divisive activities in what Wodak (2015) terms legitimization through concealment, only calculatedly valorising it. In a headline article, "Moyo, Kasukuwere must go: war vets", published on 8 February 2016, *The Herald* accused the pair of causing divisions in ZANU-PF but denied them the right of reply in the face of the allegations it attributes to war veterans. The story is silent on how the Mnangagwa faction may have been equally liable for causing factionalism in the ruling party as it takes two groups within a political party to fight for leadership for factionalism to occur (Key, 1949; Zariski, 1960, Sartori, 2005, Basira, 2019).

Another headline, "Moyo recruited to destroy ZANU: Mutsvangwa" alleged that Jonathan Moyo was son to Ndabaningi Sithole. ZANU-PF regards the late nationalist Sithole as a sell-

out even though he was among the ruling party founders. This explains why Mugabe denied Sithole national hero status. Mugabe's successor Emmerson Mnangagwa belatedly declared Sithole a national hero in 2023. Claims by Mutsvangwa that Jonathan Moyo was Sithole's son – which *The Herald* effortlessly regurgitate – are an attempt at portraying Moyo as a sell-out in the mould of his 'father'. The newspaper quotes Mutsvangwa claiming that Moyo was "Ndabaningi Sithole's illegitimate son who was seeking revenge for his father who was rejected by the revolutionary party after forging an alliance with the Smith regime at the height of the war of liberation". It is important to note that the newspaper applied similar "sell-out" frames on Joice Mujuru in the run up to the 2014 elective congress whom it accused of working with the Americans and the opposition MDC to dislodge Mugabe. *The Herald's* attempt at delegitimising the G40 as made up of dubious characters as Moyo intensified when it further quotes Mutsvangwa claiming that "Moyo was a traitor just like his father...He wants to take revenge for Ndabaningi Sithole ...He wants to reinstate his father's kingdom. Prof Moyo is inherently destructive. He has no place in ZANU-PF". The fact that *The Herald* fails to afford Moyo the right of reply when raising such serious allegations suggests that the newspaper was purposely intent on violating the politician's image and disqualifying the G40 from succeeding Mugabe as it was composed of "sell-outs" as Sithole.

The Herald repeats its call for Jonathan Moyo's dismissal from ZANU-PF for his "unbecoming behaviour" in a front page titled "Fire Prof Moyo: War vets". It is a single-sourced article quoting for the third time Christopher Mutsvangwa widely known to belong to the Emmerson Mnangagwa's Team Lacoste camp. The story urges President Mugabe to "take action against Moyo" whom Mutsvangwa accuses of "running amok by shredding every rule in the book in the country when he attacked characters of a vice president Emmerson Mnangagwa and cabinet ministers."

We cannot have that kind of traitor because of his background, maverick because of his behaviour, an anti-government programme minister because he denounces command agriculture even when the president tries to caution him, he still defies the president. We cannot continue to have such kind of men in the midst of Zimbabwe's body politic. We are saying to the president, enough is enough. Jonathan Moyo is literally in a brawl. He behaves like a mad dog in a manger.

(*The Herald* 04 July 2017)

The same article praises Mnangagwa for his effort at reviving the economy through command agriculture, a government scheme spearheaded by then Vice President Emmerson Mnangagwa that saw farmers across Zimbabwe accessing free inputs. It quoted Mutsvangwa slamming Moyo for “attacking command agriculture on social media as VP Mnangagwa’s ugly culture”. *The Herald* also celebrated another Mnangagwa ally army General Constantino Chiwenga whom the newspaper portrays as a national hero “who went to war as a young man, probably at 14 years and rose to become the top general in all the battles of that war”. In another headline story, “Barking Moyo tongue lashed”, *The Herald* lampoons Jonathan Moyo “over his attacks on government’s command agriculture programme”. The story cites then Finance Minister Patrick Chinamasa – another Mnangagwa ally – equating Moyo “to a barking dog that would not derail the programme”. No effort is made to get Moyo explain his criticism of command agriculture. Instead, *The Herald* reveals that Moyo was attacking the programme “despite him being one of the beneficiaries at his farm in Mashonaland Central Province”. The newspaper published another front-page story, “Mnangagwa reprimands Moyo on command agriculture”. It extensively quotes Mnangagwa dismissing allegations levelled against the programme by Jonathan Moyo. Mnangagwa stated:

The major attack of command agriculture came from my colleague Professor Moyo, so I met him... When I see people criticising command agriculture, I do not have time to look at the criticism. I continuously want to improve on what is there. In fact those who criticise will have eaten. They do not criticise when they are hungry, so we must make sure we produce more for them to eat and criticise.

(*The Herald* 14 April 2017)

This is an effort at legitimating Mnangagwa’s Team Lacoste not only as made up of progressive minds but veterans of Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle in the mould of Chiwenga while delegitimizing through slander the G40 as an anti-progressive group. Further, Mnangagwa is constructed as an indestructible leader toiling to feed Zimbabwe and Chiwenga as a hero of the country’s liberation war who had sacrificed his life at a tender age of 14. In deploying such positive frames, *The Herald* erects altruistic discourses demonstrating “selflessness for the sake of the larger good” (Reyes, 2011; Robert, 2019) on the part of Mnangagwa and Chiwenga.

The Herald also made strenuous efforts at portraying Moyo as a criminal in headline stories, “Prof Moyo in \$270K corruption storm”, “Prof Moyo has case to answer”, “High Court approached for minister’s arrest”, “Zimdef employees face chop”, “24hr ultimatum for Moyo”,

“Students bay for minister’s blood” and “Moyo likens self to Robin Hood” among several others. In “Prof Moyo in \$270K corruption storm”, the newspaper extensively cited the Zimbabwe National Students Union (ZINASU) demanding the immediate resignation of Moyo as minister of higher and tertiary education. The students gave President Mugabe “a week-long ultimatum to deal with the corrupt minister” and threatened, “Campus shutdowns until corruption in the education sector is wiped”. In extensively quoting ZINASU – a known affiliate of the opposition MDC – *The Herald* broke its normative editorial position that historically denied such organisations a voice on any matter. This reveals the extent the newspaper sought to delegitimise Moyo.

The Herald also systematically targeted another prominent G40 politician and ZANU-PF national political commissar Saviour Kasukuwere for editorial abuse through a number of headline stories. In one incident, Kasukuwere threatened to manhandle *The Herald* journalists whom he accused of pushing a factional agenda by deliberately tarnishing his the image for the benefit of the Mnangagwa faction. Such articles included “Kasukuwere defiant, attacks *The Herald*”, “Kasukuwere sows more discord”, “High noon for Kasukuwere”, “Six provinces reject Kasukuwere”, “10 provinces say no to Kasukuwere”, “Youth League wants Kasukuwere out”, “Kasukuwere saga needs closure: ZANU-PF affiliates”, “War vets call for Kasukuwere ouster” “Presidium to decide on Kasukuwere” and “President to decide on Kasukuwere”, among many others. In “Kasukuwere defiant, attacks *The Herald*”, the politician is reported as having “thumbed his nose at the women’s league members who accused him of trying to sabotage nationwide protests” against G40 members. Use of the statement “thumbed his nose” portrays Kasukuwere as an ill-mannered and violent politician. The article quotes Kasukuwere fuming:

I am not scared. I am not a pushover. I am not Joice Mujuru. Do you even think I am Joice Mujuru? No, I am not. So, I just want to make it very clear to you, *Herald*. No. Stop this nonsense! You are really now a source of security concern in this country. You have a tendency of trying to find stories... You write my name, and where is your source. That source must come out in the open. We know of course that some of you are on an agenda, factional agenda, trying to cause regime change. Forget it.

(*The Herald* 25 March 2017)

Kasuwere’s remarks shows that politicians in the G40 faction were privy to *The Herald*’s adoption of the Mnangagwa faction. It is equally important to note that Kasukuwere referenced

Mujuru in his outbursts suggesting that the politician was also aware of how *The Herald* was weaponised against the former vice president until Mugabe dismissed her from ZANU-PF and government. This probably explains why *The Herald* quotes Kasukuwere as having “vowed to take on Information, Media and Broadcasting Services minister Dr Christopher Mushohwe and *The Herald* whom he accused of having an agenda to split the party and government”. Mushohwe was widely believed to be a Mnangagwa ally. This probably accounts for *The Herald’s* blunt anti-G40 editorial disposition.

In another headline article titled “Misa, ZUJ slam Kasukuwere”, *The Herald* frames Kasukuwere as a corrupt and violent politician insisting that the politician’s behaviour failed to match his status as a senior government official. Kasukuwere doubled as Minister of Local Government and National Housing and ZANU-PF national political commissar at the time – two lofty positions probably revealing his close ties with Mugabe. The article derived from a press statement issued by the Zimbabwe Union of Journalists – a representative body for the welfare of journalists – condemning Kasukuwere’s attack on *The Herald* journalists. Significant in ZUJ’s statement was its salient reminder to *The Herald* to abide by basic journalism tenets by desisting from indulgence in factionalised journalism – a confirmation as well that the union was also aware of the newspaper’s involvement in ruling party factionalism.

As journalists, we should continue to be guided by the fact that our first line of defence is to conduct ourselves in an ethical and professional manner...ZUJ urge politicians to desist from dragging journalists into their fights and for journalists to refuse to be drawn into turf wars.

(The Herald 29 March 2017)

The Herald failed to heed ZUJ’s call instead upping its editorial attacks on the G40 in a headline article “War vets call for Kasukuwere ouster”, which singly quotes Christopher Mutsvangwa agitating the dismissal of Kasukuwere from ZANU-PF reminiscent of how the same politician had advocated Jonathan Moyo’s dismissal. Mutsvangwa brands Kasukuwere and other G40 politicians “putschist” suggesting the politicians believed in the violent removal of Mugabe. *The Herald’s* continual use of Mutsvangwa as a source and failure to afford the G40 the right of reply betrays its factional editorial alignment. It is difficult to comprehend how Zimbabwe’s oldest and biggest newspaper by print run and circulation, failed to afford individuals it accuses of harbouring coup intentions an opportunity to respond to such serious allegations.

The newspaper insisted on Kasukuwere's dismissal from ZANU-PF in a front pages stories headlined, "Six provinces reject Kasukuwere" (17 April 2017) and "10 provinces say no to Kasukuwere" (22 April 2017). The stories claim "Kasukuwere faces a litany of accusations including plotting to topple President Mugabe by setting up parallel party structures". Whereas the provinces may have recommended Kasukuwere's dismissal, there are glaring similarities in how the *The Herald* reported on Kasukuwere and how it had covered Joice Mujuru in the run up to the 2014 congress. Important to note is how *The Herald* would "arm-twist" ZANU-PF provincial leadership into issuing statements demanding Mugabe to punish Kasukuwere. As news editor at the time, the researcher recalls how on many occasions the editor (Caesar Zvayi) would ensure that reporters contact provincial chairpersons to ask why they had not passed a vote of no confidence on Kasukuwere as other provinces. This is reflected by a comment by ZANU-PF Matabeleland North provincial chairperson Richard Moyo below in an interview with *The Herald*.

We are meeting on Sunday to hear the decision of the provincial executive committee as the provincial coordinating committee. We will be endorsing the decision by other provinces to remove Cde Kasukuwere. As Matabeleland North, we are saying if he (Kasukuwere) has been setting up parallel structures, we support the decision by other provinces to remove him.

(*The Herald* 22 April 2017)

Whereas it is clear from the quotation above that *The Herald* "cornered" Richard Moyo to set an anti-Kasukuwere and anti-G40 narrative, what is glaring is how the newspaper proceeded to generate the headline "10 provinces say no to Kasukuwere" when Matabeleland North was yet to endorse such a position. Zimbabwe has 10 provinces and when the story was generated only nine had officially sanctioned Kasukuwere's dismissal. This bias exposes the extent *The Herald* indulgence in factionalised journalism. The newspaper ratcheted up its agenda for the dismissal of Kasukuwere in another headline story, "Youth League wants Kasukuwere out" (25 April 2017) in which again it suggestively accosted youth leader Kudzai Chipanga into issuing anti-Kasukuwere remarks. The story partly read, "Calls for the removal of Cde Saviour Kasukuwere from the post of ZANU-PF national political commissar continued growing yesterday". This implies that ZANU-PF no longer wanted Kasukuwere and seems an attempt by *The Herald* at prompting party leader Robert Mugabe to dismiss the politician.

In front page articles, “President to decide on Kasukuwere” (01 May 2017) and “Presidium to decide on Kasukuwere” (22 June 2017), *The Herald* creates an impression that Kasukuwere’s political career was on a knife-edge yet it was only procedural that after an investigation of that nature Mugabe would make a final decision on way forward. To emphasise on the seriousness of the case, *The Herald* regurgitates the charges Kasukuwere faced which included setting parallel structures “in a bid to topple” President Mugabe, fanning factionalism, corruption and abuse of office”. The allegations are similar to those the newspapers “manufactured” against Joice Mujuru in the run up to the ZANU-PF 2014 congress. The intensity of *The Herald*’s stories demanding the dismissal of Kasukuwere revealed the extent the newspaper had adopted an anti-G40 editorial stance by targeting those around Grace Mugabe. It explains why Grace Mugabe publicly censured Mugabe’s spokesperson and Secretary for Information, Media and Broadcasting Services, George Charamba, at a rally in Chinhoyi for weaponising *The Herald* against the G40. As secretary, Charamba – a Mnangagwa ally – had influence on *The Herald*’s narratives on Mugabe’s succession. At the Chinhoyi rally, Grace Mugabe remarked:

Now we see in *The Herald* there are only specific people who receive favourable coverage, while others are left out. Do you think we don’t see it? Don’t do that. George you are below ministers and you have no right to insult ministers.

(*The Standard* 03 August 2017)

Grace Mugabe went on to dismiss allegations raised against the G40 politicians Jonathan Moyo and Saviour Kasukuwere claiming, “Kasukuwere was just being victimised”.

We are doing many things with Kasukuwere and Jonathan Moyo, let them do their work. You even create corruption cases against them. They have no case to answer. We have been quiet for a long time. This must stop.

(Voice Of America 30 July 2017)

Grace Mugabe’s remarks like Saviour Kasukuwere’s earlier; show that the G40 faction was aware of the extent *The Herald* had adopted a pro-Mnangagwa and anti-G40 editorial narrative in its reportage of ZANU-PF factionalism. It is also significant to note that the same journalists who had scandalised Joice Mujuru right up to her dismissal are the same characters tasked with slandering the G40. The journalists – Tendai Mugabe, Felex Share, Farirai Machivenyika, Lloyd Gumbo, Tichaona Zindoga, and the researcher – had been socialised (Schudson, 1989)

into factional journalism and knew what was expected of them through various ways including the preferred news sources and the editor's commentaries on ZANU-PF factionalism, which gave them cues on how to editorially navigate Mugabe's succession.

The Herald equally subjected another G40 politician and Mugabe nephew Patrick Zhuwao to a barrage of negative headlines as "Indigenisation is not for Minister Zhuwao only", "Zhuwao diverted funds, ZYC", "ZYC savages Zhuwao, Lumumba", and "Zhuwao needs assistance, handholding", among others. "Zhuwao diverted funds, ZYC" (24 February 2017), is a single-sourced story in which *The Herald* accused Zhuwao of embezzling USD\$18 000 meant for youths. While it implies that Zhuwao was a corrupt politician in the mould of other G40 politicians Jonathan Moyo and Saviour Kasukuwere, it does not give him a right of reply despite the seriousness of allegations raised and their implications on his image as a minister. Another headline article, "Minister Zhuwao implicated", claimed that Zhuwao corruptly awarded a tender to company not registered with the State Procurement Board as required by the law to provide services for his ministry. The story emphasised on Zhuwao's corrupt tendencies but the minister is denied right of reply while another headline article, "I bungled: Zhuwao, I misrepresented Indigenisation Act", portrayed Zhuwao as a "dull" minister who failed to understand a government policy that he is mandated to implement. Use of the word "bungle" frames Zhuwao as a "clumsy" not worth the position of minister. Placement of the story on *The Herald* front page gives it saliency. *The Herald* employs such negative frames on other stories it published on Zhuwao.

6.5 *The Herald's* factionalised anti-G40 commentary: "Bellicose Moyo needs disciplining"

The Herald's editorial comments – as illustrated in the Mujuru scenario – exposed the extent the newspaper indulged and promoted factionalised journalism. An editorial comment reveals a newspaper's mind on topical contemporary issue. In "Bellicose Moyo needs disciplining", *The Herald* frames Jonathan Moyo as an incorrigible politician deserving punishment from the appointing authority, Robert Mugabe. "Bellicose" implies Jonathan Moyo is a problematic and pugnacious politician deserving rebuke from leadership. The comment reads in part:

On Thursday evening, Professor Jonathan Moyo, with embattled national political commissar Saviour Kasukuwere, his half-brother Dickson Mafios, Patrick Zhuwao and Wonder Mashange as cheerleaders, was the main speaker as a SAPES Policy dialogue to discuss the future of the nationalist project.

(*The Herald* 03 June 2017)

The Herald portrays the G40 politicians' careers as in precarious position while Zhuwao – a cabinet minister – is reduced to “cheerleader”. The same commentary attacks Jonathan Moyo for his “uncultured mouth” trying “to brew discord ahead of a ZANU-PF campaign launch”. The editorial emanated from Jonathan Moyo's remarks at SAPES that Sydney Sekeramayi was senior than Emmerson Mnangagwa and better positioned to succeed Robert Mugabe. The commentary frames Jonathan Moyo as a divisive element for playing “one of the most senior party leaders from Mashonaland East Dr Sydney Sekeramayi, against Vice President Emmerson Mnangagwa whom he claimed was unfit to advance the nationalist project”. It further slams Jonathan Moyo for being “the only ZANU-PF official who disputes the success of the command agriculture programme, itself one of the success stories of the party and government”. This reveals *The Herald's* pro-Team Lacoste editorial stance by legitimating Emmerson Mnangagwa as fit to succeed Mugabe and highlighting the successes of command agriculture – a programme he spearheaded as vice president. For disqualifying Mnangagwa and promoting Sekeramayi as a potential Mugabe successor, *The Herald* claimed Jonathan Moyo had exposed how “he was not grounded in ZANU-PF history or ethos despite his pretensions”. This depicts Jonathan Moyo as lacking nationalistic roots.

The Prof was also offside on the history he purported to be privy as he located Vice President Mnangagwa in the struggle from 1977, the time he went to Mozambique yet history will show Cde Mnangagwa was at the inaugural ZANU congress in Gweru in 1964, What is more, he had earlier been recruited into ZAPU in 1962 by Cde Willie Musarurwa.

(*The Herald* 3 June 2017)

The above statement – although falling short in pronouncing Mnangagwa as its preferred Mugabe successor – positions and legitimates the then vice presidency's candidature for the president while concealing Sekeramayi's participation in Zimbabwe's liberation struggle. Both Mnangagwa and Sekeramayi participated in Zimbabwe's liberation war. *The Herald* associated Sekeramayi with the G40, “particularly in light of Prof Stephen Chan's assertion that the G40 cabal lacks a unifying face”. Sekeramayi is depicted as the supposedly G40 unifying face. *The Herald* proceeded to advocate for Mugabe to punish Jonathan Moyo for undermining Mnangagwa, “It is not a secret that Prof Moyo keeps thumping his nose at the party leadership because he is used to getting away with his transgressions. It is high time the ZANU-PF

disciplinary machine threw the book at him...one bad apple left to fester spoils an entire basket”. “Thumping his nose” at leadership, suggests indiscipline just as “transgressions” while depicting Moyo as “a bad apple” for expressing his leadership preferences seemed aimed at persuading Mugabe to punish the politician as what happened with Mujuru. Overall, this commentary delegitimises the G40 as composed of undisciplined politicians with no liberation war credentials while legitimating Mnangagwa as a nationalist and one of the founders of ZANU as he “was at the inaugural ZANU congress in Gweru in 1964” and “... had earlier been recruited into ZAPU in 1962 by Cde Willie Musarurwa”. Participation in Zimbabwe’s liberation war is used as a yardstick for choosing leaders in ZANU-PF.

In another editorial comment, “Egoistic Moyo hoist by own petard” (30 June 2017), the newspaper again equates Jonathan Moyo to “one bad apple that spoils a whole box” and slammed the politician for his negative comments on the Vice President Mnangagwa spearheaded command agriculture programme.

It is unfortunate that in the midst of a bumper harvest, a feat last experienced by our farmers years ago, instead of all of us concentrating on what this good harvest means and mapping the way forward, we are seized with negative sentiments from detractors of the government and private sector-driven command agriculture programme; detractors who think they have the best minds.

(The Herald 30 June 2017)

The above statement by *The Herald* legitimates Mnangagwa whom it frames as an enterprising leader under whose stewardship of command agriculture Zimbabwe achieved “a bumper harvest, a feat last experienced by our farmers years ago”. It delegitimises Jonathan Moyo – and by extension – the G40 as “detractors” for criticising command agriculture. The word “detractors” qualifies Jonathan Moyo as having attempted to derail command agriculture through his negative comments on the programme – portraying the G40 as an anti-progressive group only obsessed with usurping power from Mugabe. *The Herald* further disqualifies Jonathan Moyo’s position in government when it suggests, “his attitude to this (command agriculture) and others is a negation of the responsibilities bequeathed to him as a cabinet minister and politburo member in the ruling ZANU-PF party”.

This sounds an effort at inciting Mugabe to dismiss Jonathan Moyo, and precisely so when it proceeds to state that, “we continue to wonder why he (Moyo) remains untouchable when he continually ignores President Mugabe’s call to stop discussing party and government issues on

social media”. In reality, Moyo and G40 politicians resorted to active social media use after *The Herald* denied them editorial space (Ndou, 2019) despite the newspaper constantly generating negative narratives about them. The title of the commentary itself “Egoistic Moyo hoist by own petard” portrays Moyo as a selfish politician. The phrase “hoist by own petard” is an anticipation of negative repercussions for Jonathan Moyo for criticising Mnangagwa. According to the Oxford Dictionary “hoist by own petard” means to “have one’s plans to cause trouble for others backfire on one”.

The commentary, “Glaring irony lost to Kasukuwere” (11 July 2017) reveals the extent *The Herald* was entangled in ZANU-PF factionalism. The editorial comment is a reaction to Kasukuwere allegedly threatening *The Herald* journalists in Mt Darwin whom he accused of biased reporting. While the commentary was on Kasukuwere, it advertently condemns Jonathan Moyo as well with the pair accused of “relentless attacks on *The Herald*...pouring out verbal vitriol as well as instituting lawsuits”. The editorial comment was also a reaction to Kasukuwere’s twitter post, “@herald will require a new pair of hands soon. It’s on”. In its editorial response, *The Herald* bravely suggests that it was ZANU-PF “that may soon require a fresh pair of hands in the position of national political commissar” and insists that Kasukuwere “has been rejected by the majority of the country’s provinces, now an axe hangs over his head...” Such an editorial disposition as displayed in the commentary was foreign to *The Herald*, a newspaper known for practicing patriotic journalism (Ranger, 2005) – which valorised ruling party politicians and policies all the time. If anything, this explains why Kasukuwere suggested “a new pair of hands” for *The Herald* in reference to a new editor. Never in the past had *The Herald* disparaged and dared a cabinet minister in that manner – by virtue of the ministers being Mugabe’s political appointees and by extension *The Herald*’s bosses worth of editorial respect. Such editorial behaviour only confirms the newspaper’s participation in ZANU-PF factionalism biased in favour of Mnangagwa’s Team Lacoste. This appears so especially when the commentary proceeds to proclaim:

We have observed with dismay important government programmes such as Special Maize Programme for Import Substitution, popularly referred as command agriculture, being subjected to unnecessary and uncalled for professorial scrutiny because some people don’t like the person appointed to superintend over the food security programme.

(*The Herald* 11 June 2017)

The Herald's constant reference to the success of command agriculture seems an attempt at legitimating Mnangagwa through positive portrayal as progressive while framing the G40 as a composition of unproductive quarrelsome politicians whose political careers were hanging by the thread. Another commentary, “Zhuwao needs assistance, handholding”, (23 June 2017) disparaged the Minister of Youth Development, Indigenisation and Empowerment Patrick Zhuwao as ignorant of his ministerial mandate. Zhuwao was associated with the G40 faction. In the commentary, *The Herald* said it “was really concerned by the policy ignorance he (Zhuwao) publicly flaunts like a badge of honour as it does not bode well for the public’s confidence in government”. Through deployment of altruistic discourses, *The Herald* legitimates Mnangagwa while delegitimizing the G40, whom the newspaper constantly refers as a “cabal”. The table below illustrates how *The Herald* systematically scandalised the G40 after Mnangagwa’s elevation to the vice presidency.

Table 6. 2: Stories published by *The Herald* when Mnangagwa assumed the vice presidency – the Team Lacoste/G40 faction war.

Publication date: DD/MM/YY	Story heading	Reporter name/position	Page	Sources
8/2/2016	Moyo recruited to destroy ZANU-PF: Mutsvangwa	Munyaradzi Musiiwa	Front page	Single sourced
8/2/16	Moyo, Kasukuwere must go: war vets	Zvamaida Murwira and Munyaradzi Musiiwa	Front page	Single source
8/10/16	Students bay for ministers’ blood	<i>Herald</i> Reporter	Front page	Single source
10/10/16	Acting President springs to Moyo’s defence	Mashudu Netsianda Junior Reporter	Front page	Single source
10/10/16	Moyo likens self to Robin Hood	<i>Herald</i> Reporter	Front page	Single source
11/10/16	Moyo not immune to arrest: lawyers	<i>Herald</i> Reporter	Front page	Multiple sources

11/10/16	Prof Moyo under fire over Robin Hood	<i>Herald</i> Reporter	Front page	Multiple sources
11/10/16	Zimdef employees face chop	Takunda Maodza Assistant News Editor	Front page	Multiple sources
11/10/16	The Constitution is Zim's supreme law	Christopher Farai Charamba Junior Reporter	Inside page	Opinionated
12/10/16	Zimdef funders speak on Moyo	<i>Herald</i> Reporter	Front page	Multiple sources
13/10/16	Students' unions tear into Chipanga	<i>Herald</i> Reporter	Front page	Single source
13/10/16	No one is above the law: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Only president immune to criminal prosecution • Everyone else is fair game, says Vice President 	Zvamaida Murwira Senior Reporter	Front page	Single source
14/10/16	High Court approached for minister's arrest	Fidelis Munyoro Chief Court Reporter	Front page	Single source
14/10/16	\$450K only a drop in the ocean, says Prof Moyo	Zvamaida Murwira Senior Reporter	Front page	Single source
14/10/16	How can tackling corruption destroy ZANU-PF?	Tichaona Zindoga Political editor	Inside page	Opinionated
14/10/16	ZACC raps Moyo, reveals bank details: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Money not used for party programmes 	Lloyd Gumbo Senior Reporter	Front page	Single source

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Public bombarded with lies 			
19/10/16	Police speak on Moyo's arrest	Fidelis Munyoro Chief Court Reporter	Front page	Single source
26/10/16	Prof Moyo responds to arrest calls	Daniel Nemukuyu Senior Court Reporter	Front page	Single source
08/12/16	Arrest Moyo, PG orders Chihuri	Daniel Nemukuyu Senior Court Reporter	Front page	Single source
21/10/16	Parly summons Professor Moyo	Zvamaida Murwira Senior Reporter	Front page	Single source
5/11/16	Concourt suspends Prof Moyo arrest	Fidelis Munyoro	Front page	Single source
29/11/16	24hr ultimatum for Moyo	Daniel Nemukuyu Senior Court Reporter Senior Court Reporter	Front page	Single source
14/4/2017	Mnangagwa reprimands Moyo on command agriculture	Zvamaida Murwira Senior Reporter	Front page	Single source
24/4/17	Knives out for Jonathan Moyo	Nduduzo Tshuma Political Editor	Front page	Single source
28/6/17	Call to censure Jonathan Moyo	Sydney Kawadza Senior Reporter	Front page	Biased sourcing
6/7/17	Command Agriculture: OPC exposes Moyo	Felex Share Senior Reporter	Front page	Single source
29/6/17	Barking Moyo tongue lashed	Zvamaida Murwira and Africa Moyo	Front page	Single source

4/7/17	Fire Prof Moyo: Warvets	Nyemudzai Kakore <i>Herald</i> Correspondent	Front page	Single source
10/7/17	Shape up, or ship out: Moyo told	<i>Herald</i> Reporter	Front page	Single source
3/6/17	Outrage over Moyo's utterances	Farirai Machivenyika Senior Reporter	Front page	Biased sourcing
2/6/17	Moyo attacks VP, lauds Sekeramayi	Fidelis Munyoro and Collen Murahwa	Front page	Single source
10/7/17	Moyo's Mgagao camp defence falls short	Daniel Nemukuyu Senior Reporter	Front page	Single source
12/7/17	Moyo fails to back Chiwenga thesis claim	Felex Share Senior Reporter	Front page	Single source
27/6/17	Gen Chiwenga reads riot act <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Warns anti-command agric lobby Security services aware of saboteurs 	Mabasa Sasa <i>Sunday Mail</i> editor	Front page	Single source
3/6/17	Bellicose Moyo needs disciplining	Caesar Zvayi Editor	Centre page	Single source
30/6/17	Egoistic Moyo hoist by own petard	Caesar Zvayi Editor	Centre page	Single source
5/7/17	Prof Moyo should use proper platform	Caesar Zvayi Editor	Centre page	Single source
14/2/17	Prof Moyo berates ZACC	Zvamaida Murwira Senior Reporter	Front page	Single source

21/6/17	Something ugly with Moyo's head	Tichaona Zindoga Political Editor	Inside page	Opinionated
23/6/17	Criticism of command agriculture an act of rogues	Trevor Shiri Correspondent	Inside page	Opinionated
13/7/17	Jonathan Moyo and the Gollum effect	Tichaona Zindoga Political editor	Inside page	Opinionated
7/7/17	Of those who live in glass houses	Caesar Zvayi Editor	Inside page	Opinionated
25 March 2017	Kasukuwere defiant, attacks The Herald	Sydney Kawadza Senior Journalist	Front page	Single sources
3/11/16	Kasukuwere sows more discord	Tendai Mugabe Senior Reporter	Front page	Single sources
29/3/17	Misa Zim, ZUJ slam Kasukuwere	Tendai Mugabe	Front page	Multi-sources
3/4/17	High noon for Kasukuwere	<i>Herald</i> Reporter	Front page	Multi-sources
17/4/17	Six provinces reject Kasukuwere	Paida Chipunza Senior Reporter	Front Page	Single sources
22/4/17	10 provinces say no to Kasukuwere	<i>Herald</i> Reporters	Front page	Multi-sourced
25/4/17	Youth League wants Kasukuwere out	Tendai Mugabe Senior Reporter	Front page	Single sources
26/4/17	Drama at Kasukuwere probe	Tendai Mugabe and Kuda Bwititi Senior Reporter	Front page	Single sources

1/5/17	President to decide on Kasukuwere	Herald Reporter	Front page	Single source
02/5/17	Kasukuwere tests waters, summons chairpersons	Takunda Maodza Assistant News Editor	Front page	Multiple-sources
18/5/17	Bulawayo youths slam Kasukuwere	Auxilia Katongomara Junior Reporter	Front page	Multiple-sources
25/5/17	Midlands saga: Kasukuwere under fire	Herald Reporter	Front page	Single source
26/5/17	Kasukuwere saga needs closure: ZANU-PF affiliates	Felex Share Senior Reporter	Front page	Single source
29/5/17	Kasukuwere probe report now complete	Tendai Mugabe Senior Reporter	Front page	Single source
16/5/17	Provinces snub Kasukuwere again	Farirai Machivenyika Senior Reporter	Front page	Single source
21/6/17	Kasukuwere to know fate	Felex Share	Front page	Single source
22/6/17	Presidium to decide on Kasukuwere	Felex Share Senior Reporter	Front page	Single source
27/6/17	Tyson's Goliath moment looms	<i>Herald</i> Correspondent	Inside page	Opinionated
8/7/17	Kasukuwere consult traditional church leaders	Farirai Machivenyika Senior Reporter	Front page	Single source

10/7/17	Kasukuwere lets cat out of bag	Farirai Machivenyika	Front page	Single source
10/7/17	Kasukuwere belittles command agriculture	Farirai Machivenyika Senior Reporter	Front page	Single source
18/7/17	Kasukuwere slammed for interference	Tendai Mugabe Senior Reporter	Front page	Multiple-sources
11/7/17	Warvets call for Kasukuwere ouster	<i>Herald</i> Reporter	Front page	Single source
11/7/17	Glaring irony lost to Kasukuwere	Caesar Zvayi Editor	Centre page	Opinionated
23/2/17	ZYC savages Zhuwao, Lumumba	Zvamaida Murwira Senior	Front page	Single source
6/4/16	Indigenisation is not for Minister Zhuwao only	Tanzikwa Guranungo Correspondent	Inside page	Opinionated
24/2/17	Zhuwao diverted funds, says ZYC	Zvamaida Murwira Senior Reporter	Front page	Single source
23/4/17	I bungled: Zhuwao, “I misrepresented Indigenisation Act”	Nyemudzai Kakore <i>Herald</i> Correspondent	Front page	Single source
19/5/17	Zhuwao defends Youth Fund defaulters	Talent Hwari Herald Reporter	Front page	Single source
20/5/16	Minister Zhuwao implicated	Lloyd Gumbo Senior Reporter	Front page	Single source
23/6/17	Zhuwao needs assistance, handholding	Caesar Zvayi Editor	Centre page	Opinionated

24/6/17	Problem Patrick has bigger issues to fight	Caesar Zvayi Editor	Centre page	Opinionated
23/6/17	Zhuwao in policy shocker	Takunda Maodza Assistant News Editor	Front page	Single source
9/6/17	Cde Patrick Zhuwao is out of order	Tichaona Zindoga Political Editor	Inside page	Opinionated
1/9/17	Zhuwao raps war vets children	Nqobile Tshili Senior Reporter	Front page	Single source
8/11/17	Parliament slams 'militant' Zhuwao	Zvamaida Murwira Senior Reporter	Front page	Single source

6.6 Conclusion

This chapter has sought to illustrate how *The Herald* adopted factions in its reportage of ZANU-PF factionalism towards the elective ZANU-PF 2014 congress, which culminated in the dismissal of Vice President Joice Mujuru. It also demonstrated how the newspaper assumed an anti-G40 and pro-Emmerson Mnangagwa faction editorial disposition in the post Mujuru era after the former was appointed vice president. The factionalised reportage manifested in biased news sourcing which birthed factionalised narratives on ZANU-PF factionalism. *The Herald* denied Mujuru the right of reply even when it raised serious allegations against her in what seemed a calculated effort at delegitimising her candidacy for presidency while legitimising Mugabe's continued rule. The post Mujuru era witnessed a systematic attempt by *The Herald* at legitimising Mnangagwa as Mugabe successor while delegitimising G40 through deployment of similar tactics – regulating access to the public sphere (Wodak, 2015). Such editorial disposition violates basic journalism rites exhorting factuality and impartiality.

CHAPTER 7

7.0 THE PRIVATELY OWNED PRESS AND FACTIONALISED MUGABE SUCCESSION NARRATIVES

This chapter sets out to illustrate how Zimbabwe's privately owned newspaper *Daily News* and *NewsDay* indulged in ZANU-PF factionalism in their reportage of Mugabe's succession matrix. These newspapers are Zimbabwe's only independent dailies with the other daily – *The Herald* – state controlled. The chapter endeavours to demonstrate how the *Daily News* and *NewsDay* adopted and legitimised factions contending to succeed Mugabe and factionalised journalism in the process. It begins with a focus on the *Daily News* while analysis of the *NewsDay*'s reportage of Mugabe's succession is reserved for end of the section. This is deliberate. Such an approach allows the study exhaustively illustrate how each newspaper partook in ZANU-PF factionalism and the consequences of such editorial configuration on journalism. The stories generated by the *Daily News* and *NewsDay* are subjected to Critical Discourse Analysis Discourse Historical Approach (CDA-DHA) to expose the intrinsic discourses laden in them. Mainly examined are stories around the ZANU-PF 2014 congress and the post Joice Mujuru ruling party era. Robert Mugabe dismissed Mujuru from the vice presidency and ZANU-PF at congress and replaced her with Emmerson Mnangagwa. The dismissal of Mujuru witnessed the emergence Mnangagwa's Team Lacoste faction and the Grace Mugabe aligned G40 group, which also fought to succeed Mugabe.

Mujuru's demise and *Daily News*' factionalised storylines

The run up to the ZANU-PF 2014 congress exposed the extent the *Daily News* indulged in factionalised journalism through its open legitimation of Joice Mujuru as Robert Mugabe's successor while delegitimising her perceived rival (Mnangagwa) as "ambitious hyenas". The newspaper achieved this through deliberate biased news sourcing, denying Mujuru's rivals a platform for reaction and expression, and its consistent deployment of the "victimhood" frame when constructing Mujuru, whom it constantly referred to as "widow" – to emphasize her vulnerability following death in a farmhouse inferno of her husband Solomon Mujuru in August 2011. At the same time, *Daily News* imaged Joice Mujuru as a battle-hardened liberation war stalwart battling a twin axis of evil in Mugabe and his wife on one hand, and Mnangagwa on the other.

In a front-page article, “I will never surrender – Mujuru” (26 October, 2014), published barely two months before the ZANU-PF congress, the *Daily News* assertively declared that Joice Mujuru was “determined to overcome First Lady Grace Mugabe’s recent scathing attacks on her and would never surrender”. Although it constantly described Mujuru as “the beleaguered widow of the late liberation hero Solomon Mujuru”, the *Daily News* was certain she would prevail over her enemies and succeed Mugabe despite “the current political storms buffeting her within ZANU-PF”. This implies that Joice Mujuru was invincible and indomitable. Even the use of phrase “political storms buffeting” is suggestive that Mujuru was being tormented by the Mugabe-Mnangagwa alliance. The *Daily News* erected a giant in Mujuru when in the same story it claims that Mujuru “confronted Mugabe” over Grace Mugabe’s public attacks on her person. Use of the word “confronted” portrays Mujuru as brave in the face of open hostility and infers she was not scared of Robert Mugabe whose ruthlessness in the face of opposition is well documented.

Whereas the story presents the Mugabe couple and Mnangagwa as divisive and ruthless, Mujuru is constructed as a hardworking and unifying politician. The *Daily News* does so by emphasizing how “Mujuru earned her degree (PhD) which was not dubiously awarded to her – a thinly-veiled low blow attack at First Lady whose PhD has elicited much controversy”. The newspaper also afforded Mujuru space to recite her role in Zimbabwe’s liberation war and her relationship with Mugabe “who had encouraged her to join the struggle”. This was an effort at legitimising Mujuru as a true veteran of Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle in the mould of Mugabe, who toiled to secure the country’s independence from the British settler regime.

In another front-page article, “State media attacks Mujuru” (31 October 2014), the *Daily News* uncharacteristically castigated *The Herald* for publishing a story that accused Mujuru of corruption. This was after the state controlled newspaper accused Mujuru of extortion and abuse of office.

Mujuru faced a new round of damaging allegations yesterday from *The Herald*, widely seen as the voice of government and powerful forces within ZANU-PF. It accused her of illegally receiving money from investment partners and using her political clout to squeeze them out of a business venture.

(*Daily News*, 31 October 2014)

Since its establishment, the *Daily News* has practiced oppositional journalism dedicated to exposing corruption in the ZANU-PF government and maladministration by the Mugabe

regime. It seems strange for the *Daily News* to condemn *The Herald* for “exposing” Mujuru’s involvement in corruption without investigating the allegations raised. The *Daily News* rather engaged a political scientist Eldred Masunungure over the allegations raised by *The Herald* against Mujuru. Masunungure dismissed the accusations as a ploy by Mujuru’s rivals claiming, “the aim was to drain political support from Mujuru by turning her into a pariah ahead of the December party congress”.

The *Daily News* also described Mujuru as “a battle-hardened veteran of the 1970s liberation war with a nom de guerre that means, “Spill the Blood”. This seems another attempt by the newspaper at legitimising Mujuru by celebrating her contribution to Zimbabwe’s liberation war at a time she was accused of gross corruption. The same article suggestively dismissed claims of Mujuru as corrupt when it stated that, “her family is known to own businesses including a diamond mine in southern Zimbabwe, which shut down two years ago due to financial problems”. The story was silent on the Mujuru family’s alleged involvement in illegal diamond mining at the controversial Chiadzwa fields in Manicaland – which Grace Mugabe often cited. What is more revealing is how the *Daily News* appeared to dismiss *The Herald* story on behalf of Mujuru whose voice it never sought becoming her official mouthpiece on the matter. When Joice Mujuru absconded the ZANU-PF December 2014 congress, the *Daily News* generated a front-page story, “Mujuru fears for her life” (3 December 2014). Despite earlier constructing Mujuru as invincible, the newspaper suddenly presented her as fragile and vulnerable – seemingly an attempt at harvesting public sympathy for the then vice president.

Further exposing its editorial allegiance to Mujuru, the *Daily News* proceeded to dismiss the ZANU-PF 2014 congress as a non-event before even it was held.

Vice President Joice Mujuru skipped the ZANU-PF politburo meeting that was held in Harare yesterday, amid suggestions that she was considering boycotting altogether the party’s damp squib congress that starts in earnest tomorrow.

(*Daily News*, 3 December 2014)

It is suggestive that the *Daily News* dismissed the congress as a “damp squib” as its preferred Mugabe successor (Mujuru) had withdrawn from the assembly. “Damp squib” according to the Merriam-Webster dictionary refers to “something that is disappointing because it is not as exciting or effective as expected”. It is therefore revealing that the *Daily News* qualified a congress yet to congregate “as damp squib” merely because Joice Mujuru had been elbowed out. To further reinforce its pro-Joice Mujuru editorial stance and expose the inconsiderate

nature of her enemies, the *Daily News* claimed that it was Solomon Mujuru who installed “the nonagenarian (Mugabe) as ZANU-PF’s leader way back in the 1970s”. This implies that Mugabe owed his presidency to the Solomon Mujuru and ought to have at least protected his widow. The newspaper then generated several other front-page stories evidently sympathising with Joice Mujuru. These included headlines, “Is Mujuru facing imminent arrest”, “Is this Mujuru’s end”, “Axing Mujuru will backfire”, “Let us pray: Mujuru”, “Fear paralyses Mujuru faction”, “Carnage for Mujuru faction”, “They murdered my Rex: Mujuru”, “Spies at Mujuru farm”, “Mujuru ally’s offices bombed”, “Mujuru defence spot on”, “Mujuru attacks now comical – analysts”, “Explain Mujuru death: Brother”, and “Mujuru ally tortured”.

The *Daily News* made it an editorial culture to dismiss allegations Mugabe constantly raised against Joice Mujuru without even establishing their authenticity. Quoting a nameless source, the newspaper claimed, “The assassination and treason allegations being levelled against perceived followers of Mujuru were only meant to ensure that the 59-year-old widow of the late liberation war hero did not have a snowball’s chance in hell at ZANU-PF’s December elective congress”. Under normal circumstances, the *Daily News* would have verified the allegations raised against Mujuru rather than engaging faceless sources to protect her. *The Daily News* claimed “prominent national players and analysts” had also dismissed the allegations Mugabe raised against Mujuru “as nothing more than mere sabre-rattling and crass skulduggery” without revealing their identities.

To buttress its pro-Mujuru editorial position, the *Daily News* in another front-page story, “Is Mujuru facing imminent arrest?” (17 November 2014) summoned well-known anti-Mugabe elements as Dumiso Dabengwa, Dewa Mavhinga, and Pedzisai Ruhanya, disguised as political analysts, to defend Joice Mujuru. Mugabe arrested and charged Dabengwa with treason soon after Zimbabwe’s independence following an alleged arms cache at ZAPU farms. On the other hand, Mavhinga headed the Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition – an organisation famed for its anti-Mugabe political rhetoric. Ruhanya is a former *Daily News* journalist whose views have always been anti-ZANU-PF administration. The *Daily News* also quotes a known MDC politician Giles Mutsekwa dismissing claims that Mujuru planned to assassinate Mugabe and usurp power. The source choices suggest that the *Daily News* intentionally courted them to endorse its pro-Mujuru narratives considering their political background and affiliations. It explains why their comments seemed rehearsed to save Mujuru’s image and political career. Ruhanya is quoted warning that, “If Mugabe wants to maintain the little left of his legacy, he is better

advised not to criminalise that liberation war widow. That woman contributed much along with her family, for this nation to be where it is today”.

This suggests that the *Daily News* courted known anti-Mugabe opposition officials disguised as political analysts in order to gain favourable commentary on Mujuru, who the newspaper celebrates not just as a decorated liberation war fighter but also as wife to Solomon Mujuru – who birthed Mugabe’s presidency. Such an editorial stance is atypical of the *Daily News* whose brand had always been associated with anti-Mugabe and ZANU-PF expositions (Ranger, 2005). The newspaper appeared to dump this established editorial position when it cleared Joice Mujuru of any wrongdoing without verifying the allegations raised by her rivals. The *Daily News* defiantly defended Mujuru by quoting Ruhanya dismissing allegations raised by her erstwhile colleagues – who have worked with her for decades – as “sheer political madness”. The assumption is that those in ZANU-PF knew Mujuru better than Ruhanya an outsider, who the *Daily News* quoted stating:

Anything can happen when lawless takes precedence but it will be unfortunate ...when the history of this country is written, Mugabe will be portrayed as the villain if this woman is arrested.

(*Daily News*, 17 November 2014)

The *Daily News* through Ruhanya equated the possibility of Mujuru’s arrest on corruption charges to “lawlessness”. The newspaper deployed similar newsgathering tactics when it elicited a comment from Alex Magaisa – former advisor to MDC leader Morgan Tsvangirai – in a story headlined, “Is this Mujuru’s end?” (15 November 2014) to comment on developments in ZANU-PF. This was after Mugabe had purged a perceived Joice Mujuru ally Rugare Gumbo from ZANU-PF. While noting that Mugabe was “a master of divide and rule politics using one faction to defeat the other”, Magaisa equated the expulsion to a “well-orchestrated Mugabe version of the night of the long knives” and equally dismissed allegations levelled against the Mujuru faction as clearing the “deck and removing all political opponents”. The *Daily News* also roped in an anti-ZANU-PF political analyst Dewa Mavhinga of the Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, who claimed that purging of Mujuru loyalists was aimed at clearing “the path for Mugabe to become a life president”. Mavhinga and the *Daily News* were silent on Emmerson Mnangagwa’s chances of succeeding Mugabe when they assumed that removal of Mujuru from ZANU-PF granted Mugabe life presidency.

In yet another editorial disposition unusual of its established ethos, the *Daily News* seemed to persuade Mugabe against dismissing Joice Mujuru in a headline story, “Axing Mujuru will backfire” (14 November 2014).

If ZANU-PF hardliners succeed in ousting embattled Vice President Joice Mujuru, it is possible the opposition will take advantage and join forces with members of parliament who support her which will result in President Robert Mugabe and the ruling party being booted out, analysts say.

(*Daily News* 14 November 2014)

This seems a covert editorial attempt by the newspaper at setting an agenda for the retention of Mujuru by dissuading Mugabe from dismissing his deputy to avert his own downfall. The *Daily News* had always sought an end to the Mugabe administration through its practice of oppositional journalism (Ranger, 2005; Ruhanya, 2014), which promoted opposition political narratives. It is rather peculiar for the newspaper to appear editorially supportive of Mujuru, worse still, Mugabe as captured by the remarks above. The same article castigated Grace Mugabe and her camp for having upped “their pressure...to remove the widowed VP from power”. Prominence was given on Mujuru’s status as a “widow” as if to draw attention on her perceived vulnerability while in equal measure portraying her rivals as divisive elements destroying ZANU-PF by fanning factionalism.

The article relied on Alex Magaisa – an MDC technocrat – as its main source. It claimed that the Joice Mujuru faction had “the needed 178 members of parliament” to cause dissolution of parliament, team up with the opposition and pass a vote of no confidence on Mugabe. It is not clear how the *Daily News* arrived at the conclusion that Mujuru had 178 MPs in parliament as all ZANU-PF legislators had contested the elections as ruling party candidates. This again sounds a veiled warning at Mugabe to retain Mujuru to guarantee his rule but emanating from strange quarters – *Daily News*. The newspaper further warned that Mujuru faction legislators “have been whispering in quiet corners that they would engage in *Bhora Musango* (work against Mugabe and ZANU-PF) if the party’s elective congress next month decided to illegally strip the VP of her position in the party and government”.

Such narratives seemed calculated at instilling fear in Mugabe in order to force him retain Mujuru. The storyline creates an impression that Mujuru was indispensable and invincible inasmuch as it quotes faceless and nameless sources. This probably explains the *Daily News*’ generation of another front-page story, “Mujuru sacking haunts Mugabe” (10 November 2015)

– which cleared the former vice president of fanning factionalism while also claiming that Mugabe regretted sacking Mujuru as his power remained under threat from those angling for his position. The article read in part, “President Robert Mugabe is now haunted by the ‘unjust and disastrous’ purging of former Vice President Joice Mujuru and her supporters”. Nowhere in the article is Mugabe confirming the compunction.

Further, whereas the article posed as a hard news story, usage of the words “unjust” and “disastrous”, not only exposed how opinionated the story was but showed the extent the *Daily News*’ aligned to the Mujuru camp. Hard news stories are not opinionated. They give a disinterested account of an event devoid of reporter’s opinions, commentary or interests. In so doing, bias is avoided. The *Daily News* also published another news headline, “Mujuru ghost haunts Grace” – which implied that Joice Mujuru was a supernatural politician whose dismissal was a grave error and whose absence in ZANU-PF exposed Mugabe’s leadership deficiencies especially considering that ruling party factionalism persisted unabated even after her demise. The newspaper’s front-page story, “ZANU-PF wants Mujuru back” (29 July 2015) created an impression that Mugabe was desperate for a reunion with Joice Mujuru. Published without either Mugabe or Mujuru’s voices, the story portrays Mujuru as invincible and quotes a nameless ZANU-PF source declaring:

She (Mujuru) has a constituency and enjoys a lot of support from the grassroots. She is not a person one can simply wish away. So, it makes sense to rope her back.

(*Daily News*, 29 July 2015)

The *Daily News* created an impression that Mujuru was a powerful politician whom without Mugabe and ZANU-PF were weak. What is more glaring, however, from a journalism perspective is how the newspaper generated a front-page article stating as a fact that ZANU-PF wanted Mujuru back without any confirmation from the ruling party and relying on nameless “sources”. If anything, the *Daily News* “others” and delegitimizes the Mnangagwa faction which it refers as “hyenas” responsible for Mujuru’s demise. These allegations are repeated without granting the Mnangagwa faction the right of reply in line with basic journalism practices, which exhort fairness and balance in news reports.

On three occasions the story refers to Mujuru’s rivals as “hyenas” – “the past three months had clearly shown Mugabe that some hyenas, and not Mujuru, were behind the seemingly unstoppable factional and succession wars”. It further claimed, “the allegations against *Mai* (mother) Mujuru were a contrived narrative by some ambitious hyenas who manufactured the

plots for their personal benefit” and “these hyenas have continued to push for her (Mujuru) to be incarcerated on account of false claims of treason”. The authenticity of such incognito sourced stories is doubtful especially considering a confession by a prominent *Daily News* journalist quoted in previous chapter that they were “bribed” to generate positive stories on the Mujuru faction. The *Daily News* reiterated its unsubstantiated claim that Mugabe was disillusioned that Mujuru intended to overthrow him in another front-paged story, “Mugabe no longer believes Mujuru plotted against him” (28 July 2015) sourced from nameless “insiders”.

The *Daily News* further exposed its pro-Mujuru editorial bias when it seemingly embarked on a campaign to discredit the ZANU-PF congress by persistently referring to it as a “damp squib”. Almost all stories on the ZANU-PF congress generated by the newspaper consistently referred to the assembly as a “damp squib”. A news headline, “Mujuru’s poser!” (01 December 2014) claimed Mujuru faction politicians were trying to persuade her “from attending the “damp squib ‘elective’ congress altogether”. The story accused ZANU-PF of “flagrant mutilation of the party constitution” in trying to deny Mujuru right to partake in the congress, adding, “It was a waste of time for Mujuru to attend congress”. It slammed Mujuru’s rivals for embarking “in this insane project ...that she (Mujuru) must fall” and idolised the vice president as “too loyal and disciplined to consciously and wilfully avoid such an important gathering”. There is an editorial attempt at “othering” Mujuru’s rivals that exposes the *Daily News*’s indulgence in ZANU-PF factionalism. This manifests in its failure to detachably report on developments in the ruling party through adherence to basic journalism values of factuality and impartiality.

Another headline, “Mujuru fears for her life” (03 December 2014) also made use of derogatory terms by referring to “the party’s damp squib congress that starts tomorrow”. Yet another front-page article, “They murdered my Rex: Mujuru (08 December 2016) also delegitimised the ZANU-PF 2014 congress which witnessed the dismissal of Joice Mujuru as “the ruling party’s sham December 2014 congress”. Sham means fake or bogus, and by this, the *Daily News* implied that the event was a hoax since Joice Mujuru – its preferred Mugabe successor– had absconded the event under duress. It equally implied that those elevated into positions of authority like Emmerson Mnangagwa – who became vice president replacing Joice Mujuru – were products of a bogus process and therefore illegitimate office holders while also mobilising sympathy for the former vice president in another headline article, “They murdered my Rex: Mujuru” (08 December 2016). Solomon Mujuru’s wartime name was Rex Nhongo. The front-page story published five years after Solomon Mujuru’s death, “claimed that President Robert Mugabe knows how her husband, General Solomon Mujuru, died in an inferno at the family’s

Beatrice farm...” It suggests that Mugabe killed Solomon Mujuru – the assumed power behind Joice Mujuru – in order to weaken his widow as evidenced by her dismissal from ZANU-PF and the purging of politicians belonging to her faction later. Quoting Joice Mujuru, the article defiantly insists, “Rex was killed to pave way for her (Mujuru) ouster”.

The story also implicated the Mnangagwa faction in the murder of Solomon Mujuru when it quotes Joice Mujuru alleging “after his death what happened to me ...only to discover that his (Mugabe) team which he gathered and drummed support for helped him oust me”. It also quotes another perceived Mujuru faction politician Dydimus Mutasa declaring, “there was more to Solomon’s death than the official version indicated”. The *Daily News*’ reliance on Didymus Mutasa as a source ignored the politician’s bias considering his disgruntlement over dismissal from ZANU-PF. Equally important to note is how the *Daily News* failed to afford Mugabe and Mnangagwa a platform to react to claims raised against them over Mujuru’s death. The result was a heavily factionalised story.

7.1 Post-ZANU-PF 2014 congress and *Daily News*’ bastardised anti-Mnangagwa storylines

The elevation of Emmerson Mnangagwa to the vice presidency succeeding sacked Joice Mujuru failed to extinguish ZANU-PF factionalism. In its attempt at reporting the ructions between President Mnangagwa’s Team Lacoste faction and the Grace Mugabe aligned G40 over Mugabe’s succession, the *Daily News* once again appeared to adopt a faction – the G40 whose agenda it legitimised while “othering” Mnangagwa and his Team Lacoste camp. The table below (Table 7.1) is a compilation of headline stories generated by the *Daily News* after Mnangagwa was appointed vice president.

Table 7. 1: The table below depicts the anti-Mnangagwa stories generated by the Daily News after his elevation to the vice president succeeding Joice Mujuru.

Date	Story headline	Page
04 June 2014	Mnangagwa must shut up	Front
09 January 2015	42% tip Mnangagwa for presidency	Front
12 January 2015	Mnangagwa sucked into \$600 000 share dispute	Front
27 February 2015	VP Mnangagwa contradicts Mugabe	Front
15 March 2015	Mnangagwa heads for trouble?	Front
02 May 2015	Mnangagwa lacks social base	Front
15 May 2015	Mnangagwa allies humbled in Gutu	Front
19 May 2015	Mnangagwa not heir apparent	Front

25 May 2016	Mnangagwa behind secret meetings	Front
26 May 2015	Mnangagwa cannot win election	Front
06 October 2015	Mnangagwa in bizarre apostolic rites	Front
08 December 2015	Mnangagwa test has come	Front
16 December 2015	Mnangagwa camp feels ZANU-PF heat	Front
12 January 2016	Mnangagwa allies face ZANU-PF sack	Front
26 January 2016	Mnangagwa faction goes for broke	Front
01 February 2016	Mnangagwa's ZANU-PF stress mounts	Front
15 February 2016	Mnangagwa might resign	Front
15 February 2016	Team Lacoste courts Mujuru	Front
21 February 2016	End of Mnangagwa	Front
10 March 2016	More Mnangagwa allies face the chop	Front
05 April 2016	Mnangagwa allies suffer massive blow	Front
25 April 2016	ZANU-PF okays Mnangagwa demo	Front
26 April 2016	Team Lacoste stalks Mugabe	Front
03 May 2016	Mnangagwa begs for mercy	Front
03 May 2016	Mnangagwa embarrassed	Front
27 May 2016	Mugabe shuts door on Mnangagwa	Front
16 June 2016	Grace frustrates Mnangagwa in Dubai	Front
31 June 2016	Can Mnangagwa survive the chop	Front
27 July 2016	Mnangagwa's problems mount	Front
30 July 2016	End nigh for Mnangagwa	Front
31 July 2016	Mnangagwa dumps allies	Front
06 September 2016	Mnangagwa camp falls further behind G40	Front
13 January 2017	Mnangagwa on the ropes	Front
30 July 2017	Grace roasts ED, Charamba	Front
31 July 2017	Will Mnangagwa survive?	Front
11 August 2017	Mnangagwa ally arrested	Front
03 September 2017	Mnangagwa beefs up security	Front
08 September 2017	Mnangagwa allies isolated	Front
12 September 2017	Mnangagwa at cross roads	Front
18 September 2017	Mnangagwa's fate: All eyes on Mugabe	Front

5 October 2017	ED (Mnangagwa) now a dead man walking	Front
11 October 2017	Defining moment for Mnangagwa	Front
30 October 2017	It's a sink or swim for ED	Front
02 November 2017	Plot to oust Mnangagwa thickens	Front
07 November 2017	Mnangagwa fired	Front
11 November 2017	Mnangagwa skips to China	Front

The table depicts how the *Daily News* systematically gave saliency – through such means as placement on first page – to stories that delegitimised Mnangagwa as a potential Robert Mugabe successor. Other factors also revealed how the newspaper indulged in ZANU-PF factionalism such as biased news sourcing and constant deployment of negative frames when reporting about Mnangagwa. When President Mugabe appointed Emmerson Mnangagwa vice president after the ZANU-PF 2014 congress, the *Daily News* generated a headline story, “Mnangagwa finally arrives” (11 December 2014). “Mnangagwa finally arrives” read in part:

After years of struggle and suffering some debilitating defeats, Justice Minister Emmerson Mnangagwa was finally appointed ZANU-PF’s first vice president yesterday, a position that sets him up to succeed President Robert Mugabe when the 90-year-old leaves office.

(*Daily News*, 11 December 2014)

The story gives saliency on how Mnangagwa struggled to become Mugabe’s deputy and is suggestive this was because of his unsuitability and undesirability for the post – which Mugabe emphatically emphasizes in the story as merely ceremonial when he remarked, “we have two vice presidents who have no real function except that they are my deputies”. It is as if Mnangagwa struggled to earn a “meaningless” post with no real political value save being instructed on what to do by Mugabe. This kind of “news construction” is despite the fact that all along the *Daily News* had projected the position as strategic in Mugabe succession matrix when it anticipated Joice Mujuru would assume the post ahead of Mnangagwa.

The newspaper recycles anti-ZANU-PF “political analysts” as Dewa Mavhinga of Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition to comment on Mnangagwa’s elevation in a seemingly choreographed act whose outcome is given considering their oppositional political orientation. Mavhinga

dismissed Mnangagwa's appointment as a non-event for Zimbabwe and "marks the end of ZANU-PF". Another "political analyst" Piers Pigou of International Crisis Group also dismissed Mnangagwa's elevation arguing that those associated with the new vice president were often presented as "radicals, even zealots" unlike the moderates and pragmatists Mujuru and her company". This clearly reflects how the choices of news sources influenced narratives on ZANU-PF factionalism and Mugabe's succession. Journalists know whom to approach and harvest storylines suiting the agenda at hand.

In yet another headline, "Mnangagwa must shut up", the *Daily News* again deploys Didymus Mutasa of the fallen Joice Mujuru faction to caricature Mnangagwa in a manner that seemed aimed at dismantling his liberation war credentials. The news article read in part:

Former Presidential Affairs Minister Didymus Mutasa has warned Vice President Emmerson Mnangagwa to zip up in his own interest or risk being exposed as a charlatan who played an insignificant role during the liberation struggle.

(*Daily News*, 04 June 2015)

According to the Oxford dictionary, a charlatan is an impostor or con artist. This degrades Mnangagwa's contribution to Zimbabwe's liberation war and seems aimed at elbowing him out of Mugabe's succession race especially considering that participation in the war is often used as a yardstick when choosing leadership in ZANU-PF. Equating Mnangagwa to a charlatan seems an attempt at "othering" or delegitimizing his presidential candidacy. Through Mutasa, the *Daily News* suggested that Mnangagwa was not a clean politician when it quotes the former threatening to "unleash a treasure trove of damning information that he had on the VP if the post-congress ZANU-PF strongman continued to mouth falsehoods". Use of "treasure trove" implied large amounts of scandals about Mnangagwa hitherto hidden while "strongman" depicts rule by threats of violence. Biblically, "strongman" implied Satan or demonic spirit, which "kills and destroys". It becomes clear in the context of ZANU-PF factionalism that the *Daily News*' deployment of such terms was not accidental but calculated to decimate and delegitimize Mnangagwa through its biased news sourcing. The intention even becomes clear when it quotes Mutasa – whose Mujuru faction had been vanquished – to comment on developments in ZANU-PF post-Mujuru. Mutasa may have been too enraged to issue an unbiased commentary on Mnangagwa whom he viewed as part of Mugabe's machinery that enabled his dismissal from ZANU-PF, after decades as a ruling party senior politician.

The *Daily News* also quoted one Bernard Manyadza, who it said was a former member of ZANLA (ZANU military wing), “who trained top military officials during the liberation struggle such as Air Force Commander Perrence Shiri and army general Constantine Chiwenga” – claiming to have “only met Mnangagwa once in exile and never heard of him”. This confirmed the newspaper’s intention to deconstruct Mnangagwa’s contribution to Zimbabwe’s liberation war. Contribution to the liberation is a badge of honour and licence to positions of authority in ZANU-PF. The *Daily News* cited verbatim, Manyadza claiming:

I don’t know him. I met him once at the International Hotel in Lusaka when I was introduced to him. That was the time when people were arrested in Boroma, the time we had Zimbabwe Liberation Council, and we said to him (Mnangagwa) since you know Zambia can you help us rescue comrades in Boroma so that we take them to Mozambique but he said he could not assist because he wanted to complete his studies.

(*Daily News* 04 June 205)

This appears an attempt by the *Daily News* at deconstructing Mnangagwa’s contribution to Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle by presenting him as uncomradely and selfish. It is reminiscent of how *The Herald* similarly tried to deconstruct Joice Mujuru’s contribution to the liberation war when it generated a story claiming she had not downed an enemy helicopter but appropriated a picture of a female comrade who had executed the task and deceived Zimbabweans for decades that it was her in the photography. It seems largely a similar script whose agenda was to elbow Mnangagwa out of the presidential race by delegitimising his liberation exploits.

The *Daily News* appeared determined to damage Mnangagwa’s liberation war legacy when it generated yet another headline, “Mnangagwa faction: US links exposed”. The article claimed Chris Mutsvangwa – a perceived Mnangagwa ally – hosted US diplomat Eric Little at his house. It concluded without giving any evidence to support its claims that Mnangagwa faction therefore “is clandestinely working with American officials” to weaken ZANU-PF from within. Mutsvangwa is reported to have “hosted and feted the American diplomat...alleged to have links with the American spy agency CIA”. The *Daily News* juxtaposed Mutsvangwa’s meeting with Mr Little to Mujuru’s hosting US Ambassador Mr Bruce Wharton when she was acting president – a meeting which saw her labelled a sell-out by rivals in ZANU-PF. It insisted that details of Mutsvangwa’s discussions with Mr Little “remain a mystery” – an editorial bid at creating an impression that the meeting may have been subversive”. What is more glaringly

is the attempt to globalise the Mutsvangwa-Little meeting by linking it to Mnangagwa especially considering that association with Europe and America was considered selling-out to former colonisers by Mugabe. This story is suggestive that the *Daily News*'s agenda was to incite Mugabe against Mnangagwa in order to earn punishment for the latter. Such editorial disposition exposes the *Daily News*' active indulgence in ZANU-PF factionalism in a manner detrimental to the practice of professional journalism.

There was also an editorial attempt at constructing Mnangagwa as a politician whose career hanged by the thread in the headline, "Mnangagwa on the ropes" (13 January 2017). The article claimed, citing nameless sources, "there was widespread agreement yesterday that Vice President Emmerson is walking a tight rope following Wednesday's dramatic events in which his ZANU-PF enemies put in motion plans to have him censured by President Robert Mugabe, over a festive season gathering that the VP hosted at his rural home". This story blew out of proportion a picture taken of Vice President Mnangagwa holding a mug inscribed, "I am the boss". The "I am the boss" was construed to mean harbouring ambitions to topple Mugabe and assume the presidency. It claimed the G40 had mobilised around the mug saga and planned "a meeting with Mugabe upon his return from his month-long holiday in the Far East to raise concerns over the VP's alleged plotting and the infamous Cupgate saga". Inasmuch as the article attempted to create an image of a Mnangagwa at Mugabe's mercy, it unwittingly exposed the G40 as too petty. The article quotes a Mujuru ally Ibbo Mandaza as a political analyst, who predicts Mnangagwa's fall, "It does appear as though he (Mnangagwa) is going the same direction as Joice (Mujuru)." The *Daily News* persisted setting the agenda against Mnangagwa through its portrayal of the vice president as facing an end to his career. In a news headline, "Mnangagwa headed for trouble?" the newspaper suggested the vice president was facing "political headwinds" for embarking on a countrywide tour to explain the new constitutional reforms". It claimed that Joice Mujuru, his predecessor, "was pretty much felled for marketing herself through the Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Social and Economic Transformation (ZimAsset) – a fate which could also befall the ZANU-PF strongman..."

The story sounded a friendly warning to Mnangagwa who presided over the Ministry of Justice charged with promoting the new constitutional reforms across Zimbabwe yet at the same time ceaselessly anticipated misfortune for the vice president – who it again brands "strongman". Equally worrying is how the story is anchored on nameless sources – this raises doubt over its veracity as it may as well be the journalist's opinions packaged as "political observers". The

newspaper further sets Mnangagwa against Mugabe in a headline, “VP Mnangagwa contradicts Mugabe (27 February 2015). It read in part:

Suddenly newly appointed Vice President Emmerson Mnangagwa yesterday appeared to set himself on a collision course with President Robert Mugabe when he told western diplomats that Zimbabwe wished to re-engage with the West after more than a decade of isolation...

(*Daily News* 27 February 2015)

What ought to be a simple hard news story is factionally interpreted to provoke disharmony between President Mugabe and his deputy Mnangagwa – and the *Daily News* qualifies its highly opinionated article by referencing Mugabe having in the past declared that “the country does not need the evil West”. Mugabe merely sought equality between Europe/America and Africa through his pan-Africanist rhetoric, which scholars as (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009; 2016) dismissed as feigned and fake. This explains why western embassies remained stationed in Zimbabwe throughout Mugabe’s reign.

This section has demonstrated the extent the *Daily News* indulged in ZANU-PF factionalism in its coverage of Mugabe’s succession in a manner suggestive that it deliberately aligned with factions. What is suggestive of intentional factional alignment is how the *Daily News* seemed aware that Robert Mugabe was behind the ZANU-PF factional wars but still generated stories blaming other factions such as Mnangagwa’s Team Lacoste for the fissures. On 03 July 2017, the *Daily News* generated a headline article, “Mugabe fooling ZANU-PF factions”, which suggested that the president “is desperately playing a delicate balancing act; juggling the two ZANU-PF factions that are wrangling over his succession in order to keep himself in power”. It insisted that Mugabe had “perfected the art of playing a balancing act among the factions” (Mnangagwa’s Team Lacoste and G40) and that “observers are convinced that Mugabe uses the factions to secure his position, by keeping them busy in the ring”. From this *Daily News* article, it becomes clear that the newspaper knew who was accountable for the factionalism ravaging ZANU-PF but may have deliberately chosen to editorially adopt either of the contending camps – factionalising journalism in the process. Another headline, ‘Wily Mugabe fools factions’ (18 April 2017) reinforced the study’s finding that the *Daily News* wilfully chose to indulge in ZANU-PF factionalism when it could have easily chosen to be neutral in line with basic journalism principles.

There is also concerted effort by the *Daily News* at portraying Vice President Mnangagwa as an unpopular politician to qualify for the presidency. The headline, “Mnangagwa cannot win elections” (26 May 2015) suggests that the vice president – who looked set to succeed Mugabe – was an unelectable presidential candidate. Quoting MDC leader Morgan Tsvangirai as its source, it read in part:

Opposition MDC leader Tsvangirai has described Vice President Emmerson Mnangagwa, who is heavily tipped to succeed President Robert Mugabe, as an unpopular strongman who cannot win an election...Tsvangirai said he was not in the same political league as Mnangagwa whom he described as visionless.

(*Daily News*, 26 May 2015)

The *Daily News* reinforces the view that Mnangagwa was an unelectable politician by highlighting that he had “a history of electoral defeats” as an aspiring legislator before only to be saved by Mugabe who would appoint him as “one of the unelected MPs in parliament”. The newspaper further pushes this agenda through another headline, “42% tip Mnangagwa for presidency” (09 January 2015) – derived from a poll conducted by Economist Global Capital (Econometer) in its 2015 report. It suggested that the “majority of Zimbabweans” believed Mnangagwa “will not take over from President Robert Mugabe”. It also implied that “party bigwigs are not happy with Mnangagwa at the moment”. The *Daily News* placed the story on the front page without interrogating how the research was conducted for the audience to fully comprehend its validity and veracity. The newspaper seemed obsessed with disqualifying Mnangagwa from the presidency as evidenced by another headline, “Mnangagwa is not heir apparent: Moyo” – quoting Mnangagwa’s opponent Jonathan Moyo – as its sole source. Jonathan Moyo was perceived a G40 faction bigwig, and naturally would not have advocated Mnangagwa succeeding Mugabe. Deriving from an interview Moyo had with Steven Sackur of the BBC during the programme *Hardtalk* – Moyo is quoted saying, “the president did not appoint him (Mnangagwa) so that he could succeed him”. Moyo was then Zimbabwe’s information minister.

7.2 *Daily News*: A G40 faction functionary?

In its reportage of factional battles between Emmerson Mnangagwa’s Team Lacoste and the Grace Mugabe aligned G40 over who succeeded Robert Mugabe after dismissal of Mujuru, the *Daily News* seemed aligned to the G40. It achieved this again through “deliberately” biased news sourcing techniques, granting G40 faction politicians a voice while denying the

Mnangagwa camp same privilege, blunt delegitimisation of Mnangagwa as Robert Mugabe’s potential successor, among other editorial shenanigans devoid of impartiality and fairness. This violated the *Daily News*’ established editorial protocol when reporting on Mugabe and ZANU-PF – an orientation that for years saw the newspaper indulging in oppositional journalism (Ranger, 2005, Ruhanya, 2014) – a journalism depicting constant editorial disdain for the ruling party as an entity and valorising the main opposition, MDC. The *Daily News*’ pro-G40 editorial configuration is depicted in stories tabled below (Table 7.2).

Table 7. 2: Daily News reports on G40 versus Mnangagwa’s Team Lacoste

Date	Story headline	Page
12 February 2016	G40 outwits Team Lacoste in Politburo	Front
18 November 2016	War vets declare war on Moyo, “Tyson”	Front
19 March 2016	G40 finishes Team Lacoste	Front
24 March 2016	Ngwenya’s new age of denials: It wasn’t me	Font
23 March 2016	G40 puts last nails on Team Lacoste	Front
31 October 2016	Moyo’s enemies ramp up the heat	Front
09 November 2016	Moyo roasts Mnangagwa	Front
28 December 2016	Moyo savages Lacoste, again	Front
03 January 217	Lacoste, G40 wars escalate	Front
12 January 2017	G40 hunts Mnangagwa, Team Lacoste	Front
27 January 2017	Lacoste youths warn Chipanga	Front
28 November 2016	G40, Team Lacoste tuck into each other	Front
28 November 2016	Moyo savages Mnangagwa	Front
25 January 2017	Kasukuwere mauls Mnangagwa supporters	Front
14 March 2017	Moyo wants to be president: Mutsvangwa	Front
17 March 2017	We’ll crush G40, Mnangagwa’s camp vows	Front
23 April 2017	Ghost of 2008 spooks ZANU-PF	Front
06 May 2017	Team Lacoste squeezes G40	Front
26 May 2017	‘Time to cut Tyson loose’	Front
02 June 2017	Dark clouds hang over Kasukuwere	Front
14 June 2017	D-Day for Jonathan Moyo	Front
15 June 2017	Con-Court reserves ruling in Moyo’s case	Front
21 June 2017	Tyson opens up	Front

22 June 2017	Tyson survives another day	Front
23 June 2017	Explosive Politburo as factions face off over Kasukuwere	Front
28 June 2017	Chiwenga after Jonathan Moyo	Front
04 July 2017	War vets want Moyo censured	Front
07 July 2017	Mahoka, Moyo off the hook	Front
17 July 2017	Jonathan Moyo: Rebel without a cause or voice of reason	Inside
30 July 2017	Grace roasts ED, Charamba	Front
30 July 2017	Case against Tyson collapses	Front
12 June 2017	G40 fears Mnangagwa is shoo-in	Front
10 April 2017	Vultures circle wobbly “Tyson”	Front
04 September 2017	Tyson regains lost ground	Front
21 September 2017	Jonathan Moyo in Ngwenya’s jaws	Front
22 September 2017	Moyo itching for day in court	Front
13 October 2017	Game on as Mnangagwa hammers Moyo	Front
20 October 2017	Grace Mugabe leads race for VP	Front
22 October 2017	Team Lacoste hatches Plan B	Front
2 November 2017	Plot to oust Mnangagwa thickens	Front
12 November 2017	Case against Tyson collapses	Front
19 December 2017	G40 kingpins allege persecution	Front

The *Daily News* routinely generated headlines implying that the G40 outpaced Mnangagwa’s Team Lacoste in the race to succeed Mugabe as captured in the table above. The newspaper became so engrossed in ZANU-PF factionalism to an extent it lost objectivity and impartiality. Biased and sensationalised headlines dominated the *Daily News*’ news pages. In one such a case, the *Daily News* generated a headline, “G40 finishes off Team Lacoste” (19 March 2016), which suggested the Grace Mugabe aligned faction, had extinguished its nemesis, the Mnangagwa group when in reality ZANU-PF had only dismissed a single politician – July Moyo – who was strongly linked to the vice president’s faction. The highly sensationalised article read in part:

In arguably the most devastating blow to befall the ZANU-PF faction rallying behind embattled Vice President Emmerson Mnangagwa's mooted presidential aspirations, one of the Midlands godfather's most trusted allies, July Moyo, has now also been booted out of the warring government.

(*Daily News*, 19 March 2016)

Besides sensationalism manifesting in the statement, the *Daily News* seems to exaggerate the implications of the loss suffered by Mnangagwa's Team Lacoste especially considering that July Moyo was not a senior government or senior party official at the time. This implies that G40 was gaining an upper hand against Team Lacoste in the factional fights. Further, whereas Mnangagwa was a national vice president, the *Daily News* reduced him to a provincial functionary when referring to him as "the Midlands godfather". More importantly, the story was sourced from a nameless G40 faction politician whom the *Daily News* quotes declaring that this, "officially marks the end of Team Lacoste". The source's tone is celebratory and conclusive – "we have now decapitated all the heads of this successionist outfit, meaning that it is all over, including for their leader (Mnangagwa)". The type of journalism deployed fails to meet the basic principles of newsgathering and reporting as it relies on a single source and does not afford the Mnangagwa faction the right of reply. It is also largely based on the source's interpretation and opinion of a single event. The output becomes a highly factionalised "news" article. The story reinforces the impression that the Mnangagwa faction was dead and buried when – again relying on a nameless source – anticipates 'a major cabinet shake-up ...likely to deliver another devastating blow to Mnangagwa's mooted presidential aspirations". This creates an impression of a Team Lacoste under leash and of a G40 faction well positioned to succeed Mugabe. That the story threatens Mnangagwa's Team Lacoste faction to "completely repent", "get rid of their successionist tendencies", and "beg for forgiveness from Gushungo (Mugabe)" – exposes the agenda the *Daily News* attempted to set. It is an effort at delegitimizing Mnangagwa as Mugabe's successor while legitimating Mugabe's reign albeit through G40.

Another headline, "G40 outwits Team Lacoste in politburo" (12 February 2016), sought to reinforce the idea that Mnangagwa's Team Lacoste was on retreat as the G40 advanced. It boldly claimed that efforts by the Mnangagwa faction to "bring down G40 group...came to nought". The article read in part:

The *Daily News* –which has reported accurately and consistently on the ruling party’s brutal infighting over the past five years – learnt yesterday that contrary to State media reports that the G40 had received a heavy shellacking, it was in fact Team Lacoste that left with their tails between their legs after the explosive meeting (politburo).

(*Daily News* 12 February 2016)

It would appear the *Daily News* resorted to fighting perceived G40 enemies in ZANU-PF and outside it, *The Herald* included. *The Herald* had editorially adopted the Mnangagwa faction, a situation that naturally positioned the newspaper for attack by the *Daily News* as reflected in this report. The article went on to predict a purge of “many other Mnangagwa camp storm troopers” whose positions in ZANU-PF it claimed were “hanging in balance”. Deployment of the phrase “storm troopers” to describe Mnangagwa faction politicians is derogatory, as it seemed designed to present them as inhumanly violent yet aiming for presidential position. The Merriam-Webster dictionary defines storm troopers as “members of the private Nazi army notorious for aggressiveness, violence and brutality”. Equating Team Lacoste faction to the Nazi army therefore exposes the extent the *Daily News* sought to undermine Mnangagwa’s standing as a prospective presidential aspirant. In the same story, the *Daily News* bluntly adopt the G40 when it celebrated the faction’s achievements in the politburo meeting by suggesting, “sources told the *Daily News*...that the G40-linked politburo members, in particular Moyo and the party’s national political commissar Saviour Kasukuwere, had allegedly ‘outclassed the successionists (Mnangagwa faction) hands down in the meeting’”.

The *Daily News*’ editorial tone is again highly celebratory while its reporter was suggestively gullible as if a factional functionary pushing an anti-Mnangagwa agenda. The story derives again from a single nameless source, who quotes G40 politicians including Jonathan Moyo fuming over “how the state media had chosen to fight in the corner of a faction in the party, while attacking other leaders”. Interestingly, it was Moyo as shown in the first data chapter, who initiated *The Herald* into factionalised journalism during his tenure as Minister of Information. The *Daily News*’ adoption of the G40 faction also manifested in its one-sided attack on the Mnangagwa faction while sparing the G40, which it presented as a victim. The newspaper also claimed another G40 kingpin, Kasukuwere, “came out guns blazing” when Team Lacoste accused him of fanning factionalism in provinces.

In yet another highly speculative headline story, “Mnangagwa might resign” (15 February 2016), the *Daily News* seemed to set an agenda for the vice president to resign. That the article

was compiled and published on front page, without Mnangagwa's voice and riding on nameless sources, exposed the extent journalism at the privately owned daily suffered factionalisation. The article claimed that "embattled" Mnangagwa was "crumpling under intense political pressure exerted on him and his allies by his determined ZANU-PF foes (G40)" and is "seriously mulling quitting both his party and government positions". "Crumple" suggests collapsing – and in the context of this story – Mnangagwa had failed to withstand competition for Mugabe's position from the rival G40 faction and "crumpled". *The Daily News* claimed that Grace Mugabe –reportedly the power behind the G40 – had brutally publicly "skinned" Mnangagwa forcing the vice president to be "anxious about his position" and to consider resigning. This seems aimed at creating a picture of a conquered Mnangagwa with no chance of succeeding Mugabe.

Ironically, there is also an effort by the *Daily News* at constructing Mnangagwa as an considerate leader when the newspaper described him as "a pragmatist and he knows that things are not looking good for him and those who support him...he is seriously thinking of stepping down, if that will heal the party". At the same time, the *Daily News* claimed Mnangagwa's G40 nemesis "are not going to stop here, as they now clearly want to finish him off", adding, "By resigning of his own accord, Ngwenya (Mnangagwa) will therefore avert further humiliation and the clubbing to death of his friends". What emerges is an attempt by the *Daily News* – through nameless sources – at both persuading and coercing Mnangagwa to resign or else, as he was "riding on the back of a hungry hyena" as the newspaper asserted. This is reminiscent of how *The Herald* used similar editorial tricks in its reportage of Joice Mujuru in the run up to the ZANU-PF December 2014 congress when it tried to persuade her to resign to save her legacy. However, the *Daily News'* journalism in this case is not only faulty in relying on faceless sources, but clumsily exposes its agenda – ridding ZANU-PF of potential threat to Mugabe's leadership and rule.

The *Daily News* displays its anti-Mnangagwa editorial orientation in a highly opinionated article, "Ngwenya's new age of denials: It wasn't me" (24 March 2016). Ngwenya is Mnangagwa's moniker and means a crocodile. The story followed a series of break-ins at Vice President Mnangagwa's office. Unknown people had reportedly broken into Mnangagwa's office on five different occasions – but the *Daily News* without availing any evidence – seemed to accuse Mnangagwa of committing the offence to gain public sympathy. So daring was the *Daily News* story in that it accused Mnangagwa – the supposed victim of the breaks-ins – of "ad nauseum ad infinitum" playing the victim. Ad nauseum ad infinitum is a Latin phrase

which means something repeatedly claimed “to a point of nausea”. The article dismissively described the burglaries at Mnangagwa’s ZANU-PF and government offices by unknown assailants as “dodgy break-ins” and “raised eyebrows about the motive”. Part of the article read:

...Mnangagwa, in all righteous indignation, looked the nation straight in the eye and insisted he suspected foul play. If apocryphal, it is definitely in character. Mnangagwa, with his colourful Karanga prose and melodrama, regularly embraces bad ideas or even invents fibs so totally that he convinces himself of their rightness. Others start to believe them too.

(*Daily News*, 24 March 2016).

The article seemed an attempt at constructing in the public mind an image of a highly deceitful character in Mnangagwa not worthy Mugabe’s position. It implied Mnangagwa lacked principles and was desperate to succeed Mugabe especially when it claims Mnangagwa “regularly embraces bad ideas or even invents fibs”. The story also appeared geared at igniting “ethnic hate” against the vice president when it referenced Mnangagwa’s “Karanga prose” especially considering his rivals –the G40 – were largely Zezuru dominated at the top while Mnangagwa enjoyed support from the Karangas. From an investigative journalism perspective, it also not clear why the *Daily News*, a newspaper that prides itself in investigative reporting, failed to institute an independent probe into the break-ins at the vice president’s office than attack the “victim” as deceitful. In a politically charged environment, journalists must instinctively take seemingly dramatic events at first value and report them as plain news stories. The *Daily News* made inferences and implications of the event without further details to establish if it was a conspiracy or just an act of crime.

This is suggestive of a newspaper that perfected the art of factionalised journalism glaringly biased in favour of the G40 while systematically scandalising its nemesis, Mnangagwa’s Team Lacoste, as exemplified in this particular story. Whereas the story derived from the alleged break-in at Mnangagwa’s office, the *Daily News* – in what appeared a bid at smear campaigning the vice president – touches on the sensitive Gukurahundi atrocities committed three decades ago suggesting that Mnangagwa had referred to dissidents as “cockroaches and the Fifth Brigade as “DDT” – a deadly pesticide used to kill vermin”. The fifth brigade was a unit dispatched to Matabeleland by Robert Mugabe during a civil war that reportedly killed over 20

000 ethnic Ndebele people. The *Daily News* articles goes further, “One wonders why he (Mnangagwa) does not shut up”.

In Parliament, he (Mnangagwa) has shirked government responsibility for the disappearance of human rights activist Itai Dzamara, who the missing activist’s family and the opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai insists was disappeared by the governing regime. His persistent denials have undercut public confidence in his vice presidency. Mnangagwa has been more of a denialist than any other leader.

(*Daily News*, 16 March 2016)

The *Daily News* tries to construct Mnangagwa as a denialist whereas this picture could actually be contrived by his rivals through repeated efforts of pinning every negative – current and historical – on him, so that when he naturally denies culpability the rivals then turn back and brand him a denialist. Further, the import of this statement by the *Daily News* was that Mnangagwa was not presidential candidate material as he had failed in the vice presidency position and consequently cannot aspire for a higher post. A pattern then emerges where *Daily News* routinely discounted Mnangagwa’s Team Lacoste in reportage on Mugabe’s succession as reflected in stories including, “Team Lacoste hatches Plan B”, “Mugabe, Grace seal Mnangagwa’s fate”, and “Defining moment for Mnangagwa – which all projected an image of a Mnangagwa on the cusp of political demise at the hands of the seemingly indomitable G40 faction. The “factional-ness” reflects not just in the frequency the *Daily News*’ generates anti-Mnangagwa faction stories but even in the wording, tone and saliency given to them. For instance, the headline, “Team Lacoste hatches Plan B” (22 October 2017) suggests existence of a Plan A, which failed.

How the story begins also confirms failure by journalists to stick to basic journalism principles, as it sounds factionalised – “far from throwing in the towel, the Team Lacoste faction is mulling throwing the name of Oppah Muchinguri for the post of vice president in case their trump card in the succession race, Emmerson Mnangagwa, is jettisoned from his position...” It sounds as if the *Daily News* had expected Mnangagwa to resign and further suggests danger of dismissal if he did not resign. The newspaper primed Muchinguri as the faction’s possible Mnangagwa super substitute. The *Daily News* proceeds to celebrate Muchinguri’s contribution to Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle – “she was one of the female combatants who participated in the liberation struggle that brought Zimbabwe’s independence...” It claimed that Muchinguri

at some point had the backing of war veterans while emphasizing that the Mnangagwa faction “lacked the numbers in the main wing to push through its agenda”.

On the contrary, the *Daily News* editorially mourned with the G40 whenever politicians in that faction seemed subdued by their rivals in Mnangagwa’s Team Lacoste, which camp the newspaper routinely constructed as barbaric. The newspaper would generate articles that suggestively sympathised with G40 politicians while apparently condemning the Mnangagwa camp. A picture was painted of a G40 under siege from the Mnangagwa faction through such headlines as, “Vultures circle wobbly ‘Tyson’” (10 April 2017), “Dark clouds hang over Kasukuwere” (2 June 2017), “G40 allege persecution” (19 December 2017), “We’ll crush G40, Mnangagwa faction” (17 March 2017) and “War vets declare war on Moyo, Tyson” (18 November 2016). “Case against Tyson collapses” (12 November 2017), “Tyson survives another day” (22 June 2017), and “Tyson survives the chop” (30 July 2017) are also some of the headlines provocatively constructing Kasukuwere as a political survivor in the face of persistent political persecution by Mnangagwa’s Team Lacoste faction. Unlike in its reportage of Mnangagwa demonstrated earlier in which the *Daily News* intently portrayed the vice president as “a dead man walking”, Kasukuwere is constructed as politically indomitable and whose corruption cases “collapse” and “who survives another day”. There seem to be an effort by the *Daily News* at saliently portraying Kasukuwere not just as a victim of political persecution catalysed by the Mnangagwa faction but to create an impression of a hero in him.

In “Vultures circle wobbly Tyson”, the *Daily News* – which had it been Mnangagwa under siege from the G40 would have generated a headline “Mnangagwa on the ropes” – presents Kasukuwere as a victim encircled not just by political rivals but by “vultures”. The vultures are the Mnangagwa faction. Whereas vultures are huge birds feeding on dead animals, in the context of the *Daily News* article, vultures infer ‘people keen on extracting benefits from other people’s difficulties’ (Cambridge dictionary). It is important to note that Kasukuwere was not just presented as a victim but “wobbly Tyson”. Tyson was Kasukuwere’s nickname deriving famous and fiery American boxer, Mike Tyson, while ‘wobbly’ implies vulnerability. The *Daily News* attempted to generate discourse implying that the Mnangagwa faction was politically persecuting a hapless Kasukuwere – and not as a fair tussle for Mugabe’s position by factions within ZANU-PF. The *Daily News*’ article deriving from nameless sources, also consistently references the Mnangagwa faction as “enemies of the national political commissar” and “Kasukuwere’s determined foes” – an attempt at constructing Team Lacoste faction as incorrigibly unforgiving politicians – which brand may not augur well with the

“presidency” (Mugabe’s position). The same article suggested that the Mnangagwa faction “last week twisted the knife into Kasukuwere”, again an editorial emphasis at giving saliency to the Mnangagwa faction assumed barbarity. The *Daily News* consistently pushed a narrative that presented Mnangagwa or his faction as “unforgiving” and “murderous”, an agenda that appeared aimed at elbowing him out of Mugabe’s succession race through mudslinging while those in the G40 were presented as victims facing marauding power hungry rivals.

This may account for the *Daily News*’ celebratory editorial tone whenever the G40’s Kasukuwere prevailed over the Mnangagwa faction – “Tyson survives the chop”, “Case against Kasuwere collapses”, and “Tyson survives another day”. If anything, the *Daily News*’ consistent reference to Kasukuwere by his moniker “Tyson” (Mike Tyson) – is suggestive of the infallible. Kasukuwere is constantly primed as a giant slayer” as if the American boxer Mike Tyson.

The *Daily News* adopted a similar editorial disposition when reporting on another G40 “kingpin” Jonathan Moyo. Although Grace Mugabe was reportedly the power behind the G40, Jonathan Moyo and Saviour Kasukuwere were its most active politicians by virtue of their regular anti-Mnangagwa faction remarks in the media. The newspaper generated a series of headlines imaging Moyo – just like Kasukuwere – as a victim rather than an equal participant as the Mnangagwa faction in Robert Mugabe’s succession matrix. For example, headlines “Jonathan Moyo in Ngwena’s jaws”, “Moyo’s enemies ramp up the heat”, “Team Lacoste guns for Moyo”, “Team Lacoste squeezes G40”, “G40 kingpins allege persecution”, and “Chiwenga after Jonathan Moyo” construct an image of a G40 politician under persecution from a rival faction. At the same time there was constant editorial effort at deliberately imaging Jonathan Moyo and the G40 as irrepressible fighters in some headlines as “Moyo roasts Mnangagwa”, “Moyo savages Lacoste, again”, “Grace roasts ED, Charamba”, “Moyo itching for day in court”, “Jonathan Moyo: Rebel without cause or voice of reason?”

“Jonathan Moyo in Ngwena’s jaws” is a headline story derived by the *Daily News* from Constitutional Court proceedings after the court dismissed the politician’s application challenging the Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission’s (ZACC) arresting powers in a case he faced US\$400 000 corruption charges. Whereas this was a straight story from court proceedings, the *Daily News*’ headline saliently disputes that this was a simple crime story by suggesting Mnangagwa’s involvement when it implied Moyo was in “Ngwena’s jaws”. Ngwena is Mnangagwa’s monicker and means a crocodile. This seems an attempt at setting an

agenda in favour of Moyo by implying that this was politically motivated persecution by a rival faction, and not legitimate prosecution. The article read in part:

Moyo, who is said to be a key member of a faction within ZANU-PF going by the moniker Generation 40 (G40), which is bitterly opposed to Vice President Emmerson Mnangagwa succeeding Mugabe, has accused Team Lacoste (Mnangagwa faction) and key players at ZACC of waging factional war against him. The ruling ... puts Moyo at the mercy of ZACC, which the Higher and Tertiary Education minister has persistently accused of being at the back and call of Mnangagwa.

(*Daily News*, 21 September 2017)

This background clearly implied that Moyo was under political persecution from the Mnangagwa faction although ZACC was a commission appointed by Robert Mugabe and housed in his office. The *Daily News* emphasized that ZACC was “supposed to be independent commission” but was not autonomous as Justice Minister Mnangagwa had “oversight over the justice delivery system hence there is concern among functionaries in the G40 that the Concourt ruling has thrown Moyo into the vice president’s hands”. What may have been a simple case of criminality is editorially factionalised with the *Daily News* failing to support its claims beyond presenting Mnangagwa, as an all-powerful god able to cause the arrest of a cabinet minister without Mugabe’s authorisation. Such editorial configuration risked diminishing the *Daily News*’ established reputation as a newspaper that fought corruption.

Another front-page article, “Moyo’s enemies ramp up the heat” (31 October 2016) again seemed to clear Jonathan Moyo of the allegations raised by ZACC and even implied that the court case was impeding development in the politician’s Tsholotsho constituency. The story’s tone and biased sourcing betray the agenda pursued. It suggested that Moyo “who is already reeling from a cocktail of hotly-contested corruption charges...is facing a fresh onslaught from his enemies within President Robert Mugabe’s warring ZANU-PF”. Besides the headline, presenting Moyo as a victim of unjustified hate suggestively dismissed the allegations raised against the politician as “cocktail of hotly-contested corruption charges”. Deployment of the word “cocktail” implied the allegations were a hotchpotch of far-fetched claims designed to nail Jonathan Moyo while “fresh onslaught” depicted a man under unjustified attack from the Mnangagwa faction inasmuch as the *Daily News* emphasised the context within which the allegations were raised – “within Robert Mugabe’s warring ZANU-PF”. “Warring” appeared a further attempt at cleansing Moyo by implying mudslinging is rife where there are fights.

Well-placed sources told the *Daily News* yesterday that development projects running into millions of dollars in the embattled ZANU-PF politburo member's impoverished Tsholotsho North constituency had allegedly been stopped by his party foes. This comes as anti-graft body, ZACC — which Moyo says is being used by his ZANU-PF enemies to hound him — is reported to be widening its probes into him to include cases, which happened 17 years ago.

(*Daily News*, 31 October 2016)

The *Daily News* presented Jonathan Moyo as a pro-development ZANU-PF politician being frustrated by the Mnangagwa faction from completing several community projects meant for the “impoverished” villagers in Tsholotsho on factional and tribal grounds. The Mnangagwa faction, which is ultimately constructed as an anti-development agent are denied right of reply and there is no indication any effort was made to engage them for a comment as the charges raised were grave. This presented Mnangagwa as a tribal and regional politician unfit to succeed Mugabe. The projects allegedly hindered by Mnangagwa faction included resurfacing of roads, construction of a stadium and an irrigation scheme. This editorial tendency to always present the G40 as victims further manifested in another headline, “Team Lacoste squeeze G40” (6 May 2017), which frames the Mnangagwa faction as an aggressor. The article was on ZANU-PF elections for the Masvingo provincial chair, and a candidate aligned to the G40 had pulled out of the race last minute. A simple and unbiased headline may have as well just centred on the candidate's withdrawal but there is a clear editorial attempt at sensationalising it and presenting an image of the G40 under siege from Mnangagwa's Team Lacoste. Deployment of the word “squeeze” in the headline implied the G40 candidate was brutally elbowed out of the polls yet the politician voluntarily opted out on the basis the elections had not “been cleared by President Robert Mugabe”.

Apart from relentlessly activating the victimhood frame, the *Daily News* also alternatively constructed the G40 kingpin Jonathan Moyo – as defiant and invincible in the midst of an implied onslaught from Mnangagwa's faction. Such editorial disposition manifested in front page stories as, “Moyo savages Mnangagwa”, in which Jonathan Moyo – a former Information minister who stood accused of clamping down on the *Daily News* causing its closure in 2003 – is granted a platform to attack Mnangagwa. In the story, Moyo brands Mnangagwa a “successionist” covertly seeking to oust Mugabe. The newspaper constructs Moyo as “Mugabe's keeper” against vultures in Mnangagwa's faction when it suggested that the

politician was ‘a stumbling block’ to Team Lacoste’s plot to illegally overthrow the president. This is an editorial attempt at legitimising the G40 while delegitimising the Mnangagwa camp as a grouping of coup plotters. The *Daily News* also celebrated Moyo’s valor when it claimed that the politician had “repeatedly taken the war to Team Lacoste over the past year” and was certain to stop Mnangagwa from succeeding Mugabe.

Of interest to note as well is how the *Daily News* habitually brands Mnangagwa “the Midlands godfather”, a phrase suggestive that he was only popular in that particular province. While insouciantly deployed, the phrase strongly implies that Mnangagwa lacked national support and was a regionalist – and cannot aspire for national presidency by positioning himself to succeed Mugabe. That the *Daily News* denied the Mnangagwa faction a right of reply to the serious allegations raised by Jonathan Moyo of the rival camp, suggest the editorial agenda was to disqualify Team Lacoste from the Mugabe succession matrix. The *Daily News* regurgitated the story, “Moyo savages Lacoste, again” (28 December 2016), and gave it equal saliency through placement on front page. Its editorial tone inferred the G40 politician was on the offensive – “Jonathan Moyo has once again taken a deadly aim at the supporters of Vice President Emmerson Mnangagwa”. “Deadly” implies lethal and suggested the Mnangagwa faction was badly exposed. The article accused Mnangagwa and his faction of gross corruption but again failed to capture their reactions to the allegations in line with basic journalism principles discouraging bias in journalism. The *Daily News* generated yet another headline, “Moyo roasts Mnangagwa” (9 November 2016), which suggestively scandalised Mnangagwa by depicting him as a desperate presidential hopeful engaging in “dark arts” to secure the presidency. The article was sourced from Jonathan Moyo’s twitter post, which read, “When their successionist project goes up in smoke, who are they gonna call? Fake prophets!” The article derived from rumours that Mnangagwa was scheduled to be guest of honour at controversial Malawian prophet Shepherd Bushiri’s ‘Black Billionaire’ breakfast meeting in Harare, Zimbabwe. Relying solely on Moyo’s tweet, the *Daily News* generated a front-page story from what later proved a hoax without verifying the information with either Bushiri or Mnangagwa’s office. It proceeded to highlight how Mnangagwa was resorting to “dark arts” to outdo opponents in the race to succeed Mugabe by backgrounding the story:

Last year, Mnangagwa also courted ridicule after he visited popular local prophet Madzibaba Wimbo who disappointed the VP’s followers after claiming that the Midlands godfather needed help if he is to succeed Mugabe.

(*Daily News*, 9 November 2016)

The story further claimed Mnangagwa deployed the army and kidnapped Wimbo “in a bid to force a succession prophecy” favourable to him. Wimbo was a prophet in the African apostolic church. The *Daily News* seeks neither Mnangagwa nor Wimbo’s comment over the sensational story, which it gave saliency through placement on front page. Emphasis seems deliberately placed on Mnangagwa’s mysticism in an editorial disposition targeted at discrediting his presidential aspirations.

7.3 *NewsDay*’s corrupted narratives on Mugabe succession conundrum

In this section, the study examines narratives on Mugabe’s succession generated by another privately owned daily newspaper, *NewsDay*. Focus is on how the newspaper, which rivals the *Daily News*, reported on the ZANU-PF 2014 congress, which felled Joice Mujuru and the rise and fall of her successor, Emmerson Mnangagwa. The stories are subjected to Critical Discourse Analysis-Discourse Historical Approach to decipher emerging narratives and expose forces behind their generation.

7.4 The ZANU-PF congress and *NewsDay*’s anti-Mujuru editorial disposition

The *NewsDay* generated headlines that suggestively delegitimised Joice Mujuru as a potential Robert Mugabe successor in an editorial manner that “silently” appeared to legitimise Emmerson Mnangagwa’s ascendancy to the presidency. It spawned headlines as, “Mujuru’s US ties behind fallout with Mugabe”, “MDC-T formed in Mujuru house – Grace”, “ZANU-PF congress to seal Mujuru, allies’ fate”, “It’s game over for VP Mujuru”, “VP Mujuru torches storm”, “Mugabe disqualifies Mujuru, Mnangagwa”, and “Mujuru camp after my life”, among several others which discounted her from the presidency. Relying on nameless sources in a headline story, “Mujuru’s US ties behind fallout with Mugabe”, the *NewsDay* depicts Mujuru as a western stooge who it disqualifies from succeeding Mugabe.

Highly placed sources in Mugabe’s office yesterday said that fears in ZANU-PF hardliners were that given her (Mujuru) close links with the West, particularly the United States, she could reverse the “gains of the liberation struggle, in particular the land reform.

(*NewsDay*, 24 October 2014)

Citing Grace Mugabe as its main source, the story claimed, “Mujuru would bring back the pre-1980 era if she took over as President”, and further suggested there were other alternative

candidates in ZANU-PF to take over from Mugabe other than Mujuru. The pre-1980 era referenced suggested Mujuru succeeding Mugabe was tantamount to Zimbabwe's recolonisation. Zimbabwe is a former British settler colony. The *NewsDay* proceeded to quote an unnamed source insisting:

It is clear that with her, the country is at risk, we don't want to go back to the pre-1980 era and there is a feeling that she can take us there as it seems she has a soft spot for the West. Zimbabwe cannot go back to that era before 1980. We want someone who will protect the revolution of the country, but with her, we can't trust.

(*NewsDay*, 24 October 2014)

The article further quoted another nameless source suggesting, "Mujuru's fate would be sealed at the watershed ZANU-PF December elective congress". It also accused Mujuru of clandestinely working with then US ambassador to Zimbabwe Charles Ray "under the cover of darkness" citing WikiLeaks. The story implied that the Mujuru family habitually worked with the opposition in a bid to topple Mugabe citing her late husband General Solomon Mujuru's "alleged involvement in the formation of Simba Makoni's Mavambo/Kusile/Dawn project". Mavambo was an opposition political party formed by a former ZANU-PF politician Simba Makoni in 2009 to challenge Mugabe's long rule. The *NewsDay* report read like *The Herald's* narrative disqualifying opposition MDC leader Morgan Tsvangirai from national presidency. *The Herald* often disqualified Tsvangirai on the basis that electing him risked reversing the gains of the liberation war as the land reform and portended Zimbabwe's recolonisation. Normatively, it is unusual for the privately owned press as *NewsDay* to adopt such an editorial stance when reporting on national politics and exposes the extent the newspaper adopted an anti-Mujuru, pro Mnangagwa editorial stance in its reportage of Mugabe's succession. The *NewsDay* report delegitimised and "othered" Mujuru through adoption of negative frames when reporting on Mugabe's succession.

The seemingly deliberate editorial stance by the *NewsDay* that constructed Mujuru as a sell-out is also reflected in the headline story, "MDC-T formed in Mujuru house – Grace" (18 October 2014). The single sourced article quotes Grace Mugabe alleging that Joice Mujuru helped in the formation of opposition political parties, the MDC and Mavambo.

The MDC was started in your (Mujuru) house, Mavambo was started in your house, corruption was started in your house and factionalism was started in your house...you control diamond mines and extort companies.

(*NewsDay*, 18 October 2014)

This is suggestive of an attempt at scandalising Joice Mujuru for political capital. Whereas in publishing the article the *NewsDay* may have derived justification from the remarks emanating from Robert Mugabe's wife Grace, responsible journalism exhorts contextualisation, verification and factuality in news reports. Contextualisation in news production protocols goads journalists to understand context when generating news reports. The *NewsDay* journalists ought to have questioned the timing of the allegations and the context within which they were generated. ZANU-PF was experiencing heightened intraparty fights between the Mujuru faction and Mnangagwa camp on who succeeded Mugabe at the time. When Grace Mugabe made the claims, Mujuru as Mugabe's deputy, appeared well set to succeed Mugabe, who was reluctant to retire. The *NewsDay* also quotes Grace Mugabe repeatedly declaring that Mujuru "does not have leadership qualities" and accusing the then vice president of bribing journalists from the privately owned press to tarnish her image. This all seemed choreographed to discredit and elbow Mujuru out of the presidential race through negative journalism. It is inconceivable how the *NewsDay* regurgitated Grace Mugabe's allegations against Mujuru without verification and suggests the newspaper may have deliberately generated the report to advance the agenda of a faction it was aligned.

Whereas the *Daily News* bluntly exposed its pro-Mujuru editorial disposition, the *NewsDay* 'covertly' aligned to Mnangagwa as in a story headlined, "Mugabe disqualifies Mujuru, Mnangagwa" (21 February 2014). The article suggested that while analysts tipped Mujuru to be Zimbabwe's next president, "Party sources claimed Mugabe once promised Mnangagwa power when he finally relinquished it". It emphasized, "Both Mujuru and Mnangagwa's political careers depended much on Mugabe's benevolence". This suggests that although some in ZANU-PF favoured a Mujuru's take over, the final decision rested with Mugabe – a Mugabe whom the newspaper hinted "once promised Mnangagwa power". Another headline, "Joice Mujuru faction regroup" (21 October 2014) – besides implying that the faction had back peddled at some point – also claims that Mugabe was "more inclined towards the Mnangagwa-Grace Mugabe faction". This again pointed to the *NewsDay*'s anti-Mujuru campaign in the run up to the ZANU-PF 2014 congress.

The headline "VP Mujuru torches storm" (11 February 2014) exposes the extent the *NewsDay* routinely scandalised Joice Mujuru. The article planted on front page derives from Mujuru's public condemnation of *The Herald*'s exposé of corruption in government owned companies –

which seemingly targeted individuals in her faction. *The NewsDay* sought comments from political sources hostile to Mujuru such as the opposition MDC-T spokesperson Douglas Mwonzora, MDC99 leader Job Sikhala, and the Harare Residents Trust's Precious Shumba. This deliberate biased news sourcing technique set in motion an anti-Mujuru faction narrative that discounted her presidential candidacy. In his commentary, Mwonzora claimed Mujuru was "a recipient of this corrupt money hence her attempt to gag the press" and emphasized without the burden of proof that the Mujuru faction comprised corrupt politicians. Shumba, another of the analyst the *NewsDay* courted, dismissed Mujuru as unreasonable.

I always thought she (Mujuru) was reasonable, but now I realise that she is also lost despite sitting in a position of high authority, influence and power...she will be exposed for being heavily involved in the corruption that has swept across our public service institutions.

(*NewsDay*, 11 February 2014)

In another front page story, "Mujuru camp after my life" (26 October 2014), the *NewsDay* quotes a Mnangagwa ally and ZANU-PF senator for Manicaland province Monica Mutsvangwa claiming that the Mujuru faction wanted to assassinate her and "intimidated other (ZANU-PF) members in an effort to coerce them into supporting the beleaguered camp". The article quotes Mutsvangwa claiming:

You will never kill me. You will never kill us. I am not afraid of dying. I have been intimidated on many occasions that if I come to Manicaland I will die. I am not afraid. People of Manicaland we need to liberate ourselves otherwise we will suffer.

(*NewsDay*, 26 October 2014)

These remarks presents the Mujuru faction as comprising murderous characters who would kill rivals for political ascendancy. The impression created is that the Mujuru faction is so exploitative and coercive in its bid to succeed Mugabe to such an extent the people of Manicaland needed to "liberate" themselves from it or perish. The article accuses Mujuru of fanning factionalism in ZANU-PF and for the collapse of the Zimbabwean economy through corruption – "The Zimbabwean economy was underperforming due to Mujuru's alleged extortionist tendencies" as companies were "failing to make profits because of this person who is always demanding 10% from them". This attempt at scandalising Mujuru by the *NewsDay* through use of third parties as Mutsvangwa – of the rival Mnangagwa faction – only exposes

the newspaper factional editorial outlook. The collapse of the Zimbabwean economy is attributable to several factors inclusive of the chaotic land reform programme, which decimated the commercial agriculture sector, corruption, and sanctions imposed on the country by western nations. The *NewsDay* also attributes Mujuru's rise in Zimbabwean politics to her proximity to Mugabe and quoted Mutsvangwa challenging her – “If you have decided and think you are ready to rule Zimbabwe you don't have to ride on Mugabe's popularity”.

The story derived from Mutsvangwa as the sole source and failed to grant Mujuru a platform for reaction as the charges raised were defamatory and scandalous to run without the granting a right of reply. What makes it even worse is the fact that the allegations emanate from a rival known by the *NewsDay* to belong in the Mnangagwa faction. Such subjective news sourcing birthed deliberately prejudiced narratives informed by factional orientation. Inasmuch as Mutsvangwa may have made such remarks about Mujuru, which were undoubtedly newsworthy from a journalism perspective, at least the newspaper should have appreciated the context within which they were pronounced. The allegations were made within heightened political contestations in ZANU-PF over Mugabe's successor. Not everything pronounced was factual and responsible journalism must have ascertained the veracity of Mutsvangwa's remarks before putting pen to paper. News is a compilation of 'truths' of interest to the public.

The *NewsDay* also appeared to set an anti-Mujuru faction agenda in a headline, “ZANU-PF congress to seal Mujuru, allies' fate” (29 November 2014), which read in part:

Vice President Joice Mujuru and her allies' fate will be sealed at the 6th ZANU-PF national congress that will usher in a new leadership and see major changes to the composition of the presidium.

(*NewsDay*, 29 November 2014)

This speculative editorial disposition by the newspaper provocatively sets the agenda for Mujuru's dismissal from ZANU-PF even before congress especially when it conclusively declares that the congress “will usher in a new leadership and see major changes to the composition of the presidium” and insisted on Mujuru “likely coming out of the congress an ordinary card-carrying member”. This editorial stance persisted in, “It's game over for VP Mujuru” (5 December 2014). The story derives wholly from a journalist's analysis of behaviours of delegates to the ZANU-PF congress and concludes that Mujuru's demise was nigh.

Body languages and interactions of the two camps fighting to succeed Mugabe spoke volumes on the goings-on in ZANU-PF, with the camp led by Justice Minister Emmerson Mnangagwa seemingly prevailing... Those linked to Mujuru... looked out of place. Mnangagwa took centre stage in working with security personnel, an indication that the camp was taking revelations of threats on Mugabe seriously.

(*NewsDay*, 5 December 2014)

This exposes the *NewsDay*'s anti-Mujuru editorial plot especially when it proceeded to regurgitate claims that "Mujuru and her allies have been linked to a plot to assassinate President Robert Mugabe". One would have expected the *NewsDay* to interrogate Mugabe's claims that Mujuru plotted to assassinate him than simply repeat the allegations without evidence. Further, it is incomprehensible why the *NewsDay* chose to derive a front-page news story from reporter's observations when congress was – as it later did – going to pronounce itself on Mujuru's fate. It is suggestive that the newspaper was editorially fervent to see Mujuru dismissed from ZANU-PF and exposes its corrupted narratives. Earlier, in a front-page article, "It's not yet game over for Mujuru" (26 October 2014), the *NewsDay* suggested Mujuru's "political career seems to be hanging by the thread" after Grace Mugabe attacked the vice president on seemingly trumped up charges of extortion and incompetence. The *NewsDay* quotes Grace Mugabe showering Mnangagwa with praises saying he "was voted by eight provinces to be VP but agreed to step down to allow Mujuru to take over when he had been voted by all provinces". This was in reference to the ZANU-PF 2004 provincial elections won by Mnangagwa but Mugabe blocked his ascendancy and appointed Mujuru to vice presidency under the guise of women empowerment. The article implied that contrary to Mnangagwa, Mujuru was power hungry. It also cites Grace Mugabe imploring Mujuru to resign – "It is not good to be fired. It would be better if Mai Mujuru resigns today than wait to be fired by President Mugabe".

Further, the *NewsDay* attempted to deconstruct narratives on Mujuru's contribution to Zimbabwe's liberation struggle when the newspaper suggested, "Her claim to fame, despite having been one of the first women commanders during the liberation struggle, was that she downed a plane. Mnangagwa's loyalists, however, dismissed the claim as propaganda". The newspaper also appeared to suggest Joice Mujuru would have been a political midget had she not been married "to a decorated war commander Solomon Mujuru who perished in an inferno at his Beatrice farm in August 2011". There seem to be a sustained editorial effort by the

NewsDay at editorially annihilating Mujuru especially towards the elective ZANU-PF December 2014 congress by deconstructing her participation in Zimbabwe’s liberation war as a means to discount her from the presidential race. Such a narration by the *NewsDay* naturally benefitted Mujuru’s rival, Emmerson Mnangagwa of the Team Lacoste faction. The tendency to rewrite history in order to deconstruct rivals’ participation in Zimbabwe’s liberation war is not a new phenomenon in ZANU-PF. Hero status – which derives from contribution in Zimbabwe’s liberation war – is habitually weaponised especially during factional instabilities to discredit perceived opponents (Mpofu, 2016; Masiya and Maringira, 2017). The *NewsDay* further generated other headlines that appeared designed at dispositioning Mujuru from the presidency through deliberate character assassination as illustrated in the stories tabled below (Table 7.3).

Table 7. 3.: Catalogue of NewsDay’s anti-Mujuru news headlines

Date	Story headline	Page
14 February 2014	Mugabe disqualifies Mujuru, Mnangagwa	Front
11 February 2014	VP Mujuru torches storm	Front
17 October 2014	Dump Mujuru, Grace tells Mugabe	Front
21 October 2014	Mujuru faction regroups	Front
23 October 2014	Mujuru must resign	Front
24 October 2014	MDC-T formed in Mujuru house	Front
24 October 2014	Mujuru’s US ties behind fall out with Mugabe	Front
26 October 2014	Mujuru after my life	Front
31 October 2014	Mujuru faction fired in Masvingo	Front
18 November 2014	I have evidence against Mujuru: Grace Mugabe	Front
29 November 2014	ZANU-PF congress to seal Mujuru, allies fate	Front
03 December 2014	Mugabe blasts Mujuru	Front
04 December 2014	Mujuru a thief, says Mugabe	Front
04 December 2014	Mujuru consulted N’angas	Front
5 December 2014	Its game over for VP Mujuru	Front
19 December 2014	Real reason behind Mujuru ouster	Front
03 April 2015	ZANU-PF fires Mujuru	Front
27 July 2015	ZANU-PF land barons funded Mujuru	Front

The headline, “Mujuru a thief, says Mugabe” was generated from President Mugabe’s speech at the ZANU-PF December 2014 congress. The single sourced story deploying such phrases as “under fire Vice President Joice Mujuru”, regurgitated unsubstantiated claims by Mugabe that the vice president looted Zimbabwe’s diamonds and gold for personal enrichment – which allegations had been raised by Grace Mugabe weeks before. The article further reiterated claims that Mujuru plotted to kill Mugabe and takeover power quoting Mugabe alleging, “Wanting a post should not lead someone into plotting to kill”. The story is not only factional but is a display of “lazy journalism” – where journalists merely regurgitate serious allegations against Mujuru fully aware of the political contestations around their pronouncements and in violation of journalism ethics. There is no effort by the *NewsDay* at triangulating news sourcing to rid reports of intentional bias. The newspaper simply parroted a one sided narrative devoid of impartiality and factuality with journalists reduced to speech summarisers. Another front-page news story, “Mujuru consulted n’angas”, again generated from Mugabe’s 2014 congress speech, claimed the then vice president attempted to kill Mugabe through witchcraft – framing Mujuru as evil and desperate to succeed Mugabe. It is single sourced and fails to follow basic newsgathering and reporting principles earlier highlighted. The *NewsDay* quotes Mugabe alleging:

One of the n’ angas said look for two river beetles of different colours. One should be named Mugabe and the other should be called Mujuru and put them in water. That’ s what happened. They were made to fight and if Mugabe’ s beetle dies, then she will rule. How, if mine won against yours . . . It seems that is what happened then.

(*NewsDay*, 4 December 2014)

These unproved allegations technically project Mujuru as primordial and a witch not worth the presidency. It is arguable that the *NewsDay* was not under an obligation from a moral and even political economy of the media perspective to sanitize through publication as headline “news” Mugabe’s allegations against Mujuru, which seemed calculated at soiling her image as a presidential aspirant.

7.5 The *NewsDay*’s anti-G40 and pro-Mnangagwa editorial configuration

The *NewsDay* editorially adopted Mnangagwa’s Team Lacoste faction in its reportage of ZANU-PF factionalism in the post Joice Mujuru epoch. The newspaper suggestively generated news headline biased in favour of Mnangagwa succeeding Mugabe over the Grace Mugabe aligned G40 faction. The *NewsDay* attained this goal by giving saliency to news articles

positioning Mnangagwa as Mugabe's successor. It also deployed biased news sourcing techniques, which granted the Mnangagwa faction more platform for expression than the G40, and deliberately generated news that delegitimised the G40 through scandalization of its members as corrupt and violent without evidence to buttress its allegations.

In a headline story, "Mnangagwa ignores G40, continues on charm offensive" (28 September 2015), the *NewsDay* implies that the then vice president was earning more admirers than detractors in the race to succeed Mugabe. The article read in part:

Acting President Emmerson Mnangagwa has publicly ignored attacks by members of a ZANU-PF faction known as the G40 and continued on a charm offensive that has won him admirers and sympathisers in the battle to succeed President Robert Mugabe.

(*NewsDay*, 28 September 2015)

The statement above suggests that Mnangagwa was gaining more support within ZANU-PF to succeed Mugabe. This implied the G40 was losing followership. The article further highlighted that Mnangagwa had "been on the receiving end of vitriolic attacks from the G40 members seeking to block his chances of succeeding Mugabe". To describe the G40's challenge on Mnangagwa as "vitriolic" implies the faction was of violent political disposition or simply uncouth as opposed to Mnangagwa whom the newspaper quotes in the story stating that the "country needed leaders of integrity". The *NewsDay* also accuses the G40 members of "seeking to block" Mnangagwa from succeeding Mugabe. The *NewsDay*'s usage of the word "block" exposes its bias in favour of Mnangagwa succeeding Mugabe – it pre-emptively suggests that Mnangagwa is destined for the presidency. The same story also describes Mnangagwa's silence despite attacks from the G40 as "a sign of political maturity" and this alternatively constructs the G40 as immature and consequently not "ripe" to succeed Mugabe.

Another news headline, "It's gloves off: Mnangagwa" (2 October 2017), describes the G40 as "Johnny-come-latelies" and indicated the vice president had declared a "bare-knuckle fight against rivals who had "lately turned him into a political punch bag". Deployment of the phrase "Johnny-come -latelies" by the *NewsDay* seems a reminder to the G40 – whose members comprised largely of non-ex-combatants referred as "Young Turks" - that the Mnangagwa faction was a grouping of politicians who formed ZANU-PF and are the party's stockholders. The Collins dictionary describes Johnny-come lately as "a person who becomes involved in an activity or organisation after it has already started and who is therefore less reliable or experienced than the people who have been involved since the beginning". In short, "Johnny-

come latelies” means a novice or newcomer. In the history of ZANU-PF and in the context of its factional battles, describing the G40 as novices or new recruits is meant to elbow them out of the duel to succeed Mugabe through a gentle reminder – “you were not there when we formed this party”. This is confirmed by Mnangagwa when the *NewsDay* quoted him declaring, “Those who joined the journey midway now think the journey is theirs, yet it’s not and will never be”. Further, for the *NewsDay* to suggest that the G40 “had lately turned Mnangagwa into a political punch bag” is to emphasize on his political tolerance in the face of hostility and this qualifies him for the presidency as a stable-minded leader. The *NewsDay* also dismissed Mnangagwa’s rivals as “detractors in the G40 led by First Lady Grace Mugabe” who “have no liberation war credentials”. The *NewsDay*’s emphasis on the G40 lacking liberation war credentials seemed aimed at disqualifying the group from the presidency since participation in the war that earned Zimbabwe independence is not only revered in ZANU-PF but is also used as a benchmark for leadership positions in the party.

The *NewsDay*’s editorial endorsement of Mnangagwa even manifested soon after his inauguration following a coup that toppled Robert Mugabe through the headline, “G40 embraces Mnangagwa” (25 November 2017). The story globalises reactions by two G40 politicians – Water Mzembe and Makhosini Hlongwane – to Mnangagwa’s takeover of the presidency giving an impression that all members of that faction had accepted the transition from Mugabe to his former deputy. The headline itself is crafted in a manner that sets the agenda for Zimbabweans to accept his presidency – as if to say even Mnangagwa’s ardent rivals in the G40 had unproblematically accepted his rule. According to the Cambridge dictionary, to “embrace” “is to accept something enthusiastically” while for the Merriam-Webster dictionary it implies “a happy acceptance”. The *NewsDay* quotes Hlongwane describing Mnangagwa’s ascendancy to the presidency as “historic” transition “done in a peaceful atmosphere”. This was despite the fact that Mnangagwa was a beneficiary of a military coup, which the *NewsDay* preferred to call “a peaceful transition”.

Even after Mnangagwa had been sworn in as Zimbabwean president, the *NewsDay*’s editorial support for his leadership continued. In a news headline “G40 wanted Mnangagwa dead: Mutsvangwa” (7 December 2017), the *NewsDay* deploys the sympathy frame in its bid to earn public endorsement for Mnangagwa’s leadership. The article quotes war veterans’ leader Christopher Mutsvangwa claiming, “the G40 cabal was hard on the heels of President Emmerson Mnangagwa and could have killed him”. The newspaper presented Mnangagwa as a victim whereas the G40 faction is constructed as murderous – with Mutsvangwa quoted

claiming, “Had it not been for the swift reaction from the security at the border, he could have been killed”. Mnangagwa escaped the country through the Zimbabwe-Mozambique border (Forbes) soon after Mugabe had dismissed him from ZANU-PF and the vice presidency.

The *NewsDay*'s pro-Mnangagwa editorial alignment also manifests in its negative construction of his G40 rivals mainly Kasukuwere and Jonathan Moyo, considered the faction's honchos. The newspaper generated a number of negative headlines on Kasukuwere including, “Kasukuwere on tenterhooks”, “Kasukuwere on the ropes”, “ZANU-PF youths dump Kasukuwere”, “Kasukuwere, Mafios woes mount”, “Mugabe roasts Kasukuwere”, “Mugabe's pre-emptive strike saves Kasukuwere” and “Army arrests G40 ‘criminals’”. In the story, “Kasukuwere on tenterhooks”, the *NewsDay* creates an impression that the then ZANU-PF national political commissar was facing an abrupt end to his political career. “Tenter”, according to Merriam-Webster dictionary, refers to “a frame used for drying and stretching cloth”. The *NewsDay* went on to publish more front page stories ‘Kasukuwere on the ropes as “ZANU-PF infighting intensifies”, Kasukuwere on the ropes” and “Kasukuwere, Mafios woes mount” as if to emphasize that the G40 had been vanquished. Such an editorial construction implies that Mnangagwa faction had prevailed over its G40 nemesis. It also narrows the G40 to Kasukuwere and globalises his individual political predicaments to imply disaster for the whole faction. The news headline “ZANU-PF youths dump Kasukuwere” also implied that the politician's career in the ruling party was on the brink of collapse through usage of such words as “the beleaguered national political commissar”. It is also a story derived from nameless ZANU-PF sources quoted claiming that the ZANU-PF youth league – a powerful ruling party organ – had “effectively turned its back on Kasukuwere” and the politician's position was “now untenable because the decision to get rid of him has support from the very top of the party”. The *NewsDay* further attempts to set an agenda for Kasukuwere's dismissal from ZANU-PF when it alleged the politician “seemed to have inherited the remnants of Mujuru's structures that were left in the party”.

That the *NewsDay* did not afford Kasukuwere the right to respond to the allegations exposes the agenda the newspaper was setting. In a politically charged environment dominated by factional wars, it was only professional and ethical for the *NewsDay* to seek Kasukuwere's comment considering the seriousness of the charges raised by the newspaper which claimed the politician sought to topple Mugabe from power through creation of parallel ZANU-PF structures. The story also seemed calculated at creating a crevice between Kasukuwere and Mugabe. This agenda is sustained in another front-page story, “Mugabe raps Kasukuwere”.

The article claimed Mugabe left Kasukuwere with an “egg on his face” after the ZANU-PF leader accused the party’s national commissar of fanning factionalism. The report is generated from nameless sources and accused Kasukuwere of “coaching” ZANU-PF provincial chairpersons to claim victimisation by Vice President Mnangagwa. In accusing Kasukuwere of “coaching” provincial chairpersons, the article depicts the politician as deceitful and lacking principles expected of a national political commissar whose mandate is mobilising support for the party. Throughout its reportage on Kasukuwere, the *NewsDay* sustainably deployed negative frames in a manner that attempts to generate adverse repercussions for the G40 as a faction.

The *NewsDay*’s pro-Mnangagwa editorial configuration manifested right up to the point when Mugabe was removed from the power through a military coup. The newspaper suggestively avoided referring to the circumstances leading to Robert Mugabe’s forceful removal from power, as a coup. A headline story published as the coup was unfolding headlined, “Army arrests G40 criminals”, announced that Jonathan Moyo and Saviour Kasukuwere “the brains behind the G40 faction were yesterday fished out from President Robert Mugabe’s Borrowdale mansion where they sought sanctuary and handed over to the military”. The tone is celebratory. The *NewsDay*’s casual reportage of the coup – which benefitted Mnangagwa – exposed its indulgence in ZANU-PF factionalism especially its failure to recognise it as a coup and to condemn the unconstitutional removal of Mugabe from power.

The ZDF insisted that their action was not a military takeover of government adding the President was still safe and in charge, although they were reports that Mugabe and his wife First Lady Grace Mugabe were under house arrest.

(*NewsDay*, 16 November 2017)

A news headline, “Chiwenga takes aim at G40”, appeared to set an agenda at delegitimising another G40 kingpin, Jonathan Moyo. Whereas the article derived from a press statement by the then Zimbabwe Defence Forces Commander General Constantino Chiwenga warning the G40 against destroying ZANU-PF from within, it is reduced to an attack on Jonathan Moyo when it claims ‘Moyo is also accused of having deserted the (liberation) war to pursue his studies in the United States’. Giving saliency to claims that Moyo deserted Zimbabwe’s liberation war is designed to delegitimise his political standing in ZANU-PF and ultimately elbow the faction he belonged from the presidential race as lacking in patriotic history. Another *NewsDay* headline, “Jonathan Moyo, political turncoat par-excellence...would be kingmaker

that never was”, also emphasized on Moyo as “war deserter” by declaring, “Moyo was educated in the United States after abandoning a bid to join the liberation struggle...before returning to independent Zimbabwe to teach at the University of Zimbabwe”.

Adoption of such news reporting practices by the *NewsDay* exposed its factional configuration as the allegations were not verified with Moyo. This suggests that the agenda from the onset was to ostracise Moyo. The *NewsDay* further quotes Chiwenga declaring that “those who did not make it to Zimbabwe were the real fighters and some of the celebrated cowards who only saw the border when going into Mozambique and coming back at independence and never during combat, they are now claiming the glory”. Reference to one’s participation in Zimbabwe’s liberation war is a yardstick in ZANU-PF determining their political value especially when it relates to apportionment of leadership positions. The *NewsDay*’s attempt at scandalising and delegitimising Moyo is reinforced when the newspaper accused the politician of trying to destroy ZANU-PF from within claiming, “he (Moyo) came within a whisker of fulfilling this prediction two weeks ago before everything crumbled like a deck of cards and with it Mugabe’s 37-year brutal rule”. What emerges from this story is an effort by the *NewsDay* at delegitimising the G40 as a viable option to succeed Mugabe by attacking its pillars – Jonathan Moyo and Saviour Kasukuwere – through prejudiced news sourcing. Chiwenga was a known Mnangagwa ally when he made the remarks and the obligation was on the *NewsDay* to grant the G40 a platform for reaction to the allegations, which the newspaper failed to grant.

This attempt by the *NewsDay* at raiding liberation war history to delegitimise the G40 manifested again in a headline, “Charamba, Moyo clash” in which the former accused the latter of being a Johnny-come-lately when he dismissed the G40 members as “little men with absolutely no iota of history behind them thinking they can one day emerge as leaders of this country”. Charamba – then Mugabe’s spokesperson and secretary for information in government – was reportedly aligned to the Mnangagwa faction when he made the remarks. Running a news story wholly reliant on Charamba as its main source when fully cognisant of his factional configuration suggests that the *NewsDay* was bent on generating a story advancing the aspirations of the Mnangagwa faction. It is largely so especially when members of the rival G40 faction were tactically silenced through clichés, “efforts to get a comment from the G40 were fruitless” – often a justification for generating a biased news article by journalists. The *NewsDay*’s opinionated article, “G40, a faction at the deep” (4 November 2016) inferred that Jonathan Moyo was on the cusp of political destruction after the politician faced allegations of

corruption involving state funds. The article appeared to motivate Mugabe to punish Moyo and challenged the veteran leader to use the case to demonstrate his government's intolerance of corruption. The story read in part:

Indeed, for several years, Mugabe has not dealt with corruption adequately if at all. But the stakes are different now. His most senior army generals have stated that corruption has become a national security threat...But Mugabe is not foolish, neither is his security personnel.

(*NewsDay*, 4 November 2016)

Whereas in journalism opinion pieces are dominated by reporter thoughts on any particular issue, suggesting that Zimbabwe was facing a security threat owing Moyo's alleged involvement in yet to be proven corruption allegations, only exposes the extent the *NewsDay* may have been editorially partaking in ZANU-PF factionalism on the side of Mnangagwa's Team Lacoste. This is largely so as the G40 is reduced to Moyo – just as with Kasukuwere's case earlier illustrated – when in fact it was a faction involving many politicians including Grace Mugabe. Further, it is also significant to note that generally, corruption was endemic in Robert Mugabe's ZANU-PF government and if anything, the veteran leader tolerated graft as a political survival strategy (Mpofu, 2016). By vigorously campaigning for Moyo's punishment, the *NewsDay* may have unduly exposed its factional alignment. That is not to condone corruption but rather red flagging the weaponisation of corruption in editorials generated by the *NewsDay* as in this particular case, which also reflected in *The Herald's* reportage on Joice Mujuru towards the ZANU-PF 2014 congress illustrated in the previous section. The paragraph extracted from the *NewsDay's* opinionated article exposes the extent the newspaper indulged in ZANU-PF factionalism albeit on Mnangagwa's side.

For the G40, the Young Turks, these are murky waters. They toppled former Vice President Joice Mujuru without much trouble, much drama. But they have reached tipping point. They are at the deep end, drowning...Be it tomorrow or some other day, they will sit on the table again. Except, this time, they will be not plotting against anyone, they will be sharing a meal, in a maximum-security prison.

(*NewsDay*, 4 November 2016).

This attempt at presenting the G40 as a composition of corrupt politicians also manifests in another *NewsDay* front page news article, "G40 on the receiving end" (6 November 2016),

which suggested that the faction “was in a tight corner and battling to survive, amid reports that more of its members have been targeted for investigation by the Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission”. While this article engages analysts on why the corruption purge seemed targeting only G40 politicians and sparing Mnangagwa’s Team Lacoste faction, it still fortifies the notion that the former were corrupt as it is given saliency through placement on front page, and fails to engage those accused of malfeasance in line with the journalism principle of right of reply.

An opinionated article, “All things come to an end, even if you are Jonathan Moyo” (20 October 2016), also constructs the G40 kingpin Moyo as an incorrigibly corrupt politician claiming, “media house after media houses has exposed his hand in corrupt deals”.

We are told it is just the start. More is on the way. Pandora’s box has just been opened. The lid has been blown off. That might even need rephrasing too. It’s not just a Pandora’s box, it’s Pandora’s entire cargo of boxes! And they stink to...He went around town gun-toting like a cowboy, picking pockets of State coffers like a hoodlum.

(*NewsDay*, 20 October 2016)

The paragraph above depicts Moyo – and by extension the G40 – as unfit to succeed Mugabe with the *NewsDay* even equating the politician to hoodlum. The Merriam-Webster dictionary defines a hoodlum as “a usually violent criminal”. This suggests that the *NewsDay* had convicted Moyo even before the courts of law had pronounced its verdict on his case. The *NewsDay* failed to treat the charges Moyo faced as mere allegations and it seems the newspaper was motivated by its anti-G40 and pro-Mnangagwa editorial alignment, which bias was confirmed by its reporters in the previous chapter. The table below Table 7.4) depicts some of the anti-G40 headlines generated by the *NewsDay*. A pattern emerges where the newspaper editorially delegitimises the G40 for the benefit of Mnangagwa’s Team Lacoste faction – this exposes the extent journalism became factionalised. Newspapers adopted factions and packaged factional interests as news.

Table 7. 4:.. Some of NewsDay’s headlines on the G40-Team Lacoste fights

Date	Story headline	Page
12 May 2015	Kasukuwere on the ropes as ZANU-PF infighting intensifies	Front

28 September 2015	Mnangagwa ignores G40, continues on charm offensive	Front
29 January 2016	Charamba, Moyo clash over G40	Front
24 May 2016	Mugabe raps Kasukuwere	Front
08 August 2016	Chiwenga takes aim at 40	Front
20 October 2016	All things come to an end, even if you are Jonathan Moyo	Centre page
04 November 2016	G40, a faction at the deep end	Centre page
06 November 2016	G40 on the receiving end	Front
17 February 2017	Mugabe roasts Kasukuwere	Front
31 March 2017	Kasukuwere on the ropes	Front
05 April 2017	Kasukuwere, Mafios woes mount	Front
10 April 2017	Mugabe's pre-emptive strike saves Kasukuwere	Front
19 April 2017	ZANU-PF youths dump Kasukuwere	Front
23 June 2017	Kasukuwere on tenterhooks	Front
02 October 2017	It's gloves off: Mnangagwa	Front
16 November 2017	Army arrests G40 criminals	Front
25 November 2017	Jonathan Moyo, political turncoat par-excellence...would be kingmaker that never was	Front
25 November 2017	G40 embraces Mnangagwa	Front
07 December 2017	G40 wanted Mnangagwa dead	Front

7.6 Conclusion

The chapter demonstrated how ZANU-PF factionalism permeated the privately owned daily newspapers' newsroom corrupting narratives on Mugabe's succession. The stories analysed clearly revealed how the *Daily News* systematically pushed a pro-G40 faction agenda while denigrating its rival, Mnangagwa's Team Lacoste group. The *NewsDay* on the other hand, adopted the Mnangagwa Team Lacoste faction and editorially caricatured the G40. The newspapers, which by virtue of private ownership ought to have reported on ZANU-PF factionalism with prejudice, were bifurcated along factional lines in their narratives to the detriment of political journalism. The independent press played into Robert Mugabe's politics of division-ism through their adoption of either of the ZANU-PF factions further reinforcing

his rule - by default. Biased news sourcing was at the centre of the newspapers' factional orientation while in some instances like *The Herald* they resorted to regurgitating Robert Mugabe's spurious allegations against Mujuru and Mnangagwa without verifying their veracity oiling the veteran leader's political survival philosophy anchored on nurturing intraparty factionalism.

CHAPTER 8:

8.0 CONCLUSION

The study examined how Zimbabwe's daily newspapers – *The Herald*, *Daily News* and *NewsDay* reported on ZANU-PF factionalism during the period 2014 to 2017. *The Herald* is a government-controlled newspaper whereas the *Daily News* and *NewsDay* are privately owned. The study focused on the period 2014 to 2017 as it marked the peak of ZANU-PF factionalism evidenced by President Robert Mugabe's dismissal of Vice President Mujuru in the run up to the ruling party's December 2014 elective congress. It witnessed the elevation of Justice Minister Emmerson Mnangagwa to the vice presidency replacing Mujuru and the resurgence of factionalism in ZANU-PF featuring Mnangagwa's Team Lacoste faction against the First Lady Grace Mugabe aligned G40 over Mugabe's succession. The study also investigated the influence of ZANU-PF factionalism on news production routines (sourcing) at *The Herald*, *Daily News* and *NewsDay* while interrogating how Mugabeism shaped narratives on ZANU-PF factionalism in the daily press.

Guided by Mugabeism as its main theoretical lenses, the study accounted for how ZANU-PF factionalism permeated the Zimbabwean media and “factionalised” journalism. ‘Factionalisation’ of journalism in the context of this thesis infers adoption of either of the factions contending to succeed Mugabe by the press through various editorial shenanigans including biased news sourcing and denying a rival faction a platform for reaction and expression in the midst of editorial scandalisation. Whereas Mugabeism is a theory seeking a nuanced understanding of Robert Mugabe's political survival strategy, for the purposes of this study the concept was narrowed down to mean rule through division-ism. The Critical Political Economy of the media theory also guided the study insofar as it related to how media ownership determined news content at the newspapers. What emerged from the study suggested that besides media ownership determining editorial content, Mugabeism strongly influenced media narratives on ZANU-PF factionalism. *The Herald* has historically adopted a patriotic journalism editorial approach when reporting on ZANU-PF and Robert Mugabe by virtue of its political economy (ownership) whereas the *Daily News* and *NewsDay* are eminent for their oppositional journalism editorial disposition (Ranger, 2005, Ruhanya, 2014, Chibuwe, 2016).

Qualitative in its approach, data for the study was gathered through face-to-face in-depth interviews with political journalists at *The Herald*, *Daily News* and *NewsDay* and also via archival research. Stories on ZANU-PF factionalism generated by the daily newspapers were subjected to Critical Discourse Analysis Discourse Historical Approach to map emerging

discourses and how they betrayed the newspapers' factional alignment. Auto-ethnography was also utilised as a data collection technique as the researcher is a former journalist and news manager at *The Herald* and reflexively shared personal experiences insofar as they pertained to ZANU-PF factionalism and its implications on narratives on Mugabe's succession. Eight senior political journalists at *The Herald*, *Daily News* and *NewsDay* participated in the study, which generated rich and unique insights into the scourge of factionalised journalism in Zimbabwe. However, editors and some journalists refused to participate in the study considering its sensitivity. A discussion on ZANU-PF factionalism is a hot potato for many journalists especially at *The Herald*. For example, an editor for *The Herald* during the period covered by the study would agree to a face-to-face interview only to backtrack on the day it was scheduled without giving any reasons. On three different occasions, *The Herald* editor agreed to an interview only to disappear last minute without explanation. Instead they would encourage the researcher to persevere in his studies and constantly checked on progress registered. Another senior political reporter at *The Herald* also agreed to an interview with the researcher on condition questions were sent to him in advance but withdrew once the request was consummated. At the *Daily News* the researcher could not interview two journalists who had generated a number of articles on ZANU-PF factionalism – Gift Phiri and Lloyd Mbiba – died before consummation of the study. However, the researcher is convinced that data gathered from those interviewed generated new insights into how ZANU-PF factionalism shaped and structured news production process at *The Herald*, *Daily News* and *NewsDay*. Interviewed participants were responsible for the majority of news headlines on ZANU-PF factionalism published by the newspapers by virtue of their status as senior political journalists.

8.1 Corrupted to adopt factions

The study established that the privately-owned newspapers *Daily News* and *NewsDay* adopted either of the ZANU-PF factions contending to succeed Robert Mugabe in the run up to the ruling party's December 2014 elective congress at which event Joice Mujuru reportedly intended to challenge the veteran leader for the presidency. The *Daily News* adopted the Joice Mujuru faction whose agenda it steadily promoted through generation of news headlines that positioned her to succeed Mugabe or outrightly sympathised with her when under political persecution. The newspaper systematically generated stories that scandalised Emmerson Mnangagwa in a bid to delegitimise his presidential credentials. The *Daily News* also deliberately gathered news on ZANU-PF factionalism from sources aligned to the Joice Mujuru faction who gave them narratives that promoted her elevation to the presidency while

denouncing Mnangagwa and denying his faction a platform for reaction and expression in line with basic journalism principles exhorting impartiality and factuality. News sources shape narratives (Schlesinger, 1978; Manning, 2001) and the essence of good journalism is unbiased news sourcing.

A senior *Daily News* political reporter (Participant A) confirmed in Chapter 7 they editorially adopted the Mujuru faction and were materially rewarded for it when they revealed, “The influences (on reportage of ZANU-PF factionalism) also came in terms of relations for me. I have a small business in Marirangwe in Beatrice area where Mujuru hails...those relations came into play...those relations shaped how we reported on ZANU-PF factionalism”. The *Daily News* also opted to editorially support the Mujuru faction as they considered her a reformist as opposed to Mnangagwa whom the newspaper believed was an extension of Mugabe or chief enforcer of his radical policies.

The capture of *Daily News* journalists by ZANU-PF factions in a bid to influence narratives on Mugabe’s succession persisted even after Mujuru was dismissed from the party and government. The post-Mujuru ZANU-PF saw the emergence of Mnangagwa’s Team Lacoste faction which battled the Grace Mugabe aligned G40 for the presidency. The study established that journalists at the *Daily News* were again “bribed” by the G40 to promote the faction’s aspirations and this ultimately “factionalised” journalism. A journalist at *Daily News* claimed, “There were also financial incentives to it. The G40 would bring money for you to sustain their agenda...”. The *Daily News* editors aligned to the G40 also socialised journalists into advancing the G40’s interests through biased news sourcing and positive coverage of its politicians. Journalists became agents of factions bidding to succeed Mugabe and this manifested in stories they generated which exposed bias. This is clear evidence of how ZANU-PF factionalism permeated the newsroom and influenced the *Daily News*’ narratives on Mugabe succession. Corrupted journalists generated corrupted narratives on ZANU-PF factionalism serving the agenda of factions they aligned. Such editorial disposition compartmentalised journalism reflecting its factional orientation and enabling Robert Mugabe’s philosophy anchored on promotion of disharmony among factions contending to succeed him.

The same situation prevailed at the *NewsDay* as demonstrated in Chapter 7 with some journalists interviewed confirming that desperate ZANU-PF factions bribed journalists to influence narratives on Mugabe’s succession which positioned them for the presidency. A

senior *NewsDay* journalist (Participant C) narrated how they were offered a residential property by the G40 through Saviour Kasukuwere - then minister of local government - in a bid to influence the newspaper's narrative on ZANU-PF factionalism. The factionalism that played in ZANU-PF replicated itself in the *NewsDay* newsroom where journalists adopted rival factions and this manifested in the stories they generated. This is indicative of the influence of Mugabeism on news generation process as the model assumes Robert Mugabe's political survival ideology hinged on fissuring the party and nurturing disharmony. In adopting the Mnangagwa faction at the expense of the 40, the *NewsDay* just as the *Daily News* which promoted G40 narratives - enabled Robert Mugabe's politics of intraparty division-ism - which ensured his ZANU-PF rivals did not coalesce and remove him from power. In their factionalised reportage on Mugabe's succession, the *Daily News* and *NewsDay* were complicit in promoting disunity in ZANU-PF immortalising Robert Mugabe's rule. The ZANU-PF factional fissures also manifested in the *NewsDay* newsroom with disastrous consequences for political journalism. This state of affairs was captured by a *NewsDay* journalist (Participant C) in Chapter 7 when they revealed, "Key factional elements within ZANU-PF sought of captured journalists. The newsroom was deeply divided along factional lines...Journalism was factionalised to an extent journalists became actors in ZANU-PF factional fights".

8.2 Mugabe's editorial 'paratroopers'

The study also established that Robert Mugabe influenced media narratives on ZANU-PF factionalism through public rhetoric. This was largely evident at *The Herald* where journalists were "forced" - through socialisation and editorial policy - to regurgitate Mugabe's remarks on ZANU-PF factionalism without verifying the veracity of allegations he raised against allies suspected of harbouring presidential ambitions. This explains why in the run up to the ZANU-PF December 2014 elective congress, *The Herald* generated scandalous news headlines on Mujuru deriving from Mugabe's remarks at political gatherings without verifying not only their authenticity but at times their logic. In one such story, "President on assassination: Mujuru engaged MDC, N'angas" (4 December 2014) citing Mugabe as its sole source, *The Herald* accused Joice Mujuru of having attempted to kill the veteran leader through witchcraft while in "Mujuru sordid deals revealed" (24 October 2014) he attributed Zimbabwe's economic collapse to looting of its vast diamond deposits by the vice president (Mujuru) and her late husband, Solomon Mujuru.

The allegations against Mujuru seemed banal considering the timing Mugabe raised them - the run up to ZANU-PF December 2014 elective congress. It would seem the allegations were

crafted and trumpeted to discount Mujuru from the presidency. Journalists were made to regurgitate these allegations without second thought as, “A protocol within *The Herald* is that you write whatever Mugabe says...It was a culture that was there” (Participant E as captured in Chapter 8). Such editorial complications and limitations “factionalised” journalism by only promoting Mugabe’s narratives while denying rival narratives expression. *The Herald* as a public sphere supposedly accessible to the rank and file in ZANU-PF courtesy of its political economy, became a closed platform inaccessible to other presidential aspirants as Mujuru and later Mnangagwa. The voices that only found expression were those supportive of Mugabe’s continued stay in power. *The Herald* also regurgitated Grace Mugabe’s remarks against Mujuru and Mnangagwa accused of angling for the presidency further tilting narratives in Mugabe’s favour. Such an editorial disposition had the effect of factionalising journalism as it allowed only a pro-Mugabe narrative when *The Herald* reported on ZANU-PF factionalism. Journalists were denied agency and forced to parrot Mugabe’s one-sided narratives without the benefit of source triangulation to rid news reports of bias.

It is significant to note that inasmuch as Mugabe cunningly influenced narratives on his succession at *The Herald* through rhetoric and reshuffling ministers of information under whose purview the newspaper fell, in some instances journalists out of own volition generated narratives legitimating his rule and delegitimising his rivals. The newspaper achieved this mainly through the editorial commentary - a section in the newspaper declaring its position on contemporary issues of interest to the public. Editorial commentary reflects the mind of the newspaper on crucial issues and Mugabe’s succession topped as one such burning national issue. *The Herald*’s editorial commentary exposed the newspaper’s position on Mugabe’s succession saga as captured exemplified in Chapter 8 in “Mujuru, a dwarf in giant robes”. The tone of the commentary is suggestive of the extent journalists at *The Herald* appeared to have been socialised into factionalised journalism to ensure generation of discourses supportive of Mugabe’s reign.

8.3 Future gaze on the media and intra-party factionalism

Whereas existing scholarship on the media and ZANU-PF factionalism is limited to how *The Herald* reported on Mugabe’s jettisoning of Mujuru (Maodza, 2017) and how another state controlled newspaper *Chronicle* constructed Mugabe’s succession matrix (Chuma et al, 2020), this study demonstrated the implications of Mugabeism on political journalism in Zimbabwe. Further, the study illustrated how ZANU-PF factionalism witnessed in the period 2014 to 2017 - ranking as debatably the most fractitious in its history after independence - permeated state

and non-state controlled newsrooms leading to what the researcher terms the “factionalisation of journalism”. Factionalisation of journalism intimates adoption - willing or unwilling, consciously or subconsciously, of a rival faction in a political party suffering factionalism and advancing its interests offending the basic tenets of professional journalism exhorting factuality and impartiality in news reportage.

Future studies on ZANU-PF factionalism and the media may examine the implications of ruling party fissures on the broadcast and digital media in Zimbabwe. This is especially so as existing scholarship (Maodza, 2017; Chuma et al 2020) seem confined to interrogating how newspapers reported on Robert Mugabe’s succession paying little or no attention at all on how other media platforms navigated the same. Future studies may also adopt a longitudinal approach by tracing the implications of ZANU-PF factionalism on the media since independence. ZANU-PF has always suffered factionalism spurred by disagreements over leadership positions and such misunderstanding always spiraled into newsrooms and distorted news production process and editorial narratives. Factionalism was endemic in ZANU-PF as it was Robert Mugabe political survival philosophy but there was scarcity of scholarship examining its implications on political journalism.

While this study compliments existing literature on ZANU-PF factionalism and the media albeit through different theoretical lenses, future studies may globalise research into intra-party factionalism and the media by interrogating the implications of factionalism within Zimbabwe’s main opposition political parties as MDC and lately CCC on the press. How the state controlled media as Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation and Zimpapers stable of newspapers reported on factionalism in opposition political parties may generate new perspectives on the media and intraparty factionalism. Equally, exploring the implications of opposition party factionalism on the privately owned media in Zimbabwe may generate rich insights into scholarship on the factionalisation of journalism. Such studies maybe timely especially considering how intraparty factionalism is dominating Zimbabwean polity. Zimbabwe’s main opposition party since independence in 1980, the MDC experienced a bout of factionalism and disintegration, which attracted significant media coverage. However, studies specifically focused on the media and factionalism within opposition political parties seem embryonic if any.

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