



**The threats of Northern Mozambique terrorist insurgencies for
Mozambique and the Southern African Development Community (SADC)
region.**

By

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Abstract

Terrorism is a global phenomenon. Since the SADC member states have gained independence from the chains of colonialism, the region has been characterised by the near absence of terrorism. The dominant perspective among academics and practitioners is that terrorism is prevalent in developed nations such as the West. This is due to their advanced economic and social systems, making it possibly more accessible for the extremists. However, recently, there has been a shift. Terrorist activities have expanded even to less developed nations, like in Africa. The study will examine the threats of Northern Mozambique terrorist insurgencies as the conflict can grow and transform into a serious regional conflict that would destabilise the SADC region and Africa.

The literature focuses on the different causes of the recent conflict and the response. Some have further ventured into providing resolutions. Guided by capacity theory, this study aims to contribute to the debate on Mozambique's current terrorist insurgencies. The study will identify possible threats posed by terrorists to Mozambique and the SADC region as an interconnected community. The study will further assess Mozambique's state capacity as a sovereign state and the Southern African Development Community's (SADC) regional capacity to deal with violent extremism.

A qualitative approach is adopted to ensure a comprehensive interpretation of data. The study is desktop by setting. Secondary data sources were used, mainly the official SADC communique on the conflict, peer-reviewed articles, books, news articles, and reports by humanitarian organisations on the conflict since 2017. The data gathered from the existing literature was analysed using the thematic analysis method. The findings show a strong correlation between state/regional capacity and lack of resources and their investment. The study explores local and regional organs, as it places importance on regionalism in dealing with extreme violence. The data shows that Mozambique and SADC have measures in place to deal with violent conflict; however, there were no direct measures or institutions designed to handle terrorism.

Ukucaphuna

Ubuphekula buyisenzakalo somhlaba wonke. Selokhu amazwe angamalungu e-SADC athola inkululeko emaketangeni obukoloni, lesi sifunda sibonakale ngokungabibikho kobushokobezi. Umbono ogqamile phakathi kwezifundiswa nabacwaningi ukuthi ubuphekula budlange emazweni asethuthukile njengaseNtshonalanga. Lokhu kungenxa yezinhlelo zabo ezithuthukile zezomnotho nezenhlalakahle, okwenza kube lula ukufinyeleleka kwabashisekeli. Nokho, muva nje sibone ushintsho. Izenzo zobuphekula zande ngisho emazweni angathuthukile njengase-Afrika. Ucwangingo luzohlola izinsongo zamaphekula aseNyakatho neMozambique njengoba ukungqubuzana kungase kukhule futhi kuguquke kube umbango onzima wesifunda ongaphazamisa isifunda se-SADC kanye ne-Afrika yonkana.

Ezincwadini, kugxilwe kwizimbangela ezehlukene zengxabano yakamuva kanye nezimpendulo. Abanye baye bazama futhi ukunikeza izinqumo. Ngokuqondiswa i-capacity theory, lolu cwangingo luhlose ukufaka isandla engxoxweni mayelana nezibhelu zodlame zamanje zaseMozambique. Ucwangingo luzohlolona izinsongo ezingase zibe amaphekula ku-Mozambique kanye nesifunda se-SADC njengomphakathi omadlela ndawonye. Lolu cwangingo luzophinde luhlale amandla ombuso/esifunda e-Mozambique njengombuso ozimele kanye neNhlangotho Yokuthuthukiswa Kwamazwe AseNingizimu ne-Afrika (i-SADC) ukubhekana nezenzo zabashokobezi.

Kulolucwaningo kusentshenziswe i-qualitative approach ukuze kuqinisekise ukuhunyushwa okuphelele kolwazi. Ucwangingo luyi-desk-top ngokusetha. Kwasetshenziswa imithombo yolwazi oluqoshiwe, ikakhulukazi inkulumbo esemthethweni ye-SADC mayelana nokungqubuzana, izihloko ezibuyekwezwe ontanga, izincwadi, izihloko zezindaba, nemibiko yezinhlangano ezisiza abantu mayelana nokungqubuzana kusukela ngo-2017. Ulwazi oluqoqwe emibhalweni ekhona yahlaziywa kusetshenziswa indlela yokuhlaziya ingqikithi. Okutholiwe kukhombisa ukhlobana okuqinile phakathi kwamandla wombuso/isifunda kanye nokuntuleka kwezinsiza kanye nokutshalwa kwezimali kwazo. Ucwangingo luhlola izinhlelo zendawo nezesifunda, njengoba lubeka ukubaluleka kwesifunda ukubhekana nodlame lwabashokobezi. Imininingwane ikhombisa ukuthi iMozambique kanye ne-SADC baneyinyathelo zokubhekana nezingxabano ezinodlame, nokho, azikho izinyathelo eziqondile kanye nezikhungo eziklanyelwe ukubhekana nobushokobezi.

Abbreviations

NCTCs- National Counter-Terrorism Centres

SADCC- Southern African Development Coordination Conference

MEC- Maritime Enforcement Capacity

SADC- Southern African Development Community

ECOWAS- Economic Community of West African States

IGAD- Inter-Governmental Authority on Development

AU- African Union

AUC- African Union Commission

UN- United Nations

DRC- Democratic Republic of Congo

US- United States

SA- South Africa

SALWs- Small Arms and Light Weapons

ASWJ- Ahlu Sunnah Wa-Jama

ISIL- Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant

FRELIMO- Frente de Libertacao Mocambique

RENAMO- Resistência Nacional Moçambicana

FADM-Mozambique Defence Force

LNG- Liquefied Natural Gas

SUPKEM- Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims

BAKWATA- Braza Kuu wa Islam WA Tanzania

UMSC- Uganda Muslim Supreme Council

NAM- Muslim Association of Malawi

CISLAMO- Islamic Council of Mozambique

SDGTs- Specially Designated Global Terrorists

DAG- Dyck Advisory Group

APSA - African Peace and Security Architecture

SAMIM- SADC Mission in Mozambique

SADC RCTC- Southern African Development Community Regional Counter Terrorism Centre

MEC- Maritime Enforcement Capacity

RISDP- Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan

RPTC- Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre

PSC- Peace and Security Council

CEWS- Continental Early Warning System

ASF- African Standby Force

GDP- Gross Domestic Product

ENDE-The Mozambique National Development Plan or Estratégia Nacional De Desenvolvimento

SPCPS- Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability

RECs- Regional Economic Communities

NEPAD- New Partnership for Africa's Development

COMESA- Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa

EAC- East African Community

CAADP- The Comprehensive African Agricultural Development Programme

REWC- Regional Early Warning Centre

NEWC- National Early Warning Centres

REWS- Regional Early Warning System

SSR- Security Sector Reforms

DDR- Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration

FDI- Foreign Direct Investment

LTTE- Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelan

COIN- Counterinsurgency

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Dedication

This study is dedicated to men, women and children who lost their lives and those who endured suffering caused by the current extreme violence in Mozambique, especially in the Northern province of Cabo Delgado and further to all those who have experienced the horrors of terrorism in Africa and the rest of the world.

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1. Chapter one: Introduction and Research background

1.1 Introduction: Setting the scene

It is worrisome to comprehend that Islamic extremists are present and active in Mozambique, the Northern region of Cabo Delgado in particular. The group said to be present in Mozambique is the Ahlu Sunnah Wa-Jama (ASWJ) or Ansar al-Sunna, locally known as Al Shabab. Al Shabab of Mozambique started as a group of disgruntled religious locals and later grew to have international connections with the Al Shabab of Somalia and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), also popularly known as ISIS.

The terrorist insurgencies in Northern Mozambique, Cabo Delgado province, have been happening since October 2017. It began as an uprising by Carbo Delgado youth in 2007, when disgruntled youth, especially from the Makua ethnic group, began opposing local religious authorities, mainly focusing on those close to the official Muslim Council of Mozambique. The Muslim religion dominates the Carbo Delgado province. In 2010, Mocimboa da Praia followed in joining the youth of Carbo Delgado, dominated by militants from the Mwami ethnic group, the largest ethnic group in Mocimboa da Praia. Their activism had elements of an Islamic tinge (International Crisis Group, 2021).

The Cabo Delgado region is nicknamed the '*Cabo Esquecido*' (Forgotten Cape). Since independence in 1975, land dispossession, impoverishment, war, natural disasters, and human rights violations have inflicted untold suffering on the population with no end in sight (Matsinhe, 2020). Observers of the recent conflict in the region believe that the region has been ripe for conflict, considering the underlying factors that haunt that part of Mozambique. The government, headquartered in Maputo, has neglected the province for a long time. There is a lack of opportunities and development for its people in the region. The people are easily recruited to join groups that challenge the government (International Crisis Group, 2021). The region appears to be engulfed by religious terrorism associated with the Islamic religion. The Islamic insurgency in Mozambique is an ongoing conflict between the Islamist extremists and Mozambican security forces. The insurgents target the civilians, recruiting and radicalising the youth of Cabo Delgado (Dos Santos, 2020).

Figure 1: Map of Mozambique.



Source: Neethling (2021).

At the beginning of 2020, the insurgents in Northern Mozambique escalated dramatically. Over 700000 people have been internally displaced, and over 2500 civilians have been killed. The insurgents have displayed terrible violence and have spread fear among the civilians. Civilians are killed deliberately; they burned villages and towns and committed wicked acts of violence with machetes, including several beheadings and desecration of dead bodies. Mozambican security forces are also accused of abusing civilians' rights, including the torture of suspected militants (Louv-Vaudran, 2021).

Historically, Mozambique has had weak security forces, and they have been unable to stem the current insurgencies, which are growing day by day. Foreigners, primarily Tanzanians from the north, joined the militants, fuelling the insurrection, motivated by grievances against the state that is failing to deliver for the people of Mozambique, which resulted in a jihadist war. The insurgencies are spreading and have the potential of spreading further to destabilise Mozambique, SADC, and Africa, presenting ISIS with a new front to exploit. The insurgency could disturb Mozambique's stability as it fulfils a peace deal between the ruling party, FRELIMO, and RENAMO's main opposition as they march to national elections in 2024 (International Crisis Group, 2021).

The rise of Islamic extremism in Mozambique's northern province of Cabo Delgado is attributed to multidimensional causes that are political, social, and economic (Dos Santos, 2020). The religions Islam and Christianity have a long history in Mozambique, and there are age-old tensions between the two. The ruling elites from Maputo, who formed the government, have a significant role in the ongoing conflict and the foreign companies benefiting from the natural resources of Cabo Delgado. The ruling elites and foreign companies are profiting from minerals exploration and other economic exploits with minimal recognisable benefits for the population of Cabo Delgado, which triggered renewed violent conflict in the province (Velthuizen, 2021).

The study will focus on Mozambique's insurgencies and their threats to Mozambique and the rest of the SADC region as an integrated community. It will further examine the state/regional capacity of Mozambique and SADC. There is not much attention given to Mozambique's recent conflict among scholars; as a result, there is not much information on the issue, also noting that authorities restrict information. Possible threats that Mozambique and the SADC region might face and their capacity to deal with terrorist activities need to be adequately studied and measured. The institutions, agreements, participation, and implementation need to be examined.

1.2 Definition of key terms

1.2.1 Terrorism

Terrorism is as old as human civilisation, with changes in methods, support, motivation and target. The fundamental characteristics of a terrorist act have not perhaps changed, but the associated tactics, targets, weapons, support systems and motivations have substantially changed. The concept of terrorism is very much contested, sometimes confusing, stemming from data tracking and analysis of contemporary acts of terrorism. Terrorism is an act consisting of at least four elements: a political goal/ motive, it is an act of violence, it is perpetrated against civilians (non-combatants), and it is staged to be performed in front of an audience to provoke fear amongst the population (Combs, 2022).

To fully clarify the concept of terrorism, Stohl (2020) identifies some myths associated with contemporary political terrorism. The myth that terrorism is exclusive to non-governmental organizations and individuals, terrorists are madmen and criminals, terrorism is a strategy of futility, terrorism is a result of few evil leaders, terrorism is exclusive to internal political conditions, governments always oppose non-governmental terrorism, and terrorism is just to create chaos (Stohl, 2020).

A new wave of terrorism hit the world in 2016 and 2017 with an outbreak of attacks by operations from the Islamic State in Iraq, Syria and those who identified with the group. The hopes that acts of terrorism as a global phenomenon are on the decline were dashed, and attacks continue by a great variety of groups around the world (Lutz, 2019). Most of the contemporary terrorism attacks are motivated and inspired by a mix of socio-political goals and personal grievances against their targets. Understanding the causes of anger became as crucial as punishing perpetrators (Combs, 2022).

Terrorism is a transnational problem that is not confined to a single state or jurisdiction. States have sponsored terrorism outside their borders and have applied terror as a tool against their population. Violence by revolutionaries and by the state poses a challenge to categorise as terrorism. The ultimate strategic aim of terrorism is to create conditions for a new regime or maintain the existing one. For a regime, terror is a message of strength, a warning engineered to intimidate and coerce compliance without the need to touch each citizen (Stohl, 2020) physically. The internet has become vital as a means of connection between the leaders of terrorist groups and their supporters, making it challenging for governments to monitor and prevent terrorism. Terrorism has become a big business, with huge budgets set for countering terrorism and sponsoring terrorism to advance interests. Groups and individuals linked to terrorist movements exist across the world, with cells of militants found in almost every state (Combs, 2022).

The media is a crucial element for terrorist groups. Communication and propaganda have an inevitable and primary role in both the terrorists' planning and the contemporary mass media's appetite to feed the public. Terrorists have goals that the media can help them achieve. Hence, terrorist groups must convey legitimacy, identity, and a clear sense of purpose and identify with those seeking similar political goals (Combs, 2022).

1.2.2 Terrorist insurgencies

Terrorism is not simply violence; it consists of violent actions to influence a broader audience to send a message precisely. Insurgents practice terrorism to publicise a cause or to demonstrate the weakness of the government of the day to apply pressure on it and its supporters. The audience's reaction is as important as the act of terror itself. For insurgents, the use of terror is to say, we exist; we must be heard; you may choose not to listen, only at significant risk. It is a message that can exist for an extended period; the message is broad, and the more extensive the message, the more successful the act. Insurgents choose their targets carefully to achieve maximum results (Stohl, 2020).

Insurgents and regimes seek to destabilise opposition forces and give an excuse for intervention, military buildups and meddling as a less costly engagement. The implementation techniques have no limits as the terrorist imagination, which includes armed attack, kidnapping, public executions, hijacking, bombing, arson, holding hostages, assassination, reprisal and publishing the list of dead individuals (Stohl, 2020).

1.2.3 Conflict and Terrorism

Conflict is the primary driver of terrorism, with the majority of terrorist-related deaths happening in nations engaged in violent conflict or with extreme levels of political terror, such as in Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East. In the developed world, issues like social alienation, lack of economic opportunities and state involvement in external conflict are the main drivers of terrorist activities (United Nations, 2020)

Conflict and violence are currently on the rise, with many contemporary conflicts waged between non-state actors such as political militias, criminal organisations, and international terrorist organisations. The dominant driver of conflict is the scarcity of resources exacerbated by climate change, illicit economic gains, a breakdown of the rule of law, absent or compromised state institutions and unresolved regional tensions. Furthermore, the regionalisation of conflict, which interlinks political, socio-economic and military issues across borders, has seen many conflicts become longer and more difficult to resolve using traditional forms of conflict resolution (United Nations, 2020).

1.2.4 State Capacity

The concept of state capacity is multi-dimensional; therefore, there have been fierce contestations by scholars over the concept. Lindval and Teorell (2016) define state capacity as a state's ability to get things done. They define state capacity as a form of power. State capacity is the ability to coerce, cajole, and persuade society members to conform to laws and directives (Lindval and Teorell, 2016).

State capacity refers to the government's ability to accomplish its policy goals. State capacity is significant for economic development. The distinction between developed and developing economies can mean that developing economies lack some degree of state capacity that prosperous states possess. The driving force of state capacity is the willingness of citizens to pay taxes to the state, which they regard as legitimate. This means that the population trusts their government, and the government is able to provide basic services. State capacity may

improve from the government's trust and legitimacy without external partners' financial incentives (Di Maro et al., 2021).

States with limited capacity may lack the ability to raise taxes to influence basic public services, enforce agreements and protect property rights. State capacity has been measured in economics as the ratio of government tax revenue to GDP. With substantial revenue, the government can invest in property rights protection and the establishment of law and order. State capacity involves investments by the national government in local government agencies to administer policies (Di Maro, 2021).

1.2.5 Regional Capacity

Regional capacity is a region's ability to respond to its population's needs, coordinate with various stakeholders, and provide training and advice (International Monetary Fund, 2024). Capacity includes all the strengths, attributes and resources at one organisation or community's disposal (SADC). Capacity includes resources such as human knowledge and skills, infrastructure, institutions and collective features such as social relationships, management and leadership (UNDRR, 2009).

1.2.6 State Capacity Building

Capacity-building is the process of developing the skills, instincts, abilities, processes and resources that organisations and communities require to serve their intended purpose. Transformation is a crucial element for capacity building, generated over an extended period (United Nations, 2021). The World Bank regards recruitment of key state personnel, adoption of technologies for property tax management, increase in locally owned sources of revenue, internal audits, urban planning records and establishment of tender boards for public procurement as essential measures to be taken by governments to build state capacity (Di Maro et al., 2021).

International development agencies invest in capacity-building projects to strengthen state institutions in developing nations. The practice of international development has shifted from financial transfers and political advocacy as a primary act in effecting development to focusing on institutions and gaining sovereignty. It has been proven that when state institutions are weak, developing countries cannot effectively apply sponsored aid to grow the economy (Di Maro et al., 2021).

1.3 Research problem and study rationale

The study aims to contribute to the existing literature on terrorist insurgencies in Mozambique. The focus is on Mozambique as a sovereign state and the SADC region as an intergovernmental organisation that promotes cooperation in the region. Critical investigations must be conducted on this kind of conflict since it negatively affects Mozambique, SADC, Africa, and the world. The war on terror is a global initiative. The study will investigate the terrorist insurgencies in Mozambique and identify their threats, exploring new areas and giving insights into imminent significant threats that may destabilise the progress that has been achieved in Mozambique and SADC. The study will also examine Mozambique's state/regional capacity and its regional body (SADC) by presenting valuable arguments supported by empirical evidence. The study will contribute to the discourse on national, regional, and international terrorism.

1.3.1 Research problems and objectives: Key questions to be asked:

- What threats do the terrorist insurgencies pose for Mozambique and the SADC region?
- To what extent can Mozambique and the SADC region deal with the terrorist insurgencies?
- Does Mozambique and SADC have the capacity to deal with terrorist insurgencies?
- What recommendations can be presented to resolve the conflict and build capacity?

1.3.2 Research problems and objectives: Broader issues to be investigated:

- To identify and evaluate the nature and the causes of the present terrorist insurgencies in Northern Mozambique.
- To investigate the threats of insurgencies to Mozambique and the SADC region.
- To examine the extent to which Mozambique and SADC can deal with terrorist insurgencies.
- To assess the capacity and the capabilities of Mozambique and SADC to deal with terrorist insurgencies.
- To identify and provide recommendations that can be implemented to resolve the conflict and build capacity.

1.4 Methodology and Methods

According to Bryman (2016), social research is a systematic way of investigating social problems or issues. Materials and sources are investigated to discover facts and come to new conclusions. Goddard and Melville (2004) assert that research is not just a process of collecting

data; it involves answering unanswered questions and being innovative with new ideas; it increases our knowledge base as humans. Research methodology is a systematic approach to solving a research problem; it is essentially a science that studies how scientific research is conducted. Taylor et al. (2015) also note that methodology is about how researchers approach issues and seek explanations. A researcher's purpose, interests, and assumptions shape the methodology of choice. According to Kothari (2004), a researcher follows a logical sequence when investigating and analysing a phenomenon.

According to Sturwing and Stead (2013), a desktop study is a process of gathering and analysing publicly available and usable information, whether on the Internet or in other kinds of media. Therefore, this study will apply the desktop data collection method. Desktop research is defined as a type of study that has few drawbacks; it is a way to obtain information that does not require the participation of humans as a sample; instead, it employs articles, books, and other publicly available sources of information as a sample. According to Bryman (2016), sampling is a critical element of any social research investigation and an unavoidable component. Data is obtained, analysed, and discussed on the research topic, and conclusions are offered. This study is based on secondary data analysis from academics and documents from multilateral institutions that have had rare access to Northern Mozambique, Cabo Delgado province, since the Mozambique Defence Force (FADM) limits access to reporting of the conflict.

This study will apply a qualitative research approach. Kothari (2004) states that the qualitative approach is concerned with the subjective assessment of behaviours and views; research in this approach is a function of the researcher's impressions and insights. Contrary to the quantitative approach, qualitative research generates results in a non-quantitative form, meaning that results are not subjected to rigorous quantitative analysis (Kothari, 2004). The approach adopted aligns well with the nature of the topic chosen. Qualitative research best understands and explains the complexities of social and political life, and it allows the researcher to learn and understand the underlying values of individuals or groups (Pierce, 2008). The study seeks to investigate the threats of Northern Mozambique terrorist insurgencies and state/regional capacity for Mozambique as a sovereign state and the SADC as an interconnected community in terms of socio-economic conditions.

NVivo is a qualitative data analysis software tool that is going to be utilised in this study. NVivo is a premier software for qualitative data analysis. The software permits qualitative

researchers to analyse data from journal articles, web pages, surveys, field notes and interviews. NVivo organises, analyses and visualises data, finding patterns and relationships (NVivo, 2024). Codes are central to understanding NVivo, and they allow the gathering of related information under one code or theme to find patterns and ideas. In NVivo, codes can be created manually or automatically (NVivo, 2024). This study will use both methods of building codes or themes manually and automatically, allowing the researcher to find hidden ideas. Codes or thematic data analysis will be used to uncover common concepts, themes, and patterns from previous studies on the subject.

Thematic analysis is a qualitative data analysis method that involves reading through a set of information and identifying patterns in meaning in the entire information collected. Thematic analysis is flexible and enables researchers to generate new insights and concepts derived from data (Braun and Clark, 2006). According to Boyatzis (1998), thematic analysis is a process applied to qualitative data, which demands clear coding by providing a list of themes. Saldana (2021) defines a qualitative analysis code as a symbolic phrase that earmarks, essence-captures, and evocatively attributes to a portion of language-based or visual data.

1.5 State Capacity Theory

The principal theory on which this study is based is the concept of state/regional capacity. The theory assists in explaining the phenomenon of terrorism within a state and or a region. It explains the variables that are responsible for terrorist insurgencies in Mozambique.

The concept of state capacity is multi-dimensional; therefore, there have been fierce contestations by scholars over the concept. Lindval and Teorell (2016) define state capacity as a state's ability to get things done. They define state capacity as a form of power. State capacity is the ability to coerce, cajole, and persuade society members to conform to laws and directives (Lindval and Teorell, 2016). They claim that this definition covers most of the other scholars' concepts. Also, most existing definitions and theories of state capacity are too closely tailored to explaining particular outcomes, such as economic growth, which limits the concept's applicability, arbitrarily impeding theory development. Moreover, state capacity can be defined more generally as the strength of the causal relationship between the policies that governments adopt and the outcomes they intend to achieve (Lindval and Teorell, 2016).

1.6 State capacity measurement and concepts

1.6.1 Coercive capacity

A state's primary component is its ability to exercise and monopolise power within its territories. Although this dimension served as the focal point of traditional macro-historical views of state creation, it was largely ignored until it came to light again in the early 2000s due to the numerous instances of state collapse that the world had experienced. The literature on conflicts in international relations started to reevaluate a state's ability to maintain control over its borders and prevent internal unrest through the use of armed force. Much of the economic literature that used limited government as a synonym for institutional maturity began to realise that a functional state must first exist to discuss executive restraints and property rights (Cingolani, 2013).

1.6.2 Fiscal capacity

This aspect highlights the state's ability to take resources from society, primarily in the form of taxes. On occasion, it also alludes to how effectively government expenditure is done. This capacity can be further associated with creating an oppressive system and war, as well as providing public goods in general. Measures of revenue raising are the typical proxy for capacity in these works, and the historical mechanisms by which states are able to centralise the tax system and enforce it on the larger population are crucial (Cingolani, 2013).

1.6.3 Administrative / Implementation Capacity

According to Cingolani (2013), the Weberian legacy of the contemporary state and the development of a professional and insulated bureaucracy lie at the foundation of the state's administrative competence. This bureaucracy is thought to be necessary for the impersonal implementation of programs and outliving monarchs. It is generally believed that implementation capability requires qualified officials and adequate financial resources, and only develops after a region has been effectively established as sovereign and under military rule. This aspect of state capacity is arguably the most frequently discussed in the literature and is commonly linked to good governance (Cingolani, 2013).

1.6.4 Relational Capacity

The state's relational capacity is another aspect of capacity followed by political sociology scholars, and the approach appears to be much broader than other aspects. It aims to demonstrate how much the state genuinely permeates society and can incorporate social interactions into its operations (Cingolani, 2013).

1.6.5 Legal capacity

The legal dimension of state capacity came with the limited government concept point of view. This places a focus on limiting the role of the state in society. Limitation is achieved by having a solid legal framework that permits reliable promises and contract enforcement. However, in recent years, this school has recognised the need to have a strong state as a requirement to support a market economy and, as a result, has tended to give parallel focus to coercive capacity in poor or fragile governments (Cingoloni, 2013).

1.6.6 Political capacity

State power is sometimes equated with political sway or the ability to make decisions. Hendrix (2010) states that linkages with state capacity are theoretically weaker than those with other dimensions. Political capacity typically refers to the amount of authority elected officials have accumulated to implement their policy preferences among the many institutional actors (Cingoloni, 2013).

1.6.7 State capacity and conflict

According to Cingoloni (2013), the 21st century saw an increase in failing or failed states, especially in sub-Saharan countries. This resulted in conflict studies and international relations beginning to take a special interest in state strength and capacity as potentially potent explanatory variables behind the outbreak of violence.

The interest in comprehending the state's function in development, a top priority on the political sociology agenda of the latter half of the 20th century, gave rise to the idea of state capacity. Prior to that, the state was mostly forgotten as a subject of study (Cingoloni, 2013).

1.7 State capacity as a form of power

Scholars have approached state capacity in various ways; for economists, the focus is on fiscal and economic growth, then those of conflict and those of environmental policies. The focus is to narrow down the concept of state capacity since it encompasses a lot of things. Lindvall and Teorell (2016) argue that state capacity should be treated as a form of power since it has significant implications for conceptualisation, theory and empirical research that some scholars who apply state capacity miss. The concept of state capacity is integrated into a broader theoretical contestation on how a state uses its resources to improve the effectiveness of the instruments or tools that states possess. Thus, state capacity, in this sense, is the power of a state to achieve desired outcomes and how a state uses or invests its resources to exert power over its territory. The state capacity is almost immeasurable if state capacity is a form of power and power as a causal effect. However, the approach identifies and measures the resources the

state utilises to gain power. Measuring resources is the best way to achieve empirical research evidence on state capacity (Linval and Teorell, 2016). The above approach will be used in this research to analyse the capacity of Mozambique as a sovereign state and further extend the analogy to regional capacity (SADC).

1.8 Limitations of the study

The foreseen limitation of this study is access to information on the conflict in Mozambique, the province of Cabo Delgado. Trustworthy information is scarce in the region, and researchers and journalists are harassed by the government and military personnel when gathering data on the ground. Further limitations are time constraints; the COVID-19 pandemic brings about uncertainties. Since this is desktop research, books, journals, and other sources of information at the libraries are not easily accessible due to COVID-19 regulations. The study will only focus on Mozambique and the SADC region to avoid being too large to complete. There are also many different types of terrorism; this study will focus on Islamic terrorism.

1.9 Structure of the Dissertation

The following dissertation will consist of five chapters:

Chapter One: Setting the scene consists of an introduction and background, setting the scene for the study. It will introduce the research problem statement and explain the importance of the topic and its far-reaching contributions. It will further consist of research questions, objectives, methodology, and the theoretical framework used to describe the phenomenon. It will finally give the structure of the dissertation.

Chapter Two: Literature review entails reviewed related literature on Mozambique terrorist activities and provides different arguments by scholars who have written on the discourse. It will further touch on the concept of state and regional capacity concerning conflict.

Chapter Three: Overview of regional institutions, SADC, AU, UN and Terrorism This chapter intends to look at the Southern African Development Community (SADC) as a regional body in relation to dealing with conflict, its measures and its structures. It will also give a brief overview of the African Union (AU) and the United Nations (UN) in relation to dealing with terrorism.

Chapter Four: Data Presentation and Interpretation The chapter will attempt to give answers to the research questions. It will critically analyse the threats of terrorist insurgencies in Mozambique and further investigate the state and regional capacity of Mozambique as a state and SADC as a regional body in relation to dealing with terrorism.

Chapter Five: Summary, Conclusions, and Recommendations The final chapter will provide a summary of the study and give conclusions. It will further provide recommendations.

1.10 Conclusion

Chapter One has given a detailed introduction highlighting the contents and structure of the study. Research questions and objectives have been given, and the study aims to give answers in the chapters to follow. State capacity theory and regional capacity have been discussed as frameworks of the research and will assist in assessing Mozambique and SADC capacity. Finally, NVivo qualitative data analysis tool has been given as the tool that has been applied to analyse data.

2. Chapter Two: Review of Related Literature

2.1 Introduction

The phenomenon of recent terrorist insurgencies in Northern Mozambique has drawn the attention of the global audience. Several scholars have engaged in a debate about Mozambique's violent extremists, of which some have looked at the issue from social exclusion perspective (Shinn, (2016), Faria, (2021), Mutasa and Muchemwa, (2021), El Ouassif and Kitenge, (2021), Morier-Genoud, (2019), Kgosi, (2021), Orre, and Rønning, (2017). In contrast, other scholars have looked at the issue from a governance and religious point of view (Sakota, 2020), Okunade et al. (2021), Afriyie and Arkorful (2021), Estelle and Darden (2021), Matsinhe and Valoi (2019), and Mukeredzi (2020).

This chapter explores and discusses the relevant existing literature on northern Mozambique terrorist insurgencies that began conducting their first major attacks in 2017. It is notably an ongoing conflict that is a threat not only to Mozambique but to the entire SADC region. Although there is current data on terrorist insurgencies in Mozambique, there is a gap in the literature that explicitly focuses on assessing the capacity of Mozambique as a state and that of SADC as a region to deal with terrorist insurgencies. The literature presented provides an in-depth understanding of the nature, causes, threats and some degree of state and regional capacity as a form of power.

2.2 Mozambique and the history of violence

Mozambique is no stranger to violent conflict. Mozambique's history of violence intersects with the present conditions. According to Sakota (2020), the history of conflict in Mozambique has conspired since 1890 to encourage insecurity, misgovernance, exclusion, and state-sponsored and non-state-sponsored terrorism. During colonial rule, terrorism and state-sponsored conflict by the Portuguese served as a foundation for the historical trajectory of violence, including extreme violence in northern Mozambique. The region frequently had state-sponsored terror directed at the natives, and natives conducted terror against the state, aiming to liberate the country (Sakota, 2020).

The post-independence conflict was carried forward. FRILIMO and RENAMO engaged in a 16-year war that resulted in millions losing their lives and livelihoods. The rule of FRELIMO excludes RENAMO, which prompts RENAMO to take up arms and occasionally conduct non-state-sponsored terror attacks. The base of the attacks is in the northern region, the stronghold of RENAMO. A sustained history of conflict has established Northern Mozambique as an enabler of the current conflict (Sakota, 2020).

2.3 Social exclusion

Social exclusion is a complex and multi-dimensional process. It involves the deprivation of resources, goods and services, rights, and the inability to participate in the normal relations and activities at the disposal of a broader population, whether in the economic, social, cultural, or political arenas. Deprivation affects individuals' quality of life and the entire population's equity and cohesion (Mack, 2016). What is evident throughout most of the literature is that the province of Carbo Delgado is plagued with inequalities throughout the population. There is a lack of opportunities and political and economic participation, which perpetuates poverty. The social exclusions lead to violence and extremism as a means to voice out grievances or as a career path.

2.4 Social exclusion perspective on terrorist insurgencies in Mozambique

Several scholars have approached the terrorist insurgencies in Mozambique from the social exclusion point of view. Estelle and Darden's (2021) analysis asserts that Mozambique's Islamic insurgencies are rooted in long-standing social and economic conditions. Exacerbated by recent economic changes in the region. Hanlon (2020) argues that material deprivation, particularly poverty, marginalisation, and lack of opportunities among young people, is at the centre of conflict, with the region serving merely as a rallying point.

For Matsinhe and Valoi (2019), the province of Cabo Delgado's economic and social conditions are among the factors contributing to the formation of malcontents and deviants. After decades of government neglect and exclusion, the province has continued to fall in the rankings. Most socioeconomic measures, such as illiteracy and unemployment, place it towards the bottom. Unemployment, lack of proper housing, a high rate of child marriage, large families, insufficient access to safe drinking water, poor sanitation, lack of resources and infrastructure, and low quality of social services are some of the region's characteristics (Matsinhe and Valoi, 2019).

Okudade et al. (2021) conducted a study comparing Boko Haram patterns in West Africa and recent insurgencies by Ansar al-Sunna in Southern Africa. They observed the similarities of the impulses that caused insurgency. It included economic exclusion. Underdevelopment and state-sponsored corruption push people into armed and extremist postures, becoming enemies of the corrupt and ineffectual government. Okunade et al. (2021) further assert that the causes of violent extremism and armed conflict in Mozambique are complex and embedded in the country's colonial history. The system of colonialism denied some demographics public goods, and that trend continued into the democratic era. Post-independence, under the Frelimo

government, the northern region and the province of Cabo Delgado are still in a deprivation situation since it is located far away from the capital, Maputo, which is in the southern region.

Economic challenges bolstered anti-government sentiments. The presence of partially hostile RENAMO towards FRELIMO orchestrates the use of force against the sitting government. The state's failure to fulfil its mandate led to the current insurgency; discriminatory political and economic conditions exacerbate a feeling of despondency among the victims. It is worth mentioning that Mozambique is at a high risk of food insecurity, and government food assistance does not fully reach the intended civilians due to rampant corruption. Alienation and disillusionment usually fuel the rise and prominence of insurgency. Social exclusion exposes Mozambique as a breeding ground for armed groups (Okunade et al., 2021). Okunade et al. (2021) also compared the Nigerian and Mozambique experiences regarding conflict. They observed that a shortage of essential resources under state control offered fertile ground for anti-government agitators to recruit disgruntled individuals.

Forquilla and Pereira (2021) also analysed the issue of insurgents because of contextual factors such as social, political and economic exclusions. They cited the problem of porous borders from the Tanzanian side and the existence of electronic and informal money transfer platforms. Relative deprivation in comparison with the elites from Maputo and the southern region and marginalisation among certain ethnic groups and Muslim factions from the north evoked discontent and an anti-government narrative. The government's disconnection with the region and its people opened a gap for ISIS and exposed local Islamic sects to training, weapons, and propaganda tools. They argue that the state's response to mass arrests and the destruction of mosques gave a boost to anti-government sentiments (Forquilla and Pereira, 2021).

2.5 Poverty and illiteracy in Carbo Delgado

Carbo Delgado is referred to as the forgotten region. The province has a population of about 2,478,039 and a higher proportion of youth. Out of 1,302,322, about 53% are under 18. The province is the fourth worst in terms of poverty. The 2017 census of Mozambique has shown that 140,217 children of both sexes aged 10–14 could not read and write, compared to only 123,838 who could do so. The illiterate group excels over the literate one by 16,379. Those in the age group of 15–29 were also poorly literate. Specifically, 166,848 males within the age group could read and write, whereas 90,313 could not. The figure for the females is that 144,918 could read and write, while 154,079 could not. Approximately 1,739,020 people live in rural areas, while only 528,695 reside in urban areas (Faria, 2020). Ultimately, inequality and marginalisation continue to ravage the community of Carbo Delgado. The longer the

conditions of inequality and marginalisation persist, the more the people will fall prey to extremists. (Faria, 2020).

2.6 Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Discovery and Conflict

Disagreements and minor conflicts regarding the Islamic religion can be traced back to 2007. A group of disgruntled youth denounced the authority of local religious leaders, who have close contact with the Muslim Council of Mozambique. They pushed for a new ideology and policies, which included the ban on alcohol, forbidding the kids to enrol in a state school and banning women's rights to work. Their economic exclusion fuelled this stunt amid the discovery of natural gas and precious stones. Artisanal miners from commercial mining concessions were expelled in 2017, which led to further discontent among locals. The desire to join militants has been less about the ideology of Islam and more about material gains, since there is a prevalence of unemployment and neglect. Many young individuals join extremist groups as a career move (International Crisis Group, 2021).

According to Stevan et al. (2021), the Conflict in Northern Mozambique is jeopardising a multibillion-dollar natural gas investment. They claim that the violence in the region is part of a larger story of capitalist infiltration into the periphery. Sinha (2021) states that foreign investments, as much as they have their positives, also present threats, but they also have their negatives in the region. The region is rich in natural resources and is home to three of Africa's major liquid natural gas (LNG) plants. There is a lack of transparency and a lack of cooperation with the locals. Karamaev (2021) notes that the insurgencies have disrupted economic activities, especially farming, thereby worsening food insecurity and possibly shutting down gas production, which is vital to the economy of Mozambique.

Considering Mozambique's poor governance and leadership, Matsinhe and Valoi (2019) assert that the Carbo Delgado region will continue its downward trend into poverty, misery, and strife despite its large deposits of mineral resources. The newly discovered natural resources will likely fuel rather than distinguish discontentment, bitterness, wretchedness, and extremism.

2.7 Governance

There is a strong belief among some scholars that the government of Mozambique neglects the Northern province of Cabo Delgado, and the lack of government services hardly affects the youth. It becomes a challenge for young people to be able to fulfil their goals. Faria (2020) asserts that negligence creates discontentment and detachment from the state, exposing the youth to any influence, for example, being open to radical preachers. Moreover, weak state

structures of governance, ineffective public institutions, corruption, and poverty are deeply exposed by the abundance of resources that have not yet materialised to benefit the locals (Faria, 2020).

As an epicentre of the conflict, Carbo Delgado province is situated in the Northern part of Mozambique. Matsinhe and Valoi (2019) have been monitoring and documenting the political situation in the region since the beginning of the attacks in October 2017. Their fieldwork included four districts, namely, Palma, Pemba, Mocimboa da Praia and Macomia, until 2019. They observed that Cabo Delgado is one of the poorest provinces in Mozambique (Matsinhe and Valoi, 2019). The province is located far away from the capital, Maputo, and the government seems to neglect the province's populace in terms of economic and social inclusion.

Negligence by the government may perpetrate the threat of terrorism. A study conducted by Bussotti (2020) found that in Mozambique, no specific measures were adopted to cope with the diffusion of terrorism, leaving radicalised forms of Islam to take shape in the province of Cabo Delgado. During the term of Guebuza, Mozambique had to face three potential threats, namely, Somali piracy in the country and RENAMO actions, neglecting the possibility of terrorist attacks. This was not based on objective risk analysis but on the political interest and interest of Mozambique's political elites, without the contribution of the general population. These actions allowed the Islamic groups to grow and eventually start conducting attacks in October 2017.

Matsinhe and Valoi (2019) assert that extremism is only possible and can find its feet when government officials are mainly concerned with self-interest over serving their people. The government of Mozambique has exercised half-mast sovereignty in the Cabo Delgado region for almost four decades. Since independence in 1975, the central authority has lacked a monopoly in relation to violence in Cabo Delgado and maintained precarious control over its borders. Mozambique also has a 2000 km long coastline that is poorly managed, exposing the country to illicit marine activities.

The 16-year civil war in Mozambique saw RENAMO settling in the northern provinces as its stronghold. RENAMO has a strong parliamentary representation and a large army of men, enjoying widespread support in the north and central provinces. For years, the ruling government of FRELIMO had tried to maintain a delicate balance between war and peace. Corruption in the region has almost become a norm, infiltrating nearly all government levels

and hindering the government from maintaining control, driving development, and bringing security. After the civil war, the ruling government never offered the nascent state an opportunity to take root following independence. As a result, the extremists saw an opportunity to exploit this weakness from the central authority and occupy the vacuum of the socio-political arena. They mobilised the illiterate, unemployed and unemployable youths who have been facing exclusion from their government. The youths have been brainwashed and formed an army that will unseat the ruling authority. The government is now desperate to exert control, making mistakes along the way. Mozambique is on the brink of becoming a failed state (Matsinhe and Valoi, 2019).

2.8 Islamic religion in Mozambique

The population of Mozambique is estimated to be 27.92 million by the government census conducted in 2019. Data shows that about 26,2% are Roman Catholics, 18,3% are Muslims, 15,1% are Christian Zionists, 14,7% Evangelical/Pentecostal, 1,6% Anglican and 4,7 others. 13,4% did not list as religious in the government census. Christianity and Islamism influenced the 13,4% that were not listed as religious in the government census since the government did not have a category for them. The regions adhere to syncretic Indigenous religious beliefs shaped by various African traditions, practices and aspects. Despite government census data, Muslim leaders claim that they account for 25-30% of the Mozambique population, a statistic that is frequently cited in the press (US Department of State, 2019).

The religion of Islam in Mozambique, mainly in the country's Northern region, existed among natives long before the arrival of the Portuguese in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. The trading Swahili coast community introduced the religion. The arrival of the Portuguese made the Islamic communities and sects be divided by race, between Africans and Indians that were brought in by the Portuguese, resulting in social, ideological, and, of course, racial divisions. The divisions among Islamic leadership have been visible and played out in relation to the state, the competing Muslim religious groups and international Islamic organisations in post-colonial Mozambique (Bonate, 2008).

Since 1981, the post-colonial era, after many hurdles and divisions between Muslim leaders in Mozambique. The FRELIMO government created a national Muslim organisation; the decision highly had a chance to influence East Africa, resulting in the creation of National Muslim Supreme Councils in Kenya (SUPKEM), Braza Kuu wa Islam WA Tanzania (BAKWATA) in Tanzania, Uganda Muslim's Supreme Council (UMSC) in Uganda and Muslim Association

Malawi (MAM). The creation of these Muslim organisations created an opportunity for East African Muslims to integrate into a united Muslim community (Bonate, 2008).

Typical of Muslim sects all around the world, there are ideological divisions among the Mozambique Muslims. The most prominent is between the Islamic congress, Sufis and the Islamic council, which are Wahhabis or Salafis and now the newly formed Ahl al-Sunna or Ansar al-Sunna. The new organisation was formed by elite leaders of Islam who separated from the Islamic Congress and Islamic Council after the Conflict that erupted between the followers in the 1980s and 200s (Bonate, 2008). The Ahl al-Sunna or Ansar al-Sunna is the group that is said to be behind the current Conflict in Northern Mozambique.

The constitution of Mozambique allows for the freedom of religious practices, gives citizens the right to participate or not participate in religious activities, and prohibits discrimination based on religion. The government can also control rights in the event of war, siege, or emergency. Faith-based political parties and religious symbols in politics are prohibited (US Department of State, 2019).

In Mozambique, the religious groups have the freedom to organise, worship and participate in building the society. However, with reports of violent extremism in the north, there have been some reports of rights violations by the security forces. Islamic Council (CISLAMO) reported that some of their members who dressed in traditional Islamic attire or had long beards risked detention, being accused of taking part in what the government labelled as violent extremists. Religious leaders at the national and provincial levels condemn the use of religion to fuel Conflict, and they encourage tolerance. They announced that violence does not form part of the Islamic religion (US Department of State, 2019).

2.9 Religious perspective on terrorist insurgencies in Mozambique

It is common for scholars to analyse the terrorist insurgencies in Mozambique through religion, Islamism in particular. According to Estelle and Darden (2021), the global Salafi-jihadi movement of the Islamic State is extending to the rest of the African continent. The authors cite that the emergence of northern Mozambique terrorist insurgencies is the latest case and testimony of Salafi-jihadi expansion. They hijack local conflict and link it to a broader Islamic state agenda. The conflict has the ambition to spread out to neighbouring countries, just like those in Mali and Somalia, establishing safe havens for extremist militants while executing the agenda of creating a humanitarian crisis (Estelle and Darde, 2021).

According to Estelle and Darde (2021), the current Salafi-jihadi insurgency conditions were set by ideological and generational schisms among Muslim leaders in northern Mozambique. The authors argue that the Wahhabi religion's education is at the centre of extremism. Wahhabism developed in the early 1990s. The Islamic educational programme was funded by non-governmental organisations, including travelling to North Africa, the Middle East, and Asia for religious studies. The education created an expectation mismatch in which students returning to northern Mozambique society did not find employment opportunities, resulting in gaps in the indigenous Sufi traditions. Afriyie and Arkoful (2021) add that the scholarship abroad resulted in a different ideology; it runs counter to Sufi-inspired Islam that has been practised in the region. The new fundamentalist have operated two mosques in Mocimboa da Praia to spread their doctrine. The children who attended the mosques a few years ago have reached the age of taking part in the militia (Afriyie and Arkoful, 2021).

Faria (2021) emphasises the influence of radical preachers who are present in Carbo Delgado. The situation of poverty and deprivation has opened an opportunity for radical preachers from Tanzania like Sheikh Hassan. The sheikhs carried out lectures, ensuring they touched on the issues involving youth, such as unemployment and poor living conditions. The preachers evoked questions in people's minds, questioning the abject poverty and misery they lived under, stating that Allah had provided mineral wealth for the people of Mocimboa da Praia. The preachers encouraged the jihadis and emphasised the importance of challenging the authorities and constructing a new social and political order (Faria, 2020).

A study conducted by Morier-Genoud (2020) tends to be different from others; the author argues that the Islamic sect that is present in Carbo Delgado aims to establish a counter-society ruled exclusively by the doctrine of Islamic law. Islamic law that has nothing to do with the Wahhabi Islamic council of Mozambique and Sufi Muslims, a majority in Cabo Delgado. The Wahhabi Islamic Council of Mozambique is against the new sect. The notion of counter-society is precisely what the jihadists embarked on, and they presented appealing ideas to the community. Appealing ideas such as forbidding state education, adopting a unique dress code, and rejecting state administration (Morier-Genoud, 2020). Columbo (2020) mentions that insurgents filmed a video in front of the police headquarters in Quissanga, where they rejected "the wealth of this world" and called for the implementation of Sharia law in the area. The rejection of the sect's new ideas by the authorities meant that there would be violence between the government and jihadists. Jihadists believed that the greater the opposition to violence by government forces, the wider the insurgency would be (Morier-Genoud, 2020).

2.10 Ahlu Sunnah Wa-Jama/ Ansar al-Sunna/Al Shabab of Mozambique

Dos Santos (2020) asserts that the extremist group that is present in Mozambique is Ahlu Sunnah Wa-Jama or Ansar al-Sunna, locally known as Al Shabab, who conducted various attacks in the province of Cabo Delgado. The Ansar Al-Sunna is a native extremist faction that has international connections, which include connections with the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), popularly known as ISIS. They seek to establish an Islamic state in the region.

Ansar al-Sunna emerged in 2015 in Carbo Delgado, the Northern province of Mozambique bordering Tanzania. It first emerged as a non-violent group until it conducted its first attack in 2017. Ansa al-Sunna has grown significantly since 2017, escalating its activities, resembling several other Islamist militant groups present on the African continent. They have achieved milestones in their insurgency that other Islamist groups have achieved (Burkart and Manasighe, 2020). Mutasa and Muchemwa (2021) assert that Ansar Al-Sunna currently has a clearly defined doctrine to establish a caliphate. However, they currently have no clear, visible or high-profile leader. The group is motivated by Ansar Al-Islam, an ideology from the Middle East of Salafism and the formation of an Islamic state or Muslim caliphate. The organisation imposes a strict Sharia law and rejects Christianity and the ideology of democracy as promoted by the West.

On the other hand, Morier-Genoud (2020), Amnesty International (2021), Heyen-Dubé, and Rands (2021) are of the view that the Al-Shabab that is present in Mozambique is not related to that of Somalia. However, the patterns and evidence show that they might have a relationship. Makonye (2020) states that research shows possible links between Ansar Al-Sunna and ISIS in Iran and Iraq, as well as Boko Haram in Nigeria. Undisputedly, the militia group in Mozambique started as sects; it was a small religious group that was locally regulated or contained and eventually developed into using guerrilla war tactics. They were referred to as religious banditry or deprived, marginalised local people who stood for criminal acts. Today, they are a fully-fledged terrorist group accountable for serious acts of terrorism (Karamaev, 2021).

2.11 Ansar al-Sunna Leadership

In August 2018, Mozambique authorities identified six men as leaders of Ansar al-Sunna in Carbo Delgado, namely, Abdul Faizal, Abdul Raim, Abdul Remane, Ibn Omar, Nuni Remane, and a person named Salimo. However, these names were announced without further details, including background and connections. Moreover, it is reported that there are more than 30 operational leaders and commanders of the Ansar al-Sunna organisation (Eisenhammer, 2018).

The leaders are reported to have connections with Congo, Kenya, Uganda, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Tanzania, and Sudan. The group is believed to have training camps in northern Tanzania, the Kibiti district of Tanzania and the African Great Lakes region (Bukarti and Munasinghe, 2020).

Moreover, Antony Blinken, the Secretary of State in the US, announced in August that they have designated five terrorist leaders in Africa, namely, Bonomade Machude Omar, Sidan ag Hitta, Salem ould Breihmatt, Ali Mohamed Rage and Abdikadir Mohamed Abdikadir, who were being designated as Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGTs) under Executive Order 13224, as amended (US Department of State, 2021). Bonomade Machude Omar, also known as Abu Sulayfa Muhammad or Ibn Omar, is the leader who is reportedly at the forefront of the Mozambique Islamic sect. He leads the military of Mozambique, and the External Affairs Department reports to him. The figure is the group's senior commander and primary coordinator for all attacks in northern Mozambique and the group's lead facilitator and communications conduit. Omar led one squad of gunmen during the March 2021 raid on Palma, while Abu Yasir Hassan, the leader of ISIS-Mozambique, led another group, and Omar also led the attack on the Amarula Hotel in Palma. Omar is responsible for attacks in Mozambique's Cabo Delgado Province and Tanzania's Mtwara Region (US Department of State, 2021).

2.12 Ansar al-Sunna Funding

Afriyie and Arkorful (2021) state that the huge amount of funding for the extremist group present in Mozambique comes from the trafficking of illegal rubies and wood, many of the precious resources that the province of Cabo Delgado is rich in. The organisation is estimated to make approximately \$3 million yearly selling timber and about \$30 million from selling rubies. The Carbo Delgado region is hardly administered; this perpetrates illegal activities such as creating a landing destination for heroin exports from the region to South Africa and Europe. The group is also linked to the illicit trading activities of ivory and contraband trafficking with Tanzanians, and extension to other African countries and further with Chinese and Vietnamese nationals. Other sources of funding come from donations from associated partners and individuals, fundamentalists from Kenya, Somalia, Tanzania, and the Great Lakes region of Africa (Afriyie and Arkorful, 2021).

According to Bukarti and Munasinghe (2020), Ansar al-Sunna has an improved financial network that can fund its operations, buy weapons and provide economic incentives to its recruits and financial support for their families and to start their businesses. Illicit activities such as the trade in ivory, wood, charcoal, and rubber provide funds. The funds ultimately

support military operations, international travel for leadership, and the enhancement of their propagandist machine, creating and producing videos. The benefits are very attractive to new recruits, including monthly salaries exceeding the minimum wage. This is also the case in other extremist groups in the Lake Chad Basin with Boko Haram, Somalia and al-Shabaab, Philippines and Maute and India with Hizbul Mujahideen (Bukarti and Munasinghe,2020).

2.13 Security in the region

Amnesty International (2021) and Mutasa and Muchemwa (2021) compare academic studies, press reports, and other witness testimonies of Mozambique Al Shabab to literature-based knowledge of Nigerian Boko Haram to assess the group's potential to expand into the Boko Haram of the Southern African region. They acknowledge that Mozambique is still the only country that is significantly affected by these insurgents; however, this could soon change and extend to other SADC countries if not correctly, timely, and strategically intervened. This was the case in Nigeria, where Boko Haram started small but today threatens the security of ECOWAS.

The insecurity threats in the SADC region are very much alive with its porous borders. As the insurgents in Mozambique continue to gain strength, the country, neighbouring states, and officials are very much concerned that the Conflict could be more attractive and invite fighters from abroad, the Jihadists, and become a platform for the world's most organised and powerful terrorist group, ISIS, and other groups that will bring more insecurity in the region (Crisis Group, 2021). Furthermore, unchecked free movement of people intensifies insecurity in the region. Without a doubt, the recent violence in Mozambique is a concern for neighbouring states, such as South Africa and Zimbabwe, and some pockets of violence have already begun to overspill into Tanzania. The conflict is not only a regional issue in Mozambique (Mwakudeu, 2021; Okunade et al., 2021).

2.14 Local and international response to Mozambique's violent extremism

In the initial stages of the attacks, the Mozambique government mishandled the conflict management. According to Okunade et al. (2021), the government of Mozambique disregarded the extremists' attacks, stating that it was solely acts of criminality by civilians. The acts of the Mozambique government, which ignored or overlooked the threats, exacerbated the attacks. Insurgency capacity and government strategy are the main factors determining the conflict's magnitude. Columbo (2020) states that the government's response has been contradictory; President Nyusi branded the insurgents a potential threat to national sovereignty, while Defence Minister Jaime Neto stated the security services had control of the situation. Furthermore, the

government of Mozambique mischaracterised the violence as extremism, which automatically led to a wrong strategy, which further resulted in worsened security conditions in the region, leading to young vulnerable individuals being recruited and the displacement of many others (Okunade et al.,2021).

The administration has retaliated by dispatching military forces to expel the intruders. It is believed the culprits are from the neighbouring country, Tanzania, who have radicalised local youth and recruited them to form part of the Islamic extremist group. An extrajudicial state of emergency and information censorship are two other notable tactics the Mozambican government took to combat the violence (Matsinhe and Valoi, 2019). Matsinhe and Valoi (2019) also found that the government suppresses information so that it does not leak to the outside world, and has suspended human rights in the area. Researchers and journalists alike are not allowed to report freely in the region, and government forces escort them. This limits the researcher's information and prompts them to rely mostly on literature-based analysis.

The government of Mozambique announced the approval of additional counter-terrorism legislation under the new law, the Legal Regime for Representation and Combating Terrorism. The law adds articles to the penal code that legitimise the punishment of anyone who commits terrorist acts, such as joining or training new recruits and jihadists. Mosques associated with Ansar al-Sunna had been closed. However, the closing of mosques has affected the wider community, leading to an erosion of government trust among the citizens (Bukarti and Munasighe, 2020).

According to Mlambo and Masuku (2021), the government's response to the insurrection follows a pattern seen throughout Africa. Military action has been prioritised in Libya, the Central African Republic, Mali, Nigeria, and Egypt, and Mozambique has followed suit. Military intervention, on the other hand, does not eliminate poverty and inequality, which have been identified as driving forces in the conflict in Mozambique. The army's use in Mozambique ignores the fact that the insurgency in the Cabo region is fuelled by socioeconomic exclusion. The emphasis has been on the need to squash the insurgency, with little consideration paid to the underlying root factors that are fuelling it. The army's deployment is motivated by the desire to safeguard one's property (Mlambo and Masuku, 2021).

Table 1: The Mozambican Government's Response to the Islamic State.

| Strengths | Weaknesses |
|--|---|
| Prior counterinsurgency and disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration experience. | Limited capabilities. |
| Willingness to request assistance. | Security-sector abuses and government corruption. |
| Ownership of response. | Political cleavages. |

Source: Estelle and Darden (2021).

Rwandan troops, deployed in July 2021 and supported by the Southern African Development Community and Mozambican troops, have regained control of the northeastern and coastal province of Cabo Delgado, reducing offshore attack risks. Insurgents have since broken up into smaller groups and spread across the interior of Cabo Delgado, Niassa, and Nampula provinces, increasing the likelihood of improvised explosive device attacks there. The violent extremism is likely to persist in the region, continuing the attacks, killing, kidnapping, extortion and destruction of property throughout 2022 (Crisis24, 2022).

2.15 State capacity in relation to terrorist insurgencies

There are multiple dimensions of state capacity and varied indicators of state capacity. This study will focus on state and regional capacity as a form of power.

The administration of Mozambique tends to downplay the attacks, with the president of Mozambique stating that the 2021 Palma attack was not more significant than something they have not seen yet. After the attack in the town of Palm that lasted about a week, several buildings were further burned down, and sounds of gunshots continued echoing almost daily. Only 5% of the civilians were able to be evacuated, leaving 95% to fend for themselves, fleeing on their own, unable to trust the government to save them (The New York Times, 2021). The government's reaction was contradictory; President Nyusi branded the insurgents as a potential threat to national sovereignty, while Defence Minister Jaime Neto stated that security services had control of the situation. Authorities arrested 50 people in connection with the attacks but did not reveal their identities or their affiliations to the insurgency, raising questions about due process and illegal detentions (Columbo, 2020).

Since 2020, the Mozambique government has been very open to foreign assistance, including SADC forces. Columbo (2020) notes that the recent attacks repeatedly prompted Mozambique officials to plead for security assistance, particularly for Cabo Delgado. During the January UK-Africa Summit, President Nyusi called for foreign assistance to face the country's internal security challenges. Officials from Mozambique signed a security memorandum of understanding with several nations, including Egypt, India, and Russia, which might aid with security training and equipment (Columbo, 2020).

According to Mlambo and Masuku (2021), the Islamic insurgency operating in northern Mozambique is flexing an increased tactical capacity, outmanoeuvring a government that is characterised by strategic mistakes and a lack of capacity. The government's shortfalls prove it cannot entirely turn the tide on insurgents. The frequent attacks on the security forces, government infrastructure and civilians reflect increased sophistication, planning and confidence while managing to win public support (Columbo, 2020).

The government and security services of Mozambique are evidently struggling. Local reports have at times reported that the security services did not defend Mocimboa da Praia or Quissanga. The forces sometimes shed their uniforms to blend with the civilians and avoid combat. The act attracted criticism from Carbo Delgado residents and was criticised by the catholic bishop of Pemba. There once surfaced a video of Mozambique soldiers complaining of low morale (Columbo, 2020).

The New York Times (2021) conducted a visual investigation in the affected region of Palma in 2021 and observed that the government forces of Mozambique could not defend Palma, leaving civilians to fend for themselves against the insurgents and evacuations of civilians in Palma after the attack had to be organised by private companies. The security forces were overwhelmed, and the troops were under-resourced. The New York Times (2021) further states that the attack in Palma was not a question of “if it could happen”; it was a question of “when it will happen”. This suggests that the intelligence and the military forces were not ready or did not have the means to defend Palma from an inevitable attack.

Palma is Africa’s largest foreign direct investment site, and it is an LNG gas project by Total Energies. The site seems to be more critical of the Mozambique government. Total struck a deal with the Mozambique government for security around the site. The site became more secure than the town of Palma. It is claimed that forces retreated from Palma when insurgents attacked; a survivor testified that there were few military personnel in Palma, and few had the

courage to fight. Over 750 soldiers stationed at the LNG site stayed inside the facility instead of rushing into the city as backup (The New York Times, 2021).

The forces failed to defend government offices, Palma business park, banks, military and police buildings. The Dyck Advisory Group (DAG), an army contractor from S.A, intervened in the situation in Palma, evacuating civilians and providing security. The Mozambique government hired them to fight the insurgencies. DAG is one of the only Mozambique actors capable of accurately conducting rescues. They intervened on their instructions without explicit instruction from the Mozambique government; there was no government oversight. Palma experienced a weeklong attack, with little or no show from the government security forces (The New York Times, 2021).

Hendrix and Young (2014) argue that military capacity may give rise to terrorism capacity while bureaucratic means suppress them. Cullen, Hendrix and Young (2014) find that terrorist assaults are more usually directed towards militaries with significant technological sophistication, as opposed to those with more excellent administrative and bureaucratic capacity. They further gave a contrast between two militarily strong nations, France and Russia, that have recently experienced different encounters with terrorism. They found that nations can be capable in various ways, and these varying capabilities lead to multiple incentives for utilising terror as a strategic and tactical instrument.

Martin (2019) contends that the state response to terrorist threats determines the growth and success of extremist groups in the developing world. When the state is unable to address domestic problems, it cannot correctly address any resulting violence. The state might not be seen as having the power to stop a movement as a segment of the populace radicalises under a particular ideological cause.

2.16 Administration and Management Capacity

According to Reddy and Kauzya (2015), capacity development has since extended beyond the individual level in terms of knowledge and skills to the quality of leadership and management of public organisations and institutions. Typical of African states, public administration is characterised by a shortage of personnel. Administration is a complex job that requires strong and diverse capabilities. Through policies and strategies of decentralisation, African domestic governments are the basis for local-level development, often characterised by low levels of resources. Public employees in political, administrative, managerial and technical apparatuses

are pressured to create and put into use decisions on highly complex matters, hindering effective development in their constituencies (Reddy and Kauzya, 2015).

Public administration capacity in local governments requires development to realise sociopolitical and economic development goals. This will bring about positive change, alleviating abject poverty in the local communities. Governance decentralisation may improve relations between the state and its population and the effectiveness of government services. Additionally, SADC member states face similar challenges and capacity gaps at individual, institutional and systematic levels. The gaps are in relation to the lack of resources, availability of a few skilled employees who also leave for better-paying jobs and there is a lack of political will to decentralise government sectors so that they will effectively serve communities that are at the grass root level of the population (Reddy and Kauzya, 2015).

2.17 Maritime enforcement capacity

A state's capacity for monitoring its territorial waters and exclusive economic zones and enforcing maritime laws, such as those that target trafficking rings and illicit, unreported, and unregulated fishing, is known as maritime enforcement capacity (MEC) (Moss, 2020). States with strong maritime law enforcement capabilities can patrol their seas, execute operations to guard against intra- and inter-regional threats and react quickly to dangers involving the ocean. They can also successfully apprehend transnational criminal actors. Even the most advanced marine security laws are meaningless without robust maritime enforcement capabilities, a fact that bad actors actively and deliberately take advantage of (Moss, 2020).

Mozambique has an MEC score of 31/100 on the Stable Seas' maritime security index. The score is the fourth lowest in southern Africa. Mozambique's capability to control its territorial waters is extremely limited. The Mozambican coast is the fourth longest in Africa. It challenges an undeveloped navy with limited operational capacity to enforce maritime security along the coast. The Navy only has about 12 patrol and coastal combatant vessels that are short of assets for service and training, which is quietly avoided due to a lack of fuel (Moss, 2020).

Moreover, Mozambique had about 200 active naval forces personnel compared to 11,200 FADM troops in 2020 (Moss, 2020). However, it is essential to note that Mozambique has made some efforts to improve its maritime enforcement capacity over recent years. They have engaged in bilateral maritime cooperation agreements, regional maritime exercises, and asset procurement. Ultimately, the MEC is limited to the rise of extremists who have terrorised the coastal towns (Moss, 2020). Furthermore, limited MEC allows violent non-state actors to

exploit the shortcomings directly and indirectly. The exploitation of diminished interdiction capabilities limited operational assets and strategic confusion (Moss, 2020). The state of Mozambique is characterised by limited statehood, the inability of a state to implement or enforce political decisions and maintain a monopoly on the use of force within its territory (Neethling, 2021).

2.18 Present and Future Capacity for Mozambique

A study by the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), *African Futures*, published in 2024, examined the development path trajectory. The study reveals the current and possible trajectory for Mozambique's development situation and state capacity by reflecting realistic policy interventions across eight sectors: agriculture, demographics and health, financial flows, manufacturing and trade. It is stated that Mozambique faces prominent challenges to development that hinder state progress. Mozambique is characterised by a weak government, corruption, low agricultural production, limited economic diversification, slow demographic transition, and infrastructure and human capital hindering state capacity (Yeboua and Chipanda, 2024).

The modelling was done using the ambitious future goals agreed upon on Agenda 2063 and targets set out in the National Development Strategy 2023-2043. The study concluded that, despite Mozambique's newfound raw minerals boost that the state will receive over the next coming years, like the LNG, will likely continue to have a significant number of people living in extreme poverty by 2043, implying that the current path Mozambique is leading is not a good option. Scenarios simulating realistic policy ambitions and interventions across eight sectors revealed that infrastructure development will have the most impact; however, infrastructure alone will be unlikely to change the present situation. Integrated advancements will be needed across all key sectors; progress will depend on the quality of governance and institutions, as weak governance leads to public financial mismanagement, macroeconomic instability and poor policy implementation. Additionally, improving governance transparency and effectiveness is essential as an initial step, as corruption negatively impacts a country's ability to deliver relevant services, economic growth, and sustainable economic development (Yeboua and Chipanda, 2024).

Like most African nations, Mozambique is capable and efficient at setting targets and putting policies in place; however, implementation proves to be a challenge. Policies aligned with the Mozambique National Development Strategy's pillars are essential to achieve. The success will also require commitment and dedication from the Mozambique authorities. Moreover,

Mozambique remains one of the poorest countries in the world, with GDP per capita estimated to be US\$450 in 2023 and with significant rates of poverty and inequality. Between 1993, post-civil war and 2015, Mozambique was considered to be one of Africa's fastest-growing economies, with an 8% annual average rate. Political and macroeconomic factors were behind the growth, and the country saw increased foreign direct investment (FDI) across extractive sectors. Post-2015, the nation witnessed a decline, averaging 3%, due to various management challenges, including the reports of the Mozambique government's hidden debts, the eruption of insurgencies, natural disasters and recently, COVID-19. Unemployment, inequality, and poverty have since persisted (Yeboua and Chipanda, 2024).

2.19 Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability (SPCPS)

SPCPS is an initiative or a plan by the US government to assist Mozambique in building capacity. The US aims to partner with Mozambique to stabilise conflict-affected regions and build lasting peace and resilience. The US recognises that the ISIS-Mozambique insurgency has committed acts of extreme violence in Northern Mozambique, in particular. The population is subjected to beheadings, killings, recruitment of militias against their will, rape, sexual slavery and child abduction. The SPCPS is a 10-year-long plan that will run from 2022 to 2032, delivering a phased approach to achieve its goals. The plan strengthens and empowers Mozambique's people, communities, and institutions to bring about reliable stability by developing open political participation and governance, sustainable and inclusive economic development, responsible justice sectors, overall security, and resilient social compactness. Moreover, the strategy aims to integrate the US's extensive and continuing security boost, economic development boost, strategic communications actions and diplomatic engagement with the Mozambique government and other domestic partners (US Embassy in Mozambique, 2024).

2.20 The Mozambican National Development Plan/ Estratégia Nacional De Desenvolvimento (ENDE) 2023-2043

The national development plan 2023-2043 is a long-term compass for the Mozambique development process. The plan's objectives are improving infrastructure, productivity, competitiveness, basic services, economic diversification, government transparency, sustainable environment, social inclusion, and reducing inequalities. The above will be achieved through ENDE's five main pillars: economic transformation, social and demographic transformation, infrastructure, environment and governance (Yeboua and Chipanda, 2024).

2.21 Regional capacity in relation to terrorist insurgencies

The actions of the Mozambique government in mischaracterising and mismanaging the conflict in the country further extend to the fact that the Mozambique government had little faith in the regional body, SADC, to intervene successfully. SADC also engaged in a passive approach. The response was opposite to what was transpiring on the ground, disregarding the visible hints. Chikohomero (2020) mentions that, in seeking assistance from outside parties and individual SADC countries, the Mozambican government exposed the distrust that exists among SADC member states and, in a sense, implicitly admits Mozambique and SADC are incompetent in countering the terrorist insurgency threats. The government enlisted private security agencies in Russia, Zimbabwe, and South Africa. The Mozambican government saw the need to contact SADC for aid only two years after the terrorist attacks began (Chikohomero, 2020).

Mozambique is a regional East African counterterrorism member with security synergy with Russia, the United Kingdom, India, Uganda, Malawi and Tanzania. Regionally, Mozambique is part of the SADC Organ on Security, Defence, Politics and Security Cooperation. Mozambique has the Prevention of terrorism act but lacks strong collaboration with SADC on counter-terrorism (US Department of State, 2019). The SADC region had no organ that dealt with terrorism in particular until the establishment of the SADC Regional Counter-Terrorism Centre (SADC RCTC) in February 2022.

2.22 SADC region capacity gaps and strengths

The capacity of regional economic communities (RECs) plays a decisive role in Africa's ability to achieve sustainable regional integration, bringing about development and sustainable peace. RECs are viewed as the pillars of practical development in AU's Agenda 2063 vision and strategy, African consensus position on development effectiveness and the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) (NEPAD.org, 2022).

Capacity gaps in the areas of governance and oversight characterise SADC. Complex structures of policy formulation and decision-making exist. The officials face time-consuming tasks such as organising heads of state summits and governments effectively and efficiently. The officials conducting these complex tasks do not have training or effective systems to generate fit decision-oriented documents, so management efficiencies should be improved to affect functionality. Furthermore, SADC, like many other AU RECs, faces challenges of strategy and planning and annual long-term planning for approval due to the evolving nature of mandates and the unreliability of funding—developing oriented frameworks and utilising them as useful

monitoring tools is challenging. Ultimately, the region is characterised by a planning capacity gap (NEPAD.org, 2022).

Citizen participation and communication pose a more significant challenge for SADC in securing population interest and participation. An optimal mechanism is absent to secure constant stakeholder engagement (NEPAD.org, 2022). Civil society and women at large appear to be excluded from conflict prevention activities. The role played by women's groups and civil society is limited. The exclusion of other social groups limits the organisation's capacity (Otobo, 2024).

SADC's capacity for organisational development is limited, and there is no balance between expectations and resources. The institution has been evolving and getting more prominent on the basis of new mandates; this requires constant re-adjustments of structures and engagement in change processes for better outcomes. Additionally, resource mobilisation and finance challenges exist, as member states need to pay their dues. Financial management systems' capacity for reporting purposes is limited; day-to-day expenditure management has challenges and a lack of accountability (NEPAD.org, 2022).

The SADC region is also making significant strides in some areas to enhance capacity. SADC has been engaged in institutional transformation under its Secretariat Institutional Reform Coordinating Committee. The initiative is aimed at improving structure, systems and staff capacity. The SADC region has made strides in capacity enhancements in peace and security by partnering with the AU. The partnering in the areas of development of early warning systems, exchange of knowledge and collective tasks of monitoring elections and coordination through the African governance architecture; however, the progress of these initiatives has been slow (NEPAD.org, 2022).

SADC is characterised by several technical challenges and constraints regarding conflict prevention structures and how it conducts its duties. SADC Regional Early Warning System (REWS) was implemented in 2010; however, only 8 out of 16 member states have established secure lines of communication with the Regional Early Warning Centre (REWC) with regional headquarters in Botswana, Gaborone. The REWC situation room is understaffed; it does not operate for 24 hours as it is supposed to. There is a lack of skilled workers; additional qualified staff members are required to strengthen the work on Security Sector Reforms (SSR) and Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) to effectively support member states (Otobo, 2024).

There exists a significant absence of regulation in the flow of reports from all the National Early Warning Centres (NEWC) to RCWC, negatively impacting REWC's ability to have complete information with regards to rising and changing threats to peace and security in SADC and putting in place fitting preventative measures. Additionally, the AU African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) programme funding to SADC divisions is irregular. Budget cycles from these two institutions are passed in different seasons, hindering the coordination and implementation of programmes. The AU budget year runs from January to December, while the SADC budget year runs from April to March. The financial support from AU APSA to implement the region's tasks ended up being ineffective (Otobo, 2024).

Significant economic integration initiatives have been in the economic development and trade sector; however, there is not much evidence of focused capacity enhancement initiatives. Regarding the agriculture and environment sector, SADC is a party to the Comprehensive African Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP), a part of the Agenda 2063 to eliminate hunger and poverty in Africa. However, there are limited active capacity strategies for agriculture and environmental issues. Additionally, there is a range of infrastructure projects and initiatives and strong support from this front, indicating some element of capacity development (NEPAD.org, 2022).

2.24 Conclusion

The literature above has revealed contentions on the issue of Mozambique terrorist insurgencies. Scholars have argued about complex matters in relation to the nature, causes, and implications of the ongoing conflict in Mozambique. The arguments revolved around social, political and economic challenges. It is, therefore, with the above contentions that this study seeks to assess. The study assesses Mozambique and the SADC state and regional capacity as a form of power to deal with the ongoing terrorist insurgencies. The literature on the discourse has mostly been concerned with investigating the nature, causes, and implications of the conflict, and there is very little on examining the capacity of Mozambique as a state to deal with the conflict and SADC's capacity as a regional body. The study will further identify the threats that could have been experienced or are already experienced by Mozambique and the SADC region.

3. Chapter Three: Overview of regional institutions, SADC, African Union (AU), United Nations (UN) and Terrorism.

3.1 Overview of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Region

This chapter explores regional organs that form part of peace and security structures, as the institutions that are tasked with maintaining peace and security, SADC and AU, among others, will be discussed, as well as their initiative towards preventing and countering terrorism and violent crimes. These institutions are crucial in thwarting extreme violence threats and building state and regional capacity.

The Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) is the predecessor of SADC, established in 1980 in Lusaka, Zambia. The SADCC was created to support national political liberation in the southern African region and to move away from depending on apartheid South Africa, which was a powerhouse in the region. The organisation was to facilitate coordination and use each member state's capabilities to gain advantage (SADC, 2022). The SADC was established in 1992 following the agreement of the heads of government to transform the SDCC into SADC. The initial focus of SADC was regional integration to boost economic development. Albuquerque and Wiklund (2015) also add that the primary purpose for the establishment of the organisation was economic integration; they further adopted a defence and security-oriented posture from the anti-colonial and anti-apartheid Southern African organisation (Frontline states), which came to an end in 1994. The regional bloc consists of 16 member states: Angola, Botswana, DR Congo, Comoros, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

The SADC Treaty was signed in 1992 and further amended in 2001. The main objectives of the SADC treaty include supporting the socially disadvantaged through regional integration, reducing poverty, gaining economic growth and development and improving the standard of living for the people of southern Africa. Regional integration, democratic principles and equitable and sustainable development are the conditions for successful objectives (SADC, 2022). SADC comprises 8 institutions: the summit of Heads of State or Government, Council of Ministers, Secretariat, Tribunal, Troika, Standing Committee of Officials, SADC National Committees and the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation. Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) also forms part and parcel of the treaty; the plan is based on strategic priorities of SADC and the Common Agenda, is designed to provide strategic

direction with respect to SADC projects, programmes and other vital dealings of the organisation (SADC, 2022).

For the longest time, southern Africa was considered a region where terror less often infiltrated. However, the region was not spared the challenges of peace and security. Democracy and governance deficits, political crises and armed conflict are factors that primarily influence state and human insecurity (Albuquerque and Wiklund, 2015). SADC is the region's principal organisation for security cooperation and the regional participant in the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). SADC member states share a lot in common, and most countries and liberation political parties worked together during times of liberation struggles. SADC was the last region to be free from colonial rule. Despite cultural and ethnic diversity in southern Africa, the region shares significant historical commonalities. The levels of human development in the region are much higher than those of other regions in sub-Saharan Africa, and there is high income inequality. The shared historical ties contribute to a sense of brotherhood and define regional cooperation in many aspects (Albuquerque and Wiklund, 2015).

3.2 Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation

The organ on politics, defence and security cooperation was launched in 1996, marking the milestone that began the transformation of SADCC into SADC in 1992. Moreover, it marked a new process to build and maintain security in the southern African region through a formal institution and the building of the institution's structure (Van Aardt, 1996). The organ on politics, defence and security has a mandate to provide the basis of peace and stability in the SADC region. This is a requirement for realising socio-economic development objectives, regional integration and eradication of poverty as espoused in the SADC Vision 2050 and the RISDP 2020-2030. The directorate includes politics and diplomacy, defence, state security, public security, regional security, policing and regional peacekeeping. The protocol on politics, defence and security cooperation guides the directorate. The primary purpose is to promote peace and security, protect the region's inhabitants from instability that the breakdown of law and order may cause, put standard policy in place and cooperate on defence and security issues (SADC, 2022).

3.3 SADC Standby Force

The SADC standby force, also known as the Brigade, launched in 2008, is made up of military, police, and civilians from SADC member states. The Brigade is an instrument of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation. It's under the guidance of the committee

of SADC police chiefs and a committee of chiefs of defence staff. The brigade participates in missions envisaged in Article 13 of the mandate of peace and security protocol relating to the establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union. The mandate includes taking action for peace and security restoration at member states' request, actively preventing conflict in the region or the resurgence of violence after agreements, observing and monitoring missions, and mainly supporting peace initiatives (SADC, 2022).

The SADC Brigade supports regional peace operations under the African Standby Force Policy Framework. The Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre (RPTC), located in Zimbabwe, serves as a training centre for participants. Training at all levels is considered an essential exercise for participants to be effective (SADC, 2022). The trainings aim to boost and equip participants by sharing critical skills and techniques, such as mastering the appropriate behaviours for effective coordination and execution. The RPTC has also assisted in equipping peacekeeping practitioners in other SADC sister regions on the African continent. The SADC Standby Force, or the Brigade, does not have a physical presence; the force is constituted when necessary to respond. SADC appoints a force commander, commissioner of police and head of the civilian to spearhead that particular mission. Moreover, the size of the regional force is not fixed; it depends on the mission's nature and the member states' ability to contribute. The SADC summit is responsible for authoring the mission (Sikuka, 2021).

3.4 The SADC Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM)

In 2021, the SADC bloc deployed the SADC Standby Force to intervene in the northern Mozambique conflict. Eight member states contribute personnel to SAMIM: Angola, Botswana, DRC, Lesotho, Malawi, South Africa, Tanzania and Zambia. The SAMIM works together with the Mozambican force FADM and other actors present. The mandate is to assist Mozambique law enforcement authorities in combating terrorism and extreme violence in Cabo Delgado. SAMIM is tasked to neutralise terrorism threats and restore law, order, and security (SADC, 2021).

According to SADC (2021), SAMIM has recorded several milestones. That is dislodging terrorists from their bases, confiscating weapons and warfare equipment and recapturing villages that were in the hands of extremists. This has created welcomed relief from the locals, created a secure environment for safer passage of humanitarian assistance, and changed the situation for locals who were displaced to return to their homes and pursue everyday life again. Deleglise (2021) argues that deploying SAMIM is not necessarily about peace support but a counterinsurgency and counter-terrorism operation. According to Deleglise (2021), the

SAMIM faces five significant challenges. The first challenge mentioned is that the conflict is complex, requiring SAMIM to toe the line and avoid over-securitisation in political and socio-economic issues. Secondly, the capability of SAMIM and operational preparedness are taken into consideration, taking into consideration that SADC has less experience in combating violent conflict as a unit. Thirdly, SADC has no experience in countering terrorism and preventing violent extremism. The fourth issue concerns the presence of many actors in Cabo Delgado involved in the matter, and finally, SAMIM alone is not enough; the region needs to be innovative and develop counter-terrorism strategies (Deleglise, 2021).

3.5 Counter-Terrorism Strategy

SADC also adopted a Counter-Terrorism Strategy in 2015 to strengthen the region's peace and security architecture by enabling a common approach. This collective approach includes sharing information on suspected terrorists, enacting and reviewing legislation at the national level on preventing and combating terrorism, and strengthening the capacity of the Financial Intelligence Units (Sikuka, 2021). SADC and intervention in extreme violence

In accordance with SADC protocol, the Organ on politics, defence and security intervened in 2021, responding to the call from the Mozambican government to assist in combating the extremists. However, the process was not smooth sailing. Bussoti and Coimbra (2023) state that SADC's challenges in planning the military intervention in Mozambique revealed a lack of "SADCnesses" or a shared mission and vision within this group.

Comprehensive legislation and policies, quick development of national counterterrorism strategies and plans of action, strengthening of NCTCs and financial intelligence units, capacity building and training for criminal justice systems to effectively detect, prevent, investigate, prosecute, and adjudicate terrorism-related offences, and increasing the ability to stop radicalisation through social media and the internet are just a few examples of the measures that are still missing (SADC, 2022)

3.6 SADC Regional Counter-Terrorism Centre (SADC RCTC)

In August 2015, the SADC heads of state and government held a summit in Gaborone, Republic of Botswana, where they agreed to adopt a regional counterterrorism strategy and a plan of action aimed at preventing and countering terrorism and also strengthening cooperation and coordination. To facilitate regional, continental, and international cooperation in countering terrorism, the Summit recognised the need for a regional counterterrorism coordinating agency; the SADC RCTC was established (SADC,2021). RCTC is based in Dar es Salaam, United

Republic of Tanzania. The SADC Treaty, the Protocol on Politics, Defence, and Security Cooperation, and the SADC Mutual Defence Pact, all of which are geared toward maintaining peace, security, and stability in the SADC region, are the foundations upon which the SADC Regional Counter-Terrorism Centre (SADC RCTC) was established. The Centre was established to promote prompt responses to terrorism and violent extremism in the region and ensure improved coordination and expanded relationships (SADC, 2022). The SADC RCTC is crucial for Member States in fostering cooperation in the control and combat of terrorist actions, including the sharing of experiences at the regional and global levels in Africa through information gathering, analysis, sharing, and training (SADC, 2022).

3.7 SADC and conflict resolution

According to the UN, regional organizations have a number of unique qualities that make them well-suited to carry out a peace-making function: they have a thorough understanding of the historical context of local conflicts; they are familiar with the actors and issues involved in these conflicts; they can build trust through the regular interaction among their member states; and they can create and uphold appropriate norms on conflict prevention and governance (Nathan, 2016).

As an organ that promotes peace and security in Southern Africa, the SADC has enjoyed very little success and has experienced quite a significant chunk of failure or inaction since its formation in 1992. The region remained wracked by high levels of violent conflict (Nathan, 2016). Conflicts such as election disputes, civil war in Angola that ended in 2002, a mutiny and external military intervention in Lesotho in 1998, undemocratic elections in Zimbabwe and violent protest since 2000, unconstitutional change of government in Madagascar in 2009 and unending wars in DRC that encourages state repression and displace thousands of civilians (Nathan, 2016).

In most significant conflicts that took place in southern Africa, SADC avoided diplomatic interaction and critical commentary with the region. It was bitterly divided over the DRC uprising and had little impact on the Angolan civil war. In response to the uprising, Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe sent soldiers to the Congo to back President Laurent Kabila. At the same time, South Africa, with support from Botswana, Mozambique, and Tanzania, tried a diplomatic solution and pushed for a truce. Divergent approaches weakened the Organ and caused intense hostility within SADC. South Africa and Zambia made the end of the Congolese war possible, but SADC has paid little attention to the DRC's subsequent conflicts (Nathan, 2016).

Moreover, the promise of stability and security in Southern Africa has not materialised, and the SADC has been more notable for its acrimonious disputes than for its efforts to promote peace. The fact that many of the most considerable disagreements between member states have revolved around the direction and techniques of peacekeeping and regional security is exceptionally significant and ironic. Over ten years, bitter conflicts plagued the Organ's creation. Surprisingly, the vehicle that was supposed to reduce strain and strengthen teamwork and confidence had the exact opposite impact. The Mutual Defence Pact for SADC was also a laborious and drawn-out process (Nathan, 2016).

3.8 The UN and regional bodies in relation to conflict and conflict resolution

Since the UN was founded, they believed regional bodies should be formed to form security blocs and solve conflicts. Article 52 of the UN charter promotes regional settings and agencies to be able to deal with and maintain global peace and security, as they are crucial and ensure that they align with the aims and principles of the UN. Security Council encourages the peaceful settlement of local disputes through the above-mentioned arrangements and agencies. The Charter assumes that states have a powerful interest in maintaining and solving conflicts in their community of states and that collective forums afford states an efficacious and legitimate means of action. Since the Cold War ended, the number of regional organisations has increased and is deemed adequate, releasing the UN of the load it has of peace-making and peacekeeping missions (Nathan, 2016).

The UN stresses the importance of regional organisations due to the belief that they can establish trust through the regular interaction of their member states, they have a solid grasp of the historical context of local conflicts, they are familiar with the actors and issues involved in these conflicts, and they can create and uphold appropriate norms for conflict prevention and governance. To maintain world peace and security, an Agenda for Peace called for increased coordination and cooperation between the UN and regional organisations (Nathan, 2016).

3.9 African Union (AU)

The African Union is the mother body of regional bodies in the African continent. It comprises SADC, ECOWAS, the East African Community and the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in the Horn of Africa. The AU's Peace and Security Council and the chair of the AU Commission work in partnership with the regional bodies and ensure strong alliances between the regional bodies and the AU Council to promote and maintain peace, security and stability (Nathan, 2016).

3.10 The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)

The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) is an institution that deals with prevention, management, and conflict resolution. A decision-making body that also deals with post-conflict reconstruction and development in Africa. The Peace and Security Council (PSC) protocol was adopted in 2002 and became fully operational in 2003; it lays down various components of APSA and its responsibilities. The PSC serves as the central pillar of APSA, supported by the commission, the Panel Of The Wise, the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), the African Standby Force (ASF) and the Peace Fund. The primary function of the AU is to promote peace and security on the continent; therefore, it works in partnership with regional bodies like SADC and ECOWAS, among others present in Africa. The PSC also interacts with other AU organs, such as the Pan-African Parliament, the African Commission on Human Rights, and civil society organisations, to promote peace and security. The relationship is key to the success of APSA (AU, 2012).

According to Chikwanda (2023), the functions and objectives of PSC are widely defined, involving conflict prevention, conflict resolution, post-conflict reconstruction, and aspects of traditional security and human security. One PSC task is coordinating and harmonising the AU's efforts to prevent and deal with international terrorism. PSC arguably provides specific guidance on addressing extreme violence on the continent. Chikwanda (2023) argues that the APSA is not doing its job effectively, drawing evidence from the recent outbreak of extreme violence in Cabo Delgado, Mozambique. Some of the elements of APSA are not as effective as they are supposed to be due to the lack of funding and political will, among other reasons. The issue of financing and ineffective elements also extends to regional economic communities. The SADC does not fully take advantage of the internal structures it put in place to assist the region. The SADC consists of the Microeconomic Surveillance Unit, Mediation Reference Group and Panel of Elders, which were operationalised in 2015; however, these institutions did not yield the results that were expected. The SADC instead uses its old practice of deploying diplomats in conflicts. It initiated SAMIM in Mozambique, a narrow approach to solving the conflict and bringing peace, which is self-defeating (Chikwanda, 2023).

3.11 Silencing the Guns in Africa by 2020

The incidence of violent extremist acts on the African continent has significantly increased since 2006. In addition to hastening a significant reversal of the development and democratic achievements previously won, the rise of violent extremism and the damaging effects of groups preaching violent ideologies also pose a long-term threat to political and economic

development (Hamilton et al., 2018). This is despite the AU initiative of silencing the guns by 2020.

The idea of "silencing the guns" originated from the observation that multiple violent conflicts that have taken place on the African continent have made the continent's intended economic and political unification challenging. Thus, the AU tried to ensure that Africa is characterised by peace, political tolerance, and good administration as part of Agenda 2063. The goal of putting an end to gun violence was set for 2020. The AU held a high-level retreat with the theme "Silencing the guns in Africa: Creating a roadmap to a conflict-free continent", also known as the Durban Retreat, as part of its plans for operationalising the goal (Mlambo, 2021).

Okumu et al. (2020) posit that Africa has improved significantly since the 1990s. However, violent conflicts persist. These conflicts have been intrastate in nature and have been sparked by, among other things, a lack of development, lousy governance, high levels of corruption, historical injustices and grievances, and improper election management. Many of these issues have contributed to violence in different ways.

According to global conflict trends, between 1989 and 2017, Africa was one of the world's most violent continents. Between 2013 and 2017, these disasters alone claimed the lives of almost 27,000 persons. The prevalence of small arms and light weapons (SALWs) from international manufacturers, those produced by African governments, and those made locally is a significant factor in the level of violence in Africa (Okumu et al., 2020).

Despite silencing the gun initiative's unfulfillment, there are some successes that can be accounted for. The specific actions to be taken to silence the weapons have been made clear. The AU Commission's (AUC) Silencing the Guns Unit is one of the crucial coordination bodies that has been developed. The desire for peace in Africa has improved continental diplomatic outreach and cooperation creation. Improvements have been made to continental structures and organisations to combat insecurity and to implement measures to stop the spread of SALWs (Okumu et al., 2020).

3.12 South Africa (SA) and Terrorism

It is common knowledge that Mozambique and South Africa are common and interrelated in many aspects, whether political, economic or cultural. World Bank (2024) notes that Mozambique has strong ties with the SADC region's economic engine, SA, which underscores the importance of its political, economic and social development to the stability and growth of the entire SADC region. Hamilton, Bax and Sayed (2018) note that the extreme violence

attacks in Mozambique are only one porous border away from South Africa, which places South Africa in danger, a country with the largest economy and better capabilities in the SADC region. A country that conducts itself as a leader of SADC and Africa at large.

Despite the not-so-strong presence of terrorist activities in S.A, it has a history of terrorism; the country has been recently involved in terrorist activities and links to ISIL. According to Hamilton, Bax and Sayed (2018), the extremists have used S.A as a relaxing and planning paradise. S.A is a preferred destination due to its advanced facilities and technology in communication and banking. The corruption of the authorities and lack of corporate awareness of terrorist funds make S.A a preferred operation site. In 1999, an individual known as Khalfan Khamis Mohamed from Tanzania was arrested in Cape Town in relation to the bombing of the US embassy. It is believed that Al-Qaeda trained the individual and has links to AL Shabaab, who was responsible for planning several terrorist activities that claimed people's lives; he occasionally lived in South Africa and travelled on a South African fraudulent passport (Hamilton, Bax and Sayed, 2018). The Thulsie twins, Brandan and Tony, were arrested in July 2016; it is believed that the twins were planning and preparing to attack the US embassy in Pretoria and Jewish centres in Cape Town on behalf of ISIS. About 60 to 100 South Africans have joined and fought alongside ISIL in the Middle East. Most of these individuals get radicalised online (Hamilton, Bax and Sayed, 2018).

According to Fabricius (2022), recently, warnings regarding the possibility of terrorism in South Africa have become louder and more frequent. The US Treasury has recently imposed sanctions on Mohamad Akbar, Umar Akbar, and brothers Nufael and Yunus Akbar, who reside in South Africa. They were described as members of an Islamic State cell working in South Africa who had given technical, financial, or material support to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. The four individuals were connected to Farhad Hoomeer, identified as the cell's head and stationed in Durban. The US imposed sanctions on Hoomeer and three other people for comparable offences. Sanctions were placed on four South African businesses with ties to Nufael and Yunus Akbar and four others that Hoomeer owned or controlled (Fabricius, 2022).

3.13 Insurgency VS Terrorism

The terms insurgency and terrorism are sometimes applied interchangeably, similar to terms such as strategy and tactics. In contrast, insurgency is a strategy, while terrorism is a tactic. Militants engaging in an insurgency may apply terrorism as a tactic to realise objectives. A significant number of terrorist groups in the world are described as insurgencies that use terrorism rather than typical terrorist movements (Clarke,2025). Infamous global terrorist

groups such as Al Qaeda and the Islamic State go beyond the application of terrorist tactics. They utilise classical guerrilla tactics in their operations; their strategy is a combination of both violent and political means. Moreover, these terrorist groups are usually part of a broader conflict, such as civil wars and insurgencies, indicating that their operations of political violence do not only constitute isolated operations of terror (Moghadam, Berger and Beliakova, 2014).

The insurgents directly oppose the state's authority and the ruling government of the time, using political and military means. The wars tend to be well-organised and can happen over a long period of time. In contrast, terrorist groups are isolated, marginalised, underground small organisations challenging the authority of a state indirectly, creating insecurity, intimidation, fear and anxiety amongst the population. The size assists in making a distinction between terrorist groups and insurgents. Terrorist groups have a small number of members, while insurgents have a larger group. Insurgent organisations such as the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelan (LTTE) and Lebanese Hizballah are thousands strong (Clark, 2025). Terrorism rarely results in a political change on its own, while insurgency results mostly in political change (Unal, 2014).

There is no clear distinction between the end goals of terrorists and insurgents; nonetheless, insurgents' goals tend to be clear and achievable, while terrorist goals tend to be vague. The structure of the organisation or management is transparent, and their functions are broad, with political and military wings acting in sync. There are recognisable representatives who are transparent and show purpose; on the other hand, terrorist groups are clandestine, underground, and small groups.

3.14 Counterinsurgency (COIN) and Counterterrorism

Insurgency and terrorism are a political struggle, with the population as an important component. The difference between counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations is that insurgents are based on population support, while terrorists are isolated groups, individuals or cells with less support from the population. COIN requires a 'hearts and minds' campaign; counterterrorism requires searching while protecting the population (De Wijk, 2023). Winning 'hearts and minds' is a special ingredient to the success of an insurgency. The leaders of a political struggle must have the ability to stay away from hostile rhetoric and stigmatisation of parts of society exposed to terrorist appeals, and avoid being part of polarising the minority and the majority groups in the social setting. Political leaders have a duty to respect group identities and grievances; socio-economic measures should be undertaken to deal with social

grievances. Militants and jihadists erode the sense of security in the communities. Deterrence can be a form of prevention in countering terrorism (De Wijk, 2023).

Most of the major contemporary terrorist organisations employ non-terrorist modes of warfare and practical guerrilla tactics. Modern governments must adopt an approach that separates the official naming of terrorist groups from their origins, conduct and threat. The majority of conflicts labelled as terrorism should be labelled as insurgents by policymakers, for the approach will assist policy analysts to take expanded intellectual tools to comprehend the complex nature of the threat posed by these groups and achieve comprehensive, adequate and long-lasting solutions (Moghadam, Berger and Beliakova, 2024).

3.15 Conclusion

The chapter has explored regional institutions and initiatives planned and implemented to address the threats of terrorism, insurgents and extreme violence. SADC and AU are significant in building state and regional capacity. The chapter further explored insurgency and terrorism, COIN and counterterrorism and finally, terrorist activities in the SADC's economic hub, SA.

4. Chapter Four: Data presentation and interpretation

4.1 Introduction

The following chapter will present data and discuss key findings. Existing literature obtained information that does not require the participation of humans as a sample; instead, it employs articles, books, and other publicly available sources of information as a sample. The information will be analysed to examine the phenomenon of threats and the state/regional capacity of Mozambique as a sovereign state and the regional organisation or body, SADC. It will discuss the extent to which Mozambique and SADC can deal with terrorist insurgencies in their territories. The qualitative data analysis tool 'NVIVO' has been utilised for its ability to analyse vast amounts of qualitative data and its reliability. State/regional capacity theory has been applied to further explain the phenomenon. The chapter will conclude by giving an in-depth reflection by the researcher that draws from the discussion in this chapter.

4.2 The study examined and attempted to answer the following key questions:

- a) What threats do the terrorist insurgencies pose for Mozambique and the SADC region?
- b) To what extent can Mozambique and the SADC region deal with terrorist insurgencies?
- c) Does Mozambique and SADC have the capacity to deal with terrorist insurgencies?

4.3 The broader issues which the study aims to answer are as follows:

- a) To identify and evaluate the nature and the causes of the present terrorist insurgencies in Northern Mozambique.
- b) To investigate the threats of insurgencies to Mozambique and the SADC region.
- c) To examine the extent to which Mozambique and SADC can deal with terrorist insurgencies.
- d) To assess the capacity and the capabilities of Mozambique and SADC to deal with terrorist insurgencies.
- e) To identify and provide recommendations that can be implemented to resolve the conflict and build capacity.

4.4 Threats of northern Mozambique terrorist insurgencies for Mozambique and SADC.

4.4.1 Mozambique and the SADC region as fertile grounds for extremists

The threats of northern Mozambique terrorist insurgencies are well alive and present. Conflict violence tends to spread like wildfire if not sufficiently attended to. Mozambique as a state has been free from severe conflict since the end of the civil war between the liberation and ruling party, Frelimo and the main opposition party, RENAMO, in 1992. However, in 2017, the country witnessed the re-emergence of extreme violence that still persists in the country. This time, it is in the form of terrorism. The SADC region has been spared violent extremism, especially that based on religion. It is argued that the extremists are looking for a new frontier to exploit and expand. The SADC region appears to be a fertile ground for terrorist activities, given the region's high levels of inequalities, considerable unemployment among the youth, poverty, weak state institutions, poor governance, and corruption among government officials.

According to Hamilton et al. (2018), the geographical positioning and socio-political and economic factors in Mozambique make the country a target and attractive destination for the operations of terrorist activities. In addition, there can be an establishment of a corridor for jihadists heading to other beautiful countries like SA and the rest of the SADC member states. SA, as a powerhouse in SADC, also lacks social cohesion; it is politically and economically vulnerable, it also has a history with terrorists, and it has recently experienced terrorist activities from ISIS.

4.4.2 Expansionist ideas

The extreme groups present in Mozambique seemed to grow in capabilities. They have developed sophisticated operational capabilities and pursued a strategic intent to seize more locations and expand operations to other districts and provinces. The Islamic State seek to expand its reach in Africa and attract fighters beyond Tanzania. The attraction of fighters from abroad is vital; they bring critical skills and experience that local fighters do not possess, such as bomb-making and battlefield tactics. Additionally, foreign fighters may become a liability, creating formations or groups within the sect, prompting more conflict and lawlessness, further requiring an international counterterrorism response (Lister, 2021).

Terrorist attacker tends to attack nearby states from the territory in which their operation is based. The attacks on nearby countries are the very nature of terrorism, which is transnational. Examples can be drawn from Boko haram in Nigeria and its influence in Cameroon and Niger,

also al-Shabaab based in Somalia and their directed attacks in Kenya. These attributes threaten regional stability, economic activities, and security (Mashimbye, 2022).

A Christian region dominates Mozambique, and a small number of people follow the Islamic religion. Lister (2021) also observes that Mozambique is a region where Christians dominate, so it will be challenging for an Islamic state agenda to gain traction. In a country where Christians are a majority, the Ansar al-Sunna does not pose an existential threat to the government.

4.4.3 Illegal Trade Practices

The presents of powerful and connected Muslim Indian and Pakistani descent businesspeople exacerbate the strong doctrines of the region for the benefit of their business interests. These businesspeople are thought to be engaged in illicit business practices. They are involved in the illegal trade of drugs, ivory, timber and human trafficking along the coast of Cabo Delgado and Nampula. These businesspeople are locally known as Monhes; they are believed to be well-connected and enjoy protection from the ruling party, FRELIMO (Velthuisen, 2021). The illicit flows through this region also likely facilitate the movement of militants and extremists from the Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes region into northern Mozambique (Estelle and Darden, 2021). Northern Mozambique continues to be a main corridor for illicit economic activities to the broader region via the Indian Ocean. The insurgents' activities and extreme violence may be contained; however, drug trafficking has increased and diversified. Many of the illicit merchandise flows go through Mozambique, illegal economic activities that undermine the rule of law (Stanyard et al., 2022).

Dos Santos (2020) highlights the possibility of an alliance between illicit business and armed Islamists, given their mutual interests in the Carbo Delgado region. The alliance could result in a quasi-state that will be beneficial to the extremists and illicit businesspeople operating in the Carbo Delgado region. The militias could provide security for illicit business transactions and result in increased profits for the businesses. If the Mozambique state continues to lose control of the region, as it is visible that the state does not have a full grip, extremist could further develop to establish a tax base of their own. Recent discoveries of mineral resources could spark ethnic conflicts between the locals, the Mukonde and Mwami tribes and those who are from southern Mozambique, like elites from Maputo. The populations from Carbo Delgado, especially people experiencing poverty, regard the region's wealth and resources as their own, given that the region is neglected by the government headquartered in Maputo.

4.4.4 Dislocation of Civilians


The figures show that close to a million civilians have been displaced in northern Mozambique due to the ongoing conflict. It is very likely that northern Mozambique, Cabo Delgado, can be controlled by the extremists, which may cause the citizens to flee, and the region will become a no-man's land. Furthermore, it is possible that the population of northern Mozambique, who recognise that their government has neglected them, will join the militias against the government and exact extreme violence, which will perpetuate the conflict (Estelle and Darden, 2021). Furthermore, SADC member states are at risk of being flooded by immigrants who are seeking asylum; this has been the case with countries like South Africa, which already have significant numbers of illegal immigrants from Mozambique and Zimbabwe in particular (Mashimbye, 2022). Additionally, it is crucial to note that the SADC region is characterised by porous borders, aiding illegal crossings and trading. Mozambique, Cabo Delgado specifically, is on the verge of a humanitarian crisis; civilians have fled their villages in search of safer areas.

4.4.5 Youth Bulge and Opportunities

The unemployment rate in Mozambique is very high, especially amongst the youth; about 800,000 young people seek employment every year. Youth unemployment in Mozambique, just like in any other SADC member state, is a ticking time bomb (Matsinhe and Valoi, 2019). The youth in Northern Mozambique, Cabo Delgado, is faced with the reality of economic and social challenges resulting from instability, which translates to the lack of skills, development, economic opportunities, information, public services and a lack of community experience. The unemployment rate in Mozambique is significantly high at 25% for the displaced youth. The exclusion of young people from economic opportunities denies them a bright future and the ability to build a stable family life. Additionally, the instability and natural disasters have led to food insecurity to a crisis level, putting an unprecedented burden on young men and women (USAID.gov, 2022).

Mozambique is a youthful region; the population is about 32 million, and two-thirds are people under the age of 25 years. The youth of Mozambique perceive unemployment as one of the most critical issues the government must address. Young citizens are slightly better than their elders in receiving education, but are also more likely not to find employment (Afrobarometer.org, 2024).

Figure 2: Not employed and looking for a job.



Source: Afrobarometer.org (2024).

4.4.6 Economic implications

Estelle and Darden (2021) state that the continuing extreme violence could have a negative impact on Mozambique's already struggling economy. Mozambique has recently discovered natural resources like rubies, which bring hope to the country's economy and people. The extremist groups seem to be driven by the newfound natural resources, specifically in the region of Carbo Delgado, where the militia challenges the government over control of the resources. Liquefied natural gas (LNG) production prospects are being threatened, and the cornerstone of Mozambique's growth and prosperity is being threatened (Estelle and Darden, 2021).

4.4.7 Risk of military intervention

Fears of the conflict spreading to neighbouring states should be valid. The Islamic State has warned countries like S.A not to intervene militarily in the conflict; otherwise, the Islamic State will respond with attacks on S.A (Stanyard et al., 2022). SA and other SADC member states have already intervened through the SAMIM mission, meaning that the warning by the Islamic State was not heeded. There is evidence of interconnection between some Islamic state-linked terror activities occurring in S.A and those of Mozambique, and further connection to jihadists from other states (Stanyard, 2022). A significant number of players are involved in trying to combat the Northern Mozambique conflict. The presence of numerous other foreign participants on the ground raises the possibility that the battle will develop into a global confrontation between the West, led by the United States, and Islamic radicalism, which is currently active in Mozambique through Al-Shabaab and ISIS (Bussoti and Coimbra, 2023).

The Mozambique conflict is believed to be driven by socio-political and socio-economic issues; thus, excessive military force, instead of engaging the communities to deal with the conflict, could become counter-productive in the long run. It can potentially further radicalise

the civilians (Mabera and Naidu, 2020). The authorities should cater to human security, not only military security. Moreover, the spread of conflict in Mozambique will mean that the government will have to depend on foreign troops, denting its sovereignty (Chingotuana et al., 2021). Although military interventions may help to limit violent attacks, they cannot bring sustainable peace (Nieuwkerk et al., 2023).

4.4.8 Reignition of Civil War

The long-standing divisions and rivalries between the liberation party FRELIMO and the main opposition RENAMO could still reignite into a full-blown civil war, given that there are still pockets of violence within Mozambique due to the divisions. Estelle and Darden (2021) note that the interplay between the region's politics, insurgents and security dynamics can reignite simmering conflict between the parties that were engaged in 15 years of civil war in the region's history books.

4.5 Mozambique's state capacity as a form of power

4.5.1 Governance challenges

Governance is a crucial capacity for any state to have to advance economic power and development. Good governance and security affect all sectors of a state. It creates incentives and boosts investors' confidence and innovation. Good governance is significant; good use of public funds improves the population's well-being. In Mozambique, poor governance is the cause of people's frustrations and grievances against the government and particular social groups. Financial corruption sentiments are high among the country's elites, and civil service capacity is low. Mozambique ranked 31st of 54 countries in Africa for government effectiveness. The World Bank scales the government effectiveness index from 0 to 5, with higher values corresponding to better outcomes; Mozambique scored 1.7 out of 5 in 2023. Mozambique is plagued by a political patronage culture that often relies on providing benefits and public goods in exchange for political support; the nation is characterised by weak institutions (Yeboua and Chipanda, 2024).

Mozambique categorises itself as a democratic state, just like all other members of SADC. However, Mozambique has democratisation problems and a weak and corrupt government (Hamilton, Bax and Sayed, 2018). The government of the day is unjust; it favours the rich and humiliates the poor (Stanyard et al., 2022). Mozambique's democracy has been in question. The Economist Intelligence Unit 2023 Democracy Index labelled Mozambique's governance as authoritarian based on all democratic indicators. Furthermore, the 2024 Freedom House report also named Mozambique as partially free, while the 2023 Civicus monitor report

downgraded Mozambique's civic spaces from “obstructive” to “repressive” (World Bank, 2024).

The government failed to integrate two opposing fronts, FRILIMO and RENAMO; the latter attacked economic and civilian structures, sabotaging the government. Mozambique's government faces contested legitimacy. The fight with RENAMO overlaps with extremists and hinders the government's efforts to cover the territories. The poor response of Mozambique to violent extremists reflects limited resources and capabilities, competing priorities, and governance challenges. Government official reports tend to inflate the achievements of the government and its security forces (Estelle and Darden, 2021). Despite the region's vast natural resources at its disposal, the region and its populations remain poor, reflecting the government's inability to implement and manage effective socio-economic initiatives that will benefit the population (Lister, 2021).

4.5.2 Government administration


The number of skilled, qualified public administrators is limited, and employees face the pressure of realising multiple, complex tasks, resulting in a lack of quality in creating and implementing strategies and policies. Administrations are characterised by few available resources, resulting in employees leaving for greener pastures. There is a shortage of skilled workforce, poor working conditions and remuneration, financial challenges undermining government effectiveness and legitimacy, local government planning is not participatory and unfunded mandates, lack of political will, oversight, evaluation and public-private partnership and overall comprehensive sustainable capacity development (Reddy and Kauzya, 2015).

4.5.3 Social cohesion

There is a significant body of literature by scholars which points to the relationship between high-capacity states and the high risk of terrorism. The more power and control a state has over its territory, the more vulnerable it will be to terrorist attacks. However, this study also reveals a correlation between low-capacity states, particularly in Africa and the high risk of terrorism. Violent extremists tend to use the capacity gaps to their advantage; they tend to ride on government shortcomings and radicalise the population, especially the youth, against the government, promising better opportunities and change. Mozambique, just like many of the SADC member states, has a high number of young people. The country is experiencing a youth bulge, with 49% youth. Youth bulge is defined as the percentage of the population of the population 15 to 29 years old relative to the population aged 15 years and above. The youth bulge is associated with the scourge of socio-political instability and violence, especially in

poorer countries, countries characterised by low-quality education, weak democracy and lack of opportunities (Yeboua and Chipanda, 2024).

Figure 3: Population structure in the current path, 1990-2043.



Source: Yeboua and Chipanda (2024).


4.5.4 Capacity and Development

A strong correlation exists between capacity, development, economic growth, poverty and inequality. Low levels of development can be associated with low state capacity. Mozambique is one of the least developed nations in SADC and the world, with GDP per capita estimated to be USD\$450 per capita. Post-civil war in 1993 and 2015, the nation was considered one of Africa’s fastest-growing economies, seeing about 8% of average annual growth, and there was socio-economic progress. The economic activities that rebounded after political and macroeconomic stability, reconstruction efforts, and increased FDI characterised the civil war. However, the growth levels were not inclusive and lacked structural transformation, resulting in an annual average growth of about 3%. Mozambique has high levels of poverty and inequality (Yeboua and Chipanda, 2024).

The Mozambique poverty rate increased from 48.4% to 62.8% between 2014 and 2015, and from 2019 to 2020. The estimated number of poor individuals increased from 13.1 to 18.9 million. Mozambique has high levels of inequality; the Gini coefficient decreased from 56.1 to 50.4 between 2014 and 2015 and from 2019 to 2020. The country saw an increase in multidimensional poverty. The share of households experiencing deprivation rose from 71 to 78.3% in 2014 and 2015, 2019 and 2020. Poverty reduction, employment opportunities, and

human capital accumulation are limited. Extreme low levels of the Human Capital Index are estimated to be 0,36, which is a structural hindrance to rapid, inclusive and sustainable growth. Essential services like health and education are not equally distributed, fuelling spatial inequalities, with no capabilities to shield the vulnerable from the effects of inequality, thus further fuelling fragility, instability and violence (World Bank, 2024).

Figure 4: Progress through the education funnel in the current path, 2023-2043.



Source: Yeboua and Chipanda (2024).

In 2022, Mozambique recorded 63% of the literate adult population, which is 22% points lower than the average for SADC. 31% of adults aged 15 years and above completed primary school, and about 8.1% completed secondary school. Low levels of students finishing school negatively affect poverty and inequality reduction and advancement. Lack of skilled labour is challenging; the workforce cannot be deployed to better-paying jobs, low productivity and formal sectors (Yeboua and Chipanda, 2024).

4.5.5 Mozambique Law enforcement capacity

Mozambique's security forces are viewed as weak and unable to stem the onslaught. A fundamental weakness is the relative size of the Mozambican armed forces. Counterinsurgency doctrine indicates that a counterinsurgent force needs to establish a ratio of one counterinsurgent per 50 inhabitants to be effective. The population of Cabo Delgado is around 2.3 million, whereas the Mozambican military has about only 11,200 active personnel, a ratio of one to 205. Furthermore, the militias have a substantial presence over the waters of Mozambique's shores; they have adequate capacity, whereas the Mozambique navy is said to

have only 200 members and 11 patrol boats (Estelle and Darden, 2021). This indicates the state's incapability, which caused a lack of Mozambique's military capacity. Moreover, Mozambique hired private security companies like the Dyck group from S.A to boost their security forces and thwart the extremists. The government hired private security companies to compensate for the weak military and acquire unique capabilities (Estelle and Darden, 2021).

The response of the Mozambique security forces depicts what has been observed over the past years; they are reactive and insufficient to keep the insurgency in check. Despite high-profile changes to Mozambique's security forces in recent months, their response in Palma was as inadequate as during the assault on Mocimboa in 2020. The conflict continued to rage from 2017 to 2021; four years later, no new capabilities were gained, and the military forces were still training to use combat vehicles and helicopters, which showed the inability to meet new security threats. The Mozambique security forces' weaknesses are attributed to a long-standing rivalry between the ruling party, FRELIMO and RENAMO. Mozambique police are believed to be favoured by FRELIMO, and a small number of RENAMO troops were integrated into the army (Lister, 2021; Mabera and Naidu, 2020). Mozambique has no experience in fighting terrorism; the country just survived a civil war, and security forces cannot deal with terrorism by design; the focus was on fighting paramilitary police groups (Lister, 2021).

There appears to be a lack of coordination and combination in defence and security forces in the immediate task that was before the forces to deal with the armed attacks facing the region. Various security forces that have arrived since mid-2019 have not successfully eliminated extreme violence (Lister, 2021). This might result from the not-so-desirable communication conditions that affect coordination and combination for a strong response to extremism. Furthermore, issues of command and control are of fragmentation between Polícia da República (PRM), which has its own militarised Rapid Intervention Unit (UIR) and units of the Forças Armadas e Defesa de Moçambique (FADM) (Lister, 2021).

The relationship between Mozambique's public and security forces appears not to be substantial. There has been a pervasive lack of public trust in the capability of the Mozambique Defence Armed Forces (FADM) (Mabera and Naidu, 2020). It is perceived that the security forces cannot defend citizens and their territory. The security forces are notorious for exercising a heavy hand when dealing with the population, and there have been reports of human rights abuses. The quality of recruits is poor, and several observers have reported that there is distrust between the newly recruited foot soldiers and the army commanders. The new recruits sell their

weapons and uniforms and choose not to participate in a war they do not see as theirs to fight (Lister, 2021).

Moreover, there is evidence of capacity challenges within the police, military and intelligence sectors. The limited capacity of security forces negatively affects various operations or crackdowns that the government may desire to implement in order to root out extremism. The gaps in capacity further hinder the public's perceptions of the government's abilities to protect the population. During the course of 2020 and 2021, the violent attacks resulted in the destruction of government infrastructure and de facto control of some territories in the Northern region by ISIS-Mozambique, making the Mozambique government's provision of services weak (U.S. Embassy in Mozambique, n.d).

4.6 SADC's regional capacity as a form of power

4.6.1 SADC's history with terror management

The Northern Mozambique terrorist insurgency is the first of its kind to ever happen in the SADC region; there have been terror incidents before, however, not at this scale and magnitude. In 2015, SADC adopted a classified counterterrorism strategy, whose development was facilitated by the closed, state intelligence-driven Regional Early Warning Centre (REWC). The current conflict provides a learning opportunity for the newly established SADC RCTC, the SSF, the Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre (RPTC) and the counter-terrorism strategy to be put in practical use. The experience will further provide for the development of national and regional capacities. The SADC lacked the capacity for effective and sustained peacebuilding in the past (Dzinesa, 2023).

4.6.2 Nature of response to extremism

The nature of the response to violent extremism appears to be a hard approach rather than a soft approach. The conflict in Mozambique has been reduced to sending military forces to combat extremism, whereas the conflict approach requires a multi-dimensional approach. This demonstrates that the region's primary concern is to restore law and order (Chingotuane et al., 2021). Therefore, this contributes to the region's lack of capacity to have a multi-faceted solution to a multi-dimensional issue.

Moreover, comprehensive legislation and policies, quick development of national counterterrorism strategies and plans of action, strengthening of NCTCs and financial intelligence units, capacity building and training for criminal justice systems to effectively detect, prevent, investigate, prosecute, and adjudicate terrorism-related offences, and

increasing the ability to stop radicalisation through social media and the internet are just a few examples of the measures that are still missing (SADC, 2022).

4.6.3 SADC law enforcement capacity

The SADC and its forces are not sufficiently funded; they lack funds, and thus, they rely on international donors. They are not well-trained and lack the equipment to fully execute their duties. There is a shortage of personnel, intelligence and technology. The SADC Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) was deployed on 15 July 2021 following approval by the Extraordinary SADC Summit of Heads of State and Government held in Maputo, Republic of Mozambique, on 23 June 2021 as a regional response to support the Republic of Mozambique to combat terrorism and acts of violent extremism.

Military capabilities between SADC member states are not equal; a majority of member states have small defence and security sectors. The states with small defence sectors tend to depend on bilateral agreements with stronger states for protection, such as India and some with North Atlantic Treaty Organisation countries. Member states tend to focus on their immediate security needs and leave a gap for others; for instance, island states will focus on maritime security threats to maintain coast guards. S.A is the only state in SADC with a defence industry; member states are facing challenges of obsolete and poorly maintained military equipment (Chingotwane et al.,2021). Moreover, the region's incapacity was evidenced by the slow response to conflict; the Rwandan forces responded faster than the SADC to the Mozambique conflict. Logistical, organisational, and mobility issues confirmed that the region faces severe deficits in the defence sector. It can be concluded that SADC's capability to respond to significant challenges like extreme violence is limited (Chingotwane et al., 2021).

Chingotwane et al. (2021) note that the SADC forces were ill-prepared upon embarking on the SAMIM mission. The SADC member states contributed their forces to be deployed in the Mozambique mission, given the member states' capacities in terms of economy, which resulted in the uneven size and preparedness of security forces, rendering the mission weak. Angola and SA contribute sizeable defence forces and budgets. They could not prevent violent attacks or even limit the consequences of attacks. There was an absence of comprehensive and systematic analysis data, which proved detrimental in supporting security forces in developing a significant approach to the conflict. In late 2022, however, Chingotwane et al. (2021) further observed an aspect where SAMIM achieved its task; one of the main tasks for the mission was to prevent the conflict from spilling over to SADC member states, which they succeeded in doing.

Table 2: Composition of the SADC Mission in Mozambique–SAMIM.

| Country | Effective (nr of militaries) | Observations |
|--------------|---|-----------------|
| South Africa | 1,495 | Head of mission |
| Angola | 20 + transport aircraft, crew and support staff | |
| Botswana | 296 | Chief deputy |
| DRC | | |
| Lesotho | 113 | |
| Tanzania | | |
| Zambia | | |
| Malawi | | |
| Zimbabwe | 304 military instructors | |

Source: Bussotti and Coimbra (2023).

4.6.4 Funding

The SADC member states presented in Mozambique that they are seemingly unable to afford to fund activities outside their borders, even though the demands at home are not financially met. They do not have the capacity for counterterrorism campaigns; therefore, a meaningful role for member states is unlikely (Lister, 2021). SADC is dependent on international donors; the statistics reveal that in 2015, around 76% of SADC’s budget of \$83 million was from external donors, while the SADC member states only contributed about 21% (Desmidt, 2017, as cited in Walwa and Malebang, 2023). The reliance on external donors makes it difficult to have a sustainable military and diplomatic intervention, as evidenced by SAMIM's personnel and equipment shortages (Walwa and Malebang, 2023). SADC's reliance on self-funding appears unsustainable, given the reported gap between SAMIM’s budgeted figure of \$35 million and the less than \$13 million raised by the regional organisation as of January 2022. SADC’s contingency fund was reportedly small, and the regional body could not sustain SAMIM without external funding (Dzinesa, 2023).

The SAMM mission is characterised by the lack of public data concerning the capabilities pledged by member states. Questions remained on the state of the ASF pledged capabilities by SADC that the SSF Planning Element (PLANELM) had established following visits to each Member State that confirmed the region’s SSF’s FOC in 2017. Moreover, there is a question of the ability to administer a sufficient multidimensional peace mission without the support of the UN (Dzinesa, 2023).

4.6.5 Regional Counterterrorism Bodies

In Southern Africa, two significant regional counterterrorism organisations have central pillars that can be identified as necessary in curbing terrorist activities, out of the recently established SADC RCTC. The Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Cooperation Organisation (SARPCCO) and the Eastern and Southern African Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG) are technical transnational units that deal with cross-border crimes and money laundering. These organisations work in connection with other similar international organisations, such as the Interpol and the global Financial Action Task Force (FATF). Additionally, the ACSRT is another vital unit based in the region of Africa that boosts terrorism prevention and builds capacity against terrorism (Marongwe, 2015).

Marongwe (2015) argues that most southern states have counterterrorism units, relevant legislation and cooperation. Moreover, the SADC region has always participated in counterterrorism measures on the African continent. They had been part of the 1999 Organisation of African Union (OAU) counterterrorism convention, the 2002 counterterrorism plan of action, and the 2004 protocol of the AU. Countries like South Africa enacted legislation like the Protection of Constitutional Democracy against Terrorist and Related Activities Act (POCDATARA) in 2004 and joined the global FATF and the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group, and further participated in the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) (Marongwe, 2015). However, Stanyard et al. (2022) argue that key institutions to monitor and prosecute terror crimes in South Africa are weak, with constant delays and derailment of terrorism prosecution evidence.

4.6.6 Regional unity and cooperation

Regional Economic Communities RECS, in their nature, undisputedly involve cooperation and interaction between states. The terrorist activities in Mozambique call for a clear-cut regional policy on duties and responsibilities. The regional policy calls for collective action and decisive leadership. Seemingly, this is not the case, given the unconvincing response to the conflict in Mozambique that seemed to defeat collective action and unity. The unconvincing SADC response strengthened the argument that the region lacks the political will to mobilise member countries in times of important need (Mlambo and Masuku, 2021). In Africa, RECs have become dominated by one or a few countries, and their interests have superseded the interests of others. The hegemonic organised structure negatively impacts cooperation and unity, an issue SADC faces (Mlambo and Masuku, 2015).

4.6.7 SADC structural issues

There seems to be a structural challenge within the SADC. The SADC, as a regional organisation, was born out of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) and was established in 1980 to aid the fight against apartheid and the liberation of South African-occupied nations, including Namibia, Zimbabwe, and South Africa. By 1994, all southern African countries had been liberated, and the SDCC had to repurpose itself, which faced various challenges. The restructuring appears not to have been accomplished (Bussoti and Coimbra, 2023).

The SADC lacks a spirit governed by shared emotions; in addition to a system of legislative agreements and existing economic interests, national interests divide member states. They still need to compromise their sovereignty in the interest of common security and recreate institutions representing citizens, like the SADC parliament (Bussoti and Coimbra, 2023). Nathan (2016) points out that the coexistence of democratic and authoritarian regimes in SADC, the absence of shared values and the small autocratic governments like e-Swatini and Lesotho have had a detrimental effect on the creation of a common identity and a more accurate strategic definition over time.

4.6.8 SADC cross-REC

The SADC cooperates with other RECs to enhance capacity. The cross-REC and AU coordinated capacity initiative is done through a partnership between COMESA, EAC, and SADC (NEPAD.org, 2022). However, the cross-REC structure is also argued to cause inefficiency. Multiple regional communities may cause commitment and policy implementation challenges due to the fact that they may not complement each other at times.

4.6.9 Influence of AUs' Capacity on RECs

SADC's relationship with the AU is highly political, resulting in disputes and disagreements between these two organisations, which may be considered a conflict. The SADC region prefers to be independent of the AU in decision-making; the preference is in line with the notion of protecting the region's sovereignty. There appears to be a lack of coordination and consultation between the two bodies. SADC realises the AU's incapability. AU has major weaknesses; it has failed to implement its peace and security architecture. There have been serious calls for the AU to reform its peace and security architecture; given the fast-changing conditions of security threats faced by member states, the security landscape is evolving very quickly, which leaves the AU always playing catch-up. The AU lacks the capacity to provide guidance and coordination (Louw-Vaudran, 2022).

4.6.10 SAMIM's effectiveness in conflict

Officials overseeing the conflict in Mozambique are confident about the progress that has been made in the region since the deployment of SAMIM and the Rwandan troops. It has been reported that SAMIM troops have flushed out extremists from the forests, killed and captured insurgents, and handed over captives to local authorities since its deployment. Furthermore, the mission rescued civilians kidnapped and recovered stolen equipment such as weapons, vehicles, computers, cell phones and documents. The seizure of this equipment assisted authorities in gaining intelligence (Walwa and Malebang, 2023).

Moreover, SAMIM and the Rwandan forces managed to restore law and order in areas like Mocimboa da Praia, Nangade Afungi, Mueda, Palma, Macomia and Nangade. The argument that there is a lack of coordination between SAMIM and Rwandan troops was refuted by commanders, citing role differences between the two and coordination responsibility lying with the Mozambique forces. They argued that there were no coordination challenges; however, there was room for improvement. Peace-building support programmes were implemented, and as a result, the capacity was built among different stakeholders such as policing, rehabilitation centres, and NGOs. Despite the challenges of COVID-19 that devastated global economies in 2020 and 2021, SADC managed to deploy forces in Mozambique without the help of external parties (Walwa and Malebang, 2023).


The extremist group in Mozambique appears to grow in its capabilities. They employ different strategies that require the SAMIM to be one step ahead of the group. Intelligence should improve, and early warning detection and counterterrorism abilities should be up for the challenge. The vast land area must be covered; extremists sometimes elude the authorities. The SAMIM has been having problems locating fighters precisely and knowing the numbers that have been eliminated and those who are still active. Initially, the number had been estimated to be 2500 to 3000 fighters (Walwa and Malebang, 2023).

SAMIM operations appear to have been adequate to a greater extent in dislodging or displacing insurgents from their strongholds (Ndawana, 2023; Dzinesa, 2023). Therefore, they failed to protect and maintain those liberated areas due to a lack of resources and human capital. SAMIM got overstretched; they had to cover a vast territory. Joint operations between SAMIM, Rwandan forces and FADM create intelligence and operational gaps. SAMIM's inadequate naval and air assets reportedly undermined the potential for the Mission's provision of air and maritime support to enhance FADM's operational capabilities (Dzinesa, 2023). Moreover, the intervention of SAMIM in the Mozambique conflict was late and will remain inadequate and

misguided until the government and stakeholders address the primary root cause of the conflict (Ndawana, 2023).

4.7 State capacity theory, capacity as a form of power

Figure 5: Resources, Policy Instruments, and Outcomes.



Source: Lindvall and Teorell (2016).


Lindvall and Teorell (2016) define state capacity as a form of power. *A* can make *B* do what would not otherwise do. In this case, *A* is the state or agents of the state, and *B* is the society or members of the society. *A* controls the decision-making agenda. State capacity has a causal relationship between the state policies and social, political and economic results. A state is an entity that implements policies to achieve the intended goal or outcome. State capacity is the strength to achieve goals. Policies do not always have to be programmatic, so clamping down on a domestic insurgency can be an example highlighting the broadness of the assumption (Lindvall and Teorell, 2016).

Public policy is a set of decisions by governments and other political actors to influence, change, or frame a problem or issue that has been recognised in the political realm by policymakers and/or the wider public (Hassel, 2015). Policies are a means by which states exercise their power 'to get things done'. Policy instruments are being used to achieve the intended outcomes, which are carrots (incentives), sticks (coercion) and Sermons (information or ideas). Moreover, resources are extremely important in realising the outcomes. A state

requires revenue, human capital (administration) and information. The revenue can be the fiscal of a state or state income; human capital can be the quality of the administration and state agents' skills; and finally, information is the ability of a state to gather up-to-date information regarding its territory (Lindvall and Teorell, 2016).

Apparently, the Mozambique state lacks the resources to realise full state capacity. The Mozambique government does not have the revenue or the funds to fund its law enforcement structures adequately. The more financial resources the state controls, the more judges and police officers can be employed to enforce the laws or coercion (sticks), the more it can spend on incentives (carrots), and the more information (sermons) it can gather about one state's territory. The ability of a state to raise revenue is a significant element of state capacity (Lindvall and Teorell, 2016). Mozambique is one of the poorest nations in the SADC region, with low economic output; thus, the revenue is low.

Figure 6: The GDP Annual Growth Rate for Mozambique between 1990 – 2020 in %.



Source: We4f.org (2022).

The correlation between development and state capacity is strong. Realistic policy interventions across eight sectors have been reviewed: agriculture, education, governance, infrastructure, demographics, health, financial flows, manufacturing and trade in Mozambique. Mozambique is characterised by porous borders, meaning that the state does not have the capacity to control the illegal flow of goods and people.

The state of Mozambique does not have the capacity to shelter and support displaced citizens from the northern region fleeing from extreme violence. They are left to fend for themselves.

Furthermore, SADC member states are at risk of being flooded by immigrants who are seeking asylum; this has been the case with countries like South Africa, which already have a significant number of illegal immigrants from Mozambique and Zimbabwe in particular (Mashimbye, 2022). The inability to shield and shelter displaced citizens indicates the government's ill-preparedness for conflict situations and lack of resources. The problem may lead to a humanitarian crisis both for Mozambique and SADC. The government of Mozambique cannot create opportunities for the youth. Specifically, Matsinhe and Valoi (2019) shared that unemployment in Mozambique is very high, especially amongst the youth; about 800,000 young people seek employment every year. Youth unemployment in Mozambique, just like in any other SADC member state, is a ticking time bomb. The SADC member states and the SADC as a development community cannot provide job opportunities for the citizens. The government cannot create opportunities for its people, raising questions about policy implementation and resource capability.

Combat resources or tools are significantly limited. The size of the Mozambique armed forces is inadequate. Counterinsurgency doctrine indicates that a counterinsurgent force needs to establish a ratio of one counterinsurgent per 50 inhabitants to be effective. The population of Cabo Delgado is around 2.3 million, whereas the Mozambican military has about only 11,200 active personnel, a ratio of one to 205 (Estelle and Darden, 2021). Mozambique has no control over its waters, given that the Mozambique navy is said to have only 200 members and 11 patrol boats (Estelle and Darden, 2021). This indicates the lack of Mozambique's military capacity caused by the state's incapability. The military is weak; as a result, the state seeks to acquire unique capabilities by hiring a private military (Estelle and Darden, 2021).

The data reveals that Mozambique faces a challenge of democratisation; human rights violations are directed at the government forces. The state of Mozambique faces contested legitimacy between FRELIMO and RENAMO, and the government is subjected to sabotage. After the war, the ruling party failed to integrate FRELIMO and RENAMO into one single government. Lister (2021), Maberu and Naidu (2020), and Estelle and Darden (2021) attest to the point that the fight with RENAMO overlaps with extremists and hinders government efforts to cover the territories. This challenge points to a lack of policy implementation.

Human capital is another critical resource that a state needs; agents of a state need skills to execute their duties properly. The state administration institutions should be effective in carrying out government policies (Lindvall and Teorell, 2016). The administration of

Mozambique seems incapable. Mozambique officials mischaracterised the extreme violence at the beginning, which automatically led to a wrong strategy, which further resulted in worsened security conditions in the region, leading to young, vulnerable individuals being recruited and the displacement of many others (Okunade et al.,2021). Moreover, the poor response of Mozambique to violent extremists reflects limited resources and capabilities, competing priorities, and governance challenges.

4.8 Regional capacity concept as a form of power

In this study, capacity includes all the strengths, attributes and resources at one organisation or community's disposal (SADC). Capacity includes resources such as human knowledge and skills, infrastructure, institutions and collective features such as social relationships, management and leadership (UNDRR, 2009).

The SADC member states are inside a cross-REC conundrum. The SADC cooperate with other RECs to enhance capacity. The cross-REC and AU coordinated capacity initiative is done through a partnership between COMESA, EAC, and SADC (NEPAD.org, 2022). However, the cross-REC structure is also argued to cause inefficiency. Multiple regional communities may cause commitment and policy implementation challenges since they may sometimes not complement each other.

The presence of many different forces tasked with the Mozambique conflict reflects the weaknesses of regional forces and strategy/policy. SADC intervention should be the first to support Mozambique authorities before the international community, which is Africans solving African problems. This argument is directly supported by Bussoti and Coimbra (2023), asserting that the presence of numerous other foreign participants on the ground raises the possibility that the battle will develop into a global confrontation between the West, lead by the United States, and Islamic radicalism, which is currently active in Mozambique through Al-Shabaab and ISIS. Similarly, the use of excessive force to solve the conflict may radicalise the local population. The use of a significant hard power approach to the conflict shows the lack of different approaches.

Incapable security forces point to a lack of resources in member states' security forces. Military capabilities between SADC member states are not equal; most member states have small defence and security sectors. The states with small defence sectors tend to depend on bilateral agreements with stronger states for protection, such as India and some with North Atlantic Treaty Organisation countries. Member states tend to focus on their immediate security needs

and leave a gap for others; for instance, island states will focus on maritime security threats to maintain coast guards. Logistical, organisational, and mobility issues confirmed that the region faces serious deficits in the defence sector.

SADC lacks reliable information to control its territory. The SADC and Mozambique's forces are not sufficiently funded; they lack the funds, and thus, they rely on international donors. They do not have the capacity for counterterrorism campaigns. SADC is dependent on international donors; the statistics reveal that in 2015, around 76% of SADC's budget of \$83 million was from external donors, while the SADC member states only contributed about 21% (Desmidt, 2017, as cited in Walwa and Malebang, 2023). They are not well-trained and lack the equipment to fully execute their duties. There is a shortage of personnel, intelligence and technology. There is a lack of coordination and combination between FADM. Rwandan troops and SAMIM forces compromised an effective response to extremists.

The SADC region lacks the human capital, revenue, and information to meet the necessary capacity. There is a lack of strategy, planning and political will to implement some of the region's SADC initiatives pertaining to peace and security.

4.9 Findings

There is a strong correlation between low state capacity, weak governance, corruption and poor economic performance and development. Mozambique is one of the poorest regions in SADC and globally. The country is characterised by a lack of development, low economic growth, and poverty. Multidimensional poverty exists, with very few employment opportunities, limited human capital and limited access to basic services like education. These factors fuel the fragility of the state, leading to instability and violence. A state that lacks economic power and effective development policies can be characterised as a state that lacks crucial elements of capacity.

There is a significant body of literature by scholars which points to the relationship between high-capacity states and the high risk of terrorism. The more power and control a state has over its territory, the more vulnerable it will be to terrorist attacks. However, this study also reveals a correlation between low-capacity states, particularly in Africa and the high risk of terrorism. The de facto territorial control by the extremists meant that the government of Mozambique's ability to provide essential services and control the population was weakened. A state that does not fully control its territories and provide critical services to its population means that the sovereignty of the Mozambique state is weakened. The state does not have the powers or

abilities to monopolise authority. Violent extremists tend to use the capacity gaps to their advantage; they tend to ride on government shortcomings and radicalise the population, especially the youth, against the government, promising better opportunities and change.

Significant capacity challenges exist within the police, military, and intelligence sectors. The prevalence of capacity limitations hinders the ability of Mozambique's security authorities to conduct effective large-scale operations to cleanse the territories of extremism and bring lasting security to the populations. The visible capacity gaps or shortfalls further dent citizens' confidence in the government and its security forces to bring about national security. The administration lacks skilled personnel; they face complex tasks with less pay. The government cannot decentralise, so the development will easily reach populations at the grassroots level. The government is plagued by poor governance, mismanagement, and favouritism, and the government's rule leans to the authoritarian side and is not fully democratic. Additionally, there are significant political cleavages; the ruling party, FRELIMO, cannot integrate the RENAMO faction into government, forming parallel legitimacy.

The initial Mozambique government response was contradictory among the government officials; the conflict was mischaracterised, automatically leading to the wrong strategy, which worsened security conditions. Strategic mistakes characterise the Mozambique government, and the government is unable to turn the tide on insurgents. The response to the insurrection has prioritised military action, which is a very narrow approach and ignores that the conflict is a result of poverty and widespread inequality. The conflict is fuelled by socioeconomic exclusion.

The major intervention by SADC was to deploy SAMIM in Mozambique. The operation has not yielded satisfactory results, and well-armed and well-trained terrorist groups' invasions continue to pose a threat to the people of Mozambique. The mission lacked intelligence, cooperation, funding and sustainable conflict resolution. Since SADC has withdrawn SAMIM, pockets of attacks have re-emerged. The mission successfully dislocated insurgents instead of rooting them out of the region. Although the region has institutions like SARPCCO, (ESAAMLG) and the recently established SADC RCTC and policies like the SADC counter-terrorism strategy in place, the region depicts limited abilities in relation to terrorism activities.

Data shows that there is division amongst the SADC members due to the fears of a few powerful states dominating the organisation, clashes of ideologies between democratic states

and authoritarian states, and member states being involved in cross-REC participation, resulting in policy clashes. The organisation lacks ‘Sadness’; member states are engaged in cross-RECs, limiting commitment and conflict of policies.

SADC has capacity gaps in governance and oversight, as well as complex policy formulation and decision-making structures. There is a shortage of skilled workers with complex tasks and a lack of working systems. SADC faces challenges in strategy and planning, as well as a lack of funding for its peace and security programmes.

There is a gap in social participation; women are sidelined in solving SADC issues, and civil society is not fully engaged in SADC programmes, which limits the organisation's capacity. The organisation faces challenges of a lack of resources; there is no balance between expectations and resources, and resource mobilisation and financial management prove to be a challenge. Member states prioritise their countries' immediate needs and have fewer resources to spare for the regional body. There is no strong communication between REWC and NEWC, affecting the ability to receive and send information on security threats, affecting coordination, peace and security capacity. Additionally, the lack of strong communication and reliable information on rising and changing threats to peace and security results in an inability to place fitting preventative measures. REWC is understaffed and does not have the capacity to operate 24 hours a day.

Comprehensive legislation and policies, quick development of national counterterrorism strategies and plan of action, strengthening of NCTC and financial intelligence units, and training for the criminal justice system to effectively detect, prevent, investigate, prosecute and adjudicate terrorism-related offences and engage in social inclusion activities are gaps that need to be addressed to achieve regional capacity.

Similar capacity gaps characterise Mozambique and SADC, such as a lack of strategy, planning, human capital, revenue, resources, mismanagement, social participation, underdevelopment and lack of decisive leadership. The resource gap and overall incapacity extend to the fact that Mozambique and SADC cannot operate outside their international donors, as the literature has shown that Mozambique received substantial international support, as well as SADC, with member states contributing less than half of the resources. Both Mozambique and SADC are dependent on developed nations and their funding programmes. Thus, Mozambique and SADC do not have the capacity to fully operate the demanding tasks of preventing and countering terrorism.

4.10 Mozambique and SADC threats and capacity for an interconnected region

The Mozambique government and its partners have been successful in dislocating insurgents; however, new threats have emerged, and drug trafficking has increased and diversified. Northern Mozambique continues to be a main corridor for illicit economic activities to the broader region via the Indian Ocean. The rule of law has been weak; many of the illicit flows of merchandise go through Mozambique, and illegal economic activities that undermine the rule of law. A state that cannot exercise autonomy of power or enforce laws within its territory lacks capacity. Likewise, the region with no territorial control or enforcement laws lacks regional capacity.

As a regional and intergovernmental organisation, the SADC has the obligation as mandated in Article 11(2) of the SADC Treaty and the Protocol on Politics, Defence, and Security Cooperation. The article stipulates that SADC member states may intervene when a member state faces threats to state legitimate authority, military coup and conflict that threatens peace and security within the territory of a member state and the entire region. The conflict in Mozambique definitely threatens the Mozambique state authority and the peace and security of the state and the SADC region.

Youth inequality is a trait that the SADC states share in common, which may be the threat that the SADC faces, that may lead to the radicalisation of all SADC youth, resulting in SADC becoming a conflict zone. It can all happen in the name of religion, ethnicity, political affiliation or other relevant social groups. Local insurrection is turning into a regional conflict.

The literature review analysis reveals important and significant possible threats and limited capacity for Mozambique and SADC in relation to terrorist insurgencies. The member states of SADC, Mozambique, lack the capacity to control their state borders, which are characterised by porosity. Some government agents are involved in illicit practices; thus, the government does not have the capacity/ power to root out the practices due to corrupt state agents. Additionally, the illegal flows through this region also likely facilitate the movement of militants and extremists from the Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes region into northern Mozambique (Estelle and Darden, 2021).

The ongoing programmes to bring peace in Mozambique and SADC, such as SAMIM and stakeholders, should continue to be stopped to assist the region's capacity to fill the gaps of incapacity. Forces should continue to bring stability. Mozambique forces and the government alone cannot withhold terrorism threats until the government develops military, administrative,

human capacity, development, and economic gains and mobilises them through newfound resources such as LNG and a growing economy.

4.11 Conclusion

Chapter four presents data and discusses key findings. As the study is desktop by design, relevant literature has been analysed using the qualitative data analysis tool 'Nvivo' for more accurate findings. The chapter has sought to give answers to research questions and realise the study's objectives. The study found that Mozambique and SADC face similar challenges in terms of limited capacity to effectively address terrorist insurgency threats. Given the region's environmental and socioeconomic conditions, they face similar challenges in capacity gaps. The study further identified terrorist insurgents' threats as a result of state and regional incapacity.

5. Chapter Five: Summary, Recommendations, and Conclusion

5.1 Introduction

Chapter Five, as the final chapter, will give a summary of the background of terrorist insurgencies in Mozambique and SADC and the measures that are in place for dealing with extreme violence. The chapter will identify possible threats and assess Mozambique and SADC's capacity to deal with terrorism. The chapter will further give findings on the relationship between extreme violence in Mozambique and SADC's capacity to deal with the present terrorist insurgencies in Mozambique. Findings resulting from the study's literature realise this study's aims and objectives. Finally, the chapter will provide recommendations on how Mozambique and SADC can build capacity and root out the ongoing conflict. Overall, this chapter aims to provide a summary that will give a clear picture and simplify the study.

5.2 Nature of Mozambique and SADC

The insurgents have conducted terrorist activities in Mozambique, Northern Mozambique in particular, since October 2017. The region is poor and plagued with underdevelopment, poverty, and inequality. The region has been dubbed the forgotten region. The conditions of deprivation were hijacked by the Islamic State extremists and utilised as a vehicle to radicalise the locals, given the grievances against the government. The majority of the population is Christian, and the minority is Muslim; however, the Northern parts of Mozambique's population are dominated by Islam, which assists to the conflict traction by Islamic radicalisation.

The Mozambique government in Maputo neglected the region and opened a gap for other elements of power authorities, which resulted in a loss of sovereignty. Matsinhe and Valoi (2019) assert that extremism is only possible and can find its feet when government officials are mainly concerned with self-interest over serving their people. The government of Mozambique has exercised half-mast sovereignty in the Cabo Delgado region for almost four decades. Since independence in 1975, the central authority has lacked a monopoly in relation to violence in Cabo Delgado and maintained precarious control over its borders. Mozambique also has a 2000 km long coastline that is poorly managed, exposing the country to illicit marine activities. Mozambique faces many challenges, such as governance, development and an ailing economy.

5.3 Extremist group and its operations

Ansar Al-Sunna currently has a clearly defined doctrine to establish a caliphate, although they have no clear, visible or high-profile leader now. The group is motivated by Ansar Al-Islam,

an ideology from the Middle East of Salafism and the formation of an Islamic state or Muslim caliphate. The organisation imposes a strict Sharia law and rejects Christianity and the ideology of democracy as promoted by the West (Mutasa and Muchemwa, 2021).

Afriyie and Arkorful (2021) state that the huge amount of funding for the extremist group present in Mozambique comes from the trafficking of illegal rubies and wood, many of the precious resources that the province of Cabo Delgado is rich in. The organisation is estimated to make approximately \$3 million a year selling timber and about \$30 million from selling rubies. The Carbo Delgado region is hardly administered; this perpetrates illegal activities such as creating a landing destination for heroin exports from the region to South Africa and Europe. The group is also linked to the illicit trading activities of ivory and contraband trafficking with Tanzanians, and extension to other African countries and further with Chinese and Vietnamese nationals. Other sources of funding come from donations from associated partners and individuals, fundamentalists from Kenya, Somalia, Tanzania, and the Great Lakes region of Africa (Afriyie and Arkorful, 2021).

5.4 Mozambique Capacity Challenges

Weak state structures of governance characterise the state of Mozambique, as well as ineffective public institutions, corruption, and poverty, which are exposed by abundant raw mineral resources that have not yet materialised to benefit the locals (Faria, 2020). Leadership, democratization, mismanagement, lack of skilled labour, lack of resources, experience fighting terror, governance, low economy growth and economic inclusion, policy implementation, institutions, sovereignty, political will, inequality, social cohesion, marginalisation of the poor, unemployment, education, basic services, and illegal markets are some of the challenges that hinder the countries capacity. Nonetheless, where there are challenges, there are also opportunities. Many young people have received a form of education than their elders, and they have more youthful energy to contribute to the economy. Mozambique is blessed with an abundance of natural resources, which, if properly managed, can benefit the country's economy. Like most African states, Mozambique has proper policies that must be adequately implemented. Moreover, Mozambique's geographic position opens opportunities for the country's growth, and they have global support.

5.5 SADC capacity challenges

Until recently, SADC had no organ or institution that directly dealt with terrorism. Establishing the SADC RCTC in February 2022 was essential to boost regional capacity. The effectiveness of RCTC is yet to be seen. Governance issues and decision-making characterise the SADC.

There exist complex structures of policy formulation and decision making, strategy and planning, along with the unreliability of funds. Moreover, there is a lack of working systems and a shortage of skilled workers.

Civil society participation is limited in SADC peace-building programmes, and women, in particular, tend to be excluded. Citizen participation and communication pose a more significant challenge for SADC in securing public participation and interest, limiting the organisation's capacity. Finances and overall resource mobilisation are a challenge, and the capacity of financial management systems is limited. There exists a miscommunication between early warning systems and conflict. Some NEWCs do not report to REWC as frequently required, resulting in a lack of valuable information about possible threats. Inequality, unemployment, mismanagement, skills, working together, competing interests, democratisation, cross-rec, external influence, lack of funds, low economic growth and exclusion, state priorities vs budget, porous borders and criminality are some challenges that hinder SADC's capacity. Nonetheless, SADC states are rich in mineral resources and have booming tourism. The region has sound policies in place that require political will to implement. Lastly, the region has international support, capacity-building programmes and aid. The region has growth potential; it needs to bring every citizen on board, including women and young people; social cohesion and an inclusive society with less inequality and more opportunities with security is possible.

5.6 Terrorist insurgency threats for Mozambique and SADC as a result of incapacity
Extreme violence and its activities tend to be contagious to neighbouring regions or states. Examples are drawn from the Boko Haram of Nigeria, where Boko Haram threatened one state and spread to neighbouring regions. Amnesty International (2021) acknowledge that Mozambique is still the only country that is significantly affected by these insurgents; however, this could soon change and extend to other SADC countries if not correctly, timeously, and strategically intervened. This was the case in Nigeria, where Boko Haram started small but today threatens the security of ECOWAS.

5.7 Recommendations

Based on the study, several recommendations can be submitted.

Mozambique and SADC have made some commendable strides in boosting their capacities, such as seeking assistance from international organisations, introducing policy plans, and

introducing new institutions to develop capacity, such as the SADC RCTC. However, there are still significant capacity gaps.

a) The state of Mozambique and SADC should strive not only for military security but also for a blend of military and human security. They use excessive force and put socio-economic measures in place to win over the local populations and achieve strong social cohesion. Holistic responses are needed at this critical juncture to prevent terrorism as opposed to countering terrorism. Although military interventions may help to limit violent attacks, they cannot bring sustainable peace. Fighting fire with fire in terrorism mostly does not produce intended results, e.g. Nigeria and Boko Haram, Somalia and al-Shabaab.

b) To boost capacity, Mozambique and SADC should strive for social and economic inclusion, create job opportunities, especially for the youth, and invest in education and skills development. Good governance is an essential factor for any state to boost capacity; issues of corruption, mismanagement and lack of political will should be addressed to improve capacity. Similarly, SADC should invest in uplifting the skills of employees, especially the youth and demand full contribution and accountability from member states. SADC admin officials have limited capacities to undertake the complex demands of tasks. Human capacity should be improved by training or hiring trained individuals and reducing the duties allocated to each official. Management should be enhanced to achieve proper and effective functionality.

c) The government of Mozambique and SADC should limit the dependence on foreign troops and funding; decision-making in governance may be compromised due to conflicting interests and approaches, which can dent state and regional sovereignty.

d) Government must improve on comprehensive legislation and policies, quick development of national counterterrorism strategies and plans of action, strengthening of NCTCs and financial intelligence units, capacity building and training for criminal justice systems to effectively detect, prevent, investigate, prosecute, and adjudicate terrorism-related offences, and increasing the ability to stop radicalisation through social media and the internet.

e) The region must move collectively; regional policy calls for collective action and decisive leadership. Seemingly, this is not the case, given the unconvincing response to the conflict in Mozambique that seemed to defeat collective action and unity. The unconvincing SADC response strengthened the argument that the region lacks the political will to mobilise member countries in times of important need.

f) SADC should establish strategies and strengthen communication with the population in order to secure public participation and interest. Regional stakeholders are important in building regional capacity.

g) SADC faces the challenge of mobilising resources; states should be liable for their dues and develop proper funds management structures, and strategic partnerships should be formed to maximise resource availability.

h) The SADC region and its member states face challenges of cross-REC conundrum; although states are trying to increase their capacity by joining multiple organisations, the organisations may not work in harmony with one another; SADC should be the priority.

5.8 Further research required

Further research is required to determine the capacity and capabilities of the extremist group. It is argued that the groups are capable, but we need to determine how far does their strengths can hold. Estelle and Darden (2021) note that an accurate estimate of IS-M's size is not publicly available. Various outlets and analysts have estimated the group has between 100 and 1,000 members since 2018, with the 1,000 figure increasingly common. The broad geographic distribution of IS-M's activities across Cabo Delgado indicates that an estimated 1,000 members, if accurate, likely refers to a core group of leadership and fighters. A more extensive logistical network that includes forcibly recruited women and children surrounds this core group.

5.9 Summary

Terrorism is a serious security threat not only for the targeted territory but also for the neighbouring regions and the world at large. This study examined Mozambique and the SADC state and regional capacity to deal with terrorism threats. Terrorist insurgents began their huge-scale attacks on civilians and government structures in Northern Mozambique, Cabo Delgado, in October 2017. The study took into account different factors that contribute to state incapacity. It was important to look at the terrorist group present in Northern Mozambique. The study learned that the group is referred to as Al-Shabaab by the locals, distinctively different from the Al-Shabaab of Somalia. However, the group also has Islamic State connections and is establishing an Islamic sect in the region. The group is formally known as the Ahlu Sunnah Wa-Jama (ASWJ), which translates to 'Supporters of the tradition.

Mozambique's state capacity has gaps in areas of governance, law and order, administration, low levels of economic growth and development, political cleavages and challenged

sovereignty. Mozambique has measures in place to boost capacity, such as amending terrorism laws and forming partnerships with regional and international partners. ISIS-Mozambique is still operating in the region despite interventions, and its capabilities appear to be growing stronger. SADC also seems to have significant capacity gaps. The region faces challenges similar to those of Mozambique: a lack of resources, a lack of human capital, a lack of social participation, strategy and planning shortfalls, competing ideologies, and structure. SADC has taken measures to boost capacity by launching RCTC and capacitating the SADC secretariat. The results of increased capacity are yet to be seen.

The study applied state capacity theory as its theoretical framework, revealing that Mozambique does not have the crucial elements that constitute full state capacity with its low available resources, revenue and human capital. The study also applied the regional capacity concept to assess SADC regional capacity and determined similar findings. The study further looked at the threats that come because of incapacity. The threats not only affect Mozambique but also affect the entire SADC region as an interconnected region. Porous borders characterise SADC; insurgents are one porous border away from the next territory or state, especially South Africa, as an economic engine of the region, as terrorists are looking to expand to new viable territories. SADC member states' social conditions are similar, with high levels of poverty and inequality, The extremists will capitalise on the incapacity and radicalise the locals, promising better opportunities.

Mozambique and SADC have no experience in fighting terrorism; Mozambique just survived a civil war, and security forces cannot deal with terrorism by design; the focus was on fighting paramilitary police groups (Lister, 2021). Furthermore, the SADC was recently formed as a united region after some member states had been recently liberated from colonial political powers. Mozambique and the SADC have no capacity to deal with the threats of terrorism, even though the region is starting to prioritise the issue by forming new institutions such as RCTC that provide research on terrorism and form strategies. This study concludes that Mozambique and SADC have limited capacity to deal with extreme violence.

5.10 Conclusion

This study has intensively reviewed literature on the threats of Northern Mozambique insurgencies for Mozambique as a sovereign state and SADC as the regional body. A summary of the research problems is given in this chapter, as mentioned in Chapter One. Threats have been identified and tested if the state of Mozambique and the SADC region have the capacity to deal with them. Recommendations were provided, and a study summary was provided. The

study found a strong correlation between lack of resources, planning and development and weak state and regional capacity.

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