

**A CHRISTIAN ETHICAL APPROACH TO ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION:  
AN ALTERNATIVE TO SAMIR AMIN'S HUMANISM AND HANS KÜNG'S  
GLOBAL ETHIC AND ITS IMPLICATIONS IN THE BURUNDIAN CONTEXT.**

**By NTIBAGIRIRWA Symphorien**

**Dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirement  
for the degree of Masters of Theology (field of Economic Ethics) in the Faculty of  
Human and Social Studies, University of Natal**


**Supervisor: Prof. Klaus NÜRNBERGER (University of Natal)**

**Pietermaritzburg 2001**

## **CERTIFICATION**

**This is to certify that the dissertation A CHRISTIAN ETHICAL APPROACH TO ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION: AN ALTERNATIVE TO SAMIR AMIN'S HUMANISM AND HANS KÜNG'S GLOBAL ETHIC AND ITS IMPLICATIONS IN THE BURUNDIAN CONTEXT, submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of a Masters degree in Theology (field of Economic Ethics) is my original research and has never been submitted to any other university.**

**Date: 31/03/2001**

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'NTIBAGIRIRWA Symphorien', is written over a horizontal dotted line.

**NTIBAGIRIRWA Symphorien**

**University of Natal**

**Faculty of Human and Social Studies**

## **ABSTRACT**

Economic globalization is a relatively recent phenomenon which has become familiar nowadays both in theory and practice. By definition, economic globalization is a transnational phenomenon characteristic of the post-industrial era and whose driving forces are respectively the recent technological innovations (as its engine), media of communication (information technology) as its facilitator, and political liberalism as its underlying political ideology, particularly after the collapse of doctrinaire socialism and the disintegration of the Soviet Union and its satellites.

The phenomenon of economic globalization is ambiguous. It is a symbol of promise for some, yet a symbol of threat and alienation for others. It has both positive and negative effects. In effect, we can appreciate the dividends of economic globalization as they are evident in the growth of international trade, a tendency to universalize liberal democracy as a result of the failure of socialism and its command economy, an apparent international solidarity, economic prosperity as well as the triumph of the market economy. On the negative side, we cannot be blind to the obvious growing marginalization of the poor countries and the poor within countries, the demise of the nation-state coupled with social and political instability, inequality and social injustices between and within countries, ecological degradation and moral decadence due to blind interests in the market and maximization of profit. However, the negative effects seem to weigh more than the positive ones. This raises the question of how to respond to economic globalization.

Two responses are analysed and critiqued in this dissertation. The first response, that of Samir Amin, comes from a Neo-Marxist perspective. Amin suggests a reversal of economic globalization altogether. This reversal consists in the reconsideration of the international socialism whereby each state should be allowed to negotiate the terms of interdependence with other states (poly-centrism). The second response is that of Hans Küng, who suggests a global ethic that could give economic globalization a human face. This economy with a human face is an “Aristotelian mean” economy; a kind of economy which is between the welfare state and neo-capitalism. The content of this global ethic supposed to underlie this economy is a set of values drawn from most of the religious traditions of the world.

My contention is that neither Amin's international socialism nor K  ng's global ethic constitute a satisfactory challenge to the power of the market and profit that are the main motive of economic globalization. Amin's international socialism is unrealistic and unreliable, particularly in this time when Marxist socialism has failed economically and has shown itself unpopular and unhelpful in practice. K  ng's idea of global ethic is a powerful suggestion. Nevertheless it lacks a conceptual foundation which would redeem it from the risk of being a mere ethical contract. This conceptual framework should be an alternative to that of the Smithian *homo oeconomicus* that informs today's economy.

The present economic order evolves around the neoclassical narrow understanding of the human being as *homo oeconomicus*. Thus, if we are to provide an ethic for the phenomenon of economic globalization, we have to build it on a concept that goes beyond the economic man. Such a concept should be an answer to the following double question: What/who are we, and how should we live given what/who we are? The concept that seems to best answer these questions is the concept of *imago Dei as relational*, central to the Judeo-Christian anthropology.

The social, political and ecological implications of *imago Dei as relational* should help us to reconstruct the human community as the context of moral values, empower the state as the natural society that can work in partnership with the Church as the family of God, and finally consider those values that can help us to consider the environment as something that is not at the disposal of human domination and overexploitation.

The ethic of *imago Dei as relational* is applied to the Burundian context as its testing ground. With the ethic of *imago Dei as relational*, the growth of the international trade should benefit the poor instead of marginalizing them, political liberalism would not lead to disorder which the profit seekers exploit to the detriment of the state, solidarity would imply equality and social justice as well as environmental care, and moral values would recover their priority over market judgment in which everything is referred to in terms of commodity. The implications of such an ordering are the following: the humanization of foreign aid and humanitarian service, the orientation of economic investment towards human promotion and not only for profit, a shift from self-enrichment minded political leadership to a leadership open to socio-economic empowerment of the poor as well as environmental care.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

<b>TITLE PAGE.....</b>	<b>i</b>
<b>CERTIFICATION.....</b>	<b>ii</b>
<b>ABSTRACT.....</b>	<b>iii</b>
<b>TABLE OF CONTENTS.....</b>	<b>iv</b>
<b>TABLES.....</b>	<b>xi</b>
<b>FIGURES.....</b>	<b>xii</b>
<b>ABBREVIATIONS.....</b>	<b>xiii</b>

## **CHAP I. GENERAL INTRODUCTION . . . . . 1**

1. 1. The issue at stake. . . . .	2
1. 2. Originality of the topic and other works in the same field . . . . .	4
1. 3. Problem formulation and analysis . . . . .	5
1.3.1. The central problem . . . . .	5
1.3.2. The sub-problems surrounding the major problem . . . . .	6
1.3.2.1. The concept of economic globalization . . . . .	6
1.3.2.2. What are the consequences of economic globalization, especially for poor countries. . . . .	6
1.3.2.3. Responding to economic globalization . . . . .	7
1.3.2.4. What alternative can we provide to Amin and Küng's responses . . . . .	8
1.3.2.5. Contextualization of the ethic of <i>imago Dei</i> . . . . .	9
1.3.3. Hypotheses for the above problem and its sub-problems . . . . .	10
1.3.3.1. The hypothesis for the main problem . . . . .	10
1.3.3.2. The hypothesis of the first sub-problem . . . . .	10
1.3.3.3. The hypothesis for the second sub-problem . . . . .	11
1.3.3.4. The hypothesis for the third sub-problem . . . . .	11
1.3.3.5. The hypothesis for the fifth sub-problem . . . . .	11
1.3.3.6. The hypothesis for the sixth sub-problem . . . . .	12
1. 4. Procedure . . . . .	12
1.4.1. Scope . . . . .	12

1.4.2. Assumptions to be made in my research . . . . .	13
1.4.3. Methodology . . . . .	14

## **CHAP II. THE NATURE OF ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION . . . . . 17**

2.1. The concept of economic globalization . . . . .	18
2.1.1. Introduction . . . . .	18
2.1.2. What is economic globalization? . . . . .	19
2.2. Technological innovations as the engine of economic globalization . . . . .	25
2.2.1. The minimization of geographical and time factors . . . . .	29
2.2.2. Increasing productivity requires enlargement of markets . . . . .	30
2.2.3. From material production to information-processing activities. . . . .	30
2.2.4. Displacement and retrenchment of workers . . . . .	31
2.2.5. Flexibility and decentralization in production and management . . . . .	32
2.2.6. From a structural position of exploitation to a structural position of irrelevance . . . . .	32
2.2.7. The Fourth World's reaction to the technology led globalization . . . . .	34
2.3. Media of communication as the facilitator of economic globalization . . . . .	36
2.3.1. Transportation . . . . .	37
2.3.2. Wire communication and coaxial cable . . . . .	37
2.3.3. Wireless broadcasting . . . . .	38
2.3.4. Earth satellites . . . . .	38
2.3.5. Fibre optic cable . . . . .	38
2.4. Liberal democracy as the politics of economic globalization. . . . .	40
2.4.1. Democratisation and economic reforms in Sub-Saharan Africa . . . . .	40
2.4.2. Link between democratisation and economic globalization. . . . .	45
2.4. Conclusion. . . . .	47

<b>CHAP III. CONSEQUENCES OF ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION . . . . .</b>	<b>49</b>
3.0. Introduction . . . . .	50
3.1. Growth of international trade and economic marginalization of poor countries . . . . .	51
3.1.1. Facts about the growth of international trade and marginalization of poor countries . . . . .	52
3.1.2. “Attempts” to integrate poor countries in the world trade . . . . .	59
3.1.3. Lack of technology as a handicap for the participation in international trade . . . . .	63
3.2. Universalization of political liberalism, yet the demise of the nation state and political instability . . . . .	64
3.2.2. The state instability in the process of economic and political liberalization . . . . .	71
3.2.3. The Sub-Saharan African State in the process of economic and political liberalization . . . . .	73
3.3. International solidarity, world inequality and social injustices. . . . .	75
3.3.1. Economic liberalization as the economic system in the global village . . . . .	75
3.3.2. Political liberalism and the idea of global village . . . . .	80
3.4. Undermining the environment to save economic prosperity . . . . .	82
3.4.1. Depletion of renewable and non-renewable resources . . . . .	82
3.4.2. Pollution . . . . .	84
3.5. Triumph of market and moral decadence . . . . .	87
3.5.1. Our spiritual value is undermined . . . . .	88
3.5. 2. The market and profit supposed to lead humanity to the universal well-being is morally empty. . . . .	89
3.5.3. Individualism and moral relativism . . . . .	90
3.5.4. Equality of opportunity as a moral purpose of liberalism loses its sense . . . . .	90
3.5.5. Absence of “ Moral Boundaries of the Market” . . . . .	92
3.5.6. Totalitarianism of the market. . . . .	92
3.6. Conclusion . . . . .	93

**CHAP IV. A CRITICAL STUDY OF AMIN’S AND KÜNG’S RESPONSES  
TO ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION ..... 95**

4.1. Introduction. ....	96
4.2. Samir Amin’s Humanist Project .....	97
4.2.1. A biographical note of Samir Amin: the man and his thought .....	97
4.2.2. Amin’s international socialism as a response to economic globalization .....	101
4.2.2.1. The Nature of international socialism .....	101
4.2.2.2. The agenda of Amin’s International Socialism. ....	105
4.2.3. Other scholars who support the humanist project .....	109
4.2.4. Critical appraisal of Amin’s response to economic globalization .....	113
4.2.4.1. Strengths of Amin’s project .....	113
4.2.4.2. Limits of Amin’s project .....	117
4.3. Hans Küng’s Global Ethic as a response to Economic Globalization .....	119
4.3.1. The man Hans Küng .....	120
4.3.2. A global ethic as a response to economic globalization .....	121
4.3.2.1. Küng’s understanding of economic globalization .....	121
4.3.2.2. Between the welfare state and neo-capitalism: “Aristotelian mean” economy .....	122
4.3.3. Other scholars who have suggested a global ethic. ....	128
4.3.4. A Critical appraisal of Küng’s response to economic globalization .....	129
4.4. Conclusion .....	133

**CHAP V. AN ALTERNATIVE TO AMIN’S AND KÜNG’S RESPONSES TO  
ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION: BUILDING THE KINGDOM OF GOD BASED  
ON THE CONCEPT OF *IMAGO DEI* ..... 136**

5.1. Introduction .....	137
5.2. <i>Homo Oeconomicus</i> versus <i>Imago Dei</i> .....	139
5.2.1. The concept of <i>homo oeconomicus</i> and its implications .....	139
5.2.2. The Concept of <i>imago Dei</i> .....	145



5.2.3. <i>Imago Dei</i> is primarily a biblical concept. . . . .	147
5.2.3.1. Relationship with God . . . . .	147
5.2.3.2. Relationship with other human beings. . . . .	152
5.2.3.3. Relationship with the rest of creation . . . . .	153
5.3. Ethical implications of the human being as a relational being . . . . .	156
5.3.1. Social implication: Reconstruction of the human community as a context of values . . . . .	156
5.3.1.1. Dependability beyond the illusion of international cooperation . . . . .	158
5.3.1.2. Mutual trust . . . . .	160
5.3.1.3. Respect . . . . .	161
5.3.2. Political Implications: Empowering the state as the respondent of the Church as the family of God. . . . .	162
5.3.2.1. The state power in the process of economic globalization . . . . .	162
5.3.2.2. Church- state partnership: How can the Church empower the state? . . . . .	169
5.3.3 Ecological implication: Towards Christian values that care about the environment . . . . .	173
5.4. God above the market: we cannot worship both God and the market . . . . .	177
5.4.1. Putting God first: the vertical relationship with God . . . . .	178
5.6.2. God in the neighbour: horizontal relationship with God. . . . .	184
5. 5. Conclusion . . . . .	186

## **CHAP VI. IMPLICATIONS OF THE ETHIC OF IMAGO DEI**

<b>IN THE BURUNDIAN CONTEXT . . . . .</b>	<b>189</b>
6.1. Introduction . . . . .	190
6.2. Geographical and historical background . . . . .	191
6.2.1. Geographical situation . . . . .	191
6.2.2. Historical background. . . . .	194
6.2.2.1. The pre-colonial period (1500-1889) . . . . .	194
6.2.2.2. The colonial period (1889-1962) . . . . .	195
6.2.2.3. The post-independence period (1962 to the present). . . . .	197
6.3. The Burundian economy in the context of economic globalization . . . . .	203

6.4. The Church and the challenge to make the Christian message ethically relevant. . . . .	211
6.5. Humanization of foreign aid and humanitarian service . . . . .	215
6.6. Sharing in the world economy: investment for profit and human promotion . . . . .	217
6.7. A shift from a self-enrichment minded political leadership to a leadership open to socio-economic empowerment of the poor. . . . .	221
6.8. Environmental protection . . . . .	224
6.8.1. The environmental question in Burundi . . . . .	224
6.8.1.1. Political instability as a result of world economic interests . . . . .	225
6.8.1.2. Export economy: agriculture and exploitation of mineral resources . . . . .	226
6.8.1.3. Demographic problems in the context of economic marginalisation . . . . .	227
6.8.2. A response from the concept of <i>imago Dei</i> as relational. . . . .	228
6.8.2.1. Controlling the mortality rate . . . . .	229
6.8.2.2. Controlling fertility rate. . . . .	229
6.9. Conclusion . . . . .	232
<b>GENERAL CONCLUSION . . . . .</b>	<b>233</b>
<b>GENERAL BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . .</b>	<b>236</b>

## TABLES AND FIGURES

### 1. TABLES

<b>Table 2.1:</b> Table of evolution of technology and communications.....	39
<b>Table 3.1:</b> Intra-Triad Foreign Direct Investment in 1990.....	55
<b>Table 3.2:</b> Net Long-Term Resource Flows to Sub-Saharan Africa from 1990-1997.....	57
<b>Table 3.3:</b> External Debt Outstanding and Debt service Payment of Sub-Saharan Africa (1990-1997).....	58
<b>Table 3.4:</b> Africa and world external debt ratios (1980-1992) .....	59
<b>Table 3.5:</b> Distribution of the world income .....	78
<b>Table 3. 7:</b> Interactions between national societies in the global village.....	80

**2. FIGURES**

**Figure 2.1:** GNP in Developing Countries and Sub-Saharan Africa(1970-1990).....41

**Figure 3.1:** Foreign Direct Investment Clusters of Triad Members in 1990, economies in  
which a Triad member dominates inward foreign direct investment stocks  
and/or flow .....56

## **LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS**

ACM:	Arab Common Market
AEFJN:	Africa-Europe Faith and Justice Network
AIDS:	Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
ASEAN:	Association of South-East Asian Nations
CCC:	Catechism of the Catholic Church
CEPGL:	Communauté Economique des Pays des Grands Lacs.
COMESA:	Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa
COTEBU:	Complex Textile du Burundi
DDT:	Dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane
DRC:	Democratic Republic of Congo
EFTA:	European Free Trade Association
ECOWAS:	Economic Community of West African States
EEA:	European Economic Area
EU:	European Union
EUDF:	European Union Defence Force
FDI:	Foreign Direct Investment
GATT:	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDP:	Gross Domestic Product
GNP:	Gross National Product
HIV:	Human Immuno-deficiency Verus
IMF:	International Monetary Fund
LAIA:	Latin American Integration Association
MNCs:	Multinational Companies
NAFTA:	North America Free Trade Area
NATO:	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO:	Non Governmental Organization
NIC:	Newly Industrialized Countries
OBK:	Organisation du Bassin de la Kagera
OECD:	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

<b>PDC:</b>	<b>Parti Démocrate Chrétien</b>
<b>PNUD:</b>	<b>Programme des Nations Unies pour le Développement</b>
<b>PTA:</b>	<b>Preferential Trade Area</b>
<b>SADC:</b>	<b>Southern African Development Community</b>
<b>SAP:</b>	<b>Structural Adjustment Programme</b>
<b>UN:</b>	<b>United Nations</b>
<b>UNCTAD:</b>	<b>United Nations Conference on Trade and Development</b>
<b>UNDP:</b>	<b>United Nations Development Programme</b>
<b>UNICEF:</b>	<b>United Nations Children Fund</b>
<b>UPRONA:</b>	<b>Union pour le Progrès National</b>
<b>US/USA:</b>	<b>United States of America</b>
<b>VERRUNDI:</b>	<b>Verrerie du Burundi</b>
<b>WB:</b>	<b>World Bank</b>
<b>WHO:</b>	<b>World Health Organization</b>
<b>WTO:</b>	<b>World Trade Organization</b>

## **CHAPTER ONE**

### **GENERAL INTRODUCTION**

Today's reality is so complex and, on the material level at least, so clearly interconnected that a different outlook is needed. Modern economics is a case in point. A stock-market crash on one side of the globe can have a direct effect on the economies of countries on the other. Similarly, our technological achievements are now such that our activities have an unambiguous effect on the natural environment. And the very size of our population means that we cannot any longer afford to ignore others' interests.

*Dalai Lama 1999:161-162*

### **1. 1. The issue at stake.**

The main focus of this dissertation is economic globalization and an ethic that should underlie it. But why focussing on economic globalization? Why does it need an ethic? There are three major reasons why I focus on the phenomenon of economic globalization. First of all, from a general view point, the phenomenon of economic globalization underlies changes in social, political and cultural life of our present world. Accordingly, it affects the life of many people, especially the poor countries, and needs to be addressed. Many scholars from various backgrounds have investigated this phenomenon of economic globalization. Thus, I would like to participate in their effort and debate, while raising my own awareness of the phenomenon as a Christian citizen of one of the poor countries affected by it. In this way, my research will also raise the awareness of my own society and that of the Church.

It is worth noting that the concept of economic globalization itself is a relatively recent concept, although it has become familiar nowadays. As a matter of fact, it came to be a significant concept in academic circles in 1980s. According to M. Waters (1995:1), globalization is the concept of the 1990s, “a key idea by which we understand the transition of human society in the third millennium.” Of course, Waters is referring to the fact that it is in the 1990s that globalization was very much debated.

Economic globalization became a popular concept with the Asian economic crisis, due to a rapid transfer of capital across national boundaries bypassing the power of nation-states. The phenomenon of globalization seems to be accelerating as an aftermath of the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the Soviet Union and its satellites in Central-Eastern Europe as well as in Africa, followed by the democratization movement on the African continent on the one hand, and the movement of nationalism in Eastern Europe on the other hand (cf. Sanks 1999:625).

Seemingly, we have not yet experienced the process of economic globalization long enough to foresee all its ramifications. Yet, whatever may be its stage, it needs to be analysed, evaluated and responded to. It is this analysis, evaluation and response that I propose to provide in this dissertation.



Secondly, as far as the Church is concerned, the phenomenon of economic globalization is thought of as one of the signs of the time after the threat of totalitarian regimes, nuclear war, colonialism and neo-colonialism. Thus globalization is an apparently new situation that calls for analysis and conceptualisation in view of orienting anew the social mission of the Church. In this respect, the value of my reflection will lie in the fact that I aim to call the Church to keep an open eye on the phenomenon of economic globalization in order to give it a human face. More importantly, the significance of my topic lies in the fact that it will provide the Church with the opportunity of exploring how it could deal with the forms of injustices created by economic globalization. By the same token, our analysis of and response to the phenomenon of economic globalization should help us to give direction to the Church's preferential option for the poor within the context of the globalized economy. At this juncture, it should be noted that reflecting on economic globalization is to give new meaning to the notions of Christian responsibility for one's neighbour, the environment and the pursuit of the kingdom of God in today's world.

Thirdly, as far as my own society is concerned, it goes without saying that Burundi is one of the poorest countries of the world which suffer from economic globalization in two major respects. The first respect is economic marginalization, described as a *worldwide form of apartheid*. Burundi continues to be marginalized alongside other poor countries, as the gap between the rich and the poor grows larger and larger. Secondly, the Burundian society is not free from the social and political instability which occurs in many Sub-Saharan African countries in the course of the democratic process. Petrella (1993:5) observed that transnational business firms, in their ceaseless pursuit of new customers, are creating networks which bypass the traditional nation-state. In this respect, the Burundian government is hastened in its demise as it is forced to become an accomplice in the type of global economic development which excludes the poor people. I fear that the state which had been a dialogue partner of the Church will progressively be replaced by the international market and the ceaseless pursuit of profit. However, the international market and economic processes are impersonal structures. The question is how the Church could deal with this new partner that is impersonal.

## 1. 2. Originality of the topic and other works in the same field

As I noted earlier, although we say that globalization is a relatively recent phenomenon, I am not the only one to reflect on it. Many scholars in various fields have reflected on the phenomenon of economic globalization. For instance, economists, such as Martin Carnoy, Paul Hirst, Graham Thompson and Michael Veseth, political scientists like James Mittelman (a political economist), M. Castells, Mel Gurtov, A. Giddens, K. Ohmae and Samir Amin, as well as theologians like Hans Küng, to name some but a few who have already worked on this issue. In fact, I will use as my background the works of two renowned scholars, namely Samir Amin<sup>1</sup> and Hans Küng in order to propose my own contribution.

My aim is to show that both Amin's Humanist Project which is alternatively called international socialism or global socialism and Küng's global ethic, although they are very valuable, need to be questioned and critiqued. My critique of the two responses to economic globalization will lead to suggest another alternative. The alternative I suggest is a Christian ethics that is rooted in our human nature as *imago Dei* which I will then test in the Burundian context.

But what is particular to the concept of *imago Dei*? What practical implications will it have which may differ from those provided by Amin's and Küng's responses? I will not enter in this discussion at this level. Nevertheless I should note that the *imago Dei* is an alternative concept to that of *homo oeconomicus* that informs the present world economic order. Samir Amin and Hans Küng might have also seen the limits of the concept of *homo oeconomicus*; but I do not think they dealt with this concept in a more emphatic way and with a particular attention than I will do in this dissertation. Neither can I ignore the fact that Küng, as a Christian theologian, is aware of the concept of *imago Dei*. However, it is not a central concept on which he bases his

---

<sup>1</sup>Samir Amin is an Egyptian economist and political scientist. He is known as one of the radical thinkers on the issues arising out of the changing nature of capitalism, North-South relationships as well as development theory. He has been the director of UN African Institute for Planning, and is presently the president of the Third World Forum based in Dakar (Senegal). Amin is a prolific writer. His most famous publications include *Accumulation on a World Scale* (1974), *Unequal Development* (1974), *Empire in Chaos* (1993), *Maldevelopment: Anatomy of a Global Failure* (1990), *Delinking: Towards a Polycentric World* (1990), and recently, *Capitalism in the Age of Globalization* (1997).

moral reflection. Furthermore, I will take the concept of *imago Dei* in a way different from the classical one. While the classical theology, influenced by the Greek philosophy of Plato or/and Aristotle, takes the *imago Dei* to be **rational**, in my dissertation I will focus on the **relational** aspect.

Obviously, as we shall see later, I cannot deny the fact that the concept of *homo oeconomicus* itself is a relational concept. But the kind of relation which is considered as far as *homo oeconomicus* is concerned is the exchange of commodities. The implication of this is that exchange relations replace all the social relationships. The risk is great that the reduction of human relationships to exchange relationships might also reduce human beings to commodities as if the whole of human society should be a “market society” which Karl Polanyi once referred to (see Meeks 1989:38-39). Thus, the originality of my dissertation lies in the fact that I suggest an alternative concept to that which leads the world economy today.

### **1. 3. Problem formulation and analysis**

#### **1.3.1. The central problem**

The central problem I propose to tackle can be put as follows: **What ethic should we provide for the phenomenon of economic globalization in its present stage?** As I noted earlier, there have been many attempts to respond to the phenomenon of economic globalization. I will prefer to approach the issue of economic globalization from a (Christian) ethical perspective. The ethical concern comes from the fact that globalization could merely be ruled by the laws of market and profit that suit a few powerful people, while reducing human society to a mere market society. However, the problem remains whether the ethics I will suggest will be sufficiently adequate to provide instances of judgement other than the market and profit which are the major characteristics of economic globalization.

### **1.3.2. The sub-problems surrounding the major problem**

#### **1.3.2.1. The concept of economic globalization**

Before one could provide an ethic for economic globalization, there is a prior question that needs to be answered: **What does economic globalization mean?** This problem calls for a conceptual analysis of the notion of economic globalization. There is no doubt that economists, sociologists, social and political scientists could understand the meaning of globalization in a way that differs from that of a theological ethicist from a poor society.

Besides, there are a lot of disagreements about the reality of economic globalization. Not all scholars say that there is such a thing as (economic) globalization. For instance, A. Rugman (2000) and Veseth (1998) among others, argue that economic globalization is a myth because it has never occurred. According to these two scholars we cannot apply the concept of economic globalization to a few delocalized multinationals of the triad formed by North America, European Union and Japan.

However, as our opening quote suggests, even the few multinationals which Rugman and Veseth talk about might have an impact on the lives of other people in other parts of the world. We may simply refer, for instance, to the pollution caused by the exploitation and the transformation of the raw materials used by these multinationals and which affect the commons such as water and air. But as we shall see it later in this dissertation, economic globalization could be more than a geographical mobility of a few powerful multinationals. Every aspect of our life is more and more becoming a commodity: knowledge, religion, education, sex, war, etc. are today seen as commodities. The understanding of the meaning of economic globalization leads us to a further question:

#### **1.3.2.2. What are the consequences of economic globalization, especially for poor countries.**

This question calls for positive answers for some and negative ones for others. In effect, for some scholars, the consequences of economic globalization are the growth of international

commerce, the opportunity of poor countries to get out of their economic maladies, international solidarity, the triumph of the market, etc. For others, the consequences of economic globalization are, for instance, economic marginalization, the demise of the nation-state, socio-political destabilisation, inequality and social injustices, moral decadence and ecological disaster. I believe that, if one is to provide an ethic that would underlie the phenomenon of economic globalization, one needs to put all these consequences on a balance sheet and see the outcome.

My contention is that poor countries, like my own society, suffer the consequences of economic globalization more than they benefit from it. For poor countries economic globalization, like colonization, could appear like another source of discontent rather than being an opportunity. However, it would be unfair to say that only poor countries and poor people suffer the consequences of economic globalization. In effect, those for whom economic globalization is an opportunity might suffer from what I call “spiritual alienation”, that is, all their spiritual wealth is invested in the expansion of the market and the endless search of profit for its own sake. In other words, economic globalization could be another road to materialism.

### **1.3.2.3. Responding to economic globalization**

What are the perspectives proposed by Samir Amin and Hans Küng, and how satisfactory are they to face the problem of economic globalization? Amin proposes a Marxist perspective, a Humanist Project as he calls it, in which each society should be allowed to negotiate the terms of its interdependence with the rest of the global economy (see Amin 1997). Amin’s Humanist Project is best known as international socialism or again global socialism. The question is whether socialism which is in a serious crisis due to the fact that it has proved itself unpopular and economically inadequate can be a satisfactory response to economic globalization. Yet, Amin’s response should be appreciated at its just value. In fact, Amin might be calling us to open our eyes to a new project pointing to the horizons of human history: *Marxism beyond Marxism*, a project in which “a post-modern capitalism calls for a post-modern Marxism as F. Jameson suggests (Jameson as in Burbach et al. 1997:5).

Instead, Hans Küng advocates for a global ethic, that is, a consensus on fundamental human values and basic moral principles (Küng 1991). This global ethic seems to be inspired by ecumenism and inter-religious dialogue. With this global ethic, Küng suggests a global economy, or a kind of Aristotelian mean economy that is located between the welfare state and neo-capitalism (1997). The question here is whether Küng's response is satisfactory if it still accommodates the concept of *homo oeconomicus* that informs the present economic order. Is there an alternative concept to *homo oeconomicus* that could give the present world economy a human face?

Thus one needs to look at these two responses to economic globalization very closely and suggest an alternative if necessary. This leads us to the next sub-problem.

#### **1.3.2.4. What alternative can we provide to Amin and Küng's responses**

Could an ethic based on the (Judeo-)Christian concept of *imago Dei* as relational be a plausible alternative to Amin's and Küng's responses to economic globalization? The pertinence of this problem lies in the fact that the relevance of the Christian message is a perennial question. Accordingly, the notion of *imago Dei* should bring us to ask ourselves whether the Christian message has an ethical dimension that is able to challenge the actual sign of the time, that is, economic globalization.

However, we need to be aware of some objections to this kind of alternative. One of the salient objections could be based on the question of whether the ethic of *imago Dei* does not appeal to a smaller audience than do that of Amin and Küng. Behind the issue of the size of the audience there could be the question of what help can God-talk which seems to be overtaken by the performance of technology and market efficiency, be to our society today? The problem with such objections would be that they are concerned with quantity while the crucial issue is the quality of life that we need. Thus by suggesting the concept of *imago Dei* as a starting-point for the kind of ethics we purport to defend, I have in mind the following fundamental question: what are we ultimately and how should we live given what we are? This question calls for a continual evaluation and could lead to the improvement of the quality of our life.

### 1.3.2.5. Contextualization of the ethic of *imago Dei*

What could be the relevance of an ethic based on the *imago Dei* to the Burundian context? This is a problem which deals with the implications of the ethics of *imago Dei* in a particular context. The context is the testing ground for any given theory. But why Burundi and not any other country? The Burundian context is interesting in two major respects. Firstly, Burundi is a country where more than 85 % of the population are Christians, and hence the question is whether Burundian Christians have been sensitive to the ethical dimension of the Christian message they received, rather than being only passively present in the Church as a worshipping community. This question calls for an evaluation of each one's way of life: what does it mean to be a Christian in the actual context of economic globalization? What should a Christian do to give economic globalization a human face?

Secondly, Burundi is today one of the poorest countries in Africa and in the world, and the most socio-politically destabilised partly as a result of world economic and political forces at work in the world today.<sup>2</sup> In effect, it seems that the external factors combine with the internal failings to make the situation of Burundi worse. The question then is whether, recovering the image of God and its implications could make the Burundian society any better.

---

<sup>2</sup> I am not implying that the Hutu-Tutsi conflict in Burundi as it is today, is merely a result of economic globalization. However, there is no doubt that this conflict acquired another dimension in the actual context of economic globalization. The democratic process which was imposed by Western countries, was accompanied by the liberalization of economy. This liberalization means that the state withdraws from state companies which were hitherto serving poor Burundians. In this process of privatisation, nothing is provided to ensure that the new market system serves them. Besides, the ongoing war makes Burundi a market of weapons manufactured in rich countries and this has social and political consequences.

### **1.3.3. Hypotheses for the above problem and its sub-problems**

#### **1.3.3.1. The hypothesis for the main problem**

The hypothesis regarding the main problem we propose to investigate can be formulated thus: Economic globalization has a negative impact on the lives of poor people, and this comes mainly from the fact that it is regulated by the forces of the market and profit that lack ethical underpinning. While economic globalization empowers those people who are in possession of the means of expanding the market in order to increase their profit, it increases the vulnerability of others who are not sufficiently equipped with these means. Thus the ethic we purport to provide in this dissertation could help us to establish a balance between the haves and the have nots so that, in the end, no one loses in the process of economic globalization.

#### **1.3.3.2. The hypothesis of the first sub-problem**

The hypothesis for the first sub-problem is the following: A critical analysis of the concept of economic globalization would show us that economic globalization is a theoretical and a practical concept for both marginalized countries and the rich ones. Theoretically, given the enormous means (technology, communications,...) that are available today, economic globalization promises to move humanity towards a universal well-being (Burbach, et al 1997:1). But practically, economic globalization is a means by which a few rich people expand the market in order to maximize their profits.

Thus, it is not obvious that the poor could benefit from that expansion of the market. The reason is that there is no way in which the poor can compete equitably with the rich. There cannot be a fair competition between the haves and the have nots. In effect, despite the rules of liberalization championed in the WTO fora, it can be shown that the poor countries do not have easy access to the markets of developed countries. Furthermore thanks to powerful and efficient means used by the rich, the poor producers cannot stand anymore.



### **1.3.3.3. The hypothesis for the second sub-problem**

The hypothesis for the second sub-problem is: Economic globalization has both positive and negative effects which need to be analysed and evaluated. The result of this analysis and evaluation is that economic globalization needs an ethic that should guide it and give it a human face. In effect, while it might be true that economic globalization is an opportunity for the rich, it is not obvious that the poor will benefit from it. Thus an ethical reflection could be a way of bringing economic globalization to be also an opportunity for the poor.

### **1.3.3.4. The hypothesis for the third sub-problem**

Samir Amin and Hans Küng are among those who have attempted to provide an ethical response to economic globalization. For Amin, we can do away with economic globalization by a widespread acceptance of the Humanist Project, or simply global socialism. For Hans Küng, instead, we should humanize economic globalization by a global ethic, that is, a set of ethical values commonly agreed upon by most religious traditions of the world.

However, neither Amin's Humanist Project nor Küng's global ethic provides us with an adequate response to the problem of economic globalization which could be helpful to poor countries. There is a need for another alternative. In effect, on the one hand, Amin's wholesale condemnation of economic globalization seems to be unrealistic in so far as it seems to ignore the victory of the market economy over the command economy. On the other hand, Küng seems to accommodate the concept of *homo oeconomicus* when the problem of economic globalization lies in this very concept. Thus any ethic which purports to give economic globalization a human face must be based on a concept that goes beyond that of *homo oeconomicus*. Such an ethic should not undermine the market economy but should bring it to benefit to whole of humankind.

### **1.3.3.5. The hypothesis for the fifth sub-problem**

A Christian ethic based on the concept of *imago Dei* could be a plausible alternative to Amin's Humanist Project and Küng's global ethic, in so far as it has implications that go far

beyond mere economic terms. Compared with Amin's Humanist Project, the ethic of the *imago Dei* seems to be a humanism *par excellence* in so far as it departs from what human beings ultimately are and extends to what kind of life they should live given their ultimate nature. Compared with Küng's global ethic, the Christian ethics we suggest as an alternative seems to have the advantage of being based on a concept that goes beyond the *homo oeconomicus* which informs economic globalization. Besides, the ethic of the *imago Dei* seems to have the advantage of giving God a place in our life, a place which is more and more being occupied by the market and the endless search of profit. Maybe apart from material "scarcity" we have to bring human beings to also feel a spiritual scarcity in the sense that the victory of the market economy is accompanied by the eclipse of God from the market (Meeks 1989:53).

#### **1.3.3.6. The hypothesis for the sixth sub-problem**

The ethic of *imago Dei* as a Christian ethical approach to economic globalization could make the Burundian society a context where people live meaningful lives socio-economically and politically. This is so because taking seriously the ethic of *imago Dei* would require that some conditions be fulfilled. Among these conditions, we may refer, for instance to the humanization of foreign aid, the redirection of the economic investment towards human promotion and not only for profit, the shift from self-minded political leadership to a leadership that is open to the social and economic empowerment of the poor, as well as the environmental care.

### **1. 4. Procedure**

#### **1.4.1. Scope**

First of all, I am aware that economic globalization has a history. However, although this historical aspect is important in understanding how the phenomenon of globalization arrived at its present stage, it will not receive much attention in this dissertation. The reason is that the concern of this dissertation is not how the phenomenon of globalization developed in time, but rather how it affects us today and how we should respond to it as Christians whose mission is conditioned by the signs of the time. Nevertheless where some historical data are judged

necessary, they will be mentioned accordingly.

Secondly, since my research deals with the phenomenon of economic globalization, I will take Küng's global ethic as it applies to global economics (second part of his work, *A Global Ethic for a Global Politics and Economics* 1997), although it is also applied to global politics. This will help me to avoid being lured onto a larger field. In the same vein, as far as Samir Amin is concerned, I will consider mainly his recent work, *Capitalism in the Age of Globalization* (1997). In effect, this work seems to be a synthesis of his other works, namely, *Maldevelopment: Anatomy of a Global Failure* (1990) and *Delinking: Towards a Polycentric World* (1990).

Thirdly, although in the overall analysis I have in mind the poor countries of sub-Saharan Africa, I shall try to be more precise as far as the context of my response to economic globalization is concerned. The testing ground of my analysis, therefore, will be the Burundian society. Burundi is one of the 32 Sub-Saharan Africa countries out of the 47 countries counted as the poorest in the world. There are two reasons for my choice. First, it is because as a Burundian citizen I know the Burundian society better than any other society. Secondly, I want to avoid being too general in my research.

#### **1.4.2. Assumptions to be made in my research**

There are three major assumptions which have to be considered in this dissertation. First of all, it should be noted that I will not approach the issue of economic globalization as an economist or a political economist. In fact, I am neither of these. Instead, I am interested in economic globalization insofar as it challenges me as a Christian from a poor society, and also as far as it is a sign of the time which challenges the social mission of the Church and its relevance today.

Secondly, in approaching the issue of globalization in general, some researchers assume an ideological premise (Marxism, capitalism or neo-liberalism). As far as I am concerned, I will deal with the issue of economic globalization without any ideological background. This will help me to have a broader vision than I could have if I was geared to one ideology. In fact, each

ideology has its own merits which need to be appreciated.

Finally, contrary to some popular and scholars' views, I do not nourish any ambition of suggesting that economic globalization should be done away with or that it should be refused. In fact, I should note at the level that it is not possible to do away with economic globalization in this era where, thanks to the means of communication and information technology, the world is more and more interconnected. My assumption therefore is that economic globalization is a reality and not just a myth as some scholars suggest. And even if economic globalization were a myth, it would be a myth that mires a reality.

By the same token, according to some beliefs, economic globalization is ungovernable. This dissertation is partly a rejection of such beliefs. Economic globalization can be governed both at international and national levels. This can be possible if, to echo Hirst's words, economic growth and trade openness are combined with fairness within and between nations (Hirst 1997:409). The achievement of this fairness requires an ethic.

### **1.4.3. Methodology**

My approach will be a critical analysis of the phenomenon of economic globalization. I will concern myself with the meaning and the implications of economic globalization as far as they affect us in our lives, with the conviction that as a Christian I can play a constructive role in the realization of an ethic that could make the on-going global economic process more human and beneficial for all people, especially the poor people.

As I noted earlier, I am not the only one to study the phenomenon of economic globalization. Accordingly, this dissertation is also based on a critical analysis of Amin's and Küng's responses to this phenomenon. This critical analysis is not intended for its own sake. In effect, the aim is to come up with an alternative to these responses which I will then apply in the Burundian context.

In trying to understand the phenomenon of economic globalization and the two responses provided by Amin and K  ng, I will also consider and interrogate the literature of other researchers who have investigated and are still investigating the phenomenon of globalization.

Accordingly, I have divided this dissertation in six chapters which I will outline here.

The first chapter is this general introduction in which I state the *raison d'  tre* of the dissertation, its originality, the problem and sub-problems surrounding it, possible hypotheses to be made as well as the procedure to be followed.

The second chapter deals with the nature of economic globalization. I will argue that globalization is a transnational phenomenon of which the driving forces are respectively the recent technological innovations, the media of communication as well as the political liberalism as its underlying ideology.

The third chapter deals with the consequences of economic globalization. I argue that economic globalization is an opportunity which is not without its discontent: the international trade is growing while the poor countries are continually marginalized, political liberalism which is championed as the ideology of economic globalization is followed by social and political instability in poor countries, despite the apparent solidarity which seems to make the world look like a village, there are growing inequalities and social injustices, economic prosperity is accompanied by environmental deterioration, and the triumph of the market is followed by moral decadence.

The fourth chapter deals with the critical analysis of two ethical responses to the phenomenon of economic globalization, namely: the response of Samir Amin who suggests global socialism and the response of K  ng who suggests a global ethic.

In the fifth chapter I will give an alternative to Amin's and K  ng's responses. This alternative is a Christian ethic based on the concept of the image of God as relational contrasted with the concept of *homo oeconomicus* which informs the economic order today.

In the six chapter, I will try to apply the ethic of the *imago Dei* as relational in the Burundian context.

Finally, in the general conclusion I will give a concise summary of different chapters and suggest future prospects. This part of the dissertation will be followed by a bibliographical list of all the works I will have consulted.

With this overview outline, I shall now embark on the first chapter of this dissertation, namely the nature of economic globalization.

## **CHAPTER TWO**

### **THE NATURE OF ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION**

Globalization has become mainly associated with the triumphant capitalism that has come to the fore since the fall of Berlin Wall in 1989, and hence with the negotiations undertaken by the World Trade Organization (...) Some other users of the word link it closely with the so-called information revolution and with the feeling that the world has become a smaller place

*William Keegan (2001:260)*

## 2.1. The concept of economic globalization

### 2.1.1. Introduction

The period between 1945 and 1989 was characterised by the phenomenon of military competition in the context of Cold War. The end of the Cold War, marked by the socio-political disintegration of the Soviet Union, the fall of Berlin Wall and the wind of democratization which swept over Eastern and Central Europe as well as the African continent<sup>3</sup> in the 1990s, introduced a relatively new phenomenon<sup>4</sup>, namely: **globalization**. This phenomenon is characterised by economic competition and extension of the free market in search of greater profit. Some scholars did not hesitate to talk of the new world order where there is no ideological confrontation, because of capitalism or economic liberalism has triumphed over the command economy of the former socialist countries. Hence, the concept of **economic globalization** which will be the focus my attention in this chapter. I shall argue that economic globalization is, to some extent, a transnational phenomenon which evolves around the following driving forces: technological revolution as its engine, media and communication (information technology) as its facilitator, and

---

<sup>3</sup>It seems difficult to talk of democratization sweeping over the African continent when countries like Angola, Burundi, Rwanda, Sudan, Libya, Gabon, etc. seem to have resisted this wind. However, the point is still valid to the extent that most African countries have seen that Marxist socialism and one party politics did not take them far, especially that they have failed economically and socially. Correspondingly, democracy (in the form of political pluralism) is more and more seductive to the African continent, although it is still at its infancy.

<sup>4</sup>The idea that economic globalization is a new phenomenon is highly disputed among scholars. For some globalization is not historically unprecedented while for others it is historically unprecedented. For Roland Robertson, although globalization is a recent significant concept in academic circles (Robertson 1992:8), its development involves five phases, namely: the germinal phase (1400-1750), the incipient phase (1750-1875), the take-off phase (1875-1925), the struggle-for-hegemony phase, and finally, the uncertainty phase (late 1960 to the present) (Robertson 1992:57-59, cf. Wallerstein 1980). Robert Schreier follows the same historical development but outlines three phases only: the phase of expansion and establishment of political power and civilization (1492-1945), the phase of decolonization, independence and economic optimism (1945-1989), and finally, the phase of global capitalism (1989-?). On the contrary, for other scholars such as Ohmae (1995), Wriston (1992), Guehenno (1995), Giddens (1990), Scholte (1993), Castells (1996), globalization is an unprecedented, a new epoch of human history, the dawn of the new millennium particularly characterised by hyper-speed in information.



liberal democracy (which is being universalized ) as its political ideology.

### **2.1.2. What is economic globalization?**

Economic globalization is one of the most powerful and persuasive images of the world today. Academics, journalists, politicians and policy-makers invite us to face the challenge of a globalized economy. For some it is a symbol of hope and promise which offers new opportunities (more open markets, new technology), while for others it is a symbol of alienation, threat and even another chance for rich countries to colonize poor countries, particularly sub-Saharan African countries (Kalliah 1999, Magesa 1999:236). After having expressed the hope that economic globalization presents for Africa, Alan Gelb and Rob Floyd do not hesitate to note the risks it presents: the risk of being marginalised and falling far behind for poor countries, and the risk of extended dependence on aid rather than private savings and investment (Gelb & Floyd 1999:3). But what does economic globalization mean?

Economic globalization is a concept that is difficult to define. There is no one definition commonly agreed upon among scholars. For some scholars economic globalization is the end of the road, or as Fukuyama suggests, “the end of history”, a ready-made achievement of the post-industrial era. This claim is questionable and can be hardly true. History keeps going. According to Anthony Giddens (1996), globalization is conceived of as a powerful transformative force which is responsible of a “massive shake-out” of societies, economies, and institutions of governance and world order. It is this shake-out which prevents economic globalization from being the end of the road and makes a process replete with contradictions. A phenomenon in which there are contradictions is dynamic and open-ended. In fact, later, it will be shown that neo-Marxists like Samir Amin, step on these contradictions in order to suggest a complete reversal of economic globalization.

For others, even if it is not the end of the road, it is, at least, an advance towards the end-state of a fully integrated world market. This claim is pertinent but disputable. According to Kenichi Ohmae (1990), we seem to be living in *The Borderless World*. One of the aspects of this borderless world is *The end of the nation state and the rise of regional economies* (Ohmae 1995).

The European Union with a common currency (Euro) and a common parliament, Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), Arab Common Market (ACM), Latin American Integration Association (LAIA), North America Free Trade Area (AFTA), Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) in the African continent can be seen from Ohmae's idea (cf. Knox and Agnew 1998:376-8). However, although the idea of borderless world has some part of truth, Ohmae would find it hard to make us believe that regional economies mean the same as "fully integrated world market". That is to say, economic globalization still falls short of the "ideal type". A number of scholars such as W. Ruigrock and R. Tulder (1995), Paul Hirst (1997), Hirst and Thompson (1996) have shown that, presently, the world economy evolves in the direction of the triad formed by the three major financial and trading blocs, namely the US led North America, the German led Europe, and the Japan dominated Asia Pacific.

According to Hirst and Thompson (1996b) and Boyer and Drache (1996), in comparison with the classical Gold Standard era, the world economy is significantly less integrated than it once was. Paul Hirst (1997) even argues that economic globalization is wholly exaggerated. This point is also supported by Gordon (1988) and Weiss (1998) who argue that, in comparison with the age of world empires, the international economy has become considerably less global in its geographical embrace. Recently Alan Rugman (2000) has gone as far as to state that "globalization has never really occurred". For him, "the vast majority of manufacturing and service activity is organized regionally, not globally" (Rugman 2000:1). Samir Amin (1997), whose response to economic globalization I will consider in the fourth chapter, sees economic globalization as excluding poor countries because they cannot compete. All these views point to the fact that, we cannot talk of "fully integrated market" when there is a growing economic marginalization of the poor countries.

Hence, a "fully integrated market" is not yet realized. It might be an end towards which the process of economic globalization is driving. Whether it will ever be achieved and at what cost is another issue. However, I am not saying that economic globalization is not a reality which we have to deal with. We may say economic globalization is not new and that it has been there since

early Renaissance in Europe when the global financial networks were constructed especially by Italians, despite the absence of fax and telegraph (James 1996:12-13). What concerns me in the present stage of economic globalization is its recent conceptualization, but also its exponential growth and the consequences that flow from the acceleration of its development. There are many people who cannot follow the present speed of economic globalization. That is what makes it particularly crucial today.

We might not deny the fact that, thanks to the recent developments in information technology, as Julia DeAnne seems to suggest, decisions taken by a firm<sup>5</sup> in one country affect the range of opinions or outcomes available to a firm or the government and its people in another country (DeAnne 1997:545). Accordingly, I will not concern myself with how economic globalization developed in time, but rather how it is reflected and lived today, taking into consideration its recent escalating developments. Economic globalization might have been there before, as various scholars have suggested, yet it is recent in its conceptualization. In other words, economic globalization is a recent concept which came to the fore in the last two decades and is now widely used in various circles.

In recent reflections, economic globalization has come to be synonymous with such concepts as liberalization, internationalisation or both at the same time. In this respect, Jan Aart Scholte (1997:429) proposes three kinds of understanding of economic globalization, namely:

- an increase of cross-border relations;
- an increase of open-border relations;
- an increase of trans-border relations.

The idea of economic globalization as a cross-border relation seems to be the very idea of IMF. In effect, IMF defines economic globalization as follows:

---

<sup>5</sup>DeAnne takes "firm" in a comprehensive way. She refers to firm, not just as a short-run profit-maximizing enterprise in the neo-classical economic sense, but as a decision-taking unit that consists of all of its stakeholders, that is, customers, shareholders, employees and the local communities where it operates.

Globalization refers to the growing interdependencies of countries worldwide through the increasing volume and variety of **cross-border** transactions in goods and services, and international capital flows; and also through the rapid and widespread diffusion of all kinds of technology (IMF 1997).

When economic globalization is understood as cross-border relations, it is synonymous with internationalization. Correspondingly, economic globalization denotes the increased movements between countries of goods and services, investment, people, money, messages and ideas. In other words, globalization means global interconnectedness, or international interdependence. However, a close look would show that internationalization cannot be equated with globalization. Globalization involves *competition* which is central to economic liberalism, while internationalization stands for relations between countries and assumes the existence of states or other regional bodies capable of interdependently establishing regular exchanges and is based on criteria of cooperation and reciprocal benefits rather than on criteria of competition.

However, in a way, those who equate globalization and internationalization are not totally wrong. Because it could be shown that competition and cooperation do not exclude each other. This seems to be the view of Amoroso who argues that internationalization has always been considered to be a process through which two parties or cultures reciprocally exchange their goods, thereby promoting the specificity of their respective production systems, forms of consumption, ways of life and, hence, their own identities. For Amoroso, the authors and actors of internationalization include economic organizations (Amoroso 1998:54).

When globalization is understood as open-border relations, it is synonymous with liberalization. Correspondingly, globalization denotes the large-scale opening of borders as states remove countless regulatory barriers to international trade, privatization of companies owned by the state, travel, financial transfers and communications. The result is a single borderless world, such that the opening of borders will yield a planetary integration. Consequently, from an economic point of view, the unitary global economy replaces the territorial state economy, while from the social and political point of view, the global community replaces national loyalties. This view is espoused by a group of scholars known as “hyperglobalists” such K. Ohmae (1995),

Guehenno (1995), and Wriston (1992). The common thesis of the hyperglobalists is that economic globalization is bringing about a denaturalization of economies through a transnational networks of production, trade, and finance. In such a borderless economy, national government are relegated to little more transmission belts or intermediate institutions for global capital. In his book, *The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy* (1996), S. Strange puts it thus:

The impersonal forces of the world markets are now more powerful than the states to whom ultimate political authority over society and economy is supposed to belong. The declining authority of states is reflected in the growing diffusion of authority to other institutions and associations, and to local and regional bodies (Strange 1996:4).

However, Scholte rejects these two ways of understanding globalization, and instead combines them to propose what he believes to be a plausible understanding of economic globalization. He contends that economic globalization can mean both internationalisation and liberalization. In effect, borders are not just crossed or opened but transcended (Scholte 1997:431). He argues that global phenomena are those which extend across widely dispersed locations simultaneously and can move between places, anywhere on the earth pretty much instantaneously. Hence, the globe becomes a single place on its own right, a global village. In short, globalization transcends national borders. Most importantly in this “transcendental” economy, everything becomes a commodity. Knowledge is sold and it is bought as it is obvious in private offices. Education which, hitherto, was understood as a service becomes a commodity offered for sale: the marketization of schools and institutions of learning brings the state to slowly withdraw from taking full financial responsibility for the education of its citizens (Christie 2000:43). Religion itself becomes a commodity as we see it happening in most of the new religious movements commonly called sects. In this respect, one of the concepts used by some new sects is “prosperity”. Even war and political parties become a commodity as it seems to be the case in the region of Africa where I come from. Thus it is not only the physical borders that are transcended.

Scholte’s understanding of economic globalization has been supported by Shah Tarzi. Tarzi draws on Scholte articulation and defines globalization as “a **deepening** internationalization

and interdependence among nations in the form of cross-border exchanges of goods, investments, people, money, messages and ideas” (Tarzi 1999:141). He is also aware that globalization can be associated with the liberalization of borders, as many countries reduce regulatory barriers to international trade, travel, financial transfers and communications. Like Scholte, he repudiates these two understandings of globalization as telling nothing new. Thus he espoused the Scholte definition of globalization as consisting in the trans-border relations which extend across widely dispersed locations, transcending territorial borders.

The above understanding of economic globalization is valuable. I will complement it by adding what I believe to be the driving forces of economic globalization. Thus, my working definition is as follows: Economic globalization is a transnational phenomenon characteristic of the post-industrial era<sup>6</sup> whose driving forces are technological revolution, media and communications, and which is correlated with political liberalization and democratization, especially after the demise of doctrinaire socialism.<sup>7</sup> The point of destination of this transnationality and these forces that drive it is the maximization of profit. Those who do not have these driving forces are marginalized or eliminated together with those who have not mastered

---

<sup>6</sup>By “post-industrial era”, I do not mean that there is no more industry as it was before. I mean that the era of manufacturing industry is more and more declining at least in most of advanced economies. According to David Held, et al, the relative decline in manufacturing industry (what they refer to as de-industrialization) is an inevitable product of shifting trade patterns and associated new international labour: as productivity rises in manufacturing, progressively fewer and fewer workers are needed to produce a given level of output (Held, et al 1999:187). Instead, with the so-called de-industrialization, we assist to another kind of industry: the industry of services: knowledge, ideas, religion, values, any piece of information, like material goods become commodities on the market place.

<sup>7</sup>I am aware that there is a Marxist explanation of economic globalization in terms of surplus accumulation. This is a follow up of Karl Marx’s observation according to which, capital by its nature drives beyond every spacial barrier to conquer the whole earth for its market (Marx [1857] 1973:524,539). Accordingly, this surplus accumulation has created global production, global markets, global business organizations, etc. It is in this respect that it is observed that producers and investors increasingly behave as if the world economy consisted of a single market (UNCTAD 1996:4). This way of the looking at economic globalization does not contradict the three forces which I see as the heart of world economy. In fact, as we shall see later, global production is possible thanks to technological development, global market is facilitated by the sophisticated means of communication, global business organization needs an adequate political environment beside the information technology of the present moment.

them very well (Sacks, et al 1998:36ff, cf. Kwesi 1998). The process by which they are eliminated is competition.

However, the three driving forces I shall consider are not commonly agreed upon among scholars of economic globalization. In fact some scholars consider capitalism and technology to be the sole driving forces, for others it is states and markets which are the driving forces of economic globalization, for others it is the combined forces of modernity (Held, et al. 1999:10). Each of these aspects believed to be the driving forces of economic globalization can be competently defended.

However, I should mention that capitalism, for instance is not a driving force of economic globalization but it is its context or framework. The state cannot be the driving force of a phenomenon which is more and more by-passing it. The market is not a force in itself, but a space where the achievements of technology are displayed and exhibited. Although modernity as a driving force of economic globalization is disputable for those who stress economic globalization far back to a period prior to the 16<sup>th</sup> century, it is nevertheless a concept that needs to be taken seriously. In effect, if we break it down, we find that it is a new outlook to reality, a world view which encapsulates the glorification of reason and science which brought about technology which I consider to be the engine of economic globalization. Although I consider the media of communication as a force on its own, I am aware that they are the production of technology, particularly information technology. Modernity encapsulates a new philosophy in which freedom is glorified while undermining the traditional view of authority and loyalty to authority. The social and political ordering that suits freedom and the new conception of authority is liberal democracy which I consider to be the politics of economic globalization. Hence, instead of taking modernity as whole to be the driving force of economic globalization, I shall prefer to consider the three aspects to which it gave birth.

## **2.2. Technological innovations as the engine of economic globalization**

Technology is part and parcel of a cultural revolution that emerged in the West in the 16<sup>th</sup> century: the culture of modernity built on two major philosophical currents, namely, empiricism

and rationalism. Empiricism is a philosophical approach according to which “only things that can be perceived by senses, or demonstrated by experiment, are taken to be real”. As for rationalism, “only what makes sense to human reason is accorded significance” (Nürberger 1999:189). Francis Bacon<sup>8</sup> (in Britain) in the 13<sup>th</sup> century and Rene Descartes (in France) in the 16<sup>th</sup> century are the fathers of empiricism and rationalism respectively. The philosophical approaches of these philosophers have certainly influenced Copernicus, Galileo, Kepler and Newton who are acknowledged as fathers of scientific revolution which, in turn, led to technological revolution.<sup>9</sup>

However, we need to clarify what is meant by “technological revolution”. Technological revolution refers to the rapid increase in economic development in Britain from the second half of 18<sup>th</sup> century, thanks to the invention of new machines such as the steam engine. This industrial revolution transferred the balance of political power from the land-owner to the industrial capitalist and created an urban working class (Issacs 1997:10). However, I will apply the concept of “technological revolution” in a special way to refer to its present level of achievement in electronics. Thanks to the advancement in electronics we have different means that make trade, money, communication and social activities grow faster than ever before.

Thus there is little or no doubt that advanced technology, particularly in the recent few decades, is one of the major driving forces behind the phenomenon of economic globalization. Petrella confirms this:

The new world order taking shape in the world today is not the one imagined by absolute statesmen of the Cold War era, that of nation-states weighing in on a new global balance of power. Quite the contrary. Rather, a high-tech archipelago of affluent, hyper-developed city-regions is evolving amid a sea of impoverished humanity. Transnational business firms, in their ceaseless pursuit of new customers, are creating these networks, which bypass the traditional nation-state frameworks. By science and technology solely in the service of the market objectives of these companies, nation-state governments are not only

---

<sup>8</sup>We should be aware of the debate going on among philosophers as to whether it is Francis Bacon (1220-1292) or David Hume (1711-1776) who is the father of empiricism.

<sup>9</sup>Here I am echoing Nürberger’s link between science and technology: “science flows into technology”; “technology is applied science” (Nürberger 1999:189).



hastening their own demise; they are accomplices in a global development strategy that excludes most of the world's population (Petrella 1993:5).

Petrella is not the only scholar who has seen technology as the engine of economic globalization. Some years before him, Noble had described technology as the subject of history when he wrote:

In a society such as ours, which long ago abandoned social purpose to the automatic mechanism of the market, and attributed to things a supremacy over people, technology has readily assumed its appearance as the subject of history (Noble 1986:ix).

Klaus Nürnberger has also confirmed the power of technology in the dynamics of the present stage of economy. In his book, *Beyond Marx and Market*, he writes,

The robust and dynamic economy witnessed today in industrialized countries is based on the scientific-technological approach to reality, the industrial mode of production and sophisticated means of communication, all of which have emerged in the West over long periods of time. Once set in motion, technological progress tends to accelerate (Nürnberger 1998:11).

Thus, there is a wide agreement that technology is the engine of the present phenomenon of economic globalization. There is an exponential increase of productivity of goods and services thanks to technological revolution, especially in the area of electronics. Electronic advancement caused computerisation, robotics, biotechnology, telecommunications and other scientific advances. Thanks to computerisation, money is no more limited to a territory because of the borderless cyberspace of banking computers, the free electronic cross flows of national currency (Tarzi 1999:143, cf. Christie 2000:41).

In finance, economic globalization implies simplified methods of capital transfer, the spread of various monies and financial instruments circulating electronically anywhere and everywhere across the world in a short time, creating (a certain) market interdependence. Of course, as Hirst and Thompson note, we should bear in mind that this capital mobility is not producing any massive

shift of investment and employment from the advanced countries to the developing ones. Instead, foreign direct investment (FDI) is highly concentrated among the advanced industrial economies (and in a small minority of newly industrialized countries) and the Third World remains marginal in both investment and trade (see Kwesi 1998:32ff, Sacks 1998:36ff).

However, whatever extent it might have, this financial market interdependence is not without problems. In effect, the recent financial turmoil in Eastern Asia as well as the turmoil in the European exchange rate mechanism in 1992, show that a disturbance in one financial market in one country can affect the whole world economy. Furthermore, a failure of few minutes in a computer network in one place shows itself disastrous in many places and to many people. One way of minimizing these problems and risks is by reducing relying on human beings' intervention by the use of more sophisticated technology (use of Internet, magnetic tape service, electronic cards, robots). Yet despite these risk management techniques provided by telecommunications and computer-based technology, a problem still remains: the fact that these technologies are mostly limited to few countries of the northern hemisphere (I shall enter in details in the third chapter of this dissertation).

Technological advancement is also perceived in manufacturing and marketing of goods. Tony Spybey gives an example of the Italian textile company of Benetton which operates shops on a global basis. Each shop, wherever it might be, is linked electronically with the headquarters via satellites, if necessary, and sales information is transferred daily. This is then collated into market intelligence from which production plans can be drawn up and continuously amended. Moreover, the customer can order and pay his/her clothes via the Internet without making any movement from his house to the shop (Spybey 1996: 265 ).

Another aspect of technology, as the engine of economic globalization, is that there is no firm that specializes in the whole manufacturing process of a given good. For instance the cellular phone, Nokia is a trade mark of Finland. But the battery of Nokia is manufactured in the Czech Republic, the earphone is manufactured in Taiwan, the Sim card and the user guide are, may be, produced in South Africa. This shows that most production involves subcontracts which might be located in different countries. The coordination of all these contracts certainly requires the use

of modern technology (i.e information technology).

But let us pause a little and ask ourselves what may be some of the implications of technology at the present context of economic globalization. I see six major implications, namely:

### **2.2.1. The minimization of geographical and time factors**

As far as geography is concerned, some scholars talk of the end of geography when they refer to the influence of technology in economic globalization. They go so far as to argue that distance and geography are outdated concepts because, with the present achievement of science and technology, it does not matter where you are. It is against this background that Robert O'Brien entitles his book *Global Financial Integration: The End of Geography*. In the same vein, the editor of *The Economist* writes:

The cliché of the information age is that instantaneous global telecommunications, television and computer networks will soon overthrow the ancient tyrannies of time and space. Companies will need no headquarters, workers will toil as effectively from home, car, or beach as they could in the offices that need no longer exist, and events half a world away will be seen, heard, and felt with the same immediacy as events across the street - if indeed streets will have any point ( *The Economist* July 30, 1994:13).

However, not all scholars who study the phenomenon of economic globalization agree that the geography factor is minimized. For instance, Veseth (1998:35) underlines that globalization is not clearly the end of geography. He argues that no amount of electronic technology can eliminate the local factors of global business. In effect, Veseth notes, multinational enterprises become multi-local enterprises which operate in several countries, but establish a distinct local advantage and compete in each based on local, not on a global advantage. He gives an example of Coca-Cola and McDonald's which adapt to local market conditions, hence becoming multi-local. For instance, the flavouring, packaging, and distribution systems are tailored to local tastes and conditions of the market. McDonald's store in India has to make its hamburgers from lamb, changing the global recipe to meet the requirements of the Hindu market.

Veseth is right in some way. In most cases, neither McDonald nor Coca Cola can use the same raw materials they use in America. In this sense, geography remains an important factor. There is no doubt that it is an exaggeration to talk of “the end of geography” as O’Brien and the editor of *The Economist* want to make us believe. It is true that financial capital can be shifted through electronic means, a mere click of a computer mouse. However, I do think this can equally be the case with mineral resources and the timber from the Equatorial forest in Africa, or from the Amazon forest in Latin America to Europe or Japan. If we were to shift material goods from one place to another by a simple click of a computer mouse, the coffee of Burundi would not have suffered from the economic blockade in 1996-1997, neither could Burundi suffer from its lack of access to the sea. Nevertheless, we should concede that in terms of time it takes to **coordinate** companies using the present technology, geography does not really matter. Moreover, the means of transportation (ships, cars, aeroplane) have acquired higher speed than it was in 1900. This increase in speed minimizes the geography fact in terms of the time it takes to move from one point to another.

### **2.2.2. Increasing productivity requires enlargement of markets:**

Economic growth is dependent upon the application of science and technology. According to Richard Nelson, advanced economies increased their productivity not so much as a result of the amount of capital or labour added to the production process, as was the case in the early stages of industrialisation, but as the outcome of a more efficient combination of the factors of production. These factors include the deeper penetration of technology in connection with the managerial know-how in the production process (Nelson 1981: 1024-64). Of course, as productivity increases, the production must find the market which requires the expansion of the existing one as well as creating new ones.

### **2.2.3. From material production to information-processing activities.**

The actual world economy is also called information economy (Castells 1993:17, Stonier 1983, Cf. Porat 1977). There is more and more a close systemic linkage between manufacturing and the information-service sector. In fact, the information-processing is more and more an

integral part of the industrial production process. In their book, *Manufacturing Matters: The Myth of the Post-Industrial Economy*, Cohen and Zysman observed that today's world economy is heavily centred on services as distinct from manufacturing (Cohen & Zysman as in Murphey 1996:327-8). In the same vein, Castells observed that, in 1990, 47.4 % of the employed population in the US, 45.8 % in the UK, 45.1 % in France and 40 % in Western Germany were engaged in information processing activities, whether in the production of goods or in the provision of services (Castells 1992). Presently, the quality of information and the efficiency in acquiring and processing it now constitute the strategic factors in both competitiveness and productivity of a given firm or country. This leads to another implication of technological advancement:

#### **2.2.4. Displacement and retrenchment of workers:**

As the labour force declines to make place to information services, thanks to the technological revolution, more workers are retrenched, creating the problem of joblessness or unemployment. For instance, the Burundian brewery (BRARUDI) has just retrenched more than 100 workers and replaced them by new technological means. Secretaries in offices are displaced as we move in the era of paperless electronic offices. Unemployment will constitute a source of insecurity in various countries. The recent demonstration of retrenched workers in France and in South Korea is a clear example of this insecurity.

The developing countries are not free from insecurity caused by unemployment. In his *Preparing for the Twenty-First Century* (1993), Paul Kennedy confirms this idea when he argues that technology will cause the displacement of labour especially in lesser developed countries, particularly those which rely on the export of crops. Here we can refer, for instance, to biotechnological farming. While this biotechnology may be beneficial to high-technological, food importing country like Japan, it will be disastrous to developing countries which were exporting food crops in Japan, hence leaving massive agricultural workers without employment. In this respect, Jeremy Rifkin (1995) gives an example of 70,000 farmers in Madagascar who were making their living by producing 70% of the world's vanilla. Today, these farmers see themselves stripped of their livelihoods simply because now the new gene-slicing technologies allow

researchers to produce commercial volumes of vanilla in laboratories.

A situation like this is most likely to produce a flow of migration, especially the younger population leaving rural areas to go to seek jobs in cities. But since they do not have the skills which the modern technology requires, they will turn into gangs of criminals that can be mobilised for anything. This will constitute another source of insecurity.

#### **2.2.5. Flexibility and decentralization in production and management:**

With the advancement of information technologies, the production and trade units can function autonomously, yet be reintegrated functionally through information networks, constituting a new economic space, which Castells calls the “space of flows” (Castells 1989). Reflecting on the globalization of business through multinational companies and capital flows, Paul Kennedy(1993) observed that many larger firms are no longer identifiable as belonging to a given country. In this connection, Kennedy argues that the real logic of the borderless world is that nobody (in some way not even the state) seems to be in control, except perhaps, the managers of multinational corporations who are responsible to their shareholders (which might be a person, a group of people, some times the state).

#### **2.2.6. From a structural position of exploitation to a structural position of irrelevance:**

With the technological sophistication and economic integration of the world economy, many countries of the poor world are engaged in a process of complete deterioration (Castells & Laserna 1989: 535-560). Within the framework of the new information economy, a significant part of the world population is shifting from the structural position of exploitation to a structural position of irrelevance. And since I am concerned with one of the poor African countries, I have to note that Africa, which hitherto was one of the sources of mineral and agricultural resources, is now entering into a situation of irrelevance. Hans Küng, a scholar I shall consider in this reflection writes: “Possibly South Asia, Latin America, and Eastern Europe will grow stronger; in the shade of these economic spheres, Africa remains the problem continent” (Küng 1997:162). It is true that when one says that Africa used to supply mineral resources one implies to some

extent a world economy (Africa participated in this economy through its own exploitation).

The technological development is such that the demand for the resources that Africa has to offer to the export market is dropping, except for the noble mineral resources such as gold, platinum, silver, diamonds, nickel, and of course, oil which are subjects of contradictions in some countries like those of the central African region (see chap.6). At the same time, most Africans do not have the purchasing power to afford manufactured goods from developed countries.

As technology becomes more sophisticated, and making the world economy more specialised and complex, there appears not only the Third World, but also the Fourth World made up of marginalized economies. In fact, according to Corney, et al (1993:7), what used to be known as Third World economies have now been redefined according to their ability to produce goods and services related to information. They fall in four major groups namely:

1. The clear winners in the new international division of labour in the world economy, that is, the rapidly growing, newly industrialized countries of Asia, often referred to as tigers.
2. The potential winners, such as Mexico as part of a North American free-trade area, Brazil and maybe South Africa.
3. The large continental economies of India and China which, primarily because of their potentially huge markets and large stock of highly skilled human capital, are on their way to integration into the new world economy.
4. The clear losers which form the Fourth World: these are the marginal, rural economies as well as the sprawling urban peripheries. The sub-Saharan African countries are classified in this last category.

While other countries are struggling to restructure their economies, the countries of the Fourth World find themselves trapped in the fatal oscillation between hyperinflation and economic stagnation, partly as a result of lack of adaptation to the new speed of world economy, poor infrastructure, and partly as a result of increasing demand of imported goods and declining supply of local goods. If this situation of irrelevance is not addressed, there are three major consequences which might be a way for the Fourth World to make its voice heard. Let us outline and comment

these three consequences in the next point.

### **2.2.7. The Fourth World's reaction to the technology led globalization**

#### *1. Connection to world economy via the criminal economy*

In their struggle for survival, the countries of the Fourth World will try to connect themselves to the world economy via the criminal economy. This kind of economy consists of drug production and trafficking, illegal arms deals, smuggling, corruption (the Central African region is already in this situation), commerce of human beings, especially women and children, as well as the commerce of organs for transplant in private clinics of developed countries. The situation is already with us rather than being a future prediction. In South Africa, for instance, we are not only referred to frequent disappearance of children, but also to the inflow and outflow of women from and to other parts of Africa, Eastern and Central Europe and Asia for various reasons such as prostitution and drug deals. Besides these, I have no doubt that the technology led globalization will also produce a growing number of "useless" people because they do not even have the privilege of being exploited (see Lampe 2000:132). But actually these people are not meant to be useless. They are marginalized because there is no demand for whatever labour they may have in the new division of labour.

#### *2. Desperation and violence.*

Another aspect of the technology led globalization is the expression of utter desperation through widespread violence, either individual or collective. This violence has transformed the cities of the Fourth World into savage and self-destructive battlefields. To refer to African countries, which I am acquainted with, the collective frustration over disintegrating economies and societies often expresses itself through ethnic struggles followed with massacres and the mad spiral of genocidal revenge that the rest of the world generally views with indifference. This seems to be the case in countries such as Burundi, Rwanda, DRC, Zimbabwe, Sierra Leone, Somalia, to name but a few. Obviously I have no doubt that tribal warfare was there even before. But in societies where people from different tribal backgrounds depended on each other, and thus were



thought to cooperate, it goes without saying that economic marginalization exacerbates rivalries.

### *3. The rise of ideological and religious fundamentalism*

The third and last consequence which is found in both the First and the Third World is the rise of ideological and religious fundamentalism. This fundamentalism can easily lead to bold terrorism and/or inter-religious war. The logic of exclusion inherent in the current technologically led world economy is met with the reciprocal appeal for exclusion of the dominant by the excluded. This leads to a breakdown of relationships and the alienation of entire groups, cultures, and even entire countries from the dominant structure of the new world order. We are already acquainted with some fundamentalist movements that oppose models of development which threaten cultural identity as they expand across the planet, while partially integrating the fragments of the societies shattered by techno-economic modernisation. In the end, this fundamentalism leads to a ferocious defence of territorial and cultural boundaries through unrestricted violence.

I am tempted to say that these three reactions might give developed countries another occasion of colonization, whatever form that colonization might take. It is true that such enterprise could be hurtful although it could have some dividends. Americans seem to have attempted this experience in Somalia in view of establishing a shortcut to the Gulf. Presently, there is a debate going on in the United States senate about devising ways of (re)colonizing war torn Central Africa Region (see Ottaway 1999, Reno 1999)<sup>10</sup>. These attempts might just be hegemonic in the first sight. But they have deep economic roots.

In conclusion we should note that technological development and its dividends are far from reaching the poor countries, especially in Africa south of Sahara. It is still too hard for poor countries to participate in the globalized economy, both in terms of production and in terms of consumption. According to Oman, there is no guarantee that economic globalization will bring the kind of multilateral trade liberalisation that would benefit poor countries which more and more constitute the Fourth World (Oman 1994:19-23). The point being put across is that only a

---

<sup>10</sup>The texts of this project of recolonization of the central African region can be found on the Internet site: [www.Burundi.org](http://www.Burundi.org). (in english section) files 353 and 357.

minority of the world's population can actually be considered to participate significantly in the mass production, and mass consumption sector of the global economy (Kwesi 1998, Christie 2000). Let us now embark on the second driving force of economic globalization which is media of communication.

### **2.3. Media of communication as the facilitator of economic globalization**

By media of communication, I refer to the **infrastructure** that facilitate economic globalization. The contemporary period is marked by dramatic advances in communication technology which is another driving force of economic globalization. According to Held, et.al,

Since the 1980s, the information technology revolution, among other factors, has encouraged a plurality of modes of organizing international production beyond simply either the international hierarchy of the traditional MNC, in which the home headquarters simply controls foreign subsidiaries, or arms-length competition between firms (Held, et.al 1999: 255).

In the same way, Castells says:

The strategic aim of firms, large and small, is to sell wherever they can throughout the world, either directly or via their linkage with networks that operate in the world market. And there is indeed, to a large extent, thanks to new communication and transportation technologies, channels and opportunities to sell everywhere (Castells 1996:95).

In the same vein, according to Veseth (1998:30, see also Held,et al. 1998:176ff), global market expansion has taken place in the last part of the 20<sup>th</sup> century alongside great advances in telecommunications (television, radio, telephone both fixed and mobile, telefax, informatics). These means of communication allow messages through space to be transmitted instantaneously and independently of human messengers. It is the enhancement of telecommunications that has created the material infrastructure for the formation of the global economy.

Telecommunications, which is part of information technology, is a critical factor which allows flexibility and decentralisation in the production and management. With the technological progress in telecommunications, production and trade units can (seem to) function autonomously, yet be integrated functionally through information networks. Where necessary, technological development has made it possible for everyone to travel in short of time. Technological development in media of communications makes possible the hyper-mobility of people, of capital on a global scale, and the deregulation of multiple markets allowing for the implementation of that hyper-mobility (Sassen 1998:88).

According to Spybey, there are two main thrusts to electronic technology which have enhanced media of communication in the present world of globalization, viz: advances in information creation, storage and retrieval on the one hand, and advances in communication via cables, optical fibres, area waves and space satellites. Thus the means of media and communication can be classified in five major categories:

- Transportation,
- wire cable and coaxial cable,
- wireless broadcasting
- earth satellite
- fibre optic cable,

### **2.3.1. Transportation**

This has been the most common means of communication in human history. One should say that travel and communication have been the same thing before the modern means of communication. In effect, there was no significant means of transmitting messages without the accompaniment of human messengers. Today transportation has passed to another stage with ships, trains, cars and aviation, making postal and express message services as well as the movement of important quantities of material goods faster than ever before.

### **2.3.2. Wire communication and coaxial cable**

Wire communication and coaxial cable began with the electric telegraph in 1844, invented

by Samuel Morse. Henceforth, messages could be transmitted independently of travel or movement of people. Today, the telegraph has evolved into telephone and fax machine, making the transmission of information instantaneous. These technologies allow a much greater volume of information to be transmitted, including images, data, and voice. However, although they are reliable, they are expensive.

### **2.3.3. Wireless broadcasting**

The transmission of information without wire is another major breakthrough in media and communication. Wireless broadcasting started with the radio receiver and is now at the level of television. These media of mass communication are very important also in transmitting a large amount of information. These seem to be a much used medium in the advertisement of goods and services in the world. However, these media suffer from interference of weather conditions. Today, the wireless medium of communication has evolved to give birth to mobile intercom systems and mobile or cellular telephones.

### **2.3.4. Earth satellites**

The wireless broadcasting is enhanced by earth satellites. This technology started in 1965. A satellite could transmit 240 telephone conversations or the volume of two television stations. One of the advantages of this medium of communication is that remote areas can be served.

### **2.3.5. Fibre optic cable**

This consists of transmission of information by light along very thin flexible fibres of glass. It is very rapid and has a very large carrying capacity. But it is also very expensive. Moreover it is not viable for remote areas. Maybe if science and technology keep progressing, this way of transmitting information may turn out to be cheaper and efficient in remote areas.

When we talk of technological advancement, we are referring to the three last forms of communication, that is: wireless broadcasting, earth satellite, and fibre optic cable which

constitute today's superhighway thanks to the development in electronics.

**Table 2.1: Table of evolution of technology and communications**

Period	technology	Communication
Since Antiquity	Natural resources of power	Human messengers
19 <sup>th</sup> century	Steam power, cheaper steel Electricity	Regular postal service Telegraph Telephone
20 <sup>th</sup> early century	Electricity Internal combustion Engine Photography  Sound recording	Radio Airmail Photographs Cinema Records, tapes
Mid 20 <sup>th</sup> century	Cathode ray tube Space rockets	Television Satellites
Late 20 <sup>th</sup> century	Electronics   Fibre optics	Computers Compact discs Fax machines Cellular phone Multiple communications

Source: Adapted from Spybey (1996:110)

However, all these means of communication of information remain the privilege of a few people who have the purchasing power. In fact, these means of communication seem to have widened the gap between the centre and the peripheries as they characterise a world divided into the haves and the have nots, the rich and the poor, those who can purchase and those who cannot. The technology of communication has reached a high level of achievement. Yet it is far away from poor places and people. I am not surprised that I spend hours and even days before I can get transport to my village which is about 200 kilometres from the capital of my country, Burundi. And even if I get transport, I spend the whole day travelling over such a short distance. This might sound better since fifty years ago, I would have had to spend more time. Nevertheless, I do not doubt that there are many areas on the African continent, where nobody has ever seen a car or spends months without seeing a car. In this condition, how can I talk of economic globalization as facilitated by media of communication? In addition, many parts of African countries have no

electricity. In these places it makes no sense to talk of telephone, fax, television, computers, Internet and even the radio. In my village situated at 4 km away from the capital of my province, of 100 families, only one family has a radio. What is sure, this radio does not serve to advertise the goods this family produces. Of course, this is not to deny the fact that technology makes international information available to more people in each nation. This helps those who have developed this technology to reach out and extend their market for more profit.

Let us now view another driving force of economic globalization which is political liberalism. I shall view this political liberalism as the politics of economic globalization.

#### **2.4. Liberal democracy as the politics of economic globalization.**

I shall attempt to show that liberal democracy is the politics of economic globalization by focussing mainly on the process of democratization in Sub-Saharan Africa since the 1990s, and show how liberal democracy was championed as a politics of economic globalization.

##### **2.4.1. Democratisation and economic reforms in Sub-Saharan Africa**


The collapse of the Berlin Wall and the disintegration of the Soviet Union and its satellites in Central-Eastern Europe and in Africa at the end of 1989, were followed by increasing claims for democratic rights on the African continent ( Bratton & De Walle 1997:27-33).

Correspondingly, since 1990, we observed a brutally quick social and political change in Africa. The one party system, close control of personal freedoms and the centralised economy were shattered. Pressures and incentives surged from the Western socio-political and economic culture to fill the vacuum. As a result, a pluralistic political participation, enlarged freedom of expression and economic liberalisation were promoted. However, it is worthwhile to note that virtual dictatorships and one party states are still alive in some parts of the continent. Nevertheless the progress towards the democratic experience is real. To refer to statistics, in 1975 in Sub-Saharan Africa, only three countries were liberal democracies, two were partial democracies, and 43 were authoritarian regimes. In 1995, in the same region, 20 countries were liberal democracies,

16 are partial democracies, and 12 are authoritarian (Potter, et al. 1997:9).

The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the injunctions of Western countries were not the only factors that forced African states to institute political reforms in the direction of political liberalism. In fact, a close look at what happened in the 1980s would reveal that political liberalism is also a fruit of a tree whose roots are deeply economic. As J. Nyang'oro and T. Shaw (1992) have observed, the decade 1980-1990 opened with the recognition by development analysts of a profound crisis in Africa's political economy (see also Haggard and Webb 1994, Diamond 1988:26-28). Economically, most of the command economies of Sub-Saharan were disintegrating and Africa was (is still) being left far behind.

**Figure 2.1: GNP in Developing Countries and Sub-Saharan Africa (1970-1990)**  
(Per capita GNP 1975= 100)



Source: adapted from World Development Indicators (World Bank 1997)

In 1980, in a concerted effort between the United Nation's Economic Commission for Africa and the Organization for African Unity sought to come to grips with, and overcome the crisis by combining external support and domestic self-reliance. This has come to be termed the Lagos Plan of Action for the Economic Development of Africa (LPA). External support was to include official assistance and transnational investment. However, this support declined as Africa's external debt kept increasing. At the level of self-reliance, African heads of states thought in terms of a common continental market that could be effected through some political action. This effort created a number of regional integrations such as the Preferential Trade Area (PTA) in Eastern and Southern Africa, CEAC (Economic Community of Central Africa), ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States), Southern African Development Community (SADC).

However, these regional associations could not achieve results and the crisis was not overcome. One of the reasons was the fact that the international world order was still based on ideological conflict. Each country was enclosed in its own ideological framework (either capitalism or socialism) rather than providing a solution to the economic crisis. Yet, at the same time, the neoclassical economy was taking its course. In the framework of this neoliberal economy, international financial institutions such as International Monetary Fund (IMF) the World Bank (WB) and Western governments as well as their financial institutions such as the Paris Club, the London Club thought that they could deal with the crisis through a reform package. This reform package included currency devaluation, privatization, cuts in government expenditure, and reform of the excessive bureaucracy. It is this reform that is referred to as a Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP).

However, as the time went on, Western governments and international financial institutions realized that socio-economic reforms could not be achieved within the context of previous political arrangements. Thus SAP was followed by political reforms in the direction of democracy.

According Edmond Keller (1995:227), the implementation of SAP exposed the political failings of the regimes concerned, which hitherto had concentrated all the political and economic power in their hands. In fact, this was the very practice of one-party and authoritarian regimes. This exposition provided an opportunity for the emergence of a civil society which claimed a



political voice on how the economy should be run (Fatton 1992: 103). Furthermore, in the post-Cold War context, Western countries endeavoured to show that it is democracy in the form of political pluralism that alone could guarantee economic growth. In other words, as it is argued, political liberalism and liberal economy go together (Iheduru 1999: 22-4, Sunkel 1993b, Pool 1993, McClintock 1989). These two aspects govern the so-called New World Order in which liberal democracy and free market go hand in hand.

The underlying reason for the link between (liberal) democracy and the free market is the presumption according to which each individual is sovereign and has the same right to determine his/her fate, develop initiatives, cooperate or compete with others. In other words, there is nobody who has the right to tell you what to do, or to submit to some higher authority which does not derive its mandate from the people as sovereign individuals. Such is the logic of liberal democracy and the free market. Correspondingly, a glance at the current international political situation reveals that the world is moving towards a political universalism centred on democracy. Democracy, especially in its liberal form seems to have become the only unquestioned political arrangement. It is this kind of political regime that is said to be conducive to free trade within nation-states and internationally.

To some extent, it would seem as if it is in the states where the tradition of liberal democracy has been established that the economy seems to flourish.<sup>11</sup> These are mostly Western European and Northern American countries (according to Potter the 24 rich countries of Western Europe, North America and Australasia are liberal democracies). It is in this respect that the governments and donors of these countries also want to teach the lesson of political liberalisation to autocratic regimes, insisting that aid must be made conditional on the implementation of free elections and free markets (Chenu 1997:154).

---

<sup>11</sup>Of course, the example of the so-called Asian tigers or dragons shows that there is necessarily no connection between liberal democracy and economic growth. For instance South Korea is not necessarily a liberal democracy, yet its economic growth is spectacular. In fact, it has been observed that strong state intervention in the economy has been one of the main causes for the rapid economic growth of the newly industrialised countries. Instead, some countries like India, are democracies, yet their economy seems to be stagnant and poor.

Accordingly, in 1990, the French minister of Cooperation and Development explained to the African partners of France that, if they want to maintain an active economic cooperation with France, they must engage in democratic reforms like Eastern and Central Europe. He added that there is no development apart from a democratic environment (cited by Ntibanunganya 1991:232). In the same perspective, the World Bank and International Monetary Fund experts did not hesitate to explain to Third World countries that the success of economic reforms must go hand in hand with the reform of political system. By this token, Claude Ake notes that the demand for democracy in Africa draws much of its impetus from the prevailing conditions within it (Ake 1993:239-244).

Thus liberal democracy is viewed as the prerequisite for economic development. Of course, it is one thing to make democracy triumph as an idea, but another to put it into practice. For democracy to be put into practice, three things are necessary: the constitution must be democratic, this constitution must be implemented, the population must be aware of its rights and dare to exercise them.

All this presupposes a change in the collective mind-set. Maybe Africa needs to do away with some aspects of its traditional mind-set and embrace some aspects of the modern mind-set as some countries like Japan did (cf. Nürnberger 1999:195-204). But the question is how much this change can be successful if it is ordered from outside. The influence from outside might be important provided it is internalized so as to become a personal insight. Accordingly, if liberal democracy which is an injunction from outside becomes a people's insight, then it can really mean the participation of all citizens to political processes. Nevertheless, one would wonder whether genuine participation is possible under the condition of poverty and serious inequalities. Poverty can make democracy difficult, although it is this same form of government that seems necessary for the poor to press for change and avoid being the prey of the rich and the powerful. Yet still, it would seem as if in liberal democracy the voice of the rich is more heard than the voice of poor.

For a genuine democracy to emerge, there is need for social reform. By social reform I mean traditional social structures and institutions have to be subjected to critical evaluation in order to look towards the future. In the absence of this reform, democracy in Africa might mean

nothing else other than destructive (social and political) competition motivated by greed and material interests as it has been observed in most African countries such as Burundi, Zaire, Congo, Rwanda, Nigeria, Zimbabwe, Niger, etc (Cf. Chenu 1997:153). In effect, democracy without social reform would just be a kind of catch-word by which ambitious demagogues and dictators hijack political power while the best leaders are crushed. In fact, in the next chapter we shall see that most African political leaders, particularly in the present context of globalization are more in search of power and profit, and hence use patterns of bargaining, manipulation and deceit, instead of political and socio-economic programmes that could liberate the people.

#### **2.4.2. Link between democratisation and economic globalization.**

My main concern is how democratization is linked with economic globalization. The argument of the link between liberal democracy and economic globalization can be constructed as follows: for three decades most countries lived in political (one party system) or/ and military dictatorship(s) with state controlled economies where less space was given to private enterprise. Economic protectionism led to closed borders. With the advent of liberal democracy, political competition would also strengthen economic competition and private enterprise, and of course, the opening of borders conducive to free market and trade. Free market and trade is what constitutes the major principle of economic globalization.

Hence, we can understand the pressure put on African countries to privatise the companies owned by the state. These companies are sold either to individual citizens or international companies (Baker et al. 1998). But privatisation seems to have failed due to low access to private capital flow, especially that of foreign direct investment (Kwesi 1998:34). Only sectors which yield quick profit such as oil, noble minerals, breweries seem to get much attention. Even here, the sector of oil and noble mineral escape the normal channel of investment because of corruption. And corruption is a barrier to foreign direct investment which is one of the aspect of economic globalization (Sacks 1998:39).

According to Makinda, it was in the interests of developed countries to see that this liberal democratization succeeds in Africa (Makinda 1996:563). However, I should make one

consideration here. The Western countries which benefit most from economic globalization championed liberal democracy as an ideology of the market and maximization of profit. Thus it was not the political concern aimed at making African better, but an economic concern aimed at enlarging their market and profit that goes with it. An American commentator once said, “The US government believes it was the triumph of democracy and market that defeated communism ( and its closed economy), and it is committed to the defence of both”. But it is difficult to be committed equally to “both” when the priority is given to the market.

It is worthwhile to note that the language of liberal democracy is not championed in the case of East and South Asia whose economies are developed, but yet fairly autocratic. On this note, the link between liberal democracy and economic take-off is controversial and needs to be questioned to some extent. The question is whether people necessarily need liberal democracy for their economy to be better. A political economist who has observed what is happening in South and East Asia would answer in the negative. Because South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan and even China did not need liberal democracy for their “economic miracle”. While in Sub-Saharan Africa liberal democracy came as an attempt to save the continent from the parlous economic state, in South and East Asia, democracy is coming after economic progress has been achieved. The post-communist Russia tried democracy but ended in economic chaos because of rampant corruption and inefficiency. Democracy in India did not necessarily lead to economic progress. Thus liberal democracy can be championed as a politics of economic globalization, but that this form of political ordering will be the sufficient and necessary condition for economic success is not so obvious. Accordingly, that liberal democracy has led to economic success in North America and Western Europe (and therefore it should be the politics of economic globalization) does not mean that the link will follow in Africa or/and Asia. I think these latter can still enter in the world economy by adapting their own political and economic models, provided these models involve all the people and lead to productivity and competitiveness.

I should say that, in the end, political liberalism is not sufficient to catalyse economic development. It is surprising that the so-called democratic nations championed political liberalism as the politics of the market-economy, but hardly said a word on education through which technology is acquired and adapted to local realities.

To conclude this point, political liberalization might be made a political system of economic liberalism, and therefore economic globalization. But this does not make it “a universal law of nature” to be applied everywhere. Economic liberalism has been introduced in Africa, but the economy of Africa continues to fall behind, and people continue to be poorer. Political liberalism has been introduced in Africa as a “missing link” between economic liberalism and economic development, but it ended in political instability and chaos which benefit to some few people and impoverish the majority of others. By this token, according to Medard, the introduction of economic and political liberalism brought international corruption and poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa (Medard 1997:413-440). On this note, I should say that political liberalism could be seen as a political ideology of economic globalization only in so far as socialism and its command economy as an alternative to capitalism and its liberal economy seem to have failed. This does not mean that there might not be other ways out.

#### **2.4. Conclusion.**

In this chapter I have attempted to critically describe the nature of economic globalization and what underpins it. Along with Scholte and Tarzi, I argued that economic globalization cannot just be equated with the crossing of borders, that is, internationalization or the opening of borders, that is, liberalization. I suggested that economic globalization is, **to some extent**, a transnational phenomenon which has technology as its engine, the media of communication as its facilitator, and political liberalism as its politics.

Before I move to the next chapter, it should be noted that the phenomenon of globalization is a neutral one. It could be either good or bad depending on what people make of it. For some countries it is another opportunity to take a step ahead, as is the case with the already developed countries of the northern triad formed by North America, the European Union and Japan, and the so-called “tigers” of Eastern and Southern Asia. For others, like the African countries, economic globalization has detrimental effects despite domestic and external efforts to provide the politics on which economic globalization could take off. This effort, let us recall, consisted in demanding liberal democratic governments which followed economic reforms launched by international

financial institutions and Western countries and donors of aid. Despite this economic and political efforts, developing African countries cannot move. Not only do these countries need some social reform on which to lay their political model (not necessarily liberal democracy) but also they need an appropriate technology and infrastructure that could catalyse their economies. Otherwise Africa will continue to lag behind and might fall into the situation of irrelevance.

I am aware that between the bloc of countries which are moving ahead with economic globalization and the bloc of countries which are stepping back because of the lack of technological know-how and infrastructure, there are other countries of the South which are struggling to be integrated. These ones will not be my concern because on the one hand their success would place them in the bloc which is moving ahead, whereas on the other hand, their failure will classify them in the bloc which is stepping back.

Instead I shall concern myself with the extremes which set the world into two parts. In the process, it will become clear that the globalization of world economy goes with the globalization of world poverty. It is here that I shall ask a crucial question: **where is God?** Is s/he on the side of those who are successful or the side of those who continue to lag in misery. I will argue that God is no where to be found in a world where people do not yet recognize themselves in **her/his image** which is the ground of sharing and therefore of justice. It is on this note that I shall now embark on the third chapter of my essay.

## **CHAP THREE**

### **CONSEQUENCES OF ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION**

At one level one might be tempted to think that a world in which multinationals help to industrialize developing countries ought to be one in which everybody benefits. After all, most of us believe in donating to aid agencies; how wonderful if multinationals could help developing countries to stand on their own feet. In fact, however, the stock of direct overseas investment tends to be concentrated in obvious places, such as the more successful economies of South-East Asia. Despite the low labor costs, multinational are not rushing to establish themselves in the more depressed parts of the Third World

*Keegan (2001: 261)*

### 3.0. Introduction

Among the wealthy in our societies, there is a global world, global investment markets and economic opportunities, but the poor are often completely left out of the process. Their economic conditions may not globalize at all (Christie 2000:41)

It is with this observation that I should like to consider the consequences of economic globalization. The phenomenon of economic globalization transcends national borders, yet 80 % of the world's population remains poor. 20 % of the world's population share 82.7 % of the world's income while the remaining 80% of the world's population share 17.3% (UNDP 1992) Despite the promise of economic globalization to move humanity towards a "universal well-being", the rich continue to be richer while the poor continue to be poorer and marginalized (cf. Mugambi 1999:273, Kalliah 1999, Bhattachargi 1997, Longchamp 1998), and progressively lose the ability and the power to name themselves (Magesa 1999:235, Rugumamu 1999, see Chambrier 1997, Shamonah 1997).

Thus the phenomenon of economic globalization is ambiguous. On the one hand, we can appreciate the dividends of economic globalization as they are evident in the growth of international trade, a tendency to universalize the ideology of political liberalism as a result of the failure of socialism and its command economy, an apparent international solidarity, economic prosperity as well as the triumph of the market economy. On the other hand, we cannot close our eyes to the by-product of economic globalization, namely: the growing marginalization of the poor countries and the poor within these countries, the demise of the nation state coupled with social and political chaos, particularly in poor countries (Amoroso 1998), obvious inequalities and social injustices between centers and peripheries between and within countries, ecological degradation, and moral decadence due to blind interest in the market and maximization of profit.

Accordingly, the main thrust of my argument, in this chapter, is structured as follows:

1. Economically, the international trade is increasing, yet poor countries and the poor within countries continue to be economically marginalized.



2. Politically, with the failure of socialism and its command economy, political liberalism is being universalized, yet the socio- political instability is increasing in poor countries while the nation- state is losing its ground and its power.

3. Socially, while we talk of international solidarity, we must be aware of obvious inequalities and social injustices between and within these countries.

4. Ecologically, economic prosperity is followed by continual ecological degradation,

5. Ethically, the triumph of the market is followed by moral decline.

Those are the articulations I shall try to develop in this chapter. Let us now consider each in turn.

### **3.1. Growth of international trade and economic marginalization of poor countries**

In its document, *World Development's Report* published in 1997, the World Bank makes the following observation:

Globalization (understand economic globalization) is not yet truly global- it has yet to touch a large chunk of the world economy. Roughly half of the developing world's people have been left out of the much discussed rise in the volume of international trade and capital flows(World Bank 1997:12).

I am aware that most the world's people left out in the process of economic globalization are in the Southern hemisphere. However, for the sake of relevance and contextual limitation, I will refer to the poor countries of the Sub-Saharan Africa. In effect, it is commonly agreed among scholars that, of all the regions of the Third World, it is Sub-Saharan Africa that is left far behind in economic development (Nations Unies 2000). In fact, Fourth World Countries are most likely to be found in this region of the world. According to D. L Sparks (1998), despite the fact of economic globalization, the economies of Sub-Saharan Africa are, for the most part small and fragile, and the region is rapidly being left behind in the global economy. Furthermore, of the 47 countries classified by the World Bank as least developed, 32 were in Sub-Saharan Africa. The region of Sub-Saharan Africa accounts for only less than 1% of world trade. According to K. R.

Nossal, in 1991, before the civil war, Somalia's external trade amounted to about US \$ 240 million. This annual figure is less than a quarter of the volume traded between United States and Canada in one day (Nossal 1998:431). As we shall see, the factors underlying Sub-Saharan Africa's parlous economic conditions are far from being solely internal. The external factors include adverse movements in terms of trade, poor foreign investment, the burden of debt, decline in foreign aid among others (Sparks 1998:11). Coming back to the main point, although there is an increase in the volume of international trade, poor countries continue to be economically marginalized. But why is this the case?

### **3.1.1. Facts about the growth of international trade and marginalization of poor countries**

According to S. Isaacs, since 1950, the world output has grown every year by an average of 3.9 % and the world trade by an average of 5.8 %. This growth of trade is particularly spectacular in new manufactured goods such as office machines, automatic data processing, telecommunications equipment, electronic equipments, parts and accessories. Between 1980 and 1993, the volume of exports in new manufactured products grew by an average of 13 % every year. This volume increased from 11.5 % in 1980 to 28.2 % in 1993 (Isaacs 1997:65ff). Apart from the trade of manufactured goods, there is also an increase of trade in services. The sector of service includes public administration, education, communication, tourism, transport, and of course, finance. Between 1980 and 1992, trade in service has grown by 8.3%. The developed / industrialized countries hold 80% of traded services (United Nations 1995).

While in developed countries we talk of exports of new manufactured goods and services, the poor countries are still exporting raw materials (mineral resources or agricultural products), because they do not have neither the **technological infrastructure** nor the know-how which is required to transform them. But as the poor countries export raw materials, they are obliged to import manufactured goods. This exportation of raw materials and importation of manufactured goods and services is very problematic. The price of raw materials is fixed by the rich countries and has been declining. The implication of this is that the poor countries get less foreign exchange. On the contrary the price of manufactured goods and services is continually increasing, and is also fixed by the very countries which fix the prices of raw materials. The implication here is that the

poor countries have to pay more for their importations. And if they have to pay more, they must export more raw materials or they have to contract debts (see Isaacs 1997:72-3).

Using his new theory of need and capacity which he contrasts with that of supply and demand, Klaus Nürnberger also goes in the direction of the above argument. He argues that while the basic needs of the developed countries (center population) are largely satisfied and the productive capacity constantly grows, the poor countries (peripheral population) have lots of unfulfilled needs, but lack the purchasing power to buy greater quantities of center products. Consequently, under the effect of advertising and aggressive marketing (use of **media of communication**), the meager income of the poor countries is spent on the goods of developed countries, while the poor producers lose their (local) markets. At the same time, because this income is not enough, the periphery is obliged to sell its raw factors of productions to the center in order to obtain an income. In contrast, **technological development** makes the center less and less dependent on the factors of production offered by the periphery (Nürnberger 1999: ch.12: sects.1&2). As a result, the poor continue to sink in underdevelopment, while the rich go in the opposite direction, that is, over-development. By this token, it is not surprising that the volume of trade is very high among the developed countries (because of high income), whereas in the poor countries it is poor (because of low income).

Another aspect of international trade is the movement of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Foreign Direct Investment refers to governments, institutions, individuals buying assets in another country. This may involve the setting up of subsidiary companies for the productions of goods. In the actual stage of economic globalization, it is often the Multinational Corporations (MNCs) that are responsible for FDI. According to Paul Hirst and Graham Thompson (1997), since early 1980, the dominant factor driving the world economy is FDI (Hirst & Thompson 1997:51). Between 1981 and 1985, the flow of FDI grew with an average of 5.4 % every year; between 1986 and 1990 it was 19.8 % every year; between 1991 and 1993 it was 7.2 % every year.

The problem is that FDI is unevenly distributed around the world for the reason I have just outlined (income and the rich and poor disparity). Most FDI takes place between industrialized countries and in a small number of newly industrialized countries of Eastern and Southern Asia

(Asian tigers or dragons) and Latin America. In 1994, The Asian tigers hosted more than 70 % of the total FDI in developing countries (United Nations 1995). Many poor countries, especially those of Sub-Saharan Africa seem to be excluded in this increasing FDI simply because they are poor (less income and poor market, lack infrastructure, lack of staff due to absence of/poor education). The small flow of FDI in Africa is generally concentrated in few countries which have natural resources such as oil, gas, gold, copper, diamond, and quick profit-making sectors such as breweries. However, even this small flow is more and more disappearing because of international corruption which is increasing in Sub-Saharan Africa (Medard 1997:413-40).


It was suggested that if the poor countries are to host FDI, they have to open up their markets applying the reforms proposed by IMF and World Bank. That is, embracing the neoliberal orthodoxy. However, although the poor countries might have opened their markets, especially those which had planned socialist economies, and then opted for the market economy characteristic of neoliberalism, there is really no full participation in the process of economic globalization.

In defining the phenomenon of economic globalization, we noted that one of the driving forces of this phenomenon is technology. In effect, it is technology that influences better manufacturing and renovate production systems and products so as better to meet internal and external demand and to play a bigger role in the process of internationalization of the goods thus produced. This technology happens to be concentrated in the triad composed of North America, European Union and Japan, and outside the triad, the newly industrialized countries (NICs which we called Asian tigers). In effect, it is these countries which produced technology as a result of their new outlook, that is, modernity in the Western countries, or which adapted it to their cultural reality in the case of East and South Asian countries. Thus, there is little or no movement of capital towards the poor countries, just as technology is lacking in these countries (Held, et. al 1999, UNACTAD 1999). Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson are right when they note:

Capital mobility is not producing a massive shift of investment and employment to the developing countries. Rather, foreign direct investment is highly concentrated among the advanced industrial economies and the Third World remains marginal in both investment and trade, a small minority of newly industrialized countries apart (Hirst & Thompson

1996:2).

**Table 3.1. Intra-Triad Foreign Direct Investment in 1990 (in billion of US \$)**

	European Economic Area (EEA)	North America	Japan
European Economic Area (EEA)		280 (15% of the stocks and 7% of the flows)	7 (17.0 % of the stocks and 45.5% of the flows)
North America	225.5 (8.4 % of the stocks and 13.6 % of the flows)		21.7 (13.1% of the stocks and 7.3% of the flows)
Japan	19.3 (21.0% of the stocks and 46.8% of the flows)	85.4 (32.2 % of the stocks and 7.3% of the flow)	

N.B: The percentages show average annual growth rates of stocks (1980-1990) and flows (1985-1991). Source: *Adapted from ANCTAD Programme on Transnational Corporations, foreign direct investment data base (as from Hirst and Thompson 1997:63).*


This has brought doubts as to whether the world economy is genuinely global since as Hirst observes, the trade, investment and financial flow remain concentrated in the Triad of Europe, Japan and the Asian NICs, and North America and this dominance is most likely to continue:

... the world economy remains dominated by the three major blocs of wealth and power: the Triad of Europe, Japan and North America. Outside the Triad, industrial growth and foreign direct investment (FDI) flows are concentrated in a limited number of successful but relatively small developing countries, or in specific regions of larger countries, such as the coastal provinces of China (Hirst 1997:410).

Figure 3.1: Foreign Direct Investment Clusters of Triad Members in 1990, economies in which a Triad member dominates inward foreign direct investment stocks and/or flow

a: In terms of average inward FDI flow (1988-1990)

b: In terms of inward FDI stock, 1990.



Source: UNCTAD Program on Transnational Corporations, Foreign Direct Investment Data Base

(in Hirst and Thompson 1996:65).

The point so far is that poor countries have very low capital and suffer from a low flow of foreign direct investment (FDI), although it seems to have increased as a result of the encouragement of privatization, economic liberalization, lifting of restrictions, (see Table 3.2). Because their exports yield low income, hence causing low capital, and because there is no sufficient FDI, they rely on extended dependence on aid, foreign assistance, and of course, debt. This latter constitutes 200 % of exports. Such percentage is unsustainably high (See Table 3.3).

**Table 3.2.: Net Long-Term Resource Flows to Sub-Saharan Africa from 1990-1997 (US\$ billion)**

	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997
<b>Net Resource Flows</b>	<b>17.2</b>	<b>16.2</b>	<b>16.7</b>	<b>14.6</b>	<b>20.6</b>	<b>24.2</b>	<b>17.2</b>	<b>20.9</b>
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)	0.8	1.6	1.6	1.9	3.3	3.8	3.3	3.0
Portfolio Flows	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.2	0.9	4.9	2.0	2.1
Flow on Long Term Debt	4.1	3.4	3.6	2.1	4.3	4.0	0.8	5.2
Grants	12.3	11.1	11.4	10.5	12.1	11.5	11.1	10.6

From the above table, we see that the volume of debt is far higher than FDI. The implication is that Sub-Saharan countries are for ever in the situation of paying debts. Even the revenues from the FDI must be used to pay debts. As a result there are no savings. Thus it is obvious that both long term debt and grants cannot be an answer for trade with poor countries to take place. Because they leave poor countries in perpetual indebtedness. This is clear if one takes a look at the outstanding debt and the debt service of these poor countries (Table 3.3). Already in the decade 1980-1990, this debt had attained dangerous proportions as compared to the rest of the world. It was respectively 26.6 %, 80.6%, 109.4% of the GNP respectively in 1980, 1987, 1990 (Table 3.4). Of course, this debt might have increased because of the structural adjustment programme which was the condition for getting a loan from international financial institutions and from Western governments. The structural adjustment programme increased debt and not savings. And it is savings that are needed if poor nations are to participate in world trade. It is here that those who suggest the total cancellation of debt owned by poor countries to rich countries might be right. Because the money used to pay the debt would be saved for an eventual investment in economic development projects.

There is another problem which is strongly pointed out by African scholars. Some African scholars argue that the loans and grants-in-aid do not serve economic development proper to African situation. Accordingly, L. Magesa argues that the type of project aided are often irrelevant to African needs. The massive repatriation of the dividends of the aid in the form of material resources and personnel contributes to the failure of aid as a solution to Africa's economic development (Magesa 1999:236). In fact, what Magesa is pointing out is that, the aid and loans that come from the world financial institutions or Western government go back through the payment of the personnel or

technical assistance as well as through buying the material resources that is needed to set up a given project. Hence, there is a need to plan projects that are adapted to African realities on the one hand, and on the other hand, to train local personnel.

**Table 3.3. External Debt Outstanding and Debt service Payment of Sub-Saharan Africa, 1990-1997 (in \$ billion, except otherwise indicated)**

Year	1990	1994	1995	1996	1997 a/
<b>Total outstanding debt</b>	284.8	304.0	322.2	324.3	315.2
Short term debt	34.5	49.5	57.9	63.0	50.9
Long term debt	250.3	255.4	264.4	261.3	265.3
Total to official creditors	193.0	225.6	232.7	232.4	223.6
Total to financial Institutions	50.4	42.0	39.9	35.1	27.3
Total to other private creditors	41.3	37.4	49.6	56.8	64.2
<b>Ratio of debt service payment to exports of goods and services (%)</b>					
Debt service ratio b/	26.3	22.3	18.7	19.4	21.7
Interest payment ratio c/	10.3	9.6	8.9	8.6	9.6
Amortization ratio d/	16.0	12.7	9.7	10.8	12.1
<b>Total ratio of debt to GDP</b>	62.5	66.7	60.2	55.7	50.9
<b>Total ratio of debt to export of goods and services</b>	231.8	249.2	227.6	211.6	194.2

Note: a/ : estimates, b/: amortization on long-term debt and interest payments, c/: on total interest payments, d/: on amortization payment (i.e. Principal repayment) on long term debt only

Source: African Development Bank, African Development Report 1998



**Table 3.4: Africa and world external debt ratios (1980-1992)**

Regions	Debt as a % of GNP				Debt as % of Exports			
	1980	1987	1990	1992	1980	1987	1990	1992
Sub-Saharan Africa	28.6	80.6	109.4	88.2	10.9	14.7	19.5	20.0
East Asia & Pacific	16.9	24.9	26.9	23.6	13.5	17.2	14.6	13.0
South Asia	17.0	21.6	30.7	28.2	11.9	20.8	25.9	23.0
Europe & Central Asia	24.3		41.0	31.3	14.0		16.9	14.0
Europe/Central Asia/Middle East/ North Africa		49.9				26.7		
Middle East and North Africa	31.0		52.6	40.3	16.1		24.4	22.2

**Source:** *Adapted from Iheduru 1999:48*

The table 3.4 shows that the Sub-Saharan African region has the highest percentage of debt of the GNP compared to other regions of the world. Table 3.2. shows that more than the half of GDP is spent on debt service (62,5 % in 1990, 66,7% in 1994, 60,2% in 1995, 55,7% in 1996). These percentages are equivalent to far more than 200 % of the income from the export of goods and services. And although it seems decreasing year after year, there is no sufficient guarantee that it will arrive to a lowest level that could allow enough savings for investment. Now the question is how to boost savings for investment. This question goes with that of the prerequisites for FDI to take place.

### **3.1.2. "Attempts" to integrate poor countries in the world trade**

In the 1980s, the world financial institutions such as the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), introduced the Structural Adjustment Programme, which, in general, is structured on neo-liberal market-economy principles. The reforms that were implemented included trade and financial liberalization, privatization of state owned enterprises, removal of barriers, deregulation of government expenditures, devaluation of local currencies, removal of subsidies on

basic necessities. This package of reforms was, in turn, intended partly to attract investments from developed countries. However, the investments hardly came as foreign direct investment. African countries continued to survive with the regime of mere financial assistance and foreign aid, to be re-funded on short term or long term basis. This latter increased the debt which was already a burden for most poor countries (see table 3.4). The motive behind SAP was not mainly the economic situation of poor countries. Instead, this program was motivated by the situation of debt that these poor countries owe to international financial institutions as well as developed countries. So IMF took recourse to measures of economic nature (stabilizing and restructuring the economy) in order to ensure full payment of the debt stock. Unfortunately, we can see the full payment is impossible as the debt keeps increasing.

Instead of debt, Hirst suggests that the foreign aid may be necessary in so far as its effect is to underwrite current consumption and to provide resources for public projects (Hirst 1999:417). However, the problem is that very little aid contributes to the growth of domestic production for future savings. One needs to think in terms of the redirection of foreign aid as an investment. Hirst suggests two ways by which investment would be redirected. On the one hand, he suggests to levy a modest tariff on FDI flows within the Triad (North America, European Union and Japan) and thus create a fund for private investment in the poorest countries. On the other hand, he suggests to establish a common regime of tax concessions to companies from OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) countries that invest in an agreed schedule of the poorest nations. In short, Hirst is suggesting that FDI be managed by international intervention. In the economic history of Sub-Saharan Africa, an almost similar solution was attempted. After the oil shocks of the 1970s, many African countries which were dependent on imported oil and fertilizers (which are petroleum derivatives) were so devastated that by the rise of the price of oil that the World Bank decided to create a separate category for them. Even the oil-producers themselves tried to establish a special fund in order to assist them (see Nossal 1998:431). However, Hirst's suggestions are difficult to apply. His suggestions would be better understood if the world economy was viewed as an enterprise of love. Hirst knows well that we are far from being there. He should remember that, for instance, the fund that was created by oil-producers to assist the African countries because of the rise of oil-prices was given as a debt to be paid back later.

In the present context of neoliberal economy, an investor would reply that the international intervention is interfering with the workings of the market. For a neoliberal economist, it is the market that knows best, and development will come effectively if markets are allowed to steer investment to where resources can be utilized. As a result, globalization will draw most poorer countries into the world economy, and permit them too to benefit from trade. Thus, the major structural inequalities in the world economy will be eliminated without intervention, as poor countries cross the threshold into economic modernity. This kind of argument is held by scholars like Susan Strange (1996) who argues that the process of globalization should be left to multinational companies (MNCs) which have the power to operate locally and internationally. The idea behind is that in the long run, these multinational companies will extend to poor countries.

However Strange's argument is not sufficiently convincing. In effect, liberalization allows the strong to be stronger and the weak to be more dependent and marginalized. In effect, as the MNCs move in the poor countries, they will just raise more needs which these poor countries cannot produce, because they don't have neither capital nor technology. Moreover, in the face of the technology and sophistication of these MNCs, the local petit enterprises will collapse, sending a multitude of people out of business and employment. Educated brains supposed to initiate locally adapted enterprises will be sold to these multinational companies together with raw materials at a very low price. The poor countries will now have to spend the purchasing power it generates in the expensive products thus produced. The profit made by these companies are not reinvested in the hosting countries, but they are repatriated in the country of origin of the MNC. In the end, poor countries lose their factors of production and continue to sink into poverty (Nürnberger 1999:312-4).

Strange's suggestion is also untenable on moral grounds. There is evidence that human beings are retreating from the responsibility towards their fellow human beings, while leaving it to the power of an impersonal force: the market and the maximization of profit wherever possible. The fact is that economic development remains concentrated in one region, while in countries like those in the Sub-Saharan Africa, there seems to be no sufficient evidence of market-led development at the horizons. And there is no evidence that the situation will change in the near future.

Of course we can go further and show that there are actually contradictory attitudes concerning the poor countries. Carole Collins has the following observation:

Take the belief that free enterprise and free trade will benefit all the people. The World Bank, for instance, has with the backing of major Northern industrial governments pushed policy reforms that reduces government involvement in regulating the economy. This has worsened the plight of poor people and failed to help- some might even say prevented- developing economies become self-sustaining. Rather than question its policies or basic assumptions, the Bank almost invariably argues that “it is the result of poor implementation” (Collins 1996:3).

The problem, however, is that developed countries are not fair to poor countries as far as international commerce is concerned. For instance, developed countries advocated for open markets, as is suggested in the quote above, but they go on to maintain high protection for their own agricultural products, while denying developing countries to use that very support measure. In other words, despite a commitment to allow more market access, the developed countries have maintained high tariffs on sensitive products, hence preventing the export of these products by the poor countries. This is embarrassing for these poor countries which rely on agriculture for most of their national revenues. In effect, agriculture accounts for 35% of Africa’s wealth and production, and 40% of exports (AEFJN 1999:12). If liberalization as championed by developing countries does not benefit such sector, *ipso facto*, the poor countries which rely on it fall in the margins of the world economy, and therefore cannot participate in the international trade. The goods, other than agricultural products, that could be competitive on the world market such textiles and mineral resources from poor countries find themselves stark, beside the fact if they are sold they are bought at low prices because they are still raw materials to be transformed.

Thus, the problem is that poor countries do not really share in this international trade. The reason is that poor countries neither have sufficient capital nor technology which is one of the driving force behind the world economy. I have explained in detail why there is insufficient capital in poor countries. I should also explain how the lack of technology and infrastructure is a handicap to trade in poor countries.

### **3.1.3. Lack of technology as a handicap for the participation in international trade**

Technology requires the know-how or skills, and these are acquired through education. Unfortunately, education is absent or poor in developing countries. Even for the few who go to school and higher institutions of learning, there are no materials which give them the skills of the technological know-how. Yet the new technology was supposed to offer genuine opportunity from these developing countries. One would expect that the top-flight scientific teaching and library facilities could be provided electronically to poor universities.

David Gabbard (2000) tried to demonstrate that there are connections between education and global economy, by comparing the US educational discourse and international development discourse. He points out the fact that both are elements of a historical process that subordinates all other forms of social interaction to economic logic and transform nonmaterial needs into commodities. In effect, as he points out, education and international economic development are synonymous with progress. He argues that a people's economic development proceeds in direct proportion to their level of educational achievement. Both education and economic development imply a process that is required for, and leads to favorable change related to the improvement of people's means to meet their needs. He observes that, as matter of fact, that education promises to effect this improvement by making United States competitive in the global marketplace and by integrating US workers into the global economy's international labor market, whereas development offers the poor and underdeveloped nations of the world the assistance that they need to join more advanced nations in sharing the fruits of the international market systems. Of course, this assistance is always another expensive commodity for poor countries which do not have sufficient capital.

It is worth noting that even the few trained people (from poor countries) who have acquired skills in one area or the other are leaving their countries because of conflict and corruption to places where there is security and certainty for a better income and better life. It has been estimated that between 1985 and 1990, about 60,000 doctors, engineers and university staff left Africa, and since 1990, the figure has reached over 20,000 per year (Gelb and Floyd 1999:13). Hence African countries face a double challenge in this respect. On the one hand, they have to rebuild the capacity to produce skilled people, and on the other hand enhance conditions for their retention. But this is pretty difficult,

because the condition of poverty of African countries is that they cannot but continuously lose their education brain to rich countries. Let me apply this aspect of education to the sector of information technology and the means of communication as part of the infrastructure needed in today's international trade.

According to Gelb and Floyd, in 1994, Africa had 4 telephone lines for 1000 people. This density was about 10 % to that of East Asia and 6% to that of Latin America. In the same vein, the Internet access in Africa is more expensive than in other regions of the world and therefore is accessible to few people only. This information technology is part of the infrastructure that is needed for trade and investment. Unfortunately, it will continue to suffer as long as the access to education and its quality remain low in poor countries. It is education that is required to give some level of technical skills. These technical skills, in turn, facilitate the absorption of technology.

Even the ordinary infrastructure of transport suffers also from lack of education and its quality. And if this infrastructure is not maintained, it falls to ruin. As the infrastructure falls to ruin, the poor countries fall behind in international trade (Gelb and Floyd 1999:9).

### **3.2. Universalization of political liberalism, yet the demise of the nation state and political instability**

The point I shall put across here is that political liberalism as a political system supposed to facilitate the market economy in Sub-Saharan countries failed. This resulted in the powerlessness of the state and social and political instability. In the midst of social and political chaos, even the market economy became a nightmare.

As we saw it in the second chapter, the phenomenon of the universalization of political liberalism seems to be more and more obvious to the eyes of political scientists and political philosophers. This universalization of political liberalism seems to be the consequence of the political ideology of doctrinaire socialism which became more and more socially unpopular and unfit to economic flourishing on the one hand, and on the other hand the consequence of people's endless quest of economic and political freedom (see Nürnberger 1998:96ff). By this token, even countries like China which seemed to be the second largest communist country in the world, after the Soviet Union has ceased to follow Marxist-Leninist (economic) policies. The young tigers of East and South

Asia, which hitherto, were autocratic seem to be engaging themselves on the path of democratization of their political life (despite their economic achievements which did not necessarily require political liberalism). However, we do know for how long Cuba and North Korea will still hold on to communism. In Africa, Libya seems to remain unshaken by the injunction of the “universal” political system as the underlying ideology of the market.

It was observed that nations where the political arrangement is political liberalism appear to have a better economy. This argument supports the thesis according to which politics and economy go hand in hand. Hence some scholars did not hesitate to argue that global capitalism must go with political liberalism. In this perspective, Mittelman sees globalization as a movement of capital involving a deepening of “commodified” forms of political and social integration (Mittelman 1998:231). Other scholars have expressed it in different terms such as: “economic emancipation is accompanied by political and social emancipation”. In short, the new world economic order has to go with the international democratic order (Frank 1993: 46-49). Let us recall that this link between political liberalism and economic growth does not seem to be obvious in the case of East and South East Asia with the Asian tigers whose economic growth has been spectacular in the last years. Thus, that the connection between political liberalism and economic liberalism worked in the case of Western countries and, maybe, in some other few countries around the world such as in Latin America and South Africa, does not mean it will necessarily work everywhere else.

In Sub-Saharan Africa, political liberalism was to secure economic reforms of the 1980s (which were failing). Accordingly, there are two major phases of political liberalism in this region of the world, namely: the economic phase and the political phase. Both phases failed leaving behind them a host of disastrous consequences. We shall consider each in turn. In the end we should be able to understand why both the economic and political projects failed.

### **1. The economic phase**

This phase evolves around the neoliberal argument which can be summed up as follows: Developing nations must allow foreign capital to flow into their economies because the lack of capital impedes economic development. Against this background, the World Bank, the International Monetary

Fund, the multilateral financial institutions as well as the Western governments suggested economic reforms to developing countries. But apparently, the primary motive was not to boost the economies of developing countries. It seems as if what was behind the suggestion of economic reforms was the fear rooted in the worsening of the economy as the debt of developing nations kept increasing (see Table 3. 2). This observation is made by Samuel Makinda when he writes:

... economic reforms were sparked by the growing debt crises in developing countries, and by the fear that any attempt to default could have a negative impact on the international financial systems (Makinda 1996:564).

Of course, this was not the only motive since the period of the 1980s came with the neoliberal credo. At the same time, it was the period when globalization became not only a theoretical concept in academic circles, but a practical concept in the conquest of larger markets.

To diffuse this neoliberal economy while trying to address the problem of the debt crisis the programme of structural adjustment was suggested as a condition for capital transfer.<sup>12</sup> This programme involved the following:

- Devaluation of national currency and removal of foreign exchange controls,
- Removal of government subsidies such as subsidies on food production
- Cut of government spending on social welfare, health and education,

---

<sup>12</sup>The Sub-Saharan countries were not the only countries to which structural adjustment programme was applied but rather all the developing countries who happen to be particularly debtor nations. This situation of debt was thought to have affected the global economy and caused a macroeconomic disequilibria in the following two ways (Amoroso 1998:120):

1. Imbalances and distortions that are both internal (national budgets), caused by surplus global demand with regard to supply, and external (balance of payments) caused by the failure of these economies to align to international standards;
2. Problems of economic efficiency (productivity) caused by deficiencies in the use of resources, in the organizations of markets and in the structure of business. Accordingly, what debtor nations supposedly need is not development policies and plans, but the restructuring of a certain number of economic mechanisms, especially those concerning the system of resource allocation so as to activate the spontaneous mechanisms of the market.



- Liberalization of trade which meant removing barriers to trade and related measures,
- Free enterprise and promotion of export product rather than meeting the needs of the people,
- Privatization and commercialization of state owned companies
- and finally a market-led economy.

The first three measures constitute the initial step which leads to the surge of domestic prices (especially the prices of imported goods) to the international levels and a freezing of the population's purchasing power to dampen demand and curb inflation. The consequence here is that, as the national currencies kept deflating, it was progressively substituted by hard currency, particularly the dollar (Amoroso 1998:122). This leads to the second step: the dollarization.

The liberalization of trade which characterizes the open-door economy constitutes the second step. The characteristics of this step is the acceleration of the alignment of internal prices to world market which Amoroso calls the "dollarization" of the economy. Here the consequence is the increasing pauperization of the poor and the systematic elimination of those who cannot adapt. Of course, the problem is the psychology created by the new economic system. The dollarization mostly concerns imported goods which people can do without. Unfortunately, the psychology of the market is such that the income got from local goods is spent on imported goods instead of investing it. In the end, because there is no more local production, the whole local market is flooded by imported goods which only few people from the urban centers struggle to buy.

The third step consists in restructuring of the public sector finances. This is achieved through the reduction of wages, liquidation and privatization of government owned companies, especially those which run budget deficits. To privatize state owned companies particularly those which were "budgetivorous" was not much a problem. The problem was that even those which were doing well and trying to satisfy the need of the people were privatized. This raises the question of whether it was possible to reconcile the conditionality regime of economic reforms with some credible measure of national ownership and commitment (Kwesi 1998:32).

The three steps were thought to lead poor countries to economic growth. This is far from being proven. The problem was that, despite much effort to meet these conditions, industrialization and

manufacturing were overtaken by problems such as the high of cost production and low quality. The consequence was the inability to compete on world markets with products from other developing countries such as East and South Asian countries. There are many reasons for this: First of all, the African countries have no means to make known their products on international and regional markets, besides the fact that they have no sufficient experience of marketing. Secondly, the manufactured goods suffered from poor or lack infrastructures such as roads, railways, ports. The transport by air was costly and made the goods expensive. Thirdly, the goods thus produced suffered from trade restrictions and high tariffs in the countries of exportation. And finally, African business owners (and leaders) started sending their capital in Western banks to protect them against inflation.

Thus the economic reforms initiated by the international financial institutions and Western governments did not achieve anything as far as economic growth and economic trade is concerned. M. Khan is even more categorical:

On the basis of existing studies, it cannot be ascertained if the programmes advocated by the IMF have improved performance in matters of inflation and economic growth. In fact, it is often found that the implementation of these programmes is accompanied by the rise in inflation and a decline in the growth rate (Khan 1990:2).

Even if we concede that there has been some flow of foreign capital, it would seem as if it did not stimulate economic growth. Instead, foreign capital led to further debt as we have noted it previously. As we can see it from Table 3.4, the debt *par rapport* to GNP rose from 28.6 % in 1980 to 109.4 in 1990; and compared with the exports, the debt rose from 10.9 % to 19,5% ( almost the double of 1980). According to the recent World Bank Report, the debt service of Africa in 1998 is equivalent to 47% of exports of goods and services. Accordingly, African countries remain economically marginalized.

But why did poor countries remain marginalized? This is a difficult issue that we have to face. Let us try to attempt an answer by using Nürnberger's "model of causation". Nürnberger distinguishes three factors at work in economic interactions, namely: factors located in the center (rich countries) which he calls *structural C-factors*, factors located at the periphery (poor countries) which he calls *structural P-factors*, and the interaction of the two which he calls *structural C/P -factors*. Structural

C-factors refer to structures and processes in the center which lead to the rapid growth of economic potency, and to the advantage of the center over the periphery. The example given here is that of capital and sophisticated technology. Structural P-factors refer to structures and processes in the periphery which lead to the inhibition of growth of economic potency, and to the disadvantage of the periphery. The example given here is lack of capital, and the lack of technology and technological know-how. Structural C/P-factors refer to structural mechanisms which cause the interaction between the center and the periphery to work and to greater advantage of the center and the lesser advantage or disadvantage of the periphery (Nürnberger 1999:98).

Let me now try to explain what happened to the SAP by using this model of causation. The measures of SAP were not a problem. But the interaction between the rich and the poor was a problem. As I tried to argue earlier, the African countries had neither capital nor technology. So the international financial institutions and the rich countries tried to provide short and long term loans in order to set enterprises for the production of export goods. But because the African countries have no sufficiently trained staff, the same rich countries provided the technical assistance which, unfortunately, is costly. This brought African countries to contract more debts. For the poor countries this is a problem for them, because even if the SAP has failed, the debt continues to be repaid with interests. In fact, as we have seen it earlier, all the economic efforts of African countries consist in paying the same debt. There is no way to save for investment. Countries which cannot pay back their debts are obliged to buy manufactured goods from their creditors with whatever revenues they happen to have. If they do not have any revenue, they have to let their mineral resources (gold, diamond, oil, etc) be exploited for free. According to W.W Rostow (1990), it is the accumulation of domestic savings and investments that lead to economic growth. Accordingly, what was financed on SAP measures were dependence and not self-reliance.

Furthermore, where the industrial sector seemed to have been promoted adequately, it was falling victim of the attitude of the political elite in power. In the first place, besides the corruption of the elite in power, the level of industrial activity was capital intensive rather than labor intensive. The manufacturing was seen as a political arms of the government of the party on power and not a rational economic unit. As such, the consequences were the lack of support of entrepreneurial development from inside the countries as well as the inability to attract foreign direct investment as a result of

unsatisfactory governmental macroeconomic governance. This point is emphasized by K R Nossal. Nossal also lays the failure of the economic phase at the feet of corrupted elites. In many countries, the local elites resorted to civil war in order to preserve their privileged positions. Other defined economic priorities for the community according to tribal loyalties. Others still were driven by venal greed and a penchant for high living copied from Western styles. In other countries still, the armed forces became dominant, leaving their barracks for the attractions of the presidential palaces. Surprisingly, most of these were still financed by some Western governments in their competition for interests (Nossal 1998:438). This led to the socio-political phase.

## **2. The Socio-Political Phase**

In the process of the liberalization of the economy, there arose an increase in civil society activities. In most poor countries, civil society groups had hitherto been banned for the sake of national unity and common economic projects. They were seen as the enemies of the state and were dealt with by coercion. But the issues these civil society groups were trying to address were the economic decay, corruption, social marginalization, authoritarian arrogance and lack of vision (Ihonvebere 1994, Baregu 1994, Iheduru 1994). Thus, the economic reforms not only challenged the command economy of most African states, but also provided the different categories of the civil society with an opportunity to open up politically. It is against this background that the economic situation was a major cause of democratization.

This democratic process in the form of political pluralism was itself intended for economic effects. In the process, every function which, hitherto, belonged to the state now was assigned to the market. That is to say, the implementation of economic reforms produced a chain reaction that operated to the disadvantage of the state structure and the state elite. Correspondingly, dictatorial regimes and one party states that dotted Africa in the pre-economic reforms period were challenged to provide political alternatives. These led to the process of democratization through the liberalizing influence of group participation by civil society. Put otherwise, as economic reforms were introduced, the political elites were losing power to the advantage of small centers of decision making. This diffusion of power empowered and emboldened civil societies to become even more active. This internal factor combined with the collapse of the communist system in the Soviet Union and its

command economy accelerated the process of political liberalism in most African countries.

Besides, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the multilateral institutions and Western governments advised that economic reforms cannot be carried out successfully without political reforms. Even aid and some financial assistance depended on the implementation of free market and free elections. As we noted earlier, the democratic nations of the West endeavored to convince African countries that it was the market and political liberalism that brought socialist states to collapse. Moreover, there seemed to be no other alternative left to African countries, especially that most countries in the world were turning away from socialist tendencies in favor of democratic processes and were embracing a market economy.

However, my main concern is not so much how far poor countries should be democratized or liberalize their politics; my concern is rather the consequences of political liberalization on the state and its socio-economic role. I want to argue that the process of political liberalization has affected the role of the state from two major points of view. First of all, the state lost its role in the process of economic liberalization (1980 to 1990). Secondly the situation of the state worsened in the political liberalization to which economic liberalization led. The failure of both economic reforms and political liberalization have sunk poor countries in poverty and social chaos.

### **3.2.2. The state instability in the process of economic and political liberalization**

The process of economic liberalism and its politics lies in the fact of economic growth, mostly in countries which are traditionally liberal. We have already noted the increase in international trade. In fact, the promises of economic liberalism is economic growth of all the people and the subsequent universal well-being (Baum 1999:46). However, the fear is what Amoroso calls *croissance appauvrissante* (impoverishing growth), that is, a development marked by a high rate of economic growth but accompanied by a significant impoverishment of a large segment of people in the society in which it occurs.

In the last two decades we have witnessed three paradoxical phenomena as far as the state is concerned, namely, the fiscal crisis of the welfare state (even in most of industrialized countries), the

importance of the state in the miracle economies of East and South-East Asia, and finally, the collapse of states and the explosion in humanitarian emergencies in various parts of the world as is obvious in most Sub-Saharan African countries. Outside Africa we might include the former states that composed the Soviet Union and these which composed the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. I am concerned about the first and the last phenomena because, they reflect most obviously the failures of economic and political liberalism outside the states which are traditionally liberal.

The argument often held by those who advise non-liberal countries is that markets and competitiveness are the harbingers of human progress. To allow the market and competitiveness to chart their course, the intervention of states and their governments has to be minimized. Because it could be an obstacle to further economic progress which market and competition is supposed to guarantee (Held, et.al 1999:3). Correspondingly, the central power is left in the hands of market forces which do not account neither to the public nor to any other organ. Where there is minimal intervention of the state, the state is limited to being a mere facilitator at the service of voracious international business. As a result local people and business respond to the state's deteriorating public services by avoiding taxation (World Bank 1997), violence, public demonstration, and the proliferation of underground market.

I have already hinted at this state of affairs in the so-called developing countries, particularly those of Sub-Saharan Africa. We centered our reflection on the role of SAP which was suggested to lead the so-called economic growth. The heart of this advise was an embedded liberalism. The characteristic of this liberalism is that there should be less participation of the state in economic development. To achieve this economic paradigm under structural adjustment, the state was required to disengage itself from social sector through the cutting of expenditures on social welfare, removal of government subsidies, and disengagement from price control.

The consequence was that those sectors, such as health and education, which needed the intervention of the state suffered enormously. This shows how economic liberalization is flawed. This is obvious in the critique which UNICEF provided. In its *Adjustment with Human Face*, UNICEF criticized the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, the very organs of economic liberalization of neglecting completely the social and human dimension of economic adjustment and

the emphasis on macro-economic issues. What is at stake is that the new economy affects poor and vulnerable people who cannot compete on economic market, and who need the protection of the state. In effect, the poor cannot afford the fees and user charges imposed on privatized services and facilities. Neither do they have the purchasing power to cope with the caprices of the market. As many people were excluded or neglected in the process, there rose resentment which leads to violence, social and political instability. Let us see how this is the case in Sub-Saharan Africa.

### **3.2.3. The Sub-Saharan African State in the process of economic and political liberalization**

We have noted that the same forces that drove the institutionalization of the market system also influenced political liberalization and democracy. Therefore, if the state has lost its force in the economic process, we should not expect it to occupy the terrain of political liberalism which is the consequence of economic liberalism. According to the World Bank's report, many countries of Sub-Saharan Africa are suffering from a crisis of state and its capability. Consequently, there is a need to rebuild state effectiveness through the overhaul of public institutions, reassertion of the rule of law, and credible checks on abuse of the state (World Bank 1997:14). However, in the World Bank's description of the situation of the state in Sub-Saharan Africa, there is no reference to the fact that the new ideology of the market and profit is one of the major causes of the crisis of the state in poor countries in general.

But how did the ideology of the market and profit become a source of state crisis in poor countries of the Sub-Saharan Africa? The process of economic liberalization of the 1980s has led to political liberalization through the creation of civil society groups. Now my task here is to explore how these civil society groups and organizations were very important in the realization of political liberalization and how they precipitated the demise of the state. Whatever was the nature of the organizations, they precipitated the demise of the state by promoting and defending their interests. There are two kinds of interests that were involved. First of all there were a political interest as long as it promised to secure foreign investors. In defending their interests to capture the prized political positions of their opponents, they gain the moral and financial support of Western governments and multilateral institutions in so far as they were committed to the ideology of opening up the market. Secondly, it is question of economic interests, at least for those organizations whose members

constitute the business class. The process of political liberalization becomes an occasion of claiming the right to private enterprise, which, hitherto was not much allowed, particularly in state commanded economies. Thus the power of the state was dissolved into those small centers of civil society organizations, because, in the end, it could not control them.

There is another way in which the power of the state was undermined by some civil society associations. In African countries most of the associations were ethnic or regional in nature. As the nations became divided in those ways, the state was destabilized. This is the case of Somalia, Sierra Leone, Liberia, former Zaire in 1990s, and Burundi. Hence, it is obvious that such civil organizations cannot have a true vision of political liberalism that could go beyond the failure of the traditional state, although political liberalism was their song. Obioma Iheduru seems to confirm this point when he points out the following observation:

... the democratic civic tradition is very incipient in Africa today and care must be taken in deciding what group to include in it. What sometimes passes for civil society organizations... might just be protest groups whose end is to assume the positions of the incumbents, but are not possessed of the true democratic traditions that will make for enduring political liberalization and democratization (Iheduru 1999:109).

The result of this situation is that the struggle between the state and civil society produced chaos that cannot attract national and foreign investment. The only investment goes in the arms trade to finance civil war, importation of food items by humanitarian agencies, and other items which we cannot expect to promote national economies. These become the very source of social and political instability, absence of law and order, the consequence of which is the failure of political liberalism itself and impossibility of a sustained economic take off.

So much for the political consequences of economic globalization. Let us now turn to social consequences. The point I will make here is that although economic globalization produced a tendency to international solidarity, we cannot close our eyes on inequalities and social injustices at the international scale.



### **3.3. International solidarity, world inequality and social injustices.**

International solidarity is well captured in the famous concept of “global village”. There are two major aspects of this global village, namely: the economic aspect and the political aspect. Let us consider each in turn.

#### **3.3.1. Economic liberalization as the economic system in the global village**

We have extensively hinted at economic activity which is no longer limited to the arbitrariness and caprices of the state. But also I hinted at the consequences of the withdrawal of the state. According to Scholte (1997:431–432, cf. Isaacs 1997: 10ff.), the global village viewed from economic stand point has the following five characteristics:

- Fast communication thanks to advances information technology
- Organizations (of business enterprise and civic association)
- Trade which builds links and interdependence between countries,
- Finance which makes money flow faster
- Growing consciousness that people belong more and more to the same world.

#### **1. Communications**

Communications through telephony, television and computer networks allow people anywhere in the world to have immediate contact with each other. Hence, thanks to information technology, the world communicates faster. This has some implication on economic development. In effect, information technology helps to create a “unified and integrated” global economy. Of course, the problem remains that the parts of the world which do not have access to these means of communication are left behind.

However, thanks to the sophisticated means of communication, human rights abuse in warring countries can be known to the world. We can also refer to the network of NGOs working in countries where there are conflicts. At the same time we should not ignore the fact that some media of

communication are interested in sensational aspect of information. For instance, African countries have complained about the fact that Western media refer to Africa only when there is violence, crimes, coups d'Etat, starvation, and the various aspects of poverty.

## **2. Organizations**

This is seen in the proliferation and expansion of business enterprises, civic associations, regulatory agencies that work as trans-border operation. For instance, there are associations for women's rights, workers' rights (trade unions), ecological movements, non-governmental organization which are organized at an international scale and forge international links through conferences, social activities such as sport. These social activities have economic implications, particularly in marketing, advertizement and tourism. But we know well that market-economy knows no charity.

## **3. Trade**

Trade is characterized by the movement of goods and services between countries. And this falls within a trans-world marketing exercise. The implication of international trade is economic interdependence between countries, in as much as countries depend on one another for goods and services. More and more countries produce goods or services for exports to other countries, while they produce less for their own economy. This is not without negative consequences in poor countries. I have already mentioned how the emphasis on export agriculture caused problems in various countries of Sub-Saharan Africa. Moreover, most of the products from the developing countries are not easily traded in developed countries. This discredits the idea of global village. We might refer to the deal between South Africa and European Union. The key issue in trade as a feature of the global village is competition without clear terms.

Yet, organizations such as GATT and WTO continue to make proposals which make the world look like a village. For instance, in the Seattle Round, the WTO made the following proposals:

- Ensure the right of companies to establish operations in foreign markets, including the right to wholly own these investments,

- Ensure that companies get national treatment, so that foreign investors have the same rights as domestic companies in a given market,
- Promote pro-competitive regulatory reform focused on an adequacy of appropriate and consistent rules as well as transparency and impartiality of regulatory administration,
- Remove barriers to greater cross-border trade,
- Remove obstacles to the free movement of people and business information (as in AEFJN 1999:17).

The question that one might ask is how poor countries will benefit from such rules of the market. The United Nation Development Programme (UNDP) has already noted the problem inherent in these rules in the conclusion of one of its reports. It argues that the new rules of globalization focus on integrating global market while neglecting the needs of people that the market cannot meet. In other words, one problem of such liberalization of trade is that it does not integrate the development dimension which poor people need such as health, education, housing, etc. Moreover, if the proposals of the Seattle round were applied, the poor countries would suffer the consequences. For instance, cheap imported products ruin the small farmers; the salaries of workers which are already low in poor countries will be spent on expensive imported goods, and governments of poor countries will lose the possibilities of defending policies to protect their few industries. In the same vein, as far as the African continent is concerned, it is obvious that firms and farmers are small and lack the technology and marketing means to compete in the world market. The opening of markets, therefore, benefits the transnational corporations at the expense of national economies and small farmers, workers, and jobless people in the poor countries (AEFJN 1999:8).

Hence with the world order based on economy, the world is now divided into two: the rich who are economically successful and benefit from trade, and the poor who are the losers in international trade. While these poor continue to decay, the rich continue to advance. According to Mel Gultov (1998:112), no reference is made to the quality of life, distribution of social benefits, or to poverty and how to deal with it. Here lies the fact of inequality and social injustices (Table 3.6).

**Table 3.5: Distribution of the world income**

World Population 100%	World income 100%
Richest 20%	82.7%
Second 20%	11.7%
Third 20%	2.3%
Fourth 20%	1.9%
Poorest 20%	1.4%

Source: *UNDP Human Development Report 1992*

#### **4. Finance**

Globalization occurs with the spread of various monies and financial instruments circulating electronically (through computers and fax) anywhere and everywhere across the world in a short time. This is referred to as capital mobility. The problem here is that this mobility of capital is dominated by few hard currencies such as the dollar. This is not without problems as far as international solidarity is concerned. Earlier we have talked of dollarization as a result of the devaluation of currencies in the developing countries and the pauperization that follow. Some people already talk of one world, one economic system (capitalism) and one currency (the dollar). Furthermore when it comes to the issue of electronic circulation, one wonders how this is true for poor countries like those in sub-Saharan Africa. The kind of movement of currency under consideration here requires the advanced technology that most of poor countries do not have.

Even if we grant that there is a financial movement in these countries, it is a very small percentage compared to the global flow, of which the major part is concentrated in the triad and the newly industrialized countries of Eastern and Southern Asia and some countries of Latin America. Even in these countries, the movement of monies is limited to some centers of economic activities. The currencies such as the dollar, pound, yen, remain unknown, therefore unused in the peripheries and rural areas. Thus financial movements benefit those who are already better off while the poor remain always in the margin.

In any case, the currencies of poor countries lose their purchasing power and may die out soon or later. To refer to a personal experience, I am always surprised that, in my country, I have to buy my flight ticket in US \$ which the Central Bank does not have in sufficient quantity. I have to find this currency on the black market. But who puts it on the black market if not those who want to commodify everything? Thus, we cannot close our eyes to the fact that governments are increasingly losing control on their currencies on the one hand, and over the flows in and out of monies in their economies (Isaacs 1997:11).

## **5. Consciousness**

People are more and more conceiving the world as a single place. They affiliate themselves with communities that transcend borders and understand their destiny in a trans-world as well as in territorial terms. This also is not without difficulties (see Table 3.6). We can already foretell some conflicts between the global and the local, although at times, a trend may display both global and local aspects (Holton 1998:187). Against this background, Roland Robertson (1992, 1995) suggests that we do not talk of a global village but of global field which includes in it challenges and contradictions that make the modern world a paradoxical place. It is paradoxical because there is an inter-penetration between the global, the local and individual aspects of social life. This creates a puzzle in the individual when s/he becomes aware of what is happening. The individual does not know whether s/he should rely on the global (cosmopolitism) or on the local (nationalism), or the individual self.

The only inter-penetration remains dominantly economic, and therefore tied to profit maximization and market expansion. As we shall discover later, human beings are more and more defined as persons-in- the market rather than persons-in-the community (whatever may be the dimension of the community, global or local). Correspondingly, most movements of people in the “global village” are socio-economically motivated. Consequently there is a danger of people/societies losing their cultural identities.

**Table 3. 7: Interactions between national societies in the global village**

Aspects of the global village	Process involved	Interactive challenges
world system of societies	Relativization of societies	relative sovereignty of individual nations in relation to that of other national societies. Problem of capacity of transnational bodies such UN to gain adherence of nations to stable patterns of regulations
Humankind	Relativization of citizenship	Relative nature of national citizenship in relation to global ideas of human rights and environment. Problem of applying general notions such as human rights to the specific needs of particular groups.
Individual selves	Relativization of the interaction between individual societies	Problem of adherence of autonomous individuals to nations. Problem of the integrity of the self in relation to the surveillance capacities of the nations-states

*Source: Adapted from Robert Holton's "Comment on the Global Field"*

### **3.3.2. Political liberalism and the idea of global village**

So far we have been concerned with how the world is tending to be one big market. But we have noted its limits in terms of social and economic inequality not only among regions but also within the same region. Now we must show that even political liberalism which tends to be the political system of the global village fails to address inequalities and social injustices despite its emphasis on equality of all people throughout the world and the rule of law.

We have already shown that political liberalism is winning the world as a political tool used to expand the market. In fact, political liberalism seems to be another commodity to be marketed. The tenants of the political ideology of liberalism argue that the last countries to be democratized are Latin America and Africa (in the 1980s/1990s). According to Stephen Gill, at this same period, there has been enormous growth in social inequalities and the erosion of public provision (e.g, education, and public health) and forms of economic distribution such social welfare and unemployment insurance systems (Gill1998:213).

But the problem is that these elements which were neglected, that is education, social welfare, health, employment are the very material and social basis for greater political equality central to the very idea of liberal democracy, but also the basis of internal and foreign investment. The problem is that even those Western countries which championed this political system in other parts of the world did not intervene substantially to assist in those material and social bases which were being undermined and which, in turn, could undermine the liberal democracy. Instead they were willing to pursue the theoretical principles of democracy in so far as they give them access to the market and profit which they are after.

However, I am aware that in countries like Gabon, Togo, Cameroon and Kenya there is neither new authority nor new governance. In fact, the political leaders of these countries are referred to as the last dinosaurs. It is true, as I argued earlier, that the market and profit as terms of the neoliberal system boosted the emergence of the civil society along with a new authority and governance. This, in principle, was something good. Because we could expect that, in the process, women who were held as victims of the traditional patriarchal system could equally be emancipated both politically and economically.

Along these dividends of the democratization process, the mass media reified the culture of consumption showing millions of people suffering of hunger, diseases, unemployment. These media hardly show the bewildering gyrations of the financial and exchange markets, bankruptcy and neoliberal politicians who were being corrupted in the name of free enterprise. Put otherwise, while people were dying of hunger and disease the few business people (both national and foreign) were requesting to be free from taxes of all kinds, when the poor countries rely on these very taxes to finance education needed to plan the future of a nation, employment, health, and food production.

The question now is this: why should the poor countries embrace the so called universal political system if it does not help them to enter the world economic evolution. Why should poor people follow the global politics if it does not change their poor conditions as evident in lack of education, health, employment, economic well-being? And finally, if the present political system continues to allow the rich to become richer while the poor become poorer, why should people embark on it? But the most important question is not why should we follow it, but rather what is wrong with the system.

The point of this essay is effectively to show that there is something which is inherently wrong in the system: that is, **a lack of ethical underpinnings which would help those better off to be sensitive to those who are worse off**. In this process, God would show his/her face. In other words, for the world to be a genuine village where people find meaning to live, and, therefore, where God finds a place, it needs more than the invisible hand of the market and profit. It needs an ethic that should regulate it. The world economy needs a human face. We shall come to this point later. For now, let us turn to another consequence of economic globalization, namely, environmental degradation.

### **3.4. Undermining the environment to save economic prosperity**

The logic of economic globalization seems to be the following: the more the economy grows, the more development there will be. Such is the transnational life style and development model that created an environmental crisis of massive proportions. There are two major ways in which economic prosperity is undermining the environment, namely through depletion and through pollution. The first consists in the increasing consumption of natural resources (both renewable and non-renewable) while the second refers to the intoxication of the environment as a result of industrial, commercial and agricultural activities. I will concern myself with how these ways are undermining the environment in poor countries.

#### **3.4.1. Depletion of renewable and non-renewable resources**

There is a growing consensus concerning the fact that renewable resources are being over-exploited while the non-renewable resources are being depleted for the sake of competition and profit maximization. In most cases, this is done against the background of taking for granted that nature would regenerate and that its resources are unlimited.

For a long time, Third and Fourth world countries have been the sources of raw materials for industrialized countries of the North. These raw materials include mineral resources (oil, gas, copper, gold, cobalt, etc), timber, and agricultural resources for export such as cotton, cocoa, coffee which erode the soil through the overuse of fertilizers. Most resources are being consumed without being



replaced. The Nigeria's and Gabon's oil and gas are not there forever. The metal resources from DRC and Zambia are not there in everlasting stock. It is true that with modern technology metal can be recycled. However, one may wonder how this will be done in the case of the poor countries where these resources have been exploited. Even if we grant that they can be recycled in the industrialized countries, it is not obvious that this will be done consistently everywhere and without financial and ecological cost (Nürnberger 1999:79).

The exploitation of timber in the Equatorial Africa leaves vast areas deforested. Although it is argued that the forest is renewable it should be noted that some species of trees which are over-exploited took thousands of years to grow and will disappear as a consequence of lack of rain and desertification. Let us also note that those who exploit the timber of the equatorial forest are rarely interested in replacing it. This clear-cutting of African Equatorial forest by transnational timber companies without replacing it shows the growth of lack of accountability and austerity programmes that favor transnational business and give short shrift to ecological considerations. This will have implication on the whole of nature later. This confirms Robert Cox's point:

In formal economics, nature, represented by land, has been subordinated to market logic. Nature, however, has its own logic, based on the interdependencies of different forms of human and nonhuman life. So long as economic logic did not lead to a destabilization of nature, so long as there was enough slack in nature for the consequences of economic logic to be tolerated, this subordination of nature to the market went unnoticed (Cox 1997:29).

The environmental crisis is also a result of agriculture. Here I am referring to agro-business. This concerns the production of coffee, tea, cotton, cocoa which are export crops of most of sub-Saharan Africa. In this kind of agriculture, the overuse of fertilizers affects the soil and could lead to desertification and erosion. In the same vein, pesticides such as DDT are used without considering their dangerous effect on the lives of the people and animal life.

It is worth noting that poor countries which produce these renewable and non-renewable resources will run short of them because they are the only source of revenue. Since the revenue yielded by the exploitation of these resources is already small to finance some programmes of development, I wonder what will be the consequence of the shortage of this sole source of income. Certainly one

consequence connected with such an overexploitation will be that the poor countries of sub-Saharan Africa will not be able to finance the resources that need to be renewed, especially in the area of agriculture. The poor people who, hitherto, were benefitting from this agriculture will lose their jobs and will be left to die.

Nevertheless, we can note some growing concern among the developed countries about this very problem of depletion. But the problem here is the injustice connected with such a concern. In effect, as Samir Amin (1997) observes, this growing concern is simply limited to not allowing others to be equally irresponsible. This leads us to another aspect of the environmental crisis caused by economic prosperity, namely pollution.

### **3.4.2. Pollution**

Pollution is another by-product of economic prosperity which is as dangerous as the consumption of non-renewable resources. In fact, the exploitation of renewable and non-renewable resources goes hand in hand with pollution. Pollution affects not only human beings but also the whole of creation. Let us see in details how this situation affect the poor countries.

The report of World Health Organization (WHO) tells us that pesticides poison half a million of workers who spray them every year. The great number of these workers are most likely to be found in poor countries. To use the experience I am acquainted with, until now the widely used pesticide in treating coffee and cotton in Central and Eastern Africa regions is DDT. Yet little or no attention is given to the reduction and/or prohibition of toxic chemicals and pesticides. It is true that some environmentalist movements have suggested heavy taxation of these products so as to get revenue that could be used to promote environment protection. This was a suggestion made by Japanese environmentalists who argue that revenue from taxation of toxic products could be useful in purchasing conservation rights in, for instance, major forests to prevent their exploitation. These Japanese specialists suggest also to use that revenue in order establish an international court which could settle disputes and prosecute offenders against the environment. But such suggestions slip on the policies and regulations of the market agreed upon in economic fora (Mitelman 1997:259).

This is a clear case where human beings are blind to the fact that they are destroying themselves as part of the environment for the sake of market and profit. Hence it is not surprising that few people can sacrifice our planet for their short term profits.

While economic development is worried about overpopulation, and demographic boom, particularly in developing countries, there is little or no worry about the fact that economic development can progressively depopulate the world. It has been observed that the global warming, the rising of the sea level with the melting ice-caps, the depletion of the ozone layer which cause human skin cancer, and the deterioration of air quality are the effects of a global economy operating with mass production and consumption. The by-product of this mass production and consumption are chemicals such as carbon monoxide, DDT, sulphur dioxide, chlorofluo-carbons, which have bad consequences on human life and biological life in general. These consequences include deforestation, depletion of animal and sea life stocks caused by the dumping of toxic and nuclear rubbish in the forest and the sea, the loss of bio-diversity, shortage of rain which causes desertification, famine, and diseases. Desertification, famine and diseases cause death of a lot of people, and hence depopulation of the world. We shall also add the war industry which uses land mines and other weapons of mass destruction.

There seems to be not much willingness to provide solutions to this problem which affects the whole of the creation. Or rather there seems to be not much willingness to revise the present ways of production and consumption which characterize the phenomenon of economic globalization. In this respect, Klaus Nürnberger is right in pointing out that the ecological concern has not become part of the economic concern. According to Nürnberger, even the mandate of the institutions to fight pollution is restricted to fighting the symptoms of the problem, while the cause remains untouched (Nürnberger 1999:84). Nürnberger also argues that by destroying nature, humanity progressively undermines the chances of (its own) survival and prosperity (Nürnberger 1998:191). He goes as far as suggesting that the chances of survival could be increased if humanity moves beyond the mere assumption of just “doing something for” our natural environment. In fact, this “doing something for” is often limited to preventing others from using the same resources. Nürnberger suggests that:

In practical terms, the criterion for establishing the difference between responsible use and wanton destruction or depletion should be the ability of the natural world to absorb the impact of such use

and regenerate itself, as well as the ability of humanity to find alternatives to non-renewable resources (Nünberger 1998:192)

To conclude this point, I don't think one can admit any globalization of an economy of which the consequence is the global destruction of the earth. The earth and all that it contains is God's and to misuse it for the sake of competition and profit maximization is evil and undermines our own life as human beings and what surrounds us. Accordingly, economic life should be structured in such a way that it aims to meet human needs without further degradation of our planet (Cobb 1994:10). Furthermore, economic development should be done in a way that makes justice between people a concern. Accordingly, one expects economic wealth to produce the development of the whole human person and all people on the one hand, and the protection of nature on the other hand, that is, linking integrality and universality (Herr 2000:60). Unfortunately, this seems to be far from being the case. Poor countries seem condemned to be the dumps of the waste produced by industrialized countries as Lawrence Summers (economist of the World Bank) advocates:

The toxic waste of the First World should be shipped to the countries of the Third World, because the Third World has more space for such waste and that the cost of treating the diseases produced by nuclear waste is much lower in these countries (Summers as in Brutus 1997:379).

We already see the results of this suggestion. In 1996, an Italian company dumped its containers of waste at the Nigerian National airport. The African equatorial forest has become the usual dumping area. This adds to an irresponsible exploitation for the sake of profit. To these few examples we should add the old weapons sold at a cheap price to warring countries of Sub-Saharan Africa. The deep consequence of this is the whole spiritual degradation. In effect, it would seem as if people whose spirituality has deteriorated or is deteriorating resort to arms to enhance their economic and political interests.

Finally I believe that the goal of human beings should not be the economic growth for its own sake. And human beings are not there for the sake the economic growth; rather economic growth is there to serve human needs. Hence the aim should be the development of an adequate economy that can be sustained and respectful of the human being and nature. This can be achieved if the present economic order is given a human face, that is, if the human person rediscovers his ethical dimension

that makes her a sharer in God's creation out of love.

### **3.5. Triumph of market and moral decadence<sup>13</sup>**

From what I have developed so far, it goes without saying that what comes first in economic globalization is the market and the resulting profit maximization. The dynamics that underlies the market and profit maximization is competition. This competition hides a lot of moral paradoxes:

- growth of productivity with greater profits, yet fewer jobs, loss of meaning, loneliness, instability in families, marginalization of the poor;
- increased wealth in rich countries and urban centers within countries, yet growing impoverishment in poor countries.
- the language of international solidarity in the midst of inequality and social injustices, etc.

In short, the goal of economic growth as a result of economic globalization is far from being a just, participatory and sustainable society (Cobb 1994:47). I shall outline six moral consequences that flow from this situation:

- The human spiritual value is undermined;
- The market and profit thought to lead humanity to well-being is morally empty;
- The individualism which characterizes economic and political liberalism leads to moral relativism;
- The equality of opportunity as a moral purpose of liberalism loses its sense;
- Absence of "moral boundaries of the market";
- The totalitarianism of the market.

Let us consider each of these points in turn

---

<sup>13</sup>I will understand morality from a communitarian perspective as consisting in preferences and choices relating to human interaction, social arrangements, and the mode of human interaction all of which constitute the way we live together. Thus when I talk of moral decadence, I am referring to the fact that these preferences and choices that constitute our human interactions are more and more misguided and inhuman.

### 3.5.1. Our spiritual value is undermined

The first moral consequence of economic globalization is that the spiritual value of the human being is endangered. D. Korten describes the loss of human spiritual value in these terms:

When we are spiritually whole and experience the caring support of the community, thrift is a natural part of a full and disciplined life... Money has displaced our sense of spiritual connection as the foundation of our cultural values and relationships. We can create societies that give higher value to nurturing love than to making money (Korten 1995:267-8).

This observation is pertinent at this particular time when some people seem to live for the sake of market and profit. By this token, human beings are reduced to the state of mere consumers or producers. But the moral sense teaches us that human beings cannot be defined in terms of what they can sell, buy and consume. The value of buying and consumerism annul the human sense of generosity and self-giving or sacrifice. Where generosity and self-giving lack, we cannot talk of responsibility for the common good. The idea of the common good disappears along with human dignity supposed to be at the center of every social and economic project (George 2000:169-170).

According to J. Cobb, in the present economic evolution, it appears as if humans are more defined as individuals-in-markets rather than persons-in-community. The implication is that economic growth undermines the fact that participation in a healthy community is more important to human well-being than the production and consumption of goods and services beyond what is essential for the biological health (Cobb 1994).

For the individual-in-the market, profit is an end in itself and any means can be used to achieve this goal. For instance, in the pursuit of profit for its own sake, women are the most exploited, particularly in the advertisement of goods because of their sexuality. Correspondingly economic globalization has been accompanied by an increase in the participation of women in different economic sectors not because the economic integration of women is necessary, but because of their sexuality. On the other hand, women are being integrated in the economic sector not because the present economic order would like to do away with the marginalization of women, but because in most cases women constitute cheap labor, especially in poor countries (Isaacs 1997:172). In short, women

become machines for the production of goods and services.

Apart from the exploitation of women, we also see the development of child labor, mostly in poor countries where there is poor availability of education. These children often come from poor families whose income is uncertain. According to the report of the World Bank in 1995, it is estimated that about a 100 million children below the age of 15 participate in economic activities (World Bank quoted by Isaacs 1997:175-176). Where economic activities are not sufficiently available, women and children are obliged to indulge in inhuman activities such prostitution and drug trafficking in order to survive. The consequence of prostitution is the pandemic spread of AIDS. It is commonly agreed that the poor countries host the highest number of HIV people.

Thus, the present economic development is far from being at the service of human beings. Instead, human beings seem to be at the service of the economic system. In this system, competition and competitiveness are encouraged whatever the cost. In his speech in 1994, the president of the United State asked the following question to Americans: "Are our children learning what they need to know to compete and win in the global economy?"(quoted by Purpel 2000:250). Such is the standard by which we measure what is needed today: competition and victory in the global economy whatever the consequences.<sup>14</sup> The danger is, of course, that in the course of this development, humans cease to be the center of the social and economic project. I do believe that a happy economic globalization should be one that is respectful of human dignity.

### **3.5. 2. The market and profit supposed to lead humanity to the universal well-being is morally empty.**

Another moral consequence is that the market and profit maximization are perceived to be the engine which moves history to universal well-being of humanity. In this kind of well-being, human relationships are once again viewed in terms of economic competition and competitiveness. No one

---

<sup>14</sup>Yet, as Michael Sandel has expressed it in his *Democracy's Discontent*, such political liberalism and the kind of economy it gives birth to is the cause of disenchantment and dis-empowerment. As a result the American citizen lives in a situation of malaise characterized by two fears: the fear that Americans, individually and collectively, are losing control of the forces that govern their lives, and the fear that the moral fabric of the community is unraveling around them (Sandel 1996:3).

can deny the fact that such relationships are devoid of any collective responsibility and concern for the common good. Poverty is defined in terms of economic failure, that is, failure to relate economically (Purpel 2000:250ff). There is hardly cognisance of the fact that competition as defined in the actual stage of economic globalization lacks fair play. Yet it is obvious that there is no way in which the nascent industries of poor countries can compete with industries of developed countries, or the subsidized agriculture of developed countries could compete with the non-subsidized agriculture of developing countries. In short, there is no way in which the weak can compete with the strong; there is no ground on which the “haves” can compete with the “have nots” (AEFJN 1999:9-10).

### **3.5.3. Individualism and moral relativism**

The market expansion and the maximization of the profit go hand in hand with the development of individualism. Individualism endangers social relationships not only in the society at large, but also in families. And as societies and families disintegrate, people lose their moral reference, and this results in a recrudescence of “moralisms”. In this vein, Bouckaert links individualism and moral relativism as follows:

An ordering on the basis of shared values taken for granted is being replaced more and more by individual possibilities and choices. (Because) the market individualizes and privatizes values and choices. This process leads to such a far reaching individualization that all shared meaning and sense of community collapse (Bouckaert 1999:27).

Along the loss of moral reference, there is also the disappearance of people’s identity and culture. The reaction to this disappearance is nationalism and racism which are often tied to the migration of people in search of a better life away from their countries of birth, and religious fundamentalism. These reactions themselves endanger human morality insofar as they involve gross inhumanity or violation of human rights.

### **3.5.4. Equality of opportunity as a moral purpose of liberalism loses its sense**

The rule of liberalism is thought to be equality of opportunity. Yet the ever rising inequalities between the rich and the poor between countries on the one hand, and between centers and peripheries



within the same country on the other hand, make it difficult to actualize such moral purpose. Against this background, Gregory Baum has asked this question:

Does the globalization of deregulated capitalism favor the unification and pacification of humanity, or is it an aggressive expansion of the economic empire to the detriment of the major part of the world population (Baum 2000:53)?

Baum's question is pertinent in so far as some people understand economic globalization to draw economies, cultures and peoples of the world in a complementary and symbiotic relationships. However, this cannot be the case in the kind of aggressive competition under our eyes. In fact, those who may talk of symbiotic relationships are "the magicians of the market" as one scholar called them. According to Neville Gabriel,

It is more the monopolization of the world's resources by powerful interest groups in Europe, North America and Japan, brokered by elites in poor countries. Indebtedness functions as a political leverage tool to force poor countries into ever more exploitative, neo-colonial global economic relationships for negligible debt relief (Neville 2000:4).

The symbiotic relationships are supposed to make the global village a reality. Unfortunately the idea of the global village is an illusion rather than a reality. It is true that, thanks to the technology of communication and transport, one could think of the possibility of a great interconnection, hence a chance of becoming a human family and human solidarity. However, the idea of the global village remains an ideology that gives the rich access to resources in every part on the world. More resources mean more markets and greater profit. The consequence of putting the market and profit first is that some people are condemned to suffer; hence the degradation of human value. If economic globalization is to give birth to human solidarity, wherein everybody has equal opportunity, there should be material sufficiency for all (George 2000:169). To this end, economic globalization should aim to make the whole of human family both producer and consumer.

According to Klaus Nürnberger, in so far as some people are more fortunate and more capable than others, equity demands that population groups with low productive capacities be empowered, while more productive groups are expected to invest at least part of their capacity in such

empowerment, whether by private initiatives or via the state (Nürnberg 1998:195). It is on this basis that inequalities between countries and within countries, between centers and peripheries can be overcome to make the principle of equal opportunity meaningful.

### **3.5.5. Absence of “ Moral Boundaries of the Market”**

Here it is question of the limits of the market. In his article, *The Moral Boundaries of the Market*, Russel Keat (1994) asks himself whether the market has boundaries. In effect, as human beings are more and more economically minded, everything becomes marketed and marketable, including money itself, political power, love, friendship, education, knowledge, health, religious salvations (the sin of simony), etc.

According to Michael Walzer (1983), if we consider ourselves as human beings who are social, social goods must be distributed in accordance with the criteria appropriate to those goods within each sphere. That is to say, each social good has a social meaning. Correspondingly, each sphere must be prevented from colonizing others. In practical terms, people’s success in one sphere must be prevented from achieving corresponding success in others. However, what we observe today in the logic of the market is that the sphere of money and commodities colonizes other spheres.

Russel Keat (1982) and Walzer have observed how the market-governed life represents the very anti-thesis of social relationship and suggested to review the central place of the state in defining the boundaries between the sphere of the market and other spheres. Unfortunately, the role of the state is being sidelined as it is deemed merely to provide the social and public facilities necessary to economic capital. Keat and Walzer are right, because the market is not a moral structure. If that is the case, we need an institution that could have moral responsibilities when it comes to moral issues that are caused by market expansion and profit maximization.

### **3.5.6. Totalitarianism of the market.**

This consequence is connected with the preceding one. Since the market and profit maximization extend to every sphere of human life where even the human being makes him/herself a commodity to

be sold/bought in one way or another, the present economic order falls into the error it purported to correct: to do away with the totalitarianism of the state. Instead, the market itself becomes totalitarian. In *The Spheres of Justice*, Michael Walzer puts it as follows:

One can conceive of the market as a sphere without boundaries, an unzoned city - for money is insidious, and market relations are expansive. A radically laissez-faire economy would be like a totalitarian state, invading every other sphere, dominating every other distributive process. It would transform every social good into a commodity. This is market imperialism (Walzer 1983:119-120).

Those are some of the elements of the present economic order which characterize today's moral decadence.

### **3.6. Conclusion**

In this chapter I have focused on the consequences of economic globalization. I have pinpointed five major consequences, namely economic, political, social, ecological and ethical consequences. My observation has been that economic globalization has both positive and negative consequences which coexist side by side: the growth of international trade along with the economic marginalization of poor countries and peripheries within countries; the ideology of political liberalism which is being universalized despite the demise of the state and the political instability it causes; an apparent international solidarity in the midst of inequalities and social injustices; an economic prosperity which undermines our natural environment, and finally a triumphant market which leads to moral decadence.

The question, therefore, is not simply to balance the benefits and burdens of economic globalization. Rather it is a matter of making economic globalization evolve in a way that is respectful of the dignity of the human person particularly and universally as well as our natural environment.

In the next chapter, I will consider efforts made by two eminent scholars in trying to make economic globalization acceptable to all. The first perspective is a Marxist response, the second is that of a moral theologian who suggests a global ethic. Although the two perspectives are valuable, I will argue that they are not satisfactory. This will help me to provide my own perspective based on the

concept of *imago Dei* as relational.

## **CHAPTER FOUR**

### **A CRITICAL STUDY OF AMIN'S AND KÜNG'S RESPONSES TO ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION**

There is a value higher than the value of the market. Slavery was abolished because the value-system said this must stop. Child labour in the factories and mines of Britain was stopped because people said no, the value-system will not allow it. We have to ask ourselves: how do we insert a human value system into the process of globalization, to fight the idea that humanity exists for the sake of globalization?

*Francis Wilson 2000:2*

#### 4.1. Introduction.

With the end of the Cold War in 1989, a new global vision emerged, with its as consequence the shift to a unipolar world dominated by only one power: capitalism and its liberal economy. This unipolarity has brought Fukuyama to consider the so-called demise of the conflict between capitalism and socialism, and to conclude that we are witnessing “the end of history”. Fukuyama is suggesting that we are moving towards a world where the major political and economic trends and patterns (political and economic neoliberalism) can be expected to remain essentially unchanged.

However, the lines of the previous chapter have shown that these trends and patterns are rather controversial, and therefore far from remaining unchallenged. The controversy consists in a dual world: duality between economic growth and marginalization of the poor, duality between centre and periphery, tendency to the universalization of political liberalism which undermines the nation-state with as consequence social and political instability, duality between international solidarity and inequality and social injustices, duality between the triumph of market and moral decadence, finally, duality between economic prosperity and environmental degradation.

Noting such dualities, it is obvious that Fukuyama’s “end of history” cannot remain unchallenged. Economic globalization and the neoliberalism on which it is grounded cannot be the end point of human history. The reason being the fact that this economic world order is built on an unethical ground, namely:

a vision of the world where power will always be in the hands of those who now possess it, and the powerless will remain so, a world where the rich will get richer and the poor will remain poorer (Brutus 1997:379).

In the present chapter therefore, I will consider and contrast two responses from two well renowned scholars. The first response is that of Samir Amin. Amin suggests a reversal of economic globalization altogether. His reversal of the system consists in a reconsideration of socialism, rather **international socialism, whereby each nation should be allowed to negotiate the terms of interdependence**. The second response is that of Hans Küng. Küng rejects the trend according to which economic globalization can remain unchallenged. He suggests **a global ethic that would make**

**economic globalization human.** This global ethic is drawn from the wealth of world ethical and religious heritage.

However, the two responses cannot be left uncritiqued. My contention is that neither Amin's international socialism, nor K  ng's global ethic constitute a satisfactory challenge to the power of the market and profit. Amin's suggestion is not satisfactory. The Humanist Project or the international socialism he suggests is unrealistic and unreliable, particularly at this time when **Marxism has failed economically to compete with its opponent ideology of capitalism and has shown itself to be socially unpopular, and eventually unhelpful in its practice.** In other words, Amin's argument cannot convince us at this time when socialism has just collapsed. K  ng's suggestion is not satisfactory either. It is true that K  ng's global ethic is a powerful suggestion, being drawn from the religious traditions of the world. Nevertheless **it lacks a conceptual foundation which would redeem it from the risk of being a mere ethical contract.** If it is to remain powerful and a sufficient guarantee for the global order, it needs to be provided with a conceptual framework. In other words, K  ng's "Aristotelian mean economy" which he situates between the welfare economy and neo-capitalism needs a guiding concept. This concept should be an alternative to that of *homo oeconomicus* that informs neoliberalism. Besides, there must be a reason why the different religious traditions of the world have the values suggested in the global ethic as a common denominator.

Hence, the present chapter will consist of three major articulations, namely a critical analysis and evaluation of:

1. Samir Amin's Humanist Project or international socialism;
2. Hans K  ng's Global Ethic;
3. Conclusion

## **4.2. Samir Amin's Humanist Project**

### **4.2.1. A biographical note of Samir Amin: the man and his thought**

Before we launch into Amin's Humanist Project, it is necessary to know a little bit about who

Samir Amin is. Amin was born in Cairo (Egypt) in 1931 and pursued his higher education in the fields of politics, economics and statistics in France. He obtained a PhD in Political Economy in Paris University as well as other degrees from the French Institute of Statistics and from the Institute of Political Studies.

After his studies, Amin returned to Egypt and served as a member of the Planning Bodies of the Nasser regime. In 1960, he left Egypt and worked in the Ministry of Planning in Mali for 4 years. From 1966, Amin taught in France until 1970 when he was appointed head of the United Nations African Institute for Economic Development and Planning in Dakar (Senegal). At present Amin is the Director of the African Office of the Third World Forum. Hence his interest in tackling such question as globalization and its effects on poor nations.

Amin interests me in his criticism of economic globalization, which, for him, is nothing else than what he terms “worldization” of the capitalist system. In fact, this phenomenon has been his life long concern as is made obvious from reading his various publications. His biography published in the *Monthly Review* classifies his reflection under four major headings:

1. A critique of the theory and experience of development,
2. An alternative methodology for analysing the global system which he calls *really existing capitalism*,
3. A re-reading of the history of social formations,
4. A reinterpretation of post-capitalist societies (*Monthly Review* 1992: 50-59).

However, although this thematization of Amin’s reflection is valuable, I will not use it for the sake of the aim I am pursuing in my dissertation. Instead, I would like to suggest another way of reading Amin’s works under three headings which assume the same thematic directions pursued in my dissertation:

1. Opposition between socialism and capitalism,
2. Accumulation of wealth and underdevelopment,
3. The relations between the North and South.



These three themes are obvious in Amin's PhD dissertation (1957), which he later published under the title: *Accumulation on a world scale* (1974). In the background of Amin's reflection lies the whole critique of what Amin terms the conventional science of economics, or the bourgeois economy which, as he argues, turns a blind eye to the contradictory dynamics inherent in capitalist accumulation.

Correspondingly Amin critiques bitterly the capitalist claim that "in its spread, the market of commodities and production factors create maximal conditions for the satisfaction of all". He argues that far from satisfying all, the market brings world polarisation. Here Amin is in agreement with the finding in the preceding chapter. Instead of bringing about the promised universal well-being, neoliberalism polarizes the world at all levels. Hence, Amin suggests an alternative methodology which could help to deal with global capitalism. This heavy task produced two publications: *Imperialism and Unequal Development* (1977), and *The Law of Value and Historical Materialism* (1978).

Amin suggests that we reverse the situation of polarization by subordinating external relations to the logic of internal development. Hence his book, *Delinking: Towards a Polycentric World* (1990). This reversal is the beginning of the road towards the negotiation of the terms of interdependence of each society with the rest of the global economy.

For Amin, the polarisation in the world is being aggravated by new technologies, new forms of worldwide finance capital, and market expansion. As a result, we have the industrialisation of one part of the world and the "fourth-worldization" of another part, that is accumulation of wealth in one part of the world and underdevelopment in another part. Against this background, Amin sees three major challenges that need to be dealt with.

1. From the political point of view we face the democratic challenge. The issue at stake is whether we should accept a pure and simple restoration of bourgeois political democracy (in the name of political liberalism) or whether we shall succeed in giving it a progressive content so as to move toward the social management of the economy.

2. In the socio-economic field, we face the market challenge: the issue is whether we should accept the law of the market which is bound to operate savagely against the majority of the world

population, or shall we succeed in mastering the market through social planning. This, of course, may require taking seriously the role of the state which is being sidelined.

3. In the area of international relations, the challenge consists in whether we shall reintegrate<sup>15</sup> the world economy and so inevitably be peripherized or we shall succeed in mastering our (local) economies.

These are the challenges which face the project of building the world system on the basis of poly-centrism. They will not be easy to deal with, especially considering that the expansion of capitalism seems to be seductively successful in imposing itself despite its unacceptable consequences. Accordingly, Amin argues that there is a need for joint effort and realism. He suggests that different regions or countries coordinate their visions and subordinate their external relations to the constraints of their internal development. This will be achieved by avoiding the temptation of merely adjusting internal development to the global expansion of capitalism. That will be the beginning of **international socialism** or **global socialism**, a *rendez-vous* to which Amin invites us in his 1997 publication: *Capitalism in the Age of Globalization*. In other words, poly-centrism allows a country to restructure itself internally. But, since other countries are also doing the same, Amin calls for joint effort. Effectively international socialism or global socialism is not born from poly-centrism. Instead, it is born from the coordination of the vision of different countries or regions. The overarching authority which would regulate the economy would, eventually, emerge from such coming together.

The question though is how far can Amin's Marxist Humanist Project take us. I myself would not personally mind a project that could challenge the present world order which is built on the priority of the market economy over other aspects of human life. The crucial question is, however, whether

---

<sup>15</sup>It is not clear what Amin means by "reintegrating" the world economy. However, one might guess that there has been the first move towards economic integration. The economic integration might be the introduction of neoliberalism in poor countries through SAP. This integration, as we saw it in our third chapter, has failed. Apart from SAP, there might be other ways of integrating the world economy. But even these unknown ways will keep us in the periphery. Amin's suggestion is that we completely forget about integrating the world economy (the term "delinking" could be understood in this way) in order to master our own local economies in the first place (economic poly-centricity), and then negotiate the terms of cooperation in the second place

the Marxism from which Amin draws his inspiration is really helpful at the time when it is going through an obvious thorough crisis due to its economic and social failures. It is this dilemma which I want to consider more closely in the next lines.

#### **4.2. 2. Amin's international socialism as a response to economic globalization**

Three points will be considered here, namely:

1. The nature of international socialism,
2. The agenda of international socialism,
3. Other scholars who support (implicitly or explicitly) international socialism as a worthwhile ideological venture.

##### ***4.2.2.1. The Nature of international socialism***

Amin qualifies his international socialism as being a Humanistic Project. As I mentioned earlier, this Humanist Project is primarily a wholesale Marxist critique of the capitalist system. Amin started dealing with this project already in his first work: *Accumulation on a Large Scale*. It is obviously a permanent pre-occupation in his inquiries. However, I shall concentrate on this theme as developed in his work: *Capitalism in the Age of Globalization*, in so far as he is dealing with how we can respond to the development of economic globalization in the last decade, which is our concern in this dissertation.

*Capitalism in the Age of Globalization* contains two key words: **crisis and chaos**. Amin's focal question is how to manage this crisis and chaos. Of course we need to ask ourselves what crisis, what chaos he is referring to. According to Amin, the crisis and chaos is a situation produced by the utopian and unrealistic project of running the world like a market (Amin 1997:ch.4, cf.1990). The crisis arises from the fact that the profits derived from the production do not find sufficient outlets in the form of lucrative investments capable of further developing productive capacity within capitalist countries. The neoliberal solution consists in finding other outlets for this excess of floating capital in other countries. As a result there is a contradiction of world capitalism which consists in the fact that, on the one hand the centres of gravity of the economic forces commanding accumulation have shifted outside the

frontiers of individual states; and on the other hand there is no political, social, or cultural framework at the world level that can give coherence to the overall management of the system.

Of course, Amin agrees that it is not capitalism which is in crisis, since it is expanding and flourishing. Instead, it is the societies in which it moves which are in crisis given the fact that the logic of the capitalist system cannot satisfy the expectations of the majority of the population:

People want such things as full employment, improvement of social services and opportunities for social mobility. The unilateral logic of capital produces unemployment, impoverishment and marginalization. Nations want independence and dignity; the logic of global capital produces the opposite. In this process, states and governments have lost the legitimacy which enabled them to intervene in the regulation of social relations in favour of popular classes, and to defend their national interests on the international scene (Amin 1997:95-96).

I argued in the second chapter that political liberalism seems to be the ideology of economic liberalism, even though this does not appear to apply to the Asian tigers, and that even democratic countries like India have not been economically successful. Amin rejects this relationship between politics and economics. Thus he argues that, on the one hand, there is no developed economic and political relationship capable of reconciling the rise of industrialisation in newly competitive zones of Asia, Latin America with the pursuit of global growth. On the other hand, there is no relationship, other than an exclusionary one, with the African periphery which is not engaged and cannot engage itself in competitive industrialisation at all, simply because it does not have the means (technological infrastructure, technological skills, capital) required by the present global economy.

The problem of capitalism in its present stage is its inability to pursue market integration and establish parallel integrative social and political structures (Amin 1997:chps. 2-3). Yet the logic of capitalism seems to be that the market expansion leads to democracy and social progress, and that political instability, poverty, unemployment, and social marginalization caused by market expansion are but transitory. This might be a hope for some Marxists who are disappointed by the failure of socialism. In its editorial article, *Socialism: Time to Retreat?* one can read the following:

Since there is no socialist movement presently active, all we can and should do is to wait and hope for capitalism to create the conditions for change: 'if the human energies are ever released again, it will be from the metabolism of capitalism itself. It is the changes in capitalism and its scientific wonders that will produce the potential forces for social transformation (Monthly Review 2000: 4).

Coming back to the market integration and its parallel integration of social and political structures, I should say that we have to be aware of the ideological rationalization of capitalism which is to make it more acceptable by claiming that it is linked to democracy on the one hand, and on the other hand, the real motive of the market-economy which is nothing else than profit.

Amin's observation is pertinent and needs to be taken seriously. There is no direct connection between the present economic development and political ordering both at the national level and at international level. The beginning of political pluralism in most of Sub-Saharan African countries was not followed by economic take off. Economic growth requires other conditions which a political system may not offer. Moreover, the economic measures suggested by financial institutions such as IMF and World Bank as well as Western governments yielded nothing other than social and political chaos. The United Nations as a structure which sometimes tries to coordinate economic and political orderings at international level is not itself a political structure. In the present development, we have seen that the United Nations is more and more overtaken by institutions such as WTO and GATT which are market and profit minded.

Hence the question that Amin asks is whether there is any alternative logic. Amin answers in the positive. The alternative is international socialism. This international socialism rests on the following premises:

1. Development as a social model rather than an economic model,
  2. The refutation of the neoliberal claim that growth is the natural product of market management,
  3. The fact that history is not directed infallibly by the laws of pure economy (ultra-liberalism).
- Economy is but one aspect among the many that are responsible for the movement of history.

The common denominator of these three premises is that economics is not prior to social and political arrangements. It will become evident that even K  ng too shares Amin's view as far as economic globalization is concerned. With this idea of international socialism, Amin shows that capitalism, and in fact, economic globalization, is not inescapable. There is a perspective through which interdependence can be negotiated. This perspective consists of framing and supporting national projects of development in conjunction with an attempt to correct initial inequalities rather than leaving them to grow more profound (Amin 1997:Chps 5-7). However, Amin does not tell us how one can frame and support such national projects. Nevertheless, one would understand that, in principle, Amin is trying to reverse the famous globalists' slogan that we should "Think global and act local". With his international socialism or global socialism, Amin suggests, instead that we should "Think Local and Act Global, but progressively". That is what Amin meant by the following:

Socialism must without doubt inscribe its strategies in the perspective of constructing a socialist world and, if not a world stage, at least of a consistent political system. But it must also define the stages which will lead in this direction. In this context it seems to me that it is impossible to bypass the stage of popular national construction, or regionalization, of delinking and building of a polycentric world (Amin 1997:79).

Amin takes care to warn us that the road to international socialism is by no means an easy one. The reason is that in the actual process of economic integration, a country's position is defined by its capacity to compete in the world market. In this competition, centres use what Amin calls monopolies. Five monopolies are pinpointed:

1. Technological monopoly: This monopoly requires huge expenditure that only a large and wealthy state can envisage.
2. Financial control of worldwide financial market such that money becomes a commodity like any other good. In this monopoly, the dollar seems to be the dominant currency.
3. Monopolistic access to the planet's natural resources: There is a dangerous exploitation of natural resources by the already developed countries. Unfortunately, capitalism's short-term rationality cannot overcome these dangers. Amin deplores the fact that even the environmental concern by these

very developed countries is simply limited to not letting others be equally irresponsible, or better, a refusal to share resources (generalized irresponsibility in the use of resources would be disastrous to the planet).

4. Media and communication monopolies: This leads to a uniformity of culture as well as the opening up of new means of political manipulation that might even lead to the erosion of democracy.

5. Arms of mass destruction: After the collapse of the Soviet Union, this monopoly remains the sole domain of the United States (Amin 1997:4-5). Let us note that the European Union has a project of a common defence force.

According to Amin's framework depicted by these five monopolies above, even the industries of the peripheries are subordinated and reduced to the role of sub-contracting. Without being elaborate, Alan Rugman has criticized Amin's definition of globalization in terms of the five monopolies extremist rhetoric (Rugman 2000:15). Whatever the case may be, on the basis of his observation of such a monopoly, Amin suggests an agenda for his international socialism to which I shall now turn.

#### ***4.2.2.2. The agenda of Amin's International Socialism.***

Amin calls his international socialism a Humanist Project. There are two tasks of this Humanist Project: The first task is situated at the national level, that is the level of self-definition. The second task is situated at the international level and consists of the different responsibilities that have to be dealt with in order to make the world meaningful to everybody.

##### ***4.2.2.2.1. The Humanist Project 's self-definition: what it involves***

According to Samir Amin, the Humanist Project is a (possible) ideal whereas globalization via the market is a reactionary utopia:

(...) the market-based management of the world system, is utopian in the worst sense of the term, a reactionary, criminal utopia, doomed in any case to fall apart under the pressure of its own

highly explosive charge (Amin 1997:151).

Here one should be wary of the concepts which Amin is using in a biased way. In effect, it seems strange to talk of market-economy as a “reactionary utopia” at the time when the market is apparently successful despite its negative effects on those who cannot follow the economic current. Moreover, by reactionary, in a Marxist way, one understands opposition to political or social change. In the present world order, there seems to be no major change going on to which the market economy is opposing. Socialism which was a contender to capitalism has now fallen, or at least, it is no longer a major threat. This is recognized by some socialists themselves when they say: “Now that the (social) movement is no longer alive, we are led to believe, there is no longer any reason to disguise the fact that productive forces are what really count” (Monthly Review 2000:3).

However, as Amin seems to suggest, the market economy is utopian in the sense that it promises a universal well-being while at the same time polarizing the world. The few rich increasingly become richer while the majority of the world’s population increasingly become poorer. Amin sees economic globalization as a system doomed to fall apart. Karl Marx made the same prediction 150 years ago, but it did not materialize. Instead it is Marxist socialism which has fallen apart while capitalism holds its head high. However, Amin might be right in some way. I do not think that a system which enriches a few people and pauperises the majority of the world’s population can keep going. If things continue the way they are presently, economic globalization will not go very further.

For Amin, as a matter of procedure, the Humanist Project should involve the construction of a global political system which is not at the service of a global market. By definition, this global political system is what he calls international socialism. This international socialism must first define its parameters in the same way as the nation-state represented historically the social framework of the national market and not merely its field of deployment (Amin 1997:5). But the project of international socialism is achieved, it will need an international authority to regulate the economy. This would mean, for instance, some kind of world state which might put an end to the nation-state. However, we need not to worry too much about this. Amin has already argued that the nation-state defines itself first, and then negotiates the terms of cooperation with other countries or its region. Thus, international or global socialism does not intend to destroy the nation-state but rather to strengthen it among other nation-states with which it shares the same project: socialism.



#### **4..2.2.2.2. *International Socialism's responsibilities:***

The international socialism has on its agenda the following points<sup>16</sup>:

1. Organization of global disarmament at appropriate levels. The recent Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, and the subsequent US led war on Iraq, the US intervention in Somalia, NATO's intervention in Eastern Europe, the persistence of wars in various countries of the African continent and other poor countries make this point of the Humanist Project's agenda more than important both at the global and national level, particularly in the redefinition of the post-cold war state (cf. Held, et al. 1999:143-8).

Of course, the issue of military intervention is very complex. The question is, of course, whether anybody should have averted the eyes to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, or to what was happening in Somalia or in Eastern Europe. However, the question is why one country (USA) or just a small group of countries seem to play the role of the world police? Why does war seem to be the privileged people's solution? Why is preventive diplomacy down-played in conflict management? Preventive diplomacy should be addressed in conjunction with the reasons that are behind ethnic rivalries and other civil wars. As I argued earlier, the US has no other interest in intervening in Somalia apart from that of creating a short cut to the Gulf. One wonders whether the attacks of the US and Britain on Iraq were not intended to show their military superiority, or any other interests. One could say the same thing of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.

2. Organization of access to the planet's resources in an equitable manner so that there would be less inequality. This is one of the contentious issues in the present world economy as far as justice and economic marginalization are concerned. In effect, poor countries like those of Sub-Saharan African countries seem to be condemned to be for ever the source of raw materials for which no fair prices are determined (the prices being determined by those who have the means to transform them),

---

<sup>16</sup>A similar agenda is suggested by Daniel Singer in his article, *Why Marxism*. According to Singer, the international socialism, or the Marxism in a Marxist fashion would have this agenda: 1. The problem of equality in a world of growing social injustice, 2. The problem of the nation-state in a globalized society, 4. The problem of work and unemployment, 4. Poverty, 5. The problem of democracy to transform the indispensable planning into the self-organized society (Singer 1997:1-5).

and consumers of products from developed countries, most of which they can do without. Of course, we should not forget the fact that raw materials yield low prices. The other side of this point of the international socialism's agenda is the ecological problem: the wanton and irresponsible exploitation of the earth's resources without replacing them. Hence this point will concern not only the problem of social and economic justice but also the problem of environmental degradation.

3. Negotiation of an open, flexible<sup>17</sup> economic relationships between the world's major regions which are unequally developed: Until the end of the Cold War, the problem was the totalitarian state and dictatorship. Today the problem is that of subordinating human society to economy. We are witnessing an economic imperialism in which the poor countries are left with no other choice than to be mere consumers; and those that cannot adapt to these conditions are pushed in a situation of irrelevance. Hence, it is suggested that the open and flexible economic relationships would bring people to share in both production and consumption.

4. Negotiation of a correct management of the global- national dialectic in the area of communication, culture and political policy. So far this management was left in the hands of the United Nations which is an interstate structure. But this structure has shown its limits. Other alternatives may include such institutions as the World Parliament which goes beyond inter-state relations to represent people's social interests.

These points are important in evaluating Amin's challenge to economic globalization. The question though is to what extent is this project feasible. Is it not an overly ambitious project which is unrealizable given the fact that the Marxism which instructs it is in serious crisis, if not dead? According to Amin, the possibility of this project relies on historical experience on the one hand, and empirical observation on the other hand. From empirical observation, polarisation which is a byproduct

---

<sup>17</sup>The terms "open", and "flexible" can be confusing at the time when economic globalization consists in opening up as well as encouraging flexible labour markets. However, the idea behind these concepts is effectively, (economic) relationship. It is difficult to say that there can be good (economic) relationships between the haves and have nots, the rich and the poor. We have already noted that the poor countries acceptance of economic reform was not successful from this very view point. The question is therefore what should be the terms of fair economic relationships in which both the poor and the rich, the haves and the have nots could benefit.

of capitalism is not part of the natural order. From the historical point of view, over the past centuries, polarisation has been challenged. People peripherized by capitalist world expansion, and who seemed for a long time to accept it as their fate, have over the past 50 years ceased accepting it. Hence, a humanistic response to the challenges of globalization inaugurated by capitalist expansion is not utopian, rather it is an ideal. The idea that international socialism is not just an utopia but an ideal has been supported by a number of other scholars beside Samir Amin.

#### **4.2.3. Other scholars who support the humanist project**

Apparently, Samir Amin is but one among many scholars who challenge the present world economic order as utopian from a Marxist perspective. Let us consider a few of them.

In their book, *Globalization and its discontents* (1997), R. Burbach, O Nunez and B.Kagarlitsky argue that the political and social foundations of the post-communist neoliberalism are gravely flawed despite the fact that capitalism is successful in this new epoch. According to this group of authors, the onrush of technology and capitalism makes it impossible to find peace and stability. Referring to the Gulf crisis and turbulence in other parts of the world, the growing misery in the world, as well as the destruction of the environment, they argue that there is a growing instability and uncertainty.

Thus Burbach and his co-authors suggest as a solution what they call a “post-modern Marxism”, that is, a kind of Marxism that goes beyond the Marxist and communist experiences of the past century and half. This post-modern Marxism would build a world based on cooperation, participation and a real liberation of the human spirit (Burbach et al. 1997:1-3). In short, to post-modern capitalism, they oppose a post-modern Marxism. This neo-Marxism promises us do away with the historic communist tradition that led to authoritarianism and an economic system that was not different from capitalism with its destruction of the environment and the creation of new, alienated working classes (Burbach et al 1997:3). The starting point of this neo-Marxism is the social sectors at the bottom of our societies which are not happy with the way capitalism is evolving today. As we shall see, this kind of socialism is known as socialism from below as Tabb calls.

In his article, *Noam Chomsky and the Struggle against Neoliberalism*, Robert McChesney has also criticized the present economic order as being utopian. He argues that the present economic order will end in the same way as slavery and colonialism were ended. The seeds of the demise of the capitalist order are thus described:

The current neoliberal order has generated massive political and economic crises from East Asia to Eastern Europe and Latin America. The quality of life in the developed nations of Europe, Japan, and North America is fragile and the societies are in considerable turmoil. Tremendous upheaval is in the cards for the coming years and decades (McChesney 1999:47).

McChesney does not suggest, as Amin does, that the response to neoliberalism should be international socialism or global socialism. However, he provides a ground for a scholar like Bellamy Foster to take the bull by the horns and to suggest a reinvented Marxism. For Bellamy Foster, the crisis which McChesney describes is caused by the internal contradictions within the capital accumulation process. That is, of course, the problem of expanding the market and maximizing the profit as an end in itself. Foster refers to historical facts which shook classical liberalism and its self-regulated market: the First World War, the Russian Revolution, the Great Depression, the rise of Fascism and the Second World War (Foster 1999b:32-33). Foster argues that as classical liberalism was interrupted by its own contradictions, so also will it be for the actual neoliberalism if the international political governance is not provided. This international political governance is thought of in terms of a reinvented Marxism, that is, a combination of political democracy and economic democracy (Foster 1999a:44, cf. Sherman 1995) in the society of associated producers across the world (Foster 1999b:38). Thus Foster is referring to the kind of international socialism Samir Amin suggests.

A call to a humanism in the form of socialism is also made by Istvan Meszaros. Meszaros argues that neoliberalism is heading to its demise not only because it lacks an international political governance but because it is, in many respects, unethical. He puts it thus:

By reducing and degrading human beings to the status of mere "costs of productions" as necessary labour power, capital could treat even labour as nothing more than a "marketable commodity", just like any other, subjecting it to the dehumanising determinations of economic compulsion (Meszaros 1997:28).

Meszaros' point is that humans have a priority before anything else and humanity should not be priced. However, the present situation is such that those who constitute labour seem to be privileged, while the actual sufferers are the unemployed. Shouldn't we take seriously Joan Robinson's idea that: "Worse than to be exploited is not to be exploited at all"! But the ideal of Marxists is effectively that those with labour should not be dehumanized and those who are unemployed should find labour because it is through work that the human being realizes him/herself.

However, it would seem that there is no warranty that socialism may not also be unethical in some respects. In effect, experience has shown that in the past socialism deprived people of their freedom in the name of equality. Furthermore, the socialist leadership ended in dictatorship which is politically unacceptable. By the same token, some Marxist scholars have criticized socialism's vanguardist philosophy arguing that Marxist socialism failed because it was a "socialism from above". The suggestion therefore, is that the neo-Marxist socialism should be a "socialism from below".

In this vein, William Tabb deplores the lack of interest on the part of those international organisations (WTO, GATT, IMF, ...) to struggle for the emancipation of the poor masses and for labour. According to Tabb, since the economic globalization that is responsible for this degradation comes from above, we need a popular resistance to globalization. This resistance from the bottom would eventually end in international socialism which Tabb calls *progressive globalism* (Tabb 1999:1-10). The resistance from the bottom is similar to Amin's popular national construction as the first stage of international socialism.

Still in Marxist paradigms, Leo Panitch makes the following observation:

It is as though seeing a man on the street, hungry and homeless, you approach his problem only through the optic of his not being motivated enough to get a job, rather than through the optic of there being something fundamentally wrong with the capitalist system. There is nothing much socialist in a value system that does not begin morally, from the latter optic (Panitch 1998:20-21).

This observation brings Panitch to suggest socialism as a socio-political system that could govern globalization in the twenty-first century. He puts it thus:

... it will be necessary to develop a new generation of socialist political leadership in the twenty-first century [with a clear vision of the way things could be and a contagious determination to turn that vision into reality<sup>18</sup>]. The goal of this new socialist political leadership must be to transform states into creative agencies of cooperation, decommodification, and democratization rather than efficient agencies for capitalist globalization (Panitch 1998:22)

In his *The Communist Manifesto After 150 years*, Ellen Meikins makes an observation similar to that of Leo Panitch. Meikins reflects in these terms:

It [capital] is now relying on simply redistributing wealth in favour of the rich, and on increasing inequalities within and between national economies with the help of the neoliberal state... In advanced countries, the most visible signs of that redistribution are a growing polarisation between the rich and the poor and the attack on the welfare state (Meikins 1998:32).

In *Capitalist Change and Generational Shifts (1998)*, Meikins pursues this observation further and makes the following conclusion:

The contradictions of capitalist expansion, then, means two things: The first is that a truly humane and democratic capitalism has never been a sustainable possibility. The second is that a socialist politics may turn out to be more rather than less possible (Meikins 1998:10).

Since inequalities produced by capitalism extend beyond national boundaries, Meikins is, in fact, suggesting that the socialist political governance should be an international project.

Thus, with this brief review, it is obvious that Samir Amin is not alone in his suggestion of a humanist project along Marxist lines. The common denominator of them all is that the economic approach of neoliberalism which gave birth to the present economic order undermines the humanity it is supposed to serve. The problem is whether the so-called international socialism is a possibility that

---

<sup>18</sup>My emphasis. These qualities and capacities were first suggested by the World Bank for capitalist political leaders (World Bank 1997:144). Panitch takes them and attributes them to his suggested socialist political leaders who should not be at the service of capitalist globalization.

is strong enough to succeed given the recent historical facts that neoliberal economists know about Marxist socialism. This brings me to have a critical eye of Amin's suggestion and his supporters.

#### **4.2.4. Critical appraisal of Amin's response to economic globalization**

Amin's response to economic globalization seems to emerge from two concerns common to most Marxists who study international political economy today (see Frieden and Lake 1995:11-12). The first concern is the fate of labour itself in a world of increasingly internationalized capital which is not accompanied by international political governance. In a world of globally integrated financial markets and mobility (de-localized), multinational corporations and workers can hardly negotiate an equitable division of wealth. Unemployment and underemployment flourish in the context of multinational capitalists shifting production to places where labour is more compliant. This movement occurs with the parallel search for maximal profit.

The second concern which is obvious in Amin's reflection is increasing poverty and underdevelopment in poor countries. While wealthy countries become wealthier and super-developed, poor countries become poorer and underdeveloped. Hence the issue is how to devise strategies for autonomous growth and development of the latter category.

Amin's general response to both concerns is international socialism or global socialism which has as its starting point, is national reconstruction. With this general background, let us now see the strengths and the limits of Amin's response to economic globalization.

##### **4.2.4.1. Strengths of Amin's project**

First of all, the starting point of Amin's project lies in naming economic globalization. For Amin, *economic globalization is nothing else than global capitalism which relies on five monopolies: technology, finance, resources, media and weapons of mass destruction*. In other words, Amin understands *economic globalization as the extension of the monopoly of capitalist imperialism*. In fact, this is the way both Marxists and neo-Marxists see economic globalization (see also Callinios et al., 1994; Gill 1995). What Amin and his supporters have against this capitalist

imperialism is its dehumanizing and exploitative aspects. On this point Amin is in agreement with the non-Marxists who criticise the process of economic globalization because of its effects.

Another important critique of economic globalization made by Samir Amin is the lack of a social and political framework similar to that of the historical nation-state. Beyond the kind of nostalgia which Amin and Neo-Marxists might have of a socialist state, I would agree with the idea that so far there is no social and political framework provided for economic globalization. Even the non-Marxists who criticize the process of economic globalization itself deplore the lack of such political governance (Herr 2000: 59ff, Minc 1997: 90). This comes from the fact that, in the present world order, the economy claims to have priority over all other aspects of human life. In neoliberalism, a human being is defined as *homo oeconomicus* rather than the classical Aristotelian definition of a human being as a political animal (*zoon politikon*) and social being. It is in this regard that even the so-called political liberalism or liberal democracy fails despite the overwhelming campaign for it throughout the world.

There is a great fear that such economic imperialism could make the world a jungle where human beings are more and more alienated from their social and political dimension. This is true in so far as human beings are defined according to what they can buy from or sell to the market. Amin's reflection is a refusal to surrender human nature to the forces of the market and their dehumanising effects. Against the claim of neoliberalism that "There Is No Alternative" (TINA), Amin suggests an alternative: the construction of a global political system, international socialism or again global socialism which is not in the service of a global market. Instead, this international socialism is thought to be the framework of the market and not its field of deployment. Hence the rightness of the concept of a "Humanist Project" of neo-Marxists as opposed to the "Economistic Project" of neo-liberals.

The strength of Amin's political system of international socialism lies in its agenda, namely: security, justice, economic cooperation, fairness in international relations.

#### **4.2.4.1.1 Security:**

As noted previously, to settle the question of security through an organization of global disarmament is the first point on the agenda of Amin's international socialism or Humanist Project.



During the Cold War, because of the arms race between the two superpowers the world feared its imminent destruction. Each superpower endeavoured to equip itself with sophisticated and dangerous weapons that could destroy not only its opponent superpower but also the whole world. It was noted that the Soviet Union had nuclear weapons that could destroy Europe many times over. Even though this did not happen, the problem of security was real especially in Third World countries where there were permanent confrontations between the two competing ideologies (Capitalism and Communism). This was and continues to be the case in Angola<sup>19</sup>, Mozambique, DRC<sup>20</sup>, and Ethiopia, although one cannot lay the entire crisis at the feet of the superpowers. The recent attacks on Iraq reveal that the security problem is far from being settled. Moreover, it was predicted that after the end of the Cold War, we would witness the demise of NATO for instance. On the contrary, its role seems to have become more significant and is clearly expanding. Its intervention in Eastern Europe is very revealing. Today, the European Union is reflecting in terms of European Union Defence Force (EUDF). One wonders whether the world is not going to engage in another dangerous arms competition, with two military forces one on the eastern side and another on the western side of the Atlantic Ocean facing each other. We should add that China keeps developing its military technology. The recent costly arms deal by the South African government shows that security is a serious issue in Africa. Thus the need for an alternative to economic globalization to put on its agenda the organisation of disarmament becomes ever more apparent.

#### 4.2.4.1.2. Justice

This point concerns the organization of equitable access to the planet's resources so that there would be less inequality. So far it appears as if the planet's resources are the sole domain of

---

<sup>19</sup>After the fall of communism, it is really difficult to know what is going on between the Dos Santos led government and the Savimbi led rebellion. Suffice it to note that in 1992 Savimbi got substantial financial aid from the USA simply because he claimed to be a democrat. Now that he has been defeated in the elections and went back to war, it is difficult to say whether the Angolan war is still an ideological one. Perhaps we should say that the ideological war has turned into a commercial war over diamonds, gold and other mineral resources.

<sup>20</sup>The issue of what is going on in DRC is more complex. Apart from the commercialization of war by Uganda, and Rwanda backed up by US and South Africa, there is also the problem of inappropriate leadership

industrialised countries. Without denying the fact that some industrialized countries have resources of their own, most resources (mineral resources, timber) are found in developing countries which have neither the means (lack of technology and infrastructure, capital, lack of skills due to poor or lack of education, and even the migration of the few brains that are available) to transform them nor the power to fix fair prices. The industrialised countries are the ones which determine what they want and fix the prices, not merely because raw materials yield low prices, but also because of the maximization of profit. I have already hinted at the fact that even the environmental concern that results from the exploitation is limited to the refusal to share irresponsible use of the planet's resources. In the same vein, while the exploitation of world resources is limited to one part the world, other people seem to be condemned to be mere consumers as long as they do not have the technological infrastructure and know-how. This adds to poor and corrupt leadership which is not sufficiently concerned with how we can address adequately the problem of economic development, as well as a kind of life-style geared to simply consume goods produced by industrialized countries. Justice requires that we all share in not only consumption but also in production.

#### **4.2.4.1.3. Economic cooperation**

Economic cooperation refers to the negotiation of open, flexible economic relationships between the world's major regions which are unequally developed. Behind this point lies the rejection of the unjust structural patterns of the world economy. This is crucial at this time when nation-states are being bypassed by market forces<sup>21</sup> and at the time when technologies and financial means are the monopoly of some few countries/centres which are in search of maximal profits. Hence Amin suggests that each society be allowed to negotiate the terms of its interdependence with the rest of the global economy in order that the essential national developments be pursued in a pluralistic world. This is what Amin refers to as *polycentrism*. Amin suggests that if economic cooperation is to succeed, the present institutions (IMF, World Bank, WTO, GATT) which run the global market have to be liquidated and be replaced by other systems for managing the global economy. The alternatives which Amin suggests are, for instance, exchange connections, definition of operational modalities for new

---

<sup>21</sup>The nation-states are being bypassed because they are thought to be obstacles of the freedom of the market. Such is the logic of neoliberalism. The state is only necessary to facilitate these operations dimmed necessary for the market.

monetary, financial, scientific, technological, commercial and environmental institutions (Amin 1997:150).

#### **4.2.4.1.4. Fairness in international relations:**

This aspect concerns the correct management of the global- national dialectic in the area of communication, culture and political policy. This will be possible if political institutions which represent social interests on a global scale are created. Amin points out to the “world parliament” as one of these institutions to be created and which go beyond the interstate mechanisms of the existing United Nations.

These are the four major points which Amin’s Humanist Project has on its agenda. In a world being shaped by technology, one wonders why Amin does not dedicate sufficient space to the problem of technology and how it should be shared. Neither does Amin provide any reflection on political liberalism as an ideology that is being championed as the political framework of the market economy. My contention here is that poor countries cannot share in production if they cannot share in technology and technological know how. Sharing in technology requires education which is not also given any space in Amin’s reflection. Yet as an African, Amin knows very well that education is one of the points that are needed to save African countries from their parlous state. This brings to us look at the limits of his project.

#### **4.2.4.2. *Limits of Amin’s project***

First of all, Amin’s socialism can be referred to as a neo-Marxist project geared to challenging neo-liberalism. The question is how a humanism along Marxist lines can really constitute a challenge to economic globalization, or rather the expansion of the monopoly of capitalism when it has failed economically, and has proved itself socially unpopular (see Nürnberger 1998:96). Thus Amin’s project is unrealistic. For global socialism to be realistic, it must be economically successful and socially popular. However, for this to happen two criteria must be fulfilled.

For international socialism to be economically successful, it will have to adopt some of the means being used by neoliberalism. These means include technological infrastructure, and a market economy (as it has been the case with the Asian Tigers). It is true that Amin suggests starting with popular national construction (a polycentric world), and then moving to regionalization to end with a socialist world, if not a world state (Amin 1997:78). As far as the regionalization is concerned, Amin suggests, for instance, to revisit pan-Africanism and pan-Arabism. This continental and sub-continental unity has always been discussed in OAU fora (for instance) as one of the ways by which economic development can take off. In effect, a continental unity means putting economic efforts together but also a common market. However, it seems that unity alone without the means of production is not sufficient for economic success.

Besides the weakening of the state by the power of transnational corporations in various parts of the world, the popular national construction does not have much chance to succeed especially with a system which has proved itself unpopular. This was obvious in the uprising of the masses in the Soviet Union and its satellites in various parts of the world, even in China which, in the end, opened up to free enterprise and the free market (Nürnberg 1998:97). In the same vein, most African countries which, hitherto, have embraced socialism wholeheartedly as a system fit for African cultures and traditions have joined neoliberalism which unfortunately produced the poor fruits we know. Amin may reply to this critique by saying that even economic liberalism is facing opposition within itself. He could point out the uprising of workers in France and a renewed trade-union militance, the attempt to sabotage the WTO summit in Seattle, the violent reaction against the World Bank and IFM in the Czech Republic and even in the USA, the financial crisis in Eastern Asia, and the loss of democratic control over the economic institutions. Maybe if international socialism is to work, it should build on these popular resentments in order to operate its revolution. However, these incidents are not yet sufficient to undermine the success of the forces of the market and its profit maximization.

It is in this light that I believe that Amin does not give a guarantee for the success of his global socialism. However, given the ethical principles of equality of people, production, and equity in the distribution of benefits that Marxism encapsulates, Amin might tell us that socialism is theoretically a good system to embrace. Hence he could, for instance, point out the fact that in the past, Marxism has been managed by people who betrayed its theoretical foundations. Even with this reply, there is

no guarantee that leaders of the socialist states will suddenly become gods who will redeem socialism from its economic and social failures of the past. It is worth noting that it is these failures of the past which make socialism flawed, and therefore unreliable in the present context of a seductive market economy. Maybe Amin's humanism needs a god as a centre for it to succeed. Of course, humans are not capable of being gods, for as the psalmists says, they are "less than gods".

Thus, my contention is that we need interventions that make the forces of the market function better and more humanly. As our introductory quote says, we need to fight the idea that humanity exists for the sake of globalization. Economic globalization needs an ethic, a human value system that could shape its processes rather than merely being replaced by a system which has just failed. It is this ethic that could expose the limits of the market vis-à-vis inequalities, injustices, poverty, environmental degradation and moral decadence. Economic globalization has achieved some economic successes, we need to bring it to achieve social, moral and environmental success as well, so that it can become the opportunity it is meant to be. I will argue that this is not possible unless we recognize ourselves as being created in the image of God. In fact, even Amin's Humanist Project could eventually succeed on this very ground. Before we embark on this argument, let us review another alternative, that of Hans Küng.

#### **4.3. Hans Küng's Global Ethic as a response to Economic Globalization**

Hans Küng is another scholar who has attempted a response to economic globalization. But who is Hans Küng? What is the content of his response? How adequate is his response? These are the questions I shall consider in the following lines. With due respect to the authority of Hans Küng and his experience as an outstanding theologian on the one hand, and my appreciation of his effort to respond to the challenge of economic globalization on the other hand, I will argue that the human values he suggests lack a sufficient (conceptual) foundation. They cannot constitute a satisfactory challenge to economic globalization by the mere fact that they are agreed upon by most of the world religions and ethical traditions. What we need at the present stage of economic globalization is not just a contract among the various world religions and ethical traditions, we need a conceptual framework that goes beyond that which informs neoliberalism, namely the self-interested *homo oeconomicus* who is always chasing after utility or profit (Underson 2000:170ff). The new conceptual framework can be

found by trying to answer the question of why there are human values shared by all. The question itself leads to a more fundamental question of what we are and how we should live given what we are. My contention is that it is because we are created in the image and likeness of God. Hence it is this concept of the image of God that yields a common ethic which could challenge economic globalization.

#### **4.3.1. The man Hans Küng**

Hans Küng was born in 1928 in Switzerland. He is known as one of the most influential and outstanding Christian theologian of our time, despite the controversy surrounding his thoughts in the Catholic Church to which he belongs. Küng's career is complex but can be viewed from three major perspectives: teaching, writing, and heading different institutions and associations.

As a lecturer, Küng has taught fundamental, dogmatic and ecumenical theology. The latter field of his teaching won him an appointment as a director of the Institute of Ecumenical Research in Tübingen. Küng's writings are heavily influenced by the three aspects of theology which he taught. Hans Küng has published widely. Besides articles, contributions to volumes of essays, editorials and prefaces, Küng published 51 books up to 1993. Most of these books deal with ecclesiological and ecumenical questions (Kuschel 1993:367-385).

Küng has recently taken a vivid interest in the moral questions of our time. In 1991, he published the famous *Global Responsibility*, a book which deals with the necessity of a world consensus on fundamental human values and basic moral principles that could be agreed upon and serve as a reference for the global crisis of our time. Küng's *Global Responsibility* led to the declaration *A Global Ethic*, which was to be approved by the Parliament of World Religions in 1993 in Chicago. Let us quickly note that Hans Küng is the president of the Global Ethic Foundation.

Behind Küng's moral interest lies a powerful concern which can be framed by the following question: what is the ethical relevance of the Christian message in the light of the social, political and economic evolution of our world today (Mertens 1998:274-5)? It is against this background that, in 1997, Küng published *A Global Ethics for Global Politics and Economics*. This masterpiece is a detailed examination of contemporary economic and political issues and an eventual response to them:

It contains two major parts, namely:

1. The global politics between real politics and ideal politics (pp 1-156),
2. The global economy between the welfare state and neo-capitalism (pp 157-276).

Obviously, the question at stake is “the ethical question raised by the phenomenon of globalization in both economic and political fields. However, I shall focus more on the second part which concerns the issue I am dealing with. Let us now consider closely the content of the response he provides to the present situation of economic globalization.

#### **4.3.2. A global ethic as a response to economic globalization**

##### **4.3.2.1. Küng’s understanding of economic globalization**

First of all, Hans Küng explains what he understands by economic globalization. He puts it as follows:

The globalization of the economy is that process through which markets and production in different countries become increasingly dependent on one another, because of the dynamics of trade in goods and services, and the movement in capital and technology. This globalization is accompanied by a globalization of technology, above all information technology (Küng 1997:160).

Küng’s understanding of economic globalization involves three aspects that seem to make economic globalization what it is: technology, communications technology and the eventual politics as an underlying ideology. Of course, his understanding of economic globalization differs slightly from the definition I considered in the second chapter. While for Küng technology accompanies economic globalization, in my understanding, technology is the engine in the process of economic globalization. For Hans Küng, economic globalization is a process that is irreversible, unavoidable, ambivalent, unpredictable, and yet ultimately controllable through a global ethic.

#### **4.3.2.2. Between the welfare state and neo-capitalism: “Aristotelian mean” economy**

Küng argues that the ethic he purports to provide is not intended to dismantle the welfare state, which, unfortunately is under the threat of the forces of the market, but rather to restrict it. But why does Küng want to restrict the welfare state? For Küng it is “because in its present dimensions it has simply become too expensive in the face of diminishing growth and the excessive ageing of the population”(Küng 1997:170). The question then arises whether the restriction of the welfare state in the northern hemisphere where there is excessive ageing, should also be applied to the welfare state (if any!) in the southern hemisphere where there is high demographic growth rate. Here the challenge is this: while in the northern hemisphere the welfare state should be restricted to save economic growth, in the south how is it going to help its young population in providing for its future? How can we safeguard the welfare state in the south while at the same time trying to foresee solutions to the problems which the Western welfare state is facing?

Hans Küng argues that the neoliberal economy (neo-capitalism) as represented by the American and British model does not provide the best solution as a restriction of the welfare state because:

1. The claim that the invisible hand of the market functions for the well-being of all citizens and guarantees progress is just as much a myth refuted by reality as the claim that socialism will bring the paradise of prosperity for everyone;
2. The policy of free trade is not a principle to which all other economic and social perspectives could be subordinated;
3. The abolition and exportation of jobs are often made at the cost of opportunities for innovation;
4. Workers are not paid according to the rise of productivity and profitability (Küng 1997:174).

Küng further argues, and rightly so, that neo-capitalism is motivated by profit and market expansion as a result of the predominance of monetary power over politics. In fact, Küng is here pointing out a problem of order of priority, namely the fact that the economy is taking undue priority in every aspect of human life. That is what I have already referred to as economism. At this juncture, Küng discards neo-capitalism as unacceptable in so far as it maintains injustices and inequalities in



which the rich get richer and the poor get poorer.

Hans Küng critically considers two kinds of market economy, namely:

1. Pure market economy or ultra-liberalism,
2. Social market economy or social liberalism.

#### **4.3.2.2.1. Pure market economy**

The pure market economy is represented by people like von Mises, von Hayek, and Milton Friedman. The pure market economy is also referred to as ultra-liberalism. This kind of economy was put into practice by Ronald Reagan in America and Margaret Thatcher in Britain. Ultra-liberalism has two major social and economic characteristics:

##### ***1. Freedom (individualism)***

The absence of compulsion is the supreme principle for ordering public life. In economic terms, people are allowed to pursue their economic interests freely whether they do so in a selfish or generous, foolish or wise way. This means that the intervention of the state is kept minimal, in other words it is restricted. Accordingly, ultra-liberalism believes in self-regulating market forces. The interventions of the state are believed to lead to a concentration of power. Individual freedom goes hand in hand with responsibility to look after oneself, such that no one else can be blamed, except oneself. Accordingly, the producer as well as the consumer, are sovereign and suffer from no coercion as to what they can sell or buy (cf. Nürnberger 1998:36).

##### ***2. Free market:***

According to the proponents of the free market, prosperity does not grow through state intervention, but rather with the division of labour or allocation of resources according to their relative productivity, ownership of the means of production, free competition, the balance between demand and supply, and the size of the market. As a result, a liberalized exchange of goods and production factors must extend worldwide. In short, all economic processes are controlled by the hand of the

market and not by any political structure or state. They insist that role of the state must be kept minimal.

Ultra-liberalism is the other extreme of the command economy of the communist model. While in the command economy social and economic responsibilities are shifted to the state, in ultra-liberalism, social and economic responsibility are mainly left in the hands of the individual. One importance of ultra-liberalism is efficiency which is born from one's motivation to improve one's performance, initiative, creativity, and self-reliance, given the fact that no one else can be blamed except oneself (Nürnberger 1998:37).

Küng rejects ultra-liberalism or the notion of a pure market economy on the grounds that ethical principles are not given any role. In effect, there is no obligation towards the nation, no specific responsibility for the society, and the ethic of business is limited to the moral obligation to increase and maximize profits. Küng's rejection of the pure market economy is pertinent in the sense that individuals in this kind of economy live as if there is no such thing as society or state. There is nothing beyond economic prosperity pursued for its own sake. Correspondingly, Küng outlines five critical questions in this regard:

1. Is there such an idea (...) as a natural harmony or spontaneous order existing on earth which, despite occasional disruptions, directs our being on the whole of society for the best, and on which in the last resort the economic order can also rely?
2. Does the invisible hand of competition really function in such a way as to combine highly egoistic self-interests, compensate for distortions in society, and thus finally also maximize the common good?
3. Does not the invisible hand sometimes show such marked signs of paralysis that with good reason people and even economists call for deep state interventions in the economy and society in order to harmonize the market process with the common good and to avoid social conflicts which are practically destabilizing?
4. Along with the failure of the state, is there not also and already a manifest failure of the market, and is not an economic theory which is constructed with the state as defective as a theory of the state which does not take adequate account of the economy?
5. Is there not a need for a new awareness in economics too that the economy has to do not only

with money and commodities, but also with living people, who, in their thoughts and action, by no means allow themselves to be limited to self-interested *homo oeconomicus* (Küng 1997:195-6)?

I would agree with Küng that ultra-liberalism is unethical. In fact ultra-liberalism could be seen to cause spiritual alienation in so far as the human spirit is invested in the expansion of the market and the maximization of profit which for ultra-liberal economists appears to be an end in themselves. The alternative might be a kind of social liberalism. This is the next notion to be discussed

#### **4.3.2.2.2 Social market economy or social liberalism**

The social market economy is also called a market economy with social obligations. While the central mind behind ultra-liberalism is Melton Friedman, the brain behind social liberalism is Ludwig Erhard (1897-1977). Social liberalism or a social market economy could be seen as a corrective of ultra-liberalism. In effect, the proponents of social liberalism recognize a social element which the proponents of ultra-liberalism fail to consider. For social liberalism, the social element serves as an important ethical dimension.

From the start it (social liberalism) recognized a social obligation, not for sentimental reasons, as Milton Friedman could possibly have assumed, but on the basis of a quite rationally formed economic order which, without any moralism, is nevertheless bound up with fundamental ethical values, norms and goals (Küng 1997:196).

The social market economy combines the principle of freedom in the market with that of social equilibrium. Hans Küng praises this kind of economy because competition is safeguarded to consolidate economic development, and at the same time, the rights of those who have a weak position in the market, are offered some protection. However, Küng rejects social liberalism as unacceptable. In effect, Küng argues, social liberalism faces two major challenges, namely: ecological and ethical challenges.

### ***1. Ecological challenge:***

Nature cannot be marketed as a commodity. In effect, economic prosperity and social welfare can be secured, while the depletion of resources and the pollution of the environment are not considered. In other words, it is not enough to save economic prosperity and social welfare, because these aspects are but a small part of a complex whole. K  ng views the ecological challenge as follows:

Should not the programme of the social market economy be reoriented on ecological goals? In this way it would become an economic and social order with not only social but also ecological commitments, taking seriously the problems of the burdening and endangering of the environment, from agriculture through transport to nuclear energy, and aiming at a socially and environmentally friendly means of production (K  ng 1997:206).

This critique is quite fair. One might increase economic prosperity and social welfare in a way that undermines the environment. Economic prosperity and social welfare are not the only thing that make human life a better life. Human life is more than these two aspects. By the same token, P. Knox and J. Agnew ask the following question:

Can the world's natural resources and increasingly fragile physical environment support the levels of production that it would take for the entire population of the world to enjoy American or Swiss levels of consumption (Knox and Agnew 1998:407)

### ***2. Ethical challenge***

K  ng recognizes that social liberalism has an ethical character. However, he argues that this ethical character is merely instrumental whereas it needs to be considered as an independent value in the society. The instrumental character of social liberalism comes from the fact that, even in this system, the economy still claims priority over other aspects of human life. Social and political choices are subordinated to market mechanisms. In other words, the problem is still that the economy and its market mechanisms are given priority over anything else. He clarifies this thus:

Doesn't the ethical basis of the social market economy need to be rethought programmatically? Unless this happens, an ecological-social market economy with an ethical foundation will remain an economic and political model which has only an instrumental character and will not rise to become an independent basic value of society. Accordingly, politics should not just conform to the market, but should also have in view the interests of all those concerned (and not just the owners of capital) weighing them up on all sides, so that the market mechanisms will have to meet particular political and ethical values and criteria (Küng 1997:206).

Both the ecological and ethical challenges are real. In fact if considered closely, in a society where a social market economy is prevailing, life is still dictated by the economy. In this social economy, the freedom of the market might be safeguarded and the profits distributed. However, in the ultimate analysis, people fail to consider how the social, political, and human interactions with the environment are merely conforming to the economic order. In fact, one could go as far as saying that the economic order enslaves other aspects of our life. For instance, profit might be distributed on the principle of justice, but human interactions go beyond distributive justice to include generosity, sacrifice, charity, mutuality, and solidarity, factors which cannot be provided by economic systems. In other words, even in social liberalism, economic growth is still an idol, a false god. According to Cobb, we have to choose between worshipping the false god or the true God. To worship the true God consists in promoting a just and participatory society rather than simply adjusting to economic growth (Cobb1994:46-7).

Thus Küng rejects both the pure market economy or ultra-liberalism as well as social liberalism because economic imperialism and its colonizing powers are unacceptable. For Küng, the economy should not dominate everything. Citing Peter Ulrich and Ingomar Hauchler, Küng deplores the fact that the economy increasingly forces its own logic on politics and social life. Thus he argues that the present economic order lacks the political support which would ensure the subordination of economic achievements to human and social goals. Correspondingly, Hans Küng also criticizes the prevailing concept of *homo oeconomicus* which informs the present economic order and whose sole interest is nothing but mere market exchange and economic utility. However, Küng does not provide any alternative concept. Nevertheless, he refers to the Aristotelian concept of the human being as essentially a *zoon politikon* (political animal) and a social being whose relationships go beyond economic motivation to imply an ethic of mutuality (Küng 1997:210). Later in the alternative to be

suggested, I will show that the political and social dimensions are but implications of the relational nature of the human being as the image of God.

Küng's suggestion is that the market economy should be at the service of humankind and not the other way round. For this to happen, **ethics must claim primacy over economics and politics**. And, since the market economy and politics are already globalized, there is a need for a global ethic. This global ethic would bring the global market economy to be "politically obligated to humane and social goals". Such a global ethic contains the following human values: life, integrity, freedom, justice, personal dignity, and mutual helpfulness. According to Küng, these values are agreed upon by the majority of the world religions. For these values to be respected, Küng calls each one to a sense of responsibility. He puts it thus:

Both in the sphere of politics and in that of economics we need a new sense of responsibility: a responsible politics which seeks to achieve the precarious balance between ideals and realities which has to be rediscovered over and over again, a responsible economics which can combine economic strategies with ethical convictions (Küng 1997:277).

Let us now consider some scholars who follows the same line of a global ethic.

#### **4.3.3. Other scholars who have suggested a global ethic.**

Like Samir Amin, Hans Küng is not the only one who used the wisdom emanating from the religions of the world in order to find an ethic that would make the present economic situation more humane. Other scholars have also used world religions, or a similar solution, in order to derive an ethic that could give us a human direction in the present situation.

Chai-Sik Chung argues that, although the destructive forces of modernity are relativizing moral traditions throughout the world, we can still derive from each of our religious traditions an ethic of **conscience** that could help us to come to terms with a minimal set of ethical values that unite us all (Chai-Sik 1994: 11-21). In the same vein, M.P Joseph ( 1995:42-58) calls for an ethic that is rooted in religious faith as a response to the negative effects of economic globalization. Of course as far Joseph is concerned, it is unclear as to whether by religious faith, he refers to all religions of

the world taken together, or each religion particularly.

In the same vein, His Holiness Dalai Lama has suggested what he calls **universal responsibility** as a way of giving the present world economic order a human face. Lama departs from the fact today's reality is complex and interconnected. A stock-market crash on one side of the globe can have direct effect of the economies of countries on the other. Technological achievements have unambiguous effect of the natural environment even in the countries where there is no technology. Thus for Lama, the important benefit of developing such a sense of universal responsibility is that it would help us to become sensitive to others whether they are close or far from us (Lama 1999:161-171).

Another scholar who promotes the notion of a global ethic is Klaus Nürnberger. Nürnberger suggests reconciling freedom (as a value central in liberalism and economic growth) with equality (which is a value central to socialism and equity) on the one hand, and on the other hand he suggests to reconcile the communitarian traditional values with the values of modernity, so as to transcend both traditionalism and modernism in a new synthesis. This reconciliation constitutes a new mind set which could lead to a liberated communal and ecological responsibility ((Nürnberger 1998:163ff, 1999:377ff).

The question I wish to ask is: How is it possible that we who are part of these religious or ethical traditions have, nevertheless, failed to live up to the ethical principles they contain? To be sure, the ethical principles outlined in the Declaration of the World's Religions are part of the Ten Commandments in the Old Testament, while the Golden Rule is found in the teachings of the New Testament. Is it not legitimate to wonder whether God has perhaps been thrown out from religions and replaced by economism which seems to be the idolatry of our time? This brings me to a critical appraisal of Küng's response to economic globalization.

#### **4.3.4. A Critical appraisal of Küng's response to economic globalization**

Küng attempts to provide a global ethic to the modern issue of economic globalization by drawing on the heritage of the world's religions and ethical traditions. His analysis and critique of

both neo-capitalism and the welfare state, or rather neoliberalism and social market economies show that “Küng is a (Christian) theologian open to the real problems of the world and committed to the necessary reform of today’s society” in collaboration with men and women of good will (Mertens 1998:279).

Küng is suggesting a kind of half-way economy between neo-capitalism and the welfare economy, in other words, a kind of economy that transcends and supplements the insufficiency of neoliberalism on the one hand, and the limits of the welfare economy on the other hand. This kind of “Aristotelian mean” economy is possible thanks to the global ethic drawn from the wealth of ancient world religions and ethical traditions. This global ethic is geared to restricting the human and environmental costs of economic globalization, hence giving today’s economy a human face.

However, Küng’s effort to provide a global ethic is not without precedence. As I have noted earlier, his *Global Ethic* is a follow up of his previous publication: *Global Responsibility*. This publication informed the Declaration of the Parliament of the World’s Religions in Chicago in 1993: *A Global Ethic* which Hans Küng himself was asked to draft. This Declaration does not demonstrate but presumes the existence of an ethic within the various religious traditions of the world:

An ethic already exists within the religious teachings of the world which can counter the global distress. Of course this ethic provides no direct solution for all the immense problems of the world, but it does supply the moral foundation for a better individual and global order: a vision which can lead women and men away from despair, and society away from chaos (Küng 1993: 17-18).

However, this Declaration itself was not without controversy. In fact, some did not sign the declaration and faulted it for being too “Western”. But we cannot be blind to the fact that the world has a tendency to see what is Western as being associated with slavery, colonialism, neocolonialism and expansionism. Other signatories reproached the Declaration for not mentioning “God” (cf. O’Connor 1994:164). Now, is there no connection between the fact that Küng does not mention God in the draft of the *Declaration Towards a Global Ethic* and the fact that the West (where Küng comes from) is traditionally Christian and yet is responsible for the evils of slavery, colonialism, and presently, socio-economic inequalities and injustices which ruined the spiritual strength of people like



those in Sub-Saharan Africa? At this juncture, I would say that any enterprise which does not refer explicitly or implicitly to God in whose image we are created, becomes questionable. Of course, it might be understandable that, when one draws on the values of all the world religions, one might not mention God which is a concept of particular religions. However, as the Catholic Church teaches,

The desire for God is written in the human heart, because man is created by God and for God; and God never ceases to draw man to himself. Only in God will he find the truth and happiness he never stops searching for. In many ways, through history down to the present day, men have given expression to their quest for God in their religious beliefs and behaviour (CCC 1992: paragraphs 27-28).

And according to Vatican II,

The dignity of man rests above all on the fact that he is called to communion with God. This invitation to converse with God is addressed to every man as soon as he comes into being. For if man exists it is because God has created him through love, and through love continues to hold him in existence (GS 19, paragraph 1).

I have attempted a critique of the background of Küng's enterprise. Yet Küng's global ethic as a response to economic globalization appears to be convincing. Nevertheless it is not free criticism. Firstly, the suggested human values that constitute its content lack a conceptual foundation, that is a concept which would give meaning to his global ethic, in the same way as the concept which informs the present economic order is the economic man (*homo economicus*) and utility or profit. In fact, there must be a reason why most of the religious traditions of the world have these values as a common denominator. It is worth noting that Küng has levelled almost the same critique against the earlier attempt by United Nations which gave birth to the Declaration on Human Rights. Küng criticizes the Declaration on Human Rights as being an ethics without foundation since it is shorn of cultural and spiritual moorings (Küng 1997:106). Of course the basic foundation for the Declaration on Human Rights was the human being as a supreme value to be upheld. But the absolutization of human beings is disastrous as far as our natural environment is concerned, and therefore does not help us much.

We should note that the same ethical values which Küng lists in his Global Ethic are also contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Yet, although the values of the Declaration on Human Rights seem to have spread throughout the world and seem to be observed in many countries to a much larger extent than previously, we cannot be blind to the fact that life is still violated everywhere as the majority of the world's population are reduced to poverty and marginalised by unjust economic structures. Social, political and economic injustices have increased between and within countries; mutual helpfulness and solidarity are disappearing in favour of selfish individualism, the expansion of the market and profit maximization; personal dignity is defined in terms of success in market and capital accumulation. In this connection, one is surprised that Küng does not give space to the critique of structures such as WTO, IMF and the World Bank which govern the world economy but fail to take care of the poor and the vulnerable people and countries, but instead protect the few rich against the poor (Northcott 1998: 225).

I would argue that these suggested values cannot lead us to an economy with a human face unless they are grounded in what we are. In other words we first need to redefine our ultimate nature by referring to the ultimate source of our being, God: we are the image and likeness of God (*imago Dei*) (Gn 1:26). That every person in the world is an *imago Dei*, is the conceptual foundation which Küng's Global Ethic lacks. And we need to derive the practical implications from this claim as far as economic globalization is concerned. How should the *imago Dei* live? Küng is certainly aware of this principle of Judeo-Christian anthropology. But he seems to sacrifice it for the sake of ecumenism and religious dialogue.

Nevertheless, one might still wonder whether the concept of the "image of God" will be helpful given historical facts. In effect, we know that when cultures were dominated by Christianity, Judaism and Islam, the world was not free from injustices and atrocities of all sorts. One might mention conquests, crusades, the inquisition, persecution, the slave trade which lasted about 400 years, destruction of cultures in Africa and Latin America in the colonial period, and apartheid. Surprisingly all these happened when the Church was in power. With all these evils which, unfortunately, are historical facts, I cannot but ask the following question: can a dark candle give light?

At the time when wealthy Romans held the poor in contempt and considered them to be practically immoral (poor people were considered to have no respect for the gods, were grasping, corrupt, liars, and were the basic cause of social disorder and rebellion [Saller (1998: 12-20)]), Christianity brought a social ethic of personal dignity and an equality that transcended social status. According to Rodney Stark (a sociologist), this distinctive ethic was one of the major factors in the spread of Christianity in the Roman empire (Stark 1997:212). Dignity and equality came not from the consideration of human beings as a supreme value in themselves but from the fact that every human being was created in the image and likeness of God. Accordingly, everybody was to be subjected to the commandment of loving one another beyond the boundaries of societies, tribes or ethnic groups, and to all who suffer as the Parable of the Good Samaritan suggests (Sanks 1999:627). By this token, the issue we are trying to address at the moment is the fact that in Jesus, as St Paul tells us, there is no Jew or Greek, slave or free, male or female, poor or rich (Ga 3:28).

#### 4.4. Conclusion

The task of this chapter has been to review two responses that have been suggested to meet the challenge of economic globalization. The first response is that of Samir Amin from a Marxist perspective and the second response is that of Hans Küng, a Catholic theologian inspired by ecumenism and religious dialogue. Samir Amin suggests international socialism or global socialism which he qualifies as being a Humanist Project (as opposed to economic project of capitalism), whereas Küng suggests a global ethic derived from the heritage of the religious and ancient ethical traditions of the world. Both global socialism and global ethic are valuable.

However, I have argued that the two responses have their shortfalls. Marxist socialism suffers from a crisis. In the various countries where it was supposed to have taken root, it has proved itself economically unsuccessful and socially unpopular despite its championed values of equality and solidarity among people. Even if one were to assume that socialism has been betrayed by its leadership, there is no guarantee that a future leadership will rescue it from its parlous state to make it successful. Certainly, Amin who defends international socialism or global socialism is aware of this concern among his Marxist colleagues. The September 2000 issue of the famous *Monthly Review* (Marxist) has the following article by the editors: "*Socialism: A Time to Retreat?*" Such a time

reveals well the defeat of Marxist socialism and therefore its incapacity to lead us to a better world. Maybe the sole guarantee for the success of Amin's project could be God as centre of the humanism he suggests. This would be a major step to a better world!

The second response cannot take us far either. It is true that the present economic world order needs a global ethic rather than just being replaced radically by global socialism as Samir Amin suggests. However, the kind of values Küng suggests are not sufficient in themselves to meet the challenges of economic globalization. In fact, as I have argued, these values were also contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights but have not prevented the economic order from being the way it is at present. People are still caring about their own interests above any moral precepts, and structural mechanisms continue to operate regardless of human moral indignation. Indeed advertizing and entertainment seem to be more powerful than moral principles. In the end, nothing seems to be able to control the accumulation of economic wealth and power.

Nevertheless, this does not mean that we should not keep trying to lay a moral foundation upon which human beings can lead a better life. This moral ground might be shaky if it is thought in terms of "do and don't", "you shall and you shall not". My suggestion is that we ask ourselves the following questions: What are we? How should we live given what we are? In the next chapter, I will argue that the values that constitute Küng's global ethic can indeed help us if they find their ground in these two questions. I will base my ethical response to economic globalization on our human nature as the image of God. It is in our being created in the image of God that we find the values of equality and solidarity central to the Marxist response. It is this concept of the image of God (*imago Dei*) in contrast to *homo oeconomicus* who is concerned with utility and profit which I want to take up so as to suggest an alternative to Samir Amin and Hans Küng. In so doing, I will call every person to his/her responsibility in the economic order as a sharer in God's nature and creation.

One might still ask oneself what practical difference my theoretical addition of a conceptual foundation will make especially if my concept of the image of God leads to the same values and norms as those of Amin and Küng. The difference is that, at least, each person (the society of humans as a whole) is invited to continuously evaluate his/her life by asking the fundamental questions on

which I base my ethic. “An unexamined life is not worth living” Socrates once said. Let us remind ourselves constantly of this wisdom.

## **CHAP FIVE**

### **AN ALTERNATIVE TO AMIN'S AND KÜNG'S RESPONSES TO ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION: BUILDING THE KINGDOM OF GOD BASED ON THE CONCEPT OF *IMAGO DEI***

It is in no way necessary, according to modern economic theory , to consider God when thinking about economy. Indeed, the absence of God in economic matters is viewed as necessary to the great advances in modern economy. The difficulty with modern market economics, however, is that human livelihood is also left out of the theory and practice of the market economy. This is not the result of the market *per se*, but of certain modern assumptions about the human being and nature that stand behind the market. Are there significant connections, though masked, between the absence of God and the disregard for human livelihood?

*Meeks 1989:xi*

## 5.1. Introduction

Our study of the nature of economic globalization has shown that economic globalization is a transnational phenomenon. The study of its consequences has shown us that it is an opportunity which is not without discontent, especially for the poor and vulnerable people and countries who constitute the majority of the world's population. The discontent comes from the fact that economic globalization is underpinned by a conception of economy that is cut off from ethics. Indeed, for the proponents of neoclassical liberalism, what matters is efficiency rather than the moral question. True indeed, "the ideology of the market knows no values except efficiency, productivity and profitability" (Litonjua 1999:228). What I have tried to do in the last chapter is to consider "arguments beyond economics" to echo the words of Katsumi Sugiura (1999:263). I have considered two kinds of response which I consider to be salient.

The first goes in the perspective of doing away with economic globalization by substituting it with international socialism. This perspective is known as the Humanist Project suggested by Samir Amin and his (neo)Marxist supporters. The second perspective is that of a moral theologian, Hans Küng. Küng does not suggest to do away with economic globalization, rather he suggests an ethic that could give it a human face. This ethic, let us recall, has as a content a set of values thought to be commonly agreed upon by the majority of the religious and ethical traditions of the world.

Despite my appreciation of these two responses to economic globalization, my critique has shown that they are not much reliable. The first is unreliable because it is inspired by Marxism which has failed both economically and socially. The second response has been rejected on the ground that the ethic suggested does not have a conceptual framework that could go beyond the self-interested *homo oeconomicus* that informs the market economy. In fact, Küng's global ethic might accommodate the concept of *homo oeconomicus* since he limits himself to the fact that the economy should not only deal with money and commodities but also with living people as if these latter should just be added secondarily to the scope of the market economy. The point I am trying to put across is that the concept of *homo oeconomicus* needs to be first critiqued seriously before any ethic can be provided. Maybe Küng takes for granted the fact that the global economy is another "religion" of which the values have to be taken seriously!

Against this background I suggest an alternative which comes from a conceptual concern. I have an impression that we are dealing with the effects of a cause. Instead we need to deal with the cause first and then attack its effects after. The ultimate cause of the discontent of economic globalization lies in its conception of the human being. In effect, the present economic order has evolved on the neoclassical narrow understanding of the human being as merely an “economic man” or *homo oeconomicus*. This concept of the human being is based upon the modern individual who aims to fulfill his or her **own** interests by rational calculations. For a neoclassicist, these rational calculations must lead to efficiency and endless increase of profit or utility (see Nürnberger 1999:274). We cannot provide an ethic for a system that is built on such a narrow understanding of the human being. And I should believe that any attempt to do so will not take us far. Hence my response.

My response is based on both an ontological and a functional question: what are we and who are we? And how should we live given what/who we are? It is on this double question that I want to base my response to economic globalization. I will argue that we are fundamentally the image of God (*imago Dei*) (Gn 1:26-27). The concept of *imago Dei* is central to Judeo-Christian anthropology. There have been many interpretations of this concept in the course of Jewish and Christian theology.<sup>22</sup> It could be a great task to go through each of them. But I will concern myself with one for the purpose of this dissertation. To be the image of God simply means to correspond to God’s own being. According to A. McFadyen, God’s being is **relational** because God is not single individual but a **community** as the use of plural language in Genesis 1 and 2 and the creation of male and female suggest (McFadyen 1990:31). This relational aspect of God and God’s image has ethical implications that should help us to challenge the phenomenon of economic globalization. Correspondingly, this chapter will consist of the following sections.

---

<sup>22</sup>For Irenaeus, the image of God is the human nature as rational and free. Thomas Aquinas thought that the image of God is primarily in the intellect or reason. John Calvin, the image of God is found in human soul. For Karl Barth, the image of God is the confrontational relationship because the confrontational relationship exists between the human being and God. Emil Brunner nearly follows Karl Barth and argues that the image of God is found in the area of the human being’s relationship to, responsibility to and fellowship with God. And finally C Berkouwer argues that the image of God is simply the relatedness to God.



1. An analysis of the concept of *imago Dei* in contrast with the concept of *homo oeconomicus*,
2. The ethical implications of the concept of *imago Dei*,
3. The priority of God on the market.

In the first section, I shall argue that the concept of *homo oeconomicus* is tied to profit maximization which is misleading as far as the moral, social and political dimensions of human beings are concerned. The concept of *imago Dei*, instead, is geared to considering the human being in moral, social and political dimensions which the concept of *homo oeconomicus* throws in the background. Such approach to the human being can save people from the idolatry of the market and profit. The market and profit should not be seen as an end in themselves, but a means to the ultimate end, God.

In the second section, I shall argue that the social, political and ecological implications of *imago Dei* should respectively help us to reconstruct the human community as a context of moral values, empower the state as the natural society that can work in partnership with the Church as the family of God, and finally reconsider those Christian values that can help us to see the environment as something that is not simply at the disposal of human domination and overexploitation.

And finally, in the third section, I will argue that given the fact that the market is more and more imposing itself as the sole interlocutor of the human being, understanding God as prior to the market should reestablish the human being in his vertical and horizontal relationships with God which *homo oeconomicus* undermines.

## **5.2. *Homo Oeconomicus versus Imago Dei***

### **5.2.1. *The concept of homo oeconomicus and its implications***

In neoclassical thought, the human being is understood as “economic man” or *homo oeconomicus*. The *homo oeconomicus* is particularly known as a profit, utility or pleasure maximiser. But what is wrong with the maximisation of profit or utility or pleasure? It would appear as if there is nothing wrong with the maximization of profit or utility in itself, provided it is intended, as

classical utilitarians argue, for the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people. Such a noble ambition!

However, there is something wrong when this utility is pursued for its own sake, and when some people are undermined, neglected for the sake of happiness which, as far as the present economy is concerned, belongs to a few people. Accordingly, this definition of utilitarianism is misleading because one would discover that it is not really the greatest number of people that is served as utilitarians claim. Instead in the present economic order, it is the greatest utility or profit for the smallest number that matters. I do not mention the fact that in the achievement of this happiness (greatest utility) people can be used as means. Yes the ambition of utilitarians is that the increase of happiness means the decrease of unhappiness. However, our observation so far is that there is more unhappiness, more discontent than the happiness thus promised. This discontent comes from the fact that in the neoclassical thought, the spirit with which utility is sought is self-interest. Adam Smith describes this self-interest as follows:

It is not from benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We address ourselves not to their humanity but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities, but of their own advantage (Smith 1776:26-27).

A certain number of things are opposed here: benevolence and self-interest, humanity and self-love, other people's need and personal advantage. Two kinds of people are equally opposed, the buyer or consumer on the hand and the producer on the other hand. But why that duality? Is it a natural duality or a created duality? In the first set of duality, there is a negation of some natural qualities of the human beings especially in the seller or the producer. In the neoclassical economics, human beings involved in the market system have no human qualities, they do not care about moral values. One may say that they are rather economic machines. There are no such virtues as benevolence, humanity, the value of altruism. The producers and sellers on the market are animated by the sole spirit of egoism as evident in self-interest, self-love, and personal advantage, while the buyer is interested in the goods being marketed. For the neoclassical thinkers, therefore, the negation of the real human nature is **intended** to suit the market and its efficiency. Neoclassical thinkers conceive of the market as the ultimate basis of social organization and interaction. The market is a

system unto itself which does not need any **human** injunction(Etzioni 1988:xi): because it is guided by “the invisible hand”. Human beings themselves become objects no less than the commodities or/and services being exchanged.

However, we should recognize a value that is in human self-interest, namely the value of motivation for both the producer and the consumer. In fact, it is this motivation that leads to efficient action and initiative. Nevertheless, the conception of human being as a self-interested producer or consumer negates such moral virtues as mutual help, solidarity, generosity and self-sacrifice.

David Miliband has outlined three claims held by neoclassicists and which we need to consider with suspicion:

1. The priority of the market over the society,
2. The claim that market is governed by unchanging rules applicable everywhere,
3. The social and political intervention and the market efficiency are locked in a zero-sum game, that is, socio-political intervention is incompatible with the market efficiency(Miliband 1993:24).

Let consider each of these three claims in turn. This will help us to see clearly how economics as conceived by neoclassicists is dissociated from ethics. And we can provide an ethics that overcomes the neoclassical economics by redefine the human being of which neoclassicists have a distorted understanding.

The first claim concerns the priority of the market over the society. This claim goes far back to the Lockean assumption that individual property rights are antecedent to society (Marquand 1988:154). From this claim comes the idea that the state’s intervention is an intrusion on individual freedom as well as a subversion of pre-existing market rationality. Obviously this claim is misleading and untenable. What comes first is neither property right nor individual freedom. Instead, what comes first is the human being and the society in which s/he lives, because as we shall see later, the human being is fundamentally social. Neither can we hold that property rights and/or individual freedom are the primary stuff of which the human being is made. Instead they are attributes one gets

when one comes into the world. In effect, property rights and individual freedom presuppose the existence of a universe from which we claim them. This universe may be the family or the society or the state or even the world. In the Christian understanding, property rights and freedom are, indeed, a gift from God to whom we owe our whole life.

The second claim is that the market is governed by unchanging rules which apply everywhere. Accordingly, the president of the World Bank opines that the laws of economics are like laws of engineering. One set of laws works everywhere (Summers in Keagan 1992:109). At the heart of this claim lies the point that the logic of the market exists independently of the social and political conditions. This marketism is also unacceptable. The market and competition on the market are given too much place as if they constitute the essentials of human nature. At this juncture we should note that the emphasis on market and competition undermines human virtues such as sharing, generosity, mutual helpful, and solidarity as I have noted earlier.

That the logic of the market exists independently of the social conditions is a follow up of the claim of the priority of the market over the society. This is a way the market tries to avoid being controlled by the society. However, the reality is that the market and its laws exist within the context of the society. It is this context that should determine to a large extent whether or not the market is given enough freedom to be efficient or given too much freedom which undermines the essential societal context (Etzioni 1988:ch.12). The market and its laws are not an entity independent from the society. In fact, contrary to the exaggerations of the neoclassical economy, it can be shown that human society could live without the market. By this token, Klaus Nürnberger has tried to challenge the neoclassical paradigm of demand and supply informed by the principle of scarcity. He shows that in history people lived on the paradigm of need: people produced to satisfy their needs. They consumed what they produced and produced what they consume (Nürnberger 1999:297ff). Well, I am not suggesting that we should go back to this early stage of economy, but I aim to show that the law of demand and supply central to classical economy is not a law of nature. In his article, *The market and the Religion of Commodities*, L. Boff sees the modern market as a recent institution as far as the place it occupies presently is concerned. Thus he notes:

The market, of course, antedates modern society, and is associated with the formation of cities... Market relations existed side by side with the reciprocity relationships proper to communities. Communities produced for their own consumption and for the system of gifts and return gifts which were the basis of social alliances. Only the surplus was destined for the market... Market society began to emerge in the West in the sixteenth century. Production began to be governed, not by human need, but by the needs of the market. The producer no longer sold the surplus production, but produced to meet demand (Boff 1992:ix).

Contrary to Boff's precision as to when the market society began, I would not say that the markets did not exist in ancient world because markets emerge wherever the economy goes beyond subsistence farming or food gathering. However, what Boff is pointing at is the fact that it might not be impossible to give the market its proper place in the society by stripping it of its undue claims and powers.

The last claim is that the political sphere and its concern with equity and the market sphere concerned with efficiency are locked in a zero-sum game, that is, political organization and the market efficiency are incompatible. Hence the market economy should be left alone. The problem is that the market does not seem to have a purpose apart from the maximization of profit. But this purpose can only be provided by political intervention for the good of all people.

Those are the three claims held by neoclassical economists, all of them founded on the understanding of the human being as *homo oeconomicus*. This understanding has deprived the human beings of an ethical dimension for the sake of market efficiency and profitability. Unfortunately this market efficiency and profitability are at the service of few self-interested individuals who succeed to adapt to the conditions of the market. Those who cannot succeed are left behind.

However, a proper understanding of human nature should show us that beyond profit maximisation, there is a judging person; beyond self-interested individuals seduced by the dividends of the market, there is a human community; and finally beyond the "economic man" whose life is the market rational calculations, there is a human being who passes moral judgment over his/her urges.

However, before we move any further, we have to be aware of an objection. One might object to our critique of the neo-classical economy built around the concept of *homo oeconomicus* by saying that the *homo oeconomicus* is not necessarily an egoist person, a self-interested individual who has nothing to do with the soft values of altruism, insensible to human relations and ecological need appeal. This objection is found in E. Schokkart's *Economy and Ethics* (1991). Schokkart argues that the *homo oeconomicus* simply acts rationally and consistently orders his/her preferences and attains them in the best possible way. It is unclear what is meant by "best possible way". Whatever case maybe the *homo oeconomicus* does not seem to expand in order to mean also *homo moralis*. Later we shall see that the reason is simply because in the neoclassical economy, there is an emphasis on the a priori reduction of needs to preferences, or rather the conflation of human need satisfaction with subjective utility/profit maximization (Bouckaert 1999:22).

In the next section of this chapter I will argue that the person who looks beyond utility/profit maximization to make a moral judgment, the person who looks beyond self-interest, a person who values needs over preferences is the image of God (*imago Dei*). The *imago Dei* is necessarily a *homo moralis*. Morality comes from the fact God gives responsibility to the human being in the world of humans (man and woman God created them) and the world of things, all of them endowed with God's goodness and beauty ("God saw that it was very good" (Gen 1:31)). This responsibility consists in keeping this goodness and beauty of creation. Thus, the distinctive characteristic of image of God as a *homo moralis* is **relationship** (with God, humans and other creatures). To talk of relationship is to talk of community. The community in itself has a moral value with three major functions, namely: a social function, a political function, as well as an ecological responsibility. These functions have four ethical implications respectively: The social function calls us to consider the human community as a context of moral values (we have already referred to the image of God as a *homo moralis*), the political function calls us to empower the state as a natural society<sup>23</sup>, a dialogue-partner of the church as family of God<sup>24</sup>, and finally, an

---

<sup>23</sup>When I say that the state is a "natural society", I am echoing some philosophers such as Aristotle, Hegel and their followers who situate the state at all the stages of human life. These philosophers use a theory referred to as the naturalist theory of the state. There are many other theories of the state. We have for instance, the class theory, the legal theory, the constitutional theory, etc (Vincent 1987). My aim here is not to compare the naturalist theory

ecological function which is an urge to reconsider the responsibility given to humanity to take care of the environment and keep it in a good condition (cf Gen 1:28-31).

### 5.2.2. The Concept of *imago Dei*

We have just seen that the neoclassical economy misunderstands human nature. It limits the concept of the human being to the one aspect of economic efficiency of self-interested individuals. With the concept of *imago Dei*, I shall argue that the human being is far more than an economic machine whose sole end is the maximization of profit or utility. More precisely, my contention is that the self-interested individual and the search of maximization of profit cannot provide a definition of the human being. I will argue that what defines the *imago Dei* is its relational nature, and the economy will not go far unless it is framed within this relational nature. I believe that the contradiction of capitalism lies in the negation of human nature as relational. I am aware that the market is also a relational concept. But the concept of the market is relational in a very narrow sense because it is limited to the mere exchange of commodities, and therefore cannot entail the whole of the human relationship. To understand this let us use the example of sexuality. Sexuality is a social relationship. When it is made a commodity of exchange on the market, it is called prostitution. Three kinds of relationship<sup>25</sup> will be outlined, namely: the relationship with God, the relationship with the fellow human beings, and the relationship with the universe (over which we are given stewardship!).

---

of the state with these other theories. Nevertheless we should note that, according to the naturalist theory of the state, there are no people or communities without a state. Even primitive communities live in states because they live in families or tribes which, according to Hegel are primitive forms of state. Aquinas argues that even in the “state of innocence” (before human being’s disobedience to God), the state existed in so far as the human being is naturally a social being (Ia, q.96, a.4).

<sup>24</sup>Here I am borrowing a concept that was used by the Synod of African Bishops in 1994. The Synod drew on the centrality of the concept of family (nuclear as well as extended) in African cultures and applied it to the Church in Africa.

<sup>25</sup>There is a fourth relationship which I shall not consider here: the relation with self. Although it might not be unimportant to consider this aspect, its discussion would not serve the purpose we pursue in this dissertation.

But why should we focus particularly on the relational dimension of *imago Dei*? For a long time, theologians have interpreted the meaning of *imago Dei* in the light of Hellenistic philosophy rather than in the light of the biblical texts of Genesis itself. Accordingly, the touchstone of theological interpretation was Aristotelian understanding of human being as a “rational animal” (see footnote 22 above). This rational nature was also thought to be a participation in God’s rational nature (Cronan 1955: 35ff). This claim can successfully be defended by taking the belief that the image of God is located in the intellect as Thomas Aquinas once argued. However, it is not without consequences. First, the focus on the rational nature or reason as a distinctive feature of the human being resulted in merely attempting to show how human beings differ from other creatures. We know how this understanding has affected the rest of creation: environmental degradation. In the third chapter we have referred to overexploitation of renewable and non-renewable resources as well as pollution in order to satisfy human wants, some times on the ground that the human being was the centre of God’s creation by virtue of his rational nature. Furthermore, the focus on reason overshadowed the important aspect of the Aristotelian understanding of human being as a social and political being. We should also note that in most cases, women and some human races were denied rational nature as if they are not created in the image and likeness of God.

The focus on the *imago Dei* as a relational being does not exclude anybody, because it is a nature that we have by the very fact that we are the image of God, who is also relational as the plural form (“let us”, likeness of ourselves) used in the creation of the human beings (man and woman) suggests (I will comment on this plural form later). Correspondingly, even economic efficiency and profit should lead us to strengthening our relational nature, insofar as it should be an economy in which all participate. It is true that even the neoclassical economics also wants everybody to participate in the economy as the removal of trade barriers to free trade seems to suggest. However, the logic of accumulation and exchange is such that many people are excluded from this economy (cf. Meeks 1989:38).

In my study I will draw heavily on the reflections of scholars such Alistair McFadyen (1990), Ray Dunning (1998), Christoph Schwöbel and Colin Gunton (1991), Wolfhart Pannenberg (1985), as well as Anthony Hoekema (1986). Those are the theologians who have taken a renewed



interest in understanding *imago Dei* as a relational being.

### **5.2.3. *Imago Dei* is primarily a biblical concept.**

God said: Let us make a man in our own image, in the likeness of ourselves, let them be masters of the fish of the sea, the birds of heaven, the cattle, all wild animals and all the creatures that creep along the ground. God created man in the image of himself, male and female he created them (Gen 1:26-27)<sup>26</sup>.

From this passage, it is obvious that the human being is above all a being-in-relation at three major levels.

1. Relationship with God in whose image we are created,
2. Relationship with other human beings (“man and woman God created them”),
3. Relationship with the rest of creation.

Let us comment each of these headings in turn.

#### **5.2.3.1. *Relationship with God***

“Let us make man in our own image, in the likeness of ourselves.” God the creator of the human being is a relational being. God speaks in plural form in the creation of the human being and of no other creature. This plurality may refer to the trinity, or the heavenly court (God and angels), or the majesty and the fullness of God’s being (NJB Gen1:26k). However, Genesis does not give us a clear reference to the trinity, beside the fact that the Jewish religion is uncompromisingly monotheistic. We cannot assume that the use of the plural form suggests that God is taking counsel from angels since angels themselves are creatures. Moreover we are not created in the likeness of angels (cf Is 40:14). Neither can we assume that the plural form is a plural of majesty since, as I have just noted, this plural form is not used for other creatures. Whatever the case may be, the plural form suggests that God is not a solitary being, but a being

---

<sup>26</sup>I have used The New Jerusalem Bible (NJB), Standard version.

in fellowship with “others” (Hoekema 1986:12). This became clear in the New Testament when St. John affirms that the Word was with God from the beginning. That God is not a solitary being but a being in fellowship suggests that God is a relational being, a community. And to be created in the image of God means that it is in our being related to God and the other human being (man and woman as a community and not just a differentiation of sex) that our being consists (Gunton 1991:58). Ray Dunning echoes the same idea when he says:

The primary relation constituting the *imago Dei* is humanity’s relation to God, in the sense that a person’s right relation to others and the earth is dependent on a right relation to God (Dunning 1998:45).

In the same vein, Anthony Hoekema argues that :

To be a human being is to be directed toward God. Man is a creature who owes existence to God, is completely dependent on God, and is primarily responsible to God. This is his first and most important relationship. All of man’s other relationships are to be seen as dominated and regulated by this one (Hoekema 1986:75).

A last theologian who emphasizes the primacy of the relationship between the human being and God is Christoph Schwöbel. Schwöbel puts it as follows:

Christian anthropology does not only claim that the relationship of humanity to transcendence is the dominant perspective from which all other relationships should be understood. It claims, more specifically, that the relationship of God to humanity is the key to the understanding of all relationships in which human beings exist, including humanity’s relationship to God (Schwöbel 1991:143).

Unfortunately, this special relationship with God has lost its originality through the fall into sin. Yet the image of God was not annihilated but perverted.<sup>27</sup> According to Anthony Hoekema,

---

<sup>27</sup>As we come to the story of the fall, we should be aware that we are putting two creation stories from two different sources together, namely Gen 1 from the Priestly tradition and from which we have the concept of *imago Dei*. This tradition does not have the story of

The image in its structural sense (is) was still there- man's gifts, endowments, and capacities were not destroyed by the Fall- but man now began to use these gifts in ways that were contrary to God's will. What changed was not the structure of man but the way in which he functioned, the direction in which he was going (Hoekema 1986:83).

In the same vein Herman Bavinck argued as follows:

Man through the fall ... has not become a devil who, incapable of redemption, can no longer reveal the features of the image of God. But while he remained really and substantially man and has still preserved all his human faculties, capacities and powers, the form, nature, disposition, and direction of all these powers have been so changed that now instead of doing the will of God they fulfill the law of the flesh (Bavinck in Hoekema 1986:83).

The idolatry of the market and wealth, the refusal to share production and consumption, the pursuit of selfish interests, undermining the common good, can be viewed from the perspective of the fall into sin. They are signs of the corrupt image and likeness of God and one's relationship with one's neighbour and with God.

Nevertheless, the relationship with God has been reshaped, renewed and regenerated in Jesus Christ and in the Holy Spirit, in the redemptive process. Against this background our relationship with God takes three dimensions: Christological, pneumatological and Trinitarian dimensions.

#### **5.2.3.1.1. Christological dimension**

To be the image of God is to be (re)created through God's Son, Jesus Christ who is the archetypal, that is a perfect bearer of the image of God. And since Jesus Christ is God's perfect image of God, likeness to Christ also means likeness to God (Hoekema 1986:31). According to

---

the fall into sin. Gen 2 is from the Yahwist tradition. This source does not mention the concept of *imago Dei* but it gives us the idea of the fall. However, as we have to take the scriptures as a whole and not in parts, we may not be involved in any contradiction which could jeopardize our argument.

Christoph Schwöbel, “the revelation of God in Christ is the foundation for what it means to be a human being” (Schwöbel 1991:141). To be the image of God, therefore, is to be conformed onto the person of Christ. According to Philip E Hughes, the Son himself is the image in or according to which man was (re) created (Hughes 1989:49).

Having been recreated to conform to the archetypal bearer of the image of God, Jesus Christ, through re-birth, human beings are reestablished in their relationship with God. But this re-birth, this renewal, this regeneration is also the work of the Holy Spirit by which the human being is delivered from the forces of sin. That is what I refer to in terms of the pneumatological dimension of our relationship with God.

#### ***5.2.3.1.2. A pneumatological dimension***

The agent of conformity to the person of Christ is the Holy Spirit. The second chapter of Genesis tells us that after God has created the human being, God blew the breath of life in the man God has created. In the New Testament this breath of God becomes the Holy Spirit who gives new life. Because of sin, the fallen human being uses the gifts of the image of God in perverse and corrupt way. Now the work of the Holy Spirit is to enable human beings to use these gifts which they hold as the image of God in a God-glorifying way. This is referred to as the process of sanctification. It is a process understood as a progressive renewal of the human being in the image of God. But how does this renewal happen? The renewal happens through the influence of preaching, teaching and study of the Word, the Good News brought to the world by Jesus Christ. By means of this Good News, the Holy Spirit instructs and enables human beings to live in a new obedience to God. Anthony Hoekema summarizes the role of the Holy Spirit in the regeneration of image of God as follows:

The renewal of the image is continued in what the Bible calls the work of sanctification- which can be defined as that gracious and continuing operation of the Holy Spirit, involving man’s responsible participation, by which the Spirit progressively delivers the regenerated person from the pollution of sin, and enables him or her to live to the praise of God (Hoekema 1986:86).

### ***5.2.3.1.3. Trinitarian dimension of our relationship with God:***

The image of God or being human takes shape by virtue of the creating and redeeming agency of the triune God. In Gen 1 (Priestly tradition) it was through the Word that God created human beings and given the Spirit of life (cf Jn 1:1-3). And it is through the same Word, in the power of the Spirit, that human beings are renewed and sanctified and reestablished in their relationship with God in the redemption process. According to Schwöbel,

The distinctive thesis of Christian anthropology is that human being as relational being is rooted in the relationship of the triune God to humanity. It asserts that the relationship of God to humanity can only be adequately understood as the basis for human relational being, if it is understood as the relationship of the triune God, Father, Son and Spirit to humanity (Schwöbel 1991:142-143).

One could explain Schwöbel's Trinitarian dimension of our relationship with God in terms of salvation history: the human being is created by God the Father, redeemed by the Son and empowered by the Holy Spirit. This kind of explanation seems to go in the same direction as that of Leonardo Boff. Boff uses the concept of "age" to show us how this Trinitarian dimension of our relationship with God features. Note that by "age", Boff meant the fact that all time is the time of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit. Thus he talks of the "age of the Father" to refer to the creation event through the Son and in the love of his Spirit; the "age of the Son" refers to the liberation of humanity corrupted by the abuse of human freedom which blocks the achievement of humanity's first calling to give glory to the Trinity; and finally, the "age of the Holy Spirit which continues and interiorizes the new life won by the Son (Boff 1988:228-230).

The fall into sin affected human being in his/her relationship with his/her fellow and the environment. But with the renewal and the restoration of the image of God, human beings can once again be empowered and enabled to function properly in these two relationships. Let us take a close look how this is lived.

### **5.2.3.2. Relationship with other human beings.**

Our image of God is created (and recreated) to find our being in relation with other people. When the author of Genesis writes that God created male and female, he meant more than a sexual differentiation. In fact the sexual differentiation is also found among animals which are not created in the image and likeness of God. Thus, although it does seem to be obvious, the author of Genesis might have meant that to be a human being is to be directed toward one's fellow. Neither a male nor a female is sufficient onto self. In fact, in Gen 1, the distinction of male and female seems to come later after the author has already mentioned the plurality of the human beings because in Gen 1: 26, the author writes: Let us make man...and let them be masters..." Accordingly the human being is not an isolated being who is complete in himself or herself. S/He is a being who needs the fellowship of others, and therefore s/he is not complete apart from others (Hoekema 1986:76). This aspect will be further considered later when we shall see the implication of this relationship in terms of dependability of human beings into the community.

We are in the image of God when, like God but in dependence on his giving, we find our reality in what we give to and receive from others in human community (Gunton 1991:59). Here the central concept is love. The ability to love is the defining aspect of human relationship (Gorringe 1994). The link that unites humans is supposed to be love because God created us and the universe out of love. Our being is an unconditional gift of love. According to Karl Barth, our humanity is fully realized in the mutual giving and receiving of assistance with gladness (Barth 1960:265). Humanity is nothing else than human beings in relationship with each other.

Even after the fall the process of redemption is geared for the renewal and reestablishment of the relationship of human being with one another. You shall love your neighbour as you love yourself. That is the principle on which the relationship with one's fellow is to evolve. The human being guided by this principle is deeply concerned with the welfare of his/her fellow. S/He makes social justice his/her concern and cares about the poor, the vulnerable and the destitute. This means that one is able to live for others rather than for oneself; that is, using all one's gifts in the service of the best interest of one's fellow (Hoekema 1986:87) But one's fellow is also the rest of God's creation.

### 5.2.3.3. Relationship with the rest of creation

The image of God is also created (and re-created) to find his being in relation with the rest of creation. In effect, apart from the community we humans form with the human species, we form a community with the non-personal world. According to Gunton (1991:60), we receive much of what we are from the world in which we are set and from whose dust we are made. The world is the context in which we are human beings. This point is also echoed by Christoph Schwöbel when he argues that the relationship to the world in which human beings live in virtue of their bodily existence is perceived as the determinative factor for human nature (Schwöbel 1991:142). However, as we shall see it later, it is difficult to reconcile the fact that Gen 1 says we should subdue and rule the world and the fact that we have to care about the environment. In fact, Christians have been accused of facilitating the abuse and the exploitation of nature. One might understand that to subdue and rule, as far as the Scriptures are concerned, does not mean to abuse or to over-exploit. Because when the human beings abuse (through pollution for instance) and over-exploit the environment, they forget that when God created the world “he saw that it was good”, and henceforth they have the duty and the responsibility to keep it “good”. The world can be kept good if the human beings take the resources they need and abstain from wanton uses.

Just like the human beings, the world has been promised a share in the final reconciliation of all things. Accordingly, the world is not something human beings stand over against and arbitrary dispose of. To be the image of God is to take the responsibility to offer the creation back to its Creator. This means that the human beings cease to use God’s creation in abusive and selfish way.

In the present order of things, the relationship between the human beings and the world is rather controversial. (Western) Christianity has abused Gen1 which talks of ruling and having dominion over creation. This has resulted in a wanton and thoughtless exploitation of the earth’s resources. But it is important to note that the proper relationship between the human being and the world is not simply limited to rule over it. We should also consider the fact that, according to Gen 2, the world is also a garden which human beings have been given to work and care for (cf Gen 2:15). According to Hoekema,

If human beings had been commanded only to rule over the earth, this command might easily have been misconstrued as an open invitation to irresponsible exploitation of the earth's resources. But the injunction to work and take care of the Garden of Eden implies that we are to serve and preserve the earth as well as to rule over it (Hoekema 1986:80).

Thus, the responsibility to subdue and rule over the earth which we find in Gen 1 should include the care for it as it is suggested in Gen 2, that is, a concern for the conservation of natural resources, preservation of the environment and prevention of whatever could destroy it, and therefore opposition to wasteful and thoughtless exploitation of resources. In other words, God created the world and saw that "it was very good". As people created in God's image and likeness, we have the responsibility to keep good and beautiful, that is habitable for us and for the whole of creation. This requires the human beings to use natural resources responsibly and in good relationship with one another.

Hence, the relationship between human beings and the world around us cannot be thought of anymore other than the relationship between human beings and God, and between human beings and their fellow human beings (Hoekema 1986:79).

The point being made thus far is that the concept of *imago Dei* does not allow any talk of human beings as isolated entities. Instead the concept of *imago Dei* affirms that the individual human beings are related to God, to one another and the world which is the natural context in which they evolve (McFadyen 1990:18).

But one might challenge my argument by saying that we do not need to resort to the concept of *imago Dei* in order to know that the human being is, by nature, a relational being. Some neoclassical economists would even agree with this definition. Beside, it is not a new injunction for them to say that we depend on nature in order to survive. However, as I have noted earlier, neoclassical economics uses relationality in a special way. The emphasis is on the exchange of commodities. In other words, exchange relationships of give and take, or "pick and pay" have a priority over other social relationships (cf. Wogaman 1986:20). Neoclassical economics knows that nature is important for our survival and that we depend on it. But to what extent can we expect the self-interested, profit driven *homo oeconomicus* to put a brake on the wanton



exploitation of natural resources and be concerned by the pollution caused by mass production?

We are made to believe that exchange relationships and profit maximization dear to neoclassical economy are tied up with quantity thought in terms of economic growth. The more one emphasizes exchange relationships and profit maximization which result in economic growth, the more the quality of our social relationships and relationship with the environment become poor. In the end, even our relationship with God from whom everything comes is endangered. According to Klaus Nürnberger, freedom and responsibility are at stake. Rightly so. In the neoclassical economics, we are free to maximize our profit, and this involves increasing our exchange relationships. But the consequence is that we lose a lot of responsibility in our relations with God, social relations and our relations with the environment. By this token, Nürnberger shows that economic growth which came to be an overriding concern of both capitalist liberalism and socialism had negative ecological effects. As both ideologies were simply concerned with economic growth for greater prosperity for all, they forgot that it is also their responsibility to care of the environment, a responsibility which, today, is evaluated in billions of dollars (Nürnberger 1998: 181-182). Moreover, the kind of competition that went on between capitalism and socialism did not only put the environment at risk. As we know, human relationships were also jeopardized as economic competition evolved side by side with war competition which was evident in arms race.

Accordingly, when we say that the concept of *homo oeconomicus* is misleading, we mean that it does not take sufficiently the relational nature of human being in the way in which we have described it. In fact, *homo oeconomicus* should be seen as one aspect and not the whole of the relational nature of the human being. Correspondingly, we should not be limited to promoting only economic efficiency of self-interested individuals who over-exploit common resources for their personal interest and aggrandizement, but we should also take responsibility of the poor and the vulnerable, and cease to consider them as those who have failed economically, or people to be exploited for economic ends. Hence it is through the structure of human relationship that the ethical sense arises.

In the next lines we shall try to derive an ethic founded on this understanding of *imago Dei* as relational. In this way, even economic ordering will fit in this ethic as part of the relational nature of human being. In the first place we shall see that to refer to the human being as relational means that human being is essentially social. This should help us to build the human community as a context of values that make this social nature a reality. Relationality also involves a society ordered in a certain way: the state, which, if empowered as a natural society should be a dialogue-partner of the Church as family of God. Our relational nature will also bring us to take seriously those Christian values that consider the world (environment) as the other-than-oneself that needs care and love rather than something over which human beings exercise dominion and power for selfish wants.

### **5.3. Ethical implications of the human being as a relational being**

#### **5.3.1. Social implication: Reconstruction of the human community as a context of values**

Let consider once again this verse from Genesis: “Let us make man in our image, and in our likeness... Male and female, he created them”. Earlier, we argued that the plural form in this verse shows that God is relational, a communal being. The plural form should be interpreted as indicating that God does not exist as a solitary being, but as a being in fellowship with ‘others’. This means that God has a social nature and interpersonal character (Dunning 1998:86, cf. Barth 1960:198). Thus if we are made in God’s image and likeness, we are also social beings, that is, beings-in-community. According to Philip Hughes,

The creator of man as male and female, together with the encouragement to ‘be fruitful and multiply’ shows that man was intended to be a communal being enjoying personal fellowship with his fellow humans (Hughes 1989:52).

What this quote suggests is that the community is an essential feature of the human being. However, if we look closely to our situation today, the more the market expands in search of the maximization of profit, the more the community becomes endangered. This is the case insofar as the liberalism that underlies the expansion of the market and pursuit of profit promotes individualism to the detriment of the community.

The expansion of the market promises the achievement of a world community: the global village. There is no way we can build a community around competition, especially that there are people who cannot compete. Earlier we have noted that Sub-Saharan African countries cannot compete, because they do not have the means by which they can enter in this competition. In this order of thought, the global village becomes an illusion, an impossibility. E. H Carr was right when he opined that the international order and international solidarity will always be slogans of those who feel strong enough to impose themselves (Carr 1981:87).

Although the global market appears to be the most sophisticated organization, the community that it promises could turn out to be a mountain of confusion because of the fierce competition by which each one wants to maximise his/her profit. Moreover, as Adam Smith advises us it is not humanity that matters, but economic efficiency. Thus the kind of community which the market promises could end in something similar the tower of Babel which ended in confusion as people wanted to rely solely on their own power to reach God without God's help. The present tower of Babel is the economic enterprise itself. At its foundation, it seems to be strong and progressing as the market keeps expanding to yield more profits. But the logic of fierce competition could endanger the future of the tower. In effect, competition destroys and excludes those who cannot adapt to the rules of the market game. The implications of this destruction and exclusion could be resentment, social discontent, etc. Beside that, economic efficiency arrived at as result of competition also turns out to be costly in other ways that could be dangerous to the players in competition themselves: for instance, the creation of incentives to costs in ways that are damaging to people and to the community (the problem of waste, low wages in order to save competition) (see Wogaman 1986:22).

The second chapter of the Acts of the Apostles suggests us a kind of community to which we can restructure ourselves. It is the community of Pentecost where people are recognized in their diversity, yet with a common project: a human community in which love is the heart. Hence, the kind of community we need to achieve is a community in which people cooperate in love and put their gifts together for the good of all. This kind of community is different from the community built on competition, because by sharing the gifts, they share a common journey back to God who is Love. It is love that builds relationship between the human beings and God, between the human

beings themselves, and relationship with the universe which is a context in which we are living. In other words, love is the ethical principle around which the reconstruction of the community is to evolve.

“Love your neighbour as you love yourself”. A neighbour, according to Jesus Christ, is any body who is in need of one’s assistance. Love as an ethical principle around which human community should be built involves many other values without which the community cannot be what it is: dependability and mutuality, respect, and trust.

#### ***5.3.1.1. Dependability beyond the illusion of international cooperation***

By “dependability”, I do not mean the fact that one can be sure that a person will honour his/her engagements towards others. Neither do I use dependability to mean “dependence”, that is, the fact that one cannot fend for him/herself without drawing on the support of others. I use dependability to mean the acknowledgement that no one is sufficient unto oneself. In other words, dependability means responsibility for each other. In international economic and political terms, the concept used is “international cooperation”. However this concept does more harm than good especially for the poor countries. My observation is that for the poor, cooperation means illusion. We have already hinted at this illusion in the third chapter of this dissertation by using Nürnberger’s model of causation, or the interaction between the centre and the periphery. Let us move further to provide more instances. Take the example of international aid to poor countries. This aid is limited to the famous old Christian mentality of doing something to those in need, meaning taking baskets of groceries to the poor at thanksgiving and Christmas, providing shelters to the homeless, sending supplies to countries ravaged by natural disaster. However, poor countries and people need more than getting something from those who have it if human community is to be meaningful. A step further involves an attempt to do something about the structures of evil in society that produce poverty, inequality, suffering and injustices in the world. This also involves taking risks to confront the society’s powerful who are resistant to be dislodged from their unjust structures in order to make cooperation a reality.

Dependability involves openness to others in their needs. W. Pannenberg and McFadyen call dependability ex-centric orientation to others. According to McFadyen, there is no self in itself because it is the self as it is with and for others (McFadyen 1991:154). It is this kind of person I call *umuntu-mu-bantu* (being-with/in-others)<sup>28</sup>. Correspondingly, a person who depends on him/herself and is only loyal to himself/herself will appear as disloyal to others. And this could be a problem to cooperation which dependability involves. However, dependability does not mean that people's integrity and dignity are overridden. One's integrity and dignity could be overridden if dependability is reduced to mere paternalistic dependence. For personal integrity and dignity to be safeguarded, dependability must go hand in hand with acceptance of the other and others' acceptance of one, and this leads to responsibility for each other (cf. McFadyen 1991:154). The responsibility for one another requires that each struggles to be a person of humanity, that is *umuntu-w'ubuntu* (being-with-self). The framework where this could happen is the community. A community is a community when people are open to one another and are responsible for each other.

Dependability has been expressed in various ways by African scholars. For instance, John Mbiti has expressed dependability in these terms. "I am because we are, and since we are therefore I am". The meaning of this principle is thus explained:

Only in terms of other people does the individual become aware of his own being, his own duties, his privileges and responsibilities towards himself and towards other people (Mbiti 1969:141).

Mbiti is expressing the idea of dependability as found in various societies of Bantu culture. For instance the Xhosa in South Africa say: *Umntu ngumntu ngabantu*, that is, a person is a person through other persons (Shutte 1993:46). This African way of expressing dependability is amenable to the Aristotelian principle of viewing a human being as essentially social, relational. The followers of Aristotle (and of Thomas Aquinas) have argued that we cannot fulfil ourselves as human beings unless we realize that we depend on others to act, develop socially and culturally

---

<sup>28</sup>The concepts of *being-with-self* and *being-with/in-self* which are used in this section are fully explained in the chapitre four of my Masters Thesis in Philosophy (1999).

(and I would add economically and ethically) (Lachance 1939, McCool 1975:15). This brings us to another value of human community, namely: mutual trust.

### **5.3.1.2. Mutual trust**

Dependability cannot stand alone as a value in the community. In fact it has meaning within the context of mutual trust. In a community where there is no mutual trust, dependability would make human relationships exploitative, hence multiply parasites.

The value of mutual trust involves a shared hope, that is, the fact that one can intervene when the other has a **need**. Unfortunately, as the economy claims priority over social and ethical values, mutual trust loses its value and relevance as people's **needs** give place to **preferences** and rational calculations of self-seeking individuals. Preferences are individual and social **constructions** which express, intensify and transform needs. Instead needs are the **necessary** conditions for human functioning in a historically and culturally determined community (Bouckaert 1999:22). In the context of mutual trust, needs are translated into rights that one can expect to be secured if one's dignity as the image of God is to be safeguarded.

Bouckaert has shown the relevance of mutual trust in economic institutions. He argues that in a society where mutual trust counts, economic institutions will be concerned about their social and moral reputations. In other words, being-with-self (umuntu-w'ubuntu) and being-with/in-others (umuntu-mu-bantu) come together in socio-economic ordering. By this token, economic institutions will demand personal integrity of their members and they will attempt to attach people morally to their institutions through gifts and other symbol of esteem (Bouckaert 1999:27). In the same respect, K. Arrow argues that in a well functioning economic system, relations of mutual trust bring people not to deceive one another, even in the case where deception might constitute an economically rational behaviour (Arrow 1987).

However, mutual trust is not without problems. One of the problems of mutual trust is that there is no absolute predictability, and sometimes one can expect disappointment. But McFadyen argues that absolute predictability and disappointment do not matter. What matters is security in promise. **He**

puts it as follows:

In a relation where mutuality counts, there is neither the promise of absolute predictability nor absence of pain of disappointment, but an area of free play in which all the pain, misunderstanding and bitterness of personal life are secured in the promises of genuine interest in the other as the other (McFadyen 1991:159).

### **5.3.1.3. *Respect***

Dependability and mutual trust cannot stand alone. Neither could they have a meaning outside the framework of respect. Respect means that in a human community, people have equal dignity and are treated as such. In fact, the other way of translating “Love the neighbour as you love yourself” is to say, “respect the neighbour as you respect yourself”. This is important in as much as each person is created in the image of God. And a disrespect of any person is a disrespect of God in whose image one is created. W. Pannenberg makes this comment concerning respect:

The other man is respected if I know that the same infinite destiny that is at work in myself is also at work in him ... I always have to keep myself open to the possibility that the other person can still find his way beyond himself to new possibilities. **I am obligated to help him** <sup>29</sup> to do that, by my criticism of what he already is, which goes along with respect for his own particular possibilities. The person who fails to respect and to help the other in his infinite destiny for God also injures his own destiny, which is one with that of the other in the infinite. Mutual respect is the foundation of all true human relationships. The basic act of love is the respect for one another, which, full of imagination, is on the lookout for the possibilities that exist for the other, and still leaves him the right to his own path. Where anyone finds respect, there he is taken seriously as a man (Pannenberg 1970:84-5).

In a community where respect is valued, other human values such as friendship (I mean the love of the person for his/her own sake), generosity, spiritual devotion, self-sacrifice, genuine cooperation are equally valued. In short, the principle of “the love of the neighbour as one loves oneself” from which respect flows becomes fulfilled. It is in this respect that the Church teaches that:

---

<sup>29</sup>My emphasis.

Respect for the human person proceeds by way of respect for the principle that “everyone should look upon his neighbour (without any exception) as ‘another self’, above bearing in mind his life and the means necessary for living it with dignity. No legislation could by itself do away with the fears, prejudices, and attitudes of pride and selfishness which obstruct the establishment of truly fraternal societies. Such behaviour will cease only through the charity that finds in every man a “neighbour,” a brother (CCC 1992: paragraph 1931)<sup>30</sup>.

These are the three major values around which human community should be built. At the same time they are characteristics of the human community as a context of values and of human being as relational. We shall now embark on another implication of the *imago Dei* as relational being, namely: the political implication. The suggestion here will be that we need to reconsider the state as a natural society which could be a respondent of the Church as the family of God.

### **5.3.2. Political Implications:**

#### **Empowering the state as the respondent of the Church as the family of God.**

##### ***5.3.2.1. The state power in the process of economic globalization***

With the accelerated process of economic globalization in the last few years, we are living in a period of the mutation of the state: The power of the state is more and more decreasing. However, not all scholars agree that the power of the state is decreasing. For instance, Leo Panitch argues that the power of the state is not diminished in the process of economic globalization. He gives five arguments why this is the case:

1. States are still fields of class relationships: internationalization of capital means that foreign capital becomes interiorized, that is absorbed not only within a given territory but becomes a player on the field of the state;
2. The State continues to establish the essential infra-structural and juridical conditions of the markets, private property, and contract within their territorial domain.

---

<sup>30</sup>The references to the document *The Catechism of the Catholic Church* (CCC) will by number of the paragraph rather than page number suggested by Harvard system.



3. States are the actual authors of economic globalization in so far as it is the changes they made in the rules governing capital movements, investments, currency exchange, and trade that permitted a new stage of global accumulation to come about;

4. States do not withdraw from the economy but restructure their relationship to it, reordering their apparatus and the role each plays in representing and regulating social actors and markets,

5. It is through inter-state relations, as those formalized in international agreements, treaties, and the rules governing international agencies that necessary juridical and infra-structural conditions for global capital accumulation are established and maintained (Panitch 1998:13-14).

Ironically, those five points all point to the reality of the fact that the power state is diminished. Besides the fact that there are amounts of transnational capital escaping the state, it should be noted that the state is becoming more and more attuned to fostering and/or accommodating the capital accumulation on a large scale of a few powerful who have succeeded in the new economic order while the majority are left in an untenable situation. Conversely, the logic of the neo-classical economy is such that the role of the state is reduced when one sees its relation to both domestic and international markets. M.D Litonjua notes also the decreasing power of the state in these terms:

The new economic fundamentalist's ideology of unfettered market would reduce the role of government to the libertarian role of a night watchman. The two theoretical movements, Economics and Public choice would make Law facilitate the natural logic of market, and would subject all political decision to economic criteria of costs and benefits (Litonjua 1999:220).

The idea of limiting the state to the role of night-watchman goes far back to the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> centuries when the state was expected to be limited to providing basic security for its citizens: defence against external threats through strong armed forces and security against internal disorder through a strong justice system (Nossal 1998:73). The present economic order is structured in such a way that even the defence force can be provided by private security companies. There is no doubt that the justice system could also fall in the hands of private business. The state is also being overtaken by internationalized system of communication and production, which, despite the state's continual deterioration require it to be more responsible. Hence we cannot but ask ourselves what becomes the political and social role of the state.

In most of the developing countries like those of Sub-Saharan Africa (which I have in mind in the dissertation), the state is powerless in a particular way, and according to the 1997 World Bank Report it might even disappear. This might sound much as an exaggeration. However, even if it does not disappear, in many countries it is in such a situation that it cannot be of much help to its citizens. This seems to be the case in DRC<sup>31</sup>, Somalia, “pre-Charles Taylor” Liberia and Sierra Leone. Beside that, we have hinted to the fact that the international financial institutions and Western governments have acted as if it was a powerful state in their proposals of structural adjustment programmes and political liberalization which have left African states in ruin. Even the World Bank, in its 1997 Report, has recognized this tragedy of Sub-Saharan African states collapsing from within and losing more of their effectiveness (World Bank 1997:25). The reason is still the fact that with the acceleration of economic globalization, the Sub-Saharan African state lost not only its economic role, but also, in the process, it lost its social and political role. And since these Sub-Saharan countries cannot compete economically, having no means of competition, they fall in a situation of irrelevance, and hence will find themselves in a situation of exclusion.

However, The World Bank limits the collapse and ineffectiveness of the Sub-Saharan African state to the failure of defining public rules and institutions that would allow markets to flourish (World Bank 1997:1). This is another confirmation that the economic order claims priority over the moral, social and political order. My concern is, effectively how the world economic order should be redirected so as to have a moral quality, which in turn, could allow the state to have a role. This redirection should include the following<sup>32</sup>:

1. From international organizations view point, one should expect the regulation of international trade in the way that would help the poor countries to emerge rather than falling behind. This cannot be possible unless there is a code of conduct which is geared to compensating for international economic imbalances. In the same vein, one would also expect the cancellation of the debt burden in

---

<sup>31</sup>In the last year of the Mobutu regime, the situation of the state deteriorated in way that the Catholic church seems to have played a role of substitute.

<sup>32</sup>For the following suggestions, I am indebted to Klaus Nürnberger. I formulate these suggestions by using the last part of his book *Prosperity, Poverty and Pollution* (1999) especially in its chapters 14, 16 and 18.

order to give poor countries a chance to develop. International aid should be conditioned on self-reliance and sustainable development by empowering local potentials.

2. From national point of view, one would expect first of all, public accountability, democratic procedures, the rule of law, the containment of corruption, enforcement of justice as well as the state's effort to provide necessary social, economic, and human infrastructure. Unnecessary conflicts should be avoided by fostering social justice, conflict resolution through legal system as well as democratic accountability. This should result in downsizing military expenditures in order to finance national development and individual initiatives. Instead of speeding all their time in war, the soldiers should have now spare time for public works that promote socio-economic development. Self-reliance and sustainable development should be a major concern of political leaders. The role of leaders should be to foster local skills and to exploit local resources to fulfil local needs.

3. The intellectual class should see the reconstruction of the collective consciousness as its first task. Their reflections must be geared to stimulating patriotism and to bring each individual to be a responsible citizen. In trying to reconcile tradition and modernity, priority should be given to developing traditional tools and methods of production on the basis of modern insight and scientific research.

4. The private sectors of the economy (both at national and international levels) should not only be concerned by the endless pursuit of profits in whatever way. They should be won to ethical marketing practices by committing themselves to codes of conduct provided by international organizations. Accountability should be one of their highest values to be held in esteem and should not fear to expose their business practice to public scrutiny. In the framework of self-reliance and sustainable development, they should endeavour to provide alternative products and methods of production through research and experimentation.

5. In most poor countries (countries such as Burundi and Rwanda which are best known to me), voluntary groups and NGO seem to be flourishing. It is easy for them to fall in routine of their punctual activities of humanitarian assistance. In the context of redirecting economy and giving it a moral quality, they should endeavour to experiment new life styles, filling in welfare gaps left open by the

state (without pretending to replace it), support individual initiatives and channel the motivation of committed individuals into practical actions.

6. The role of mass media of communications should be primarily to expose whatever could serve as model to be followed as well as public evils which undermine progress, and to maintain the collective value system.

7. Finally, the role of religious communities should be primarily to cater for the transcendent dimension of human life, offer acceptance and belonging, build up self-confidence and should critique and confirm values. In this vein, their spiritual concerns should be translated in social concerns. We shall come to this point in the particular case of the Christian Church.

With these few suggestions, the market is not prevented from flourishing, and the state could be brought closer to the people. Both the interests of the market and the interest of the people are protected. Hence, when I talk of the empowerment of the state I am talking of helping it to recover from being overtaken by economic processes in order to become a dialogue-partner of the Church as the family of God. In other words, I am trying to rescue the state from the minimalist gulf into which it is thrown by neoliberalism which limits it to the sole role of promoting the expansion of the market.

To achieve this aim we need to come back to our understanding of the *imago Dei* as relational, therefore social. To say that the human being is relational, is to say that human being is a being-in-community. At national level, the lowest level of the human community is the family, and its highest level is the state. It is true that, as we move in history, these two realities (the family and the state) are questioned, and have become a matter of debate particularly at this time when we not only have the state but also the global community. Hence we need to take seriously McFadyen's suggestion:

It is important to come back to this aspect of human nature (social and political) at the time when individualism that underlies liberalism emphasizes private rights, interests and freedoms that are, in principle, opposed to their limitation in the socio-political order (McFadyen 1990:193).

In this order of thought, the state is a reality that needs to be re-defined. My starting point will be the fact that the state is part of human nature, insofar as the human being is a community-being and

the state is itself a human community. It is true that God did not create the state as such. But insofar as he created the human being as a social or community oriented being, God intended the state as well, that is, that more specialized form of society in which people, by means of the law and order seek some degree of “temporal happiness” unattainable by the sole individual effort. I talk of temporal happiness insofar as it is limited to this life here on earth. And it can be achieved if the state provides order, justice and progress (Aquinas in E.F Murphy 1921:21). A biblical scholar might even go as far as saying, and rightly so, that God created the state because God institutionalized kingship. Accordingly, we have to understand the state as an overall expression of the common good. The state is that social and political structure that sets the situation within which people define themselves and relate to each other.

Thus the function of the state cannot be limited to allowing the accumulation of wealth as “the faithful of the religion” of the market would try to make us believe, or/and in regulating the distribution of social status and material goods and services as the proponents of the welfare state hold, but also and mostly its attachment to meaning. There is meaning when the moral, the social, the political and the economic are held together as aspects of every human being. If the state is to achieve this function, we need to do away with the idea of being a “minimal state” while the “maximal state” becomes the market. How can this be achieved?

The first thing is to bring the state to be conscious of itself and its function. The state is there not for the market but for the good of all its citizens in all their needs and in their relationships with one another within itself but also outside itself. The seven workable suggestions are viewed against this background. The state cannot be limited to being a mere partner, catalyst or/and facilitator of the market as the World Bank has suggested in its 1997 Report. In this order of thought, the measures of IMF and World Bank should be reviewed if we are to rescue the state from being undermined. There is no way in which we can understand how the state which belongs to the people can turn against them.

If such is the case it seems absurd that the state should withdraw from subsidizing its food production. One might ask where the subsidies would come from. The answer is that tariffs and taxes should be imposed on importations and the money should be used to foster food production and ~~other~~

needs of the people. It is absurd that the state should withdraw from the public sector and do away with the social welfare of its people. To disengage in such sector as education is to fail to invest for the future since education of a state's population is an important investment. It is absurd that the state should engage itself in export production rather than trying to meet the needs of its people. The idea here is not to condemn exports in favour meeting the needs of the people. But there should be a balance between the two. In effect, it is exports that provide the state with foreign currency which might be needed to purchase medicines or other useful equipments which it cannot produce by itself. It is absurd that the state should engage itself in the measures that go in the sense of removing the barriers that protect its nascent industries and other local private sectors against fierce competition. It is true that some times nascent industries need to be exposed to competition in order to stimulate their efficiency and competitiveness. This means that such an exposition must be strategic.

The measures suggested by IMF and the World Bank protect the few powerful and put at risk the vulnerable and the poor. The state is neither for the few rich, nor for the vulnerable and the poor alone. It belongs to all in so far as they are a communion under the same law and order. By law and order I mean a situation of justice and peace, a situation in which people respond to each other dependably, in respect of each other and in mutual trust. In this situation, selfishness, greed and unfair treatment of others give place to sharing and cooperation. A society in which these values are being realised is a society which is approaching the kingdom of God which is the horizon to which the Church looks.

There are many models of the Church which have been used throughout the history. In my dissertation I shall use the understanding the *Church as family of God*, a model of the Church which was adopted by the Synod of African bishops in 1994 as I said earlier. This understanding of the Church is in line with my definition of the *imago Dei* as relational. In effect, the Church as family of God denotes a communion and solidarity which involve an intimate relationship with God, and the bond of charity and fraternity that knits all God's people together. Communion and solidarity are expressed through mutual recognition and respect of the other as a human being and as a neighbour to be helped and to be made a sharer in the banquet of life to which we are all invited by God (Nwagu 1998:18-19). Communion and solidarity also mean concrete action: equitable sharing of material goods and spiritual goods (knowledge for instance) as well as cooperation with one another in order that the

common good may be safeguarded. By equitable sharing of the world's resources I do not mean a situation where the poor should for ever remain dependent, that is, a situation where the rich producers should simply give what they produce to poor consumers. A Chinese proverb says: "If you give a fish to a man, you feed him for one day; if you teach him how to fish, you feed him all his life." In today's economic order, it is production that needs to be shared. The suggestions we made earlier lead to how this should be achieved. According to Nürnberger, it "shared production leads to a shared income which makes genuinely shared consumption possible."

#### **5.3.2.2. Church- state partnership: How can the Church empower the state?**

We have been talking about the state as respondent or a dialogue-partner of the Church as the family of God without clarifying what we really mean. I reserved this task to the present lines. The state and the Church are both institutions that are geared to people's well-being and happiness. They are both God-given institutions for glorifying God as well as preparing people for eternal life through enforcing law, order, justice, liberty, progress and mutual coexistence in society respectively. In its document, *Gaudium et Spes*, Vatican II teaches that both the Church and the state are devoted to the vocation of the human beings as well as to the service of the welfare of all insofar as both institutions practice better cooperation according to the prevailing situation (GS 76). The same document recalls that the two institutions are nevertheless autonomous and independent from each other in their own fields.

The Church is not the state and is not bound to any politico-economic system. In this way the Church is a sign and safeguard of the transcendent dimension of the human being and has as its mission to direct every human being to eternal destiny. This requires loyalty to the Gospel which elevates every person to what is true, good, beautiful in the human community (GS 76). In order to achieve this, the Church appeals to people's **hearts and consciences** to maintain peace, order, and harmony characteristic of the kingdom of God. It has also the divine right to guide and direct God's people by **criticising and condemning** unjust and oppressive structures whether they come from within the state itself or outside the state (Majawa 1998:75). Thus the appeal to people's hearts and consciences and the critique and condemnation of unjust and oppressive structures are the two aspects of the role of Church by which it can empower the state. So the critique that the Church provides is a constructive



one in so far as it subjects the state to self-evaluation and self-reconstruction.

#### **5.3.2.2.1. Appeal to people's heart and conscience:**

This is an imperative necessity at this time when people have shifted from the emphasis of “being” to “having” following the fact that the economy claims priority over the moral, social and political aspects of human life. By “being” I mean what a human being is essentially. If a human being loses this essential dimension, one loses also one's humanity or humanness (*ubuntu*). Hence Burundians would say: *Umntu yafpuye agenda*, that is, a “living dead”. This concept has to be distinguished from one used to mean ancestors. When Burundians talk of “a living dead”, they mean a person who lacks authentic life inspired by one's conscience. By “having”, I am referring to the fact that one is determined by wealth s/he has rather than what s/he is. Once, again, I am inspired by the Burundian wisdom which talks of one having everything except conscience (*Nta mutima*). Effectively, the more a person is overwhelmed by materialism, the more that person becomes spiritually corrupt.

Correspondingly, this shift from being to having is important insofar as it dictates the expansion of the market and the maximization of profit. The more one is attuned to the market expansion and profit, the more one becomes disinterested in other people. We have already referred to the egocentrism and materialism of *homo oeconomicus* as depicted by Adam Smith in his reference to the butcher, the brewer and the baker. Thus the appeal to people's hearts and consciences consists in calling them to their being human. Being human means that one acknowledges that one has existence thanks to the existence of others. It is a combination of *being-with-self* and *being-with/in-others*. A human being can only exist as a social being given his/her relational nature. The implication of acknowledging that one has existence thanks to existence of others is the life of sharing, common vision, helpfulness (not out of abundance but out of concern for each other's welfare), generosity and other values that make human community a reality.

Our heart and conscience always direct us towards the good of ourselves and that of others in the community: the common good. By the common good I understand the sum total of the necessary conditions which contribute to the development and fulfilment of the human being. These conditions include public peace, private and public prosperity, and spiritual goods (Guerrey 1962:120). The



common good is an important domain where the state needs support. In effect, according to Vatican II, it is in the common good that the state finds its justification and meaning as well as the source of its specific and basic right to exist (GS 76). In the present order, this common good seems to be something that is left to be determined by the judgement of economic power. This economic power seems to replace the public authority supposed to protect the right of every citizen and every association of citizens (Cf. GS 75). The Church teaches that the common good cannot be an affair of individuals or a group of individuals or independent structures which constitute themselves to replace public authority (GS 65). The fear is that some citizens might be deprived of their right of participation in public life. The Church supports the state and public authority in these words:

The growing complexity of modern situation makes it necessary for public authority to intervene more often in social, cultural and economic matters in order to bring about more favourable conditions which enable citizens and groups to pursue freely and effectively the achievement of man's well-being in its totality (GS 75).

The Church also calls the citizens of each state to cooperation and sense of responsibility in these words: "Citizens should cultivate a generous and loyal spirit of patriotism, but without narrow-mindedness so that they will always keep in mind the welfare of the whole human family" (GS 75). In all these, Christians are called to serve as example especially that Jesus Christ called his followers to be the salt and the light of the earth (Mt 5:13-16):

Christians must be conscious of their specific and proper role in the political community: they should be shining example for their sense of responsibility and their dedication to the common good; they should show in practice how authority should be reconciled with freedom, personal initiative and with the solidarity and the needs of the whole social framework, and the advantages of unity with profitable diversity (GS 75).

The second order where the Church is called to play a role is somehow a corollary of the appeal to people's hearts and conscience:

#### 5.3.2.2.2. *The Church criticises and condemns unjust and oppressive structures.*

The structures that need to be criticised at the moment are the economic structures and the political ones which may allow these economic structures to exploit or/and oppress people. The Church's critique and condemnation of unjust structures are geared to calling the state to its functions and power to serve everybody and distribute equitably the resources available. In effect, the state has a tendency to be on the side of the few powerful to the detriment of the vulnerable and the poor. One may wonder whether democracy supposed to reverse this situation can function. It is true that the rich and the poor have the same vote. But beside the fact that the political leaders can manipulate and exploit their mandate, we have to be aware that their political campaigns are often financed by some rich people or companies whose interests these leaders promise to secure. In the end, the poor cannot but vote according to false promises heard in demagogical speeches.

The introduction by the World Bank and IFM of the measures of structural adjustment and their adoption by the developing countries is to be seen from this perspective. As we have seen it, these measures include the removal of trade barriers, cutting subsidies on agriculture, withdrawing from public sectors such health and education, etc. It is in this respect that in the Encyclical *Centesimus Annus* the pope John Paul II writes:

Love for others, and in the first place love for the poor, in whom the Church sees Christ himself, is made concrete in the promotion of justice. Justice will never be attained unless the people see in the poor person, who is asking for help in order to survive, not an annoyance or a burden, but an opportunity for showing kindness and a chance for greater enrichment (*Centesimus Annus*, 58)<sup>33</sup>

I may not go as far as suggesting that economic and political structures should necessarily be enterprises of love, but at least I expect them to have a concern for justice and fairness. The Pope John Paul II pursues his advise in these words:

---

<sup>33</sup>In the later note, this document will be referred to as CA

It is not merely a matter of giving from one's surplus, but of helping entire people which are presently excluded or marginalised to enter into the sphere of economic and human development. For this to happen, it requires above all a change of life-styles, of models of production and consumption, and of the established structures of power which today govern societies (CA 15).

The service of the Church in supporting the state has to be such that even the aid received has a human face and not just a kind of aid which maintains them in abject poverty and keep them falling in situation of irrelevance. This will also involve giving support to enlightened leaders as well as civil society organizations and NGO which demand a greater degree of accountability and transparency in those political and economic structures in which it is easy to fall into corruption (Riddell 1999:324).

So much with empowering the state. We shall now consider the ecological implication of the *imago Dei* as a relational.

### **5.3.3 Ecological implication: Towards Christian values that care about the environment**

Let me first provide a link between the state and environment protection and care. According to R.D Lipschutz and K Conca,

One of the fundamental sources of state power is control over the resources located within the national territory. And natural-resource goods and environmental services are an important component of this resource base. The power to grant or alter property rights to resources can be an important means of building state alliances with the society. And the effective use or allocation of those resources can, in principle, serve such fundamental state purposes as national integration, state-building, preserving the social order or maintaining the legitimacy of the state itself (Lipschutz and Conca 1993:19-20).

This provides us with a background to deal with the ecological implication of the *imago Dei* as relational.

The ecological aspect is the third dimension of the *imago Dei* as a relational being. As we noted earlier, the human being has a three dimensional relationship: relation with God, relation with the

neighbour, and relationship with the world or nature, over which s/he is given dominion. However, I would like to move away from an ethic derived from the understanding of the human being as a creature called to dominate and subdue the earth (Gn 1:28). In effect, for quite some times a charge has been laid against the traditional Judeo-Christian view of the *imago Dei* as far as the environmental degradation is concerned. The charge claimed that the human being abused the environment by claiming that s/he was the centre of God's creation, and that the rest of creation was there for their use (see Bryant 2000: 35, see also Cobb 1972, 1994). This charge can be traced back to 1970 when Lynn T. White (an American historian) pointed out the disastrous influence exercised by Judeo-Christian linking human destiny to the image of God with the commission to exercise dominion over creation.

However, W. Pannenberg has tried to defend the Judeo-Christian tradition from the above charge in the following words:

Only beginning in the eighteenth century did the commission given to human beings to represent God in their dominion over nature turn into a claim that they have unlimited power to dispose of nature. This happened at the very time when modern humanity in its understanding was cutting its ties with the creator God of the Bible. It is therefore incorrect to charge Western Christianity as a whole with this distortion of the biblical commission of domination, this failure to recognize the role of humanity as fiduciaries. It was in fact only the emancipation of modern humanity from biblical revelation that turned the biblical commission of domination into subjugation of nature to human beings on their own authority and for their own arbitrary use (Pannenberg 1985:78).

Pannenberg might be right in his defence. Yet the charge cannot easily be dismissed because our environment has been used as if it is at the mercy of human beings for their egoistic and materialistic ends. Even if we grant that the abuse of nature was much more effective as humanity cut itself from God, we cannot do away with the fact that it used the link between human destiny and God's commission to defend the Christian faith against the suspicion that it was hostile to the spirit of modern science and technology (Gogarten 1952:149ff). More recently, Rosino Gibellini argued that Christian theology has failed to make faith culturally operative in creation because it has limited itself to history, which it interprets as the history of salvation, and abandoned nature to science and technology (Gibellini 1995:126). In any case, we need to reorient the relation between the human being and the rest of creation by using the fact that both are the creatures of God.

My contention is that the concept of *imago Dei* as relational can save our environment from continuous degradation. Relationality brings us to consider the environment as a part of God's creation which must not merely be subjected to domination and merciless exploitation for human wants. Accordingly, we need to consider the Christian values that go in this direction. In so doing, we should arrive at the conclusion that Christianity *per se* cannot be ecologically irresponsible not less than it should not be socially. We might not go as far as saying that we should treat the environment as one's "neighbour" who needs care and attention since such concept involves personal and reciprocal relationship. But it is imperative that humans should be responsible to God and to each other for their use of nature by taking as much as necessary and take care not to destroy it wantonly. That is what the ethic of *imago Dei* suggests.

In effect, the *imago Dei* as relational is entrusted with **responsibility**: that of representing God in the rest of creation. One of the important aspects of this responsibility is **caring** for creation and keep it "very good" on behalf of God in the same way as God cares for us. Just as God wants us to flourish, so also are the human beings required to extend God's love to all creation so that it can continue to flourish and be good. According to Bryant, God's love and goodness show that God supports the well-being of the created world (Bryant 2000: 36).

Even though we are not going as far as considering the environment as one's fellow, we need to see it as "the other-than-oneself" in need of attention as I said earlier. The other-than-oneself is anything of God's creation that needs to be considered with **love and service**. Love and service are two important values of Christian life. In fact, there is really no meaningful responsibility without love and service. Jesus, who is the ultimate image of God, is referred to us as one who came to love and serve especially the vulnerable. By the same token, Jesus tells us that God feeds the birds in the sky and clothe wild flowers in the fields (Mt 6:25-34). Jesus is making more than a comparison between the love and service God has for the human being and the love of the rest of creation. Even if we grant it to be a comparison, we have to see this comparison in terms of an invitation for the human beings to **participate**<sup>34</sup> in the same kind of care and love that God has for the whole of God's creation.

---

<sup>34</sup>I am using the concept of participation in the philosophical sense Thomas Aquinas used it. In the philosophy of Aquinas, participation means being in a limited and proportionate state what another is in a greater or absolute state. In fact it is in this sense that we are the image and likeness of God (see Cronan 1955:25-28).

Hence, in the same way as we care about and love ourselves in terms of food and clothing, so also are we to feed and clothe the environment from which we take from. What is involved here is love, a love that acts in a natural world. This love seeks the flourishing of others and is in union with others. Here I am echoing what W. Pannenberg calls the exocentric nature of human beings, that is, openness to the infinite horizon which includes other people and the natural world (Pannenberg 1985:63-75). Bryant goes in the same direction and says:

Human fulfilment comes through another-directedness that takes us beyond all individual beings to the ultimate horizon with which we know and have to do with all particular beings, to God. As the horizon of beings, the divine life includes all creation, so that we cannot serve God without regard for creation (Bryant 2000:43).

The interaction between the human beings and the environment is amenable to the famous golden rule of doing to others what one would like done unto self. Translated in ecological terms we would say, in the same way we should not like to be destroyed, so also we should not destroy the environment. In fact, according to Gen 2:7, the human being is created out of the earth (*adamah*), such that to care for the earth (environment) is, indeed to care for oneself. It is true that we cannot do to nature what we do to ourselves as humans in every case. But the point is that the human beings realize themselves in the environment. Likewise, the environment realizes itself and reaches its full significance in human beings. If this interaction were to be balanced, the interaction between human beings and the environment would be peaceful and harmonious.

Unfortunately, when we talk of environmental degradation, we are referring to distortion in the interaction. For Gerhard Liedke, this distortion is thought of in terms of asymmetrical relation, insofar as human beings turn out to dominate in a way that threatens the environment. Liedke argues that the most urgent task is to work towards a "symmetrical" relationship. This means encouraging the growth of the environment that is threatened by the violence of human technology. For Liedke, the encouragement would consist in the "renunciation of force on the part of human beings, a reduction in the excessive pressure of violence to which we subject the non-human creation" (Liedke in Gibellini 1995:129). In his argument, Liedke suggests that we do not just talk of ethic of self-limitation as some theologians like Christoph Uehlinger (1995:55) suggests, but rather of the ethics of **solidarity** with God's creation. This solidarity requires that we take care not to destroy the environment but that we

give it a chance to absorb the impact we have on it and to regenerate itself wherever it is possible.

Liedke is right here. The language of economic globalization simply brought us to be happy with international solidarity or global village for human beings. In other words, this solidarity does not involve the environment which constitutes one of the three dimensions of the *imago Dei* as relational. We talk of international solidarity or global village and we forget that this solidarity should not occur only **in** the world of humans but also **with** the environment. This would be a major step towards a shift from the category of control (dominion) in which the environment is completely at the disposal of human beings as a material which can be manipulated and be the object of technology to the category of conservation of creation and of cooperation with it (cf. Gibellini 1995:130). Such is the ecological implication of the ethic of the *imago Dei* as relational.

In the last section of this chapter, we shall see that the ethic of the *imago Dei* can be summed up as follows: **“Glory to God in the highest”** and **“Peace to men on earth”**. The first part of this phrase refers to the vertical dimension of human relationship with God. I am aware that the word “vertical” can be confusing because it could mean “up there” somewhere, when God is among us, in us, in the neighbour, in nature. However, by vertical dimension I mean the recognition of God’s **transcendence**. The second term of the phrase refers to the horizontal dimension of human relationship with God. By horizontal relation I mean God’s immanence and how it should shape our ways of life. God is both transcendent and immanent. That is, God is transcendent, yet God is with us. If that is the case, we should do away with the “idolatry” of the market and give God due place and priority. We cannot worship both God and the market. The more we emphasize the expansion of the market and the maximization of profit as an end and hence become materialistic, the more we lose our spiritual sense and hence forget our need for God as our ultimate end.

#### **5.4. God above the market: we cannot worship both God and the market**

The market and the profit it yields, no matter how valuable it may be, cannot be the ultimate end of human life. Our reflection so far has shown that the expansion of the market and the growth of production accompanied by greater profits which bring along with them a lot of losses, especially human being’s spiritual values and the capacity to turn to God who is the ultimate source of our

existence. This is because the present economic order, as economists argue, is not concerned with the ethical questions but with efficiency in the production of wealth. I argued that efficiency in the production of goods and services is meaningless if it does not lead us to give glory to God and to live in peace with others. Hence the title: we cannot worship both God and the market. Ethics is the human way of returning back to God.

It is on our journey towards God that we sing: **Glory to God in the highest and peace to men on earth**. The first part of the proposition means that we have to put God first. It is our human vertical relation with God as I said. The second part of the proposition means that we have to see God in the neighbour, and that we cannot relate and love God without relating to and loving the neighbour. It is our human relationship with others including the environment.

#### **5.4.1. Putting God first: the vertical relationship with God**

What do we mean by putting God first? The problem of today is no longer atheism, as it has been in the 19<sup>th</sup> century and the first part of the last century. It is rather a paganism and an idolatry of a certain kind. With the process of economic globalization we are at the stage where God may be there, but means nothing as the opening quote of this chapter suggests. We are in the stage whereby the market becomes actually the “god”. In other words the features of the religion of God of the Bible are adopted by the economic narrative. According to L. Boff (1992:xi-xii, cf. Boeve 1999:31), there are eight features of “economic religion”. Let us outline and view each in turn:

***1. The fundamental dogma: money is all-powerful and gets things done, and the market guides our destinies better than our consciences.***

There is no doubt that we seem to be living in the era of “monetarism” and “marketism” today. It would even be difficult to deny that those who have money and lead the market have power and authority to decide on the fate of others. In fact these elements have drown the world in a materialism of a certain kind. Let me recall the words of St. Paul in his first letter to Timothy: The love of money is roots of all evils and there are some who pursuing it, have wandered away for the faith (1 Tim 6:10). Obviously we need money and markets, but we cannot treat them as end in themselves (cf Wogaman



1986:38). Thus, there is no reason why they should be given priority in our life because the market and money alone cannot give us happiness. Here again we should recall the words of St Paul to Timothy:

Instruct those who are rich in this world's goods that they should not be proud and should set their hopes not on money, which is untrustworthy, but on God who gives us richly all that we need for our happiness. They are to be good and rich in good works, generous in giving and always ready to share (1Tim 6:17-18).

## ***2. Theology: Theories of economists.***

According to Boff, the theology of the economic religion is the different theories of economists. The dominant economic theory is the neoclassical economic theory. However, Boff's claim is not as simple as that. Certainly devout Christians have or favour some economic theories, yet they still praise God. We may refer to Christians who have defended, for instance, economic theories of capitalism or socialism. Boff himself favours Marxism. However, where the problem lies is in making a given economic theory an absolute truth. Once again, we could refer to Wogaman's words: "Humanity is not on earth to serve economics, rather the function of economics is to serve humanity, in accordance with God's loving purposes (Wogaman 1986:38).

## ***3. Evangelization: advertisement.***

According to Boff, advertisement is the proclamation of a "good news" in which good and happy people are associated with commodities. Boff is not suggesting that advertisement should stop. But we should be aware of the negative effects of adverts on poor people. As Nürnberger has pointed out, advertisement and aggressive marketing are the ways by which centre producers raise the need levels of the centre population and bring people of the periphery to desire the same commodities. The implication is that the periphery is brought to spend its meagre income on centre products while the peripheral producers lose their markets (Nürnberger 1999:327). And this results in inequalities.

#### ***4. Sacraments: Commodities (like Marlboro cigarettes or Coca Cola) give energy and life.***

This could sound as an exaggeration. A Christian can smoke or drink Coca Cola but still need the sacraments of the Church. However, Boff's concern is real and needs to be taken seriously. These commodities he gives as an example among the many are at the same time vehicles of the culture of consumerism "à l'Américaine" or "à l'Européenne". In his book *Toward a theology of corporation* (1981), Michael Novak had characterised corporations as being sacramental in character and as fulfilling the biblical role of a "suffering servant" in the face of abuse of corporate critics. Yet Novak must be aware that business is not an enterprise of love where a business person would be willing to do all, or to give all without any specific material incentives (Novak as in Wogaman 1986:39).

#### ***5. Churches/temples: Banks***

We all need banks and we use banks if we want to secure our money. But all us do not conceive of banks in the same way. We could think of people who seem to spend almost all their life in stock exchanges as if they are gambling. Certainly these people do not have the time for anything else. Their church or temple becomes the bank itself. The fear here is that money and its endless fluctuation end up causing a spiritual alienation in the person who has put all her/his trust in them.

#### ***6. Pilgrimages: Great shopping centres or consumer cities,***

Just as we need banks, so also we need shopping centres. I am always impressed by the number of people I meet in shopping malls. It is as if they are the faithful who have organised a trip to the "promised land". My impression is also the number of people who are there not because they are shopping but because they can only, they say, window-shop. These people have little or no money. In the end they feel obliged to spend the little money they have on things they do not need

#### ***7. Priests or pastors: Bankers and financiers***

For Boff, these people offer the greatest worship to money because they make it earn. To be a banker or a financier is not a problem since it may be a way of earning the living like any other work.

However, this does not mean that such a way of life is without problems when it is absolutized. How often do we hear that these bankers and financiers ask disproportionate interests on loans. In the third chapter we have referred to what the debt burden (which has become an issue in the international economy) is doing to poor countries.

***8. The ethics of economic religion: individual interest is the general norm of behaviour, and the limits of egoistic interest are contracts.***

According to Wogaman, none of us is free from selfishness, but there are those who are profoundly corrupted by materialism (Wogaman 1986:39). Thus individual interest is not bad, provided it does not deprive a person of these moral virtues such as kindness, generosity, love of and concern for others. In the same way, there is no problem in entering into contracts provided we keep in mind that beyond contract there are such moral virtues as self-sacrifice and self-giving. And finally beyond the individual there is the society and beyond the individual interest, there is the common good which we are all called to serve as community members .

For L. Thurow the slogan for this new religion: ***“The Market, and the Market alone rules! Survival of the fittest, capitalism stands alone”***( Thurow 1996:1-5). Although Thurow might be referring to the defeat of socialism, we have to warn him against the danger of absolutization of the market and the glorification of capitalism. The refusal of prioritizing the market and glorifying capitalism does mean that those who produce goods and services should not exchange them according to market demand. But we must know that beyond exchange of commodities, there are social relationships which cannot be translated in economic terms. In the light of Thurow’s suggested slogan for the “economic religion”, we may recall George Gilder who, in his *Wealth and Poverty* (1982), attributed to capitalism acts of outgoing and self-giving love. Yet he knew well that business people do not necessarily work for the sake of others.

We can avoid the limits of the economic religion by letting God be God, that is, giving to God due priority. This, in turn, could challenge us

to keep our intrinsic and instrumental values in the right relationship so that the priorities we build into our personal economic lives and our social policies will undergird the deeper meaning of our

existence (Wogaman 1986:40).

Letting God be God is the constitution of human beings in so far as they created in the image and likeness of God. It is the human beings' creature-ness that yields gratefulness and praise as a response to God for having created us. Accordingly, in dealing with the vertical dimension of the human being, I am concerned with the way God comes to human beings and the way human beings should go towards God. A. McFadyen pictures this relationship as follows:

What is distinctive about human relation to God in creation is that God's creative and sustaining activity elicits, enables and deserves a free and thankful response... The response of thanks and praise is given not only in recognition of God as originator and sustainer of creation, it is also given in response to the perception of God as intervening to transform (Israel's) historical situation (McFadyen 1991:19).

It is in this thankfulness and praise that the phrase "Glory to God in the Highest consists!" In economic terms, to be thankful and to praise God would consist in using money in responsibility to God and in mutual service to each other. Accordingly, McFadyen says that the human being ought to be defined as being-in-gratitude, such that the relational structure of the human being is one of openness to and for God and God's word. He puts in thus,

Being-in-gratitude involves a recognition of the incapacity to live from individual or communal resources alone, a turning towards God in the understanding that that which is accomplished for humanity open to God's word is decisively different from that which could happen for a humanity closed in upon itself in a process of circumlocution, and therefore exclusively into one's own power (McFadyen 1991:21).

The problem with the present process of economic globalization is that the *homo oeconomicus* is open to him/herself and the market on the one hand, and closed to God on the other hand. This is obvious by the fact that even religion itself has become a commodity that is marketed. Openness on oneself and the market is accompanied with the emphasis on human power. Let us recall that some new religious movements emphasize on (the gift of) power. But human power presupposes that one is sufficient unto oneself in such a way that there is no need to be grateful to God; because God's

communication does not seem to bring anything new in the same way as the invisible hand that guides the market does. That is the very crisis of the faith and the triumph of the market over religion that needs to be sorted out, especially in that part of the world where Christianity is thought to have guided history (Boeve 1999:32). In the same vein, De Santa Ana observed that the present human being is not concerned about the moral aspect that makes human activities human but s/he is concerned with how human activities are efficient, especially as far as wealth is concerned (De Santa Ana 1995:7).

The point being argued here is that the market is being established as the “god” which transforms. But the kind of transformation which that god brings does not take us far since it is a transformation in which the unfit, those who cannot cope with or adapt to the forces of the market and profit are excluded. The god that excludes a part of the people and allows the abuse of creation is unacceptable. Moreover, the market is not a creator, but a creature of the *homo oeconomicus*. A god that excludes some people, and does not care for the poor and the vulnerable is not worthy of thankfulness and praise. God’s movement to human beings consists effectively in creating and sustaining all what God creates, while human response should consist in thanks and praise.

The real transformation is that which is operated in the spirit of the real God: the God of Jesus Christ. The transformation operated by the God of Jesus Christ takes into consideration the following elements: the love of the neighbour as one loves oneself; taking care of the “garden” so that it reflects the glory of God, goodness: being good as the heavenly Father is good.

These elements are at the heart of the vertical dimension of the *imago Dei*. Giving thanks and praise to God is not possible without ethico-social and ecological mediation: to be the image of God is to have the human responsibility to offer creation back to its creator as a sacrifice of praise. Hence the next dimension: the horizontal dimension.

### 5.6.2. God in the neighbour: horizontal relationship with God.

The horizontal dimension of the *imago Dei* is the social and ecological mediation of the vertical dimension. In other words, God who is transcendent is immanent in our social and ecological relations. According to Nwagu,

The horizontal dimension is experienced as solidarity expressed through mutual recognition and respect for the other person. He/she must be accepted as a human being and not just as a tool to be used and discarded when no longer useful. The other person becomes a neighbour and a helper capable of being a sharer on a par with ourselves in a banquet of life to which all are invited by God (Nwagu 1998:18-19).

One cannot relate to God without relating to the neighbour. The invisible is mediated by the visible. That is what St. John says in his first letter when he writes:

Anyone who says "I love God" and hates his brother is a liar. Since whoever does not love the brother he can see cannot love God who he has not seen. Whoever loves God must love his brother (1Jn 4:20).

In short, you cannot love God you do not see without loving the neighbour you see. The more one gets involved positively with one's neighbour, the more one rises to God, and the more God comes to meet him/her. In the previous point, we talked about the fact that in the present world economic order, people are closing themselves from God and open themselves to the market and the profit it offers. It is not an exaggeration if we were to talk of darkness that follows from closing oneself from God and the light that follows from one's opening himself to God. In the first place, people fully open to the market and the maximization of profit tend to be closed to the neighbour. This closing brings with it misery, poverty, anger, resentment, hatred, envy, destruction of the environment, ect. In the end, this may result in a violent reaction. This is what I call darkness to which the love of increasing riches leads to. In other words, any situation in which God is not encountered as the centre is a situation of darkness.

Instead the openness to God, and therefore to the neighbour produces a situation of light which everybody is happy to see because it produces the values of fraternity, non-partisan solidarity, sharing, truthfulness, mutual trust, mutual help, self-sacrifice, generosity, respect of the life of the other and the whole of God's creation. Hence whenever God is the reality that matters, there is light which consists in these values. Coming to this light is a process which consists in seeing the expansion of the market and the profit that proceeds from it as values that ought to be shared and not just be concentrated in the power of the few successful who can adapt to the dictates of the market. Accordingly, the market should be seen as not the ultimate but as one of the aspects in human life that lead to the ultimate, God. Anyone who loves his/her neighbour remains in the light and there is in him/her nothing to make him/her fall away (1Jn 2:10).

The love of the neighbour should bring solidarity in which God is the centre where the strong meet the weak, the rich meet the poor, the just meets the unjust, the exploiter meets the exploited, a centre where one meets one's enemies. That is the very purpose of God and God's people: the establishment of the kingdom. This kingdom means the inauguration of goodness and mercy, and renunciation of privilege in favour of service to one another. It also implies the exaltation of the humble and the restoration of violated rights (Boff 1988:167). In the language of the liberation theology, this kingdom means also liberation. In the first place, it is the liberation of the rich from spiritual alienation, because one's spiritual wealth is taken away by the market and the endless search of maximal profit. That is the very meaning of Jesus's warning to Pharisees: You cannot be slave of both God and money (Lk 16:13b). And elsewhere he says:

How hard it is for those who have riches to make their way into the kingdom of God! Yes, it is easier for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle than for someone rich to enter the kingdom of God (Lk 18:24-25).

In the second place, God's kingdom is liberation of the poor from material alienation. The poor countries should not simply be the fields of raw materials (at least for those which have them), or simply be left to fall behind the more the world economy becomes more sophisticated, neither should they be the host of relocated companies for cheap labour which yields higher profits (despite the fact that some countries may benefit from it). The kingdom of God means that the poor and the exploited are brought back to God's justice and righteousness (Boff 1988:16). That is what is meant by "Peace

to men on earth!” Because where the rich is freed from spiritual alienation and the poor freed from material alienation, there is genuine peace and harmony that come from the common denominator, God, in whose image and likeness the whole of humankind is created.

## 5. 5. Conclusion

So far I have concentrated my effort in trying to provide an alternative to Amin’s international socialism and Küng’s global ethic. I have suggested an ethic based on the concept of *imago Dei*. With the concept of *imago Dei*, I went deep into the origin of humanity in God. We are created in the image and likeness of God as chapter one of the book of Genesis tells us. To be the image and likeness of God is to be relational, that is, social beings, because God is also relational, and therefore social. Apart from the fact that God speaks in a plural form, we know also that God is a community (of the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit). To say that we are created in the image and likeness of God suggests that we are meant to be relational as God who is a “community being” is relational. I have indicated that the human being has a three-dimensional<sup>35</sup> relationship: relationship with God, relationship with one’s fellow, and relationship with the world. This three- dimensional relationship has three implications, namely:

1. The social implication which calls to build a human community as a context of values.
2. The political implication which calls us to empower the state as a dialogue-partner of the Church as family of God,
3. The ecological implication which calls us to consider the environment as the other-than-oneself that needs care, love and service.

I also argued that we cannot worship both God and the market. Accordingly, on the one hand we need to put God before the market, that is, letting God be God, and on the other hand we have to see God in the neighbour and in the environment. That is what is meant by: **Glory to God in the highest and peace men on earth!** Putting God first is the vertical dimension which makes us beings-in-gratitude (always called to be thankful and to praise God for creating and sustaining us). It is the

---

<sup>35</sup>The fact that God is a trinity has nothing to do with the three- dimensional relationship.



recognition of God's transcendence. But the vertical dimension is mediated by the horizontal dimension, that is, the fact we cannot relate to God unless we relate to our neighbour and use natural resources in a responsible way. The horizontal dimension is the recognition of God's immanence, that is, God's presence among us, in us, and in nature.

The advantage of our alternative is that it departs from a powerful critique of the very concept that informs the present neoclassical economy: the concept *homo oeconomicus*. I argued that while the concept of *imago Dei* makes human beings moral beings, the *homo oeconomicus* does not necessarily become a *homo moralis*. The point defended here is that any solution to the present phenomenon of economic globalization must first question seriously the concept of *homo oeconomicus* that informs it. Amin did not go to that extent. On the other hand, K  ng tries to accommodate the concept of *homo oeconomicus*, by putting it side by side with **living people** (social being in the Aristotelian sense). This kind of compromise between the *homo oeconomicus* and living people does not give enough space in which we put God first and be sufficiently dedicated to the neighbour. It is unacceptable in so far as it still gives room to the idolatry of the market and endless search of profit.

However, one might wonder whether I am not constructing an ethic that appeals to Christians while rejecting a humanistic ethic (both Amin's and K  ng's ethic) that appeals to a wider constituency. But such a critique fails to understand that the Christian ethic I am suggesting is a humanism *par excellence*, insofar as it goes deep into the roots of the human beings in God. Hence it is more grounded than any other humanism.

Now the crucial question is this: what practical promise does the ethic of *imago Dei* give us? The Christian ethic I am suggesting here is not an economic project. Instead it is a social project which should help us to share what God has given us. Whatever a human being has is meaningful to the extent that it is shared. We have given some suggestions of how the sharing can be done practically. Thus the promise of our ethic is a human being conscious of what one is and how one should live out that identity. The definition of the human being as the image of God is tied up with a responsibility, that of caring about and serving others (the environment included) as a mission received from God. Human economic development is part of this mission. In the last chapter, I will try to see how this can work in the context of Burundi.



## **CHAPTER SIX**

### **IMPLICATIONS OF THE ETHIC OF IMAGO DEI IN THE BURUNDIAN CONTEXT**

Instead of feeding their populations the countries of the Third World race with the International Monetary Fund's encouragement, to expand exports. Local needs, a clean environment, healthy citizens are simply ignored in the economic equation.

*Andrew Vincent 1995:23*

### 6.1. Introduction

The present task is to try to apply the ethic of *imago Dei* as relational into the Burundian context. Burundi is one of the poor countries of Sub-Saharan Africa which suffer from the consequences of economic globalization. I am aware that like any other country of Sub-Saharan Africa, Burundi has its domestic failings. My observation is that the forces of economic globalization combine with these internal failings to make it worse (cf. Kwesi 1998:32). But what forces and what internal failings? The forces of economic globalization which I refer to are external profit-seekers, undefined terms of exchange on the international market, inappropriate economic measures suggested by the World Bank and the IMF, debt burden, problems of accessing to the market of developed countries, etc. The internal failings to which I am referring to are, for instance, internal divisions and wars, corrupt leaders, lack of public accountability, absence of social justice and the rule of law, poor economic projects, poor and uneducated population, scarcity and overexploitation of land due to a high demographic growth, etc. Thus, the situation of Burundi is a product of the interplay of the factors of globalization building on the local ones.

The ethic of *imago Dei* as relational which I suggest as a response to economic globalization has one main purpose: to address the impact of economic globalization in the context of Burundi which is, at the same time, torn apart by its own internal problems. With the ethic of *imago Dei* as relational, the growth the international trade should benefit the poor instead of continually marginalizing them, political liberalism would not lead to disorder which the profit-makers exploit while undermining the state, solidarity will imply equality and social justice as well as environmental care, and finally moral values will recover their priority over market judgements in which everything is referred to in terms of commodity (see chap.3).

For the above ideal to be achieved, the Burundian Church (75% Catholic, 15% Protestant) has to be won to the fact that the Christian message is primarily ethical. For a long time, the Burundian Church seems to be satisfied with the massive number of people and little or nothing beyond. But the number of worshippers is one thing, and what they do is another. However, what is important is not the number of worshippers, but the ethical mission they have to fulfill as people who recognize themselves as created in the image and likeness of God. In the present context economic globalization,

this ethical mission is to **contribute** to the following:

1. The humanization of the foreign aid and humanitarian service,
2. Orienting economic investment towards human promotion and not only for profit,
3. Shifting from self-enrichment minded political leadership to a leadership open to socio-economic empowerment of the poor.
4. Environmental care.

Before we embark on these points, let us first outline the geographical and the historical situation of Burundi.

## **6.2. Geographical and historical background<sup>36</sup>**

### **6.2.1. Geographical situation**

The geographical situation of Burundi is difficult to define. For some people, Burundi belongs to the central African region, while for others, Burundi is an East African country. The reason for putting Burundi in central Africa might not be simply empirical. One might assume that there is a geopolitical motive behind it. In effect, while most of the East African countries were colonized by the British, and thus have English as a common language and influence, most of the central African countries were colonized by either France (Congo-Brazzaville, Gabon, Cameroon, Tchad, Central Africa Republic, or Belgium (Burundi, Rwanda, DRC) and thus have French as a common language and influence. However from the physico-geographical view point, Burundi is situated in the Eastern part of the rift valley, making it part of the East African region along with countries such as Tanzania, Uganda, Kenya, Sudan, and Ethiopia.

Burundi is surrounded by the following countries: in the North by Rwanda, from South to East by Tanzania, and in the West by the DRC, interrupted in its south by lake Tanganyika. This surrounding makes Burundi an in-land country. This seems to be an economic handicap as far as

---

<sup>36</sup>For most of the following data, I am indebted to the document, *Instruments internationaux relatifs aux droits de l'homme* (1999), produced by the United Nations.

importation and exportation of goods is concerned. Burundi is one of the smallest countries of Africa. The area size is 27834 square kilometres, with 2000 of lakes. Its population, mostly concentrated in volcanic and fertile soils at 1500-1800m, consists of three social components, namely: Hutu (85%), Tutsi (14%), and Twa (1%) mixed all over the national territory. Although the question of national unity remains a puzzle, Burundians have a common culture, language, tradition and religion.

However, the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> century ethnological studies have attributed agriculture to the Hutu, and cattle-breeding activities to the Tutsi, although both groups practice both activities. Nevertheless, that the two groups share the same culture should not prevent any scholar from investigating the origin of each group in order to find out the root source of the present conflict beyond the cause usually attributed to the colonization. I shall not to much give space to such an investigation in my present dissertation. Suffice it to note that the Tutsi tend to trace their umbilical cords to Hebraic people *via* Egypt and Ethiopia. It is against this background that *The Jerusalem Post* of 23 November 1998 demanded the Israeli government to protect the Tutsi of Great Lakes region like the Falachas and the Orits of Ethiopia. A book, *Batutsi: Codes Hebraiques et Transferts Salomoniques dans les Royaumes Nilo-Kushitiques du Sud* (1999) referring the Tutsi people to Jewish roots is being published (Ntakarutimana 1999:1-2). I should also add that the German and Belgian ethnologists referred to the Tutsi as Hamites, that is, descendants of Cham who is referred to in the Bible. Accordingly, they are said to be tall and wiry, and have such features as "graceful indolence in gait which is peculiar to Oriental people" (Mecklenburg quoted by Lemarchand 1974:6). Although it seems to satisfy most of European observers, R. Lemarchand rejects that description of the Tutsi as simplistic because it tends to exaggerate cultural discontinuities among Burundians. What is difficult here is that the Tutsi do not have a religion or/and a language of their own. As for the Hutu people, they are thought to be indigenous people, who probably migrated to the South from the Sahara pushed by the conditions of drought several hundred years ago. They are said to be a medium-sized type of people. And finally, the Twa are pygmy people who are thought to have emerged from the equatorial forest. Although they also speak the same language like the first two groups, they are not well integrated into the social order and still marry among their families. Their main activities are pottery, hunting and food gathering. However, they are more and more giving themselves to agriculture, especially that forests for their food gathering and hunting are disappearing due the pressure of overpopulation and war.

Along the above, it would be difficult to question the fact of migrations of people. It might be true that both Hutu and Tutsi migrated from the North. Both might have followed the Nile in search of better lands for agriculture and cattle-breeding. The minority might have adopted the language and culture of the majority as the two groups mixed all over the national territory. However, this hypothesis may be falsified by the fact that some Tutsi people are called "*Banyaruguru*" or "*Bavejuru*", that is, the people who came from "up there", from the North. Nevertheless, I think that the name "*Banyaruguru or Bavejuru*" informs us about who first arrived in Burundi. It might be possible that the Hutu arrived in Burundi first, followed by Batutsi.

However attention must drawn to the fact that the *Banyaruguru* is one of the two groups of the Tutsi people, the other group being the Hima. This latter did not really have a share in power during the monarchic period. Attention must also be drawn to the fact that there is another group of people, the *Ganwa* who claim not to belong to neither Hutu nor Tutsi ethnic groups. The *Ganwa* formed the core of the political elites, and as such held most of the chiefly positions under the monarchy (Lemarchand 1974:7). The colonial administration, however, unduly assimilated them to the Tutsi people and it has been taken to be so since then. The origin of the Ganwa is a matter of historical debate. However, one of the hypotheses could be that they might be the descendant sons of the first king of Burundi, Ntare Rushatsi, who never associated himself with any ethnic group. Yet, one legend has it that Ntare Rushatsi was a Hutu of the Bahanza clan which is an important Hutu clan in the traditional Burundi (Weinstein 1976:63). Among the wives of the first king, some were Hutu and other were Tutsi. Thus, it might be true that some of the king's sons were born from the Hutu mothers and others from the Tutsi mothers. Such that some Ganwa have Hutu blood and others Tutsi blood. My concern is whether this had any bearing on the subsequent history of Burundi.

Before I move to the historical background I should note that contrary to most African modern states, Burundi is not an artificial creation of colonial rule, although its real borders have been modified. Almost a quarter of the country was attached to Tanzania in 1916 in the project of constructing the railway linking from Cape to Cairo. Some people might think, as they often do, that Rwanda and Burundi were the same kingdom which was divided into two during colonization. This is not true at all. Although both Rwanda and Burundi spoke almost the same language and have almost the same ethnic composition, they were two different kingdoms. During the colonial rule (both German

and Belgian) still kept them separate.

### **6.2.2. Historical background.**

The history of Burundi can be divided into three major parts:

1. The pre-colonial period (1500? -1889),
2. The colonial period (1889-1962),
3. The post-colonial period (1962 to the present).

#### **6.2.2.1. The pre-colonial period (1500-1889)**

The pre-colonial Burundi was a kingdom socio-politically organized as follows: At the head was the king (*umwami*), helped by the chiefs (*abaganwa*) who were mostly descendants of the king, and the secretaries of the kingdom (*abanyamabanga*). There were also vice-chiefs as well as auxiliaries of the monarchic power. The vice-chiefs and the auxiliaries came from the rest of the population. These were people who could have links with the king and were entrusted with a piece of territory to govern on behalf of the king. They were delegated authorities (*ivyariho*). At the lowest level of the power pyramid was the population.

As in other traditional societies, the king was believed to have a supernatural origin. Thus the population could never participate in the designation or appointment of the king, not even the designation of other politico-administrative authorities. The abuse of power and other matters of justice were handled by traditional judges (*abashingantahe*). The monarchy managed to build up a nation and maintain national unity and social peace. Despite the rivalries among the chiefs, and inequalities linked to birth in the politico-administrative class and arbitrary cases such as disowning people of their cattle or/and land (*kunyaga*), exile (*kwangaza*), etc., it can be noted that power was exercised for the good and interest of all people and the maintenance of the social order. I should note that the historical studies so far have not indicated any major conflict between Hutu and Tutsi before the arrivals of Germans and Belgians who respectively colonized Burundi. Both Hutu and Tutsi referred to themselves as “*bene mugabo umwe*”, meaning that they were gathered around the same



leader, the king (Project d'Accord d'Arusha 2000:7).

As I said, it is not clear whether the first king was Hutu or Tutsi although there a legend which says that he was a Hutu from the Bahanza clan. What is sure is that he did not belong to the Twa group. Among the chiefs and vice-chiefs, besides the Ganwa, some were Hutu and others Tutsi. There were four dynasties in Burundi: the dynasty of Ntare, the dynasty of Mwambutsa, the dynasty of Mutaga and the dynasty of Mwezi. The dynasties of Mwambutsa and Mutanga were always transitory for reasons which not yet clarified. The descendants of Ntare were called Batare (from Ntare) tended to say that they were neither Hutu nor Tutsi, while the descendants of Mwezi were called Bezi (from Mwezi) and clearly claim to be Tutsi. Whatever case maybe, presently both the administration and the army are dominated by the Tutsi. And even here it should clearly be stated that it is mostly the Tutsi of the Hima group to which I have referred to who are on power. The first president, the second and the present one are all Tutsi-Hima. As to how this came about historically, we could get some hints by interrogating the colonial rule to which we shall now turn.

#### **6.2.2.2. The colonial period (1889-1962)**

In the colonial period, Burundi passed under the domination of two different colonial powers. Burundi was first colonized by the Germans from 1889 to 1916 after 7 years of war in which Burundi lost its sovereignty to the Germans. The victory of the Germans over the Burundians meant also the victory of the Western culture over the Burundian traditional culture, the victory of modernity over tradition. As I shall note later, the king, the chiefs, in fact the whole of traditional administration lost their meaning. They could no longer serve people, but had to serve the new rulers.

Due to the World War I, Burundi was taken over by Belgium in 1916. From 1916 to 1923, it was under the military occupation of Belgians, who first exercised their rule under the mandate of the League of Nations and later under the trusteeship of the United Nations from 1926 to 1962. Both Germany and Belgium practised indirect rule.

During the Belgian administration, a series of social and political transformations which later had serious consequences for the future of the country were undertaken. The transformation consisted in

weakening the royal power while making chiefs the civil servants of the Belgian administration. All Hutu chiefs and vice-chiefs were dismissed as part of the principle of “divide and rule”. The objective was to turn the Tutsi against the majority of the Hutu, and afterwards back the Hutu majority against the Tutsi minority. The question that one may ask is how the colonial rulers managed to distinguish between the Hutu and the Tutsi since both had the same culture, spoke the same language and were intermingled geographically. First of all in most cases, the Hutu and the Tutsi respectively recognize themselves as such. Secondly, the colonizers used the methods of ethnology and ethnography. It is with these methods that they tended to identify the Tutsi as tall people and the Hutu as the medium-sized people. The colonial administration introduced the port of identity card on which one’s ethnic group was mentioned. All these helped the colonial administration to achieve its plan.

At the time of independence in 1962, two parties of opposing tendencies were formed. The first party was UPRONA (Union for National Progress) which was nationalistic with Marxist inspiration. This party was founded and led by Louis Rwagasore, a Tutsi from Bezi lineage, who was killed shortly before independence under the instigation of the Belgian administration. Although Rwagasore was a Tutsi, he apparently enjoyed the popularity of both the Hutu and the Tutsi by the very fact that he was perceived as liberator of Burundians from the colonial rule on the one hand, and on the hand, as he was from the royal family, he was thought to play the same role as that of his father considered as the father of all Burundians. Yet the seed of tension was already there by the very fact that the Belgian seemed to support any alternative to Rwagasore and his immediate independence project. Meanwhile, the Tutsi elite saw in the leadership of Rwagasore as their tribesman an opportunity that could help to keep the privileges and positions given to them by the previous Belgian plan. The second party was PDC (Christian Democratic Party) which was Conservative and linked with the Belgian administration. This party was founded by Baranyanka Pierre (and his family ) from the Batare lineage (Baranyanka was said to be the great grandson of king Ntare I). While the former party claimed immediate independence, the later saw independence as a later project. According to Weinstein, the PDC supported political independence accompanied by democratic institutional reforms, but argued that the premature departure of the Europeans would mean a return to the system of exploitation of former times (Weinstein 1976:234). I am not clear what is meant by “the system of exploitation”, but one could understand that the Bezi of which Rwagasore was a member used its traditional political position to exploit other Burundians. In fact, according to the same source, the Batare feared that after

independence the Bezi would remove them from all administrative power and threaten their wealth.

However, the division between the Batare and the Bezi does not still give us a clear understanding of the conflict between the Hutu and the Tutsi which intensified after the independence. Nevertheless, the transformation brought about by the Belgian administration still played a major role in the worsening of the relations between the Hutu and the Tutsi. The observation is that in the competition for power which accompanied independence, the Ganwa tended to align themselves with the Tutsi to form one ethnic block and the Hutu as the opposing bloc. That is actually what happened within the leadership of UPRONA which won a victory over the PDC.

#### **6.2.2.3. The post-independence period (1962 to the present).**

This period can be divided into three periods: the monarchic period, the republic period and the constitutional democratic period.

##### ***6.2.2.3.1. Post-independence monarchy (or constitutional monarchy)***

After independence, the monarchy lasted four years and was done away with on 28 November 1966. During the four years, the king had re-gained power in the new social and political context brought about by the Western culture. In effect, the constitution credited the king with executive power of appointing the cabinet, while the legislative powers were to be exercised collectively by the king and the parliament. Unfortunately the whole social and political arrangement was along Hutu/Tutsi lines, partly as a legacy of the transformations brought about by the Belgian administration. One effect of this social and political arrangements along ethnic group is the following: in 1965, the Hutu were accused of having attempted to seize power by force and put an end to the monarchy but they failed. The head of the army, Capitain Micombero (Tutsi-Hima) reacted by a brutal repression against the Hutu leadership as well as the Hutu population. Most Hutu intellectuals were executed, and many Hutu were purged from the army. I have a suspicion that Micombero wanted to use the so-called attempted coup by the Hutu leadership to eliminate all those would serve as an obstacle to his future plan: that of seizing power for himself. In effect, in the legislative elections of 1965 the Hutu had emerged with 23 seats out of a total of 31. So Micombero feared that the Hutu might take power

and lose an opportunity to ascend to power in the process. The king himself feared to lose all control and authority over the people, and thus appointed a Tutsi prime minister. This ethnic tension persists and continues to mark the country up till today.

#### **6.2.2.3.2. *The Republican period***

The republican period consists of three major phases: the first republic, the second republic, the democratic experience. The first republic dates from 28 November 1966. It was declared by Captain Michael Micombero. It was a military coup against the constitutional monarchy. The president of the first republic ruled the country 8 years on a decree-law, that is, until 11 July 1974 when the constitution was drawn. This decree gave the head of state both executive and legislative power. The 1974 constitution allowed only one party in the country. This party controlled the executive as well as the judiciary power. The secretary of the party was at the same time the head of state, of the executive and the legislative power. With this concentration of powers, the first republic quickly degenerated in nepotism, corruption, regionalism, and tribalism. In effect, the president Micombero surrounded himself with the Tutsi-Hima from Bururi, his province of origin (in the southern part of the country) to the detriment of the Tutsi from other parts of the country. Only few Tutsi from other parts of the country and few Hutu were given a share in power. The new government formed by Micombero on 12 Decembre 1966, has 5 Hutu ministers out of a total of 13. This did not prevent the majority of the Tutsi in all the country from seemingly being happy that the power was in the hand of the Tutsi elite even though, there emerged a tension between the Tutsi-Hima and the Tutsi - Banyaruguru. I will not dwell on this tension which is a minor one compared to that of Hutu and Tutsi. Instead the few Hutu who were left in the army and in the government after the 1965 massacres were not happy with the situation. Hence, seemingly following an abortive coup attempt<sup>37</sup> in April 1972,

---

<sup>37</sup>There are serious doubts as whether there was a coup attempt on the part of the Hutu. R. Lemarchand has the following question:

Since the Hutu leadership had been reduced to a skeleton of its former self as a result of previous purges, can one believe that a mere handful officials would be bold enough to organise a major rebellion against an army largely dominated by Tutsi officers (Lemarchand 1974:16).

In his reflection, Lemarchand does not exclude the hypothesis according to which there might have been calculated provocation on the part of the Bururi elites. In investigating acts of

independence the Bezi would remove them from all administrative power and threaten their wealth.

However, the division between the Batare and the Bezi does not still give us a clear understanding of the conflict between the Hutu and the Tutsi which intensified after the independence. Nevertheless, the transformation brought about by the Belgian administration still played a major role in the worsening of the relations between the Hutu and the Tutsi. The observation is that in the competition for power which accompanied independence, the Ganwa tended to align themselves with the Tutsi to form one ethnic block and the Hutu as the opposing bloc. That is actually what happened within the leadership of UPRONA which won a victory over the PDC.

#### **6.2.2.3. The post-independence period (1962 to the present).**

This period can be divided into three periods: the monarchic period, the republic period and the constitutional democratic period.

##### ***6.2.2.3.1. Post-independence monarchy (or constitutional monarchy)***

After independence, the monarchy lasted four years and was done away with on 28 November 1966. During the four years, the king had re-gained power in the new social and political context brought about by the Western culture. In effect, the constitution credited the king with executive power of appointing the cabinet, while the legislative powers were to be exercised collectively by the king and the parliament. Unfortunately the whole social and political arrangement was along Hutu/Tutsi lines, partly as a legacy of the transformations brought about by the Belgian administration. One effect of this social and political arrangements along ethnic group is the following: in 1965, the Hutu were accused of having attempted to seize power by force and put an end to the monarchy but they failed. The head of the army, Captain Micombero (Tutsi-Hima) reacted by a brutal repression against the Hutu leadership as well as the Hutu population. Most Hutu intellectuals were executed, and many Hutu were purged from the army. I have a suspicion that Micombero wanted to use the so-called attempted coup by the Hutu leadership to eliminate all those would serve as an obstacle to his future plan: that of seizing power for himself. In effect, in the legislative elections of 1965 the Hutu had emerged with 23 seats out of a total of 31. So Micombero feared that the Hutu might take power

and lose an opportunity to ascend to power in the process. The king himself feared to lose all control and authority over the people, and thus appointed a Tutsi prime minister. This ethnic tension persists and continues to mark the country up till today.

#### ***6.2.2.3.2. The Republican period***

The republican period consists of three major phases: the first republic, the second republic, the democratic experience. The first republic dates from 28 November 1966. It was declared by Captain Michael Micombero. It was a military coup against the constitutional monarchy. The president of the first republic ruled the country 8 years on a decree-law, that is, until 11 July 1974 when the constitution was drawn. This decree gave the head of state both executive and legislative power. The 1974 constitution allowed only one party in the country. This party controlled the executive as well as the judiciary power. The secretary of the party was at the same time the head of state, of the executive and the legislative power. With this concentration of powers, the first republic quickly degenerated in nepotism, corruption, regionalism, and tribalism. In effect, the president Micombero surrounded himself with the Tutsi-Hima from Bururi, his province of origin (in the southern part of the country) to the detriment of the Tutsi from other parts of the country. Only few Tutsi from other parts of the country and few Hutu were given a share in power. The new government formed by Micombero on 12 Decembre 1966, has 5 Hutu ministers out of a total of 13. This did not prevent the majority of the Tutsi in all the country from seemingly being happy that the power was in the hand of the Tutsi elite even though, there emerged a tension between the Tutsi-Hima and the Tutsi - Banyaruguru. I will not dwell on this tension which is a minor one compared to that of Hutu and Tutsi. Instead the few Hutu who were left in the army and in the government after the 1965 massacres were not happy with the situation. Hence, seemingly following an abortive coup attempt<sup>37</sup> in April 1972,

---

<sup>37</sup>There are serious doubts as to whether there was a coup attempt on the part of the Hutu. R. Lemarchand has the following question:

Since the Hutu leadership had been reduced to a skeleton of its former self as a result of previous purges, can one believe that a mere handful of officials would be bold enough to organise a major rebellion against an army largely dominated by Tutsi officers (Lemarchand 1974:16).

In his reflection, Lemarchand does not exclude the hypothesis according to which there might have been calculated provocation on the part of the Bururi elites. In investigating acts of

massacres of unprecedented magnitude and brutality were carried out. About 100 to 200 thousand Hutu were killed, and about 300 thousand fled in the neighbouring countries (Ryntjens 1995:7). These massacres have been qualified of selective genocide since it was mostly carried against any “enlightened” Hutu: civil servants in the public or private sectors, in the army, in churches, schools (teachers and students), traders, nurses, etc. There is no doubt that this genocide is a watershed in the present history of the country. On the one hand, for the Hutu, it is a proof of the existence of an ongoing genocidal plan nurtured by Tutsi extremists, and on the other hand it is the threat that the Hutu might revenge and exterminate the Tutsi (Reyntjens 1995:7).

The fact that there has been no judicial follow up created a culture of impunity in Burundi. It is as if anybody can commit similar massive human rights violations without the fear of being prosecuted. According to Weinstein, the judicial follow up was obscured by the discovery of the nickel deposits valued at about \$ 14 billion in 1973. The industrialized states of the West as well as Eastern countries scurried to win Burundi’s rights to exploit that nickel and other rare minerals. In the shuffle, international criticism of the 1972 selective genocide against the Hutu was thus silenced (Weinstein 1974:xi). This could serve us a lesson of how the economy takes priority to other aspects of life.

In 1976, the second republic was declared, brought about by another military coup led by another Tutsi-Hima, Col. Jean Baptiste Bagaza from the region as that of Micombero. The second republic consisted of two phases: the phase of national reconstruction and what I can call an authoritarian phase (Manirakiza 1997). This phase of national reconstruction lasted about six years (from 1976 to 1982). It was a period of political and socio-economic organisation with a Marxist tendency (Manirakiza 1997:32-40). Feudalism and the tax imposed on all Burundian citizens were abolished. Private savings<sup>38</sup> and private businesses were encouraged under the supervision of the state. The state itself initiated some economic projects and small manufactures were built. However, despite this Marxist tendency reflected in the socio-economic programme, Burundi never claimed to be a socialist country. In fact the leaders always claimed to belong to the Non-

---

genocide in Burundi this hypothesis should be taken seriously.

<sup>38</sup> Apart from voluntary private savings, there was a private saving of 500 Burundian Francs which was compulsory on every citizens in rural area. This amount replaced the previous individual tax.

Aligned Movement in order to benefit from both socialist and capitalist systems.

Burundi became a member of PTA<sup>39</sup> (Preferential Trade Area) and hosted its bank. Burundi joined other regional societies such OBK<sup>40</sup> (Organization of Kagera Bassin), CEPGL<sup>41</sup> (Economic Community of Great Lake Countries). Refugees (who fled the 1972 massacres) were encouraged to return back in order to rebuild their country. A new constitution which allows the separation of the three powers (Executive, Legislative and Judiciary) was promulgated in 20 November 1981. However, in this “democratic” regime, pre-eminence was given to the head of state. This was characteristic of an authoritarian phase. While the president could dissolve the parliament, the parliament could not challenge the executive.

The second republic illustrated itself by the conflict with the Catholic Church particularly (other churches did not make much of an exception), a conflict which was characteristic of an abuse of power<sup>42</sup>. Like the first regime, the second republic suffered from regionalism, nepotism, corruption characteristic of the military junta in the context of one party authoritarianism, paving the way to the proclamation of the third republic in 1987.

The third republic was also the result of a military coup on 3<sup>rd</sup> September 1987. It was declared by Major Pierre Buyoya (the present president). The purpose of the coup was to

---

<sup>39</sup>PTA, which is the present COMESA (Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa), is a regional association of 13 countries of Eastern and Southern Africa.

<sup>40</sup>OBK is a regional economic association of four countries sharing the Kagera river, namely, Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda and Tanzania.

<sup>41</sup>CEPGL is a regional economic association of three francophone countries, namely DRC, Burundi and Rwanda.

<sup>42</sup>It is not clear what was really the cause of the conflict between the state and the church. Some think that the renewal of the conflict between UPRONA (nationalist, dominated by a Tutsi leadership) and PDC (Christian and somehow pro-Hutu), others think that it was just dictatorship fearing the power of the Church which was more and more taking roots among poor people under the influence of the theology of liberation inspired by Marxism. But here the problem is that the head of state seemed to have been sympathetic to Marxism in his socio-economic and political programmes and had a tight friendship with a socialist leader, M. Khadafi of Lybia (cf. Manirakiza 199:73ff).



reestablish the good relationship between the state and the Church, and restructure the institution of the state which was now confused with the head of state and the one party. One of the merits of the third republic was the initiation of the debate on the issue of national unity by recognizing the conflict between the Hutu and the Tutsi. This debate ended in a charter of national unity in 1991. Contrary to the two other military regimes, a prime minister was appointed to coordinate and supervise activities of the executive. The Church-state relations were restored. The political changes accelerated as the international environment was changing in the direction of political liberalism. The third republic came just two years before the collapse of the Soviet Union and the fall of the Berlin Wall accompanied by the claim of liberal democracy in various parts of the world including Africa. It is in this context that Burundi opened itself to political pluralism. A constitution which were to facilitate this political change was promulgated on 13 March 1992.

The promulgation of the constitution in 1992 was the beginning of a process which culminated in the presidential and legislative elections in June 1993. Unfortunately the political institutions born of the democratic process were sabotaged and paralysed by the Tutsi dominated army: the newly elected and first Hutu president was assassinated together with the president and vice-president of the parliament as well as various members of the cabinet three months after he was sworn in. It is not clear what might have been the genuine cause of this coup d'Etat. Various opinions point to hidden corruption of the precedent regime in connection with the gold dealer and refiner company from Belgium, others talk of the Tutsi (Hima)dominated army which did not accept a Hutu as a head of the country, the army having been in power for about 30 years.

The hypothesis which underlies my dissertation is that the inadequate economic ordering and maximization of profit in the present context of economic globalization combined with the prevailing ethnic tension in this coup. This does mean that I undermine the power of historical events in social and political ordering of Burundi. As I shall point out later, the assassinated head of state, Melchior Ndadaye had pointed out the fact that a Belgian gold dealer and refiner (AFFIMET) was operating illegally in the free-export zone, a so-called privilege given to Tony Goetz and Sons from Anvers (Belgium) to the detriment of the French and Pakistani gold dealers. The consequence of this deal is that AFFIMET was depriving the country of several million of US dollars of tax every year. An Italian journalist R. Cavalieri asked Tony Goetz whether

AFFIMET financed the October 1993 coup d'Etat, Goetz answered that President Melchior Ndadaye, fell in the trap of crocodiles, and that nobody could have abandoned to the risk of a democratic game the wealth accumulated through a fine network of corruption ([www.burundi.org/francais/fr\\_02/analyses/analyse\\_36](http://www.burundi.org/francais/fr_02/analyses/analyse_36))

The consequence of the coup was a social and political confusion as well as the destruction of some socio-economic infrastructures. Many people were massacred and many others exiled or displaced. An effort to manage the chaos resulted in a "Conventional Regime" on 10 September 1994. This conventional regime was overthrown on 25 July 1996. A process of negotiation between different parties on the one hand and different armies on the other hand was started in Arusha, Tanzania, under the mediation of late Julius Nyerere and later Nelson Mandela. A political peace agreement was signed on 28 August 2000 and is due to be followed by a military agreement as well as power sharing.

This whole situation has accelerated the plight of the poor, the economy of the country has deteriorated and the social and political situation is more than unstable. But, strangely enough, foreign profit making companies continue their activities: AFFIMET continues clandestinely its gold deals in connection with other international mining companies operating in DRC and other countries of the Central Africa region, the brewery of which Heineken from the Netherlands owns more than 60% of shares has doubled its production, mining companies find the present situation of social and political instability advantageous to make deals ([www.burundi.org/english/uk\\_02/documents/document\\_357](http://www.burundi.org/english/uk_02/documents/document_357)). I have no much doubt that if peace and stability were to prevail, my country and the Central African region in general could build on the efforts of these international companies to make the economy benefit to poor people. Besides the efforts of international companies to make profit even in the time of instability, there is a need to fight against corruption through the valorisation of public accountability and judiciary system, intervention of international institutions in dealing with international companies which violate ethical principles among other things.

To conclude this point, I should simply note that just as in the post-independence era socio-economic developments were shaped by the tension between capitalism and socialism, so also the

present socio-economic and political developments are to be understood within the context of neoliberalism and the political arrangement that supposedly suits it. The latter is a sign of the time which the Church should be aware of. Before I embark on how the Church should deal with this sign of time, let me first review the economic situation of Burundi.

### **6.3. The Burundian economy in the context of economic globalization<sup>43</sup>**

The economy of Burundi has always been dictated by the prevailing international context while at the same time it follows the declining evolution of other Sub-Saharan countries as a result of internal crisis (see Messer 1998). I shall concern myself with the period covered by the injunction of neoliberalism to the present.

Burundi is not an industrialized country. Its economy is heavily dependent on agriculture both for export and internal subsistence. The agriculture for export consists of coffee, tea and cotton. Other agricultural export items such as banana flour and fruits are still at the level of experimentation. Coffee is the dominant cash crop and economic mainstay for Burundi. It constitutes more than 80% of total export-earnings. Accordingly, the economic performance is heavily dependent on international prices<sup>44</sup> for coffee which vary according the world production on the one hand, and on internal social and political situation as well as weather for its production on the other hand.

In 1990, following the implementation of Structural Adjustment Programme inaugurated in 1986, an attempt was made by the government to attract private sector investments in the coffee industry with some success. In 1991, export yielded 73 million of US \$ as a result of the improvement in the world coffee price. In 1992, it yielded 51 millions because of a 35 % decrease in the world coffee price. In 1993, the export value was 47 million, because the coffee export continued to suffer as a result of the continual depression in world coffee prices as well as the reduction of the volume of production due to civil unrest. In 1994, there was a significant rise in

---

<sup>43</sup>For much of what follows, I am indebted to the notes of F. Messer (1998)

<sup>44</sup>I do not underestimate the market speculation of international companies which import coffee

value export (more than 100 million US \$) but this rise fell to 94 million in 1995 and to 41 million in 1996 as a result of both unfavourable international economic conditions (low prices, high tariffs on exports) and internal instability.

The second export commodity is tea. Like coffee, this export item suffers from both the fluctuations in the world prices and the domestic situation. The export crop has suffered much in these years of civil unrest especially since most tea plantations are situated in the war zone. In 1993, it constituted 14.6 % of total export earnings. But this percentage continues to fall year after year. In 1994, it fell to 7.2 % and slightly rose to 7.7 % in 1995.

The third export crop is cotton which constitutes 5.7 % of total exports (1987), 4 % in 1993. All the cotton is exported to Belgium, but other alternatives are being explored, especially within the framework of the African regional markets. There is also the possibility that the whole production could be used by the local textile industry.

Besides the export of agricultural products, Burundi has some mineral resources, although some of them are in small quantities. The best known is gold. Alluvial gold is available in the North-Western (Cibitoke) and North-Eastern parts of the country, especially in the province of Muyinga. Most of the gold is presently exploited by the Belgian gold dealer and refiner (AFFIMET) owned by Tony Goetz and Sons, along with Pakistani and French companies. A state owned mining company (BUMINCO) has started the mining activities in the region of Muyinga, but not much is known about it. In 1994, 9.6 metric tons of gold were exported from Burundi. Because of the privilege to operate in a free-export zone, AFFIMET could also import gold and other precious stones from Uganda, Rwanda and the DRC, hence making Bujumbura the centre of gold export in the Central African region. In the late 1990, it was estimated that the "local" production in Burundi was 25 metric tons per year and is due to increase up to 50 metric tons a year.

Hence, one could understand that illegal maximization of profits also in the area of precious stones could impact on the social and political evolution of the country, just as it is also being the case in the central African region including Burundi (Bacamurwanko 1997:56-57). Other mineral

resources exploited include the bastnaesite, cassiterite, tungsten, columbo-tantalite in small quantities.

However, important reserves of other mineral resources are still under investigation.<sup>45</sup> The reserves of vanadium are estimated to be 14 million metric tons, that of carbonite is estimated to be 7.3 million metric tons. The deposits of uranium are still being surveyed. Important reserves of nickel (second largest deposit in the world) were discovered in the central region of the country in 1973. A three-year exploitation agreement was signed in 1993 with a subsidiary of a British company, Rio Tinto-Zinc, and the Australian BHP corporation. The Anglo American Corporation is also trying to negotiate a deal concerning this nickel exploitation. In the late 1980, it was discovered that some petroleum deposits exist beneath Lake Tanganyika and in the Rusizi valley. Test drills were carried out by US Petroleum in association with the Burundian government. All this mineral wealth could bring Burundi into the world economy provided it is not done through a channel of corruption, and provided the Burundian leadership is committed to peace and stability.

Following these discoveries, we observe the proliferation of many companies from all over the world: American Mineral Field Corporation, Anvil Mining of Australia, the Helvetico-Canadian Lundin, Eurocan of Canada, De Beers and Gencor of South Africa, Anglo-American Corporation, Iscor, and certainly many others. Some scholars suspect that these different international companies might be behind the present warring situation in the whole of the central region. As I mentioned earlier, AFFIMET of Tony Goetz and Sons (which might be working in connection with Barrick Gold Corporation and Anglo American Corporation) has been pointed out as having a heavy hand in the coup against the democratically elected president Melchior Ndadaye in 1993. The president M. Ndadaye who exercised power for three months before his assassination seems to have been the stumbling block for this Belgian company as it was the one who had discovered how it was depriving the country of several million US \$ of tax annually (see Ntakarutimana 1998:3, Sindayigaya 2000). This situation might require the establishment of

---

<sup>45</sup>The survey of reserves of mineral resources is at its infancy in Burundi. However, we should note that Burundi is part of a huge mineral-wealthy region which extends all the way from the Horn of Africa down DRC and Angola.

international institutions and mechanisms that could help deal with national and interstate conflicts and investigate their connections to the exploitation of natural resources in the central African region.

As far as the manufacturing industry is concerned, there is no developed industry in Burundi. One of the reasons for this is that greater profits are arrived at through corruption of the elite of the country, and therefore there is really no foreign direct investment which can propel proper industry in Burundi. Other reasons include the lack of technological know-how due to poor or absence of education, poor socio-economic infrastructures, internal conflicts and wars which discourage individual initiatives and motivations, lack of investment partly as a result of a culture of consumerism and imitation of Western life-style and partly as a result of the debt burden. However, there are some few petit industries such the industries for processing agricultural products (cotton, coffee, tea, vegetable oil extraction), mining industries, manufacturing, construction etc. These industries provided 17.9 % of GDP (in 1995), and 6 % of export -earnings (1994). The population of 2.3 % working in industry has not increased since 20 years.

In the period of 1983-1987, attempts were made by the government to revitalize the economy by increasing and diversifying production, both for export and import-substitution within the framework of SAP. Several small enterprises were established. These include cement, footwear, soap, insecticide factories and flour mill, as well as the extension of the present national brewery. A textile industry (COTEBU) was established with the aid from the People's Republic of China. Its products are exported to Rwanda, DRC and Uganda. A bottling industry (VERRUNDI) was also established to produce bottles for the breweries of Rwanda, DRC and Burundi. These latter industries are more and more declining as the regional market is increasingly invaded by cheaper products from Israel (for bottles) and East Asia (textiles). A decade ago, a sugar mill was built in the Eastern part of the country. But its surplus cannot yield hard currency for the country as the sugar is exported by some top leaders to neighbouring countries through a channel of corruption. In the context of the Structural Adjustment Programme, the government has tried to privatize some of these industries together with other public companies in order to make them more competitive but without much success.

In 1994, within the framework of the PTA (Preferential Trade Area, presently known as COMESA: Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa), the governments of Burundi and Zimbabwe initiated a series of negotiations in which Burundi hoped to secure greater access to the textile market in Zimbabwe in exchange for a commitment to purchase 50 % of its malt requirement in Zimbabwe. The Franco-Belgian textile industry highjacked the deal by purchasing all cotton fabrics produced by COTEBU. As a result, Burundi failed to export its textile products to Zimbabwe in order to purchase its malt in return. I take this as one of the ways the efforts of developing internal and regional markets in Sub-Saharan Africa are being sabotaged by Western lobbies for their advantage. Of course one might say that is how competition works: the fittest survives. This is also part of the disordered maximization of profit, the consequence of which is the increasing misery of the poor (Friesecke 1997:91).

Beside exports (and tax- earnings from imports), Burundi depends on foreign aid for capital projects and budgetary support. Its main bilateral donors include Belgium, France, Germany and Japan. Following the wave of democracy after the fall of the Soviet Union and its communist system, these Western donors withheld their aid and made the introduction of liberal democracy a condition. Unfortunately, this attempt to liberalize national politics conditionally failed. The failure of liberal democracy (the root of which are partly economic interests) was costly both socially and economically. Nevertheless the “liberal” spirit remains as we see it in different small social, political and military groups with different interests not easy to reconcile, and which in some cases can be used to have access to economic resources of our country in exchange of support to ascend to political power (Ntakarutimana 2000:8).

Like any other poor country, beside the fact that the profit-seekers take advantage of corrupt leadership, Burundi suffers also from the unjust economic structures of the neoliberal economy. We have already noted that coffee as the mainstay of Burundi’s export depends on prices on the world market. One might guess that the prices are low or high according to the laws of demand and supply . But one should not underestimate the search of greater profit by the international companies which import coffee from developed countries. To this I should also add heavy taxes and high tariffs imposed by Western countries that strike this export despite the measures of a free economy championed in WTO fora. When this happens the government is

obliged to contract debts which cost a lot to the country. In 1995, the total external debt was 1,153 million US \$, while in 1990 it was 907 million US \$. That is to say the annual growth of the external debt is about 4.9 %.

When the prices of coffee are low internationally, people who suffer most are the citizens who take more than six months to produce that coffee. All this time could be used to produce subsistence food crops. The injunctions of the SAP to avoid dependence on coffee exports by creating manufacturing industries were not helpful since with the liberalization of the world economy, the products of these industries were quickly overtaken by the cheap products from developed countries or from the newly industrialized countries. And as a consequence all the investments acquired through heavy debts were lost.

This situation goes with two other problems: the destabilisation of South-South relations and the loss of the purchasing power due to the dollarization in the world economy. Burundi suffers from the destabilisation of the South-South relation in the effort to establish local and regional markets. We have already hinted at the case of the Franco-Belgian textile industry which highjacked the trade deal between Burundi and Zimbabwe. This is one of the many cases of how the cruel competition of neoliberalism is negative for poor countries. Poor countries are easily deprived of economic freedom.

The dollarization of the world economy is another aspect from which Burundi suffers (see Yamuremye 1998). This started with the injunctions of the SAP which was thought to be a way of helping poor countries to adapt to the world economy. In 1983, the exchange rate of the Burundian currency which hitherto was fixed in relation to the dollar was devalued by 23 % when it was linked to the famous IMF's Special Drawing Rights (DSR). In exchange, Burundi could get low-interest loans from the World Bank. Devaluation was one of the conditions for a poor country like Burundi to get aid or loans from the World Bank, IMF and other donors. Accordingly the Burundian external debt passed from 166 million US \$ in 1983 to 455 millions US \$ in 1985, a debt average annual growth of 22,5 % . In 1986, the Burundian currency was devaluated again by 15% as part the SAP package. The objective of this devaluation, it was argued, was to counter the country's over-reliance on coffee export earnings, address the decline in economic growth and



the rapid increase in external indebtedness.

However, the SAP measures did not work. Instead, Burundi continues to suffer from indebtedness and the economy is not any better. Products from developed countries of the Western and of the new industrialised countries of the East Asia continue to overwhelm the country causing some industries to close. In the end the volume of imports outweighs the volume of export. Yet the mechanisms behind currencies relations are such that if the value of a national currency is high, the products of that country are expensive on the world markets and its imports are cheaper. The implication is that the imports will increase and the exportation will decrease given the fact that the prices are not competitive if the national currency is overvalued. And if the imports are higher than the exports, this result in indebtedness. In the case of poor countries like Burundi, the devaluation of the national currency did neither increase the exports nor reduced indebtedness. Maybe the SAP's measures were ill-advised. But according to Friesecke, the problem of the SAP is that it is a kind of language used by the IMF and World Bank to market aid and loan to poor countries (Friesecke 1997: 91ff).

But the question is whether there is a way by which the aid and loan can serve self-reliance and sustainable economic development. How can Burundians use the aid and loan got to really boost exports and stop imports or at least establish a balance between the two? We shall come to some suggestions later. Meanwhile, we should note that despite the series of devaluations initiated by the World Bank and IMF, Burundi cannot but be dependent on coffee, on foreign resources to finance its external deficits, while the population has to survive thanks to humanitarian assistance. I think that even the production of coffee will decrease tremendously as it requires a lot of care which a hungry population, still on the run because of civil unrest cannot provide. Furthermore, the diversification of production cannot take place in the context of poverty. The failure of the World Bank and IMF's SAP is also linked with the technical assistance to poor countries, which, besides the fact that it is costly, is in most cases also inappropriate. As usual, the argument of the IMF and the World Bank was that SAP did not go hand in hand with political reform. Hence with the threat to see its aid cut off, Burundi attempted a democratic reform in the form of political pluralism which ended up ruining the country at all levels of national life. It is true, as I said earlier, that democratization was meant to solve the problem of uncontrolled

authoritarian regimes which were corrupt. But such democratization did not go with other things such as public accountability, “conversion” to the rule of law, and social justice. In the end, one finds that corruption entered through the back door.

Neoliberalism in Burundi came with a host of multinational companies operating in the Great Lakes region but having their background in Burundi. These companies try to maximize their profits by avoiding channels whereby they would be obliged to pay taxes that could help the poor, but also they destabilize the region of which Burundi is a part. This destabilisation is based on the corruption of the elite and political leaders. In reaction to this corruption, some factions of the population resort to war leading to the proliferation of illegal deals of arms via those very companies or their associates. In this connection, we should also note the rivalries between companies trying to win monopolies on one deal or another which end in conflicts which kill the poor. Such is the case in the DRC conflict in which, unfortunately, Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda participate (De Hoyos 1997:26-36). This might sound as if fighting groups are puppets of some international companies. I cannot go to the extent of saying war factions are puppets of international companies. But we should note that the war in Central African region is more and more being commercialized, and as a result, the fighters lose the main focus of their fighting. For me this focus is supposed to be power sharing, accountable leadership, social justice, economic reconstruction, political stability, and the well-being of the people.

The central point of my argument is that in the situation of my country it is the question of market and profit that is at stake. The question the humanity (*ubuntu*) does not count, instead it is profit at all costs that counts because it can be obtained through illegal ways, through corruption of the elite of the country. It is here where the role of the Church should come in, because of its belief that the human being is the image of God and there is a way of life appropriate to that nature. This way of life is that of relationship with God, and with one's fellow, and with environment. Putting profit first destroys this relationship because as we have seen it entails corruption and killing. I believe that one of the duties of the Church to bring life where there are corruption and death.

#### **6.4. The Church and the challenge to make the Christian message ethically relevant.**

The Church has always been guided by the signs of the times. Does the Church of Burundi see the present phenomenon of economic globalization and its consequences as the sign of the time it has to deal with? My task here is to bring the Church to an awareness of the phenomenon and to deal with it by trying to make the Christian message ethically relevant.

In his lecture, E. Ntakarutimana observes: "The crisis in Burundi is a politico-ethnic conflict whose deep roots go deeper in the control of economic interests in a world environment in mutation" (Ntakarutimana 1997:2). As his lecture suggests, by "world environment in mutation", he was referring to the present process of economic globalization. This mutation is also referred to by William Reno from Florida International University whose reflection is directed to the warring region of Central Africa:

Will some states disappear amidst warfare? Some explain this crisis as a result of the tendency for global markets to overwhelm the bureaucratic capacities of even strong state (Reno 1999:1).

The first aspect of the challenge to the Burundian Church is to be able to read this mutation as the present sign of the time which underlies the crisis of the Burundian society. In effect, in its pastoral plans, the Burundian Church acts as if it is not informed about the root source of the crisis and its ramifications, or if we grant that it is informed, it seems afraid to name the truth. E. Ntakarutimana is also right when he points out that the Burundian Church is clearly absent where people need it to be present:

When it was time to organize the peace talks in Arusha, it is surprising that the different forces of the country (Burundi) did not perceive the Church of Burundi as a moral force which must be present in Arusha to give the contributions of its ethical vision. And nobody requested its presence. This is a frightening indication from which we should draw lessons (Ntakarutimana 2000:7)<sup>46</sup>

---

<sup>46</sup>Text translated from French by myself.

Yet, as I pointed out in the precedent chapter, the role of the Church is to call people's conscience, whoever they may be, and to deal with the structures of injustices, whatever they may be. For this to be possible, there are two conditions. The first is that the leaders of the Church should inform themselves about the people and the structures of injustices that might be operating within the country (whether local or international). Even though most Church leaders are not necessarily economic experts, I do not see anything that should prevent them from creating a department of experts that could instruct them about the matter.

The second condition is that the Church should not fear to deal with them. To deal with structures of injustices is part of the meaning of being Christian or to be a follower of Christ. Some of the ways of dealing with the structures of injustices would be to inform the national and the international community, collaboration with NGOs, collaboration with associations of human rights as well as with some national and international legal bodies. In effect, in most cases, people are willing to do something but they are not informed on what is going on.

When the neoliberal economy was being launched in Burundi starting from 1983 (but officially announced three years later), I did not see any action of the Church through a reflection on what could be the impact of that new economy on the people. The old traditional pastoral activities continued. No theological reflection was made, and therefore no action was taken. The neoliberal agenda which accelerated after the collapse of communism followed by the demand of democracy in various parts of the world, was the source of political pluralism in Burundi. But the Church failed to ask questions about the influence that might be behind this political agenda. Instead, it was surprised when the presidential candidate expected by some "economically motivated" lobbies and connections in the local opinion was not the one who was voted for. Three months later, the newly elected president and his nearest colleagues were assassinated. The Church of Burundi never asked questions about the real cause of the coup.

This coup was followed by a fragmentation which goes beyond the traditional division between Hutu and Tutsi. Presently, the Hutu and Tutsi are divided among themselves respectively. The country counts 19 political parties which are now marketed to national and international opinions like commodities. The rebellion opposing the governmental army is also very fragmented.

Even here the Church has not yet asked questions about the deep causes of this fragmentation nor the economic interests that might be behind each fragment (cf. Ntakarutimana 2000: 5-10).

Since I should not like to enter in the whole debate between communitarians and the liberals, I will simply note that the fragmentation of the Burundian society, like most of the contemporary societies, follows the general liberal paradigm at work in today's world and which characterises economic globalization. From a philosophical point of view, this new paradigm preaches the promotion of the individual or a group of individuals and its good claimed in terms of right. Little attention is given to the community and the individual responsibility to the community. From a political point of view, the new paradigm promotes political parties evolving around an individual/group political vision. Economically, it is freedom to maximize one's profit. Little attention is given to the common good and general well-being of the people. That is what characterises the liberal paradigm from which economic globalization evolves.

Hence the challenge for the Church as a community is first to bring the individual to be part of the society on the one hand, and on the other hand to bring the individual good to be part of the common good. The implication would be that a political party would now work for the national good, and the individual freedom to maximize one's profit could not undermine the freedom and the profit of all in the society. In short, it is a matter of knowing how the individual wealth could contribute to the wealth of the society as a whole. This is possible if moral judgement takes priority over market judgment.

Now since we are in economic globalization, the first thing the Church has to do is to reflect on the phenomenon of economic globalization and the way it is operating in our country, how the individual or group of individuals might be connected to other individuals or groups of individuals elsewhere. By the same token, the Church should investigate what individuals or groups of individuals from elsewhere who are already present in our country and how they are using the internal fragmentation and fragility in the country in order to loot it by corrupting those who are supposed to build it. I have already referred to Roberto Cavalieri's revelation of the fact that the war going on in Burundi is a "war over gold". Burundi being seen as a background for a trade of all kinds of things including drug, ivory, gold. These things do not benefit the country

as a whole. They benefit some of those who are in power, the top political leaders, leaders of political parties, military junta and some business men. When enlightened people try to deal with corruption, they are immediately killed. Besides the assassination of the president and his colleagues in 1993, I should also mention the minister of Energy and Mines who was assassinated in 1995 while he was trying to investigate the case of some mining companies operating illegally in the country thanks to corruption.

When I talk of challenging the Church to make the Christian message ethically relevant, I am calling it to move beyond its just being a worshipping community, hearing the good sermon about the love of God and the neighbour without giving it practical implications in the real life in the present context. We call the Church to fight for justice. And for this justice to be achieved, the Church needs to know and deal with those internal and external actors working in a network and that are sources of evil in the country and in the Great Lake region in general.

The Christian ethics I have suggested seems to be appropriate for the Church in as much as the prophetic role of the Church consists in seeing the human beings beyond the aspects of politics, duties and rights, productions and consumption, and profit.

The role of the Church could be, for instance, to discourage the military solution to the Burundian crisis which has economic roots as I noted. It could do this by calling the parties in conflict to the negotiation table, making appeal to preventive diplomacy and pacific resolution of conflicts, reinforcing the judiciary system in the country in order to do away with the culture of impunity, etc. The military solution to a crisis is unjust in itself, because it is costly in human, material, cultural, ecological, social, psychological and spiritual terms point. More so, instead of calling for humanitarian intervention for issues which partly have economic roots, it could be the duty of the Church to see beyond the punctual actions of charity, and humanitarian aid. According to Ntakirutimana, the present situation requires that the Church understands political mechanisms, the juridical structures and economic foundations in order to deal with the effect of economic globalization which now invade all aspects of human life (Ntakirutimana 1997:6-8).

Finally, the ethical relevance of the Church should be seen in education. Education is not something to be left in the hands of profit-making individuals or groups of individuals. Presently, we observe a mushrooming of private high schools and universities all over the country. I have nothing against the multiplication of institutions of learning in the country provided they attempt to respond to the needs of the country and its citizens. But a response to the needs of our country and its citizens requires an ethic to prevent the individual from just looking at the profit making characteristic of economic globalization. In a situation where the Burundian state is weak, the Church needs to make its message relevant by organizing a platform of collaboration and cooperation between these institutions among themselves and between them and the society. At the same time it must try to make sure that they do not foster inequalities, especially that most of them might just be open only to rich people who can pay while those who cannot pay are deprived of their right of being educated. Moreover, the Church should make sure that these institutions of learning have enough tools and wisdom which our society needs for its reconstruction. Some of the humanitarian service, foreign aid, and foreign investments should be directed toward this effort.

#### **6.5. Humanization of foreign aid and humanitarian service**

In July 2000, the World Bank gave Burundi an amount of 30 million US dollars. In December of the same year, Burundi got 40 million more from the same bank. The question that came to my mind was this: "What for (in this period of war)?" Purposely, it was for remedying the insufficiency of foreign currency in the country and to regularise and harmonize the exchange rate between the black market and the official market. But why such an amount of money for a country whose debt-service amounts to more than 46.8 % of its exports of goods and services (1993)? Then I cast back my mind to the series of devaluations of the Burundian currency since 1983 to 1993 and its present state. The amount given by the World Bank came in the form of aid. But aid does not mean donation, neither does it mean help in the real sense of the term. Burundi will have to pay it back, but in which way and by what means?

Because aid is not a help born of an enterprise of love, it is always conditional. In the 1980s, aid was given to Burundi provided Burundi adopted the Structural Adjustment Programme. In the

1990s, aid was promised to Burundi provided it promoted liberal democracy and the rule of law as if these social and political values were not necessary 10 years before. The donors always talk of three conditions that have to be satisfied for aid to be provided: an economic condition: SAP supposed to boost a country's economy, a political condition: liberal democracy which is thought to guarantee the rule of law, and a social condition: it is said that liberal democracy is the guarantee of human rights. But these conditions hide non-declared motives of aid. The most important non-declared motive is economic and political imperialism (Olsen 1998:344-347). It cannot be denied that poor countries go to the IMF and World Bank because they need aid for whatever motives. Neither can it be denied that there might be good motives on the parts of the IMF and World Bank in imposing certain conditions for aid to be given. However, I do not see any sufficiently convincing reason why aid should be tied up to a political or an economic system. In effect, the risk is great that the aid given might serve to finance a political or economic ideology instead of focussing on how to sort people from poverty (Riddell 1998:313ff). Accordingly, it is not necessarily neoliberalism that poor countries like Burundi need, but development. The authorities of Burundi adopted both economic and political liberalism but ended in a situation of economic poverty and political chaos. We could imagine that the debt contracted by the government to finance the process of political liberalism could have been used to finance some projects of development.

The Structural Adjustment Programme which practically started in 1983 seems to have opened the door to private firms which, while looting in the Great Lake region, used Burundi as a background through corruption. When they were surprised by the demand of democracy which worked to the detriment of the political institutions they corrupted, they resorted to financing a coup d'état which brought with it chaos and misery to people. Thus we cannot talk of economic conditions of aid since these conditions come with economic decline, we cannot talk of human rights when people are deprived of livelihood, neither can we talk of democracy and the rule of law when some Western firms which resort to corruption of political institutions and cause political instability go unpunished. How can we talk of liberalisation of economy when these companies resort to corruption which is a barrier to economic growth and foreign direct investment (Sacks, et al. 1998:39). Corruption can be avoided provided political democracy implies economic democracy. For this to happen, firms and those who have the power to allow them to



operate in the country should follow the law. To follow the law requires public accountability that should keep administration clean and transparent.

The ethic of *imago Dei* I suggest as a response to economic globalization calls for another way of looking at aid. While so far aid is given from the donor interest, the ethic of *imago Dei* suggests us to consider the recipient's needs as well (De Walle 1999, Olsen 1998, Stokke 1995, Uvin 1993). I am not implying that banks should not charge interests on the loans, or that private firms should not make a profit. Far from there. What I am suggesting is that interests and loans can be kept in reasonable norms at least for those international financial institutions supposed to help in the economic reconstruction in order to benefit to the poor.

Furthermore, it is not fair that the donors of aid lay much emphasis on the economy and the politics in poor countries and completely ignore social aspects such education which is the foundation of the future of any nation. Today, human life is being driven by advances in technology. The question is this: if education is ignored, who will adapt this technology to the realities of poor countries so as to participate not only in consumption but also in production? Since education is always a strategic sector in the creation of the future of a country, in Burundi, as in other poor countries, education should be a concern of the state. This would help to avoid the liberal market's conception of schooling in which disadvantaged students do not constitute a good investment for education (Grace 2000:11). The state should be helped by donors of aid for its investment in education. This aid should be supplemented by taxes from foreign investors, especially those which hide behind ultra-liberalism to avoid doing that duty. One does not mind liberalization of the economy provided it is made human to serve the poor.

#### **6.6. Sharing in the world economy: investment for profit and human promotion**

The point I will argue here is that it is possible to combine the investment for profit and human promotion. For this to be achieved, it suffices that one commits oneself to being human as a member of human community and draw the implication in favour of people in need.

Let us first recall our definition of economic globalization. We defined economic globalization a transnational phenomenon. This transnationality encapsulates investment in other countries which could benefit human promotion, provided it allocates necessary resources to the country where it goes. This could be possible by paying taxes where they are due and by avoiding corruption as much as possible. It is a matter of honesty as a moral virtue. For business people to have a market and the necessary conditions to sell their commodities could be seen as a right. However, they should also know that they have the duty and responsibility to the people of the country where the investment is made. That is what I call combined interest of the investor and the needs of the people of the place where the investment is made.

While poor countries try to formulate their trade and economic policies in order to offer an attractive environment to investors in the context of economic globalization, these investors in turn should also be ready to do something about promoting sufficient domestic savings. This might sound as if investors should become charities. It is an ideal to high to achieve in the economic order. But I still believe that domestic savings provide possibilities for future investments as well as the possibility of an eventual promotion of the poor. In effect, it is these domestic savings that could serve to provide the infrastructure as well as human resources which investors require.

According to bishop Legaspi, one of the beliefs of the Catholic Church in matters of economic development is that “the creation of wealth has a moral dimension because it is the duty of everyone to contribute to the moral good”(Legaspi 1999:10-11). This is an important belief at a time when efficiency in the market is being preferred to social justice. When I suggest that it is possible to make an investment for profit and human promotion, I am referring to the moral duty to create wealth as a part of the common good, that is , the combination of efficiency in the market and social justice. It is this ground that would bring Burundi to share in the world economy.

However, Burundi cannot satisfactorily share in the world economy with its burden of debt. Accordingly, sharing in the world economy would also require the cancellation of the public debt. There is no way in which we can talk of the *imago Dei* as relational while most nations of the world are suffering under the burden of debt they are not able to pay. We have noted that the public debt service of Burundi amounts to a large part of its export of goods and services. This

year (2000), the debt service is estimated to amount to 58.5% of goods and services, while the whole external debt is equivalent to 186.7% of the GDP. In 1999, the whole external debt was estimated to be 135.0 % of GDP while the service was estimated to 61.9 % of the exports of goods and services. In 1998, the debt service was 53 % of export earnings (PNUD 1999:79). These are some indications of the problem of debt. Even if the war were over, it would be difficult for the country to think of human development with such amounts of debt.

The debt cancellation cannot be easily implemented unless there is a political will and commitment on the part of the developed countries and world financial institutions. But I believe that the starting point should first be the terms of international trade, namely fair prices. High tariffs and taxes on the exports for poor countries should be reduced. We have already noted that Burundi exports agricultural products such as coffee, cotton, and tea. These exports of agricultural products depend on international prices which are fixed independently of the producers. The producers should be given the possibility of fixing the price or at least the possibility to negotiate fair and equitable prices. Burundi would benefit from such an arrangement

Another perspective in which Burundi can share in the world economy is for the Western countries to avoid sabotaging South-South trade relations, or the African regional market. I think even Burundi would benefit from an African regional market rather than always dealing with international market with unfair terms sometimes. This might not apply to such items as coffee and tea which are important export items of Burundi. But I have already referred previously to the highjacking of the deal between Burundi and Zimbabwe in 1994 in their local products: cotton and malt respectively. The problem arises with the Burundi bottling company (VERRUNDI) which was exporting its products in the neighbouring countries. With the invasion of the same but cheap products from developed countries, VERRUNDI is under the menace of closing its production. On the contrary, the developed countries, if they believe in their own rules championed in the fora of WTO, they should, instead, open their markets to exports of products from poor countries. So far there are still heavy taxes and tariffs on products from poor countries, the coffee and tea of Burundi particularly. If the rules of WTO were to be applied, I should expect that the coffee and tea as well as the textile products to be exempted from these taxes and tariffs. But this is far from being the case. I do not see why the WTO should champion the rules of liberalization if developed

countries are not ready to apply them in favour of poor countries. Of course developed countries might say that they do not necessarily need the coffee or the tea from Burundi. And the power of technology is such that they can find alternatives, just like the natural vanilla of Madagascar is today being replaced by a synthetic one. But is there no economic injustice difficult to deal with in this respect?

According to the WHO director-general, Mike Moore (quoted by AEFJN 2000:4), since the poor countries account for less than half of 1% of world trade, and get less than 1% of foreign investment, they need both free access to the markets of developed and developing countries, and assistance to build up their institutional and human capacity and their infrastructure in order to produce and trade a diversified range of goods and services.

The world economy is far more defined in terms of competition. But the competitive position of a country is determined by human resources, by knowledge, by science and technology. This, in turn, requires that educational institutions be taken seriously. Accordingly, contrary to the neoliberal proposals made by the World Bank, this sector should be invested in and most aid should actually be directed towards it as it is the very future of a nation and its position in the world economy (Legaspi 1999:3) as I have previously noted.

There are some forms of trade which should be abolished if the investment for profit and human promotion is to succeed, namely, the arms trade especially in Burundi and the central African region. This kind of trade destroys the country by maintaining it in a state of warfare; hence it discourages the initiatives of people who may be willing to build. As we suggested in the precedent chapter, the legal management of conflicts, the reinforcement of social justice should be upheld in order to avoid violent conflicts of which the consequence is the proliferation of the arms trade. The arms trade should be abolished in its illegal forms in order to minimize if not abolish easy access to arms deal. The problem though is how it will be possible to deal with corrupt and dictatorial regimes (Nürnberger 1999:409). This is a crucial question given the fact that power sharing and social justice are now being addressed thanks to military intervention. However, this does mean we cannot live without military interventions. The pacific management of conflicts can help in the minimization of arms trade; and this in turn would help to invest in the (re)construction

rather than destruction which is going on presently. In fact, we cannot talk of the *imago Dei* as relational and entertain a kind of trade geared to killing people. The God in whose image we are made is God of life.

**6.7. A shift from a self-enrichment minded political leadership to a leadership open to socio-economic empowerment of the poor.**

In the previous section, I dealt with how the external factor can be humanized so as to allow Burundi to participate in the world economy. Now I should like to embark on the internal factor, that of the national leadership. I shall argue that unless we move away from a self-enrichment minded leadership to a leadership open to the social and economic empowerment of the poor, economic globalization cannot be an opportunity for Burundi. Instead, the country will continue to sink deeper in social and political instability as a result of the deteriorating situation of the poor.

To begin with, the 1999 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) report on human development in Burundi pointed out that poverty in Burundi is, among others, a result of exclusion of a part of the population from political and socio-economic ordering of the country. This observation is also made by scholars interested in the Burundian crisis such R. Lemarchand (1994:163-164) and Filip Ryntjens (1995:9ff). Since the time of independence, Burundian political leaders seem to exercise power through family connections. The political ordering does not guarantee the civic integration of the people. The political leadership deals with the national economy mostly for private ends, thus with no regard for the common good. Because of this collective egoism, there is a lack of economic integration (PNUD 1999:80).

For a country like Burundi that struggles with its poor economy on the one hand, and socio-political instability on the other hand, social stability and economic success depend on the extent of an efficient and honest government. In my article, *Le leadership Burundais à travers les ages de la politique* (1996), I argued that the lack of justice prevented the leaders from being honest and efficient. This lack of justice continues as it is obvious in private commercial transactions which end in the war that is going on presently (Reno 1999:3). We have already noted how gold deals benefit some individuals such as leaders of political parties, the leaders of military junta, etc. I fear

that even the various groups which fight for power in Burundi might follow the same pattern. Their aim seems to be the access to power not in order to liberate and serve the people, but in order to grab whatever is available.

If our political leaders were not so much concerned about their own self-enrichment, they would see that the lack of integration plays against the whole country. Where there is no integration, there is disorder which can be exploited for personal ends of all kinds. The combination of external exploitation using internal disorder through corrupt leaders is what makes the war among Burundians become a way of life.

In such a context, economic globalization can hardly be an opportunity for the poor people of Burundi. W. Reno notes that this is most likely to be the case in all failing states, because the political conflict tends to shift towards control over markets at the same time as officials in foreign states shift resources from aid to African states to aid business in Africa (Reno 1999:3). Hence while we continue to lose people in war and sink deeper into poverty, those for whom economic globalization is an opportunity might gain instead. Reno has shown that foreign firms that do business in weak states can commercialize war and internal disorder for themselves (Reno 1999:6).

What is at stake is the whole notion of the source of power which the leaders exercise, and for whom it is exercised on the one hand, and on the other hand our concept of human being as a relational being. Leadership is a relational concept, including the relation with God who is the source of power *par excellence*<sup>47</sup>.

I have already pointed out that the Burundian economic success depends on the efficiency and honesty of the leadership. Here we are back to the values we have already pointed out. These are values such as dependability, mutuality, respect and trust which characterise the *imago Dei* as relational. The honesty and efficiency of the leadership on which economic success partly depends cannot be thought of outside the values of dependability, mutuality, respect and trust which love

---

<sup>47</sup>Here I can recall two theories of the origin of authority, namely, transmission theory in which the people are the immediate cause of authority, but the primary cause remains God; and designation theory in which God is the immediate cause of authority, while the people act as instrumental cause (McCoy 1956:127)..

involves. Outside these values, there is corruption, self-enrichment and disempowerment of poor which cut the leadership from its people and from God. As a result there is a betrayal of one's nature as the *imago Dei* and as a relational being.

Now how do we move from that negative practice that undermines the human nature of the leadership. One possibility is to move away from the individualistic spirit. In the Burundian society, there are two kinds of individualism that evolve side by side. Individualism of the Western kind and individualism of the African type which I refer to in terms of family connections. This is a kind of individualism which is called nepotism or collective selfishness. The first one uses the second. The problem then is how to prevent the leadership from using his citizens to achieve ends that do not serve them.

The gospel message suggests us that we should love our neighbour as we love ourselves. One's neighbour is not necessarily one from one's family or one's clients, but any person in need. This is the very meaning of the image of God as relational. With this teaching, we are bringing the leadership to look at responsibility as the individual highest ideal on the one hand, and aim at justice as the highest ideal of the society on the other hand (Niebuhr 1949: 257). As the leadership moves closer to the ideal of responsibility as a personal ideal, it will move away from self-enrichment and corruption to embrace justice as the highest ideal of the society. The poor will be empowered in the process. Here I should also note that the reconstruction of the community is possible in so far as the individual ideal meets the ideal of the society.

Put differently, the leadership can move away from the individualistic spirit by seeing that corruption and self-enrichment of the leadership have negative consequences for the whole country: They lead to social and political instability in which even the leadership itself loses. In effect, although corruption and self-enrichment make the leadership better off financially, it loses power over the citizens who continue to sink into poverty. Poverty leads to resistance, violence, disobedience and war. A hungry man is an angry man!

I should recall that the cause of the present socio-political crisis in Burundi lies in the fact that the leadership accepted to be used by some international lobbies in search of greater profit.

This kind of corruption has become structural. It no longer matters who ascends to power; but the most important thing is whether the person who ascends to power is able to serve the interests of the lobbies in search of maximal profit (Ntakarutimana 2000:8). These conflicting interests lead to war in which many people, especially innocent ones can die. The *imago Dei* is one who chooses life because God is life.

Once the leadership has moved away from corruption and self-enrichment, national programmes of development can be started: public infrastructure can be financed by investors and poor people can be helped to involve themselves in projects of self-reliance (UNDP 1999:94). In practical terms, to move away from corruption and self-enrichment means that the leadership is accountable and guided by the rule of law or any other code of conduct.

## **6.8. Environmental protection**

In the media, the usual language is that of political, social and economic crisis. Hardly does one hear about the ecological disaster caused by the ongoing social and political instability in Burundi and other countries surrounding it. Even the Internet home page concerning environmental questions does not seem to take seriously the environmental degradation in the country. The last part of this chapter will take up this issue as the third dimension of the *imago Dei* as relational. My concern is that we cannot simply concern ourselves with the social, political and economic issues without referring also to the deterioration of the environment as the context in which these social, political and economic activities take place. This section will evolve around two articulations, namely:

1. The environmental question in Burundi
2. A response from the concept of *imago Dei* as relational

### **6.8.1. The environmental question in Burundi**

I shall take up this question as a by-product of economic globalization and argue that the environmental degradation in Burundi is a product of three major factors of economic



globalization:

1. Political instability resulting from economic interests in the context of economic globalization,
2. Export economy: Here I will concentrate on the export agriculture and exploitation of mineral resources
3. The demographic problem in the context of economic marginalization.

#### ***6.8.1.1. Political instability as a result of world economic interests***

In the previous sections, I noted that economic liberalism caused political instability in various parts of the world as well as in Burundi. In Burundi, the consequences of these economic processes are the present war which caused a lot of movements of people both inside (displaced) and outside (refugees). These people occupy green spaces outside their homes and chop trees for their shelters and fire wood. In the region where I come from, for instance, large parts of artificial forests have been stripped, rare species of trees which took many years to grow have disappeared, trees which, hitherto attracted the rain and protected the soil against erosion have been chopped down. The region is today facing a serious drought.

Besides the displacement of the population, there is war itself. Presently the rebels use the forest, mainly the Kibira, a natural forest of the mountains and its surroundings. As this forest is a battle field, the fauna which hitherto had made this forest their natural home have to flee while some of the animals serve as food for the fighters. The government army has to use fire in some areas where it cannot penetrate the forest to fight the rebels.

I should also add that while in developed countries the air is polluted by smoke from industries, the air of Burundi is polluted by the smell of unburied bodies of people and domestic animals (cows, goats, sheep, etc.) killed during fighting or violence. Some of these bodies are thrown in rivers which makes the water unusable or/and dangerous for people who are obliged to use it. Thus, although I have not found any source to confirm my observation, I have little doubt to say that the recrudescence of diseases and the appearance of new ones which were never heard

of before might be caused by that pollution.

#### ***6.8.1.2. Export economy: agriculture and exploitation of mineral resources***

As I noted previously, export agriculture comprises mainly coffee, tea and cotton. I am not informed about the pesticides used for tea and cotton, but as far as coffee is concerned, the pesticide is mainly DDT which is well known to be dangerous for the life of animals and people. The same chemical is used in the protection of beans and pease. So far, the government has not made much effort to provide alternatives to DDT. Furthermore, since there are no herbicides and special manure provided for coffee plantations, people have to use grass to cover the coffee trees. To have this grass, people have to strip the hills of their natural cover. And when the rain comes, there is nothing to protect the mountains from erosion.

As far as the exploitation of mineral resources is concerned, I should first take note of W. Reno's words: "Desperate local authorities are not likely to impose stringent and costly environmental or other social regulations, nor that business be practised in any particular way" (Reno 1999:5).

It is not clear to me what Reno means by "nor that business be practised in any particular way". However, one could understand that Reno is referring to any economic activity that has ecological effects. Whatever case maybe, we have to take seriously Reno's observation even though there is not much exploitation of mineral resources in Burundi. In any case where the alluvial gold, cassiterite, phosphate are exploited, the people involved in the exploitation of these mineral resources have not given any special attention to the ecological effects of their activities. The erosion by the rain has worsened the situation in these areas. Furthermore Reno's observation should serve to call the attention of the authorities of my country who are soon going to lead the exploitation of the second world reserve of nickel and eventually that of vanadium and uranium.

### ***6.8.1.3. Demographic problems in the context of economic marginalisation***

This aspect does not seem to be connected directly with economic globalization. However, it can be shown that the population is increasing both in the rural area and the urban centres. The difference though is that in the rural area the income decreases as the population increase; while in the urban areas the income seems to be increasing. The decreasing income in rural areas goes along with the loss of purchasing power of the Burundian currency. And as people lose their purchasing power, they have to get alternative means to survive. In Burundi, the alternative is the overuse of the land which results in its impoverishment.

Burundi is known to have the highest population in Africa: 230 habitants per s.k. The demographic growth averages 2.9 % and about 7 births per family. Yet between 1993 and 1998, the death rate varied between 15 and 17 per thousand and could keep increasing because of the AIDS pandemic (UNDP 1999:2). 90 % of the Burundian population live on agriculture and this has consequences on the environment. In effect, as the population increases, the space for agriculture becomes smaller and smaller for the population to survive, but also poorer and poorer because of overexploitation as the only source of subsistence.

Despite the war, the population is also increasing in the urban centres as I noted earlier. The town of Bujumbura, for instance recently acquired more land to extend the town. This extension, unfortunately has to move people from rich land (the plain of Bujumbura is one the richest parts of the country). It is not only in the capital of the country where this is happening. Some other urban centres in the country keep growing and have to occupy the land that the population could use for farming. This extension is partly due to the migration of people from rural areas hoping to get better opportunities in urban centres than can be offered in rural areas. Unfortunately, these people have no skills that today's world economy requires. Thus, they can resort to what I have referred to as criminal economy in order to survive. Furthermore they can be mobilized for violence of all kinds. Criminality and violence can cause unclean cities as those who are supposed to clean them could fear for their security. This was obvious in 1993-1994. Some migrants are recruited by the new religious sects. Most of these new sects occupy the periphery of cities where the young migrants are in order to offer them a spiritual hope as a kind of substitute to material prosperity

they do not have. And this also exerts pressure on the physical environment.

Now the question is, what way out? Of what use can the concept of *imago Dei* be? We may grant that the concept of *imago Dei* could advice us about how we can live with one another in harmony and peace. We may also grant that the concept of *imago Dei* could suggests us to use the natural resources in responsibility to God and to one another by taking what we need. However questions still remain: can the concept of *imago Dei* help us to deal with the issue of overpopulation in the rural and urban areas? Can the concept of *imago Dei* offer us any solution to the scarcity of cultivable lands which due to overpopulation? These questions are not easy to deal with. Let us attempt some suggestions.

#### **6.8.2. A response from the concept of *imago Dei* as relational.**

Our response to the issue of environmental degradation is based on our relation to God, and our relation to one another. We cannot respect God without respecting each of God's creatures: people as well as the environment. In fact the two go hand in hand and cannot be taken apart. The problem though is that there is a tendency to emphasize the relation between people and ignore the physical environment in which they live. The starting point for environmental protection is, of course, ecological awareness. In effect, the ongoing language is that of power sharing, peace process, reconciliation, justice, a kind of social and political response to a problem whose roots are economic interests in a country which is experiencing a high demographic growth. It is true that social, political issues are crucial. But we should not only think socially and politically, but we also we need to think ecologically.

Peace, justice and reconciliation are thought of as if they are limited to people. It is true that if these ideals are reached some aspects of the environment will be saved. The forest will no more be the habitat of the rebels and a battle field, and the absence of gun noise will give peace to animal life, rivers will no more be polluted by dead bodies of people or animals, and air will once again be pure, war-caused diseases will disappear. But the environment will continue to suffer from the pressure of an increasing population. My suggestion is that even if peace, justice and reconciliation between people is established, Burundians will still need to establish justice with the environment

as the natural milieu in which they live. One way of doing this is to regulate population growth in relation to the available space. Two solutions can be suggested here, namely on the one hand measures have to be taken to control the mortality rate, and on the other hand to control the fertility rate.

#### ***6.8.2.1. Controlling the mortality rate***

In the last years mortality has increased as a result of war and aids pandemic. Thus, the mortality can be controlled by avoiding war wherever possible. This may require resorting to such means as negotiation as it is being done in Arusha presently, pacific conflict resolution, preventive diplomacy, reinforcement of justice, legal means, the rule of law, etc. We noted that there is a recrudescence of some diseases and appearance of new ones as result of the on-going war. The state, with the help of NGO presently operating the country and the international community should allocate a special budget in order to improve the health care of people. The AIDS pandemic needs to be dealt with through regular campaigns of conscientisation. If possible, pharmaceutical companies should avail medicines at affordable price.

#### ***6.8.2.2. Controlling fertility rate.***

This is certainly a contentious issue. On the one hand, we have a traditional culture which lays emphasis of prosperity. This prosperity consists in having many children. On the other hand, we have the dominant religion (Catholic Church) which sees contraception as sinful because it is against the purpose of the sexual act, that of procreation. Here there is a lot of work to be done and a mind set be changed. First of all, some mentalities of the Burundian traditional culture in matters of procreation need to be challenged. The idea that to have many children is a value to be held in esteem is unhelpful today. If the space of 27834 square kilometre was enough for a population of 3 million people 50 years ago, it might not be enough for more than 6.5 million people today. Here lies the necessity of informing people about the problem of overpopulation.

One of the ways of dealing with the growing population will be by the family planning. There is already a project of family planning in Burundi. But the question remains whether the family

planning should be imposed to people whoever they may be or whether it should made a matter of choice. According to Klaus Nürnberger, the family planning should be voluntary but four conditions have to be fulfilled, namely:

1. Information which should cover sex education, creation of an awareness of the global problem of overpopulation, and conscientisation concerning human rights and responsibilities.
2. The availability of harmless and affordable contraceptives.
3. Old age security: parent should not generate a large offspring for fear of being abandoned in their helpless years.
4. Female emancipation: women must be entitled to refuse pregnancies without the fear of victimization. In this regard, the state has the duty to create the institutional framework for female emancipation and gender equality in all spheres of life, including procreational behaviour (Nürnberger 1999:401).

Family planning could involve contraception as the second condition suggests. But as I have just noted it, we live in a country in which the morality of the Catholic Church which is dominant religion does not allow contraception . Instead the Catholic Church suggests a sexual discipline expressed as follows:

Periodic continence, that is, the methods of birth regulation based on self-observation and the use of infertile periods, are in conformity with the objective criteria of morality. These methods respect the bodies of the spouses, encourages tenderness between them and favour the education of authentic freedom (CCC 2370).

Although I am also a catholic, I think we need to be realistic about sexual morality. In the above quote, the Catholic Church takes it for granted that there are only married couples. It ignores the fact we live in an era where premarital and extramarital sex can hardly be prevented because of individual freedom. Hence where the Church's sexual moral ideal is too high to reach, it might be advisable to use the methods of contraception. The Church's argument that contraception is unnatural should be more and more transcended because, according to Nürnberger, little or nothing we do as humans is natural (Nürnberger 1999:400).

However the family planning should go with poverty reduction and the redirection of people's relation to the land. This would involve on the one hand helping the population to use the land properly, to protect it as their source of subsistence, and on the other hand to help the population not to rely solely on agriculture for their survival. The population of Burundi relies on the land because there are no alternatives. Maybe one of the ways will be to take education seriously, to create conditions of social stability, and sufficient infrastructure in order to attract investors who could provide job opportunities. At this juncture, we should also reiterate the suggestion that individual initiatives should be encouraged, and individual motivations should be translated into actions Nürnberger (1999:363). All these would help not to rely solely on farming.

However, so far we seem to be providing an internal solution to a problem which is also influenced by an external factor, the economic globalization factor. This factor brought the leadership to concern itself with economic interests. There is a need to give up corruption which leads to war. The political leadership should not allow foreign companies to squander national resources. That is to say, the leadership needs to redirect its mind from its own economic interests to the people. That is, one's relation to material goods has to be controlled so that attention might be given to people and the environment in need. This will first require the reconstruction of the state and its authority.

Finally we should try to protect the environment against erosion. This involves planting trees where there are none to attract the rain, as well as finding alternatives to some chemicals like DDT which are dangerous to human and animal life. Moreover the methods of maintenance of coffee trees have to be studied. This could help people to avoid stripping bare the earth of its natural cover. This solution cannot be successful unless education is taken seriously. In effect, this solution together with other solutions I have suggested require that people understand them. At the same time the country needs its own experts to reflect on and apply them.

## 6.9. Conclusion

My effort so far has been to apply the ethic of *imago Dei* as relational to the Burundian context in the present situation of economic globalization. I began by observing that Burundi has its own domestic failings (corrupt leadership, internal division and mutual exclusion, poverty, etc) and that those who want to maximize their profit exploit these internal weaknesses. In the same vein, the injunction of economic neoliberalism through SAP and political liberalism in the aftermath of the collapse of communism seems to have failed because of political and economic imperialism which might have been behind some suggestions. Against this background I tried to challenge the Burundian Church to make the Christian message ethically relevant by weighing on the internal failings as well as on those who make use of the internal weaknesses in order to provide a better future to our society. The Church of Burundi might not have all the power to effect change but it can contribute to the process of change.

I argued that the involvement of the Church should lead to the humanization of foreign aid and humanitarian service, the orientation of economic investment towards human promotion and not only profit, moving the political leadership from self-enrichment to the socio-economic empowerment of the poor, and finally to environmental awareness. It is in this way that the international trade could benefit the poor instead of marginalizing them, political liberalism could no longer be synonymous with disorder which the profit makers exploit for their own benefit, solidarity can now mean equality and social justice among humans, and peace with the environment, and finally moral values could take priority over market judgement in which everything including war is commodified.

However, this cannot be left to the sole effort of the Burundian Church. In the same way as we talk of the interaction between the global and the local economy, we need to talk of the local Church interacting with the global Church to make the situation of humankind better.



## GENERAL CONCLUSION

So far our concern has been the challenge of economic globalization and how we should meet it. That was the task we undertook in the six chapters of this dissertation.

The first chapter was a general presentation of the issue of economic globalization and the task we proposed to undertake.

In the second chapter, we explored the nature of economic globalization. We argued that economic globalization is a transnational phenomenon which invades all our lives and whose driving forces are respectively the recent technological innovations as its engine, the media of communication as its facilitator and the political liberalism as its underlying ideology.

In the third chapter we tackled the positive and the negative consequences of economic globalization which evolve in parallel. On the positive side, we noted the following consequences: growth of the international trade, the legitimization of the ideology of political liberalism, an apparent international solidarity, economic prosperity and the triumph of the market judgment. On the negative side, we noted the following consequences: continual marginalization of the poor countries, the demise of the nation-state and socio-political instability, growing inequalities and social injustices, environmental deterioration and moral decadence.

In the fourth chapter, we critically explored two major responses to economic globalization, namely, S. Amin's Humanist Project or global socialism and H. Küng's global ethic. We argued that although the two responses are valuable, they do not help us to address the challenge of economic globalization satisfactorily. Amin's Humanist Project is unrealistic and unreliable in so far as it is based on a Marxist system which is in crisis and which has failed socially and economically, while Küng's global ethic fails to provide us with an alternative concept to that of *homo oeconomicus* that informs the world economy today.

In the fifth chapter, we suggested an alternative to Amin's global socialism and Küng's global ethic. This alternative is the ethic of the *imago Dei* as relational contrasted with the concept

of *homo oeconomicus* which is central to economic globalization. The concept of *imago Dei* opened us to the following implications: the reconstruction of the human community as a context of values, the empowerment of the state as a dialogue partner of the Church as the family of God, and the reconsideration of Christian values that should help to care about the environment. We argue that for all these to be fulfilled, we must make sure that God is prior to the market.

Finally, in the sixth chapter, we tried to apply the ethic of the *imago Dei* in the Burundian context. We challenged the Burundian Church to make the Christian message ethically relevant as a way of contributing to the process of making economic globalization human. This contribution should be seen in the following: humanization of the foreign aid and humanitarian assistance, economic investment for profit and human promotion, shifting the Burundian leadership from self-enrichment to a leadership open to socio-economic empowerment of the poor, and finally ecological care.

Now the question is this: what are the future prospects? In effect, there is the level of theory and there is the level of praxis. How do we move from theory to praxis? How can we make the ideas developed in this dissertation accessible to the people out there? What are the issues which need to be deepened in our future reflections?

One way by which the ideas of this dissertation can be accessible is by discussing them with people to whom I am linked in one way or the other whether in the Church or in the secular milieu. This could be done in the form of seminars or workshops or even through preaching. Another way by which the ideas of this dissertation can be made accessible to people is through publications. For the past years, I have been involved in publication of articles or short notes on the social and political situation in Burundi and in Africa in general. There is no doubt that the different periodicals in which I usually publish will provide me with a space in which I can make known the ideas of this dissertation.

As I discuss with other orally or in written form, I will be exposed to questions and issues which call for further reflection and which may need to be made at a higher level than that of a masters. Besides, such issues as the humanization of the foreign aid, economic investment for profit

and human promotion among others need more space and reflection than the one provided here. The shift from self-enrichment minded leadership to a leadership open to socio-economic empowerment of the poor is part of my dream project of Civic Education which I am planning in the near future.

However, we cannot ignore the fact that the future of economic globalization might be holding more than we can guess at this point of time. As we noted in the general introduction, we have not yet experienced the process of economic globalization long enough to foresee all its ramifications. Thus while we need to keep pushing further our reflection on this phenomenon, we need to keep our eyes open and be ready to respond to whatever challenges economic processes could present us in the future for the good of humankind.

## GENERAL BIBLIOGRAPHY

AJFJN 2000. Africa and the New Round of Trade Negotiations of the World Trade Organization (WTO). <http://www.oneworld.org/aeijn>

\_\_\_\_\_. Debt Cancellation for African Countries: Action Plan 2000.  
[http://www.oneworld.org/aeijn/dossiers/debt\\_e0001html](http://www.oneworld.org/aeijn/dossiers/debt_e0001html)

\_\_\_\_\_. Debt reduction for African Countries.  
[http://www.oneworld.org/aeijn/dossiers/debt\\_e0003html](http://www.oneworld.org/aeijn/dossiers/debt_e0003html)

Ake, C 1993. The Unique Case of African Democracy. *International Affairs*, 69:239-244.

Amin, S 1974. *Accumulation on a World Scale: A Critique of the Theory of Underdevelopment*. New York: Monthly Review.

\_\_\_\_\_. 1977. *Unequal Development: An Essay of the Social Formulation of Peripheral Capitalism*. Hassocks, Sussex: Harvester.

\_\_\_\_\_. 1990. *Delinking: Towards a Polycentric World*. London: Zed Books.

\_\_\_\_\_. 1997. *Capitalism in the age of globalization: The management of contemporary society*. London/ New York: Zed Books.

Amoroso, B 1998. *On Globalization: Capitalism in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*. London: MacMillan Press.

Anderson, E 2000. Beyond Homo Economicus: New Development in Theories of Social Norms. *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 29(2):170-200

Aquinas, T 1947. *Summa Theologia*. 3vols. Translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province. New York: Benziger Brothers.

- Bacamurwanko, J 1997. Africa is a test case for mankind's survival. *Executive Intelligence Review* (special Report), 53-57.
- Baker, D et al. 1998. *Globalization and Progressive Economic Policy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Baregu, M 1994. The Rise and the Fall of the One Party State in Tanzania, in J. A Wilder (ed). *Economic Change and Political Liberalization in Sub-Saharan Africa*. London: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Barth, K 1960. *Church Dogmatics*. Edinburgh: T&T Clark
- Bhattacharji, S 1997. Challenge to mission in the context of globalization. *International Review of mission*, 62(2):79-95.
- Boeve, L 1999. Market and Religion in Postmodern Culture. *Theology*, 102(805): 28-36.
- Boff, L 1988. *Trinity and Society*. New York: Orbis Books.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 1992. The Market and Religion of Commodities. *Concilium*, 3:ix-xiii.
- Bouckaert, L 1999. The Project of a Personalistic Economics. *Ethical Perspectives*, 6(1):20-31.
- Boyer, R & Drache, D (eds) 1996. *States Against Markets*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Bratton, M & De Walle, N V 1997. *Democratic Experiments in Africa*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Brutus, D Africa 2000 in the New Global Context: A Commentary. *Africa Today*, 44(4):379-384.

- Bryant, DJ 2000. *Imago Dei*, Imagination, and Ecological Responsibility. *Theology Today*, 57(1): 350-50.
- Burbach, R et al. 1997. *Globalization and its Discontents: The Rise of Postmodern Socialisms*. London: Pluto Press.
- Burundi-Economie: La Filière de l'Or et le Drame Burundais. [http://www.burundi.org\\_36html](http://www.burundi.org_36html)
- Carnoy, M et al (eds) 1997. *The New Global Economy in the Information Age*. Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press.
- Carr, EH 1981. *The Twenty Years Crisis 1919-1939*. London: Papermac
- Castells, M 1996. *The Rise of the Network Society*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Catechism of the Catholic Church* 1992. Nairobi: Paulines Publications Africa
- Chai-Sik, C 1994. Transcending the clash of civilisations. *Theology and Public Policy*, 6(1): 11-21.
- Chambrier, HA 1997. La Globalisation de l'Economie: Nouvelles Chances, Nouvelles Opportunités pour l'Afrique. *Etudes et Statistiques*, 238: 243-256.
- Chenu, F 1997. New Social Movement: Democratic Struggle and Human Rights in Africa, in J,H Mittelman (ed). *Globalization: Critical Reflections*. London: Lynre Rienner Publishers.
- Christie, P 2000. Globalization and the Challenge of Catholic Education, in M. Potterton and C. Northmore (eds). *Catholic Schools and the Common Good*, 41-48. Johannesburg: Centre for School Quality and Improvement and the Catholic Institute of Education.

- Cobb, JB 1994. *Sustaining the Common Good: A Christian Perspective on the Global Economy*. Cleveland (Ohio): The Pilgrim Press.
- Cohen, SS & Zysman, J 1987. *Manufacturing Matters: The Myth of the Post-Industrial Economy*. New York: Basic Books.
- Conca, K and Lipschutz, RD 1993. The State and Global Ecological Interdependence, in R.D Lipschutz and K. Conca (ed). *The State and Social Power in Global Environmental Politics*, 19-23. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Cox, R 1997. Economic Globalization and the Limits of Liberal Democracy, in A.G McGrew (ed). *The Transformation of Democracy: Globalization and Territorial Democracy*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Cronan, EP 1955. *The Dignity of the Human Person*. New York: Philosophical Library.
- DeAnne, J 1997. Globalization and stakeholder conflict: a corporate perspective. *International Affairs*, 73(3):453-468.
- De Hoyos, L 1997. Can we stop the Chain of reaction of catastrophe? *Executive Intelligence Review* (special Report), 26-37.
- De Santa, AJ 1995. The Present Socio-Economic System as a Cause of Ecological Imbalance and Poverty. *Concilium*, 5:3-11
- De Walle, N V 1999. Aid's Crisis of Legitimacy: Current Proposals and Future Prospects. *African Affairs*, 98:337-352.
- Diamond, L et al. (eds) 1988. *Democracy in Developing Countries: Africa*. Boulder, Colo: Lynne Rienner Press.

- ✓ Dunning, HR 1998. *Reflecting the divine image: Christian ethics in Wesleyan perspective*. Illinois: Intervarsity
- Engelhard, P 1996. *L'homme mondial*. Paris: Arlea.
- Etzioni, A 1988. *The Moral Dimension: Towards a New Economics*. New York: Free Press.
- Fatton, R 1992. *Predatory Rule: State and Civil Society*. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Flannery, A (ed) 1992. *Vatican Council: The Conciliar and Post Conciliar Documents*, 2vols. Indiana: The Liturgical Press.
- Foster, JB 1999. Building Marxism. *Monthly Review*, 50(10): 38-45.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 1999. Contradictions in the Universalization of Capitalism. *Monthly Review*, 50(11): 29-39
- Frank, TM 1993. The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance. *The American Journal of International Law*, 86(1):46-81.
- Frieden, JA & Lake, DA 1995. *International Political Economy: Perspectives on Global Power and Wealth*. 3<sup>rd</sup> Edition. London/New York: Routledge.
- Friecke, U 1997. Choose Development, not IMF Genocide. *Executive Intelligence Review* (special Report), 91-95.
- Fukuyama, F 1991. *The End of History and the Last man*. London: Macmillan
- Gelb, A & Floyd, R 1999. The Challenge of Globalization for Africa. *South African Journal of International Affairs*, 6(2):1-17.



George, F 2000. L'Eglise dans le Monde: L'Eglise Catholique unie pour relever les défis de la mondialisation. *Sedos*, 32(6): 166-172.

Ghai, D & De Alcantara, G 1994. Globalization and Social Integration, in *World Summit for Social Development*. Geneva: UNRISD.

Gibellini, R 1995. The Theological Debate on Ecology. *Concilium*, 5:125-134.

Giddens, A 1990. *The Consequence of Modernity*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Gill, S 1995. Globalization, Market Civilization, Disciplinary Neoliberalism. *Journal of International Studies*, 24(3): 399-423.

✓Gorringe, TJ 1994. *Capital and Kingdom: Theological Ethics and Economic Order*. New York: Orbis Books.

Grace, G 2000. Catholic Schools and the Common Good: What it means in Educational Practice, in M. Potterton and C. Northmore (eds). *Catholic Schools and the Common Good*, 9-19. Johannesburg: Centre for School Quality and Improvement and the Catholic Institute of Education.

Guéhenno, JM 1995. *The End of the Nation-State*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press

Guilder, G 1981. *Wealth and Poverty*. New York: Bantam Books.

✓Gunton, C 1991. Trinity, Ontology and Anthropology: Towards a Renewal of the Doctrine of the *Imago Dei*, in C. Schwöbel and C. E Gunton (eds). *Persons, Divine and Human*. Edinburgh: T&T Clark.

Gustov, M 1999. *Global Politics in the Human Interest*, 4<sup>th</sup> edition. London: Lynne Rienner.

Haggar, S & Webb, SB(eds) 1994. *Voting for Reform: Economic Adjustment in New Democracies*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Held, David et al., 1999. *Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture*. Cambridge/Oxford: Polity Press.

Herr, E 2000. La mondialisation: pour une évaluation éthique. *Nouvelle Revue Théologique*, 122:51-67.

Hirst, P 1997. The global economy: myths and realities. *International Affairs*, 73(3):409-425.

Hirst, P & Thompson, G (eds) 1996. *Globalization in Question*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

✓ Hoekena, A A 1986. *Created in God's image*. Grand Rapids: Eedmans

Holton, RJ 1998. *Globalization and the Nation-State*. London: MacMillan Press.

✓ Hughes, PE 1989. *The True image: The Origin and Destiny of Man in Christ*. Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans

Iheduru, O M 1999. *The Politics of Economic Restructuring and Democracy in Africa*. London: Greenwood Press

Ihonvbere, J O 1994. *Nigeria: The Politics of Adjustment and Democracy*. New Brunswick: Transaction Publisher.

IMF 1997. *World Economic Outlook*, May.

Isaacs, S 1997. *South Africa in the Global Economy: Understanding the Challenges, Working Towards Alternatives*. Durban: TURP.

- Joseph, MP 1995. You shall have no other gods: An ethical critique of global market.  
*Bangalore Theological Forum*, 27 (3-4):42-58.
- Kalliah, A 1999. Globalisation: Colonisation perpetuation: A critique of the marginalized.  
*Journal of Dharma*, 24(1): 84-112.
- Keat, R 1982. Liberal Right and Socialism, in Keith Graham (ed), *Contemporary Political Philosophy*, 59-82. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 1993. The Moral Boundaries of the Market, in Colin Grouch and D. Marquand (eds).  
*Ethics and Markets*, 6-20. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Keegan, W 2001. Global Winners, Global Losers. *The Tablet*, 260-261, 24 February.
- Kennedy, P 1993. *Preparing for the Twenty-First Century*. New York: Random House.
- Knox, P & Agnew, J 1998. *The Geography of the World Economy*. 3<sup>rd</sup> edition.  
London: Arnold Publishers.
- Korten, DC 1995. *When Corporations Rule the World*. San Francisco: Berret-Koehler Publications.
- Krugman, P R. 1998. *La mondialisation n'est pas coupable*. Paris: La Decouverte.
- Küng, H 1991. *Global Responsibility*. London: SCM Press.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 1997. *A Global Ethic for Global Politics and Economics*. London: SCM Press.
- Kuschel, KJ & Häring, H (eds) 1993. *Hans Küng: New Horizons for Faith and Thought*.  
London: SCM Press.

- Kwesi, B 1998. Integrating Africa into the globalization process, in World Economic Forum. ***The Africa Competitiveness Report 1998***.
- LaChance, L 1939. ***L 'Humanisme Politique de St. Thomas: Individue et l'Etat***, 2vols. Ottawa: Levrier.
- Lama, D 1999. ***Ethics for the New Millennium***. New York: Riverhead.
- Lategan, B et al. 2000. Magicians of the Market. ***New South African Outlook***, 2:1-5
- Legaspi, L 1999. ***Globalization and its Impact on Catholic Higher Education***. Paper presented at the 7<sup>th</sup> Conference, Association of South East and East Asian Catholic Colleges and Universities. Unpublished.
- Lemarchand, R 1970. ***Rwanda and Burundi***. London: Pall Mall Press.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 1994. ***Burundi: Ethnic Conflict and Genocide***. New York: Woodrow Wilson Center Press.
- Lemarchand, R & Martin, D 1974. ***Selective Genocide in Burundi***. London: Minority Rights.
- Litonjua, MD 1999. Global Capitalism: The New Context of Christian Social Ethics. ***Theology Today***, 56(2):210-228.
- Longchamp, A 1998. Mondialisation du développement? ***Metanoia***, 8(3-4):178-195.
- Longman, T P 1998. Empowering the weak and protecting the powerful: the contradictory nature of churches in Central Africa. ***African Studies Review***, 41 (1): 49-72
- Magesa, L 1999. Africa's struggle for self-definition during a time of globalisation. ***Sedos***, 31(8/9): 235-239.

- Majawa, C 1999. The Church's Role in Defending Genuine Democracy in Africa. *Africa Ecclesial Review*, 42(1-2):52-78.
- Makinda, SM 1996. Democracy and Multiparty Politics in Africa. *Modern African Studies*, 34(4): 555-573.
- Manirakiza, M 1997. Burundi: *La Déviance d'un Pouvoir Solitaire*. Paris: La Longue Vue.
- Marquand, D 1988. *The Unprincipled Society*. London: Fontana.
- Martin, H.P & Schumann, H 1997. *Le piège de la mondialisation*. Paris: Actes Sud.
- Mbiti, J 1969. *African Philosophy and Religion*. London: Heinmann
- McChesney, RW 1999. Chomsky against Neoliberalism. *Monthly Review*, 50(11): 40-47.
- ✓ McFadyen, A 1990. *The Call to Personhood: A Christian Theory of Individual and Social Relationships*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- McClintock, C 1989. The Prospects for Democratic Consolidation in a "Least Likely case". *Comparative Politics*, 21:127-148
- Medard, M 1997. La Corruption Internationale et l'Afrique Sub-Saharienne. *Revue Internationale de la Politique Comparée*, 4(2):413- 440.
- Meeks, MD 1989. *God the Economist: The Doctrine of God and Political Economy*. Minneapolis: Fortress Press.

- Meiksins, EW 1998. The Communist Manifesto After 150 Years. *Monthly Review*, 50(1): 14-35.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 1998. Capitalist Challenge and Generational Shifts. *Monthly Review*, 50(5): 1
- Mertens, HE 1998. Küng's Plea for a Global Ethic. *Louvain Studies*, 23:274-279
- Messer, F 1998. Burundi- Economy, in *Africa South Sahara*. London: Europa Publication.
- Meszaros, I 1997. The Uncontrollability of Globalizing Capital. *Monthly Review*, 49(9): 27-37.
- Minc, A 1997. *La mondialisation heureuse*. Paris: Plon.
- Miliband, D 1993. The New Ethics of Economics, in C Grouch and D. Marquand (eds). *Ethics and Markets*, 21-30. Oxford: Blackwell
- Mittelman, J H (ed) 1997. *Globalization: Critical Reflections*. London: Lynne Rienner.
- Monthly Review 2000. Socialism: A Time to Retreat. *Monthly Review*, 52(4):1-7.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 1992. A Brief Bibliography of Samir Amin. *Monthly Review*, 44:50-59.
- Mucchielli, J.L 1993. *Multinationales et Mondialisation*. Paris: Seuil.
- Mugambi, J N K 1999. Missiological Research in the Context of Globalization. *Scriptura*, 71: 253-78
- Murphy, EF 1921. *St. Thomas' Political Doctrine and Democracy*. Washington: Catholic University Press.

Murphey, DD 1996. The "Warp-Speed" Transformation of the World Economy: A Discussion of Ten (of the Many) Recent Books. *The Journal of Social and Political and Economic Studies*, 21(3): 301-342.

Nations Unies 1999. *Document de Base Constituant la Première Partie des Rapports Présentés par les Etats Parties: Burundi*. Genève: Nations Unies.

Niebuhr, R 1932. *Moral Man and Immoral Society*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons.

Noble, DF 1986. Democracy and Multiparty. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 34(4):555-573.

Nossal, RK 1998. *The Patterns of World Politics*. Scarborough: Prentice Hall

Ntakarutimana, E 1997. L'Afrique des Grands Lacs: Quelles mutations? Paper presented at The Conferences St. Albert Le Grand. Unpublished.

\_\_\_\_\_ 1997 *Le Respect des Droits de l'Homme, Fondement de tout Etat de Droit*. Paper presented to the Deutsche Stiftung Für Internationale Entwicklung. Unpublished.

\_\_\_\_\_ 1999a. Exorciser la Mémoire Comme Thérapie Collective en Vue de la Réconciliation. Paper presented to Journées Burundaise de Padova. Unpublished.

\_\_\_\_\_ 1999b. Le Sud saura-t-il pardonner au Nord. *Sedos*, 31 (11):281-287.

\_\_\_\_\_ 2000. De l'Eclatement à la Recomposition de la Société Burundaise. *Tuj'i'buntu*, 20:5-12.

Ntibagirirwa, S 1996. Le Leadership Burundais a Travers les Ages de la Politique: Revision et Perspective. *Au Coeur de l'Afrique*, 2-3: 260-283

\_\_\_\_\_ 1999. *A Retrieval of Aristotelian Virtue Ethics in African Social and Political Humanism: A Communitarian Perspective*. University of Natal Pietermaritzburg (Unpublished)

Ntibantunganya, S 1991. L'Afrique dans le Débat sur la Démocratisation. *Au Coeur de l'Afrique*, 2-3: 207-236.

Nürnberg, K 1998. *Beyond Marx and Market*. Pietermaritzburg: Cluster Publications.

\_\_\_\_\_ 1999. *Prosperity, Poverty & Pollution: Managing the Approaching Crisis*. Pietermaritzburg: Cluster Publications.

Nwagwu, MG 1999. Communion and Self-Reliance: Signs of Church as God's Family in Africa. *Africa Ecclesial Review*, 42(1-2):18-25.

Nyang'oro, J & Shaw, TS 1992. *Beyond Structural Adjustment in Africa: The Political Economy of Sustainable and Democratic Development*. New York: Praeger.

O'Connor, J 1994. Does a Global Village Warrant a Global Ethic? *Religion*, 24:155-164.

Ohmae, K 1990. *The Borderless World*. London: Collins.

\_\_\_\_\_ 1995. *The end of nation state: the rise of regional economies*. London: Collins

Okongwu, C SP 1999. Africa and the emerging World Order in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century: Challenges and Prospects. *Sedos*, 31(5): 147-153.



- Olsen, GR 1998. Europe and the Promotion of Democracy in Post Cold War Africa: How Serious is Europe and for What Reason? *African Affairs*, 343-367.
- Ottaway, F 1999. Le Redécoupage de l'Afrique: Un avenir apocalyptique Proposé et Discuté devant le Sénat Américain. <http://www.burundi.org.doc.353>.
- Panitch, L 1998. The State in a Changing World: Social Democratizing Global Capitalism. *Monthly Review*, 50(5): 11-22.
- Pannenberg, W 1970. *What is Man. Philadelphia*: Fortress Press.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 1985. *Anthropology from a theological perspective*. Philadelphia: Fortress Press.
- Paul, J II 1991. *Centenary of Rerum Novarum (Centesimus Annus)*. Pretoria: Southern Africa Catholic Bishops' Conference.
- Petrella, R 1996. Globalization and Internationalization: The Dynamics of the Emerging World Order, in Boyer, R & Drache, D (eds). *States against Markets: The Limits of Globalization*. London: Routledge.
- PNUD (Burundi) 1999. *Rapport sur le Developpement Humain au Burundi 1999: La Pauvreté au Burundi*. Bujumbura: Presses Lavigerie.
- Polanyi, K 1944. *Great Transformations*. New York: Rinehart.
- Pool, D 1993. The Link between Economic and Political Liberalisation, in T.Niblock and E.Murphy (eds). *Economic and Political Liberalisation in the Middle East*. London: British Academic Press.
- Potter, et al. (eds) 1997. *Democratization*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

***Projet d'Accord d'Arusha pour la Paix et la Reconciliation au Burundi.*** 2000

Purpel, DE 2000. Moral Education, in David Gabbard (ed). ***Knowledge and Power in the Global Economy***, 247-254. London: Lawrence Erlbaum Ass.

Reno, W 2000. Le Redecoupage de l'Afrique (2<sup>nd</sup> Part): War, Business, and the Centrality of Sovereignty in Africa. <http://www.burundi.org.doc.357>.

Reyntjens, F 1995. ***Burundi: Breaking the Cycle of Violence***. London: Minority Rights.

Riddell, RC 1999. The End of Foreign Aid to Africa? Concerns About Donor Policies. ***African Affairs***, 98:309-335.

Rifkin, J 1995. ***The End of Work: The Decline of the Global Labour Force and the Dawn of the Post-Market Era***. New York: Tarcher / Putnam Books.

Robertson, R 1992. ***Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture***. London: Sage.

Rodrick, D 1997. ***Has Globalization gone too far***. Washington: Institute for International Economics.

Rostow, WW 1990. ***The Stages of Economic Growth***, 3<sup>rd</sup> Edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Rugman, A 2000. ***The End of Globalization***. London: Random House.

Rugumamu, SM 1999. ***Globalization, Liberalization and Africa's Marginalization***. Harare: AAPS

Ruigrock, W & Tulder, RV 1995. ***The Logic of International Restructuring***. London: Routledge.

Sacks, JD et al 1998. Foreign Direct Investment in Africa, in World Economic Forum. *The Africa Competitiveness Report 1998*.

Saller, R 1998. Poverty, Honour and Obligation in Imperial Rome. *Criterion*,  
Spring/Summer 12-20

Sandel, M 1996. *Democracy's Discontent: America in Search of Public Philosophy*. Cambridge:  
The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

Sanks, T H 1999. Globalization and the Church's Social Mission. *Theological Studies*,  
60(4): 625-651.

Sassen, S 1998. *Globalization and Its Discontents*. New York: The New Press.

Scholte, JA 1993. *International Relations of Social Change*. Backingham: Open University

\_\_\_\_\_ 1997. Global capitalism and the state. *International Affairs*, 73(3): 427-452.

Schreiter, R 1997. *The New Catholicity: Theology between the Global and the Local*.  
New York: Orbis Books.

✓ Schwöbel, C 1991. Human Being as Relational Being: Twelve Theses for Christian Anthropology,  
in C. Schwöbel and C. E Gunton (eds). *Persons, Divine and Human*. 141-165. Edinburgh:  
T&T Clark

Sen, A 1987. *On Ethics and Economics*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Sherman, JH 1995. *Reinventing Marxism*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

- Shomonah, MD 1997. Praying the Lord's Prayer in a Global Economic Era. *Ecumenical Review*, 49 (4): 439-450.
- Shutte, A 1993. *Philosophy for Africa*. Cape Town: University of Cape Town Press.
- Simpson, JH 1996. The great reversal: selves, communities, and the global system. *Sociology of Religion*, 57(2):115-125.
- Sindayigaya, JM 2000. *Mondialisation: Le Nouvel Esclavage de l'Afrique*. Paris: L'Harmattan.
- Singer, D 1997. Why Marxism. *Monthly Review*, 49(60):1-5.
- Smith, A 1776. *An inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations*. London
- Sparks, DL 1998. Economic Trends in Africa South of the Sahara 1997, in *Africa South of the Sahara 1998*. London: Europa Publication.
- Spybey, T 1996. *Globalization and World Society*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Stakehouse, ML 1989. The theological challenge of globalization. *Christian Century*, 106(14): 468-471).
- Stark, R 1997. *The Rise of Christianity: A Sociologist Reconsiders History*. Francisco: Harper Collins
- Stokke, O (ed) 1995. *Aid and Political Conditionality*. London: Frank Cass.
- Strange, S 1996. *The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Sugiura, K 1999. *Institutional Economics Needs Interdisciplinary Studies of Social Sciences. Journal of Economic Issues*, 32(2): 257-264.

Sunkel, O 1993. From Inward-Looking Development to Development from Within, in O. Sunkel (ed). *Development from Within: Toward a Neo-structural Approach for Latin America*. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Tabb, WK 1999. Progressive Globalism: Challenging the Audacity of Capital. *Monthly Review*, 50(9):1-10.

Talbott, S 1995. The New Geopolitics: Defending Democracy in the Post-Cold War Era. *The World Today*, 51, 1 January.

Tarzi, S 1999. Financial Globalization and National Macroeconomic Policies: Managerial Challenges to the Nation-State. *The Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies*, 24(2): 141-161.

*The New Jerusalem Bible 1985*. London: Darton, Longman & Todd

Thurow, L 1996. *The Future of Capitalism: How Today's Economic Forces Shape Tomorrow's World*. New York: Penguin.

Uehlinger, C 1995. The Cry of the Earth? Biblical Perspectives on Ecology and Violence. *Concilium*, 5: 41-57.

UNCTAD 1996. *World Investment Report 1996: Investment Trade and International Policy Arrangement*. New York: United Nations.

Veseth, M 1998. *Selling Globalization: The Myth of the Global Economy*. London: Lynne Rienner.

Vincent, A 1987. *Theories of the State*. Oxford: Blackwell

Wallerstein, R 1980. *The Modern World-System II: Mercantilism and the Consolidation of the European World Economy 1600-1750*. New York: Academic Press.

Walzer, M 1983. *Spheres of Justice*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Waters, M 1995. *Globalization*. London: Routledge.

Weinstein, W 1976. *Burundi: Historical Dictionary of Burundi*.  
New York: The Scarecrow Press.

Weiss, L 1998. *State Capacity: Governing the Economy in a Global Era*.  
London: Routledge.

Wilfred, F 1998. Church's Commitment to the poor in the age of globalization. *Vidyajyoti Journal of Theological Reflection*, 62(2):79-95.

Wilson, F, et al 2000. Magicians of the Market. *New South African Outlook*, 2:1-5

Wogaman, P 1986. *Economics and Politics: A Christian Enquiry*. London: SCM Press

World Bank, 1997. *The State in a Changing World*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Wriston, W 1992. *The Twilight of Modernity*. New York: Charles Scribners Sons.